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Abstract

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN CENTRAL ASIA
AND THE BRITISH RESPONSE

1834 - 1885

by

Gali Oda Tealakh

Supervisor Dr. David W. Sweet

This thesis is a study of Russia's expansion at the expense of the Khanates of Central Asia in the nineteenth century, beginning with the early exploratory missions of the 1830s and 1840s, continuing with the conquest of Kokand and Bukhara in the 1860s, the subjection of Khiva in 1873, and concluding with the fall of Merv in 1884. The threat to British interests represented by this expansion is examined, including a study of Russian projects for the invasion of India, and the failure of the British to react more decisively than they did is explained: only when the Russian advance threatened the continuation of Afghanistan as a buffer state did the British exert their influence to halt the Russian advance. The motives and procedures of Russia's expansion in the region are examined, specifically through the case history of the construction of the Central Asian railroad, and more generally in the policy of Russification upon which the Russians embarked even before their conquest was complete. An examination of the interaction of economic, political and military motives underlying the Russian expansion leads to the conclusion that, although its long-term economic, social, and cultural consequences for Central Asia were enormous, the more immediate logic purpose of the Russian conquests was military, administrative, and political.

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
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A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Durham
Department of History
1991



14 OCT 1992



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Declaration

This thesis was carried out at the University of Durham,
Department of History. No part of it has been published before,
or submitted for any other degree.

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*This work is dedicated
by the author to*

**HIS MOST GRACIOUS MAJESTY
HUSEIN BIN TALAL
THE AUGUST SOVEREIGN OF
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN**

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The current work is offered as a contribution to historical knowledge and understanding of the nature of, and the imperatives behind, the Russian march into Central Asia in the nineteenth century, and of the British response to it. Throughout her advance in the region, which extends from the steppe zone in the north to the borders of Afghanistan and Persia in the south, Russia's expansion in all its phases was justified by official Russian statements as an attempt to bring the benefits of order and civilization to a turbulent and barbarous region. In this study I shall attempt to establish the political and strategic motives behind these justifications, and I shall consider the Anglo-Russian rivalry as one of the major influences upon the political behaviour of both great empires, which shaped their relation in Asia, and indeed more generally, throughout the nineteenth century. I shall also attempt to give due weight to the economic and cultural implications of the Russian annexations in Central Asia.

* * * * *

I want to thank my supervisor Dr. David W. Sweet for his unfailing advice, encouragement, and sincere efforts throughout my work on this topic. I am obliged to him for his continuous attention, originality, and recommendations. My thanks are also due to Dr. John Slatter, Chairman of the Russian Department, for his remarks especially on translation and quotations from Russian sources. I am thankful as well to Mr. R. T. B. Langhorne, St. John's College, University of Cambridge, for his kindness during my stay at Cambridge University during the winter of 1988.

During the years of study I was so fortunate to be inspired by distinguished statesmen and intellectuals from my country. At the top of my list comes His Highness Khalifah Bin Hamad Āl-Thani The Amir of The State of Qatar, for his care and encouragement; my due recognition to his Lordship my father-in-law Mr. Jom'a Hammad, member of the Upper Chamber of the Jordanian Parliament, and first Secretary General of the National Union, for his fatherly care and affection, his sincere counsel and compassionate encouragement were indispensable; to His Excellency Mr. Kamil el-Sharif, Minister of the Religious Affairs, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan for his

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Now the boat is gently floating over high seas and the sail is full of germane breeze, it is time to give due respect and thanks to those who gave me the early inspiration to start from rough shores. My thanks due to Professor Barbara Jelavich, for early attention and encouragement; pertinent gratitude as well to Professor Charles Jelavich, both from the Department of History, Indiana University. My thanks are due as well to Miss Ann Foley, a sincere and thoughtful friend. Also, I am grateful to the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom; to Mrs. J. Butterfield, and to Mr. Miles Roddis; to Dr. V. Armitage, Dean of the Colleges, University of Durham; and to Mr. John R. White.

During those ardent years of solitary work I had a never-ending source of inspiration that made them tolerable and fruitful continuously flowing from those to whom I am most obliged: my father, who through heavenly love, stamina, patience, and boundless energy gave me, my brothers, and sisters the needed education with great sacrifice; to my family: my beloved wife and my innocent sons, whom I believe suffered most during my absence and would be most cheerful to share this modest achievement with me; I am most obliged to members of my family who generously financed my stay in the United Kingdom insisting not to be singled out from other members of the family nor to be mentioned by name.

I would like to extend my gratitude to those authors, translators, and editors whose books and articles were beneficial for me during the years of preparing this thesis. My deep appreciation to Ms. Lesley Forbes, and to all the personnel of the Library of the University of Durham, the inter-library loan desk and the circulation desk, who through friendly concern and commitment have a hand in every success. My thanks as well to the staff of the Library of the University of Cambridge, the India Office Library, the Public Record Office, and the British Library. Appropriate gratitude due as well to the team of the computer centre of the University of Durham.

NOTES ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION

The consistent spelling of names, whether personal or geographical, in a Turkic region subject to at least three cultural influences, Arabic, Russian, and Persian, presents in itself an insurmountable challenge to the historian of the region. In the nineteenth century, the transliteration of Russian and Arabic characters for Western as well as Russian travellers and writers of the nineteenth century was evidently a matter of personal convenience, intelligence, and preference. Thus the spelling of geographical or personal names, Russian or Turkic, frequently differs from one author to another. Following the Russian conquest and the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet, the renaming of places, rivers, and cities, besides the intensive efforts towards Russification in the fields of administration, education, and the economy, further complicated the problem.

In this thesis, for transliterating Arabic, Turkish, and Persian words, *The Encyclopedia of Islam* (4 volumes and supplements, Leyden, London 1913-1938) has been consulted, and also the *Handbook of Oriental History*, C. H. Phillips, (ed.), (London 1963). For transliterating Russian characters I have observed the following system which is based on the systems of the British Library and the Library of Congress:

Russian	English	Russian	English	Russian	English
А а A a	Б б B b	В в V v
Г г G g	Д д D d	Е е E e
Ё ё Ё ё	Ж ж Zh	З з Z z
И и I i	Й й Ii ii	К к K k
Л л L l	М м M m	Н н N n
О о O o	П п P p	Р р R r
С с S s	Т т T t	У у U u
Ф ф F f	Х х Kh	Ц ц Ts
Ч ч Ch	Ш ш Sh	Щ щ	... Shch
Ъ, Твёрдый знак	<i>(has no equivalent in English)</i>			Ы ы Y y
Ь, Мягкий знак	<i>(has no equivalent in English)</i>			Э э E e
Ю ю Iu	Я я Ia		

Translations from Russian language sources are mine, unless otherwise indicated as being quoted from an already translated source.

INTRODUCTION

Russia in Asia

The nineteenth century was a decisive era in the political and economic relations between Russia and the Khanates of Central Asia. These relations, as we shall see, had their roots deep in history as a direct result of Russia's geographical location. The history of Russia's association with Asia had been from its beginning different from that of any other European colonial power. The geographical difference is evident enough: Russia, itself part of the Eurasian land mass, had established itself in Siberia in the late sixteenth century after the fall of the city of Sibir to Yermak in 1582. It has been customary to distinguish between Russia in Europe and Russia in Asia, although there are no distinct geographical barriers between the two. The Urals mountains cannot be considered as a barrier, because of their permeability on the one hand, and because on the other they leave a wide and fertile prairie between their southern end and the Caspian Sea.

Russia had herself been under the domination of Asian peoples, the Mongols and the Tatars, for more than 200 years: a period long enough to exert a strong influence on the Russians culturally as well as ethnically. Even linguistically the Tatars and the Mongols left their traces in the Russian vocabulary. Some historians have explained the oriental habits in Russian life, and words in the Russian language, as a heritage of the Tataro-Mongol domination.¹ After liberating herself from Tataro-Mongol domination, Russia naturally would expand, and as a reverse tendency the expansion was more notably in the direction of her now declining Asian neighbours. This process developed in correlation to the westernization of Russia: it is true to say that Russia became an Asiatic power by westernizing herself. Russia's expansion in Asia was marked by a dual phenomenon: by expanding through Siberia and further east to the Pacific ocean, Russia was following a natural law of expansion; on the other hand her expansion in Central Asia may be characterized as an imperialist endeavour.²

Russia's expansion into Asia began in the sixteenth century. It was in no sense a coordinated expansion, but rather an organic process partly touched off by the removal of the Tataro-Mongol rule and constraints, the predatory spirit of the Cossacks, the merchant-adventurer tradition of the Novgorod traders, and the sense of mission implanted in the Russians. Believing themselves to be the heirs of the Byzantine imperial tradition, with their inheritance of the Holy Scriptures in a language intelligible to those who could read,³ fascinated with the image of Spain as the protector of Christendom in the west, and in a desperate attempt to emphasize their European identity, the Russians aspired to play the role of the eastern wing of Christianity defending European civilization from barbarism and the Islamic offensive. All of these factors exerted a stimulating and tangible influence upon Russia's political behaviour in Asia as well as in Europe. Russia made her first movements eastward in Siberia, and the Pacific ocean was reached by the end of the seventeenth century. During this phase the Russians encountered only primitive tribes inhabiting vast territories, who were soon outnumbered by the more dynamic Russian settlers.

The southward movement from Siberia, which began in the eighteenth century, first into the steppe region of Kazakhstan and later, in the nineteenth century, into the Khanates of Central Asia, was what might be characterised as manifest destiny. In Lord Curzon's words, "Russia was as much compelled to go forward as the earth is to go round the sun".⁴ Russia, by expanding eastward and southward in Asia, was following laws of natural growth, encouraged by two underlying considerations; the first of which was the need to secure access to an open sea free of ice, and the second was the urgent need for markets far and secure from her European competitors.

Russian expansionist activities south of the Urals in the nineteenth century have been regarded as a response to the needs of the development of mercantile

capitalism in Russia. In this phase the Russian textile industry, as indeed the whole Russian economy, needed new markets and cheap sources of raw materials secure from European rivals. Hence some Russian and Soviet historians have emphasized the economic factor behind Russia's advance in Central Asia; whereas many western writers and historians have regarded her conquest of the steppe and Central Asia as part of her strategy against India, which is indeed supported by the numerous plans designed and developed by several of her most prominent Imperial Generals for that purpose.

In retrospect, a number of reasons for Russian expansion - economic, political, and military - have been advanced, but it is still not clear how far, and in what proportion, each of those reasons weighed with the Russian Government itself, confronted as it often was with situations created by decisions taken on the spot by local military commanders or governors, but, of course, attentively inspired by "Russia's interest" as a guideline. D. A. Miliutin,⁵ the Russian War Minister (1861-1881) commented regarding this matter:

I have summoned local commanders to follow as closely as possible the instructions and directives given to them, but in addition I recognised that it would be damaging to deprive them through such instructions of their personal initiatives.⁶

The minister here admitted that the officers should have the right of self-judgement, and deal with any situation in light of the prevailing circumstances according to their "personal initiatives". In addition, the War Minister frequently found himself in conflict with the views and policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding procedures in Central Asia. Summing up the whole process, M. G. Cherniaev⁷ manifesting his admiration towards such a principle, i.e self-judgement, wrote to Prince Bariatynskii⁸ in 1867 saying:

It is a splendid fact in the history of extending our dominions..., that all our actions from the Ural to the Irtysh, to the feet of the Himalayas and Tian-Shan have been achieved by the initiatives of regional officers, in the face of successive opposition on the part of the central government.⁹

The countries lying between the western frontiers of China and the Caspian Sea presented Russia with problems and situations entirely unlike those which the Russians had experienced in their earlier advance into Siberia and the Steppe region. Here they confronted societies with old civilizations and established traditions, and fierce warlike tribes. In addition, Russia found herself obliged to take into consideration the fact that behind the belt of mountains to the south lay the power of the British Empire, a centre that radiated a counter influence, political and economic, all over this part of Asia, and had equal interests in it. Russia suddenly found herself faced with a great European Empire, and was obliged to shift her policy from one adapted to the Asian context to one more suited to European political psychology.

From a cultural and, particularly, a historical point of view, the Central Asian peoples may have seemed barbaric to the Russians, nor did they have for them the same feeling of ethnic affinity which existed elsewhere towards Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Baltic peoples, or in other words all those areas where the "lesser brother" lived.¹⁰ The Central Asians, despite the state of decline that had overcome them even before the Russian advance, still themselves felt their glorious past, and remembered that in the recent past they had played a role of rivalry with Russia, and that for a substantial period of the more remote past they had dominated over her.

During the nineteenth century Russia developed close but mostly hostile and antagonistic contacts with the people of Central Asia. These relations, reflected in the memoirs of politicians, historians, and pamphleteers, were such that Russian officials in Central Asia saw in Britain, their avowed rival, less animosity than in the indigenous peoples. The first Governor-General of Central Asia, Kaufmann, wrote in 1876 to the Russian Minister for War that the Russians "have reciprocal interests with England in Asia: together with her we have common enemies, Islam and barbarism".¹¹

Painstakingly Russia portrayed her Asian neighbours to European courts as

barbarians, an image which to some extent granted her the role of a nation with a civilizing mission on the one hand and legitimised her military action on the other. By mistreatment of European travellers, by engaging in the slave trade, and through their tyrannical rule over their own people, the Governments of the Khanates contributed to the success of Russia's allegations and facilitated the achievement of her designs. Despite repeated advice by Britain and the Government of India to avoid furnishing Russia with pretexts for advance, they continued in their habits, and intensified their rivalries and ravaging internecine wars.

Historiography

Both Russian and western historians have advanced a variety of explanations for the expansion of Russia in Central Asia. Among the main reasons offered have been the increasing need to establish new markets for her trade; the need to combat British designs against her influence in Central Asia; and the design against British India.¹² In varying degrees, and in different circumstances, all of these factors can be seen to have played some part in stimulating as well as in justifying the expansion. The treatment of the subject by Soviet historians of Central Asia has varied considerably. While fairly consistent in condemning the imperialism of the Tsarist Government and the oppressive nature of its administration of Central Asia, those historians have at times contrived to give an impression of a natural inevitability about the process. While considering that the Tsarist Government was not actuated by the purest motives, some have still depicted the Russian conquest as not in fact a conquest at all, but a process of "voluntary adherence" (*dobrovolnoe prisoedinenie*) to the Russian empire of peoples oppressed by their native rulers, or threatened with absorption by other imperialist powers, notably Britain. Thus they have misapplied the Soviet interpretive philosophy of the twentieth century to historical events that took place in the nineteenth century. From most, if not all, Soviet history writings

during the last three decades, which followed the 1950s, the word conquest (*zavoevanie*) has been dropped and the expression "voluntary adherence" or "joining" (*prisoedinenie*) substituted.¹³

It is thus most noteworthy that some Soviet historians, since the second World War, have changed the evaluation of Tsarist Russia's expansionist policy in Kazakhstan and Central Asia.¹⁴ They justify their new attitude by explaining that a change of interpretation was necessitated by the misunderstanding which had taken place in the thirties of this century under the impact of the "anti-Marxist" school of Pokrovskii, which had led to this question being interpreted incorrectly.¹⁵ Their new interpretation involves considerable modification of the previous orthodoxy and in particular tends to promote a misleading impression that there were no antagonisms between the native Central Asians and the Tsarist authorities during the Russian subjugation of Central Asia. In justification of their attitude, which contradicts incontrovertible evidence of the ruthlessness of the Russian policy of subjugation, and the fierce resistance of the indigenous population to the Russian military administration, they attributed the reason for that resistance to the endless feudal wars and raids, in which rival factions besides Uzbek and Turkoman tribal elites took part, which ruined the country, and interrupted the economic life of the people. According to their debatable interpretation, this situation brought the Turkoman people to regard Russia as the power that would be able to put an end to these wars.¹⁶ In addition, they seek to attribute the resistance of the Turkomans merely to the influence of their Muslim spiritual leadership and the encouragement of British imperialism. The members of this new school attempt to paint a rosy picture of the relations between Russia and Central Asia by arguing that trade, diplomatic relations, and economic intercourse were growing substantially despite the raids of the nomadic tribes; that their raids in turn necessitated the escort of commercial caravans by military detachments; and that every five or six years an

embassy from Bukhara and Khiva would arrive in Moscow and St. Petersburg for the purpose of expanding these relations.¹⁷ In fact, it was not only a practice of tribesmen to plunder and loot caravans, it was also a customary practice and settled policy of Russian troops to despoil and pillage. We find much documented evidence of such practices in Russian sources of the nineteenth century:

In 1871, while Colonel Markozov was conducting a reconnaissance operation accompanied by a regiment of his force in Uzba, near Tubiatana to the north of Chekishlar, he surrounded a trade caravan consisted of 300 camels coming from Khiva to the Attrek and despoiled it.¹⁸

The revisionist arguments cannot provide an adequate basis for justifying the subjugation and later the assimilation of the nations of Central Asia by Tsarist Russia, and cannot stand as a ground for such a gross reinterpretation of history. The historical records suggests a completely different interpretation. From the early nineteenth century, and at first by way of trade relations, the Russian government began to conduct delicate reconnaissance activities. De Maizon's expedition to Bukhara in 1833-1834, which will be alluded to later,¹⁹ leaves neither ambiguity nor room for the pretence of friendly intentions or equal relations with the Khanates of Central Asia. The way this mission was designed, and the duties and assignments given to De Maizon, from the outset reveal the real intentions and ambitions of Russia in the region.

The earlier Soviet perspective on the history of Central Asia - which is now the subject of recent condemnation and criticism by Soviet historians - such as that approach contained in *Istoriia Narodov Uzbekistana* (History of the Uzbek Peoples),²⁰ does not in most respects diverge from any other Russian works related to the history of that region. One of the important differences, (now once again categorically denied), is the recognition in that work that the Khanates had already reached the level of centralized governments, and had achieved an advanced level of development in their political as well as social and economic life, even before the Russian occupation. This recognition of course leaves no space for claiming a prog-

ressive role for the Russian conquest, or for that civilizing role of Russia which has been so vehemently propagated during the last three decades.

Interestingly, the advocates of the new school obviously try to avoid recognition of that characteristic brutality which had marked the Russian advance from its beginning. Lord Curzon, who visited in 1888 a Tekke Turkomans' site in the company of an eye-witness of the campaign of 1881, who was acquainted with the details of the storming of the fortress, wrote:

at 4 in the afternoon Skobelev led his cavalry through the breach and ordered both horse and foot to pursue the retreating enemy and to give no quarter. This command was obeyed with savage precision by both till darkness fell... Eight thousand persons of both sexes and all ages were mercilessly cut down and slain. On the morning after the battle they lay in rows like freshly mown hay, as they had been swept down by the mitrailleuses and cannon. In the fort were found the corpses of 6,500 men, ... all who had not succeeded in escaping were killed to a man by the Russian soldiers,... The troops were allowed to loot without interruption for four days. Within the same time Skobelev admitted that he must have destroyed 20,000 of the enemy.²¹

Evidently, for the sake of contemporary political goals, the revisionists have not hesitated to moderate the historical record as established by the sources in many languages. For instance the genocide of the Geok-Tepe Turkomans, who in January 1881 made their last valiant effort against Skobelev - who was given *carte blanche* in his selection of both the manner and means of operation - which in Lord Curzon's words "was not a rout but a massacre, not a defeat, but an extirpation".²² Krausse, another contemporary, gave this account:

As soon as the flight of the Tekkes had begun, Skobelev led his cavalry through the breach and ordered a pursuit to be made by both horse and foot soldiers, who were instructed to give no quarter... All who had not succeeded in escaping previously - men, women, and children - were killed by the pursuers... The soldiers cut down the fugitives where they found them, leaving the dead upon the plain mown down as if with a scythe, men and women, children and infants, all dead, many frightfully mutilated in the cause of the civilizing spread of Russian influence. After the pursuit the troops were allowed to loot for four days...²³

The "civilizing" mission of Imperial Russia in her actual treatment of the

indigenous peoples is also vividly recorded by MacGahan, who escorted the Russian troops in the campaign against the Yomuds in 1873, and who gives a startling eyewitness account of that march. After describing the peaceful fields and fruit trees, and the pleasant Turkoman boys and girls offering Golovachev's²⁴ infantry and Cossacks bread, fruits, and milk, MacGahan says:

I was still musing on the quietness and desolation of the scene, when all at once I was startled by a sharp crackling sound behind me. Looking round, I beheld a long tongue of flame darting upward from the roof of the house into which I had just been peering, and another from the stack of nicely-gathered unthreshed wheat near it. The dry straw-thatched roof flashed up like powder, and the ripe wheat-straw burned almost as readily. Huge volumes of dense black smoke rose out of the trees in every direction, and rolled overhead in dark ominous looking clouds, coloured by the fiery glare from the flames below. I spurred my horse to the top of a little eminence, and gazed about me. It was a strange, wild spectacle. In an incredibly short space of time flames and smoke had spread on either side to the horizon, and, advancing steadily forward in the direction of our course, slowly enveloped everything. Through this scene moved the Cossacks like spectres. Torch in hand, they dashed swiftly across the country, leaping ditches and flying over walls like demons, and leaving behind them a trail of flame and smoke. They rarely dismounted, but simply rode up to the houses, applied their blazing torches to the projecting eaves of thatch, and the stacks of unthreshed grain, and then galloped on. Five minutes afterwards, sheets of seething flame and darkling smoke showed how well they had done their work. The entire country was on fire.

In half an hour the sun was hidden, the sky grew dark; for, as though the sudden lighting of so many fires had produced some change in the atmosphere, a rain set in - a thing almost unknown in Khiva, and which added one dismal feature more to the already dismal scene. It was a slow, drizzling rain, not sufficient to put out the fires, but only to beat off the ashes and make them burn brighter, to drive down the smoke, and make it hang over the trees in heavy, sullen masses, darkening the air, and forming a lowering background to the blood-coloured flames. This was war such as I had never before seen, and such as is rarely seen in modern days.

It was a sad, sad sight...²⁵

Sometimes these same historians, who defend the Russian "civilizing role" in Central Asia, contradict themselves by admitting contrary views to those they propagate, when for instance they admit the existence of discontent among the Turkoman people, caused by the expansionist policy of Tsarism and the actions of

its armies. They emphasise that discontent was invented and utilized by what they call the reactionary Turkoman elite and Muslim spiritual leadership, which they accuse of having been connected with the British intelligence service. This attitude, towards the Turkomans' leadership indiscriminately, must inevitably lead to the conclusion that cooperation or sympathy between the Turkomans and the Russians was excluded, although asserted by Soviet historians.²⁶ Indeed, they spontaneously admit that the Russians were unwelcome, when they affirm that in Turkestan the Tsarist armies were met with severe and unusual resistance by the Turkoman tribes, especially in Akhal. The heaviest casualties inflicted on the Russian army in all its campaigns in Central Asia were in the Turkoman country, where these modern interpreters of history claim amity and harmony.²⁷ In the face of the undeniable facts of history, they attribute the atrocities to Tsarism rather than to Russia generally, or to individual abuses of authority which accompanied Russia's expansion:

A brutal military-colonial rule had been installed after annexing Turkmenistan to Russia. Tsarism strove to withhold economic and cultural development from the Turkoman people...²⁸

Elsewhere, these authors refer to "insulting Tsarist policy... dictated by the eruption of the Russian colonial advance and by the military strategic situation".²⁹ They have also offered the rationalisation that Russia's and Tsarism's³⁰ aggression had been escalated by the active expansionist policy of England in Central Asia, which jeopardized Russia's security, an explanation hardly consonant with the policy of "masterly inactivity" generally pursued by the British in Central Asia.³¹

It is in order to subject both Stalinist and post-Stalinist interpretations to a more empirical scrutiny that I have returned to the contemporary sources available to the historian of the present day. The reader will find a description of the most valuable of these, in both Russian and English, in the bibliographical essay which precedes the bibliography at the end of this work.


Geography and ethnology

It is important to notice here that Soviet historians usually use two different geographical expressions when referring to Central Asia. They use the term *Tsentralnaia Aziia*, which means "Central Asia", when they refer to Kazakhstan or the prairie region *Stepnoi krai* with the region extending to the south-west of Mongolia;³² and for what is known in the west as Central Asia they use *Sredniaia Azia*, which means "Middle Asia".³³ Apparently, the motive is not a pure scientific but a political one. They aspire to separate the Kazakh steppes, which Russia conquered and incorporated earlier, without substantial international attention or impediments, from what Russia annexed in the second half of the nineteenth century. It appears that Soviet historians have been anxious to establish divisions and distinctions between the peoples of the region. Russian Turkestan now consists of four Soviet Republics: Kirghiziia (Kirghizistan), Tadzhikistan, Turkmeniia (Turkmenistan), and Uzbekistan. The fifth is the Republic of Kazakhstan, which occupies the steppe region. The indigenous populations of all five Republics are Muslim and non-Russian, and are all ethnically closer to each other than any of them is to the Russians or the Slavs.

The peoples inhabiting the region, anthropologically speaking can be grouped as follows: the Uzbeks and the Tadzhiks belong to the Caucasoid race of the type known as Central Asian riverain; the Kazakhs and Kirghiz belong to the south Siberian type formed as a result of the mingling of the Central Asian Mongoloids with the ancient Caucasoid population of Kazakhstan. Although the Mongoloid features of the Kazakhs, and even more of the Kirghiz, are more evident than those of the other peoples of Central Asia, they are not typical representatives of the Mongoloid race. The Turkomans are from a different ethnic group: they are of the Khorasan type, which is related to the Mediterranean group, and they are considerably taller.³⁴

The area between the Oxus (Amu-Daria) and the Jaxartes (Syr-Daria) is dominated, ethnically speaking, by the Iranians, who gradually absorbed the successive waves of foreign races which swept through the region from the Altai,³⁵ namely the Tats, Tazhiks, Sarts, Galsha, and Persians, who can be found over that vast region from the Indus to the Jaxartes, with Afghan domination to the south and Uzbek to the north. In earlier periods, from 700 B.C to 300 A.D., this region had been swept by Uralian tribes, Finns, and Laps who expanded to reach India in one direction and Syria and Asia Minor in another. As a western historian commented in 1875, this vast migration and long-continued occupancy must at the time have left its impress, more or less strongly marked, on all the countries intermediate between the Jaxartes and the Euphrates.³⁶ This impress then conflicted with the influx of another family of tribes: the Turkic wave of immigration followed, and from the fourth century to the tenth there seems to have been a continuous stream of Turkic tribes pouring in from the Altai and pushing towards Europe. The mixture was completed by the expeditions of Chenkiz Khan and Timur, which coloured the Turkish complexion in Central and Western Asia.³⁷

It was this rich combination of ethnic diversity which the Russians, under both Tsarist and Soviet regimes, sought to subdue and Russify. Its incorporation into the Russian empire has, as we have seen, presented severe problems of ideological justification to successive schools of Russian and Soviet historiography. The history of Russia's relations with the peoples of Central Asia still therefore offers many topics awaiting investigation. Fascinating episodes of conquering colonialism and heroic resistance happened precisely here, in Central Asia. I hope that this modest study of an era before the Sovietization of Central Asia will be a useful contribution to the scholarship of the subject, and may further the investigation of the earlier as well as the later periods of Russia's presence in this sensitive and neglected region.



**CENTRAL ASIA
BEFORE THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE**

..... Territories disputed
 between Bukhara and Kokand
 + + + + + Territories disputed
 between Bukhara and Khiva

Chapter One

RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Russia's early contacts with Central Asia

It is hard, if not impossible, to ascertain the precise date at which contacts were established between Russia and Central Asia. Some Arabic records place that date in the tenth century,¹ while some Russian historians indicate that commercial routes between Russia and Central Asia, mainly in the region of the Amu-Daria river, were established in the eighth century.² Contacts with Central Asia were however greatly enhanced during the reign of Peter the Great, who pushed Russia's peripheries outwards in every direction in Europe and in Asia as well. As a nineteenth-century British commentator noted, Peter

devised a scheme of territorial annexation, which during his own splendid career he practised with the greatest success upon neighbouring countries, which he bequeathed to his successors, and which a very slight knowledge of Russian history will enable us to recognize as the formula since adhered to by the successive occupants of the Muscovite throne.³

The early historiography of Central Asia was derived from tradition and from casual notices, and in certain brief sketches given by the historians of Alexander the Great's period, until the Arab conquest of the region in the tenth century, when "the Arab invaders were followed by annalists, whose minute narratives have left no period obscure from that date".⁴ This period in the history of Central Asia represents a new era which witnessed the first civilizing effect of Islam on Central Asia. Some Soviet historians dispute this proposition and argue that it was not the Arabs and Islam that influenced Central Asian culture, but that Arab and Islamic culture was derived from Central Asia.⁵ Presumably they have adopted this flimsy interpretation because of political as well as ideological considerations, for on the one hand Islam is the second largest religion in Russia, and on the other they seem

unwilling to admit a positive role for any religion even in the past. By contrast historians in the West, including some who are pro-Soviet, concede that "the people of Turkestan never entered history as a nation in their own right".⁶ Yet others have argued that

it was Islam which, as it were, put Central Asia on the map as a region inhabited by peoples who had to some extent succeeded in organizing their society and were thus qualified to enter history.⁷

The properly documented history of Russia's relations with the region can be traced back to Ivan III (1462-1505), who was the first Russian monarch to take advantage of the situation that prevailed as a result of the rivalry between the Tatars of Kazan and the Crimea on the one hand, and the Golden Horde on the other. He sided with the Tatars who successfully paralysed the power of the Golden Horde.⁸ The Russian colonial movement eastward began in the middle of the sixteenth century during the reign of Ivan Grozny (the Terrible) (1547-1584). This was a venture of an altogether different and more expansionist kind: the fall of the Khanate of Kazan in October 1552 was followed in 1556 by the fall of the Khanate of Astrakhan, to bring the Russian borders to the mouth of the Volga river and the northern shores of the Caspian Sea for the first time in Russia's history, and to make her a Eurasian power in close proximity to Central Asia. At this stage the Russia state began to face the problem of securing its borders against nomad incursions. To treat this problem, Russia built chains of fortified posts to block those nomads from reaching the central provinces of the Empire, and the government "soon discovered what use could be made of the Cossack communities which were springing up in the frontier regions".⁹ The ebb and flow of the tide between Asia and Europe ended in favour of Russia. She invaded and expanded to the East by land in the period of the great discoveries, when Spain and Portugal were discovering the new world by sea.

Apparently Russia was for a period unaware of the decay of her eastern neighbours, despite the fact that the balance of power between her and Asia had

turned in her favour. Thus in 1581 Yermak Timofeivich Povolzheskii, the Ataman of the Volga Cossacks,^a was not only blamed, but was actually condemned to death for getting involved in war with Kuchum, the Khan of western Siberia. The Muscovite Grand Duke (Kniaz) Stroganov¹⁰ was the first to blame Yermak, and sent him a warning message remonstrating with him for becoming "involved in dispute with such a great and strong neighbour".¹¹ Ivan the Terrible regarded this adventure of Yermak as a disgrace, and wrote thus to the Stroganovs who sheltered Yermak and had him in their service in Perm:

If you do not dismiss from your service the band of the Volga Cossacks, namely Yermak, the robber chief and his followers, or if you show negligence in protecting Perm and indulge in repetition of this treacherous conduct, a severe chastisement will be visited upon you, and the robber Chiefs and Cossacks who have obeyed and served you, while they have left my territory unprotected, shall be put to death.¹²

Obviously, Ivan's reaction was based on the assumption that Yermak could not conquer Kuchum, the Khan of Sibiria, presuming that any confrontation with that Khan would result in a disaster to Russia. But after Yermak's victory and the fall of the town of Sibir¹³ in 1581, the Cossack leader sent one of his followers

^a The word Cossack apparently was derived from the Turkic word "Kazak", which means free frontiersman. On the top of each Cossack community there was an Ataman. Later, after total submission to Moscow in the 18th century the Ataman was substituted by a "Voevoda" or military commander. The Cossack hosts sprang up wherever Russia expanded. The names of these hosts indicate their location and their territories: the Kuban Cossacks, the Astrakhan, the Ural, the Don, the Siberian, later the Turkestan Cossacks, the Trans-Baikal, the Semirechinsk, etc. The Cossacks (the Russian word "Kazaky" or "Kazachestvo" means rangers or wanderers) sprang up and flourished as a military power by taking part in the wars between Russia, Poland, and the Tatars. What associated them with Russia was no national or Slavic sympathy, for they did not belong to the Great Russian race (Veliko-Rus), but rather a vague communion in the Orthodox faith, which led them to hate the Poles as Catholics as much as the Turks as Muslims. It was therefore possible as well as less dangerous for the Tsars of Muscovy to recruit them as allies and employ them in frontier defence. They formed military settlements on the fringes of the Empire depending on agriculture and ready, in a very short time, to provide a menacing cavalry force using their own arms and horses. Liashchenko, P. I., *Istoriia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR* (History of the National Economy of the USSR), vol. I, (Leningrad 1947) p.358-361. Also vide Abdykalykov, M., and Pankratova, A., *Istoriia Kazakhskoi SSR* (History of Kazakhstan SSR) (Alma-Ata 1943); Pushkarev, S. G., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms*, (Yale University 1970), p. 35; and Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia in Asia*, pp. 35-7.

named Koltso to Moscow to tender the submission of the Siberian kingdom to the Tsar; he was received in State by Ivan,¹⁴ and subsequently Yermak enjoyed the forgiveness of his monarch and entered Russian history as a hero, not as a convicted felon.

The Russian advance in Siberia was remarkably rapid and the shores of the Pacific were reached by the end of the seventeenth century. Historically speaking, Siberia was a safe haven for Russian outlaws like Yermak as well as those farmer-settlers¹⁵ and fugitives who fled the inhumane treatment to which they were subjected in their home-land. Most of those who migrated to distant Siberia were actually rebellious against the Russian authority or fleeing from exaction and serfdom.¹⁶ But they behaved differently when Tsarist authority, their former oppressor, followed their progress into Siberia, where they became an effective instrument for attesting and spreading that authority,¹⁷ as indeed was the case with Yermak himself and his Cossack band. The process of expansion was spontaneously hastened by oppression and the severe rule of absolutism in Russia's heartlands, that resulted in a massive exodus eastward. As Mackenzie Wallace, Britain's leading observer of Russian affairs in the later nineteenth century, dramatically expressed it:

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this oppression reached its climax. The increase in the numbers of officials, the augmentation of the taxes, the merciless exactions of the Voyevods^b and their subordinates, the transformation of the free peasants into serfs, the ecclesiastical reforms and consequent persecutions of the Old Ritualists, the frequent conscription and violent reforms of Peter the Great, these and similar burdens made thousands flee and seek a refuge in the free territory where there were no proprietors, no Voyevods, and no tax-gatherers. But the State, with its army of officials and tax-gatherers, followed close on the heels of the fugitives, and those who wished to preserve their liberty had to advance still further. Notwithstanding the efforts of the authorities to retain the population in the localities actually occupied, the wave of colonization moved steadily onwards.¹⁸

The history of Russia's advance eastward was marked by political ambiguity

^b. Voevod literally means commander of army, but in old Russia this title was officially given to functionaries who fulfilled both jobs: a local army commander and civil governor.

and military consistency, which includes no record of any instance of withdrawal from any region once occupied at the expense of Muslim Central Asia. Equally, her expansion into Central Asia though comparatively slow especially in its earlier stages, was subject to no retrogression, and clearly guided by an unfaltering purpose: an uninterrupted chronicle of aggression, of acquisition, and of assimilation that began with the conquest of Perm and Siberia down to the subjugation of Kokand, Bukhara, Khiva, and Merv, culminating in Russia's establishment as an Asiatic great power bordering China, Afghanistan, and Persia. During her drive she developed a peculiar system of "colonies constituting colonies of their own with their own regulations"¹⁹. This was the situation of Perm as regards Siberia, of Orenburg towards the steppe, and later in the 1860s the case of the Russian province of Turkestan towards the Uzbek Khanates. After the conquest of Kazan, Astrakhan, and Siberia in the sixteenth century, and the establishment of Orenburg as the centre of her proceedings on the steppe and in Central Asia, Russia adopted a unique policy of allegiance leading to assimilation, and protection leading to subjugation, in dealing with the nomads of the steppe; who, one after another, to the close of the nineteenth century, acknowledged the might of Russia, by confessing allegiance which it has been the consistent endeavour of Russian administrators to develop into assimilation with the rest of the Empire.²⁰

The conquest of Siberia has been said to have brought under Russia's control fifty-nine different nationalities of different languages and creeds and it added nearly five million square miles to her territory.²¹ Russia advanced in obedience, as it were, to a social-Darwinist law that, as amongst animals the stronger species eliminated the weaker, so amongst men the stronger state subdued the weaker and seized its resources. In this regard Russia, endowed by nature with the necessary social psychology, half European and half Asian, ruthlessly implemented these principles in her dealings, not only with Asian societies, but with neighbouring

nations in Europe as well.

Official advice tendered to the India Office shows that some Russophiles in Britain were disposed to give the Russians their support in this process, at least in so far as the conquest of Asia was concerned, and to emphasize Russia's "civilizing" mission as the:

most eastern of the fraternity of nations comprised in the continent of Europe. The civilization of the East and West, or as some would probably put it, the barbarism of the East and the civilization of the West, meet on her confines.²²

Be that as it may, it remains true that in terms of power-politics, until the middle of the nineteenth century, Russia met no power able to halt her advance either in Siberia or in the steppe, and the resistance of her victims was insufficient to maintain and safeguard their independence.

The Russian arrival at the Central Asian stage of her expansion was preceded by centuries of foreign invasion and internal wars between the Khanates that prevented the "natural process of nation-forming" among the peoples of Central Asia.²³ The Russians came in to the region with different methods, goals, and policies. Under the camouflage of civilizing, stabilizing, and pacifying, they conquered, assimilated, annexed and settled, proclaiming that this expansion was a natural movement aimed at securing the trade routes, pacifying "barbarous" tribes and achieving natural frontiers. By appeal to these three issues, Russia justified the advance which led to the absorption of the Central Asian Khanates with which she claimed to have profitable trade-relations. The last decade of the eighteenth century was a turning point in the history of Russian-Central Asian relations. Russian opinion then began to regard the region as being significant as an undivided political and geographical unit, rather than as a convenient depot on the way to India as had previously been assumed in Russian strategic thinking.²⁴

By the end of the seventeenth century Russia had established economic, cultural, and political relations with Persia, China, Central Asia, and there had been

sporadic contacts with India.²⁵ Terentiev²⁶ informs us that the Bukharans, as merchants and missionaries, appeared in Siberia as early as its settlement.^c They became closely involved with the Siberian tribes, helped them in managing their economic affairs, and as a result they became influential. Until 1834 the Bukharans were the most privileged merchants in Siberia and the steppe, and they were the only investors. For the purpose of promoting economic activities, the Russian administration exempted them from paying any tariffs or taxes. Russia since the beginning of her conquest of Siberia avoided doing any thing to hinder the Bukharans' enterprise, but left them to continue their economic and missionary activities among the Tatar tribes; Aial, Baram, Tchat, and others, who were under Russian administrative control, were thus at the same time under Bukharan economic influence²⁷. Russia was obliged to acquiesce in this situation due to the inadequacy of her communications with Siberia, which had to pass through the tundra and forest zones, which rendered them slow and difficult, thus severely impeding her trade with Siberia;²⁸ whereas the routes between Siberia and her southern neighbours, the Bukharans, crossed comparatively less impassable desert. After stabilizing her authority and overcoming the difficulty of communications with Siberia in the late eighteenth century, Russia terminated all privileges that had been given to the Bukharans and confined commercial activities in Siberia to Russian merchants, thus cutting Central Asia off from a profitable market and source of raw materials. After centuries of Bukharan domination of Siberian economic activities, the Imperial Government, on February 12, 1834 put an end to Bukharan enterprise in all Russian administered ter-

^c The Bukharans here means all Central Asians including the Khivans, the Kokandis, the Turkomans, as well as the Bukharans themselves. Terentiev mentioned that all these nationalities were known in Russia as Bukharans and enjoyed the privileges that had been given to the Bukharan merchants for the purpose of fostering commerce in Siberia. The author mentioned interesting stories about rich Russians merchants who registered themselves as Bukharans to enjoy the privileges which were granted to the Bukharans and to avoid the payment of taxes. See Terentiev, *Rossiia i Angliia v Borbe za Rynki*, (St. Petersburg 1876), pp. 15-17.

ritories. On that date the Emperor ratified a resolution by the Government Council to limit these privileges to Russian merchants, and restrict Bukharan undertakings to certain cities where they should be registered as Russian subjects, while Bukharans who were active in agriculture were subjected to heavy land taxes.²⁹

Phases of the Khanates' history

There were three seminal incidents which inaugurated the modern history of Central Asia, and radically affected the future development of the Khanates. The first was the Russian advance in Siberia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, already outlined, which resulted in a permanent Russian presence there and hindered the traditional Central Asian trade with the Siberian tribes. The Russian frontier was pushed east through Siberia little noticed due to the predominance in the migration of farmers, who came as individuals and small groups oppressed in their home land, who initially represented no external authority, and offered no threat of conflict or assimilation to the indigenous population. Despite the enormous territorial expansion that Russia achieved between the fall of Kazan (1552) and the fall of Ak Masjid (1853), her craving for expansion remained unsatisfied, for reasons which were essentially economic and demographic, rather than power-political.³⁰

The second episode was the conquest of Bukhara, Khorezm (Khiva), and the Turkomans' country by Nadir-Shah in 1740.^d Controlling these khanates for seven

^d. Nadir-Shah (1688-1747) was born in a small town called Destejerd in the province of Dereghez in Khorasan. Originally from a Turkoman tribe known as Kiriklu of the Afshars, part of which settled in northern Khorasan. He entered the service of Tahmasp II (Safavid) of Persia and at the beginning was known as Tahmasp-Quli Khan, but after his coronation he became known as "Nadir", which in Arabic means "rare". He distinguished himself in fighting the Afshars, his fellow tribesmen as well as Tatars, Uzbeks, and Turkomans. Nadir fought the Abdalis of Herat controlled Astrabad and Mazandaran. He fought successfully against the Ottomans who were in control of south-western Persia, and after a successful campaign in the Caucasus, advanced against Kablan Giray of Crimea in 1735. In 1736 he came to Mughan where governors and notables wanted to crown him as a king for his efforts that liberated Persia. He accepted the crown on condition that the Persians abandon
(continued...)

years (1740-1747), he destroyed not only their political status, but ruined their economy as well. After sacking Delhi, Nadir went so far as to probe the Ottomans in the west but found them too hard to conquer. Then he turned his ambitions to Central Asia. He devastated the region to the extent that some towns were totally destroyed, and later had to be reconstructed from their ruins. Bukhara was partially saved because her authorities surrendered the Khanate peacefully, recognising the futility of resistance³¹. Even Samarkand, the capital of Tamerlane, was completely desolated during his advance in 1740, and the remnants of the population, nearly 1,000 families, were forced to seek refuge in the citadel.³² The legacy which Nadir Shah left, in both India and Central Asia, was one of fatally weakened and inimically opposed dynasties.

The third development, the most devastating and long lasting, was the discovery of the new maritime trade route around the Cape of Good Hope to India in the fifteenth century, and the formation of British, French, and Dutch merchant companies a century later: in the long run this fundamental shift in economic activity notably weakened the old trade routes through Central Asia, a process which was finally completed by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Consequently, the Khanates gradually lost their international commercial importance, though they remained of vital and indeed increasing strategic importance to the emerging and rival

^d(...continued)

the Shi'a practices introduced by Ismail I, which contradicted Sunni (Orthodox) sect of his ancestors. In 1738 he entered Kandahar and reduced Ghazni, Kabul, Djalalabad, Lahore and entered Delhi in 1739. In 1740 he set out to Balkh and contacted Abul-Faidh, Khan of Bukhara, with whom he came to good terms, thus Bukhara was saved from imminent destruction. The same year witnessed the conquest of Khwarizm. Troubles that erupted in the Caucasus in 1741 necessitated another campaign, mainly against the Daghistanis this time. He entered Daghistan and remained there until 1743. His long stay in Daghistan led the Russians to speculate that he had plans against Northern Caucasus, and concentrated an army of 42,000 men to meet his advance. Nadir's Empire began to disintegrate as a result of the malpractices of his tax collectors, who caused a number of uprisings in several states of that vast, multi-national Empire. For more about his life vide Bartold, *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 611-623 and *Encyclopedia of Islam*.

European powers in the region, Russia and Great Britain.

Despite the irreversible decline that engulfed the region during this period, Russia's interest did not decline, indeed it increased. Central Asia represented, from the Russian point of view, both a vital strategic location for the advance towards India and the warm-water ports; and a region still considered valuable for its commercial resources and its communications with other Asian countries. In Russian policy, political and military purposes continued to exist side by side with the older economic interests.

Studying the political map of Central Asia at the beginning the nineteenth century, we find three Khanates instead of the numerous tiny Bekships which had existed during the eighteenth century scattered on the peripheries of the main Khanates.³³ The formation of three centralized khanates was a significant stage towards the unification of the whole region as one political entity.

The pre-Soviet history of the Central Asian Khanates can be divided into three periods of which the second forms the core of this work. The first period, from the second half of the fourteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, began with the breaking of the Mongol yoke, which resulted in a short period of prosperity under Tamerlane (1370-1405), who conquered the Golden Hord in a series of battles fought in northern Khwarizm. After the reign of Tamerlane (1336-1405), the steppe region was inhabited by a Turko-Mongol hord, which Muslim writers referred to as Uzbeks.³⁴ In the time of Abul-Khair Khan (1557-1598) the population of this horde split into two parts, one part remaining under the authority of Abul-Khair, who established himself as the master of the Syr Daria,³⁵ and preserved the name Uzbeks, while the other part, dissatisfied with the rule of Abul-Khair, migrated to the basin of the Chu river and Semirechie, and became known as Kazakhs.³⁶ They formed the Middle Horde and occupied the territory between Aktiubinsk and Semi-

palatinsk. Abul-Khair conquered Khwarizm in 1430/1431 and entered its capital Urgench, establishing his authority over the whole region, and suppressing the rivalries between the tribal chiefs. Existing cities flourished and others were built in this period, during which Samarkand became the capital of the whole region.³⁷

After the death of Abdullah Khan II, the last of the Shaibanid rulers, the Astrakhanid or Janid dynasty (1599-1737) assumed control of the whole *Maveraunnahr*^e region; they added political disintegration to the unavoidable economic and cultural decline of both Bukhara and Khiva in the seventeenth century. In addition to these political factors, the region suffered grievously from natural disasters, such as the shift of the course of the Amu Daria to empty itself in the Aral sea instead of the Caspian, in the second half of the sixteenth century, which deprived the western regions of their only source of irrigation³⁸. Furthermore, the deviation of the river stripped the region of its role as intermediary between the East and the West, for it deprived the region of a vital water-way that had served to connect its trade with the Caucasus, with western Persia through the Caspian sea, and with the Russian market through the Caspian and the river Volga. These factors were accompanied by the rise of Russia's power and ambitious activities in the region, partly intended to offset the British gains in India. While the rest of the Muslim World was variably touched by the explosive force of European influences, Central Asia entered the modern era as a backward region, for two closely inter-connected reasons: firstly, its remote location and economic decline, and secondly, Russia's colonial ambitions and the spread of Russian influence in the region.

In the fifteenth century Shaibani Khan, the nephew of Abul-Khair, united all the Uzbeks and other Turko-Mongol tribes under his authority, dominating Bukhara, Khorezm, Ferghana, Khorasan, Samarkand, and Balkh. But after the death of Shai-

^e. This word literally means "the region beyond the river" (Amu Daria river) in Arabic, and it is known that Arab geographers first gave this name to the whole of the region extending between the Oxus and Jaxartes.

bani Khan in a battle against Shah Ismail of Persia in 1510, the Uzbek government split again into two states: one in Khorezm with its capital in Urgench, later moved to the city of Khiva so that the Khanate itself became known as Khiva too, while the other part continued to be known as Bukhara.³⁹ By the end of the eighteenth century a third Khanate known as Kokand began to emerge and consolidate its power in the Ferghana valley from 1798 under the "Min" dynasty. The history of the emergence of Kokand as an independent Khanate was dominated by endless disputes with Bukhara around the Bekships of Khojent, Ura-Tiube, and Tashkand. From the 1840s Kokand became the target of the Russian expansion and the Khanate faded entirely from the political map as an independent entity in 1876 and, after the reduction of Bukhara and the fall of Khiva, became known merely as the Ferghana valley.⁴⁰

The second period in the Khanates' history, which constitutes the core of this study, extends from the beginning of the nineteenth century until 1885, the year of the last major extension of Russian territory, following the Penjdeh affair, in which Russia confronted Great Britain in Asia for the first time since the Crimean War. This phase was marked mainly by despotic rule, rivalry, and continuous inter-Khanate wars. Besides the lack of unity and the internal conflicts between the governors (Beks) of the counties (vilayets) and different clans and tribes, the three Khanates busied themselves with feudal wars against each other instead of facing the tide of Russian expansion.⁴¹ The three Khanates entered the nineteenth century under different and antagonistic dynasties⁴² and the whole of the region "stood lowest of all Muslim lands on the cultural scale".⁴³ But it would be inaccurate to assume, as some Russian historians claim, that Russia found in Central Asia nothing but barbarism; on the eve of the Russian conquest the Khanates had undoubtedly reached a level of development higher than that of a century earlier:

Khiva and Samarkand were once more considerable cities..., the Khanates of Khiva and Kokand could boast of a more animated activity in the field of

culture, literature (especially historiography)... For the first time Ferghana had become the centre of a large state, which embraced nearly the entire basin of the Sir-Daria... After an interval of several centuries, the colonizing movement towards the steppe was revived and agriculture was resumed under the protection of Kokand fortifications.⁴⁴

In Central Asia, during the first half of the nineteenth century, internal and external trade relations continued to develop so that some cities such as Bukhara, Samarkand, Karshi, Tashkand, and others became once again important centres of regional trade.⁴⁵ Western contemporary observers regarded Russia's victims as countries "well peopled, fertile, rich, and civilized, and whose inhabitants were not in accord with the conquering power in race, religion, and language".⁴⁶ Much more on this period will be found in the following chapters.

The third period runs from the incorporation of Penjdeh in 1885 until 1924 and the disappearance of the last vestiges of Central Asian autonomy. This was a period of increasing Russian domination, which became total after 1924. The main features of this period were the increasing predominance of Russian culture, the destruction of historic names and traditions, the increasing isolation of the whole region from the rest of the world and its conversion into an internal market and source of raw materials for the Russian economy. This process, begun under the Tsars, was completed by the incorporation of the region into the Soviet economy; thereafter the historic peoples of the region were subjected to severe religious oppression, cultural assimilation, and the imposition of an alien ideology which sought to destroy the traditional bases of Muslim society. The present work is not, however, addressed to this tragic period in the history of these once proud and independent peoples.

Intensification of the Russian advance

The beginning of the nineteenth century witnessed the first combined Franco-

Russian attempt against India,^f however when France lost interest in the venture, Russia assumed the task individually, with the prevailing assumption that "what the Alexander of two thousand years ago did, with hosts possibly not less numerous than the armies of modern days, surely the Alexander^g of to-day can do also".⁴⁷ The failure of these ambitions convinced Russia of the necessity of establishing herself in Central Asia in order to turn the region into a power base, from which to threaten and disquiet the British in India and to influence their stand in Europe. Unable to expand further in Europe, and meeting the resistance of other European powers in her designs against the Ottoman Empire, Russia turned to play the game in eastern lands, where weaker nations and "backward" tribes seemed to wait her rule in utter helplessness.⁴⁸ This long process began with measures directed towards the amplification of Russia's trade with Central Asia and Persia, which in turn was held to necessitate commanding their trade routes and consequently, led her by no means reluctantly into conflict with the governments of the region, over the protection of trade caravans. These tactics, at first apparently commercial, developed through manipulation of the manifest weakness of and rivalries between the Khanates, towards the ultimate goal of subjugation. The liquidation of the Middle and Lesser Hordes in 1822 and 1824 brought Russia to a stronger position in this direction, and was followed by the construction of a series of advanced outposts to the south of Orenburg: Kokchetav and Karkaralinsk in 1824, Bayan-Aul in 1826, and Sirgiopol in 1831.

The 1830s were noteworthy for the erection of more advanced forts, the most important among which was Novo-Aleksandrovskoe on the Mangishlak peninsula on the eastern coast of the Caspian in 1834. These efforts constituted a quick response

^f. This issue will be discussed in detail in chapter five, "The Russian Threat to British India".

^g Tsar Alexander I, 1801-1825.

to mounting British political influence in Afghanistan, which was in itself a reaction to claims laid by the Persian Government to Afghan territories as far east as Ghizni and Herat. As Lord Tenterden reported:

The success of the Shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia, and their Minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution. Herat once annexed to Persia may become, according to the Commercial Treaty, the residence of a Russian Consular Agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan.⁴⁹

The 1840s saw the erection of still more strategic bulwarks in the heart of the steppe; Karabutak, and the Ural forts between the Aral Sea and Orsk on the river Irghiz, and the Orenburg Fort on the Turgai river. These forts marked a solid step towards commanding the long-coveted line of the Syr Daria. Russia's efforts in this direction began to show their effects in India, and were among the factors which led Auckland,^h Governor-General of India, to endeavour to turn Afghanistan into a more solid barrier against possible Russian attempts on India. The disastrous outcome of that campaign encouraged Russia to pursue even more vigorously her "forward policy" in Central Asia.

At this stage the British were not too alarmist about the Russian outposts on the Aral and the Syr Daria, regarding them as points from which the local populations could be kept in check and accustomed to the presence of Russian control. But it was clearly understood that those military posts could also afford to Russia in the future points on which she could rely in any movement of military forces from Orenburg towards the south.⁵⁰

^h. George Eden, First Earl of Auckland (1784-1849), succeeded Lord William Bentinck as Governor-General of India. To check the Russian political and commercial activities in Central Asia, he sent Alexander Burnes to Kabul in 1837, the same year when Vitkeivich was there. Dost Muhammad received the envoy courteously, but when he found that the English had no idea of helping him to recover Peshawar from the Sikhs, he dismissed him from his court. This incident was behind Auckland's adoption of a policy aimed at dethroning Dost Muhammad and reinstating Shah Shuja', dethroned for more than twenty years. This policy led to the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1839.

In the second quarter of the nineteenth century Russia's emissaries, secret and public, military and civil, were reconnoitring the region, exploring and collecting strategic data or negotiating with influential parties in Central Asia, while at the same time she was busy subjugating the steppe region and establishing herself on the shores of the Aral Sea and at the mouth of the Syr Daria, under the pretext of securing her trade routes and protecting her trade caravans. Russia's drive southward in the steppe region was relatively easy due to the continuous wars between the Golden and the Little Hordes. Nonetheless, the gradual penetration of the Cossacks into the steppes provoked turbulent resistance from the Kazakh and Kirghiz tribes, who tried to defend their pasture lands against the expanding colonization of Russia's Cossacks. The Kazakhs' struggle against the military administrations of western Siberia and Orenburg lasted nearly for half a century (1802-1847) under the leadership of Kenesary Kasimov, who was finally beheaded by Russian officers, and his head sent to Grand Duke (Kniaz) Gorchakov.⁵¹

The later 1840s witnessed the resumption of Russian military action in the region, this time against the Khanate of Kokand, which was accused of spreading disorder among the Kirghiz after the failure of the Khivan campaign of 1839. This new policy, against Kokand, revealed an important revision of Russian strategy: the unsuccessful expedition against Khiva in 1839 had convinced Perovskii,⁵² Governor-General of Orenburg, that the most favourite route to Khiva lay, not across the desert, but through the fertile lands of Kokand and Bukhara. Thus was the fate of these proud and ancient Khanates sealed.

In contrast to British activities in the region, which were restricted to sporadic political communications, Russian ventures in Central Asia were from the outset more aggressive and acquisitive despite the setback European Russia suffered in the Crimean War. Russia's military concentration against Turkey and in the Black Sea did not deter her from making considerable addition to her naval force in the

Caspian Sea and indeed may be said to have encouraged it.⁵³ Russia launched vigorous military and diplomatic assaults in Central Asia throughout the period of her Black Sea preoccupation, between 1845 and 1859. These years witnessed the subjugation of a number of strategic posts formally controlled by Kokand, such as Raim (Raimsk, 1847), Kazala (Kazalinsk or Fort No. 1, 1847) and Ak-Masjid (Fort Perovskii, 1853), all on the lower Syr Daria. Russia's advance was "however" not as easy as it had been in the steppe, her military success being much more costly, and largely due to the "superiority of their rifles over the weapons of the Kokanese, and also to the assistance of a small piece of rifled artillery".⁵⁴ An Italian eye-witness of Cherniaev's advance against Kokand mentioned that his expedition was assisted by ships from the Aral flotilla that accompanied his army by way of the Syr Daria to within thirty miles of Tashkand.⁵⁵

On the front of Semirechie the advance was correspondingly successful. On this line Russia conquered the vast region from Semipalatinsk down to Aiaguz (1845-47), Kopal (1847), and Almata (Fort Vernoe, 1854). On the diplomatic front Russia, between 1857 and 1859, dispatched three missions to four courts: N. P. Ignatiev⁵⁶ in 1858 was dispatched to Khiva and Bukhara; Captain Chokan Valikhanov⁵⁷ (1835-1865) to Kashgar; and Ia. V. Khanykov⁵⁸ to Herat in 1858-59. These important missions will be discussed in greater detail in chapter II, below. Ignatiev's mission was mainly dedicated to studying British activities in Central Asia, to obtain first hand intelligence about the area, and to survey possible routes leading from Bukhara and Khiva to India.⁵⁹

Russia inaugurated her advance along the Syr Daria by attacking Ak-Masjid in 1853, where Yakub Bek⁶⁰ led the heroic defence of the fort. He was friendly to England and his resistance caused the Russians some dismay. Later, in 1865, he led the famous Kashgar rebellion against the Chinese, where he secured for himself the throne "under the pretext of being the general of Buzruk Khan".⁶¹ This later

uprising in Kashgar in 1865 alarmed the Russians, since Yakub Bek's advance northward, after taking control of Kashgar and Yarkand, menaced their positions in Semirechie. These developments, from Russia's point of view, looked like the spread of British influence and threatened Russian communications with Western Siberia. To stop the insurrection from spreading to the north, Kaufmann ordered in June 1871 the occupation of the Ili valley and the Kuldja district as a precautionary measure against Yakub Bek. The defeat of Yakub Bek by the Chinese, in 1877, led to the restoration of the province of Kuldja to China;⁶² but in the meanwhile these adventures and upheavals had clearly signalled the onset of open competition between Russia and Britain in central Asia.

Origins of the Anglo-Russian rivalry

Russia's conquests had become increasingly threatening to Great Britain, the only European power whose interests in inner Asia came into direct conflict with Russia's own, and whose strength might be sufficient to deter Russia's ambition and arrest her advance. Until the Penjdeh incident of March 18, 1885, which brought both powers to the verge of war, neither the Russian politicians in St. Petersburg nor her Generals in Asia had any clear idea where to stop; instead, one acquisition of territory led to another, without appreciation of how far "annexation strengthens or weakens her", and evidently, as the British perceived it, devoid of "plausible conjectures as to how, when, and where the process of expansion is to stop".⁶³ By the early forties Russia had acquired exclusive control over the Caspian Sea and established paramount influence in Persia, which according to an informed British observer, Sir Harford Jones, "was delivered, bound hand and foot, to the Court of St. Petersburg" after the Treaty of Turkomanchi in 1828.⁶⁴ Ironically throughout her drive in Central Asia Russian opinion complained about the ubiquitous Britain, which was said to appear on every side "with her treaty rights or prior claims",

erecting "one barrier after another in the way of Russian progress".⁶⁵

While Russia was intriguing and instigating Persia to conquer Herat under Russian protection, and dispatching her officials in diplomatic missions to Kabul, activities that led to the war between England and Afghanistan in 1839,⁶⁶ Britain had maintained the hope that Russia had reached the limit of her natural expansion in Asia. The British hoped that their relations with Russia could be placed on a stable and permanent footing, so that

their rivalry will henceforth be confined to their mutual promotion of peace and civilization in their respective spheres. Cordially aiding each other in this philanthropic aim, they may effect much good, and mutually benefit their own interests.⁶⁷

This British desire for an accommodation with Russia's expansion, gave the latter a rare opportunity to exercise a free hand in Central Asia, for that aspiration pacified British public opinion, and created the conditions for that political course known as the policy of "masterly inactivity".⁶⁸ This policy continued throughout the 1860s, despite the increasing apprehension of the members of the Calcutta school of politicians, who were aware of Russia's ambition and believed that she

never made a treaty without obtaining a fresh territory, or acquiring the exercise of rights over new provinces which have ever proved the inevitable precursors of annexation.⁶⁹

Thus British policy during the decisive 1860s tended to disregard Russia's rudimentary political practices, evident in all her proceedings in Central Asia, which routinely exhibited her tendency to handle all events with a view to the "moment when circumstances may combine to afford a safe opportunity for further advance".⁷⁰

Russian historians of the twentieth century have described all this Russian activity as a process of gradual penetration of Russian elements into Central Asia, beginning in the time of Peter the Great. The Russian determination to dominate this region, the cradle of Empires, which lies between China, the Middle East, and

Europe, was apparent. This process took one hundred and fifty years of continuous and irreversible advance, during which forts were built in Kazakhstan and a "defence line" marked out and strengthened to defend the new acquisitions.⁷¹ As the name of this line indicates it was never acknowledged as a border line by Russia: the forts which were built on it were not for its demarcation or protection, for it was never attacked, but to extend Russian power, authority, and influence, and to accustom the neighbouring tribes to her presence. This line was continuously pushed forward, till by the middle of the nineteenth century the Russian borders had reached those of Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand, and by the 1880s adjoined Afghanistan.



Said Muhammad Khudayar, Khan of Kokand

Chapter Two

RUSSIAN POLICY AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE KHANATES

Her long line of frontier is devious, and not always thoroughly defined; it wanders along the crest of mountains, is marked sometimes by the course of rivers, and occasionally almost lost in pathless desert. (*Quarterly Review*, 1877)

Rivalry and conflict between the Uzbek Khanates

The Khanates strove to improve their relations with Russia often at the expense of their relations with each other; in other words, each tried during its struggle against the others to draw individually nearer to Russia. Their relations with Russia were thus dictated by their animosity towards each other, and as a result of misjudging the full extent of Russia's ambitions, they failed to develop any form of regional political, economic, or military co-operation to face Russia's encroachment. Turkey and England were the most interested in maintaining the independence of these states in the face of Russian expansion. Turkey, frequently sent envoys to reconcile Kokand and Bukhara, while all Khivan envoys returning from Istanbul delivered to the Khivan Khan the Sultan's advice to end his war against the Merv Turkomans, and join Bukhara and Kokand against Russia. British envoys also tried to secure a degree of unity against the Russian advance.¹

The lack of realization on the part of successive Khans that they had to fight against an external power intrinsically different from themselves in every respect was at the root of their failure to apprehend the common danger, and led them to allow their old patterns of internal rivalries to absorb their energies until it was too late to take a different course. The Khanates failed to unite around the strong anti-Russian religious and national sentiments that their people demonstrated when facing the Rus-

sian troops. They realized very late that they ought to act according to a common feeling against the Russian advance and infiltration.² Internal affairs in each Khanate were similar to its external relations. A change of Amir or the transfer of power from one Khan to his successor was usually accompanied by attempts by provincial officials to secure their own independence.³ Thus the governors of parasite political formations such as Dzhizak, Zaamin, Pieshgar, Urmitan, Ura-Tepe and others repeatedly engaged in alliances and intrigues against their parent government. Thus the situation of the Central Asian states can be characterized as dominated by lack of cohesion, and torn by internal wars that diverted them from an objective evaluation of the Russian encroachment.

Since the thirties of the nineteenth century, Russia had been monitoring these regional antagonisms and employed them in her political designs. Investigating the controversial relations between these Khanates, the Russian government was able cautiously to begin driving wedges between them. As Zhukovskii observed:

It was impossible not to pay attention to the existing discrepancies between the Bukharan and the Khivan governments, which were ready to erupt into open war. About this the Bukharan messenger Balta Quly Bek, who arrived in Orenburg in 1830 spoke openly. He was authorized to request the Russian Emperor to assist in putting an end to Khivan impudence.⁴

The road to Bukhara and Khiva saw all kinds of missions avowed and clandestine, diplomatic and military, scientific and commercial. The Russian agents penetrated the Khanates utilizing every possible camouflage, according to *Blackwoods* even as petty traders, professing themselves Jews.⁵ Russia's designs were assisted by the negative and hostile relations that prevailed among the Khanates of Central Asia, who under the pressure of their jealousy and competition with each other, tried individually to seek Russia's consent and benevolence.⁶ Russia attentively investigated the issue of inter-Khanate relations, and sent several official envoys to both Khiva and Bukhara, who confirmed the prevalence of irreconcilable antagonism among the Khanates.⁷ In this milieu Bukhara endeavoured to enhance its commercial ties with

Russia, and sent in July 1836 a second messenger to Orenburg,⁸ to negotiate friendship, and to improve political-commercial relations. But Russia, at that time, was overwhelmed by pacifying the steppe, stabilizing her position in the newly conquered territories, and pushing her borders southward there. So on this occasion the Bukharan envoy returned without achieving any tangible results.⁹ During the early 1830s the attitude of St. Petersburg toward Khiva had been influenced by accusations in regard to alleged Khivan provocation of disaffection and disorder among the nomads of the steppe over whom Russia claimed nominal authority, and by plunder in the steppe which was attributed to Khiva as well. The Kirghiz, who were the source of dissension between the two governments, actually were less stirred by Khivan projects, than by the corruption and misconduct of the Russian officials. These allegations were fabricated in order to provide a justification for Russian policy which would conceal its real motives aimed at expanding her commercial and political influence to dominate the region. In this regard General Cherniaev¹⁰ openly acknowledged that:

the Khivans did not excite the Kirghiz to rebellion, on the contrary, they were made to rebel by the introduction of the regulations composed under the supervision of the Ministry of War... When the Cossack detachments were sent out to put down these disturbances, the Kirghiz threw the blame on the distant Khivans, and the officials accepted these excuses to cover their own mistakes. In this way the idea grew up at St. Petersburg of the instigation of the Kirghiz by the Khivans, who had no thought for foreign undertakings when they could scarcely maintain themselves at home against the Turkomans. We must remember, too, this fact, that when we are quiet our neighbours are quiet, but as soon as we excite the discontent of our own Kirghiz, some of our neighbours are immediately found to be to blame.¹¹

Monitoring early Russia's activities in the region through her frequent envoys to Central Asian Khanates, the Khivan Khan felt that his country's relations with Russia were deteriorating, because of the lack of trade agreement, and mainly as a result of allegations of Khivan activities to instigate rebellion among the Kirghiz tribes in the steppe. But Russia's real motives lay far beyond the Kirghiz question, mainly in jealousy and desire to encounter British activities against Afghanistan. Perovskii's¹² expedition of 1839 was already in preparation. So the Khan sought

support from Bukhara, and proposed the formation of a coalition to confront the Russian threats and ambitions. However Bukhara in these years of trade prosperity with Russia did not wish to go for extremes in policy, so the Amir of Bukhara refused the offer.¹³

The same allegation, i.e. stirring the Kirghiz, was also made against Kokand. The Russo-Kokandian rivalry for the domination of the Kirghiz steppes was thought to have reached such magnitude that Russia should either abandon the steppes or force the Kokandis out.¹⁴ Meanwhile the internal situation in Kokand was not coherent and affected by two factors: the Uzbek intrigues, and wars with Bukhara. Russia in this environment was naturally encouraged to strike. Thus during the forties Perovskii advanced along the Syr Daria to regain his lost laurels after his disastrous expedition against Khiva in 1839. Several small forts to the east and north-east of the Aral sea were conquered:¹⁵ Turgai and Irghiz (1845), Raim (Aralskoe), and Kazala (Kazalinsk or Fort No. 1) in 1847.¹⁶ By the year 1857, the Russian line along the Syr-Daria river consisted of four Forts: Kazala (Kazalinsk), Fort Karmakchi (Fort No. 2), Ak-Masjid (Fort Perovsk or fort No. 3) which fell to Perovskii after the second attempt in 1853, and the fourth was Julek. Subsequently General Cherniaev, commander of the Russian army, took advantage of the prevailing hostile relations between Bukhara and Kokan, contacted Nasrullah,^a the Bukharan Amir, taking advantage of the prevailing bostile relations between Bukhara and Kokand, and invited him to a partition of Kokand, Bukhara taking the south and Russia the north. The Bukharan Amir was ill disposed to this offer, not out of solidarity but because he believed the whole of the

^a. Nasrullah (1826-1860) was well known for his brutality. After the death of his father, Amir Haidar, he assassinated his brothers to be the only heir of the throne. In the 1840's he invaded Kokand captured its ruler Muhammad Ali (Madali Khan) (1821-1842) and executed him together with his two sons and pregnant wife. During his reign from 1826 to 1860 he tortured and killed unspecified numbers of his people and foreigners, among whom two British officers, Conolly and Stoddart, who came to Bukhara to assist the Khanate in face of the Russian avalanche. Ironically he was known in his own country as the Amir "Qassab" or the butcher. See *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, v. 2, p. 166.

Khanate should belong to him.¹⁷ The Bukharan Amir was the only one among the Central Asian sovereigns who claimed an authority and rights extending over the whole of Turkestan. Earlier history of relations between the Khanates give evidence of the Amir's intentions. Bukhara had conquered Kokand in 1842 and killed its ruler, Madali Khan (Mohammad Ali, 1821-1842) and his sons. Kokand regained her independence under Khudayar Khan (1845-1858 and 1865-1875).¹⁸ Disregarding the Russian invasion, and the fall of a considerable number of Kokandian cities, Bukhara and Kokand continued to dispute the cities of Tashkand and Turkestan which were themselves under Russian threat as well. Bukharan-Kokandian relations were unremittingly hostile throughout the nineteenth century, and history bears no instance of cooperation between the two countries.

As a result of the Crimean War the Russian advance was curtailed for the next few years, and Fort Julek remained the farthest point of the Russian advance. Crippled in the Black sea, Russia turned for compensation to Central Asia, where she concentrated her political, military, and economic energies without provoking much in the way of opposition from Britain.¹⁹ The new political course was inaugurated in 1858 by General Katenin's and Annenkov's plan^b for the unification of the Orenburg and Siberian frontier lines, by the construction of a line of fortifications from the Aral sea to the Irtysh that would lead to the annexation of vast Kokandian territories as well as the large cities of Turkestan, Tashkand.²⁰ The grandiose military project derived its origin from a proposal put in front of the Government in 1853 by General Gosfordt (Hosford), Governor-General of West Siberia, the realization of which would necessitate an advance of about 1000 km in Kokandian territory. General Gosfordt initiated this plan by suggesting to his superiors that the two lines were hanging in the air leaving a wide undefended gap between them. His idea was widely approved

^b. General Katenin, A. A. was the Governor-General of Orenburg from 1857 until 1860. Their plan was based on Gosfordt's (Hosfordt) plan for the same purpose which will be alluded to later in this chapter.

among the military and sanctioned by St. Petersburg though its execution was delayed.²¹ The accumulating situation after the Crimean War, and the need for securing alternative supplies of cotton, which suddenly became acute during the American Civil War, necessitated the realization of Gosfordt's plan against Kokand in the early 1860s: General Cherniaev advanced from Vernyi to storm Aulie Ata, while simultaneously Colonel Verevkin advanced from Perovsk against Turkestan and took it. The Russian progress against Kokand led to wide-spread predictions among observers that Bukhara and Khiva were entirely at the mercy of Russia, and would probably be conquered as well.²² Oddly Bukhara and Khiva did not share that apprehension. After the conquest of part of Kokand, the Russian Government announced that it did not intend to make any further advances in that direction, but this assurance was soon followed by the conquest of Tashkand in May 1865, yet another declaration that they did not intend to annex it but to "form it with the adjacent territory, into an independent state".²³ Later of course it was incorporated into the Turkestan Province which had been formed in February 1865. Vamberg described the Khanates' relations as

so far from giving each other any mutual support in the moment of peril, would by their dissension furnish the common enemy with the very best arms against themselves. Khiva and Khokand are then to be regarded as the constant enemies of Bukhara: still Bukhara does not look for any serious danger in those quarters, and the only rival that she really fears in Central Asia is one that day by day is becoming more formidable to her - Afghanistan.²⁴

These intense inter-Khanate rivalries were not modified even after the fall of many of Kokand's strategic cities into Russia's hands. The Amir of Bukhara continued his aggressive policy in the critical mid sixties, and occupied Gissar, Kuliab, Dainau, and Karategin.²⁵ In face of Bukharan aggression, Khudayar Khan of Kokand sought assistance from General Abramov against Muzaffar. Abramov could not let slip this unique opportunity of posing as a judge between his enemies, and wrote to the Amir advising "friendship towards the friends of Russia and enmity towards her enemies".²⁶ This cynical advice amounted to saying that national solidarity among

the Uzbeks should not be the ruling criterion in the relations among the Khanates, but that Russia's attitude should be consulted, and Russia's interest should be advanced.

Thus the history of the Khanates' relations was a history of a series of disputes and battles. These internecine conflicts, as the *Quarterly Review* observed in the critical year 1865, had "raged with varying intensity and in more ways than one facilitated the Russian advance".²⁷ Accordingly Russia took advantage of the prevailing discord and dealt with each Khanate separately. Even in time of war with one Khanate, Russia managed to preserve neutral, if not good, relations with the others. This policy proved to be successful during the Russian invasion of Kokand in 1853 until the fall of Tashkand in 1865, when Khiva preferred to promote her trade interests with Russia, and in the mid-sixties when the Bukharan army simultaneously attacked Kokand when she was combating the Russians.²⁸ Nasrullah attacked Kokand for the second time in 1865, when the Khanate was the target of the Russian invasion, and confiscated all its guns, leaving it nearly disarmed in face of Russia.²⁹ Later in 1866, when the Bukharan forces were engaged against the Russian troops around Ura-Tepe and Dzhizak, Khiva again refused the Amir's invitation to join in a confederation against Russia.³⁰ Khiva at this time brought the Yomud Turkomans under her sway.³¹ The same attitude was repeated afterward during Russia's invasion of Bukhara in 1868, other Khanates remained neutral.³² Kokand was no exception, for she demonstrated the same hostile attitude and acted similarly, for instance the Government of Kokand willfully supplied the Russians, who were engaged against Bukhara, with corn at prices "under the circumstances remarkably moderate".³³ The Khanates relations deteriorated to the extent that Khudayar Khan of Kokand sent an envoy to congratulate Kaufmann on his victory over Bukhara, and in 1868 the same envoy returned in the same year to applaud the Russian defeat of the Bukharan army at Zerbolak.³⁴

The Bukharan relations with Russia even after 1868 were mostly motivated

by the desire of the Amir to weaken his regional rivals. Nasrullah, the Amir of Bukhara, had agreed on the partition of Khiva together with Russia.³⁵ In 1871 Amir Muzaffar, the successor of Nasrullah, demonstrated the same stand adopted by Kokand earlier when he assured Struve, Kaufmann's envoy, of his willingness to provide the Russian troops advancing against Khiva with supply and free passage through Bukhara's territories.³⁶ Again in 1873 the Bukharan ruler hastened to supply with food the Russian detachment which had run short of provisions during the Khivan campaign, and even provided the advancing army with extra supply to leave them a margin of support.³⁷ Kaufmann wrote to the Amir saying, "the friendly and liberal hospitality shown by you to the troops of the Great White Tsar obliges me to express to you my heartfelt acknowledgement".³⁸ Notwithstanding this effusiveness, Bukharan collaboration did not prevent Russia from imposing a second humiliating treaty upon her in 1873, directly after the subjugation of Khiva.

The internal situation of each Khanate was often no better than the relations between the Khanates. Desperate and chronic struggle and intrigues between the throne and the aristocrats exhausted the Khanates and dominated the internal atmosphere, though these struggles began in Bukhara later than in both Khiva and Kokand as a result of the Amir's position among the *Ulema*.³⁹ Nasrullah as well as Muzaffar his successor laboured to liquidate the authority of corrupt aristocrats and profane Beks. Both Amirs, assisted by the *Ulema*, laboured to unite all provinces and bekships under the sway of the central government and put an end to feudal ravaging wars.⁴⁰ Other Khanates were the scene of similar disturbances caused by Beks and governors of large cities who strived to gain independence.

Russian policy and the moving frontiers

Monitoring Russia's fluid boundaries in the steppe region, the observer would find them forming series of parallel lines defended by forts leaving the inter-

mediate spaces wholly without protection;⁴¹ even the territories between the old and the new border lines were unprotected, and frequently were the scene for inroads against Russian caravans. Russia used to blame Khiva and Kokand for fomenting disorder within her domains, while at the same time uninterruptedly advancing her frontier to the Jaxartes and claiming,

a right to the country lying immediately north of the Jaxartes, from the Aral to Ag-Masjid, in virtue of a treaty concluded some time in the last century with one of the rulers of Turkestan.⁴²

Thus was Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary, advised by his man on the spot, while *Blackwoods* commented that Russian policy was based on the principle of "protection leading to subjection".⁴³ Her policy was characterized as slow but sure, and "has ever been, and would still seem to be, aggressive".⁴⁴ The Russian treatment of all subjugated nations, civilized or savage, settled or nomadic, began as a "humanitarian" protection which was developed into allegiance, then into subjection, until it reached its ultimate phase: complete subjugation and assimilation. "Her steps were slow but were attended with results and were always carefully planned with the view of securing what had already been attained".⁴⁵

Regarding the frontier issue, Tsarist diplomacy exploited the uncertain situation and considered the lack of demarcated boundaries in the region as beneficial to Russia, and delayed as long as possible the demarcation of her boundaries.⁴⁶ Britain's opinion, as reflected in *Blackwoods*, was clear:

The lines of steppe and the forts along it are not to be considered as fixed establishments; but the frontier is to be gradually extended as the regime is propagated and embraces more distant portions of the tribes.⁴⁷

Russia took advantage of the fact that her policy in the steppe region, during the nineteenth century, was not challenged by any other power, and was stimulated by easy annexation, and the success of the policy of intrigue which deliberately instigated animosity between the Kirghiz Sultans and tribes. These tactics towards the Kirghiz⁴⁸ led Russia to the construction of a line of military forts in the heart of the steppe.

This line however could not be considered as Russia's frontier as it was not formally demarcated and was designed to exercise powerful influence on the nomads beyond the Russian-controlled territory.⁴⁹

The boundaries of the Khanates were not demarcated either. Among the Khanates, this was the source of endless feudal wars, which exhausted their economy, ruined cities, and destroyed agriculture and irrigation systems in many episodes.⁵⁰ Russian policy throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, exploited the absence of defined boundaries to facilitate its practices and promote its designs in the region:

It was not only the three Khanates which had no stable frontiers; none of the countries surrounding them had it either. Persia disputed Khorasan and Herat not only with Khorezm but with Afghanistan. The latter in addition disputed Balkh, Gissar, Kuliab, Badakhshan and the Pamir vilayet⁵¹ with Bukhara.⁵²

This situation was favoured by Russian diplomacy as long as the lack of fixed boundaries in the area was in accord with designs; thus Russia avoided not only demarcation but negotiating the issue as well.⁵³ Even though Russia's boundaries up to the early forties of the century were along the Emba river, Orenburg officials aspired to reach Syr Daria and establish their authority over the whole region between the Emba and that river in order to be adjacent to Khiva and Kokand. Later she claimed right over both sides of the river. In their reply to Kaufmann's letter to the Khivan Khan on December 1, 1867, the Khivans insisted that Russia had no rights on the left side of the Syr Daria:

Your statement that both sides of the Syr Daria belong to your rule is apparently an infringement of previous treaties, since the southern side of the Syr Daria belongs to us. If on the southern side of the Syr Daria, rebels disturb caravans, we will put them down; but if they attack the caravans on the other side of the Syr Daria, that is your business.⁵⁴

In this letter the Khivans required from the Russian administration in Tashkand an undertaking to respect the existing treaties. The Russians denied the existence of any such treaties.⁵⁵ Kaufmann withheld the reply, stationed his troops

along the Kuvan Daria and Yani Daria rivers and refused to evacuate the left side of the Syr-Daria. This incident is a good example of the Russian policy of exploiting its undefined borders, and reflects clearly enough the methods Russia followed in relations with her neighbours. Thus in a sense, the Russian boundaries could be held to extend wherever the nomadic Kirghiz pitched their tents.

Kaufmann began in 1867 a correspondence with the Khan of Kokand, the ostensible purpose of which was the settlement of trade issues. In the course of these communications, the Khan sent an envoy to Tashkand to negotiate the issue of the borders between Russia's domains and the Khanate. Kaufmann carefully abstained from considering this matter to be part of the negotiations, justifying his position by appealing to:

the absence of certain geographical and ethnological data, ..., in order that the final settlement might not afterwards be complicated by any previous decisions adverse to Russian interests.⁵⁶

Clearly he hoped to preserve that vague situation and keep the door open for further advance. Kaufmann insisted on the conclusion of the peace treaty and trade agreement without discussing the question of boundary demarcation.⁵⁷

Russia exploited the policy of undefined boundaries even after subjugating the Khanates. After the conquest of Khiva in 1873, the boundary of Russia's possessions on the Caspian sea were left undefined to furnish the Caucasian troops with grounds to undertake another campaign against the Turkomans.⁵⁸

Russia's political missions to Central Asia: methods and purposes

Russian missions to the courts of Central Asia were not undertaken in order to resolve frontier disputes, since as we have seen the Russians had no interest in so doing, while their territory was never genuinely threatened by the Khanates; nor were they principally intended to promote commercial intercourse, though this may have been a fitting pretext. The main task of these missions was intelligence gathering,

economic, topographical, political, and military. In addition they pursued another purpose which was as important as the others, i.e. sowing intrigues and inflaming animosity between the Khanates while seeking to attach them individually to Russia. In the long run, this strategy was designed to establish Russian ascendancy enabling Russia to overthrow such influence as Britain might seek to exercise there, and ultimately putting Russia in a fitting position to threaten an attack against India.

Usually the Russian envoys were not high level officials, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Orenburg Military Administration bestowed higher rank on them before their departure for Central Asia for the purpose of conducting talks, to facilitate their sojourn in the Khanates, and enable them to meet the highest dignitaries. For the purpose of strengthening Butenev's negotiations with Nasrullah, it was necessary to give the agent the title of messenger, supplied with the required authorization from the Russian Government.⁵⁹ This procedure was a common one in Russian policy with the countries of the region.

One of Russia's immediate objectives in the region was to eradicate any connection between the Khivans and the Kirghiz, an objective which Russia had long pursued, but talks with the Khivans in this regard did not bring about any substantial conclusions.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the Kirghiz themselves were against the idea of becoming Russian subjects.^c The Kirghiz issue emerged as a complicating factor, which contributed to the sparking of conflict with Kokand in 1851 and 1853.⁶¹ Subsequently Russia was forced to postpone her plans under the pressure of her deteriorating situation before and during the Crimean War: besides the Russians were still insufficiently informed and needed to complete their reconnaissance activities in the area. In

^c. Terentiev in his three volume-work *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii* tells fascinating stories about the Kirghiz resistance and objection to the idea of association with Russia. Nikiforov on his way to Khiva found it worth while to communicate with the Kirghiz elders and leaders in the steppe, thus in massive gatherings he listened to their opinions which reflected their aversion to the Russian procedures such as confiscating their land and imposing heavy taxes on them. Terentiev recorded in his work that they emphasized that they, as Muslims, cannot be subject to Russia. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, pp. 185-190.

spite of those earlier missions to which we now turn, they still had very little information about the situation inside the Central Asian governments, and about their mutual relations as well.⁶² However, these early missions are very instructive to the historian for what they reveal about the covert as well as the overt goals of Russian policy.

De Maizon's mission (1834)

Russian political activities in Central Asia at the beginning of the 19th century were marked by an observant attention towards the affairs of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand. The first missions to these Khanates was that of Alexander Feodorovich Negri (1784-1854) in 1820 to Bukhara. The outcome of this mission was a book titled *A Journey from St. Petersburg to Bukhara* by Baron Georgii Meiendorf, published in French in 1826.⁶³ In 1833 Perovskii, a 38-year old General, was appointed as Governor-General of Orenburg, Russia's operative post in the steppe, and the bastion that controlled all her communications with Central Asia. The new Orenburg administration began persistently to scrutinize every event that took place in Bukhara and Khiva. On September 26, 1833, shortly after his appointment as Governor-General of Orenburg, Perovskii wrote a letter to Rodofinikin,⁶⁴ head of the Asiatic department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he discussed urgent political and commercial concerns. He expressed his desire to receive reliable information about certain foreign activities, notably British, which he believed to be taking place in Central Asia.⁶⁵ In the same letter he expressed his worry about British commercial penetration of Central Asia. Perovskii also pointed out that not long ago two Englishmen visited the Khanates, William Moorcroft and George Trebek. So he suggested they send an envoy, not directly from the central Government, but from the local authorities of Orenburg to avoid publicity and other complications; in this way, the government would avoid large costs, and the envoy might hope to avoid undue scrutiny and suspicion on the part of the Bukharan government and population.⁶⁶ Perovskii's ideas

corresponded with the intentions of the Government, which was already attentively watching British activities in the region. It was preparing to expand commercial relations on the one hand, and endeavouring to exchange embassies with the Khanates on the other. For this task Perovskii in his letter suggested I. V. Vitkevich as envoy. He received from St. Petersburg Imperial consent to his proposal except that the Emperor did not see Vitkevich as a reliable person for such an important mission:⁶⁷ for this purpose it was crucial to choose a highly experienced and reliable official.⁶⁸ Perovskii was quick to find a suitable alternative figure: he was P. I. De Maizon. De Maizon had been born in the kingdom of Sardinia, and besides his oriental features, which would give him the advantage of being inconspicuous in carrying out his task, he had mastered Arabic, Persian, Tatar, and Russian, as well as French in which he later wrote his report. De Maizon was entrusted with the mission and received his list of instructions in October 1833. These instructions reveal the extent of Russia's interest in Central Asia. They revealed that Russia was not mainly interested in developing trade relations or freeing Russian subjects held captive in Khiva and Bukhara, but deeply concerned with obtaining intelligence that would facilitate extending her influence in those circles where final political decisions were taken.⁶⁹

An analytical investigation of De Maizon's mission, from the point of view of its design, the high level of authorization, and the statement of its objectives, reveals it as the first major Russian intelligence mission to the Central Asian Khanates in the nineteenth century. For De Maizon's assignment, Perovskii designed a list of priorities to which De Maizon was to pay attention. This list contained points that were concerned merely with the internal affairs of these Khanates on the one hand, and on the other points which clearly demonstrate tireless Russian efforts towards the subjugation of the Khanates.⁷⁰ This list of issues included a very wide range of concerns, which penetrated every sphere of life in these Khanates; political, military, economic, commercial, and ethnic. This list of issues, however, also demonstrates

almost total Russian ignorance of Central Asian affairs in the 1830s, touching subjects such as geography, trade, ruling elites, and the tribes of this region. It demonstrates as well Russian ignorance about the Khanates' foreign relations. Politically speaking, the instructors asked for detailed information ranging from the popular attitude towards the policies of the regime, to the calibre of the rulers of Bukhara, a task requiring a proficient and observant envoy capable of gathering, without hindrance, the necessary information. Economically, Russia was interested in expanding her trade and was therefore inquisitive about Bukhara's commercial relations with other foreign governments, particularly Great Britain, Turkey, Persia and other regional states.

After a successful journey, De Maizon returned with an official Bukharan promise not to intervene in any military action in case of war between Russia and Khiva.⁷¹ This cleared the way for Russia to subjugate part of the Kirghiz tribes who occupied territory between her and Khiva, as a step towards encroachment upon Khiva itself. Russia inaugurated this move by building the fortress Novo-Aleksandrovsk, on the eastern shore of the Caspian sea, in 1834.

The mission of Vitkevich (1836) and its aftermath

In the following year, 1835, continuing his surveillance activities in the region and to check the information reported by De Maizon, Perovskii planned a similar mission to Bukhara, to be executed by Vitkevich, a Russian officer said to be deeply acquainted with the tradition and the languages of the Asian population after ten years of service in the steppe region, but whom, as we know, Perovskii had unsuccessfully proposed previously for the mission carried out by De Maizon.

Vitkevich defined his mission at the beginning of his report saying that the purpose of his expedition was to insinuate himself into those Kirghiz tribes which lay beyond the Russian domains in the steppe, to act in a way that might influence the mind and spirit of those nomads, obtain reliable and detailed information about their

affairs, and discover the extent of Bukharan, Khivan, and British influence over them.⁷² But how he left for Bukhara and what official directions he received from Perovskii is still unknown.⁷³ However, in this respect there is one clue, which can be deduced from the recommendation which Perovskii sent to Rodofinikin, on July 14, 1836 after the return of Vitkevich from Bukhara;⁷⁴ this confirms speculation that Vitkevich had been sent at Perovskii's instigation, and that Perovskii wished to secure his promotion after long service without advancement.⁷⁵

The mission was carefully prepared. The same techniques which had been used in De Maizon's mission were repeated here again. Vitkevich was dressed in Asiatic clothes and traversed with a trade caravan destined for Bukhara.⁷⁶ The official version maintained that he was commissioned to travel to the steppe, but was driven to Bukhara under the pressure of a snow storm.⁷⁷ There also remains much confusion about the disguise he adopted. On the one hand, some authorities describe him as, "in the capital of a closed Muslim country, ... riding his horse in his official uniform as a Cossack officer";⁷⁸ on the other, he is more plausibly said to have travelled disguised as a simple Kirghiz.⁷⁹ His mission in Bukhara lasted for six weeks from January 2nd to February 13, 1836, during which time he collected economic and political evidence and above all intelligence about the relations between the Khanates.⁸⁰ He collected interesting information not only about Bukhara, her military forces, economy, and trade, but also about Khiva, her economy and her relations with the Kirghiz, Karakalpaks, and Kaisaks.⁸¹ Vitkevich returned to Orsk from Bukhara on April 18, 1836.⁸² In 1837 he was recalled to St. Petersburg and was sent to serve under the supervision of the Russian minister in Teheran, Graf Simonich. He carried confidential instructions from Rodofinikin to be delivered to Dost Muhammad, the Amir of Afghanistan. These included a promise that Russia would assist him with two million roubles in cash and two millions in goods, in return for an alliance against Khiva. Vitkevich accompanied the Persian army, which included a Russian battalion,

led by the Shah against Herat, with Simonich as his advisor. Vitkevich however left the advancing army, and via Sistan and Kandahar arrived at Kabul where he was able to make contact with Dost Muhammad. In 1838 he returned to Teheran and early in 1839 to St. Petersburg where he was mysteriously murdered.⁸³

In 1837, then he was able to alarm the British in India when he appeared in Kabul offering Dost Muhammad financial assistance and alliance with Russia. A contemporary historian described his activities:

The mysterious doings of the Russian officer Vitkevich in Bukhara in 1835 and in Kabul, the Afghan capital, in 1837, had constituted one very solid cause of the invasion of Dost Mohammad's country by the army of India...⁸⁴

But the success of his mission to Kabul depended to a great degree on the success or the failure of the Shah's enterprise against Herat.⁸⁵ Russia was so interested in the expedition that, as British opinion believed, "she remitted £25,000 of the debt contracted by Persia in 1828, in order that it might be expended in fitting out the expedition".⁸⁶

Russia sought to achieve two goals in this torturous course: to assist Dost Muhammad via Persia since she could not offer him direct assistance apparently to avoid irritating Great Britain; and secondly to have Dost Muhammad as an ally against Khiva. Meanwhile Perovskii wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs warning that if Russia would not assist Dost Muhammad, England would conquer Afghanistan and possibly other nations of Central Asia, which, if supplied with arms, gun-powder, and money would form a formidable obstacle to Russian expansion in the region.⁸⁷

From the British point of view, the venture against Herat would have far reaching repercussions beyond the Afghanistan boundary:

The success of the Shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia... The motive cannot be mistaken: Herat once annexed to Persia may become according to the commercial treaty the residence of a Russian Consular Agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan.⁸⁸

It happened, during the advance on Herat, that a lieutenant, Pottinger by name, of the Bombay artillery was in the city. He took charge of the defence and successfully conducted it with a "courage and ability which have immortalized his name",⁸⁹ as *Blackwoods* was complacently to observe twenty years later.

However, the official position of the Russian government vis-à-vis the Persian attack upon Herat was very different from its real intentions. Even though the expedition was financed by Russia, and the Russian Ambassador Count Simonich instigated the Shah, and Russian officers and troops accompanied the advancing army, yet in St. Petersburg Count Nesselrode, the Russian Foreign Minister "professed to agree with the British Government as to the viciousness of the course pursued by the Persian monarch".⁹⁰

Perovskii's Expedition against Khiva (1839)

In 1839 Russian policy was impelled by many factors to dispatch an expedition against Khiva; first, Russia was closely watching British activities in Afghanistan, and was eager to take counter measures against it; secondly, Russia was instigated by jealousy of Great Britain's commercial success beyond the Hindu Kush and in Central Asia, wanted to secure the Khivan market from her avowed rival, and turn it into a closed market for Russian products which otherwise would be incapable of competing successfully against British-Indian goods.⁹¹ The Russian Government also had by now accumulated enough intelligence through the missions of De Maizon (1834-35) and Vitkevich (1836-37). This aggressive policy was facilitated by the absence of any power near enough to the scene of action able to expose and resist, at the time, the true nature of her designs, and the invalidity of the pretexts she put forward.⁹²

Perovskii assembled a considerable force and marched on Khiva in the winter of 1839. This expedition was delayed for reasons connected with the British operation against Dost Muhammad of Afghanistan.⁹³ Perovskii marched with an

army of more than 5,000 soldiers and 22 guns, besides 2,000 Kirghiz to care for 10,000 camels and a number of horses. Most of the men who took part in the expedition were either Russian convicts or Polish prisoners.⁹⁴ The expedition failed totally, not achieving any of its targets nor reaching Khiva, and most of the men and transport animals perished "in consequence of the ruinous idea that, on account of the want of water in the steppe it would be easier to make the campaign in winter and that Russian soldiers had nothing to fear from the cold".⁹⁵ The expedition failed utterly after having got no more than half way towards Khiva.

Had he succeeded in securing victory over Khiva, Perovskii was to have been allowed stay there as long as should be necessary to impose on the Khivans the following conditions:

- 1- to stop all hostile actions against Russia;
- 2- to limit Khiva's authority over the Kirghiz and Turkomans who yielded to Russia;
- 3- Khiva's authority should not exceed her boundaries;
- 4- Khiva should not shelter Kirghiz fugitives who instigate the Kirghiz uprisings;
- 5- caravans should not be forced to pass through Khiva;
- 6- Khiva should give up claiming any rights on forts on the Syr Daria;
- 7- no duty should be collected from the Russian merchants, and they also should be on equal terms with the Khivan merchants in all respects;
- 8- Russia and Khiva should exchange consuls - the first in Khiva and the second in Orenburg; the Russian consul, without impediment, should be able to keep ships in the Amu-Daria river;⁹⁶

News of the failure of Perovskii's expedition reached the English headquarters at Kabul, and was naturally received with feeling of intense relief. At least for the time being, the ominous prediction of Baron Brunnow that the Sepoys and the Cossacks were about to meet on the banks of the Oxus was clearly premature. But the Britons did not relax the attention with which they had been monitoring the increasingly threatening nature of Russo-Khivan relations since the early 1830s. Perovskii's attempt against Khiva of 1839 authentically justified their fears that Khiva would become the first Russian victim in Central Asia. These apprehensions were behind

Palmerston's decision in 1840 to despatch two British officers, Captain James Abbot and Sir Richmond Shakespeare on an advisory mission to Khiva. Palmerston having detected the Russian purpose behind the pretext, the main objective of the mission was to rob "the Russians of their main pretext for action against Khiva".⁹⁷ They arrived there while Perovskii was retreating with the remnant of his army. In an attempt to fulfil Russia's demands and eliminate her ostensible grievances, they convinced the Khan of Khiva to moderate his policy towards Russia.⁹⁸ The Khan was quick to adhere to their advice and abolish the customary practice of seizing and enslaving Russian subjects.

The ulterior purposes of Perovskii's expedition had been, through military power, to inspire respect for Russia, to consolidate her influence in Central Asia, and to counteract the spread of British influence in Central Asia, which would hurt Russia's industry and trade in the region.⁹⁹ Its immediate objective had been to dethrone the Khivan Khan Alla Quly and to appoint one of the Kirghiz sultans loyal to Russia in his place.¹⁰⁰ It had been hoped to detach the Kirghiz from their loyalty to Khiva, but when Orenburg proposed this to some of the Kirghiz elite, they rejected the offer. Underlying the whole of Russian policy at this time was the need to counteract the British success in Afghanistan, lest it should encourage resistance to Russian influence among the Kirghiz, and resistance (encouraged by the activities of possible British agents) in Khiva itself.¹⁰¹

After the unsuccessful end of Perovskii's expedition, the Khivan Khan realized Russia's determination to strike against him, while the other Khanates remained aloof. Thus, in an apparent endeavour to remedy the rift with Russia, he sent Ata-Niaz Khozha along with Shakespeare to Orenburg accompanied by 418 Russian prisoners,¹⁰² as a gesture of good will.¹⁰³ Simultaneously the Khan issued his famous declaration of July 19, 1840 prohibiting all practices of slave trade, plunder, and attacking trade caravans, to be binding on all his subjects. The declara-

tion said:

To all brave warriors, fighters, heads of the Kirghiz, and Karakalpaks, to all citizens of our splendid kingdom... we declare that as of Jumadi al-Awwal 1256 (1840), we together with the great Russian Emperor began a new age of peace, positively we seek his friendship and goodwill; from now on, no one should attack Russian possession, or purchase Russian prisoners. If any will act in defiance to our high command, and attack Russian land or acquire Russian prisoners, he shall not avoid our Royal wrath and will be penalized appropriately....¹⁰⁴

This declaration should indeed have eliminated the Russian grievances, if Russia positively sought merely to end the slave trade and to secure her caravans. But the Russians perceived this act as a sign of weakness on the part of Khiva (as indeed it was), while the British efforts were correctly understood as an attempt to deprive Russia of any reason to attack Khiva in the future.¹⁰⁵ Abbott's efforts were interpreted slightly differently, as a step towards a projected Anglo-Khivan alliance. Hence soon after the defeat of Perovskii St. Petersburg began to move so as to increase political influence in Khiva and Bukhara. In the spring of 1841 the Russians, seeking to have resident agents in both Khiva and Bukhara, sent missions there headed by Nikiforov and Butenev.¹⁰⁶

There is no reason to believe that the Russians had abandoned their covert goals, which were no less than the conquest and complete control over the Khanate of Khiva. For his part, the Khan adopted the advice of Arthur Conolly¹⁰⁷ and sent embassies to both Kokand and Bukhara, in an unsuccessful endeavour to organize a system of mutual aid and defensive alliance against Russia's aggression.¹⁰⁸ This proposed confederation received no serious consideration in Kokand and Bukhara and never was realized in actuality for reasons already explained above.

Russia viewed the British missions and diplomatic negotiation with these Khanates, as activities directed against her interests in the region. Thus her extreme sensitivity to them can be explained adequately by pretension, based on doubtful claims of prior rights, to exclusive relations with the Central Asian Khanates in both

the commercial and political spheres.¹⁰⁹ The Russians claimed exceptional rights in Khiva based on allegations that the Khanate was bound to Russia by special relation, which afforded her a privileged position in dealing with Khiva.¹¹⁰ It was apparent that, even though Khiva was protected for the time being by her geographical location, as an oasis in a sea of sand, Russia's Generals would not lose time in accomplishing their military designs after overcoming that geographical obstacle. Meanwhile the Khans lacked international political vision, they were brutal, and mostly motivated by hatred towards each other. Thus they failed to make the most of the opportunity presented to them by the Anglo-Russian rivalry to become active players in the Great Game and perhaps preserve their independence.

Nikiforov's mission to Khiva (1841)

Russia's policy of reconnaissance purposes and developing trade relations was re-activated after the ignominious failure of Perovskii's expedition. Her first mission in the new period was headed by Captain Nikiforov.¹¹¹ Nikiforov, accompanied by two topographers, left Orenburg on May 3, 1841¹¹² and arrived at Khiva August 9, 1841. This time Russia tried a new approach with Khiva, which reveals the Russian intention of establishing hegemony over the Khanate by reducing contacts with her to a local level, i.e. with Governor-General of Orenburg, thus aiming to localize Russia's relations with Khiva and so avoid international complications. These ambitions were for long hidden behind the facade of such pretences as the slave trade, the interruption of trade routes, and sovereignty over the nomads. Nikiforov was instructed to tell the Khivans, on behalf of the Russian government, to contact the Commander of Orenburg Military District about any problems, as it was the nearest Russian administration to Khiva.¹¹³

Besides the main points of his mission, which were the termination of the slave trade, the limitation of Khivan influence over the nomadic tribes, and the

promotion of Russia's trade with Khiva and other adjacent territories, Nikiforov was instructed to revive Khivan confidence in Russia's good faith, which had been ruined by Perovskii's expedition, and to reduce their suspicions about Russia's intentions. Nikiforov, like previous envoys, was warned to avoid, in his talks with the Khan or other officials, discussing or answering any question regarding where the Russian boundaries should be fixed; in any such situation, Nikiforov was to manoeuvre in order to distract attention to another subject, give general interpretations, and shift the talks towards the oath which had been taken by the nomadic people who now accepted Russian citizenship.¹¹⁴ Nikiforov was instructed to collect topographic intelligence about strategic locations. He was directed to extract Khivan recognition that the eastern coast of the Caspian belonged to Russia, he was warned as well not to irritate the Khivans by raising the issue of free access to other Khivan cities.¹¹⁵

Throughout his activities, Nikiforov was to do his best to revive the Khivan trust in Russia's purposes, as this was "the most important prerequisite for the success of future Russian political influence over the Central Asian Khanates".¹¹⁶ He did not however achieve any success in his talks with the Khivan officials on any of the above questions. The only outcome of his expedition was a detailed description of the road to Khiva and of the city itself, which was the work of the topographers who accompanied him.¹¹⁷

Regardless of the outcome of Nikiforov's mission, Khiva was not interested in furnishing genuine attempts to develop fruitful and steady relations with Russia. So the Khan again sent his envoys, Vaiz Niaz and Ishbai Babaev, to Orenburg where they arrived on December 12, 1841, and in February 1842 they left for St. Petersburg to deliver a memorandum from the Khan to the Emperor, as well as to negotiate the ratification of an act based on a modified version of what Nikiforov brought to Khiva.¹¹⁸ In St. Petersburg, however, the Khivan envoys were rejected, accused of having no authority to negotiate, and sent back accompanied by a new Russian

mission to Khiva headed this time by Danilevskii, to resume what Nikiforov had already begun.¹¹⁹ Thus Nikiforov's mission ended without achieving any of its objectives.¹²⁰ If this negative result had any deeper significance, it must be the demonstration that Khiva's cautiousness about Russia's intentions was still very strong, in spite of the abolition of slavery and the famous declaration of the Khan of July 19, 1840. In the meantime the Russians interpreted all their political failures with Khiva as being the result of the work of British agents.

Butenev's mission to Bukhara (1841)

Conspicuously Russia intensified her efforts to deal with each Khanate separately. Simultaneously with Nikiforov's mission being prepared to Khiva, Russia prepared to send a separate mission to Bukhara, in return for a Bukharan mission to St. Petersburg in 1840, to discuss the Amir's fears of the appearance of the British army north of the passes of the Hindu-Kush.¹²¹ This mission was led by N. F. Butenev, who left Orenburg for Bukhara on May 3, 1841, simultaneously with Nikiforov, and accompanied by Khanykov and two mining engineers from a group that had been requested by the last Bukharan envoy.¹²² Khanykov, the well-known orientalist, was commissioned to pacify the Afghans by conveying to them that Russia's aim was to erect a bulwark against the British drive for conquest.¹²³ Before leaving for Bukhara Butenev conferred in Orenburg with Perovskii, who advised him how he should conduct negotiations in Central Asia.¹²⁴ Butenev arrived at Bukhara on 5 August 1841.

When the mission arrived at Bukhara, it was received by the Amir the same day. Butenev was thereafter to be allowed to come to the palace every Friday morning,¹²⁵ but there is no record of his talks in the palace, even though the mission stayed in Bukhara for eight months. It appears that the Bukharans had deliberately chosen Friday, the Muslim sabbath, for these meetings, so that formal talks with the

Amir could not be held.¹²⁶ When Butenev failed to visit the palace on Fridays, the Amir authorized one of his counsellors to take charge of conducting the negotiations with him. The Russians expected that Butenev would negotiate with the Amir directly, so they considered this as the first misfortune to meet the envoy and his mission. Though Butenev was able to deliver a list of the issues which concerned Russia, the Bukharan answer to all the Russian demands was unsatisfactory from Russia's standpoint. Regarding signing a treaty of trade and transit¹²⁷ the Amir, because of previous experience, insisted that the Russian Emperor should sign it first and send it back to Bukhara with a Bukharan messenger, who would be dispatched to Russia for the purpose. Concerning the Russian prisoners, the Amir was willing to fulfil Russia's request for their release, but not before ratification of the treaty. The Amir promised to reduce the duties collected from Russian merchants in Bukhara if Russia would do the same in regard to tariffs collected from the Bukharan merchants.¹²⁸

During his stay in Bukhara Butenev met both of the British officers Stoddart and Conolly, who were imprisoned there. He was informed that the Amir had written a letter to Her Majesty the Queen and that upon receiving a reply both would be released.¹²⁹ Both British envoys had been sent to the Uzbek Khanates, to persuade them to remove Russian grievances and thus be in a stronger position to preserve the independence of the Khanates. Stoddart was dispatched to Bukhara in 1838, and in 1840 Conolly was sent to Khiva and Kokand.¹³⁰ Out of altruism and belief in the cause he pursued, on his way to Kokand he decided to visit Bukhara to free Stoddart. Instead he was imprisoned with him.

From Terentiev we learn the surprising fact that the property of Stoddart and Conolly, their maps, and their papers, were on sale in the market at Khiva, yet Butenev prohibited any of his associates from purchasing any of the property of the British agents.¹³¹ This seems odd and inconsistent with usual Russian practice, and contradictory to Butenev's instructions which had clearly urged him to collect intel-

ligence information. It is unlikely that he would miss such an opportunity without considerable reason. Neither Terentiev nor Zhukovskii, however, tell us why Butenev abstained from buying at least the maps and the papers of the British agents. The reader will recall that one of De Maizon's guide lines was to search for and purchase the papers of Moorcroft and Trebek. Undoubtedly the papers of Stoddart and Conolly would have been of great interest in St. Petersburg, so we must conclude that there must have been a convincing reason which prevented their acquisition: it could be either lack of money, or perhaps a suspicion that the sale was merely a trap to ensnare the mission. He preferred safety and evaded the risk.

In April 1842 Butenev left Bukhara. Four days after his return to Orenburg, a Bukharan embassy arrived to negotiate what Butenev had offered Bukhara.¹³² Butenev did not achieve any of his objectives in pursuit of Russian policy, whereas Rawlinson found this mission paradoxically helpful to Britain, for not only did it place British observers

behind the Russian scenes during the most eventful phases of our own Afghan occupation but it also presents us with a report by an eye witness of many details relating to the captivity of Stoddart... which were before but imperfectly known to any of us.¹³³

The great game clearly was not always predictable in its results for either of its participants.

Danilevskii's mission to Khiva (1842)

The frequent Russian missions to Khiva had more than one objective, and the political negotiations were often a cover for other more devious endeavours. So Danilevskii's mission (1842), like that of his predecessor Nikiforov, included a naturalist as well as a topographer, for survey and intelligence purposes. And as explained earlier, the official instructions to the mission were in two parts: the first dealt with open matters of public policy, while the second was associated with matters of strategic interest, which of course were all clandestine. The declared goals of

Danilevskii's mission were to negotiate the reduction of commercial duties to five per cent of the declared price of the merchandise, to mediate the liberation of Persian prisoners¹³⁴ to imbue the Khan with a strong sense of Russia's good will, and to emphasize Russia's influence over Khiva.¹³⁵ On the other hand he had been warned to avoid addressing the delicate boundary question; if the Khivans however insisted on discussing that issue, then he was told to define Russia's borders with Khiva as being the river of Syr-Daria and the northern shores of the Aral Sea, to the Caspian Sea.¹³⁶

Danilevskii succeeded remarkably, and on the morning of December 27, 1842, the Khan who had just returned from the battle field against Bukhara issued a solemn declaration in the following terms:

- 1) From now on neither overt nor covert inimical act should be taken against Russia.
- 2) No plunder and brigandage neither in the steppe or on the Caspian; if any Khivan subject committed such an act, the culprit would be immediately punished, and the stolen property would be returned.
- 3) Not to enslave Russian captives, and be responsible for the safety and protection of the property of the Russian subjects who might be in the Khivan domains.
- 4) In case of the death of a Russian citizen in Khiva, all his property should be delivered to the Russian border-guards, to be passed to his heirs.
- 5) Prevent Russian dissidents and insurgents from lodging in Khiva but to hand them over to Russia.
- 6) Duties will be collected from the Russian merchants once a year, and would not exceed five percent.
- 7) All Russia's trade in transit through Syr-Daria to Bukhara or any other Asian country, or goods from those countries designated to Russia, will be duty free.
- 8) Not to hinder trade of other Asian countries with Russia, but to collect from them legal 'zakah'.¹³⁷
- 9) To behave in all cases as a devoted neighbour and sincere friend, and to enhance more and more the ties of amity with the Russian Empire.¹³⁸

This declaration was to be observed by all the Turkomans, Karakalpaks, southern Kirghiz, and Uzbeks who were under Khivan authority.¹³⁹

Russia agreed with alacrity to match all of the above conditions with similar undertakings. On this basis talks were concluded and Danilevskii left for St. Pet-

ersburg. Russia had not expected such success, so this agreement received the highest possible endorsement, and an approved copy was delivered to the Khivan Khan through his envoy Min Bashi Muhammad Amin, who accompanied Danilevskii to St. Petersburg.¹⁴⁰

After this remarkable diplomatic attainment, which was mostly due to Khivan fears arising out of the British success in Kabul,¹⁴¹ it seemed that Russia might be satisfied with her new friendly relations with Khiva. But for Russia this was no more than a temporary halt on the road to the full subjection of Khiva. In this respect Zhukovskii tells us that the major benefit of Russia's improved relations with Khiva actually amounted to the improvement of her military and geographical intelligence about the Khanates of Central Asia. All the other elements in the negotiations were in the longer term no more than dead letters.¹⁴²

The following period (1842-1845) was marked by the Bukharan-Khivan war for the domination of Merv. Meanwhile Russia intensified her efforts to control the lower Syr Daria. By 1847 she had established herself on the eastern shores of the Aral sea by the conquest of several strategic Kokandian forts of Raim, Kazala, and Aralsk. In the following year (1848) Russia dispatched a group of scientists, Butakov, Pospelov and Shevchenko in a scientific mission to study the Aral sea. During the years that preceded the Crimean War, 1850-1853, Russia was preoccupied by subjecting Semirechie and the region beyond the Ili river. Russia's activities in this period doubtless signalled that she was preparing for a military campaign though the eruption of the Crimean War delayed her action.

Ignatiev's mission to Khiva and Bukhara (1858)

In mid-1857, only one year after the humiliating treaty of Paris which concluded the Crimean War, Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) recalled Colonel N. P. Ignatiev, the military attaché in London, to report upon British activities in Asia.

Ignatiev worked out a project for sending an expedition to Afghanistan, the purpose of which was to study the region and to discover possible approach routes to India. In the event of another rupture with England, he concluded that only in Asia could Russia fight against her with any prospect of success.¹⁴³

On October 16, 1857 Tsar Alexander II approved Gorchakov's suggestion to dispatch yet another envoy to Khiva and Bukhara. On January 4th, 1858 this suggestion was sanctioned by the Special Committee of the Government council. It was there resolved to send two missions; one, diplomatic and led by Ignatiev, to Khiva and Bukhara, and the other scientific and headed by Khanykov, to Afghanistan.¹⁴⁴ Ignatiev's mission left Orenburg in May 15, 1858 and arrived at the capital of Khiva on July 19.¹⁴⁵

Russia strictly observed her usual policy towards Central Asia, the policy that tended to justify each Russian proceeding in the region as a response to British activity which threatened her interests. The justification for this mission was the claim that a British agent had arrived in Bukhara and was trying in every possible way to wreck Russia's trade with both Bukhara and Khiva.¹⁴⁶ At the same time the old issue of directing Central Asian trade towards the Caspian sea was revived, even though Russia had no reliable position on its eastern shore.¹⁴⁷

Russia dispatched Ignatiev in a mission to both Khiva and Bukhara with the usual two-fold purposes, on one side to negotiate the question of sending trade agents to both Khiva and Bukhara, while on the other Ignatiev was instructed to make a topographical diary, to describe geographically and statistically the countries on his way, to collect information about the old bed of the Amu¹⁴⁸ in the hope that it could be re-directed to the Caspian; he was also to report upon the Turkomans, their military strength and their relations with their neighbours, about the roads leading from the Khanates to adjoining countries and about the military forces of the Khanates and adjacent countries.¹⁴⁹

Ignatiev with a force of 117 men crossed the Ust-Urt desert and arrived at Chernyshev Gulf at the Aral sea, where he met two vessels commanded by Butakov. The two vessels sailed with Ignatiev to the mouth of the Amu Daria. Here he conferred with Ata Murad, the Turkoman Khan who at that time was leading a rebellion against Khiva and was besieging Kunia-Urgench. Ignatiev preferred not to be involved in this dispute to avoid complications in Khiva, and proceeded to Kungrad.¹⁵⁰ The reason why the mission was accompanied by several ships from the Aral flotilla was that it was hoped to reconnoitre the Amu and occupy Kungrad or the mouth of the river.¹⁵¹ In the meantime Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenburg, was in contact with Ata Murad. His letter to the Yomud Khan was intercepted by the Khivans, and this misfortune contributed much to the ultimate failure of Ignatiev's mission in Khiva.¹⁵²

Regarding the exchange of trade agents, Ignatiev was sceptical about the Bukharan and the Khivan governments agreeing to the proposal, in contradiction to what the St. Petersburg newspapers were reporting about the imminent exchange of resident agents between Russia and the Central Asian states.¹⁵³ Ignatiev wrote to the Director of the Asian Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they appeared likely to ask in return for accepting Russian trade agents that they might send their agents to the Novgorod exhibition.¹⁵⁴ Ignatiev was convinced that trade agents in the Khanates would be of advantage to Russia, and suggested that it would therefore be politic to include an article in the agreement, to allow them to send their agents to Orenburg. As he reported, "I intend to convince them of the profit they would gain from sending their agents to Orenburg".¹⁵⁵ Lord Wodehouse, the British ambassador, was dismayed by the Russian proceedings until he was assured by them that no military demonstration was intended in that part of Asia.¹⁵⁶ After the failure of his mission Ignatiev observed that he could not foresee any profit in associating Russia with such a cunning Amir.¹⁵⁷ This scepticism was no doubt based on the experience

of Butenev's unsuccessful mission to Bukhara in 1841.

Convinced of the sterility of his talks in Khiva, Ignatiev decided on August 31, 1858 to leave Khiva for Bukhara, after informing St. Petersburg of his intention, and emphasizing to his superiors not to allow any Khivan embassy to visit Orenburg, unless the Khivan Khan would agree in writing to all the Russian requirements. Clearly Ignatiev had been disappointed in his intrigues in Khiva. For a long period Russian policy had aimed at the overthrow of the ruling Iltuzer dynasty, which it regarded as "usurpers",¹⁵⁸ and as we have seen one of the objects of Perovskii's expedition of 1839 had been to depose the Khan and appoint a Kirghiz Sultan in his place.¹⁵⁹ The new Khan encountered by Ignatiev, Sayed Mohammad Bahadur, had just taken control of Khivan affairs and had already aroused the hostility of the Turkoman tribes. The Russians therefore tried to encourage the Turkomans so as to subvert the recalcitrant Khanate from within. When the Khan detected this design in the military force and especially the warships which accompanied Ignatiev's mission, he denied them passage;¹⁶⁰ the military party accompanying Ignatiev also became an obstacle to agreement with the Khivan negotiators, and all of this obstructed his attempts to reach an agreement with the Khan. The other ostensible aim of the mission, to secure Khiva's agreement to Russian navigation of the Amu Daria, was also frustrated; not only because of Khivan opposition, but also because of Bukhara's refusal, based on the fear that, once allowed, it would attract all the trade of the region into Russian hands.¹⁶¹

Ignatiev arrived in Bukhara in September 20, 1858 while the Amir was leading an expedition against Kokand. Bukhara at that time was isolated in the region; she was in dispute with Khiva and Kokand, and with Afghanistan over the region of Balkh and other possessions on the left side of the Amu Daria.¹⁶² Upon his return from the front against Kokand, the Khan consequently accepted the Russian demands and issued a directive to ensure their fulfilment.¹⁶³

Russia was more satisfied with the results of her surveillance efforts than with the diplomatic venture. Through this mission Russia studied thoroughly the Amu-Daria river and the southern shores of the Aral Sea, explored inter-Khanate relations still further, and obtained vital information for a future invasion of the Khanates. Russia was assured of the possibility of invading Khiva in the summer,¹⁶⁴ and was now confident that agreement with one Khan would not be binding to another, and that invading the territory of one Khan would not damage relations with another.¹⁶⁵ These ideas encouraged Russia's underlying disposition to use her armed forces on a greater scale in order to settle her disputes with these Khanates. After Ignatiev's mission, Russia singled out Kokand to be the first victim, as it had such strained relations with the other Khanates, and its geographical location made it more vulnerable and accessible to Russian troops.

Consequences of the Crimean War

The defeat in the Crimean war was the main reason that turned Russia once again toward Central Asia for compensation, in so far as her hands were now tied in the Balkans. Crippled in Europe, where she would meet efficient and powerful rivals, she remained vigorous in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where she found feeble and decaying neighbours. However, in the Asian direction Russia also found herself heading towards British possessions and interests where, unlike in Europe, Britain had no allies and "rivalry and hostility were less disguised".¹⁶⁶ Though Russia believed the British to understand that her affairs in Europe were damaged for a long time to come, nevertheless:¹⁶⁷

by guarding the line of the Danube, while leaving open the Transcaucasian frontier and the shores of Anatolia, you change the main line of Russian advance from the western to the eastern side of the Black Sea. You divert it from Europe into Asia, and by so doing change the powers by whom such southward progress brings her into collision.¹⁶⁸

Russia was not slow to resume progress in the Central Asian arena after the

Treaty of Paris. Perovskii was advancing successfully, though slowly, on the Jaxartes and Russia's intrigues against India were apparent and felt in Afghanistan. Lord Lawrence understood the Russian strategy when he, during the Crimean War said that he was "looking out sharp towards Kabul. If the war continues, Russia will no doubt intrigue there".¹⁶⁹

As observed in the late 1850s, after the Crimean War, the Russians recognised their advantage in Central Asia, where their actions were "fraudulent and defiant",¹⁷⁰ the Orenburg authorities dashed across the steppe subjugated its inhabitants and erected fortresses on the Irghiz and Turgai rivers, while the British perceived that process as guided by "natural law of increase".¹⁷¹ Russia moved vigorously to secure profitable trade with the less competitive, but cotton producing countries of Central Asia, which became more valuable to her during the American Civil War, which of course resulted in a sharp reduction in the cotton supply. Central Asia doubled her cotton production which saved Russian industry on the one hand, and of course besides other factors, elevated Russia's desire to dominate the region on the other.¹⁷² Commerce, ambition, and the pressure of rivalry propelled her to resume the process of conquest on her south-eastern Asian peripheries.

Russia's activities in the period that followed the Crimean War were in full contrast to Britain's, despite the fact that that war had revealed the decadence and impotence of Russia. Russia sought to avenge her defeat by following a full-scale expansionist policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus; whereas Britain seemed unable to take advantage of her military superiority after the Crimean War, to retard the Russian advance in Central Asia and in the Caucasus.

The defeat in the Crimean War came as a violent shock which opened Russia's eyes to her defective social system and pushed her towards reform. It revealed the decay and weakness of the state and the social structure. The new Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) and his advisors realized that Russia was paralysed by the

old system of serfdom (krepostnichestvo), and accepted the humiliating clauses of the Paris treaty in the belief that peace was necessary and would provide the opportunity to take care of domestic matters, of which they must take advantage. The first step must be to free the serfs because, according to Prince Gagarin, "there was the centre of all evils".¹⁷³ Despite the strong objection of the serf owners and even of the serfs themselves who objected to the new reforms on the ground that they had been deprived of their land,¹⁷⁴ the Tsar held firm to the conviction that serfdom must come to an end on the terms devised by his government.¹⁷⁵

Even though the foreign policy of the Russian government remained the same, it accused field Generals and laid the blame on them, however never rejected any "unauthorized" acquisition by its Generals so long as it resulted in success. Its policy, in Central Asia, was based on one of the most destabilising principles in public affairs, i.e., "waiting upon events" and "profiting by the blunders of others" in order to achieve its objectives.¹⁷⁶ An explicit pattern of such a policy can be demonstrated from events which followed the Anglo-Russian agreement about the northern frontiers of Afghanistan in 1872, upon which General Cherniaev commented that "he attached no importance whatever to it, and that it was in fact of no use to either country", because it was of such a character "that Russia will easily find a number of pretexts for breaking it when necessary".¹⁷⁷ From this point of view Russia merely behaved like any other imperial power of the same period. It is difficult if not impossible to find a dispassionate way of describing Russian policy in Central Asia which will not appear to be prejudiced, for one principal reason, that is to say Russia was the most influential actor, militarily, politically, and economically on the Central Asian arena, while other parties, mainly Britain, even though interested in the region, were mostly interested in stopping Russia at a distance from India. Historians should take in consideration Russia's predominant position in Central Asia before making judgement. Hence it would not be far fetched to conclude that Russian practice and

policy in the region was founded upon deceit, duplicity, and disregard of all principles other than Russian self-interest.



Muzaffarud-Din, Amir of Bukhara



General K. P. Kaufmann

Chapter Three

THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE AGAINST KOKAND AND BUKHARA

British reactions to the Russian advance

The antagonism that prevailed between Russia and Great Britain in Asia in the nineteenth century had developed out of the pressure of those jealousies which had arisen gradually during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In that period both Empires were expanding their territory and stabilizing their rule in the areas of their preponderance. In that era of acquisitions the lure of the wealth of India, which had flattered Russian ambitions since the time of Peter the Great, became a concrete element in Russia's political projects, and as it crystallized became a permanent irritant in the relations between the two Empires, British and Russian.¹

The rivalry between these Empires was not motivated by racial feeling, religious hatred, or national glory, but developed out of the apparent incompatibility of their interests and ambitions, so that without the conscious intention of either nation, it arose by slow degrees from small beginnings, until it became the dominating factor that shaped their relations.² Russian practices and designs in the East were already perceived to be threatening to Great Britain after the imposition of the treaty of Gulistan on Persia in 1813. It was in that treaty that historians and politicians consider that "the rivalry of England and Russia had its birth".³ This treaty gave Russia control of all the western shore of the Caspian Sea and the territories extending to the west as far as Erivan and parts of Georgia, and so made Russia the unchallenged master of the Caspian.⁴

Russia reinforced her position in the Caspian by occupying the island of Ashur-Ada in the southernmost corner of that sea in 1837-38, under the pretext of stopping Turkoman piracy. The occupation at the time did not attract much attention in Britain until 1842 when the matter reached the Foreign Office following a Persian request for British assistance to end the Russian occupation of that island. Under Anglo-Persian pressure Russia instead sought an alternative base on the eastern coast, although she failed temporarily because of Turkoman resistance. In subsequent political developments Russia acknowledged Persia's title to Herat in exchange for Russian rights of expansion to the east of the Caspian and in the basins of Syr Daria and Amu Daria.⁵

In face of these expansionist designs, England tried to implement in Central Asia the policy of a balance of power, which had proved to be so effective in protecting her interests in Europe. However, this policy was less effective in Asia, mainly because Britain's European allies, out of jealousy of her powerful position in Asia, proved unreliable and tended to side with Russia or perhaps at best adopt a neutral policy.

As early as 1830 the conflict between the interests of both empires in Asia had reached a level of chronic suspicion and serious animosity; on the Russian side this can be deduced from Russia's escalating intelligence activities during the 1830s.⁶ Hence their rivalry crystallised and their interests in Asia began to make an impact on their relations in Europe. The steady Russian advance in the direction of India, even though it was still involved in the remote Central Asian steppe,⁷ alarmed British politicians, who considered an early military confrontation with Russia a likelihood and a necessity in order to terminate the threat to British interests and security. Lord Ellenborough, the president of the Board of Control, remarked in 1830 that,

our policy in Europe and in Asia ought to be the same, to pull down Russian power... I would, in Persia and everywhere, endeavour to create the means of throwing the whole world in arms upon Russia at the first convenient time.⁸

Britain's policy in Central Asia was thus influenced largely by the needs of the defence of India against the Russian menace. Britain at this stage began assessing Russian policy in the steppe region and appraising her influence over the Uzbek Khanates, in the search for ways to counter and limit that influence. For that purpose Britain investigated Russia's naval strength in the Caspian and the volume of her trade in the region.⁹ Consequently this led to intelligence of other useful matters: the condition of routes between Orenburg and Bukhara and Khiva, the duration of the journey, and the number of caravans.¹⁰ During four decades, i.e. from the late 1820s to the late 1860s, attention was directed towards collecting information about Russia's settlements on the eastern coast of the Caspian, and interest in the Aral sea. Britain was concerned as well to assess the military capability of the Khanates and their potential to resist Russia's aggression, and their revenue from trade with her.¹¹

While it may be observed that both empires during the first half of the century made comparable advances, England extending her possessions from the Indian ocean along the Indus to Peshawar, while Russia assimilated the Kirghiz steppe, confirmed herself on the eastern shores of the Aral sea, and advanced along the Syr Daria,¹² it was also reasonable, as did Vambery, to describe British policy in Central Asia in the first half of the century as "inactive", and certainly her military influence extended no further than the northern frontiers of Afghanistan.¹³ The failure of the Persian expedition against Herat in 1838, despite Russia's support, and the failure of Perovskii's expedition against Khiva the next year, revived a feeling of relief in India and a renewed feeling of security. The same events created unaccustomed indifference towards the activity of the Russian Government, that prevailed in British policy and engulfed British public opinion as well up to the 1860s.¹⁴ The fears of the Indian Government did not echo in London, basically because Russia's

stumbling efforts during the period that preceded the Crimean War, contributed to what later became known as the policy of masterly inactivity. The advocates of this policy argued that the sense of alarm formerly deluded Britain into errors, and led to the ill-considered war with Afghanistan in 1838.¹⁵

The players in the Great Game were not necessarily antagonistic in all fields at all times. Britain viewed Russia in Europe as different from Russia in Asia. There were even instances when Britain regarded the Muscovite advance in Central Asia as being advantageous to the interests of England,¹⁶ while in Europe Britain sometimes considered Russia as a

great conservative power of the West, [which] might be expected to render important aid to the cause of peace and order, by checking the revolutionary mania of France and Germany.¹⁷

Apparently St. Petersburg noticed the ambivalence behind Britain's inactive policy, and felt confident enough to launch the military campaigns that marked the 1860s and ended in the subjection of both Kokand and Bukhara.

The rivalry between the two empires had three different but connected forms: military, political, and economic. Although none of these can be considered in isolation, Russia's ability to combine all these factors was unrivalled. She masterfully mixed economic with military considerations and her trade served as a mask for political intentions.¹⁸ This policy usually obligated her Asian neighbours by commercial treaties, which inevitably would be followed by expanding political influence, and once commercial installations had been established, military protection became mandatory.¹⁹

Economically speaking, St. Petersburg laboured to secure Central Asian markets, and sought to turn the region into a base for advancing Russian trade further with Afghanistan, Eastern Turkestan, and India. These ambitions were checked by Britain who controlled the Iranian market through superior merchandise and had won the same position in Central Asia, almost effortlessly, by supplying the

Central Asian market with reasonably priced goods.²⁰ As a result Russia was the loser in this commercial rivalry with Britain in that market, and as a result the amount of her potential exports to the Khanates was severely limited.²¹ This situation remained the same until the Russian military presence became paramount in Central Asia in the 1860s, and adjusted the balance in her favour by imposing preventive duties on British commodities.²²

The apparently irreconcilable confrontation between the interests of Russia and Great Britain led on both sides to the conviction that the weakness of one meant the strength of the other; hence "each nation had identified the other as a major threat".²³ To conceal her designs and to avoid open political clashes with England, Russia was, in addition, unique in the conduct of its foreign policy: it had an Asian policy engineered by the Asian Department of its Foreign Ministry, which was functionally dissociated from the European Department.²⁴ Whereas the Foreign Ministry ostensibly harmonised the work of both departments, in practice this division assisted the prosecution of Russian plans in Central Asia, in such absolute secrecy that the right hand did not know what the left was doing.²⁵ It was from this propensity that the character of Russia's apparently ambiguous policy took its origin: she strove to pacify Britain and assure her of Russia's blameless intentions, while in no way actually slowing down her expansionist efforts. While Russian troops were subjugating the steppe, advancing along the Syr Daria, and conquering key cities of Turkestan, Chemkend, Samarkand and elsewhere, her politicians maintained that the antagonism between Russia and England proceeded only from the latter's fears about the security of India.²⁶ Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister (1856-1882), frequently and in categorical terms confirmed and insisted to British politicians and diplomats that the Emperor was opposed to Russian expansion in Central Asia. St. Petersburg adhered to this policy from the mid 1860s up to the conquest of the Akhal Tekke and Merv Turkomans in 1884.²⁷ Even when evidence of military expansion, against

Kokand and Bukhara in the sixties, was conclusive, the Emperor himself assured the British of his pacific intentions and Gorchakov echoed his words:

the probable eventuality of hostilities between the Russian and Bukharan forces in Central Asia did not modify the determination of the Emperor to abstain from conquests... no change had taken place in the policy of Russia, and that the Emperor is as determined now as in 1865 to abstain from conquest in Central Asia, His Imperial Majesty being convinced that such accession of territory would be injurious instead of proving advantageous to the Empire.²⁸

Repetition of analogous assurances became characteristic of the imperial policy in Central Asia for years to come and in connection with several issues.²⁹

Russian officials were in no doubt about the advantages of their Asian possessions in relation to their strategic plans. Ignatiev,^a the Military Attaché in London in 1857, reported after the Crimean War that in case of another rupture with England, only in Asia could Russia confront her with probability of success. He emphasized that controlling the Amu Daria waterway was a necessity, as it would powerfully assist Russia in threatening Great Britain on the Indian front.³⁰ Miliutin,³¹ the War Minister, wrote to Gorchakov in 1861 about the same strategy, justifying the fever of expansion and conquest that consumed the activities of the Russian Generals in Central Asia:

in case of European war, we must value the occupation of that region, which brings us nearer to the northern borders of India and would assist our approach to that country. By controlling Kokand we can constantly threaten the possessions of British East India. This would be exceptionally important, since only here we can be perilous to our enemy.³²

The official press in St. Petersburg was engaged in a fierce polemic, the purpose of which was to pacify British politicians by insisting that the real objectives in Russia's advance were limited to commercial gains but not strategic. Obviously commercial interests did not contradict with strategic plans. It was clear that she desired a market where she had no strong competitors and which would secure

^a. Later in the same year he was recalled to St. Petersburg and dispatched in a diplomatic mission to Bukhara. See his mission in chapter two.

economic advantages on the one hand, and enable her to compete with European rivals on the other. Securing this market from Russia's point of view evidently meant complete control over Central Asian states, which meant the realization of her political as well as economic goals; and the temporary success of her trade would not therefore lead to abandoning her strategy of eventually controlling the Indian trade, as the *Golos* observed:

neither the commercial nor the political object will be attained, until Russia has taken complete possession of Bukhara, the great centre of the trade and political life of Central Asia.³³

The success of Russia's aggression throughout the 1860s in the lands between the Syr Daria and Amu Daria rivers secured to her an unchallenged position in that region; and contributed to her political, military, and economic weight not only in Asia but by extension in Europe as well. Thus her ambitions and desire for expansion grew wider and new hopes for further expansion were raised. The accumulating evidence of these aspirations provoked increasing suspicion among other European powers with interests in Asia, of which of course the most prominent was Great Britain.³⁴ Russia launched a political offensive, which began with Gorchakov's circular of November 21, 1864, and was designed to portray Russia as the carrier of the banner of civilization obliged to subdue barbarism, while in reality her troops were advancing, contrary to her allegations, against stable nations with unique culture and history.³⁵ Britain however accepted Russia's justification, despite the fact that there remained serious uneasiness regarding the future of the Khanates.³⁶

Russian politicians aspired to exclude the issue of Central Asia from surfacing and affecting the relations between the two Governments. In an effort to divert attention away from Central Asian toward European affairs, during a meeting with Buchanan, the British Ambassador in December 1868, Gorchakov deliberately pressed forward issues concerning both governments in Europe rather than those taking place in Turkestan. To Buchanan, who was directed by his Government to

discuss the nature and dimension of Russian military activities in Central Asia, he insistently avoided addressing the subject and instead expressed his hope that the two governments would be able to put into effect the good understanding which existed between them in Europe.³⁷ Responding to Buchanan's expressed concerns and interest over the state of affairs in Central Asia, Gorchakov again diverted attention towards England's desire to promote the maintenance of peace in Europe. He pointed to the identity of their interests in the Ottoman Empire, saying that Britain wished

to secure the Christian subjects of the Sultan against oppression, and so does Russia... would it not be wise and prudent were they to act together in endeavouring to carry out by moral influence their common objects, and to guard against eventualities which may arise at no distant future of a nature to disturb the balance of power in Europe?³⁸

Gorchakov thus, by emphasizing the similarities in the interests of both Empires in Europe, evaded discussing the Russian campaign in Central Asia, which ended by the annexation of vast territories and several important cities of Kokand in 1865 and the following year.

Prince Gorchakov's circular of November 1864

In less than a quarter century (1845/68) Russia occupied vast territories extending from the Emba river to the heart of Central Asia. She controlled the Island of Ashurada in the Bay of Astrabad, erected Fort Novo-Alexandrovsk, and occupied Chikishlar on the eastern shore of the Caspian in 1842, established a line of fortifications on the Syr Daria, conquered Dzhulek in 1853, and captured Turkestan and Chemkend in 1864.³⁹ This vast expansion created an image of non-stop expansion in Russia's proceedings in the region.

Sir Robert Peel's doctrine, that "when civilisation and barbarism come into contact, the latter must inevitably give way" may be taken as encapsulating the general response of western European civilisation to these enigmatic proceedings.⁴⁰

The circular of November 1864, in which Gorchakov set out arguments to reassure other European Governments about the scope and purposes of Russian expansion in Central Asia, concealed, especially from the British, the true magnitude of Russia's territorial ambitions, and Russian strategic goals with regard to India. The circular stated that

it always happens that the more civilized State is forced in the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character make most undesirable neighbours.⁴¹

Further it went on to legitimize Russia's forward policy:

the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission... Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically recurring expeditions against an enemy whom his social organization makes it impossible to seize... if, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, ...its withdrawal is put down to weakness... The work has then always to be done over again from the beginning.⁴²

It may however be remembered that it never happened in the history of the Russian advance in Central Asia that she withdrew voluntarily except perhaps in the exceptional instance of Chinese Kuldja in 1881. Consequently, to pacify European opinion, and particularly to preserve the "indifference of Englishmen towards Russian progress in those regions",⁴³ Gorchakov prepared the ground for further Russian advance, legitimated the fluidity of the Imperial borders in the Steppe, and their steady encroachment and irretrievable absorption of land as well as people:

in order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are established in the midst of these hostile tribes, ...soon beyond this second line other still more distant tribes come in their turn to threaten the same dangers and necessitate the same measures of repression.⁴⁴

Indeed, it was true to say that Russia, after subjugating one group of tribes, would then accuse their neighbours of stirring up trouble against her, would then subjugate the second and so on unblushingly until all the Uzbek Khanates fell prey to a well designed Russian execution in Central Asia. This process began to alarm the British, especially following the Russian conquest of a number of important cities in Turk-

estan and Kokand, raising the prospect that the Russian advance in Central Asia if unhindered would eventually endanger the security of India.⁴⁵ Receiving a report concerning the new situation which had been created by the recent Russian conquests Lord John Russell, the Foreign Secretary, commented that the Russian encroachment in Central Asia caused "an uneasy feeling in countries to which it relates".⁴⁶ Though the Russian advances were alarming, yet not all her proceedings were revealed to the world. Lumley, the Secretary at the British Embassy in St. Petersburg, was instructed to collect intelligence on the actual Russian conquest in Central Asia. Although his endeavours were hard, the results were "vague and scanty".⁴⁷ Some of the intelligence he gathered was from an Italian mission which had visited Central Asia. From this mission he learnt that all Russia's proceedings were kept secret. He was told that an officer wrote a letter to a friend and mentioned to him some of the actions that had taken place at the front. The letter was censored and returned, and the officer was warned. Already Russia intended to keep her proceedings in the region as secret as possible. Gorchakov himself, when M. Gianotti, the Italian Chargé d'affaires, spoke to him admiring the success of the Russians against Kokand, dismissed the topic and evaded conversation in a way to preclude decisively any further mention of the matter.⁴⁸

Despite the Russian efforts to keep the matter confidential, however, reports began to circulate not only in diplomatic circles but in the public domain as well. The *Times* published a telegram from Paris informing its readers about the fall of Kokand to the Russian army.⁴⁹ These revelations were alarming to Russia, and Gorchakov began to recognise the need to allay the fears of the European powers regarding Russia's proceedings in Central Asia even though Tsarist policy regarded Central Asia as an appropriate region for conducting the competition with Britain.⁵⁰ In his circular Gorchakov explained Russia's Central Asian policy to various Courts of Europe, presenting Russia as the carrier of the banner of civilization faced by

wild and nomadic tribes. In the circular Gorchakov stated that Russia's advance was necessitated by the lack of fixed frontiers with the migratory tribes: hence her forward push would cease only when she reached a point where settled nations of sufficient social organization could be met. This Russian claim may have been designed to pacify Europe and to fit the occasion; it was however likely to appear very ominous to a neighbouring imperial power such as Britain.⁵¹

In his circular Gorchakov traced the successive stages by which a civilized state would find itself compelled to advance to spread order, having come into contact with the nomads. He explained that a territory inhabited by a migratory population could not be a fitting frontier for a civilized government, which must then find itself pushing forward until it reached a stable political grouping. He compared the Russian position in Central Asia with that of the United States in North America, France in Algeria, Holland in Indonesia, and England in India, thus hoping to win sympathy in the West for Russia's actions in the East. He confided that:

it has been judged indispensable that our two fortified lines, one extending from China to the Lake of Issyk Kul, the other from the Sea of Aral, along the Syr Daria, should be united by fortified points, so that the posts should be in a position of mutual support leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes might make with impunity their inroads and depredations.⁵²

Gorchakov masterfully avoided stating definitely that the final point of Russia's advance had been reached in 1864, leaving ambiguity around Russia's future plans, as well as about the affairs of the nomadic tribes and the issue of Russia's undefined boundaries. Nonetheless this circular was the first Russian official document to deal systematically with her policy in Central Asia.

It must be noted that the circular was not communicated verbatim to the British court, neither through the British embassy at St. Petersburg nor through the Russian embassy in London. Evidently it was designed to guide Russian diplomats abroad in their verbal explanations to the courts to which they were accredited. Russell reflected that it was highly desirable that Great Britain should receive a copy

to be aware of the Russian intentions in Central Asia.⁵³ Gorchakov however considered the British request for a copy of his manifest to be unwarranted,⁵⁴ though he read it to Buchanan, the British ambassador in St. Petersburg, as a personal and confidential communication.⁵⁵ He also told Buchanan that Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador to England, would communicate the contents of the circular confidentially to Russell. Russell was unimpressed by these concessions and instructed Buchanan to inquire why it had been sent to Vienna, Paris, Berlin, and other courts, if the matter was so secret.⁵⁶

In spite of the protestations in Gorchakov's circular, the Russian government wasted no time in creating, on February 12, 1865, the new Province of Turkestan; Tashkand was stormed, and the city of Khokand was taken in the same year.⁵⁷ Again St. Petersburg found it expedient to blame the Generals in the field.^b Cher-

^b. It seems that some politicians and historians believed the Russian claim that difficult communications with the officers in remote regions rendered it difficult for St. Petersburg to control the situation. However it should be clear that there was no Russian General or officer who would take a risk and carry the responsibility if he knew that he would be accountable for his deeds before his superiors. Besides, all the Governors of Orenburg and Western Siberia used to adhere to the opinion of St. Petersburg (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the War Ministry); in case the directives were of general character, they would feel free to execute what they saw to be in the interest of Russia. Katenin, the Governor-General of Orenburg was enthusiastic to occupy the cities of Turkistan and Tashkand to secure Russia's possessions in Central Asia; when the Minister of War rejected the plan, because of the unsuitable international situation, Katenin refrained and deferred to his superior. Later he strictly observed the directions when he was allowed to occupy only Dzhulek. The Governor-General of West Siberia, in connection with Kokandian activities in the region of the river Chu, asked St. Petersburg to occupy Peshpek. Meanwhile Bariatinskii, the Commander of the Caucasian Army, when he intended to occupy a point on the south-eastern shores of the Caspian in the late 1860s, sought permission from St. Petersburg first. But if Great Britain would remonstrate and ask for explanation, St. Petersburg would blame deficient communication with the field officers. MID, Gl. Arkh., 1-9, 1852-1862 gg., No. 8, ll. 240-266; and 1858-1860 gg. ll. 20-31 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Main Archive, 1-9, 1852-1862, No. 8, sheets 240-266; and 1858-1860, sheets 20-31) quoted in Popov, "Iz Istorii...", pp. 204-5. *Blackwoods* was in no doubt what interpretation to place upon these expedient fictions in Russian policy: "it is a maxim of the Russian government to repudiate the conduct of its officers until their project is accomplished, thus preventing oppos-

(continued...)

niaev was recalled in 1866 and replaced by General Romanovskii, who maintained that he would endeavour to pacify Russia's neighbours by a durable settlement of the frontiers rather than by conquest.⁵⁸

Romanovskii's declared intentions, if maintained, would have given Russia a peaceful period to adjust herself and assimilate her newly conquered territories. The chief qualification to his intentions, (if we assume that he meant them seriously), was the instructions he received from St. Petersburg before taking up his new position. These instructions were no different from the general frame of guidance usually communicated to his predecessors; they reminded him that:

the true interests of Russia should be kept in view. As regards Bukhara, it is above all desirable to re-establish speedily friendly commercial relations with that Khanate, but at the same time, the immediate local chief is bound to remember that the Asiatic respects only the force of arms. The main object of the commander should therefore be to make the Amir understand that we are not desirous of conquest, and that we do not threaten the integrity of his dominions, but that we shall not allow him to extend his dominion in the direction of our limits.⁵⁹

Furthermore, his instructions prepared the ground for justifying further advance, either for protecting "legitimate trade, or in the general interests of humanity".⁶⁰ Like Gorchakov's circular, they were concealed in terminology suited to a forward policy in a situation of fluid boundaries. It was so far impossible to reconcile Russian assurances emanating from St. Petersburg with Russian procedures in Central Asia. It was impossible for politicians then, as it in some cases still is for historians now, to divine the true purposes of Russian policy in any given situation, and to separate the transient from the permanent in Russian policy. Prince Gorchakov said in his circular:

^b(...continued)

ition until it is too late for other governments to interfere". *Blackwoods*, vol. LXXXI (Feb. 1857), p. 139.

In spite of our unwillingness to extend our frontier, these motives^c had been powerful enough to induce the Imperial Government to establish this line between Lake Issyk-Kul and the Syr-Daria, by fortifying the town of Chemkend, lately occupied by us.

He continued that this position

puts us in the immediate neighbourhood of the agricultural and commercial populations of Kokand. We find ourselves in the presence of a more solid and compact, less unsettled, and better organized social state; fixing for us with geographical precision the limit up to which we must halt, ... any further extension of our rule, meeting, as it would, no longer with unstable communities, such as the nomadic tribes, but with more regularly constituted States, ... would draw us on from annexation to annexation with unforeseen complications.⁶¹

These assurances were given just six months before the assault against Tashkand in May 17, 1865; but of course a pretext was easily found and Bukhara was to be blamed this time.

In a conversation between Lord Augustus Loftus, Britain's ambassador at St. Petersburg, and Prince Gorchakov regarding the adventurous policy of Russia's Generals in Central Asia, who aspired to obtain the order of St. George by laying new acquisitions at the feet of the Emperor, Loftus suggested that "St. George might be given to the Governor-General before he entered on his functions, which might

^c. These motives mentioned earlier in the same circular were: "1. It has been judged to be indispensable that our two fortified frontier lines -one extending from China to the Lake Issyk-Kul, the other from the Sea of Aral along the Syr-Daria-should be united by fortified points, so that all our posts should be in a position of mutual support, leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes might make with impunity their inroads and depredations. 2. It was essential that the line of our advanced forts thus completed should be situated in a country fertile enough, not only to insure their supplies, but also to facilitate the regular colonization, which alone can prepare a future of stability and prosperity for the occupied country, by gaining over the neighbouring populations to civilized life. 3, and lastly. It was urgent to lay down this line definitively, so as to escape the danger of being carried away, as is almost inevitable, by a series of repressive measures and reprisals, into an unlimited extension of territory". FOCP 3785, analysis by Lord Tenderden of the papers presented to the Parliament respecting Central Asia 1838-1878; also Parliamentary Papers, 79, p. 682 ff; and appendix II.

render him less bellicose and ambitious for glory".⁶² It does not appear however that this sage counsel was adopted by the Tsar.

As soon as General Romanovskii arrived in Turkestan in the spring of 1866, he was met with confusion, with the grievances and the unrest of the local populations as well as their rulers within and beyond Russia's frontiers, which were caused by the rapidity of the recent Russian military operations. Sorting out his priorities, he found himself, like any of his predecessors, acting according to the first portion of the Imperial guidance i.e. "the true interests of Russia should be kept in view". He resolved that a military blow was necessary, sent a reconnaissance party into Bukharan territory, which looted large herds of sheep from Bukhara and returned to the Russian camp. His next step was directed against Irjar: two weeks later he captured Nau and the commercial emporium Khodzhand.⁶³ Obviously St. Petersburg did not find any contradictions between these actions and its intentions, for it formed a special commission in the winter of 1866/1867 to study the situation and to consider the best system of administration. Following the recommendations of this commission, the Imperial *Ukaz* of July 23, 1867 was issued, declaring the formation of the Province of Russian Turkestan and the appointment of General K. P. Kaufmann as its first Governor-General. The borders of the Province of Turkestan were accurately defined on every side except the south, which clearly indicated Russia's intentions towards further advance. The following events soon justified the expectations and further expansion followed in that direction.⁶⁴

Throughout all of these developments in Central Asia, Russia's policy in the region was decided and executed by military officers; political decisions in St. Petersburg were a matter of dispute and competition between the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁶⁵ Miliutin, the War Minister, was a strong advocate of the annexation of Central Asia, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more sensitive to the complexities of the international situation, was reluctant and

less enthusiastic regarding these military designs and their timing. Miliutin blamed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for following in its Asian policy a system of passive conservatism, and for being worried about maintaining friendship with England.⁶⁶ At a slightly deeper level, these differences were resolved into a harmony of purpose, which confused their opponents and enabled them to achieve their goals without any serious protest or opposing action.

The conquest of Tashkand (1865)

In the spring of 1864, Colonel Cherniaev, the strongest supporter of the unification of the Orenburg-Siberian frontier lines, advanced from Fort Vernoe and conquered Aulie Ata; meanwhile Colonel Verevkin^d was leading another column from Fort Perovskii against Turkestan, which the Russians historically considered as a centre of pan-Islamism. The two colonels were competing with each other, and in this spirit of rivalry Verevkin endeavoured to move ahead of Cherniaev and conquer Chemkend. The force he sent for the purpose was however defeated with heavy losses and retreated back to its camp. Cherniaev had the same target in mind. He advanced against Chemkend, and arrived at the vicinity of the city; he did not attack it however at once, but waited until September 1864, when he was reinforced by the return of Verevkin's forces. The joint force was put under his command and the city was besieged on September 22, 1864.⁶⁷

The Kokandis tried to break the Russian blockade by a counter attack. They were defeated and retreated into the city with their leader Alim Kul fatally wounded. Upon receiving news of the death of Alim Kul, Cherniaev hoped that not only Chemkend would be easy prey but Tashkand also. Thus after the fall of Chemkend he advanced against Tashkand, placed his batteries in position and made the first assault, only to find that this city was more strongly defended than he had thought.

^d Both Cherniaev and Verevkin were promoted to Generals.

He was repulsed and retreated to his camp at Chemkend with heavy loss.⁶⁸ The death of the regent of the Khanate disheartened the population and boosted the ambition of the Russians. Cherniaev, repulsed for the moment but now thinking not only of Tashkand but also of the future of the Khanate of Kokand, communicated to the Amir of Bukhara a message warning him that his advance against Kokand would be regarded as an act of aggression against Russia.⁶⁹

Cherniaev's warning to the Amir of Bukhara, and the efforts to conquer Tashkand revealed Russia's real intention behind the unification of the Siberian and Orenburg lines.⁷⁰ The retreat was temporary and upon receiving intelligence about the intention of the Amir of Bukhara to assist the defenders of Tashkand, Cherniaev adopted measures to prevent it. Immediately he strengthened his position at Niaz Bek, sixteen miles from Tashkand, and controlling the water supply of Tashkand. He diverted the river Chirchik, and isolated the city from communications with Kokand or Bukhara. He delayed attacking Tashkand, hoping that the city would be reduced by intrigue, if not then by confrontation in line with the sentiments of Gorchakov's circular:

It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet no hold upon them. The work has then always to be done over again from the beginning.⁷¹

Since his aspirations for peaceful reduction of the city were fruitless, Cherniaev strengthened his blockade. In May 1865 he received essential reinforcement from Orenburg which, according to Soviet historians, was essential for this campaign.⁷² Meanwhile he contacted the merchants of Tashkand who were desirous for peace with Russia. He received a merchant called Muhammad Saat Bai said to be in close relation with trade houses in Moscow, Nizhnii Novgorod, and Troitsk. Cherniaev described Saat Bai as "a civilized Muslim ready to go against the Quran if this would not jeopardize essential teachings of Islam".⁷³ This characterization of Saat

Bai denoted that the Russians had influenced certain elements in the city (some historians called them the disloyal party, others the peaceful party).⁷⁴

In the meantime the Muslim clergy of Tashkand decided to appeal for Bukharan assistance. They dispatched a mission to Bukhara, and upon receiving news of the advancing Bukharan army the Tashkandis declared their acceptance of Bukharan citizenship. In a precautionary move, Cherniaev therefore advanced to Chinaz to prevent the arrival of the Bukharan force. The Russian detachment returned before reaching its destination upon receiving news about the withdrawal of the Bukharan garrison from Chinaz.⁷⁵

The city was under increasing pressure from the Russian siege, and suffering from lack of water and provisions. In addition, the population was placed under psychological stress by Russian rumours that a fifth column in their city would attack the defenders from inside: "this subterfuge placed the inhabitants in great distress".⁷⁶ The Russians were both intriguing within and were strengthening their forces outside. Further encouragement from the General-quartermaster of the General Staff of Orenburg army was sent to Cherniaev urging him to take decisive action, saying that "the conquest of Tashkand had become a necessity".⁷⁷ While this was the situation around Tashkand, there arose a dispute between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War over the objectives and timing of the advance.⁷⁸ This controversy was triggered as a result of Britain's political remonstrations in St. Petersburg in 1864.⁷⁹

Due to uncertainty about his prospects of victory, Cherniaev sought to achieve the separation of the city from Kokand, without giving any evidence that Russia was behind this design. Stremoukhov, head of the Asiatic Department in the Foreign Office, proposed that this separation should be achieved without the visible assistance of Russia,⁸⁰ since Russia could not afford further sacrifices which would end up by maintaining the present situation and could not annex the city because of

the "undesirable consequences" that this would entail.⁸¹ Stremoukhov clearly was influenced in his recommendations by the pressure of Britain's protest against his country's proceedings in Central Asia. A nominally independent Tashkand under a Russian protectorate was favoured by Gorchakov, and became the guiding principle of the Russian Foreign Office's view of future relations with all the Khanates after its reduction to full dependency on Russia. Instructions for separating Tashkand from Kokand were enough for Cherniaev to act freely.

To pacify Bukhara, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs authorized Kryzhanovskii,⁸² Governor-General of Orenburg, to explain to Muzaffar, the Amir of Bukhara, the political changes that were taking place and to assure him of Russia's desire to develop commercial relations with Bukhara and her determination to avoid territorial augmentation. Gorchakov, by this communication, aimed at neutralizing Bukhara so as to be free to weaken Kokand by cutting off Tashkand, its largest city and economic centre. Meanwhile Cherniaev received further instructions from Kryzhanovskii warning him, in order to evade future complications, to separate Tashkand from both Kokand and Bukhara and put it under a direct Russian protectorate.⁸³

While these transactions were going on, the situation in Tashkand grew more tense, and more favourable for military action by the Russian forces after the arrival of the Kokandi force in the city. The Russian commander sent a message to the inhabitants of Tashkand conveying to them his desire to receive their representatives "to hear their requests and wishes".⁸⁴ This apparently political manoeuvre was however more of a psychological ploy to gain advantage ahead of the forthcoming assault. On the night of 14-15 June 1865 Cherniaev gave orders to storm the city. The Russian army breached the walls and entered the city after a three-day battle, 15-17 June, to find the whole city committed to resistance and the streets barricaded. However, on 17 June the *aksakals* (elders) met Cherniaev to offer him their condi-

tions for submission and peace. Cherniaev tried to extract from them a document stating that the city had voluntarily accepted the Russian authority,⁸⁵ so as to justify his action before European public opinion. In his effort to extract that document he summarily arrested all those who rejected his proposal and refused to sign. Under this threat from the victorious Cherniaev the elders found themselves obliged to put their seals to Cherniaev's declaration.⁸⁶

Sir Henry Rawlinson,[°] a member of the India Council, commented most perceptively and prophetically after the fall of Tashkand that "the fate of Kokand may be considered to have been sealed... The loss of Tashkand is in fact a death-blow to the independence of Kokand".⁸⁷

The Russian success naturally caused uncommon urgency in diplomatic circles. Lumley, Secretary of the British Embassy at St. Petersburg, was directed to raise the issue again with Gorchakov. He was assured by the Russian Foreign Minister that the Central Asian Khanates had become troublesome neighbours;⁸⁸ the occupation of Tashkand was explained to Great Britain as a necessary precondition for "organizing a fertile province... capable of supplying the Russian army with every necessary".⁸⁹ This explanation was followed by the usual assurances that the Tsar was not willing to expand his dominions and opposed any further advance.⁹⁰ Russian officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured Lumley that Russia required no further territorial aggrandizement on the frontiers of Kokand, since by the conquest of Chemkend and the territories she controlled, Tashkand and environs, she had in her possessions a fertile country capable of maintaining Russian armies between the rivers Chu and Syr Daria.⁹¹ Furthermore, to reduce British criticism, the Russian Government declared that Tashkand would be treated and considered as

[°]. Sir Henry Creswich Rawlinson (1810-1895) instructor to the Persian army 1833-1839, and in the following year was appointed as political assistant in Kabul; in 1843 political agent in Turkish Arabia, promoted to Consul-General at Baghdad in 1844; in 1856 became director of East India Company; in 1858 he became member of the India Council until 1895.

an independent city. Nevertheless on November 7, 1865 Buchanan reported to Clarendon his suspicions regarding Russia's intentions there saying that Russian authority seemed to be de facto established in Tashkand.⁹²

The seizure of Tashkand was not only a turning point in Central Asia, it also had far-reaching reverberations in Persian politics. The Shah reacted to it by urgently calling upon Great Britain to take steps to halt the Russian advance and to raise the urgent question with St. Petersburg of stopping it; also to open channels of communications with the Central Asian principalities for the assessment of the Russian aggression.⁹³ The Shah believed that, if the Russians reached Merv and Maimaneh, he would not be able to save Khorasan and Astrabad from their clutches.⁹⁴ He assured the British that his Government would do all it could to prevent the Turkomans of Merv and Maimaneh from provoking the Russians to further acts of aggression.⁹⁵

British public opinion was no less alarmed by Russia's forward movement in the region. The *Times* informed its readers that Russia was taking possession of key points in Central Asia from which she would be capable of threatening India.⁹⁶ Six months later, the *Times* repeated its warning, though this time it came in an article by Vambéry in which he stated that "the approach of Russia to Bukhara and Afghanistan is to be effected much sooner than the English politicians believe".⁹⁷ In response to these expressions of anxiety, and after the military operations of 1865 which gave Russia control over Tashkand, Prince Gorchakov again explained that Russia's intentions in Central Asia would prove to these alarmed persons in England, that their apprehensions were unfounded, and that the Emperor had no wish to extend the limits of the Empire, but was only desirous of establishing an orderly state of things on the frontiers.⁹⁸ These assurances may be added to the pile of empty undertakings, issued over the years temporarily to pacify Russia's opponents, but having no weight when Russia's interests were involved. The city of Tashkand

was annexed in 1867 and became the seat of Russian Government in the Region, the Turkestan Governorate with Kaufmann as its first Governor-General.

The period that followed the conquest of Tashkand in 1865 thus saw no diminution in the expansionist character of Russian policy. The fall of Tashkand was accepted with alacrity by the Emperor, and Cherniaev was rewarded with a diamond-hilted sword, in spite of the jealousy of Kryzhanovskii, his direct superior and Governor-General of Orenburg.⁹⁹ The Bukharan Amir remained loyal to the goal of relieving the population of Tashkand, although his forces were at the same time engaged on another battlefield, against Kokand. He contacted Cherniaev and demanded the evacuation of the city.¹⁰⁰ The situation thus became one of direct rivalry between Bukhara and St. Petersburg over Kokand. Miliutin, aware of increasing British pressure in regard to Russia's swift expansion, urged Cherniaev to be cautious and to adopt a policy of peaceful relations with Kokand.¹⁰¹ The Russian commander dispatched his envoy Struve to Bukhara, where however he was detained as a response to the detention of Najmud-Din, a Bukharan envoy had been sent to St. Petersburg but had been arrested at Kazala and deported to Orenburg.¹⁰² Thereupon Bukharan merchants in Russian controlled territories were detained as a reprisal for the detention of Struve. Kryzhanovskii not unnaturally became worried that these complications were leading Russian policy into an uncontrollable predicament. To reduce tension with Bukhara he declared Tashkand an independent city in September 1865: an action that probably would satisfy the Amir so long as Cherniaev did not at the same time attack Dzhizak.¹⁰³ Cherniaev was therefore accused of serious indiscretions and was recalled to St. Petersburg; he was replaced by General Romanovskii in March 1866.¹⁰⁴

The instructions which Romanovskii received from the Ministry of War included advice to guide him in his new position: it was said that Asians respected only force, and that the slightest lull or hesitation, not to speak of retreat, would be

interpreted as a sign of weakness.¹⁰⁵ It may therefore be understood that a newly-appointed General would hardly behave pacifically in the light of such provocative advice, especially as it came from the War Minister himself. Besides the soldier's usual eagerness for glory, which could not be obtained without a dramatic victory which would be appreciated in St. Petersburg, Romanovskii encountered several explosive issues that could provide a pretext for justifying the resumption of combat; of these not the least was the detention of Struve.¹⁰⁶

After the defeat by Romanovskii of the Amir's army near Ura Tepe on 8 May 1866, Bukharan resistance was notably enfeebled. Romanovskii took advantage of this to attack Khodzhand, a strategic city on the left bank of the Syr Daria between Dzhizak and Kokand, and took it on 24 May.¹⁰⁷ The new situation induced Kryzhanovskii in June 1866 to consider the conquest of the whole of Kokand. For this purpose he laboured to stabilize his authority in the already conquered territories, and to cover the expenses of the forthcoming campaign he began levying taxes. Meanwhile he directed Romanovskii to treat Khudayar, the Khan of Kokand, as a vassal of Russia, intimating to him that if he should resist then the Khanate would be liquidated.¹⁰⁸ Kryzhanovskii coveted for himself the conquest of Naman-gan and Kokand. He resorted to deception to get the necessary funding from St. Petersburg for the campaign: he wrote to Miliutin on 18 August 1866 that Romanovskii had reported to him that the Khan of Kokand behaved in an unfriendly manner towards Russians, and asked the Minister for assistance to the extent of 200,000 roubles, in addition to the 50,000 he had received earlier, for the reduction of either Kokand or Namangan.^f

^f. Terentiev says that Kryzhanovskii lied to the Minister because Romanovskii did not report to him about unfriendly attitude from Khudayar or ask for extra financial assistance. To cover the gloomy situation in which he found himself, Kryzhanovskii complicated the situation by escalating hostilities with Bukhara, giving Romanovskii free hand in that front in order to reconcile him. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, v. I, p. 362.

In September 1866 a Bukharan embassy arrived at Khodzhand to announce, as Terentiev put it, Bukhara's "full readiness" to meet all of Russia's requirements and to sign a peace treaty.¹⁰⁹ Kryzhanovskii was not looking for peace, and exploited the gifts which were sent to him by the Amir into a reason for further escalation in their conflict. He invented the idea that the Amir had intentionally sent such an insignificant gift, which was a piece of silk, in order to disdain him and the prestige of Russia. He included this story in his report to Miliutin. These proceedings indicated that he had already decided to go to war against Bukhara even before the end of the talks with the Bukharan envoy, who was told on 13 September 1866 that Bukhara must pay an indemnity of 100,000 tillas within ten days or Ura Tepe and Dzhizak would be taken.¹¹⁰ Kryzhanovskii's full intention will be readily understood if the reader considers that the ten-day period was not enough for the envoy to travel from Khodzhand to Bukhara and return back even if the money were already collected!

Kryzhanovskii wrote to Miliutin on 5 September 1866 that he would attack Bukhara forthwith if the conditions were not met. On September 20, three days before the expiration of the period, he moved his forces to a striking position against Bukhara. In the following month he conquered vast territories including three cities, Ura Tepe, Dzhizak, and Yani Kurgan.¹¹¹ These Russian conquests were large enough for the formation of a new military district, the Turkestan oblast, under General Kaufmann who replaced Romanovskii in 1867.

The formation of the Turkestan General-Governorship (1867)

The beginning of the 1860s had witnessed intensive political preparations for the second wave of conquests in Central Asia. Russia at that time achieved at home a number of essential reforms the most important of which was the liberation of the serfs in 1861, which released a not inconsiderable proportion of the peasantry for

resettlement or employment in remote parts of the Empire. Apparently the newly conquered regions of Central Asia were regarded as the optimum place for the purpose. Meanwhile St. Petersburg resolved to unite her Siberian and Orenburg frontiers in conformity with the plan of General Bezak which had been put to the government in 1861. The Russian conquests in the first half of the sixties were in part regarded as essential to the process of linking up and consolidating her frontiers.¹¹²

By 1867 Russia's conquests were vast and spectacular and led St. Petersburg to think of reorganizing its new acquisitions in the region. For this purpose a committee was created under Miliutin's presidency, the members being General Kryzhanovskii, governor of Orenburg, Stremoukhov, director of the Asiatic Department, Adjutant General Geiden, the chief of the General Staff, and all field Generals who had taken part in the recent operations in Central Asia, namely Cherniaev, Romanovskii, Vorontsov-Dashkov, besides Galkin, the State Counsellor. The committee included as well the four members of the Stepnoi Committee which was formed in 1865, Girs, Gutkovskii, Geins, and Protsenko. Kryzhanovskii was the only one among all of these to protest against the creation of a General-Governorship of Turkestan, and that for one main reason: the creation of this government would deprive him of his almost unlimited powers in Central Asia and turn him into a mere governor of an internal Russian oblast.¹¹³ The Emperor issued the decree (*Ukaz*) for the formation of the Turkestan Governorate on 11 July 1867 including in it the oblasts of Syr Daria and Semirechie, with its seat at Tashkand. These two subordinate oblasts were entrusted to two Military Governors accountable to the Governor-General himself. Kryzhanovskii continued to oppose the creation of the new administration, protesting that its remoteness would complicate communication with St. Petersburg, but his real reasons behind these objections lay in his fears that the result

would be an encroachment by St. Petersburg on his virtual independence of action in Central Asia.¹¹⁴

In practice, however, the formation of this government marked a new stage in Russia's advance without involving the central Government directly. The new governorate had many of the powers and authority of an independent state. It had its separate judicial, economic, political, and civil organisation, while the Governor-General had extraordinary powers both within the boundaries of the governorate and in dealing with its neighbours.¹¹⁵ On the eve of his departure from St. Petersburg to Tashkand, Kaufmann received directions to facilitate the colonisation of the newly acquired territories. For the extraordinary powers which had been endowed on him, Kaufmann won locally the title of "half-Tsar" (*Yarym Podshah*). St. Petersburg's purpose in creating such an administration was precisely to safeguard itself against Britain's political objections on the one hand, and to erect a centre of operation close to the Khanates to deal with them without international complications on the other. The success of the Government of Turkestan, which was the first Russian experience of the kind, led Russia to repeat the procedure by creating further centres of authority adjacent to her next targets.⁸ The last of these was the creation of the Transcaspian oblast in May 1881 with its seat in Askabad.¹¹⁶

⁸. The Russian administrative division of Central Asia consisted of five oblasts, while each of them was divided to regions (uezdy). The structure by 1900 was as follows:

- Syr Daria oblast consisted of the following uezds: Kazalinsk, Perovsk, Chimkend, Aulie Ata, and Tashkand (seat of the Government of the oblast).
- Ferghana oblast (Kokand): Kokand, Novyi Marghilan (capital of the oblast, later Skobelev), Andizhan, Namangan, and Osh.
- Samarkand oblast: Samarkand (administrative centre of the oblast), Katta Kurgan, and Dzhizak.
- Semirechie oblast: Vernyi (capital of the oblast), Kopal, Lespinsk, Prezhevsk, and Pishpek.
- Transcaspian oblast: Mangishlak, Krasnovodsk, Askabad (seat of the Government), Tedzhen, and Merv.

The Reduction of Bukhara (1868)

As we have seen, Russia's conquests were large enough by 1867 for the formation of a new governorate headed by an Engineer-General, Kaufmann, who was chosen by Alexander II personally.¹¹⁷ The Tsar himself invested him with exceptional authority to deal with the Khanates of Central Asia. He began his task together with Kryzhanovskii by working out a draft treaty in September 1867, according to which the Bukharan Amir would be required to grant safe passage for Russian merchants, to give Russia's nationals equal rights with Bukharans, to accept Russian agents in Bukhara, to pay a war indemnity, and to consult the Russian authorities in Tashkand before getting entering into relations with any foreign power:¹¹⁸ this last provision involving a near protectorate status.

Kaufmann reported to Miliutin on 13 November 1867 that Russia's authority in Tashkand was not yet secure, and that only inhabitants of the Indian minority expressed their loyalty, while the rest of the population showed restraint, indifference, and even disrespect towards the administration. He concluded his letter by stating that the mood there was unpleasant, and readiness existed among the population to take advantage of any suitable opportunity in a fitting situation, to rid themselves of Russian authority.¹¹⁹

Terentiev commented that the conquered territories were vast enough and that the time had come to organize and stabilize. In July 1867 the Turkestan oblast became the Turkestan General-Governorship, and, as mentioned earlier, included Syr Daria and Semirechie with its seat in Tashkand and Kaufmann as its first Governor-General.¹²⁰ The new government of Turkestan was no less ambitious than the previous ones: its officials almost at once in 1867 sent a report to the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Office emphasizing the necessity of annexing Samarkand for the safety of Russia's other possessions in the region. This report coincided with the prevailing tendency in St. Petersburg, which was towards augmenting Russia's

influence in Bukhara, the key to the Amu Daria basin. St. Petersburg evidently feared the expansion of Britain's influence in that Khanate, and Britain's attempts to turn it into a buffer state. Both Tashkand and St. Petersburg feared that the British would finance and arm the Amir of Bukhara, which they regarded as threatening and as inevitably leading to the end of Russia's influence. Hence the Russians in Tashkand resolved, as we have already seen, to insist on Russia's merchants having a free hand in the Bukharan market, and to demand such political privileges as would lead to binding the Khanate economically and politically to the Empire. The Tsar was in favour of this approach,¹²¹ which was intended to lead to the exclusion of British influence and the incorporation of Bukhara.

While the correspondence between Kaufmann and the Amir of Bukhara concerning the ratification of the proposed treaty of 26 September 1867 was proceeding, the situation was tense and rival factions within Bukhara were opposing the Amir's policy.¹²² Receiving the draft treaty which was signed by Kryzhanovskii and approved by the Tsar, Kaufmann added two articles: one providing for free access to all the towns in Bukhara, and the second stipulating that future communications between the two countries should be exclusively between the Amir and the Governor-General of Turkestan, i.e. Kaufmann himself. The draft treaty included twelve articles: the first drew the border line between the two states along the Kashgardavan range along the Nurata mountains to Kizyl-kum desert, then along the Bukantau chain to the mouth of the Syr daria. The second, closely related to the first and designed to guard against geographical error and to provide Russia with reliable reasons for future modifications, stated that the "contracting parties reserve to themselves the right of deputing trustworthy agents for the purpose of making a more precise definition of the boundary on the spot".¹²³ The other clauses gave Russia free access to all the Bukharan towns, and the Russian merchants the right of possessing caravanserais, acquiring permanent property in Bukhara, and appointing

their agents in Bukhara.¹²⁴ The Amir was to be held responsible for the safety of Russian caravans.

Kaufmann handed the treaty to a Bukharan envoy for ratification by the end of October 1867, and at the same time he entrusted the envoy with a letter to the Amir. The letter incorporated the usual pretensions to Russian hegemony and employed the same intimidating language that had been used in previous communication with the Bukharan Amir and the other Central Asian rulers. In this letter Kaufmann affirmed that war was inevitable,

if our neighbours do not observe the sacredness of treaties, the inviolability of our frontier, and the necessity for acting with justice towards Russian subjects. Recent events will doubtless have afforded an example of this, and will restrain every one from becoming the enemy of Russia.¹²⁵

The Bukharan ratification of the treaty and reply to the letter was however delayed until mid-November due to an unintended geographical error: the Russians had confused the location of some localities included in the treaty and thus rendered its ratification impossible. The Russians had assumed that there was one mountain range called Nurata, but it turned out that there were two and that a Bukharan Bekship by the same name existed between them.¹²⁶ Kaufmann affected to consider the delay as a refusal on the part of the Amir to accept the treaty, and rejected the Bukharan explanation. In St. Petersburg the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured Rumbold, the British ambassador, that Kaufmann was a loyal adherent of the views of the Emperor and opposed any further advance in Central Asia.¹²⁷ Gorchakov reassured Rumbold that Kaufmann

had gone back to his command with the amplest instructions to live on terms of peace and amity with Bukhara and the other states bordering on the Russian possessions.¹²⁸

The *Voennyi Zhurnal*, the organ of the War Ministry, wrote on 1 June 1868, in direct contradiction to Gorchakov's assurances, that Russia would be obliged by circumstances, and by strategic considerations, after the arrival of reinforcements "to advance, and that not later than next year".¹²⁹ In these matters, the British were

hampered by the absence of reliable intelligence except for reports based on individual observations, which mostly were either incomplete or not to the point and exaggerated.¹³⁰

During this period Muzaffar, the Amir of Bukhara, communicated to the Governments of Kokand, Afghanistan, Khiva, and Kashgar a proposal for the creation of a coalition to resist Russian advance.¹³¹ The Amir, taught by the experience of previous failures, resolved to avoid opposing Russia alone, and sent Muhammad Faris as far afield as India and Turkey for assistance; the negotiations with both Governments were however fruitless.¹³² The Bukharan Amir found himself with only one realistic option, that is to try to secure the recovery of Ura-Tepe and Dzhizak by political means. The Russians as well were ready, for the time being, to avoid another round of hostilities while Kaufmann was arranging to visit St. Petersburg. However, after receiving intelligence reports about Bukharan activities in Naryn and Altishahr, the Governor-General resolved to postpone his journey which had been fixed for April 1868.¹³³

Skirmishes on the frontier between the Bukharan possessions and the Russian domains, between ambitious Russian officers and disaffected Bukharan Beks, inflamed the situation. A group of Bukharan troops arrested Captain Sluzhenko with three soldiers, who apparently were engaged in a reconnaissance mission between Chinaz and Dzhizak. Kaufmann demanded their immediate release and ratification of the draft treaty without delay.¹³⁴ The officer and his companions were released in March 1868, but no word about the treaty was received, for the Bukharan authorities were still insistent upon defining the exact location of the boundaries mentioned in it.¹³⁵ Despite the release of the officer and his companions, Kaufmann thereupon determined to attack Samarkand after receiving a messenger from a disloyal Bukharan party, led by Jura Bek and Baba Bek, promising him assistance against the Amir, on the condition that their neutrality should not be compromised.¹³⁶

The Amir was under increasing pressure from his subjects, and notably the *Ulema*, to fight Russia. In search of funds for a costly war, he imposed new taxes, not exempting the Mullahs¹³⁷ and even so delayed the war due to financial difficulties, while claiming he was seeking a better opportunity to combat the Russians. The Amir thus began to be publicly criticized and accused of cowardice.¹³⁸ His internal foes became almost as formidable as his external: "the clergy (*Ulema*) of Bukhara and Samarkand were urging him to declare holy war".¹³⁹ While he was away from the capital the Mullahs and militant Beks agitated the people and declared war against Russia. The Amir had then little alternative, but to lose his throne or to consent to war, before he had completed his political arrangements and military preparations.¹⁴⁰ Hastily he sent an envoy to the Russians with a modified peace treaty. His proposed treaty was rejected by Kaufmann, who ordered his army to march from Yani Kurgan and Samarkand if the Bukharans would not consent to his original treaty within two days.¹⁴¹ In this tense situation a Bukharan Bek, Jura Bek by name, led an attack upon the Russians at Dzhizak.¹⁴² Kaufmann cancelled his proposed trip to St. Petersburg and attacked Samarkand. The Amir personally had little hope of success; even though he was in a desperate situation in confronting the war party in his own country, he made an appeal to Russia to halt the hostilities for two days. Kaufmann, who was rejoicing in these opportune developments, granted him two hours.¹⁴³ On the resumption of hostilities the Bukharan army could not withstand the Russian forces and dispersed, and the gates of Samarkand were locked by the inhabitants. On the next day the *aksakals* (elders) of Samarkand were sent to Kaufmann asking for the safety of the city and the safety of its inhabitants.¹⁴⁴ Samarkand was conquered on 14 May 1868.¹⁴⁵ For this dazzling victory the forward party in St. Petersburg, voiced its opinion the *Voennyi zhurnal* and offered the following justification:

We have reached the limit where we have no longer any choice and where any delay or irresolution could only complicate matters. Our troops have

taken Samarkand and are only three or four marches from Bukhara... If we are to remain in close contiguity to the Emir under a treaty which will only give the enemy time to rally, it will be indispensable to increase our force in Central Asia by several battalions and some sotnias of Cossacks, to strengthen our garrisons, establish more forts, and that is to say that we are to waste our strength year by year in teaching the Bukharans how to fight.¹⁴⁶

The fall of Samarkand gave Russia exclusive control over the water supply of the Zeravshan upon which Bukhara depended for irrigation. The Amir therefore marched with his army against Katta Kurgan, half way between the city of Bukhara and Samarkand. Golovachev, the commander of the Russian army, who thus found himself in a perilous situation, asked Kaufmann for assistance.¹⁴⁷ Kaufmann rushed to his General's help, and the Amir was defeated at Zerbulak heights on 26 June 1868.¹⁴⁸

Following the Bukharan defeat the Amir fled to Kermineh and declared his intention to end the war with Russia unconditionally, giving Kaufmann the necessary permission to annex the Khanate in its entirety.¹⁴⁹ However, Kaufmann was fully aware of the international difficulties that might face his country if he annexed Bukhara. Thus he re-instated the defeated Amir and assisted him to put down the revolt which was led by his son Abdal-Malik in Karshi.¹⁵⁰ The authority of the Amir was firmly re-established, and Karshi was annexed to Bukhara on 27 October 1868.¹⁵¹ After the victory over Abdal-Malik, Kaufmann formed the Zeravshan district from territories newly annexed at Bukhara's expense, regardless of the protest of his opponents in the Treasury and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who were mostly worried about the financial burden that might be involved. Kaufmann however had presented them with an accomplished fact.¹⁵² Furthermore, Kaufmann's forward policy was favoured by many influential elements of Russian society, such as merchants and industrialists, who established in December 1865 an organisation called the Moscow-Tashkand Trade Association. Members of this committee were heavily involved in attempting to influence Russian policy in the region. Thus when the Bukharan Amir was short of money, as a result of his war

against his recalcitrant son, and could not therefore pay the due instalment of the imposed indemnity to Russia, one member of this association, Khludov by name, offered a loan to the Bukharan Amir if the Imperial Government would guarantee the loan.¹⁵³ Kaufmann duly welcomed the enterprise, believing that it would put the Bukharans under the influence of Russian capital, and so enhance Russia's political as well as economic influence.¹⁵⁴

This victory over Bukhara opened to Russia the horizon for further conquests. In St. Petersburg, despite the repeatedly declared policy of no further advance or new acquisitions, voices were raised advocating the annexation of what Russia had conquered. The Emperor's previous assurances were abandoned. Regarding Samarkand, Gorchakov assured the British Government that it was the desire of the Emperor to restore it to Bukhara, but that there was some difficulty in ascertaining that this could be done without a "loss of dignity" and without obtaining some "guarantee for the welfare of the populations which had accepted Russian citizenship".¹⁵⁵ In view of the fact that Kaufmann had no intention or instructions to withdraw, Gorchakov's promise was meant merely to gain time for consolidating Russia's position, a reminder of earlier and by now traditional Russian practice. The guide lines of that policy would deter any Russian official from withdrawal so long as the conquest was perceived as an advance achieved

at the cost of so many sacrifices, and to face back... would evidently be incompatible with the dignity of Russia and with the views of the Government.¹⁵⁶

There was therefore no reason to suppose that Gorchakov's assurances would bind Russia to any action other than what St. Petersburg perceived to be in conformity with its larger interests.

Even so Gorchakov tried to reassure Buchanan that Kaufmann would be able, in compliance with the instructions sent to him, to make arrangements which would enable the Russian troops to withdraw without compromising the safety of Samar-

kand and its inhabitants. However in the absence of impartial observers, Russia would be able to create conditions and influence events in the way that would serve her purposes. The Russian goal was to pacify other interested and anxious parties, mainly Britain, until it would be too late for them to protest, and Russia's occupation would have become a *fait accompli*. In pursuit of this goal of reassuring the British, speaking to Lord Clarendon in September 1869, Prince Gorchakov stated that the Emperor considered, and that he entirely shared his opinion, that an extension of territory would be an extension of weakness, and that Russia had no intention of going further south. As a proof of this determination, he added that it was the intention of the Emperor not to retain Samarkand.¹⁵⁷ In practice no efforts were made by either the War Ministry or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to realize that intention, and instead they followed a completely different course. Abramov, the commander of the Russian troops in Samarkand, with the consent of Kaufmann, sent a message to the Bukharan Amir offering him peace based on terms which revealed that Russia had no intention of withdrawal: first, Bukhara should acquiesce in the cession of Samarkand and Russia's sovereignty over the city; second, she should pay a war indemnity; and third, she must recognize Russia's rights over all the territories conquered since 1865.¹⁵⁸ These terms were designed to create difficulties which would so complicate the situation that a Russian retreat from previous assurances would be held to be justified.

It was clear from procedures adopted by the Russian Government that there was no intention of evacuating the town or restoring it to the Amir.¹⁵⁹ Gorchakov, in order to deflect attention from intended action against Khiva, to justify his government's policy in Central Asia and to provoke British action against Afghanistan, expressed his desire in an interview in 1872 with Loftus, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, to see the Governments of India and of Russia exercising their influence over the "Asiatic States on their frontiers", and blamed Great Britain for




paying "money to the ruler of Afghanistan, while Russia was exacting a war indemnity from the Khan of Bukhara". It is obvious from Gorchakov's discussion that he was anxious to see Britain involved in expansionist activity against Afghanistan, instead of monitoring Russian activities in Bukhara. His aim was no less than inflaming the region through political intrigues: he even reflected in favour of a *more* active British policy in the region when he said that the influence of the Government of India "should be greater at Kabul, and more should be expected from it".¹⁶⁰

All these political manoeuvres were aimed at providing a justification for retaining Samarkand. Buchanan reported in July 1870 that the Imperial Government now maintained that it could not with credit to itself, nor in justice to the inhabitants, restore Samarkand to the Government of Bukhara.¹⁶¹ On these grounds Russia annexed the city.


Throughout its advance in Central Asia, Russia insisted on its willingness that a "complete entente cordiale should be maintained between Russia and England in Asia".¹⁶² Even though both Britain and Russia were in many respects similar as colonial powers in Asia, there were also essential differences between them, the most evident being that the conquering Russian armies were followed by Russian settlers to reshape the demography of her colonies. Russia's assurances to Great Britain and other European powers in the diplomatic circles in St. Petersburg were no doubt temporarily convincing, but her real practices in Central Asia were totally different and guided by other principles. While her Generals, Cherniaev, Romanovskii, and Kaufmann were advancing from Peshpek and the river Chu, to Tashkand, Khodzhand, Samarkand, and the capital of Bukhara, Prince Gorchakov was feigning innocence, denying any desire for annexation, and justifying Russia's practices as uncontrollable wars imposed upon her by the Central Asians.¹⁶³

The fate of Bukhara was decided by the treaty of 14 June 1868, which was a modification of the draft treaty of September 1867, and by the treaty of 23 July 1873. These treaties determined the fate of Bukhara in the Russian strategy in the region. Kaufmann himself acknowledged that the terms of these agreements resolved the Bukharan issue in Russia's favour. After the imposition of Russia's dominion over Bukhara, and the liquidation of her independence, the Amir became totally reliant on the Russian agent in Bukhara, although nominally he was still in charge of the internal affairs of his country, and Bukhara became totally dependent on Russia and her regional administration, the government of Turkestan province.¹⁶⁴

After victory over Bukhara, Russia's hegemony over the whole region was notably enhanced.¹⁶⁵ The Central Asian markets became dominated and exclusively controlled by Russian merchants. Tenacious Khiva and the Turkomans then became the next target of Russian intrigue in promoting her inexorable southward advance.



MUHAMED RAHIM BOGADUR KHAN. *From the 'Graphic.'*



General Golovatchev

Chapter Four

THE SUBJECTION OF KHIVA AND THE MENACE TO AFGHANISTAN

The conquest of Khiva left Russia face to face with the Turkomans. These hardy sons of the desert, kinsmen of the Osmanli who all but conquered Europe ... The capture and practical annexation of Khiva secured to Russia possession of the central point in the curved line which threatened the frontier of India...

Malleon, *The Russo-Afghan Question and the Invasion of India*, (1885).

Traditional attitudes and new prospects

British alarm about Cherniaev's campaign against Kokand in the early 1860s was to some extent pacified by Gorchakov's wordy circular to which reference has already been made. Yet the following years, despite repeated Russian assurances that the Emperor had no desire to acquire more territory at the expense of his neighbours,¹ witnessed the fall of Central Asian cities one after the other, until Kokand was crippled, the prestige of Bukhara was destroyed, and the Khanate was reduced to a Russian satellite by the treaties of 1868 and 1873 . Khiva was dismembered and the Khan acknowledged himself as the "humble servant" of the Tsar. Meanwhile the British Government made several protests against the extension of the Russian dominions.² The British policy of "masterly inactivity"³ relied upon the frequent promises that Russia had given, and the belief that she would be bound by her verbal assurances and written guarantees to Britain.⁴ This policy was based also on the assumption that it would be to the advantage of British rule that British India have as its neighbour in Central Asia a powerful Russian Empire for two reasons: first, Britain would have a reasonable and responsible neighbour with which to conduct political negotiations, instead of hordes of fanatical savages; and second, in a settled condition, Central Asia would be a better customer for the export and import trade of India.⁵

Public opinion as well as political opinion was captured by the idea that the Russian expansion in Central Asia promised

to substitute civilization, albeit not of the highest type, for the grovelling superstition, the cruelty, the depravity, the universal misery which now prevail in the Uzbek and Afghan principalities.⁶

There was an apparent disposition, prevailed among British politicians and observers, to overlook Russian ambition in its early stages and to believe that the Russian annexation would result in

a reasonable and responsible neighbour with whom to conduct political negotiations, instead of hordes of fanatic savages on whom no reliance can be placed; and secondly, because Central Asia, in a settled condition and under European Government, would naturally be a better customer, both in regard to the export and import trade of India, than the barbarians who now encircle our North-West frontier with transit duties and prohibitive tariffs, who are too poor to purchase our manufactures, and too indolent to supply our markets with their own produce.⁷

The image of the Central Asian states as the cradle of barbarism and anarchy, that dominated the liberal press in England, substantially contributed to welcoming the Russian advance as a progress of civilization against barbarism, and knowledge against ignorance. This assumption was however coupled with a conviction of the inviolability of the Indian north-western frontier. The Russians on their side were of course interested in nourishing this theory, and in that direction they portrayed the Central Asians in the worst possible light to European opinion, assisted in their exertions by the mischievous internal and external policies of the Khans and Amirs of Central Asia.

All of these opinions took as their starting-point the celebrated observation of Sir Robert Peel in 1844, when he said that "when civilization and barbarism come into contact, the latter must inevitably give way". This phrase was so effective that some observers were evidently prepared to regard the extinction of the governments of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva as both necessary and desirable, and to regard any effort on the part of the British government to stop Russia as groundless.⁸

Russia subtly exploited these opinions and implanted them in her foreign policy, which was designed to portray Russia as the carrier of the banner of civilization against Asiatic barbarism: an image that later crystallized in the alleged "civilizing role of Russia", and was then introduced to the European Courts officially in A. M. Gorchakov's circular of November 21, 1864.

This duplicitous Russian policy, which was the natural result of Russia's insatiable thirst for conquest and susceptibility to Britain's reactions,⁹ was expressed in the assurances of Prince Gorchakov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of other officials in his office, and even on occasion of the Emperor himself, and it evidently reassured to some extent British official opinion, and activated the Russophile party in England, which up to 1878 asserted that Russia had no intention of disturbing British India.¹⁰ While preparing for the invasion of Khiva, Russia succeeded in eliminating British apprehension about the security of the Afghan frontiers. Buchanan, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, reported to Clarendon that he was assured by Prince Gorchakov that Afghanistan lay entirely without the range of Russian political interests and it was hoped that this would be considered equivalent to an engagement that Russia would abstain from any interference in the affairs of that country.¹¹ Russia frequently affirmed the neutrality of Afghanistan and expressed its readiness to negotiate on the issue with Great Britain; and Prince Gorchakov received this idea positively.¹² These Russian promises not to intervene in Afghanistan neutralized Britain's opposition. Meanwhile Russian policy was concerned not to irritate Britain or appear to threaten her possessions in India before the conquest of Central Asia should be complete, otherwise Britain would have been obliged to pursue a much more active policy regarding Central Asia, in order to safeguard Afghanistan and secure her Indian possessions, a line of policy that would have severely affected Russian designs in Central Asia.¹³

The first serious Russian move against Khiva from the west was in 1856

when it was declared that the Russians intended to remove their station on the Caspian island of Ashurada to the mainland, at Hasan Kuli at the mouth of the River Attrek, on the ground that the sea, driven by heavy gales, had made serious encroachment on the island.¹⁴ In the following November the Russians dispatched 3,000 men with four guns from Petrovskii on the Caspian to Kizyl Su (later renamed Krasnovodsk) at Balkan Bey, with the avowed object of occupying that place, in order to open out a road thence to Khiva and the rest of Turkestan. The Persian Government did not detect at that time that the Russian objective was the subjugation of the Turkoman tribes who were inhabiting the territory between the Attrek river and Khiva, and believed the Russian story. The Shah addressed a Firman to the Governor of that region^a saying that the Russians "intended having a port at Kizyl-Su for their commerce with Turkestan, and that such a step would in no way injuriously affect Persia, its subjects or tribes".¹⁵ The governor warned in his reply that many evils would rise from the Russian presence at Kizyl-Su. During this period of slow correspondence between the Governor and Teheran, the Russians made considerable advances on the eastern coast of the Caspian and inside Turkestan in the direction of Khiva.¹⁶ Prince Gorchakov denied in 1869 that the Russian Government had any intention of dispatching a military expedition against Khiva, and repeated to Buchanan that recent Russian activities on the eastern coast of the Caspian sea were intended for the protection of a factory and fort at Krasnovodsk.¹⁷

The Russian press began a campaign against Khiva, urging the government to consult only the interest of Russia in determining the course to be pursued after the capture of Khiva, and loudly protested against the right of any foreign power (particularly Britain) to interfere in the progress of Russia in Central Asia.¹⁸

^a. The issue of confused boundaries between Russia and Central Asia, which I have discussed earlier, existed also between the Khivans and the Persians. This territory was disputed between the two Governments, while the Turkomans, with their feudal wars and internal rivalry against each other, contributed to the confusion of which Russia took full advantage.

However the *Golos* even went to the extreme in order to alienate increasing suspicion in Russian political assurances saying that "the reduction of Khiva would not be understood in Central Asia, except a symptom of weakness on the part of Russia".¹⁹ Nevertheless Russian policy and intentions were clearly reflected in the semi-official press, and was marked by its warning language towards Britain:

Russia is not Burmah or Kashmir that she should be compelled to have recourse to duplicity and humiliating insincerity, she can lay down rational territorial boundaries for herself, and defend them when necessary, with a powerful hand.²⁰

Despite all evidences, Prince Gorchakov denied categorically to Buchanan during an interview that Russia had any plans against Khiva, and opened the Turkoman issue by saying that they were not under either Khivan or Persian sovereignty; he maintained that the claim of the Shah over the Turkoman territories was no stronger than the claim of "the King of Italy to the throne of Jerusalem".²¹ He declared that the conquest of Khiva would actually be embarrassing to the Russian Government rather than an advantage.²² The British consul at Teheran was absolutely correct when he reported in 1869, just after the reduction of Bukhara, that future Russian activities in the region would start from Krasnovodsk, the nearest port on the Caspian to Khiva and the Turkoman country.²³ Russia, after the reduction of Bukhara in 1868, began preparing for the absorption of Khiva, her long standing objective in the region. Meanwhile in March 1873, she diverted the attention of the British Government and the Government of India towards Kaufmann's activities and correspondence with the Afghan Amir regarding the provinces of Wakhan and Badakhshan, which nearly led to war between Afghanistan and Bukhara backed by the Russian Government.²⁴ The Russian purpose behind this manoeuvre was obviously to screen her preparations for invading Khiva.

Even before the campaign against Khiva, British public opinion once again became concerned at Russian proceedings in Central Asia. Granville communicated this to Loftus, saying that as a result of Russia's advances a "certain amount of

excitement and susceptibility had been caused in the public mind of this country on account of questions connected with Central Asia".²⁵ This state of affairs was the natural result of Russia's advance in a period characterized by a Russian contemporary account as follows:

under the pressure of Government necessities, Russia, in the last eight years [from 1865 to the conquest of Khiva in 1873], stood on a firm foot in Central Asia, parts of which are either incorporated in the Empire, or recognize her moral and political influence.²⁶

At the close of 1872, while St. Petersburg was busy planning for the invasion of Khiva, Count Shchovalov was dispatched by the Emperor on a confidential special mission to London, to have a personal interview with Earl Granville.²⁷ The Emperor sought to pacify and prevent any misunderstanding with England.²⁸ Russian policy was influenced by two factors; the first, was that the growing British interest in maintaining Khiva's independence required Russia to be more cautious in her dealings in Central Asia; the second, was the growing tension with Germany.²⁹ The British Government seems to have received confidential information about the expected Russian encroachment upon Khiva, but was nevertheless willing to trust the assurances which came from St. Petersburg. In 1872 confidential and reliable news of Russia's military preparations against Khiva were received, but they were regarded as no more than reconnaissance moves made by Russia, with the double object of obtaining information, and for the purpose of proving to the Khan that he was not beyond the reach of Russian military action.³⁰ British susceptibilities obliged Russia to soften her tone in Central Asia. Thus the mission of Shchuvalov was followed on January 31, 1873 by Gorchakov's dispatch in which he agreed to the boundary line of northern Afghanistan which was drawn by Britain.³¹ Thus, while the preparation and the concentration of four Russian armies in striking positions was going on quietly, the Emperor agreed to all demands made by Great Britain as regards to the security of Afghanistan.

Prince Gorchakov, in a meeting with the British ambassador at St. Petersburg

in 1869, had assured him that Afghanistan was looked upon by Russia as a neutral territory to separate the possessions of the two Empires in Asia. Gorchakov had even stated that he was willing to include in this neutral zone some territories south of the Oxus disputed between Khiva and Bukhara before the Russian conquest.³² The Amir of Afghanistan however in 1873, before the conquest of Khiva, expressed alarm about Russia's real political conduct, saying that it was "impossible for the Russians to remain always firm in their negotiations".³³ His fears sprang from the expectation that the Russians, once in possession of Khiva, undoubtedly would endeavour to extend their influence southward over the Turkomans of Merv. Sher Ali assumed that these tribes would seek refuge in Badghiz in the province of Herat, providing the Russians, "if they do not desist from their misbehaviour", with the needed pretext to intervene in Afghanistan.³⁴ Subsequent developments proved the validity of his judgment, and the Chief of the Merv Turkomans sent his son to Kabul for permission "to take shelter in Badghiz in case they should not be able to oppose the Russians".³⁵

The main point at issue over the Afghan frontier at that time was that of the provinces of Badakhshan and Wakhan on the northern frontiers of Afghanistan. The information received in London from the Government of India showed that these provinces belonged to Sher Ali. Russia made the appropriate concession and St. Petersburg, in a designed move to secure Britain's faith, agreed that these regions "should not be a cause of difference between the two countries".³⁶ Later Stremoukhov, Director of the Asiatic Department, in defiance of these recent assurances, disputed the existence of any rights of the Amir of Kabul over Badakhshan and Wakhan, saying that the information of General Kaufmann, who opposed any concessions, was more reliable than that of the Government of India. When Loftus asked him why Russia had consented to including them in Afghanistan, he replied: "the English were very violent on the subject and even threatened us with war.

There was therefore nothing else for us to do".³⁷

The British Government was fully aware that Russia would retaliate against Khiva for its supposed subversive activities among the Turkomans on the shores of the Caspian sea:³⁸ but did not oppose it actively, trusting in Russian assurances that the Emperor had no desire to acquire territory. The Imperial Government informed London that the Khivan expedition would have the object of punishing acts of brigandage, of recovering fifty Russian prisoners, and of teaching the Khan that such conduct must not continue; in the same communication Russia assured Britain once more that she would not take possession of Khiva, and that instructions were given not to prolong the occupation of Khiva.³⁹ It was not only "far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it".⁴⁰ Count Shchuvalov during his visit to London at the beginning of 1873 requested Earl Granville to give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter.⁴¹ Prince Gorchakov repeated that the Emperor was determined that "on no pretext whatever was the Expedition to remain at Khiva" and positive instructions to this effect had been given to General Kaufmann, commander of the expedition.⁴² The objectives of the expedition as communicated to the British Government were "to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe".⁴³

On his return to St. Petersburg Shchuvalov called on Loftus and repeated to him the assurances given by the Emperor regarding Khiva, and his opposition to the extension of Russia's territory southward.⁴⁴ Similar assurances of course had been given by the Imperial Government regarding Samarkand and Bukhara, but when the favourable moment came, these assurances were discarded without the smallest hesitation.⁴⁵ When Russia breached these promises, justification was readily found in changing circumstances which were held to oblige the Imperial Government to

renounce its previous promulgations.⁴⁶ There was equally no guarantee that circumstances would remain the same regarding the assurances about Khiva. From Russia's repeated assurances, as circulated by the Emperor and Prince Gorchakov, compared with her actual practice, the sceptical observer might reasonably entertain doubts about the validity of the word of the Tsar as well as of his ministers.⁴⁷

Soon, indeed, the *Moscow Gazette*, the mouthpiece of the Russian foreign ministry, questioned whether the promise given in the name of the Emperor in respect of the evacuation of Khiva had the force of an international engagement, or was merely a declaration of views subject to modification according to the march of events.⁴⁸ The *Gazette*, seeking to demonstrate Russia's unwillingness to acquire more territory, observed that Russia had left both Kokand and Bukhara independent not by compulsion, but by her free will.⁴⁹ However it avoided the uncomfortable truth that Russia had annexed a considerable part of the territories of Kokand and Bukhara leaving them weakened, and ignored the treaties that bound both Bukhara and Kokand to Russia, put them at the mercy of the Governor-General, turned them into a closed market for Russian trade and severely restricted their independence. In general the Russian semi-official press orchestrated the denunciation of "the idea of giving up Khiva if it should fall into the possession of Russia".⁵⁰ Britain's standpoint regarding the contradictions between Russia's declarations and practices, was exemplified in Gladstone's statement to the House of Commons, that:

England had entered into no engagement towards Russia, and that Russia had consequently entered into no engagement towards England.⁵¹

This declaration evidently left both parties free to act as they might deem fit. Subsequently, Gorchakov himself insisted on clarifying the terms "assurances" and "engagements" used in Loftus' dispatch of May 10, 1873 and referred to in another dispatch dated May 14, 1873: in a further interview with Loftus he stated that he could not accept these terms as applying to his statements regarding Russia's policy towards Khiva.⁵²

Russia by that time had completed her preparations and wanted to rid herself of engagements that would limit her freedom of action during and after the conquest of Khiva, as her earlier practices had shown that she usually preferred to wait for suitable circumstances and then formulate her policy, rather than declaring proceedings in advance which might then be falsified by events. Count Shchuvalov stated at the end of May that "no assurances have been given nor engagements taken by Russia towards England in regard to Khiva".⁵³ This language on the eve of the Khivan expedition, was no doubt ominous for the future of Khiva. Loftus observed that the situation was analogous to recent Russian practice regarding Tashkand, which Russia had undertaken to restore to independence but which had ended up as the seat of the Russian administration in the region; and also Samarkand, which had been annexed to Russia regardless of repeated assurances that it would be restored to the Amir of Bukhara.⁵⁴

The conquest of Khiva (1873) and the confrontation with Britain

The Russian Government began concentrating its forces and dispatching war material from Baku to Krasnovodsk. St. Petersburg attacked Khiva with four armies; the Caucasian from the west, the Orenburg combined with the Turkestan armies, and the west Siberian regiments.^b The Russian forces, according to Western and Russian

^b. The invasion of Khiva by four armies meant that Russia either ill-informed about the strength of Khiva, or that she could not withstand a risk of defeat in Central Asia. She mobilized four armies to attack Khiva from three different sides: Turkestan and West Siberian armies advanced from the east, consisted of 21 infantry battalions, 8 cavalry sotnias, 20 guns, 8 rocket propellers. Total infantry were 3,420 soldiers, 1,150 cavalry, 677 artillery soldiers accompanied by 1654 horses. Russia did not need any more the huge number of transport animals which she used to mobilize in her previous expeditions because this time she was operating from bases in Central Asia itself not from remote Orenburg. *Khivinskii pokhod*, pp. 11-12. The second army was that of Orenburg, advancing from the north, and consisted of 3,461 combatants carried on 1,797 horses. *Khivinskii pokhod*, pp. 48-49. And the third army was the Caucasian, which advanced from the west and was divided into two divisions: Krasnovodskii division, 20 companies, 3 sotnias, and 18 guns; and Mangishlakskii division with unspecified number of soldiers or equipment, for it was engaged in suppressing
(continued...)

sources, exceeded 10,000 soldiers, among which there were at least 4,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and twelve guns.⁵⁵

After stabilizing her position in Bukhara, the Russian Government had begun as early as 1869 to concentrate contingents from the Caucasian army in Krasnovodsk on the eastern coast of the Caspian, under the command of Stoletov. During the period from 1869 until 1873 this army was occupied in extensive reconnaissance activities.⁵⁶ By the occupation of Krasnovodsk Khiva became encircled from three sides. The Tsar this time wanted to ensure the success of the expedition, and decided to send four armies from three sides: two armies from the west; the Caucasian army under Colonel Markozov,[°] and another from Kinderly Bay under the instruction of Colonel Lomakin; from the north the Orenburg army under General Verevkin, and from the east the Turkestan army under the command of Kaufmann himself. The Caucasian army due to better supply and communications with Baku took charge of covering the southern flank. Thus from the beginning the officers of this army included in their reconnaissance activities territories inhabited by the Turkomans and

^b.(...continued)

the Mangishlak uprising in January 1873, and was decided to join the expedition in later time. *Khivinskii pokhod*, pp. 58-60, 75-76.

[°]. Markozov could not reach Khiva and retreated. On June 16th this news were confirmed in St. Petersburg to stir deep feeling not only of regret but of apprehension and disappointment as well. Notwithstanding the General was not blamed for failure to reach his destination because the Minister of War evaluated his officer's position in his diary as "physically impossible to go forward". Nonetheless Markozov was mildly blamed for unfortunate choice of his route to Khiva. Miliutin mentioned that Markozov made a mistake by irritating the Turkomans and surveying the Attrek at the beginning of his march. If he had managed to avoid these acts, he would have not faced any difficulty in obtaining needed camels and safe passage, and if he marched from Krasnovodsk, not Chikishlar undoubtedly he would have reached Khiva. See *Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 1873-1875*, v. I, p. 88. Miliutin's first reaction, on May 16th, demonstrated his concern regarding Russia's prestige and moral influence over the local population. He criticized Krasnovodsk Headquarters (part of the Caucasian Army) for assuming leading role in the expedition against Khiva. The engineer of the expedition was Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan. *Dnevnik D. A. Miliutina 1873-1875*, v. 1, p 86.

were engaged in skirmishes with the southern and the Khivan Turkomans.^d The command of these armies was given to General Kaufmann on the eve of the expedition against Khiva in 1873.

General Kaufmann headed the Turkestan army from Tashkand against Khiva's eastern borders. His army consisted of two divisions; the first which he was heading, and the second started from Kazala. The two columns were to meet in the Bukan-Tau mountains. Kaufmann changed his plan and shifted his route to Khala Ata in northern Bukhara, and sent the Kazala column to meet him there, which meant that they had to cross 120 extra miles of desert. Both columns reached Khala-ata on May 6, 1873 and the meeting took place the same day.⁵⁷ Even so Kaufmann was about to give order to retreat under the pressure of the desert heat and lack of water, when "he was saved by one of those trivial circumstances which often intervene in the most unlooked for manner in the affairs of men".⁵⁸ One of the volunteer guides succeeded in finding three wells four miles away and saved this expedition from being added to previous disastrous attempts.

The Russian armies advanced against Khiva gradually and cautiously. General Verevkin captured Kungrad on the western edge of the delta of the Amu. The first strategic town that fell to Kaufmann on May 14 was Khazarasp on the left bank of the Amu Daria.^e From Khazarasp, Kaufmann began his move against the

^d. The Turkoman tribes of Khiva were mostly the Yomuds (frequently called the Yomuds of Khiva) and the Chadoors, and the Southern Turkomans whose territory extended from the Persian borders to the southern fringe of Khiva were the Ja'farbai Yomud, Goklan, and Tabai.

^e. Kaufmann was unable to conquer the city and control it on first assault, he was compelled to retreat to Pitniak. This fact would explain why Kaufmann could not reach the capital before General Verevkin, who waited for instructions from Kaufmann until May 28. Upon the arrival of news that Kaufmann withdrew from Khazarasp in front of strong resistance, Verevkin attacked Khiva city. When he was informed that Kaufmann recaptured Khazarasp, he was motivated to have the honour of capturing the capital of Khiva, although he was instructed to wait for the arrival of the Turkestan army. Kaufmann wanted to be himself on the head of the conquering army so the honour of the conquest of Khiva would
(continued...)

Khivan capital. The Khan was unable to resist the advance of Kaufmann because of the advancing armies of Verevkin and Lomakin from the north and the north-west. As Mac Gahan observed, "It was they who did the greater part of the fighting, and it was by them Khiva was really taken".⁵⁹

The Khan sent to Kaufmann asking for a three-day truce, during which he aspired to reach an agreement with the Governor-General. The Khan's request was not answered, but Kaufmann orally told the envoy to tell the Khan that talks would be carried on in Khiva, a similar message to Verevkin received no answer.⁶⁰ Khiva fell on May 29, 1873 and the Khan, after a short period of hiding among the Yomud tribes, unconditionally surrendered himself on June 14, 1873. The Russian Government declared that the occupation of Khiva would be very short, and that the principal object of negotiations would be to secure a wider sphere of operation to her trade, to open up profitable new markets.⁶¹ British observers affirmed in defiance of Russian assurances that "after Russia has occupied Khiva, she will inevitably retain that city, in order to avoid further costly and difficult campaigns in that country".⁶²

Among their discoveries in the Khan's palace, the Russians found letters exchanged between the Khivan Government and the Government of India. One of these letters was a reply from the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook, to the Khan's request for help against the Russians.⁶³ Kaufmann wrote to the Khan while he was in disguise among the Yomuds in June 1873, that he would be treated with all honours if he would surrender himself, but in case of his refusal "somebody else would be made Khan in his stead". Kaufmann had in mind as the alternative his brother who had been in prison for the last year, and pleaded his claim to the throne to Kaufmann.⁶⁴

^e.(...continued)

be his. Terentiev gives a minute account of the Khivan expedition, vide *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. II, pp. 250 ff.

The Khan thus returned to Khiva on June 14, 1873 and had a meeting with Kaufmann the same day. After exposing his willingness to accept the conditions imposed by the conqueror, he was allowed to resume his government under the supervision of a *Divan* or council, which was not only formed for the purpose of collecting money for the payment of a war indemnity, but for advising the Khan of the best way to follow the directions coming from the high military command, which virtually controlled the country. Members of the *Divan* were, besides the Khan himself, three Russian officers, and three Khivan ministers.⁶⁵ The Khan, according to the agreement already signed between him and Kaufmann, lacked any power in the internal or external affairs of his country. The membership of the council speaks for itself about the distribution of power.⁶⁶

Following the occupation of Khiva, naturally the British were speculating with scepticism whether Russia would hold to her previous assurances and withdraw or the same practice of her classical policy would be resorted to again.⁶⁷ They very soon received the disquieting news that the Russian army would remain in Khiva until she had paid the war indemnity of 2,200,000 roubles demanded by Kaufmann, which meant that the Russian troops would remain there indefinitely.⁶⁸ All the Russian procedures indicated that the occupation would be a prolonged one, and in contradiction to the assurances given to the British Government, the Emperor sanctioned the Russo-Khivan agreement of August 1873; a pretext was given that the earlier assurances referred to the town of Khiva rather than to the Khanate itself.⁶⁹ On August 24, 1873 Kaufmann forced the Khivan Khan to sign the Russo-Khivan treaty which turned the Khanate into a Russian protectorate. Morier, dismayed by the Russian coup, wrote to Derby that:

it is now quite clear, from the publication of the Khivan treaty, that Count Shchupalov's promises were merely made to humour the English Government for the moment.⁷⁰

After the publication of the Russo-Khivan treaty, which crippled Khiva, re-

duced her status internationally and restricted her freedom of action internally, the British Government saw no practical advantages in examining too minutely how far these arrangements were in accordance with the assurances given to Granville in January 1873 by Shchuvalov as to the intentions with which the expedition against Khiva was undertaken.⁷¹ After the Khivan campaign Russia's assurances evaporated, her language and conduct were severely changed. It was now time for Russia to reconsider the position of Afghanistan. The Russian assurances that Afghanistan would remain out of the sphere of Russian control dissatisfied General Kaufmann "for if strictly adhered to it completely dispelled all prospect of an invasion of India", he believed that abstaining from intervening in Afghanistan "meant nothing more or less than the abandonment of the main object of the advance into Central Asia".⁷² Such a change in policy would however be entirely contradictory to the affirmation by Prince Gorchakov that:

His Imperial Majesty looks upon Afghanistan as completely outside the sphere within which Russia may be called upon to exercise her influence. [There will be] no intervention or interference whatever.⁷³

Five years after the fall of Khiva, and with Khiva and Bukhara under control, the question of establishing connections with Afghanistan with the purpose of influencing her policy was put on the agenda and discussed thoroughly in St. Petersburg and Turkestan. Kaufmann wrote to Sher Ali in June 1878 that a high ranking Russian envoy would visit Kabul.⁷⁴ The envoy was General Stoletov, who together with General Cherniaev had an audience with the Tsar in March 24, 1878 just before leaving for Central Asia.⁷⁵ Activization of Russian policy in this year was undoubtedly enhanced by the success of her armies against Turkey in the Near Eastern crisis of 1877-1878. Sher Ali and his Government made a vain attempt to

prevent his arrival and to avoid receiving him.^f The reply came from Kaufmann that the envoy was already on his way to Afghanistan, and his protection and decent reception were the responsibility of the Amir.⁷⁶ Russia's main aim in mounting Stoletov's mission was the discovery of the countries located to the south of the Amu Daria, and to study the geography of Afghan territory as well. The Russian envoy was accompanied by a considerable number of personnel. He left a group of his men on each stage of his route from Bukhara to Kabul, as claimed to "convey dispatches", but actually their main purpose was to survey the country.⁷⁷ This mission was regarded by Britain as a violation of the engagements which Russia had entered into with England earlier regarding Afghanistan. Russia's response to Britain's objections came from M. de Giers, head of the Asian Department in the Russian Foreign Office (1875-1878), who denied that the Emperor or General Kaufmann had the intention of sending a mission to Kabul. The mission was intended to be so secret that M. de Giers either did not want to admit it or may have not been informed of it; Gorchakov later explained that the mission was "one of courtesy" and that M. de Giers "had not been informed of it".⁷⁸

Thus after the collapse of the Central Asian Khanates of Kokand, Khiva, and Bukhara, Russia had her ambitious Generals monitoring the Afghan borders. However the prevailing assumption among the British was that Russia, after the fall of Khiva, had reached the limit of her advance southward, and that her relations with Britain in Central Asia would rest on

a firmer and more lasting basis than before, and that their rivalry will henceforth be confined to their mutual promotion of peace and civilization in their respective spheres.⁷⁹

^f. Sher Ali was far from being in harmony with the Government of India, however promises from Tashkand were more attractive. While the British Government became more "persistent in making inconvenient demands upon him", he regarded the Russian alliance as his last resource. Russia's policy was totally different. The Russians required nothing from him and "drew pictures of greater power and wider empire yet to be secured". Vide Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, pp. 66-67.

This assumption did not appear to have been seriously disturbed by the Stoletov mission to Sher Ali. On the other hand, the predominant drive among Russian officials, military and civil, in Central Asia was towards intrigues in Afghanistan and the discovery of "the spirit of disaffection" among the Afghans and British subjects in India. Thus they began to cultivate the opinions of that "unimportant clique" in Afghanistan that might seek in the Russians its ally and supporter.⁸⁰

After the conquest of Khiva, Kaufmann began correspondence with Sher Ali for the purpose of establishing "neighbourly relations".⁸¹ Though there was no particular reason for correspondence with the Afghan sovereign, Kaufmann had little difficulty in finding an agreeable subject to open his correspondence with him. He stressed the advantages to Afghanistan of closer relationship with Russia, while Stoletov stressed the duty of making common cause against the British in India.⁸

⁸. One of Kaufmann's letters to the Amir says: "Be it known to you that in these days the relations between the British Government and ours with regard to your kingdom require deep consideration ... be it known to you that your union and friendship with the Russian Government will be beneficial to the latter and still more so to you. The advantages of a close alliance with the Russian government will be permanently evident". FO 65/1071 No. 26, October 27, 1879, Roberts to Lyall.

In another letter from Stoletov to the Wazir Shah Muhammad Khan of Afghanistan dated the 8th of October 1878, Stoletov says: "whatever our Government advises you, you should give ear to it. I tell you the truth that our Government is wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove. There are many things which you cannot understand, but our Government understands them well. It often happens that a thing which is unpleasant at first is regarded as a blessing afterwards. Now, my kind friend, I inform you that the enemy of your famous religion wants to make peace with you through the Kaiser (Sultan) of Turkey. Therefore, you should look to your brothers who live on the other side of the river (i.e. in India). If God stirs them up, and gives the sword of fight into their hands, then go on in the name of God (Bismilla), otherwise you should be as a serpent; make peace openly and in secret prepare for war; and when God reveals His order to you, declare yourself. It will be well when the envoy of your enemy wants to enter the country, if you send an able emissary possessing the tongue of a serpent, and full of deceit, to the enemy's country, so that he may with sweet words perplex the enemy's mind, and induce him to give up the intention of fighting with you. My kind friend, I entrust you to the protection of God. May God be the protector of the Amir's kingdom, and may trembling fall upon the limbs of your enemies, Amen". FO 65/1071 No. 26, October 27, 1879, Roberts to Lyall.

Kaufmann's purpose was not anything else but to open a direct channel for communications which inevitably would lead to the exchange of envoys, discussing trade issues, and obtaining information about Afghanistan necessary for political intrigues and sowing destabilization: the same policy, in other words, which had proved so successful in Central Asia during the previous half century.

Kaufmann styled Sher Ali "the friend of the all-powerful Tsar" to win his sympathy, but also emphasized the formidable power of the Tsar, and the success of his arms, using the conquest of Khiva as a veiled menace:

Your highness may have heard that the Khan of Khiva had commenced committing unjustifiable and unlawful acts whereupon His Majesty the Emperor of Russia directed me to go to Khiva with a view to compel him by force of arms to act according to law. This undertaking was attended with full success. Having obtained a victory over the army of Khiva, I conquered the country... At present peace has been established in the country. It is not the wish of His Imperial Majesty to add territories to his extensive Empire.⁸²

The British chose to rely upon Russian assurances and did not take seriously Sher Ali's appeal for assistance, assuming that there was no ground for his apprehension and that England and Russia were good friends. Great Britain, as Boulger put it, might have "taken up a bold position, and stood upon the inviolability of international obligations", but was instead contented with "the weak arguments of the Tsar and Prince Gorchakov".⁸³

In their diplomatic offensive which contained a holocaust of broken assurances, Count Shchuvalov distributed a note from Prince Gorchakov in April 1878, on the eve of the Turkoman campaign designed to prepare the political ground for the forthcoming conquest, which contained "positive assurances" that the Emperor again had no intention of further extending the frontiers of Russia as they then existed in Central Asia. In a memorandum forwarded to Her Majesty's Chargé de Affairs at St. Petersburg Lord Derby stated that:

Her Majesty's Government fully accepted the assurances of the Imperial Cabinet as to the extension of the southern frontiers of Russian territory, but

they equally admitted the force of the arguments which had been advanced to explain the repeated annexations which, in spite of those assurances, had taken place.⁸⁴

There could hardly be a more poignant statement of British disbelief in Russian intentions and powerlessness to influence them. Following the conquest of Khiva the Imperial Government in 1873 declared the formation of the *Transkasp-eiskii Voenny Okrug* or Trans-Caspian military district. The purpose of creating the new military district was stated to be the security of the regions recently acquired. Besides this, the new district was given the task of securing communications between the Russian positions on the Attrek and Mikhailovsk on the Caspian, and to deal with the Turkoman tribes, whose subjection and the occupation of their main city, Merv, had already been "decided upon as an inevitable necessity, connected with the security of the district recently acquired by Russia".⁸⁵

Following the fall of Khiva the Russian activities in Afghanistan increased and General Abramov was dispatched to visit Kabul in 1878. The British Government became convinced that the Russian pledges and words were useless, thus Lord Lytton suggested to Queen Victoria the occupation of the Hindu Kush as the "only remaining chance of permanent security".⁸⁶ Just as the visit of Vitkeivich in 1837 to Kabul had led to the first Anglo-Afghan war in the century, General Abramov's visit led to the third Anglo-Afghan war of November 1878.

Just on the eve of the Turkoman campaign General Abramov arrived at Kabul on July 22, 1878. As he laid it before the Amir, the purpose of his visit was to "strengthen and perpetuate" the existing friendly relation between Russia and Afghanistan by a "treaty of amity".⁸⁷ The envoy endeavoured to convince the Amir of Afghanistan to break off all friendly relations with the British and the Indian Governments and to contract an alliance with Russia. As a precautionary strategy in case of an unsatisfactory outcome to Abramov's mission, the Russians planned to offer their support to Sher Ali's nephew, who was residing at Samarkand, to secure

control of Maimanah, Balkh, and Badakhshan "and annex the country thus conquered to the Russian domains".⁸⁸ Abramov also discussed issues of trade and the reduction of duties on imported Russian goods, and asked for permission for free travel through Afghanistan for Russian merchants.⁸⁹ The methods of this mission to Kabul were essentially the same as those by which Russia had extended her influence in the Central Asian Khanates over the preceding half century.

Britain and the policy of the buffer zone

The idea of a buffer zone, or buffer states, between the possessions of both Empires in Central Asia began to appear as a political question in the early 1840s after Perovskii's expedition against Khiva and the first Anglo-Afghan war. The first Afghan War and the contemporaneous Russian activities against Khiva had directed the attention of British politicians to increasing Russian military activities in Central Asia and diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan. Two years before the first Khivan expedition in 1839, Vitkeivich was offering Dost Muhammad Russian arms and support. These events and the subsequent Russian operations on the Syr Daria suggested the desirability of barriers between Russia and England in Asia. Henceforth the policy of the buffer zone was adopted and developed. The political efforts in this direction resulted in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1844, which constituted the territories between the British possessions in India and the Russian possessions in the steppe, including the Central Asian Khanates, as buffer states between the two Empires.⁹⁰ As a result of the progress of the Russian advance this issue gained exceptional urgency, and reappeared in the correspondence between the two Governments after 1868, simultaneously with the issue of the security of the Afghan borders. While Russia was preparing for the invasion of Khiva and reconnoitring the Turkoman country, she exhibited an unusual degree of willingness for a mutual understanding with Great Britain and was "waiting to be asked to enter

into treaty engagement respecting the neutrality of Afghanistan", according to Buchanan.⁹¹

The buffer zone issue had been discussed frequently by officials of the two Governments and seemed at that time to be an idea accepted by both Empires. After an interview with Gorchakov, Rumbold, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, stated that Gorchakov "proposed Afghanistan as a territory well suited to serve as buffer ground between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia". Gorchakov added in the same meeting that he was ready to

include within that neutral ground the whole tract of country coloured in yellow [the Turkoman land to the south of the Oxus]. He could not go further because the competent persons who had been consulted raised objections, and because any greater extension of the neutral zone would include portions of the Bukharan territories south of the Oxus.⁹²

This issue was discussed back and forth, not without some misgivings on the part of the Indian Government, from the beginning of 1869 until 1873 when it lost its momentum after the fall of Khiva. It was a first priority for Forsyth, an officer of the Government of the Punjab, during his visit to St. Petersburg in 1869 as representative of the Indian Government, where he held several meetings with Gorchakov and other officials the outcome of which was however a deep conviction that "a neutral zone in its strict sense was impossible".⁹³ Lord Mayo regarded the proposal of a neutral zone as a limitation on the free action of the Indian Government. He suggested that Russia should implement this policy by assisting the independence of the Khanates along her southern borders, i.e. Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva, while the Government of India would do the same regarding Kelat, Afghanistan, and Yarkand. Thus the two Governments would create jointly a buffer zone and the Russian advance would be halted.⁹⁴ Nonetheless this proposal was of course impractical because of Russia's determination not to strengthen but to weaken the Uzbek states. Russia's intentions were made obvious by the declarations in mid 1860s by officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry that Russia must eventually annex

Bukhara and Kokand, as India must eventually annex Afghanistan.⁹⁵

As a result of Russia's vigorous advances between 1865 and the fall of Khiva in 1873, the map of central Asia was altered dramatically.^h Faced with this vigorous expansion, Great Britain made an effort at least to secure the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, which resulted in the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1872 concerning the northern borders of Afghanistan. The Afghan boundaries were delineated the same in both Russian and British maps. The Russian Government did not protest or make any reservations regarding that line until her frontiers became conterminous with those of Afghanistan in 1884.⁹⁶ Russia during the twelve years that preceded 1884 absorbed Khiva and the Turkoman country, and pushed her frontiers forward until Afghanistan was the next natural target and could be reached conveniently through the Transcaspian railway. Thus Russian diplomacy provided a convenient cover for the reality of the Russian military and political advance. On March 27, 1869 Clarendon had suggested to Baron Brunnow, the Russian Ambassador in London, the recognition of some territory as a buffer or neutral zone between the possession of England and Russia. He drew Brunnow's attention to

the rapid progress of the Russian troops in Central Asia, and made a proposal for the recognition of some territory as neutral between the possessions of England and Russia, which should be the limit of those possessions, and which should be scrupulously respected by both powers.⁹⁷

Clarendon assured the Russian Ambassador that such an engagement was necessary for the purpose of allaying the excitement and suspicions that were arising in British public opinion and the British press as well.⁹⁸

Gorchakov accepted the suggestion and expressed his full assent to the

^h. This period witnessed the formation of Turkestan Oblast in February 12, 1865, followed in May of the same year by the conquest of Tashkand. In October 1866 Khojand was conquered, and Turkestan Governorship was declared as an independent military district (Okrug). Bukhara was defeated in June 1868, followed by the annexation of Katta-Kurgan and Karshi to Russia's domains. And in 1873 Khiva the old enemy was conquered, and in the same year Russia launched her campaign against the Yomud Turkomans.

proposal of Clarendon to keep a zone between the possessions of the two Empires in Asia, stating that the "idea expressed by Lord Clarendon... suits the views of the Emperor".⁹⁹ He further instructed Brunnow to express to Her Majesty's Government the Emperor's positive assurances that Afghanistan lay outside the sphere of Russia's influence.¹⁰⁰ Later Gorchakov while discussing the issue with Buchanan repeated the same opinion and the Emperor's will that Afghanistan should be looked upon as constituting the neutral ground which it was appropriate to establish. Clarendon had some reservation on the ground that Afghanistan alone would not fulfil the conditions of a neutral territory, because Russia might get involved in disputes with the chiefs on the borders and thus feel herself justified in breaking the arrangement she had entered into with Britain.¹⁰¹ Clarendon informed Brunnow, that in the opinion of the Secretary of State of India:

Afghanistan would not fulfil those conditions of a neutral territory that it was the object of the two Governments to establish, as the frontiers were ill-defined; and if the Russian forces advanced to those frontiers disputes with the Chiefs on the border would sooner or later but infallibly ensue, and Russia might be compelled, however unwillingly, to disregard the arrangement she had entered into, and it was, therefore, thought advisable to propose that the Upper Oxus, which was south of Bukhara, should be the boundary line which neither Power should permit their forces to cross.¹⁰²

To Clarendon's proposal that the Oxus formed "the most desirable line of demarcation for a neutral ground between the Russian and the British possessions", Gorchakov showed at this time no objection, though Baron Brunnow expressed his reservation as Khiva was to the south of the Oxus and such an arrangement would encourage the Khan's hostile attitude towards Russia.¹⁰³ The Russian Government declined to accept the proposal on the ground that it gave an extension to the frontiers of Afghanistan.

Granville in October 1872 authorised Loftus to explain to the Russian Government that "the right of the Amir of Kabul, Sher Ali, to the possession of the territories up to the Oxus as far as Khoja Saleh is fully established".¹⁰⁴ The

response of the Russian Government was positive and they concurred that Badakhshan, Wakhan, Sarikul (Woods Lake) to the junction of Kokcha river with the Oxus, as well as Kunduz, Khulm and Balkh, should all be acknowledged as belonging to Afghanistan. The Russian Government authorized Kaufmann, as the nearest authority, to investigate the issue on site, though due to local difficulties "he was unable to accomplish his task".¹⁰⁵ Even so the Russian Government admitted that the Amu Daria constituted the Afghan boundary from Kokcha to Khoja Saleh, and this recognition was beyond dispute.¹⁰⁶

Kaufmann however, in a letter to Gorchakov, disputed this view of the matter as being inaccurate and "far from being complete".¹⁰⁷ The Russian Government, notwithstanding Kaufmann's protest, accepted the boundary as defined by Granville in his dispatch to Loftus dated October 17, 1872. Meanwhile the Government of India advised the Amir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali to preserve the "peaceful policy ..., in accordance with the advice formerly given to him by Lord Mayo".¹⁰⁸ Gorchakov however protested that Badakhshan and Wakhan should be excluded and regarded as independent, though he pledged that the boundary of Afghanistan and Bukhara should be regarded as both sides of the Oxus respectively.

In the meantime the Afghan Government was trying to secure itself in the face of Kaufmann's attempts against the Turkomans and instigation of the Amir of Bukhara. For this purpose Sher Ali asked for British assistance but he was ignored. This was because the British had decided to place their confidence in their mutual understanding with Russia over the frontiers of Afghanistan. In any case the Viceroy of India had no power to provide assistance without the consent of the Home Government.¹⁰⁹ Sher Ali became more and more convinced that the security of Afghanistan could only be secured by an "offensive and defensive alliance with Great Britain",¹¹⁰ which would be of equal advantage to England and Afghanistan. The Amir was routinely ignored. His envoys to India usually went back with "cold

words of comfort and without the material assistance" their country needed.¹¹¹ This neglect led to the estrangement of the Afghan Government from the British. Notwithstanding the Amir was far from being friendly to Russia, it was in a real sense British policy which lay behind his reception of Russia's envoys on the one hand, while the declaration of war against him by his brothers also accelerated his inclination towards Russia on the other.¹¹²

For the British it was important that the frontiers of Afghanistan, as the bulwark of India, should be strictly delimited in a formal agreement with Russia. For this purpose Loftus suggested to Granville, who was visiting St. Petersburg early in 1872, that they take advantage of the presence of Kaufmann at St. Petersburg in the winter of 1872 to bring the issue to a conclusion. During the talks Loftus tried to convince the Russians that Britain understood the benefits of consolidating Russia's influence in Central Asia by peaceful means and developing the resources of the country.¹¹³ M. de Westmann, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that these opinions fully corresponded with those of the Imperial Government, and that Russia required peace in Central Asia. Gorchakov also acknowledged that the two Empires considered it as "expedient to have a certain intermediary zone for the purpose of preserving their respective possessions from immediate contact".¹¹⁴ The British party suggested that the neutral zone should include those Khanates to the north of the Oxus, i.e. Bukhara and Kokand, or all the territories between the Afghan and the Russian frontiers.¹¹⁵ The Russian Government did not sympathize with this extensive suggestion, evaded commenting directly and delayed their answer, and justified their delay by saying that they should wait until the proposal could be translated and submitted to the Emperor.¹¹⁶

Westmann assured, in relation to an observation from Loftus regarding the matter, that it was in the interest of the Government of Great Britain and Russia that:

the frontiers of Afghanistan and Bukhara should be strictly defined, and that the conclusion to which Her Majesty's Government had come was in complete harmony with the understanding which had been agreed upon with Mr. Forsyth when he visited St. Petersburg in 1869... M. de Westmann assured him that the views and opinions of the Imperial Government were identical with those he had expressed.¹¹⁷

Westmann added that Russia required peace in Central Asia, and even stated that a cordial understanding between the two countries was more necessary to Russia than to England.¹¹⁸ He entertained some plan of establishing a neutral zone between the English and Russian frontiers in Central Asia, which "would necessitate two frontier lines".¹¹⁹ Loftus drew Westmann's attention to the fact that a neutral zone should include those independent states lying between the frontier of Afghanistan and the Russian frontier and that "this idea would be represented by Bukhara on the north and even perhaps by Afghanistan south of the Oxus".¹²⁰ Loftus added that there should be no obstacle to creating a buffer zone. Westmann appeared entirely to agree. But this was before the fall of Khiva in the following summer.

Despite British eagerness to resume the definition of the buffer zone, the Russian Government delayed proceeding, pending Kaufmann's opinion which was to be based on the position on the ground in Central Asia. In pursuit of these delaying tactics, Russian officials in order to distance themselves from previous assurances, adopted a technique of contradictory announcements to the extent that a subordinate would apparently dispute his superior's opinion. Thus in 1872 Russia appeared officially to have accepted the line of the frontiers proposed by Granville, and the acceptance was communicated to Brunnow by Gorchakov, who stated that Russia "does not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England".¹²¹ However the head of the Asiatic Department, Stremoukhov, protested and expressed the view that the Hindu Kush, not the Oxus, would be the frontier line separating the two Empires in Central Asia.¹²² The British considered that any Russian attempt to cross the Oxus would entail serious consequences, and that any Russian move in that

direction would be regarded as threatening to India. In view of the efforts being made by Kaufmann in Central Asia, the British Government communicated to Sher Ali through the Government of India the advice that he had the right to defend his northern provinces if invaded.¹²³ The stronger line of the British Government encouraged by the apparently conciliatory attitude of the Russian Government, was exemplified in Loftus' observation that:

the eye of England in that quarter is not obscured, nor her arm shortened when it is a question of protecting her interests and those of her Indian Empire.¹²⁴

The semi-official Russian press demonstrated against what it saw as restrictions imposed on the policy of Russia in Central Asia through engagement in a buffer zone policy, and demanded the abrogation of all previous agreements entered into between the two Governments, including that of 1872. In a sharp tone the *Moscow Gazette* wrote in March 1873:

What right has England to interfere in the affairs of an independent State, to control its action, and to enter into diplomatic negotiations with it, in respect to subjects which do not come within the province of international law? Just as a man in a civilized state of society, possessed of complete civil rights, attaches great value to his independence, so, in a still greater degree does an independent power value that independence, and any uncalled for interference in her affairs is an insult to her dignity... In the policy of England towards Russia it is impossible not to see great irregularities, and every irregularity lays the foundation for future difficulties.¹²⁵

This attitude was known to be held as well by the military, scientific, and literary persons who took an interest in Central Asian affairs.¹²⁶ It also demonstrated explicitly that Russia regarded Central Asian affairs, without justification, as an internal matter.

The relentless Russian drive into Central Asia continued and increasingly alarmed London. Russia was coming almost within arm's reach of the most precious jewel in the British diadem, India. Less than a year after the fall of Khiva, Russia began pressing towards the conquest of Merv. According to Colonel Glukhovskii, who reported to General Kaufmann on the state of affairs after 1873, and the need to

press forward against the Turkomans:

if Afghanistan (that is England) first occupies Merv then the degree of quiet in the Turkoman steppe will entirely depend on that power, and Russia cannot then easily guarantee the security of the commercial roads from the Caspian to the Amu Daria, nor have the possibility of directing the European trade through Persia and Merv into Central Asia, which would be detrimental to the development of our commerce and to all our Trans-Caspian possessions.¹²⁷

Hardly had Russia replied to Britain's proposal about the buffer zone than Kaufmann forced the Khan of Khiva to submit to his demands and accept vassal status and acknowledge himself as the humble servant of the Emperor.

Britain began to complain more audibly about the bear walking like a man on the roof of Asia. As the British along the northern borders of India felt the breath of the bear descending southward, the diplomatic atmosphere in London became more tense. It was not until after the turn of the century and under the influence of more compelling developments that Anglo-Russian relations were improved and an agreement was reached.¹²⁸

THE RUSSIAN THREAT TO BRITISH INDIA

No Russian patriot, recognizing the possibility of a successful achievement of the purpose, and placed by destiny in a position to guide the operation, can hesitate to point out the immense resources which, I will permit myself to say, our Government has accidentally accumulated on this frontier, and by means of which, with adequate resolution and with timely preparation, it is possible, not only to strike an effective blow at England in India, but also to crush her in Europe.
General Skobelev, *Project for the Invasion of India*, (1877).

Early projects against India

France was the first among European colonial powers to target British India in her rivalry with Great Britain. Napoleon considered India as the most vulnerable target in the British domains, and seriously considered making a strike there. In 1791 a French emigrant in Russia, by the name of St. Jenis, had suggested to the Empress Catherine II (1762-1796) a plan for the conquest of India from the British, with the ostensible purpose of restoring the dynasty of the Great Moguls.¹ Catherine rejected the idea but her successors, for their own reasons, were more supportive of and more interested in the venture.² As the French threat diminished the Russians took over the Indian strategy and adopted it as a means of exercising political leverage over events in Europe and of influencing British attitudes regarding the Eastern Question. This long-term political and strategic programme accompanied the intensification of Russian attempts to gain access to new markets in Asia.³

Long before the fever of the 19th century rivalry with Great Britain, Russia had already coveted India, initially for largely commercial motives. The first Russian merchant who endeavoured to reach India was Afanasii Nikitin (Tverskii), who was dispatched in 1469 by Prince Mikhail Borisovich, a contemporary and rival of Ivan III (1440-1505). Nikitin could not proceed through Central Asia, and was obliged to

change to an alternative route along the western shores of the Caspian Sea through Derbend, Baku, Persia, and Khorasan, where he was unable to continue and failed to reach India. Later Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (1629-1676) endeavoured to establish contacts with the Mogul dynasty in India, through Bukhara.⁴ He sent Pazukhin in 1669 to Bukhara for the purpose of reconnoitring the route to India via that state. Following Pazukhin's confirmation of the possibility of reaching India through Bukhara, a Tatar from Astrakhan named Yosip Kasimov (Yosif Qasim) was commissioned to establish contacts with India. Kasimov reached Kabul in 1676, but he was prevented from proceeding, being considered by the Afghans a government official not a merchant, and so returned to Moscow in 1678. Simion Malenkii, encouraged by the ambitious Peter the Great (1682-1725), made a successful attempt in 1695, this time as a merchant. He reached Delhi, but died on the way back and only one of his companions returned to Astrakhan, and he was incompetent to deliver any useful information about their trip.⁵ Thus Russia remained without any detailed information about the road to India.

Peter the Great equipped two expeditions in 1717; the first, setting out from Siberia to reach Yarkand was headed by Gagarin; while the second, led by Bekovich-Cherkasskii, was to overawe Khiva and to persuade the Amir of Bukhara to send to India a caravan consisting of thirty five merchants, thirteen of whom must be Russians. The outcome of this adventure was the disastrous fate which Bekovich's expedition met in Khiva. The Russian Government then waited until 1750, when another caravan was dispatched to India. The initiator this time was the Governor of Orenburg, Nepliev. The caravan met with the same obstacles that had impeded earlier efforts, and was blocked because it was not carrying merchandise. As a result of these endeavours Russia discovered that it was easier for a merchant to cross the distance to India than for a government official, "because everywhere he is needed, and everybody is his friend".⁶ Apparently, it was this recognition which led Russia to

colour all of her subsequent designs in Asia with a commercial character. This will explain why all of Russia's succeeding designs against Central Asia were executed under the pretence of enhancing or protecting her commercial interests, to the extent that it became difficult to distinguish commercial from political matters in these Russian procedures. In this respect Lord John Russell in 1860 perceptively observed "how far political are mixed up with commercial views" in Russian procedures.⁷

Reaching India was a target that had been contemplated by Peter the Great, halted under Catherine, and entered the stage of execution under successively Paul and Alexander. As *Blackwoods* observed after the Crimean War, "the invasion of India is a design never laid aside at the Court of St. Petersburg".⁸ Besides the military and political components of this strategy against India, Russian policy was also motivated by other and vital considerations: strategic, to obtain an outlet to warm seas, and economic, to open up potential markets for her growing industry. By the year 1830 the recognition of these ambitions had crystallized an explicit Russophobia in British opinion which resulted in classifying Russia as "Britain's great enemy".⁹

Under Alexander, Russia's aspiration to reach India was enhanced by an ambitious plan for trade with India submitted in 1802 to the "Neglasnyi committee".¹⁰ The project was studied and approved and efforts were made to secure communications with India, but at this stage the ambition was beyond reach in this direction. With her trade in the west ravaged by the Napoleonic wars, Russia doubled her efforts in the east to establish trade relations with Afghanistan and India through Central Asia, which however proved to be a formidable obstacle to Russia's caravans. Russia therefore endeavoured to find an alternative route from western Siberia through Aksu, Kuldja, Kashgar, and Chinese Tibet to Kashmir and India. This road proved to be extremely long and expensive and the same merchandise could be obtained in the markets of Central Asia via Orenburg. Nevertheless, as a result Russia succeeded in establishing relations with certain principalities of India,¹¹ though this was met by

the spread of Britain's influence in Afghanistan and by a vigorous boost to Britain's trade in Bukhara and other Khanates of Central Asia.¹²

Napoleon, unable to demolish Britain's naval supremacy but able to take advantage of the deteriorating relations between England and Russia in the first decade of the century, found that the most attractive and vulnerable target among Britain's possessions was India, with its extended communications and exposed frontiers.¹³ After the failure of his grandiose plan to invade India with French forces, of which the Egyptian expedition was a preliminary and unsuccessful stage, he devised the idea of a joint Franco-Russian expedition against British India.¹⁴ Increasingly therefore he became more friendly in his relations with Paul I (1796-1801) and freed 6,800 Russian captives and restored to them their arms.¹⁵ According to this plan a combined force of thirty-five thousand Russians, to be joined by an equal number of French troops, would land at Astrabad and march on India via Herat and Kandahar.¹⁶

Central Asia was considered merely as the second route towards India in the early stages of Russian strategy, so long as the region was not yet included in Russia's sphere of influence.¹⁷ The main highway was regarded as lying through Persia, Herat and Kandahar to India. This route was also not under effective Russian control particularly as long as Persia was still protected by the formidable Caucasus mountain-range. Russian encroachment against Persia at the beginning of the nineteenth century should be at least partly understood in light of Russian attempts to open a route towards India. In that campaign she conquered Georgia in 1801, Mingrelia in 1803, and Imeretia 1804, while Shervan, Derbend, and Baku were ceded by Persia to Russia by the Gulistan treaty of 1813. That treaty was however counter-balanced by the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814, which was concluded largely as a response to the Franco-Russian designs against India. Under the terms of this treaty Britain promised assistance to Persia against external invasion; however, when

Napoleon's threat was over, Britain "dropped all interest in Persia".¹⁸ Even so, in view of the Persian obstacle, the Russians began to favour the Central Asian route to India, despite the fact that it was long and passed through the harshest deserts of Asia, the Kara-Kum and Kizyl-Kum.

While Napoleon was tied up with the war in Europe, the idea seemed extremely attractive to Paul I, who decided to act alone by penetrating into the heart of India, not under the guise of a mercantile undertaking, but with fire and sword.¹⁹ Consequently, on January 12, 1801, he issued a written order to Orlov, the Ataman of the Don Cossacks, to march with a force of 22,507 Cossacks and twenty four guns to Orenburg and then proceed by three routes via Bukhara to the Indus. To charge his Cossacks with fervour, the Tsar assured them in a letter, dated 24 January 1801 and addressed to Orlov, that the whole of India would be their reward, saying "all the wealth of India shall be your reward for this expedition".²⁰ The main purpose and extraordinary ambition of the campaign in this early stage of Russia's advance was apparently to destroy the British factories and establishments in India, to bring the country under Russian control, and to win over Indian trade in favour of Russia.²¹ The Emperor gave his order for the release of 1,670,285 roubles to the Cossack army.²²

\ Paul's letter to Orlov however demonstrated Russia's utter ignorance of the character of the peoples inhabiting the region between Orenburg and India, as well as the geography of the area. The leaders of the expedition not only confused the roads to India, but also confused India itself.²³ The Imperial letter said:

I authorize this expedition to you and your troops... You can gather them and advance towards Orenburg, from there you can select one of the three roads or march with your artillery by all three roads at once, by way of Bukhara and Khiva to the river Indus and the British establishments located around it. The military forces to be found there are of the same type as yours; having artillery you possess an advantage. Prepare every thing necessary for the expedition, send your scouts to prepare or discover the road, our reward would be all the wealth of India as a result of this expedition... this enterprise will crown you with glory... and will hit the foe in his heart. I am sending you all the maps I

have. They only cover as far as Khiva and the Amu river. It will be your business to find out about the peoples living under Indian domination.²⁴

In another letter he wrote defining the policy the Cossacks ought to pursue in India, and the tactics which they should employ. The Emperor felt himself obliged to define the road which his army should follow:

Vasilii Petrovich, I am sending you a new and detailed map of India. Remember that you are to be concerned solely with the British, you are to offer peace to all those who would not help them, and assure them of the friendship of Russia. Proceed from the Indus to the Ganges against the British. On the way secure the domination of Bukhara so that the Chinese should not get hold of it, and in Khiva liberate our prisoners. If you require infantry I will send you some later, but not otherwise can I dispose of any. It would be better if you were able to do everything alone.²⁵

The sudden death of Paul I in March 1801 however terminated the projected expedition. His successor Alexander I (1801-1825) was no less fascinated with the idea, and discussed it with Napoleon during their meeting in Tilsit in 1807.²⁶ Napoleon was however less enthusiastic, and Russia found herself with no option but to shelve her ambition. The next half century witnessed severe set-backs in Russia's efforts; in 1839 Perovskii retreated with heavy loss in man power and transport animals.²⁷ Russia was unable to repeat her expedition and was as yet slowly trying to establish herself on the lower Syr Daria. The 1840s and 1850s saw intensive Russian efforts directed towards the conquest of the Kazakh tribes and erecting advanced forts in the steppe and Semirechie as well.²⁸ England successfully annexed the Punjab in 1849, which added to the difficulties facing Russian plans to communicate with India. Thus the new development in India put an end to direct and regular economic and cultural connections between Russia and India, and hindered for an unforeseen period the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Russia sought compensation in Central Asia where her diplomatic efforts explicitly concerned Bukhara and Khiva.²⁹ England did not see a direct threat to her position in India from Russian activities in Central Asia. Up to the mid 1850s Russia was busy discovering routes to India through Kashgar, which they regarded as a natural road

suitable for camels and baggage.³⁰ The Crimean War naturally renewed interest in the idea of threatening Britain in India, and General Dugamel (Duhamel) submitted in 1854 to Nicholas I (1825-1855) a project for the invasion of India in retribution for Britain's hostility in the Ottoman question.^a General Perovskii's advance along the Syr Daria during that war in 1853-1854 was partially a move in that direction, and timed to inflict pressure on Britain during the Crimean War.

Russia resolved to overcome the many obstacles in her way: thus the strategy was shelved but was never forgotten. Russia resolved to advance her bulwarks in Central Asia before attempting any adventure against India. Abbott in 1855 wrote:

Russia should rather resolve on absorbing within her vast empire the principalities of Khiva, Kokan, and Bukhara, before attempting anything against India, the recent advance of her frontier to the Jaxartes would now render the former merely a question of time and convenience to Russia, unless some new combination is effected against her; as it cannot be supposed that any one of these states could offer availing resistance to even a single division of the Russian army.³¹

Obstacles to the invasion of India

Russia thus was not yet a formidable power in the region and had to conquer Central Asia to be able to exhibit a real threat to British India. Yet she had already substantial ambitions to destabilize India and undermine the British power there, so as to be able to dominate the sub-continent through closer relations with the weak and discontented Princes. In the short term, in the mid 1850s Russia was compelled to advance southward for yet another reason, since she was engaged in war with Great Britain in Europe, so it was natural that she would seek to undermine the British in India. As we have seen, the external threat to British India historically had two phases; in the first Britain had but one enemy, France; while a second and overlapping phase brought Russia into the arena, advancing inexorably in the direction

^a. General Duhamel had succeeded Count Simonich as Minister in Persia. His project will be discussed later in this chapter.

of India's most vulnerable north-western frontiers.³² Even after the end of the war, Russia intensified her efforts in this direction, especially during the 1860s which witnessed the stabilization of Russian power in the Syr Daria basin, and the strengthening of her grip on Bukhara after signing the first Russo-Bukharan agreement in 1868. It was reported by Buchanan from St. Petersburg that "some aspiring Russian Generals had entered into communication with some restless or malcontent Indian Princes and that intrigues were rife and disturbing".³³ Some Russian historians have affirmed that various Indian princes contacted Russia with the hope of obtaining her assistance in their struggle against British rule.³⁴ The strategy of St. Petersburg was intended to agitate the Indians in order to cause a feeling of insecurity in the country, which would render it impossible for the British to withdraw troops from India for service in Europe.³⁵ Russia's expansion in Central Asia, with the large expenses which it entailed for the Russian exchequer, should not be perceived merely in the context of securing trade routes and pacifying the nomads, as a British observer noted in 1885:

Russia's expeditions in Central Asia have always been undertaken not with a view to an improved frontier, the Russian frontier on the Central Asian side having never been threatened... but simply in order to place Russia in a position to threaten and, on fitting opportunity, attack India.³⁶

Provoking this issue would inevitably lead to two main inconveniences for the British: first, it would increase Britain's economic burden which was already enormous; and second, Britain would find herself obliged to increase her military presence in the sub-continent by withdrawing troops from Europe, a step which was highly desired by Russia. Britain in this period feared most the effect of the influence of Russia, the external enemy, over India's discontented princes, the internal danger. The assumption of a mutual effect between the external and internal enemies, led British strategists to adopt the well-known forward policy which sought to keep these enemies detached from each other.³⁷ Soon after the advance along the Syr Daria,

Blackwoods considered the possibility of Russia attacking India and answered in the affirmative:

The policy of Russia is a game of centuries. She will not spring too soon; she has learnt that grand secret of success - to wait. But waiting, with her, is not inaction; and her approaches towards India are now sufficiently far advanced to cause us active disquietude. She has begun in earnest to push forward her tirailleurs against us preparatory to the pitched battle. She will continue to throw Persia against our first parallel of defence, Afghanistan; and, if unopposed, will carry the sap of bribery and coercion through that mountain-rampart up to the very plains of India. Henceforth we may look for a series of harassing attacks, increasing in magnitude - wandering Turkomans and civilised Persians being alike pressed into the service, until Russia descends herself into the arena, and presses the assault with all her forces.³⁸

The difficulties attending the invasion of India were however enormous. They lay, besides the remoteness of Russia's military strength in Asia, in the character of the people of Afghanistan and Central Asia, the formidable difficulties of communications and the scantiness of resources in the region.³⁹ Britain's hard experience in Afghanistan during the first Anglo-Afghan war in 1838-1842 had led her to the assumption that Russia would face similar difficulties when advancing upon India. Some politicians went so far as to assume that "the undertaking was impossible because it was attended with [such] great difficulty".⁴⁰ In the mid 1860s, when Russia was advancing against Kokand and apprehension in British opinion was mounting regarding the security of India, Sir Roderick I. Murchison, the president of the Royal Geographical Society of London, indicated these apprehensions as devoid of reason and said that "the alarm taken by [some] of our countrymen... is entirely groundless".⁴¹ The Russian press was quick to stress the point in order to support the Russophile tendency, while Russian officials continued to deny any intention against India.⁴²

The Russian advance through the steppe had not been regarded as threatening, but there was no doubt that the move southward in the steppe region and along the Syr Daria was alarming. The British were fully aware of the fact that the most vulnerable frontiers of India were those of the north west, facing the Russian advance.

Despite Russia's improving military position at the expense of Kokand between 1855 and 1864, Britain still suffered from inaccurate evaluations of Russia's power in Central Asia, depending mostly on information collected from individuals or officers who visited the Uzbek Khanates. This relative absence of good intelligence led to a surprising indifference towards the affairs of Central Asia. This was still the situation as late as 1860.⁴³ Regarding this lack of information Boulger, a leading member of the Royal Asiatic Society, wrote that Britain had no information whatever from English sources, and complained that "this state of ignorance would have been simply intolerable".⁴⁴ Other observers shared this point of view, and admitted that Britain's knowledge of Central Asia was of comparatively limited character for reasons of remoteness, inaccessibility, and dangers facing European travellers.⁴⁵ The British military absence from the Central Asian field was not however to be taken as meaning that Britain had no political interest in maintaining the independence of the states of Central Asia. Britain's genuine interest was reflected in Russell's despatch to Crampton in 1860 directing him to communicate to Prince Gorchakov that

the British Government, having a great interest in the maintenance of the states of Central Asia in a condition of political independence, might find it necessary to station a British Consul at Astrabad in order to obtain trust-worthy information as to what is taking place on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea.⁴⁶

The Russian advance against Kokand up to the end of 1864 was discussed without significant detail. Political correspondence regarding this matter reveals that the British Government had scanty information about the state of affairs in the territories conquered by Russia or menaced by her armies, and had no clear detailed maps of the region.⁴⁷ Britain's main source of information was her embassy in St. Petersburg, which was endowed by able officers capable of collecting data not only from Russian press, but from a variety of other sources.⁴⁸ Up to 1867 the Government of India showed indecision about offering assistance to Bukhara and Kokand, upon their

request, because its ignorance of the actual state of affairs in that region hindered "any effective aid either by advice or in any other form".⁴⁹

Russia's offensive moves in 1864 and thereafter put her on the way to India.⁵⁰ After the conquest of the Turkoman country, the culmination of Russian acquisitions in Central Asia which put her in a position directly to threaten the frontiers of Afghanistan, Russian policy once more aspired to the realisation of the great goal of her Indian ambitions. This was now to be achieved by linking her railway system with Merv and the Afghan frontiers and eventually connecting it up with other trade centres in Central Asia and with the network of British India.⁵¹ This extension of railway communications (which is more fully discussed below in chapter VI) was the essential step which was to change the strategic threat to India from potentiality to reality. Russia's threat to India was less perilous in the first half of the nineteenth century, so long as Russia lacked means of communication with Orenburg, and it took three to four months for a regiment to reach Orenburg from Russia's heartland. Britain was then in an even worse position in that it took only a little less than a year to send reinforcements from the British Isles to the northern frontiers of India.⁵² Russia did not take benefit from her relative geographical advantage up to the Crimean War, but thereafter she turned her activities to Central Asia. By the time of the eruption of the Russo-Turkish war in 1877, Russia's position in the region had undergone essential and extensive changes. Her centre for action against India had moved from remote Orenburg to Tashkand, and in the 1880s even closer, to Askabad, assisted by the development of modern railway communications that facilitated the transfer of troops from the Caucasus to the Afghan borders in a remarkably short time; besides this, Russia had now secured sufficient sources of supply in Bukhara, Khiva, and the Ferghana valley (Kokand). The former difficulties of communication were materially diminished as a result of Russia's advance, culminating in her acquisitions against the Turkomans, and the construction of the railway. Her activities

and the utterances of her Generals became more frank and the invasion of India was discussed openly. Even Kaufmann proposed preparations to make the first attempt against India in 1878, after the Russo-Turkish War and Russian humiliation at the Congress of Berlin, but before the campaign against the Turkomans the motivation of which was similar to that of Perovskii's advance against Kokand during the Crimean War. He assembled 20,000 soldiers in Djam, fifteen miles west of Tashkand, and had a reserve of 50,000 soldiers in Siberia.⁵³ Kaufmann wrote describing his preparations to General Bogdanovich: "by the will of the Emperor, I have assembled an army of dimensions as yet unseen in Central Asia, and of a quality fit to encounter any troops in the world".⁵⁴

The Russophile party in Britain, up to 1878, had remained loyal to the assumption that Russia had no intention of attacking India. However Kaufmann's expedition unavoidably exposed the falsehood of such a view. Yet this campaign also revealed to Russia the immense difficulties to be encountered on the road to India and pushed her to move forward against the Turkomans in order to remove some of them. Kaufmann's activities against India were described by Doctor Yavroskii, a physician who accompanied Stoletov in his mission to Kabul in 1878:

In May 1878 there was a greater stir in society at Tashkand than at any previous period. Preparations were being made for an expedition to India. An order had been issued for the formation of three detachments of Turkestan troops to set out in a very short time for the southern frontiers... everywhere expressions of delight could be heard at the impending march. Now we're off to India to drive the English out of it.⁵⁵

These designs resulted in exceptional diplomatic and reconnaissance activities in the countries between Russia's domains and India. Grodekov was dispatched to Herat, Colonel (later General) Nikolai Grigorevich Stoletov to Kabul, to be met there by Pëtr Ivanovich Pashino (who had earlier served for two years as interpreter to Abdur-Rahman Khan, and was dispatched to India to take advantage of his knowledge of Afghan politics). At the same time Colonel Matveev was dispatched to Balkh and Badakhshan.⁵⁶

The controversy over the Indian question had a powerful effect upon Anglo-Russian relations in the second half of the nineteenth century, and cast its shadow even over the opinions of the Russian Generals who became split over the issue. General Grodekov asserted the futility of the enterprise, maintaining that no practical Russian General believed in the possibility of an invasion of India; and that the millennium would take place before Russia invaded India, while General Cherniaev affirmed that the Russian invasion of India was perfectly possible, though not easy. There was a third politically-conditioned opinion, based on the premise that Russia could intentionally keep open the Indian question in order to keep her rival at a permanent disadvantage.⁵⁷ On this view, the absorption within Russia's vast domains of the Khanates of Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva could be seen as the prelude to even more ambitious projects against India.⁵⁸ Russia's ambition to unsettle Great Britain in India was politically motivated even before the conquest of Turkomenia; it later turned out to be a real military threat in the 1880's.

Some British politicians and observers considered the question of the Russian threat to India in the light of the difficulties encountered in operations against Kokand in the 1850's, though they may have exaggerated the obstacles that stood in the way of the Russian advance. Many even publicly denounced apprehensions of a Russian invasion of India, and characterised it as merely a political nightmare, though the idea continued to permeate the analysis of Indian security.⁵⁹ Even before the conquest of the Khanates, English writers saw the Russian course on the Jaxartes as one of steady encroachment towards British India, although there were some who regarded the Russian advance merely as a disagreeable not really threatening event.⁶⁰

No doubt there were two obstacles that hindered the supposed Russian invasion: the first was the difficulties of the terrain, and the second was the fierce and warlike tribes inhabiting it. However Russia had several options to deal with these hindrances. The first would be overcome by securing the neutrality of Persia and the

augmentation of Russia's influence in Afghanistan. The second would be surmounted by mobilizing these tribes against the British and inducing them to loot and plunder British India. In dealing with the Afghan issue, Skobelev at the eve of the Turkoman's campaign in 1880 suggested rapid diplomatic and military action to culminate in the occupation of Kabul, while the period that followed the occupation should be a waiting period, during which Russia should maintain contacts with disaffected elements in India.⁶¹ British observers considered that the optimum solution to encounter these Russian designs lay in encouraging the conviction of Her Majesty's subjects in India, as well as the princes of India, that Britain was and remained:

a first class power, and able to cope successfully with any other power likely to dispute her supremacy in British India, and that their position is as good, or better under British rule than it would be under the rule of any other foreign power.⁶²

In 1881 General Grodekov took pains to convince Charles Marvin during a lengthy conversation of the impossibility of a Russian invasion of India. Marvin commented that he was quite satisfied that Russia could not invade India at present from her position at Askabad, but added that

Russia's position may change. You may by degrees annex Meshed and Herat, and your position would be better in that case for invading India from those points.⁶³

This was perhaps true: but of course we know that in the event Russia did not succeed in expanding its control as far as Meshed or Herat.

One of the factors that pacified English politicians was their disposition to believe in Russia's repeated assurances about the purposes of her advance, and justifications of her mission, offering the illusion of civilized Cossack troops chasing and subduing undomesticated wild tribes, an image which prevailed since the conquest of the steppe. When these tribes were subjugated and Russia came into contact with stable nations with a developed agriculture, prosperous trade, and an established political and social order, the image then underwent certain modifications to fit the new stage of advance and conquest against the Central Asian Khanates. It became that

of a Russian army labouring to spread European civilization among semi-savage people.⁶⁴ During the diplomatic offensive aimed at pacifying British official and public opinion, the Russian press blamed the Government of India as the source of the idea of a Russian invasion of India, arguing also that the expression of this fear was evidence that the English rulers of India were as yet unconvinced of the stability of their power.⁶⁵

In an interview with Loftus in 1874, Gorchakov affected to be offended by Britain's apparent lack of confidence in Russia's promises and assurances about the pacific character of her forward movement in Central Asia.⁶⁶ But such lack of confidence was altogether natural in view of the long succession of broken promises that marked the Russian career of conquest in Central Asia from the early 1840s, up to Gorchakov's circular of November 1864, down to the Turkoman campaign of 1880-1881 and the conquest of Merv in 1884. Hence Russian assurances that there was no intention to invade India would not be likely to impede her from carrying on her usual practice, and break her promises if they came into contradiction with her interests.

Russia in her rivalry with Britain in Asia and Europe, undoubtedly regarded India as Britain's Achilles heel and relentlessly strove to place herself in a position to threaten the Indian frontiers. This intention was at the same time accompanied by efforts for the time being to eliminate Britain's anxiety and mistrust. Prince Gorchakov, in a desperate attempt to revive Britain's confidence in his and other Russian official assurances said that:

the idea of an attack on India is absurd; moreover, it would be impossible for us to attack India. Why will you not have confidence in our word? In that of our Emperor?⁶⁷

But this loss of confidence between the two Empires was a natural result of the deceptive declarations by the Emperor himself and his Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding Russia's proceedings in Central Asia from the fall of Tashkand to the fall of Merv. In 1865 the Emperor had insisted that his dominions were vast enough and his

intention in Central Asia was "to encourage commerce and civilization".⁶⁸ Russia between 1865 and 1873 conquered large territories from Kokand, tied Bukhara hand and foot with the treaty of 1868, and subjected Khiva in 1873, while the usual assurances were offered by officials and by the Emperor himself.⁶⁹ The ruthless Turkoman campaign of 1880-1881 was accompanied by the same assurances at the same high level, to the extent that Gorchakov avowed that the Emperor had issued positive orders that no expedition should be undertaken against the Tekke Turkomans.⁷⁰ These assurances were transparently false, as events showed.

Russian strategies for the invasion of India, 1854-1881

The idea of invading India was rarely far from the minds of Russian politicians and Generals. This issue was frequently considered not only by Russia's Generals, who had put before the Government detailed plans for achieving this task,⁷¹ but also attracted Russian orientalists such as Valikhanov, who admitted that designs on British India could be entertained with "a force on the Caspian as with an army at Bukhara. The same distance [in each case] would have to be passed by the invading force before reaching Afghanistan".⁷² British travellers also did not exclude the possibility of an army marching across the steppe and desert of Turkestan to Afghanistan, though acknowledged that it "would not be easily accomplished".⁷³ British politicians had different assumptions, they believed that with the shores of the Caspian as the nearest Russian bases for an invading army, surrounded by such warlike, predatory and treacherous races as the tribes of Central Asia, it would be a very perilous one.⁷⁴ Loftus regarded it as the "most venturesome proceeding to march an army into a hostile and difficult country".⁷⁵ General Dugamel had already submitted to the Emperor a more comprehensive project in 1854 during the Crimean War for the conquest of India. When advocating his project he emphasized the idea that the Crimean War imposed

upon Russia the duty of showing how she can attack England in her only vulnerable point, in India, and thus force her to assemble so great a force in Asia as to weaken her action in Europe. History teaches us that nearly all the Powers which conquered India found their way to it through Central Asia and Persia....⁷⁶

While Russia was immersed in the Crimean War, Dugamel produced a detailed plan including five routes to be followed: three from Orenburg or Orsk to Kabul; one from Astrakhan on the northern shores of the Caspian by water to Shahnid and then via Meshed, Herat, and Candahar to Kabul; and the fifth from the Caucasus to Tabriz, Teheran, Meshed, Herat, Candahar, and thus to Kabul. All his routes met in Kabul, which made it the head of the arrow against India. He emphasized that an Afghan alliance stood as a prerequisite for the success of the venture, and envisaged it would be possible to win the Afghans over by tempting them with the prospect of spoils and acquisition of territory, "should this be the means also of winning over the Sikhs, so much the better; but the Afghan alliance is of the greatest importance".⁷⁷ From the British point of view, a careful evaluation of India's internal and external situation led to the recognition that, if Russia could secure her influence in Afghanistan, she would face no difficulty in employing an army greater in numerical strength than anything the Government of India could bring into the field. The whole venture depended on the possession of Afghanistan. An Anglo-Afghan alliance would therefore render the Russian invasion a very remote contingency and its success would be doubtful if not impossible.⁷⁸

The issue of how to manipulate Asian tribes, who were regarded by Loftus as an obstacle to a Russian invasion, had already been thoroughly dealt with in General Khrulev's project for invading India in 1855. Khrulev suggested to the Emperor that Russia should form native forces to fight the British, while Russia's own forces should be in reserve. He observed that the entrance of a corps of thirty thousand men into Afghanistan would excite the national antipathy of the Afghans against the English, and would shake the power of the English in India. He wrote:

we should endeavour to raise a native force; our own should form the reserve. We are bound to instruct the population in our methods of offering opposition to the oppression of the English, whose force in India consists of only twenty five thousand European troops.⁷⁹

The Russian press, notably the *Moscow Gazette*, a Government controlled organ, oddly revealed the true intention of St. Petersburg when it admitted just after the reduction of Bukhara that there was now no barrier which could "arrest the progress of either power on the other. They are only separated by a tract of country without any means of defence".⁸⁰ The French traveller, Ferrier, supposed that the Russian expansion towards the Oxus and Khiva was intended to reduce the difficulties of a march against India.⁸¹ The *Moscow Gazette* maintained that the invasion of India would become a matter of fact in the event of another war "like that of the Crimea".⁸² Some months later the *Moscow Gazette* affirmed the same view once more: "Central Asia is for Russia a strong strategic point against England in the event of an Eastern War".⁸³ British opinion realized that a strong Russian dominance in Central Asia might be fatal to Britain in India, but their efforts to halt the Russian advance were hopelessly inadequate to counter Russian intrigues in the region. Clarendon explained to Buchanan, the ambassador in St. Petersburg, that:

the only apprehension we had was that the nearer approach of the Russians and intrigue with native chiefs might bring the Indian mind in a ferment and entail upon us much trouble and expense all of which would be avoided by clear understanding with the Russian Government.⁸⁴

While Russian diplomacy was labouring to foster British confidence in her pacifying assurances after subjecting the Uzbek Khanates and dominating the eastern coast of the Caspian, General Skobelev submitted to his Government in 1878 a comprehensive project for invading India. He recommended that Russia "should throw a mass of Asiatic cavalry into India as an advanced guard. Their motto would be, blood and plunder".⁸⁵ After the Akhal Tekke campaign in 1881, Skobelev admitted that the invasion of India would require 150,000 troops, explaining that 60,000 were to enter India, while 90,000 guarded their communications.⁸⁶ He confirmed, in contradiction

to apparent difficulties and enormous expenditure, that Russia could march an army to India if she chose,⁸⁷ though he declared, to Marvin that he would himself abstain from commanding such an expedition.⁸⁸

As an integral part of his plan, Skobelev put guidelines for dealing with Afghanistan. He suggested the occupation of key strategic locations in the country, and cooperation with the Afghan troops and people. In return Russia would suggest the extension of the frontiers of Afghanistan southward to the Indus,⁸⁹ guarantee the independence of Afghanistan, and tender that country financial aid. In case of rejection of these terms, however, the Amir of Afghanistan should be deprived of his throne.⁹⁰

Meanwhile another strategist, Lebedev by name, sought to save Russia's image and avoid destruction of resources, offering to achieve Skobelev's objectives but in a different way:

in our opinion the campaign to the frontiers of India should be carried out exclusively by regular troops. The employment of Turkomans and Kirghiz would mean laying waste the country over which we should have to move, and stir up against us the hatred of the people who suffered from their outrages and plundering.⁹¹

In line with the usual practice in Russian policy of concealing her intentions, and pronouncing exactly contrary to what intended, officials in St. Petersburg offered the usual assurances that apprehensions of invading India were quite needless:

the idea of a Russian army marching to the Indus could not be realized, or at any rate could not be carried into execution without frightful sacrifices and without straining our forces to the utmost.⁹²

Since the projects of the Russian military assumed that the enterprise could be accomplished without undue strain, we may conclude that the diplomats were exaggerating the difficulties in invading India for the purpose of misleading British opinion, both official and public.

A Russian army marching against India would of course be more dangerous if timed to coincide with a European war. Observers believed that England could repel a Russian attack, but they warned that "a European war might endanger the whole

question".⁹³ If war was declared in Asia and Europe simultaneously, the British would be unable to send troops to reinforce their troops in India, or withdraw troops from India to operate in Europe.⁹⁴ Also an invading army would pose a serious threat if it coincided with disturbances like those of the 1857 mutiny. England would be able to put down the mutiny, as it could defeat a Russian army of invasion, "but what if a mutiny and a Russian invasion came together?" as Seeley put it.⁹⁵ The conquest of Khiva was necessary to secure the nearest point capable of sustaining and comforting a Russian army crossing the Caspian, while the Oxus would afford a convenient waterway down to the Afghan boundaries.⁹⁶ Russian plans were perceived in different ways by officers of the Government of India; some, even after the fall of Khiva, viewed Russia as still being far away and incapable of posing a real threat to India. This group, as we know, became known as the school of "masterly inactivity". This school was criticised by Ferrier for ignoring Russia's ability to advance under the pretext of restoring those native dynasties which had been conquered by the British:

The very presence of the Russian would create a hostile feeling against their adversaries among the native population; many chiefs and their dependents would take arms; the English would then find their rear menaced and on their own territory, and it may be foreseen that, instead of their being able to bring forward the whole of their forces against the enemy, they would be obliged to ditch and employ the best and most efficient part of it, that is to say, their European troops, in putting down the revolts which probably would take place in almost every direction....⁹⁷

This political tendency justified "masterly inactivity" through indulgence in the illusion that it would be impossible for the Russians to overcome the vast deserts and subdue the recalcitrant tribes of Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Others advocated the opinion that the defence of India should lie in the countries beyond its frontiers, and advocated confronting Russia as early as possible, and before she conquered the Uzbek Khanates; thus it became known as the forward party or the "Scind school". Exponents of the forward strategy opposed Lord

Lawrence's approach, that it would be enough to annihilate the Russian army in the passes of the north-west frontier. Although some observers argued saying that, "no doubt all this represented a very comfortable philosophy, but, in the event of their not being defeated, what then?",⁹⁸ they acknowledged that it would be difficult for the British to avert the Russian advance if they remained behind the Indus.⁹⁹ Russia's Central Asian base, remote in the thirties, became nearer each year until it became coterminous with Afghanistan:

we have at present to deal, not with a Russia creeping along the lower water of the Jaxartes, and without a harbour on the eastern coast of the Caspian, but with a Russia firmly established on the Oxus and Kopet Dagh and possessing steamers on the Central Asian rivers and a line of railway for more than two hundred miles in the territories of the Turkomans.¹⁰⁰

As the Russian advance proceeded, both schools of thought, the "inactive" and the "forward", found it increasingly ominous and were increasingly concerned about the defence of India. If it was true that "the best defence of India was to keep Russia at a distance", then growing Russian influence in Central Asia was bound to be disquieting and to enhance the influence of the forward school.¹⁰¹

Russia's attempts to open up channels of communication with certain Indian Princes did not concern Wood, Secretary of State for India, when he wrote to Lawrence that he was not much afraid of the Russians, but that he believed that their growing proximity might disquiet the countries on India's north western frontier and "give them a notion that there is a power behind them who might protect them if stirred".¹⁰² The Russians well understood the game, and were encouraged to develop their plans against India by exploiting factors within India itself. As a European power with deep experience in dealing with Asians, the Russian Government regarded the British Government in India as alien to its subject peoples from the points of view of religion, culture, and race. Russian politicians took the view that the Government of India was able to maintain itself because of the support of the army, but that a great

part of that was not English and was bound to the Government only by their pay; thus its relation with the British seemed merely that of mercenaries.¹⁰³

After the reduction of Bukhara, which brought under Russian influence also the tiny mountain states of Shugnan and Darwaz, Russia was now separated by only 200 miles from India. The formation of the Government of Turkestan made Russia de facto the great power in the region with unrivalled influence over the southern Bekships of Kitab, Shahri-Sabz, and Karategin, which at any convenient moment could be annexed, with Russia's instigation and encouragement, either to Bukhara or Kokand whichever was more suitable to Russia's long-term ambitions.¹⁰⁴

After the subjugation of Khiva in 1873, Russia began a delicate campaign directed to detach Sher Ali, the Amir of Afghanistan, from his British supporters, a campaign which indicated that, although Russia had often denied that India was her goal, nothing short of that prize would in the end satisfy her.¹⁰⁵ Following the treaty signed by Kaufmann and Sayed Rahim, the Khan of Khiva, in 1873, British politicians could no longer overlook that Russian ambitions were designed to upset India, and were obliged to learn "by what means she seeks to realise her ambitions".¹⁰⁶

The *Golos* a leading Russian semi-official journal, published in 1877 an article stating that, while it was obvious that Russia could not challenge Britain in Europe in case of war, Russia would be able to mobilize a force of no less than 30,000 men on the north-western borders of India.¹⁰⁷ Once she controlled Afghanistan, either politically or militarily, and had achieved conquest of Herat and Kandahar provinces, Russia would become India's immediate neighbour; from this new position she would be able to change the balance of power between her and Great Britain, not only in Asia but in Europe as well.¹⁰⁸ Despite the fact that Herat was the centre of a fierce Turkoman tribe, the Jamshidis, Russia would not hesitate to make the necessary sacrifice as long as Herat "lay astride one of the possible Russian routes for the

invasion of India, and was therefore strategically sensitive".¹⁰⁹ The fall of Herat would destroy Britain's position in Afghanistan and would have a negative effect on the internal tranquillity and security of British India. The *Golos* remarked that Russo-Persian cooperation in the 1840s and 1850s had been regarded as injurious to British interests and that the magnitude of the danger which it would bring about, was immense.¹¹⁰

As we have seen, British public opinion regarding the question of the Russian threat to India ranged between two extremes. The first was a pacific position that regarded Russia as a better neighbour than the turbulent tribesmen and "hereditary brigands" beyond the Indian frontiers and made the assumption that it was needless to evince any signs of alarm at the advance of Russia towards the Indian frontiers, or at her rapid subjugation of Central Asia.¹¹¹ The second can be characterized as an alarmist one that saw in Cherniaev's advance, along the Syr Daria, against Kokand in the 1860s an action highly threatening to the security of India. The advocates of this doctrine believed that,

if a duel were to be fought between the Russian bear and the British whale... Central Asia would be the place where the two must join issue.¹¹²

This was the opinion of Charykov, who was the chief negotiator with the Amir of Bukhara for extending the railway through his domains; like him, the Russian Generals who executed military policy in Central Asia saw Turkestan as the forward bulwark from which Russian forces would invade India.¹¹³ After consolidating their position in Central Asia, the Russians contemplated seriously the execution of these intentions. The time seemed exceptionally fit; Sher Ali was not cooperative with Britain, so that Britain could not take any effective action in Central Asia against Russia. On 24 March 1878, the Tsar gave a private audience to two of his Generals, Stoletov and Cherniaev, the two men most prominent and most acquainted with Central Asian affairs. After this meeting, both left for Central Asia.¹¹⁴ Clearly, if the British were to abandon the policy of "masterly inactivity" and detente with Russia,

and instead seek to counter the Russian advance by adopting the "forward policy", then close relations with Afghanistan would be of vital importance to them. The British strategy for meeting an enemy advance towards the north-western frontiers of India was hitherto based upon pulling the enemy nearer to their line of defence, where Britain had direct railway communication with the sea, which was considered as a "proper place to meet the forces which any invading power may precipitate upon her".¹¹⁵ The Russians however had studied and designed counter-measures against this strategy, known as the "backwards policy" which was the military corollary of the political strategy of inactivity. The adherents of the "forward policy", who believed that the best defence of India should include the countries beyond her frontiers, held that it was the needs of Indian security that should shape the British policy towards Afghanistan both in war and peace. Though there were other factors that influenced the relations between Britain and Kabul, the most important were the policy of Kabul towards Russia, and the activity exhibited by Russia in Central Asia, which usually added to apprehension regarding India's northern frontiers, and led the British where necessary to contemplate war with Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ In this situation Afghanistan found itself inclined to pursue a policy of neutrality, which however put her under double-sided political and military pressure from both Empires. The old Anglo-Russian agreement of 1844 in which the Central Asian Khanates were regarded as a neutral zone, encouraged the Afghans to appreciate the advantages of the policy of neutrality.¹¹⁷ But this policy also had its negative aspects. Palmerston's achievement in the 1840s, which gave a sense of security to British India, was possible because Russian authority was not yet secure even in the steppe region, and the Central Asian states were secure from direct Russian military pressure.¹¹⁸ It was the Russian advance itself which increased the threat to Afghanistan and made the policy of neutrality more difficult to maintain.

The security of Afghanistan as the military road to India became one of the most critical considerations of the Indian government. Observers fathomed the relationship between Russia's Asian and European policies, and gathered that the Russian troops stationed on the Amu Daria were the outposts which would be the first to begin the possible contest for the solution of the Eastern Question.¹¹⁹ Hence a stable Afghanistan would not be easy prey to Russia, and would guard India from involvement in Persian or Central Asian affairs. It was also believed that securing Afghanistan would require far less troops than what must be required for the defence of India. Russia, as soon as she approached India, would use all her means to create discontent and destabilize British India to force England, as mentioned earlier, to transfer troops from Europe to Asia. Thus the Indian question would have an auxiliary role in solving the Eastern Question: at all events, the moment Russia became contiguous to Indian possessions, England must immediately send out an increase of force to the East Indies. Marvin recorded that General Skobelev admitted to him, in a personal interview, that Russia should seek to settle the Eastern Question by striking a blow against England in Asia, and asserted that if England should make Russia "wild" by stopping her in Europe, "Russia would retaliate by trying to invade India" or at least disturb her frontiers.¹²⁰

Clarendon explained to Gorchakov that a nearer approach to the Hindu Kush by the Russians would put Indian opinion in a ferment and thus entail for Britain much trouble and expense, all of which "would be avoided by a clear understanding with the Russian Government".¹²¹ It was evidently therefore becoming clear that the security of India's northwestern frontiers did lie in the countries beyond, and thus for understanding British policy on the northwestern frontier of India, one must look far beyond the immediate boundaries of the Empire.¹²² In the 1860s, the British had evaluated their military position, with reference to an invasion from beyond India's north-western frontiers, as unsatisfactory.¹²³ The source of Britain's anxiety lay of

course in the hostile advance of a European rival towards India, "or such a combination of the heterogeneous elements of combustion as exist in and around her boundaries..., at the instigation or under the auspices of this power".¹²⁴ A hostile power, it was estimated, would find around a quarter of a million warriors ready to go for war or plunder. Great Britain, during the 1850s and the 1860s, made more than twenty abortive expeditions to restrain these tribes from plunging into India on their own or under the direction of a foreign power.¹²⁵ Russia it was feared, with her duplicity and experience in dealing with nomadic tribes, would need little effort to activate these tribes against India.

Among all these projects General Skobelev's project of 1878 was probably the most comprehensive and practical. It embodied all previous aims and plans, and was planned after consolidation of Russia's position in Central Asia and the conquest of the Turkoman tribes. When the project was completed on 26 January 1877, Skobelev put his project in full detail in a thirty-page letter to one he considered a confidant and friend for deliberation; it has been found in Prince Cherkaskii's^b papers.¹²⁶

However even he, in a pragmatic tone, forewarned that the adventure against England in India was a hazardous one, and might end in the annihilation of the Russian army. But if the Russians succeeded in demolishing the British Empire in India, this would have far-reaching repercussions in England itself:

competent people in England are aware that a defeat on the borders of India would entail social revolution in the metropolitan country... the fall of British might in India, would mean the beginning of the fall of England.¹²⁷

Thus Skobelev, even before the Turkoman campaign in 1877, when he was Governor of Ferghana, was urging that Russia take advantage of the striking position she had in her favour in Central Asia, to realize the dream of conquering India; he put

^b. V. A. Cherkaskii was mainly active in the Polish and Bulgarian affairs. He was actively involved in publishing and writing in the *Russkaia Beseda*, and supporter of the abolition of the serfdom before 1861. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, he was representative of the Russian Red Cross on the front.

before his Government an ultimatum saying that he would resign if Central Asia was not used to influence the Eastern Question and as a leverage to modify Britain's policy in Europe:

I am all the less in a position to apply for leave to quit this region, because I firmly believe in its aggressive power as an agent for the solution of the Eastern question. It has been frequently said that from Central Asia Russia can threaten the British rule in India, and that it is therefore absolutely necessary for England at this juncture to check the advance of the Russian troops in Turkestan. If we look around us, we shall find that our position in Turkestan is indeed most formidable, and that the apprehensions of the English are not groundless.¹²⁸

In Skobelev's view, Russia's efforts in Central Asia were best justified in connection with her plans against India, and with the effect that her success against British India would have on Europe, otherwise it was a matter of grave doubt whether the enormous amount of treasure which had been spent for the conquest of Central Asia would ever bring a commensurate return.¹²⁹ Skobelev, as representative of the "forward policy" mentality among the Generals, argued that, with such a commanding position in the hand of Russia, the Eastern question would have a wholly different aspect. With Russia's present experience, with her troops and with the available resources under her control in the region, he affirmed that:

there is no Asia capable of preventing us from carrying out the broadest strategical designs which we might conceive... A knowledge of this region, and of its resources, leads inevitably to the conclusion that our presence in Turkestan, in pursuance of Russian interest, is justifiable solely on the ground of an endeavour to solve the Eastern question in our own favour from this quarter. Otherwise the hide is not worth the tanning, and all the money sunk in Turkestan is lost.¹³⁰


In St. Petersburg, in the Ministry of Foreign affairs, politicians as well, did think that the Central Asian advance worthwhile in light of Skobelev's ideas, and by threatening India the Eastern Question could be solved in Russia's favour. These considerations found its repercussion among English politicians. The British Consul-General at Tabreez, drew the attention of the British Government to Russia's increasing activities in Central Asia and the Caspian:

I consider the augmentation of the Caspian navy in the light of a menace to Central Asia and British India. It can hardly be doubted but that Russia, having failed for the present in her designs on the western part of the Turkish Empire, will devote increasing attention to the affairs of Asia generally... It cannot be doubted that the true interests of Russia lie rather in the East than in the West.¹³¹

Further, Abbott analyzed Russia's attempts in the region as part of her strategy towards Afghanistan, pointing out that the routes from Astrabad into Afghanistan were the most convenient routes leading from Russia to the same point and then to India.¹³² This strategy may be regarded as reaching its apogee in the Skobelev plans of 1877-1878. In the next chapter we shall consider how it was to be facilitated by the construction of the Central Asian military railway, and in chapter eight how it was further advanced by the expansion of Russian power to the frontiers of Afghanistan. The Penjdeh affair of 1885 brought Russia and Britain to the brink of war over Central Asia and the defence of Afghanistan. However, it may be observed that Skobelev's enterprise, however much it may have influenced the policy of the Government in St. Petersburg, proved to be over-optimistic, and that the Russian threat to Afghanistan and India had but little effect upon Russia's position of relative weakness in Europe and in the Eastern Question during these years.



GENERAL ANNENKOFF.



Railway brigade clearing sand dunes

Chapter Six

THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY RAILROAD

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the railway has been in its execution and is in its immediate object a military railway.
Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, (1889)

Origins of the Transcaspian railway project

From the beginning of Russian expansion in Central Asia, the troops suffered most from the lack of a reliable and efficient means of communication and transport; hence the question of a fast and practical connection with European Russia was raised by General K. P. Kaufmann, the first governor of Turkestan, as early as 1873, following the conquest of Khiva.¹ The Russian Generals in Central Asia as well as Russian officials in St. Petersburg felt that the subjugation and colonization of Turkestan without a modern means of transport would be impossible in both military and commercial aspects. Apart from the imperatives of military communications, the development of Turkestan as a trade centre would depend entirely on the development of railways. This concept found its way to the press: for instance in March 1873 *Golos* commented sharply that "to occupy Turkestan and not to have a railway for communication with the centre of the State is devoid of sense...".² The Transcaspian military railway system was initially constructed under the pressure of urgent strategic-military purposes, with vigilant consideration of future conquests, and it did not offer any non-military service until that main purpose was achieved. But it subsequently facilitated the immigration of Russian colonists, mainly in the Transcaspian region. The project remained, after construction, under the control of the Ministry of War until 1899, when it was transferred to the Ministry of Communications.³

The Transcaspian railway, which was considered by contemporary observers as of the highest strategic importance, was surely even more menacing when regarded in connection with the Caucasian rail road which joined Batumi on the Black Sea with Baku on the Caspian. It was menacing for it gave unprecedented speed to the despatch of troops from the Black Sea region to stations in the farthest Russian outposts in Asia in front of Herat; and also in reverse it would enable the Transcaspian armies, if needed, to take part in fighting in Europe.⁴ When the construction began it did not disturb the political situation or meet undue objection either in Europe or in British India, despite the fact that it threw off its temporary character as a narrow gauge railway very early and had evolved into a wide-gauge permanent line as early as 1881.⁵

Colonel Glukhovskii, after surveying the region in 1873 following the conquest of Khiva, reported that the "best direction for a railway in Central Asia would be from Krasnovodsk to the Amu Daria".⁶ He explained that the advantage of this project was that it would, incidentally, facilitate the transport of all the production of Central Asia and Afghanistan to Russian markets, but that above all it would have great potentiality for the transport of troops.⁷ On November 29, 1872 a Special Committee for the Advancement of Russian Trade and Industry studied the question of connecting Central Asia by railway with Russia and Europe. The committee suggested three ways for connecting Turkestan with the rest of the Empire: first, from Krasnovodsk through Khiva, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkand; second, from Orenburg through the steppe, Syr Daria, to Tashkand; third, from Ekaterinburg to Tashkand.⁸ In 1873 the Committee for the Advancement of Russian Trade and Industry, studied the subject and suggested that, if capital were short, the project could be limited to "the construction of a railroad between Krasnovodsk and Khiva, and goods could then be transported across the Caspian by the Krasnovodsk Railway

and the Amu Daria".⁹ This proposition was however unsatisfactory as it was too limited and disregarded potential connections with India.

At the beginning the Russians had hoped that the Amu Daria river would solve the problem of communication in this region. This idea had its origins in the reign of Peter the Great, who in 1713 turned his attention towards the east after the visit in that year to Russia of a Turkoman chieftain named Hadji Nafiz,^a who enhanced Peter's fervour with his tales of the wealth and gold of the east. He mentioned to the Tsar that the Amu Daria, which then (as now) flowed towards the Aral Sea, had earlier flowed into the Caspian, but as a result of a dam built by the Khivans,^b it had changed its course towards the Aral Sea. Peter at that time could not of course think of building a railway communication, but he seriously thought of restoring the river to the original channel along which it had once flowed. He entertained the hope that, if the river ran back into the Caspian Sea, then it would bring the Caspian into direct contact through this waterway with Khiva and render its invasion possible.¹⁰ According to Hadji Nafiz, it was to forestall this invasion that the Khivans had diverted the Amu Daria in the first place.¹¹

Later, in the nineteenth century, explorations were made of the old bed of the Amu Daria, partly with a purely scientific aim, and partly to investigate the possibility of restoring the river once more into its old channel. These expeditions found

^a. Khodja Nefes as Russian historians call him, while Western historians refer to him as Hodja Nefes.

^b. After inspecting the story of Hadji Nafiz, who is a Turkoman chieftain, I have formed the impression that this sage came to Russia with a premeditated plan designed to pull the Russians to fight the Khivans on the Turkoman side. The reason behind this intrigue was the fact that the Turkoman tribes had been hurt economically by the deviation of the Amu Daria's course toward the Aral Sea. They lost the main source of water for their agriculture. Besides, the unfriendly relations between the Turkomans and the Khivans, led the Turkomans to assume that the latter intentionally diverted the course of the river by building a dam just to weaken them; though it is much more likely that it was natural causes which changed the course of the river. As a result of their state of helplessness in front of the Khivans, their sapient leaders and rivals, the Turkomans decided to get the Russians involved in this perplexity on their side.

that a well-defined bed existed near Uzba, debouching into the Caspian near Krasnovodsk; but it was believed that if the dams on the Laudan were removed, the water would flow along the old bed just for some distance, at most as far as Sary Kamysh, but would not reach the Caspian.¹² This was a setback to Russian plans to solve the problem of transport and communications by way of the Amu Daria waterway, the more so because building a railroad was held to be impossible from a financial point of view. Consequently, military strategists then aspired to utilize the river not by restoring it to its old bed, but as it was in its present condition, and suggested the building of a flotilla in the Aral Sea. The strategists were faced by a number of predicaments connected with navigation in the delta of that river. Hence,

ships were introduced, but shoals and frequently shifting channels required small vessels of extremely shallow draft. Moreover, the fact that there was no outlet closer to European Russia than the land-locked Aral Sea limited their economic and military use.¹³

All these hindrances however promoted further serious thoughts about the construction of a railway to join Samarkand and Tashkand with Orenburg.

In 1873 General Beznosikov, assistant of the military Governor of Semipalatinsk oblast, was assigned the duty of investigating the feasibility of constructing a railway to Tashkand. He submitted a voluminous report describing the route, and a detailed map, although his report failed to win any official confidence in Russia at that time. However, it did most significantly attract the attention of De Lesseps, who was engaged in grandiose projects such as the Suez Canal and others in America. Kattar, an assistant to De Lesseps, tried to purchase a copy of Beznosikov's project, though the latter refused on the basis that the project belonged to the Russian Government. Kattar turned to Kaufmann for permission to have access to study the project. Kaufmann, out of enthusiasm and to boost interest in the project, granted him permission to review it. Having it in hand, Kattar copied all the data. Beznosikov felt that he was mistreated and took the case directly to the Minister of Transport, Count Baborinskii, who was more indignant even than Beznosikov. He

asked Kaufmann to return the project promptly to the ministry with an official explanation. The minister published an article announcing that it was Beznosikov's project not De Lesseps', but also emphasized the point that De Lesseps had offered his services to execute the railway project.¹⁴

Dissatisfied with the Orenburg route, Beznosikov surveyed an alternative line from Ufa, the capital of Bashkiria, to Samarkand via Troitsk.¹⁵ In 1873 the semi-official *Moscow Gazette* advocated the construction of a railway:

At the present time when we are firmly consolidated in the valley of the river Syr Daria, it becomes clear for us that we cannot remain in a passive state. We must go on as rapidly as possible, and the aim of our forward movement is the joining of the Central Asian trade with that of India. This is the arm by which our conquests in Central Asia will be for ever secured to us. The existing communication of Tashkand with the interior of Russia at present is altogether unsatisfactory, and to get out of this difficulty we suppose it indispensable to join Tashkand with Orenburg by a railway.¹⁶

An attempt to reconcile the British towards Russian railways was made by stressing that the railway from Orenburg to the Indian borders would curtail the journey time of British goods from India to Europe to thirteen days.¹⁷ Meanwhile different parties in St. Petersburg were debating the advantage of the line. Other strategists favoured the route across the Ust-Urt desert between the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea and the western coast of the Aral Sea. The Russo-Turkish war diverted the attention from the railway project until 1879. By the end of the 1870's, St. Petersburg already had more than forty different projects to choose from.¹⁸

From the early 1860's Russian military opinion had advocated the construction of a railway connection with Central Asia, even though initially, for financial reasons, preparations for it were limited to surveys and topographical investigations. The military point of view was represented by General Bezak's opinion propagating and urging the construction of the railway in 1873:

to act offensively only from Orenburg, having in the rear 1,000 versts of steppe, was absolutely impossible and it was indispensable to join the action of the Orenburg corps with that of the Siberian troops...¹⁹

General Bezak's remarks indicated that some of the military wished the direction of the railway to be from north to south, i.e. from Orenburg to Tashkand. There were several possible routes being canvassed which all followed this basic requirement. There were also schemes for a west-east route starting from Krasnovodsk on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. And there was in addition the most grandiose scheme of all, that associated with the name of the great entrepreneur of means of communication in this era, the French engineer Ferdinand De Lesseps. As a result of their desperate need for his experience and regardless of the earlier dispute with Kattar, the Russians contacted De Lesseps, whose hands were empty for the moment, through M. Cotrad who had been one of the engineers employed in the Suez Canal project, and also Yanitskii, a Russian engineer and one of the chief contractors of the Suez Canal.²⁰ Russian contractors had already shown cautious interest in the project, but the idea of a Central Asiatic railway made no great head until foreign competitors came in, the most famous of whom was De Lesseps; his acceptance of the scheme contributed to its credibility, enhanced competition, and numerous projects were brought forward by Russian competitors. The most bold among these was that of Bagdanovich, who proposed the construction of a railway from Saratov on the Volga river to Guriev at the mouth of the Ural river, then across the Ust-Urt desert to Khiva, Bukhara, and Samarkand, with a branch to Tashkand and another to Peshawar.²¹

F. de Lesseps wrote in 1873 to the Emperor Alexander II, as well as to Ignatiev, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople, setting out the details of his project, in which he recommended a railway from Calais to Calcutta, a distance of 7,500 miles, the portion from Orenburg to Samarkand to be laid by Russia, and from Samarkand to Peshawar by England.²² From this recommendation it is obvious that Mr. de Lesseps was not aware of the fact that Samarkand was already conquered by Russia and England would not be allowed to build that portion because Russia's

influence in both Bukhara and Khiva was paramount. Railway lines of course had already been constructed as far as Orenburg from European Russia on one side, and to Peshawar from India on the other. Thus De Lesseps became enthusiastic to complete the link between Orenburg and Peshawar. He suggested, when faced by the problem that his Russian client, might be deterred by financial considerations, that the cost of the project could be collected from public subscription, and that the subscribers should form the Grand Central Asiatic Railway Society.²³

Ignatiev instantly welcomed the idea. De Lesseps, backed by financial establishments, began the formation of a group to undertake the preliminary topographical surveys, and to submit its findings to a committee of experts, who would study the technical feasibilities of the enterprise and of its projected commercial advantages. Some Russian officials agreed to the project as suggested by de Lesseps, despite the fact that it was against Russia's commercial interests in Central Asia to open the region up to foreign penetration, mainly British, which would frustrate Russian ambitions to turn it into an internal market, because they counted on the British rejecting it on the basis that it would open the road toward India. Despite Russia's enthusiasm and acceptance, the scheme had been secretly rejected in a special ministerial council held in 1873 to discuss the contents of M. de Lesseps' letter to the Emperor.²⁴ To obtain the consent of the British government, De Lesseps communicated with Lord Granville, who seems to have regarded the proposition nonchalantly. De Lesseps indicated to him that he intended to send his son and another engineer to India and Afghanistan to make the preliminary studies for the project.²⁵ The Indian Government declined to concur with the project, and when the French engineers, led by De Lesseps' son Victor, reached the frontier of Afghanistan they were prohibited from proceeding further, ostensibly because of the difficulties that might arise in Afghanistan, and returned to Europe.²⁶ On the British side, the project was rejected for reasons both of security and of prestige, but above all out of

consideration of the formidable danger that would spring up from the consolidation of Russian supremacy as far south in Afghanistan as Kandahar. Lord Curzon later revealed the British attitude when he alluded to these concerns:

I devoutly hope that not one of the three [Downing Street, the House of Commons, and the British people] would for a moment entertain an idea so speculative in its inception, so problematical in its issues, so perilous in the lateral contingencies to which it might give birth.²⁷

It was obvious that, by agreeing to the project, England would connect her rich Indian domains with the limited and Russian dominated market of Central Asia. In line with the increasing Russian military might and economic control in Central Asia, the trade of the region with England declined under the prohibitive tariffs imposed on European, mostly British, goods imported into Central Asia,²⁸ while by agreeing to the railway, "England would find that she had stupidly handed over the keys of her commercial monopoly [in India] to her only formidable rival".²⁹

Owing to British lack of enthusiasm for it, the scheme lost support and shortly afterwards de Lesseps turned his ambitions towards the Panama Canal.³⁰ Subsequently the Central Asian Railroad project was shelved because of the Near Eastern crisis of 1875-78. But an Imperial decree for the construction of a railway from Mikhailovskii gulf on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea to Kizyl Arvat was issued in 1880. Under the imperative of the urgency that surrounded the project, all its material was to be freed from tariffs and custom duties, especially that part of the rail which was ordered from the De Cauville Company in France. This part was not primarily for use in the construction of the railway, but to be used as a pattern for Maltsev's Company, the Russian manufacturer, who would produce more than three-quarters of the needed rails.³¹

Military imperatives and the building of the railway

Despite some interruptions caused by the revolt in Kokand in 1875 and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, the Central Asian region witnessed during the 1870s

increasing Russian activities aimed at subjugating the Turkomans. For military reasons connected with the new battle-field in the Turkoman country, the Russian Government was pressed by its Generals to implement the project, primarily for military purposes, and regardless of any economic considerations, to assist the forces operating against the Turkomans of Akhal-Tekke and to clear the way to Merv, the Turkomans' stronghold. Russia had foreseen the enormous advantages that would result from the annexation of Merv. This rich oasis with its strategic location would secure Russia's acquisitions in Central Asia, i.e. the Uzbek Khanates and the Turkoman tribes, from any undesired influence that might be instigated by the example of Afghanistan on the one hand, and on the other the conquest of this rich oasis would facilitate the stationing of a large Russian army and give Russia absolute control over the whole region both politically and commercially.

Russian Government was not interested in developing the mineral and natural resources of Turkmeniia, since it did not want to attract the attention and jealousy of other European rivals, and, according to Grulev, was similarly uninterested in developing the wealth of Turkmeniia in so far as it looked at the region primarily from a strategic point of view. He wrote:

Turkestanskii Krai (Turkestan Province) is one of the most precious pearls in the crown of the Russian monarchs. Its importance comes from its location in Central Asia, and from the fact that it could be used as a base for advance against India. And this point of view was not confined to theory and judgment, but without hesitation implemented in practical life.³²

If Russia's main purpose in the region had been economic, that would undoubtedly press her towards establishing communication with the richer parts of her acquisitions, such as Kokand, which supplied Russian industry with cotton, and desperately needed better roads. However a railway was built in this region not because of economic demand, but when strategic necessity dictated it.³³

Despite Russia's well known interest in a Central Asian railway, the Trans-caspian military line actually came as a surprise, for foreign observers and for the

Russians who were concerned with the scheme, from the point of view of its execution, destination, and timing. All previous schemes which Russia had received from foreign and Russian contractors were intended to connect Orenburg with Turkestan, i.e. from the north to the south, with the purpose of connecting the Empire with its most populous region in Central Asia, and there had been ambitious encouragement from the Governors-General of Orenburg and Turkestan to develop a commercial railway.³⁴ Nevertheless it was evidently the needs of military strategy that lay behind the remarkable alteration of the enterprise, and resulted, regardless of all projects that suggested a railway from Orenburg to Tashkand, in developing the line from Mikhailovsk on the Caspian Sea in the west, heading eastward across that arid desert that had witnessed the disastrous retreat of the Russian army only a few years ago. The urgency of the renewed military operations in the area could not tolerate postponement until the construction of a permanent railway, so it was decided to build a light, narrow-gauge line to supply the advancing army as soon as possible. Only later did this light railway become the prototype of a permanent rail system.

The Generals were the most fervent supporters for the realization of the railway for military purposes. General Kaufmann had been advocating a rail road from Orenburg to Tashkand (north-south) since the mid-1870's, but he met no success in his endeavours to convince his superiors in St. Petersburg.³⁵ The ill-fated expeditions of Lomakin in 1878 and 1879 against the Turkomans, and their retreat across the desert, prepared the way for accepting the new project (west-east) and convinced St. Petersburg of its necessity for achieving the subjugation of the region. Despite her financial difficulties, Russia was compelled to accept the enterprise:

in Akhal the Russian troops were fiercely resisted, as a result they were obliged to retreat. One of the main reasons of the failure of the Akhal campaign in 1879 was the lack of modern means of transport and communication. Thus the Tsarist Government decided to build a railway simultaneously during the next expedition against the Turkomans.³⁶

The recent expeditions, though adequately prepared and equipped against the Turkomans had resulted in the annexation of only 45 versts, from Chat to Duz-olum. Thus three years (1877-79) of reconnoitring and raiding the Akhal-Tekke oasis had resulted in no tangible outcome, despite the engagement of a large number of soldiers;³⁷ this fact encouraged the idea of reconsidering methods to overcome these impediments, and to furnish the troops with suitable and efficient means of transport. The bitter Russian defeat in August 1879 at Geok-Teppe promoted a four-year and 40,000,000-rouble railway plan.³⁸ As Curzon later observed, it was while

General Lomakin was prosecuting his series of ill-adventured expeditions against the Akhal Tekkes that mention was first made of a Trans-Caspian Railway (his successor, General Tergukasov laying stress upon the idea in a report upon the unsuccessful campaign of that year, and upon the proper means by which to subjugate the Akhal Oasis); and in 1880, after Skobelev had been appointed Commander-in-Chief, in order to retrieve the Russian laurels, that the work was actually taken in hand.³⁹

The defeat of Lomakin at the gates of Geok-Teppe proved to Russia that the subjugation of the Turkomans was more difficult than had been thought, and this became the major factor for enhancing and inspiring the railway project and prepared St. Petersburg for accepting financial sacrifices. As a contemporary observer put it,

the disaster at Geok Teppe shook the power of Russia in Central Asia, and rendered a campaign of revenge unavoidable. The principal difficulty of the second expedition consisted in the extreme scarcity east of the Caspian of transport animals, to convey the stores of the army across the band of desert lying between the coast and the oasis of Akhal.⁴⁰

Previously the only means of military transport in Central Asia had been camels, and the main difficulty in all Central Asian campaigns had been the huge loss of those animals during battles. The Trans-Caspian armies had 12,273 of these animals at their disposal, positioned in different locations, though only half of them had saddles. Supplying forage, and caring for them was another major logistic problem, for each group of 6-8 camels required a camel driver. By the end of Lomakin's campaign in 1879, only 350 animals remained, and the Russians found

themselves obliged to buy, hire, or frequently confiscate a great number of them from the local tribes.⁴¹ Russia had attempted unsuccessfully to reach an agreement with the Atrek Turkomans, according to which the Turkomans would provide an adequate supply of camels for Russia's needs, but the tribes showed no enthusiasm for cooperation, and the Russians thereupon forcibly confiscated their animals.⁴² Russia therefore found itself in the position of adopting the very practice which had been her main justification throughout her drive against the Central Asians, i.e. conducting similar acts of pillage and robbery to those of which it accused the tribesmen; this necessarily damaged its image as a European country striving to protect its borders against plunder and claiming the right to "civilize" them. Skobelev was therefore granted permission to select a suitable means of transportation which would assist the conquest of the Turkomans.

Immediately after his appointment General Skobelev exhausted every possible way to secure all necessities for a renewed advance against the Tekke Turkomans. Before leaving St. Petersburg to assume his new post as Commander-in-Chief of the Russian army, he invited a Russian merchant, Vasilii Efimovich Miakinkov, in March 1880 and negotiated with him the possibility of supplying 6,000 camels to be available for work on the eastern shore of the Caspian. Miakinkov refused the idea of lending the animals and suggested instead selling the camels to the Government at a reasonable price of 110 roubles each. Negotiations with Miakinkov were conducted in complete secrecy, to the extent that Miakinkov himself did not know why this huge number of animals was needed. Miakinkov pledged to deliver the camels at Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga river.⁴³ This offer was not favoured by Skobelev but he did not refuse it as there was a desperate need for means of transportation. Meanwhile Skobelev was conducting another round of negotiations with A. E. Gromov, a Russian camel dealer from Tashkand. Gromov proposed the loan of 5,000 camels as a better deal, accompanied by 1,000 camel drivers, to be delivered

at Krasnovodsk, which was much nearer to the field of operations than Astrakhan. General Skobelev received offers from several other dealers, and the result was that the Russian Government had secured the availability of 18,000 - 20,000 camels. Even so, in spite of all these efforts there were also parallel attempts directed towards the construction of a light railway from Mikhailovsk to Kizyl Arvat.⁴⁴

In January 1880 an Imperial command was issued for the construction of a railroad from Mikhailovskii gulf to Kizyl Arvat, a distance of nearly 100 versts, from materials to be supplied by the Maltsev and De Cauville Companies. The need and urgency for the railway induced the Government on March 29 to free the material for this project from the routine of import duties.⁴⁵

The initial railroad project had thus been decided upon, despite Russian apprehension that it would be vulnerable as it was located very near to the Persian borders, and that British agents were already teaching the Turkomans how to destroy it.⁴⁶ The construction of the railroad was still opposed by the Governor-General of Orenburg, Kryzhanovskii, as he assumed that the project would divert attention from Orenburg province, and consequently diminish the importance of his administration.⁴⁷ Many others opposed the project for security reasons connected with the location of the railroad and the possibility of triggering war with England, while Russia was as yet incapable of securing the traffic on the line by an advance towards Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan.⁴⁸

In addition to his immediate efforts to secure an adequate supply of camels, Skobelev also decided also to operate a light railway starting from his headquarters in Chikishlar, the southern-most Russian fort on the Caspian Sea, to the Akhal oasis along the river Atrek. For reasons connected with the fact that the line would be very near to Persia, and also for difficulties related to navigation in the shallow waters of Chikishlar, he shifted his attention to Krasnovodsk in the north. In this stage an American investor, Berry, became interested in the project and offered the

construction of a line from Mikhailovsk to Kizyl Arvat, and pledged to accomplish it by September 1, 1880 if the contract could be signed by February 18 the same year.⁴⁹ The American offer was rejected because of financial and technical conditions which the Russians considered unacceptable: Berry proposed to St. Petersburg to exclude Russian engineers from taking part in the construction of the project, and he wanted to begin the enterprise from Mikhailovsk⁵⁰ rather than Krasnovodsk which was preferred by the Russian Government, although the nature of the land between Krasnovodsk and Mikhailovsk discouraged contractors to start from Krasnovodsk. He proposed that the rails and sleepers would come from used materials to be shipped from the western States of America, and for the purpose of transportation of the material across the Caspian, he asked the Russian Government to supply him with fourteen steam ships.⁵¹ Russia, in the light of an earlier unsuccessful enterprise, where in European Russia the Americans had built a line for the transport of grain, rejected Berry's offer. Instead they ordered the rails and other materials from England, Belgium, and Germany, a deal that led to the skyrocketing of metal prices in Europe. Two locomotives and 500 wagons were ordered from foreign companies, while Maltsev signed a contract to build 100 wagons. The main reason for ordering locomotives and wagons abroad, was explained by the fact that the cost of these machines in France or any other European country, plus the costs of their transport to the Caspian, would still be cheaper than building them in Russia. They would also be more reliable and modern.⁵² It is very clear that the superiority of West European technology as well as expertise was recognized by the Russians, and that it contributed largely to the quick and successful inauguration of the railway.

The Russian Government however decided to start the project immediately with its available resources, and the supervision of the construction was given to General Annenkov, the controller of the Russian Military Transport. Studying the project Annenkov decided to use 100 miles of steel rails purchased in 1878 for use

in military purposes in the Balkans in the event of the collapse of Berlin Congress, since when they had lain idly in European Russia.⁵³ For the construction works the Government formed in 1880 a railway battalion, which in 1884 became known as the First Trans-Caspian Railway Battalion.⁵⁴ The Government strove to press forward with work on the line, for the slightest delay would threaten the army's supply, weaken its performance, and possibly adversely affect Russia's political interests in Turkestan and Central Asia in general; above all Russia could not risk another defeat to be inflicted on her army by the Turkomans.⁵⁵

While Skobelev was preparing his expedition against the Tekke-Turkomans, the first rails of the line were laid in October 1880. Annenkov pressed ahead with laying a narrow-gauge track from Fort Mikhailovsk to Kizyl Arvat.⁵⁶ The line was not however to be operated by steam, but by horses and camels throughout its first two hundred and thirty kilometers. For this purpose General Petrosevich was authorized to buy 1,000 Kirghiz horses from Mangishlak.⁵⁷

Skobelev, who was of course well acquainted with the political dimension of the issue of the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia, and therefore understood the advantages of a permanent heavy gauge line, decided to pursue the annexation of the oasis to prepare the way for the building of a permanent railway. Progress at first was extremely slow owing to the resistance and raids of the Turkomans. In January 1881 Geok Teppe was carried by storm. Directly after this victory, the narrow gauge line was abandoned and work on the permanent wide-gauge line was resumed, supported by the use of the existing narrow-gauge line. In December 1881 the broad gauge line reached Kizyl Arvat and the first locomotive steamed there.⁵⁸ The local Russian authorities, urged on not only by military imperatives, but also by pressure from St. Petersburg to push the work forward, took the line as far as Askabad in November 1885; Merv was reached in 1886. The railroad crossed the desert of Kara Kum and connected Charjui in 1886. Two years later, in 1888, the rail road reached

Samarkand. In 1894 a line was finally built from Mikhailovsk to Krasnovodsk. The annual budget of the line reached 12,240,000 roubles in 1885, a fact that demonstrates the importance of the line, while the Russian Government by then relied upon it to secure its presence, and for the success of its contest with England in the region.⁵⁹

The Russian Government realized that it would be impossible to counter British influence without a railway which would give her unrivalled control over Central Asia. The railway was accomplished in two stages; the first was mainly military from the beginning of the scheme until it reached Askabad in 1885, while the second stage witnessed the continuation of dominating strategic ambitions alongside some economic factors.⁶⁰ During the second stage the line connected Bukhara and Samarkand, and reached Merv, and was pushed to Kushk on the Afghan frontier. Russia willingly accepted the costs of the line which reached 51 million roubles.⁶¹ The extension of the line to Merv and Kushk was worthless from an economic point of view, but from a strategic point of view the railway terminus brought Russia within fifty three miles of Herat,

and so placed the dominions of the Amir of Afghanistan within easy reach of a Russian army. The intention of Russia in this respect may be gathered from the fact that at the present terminus piles of rails are lying stored idle as if only waiting till the command to extend the line should be given.⁶²

This branch of the railway, i.e. from Merv to Kushk, was not intended for any other purpose other than connecting the Russian line with the Afghan frontier, thus enabling the next phase of Russian expansion, the expected move against Herat, to be prepared. In the long run the line could be extended to connect with the rail network of British India and provide a Russian outlet to south-east Persia and the Arabian Sea.⁶³

The Central Asian Railway, despite the advocacy and the support it had received, was not without opponents. As its advocates and defenders were mostly Generals - it is doubted that any other voice will be heard in a society where anyone

who is not an official is no one - its most important opponents were Generals too. Apart from voices that protested against the development of Turkestan, there were others who criticized the railroad on the argument that the first sand storm would bury the line. The most influential figure against the Trans-Caspian railway was General Cherniaev, the conqueror of Turkestan; he was the organizer of the first system of communications in the region, on the pattern of Russia's mainland post roads to connect the newly conquered towns of Aulie-Ata and Chimkend in 1864 and to connect them with Orenburg and Semirechie.⁶⁴ Later, in 1882, as Governor-General of Central Asia, Cherniaev called for a more northerly approach, i.e. from Orenburg, to Tashkand and advocated a railway that connected Khiva with Kizyl Arvat and the Caspian Sea. From Khiva he considered the Amu-Daria river would be a convenient waterway to connect Bukhara with the system.⁶⁵ It appears that the partisans of this point of view were preoccupied by the development of Turkestan and Central Asia as a market for Russian merchandise and a source of raw material for the Russian industry. Their ideas were largely discounted precisely because they were motivated by economic incentives and seemed to be unaware of the long-term strategic purposes of the railway.

According to Lord Curzon, General Cherniaev wrote a series of articles to prove its futility. Irritated by his failure and the jealousy of the success of his colleagues, Kaufmann and Skobelev, he exploded his annoyance in a letter to *Novoe Vremia* in the summer of 1886, in which as Curzon later put it "he threw a parting douche of very cold water upon General Annenkov's scheme, and declared his own preference for a line from Saratov on the Volga to Kungrad on the Amu Daria between Khiva and the Aral Sea".⁶⁶ Cherniaev's approach was essentially for a commercial road and showed little awareness of the strategic purpose of the line which was extending vigorously southward. This suggests once more the degree of secrecy that wrapped the real intention of the project. He was not informed that his

proposed project would consolidate Russia's influence only in Central Asia, and that a railway from Mikhailovskii gulf or from Kizyl Arvat to Khiva or the Amu, "would possess little of the political and military importance accruing to a line from Kizyl Arvat to Herat". Cherniaev's proposal was considered as merely commercial and not by any means serving Russia's long-term strategy in Afghanistan and India.⁶⁷ His previous stature as a major influence on Central Asian policy had been much diminished; thus his opposition had no weight.

The Amir of Bukhara, not surprisingly, was among the opponents of extending the line to his country. N. V. Charykov was commissioned to go to Bukhara to convince him of the usefulness of the railway, and to assure him of Russia's commitment not to interfere in Bukhara's internal affairs and that the railway would facilitate Russia's defence of Bukhara against Kabul. Finally Amir Muzaffar agreed to Russia's demands and pledged to cede without charge public land and even *Waqf* ° to be used for the line. He promised assistance in hiring workmen as well.⁶⁸ Charykov's mission was concluded with remarkable success, and an agreement was signed between the Kush-begi of Bukhara and Charykov on June 18, 1885 which cleared the road for extending the line without impediments to Samarkand, Khojand, and Tashkand.⁶⁹

The construction of the Transcaspian railroad was finished in an extremely short period, considering the difficult natural circumstances and hostile population. The main reason behind those achievements was the fact that the workers were mostly soldiers and the engineers were military officers.⁷⁰ It is highly significant that

supervision of the construction was given to General Annenkov and a staff of military engineers. General Annenkov followed the progress of the construction by living with his staff in a special two-storeyed carriage containing

°. *Waqf* are the land or any immovable property registered for religious endowment. The revenue of these lands usually used to sustain religious establishments, clergymen, religious schools, orphans, and others.

all the required technical equipment, which was hauled to the sector under construction.⁷¹

The consequences of the Central Asian Railway

Kizyl Arvat remained the terminus until March 30, 1885, the year that witnessed the dangerous confrontation between Komarov's troops and the Afghan army at Penjdeh and Kushk, an incident that nearly led to war between Great Britain and Russia, unmasked the ultimate purpose of the railroad, and revealed its true nature as a military arm in the rivalry of the European powers in Asia. After the annexation of Merv in March 1884, Britain feared the approach of Russian troops towards the ill-defended Afghan borders and suggested the delimitation of these boundaries. The Russian government agreed officially, while her troops were still advancing, until they clashed with the Afghan army at Penjdeh in March 1885. This incident revived all the old British suspicions of Russia's double-sided policy, and her intentions for invading India. The peaceful resolution of the Penjdeh affair was indeed only a temporary breathing space, for Russia subsequently extended the railway into Penjdeh and up to Kushk; the first train arrived there in 1898, thus putting Herat at the mercy of the Russian army. As a result of the extension of the line to Kushk, Britain and British India had, as Curzon said, to prepare "themselves for a Russian occupation of Herat... as the next forward move of Russia in the Central Asian game".⁷² The British government had in 1885 "asked the parliament for war credits; the viceroy Lord Dufferin, prepared to move twenty-five thousand troops to Quetta; and the navy was ordered to occupy Port Hamilton in Korea, from which operations against Vladivostok could be mounted".⁷³ Clearly the British regarded the Russian advance southwards as menacing, and tending inexorably towards the occupation of Herat. Therefore the British policy of "masterly inactivity" in the region had to be revised to match Russia's apprehended aggression. It had previously been suggested that a railway should be built from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf through

Asia Minor and the Euphrates valley, and thence onwards through Baluchistan to India.⁷⁴ The Euphrates valley railway, as viewed by contemporary observers,

would shorten the distance by about 1,000 miles,^d and reduce the journey by several days... The connection of Candahar with the Mediterranean, opposite Cyprus, by a railway, would be a matter of the highest strategical importance.⁷⁵

This project would neutralize the Transcaspian Military railway by giving Britain the same military advantage in defending India's northern borders. Understandably Russia sought to impede Britain's plans to build a railway via Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf and finally to India, which would revive the ports of that gulf, and would eventually shorten the journey from Europe to India by thirteen days. Russian policy preferred linking the Indian system with the Russian, to divert European communication with British India to pass through Russian territory without risking a conflict with Britain. The Russian strategists endeavoured to make Russia the link between Europe with its five hundred million population and India with its richness. When Russia eventually would be connected with India by a modern railway line, her influence would be unlimited and she would have the option to influence, intrigue, or ultimately invade India militarily.⁷⁶

As we have seen, the local, military railway from Mikhailovsk to Kizyl Arvat, turned into a strategic scheme in the heart of Asia although, instead of connecting the Central Asian trade centres of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkand with the north, as had been projected in the 1860s and 1870s, those cities became connected from the south and the west in accordance with strategic necessities. The physical landscape was encouraging, the only obstacle being the building of some bridges over the Zeravshan and the Syr Daria, but the Russians were not likely to be discouraged by a gap of 200 miles from linking together their two bases of opera-

^d. the journey here is compared with the maritime route via the Suez Canal.

tions, Turkestan and Orenburg on the one hand and the Transcaspian military okrug on the other "whose firm grip may one day be required to draw the teeth of England in Central Asia".⁷⁷

As was rightly expected, a relatively short extension of this rail road from Samarkand to Tashkand, a distance of only 200 miles, would enable Russia to bring Siberian troops to operate together with the Transcaspian armies at the southern-most point of Russia's Central Asian acquisitions in a remarkably short time in case of any conflict with England. On the other hand, for the security of her dominions, Russia relied on the railroad to secure her grip in controlling the subjugated population, and prevent the spread of national feeling from neighbouring countries, notably Afghanistan. Events in Afghanistan, which followed the defeat of the British General Berrow in 1879, strongly awakened the population of the area and stirred a wave of national feeling that spread to the upper Amu Daria and threatened to engulf the Russian-dominated Khanates; at the same time, from the Russian point of view, they might be exploited by the British as a suitable pretence to justify the despatch of British troops to Herat by way of retaliation. This would have a negative consequence for Russia not only in Central Asia, but everywhere where Russia had interests. The Russians considered that the control of Herat by Britain, without a counter-weight on their side, would revive the dormant aspirations of the tribes of the Khanates, which had lost their independence as a result of Russian military might. Very little effort would be needed to bring the chaos which had begun around Herat to the upper Syr Daria and the Amu Daria regions. In such a case, with the help of the railway, Russia would be able to deploy the necessary force, maintain order and prevent any communication with the mutinous population of Herat.⁷⁸

After the striking success of constructing the railway line, and overcoming natural impediments, such as drought, the character of the desert sand, and the scarcity of water, General Annenkov was determined to expand the project.⁷⁹ He urged

the extension of the railway southward to Herat and even suggested an intersection with the Indian system at Quetta.⁸⁰

Despite the fact that General Annenkov, the railway engineer, in an interview with Charles Marvin, in February 1882, after the campaign against the Tekkes, had denied the idea of extending the line beyond Kizyl Arvat, the primary target of the military railroad, it is noteworthy that he was active in St. Petersburg early in 1885, to gain support for further extension for the project, and these activities were accompanied by reconnaissance efforts led by Alikhanov and Lessar, two Russian lieutenants celebrated for their daring studies of southern lands, apparently Merv and Herat. Skobelev affirmed Annenkov's denial and he himself denounced any intention towards its extension to Askabad. The manoeuvres of Skobelev as well as Annenkov were in harmony with Russia's traditional policies of expansion, "tending to prepare for war in times of peace, and to realize her plans at a suitable and fitting time".⁸¹ Such evasion and ambiguity was usually designed to quieten the scepticism of Great Britain. Grodekov in 1883 observed that General Skobelev was the most ardent supporter of the railway extension from the beginning of its existence, and advocated the continuation of the railroad to Askabad and the Amu Daria, for the purpose of joining Samarkand with St. Petersburg. He believed that this would be the cheapest and most efficient way to perpetuate Russia's control over Turkestan and to attach it to the rest of the Empire. He proposed the popularization of the enterprise for the purpose of compensating Russia's enormous expenditure. Skobelev put the responsibility on the government to secure the development and utilization of the railroad to raise the greatest possible revenue.⁸²

Yet another Russian official, Serebriakov, had mentioned to Marvin in 1882 Russia's desire to extend the railway to Herat from both sides, i.e. from Sibe to Herat and from Askabad to the same, emphasizing at the same time that Russia had no desire to fight England. Marvin commented on Serebriakov's ideas that the very

existence of such a railway must excite alarm. When it was finished, it would inevitably contribute to anxieties that Russia would then be in a position to invade India, rather than merely encouraging trade: Marvin argued that the existence of the railway network in Turkestan had promoted alarm, not allayed it. Serebriakov was able to answer Marvin that England would be able to rip the railway to pieces in case of war and prevent the invasion.⁸³ Since the last thing the British wanted was a war with Russia over Central Asia, this was hardly encouraging.

Clear as it was, however, the Russian officials did not admit the military-strategic character of the railway. They were rather inclined to stress its commercial objectives, despite the fact that this was not, as we have seen, the primary objective of Skobelev's enterprise. In June 1885 the Tsar instructed Annenkov to continue the line to the Afghan peripheries. A second battalion of selected men was sent from Moscow. It arrived at Kizyl Arvat on July 3, 1885 and resumed the task on July 13. It cannot be mistaken that an obvious tendency of rivalry in building railways was sparked by the fear and suspicion that dominated the relations of both Empires in that region; while the Russians were incessantly advancing forward their railway, the British were constantly engaged upon the analogous railway of Hurnai and Bolan in Baluchistan.⁸⁴ Russian propaganda did not change; it took the usual line to justify expansion, and repeatedly insisted that there was no intention to proceed further; a position not accepted even by the friends of Russia:

From Kizyl Arvat to Askabad is 135 miles, and from thence to Sarakhs ... an additional 186 miles, beyond which it is only 200 miles of easy country to Herat ... The railway, however, is needed for nothing but strategical purposes, and need not be considered at present if Russia is content to remain at Merv. There she has abundant scope for what she considers her mission of civilization.⁸⁵

Lord Curzon (emphatically not a friend of Russia) was very sensitive to the role of the military railway in the whole process of Russian expansion, as he explained after his visit to the Transcaspian railway in September and October 1888:

General Annenkov's railway has laughed alike at river and at sands, has passed the impassable, and has linked together and consolidated the earlier and the later conquest, welding east and west into a single Central Asian Empire. ...Panic stricken before, Bukhara is impotent now, having signed away her last expiring chance of freedom when the first rails started from the Oxus bank.⁸⁶

Thus the narrow gauge railroad, which was once intended to facilitate the subjugation of the Tekke Turkomans, turned after that campaign into the precursor of a much larger scheme of augmentation and acquisition, an imperial policy of wholesale expansion.

The commercial consequence was that products from Central Asia began to be imported in greater quantities to European markets, and dealers from countries other than Russia, such as France, Britain, Germany, and Italy, came to buy carpets and luxury commodities such as silk and embroideries, attractive to European consumers. The railway also opened up the local Central Asian market to the impact of European goods, such as porcelain, lamps, glasses, mirrors, brushes, writing materials, coffee, and preserves. As well as these useful commodities there appeared others, unwelcome to local tradition, such as cards, cigars, alcoholic drinks, against the sale of which the Bukharan government strove unsuccessfully; but later secured a degree of regulation by agreement with the railway authorities.⁸⁷

The railway, in addition to the consolidation of the Russian presence, turned Central Asia to a state of complete dependency on Russia, and expedited the spread of the Russian settlements and dramatically increased their population (this process will be considered in the next chapter). Politically speaking, the railway curtailed the autonomy of the Khanates and limited their authority even in their internal affairs, and on the international arena the railway beyond doubt improved Russia's power in Asia. Locally, despite temporary limitations connected with the shipment of goods across the Caspian, which often took more than three months to reach Turkestan from European Russia, the railway had already brought about an extraordinary change in the life of the Khanates. It connected the Khanates directly to Europe in

all spheres of life after long isolation: of course the primary European influences were Russian.

We have seen that Russia's efforts were directed, however, not towards the economic and commercial development of Central Asia, as frequently asserted by Imperial officials, but towards obtaining military-strategical prominence in that region, and far beyond its confines as well. The later history of the Transcaspian Railway confirmed this postulation. Russia extended the line to Samarkand, Marghilan, and Namangan not for any purpose other than establishing a position from which to menace Afghanistan and India. A Russian observer in 1909 commented that Russia's expenditures, the size of her armies, and political plans were not designed to promote her economic gains, but were directed towards achieving political and strategical gains:

We conquered Turkestan but we did not pay attention to this miraculous land, which was brought to us by divine Providence, we overlooked it, searching for further acquisitions in a foggy distance.⁸⁸

Besides stabilizing Russia's control in the region, the railway put the economy of Central Asia in total dependency on Russia's economy. It brought to the region a new industry connected with maintaining locomotives and wagons as well as the rails themselves. As long as the line was detached from Russia's network, the refurbishing plant had to be local. Kizyl Arvat was chosen to be the base for military, commercial, and geographic considerations. But the Russians did not employ the indigenous population in this industrial enterprise.⁸⁹ Until the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway, the Central Asian railroad had no rival in its continental prominence, the main purpose of its initial construction was purely military, but its later economic importance and cultural consequences should not be overlooked. After the shift of the economic centres of activity in the age of western Europe's maritime discoveries, events undoubtedly contributed to the isolation of Central Asia; this rail road however came to revive and connect the region with

Europe, and opened the door to further economic development; it gave Russia an unequivocal hold over Central Asia both militarily and economically.

However Russia fell short of convincing Great Britain to connect her Indian railway network with the Transcaspian railway. This predictable British refusal deprived Russia of the chance of becoming the centre of communication and trade between Europe and British India. After the southward extension of the line to Kushk, Russia found herself obliged by British resistance to postpone plans for further southward movement. Her long-term goals of establishing her influence in the Indian sub-continent and her ambitions of having an outlet to warm seas, of securing the opportunity to interrupt Britain's communication with India, and spreading her influence in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf, all of these had for the time being to be postponed.

IMMIGRATION AND RUSSIFICATION

Russian settlement in Central Asia: the military phase

The history of Russia's immigration into the Central Asian region is closely connected with the history of her military and political expansion. The dense population in western and central Russia could not expand any further at the expense of her western neighbours or settle in their lands, since those dynamic nations were already developing their lands, and becoming formidable rivals to the Russians, who were unable as well as unwilling to ignite war with such powerful neighbours. Russia had earlier made spectacular gains in this direction, as a speaker in the British parliament remarked in 1836:

on the north Russia came within thirty miles of the west coast of Norway, a coast abounding with secure natural harbours, which were never frozen... The ground within seventy miles of Stockholm was Russian; Warsaw was hers - she approached with 100 miles of Dresden. She had crossed the Danube, and possessed Kalisch, which was nearer to Paris than to Moscow.¹

But thereafter these opportunities were exhausted in the west, Russian policy concluded that there was neither free land nor room for military expansion and annexation there, and so Russia turned to the east.² In the east she found vast territories without strong rivals, and in some instances the Russians were even welcomed as essential working hands. Russian individuals in their search for empty land were uniquely motivated to looking

forward to attaining the luxuries and enjoyments denied them in their own country, but which they knew were to be procured elsewhere. The Government of Russia encouraged that feeling. All their policy and arrangements were directed with that view.³

The Russian bureaucratic system served this aspiration and was famous in this respect, encouraging foreign service and the spirit of adventure in a country

where there were no careers open to any man but those connected with the State, and it was characteristic for Russia's foreign service that "the moment a soldier left the country on foreign service he received four times his ordinary pay".⁴

Eastward, the Slavs reached the Volga basin and settled in Kazan and Astrakhan as early as the sixteenth century. The next wave reached the Urals by the end of the century, inaugurating the settlement of Siberia. Wherever the Slavs settled they were known as ploughmen and wheat-growers.⁵ Like no other great migration, the settlement of Russian civilians in Siberia was followed by the Russian armies, not preceded by them. Throughout the history of Russia's expansion eastward, before the 19th century, it would be hard to find in Asia any land that had been conquered by her armies before it was penetrated either by merchants, or by migrant peasants.

At the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, this well established pattern of extension began to change, and civilian settlement began to accompany military expansion.⁶ Russia resumed her expansion in the steppe, where fifteen fortifications were erected to the south of Orenburg following 1835. These forts were of mixed nature: on the one hand they were military (Cossack) posts, and on the other they included a civilian element, mostly the families of the Cossacks.⁷ The Cossack communities (usually called Cossack hosts) were ethnically mixed. They formed regiments of irregular cavalry in the Russian army, and were defenders as well as colonizers of the borderlands. The main difference between the regular army regiment and the Cossack regiment is that the latter regiment included not only the combat personnel but all their dependents as well. This made them Russia's most effective arm not only for occupation but also for colonization. Russia's posts, south of Orenburg, were ostensibly intended to protect the south-eastern peripheries of Orenburg and to check the Khivan and Kokandian influence among the Kirghiz and Kazakh population.⁸ Actually they were not as defensive as they seemed, but mostly

they were of an offensive character that would aid Russian penetration further into the steppe, at a time when Russia had no demarcated borders there and her fluid boundaries incessantly moved forward at the expense of her neighbours. The direct benefit derived from the existence of these fortifications was basically to familiarize the nomads with the Russian presence, and to reinforce Russian hegemony and influence over the nomads through dealing with them and asserting protection over them.

Attention was directed, of course, to establish new forts to be advantageous from military as well as commercial considerations. Ilitsk and Ak Mola were implanted in the heart of the steppe for these purposes; besides securing political influence over the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, they dominated the caravan route leading from Central Asia to Orenburg and Western Siberia. The line of forts which extended south of Orenburg and Orsk was designed to deter the raids of the Kirghiz of the Lesser Horde, who at that time had not yet submitted to Russia. General Perovskii, as early as 1836, tried to erect a forward post at the mouth of the Syr Daria, capable of maintaining a population of nearly 1,000 persons; but efforts in this direction were delayed because of the intensive preparation for the intended expedition against Khiva in 1839.⁹ The unsuccessful expedition against Khiva pushed Russia towards the construction of more fortifications in the steppe, in order to safeguard the rear of her forces in case of similar campaign, and in the meantime to be used in future expeditions as advanced military stores for ammunition and supply. For this purpose Fort Embinskoe was erected in 1839 at the junction of the Aty-Iakshi and Emba rivers and was enhanced by Fort Ak-Bulakskoe to the south-west of Embinskoe at a distance of about 165 km. These were the most important forts built in the steppe before 1845.¹⁰ British observers considered these forts as important works which would enable Russia to command routes of communications with Central Asia and serve as a "connecting link between the old frontier of the

Empire and the long coveted line of the Jaxartes".¹¹ This policy was ended by the formation of the Turkestan Governorship, and as a direct result of the Russo-Bukharan treaty of 1868, which turned Bukhara to a satellite state. Hence these fortifications lost their military significance and began to develop in a civil direction as agricultural colonies, commercial centres or simply trading posts.¹² As a result of continuous advance these forts in time lost their military importance, and naturally were opened to receive more settlers. Merchants and civilian settlers of these fortifications, after the conquest of large Central Asian cities, moved to settle in the vicinity of those cities.¹³

Despite all Russia's claims about protecting the Kirghiz population, and about the submission of the Kazakh and the Kirghiz tribes to its authority, historical evidence shows that the Kirghiz were not satisfied with Russia's colonial policy and resisted it by attacking her settlements, caravans, and trade routes as late as 1870. To control their attacks, the Russians, after the subjugation of the whole of the Syr Daria basin and the reduction of Bukhara to a vassal state by the Russo-Bukharan treaty of 1868, went on to build in 1869 a fort at Aktiubinsk, just to the south of Orenburg. This fort, according to the *Military Encyclopedia* of 1911, was built to deter the Kirghiz raids in the vicinity of Orenburg and to ensure stability in the region.¹⁴ The construction of the fort in that late year, and as deep inside the steppe, undeniably demonstrates the state of unrest which still prevailed deep behind the Russian lines.

The defeat of Russia in the Crimean War caused a far-reaching political and economic shock to Russian society. It further worsened the economic situation of the population as a whole, where most of the burden fell on the Russian peasantry. The abolition of serfdom in 1861 particularly was meant in part to remedy that situation. Nonetheless it did not solve the peasants' problems nor it did bring any recovery to their deteriorating conditions.¹⁵ The government, in order to ease the pressure of

the reformists and intelligentsia towards reform, found it expedient to facilitate peasant migration towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia, which were regarded as new provinces suitable for institutionalized immigration.¹⁶ The central government in St. Petersburg also sought to realize a two-fold target: to create a socio-political underpinning that would support and promote the Russian administration in the conquered regions, and to solve the dilemma of landless peasants who were the target and instrument of radical movements, which daily were gaining momentum. The emancipation of the serfs in 1861 gave a renewed and massive impetus to the process of Russian colonization in Central Asia. During the 1860s, a number of these settlements sprang up in the newly-conquered territories, either in the vicinity of Central Asian cities, or in the neighbourhood of advanced military fortifications.¹⁷

Russia's settlements grew up during her advance into Central Asia in the shape of two lines corresponding with her military fronts. The first line stretched through the Kirghiz and Kazakh steppe along the Orenburg military line, while the other extended through the region of Semireche, Chemkend, and Aulie-Ata down to Peshpek along the West Siberian line. The number of Russians in Semireche in 1873 was already believed to be 25,000 military and civilians, among whom were 17,000 Cossacks, and 1,600 villagers; the remainder were soldiers.¹⁸ Immigration from the north-east i.e. towards Semireche, began earlier and was fostered by a suitable climate and fertile soil. From the towns of Semipalatinsk, Sirgiopol, and Kopal, a line of colonies and outposts stretched to Fort Vernoe; this was usually known as the West Siberian line. Fort Vernoe was one of the military-agricultural colonies of Semireche, which the Russian authorities distributed among their veteran soldiers because of its favourable climate and fertile soil. As early as the end of the Crimean War, between four and five thousand colonists were already settled in Vernoe alone, their number rapidly increased as a result of the location of this colony at the

crossroads between Kokand, Kuldja, and Kashgar to Semipalatinsk.¹⁹

The colonization of Semireche had begun by gradual expansion southward by the west Siberian Cossacks. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Cossacks of the Altai line, a division of the Siberian Cossacks, began erecting new settlements. Sergiopol was established in 1831, Kopal in 1847, Vernoe in 1854, Almatinskaia, Lepinskaia, and Karabulak in 1855. In 1867 the Russian colonies in the region of Semireche numbered fourteen settlements with a population of 14,413. The number of settlers in Vernoe (Alma Ata) reached 12,000 by 1871. For the purpose of enhancing the colonization of the region of Semireche, the 9th and 10th Cossack regiments were compulsorily detached from the Siberian Cossack army and sent there. Later in the mid 1860s, after a considerable increase in the population of Semireche, an independent Semirechian Cossack army was formed. Even so Kaufmann, despite his well known enthusiasm towards encouraging immigration, was disappointed with the outcome of Cossack colonization of the region and put an end to forced settlement of the Siberian Cossacks in 1873-1874. The number of immigrants nevertheless increased continuously as a result of the influx of civilian immigrants from Russia's mainland. These settlers were the main reason behind a number of revolts by the natives.²⁰

Already by the end of the 1860s the division of towns in Central Asia into old and new quarters, i.e. Asiatic and Russian, was a familiar sight to all visitors from Europe, and speaks of itself of considerable Russian presence. Schuyler described it as follows:

The old town, the new town, and the Tartar suburb, though rapidly fusing together, give the place a somewhat straggling air; still it has in every way the appearance of a flourishing Russian or rather perhaps Siberian town presenting a complete contrast to all places south of the mountains.²¹

In addition to organized and state-sponsored immigration, another spontaneous stream of immigrants flowed towards Kazakhstan and Central Asia.²² The Tsarist Government, for the purpose of supplying these immigrants with the land

they needed, confiscated under several justifications the land of the natives. The confiscation of land had already become an official policy under the Imperial directive of 1853, which legitimized the practices and procedures of the local administration in this respect. When in 1858 the Kazakh population protested against the seizure of their land in the lower Syr Daria, Katinin, the Governor-General of Orenburg, asserted that no more land would be confiscated from the Kazakh population for settlement. However this declaration did not affect the districts of Aulie-Ata and Chemkend, which were exempted for strategic considerations.²³ The Imperial directive of 21 October 1868 dispossessed the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz from their land, by declaring that the land remained the property of the Imperial Government, which had the sole authority to allow them to exploit and to roam in it.²⁴ This directive, in the following years became the cornerstone for a more aggressive development of the Russian colonies. The province of Syr Daria witnessed, during the administration of General Grodekov,²⁵ the construction of fifty-one settlements, with a population of 18,259 by the end of the 1880's.²⁶

In his second term as Governor-General of Orenburg (1851-1857), Perovskii reversed all the plans which he had advocated during his first term (1833-1842). He preferred to advance against Kokand along the Syr Daria river instead of attacking Khiva, his original target, across arid desert. The most striking administrative order he gave was directed against the concentration of the Kirghiz in permanent settlements. He believed that they were nomads and must remain nomads, and was so opposed to their settlement that he destroyed their winter homes.²⁷ The new policy tended to open the door wide for replacing them with Russian peasants.

The building of new fortified bastions was resumed under General Obruchev, commander of the Independent Orenburg corps, from 1845 onwards. The new fortifications were intended to be raised on the Kazakh's grazing pasture to the north of the Aral Sea, but the Russians discovered that the climate of the area was

unfavourable for permanent settlement; thus settlements were constructed only on the banks of the Irghiz and Turgai rivers. Fort Uralsk was erected on the right bank of the Irghiz, and Fort Orenburgskoe on the right bank of the Turgai.²⁸ Choosing an advanced location on the Syr Daria for the construction of a fort was assigned in 1846 to Captain Schultz, who recommended the occupation of Raim at the mouth of the Syr Daria, or the establishment of a Russian settlement in the same territory. The following year Russia occupied the site.²⁹ Not far from Uralsk and Orenburgskoe, in 1847, yet another fortified settlement known as Kara-Butak was raised on a tributary of the Irghiz river and used as a connecting point between the Orenburg line of forts and Kos-Aral on the Aral Sea.³⁰

In 1834 one of the most important tasks assigned to De Maizon during his mission to Bukhara had been to gather information about the Syr Daria basin and its inhabitants. The Orenburg authorities were keen to discover where the migrant Kirghiz in the Syr Daria region traded, whether the Khivans oppressed them, and whether they would agree to roam nearer to Russia's domains. De Maizon was also asked to report in detail about the suitability of the land beyond the Syr Daria for the cultivation of grain and cotton. These assignments demonstrated Russia's intention to colonize the region permanently and her intrigues to that end in trying to attract the Kirghiz by driving a wedge between them and the Khivans. Obviously Russia was interested in getting agricultural and commercial information for the realization of her plans; thus De Maizon was asked to pay attention to the sources of water, the possibilities of digging canals and the prospect of irrigation from tributaries of the Syr Daria.³¹ However, even by 1860s, and after controlling the Syr Daria basin and Semireche, Russia had not developed any irrigation project, despite the fact that most of her immigrants were peasants. Only after 1885 did the Russian authorities begin building irrigation systems and restoring the old ones.³²

In 1848 Obruchev erected the first Russian settlement at the mouth of the Syr

Daria sixty versts³³ from the Aral Sea, not far from the annexed Kokandian post Raim. This settlement, known as Raimskoe, became the base of Russia's activities towards exploring the Aral Sea. In 1849 this fortification was opened to civilians. The civilian population was small in number but of great significance for Russia's economic purposes and likely to increase. Obruchev in 1849 allowed, on the basis of permanent residency, sixty five families to live in Fort Karabutak, Raimskoe, and Orenburgskoe.³⁴ Obruchev was interested too in building a strong flotilla in the Aral Sea for use against Khiva and exploring the Amu Daria. He believed that Raimskoe would serve as a base for his advance toward the upper Syr Daria, but his ambitions were checked by the strong Kokandian fort Ak Masjid and its garrison, which was headed at that time by the renowned leader Yakub Bek. This fort hindered all Russian efforts towards exploring the Syr Daria. After the failure of repeated attempts to occupy Ak Masjid, the fort fell to Russia in 1853, after a long and ruthless siege, thus at length clearing the waterway for its vessels. The bastion was renamed Fort Perovskii and because of its critical location, Russia turned it into the centre of her activities in the region. She supplied the fortress with ammunition and a large amount of supplies enough to sustain its residents for at least eighteen months, who besides military personnel included a considerable number of Cossack families.³⁵ As a direct result of the annexation of Ak Masjid, the previously highly valued Raimskoe fortification lost its significance. Fort Perovskii became the centre of communication between other Russian forts in the region.³⁶

By 1860 separate settlements emerged in the vicinity of Fort Perovskii, because the military authorities did not admit settlers within the fort because of military considerations. The settlers of these new colonies were mostly a mixture of Bukharan and Russian merchants. However civilian elements began to settle in Kazalinsk on the mouth of Syr Daria; the Bukharan merchants were the first to appear there and were then followed by their Russian competitors, who migrated to

this strategic point on the trade route between Bukhara and Orenburg with their families. To meet the needs of the rapidly increasing population in Kazalinsk, the Russian authorities built in 1862 six more grain mills.³⁷ Even so these Russian colonies can be characterized primarily as military settlements so long as the Russian civilians who settled in these colonies were assigned in one way or another to supporting military functions.³⁸

Russian settlement in Central Asia: the civilian phase

The second stage began in the mid sixties when the Russian authorities split the region between Orenburg and Tashkand administratively into two districts, Turgai district and the district of Syr Daria;³⁹ the latter became a part of the newly formed Turkestan Province after the fall of Tashkand. Russia in this division was still guided by military as well as economic considerations.

Two factors affected the construction of the new settlements in the region; the first was the conquest of the Khivan Khanate in 1873, which led to essential changes in the caravan routes between Central Asia and Russia; and the second was the construction of the Trans-Caspian railroad at the beginning of the 1880s.⁴⁰ The impact of the railroad, in addition to its military character, can be seen in its utility in connecting the scattered settlements which began to rise along its route shortly after the subjugation of the Turkomans in 1881. The second stage of Russia's colonization of Central Asia was marked by a very important achievement, the opening of a regular mail link between Orenburg and Tashkand. This long line began with the connection of Orenburg with Kazalinsk in 1862 as the first stage, and by 1865 it connected Orenburg with Tashkand. This route, Orenburg-Tashkand, reduced the journey between the two destinations to twenty four days instead of two months, while carriers delivering urgent mail could shorten that period of time to just 12-15 days, and in some highly important cases to nine days only. Because of Kazakh and

Kirghiz attacks most of the stations on this route had to be capable of defending themselves.⁴¹ In 1864 Russia opened a further mail connection between Vernoe and Chemkend.

In 1875 the Russian Government forced the Ural Cossacks to settle in the Amu Daria region, for rejecting new regulations regarding their conditions of service. They were forced to settle not far from Tashkand, establishing a colony known as Nikolskoe. These Cossacks there met with the scarcity of water, the main obstacle that had long hindered the colonization of the region. The new settlers came with their own way of cultivation, which proved to be unfitted to their new environment. Moreover they dealt aggressively with the indigenous population and usurped their land and animals.⁴² Previously the Russian Government had been reluctant to colonize the region, fearing possible riots by the indigenous peoples in face of a heavy Russian civilian presence, and the only colony in this region had consisted of 100 households which was developed at the insistence and custodianship of General Kaufmann.⁴³ As a precautionary procedure the administration sought to shift the settlers' flow to the south towards the valley of Kugartsk. Meanwhile the administration, due to financial difficulties, discontinued its programme of supplying new settlers with farm animals and other privileges.⁴⁴ Considerable proportion of the settlers were Ukrainian peasants driven by famine and the lack of land in their home country. Official servicemen and retired military personnel made up an important part of the settlers. The administration of Turkestan Province furnished them with the required land, but as some of them were not interested in agriculture, and leased their allotments to landless peasants, Kirghiz or Russian peasants, and they sought their fortune in cities.⁴⁵

Many new settlers established themselves in urban centres to be in close proximity to the administration, and were also attracted by the opportunities which local industry and trade activities could offer. Thus they created the characteristic

division of Central Asian cities into two parts: indigenous or Asian, and Russian or European quarters. The Russian part of Tashkand was established in 1865 as a quarter for housing the Russian military as well as civilian officials, although it grew rapidly as a result of increasing number of settlers. The largest Russian community in Central Asia constituted 20% of the population of Tashkand, and this fact was mainly behind the granting of limited autonomy to the city. The Russian administration in Central Asia ruled over the whole urban population, in theory equally, but actually it cared primarily for the development and welfare of the Russian portion, and most of its expenditure was devoted to the Russian quarters.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the Russian Government encouraged settlement in strategic locations not only by Russians, but also by *inorodtsy*⁴⁷ immigrants from other peoples, for the purpose of creating a counter-weight to the indigenous population on the one hand, and to promote the production of much needed raw materials for her industry by way of securing availability of a suitable labour force on the other. The administration was particularly interested in settling the Mennonite Germans,^a who had come to Russia in the 18th century. In 1879-1880 nearly five hundred Mennonite families arrived in Turkestan. However their settlement was not voluntary, as their creed was opposed to violence, they had refused military service in the Volga region. Hence they were forced to settle in the vicinity of Tashkand, where they built five colonies.⁴⁸ Apparently the climate was unsuited to their enterprise, so they appealed to the Bukharan Amir Muzaffar for protection and land. But, being himself in a state of vassalage, the Amir could not satisfy their aspirations. Then Kaufmann took the initiative and got permission from St. Petersburg for them to

^a. The Mennonites were named after Menno Simon (1469-1561) and are a Christian denomination located in many countries of the world, with heavy concentration in the United States and Canada. They are an offshoot of the sixteenth-century Anabaptists, a radical reform movement in Europe. Their thought is based on separation between religion and the world. Under severe persecution in the 16th century, they adopted a strategy of withdrawal from society. It is believed that they went to Russia not to stay, but on their way to America.

settle in Khiva, where under Kaufmann's pressure the Khan allotted them land in the vicinity of Ak Metched, 13 km from Khiva the capital.⁴⁹

The resolution in 1866 of the Central Board of Western Siberia, in an attempt to confront corruption and promote productive farming, announced that the advantages of settlement in the steppe region and Turkestan would be granted only to those working families which had strong moral qualities, were materially efficient and able to guarantee their trustworthiness. The Russian authorities in Semireche adopted a similar position, while officials in central Russia were instructed to give permission to certain categories of people and direct them towards those regions where they could receive free public land.⁵⁰

Kaufmann believed that these Russian settlements in Central Asia would have a considerable impact on the region, when they had developed and established direct communications and programmes of mutual assistance towards each other. He advised that the existing settlements in the region should be rearranged in such a way that they became a network of settled colonies capable of dominating the economy and providing assistance to each other.⁵¹ He was deeply interested in creating an alien social presence in Central Asia as a whole, and chiefly in the main cities of Central Asia: Samarkand, Tashkand, and others. Thus he encouraged and offered generous assistance to German, Polish, and Tatar as well as Russian colonization and settlement in the region. He showed concern for them, built houses for them, and granted them a subsidy of 1,200 rubles for adjustment to their new life.⁵² Kaufmann's policy of assisting settlement was accompanied by another political course, directed against native institutions and establishments. He deprived these foundations of any official financial support and, for example, imposed heavy restrictions on the collection of the religious endowment which constituted the only source of survival to these establishments, whether educational, judicial or cultural. Lykoshin argued that the legal system was far from being just, and intentionally

preserved many elements of the old order.⁵³ The system of "enlightenment of the Aliens", which was established by Il'minskii, the engineer of Kaufmann's educational policy, was completely different from both the Russian and the Muslim school systems. Il'minskii endeavoured through this system to Russify and Christianize the education system by offering opportunities to graduates from Russian schools, by propagating Orthodoxy, and by eradicating the original alphabet of the indigenous national languages and replacing it with the Cyrillic.⁵⁴ In this regard Kaufmann reported:

in the first year of my administration, I have moved all the Mullahs, who had been sent by the Chief-Mufti of Ufa; I have abolished all previous connections between our government and the local Muslim establishments; and I have cancelled the right of these organizations to own the endowment of land (*Waqf*).⁵⁵

Moreover he prevented all Muslim missionary activity in the region, under the pretext of avoiding what the British had experienced in India during the 1850s.⁵⁶

In 1874, at the instance of Kaufmann, the Russian administration built five colonies in the district of Aulie-Ata, on a very important post road connecting Vernoe, Tokmak, and Peshpek in the east, with Chemkent Turkestan, and the entire Syr Daria basin in the west. These settlements were not regulated by any legislation or administrative order. In the same manner Russian settlements continued to spring up in the region also under General Cherniaev (1882-1884), the successor of Kaufmann.⁵⁷

Thus we can see, since its first steps in Turkestan, that Russian policy was dedicated to maintaining and perpetuating Russia's presence in the region on the one hand and stabilizing her command on the other. The local populations still resented and would not accede to the appearance and presence of the Russian peasants in their lands. For this purpose the government sought to encourage, in the first instance, the resettlement of the Cossacks.⁵⁸ Their sustenance would have been im-

possible without generous subsidy and allotments of land, besides other privileges granted by the Russian administration to the new-comers. These privileges included the granting to each family, upon arrival 27 acres of land free of taxation besides the needed farm animals, and long term credits.⁵⁹ As a result, even in remote areas where one seldom met any dwellers, the Russian peasants had penetrated and formed considerable colonies. Schuyler, after his trip to Central Asia in the late 1870s mentioned that:

after leaving Ak-Su river we seldom met any sarts^b, but on the contrary numbers of genuine Russian peasants, for here begin the Russian colonies.⁶⁰

In 1873, Tokmak one of the towns of the district of Semireche had a Russian population of 800.⁶¹ On the eastern flank of the immigration highway, where the Trans-Ili region witnessed the arrival of settlers as early as 1853, the number of Cossack and civilian colonists arriving from western Siberia, and from Russia's mainland reached considerable proportions in 1871. Kalpakovskii, the military governor of Semireche, according to Suleimenov, became the first initiator of legalized colonization. He issued in 1868 "Temporary rules for peasants' settlement in Semireche". Kalpakovskii's rules granted for the immigrants, besides land, the privileges of exemption of that land from taxation for the first 15 years, long term credits, and other encouraging grants.⁶² Later in 1883, because of the shortage of more available land, the Government suspended these privileges; Semireche was completely closed for further settlement in 1891.⁶³

The Cossack presence and the continuous flood of immigrants became a grave challenge to the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, who were discontented as a result of losing their rich land to the new-comers, who were moreover unfamiliar with the local irrigation techniques, and frequently ruined them. These factors among others led the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs to attack the Russian colonies.⁶⁴ The Russian ad-

^b. The sarts in local languages means the urban dwellers, but as used here by Schuyler it means indigenous, which is common in European historical literature.

ministration however did not hesitate to attribute these hostilities and unrest, in the early stages, to Khivan or Kokandian intrigues aimed at spreading disarray among the nomads. This allegation as we have seen was one of the main pretexts utilized by the Russian politicians to justify their aggression against the Khanates. The programme of civilian resettlement in Central Asia continued and reached a massive scale in 1871, when the Russian authorities deported immense numbers of Uralians, Tatars and Bashkirs, to the Syr Daria region, an operation that gave the impression of an exiled population in Central Asia. The Uralians were not immigrants but brought here as deportees for their refusal to submit to the law of general military service. The Uralians, even after resettlement in Turkestan, refused to submit to local authorities, and rejected government demands to register upon arrival in the town of Kazalinsk.⁶⁵ They consisted mostly of Tatars and Bashkirs and proved, after their forced resettlement, that they were capable of flourishing; despite the severe climatic conditions, and the harsh character of the land they had been assigned to, some established great influence on the economic life of the region. It surpassed that of the Russian immigrants, who preferred to seek settlement in more convenient regions. These Uralians developed and monopolized the fishing industry on the banks of the Syr Daria and the eastern shores of the Aral Sea,⁶⁶ yet another example of the pervasive role which the official policy of Russian settlement exerted in the economic development of Central Asia.

Education policy and the attempt at Russification

The conquest of Central Asia, as we have seen, began as an exercise of military power, but its perpetuation and continuity depended on victory in other fields such as economic domination and cultural control. The Russian Government was confronted with the dilemma which met all other colonial powers in the century, i.e. educating the colonized population. The Russians were confronted by completely

different traditions and cultures in Asia. However, in this field Russian authorities were not without experience, because they had dealt with similarly alien nations, with comparable cultural backgrounds, throughout their advance eastward, in the Khanate of Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the steppes. The Russian officers, themselves half Asian and half European, unlike those of other European countries, mastered methods of drawing closer to the Asians, and delicately knew how to split them and win the sympathy of one party against the other. Russia gradually began imposing her culture on her Muslim subjects; and there was no doubt that "Russification" was a determined principle and could prove to be most effective of all through her educational policy. This system has been well described as:

elements of western-style education, in the Russian spirit, with an Orthodox Christian background, imparted in the pupil's own language by native teachers.⁶⁷

This policy may have appeared to serve the short and medium-term interests of the Russian State; whether it did much to benefit its recipients, the peoples of Central Asia, is more doubtful. It isolated them from any effects of Western culture that might reach them other than through Russian mediation, and hindered the possibility of further development in their own national cultural life. Vambéry has put it as follows:

under Russian sway a transformation, ..., could at the best only be possible by forcing the Asiatics entirely to give up their national individuality, by their being swallowed up in the mass of the ruling element, in short, by Russification.⁶⁸

For short-term necessities, the Russian authorities sought to create "Russified" individuals capable of controlling the economic and political aspects of newly assimilated societies. Thus these individuals, whether activists in the fields of education or religion, enjoyed privileges usually granted only to Russian officials. In this direction the Russian authorities took extraordinary pains to eliminate existing religious establishments and educational institutions. In the field of education, which

included religious schools, all subsidies to the traditional religious authorities were severely restricted, to the extent that they were deprived of all grants from the controlling Russian administration and from the Khanates as well. In the meantime an attempt was made to foster a network of schools that would spread the Russian language and culture among the indigenous population.⁶⁹ Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan, decisively opposed any development in the indigenous cultural life and hindered the traditional educational system.⁶ He forbade all the connections between the Russian administration and the local institutions that had existed during the time of his predecessors.⁷⁰ He endeavoured to destroy the existing order, according to Terentiev, and resisted any suggestion of reorganizing the indigenous schools, insisting that they should manage their affairs without any support from the Russian administration, or fade away.⁷¹ But, as we have already seen, he also severed them from their traditional sources of support.

Instead he fostered a new type of school designed to create "Russified" individuals, superficially attached to their heritage, upon whom Russia could rely to control and govern. The indigenous children were admitted to schools, not for the purpose of enlightenment but for assimilation, Russification, and nurturing love for Russia and respect for "the unlimited authority of the white Tsar".⁷² Curtis in this regard wrote that,

the Russian government does not prohibit native children from attending the schools that are furnished for the inhabitants of the Russian towns, and admits them free of tuition, and particular pains are taken to impress them with the greatness and the goodness and the far-reaching authority of the Czar. In other words, they are russified as thoroughly as possible.⁷³

Kaufmann rigorously maintained his policy of negligence of Muslim spiritual

⁶. The system of *madrrasah* and *Maktab* prevailed in Central Asia, but not in the Kazakh steppe where schools did not exist before the coming of Russia. In these *madrсахs* and *maktabs* the pupils learned mostly theological education besides mathematics, astronomy, and history. But in the sense of the Western educational system, schools in Central Asia did not exist.

leadership and Muslim institutions.⁷⁴ Lykoshin described the native schools under Russian administration in Tashkand:


primary schools for children located in narrow, low and dark huts, so that one would admire the endurance of those children, and their patience in such inconvenient condition.⁷⁵

These conditions and intentions were resisted by all Central Asians, including the Kirghiz and the Kazakhs, who refrained from sending their children to such schools, until they were desolated and finally closed. However, conditions of schools in Russian quarters and colonies were different. Among measures that would encourage immigration and settlement of Russians, besides free land and other privileges alluded to earlier, Kaufmann opened a school in every Russian settlement. He built a school in Kazalinsk, even though it had been desolated earlier because of its unfriendly climate, and another in Perovskii, for the purpose of attracting the settlement of Russians in the region.⁷⁶ Even though these schools were opened to Kirghiz children, no native student attended them during their first seven years.⁷⁷ The key reason behind the sad fate of these schools was the great apprehension in the minds of the parents of these children regarding the type of education they would receive there, which was unrelated to their traditions, religion, or history. These fears created a passive resistance on the part of the natives who abstained from sending their children to these schools. In 1867 only twenty five pupils attended the Russian schools in Tashkand, the largest city in Central Asia, and less than thirteen in Khodzhend, while the schools in Kazalinsk and Perovskii were already closed. To remedy this situation, Kaufmann formed a special committee authorized to deal with the difficulties that met the Russian system of education. The committee included three military officers: Brodovskii, Terentiev,⁷⁸ and Kun. Among the recommendations of the committee there were two prominent points. The first was the construction of mixed Russo-Central Asian schools, which would be a strong rival to the indigenous schools; and the second was the introduction of the

Russian (Cyrillic) alphabet to replace the Arabic. These recommendations became the basis for a full-scale course of Russification and assimilation, although it may be debated whether the Russian educational policy in the whole of Turkestan was as successful as the committee had hoped. There were 61 mixed schools, attended by less than three thousand native pupils (as a result of the dominating apprehension already noted, that the youngsters would be assimilated and Russified).⁷⁹ The Russian administration in Turkestan sought to convince St. Petersburg of the necessity of establishing native secondary schools, in order to prepare teachers for the provincial schools. But the Ministry of Public Education feared that these schools would be too busy with propagating Islam and anti-Russian feelings, and declined to grant them any assistance.⁸⁰

Among other procedures to boost her cultural influence in Central Asia, Russia built a public library in Tashkand which included 10,000 volumes in Russian language, some in other foreign languages, but none in the local languages! In the same direction, towards achieving cultural predominance, Russia issued a number of official publications besides three Russian daily newspapers: *Turkestan*, *Turkestan Courier*, and *Turkestan Agriculture*, but all in the Russian language. The only newspaper in the local language was *Turkestan Native Gazette*.⁸¹ All these newspapers, including the native one, had at the top of their priorities the task of defending Russian policy in the region, advocating the civilizing role of Russia, and keeping the public constantly alert to the supposed danger of alleged British designs and British aggression.

A full examination of the progress of Russification in Central Asia would require a separate study of its own, but the evidence from the observations of contemporary Russian authorities does suggest that it was more successful in promoting resistance than assimilation or loyalty.



CENTRAL ASIA IN 1885
 - - - - - International Frontier
 - - - - - Province Boundary

Chapter Eight

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TURKOMANS

I always have the assumption that the Central Asian foe is not insignificant as some assumed. Judging the situation from the reports which I have received about the Tekke Turkomans, I believe that they might be exceptionally militant people. Alexander II speaking to General Skobelev before the Turkoman campaign, January 12, 1880.

The enemy is brave, and skilful in single combat; he fires effectively... but he operates in individual extended order, or in detached bodies, very little obedient to the will of their chief. Skobelev's Official Report, December 24, 1880.

Kaufmann and the Yomuds

The conquest of the Khivan Khanate in 1873 created a new situation in Central Asia; Russia now sought to spread its authority over adjacent territories whether they clearly belonged to, or were merely claimed by, the Khivans, such as the Yomud territory.¹ The Turkoman country^a for several reasons was considered by British politicians to be more important than Khiva, the fall of which was regarded as a "stepping stone to the subjugation of the Turkomans".² It was evident that the Russian Government would want to master the strategic Turkoman country, which would connect her possessions on the Caspian with Khiva and Bukhara, and her dominions in Central Asia with Afghanistan and Persia. The reduction of the Turkomans' country, besides safeguarding her recent acquisitions, in the region, would secure for her military predominance in the whole region and prepare the way for further advance. British politicians understood that to stop robbery and slavery was no doubt the Russian humanitarian mission, but that it had also massive political

^a. The Turkoman country, bordering Bukhara, Khiva, Afghanistan, and Persia, occupied the vast territory between the Caspian and the Oxus. Controlling Turkomania and its tribes constituted the key to the long-term mastery of the Khanates of Central Asia.

consequences.³ They realized that the collapse of the Turkomans would become a powerful incentive to a further advance:

by the subjection of the Turkoman tribes Russia acquired that land of war like population, which can supply at the lowest 40,000 armed cavalry... with complete command of the Caspian and of the rail roads leading to and beyond it, and with an army of 120,000 men... Russia has acquired the basis for military operations which may seriously menace the independence of Persia and Afghanistan, and thereby become a standing danger to our Indian Empire.⁴

After reinstalling the Khan of Khiva as a Russian puppet in 1873, Kaufmann began discussing ways of collecting the war indemnity from the Khivans and from the Turkomans as well. The Khan straightforwardly repudiated responsibility for collecting the Turkomans' share, and insisted that they had never paid him anything in the shape of taxes, that they would not now, and that it was beyond his power to compel them to do so.⁵ Kaufmann then resolved to collect the war indemnity from the Turkomans directly himself, and issued a declaration ordering the Yomuds to pay 300,000 roubles within two weeks.⁶

Russia in her advance generally considered tolerance in any of her officers as a sign of weakness; thus Colonel Stoletov, who won the sympathy and obedience of the Turkomans without oppressing them, was accused of having a "soft" attitude and replaced by the hard-liner V. I. Markozov as commander of the Krasnovodsk garrison.⁷ After the subjection of Khiva, Kaufmann instructed both Glukhovskii and Markozov to survey the western part of Khiva down to lake Sari-Kamysh in the heart of the Yomud territories. Their survey took on a military as well as an economic character, and they met no resistance from the Turkomans, who discerned the absurdity of resistance after the fall of Khiva, so they "not only professed their entire submission but showed it in deeds".⁸ In spite of that attitude, Markozov arrested several Yomud elders and confiscated their camels to carry his equipment from Krasnovodsk to the region of Sari-Kamysh, where he would meet with Glukhovskii who was dispatched to the same point from Khiva.⁹ According to Miliutin,

the War Minister, and Kaufmann, the Governor General of Turkestan, the conquest of the Turkomans was necessitated by the impossibility of maintaining peace in Khiva as long as they were independent, but the military survey shows that the real reason lay in the fact that the south-western part of Central Asia, i.e., the Turkoman country, had major strategic significance as the eastern flank of the Caucasian army, and was regarded as a natural military extension of Bukhara and Khiva.¹⁰

As usual some Russian officers were eager for an easy campaign against the Turkomans for the purpose of obtaining decorations and promotion, especially the Order of St. George, the highest decoration in Russia. The Russian Generals also were motivated by the idea of inflicting punishment on those recalcitrant Turkomans for, as Terentiev put it, "we never had the chance to teach them a lesson, and to let them feel the weight of our hands"; besides it was an opportunity for those who had arrived too late during the Khivan campaign and had no chance to fight, all of whom were sent in the expedition, at least to "smell the gun-powder".¹¹ The Yomuds, the target of the intended campaign, had sent their chieftains to Kaufmann after the fall of Khiva, declared their submission and asked for peace. Despite accepting their submission, Kaufmann considered it necessary to inflict a severe punishment on them for their previous resistance and to make them feel the Russian power.¹² With these views Kaufmann decided to take advantage of the presence of his troops in Khiva, at a convenient marching distance from the Yomuds, and determined to "change the order of things regarding the Turkomans, materially and morally, by subduing their pride and their license".¹³ Kaufmann believed that the Yomuds remained a centre of resistance to the Russian presence, and were capable of dealing a blow to his army; nor did he forget that the Khan of Khiva had sought refuge among them in the near past. So he demanded that the Yomuds pay a war indemnity of 300,000 roubles in two weeks. The Yomuds acceded but appealed for a longer period to collect such a large sum. The indemnity would be paid, as the Yomuds' elders said, but the fact

that they were a nomadic people rendered it difficult to collect such a sum in such a short time; besides their wealth consisted of flocks not ready cash, and "it was impossible even to raise it by the sale of their cattle or their corn, or even the jewels and ornaments of their wives and daughters".¹⁴ It is clear that there was a pre-determined plan in Kaufmann's mind behind the demand of payment in cash not in kind, for ordinarily accepting camels for use by the army would have been worth more than money. The Russians were looking for a pretext to inflict punishment on the Yomuds, and they found it in their inability to pay the indemnity within the stated period.

The massacre of the Yomuds (1873)

Kaufmann therefore detained twelve of the Yomuds' elders, who came asking for an extension of the period fixed for paying the indemnity, as hostages and sent back five of them to collect the money. Kaufmann dispatched a force on 18 July 1873, one day before the beginning of the two-week period for the payment of the indemnity, which was set forth from 19 July to 3 August; it was led by General Golovachev and was to discover the Yomuds' intention, whether they had resumed the collection of the money or not.¹⁵ If he discovered evidence to justify suspicion of their intentions, Kaufmann furnished him with the following military command:

I order you immediately to move upon the settlements of the Yomuds which are placed along the Ghazavat canal and its branches, and to give over the settlements of the Yomuds and their families to complete destruction, and their herds and property to confiscation.¹⁶

Another order was issued to a detachment from the Orenburg army, despatched for the same purpose, "to proceed to the work of slaughter".¹⁷ An eye-witness heard Golovachev delivering the command to his subordinates:

I have received an order from the commander-in-chief... this expedition does not spare either sex or age, kill all of them.¹⁸

Even Russian historians expressed surprise at the decision to send troops against the Yomuds since they did not refuse payment, but merely asked for a longer period.^b

Golovachev lost no time and spared none, his Cossacks eagerly assumed their appointed task, slaughtering indiscriminately and burning every thing. Upon receiving the news, Kaufmann approved the procedure, though he advised Golovachev to spare the grain and not to burn it:¹⁹ grain of course being a strategically valuable commodity. The destruction, ruin, and butchery wreaked on the Yomuds was great; they were not prepared to resist, thinking that submission would spare them and their properties. After the massacre, Kaufmann increased the amount of the indemnity to 310,000 roubles, though he agreed to receive half of it in camels.²⁰ As Schuyler observed:

The Turkoman women had to strip themselves of all their ornaments and bring them into the Russian camp for sale... Every necklace and bracelet thus given up will leave a long legacy of hatred.^c

^b Kaufmann became abashed and frequently found himself on the defensive trying to justify the motives that provoked him to issue such a command. The whole of Russia was embarrassed when Skyler, an American writer, accused Russia of barbarism after having read Schuyler's *Turkestan*. That was a severe blow to the Russian image in the United States of America. Russian writers accused him of falsehood, although they couldn't accuse Schuyler, the American Consul General at St. Petersburg, who put a translation of the order in his book, for he visited Central Asia by invitation of the Imperial Government, and he had the text from a Russian official; they denied such a command and defended their allegations by stating that MacGahan had visited the region but did not refer to such a directive. Terentiev gave a good image of the confusion and defamation that prevailed, in his *Istoriia Zavoevaniia*, II, 267-8.

^c It should be remembered that these are the words of Schuyler, the United States Consul in St. Petersburg, who was invited by the Imperial Government to visit Central Asia and had an opinion far from hostile to Russia. In a very humane language he stated that these ornaments were exhibited later at St. Petersburg and in 1875 at Paris. Schuyler recorded the following story, which he heard from an eye-witness who took part in the massacre, Abramov by name. He said the army advanced on 7 September 1873 against the Turkomans killing virtually everyone on their way "cutting everybody down, whether a small child or an old man... A mother, who had been riding on a horse with three children was lying dead. The eldest child was dead also, the youngest had a sabre cut through his arm, and while crying was wiping off the blood. The other child, a little older, who was trying to wake up the dead mother...". Schuyler, II, 359-60.

Following the conquest of Khiva and the suppression of the Yomuds, Russia in November 1873 formed a new military district, the Transcaspian Military District, on the eastern coast of the Caspian including all the territory between the Caspian and Khiva, under the control of the Caucasian military administration. Colonel Lomakin, who had been promoted to General after the fall of Khiva, was appointed Governor-General of this district.²¹ The new formation was justified by the need for safeguarding a strong position on the eastern coast of the Caspian for securing the passage of the Caucasian regiments, which would be needed for an operation against the Akhal Tekke Turkomans who continued to oppose the Russian presence in their territory and oases.²²

In 1876 Lomakin was authorized to begin reconnoitring the region between Chikishlar and the Kopet Dagh range, under the pretext of conducting scientific research on the old bed of the Amu Daria.^d He was instructed to dig wells in waterless areas, and was commanded to occupy Kizyl Arvat which fell to him on 7 May 1877 though heavy fighting erupted on 12 May and the Russians were obliged to retreat.^e Although unsuccessful, this episode shows that the annexation of the Turkoman country, which became of urgent priority in Russian policy after the fall of Khiva, was wanted to open the road in front of Russia directly to Afghanistan across a wide front extending from the Caspian to the Pamirs.²³

^d. The Russians spared no effort to create a suitable route for transport and communications to facilitate their advance. They regarded the Oxus (Amu Daria) as a proper water way, if diverted to its old course, which would connect Russia's central zone through the Volga river, the Caspian sea and the Oxus to the borders of India. This idea existed in Russian thought since the expedition of Bekovich-Cherkasskii in 1717, when Peter the Great inquired about the possibility of diverting the river to be used by an avenging army against the Khivans. The idea held its importance as strongly as ever until the end of 1880 when General Glukhovskii with ten engineers tried to determine the possibility of diverting the Oxus back towards the Caspian during the campaign against the Turkomans.

^e. Terentiev admitted the withdrawal of the troops after that battle, though he attributed it to lack of forage. He also blamed Lomakin and accused him of mismanagement and misconduct of the campaign, which obliged him to withdraw from Kizyl Arvat. Vide Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, III, 3-4.

During the critical period that followed the fall of Khiva in 1873 up to Skobelev's campaign of 1880-1881, Britain did not offer the Turkomans any practical assistance, even though the security of the Turkomans in that period was crucial for the security of Afghanistan and India as well. At the same time as the international situation in Europe became more tense, new developments in Kokand compelled Russia in 1875 to take decisive measures against the insurgents there. The following years were dominated by the annexation of Kokand and the resolution of the rivalry between Turkestan and the Caucasus armies for the honour of conquering the Turkomans.²⁴ Meanwhile Russia's main effort of expansionism in the following years, 1877-1878, was directed against Turkey and towards the Balkans. British inactivity in this period was partly due to preoccupation with other imperial and above all European questions, and partly to the image of barbarism which they attached to these tribes, and their "inhuman" practices. Thus British sentiment was far from being in favour of the Turkomans, which led to a false evaluation of the significance of Merv, their stronghold, until it was too late to deter Russia from conquering the Tekkes, and the two headed eagle flew above the ramparts of Geok Tepe and Akhal Tekke.²⁵ Even so, the issue of Merv was treated seriously by the British following the conclusion of the Russo-Khivan treaty of 1873. Granville instructed Loftus on 7 January 1874 to express Britain's views regarding Russia's policy in Central Asia, which were said to be arousing the apprehensions of the Amir of Afghanistan regarding Russia's evident intention to capture Merv. The Amir's fears were triggered by the recognition that Russia's action against the Turkomans would bring them to the vicinity of Herat, and so bring the Governments of Russia and Afghanistan into conflict.²⁶ The British action did not exceed diplomatic remonstrance in St. Petersburg.

These representations evidently had some effect upon Russian policy regarding Merv and the Turkomans. Miliutin wrote to the Viceroy of the Caucasus,

warning him that England was monitoring every Russian step in that direction, especially toward Merv, and conveyed to him the Emperor's recommendation that the Caucasian and Turkestan administrations should evade open belligerence or any activity that could be regarded as hostile, in order to avoid Britain's protests.²⁷ Thus Russian activities against the Turkomans were disguised as reconnaissance activities, despite the large number of troops that took part. Russia timed her action against the Akhal Tekke Turkomans in 1880 to coincide with the fall of the Beaconsfield Ministry and the coming of Gladstone to office, when British public opinion was concerned mostly with domestic affairs.²⁸ Meanwhile, Lomakin continued his activities in reconnoitring the region between Chikishlar, Krasnovodsk, and the strategic Kizyl Arvat.²⁹ Because of British hostility to Russia at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Russian interest was revived in making a military demonstration to be conducted on the northern borders of Afghanistan, i.e., on the road to India. The Russian Government, as Terentiev put it, faced with Britain's stand in the Near East, found it natural to use Russia's new position in Central Asia against the interest of British India, to create enough trouble in Asia to occupy Britain's attention and deflect her from interference in the affairs of other countries, and notably from assisting Turkey. He observed that Britain maintained a strong fleet near the shores of Greece that prevented that potential Russian ally from declaring war against Turkey, and "maintained another sea-borne force in the Dardanelles that prevented us from occupying Constantinople".³⁰ The Caucasian army was therefore put on alert and ordered to advance against Merv where it should meet the Turkestan army advancing from Khiva. It was only the achievement of a compromise with Great Britain in Berlin which led to the abandonment of that operation.³¹ Instead Lomakin occupied Chat and was directed to connect it with Chikishlar by a chain of forts.^f

^f. Chat is an isolated small town, though the Russians mobilized 18 regiments, 2 sotnias, and 8 guns against it. Lomakin advanced further against Khodja Kala, meeting no resistance; (continued...)

By 1877 Chikishlar on the eastern coast of the Caspian had become the centre of operations against the Turkomans. Lomakin's ventures were however largely unsuccessful, and on one occasion he narrowly escaped by burying his gun in the desert.³² To inject Lomakin's efforts with better means of success, the Russian government authorised him to form a brigade of militia (*militsiia*)^g from the Yomuds, Tekkians, and Khivans, to buy 400 horses, to hire the necessary camels from Khiva and Mangishlak and to dig wells between Chikishlar and Chat. Lomakin was assisted by another General from the Caucasian staff, General Lazarev,³³ who crossed the Caspian with four battalions in the spring of 1879. The Tekkians replied by attacking Krasnovodsk on 7 April and captured 200 camels from those brought for the intended expedition. The Russian army lost four soldiers killed and twelve wounded when force was sent unsuccessfully to recover the camels.³⁴ Despite Lomakin's cruelty, all his efforts to subdue the Turkomans ended with failure and increasing hostility. In his last campaign against them he refused to give them quarter and "shot their wives and little ones as though they had been rats".³⁵ The failure of his campaign against the Turkomans was felt throughout Russia, and the Russian army was so disgraced that fast repair of the situation became imperative.³⁶ The period was marked by decline of Russia's prestige, and Chikishlar as well as Krasnovodsk became the object of frequent attacks by the Tekkians. Lomakin was accused of being irresolute and incompetent for the obligation he assumed; by proclaiming that he was authorized by Grand Duke Mikhail^h to rule over the Turko-

^f(...continued)

he resolved to advance against Bendisen, where he met the Tekkians and was obliged to retreat to Khodja Kala, and on 8 September 1878 retreated to Chat.

^g. For methods of choosing candidates, their past, character, salary, clothing, training, and later employment at Merv see Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, pp. 127-129.

^h. Grand Duke Mikhail was a brother of Alexander II and the commander of the Daghistan and the Caucasian armies.

mans of the Attrek and Gorgan, he also antagonised the Persians without achieving any practical success.³⁷

The appointment of Skobelev and the conquest of Akhal Tekke (1880-1)

Following the defeats of General Lomakin, the Tsar found his most fitting servant for the task of retrieving the lost Russian prestige to be General Skobelev. He had taken part in the expedition against Khiva in 1873 as the commander of Kinderly corps, an advanced wing of the Turkestan army. He also took an active part in the Yomud massacre that followed the fall of Khiva, and won further reputation in 1875-6 during the campaign against Kokand. In January 1876 he displayed exceptional brutality against the inhabitants of Andijan.³⁸ Skobelev's campaign led to the end of the existence of Kokand as an independent state: on 19 February 1876 Kokand was annexed to the Empire and replaced on the map by the title of Ferghana valley. This was the General selected by the Tsar to settle accounts with the Turkomans.

In the mid 1870s when Russian activities were hindered and the time was unfit for action against the Turkomans, Prince Gorchakov, the Foreign Minister, affirmed to the British Government that orders were positively issued on behalf of the Tsar that no expedition should be undertaken against the Tekke Turkomans, and that they had been given in such conclusive terms that no Russian official in Central Asia would dare to take the liberty of departing from them.³⁹ Gorchakov also gave assurances that Russia would not extend her borders at the expense of the Turkomans even if she should be compelled to act against them as a reprisal for their depredations.⁴⁰ He confirmed to Loftus in January 1874 that Russia "had no intention of undertaking an expedition against the Turkomans", and in a dispatch to Baron Brunnow he confirmed that the Emperor had himself given similar assurance directly to Loftus.⁴¹ Gorchakov told Doria:

the intention of the Emperor of Russia is not to extend the frontiers of Russia beyond their present limits in Central Asia either on the side of Bukhara or on that of Krasnovodsk and the Attrek.⁴²

Britain accepted Russia's latest assurance, despite the frequent violation of previous and similar ones.

Notwithstanding these diplomatic niceties, in St. Petersburg the question of subjugating the Turkomans was discussed in late 1878 by a special committee including the War Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, (who took charge of pacifying Britain and furnishing her with assurances) and the Commander of the General Staff. They resolved that no peace would be possible as long as the Turkomans were not under the sway of Russia.¹ Gorchakov's participation in these discussions is an instructive comment upon the diplomatic assurances just referred to, and upon the contention sometimes advanced that the Russian Foreign Office had no responsibility for the policy of expansion in Central Asia. These powerful figures recognised that the relatively small expeditions in the period between 1869-1879 had been expensive, unproductive and negative, and that their results had been mainly humiliating.⁴³ Considering all the circumstances the committee recommended: first, the assembly in the spring of 1879 of an army capable of subjugating the Akhal Tekke; second, after securing its lines of communication, and subduing the country, the army should proceed to occupy the line to Uzba and to erect a fortress in Igda. Earlier on 23 January 1878 these recommendations had been sanctioned by Alexander II.⁴⁴ Lazarev collected fifteen thousand camels for the intended campaign, and mobilized 18,000 men, the largest Russian army ever seen in Central Asia, supplied with every necessary.⁴⁵ He advanced to the heart of the Tekke oasis until

¹. St. Petersburg was convinced that her influence would be secured in the region extending from the Caspian to Samarkand and Tashkand only after the fall of the Turkoman country. Vide Grodekov, II, 64-70. Regardless, the Russian officials continued their usual political practice of declaring one intention and planning for another. Vide *Istoriia Narodov Uzbekistana*, II, 249.

he reached Geok Teppe, but once again his campaign against the Tekkes proved to be fruitless, and he was compelled to retreat after considerable loss.⁴⁶ This further military humiliation in 1879 could not be attributed to the need for a stronger or better armed military force, for the army was numerous enough. The Generals attributed its failure to the want of an adequate plan and better means of supply and communication, rather than to the valour of the Turkomans. General Grodekov described the repeated expeditions since 1877 as raids rather than operations of an advancing army,⁴⁷ and called for a better planned offensive.

In January 1879, after the death of Lazarev, General Tergukasov put forward a plan for the conquest of the Akhal Tekke oasis. Tergukasov underlined mostly the problem of deficient communications between positions already conquered by Russia, such as Chikishlar, Chat, and Duz-olum. He also emphasized the necessity for establishing permanent services such as hospitals, stores, telegraphs, and postal services, for controlling the conquered territories and facilitating the movement of the troops.⁴⁸ This interesting recommendation clearly displayed the Russian tendency to promote the colonization of the region by civilian measures for military purposes. Tergukasov cautioned St. Petersburg that this was the only method that would help Russia to subdue the Turkomans.⁴⁹ His plan demonstrated the defective condition of the troops and the urgent need to provide them with a supporting civilian infrastructure in this hostile land. It came as a reminder of the similar procedures enforced by Kaufmann in the 1860s following the conquest of Turkestan, when he encouraged the settlement of the Mennonites and others in the conquered territories.⁵⁰ Some opponents of Tergukasov considered that his plan addressed mainly the conquest of strategic points while neglecting the rest of the country. But as we have seen he did address wider questions, and he suggested encouraging the families of lower-rank servicemen to undertake permanent residency and colonization. Tergukasov's plan heavily relied on the Caspian fleet, and stressed the neces-

sity for a railway between Krasnovodsk and Kizyl-Arvat for the success of any operation against the Turkomans. Tergukasov, in suggesting this railway, wanted to liberate the Russian army from dependence on the Persians and other Central Asians for camel supply.⁵¹ The railway was considered also by General Skobelev as being the key factor. This seems to have been an important element in the Russian response to growing fears about the development of British influence in Persia, and the prevailing assumption among Russian politicians that Britain was about to occupy Merv and possibly even Herat.⁵² Russia's increasing fears in this period were reflected in an alarming report by F. L. Geiden, commander of the General staff, and L. N. Sobolev, commander of the Asian division of the General staff, in which they argued:

current events in Central Asia have enormous political significance. The British were trying by every possible means to dominate the whole of Afghanistan, and a slightly bolder policy would lead them to Herat and northern Afghanistan; they want to subdue Persia to their influence, Merv as well, and the Tekkians may be regarded as part of Persia.⁵³

Alexander II observed that, if the British should establish themselves in Herat, by putting it under the control of a Persian garrison led by English officers, the prospect for Russia would be dismal. So the Emperor decided to assign to the command a General known for his swift and decisive actions, and the choice fell on General Skobelev. The observation of Grand Duke Mikhail, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, that Skobelev's appointment was acceptable if, but only if, a strong forward policy was intended, is instructive.^j Throughout her advance in Central Asia and the Caucasus,

^j The commander of the Caucasus General staff wanted to appoint one of his Generals, who had distinguished themselves in the last Russo-Turkish war; the Tsar chose Skobelev for the projected task against the Tekkians for more than one reason. He had served in Central Asia, was well acquainted with the state of affairs in the region, and had distinguished himself in the last war with Turkey. Skobelev was informed of his appointment in 10 January 1880. The Viceroy of the Caucasus wrote to the Tsar saying that if the conquest of the Akhal was intended to be rapid, then the appointment of Skobelev was agreeable, but if the conquest was to be gradual then the duty should be assigned to another General. Vide Terentiev, *Istoriia*, III, 33-4.

Russia had two options in front of her: either to subdue by a conciliatory process, time-consuming but successful, such as she had resorted to during the 1820s and the 1830s to subdue the Kirghiz; or to apply decisive force in rapid and overwhelming military campaigns, which would be costly. Russia preferred the option of the quick and decisive conquest in the case of the Turkomans, for her action there brought her into close proximity with her avowed rival, England, and to pre-empt British influence needed to be brief and resolute.⁵⁴

The Russian press, especially those organs closely connected with the Government, began as early as the beginning of 1879 to advocate the conquest of Merv as an advanced post from which Russia could easily affect developments in western Afghanistan and menace India.⁵⁵ Russian public opinion was thus being conditioned to accept the advantage of an advance. The politicians were disposed to reflect upon the "inactivity" which had dominated earlier British actions, and to recall that previous English remonstrations had been followed by no action. It was a matter of course that the advance of the Russians on Merv would give rise to endless dissatisfaction and to menacing demands for explanation on the part of the English Cabinet. But it was impossible to act so as to satisfy everybody especially the English, who were never satisfied with anything. They ought moreover to have accustomed themselves to this, remembering that the same thing occurred in the Khivan and Kokand expeditions which did not prevent them from occupying that region and subjugating to Russian rule a population of 3,000,000 and a rich country.⁵⁶

After the decision was taken to appoint General Skobelev, following the retirement and death of General Tergukasov,⁵⁷ for the task of conquering the Turkomans and restoring Russia's disgraced dignity after the failure of Lomakin's and Tergukasov's efforts, he had an audience with the Emperor on 12 January 1880 during which Alexander II told his General that he always maintained the opinion

that the Central Asian foe was not as contemptible as some portrayed him, but that "judging by what I have had reported to me, those Tekkians must be an exceptionally belligerent people".⁵⁸ The Emperor made no secret of his extreme concern for the success of the forthcoming expedition. His anxiety and apprehension can be deduced from the range of advice and directives he gave to Skobelev, the most impressive among which was his emphasis on conducting the attack decisively: "no retreat from the plan once adopted, no dangerous backward step that might be taken as evidence of our weakness in the eyes of Europe and Asia, that might encourage our foe, or inflict on Russia high expenses that might exceed the cost of the expedition itself".⁵⁹ Following that interview, Skobelev joined a team from the General Staff headed by F. L. Geiden, commander of the General staff, to discuss in detail the intended operation against the Akhal Tekke, and to determine how expensive and how effective the rail road would be in achieving the target. The conclusion was positive and recommendations were given in favour of constructing a railway between Krasnovodsk and Kizyl-Arvat. Skobelev then asked for 5,000-6,000^k infantry assisted by ten sotnias of cavalry, and 32 guns from the Caucasian army to be transported to Transcaspia.¹ From its own sources, the British Government received

^k. The number of the Russian troops cannot be ascertained at this point because of the secretive inclination that marked Russia's military proceedings. Contradicting numbers have reached us through eye-witnesses of the campaign and historians contemporary with the period. Marvin recorded the number 12,000 in his book *Merv...*, pp. 386-9; Krausse, a well informed historian, indicated that the Russian army was 18,000 men, vide his *Russia...*, p. 87; In *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, v. I, pt. 2, p. 96, the number which has been given indicated an army of 11,000 men armed with 107 guns. Yet other sources, among them contemporary British observers, fixed the number of the Caucasian army assigned to operate against the Turkomans as 25,000 men, vide FO 65/1071, No. 26, Major-General Roberts to Lyall, October 27, 1879; also FOCP 4040, Captain Milner and Captain Marshall, November 28, 1879.

¹. Grodekov, *Voina*, I, 176-181; Terentiev, *Istoriia*, III, 34; and Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie*, p. 350. These three historians gave the number of the troops of the main body not including the north and south columns which were listed in full detail by Marvin in his work *Merv*, 391. He accurately gave the following account:

(continued...)

reliable information that the Russian Government had laid out immense sums of money upon the Akhal-Tekke expedition, and that no less than 10,000 men were engaged in it; but reliable and consistent estimates were then, and still are, difficult to establish.⁶⁰ The Viceroy of the Caucasus was charged with supplying Skobelev with sufficient troops and armament. The Turkomans, or "wild sons of the desert" as they were called by Loftus, were poorly armed, badly disciplined, unprovided with leaders of any rank other than their chieftains, and had no artillery.⁶¹

Skobelev observed that the construction of the railway would require a separate expedition, strong protection, and help from both the Turkestan and Orenburg military districts. To inflame his soldiers against the Tekkians, Skobelev went out of his way to remind his subordinates and soldiers of the disasters of 1878-9 and warned that the honour of Russia demanded revenge for "the fallen comrades".⁶² Skobelev, as characterized by Russian historians, belonged to those warlike figures who aspired for fame and glory, inclined towards slaughter rather than negotiation, and was a fierce supporter of inflicting complete military defeat on the Tekkians; his rhetoric was characterised by extensive chauvinism.⁶³

Some Generals from the Orenburg administration, considering financial factors, suggested that the expedition against the Turkomans should start from an entirely different starting point. General Meyer, assistant to General Kryzhanovskii,

¹(...continued)

- I. North Column: led by Colonel Kozelkov consisted of:
 - 8 companies of infantry.
 - 2 sotnias of cavalry.
 - 10 guns and two rockets.
- II. South Column: led by Colonel Kuropatkin included:
 - 8 companies of infantry.
 - 2 sotnias of cavalry.
 - 10 guns and two rockets.
- III. Main Body: led by Skobelev and included:
 - 18 and half companies of infantry.
 - 7 squadrons of cavalry.
 - 32 guns.

the Governor-General of Orenburg, proposed that the expedition against the Turkomans should start from Bukhara and Khiva and proceed against Merv, the fall of which would considerably weaken the Turkomans' resistance. Yet another General, Brokh by name, suggested attacking the country from two sides: from the Attek through Duz-olum, and from Krasnovodsk through Kizyl-arvat. Both advancing armies should meet in Bami to promote joint action against the main body of the Turkomans.⁶⁴ Skobelev was aware of all of these suggestions and himself, in view of the heavy expenses of the campaign and the lack of necessary material, contemplated yet another plan, of starting his campaign from Chikishlar. For this purpose, even before arriving at his destination and while he was still in the Caucasus on his way to cross the Caspian to Central Asia, he urgently enquired about the quantity of military supplies already stored in Duz-olum, and ordered General Muraviev to telegraph him at Petrovsk in the Caucasus. Also he encountered the chronic dilemma that had faced all his predecessors, the means of transportation. Thus while he was on his way from the Caucasus to Transcaspia he inquired about the availability of camels in the Attek valley, to carry his troops from Chikishlar, Chat, and Duz-olum through the desert and the Kopet-Dagh range to Bami and beyond.⁶⁵ He was obsessed by the idea that the earlier failures had been more than mere military defeats, but had shattered Russian prestige in the region. Consequently he felt that he was obliged to adopt a strategy of no retreat. The Russians feared more than anything else that another Turkoman victory over their army, perhaps with the help of Afghanistan, would have far-reaching repercussions in Khiva and Bukhara, and throughout the whole of Central Asia.⁶⁶

The Turkoman tribes, despite their acknowledged valour, were weakened by the fact that they were divided among themselves and as hostile to each other as they were towards the Russians. They had little knowledge of modern weaponry, of

military science and discipline. In his official report of the siege of Geok Tepe, speaking of the Turkomans, Skobelev said:

the enemy is brave, and skilful in single combat; he fires effectively... but he operates in individual extended order, or in detached bodies, very little obedient to the will of his chief....⁶⁷

These deficiencies were of course much exploited by the Russian Generals, who manipulated one tribe against another. Though Skobelev had little confidence in the Turkomans' cooperation, which he believed with some justice to proceed either out of fear or for money, he did employ Turkoman road-guides, who collaborated with the Russians for these reasons. Not wholly unexpectedly, these guides deliberately deluded the Russian troops, and on occasion in order to exhaust the advancing army chose longer or more difficult roads.⁶⁸ To guarantee their obedience he arrested their elders: in May 1880 he invited the elders to his camp under the pretence of distributing decorations and entertainment, and discussing camel trade. All those who accepted the invitation and attended the Russian camp were detained.⁶⁹ Although this deception delivered the Turkoman leadership into Russia's hand, it was counter-productive. The arrested chieftains were coerced to write to their relatives and fellow tribesmen urging them to serve the Russians devotedly, otherwise they, the elders, would be exiled to Siberia. As a direct result, the Turkoman population became hostile and mistrusted Russia's credibility and good faith. As a result it became difficult for the Russians to distinguish between their supporters and opponents.⁷⁰

Further, and after exhausting preparations, Skobelev was not sure of the success of his expedition if it started from Chikishlar: this was due to the problems of navigation and marine transportation of the equipment from the Caucasus to this port, because of its shallow water and its vulnerability to Turkoman attacks. Thus his choice shifted toward Krasnovodsk as his headquarters, partly for its convenient location as the nearest point to the Caucasus, and partly for its position at the start of a line of "auls" (villages) and colonies stretching southward along the Kopet Dag

range to Askabad, which would render it more secure and adequate for supplying an advancing army rather than the route from Chikishlar. With his headquarters at Krasnovodsk, Skobelev decided to advance from Chikishlar and Krasnovodsk simultaneously and therefore directed General Markov to survey the Attrek region. In his report, Markov stated the impossibility of relying on the Attrek river as a means of transportation for this expedition.⁷¹ Meanwhile Skobelev surveyed the region between Chikishlar and Bendesen up to Bami and Nukhur,^m aiming at splitting the Turkomans into two parts, one to the north of Bami and the other to the south. In June 1880 he resolved to occupy Bami and to build a railway from there to Krasnovodsk.⁷² To weaken the resistance of the Turkomans, the Russian diplomatic mission in Teheran asked the Persian authorities to stop supplying the Tekkians with food.⁷³

Finding the Turkomans characteristically difficult to subdue, and after the failure of his endeavours during the early months of 1880, Skobelev tried to intimidate them, by offering them unacceptable conditions for "peace". Either they would voluntarily subject themselves to Russia by accepting, or if not the preparations were in full swing at both chosen starting points, Chikishlar and Krasnovodsk. On 23 May 1880 Skobelev invited the Tekkes to join the millions of Muslims who enjoyed "the mercy of the white Tsar", and offered them the following conditions for peace: first, to build a road along the Sumbar river to Archman or Bakharden; second, to supply the Russian army with 1,000 mares; third, to liberate all slaves; fourth, to pay one million roubles indemnity; fifth, to hand over a number of youths from the best families to the Russian authorities as hostages, and to be sent to Russia for training; sixth, to allow Russian troops to occupy Kizyl-Arvat, Archman, Geok Tepe, Askabad and other strategic points, without resistance; seventh, to

^m. Bami was the more strategic point for it was located at the junction of the two supply routes from Chikishlar and from Krasnovodsk.

declare that the Akhal-Tekkian land belonged to the Russian sovereign who would rule it as he pleased; eighth, to hand over to him all historical documents and manuscripts; ninth, to secure a safe path for the Russian army to occupy the oases and furnish the soldiers with camels and food supplies; tenth, to deliver a number of their chieftains and sardars as hostages to the Russian authorities.⁷⁴ This astounding catalogue of conditions naturally had no attraction for the Turkomans, who rejected them and, despite their lack of unity and the need for British or Afghan assistance, which they could not secure, prepared for combat against a superior and well-armed modern army.

Having conquered Bami and Kizyl Arvat, Skobelev had secured a convenient supporting base for his troops. On 17 July 1880 Skobelev advanced and camped six miles from Geok Teppe and began surveying the area. After intensive reconnaissance he arrived at the conviction that Geok Teppe could only be taken by siege and so he asked Grand Duke Mikhail, commander of the Caucasian army, to support him with 12,000 troops and 100 guns; in addition he was to be joined by a contingent from the Turkestan army, and Colonel Kuropatkin was sent from Samarkand to assist him.⁷⁵

By 23 December 1880 the Russian preparations were completed and the siege of Geok Teppe started. In spite of damaging Turkoman counter-attacks, the superior arms of the Russians broke their resistance after a three-week siege, and the stronghold was stormed on 12 January 1881. The defenders of the fort resisted courageously despite their enormous losses and the inadequacy of their weapons by comparison with those of the Russians.⁷⁶ It was rare during Russia's dealings and wars with the Central Asians for them to attribute any positive character to the tribesmen, but on this occasion they admitted that the Tekkians had granted a short truce in response to Skobelev's request to remove bodies and had not broken it.⁷⁷ Skobelev admitted that the conduct of the Tekke fighters throughout the truce were "most honour-

able".⁷⁸ Losses were great on both sides,⁷⁹ and the campaign showed the Russians that their advance would be very expensive: the siege of Geok Tepe had been very damaging, and the Russian army in one instance lost several guns.⁸⁰ However, the construction of the railway on the heels of the army marching from Krasnovodsk, had solved the problems of rapid transport and communications, and facilitated the conquest of Geok Tepe, which entered history as one of the most brutal massacres inflicted on Central Asians.⁸¹ After the fall of the fortress on January 13, 1881, Russian troops were ordered to chase the fugitives for ten miles. Skobelev feared that the Tekkians were withdrawing to prepare for another battle, so he gave his orders to spare none of them:⁸²

All who had not succeeded in escaping previously - men, women, and children - were killed by the pursuers, the number of slain being estimated by Skobelev at 8,000... and he put the total number of the Tekkes slain during the siege at 20,000.⁸³

During his visit to Paris in February 1882, Skobelev admitted that he had had 21,000 men killed in one campaign.⁸⁴ Russian losses in this campaign of course were nowhere near so severe, but nonetheless considerable: it should be noticed that the Russians usually minimised the number of their losses, but their loss this time, even according to their account, was 268 killed and 669 wounded, and if we add 450 killed and wounded in 1879 during Lomakin's siege and other men killed and wounded in the reconnaissance efforts, the number was clearly substantial despite efforts to diminish it.⁸⁵

By the end of March 1881 the last leader of Turkoman resistance, Tikma Sardar, submitted to Skobelev. Even before this, Colonel Kuropatkin was sent with a suitable force to occupy Askabad, where the roads from Persia and Khiva meet, and push forward across the Tedzhen plain towards Merv. In February 9, 1881 Askabad fell, but to the disappointment of Skobelev, Alexander III, successor to the assassinated Alexander II, recalled him to report to St. Petersburg. The new Emperor was

convinced that what remained to be achieved in Turkomaniia could be attained by peaceful means, rather than attracting the attention of Europe by another ruthless campaign.⁸⁶ St. Petersburg incorporated the Akhal Tekke oasis in the Transcaspian Military district (*Transkaspeiskii Voennyi Otdel*) with its seat at Askabad.⁸⁷

However, despite the fact that Russia appeared desirous to digest her new acquisitions in peace, and to avoid any untimely confrontation, she energetically continued paving the way for her future extension. Alikhanov Avarskii, disguised as a Russian merchant, was dispatched to Merv, accompanied by two Russian officers, his instructions being to discover the feelings of the inhabitants towards Russia, to survey the region, and "to pave the way for the future establishment of Muscovite rule in the oasis".⁸⁸ The pseudo-merchant surveyed the Kaushid Khan Kala, the immense rampart which the Mervians had built for the defence of their country. Colonel Venkoskii was dispatched on a secret mission to Kabul, and Captain Lessar was instructed to survey the region between Askabad and Herat including the Herirud valley.⁸⁹ This process reached its culmination in 16 March 1885 when, as Thornton the British ambassador at St. Petersburg reported, Alikhanov instigated the Sariks to rise while General Komarovⁿ asked for permission to attack Penjdeh.⁹⁰ These covert missions and their familiar sequence clearly indicated that the Russian Government was not eager to halt, but was merely accumulating necessary information and awaiting a suitable moment for further advance.

Russian policy moved quickly to pacify the Turkomans, to open the road to Merv and Afghanistan, and to mobilize the Turkomans for her further advance. Later reports showed that the Turkomans, apparently at Russian instigation, had been migrating freely, to Penjdeh and Kila Wali in Afghanistan. The Afghan authorities endeavoured to put a stop to this flow, and considered it might therefore become

ⁿ. Alexander Vissarionovich Komarov, succeeded General Grodekov as Governor-General of the Transcaspian District in 1883 and remained in the post until 1889.

necessary to send a detachment of Afghan troops to Kila Wali for this purpose.⁹¹ The issue of Merv then became the occasion of a number of communications exchanged between the British and the Russian Governments. De Giers, head of the Asian Department of the Foreign Ministry, assured Lord Dufferin that the Russians would not only not go there, "but happily there is nothing which can require us to go there":⁹² another bland assurance due to be falsified by events.

Despite the massacre inflicted on Geok Tepe, the Russian authorities declared an amnesty and even distributed decorations among Turkoman chieftains; some earned the title of "officer" and a Turkoman delegation, with Skobelev's consent, went to St. Petersburg and was received by the Emperor and the War Minister.⁹³ Russia began to incorporate the Turkomans under her protection and to play the role of their defender against Persian oppression. Russia as we have seen had a system for controlling her lesser neighbours, a combination of two methods, force and seduction; following their forcible defeat they would themselves be transformed into an effective force for further conquest.⁹⁴ This system was a characteristic feature of her advance, in the Caucasus as well as in Central Asia, where the Kirghiz were utilized against the Karakalpaks and the Uzbeks, the latter against the Turkomans, and they in their turn against the Afghans, and the Persians.⁹⁵ On 24 May 1881 an Imperial Ukaz was issued announcing the formation of the Trans-Caspian district and the annexation of the Tekke Turkomans to the Empire. The creation of this district inaugurated a new phase in Central Asian affairs. The attention of observers was no longer fixed on Tashkand, which lost its prominence, and attention became directed towards the role the Caucasus armies played against the Turkomans and towards procedures and policy to be followed by the new administration towards its neighbours. It will be remembered that, when Kryzhanovskii resisted and remonstrated against the formation of the Governorship of Turkestan, he knew that it would mean a lesser role for Orenburg in the affairs of Central

Asia. Now Kaufmann and the whole of the Turkestan Governorship lost their significance as the decisive authority in the region after the formation of the Trans-Caspian military district with its seat at Askabad. The new district seized the power of making decisions, and conducting intrigues against its adjacent neighbours, mainly Merv and the rest of the Turkoman tribes. Askabad became the new centre of action in the region, and the General in charge, General Grodekov,⁹⁶ and the Colonels associated with him, Komarov and Moraviov, would be in the centre of attention at St. Petersburg, while other previously popular Governors-General and Generals, such as Kryzhanovskii, Kaufmann, Golovachev, Lazarev, Lomakin, and even Skobelev, must suffer a decline of influence.

The fall of Merv (1884)

In line with the guarantees issued by the Russian Government not to annex Merv, it sought to keep its designs against that city undisclosed until the time was ripe for annexation. Count Shchovalov, director of the Russian secret police, and confidential counsellor to the Emperor, had explained in a letter to Kaufmann dated 27 November 1878 the degree of secrecy which wrapped the question of Merv. He admitted that Russia, in regard to Merv, had two policies: the policy of restraint, and the forward policy. Behind the camouflage of the policy of restraint, the Russian diplomats and officials manoeuvred to rid themselves from responsibility for events in Central Asia in the face of British objections, waiting instead for a haphazard event which would make the realisation of their hidden intention appear to happen accidentally. This policy was open to one grave objection, as seen by Russian observers, that it would leave Russian policy at the mercy of probability and luck. On the other hand, they saw its advantage in that it "would eliminate any reason that may lead to confrontation with England".⁹⁷ The forward policy was not openly recommended as an official course by Russian politicians, for they saw that it would

bring Russia unpredicted difficulties with her rivals which might harm her interests. The question of Merv compelled Russia to choose one or the other course. Shchov-
alov in his letter to Kaufmann acknowledged that Russia would in the last resort
adopt the forward policy and attack Merv if England were to occupy Herat and
Kabul. However he warned that if Russia were to act first against Merv, she would
furnish Britain with the pretext to occupy Afghanistan. Russia's viewpoint on the
question of Merv was kept in deep secrecy up to the end of Akhal Tekke campaign;
"only 15-20 people in the whole of the Empire knew the real state of affairs in this
regard".⁹⁸

The Turkomans' elders began to be invited to come to Askabad, the new seat
of the Government, where they were received with honour and courtesy. These
efforts proved to be highly effective and Russia's "moral influence over the Turko-
mans" was enhanced, as the British acknowledged.⁹⁹ Despite all assurances it was
clear to them that Russia's efforts were directed towards controlling Merv. Officials
in St. Petersburg still denied that any effort was being made in that direction.
Meanwhile the Russian Government at Askabad received a delegation of Merv
Turkomans. In March 1884 De Giers disclosed to E. Thornton, the British ambassa-
dor, that the Emperor had acceded to the request of the representatives of the Merv
Turkomans that he should accept their allegiance.¹⁰⁰ There then followed intense
diplomatic efforts aimed at clarification of the boundary of Merv, and at demarcation
of the borders of Afghanistan. The British Government secured an answer from the
Russians that the territory of Merv was held to extend eastward to the Oxus and
south to the frontiers of Afghanistan.¹⁰¹

Russia's covert efforts in the region included a policy of waiting upon inter-
tribal rivalries, under the pretext of settling disputes between the Tekke, the Sarik,
and the Salor Turkoman tribes; Russian agents also appeared in Penjdeh and Mai-
maneh inside Afghan territory. Upon Thornton's inquiry about the purpose of these

Russian activities, De Giers assured him that no scheme of annexation was intended and denied that any agent had been sent to Maimaneh. The Russian Government, in agreement with its usual apparently conciliatory practice, agreed to the British proposal to send two commissioners to determine the boundary line between Khoja Saleh and Tedzhen, but objected to the presence of an Afghan representative, even as an expert to give necessary advice and information.¹⁰² Meanwhile Russia's activities in the region continued, her relations with the Turkomans tribes were enhanced, and a wedge was driven, as a result, between the Turkomans and the Afghans on one side and the Persians on the other.

The British and the Indian Governments were worried about the security of Herat, and regarded the Russian advance towards Merv as a menace to the security of Afghanistan and as a serious infringement of all previous assurances. The British Cabinet considered measures to correct the deteriorating situation, mostly designed to keep the Russians out of Herat. Although the Russian Government regarded this action as directed against its activities, directly and as a threat designed to oblige it to abandon its policy against the Turkomans, in practice it did not do so.

Since the fall of Khiva the Russian Government had aimed at the control of Merv, and Russia's activities had begun to alarm the British Government, which protested against them, arguing that there was no justification for them, and above all that they compromised the security of the Afghan frontiers.¹⁰³ In March 1884, after nearly eleven years interval, the Russian army entered Merv and established control over the basins of the Tedzhen and Herirud rivers. The conquest of Merv was justified by Russian officials as a counter step to Persia's activities in the region.¹⁰⁴ The Persian move was however evidently a precautionary one designed to limit the damage and ruin that had been caused by the Turkomans' raids against Khorasan. Komarov dispatched Alikhanov to meet the Khan of Merv to deliver a letter. Meanwhile the Russian troops advancing in the direction of Merv halted at a

distance of only one hundred miles.¹⁰⁵ The Merv elders realized the futility of resisting the Russian armies without assistance from either Persia or Afghanistan. The inhabitants were divided and their resistance was feeble. Komarov advanced and after breaking the resistance of the anti-Russian party entered Merv.¹⁰⁶ The occupation of Merv did not surprise either the British Government or the Indian. Lord Derby had written in 1877 to Loftus, during the Russian operations against the Tekke Turkomans, that it was obvious in the light of Russia's earlier practices, that she would ultimately occupy Merv; but he directed Loftus to remind Gorchakov of his as well as the Emperor's assurances regarding the extension of Russia's territory in that direction.¹⁰⁷ All of Britain's previous fears were thus realised, and now the Russian spears were pointed directly against Herat.

Epilogue: the Penjdeh incident

The fate of Merv, "the Queen of the World", was decided in March 1884. Its conquest completed the Russian campaign to annex the territories of the Turkoman peoples of Central Asia, but it did not mark as yet any pause in the Russian career of expansion in Central Asia as a whole. In the fluid condition of frontiers in the whole region, upon which we have already commented, the Russians had become accustomed to conducting their policy as though there were no frontiers of any kind at all to restrain them; or perhaps, to behaving as though any recognition on their part of frontiers beyond which they had no claims or interests was a purely tactical and temporary expedient, to be disregarded as soon as it became possible to do so. Their annexation of Penjdeh in 1885, as their acquisition of the Pamirs in 1895 (both of course at the expense of Afghanistan), must remain beyond the scope of the present study; but we may briefly observe how it exemplified in almost classic proportions the manners in which they had secured their conquests over the previous half century.

The newly conquered Turkomans became an effective instrument at the disposal of Russian policy; naively they trusted their new masters and without full realisation of the consequences, helped to realize their plans and to advance their intrigues. It was the usual practice of the Russian Generals and Colonels to encamp their regular troops in a certain stronghold and send semi-regular troops from the newly conquered population, now mobilized as part of the Russian force, forward for purposes of reconnaissance and to engage in skirmishes; these in due course would be utilized as a justification for further advance and new claims.¹⁰⁸ On the other front Alikhanov conquered Serakhs from the Persian troops. The annexation of Serakhs gave Russia control over the right bank of the river Tedzhen; furnished thus with unchallenged command over

the junction of the roads to Herat and Meshed, and the best entrance to Khorasan from the north, it cannot fail to exercise a very serious influence on the momentous issue of the Russo-Indian question. If England does not use Serakhs for defence, Russia will use it for offence.¹⁰⁹

The fall of Serakhs encouraged the Russian troops to advance south from Merv along the Murgab river, taking control of the strategic localities between that city and Kizyl Tepe. Reports reached the Afghans at Penjdeh that a Russian infantry column supported by field guns was marching on Kizyl Tepe, one mile from Pul-i-Khitsi.¹¹⁰

The Russian advance was deliberately provocative, designed to facilitate an attack on the Afghan post at Ak Tepe. Alikhanov, commander of the advancing force, looted sheep belonging to Penjdeh inhabitants, and stopped the Saryks from grazing north of Ak Tepe and Serakhs; he and Komarov used every possible means to instigate the Saryks to rise. In the mean time Komarov sought the consent of his superiors at St. Petersburg for an attack on Penjdeh. De Giers in an interview with Colonel Trench, from the staff of the British embassy in St. Petersburg, promised that the Russian force would not advance from its present positions:

that peremptory instructions had been given to the officers in the Transcaspian province, not only that all care should be taken to avoid a conflict, but that no measures of incitement should be made use of.¹¹¹

Despite these assurances General Komarov advanced to Hazrat Imam with a considerable force, reported to be 1,500 men plus the troops under Alikhanov's command, 400 infantry, 300 cavalry, and unidentified number of Cossacks, which were stationed at Yarym Teppe. In contradiction of what De Giers had told Thornton, the orders which St. Petersburg sent to Komarov were of a completely different character: they clearly urged the local Russian command, in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, to "seize Penjeh and to advance with the utmost speed with all available forces to Herat... before the Anglo-Indian forces can reach that city".¹¹² In the mean time Russia was apparently preparing for full scale war against England. The War Minister instructed the Caucasus Command at Tiflis to mobilize two army corps, and all the officers of the Caucasus armies, Turkestan, and the Transcaspian Provinces were ordered to report promptly to their posts and regiments:

Preparations, moreover, have been made with the Kavkaz and Mercury Steam-ship Companies for the transport of a considerable body of troops from Baku to Krasnovodsk.¹¹³

On 26 March 1885 General Komarov's forces joined Alikhanov's columns at Yarim Teppe and Kizyl Teppe and it became clear that the Russians intended to attack Ak Teppe and Penjeh.¹¹⁴ The Afghan and British observers suspected that Russian troops were also moving towards the strategically sensitive Zulfihar Pass, so the Afghans began to send reinforcements to that place.¹¹⁵ On 27 March 1885 the Russian troops commenced hostilities against Penjeh, though they were unsuccessful in their attempt to cross the river. In an effort to avoid hostilities, the Afghan commander made an attempt to meet General Komarov to discuss a settlement, but received no reply. Three days later Komarov advanced against Pul-i-Khatun and Penjeh and took possession of it; this marked the beginning of Russia's policy of expansion at the expense of Afghanistan.¹¹⁶ Kabul protested against the aggression

and demanded verification of the frontiers by Great Britain. The result, following a brief but acute crisis between Russia and Great Britain, was a compromise negotiated between Russian and British officers on the spot, which did indeed transfer to Russia sovereignty over the Penjdeh territory which had formerly been regarded as Afghan, and whose inhabitants had owed such allegiance as they acknowledged to the Amir of Kabul.¹¹⁷

The Penjdeh affair of 1885 may be regarded as marking the end of the Russian expansion at the expense of the Turkomans of Central Asia, and the beginning of a policy of aimed against Afghanistan. It was also the first occasion when the Russians found themselves negotiating frontiers with British officers rather than with the frightened and corruptible representatives of weak Khanates. Nevertheless they secured a further territorial advance in return for their undertaking to respect the new frontier; as indeed they also did in the Pamirs episode 1893-1895, also at the expense of Afghanistan.¹¹⁸ However, and in so far as their expansion into Afghan territory finally brought them up against the opposition of the British, we may in retrospect regard the decade 1885-1895 as that in which the tide of Russian expansion in Central Asia was arrested. After 1895, they turned their attention to the Far East, to Manchuria and Korea, where the British were largely powerless to restrain them and where their progress was finally halted only by defeat in war at the hands of the Japanese in 1905. It was after that defeat, and in order to begin the reconstruction of their political position in Europe after the disastrous revolution of 1905, that the Russians finally acknowledged in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 that Afghanistan lay outside their sphere of influence, and within the sphere of influence of British India: the realisation of an old British policy, the policy of the buffer zone.¹¹⁹ It was only in 1979 that the Russians, the last surviving imperial power of the 19th century, finally entered Afghanistan, under different international and regional circumstances, and utilising a totally different pretext. The historian may

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however consider that their underlying aspiration to ascendancy and control of the region remained fundamentally unchanged, whatever the political character of the regime in Moscow might be.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen throughout this work, the absence of clear natural frontiers in that vast territory, extending from the Caspian in the west to the Irtysh river in the east, was of great advantage to the Russians in their period of expansion eastward and southward into Central Asia. It enabled them systematically to absorb the steppe region inhabited by nomadic tribes, as they pushed their moving frontier inexorably towards the Syr Daria river. From the early nineteenth century, Russian contact with the more settled Khanates of Central Asia beyond the Syr Daria began to evince an increasingly acquisitive aspect and to assume a more aggressive form, exploiting the rivalries between the Khanates. Russian envoys were sent to the Khanates, ostensibly to conduct diplomatic or commercial negotiations, or to secure the release of hostages; but in secret they were sent also to gather intelligence which would be of political and strategic advantage to the Russian military advance: to survey the region and collect topographical data, to discover the availability of supplies of food and water, and to assess the attitudes of the populations towards each other, their rulers, and the Russians themselves. The earliest military advance, that of Perovskii against Khiva in 1839, was a humiliating failure, and Russian attention was subsequently diverted to the Ottoman Empire by the events leading up to the Crimean War of 1853. Russia's defeat in 1856 led to a revival of interest in the Khanates as an area of easy compensation. In the 1860s and the 1870s the Russian advance was swift and dramatic, extinguishing successively the independence of the Khanates of Kokand, Bokhara and Khiva, and culminating in the campaign against the Turkomans and the capture of Merv, the "Queen of the world", in 1884. In an era of widespread and impressive imperial expansion, this was the most remarkable (yet perhaps the least remarked) example of European imperial conquest in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Apart from the neighbouring states of Persia and Afghanistan, the power

most threatened by the advance of Russia in Central Asia was Great Britain, the great imperial power of India, with interests extending from the Persian Gulf in the west, through Persia and Afghanistan, to Tibet and Chinese Turkestan in the east. Throughout their advance in Central Asia, the Russians were aware that the only European power capable of limiting their ambitions was Britain, and they made frequent and assiduous attempts to appease British fears. On the one hand they appealed to British sympathy for their supposed "civilising mission", on the other they repeatedly maintained that Russia had no intention of making permanent conquests and annexations in the region: Gorchakov's notorious circular of November 1864 was merely one example of this mendacious and two-edged policy of pursuing expansion in practice while denying it in theory. Successive administrative reorganisations, from the formation of the new General Governorship of Turkestan (1867) onwards, are adequate evidence of the Russian aim of permanent annexation. The encouragement given to settlement by Russian civilians in the conquered territories, and the efforts towards Russification through education and by undermining the traditional bases of Muslim society, give further proof of Russia's long-term objectives.

The subjugation of Khiva in the 1870s, and the capture of Merv in 1884, brought the Russians to the frontiers of Afghanistan and demonstrated in increasingly acute form the Russian menace to the security of British India. As we have seen, Russian projects for the invasion of India dated back to the reign of the Tsar Paul, and, particularly in periods of Anglo-Russian confrontation over the fate of the Ottoman Empire, were regarded by the Russian military as a powerful lever to be applied against the British to secure their compliance in the Eastern Question. The British response, though increasingly anxious, was remarkably irresolute. The British and Indian governments did little to halt the Russian avalanche, whether by territorial expansion, military assistance, or even financial aid to those states threatened by Russian ambitions: frequent appeals for assistance from the Khanates were ignored by the government of India; masterly inactivity persisted long. The policy of the

"buffer zone" was originally supposed to include at least a part of the Khanates' territories as well as Afghanistan; but it was pursued at best through half-hearted political and diplomatic representations, producing a sequence of indecisive understandings, which St. Petersburg found no difficulty in successively undermining and eroding. Only in 1885, as a result of the Penjdeh affair, did British officers meet their Russian counterparts, to delimit a frontier and set limits to Russia's southward advance; and even then the result of their work was to surrender a part of the territory of the Amir of Afghanistan to Russia. The conquest and subjugation of the Khanates of Central Asia was by then already complete.

It is clear that, throughout this process, the interaction between economic, political and military considerations and motivations was shifting and complicated. We have seen how, from the time of De Maizon's mission (1834) onwards, economic interests were used as a screen behind which political and military ambitions could be pursued. We have seen how strategic considerations, including the ambitious project for the invasion of India, dominated the thinking and shaped the policies of Russia's Generals, who were of course the administrators of the region as well as its conquerors. In this context the history of the Transcaspian railway project is highly instructive. Those in government who wished to promote the opening-up and economic development of Turkestan wished to see the railway built southwards from Orenburg, but this well-intentioned project was frustrated by various obstacles, mainly financial; whereas those Generals who were intent on improving their military and strategic position against the Turkomans encountered no opposition to their project for a railway eastwards from the shores of the Caspian, and no financial obstacles were allowed to stand in their way. As we have seen, it was the military railway that was built, its connection with Orenburg being completed only later, in the 1890s, following the final termination of the southward advance. Of course the railway had enormous economic, social, and cultural consequences for the whole region, promoting its commercial development, facilitating the settlement of Russian colonists in large numbers, and opening it up to foreign influences: but it is clear

that it was initially built, and its route determined, out of military considerations. We need not disagree with those Marxist historians who insist on the importance of economic factors in Russian imperialism in Central Asia, as indeed we can accept the view of historians of imperialism in general that economic motivations and consequences were an important part of the imperial process; but we have seen in the specific case of Russia's advance against the Khanates of Central Asia that it was first of all military and strategic imperatives, and then political and administrative considerations, which dictated the methods and direction of the advance.

Unlike other European powers, which went to Asia for economic and commercial gain, and remained temporarily for political reasons, Russia went into Central Asia to stay. The intention and the plan permanently to colonise the region was peculiar to Russia, and the increasing military and civilian presence was accompanied by vigorous efforts towards Russification. Through investigating her various practices, military, political and economic, we have seen that Russia's purpose was no less than the total assimilation of the peoples of Central Asia and the incorporation of their lands into the great Russian Empire.

Appendices

**Guide Lines to De Maizon
For his Journey to Bukhara
From The Governor-General of Orenburg
General Perovskii
(October 1833)
(*Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*)**

Vasilii Alexeevich Perovskii (1795-1857) was twice Military Governor of Orenburg, from 1833 until 1842, and from 1851 until 1857. In September 26, 1833 Perovskii wrote a letter to Rodofinikin, head of the Asiatic Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which he discussed urgent political and commercial concerns. He expressed his desire to receive reliable information about certain foreign activities, notably British, which were taking place in Central Asia. In the same letter he stressed his worry about British commercial penetration in Central Asia. Perovskii also pointed out that not long ago two Englishmen, William Moorcroft and George Trebek, had visited the Khanate of Bukhara. So he suggested sending an envoy not directly from the central Government but from the local authorities of Orenburg, to avoid publicity and other complications. He emphasized the fact that in such a way, the government certainly would avoid excessive costs, and the envoy would avoid the speculation and cautiousness of the Bukharan government and population as well. Perovskii's ideas fully corresponded with the intention of the Imperial Government, which was by that time attentively watching Britain's activities in the region, and anxiously aspired to expand its own commercial relations on the one hand, and exchanging embassies with the states of Central Asia on the other. For this intricate task Perovskii suggested commissioning I. V. Vitkeivich, for his knowledge of local languages. Perovskii's project received the consent of St. Petersburg. The only reservation was that the Emperor did not see that Vitkeivich was a reliable person for such an important mission. The reason behind this rejection lay in the fact that Vitkeivich had been involved in anti-Government political circles during his time in the Gymnasium in 1823. Perovskii

was quick to find the suitable and confident alternative figure: he was P. I. De Maizon. De Maizon was born in the Kingdom of Sardinia, though his name indicates a French origin. His oriental features gave him the necessary advantage in carrying out his task; in addition he had mastered the Russian, Arabic, Tatar, Persian, and Turkish languages. He was entrusted with his mission and received this list of instructions in October 1833. He commenced his task disguised as a Tatar Mulla under the pseudo-name of Mirza Ali.

The instructions, covered nearly every aspect of life; social, commercial, political, military, agricultural, geographic, and others. Reviewing it one would undoubtedly come out with the conviction that Russia's aims lay far beyond apparent commercial interests, or liberating her prisoners, i.e. in obtaining essential information which might be necessary for total control of the Khanate. The instructions reveal in the same time Russian ignorance of such wide range of issues about neighbouring state. They were originally written and communicated to De Maizon in Russian. Eventhough, the Emperor took part in discussing this mission, neither he nor Perovskii signed the communique, in stead it was signed by anonymous secretary. The translation given here is by the author of this thesis. Perovskii directed De Maizon to investigate the following points:

1 - The Bukharan attitude towards Russia in general, and their government in particular. If their disposition is negative, then what is the reason? For that displeasure do they have any reasons that were unknown to the government?

2 - The characteristics of those personalities who are in power in Bukhara.

3 - Agricultural production. Cannot the production of cotton be increased, and to what extent? The production of silk as well.

4 - In case of increasing Bukharan exports to our country, would they accept payment in commodities which until now they do not import from us; or is it possible to increase the consumption, in Bukhara, of those commodities which the Bukharans already import from us?

5 - Does not Bukhara receive, from other Asian countries, commodities that do not reach Russia, but whose use would be beneficial here, and replace goods of the same sort but from European production? In this respect it is recommended to pay attention to the dye indigo or what is called "Kubovaia" paint. It remains to be found out what quantity can be brought into Russia from Bukhara, and at what

price?

6 - The Bukharans import from Russia a considerable amount of iron and copper. They then manufacture it themselves and produce different articles and utensils, despite the fact that these products can be manufactured in Russia more conveniently and cheaper, it is helpful to know the reasons.

7 - The Bukharans import a great deal of tea from Chinese Turkestan, and at reasonable prices, so that we can get the same commodity at the same price, but as it is transported not in boxes but in sacks, otherwise it not flavoured. Also, is there any possibility of transporting it in boxes suitable to be carried on horseback, as the caravans between Kashgar and Kokand do?

8 - How is the trade going between Bukhara and Chinese Turkestan?

9 - How strong are the commercial links between Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand, Badakhshan, Afghanistan, and Persia?

10- What is the Bukharan's opinion of the English and their East Indian Company. What did the Englishmen who visited Bukhara do? Were many English goods brought to Bukhara this year, and how much from Persia? Also how much from Turkey through Persia, what was the quality of those goods, at what price were they sold, and were they bought willingly? This subject is so important that the most penetrating attention should be directed to it and the most detailed data should be collected.

11- How extensive is the exchange of goods between the Bukharans and the Kirghiz and is it profitable to the latter?

12- Where do the Kirghiz roaming beyond the Syr-Daria barter for their food and other products?

13- It is known that the Khivans oppress them [the Kirghiz]; it would not be bad thing to discover whether they would agree to roam nearer to Russia?

14- What is the influence of Sultan Manumbai Shir-Gazi over these Kirghiz, and is he really completely loyal to the Khivan government?

15- Is the land beyond the Syr-Daria suitable for the cultivation of grain and cotton?

16- Is it true that the Yanydaria river dried up some years ago, and then resumed its flow?

17- Is there any possibility to have Kyzyl-daria to flow again like the Yanydaria? And would the terrain allow canals from Syr-Daria and from its tributaries?

18- Is it true that the Amu-Daria has a branch flows to the Caspian sea?

19- The chief of the Khivan caravan, newly arrived her, confirmed the accounts of the Kirhgiz and declared that the present change in the course of the Amu-Daria was caused by a flood, which took place last summer in Khiva, damaging fields and destroying the growing wheat. The most detailed information on this would be highly useful.

20- Kirhgiz and Bukharans have said that during the period when grain prices were soaring in Khiva, or grain disappear almost completely during the last winter many inhabitants left the city, which has resulted in a significant reduction in her population, and the Khivan government became completely powerless. This matter deserves to be explained in details.

21- In 1832 Abbas-Mirza drew close to Khiva with his army, then unexpectedly he stopped, and news about his expedition suddenly dried up. Did he delay the punishment which he had prepared for the Khivans, or did they reached some kind of reconciliation?

22- The Russian captives in Khiva have found the only means of escaping imprisonment to be the very difficult flight across the Kirhgiz steppe to Russia, but it would be less far to flee to Bukhara, whence they could fairly easily come to Russia with the caravans. Why they do not use this method? Are there not people in Bukhara, who would agree to buy prisoners from Khiva, bring them to Bukhara, and from there smuggle them to Russia? Since the Khivans will sell prisoners only to their co-religionists, this suggestion would seem acceptable.

23- You should be extremely careful in your dealings with the Russian prisoners in Bukhara, so as to avoid giving the Bukharan government any cause for dissatisfaction. Any meetings with them, should as far as possible not be in private, and you should avoid having any relations with them, the subject of which might be a source of discontent to the Bukharans. But you can openly ask for their release and, if all else fails inquire about the desired reward. It goes without saying that details about the number and condition of the Russian prisoners would be appreciated by our authorities.

24- It may happen, that the Kush-Begi may send some presents to the military governor in response to what he received from us; in that case you must explain to him that, the gift most pleasing to me would be to set free and send home one or more of the Russian prisoners.

25- In 1825 an Englishman named Moorcroft arrived in Bukhara from India, and was killed on his way back in Khulm. His and his companions' belongings were plundered by the local chieftains and sold publicly. Local people would not see any value in his papers, so these may be preserved, and it is even probable that you can buy them for modern gifts and promises of future reward. Our government would

not object to expending some thousands of rubles, in order to obtain all the papers of that traveller.

Signed: Secretary Ulianov

Appendix II

PRINCE GORCHAKOV'S CIRCULAR^a

November 21, 1864

(Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*)

The position of Russia in Central Asia is that of all civilized States which are brought into contact with half-savage, nomad populations, possessing no fixed social organization.

In such cases it always happens that the more civilized State is forced, in the interest of the security of its frontier and its commercial relations, to exercise a certain ascendancy over those whom their turbulent and unsettled character makes most undesirable neighbours.

First, there are raids and acts of pillage to be put down. To put a stop to them, the tribes on the frontier have to be reduced to a state of more or less perfect submission. This result once attained, these tribes take to more peaceful habits, but are in their turn exposed to the attacks of the more distant tribes.

The state is bound to defend them against these depredations, and to punish those who commit them. Hence the necessity of distant, costly, and periodically recurring expeditions against an enemy whom his social organization makes to impossible to seize. If, the robbers once punished, the expedition is withdrawn, the lesson is soon forgotten; its withdrawal is put down to weakness. It is a peculiarity of Asiatics to respect nothing but visible and palpable force; the moral force of reason and of the interests of civilization has as yet no hold upon them. The work

^a. Alexander Mikailovich Gorchakov (1798-1883), a Russian diplomat served as ambassador in London, Rome, Berlin, and Vienna. He took part in the Conference of Ambassadors at Vienna in 1854 with the main objective to prevent Austria, Prussia and other Governments from joining the Anglo-French-Turkish coalition against Russia. In 1856 he became the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1856-1882) to become one of the most prominent engineers of Russia's aggressive policy in those turbulent years. He was the initiator of the abrogation Paris Treaty in 1871, which was imposed upon Russia after her defeat in the Crimean War in 1856. He also played vital role in the rapprochement between Russia, Germany, and Austro-Hungary, or the well known union of the Three Emperors in 1873, which he masterfully utilized to enhance the position of his country against Turkey, and succeeded in neutralising Europe in the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-78, which ended by the agreement of San Stefano (1878).

has then always to be done over again from the beginning.

In order to put a stop to this state of permanent disorder, fortified posts are established in the midst of these hostile tribes, and an influence is brought to bear upon them which reduces them by degrees to a state of more or less forced submission. But some beyond this second line, other still more distant tribes, come in their turn to threaten the same danger, and necessitate the same measures of repression. The State thus finds itself forced to choose one of two alternatives - either to give up this endless labour, and to abandon its frontier to perpetual disturbance, rendering all prosperity, all security, all civilisation and impossibility, or, on the other hand, to plunge deeper and deeper into barbarous countries, where the difficulties and expenses increase with every step in advance.

Such has been the fate of every country which has found itself in a similar position. The United States in America, France in Algeria, Holland in her colonies, England in India - all have been irresistibly forced, less by ambition than by imperious necessity, into this onward march, where the greatest difficulty is to know where the greatest difficulty is to know where to stop.

Such, too, have been the reasons which have led the Imperial Government to take up at first a position resting on one side on the Syr Daria, on the other on the lake of Issyk Kul, and to strengthen these two lines by advanced forts, which, little by little, have crept on into the heart of those distant regions, without, however, succeeding in establishing on the other side of our frontiers that tranquillity which is indispensable for their security.

The explanation of this unsettled state of things is to be found, first, in the fact that between the extreme points of this double line there is an immense unoccupied space, where all attempts at colonisation or caravan trade are paralysed by the inroads of the robber tribes; and, in the second place, in the perpetual fluctuations of the political condition of those countries where Turkestan and Kokand, sometimes united, sometimes at variance, always at war, either with one another or with Bukhara, presented no chance of settled relations, or of any regular transactions whatever.

The Imperial Government thus found itself, in spite of all its efforts, in the

dilemma we have above alluded to, that is to say, compelled either to permit the continuance of a state of permanent disorder, paralysing to all security and progress, or to condemn itself to costly and distant expeditions leading to no practical result and with the work always to be done anew; or, lastly, to enter upon the undefined path of conquest and annexation which has given to England the Empire in India, by attempting the subjugation by armed force, one after another, of the small independent States whose habits of pillage and turbulence, and whose perpetual revolts, leave their neighbours neither peace nor repose.

Neither of these alternative courses was in accordance with the objects of our August Master's policy, which consists not in extending beyond all reasonable bounds the regions under his sceptre, but in giving a solid basis to his rule, in guaranteeing their security, and in developing their social organization, their commerce, their well-being, and their civilisation.

Our task was, therefore, to discover a system adapted to the attainment of this threefold object.

The following principles have, in consequence, been laid down:

1. *It has been judged to be indispensable that our two fortified lines, one extending from China to the lake of Issyk Kul, the other from the sea of Aral along the Syr Daria, should be united by fortified points, so that all our posts should be in a position of mutual support, leaving no gap through which the nomad tribes might make their inroads and depredations with immunity.*

2. It was essential that the line of our advanced forts thus completed should be situated in a country fertile enough not only to insure their supplies, but also to facilitate the regular colonisation, which alone can prepare a future of stability and prosperity for the occupied country by gaining over the neighbouring population to civilised life.

3. Finally, it was urgent to lay down this line definitively, so as to escape the danger of being carried away, as is almost inevitable, by a series of repressive measures and reprisals into an unlimited extension of territory.

This system was suggested to us by a very simple fact, the result of experience, namely, that the nomad tribes, which can neither be seized nor

punished, nor effectually kept in order, are our most inconvenient neighbours; while on the other hand, agricultural and commercial populations attached to the soil, and possessing a more advanced social organization, offer us every chance of gaining neighbours with whom there is a possibility of entering into relations.

Consequently our frontier line ought to swallow up the former and stop short at the limit of the latter.

These three principles supply a clear, natural, and logical explanation of our last military operations in Central Asia. In fact, our original frontier line extending along the Syr Daria to Fort Perovskii on one side, and on the other to the lake Issyk Kul, had the drawback of being almost on the verge of the desert. It was broken by a wide gap between the two extreme points; it did not offer sufficient resources to our troops, and left unsettled tribes over the border, with which any settled arrangement became impossible.

In spite of our unwillingness to extend our frontier, these motives had been powerful enough to induce the Imperial Government to establish this line between Lake Issyk Kul and the Syr Daria by fortifying the town of Chemkend, lately occupied by us. By the adoption of this line we obtain a double result. In the first place, the country it takes in is fertile, well wooded, and watered by numerous watercourses; it is partly inhabited by various Kirghiz tribes which have already accepted our rule; it consequently offers favourable conditions for colonisation and the supply of provisions to our garrisons. In the second place, it puts us in the immediate neighbourhood of the agricultural and commercial populations of Kokand. We find ourselves in the presence of a more solid and compact, less unsettled, and better organized social state, fixed for us, with geographical precision, the limit up to which we are bound to advance, and at which we must halt, because, while on the one hand any further extension of our rule, meeting, as it would, no longer with unstable communities such as the nomad tribes, but with more regularly constituted States, would entail considerable exertions, and would draw us on from annexation to annexation with unforeseen complications; on the other, with such States for our future neighbours, their backward civilisation and the instability of their political condition do not shut us out from the hope that the

day may come when regular relations may, to the advantage of both parties, take the place of the permanent troubles which have up to the present moment paralysed all progress in those countries.

Such are the interests which inspire the policy of our August Master in Central Asia.

It is needless for me to lay stress upon the interest which Russia evidently has not to increase her territory, and, above all, to avoid raising complications on her frontiers, which can but delay and paralyse her domestic development.

The programme which I have just traced is in accordance with these views.

Very frequently of late years the civilisation of these countries, which are her neighbours on the continent of Asia, has been assigned to Russia as her special permission.

No agent has been found more apt for the progress of civilisation than commercial relations. Their development requires everywhere order and stability, but in Asia it demands a complete transformation of the habits of the people. The first thing to be taught to the population of Asia is that they will gain more in favouring and protecting the caravans trade than in robbing them. These elementary ideas can only be accepted by the public where one exists; that is to say, where there is some organized form of society, and a Government to direct and represent it.

We are accomplishing the first task in carrying our frontier to the limit where the indispensable conditions are to be found.

The second we shall accomplish in making every effort henceforward to prove to our neighbouring States, by a system of firmness in the repression of their misdeeds, combined with moderation and justice in the use of our strength, and respect for their independence, that Russia is not their enemy, that she entertains towards them no idea of conquest, and that peaceful and commercial relations with her are more profitable than disorder, pillage, reprisals, and a permanent state of war.

The Imperial Cabinet, in assuming this task, takes as its guide the interests of Russia. But it believes that at the same time it is promoting the interests of

humanity and civilisation. It has a right to expect that the line of conduct it pursues, and the principles which guide it, will meet with a just and candid appreciation.

Signed

(A. M. Gorchakov)

**DECREE
FOR THE FORMATION OF THE OF THE PROVINCE
OF TURKESTAN**

(Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana)

Where as we hold it to be expedient to modify the civil and military organization of the territories bordering on China and the Central Asian khanates which formed portions of the Governments of Orenburg and West Siberia, We ordain by these presents that:

1. A General-Governorship be forthwith established in Turkestan, which shall consist of the province of Turkestan, the circle of Tashkand, the districts lying beyond the Syr-Daria, which were occupied by us in the year 1866, and the portion of the province of Semipalatinsk that lies to the south of the Tarbagatai mountain range.

2. The boundaries of the Government of Turkestan shall henceforward be:

a - With respect to the Government of West Siberia: the ridge of the Tarbagatai mountains, and their offshoots as far as the present frontier line which divides the province of Semipalatinsk from the country inhabited by the Kirghiz of Siberia, shall form the frontier on that side, as far as the lake of Balkhash, then extending farther in a curve drawn through the middle of that lake, and equidistant from its shores, and then in a straight line to the river Chu, thence following the course of that river till its confluence with the Syr Daria.

b - With respect to the Government of Orenburg: the frontier line shall be drawn from the middle of the Gulf of Perovskii in the Sea of Aral, over the Termembes mountain, the place called Terekli, over the Kalmas mountain, the place Muzbil, the Akkum and Chubar-Tubia mountains, the southern point of the sandy desert Myn-Kum, and the place Myn-Bulak, to the confluence of the rivers Sari Su and Chu.

3. The new government shall be divided into two provinces, one the Syr-Daria, the

other Semirechinsk, and the river Kurogoty will form the boundary line between them.

4. The chief administrative power over the country thus constituted will be entrusted to a Governor-General, and the provinces of the Syr-Daria and the Semirechinsk to Military Governors; as regards the military administration and the military establishments, the two provinces shall form the military district of Turkestan, and the command of the whole of the troops stationed within the district shall be entrusted to the Governor-General, with the title, "Commander of the Forces of the District" and the Military Governors shall command the troops in their own provinces, with the title "Commander of the Forces" in their respective provinces.

5. On the establishment of the provinces of the Syr Daria and the Semirechinsk, existing civil authorities therein employed shall remain at the disposition and under the control of the respective Military Governors until general regulations for the guidance of the administration of the whole district shall be promulgated.

Dated July 11, 1867

Appendix IV

RUSSO-KHIVAN TREATY

August 12, 1873

(FO 65/879, No. 415, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 22, 1873; and in Zhukovskii, Snoshenii Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi za poslednei trekhsotletie)

1. Sayed Mohammed Rahim Bahadur Khan professes himself the humble servant of the Emperor of all the Russias. He renounces the right of entertaining any direct and friendly relations with neighbouring sovereigns and khans, and of concluding with them commercial or other treaties of any kind whatsoever, and shall not, without the knowledge and permission of the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, undertake and military operations against such neighbouring countries.
2. The boundary between the Russian and Khivan territories shall be the Amu Daria from Kukertli down the river as far as the point at which the most westerly branch of the Amu Daria leaves the main stream, and from that point the frontier shall pass along such branch as far as its mouth in the Aral sea. Farther, the frontier shall extend along the sea coast to Cape Urgu, and from thence along the edge of the Chink of the Ust-Urt, following the so called ancient bed of the Amu Daria.
3. The whole of the right bank of the Amu Daria, and the adjoining lands, which have hitherto been considered as belonging to Khiva, shall pass over from the Khan into the possession of Russia, together with the people dwelling and camping thereon. Those parcels of land which are at present the property of the Khan, and of which the usufruct has been given by him to Khivan officers of State, become likewise the property of the Russian government, free of all claims on the part of the previous owners. The Khan may indemnify them by grants of land on the left bank.

4. In the event of a portion of such right bank being transferred to the possession of the Amir of Bukhara by the will of His Majesty the Emperor, the Khan of Khiva shall recognise the latter as the lawful possessor of such portion of his former dominions, and engages to renounce all intention of re-establishing his authority therein.

5. Russian steamers, and other Russian vessels, whether belonging to the Government or to private individuals, shall have the free and exclusive right of navigating the Amu Daria river. Khivan and Bukharan vessels may enjoy the same right, not otherwise than by special permission from the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

6. Russians shall have the right to construct wharves on the left bank wheresoever the same shall be found necessary and convenient. The Government of the Khan shall be responsible for the safety and security of such wharves. The approval of the localities selected for wharves shall rest with the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia.

7. Independently of such wharves, Russians shall have the right to establish factories on the left bank of the Amu Daria for the purpose of storing and safe-keeping their merchandise. For the purposes of such factories the Government of the Khan shall allot, in the localities which shall have been indicated by the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, a sufficient quantity of unoccupied land for wharves, and for the construction of storehouses, of buildings for the accommodation of servants of the factories, and of persons transacting business with the factories, and of merchants' offices, as well as for the establishment of domestic farms. Such factories, together with all persons residing thereat and with all goods placed therein, shall be under the immediate protection of the Government of the Khan, which shall be responsible for the safety and security of the same.

8. All the towns and villages, without exception, within the Khanate of Khiva shall henceforward be open to Russian trade. Russian merchants and Russian caravans may freely travel throughout the entire khanate, and shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The Government of the Khan shall be responsible for the safety of caravans and stores.

9. Russian merchants trading in the khanate shall be free from the payment of customs duties *zakah* and of all kinds of dues on trade, in the same manner as the merchants of Khiva have long enjoyed immunity from *zakah* on the route through Knzalinsk, Orenburg, and at the stations on the Caspian sea.

10. Russian merchants shall have the right of carrying their goods through the Khivan territory to all neighbouring countries free of customs duties (free transit trade).

11. Russian merchants shall, if they desire it, have the right to establish agents (caravan bashis) in Khiva and other towns within the khanate, for the purpose of maintaining communication with the authorities and superintending the regularity of their trade.

12. Russian subjects shall have the right to hold immovable property in Khiva. A land-tax shall be leviable on the same by agreement with the superior Russian authority in Central Asia.

13. commercial engagements between Russians and Khivans shall be fulfilled inviolably on both sides.

14. The Government of the Khan engages to investigate, without delay, the complaints and claims of Russian subjects against Khivans, and in case such complaints and claims shall have proved to be well founded, to give immediate satisfaction in respect of the same. In the examination of disputes or claims

between Russian subjects and Khivans, preference shall be given to Russians in respect to the payment of debts by Khivans.

15. Complaints and claims of Khivans against Russian subjects shall be referred to the nearest Russian authorities for examination and satisfaction, even in the event of such complaints and claims being raised by Russian subjects within the confines of the khanate.

16. The Government of the Khan shall in no case give refuge to emigrants (runaways) from Russia having no permit from Russian authorities, without regard to the nationality of such individuals. Should any Russian subjects, being criminals, seek concealment within the boundaries of Khiva, in order to avoid judicial pursuit, the Government of the Khan engaged to capture such persons, and to surrender them to the nearest Russian authorities.

17. The proclamation made by Sayed Mohammed Rahim Bahadur Khan on the 12th of July last respecting the liberation of all slaves in the khanates and the abolition in perpetuity of slavery and of trade in men, shall remain in full force, and the Government of the Khan engages to employ all the means in its power in order to watch over the strict and conscientious prosecution of this matter.

18. A fine is inflicted on the Khanate of Khiva to the extent of two million two hundred thousand roubles, in order to cover the expenses incurred by the Russian Exchequer in the prosecution of the late war, which was provoked by the Government of the Khan against the Khivan people. Since, owing to the insufficiency of money in the country, and particularly in the hands of the Government, the Khivan Government is unable to pay the above sum within a short time, the Khivan Government shall, in consideration of such difficulty, have the right of paying the said fine by installments, with the addition of interest thereon at the rate of five per cent. per annum, on condition that, during the first two years, one hundred thousand roubles shall be annually paid into the Russian Exchequer, one

hundred and twenty-five thousand roubles per annum during the two ensuing years, and, after that, one hundred and seventy-five thousand roubles per annum during the succeeding two years, and in the year 1881, that is to say, after the expiration of eight years, the sum of two hundred thousand roubles shall be paid; and, lastly, a sum of not less than two hundred thousand roubles per annum shall be paid until the final settlement of the claim. The installments may be paid both in Russian bank-notes and in the current coin of Khiva, at the pleasure of the Government of the Khan. The first instalment shall be paid on the 1st of December 1873. On account of this instalment the Khan shall have the right to levy a tax for the current year from the population on the right bank, according to the assessment hitherto in force. This collection shall be terminated by the 1st of December, by agreement between the Khan's collectors and the local Russian authorities. Subsequent installments shall be paid in by the 1st of November of each year, until the entire fine, with interest thereon, shall have been paid off. After the expiration of nineteen years, that is to say, by the 1st of November 1892, after the payment of two hundred thousand roubles for the year 1892, the sum of seventy thousand and fifty-four roubles will still be due by the Government of the Khan, and, by the 1st of November 1893, the last instalment of seventy-three thousand five hundred and fifty-seven roubles shall be paid. Should the Government of the Khan desire to shorten the term of payment, and thus to reduce the amount of accruing interest, it shall have the right to pay larger annual installments. These conditions have been fixed and accepted for exact execution and constant guidance on the one part by General Aide de Camp Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and on the other part by Sayed Mohammed Rahim Bahadur Khan, Ruler of Khiva, in the garden of Hendemian.

The original treaty was signed and sealed by General Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan, and by Sayed Mohammed Rahim Bahadur the Khan of Khiva.

August 12th 1873, the first day of the month Rajab 1290.

Signed and sealed, General Kaufmann

The Turkish text signed and sealed by Sayed Mohammad Rahim, Khan of Khiva

RUSSO-BUKHARAN TREATY

September 28, 1873

(Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*)

1 - The line of frontier between the dominions of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and those of His Eminence the Amir of Bukhara remains unaltered. All the Khivan territory on the right bank of the Amu Daria being now annexed to the Russian dominions, the former frontier separating the possessions of the Amir of Bukhara from the Khanate of Khiva, and stretching on the west from the locality called Khal-ata towards Gugertli, Togai, on the right bank of Amu, is abolished. The territory situated between the former Bukharo-Khivan frontier, the right bank of the Amu Daria from Gugertli to Meshekly, Togai, and the line passing from Meshekly to the point of junction of the former Bukharo-Khivan frontier, with the frontier of the Russian Empire, is annexed to the dominions of the Amir of Bukhara.

2 - The right bank of the Amu Daria being detached from the Khanate of Khiva, all the caravan routes leading from Bukhara to the north into the Russian dominions traverse henceforth exclusive lands belonging to Bukharan and Russia. The Governments of Russia and Bukhara, each within its own limits, shall both watch over the security of the march of caravans and of the transit trade.

3 - Russian steamers and other Russian Government vessels, as well as vessels belonging private individuals, shall have the right of free navigation on that portion of the Amu Daria which belongs to the Amir of Bukhara.

4 - Russians shall have the right to establish wharves (landing-places) and storehouses for merchandise in such places on the Bukharan banks of the Amu Daria as may be judged necessary and convenient for that purpose. The Government of Bukhara shall undertake to watch over the safety and security of the said wharves and storehouses. The ratification of the selection of localities for

the establishment wharves shall rest with the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia.

5 - All the towns and villages of the Khan of Bukhara shall be open to Russian trade. Russian traders and Russian caravans shall freely pass through all parts of the khanate and shall enjoy the special protection of the local authorities. The Bukharan Government shall be responsible for the security of Russian caravans within the confines of the Khanate of Bukhara.

6 - All merchandise belonging to Russian traders, whether transported from the Russia possessions into Bukhara or from Bukhara to Russia, shall, without exception, be liable to a tax of two and a half per cent. In the same way as a duty of one-fortieth is charged on merchandise in the Turkestan province. Besides this *zakah* no other supplementary tax shall be imposed.

7 - Russian traders shall have the right to transport their merchandise through Bukhara to all neighbouring countries free of duty.

8 - Russian traders shall be allowed to establish caravanserais for the storage of their merchandise in all Bukharan towns in which they may consider it necessary to do so. Bukharan traders shall enjoy the same privilege in towns of the Turkestan province.

9 - Russian traders shall have the right to have commercial agents in all the towns of Bukhara, whose business it shall be to watch over the regular course of trade and over the legal imposition of customs dues, and who shall also be authorised to enter into communication with the local authorities. Bukharan traders shall enjoy the same privilege in the towns of the Turkestan province.

10 - Engagements of trade between Russians and Bukharans shall be held sacred and inviolable on both sides. The Bukharan Government shall promise to keep

watch over the honest fulfilment of all trading engagements, as also over the conscientious conduct of trading affairs generally.

11 - Russian subjects shall equally with the subjects of Bukhara have the right to occupy themselves in the Bukharan dominions with the various trades and crafts which are allowed under the *Shari'ah* in exactly the same way as Bukharan subjects are permitted in the Russian dominions to follow those occupations which are sanctioned by the laws of Russia.

12 - Russian subjects shall have the right to possess immovable property in the khanate, i.e. to acquire by purchase gardens and cultivable lands. Such property shall be liable to a land-tax on an equality with properties of Bukharan subjects. The same right shall be enjoyed by Bukharan subject within the limits of the Russian Empire.

13 - Russian subjects shall enter the Bukharan dominions with permits, issued by the Russian authorities, for crossing the frontier; they shall have the right of free passage throughout the entire khanate and they shall enjoy the special protection of the Bukharan authorities.

14 - The Government of Bukhara shall in no case admit into its country any emigrants from Russia whatever may be their nationality, who are not provided with permits from Russian authorities. If criminal, being a Russian subject, seeks refuge within the confines of Bukhara from the pursuit of the law the same shall be arrested and delivered over to the nearest Russian authorities.

15 - In order to hold direct and uninterrupted relations with the superior Russian authorities in Central Asia, the Amir of Bukhara shall select from among those around him a person of confidence whom he shall establish at Tashkand as his Envoy Plenipotentiary. Such Envoy shall reside at Tashkand in a house belonging to the Amir, and at the expense of the latter.

16 - The Russian Government may in like manner have a permanent representative in Bukhara shall be near the person of His Eminence the Amir. The Russian Plenipotentiary in Bukhara, as in the case of the Amir's Plenipotentiary in Tashkand, shall reside in a house belonging to the Russian Government, and at the expense of the latter.

17 - In deference to the Emperor of all the Russias, and for the greater glory of His Imperial Majesty, His Eminence the Amir Sayed Muzaffar has resolved that henceforth and for ever the shameful trade in men which is so contrary to the laws of humanity, shall be abolished within the limits of Bukhara. In conformity with this resolution, Sayed Muzaffar shall immediately send to all his beks the strictest orders to that effect. Besides the order abolishing the slave trade, commands shall be sent to all the frontier towns of Bukhara to which slaves are brought for sale from neighbouring countries, to the effect that in case slaves should be brought to such places, notwithstanding the orders of the Amir, the same should be taken from their owners and immediately liberated.

18 - His Eminence Sayed Muzaffar, being sincerely desirous of developing and strengthening the friendly and neighbourly relations which have subsisted for five years to the benefit of Bukhara, shall be guided by the seventeen articles composing the Treaty of Friendship between Russia and Bukhara This treaty shall be written in duplicate, each copy being written in the two languages, one in the Russian and the other in the Turkish language. In token of the confirmation of treaty and of its acceptance as guide to himself and to his successors, the Amir Sayed Muzaffar has attached his seal.

Sha'ban, 19th, 1290 (A.H.),

September 28th, 1873 (A.D.)

Abbreviations

AKAK	Akty Kavkazkoi Arkhiologicheskii Komissii
FO	Foreign Office
FOCP	Foreign Office Confidential Print
gl. arkhiv	Glavnyi Arkhiv
IO	India Office
L/P&S	Letters, Private and Secret
MID	Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del
PP	Parliamentary Papers
PRO	Public Record Office
SAGU	Sredne-Aziatskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet
SHC	Secret Home Correspondence
TsGVIA	Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv

Glossary

Arshin	2.33 feet
Bushel	36,3687 litre
Chetvert	5.77 bushels
Chinovnik	Civil functionary, bureaucrat
Desiatin	2.7 acres
Gubernia	Governorship, governorate, province
Pud	36.11 lbs
Sajen	7 feet English
Uezd	district
Ukaz	decree, legislative act
Verst	0.66 English mile (3,500 feet)
Volost	small rural district, usually consisted of group of villages under local administration.

Notes and References

Introduction

Footnotes

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3. Mazour, A., *Russia, Tsarist and Communist*, (N. Y. 1962) pp. 18-19; also vide Wheeler, G., *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (London 1964), p. 49.
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5. Miliutin, Dmitrii Alexeivich was one of the most prominent figures in the Russian military and political decision making process in the second half of the nineteenth century. After a long career in the army he became the minister of war from 1861 until 1881, a period in which Russia was mostly active in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
6. Levteeva, L. G., *Prisoedineniia srednei Azii k Rossii v Memuarnikh Istochnikakh*, (Tashkand 1986) p. 12.
7. Colonel (later General) Mikhail Grigorevich Cherniaev, was the commander of the army acting against Kokand during the late 1850's and the 1860's, the Governor of the Turkestan Oblast (1865-1866), later in 1882-1884 Governor General of Turkestan. He is known in Russian history as the conqueror of Tashkand.
8. Bariatynskii in the 1850's and 1860's was the commander of the Caucasian army which fought against the Murids' movement under the leadership of Imam Shamil, who led the mountaineers' struggle against the Russian advance in Daghestan, Checheniia, and Chercasia.
9. Levteeva, L. G., *Prisoedineniia srednei Azii k Rossii...*, p. 97.
10. Commonly the [Great] Russians called all the Slavs or the Orthodox people "Mladshie Bratia" (Younger Brothers), or "Malye Bratia" (Lesser Brothers), and historically they carried the responsibility of defending those peoples, consequently they assumed the right to rule over them.
11. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, 9 volumes in 10, (Moscow 1963-1977) vol. II, pt. I, p. 418.
12. Edwards, H. Sutherland, *Russian Projects against India from the Czar Peter to General Skobelev*, (London 1885) pp. 262 ff.; and Cheshire, H. T., "The Expansion of Imperial Russia to the Indian Border", *Slavonic Review*, XIII (1934-5).

13. Gafurov, B. G., is a clear example for this change, see his work *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda*, (Moscow 1949), and the same work republished in 1955: the change from one viewpoint to another is very clear especially in chapter 21 where the title in the 1949 edition reads "The Conquest of Central Asia by Tsarism", while the same chapter in the 1955 edition became "Uniting Central Asia to Russia"; the change is evident in the text as well to fit the new stream. There is a series of similar works in which the Russian conquest of Central Asia appeared as a liberating process; see Dzhamgerchinov, B., *Prisoedinenie Kirghizii k Rossii*, (Moscow 1959).

14. A remarkable shift in the way Soviet historians treated Central Asian history happened precisely in the mid fifties. The new tendency inclined to reinterpret the history of Russian-Central Asian relations, basically to emphasize its supposed positive aspects and explain that expansion came as a vital necessity for the prosperity of these nations. This group includes: Rosliakov, A.; Gafurov, B. G.; Dzhamgerchinov, B.; Braginskii, I.; Tikhomirov, M. N.; Romodin, V.; Radzhabov, S.; Karryev, A. and others (most of whom are Central Asians). This group of historians was influenced by the doctrine of M. D. Bagirov, the Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaizhan, who was the first to criticize the movement of "Muridism" in the Caucasus in the mid nineteenth century as an instrument of both Turkish and British imperialism, despite the earlier sympathetic evaluation of the movement as struggle against the Russian armies. His reinterpretation, mainly due to his position in the party, caused an expanding wave that engulfed the history of other regions. For the origins of this tendency vide; *Voprosy Istorii*, No. 3, 1956, and No. 12, 1956. It is of great value, for the purpose of comparison, to review N. A. Smirnov's book *Muridism na Kavkaze*, (Moscow 1963).

15. Braginskii, I. C.; Radzhabov, C.; Romodin, V. A., "K Voprosy o Znachenii Prisoedineniia Srednei Azii k Rossii" (to the issue of the significance of uniting Central Asia to Russia), *Voprosy Istorii*, (8) 1953, p. 21. M. N. Pokrovskii's book *A Brief History of Russia*, (London 1933), does not deviate in any particular from the party line, or misinterpret any hypothesis, the original Russian edition was praised by Lenin himself, who wrote a foreword for the book calling it a necessary guidebook and suggested that it should become a text book in schools.

16. Karryev, A.; Rosliakov, A., *Kratkii Ocherk Istorii Turkestana*, (Askabad 1956) p. 5. Other Soviet historians share this opinion with them regarding the same point of view, see for instance: Dzhamgerchinov, B., *Prisoedinenie Kirghizii k Rossii*, pp. 344 ff. and Gafurov, *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda*, pp. 423 ff. Even the misleading vocabulary which has been used by these authors should be subjected to criticism and investigation. The inaccuracy of their opinion would be obvious in light of the real attitude of the Turkomans as illuminated by a distinguished statesman: "Russia since the conquest of Khiva was determined to master the territories between the Caspian and the Russian possessions to safeguard her military communications between the Attrek river and Khiva. For this purpose Russia was determined to subjugate the Turkomans. She had the option to choose between subjugating them by military means, which she tried but found it costly and inefficient, or through conciliatory process, which proved to be more relatively successful among the southern Turkomans". Loftus, Augustus (Lord), *The Political Reminiscences*, pp. 112-113; yet from a Russian source: "Skobelev was assisted throughout his expeditions by local guides who collaborated with him either under threat or for money, frequently these conductors or guides consciously misled the Russian troops". Terent'ev, M.A., *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, vol. III, p. 136.

17. *Voprosy Istorii*, (8) 1953, p. 22-3.
18. Grodekov, N. I., *Voina v Turkmenii, pokhod Skobeleva v 1880-1881*, (1883) v. I, p. 102.
19. See appendix I and chapter II for details.
20. *Istoriia Narodov Uzbekstana*, 2 vols. (Tashkand 1947), published by the Institute of History and Archaeology of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbekstan SSR, and Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the SSSR.
21. Curzon, G., *Russia in Central Asia*, (London 1889) pp. 82-3; General Skobelev admitted during his visit to Paris, in an interview with the Paris correspondent of the Daily News, that he had 21,000 men killed under him in his recent campaign. See Marvin, C., *The Russian Advance...*, pp. 39-59 and 306-7.
22. Curzon, G., *Russia in Central Asia*, (1889), p. 83.
23. Krausse, Alexis; *Russia in Asia*, (London 1899) p. 100-101. These events may be understood more fully against the background of other similar practices: the massacre of the Yomuds by General Kaufmann following the fall of Khiva in 1873, and General Lomakin's assault on Denghil Tekke inhabitants in 1879; see Terent'ev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, vol III, chaps. I & II. For detailed account of Skobelev's campaign, see Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii i Pokhod Skobeleva v 1880-1881* (War in Turkmeniia and Skobelev's Campaign in 1880-1881), vol. III, chapter XV, pp. 197-295.
24. The commander of the expedition.
25. MacGahan, J. A., *Campaign on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva*, (London 1874) 2nd ed., pp. 358-9.
26. See Khalfin, N., *Prisoedinenie srednei azii k Rossii*, pp. 335-351; and *Istoriia narodov Uzbekstana*, v. II, pp. 241-250.
27. Gafurov, B. G., *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda*, v. I, pp. 423-6; Dzhamgercinov, V. D., *Prisoedinenie Kirghizii k Rossii*, pp. 344-358; and Aminov, A. M., *Ikonomicheskoe Razvitie Srednei Azii*, pp. 67-75; and Karryev, A.; Rosliakov, A., *Kratkii Ocherk Istorii Turkestana*, p. 6.
28. Karryev, A.; Rosliakov, A., *Kratkii Ocherk Istorii Turkestana*, p. 6.
29. *Voprosy Istorii*, (8) 1953, p. 28.
30. It should be observed that the Soviet authors of this propensity attribute unpleasant facts to Tsarism. In this case they used the expression "Tsarist policy", and avoided the idiom "Russian policy", because it contained wider national implications.
31. *Voprosy Istorii*, (8) 1953, p. 29. It must be remembered that England did not dispatch any military expedition to any of the Central Asian Khanates, and her ambition in this region was limited to keeping these states independent or included in a system later crystallized in the well-known "buffer zone" policy designed to protect British India and stop the Russian advance.

32. For definitions of the region of "Tsentralnaia Aziia" from both historical and geographical points of view see; Sinitsyn, V.M., *Tsentralnaia Aziia*, (Moscow 1959); and Schukina, N.M., *Kak Sozdavalas Karta Tsentralnoi Azii*, (Moscow 1955).
33. The celebrated Bartold, V. V. used both terms indiscriminately in his *Sochineniia* (9 vols. in 10) to mean the same; see vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 475, 505; vol. III, pp. 540, 541; vol. V, pp. 19, 28, 253, 468, 593, 613. Notably all pre-Soviet historians, as well as early Soviet historians, did not differentiate between the two expressions.
34. Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, pp. 3-11.
35. The word "altai" has its origin from the Turkic word "altan" (golden). The Altai mountains, geographically speaking, nowadays are divided between China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union. From these mountains three great Asian rivers take their sources; Ob, Irtysh, and Enesei. These mountains extend from 81° to 106° longitude, and from 48° to 53° latitude.
36. Rawlinson, H., *England and Russia in the East*, (London 1875), pp. 247-8.
37. *Ibid*, p. 249.

Chapter One

Footnotes:

1. Ibnu Khaldun, *Tarikh Ibnu Khaldun*, vol. 3, pp. 478ff, 604-5, 870-1; Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 171ff; Ibnu 'Arabshah, Ad-Dimashqi, *Narrative of the Confederates and Bantering of the Smarts*, Egypt 1312 H. (1898-99 A.D.), p. 231-240; Ibnul-Athir, Abil-Hasan, *Al Kamil fit-Tarikh*, (The Complete in History), Bulaq, Egypt 1301 H., 1883-1884 A.D., vol. 9, pp. 2-5, 89, 230, 291,330, 340-44; and Yakoub al-Hamawi, *Mu'jam al-Buldan*, (Dictionary of Countries), (any edition), article "Rūs".
2. Khanykof, Ia, V., "Poiasnirtel'naia zapiska k karte Aral'skogo moria i Khivinskogo Khanstvo", *Zapiski istoricheskogo obshestvo*, Book (5) 1851, p. 282.
3. *Blackwoods Magazine*, "The Progress and Policy of Russia in Central Asia", (unsigned), vol. LXXV (May 1854), p. 611.
4. *Quarterly Review*, "Russian Advance in Central Asia", (unsigned) vol. CXXXVI (1874) p. 395.
5. *Voprosy istorii*, "O nekotorigh voprosakh istorii narodov srednei Azii", vol. 4 (1951) pp. 3-5; also vide Ghafurov, B. G., *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda* (Moscow 1949), pp. 133-162.
6. Seton-Watson, H, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917*, (Oxford 1967), pp. 739-740.
7. Wheeler, G., *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (London 1964), p. 28.
8. Terentiev, M.; Daukes, F. (tr.), *Russia and England in Central Asia*, (Calcutta 1876) vol. I, pp. 2-4.
9. Lobanov-Rostovsky, A., *Russia in Asia*, pp. 35-6.
10. He was the first to react because Yermak, after having escaped a death sentence by Ivan the Terrible, was in the service of the Stroganov family, which established the first Russian colonies in Perm beyond the Urals.
11. Grulev, M., *Sapernichestvo Rossii i Angliia v srednei Azii*, (St. Petersburg 1909) p. 6.; and Terentiev, M. A.; Daukes, F. C. (tr.), *Russia and England in Central Asia*, (2 vols.) (Calcutta 1876) vol. I, pp. 6-9.
12. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, pp. 9-10.
13. Some historians refer to it as Siberia.
14. Terentiev; *Russia and England*, vol. I, pp. 10-11; Krausse, A., *Russia in Asia*, pp. 21-23.

15. Mackenzie Wallace wrote in 1876 a sympathetic description of these Russian colonists: "For this kind of colonization the Russian peasant is by nature peculiarly well adapted. Peace-loving, good-natured, long-suffering, having always at hand the soft answer which turneth away wrath, and possessing a power of self-adaptation... He has none of that consciousness of personal and national superiority... Nor has he any of that inconsiderate proselytizing zeal... Each nation, he thinks, has received from God its peculiar faith, and all men should believe and act according to the faith in which they have been born. When he goes to settle among a foreign people, even when his future neighbours have the reputation of being inhospitable and unfriendly to strangers, he takes with him neither revolver nor bowie knife. He has no intention of injuring others, and does not see why others should do him any bodily harm". *Fortnightly Review*, vol. XXVI (1876), p. 147.

16. Wheeler, G., *The Modern History of Central Asia*, p. 51.

17. Liashchenko, P. I., *History of the National Economy of Russia*, pp. 585-591.

18. Wallace, D. Mackenzie, "The Territorial Expansion of Russia", *Fortnightly Review*, vol. XXVI (1876), pp. 146-7.

19. *Quarterly Review*, "Russian advances in Central Asia", vol. CXXXVI (1874) p. 400.

20. *Ibid*, pp. 400-1.

21. Krausse, A., *Russia in Asia: a Record and a Study*, (1899), p. 12.

22. *The Central Asian Question from An Eastern Stand-Point*, (no author) (1869) p. 4.

23. Wheeler, G., *The Modern History of Central Asia*, p. 29.

24. Bunakov, E. V., "K Istorii Snochenii Rossii s Sredneaziatskimi Khanstvami v XIX v", *Sovetskoe vostokovedenie*, vol. 2, 1941, p. 6.

25. Ziaev, Kh. Z., *Ikonomicheskie sviazi srednei Azii s Sibiriu v XVI-XIX vv.*, (Tashkand 1983), p. 14. In the fifteenth century a Russian merchant named Afanaci Nikitin reached northern India after four-year trip. In the account of his travel he said: " Brothers, Russian Christians, whoever of you wants to go to India he should leave his belief behind him in Russia and shout "Muhammad", and proceed in the land of Hindustan. These infidel spaniels Busurmen (distorted form of Musulman, which means in Russian Language rubbish or garbage man) have lied to me,... saying that there is nothing in their land; pepper and colouring material are cheap, but bringing them by sea would entail heavy taxes and there is many pirates on the sea". Raskolnikov, F., "Russia and Afghanistan", *Novyi Vostok*, No. 4, (not dated), p. 13 (footnote).

26. Terentiev was the most authoritative of nineteenth-century Russian historians of Central Asia. He had a long career as a General in the army and as a high ranking official in the office of Kaufmann, Governor-General of Turkestan. His position and rank gave him access to sensitive documents, decision-making process, and to most secret military plans. He wrote many invaluable works on the history of the region. Vide bibliography in this work for a list of his books.

27. Terentiev, *Rossia i Angliia v borbe za rynki*, (St. Petersburg 1876), p. 12.

28. Terentiev, M. A., *Rossiia i Angliia v borbe za rynki*, (St. Petersburg 1876), p. 18.
29. Terentiev, M. A., *Rossiia i Angliia v borbe za rynki*, pp. 16-17.
30. Wallace, D. Mackenzie, "The Territorial Expansion of Russia", *Fortnightly Review*, vol. XXVI (1876) p. 146.
31. Schuyler, E., *Turkestan: Notes on a Journey in Russian Turkestan, Kokand Bukhara, and Kuldja*, 2 vols., (London 1876), vol. I, pp. 341, 383; also vide Bartold, V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 268-274.
32. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 272.
33. These Bekships were: Shahr-i-sabz between Bukhara and Kokand; Aral to the north of Khiva; Tashkand neighbouring Kokand; Karategin, Darvaz, Shugnan and others in the mountain region to the east of Bukhara; Merv to the south and southwest of both Khiva and Bukhara. These political formations derived their name from the Turkish word "Bek" or "Beg". *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, pp. 10-22, 43-5, 51, 57, 97, 318-9; and Ivanov, P. P., *Ocherki po istorii srednei Azii*, pp. 117-119.
34. Feoletov, N., "Bukharskoe i Khivinskoe Khanstva..." *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, pp. 68-9.
35. Bartold, V. V., article "Abul-Khair" in *Encyclopedia of Islam*.
36. Bartold, V., articles "Kazakhs", and "Kirghiz" in the *Encyclopedia of Islam*.
37. Bartold, V., *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1956), vol. I, p. 63, vol. II, pp. 108-9, 153-4.
38. Bartold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia*, p. 66; and Feoletov, N., "Bukharskoe i Khivinskoe Khanstva i otnosheniia ikh s Rossiei", *Istoricheskii zhurnal* (3) 1941, p. 69.
39. Feoletov, N., "Bukharskoe i Khivinskoe Khanstva", *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, p. 69.
40. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, (Tashkand 1956) pp. 45-6, 50-2; Wheeler, G., *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, p. 44-5, 242-4; also vide Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, p. 47.
41. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 43-54.
42. Bukhara under the "Mangit" dynasty, Kokand under the "Ming" dynasty, and Khiva under the "Inaq's".
43. Bartold, *Four Studies*, v. I, p. 66.
44. Bartold, *Four Studies*, vol. I, p.67.
45. De Maizon, P. I., *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, pp. 58-59, 73-84; and Braginskii; Razhabov; Romodin, "K voprosu o znachenii prisoedineniia srednei Azii k Rossii", *Voprosy istorii*, pp. 23-4.

46. *Quarterly Review*, "The military power of Russia in Central Asia", vol. CXLIII, (1877), p. 554.
47. *The Central Asian Question from an Eastern Stand-Point*, (no author) (London, Edinburgh 1869), p. 14.
48. Foreign Office Confidential Print No. 799, February 8, 1855, Consul Abbott to Clarendon.
49. FOCP 3785, No. 128, Analysis by Lord Tenterden of the Papers Presented to Parliament respecting Central Asia, Nov. 30, 1878. Charles Stuart Tenterden was (permanent) under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
50. FOCP No. 799, February 8, 1855, Consul Abbott to Clarendon.
51. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg 1906) v. I, pp. 203-4.
52. Zhukovskii, S. V., in his book *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi* wrote, "Besides the Khivans our Kirghiz began to fall into the hands of the Kokandis, then the Russian authorities knew the necessary steps to protect the Kirghiz from the new effect. In this regard Obruchev [Governor-General of Orenburg] sent a notice to the Government suggesting the conquest of Khiva with the annexation of Ak Masjid. This proposal was not approved either by the higher authorities, or by Perovskii, who replaced Obruchev", (p. 142). Obruchev's ideas, although they seemed inconsistent with the strategy of Russian Government for the reduction of Khiva, proved later, especially after 1839, to be accurate.
53. FOCP 2150, No. 42, August 20, 1856, Abbot to Foreign Office.
54. L/P&S/3/69 No. 29, Russell to Secretary of State for Indian Council, April 29, 1864.
55. L/P&S/3/69 No. 29, Russell to Secretary of State for Indian Council, April 29, 1864.
56. Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev (1832-1908) was one of the most distinguished Russian diplomats. He served in London as a military attaché in 1857. He was sent to China to negotiate and sign the Sino-Russian treaty of 1860, winning the province of Ussuri for his country. Later from 1861 to 1864 he was the Director of the Asiatic Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before retirement he represented Russia at the Ottoman Court for thirty years. His mission to Khiva and Bukhara was a complete success. Vide his mission in chapter two.
57. He was an officer in the Russian army and a renowned orientalist.
58. A distinguished Russian orientalist, he had earlier served as the Russian Consul-General in Tabreez in northern Persia.
59. Khalfin, N. I., *Tri Russkie missii*, (Tashkand 1956) pp. 43-45.

60. Mohammad Yakub Bek, was born in 1820, to a family of a judge at Piskent, a village in Kokand to the south of Tashkand. He entered the military service of the Khanate of Kokand at an early age. In 1853 he commanded the garrison of Ak Masjid against General Perovskii's assault. With a small company of devout loyals, he impeded a large Russian force, armed with every kind of modern weaponry, from taking Ak Masjid for nearly a month. His energy and dynamism crowned him as the prince of Kashgar in 1866. Later in 1873, the Sultan rewarded him by the title of Amir. Boulger, in his *Central Asian Portraits*, (London 1880, reprinted in Netherlands 1978) wrote, "As administrator, soldier, and prince, Yakoob Beg has left a name that will, at all events, provide our descendants at some remote period with a subject for historical surmise as to what might have been if the fates had been less untoward. He possessed, so far as can be judged, the same qualities that made Genghis, Timour, and Nadir the conquerors of Asia; but he lived in a changed world. He was a great man, born several centuries too late".

61. Schuyler, *Turkestan...*, vol. I, p. 353.

62. Bartold, V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 394-399; Lobanov-Rostovskii, A., *Russia and Asia*, pp. 184-5; Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 317-9.

63. *The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, 1862-1879*, (1894), vol. II, p. 46-47; and Wallace, D. Mackenzie, "The Territorial Expansion of Russia" *Fortnightly Review*, vol. XXVI (1876), p. 146.

64. *Blackwood's Magazine*, "The War in Asia", vol. LXXXI, (Feb. 1857) p. 138.

65. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, (1899), p. 307.

66. FOCP 3785, No. 128, Analysis by Lord Tenterden of the Papers Presented to Parliament respecting Central Asia, Nov. 30, 1878.

67. *The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus*, vol. II, p. 46.

68. This idiom was used for the first time to describe the British policy, in the decade that followed the Crimean War, by Wyllie, John William in his article "Masterly Inactivity", *Fortnightly Review*, vol. VI (1869). Wyllie was an ardent admirer of the policy of Sir (later Lord) John Lawrence, who observed the potential threat in Russia's advance in Central Asia and urged the home ministry to correct the situation before it was too late, (see F.O. 65/867, No. 3, January 4, 1860, Rawlinson to Wood). Wyllie has written a number of articles in the *Edinburgh Review* "Foreign Policy of Sir John Lawrence", and letters on the same to the Daily News and the Times. His articles on Central Asia and India are edited by Hunter, W.W., *Essays on the External Policy of India*, (London 1875).

69. "The progress and policy of Russia in Central Asia", *Blackwoods Magazine*, vol. LXXV, May 1854, p. 612.

70. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 307.

71. Feoletov, N.; "Bukharskoe i Khivinskoe Khanstva i ikh otnosheniia s Rossii" (Bukharan and Khivan Khanates and their Relations with Russia), *Istoricheskii zhurnal*, (1941) No. 3, p. 74.

Chapter Two

Footnotes

1. Popov, A. L., "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", *Istoricheskie zapiski*, (1940) vol. 9, p. 201.
2. Holdsworth, M., *Turkestan in the nineteenth century*, (Oxford 1959), p. 2-3.
3. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, (Tashkand 1947) pp.162-3.
4. Zhukovskii, S.V., *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi za poslednee trekhsotletie*, p. 107.
5. *Blackwoods*, "The War in Asia", vol. LXXXI (Feb. 1857) p. 141.
6. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 280-286.
7. Popov, A. L., "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 201.
8. The previous was Balta Quly Bek, who visited Orenburg in 1830.
9. Zhukovskii, S. V., *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi za poslednye trekhsotletie*, (Petrograd 1915), p. 109.
10. General Cherniaev, M. G. was an advocate of the extension of the Siberian line across the Ili river before the outbreak of the Crimean War, and later became known as the conqueror of Tashkand after its fall in 1865.
11. Cherniaev (General), *Russkii mir*, Feb. 14, 1875. Quoted in Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 331.
12. Perovskii was Governor-General of Orenburg twice: from 1833 to 1842, and from 1851 until 1857.
13. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi*, p. 111; also see Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, (1876), v. I, p. 201.
14. Rawlinson, H., *England and Russia in the East*, (1875), pp. 170-2; also Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 157.
15. I have listed the original names putting the Russian naming after the conquest in brackets.
16. Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, pp. 166-8.
17. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii...*, p. 158-9.
18. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 290-1; and *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, v. I, pt. 2, p. 52.
19. Charykov, N. V., *Glimpses of High Politics through War and Peace 1855-1929*, p. 159.

20. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, (1906), vol. I, pp. 212-218.
21. Towards the realization of this plan, Russia occupied the following Kokandian cities: Tokmak, Peshpek, Aulie-Ata, Chemkent, Turkestan, Dzhulek, and others. Popov, "Iz Istorii...", p. 200.
22. FOCP 2350, War Office Report on Russian advances in Asia, 1873; and Michell, J., in his introduction to Valikhanov's *The Russians in Central Asia*, (London 1865), p. VI.
23. FOCP 2350, War Office Report on Russian advances in Asia, 1873.
24. Vambery, *Travels in Central Asia*, (1864), p. 431.
25. See map "Central Asia before the Russian advance" for size and location of territories disputed between Bukhara and Kokand.
26. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 84-88, 134-136; Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, p. 85.
27. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", (1865) vol. 118, p. 546.
28. Khalfin, N., *Politika Rossii v srednei Azii*, p. 217.
29. Bartol'd, *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 291.
30. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, p. 160.
31. Babakhanov, M. G., Nepomnin, V. Ia., Kary-Niazov, T.N. (eds.), *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 11; and Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, p. 154.
32. Rozhkova, M. K., "Iz Istории Torgovli Rossii so Srednei Aziei v 60-kh godakh XIX v.", *Istoricheskie zapiski*, (1960) vol. LXVII, p. 193; FOCP 2350, War Office Report on Russian advances in Asia, 1873; also Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, vol. I, p. 155.
33. Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, (1876), v. I, p. 145.
34. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, v. I, pp. 134-5.
35. Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 203.
36. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, (St. Petersburg 1906), vol. I, pp. 486-7; Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, pp. 96-99.
37. Terentiev, *Russia and England*, v. I, pp. 107-8.
38. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, p. 109.
39. Bartold, *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 290.
40. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 49-51.
41. Terentiev; *Russia and England in Central Asia*, vol. I, p. 19.

42. FOCP 799, Consul Abbott to the Earl of Clarendon, Despatch Feb. 8, 1855.
43. *Blackwoods*, "The Progress and Policy of Russia in Central Asia", vol. LXXV, (May 1854), p. 611.
44. *The Central Asian Question*, pp. 17, 20.
45. Sarauw, C. F., "Russia's Commercial Mission in Central Asia", *Simla*, 1872, p. 303.
46. Popov, A. L., "Iz Istoriiia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii", *Istoricheskie zapiski*, vol. IX (1940), p. 198.
47. *Blackwoods*, "The Progress and policy of Russia in Central Asia", vol. LXXV, (May 1854) pp. 620-1.
48. The Kirghiz were divided under the authority of Khiva, Kokand, and Russia. The nomadic type of life they lived rendered it hard to determine their loyalty, though some of them were considered nominally Russian subjects.
49. Vucinich, W. S. (ed.), *Russia in Central Asia*, pp. 251-261.
50. *Istoriiia narodov Uzbekistana*, p. 163.
51. Vilayet (Wilayah) is an administrative division similar to a county or a province.
52. Holdsworth, Mary, *Turkestan in the nineteenth century*, p. 2.
53. See Nikiforov's and Danilevskii's missions in this chapter.
54. Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, vol. I, p. 158; also Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 416.
55. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, pp. 159-60.
56. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, p. 133.
57. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, v. I, p. 133.
58. Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. I, p. 209-10.
59. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi*, p. 129.
60. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii*, p. 141.
61. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 142.
62. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 145.
63. Bartol'd, V. V., *Istoriiia izucheniia vostoka v Evrope i Rossii*, 2nd edition, (Leningrad 1925), pp. 554-6; *Istoriiia narodov Uzbekistana*, v. II, p. 15-17.

64. Konstantin Konstantinovich Rodofinikin (1760-1838) the first Director of the Asian Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1819-1833). In 1833 he became a member of the Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
65. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, p. 5.
66. Ibid, p. 5.
67. Vitkevich was involved in political circles during his years in the Gymnasium; in 1823, he organized a group called "Black Brothers" in Poland.
68. Letter of Graf Chernyshev, V. A., the War Minister, to Perovskii, No. 1166, Secret, paper No. 4, quoted in Chabrov, G. N., "Poezdka v Bukharu Perevodchika P. I. De Maizona (1833-1834 gg.), SAGU (Sredneaziatskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet), vyp. XCIV, 1957, p. 111.
69. See appendix I for the full text of De Maizon's instructions, and especially points 1, 2, 10, and 14.
70. See appendix I.
71. Zhukovskii, C. V., *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi*, p. 108.
72. *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve*, p. 84. Despite the fact that Vitkevich mentioned that his mission was to the steppe, in Pervskii's letter to Rodofinikin he stated that Vitkevich was dispatched to Bukhara, and in the same letter he recommended him for reward for his bold efforts. *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve*, p. 12.
73. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, p. 13.
74. Full text of the letter of recommendation addressed to Rodofinikin in *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, p. 12.
75. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, pp. 12-14.
76. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. I, p. 109.
77. *Zapiski o Bukharskom khanstve*, p. 84-5. Sir Henry Rawlinson doubted the whole story, on the grounds that it is unbelievable that a snow storm could drive a Cossack officer as far as 800 miles across the steppe. Rawlinson, H., *England and Russia in the East*, (London 1875), p. 148.
78. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, p. 14.
79. Schuyler, E., *Turkestan*, v. II, p. 378; Krausse, A., *Russia in Asia, a Record and a Study 1558-1899*, (London 1899), p. 145.
80. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi...*, p. 108-9.
81. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, pp. 86-99.

82. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, p. 14.
83. The Russian Government was quick to attribute his death to a "British hand", saying that no one would be interested in his liquidation other than England to whom he caused a lot of trouble in Kabul. Terentiev, *Istoriia srednei Azii*, vol. I, p. 109-110.
84. Thornton, A.P.; "The reopening of 'Central Asian Question', 1864-9" *History*, (41) 1956, pp. 122-23.
85. McNeil to Palmerston, April 11, 1838; quoted in Ferrier, *Caravan Journey and wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan, and Beloochistan...*, (London 1856), p. 507.
86. *Blackwoods*, "The War in Asia", v. LXXXI (Feb. 1857), p. 139.
87. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. I, p. 109-110.
88. FOCP 2150, No. 42, despatch, Abbott, August 20, 1856.
89. *Blackwoods*, "The War in Asia", v. LXXXI (Feb. 1857), p. 139.
90. *Blackwoods*, "The War in Asia", v. LXXXI (Feb. 1857), p. 139.
91. Sarauw, "Russia's Commercial Mission in Central Asia", *Simla*, p. 303.
92. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russian advances in Central Asia", vol. CXXXVI (1874) p. 433.
93. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 114-15
94. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 62-3.
95. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 330.
96. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 116-17.
97. Gillard, D., *The Struggle for Asia*, p. 55.
98. FO 60/237, No. 28, May 5, 1859, Stanley to Doria.
99. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", (1865) vol. 118, No 2, p. 537-8; and Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 114.
100. Zhukovskii; *Snosheniia...*, p. 116 ff.
101. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 54-59.
102. In *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR* the number of prisoners was 424, see p. 58.
103. Valikhanov, M. V., *The Russians in Central Asia*, (London 1865), pp. 549-551; and *The Quarterly Review*, "The Russian advances in Central Asia", vol. CXXXVI (1874) p. 423.

104. Terentiev, M. A., *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. I, pp. 174-5; and Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi...*, p. 120-21.
105. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. I, p. 174.
106. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 176.
107. Arthur Conolly was a supporter of the policy of containing Russia in the steppe and eliminating all reasons that might furnish her with appropriate reason for aggression against Khiva. Slave trade besides the security of Russian trade were strong excuses for Russia's advance. Conolly's mission was mainly to put an end to ignoble trade motivated by human and political incentives. He was an advocate of opening Syr Daria and Amu Daria for steam navigation, which would lead to prosperity of legal trade and cutback illegal. Nonetheless the dramatic retreat of the British army in 1842 which led to the shocking execution of both English officials, Stoddart and Conolly in Bukhara, had seriously influenced the thought of contemporary British politicians and enhanced the treacherous assumption that Russia's advance was not entirely evil. See Khan, A., *England, Russia and...*, pp. 91-93.
108. Vambery, *Travels in Central Asia*, (London 1864), p. 433.
109. Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, vol. I, pp. 16-23.
110. *Quarterly Review*, "Russian advances in Central Asia", vol. CXXXVI (1874) pp. 420-1.
111. Nikiforov's personality was far from being stable. Terentiev described him as frustrated and discontented. After a year as a candidate in the Military Academy he was dismissed and exiled to serve in the Orenburg line. He served in battalion No. 2 from 1833 to 1835, when Perovskii transferred him to the Head Quarter of the General Staff. His misfortune deeply affected his nature and made him a bilious and uncontrollable alcoholic. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 179.
112. Terentiev and Zhukovskii mentioned that Nikiforov began his journey on May 3rd but Kostenko mentioned May 30th in his *Sredniaia Aziia i vodvorenii v nei Russkoi grazhdanstvennosti*, (St. Petersburg 1870), p. 127.
113. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, vol. I, p. 176.
114. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. I, p. 177-8; Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi...*, p. 123-24.
115. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. I, pp. 178-9.
116. Zalesov, "Pokhod v Khivu Kapitana Nikiforova v 1841g", *Voennyi sbornik*, (1861), p. 52; Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. I, p. 178.
117. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 179-180; Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 128.
118. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 189.
119. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii...*, p. 135.

120. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, pp. 189-90.
121. *Quarterly Review*, "Russian Advances in Central Asia", vol. CXXXVI (1874) p. 402.
122. Zhukovskii, S.V.; *Snosheniia Rossii...*, p. 111.
123. Popov, A.L.; "Iz istorii zavoevaniia Srednei Azii," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, IX (1940), p. 204; and Khalfin, N.A.; *Tri russkie missii*, (Tashkent, 1956), pp. 115-6. Khanykov was authorized to solicit the Afghans to join in a federation with the Central Asian Khanates to resist the British plans. This odd political step was taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a tactical manoeuvre designed for dissolving the Anglo-Afghan alliance. Russia was confident that the offer would be rejected due to worsening Bukhara-Afghan relations. Russia hoped by this offer to implant in the mind of the Afghan Amir the image of friendly Russia, attract his sympathy and to intimate to him that she was decisively opposing England.
124. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii...*, p. 131-2.
125. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. I, p. 197.
126. Yet one may assume that the Amir deliberately had chosen that day out of desire to host the Russian envoy in unceremonious fashion and to discuss a wider range of issues.
127. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, pp. 129-30.
128. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. I, p.196-7.
129. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 197.
130. Rawlinson, *England and Russia...*, pp. 152-3.
131. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, v. I, p. 197.
132. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, v. I, p. 197.
133. Rawlinson, *England and Russia...*, pp. 157-8.
134. He was instructed to negotiate the release of Persian prisoners in accordance with the amicable relations that prevailed between Russia and Persia in that period, and because diplomatic relations between governments of Persia and Khiva, despite geographical proximity and common regional interests, did not exist.
135. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", (1865) vol. 118, No. 2, pp. 536-8; and Zhukovskii, p. 136-7.
136. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, pp. 190-191; Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 136. The same instructions had been given to Nikiforov, see his mission above.
137. The *zakah* in Islam is an obligation collected from the rich for the benefit of the needy, its amount does not exceed 2.5% annually.
138. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, pp. 194-5; Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 137-8.

139. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", (1865) vol. 118, No. 2, p. 546.
140. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 194; Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii...*, p. 140.
141. Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, p. 159.
142. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 140.
143. Popov, "Iz Istorii...", p. 202.
144. Popov, "Iz Istorii...", p. 203.
145. Popov, tells us that the mission arrived at Khiva in July 19th, while Zhukovskii prefers the 16th.
146. Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (TseGVIA), (The State Military-Historical Central Archive), quoted in Khalfin's *Politika Rossii v srednei Azii*, Moscow 1960, p. 85.
147. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, pp. 241-2. Russian authorities strived in 1859 to find a colony on the east shore of the Caspian, and the neighbourhood of Krasnovodsk Bay was chosen, but they discovered that such advanced colony was isolated and insecure because it was vulnerable to hostile and marauding tribes. The project was given up until the year 1869, when the Caucasus army crossed the Caspian to take part in the Central Asian affairs. Before 1869 Russia had scattered insignificant forts the largest of which was Novo-Alexandrovskoe on Kaidak gulf. This fort, due to unsuitable climate of the area was transferred to Mangishlak peninsula and renamed Novo-Petrovsk and from 1857 it became known as fort Alexandrovsk. Vide Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, vol. I, 92. The appearance of supporting points on the eastern coast of the Caspian played highly important role in the advance against Khiva and later against the Turkomans. Tikhomirov, M. N., *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, p. 9.
148. Russia seriously studied the issue of shifting the Amu Daria to the Caspian Sea. Colonel Glukhovskii, who was entrusted to study the situation in the region after the fall of Khiva, suggested in 1874 "sending as much water as possible into the old bed of the Amu Daria" to furnish Russia with a convenient water way in her rivalry with Britain. FOCP 2606, Abstract of the Report of Colonel Glukhovskii to the Head of the Staff, dated June 14, 1874, sent home in Loftus' No. 105, March 31, 1875; also vide Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, pp. 241-2.
149. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 146-7.
150. Popov, "Iz istorii...", p. 203.
151. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, pp. 242-3.
152. Popov, A. L., "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 203.
153. FO 65/867, No. 259, Lord Napier, June 4, 1862.

154. He meant the annual exhibition in Novgorod, which the Tsarist Government once considered a national pride, and invited to it the diplomatic corps from Petersburg (later Petrograd) and Moscow.
155. Zalesov, "Posolstvo v Khivu i Bukharu polkovnika Ignatieva v 1858 g., *Russkii vestnik*, 1871, vol. 91, p. 421 ff. Quoted in Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii...*, p. 147-8.
156. FO 65/867, Wodehouse to Clarendon, March 25, 1858.
157. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi...*, p. 148.
158. The Iltuzer dynasty was established at the turn of the nineteenth century by Iltuzer Inak Khan. He ruled only for two years (1804-1806).
159. See Perovskii's military expedition above.
160. Popov, A. L., "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 203.
161. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi...*, p. 152
162. Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 203.
163. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 154.
164. Zhukovskii, *Snosheniia...*, p. 154.
165. Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, pp. 143-149.
166. *Blackwoods*, "European politics", vol. LXXXI (Jan. 1857), p. 125.
167. L/P&S/18/c.4 memoranda on Central Asian Question, 20 July, 1868.
168. *Blackwoods*, "The war in Asia", vol. LXXXI (Feb. 1857) p. 137.
169. Boulger, *Central Asian Question*, (London 1880), p. 126.
170. *Blackwoods*, "European politics", vol. LXXXI (Jan. 1857), p. 125.
171. L/P&S/18/c.4, Memoranda on Central Asian Question, July 20, 1868.
172. Masal'skii, V. I. quoted in *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, (Tashkent 1956) vol. I, pt. 2, p. 86.
173. Gagarin, M. D. (Prince) to Alexander II, quoted in Voznesenskii's *Razlozhenie*, p. 228.
174. Great bulk of serfs did not understand what these reforms meant for, thus they were unhappy with the government's project to sell them land collectively. They deemed the whole affair as designed to dispossess them. Also the landlords laboured to maximize their profits and minimize their loss were successful in interpreting the Imperial decree in their own favour. For further discussion of this subject vide Mazour, A., *Russia Tsarist and Communist*, pp. 256-8; and Dvornik, F., *The Slavs...*, pp. 549-551.
175. Kornilov, A. A., *Modern Russian History*, vol. II, p. 3-5.

176. Curzon, G., *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 315-316.

177. FOCP 2421, No. 59, Loftus to Granville, March 19, 1873.

Chapter Three

Footnotes

1. Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*, (1879), v. II, p. 338.
2. Krausse, A., *Russia in Asia, a record and a study 1858-1899*, (1899), p. 218.
3. Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*, (London 1879) v. II, p. 340.
4. This treaty gave Russia the upper hand over Karabakh, Georgia, Elizabeth Paul, Shirwan, Derbend, Shurgil, and Mingrelia. In short it gave Russia possession of all the territories between the Caspian and the Caucasus.
5. Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, (1875), pp. 137-8.
6. See De Maizon's and Vitkevich's reports following their missions to Bukhara in *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve* and chapter II of this work.
7. In the 1830s threat to India was minimal as a result of Russia's campaign against Turkey, where she was victorious though one hundred thousand men had died of disease. She had been seriously weakened and could not entertain embarking a gigantic enterprise against India. FO 65/185, No. 9, Heytesbury to Aberdeen, January 18, 1830.
8. Ellenborough, *Political Dairy*, 1828-30, 25 September, 10 October 1828; quoted in Crawley, "Anglo-Russian Relation 1815-1840", *The Cambridge Historical Journal*, (1929) vol. III, No. 1, p. 49-50.
9. FO 65/867, No. 3, Rawlinson, inclosure, January 1860; also FO 65/871, No.215, Buchanan, translation by J. Mitchell of an article in the *Invalid Russe*, (dated October 28, 1869), Nov. 1, 1869.
10. L/P&S/3/75, No. 68, Clarendon to Duke of Argyll, June 9, 1869; also Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, pp. 197-198.
11. FO 65/178, No. 33, Aberdeen to Heytesbury, Dec. 23, 1829; Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, pp. 141, 160-8, 340-1.
12. Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, p. 141.
13. Vambery, *Sketches of Central Asia*, (1868), p. 379-80; and *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian frontier question*, (1874), p. 2-7.
14. Vambery, A., *Sketches of Central Asia*, (London 1868) p. 379.
15. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", July & October 1865, vol. 118, p. 532.
16. Vambery, *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question*, (London 1874) p. 4.
17. *Quarterly Review*, July & October 1865, vol. 118, p. 529.

18. Popov, "Borba za sredneaziatskii platsdarm", *Istoricheskie zapiski akademii nauk SSSR*, No. 7 (1940), p. 182.
19. L/P&S/3/65, F.O. No. 90, Crampton to Russell, April 29, 1860.
20. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, v. II, p. 215-216.
21. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, pp. 77-82.
22. L/P&S/3/75, F.O. No. 39, Clarendon to Secretary of India, August 18, 1869.
23. Gillard, *The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914*, p. 2.
24. Heads of the Asian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Rodofinikin, K. K., 1819-33; Kovalevskii, Ye. P., 1856-61; Ignatiev, N. P., 1861-64; Stremoukhov, P. N., 1864-; Giers, N. K., 1875-78; Zinoviev, I. A., 1883-91; Kapnist, D., 1894-98.
25. Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*, v. II, p. 340.
26. FOCP 2223, inclosure in No. 3, Extracts from *Moscow Gazette*, Buchanan to Clarendon, February 20, 1869; also in L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Clarendon, February 20, 1869.
27. L/P&S/3/75, No. 137, June 30, 1868, Buchanan Stanley; L/P&S/3/75 No. 54, May 26, 1869, Clarendon to Argyll; FOCP 2223, No. 5 and 6, Buchanan to Clarendon, February 20, 1869; FOCP 2421, No. 69 Loftus to Granville; and FOCP 4930 memorandum, February 25, 1884
28. L/P&S/3/75, No. 134, Buchanan to Stanley, June 30, 1868.
29. FOCP 2223, No. 5, February 20, 1869, Buchanan to Clarendon; L/P&S/3/75, No. 16, Buchanan to Argyll, March 2, 1869; L/P&S/3/75, No. 54, Clarendon to Argyll, May 26, 1869.
30. Popov, A. L., "Iz istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii", *Istoricheskie zapiski*, (1940) vol. 9, p. 202-3,
31. Miliutin was the strongest supporter of the "forward policy" in Central Asia. He frequently criticized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which relatively preferred more careful approach, as "highly worried about friendship with England". *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, p. 229.
32. MID, gl. arkhiv, 1-9, sheets 78-84, quoted in Popov, A. L., "Iz Istorii Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii", *Istoricheskie zapiski*, (1940) vol. 9, p. 211.
33. FOCP 2421, extract from the *Golos* in No. 56, Loftus to Granville, March 15, 1873.
34. Lobanov-Rostovskii, A., "The shadow of India in Russian history", *History*, vol. XIV, April 1929, and January 1930, p. 217-8.
35. Valikhanov, *The Russians in Central Asia*, (1865), pp. 396 ff; and *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. 2, pp. 227-331.

36. L/P&S/3/65/, No. 664, Russell to Crampton, March 30, 1860.
37. FO 65/868, No. 383, December 6, 1865, Buchanan to Clarendon.
38. FO 65/868, No. 383, December 6, 1865, Buchanan to Clarendon.
39. FOCP 3785, No. 128, analysis by Lord Tenterden of papers presented to Parliament respecting Central Asia, Nov. 30, 1878.
40. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", v. 118, July-October 1865, p. 533.
41. FOCP 3785, No. 128, analysis by Lord Tenderden, Nov. 30, 1878; and *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. LXXV, appendix in Central Asia 2. For full text of the circular vide appendix II in this work.
42. FOCP 3785, No 128, analysis by Tenderden, Nov. 30, 1878; *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. LXXV, appendix in Central Asia 2.
43. Vambery, A., *Sketches of Central Asia*, (London 1868), p. 379; also Vambery, *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian...*, pp. 1-3.
44. FOCP 3785, No. 128, analysis by Tenderden, Nov. 30, 1878; and *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. 79, p. 682 ff; also vide appendix II.
45. FO 65/876, No. 3, Rawlinson to Wood, January 3, 1860.
46. FO 65/549, No. 66, Russell to Crampton, March 31, 1860.
47. FO 65/867, No. 46, Lumley to Russell, September 13, 1864.
48. FO 65/867, No. 46, Lumley to Russell, September 13, 1864; also L/P&S/3/69, No.29, Russell to Secretary of State for India in council, September 6, 1864.
49. *Times*, December 6, 1864, p. 12, c. 1.
50. Popov, A. L., "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", *Istoricheskie zapiski*, (1940) vol. 9, p. 199.
51. Some Russian historians admitted that Russia's policy tinted with pacifying character, and in such events it heavily relied on explanatory methods and elaborated on the incentives of Russia's move. Frequently the excuse was the inappropriate trend between a civilized Government and nomadic tribes. Usually Russia's dispatches ascertained that such an action would be ceased by reaching natural frontiers with settled nations. Levteeva, L. G., *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii k Rossii v memuarnykh istochnikakh*, p. 12.
52. FOCP 3785, No. 128, analysis by Tenderden, November 30, 1878.
53. FO 65/867, No. 2, Russell to Buchanan, January 10, 1865.
54. FO 65/867, No. 24, Buchanan to Russell, January 18, 1865.
55. FO 65/867, No. 25, Buchanan to Russell, January 18, 1865.

56. FO 65/867, No. 18, Russell to Buchanan, January 28, 1865.
57. Khalfin, N. A., *Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii (1857-1868)*, (Moscow 1960) pp. 177-9.
58. *Quarterly Review*, (1874) vol. 136, p. 409.
59. *Quarterly Review*, (1874) vol. 136, p. 410.
60. *Quarterly Review*, (1865) vol. 118, p. 547.
61. FOCP 3785, analysis by Lord Tenderden of the papers presented to the Parliament respecting Central Asia 1838-1878; also *Parliamentary Papers*, 79, p. 682 ff.
62. Loftus, *Diplomatic*, p. 17.
63. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, p. 89 ff.; also *Quarterly Review*, (1874) vol. 136, p. 411.
64. *Quarterly Review*, (1874) vol. 136, p. 413.
65. Levteeva, L. G., *Prisoedinenie...*, p. 12-16.
66. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, (1947) p. 229; Feoletova, *Prisoedineniia...*, pp. 11-16.
67. Popov, "Iz istoriia...", p. 212.
68. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, I, pp. 112-113.
69. Serebrennikov, *Turkestanskii krai*, v. 19, pt. I, pp. 152-55, Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, May 11, 1865, in Khalfin, *Politika Rossii*, p. 199.
70. Fo 65/ 867, No. 48, Lumley to India Office, Sept. 13, 1864; L/P&S/18/c.4, memorandum on Central Asian Question, July 20, 1868.
71. See appendix II.
72. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii v srednei Azii*, pp. 94-96, and 121 ff.
73. Tsentralnyi-Gosudarstvennyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv (TsGVIA), File No. 400, case 50, sheet 10, Cherniaev to Chief of the Staff, October 4, 1866; in Khalfin, *Politika Rossii...*, p. 192; and Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii...*, p. 205.
74. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. I, (1876), p. 113.
75. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, I, 113-114.
76. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 68.

77. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii...*, p. 193. This communication should once more refute Russia's allegation that the advance in Central Asia was mostly initiated by field officers. Popov mentioned that Cherniaev after having been assured of the strong resistance the city was capable of, asked St. Petersburg to allow him extra time for further preparations. Popov, "Iz istoriia...", p. 213.
78. Levteeva, L. G., *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii k Rossii*, p. 12 and 97 (note).
79. *Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv* (TsGVIA) 400, case 34, pp. 165-172, quoted in Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii k Rossii*, pp. 171 ff; and L/P&S/3/69, No. 29, Russell to Secretary of State for India in council, April 29, 1864.
80. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii...*, p. 195.
81. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii...*, p. 194.
82. Governor-General of Orenburg 1865-1881.
83. Serebrennikov, *Turkestanskii krai...*, v. 19, pt. I, pp. 81-85; quoted in Khalfin, *Politika Rossii*, p. 195.
84. Serebrennikov, *Turkestanskii krai, sbornik materialov*, (1912-1916), v. 19, pt. I, 192-6, Gorchakov to Kryzhanovskii, June 6, 1865, in Khalfin, *Politika Rossii*, p. 200.
85. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, p. 233.
86. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, p. 234.
87. Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, p. 176. Tashkand was the centre of economic life a cross-point for trade routes from different countries. St. Petersburg even considered the issue of annexing the whole of the Khanate of Kokand to the Oblast of Turkestan which has been formed on February 12, 1865.
88. FO 65/868, No. 54, Lumley to Russell, Aug. 15, 1865.
89. FO 65/868 No. 38, Lumley to Russell, August 2, 1865.
90. FOCP 2223, No. 5, Buchanan to Clarendon, February 20, 1869.
91. FO 65/868 No. 38, Lumley to Russell, August 2, 1865.
92. FO 65/868, No. 338, Buchanan to Clarendon, Nov. 7, 1865.
93. FO 65/867, No. 127, despatch, December 6, 1864.
94. FO 65/869 No. 24, Alison to Stanley, Feb. 12, 1868.
95. FO 65/869 No. 24, Alison to Stanley, Feb. 12, 1868.
96. *Times*, Dec. 27, 1864, p. 5, c. 5.
97. *Times*, June 17, 1865, p. 12, c. 6.

98. FO 65/868 No. 368, Buchanan to Clarendon, Dec. 3, 1865; and FO 65/868, No. 388, same to same, Dec. 10, 1865.
99. Kryzhanovskii was not a partisan of peace in Central Asia, but he coveted himself for glory and high order. Vide Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii...*, p. 220.
100. Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 214.
101. Serebriannikov, A. G., *Turkestanskii krai*, v. 21, pt. 1, p. 20, Miliutin's note regarding Russia's policy, Nov. 14, 1866, quoted in Levteeva, *Prisoecinenie srednei Azii k Rossii v memuarnykh istochnikakh*, pp. 14-16, 89-93.
102. FO 65/868, No. 111, Buchanan to Clarendon, March 14, 1866; Terntiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, v. I, pp. 329-330; and Rawlinson, *England*, p. 266.
103. MID, Gl. Arkh. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Main Archive), I-9, 1865-1867, No. 11, sheets 56-57, Pashino to Strimoukhov, February 24, 1866, quoted in Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 214.
104. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, I, 335; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, I, 117.
105. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. I, pp. 336-337.
106. Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, p. 266.
107. Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 215.
108. Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 215.
109. Terntiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. I, p. 363; and Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 215.
110. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. I, p. 363.
111. Khalfin, *Politika Rossii v srednei Azii*, p. 224; and Popov, "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii", p. 215.
112. FO 65/867, No. 277, translation by Mitchell, July 31, 1861; and Gregoriev's letter to the Moscow Gazette, quoted in L/P&S/18/c.4 memorandum on Central Asian Question, July 20, 1868; and Wheeler, G., *The Modern History...*, p. 66.
113. Pierce, R., *Russian Central Asia*, p. 46-8, 314; and Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii*, p. 225.
114. Schuyler, E., *Turkestan*, v. II, p. 204; Pierce, R., *Russian Central Asia*, p. 47.
115. *Tsentralnyi gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv Uzbekskoi SSR*, fond KTGG, No. 409, sheets 10-11 quoted in Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii...*, p. 225-6; Lobanov-Rostovsky, A., *Russia in Asia*, p. 156; and Gafurov, *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo naroda*, v. I, p. 304.
116. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 96-97.

117. *Istoria narodov Uzbekistana*, v. II, p. 235.
118. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, v. I, pp. 383-4; and Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie...*, p. 218.
119. MID gl. arkh., I-9, 1865-1867, No. 16, sheets 13-18, quoted in Popov, "Iz istorii...", p. 216.
120. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, I, 383-4.
121. MID Gl. Arkh., I-9, 1867, sheets 13-18, in Popov, "Iz istorii...", p. 218.
122. Russian claims that it was not possible to control the actions of Russian Generals in Central Asia, due to its remoteness and the difficulty of communicating with them, are not convincing. As already explained, the Generals were given general guidelines by the central Government, of which the most important was to adhere to "Russia's interest". This principle governed their behaviours and secured for them almost unlimited authority. Kaufmann was of course no exception: he was given the authority to take final decisions in matters concerning politics, boundaries, commerce, the despatch of envoys to the courts of the Khanates, and the conclusion of treaties with them, which he was authorized to sign himself, as of course he did. *Gramota visochaishikh polnomochii* (Certificate of the Highest Authorization), quoted in Khalfin, *Politika*, 226.
123. Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, v. I, pp. 41-42.
124. Terentiev, *Russia and England*, v. I, p. 42-3.
125. Kaufmann, quoted in Terentiev, *Russia*, v. I, pp. 43-4.
126. Vide Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. I, pp. 240-1.
127. L/P&S/75, No. 54, Clarendon to Argyll, May 26, 1869.
128. L/P&S/3/75, No. 68, Clarendon to Argyll, June 7, 1869.
129. L/P&S/3/75, No. 68, Clarendon to Argyll, June 7, 1869.
130. Khan, M. A., *England, Russia...*, pp. 54-6.
131. FO L/P&S/18/c.4, memorandum, July 20, 1868; and Boulger, *England and Russia*, v. I, p. 178. Alliance with Afghanistan was beyond reach because of disputes around Balkh, Khulm, and Kunduz.
132. Terentiev, *Russia and England*, v. I, p. 50.
133. FO 65/869 No. 972, June 3, 1868; Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. I, p. 241; Terentiev, *Russia and England*, v. I, pp. 47-50.
134. Terentiev, *Russia and England in Central Asia*, v. I, p. 45; Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. I, 243-4, and vol. II, 302-3.
135. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. II, pp. 302-3; and Terentiev, *Russia*, v. I, p. 46.

136. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. I, 244.

137. In Bukhara the Mullahs or the clergymen were not only priests in the Mosques, but were professors in the seminaries and schools as well spiritual leaders of the nation, a job which rendered them more powerful as the only powerful category among the population capable of challenging the Amir's authority. Before recently imposed taxes they were exempted.

138. The public began to recall his retreat in front of the Russians in the battle of Irjar in May 1866.

139. Boulger, *England and Russia*, v. I, p. 179.

140. Boulger, *England and Russia*, v. I, p. 180; Terentiev, *Russia and England*, v. I, p. 53; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, 304.

141. Boulger, *England and Russia*, v. I, pp. 179-181; Terentiev, *Istoriia*, v. I, pp. 406-7; and Terentiev, *Russia and England*, v. I, p. 54.

142. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. I, p. 241.

143. FO 65/869 No. 972, June 3, 1868; Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, v. I, pp. 402-3, 405-7; also Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, p. 6.

144. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, v. I, pp. 422-426.

145. Terentiev, *Russia*, v. I, p. 55.

146. L/P&S/3/75, No. 68, Clarendon to Duke of Argyll, June 9, 1869.

147. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. I, p. 243.

148. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. I, pp. 244-6.

149. Boulger, *England*, v. I, pp. 181-2; and Terentiev, *Istoriia*, v. I, pp. 472-3.

150. Schuyler, II, 305; also Khalfin, *Politika*, p. 217. In many historical works Abdal-Malik was referred to as the "Katta Tora" which means the Crown Prince of Bukhara.

151. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, 305. Boulger, *England*, v. I, p. 182;

152. Popov, "Iz istorii...", p. 219.

153. Terentiev, *Russia and England*, I, 71-2. Members of this association were active in the Central Asian arena as early as 1866, when one of them, Saveliev suggested that in order to promote the trade of the region a horse-operated railway should be constructed to link the Caspian and the Aral seas; from there merchandise could be shipped via Syr Daria and Amu Daria into the hear of the Khanates. The Minister for War, for his own military reasons, supported the project. It was not however realized, owing to the rapid advance of the Russian army over the next two years, as a result of which Russian merchants found their Central Asian markets already secured for them; they were then encouraged to establish their

caravanserais and to appoint their agents in the cities of Central Asia. See Popov, "Iz istorii...", p. 220.

154. Popov, "Iz Istoriia...", p. 220. The Amir consented in a secret agreement to pay one million rubles war indemnity. FO 65/871, No.220, Buchanan to Clarendon, Nov. 2, 1869; FO 65/870 No. 122; and FO 65/901 No. 23, Granville to Loftus, January 7, 1874; Schuyler mentioned the amount as 125,000 rubles, Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. II, 305. Besides, the Amir under heavy financial burden wanted to reduce the number of his army, but Kaufmann who mostly needed that force now as a partner with the help of whom he would accomplish many tasks under the Bukharan banner, advised him to maintain the army for subduing disloyal beks and other adversaries. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, v. I, p. 474.

155. FO 65/871, No.220, Buchanan to Clarendon, Nov. 2, 1869.

156. L/P&S/3/75, No. 68, June 9, 1869, Clarendon to Duke of Argyll.

157. FO 65/871, No.220, Buchanan to Clarendon, Nov. 2, 1869.

158. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, v. I, p. 424.

159. FO 65/874 No 159, Loftus to Granville, June 27, 1872; after the conquest of the city the Russians promised safety only to those who would declare their loyalty to the Russian administration. Citizens began to come for this purpose and delegations from the suburbs as well. Though there were some districts abstained from sending any delegations. These districts were; Chilek and Urgut. Prominent persons were given orders and memorial medals. One of these personalities offered such a medal was the chief-judge of Samarkand, who regretted to accept the reward or carry it, explaining that, if he accepted it, the people would deem him apostate, but for the conqueror nothing can be better desired, so under pressure and intimidation the chief-judge accepted the reward, although to carry it in his pocket not to be decorated with it. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, v. I, p. 424.

160. FO 65/871, No.220, Buchanan to Clarendon, Nov. 2, 1869.

161. FO 65/901 No. 23, Granville to Loftus, January 7, 1874.

162. FO 65/871, No. 222, Forsyth to Buchanan, Nov. 2, 1869.

163. L/P&S/3/75, F.O. No. 137, Buchanan to Stanley, June 30, 1868.

164. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, (Tashkand 1956) v. I, pt. 2, p. 139.

165. Khalfin, *Politika*, p. 219 ff; also Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie*, p. 217 ff.

Chapter Four

Footnotes:

1. FOCP 2223, No. 5, and No. 6, Buchanan to Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1869; also FOCP 2223, No. 18, communication, Baron Brunnow to Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1869.
2. Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*, (1879) v. II, p. 347.
3. The crisis of the Indian Mutiny in the mid fifties made Britain and the Government of India more inclined towards the internal affairs of India instead of monitoring and challenging the Russian advance in its first steps on the Syr Daria. The policy of "masterly inactivity", was first identified by the forward party among the Indian officers, who attributed it to Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy of India. At home the liberals defended his policy and regarded it as the policy of wisdom, one of whose results could be seen clearly in the good relations with Afghanistan. Vide Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, (1880) p. 122 ff.
4. Boulger, *England and Russia...*, v. II, p. 347.
5. Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, (1875) p. 143.
6. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", vol. 118, July-October 1865, p. 533.
7. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians...", vol. 118, p. 533.
8. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians...", vol. 118, p. 533.
9. FO 65/877 No. 118, Loftus to Granville, March 27, 1873; and Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, p. 145.
10. A large portion of the Anglo-Indian politicians reacted in favour of the opinion that the approach of Russia towards India meant the "substitution of order and civilization, and a Christian Government, for the ignorance, the cruelty, the anarchy of the fanatical Uzbeks must be advantageous, and they further point to the impetus that would be given to trade by an increased security and facility of communication, as well as by the increased wants of a settled and improving community". L/P&S/18/c.4 memorandum on Central Asian Question, July 20, 1868. This point of view obviously paid no consideration to political motives and consequences, and completely ignored the incentives that pushed Russia for such huge sacrifices during her advance. Also vide Marvin, C., *The Russian at Merv and Herat*, (1883) p. 397.
11. FOCP 2223 No. 6, Buchanan to Clarendon, February 20, 1869.
12. L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Duke of Argyll, March 2, 1869; also Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 266; also vide *Central Asian Review*, v. 4, No. 4, 1958, p. 455-6.
13. Boulger, *England and Russia*, vol. II, p. 348.

14. Hasan Kuli was inhabited by Turkoman tribesmen, mostly Yomut, who opened fire on the advancing Russians and obliged them to retreat to Ashurada. See FOCP 2150, No. 42, Abbott, despatch August 20, 1856.

15. FOCP 2150, No. 42, Abbott, despatch, August 20, 1856.

16. FOCP 2150, No. 42, Abbott despatch, August 20, 1856.

17. The Russian Government was active around the Khivan boundaries. From the west the Caucasian army established a fort and naval station on the bay of Krasnovodsk and another fort on the mouth of the Attrek in 1869. After several attempts against the Turkomans of the region, the Russians sent an expedition "nominally to explore the old bed of the Oxus, but really to investigate the road to Khiva to a great distance as possible". The following years, 1870-1872, witnessed the reconnaissance of the Kizyl Kum desert down to the peripheries of Khiva. See Schuyler, II, p. 332. This account supports the account of Marvin in which he assured that the Russian in that time wanted to erect that fort not as a fort for the protection of their fishery industry, but to establish a base for Caucasian cooperation in the projected campaign against Khiva. Vide Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, p. 457.

18. FO 65/877 No. 121, Loftus to Granville, April, 1, 1873. It should be borne in mind that Russia had no free press similar to that of Great Britain. The Russian press closely connected with the Government and controlled by her, a fact that makes any observer to perceive what the press publishes as an official policy.

19. FO 65/877 No. 121, Loftus to Granville, April 1, 1873.

20. FO 65/877 No. 121, Loftus to Granville, April 1, 1873.

21. FO 65/871 No. 215, Buchanan to Clarendon, Nov. 1, 1869; and FO 65/871 No. 295, Buchanan to Clarendon, Dec. 29, 1869.

22. L/P&S/3/76, No. 96, Buchanan to Clarendon, December 16, 1869.

23. Thomson to Clarendon, quoted in Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, pp. 118-9, 322.

24. FO 65/877 No. 118, Loftus to Granville, March 27, 1873.

25. FOCP 2349, No. 1, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 8, 1873.

26. *Khivinskii Pokhod 1873 g.*, (1888) p. 5.

27. Count Shchuvalov was the Director of the Russian Secret Police, and confidential counsellor to the Emperor. His visit was wrapped in rumours that he was going to discuss the organization of an International Society with London and other European courts. Prince Gorchakov and M. de Westmann, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, voiced unfamiliarity with the nature of his visit. Baron Brunnow knew less about the purpose of the visit, though he assured Granville that Shchovalov was a "satisfactory" person to communicate with. Later the visit was said to be of social purpose related to the marriage of the Duke of Edinburgh and the Grand Duchess Maria. FO 65/875, No. 8, Loftus to Granville, Jan. 8, 1873.

28. FOCP 2349, No. 1, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 8, 1873.

29. FO 65/875, No. 6, Granville to Loftus, January 1, 1873.
30. FO 65/874 No. 128, Loftus to Granville, May 28, 1872.
31. FO 65/879 No. 416, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 20, 1873; and FO 65/901 No. 23, Granville to Loftus, January 7, 1874.
32. L/P&S/3/75, No. 68, Clarendon to Argyll, June 7, 1869.
33. FOCP 2351 No. 416, Loftus to Granville, November 20, 1873.
34. FOCP 2351, No. 416, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 20, 1873.
35. FOCP 2351, No. 416, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 20, 1873.
36. FOCP 2349, No. 1, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 8, 1873.
37. FO 65/877 No. 118, Loftus to Granville, March 27, 1873.
38. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 331. Russia attributed the disarray among the Kirghiz and Karakalpak tribes on the eastern coast of the Caspian as the work of the Khivans, while Russian and Soviet historians have expounded the events as the result of maladministration and misuse of authority by Russian functionaries. Vide *Istoriia Narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, pp. 253-258; and Khalfin, N., *Prisoedineniia srednei Azii*, p. 298.
39. Parliamentary Papers, v. LXXXV (1872), No. 3, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 8, 1873; and FOCP 2349, No. 1, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 8, 1873.
40. FO 65/879 No. 416, Loftus Granville, November 20, 1873.
41. FOCP 2349 No. 1, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 8, 1873; and 2349 No. 10, Viceroy of India in Council to Argyll, March 28, 1873.
42. FOCP 2349, No 3, Loftus to Granville, February 4, 1873.
43. FOCP 2349, No. 1, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 8, 1873.
44. Loftus, *Diplomatic Reminiscences*, vol. II, pp. 49-50; FOCP 2349, No. 26, Loftus to Granville, Jan. 22, 1873.
45. Loftus, *Diplomatic Reminiscences*, vol. II, p. 45-46.
46. FOCP 2349, No. 5, Loftus to Granville, February 19, 1873.
47. Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*, (1879) v. II, p. 368.
48. FOCP 2349, No. 6, Loftus to Granville, abstract from Moscow Gazette, April 2, 1873. This Gazette expressed the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and had close connections with it.
49. FOCP 2349, No. 6, inclosure, April 1, 1873.

50. FOCP 2349 No. 9 Loftus to Granville, May 10, 1873; FO 65/878 No. 211, May 27, 1873, Loftus to Granville; and FOCP 2349, No. 18, same to same, May 27, 1873.
51. FOCP 2349, No. 7, Granville to Loftus, May, 7, 1873.
52. FOCP 2349, No. 13, telegram, Loftus to Granville, May 21, 1873.
53. FOCP 2349 No. 18, Loftus to Granville, May 27, 1873.
54. FOCP 2349, No. 18, Loftus to Granville, May 27, 1873.
55. FOCP 2421, No. 57, Thomson to Granville, March 22, 1873. In *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. 1, book 2, p. 92. The commander of the Caucasian army, General Svistunov, remarked that having supporting point on the eastern Caspian shores was indispensable for operating against Khiva from the nearest point to the Khivan borders, he also emphasized the importance of maintaining the commitment and loyalty of the Bukharan Amir as long as it was vital for easing the task of the Turkestan army which would attack the other side of Khiva. Main Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1-9, 1870, No. 22, sheets 4-76, Svistunov's notes, quoted in Popov, "Iz Istrii Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii", pp. 228-9.
56. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 92.
57. MacGahan, J., *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva*, (1874) pp. 165-7.
58. MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus...*, p. 167.
59. MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus...*, p. 203.
60. Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevanii srednei Azii*, vol. II, pp. 246-7, 251; MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus...*, p. 212.
61. *Khivinskii Pokhod*, p. 5.
62. FO 65/877 No. 121, Loftus to Granville, April 1, 1873.
63. MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus...*, p. 249.
64. MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus...*, p. 273.
65. MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus...*, p. 278.
66. Vide appendix IV, Russo-Khivan treaty of 1873.
67. FO 65/875, No. 26, Granville to Loftus, Jan. 31, 1873; FOCP 2421, No. 63, Loftus to Granville, April 1873; and FOCP 2555, No. 14, Morier to Derby, June 1874.
68. Krausse, A., *Russia in Asia, a Record and a Study 1558-1899*, (London 1899) pp. 76-77.
69. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, vol. II, p. 106.
70. FOCP 2555, No. 14, Morier to Derby, June 1874.

71. FO 65/901 No. 23, Granville to Loftus, January 7, 1874.
72. Boulger, *England and Russia...*, vol. II, p. 349.
73. FOCP 2349, No. 7, Granville to Loftus, May 7, 1873; and Gorchakov to Brunnow in FOCP 3785 No. 128, Analysis by Tenterden, Nov. 30, 1878; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. II, p. 266.
74. FO 65/1032 Nos. 807 and 808, Sept. 25, 1878, Plunket to Salisbury.
75. FO 65/1029 No. 415, April 12, 1878, Loftus to Salisbury; and No. 442, April 19, 1878, same to same.
76. *Parliamentary Papers*, LXXX (1878), No. 144/ 2 & 4.
77. FOCP 3937 No. 399, Supplementary to the Analysis by Lord Tenterden of the Papers presented to Parliament respecting Central Asia, Dec. 23, 1878.
78. FOCP 3937, No. 399, Supplementary to analysis by Tenterden, Dec. 23, 1878.
79. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, vol. II, p. 46.
80. Marvin, C., *The Russian Advance towards India*, (London 1882), p. 65.
81. FO 65/1071 No. 26, Major-General Sir F. S. Roberts, Kabul Expeditionary Field Force, to A. C. Lyall, October 27, 1879.
82. FOCP 2555, Inclosure No. 4 in No. 11, from Mallet to Trenton, January to June 1874.
83. Boulger, *England and Russia*, v. II, p. 351-2.
84. FOCP 4930, No. 9, memorandum on the correspondence with the Russian Governemnt in regard to Merve, February 25, 1884.
85. FOCP 2351, No. 416, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 20, 1873.
86. Lord Lytton to Queen Victoria, August 31, 1878, in *The Letters of Queen Victoria*, Buckle, G. (ed.), vol. II, (London 1926), pp. 638-9.
87. FOCP 3871, No. 145, letter, British agent at Peshawar, August 3, 1878.
88. FOCP 3871, No. 145 inclosure, August 4, 1878.
89. FOCP 3871, No. 145, inclosure, August 14, 1878.
90. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 247.
91. FO L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Argyll, March 2, 1869.

92. FO 65/870 No. 68, Rumbold to Clarendon, June 2, 1869. The coloured map which was referred to included all territories of the Turkomans south of the Oxus. In regard to the neutral zone policy he wrote that Russia according to the agreement from her base at Samarkand could absorb all the territories beyond the Oxus including the Bekships of Hissar, Kulab, and Darwaz, besides the whole of Afghan-Turkestan as well "without England being permitted to address to her a word of remonstrance".

93. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, 266. Rawlinson quoted Lord Mayo's letter dated June 10, 1869 in which he spoke against the neutral zone policy. It said that any foreign power could remonstrate against any action taken by England with regard to India's northern frontiers. Though he would be in favour of that policy "if Russia would consent to place herself in the same positions regards Khiva, the unconquered part of Bukhara, and the independent tribes along her frontier (if she has a frontier), as we are willing to do as regards Kelat, Afghanistan, and the territories of the Kushbegi", and "if Russia would consent to this and agree to a joint solemn public declaration with [us] to that effect, binding on the honour and the good faith of the two Governments". Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, pp. 300-1.

94. Rawlinson, *England and Russia*, p. 302; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, p. 266.

95. Parliamentary Papers, (1878) LXXX, p. 45, Doria to Derby, July 13, 1875.

96. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 280.

97. FO 65/901 No. 23, Granville to Loftus, January 7, 1874; and L/P&S/3/75, No. 88, Buchanan, March 27, 1869

98. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, 266.

99. FOCP 3785, No. 128, Analysis by Tenterden, November 30, 1878.

100. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, p. 265-6; *Parliamentary Papers*, v. LXXV (1873), Gorchakov to Brunnow, March 7, 1869. Yet these assurances were disregarded when the issue of the Afghan peripheries was affected by the new Russian attitude after the conquest of the Turkomans' country.

101. FOCP 3785, No. 128, Analysis by Tenterden, November 30, 1878.

102. FO 65/929 (no number) Inclosure No. 3, September 16, 1875; and FOCP 3785, No. 128, analysis by Tenterden, Nov. 30, 1878.

103. FOCP 3785, No. 128, memorandum, November 30, 1878.

104. *Parliamentary Papers*, v. LXXV (1872), Granville to Loftus, October 17, 1872.

105. *Parliamentary Papers*, v. LXXV (1872), Granville to Loftus, October 17, 1872.

106. *Parliamentary Papers*, v. LXXV, (1872), Gorchakov to Brunnow, Dec. 7, 1872.

107. *Parliamentary Papers*, v. LXXV (1872), inclosure No. 1 in No. 2, Kaufmann to Gorchakov, Nov. 29, 1872.

108. FOCP 2349, No. 10, Northbrook to Argyll, March 28, 1873.
109. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 279.
110. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 250.
111. Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, (1880) p. 131.
112. Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, p. 131.
113. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences...*, v. II, p. 43.
114. *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. LXXV (1873), No. 2. Gorchakov to Brunnow, Dec. 7, 1872 (communicated to Granville by Brunnow, Dec. 29, 1872).
115. The Russian frontiers her meant the frontiers of the Province of Turkestan.
116. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, v. 1, p. 44.
117. FO 65/874 No. 317, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 12, 1872.
118. FO 65/874 No. 317, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 12, 1872.
119. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, p. 44.
120. FO 65/874 No. 317, Loftus to Granville, Nov. 12, 1872.
121. Prince Gorchakov to Count Brunnow, St. Petersburg, January 31, 1873, quoted in Loftus, *Diplomatic*, vol. II, p. 296.
122. Marvin, C., *The Russian Advance Towards India*, (London 1882) p. 61.
123. *Parliamentary Papers*, v. LXXV, No. 1, Granville to Loftus, October 1872.
124. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, vol. II, p. 56.
125. FOCP 2421, No. 63, Loftus to Granville, April 1873.
126. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, vol. II, p. 55.
127. FOCP 2606, No. 91, abstract, June 14, 1874.
128. Mazour, Anatole G., *Russia: Tsarist and Communist*, (New York & London 1962), p. 294-5.

Chapter Five

Footnotes:

1. The Russians were interested in establishing contacts with the Moguls who were regarded as a victim of the British colonial rule in India. Hence Russia chose to utilize the issue as pretext for her designs in that country, see Nizamutdinov, I. G., *Ocherki Istorii Kulturnikh Sviazei Srednei Azii i Indii*, p. 37.
2. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I (book 1), (Tashkent 1956) p. 55.
3. Popov, "Borba za Sredneaziatskii Platsdarm", *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, (1940) v. 7, p. 182.
4. Terentiev, M. A., *Rossia i Angliia v Bor'be za Rynki*, (St. Petersburg 1876) pp. 7-8.
5. Terentiev, M. A., *Rossia i Angliia v Bor'be za Rynki*, pp. 8-9.
6. Terentiev, M. A., *Rossia i Angliia v Bor'be...*, p. 9.
7. L/P&S/3/65, No. 664, Russell to Crampton, March 31, 1860.
8. *Blackwoods Magazine*, "The War in Asia", vol. LXXXI (Feb. 1857), p. 145.
9. Towle (ed.), Bellamy, *Estimating Foreign Military Power*, p. 41.
10. An extraordinary committee for studying extraordinary political or economic issues and reporting to the Council of Ministers directly.
11. *Central Asian Review*, "Russia's Relations with India", v. 4, No. 4 (1958), pp. 451-2.
12. *Zapiski o Bukharskom Khanstve*, pp. 77-79.
13. Terentiev, *Russia and England*, vol. II, pp. 11-12
14. Popov, "Borba...", p. 182.
15. Terentiev, *England...*, vol. II, p. 12.
16. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 1, p. 55; also, Terentiev, *Russia ...*, vol. II, p. 13; Schuyler gave slightly different account, dismissing Russia's ambitions, he mentioned that Paul initiated the venture out of hatred to the English and sympathy toward Napoleon. He suggested to concentrate 25,000 regular troops plus 2,000 Cossacks in Astrakhan on the northern shores of the Caspian, while France should send 35,000 men to the Danube from where they would be conveyed to Astrakhan from where both armies should proceed to Astrabad. The next step was to advance to the Indus in forty days. Following Napoleon's reluctance regarding the adventure, Paul decided to undertake it individually with his own troops. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, v. II, p. 265.
17. Popov, "Borba...", p. 182; Krausse, *Russia*, p. 149.
18. Anwar Khan, *England and Russia*, p. 4.

19. Terentiev, *England and Russia...*, vol. II, p. 11, (Calcutta 1876).
20. Terentiev, *Russia and England*, (1876), vol. II, p. 19; *Istoriia zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, (1906), vol. II, p. 43; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, (1876), II, 265.
21. Popov, "Borba...", p. 182; and Terentiev, *Russia and England*, vol. II, p. 19.
22. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, vol. II, p. 43.
23. *Central Asian Review*, "Russia's Relations with India", v. VI, No. 4, 1958, p. 450-1.
24. Raskolnikov, F., "Russia and Afghanistan", *Novyi Vostok* (The New East) (no date) v. IV, p. 21; Terentiev, *Russia and England*, vol. II, pp. 19-20.
25. Op. cit. Raskolnikov, F., "Russia and Afghanistan", *Novyi Vostok* (The New East) vol. IV, p. 21; also, Terentiev, *Russia and England...*, vol. II, pp. 19-20.
26. Terentiev, *Russia and England*, vol. II, pp. 21-22.
27. See Perovskii's expedition against Khiva in 1839 in chapter two.
28. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, vol. II, pp. 88 ff. For more about Russia's policy in the steppe see chapter one.
29. Liusternik, E. Ia., *Russko-Indeiskie Ikonomicheskie, nauchnye i kulturnye sviazi v XIX v.*, (Moscow 1966), pp. 23-25.
30. Terentiev, M. A., *Russia and England in Central Asia*, (1876), vol. II, p. 101, 106.
31. FOCP No. 799, Consul Abbott to the Earl of Clarendon, Despatch, February 8, 1855.
32. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, p. 335.
33. L/P&S/3/75, No. 88, Buchanan, March 27, 1869.
34. Khalfin, N. A., "Posolstvo Baba Ram Singkha v Turkestane v 1879 godu", *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie*, 1957, No. 2, pp. 154-8.
35. Edwards, S. H., *Russian Projects...*, p. 1.
36. Edwards, Henry Sutherland, *Russian Projects against India...*, (London 1885) p. iv. (preface)
37. Yapp, M., *Strategies of British India*, pp. 14-17; also Gillard, D., *The Struggle...*, p. 29.
38. *Blackwoods Magazine*, "The War in Asia", vol. LXXXI (Feb. 1857) p. 147-8.
39. Ferrier, *Caravan Journey and wandering in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkestan and Beloochistan*, (1856), p. 457.
40. Boulger, *England and Russia...*, v. II, p. 345.

41. *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society*, v. VIII, May 1865, p. 228, quoted in Anwar Khan, *England*, p. 58.
42. L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1869.
43. L/P&S/3/65 No. 664, Russell to Crampton, March 31, 1860.
44. Boulger, D. C., *England and Russia in Central Asia*, (London 1879) vol. II, p. 2.
45. *Quarterly Review*, "The Military position of Russia in Central Asia", (1877) vol. CXLIII, p. 551.
46. L/P&S/3/65, No. 664, March 31, 1860, J. Russell to Sir J. Crampton.
47. L/P&S/3/69, No.29, Russell to Secretary of State for India in council, April 29, 1864.
48. L/P&S/3/69, No. 29, Russell to Secretary of State for India in council, April 29, 1864.
49. *Enclosures to Secret Letters from India* (ESLI), 1867/2 Viceroy to the Amir of Bukhara, January 24, 1867, quoted in Anwar Khan, *England and Russia*, p. 110.
50. FOCP 2421, inclosure No. 3 in No. 60, Abbott to Granville, March 15, 1873.
51. FOCP 2421, inclosure No. 3, in No. 60, March 15, 1873.
52. Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, (1883), pp. 386-7; Boulger, *England and Russia*, v. I, pp. 124-131.
53. Marvin, *The Russian Advance Towards India*, (1882), p. 86, 160-1.
54. Kaufmann to General Bogdanovich, July 15, 1878, quoted in Marvin, *The Russians*, p. 396.
55. Yavorskii, *Journey of A Russian mission to Afghanistan*, (St. Petersburg 1882), quoted in Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, (1883), p. 394.
56. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, vol. I, pt. 2, pp. 92, 183 ff.
57. Curzon, G., *Russia in Central Asia*, pp. 11-12.
58. FOCP 799, Consul Abbott to the Earl of Clarendon, Feb. 8, 1855.
59. In the Blue pamphlet, a paper discussing the Central Asian Affairs circulated among members of the Government marked as "private", the author excluded the possibility of a Russian invasion against India (pp. 14-15), although he expressed his apprehension that such an invasion is inevitable if certain circumstances would prevail, in this respect he asked the following question which speaks for itself, "How, I would ask, are we prepared even for the eventuality here foreshadowed, much less the invasion of India by a powerful European enemy backed by the military strength of Persia, and the Uzbeks, including the Khanates of Khiva, Kokand, and Bukhara, and the whole of Turkestan?". *The Central Asian Question from an Eastern Stand-Point*, p. 29; also vide Krausse, *Russia*, p. 247.

60. Vambery, A., *Sketches...*, pp. 379-380.
61. Edwards, H. Sutherland, *Russian Projects Against India, from the Czar Peter to General Skobelev*, (London 1885), pp. 280-281.
62. *The Central Asian Question*, (Edinburgh 1869) p. 12.
63. Marvin, *The Russian Advance*, p. 163.
64. Vide Gorchakov's Circular, appendix II; and Lansdell, Henry; *Russian Central Asia, including Kuldja, Bukhara, Khiva, and Merv*, vol. II, p. 489-491.
65. L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Clarendon, February 20, 1869.
66. FOCP 2223, No. 6, Buchanan to Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1869.
67. Lord Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, 1862-1879, vol. II, p. 127-8; FOCP 2223, No. 6, Buchanan to Earl of Clarendon, February 20, 1869.
68. FOCP 3785, No. 128, memorandum, November 30, 1878.
69. FOCP 2223, No. 5 and No. 6, Buchanan to Clarendon, February 20, 1869.
70. FOCP 4930, memorandum, February 25, 1884.
71. For the original text of Skobelev's project see *Istoricheskii Vestnik*, "Proekt M. D. Skobeleva o pokhode v Indiu", vol. XIV (14), December 1883, pp. 543-555; also vide Skobelev's plan for Invading India in Edwards, H. S., *Russian Projects Against India*, (London 1885), pp. 271 ff.
72. Valikhanov, *The Russians in Central Asia*, pp. VI-VII.
73. Alexander Burnes, quoted in Ferrier, *Caravan Journey...*, p. 458.
74. *The Central Asian Question*, p. 15.
75. Loftus, *Diplomatic Reminiscences...*, vol. II, p. 48.
76. Edwards, H., *Russian Projects...*, p. 267.
77. Edwards, *Russian Projects...*, p. 271. For detailed investigation of roads leading to India from Central Asia see Boulger, *England and Russia...*, vol. I, pp. 125-140.
78. *The Central Asian Question*, p. 31.
79. Edwards, H. Sutherland, *Russian Projects against India*, (1885) pp. 265.
80. L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1869.
81. Ferrier, *Caravan Journey...*, pp. 455-8.
82. L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1869.

83. L/P&S/3/75, No. 21, Rumbold to Clarendon, April 28, 1869.
84. L/P&S/3/75, Clarendon to Buchanan, September 10, 1869.
85. *Blackwoods Magazine*, "Russia's Aims", vol. CLXIX (April 1901), p. 553. British observers anticipated as early as the end of the 1860s Russia's designs and predicted that she might resolve to mobilize the tribes of Central Asia and Afghanistan who were at variance among themselves and form "a powerful combination of them..., a little gold scattered amongst them, on the prospect of a little Indian loot would probably stimulate them as efficiently as it no doubt would our excellent friends the Sikhs". *The Central Asian Question*, (1869), p. 27.
86. British politicians anticipated all Russia's thoughts. Sir Edward Hamley said, "We may be assured that the invading army of India, such as we cannot afford to despise, will be no improvised force, no barbarous hords, but truly formidable in numbers, organization, and leadership". Quoted in Marvin, C., *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, (1883), p. 312. These numbers may seem a problem by themselves to mobilize, but for Russia the case was different, she had 130,000 men in the Caucasus, besides her contingents in Central Asia estimated at nearly 50,000 men.
87. Marvin, *The Russian Advance...*, pp. 104-5.
88. Marvin, *The Russian Advance...*, p. 103.
89. It should be remembered that Russia extended the frontiers of Bukhara at the expense of Khiva in 1873, when she annexed the Khivan territories on the right side of the Oxus to Bukhara. The same practice was pursued earlier during her war with Kokand.
90. *Blackwoods Magazine*, "Russia's Aims", (1901), vol. CLXIX, p. 552.
91. *Blackwoods Magazine*, vol. CLXIX (April 1901), p. 553.
92. L/P&S/3/75, Buchanan to Clarendon, Feb. 20, 1869.
93. Ferrier, *Caravan Journey*, p. 458. The author admitted that the English have many chances to conquer a marching Russian army "if they could during such a war rely upon the tranquillity of India", which demonstrates the degree of Russia's dependency upon instigating riot among the Indians as prerequisite for the success of the invasion. See pp. 468-9.
94. Ferrier, *Caravan Journey*, p. 466.
95. Seeley, J. R., *The Expansion of England*, (1900) p. 338.
96. Ferrier, *Caravan Journey*, p. 458.
97. Ferrier, *Caravan Journey*, p. 465.
98. Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, p. 135
99. Ferrier, *Caravan Journey*, p. 465.

100. Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, p. 135-6.
101. Boulger, *England and Russia in Central Asia*, vol. II, p. 372.
102. Lawrence Papers, No. 6, February 27, 1865, Wood to Lawrence, (Private), quoted in Ahmed Khan, *England, Russia and Central Asia*, p. 129.
103. Seeley, *The Expansion of England*, p. 318-230.
104. Boulger, *Central Asian Questions*, p. pp. 64-65.
105. Boulger, *England and Russia*, vol. II, p. 366.
106. Boulger, *England and Russia*, vol. II, p. 367.
107. FO 65/992, No. 672, Loftus to Derby, December 5, 1877.
108. *Blackwoods Magazine*, vol. CLXIX, (April 1901), p. 552.
109. Sweet, D. W., *British Foreign Policy 1907-1909, The Elaboration of the Russian Connection*, (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 1971), p. 70.
110. FO 65/871, No. 295, Buchanan to Clarendon, November 29, 1869, and FO 65/871, No. 11, same to same, January 12, 1870; see also Ferrier, *Caravan Journey*, p. 507.
111. *The Central Asian Question*, pp. 42-43.
112. Charykov, N. V., *Glimpses of High Politics*, (London 1931), p. 160.
113. Grulev, *Sopernichestvo Rossii i Anglii...*, p. viii.
114. FO 65/1029, No. 415, Loftus to Salisbury, April 12, 1878, and FO 65/1029, No. 442, same to same, April 19, 1878.
115. *The Central Asian Question*, p. 43.
116. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, (1899) p. 246.
117. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 247; and for full account of this agreement vide, Edwards, *Russian Projects against India*, p. 149 ff.
118. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 247.
119. Vambéry, *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question*, (1874) p. 241.
120. Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, pp. 400-1.
121. FOCP 3785 No. 128, Analysis by Tenterden, November 30, 1878.
122. Mackinder, *India*, pp. 118 ff.
123. *The Central Asian Question*, (1869) p. 24.

124. *The Central Asian Question*, (1869) p. 27.

125. *The Central Asian Question*, pp. 27-28. An estimation of the native forces showed that Russia could employ under the command of her Generalissimo in Central Asia the following troops: Persian contingents 50,000; Bukhara 20,000; Khiva 10,000; Kokand 10,000; Afghanistan 100,000; Turkomans 20,000; and other nationalities 20,000; besides of course a good number of forces of European origin. The Indian army was reduced after the mutiny of 1857 to less than 200,000 soldiers mainly preoccupied by watching the restless natives and defiant, well-armed princes, rather than protecting the frontiers of the country. *The Central Asian Question*, pp. 30-33.

126. *Istoricheskii vestnik*, vol. 14, December 1883, p. 543.

127. *Istoricheskii vestnik*, v. 14, December 1883, p. 547.

128. *Istoricheskii vestnik*, "Proekt Skobeleva", v. 14, December 1883, p. 546; also Edwards, *Russian Projects...*, pp. 275-6.

129. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 124.

130. *Istoricheskii vestnik*, "Proekt Skobeleva", vol. 14, December 1883, pp. 549-550; and Edwards, *Russian Projects...*, pp. 284-5; The *Istoricheskii vestnik* of December 1883, after publishing Skobelev's plan commented: "Six years have rolled away since these energetic words sounded, since the patriot wrote his words admitting the fact that when it comes to the welfare of Russia there can be no question of risk, for Russian soldiers beyond the Hindu Kush will know, if needed, how to die to the last man. Six years have elapsed, years pregnant with so much". During these six years Russia swept over the rest of the of the Turkoman country, occupied Merv, Serakhs, and Kushk, these years witnessed the expansion of the military railway from Krasnovodsk to Merv and Kushk nearly eighty miles short from Herat. *Istoricheskii vestnik*, vol. 14, December 1883, p. 554.

131. FOCP 2150, No. 42, Abbott, August 20, 1856.

132. FOCP 2150, No. 42, Abbott, August 20, 1856.

Chapter Six

Footnotes:

1. Dmitriev-Mamonov, A. I., *Putevoditel po Turkestanu i Sredne-Aziatskoi Zheleznoi Dorogi*, (1903) p. 141.
2. FOCP 2421, No. 60, Inclosure No. 3, Extract from the *Golos*, Abbott to Granville, March 15, 1873.
3. Drage, G, *Russian Affairs*, (1904), p. 508-9.
4. Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, (1883), p. 354-5.
5. Marvin, *The Russians*, p. 359.
6. FOCP 2606, Abstract by Lord Loftus, March 31, 1875, from a report by Colonel Glukhovskii (dated June 14, 1874).
7. FOCP 2606, Abstract, March 31, 1875.
8. FOCP 2421, No. 60, inclosure No 3, extract, Abbott to Granville, March 15, 1873.
9. FOCP 2421, No. 60, inclosure No. 3, extract, Abbott to Granville, March 15, 1873.
10. Edwards, Southerland H.; *Russian Projects Against India*, (1885), pp. 5-7.
11. Peter the Great was captured by the stories of wealth and sands of gold in the east, and dispatched two expeditions: one to Turkestan in 1715, and the other in 1717 to Khiva headed by Prince Bekovich Cherkaskii.
12. Schuyler, E., *Turkestan, notes of a journey in Russian Turkestan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*, 2 vols. (London 1876) vol. I, p.221-222.
13. Pierce, R. A., *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917*, p. 184.
14. Terentiev, M. A., *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg 1906), vol. III, p. 231. The author writes from first hand knowledge for he, as a General, worked in the office of General Kaufmann, the Governor-General of Turkestan, for more than two decades.
15. Pierce, R., *Russian Central Asia*, p. 185.
16. FOCP 2421, No. 60, Inclosure No. 3, extract, Abbott to Granville, March 15, 1873.
17. Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, (1906), vol. III, p. 230.
18. Rozhkova, M. K., *Ekonomicheskie Sviazy Rossii so Srednei Aziei*, p. 82-6.
19. FOCP 2421, No. 60, Inclosure No. 3, extract, Abbott to Granville, March 15, 1873.

20. Schuyler, E., *Turkestan...*, vol. I, p. 223; Stuart, A., "le chemin de fer central-asiatique projeté par MM. Ferdinand de Lesseps et Cotrad," in *L'Explorateur*, (Paris 1875) II, 396-399, 417-422.
21. Schuyler, E.; *Turkestan...*, vol. I, p. 223.
22. Curzon, G.; *Russia in Central Asia in 1889*, (1889), p. 35. The author visited Central Asia in September and October 1888, and had the opportunity to travel across the region using the newly-constructed railway; Schuyler, E., *Turkestan: Notes on a Journey in Russian Turkestan, Kokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*, 2 vols., (London 1876), vol. I, p. 224; and Stuart, A.; "Le chemin de fer central-asiatique projeté par MM. Ferdinand de Lesseps et Cotrad," *L'Explorateur*, II (1875), 396-7.
23. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, (1889) pp. 35-7; Schuyler, *Turkestan: notes on a journey in Russian Turkestan*, (1876), v. I, p. 223.
24. Schuyler, E.; *Turkestan: notes on a journey in Russian Turkestan*, (1876), vol. I, p. 224; and Curzon, G.; *Russia in Central Asia*, (1889), p. 35-6.
25. Schuyler, E.; *Turkestan...*, vol. I, pp. 222-223.
26. Curtis, William Eleroy; *Turkestan the Heart of Asia*, London 1911, p. 19. vide also Pierce, R.; *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917*, p. 185.
27. Curzon, G.; *Russia in Central Asia...*, (1889) p. 269.
28. L/P&S/3/76, F.O. No. 96, Clarendon to the Secretary of State for India, January 4, 1870.
29. Schuyler, E.; *Turkestan*, v. I, pp. 222-5; Curzon, G.; *Russia in Central Asia...*, p. 270.
30. Terentiev, M.A., *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, (St. Petersburg 1906), vol. III, pp. 230-231; also vide Curzon, G., *Russia in Central Asia*, (London 1889) p. 36; and Pierce, R., *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917*, p. 185-6.
31. Grodekov, N. E., *Voina v Turkmenii, Pokhod skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, 3 vols., (St Petersburg 1883), vol. I, p. 226. General Grodekov, an eye-witness of the Russian advance in Central Asia since its early stages. He occupied the post of Governor of Syr Daria oblast since its establishment until he joined Kaufmann's administration in the mid 1860's.
32. Grulev, M., *Sopernichestvo Rossii i Anglii v Srednei Azii*, (1909), p. 365. Grulev served most of his long career as an officer in the Russian army in Central Asia and the Far East.
33. Grulev, M., *Sopernichestvo Rossii i Anglii v Srednei Azii*, (1909), pp. 365-66.
34. Marvin, *The Russians*, pp. 355-357.
35. Miliutin, D.A.; *Dnevnik, 1873-1882*, (Diary, 1873-1882), Moscow, 1947-1950, vol. I, p. 181, and vol. III, p. 179.

36. Redzhepov, P., "Iz Istorii Stroitelstva Kizyl Arvatskikh Zheleznodorozhnikh Masterskikh", *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR, Serii Obshchestvennykh Nauk*, No. 6, 1960, p. 16.
37. Grodekov, N. E., *Voina v Turkmenii, Pokhod skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, 3 vols., (St Petersburg 1883), v. I, p. 169.
38. Grodekov, N. E., *Voina v Turkmenii, Pokhod skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg 1883), v. I, p. 174.
39. Curzon, G.; *Russia in Central Asia...*, p. 37.
40. Marvin, *The Russians*, p. 357.
41. Grodekov, N. E., *Voina v Turkmenii, Pokhod skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, 3 vols., (St Petersburg 1883), vol. I, pp. 152-156, and vol. II, pp. 301-306.
42. Terentiev, M. A.; *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, St. Petersburg 1906, vol. II, p. 77.
43. Grodekov, *Voina*, v. I, pp. 207-8 and pp. 210-11.
44. Grodekov, *Voina*, v. I, pp. 212.
45. Curzon, *Russia*, p. 40; Grodekov, *Voina*, v. I, p. 226.
46. Terentiev, *Istoriia ...*, vol. III, p. 230.
47. Popov, A. L., "Iz Istorii Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii", *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, No. 9, (1940) p. 224.
48. *Vestnik Evropy*, June 1870, pp. 804-5, quoted in Popov, "Iz Istorii...", *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, No. 9 (1940), p. 229.
49. Grodekov, *Voina*, v. I, p. 183.
50. Surveying this locality was conducted during early works in connection with reconnoitring the eastern shores of the Caspian sea mainly between the years 1856 and 1874. The Caucasian Military headquarters categorically declined to concur with the opinion of accepting Mikhailovskii as the starting point for the expedition or concentrating the army. The rejection of General Staff of the Caucasian army was based on the fact that this gulf was shallow and not fitting for navigation of even small ships, and if desperately needed it could be used as a auxiliary route in the worst condition. They strongly supported the idea of building a rail between Krasnovodsk and Kizyl Arvat, nearly 340 vërsts. Grodekov, *Voina*, v. I, pp. 218-221.
51. Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii*, III, 35; Grodekov, *Voina*, I, 183; and Curzon, *Russia*, p. 38.
52. Grodekov, *Voina*, I, p. 226.

53. Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, (1883), p. 358; and Curzon, G. *Russia in Central Asia*, (1889) pp. 39-41.
54. This Battalion consisted of 1081 soldiers from different professions, 25 officers, and 30 engineers and physicians, besides an unspecified number of workers brought from Central Russia and the Caucasus exclusively for work on the project. Vide Redzhepov, "Iz Istorii Stroitelstva Kizyl Arvatskikh Zheleznodorozhnikov Masterskikh", *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Turkmenskoi SSR*, No. 6, 1960, pp. 17 ff; and *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, v. I, pt. 2, pp. 119-121.
55. Redzhepov, "Iz Istorii Stroitelstva Kizyl Arvatskikh Zheleznodorozhnikov Masterskikh", *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk SSR*, No. 6, 1960, pp. 16-17.
56. Lobanov-Rostovsky, A.; *Russia and Asia*, p. 172.
57. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii, Pokhod skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, (St. Petersburg 1883), v. I, p. 227.
58. Curzon, G.; *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 40-41.
59. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, v. I, pt. 2, p. 120; Lobanov-Rostovsky, A.; *Russia and Asia*, p. 173.
60. Redzhepov, "Iz Istorii...", *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk*, No. 6, 1960, p. 17.
61. Massalskii, V. I., *Turkestanskii Krai*, p. 580.
62. Drage, G, *Russian Affairs*, pp. 510-11.
63. Drage, *Russian Affairs*, p. 511.
64. Marvin, *The Russians at Merv and Herat*, (1883), p. 358-361; and Pierce, R. A., *Russian Central Asia*, p. 182.
65. Curzon, G.; *Russia in Central Asia*, pp. 42-44.
66. Curzon, G. *Russia in central Asia*, (1889), p. 43-44.
67. Marvin, *The Russians*, (1883), p. 362.
68. Pokrovskii, S. P., "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia Rossii i Bukhary", SAGU (Sredne-Aziatskii Gosudarstvennyi Uuniversitet) Bulletin, (Tashkand) XVII (1928), pp. 44-45.
69. Charykov, N. V., *Glimpses of High Politics*, pp. 197-198; and Pokrovskii, S. P., "Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia Rossii i Bukhary", SAGU Bulletin, XVII (1928), pp. 45-48. Pokrovskii dated the protocol with Bukhara June 25, 1885, while Charykov gave the date mentioned in the text.
70. Karryev, A.; Rosliakov, A.; *Kratkii Ocherk Istorii Turkmenistana 1868-1917*, (Askabad 1956), p. 56.

71. Lobanov-Rostovsky, A.; *Russia and Asia*, p. 172-173. Regarding the same matter Curzon said, "Not only the construction of the line entrusted to a lieutenant-general, but the technical and, to a large extent, the manual labour was in military hands. The same may be said of the working staff at this moment. Civilians have been and still are employed as surveyors, architects, and engineers; but the bulk of the staff is composed of soldiers of the line. The engineers are in many cases driven by soldiers; the station-masters are officers, or veterans who have been wounded in battle; and the guards, conductors, ticket-collectors, and points-men, as well as the telegraph and post office clerks attached to the stations, are soldiers also". Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 48.
72. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, (1889), p. 267. Russia's relentlessly forward policy in this period was criticized by number of Soviet historians among them we find; Khalfin, N., *Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii*, pp. 3-7, and *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii k Rossii*, pp. 420-424; *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda*, vol. II, pp. 57 ff, 130-132, 192 ff; and Gafurov, E. G., *Istoriia Tadzhikskogo Naroda*, vol. I, pp. 426-430.
73. Gillard, D., *The Struggle for Asia...*, p. 144.
74. Marvin, *The Russians*, p. 372-6, 380-2.
75. Marvin, *The Russians*, p. 381.
76. Vide Grulev, *Sopernichestvo*, pp. 365-8.
77. Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 261-262.
78. Grodekov, N.I.; *Voina v Turkmenii, Pokhod Skobeleva v 1880-1881*, (1883), vol. III, p. 68.
79. In order to win support for his plan, he published a booklet entitled *The Akhal Tekke Oasis and the Roads to India*. The title of his brochure reveals the real intentions behind extending the project southwards. Annenkov's booklet has not been available to me but is referred to by Curzon in *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 42.
80. Curzon, G., *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 42.
81. Grulev, M., *Sopernichestvo Rossii i Anglii v Srednei Azii*, (1909), pp. 42-43.
82. Grodekov, N.I.; *Voina v Trukmeniia*, vol. I, pp. 278-9.
83. Marvin, *The Russian Advance*, p. 247-8.
84. Curzon, G., *Russian in Central Asia*, (1889), p. 44.
85. Lansdell, Henry, *Russian Central Asia, including Kuldja, Bukhara, Khiva, and Merv*, London 1885, vol. II, p. 490. As a friend of Russia, the author was invited by St. Petersburg to travel across Central Asia on the expense of the Empire. The outcome of his trip was a two-volume book glorifying Russia's triumph and civilizing mission in the east.
86. Curzon, G., *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 274.

87. Heyfelder, *Unsere Zeit*, October 1888, (Leipzig), Dr. Heyfelder lived a considerable time in Bukhara, and was surgeon-in-chief to Skobelev's campaign in 1880, later he was appointed as chief of the medical staff to General Annenkov's rail road battalions, quoted in Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, London 1889, p. 191-2.

88. Grulev, *Sopernichestvo Rossii i Anglii v Srednei Azii*, (1909) p. 366.

89. Redzhepov, "Iz Istorii...", *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk*, No. 6, 1960, p. 20.

Chapter Seven

Footnotes:

1. *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 31 (1836), col. 615.
2. Rittikh, A. F., *Pereseleniia*, (Kharkov 1882), p. 6.
3. *Hansard*, vol. 31 (1836), p. 616.
4. *Hansard*, vol. 31 (1836), p. 616.
5. Rittikh, *Pereseleniia*, p. 2-6.
6. There are two types of colonies built by the Russian army and administration in Central Asia. The one called in Russian *ukreplenie*, I refer to as fort, because of its military nature and location at the border line while the other called *poselenie* I refer to as settlement, because it was populated mostly by civilians, and usually located behind the line of forts. Forts regularly converted to settlements after the advance of the borders.
7. The word Cossack (Russian Kazak) was derived from the Turkic Kazak, which means free frontiersman. The most important Cossack hosts up to the 18th century were: the Don Cossacks, the Yaik (later became known as Ural Cossacks), and the Terek Cossacks. Each community was headed by an elected Ataman. See *Bolshaia sovetskaia entsyklopediia*, article "Kazak"; also vide Pushkarev, S. G., *Dictionary of Russian Historical Terms*, pp. 34-35. Vide as well footnote (a) chapter one.
8. Chabrov, G. N., "Russkie poseleniia...", *Trudy SAGU*, No. XC, (Tashkand 1957), p. 153.
9. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. I, p. 108.
10. Chabrov, G. N., "Russkie poseleniia mezhdru Orenburgom i Tashkentom v XIX nachale XX vv. (1824-1917)", *Trudy SAGU*, vypusk, 1957, p. 157.
11. *Quarterly Review*, "The Military Position of Russia in Central Asia", (1877) vol. CXLIII, p. 552.
12. Chabrov, "Russkie poseleniia...", pp. 153-7.
13. Chabrov, G. N., "Russkie poseleniia mezhdru Orenburgom i Tashkentom v XIX nachale XX vv. (1824-1917)", *Trudy SAGU*, vypusk, 1957, p. 153.
14. *Voennaia entsiklopediia*, (St. Petersburg 1911) vol. I, p. 213; quoted in Chabrov, "Russkie poseleniia...", p. 174.
15. Fueter, Edward, *World History, 1815-1920*, (London 1925), pp. 220-222.
16. Rasul-Zade, P. N., *Iz istoii sredneasiatsko-indiiskikh svyazei vtoroi poloviny XIX nachala XX veka*, p. 33-4.
17. Chabrov, G. N., "Russkie poseleniia...", p. 153.

18. FOCP 2421, inclosure in No. 60, Abbott to Granville, March 15, 1873.
19. *Quarterly Review*, "The Russians in Central Asia", vol. 118, pp. 553-5.
20. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 319-321; also vide Dmitriev-Mamonov, A. E., *Putevoditel' po Turkestanu...*, (St. Petersburg 1903), p.61. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, (Tashkand 1947) p. 347.
21. Schuyler, E., *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 145.
22. Suleimenov, B. S., and Basin, V. Ia., *Vostanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane*, (Akademiiia Nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, Alma-Ata 1977), p. 35.
23. Bartold, V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 324-6.
24. Quoted in Suleimenov, B. S., and Basin, V. Ia., *Vostanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane*, p. 29-30.
25. He was the Governor-General of the Syr Daria province in the sixties, and author of the most detailed account of Skobelev's expedition against the Turkomans in 1880-1881, *Voina v Turkmenii i pokhod Skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg 1883).
26. Dmitriev-Mamonov, A. E., *Putevoditel' po Turkestanu...*, (St. Petersburg 1903) p. 61.
27. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 210.
28. Terentiev, M. A., *Istoriia zavoevanii srednei Azii*, vol. I, p. 203; also vide Chabrov, G. N., Op. cit., "Russkie poseleniia", *Trudy SAGU*, No. XC, (Tashkand 1957), p. 158.
29. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, pp. 81-2.
30. Chabrov, "Russkie poseleniia...", p. 158. Kos Aral is a very small fortification but strategically important, on the shore of the Aral sea, intended to protect fishermen in the region and check the antagonistic Uralian immigrants, who were exiled from Bashkiria to this region.
31. See Appendix I, points Nos. 11-17.
32. Bartold, V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 323-6.
33. The verst equals 1.067 kilometers.
34. Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. I, p. 208; and Chabrov, "Russkie Poseleniia...", p. 162.
35. Chabrov, "Russkie poseleniia...", p. 165.
36. These forts were: Raimsk; Kazala or Fort No. 1; Kermakchi or Fort No. 2; and Kamysh-Kurgan or Fort No. 3 on the Kuvan Daria river.
37. Chabrov, "Russkie poseleniia...", p. 166.
38. Chabrov, "Russkie poseleniia...", p. 174.

39. Turgai district extended from Orenburg and Orsk in the north, to the lower Sary Su river and the northern shores of the Aral Sea in the south while the district of Syr Daria included territories between Turgai district and the boundaries of the Khanates.
40. Chabrov, "Russkie poseleniia...", p. 153.
41. Maev, N. A., *Putevoditel' ot St. Peterburga do Tashkenta*, (St. Petersburg 1870) p. 40; quoted in Chabrov, "Russkie Poseleniia...", p. 177.
42. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, p. 349.
43. Gavrilov, N., *Pereselencheskoe delo v Turkestanskom krae*, (St. Petersburg 1911), p. 2.
44. Gavrilov, N., *Pereselencheskoe delo v Turkestanskom krae*, (St. Petersburg 1911), pp. 157-8.
45. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 321; also, *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, p. 348.
46. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, pp. 351 ff.
47. *Inorodtsy* are people of non-Slavic ethnic groups living permanently in the Russian Empire.
48. Bartold, V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p.235.
49. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, p. 350.
50. Central Government Archive, Ministry of Interior; file No. 30, case No. 23, sheet No. 4, 1866, quoted in Suleimenov, B. C.; Basin, B. Ia., *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane*, (Alma-Ata 1977), pp. 28-9.
51. Suleimenov, B. C.; Basin, B. Ia., *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane*, (Alma-Ata 1977) p. 29.
52. Terentiev, M. A., *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. III, p. 270.
53. Lykoshin, *Polzhizni...*, p. 76.
54. Levteeva, L. G., *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii k Rossii v memuarykh istochnikakh*, (Tashkand 1986), p.63, 119. Through this system Chuvashs, Mareians, Tatars, Udmurtians, and other nations have lost their alphabet compulsorily.
55. Kaufmann's report, quoted in Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. III, p. 271.
56. Op. cit. Kaufmann's report, quoted in Terentiev, *Istoriia...*, vol. III, p. 271.
57. Gavrilov, N., *Pereselencheskoe delo v Turkestanskom krae*, (St. Petersburg 1911) pp. 1-2.
58. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, (Moscow 1963) p. 319.

59. Gavrilov, N., *Pereselencheskoe delo v Turkestanskom krae*, (1911), p. 3.
60. Schuyler, E., *Turkestan...*, vol. II, p. 126.
61. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, p. 126.
62. Suleimenov; Basin, *Vosstanie 1916 goda v Kazakhstane*, p. 32.
63. *ibid.*
64. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 319.
65. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, pp. 319-320.
66. Geyer, *Putevoditel' po Turkestanu*, (Tashkand 1901), p. 191.
67. Pierce, Richard, *Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917*, (Berkeley and L.A. 1960), p. 205.
68. Vambery, V., *Western Culture in Eastern Lands*, (London 1906), p. 122.
69. Vambery, A., *Western Culture in Eastern Lands*, p. 93.
70. Bartold, V. V., *Sochineniia*, vol. II, pt. 1, p. 297-8.
71. Terentiev, M. A., *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, Vol. III, p. 271; also see, Pierce, Richard, *Russian Central Asia 1867-1917*, pp. 213-214; Levteeva, *Prisoedinenie...*, p. 63.
72. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. III. p. 303.
73. Curtis, W., *Turkestan, the Heart of Asia*, p. 333.
74. Ostroumov, N. K., quoted in Levteeva, *Prisoedinenie...*, p. 119.
75. Lykoshin, *Polzhizni...*, p. 226.
76. It was the same region where the Uralians were brought.
77. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. III, p. 303.
78. Terentiev, M. A., the author of one of the most comprehensive historical records of the Russian advance in Central Asia. For list of his works see the bibliography.
79. Terentiev, M. A., *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. III, p. 304.
80. Terentiev, M. A., *Istoriia zavoevaniia...*, vol. III, p. 303-4.
81. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, vol. II, p.352-3.

Chapter Eight

Footnotes:

1. *Khivinskii pokhod*, p. 130. When the Russians began to study the relations between Khiva and the Yomuds they discovered that the latter composed a considerable part of the Khivan army, and to some extent influenced the Khan's policy. The Khan sought refuge among them after the fall of his capital in 1873 as we have seen earlier.
2. Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, p. 321.
3. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, February 25, 1884.
4. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, 1862-1879*, II, 114-5.
5. MacGahan, *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva*, (1874), p. 352; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, 355.
6. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, pp. 72-80; Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, II, 267-9; MacGahan, *Campaigning*, 350-354; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, vol. II, 356.
7. Archive Grodekov, file No. 1, sheets 43-46 quoted in Tikhomirov, M. N., *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, p. 13.
8. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, 354.
9. Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, p. 14.
10. *Khivinskii pokhod*, p. 5-9; and *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, v. I, pt. 2, p. 96.
11. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, II, 266-267.
12. As already observed the campaign against the Yomuds can also be regarded as being motivated by the need to give the Turkestan army, which arrived at the capital of Khiva later than the Orenburg army under Verevkin, the opportunity to distinguish itself. Rawlinson, p. 325; Schuyler, II, pp. 354-5.
13. Official report published in the *Military Journal*, Dec. 1873, quoted in Schuyler, II, 356.
14. Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, p. 356.
15. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, II, 266-270; and MacGahan, *Campaigning*, 358 ff.
16. Schuyler, II, pp. 357-8; and Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, II, 269.
17. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, II, p. 269.
18. The eye-witness is believed to be MacGahan, for he was the only non-Russian (American) to accompany the expedition against Khiva and the campaign against the Yomuds as well; quoted in Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, 359.

19. MacGahan, *Campaigning*, pp. 368-77; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, 358.
20. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, II, pp. 281-4.
21. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 81. Lomakin was regarded as the General who had seriously damaged Russia's prestige by his successive failures. See Marvin, *Merv*, p. 342-5.
22. Russia, even at this late stage of her conquest in Central Asia, continued to claim that the annexation of these oases would complete her advance, for the annexation of Turkoman-
iia would secure for her "good frontier to round off her Caspian possessions". Vide Marvin, *Merv*, p. 345.
23. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, II, 248.
24. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, III, 1-4.
25. FOCP 2555, No. 14, Morier to Derby, January to June 1874; and Marvin, C., *Merv*, pp. 339-340, 344.
26. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, February 25, 1884.
27. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii*, p. 335.
28. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie*, p. 355; and Marvin, *Merv*, 385.
29. Rawlinson, pp. 326-9, 340-5; Krausse, pp. 86-88; and Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii k Rossii*, pp. 334-5.
30. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, v. II, p. 427-9.
31. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, vol. III, p. 4.
32. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 85.
33. He was said to be one of the most valiant Generals in the service of the Tsar. Upon his arrival at Chikishlar, he played a psychological game against the Turkomans. He inquired how many Tekke prisoners were being held by the Russians, when he was told that there were eighteen, he asked to be brought to him, and told them, "you are at liberty, go back and tell your people that I shall soon pay them a visit. Eighteen Turkomans are nothing to me; I shall take eighteen thousand Turkomans when I come, and will not leave a village in the whole district. Be off and tell this to your friends". MacGahan, quoted in Krausse, p. 86. Nonetheless, he was characterized as flexible by Terentiev when he compared him with the hard-liner General Tergukasov, vide Terentiev, *Istoriia*, III, 28.
34. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, I, 138-140.
35. Marvin, *Merv*, 392.
36. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, 96.
37. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, III, 5-6; and Schuyler, *Turkestan*, II, 380-1.

38. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, v. I, pt. 2, p. 95; and *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, II, 248.
39. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, February 25, 1884; and *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, II, 248.
40. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, II, 248.
41. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, February 25, 1884.
42. FO 65/929 (no number) September 16, 1875, draft of dispatch to Mr. Doria.
43. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, I, 134.
44. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, I, 134.
45. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 87.
46. FOCP 4040, Notes by Captain Milner and Captain Marshall, November 28, 1879; and *Istoriia Narodov Uzbekistana*, II, 249.
47. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, I, 169-170.
48. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, I, 171; Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, III, 28-31.
49. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, I, 173.
50. See chapter VII for more about the settlement of the Mennonites.
51. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, vol. I, p. 174; and chapter VI for the Central Asian military railroad.
52. *Arkhiv Grodekova*, file No. 2, quoted in Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, p. 45.
53. Central Military Archive (TsGVIA), Glavnyi Shtab, Aziatskaia Chast', F(ile) No. 400, C(ase) 43 (1880), sheet No. 1, March 27, 1880; quoted in Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii*, pp. 348-9.
54. Loftus, *Diplomatic*, II, 113.
55. FO 65/1060 No. 43, January 29, 1879 Loftus to Salisbury.
56. FO 65/1060 No. 43, January 29, 1879 Loftus to Salisbury.
57. General Tergukasov fell sick in December 1879, and was sent to the Caucasus for treatment and for rest. He did not improve and died in the same month.
58. Terentiev, *Istoriia zavoevaniia*, III, 34; and Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, I, 180.
59. *Istoriia Uzbekskoi SSR*, v. I, pt. 2, p. 96.

60. FO 65/1105 No. LVI, 1880, Abstract, Robert Mitchell
61. Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, II, 112; and Marvin, *Merv*, 391.
62. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, pp. 71-2.
63. Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva*, 46; and Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii*, 351-2.
64. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, I, 178.
65. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, 41.
66. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, 42.
67. Skobelev's Official Report, December 24, 1880, *Voennyi Sbornik*, April, 1881.
68. Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia*, III, 136.
69. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, pp. 60-1.
70. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, p. 61.
71. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, 65-8.
72. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, 78, 86.
73. Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, p. 46.
74. Grodekov, *Voina v Turkmenii*, II, 70-72.
75. Marvin, *Merv*, 386-9.
76. Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia*, III, 194; and Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, 51.
77. Marvin, *Merv*, 398; and Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, 51.
78. Marvin, *Merv*, 398.
79. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii*, 352.
80. FO 65/1128 No. 1, January 1, 1881, Dufferin to Granville; and FO 65/1128, No. 1, January 4, 1881, Thompson to Granville; also Marvin, *The Russian advance*, p. 51. The Russians lost in 1881, during Skobelev's siege of the Dengil Teppe, four mountain guns and three mortars. Vide Marvin, *Merv*, 394.
81. *Istoriia narodov Uzbekistana*, II, 249; Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, 51.
82. Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, 51-2. In a telegram General Skobelev admitted that "a flying column of all arms pursued and hacked the fugitives for 10 miles", quoted in Marvin, *Merv*, 399.

83. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, 100; Lord Curzon recorded similar numbers, vide *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 83.
84. Marvin, *The Russian Advance*, p. 307.
85. Kostenko, *Turkestanskii Krai*, (St. Petersburg 1880), quoted in Marvin, *Merv*, 393 and 400-401. Kostenko, one of the most informed Russian writers of that period, has a number of valuable articles mostly in the *Voennyi Sbornik* regarding the Russian operations in the region and in many instances diaries of officers. He also has several articles in the same source about the conquest of the Caucasus.
86. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, 101-2.
87. Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie Merva k Rossii*, 46-50.
88. Krausse, *Russia in Central Asia*, 102.
89. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, 105; and Marvin, *The Russians at Merv*, p. 164.
90. FOCP 5086, Memorandum, March 21, 1885.
91. FO 65/1252 No. 174, October 5, 1885, Enclosure to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.
92. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, E. Barrington, February 25, 1884.
93. Khalfin, *Prisoedinenie Srednei Azii*, 352.
94. Obviously by employing them against her enemies, she evaded their resentment and created unique circumstances for the success of her "no retreat policy", which stand as a reminder of her early ventures in Central Asia when, as Lord Curzon shrewdly described it, as "a forward movement, whether voluntarily undertaken, or beneath the pressure of circumstances, is seldom repented of and never receded from. No return tickets are issued to a punitive foray of Cossacks. Advance is inexorably followed by annexation". Vide *Russia in Central Asia*, p. 387.
95. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, I, 209-211; Grodekoy, *Voina*, I, 212-3; Marvin, *Merv*, 394; and Loftus, *The Diplomatic Reminiscences*, 114.
96. Grodekoy is the author of a complete account of the war in Turkomania, *Voina v Turkomenii, Pokhod skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, see bibliography.
97. Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia*, II, p. 525.
98. Shchovalov to Kaufmann, letter, quoted in Terentiev, *Istoriia Zavoevaniia*, II, 525.
99. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, February 25, 1884.
100. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, February 25, 1884.
101. FOCP 5086, Memorandum, March 21, 1885; also FOCP 4930, February 25, 1884.

102. FOCP 5086, Memorandum, March 21, 1885.
103. FO 65/901, (no Number) Dec. 18, 1873, Memorandum, Sir H. Rawlinson to Mr. Grant Duff.
104. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, III, 246-9; and Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie*, p. 131.
105. Lansdell, H., *Russian Central Asia*, (1885) vol. II, pp. 484-488.
106. Terentiev, *Istoriia*, II, 242-5; and Tikhomirov, *Prisoedinenie*, 131.
107. FOCP 4930, Memorandum, February 25, 1884.
108. This what happened at the outskirts of Ak Teppe on March 26, 1885 where the Russians were encamping. A column of Turkoman cavalry approached Kizyl Teppe and proceeded toward Pul-i-Khisti. Their purpose was discovering the Afghan positions and to get involved in affray with them. When the Afghan troops, and the present British officers, warned them not to advance, on this occasion they retreated. FOCP 5039, Memorandum, April 10, 1885.
109. Sir Charles MacGregor, quoted in Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 106.
110. FOCP 5093, Memorandum, April 10, 1885.
111. FOCP 5162, Memorandum, June 29, 1885. It should be clear that all these assurances were designed to pacify Great Britain, and this one stands as reminder of previous assurances by the Emperor and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Gorchakov, during the Russian advance from the early sixties, when allegedly Russia wanted to join the Siberian and the Orenburg lines in one front, up to the annexation of the Turkomans' country and Merv.
112. FOCP 5140, No. 72, Colonel Trench to Thornton, March 31, 1885.
113. FOCP 5140, No. 72, Trench to Thornton, March 31, 1885.
114. FOCP 5093, Memorandum, April 10, 1885.
115. FOCP 5140, No. 134, Granville to Thornton, April 11, 1885.
116. FOCP 5093, April 10, 1885.
117. Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, p. 106.
118. Langer, *Diplomacy of Imperialism*, pt. I, pp. 37-38; and Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, (1899) p. 373.
119. Sweet, *British Foreign Policy 1907-1909, The Elaboration of the Russian Connection*, (Unpublished thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy), pp. 43-7, 62 ff.; Krausse, *Russia in Asia*, pp. 106-108, 303-305.

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The writings of western officials and travellers who visited the region contain indispensable first hand descriptions. I have especially utilised those who were equipped with knowledge of the Russian language, among whom we find Eugene Schuyler, the American Chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg, who, after a visit to the region, contributed *Turkestan: Notes on a Journey in Russian Turkestan, Kokand Bukhara, and Kuldja*, (2 volumes, London 1876), which deals, among other important subjects, with issues such as the Russian immigration to the region and the Russian administration; Henry Lansdell, who also was invited by the Imperial Government to visit Central Asia and later published *Russian Central Asia including Kuldja, Bokhara, Khiva, and Merv*, (2 volumes, London 1885); and Charles Marvin's eye-witness narrative in his *The Eye-witness account of the disastrous Russian campaign against the Akhal Tekke Turkomans, describing the March across the burning desert, the storming of Dengeel Tepe, and the disastrous retreat to the Caspian*, (London 1880) (and his other works listed in this bibliography): he was an Englishman who was allowed to accompany the advancing Russian armies, and tells of his personal meetings and interviews with Skobelev on the eve of his departure to Central Asia as Commander-in-Chief of the Transcaspian army, which have made his books indispensable even to Russian and Soviet historians who have referred to them frequently. The same privilege, i.e. exemption to accompany the Russian advancing forces, was granted to Januarius A. MacGahan. This made his book *Campaigning on the Oxus and the Fall of Khiva* (1874) essential as an eye-witness account for the historians investigating this campaign. Lord Curzon's *Russia in Central Asia in 1889 and the Anglo-Russian Question*, (London 1889), also was based on personal observations during his visit to Central Asia in the autumn of

1888. His travelling along the Transcaspian railway makes his book an indispensable reference for any study of that project, its local impact and potential as an effective arm in Russia's contest with England. Additional value to this book, comes from the fact that it was read, before publishing, by M. Lessar, previously Russia's political agent in Bukhara, who in 1889 was Consul-General at Liverpool. The threat to India and rivalry between the two empires was discussed in *The Central Asian Question from an Eastern Stand-Point*, (London, Edinburgh 1869), an unsigned work whose contents give evidence that its author was well informed about the relations between the two Empires, England and Russia, their intentions and strength in Asia. Originally this appear to have had a restricted circulation within the government but was subsequently published. A lively representation of political activities in St. Petersburg, and of Anglo-Russian and Russo-Turkish relations, is in *The Diplomatic Reminiscences of Lord Augustus Loftus, 1862-1879*, (2 volumes London 1894). Other European writers and travellers, besides recording integral and unique accounts of Central Asian politics and economy, provided us with historical records of the customs, heritage, character, and tradition of the people of Central Asia. J. P. Ferrier in *Caravan Journey and wanderings in Persia, Afghanistan, Turkistan, and Beloochistan; with a historical notices of the Countries lying between Russia and India*, (London 1856), made a lively reconstruction of the countries traversed by him. The author, besides his description of roads and social life, paid attention to early Russian efforts in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Among these travellers also we find prominent scholars and writers such as Armenius Vambery, who wrote several books that deal with the rivalry between Bukhara and Afghanistan, types of governments in both countries, their commercial and educational institutions, and Russia's strategy and its commercial superiority in Bukharan markets, e.g. in his *Travels in Central Asia*, (London 1864). The politics of both European Empires were dealt with in his *Central Asia and the Anglo-Russian Frontier Question*, (London 1874); in *Sketches of Central Asia*, (London 1868), Vambery included a brisk description of minute specifications of social life and local administration; and in *Western Culture in Eastern Lands*, (London 1906), he illustrated the dimensions of change in the life and social structure of the Khanates after massive immigration from European

Russia, the type of local government imposed by St. Petersburg and the system of education and methods of coercion followed by the Russian administration. An invaluable work examining Russian strength in Central Asia is a volume by Singh, S. H., *A History of Kokand*, (Lahore 1878). This book is based on original intelligence submitted to the Government of India by Pandit Manphul, an official of the Punjab authorities. Manphul was dispatched on an intelligence mission to Central Asia in 1865 accompanied by three assistants. Their original accounts provided the basis of Singh's book which deals, among other issues, with Russia's military strength in Turkestan and the threat facing Kokand from that power. The military presence and influence of both empires in their respective spheres was traced by a member of the Royal Geographical Society, D. C. Boulger, in *England and Russia in Central Asia*, 2 vols. (London 1879). It is needless to say that his *Central Asian Portraits* (1880) is an essential biographical reference to a number of Central Asian dignitaries. Russia's strategy against British India was discussed profoundly in H. Southerland Edwards' *Russian Projects against India from the Czar Peter to General Skobelev*, (London 1885). The same subject was thoroughly investigated by G. Malleon, an officer of the army of the Indian Government, in *The Russo-Afghan Question and the Invasion of India*, (London 1885). An indispensable volume about the politics of both empires in Asia, their political and economic rivalry in Asia, and its direct effect on the Khanates of Central Asia and Afghanistan, is Henry Rawlinson's *England and Russia in the East* (London 1875). Besides these sources there are other contemporary works and articles in different periodicals listed in this bibliography which have proved most illuminating.

The nineteenth-century Russian sources have of course been utilized by previous authors, however, these sources remain far from being fully used. It is appropriate to say that these sources, especially those written by Russian orientalists, Generals, and officials who served in Central Asia, among whom we find Khanikov, Valikhanov, Terentiev, Grodekov, Kaufmann, Skobelev, Grulev, and academicians such as Bartol'd, and others, contain a very wide a range of useful material, not only for the political historian, but for other fields of history: economic, social, and military. Miliutin's *Dnevnik*, (3 volumes Moscow 1947-1950) stands as the best

source in regard to correspondence and communication with Generals in Central Asia. These three volumes contain excellent material which demonstrate St. Petersburg's firm control over proceedings in Central Asia, which help to refute the assumption that the Central Government could not control "ambitious Generals" in Central Asia. General M. A. Terentiev was one of the highest ranking officials in Kaufmann's office in Turkestan for a long period that extended from the year of the formation of the Turkestan province (1867) until the early 1880s. His works, besides the fact that they are a complete narrative of the Russian conquest, was a first hand account and differ from other works by their apparent impartiality. The neutrality of his judgement was the main reason behind the Imperial censor's decision to postpone publishing his works for more than a quarter of a century. In *Rossia i Anglia v bor'be za rynki*, (St. Petersburg 1876), Terentiev extensively discussed economic rivalry between Russia and England in Asia with emphasis on Russia's advantages in this contest; in *Russia and England in Central Asia*, (2 vols.) (translated by Daukes, F. C., Calcutta 1876), the author reviewed the history of the Russo-Central Asian relations and the position of both Empires in the region; *Istoriia zavoevaniia srednei Azii*, (3 volumes St. Petersburg 1906), is among the best historical sources about the Russian advance in Central Asia. In this work Terentiev discussed events, military operations, and the attitude of Central Asians, officials and laymen, giving very interesting details. The same can be said about General Grodekov, who was an active figure in the military administration of Central Asia, in Kaufmann's office as well, for most of his career. He recorded in minute detail Skobelev's campaign against the Turkomans in his *Voina v Turkmenii, pokhod Skobeleva v 1880-1881 gg.*, (3 volumes, St Petersburg 1883), besides which he left complete archive named after him as *Arkhiv Grodekova*. These most important works of both Terentiev and Grodekov, are not translated. The Khivan expedition was discussed as well in *Khivinskii pokhod 1873 g.*, (St. Petersburg 1888), an anonymous study but the details it contains prove that the author was closely involved in preparing military operations against Khiva. It contains vital and itemized military details of plans and of armies which took part in the Khivan campaign. Alikanov Avarskii, a renowned Russian officer who served in Central Asia, left interesting accounts in his articles

published in *Vestnik Evropy*, "Zakaspeiskie vospominaniia 1881-1885", part I in volume September 1904, and part II in volume October 1904. His original name was Maqsud Ali khan Avari, originally from Daghistan. After joining the Russian army as an officer, he demonstrated vivid energy and accomplished skillfully tasks assigned to him in Central Asia. In these articles he speaks of his efforts in reconnoitering the region to the south of Askabad; his clandestine visit to Merv, and negotiating with the four Khans of Merv. The author in astonishing details describes the efforts spent to survey Serakhs, the basin of the Tedzhen river, and the intrigues against the Saryk Turkomans. Skobelev's project for the invasion of India, which later was found in the papers of Prince Cherkaskii, leaves no doubt about the intention of Russia's Generals and politicians against British India for political, strategic, and economic purposes. Skobelev in his project "Proekt M. D. Skobeleva o pokhode v Indiiu", *Istoricheskii vestnik*, vol. XIV, Dec. 1883, elaborated on methods of conducting the campaign and the consequences of invading India on European politics. Among interesting works about Trans-Caspian railway we find Dmitriev-Mamonov's *Putevoditel po Turkestanu i sredne-aziatskoi zheleznoi dorogi*, (St. Petersburg 1903): a very informative book about the history of the project and its later development from military railway to civilian project, the author describes in detail the regional, political and economic impact of the project, as well as its management and the historic places traversed by the railway. A valuable study of later stages of immigration to the east, its social and economic aftermath is Isaev's *Pereselenie v russkom narodnom khoziaistve*, (St. Petersburg 1891). Kostenko, Lev Feofilovich (1841-91), wrote several articles about his military activities in both Central Asia and the Caucasus. The author, after graduation from the Academy of the General Staff, was attached to Turkestan military circles in 1867. He took part in the Khivan expedition in 1873, and in 1887 was appointed as chief of the Asian department of the General Staff. He wrote a considerable number of articles dealing with the Khanates of Bukhara and Khiva; among which "Opisanie puteshestviia Russkoi missii v Bukharu"; and "Gorod Bukhara v 1870", *Voennyi sbornik*, 76 (1870). The two articles are closely correlated. In the first the author discussed the customary Russian way of dealing with Central Asians and described life in the

steppe and the roads crossing this region. The article contains valuable facts about the education and economy of Samarkand. In the second article Kostenko depicts social life in the Khanate, as well as Russo-Bukharan and Anglo-Bukharan trade: also in both articles he discusses the status of Russian fugitives in Bukhara. In a very informative article "Istoricheskii ocherk rasprostraneniia russkago vladychestva v srednei Azii", *Voennyi sbornik*, August 1887, the author discussed reasons for, and stages of Russia's advance in Central Asia. The author also underlined the advantages of Russia's geographic location on the Eurasian landmass. Bukhara, its internal and foreign affairs, were scrutinized by D. N. Logofet in number of interesting works; *Bukharskoe khanstvo pod russkim protektoratom*, (2 vols., St. Petersburg 1911), where he as an advocate of the annexation of Bukhara and defends his point of view from political as well as economic aspects. He has several other works about this Khanate; *Ocherki i rasskazy* (St. Petersburg 1905); *Na granitsakh srednei Azii, putevye ocherki* (St. Petersburg 1909); *Strana bespraviiia, bukharaskoe khanstvo i ego sovremennoe sostoiianie*, (St. Petersburg 1909). *Bukharskoe khanstvo pod russkim protektoratom* is probably the most important because the author, besides other matters, discusses in detail the social and political life of the Khanate. Misuse of authority by the Bukharan government was exceptionally underlined. His points of view were accepted as guidelines by the Turkestan government when the fate of Bukhara was under discussion in 1909. P. Nebolsin in several, mostly economic works, illustrates Russia's increasing interest in Central Asia, and in the meantime demonstrates the inferiority of Russia's merchandise compared to European goods dominating Central Asian markets. He sought to portray Russia as the most advantageous partner for the Central Asians. The history of Khiva has ample works, however N. G. Zalesov's, due to the author's participation in political life, are among those most interesting, "Pokhod v Khivu Kapitana Nikiforova v 1841g", *Voennyi sbornik*, (1861) No. 8; and "Posolstvo v Khivu Podpolkovnika Danilevskogo v 1842 g.", *Voennyi sbornik*, 1866, No. 5; reprinted in *Russkii Vestnik*, 1871, No. 2, pp. 421-440 and No. 3, pp. 42-82. Zalesov (1826-1896) began his career in Orenburg oblast' as an officer and was promoted during his long service (1848-1870) and became Chief of Staff of Orenburg Corps. The author took part in Ignatiev's mission

to Khiva and Bukhara in 1858, hence his articles are regarded as first hand accounts. See *Russkaia starina*, April-December 1903 about the author's biography.

Yet Bartol'ds works; *Sochineniia*, (9 volumes in 10, Moscow 1963-1977), *Istoriia izuchenie vostoka v Evropy i Rossii* (Leningrad 1925), are not only complete but among rare works that can be considered impartial. They include besides historical accounts, reliable studies of other economic, social, cultural, and political aspects. Bartol'd, a well known academic, worked on the history of these Khanates under two political patterns, the Tsarist and Bolshevik systems. However his approaches are reliable and cherished by contemporary historians of the region.

Besides the above mentioned, sources for the history of Central Asia itself are abundant and various. They include rich and well documented "waqf" chronicles and records of legislative processes in the Khanates. However, most of these sources remain unstudied, and untranslated into any European language other than Russian. Accounts of European diplomats and travellers, including Russian, are among the most important sources. There is another series of accounts: memoirs which include highly informative material and fairly used as well, including official archives of the Khanates, accounts of merchants who narrated to Russian authorities, of course upon their request, their observations. In addition to that, one can add descriptions and tales of freed slaves or abducted citizens which contain ample information, despite the fact they should be handled with vigilance and extra care due to the fact that narrators may tend to exaggerate. Most of these accounts and manuscripts are preserved in the Institute for the study of Eastern Manuscripts, Academy of Science of Uzbeksan SSR, hence their availability to foreign writers is limited to quotations in Russian works.

However, diplomatic and missionary accounts can be characterised as among the most accurate and comprehensive. This category of sources includes communique, military and political, and official reports such as those of De Maizon and Vitkevich about their missions to Bukhara published recently as *Zapiski o Bukhar-skom Khanstve*, (Moscow 1983). These reports are among the first that can be classified as intelligence reports about internal and external affairs of the Khanates. These reports included highly valuable accounts about economic, political, social,

and most interestingly about religious affairs. To the same category belong the accounts of the orientalist Khanikov, Valikhanov and others, mining engineers Butenev and Bogoslovskii, and diplomatic reports of Nikiforov, Butenev, Danilevskii, Ignatiev and other diplomats who were commissioned officially for negotiations with the governments of the Khanates. Their accounts are recorded in Zhukovskii's *Snosheniia Rossii s Bukharoi i Khivoi za poslednye trekhstotletie*, (Petrograd 1915): A highly useful study of Russia's political exertions to influence Central Asian Khanates through official envoys.

The inaccessibility of unpublished original sources, to foreign writers gives great value to Russian published works based on those sources. Hence the works of Popov, especially in view of the author's established impartiality, have great value. His articles "Borba za sredneaziatskii platsdarm" and "Iz istorii zavoevaniia srednei Azii" derive their importance from the fact that they are based on the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, MID), *Tsentralno-voenno istoricheskii arkhiv* (TsVIA), *Morskoi sbornik* (MS), *Torgovyi sbornik* (TS), *Akty Kavkazskogo arkhologicheskogo komiteta* (AKAK), *Moskovskie vedomosti* (MV), *Arkhiv Grodekova* (AG), *Russkii arkhiv* (RA), *Zapiski russkogo geograficheskogo obshchestva* (ZRGO), and others. The same is true regarding M. Rozhkova's *Ekonomicheskaiia politika tsarskogo pravitelstva na srednem vostokey v vtoroi chetverti XIX veka i russkaia burzhuaziia*, (Moscow 1949), *Ekonomicheskie sviazi Rossii so srednei Aziei*, (Moscow 1963), and her article "Iz istorii torgovlii Rossii so srednei Azii v 60-kh godakh XIX veka", *Istoricheskie zapiski*, No. 67 (1960); and N. A. Kalfin's *Politika Rossii v srednei Azii*, and *Prisoedinenie srednei Azii K Rossii*. Grulev's *Sopernichestvo Rossii i Anglii v srednei Azii*, (St. Petersburg 1909), is based mostly on personal observation during his long service in the region. Other Russian sources will be commented on in the following bibliographical list.

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