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**Governing ageing in Chile: from neoliberal
hegemony to more hopeful demographic futures?**

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Abstract

In this thesis, I explore how demographic ageing is regulated in Chile through the governing of older populations, with particularly close attention to how the ‘actually existing’ neoliberal context in Chile permeates and conditions diverse political projects and strategies implemented by central and local governments. I approach this shaping as a historical and conjunctural process realised through multiple central and local governing projects, as well as a legacy thrown into particularly sharp relief and retrospective political questioning by the unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-neoliberal social uprising of 2019. These intertwined conjunctural moments have unearthed the limitations of neoliberal strategies in addressing the needs of older people. To explore the governing of older populations in Chile, I undertook a hybrid on-site and online ethnography exploring a wide range of national and local policies and governing projects. In investigating local governing projects, I analysed –with different depths– the case of seven contrasting municipalities in the capital city of Santiago, Chile.

With demographic ageing positioned as a risk to economic development, I suggest that the main rationale guiding Chilean policies and programs has been to avert the central state’s welfare and caregiving responsibilities toward a growing number of potentially dependent populations; economically, physically and cognitively. I argue that governing strategies directed to older populations are deeply neoliberal –sometimes deliberately and sometimes inadvertently– in that they pervasively have been designed to shift and devolve welfare and caregiving responsibilities to different (non-central state) scales such as families and charitable institutions, local governments, communities and older people themselves. In these explorations, I also consider more closely alternative governing projects that have contested, to differing extents, the central state’s neoliberal neglect. Unpacking how progressive governing projects at central and local levels have sought to imprint a different common sense on state responsibility, I also consider how these alternative projects have themselves been reshaped by neoliberal ideas and strategies. In this case, I argue that neoliberal ideas and strategies, together with the material effects of Chile’s neoliberal context, are holding back the advances of progressive governing projects. Nonetheless, as hegemony is never final, I also consider how the intertwined moments of the COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-neoliberal social uprising of October 2019 also shed light on how the history of neoliberal policies directed at older populations in Chile continues to be contested.

Scholarly understandings of neoliberalism as a political hegemonic project are central to this thesis’ argument. I draw on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as a position of ‘leadership’ continuously constructed through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent (Hall 1986, p.15), to unpack how neoliberal ideas and strategies have reached a position of leadership in the governing of demographic ageing amid opposition from alternative governing ideas and projects. Three crosscutting findings emerge from this research: 1) through a marked politics of devolution within Chilean governance, access to welfare and caregiving has been rendered deeply unequal with old age; 2) the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies is revealed in the persistence of the central state’s politics of scalar devolution and ways in which would-be progressive local governing projects end up complying with neoliberal aims; 3) though neoliberal hegemony has been secured thus far in this case through multiple strategies, it continues to be subject to contestation. Such findings offer insights for building more hopeful demographic ageing futures.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|-----|
| <i>Abstract</i> | 2 |
| <i>Statement of Copyright</i> | 6 |
| <i>Acknowledgements</i> | 7 |
| Chapter One – Introduction | 9 |
| Research objective and main argument | 14 |
| An analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies | 15 |
| On methods | 19 |
| Structure of the Thesis | 21 |
| Overarching findings | 24 |
| <i>The effects of a marked politics of devolution: deepening inequalities in old age</i> | 24 |
| <i>The hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and governing strategies</i> | 25 |
| <i>Contesting neoliberal hegemony</i> | 27 |
| Chapter Two – An analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project | 30 |
| Introduction | 30 |
| Gramsci’s hegemony through the lens of Stuart Hall | 32 |
| Unpacking the neoliberal hegemonic project | 37 |
| <i>The role of coercion, consent and common sense</i> | 37 |
| <i>The state and the neoliberal hegemonic project</i> | 40 |
| <i>The neoliberal hegemonic project and the withdrawal of the welfare state</i> | 44 |
| <i>Consolidating the neoliberal hegemonic project amid crises and contestation</i> | 52 |
| Resurfacing the case of Chile | 56 |
| Conclusions | 61 |
| Chapter Three – Methods | 65 |
| Introduction | 65 |
| Semi-structured interviews | 67 |
| Documentary analysis | 75 |
| Participatory observation | 77 |
| Data Analysis | 80 |
| Positionality | 82 |
| Ethical considerations | 84 |
| Conclusions | 86 |
| Chapter Four – Hegemonic struggles over the central state's strategy of traditional forms of caregiving | 87 |
| Introduction | 87 |
| The central state’s hegemonic project on traditional forms of caregiving | 92 |
| The intertwined effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the ongoing anti-neoliberal social uprising | 103 |
| <i>‘Vamos Chilenos’: reinforcing traditional forms of caregiving during the pandemic</i> | 103 |

| | |
|---|-----|
| <i>The effects of an anti-neoliberal common sense</i> | 109 |
| Conclusions | 116 |
| <i>Chapter Five – The unintended effects of top-down devolution in the governing of older populations</i> | 126 |
| Introduction | 126 |
| Incapacitating the local state and engendering contestation | 129 |
| <i>Top-down devolution in the governing of older populations</i> | 129 |
| <i>The incapacitating effects of top-down devolution</i> | 132 |
| <i>The incapacitating effect of an uneven landscape of municipal budgets</i> | 136 |
| Local governments’ contestation | 139 |
| <i>The case of Recoleta</i> | 141 |
| <i>The case of Peñalolén</i> | 147 |
| Conclusions | 152 |
| <i>Chapter Six – Participation as the solution of almost everything</i> | 158 |
| Introduction | 158 |
| Unpacking the construction of an anti-dependency rationale to participation | 163 |
| <i>The neoliberal instrumentalisation of democratic and community participation</i> | 163 |
| <i>The neoliberal instrumentalisation of a rights-based approach</i> | 168 |
| <i>The neoliberal medicalisation of participation</i> | 169 |
| ‘Holding back effects’: the case of communitarian Renca | 172 |
| <i>Renca’s progressive approach to older people’s participation</i> | 176 |
| <i>Unintendedly complying with neoliberal strategies</i> | 179 |
| Conclusions | 184 |
| <i>Chapter Seven – Conclusions</i> | 189 |
| Introduction | 189 |
| Research findings | 191 |
| <i>The neoliberal politics of scalar devolution</i> | 191 |
| <i>Contesting neoliberal hegemony</i> | 194 |
| Research contributions and limitations | 196 |
| Future research ideas | 199 |
| <i>Appendix</i> | 201 |
| Appendix A. List of Interviews | 201 |
| Appendix B. List of policy documents | 205 |
| <i>References</i> | 208 |

Table of Figures

| | |
|---|-----|
| <i>Figure 1. Localisation of the seven municipalities in the city of Santiago, Región Metropolitana, Chile.</i> | 69 |
| <i>Figure 2. Annual per capita budget of municipalities of the capital city of Santiago in 2021</i> | 73 |
| <i>Figure 3. Alejandra (with the mask) visiting her ninety-three-year-old neighbour Juana Faúndez (Black cover on Juana’s eyes, by author).</i> | 106 |
| <i>Figure 4. Institutions that would be connected through the Conecta Mayor’s mobile application.</i> | 108 |
| <i>Figure 5. Interview with Rodrigo Delgado (on the right) and Facebook comments of women struggling to care for her bedridden mother and two small children.</i> | 109 |
| <i>Figure 6. Dignity for our grandparents.</i> | 112 |
| <i>Figure 7. Folkloric performance of Grupo Aparcoa.</i> | 114 |
| <i>Figure 8. Photos of the inauguration of the local program of older people 2020.</i> | 143 |
| <i>Figure 9. Renca’s mayor –Claudio Castro Salas– Instagram and Twitter accounts.</i> | 174 |
| <i>Figure 10. Photos of Somos Renca shared by volunteers.</i> | 181 |

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For Ignacio and Maite

Chapter One – Introduction

Loreto is living her best life in her seventies. Everyone who knows her says that she does not represent her age. She not only wakes up at six a.m. to twenty minutes of yoga every morning but during her evenings, she spends about half an hour or more reading, doing word searches or crossword puzzles to keep a healthy brain. Having lived for fifty years in the same neighbourhood, she is very engaged in the heart of the local community. After retiring from working as a nurse at sixty-five years –five years after the retirement age for women in Chile– she has been devoted to contributing to her community in every way she can. She not only volunteers in different activities such as a local government initiative promoting food recycling from local street markets (*ferias libres*) or the local church's festive activities but also she is the leader of a local club of older people. Just a year after retiring, she decided to run for president of her neighbourhood's club for older people where she not only meets friends but encourages other peers to keep healthy and productive lives. For this, she applied to the central government's National Fund for Older People and was granted funds to implement aerobic classes once a week for the members of the club. She is an excellent neighbour, helping with grocery shopping and always keeping an eye on the needs of two older neighbours –eighty-six and ninety-one years old– that, because of multiple life circumstances, have no family networks to turn to.

Loreto is aware that by remaining healthy and active, she is avoiding or delaying multiple kinds of physical and cognitive dependency in old age. However, she also knows that life is unpredictable and, as a former nurse, that physical dependencies can develop at any time and just from a bad fall. Thus, she has been pondering some provisions in case of requiring caregiving in the future. Even though by pushing her retirement back by five years, she was able to retire with a 'good enough' pension that prevents her from becoming economically dependent on her two grown-up children, she knows that private caregiving is mostly unaffordable and public options are out of her reach as she is not 'vulnerable enough' to qualify. Considering this, she knows that she can turn to her two grown-up children or two younger sisters to ask for some caregiving support at home or for complementing the costs of private caregiving. They have even discussed these ideas and one of her sisters offered that she could move in with her, so that she could rent out the flat and pay for home caregiving. Having a strong community network is also important, as there could be neighbours to

support her in the future, just as she does with her two older neighbours. Equally, as she lives in an affluent area, the local government would have funds to support her with some sort of caregiving subsidy if needed. All these provisions are key, as she has heard –particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic– of many older people living under abandonment and vulnerability due to the lack of familial or community support, or by living in areas where local governments are unable to provide alternative forms of support due to lack of funds.

Loreto is a fictional depiction of the older individual envisioned by the neoliberal policies governing demographic ageing in Chile. With evidence on the ongoing process of demographic ageing in Chile, which envisions that 32,1% of the population will be aged sixty years and over by 2050¹, the overarching governing rationale has been one of averting the potential costs of a growing number of older populations from falling on the state. As I unpack in the following chapters, since the implementation of the first national policy (1996) and program (1995) for older populations, the central state's overarching governing rationale has been that of avoiding caregiving and welfare responsibilities toward this growing population group by empowering them as active and preventive individuals and encouraging others to take on responsibilities when older people cannot themselves, such as families, charitable institutions, local governments and communities. These neoliberal strategies have been articulated in light of the existing and projected conditions of economic and functional dependencies experienced by older populations. Growing conditions of dependency pose a significant challenge to the ongoing trend of economic and policy neoliberalisation characterised by the withdrawal of the state in the provision of welfare through the responsabilisation of individuals in accessing commodified forms of welfare. Futures of economic dependency in old age are associated with the fact that 18% of older people in Chile live below the poverty line and 4% under the extreme poverty line (Thumala et al., 2017). At the same time, conditions of functional dependency, defined within national level policy as the result of a 'combination of chronic diseases with risk factors and the "ageing of old age" [which is a growing number of older people aged eighty years and over]', are projected to increase from 22% in 2012 to 30% of the older population by 2025, meaning higher demands for caregiving and public forms of welfare. This is particularly significant when considering that high levels of physical impairment, isolation and lack of social support are associated with the older population in low-income situations (Marín & Wallace, 2002; Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012; Thumala et al., 2017).

Nonetheless, there have been moments of –relative– departure from the central state's neoliberal anti-dependency rationale. During the progressive governing project of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010; 2014-2019), the central government imprinted a different rationale on state responsibility in the governing of issues of ageing. In her first governing period (2006-2010), the central government conducted a pensions reform that increased the scope of public subsidies and promoted the installation of a ‘Rights-based System of Social Protection’ that would comprise areas such as healthcare, housing and mobility, among others, through the expansion of the subsidiary role of the state. In this regard, the central government conducted a series of studies that not only unveiled the increasing caregiving needs of older people under a phenomenon of advanced demographic ageing but also the challenges to the provision of caregiving represented by the private character of caregiving services and the inequalities –socioeconomic and gendered– ingrained within familial forms of caregiving. Considering this, the central state developed specific programs that would support families in their caregiving responsibilities through survival benefits for vulnerable families caring for bedridden older people and through the implementation of comprehensive public programs to prevent functional dependencies in old age. For instance, one of the presidential measures was to implement a monthly stipend for family carers of poor and bedridden individuals (*Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor*, 2009c). At the same time, the National Service of Older People (*Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor* –SENAMA), which is the central government’s main institution governing issues of ageing, initiated collaborations with the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism to develop a public ownership alternative to long-term caregiving, which later resulted in the building of Public Long-term Care Establishments².

Progressive ideas have also played a significant role in the emergence of local government contestation over the lack of responsibility of the Chilean central state in the provision of welfare. Following a rights-based approach to issues of ageing, local governments have had a key role in contesting the central state’s neglect by demonstrating that increasing access to welfare and caregiving is possible. For instance, since 2012 the communist local government of the municipality of Recoleta has implemented a series of public ownership projects such as a popular pharmacy, a popular optics, a popular audiology and a municipal real estate project that not only expand access to welfare but dispute their neoliberal commodification. Paradoxically, local government contestation over the central state’s neglect is not limited to progressive governing projects. Contestation over the central government’s neglect in

addressing the existing and emerging needs of the older population has emerged from contrasting sources such as the right-wing Association of Municipalities called AMUCH – Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile (AMUCH). In 2017 the AMUCH published a report voicing the municipal discontent of 270 out of 345 municipalities over the disconnection of central government from the welfare needs of older people, demanding central government to take on responsibilities for older populations (Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile, 2017).

Despite progressive efforts to establish an alternative logic of state responsibility and municipal contestation over the central state's neglect, the intertwined moments of the COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-neoliberal social uprising of October 2019 –which this study investigates just until the entry referendum of October 2020– have uncovered a pervasive neoliberal character in policies directed to older populations, both in a more overt sense and within seemingly more progressive departures. By persistently addressing the 'threat' posed by an increasing number of older people through strategies premising their welfare and caregiving prospects on their private pensions, their postcode, their community and their familial networks, the central state has heightened life inequalities in old age instead of meaningfully addressing the needs of older populations. Also, due to multiple reasons such as the central state's pervasive top-down control and local governments limited devolved autonomy –which I explain in more detail below, would-be progressive local governing projects have unintendedly contributed to the neoliberal aim of averting welfare responsibilities of the state toward older populations. Nonetheless, these intertwined moments –again, the COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-neoliberal social uprising of October 2019– also shed light on how the history of neoliberal policies directed at older populations continues to be contested. The counter-neoliberal ideas on state responsibility represented by a rising left-wing bloc have been articulated in different ways to contest the retrogressive effects of neoliberal policies on older populations.

Considered in order, the anti-neoliberal social uprising started by the end of October 2019. It centrally contested the effects of neoliberal policies –e.g., inequity generated by the commodification of welfare– and the limited and subsidiary role of the central state inscribed within the Political Constitution. Notably, it also disputed the lack of central state responsibility in the provision of welfare for older populations. People who took to the streets unequivocally blamed the existing private pension and health system for the vulnerabilities

and inequalities Chileans experience in old age. Against this background, the COVID-19 pandemic –which began in March 2020, just five months after the onset of the social uprising– became a magnifying glass for the evident failure of years of anti-dependency neoliberal policies. According to studies conducted for a nationwide philanthropic charitable initiative designed to raise money in support of vulnerable older people –called *Vamos Chilenos*– 80,000 older individuals were experiencing concerning conditions of economic poverty and abandonment. However, to avoid welfare and caregiving responsibility toward this large number of older people under conditions of vulnerability and abandonment, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in Chile (2020) the central state reinforced traditional forms of caregiving by supporting a charitable tech solution to familial neglect –that would be funded by *Vamos Chilenos*. Significantly, the counter-neoliberal ideas on state responsibility guiding the social uprising also contested the central state’s most recent strategy of reinforcing traditional forms of care by informing heated Twitter contestation over central state’s neglect.

In evaluating this overarching context of governing rationales and strategies directed to older populations in Chile, I argue that these have been deeply neoliberal as they have been designed to avert welfare and caregiving responsibilities on the central state by devolving them to different scales: families and charitable institutions, local governments, communities and older people themselves. Furthermore, it is significant that progressive governing projects have been unable to counter the pervasive effects of these politics of devolution and responsibility-shifting. I argue that this speaks to the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies, which have sometimes even resulted in Chile’s would-be alternative governing projects complying with the neoliberal strategy of averting welfare and caregiving responsibilities toward older people. However, despite the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies, counter-neoliberal ideas on state responsibility continue to guide different forms of contestation of central state’s neglect. Though these paradoxical developments were not created by the COVID-19 pandemic, the country’s COVID-19 experience uncovered and highlighted this complex historical legacy in sharp ways. In the remainder of this introduction, I will outline the research's objective and main argument, the central theoretical framework guiding my explorations, the research's methods and the structure of the thesis. I will also introduce the research’s overarching findings.

Research objective and main argument

In this thesis, I explore how demographic ageing is regulated in Chile through the governing of older populations, with particularly close attention to how the ‘actually existing’ neoliberal context in Chile permeates and conditions diverse political projects and strategies implemented by central and local governments. Notably, I find that demographic ageing has been increasingly positioned as a risk to economic development due to the associated welfare and caregiving costs of a growing number of populations outside the labour market. I therefore suggest that the main rationale guiding Chilean policies and programs directed to older populations has been to avert welfare and caregiving responsibilities on the central state. I argue that governing strategies directed to older populations are deeply neoliberal – sometimes deliberately and sometimes inadvertently – in that they pervasively have been designed to shift and devolve welfare and caregiving responsibilities to different (non-central state) scales such as families and charitable institutions, local governments, communities and older people themselves. Devolution to these diverse scales has been conducted through different strategies. These include the instrumentalisation of historically ingrained forms of ‘common sense’ on the traditional role of families and charities to provide welfare and caregiving to older people, the central state's exercise of top-down control to ‘dump’ critical social issues onto hollowed-out local governments and the instrumentalisation of progressive ideas of participation to render mainstream active and preventive subjectivities in old age. The last have a troubling tendency to ‘responsibilise’ older individuals and communities, pushing them to self-arrange their welfare and caregiving needs.

In unpacking how the neoliberal context in Chile conditions the governing of older people, I also consider more closely the alternative governing projects that have contested –to different extents– the central state's neoliberal neglect. I explore how progressive governing projects at central and local levels have sought to imprint a different common sense on state responsibility. However, I also consider how these alternative projects have themselves been reshaped by neoliberal ideas and strategies. Based on these explorations, I argue that through the governing of ageing, neoliberal ideas and strategies are neutralising progressive ideas and holding back the advances of progressive governing projects. Progressive governing projects have been able to articulate an anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility. However, I suggest that under the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies, progressive governing projects at central and local levels have proven in practice susceptible

to complying with the strategies of shifting and devolving welfare responsibilities described above: again, onto families, communities and older individuals themselves. In this regard, I argue that would-be progressive governing projects are being held back by the neoliberal instrumentalisation of both historically ingrained forms of common sense in the Chilean context and of progressive ideas –such as the democratic and empowering effects of participation promoted by progressive movements.

In these explorations, I argue that the ‘actually existing’ neoliberal context in Chile has contradictory effects in the governing of issues of ageing. On the one hand, neoliberal policies have engendered and propelled bottom-up contestation. On the other hand, neoliberal ideas and strategies possess a hegemonising capacity that is enhanced by the lingering material effects of neoliberal restructuring policies. Examples of the former include contestation triggered in response to the retrogressive outcomes of neoliberal policies, such as contestation over the impoverishing effects of private pensions during the anti-neoliberal social uprising of 2019. Moreover, I suggest that the roll-back character of the Chilean state has also engendered less overt forms of contestation; notably, local government implementation of alternative governing projects expanding access to welfare entitlements for older populations. However, in unpacking these would-be alternatives, I argue that they are simultaneously enabled and held back by the cumulative effects of Chile’s ‘already existing’ neoliberal context, via the downward restructuring of the state and the devolution of governing powers to local governments. This process of devolution generated paradoxes. Local government contestation is triggered and enabled by an increasing sense of ownership over critical issues and reworked notions of autonomy based on the closeness between the local state and the population. However, it has also meant that progressive governing projects at the local level can end up inadvertently working to neoliberal ends, in continuing to shift and devolve welfare responsibilities to non-central state scales.

An analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies

Central to this thesis’ argument are scholarly understandings of neoliberalism as a political hegemonic project. Considering that the research takes place in Chile –widely acknowledged as a neoliberal laboratory (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2008)– Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as a position of ‘leadership’ is instrumental for understanding how the neoliberal governing

project initiated through radical means during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) has managed to remain current after the return of democracy and permeate the rationales and strategies governing today's older populations. Gramsci defines hegemony as a position of 'leadership' within a complex social formation that must be continuously constructed –by a historical bloc or formation– through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent (Hall, 1986, p.15). Using this lens allows for understanding how neoliberal ideas and strategies have been able to reach a position of leadership –amid opposition from alternative governing ideas and projects– in the governing of emerging social issues that pose a challenge to neoliberal rule. Thus, with demographic ageing positioned as a risk to economic development, I use an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies to unpack how diverse political projects have contributed –either deliberately or inadvertently– to the neoliberal aim of averting central state's responsibility in the provision of welfare and caregiving toward a growing number of dependent older populations –economically, physically and cognitively. Also, this analytical framework enables me to consider how the hegemonic position of neoliberal ideas and strategies is constantly reworked amid emerging forms of contestation guided by alternative governing ideas and projects that try to gain a position of leadership.

In assembling an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project, I draw on scholarly accounts of the characteristic processes and strategies leading to the construction of neoliberal ideas and strategies as hegemonic. Notably, scholars argue that the construction of neoliberal hegemony by diverse political coalitions and governing projects has depended on the articulation of coercion and consent (Hall, 1986a; Hall & O'Shea, 2013; Harvey, 2005); on the instrumentalization of the state for building wider political consent and ensuring the embedding and continuity of the neoliberal project (Brenner et al., 2010; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2013; Peck & Tickell, 2002); and on the deployment of multiple strategies to consolidate and maintain a position of leadership amid its internally generated crises and contestation. In this regard, the neoliberal project has been subjected to continuous transformation characterised by the creative destruction of inherited institutional landscapes, the development of novel strategic policies and the co-optation and neutralisation of progressive ideas and governing projects (Brenner et al., 2010; Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hall, 2011; Hart, 2014; Leal, 2007; Paterson, 2009; Peck, 2012; Peck & Tickell, 2002; A. Williams, 2020).

The production of consent is profoundly shaped by the embedding of neoliberal ideas as the common-sense alternative for socio-economic organisation. For instance, in addition to reinforcing widely accepted ideas on how the neoliberal political project has been installed through different forms of coercion –e.g., through the exercise of authoritarianism in Chile– Harvey (2005) brings attention to the role of ideas and political strategies in embedding the neoliberal project as common sense. Suggesting that ‘for any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced’ (Harvey, 2005, p.5), he argues that the hegemonic ascendancy of neoliberalism as a viable political project was considerably dependent on the socio-historical grip of its two founding ideas: ‘human dignity and freedom’ (Harvey, 2005, p.5). Equally, in unpacking the ascendancy of neoliberal hegemony in the UK, Hall and O’Shea (2013) argue it is the result of forty years of ‘concerted ideological assault’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013, p.12) in which the UK’s neoliberal right purposefully undermined previous common-sense ideas that had gathered political consensus in support of the welfare state. The construction of consent also entails a different understanding of the state. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony underpins a redefinition of the state not only as a site for the exercise of coercion but for the building of wider popular consent, with the state having an ‘educative and formative’ role (Hall, 1986, p.18). Thus, the state’s strategic position within the construction of hegemony lies in its capacity to mobilise cultural and ideological consent through multiple combinations of coercive, educative and regulative measures (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.164).

The instrumentalisation of common sense and the state in the construction of a position of leadership of neoliberal ideas in the governing of ageing is central to this research. Considering that one of the most distinctive areas of struggle for the construction of neoliberal hegemony has been the redrawing of the welfare role of the state, among the main strategies has been the devolution of welfare and caregiving responsibilities to families, communities and individuals (Cooper, 2017; Joseph, 2002; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 1999). Through a Gramscian lens, devolution to these different scales has been achieved through the building of consent through the instrumentalisation of common sense. Devolution to families has been based on the construction of wider popular consent through the instrumentalisation of common-sense ideas about their traditional role in the provision of welfare and caregiving (Cooper, 2017). Similarly, the neoliberal responsabilisation of communities has been achieved through the mobilisation of romantic conceptions of community that position ongoing social issues as the result of society’s detachment from root community values rather

than from uneven processes of capital accumulation. These ideas have been mobilised as common sense by locating communities ‘in an idealised past’ (Joseph, 2002, p.10) and conferring them a set of inherent moral values which are passed through generations and escape the logic of the market or the state. As I demonstrate in this thesis, the instrumentalisation of traditional common sense –and its moral values– has been pivotal for shifting and devolving welfare and caregiving responsibilities over older populations to families and communities.

Considering the state as the point from which the leadership of any hegemonic formation is ‘ultimately exercised’ over society (Hall 1986, p.18), the instrumentalisation of the state is also a key condition for the construction and maintenance of hegemony. As such, states have been subjected to different strategies ensuring the embedding and continuity of the neoliberal project. For instance, Peck and Tickell (2002) have described two main forms through which diverse political coalitions and governing projects have instrumentalised state apparatuses to neoliberal ends: the ‘rolling-back’ of the welfare state apparatus through radical privatisation and commodification projects and the ‘rolling-out’ of less radical policies. The latter is characterised by expanding the neoliberal ‘frontier of active policy making’ to extramarket areas to mask and contain its negative externalities (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.389). In tandem, roll-back and roll-out policies have been strongly associated with state restructuring processes of denationalisation and destatisation (Jessop, 2002), as these have been paralleled to the increasing privatisation of state functions, the upward devolution of state power to international governance bodies and the downward devolution of state welfare responsibilities to subnational levels (Jessop, 2002; MacLeod, 2001; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 1997). As I discuss in this thesis, these state restructuring processes are key for understanding the hegemonic position of neoliberal ideas and strategies in the governing of issues of ageing. For instance, the devolution of welfare responsibilities onto hollowed-out local governments has been key in engendering alternative governing projects within local governments that contest –to different extents– the lack of welfare provision by the central government. Equally, the advances of progressive governing projects at the local are being held back by pervasively limited devolution of governing powers to local governments, austerity politics and the commodification of welfare.

Another significant insight from Gramsci’s hegemony is that a position of leadership needs to be constantly developed, advanced and sustained in a ‘relation of force’ with other opposing

projects that also work to achieve a leading position within a social formation (Hall, 1986a; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016). In this regard, a Gramscian conception of hegemony provides the analytical grip to account not only for the multiple neoliberal strategies to gain and maintain a position of leadership over other alternative projects but also to unpack emerging forms of contestation. Hegemonic projects need to be maintained and reworked under the threat of alternative governing ideas. For instance, progressive ideas about participation –such as notions of it as democratic, a right and a form of empowerment– have been neutralised through the instrumentalisation of participation as a cost-effective strategy enabling the withdrawal of the welfare role of the state (Leal, 2007; Lemke, 2001). Neoliberal participation works by inviting individuals and collectives to increase their ‘participation’ in ‘the solution of specific matters and problems which had hitherto been the domain of state agencies specifically empowered to undertake such tasks’ (Lemke, 2001, p.202). As hegemony is never final, an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas is also attentive to the emergence of contestation. In this regard, contestation not only emerges as the response to the retrogressive outcomes of neoliberal policies but also is significantly conducted in the arena of common sense. As I demonstrate in this thesis, the neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive ideas about participation has been key for rendering preventive subjectivities in old age and responsabilising older individuals in the prevention of dependencies and for responsabilising communities in the welfare and caregiving of older populations. Most critically, the instrumentalisation of progressive ideas on participation is holding back progressive governing projects at the local level. Nonetheless, neoliberal hegemony continues to be contested by an alternative common sense on state responsibility. Overall, an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies is useful for unpacking the deeply neoliberal character of Chile's policies directed at older populations and the implications of emerging forms of contestation.

On methods

In exploring the governing of demographic ageing in Chile, I approach it as a historical and conjunctural process shaped by multiple central and local governing projects, as well as a legacy thrown into particularly sharp relief and retrospective political questioning by the unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-neoliberal social uprising of 2019. For this, I draw on a hybrid on-site and online ethnography conducted during and after the

COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-neoliberal social uprising of 2019. In this research process, I explored a wide range of national and local policies and governing projects and conducted in-depth interviews with a wide range of professionals working on issues of ageing. From February 2020 to April 2021, I conducted forty-seven on-site and online in-depth interviews with central government policymakers and local government officers of seven different local governments of the capital city of Santiago (list of interviews in Appendix A). Twenty-three of these interviews were conducted with local government officers and program participants of municipal offices for older people in seven municipalities of the city of Santiago. I also conducted fourteen interviews with central government policymakers and ten interviews with representatives of other institutions related –to different extents– to the governing of issues of ageing such as two major municipal associations and various non-governmental organisations and research centres. In addition, I analysed forty-three policy documents comprising twenty-two historical documents of national-level policies and programs on demographic ageing, six documents of current national-level policy and programs directed to older people, five international policy guidelines and international agreements including those on human rights of older people, three presidential speeches associated with the creation of the National Service for Older People (central government's institution governing issues of ageing) and seven local government policy documents including local development plans and healthcare plans. I also undertook on-site and online ethnographies of specific events. Just before the breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic in Chile, I was able to attend the annual celebration of the start of the program for older people of the municipality of Recoleta and a capacity-building workshop –of the same municipality– designed to help organised groups of older people apply to the participatory National Fund for Older People. During the COVID-19 pandemic, I also watched a two-day philanthropic TV show designed to raise money in support of 80,000 vulnerable and abandoned older people quarantining at home and followed social media discussions about the program such as on Twitter.

To ground the historical political legacies evaluated in this research, I examine how ageing has been governed in Chile from the country's first capitalist governing projects after its independence of colonial rule in 1818 up to the present era. The present period has been characterised by democratic governing projects –neoliberal and progressive– following the return of democracy in 1990 after the military dictatorship of Pinochet (1973-1990). As the research's central focus and explanatory priority is the persistently neoliberal character of the country's strategies governing demographic ageing, I dedicate particular attention to the

authoritarian era (1973-1990) and democratic neoliberal governing projects up to the second governing period of the right-wing president Sebastian Piñera (2018-2022), including the progressive centre-left governing projects of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010; 2014-2018). To critically assess the rationales and outcomes of existing governing strategies, I also analyse them through the lens of two intertwined conjunctural moments: the COVID-19 pandemic and the anti-neoliberal social uprising of 2019. These two moments not only disrupted the research project in different ways –which will be explained in Chapter Three on methods– but more significantly, became highly meaningful for analysis. As perceived by people taking to the streets during the social uprising of 2019 and conveyed by local government practitioners through multiple interviews, these moments have unearthed the limitations of neoliberal strategies in addressing the needs of older people. Also, it is important to note that in relation to my explorations of local governing projects, I analysed – with different depths– the case of seven contrasting municipalities in the city of Santiago. In bringing attention to the heterogenic landscape of municipal budget, I explore how the neoliberal restructuring of the state conducted during the dictatorship conditions their autonomy from central-level programs and policies and their capacity to address the emerging and pressing welfare and caregiving needs of older populations.

Structure of the Thesis

Following this Introduction, this thesis comprises six additional chapters.

In Chapter Two, I discuss supporting literatures which have informed this project's central analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies. First, I draw on Stuart Hall's reading of Gramsci's notion of hegemony to outline its main characteristics and processes (Hall, 1986a, 1988, 2011; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016). I discuss Hall's interpretation of the explanatory power of Gramsci's notion of hegemony and how the neoliberal political project constitutes a hegemonic project. Second, I look into the characteristic processes and strategies leading to the construction of a position of leadership of neoliberal ideas and strategies within complex social formations. I discuss how the hegemonic neoliberal project has been historically constructed through the articulation of coercion and consent and the instrumentalisation of states. In this context, I consider how the neoliberal project on the withdrawal of the welfare role of the state has been conducted through the instrumentalisation of families, communities and individuals devolving them

significant welfare and caregiving responsibilities. I also explore how the neoliberal project has deployed multiple strategies to consolidate and maintain a position of leadership amid its internally generated crises and forms of contestation. Finally, I consider how the case of Chile has the potential of illuminating scholarly analysing about the survival and re-invention of neoliberal ideas and strategies amid changing socio-political landscapes.

In Chapter Three, I introduce the project's research methods and how I adapted them to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic. I explain the process leading to conducting a hybrid on-site and online ethnography, but also how this changing research context impacted my positionality and research ethics. First, I consider the relevance of conducting semi-structured interviews for my research. I argue that despite this being a flexible approach during the pandemic –as I was able to conduct interviews online– the strategy meant depending on the willingness of participants to engage on emerging topics and cases. Second, I explain the relevance of documentary analysis and how it enabled me to have both a historical and scalar understanding of central challenges and Chilean governing strategies around issues of ageing. Third, I discuss how conducting participatory observations online prompted several methodological considerations and adjustments. Fourth, I explain how my positionality was shaped by being 'new' to researching issues of ageing and by being perceived as a researcher from a foreign institution conducting 'distant' online research during the pandemic. Finally, I assess how the changing research context demanded a constant re-assessment of ethical considerations.

In Chapter Four, I focus on the neoliberal strategy devolving welfare and caregiving responsibilities to families and charitable institutions, and on the counter-neoliberal common sense contesting it. I explore how the central state's hegemonic project instrumentalising traditional forms of care –i.e., familial and charitable, which was recently accommodated to address the caregiving and welfare needs of vulnerable and abandoned older people during the pandemic– is being increasingly contested by an anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility. For this, I begin by mapping how different governing projects, alternating between capitalist (1818-1924) and welfare (1924-1973) projects and authoritarian (1973-1990) and democratic neoliberal projects (1990 until date), have reworked traditional forms of care –albeit with different emphasis– as the central state's primary governing strategy to address the welfare and caregiving needs of older people. Then, in the second section, I investigate the intertwined effects of the pandemic and ongoing socio-political conjuncture to

demonstrate how the central state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of care is challenged by an anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility. I analyse the case of the philanthropic charitable TV show called *Vamos Chilenos* (Let's Go Chileans) designed to raise money to implement a tech solution to the familial neglect experienced by the 80,000 vulnerable and abandoned older people uncovered during the COVID-19 pandemic and how it is being challenged in the new socio-political conjuncture. Particularly, I explore how the anti-neoliberal common sense guiding the social uprising of 2019 and constructed by a rising left-wing bloc has permeated Twitter discussions ignited by the TV show regarding the role of the state in the care of vulnerable and abandoned older people.

In Chapter Five, I focus on the neoliberal devolution of critical social issues onto hollowed-out local governments in Chile and how it is engendering alternative forms of contestation. Exploring ongoing forms of local government contestation over devolved and unfunded responsibilities in the provision of welfare toward older populations, I demonstrate how the central state's marked devolution of governing responsibilities on issues of ageing is having unintended effects. First, drawing on the experiences and views of local government officials across seven different municipalities in the city of Santiago and on a critical reading of historical documents and policy, I explore the incapacitating conditions leading to local governments' contestation. Particularly, I trace the process of devolution of responsibilities to local governments in the governing of ageing through top-down control, uneven access to central-level programs and an unequal landscape of municipal budgets. All, I argue, hinder local governments' capacities to respond to the needs of their older populations. Second, analysing the case of two municipalities in the city of Santiago, Recoleta and Peñalolén, I explore how local governments' contestation is mediated by unintended effects of the neoliberal downward restructuring of the state such as local governments' increasing sense of ownership over critical issues, as well as reworked notions of autonomy based on the closeness between the local state and the population.

In Chapter Six, I focus on the process of neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive ideas of participation leading to the devolution of welfare and caregiving responsibilities onto communities and older individuals themselves and how this holds back progressive efforts. For this, I begin by unpacking the gradual construction of an anti-dependency rationale for participation within national-level policy. I outline how, since the return of democracy in 1990, governing projects positioning participation as key to the strengthening of democracy –

third-way neoliberal governing projects of the Democratic Christian presidents Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000)– or as a central human right within a rights-based approach to older populations –the first centre-left governing project of the Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010)– have simultaneously placed older people’s participation as a cost-effective solution to poverty and quality of life and, most recently, as a therapeutic tool for the prevention of physical dependency. These approaches privilege participation’s cost-effective capacities rather than its radical and emancipatory possibilities. Next, drawing on the cases of the communist local governing project of Recoleta and the communitarian local governing project of Renca, I explore how neoliberal ideas and strategies are capable of neutralising progressive forms of participation articulated within counter-neoliberal governing projects. I argue that the latter is having holding-back effects on the advancement of progressive governing projects.

Finally, in Chapter Seven, I outline the main conclusions emerging from the research.

Overarching findings

The effects of a marked politics of devolution: deepening inequalities in old age

One of the cross-cutting findings of the research is that through a history of state neglect, older people have been perceived and constructed as having less than ‘normal’ value within the central state’s multiple political-economic governing projects. As outsiders of the labour market and a perceived potential threat to economic development due to the costs associated with age-related dependencies –economic, physical and cognitive– and associated welfare and caregiving responsibilities, the central state’s primary governing rationale has been to avert these responsibilities toward older populations. As I explain in more detail in Chapters Four, Five and Six, avoiding responsibilities toward older populations has been achieved through a neoliberal politics of scalar devolution shifting welfare and caregiving responsibilities onto families, charitable institutions, local governments, communities and older people themselves. Through this neoliberal politics of scalar devolution, access to welfare in Chile has been rendered deeply unequal for older populations. As I unpack in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the central state’s different valuation toward older people is materialised through an unequal landscape of municipal budgets, unequal access to austere central-level programs and differing socio-economic capabilities of families, communities

and older people to assume welfare and caregiving responsibilities. Municipal budgets condition the number of programs and welfare support provided by local governments to older populations. As such, the austere character of central-level programs and the disparate landscape of municipal budgets in the city of Santiago condition local governments' possibilities of developing ad-hoc locally funded programs responding to older people's pressing needs. Taken in tandem, these conditions position older people as having a different value for the central state depending on where they live. These contrasting values are also materialised in terms of families' socio-economic capabilities in providing commodified forms of welfare and caregiving –e.g., accessing private forms of long-term care. Moreover, as I explore in Chapter Six, the central state's neoliberal strategy of devolving responsibilities to older individuals through the mainstreaming of active and preventive subjectivities has reinforced biased and value-leaning perceptions toward different subjectivities in old age. Older people engaging actively in society through work, voluntarism and preventing physical dependencies by doing exercises have been constructed as more valuable to society compared to those in need of welfare and caregiving. Finally, the cost-effective and anti-dependency rationale positioning older people's participation as the primary governing technique for addressing their emerging needs reveals how the central state continues to undervalue older people's welfare and caregiving requirements.

The hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and governing strategies

Across the different chapters, the persistence of the Chilean central state's politics of scalar devolution demonstrates the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies. For instance, as I explore in Chapter Four, the perpetuation of the central state's project on traditional forms of care is the result of its adoption by neoliberal governing strategies trying to avert the costs of demographic ageing in the state. Neoliberal governing strategies – including recent efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic– have reworked and instrumentalised the historically ingrained character of familial and charitable forms of care in positioning them as a common-sense governing strategy. Its common-sense status has been achieved either by equating familial responsibilities as those of the individual for accessing commodified forms of welfare –during the military dictatorship– or by positioning family altruism as a legal and democratic moral duty after the return of democracy. Equally, the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas has also been achieved through a process of ideational distortion. In Chapter Six, I show how through the harnessing and appropriation of

progressive ideas and languages about participation within national-level policy and programs –such as notions of it as democratic, a right and form of empowerment– older people’s participation has paradoxically been instrumentalised as a cost-effective governing tool to prevent welfare responsibilities on the state, devolving them to individuals and communities. For instance, with participation positioned as a right of older populations, participation has been easily articulated as a cost-effective strategy to mainstream active and preventive behaviours in old age, devolving older individuals’ responsibilities for their well-being and the prevention and rehabilitation of age-related dependencies, economic and physical.

The hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies is further underlined in unpacking how these are holding back the advancement of progressive governing projects. Through an intertwined discussion in Chapters Five and Six, I show how progressive governing projects that try to counter neoliberal strategies by expanding access to welfare entitlements through public ownership projects –such as the communist local governing project of Recoleta– or by mainstreaming communitarian forms of participation to empower the older population in decision-making processes within the local government project –such as the communitarian local governing project of Renca– are held back by unintendedly complying with the neoliberal strategy of preventing and devolving the costs of age-related dependencies. For instance, as I discuss in Chapter Six, with the aim of advancing a rights-based approach to older people and therefore, positioning participation and health as basic entitlements, the communist local governing project of Recoleta has uncritically implemented the central government’s medicalised and therapeutic rationale for participation. This medicalised approach, in harnessing scientific evidence that positions social interactions as having beneficial health effects, has constructed participation as a strategy for the prevention of age-related dependencies. Thus, the counter-neoliberal local governing project of Recoleta not only complies with the neoliberal strategy of averting the costs of age-related dependencies but also by reifying physical dependencies as something to be prevented, it moves away from progressive logics advocating accommodation of social, economic and built environments to better include different abilities.

Chile’s actually existing neoliberal context is also impacting the extent to which neoliberal ideas and strategies end up holding back progressive governing projects. As I explore in Chapters Five and Six, how progressive local governing projects end up complying with the

neoliberal strategy of devolving welfare responsibilities –onto families, communities and older people– is strongly mediated by the lack of local government funding and by the contradictory position of local governments within the structure of the Chilean state as both autonomous governing entities and executors of central level policy. For instance, like the case of the local government of Recoleta, the communitarian local governing project of Renca ends up complying with the neoliberal strategy of devolving welfare and caregiving responsibilities to communities. Unpacking the voluntary program called *Somos Renca* (We Are Renca) implemented to support older people quarantining during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, I argue that under a combination of limited resources and unmet welfare needs of older populations, communitarian forms of participation ended up devolving significant caregiving responsibilities to the community. In this case, resorting to community voluntarism by the local government was triggered by the asymmetry between devolved municipal responsibilities and resources; asymmetry heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Contesting neoliberal hegemony

Following Hall's (1986) reading of Gramsci's conception of the state as an 'arena of different social contestations' (Hall, 1986, p.19), another crosscutting finding is that the Chilean state is being constantly reworked through the governing of demographic ageing. Across the chapters, the governing of older populations constitutes an evolving constellation of different governing strategies and rationales intertwined and confronted at different levels. For instance, issues of ageing have engendered confrontations between contrasting common senses on the central state's responsibilities in providing welfare and caregiving for older populations: either supporting or against a greater welfare role of the state. As I explore in Chapter Four, the central state's hegemonic project instrumentalising traditional forms of care –i.e., familial and charitable– as the main neoliberal strategy for averting welfare and caregiving responsibilities has not only been historically consolidated through contrasting governing projects but most recently, it has become publicly contested on a national level. When adapted to address caregiving and welfare needs of vulnerable and abandoned older people during the COVID-19 pandemic via the philanthropic charitable TV show *Vamos Chilenos* (Let's Go Chileans) supported by the central government, the centralisation of these traditional forms of care were challenged by an anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility.

Under the intertwining of the ongoing socio-political conjuncture and the pandemic, the limitations of the state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of caregiving were not only publicly uncovered –with evidence of 80,000 people aged eighty years and over living under conditions of poverty and abandonment– but significantly contested by the anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility informing the social demands of the social uprising of October 2019. An anti-neoliberal common sense represented by the maturing of a rising left-wing bloc emerging from previous social movements –such as that of high-school (2006) and university students (2011), anti-private pensions (2016) and feminist (2018) movements, that advocated for disrupting the neoliberal character of the Chilean central state by expanding its role in the economy and in the provision of welfare entitlements –such as education, pensions, health and caregiving (Casals, 2022; Hiner et al., 2021; Pizarro-Hofer, 2020). Moreover, discussions around state responsibility and traditional forms of care taking place on Twitter demonstrated how the anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility had permeated civil society, which was –at that point– opposing a history of state neglect.

The reworking of the state through issues of ageing also confronts two distinctive levels of government: the central and local governments. As I argue in Chapter Five, local governments' contestation of the central state's neglect of the welfare needs of older people is not only redrawing the boundaries of welfare responsibilities of the Chilean state, but contestation emerges as an unintended effect of the restructuring process conducted during the military dictatorship. Contradictorily positioned as both 'autonomous' governing entities and 'executors' of central level policy, local governments are driven by a sense of ownership of critical social issues. Thus, they try to rework their limited forms of devolved autonomy – they remain executors of central level-policy– to respond to the caregiving and welfare needs of older populations through alternative local governing projects to counter the central state's neglect. In this regard, local governments' contestation encompasses taking responsibility of bridging welfare gaps by offering services to increase older people's possibilities to access welfare entitlements. For instance, the counter-neoliberal local government of Recoleta is developing public ownership programs –for example, popular pharmacies, optics, audiology and a municipal real estate project– to lower the living costs of older people and increase access to welfare, while at the same time, is countering the neoliberal rationale on the commodification of welfare.

Interestingly, bottom-up contestation from local governments not only emerges from distinctive counter-neoliberal governing projects, but contestation also comes from local governing projects not opposing neoliberalism. In Chapter Five, I suggest that local governments' sense of ownership over critical social issues produces a particular form of localism that opposes retrenched neoliberal policies –no matter what the local governments' political colour. For instance, as I discuss in Chapter Five, my first encounter with local governments' contestation was while reading a report published in 2017 by the right-wing association of municipalities called AMUCH –*Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile* (AMUCH). In this report, local governments challenged the devolved and unfunded responsibilities to address the existing and emerging needs of the older population, blaming central government for the lack of a comprehensive response. Similarly, while researching the case of the local government of Peñalolén, which is a centre-democratic project close to third-way neoliberalism, I confirmed that bottom-up contestation over the lack of central state's welfare responsibilities was produced despite not having a counter-neoliberal project. The 'Defense Office for Older People' (*Defensoría del Adulto Mayor*) has legally sued the National Service of Older People (*Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor* –SENAMA) to take responsibility over the caregiving of abandoned older people by admitting them to public long-term caregiving establishment or by subsidising their need of caregiving. These disparate cases collectively demonstrate how the boundaries of the Chilean state's welfare and caregiving responsibilities are being redrawn through contestation. All these research findings and their implications for theory and practices are discussed further in the following chapters. In unpacking how neoliberal hegemony over issues of ageing is constructed and contested, these research findings offer insights for building hopeful demographic ageing futures.

¹ Institute of National Statistics 2023. Data accessed in June 2023:
<https://www.ine.gob.cl/estadisticas/sociales/demografia-y-vitales/demografia-y-migracion/2022/09/27/cerca-de-un-tercio-de-la-población-de-chile-en-2050-estaría-compuesta-por-personas-mayores#:~:text=El%20porcentaje%20de%20personas%20de,2050%20las%20personas%20mayores%20equivalgan>

² This collaboration began in 2007 and is regulated by the Decree 49 of the Ministry of Planning:
<https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1026803>

Chapter Two – An analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project

Introduction

Neoliberalism is central to understanding how demographic ageing and older populations are governed in Chile. Its centrality is not only associated with the context in which governing strategies directed to older populations are designed and implemented –the research takes place in Chile, widely acknowledged as a neoliberal laboratory (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2008). Also, it has to do with the way in which the neoliberal governing project initiated through radical means during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet has managed to linger after the return of democracy and permeate the rationales and strategies governing today’s older populations. For this reason, I refer to Gramscian understandings of neoliberalism as a political hegemonic project. Gramsci defines hegemony as a position of ‘leadership’ within a complex social formation that must be continuously constructed –by a historical bloc or formation– through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent (Hall, 1986, p.15). Using this lens allows for understanding how neoliberal ideas and strategies have paradoxically been able to reach a position of leadership –albeit with opposition from alternative governing ideas and projects– in the governing of emerging social issues that intended to challenge neoliberal rule. Centrally considering how demographic ageing in Chile has been positioned as a risk to economic development, I use an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project to unpack how diverse political projects have contributed –either deliberately or inadvertently– to the neoliberal aim of averting the central state’s responsibility in the provision of welfare and caregiving toward a growing number of dependent older populations; economically, physically, and cognitively.

To unpack how the neoliberal project adapts and articulates itself to maintain a position of leadership in the governing of demographic ageing in Chile, in this chapter I assemble an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project. Doing so, I draw on critical scholarship accounts of the characteristic processes and strategies leading to the construction of neoliberal ideas and strategies as hegemonic. First, I draw on Stuart Hall’s interpretation of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to outline its main characteristics and processes (Hall, 1986a, 1988, 2011; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016). I explain

how the explanatory power of Gramsci's notion of hegemony lies in its conception of political and ideological leadership as constructed through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent and advances a comprehensive understanding of the state. The state is not only understood as the place from which coercion is exercised but as strategic for the building of wider popular consent. I also explain how drawing on Gramsci, Hall (1998, 2011) argues that the neoliberal political project constitutes a hegemonic project. Namely, he suggests that its hegemonic condition lies in the capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies to permeate different global and local contexts and maintain a position of leadership amid economic and financial crises.

Second, I look to the characteristic processes and strategies leading to the construction of a position of leadership of neoliberal ideas and strategies within complex social formations. I explain how the construction of neoliberal hegemony by diverse political coalitions and governing projects has depended on the articulation of coercion and consent, with the latter profoundly shaped by the embedding of neoliberal ideas as the common-sense alternative for socio-economic organisation (Hall, 1986a, 2011; Hall & O'Shea, 2013; Harvey, 2005). Because of the strategic role of the state in the construction of hegemony, I also discuss how diverse political coalitions and governing projects have instrumentalised the state for ensuring the embedding and continuity of the neoliberal project (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hall, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002, 2013; Lemke, 2001; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Specifically, I refer to the processual embedding of neoliberal ideas and strategies through roll-back and roll-out policies (Peck & Tickell, 2002) and the rescaling of state activities and functions (Jessop, 2002; MacLeod, 2001; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 1997). Considering that one of the most distinctive areas of struggle for the construction of neoliberal hegemony has been the withdrawal of the welfare role of the state, I also unpack its main strategies. These have been characterised by the instrumentalisation of families, communities and individuals devolving them significant welfare and caregiving responsibilities (Cooper, 2017; Joseph, 2002; Lemke, 2001; Newman & Tonkens, 2011; Rose, 1999).

Based on Gramsci's hegemony as constructed in a relation of force with other alternative political and ideological projects, the hegemonic condition of the neoliberal project also rests on the capacity of diverse political and governing projects to address crises and contestation. In this regard, critical scholars suggests that the maintenance of a position of leadership of

neoliberal ideas and strategies by diverse neoliberal governing projects has been enabled by the effects of its processual embedding and the creative-destructive nature of neoliberal policies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002, 2013; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Moreover, critical scholars have highlighted that political coalitions and governing projects have deployed diverse strategies to control and co-opt counter-neoliberal ideas and projects engendering contestation, such as that of Gramsci's *trasformismo* (Hall, 2011; Hall & O'Shea, 2013; Leal, 2007; Paterson, 2009). Finally, after a close reading of mainstream critical scholarship on the hegemonic political project, in which analysis of the case of Chile has been limited to that of a laboratory for the first implementation of Friedman's neoliberal policies (Klein, 2008; Peck, 2010), I suggest that the case of Chile has further analytical potential. Echoing the efforts of critical scholars in Chile (Jessop, 2002), I argue that the Chilean case is particularly illuminating when analysing the survival and re-invention of neoliberal ideas and strategies amid changing socio-political landscapes.

Gramsci's hegemony through the lens of Stuart Hall

Stuart Hall, one of the most influential Gramscian scholars in critical cultural studies was keen to reassert the explanatory powers of Gramsci's theory of hegemony^a. Both in his essay on 'Gramsci's Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity' (Hall, 1986a) and in his 1983 lecture on Hegemony and Domination at the University of Illinois^b, Hall argues that Gramsci's hegemony contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of domination, political struggles and strategies within capitalist societies. As I discuss in this section, in unpacking Gramsci's concept of hegemony from its first articulation as a specific stage of class alliance to its expanded understanding as a political strategy of domination, Hall argues that the explanatory power of Gramsci's hegemony lies in its conception of political and ideological leadership as constructed through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent. In tandem, its explanatory power is strengthened by Gramsci's comprehensive understanding of the state. Considering Gramsci's notion of consent, the role of the state in the construction and preservation of hegemonic projects not only lies in its capacity to exercise coercion but as the place for the building of wider popular consent. At the same time, Hall suggests that the explanatory power of Gramsci's hegemony is related to its attention to common sense, to the capacity of hegemonic blocs to control and contain opposition and alternative forces and to the processual character of the construction of hegemony. Based on Gramsci's processual understanding of hegemony, Hall (2011) suggests

that considering the capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies to permeate different global and local contexts and maintain a position of leadership amid economic and financial crises, the neoliberal political project constitutes a hegemonic project.

Hall explains Gramsci's hegemony as a concept transitioning from a specific stage of class alliance to an expanded understanding as a political strategy of domination. He suggests that Gramsci's first articulation of hegemony as a moment of class alliance was the result of his overarching effort to depart from reductionist interpretations of economic and class struggles over modes of production. Instead of limiting explanations of political and ideological developments to questions such as 'who profited financially from a particular event' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.159), Gramsci's analysis focuses on the relations of force shaping these developments. Gramsci's analysis of historical crises and political struggles –also termed as the 'conjunctural'– pays attention to the movements and changing balance between historical forces that lead to transformations in the social formation^c. By focusing on the changing 'relations of force' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.161), Gramsci suggests that historical forces looking to assert domination over society do so in relation to other (opposing) forces that relate to each other through an unstable balance in which none ever asserts a final victory. This approach also renders class struggles more complex. Rather than conceiving classes as having a 'given' unity (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.162), they must be 'produced' through 'specific economic, political and ideological practices' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.162). This complex reading of historical transformations and political struggles as taking place in a changing relation of force, and of class unity as unstable and in need of constant articulation, is what lead Gramsci to his first articulation of hegemony as a specific moment of class alliance; as a moment of hegemony. Gramsci suggested that it is not just a single class that can reach a position of domination over society, but a hegemonic bloc composed of a particular class alliance in which different classes articulate in subordination –not total incorporation– to the politico-economic aims and ideology of a dominant class –not limited to the capitalist class– capable of forging a 'collective will' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.162)^d.

Hall also explains how within the progression of Gramsci's work, the concept of hegemony was expanded to that of an analytical term accounting for the political strategies applied in the construction of all leading historical formations. Beyond conceptions of hegemony as a moment of class alliance, it was conceived as a crosscutting strategy for political and ideological domination. This progression in the understanding of hegemony emerges from

Gramsci's comparative analysis between the kinds of politics inscribed in the East and the West by the end of the nineteenth century. Gramsci suggests that in comparison to the East, where power could be seized through a 'war of manoeuvre' and where everything is condensed into one front and moment of struggle' (Hall, 1986, p.17), the political struggles taking place in the West were transitioning to that of a 'war of positions' (Hall, 1986, p.17). In his analysis, the East was epitomised by pre-revolutionary Russia's 'long-delayed modernisation', its 'swollen state apparatus and bureaucracy' and its 'relatively undeveloped civil society' (Hall, 1986, p.17). In contrast, the West's transition into modern capitalism was characterised by 'the emergence of modern mass democracy' (Hall, 1986, p.18) and by the increasing complexification of civil society and its relative independence from the state. Thus, amid this novel Western-capitalist context, Gramsci suggests that forms of domination required to engage in a different type of politics sensitive to the 'dispersal' of power' (Hall, 1986, p.18) amid the state and civil society. In this regard, the construction of hegemony would be achieved through a war of positions –also referred to as hegemonic politics– which consisted in the process of 'winning consent within the voluntary institutions of civil society' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.176) through the construction of an ethico-political leadership across multiple domains of the social formation at once.

Considering Gramsci's evolving notion of hegemony, Hall argues that it can be conceived as the comprehensive exercise of political and ideological leadership through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent. Since the active construction of hegemony occurs through a 'passive revolution' taking the form of a 'war of position' conducted in various arenas of the social formation at once, a position of leadership is not achieved solely through coercive means of domination. Rather, hegemonic projects are more about 'making themselves popular' by building 'popular consent' within all fronts of the social formation (Hall, 1986, p.15-16). It is the creation of popular consent, of becoming part of the common sense of the masses 'which makes possible the 'propagation' for a time, of an intellectual, moral, political and economic collective will throughout society' (Hall, 1986, p.15). Nonetheless, even if hegemony rests primarily on the construction of consent, coercion – generally exercised through the rule of law and the state apparatus– acts 'to enforce the terms of consensus and domination over others' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.172). In this regard, as the construction of hegemony needs to be achieved within all fronts of the social formation, the intertwined exercise of coercion and consent 'encompass[es] the critical domains of cultural, moral, ethical and intellectual leadership' (Hall, 1986, p.17). It is under this integral

understanding of coercion and consent that Hall suggests that Gramsci's hegemony can be conceived as a position of leadership: 'Hegemony is leadership which is in control, and that is what hegemony means: mastery' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.172).

Crosscutting the articulation of coercion and consent lies the state. For Gramsci, the state plays a significant role in the construction and preservation of hegemonic projects. Departing from reductionist interpretations in which the state is 'reducible to the coercive instrument of the ruling class' (Hall, 1986, p.18), for Gramsci, the state is conceived as the point from which the leadership of any hegemonic formation is 'ultimately exercised' over society (Hall, 1986, p.18). In this regard, Gramsci's notion of hegemony underpins a redefinition of the state not only as a site for the exercise of coercion but for the building of wider popular consent, with the state having an 'educative and formative' role (Hall, 1986, p.18). With the construction of a position of leadership taking place within the 'trenches' of civil society (*PN*, p.243 in Hall, 1986, p.18), Gramsci goes on to suggest an enlarged conception of the state as comprising 'political society + civil society' with both positioned as integral arenas of political struggle (*PN*, p.263 in Hall, 1986, p.19). Thus, the state's strategic position within the construction of hegemony lies in its capacity to mobilise cultural and ideological consent through multiple combinations of coercive, educative and regulative measures (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.164). It is the point from which dominant formations work on 'bringing into line' or 'adapting the civilisation and the morality of the broadest masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production' (*PN*, p.258 in Hall, 1986, p.18). In light of this, and as I explain further below, critical scholarship on neoliberal hegemony pays significant attention to how governing projects working to reassert the hegemonic position of the neoliberal political project have related to and instrumentalised the state in multiple ways.

Considering that a critical contribution of Gramsci's hegemony is its attention to the role of consent in the construction of leadership, the notion of common sense gains significant explanatory power. As I unpack further below, in Hall's explanation of the hegemonic condition of the neoliberal political project in the UK (Hall, 2011; Hall & O'Shea, 2013), becoming common sense is a fundamental condition in the construction of a hegemonic project as it enables the development of the necessary popular consent to conduct the transformation of the social formation. With common sense positioned as a strategic arena of political struggle, Hall suggests that hegemonic projects need to be particularly attentive to

the domain of the moral 'since it is the language within which vast numbers of people actually set about their political calculations' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.173). Hegemonic projects also instrumentalise common sense to control opposing political projects (Hall, 2011). As hegemony does not entail the elimination or total incorporation of opposing forces within a social formation, the construction of a position of leadership entails the capacity to control and contain opposition and alternative forces. To account for this, Hall explains how the long duration of liberalism as a hegemonic formation in the UK during the nineteenth century was based on its capacity to articulate itself as a 'mansion of many rooms' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.174) in which alternative forces were controlled under notions of the individual's capacity to exercise freedom.

To further unpack the explanatory powers of Gramsci's notion of hegemony for analysing neoliberal ideas and strategies, it is important to highlight its processual character. For Gramsci, hegemony is never final but in continuous construction through relations of force. Hall points out that there is nothing 'automatic' about hegemony (Hall, 1986, p.15). Rather, it needs to be 'actively constructed and positively maintained' (Hall, 1986, p.15). Reaching a position of leadership is an ongoing process in which a particular political project is developed, advanced and sustained in a 'relation of force' with other opposing projects that also work to achieve a leading position within a social formation (Hall, 1986a; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016). Against this background, Hall (1988, 2011) suggests that both the processual understanding of hegemony and its construction through relations of force are key for understanding the neoliberal political project as a hegemonic project. Based on an analysis of the UK's neoliberal right initiated by Thatcher, Hall (2011, 1988) suggests that 'neoliberalism does constitute a hegemonic project' (Hall, 2011, p.728 –emphasis of author). As I explain in more detail in the following sections, Hall's (1988, 2011) description of the hegemonic character of the neoliberal project in the UK not only resides in the radical character of Thatcher's privatisation and commodification policies. Rather, its hegemonic character significantly resides in the processual embedding of neoliberal ideas as common sense and the lack of comprehensive opposition from the left (Hall, 1988; 2011). Together, these account for the capacity of the neoliberal project to maintain a position of leadership amid diverse governing projects and the lingering effects of financial and economic crises (Hall, 2011). Moreover, beyond the UK's neoliberal project, Hall (2011) suggests that the hegemonic condition of the neoliberal project also resides in the way in which neoliberal ideas and strategies constantly 'combine with other models, modifying them' (Hall, 2011,

p.708). Consequently, there is a large diversity of neoliberal projects that vary according to their relationship with the sediments left by other historic and emerging projects and forms of opposition (Hall, 2011). In this regard, the hegemonic character of the neoliberal project simultaneously resides in the situated governing practices and in the capacity of neo-liberal ideas, policies and strategies of ‘incrementally gaining ground globally, re-defining the political, social and economic models and governing strategies’ (Hall, 2011, p.708).

Hall’s (1988, 2011) comprehensive understanding of the neoliberal hegemonic project is particularly relevant when dealing with critique over notions about neoliberal hegemony. Interpretations of neoliberalism as a global hegemonic order have been strongly criticised for contributing to obscuring the ‘micro-practices’ inscribed within neoliberal strategies (Ong, 2007, p.5), as well as the local variability and the multiplicity of other governing rationales and projects with which neoliberal projects need to negotiate when implemented at the urban or local scales (Le Galès, 2016). In contrast, Hall’s (1988, 2011) articulation of Gramsci’s hegemony brings attention to the historical and contextual construction of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Drawing on Gramsci’s hegemony, the explanatory power of conceiving neoliberalisation processes as part of the ongoing construction of a hegemonic project lies in its attention to the situated governing practices through which neoliberal ideas and strategies struggle to achieve a position of leadership in the governing of social formations (Colpani, 2022; Hall, 1986a, 1988, 2011). As I unpack in the remainder of this chapter, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony provides the analytical grip to account for the processual and contextual construction and differentiation of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Its explanatory power is strengthened by its emphasis on the multiple strategies implemented to gain and maintain a position of leadership such as constructing neoliberal ideas as common sense or instrumentalising the state.

Unpacking the neoliberal hegemonic project

The role of coercion, consent and common sense

Mirroring Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, the hegemonic character of the neoliberal project has depended on the ability of multiple neoliberal political and governing projects to articulate intertwined strategies of coercion and consent. In Harvey’s (2005) account of the political-economic origins and the global reach of neoliberalisation processes, the author

draws on Gramsci to explain how the hegemonic condition of neoliberalism as a political project of class restoration led by the capitalist elite results from the strategic articulation of coercion, political consent and the deployment of its 'conceptual apparatus' (Harvey, 2005, p.5). The latter two intertwined in terms of the capacity of political ideas to become common sense (Harvey, 2005). In addition to reinforcing widely accepted ideas on how neoliberal political projects have been installed through different forms of coercion –e.g., through the exercise of authoritarianism in Chile, outright austerity cuts and financial pressures in New York City, or through the abolition of institutions representing oppositional ideals such as the Greater London Council in the hands of Margaret Thatcher– Harvey brings attention to the role of ideas and political strategies. Suggesting that 'for any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced' (Harvey, 2005, p.5), he argues that the hegemonic ascendancy of neoliberalism as viable political project was considerably dependent of the embedding of neoliberal ideas as common sense. Specifically, he refers to the socio-historical grip of its two founding ideas: 'human dignity and freedom' (Harvey, 2005, p.5). For instance, he argues that the enforcement of neoliberal policies in Iraq were considerably enabled by the US President Bush's articulation of notions of freedom to gain support for the military invasion. In this case, common-sense notions of freedom embedded in the American culture were easily intertwined with the role of the market as its main guarantor. Interestingly, Harvey (2005) also shows how the neoliberalisation of the Chilean state was not only enabled by authoritarian rule but by the sedimentation of neoliberal ideas among Chilean elite intellectuals who, during the US Cold War programme, were trained at the University of Chicago as part of a larger strategy to 'counteract left-wing tendencies in Latin America' (Harvey, 2005, p.8). Under the label of 'Chicago Boys', this group of intellectuals were the main ideologues of the policies and strategies for the restructuring of the economy and the state.

Sharing Harvey's (2005) concern with the role of common sense, Stuart Hall (2011; Hall & O'Shea, 2013) shows how the instrumentalisation of traditional forms of common sense has been key not only for building but for maintaining the hegemonic position of neoliberal ideas and strategies. Drawing on Gramsci's ideas of common sense as simultaneously rooted in history and tradition, Hall (2011; Hall & O'Shea, 2013) suggests that linking the ideological apparatus of a specific political project –such as neoliberalism– to historical forms of common sense provides the grounds for its constant re-articulation and reinvention. As the author explains for the case of the neoliberal project in the UK in his essay on 'the neoliberal

revolution' (Hall, 2011), the capacity of the neoliberal project to become a common thread through seemingly opposing governing projects –from Conservatives to the New Labour Party– results from its articulation with the socio-cultural legacy of two hundred years of British capitalism under the idea of 'the free, possessive individual' (Hall, 2011, p.706). As such, the neoliberal project has borrowed and evolved from common-sense notions about the freedom to accumulate wealth, dispose of property and act upon individual interests, which are historically rooted in the UK's political liberalism of the eighteenth century, and which were also furthered during the industrialisation and Fordist cultures of mass production and consumption (Hall, 2011). The neoliberal instrumentalisation of historically ingrained common sense is a key analytical lens for this research. In analysing the Chilean central government's neoliberal politics of devolution of welfare and caregiving responsibilities to families and communities, the instrumentalisation of traditional common sense emerges as a significant governing strategy. As I discuss further below, this coincides with scholarly work highlighting that the neoliberal strategy of devolving responsibilities to families, communities and individuals through the instrumentalisation of traditional common-sense ideas about their welfare and caregiving roles has been a key strategy ensuring the withdrawal of the welfare role of the state (Cooper, 2017; Joseph, 2002; Lemke, 2001; Rose, 1999).

Critical scholars also suggest that the embedding of neoliberal ideas as common sense has not been limited to the articulation of traditionally ingrained ideas but also it has depended both on the mobilisation and education of neoliberal ideas –by hegemonic blocs– and on active struggles to undermine opposing ideas. Unpacking Reagan's neoliberal governing project in the US, Harvey (2005) suggests that the embedding of neoliberal ideas as common sense was achieved through the powerful agency of corporations. For instance, political consent for the installation of neoliberal policies was built on the hands of organised corporations that preceding and during the governing project of Reagan in the US, embarked on the ideological transformation of socially influential institutions such as universities, schools and the media by funding pro-business research agendas and think tanks. At the same time, the latter produced the 'technical and empirical studies and political-philosophical arguments broadly in support of neoliberal policies' (Harvey, 2005, p.44) that guided the rolling of neoliberal policies at the national level. The positioning of neoliberal ideas as common sense has also been articulated through active struggles to undermine opposing ideas. Looking into the case of the UK's neoliberal right, particularly under the governing projects of Thatcher (1979-1990) and Cameron (2010-2016), Hall and O'Shea (2013) argue that the neoliberal common

sense has become dominant after forty years of what they call a ‘concerted ideological assault’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013, p.12). In this regard, the building of legitimacy for the neoliberal project was achieved by the purposeful undermining of previous common-sense ideas that had gathered political consensus in support of the welfare state. For instance, by shifting common sense notions of the British citizen as a taxpayer to a consumer, or by rolling novel ideas on efficacy based on market logics such as ‘value for money’ and ‘greater efficiency’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013, p.12), the neoliberal political project gained momentum for the rolling of commodification strategies and for the curtailing of the public bureaucracy. At the same time, by installing the idea that ‘you cannot throw money at a problem’ through political discourses and the media, the neoliberal right justified austerity measures while contradictorily throwing money ‘at the banks or at the economy via quantitative easing’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013, p.13). Equally, the authors show how austerity politics have been further advanced by the co-optation of good sense notions regarding fairness rooted in the UK’s welfare state project. Previous notions of fairness defined as ‘a collective contract between all members of the society to guarantee a fairer distribution of wealth, and a chance for everyone to flourish and make a useful contribution’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013, p.15) have been ‘trans-coded’ into the grammar of markets by suggesting that it should be based on the ‘reward for personal effort’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013, p.16) and not on redistribution.

The state and the neoliberal hegemonic project

Critical scholars have suggested that the neoliberal project seems to have a contradictory relationship with the state. Even though there is a clear line of ideological argument in which the neoliberal project appears as rejecting the state and its regulatory capacity over the auto-regulatory nature of the markets, the neoliberal project depends to a great extent on the state to ensure not only the operation of the markets but the embedding of the neoliberal project amid its internally generated crises. In unpacking the history of the neoliberal project in the UK, Hall (2011) suggests that the linchpin neoliberal idea of the ‘free, possessive individual’ is closely associated with notions about the state being ‘tyrannical and oppressive’ (Hall, 2011, p.706). In fact, he argues that ‘the welfare state in particular is the arch enemy of [neoliberal] freedom’ (Hall, 2011, p.706). Ideally, for neoliberals, the role of the state should be limited only ‘to some basic functions’ (Lemke, 2001, p.201) and its role in the costly provision of social welfare reduced if not eliminated (Hall, 2011; Lemke, 2001). In this regard, Harvey (2005) offers an illustrative depiction of the ideal neoliberal state. Its

functions are limited to guaranteeing individual freedoms, expanding the regulatory reach of the market through the privatisation of assets, ensuring the free mobility of capital and promoting the responsibility of individuals (Harvey, 2005). In tandem, social issues such as poverty are assumed to be naturally addressed by the improving performance of markets and its 'trickle down' effect (Harvey, 2005, p.64). This has also been referred to as the neoliberal 'utopia' of free markets' (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.352).

However, as a 'utopia', the rejection of the state appears only at the level of ideology. Critical scholars suggest that the state has had a central place in the construction of the neoliberal project. Unpacking Foucault's 1979 lectures on neoliberalism as a modern art of government, Lemke (2001) argues that contrary to the neoliberal utopia of market freedom, the state 'not only retains its traditional functions but also takes on new tasks and functions' in the construction of neoliberal governing projects (Lemke, 2001, p.201). For instance, in Harvey's (2005) account of the construction of the neoliberal hegemonic project, state apparatuses have had a significant role in the articulation of coercion and consent for the implementation of neoliberal policies. Both in authoritarian and democratic contexts states have had a key role in the internationalisation of economies and the commodification of welfare and services. The role of the state has also been interpreted in terms of the role of inherited institutional landscapes in the implementation of neoliberal policies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002). In proposing the concept of 'actually existing neoliberalism', Brenner and Theodore (2002) explain how neoliberalisation processes are conditioned by the interaction between neoliberal strategies and inherited institutional landscapes. The role of the state in the implementation of neoliberal governing project also comes through Jessop's (2013) identification of four types of neoliberalism that have been shaped in a relation of force with pre-existing models such as 'Atlantic Fordism in advanced capitalist economies, import-substitution industrialisation in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, export-oriented growth in East Asia and, in a quite different but related context, state socialism in the Soviet Bloc, China and Indo-China' (Jessop, 2013, p.70).

Paradoxically, the role of the state is not only associated with ensuring the workings of the markets but with addressing the multiple contradictions emerging from neoliberal policies. In their analysis of the disjuncture produced between neoliberal ideology and practice, Brenner and Theodore (2002) suggest that the state has been key in containing the contradictory societal effects produced by neoliberal political practice such as 'pervasive market failures,

new forms of social polarisation, and a dramatic intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales' (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.352). The role of states in the regulation of the contradictory societal effects of neoliberal policies also comes through in the rolling of innovative policies designed for the re-embedding of the neoliberal project amid its evolving crises. For instance, austerity policies that enabled 'state-backed rescues of the global financial system' during the financial crisis of 2008 (Williams, 2020, p.211), or familialisation policies designed to ensure the withdrawal of the welfare role of the state, have been actively constructed by states through the articulation of regulatory frameworks and the instrumentalisation of traditional forms of common sense (Cooper, 2017; Hall, 2011; A. Williams, 2020).

Having a central place in the construction of the hegemonic projects, the state has been subject to different strategies to ensure the embedding and continuity of the neoliberal project. Peck and Tickell (2002) have described two main forms in which the neoliberal governing project has related to and instrumentalised the state apparatus. The first form has been the implementation of radical restructuring projects characterised by policies aimed at the 'rolling-back' of the Keynesian welfare state. The radical state restructuring policies, epitomised by Thatcher's and Reagan's governing projects, reorganised the state to ensure an expansive politics of commodification and the retrenchment of the welfare role of the state. Key roll-back policies comprised the privatisation of public enterprises and services and the consolidation of state-backed forms of market rule. In tandem and considering emerging opposition, state restructuring efforts were generally accompanied by coercive measures limiting collective forms of organisation and opposition, such as the disarticulation of unions. However, due to the contradictory results produced under this roll-back phase, the way in which the neoliberal project instrumentalised the state transitioned into a less radical approach. Amid the financial instability of the transatlantic recession of the early 1990s and the social externalities produced under the unregulated operation of markets and the progressing withdrawal of the social state, the neoliberal project 'gradually metamorphosed into more socially interventionist and ameliorative forms' (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.388). According to the authors, instead of rolling back the social role of the state, the strategy was to expand the neoliberal 'frontier of active policy making' to extramarket areas to mask and contain its negative externalities (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.389). In this new 'roll-out' phase the neoliberal project instrumentalised the state to expand the logic of market governance into social and penal policy aimed at the 'reregulation, disciplining and containment of those

marginalised or dispossessed by the neoliberalisation of the 1980s' (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389).

The instrumentalisation of the state has also been associated with the rescaling of state activity and functions. In Jessop's (2002) account of the transition of the Keynesian Welfare National State (KNWS) into a Schumpeterian workfare postnational regime (SWPR) in Europe during the decline of Atlantic Fordism, he argues that the KNWS was subjected to widespread restructuration processes comprising the rescaling of the functions of national states through processes^e of denationalisation –characterised by the transferring of functions to 'supranational, national, subnational and translocal levels' (Jessop, 2002, p.195), and destatisation –characterised by the increasing participation of private entities to realise state functions due to the 'redrawing the public-private divide' (Jessop, 2002, p.195). Just as the neoliberal project has thrived due to the promotion of Schumpeterian competition and its social policy imperative of getting 'people from welfare into work' (Jessop, 2002, p.459), processes of roll-back and roll-out neoliberalism have been strongly associated with state-restructuring processes as these have been paralleled to the increasing privatisation of state functions, the upwards devolution of state power to international governance bodies, the creation of new competition spaces, and the downward devolution of state welfare responsibilities to subnational levels (Jessop, 2002; MacLeod, 2001; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Swyngedouw, 1997). The latter is of key interest for this research. In 'austerity urbanism', Peck (2012) explores how the intensification of neoliberal austerity politics in the US after the Wall Street crash of 2008, has gone hand in hand with the rescaling of welfare responsibilities onto lower tiers of state, particularly local governments. Among the various forms that a politics of austerity can have, such as fiscal retrenchment (Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2002) or familialisation strategies to offload welfare responsibilities of the state (Cooper, 2017), a key strategy that has gained momentum after the 2008 financial crisis has been the 'scalar dumping' (Peck, 2012, p. 647) of critical social issues to the lowest level of the state (Jessop, 2002; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999). In this context, Peck (2012) not only argues that austerity politics has been a central neoliberal strategy in the rolling back of the state's frontier in the provision of welfare and social security but also that it has been increasingly conducted through 'the systematic dumping of risks, responsibilities, debts and deficits, to the local scale' (Peck, 2012, p.650). Peck argues that as renewed austerity policies in the form of scalar dumping are being implemented and deepened within already existing neoliberal landscapes, this is leading to the 'incapacitation' of the local state (Peck, 2012, p. 631).

The neoliberal hegemonic project and the withdrawal of the welfare state

Considering that one of the most distinctive areas of struggle in the construction of neoliberal hegemony has been the redrawing of the welfare role of the state, in this section I explore the main neoliberal strategies averting welfare responsibilities on the state. Reflecting on the workings of the roll-back and roll-out phases of neoliberalisation proposed by Peck and Tickell (2002), the redrawing of the welfare role of the state has been conducted through the privatisation and commodification of welfare and the expansion of market rationales into the regulation and disciplining of populations. The latter has been specifically directed to those marginalised from the ‘trickle down’ (Harvey, 2005, p.64) effect of markets and to those affected by the contradictory effects of roll-back policies. Within this overarching framework, critical scholars have paid significant attention to the responsabilisation strategies articulated within neoliberal policies of privatisation, commodification and disciplining (Cooper, 2017; Joseph, 2002; Lemke, 2001; Newman & Tonkens, 2011; Rose, 1999). As I unpack in this section, responsabilisation strategies working to achieve and maintain the withdrawal of the welfare role of the state have been characterised by the instrumentalisation of families, communities and individuals devolving them significant welfare and caregiving responsibilities (Cooper, 2017; Joseph, 2002; Lemke, 2001; Newman & Tonkens, 2011; Rose, 1999). Equally, devolution to these different scales has been the hallmark of the neoliberal project for addressing emerging social issues that pose a challenge to neoliberal rule, particularly those threatening to increase social demands for welfare and caregiving.

In this section, I use a Gramscian lens to unpack how devolution to families, communities and individuals has been achieved through the instrumentalisation of traditionally ingrained common sense and of progressive ideas about participation. As I hinted above, devolution to families has been conducted through the instrumentalisation of common-sense ideas about their traditional role in the provision of welfare and caregiving (Cooper, 2017). Similarly, the neoliberal responsabilisation of communities has been achieved through the mobilisation of romantic conceptions of community that position ongoing social issues as the result of society’s detachment from root community values rather than from uneven process of capital accumulation. Moreover, devolution of welfare and caregiving responsibilities to communities and individuals has been furthered through the neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive ideas about participation –such as notions of it as democratic and empowering.

Instrumentalising families

The instrumentalisation of traditional forms of social organisation such as families has been a central neoliberal strategy for the dismantling of the welfare state. In her seminal work on neoliberal family values in the US, Cooper (2017) argues that the role of the family as a form of social organisation has not only been key to the installation of the neoliberal project but also that it previously had been overlooked within interpretations of neoliberalisation processes. Even though the left has blamed neoliberals for destroying the Fordist family wage and disabling ‘the long-term obligations of love and parenthood’ (Cooper, 2017, p.9) through the flexibilisation of labour and commodification policies instilling individualising behaviours, Cooper (2017) argues that these interpretations are misleading. Analysing the history of welfare policies in the US, she argues that despite neoliberals having a more adaptable approach to the disintegration of the Fordist family wage, they have been equally concerned with its implications on the state. Despite benefiting from expanding markets such as those sustained on the ‘newly liberated labour of former housewives’ (Cooper, 2017, p.8), neoliberal actors have been equally concerned with the destruction of normative family roles in the provision of welfare and caregiving^f as it increases costs accrued on the state. Therefore, in the demise of the Fordist family wage neoliberals embarked on the reinvention of the family, instrumentalising it as the common-sense alternative to state welfare and redistribution. For this, American neoliberals formed an alliance with neoconservatives who, in addition to advocating for the traditional role of families also blamed the US welfare state for upsetting ‘the equilibrium state of the family’ and undermining ‘its natural incentives toward altruism and mutual dependence’^g (Cooper, 2017, p.58). In contrast, their joint strategy was to enforce family responsibility. An iconic example of this joint effort was President Clinton's welfare reform, known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which replaced welfare provision with a stronger disciplinary and pedagogical role of the state for reinforcing family and individual responsibilities.

Neoliberals have implemented diverse strategies to reinforcing familial responsibility. Building on Marx’s conception of the family ‘as the elementary legal form of private wealth accumulation’ within capitalist societies (Cooper, 2017, p.16), Cooper (2017) suggests that US neoliberals have devised multiple strategies for it to remain as the basis of welfare distribution. For instance, the author shows how with the aim of restructuring the US welfare

state, the Clinton administration articulated both traditional and novel familialisation strategies. Returning to the familialisation strategies for poverty relief inscribed within the colonial Poor Law tradition –preceding the installation of state welfare in the US, Clinton’s welfare reform reinforced filial obligations through a policing strategy inspired by Poor Law-style pedagogical role of charities and the punitive role of courts^h. Simultaneously, based upon the trend of increasing asset valuation triggered by the Federal Reserve’s sustained policy of rising interest rates to protect the value of private capital, Clinton’s administration designed a novel strategy on family responsibility. With the home conceived as the centre of family life and an inheritable asset, Clinton’s Homeownership Strategy promoted the ‘democratisation of credit’ through the state-supported flexibilisation of borrowing criteria. Expanding access to inheritable wealth in the form of homeownership would not only serve as a strategy for reducing welfare dependence but it would strengthen ‘the bonds of family dependence’ (Cooper, 2017, p.138).

As the neoliberal alternative to social welfare, family responsibility has been constructed as the common-sense strategy to respond to unknown social risks. Unpacking the conjuncture produced by Reagan’s dismantling of public health and the AIDS crisis in the US –since 1881 until the early 1990s– Cooper (2017) shows how family responsibility has been instrumentalised to accommodate unknown social risks such as the need for healthcare, caregiving and the provision of welfare for dependent populations. With the healthcare crisis produced by the drastic cuts on Medicaid and Medicare enforced by Reagan’s Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act –or OBRA (1981)– and the introduction of financial incentives to public hospitals for the earlier discharge of patients (1983), the healthcare of vulnerable patients was eventually offloaded onto familial care. As public hospitals were already struggling under the combination of austerity measures and an increasing number of impoverished or unemployed –and uninsured– patients, healthcare was shifted into the home and families either through ‘intermittent healthcare visits at home’ or through the revival of ‘centuries-old filial obligation laws’ by states (Cooper, 2017, p.190,197). Against this background, the parallel handling of the AIDS epidemic reinforced familial care in the managing unknown risks. With private insurers placing the HIV-infected as uninsurable risks, the healthcare of HIV-patients was to be borne either by the public health sector or the family. However, as the public health sector was unable to respond, charitable and familial care became the only optionⁱ. Paradoxically, instead of sticking to demands for state welfare, the gay community affected by state abandonment during the AIDS pandemic resorted to

neoliberal notions of family responsibility to demand for same sex marriage^j. Based on the private insurance of the family, the same sex campaign was framed as a strategy to ‘live independently of the state’ (Cooper, 2017, p.211). Thus, the AIDS epidemic had eventually served to embed the neoliberal notion of family responsibility amid politically active groups previously advocating for the expansion of state welfare beyond the non-normativity of the Fordist family^k. In light of the processual construction of hegemony, over years of neoliberal efforts to reinstate familial responsibilities in the US, families have been placed as the common-sense alternative for the provision of welfare, caregiving, social mobility and as an insurance against unknown risks. As I will suggest, such framings have many corollaries in the Chilean context.

Instrumentalising communities

Like private families, communities have also been subject to neoliberal instrumentalisation. In her book ‘Against the Romance of Community’, Miranda Joseph (2002) argues that community is intertwined in a supplementary relation with capital. As such, communities are not only profoundly shaped by practices of production and consumption but are continuously instrumentalised to enable the flow of capital. Based on ethnographic work^l as well as on a critical reading of the wider discursive deployment of communities, again drawing centrally on the case of the US, Joseph (2002) argues that the instrumentalisation of communities by capital has been enabled by romanticised conceptions of community. Romantic conceptions of community work by positioning communities as detached from and in opposition to capitalism, with the aim of instrumentalising them as its humanising ‘other’ (Joseph, 2002, p.10). Their discursive construction as the ‘other’ of capitalism is produced by locating them ‘in an idealised past, disconnected from the present [and its existing problematics] as if by epochal break’ (Joseph, 2002, p.10). As such, communities are vacated from the historical processes associated with their material construction. Equally, communities are considered as containing a set of inherent values guiding individual moral actions which are passed through generations and escape the logic of the market or the state. In this regard, by positioning communities as parallel to and detached from capital, romantic conceptions of community end up constructing ongoing social issues as the result of society’s detachment from root community values rather than from uneven process of capital accumulation. With communities constructed both as the problem and solution to ongoing social issues, the

author argues that romantic conceptions work supplementing capital, with supplementarity understood in Derridean terms as acting ‘in-the-place-of’ (Of Grammatology, 145, in Joseph, 2002, p.2). In this regard, communities are instrumentalised by capitalist practices and forms of accumulation to retain control over social formations and divert responsibility in the construction of social inequalities. Something similar is highlighted by structuralist scholars such as Jessop (2002) who argues that neoliberalism ‘promote(s) “community” (or a plurality of self-organising communities) as a flanking, compensatory mechanism for the inadequacies of the market mechanism’ (Jessop, 2002, p.455).

The neoliberal instrumentalisation of communities has also been unpacked by governmentality scholars. In mapping the emergence of communities as an object of government in the twentieth century, Rose (1999) explains how communities have become strategic spaces for the reinvention of government amid ongoing tendencies for the restructuration and dismantling of the welfare state. Interestingly, Joseph’s (2002) interpretation of community as simultaneously being the problem and the solution is coincident with Rose’s (1999) account of communities as an emerging site of (neo)liberal governmentality. Rose (1999) suggests that the governmental move towards the inclusion of communities as a sector of government and as a site for technical intervention was associated with the emergence of a strong discourse among sociologists during the 1960’s that positioned communities as the ‘antidote to the loneliness and isolation of the individual generated by ‘mass society’ (Rose, 1999, p.169). As well, this double articulation of communities as the problem and the solution became eagerly endorsed by different sectors such as the left and civil republicanism. In response to the ‘crisis and collapse of state socialism’ the left shifted its attention to communities ‘as the antidote both to the state and its bureaucratic apparatus of political administration and control and to the free market’ (Rose, 1999, p.169). For civic republicanism, communities were the solution to the pervasive liberal individualism that had overshadowed the idea of the common good within democratic societies. Against this background, Rose (1999) explains how particularly in the hands of US and UK Third Way neoliberals such as Clinton and Blair, communities became instrumentalised as the strategic space for ‘reinventing government’ amid their overarching efforts of welfare reform. Conceived as the problem and the solution –e.g., communities of welfare recipients, communities were positioned as a common-sense alternative to state welfare. For Third Way reformers, building communities as an alternative to state welfare was achieved through a double movement of autonomisation and responsabilisation in which

by being recognised as autonomous ‘partners’ of the state, communities were simultaneously devolved ‘a portion of the responsibility’ for solving social issues previously attended by the state (Rose, 1999, p.174).

According to Joseph (2002), capital works by creating and displacing communities. Through ethnographic work in the gay and lesbian community in San Francisco, Joseph (2002) shows how the private sector has used ideas about diversity to create a larger community of gay consumers. For instance, she shows how for expanding its market frontiers the communication business AT&T articulated notions of diversity to create a new corporate culture that positioned the business as part of and enhancing a sexually diverse community. For AT&T, greater identity diversity was set to expand the borders of production through creativity and would also empower and incorporate a group of ‘niched’ consumers (Joseph, 2002, p.20). Equally, the creation of communities has been part of governing strategies to devolve them welfare responsibilities. Joseph (2002) suggests that non-profit and non-governmental organisations –as representatives of communities– have been activated in different moments as an alternative to state welfare and as a place for the creation of capitalist subjects in the US. She argues that communities act as ‘sites of incorporation into hegemonic regimes’ (Joseph, 2002, p.12). For instance, she explains how Clinton’s reinvention of private family responsibilities was accompanied by the re-articulation of non-profit associations that, with initiatives such as The Partners for Fragile Families project, funded by the Ford Foundation, were devolved responsibilities for promoting family values and parental responsibility among vulnerable members of communities. Similarly, non-profit and non-governmental organisations have been used by the World Trade Organisation and the IMF to create capitalist subjects and act as alternatives to state-led poverty alleviation strategies, with initiatives such as community-based microcredits (Roy, 2010).

Instrumentalising participation

In unpacking the neoliberal strategies rearticulating the welfare role of the state, critical scholars have brought attention to the role of participation in the responsabilisation of communities and individuals. Unpacking Foucault’s 1979 lectures on neoliberalism as a modern art of government, Lemke suggests that participation has been instrumental to ‘the withdrawal of the state’ (Lemke, 2001, p.203). With neoliberalism defined as a political

project that tries to expand the logic of the market into the social domain, Lemke (2001) argues that the reduction of the welfare role of the state has been associated with a strategy of individual and collective responsabilisation through participation. The withdrawal of the welfare state is achieved by inviting individuals and collectives to increase their 'participation' in 'the solution of specific matters and problems which had hitherto been the domain of state agencies specifically empowered to undertake such tasks' (Lemke, 2001, p.202). In this regard, neoliberal participation enforces the logic of private responsibility in the provision of welfare and caregiving by mainstreaming entrepreneurial and responsible subjectivities. Participation as the neoliberal strategy for educating responsible subjectivities has also been interpreted by Newman and Tonkens (2011) through the lens of 'active citizenship'. In their edited book unpacking ongoing restructuration processes of Western European welfare states, the authors illustrate how the construction of active forms of citizenship has been instrumental for devolving significant welfare and caregiving responsibilities onto individuals and communities. Even though processes of responsabilisation are context-specific, the authors argue that responsible subjectivities are constructed through active forms of participation encouraging individuals and communities to take part in the delivery of caregiving and welfare as co-producers and partners. Active citizenship also works by making them responsible for 'enhancing their [own] health and wellbeing' (Newman & Tonkens, 2011, p.185).

Dagnino (2010) also coincides with interpretation of the neoliberal instrumentalisation of participation as a strategy for rearticulating the welfare role of the state. In her account of how citizenship participation in Latin America fluctuates between democratic and neoliberal frameworks, she argues that contrary to democratic forms of participation in which the state shares meaningful decision-making powers with civil society, such as the case of Budgetary Participation in Brazil, neoliberal participation is about installing a logic of economic efficiency into the state by transferring 'the state's social responsibilities to individuals, civil society groups and the private sector' (Dagnino, 2010, p.31). Neoliberal forms of citizen participation consist of participatory public policy programs in which impoverished citizens take a substantial role in their execution, or of citizen organisations that work executing social policies and services previously provided by the state; generally referred to as the 'Third Sector' (Dagnino, 2010, p.32). Interestingly, in her explanations of neoliberal participation, Dagnino refers to one of the cases unpacked in this thesis: the Chilean participatory program for the reduction of poverty called 'Fondo de Solidaridad y Inversión

Social (FOSIS)' (Dagnino, 2010, p.34). Overall, the author argues that cost-effective forms of neoliberal participation not only result in the depoliticisation of social movements as these are 'attracted by the opportunities offered by the state to engage in the execution of public policies' (Dagnino, 2010, p.32) but also it enables the concentration of power and control within the neoliberal state.

Traces of how participation has been instrumentalised for neoliberal ends also comes through scholarly understandings of participation being 'Janus-faced'. Within critical academic work on development (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Hickey & Mohan, 2004) and citizenship (Dagnino, 2007, 2010; Marinetto, 2003; Newman & Tonkens, 2011) the notion of Janus-faced participation has been used to describe the contradictory forms it can take depending on the rationales under which it is instrumentalised. Janus face of participation is considered as shaped by contrasting governing rationales. When used as a disciplinary governing technique for the activation of individuals and communities, participation is considered as instrumental to the neoliberal strategy of transferring responsibilities and rolling back the social state (Marinetto, 2003; Newman & Tonkens, 2011; Rose, 1999). In contrast, when framed under a progressive democratic framework, it is conceived as an opportunity to challenge the neoliberal hegemonic project and reimagine state projects (Dagnino, 2010; Newman, 2014; Newman & Clarke, 2014). In this regard, participation has been described as having either emancipatory or disciplinary effects. For instance, when understood in terms of grassroot forms of 'collective agency' it has been described as having empowering effects. In contrast, when used as a governing technique it can have disciplinary effects by imprinting new subjectivities instrumental to neoliberal rule, such as active and entrepreneurial subjectivities (Newman & Tonkens, 2011, p.198). Equally, participation has been conferred either empowering or disempowering effects. This has been described as depending on the extent to which it alters the distribution of power (Fung & Wright, 2011; Hickey & Mohan, 2004), or embodies a stabilising strategy that perpetuates its unequal configuration (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Moini, 2011). As I underline in this thesis, these contradictory dynamics and understandings can have interrelate and blur in complex ways within would-be progressive governing projects—complexity that demands more unpacking in the Chilean state context and beyond.

Consolidating the neoliberal hegemonic project amid crises and contestation

Embedding the neoliberal project

Returning to considerations of the neoliberal project as a whole, many scholars have argued that its persistence as a hegemonic condition thus far has depended on the capacity of diverse political and governing projects to embed and adapt neoliberal ideas and strategies amid crises and contestation. In this regard, critical scholars have pointed out to the effects of its processual embedding and the creative-destructive nature of neoliberal policies. Through a historical account of the main shifts of neoliberal policy in the US and the UK, Peck and Tickell (2002) uncover how the processual embedding of neoliberal ideas and strategies has been instrumental to its construction as a hegemonic project. Understanding neoliberalisation ‘as a process, not an end-state’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.383), they argue that the survival of the neoliberal project to multiple crisis –external and internal– results from the capacity of diverse political and governing projects to adapt and transform governing strategies while maintaining the neoliberal ideological construct based on market rule. In addition to suggesting that the consolidation of the neoliberal project has been enabled through intertwined roll-out and roll-back processes, as mentioned above, they show how each of these phases has emerged as a response to specific crisis. For instance, the authors explain how the initial installation of the neoliberal project through roll-back strategies took place during the macroeconomic crisis of the Keynesian model in 1970. The crisis of the Keynesian model provided the conditions to transform the neoliberal ideas cultivated by intellectuals such as Hayek and Friedman into ‘the state-authored restructuring projects of Thatcher and Reagan’ (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.388). Equally, the authors suggest that its roll-out phase emerged as a response to the internal crises generated by roll-back neoliberal policies. In fact, they highlight that the roll-out phase ‘reflects a series of politically and institutionally mediated responses to the manifest failings of the Thatcher/Reagan project’ such as unemployment, uneven development and economic stagnation. As such, it ‘represents both the frailty of the neoliberal project and its deepening’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Peck & Tickell, 2002)^m.

Similarly, Jessop (2013) suggests that the processual character of neoliberalisation has been pivotal for the embedding and survival of the neoliberal hegemonic project. In an article

intended to bring together different notions of neoliberalism, Jessop (2013) not only endorses hegemonic understandings but also suggests that the hegemonic neoliberal project is enabled by the lingering effects of the restructuring policies implemented during roll-back phases: ‘the project still dominates world society thanks to the path-dependent effects of policies, strategies and structural shifts that were implemented during that highpoint’ (Jessop, 2013, p.72). Jessop (2013) even suggests that amid emerging scenarios of post-neoliberalism like Morales's Bolivia (Goldstein, 2012) or other left-wing progressive governing projects in Latin America, ‘it will prove hard to reverse the legacies of roll-back, roll-forward and blow-back neoliberalism’ (Jessop, 2013, p.73). In this thesis, insights about the effects of the processual embedding of neoliberal ideas and strategies are critical for understanding how progressive governing projects are held-back by the lingering effects of roll-back policies. For instance, progressive local governing projects working to expand access to welfare entitlement for older populations are being held-back by the limited devolution of autonomy.

Critical scholars also suggest that the consolidation of neoliberal ideas and strategies has been enabled by processes of creative-destruction of inherited institutional landscapes. Defining ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ as the context-specific form of the neoliberal project (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.349), Brenner and Theodore (2002) propose to read neoliberalisation as a process through which neoliberal policies and inherited institutional landscapes shape each other dialectically. In this regard, actually existing forms of neoliberalism are the result of ongoing processes of ‘creative destruction’ characterised by ‘the (partial) destruction of extant institutional arrangements and political compromises through market-oriented reform initiatives; and the (tendential) creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification and the rule of capital’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.362). For instance, the ‘dismantling of traditional national relays of welfare service provision’ can be read as a moment of destruction giving space for the creation of an institutional arrangement intended for the ‘devolution of social welfare functions to lower levels of government, the social economy and households’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.365). In this regard, the destruction and creation of institutional and governing landscapes strengthens the processual embedding of neoliberal ideas and strategies as these become intertwined with context specific common senses and governing practice.

Creative strategies

Considering that a hegemonic position is constructed in a relation of force with other alternative political and ideological projects, the hegemonic condition of the neoliberal project also rests on the capacity of diverse political and governing projects to address contestation. That neoliberalism produces counter-effects and contestation has been widely acknowledged by scholars as a part of the contradictory nature of neoliberal policies (Geddes, 2011, 2014; Guarneros-Meza & Geddes, 2010; Hart, 2014; Harvey, 2013; Peck, 2012). As mentioned above, these contradictory effects have been explained as part of the internal ‘disjunctures’ of the neoliberal project (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.352). Even though ‘neoliberal ideology implies that self-regulating markets will generate an optimal allocation of investments and resources, neoliberal political practice has generated pervasive market failures, new forms of social polarisation and a dramatic intensification of uneven development at all spatial scales’ (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p.352). As such, contestation emerges in response to its multiple contradictions. For instance, in ‘austerity urbanism’ Peck (2012) unpacks how a new wave of austerity policies at the urban level in the US have not only resulted in the incapacitation of local governments to respond to the emerging needs of the population but also how these policies have been key in animating different forms of resistance due to the instability produced by retrenched ‘small-state solutions’ (Peck, 2012, p.649). This also coincides with Hart’s (Hart, 2014) work in post-apartheid South Africa. She argues that one of the contradictions of neoliberal policies that try to impose ‘fierce fiscal austerity combined with massive new responsibilities for local governments’ (Hart, 2014, p.83) is that municipalities have come to represent key sites of contestation to neoliberal strategies and the unfolding of political struggles (Hart, 2014). In this context, contestation has not only been associated with a politics of resistance and ‘anti’ discourses (Ferguson, 2010) but also has expanded to other less overt strategies that try to ‘rework’ or ‘supplant’ neoliberal ideas and strategies. These novel forms of contestation comprise lobbying and legislative action, alternative knowledge production, development of counter-neoliberal social and economic practices and the installation of alternative governing projects at the local level (Ferguson, 2010; Leitner et al., 2007; Rondelez, 2021). Overall, scholarly understandings of how neoliberal policies and restructuring processes such as top-down devolution of welfare responsibilities end up animating different forms of contestation is central to this research. For instance, the devolution of welfare responsibilities onto

hollowed-out local governments in Chile has been key in engendering alternative governing projects that contest –to different extents– the lack of welfare provision by central state.

As hegemony is never final and needs to be constantly reworked, political and governing projects trying to reassert the hegemonic position of neoliberal ideas and strategies have deployed diverse strategies to control and co-opt counter-neoliberal ideas and projects. Through a Gramscian lens, a distinctive strategy has been that of *trasformismo*. Based on International Political Economy readings of Gramsci (Cox, 1983; Paterson, 2009), who used the notion of *trasformismo* to explain the Italian politics of Giovanni Giolitti of building a broader political coalition by co-opting working-class leadership (Cox, 1983), *trasformismo* has been defined as a recurring strategy of dominant hegemonic forces to address periods of fracturing consent and instability threatening a hegemonic project (Bates, 2013; Paterson, 2009). As such, *trasformismo* consists of the underhanded co-optation of ideas and leadership through processes of ideational distortion and incorporation. Ideational distortion works by absorbing the languages of opposing leaderships and organisations ‘into the official documents, policies and procedures of the target political institutions’ (Paterson, 2009, p.47). In this regard, the strategy of *trasformismo* ‘works like a mirror’ (Paterson, 2009, p.47), giving the impression that alternative ideas or demands are being addressed, while in practice, are being stripped of their original meaning to prevent further opposition. Critical scholars have argued that the strategy of *trasformismo* has been used by neoliberal international governing project such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Paterson, 2009) and the World Bank (Leal, 2007) to phase out mounting opposition. For instance, in analysing the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) response to a wave of anti-globalisation protests and discontent over the socio-environmental externalities of international trading – epitomised in the 1999 ‘Battle of Seattle’, Paterson (2009) suggests that the WTO used *trasformismo* to deflect criticism and accountability. Through a strategy of ideational distortion, the WTO was reframed within official documents as promoting ‘fair trade’ (Hewitt, 2001 in Paterson 2009, p.49), contributing to the alleviation of poverty, the promotion of peace and the caring for the environment. At the same time, the WTO initiated a process of incorporation of progressive leadership through the inclusion of Alter-NGOs into decision-making processes through participatory instances. However, the participation of Alter-NGOs was restricted to ‘observer status’ (Paterson, 2009, p.52).

Trasformismo has been considered as having re-politicising effects instrumental to the preservation of the hegemonic neoliberal project. Alluding to the idea of ‘incorporation’ as a strategy to exercise control, Leal (2007) uses Gramsci’s lens of *trasformismo* to explain how radical forms of participation based on the ‘Marxist-oriented school of participatory action research’ (PAR) (Leal, 2007, p.543), were co-opted by the World Bank as a method of deterrence of social discontentⁿ. Similar to the WTO’s strategy of *trasformismo* described by Paterson (2009), the World Bank shifted its official language to adopt progressive notions about participation –such as notions of it as democratic and empowering, and designed a set of methodological packages and techniques to prescribe participation as the main strategy for the alleviation of poverty and for achieving sustainable development. The instrumentalisation of progressive notions of participation becomes evident within the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 2000. Even though participation appears as one of the main methodological strategies for halving poverty by 2015, the declaration maintains an ‘ambiguous stance’ about its root causes (Leal, 2007, p.543). In this regard, Leal (2007) suggests that instead of having de-politicising effects –as suggested by Cooke & Kothari (2001)– the neoliberal instrumentalisation of participation should be read as having re-politicising effects as under its new co-opted form, participation ‘inevitable serve[s] to justify, legitimise and perpetuate [the] current neo-liberal hegemony’ (Leal, 2007, p.544). An analytical understanding of *trasformismo* and its working through processes of ideational distortion is central to this research. As I demonstrate in this thesis, the neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive ideas about participation has been key for rendering preventive subjectivities in old age and responsabilising older individuals in the prevention of dependencies. The same strategy has been used in responsabilising communities in the welfare and caregiving of older populations. Equally, by using instrumentalised ideas about participation –such as notion of it as preventive of dependencies, counter-neoliberal local governing projects end up being held-back in the advancement of progressive policies.

Resurfacing the case of Chile

Strikingly, mainstream scholarship on the neoliberal hegemonic project has limited its analysis of the Chilean case to that of the first place of implementation of the neoliberal policies of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics. Its analytical relevance has been restricted to that of the laboratory-like context enabled by Pinochet’s authoritarian rule (Klein, 2008; Peck, 2010). Nonetheless, the processual embedding of the neoliberal

hegemonic project and its effects on populations has not stopped there. As argued by critical scholars in Chile (Benwell et al., 2021; Bustos-Gallardo et al., 2019; Bustos-Gallardo, 2021a; Hiner et al., 2021; Moya, 2013; Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019; Salazar-Vergara, 2019; Toro & Navarrete-Hernandez, 2022), the Chilean case continues to speak to the survival and re-invention of neoliberal ideas and strategies amid a changing socio-political landscape. In this regard, by critically analysing how the ‘actually existing’ neoliberal context in Chile permeates and conditions the governing of older populations, I intend to add to scholarly efforts unpacking how the case of Chile continues to speak to the processual reinvention of the neoliberal project. As a stepping stone, in this section, I lay the basis for analysing how the case of Chile is illuminating when it comes to the neoliberal instrumentalisation of the state. Beginning with the forceful implementation of neoliberal policies during the military rule of dictator Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990), the neoliberal project restructured the Chilean state through radical roll-back policies that, as I explore in the following chapters, continue to influence how critical social issues are governed in a renewed roll-out phase.

The state restructuring policies implemented during the military dictatorship of Pinochet (1973-1990) were primarily aimed at transforming the relationship of the Chilean state with the market and its role in the provision of social security. Since the military coup of 1973 until the return of democracy in 1990, the Chilean welfare project –initiated with the first welfare and labour laws during the 1920’s and 1930’s– experienced a radical dismantling process targeting its political, economic and institutional structure. First, the military restructuration targeted its corporatist-political structure. Despite the implementation of universalising welfare policies during the 1960s and early 1970s, the military regime blamed the corporatist character of the welfare governing project for the existing conditions of extreme poverty. Since workers accessed social welfare through union organisations^o, the Chicago Boy ideologues argued that the unequal concentration of ‘benefits in some sectors’ was in direct detriment of ‘the population in greatest need’, and therefore, conditions of extreme poverty were the result of the ‘misuse of political power’ (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1992, p.28). Moreover, the military regime blamed the collective and political nature of the welfare governing project for the inflationary tendencies within the national economy, as it was considered the source of the growing fiscal deficit. As an alternative, the military regime embraced the neoliberal ideas proposed by the Chicago School of Economics led by Milton Friedman, as it promised ‘sustained economic development, increase the wellbeing of the population, discipline social actors and lead to abandoning collectivism in

favour of defending individual interests and entrepreneurship' (Farías-Antognini, 2019, p.120; Taylor, 2006). Thus, based on the discursive articulation of the failures of welfare projects, the military regime justified the suppression of the National Congress and the activities of political parties and labour organisations, paving the way to conduct a violent transformation of the Chilean state without opposition.

The dismantling of the corporatist-political structure of the Chilean state was followed by the economic system. At the basis of the welfare governing projects was the economic model of Industrialisation by Import Substitution (*Industrialización por Sustitución de Importaciones – ISI*). This model had been implemented since 1930 as the alternative to the economic crisis produced due to the decline in saltpetre and copper exports and the macroeconomic effects of the Great Depression. It promoted the creation of national industries in strategic areas of production such as energy and fuel, agriculture, mining and industry, in which the state acted as the main developer and protector through foreign exchange and import policies, public subsidies and the creation of the Production Development Corporation (*Corporación de Fomento a la Producción –CORFO*) in 1939. Therefore, the first neoliberal reforms implemented between 1973 and 1978 were directed toward the economic role of the Chilean state, displacing it as the main promoter of economic development in favour of the market. Highlighted in the book that contained the main neoliberal policies proposed by the Chicago Boys –called '*El Ladrillo*' (The Brick), Chilean neoliberals advocated for 'the use of the market for the efficient allocation of resources' (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1992, p.62) over the developmental role of the State (Peck, 2010). This was the basis for opening the national economy to international markets and agents and implementing privatisation schemes directed toward national industries, banks and services; a roll-back strategy that was later extended to the restructuring of the welfare role of the Chilean state.

The scope of neoliberal reforms was not limited to the political-economic architecture of the state but expanded to displace its role in the provision of social welfare through commodification strategies. With the assurance of eight additional years in power after the repressive plebiscite of 1978 and the promulgation of a new Political Constitution in 1980, the authoritarian regime implemented 'a series of dramatic institutional reforms named the 'Seven Modernisations'' (Taylor, 2006, p.85). These reforms were intended to restructure 'the institutions governing labour relations, education, health and social security provision, judicial procedure, decentralisation and [the] agrarian reform' through large privatisation

schemes (Taylor, 2006, p.85). The idea was to consolidate the primacy of market mechanisms in the allocation and distribution of social security and services. One of the most radical reforms was the privatisation of the pension system which not only resulted in private companies administering pension funds –organised under the Pension Fund Association, or AFP– but in transforming pensions as an individual responsibility and as an opportunity for private capitalisation (Taylor, 2006). In parallel to the privatisation schemes, the neoliberal project developed a regressive conception of social welfare toward marginalised populations. Social welfare was characterised by the implementation of a targeting system based on a cost-effective rationale to prevent the budget overload of the Treasury and ‘[the] bureaucratic swelling of the State’ (Salazar-Vergara, 2019, p.237). The targeting approach was strategic to the construction of a new ‘assistance’ role of the state characterised by the restricted allocation of social benefits only to those under conditions of extreme poverty and unable to access commodified forms of welfare.

Mirroring Jessop’s (2002) description of neoliberal rescaling strategies, the dictatorship also conducted a rescaling of the national state’s functions and activities. The hollowing-out of the Chilean state was achieved by redrawing the public-private boundary and by a process of decentralisation characterised by the top-down devolution of unfunded responsibilities to the smallest administrative tier of the Chilean state: municipalities or local governments. Together with the increasing role of the private sector in the provision of services –including water, telecommunications, sanitation and electricity– and the running of key industries previously owned and administered publicly by the state, the dictatorship also enforced a decentralising process. Similar to Hart’s (2014) description of neoliberal unfunded top-down devolution processes in post-apartheid South Africa, Pinochet’s decentralisation devolved significant responsibilities in the provision of services and the solution of critical social issues to local governments. Compared to previous welfare projects in which healthcare and education were centrally administered and funded to ensure equal access and territorial distribution, responsibility over these critical services –healthcare and education were only partly privatised– were devolved onto local governments. Moreover, local governments’ finances and administrative capacities were being simultaneously degraded under the implementation of a competitive system for accessing resources. In their article unpacking the roll-back and roll-out neoliberal processes experienced by Chilean urban policy, Navarrete-Hernandez and Toro (2019) explain how under what they term a ‘Tiebout-like model’ of municipal income distribution (Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019, p.910), local

governments were no longer funded by the central government but were forced to compete to generate local income through local taxes (more details in Chapter 5 and in Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019). Even though the dictatorship created a system of municipal income distribution designed to compensate for income inequalities –called the Common Municipal Fund (*Fondo Común Municipal*), it only worked by providing survival income to the poorest municipalities. Therefore, as the municipal budget depended on the income of the populations living in its territorial administrative area –called the commune, and on the entrepreneurial and real estate projects that they were able to attract, the quality of the remaining forms of welfare ended up deepening already existing conditions of socio-economic and spatial segregation (Garreton, 2017a, 2017b; Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019; Salazar-Vergara, 2019; Zunino & Hidalgo, 2009).

As I explore in the following chapters, the neoliberal institutional landscape forcefully drawn during the military dictatorship continues to influence the hegemonic character of the neoliberal project in contrasting ways. Paradoxically, the radical neoliberal restructuring of the state is having contradictory effects. As I explore in more detail in Chapters Four, Five and Six, the roll-back character of the state toward older populations is generating multiple forms of contestation. Central state's neglect toward older populations is being contested by counter-neoliberal ideas supported by a rising left-wing bloc and by progressive governing projects at the local level. Mirroring Peck's (2012) and Hart's (2014) ideas on how neoliberal devolution is animating new forms of contestation, Pinochet's radical and unfunded top-down devolution is engendering alternative governing projects at the local level. Based on reworked conceptions of local autonomy and an increasing sense of ownership of critical social issues, local governments are redrawing the state's responsibility in the provision of welfare and caregiving. Cases such as the communist local governing project of Recoleta, the communitarian local governing project of Renca and even the third-way local governing project of Peñalolén, are implementing multiple policies that contest –to different extents– the decentralisation of welfare responsibilities.

Nonetheless, and coinciding with Jessop's (2013) ideas about the effects of roll-back neoliberal policies, the hegemonic condition of the neoliberal project in Chile is significantly mediated by the lingering effects of Pinochet's restructuring policies. For instance, despite various governing efforts and policies implemented in democracy since 1990 'to mitigate the negative social consequences of neoliberal reform(s)' (Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019),

most of the radical reforms implemented between 1973 and 1990 remain in force to date. Initially implemented by governing projects of *La Concertación* and later by the *Nueva Mayoría* –broadly, political coalitions of centre-left, policies designed to expand the state’s role in the provision of social welfare have been largely characterised as comprising a roll-out phase due to the limitations of moving beyond market rationales and the subsidiary role of the state (Garreton, 2017a, 2017b; Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019; Salazar-Vergara, 2019; Zunino & Hidalgo, 2009). In this regard, the rolled-out neoliberal character of the social policies implemented since the return of democracy has been largely conditioned by the limited and eroded ‘capacities of the public sector to regulate economic activities to promote social benefits over private interests’ (Garreton, 2013 in Garreton, 2017b, p. 39). This results from ‘constitutional and legislative restrictions to the scope of public action, limited budgets and a strong influence of private experts and interests over the design of public policies’ (Garreton, 2013 in Garreton, 2017b, p. 39). Notably, in this thesis, I explore how the rolled-back landscape of the state is also limiting the implementation of alternative governing projects at the local level.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have unpacked the analytical framework guiding this thesis: the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project. For this, I have drawn on critical scholarship accounts of the characteristic processes and strategies leading to the construction of a position of leadership of neoliberal ideas and strategies within complex social formations. Based on Hall's reading of Gramsci's Hegemony (Hall, 1986a, 1988, 2011; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016), I was able to distinguish the foundational ideas guiding understandings of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Notably, the explanatory power of an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project lies in its conception of political and ideological leadership as constructed through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent and on a comprehensive understanding of the state (Hall, 1986a, 1988, 2011; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016). In this regard, the construction of a position of leadership of the neoliberal project has been contingent on the capacity of political and governing projects of instrumentalising the state to embed neoliberal ideas and strategies through the articulation of coercion and consent, with the latter profoundly shaped by the embedding of neoliberal ideas as common sense (Hall, 1986a, 2011; Hall & O’Shea, 2013; Harvey, 2005). The processual embedding of neoliberal ideas as common sense has been achieved through the

instrumentalisation of traditionally ingrained ideas –such as ideas about personal freedom and family responsibility, the mobilisation and education of neoliberal ideas and active struggles to undermine opposing ideas. In tandem, the instrumentalisation of the state by neoliberal political and governing projects has been key for ensuring the workings of the markets and for addressing the multiple contradictions emerging from neoliberal policies (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hall, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Lemke, 2001). The instrumentalisation of the state has been achieved through roll-back and roll-out policies and the rescaling of its activities and functions (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Jessop, 2002, 2013; MacLeod, 2001; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Swyngedouw, 1997). Equally, in light of the neoliberal drive of phasing out the welfare role of the state, a significant hegemonic strategy has been that of instrumentalising families, communities and individuals devolving them significant welfare and caregiving responsibilities (Cooper, 2017; Joseph, 2002; Lemke, 2001; Newman & Tonkens, 2011; Rose, 1999).

The explanatory power of an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal political project also resides in Gramsci's Hegemony as never final but in continuous construction through relations of force (Hall, 1986a; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016). Hence, the hegemonic condition of the neoliberal project depends on the capacity of diverse neoliberal governing projects to embed and adapt neoliberal ideas and strategies amid crises and contestation. In this regard, critical scholars suggest that the maintenance of a position of leadership by diverse neoliberal governing projects has been enabled by the effects of its processual embedding, the creative-destructive nature of neoliberal policies, and the implementation of strategies to control and co-opt counter-neoliberal ideas and projects (Brenner & Theodore, 2002; Hall, 2011; Hall & O'Shea, 2013; Jessop, 2002, 2013; Leal, 2007; Paterson, 2009; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Significantly, the capacity of the neoliberal project to rearticulate itself amid crises and contestation has been enabled by its processual embedding through roll-back, roll-out and state restructuring processes (Jessop, 2002, 2013; Peck & Tickell, 2002). Equally, Gramsci's notion of *trasformismo* is illuminating when analysing the capacity of the neoliberal project to address contestation. Processes of ideational distortion have been a key strategy of neoliberal political and governing projects to control and cop-opt counter-neoliberal ideas and projects (Leal, 2007; Paterson, 2009).

As I hinted above and will demonstrate in the following chapters, a hegemonic conception of the neoliberal project is the theoretical engine of this thesis. Notions about neoliberal

hegemony being constructed through the instrumentalisation of traditional forms of common sense (see Chapter Four), the rescaling of state functions and responsibilities through top-down devolution of welfare responsibilities to local governments (see Chapter Five), and the instrumentalisation of progressive ideas (see Chapter Six) are central analytical underpinnings. Also, conceptions about hegemony being constructed in a relation of force, provide a flexible and comprehensive lens for unpacking how the neoliberal project devolving welfare and caregiving responsibilities toward older populations is simultaneously being contested by alternative ideas about state responsibility. In this regard, the effects of neoliberal policies are not only engendering contestation (see Chapters Four, Five and Six) but also neoliberal governing projects are deploying strategies such as ideational distortion to divert potential contestation and future dependencies on central state (see Chapter Six). Significantly, roll-back neoliberal policies such as the devolution of unfunded and limited forms of autonomy to local governments, are holding back the advance of progressive governing projects and ensuring the hegemonic position of neoliberal ideas and strategies (see Chapters Five and Six).

^a As scholarship drawing on the Gramscian notion of hegemony is large I focus mainly on the work of Stuart Hall, one the most influential Gramscian scholars in critical cultural studies. Hall's use of Gramsci's notion of hegemony is situated in his effort to unpack the threefold character of the UK's political conjuncture during the 1980s which was marked by the joint rise of Thatcher's neoliberal political project, 'the crisis of the Left, and the consolidation of identity as a key terrain of political and ideological struggle' (Colpani, 2022, p.224). His aim was to reassert the explanatory powers of Gramsci's theory of hegemony to 'help build an expansive Left' aware of the complex and articulative nature of neoliberal strategies (Colpani, 2022, p.223).

^b In these lectures -transcribed, assembled and edited by Grossberg and Daryl Slack's (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016), Stuart Hall discussed the evolution of Cultural Studies in the UK and how Marxism contributed in different forms to the interpretation of culture, including a lecture on hegemony and domination.

^c The notion of social formation as used by Althusser and colleagues in the 'New Left Books, 1970', in which inspired by Gramsci's antireductionist efforts, they try to overcome the economist limitations of the notions of 'modes of production' and 'invoke the idea that societies are necessarily complexly structured totalities, with different levels of articulation (the economic, the political, the ideological instances) in different combinations; each combination giving rise to a different configuration of social forces and hence to a different type of social development' (Hall, 1986, p.12).

^d A moment that for Gramsci was missing in Italy –before the ascendancy of fascism– as the two dominant politico-economic blocs in the north and in the south had failed 'to work on the terrain of the common sense of ordinary people' to build a wider class alliance that could enable 'the necessary ground on which capitalism [could] develop as a national project' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.173).

^e These interlinked processes have also been referred to as the 'hollowing out' of national states characterised by 'the increased importance of private-public networks to state activities on all levels –from local partnerships to supranational neo-corporatist arrangements' (Jessop, 2002, p. 254).

^f For American neoliberals –epitomised by the thought of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School of Economics, both the self-sufficient family and individual are 'basic manifestation[s] of the free-market order' (Cooper, 2017, p.57), with families constituting a 'kind of natural insurance' (Cooper, 2017, p.60) through the transmission of wealth, private education and caregiving.

^g Blames were placed on a specific welfare program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) that supported mothers and children deprived of a traditional family structure.

^h Replacing the questioned AFDC program with the program Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) designed to enforce ‘paternity obligations’ (Cooper, 2017, p.67), the Clinton administration repurposed the AFDC ‘as an immense federal apparatus for enforcing the “private” responsibilities of family and work’ (Cooper, 2017, p.70)

ⁱ As the AIDS crisis disproportionately affected impoverished and non-normative populations groups of drug users and gays generally excluded from normative family networks, the struggling public health sector – sometimes also exercising moral discriminations against these ‘underserving ill’ (Cooper, 2017, p.203)– was replaced by a left-leaning non-profit sector now excluded from Reagan’s conservative funding. Family responsibility over the caregiving of ill and dependent populations was reinforced by Reagan’s conservative re-articulation of the non-profit sector –that had emerged from the ‘Great Society community action program’– by restricting funding to those promoting normative values about family responsibility and monogamous heterosexuality, generally church-based charities (Cooper, 2017).

^j For neoliberals, marriages served as a natural form of insurance as it would ‘increase the psychological cost of promiscuous sex’ and internalise some of the economic costs ‘by transferring at least some of the burdens of care onto a spouse’ (Cooper, 2017, p.174).

^k While Keynesian welfare advocates thought addressing the AIDS crisis by subsidising safe sex and prevention campaigns, neoliberals considered that the adequate regulatory response was the promotion of marriage as the cost of AIDS was to be borne privately due to its condition as the ‘shadow price’ of a private –and unsafe– lifestyle choice (Cooper, 2017, p.168).

^l In the gay and lesbian community in San Francisco, particularly that of the iconic Theatre Rhinoceros.

^m In a later article, Peck (2013) explains how the hegemonic condition of the neoliberal project has been confirmed and furthered amid new crises such as the global and financial crisis of 2008 (Peck, 2013, p.140).

ⁿ For Leal (2007), the political reason leading to the co-optation of participation was that grassroots participatory action –supported in several places by the Marxist school of PAR– was playing an active role in third world mobilisations against the advancing of the neoliberal project during the Cold War, and later, during the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the World Bank and the IMF under pressures for debt-renegotiation.

^o Even though the model enabled a significant expansion of wages and social welfare, its segmented labour-corporatist structure produced a segregated distribution of benefits which, paired with the inflationary crisis produced by the effects of foreign exchange and import policies, paved the way for the neoliberal restructuring (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1992; Farías-Antognini, 2019; Garretón, 2007).

Chapter Three – Methods

Introduction

This research was significantly shaped by the COVID-pandemic. My original project examined the intersection between two socio-environmental phenomena shaping Chile's urban development, population ageing and increasing susceptibility to disasters due to natural hazards and climate change. Particularly, I was looking into how the Age-Friendly Cities and Communities (AFCC) initiative of the WHO (2007) was being mainstreamed by the central government and implemented within contrasting municipalities in the city of Santiago. One important draw of AFCC as a research object was that I thought its participatory nature would provide useful scope for analysing the role of older people in the co-construction of adaptation strategies. As such, before the COVID-19 outbreak in Chile in March 2020, I was immersed in the second month of research fieldwork in the city of Santiago, Chile. I had planned to conduct ethnographic work comprising participatory observations of the implementation of the AFCC and other municipal programs as the AFCC was just landing, including interviews with central and local level practitioners and with older people participating in AFCC activities and other municipal programs. Quantitative methods had been dismissed as I wanted to go in-depth on the qualitative accounts and sensitivities of older people and practitioners through their lived experiences, and I was interested in maintaining a grounded approach sensitive to emerging narratives and problems (Becker, 1996; Creswell, 2013).

However, the COVID-19 pandemic imposed radical changes on the research. Not only was I unable to continue conducting in-person interviews and participatory observations due to restrictive measures on mobility and social interactions but, most significantly, the older population that I was meant to engage with while exploring the local implementation of municipal AFCC programs was severely affected. Older people were significantly impacted by the devastating COVID-related death toll among this population group and by the impact of restrictive age-related COVID measures on their quality of life. From the beginning of the pandemic, the everyday lives of older Chileans were disrupted due to the enactment of prohibitions such as the permanent suspension of gatherings and activities of clubs of older people –central to their grassroots participation– and the suspension of on-site operations of

multiple central and local programs for older people, such as Day Centres and municipal workshops. The central state also imposed an obligatory quarantine for people aged seventy-five and over throughout the country, independent to the local levels of COVID-19 infection. Added to all this, the unfolding of the pandemic resulted both in the uncovering and escalation of the economic poverty, food insecurity and abandonment experienced by a considerable proportion of Chile's older population (more details in Chapter Four). This was accompanied by an ageist reaction of the media highlighting the fragility and vulnerability of older people. Thus, engaging older populations at that moment raised significant ethical concerns. For example, the likelihood of sensitive topics such as participants' lockdown experience emerging during interviews, potentially triggering uncomfortable feelings and distress.

The changing research context and the complexities of researching issues of ageing during the pandemic forced me to shift my research focus and methods. One might think that I could have explored the COVID-19 pandemic as a disaster but, after a couple of weeks during which I began migrating onto online forms of participatory observation –which included following online news to stay on top of the unfolding of the pandemic in Chile– I realised that local governments were gaining a particularly relevant role in the handling of the pandemic. Municipalities not only acted as the main respondents to the emerging needs of older people –devising multiple strategies for the home delivery of groceries and medicines, among others– but also openly criticised in the media the lack of central government support in the provision of welfare. The latter critiques coincided with some of the concerns shared by policymakers of the two largest associations of municipalities in Chile and by the only local government officer from a municipal office that I was able to interview in person just before the pandemic breakout. Among their main concern was that the existing central-level policies, programs and funding limited the local governments' ability to meaningfully respond to the needs and problems of the older populations; limitations that were only heightened under the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. The general trend of welfare state withdrawal that I had encountered began steering the research focus into how the history of neoliberal policies in Chile and its 'actually existing neoliberalism' was shaping the governing of demographic ageing in Chile.

Along with this shifting research focus, I also had to adapt the research methods. In the remainder of this chapter, I explain how I ended up conducting a hybrid on-site and online

ethnography, through which I explored a wide range of national and local policies and governing projects and conducted in-depth interviews with a wide range of professionals working on issues of ageing. In addition, I consider how the changing research context impacted my positionality and ethical considerations arising in the project. First, I explain the process of conducting semi-structured interviews, discussing how the COVID-19 pandemic impacted their development and increased my dependence on the willingness of online participants to engage on emerging topics and cases. Second, I explain how documentary analysis allowed me to approach the governing of ageing in Chile as a historical and conjunctural process shaped by multiple central and local governing projects. This method helped me gain both a historical and scalar understanding of the country's main challenges and governing strategies around issues of ageing. Third, I explain how participatory observations migrated online and assess the implications of this shift for the research. Though 'hanging around' social media platforms offered a sensible alternative for researching issues of ageing amid COVID-19 restrictions on mobility and social interactions, it prompted several methodological considerations and adjustments. Fourth, I consider how the shifting research focus and methods transformed my positionality. Conditions such as being 'new' to researching issues of ageing and my position as a researcher from a foreign institution conducting 'distant' online research during the pandemic –most interviews were conducted online from Durham, UK– strongly shaped the way I was seen by participants and how I learned about the governing of ageing in Chile. Finally, I explain how the changing research context demanded a constant re-assessment of ethical considerations.

Semi-structured interviews

Interviewing was a central research method. From February 2020 to April 2021, I conducted forty-seven semi-structured interviews, the majority of which were one-to-one except for five group interviews. With the research focused on governing history, rationales and practices directed to older populations, interviewees spanned a variety of professionals working directly and indirectly with the design and implementation of central state and local governing policies and programs. Institutional membership of interviewees comprised central government institutions, seven different local government offices of older people in the city of Santiago (Figure 1) and other related local government departments such as healthcare, research centres, non-governmental organisations and associations of municipalities (list of interviews in Appendix A). Due to COVID-19 restrictions, thirteen of the forty-seven

interviews were conducted in-person and thirty-four were conducted online. Contact was made via email which outlined the research and gave participants the opportunity to consider any involvement. Snowballing was used after developing a first interview with a professional representing an institution of research interest, as I would generally ask for any recommendations to interview other people (Parker et al., 2019). All the interviews were in Spanish and voice recorded after verbal or written consent from participants. Verbal consent became the norm during online interviews and, when conducted online, the main online platforms used were Zoom and Google Meet. In two cases, the interviews were conducted through audio capsules on WhatsApp. The length of the interviews fluctuated from one hour to two and a half.




Figure 1. Localisation of the seven municipalities in the city of Santiago, Región Metropolitana, Chile.

Source: Author.

Considering the COVID-19 disruption to the research, I separate the interviewing process into two phases according to the context and the evolving research aim. During the first phase which took place between February and early March 2020 –just before the COVID-19 outbreak in Chile– I conducted twelve interviews with practitioners and researchers spanning central government institutions such as the National Service for Older People –Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor (SENAMA), the Undersecretary of Regional Development– Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional (SUBDERE), the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, the Universities of Chile and Valparaíso and the two larger association of municipalities. The latter included the all-party Chilean Association of Municipalities (ACHM) and the centre-right Association of Municipalities of Chile (AMUCH.) This phase consisted of an initial exploration of national-level policies on ageing, the implementation of the WHO’s Age-friendly cities and communities’ (AFCC) initiative and the role of municipalities in the implementation of the AFCC and other national-level programs. Researched topics comprised the history and processes of how issues of ageing became a relevant area of public policy, the rationale of the multiple programs directed to older populations and their synergy with the AFCC program and the multiple problems faced by local governments generated by the austere character of central level programs, among others. As I was also interested in local governments’ implementation of AFCC and other programs, I conducted a first interview with an officer of a local government’s office of older people. Even though these interviews were conducted in light of my pre-COVID research framework, their contextual character and the insights emerging from the ongoing explorations, such as the role of participation and the discontent of local governments over the lack of central government funding and programs, continued to inform and shape my research.

The second phase, which took place between mid-March 2020 and April 2021, was marked by the COVID-19 pandemic and the challenges of adapting the research focus and methods. Considering that the research focus was leaning towards the governing of demographic ageing in Chile and the emerging evidence on the problems faced by local governments, I conducted twenty-three semi-structured interviews –four of these was a group interview– with practitioners and program participants of municipal offices for older people, fourteen interviews with policymakers from central government –one of these was a group interview– and ten with other institutions related to the governing of issues of ageing. Regarding my explorations of local governing practices, I investigated the experiences and programs of seven municipalities in the city of Santiago. These municipalities represent the contrasting

socio-economic segregation of the city. Chile's municipal budgets are highly dependent on local tax revenues from property taxes, commercial permits and car permits. This fiscal decentralisation and devolution creates an uneven landscape of municipal budgets in Santiago, characterised by high-income municipalities with annual budgets almost ten times higher than lower-income municipalities. This contrasting landscape is reflective of the profound inequalities resulting from years of neoliberal policies initiated during the military dictatorship (see Chapter Five). To gain a sense of how the unequal distribution of municipal budgets was impacting the governing of older populations, I included a set of more than less wealthy municipalities in the analysis: the high-income municipalities of Las Condes and Santiago, and the medium to low-income municipalities of Renca, Conchalí, Cerro Navia, Peñalolén and Recoleta (Figure 2). Topics discussed with local government practitioners comprised the history of the local government offices for older people, their pre-pandemic programs, their relationship with central government, disruptions encountered under COVID-19 and the main challenges pre- and post-pandemic in addressing the emerging needs of older populations, among others. Even though there was a set of predefined topics to be discussed with local government practitioners, I tried to keep an open dialogue to provide ample space for emerging topics (Valentine, 2005). During the second interviewing phase I also conducted twelve interviews with practitioners from the central government, associations of municipalities researchers and non-governmental organisations to grasp how the pandemic impacted governing practice and uncovered lingering problems. For instance, considering the role of municipalities in the two-day philanthropic TV Show '*Vamos Chilenos*' (more details in Chapter Four), I was able to conduct a second interview with practitioners of the two associations of municipalities just a couple of days after the event.

Focusing on specific cases was also part of this second phase. I was unable to research the seven municipalities in equal depth, for varying reasons. External factors such as lack of support from local government officials in redirecting me to other potential participants, or participants' willingness to conduct a second round of interviews, impacted the possibilities of gathering further data and exploring emerging issues at length. For instance, conducting group interviews to deepen discussions of specific programs was only possible in two municipalities –Peñalolén and Renca– and emerged from the generosity of participants. The focus group conducted with volunteers of the program *Somos Renca* (more details in Chapter Six) emerged from a spontaneous offering by one of the program's coordinators, who suggested that I should learn about the program from the volunteers themselves. Equally, as

the research unfolded, I realised that three of these municipalities were not only trying to do things differently –such as expanding access to welfare for older populations and redrawing the meanings of participation– but also represented alternative governing projects to neoliberal rule. Thus, under the combination of greater willingness from local government officials to contribute to the research and my own research interest, I was able to conduct more in-depth analysis in the cases of the communist local governing project of Recoleta, the communitarian local governing project of Renca and the third-way local governing project of Peñalolén.




Figure 2. Annual per capita budget of municipalities of the capital city of Santiago in 2021

Source: Author, from public data available in the National Municipal Information System (*Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal –SINIM*) accessed in April 2023. Researched municipalities in red.

Conducting semi-structured interviews was a flexible approach to addressing the challenges posed by a changing research context. It was not only an effective way of engaging different

actors and ‘learning’ about different topics and perspectives through conversation (Crang & Cook, 2007; Valentine, 2005) but also interviews were easily adapted into online environments and allowed me to extend fieldwork upon my return to the UK. Equally, as the emergence of novel topics was a common trend, online interviewing was a flexible option to repeat interviews with practitioners with tight schedules to engage further on specific topics that became relevant as the research unfolded. Even though semi-structured interviews consist of having an initial set of questions, this was not a limiting factor to the scope of addressed topics. On the contrary, it proved practical for crossing a first ‘entry’ barrier, as in some cases participants would ask me to send the list of questions prior to the interview. Moreover, as the conversation went along, most participants felt comfortable expanding deeper into emerging topics –not included within the first set of questions. It is also important to note that as the research focus shifted, some of the interviews conducted were not ultimately considered within the analysis. Interviews conducted with policymakers of the National Service for Disaster Prevention and Response (*Servicio Nacional de Prevención y Respuesta ante Desastres* –SENAPRED) and the Ministry of Housing were not included as the topics addressed within them –such as Disaster Risk Reduction and the role of housing in the AFCC programs– were no longer part of the research aim.

As noted above, the willingness of participants played a significant role in the development of the research. As researching online prevented me from accessing new participants through on-site contact with people and by participating in local government activities, I heavily relied on the willingness of interviewees to redirect me to other practitioners. Fortunately, most participants were interested in the research topic and willing to share their experiences, email specific materials and documents, as well as redirecting me to other potential participants. The generosity of participants not only conditioned the possibilities of deepening analysis of specific programs and cases but also influenced the depth of conversations possible about sensitive topics. Despite the sensitivity of some topics –e.g., discontent over the central government’s programs– I rarely encountered censorship. Instead of asking me to stop the voice recording or censor a section of the conversation, sensitive insights conveyed by participants were only labelled as ‘personal opinions’. In this context, it is important to mention that practitioners were considerably concerned and engaged in improving the quality of life of the older populations. Many of them shared progressive imaginaries about the need for greater provision of welfare and caregiving by the state, promoting meaningful forms of participation, among others. In this regard, the research's

insights about the ways in which neoliberal ideas are capable of holding back progressive ideas are not intended as a critique of their progressive ideas and efforts but rather, as an opportunity to reflect on how progressive projects can avoid complying with neoliberal objectives.

Documentary analysis

In exploring how demographic ageing is governed in Chile through the governing of older populations, another key method was the analysis of historical and current policy documents informing governing practice at international, national and local levels. I conducted discourse analysis of forty-three policy documents comprising twenty-two historical documents of national-level policies and programs on demographic ageing, six documents of current national-level policy and programs directed to older people, five international policy guidelines and international agreements including those on human rights of older people, three presidential speeches associated with the creation of the National Service for Older People (*Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor* –SENAMA) and seven local government policy documents including local development plans and healthcare plans (list of documents in Appendix B). All these documents were accessed online between January 2020 and December 2021 either from public archives, online repositories, websites of relevant bodies or through the help of public officials who kindly sent specific program or policy documents by email after discussing them over interviews. As these documents were written in Spanish, I translated quotes upon their relevance to the research findings and the final thesis text. Considering the timeframe of the first programs and policies developed for older populations, my documentary analysis dedicates particular attention to the democratic neoliberal governing projects up to the second governing period of the right-wing president Sebastian Piñera (2018-2022), including the progressive centre-left governing projects of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010; 2014-2018).

The analysis of the twenty-two historical policy documents sits with the analytical approach contained in Gramsci's notion of hegemony as a historically grounded and evolving process. Considering Gramsci's processual understanding of hegemony, (Hall, 1986b, 1988, 2011), the analysis of how neoliberal ideas and governing strategy have been historically embedded and reworked within policy documents to maintain a position of hegemony was key for this research. Reading current governing strategies and struggles through a historical perspective

not only enabled me to trace the construction of the neoliberal approach to the governing of ageing but, from a methodological perspective, it proved beneficial for understanding the roots of existing problems emerging from the interviews and participatory observations while avoiding partial interpretations (Mayhew, 2003; Roche, 2005). Historical documents were eye-opening. Apart from providing a general context to ‘when’ issues of ageing became a relevant governing topic, historical documents enabled me to get a sense of how discourses and governing strategies around issues of ageing shifted between different governing projects. For instance, the pedagogical shift of the Chilean state that took place with the return of democracy (1990) became clear when analysing the first set of policy documents designed by the National Committee for Older People (Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor –CNAM). Released between 1998 and 1999, these pedagogical manuals aimed at mainstreaming responsible and autonomous subjectivities through novel notions of ‘active ageing’, as well as reinforcing traditional forms of familial care (see Chapters Four and Six). At the same time, the historical compilation of Congress discussions (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002) leading to the creation of the National Service for Older People (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor –SENAMA), which contained verbatim transcriptions of Congress debates, was key for tracing the neoliberal roll-out character of the governing strategies directed to older populations, and the contested role of hollowed-out municipalities struggling to improve the quality of life of older populations and meaningfully respond to emerging critical issues such as the need for caregiving and welfare (see Chapter Five). Together with historical documents, the analysis of presidential speeches was strategic for interpreting current policy documents in light of their political context and temporality, which in tandem, also provided the grounds for enriching the analysis of the problems voiced through interviews, particularly those raised by local governments and associations of municipalities (see Chapters Four and Five).

Analysis of more recent policy documents produced at international, national and local levels was not only key for contextualising the analysis of the problems voiced through interviews but also for developing a scalar understanding of how neoliberal and progressive rationales permeate governing practice and are negotiated at national and local levels. For instance, I realised that international policy frameworks advocating for a rights-based approach to older populations, such as the regional suggestions provided by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, 2006a, 2006b) to comply with the economic, social and cultural

rights established within the Human Rights Convention, were central for the progressive shift implemented during the alternating governing projects of centre-left president Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010; 2014-2018). These international policy guidelines continue to inform progressive efforts at the local level (see Chapters Four, Five and Six). For instance, under efforts to expand access to welfare entitlements, the local government of Peñalolen has implemented and funded local programs on caregiving (see Chapter Five). Similarly, neoliberal hegemony has taken hold of national-level policy frameworks and programs to instil neoliberal rationales and governing practices at the local level. Despite the progressive governing efforts of local governments, neoliberal rationales have permeated the local governing practice. As I explain in Chapter Six, the neoliberal medicalised approach to participation inscribed within the Comprehensive National Policy of Positive Ageing and within programs such as Day Centres for older people has permeated the participatory local governing approach of the communist municipality of Recoleta in the city of Santiago. It is important to highlight that to avoid biased interpretations from documentary analysis alone (Robson & McCartan, 2016), these readings were always accompanied and filtered against the views and voices of officials from local governments and municipality associations as they were the ones working on the policy environments constructed through these policy frameworks and negotiating their implementation on the ground. For obvious reasons, such as being at the centre of the production of national policy, officials at the national level were less critical when considering the implications of national-level policy frameworks in the quality of life of older populations.

Participatory observation

As part of my initial research project, I had planned to conduct a participatory observation of the local governments' activities and programs directed at older populations with particular attention to those related to the WHO's initiative of Age-friendly Cities and Communities. Therefore, just before the start of the COVID-19 pandemic breakout in Chile, I had already attended two activities of the municipality of Recoleta in the city of Santiago, which was the first local government that I contacted after an initial round of interviews with central government officials and other practitioners in February 2020. After a first interview with a local government officer of the municipal office of older people, I was kindly invited to attend the annual celebration of the start of the program for older people of the municipality and a capacity-building workshop designed to help organised groups of older people apply to

the participatory National Fund for Older People of SENAMA. At that moment, participatory observation was proving to be a significant complementing tool to the conduct of semi-structured interviews (Crang & Cook, 2007). Together with some glimpses emerging in the interviews, I was already realising the importance of participation in the governing of older populations at local and national levels. Nonetheless, with the pandemic breakout, on-site observations had to be halted.

Despite not being able to proceed with the on-site participant observations, I was able to get a sense of what was going on by ‘hanging around’ on social media and online news platforms. I benefited from the fact that as COVID-19 regulations imposed a limit on social-gatherings and on-site activities beyond the essential –e.g., essential work travels, grocery and pharmacy shopping, attending medical appointments, etc., social media became a key site for communication and the development of activities. For instance, some of the local governments’ activities directed to older populations who were most affected by COVID-19 regulations took place in online platforms –e.g., the municipality of Recoleta celebrated the day of older people in Facebook (October 2020). Hanging around on social media enabled me to access multiple materials that, together with online interviewing, helped me to make sense of the main issues affecting older populations and the governing strategies set in place. I also followed online news^a about the unfolding of the pandemic to stay on top of the evolving restrictions imposed on older populations and the unfolding of other events such as political discussions about the withdrawal of pension funds. The latter was not included in the research as it would have resulted in another thesis on itself.

Through platforms such as Instagram, Twitter and Facebook, I followed the official accounts of the National Service for Older People –@SENAMAGOB and the official accounts of the local governments I was researching and of their respective mayors –e.g., Instagram accounts of the mayors of Renca (claudiocastrosalas), Peñalolén (carolina.leitao_) and Recoleta (danieljaduejadue). These platforms were useful for accessing relevant information that complemented the critical findings of the research. For instance, when researching the communitarian governing project of the local government of Renca and how it negotiated neoliberal conceptions of older people’s participation (more details in Chapter Six), social platforms such as Instagram and Twitter were key for gathering evidence about the mayor Claudio Castro’s conception of communitarianism. The mayor’s Instagram profile not only reads ‘In times of individualism, nothing more revolutionary than the community’ but also I

was able to access communitarian ideas through the official Twitter account of the municipality of Renca (@Muni_Renca). The latter had published the mayor's communitarian perspective during a forum of local governments organised by mayors and political representatives from centre-left parties titled 'Creating Community'. It was also through Twitter that I heard for the first time about the state-supported philanthropic charitable TV show called *Vamos Chilenos* (Let's Go Chileans) that raised money to implement a tech solution to the familial neglect experienced by the 80,000 vulnerable and abandoned older people uncovered during the COVID-19 pandemic.

During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic in Chile between early 2020 and mid-2021, social media platforms not only became one of the main sites for local government and central government communications but also for contestation. When conducting the online participatory observation of the two-day philanthropic charitable TV show called *Vamos Chilenos* (Let's Go Chileans), I realised that Twitter had become a central platform of social contestation. As social media platforms such as Twitter had become one of my regular sites for staying on top of the main events around issues of ageing, I began following all conversations happening under the #*VamosChilenos* while watching the unfolding of the TV show. In this regard, the opposition to the charitable nature of the TV show and the lack of provision of welfare and caregiving from central and local states voiced on Twitter, was closely informed by the anti-neoliberal common sense guiding the social uprising of 2019 and historically constructed by a rising left-wing bloc able to flag the retrogressive outcomes of neoliberal policies. As I discuss further in Chapter Four, the kind of contestation taking place under the #*VamosChilenos* mirrored what other authors had uncovered for the case of Chile in that pandemic had resulted in the migration of social contestation and debates over the new constitution into alternative social platforms (Badilla Rajevic, 2020; Luna et al., 2022; Pinochet-Cobos, 2021). Therefore, as I demonstrate in Chapter Four, social media platforms were a key site for analysing the unfolding disputes over the governing approach toward abandoned and vulnerable populations amid the double conjuncture of the social uprising of 2019 and the COVID-19 pandemic.

'Hanging around' on social media platforms prompted several methodological considerations and adjustments. For instance, I had to assess the relevance of Twitter in light of existing methodological considerations raised by social scientists. Even though there is consensus about Twitter as a prolific social media platform for social research (Deller, 2011; Giglietto et

al., 2012; Marwick, 2013; Thelwall et al., 2011), others criticise its lack of statistical representativeness and the biases that can emerge from it as Twitter users tend to represent a particular demographic and socioeconomic status –namely, affluent young and not-so-young adults (Blank, 2017; Castillo et al., 2011; Hargittai, 2020). Nonetheless, I was not looking for statistical representativeness, nor concerned with its use by a particular demographic – through the multiple interviews I had realised that one of the challenges encountered by local governments was the digital illiteracy of older populations. I was interested in its deployment by central and local governments and in its condition as a window into opinions around specific events (Deller, 2011; McCormick et al., 2017; Procter et al., 2013; Thelwall et al., 2011). Also, as hanging around social media was a complementing approach to the development of interviews and documentary analysis, Twitter became a useful platform.

In tandem, I had to build up a new social media literacy both in the usage of social media platforms –particularly Twitter– and on how to access and process large amounts of data^b. For this, I recurred to the software Nvivo 12. Even though there are other free platforms recommended by social scientists such as Mozdeh, NodeXL and DMI-TCAT (Yu & Muñoz-Justicia, 2020), the Nvivo software 12 provided by Durham University IT Services was a straightforward option for me. As I was already analysing and coding policy and historical documents, as well as interview transcriptions on Nvivo, I was not only familiarised with the platform but, was able to compare data from different sources on a regular basis. For instance, to locate specific topics and compare their relevance within different sources easily, I was able to run simultaneous word queries –e.g., a query about the word ‘state’ or ‘welfare’– on both Twitter data and other documents. At the same time, Nvivo had a useful tool to download Twitter data directly from a webpage called NCapture. Nonetheless, one of the main difficulties of using Nvivo in a macOS environment was that Twitter data was only displayed on tables and I was unable to produce any graphics or export the table to an easy-to-use format such as Excel. This did not interfere with the quality of the research findings.

Data Analysis

Making sense of the collected data was one of the main research challenges. It not only involved the systematisation of a large number of documents and interviews but a ladder-like process of selecting, analysing and deepening the main emerging topics. An initial stage of the data analysis was the temporal organisation and thematic coding of policy documents,

news, transcribed interviews and Twitter data on Nvivo. Having all these documents together in one Nvivo project enabled me to code emerging ideas such as participation, central-local disconnections, abandonment in old age, local government challenges –among others– across multiple sources –such as policy, news and interview transcripts. The initial identification of crosscutting themes was then translated into a discursive analysis of the main policy documents and interview transcripts. For instance, after realising that participation was a recurring theme among local government practitioners, both as a governing technique and as a good way of ageing, my discursive analysis of policy documents centred its attention on how the definition and ideas about participation changed within the different national and local policies. Equally, my discursive analysis was enriched by applying the critical lens of Gramsci's hegemony and *trasformismo* for unpacking how ideas of participation were purposively conflated with other political ideas around democracy, human rights and preventiveness (see Chapter Six). The historical and scalar contextualisation of these documents was also central to the analysis. Historical accounts of Chile's capitalist and neoliberal legacy also fed into the analysis providing a 'grounding effect' through which I was able to assess the agency of Chile's 'actually existing' neoliberal context in the governing of older populations.

The incorporation of social media data into the analysis considered the different ways in which social interactions take place within these online environments. Even though I also resorted to Nvivo for the initial systematisation and coding of Twitter data through the tracking of keywords and topics –such as 'state', 'family', 'apruebo', 'rechazo' (more details in Chapter Four), its in-depth analysis followed a different approach based on how social media debates and opinions are conveyed. When analysing public debates around specific topics, I focused on the evolving discussions taking place under specific 'hashtags' instead of analysing the opinions conveyed within Twitter accounts. For instance, when deepening on the contestation around the charitable approach of the philanthropic TV Show *Vamos Chilenos* (see Chapter Four), my analysis focused on the public debate taking place under '#VamosChilenos'. In contrast, when using social media to deepen analysis of specific cases, such as the case of the communitarian local governing project of Renca, I focused on analysing specific Twitter accounts such as that of the mayor Claudio Castro and the municipality's official account. All these data, such as political statements of mayors portrayed within social media profiles, complemented my analysis of policy, interviews and historical documents. Finally, it is important to highlight that most of my comprehensive

analysis took place during the writing process. In this regard, the narrative writing style adopted in this thesis became an organic way in which to develop my main arguments and build upon existing theoretical debates and insights.

Positionality

The intricacies of my own positionality were revealed through the reflexive interaction with the research participants and a changing research context. Even though I had reflected on some aspects of my positionality prior to my fieldwork in Chile, the changing research context triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic brought to light other dimensions that I had not reflected on. Reflections on how being a thirty-two-year-old ‘professional’ could become a barrier for interpreting the experiences and perceptions of older and probably ‘less educated’ participants, or my vantage position as a ‘Santiaguina’ familiarised with the city and as a woman engaging with groups of older people led by other women were reshaped while researching during the pandemic. While online researching governing practices and rationales through the lens of central and local government practitioners, conditions such as being ‘new’ to researching issues of ageing and my position as a researcher from a foreign institution conducting ‘distant’ online research during the pandemic –most interviews were conducted online from Durham, UK– strongly shaped the way I was seen by participants and how I learned about the governing of ageing in Chile.

Having initially reflected on how being a professional with considerable work experience could impact the research, my positionality transitioned to that of a beginner and learner. Even though previous work experience helped me to access my first contacts on issues of ageing, what marked my position as a researcher was not my previous experience in the Chilean context but my position as a new researcher on issues of ageing. This was both a self-imposed label that unfolded during fieldwork as I felt that, despite a year of desk research on ageing in Chile every topic was novel and exciting, and a condition perceived by participants who generally enquired about my previous experience on issues of ageing. Being ‘new’ considerably shaped my research pathway. Probably out of beginner’s luck, at the onset of my research fieldwork, I had significant support for accessing contacts and being redirected. For instance, after interviewing a member of the Transdisciplinary Network on Ageing at the University of Chile whom I had contacted through a previous co-worker at the university, she offered help in contacting other researchers, policymakers and local

government officers. She also suggested I look into particular policy documents and materials that proved quite useful along the way. After thanking her, she kindly mentioned that this was the least she could do as she could not imagine how challenging it was to engage with a new research topic. Being perceived as ‘new’ in the research of issues of ageing positioned me as the ‘learner’ within the conversations, which enabled me to deepen various –sometimes sensitive– topics through the interviews. As participants generally enquired about my work and professional coordinates prior to PhD studies, which flagged my position as a rookie on issues of ageing, I was granted several explanations and space to enquire. I quite vividly recall an interview with a professional of the Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades – ACHM, who was surprised that I had not heard about the program 'The House of All' implemented under the Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social –FOSIS) just after the return to democracy (more details in Chapter Six). After that, he was keen on sharing a detailed historical account of how programs for older people had emerged and evolved.

My position as a distant outsider researching during the COVID-19 crisis also shaped how participants shared their ideas and emerging research insights. As a researcher from a foreign university who was conducting online interviews from the UK, participants perceived our interactions as either an opportunity to gain a broader platform for conveying their perspectives on successful approaches to the governing of ageing or as an opportunity to express the frustrations of working on issues of ageing at a moment of crisis. In both cases, being a distant ‘outsider’ contributed to gaining depth over the unfolding of the neoliberal hegemonic project governing issues of ageing (Bridges, 2001). In the first case, as some participants with a position of leadership within the political governing project of the time – the second right-wing governing project of President Sebastián Piñera 2018-2022– shared their perspectives on successful approaches to the governing of ageing, I was able to learn about the key role of neoliberal ideas such as active ageing and the prevention of dependencies in old age. In the second case, as local government practitioners were being overwhelmed with responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, they came into the interview with the aim of sharing the difficulties and challenges of addressing the needs of the older population uncovered during the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, there were several stories that I restrained from sharing due to their sensitive content. This placed me at crossroads as I had to navigate contradictory narratives of success and struggle, which later resonated with theoretical ideas about the disjunctures of neoliberal projects and how the neoliberal

hegemonic project works by displacing its contradiction through narratives of success and responsabilisation, as well as through the instrumentalisation of progressive ideas. In tandem, I was able to make sense of local governments' struggles through a careful reading on how roll-back neoliberal policies initiated during the dictatorship continue to affect their governing possibilities despite their progressive efforts.

Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations and sensitivities were pivotal for navigating the research process. As an overarching framework, the research followed the ethical principles for social science research provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in the Framework on Research Ethics and underwent Durham's University ethical assessment. Issues of anonymity and confidentiality were central ethical principles. In this regard, interview participants were provided with written information in the form of a consent form detailing the general purpose of the research, the potential use of the data, the management of confidentiality and anonymity, as well as stating the possibility to withdraw from the study and requesting the permanent deletion of data, or even the full interview at any point. As most contacts were made via email through my Durham University institutional email account, the consent form, along with a proposal of interview questions, was sent in advance to enable enough time to consider the formalities of the research and make an informed decision to participate. Consent to both the management of data and voice recording was either written or oral, with the latter becoming the norm during online research. In cases where I was not able to send these documents online and beforehand, I verbally explained the research formalities and asked for oral consent before the conduction of the interview. For example, in the focus group conducted with volunteers of the programs *Somos Renca* and a phone interview conducted with the leader of a club of older people I began by explaining the research's anonymity and confidentiality considerations. In light of the potential vulnerability of older populations, I initially restrained from engaging with older populations. Older people could be experiencing distress out of the age-related COVID measures and the devastating COVID-related death toll among this population group.

Ethical issues were constantly assessed during fieldwork. For instance, the decision not to develop interviews with older populations during the pandemic was made after discussing ethical implications with my supervisors. As the first ethical assessment of the research had

to consider the potential vulnerability of older populations in researching disaster vulnerabilities, we were aware that discussing sensitive topics such as their experience and memories of past disasters –e.g., earthquakes and tsunamis– older people might feel anxious about the present or the future, or also feel uncomfortable. Therefore, when factoring in the current COVID-19 disruption and how it particularly affected the lives of older populations in terms of death tolls and mobility restrictions, we decided not to include them within the research and change the research focus instead. It is important to note that this was also subject to changes further along the line. I ended up interviewing two older individuals. However, interviewing them happened because they were actively engaged in the implementation of local government programs and the conversation was limited to the contents and challenges of the programs. Similarly, as the research also underwent methodological changes such as migrating into an online environment, I had to consider other ethical issues such as the use of data emerging from social media, particularly Twitter. Considering the unsettled debate on the ethical problematics of using sensitive personal information shared on social media platforms such as Twitter despite the user's acceptance of the platform's terms of use that indicate the public exposure and use of the content (M. L. Williams et al., 2017), I was careful not to disclose sensitive personal data and limit the analysis to opinions generated within an open public debate.

Ethical considerations also came into play during the analysis of data and writing of the thesis. As transcriptions were outsourced, to ensure anonymity I listened to all interviews and cropped sections where interviewees gave away their name, noted institutional coordinates or shared sensitive data and opinions prior to transcription. Sensitive sections were transcribed by me on a separate document and connected later through codification. Only specific quotations were translated into English when considering that they would be included in the main body of the thesis chapters. To ensure the highest level of anonymity, when citing quotes from specific interviews I didn't disclose the professional's role or position within the institutions –e.g., 'director', or 'president'. Rather, I referred to the participant as a 'professional' among many others. In some cases, I hid the gender of the participant as it could give away the participant's coordinates due to the small number of professionals working in the same institutional offices. Nonetheless, and as stated in the consent form, I had to keep institutional memberships public as otherwise it could have hindered the analysis and findings. Anonymity was not a concern when analysing and writing about the opinions and political affiliations of publicly elected figures. Finally, as mentioned above, I also had to

refrain from analysing sensitive data particularly associated with the participant's COVID-19 experiences, as I was unsure about the ethical implications and it felt intuitively wrong.

Conclusions

Overall, investigating how older populations are governed in Chile has required navigating a constantly changing research scenario. Even though the COVID-19 pandemic offered a novel lens for looking into the effects and contradictions of the neoliberal governing ideas and strategies regulating older populations in Chile, adapting the research focus and methods was a significant challenge. As a challenge, I have been left with multiple lessons and ideas about future research avenues. A significant lesson is how one's positionality is significantly shaped by contexts and how others perceive you not only as a researcher but as potential actor interpreting their experiences of success and frustration. In this regard and considering the changing research focus, in future research projects I would come to interviews with a clearer statement about the changing and evolving nature of the research process, and how the experiences and insights shared within interviews feed into the learning process of the researcher. Another lesson would be not to dismiss the capacity of research ideas on taking new paths. As a researcher, one needs great deal of flexibility to engage with new ideas, focuses and methods as the research unfolds. The diminished COVID-19 limitations in which I am finishing this research (2023), also open up new ideas for research. In future research, I would reconnect with the initial ideas propelling this research. Researching how issues of ageing, disaster risk and climate change adaptation interconnect as risks to be governed ignite many questions. Equally, I would bringing back older people into central stage. I would return of initial ideas on conducting on-site ethnographic work. Connecting with the ideas emerging in the following chapters, my ethnographic explorations would focus on how older people participation, perceive and negotiate the multiple ideas and strategies designed to govern them.

^a Online news sources included right –El Mercurio, Latercera, centre –El Mostrador, left –La Izquierda Diario and independent –Ciper– editorial inclinations.

^b For the case of social media platforms such as Instagram and Facebook, I only used them to follow specific accounts and access additional specific information.

Chapter Four – Hegemonic struggles over the central state's strategy of traditional forms of caregiving

Introduction

Six months after the first case of COVID-19 in Chile, a two-day philanthropic TV show designed to raise money to support 80,000 vulnerable and abandoned older individuals affected by the COVID-19 pandemic unexpectedly backfired on the Chilean government's neoliberal strategy of familial and charitable provision of welfare and caregiving toward older people. Supported by the National Service for Older People (*Servicio Nacional de Personas Mayores* – SENAMA) and the two main associations of municipalities of the country, the TV show called '*Vamos Chilenos*' ('Let's Go Chileans') replicated a similar strategy to that of the famous Chilean charitable TV show called '*Teletón*' ('TV marathon') designed to raise funds to implement rehabilitation programs for disabled children since 1984 –during the military dictatorship. In this case, *Vamos Chilenos* aimed to raise money to create a private non-profit foundation that would work reinforcing familial and charitable forms of care by reconnecting older people with their families and support networks, as well as deliver basic food boxes for up to six months. As a strategy to avoid central state's welfare responsibilities toward vulnerable and abandoned older people, conditions of vulnerability were portrayed as the result of familial abandonment and lack of kinship love and care. Also, charitable forms of community support that emerged during the pandemic such as collective strategies for the provision of meals –called 'common-pots' (*Ollas communes*)– or one-to-one neighbour support were framed in terms of practices of solidarity to be mimicked by the economic elite and the public by donating to the initiative. Moreover, to avoid transferring criticism over *Teletón*'s reinforcement of charitable stigmas toward disabled people (Ferrante, 2017; Humeres, 2019; Organización de las Naciones Unidas, 2014), *Vamos Chilenos* appealed to notions of solidarity and national unity by being broadcasted during the national independence holidays of September 2020. However, given the ongoing socio-political conjuncture emerging in October 2019 from one of Chile's largest social uprisings against the effects of neoliberal policies, central government's deployment of philanthropic charity and its politics of familialisation were not well accepted by the public.

Despite being supported by the main state institutions working with older people, a heated public debate on Twitter strongly opposed the charitable character of ‘*Vamos Chilenos*’ and called into question the role of the central government toward the older population. This Twitter debate was about who was responsible over the welfare of vulnerable and abandoned older people: families, philanthropic charity, or the Chilean state. Significantly, ideas opposing the state’s politics of familial and charitable care were informed by ideas emerging from the socio-political conjuncture surrounding the social uprising of October 2019, which contested the effects of neoliberal policies –e.g., inequity generated by the commodification of welfare– and the limited and subsidiary role of the central state inscribed within the Political Constitution^a. In fact, in October 2020, a year after the beginning of the social uprising and just a month after the broadcasting of ‘*Vamos Chilenos*’, the drafting of a new political constitution would be submitted for a national referendum. Amid this context, Twitter debates around ‘*Vamos Chilenos*’ reflected polarised opinions of #*Apruebo* (#Approve) and #*Rechazo* (#Reject). Notably, as I will discuss below, most Twitter users that challenged the lack of state responsibility in the provision of welfare and caregiving toward older populations and opposed the charitable approach of *Vamos Chilenos* signed their tweets highlighting their support for a new constitution: #*Apruebo* (#Approve). As contestation, some artistic performances broadcasted in the TV show supported the plebiscite option of *Apruebo* –e.g., by wearing special garments indicating their political posture in favour of the plebiscite option of *Apruebo*. In contrast, those rejecting the writing of a new constitution and endorsing the charitable approach of the state, blamed *Vamos Chilenos* for allowing the politicisation of the charitable event by the left, trying to silence the ongoing Twitter debate on state responsibility. I will suggest in this chapter that the precarious living conditions of abandoned and vulnerable older people publicly disclosed by *Vamos Chilenos* became one of the arenas of the ongoing hegemonic struggle between two seemingly coherent blocs either in favour or opposing the welfare role of the central state and the withdrawal of its neoliberal strategies –such as the instrumentalisation of traditional forms of provision of welfare and caregiving.

In this chapter, I both explore this contemporary pandemic-era debate and historicise it within longer-running governing strategies directed at Chile’s older population. Doing so, I argue that the central state’s hegemonic project instrumentalising traditional forms of care (i.e., familial and charitable) to avoid welfare and caregiving responsibilities toward older people –recently accommodated to address the caregiving and welfare needs of vulnerable and

abandoned older people during the pandemic— is being increasingly contested by an anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility. I suggest that the historical tendency of the state of avoiding responsibility over the caregiving and welfare of older people through a politics of traditional forms of caregiving, mirrors the values conferred to older populations within the different political-economic projects, either as outsiders or as a threat to economic development. In this regard, neoliberal governing projects—including the TV show *Vamos Chilenos*— have reworked and instrumentalised historically ingrained traditional forms of caregiving to comply with the neoliberal strategy of preventing a growing welfare role of the state toward older people amid a phenomenon of demographic ageing increasingly constructed as a risk to the economy and development. In tandem, I suggest that through the intertwining of the ongoing socio-political conjuncture and the pandemic, the limitations of the state’s hegemonic project on traditional forms of caregiving have not only been publicly uncovered but significantly contested by the anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility informing the social demands of the social uprising of October 2019. An anti-neoliberal common sense represented by a rising left-wing bloc that conceives that responsibilities over the welfare and caregiving of older people belong to the state, not to struggling families nor philanthropic forms of charitable care.

This chapter unfolds in the following structure. First, I unpack how traditional forms of caregiving have become the central state’s hegemonic project for addressing older people’s welfare and caregiving needs, with special attention to recent neoliberal governing projects. For this, I draw on historical and policy documents to map how different governing projects, alternating between capitalist (1818-1924) and welfare (1924-1973) projects and authoritarian (1973-1990) and democratic neoliberal projects (1990 until date), have reworked traditional forms of care. Albeit with different emphases, these governing projects have constructed traditional forms of caregiving as the central state’s primary governing strategy to address the welfare and caregiving needs of older people. First, I explore how despite the contrasting origins of welfare governing projects (1924-1973)—emerging from labour movements— and their ethos of expanding access to welfare entitlement, they continued to replicate the governing rationale of previous capitalist governing projects (1818-1924) placing the welfare of older people under conservative notions of familial responsibility and in its absence—or limitations— on philanthropic and church-based forms of care. Subsequently, I unpack how the neoliberal governing projects—first under Pinochet’s military dictatorship (1973-1990) and later under democratic governing projects (1990 to

date)— have instrumentalised the historically ingrained character of familial and charitable forms of care to position them as a common-sense governing strategy to avert welfare responsibilities on central state. During the military dictatorship, familial responsibilities were equated to those of the individual in accessing commodified forms of welfare. Later, despite creating a national policy, programs and a specialised public institution in charge of improving the quality of life of the older population as part of a wider strategy of overcoming a history of state neglect, democratic governing projects have continued to reinforce traditional forms of care as the primary sources of welfare for older people. Family altruism was reworked as a legal and moral duty and the caregiving of abandoned older people was outsourced by subsidising charitable and philanthropic institutions. Even during progressive governing projects working to expand the scope of welfare responsibilities of the central state such as the first centre-left governing project of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), the central state’s politics on familial forms of care remained almost untouched.

In interpreting this historical experience, I draw upon two theoretical lenses. First, I follow Hall’s reading of Gramsci’s notions of hegemony and common sense as being historically constructed (Colpani, 2022; Hall, 1986a; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016) to suggest the building of a hegemonic governing project on traditional forms of care by the central state. Based on Hall’s interpretations that the construction of a hegemonic project is a historical process in which a specific common sense, instrumental to a particular hegemonic bloc, is reworked and reshaped to remain current and dominant over other forms of common sense (Colpani, 2022; Hall, 1986a; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016), I argue that traditional forms of care have been reworked as the state’s hegemonic common sense due to the reluctance of the different governing project of taking responsibility over the welfare of older populations. In this context, neoliberal governing projects in Chile have positioned traditional forms of care either as a conservative value or as a moral duty despite increasing evidence of its limitations. To analyse the most recent neoliberal instrumentalisation of traditional forms of care, I also draw upon Melinda Cooper’s seminal work on neoliberal family values in the US (2017), in which she deciphers the neoliberal strategy of adopting traditional conservative values to prevent the increment of the welfare role of the state and to safeguard the interests of capital. She argues that for American Neoliberals—the same school that guided Chile’s neoliberal reforms—the enforcement of private family responsibilities as the logical alternative to welfare has been a recurrent strategy to ‘accommodate the new of ‘uncontrolled forces’’ (Cooper, 2017, p.312). Issues that cannot be adequately addressed through the market

economy, such as dependent populations, or unknown social risks such as the need for caregiving are instead channelled into traditional forms of social organisation such as families (Cooper, 2017). Even though her focus is on familialisation strategies, she also identifies a parallel between a politics of familial responsibility and the emergence of charitable approaches that either enforce or fill the gap left by familial forms of welfare provision. I argue that the same neoliberal strategies of reworking charitable forms of care – familial, philanthropic and church-based– have been implemented, with nuances, by the Chilean central state toward the older population. Such interventions reflect evolving policy discourses concerned with the advent of a problematic process of demographic ageing that would pose unknown risks to economic growth and development (MIDEPLAN, 1991, 1993; The World Bank, 1994).

Second, I look into the intertwined effects of the pandemic and ongoing socio-political conjuncture to demonstrate how the central state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of care is challenged by the anti-neoliberal common sense of a rising left-wing bloc able to flag its retrogressive outcomes —the impoverishing effects of the central state's ongoing tendencies to avoid and abandon welfare responsibilities. In this investigation, I return to the case of the TV show *Vamos Chilenos* to demonstrate how despite the evident failure of familialisation strategies, the neoliberal strategy continues to articulate traditional forms of charitable care to manage the uncontrolled effects of the pandemic. At the same time, I show how it is being challenged in the new socio-political conjuncture: particularly, how its anti-neoliberal common sense permeates Twitter discussions regarding the role of the state in the care of vulnerable and abandoned older people. In this analysis, I simultaneously draw upon Hall's reading of Gramsci's notion of 'relations of force' as 'the actual terrain of political and social struggle and development' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.161) and on Hall and O'Shea's work on neoliberal common sense (2013). The authors argue that historically ingrained forms of common sense are key sites of political struggle and can 'evolve to give meaning to new developments, solve new problems, [and] unravel new dilemmas' (Hall & O'Shea, 2013, p.10). Based on this, I explore how issues of vulnerability and abandonment in old age became one of the grounds of the ongoing hegemonic struggle between two opposing common sense on state responsibility: either embracing or opposing the welfare role of the state. I argue that neoliberal strategies can be challenged by alternative common senses emerging in response to their own limitations and contradictions.

The central state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of caregiving

With roots in conservative catholic values and a marked divide between the elite and the wider population^b, familial and charitable –i.e., philanthropic and church-based– forms of care have been the hallmark of central state's history of neglect toward older people. Paradoxically, throughout a history of different governing projects alternating between capitalist (1818-1924) and welfare (1924-1973) projects, and authoritarian (1973-1990) and democratic neoliberal projects (1990 until date), even during progressive governing projects working to expand the scope of welfare responsibilities of the central state –such as the first centre-left governing project of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010), traditional forms of care have been historically reworked as the central state's main governing strategy to address the welfare and caregiving needs of older people. For instance, despite their contrasting origins –the first^c, run by the church and economic elite, and the second, emerging from labour movements– the capitalist^d (1818-1924) and welfare (1924-1973) governing projects placed the welfare and care of older people under conservative notions of familial responsibility and in its absence –or limitations– on philanthropic and church-based forms of care. In this context, the prevailing familial and charitable rationale for the provision of welfare and caregiving has been guided by the values conferred to older populations within the different political-economic projects. For instance, for capitalist state projects older people were no longer valuable members of the working force, and for welfare governing projects, older people were outsiders of the labour rationale guiding the allocation of welfare. Later, as I explain in this section, authoritarian and democratic neoliberal governing projects have reworked and instrumentalised traditional forms of care to comply with the neoliberal strategy of preventing a growing welfare role of the state toward older people amid a phenomenon of demographic ageing increasingly constructed as a risk to the economy and development.

Despite the radical origins and the consistent efforts of welfare governing projects (1920-1973) to expand access to entitlements, the labour rationale guiding the distribution of welfare resulted in sustaining non-state traditional forms of care characteristic of previous capitalist state projects. Considering the strong role of labour organisations in the transition to welfare governing projects (1920-1973), the role of the central state was reworked to comply with the provision of welfare entitlements based on a marked labour rationale. Emerging from the rise of the *Movimiento Obrero* (Labour Movement) and the incorporation of their

demands into mainstream politics during Congress discussions about quality of life^e –also known as *la cuestión social* (the social question)– the role of central state was transformed into one that ensured the protection of the labour force and the provision of social assistance. Under the presidency of Arturo Alessandri who triumphed in 1920 under promises to transform the role of the state towards the labour force^f, the executive developed a series of social law projects. The state was to ensure housing, health and social security for formal workers contributing to the development and modernisation of the country. Approved by Congress^g in 1924, The Social Laws constituted the basis of welfare state projects enabling the development of a system of social security for workers setting a point of inflexion where welfare issues shifted from being addressed through charity to being ‘treated as a matter of justice’ (Arellano, 1988, p.25-28)^h.

Due to the labour rationale behind the distribution of welfare, a significant proportion of the population remained side-lined from progressive advances in the public provision of welfare entitlements. Even though older people were able to access social assistance by means of healthcare policies –which was the only entitlement treated under universalising logics– they remained subject to familial and charitable care. From the first welfare governing project of president Arturo Alessandri (1920-1924) to the governing project of the Christian Democrat president Eduardo Frei Montalva (1964-1970), welfare redistribution followed a labour and corporatist rationale in which unions and organised workers pressured to expand their access to state benefits (Arellano, 1988; Farías-Antognini, 2019). Yet, the leverage power was different between groups of formal workers, generating a segmented structureⁱ that traversed multiple welfare areas such as the regulation of working conditions, remuneration, social security, health benefits and housing (Arellano, 1988)^j. This segmented structure also marginalised those outside the formal labour market, with the provision of welfare following ‘parallel tracks’ either as social assistance or social assurance (Farías-Antognini, 2019, p.32). While formal workers were entitled to social assurance –albeit segmented– informal workers and their families, as well as those marginalised from work such as women, children and already aged individuals, ‘were excluded and remained the subject of interventions by a network of assistance and civilizing actions’ through health policies, or dependent on private charitable initiatives (Farías-Antognini, 2019, p.32). The compromise towards the equitable provision of welfare was limited to the healthcare of the population^k. Even within the universalising welfare projects of the Christian Democrat president Eduardo Frey Montalva (1964-1970) and the Socialist President Salvador Allende (1970-1973) that aimed to expand

social benefits to marginalised sectors¹, older people remained side-lined from the main welfare advances (Farías-Antognini, 2019, p.81). The prevailing modernising and labour rationale contributed to maintaining the exclusion of population groups who found themselves outside this terrain, such as older people. Despite the creation of a pension system for formal workers, or the inclusion of women within the right to work and pension guarantees during the 1960s, people who were ‘already aged’ by the time these social guarantees were implemented, or those who could not access them due to the informal character of their work, remained subject to familial or charitable forms of care (Arellano, 1988).

Since the military coup of 1973, and until the return of democracy in 1990, traditional forms of familial and charitable care were reinforced as common-sense forms of welfare provision. Familial care was reinforced under the neoliberal rationales of individual responsibility and the commodification of welfare. At the same time, philanthropic forms of charitable care were rearticulated as part of central state’s strategy for subsidising market externalities such as population under extreme poverty conditions. Simultaneously, the neoliberal strategy of reinforcing traditional forms of care was intertwined with efforts to mainstream conservative values on gender as common sense, positioning men as the head and provider of the family and women as caregivers. During the seventeen years of military dictatorship in Chile, previous welfare policies and incipient efforts for the universalisation of welfare entitlement were radically dismantled, transforming the state’s relationship with the market and its role in the provision of social security. The scope of the neoliberal reforms conducted during the military dictatorship (1973-1990) were not limited to the political and economic architecture of the state but expanded to displace its role in the provision of welfare through its commodification and the reciprocal enforcement of individual and familial responsibilities (more details in Chapter Two). After dismantling the corporatist and political organisation characteristic of previous welfare governing projects, which constituted an authoritarian strategy for removing political opposition, the military dictatorship implemented ‘a series of dramatic institutional reforms’ called the Seven Modernisations directed to ‘the institutions governing labour relations, education, health and social security, judicial procedure, decentralisation and agrarian reform’ (Taylor, 2006, p.85). These reforms were intended to roll-back the welfare role of the state through large privatisation schemes that would consolidate the primacy of market mechanisms in the allocation and distribution of social security and services (Peck, 2010; Peck & Tickell, 2002; Taylor, 2006).

As commodification strategies were based on the purchasing powers of individuals, these enforced the mutually constitutive role of the private family and individuals as the legitimate locus of welfare responsibilities. Based on Cooper's (2017) analysis of familial rationales in the US's neoliberal policies, the installation of a competitive market for the provision of welfare services was strategic to the withdrawal of the welfare state not only because individuals would take responsibility for their well-being but also because it would result in the natural enforcement of private family responsibilities^m. Just like neoliberals in the US, the Chicago Boys in Chile equated the natural order of the market to that of a 'male' private individual and his family. To cement neoliberal ideas on family responsibility as natural, these were permeated with conservative values on male family responsibility which not only were part of the popular common sense of the time but also infused with traditional catholic values on gender roles. Within their programmatic paper called 'El Ladrillo', Chilean neoliberals stated that '*the market system implies clear, automatic and impersonal mechanisms for rewards and punishments while providing sufficient incentives that are consistent with a central characteristic of the human being: his ability and willingness to obtain a better destiny for himself and his family*' (Centro de Estudios Públicos, 1992, p.67-68). Therefore, by complying with traditionally accepted ideas on male freedom and responsibility, the commodification of welfare such as the case of the pension system, would transfer the responsibility to provide for old age from the state to the individualⁿ and his family, and even transform older people's pension funds as grounds for private capitalisation.

In parallel to reworking individual and familial responsibilities through the commodification of welfare, the military regime developed a regressive kind of social welfare that worked hand in hand with renewed philanthropic forms of charitable care supported by conservative ideas on the caregiving role of women. The military dictatorship's conception of welfare was characterised by the development of a targeting system that would subsidise the marked by providing –scant– social benefits to those population groups unable to satisfy their welfare needs through market mechanisms^o. A targeting system would prevent the budget overload of the Treasury and '[the] bureaucratic swelling of the state' (Salazar-Vergara, 2019, p.237). Paradoxically, the implementation of a targeting system resulted in the development of the first public policy aimed at the elderly. Designed to address conditions of extreme poverty of those marginalised from previous labour and corporatist logics –generally women and informal workers– the military dictatorship created a program of pension assistance called *Programa de Pensiones Asistenciales* (PASIS) –Assistance Pension Program (1975). At the

same time, to prevent compromising the retrenched welfare role of the state, the survival character of PASIS^p was complemented with renewed forms of charitable care directed to those experiencing familial abandonment. The military dictatorship promoted the creation of charitable institutions lead by the wives of prominent military officials and economically supported them through transfers of publicly owned property and funds. In the case of vulnerable and abandoned older people, the charitable institution in charge of their care was the *Consejo Nacional de Protección a la Ancianidad* (CONAPRAN) (National Council for the Protection of the Elderly) (1974) which was headed by ‘the wife of the commander in chief of the Chilean Air Force’ (MIDEPLAN, 1991, p.44)^q. Interestingly, by positioning the ‘wives’ of military officials at the head of state-supported charitable care, these institutions not only reinforced traditional forms of charitable care previously counter under the now fading welfare governing projects but also permeated the neoliberal project with conservative ideas on the familial and caregiving role of women. In fact, the creation of CONAPRAN has been considered as part of a wider civilising project of the military dictatorship that advocated for the familialisation of care by promoting the role of ‘women in their maternal role within the everyday sphere’^r (Valenzuela 1993 in Farías-Antognini 2019, p.147). Thus, by the return of democracy in 1990, the neoliberal strategy governing of older populations had already been articulated through the coupling of private family responsibilities, survival support and conservative ideas of charitable and gendered care (Cooper, 2017; Jessop, 2002; Salazar-Vergara, 2019).

Despite the governing shift represented by the return of democracy in 1990^s and alarming evidence of the impoverished conditions of older populations amid a novel process of demographic ageing, central government continued reinforcing traditional forms of caregiving. Instead of critically assessing the impact of a history of state neglect through the prevalence of familial and charitable forms of welfare, the three consecutive third-way neoliberal democratic governing projects –under the presidencies of Christian Democrats Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei (1994-2000) and Democrat^t president Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006)– reworked familial and charitable care as the main strategy for the provision of welfare toward older people. As the first democratic governing project –under the presidency of Patricio Alwyn (1990-1994)– advocated for the reduction of poverty and the inclusion of marginalised groups into a novel project of national development, older people appeared as one of the most impoverished^u and growing population groups. Within the first socio-economic diagnosis and policy recommendations produced by the Ministry of

Planning and Cooperation (Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación de Chile – MIDEPLAN) (MIDEPLAN, 1991, 1993), old age was depicted as ‘a reality of impoverishment’ (MIDEPLAN, 1991, p. 56). The number of older populations living below the poverty line^v was considerable: 22.7%^w (CASEN, 1990 in MIDEPLAN, 1993, p.6). At the same time, Census data showed a sustained process of demographic ageing with the number of adults aged sixty years and over doubling between the Census of 1970 and 1982, and demographic projections positioning them at 9% of the population by 1990^x and 15% by 2025^y (CELADE, 1990 in MIDEPLAN, 1991). In this regard, the overlap between poverty and a growing number of older people fed into emerging discourses that positioned demographic ageing as a risk to development efforts (MIDEPLAN, 1991; The World Bank, 1994)^z. Demographic ageing and older populations were constructed as relevant public issues to be addressed by an active role of the central government^{aa}. However, as I explain below, the active role of the central state did not refer to the provision of welfare but rather, to implementing a range of policies designed for transferring welfare responsibilities to the traditional dyad of families and charities^{bb}.

With the aim of averting the dependency of this growing population group on the state, during the third-way neoliberal project of the Christian Democrat president Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), central government reinforced familial forms of welfare and caregiving as a moral duty. Similar to what Hall considers a common strategy ‘to command the space of common sense’, the first National Policy for Older People of 1996 instrumentalised ‘the domain of the moral’ (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.173) by constructing families as the most natural and socially accepted unit of society responsible for providing welfare to older people. Moreover, as mentioned by Cooper (2017), calling upon ‘family altruism’ as ‘an immanent order of noncontractual obligations and inalienable services’ (Cooper, 2017, p.58) was part of the central government’s neoliberal strategy of averting welfare responsibilities. Within the first National Policy for Older People of 1996^{cc}, the active role of the central state was articulated against an even greater role of society and particularly of the family. Families were articulated as having the primary responsibility to address the needs of the older population: ‘it is necessary to emphasise that the problems and situations experienced by Older Adults are not solved or overcome only with the action of the state. *On the contrary*, an important part of *the problem of the Elderly* must be solved by the community itself and, *especially, within the family*’ (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996, p.11 – emphasis of author). With families recognised by society as morally ‘in charge of watching

over and protecting the development of its members' (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996, p.18), the 'normal' was 'for older people to find material, emotional and spiritual support in their children, siblings and grandchildren' (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996, p.18).

The central state's neoliberal strategy of reinforcing family responsibilities as common sense not only appealed to the moral role of families, but recurred to the coercive capacity of existing legal frameworks. Instead of questioning the ability of families to comply with their legal welfare and caregiving responsibilities toward older populations, President Eduardo Frei's (1994-2000) third-way neoliberal project reinforced them by exercising the pedagogical role of the state. Efforts to educate older people on the legally binding obligations held by their kinship toward them were guided by a set of manuals and recommendations elaborated by the National Committee for Older People (*Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor* –CNAM) and the United Nations Program for Development –UNDP^{dd}. The pedagogical strategy of central government instrumentalised the United Nations' (United Nations, 1991) notions of older people's rights as a framework to enforce familial responsibilities. Instead of raising awareness about the state's responsibility of expanding access to welfare entitlements, the manual on 'rights and duties of older people' (Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor & Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 1999a) indicated that one of the fundamental rights of older individuals was to access the comprehensive care and welfare provided by their families. Most significantly, the manual highlighted that this fundamental right was inscribed within the Civil Code and its supporting laws^{ee}. Under the 'duty of relief', offspring were presented as 'always bound to take care of their parents in their old age, in the state of dementia and in all circumstances of life in which they need their help' (Article 223 of the Civil Code cited by Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor & Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 1999, p.7-8). At the same time, the 'duty of relief' was presented as intertwined with the 'right to maintenance', which placed legal obligations on the direct descendants 'to provide [older members] with the minimum to live' (Article 321 of the Civil Code cited by Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor & Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 1999, p.7-8). Underlying, older individuals unable to access the 'natural' and socially accepted care of their offspring, should access them through legal means such as alimony lawsuits. Thus, the central government was avoiding older people's contestation over welfare entitlements by confronting them to their kinship.

Paradoxically, the central state's reluctance to assume greater welfare responsibilities continued until it was challenged by charitable institutions during Congress discussion to create the first public institution for older people (1999-2002). Charitable institutions unearthed a much-avoided reality by central government: family limitations in the provision of welfare and caregiving. Even though the bill that proposed the creation of the National Service of Older People (*Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor* – SENAMA)^{ff} was posited as part of a governing strategy to overcome a history of state neglect^{gg}, the bill was found wanting^{hh}. For example, charitable institutions highlighted that there were notable limitations regarding social securityⁱⁱ and the caregiving of abandoned older people –which had been historically addressed by the charitable sector. Based on their experience, church-based charitable institutions argued that public policy's common sense on family responsibility was unrealistic and oblivious to the limits of familial care and resulting conditions of abandonment^{jj}. Instead, they appealed for an active role of the state in the care of abandoned older people, arguing that the caregiving of older individuals marginalised from familial forms of care should be '*a function that the state should somehow cover*' (Hogar de Cristo, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.37). Even though other parliamentary objections about the bill's incapacity to address social security issues were not successful^{kk}, the arguments raised by church-based charitable institutions^{ll} regarding SENAMA's proposed role in caring for abandoned older people were incorporated into the bill. Therefore, SENAMA's role was expanded from 'ensur[ing] the full integration of the elderly into society^{mmm}', to protecting them 'against abandonment and indigence' (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.535). Yet, to achieve this, the central government embraced the neoliberal strategy of outsourcing the care of indigent and abandoned older people by partly subsidising charitable institutions and incorporating them into SENAMA's model of governance beyond the state (Jessop, 2002; Salazar-Vergara, 2019; Swyngedouw, 2005)ⁿⁿ.

The only moment of relative departure from the central state's aim of avoiding welfare and caregiving responsibilities toward older populations was conducted during the first centre-left governing project of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). Even though her progressive governing project advocated for greater state responsibility in the provision of welfare –e.g., through pension reforms and the incipient installation of a System of Social Security– and recognised the limitations of familial and charitable forms of care amid a process of advanced demographic ageing, it was unable to debunk the state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of care. Instead of decentring families as the primary source of

welfare and caregiving, it only provided –limited– state support toward vulnerable family caregivers. Nonetheless, it was able to debunk –to some extent– the history of neoliberal instrumentalisation of charitable forms of care by developing publicly owned long-term establishments to provide care for vulnerable and abandoned older people.

Following Regional suggestions provided by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean –ECLAC (*Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe* –CEPAL) (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, 2006a, 2006b), the first presidency of Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) installed a different governing project that positioned older people as subjects of rights and entitled to welfare^{oo}. ECLAC’s recommendations to comply with the economic, social and cultural rights established within the Human Rights Convention (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, 2006a, 2006b), provided the framework to push forward more progressive ideas on the role of the state in ensuring older people’s access to welfare (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, 2006a, 2006b). Under this rights-based approach, the governing project of Bachelet conducted the first reform to the private pension system and advocated for greater state responsibility through the gradual implementation of a System of Social Security for older people (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c). Simultaneously, evidence on what was considered a novel process of advanced demographic ageing^{pp} shifted attention to the limitations of familial and charitable forms of care amid futures of increasing conditions of physical dependency, justifying the need to rework the neoliberal rationale on state responsibility (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a).

After the pension reform introduced in 2008^{qq}, SENAMA embarked on a parallel process to incorporate a rights-based approach into public policy, which uncovered the limitations of familialisation strategies. As complying with the social, economic and cultural entitlements of older people not only required a pension reform but also to ensure access to welfare entitlements, SENAMA began to devise strategies to ensure a process of gradual increment of the state’s responsibility in providing access to welfare entitlements. The idea was to initiate the gradual implementation of a ‘Rights-based System of Social Protection’ that would comprise areas such as healthcare, housing, mobility, among other, through the expansion of the subsidiary role of the state. As the state’s subsidiary role continued to be based on a targeting system, the focus was placed on vulnerability. This is when the phenomenon of advanced demographic ageing emerged as a major public issue, uncovering

the limits within the predominant familial approach toward caregiving in old age. The National Study of Dependency (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a)^{rr} unpacked an ongoing process of advanced demographic ageing and its relation to the increment of age-related functional dependencies –physical and cognitive. As functional dependency required caregiving, the study also evidenced the economic and gender inequalities ingrained within familial forms of care. Higher levels of physical dependency in old age were concentrated within lower income groups and women were subject to the major socio-economic burden of caregiving^{ss}. Moreover, the reduction of family sizes and unequal access to market-based caregiving services^{tt}, would continue to weaken the family's ability to cope with growing caregiving needs (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c, 2009a, 2009b). For SENAMA, ensuring access to welfare entitlements would require reworking the relationship between families and the state^{uu}.

However, the recognition of family limitations did not lead to a change in the legally enforced obligations of offspring. Rather, it established a different responsibility of the state toward familial. Instead of decentring families as the primary source of welfare and caregiving, it only provided –limited– state support toward vulnerable family caregivers. The state would ‘support’ families in their caregiving responsibilities through survival benefits for vulnerable families caring for bedridden older people and through the implementation of comprehensive public programs to prevent functional dependencies in old age –referred to as Socio-sanitary Services (*Servicios Sociosanitarios*). Despite the progressive logic of increasing the state’s responsibility, Bachelet’s governing project followed a neoliberal cost-effective approach to the prevention of dependency rather than following progressive efforts to accommodate the increment of different abilities in old age. One of the presidential measures was to implement a monthly stipend^{vv} for family carers of poor and bedridden individuals in order ‘to improve the quality of care for the bedridden person, *relieve the family*, [and] *reduce the burden on the caregiver* [in order to prevent their] *institutionalisation*’ (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor 2009c, p.96). The other strategy was the ‘urgent’ installation of ‘socio-sanitary services’^{ww} for the older population to delay age-related physical dependency. In this regard, the reluctance to contradict the familial nature of caregiving reflects Cooper’s (2017) arguments that those supporting or opposing ideas of the welfare role of the state only differ on ‘the proper relationship to be established between the family and the state’ (Cooper, 2017, p. 90), but seldom contest ‘the centrality of the family within their vision of economic life’ (Cooper, 2017, p. 91), nor the unpaid

caregiving role of women towards older family members. In fact, the uncontested role of familial care paved the way for the consolidation of a preventive socio-sanitary strategy by the following right-wing neoliberal governing project that aimed at ensuring that the major costs of caregiving remained within familial and community^{xx} spaces, not the state^{yy}. ‘Socio-sanitary’ programs such as Day Centres for Older Adults^{zz} were implemented during the first government of President Sebastian Piñera (2010-2014).

Equally, the historical neoliberal instrumentalisation of charitable forms of care remained almost unchanged despite progressive efforts to increase the state’s responsibility in the provision of welfare and caregiving to vulnerable and abandoned older people. As part of progressive efforts to implement a rights-based approach by expanding the welfare role of the state, Bachelet’s governing project worked toward debunking the uncontested role of traditional forms of charitable care^{aaa} by developing a public ownership alternative to long-term caregiving. Under evidence of increasing functional dependency and the increasing challenges being experienced by subsidised charities unable to absorb the increasing number of abandoned older individuals (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012), SENAMA initiated collaborations with the Ministry of Housing and Urbanism to build Public Long-term Care Establishments^{bbb}. However, due to its minimal coverage, Public Long-term Care Establishments have not been enough to overcome traditional forms of charitable care. Initially, the program was designed to bridge the caregiving gap of 11,015 vulnerable and abandoned older individuals (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012). Nonetheless, following a narrow targeting logic^{ccc}, the Public Long-term Care Establishments only serve a total of 1,118 older individuals, leaving 9,897^{ddd} with no state support (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012). As I explore in the following section, the prevailing lack of state responsibility and the increasing limits of familial and charitable forms of care were uncovered during the pandemic with evidence of 80,000 vulnerable and abandoned older people.

The intertwined effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic and the ongoing anti-neoliberal social uprising

‘Vamos Chilenos’: reinforcing traditional forms of caregiving during the pandemic

Paradoxically, the limitations of central state’s hegemonic project on traditional forms of care were publicly uncovered during efforts of the right-wing neoliberal governing project of president Sebastián Piñera (2018-2022) to reinstate familial and charitable forms of care to address the conditions of abandonment and vulnerability of older people uncovered during the pandemic. Six months after the arrival of the first COVID-19 case in Chile, the pandemic had revealed 80,000 older individuals aged eighty years and over living under extreme conditions of poverty and abandonment. In response, the National Service of Older People (SENAMA) and the two main Associations of Municipalities^{eee} agreed to back the private non-profit initiative *Conecta Mayor* (Older Connect) created by the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile (*Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile* –PUC), which would be funded through philanthropic donations made during the charitable TV show *Vamos Chilenos* (Let’s Go Chileans). The non-profit organisation called *Conecta Mayor* would aim to reconnect older people with their families and support networks^{fff}. Hosted by Mario Kreutzberger^{ggg}, the most iconic anchor of the nationally renowned philanthropic TV show called *Teletón* –alluding to a TV marathon, *Vamos Chilenos* was to replicate a similar strategy. Broadcasted every one or two years since 1978, *Teletón* consists of a two-day TV show designed to raise funds to implement rehabilitation programs for disabled children through the charitable non-profit institution known by the same name^{hhh}. In this case, a similar strategy was implemented for abandoned and vulnerable older people. As mentioned by the Head of the Catholic University during one of the opening interviews of *Vamos Chilenos*, the idea was to install the same dyad of philanthropic fundraising to fund a non-profit institution supporting abandoned and vulnerable older people: ‘Forty or more years ago, *Teletón* began great work with our children with disabilities *and today we want older adults, older people, to have that recognition in the country*’ (Ignacio Sanchez, Rector of PUC –emphasis of author).

However, the central state’s U-turn to traditional forms of charitable care in an era of rights-based discourses was a delicate matter that needed a few tweaks. As *Vamos Chilenos* was supported by central state institutions guided by policy frameworks that position older people

as subjects of rightsⁱⁱⁱ, the program had to avoid transferring criticism over *Teletón*'s reinforcement of charitable stigmas toward disabled people (Ferrante, 2017; Humeres, 2019; Organización de las Naciones Unidas, 2014)ⁱⁱⁱ. Therefore, instead of appealing to the charitable nature of the public through sensitive stories of older people's abandonment and poverty, the TV show urged the solidarity of Chileans by creating a narrative around the heroic and solidary actions of communities and critical health workers during the pandemic. Solidarity was also reinforced under notions of national unity, presenting it as a common trait of the Chilean people emerging during major catastrophes and broadcasting the TV show during the national independence holidays of the 18-19th of September (2020). Accordingly, the TV show was composed by short documentaries on community solidarity, the work of healthcare and other key workers during the pandemic, inspiring cases of older people implementing different strategies to remain active and connected with their families during quarantines, along with live music and other artistic performances including national folklore and dances^{kkk}. To bring the perspective of vulnerable and abandoned older people while avoiding their unnecessary exposure and stigmatisation, the TV show included interview sections with experts^{lll} and parallel Facebook live events to inform the public about the causes and problematics associated with older people's abandonment.

Mirroring Hall and O'Shea (2013), the TV show was used by the central government as a platform for shaping and influencing popular opinion about where the responsibility for the conditions of abandonment lay: within families, not the state. During the first half-hour of transmission, the neglect of familial responsibilities as the primary cause of abandonment was already taking shape. Mario Kreutzberger, who also identified himself as an older individual affected by age-based quarantines, greeted the public and introduced the goal of the *Vamos Chilenos* of raising money to support older people living in abandonment and in need of basic support. In his opening address, he constructed older people's conditions of loneliness and isolation as the result of lack of kinship love and companionship: 'there are those who are having a very bad time, with many difficulties to face each day, *distanced from their loved ones, or worse than that, in solitude not being loved*' (Mario Kreutzberger, main host of *Vamos Chilenos* –emphasis of author). Moreover, following the idea of celebrating Chilean solidarity, he argued that in contrast to familial abandonment, there were exemplary cases of neighbourly and community solidarity that emerged during the pandemic. He introduced the first case of solidarity of 'Alejandra', who despite losing her income and having a child with lymphoma cancer, had devoted her time to supporting her neighbours

during the pandemic. Alejandra and her mother organised a common pot (*'Olla Común'*) that provided free meals cooked with donated supplies. She mentioned that even though she had lost her income, she was still shocked by the conditions of poverty uncovered by the pandemic, particularly among older people.

To influence the public's perceptions about the natural character of familial forms of care, during Alejandra's short documentary, the TV show showed her touring her neighbourhood and visiting older neighbours. Reinforcing traditional common sense on family responsibility by influencing moral assumptions about 'good' and 'bad' familial caregiving, these cases illustrated how familial responsibilities shaped older people's quality of life. Also, replicating the lingering tradition of *Teletón's* reinforcement of charitable stigmas toward disabled people, the documentary had no consideration of the ethical implications of publicly disclosing the living conditions of vulnerable older people. The first case was that of Juana Faúndez, a ninety-three-year-old bedridden woman who was being looked after by her children. Even though she was telling Alejandra that she was struggling to sleep due to breathing problems, the program portrayed her situation as the most adequate and common caregiving arrangement in the neighbourhood: 'there are many older adults who are in these conditions here and the children end up taking care of them or the grandchildren' (Alejandra, Neighbour from the municipality of Macul, City of Santiago). In this case, familial responsibilities were represented as the most natural form of caregiving, dismissing potential concerns about the adequate medical care required by Juana due to her fragile health condition (Figure 3).



Figure 3. Alejandra (with the mask) visiting her ninety-three-year-old neighbour Juana Faúndez (Black cover on Juana's eyes, by author).

The captions portray the health difficulties experienced by Juana: Juana's offspring: 'she stifles during the night, she can't sleep'. Juana: 'I'm stifling'. Source: Screenshot of TV show *Vamos Chilenos*.

In contrast to Juana, Alejandra mentioned that there were many other cases of older people living alone. To illustrate this, she introduced an older couple struggling with loneliness and depression. The reporters asked the seventy-five-year-old woman, Blanca Aros, if she had any family. To this, she replied that they did not have family, despite her having six children. In this case, the conditions of depression and loneliness experienced by the couple were depicted as the result of familial abandonment and lack of kinship love and care: 'I have no more family. It's just the two of us. Yes, I have six children. They don't call us. I've already tried to cope with this, but the sorrow is there, the pain is there, the anguish is there, the loneliness is there' (Blanca Aros, Neighbour from the municipality of Macul, City of Santiago). The examples shared by Alejandra also echoed in the program's Twitter hashtag: *#VamosChilenos*. In favour of the traditional common sense of family responsibilities, to which the TV show was appealing, several Twitter users reacted to abandonment as an unjustified and punishable family behaviour. For instance, disclosing the catholic roots of traditional common sense on familial responsibility, user @carolinalibra demonised offspring abandonment associating familial neglect as something to be punished and as violating the

‘sacred’ responsibility of the family: ‘I don’t know how those children who have abandoned their old people can sleep peacefully, without a doubt life will charge them with karma and when they are old, they will pay. *That detachment with blood and with something so sacred is something that can never be understood*’ (@carolinalibra – emphasis of author).

The state also blamed familial neglect. Familial abandonment was portrayed by state experts as the main cause of older people’s struggles and positioned as the main rationale guiding *Conecta Mayor*'s technological solution for reconnecting older people to their families. During an open transmission interview with the Heads of SENAMA and the Chilean Association of Municipalities (AMUCH), familial abandonment emerged as a central concern. When asked about the biggest challenge during the pandemic, the Director of SENAMA mentioned that they were surprised by the scope of familial abandonment voiced by older people in the calls received by an open phone-line called *Fono Mayor* (Elder’s Phone) implemented by SENAMA as an emergency support line during the pandemic. In fact, these had resulted in SENAMA’s decision to support this charitable initiative: ‘One of the main calls we have received has been due to loneliness, due to the abandonment that many people experience by their family...[a] *call to take charge among all of us to improve the quality of life for the elderly*’ (Octavio Vergara, Director of SENAMA –emphasis of author). In the same interview, the President of AMUCH, who at the time was the mayor of the local government of Estación Central in the City of Santiago, mentioned that conditions of abandonment to be addressed by the non-profit initiative *Conecta Mayor* originated within familial roles and spaces. Abandonment emerged from unfulfilled reproductive roles or familial neglect: ‘we are talking about people who do not have a son, do not have a daughter, a grandson, and if they did, many times that son, that grandson, forgot about that older adult, literally forgot’ (Rodrigo Delgado, former Director of AMUCH). Paradoxically, despite expert's recognition of familial irresponsibility as the leading cause of abandonment, they backed the idea of implementing a tech-solution to familial neglect. *Conecta Mayor* would work on reconnecting abandoned and vulnerable older adults to their families and local support networks by providing them with friendly-user smartphones with free data and minutes (Figure 4). Thus, through the dyad of Chile Vamos and *Conecta Mayor*'s tech-solution, the state was not only reinforcing familial care but reworking charitable forms of care as part of central state’s strategy toward older people as these charity initiatives would step into SENAMA's mandate of ‘protecting’ older people against abandonment.



Figure 4. Institutions that would be connected through the *Conecta Mayor*'s mobile application^{mmmm}.

Source: Screenshot of TV show *Vamos Chilenos*.

Family limitations and struggles, as well as SENAMA's responsibility toward abandoned older individuals, were almost silenced during the whole broadcasting. The state-sponsored TV show did not recognise any relation between conditions of abandonment and central state's reluctance to meaningfully address the limits of familialisation strategies. In fact, during a Facebook live interview with the Director of SENAMA, the only reference to the limits of public policy was associated with the rapid increase in the number of older people^{mmn}. The rapid demographic transition, rather than central state's politics of familialisation, was the main reason for lagging behind the problems emerging from demographic ageing. However, even though the live transmission was able to silence the needs and conflicts experienced by families, there were other spaces in which family struggles came to light. For instance, family limitations emerged during the Facebook live interview with the president of AMUCH and mayor of the local government of Estación Central. While he was talking about the extreme conditions of abandonment experienced by at least 1,400 older people in the commune, they received a Facebook message from a woman struggling to provide care for her bedridden mother (Figure 5). The desperation in her message was evident. Clouded by traditional common sense on familial care that morally punishes familial neglect, she blamed herself for not being able to care for her mother –and two children. Having recently lost her job, with two small children and with clear signs of depression –she mentioned she was 'crying about everything'– she was struggling to care for her bedridden mother with advanced fibrosis. Her small children had to care for her mother while she was trying to find alternative forms of income to make ends meet. Considering this, she was asking whether the funds collected by *Vamos Chilenos* would be extended to family caregivers in need. To this, the mayor was asked by the journalist about available programs to

support these families. He replied referring to Bachelet’s caregiver stipend for bedridden people. However, he did not mention how small the stipend is (CLP 20.000 or USD 23)^{ooo}, nor did they talk further about the contradictions embedded within familial caregiving responsibilities.



Figure 5. Interview with Rodrigo Delgado (on the right) and Facebook comments of women struggling to care for her bedridden mother and two small children^{ppp}.

Source: Screen shot of Facebook live event ‘Connect with the expert’ (‘Conéctate con el especialista’) of Vamos Chilenos.

The effects of an anti-neoliberal common sense

The precarious living conditions of abandoned and vulnerable older people publicly disclosed by *Vamos Chilenos* became one of the arenas of the ongoing hegemonic struggle about the scope of welfare responsibilities of the state. Drawing on Hall’s reading about Gramsci’s hegemony (Hall, 1986a; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016) the central state’s hegemonic project on traditional forms of care reworked under the TV show *Vamos Chilenos*, was challenged by the anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility informing the social demands of the social uprising of October 2019. During the two-day live transmissions, assumptions about charitable support, family responsibilities and silenced state responsibility did not go unnoticed by the public. Twitter was populated by heated discussions under the program's hashtag: #*VamosChilenos*. Opinions regarding the inadequate solution provided by *Conecta Mayor*, the lack of consideration of familial limitations and the state’s irresponsibility toward vulnerable and abandoned older people were the main contestations. For instance, while several Twitter users were criticising the immoral behaviour of younger family members after Alejandra’s short documentary, other users, such as the grandchild of the seventy-five-year-old woman who appeared in the documentary –Blanca Aros– contested the biased

interpretation of the TV show toward family responsibility. He mentioned that if the public knew about the abusive behaviours of the woman toward her six children, no one would dare blame them for her feelings of abandonment^{qqq}. This was echoed by other users referring to familial responsibilities as contradictory due to histories of abuse and poverty. Users argued that in case of family limitations, caregiving responsibilities should belong to the state: ‘many families cannot have them [older people], or they are older adults alone [with no family]. *The state must take charge. I do not see a [state-funded] home for the elderly as unreasonable*’ (user @KariVedder). As most Twitter opinions criticising the lack of state responsibility and the quixotic solution provided by *Conecta Mayor* signed their tweets with ‘#Apruebo’, I realised that the public’s contestation reflected the wider anti-neoliberal common sense being articulated under the recent social uprising of 2019 which contested the effects of neoliberal policies –e.g. inequity generated by the commodification of welfare– and the limited and subsidiary role of the Chilean state inscribed within the Political Constitution.

Central state’s neoliberal common sense on traditional forms of care and state withdrawal was being challenged by the anti-neoliberal common sense structuring the social uprising of October 2019. Just five months before the arrival of the first COVID-19 cases in Chile and the implementation of age-based quarantines for older people^{rrr}, the most significant anti-neoliberal social uprising since the return of democracy had begun^{sss}. Inscribed within artistic performances, graffiti, banners, slogans and social media populating months of demonstrations, neoliberalism was at the roots of a large list of problems affecting the population^{ttt}. Corruption, indebtedness, cost of living, inequalities between the rich and the poor, uneven access to healthcare, education and impoverishing pensions were all associated with the effects of neoliberalism (Casals, 2022; Garcés, 2019; Hiner et al., 2021; Pizarro-Hofer, 2020; Suarez-Cao, 2021). For instance, the privatisation of the pension system under the neoliberal reforms conducted during the dictatorship had resulted in the exacerbation of economic insecurity in old age –by 2020, 50% of pensioners received a monthly pension below the minimum wage despite state subsidies– and of the inequalities experienced and accumulated during the work period, with women and informal workers experiencing the greatest precarity conditions^{uuu} (Gálvez & Kremerman, 2019, 2021). The anti-neoliberal character of the social uprising was also the consensus among independent media, politicians and intellectuals, concerned with elucidating the origins of the social unrest. For those expressing and supporting widespread social discontent, the Political Constitution written during the military dictatorship of Pinochet (1988)^{vvv} was perceived as the reason for

the reproduction of inequalities and abuses embedded within Chile's neoliberal model. Thus, changing the neoliberal and military-imposed constitution soon became an organic demand of the social uprising, as well as the political outlet for the conflict (Casals, 2022; Garcés, 2019; Hiner et al., 2021; Pizarro-Hofer, 2020; Suarez-Cao, 2021). In fact, in a transversal agreement signed on the 15th of November 2019 between Congress and right-wing president Sebastian Piñera (2010-2014), it was decided to submit the option of drafting a new political constitution to a national referendum. In what was informally called 'the entry plebiscite', the options to the question 'Do you want a New Constitution?' would have only two options: Approve (i.e., Yes, I want to) and Reject (i.e., No, I don't want to). Due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the entry plebiscite took place on the 25th of October 2020, almost one month after the national broadcasting of *Vamos Chilenos*.

Demands for a new political constitution emerged from the maturing of an anti-neoliberal common sense articulated by a rising left-wing bloc that had permeated the social uprising's demands for a new treatment of the state toward the population. Coinciding with Gramsci's idea on common sense as historically constructed (Hall & O'Shea, 2013), demands for dignity and greater welfare responsibilities of the state articulated through the different social demands had its origins in previous social uprisings such as of high-school (2006) and university students (2011), anti-private pensions (2016) and feminist (2018) movements (Casals, 2022; Hiner et al., 2021; Pizarro-Hofer, 2020). These social movements advocated for disrupting the neoliberal character of the central state by expanding its role in the economy and in the provision of welfare entitlements –such as education, pensions, health and caregiving– which could be achieved by creating a new political constitution (Casals, 2022; Hiner et al., 2021; Pizarro-Hofer, 2020). These alternative notions of greater state responsibility –with 'state' articulated as a monolithic concept– and the need for a new political constitution were closely informing the demands of the current social uprising for dignified treatment from the state. Multiple authors have unpacked how the different artistic performances and slogans populating the streets and city infrastructure^{www} called for disrupting the 'normalcy' of neoliberalism and for 'articulating new collective meanings'^{xxx} and demands for change (Badilla Rajevic, 2020; Benwell et al., 2021; Pinochet-Cobos, 2021, p.538-550). Demands for change were generally evoked as a new treatment from the state toward the population. For instance, demands for a new role of the state in addressing inequality were inscribed on ideas of dignity, with slogans saying, 'until dignity becomes a habit' (*hasta que la dignidad se haga costumbre*)^{yyy}, with demonstrators even changing the

name of an iconic square of Central Santiago to ‘Dignity Square’^{zzz}. In fact, demands regarding better pensions, health and living conditions for older people were also articulated under notions of dignity (Figure 6). Thus, the idea of a new Political Constitution that would bring dignity to the population, including older people, would imprint a different common sense on state responsibility to that of neoliberal state withdrawal by guaranteeing equal access to welfare rights.



Figure 6. Dignity for our grandparents^{aaaa}.

Source: Photo by Gonzalo Robert in Fundación Sol 2020.

Considering the intertwined socio-political and pandemic conjuncture, older people’s conditions of vulnerability and abandonment uncovered by the pandemic and disclosed by *Vamos Chilenos* became one of the arenas of the ongoing hegemonic struggle between those in favour or opposing the restitution of the welfare role of the Chilean state and the withdrawal of its neoliberal strategies. On the one hand, the anti-neoliberal common sense represented by a rising left-wing bloc contested the central state’s neoliberal strategy of reworking traditional forms of care arguing that older people’s conditions of vulnerability and abandonment were the result of the central state’s neglect. On the other, central state’s reinforcement of traditional forms of care was supported by those in favour of familial and charitable forms of care and rejecting the need of writing a new Political Constitution. At the same time, this intertwined conjuncture also shifted the spaces of contestation. As the pandemic had constrained social mobilisations due to strict quarantines and lockdowns, social contestation and debates over the new constitution had already migrated into alternative social platforms (Badilla Rajevic, 2020; Luna et al., 2022; Pinochet-Cobos, 2021). Therefore, disputes over the governing approach toward abandoned and vulnerable

populations took place in traditional and social media platforms including the TV show and Twitter. In Twitter, the anti-neoliberal bloc was represented by those who approved the creation of a new constitution under the hashtag: #Apruebo; Those supporting *Vamos Chilenos* and opposing the demands of the social uprising, signed their tweets with hashtag: #Rechazo.

Disputes over central state's neoliberal common sense on traditional forms of care took place through the spontaneous coupling of artistic performances in the TV show and Twitter discussions. Even though there had been tweets contesting the familial approach of *Vamos Chilenos* such as those arguing against the TV show's strategy of blaming familial neglect and the lack of consideration of familial limitations –as mentioned above– twitter discussion took a significant shift after one of the most recounted artistic interventions of #Apruebo in *Vamos Chilenos*. Around five hours into the TV show and while singing lyrics highlighting the inefficiency of the central government's COVID-19 response, performers of the folkloric group *Aparcoa* wore special garments indicating their political posture in favour of the plebiscite option of *Apruebo* (Figure 7). Immediately, their performance ignited a heated discussion on Twitter. For instance, with 757 retweets^{bbbb} a user under the name '@Patriota0073' (@Patriot0073) –with 'Patriot' alluding to the nationalist tenets of the extreme right-wing political party of the Republicans– suggested that the artistic performance of *Aparcoa* would backfire and increase the plebiscite option of #Rejection: 'Sigrid Alegría [name of the lead signer] and the members of the APARCOA group with Pañuelos [(garments)] of Approval. #REJECTION #REJECTIONGROWS' ('@Patriota0073 –emphasis of author). In tandem, other users against the drafting of a new constitution –#Rechazo– began blaming the artistic left and those of the #Apruebo for politicising the 'honourable' philanthropic cause of *Vamos Chilenos* and threatened to halt their donations. For instance, with 292 retweets @rifkaabu made a call not to donate as *Vamos Chilenos* was an initiative of the Chilean left: 'We make a call not to donate in #VamosChilenos, a club of the Chilean left that carries out political proselytising in the channel of all Chileans' (@rifkaabu). With similar ideas, @PatyEspindola5 –with 1,025 retweets– blamed *Vamos Chilenos* as an undercover campaign of the 'Approval' and criticised them for instrumentalising solidarity: 'I have a question... Is #VamosChilenos the official approval campaign? It seems tremendously basic to me that a 'cause of solidarity' becomes an 'undercover' political act #IReject' (@PatyEspindola5). However, as I explain below, while users favouring #Rechazo blamed supporters of 'Apruebo' for co-opting the TV show, it was quite the opposite. Twitter users in

favour of #Apruebo were reinforcing arguments against the charitable character of the TV show.



Figure 7. Folkloric performance of Grupo Aparcoa.

Source: Screenshot of TV show Vamos Chilenos.

Central state's neoliberal common sense on traditional forms of care was challenged by the anti-neoliberal common sense articulating the social uprising. Users signing under #Apruebo contested the central state's neglect and its strategy of averting responsibility over the real problems affecting older people. *Conecta Mayor* would not solve older people's problems. Bad pensions, healthcare and lack of better treatment based on dignity were not going to be solved with mobile phones. As illustrated by the following tweet, a new constitution was perceived as the more adequate approach to solving the vulnerability of the 80,000 older adults targeted by *Chile Vamos*: 'Older adults need more [healthcare] attention, more empathy and BETTER RETIREMENTS. What do #VamosChilenos do? Give them a cell phone. Remember to APPROVE. In [this] program they don't say it, but that's what can change the future of older adults' (@pauladelafu). At the same time, *Conecta Mayor* was portrayed by Twitter users as an example of the state's lack of responsibility. They questioned the TV show's strategy of positioning vulnerable adults as subjects of charity, instead of implementing ad-hoc public policies. Among reasons to approve the drafting of a new constitution would be that charity should not continue to replace the state's responsibility: 'If for years people with disabilities have been shown as citizens [subjects] of charity and not of rights, should we do the same with older people? They need the state to take over, not TV to get them a [food] box. *That's why I #approve*' (@Rockdrigox). As posted and retweeted by other users, instead of charity, the development of a new constitution would bring about social justice by providing the foundations to implement a welfare state and guarantee the fundamental rights of citizens: 'No more shows. No more charity. No more bingo.'

#NewConstitution, Welfare State, guaranteed fundamental rights. #SocialJustice' (user: @SaryOasis). The anti-neoliberal common sense rising in opposition to central state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of care was not only articulated by users showing their referendum preference with *#Apruebo*. Other users articulated a clear anti-neoliberal common sense that opposed the philanthropic and charitable character of *Vamos Chilenos*. For instance, a user interpellated the Twitter community asking to retweet her tweet if people preferred donating to a grass-root community initiative such as 'common-pots' to donating to the TV show represented by the figure of *Don Francisco*. It was retweeted 1,404 times: 'Do you prefer to support *Don Francisco's* television campaign or support the common pots? RT:*#OllasComunes*' (@gilda_chiesa). Therefore, despite the TV show's efforts to avoid contradicting rights-based discourses around older people, users guided by an alternative common sense on state responsibility blamed it for positioning welfare rights as to be accomplished by charitable strategies.

Even though there is no consensus on the reasons why *Vamos Chilenos* did not reach its collection goal, the anti-neoliberal common sense represented by *#Apruebo* played a significant role. As the TV show was unable to raise all the funds envisioned^{cccc}, different hypotheses emerged. For the leading figures of the program, such as Mario Kreutzberger, reaching half of the expected goal was due to the economic hardship being experienced by the population during the pandemic, the timing of the public campaign which had only begun twenty-five days before, and probably, broadcasting it during the national independence holidays when people were not interested in TV shows. When interviewed by a mainstream news media called 'LaTercera'^{dddd} regarding the politicisation of the program, he seemed unaware and mentioned that as the event was supported by mayors from all the political spectrum –represented under the Associations of Municipalities– he thought that the program had a widespread acceptance. For those in favour of the *#Rechazo*, the blame was to be placed on the *#Apruebo* for discouraging the 'sensible' public from donating. For those in favour of the *#Apruebo*, its failure was evidence that the public was already aware that critical welfare issues were not to be treated through philanthropic charity but as the state's responsibility to provide sound public policies to ensure older people's dignity. The novel common sense on state responsibility to be inscribed within a new constitution was the way forward. A month later, on the 25th of October 2020, *#Apruebo* had won the plebiscite with just over 78% of the votes. A year later, the left-wing bloc also won the presidential election

of December 2021 under the representation of Gabriel Boric, president of Chile 2022 until date.

Conclusions

With roots in conservative catholic values and a marked class divide, the hegemonic character of familial and charitable forms of care as the central state's main governing strategy for the provision of welfare and caregiving for older people lies in its continuation and reinforcement through contrasting governing projects. In this regard, the uncontested embeddedness of familial and charitable forms of care has shed light on the values conferred to older populations within the different political-economic projects which have conceived them as either outsiders or threats to economic development. Most recently, mirroring Cooper (2017), neoliberal governing projects trying to avert welfare and caregiving responsibilities of the central state toward this growing population group amid a scenario of advanced demographic ageing, have capitalised on the historically ingrained character of traditional forms of care to reinforce it as a natural and socially accepted common sense. In fact, despite discursive efforts to depart from a history of state neglect by recent democratic neoliberal governing projects, traditional forms of care have remained almost untouched. Democratic neoliberal governing projects preceding the centre-left governing project of President Michelle Bachelet not only recurred to reinforcing traditional forms of care as common sense by appealing to legal and moral duties but also these governing projects continued to adhere to the commodification of welfare facilitating the double reinforcement of familial and individualisation rationales. At the same time, mirroring Hall's interpretation of Gramsci's common sense, the 'traces and 'stratified deposits'' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.165) of traditional forms of care as common sense have clouded progressive efforts to depart from the neoliberal withdrawal of the state. Even though during the governing project of Michelle Bachelet central state's politics on familial forms of care was blamed as perpetuating socioeconomic and gender inequalities, it did not decentre families as the main providers of welfare and caregiving. This was not the same for charitable forms of care which were replaced –to some extent– by a public ownership project on long-term care.

Nonetheless, under the confluence of the pandemic and the anti-neoliberal socio-political uprising of 2019, the central state's common sense on traditional forms of care was challenged. Despite renewed efforts to position familial and philanthropic forms of care by

the right-wing neoliberal governing project of Sebastian Piñera, the evident failure of the central state's historical politics of familialisation –leaving 80,000 older people in poverty and abandonment– and the anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility guiding the social uprising transformed older people's conditions of abandonment and vulnerability as one of the grounds of the ongoing hegemonic struggle. While central government tried to reinforce familial and philanthropic forms of care through moral appeals to good and bad forms of familial care and a charitable technological solution to address familial abandonment, Twitter users contested the lack of consideration of family limitations and the state's irresponsibility over the caregiving of vulnerable and abandoned individuals. The anti-neoliberal common sense cultivated by a rising left-wing bloc through years of social movements and contestation, was penetrating the historically constructed trenches of the state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of care. Nonetheless, contestation did not reach a moment of de-centring family responsibility but, like Bachelet's governing project, it asked for the state's support for struggling families and caregivers. In this regard, contestation over traditional forms of care have followed parallel tracks depending on its familial or charitable nature. In comparison to church-based and philanthropic forms of charitable care, familial responsibilities have been seldomly questioned by the left as the natural locus of welfare provision. Similar to what Cooper (2017) considers as the left's struggle to de-centre the role of familial responsibilities, the traditional welfare and caregiving role of families have remained unchanged. In contrast, either through public long-term care projects, or fierce social media contestation directed to the charitable dyad of *Vamos Chilenos* and *Conecta Mayor*, traditional forms of charitable care have been overtly challenged. This difference suggests that progressive forms of common sense need to advance toward de-centring familial forms of care and unpack further the way in which historically ingrained forms of common sense –and other forms of common sense in general– are used by governing projects to assert their hegemony. Mirroring Hall's interpretation of Gramsci's common sense as a relevant political arena to be guarded (Hall & O'Shea, 2013; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016), these findings could speak to the later unfolding of the ongoing socio-political conjuncture. Even though the anti-neoliberal common sense reached widespread consensus in the entry plebiscite and the rise of the left-wing bloc as a state governing project, an extreme right-wing bloc –represented by Chilean Republicans– has been able to build a growing presence in the political scenario by appealing to common-sense ideas about human security, rather than social security.

^a Changing the political constitution soon became an organic demand, as well as the political outlet for the conflict (Casals, 2022; Hiner et al., 2021; Pizarro-Hofer, 2020; Suarez-Cao, 2021).

^b Capitalist state projects since the independence from Spanish colonial rule (1810-1818) were characterised by the provision of social and medical support to the population by a binary of ‘palace and hospice’, where the needs of the impoverished were managed through private charity funded by philanthropic sections of the ruling elite and the Catholic Church. As illustrated by a Chilean historian, the social order was articulated between opposing notions of ‘misery and mercy’ or by ‘the whip and pity’ (Illanes-Oliva, 2010, p.22). The economic elite-imposed conditions of misery and repression through the state co-opted by their interests, while at the same time financing the church's charity to address the most notorious externalities produced by extreme poverty. The elite-church binary provided shelter, hospitals and basic assistance to those unable to care for themselves or abandoned by their families. Impoverished children, women and older people unable to work, were among their main beneficiaries (Farías-Antognini, 2019).

^c The capitalist state projects (1818-1924) were characterised by a conservative oligarchy that controlled both the means of production and the state apparatus without political opposition. From the state, they controlled public investments towards the construction of infrastructure for mineral and agricultural exports and exploited the population by means of irregular and precarious work (Arellano, 1988; Illanes-Oliva, 2010). The political and socio-economic landscape was characterised by deeply engrained conditions of inequality. The economic-political elite benefited from the economic benefits of the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) and the Occupation of the *Indígenas* Territory in la Araucanía by the Chilean government (1860-1883). Newly appropriated lands were used for the mineral extraction of saltpetre and the cultivation of wheat, both for exportation. On the contrary, an impoverished labour force and populations, were mired in deep-rooted conditions of poverty, critical sanitary and housing conditions, as well as marginalised from political decision and ‘benefits’ (Arellano, 1988; Illanes-Oliva, 2010).

^d There is no consensus on the dates of the capitalist and welfare state projects. Some historians argue that capitalist state projects should be dated from the Spanish conquest in 1541, to the first Labour Code of 1931 that changed the state’s relationship with workers and marked the consolidation of the welfare state projects (Salazar-Vergara, 2003). Others, mark the beginning of the welfare governing projects in 1924 with the creation of the first social laws (Arellano, 1988; Illanes-Oliva, 2010). As I focus on the effects of governing projects on older populations marginalised from labour rationales, I date the capitalist governing projects from 1818 (Chile’s Independence) to 1924 and the welfare governing projects from 1924 to 1973.

^e The transition to welfare governing projects (1924-1973) unfolded in two parallel lines: the rise of the labour movement and the installation of political discussion about the role of the state in the wellbeing of the population -otherwise known as the ‘social question’ (*La Cuestión Social*) (Arellano, 1988; Illanes-Oliva, 2010). Though parallel, these converged on the objective to address the deep conditions of inequality by installing a logic of social justice to overcome the history of state abandonment and philanthropic care. Propelled by precarious working, health and housing conditions, as well as by high living costs, labour grass-root organisations such as mutual relief societies and organised workers from various extractive industries such as saltpetre mines in the north, coal mines in the south and railway and port workers, initiated the labour movement (*El Movimiento Obrero*) (Farías-Antognini, 2019). Through a robust mobilising capacity leading to a series of national strikes between 1890 and 1907 (De Shazo 2007 in Farías-Antognini, 2019), *El Movimiento Obrero* appealed for a new role of the state in ensuring better work and living conditions. Nonetheless, it was soon disarticulated by the strong repression of the opposing capitalist elite, with devastating moments such as the slaughter of workers in the northern city of Iquique in 1907 (Arellano, 1988; Farías-Antognini, 2019; Illanes-Oliva, 2010). Amid strong coercive measures against their mobilisation, their demands continued a parallel path through their incorporation into party politics and congressional discussions. Even though *El Movimiento Obrero* emerged independently from political parties, the later participation of party members and leaders resulted in the incorporation of some of their demands into party guidelines and legislative projects – mainly represented by the Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata*)– leading to public debates and congressional discussions around the ‘social question’ (*La Cuestión Social*). *La Cuestión Social* alluded to issues surrounding labour regulations and the living conditions of the wider population, questioning the role of the state on these matters. Within these debates, demands from the Labour Movement were represented in Congress by more progressive political parties such as the Democratic Party, Radicals (*Radicales*) and some progressive Liberals. These parties formed the Liberal Alliance (*Alianza Liberal*) led by Arturo Alessandri, who won the presidential chair in 1920 (Arellano, 1988; Farías-Antognini, 2019; Illanes-Oliva, 2010).

^f Arturo Alessandri triumphed under promises to transform the role of the state towards the labour force: ‘[as] the proletariat is an irreplaceable economic factor, the state must have the necessary elements to defend it physically, morally and intellectually’ (Alessandri, Presidential Program in Godoy, 1971 in Arellano, 1988, p.28). Likewise, following the conception of the Fordist family and the role of the male family provider, the

state was to safeguard remunerations to satisfy ‘the minimum needs of his [the worker’s] life and those of his family’ (Alessandri, Presidential Program in Godoy, 1971 in Arellano, 1988, p.28).

^g Even though these laws were proposed by the executive in 1920, the opposition blocked them until the military uprising of 1924, which pressed Congress to approve the social laws regulating the labour market, social security and access to healthcare.

^h For instance, until 1924 and the creation of the Ministry of Hygiene, Assistance and Social Welfare, the healthcare of the population was mainly serviced by private charities (*beneficiencia privada*) funded by the elite and administered by the church.

ⁱ The consolidation of the labour-corporatist model for the allocation and distribution of social welfare was enabled by the promulgation of the first work code in 1931, in which the different work unions negotiated with the state through the Ministry of Labour.

^j For instance, the Law on Occupational Illness, Disability and Accident Insurance (*Ley de Seguros de Enfermedad, Invalidez y Accidentes del Trabajo*) (1924), gave place to a segmented pension and insurance system according to different work categories: ‘The Social Security Service provided coverage to the working sectors; the Private Employees Provident Fund to private employees; and the Fund for Public Employees and Journalists to state workers’ (Fariás-Antognini, 2019, p.29).

^k The universalistic approach of the welfare governing projects in the provision of healthcare resulted from the interventions of a new class of progressive professionals concerned with the role of the state in addressing the precarious sanitary and living conditions of the population besieged by pandemics (Arellano, 1988; Illanes-Oliva, 2003, 2010). In light of the high mortality experienced in charitable pesthouses between 1870 and 1886 amid waves of smallpox and the cholera pandemic (1887-1889), an increasingly organised group of healthcare professionals began to install the need to address the sanitary conditions of the population and move beyond the charitable provision of healthcare. Identified with secular ideas regarding the role of science and the state, these professionals pushed for more substantial involvement of the state in ensuring the minimum hygiene conditions of the population and the regulation of the charitable provision of healthcare. With initiatives such as the compulsory vaccination against smallpox (1887), the creation of Public Hygiene Councils (1889), the Superior Council of Public Hygiene (1892) and the Institute of Hygiene (1892), the state began to gradually assume a regulatory role over the charitable provision of healthcare (Illanes-Oliva, 2010). Later, amid public and congressional debates about ‘The Social Question’, issues of healthcare began to intersect debates over the role of the welfare role of the state. Thus, with the enactment of the social laws and the creation of the Ministry of Hygiene, Assistance and Social Welfare in 1924, the state was consolidated as the entity in charge of public health. During the consolidation of welfare governing projects (1924-1960), the health and sociosanitary system was continuously improved and strengthened, extending its coverage towards the wider population. In this context, efforts such as the Preventive Health Law (1938), the Mother and Child Law (1937), the creation of the National Health Service (*Servicio Nacional de Salud - SNS*) (1952), as well as the implementation of family control programs during the 1960s, were extended to the wider population resulting in a gradual reduction in mortality rates and an increase in life expectancy. Overall, the health character of the welfare governing projects was imprinted by the conjunction of capitalist and labour legacies which sought to improve the health and vitality of the (existing and future) working population to consolidate the national economic development (Illanes-Oliva, 2010; Morales-Contreras, 2001; Moya, 2013; Pieper-Mooney, 2008).

^l The Christian-Democratic administration implemented diverse laws and policies such as ‘the equalisation of the agricultural worker’s minimum wage with the industrial worker’s wage’, the ‘single family allowance for employees, workers and farmers’, among other initiatives pushing towards the inclusion of marginalised groups of women and urban dwellers. The Popular Unity sought to address the existing socioeconomic inequalities through an economic and social plan that placed the action and responsibility of the state in the foreground of the redistribution of goods and services, developing educational and health reforms ‘which proposed common, egalitarian and universal coverage plans for the population’ (Fariás-Antognini, 2019, p.82). The universalising governing project of The Union Popular was aborted with the military coup of 1973 and the rollout of the dictatorship.

^m Cooper (2017) mentions that ‘the imperative of personal responsibility slides ineluctably into that of family responsibility when it comes to managing the inevitable problems of economic dependence (the care of children, the disabled, the elderly, or the unwaged)’ (Cooper, 2017, p.71).

ⁿ Formal workers were ‘obligated to place a percent of their monthly salaries in an individual account within a private pension fund’ administrated by private companies organised under the Pension Fund Association –or AFP– in charge of investing the funds in domestic bonds and equities, moving later to international markets (Barrientos, 2000; Taylor, 2006, p.95).

^o The allocation of social benefits would be limited to those under conditions of extreme poverty and unable to access commodified forms of welfare.

^p PASIS provided limited support ‘equivalent to one third of a minimum pension’ which in 1991 consisted of 8.067 CLP –approximately USD 15 per month, today– (Fariás-Antognini, 2019; MIDEPLAN, 1991).

^q CONAPRAN assumed a central role in the promotion of care for vulnerable older people, engaging in the coordination of charitable work and providing charitable caregiving for over 30,000 older people (MIDEPLAN, 1991, p.44).

^r This civilising project ‘was supported and promoted by a large number of female volunteers under the leadership of the wives of the commanders-in-chief of the Armed Forces, with the participation of the spouses of national, regional and communal authorities’ (Caro-Puga, 2014; Farías-Antognini, 2019; MIDEPLAN, 1991).

^s The return to democracy in 1990 after seventeen years of military dictatorship was propelled by the articulation of increasing social discontent, political re-articulation and international interests to erase the authoritarian and repressive face associated with the neoliberal model. With social mobilisations forged under the economic crisis generated by neoliberal restructuring policies (between 1983 and 1987), and international attention about concerns over human rights violations, the military dictatorship became problematic to the US’s project of positioning the neoliberal political-economic project. In fact, Ronald Reagan –initially a close ally of the military regime– became concerned with the social ‘ungovernability’ and decided to ‘abandon Pinochet’ (Salazar-Vergara, 2019, p.242) to save Chile’s neoliberal model. By financially and ideologically supporting the installation of a liberal-democratic framework to the neoliberal model implanted by force, the idea was to provide neoliberalism with the merits of being considered an international exemplar (Salazar-Vergara, 2019, p.242). Under this context and with the re-institution of the activities of political parties in 1987, the development of the national plebiscite of 1988 on the continuation of the military regime set a terminating date for the military dictatorship.

^t Member of the centre-left democratic party called Party for Democracy (*Partido por la Democracia* –PPD).

^u It is important to mention that the recognition of the pension system as an underlying factor of poverty in old age was associated with the pension system inherited from the welfare governing projects, rather than the private pension system of individual capitalisation, which was only mentioned in terms of its failure to include people in irregular or informal jobs (MIDEPLAN, 1991).

^v The high number of older people living in poverty was considered as the result of precarious assistance policies of the military dictatorship (e.g., PASIS) and the overlooked impacts of the economic crisis of 1982-1984 on the number of families living in conditions of poverty.

^w Data from the recent National Survey of Socioeconomic Characterisation of 1990 (*Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional* –CASEN).

^x The National Census was conducted every 10 years, with the last one implemented in 1982. Therefore, MIDEPLAN used projections to calculate the percentages of older people for 1990 and even 2025.

^y The last CENSUS of 2017 identified that 16,2% of inhabitants were 65 years and over. Current projections place this population group at 24% by 2050, placing Chile as the second country in Latin America with the highest rate of demographic ageing, after Uruguay. <http://www.senama.gob.cl/noticias/estudio-del-banco-mundial-anticipa-que-en-2050-el-24-de-la-poblacion-chilena-seran-personas-mayores>

^z Demographic ageing not only represented a process with the potential of ‘affecting the economic and social structure of the country’ but also a challenge in terms of addressing the ‘physical and social deterioration of the individual and their marginalisation’ (MIDEPLAN, 1991, p.6), all of which required of state intervention ‘to anticipate the problems arising from it’ (MIDEPLAN, 1991, p.3).

^{aa} The idea of a new role of the state began with the Basic Guidelines proposed by MIDEPLAN in 1993 for a National Policy on Ageing and Old Age, which positioned demographic ageing as a new phenomenon to ‘be treated’ under an ‘active and irreplaceable role’ of the state (MIDEPLAN, 1993, p.3)

^{bb} As I explore in the following chapters, strategies for averting responsibilities on the state also included transferring responsibilities to Local Government, Communities and Older people themselves.

^{cc} During the government of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994 - 2000) –second democratically elected government after the military dictatorship– the democratic project continued the process towards the inclusion of both demographic ageing and older people with the creation of the National Commission for Older People in 1995 (*Comisión Nacional del Adulto Mayor* –CNAM). The first National Policy for Older People of 1996 was developed by CNAM together with the collaboration of ‘38 prominent personalities from the academic world, professionals and public officials linked to the subject of ageing, as well as for parliamentarians from all political parties’ (Presidential discourse 1999 in Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.6).

^{dd} Directed to older people, these manuals addressed diverse topics concerning self-care, participation and the rights and duties of older people within the new democratic regime.

^{ee} As the Civil Code dates back to 1855, it has been modified through various laws. The most recent modification of family responsibilities in Law 19585, which ‘modifies the civil code and other legal bodies in matters of filiation.’ (Ministerio de Justicia, 1998).

^{ff} SENAMA was proposed as a public service with administrative character and functions, with the primary function of ‘coordinating the actions of the state services and civil society for the benefit of the elderly’ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.6). The role of SENAMA followed the neoliberal rationale on limited state intervention as its coordinating role responded to the need ‘of not creating a disproportionate

state body, which [would mean] extraordinary expenses to the Treasury’ (Presidential discourse 1999 in Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.8-10). According to this neoliberal rationale on limited state intervention and governance beyond the state, the bill also proposed the competitive participatory program called National Fund for Older People, to be overseen by SENAMA. The National Fund for Older People would ensure a retrenched role of the welfare state, as instead of providing ‘direct financial aid’, it would ‘support for the associativity of the elderly for the creation of social and cultural spaces that [would] allow the initiatives of the elderly themselves to improve their [own] quality of life’ (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996, p.14).

^{es} Despite reinforcing historical forms of state neglect through the promotion of familial and charitable forms of care, in his opening address to Congress to initiate legislative discussion to create the first public institution for older people –the National Service of Older People– president Eduardo Frei mentioned that under his government the state was overcoming a history of state neglect: ‘From a historical perspective, it should be recognised that for Chilean society the issue of aging and old age has been relegated from the concern of the people, and postponed in the concern of public services, producing a de facto marginalisation of older adults of social, cultural and economic activities. All this has meant for many years a discriminatory treatment and postponement of the legitimate aspirations of this age segment, to which the country owes so much.’ (President Frei, 1999 in Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.6).

^{hh} Congress discussions also included a wide range of actors such as representatives of multiple organisations of older people, municipalities already implementing local programs for older people and three representative charities with caregiving programs for vulnerable older people.

ⁱⁱ Congressmen objected SENAMA’s incapacity to address issues of social security considered central due to the existing conditions of economic vulnerability. For instance, Deputy Carlos Montes was concerned with SENAMA's lack of competence over key issues such as pensions and health for the elderly, alluding to previous welfare governing projects that could allocate considerable resources to sectors of the population in need: ‘in other times of our history, forms of funding were generated that showed a priority of society with certain groups; [these could be] the case of older adults...it is not enough to create a device that coordinates policies with a competitive fund’ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.119).

^{jj} They argued that apart from the self-explaining fact that their role was the result of the historical limitations of familial care and resulting conditions of abandonment, families were being confronted with the ever-increasing costs of care due to the deterioration of health conditions associated with age, which in some cases led to situations of abandonment. Moreover, families were subject to multiple economic limitations and internal problems –such as abuse, relationship problems, etc.– which prevent them from providing the required care for their elder members.

^{kk} These objections were dismissed, alluding to the fact that SENAMA had a different objective which consisted of promoting the social integration of the elderly by increasing their social participation and providing them with the ‘information and knowledge’ to access already existing services provided by public and private institutions (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.48).

^{ll} Hogar de Cristo, Fundación las Rosas and Fundación San Vicente de Paul. Observations made during the first ‘Family Commission’ of the lower house of Congress (*Comisión de Familia de la Cámara de Diputados*) in 1999.

^{mmm} SENAMA’s role also includes ‘[ensuring] the exercise of the rights that the Constitution of the Republic and the laws recognise’ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.535)

ⁿⁿ The nature and mechanism for the allocation of the National Fund for Older People was rendered more flexible including the possibility to establish direct transfers of public funds from SENAMA to public or private non-profit institutions dedicated and specialised in the ‘maintenance, support and promotion of abandoned indigent older adults’ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile 2002, p.535).

^{oo} Based on regional data about the deficiency of labour regulations and social security systems, paired with conditions of economic poverty in old age amid an ongoing process of demographic ageing, ECLAC introduced regional policy recommendations that advocated for the states to strengthen their social security systems based on a rights-based approach. A rights-based approach consisted of reinforcing the notion of human rights to that of welfare entitlements, to comply with the economic, social and cultural rights established within the Human Rights Convention (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, 2006b, 2006a).

^{pp} also referred to as the ‘ageing’ of demographic ageing and characterised by a growing number of people aged eighty years and over.

^{qq} The first step toward greater state responsibility was the pension reform introduced in 2008 (Ministerio del Trabajo y Previsión Social & Subsecretaría de Previsión Social, 2008). Considering ECLAC’s negative assessment of the Chilean pension system, which was accused of reproducing working life inequities in later life and ‘transforming them into pension inequities’ (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, 2006b p.131), Bachelet introduced the first reform to the system of individual capitalisation by increasing the subsidiary role of the state. The pensions reform aimed at constructing a different relationship between the state

and the older population by increasing its subsidiary role under notions of solidarity associated with redistributive pensions systems. Although in this case, instead of introducing a redistributive system within the pensions system, the state would create and subsidise a solidarity pillar based on revenues emerging from general taxation. One of the main instruments introduced by the pension reform was the creation of a Solidarity Pension System (SPS) which established a set of benefits for older individuals –those aged sixty-five and over– disenfranchised from the formal labour market. However, despite an increasing subsidiary role of the state, these reforms were unable to fully address income inequalities in old age as the market-based structure responsible for pension and labour inequalities remained untouched. Hence, individual and familial responsibilities over economic security in old age hardly changed (Gálvez & Kremerman, 2019, 2021).

^{rr} The National Study of Dependency of Older People was designed to explore for the first time the epidemiological characteristics of dependency conditions experienced by older population aged eighty years and over (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a). The National Study was developed as a medico-technical instrument that would allow for the epidemiological characterisation of dependency of the older population. It was elaborated with the participation of a multi-disciplinary group of experts on health and ageing. The agreed definition of dependency was based on the paring of the levels of ‘functionality of the person and the amount, type and level of help [required] from third parties’ in order to develop daily activities. In this regard, dependency was measured in terms of the degree of functional dependency to conduct ‘basic activities of daily living’ such as ‘bathing, dressing, walking, eating’ among others and ‘instrumental activities of daily living’ such as ‘preparing food, handling your own money, going out alone, shopping’ among others. Based on these criteria, functional dependency was defined as a ‘continuum that goes from severe to mild, depending on the activities of daily living involved and the help required for its realization’ (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a, p.9-14).

^{ss} As 85,6% of caregivers were female family members –spouses or offspring– of whom 91,5% did not receive any associated income (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a).

^{tt} A parallel study on the demand and supply for caregiving services evidenced another ‘reality of profound social inequity’ (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009b, p.109). The only alternative to familial forms of caregiving was –and continues to be– private market-based caregiving services, with vulnerable families experiencing significant access limitations and therefore, higher caregiving burdens (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a).

^{uu} ‘The message is already clear: the issue of care cannot continue to fall on women, on the family or, in their absence, on the foundations of the Church. The characteristic of the aging of old age and the increase in dependencies added to families with little capacity to provide care and with no social support calls us to a greater role for the state, both in the redesign of current policies, as well as in the implementation of socio-sanitary supports that are currently non-existent.’ (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a, p.7).

^{vv} Assigned only to family members outside the labour market, the stipend was designed to compensate for the lack of income of the familial carer. When first implemented in 2006, the stipend was of CLP 20.000 (USD 23). Today, it amounts to CLP 30.879 (USD 23). However, the amounts never reach 1/4th of the monthly income associated with the extreme poverty line, being unable to address conditions of poverty and unemployment of family carers –generally women–. The income associated to the extreme poverty line was of CLP \$117.750 in 2021 (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c); <https://www.chileatiende.gob.cl/fichas/49627-programa-de-pago-de-cuidadores-de-personas-con-discapacidad-estipendio>; http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/storage/docs/cba/nueva_serie/2021/Valor_CBA_y_LPs_21_01.pdf).

^{ww} A socio-sanitary approach was defined as the combination of social and sanitary services for the older population that would contribute to maintain their functionality, provide rehabilitation if needed and arrange for long-term care (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c).

^{xx} This is revised in more depth in Chapter Six.

^{yy} This socio-sanitary and preventive rationale was consolidated during the presidency of Sebastian Piñera (2010-2014) with the Comprehensive Policy of Positive Ageing of 2012 –in force today (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012). The Comprehensive Policy (2012) established a socio-sanitary strategy characterised by the implementation of ‘tiered and comprehensive health and care services’ based on the ‘principle of minimal intervention’ (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor 2012, p.24-25). The latter referred to preventing the increment of levels of functional dependency among the older population to avoid the higher costs associated with hospitalisations and the need for long-term caregiving. This socio-sanitary and cost-effective approach would be ‘essential for the financial sustainability of services’ amid the scenario of advanced demographic ageing (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012, p.24-25). This preventive socio-sanitary strategy would comprise a tiered system that began at the home and escalated upwards to hospitals and long-term care establishments (private and public) depending on the level of functional dependency and the need for caregiving. The home and the family were the basis of the tiered socio-sanitary system, with the need of scaling down preventive interventions. While self-reliant older individuals could live in their homes, in the case of an

increase of functional dependency the system would require ‘a more active role for the family’, or in their absence, of ‘tele-care mechanisms, assistance and home care’ (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor 2012, p.25-26). At the same, older individuals would be able to access rehabilitation in day centres. For the case of abandoned older people, instead of strengthening SENAMA’s long-term care establishments, it implemented novel forms of Home Care that provide hours of home care for vulnerable and abandoned older people. Overall, the aim is preventing the need to access costly forms of long-term care.

^{zz} Preventive governing rationales are explored in more detail in Empirical Chapter six.

^{aaa} CONAPRAN is still one of the major beneficiaries of state subsidies today.

^{bbb} Under the program of Public Long-term Care Establishments, SENAMA would coordinate the construction of the facilities as well as fund and externalise its management to either private non-profit institutions or local governments. This collaboration began in 2007 and is regulated by the Decree 49 of the Ministry of Planning: <https://www.bcn.cl/leychile/navegar?idNorma=1026803>

^{ccc} Implemented through a targeted strategy, eligible older persons should have moderate to severe dependency, belong to the first 2 most vulnerable socioeconomic quintiles, lack family networks and not owning a home.

^{ddd} As I explore in the following section, the 11.015 older individuals identified was eligible and requiring public Long-Term Care Establishments by the Comprehensive Policy on Positive Ageing in 2012 increased to 80.000 by 2020 (during the COVID-19 pandemic). These new figures were estimated by the Catholic University in support of the charitable TV program *Vamos Chilenos*.

^{eee} The two Associations of Municipalities were: La Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades -ACHM, y la Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile -AMUCH. The first, comprised municipalities from all political spectrum and the latter mainly of the right and centre-right. Municipalities would support Conecta Mayor by selecting eligible older individuals and distributing the mobile phones and basic food boxes. The initiative is explored in more detail below.

^{fff} *Conecta Mayor* would provide mobile phones to 80,000 vulnerable and abandoned individuals to connect them to their families and local networks and provide basic food boxes for 6 months.

^{ggg} Also known as ‘*Don Francisco*’ in relation to the character Don Corleone in the film *The Godfather*.

^{hhh} The two-day TV ‘marathon’ is populated by a wide range of live music and artistic performances, as well as sensitive rehabilitation stories of disabled children to appeal to the charitable donations of the public, economic groups and the elite. Donations are publicly made by businesses and economic groups during live transmissions and by the public through bank deposits or transfers.

ⁱⁱⁱ During the second government of Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018), Chile had signed the Interamerican Convention on Human Rights of the Older Population in 2017. The Convention positions older people as subjects of rights and the state as the main responsible and supporter of families in ensuring accessibility of welfare entitlements.

ⁱⁱⁱ In a UN report of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the same TV show of Teletón in Mexico (Imported from Chile), had been criticised of ‘promot[ing] stereotypes of people with disabilities as subjects of charity’ (Organización de las Naciones Unidas, 2014, p.3).

^{kkk} In parallel, *Don Francisco* –80+, who identified himself as an older individual helping other older people—along with a new generation of television figures, called upon the public celebrating at home—pandemic restrictions were still in place— the ‘better off Chileans’— and economic groups to donate to the bank account 2020 of *Vamos Chilenos*.

^{lll} Experts such as the Director of the National Service of Older People (SENAMA), the Association of Municipalities of Chile (Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile –AMUCH) and the Society of Geriatrics and Gerontology of Chile.

^{mmmm} On the left, they highlight the teleassistance program provided by Conecta Mayor. On the right, the other main contacts would be two family members (‘familiar’), the primary healthcare centre CESFAM, a national health program called ‘Salud Responde’ and the police (‘Carabineros’).

ⁿⁿⁿ The Head of SENAMA mentioned that in comparison with European countries that have experienced the same process of demographic ageing over 120 years, Chile was being affected by a more rapid pace of demographic ageing—he mentioned forty to fifty years—that challenged the creation and implementation of public policy.

^{ooo} <https://www.chileatiende.gob.cl/fichas/49627-programa-de-pago-de-cuidadores-de-personas-con-discapacidad-estipendio>

^{ppp} Direct translation of posts made by Raquel Carina Rendich Sepulveda: (on the left) ‘I hope they help the caregivers. I take care of my eighty-five-year-old mother and she is a patient with advanced fibrosis and I have to take care of my children. A huge burden, more so with her [who] has many illnesses.’ (On the right) ‘My mother is already a bedridden patient. I have done a lot for my mother. I live day by day in [hospital’s] urgency. I cry for everything. I am jobless. Still, I have to work. My little children take care of my mother’ (Facebook comments of Raquel Carina Rendich Sepulveda).

^{qqq} The grandchild of Blanca Aros tweeted: ‘My grandmother has just appeared in the #VamosChilenos campaign with a pity face saying that none of her children calls her. Let the people know that she made life impossible for my mother and my uncles during their childhood!’ (@ElSidharta).

^{trr} The first COVID measures affecting older people were implemented in March 2019 such as age-based quarantine for people aged 80 and over. Equally, all participatory activities for older people were suspended such as Clubs of Older People and central and local government programs.

^{sss} Starting with massive fare-evasion and demonstrations from high-school students over the rise of tariffs on Santiago’s undergrown system, social discontent and demonstrations from the wider population soon escalated in intensity and national reach. By the 18th of October, heated manifestations spreading across the major underground stations and high-traffic avenues were already gaining increasing support from the wider population, who started to echo their pots and pans. Over that day, the increasing intensity and rage of demonstrations were met with fierce police repression from the right-wing government of Sebastian Piñera, who by the end of the day declared a 15-day emergency state that enabled the armed forces to patrol the city. However, military and police repression could not contain the growing discontent and demonstrations gained increasing momentum. Initial discontent over raising transport tariffs was met with wider social discontent over police brutality and the everyday precarity and inequalities experienced by the wider population. The government’s repressive response and criminalisation of legitimate student demands were perceived as a depiction of power and economic inequalities ingrained within the neoliberal model. Thus, the social uprising which lasted for months until the implementation of the first restrictions on movement due to the pandemic, wasn’t the result of the raise of tariffs by 30 Chilean pesos, but of 30 years of rolled-out neoliberalism: ‘It’s not thirty pesos, it’s thirty years’ (*No son treinta pesos, son treinta años*) (One of the first coined slogans of the social uprising). For a chronology of the events and massive demonstrations that took place every Friday on the anniversary of October 18th -such as the largest demonstration in the history of Chile on October 25th (which summoned more than 1.2 million people), see: (Badilla Rajevic, 2020; Casals, 2022; Garcés, 2019; Hiner et al., 2021; Pizarro-Hofer, 2020).

^{ttt} Direct challenges to neoliberalism were inscribed in slogans such as ‘neoliberalism is born and dies in Chile’ (*el neoliberalismo nace y muere in Chile*); performances burning the Political Constitution of Chile approved during Pinochet; or in social media platforms such as #ChileDespertó (Chile Woke Up).

^{uuu} Uncovered by independent policy researchers in 2021, 50 per cent of the monthly pensions paid by the private system in 2020 were considerably below the minimum wage of CLP 300,000.0 in December 2020 (USD 370.00), reaching a monthly average of CLP 215,000.00 CLP (USD 265.00). This amount included the state subsidy introduced by President Michelle Bachelet in 2018 called Aporte Previsional Solidario (APS), otherwise, the monthly amount would be CLP 154,000.00 (USD 190.00) (Gálvez & Kremerman, 2021). Moreover, as the privatisation of the pension system is based on individual capitalisation, it sharpens the inequalities experienced and accumulated during the work period, with women and informal workers experiencing the greatest precarity conditions (Gálvez & Kremerman, 2019). For instance, in the same policy research, 50 percent of retired women received a monthly pension below CLP 160.00 (USD 197), which also included the APS –otherwise, the monthly amount would be CLP 141,000.00 (USD 174.00) (Gálvez & Kremerman, 2021). Therefore, despite the 2008 –partial– reform to the pension system which introduced a logic of ‘solidarity’ through a state subsidy that complements the lower pensions –called *Aporte Previsional Solidario* (APS), the economic security in old age continues to be a significant concern.

^{vvv} The political constitution of 1988 was latter modified during the Presidency of Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000-2006).

^{www} Beginning in the capital city of Santiago, demonstrations also took place in other major cities of the country such as Valparaíso, Constitución, Iquique, Antofagasta, La Serena, Temuco, Valdivia, Punta Arenas, among others.

^{xxx} For instance, impressive light projections over iconic building stated, ‘we will not return to normal because normal was the problem’ (‘no volveremos a la normalidad porque la normalidad era el problema’ in (Pinochet-Cobos, 2021, p. 550). At the same time, different groups engaged in the design of alternative national flags that represented new ideas of community and national identity (Benwell et al., 2021).

^{yyy} Feminist movements also demanded a different treatment toward women, with the state represented as rapist of women sexual and social rights (Dragnic, 2020; Hiner et al., 2021; Silva-Flores, 2022).

^{zzz} This square previously known as *Plaza Baquedano* acted as the convergence point of demonstrations.

^{aaaa} The online publication of Fundación Sol 2020 can be accessed in:

<https://www.fundacionsol.cl/blog/actualidad-1/post/cambios-en-el-sistema-privado-de-pensiones-en-chile-un-mercedes-benz-que-no-termina-de-arrancar-5956>.

^{bbbb} The most retweeted tweets around *Vamos Chilenos* reach approximately 1,500 retweets.

^{cccc} Instead of collecting the CLP 30.000.000.000 (USD 34,440,000) goal of the TV show, it only collected CLP 16.000.000.000 (USD 18,352,000). The private sector, represented by The Confederation of Production and

Trade (*La Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio - CPC*), had donated almost half of the amount: 7.000.000.000 (USD 8,036,000).

^{dddd} Interview to '*Don Francisco*' regarding the failure of the TV show:

<https://www.latercera.com/entretencion/noticia/don-francisco-y-su-mea-culpa-por-vamos-chilenos-fue-un-desacierto-mio-hablar-de-meta/GVVEVTUDKJGI3I4CDGJQCCHYDY/>

Chapter Five – The unintended effects of top-down devolution in the governing of older populations

Introduction

During preparations for my research fieldwork, I came across a report in which local governments contested the rolled-backed state in relation to its welfare responsibilities toward older populations. The report, published in 2017 by one of the largest Associations of Municipalities in Chile (*Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile –AMUCH*), was voicing the discontent of 270 out of 345 municipalities over the disconnection of central government from the welfare needs of older people, demanding central government to take on responsibilities for older populations (*Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile, 2017*). This marked my first encounter with local government contestation over issues of ageing. Until that point, all other official reports and policy documents seemed to agree to the devolution of responsibilities to municipalities. For instance, a report authored by the First Lady of the Country, the National Ministry of Planning and the Regional Government of the Metropolitan Region, stated that ‘the growing demand of the elderly could be met by the respective municipalities’ and invited them ‘to rapidly increase the coverage of all programs’ (*Secretaría Regional Ministerial de Planificación y Coordinación Región Metropolitana, 1998, p.5-6*). Yet, in AMUCH’s report, local governments challenged the devolved and unfunded responsibilities to address the existing and emerging needs of the older population, blaming central government for the lack of a comprehensive response. In contrast to central government’s neglect, the report highlighted that municipalities were ‘proactively’ addressing the welfare needs of older populations: ‘In order to improve the role of municipalities in [addressing issues of ageing], it is necessary for SENAMA –in short, *the central government in charge of the matter*– to develop more innovative responses to the various needs of the elderly and take into account municipalities in the centre of its action, that massively provide services and benefits to their elderly, *proactively and as one more function of municipal work*’ (*Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile, 2017, p.3 –emphasis of author*).

Further into the research, I noticed that local governments’ contestation was not restricted to voicing discontent over devolved and unfunded responsibilities in the provision of welfare.

As stated within AMUCH's (2017) report, at the centre of their contestation municipalities were 'proactively' bridging welfare gaps amid central government's neglect and the effects of territorial inequalities. Driven by a sense of ownership of critical social issues and the need to strengthen their autonomous governing capacities, municipalities were offering services to increase older people's possibilities to access welfare entitlements. For instance, the local government of Recoleta located in the city of Santiago was developing public ownership programs –such as popular pharmacies, optics, audiology and a municipal real estate project– to lower the living costs of older people. Similarly, the local government of Peñalolén –also located in the city of Santiago– was implementing locally funded programs to support older people with physical and cognitive dependencies and to support abandoned older individuals accessing public long-term caregiving. Moreover, as executors of central government's policy, Recoleta's and Peñalolén's contestation also reworked specific central-level governing rationales. Central government's rights-based approach installed during the first governing period of President Michelle Bachelet (2006 – 2010) was used as a magnifying glass through which to develop local programs and as a reference to challenge central government's neglect. This is when I realised that local government contestation was propelled and enabled by the contradictory role of the municipality within the hollowed-out neoliberal state; they were simultaneously 'autonomous' governing entities and 'executors' of centrally designed policies.

In this chapter I explore how local government contestation over issues of ageing is deeply conditioned and enabled by its position within the neoliberal hollowed-out structure of the Chilean state restructured during the military dictatorship. I argue that despite their contradictory role as 'autonomous' governing entities and 'executors' of centrally designed policies, the devolution of governing responsibilities on issues of ageing to local governments is having unintended effects: local governments are implementing alternative governing projects that contest –to different extents– the neoliberal rationale of averting dependencies of the older population on the actions of the state. I sustain that the 'closeness' between local governments and the older population produced by central government's devolution of critical social issues, is animating municipalities to take over responsibility in the governing of issues affecting older populations such as access to caregiving. Moreover, their limited autonomous credentials devolved since the neoliberal restructuring of the Chilean state conducted during the dictatorship are being reworked to implement alternative local

governing projects that counter the lack of welfare responsibilities of central government – SENAMA and other ministries such as the Ministry of Health– toward the older population. The chapter unfolds in the following structure. First, I explore the conditions leading to local governments’ contestation. Drawing both on the experiences and views of local government officials across seven different municipalities in the city of Santiago and a critical reading of historical documents and policy, I analyse the local governments’ contradictory position within the neoliberal structure of the Chilean state and its effects in their capacity to meaningfully respond to the growing welfare and caregiving needs of older populations. Specifically, I trace the devolution of responsibilities to local governments in the governing of ageing unpacking how top-down control, uneven access to central-level programs and an unequal landscape of municipal budgets hinder the local governments’ possibilities to respond to the needs of the older population. Doing so, I echo Peck’s (2012) work on austerity urbanism in the US, in which he suggests that the combination of a deeply carved neoliberal context and renewed forms of austerity reinforcing the downward devolution of welfare responsibilities to localities are the main conditions leading to the ‘incapacitation’ (Peck 2012, p. 631) of the local state in the governing of emerging issues affecting populations. Something similar is being experienced by local governments in Chile. Under the combination of limited devolved autonomy and stark central government programs designed to address the welfare and caregiving needs of older populations, local governments are facing incapacitating conditions in the governing of issues of ageing.

Second, I explore how the conditions leading to the incapacitation of local governments in the governing of issues of ageing are unintendedly engendering different forms of municipal contestation. Analysing the case of two municipalities in the city of Santiago, Recoleta and Peñalolén, I suggest that local governments’ contestation is mediated by the unintended effects of the neoliberal downward restructuring of the state such as municipalities increasing sense of ownership over critical issues, as well as reworked notions of autonomy based on the closeness between the local state and the population. Here, I build on Peck’s (2012) and Hart’s (2014) work suggesting that local government contestation emerges as a response to the controversial effect of the deepening of austerity politics within existing neoliberal landscapes (Peck, 2012) and to the contradictory nature of neoliberal policies that try to impose ‘fierce fiscal austerity combined with massive new responsibilities for local governments’ (Hart, 2014, p.83) and I also expand to consider other triggering conditions. Looking into the local governing projects of Recoleta and Penalolén I not only confirm that

contestation is driven by navigating the contradictions of responding to the increasing needs of the older population with limited and unequal resources but also I show how local governments closeness to the population and their search for autonomy from central government are key in the articulation of local forms of contestation. In this regard, I draw on Bulkeley et al. (2018) to explore the way in which autonomy ‘holds a promise of alternative forms of social organisation and of a politics that could enable radical transformations’ (Bulkeley et al., 2018, p.4). Furthermore, considering that the political projects of the municipalities of Recoleta and Peñalolén relate differently to neoliberalism –Recoleta's communist project opposes neoliberalism, while Peñalolén's centre-democratic project is close to third-way neoliberalism– I argue that local governments' sense of ownership over critical social issues produces a particular form of localism that opposes austere neoliberal policies despite the local governments' political colour. In the case of Peñalolén, bottom-up contestation is produced despite not having a counter-neoliberal project like the case of Recoleta. This idea takes force when considering that the Association of Municipalities voicing the municipalities' discontent over devolved and unfunded governing responsibilities toward older populations –under their 2017 report mentioned above– groups mainly right-wing municipalities, which in the case of Chile, means being close to neoliberalism. Overall, these findings suggest that despite the incapacitating effects of top-down devolution, local governments' closeness to the populations and search for local forms of autonomy positions them as key sites for developing more progressive policies for older populations.

Incapacitating the local state and engendering contestation

Top-down devolution in the governing of older populations

Top-down devolution of responsibilities over issues of ageing from central to local governments has been the hallmark of central-local relations since the emergence of demographic ageing as a public issue in Chile. Even before the creation of the National Service of Older People –SENAMA– local governments were devolved welfare responsibilities toward older populations under a central government program designed to alleviate poverty and improve the quality of life of economically vulnerable older people. As older people were considered among the most impoverished population groups with pensions below the level of subsistence (MIDEPLAN, 1991)^a, vulnerable older people were targeted within one of central government's –then, the Ministry of Development and Planning

(MIDEPLAN)– signature programs intended to address the high levels of poverty following twenty years of military dictatorship (1973-1990). This program called Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (*Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social*–FOSIS) had a specific scheme called ‘More Life for Your Years’^b which was designed to improve the quality of life of the elderly through small-scale funding transferred from central government to organised groups of older people, with municipalities acting as intermediaries (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002). As part of this, local governments were asked to promote the participation and association of the older population^c and were also required to adapt and increase municipal services for this population group. Thus, by 1998 and before central government’s creation of the National Service for Older People in 2002 and the first program for older populations called National Fund for Older People, several municipalities in the city of Santiago were already installing Offices of Older People and programs designed to improve their quality of life^d.

Central government’s devolution to local governments was bolstered by the reactivation of communities. When conducting an in-person interview with a policymaker of the Association of Chilean Municipalities –ACHM, I realised that the devolution of welfare responsibilities to local governments was also reinforced by central government’s reactivation of neighbourhood and community forms of participation through FOSIS^e. While discussing the history of local governments’ role in governing issues of ageing, he suggested that organised groups of older people reactivated through FOSIS were a significant factor in the municipalities’ drive to address issues of ageing. As FOSIS’s small-scale grants were only conferred to organised groups of older people –e.g., clubs of older people (*clubes de adulto mayor*)– their reactivation resulted in the local government receiving increasing demands from organised groups at the local level. He mentioned that local governments began to increment municipal services and benefits while ‘receiv[ing] the pressure when the organisations of the older population were formed’ (policymaker, *Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades* –ACHM). As the adaptation and increase of services and novel demands from organised older populations were to be funded with municipal budgets, the central government was already devolving responsibilities for the provision of welfare to local inhabitants^f.

With the development of the first national policy frameworks on ageing (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996; MIDEPLAN, 1993) and the creation of SENAMA in 2002

(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002), top-down devolution was furthered under what seemed contradictory conceptions of the role of local governments. Local governments were reinforced as the locus for the implementation of programs and response to the needs of the older population under notions of devolved autonomy and as executors of centrally designed policy. In the first National Policy Guidelines of 1993 municipalities were defined as the ‘articulating space’ (MIDEPLAN, 1993, p.37) between Central government and Older People and as sites for the materialisation of programs. Central government's rationale for devolution argued that as autonomous governing entities, local governments were better able to respond to the needs of older populations by developing a locally adapted response to demographic ageing (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002). Later, the National Policy on Ageing (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996) moderated the scope of action of municipalities restricting their role to *executors* of centrally designed policy and programs, which has been maintained until today with the creation of SENAMA in 2002 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002; Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996). In this case, with the aim of reasserting central state’s control over public policy, the rationale for the devolution of responsibilities to localities was restricted to the participatory nature of public policy^g downplaying the local governments’ agency in the local adaptation to demographic ageing.

As hinted within these policy frameworks, top-down devolution and the role of local governments in the governing of ageing has been conditioned by the contradictory position of municipalities within the hollowed-out Chilean neoliberal state as both autonomous governing entities and executors of central-level policy. As highlighted in Chapter Two, one of the most controversial restructuring processes of the Chilean state was conducted during the military dictatorship of Pinochet (1973-1990). As part of the forceful dismantling of the corporatist welfare state, the military dictatorship not only conducted radical privatisation schemes of key welfare services such as health, pensions, public services and natural resources but also enforced a decentralising process to devolve the ownership of critical social issues to localities. As municipalities had historically claimed autonomous governing credentials based on their origin as the most basic form of organisation of the Chilean Republic^h, the dictatorship instrumentalised these notions of autonomy to devolve responsibilities over the welfare of the local community. Under the resulting decentralisedⁱ structure of the state, municipalities^j were legally defined as ‘*autonomous corporations of Public Law, with legal personality and their own assets, whose purpose is to satisfy the needs*

of the local community and ensure their participation in the economic, social and cultural progress of the respective communes' (Ley Orgánica Constitucional Municipal, Ley No. 18.695, 2006, p.15 –emphasis of author; Salazar-Vergara, 2019). However, in parallel and countering rhetorical forms of devolved autonomy, municipalities were legally enforced to act as executors of central-level policies and programs^k with most of their functions depending on central-level institutions, programs and funding (Salazar-Vergara, 2019; Vial-Cossani, 2016; Villagrán-Abarzúa, 2015). Therefore, despite regaining their autonomous status and assuming residual forms of welfare responsibilities within the new rescaled structure of the Chilean neoliberal state, central government continued to exert control (Jessop, 2002, 2013; MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999). Interestingly, the effectiveness of reasserting local forms of autonomy for the top-down devolution of welfare responsibilities to municipalities became evident with the creation of SENAMA (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002). For local governments, devolution under notions of autonomy was better accepted than under notions of executors. During Congress discussions on the creation of SENAMA, local government contestation was directed to becoming 'mere *executor(s)* of programs prepared by other entities' (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.45 –emphasis of author), not to a form of devolution that recognised their *autonomy* to create and adapt programs for the older population.

The incapacitating effects of top-down devolution

Further into the research I realised that top-down devolution through local governments' contradictory credentials had incapacitating effects. When online interviewing a professional of the Department of Community Services¹ of one of the seven researched municipalities in the city of Santiago, he mentioned that their contradictory position within the state seriously hindered their capacities to solve the pressing welfare issues experienced by populations. Similar to Peck's (2012) argument on the incapacitating conditions experienced by the neoliberal hollowed-out local government, the contradictory role of municipalities restricted them to mere administrators of scarce resources: 'we are not the ones who have a lot of power in the matter of decision, beyond investing a little more here, a little further there' (local government officer, *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). This was also voiced by the professional of the Association of Municipalities of Chile (*Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile –AMUCH*). When discussing the local governments' contestation expressed in their 2017 report –highlighted in the introduction– he

mentioned that local governments' discontent was not about devolved responsibilities. Local governments contested their limited governing capacities and resources as these constrained them to administrators of scarce resources: 'in this state chain of state institutions, the municipalities are generally at the bottom...territorial powers are limited by centralisation and the scarcity of resources...this prevents proper local governing, they manage resources' (policymaker, *Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile –AMUCH*). Since municipalities are accountable to the community for issues that are not resolved under their autonomous credentials, local governments are left at a critical juncture where 'the blame is always on the municipality' (local government officer, *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*).

The incapacitating conditions experienced by local governments are heightened through concealed forms of top-down control and uneven access to central-level funding. SENAMA's strategy to install central-level programs within municipalities has followed a demand-based approach exercising top-down control over municipalities. A demand-based approach means that through the implementation of centrally designed programs within the localities, central government creates a novel demand for services at the local level; a demand that must be met by local governments after central government funding is withdrawn. As municipalities are mandated to implement central-level programs and forced to access central-level resources to extend their limited resources, SENAMA's programs land easily at the local level. However, upon withdrawal of central government funding, the municipality is to decide whether to continue funding the programs with their own annual budget. As the municipality receives the direct demand from the community, eliminating the program is generally not an option. While discussing the historical role of local governments during the same in-person interview with the policymaker of the Association of Municipalities, he mentioned that this demand-based approach was a well-known central-level 'trick' (policymaker, *Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades –ACHM*). It was not only used by SENAMA to install pilot offices for older people in twenty different municipalities^m but also used by other central-level services to install offices and programs for other population groups such as for younger or disabled populations: 'the trick of creating programs within municipalities is historic, that's how INJUV, the National Youth Institute, started. They ['central government'] told us: "we want to open youth offices throughout the country, because it is so important" and the mayors replied: "yes, but I don't have money"; "don't worry, mayor, we will finance...well, during the second year of the program [central government] says: "Do you know, mayor? The money is

over, there is no project, so now either you close the office, or you take charge”. And what mayor was going to close the youth office? None’ (policymaker, *Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades –ACHM*).

This concealed form of top-down control from central government still works today as a strategy to devolve unwanted welfare responsibilities onto the local state. After accessing central-level funding to implement a first version of the programⁿ, municipalities are deemed responsible for accessing new resources to continue its implementation after funding withdrawal, or to expand coverage. For instance, when researching the multiple programs for older people provided by the municipality of Peñalolén, I realised that the local government was funding a Memory Program^o designed and previously funded by central government under the National Plan of Dementia^p –hereafter referred to as NPD– (2017) created during the second governing period of President Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018). Initially implemented as a pilot program^q, the Memory Program works in the early detection, early home treatment and referral of complex cases. After identifying a case of dementia, they create a person-centred treatment that contemplates home visits to treat the person with dementia and provides support to caregivers to adapt their home spaces and routines to improve the quality of life of the person with dementia and the caregiver^f. However, when online interviewing one of the professionals of the program, she mentioned that despite the growing demand at the local level –they served 240 people, which was more than the initial expected target set by central government of 145 people– central government stopped funding the three pilots in 2019^s. When asking the professional about the reasons for central government’s withdrawal her opinion was that it could be related to public policy’s ageism – i.e., age-related form of discrimination. As older people, particularly those with dementia, are not going to improve their health-related conditions, there is not enough interest to maintain the program: ‘finally and unfortunately, because of ageism or something else [she was not sure], in the end the interventions with the elderly at the level of public policies sometimes are not very well considered because, uh [she hesitated], we are dealing with users who will not get better’ (local government officer, *Programa de Memoria, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). Faced with central government’s neglect despite the local demand, the municipality of Peñalolén took over the program and continues to finance and expand its coverage until date.

Uneven access to austere central-level programs also adds to the incapacitating equation. When interviewing local government officers from seven different municipalities in the city of Santiago, it became clear that due to the bidding character of central-level programs and their limited coverage, there was a fragmented and uneven landscape of programs for older people at the local level. Not all municipalities were able to access SENAMA's main programs such as Day Centres for Older People ('*Centros Día de Personas Mayores*'), Home Care ('*Ciudadanos Domiciliarios*') and Long-term Care Establishments ('*Establecimiento de Larga Estadía*, ELEAM'). Due to their preventive –Day Centres are designed to prevent functional dependency– and caregiving character –Home Care and ELEAM programs provide different forms of caregiving– these programs are highly demanded by older populations. For instance, when interviewing a local government officer of the Office for Older People of the municipality of Cerro Navia, she mentioned that they had recently submitted a bid for funding to open a Day Centre for Older People but was unsuccessful despite meeting the requirements of a high prevalence of economically vulnerable older populations developing functional dependency. Something similar occurred in the municipality of Renca when requesting the local implementation of the Home Caregiving program of SENAMA. Despite the demand for home-based caregiving emerging during the COVID-19 pandemic, the response was negative. SENAMA replied they did not have more funding to expand the program into other municipalities. In fact, the uneven access to central government programs due to the austere character of public policy is evidenced when considering the number of municipalities benefiting from home-based caregiving programs such as Chile Cares ('*Chile Cuida*') and SENAMA's Home Caregiving program^t which provide home caregiving services at least once a week depending on the level of functional dependency of the older person. Out of the 345 municipalities in the country, '*Chile Cuida*' is being implemented in 21 municipalities and the Home Caregiving program of SENAMA in 24, together reaching a coverage of approximately 7% of local governments^u.

On top of this, the coverage of central-level programs does not coincide with the existing demand at the local level. Accessing central-level programs does not ensure that the critical needs of caregiving among the older population are met. As central-level programs have a strong austere character, their quotas are below the existing demand at the local level. For instance, when interviewing a professional of the Office of Older People of the municipality of Santiago about their main programs and challenges in governing older populations he mentioned that central government's programs were not enough to respond to the caregiving

needs of older populations. Despite having accessed all available caregiving programs from central government –such as *Chile Cuida* and SENAMA’s Homecare– he highlighted that the caregiving needs of the older people ‘are many more than the capacity of the programs’ (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Santiago*). He explained that before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic the waiting list to access SENAMA’s Home Caregiving program doubled its coverage of 30 beneficiaries, with 40 older people in the waiting line. Moreover, he mentioned that during the COVID-19 pandemic response, the municipality had realised that the number of vulnerable and abandoned older people in need of caregiving support was even greater^v. Up to that moment, the municipality was daily delivering food to 130 elderly people in their homes and the professional was unclear on how they would manage the demand after the peak of the COVID pandemic had passed. The program was funded by the relocation of funds from other local government programs. To make matters worse and depicting the cold-blooded character of central government’s austerity, he mentioned that the availability of vacancies generally occurs upon the death of the beneficiaries or if someone else takes responsibility for their caregiving –quite unlikely, as beneficiaries are generally abandoned. Coverage and quotas are even more critical for long-term caregiving^w.

The incapacitating effect of an uneven landscape of municipal budgets

Top-down devolution added to austere central-level programs is not the only incapacitating condition experienced by local governments. The uneven landscape of municipal budgets in the Greater City of Santiago accentuates both their struggles and the spatial inequalities in the availability of welfare alternatives for the older populations even further. Since municipalities draw on their own funds to try to address the gaps in central-level programs^x, budgetary inequalities between the forty^y municipalities of the capital city of Santiago amplify the effects of top-down devolution on the possibilities of older people accessing welfare (Figure 2 in Chapter Three). The scope of budgetary inequalities between local governments in Santiago becomes clear when comparing the annual municipal budget of the high-budget municipality of Las Condes and the low-budget municipality of Recoleta, two of the seven municipalities researched during fieldwork. If we compare the annual municipal budget of 2021 of the municipality of Las Condes which amounted a total of approximately 375,000,000,000.00 Chilean Pesos (USD 468,000,000.00) with the annual municipal budget of the municipality of Recoleta for the same year, of approximately 32,000,000,000.00

Chilean pesos (USD 39,000,000.00), the budget of Las Condes is almost ten times higher than the budget of Recoleta. There is a difference of approximately 343,000,000,000.00 Chilean Pesos (USD 428,000,000.00). Thus, a single high-income municipality enjoys the budget of almost ten low-budget municipalities in the city of Santiago. Budgetary inequalities are critical when translated into available local resources per inhabitant. Even considering that the number of inhabitants of Las Condes almost doubles that of Recoleta^z, per capita budgetary difference remains considerable. The disparities between the annual income per capita of Las Condes (CLP 1,270,000.00 or USD 1,580.00 approx.) and Recoleta (CLP 205,000.00 or USD 256.00 approx.) means that the municipality of Las Condes has more than five times the budget of Recoleta to invest in services throughout the year per inhabitant^{aa}.

Like top-down devolution, the uneven municipal budgetary landscape in the City of Santiago resulted from the restructuring process of the state conducted during the military dictatorship. Together with the top-down devolution of welfare responsibilities through Constitutional and legal reforms, the military regime devolved self-funding responsibilities to municipalities by altering the municipal funding mechanism^{bb}. Under notions of fiscal decentralisation, the Decree-Law No. 3,063 on Municipal Revenues of 1979 established that municipalities would be funded by local tax revenues from property taxes, commercial permits and car permits. As mentioned by scholars, the neoliberal rationale behind tax devolution intended to foster local competition for resources as local governments revenue would depend on local-level strategies to attract real-estate and commercial investment, or rich households (Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019; Vial-Cossani, 2014, 2016). Considering that municipal revenues would depend on the wealth contained within the communal limits, the dictatorship also conducted reforms to increase local economic competition such as modifying the communal boundaries of the city of Santiago under notions of ‘social homogeneity’ (Morales et al., 1990; Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019). A rationale of social homogeneity consisted of aggregating similar socio-economic groups within communes, and therefore, meant the expulsion of vulnerable population groups from high-income communes to the new peripheral communes of Santiago (Morales et al., 1990). Until today, and despite the introduction of a weak redistribution system called ‘*Fondo Común Municipal*’ (‘Municipal Common Fund’)^{cc}, the resulting municipal landscape is characterised by highly contrasting socio-economic conditions^{dd} and municipal budgets (Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019).

The neoliberal landscape of municipal budgetary inequalities impacts the form in which issues of ageing are governed at the local level. Municipalities do not respond to the same number of needs, nor respond under the same resources. Scholars have defined this as a double burden in which poor municipalities have fewer resources and capacities for accessing central-level resources while having higher demands from population groups with fewer resources. In contrast, wealthier municipalities receive fewer demands for support from the population while having higher economic and human resources to respond (Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019; Vial-Cossani, 2014, 2016). Moreover, while researching the case of the high-budget municipality of Las Condes, I also realised that this double burden also impacts the autonomy of local governments. Having fewer resources increases local governments' dependency on regional and national level programs and resources, restricting their autonomy to develop locally sound program. In contrast, a larger budget signifies greater municipal autonomy to address the emerging needs of older people. For instance, when online interviewing a professional of the Office of Older People of the municipality of Las Condes about their different programs, he mentioned that all were locally designed and funded. Based on their large resources, which surpassed that of the Directorate of Community Development (DIDECO)^{ee} of other municipalities, he mentioned that they did not depend on SENAMA's programs to respond to the needs of the older populations: 'the municipality is quite autonomous in its resources and everything, so it does not work with SENAMA programs...the annual municipal budget is about 6,000 to 5,000 million...it is a budget like a DIDECO [of other municipality]^{ff}, but only for the Office for Older People' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Las Condes*). Therefore, unlike other municipalities, Las Condes has developed much needed caregiving programs despite their cost. The professional mentioned that the Office had an annual budget of 1,000,000,000.00 Chilean Pesos (USD 1,260,000.00) assigned for caregiving programs. This municipal budget is striking when compared to the annual budget of SENAMA's Home Care program of CLP 1.250.874.000, which is supposed to address the national demand (USD 1,545,720.01)^{gg} (Dirección de Presupuestos Gobierno de Chile, 2020). Considering this, the municipality has been able to develop caregiving^{hh} programs that escape the austere and targeted logic of SENAMA's caregiving programs as it complements the selection of beneficiaries with a personalised assessment of caregiving requirements: 'the [program called] vulnerable, is [of] 1,000 million, so it is obvious that with such a budget, uh, the management becomes much more autonomous...there is not the limitation of the Social Registry of Households [the targeting mechanism used by SENAMA]...we ask for it, but

there is an interview that goes much further than just qualifying for the Social Registry of Homes' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Las Condes*). Caregiving programs in the municipality even provide a monthly subsidy of approximately 300,000 Chilean Pesos (USD 374) for older people requiring long-term caregiving that enables them to access private facilities up to a monthly cost of 1,000,000 (USD 1240). An unimaginable welfare entitlement to be provided by lower-budget municipalities.

Mirroring these budgetary inequalities, the incapacitating conditions experienced by local governments have been perceived as the result of central state's unequal valuation of citizens. When discussing the challenges of addressing the needs of older populations with the professional of the Office of Older People of the medium-budget municipality of Recoleta, she was keen to highlight that there was an underlying significance to budgetary inequalities. The double burden produced and sustained under the hollowed-out neoliberal structure of the state meant the older people from different communes were valued differently by central state assigning more resources to older populations living in high-budget communes: 'an older person from Recoleta has a different value for the state than an older person from Las Condes...it is very different when the [central] state gives you the resources so unevenly [as] these resources are basically used to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*). In this regard, the combination of top-down devolution, uneven access to austere central-level programs and an unequal landscape of municipal budgets have not only had incapacitating effects on local governments but also perpetuated central government's neglect, unequal valuation and treatment of older populations. Nonetheless, as I explore in the following section, this combination of neoliberal landscapes and strategies is having unintended empowering effects on local governments that are contesting –to different extents– the austere neoliberal character of central state.

Local governments' contestation

Reading through my first encounter with local governments' contestation in AMUCH's report (Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile, 2017) –mentioned in the introduction– under the light of processes of top-down devolution it became apparent that local governments' voices of discontent were triggered by the incapacitating effects of top-down

devolution under unequal resources. This coincides with what Peck (2012) points out as the controversial effects of austerity politics in animating different forms of resistance due to the instability produced by austere and ‘small-state solutions’ (Peck, 2012, p.649). In fact, when discussing the reasons engendering local governments’ discontent with the professional that authored the report he mentioned that local governments were generally surpassed by the emerging needs of the populations: ‘many of the emerging needs that come from the territories, the municipalities generally do not have the capacities, whether professional, technical or planning, to be able to provide a satisfactory solution’ (policymaker, *Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile - AMUCH*). Considering local governments’ overarching lack of resources to develop locally sound programs, the professional highlighted that local governments contested central government’s disregard for the role of local governments in developing locally attuned programs based on their closeness to the populations: ‘resources are being underutilised here when the local government often has the capacity by its very nature, which is the closest institution to the people, to be able to develop public policies’ (policymaker, *Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile - AMUCH*). In contrast, and mirroring the first section of the chapter, local governments perceived the existing central-level programs as ‘disconnected’ (policymaker, *Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile - AMUCH*).

Exploring in more detail the implications local governments’ closeness to the population, in this section I analyse how in the cases of the local governments of Recoleta and Peñalolén, contestation has been about countering central government’s disconnection from the situated needs of older populations by taking responsibility for their welfare. As I unpack these two different cases, I show how despite their different political projects and their different relation with neoliberalism—Recoleta’s communist project opposes neoliberalism, while Peñalolén centre-democratic project is close to third-way neoliberalism—both municipalities are contesting central government’s disconnection from the situated needs of older populations through local governing projects that try to advance a rights-based approach. In this regard, contestation has been paradoxically propelled and enabled by the unintended effects of the downward restructuring of the state such as an increasing sense of ownership over critical issues and reworked notions of autonomy based on the closeness between the local state and the population. A local ‘sense of ownership’ of critical social issues—defined as the local governments’ awareness about the day-to-day unmet needs of older populations and their drive to address them—has been produced by the closeness between the municipality and the

older population under the top-down devolution of welfare responsibilities. In tandem, local governments' sense of ownership has become central to consolidating their devolved but limited forms of autonomy. As local autonomy has to do with the 'link [between] power and accountability' (Bulkeley et al., 2018), the autonomous governing projects of Recoleta and Peñalolén have been forged by responding to the situated and critical needs of the older populations. Moreover, as executors of central-level policy, local governments' contestation also reworks specific central-level governing rationales. Considering that local government contestation is about taking over responsibilities, central government's rights-based approach installed during the first governing period of President Michelle Bachelet (2006 – 2010) is used as a magnifying glass through which to develop local programs and as a reference to challenge central government's neglect.

The case of Recoleta

The medium-budget commune of Recoleta located southwest of the city of Santiago is at the forefront of progressive local governing projects trying to expand access to welfare entitlements. Under the local governing project of the communist mayor Daniel Jadue since 2012, Recoleta's strategy has been to debunk the neoliberal common sense about private provision of basic services and to counter socio-economic inequalities by repositioning notions of public ownership and citizen control. Despite its historical roots as a site of popular neighbourhoods of the city of Santiago such as the commercial neighbourhood La Chimba, the main cemeteries of the city and other social housing and self-construction neighbourhoods dating back to approximately 1950, the commune and municipality of Recoleta was created during the spatial administrative restructuring conducted under the military dictatorship. Like the municipality of Peñalolén, the administrative limits of the commune emerged in 1981 from the redrawn map of communes carved during the military dictatorship under the logic of 'social homogeneity' (Morales et al., 1990; Morales & Rojas, 1986). In this case, the logic of social homogeneity worked to exclude vulnerable population groups from the municipality of Santiago, as the considerable percentage of economically vulnerable populations of Recoleta –estimated at 35,1% in 1994ⁱⁱ– were to be governed by a different municipality to that of the central civic municipality of the capital city of Santiago (López et al., 1995; Municipalidad de Recoleta, 2020). Nonetheless, the commune remained under no definitive local authority until the return to democracy and the establishment of the municipality of Recoleta in 1992. Since then, municipal governing projects have fluctuated

between left and right political poles. Under the most recent municipal administration of the communist mayor Daniel Jadue since 2012, which came right after 8 years of local administration under the right-wing party *Unión Demócrata Independiente* (UDI), the municipality of Recoleta became an alternative governing project that contests neoliberal ideas and strategies. It is recognised as the first local government to achieve public ownership –locally referred to as *municipalización* (municipalisation)– of key services through the implementation of popular pharmacies, optical services, an open university, and recently, the installation of a popular real estate project.

In line with its historical origins^{jj}, the older population has been a central focus of the municipality’s progressive public ownership projects. As older populations on lower pensions struggle to access welfare services such as medicine and sometimes housing, they are considered the main beneficiaries of Recoleta’s governing project. When attending the inauguration of the local program for older people of 2020 (Figure 8), which took place just a few weeks before the breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic in Chile in a park opposite the famous *Plaza la Paz* in the heart of the commune, I had the opportunity to listen to the mayor’s opening address. In a speech directed to around 400 older people, mayor Daniel Jadue started criticising the inaugural brochure of the municipal program for older people. To his astonishment, the brochure only contained the programs offered by the office of older people leaving out relevant work of the municipality for the older population such as the popular pharmacy, the popular optics, the popular audiology and the municipal real estate project that supports inhabitants that are being removed from the commune due to high rent and housing prices by providing rent at a fair price. During the address, the mayor was keen to remind that municipal projects on public ownership such as the popular pharmacy and even the real estate project –which, as mentioned by the professional of the Office of Older People, benefited six families living with their older members^{kk}– had older people at the centre. Due to their low pensions, older people were the most affected by the neoliberal privatisation of services: ‘the program for the elderly is not only the set of activities that we do with you directly throughout the year, but it is also all the direct and indirect benefits that the municipality, uh, brings to our elderly and that have been fundamentally created with a focus on our elderly people who are the main beneficiaries of all these services’ (mayor Daniel Jadue, address in March 2020 during the inauguration of the municipal program for older people). In fact, on the mayor’s Twitter account he mentioned that since the inauguration of the municipality’s popular pharmacy in 2015, one of the main population

groups benefiting from it was older populations¹¹, as by the lower prices of medicines offered by the pharmacy, they were able to access health-treatments despite their low pensions: ‘Thousands of elderly people have benefited, precisely those who receive hunger pensions every month and who often put aside their medical treatment because they have no way to pay for it’ (@danieljadue, 2020).



Figure 8. Photos of the inauguration of the local program of older people 2020.

Source: author, while conducting ethnographic research in Recoleta in March 2020.

Debunking private ownership has been a hallmark of Recoleta’s local governing project. One of the primary rationales guiding Recoleta’s public-ownership projects has been to counter the neoliberal logic of commodification of services. In fact, one of the reasons that took mayor Daniel Jadue to office was his political governing project in which he promised to improve access to welfare services. During his political campaign, the mayor promised to demonstrate that countering the private and market-driven provision of basic services would not only improve access to services and quality of life but also that it was an achievable project by the local government. In this regard, public ownership projects such as the popular pharmacy, the popular audiology and the real estate project, among others, have been designed to counter neoliberalism’s characteristic private provision of welfare. For instance, while explaining the benefits of the real estate project during his public address on the

inauguration of the program for older people, he mentioned that it was the first public ownership project in the country designed to provide rent at a fair price and regulate its private provision. Countering private ownership with local state control was Recoleta's strategy to intervene in the inequalities produced by the rental market: 'These are the first thirty-eight public houses for protected rent, for rent at a fair price, that are built in the history of Chile; The country had never built housing so that it remained in the power of the state, so that [the state] could intervene in the abusive rental market' (mayor Daniel Jadue, address in March 2020 during the inauguration of the municipal program for older people). In contrast, the mayor mentioned that public ownership prevented abuse: 'with a municipal administration to allow everything to go in order and that no one abuses trust' (mayor Daniel Jadue, address in March 2020 during the inauguration of the municipal program for older people). Equally, during the inauguration of the popular pharmacy in 2015, the mayor mentioned that public ownership projects had been designed to address limitations to access critical services amid a history of deep socioeconomic inequalities produced through privatisation schemes and abuse from private providers: 'In Chile, unfortunately, health and medicines continue to be a business. For years the pharmaceutical industry has been deceiving us with high prices for the medicines that we must pay month after month' (mayor Daniel Jadue, People's Pharmacy Inaugural Address in 2015)^{mm}.

Paradoxically, Recoleta's public ownership projects designed to counter the neoliberal commodification of welfare have been enabled by top-down devolution. Specifically, its progressive projects have been built by reworking centrally devolved autonomy and welfare responsibilities in tandem. When discussing Recoleta's governing project toward older populations with a professional of the Office of Older People –just before the breakout of the COVID-19 pandemic– I asked how the local government managed to develop its signature public-ownership projects. To this, she replied that for implementing the popular pharmacy, optics, audiology and recently, the popular real estate project, the municipality did not require any legal reforms or huge investments, but just reworking the scope of devolved autonomy and welfare responsibilities: 'we just had to know the system we had and be able to manage it in such a way that it serves those who have to be served...the citizens.' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*). In this regard and recalling an interview conducted with a professional of the unit for the improvement of municipal management of central government's Undersecretary of Regional Development (*Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional, SUBDERE*) –conducted a month before the

pandemic breakout– Recoleta's public ownership projects have been enabled by central government's notion of local autonomy which considers municipalities as having ‘the power to determine how they are going to offer the service’ (policymaker, *Unidad de Mejoramiento de la Gestión Municipal, Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo - SUBDERE*). At the same time, as mentioned by mayor Daniel Jadue during the inauguration speech of the popular pharmacy, the municipality also reworked its devolved welfare responsibilities. Based on its legal mandate to satisfy the needs of the local community (Ley Orgánica Constitucional Municipal, Ley No. 18.695, 2006), the municipality was legally enabled by central government to implement locally designed and funded programs to increase accessibility to key services: ‘our popular pharmacy is based on the Municipal Organic Law, which states that one of the responsibilities of the mayors is to ensure the health and environment of the community’^{nm} (Daniel Jadue, Inauguration speech of the Popular Pharmacy). In fact, the installation of the popular pharmacy in which the municipality acts as the buyer and seller of medicine at cost price^{oo}, was supported by the National Institute of Health (*Instituto Salud Pública - ISP*) and the Office of the Controller General of the Republic (*Contraloría General de la República*) (Municipalidad de Recoleta, 2014).

Furthermore, contesting private ownership has been interwoven with Recoleta’s governing stamp characterised by its closeness to the population. Being close also means taking responsibility for the needs of the population. While researching Recoleta’s autonomous local governing project, I realised that its governing strategy coincided with the model of governance through proximity (Montecinos, 2007) discussed with a professional of the unit of citizen participation and transparency^{pp} of SUBDERE –two weeks before the pandemic breakout in Chile. Discussing about the importance of participation for local governments, he mentioned that municipalities in Chile were increasingly incorporating governing strategies that interweave participation and proximity such as mayors visiting neighbourhoods, developing thematic meetings with the neighbours to listen to their concerns –also called *cabildos*– while fashioning new conceptions of autonomy based on their closeness with the population. Governing through proximity aimed at transforming the relationship between the population and the local state by ‘not imposing the projects that are thought from the municipality but rather, listening to the people’ (policymaker, *Unidad de Participación Ciudadana y Transparencia Municipal, Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo - SUBDERE*). In the case of Recoleta, the first public ownership project of

the popular pharmacy originated from the close relationship between the municipality and community organisations. The popular pharmacy emerged in support of seventeen neighbours that, to access high-cost pharmacological treatments, created a community cooperative called ‘*Salud Solidaria*’ (Solidarity Health) in 2014 envisioned ‘to find mechanisms to facilitate access to medicines for residents of the commune’ (Municipalidad de Recoleta, 2014, p.1). In light of the increasing number of members of the cooperative and their socioeconomic vulnerability –which by 2015 reached about a hundred members– the municipality hired a pharmacist to support them in the acquisition of low-cost medicines and supported them with 8,000,000 Chilean Pesos (USD 9,200.00 approx.) to purchase medicines. Based on the regular meetings between the cooperative and municipal officials, the municipality realised the great needs being experienced ‘mostly [by] older adults affected by chronic pathologies and high monetary cost’ (Municipalidad de Recoleta, 2014, p.3), and decided to develop a larger municipal project that evolved into the Popular Pharmacy Ricardo Silva Soto, which is located in the main building of the municipality –called *Edificio Consistorial*– next to the popular library.

Recoleta’s autonomous governing project based on closeness to the population has also been intertwined with local imaginaries on a rights-based approach. When discussing the rationale guiding Recoleta’s programs toward older populations with the professional of the office of older people, she mentioned that the municipality’s public-ownership projects and other programs increasing access to welfare entitlements, such as healthcare, contributed to advancing the implementation of a rights-based approach: ‘[to] move beyond the paper...to be able to shorten [the gap] a little, or at least to be able to demonstrate that things can be done in another way’ (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*). In this regard, the professional mentioned that improving access to welfare entitlements was due to the municipality’s drive to respond to the needs of the population through a closer understanding of their problematics, which constituted a different way of governing. She highlighted that following a similar rationale to that guiding the development of the Popular Pharmacy, other local programs were developed by a different way of governing characterised by a closer understanding of the difficulties experienced by older populations. This is the case of the municipal program ‘health in your neighbourhood’ (*Salud en tu barrio*) which works by bringing health to the main neighbourhood associations at least once a month to reduce transport costs and waiting lists for the population: ‘it has to do with a logic, a way of doing things and, for example, ‘health in your neighbourhood’ in

this commune is very particular because the mayor's idea [is] that no person, particularly the elderly, be more than two or three blocks from a healthcare centre' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*). Thus, public ownership programs enabling savings, such as between 40% and 70% on the purchase of medicines⁹⁹ –in the Popular Pharmacy – or through hearing prosthetics that can be accessed at a quarter of the market prices in the popular audiology, demonstrated that advancing a rights-based approach was possible under closer and progressive forms of governing. In fact, during the inauguration of the popular pharmacy, the mayor of the municipality mentioned that through the Popular Pharmacy, the population of Recoleta was 'recovering –in part– the right to health'¹⁰⁰ (mayor Daniel Jadue, inauguration speech of the Popular Pharmacy in 2015).

The case of Peñalolén

The local governing project of Peñalolén brings a different perspective into local governments' contestation by illustrating how closeness to the populations and a sense of ownership over critical social issues engenders and enables contestation despite not having a counter-neoliberal local governing project. In the case of Peñalolén, contestation emerged under the installation of a third-way neoliberal governing project trying to conciliate the competitive logic of municipal funding with the welfare needs of socioeconomically vulnerable populations. Since the arrival of the Cristian-Democratic party –located at the centre of the right-left political spectrum– under the leadership of mayor Claudio Orrego (2004-2012) in 2004, the local governing project has been to bridge the gap between the rich and poor of the commune. For this, the local government has used the growing municipal budget emerging from the competitive location of the commune to increase the quality of life of the most economically vulnerable populations. This third-way logic of redistribution emerged amid a contrasting socio-economic landscape. Located in the piedmont of Los Andes Mountain range and close to the high-income municipalities of Las Reina, Ñuñoa and Las Condes, Peñalolén is one of the most socioeconomically contrasting communes of Santiago. Having been initially populated by socioeconomically vulnerable groups from the municipality of Ñuñoa, as well as by squatter movements in search of the right to housing (Krellenberg et al., 2011; Valenzuela-Marchant, 2014), from the early 2000s the commune has experienced an increasing arrival of new middle and high-income families due to the availability of cheaper agricultural land, its closeness to other high-income communes and the perceived environmental amenities of the piedmont¹⁰¹. The arrival of new high-income

families, as well as associated commerce and services, has increased the annual municipal budget and the local government's possibilities to develop alternative programs. The local governing project on redistribution has focused on investing the increasing municipal budget in municipal programs, community and urban infrastructure and public services⁴ designed to improve the quality of life of the most vulnerable population. As I explore below, Peñalolén's project of redistribution has evolved to counter the central government's neoliberal approach to social welfare by providing locally funded programs and even suing the SENAMA to provide access to long-term caregiving for abandoned older people.

Peñalolén's local governing project of redistribution emerged from an autonomous governing project based on participation and an increasing sense of ownership of critical social issues. When interviewing a professional of the Community Development Directorate (*Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario* –DIDECO) of Peñalolén who had worked in the municipality since the governing project of mayor Claudio Orrego, he mentioned that the local governing project was characterised by a close relationship with the population wrought through participation. When discussing the local programs for older populations he asked me if, from the interviews conducted with other local government officials of the municipality of Peñalolén, I had realised that the local governing project on redistribution had emerged from the close participation of the populations. He was keen to highlight that the municipality's programs had emerged in response to the needs identified through close conversations with the population in neighbourhood boards that gathered representatives of different interests such as older people, children, athletes, among others. Since then, their local governing projects had been focused on responding to the needs of the population, with the only limitation being that of funding: 'I don't know if José told you, but one of our first instruments to approach the communities were the neighbourhood boards... and from that, we began, building from the neighbourhoods, uh, first, [identifying] what the needs were, [and] then the prioritisation of the needs, because, clearly, our resources are always scarce' (local government officer, *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). This closer relationship with the population had increased their sense of responsibility over critical social issues.

Considering the above, older people's community engagement and grass-root participation has resulted in the deepening of the redistribution project under a rights-based approach. When interviewing different municipal officials, I realised that the Local Development Plan's

(2018-2025) aim of ‘guaranteeing the right to live well’ (Municipalidad de Peñalolén, 2018, p.12)^{uu} was closely related to older people being one of the most engaged groups in the commune. For instance, during the same interview with the professional of DIDECO, he not only mentioned that older people were one of the most ‘important focuses’ for the municipality but also that they had a strong compromise of participation within their communities: the leaders we have, there are several who have been leaders since 1965, that is, a lifetime being a leader and they are the ones who ‘put their name and face’ [a colloquial term meaning ‘take responsibility’] (local government officer, *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). In fact, he also mentioned that as the residents that arrived as young settlers are today’s older residents of the commune, senior community leaders also have a long history of grassroots organisation and association: ‘the senior leader has also gone through all the types of organisations. First, they were a union member, then they joined the neighborhood council, there are some who remain in the neighborhood council and have clubs for older people’ (local government officer, *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*).

Older people’s participation within their communities has resulted in the close understanding of their critical needs and thus, in the local government’s drive to advance a rights-based approach toward them. Since the implementation of the first Office of Older People in the early 2000s its working rationale has been that of participation and the promotion of a rights-based approach. As most of the older neighbours live from the Basic Solidary Pensions offered by the central state through the Social Welfare Institute (*Instituto de Previsión Social –IPS*) –which only recently exceeded the poverty line with a fiscal project called universal pensions– the municipality is implementing programs that support them –to some extent– to handle the costs of caregiving that come with physical and cognitive limitations^{vv}. In fact, within the latest PLADECO (2018-2025)^{ww} the central aim of guaranteeing the right to live well is closely interconnected with the need for care of the older population, specifically under the strategic governing objective ‘Peñalolén takes care of you’ (*Peñalolén Te Cuida*) (Municipalidad de Peñalolén, 2018, p.12)^{xx}, in which older people are positioned as a main group of interest.

Like the case of Recoleta, top-down devolution is engendering local forms of contestation over central government’s neglect. In this case, contestation is about ensuring access to caregiving entitlements amid central government’s withdrawal and austere programs. This

mirrors what Macleod and Goodwin (1999), Jessop (2002) and Salazar-Vergara (2019) have argued about the effects of the rescaled welfare responsibilities of the neoliberal state on cementing the ownership of critical social issues within localities. During the same interview with the professional of DIDECO, he mentioned that as the municipality was already aware of the problems experienced by the population, the local government was made responsible for providing solutions even if the responsibility belonged to central government: ‘people [communicate their needs] to us, and we have to take charge somehow...it is not the central government, finally, the one that responds [to] the direct need, or the direct demand, but it is the municipality’ (local government officer, *Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). For instance, as central-level programs are not able to cover the demand for caregiving support for older populations, the municipality expands coverage through the articulation of nationally and locally funded programs. Central-level programs implemented at local level include caregiving programs such as the Home Care program for people with severe dependency of the Ministry of Social Development and Family, the community day centre for dementia Kintún of the Ministry of Health and SENAMA’s Home Care program. Nonetheless, as mentioned by local government practitioners, these programs are far from covering the increasing demand at the local level^{yy}. In fact, due to the local demand for caregiving support –particularly for older people with dementia^{zz}– the municipality has had to continue financing caregiving programs discontinued by the central government. As mentioned in the first section of the chapter, the program of ‘comprehensive support for people with dementia’ initially funded by the Ministry of Health was transformed into a locally funded programs called ‘Memory Program’ and continues to support both people with dementia and their caregivers through home visits and counselling^{aaa}. Moreover, as the municipality is aware of the narrow and unstable character of caregiving programs, the local government created a local program called ‘fragile’ (*frágiles*)^{bbb} which currently supports 1,200 older people through healthcare home visits and close monitoring of health conditions. However, and despite the availability of programs, there is a generalised perception that the local demand for caregiving is increasing and that critical conditions of abandonment in old age escape the local government’s capacities.

Peñalolén’s drive to take on responsibilities over the welfare of older populations has also led them to legal confrontations with SENAMA. In 2018, mayor Carolina Leitaó (2012 until date) –also part of the Christian Democratic Party– decided to create a ‘Defense Office for Older People’ (*Defensoría del Adulto Mayor*). Initially, the program was conceived to instil

values of good treatment and fight against domestic violence towards older people. However, they soon realised about other pressing needs beyond domestic violence. For instance, as most older residents live on low pensions, they generally rent out rooms or sections of their property but have no support to carry out rental lawsuits due to lack of payments or breach of contracts. Thus, the *Defensoría* decided to install a specific area of legal support for older people to solve these and other issues such as abusive demands of payment from private companies, basic services, etc^{ccc}. The *Defensoría* has also encountered cases where older individuals requiring long-term caregiving arrangements have no family support and thus, the legally responsible entity in charge of their caregiving is the central state. For these cases, its strategy has been to legally challenge the National Service of Older People –SENAMA– after receiving a negative answer to admit the older person to a Public Long-term Caregiving Establishment. Even though SENAMA is responsible for older people’s ‘protection against abandonment and indigence’ (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2002, p.535), in practice, accessing Public Long-term Caregiving Establishments is a critical problem due to either lack of vacancies or inflexible requirements. For instance, to enter a public long-term care establishment, the older individual cannot be a homeowner. The issue is that older residents of Peñalolén are generally homeowners^{ddd}. Thus, in cases of inflexible entering criteria amid urgent need of caregiving, the *Defensoría* has had to legally sue SENAMA to force them into taking responsibility for their care: ‘we entered a conflict with the state, well, we are also a state, but ultimately with the central government. Because we return [them] the responsibility and take [SENAMA] into the Court of Justice’ (local government officer, *Defensoría de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). Until today, the *Defensoría* has forced central state to take over responsibility for the caregiving of five older residents of Peñalolén by ensuring access to long-term care establishments or specialised healthcare.

The legal bottom-up contestation of *Defensoría* over critical issues of caregiving has been conducted by reworking the responsibility of central government within national and international normative frameworks. Legal confrontations are based on reworking the central government’s responsibilities in ensuring the life and health of individuals established by the military-enforced Political Constitution of 1980. Under the right to health established in the Constitution, the central government is only obliged to establish programs for individuals to access health services through public or private programs, but responsibilities over accessing health remain an individual responsibility. As such the state is not responsible to ensure the health of individuals, nor access to welfare entitlements. However, as the Constitution places

the central state as responsible for ‘the right to life and physical and mental integrity of the person’ (Ministerio Secretaría General de la Presidencia, 2005), Article 19, sub-article number 1), the legal team postulates the need for long-term care for the elderly as a part of ensuring the life of the individual by taking responsibility for their right to health: ‘when a person is ill, it is ultimately the duty of the [central] state to guarantee their physical and mental integrity. This is established, it is the first constitutional right [of] the constitution’ (local government officer, *Defensoría de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). At the same time, legal confrontations over the central state’s responsibility are supported by the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights of the Older Population, signed by Chile in 2017, which positions the state as responsible for and the supporter of families in ensuring accessibility of welfare entitlements such as caregiving. Thus, as mentioned by the lawyer of *Defensoría*, they position the state as contravening both the constitutional and international rights of older individuals: ‘the state of Chile is violating the rights, and the rights enshrined in the constitution, and not only in the constitution, but also in the Inter-American Convention on the Rights of the Elderly’ (local government officer, *Defensoría de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén*). Even though legal actions have proved effective in challenging devolved responsibilities, *Defensoría* is aware of the limitations of their approach under the urgent and increasing need for care, as well as the territorial inequalities affecting municipal budgets to fund such programs.

Conclusions

While top-down devolution of responsibilities in the governing of older people has been intended to decentre the state’s responsibility over issues of ageing, in this chapter I have explored its unintended effects and how these are redrawing the landscapes of responsibilities toward the welfare of the older population. I have unpacked how the incapacitating conditions of top-down devolution and control, uneven access to central-level programs and an unequal landscape of municipal budgets, have paradoxically empowered local governments to counter the austere character of central-level programs amid central government’s overarching neoliberal rationale of state withdrawal (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Peck, 2012). Interestingly, the contradictory role of local governments as ‘executors’ of central-level policy and as ‘autonomous’ governing entities, has enabled them to redraw the politics of scales of welfare responsibilities, even leading to what could be considered as a particular form of localism characterised by countering central government’s neglect toward

the needs of older populations. Without intending to fall into the ‘local-level trap’ (Purcell, 2006), the cases of the municipalities of Recoleta and Peñalolén have demonstrated how autonomous governing projects triggered by a sense of ownership of critical social issues and by their closeness to the population, have empowered local governments to contest neoliberal rationales and practices mainstreamed from central government. Based on top-down imposed forms of participation, legally inscribed responsibilities and central government’s progressive rationales such as a rights-based approach, local governments are reworking the meanings of devolved autonomy to provide alternative governing paths despite their hollowed-out position within the state and political colour. Thus, I have demonstrated that local governments’ contestation is not only mediated by the neoliberal restructuring of the state (Peck, 2012) and the increasing unmet demand from the local population (Hart, 2014) but also by local imaginaries and practices of autonomy (Bulkeley et al., 2018) which have been instrumental for shaping forms of contestation based on every-day local governing practice characterised by closeness to the older population.

^a Situating the older population as an economically vulnerable group was based on statistical data provided by the Institute for Social Security Normalisation (INP) which evidenced that 81,2% receive between 50 and 100 dollars per month, which was considered as an ‘income that does not allow an independent and dignified subsistence’ (MIDEPLAN, 1991, p.7).

^b FOSIS had a special program to address issues of poverty in old age known as ‘More Life for Your Years’. This program defined different objectives to be attained such as to ‘a) develop an offer of specialised services for the elderly; b) to allow poor older adults to access the public services currently offered [by central state and Municipalities]; c) *to significantly increase the coverage of care for the elderly poor*; and d) *to test a decentralised system for the provision of services to improve the quality of life of the elderly*’ (Secretaría Regional Ministerial de Planificación y Coordinación Región Metropolitana, 1998, p.26).

^c The participatory nature of this program is unpacked in Chapter Six.

^d As I explore in Chapter Six, these programs were mainly participatory due to their cost-effective nature and ideas that participation was the main strategy to improve older people’s quality of life (e.g., the installation of theatre groups and workshops). However, due to the vulnerable socio-economic conditions experienced by older populations, municipalities also offered small benefits such as boxes of food, diapers and exempted older populations from paying for municipal services such as the collection of garbage.

^e As I explore in more detail in Chapter Six, FOSIS reactivated previous forms of community organisation promoted by previous welfare governing projects, repurposing them as alternative forms of welfare infrastructure.

^f The participatory character of programs has been instrumental to the devolutions of responsibilities not only to local governments but to older people themselves. This will be explored in more detail in Chapter Six.

^g The focus on participation was based on the main policy framework to promote ‘the social integration and the participation of the elderly’ (MIDEPLAN, 1993, p.15-16). This will be unpacked in Chapter Six.

^h The municipality as a form of local government originated from autonomous forms of local power based on reworked notions of the colonial *Cabildo*. The *Cabildo* was the primary form of socio-political organisation, administration of justice and of economic and land regulation during Spanish colonial power. The *Cabildos* had the ability to convene the local population in the resolution of day-to-day neighbourly and community issues in the form of ‘Open Cabildos’ (*Cabildos Abiertos*) (Ahumada et al., 1981, p.10). In contrast to its colonial origin, the process of national independence (1810 – 1818) emerged from the *Cabildo*. Intentions of national autonomy were articulated within a space that was considered as the basis of local autonomy. In fact, the Liberal constitution of 1828 consolidated them as the ‘the cornerstone of the state’ (Salazar-Vergara, 2019, p.29). Ever

since, the *Cabildo* has been an historical compass of local autonomy amid constant struggles on centralised and decentralised forms of state power (Salazar-Vergara, 2019; Vial-Cossani, 2014).

ⁱ Defined as ‘decentralisation’, the downwards restructuring of the Chilean state is inscribed within Articles 110 to 126 of the military Constitution of 1980. It established a territorial and administrative decentralised structure of the state based on the hierarchical articulation of the national, regional and communal territories, each of them with their respective ‘governing body’ and political authority. Despite defining specific governing bodies, such as municipalities, the devolution of power was limited to functions of law enforcement and administration of resources. This contrasts with the constitutional ‘power of the [central] state’, defined as the attributions of ‘representation (elections), legislation (creation of laws), government (law enforcement) and administration of the resources assigned to the decisions taken’ (Salazar-Vergara, 2019, p.274-275). Thus, despite the deployed notions of ‘decentralisation’, Chile is considered ‘one of the most centralised countries in the [South American] region’ (Vial-Cossani, 2016, p.111). Its centralised character is based on the concentration of fiscal, legal and even administrative power –particularly regarding the allocation and of resources to be administered– within the central state. The asymmetry of power is reinforced by restrictive resources, with regions and municipalities representing ‘only about 17% of the State’s budget’, among other concerns (Vial-Cossani, 2016, p.111).

^j In charge of administering the lowest level of the territorial administrative subdivision of the national territory: the commune.

^k The Constitutional Organic Law of Municipalities (Ley Orgánica Constitucional Municipal, Ley No. 18.695, 2006) defines a set of ‘exclusive’ and ‘shared’ functions or competencies of the municipality. ‘Exclusive’ functions are very limited and comprise the elaboration of the Communal Development Plan (*Plan de Desarrollo Comunal* –PLADECO) and the Communal Regulating Plans (*Plan Regulator Comunal* –PRC); ‘to promote community development; to manage the cleaning and garbage collection of public spaces; to apply (centrally designed) legal norms in transportation, traffic, construction and urbanisation’ (Vial-Cossani, 2016, p.113). In contrast, ‘shared’ functions are those that need to be implemented under the guidelines of other central state organisms, generally national-level ministries and their regional offices. These include ‘transportation, health, education, environmental protection, culture, sports, employment promotion, economic development, urbanisation, roads and citizen security’ (Vial-Cossani, 2016, p.113).

^l The Department of Community Services is part of the Community Development Directorate (*Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario* –DIDECO) of municipalities, which contributes to the municipal aim of ‘improv[ing] the quality of life of the inhabitants of the commune, especially the most vulnerable sectors of society’ ([https://observatoriofiscal.cl/Actua/Repo/Función de DIDECO](https://observatoriofiscal.cl/Actua/Repo/Función_de_DIDECO))

^m Through the ‘Program of Innovative Interventions for the Elderly’ (Programa de Intervenciones Innovadoras para el Adulto Mayor -PIIAM) funded by a loan of the Interamerican Development Bank (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c).

ⁿ This strategy it used to implement programs such as the Day Centers, Long-term Care Establishments, or promote the implementation of the Age-friendly Cities program (*Ciudad Amigable*). For Ciudades Amigables, funding has been made available to support the participatory diagnostics and the implementation of a first adaptation project; For Day Centres, the strategy is to finance a least a first version.

^o Formally called Comprehensive Support Program for people with Dementia (*Programa de Apoyo Integral a las personas con Demencia*) (da Silva Villar et al., 2021).

^p Even though the National Plan of Dementia is directed to people with dementia of all ages, population aged sixty-five and over are the main beneficiaries due to due to health prevalence in old age.

^q As most national level programs, the National Plan of Dementia (NDP) approved in 2017 was initially implemented as a pilot in three municipalities in Chile: Peñalolén, Osorno and Magallanes. The NPD proposed a three-tier system. The Memory Program –first tier– worked in the early detection, early home treatment and referral of complex cases –to second-tier memory centres, or third-tier hospitalisations.

^r At the same time, the program provides follow-up support to ensure compliance with healthcare treatments and supports caregivers with advice, strategies and sometimes guidance to access other forms of social welfare.

^s The central government’s withdrawal of funding from the National Plan of Dementia in 2019 during the second presidency of Sebastián Piñera (2018–2022) was heavily criticised by academics and advocacy groups. Even though it was interchanged by specific funding to cover Alzheimer’s within the public National Health Service -called *Fondo Nacional de Salud*, FONASA- the amount of funding was considered insufficient and a step back in public policy. For more details revise the following: <https://www.uchile.cl/noticias/159725/como-avanzar-sin-un-plan-un-auge-despoblado-para-el-alzheimer>

^t To respond to caregiving needs, the central government designed a series of programs such as the Home Care program for people with severe dependency (bedridden) of the Ministry of Health (2009); the program of Home Care of SENAMA (2013); and the program Chile Cares (Chile Cuida) of the Ministry of Social Development and Family (2014). These programs attend different population groups and levels of dependency providing homecare support two to three times a week. The latter two, are directed to older people, while the first one has no age restriction. These programs have become the pillar of Home Care Services (*Servicios de Atención*

Domiciliaria – SAD) of the National Support and Care Subsystem created in 2017 (*Subsistema Nacional de Apoyos y Cuidados* - SNAC). The latter was created during the second presidency of Michelle Bachelet (2014–2018).

^u In Chile, there are 345 municipalities. <https://www.chilecuida.gob.cl> ; <http://www.senama.gob.cl/cuidados-domiciliarios>

^v This mirrors the findings of Chapter Four.

^w Long-term care is another pressing issue. For decades, for-profit and non-profit institutions have provided long-term care services privately. Only since the first government of Michelle Bachelet and the installation of a rights-based approach to governing practice, the central government decided to build and finance seventeen Public Long-term Care Facilities with 938 vacancies at National Level. In the Metropolitan Region, there are two with 168 vacancies. Public coverage is extremely limited. In fact, within the Comprehensive Policy of Positive Ageing (*Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor*, 2012) the number of older populations needing public long-term care was estimated at 11.015 older individuals, surpassing 90% of the current quotas. Long-term care remains a private issue. 77% of the Long-term care establishments in the Metropolitan Region are private for-profit. The total vacancy is 9,957 and the average monthly costs ranged between 300,000 and 400,000 CLP (USD 378-500) (*Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor*, 2011); two to three times the basic solitary pension.

^f

^y The limits of the city of Santiago, and thus, the number of municipalities composing it, is disputed. Considering the number of municipalities regulated by the Santiago Metropolitan Regulatory Plan (*Plan Regulador Metropolitano de Santiago -PRMS*), the Greater City of Santiago is composed by 52 municipalities. However, when considering the urban conurbation of the city, it only comprises 40 municipalities. The other 12 municipalities are mainly rural.

^z According to the 2017 CENSUS, the commune of Las Condes has 294,838 inhabitants and the commune of Recoleta, 157,851.

^{aa} <http://www.sinim.gov.cl>

^{bb} Previous to the military reforms, municipal funds came from the central government, which was in charge of collecting taxes throughout the territory and distributing them among municipalities to ensure equitable resources. Moreover, key services were centrally provided and financed by central state to ensure the equitable provision and quality of health care, education and other essential services.

^{cc} As part of the military restructuring of the local state, the military regime created ‘a weak system of redistribution among municipalities’ (Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019, p.909) called the Municipal Common Fund (*Fondo Común Municipal* – FCM) that centrally collects a percentage of local tax revenues from the municipalities as well as central-level funding to redistribute to lower-income municipalities and mitigate budgetary inequalities. This redistributive mechanism is still in place and constitutes the most prominent source of municipal funding for most municipalities, as most of them cannot self-finance from local tax revenues. Considering the marked economic inequality and high concentration of resources in the territory, in 2019 the Municipal Common Fund obtained its funds mainly from fifty-two communes (Bravo, 2014). Despite reforms to increase redistribution during democracy such as increasing the fiscal contribution of central government and increasing the taxation of high-income communes, these have not been able to address the lingering budgetary inequalities.

^{dd} If Chile is considered one of the most unequal countries of the OECD and within the Latin American Region, the city of Santiago represents the urban and spatial materialisation of inherited territorial, income and class divides (Agostini et al., 2016; Boano, 2017; Brevis, 2020; Fuster-Farfán, 2021). In Chile, the income of the richest twenty per cent of the population is ten times higher than that of the poorest quintile, being surprisingly higher than the average of OECD countries (Brevis, 2020, p. 94 based on OECD statistics of 2018).

^{ee} Departments of Offices of Older People –the name depends on the municipality– are generally located in the Directorate of Community Development –*Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario*– which attends the social needs of all population groups within each municipality. In 2019, the average budget of a municipal DIDECO in Chile amounted to approximately 1,000,000,000.00 Chilean Pesos (USD 1,257,000.00) (*Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile*, 2019, p.15). As mentioned earlier, the aim of DIDECO within a municipality is to ‘improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of the commune, especially the most vulnerable sectors of society’.

^{ff} At national level, the annual average budget of a DIDECO is approximately 1,000,000,000.00 Chilean Pesos (USD 1,257,000.00) (*Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile*, 2019, p.15).

^{gg} https://www.dipres.gob.cl/597/articles-197938_doc_pdf.pdf

^{hh} The municipality of Las Condes has implemented two caregiving programs called ‘*Respiro*’ (Respite) and ‘*Cuidadoras para personas vulnerables*’ (Caregivers for vulnerable people) also called ‘*Vulnerable*’ (Vulnerable). The first one supports caregivers of approximately 100 older individuals by providing home caregiving twice a week and during one weekend a month, plus other benefits. The second one, supports families through small subsidies of up to 300,000 (USD 378) Chilean Pesos to access long-term caregiving

facilities up to a monthly cost of 1,000,000.00 (USD 1260). When the interview was conducted, the program ‘Vulnerable’ belonged to the Department of Older People. Today, the program is located in the department of Disabled People. <https://www.lascondes.cl/servicios/guia-beneficios-sociales/departamento-discapacidad.html>; <https://www.lascondes.cl/servicios/guia-beneficios-sociales/adulto-mayor.html>

ⁱⁱ Even though the population living under economic poverty in the commune has transitioned from 35,1% in 1994 to 6,9% in 2017, poverty levels remain higher than the average of the Metropolitan Region, with 5,4% of the population under conditions of poverty in 2017. Moreover, when considering a recent more comprehensive measurement of poverty called ‘multidimensional poverty’ (*pobreza multidimensional*), which considers other variables such as access to education, health, work, social security and housing, poverty concentrations in the commune (22,5%) remain higher than the national (20,7%) and metropolitan (20,0%) average in 2017 (López et al., 1995; Municipalidad de Recoleta, 2020).

^{jj} Recoleta is characterised as a commune with high concentration of older populations, with a percentage of people aged 65 years and over higher (13,38%) than the average of the Metropolitan Region (11,42%) and the Country (12,49%). Demographic projections of the National Office of Statistics –Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE– for 2021. Official data accessed in April 2023 in:

https://www.bcn.cl/siit/reportescomunales/comunas_v.html?anno=2021&idcom=13127

^{kk} Older people were included as beneficiaries of the popular real-estate program with the first floor of the building allocated for families with an older member. <https://www.latercera.com/nacional/noticia/inmobiliaria-popular-proyecto-las-familias-vulnerables-recoleta/51845/>

^{ll} The focus on older population is also highlighted in the municipal online news on the opening of the popular pharmacy: <https://www.recoleta.cl/farmacia-popular/>

^{mmm} <https://ww2.recoleta.cl/farmacia-popular-2/>. By 2019, ‘three pharmaceutical companies dominated 90 per cent of the market. These companies have been investigated and convicted multiple times for crimes of collusion in pricing medicines. The public health system only offers medications for a limited number of serious illnesses with high mortality rates’ (Panez-Pinto, 2020, p.127 – The future is public: working paper 7).

ⁿⁿ <https://ww2.recoleta.cl/farmacia-popular-2/>

^{oo} <http://www.saludpublica.uchile.cl/noticias/116786/farmacias-populares-vs-farmacias-impopulares>

^{pp} The office supports local governments throughout the country in the incorporation of participatory strategies prescribed by central government through the Law No 20.500 of Associations and Citizen Participation in Public Management (Ministerio Secretaría General de Gobierno, 2011) which has recently included participatory strategies such as participatory budgeting, citizenship letters, among other.

^{qq} <https://ww2.recoleta.cl/todo-un-orgullo-mas-de-35-mil-inscritos-en-la-farmacia-popular-de-recoleta/>

^{rr} <https://ww2.recoleta.cl/farmacia-popular-2/>

^{ss} The increasing pressure for real-estate development has resulted in the reconversion of extensive vineyards and agricultural land into new high-income suburbs (Romero et al., 2011; Vásquez & Salgado, 2009).

^{tt} The local government has invested in several projects to improve the infrastructure of municipal services such as building primary healthcare and dental health centres, parks, sports and community centres and two large cultural centres Chimkowe and San Luis. It has also implemented various locally developed programs, mostly directed to the low- and medium-income households of the commune.

^{uu} Under the political leadership of mayor Carolina Leitaó (2012 until date), also part of the Christian Democratic party.

^{vv} Since 2016, the municipality has been monitoring the advance of functional dependency of the older population, with levels of functional dependency increasing since 2017 (Corporación Municipal de Peñalolén, 2020).

^{ww} One of the five strategic areas of development of the Local Development Plan of the municipality of Peñalolén (2018 – 2025) is to build a ‘Closer Peñalolén’ (Municipalidad de Peñalolén, 2018). Achieving a closer relationship between the local government and the community is rooted in ideas to increase the accountability and transparency of the municipal budget and programs, enhance the participation of the population in decision-making processes and implement notions of open government. Reflecting the local government’s participatory project, the local population is positioned as ‘co-creators’ (Municipalidad de Peñalolén, 2018).

^{xx} Peñalolén Te Cuida is the first of the five strategic objectives of the Local Development Plan of the municipality 2018-2025 (Municipalidad de Peñalolén, 2018). It represents a significant shift in governing practice at the local level as it advocates for a relationship between care and a rights-based approach based on the recognition of the economic, social and cultural entitlements of the population. The aim of Peñalolén Te Cuida is to ensure progress in ‘health; education, social and economic security; as well as citizen security’ (Municipalidad de Peñalolén, 2018, p.12). The notion of ‘citizen security’ refers to addressing crime levels and perceptions of security.

^{yy} Together, these caregiving programs do not exceed a quota of 100 people, which according to the interviewees does not cover the local need. Moreover, the program Kintun only offer support for up to a year and a half.

^{zz} Just in Peñalolén, older people with dementia are estimated at 2,549 older people, or 7,1% of the older population of the commune (Corporación Municipal de Peñalolén, 2020).

^{aaa} In 2019, it served 670 older people with dementia and their caregivers, trying to bridge the gap left by the 'pilot' central-level program (Corporación Municipal de Peñalolén, 2020, p.104).

^{bbb} This programs was originally called 'Salud en tu Casa' (Health in your home)

<https://www.cormup.cl/penalolen-lanza-innovador-programa-de-salud-para-adultos-mayores/>

^{ccc} Today, the Defensoría has two main areas of work. The area of good treatment and the legal area which daily services approximately twenty-five cases with a team of three lawyers, three social workers, one psychologist and one administrative staff. The legal area deals with family and civil cases such as rental lawsuits, pension payments, interdictions, inheritances, divorces, alimony for the elderly and the personal care of children as many older people take care of their grandchildren but have no legal rights on their care. The social area, or good treatment area, deals with vulnerable situations such as domestic violence, people with Diogenes syndrome and older people living in conditions of abandonment and poverty. These areas interact to address critical issues of domestic violence and abandonment.

^{ddd} This was indicated by the Lawyer of the Defensoría. The postulations ask to provide 'housing condition', among other things. <https://www.chileatiende.gob.cl/fichas/9655-establecimientos-de-larga-estadia-para-adultos-mayores-eleam>

Chapter Six – Participation as the solution of almost everything

Introduction

While conducting onsite research in the city of Santiago, I not only realised that older people's participation was an ethos of good governance toward older populations but also that it was uncritically positioned as the solution to almost everything. Participation was not only the main governing strategy of the National Service of Older People^a –e.g., the first and main program of SENAMA called National Fund for Older People has a participatory character^b– but also it was commonplace practice within local governments. When introducing the research project to a professional of the Office of Older People of the municipality of Recoleta^c, she told me that during my research I would become very familiar with participation: ‘for us, the stamp we give [to the municipal program for older people] is to try to bet on participation, *again* [alluding to how often she had referred to participation during the interview], you are going to hear this a lot’^d. This was soon confirmed. The two following activities I joined in March 2020, just before the pandemic breakout, were of a participatory nature: the annual celebration of the start of the program for older people of the municipality, and a capacity-building workshop designed to help organised groups of older people apply to the participatory National Fund for Older People of SENAMA. Further into the research, I realised that participation was a key local governing practice to address the social, economic and medical needs of the older population. Other municipal offices of older people provided multiple participatory workshops and activities throughout the year, promoted the participation of older people in clubs of older people and even used participatory strategies to expand the coverage of central-level programs in order to increase older people's access to welfare. Moreover, during the pandemic, participation continued to be a central governing strategy. For instance, the municipality of Renca^e resorted to community participation to respond to the provisioning and caregiving needs of abandoned older populations during the height of the pandemic through the voluntary initiative called *Somos Renca* (We Are Renca).

Through multiple interviews with practitioners, it became clear that the centrality of participation was based on widespread consensus about its multiple benefits for older populations and again, its framing as the solution to almost all problems. As such,

participation was furnished by multiple, sometimes contrasting meanings that fluctuated between a neoliberal cost-effective logic and progressive notions of empowerment. When discussing the different programs directed to older populations during my first in-person interview with a professional of SENAMA, participation was conceived as having multiple benefits that positioned it as a cost-effective tool to address common issues experienced by older populations. Older people's participation within society and communities was not only considered as 'the best way to grow old' but also participatory programs promoting active ageing were deemed as addressing 'stereotyped images in old age', as 'improv[ing] the[ir] quality of life' and 'prevent[ing] [older people] from becoming [physically] dependent' (policymaker, *Unidad de Estudios, Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor –SENAMA*). Equally, participation was perceived as having empowering effects. The professional mentioned that 'active participation [meant] that older people are the ones who make the decisions' (policymaker, *Unidad de Estudios, Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor – SENAMA*).

Similar contrasting rationales were articulated at the local level. During the same interview with the Office of Older People of the municipality of Recoleta, under the communist governing project of mayor Daniel Jadue, participation was not only considered as empowering older populations in the construction of new life meanings but also it was presented as an effective therapeutic strategy for preventing health-related dependencies: 'the benefits of participation are therapeutic, they are health' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*). Likewise, under the communitarian governing project of the municipality of Renca, despite efforts to construct participation as enabling self-determination and devolving decision-making powers to older populations, communitarian forms of participation such as the voluntary program *Somos Renca* turned out to be a cost-effective strategy to address the pressing welfare needs of older populations that emerged during the pandemic. This is when I realised that despite their progressive credentials, the local governments of Recoleta and Renca were uncritically reifying physical dependency as a disability to be prevented and unintendedly devolving welfare responsibilities to older individuals and communities. This raises a significant conundrum for progressive politics: how, by positioning participation as an encompassing solution to issues of ageing, do two seemingly progressive municipalities contribute to the process of neoliberalisation at a national level?

In this chapter, I explore the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies by unpacking the construction of an anti-dependency rationale for older people's participation. I argue that practitioners' consensus about participation being a solution to almost everything results from a process of neoliberal instrumentalisation of forms of participation articulated within more progressive governing projects at national and local levels. I sustain that through the harnessing and appropriation of progressive ideas and languages about participation – such as notions of it as democratic, a right and form of empowerment– and conditioned by an already existing neoliberal context, older people's participation has been instrumentalised as a cost-effective governing tool to prevent welfare responsibilities on the state. As a neoliberal cost-effective governing tool, anti-dependency participation works by devolving welfare responsibilities at two levels: the individual and the community. Devolution to individuals is materialised by positioning older people's participation as a therapeutic governing tool for the mainstreaming of active forms of ageing. Individuals are devolved responsibilities for their own wellbeing and the prevention and rehabilitation of age-related dependencies, economic and physical. Simultaneously, by encouraging older people's participation within communities –e.g., clubs of older people– or community-based forms of aid within local governing projects –e.g., voluntary programs supporting older populations– devolution also takes place by positioning communities as alternative forms of welfare infrastructure.

This chapter unfolds in the following structure. First, I examine how an anti-dependency rationale for participation has been gradually built under the neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive ideas about participation within national level policy. For this, I draw on historical policies and programs directed to older populations as well as on in-depth interviews with national and local level practitioners to outline how, since the return of democracy in 1990, governing projects positioning participation as key to the strengthening of democracy –third-way neoliberal governing projects of the Democratic Christian presidents Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000)– or as a central human right within a rights-based approach to older populations –first centre-left governing project of the Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010)– have simultaneously placed older people's participation as a cost-effective solution to poverty, quality of life, and most recently, as a therapeutic tool for the prevention of physical dependency. Unpacking how these governing projects have increasingly privileged participation's cost-effective rather than its radical and emancipatory character, I will suggest that the process of neoliberal instrumentalisation has been conducted through the

manipulation of progressive ideas about participation. I demonstrate how the gradual building of an anti-dependency rationale to participation has capitalised on widespread notions of participation being a strategy for rebuilding trust and strengthening responsible forms of citizenship inscribed within democratic projects, or instrumentalised previous Welfare State rationales on community participation and recent governing efforts to position participation as a right. Most recently, the cost-effective approach to participation has been consolidated under a medicalised logic that, by harnessing scientific evidence that positions social interactions as having beneficial health effects, has constructed participation as a strategy for the prevention of age-related dependencies.

In analysing the gradual construction of an anti-dependency rationale for participation, I draw on the Gramscian notion of *trasformismo*. Developed primarily through scholarly work on International Political Economy (Cox, 1983; Morton, 2010; Paterson, 2009) and Energy Transitions (Ford & Newell, 2021; Newell, 2019), the notion of *trasformismo* has been defined as a ‘strategy’ (Morton, 2010; Paterson, 2009) through which progressive ideas and projects are ‘neutralised by being brought within hegemonic frameworks’ (Ford & Newell, 2021, p.3 –emphasis from author). Particularly, I draw on one of the most distinctive strategies of *trasformismo* called ideational distortion (Bates, 2013; Leal, 2007; Morton, 2010; Paterson, 2009). Working ‘like a mirror’, ideational distortion consists of a process in which potentially threatening ideas and languages ‘are absorbed and written into official documents’ and policies (Paterson, 2009, p.47), while being stripped of their original meaning. The logic is to capitalise on existing consensus built around progressive ideas and reshape them as a common sense that works for the hegemonic project (Hall, 1986a; Paterson, 2009). Ideational distortion has been a recurrent neoliberal strategy for co-opting counter-neoliberal ideas and projects (Bieling, 2006; Leal, 2007). For instance, Leal (2007) argues that the World Bank used ideational distortion to co-opt progressive forms of participation by reframing participation as a governing technique through methodological packages (Leal, 2007). I argue that a similar strategy of ideational distortion has taken place in building an anti-dependency rationale for participation in the governing of older populations in Chile. Progressive conceptions of participation have been ideationally distorted as they have been discursively constructed as primarily democratic, empowering, and constitutive of rights, but in practice, have been reduced to bounded forms of participation designed to contain and prevent welfare dependencies on the state. Based on this, I sustain that scholarly work exploring the Janus-faced character of participation

(Dagnino, 2007, 2010; Marinetto, 2003; Newman & Tonkens, 2011) could benefit from the Gramscian notion of *trasformismo* as it provides a sensitive lens to unearth how the progressive face of participation is intentionally instrumentalised by its regressive version.

Second, I explore how neoliberal ideas and strategies are capable of neutralising progressive forms of participation articulated within counter-neoliberal governing projects. Based on conceptions about the neutralising effects of *trasformismo* in which progressive ideas become distorted and ‘brought within hegemonic frameworks’ (Ford & Newell, 2021, p.3), I explore how progressive governing projects end up working for neoliberal ends. I argue that the neutralisation of progressive forms of participation end up holding back the efforts of progressive governing projects as they unintendedly comply with the neoliberal strategy of preventing and devolving the costs of age-related dependencies. In this regard, I expand the Gramscian notion of *trasformismo* to consider other processes holding back progressive governing projects. I argue that the efforts by progressive governing projects are not only held back through processes of ideational distortion but also by the cumulative effects of already existing neoliberal contexts and the misunderstanding by progressive leadership of the workings of neoliberal strategies. For this, I explore –to different depths– the cases of the communist local governing project of Recoleta and the communitarian local governing project of Renca. First, I briefly explain how by uncritically using the central government’s medicalised and therapeutic rationale for participation, the communist local governing project of Recoleta complies with the neoliberal strategy of averting the costs of age-related dependencies. Also, by reifying physical dependencies as something to be prevented, Recoleta moves away from progressive logics advocating for the accommodation of the social, economic and built environments for the inclusion of different abilities.

Then, I unpack in more depth the communitarian local governing project of Renca and its voluntary program called *Somos Renca* to demonstrate how the neutralisation of progressive forms of participation not only occurs through ideational distortion. Efforts from alternative governing projects based on progressive ideas about participation are being held back by the intertwined effects of an already existing neoliberal context and the misunderstanding by progressive leadership of how romanticised conceptions of community are instrumentalised for neoliberal ends. Drawing on in-depth interviews with local government officials and a focus group with volunteers of *Somos Renca*, I argue that under a combination of limited resources and unmet welfare needs of older populations –uncovered during the pandemic–

communitarian forms of participation ended up devolving significant caregiving responsibilities to the community, disclosing the contradictory role of community participation within progressive governing projects. Here, I refer to Joseph's (2002) warning about the blurring effects of romanticised understandings of communities to suggest that progressive governing projects need to consider that neoliberal strategies not only work through individualism but through communities. As the 'other' of capitalism (Joseph, 2002, p.10), communities are positioned as the solution to the inequalities produced within neoliberal societies obscuring the responsibilities of neoliberal ideas and strategies in the existing conditions of inequality.

Unpacking the construction of an anti-dependency rationale to participation

The neoliberal instrumentalisation of democratic and community participation

The neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive forms of participation began during the return of democracy. After seventeen years of military rule, conceptions of participation as a strategy for rebuilding trust and democracy became the linchpin of governing projects looking to avert responsibilities for poverty alleviation from falling on the state. Notably, participation was used to devolve welfare responsibilities to impoverished populations groups, including older people. During the first two third-way neoliberal governing projects of the Democratic Christian presidents Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000), Chile's central government aimed at restoring the population's trust in institutions and strengthening traditional forms of political participation, while simultaneously addressing the lingering effects of the dictatorship in terms of high levels of poverty and socioeconomic marginalisation. In line with the third-way neoliberal character of their governing projects, these political aims were to be achieved while ensuring limited state expenditure and economic growth based on the strengthening of the market. Therefore, capitalising on the overarching consensus of rebuilding democracy, citizen participation as a form of legitimisation of the novel democratic project was instrumentalised as a cost-effective strategy for poverty alleviation. This neoliberal capture of democratic forms of participation was inscribed in the most iconic participatory program for poverty alleviation –and the first participatory program directed to impoverished older populations^f– called Solidarity and Social Investment Fund^g (*Fondo de Solidaridad e Inversión Social* –FOSIS). FOSIS had a dual neoliberal and democratic ethos. From a neoliberal perspective, the participatory nature

of FOSIS followed the logic of devolving responsibilities for poverty alleviation to impoverished populations by enhancing their already existing potential to overcome conditions of poverty (MIDEPLAN, 1993; Vergara, 1997). Consisting of small-scale funds transferred to impoverished neighbourhood and community organisations, its rationale was to ‘enable’ the poor by transferring them ‘tools and conditions so that they [could] integrate themselves and permanently, into the economic and social life of the country’ (Tomei, 1997, p.2-3). The idea was to shift participants’ agency from passive to active and responsible subjects in charge of transforming their poverty conditions.

From a progressive perspective, FOSIS’s central aim was to rebuild democracy through community participation. FOSIS articulated the progressive logic of ‘building a real and stable democracy’ (MIDEPLAN, 1993, p.39) by promoting the building of trust within communities and toward institution. While discussing the history of local government programs directed at older populations with a professional of the Chilean Association of Municipalities, he mentioned that FOSIS was primarily about the rebuilding of trust toward public institutions and between neighbours as they had been intervened by the military regime through direct appointments and the persecution of dissent. Having worked himself in the implementation of FOSIS’s specific programs for older people –called ‘Program for the Improvement of the Quality of Life of the Elderly (More Life for your Years)’– he pointed out that the participatory character of FOSIS initiatives such as ‘Between All’^h, or its specific version for older populations called ‘The House of All’, enabled to rearticulate local fabrics of trust: ‘*FOSIS was born to restore trust...the neighbourhood organisations had been intervened, so the neighbourhood leaders had been appointed, it was a chain*’ (policymaker, *Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades* –ACHM, emphasis of author). As neighbourhood and community organisations had been co-opted during the military regime by restricting their autonomous conformation and election of representatives, their reactivation was key to the democratic project and considered as ‘the signature, the root and the expression of a true democracy’ (President Patricio Aylwin, 1990ⁱ).

Based on the idea of recovering democracy, FOSIS repurposed previous forms of community organisation inherited from preceding welfare governing projects^j to comply with the neoliberal aim of averting welfare responsibilities on the state. Even though the promotion of community organisation was considered primarily functional to restore trust after the dictatorship –e.g., by transferring small resources and encouraging decision-making within

community organisations– in practice, FOSIS positioned communities as cost-effective forms of welfare infrastructure. Similar to what Dagnino (2005) defines as the perverse confluence of neoliberal and democratic meanings of participation, FOSIS enabled the ‘shifting’ of welfare competence of the state onto ‘responsible’ communities (Lemke, 2001, p.2), while also ticking the box of democracy by promoting the rebuilding of trust. FOSIS small-scale funds were transferred to neighbourhood associations and community organisations legally recognised under the renewed Bill of Neighbourhood Organisation of 1968 –Law of Community Organisation N°16.880– under which, the welfare state project of President Eduardo Frei Montalva’s (1960-1970) had sought to empower marginalised groups to access welfare benefits reserved only for unionised formal workers^k. For marginalised groups, demands generally concerned access to housing and the supply of minimum urban services such as drinking water, sewerage and electricity.

Paradoxically, by legally conferring them union-like bargaining powers, these organisations were not only enabled to demand and leverage their interest with local and central governments but also were conferred significant responsibilities in the provision of welfare. Within Frei’s welfare project, communities were responsible for the improvement of their living conditions through the self and community construction of housing, schools, nurseries, paving of roads, renovation of public lighting, among others. In this regard, even though the renovated Bill on Neighbourhood Councils and Community Organisations –N.19.418 (Ministerio del Interior, 1996)– did not reach the same bargaining powers for neighbour and community organisations, it reactivated their autonomous organisations and, through participatory programs such as FOSIS, repurposed them as an alternative form of welfare infrastructure instrumental to the neoliberal project of state withdrawal. Responsible communities were to take over responsibilities for their own conditions of poverty and solve them, while irresponsible communities were to rely on state support and welfare to overcome them.

Later, with the creation of the first policy and program for older populations, the central government continued to strengthen the neoliberal character of older people's participation by consolidating the welfare role of communities and mainstreaming ‘efficient’ forms of community leadership. Like Rose’s (1999) description of the double movement between ‘autonomisation and responsabilisation’ (Rose, 1999, p.174), or Lemke’s (2001) definition of

neoliberal forms of participation as having a ‘pricetag’ (Lemke, 2001, p.2002), the central government’s first policy and program directed at older populations consolidated older people’s participation as a strategy to pass them on responsibilities for their own welfare. Under the aim of preventing older people’s ‘dependency on the actions of the state to satisfy [the] requirements [of older people]’ (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996, p.14), the first National Policy of Ageing (1996) not only incorporated FOSIS programs for older people –such as the House of All and other small-funds– to continue devolving welfare responsibilities onto communities but also older people’s leadership became a site of governing intervention. Forms of community leadership mainstreamed from central government did not follow progressive logics promoting the self-determination and autonomy of community organisations. Instead, neoliberal forms of community leadership were about increasing the efficiency of community organisations to provide for the welfare needs of their older members. Within the pedagogical manual of the National Committee for Older People (*Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor* –CNAM) titled ‘older adult, today’s leader’, CNAM aimed at ‘optimising’ the role of leaders to ‘improve the efficiency of their organisations’ and ‘ensure that [leaders] more effectively fulfil their task of improving the living conditions of the elderly’ (Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor & Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 1999b, p.1). Later, with the creation of the participatory National Fund of Older Adults (2003) the National Service of Older People (SENAMA) created in 2002 the state consolidated older people’s community organisations as an alternative form of welfare infrastructure by replicating FOSIS’s model. Through its modality of competitive small-scale funds to be accessed by older people’s organisations¹, the program promotes active subjectivities by funding projects that contribute to the development of self-responsibility and the strengthening of economic and physical autonomy. In tandem, as the program also funds voluntary initiatives to promote the self-help between groups of older people^m (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2014, 2018, 2022), it contributes to the consolidation of older people’s organisations spaces for the provision of welfare and community support.

Instrumental to central government’s neoliberal strategy of averting caregiving responsibilities, participation was also positioned as the main strategy for mainstreaming active lifestyles. Based on ideas that considered that issues of quality of life were due to older people’s ‘non-existent’ role within society (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996, p.5) or due to inherited perceptions placing them as passive recipients of charitable care and

assistance, central government advocated transforming older people's subjectivity into active members of society responsible for improving their own quality of life. Hence, the first National Policy on Ageing (1996)ⁿ defined active subjectivities in old age as continuing to retain autonomy and contribute to society and the economy while avoiding the need for state support. The neoliberal version of an active older citizen would continue to participate within communities and society^o and never request the state for welfare or caregiving support. Keeping with the trend of ideational distortion, central government's neoliberal version of active ageing was constructed as a democratic duty. To reinforce positive value-leaning perceptions around active ageing, central government capitalised on consensus that conceived active forms of participation within society as a positive and democratic value. Within CNAM's pedagogical manual of 'rights and duties' (Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor & Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 1999a) active forms of ageing scaped the progressive logic of empowerment in which active forms of participation are conceived as enabling the political agency of populations to demand welfare entitlement from the state. Instead, active ageing as a democratic duty was defined as taking responsibility for the self-care which in tandem would contribute to the development of the country. Active ageing was not only defined as the 'fundamental duty to seek and take advantage of opportunities to stay busy, current, and developing their potential' (Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor & Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 1999a, p.15-16) but also by 'stay[ing] active', older people would contribute to a more promising future 'for themselves and the country in general' (Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor & Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, 1999a, p.15-16).

Reading the central government's policies through the lenses of local government practitioners, I realised that the ableist logic guiding the mainstreaming of active lifestyles in old age not only worked by devolving responsibilities but by blurring the need of caregiving in old age. When discussing availability of caregiving programs with a professional of the Office of Older People of the municipality of Santiago –in the city of Santiago– I confirmed my suspicion regarding the cost-averting neoliberal logic behind the promotion of active subjectivities in old age. In his opinion, central-level's disproportionate focus on the promotion of active forms of ageing was not only a strategy for preventing age-related dependencies –such as physical and economic– but also it diverted attention from the need to strengthen meaningful public caregiving programs. The ableist character of central-level policy was oblivious to the fact that conditions of dependency are generated by multiple

factors and that older people would eventually require caregiving: ‘I believe that the issue of care has not been addressed from the point of view of budgetary injection of the magnitude that is required because the focus is actually on active life, which is fine, but the problem is that if we focus only on active life to prevent [age-related dependencies] we leave out all these people who are going to need [caregiving] support anyhow...people develop dependencies due to 500,000 factors, due to health, poor nutrition, cultural and social factors, external conditions, accidents.’ (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Santiago*).

The neoliberal instrumentalisation of a rights-based approach

Following the same process of ideological distortion of democratic meanings of participation, the anti-dependency rationale to participation was deepened through the neoliberal capture of progressive notions of participation contained within a rights-based approach. Positioned as a central right and empowering of older populations, participation was contradictorily harnessed as a cost-effective strategy to expand access to welfare entitlements and to prevent future dependencies of older populations on the state. As discussed in previous chapters, during the centre-left governing project of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) central government pushed for the progressive implementation of a rights-based social protection system that would expand older people’s access to welfare entitlements. These efforts followed ECLAC’s (Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe, 2006b, 2006a) recommendations to implement a rights-based approach that ensured access to social, economic and cultural rights of older populations. Amid this progressive policy shift, SENAMA’s White Paper (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c) not only positioned participation as a pivotal right constitutive of citizenship by adopting languages of empowerment but also these progressive ideas were harnessed to deepen participation’s anti-dependency rationale by positioning it as a cost-effective governing tool for implementing a system of social protection. In fact, notions of empowerment were absorbed into the neoliberal logic of devolving responsibilities. With empowerment defined as ‘knowledge about rights and the ability to demand them so that the state provides their effective guarantee’ (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c, p.16) participation was defined as the means for articulating individual and community interests to expand access to welfare entitlements. However, despite articulating progressive languages on empowerment, SENAMA inadvertently continued to strengthen participation's anti-dependency rationale as

it devolved responsibilities to older individuals and communities to demand the state to expand access to welfare entitlements despite knowledge about the existing and projected needs of older populations (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c).

The neoliberal instrumentalisation of rights-based notions of participation goes even further. Within SENAMA's White paper (2009c), participation was not only an empowering right to demand welfare entitlements but also a cost-effective means to access them. Positioning older people's participation in community organisations as a 'protective factor' (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c, p.16), participation was once more used to devolve welfare responsibilities to communities by reinforcing them as the adequate infrastructure to expand access to welfare entitlements. Participation's protective character was based on its effects on the behaviour of older populations as it enhanced 'reciprocal support, bonds of solidarity and work', as well as 'active' subjectivities in old age (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c, p.16). Participation contributed to preventing future dependencies of this population group as it strengthened the welfare role of communities by enabling 'mutual support' to 'collectively address problems' and fulfilling affective and communication needs (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c, p.78). Thus, with policy measures such as strengthening the scope of the National Fund for Older People and promoting older people's community leadership and voluntaryism, access to social welfare would be increased by strengthening both the ability and responsibility of communities to solve their own problems. Moreover, under SENAMA's participative program for economically vulnerable and abandoned older people called 'Network', which works by reinserting economically vulnerable older people into the local public and community network –e.g., municipal programs and organisations of older people– participation was again reinforced as a strategy for poverty alleviation (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009c, p.105).

The neoliberal medicalisation of participation

The governing rationale underpinning participation became even more ableist under a medicalised approach that conferred it preventive and rehabilitating effects over physical forms of dependency. Under SENAMA's rights-based approach, participation was also positioned as a cost-effective strategy for preventing physical dependencies in old age. Despite being articulated by a centre-left governing project advancing progressive ideas on welfare rights, the medicalised approach to participation contradicted progressive

assumptions on participation. Instead of encouraging the participation of older populations while accommodating the social, economic, and built environments to transform physical dependencies into diverse abilities, participation was used to treat and prevent them under a strong cost-effective rationale. As discussed in Chapter Four, the governing aim of installing a social protection system coincided with the recognition of the costs to the healthcare system and society associated with the increment of levels of functional dependency among those aged 80 years and over. In this context, SENAMA's White Paper (2009c) argued that a system of social protection required the cost-effective management of conditions of functional dependency among older populations. The strategy was to invest in the implementation of cost-effective socio-sanitary programs designed to prevent and rehabilitate conditions of dependency to mitigate the projected economic and healthcare costs. It was within the 'socio' dimension of these programs that participation's preventive and rehabilitating benefits were articulated. Based on the adaptation of the International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health of the World Health Organisation^P, SENAMA's National Study of Dependency (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a) included social participation as a factor for measuring functional dependency and was conferred therapeutic credentials to prevent and rehabilitate functional capacities. Older people's participation would contribute to '*avoiding high rates of hospitalisation and medication, greatly reducing costs for the state and individuals*' (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a, p.67 – emphasis of author). Confirming this medicalised shift, the National Fund of Older People was rearticulated as '*contributing to maintaining [the] functionality and autonomy of the elderly*' (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2009a, p.90), promoting the application of proposals that contributed to the prevention of health-related dependencies.

Replicating previous anti-dependency rationales that promoted older people's economic self-sufficiency, the medicalised approach to participation shifted to mainstreaming physical self-sufficiency. This mirrors Ong's (2006) consideration of neoliberal governing strategies as deploying a 'biopolitical mode of governing that centre on the capacity and potential of individuals and the population as living resources' (Ong, 2006, p.6) to be harnessed and managed to comply with neoliberal objectives. In this case, the aim is to prevent the socioeconomic risks of advanced demographic ageing. Drawing on scientific evidence that positioned social interactions as having beneficial health effects, during the right-wing governing project of Sebastián Piñera (2010-2014) participation's medicalised approach was

consolidated by incorporating it as a component of the central government's therapeutic interventions. Articulating a stronger socio-economic argument, the central aim of the novel Comprehensive Policy of Positive Ageing (2012-2025) was to prevent the wider socio-economic 'risks' of functional dependency (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012, p.10). In this regard, the increasing demand for hospitalisations and long-term caregiving were conceived as entailing 'prohibitive economic costs and negative social impacts'^q (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012, p.10). Under this risk-preventing rationale, participation was consolidated as a therapeutic technology for enhancing older people's intrinsic capacities to prevent functional dependencies and was included as an activating technique within SENAMA's novel socio-sanitary programs, such as Day Centres for Older Adults –*Centro Día Adulto Mayor*, CEDIAM^f. The consolidation of participation's therapeutic effects was based on scientific research highlighting the benefits of social interactions on an individual's health. In contrast, the lack of participation was articulated as having adverse effects such as loneliness and isolation (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2020, 2012). Loneliness and social isolation were associated with medical conditions such as 'greater vascular resistance, higher blood pressure, less inflammatory control, less immunity and worse sleep hygiene' (Cacioppo, Capitanio and Cacioppo 2014 in Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2020, p.28). Loneliness was even equated to 'smoking 15 cigarettes a day or with excessive alcohol consumption' (Holt-Lunstad, Smith, and Bradley 2010 in Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2020, p.18). In this regard, therapeutic interventions within socio-sanitary programs such as CEDIAM's were designed not only to comprise tailored physical and cognitive rehabilitation plans but also to promote older people's participation within the community and local networks^s. Equally, the education of healthy, active, and preventive behaviours was included in participatory activities. Hence, older people's participation in organisations of older people and participatory activities offered by local governments were repurposed for contributing to the prevention of physical dependencies in old age.

Interestingly, the scope of ideational distortion and its neutralising effects were evident when researching the case of the counter-neoliberal governing project of Recoleta^t. By implementing a medicalised approach to participation, the communist local government of Recoleta was not only moving away from progressive efforts to accommodate diverse abilities and health conditions but also it was unintendedly complying with the neoliberal aim of preventing the costs of physical dependencies in old age. Mirroring what Paterson (2009)

refers to as the mirror-like effect of ideational distortion, the installation of a medicalised common sense within the local governing project has taken place through the neoliberal co-optation of consensus around the need to advance a rights-based approach to older populations and everyday evidence about the benefits of social interactions. When interviewing the Office of Older People of the municipality I realised that older people's participation was not only conceived as a 'basic right of older people' but also the therapeutic benefits of participation were evidenced in everyday practice (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*). The professional mentioned that in her experience, the quality of life of older populations increased when interacting with pairs. She mentioned that this could be seen in the case of men, who are generally reluctant to engage in participatory activities as they conceive them as a gendered role of women. However, after the installation of a male-only club of older people, its members realised how participation changed their life. After opening the club no one wanted to stop attending as it made them feel better, proving that health was not only associated with attending medical appointments but interacting with others: 'now they participate all the time because they see the benefits of that, the benefits of participation are therapeutic, they are health. We always associate health with going to the doctor regularly and taking our medications, but we don't associate it with other factors that are tremendously important to be in good health, and participation helps a lot in that' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*). Thus, the neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive and scientific languages and ideas about participation is having neutralising effects at the local level. Even though the local government is trying to redraw the central government's responsibility in the provision of welfare entitlements (see Chapter Five), it is also devolving preventive responsibilities to individuals. By unintentionally reifying health dependencies and complying with the preventive and cost-effective forms of participation, Recoleta was uncritically implementing a neoliberal rationale for participation. As I explore in the following section, progressive governing projects are not only held back through processes of ideational distortion but also by the cumulative effects of already existing neoliberal contexts and the misunderstanding by progressive leadership of the workings of neoliberal strategies.

'Holding back effects': the case of communitarian Renca

When analysing the case of the communitarian project of the local government of Renca, I realised that the advancement of progressive governing projects is not only being held back

by the neutralising effects of ideational distortion. Efforts from alternative governing projects based on progressive ideas about participation are being hold back by the intertwined effects of an already existing neoliberal context and the misunderstanding by progressive leadership of how romanticised conceptions of community are instrumentalised for neoliberal ends. The first time that my attention was drawn to the counter-neoliberal credentials of Renca's communitarian local governing project was during two online interviews with a professional of the municipal office of older people. While discussing the meanings of participation, he mentioned that as the local governing project was communitarian, older people's participation had a different meaning from central government's anti-dependency rationale. Instead of privileging a preventive logic, a communitarian approach to participation promoted older people's self-determination and inclusion within the local governing project. According to the professional, the communitarian seal of Renca installed under the governing project of mayor Claudio Castro was a revolutionary philosophy as it marked a substantial difference from the previous right-wing local governing project. Instead of promoting the meaningful participation of the population within the local governing project, the previous right-wing local government –that governed for 16 years^u– had disaggregated the community. By privileging access to municipal benefits only for certain individuals and groups based on personal favours and patronage, the previous local governing project was close to the hierarchic and authoritarian governing structure of the military dictatorship. Thus, the local community had been atomised and subsumed under the mayor's will, limiting their voice and their engagement in decision-making processes and real possibilities of addressing the conditions of marginalisation and stigma of the population living in the commune. In contrast and citing the mayor's Twitter and Instagram accounts, whose main profiles read: 'In times of individualism, nothing more revolutionary than the community' (Figure 9), the professional described the local government's communitarian approach as empowering of communities. The local governing project was defined as built on the revaluing of local identities and concerned with addressing inequalities and advancing the implementation of a rights-based approach toward older populations.



Figure 9. Renca’s mayor –Claudio Castro Salas– Instagram and Twitter accounts.

Source: @cn_castro 2022v.

When deepening more into the mayor’s communitarian rationale, I realised that its revolutionary credentials had evolved in opposition to the third-way communitarianism characteristics of his political party of origin: the Christian Democrats. Now an independent^w, he was critical of the communitarian approach of the Christian Democratic party^x that, since the return to democracy, had adopted a third-way neoliberal approach to communitarianism under the notion of a social market economy. Mirroring Bieling’s (2006) characterisation of third-way communitarianism, the Christian Democratic party advocated for a market-led modernisation of the state ‘in consideration of revitalised community bonds and sound civil society structures’, while ensuring ‘the promotion of market competition, improved competitiveness, and the primacy of sound budget policies’^y (Bieling, 2006, p.218). In fact, in his resignation letter to the party published online just ten days after the counter-neoliberal social uprising of October 2019^z, Claudio Castro mentioned that the party was no longer capable of channelling the demands of the population. He suggested that its communitarian foundations –which, trace back to president’s Eduardo Frei Montalva’s Welfare project (1960-1974)– had been co-opted by the individualising rationales guiding the commodification of welfare. Thus, running independently under a strong ‘community perspective’ for the next local government elections in 2021 could contribute to better channelling the population's needs and strengthening the opposition to the right-wing government of the time –under president Sebastián Piñera (2018-2022)^{aa}.

In contrast, Claudio Castro's communitarianism is defined as closer to the party's foundational ideas on community empowerment and self-determination. It is also considered as counter-neoliberal. Claudio Castro's communitarian ideas are closer to the welfare program of 'Popular Promotion' (*Promoción Popular*) of the Christian Democratic president Eduardo Frei Montalva (1960-1974). The Bill of Community Organisation N°16.880 of 1968 created during Montalva's governing project conferred bargaining powers to vulnerable communities disfranchised from the state's welfare. Hence, Renca's communitarianism emphasises the community's decision-making powers within the local governing project. In fact, notions of community empowerment come forward in Renca's Local Development Plan (2020-2024) titled 'Renca is better in community' (*Renca es mejor en comunidad*), in which the mayor refers to the community as decision-makers and owners of the Plan (Municipalidad de Renca, 2020, p.5). In tandem, Renca's communitarianism has been conferred counter-neoliberal credentials. Claudio Castro considers communities as the means to counter the marginalising effects of neoliberal individualism and the commodification of welfare. About a month before his resignation from the Christian Democratic party, Claudio Castro explained some of the tenets of communitarianism during a forum of local governments organised by mayors and political representatives from centre-left parties titled 'Creating Community' –taking place in November 2019. Covered by the press of the municipality of Renca under the Twitter account @Muni_Renca^{bb}, communitarianism was considered a sound governing strategy for advancing access to welfare entitlements: 'communitarianism is focused on maximising people's social rights and this is where the state must advance to strengthen them' (mayor @cn_castro by @Muni_Renca). Communitarianism's opposition to the market economy and the individualising effects of neoliberal policies were also echoed in some of the mayor's previous discourses such as the one conducted during the celebration day of community leaders in Renca. In that opportunity he mentioned that the leadership of communities was an alternative to individualistic and market-based governing strategies: 'it seems that the market is the only guide, and that is why celebrating the role of the leaders is one of the most counterrevolutionary things, because individualism cannot win us' (Message of Mayor Claudio Castro, 9th of August 2018)^{cc}.

Renca's progressive approach to older people's participation

Central government's anti-dependency rationale for participation is being reshaped under Renca's communitarian rationale. Instead of embracing the neoliberal cost-effective approach to participation in which older people's participation is intended to prevent economic and physical dependencies by encouraging self-sufficiency, Renca's communitarian project tries to empower older populations by encouraging their self-determination and decision-making within the local governing project. The way in which older people's participation is being reshaped by Renca's local governing project emerged while interviewing the professional of the office of older people. After enquiring how a communitarian approach to participation differed from that of central government's anti-dependency rationale, he mentioned that the primary aim of participation was to include older people within the process of community building and that all other forms or meanings of participation were channelled towards that aim: 'participation is a mechanism for people to get involved in this community process, which is what we consider to be the most important thing' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca*). Older people's participation under Renca's communitarianism aims to empower older populations in their self-determination capacities. What the local government considers the main achievement is that older populations are enabled to do what they want which generally is to build friendships, networks, and meaningful experiences: 'many of the things that happen to us with the clubs [of older people in which they] participate, is that they later become friends...what we generate are instances so that what I am telling you is generated: that they get to know each other, that they talk, and that experiences arise that may be important for older adults' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca* –emphasis of author). Therefore, municipal participatory activities and workshops such as theatre, tai-chi, dance, exercises, weaving, and bakery workshops, among others, are not designed to prevent physical dependencies but to increase their chances of building meaningful experiences and new life meanings in old age.

Moreover, in line with communitarian notions of community empowerment and self-determination, older people's participation is also considered as advancing their decision-making powers within local policies. Similar to Fung and Wright's (2001) notions on local forms of empowerment, Renca's communitarianism as a particular mode of local governance aims to empower older populations through participatory mechanisms that expand the ways

‘in which ordinary people can effectively participate in and influence policies which affect their lives’ (Fung & Wright, 2011, p.11). When discussing the alternative meanings of participation under a communitarian logic with the professional of the office of older people, he mentioned that social participation was meant to contribute to older people’s empowerment by incorporating them as meaningful actors in the design and prioritisation of local government policies. For instance, he mentioned that during the height of the pandemic, older people had decided to repurpose the municipal budget for community participation of around USD 406,000.00 (CLP 400,000,000.0) to support Renca’s inhabitants aged 60 years and over with the delivery of gallons of gas for heating. Reaching that decision was possible based on pre-existing participatory instances within the commune, such as monthly meetings between the leaders of clubs of older people and the mayor, and the Council of the Civil Society of the Commune –COSOC– which had the participation of five older people among its fifteen councillors. Therefore, once the leaders of older people proposed the measure to the mayor, it was discussed and approved in the municipal COSOC, benefiting approximately 17,000 elderly residents in the commune.

Renca’s communitarian approach to participation is also reshaping the local government’s role as executor of central-level policy^{dd}. As older people continue to participate in centrally designed and funded programs such as SENAMA’s National Fund for Older People or Day Centres that try to mainstream neoliberal ideas about preventive subjectivities and to devolve welfare responsibilities onto individuals, the local government is making efforts to reshape them. The idea is that these programs benefit older people rather than the cost-averting neoliberal project. For instance, during the same interview with the professional of the office of older people, he mentioned that they used the therapeutic credentials of participation to trick central government to access funds from SENAMA’s National Fund for Older People. The idea is to access central-level funding to enhance older people’s self-determination by providing them with funds to do what they want. As older people generally use these funds to travel for fun –which is quite contested from central government as it does not comply with its preventive and devolving objectives– they have helped organisations of older people access them by articulating central government’s anti-dependency rationale. By arguing that a leisure trip would have positive mental health effects, the aim is to enable older people to continue doing what they want which is to travel: [P:]^{ee}"what do you want?" [OP:] "we want to go for a walk." [P:] "why do you want to go for a walk?" [OP:] "Because it's good for us" [P:] "why is it good for you?" [OP:] "Because it makes us happy." [P:] "And how does it help

you? Does it help you physically?" [OP:] "No, it's that we get out of our problems" [P:] "Then it could be that it's more about mental health? Then, mental health[!]" (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca*).

Something similar happens with SENAMA's Day Centre for Older People –CEDIAM– located in Renca^{ff}. Despite following CEDIAM's strict execution guidelines from SENAMA, the local government of Renca tries to mitigate its overarching rationale of passing on cost for the prevention of physical dependencies onto older people. While online interviewing one of the professionals of Renca's CEDIAM^{gg}, he mentioned that one of the main challenges faced by the older people within the program was its offloading character as they could only take part in the program for seven months to one year in order allow room for others (local government officer, *Centro Día de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca*). In this regard, instead of providing constant support to vulnerable older people as part of a comprehensive strategy of accommodating the local environment to different health and mobility conditions, CEDIAM only works by teaching them how to prevent the development of physical dependency. Therefore, to mitigate the devolving rationale of the program, the local government implemented two strategies. The first was to expand the program's coverage under the municipal budget, offering the continuation of the program through one weekly session for program graduates. The second was to encourage older people to create a club to continue meeting regularly as older people had expressed their interest in continuing strengthening the friendships they had formed with other program graduates. This is when he suggested I talk with the leader of the club of older people created by around thirty-five program graduates called *Halcones de Renca* –Renca Falcons.

Interestingly, when interviewing the community leader of Halcones de Renca, I realised that the local government was unintendedly reworking CEDIAM's therapeutic approach to participation. Even though by implementing CEDIAM, the local government of Renca –just like Recoleta– was unintendedly reifying physical dependences, their strategy for mitigating central government's devolution of responsibilities to older individuals was simultaneously reworking participation's preventive approach. Older people's participation in the club was about making friendships and exercising their self-determination, not about preventing dependencies. During our phone call, the leader of the club not only reassured me how difficult it was for everyone to deal with the graduation of the program but also she was keen to explain how the creation of the club had enabled them to organise multiple activities while

building friendships. She mentioned that since the creation of the club, they would meet every Wednesday to chat, have tea, sing karaoke and play *lota* [a type of bingo] to collect money to do what they like the most, travel: '[creating the club] has been super good [for us], we've travelled for seven days, we went to Chillán, we've travelled a lot, [which is] the thing older people like most' (Community leader, *Club de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca*). She was quite emphatic on the idea that the reason for the club was to have fun, it was their space for doing and planning whatever they wanted beyond their family and other commitments. She even mentioned that they had rejected offers from the municipality to carry out specific 'active ageing workshops' –e.g., gymnastics workshops– in the club as 'it takes us out of [our] intimacy because we couldn't do the *lota* and we couldn't be talking about what we like most' (Community leader, *Club de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca*). Older people's participation in the club was mostly about enjoying themselves and making friendships. As mentioned by the leader of the club, everyone looked forward to Wednesday afternoon, as above all, the idea of the club was to do what they 'deserved' at their age, which was 'to have a good time, to go out, to see our friends' (Community leader, *Club de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca*).

Unintendedly complying with neoliberal strategies

Contradictorily, when analysing Renca's voluntary program directed to older people during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic –called *Somos Renca* (We Are Renca), I realised that communitarian forms of participation unintendedly complied with neoliberal aims. Despite the local government's counter-neoliberal efforts, their voluntary program was devolving welfare and caregiving responsibilities to communities. Mirroring Joseph's (2009) romanticised conception of communities, *Somos Renca* positioned communities as the means to counter the conditions of abandonment experienced by vulnerable older populations uncovered during the COVID-19 pandemic^{hh}. In this case, the neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive ideas about participation was enabled by the misunderstanding –by progressive leadership– of the workings of neoliberal strategies and the effects of an already existing neoliberal context. The misunderstanding about how communities become instrumentalised for neoliberal aims, became clear during the same local governments' forum titled 'Creating Communities' when the mayor highlighted that one of the progressive tenets of communitarianism was that communities could support the state. During the forum, Claudio Castro mentioned that communities were not only the key to transforming the

relationship between the state and the population from a relationship based on individualism and the commodification of welfare to one based on the protection of rights. Also, communities were the state's 'help' to achieve it: '[communitarianism] has to do with how we build communities to defend the people and how to help the state in an individualistic society after the commodification of relationships' (mayor @cn_castro by @Muni_Renca). This romanticised conception of communities positioning them as the solution to the commodification of welfare also appears in Renca's Local Development Plan (2020-2024) titled 'Renca is better in community' (*Renca es mejor en comunidad*) (Municipalidad de Renca, 2020). Even though the plan considers the local community as decision-makers and owners of the Plan, the mayor also calls for the responsibility of the community in its implementation: '[for the Plan] to become a reality, [it] requires the commitment of all of us who serve in the municipality, and very especially, it requires that the renquina community take ownership of this plan...where the neighbours of Renca build that shared future day by day' (Presentation of Mayor Claudio Castro, Municipalidad de Renca, 2020, p.5).

Considering the above, Renca's romanticised conception of community is enabling the neoliberal instrumentalisation of its progressive ideas about participation. When researching the local government's voluntary program *Somos Renca* implemented to support older people quarantining and living alone during the COVID-19 pandemic, it appeared that based on communitarian notions of trust, the local government ended up devolving significant caregiving responsibilities to an already struggling community (Figure 10). Emerging from the local government's concern of preventing the abandonment of older people quarantining at home during the height of the COVID-19 pandemicⁱⁱ, the initial idea of the voluntary program was to assess the living and health conditions of 2,000 people aged 70 years and over and living alone to guide the municipal response^{jj}. As the volunteers of the program would reach older people in the intimacy of their homes, the design and implementation of the program were based on community trust. When interviewing the coordinator of the program, he mentioned that as volunteers would reach older people in the intimacy of their homes, the collaborative work and trust cultivated between the local government and community organisations became key for its implementation. To ensure that older people were visited by neighbours and familiar faces, the local government installed the coordination of the program in the department of community organisations in charge of implementing the local government's participatory agenda known as '#RencaParticipates' (*#RencaParticipa*)^{kk}. According to the professional, the department's close territorial presence within the commune

and the trusts built through previous and existing work with community organisations were central to gathering around 270 community volunteers that were familiar to the older neighbours. In fact, community organisations became key enablers of the COVID-19 response: ‘we have a lot of trust with our social leaders, and from there we raise a lot of volunteers...so I think that this is key, in the sense that the ties are there, that they are maintained, and that they are the ones who enable this’ (local government officer, *Coordinación Territorial, Municipalidad de Renca*).



Figure 10. Photos of *Somos Renca* shared by volunteers.

Source: Volunteers of *Somos Renca*.

The hollowed-out condition of local governments in Chile is also enabling the neoliberal instrumentalisation of progressive ideas about participation. Renca’s strategy of resorting to community trust and collaboration for dealing with the pandemic response was strongly influenced by the local government’s limited devolved autonomy and resources. Mirroring what I already discussed in Chapter Five about the hollowed-out condition of local governments in Chile (Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019; Salazar-Vergara, 2019), resorting to community voluntarism was due to the asymmetry between devolved municipal responsibilities and resources. Asymmetry that was heightened during the COVID-19 pandemic. While interviewing the coordinator of *Somos Renca*, he mentioned that as the local government had to address an unprecedented number of social needs while having the same

limited resources, the participatory character of the program became a cost-effective alternative to the local government's COVID-19 response. In fact, the professional was quite candid when recognising that without the program, they would not have been able to assist the elderly at all: 'community management [was] super key...if we had not had the *Somos Renca* program, we would not have been able to reach these older adults, that is, zero options...' (local government officer, *Coordinación Territorial, Municipalidad de Renca*). Soon after the beginning of the program, volunteers became a critical social infrastructure to the local government's COVID-19 response by expanding their initial role of surveying the living and health conditions of the older population to that of delivering specific municipal benefits to their homes. Volunteers home-delivered medicines, the Complementary Food Program for the Elderly of central government, the gas vouchers provided by the local government, and food boxes provided both by the central and local government. Interestingly, other municipalities also resorted to voluntary programs for the same reason. The communist local government of Recoleta also implemented a voluntary program where young neighbours of the commune assisted older people with basic grocery shopping and the delivery of medicine and food boxes.

Under the intertwined effects of a romanticised conception of community and Renca's hollowed-out condition, the voluntary program *Somos Renca* ended up devolving significant caregiving responsibilities to communities. Coinciding with Bieling's (2006) idea of the 'hegemonic capacity of neoliberalism to absorb and neutralise' alternative projects and ideas such as communitarianism (Bieling, 2006, p.220-221), Renca's progressive ideas about community participation were recast under the neoliberal strategy of responsabilising communities in their self-provision of welfare. When conducting an online focus group with four volunteers of the program –considered among the most engaged volunteers by the coordinating professional– I realised that during and even beyond the program implementation, some volunteers had gone beyond the surveying and home delivery of municipal benefits. Volunteers disclosed how under what they considered as the intertwining of a growing sense of trust with older individuals –several older people considered them as friends– and shocking conditions of abandonment and poverty they felt deeply compelled to support them with whatever means they had. Thus, they began to supply basic welfare and caregiving needs such as bringing prepared food from community common pots, running their shopping, accompanying them to their medical appointments, and in some cases, bathing them or changing their diapers. For instance, one of the volunteers and president of a

neighbourhood association shared how she and another neighbour had to take care of a ninety-one-year-old woman whose fall in the bath had resulted in an exposed injury on her shoulder. As the neighbours heard the older woman crying for several days, they contacted the volunteers who took her to the hospital. After her discharge, they supported her with shopping, the daily delivery of prepared food from the community common pot and bathing her. To the volunteer's shock, even though the old woman received a monthly stipend from her children who lived in other communes of the city, she was never visited or helped by her family. In contrast, even though volunteers were already economically struggling during the pandemic, as many of them were neighbours that had lost their jobs to the pandemic, they had become her immediate caregivers. As well, other volunteers mentioned how even after finding new jobs, they had taken the compromise to continue supporting at least one older neighbour with limited mobility to change diapers.

Against this background, *Somos Renca* not only contributed to the neoliberal aim of averting welfare responsibilities from falling on the state but also reinforced existing socioeconomic inequalities. Like MacKinnon & Driscoll's (2012) realisation of how the promotion of community resilience among low-income communities becomes regressive 'insofar as it normalises the uneven effects of neoliberal governance and invigorates the trope of individual responsibility with a renewed 'community' twist' (MacKinnon & Driscoll-Derickson, 2012, p.263), community participation under *Somos Renca* was transformed into a regressive policy. *Somos Renca* was devolving welfare and caregiving responsibilities to an already struggling community. During the focus group with volunteers, it became clear that devolved responsibilities from central and local government fell upon volunteers who were also struggling under the socio-economic effects of the pandemic. Two of the four volunteers had lost their job during the pandemic and –as mentioned by the coordinator, that was the case of many others. For instance, the volunteer and president of a neighbourhood association mentioned that as she was delivering food from the community common pots to thirty-six older people from different neighbourhoods at the time, she was not able to continue supporting them because of economic problems. She mentioned that even though the municipality had helped the volunteers with the provision of essential food boxes to distribute, she had to fund the delivery of these and other municipal benefits from her own resources while unemployed: 'I had to self-manage it myself, how to fill my vehicle with gasoline to go out and distribute food every day... I felt sorry because I didn't have more money to pay for gasoline...we [her and other volunteers] were also out of work' (volunteer,

Programa de Voluntariado Somos Renca, Municipalidad de Renca). The link between voluntarism and unemployment was confirmed by the coordinator of *Somos Renca* who mentioned that one of the reasons why the program had stopped was because many of the volunteers had found jobs: ‘there were people who stopped working in this pandemic, and all their energy was [redirected to] volunteering...[but now] there are fewer volunteers than before, there are some who have returned to work, there are others who are already disinterested’ (local government officer, *Coordinación Territorial, Municipalidad de Renca*).

Conclusions

With participation positioned as a central governing tool toward older populations, in this chapter I have unpacked the different ways in which it serves the neoliberal strategy of averting welfare responsibilities on the state. I have explored how since the return of democracy different governing projects looking to consolidate participation as a cost-effective governing strategy toward older populations have instrumentalised progressive ideas on participation through a process of ideational distortion. Ideas about participation being a governing strategy strengthening democracy, as a conduit for responsible and active forms of citizenship and as an empowering right of older populations, have been instrumentalised to devolve welfare and caregiving responsibilities to individuals and communities. Even during Bechelet's governing project working to advance a rights-based approach, participation remained a cost-effective strategy to implement and expand the scope of programs. Even more, the medicalised approach to participation also emerged during Bachelet's governing project as a strategy to address the increasing levels of physical dependency accompanying advanced demographic ageing. As a result, participation has been constructed as a cost-effective strategy to mainstream preventive and responsible subjectivities. The scope of the neoliberal distortion of progressive ideas about participation becomes clear when analysing the extent to which a medicalised approach to participation has been able to permeate counter-neoliberal governing programs such as the case of the communist local governing project of Recoleta. By uncritically accepting the medicalised and therapeutic effects of participation, counter-neoliberal projects can unintentionally reify physical dependencies as disability and move away from progressive efforts to build inclusive environments. Overall, through a consistent process of neoliberal ideational distortion, older people's participation has been consolidated as a cost-effective governing technique designed to position individuals and communities as infrastructure for preventing

the potential costs generated by older people's functional dependency under a process of advanced demographic ageing.

Exploring participatory governing strategies directed to older populations during the COVID-19 pandemic, I also unpacked how neoliberal ideas about participation are capable of neutralising progressive forms of participation articulated within counter-neoliberal governing projects. Unpacking the cases of Recoleta and Renca I argued that progressive governing projects were being held back as they unintendedly complied with the neoliberal strategy of preventing and devolving the costs of age-related dependencies. In this regard, the efforts by progressive governing projects were being held back not only through processes of ideational distortion but also by the cumulative effects of already existing neoliberal contexts and the misunderstanding by progressive leadership of the workings of neoliberal strategies. For the case of Renca, the neoliberal neutralisation and instrumentalisation of communitarian ideas and strategies at the local level is contingent on both the paradoxical idea of community responsibility and on the local government's limited devolved resources and autonomy. Arguing that the voluntary program *Somos Renca* was unintendedly devolving significant caregiving responsibilities to already struggling communities, I demonstrated the dangers of articulating notions of communities within progressive governing projects. In this regard, I add to scholarly work exploring the limited progressive effects of policies promoting community resilience (MacKinnon & Driscoll-Derickson, 2012). Well-intentioned reforms can reproduce and even accentuate the same inequalities that were supposed to overcome (MacKinnon & Driscoll-Derickson, 2012).

Finally, based on these explorations I suggest a new perspective into the conditions leading to a strategy of *transformismo*. Considering that the construction of an anti-dependency rationale for participation has taken place amid an unprecedented phenomenon of demographic ageing, I argue that the strategy of *transformismo* is not only used by dominant hegemonic forces during moments of minimal hegemony and periods of fracturing consent (Bates, 2013; Paterson, 2009). Significantly, it is used to ensure a hegemonic position under uncertain futures. In this regard, similar to how notions of preparedness and resilience have been instrumentalised by states as a cost-effective strategy to 'act in the dark' amid the unknown futures and risks unfolding under climate change (Amin, 2013, p.141; MacKinnon & Driscoll-Derickson, 2012; Walker & Cooper, 2011), participation has been equally elevated

as a moral category to create responsible and preventive individuals and communities able to weather, in this case, the unknown futures and costs of advanced demographic ageing.

^a Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, SENAMA.

^b *Fondo Nacional Adulto Mayor* of the *Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor* – SENAMA.

^c The municipality of Recoleta is located in the capital city of Santiago, Chile.

^d Local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta*.

^e The municipality of Renca is also located in the capital city of Santiago, Chile.

^f FOSIS was the first participatory program directed at older people who –together with children, women, youth, and indigenous populations– were considered among the most impoverished sectors of society (MIDEPLAN, 1991, 1993).

^g Implemented since 1995 under the presidency of the Christian Democrat Patricio Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-1998), FOSIS consisted of small-scale funds for implementing poverty alleviation initiatives –such as buying an oven for a community centre, repaving neighbourhood areas, or the creation of music and theatre groups. These initiatives were designed and executed by organised groups of impoverished sectors of society such as older people, encouraging them to collaboratively improve their quality of life.

^h For instance, as mentioned by the policymaker of the Chilean Association of Municipalities, within the FOSIS initiative ‘Between All’, local governments encouraged the presidents of the neighbourhood associations to include the whole community within the design and implementation of programs: [as municipal officials, we told them] “we are going to work with your board of neighbours, but not only with you, I want you to join the youth group, the parish, the evangelical church, the firefighters, the school principal; and that All of you will develop this initiative” (policymaker of the *Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades* – ACHM). The same logic was replicated for older people under the program of ‘The House of All’ which gathered the local clubs of older people

to develop collaborative activities such as theatre performances or other group activities. In this regard, FOSIS participatory projects, which ranged from supporting community organisations with basic infrastructure to start a small business –such as buying an oven for a community centre– to the repaving of degraded neighbourhood areas or funding music and theatre groups, were perceived as strengthening democracy by expanding civil society participation from its political form to participation within the actions of the state.

ⁱ Speech to submit the Bill on Neighbourhood Councils and Community Organisations, 1990. History of Law N°19418, accessed in <https://www.bcn.cl/historiadelaley/historia-de-la-ley/vista-expandida/6955/>

^j More details in Chapter Five.

^k As discussed in Chapter Four, the Chilean welfare state maintained a strong corporatist and labour rationale which resulted in the marginalisation of population groups outside the labour market such as rural immigrants and the urban poor.

^l Currently the National Fund has three different competitive funds: ‘Self-managed’ ‘Intermediate executors’, and ‘Institutional Agreements’. The scheme of competitive small-scale fund designed to promote de associativity and social participation of older people is called ‘Self-managed’ and finances projects conceived, elaborated and developed by organisations of older adults, through a contest. Its objective is to generate and develop self-management skills, autonomy, and independence of the participating older adults. (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2014, 2018, 2022).

^m The National Fund’s Self-management scheme only finances projects that contribute to improving the quality of life of older adults; strengthening associativity, organisation and collaboration among older adults; promoting the integration and social participation of older adults; generating volunteering actions of older adults for other older adults, through the delivery of services to facilitate and improve their life situation; and promote habits associated with health prevention and self-care. The typology of funded projects include: volunteer actions and community service; organisational strengthening; productive activities; healthy living, personal development, training and education; digital literacy; recreation and use of free time; others (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2014, 2018, 2022).

ⁿ The main objective of the National Policy of Ageing (1996) was to ‘achieve a cultural change which means a better treatment and appreciation of Older Adults in our society, which implies a different perception of ageing and, to achieve better levels of Quality of Life for all Older Adults’ (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996, p.15)

^o To enhance older people’s active participation within society, the policy introduced initiatives to increase older people’s opportunities to remain active within society, such as the reduction of transport fares, the incorporation of retired professionals as volunteers within programs for poverty alleviation, as well as the development of

participatory instances to enhance the transmission of older people's experience within society (Comisión Nacional para el Adulto Mayor, 1996).

^p <https://www.who.int/standards/classifications/international-classification-of-functioning-disability-and-health>

^q The policy argued that based on the projected scenario of functional dependency that estimated an increment of dependent older populations from 22 to 30 per cent by 2025 (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012, p.7).

^r Implemented since 2013, CEDIAM's are designed to revert mild conditions of functional dependency through a comprehensive socio-sanitary approach that educates and promotes healthy and active behaviours to encourage older individuals to remain autonomous, independent, and living in within their homes, families, and communities. CEDIAM's serve older people with mild conditions of functional dependency and under socio-economic vulnerability, providing one-to-one and group activities socio-sanitary intervention, as well as capacity-building activities for primary caregivers from six months to a year, when, depending on specialist's assessments, are discharged (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012).

^s CEDIAM's specific objectives: (1) Promote healthy lifestyle habits in older adults, both physically and cognitively; (2) Promote independence in basic and instrumental activities of daily living; (3) Promote older adult's access to information and incorporation within social resources through the activation and/or strengthening of formal and informal support networks; (4) Orient, inform and educate families and/or informal caregivers on gerontological issues, allowing them to have knowledge and tools that facilitate [older people's] adaptation to environments and socio-sanitary care; (5) Prevent the increase in dependency through the strengthening of functional, cognitive and social; [and] (6) Promote an environment that favours social and affective relationships (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012).

http://www.senama.gob.cl/storage/docs/GUIA_PROGRAMA_CENTROS_DIURNOS.pdf

^t As I mentioned in the introduction, the medicalised and therapeutic character of participation was part of the local government's common sense despite its counter-neoliberal project. As discussed in Chapter Five, the local government of Recoleta was disrupting the commodification of welfare by expanding access to public welfare through the municipalisation of key welfare services –such as popular pharmacy, opticians, and a real estate project.

^u Under the leadership of Mayor Vicky Barahona, member of the political party that supported the military dictatorship of Pinochet, called Independent Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente -UDI).

^v Main profile reads: In times of individualism, nothing more revolutionary than the community. Mayor of #Renca. ('En tiempos de individualismo, nada más revolucionario que la comunidad. Alcalde de #Renca')

^w Mayor Claudio Castro was part of the Christian Democratic Party from 2011 to 2019.

^x Christian Democrats represented under the presidencies of Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) and Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) formed part of the democratic coalition known as *La Concertación* (1990-2013), composed by multiple centre-left parties ranging from Christian Democrats (Democratas Cristianos –DC), Socialists (Partido Socialista –PS), Party for Democracy (Partido Por la Democracia –PPD), Radical (Radicales), Humanists (Humanistas), among other. Since 2013, the DC continued to form part of a new political conglomerate called *Nueva Mayoría*, which extended and strengthened its lefts-wing ideas during Michelle Bachelet's second presidential candidacy in 2013 by including the Communist Party, Citizen Left, and others. Currently, its excluded from the left-wing governing project lead by president Gabriel Boric (2022 until date).

^y Claudio Castro's resignation letter can be accessed online in the following Facebook link:

https://www.facebook.com/claudiocastrorenca/posts/2604673832955727?_tn=-R, 28th of October 2019.

^z More details on Chapter Four.

^{aa} Referred to in news such as: <https://www.latercera.com/la-tercera-pm/noticia/coletazo-la-crisis-alcalde-renca-renuncia-la-dc-dudas-rol-canalizador-del-partido-momento-politico/887630/>

^{bb} As the meeting was covered by the press of the municipality of Renca under its Twitter account @Muni_Renca, I was able to access the main ideas articulated under Renca's communitarian model.

^{cc} Celebration day of Renca's community leaders: <https://renca.cl/renca-celebra-dia-del-dirigente-vecinal-con-1-000-lideres-comunitarios/>

^{dd} For more details about local governments role as executors of central government's policies see Chapter Five.

^{ee} A made-up dialogue by the professional to exemplify how they help older people access central level resources to do what they want. P: professional; OP: older person.

^{ff} SENAMA's Day Centre implemented in Renca is funded by both SENAMA and the municipality of Renca. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, one of the most representative programs of SENAMA's socio-sanitary strategy for preventing the socio-economic costs of older people's functional dependency are the CEDIAM's, which are designed to delay the physical and cognitive deterioration of vulnerable older people with moderate levels of dependency. In this regard, Renca's CEDIAM follows SENAMA's national guidelines which propose a series of therapeutic interventions comprising tailored physical and cognitive rehabilitation

plans and the promotion of older people's participation and incorporation within the community and local networks (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012).

^{gg} Renca's CEDIAM has a coverage of seventy-two users for seven months. Entry requirements include: be 60 years old or older; live in the commune of Renca; be diagnosed with mild dependency by the local health network; and be targeted among the lower three tiers of the Social Registry of Homes.

<https://renca.cl/beneficios-adulto-mayor/v>

^{hh} In Chapter Four I offer more details on how the COVID-19 pandemic uncovered older people's conditions of poverty and abandonment.

ⁱⁱ The professional mentioned that the initiative emerged from the municipality's concern with international cases –such as what had happened in the city of Guayaquil in Ecuador – in which older people had died of COVID-19 alone in their houses (<https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-52116100>).

^{jj} The volunteers were assigned the task of assessing older people's socio-sanitary conditions. For this, they had to survey potentially abandoned and vulnerable older individuals ages seventy-years-and-over based on socio-sanitary forms designed by the department of community organisations and the municipal health corporation local healthcare network to collect information regarding the social and health situation and needs.

^{kk} Apart from the Local Development Plan (2020-2024), the governing plan of Renca is structured under three main development strategies contained within the following logos and social media hashtags: #Renca-Proud (#*RencaOrgullosa*), #Renca-Grows (#*RencaCrece*), #Renca-Participates (#*RencaParticipa*). As mentioned by the director of the office of older people of Renca, #*RencaOrgullosa* is about strengthening the community's sense of belonging through participatory activities that recognise the population's history and identity within the commune. #*RencaCrece*, is about generating jobs for the people living in Renca and bringing economic justice to the commune through social-responsibility agreements between the municipality and the main industries located and polluting in the commune, such as the 'CCU' bottling plant and the 'Generadora Metropolitana' thermoelectric plant. The latter is a local government strategy to compensate for the fact that these industries do not pay taxes in Renca but rather pay their taxes in one of the richest communes of the city of Santiago 'Las Condes' –a taxing situation that escapes the regulatory powers of the municipality. And finally, #*RencaParticipa*, considered as 'the axis of community-based management' (local government officer, *Coordinación Territorial, Municipalidad de Renca*), is about implementing the communitarian project of Renca through participatory activities and the cultivation of good relations between the municipality, neighbourhood associations and the organised community.

Chapter Seven – Conclusions

Introduction

Going back to my fictional depiction of the older individual envisioned by the neoliberal policies governing demographic ageing in Chile written in the introduction, I think that Loreto's preparedness seems to be very well justified. In light of the Chilean central government's pervasive neoliberal politics of scalar devolution, for her to work hard to remain healthy and active –both physically and within her community– seems like a 'common-sense' strategy. So too does pondering some provisions in case she requires caregiving in the future, such as living with one of her sisters while renting her flat to pay for caregiving costs. The common-sense status of these actions is based on the strategies implemented by various governing projects to responsabilise families, communities and older populations themselves around challenges associated with ageing. Moreover, it is also founded in the ways in which these existing scalar politics of devolution and responsabilisation are *not* working. Familialisation strategies work on unrealistic ideas of kinship and love that neglect significant family limitations –from socio-economic strains to the absence of family networks and gender inequalities in practice. Equally, local governments under tight budgets and unequal access to austerity-tightened central government programs face significant limitations in their capacity to support older populations. Moreover, as a knock-on effect, the devolution of responsibilities to communities does not ensure fair access to welfare and caregiving as it reinforces socioeconomic segregation. Therefore, at first glance, individual preparedness and provisions would seem to be the most reliable alternative.

Nonetheless, and confirming the contradictory effects of neoliberal policies, individual preparedness does not ensure a good quality of life in old age. As evidenced during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and voiced by struggling local governments, the number of abandoned and vulnerable older people unable to care for themselves due to the natural emergence of age-related dependencies is growing. As synthesised by a local government practitioner of the (high-budget) municipality Santiago when discussing the austere character of central-level programs, the neoliberal politics of scalar devolution does not work in the face of inevitable ageing-related challenges: 'I am surprised by the number of single elderly

people who were left without family, old people, old people, ninety-year-olds, ninety-eight-year-olds who were left without siblings, without children, without anyone, *and that due to their age, not even due to an illness associated with a chronic illness, they cannot support themselves*' (local government officer, *Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Santiago* –emphasis of author).

As discussion of Loreto's fictionalised experience as an exemplar of an active and preventive older individual argues, none of these idealised strategies of responsibility ensure a good quality of life in old age. To further adequate provision of welfare and caregiving, the implementation of alternative governing projects that rework and contest the central and local state's responsibility is critical. As I explored across Chapters Four, Five and Six, counter-neoliberal ideas and governing projects have been key in opening up new possibilities and imaginaries around welfare and caregiving responsibilities. For instance, Michelle Bachelet's governing project (2006-2010) advocating for implementing a rights-based approach in the governing of older populations was able to redraw the central state's responsibility in the provision of long-term care for older populations. Equally, alternative local governing projects inspired by a rights-based approach such as those of Recoleta and Peñalolén are also contributing to redrawing the boundaries of the state's responsibility through public ownership and caregiving projects, as well as through legal confrontations. Nonetheless, in exploring these governing projects further, I was astonished when realising about both the lack of awareness about the workings of the ongoing politics of scalar devolution and the lingering retrogressive effects of the neoliberal roll-back policies implemented during the military dictatorship. In these crucial ways, the scope of public programs has fallen short so far in addressing the scale of welfare and caregiving needs faced on the ground. Moreover, these would-be alternative progressive projects have unintendedly contributed to the neoliberal aim of devolving welfare responsibilities to families, communities and older people.

In light of these contrasting findings, in the remainder of this chapter, I offer final reflections about this research's findings, limitations and contributions, as well as future ideas for research. First, I walk through two main research findings: that the governing of older populations has been conducted through a neoliberal politics of scalar devolution, and that emerging forms of contestation over the central state's neglect are being held back in under-recognised ways. Second, I reflect on this research's theoretical and practical implications. At

a theoretical level, I suggest that it adds up to ongoing scholarly efforts to bring the Chilean case back to the forefront of critical research on neoliberalism. Moreover, in developing an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies (after Hall, 1986) in the governance of demographic ageing and older populations, this research argues for the ongoing explanatory purchase of neoliberalism as a concept (Hall, 1986). Among this thesis' contributions to governing practice, I suggest that the scalar and temporal understandings of the governing strategies and programs directed to older populations developed here can inform future policymaking –particularly efforts to address the limitations of existing programs in meaningfully addressing the critical welfare and caregiving issues experienced by older populations in Chile. Equally, the insights generated through an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies can contribute to the reflexive practice of progressive politics. I also reflect on the limitations imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the potential findings and nuances that I missed by not engaging older populations. Finally, I reflect on future research. I suggest that a key area of future enquiry would be how the older population experience, perceive and potentially challenge the central government's neoliberal politics of scalar devolution. Future research could also benefit from looking into the other side of the coin and look into more hopeful and liberating futures.

Research findings

The neoliberal politics of scalar devolution

A main finding emerging from this research is that the regulation of demographic ageing in Chile via the governing of older populations has been conducted through a neoliberal politics of scalar devolution of welfare and caregiving responsibilities. In unpacking how multiple governing projects at central and local levels taking place since the return to democracy (1990) have contributed –sometimes deliberately and sometimes inadvertently– to the neoliberal aim of averting welfare and caregiving responsibilities on the central state, I demonstrated how the governing of older populations has been characterised by a marked politics of scalar devolution. A cornerstone of this governing strategy has been the central state's hegemonic project on familial and charitable forms of care. In Chapter Four, I discussed how the central state's politics on familial and charitable forms of care was installed and continuously reinforced by contrasting governing projects –capitalist (1818-

1924), welfarist (1924-1973), authoritarian (1973-1990) and democratic neoliberal projects (1990 until date). Its consolidation as a traditional common-sense approach to the welfare and caregiving of older populations has been closely related to the values conferred to older populations as marginal within these different political-economic projects: as either outsiders or threats to economic development. Interestingly, the transition from outsiders to threats to economic development was marked by the first policy efforts for making demographic ageing legible conducted after the return to democracy. Since then, roll-out policies implemented by democratic neoliberal governing projects have capitalised on the historically ingrained character of traditional forms of care. Private family responsibility was not only reinforced by appealing to the legal and moral duties of kinship but also democratic neoliberal governing projects continued to adhere to the commodification of welfare facilitating the double reinforcement of familial and individualisation rationales. In this regard, Chile's politics of familialisation toward older populations mirrors Cooper's (2017) reading of the US's neoliberal familialisation strategies in that issues that cannot be adequately addressed through the market economy –such as dependent populations, or unknown social risks such as the need for caregiving– are governed instead by channelling them into traditional forms of social organisation and provision of caregiving (Cooper, 2017). At the same time, mirroring Hall's interpretation of Gramsci's common sense, the 'traces and 'stratified deposits'' (Stuart Hall Estate, 2016, p.165) of traditional forms of caregiving as common sense have clouded progressive efforts. Even though during the governing project of Socialist President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) central state's politics on familial forms of care was blamed as perpetuating socioeconomic and gender inequalities, it did not decentre families as the main providers of welfare and caregiving. This was not the same for charitable forms of care which were replaced –to some extent– by public ownership projects on long-term caregiving.

The central state's neoliberal politics of scalar devolution anchored on traditional forms of welfare and caregiving has been reinforced through governing strategies responsabilising local governments. In Chapter Five, I argued that local governments' contestation over issues of ageing was triggered by the central state's devolution of unfunded welfare responsibilities for older populations amid their hollowed-out condition. Based on Peck's (2012) work on austerity urbanism in the US, I suggested that the central state's politics of top-down devolution has resulted in the 'incapacitation' (Peck, 2012, p. 631) of local governments in the governing of emerging issues affecting older populations, as well as in the increasing

socio-economic inequalities experienced in old age. As part of the radical roll-back policies restructuring the Chilean state implemented during the military dictatorship, the remaining responsibilities in public welfare provision were significantly transferred to local governments. However, these responsibilities were not paired with the adequate transfer of central-level funding. Under contradictory notions of autonomy, local governments were left to compete with each other to attract funding either in the form of place-based taxation or by accessing austere central government programs. Thus, local governments' possibilities for expanding access to welfare and caregiving for older populations are conditioned by an uneven landscape of municipal budgets and austere central-level programs that do not coincide with the existing demand at the local level.

In Chapter Six I also unpacked how communities and older people themselves have also been incorporated into the central state's responsibilisation strategies. In exploring the ways in which progressive ideas about participation have been instrumentalised by the central state's anti-dependency politics, I argued that participation has been the main governing strategy for pushing individuals and communities to self-arrange their welfare and caregiving needs, including the prevention of age-related dependencies. Within both national and local governing practice, devolution to individuals has been materialised by positioning older people's participation as a therapeutic governing tool for the mainstreaming of active forms of ageing in which individuals are devolved responsibilities for their own wellbeing and the prevention and rehabilitation of age-related dependencies –economic and physical. Simultaneously, by encouraging older people's participation within communities –i.e., clubs of older people, or community-based forms of aid within local governing projects –i.e., voluntary programs supporting older populations, I suggested that communities have been devolved responsibilities by positioning them as alternative forms of welfare infrastructure.

Overall, instrumentalising these different scales has been a key strategy to ensure that the neoliberal hegemonic project of averting welfare and caregiving costs on the state remains unchallenged amid the growing welfare and caregiving needs associated with the new scenario of advanced demographic ageing.

Contesting neoliberal hegemony

In exploring the hegemonic character of the central state's neoliberal politics of scalar devolution, another research finding has been that emerging forms of contestation over central state's neglect have been held back by neoliberal ideas and strategies. First, it is important to bring attention to the emerging forms of contestation. Based on Gramsci's idea that hegemonic projects are constructed in a 'relation of force' with other opposing projects that also work to achieve a leading position within a social formation (Hall, 1986a; Stuart Hall Estate, 2016), I was sensitive to the emergence of contestation. In this regard, I realised that contestation over the retrogressive outcomes of the central state's politics of scalar devolution was being propelled by an alternative common sense on state responsibility cultivated by a rising left-wing bloc. In Chapter Four, I unpacked how the central state's neoliberal politics of traditional forms of caregiving recently accommodated during the COVID-19 pandemic to respond to the welfare and caregiving needs of 80,000 abandoned and vulnerable older individuals, was contested by a progressive common sense on state responsibility. I argued that the evident failure of the central state's politics of familialisation and the anti-neoliberal common sense on state responsibility guiding the social uprising of October 2019 transformed older people's conditions of abandonment and vulnerability as one of the grounds of the ongoing hegemonic struggle. While the central government tried to reinforce familial and philanthropic forms of care through moral appeals to good and bad forms of familial care and a charitable technological solution to address familial abandonment, Twitter users watching the philanthropic TV Show *Vamos Chilenos* challenged it. Twitter users contested the lack of consideration of family limitations and the state's irresponsibility over the caregiving of vulnerable and abandoned individuals. In this regard, the anti-neoliberal common sense cultivated by a rising left-wing bloc through years of social movements and contestation was penetrating the historically constructed trenches of the state's hegemonic project on traditional forms of care.

Paradoxically, in these explorations, I also found that contestation was being triggered by the lingering effects of the neoliberal downward restructuring of the state. In exploring how local governments' alternative governing projects constituted an emerging form of contestation of the central state's neglect, in Chapter Five I argued that it was triggered by their hollowed-out position within the Chilean state. The incapacitating conditions of top-down devolution and control, uneven access to central-level programs and an unequal landscape of municipal

budgets have paradoxically empowered local governments to counter the austere character of central-level programs (MacLeod & Goodwin, 1999; Peck, 2012). Local governments' – limited– devolved autonomy has enabled them to redraw the politics of scales of welfare responsibilities. The cases of the municipalities of Recoleta and Peñalolén have demonstrated how local governments' sense of ownership of critical social issues and their closeness to the population, have empowered them to challenge central state neglect by pushing the frontier of public provision of welfare. Moreover, there is an emerging bottom-up form of localism that opposes the austere character of the central government's policies despite the local governments' political colour. In this regard, I suggested that as local governments rework the meanings of devolved autonomy to provide alternative governing paths despite their hollowed-out position within the state and political colour, their contestation is also mediated by local imaginaries and practices of autonomy (Bulkeley et al., 2018).

Progressive efforts by alternative governing projects to counter the central government's neglect have been held back in multiple ways. Through an intertwined discussion in Chapters Five and Six, I showed how progressive governing projects –at central and local levels– have unintendedly contributed to the neoliberal aims of devolution and responsabilisation. This has been enabled by the neutralising effects of the ideational distortion of progressive ideas about participation, the lingering effects of an already existing neoliberal context and the misunderstanding by progressive leadership of the workings of neoliberal strategies. Regarding ideational distortion, I explored how since the return of democracy ideas about participation being a governing strategy strengthening democracy, as a conduit for responsible and active forms of citizenship and as an empowering right of older populations, have been instrumentalised to devolve welfare responsibilities to individuals and communities. Processes of ideational distortion have contributed to the conflation of progressive ideas on participation with neoliberal aims. For instance, despite placing participation as an empowering right of older populations, Michelle's Bachelet first governing project advocating to expand access to welfare entitlements through a rights-based approach, also placed participation as a cost-effective strategy to expand the scope of programs and mainstream preventive and responsible subjectivities.

Processes of ideational distortion have been significantly enabled by the misunderstanding by progressive leadership of the workings of neoliberal strategies. This was the case for the local governing project of Recoleta that, by uncritically accepting the medicalised and therapeutic

effects of participation, not only complied with the neoliberal strategy of averting the costs of age-related dependencies but also unintendedly reified physical dependencies as disability and moved away from progressive efforts to build inclusive environments. Similarly, based on Joseph's (2002) warnings about the neoliberal instrumentalisation of romanticised conceptions of community, the neoliberal instrumentalisation of communitarian efforts in Renca was enabled by the complexities inscribed on ideas about community responsibility. The effects of the misunderstanding by progressive leadership about the workings of neoliberal strategies also come through in Chapter Four when analysing how efforts to contest the central state's neglect have not de-centred notions about family responsibility. Contestation has been limited to demanding the central state's support for struggling families and caregivers and de-centring philanthropic and church-based forms of charitable care.

Finally, Chile's already existing neoliberal context is having significant holding-back effects. As local governments remain executors of central-level policies and dependent on central-level funding, counter-neoliberal local governing projects end up contributing to the implementation of neoliberal policies by default. For instance, Recoleta's access to medicalised and therapeutic conceptions about participation is mediated by its role as an 'executor' of central-level policies. This was also evidenced in the case of the local government of Renca. Unpacking the voluntary program called *Somos Renca* (We Are Renca) implemented to support older people quarantining during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, I argued that under a combination of limited resources and unmet welfare needs of older populations, communitarian forms of participation ended up devolving significant caregiving responsibilities to the community. Overall, insights about the agency of an already existing neoliberal context in holding back progressive efforts coincide with Jessop's ideas on how the hegemonic neoliberal project is enabled by the lingering effects of the restructuring policies implemented during roll-back phases: 'the project still dominates world society thanks to the path-dependent effects of policies, strategies and structural shifts that were implemented during that highpoint' (Jessop, 2013, p.72).

Research contributions and limitations

After unpacking the neoliberal character of the governing strategies regulating older populations in Chile, I suggest that the findings of this research have several theoretical and practical implications. First, by critically analysing how the 'actually existing' neoliberal

context in Chile permeates and conditions the governing of older populations, this research adds up to ongoing scholarship efforts of bringing the Chilean case back to the forefront of critical scholarship on neoliberalism (Benwell et al., 2021; Bustos-Gallardo, 2021b; Bustos-Gallardo et al., 2019; Hiner et al., 2021; Moya, 2013; Navarrete-Hernandez & Toro, 2019; Salazar-Vergara, 2019; Toro & Navarrete-Hernandez, 2022). Mainstream critical scholarship on neoliberalism has limited its analysis of the Chilean case to that of the first place of implementation of the neoliberal policies of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school of economics in which the authoritarian context provided a ‘now-notorious opportunity for a (barely) controlled experiment’ (Klein, 2008; Peck, 2010). Thereby, it has overlooked the way in which the Chilean case speaks to the survival and re-invention of neoliberal ideas and strategies amid a changing socio-political landscape. In this regard, this research contributes to scholarship efforts re-thinking the theoretical implications of the Chilean case by drawing on it to think about how neoliberal strategies and ideas are adapted to accommodate emerging social issues such as advanced demographic ageing. Research findings also confirm the relevance of the Chilean case in analysing the role of inherited institutional landscapes in the construction and maintenance of hegemonic projects.

Another theoretical contribution of the research is applying an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of the neoliberal project into the research of demographic ageing and the governing of older populations. Using Gramsci’s notion of hegemony as a position of ‘leadership’ that must be continuously constructed and adapted through the intertwined articulation of coercion and consent (Hall, 1986, p.15), has provided a flexible analytical lens for understanding how neoliberal ideas and strategies have been reworked –either deliberately or inadvertently– by diverse governing projects to accommodate and control the potential threats of a growing number of dependent older populations on Chile’s economic development. In this regard, this research coincides with Stuart Hall’s (1986) ideas about the explanatory powers of Gramsci’s notions of hegemony. In this case, the explanatory powers of Gramsci’s notions of hegemony were contingent on the intertwined analysis of the articulation of coercion and consent, the instrumentalisation of the state and the deployment of multiple strategies to consolidate and maintain a position of leadership.

By offering a comprehensive understanding of the existing challenges experienced in governing older populations in Chile, the findings emerging from this research also have the potential to inform governing practice. The scalar and temporal understandings of the

governing strategies and programs directed to older populations developed in this research can inform future policymaking aiming to address the limitations of existing programs in meaningfully addressing the critical welfare and caregiving issues experienced by older populations in Chile. For instance, by shedding light on the limitations and incapacitating conditions experienced not only by hollowed-out local governments but also by families and communities, these scales emerge as key areas of consideration in the development of comprehensive policy alternatives to address the hardships experienced in old age. Equally, considering how the neoliberal politics of scalar devolution has rendered older people's quality of life deeply unequal, research findings suggest that policy efforts could be directed to re-centring the central state's responsibilities while re-thinking familial, community and municipal devolved responsibility. Similarly, reflecting on the physical dependencies projected within national policy frameworks (Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor, 2012) and on insights from local government practitioners about physical dependencies being triggered by multiple factors, instead of reifying dependencies through an anti-dependency rationale, policymaking efforts could focus on accommodating different age-related abilities by building inclusive environments and expanding caregiving alternatives.

The findings of this research also have implications for progressive politics. The insights generated through an analytical framework on the hegemonising capacity of neoliberal ideas and strategies can contribute to the reflexive practice of progressive politics. In unpacking the ways in which the neoliberal aim of averting welfare and caregiving responsibilities toward older populations has reached a position of leadership in the governing of older populations in Chile, I have not intended to discredit the efforts made by alternative projects. Rather, this research's findings about the holding-back effects of neoliberal ideas and strategies can expand understanding of the workings and unintended effects of neoliberal strategies, as well as offer guidance to reorganise and redirect alternative governing ideas and projects. For instance, research insights about the ways in which progressive ideas about participation end up contributing to neoliberal aims, or on how traditional forms of common sense are rearticulated to embed neoliberal strategies –such as familial and charitable forms of caregiving, shed light on how the already existing neoliberal context and processes of ideational distortion can condition the outcomes of progressive projects.

In reflecting on research limitations, I cannot help but think about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Beyond the methodological adjustments described in Chapter Three, COVID-

related limitations are associated with the potential findings and nuances that I missed by not engaging older populations. Even though the research's aim and methods were adjusted to the practical and ethical restrictions imposed by the pandemic, incorporating the perceptions and views of older populations into the analysis of how demographic ageing is regulated in Chile through the governing of older populations constitutes a significant loss. In addition, conducting an online ethnography prevented me from looking into the situated practices governing older populations. On-site ethnographic explorations about the meanings and perceptions of older people's participation in local clubs of older people, or in local and central-level programs, could have steered the research findings in other directions. In this regard, the findings of this research remain open to new insights, articulations and contestation by older populations. This is also the case for practitioners working with older populations who, by the limitations imposed by conducting research in an online environment could not participate in the research or, after reading the main research findings, decide to provide new insights that contest –to different extents– the ideas developed in this research. In this regard, it is important to highlight that I have already shared some of the research findings with one municipality through an online presentation, and I will do so with other local governments and other interested institutions.

Future research ideas

If not for the COVID-19 pandemic, older people would have had a central stage in this research. As I had initially planned to conduct on-site ethnographic work exploring the implementation of municipal AFCC programs and the role of older people in the co-construction of adaptation strategies, older people's perceptions about the governing strategies directed to them –such as AFCC programs– would have had a central role in shaping this research. Therefore, one of the most obvious areas for future research would be enquiring about the role of older populations in the governing of demographic ageing. Considering that this research's findings speak about how demographic ageing is regulated through the governing of older populations, a key area of future enquiry would be how the older population experience, perceive and potentially challenge the governing strategies designed to create active and preventive subjectivities and to devolve responsibilities on their caregiving and welfare to local governments, kinship and communities. Exploring how older people relate to the neoliberal common sense on traditional forms of caregiving and to medicalised and preventive conceptions of their participation could potentially challenge this

research's findings. Also, future research could focus on analysing each of the other scales of neoliberal devolution in more detail. In light of the emerging evidence about the limitations of families and communities in addressing the caregiving needs of older populations, future research could focus on how the existing neoliberal context conditions their processes of adaptation and triggers novel forms of contestations.

Future research could also benefit from looking into the other side of the coin. As in this research, I limited myself to the analysis of the neoliberal character of the governing strategies directed to older populations, future research could look into the futures of progressive ideas around issues of ageing. Instead of exploring the workings of neoliberal anti-dependency rationales and the strategies for avoiding the risks and costs of dependent populations, future research could look into more hopeful and liberating futures. In light of the unintended effects of neoliberal restructuring policies in animating different forms of local government contestation (see Chapter Five), ideas about hopeful futures might reside in the scales of neoliberal devolution uncovered in the research –again, local governments, families, communities and older people. Equally, research on hopeful demographic ageing futures could encompass ideas about the accommodations of different age-related abilities – physical and cognitive– through the building of inclusive environments. Finally, going back to my initial research ideas on intersecting demographic ageing and disaster risk reduction, future research could explore how different environmental and social phenomena are governed as ‘risks’ within neoliberal contexts. In this regard, scholarly efforts could unpack how notions of ‘risk’ are integral to neoliberal hegemonic projects trying to govern the unknown of intertwined climate change and ageing futures.

Appendix

Appendix A. List of Interviews

| List of Interviews | | | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| N. | Role | Type of institution | Institution | Set-up | N. of participants |
| 1 | Policymakers | Association of municipalities | Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile - AMUCH | In-person interview | 1 |
| 2 | Policymakers | Association of municipalities | Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades - ACHM | In-person interview | 1 |
| 3 | Policymaker | Association of municipalities | Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile - AMUCH | On-line interview | 1 |
| 4 | Policymaker | Association of municipalities | Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades - ACHM | Written interview - Email exchange | 1 |
| 5 | Policymaker | Central government | Unidad de Estudios, Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA | In-person interview | 1 |
| 6 | Policymaker | Central government | Unidad de Mejoramiento de la Gestión Municipal, Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo - SUBDERE | In-person interview | 1 |
| 7 | Policymaker | Central government | Ministerio de Vivienda y Urbanismo | In-person interview | 1 |
| 8 | Policymaker | Central government | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA | In-person interview | 1 |
| 9 | Policymakers | Central government | División de Políticas y Estudios, Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo - SUBDERE | In-person interview | 3 |
| 10 | Policymakers | Central government | Programa Derechos Humanos de las Personas Mayores, Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA | In-person interview | 1 |
| 11 | Policymakers | Central government | Unidad de Participación Ciudadana y Transparencia Municipal, Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo - SUBDERE | In-person interview | 1 |

| | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--|-------------------------|---|
| 12 | Policymakers | Central government | Unidad de Asociaciones de Municipios y Gobernanza Territorial, Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo - SUBDERE | In-person interview | 1 |
| 13 | Policymakers | Central government | Subsecretaría de Desarrollo Regional y Administrativo - SUBDERE | In-person interview | 1 |
| 14 | Policymakers | Central government | Servicio Nacional de Prevención y Respuesta ante Desastres - Senapred | On-line interview | 1 |
| 15 | Policymakers | Central government | Servicio Nacional de Prevención y Respuesta ante Desastres - Senapred | WhatsApp audio capsules | 1 |
| 16 | Policymakers | Central government | Respuesta a COVID-19, Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA | WhatsApp audio capsules | 1 |
| 17 | Policymaker | Central government | Programa Ciudades y Comunidades Amigables, Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA | On-line interview | 1 |
| 18 | Policymaker | Central government | Servicio Nacional de Prevención y Respuesta ante Desastres - Senapred | On-line interview | 1 |
| 20 | Local government officer | Local Government - Cerro Navia | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Cerro Navia | On-line interview | 1 |
| 21 | Local government officer | Local Government - Conchalí | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Conchalí | On-line interview | 1 |
| 37 | Local government officer | Local Government - Las Condes | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Las Condes | On-line interview | 1 |
| 22 | Local government officer | Local Government - Peñalolén | Defensoría de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 1 |
| 27 | Local government officers | Local Government - Peñalolén | Centro Kintún y Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 2 |
| 28 | Local government officers | Local Government - Peñalolén | Centro Kintún y Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén (Repeat interview) | On-line interview | 2 |
| 29 | Researcher | Local Government - Peñalolén | Centro Kintún, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 1 |

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|----|---------------------------|------------------------------|---|---------------------|---|
| 30 | Local government officers | Local Government - Peñalolén | Defensoría de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 2 |
| 31 | Local government officer | Local Government - Peñalolén | Programa de Memoria, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 1 |
| 32 | Local government officer | Local Government - Peñalolén | Dirección de Desarrollo Comunitario, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 1 |
| 33 | Local government officer | Local Government - Peñalolén | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Apoyo a Clubes de Adulto Mayor, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 1 |
| 34 | Local government officer | Local Government - Peñalolén | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Desarrollo de Talleres, Municipalidad de Peñalolén | On-line interview | 1 |
| 38 | Local government officer | Local Government - Peñalolén | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Peñalolén (Repeat interview) | On-line interview | 1 |
| 36 | Local government officer | Local Government - Recoleta | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta | On-line interview | 1 |
| 39 | Local government officer | Local Government - Recoleta | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta (1st repeat interview) | In-person interview | 1 |
| 40 | Local government officer | Local Government - Recoleta | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Recoleta (2nd repeat interview) | On-line interview | 1 |
| 23 | Local government officer | Local Government - Renca | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca | On-line interview | 1 |
| 24 | Local government officer | Local Government - Renca | Centro Día de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca | On-line interview | 1 |
| 25 | Local government officer | Local Government - Renca | Coordinación Territorial, Municipalidad de Renca | On-line interview | 1 |
| 26 | Volunteers | Local Government - Renca | Programa de Voluntariado Somos Renca, Municipalidad de Renca | On-line interview | 5 |
| 35 | Community leader | Local Government - Renca | Club de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca | WhatsApp call | 1 |
| 41 | Local government officer | Local Government - Renca | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Renca (Repeat interview) | On-line interview | 1 |

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| 19 | Local government officer | Local Government - Santiago | Oficina de Personas Mayores, Municipalidad de Santiago | On-line interview | 1 |
| 42 | NGO member | Non-governmental organisation | Revivir | On-line interview | 1 |
| 43 | NGO member | Non-governmental organisation | Geroactivismo | On-line interview | 1 |
| 44 | NGO member | Non-governmental organisation | Amanoz | On-line interview | 1 |
| 45 | Researcher | Research centre | Transdisciplinary Network of Ageing - University of Chile | In-person interview | 1 |
| 46 | Researcher | Research centre | Centro de Investigación Gerópolis - Universidad de Valparaiso | On-line interview | 1 |
| 47 | Researcher | Research centre | Centro de Investigación Gerópolis - Universidad de Valparaiso | On-line interview | 1 |

Appendix B. List of policy documents

| List of Policy Documents | | | |
|---|---|----------------------|--|
| Type of Document | Policy Documents | Year | Author |
| Historical policy documents | Envejecimiento en Chile: Diagnóstico sectorial y bases para una política nacional | 1991 | MIDEPLAN - Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación |
| | Política Nacional sobre Envejecimiento y Vejez: Lineamientos Básicos. | 1993 | MIDEPLAN - Ministerio de Planificación y Cooperación |
| | Política Nacional para el Adulto Mayor | 1996 | Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor |
| | Autoestima y asertividad | 1998 | Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor y Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo -PNDU |
| | Adulto Mayor: Programas municipales en la región metropolitana. Diagnóstico y propuestas. | 1998 | Secretaría Regional Ministerial de Planificación y Coordinación, Región Metropolitana -SERPLAC METROPOLITANA |
| | Adulto Mayor Líder de Hoy, 1999 | 1999 | Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor y Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo -PNDU |
| | Adultos Mayores: Derechos y Deberes, 1999 | 1999 | Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor y Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo -PNDU |
| | Chile y los Adultos Mayores: Impacto en la Sociedad del 2000 | 1999 | Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor y Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo -PNDU |
| | Creación de Proyectos | 1999 | Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor y Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo -PNDU |
| | Manual para el autocuidado de los adultos mayores | 1999 | Comité Nacional para el Adulto Mayor y Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo -PNDU |
| | Adultos Mayores Integrados a la Sociedad | 1999 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| Cuidado y Autocuidado de salud del adulto mayor | 1999 | Universidad de Chile | |

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| | Historia de Ley 19828. Crea el Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor | 2002 | Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional |
| | Resumen ejecutivo cuenta pública SENAMA | 2004 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Guía de seguridad ciudadana para el adulto mayor en el hogar | 2005 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Guía de seguridad ciudadana para el adulto mayor en la vía pública | 2005 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Adultos mayores: prioridad de los gobiernos de la concertación | 2005 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Libro Blanco: Las Personas Mayores en Chile: Situación, avances y desafíos del envejecimiento y la vejez | 2009 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Estudio sobre la Demanda de Servicios de Cuidado para las Personas Mayores | 2009 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Estudio Nacional de la Dependencia en las Personas Mayores | 2009 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | El Adulto Mayor en las Comunas de Chile | 2016 | Dirección de Estudios, Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile - AMUCH |
| | El trabajo de los municipios a favor del adulto mayor | 2017 | Dirección de Estudios, Asociación de Municipalidades de Chile - AMUCH |
| Presidential speeches | Discurso del presidente Eduardo Frei con el que se inicia el proyecto de ley que crea el Servicio Nacional de Adulto Mayor -SENAMA | 1999 | Presidente Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994-2000) |
| | Discurso presidencial presidente Ricardo Lagos de Ley que crea al Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA | 2002 | Presidente Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000-2006) |
| | Discurso del presidente Ricardo Lagos en el Encuentro 'Vivir la Vida, Toda la Vida' | 2005 | Presidente Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000-2006) |
| International Policy Frameworks | Plan de Acción Mundial sobre el Envejecimiento, Madrid | 2002 | United Nations - Second World Assembly on Ageing |
| | El Envejecimiento de la población latinoamericana: ¿hacia una relación de dependencia favorable? | 2000 | Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe |

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| | La protección social de cara al futuro: Acceso, financiamiento y solidaridad | 2006 | Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe |
| | Boletín Envejecimiento y Desarrollo: Los derechos en la vejez. | 2006 | Comisión Económica para América Latina y El Caribe |
| | Convención Interamericana sobre la protección de los derechos humanos de las personas mayores | 2015, signed by Chile in 2017 | Asamblea General de la Organización de los Estados Americanos |
| Current national level policy and programs | Política integral de envejecimiento positivo para Chile 2012-2025 | 2012 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Estudio de Evaluación del Programa Cuidados Domiciliarios del Servicios Nacional del Adulto Mayor | 2020 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Evaluación de Impacto de Centros Diurnos | 2020 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| | Bases Fondo Nacional del Adulto Mayor | 2014, 2018, 2022 | Servicio Nacional del Adulto Mayor - SENAMA |
| Local government policy documents | Plan de Desarrollo Comunal de Recoleta (2015-2018) | 2015 | Municipalidad de Recoleta |
| | Plan de Desarrollo Comunal de Recoleta (2020-2025) | 2020 | Municipalidad de Recoleta |
| | Plan de Desarrollo Comunal de Renca (2020-2014) | 2020 | Municipalidad de Renca |
| | Plan de Desarrollo Comunal de Peñalolén (2013-2016) | 2013 | Municipalidad de Renca |
| | Plan de Desarrollo Comunal de Peñalolén (2018-2025) | 2018 | Municipalidad de Renca |
| | Adulto mayor y Deporte | n.d. | Corporación de Deportes, Municipalidad de Peñalolén |
| | Plan de Salud 2020, Peñalolén | 2020 | Corporación Municipal de Peñalolén |

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