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*Urbanising the Security-Development Nexus: A  
Revisited Perspective on Segregation Governance in  
Miskolc, Hungary*

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## Abstract

### **Urbanising the Security-Development Nexus: A Revisited Perspective on Segregation**

#### **Governance in Miskolc, Hungary**

*Miklós János Dür*

The thesis develops a critique of two competing visions of urban segregation governance in Miskolc, a medium-sized post-industrial city in Northern Hungary. At one end of the spectrum lies a penal populist agenda of displacing the marginalised, and primarily the city's Roma population, through slum clearances and policing interventions to prevent said groups from circulating back into the city. At the other end is an emancipatory and pro-welfare social policy approach that works on social divides in situated, sensitive, and sympathetic ways. The two perspectives are by no means mutually exclusive, however. Instead, they are wielded in tandem with varying intensity depending on the political stance and options of the municipal administration, and ultimately orchestrate the same hegemonic vision of keeping unwanted surplus populations at bay.

The study demonstrates that the overlapping domains of penal and social policy in Miskolc are shot through with the notions of security and development in their discursive and practical mobilisations alike. To make sense of these relationships, the security-development nexus (SDN) – a concept predominantly utilised in international geopolitical and development research thus far – is adapted to the urban level. An SDN-based perspective allows us to understand the ways that social divides are governed in Miskolc through a joint operation of sovereign power and biopower. Additionally, it enables a holistic and interconnected view of segregation governance in neoliberal cities rather than being siloed to either security or development alone. The study reflects on the above outlined dynamics against the backdrop of right-wing populism, which continues to dominate mainstream Hungarian politics.

**Urbanising the Security-Development Nexus: A Revisited Perspective on Segregation  
Governance in Miskolc, Hungary**

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Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Department of Geography

Durham University

2023

## Table of Contents

<b>Abstract</b> .....	<b>1</b>
<b>Statement of Copyright</b> .....	<b>12</b>
<b>Acknowledgements</b> .....	<b>13</b>
<b>1. Introduction</b> .....	<b>14</b>
1.1 Cutting-edge surveillance behind prefab panel walls.....	14
1.2 Scoping the thesis: core aims and openings .....	16
1.3 Conceptual background in a nutshell .....	19
1.4 Roma discrimination in Europe: contextualising intersections of security and development .....	21
1.4.1 The European Roma and security .....	22
1.4.2 The European Roma and development .....	23
1.5 Illiberal Hungary? .....	25
1.6 Study composition: locating intersections.....	30
1.7 Research questions .....	32
1.8 Structure .....	35
<b>2. Conceptual underpinnings</b> .....	<b>37</b>
Chapter introduction.....	37
2.1 The security–development nexus: an overview .....	38
2.2 Duffield’s dual critique of the SDN .....	42
2.2.1 Circulation and sovereign power: the geopolitics of global developmentalism .....	43
2.2.2 The biopolitical governance of the global poor.....	47

2.3 The SDN within the global North: overlooked scalar dimensions?.....	52
2.3.1 The SDN and the European Roma .....	55
2.4 Urbanising the SDN .....	57
2.4.1 Why downscale? Rationale and approach.....	58
2.4.2 Locating sovereign power and circulations in the neoliberal city.....	61
2.4.3 Welfare state diminution and biopolitics in the urban borderlands .....	63
2.4.4 Towards an integrated urban SDN .....	67
Chapter conclusion.....	69
<b>3. Context: the Roma and segregation in Hungary and Miskolc.....</b>	<b>72</b>
Chapter introduction.....	72
3.1 The Roma .....	72
3.1.1 Identification and classification .....	74
3.1.2 The Roma and security: the ethnicization and criminalisation of poverty.....	76
3.1.3 The Roma and development: the endless deferral of emancipation.....	81
3.1.3.1 Civil society and the Roma under illiberal social policy .....	84
3.2 Miskolc: a transitioning patchwork city.....	87
3.2.1 Pathfinding and polarisation.....	90
3.2.2 In the grip of a centralised state .....	92
3.2.3 Segregation in Miskolc: an overview .....	94
3.2.4 The main study areas.....	97
3.2.4.1 Lyukó Valley.....	98
3.2.4.2 The Numbered Streets .....	101

Chapter conclusion .....	104
<b>4. Methodology .....</b>	<b>106</b>
Chapter introduction.....	106
4.1 Methodological design principles .....	107
4.2 Methods: facts, rationale, and reflections.....	108
4.2.1 Semi-structured interviews.....	109
4.2.2 Documentary analysis .....	112
4.2.3 Participant observation and field diary.....	114
4.2.4 Triangulation .....	115
4.3 Data analysis .....	117
4.4 Ethics.....	119
4.4.1 Doing no harm and giving back .....	120
4.5 The impact of COVID-19 on the fieldwork.....	121
4.6 Positionality: “You don’t look like someone who’s researching the Roma...”.....	122
4.6.1 Implications of an ‘outsider’ narrative position .....	125
4.7 Between East and West.....	127
Chapter conclusion.....	128
<b>5. Life-chance divides in the making .....</b>	<b>130</b>
Chapter introduction.....	130
5.1 “It is not the skin colour – it is the behaviour”: producing (in)civility and (under)development .....	134
5.1.1 Behaviour in public discourse .....	134

5.1.1.1 Welfare dependency .....	135
5.1.2 Behaviour in politics and policy.....	139
5.2 The ‘lowest common denominator’ and racialised public security.....	142
5.2.1 Crime in public discourse.....	145
5.2.2 Crime in politics: minefield or vicious circle? .....	147
5.2.3 Crime in policy.....	152
5.3 Mid-chapter reflections .....	154
5.4 The territorial production of life-chance divides.....	155
5.4.1 Territorial stigma in public discourse.....	155
5.4.2 Territoriality in politics and policy.....	161
5.4.2.1 A bird’s-eye view of segregation .....	161
5.4.2.2 Concentrating the margins and containing underdevelopment .....	163
5.4.2.3 Administering ‘no man’s land’ .....	165
5.5 Future prospects .....	169
Concluding remarks .....	174
<b>6. The populist politics of security and shifting frontiers of circulation .....</b>	<b>178</b>
Chapter introduction.....	178
6.1 Disrupting circulation.....	182
6.1.1 The strongmen and the slum: populist securitisation in action .....	186
6.1.1.1 Case study: the nest-builder controversy in Avas .....	188
6.2 Diverting circulation: out of sight, out of mind?.....	191
6.2.1 Selective slum clearances .....	192

6.2.1.1 The Numbered Streets evictions .....	193
6.2.1.2 Is Lyukó too far to matter? .....	197
6.2.2 Securing mobility .....	199
6.2.3 Police presence .....	203
6.2.3.1 Policing in the Numbered Streets: a case of situated mediation? .....	203
6.2.3.2 Policing in Lyukó: all talk and no action?.....	206
6.2.4 Selective surveillance and the consolidation of a new circulatory order .....	209
6.3 Sustaining circulation: the securitisation deadlock .....	218
Chapter conclusion .....	224
<b>7. The scalar paradox of biopower: towards governing in proximity? .....</b>	<b>228</b>
Chapter introduction.....	228
7.1 Outsourcing and self-responsibility in perspective .....	233
7.1.1 At a distance .....	233
7.1.1.1 Complications at a distance: the localisation debate .....	238
7.1.2 In proximity .....	241
7.1.3 Instilling self-responsibility through labour? A comparison between distance and proximity .....	245
7.2 Constellations with sovereign power .....	249
7.2.1 At a distance: a biopolitical valve of social tensions .....	250
7.2.1.2 Does right-wing populism make a difference to the exercise of biopower? ..	253
7.2.2 In proximity: intersections of support .....	257
7.2.2.1 Relations with sovereign power: the case of education .....	257

7.2.2.2 Sensitive policing: sovereign power in proximity.....	261
Concluding remarks: the silence of biopolitics? .....	265
<b>8. Conclusion.....</b>	<b>270</b>
8.1 Findings.....	272
8.1.1 Research question 1: how is segregation in Miskolc understood in the governance, politics, and daily life of the city? .....	272
8.1.2 Research question 2: in what ways are these understandings reflected in municipal approaches to penal and social policy, especially in view of right-wing populist politics in Miskolc and Hungary? .....	275
8.1.2.1 Penal policy .....	276
8.1.2.2 Social policy .....	277
8.1.3 Research question 3: how, in whose interest, and to what effect is power operationalised in the municipality’s responses to segregation in the above two policy domains?.....	280
8.1.3.1 The nature and effects of the two forms of power .....	280
8.1.3.2 On the interests served .....	283
8.2 Limitations of research approach and findings .....	285
8.3 Implications of findings for future research.....	287
8.4 The outlook for Miskolc.....	290
<b>Appendix .....</b>	<b>292</b>
<b>Bibliography .....</b>	<b>303</b>

## List of Illustrations

Figure 1. The main building blocks of the study. My drawing.....	32
Figure 2. A visual interpretation and adaptation of the key components of Duffield’s (2007; 2010) critique of the liberal way of development. My drawing.....	43
Figure 3. Miskolc on the map of Hungary. My screenshot of Google Maps.....	88
Figure 4. An aerial photograph of some of the city’s abandoned factories. © LMP Miskolc – BAZ megye (2021). Image used with copyright owner’s permission. ....	89
Figure 5. Prefab panel apartment blocks in the Avas area. My photograph, 2020. ....	89
Figure 6. Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets on the map of Miskolc. My arrangement; map data from Google Maps. ....	97
Figure 7. A view of Lyukó Valley. My photograph, 2020.....	98
Figure 8. This van is the only “grocery store” in the centre of Lyukó Valley, selling basic goods by the main road. My photograph, 2020.....	100
Figure 9. A house from closer up in Lyukó. My photograph, 2020.....	101
Figure 10a) Streetscape and b) a waste dump in Lyukó. My photographs, 2020. ....	101
Figure 11a) and b). Abandoned and/or decaying houses in the Numbered Streets. My photographs, 2020. ....	103
Figure 12. Streetscape with renovated HCSOM social housing in the Numbered Streets. My photograph, 2020.....	103
Figure 13. A blog post about Lyukó Valley shared in a generic Facebook group for residents of Miskolc, with some selected stigmatising comments. Source: Facebook [edited and anonymised]. ....	158
Figure 14. A post in a public Facebook group for residents of Miskolc, with some selected sarcastic and demonising comments. Source: Facebook [edited and anonymised]. ....	159

Figure 15. Segregated neighbourhoods in Miskolc as of 2014 according to the council’s Integrated Urban Development Strategy, with the number of residents in each. Source of segregation data: Miskolc City Council (2014a). Map data from OpenStreetMap.....	185
Figure 16a) and b). Comparison of initial stops of buses No. 16 to Lyukó Valley and No. 6 to Pereces. My annotations; map data from Google Maps.....	201
Figure 17. The subcentre of the Municipal Police in Lyukó Valley. My photograph, September 2020.....	208
Figure 18. The location of the Municipal Police’s individual cameras across the city of Miskolc, installed as of 17th September 2021. Lyukó Valley is highlighted in yellow, and the Numbered Streets are in red. My arrangement; source of CCTV location data: MIÖR (2021b); map data from Google Maps. ....	213
Figure 19. An extract from Figure 18 for a closer image to illustrate the comparison between Lyukó Valley (red) and the Numbered Streets (yellow). My arrangement; source of CCTV location data: MIÖR (2021b); map data from Google Maps. ....	214
Figure 20. A further enlarged and annotated version Figures 18 and 19, showing the “boundary-cameras” (circled in red) controlling key routes of movement between Lyukó Valley and the internal city. My arrangement; map data from Google Maps.....	215
Figure 21. Crime statistics in Miskolc between 2006 and 2021, indicating the left-wing MSZP (red), Fidesz (orange), and joint opposition (grey) eras, with overlapping transition years in striped columns. My compilation based on data from Miskolc Constabulary (2010, 2021); Minap.hu (2019a, 2022). ....	220

## List of Abbreviations

B.A.Z. County = Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County

CBO = community-based organisation

CEE = Central and Eastern Europe

CPS = Crime Prevention Strategy

DK = Demokratikus Koalíció\* (Democratic Coalition)

HCLU = Hungarian Civil Liberties Union

HCSOM = Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta

IUDS = Integrated Urban Development Strategy

LGBTQ+ = lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer/questioning, and others

MESZEGYI = Miskolci Egyesített Szociális, Egészségügyi és Gyermekjóléti Intézmény\*  
(Miskolc United Social, Healthcare, and Child Welfare Institution)

MIÖR = Miskolci Önkormányzati Rendészet\*<sup>1</sup> (Miskolc Municipal Police)

MSZP = Magyar Szocialista Párt\* (Hungarian Socialist Party)

NEKI = Nemzeti és Etnikai Kisebbségi Jogvédő Iroda\* (Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities)

NGO = non-governmental organisation

SDN = security-development nexus

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<sup>1</sup> The asterisk (\*) denotes organisations and bodies that do not use an English name and/or acronym. In these cases, the original Hungarian abbreviations were retained.

## **Statement of Copyright**

*The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.*

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## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1 Cutting-edge surveillance behind prefab panel walls**

The buildings of the Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR) headquarters fit well into the rest of the streetscape with a socialist prefab panel architecture and dull yellow exterior. Upon my arrival for a visit, little did I know that one of these humble-looking structures was in fact home to the most advanced smart surveillance control room in Hungary, completed just a few years ago. As I entered, an executive officer greeted me, and we made our way to a large meeting and press room with an elongated roundtable. It was separated from the main operations control room by a glass window, where live camera images from around Miskolc were displayed on a sizeable wall of twenty-four screens. Occasional radio beeping could be heard as the officers on duty were communicating. Over several hours, the officer briefed me on the history and institutional structure of MIÖR, gave a virtual tour of different neighbourhoods in Miskolc from a public security perspective, and then demonstrated some of the impressive functionalities of the intelligent software behind the CCTV system. The cameras provide high-resolution and wide-angle images with pan and tilt properties and are capable of software-enabled intelligent functions, such as spotting unattended items, reading license plates, identifying group gatherings and vehicles entering or parking in unauthorised areas. The control room facility is staffed day and night as images from the city are monitored and analysed continuously.

Miskolc emerged as a backup field site after the COVID-19 pandemic had thwarted my original research plans on digital urbanism in Accra, Ghana. At the beginning of the first lockdown in spring 2020, I was a year into my doctoral studies and only a few months away from starting fieldwork in Ghana. However, the project became unfeasible due to the volatility of travel and pandemic regulations. Consequently, I had to look for an alternative destination and devise an altogether new study. Miskolc was the most rational choice given my master's research in the city on smart and digital initiatives (Dürr, 2018). Furthermore, it was more

directly accessible by national travel as I was based in Budapest between summer 2020 and spring 2021. With previous experience of the city's digital developments, I was hoping to continue studying them, thereby regaining some of the time lost due to the change of research trajectory.

The state-of-the-art intelligent CCTV network and control room constituted the flagship project of Miskolc City Council's bundle of smart city initiatives (Vécsi, 2017; Miskolc City Council, 2018a; Dürr, 2023). Still under development at the time of data collection for this thesis, the smart surveillance network entails a planned total of 790 cameras across the city, out of which 231 cameras were operational as of October 2022 (MIÖR, 2022; Minap.hu, 2016a; Miskolc City Council, 2017b, 2021g). While the municipal smart city vision entailed a further bundle of smaller projects such as public Wi-Fi networks aboard trams, smart grid improvements for the electricity network, a smartphone application for tourists visiting the city, and a generic error reporting app for residents, among other things, they were eclipsed by the magnitude of the CCTV network overall<sup>2</sup> (Miskolc City Council, 2017b, 2018a).

As I have argued elsewhere, the policy choice of making the smart surveillance apparatus *the* central and most generously funded element of the entire smart city package indicates that securitisation was a priority in imagining a digitally enhanced future Miskolc (Dürr, 2023; see also Miskolc City Council, 2017b; Miskolc City Council, n.d.; Government of Hungary, 2017; Minap.hu, 2019b). But why so? Although I had only sought to research the smart CCTV system itself at the beginning, available data sources and interview candidates ran out rapidly, public awareness of the smart surveillance project was limited, and I encountered early constraints to

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<sup>2</sup> Compared to other initiatives in the smart city strategy, the CCTV network and control room received by far the largest amount of state funding at 1.7 billion HUF (approximately £4.73 million) out of Miskolc's total smart city budget of 6.3 billion HUF (approximately £15.6 million) (Miskolc City Council, 2017b, n.d.; Government of Hungary, 2017).

data access in respect of the CCTV network due to privacy and data protection issues, which restricted further research along my original lines of inquiry. I therefore turned towards broader questions around the municipality's favouring of policing enhancements and the socio-political drivers that brought the CCTV project into being.

## **1.2 Scoping the thesis: core aims and openings**

This thesis is about the governance and politics of racialised segregation in Miskolc, in which the smart surveillance network is only the tip of the iceberg. The study aims to critically scrutinise penal and social policy as two co-constitutive halves of the hegemonic management, sorting, and ordering of the city's marginalised population, many of whom are Roma. It considers these processes against the wider backdrop of a right-wing penal populist political regime in Hungary – as well as in Miskolc before 2019 –, and the continued dominance of anti-Roma prejudice in public discourse both locally and nationwide. The thesis further seeks to understand the nature, operation, manifestations, and purposes of power deployed in municipal penal and social policy approaches to segregation.

The study argues that in Miskolc, the interconnected notions of security and development fundamentally underpin Roma-related popular imagination, political rhetoric, and decision-making alike. Consequently, security and development must also be integral to our interpretive vocabulary of racialised urban exclusion. Furthermore, it shows that although the hard-line and sometimes violent nature of power in anti-Roma securitisation measures may seem diametrically opposed to the benign character of social work in poor neighbourhoods, at the structural level they coproduce the same ultimate agenda of fashioning and upholding socio-spatial divides and hierarchies, despite some micro-scale instances of emancipatory intent.

Public security has been a pivotal concern in the recent history of Miskolc for a complex set of social and political reasons. As the former heavy industrial centre of Northern Hungary,

the city saw economic recession and surging socio-spatial inequality after the collapse of state socialism in 1989. Rising unemployment, poverty, segregation, and ghettoization in various parts of Miskolc came hand in hand with territorial stigma, ever more widely circulating perceptions of criminality and a declining sense of public safety in the city (Halász, 2018; Balatonyi and Cserti Csapó, 2016).

The city's sizeable Roma community – or Gypsies, as they are still called sometimes, although the term is now largely deemed pejorative (Vermeersch, 2012) – were worst hit by the reduction of low-skilled labour and consequent impoverishment. The proliferation of slum-like neighbourhoods therefore soon became racialised in public thinking as the Roma turned into the primary scapegoats for the city's recession and were widely associated with welfare dependency, incivility, and criminality (Ladányi, 2010 [1991]; Lengyel, 2009; Havasi, 2018). The racialisation of poverty gained particular traction among the low-income non-Roma population who, in competing with the Roma for the same jobs and resources, possessed no particular competitive edge in skills, education, or wealth, and have therefore resorted to racialisation as a desperate means to reassert their perceived superiority (see Chapter 5; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Scheiring and Szombati, 2020).

Many of the city's Roma – constituting up to 10-15 percent of Miskolc's population, above the national average of 8-9 percent<sup>3</sup> – continue to live in impoverished segregated neighbourhoods (Havasi, 2018; Halász, 2018; Kotics, 2020; Király et al., 2021). Tensions with the non-Roma majority remain acute, which many local politicians have been trying to exploit through punitive – and sometimes overtly racist – narratives around bringing the city's public security back under control (e.g., Fidesz Miskolc, 2010; HirTV.hu, 2019; Borsodihir.hu, 2020).

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<sup>3</sup> The reason why it is practically impossible to be more precise on these numbers is explored in section 3.1.1 of Chapter 3.

Consequently, revanchist slum clearances, as well as racialised and exclusionary socio-spatial ordering practices have repeatedly surfaced in municipal policy to varying degrees since the collapse of state socialism in 1989 (Havasi, 2018; Halász, 2018). Although human rights advocacy groups and Roma intellectuals regularly challenged such measures – sometimes successfully, other times less so – these largely discriminatory actions are nonetheless generally endorsed or at least tacitly accepted by the non-Roma public and have remained defining political questions for the city’s governance in the last few decades (Ladányi, 2010 [1991]; Lengyel, 2009; Havasi, 2018; Horváth, 2019).

In contrast to punitive governance practices, however, emancipatory social development responses have proven unpopular, mismanaged, and ineffective time and time again (Havasi, 2018)<sup>4</sup>. In the absence of successful large-scale welfarist social policy and inclusion packages, adequate employment, housing, and social mobility opportunities for the poorest, only two social services organisations have remained in the segregated neighbourhoods of Miskolc as the state’s outsourced provisioning bodies. They are called the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta (HCSOM) and the Miskolc United Social, Healthcare, and Child Welfare Institution (MESZEGYI for short in Hungarian), and they supply basic goods, provisions, and social support to the most deprived residents. Of particular interest to this study from a social policy perspective is a peripheral and semi-rural slum called Lyukó Valley – the largest segregated neighbourhood in the city and the whole of Hungary (see Section 3.2.4.1 in Chapter 3) –, where such outsourced social provisioning is taking place and will be analysed in depth (see Chapter 7).

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<sup>4</sup> See Section 6.1.1.1 in Chapter 6 on a corrupted and failed social housing initiative called the Nest-builder Programme.

As emancipatory efforts have stayed feeble, the intensity of penal populist interventions peaked in the 2010-2019 period when Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's right-wing populist Fidesz party was in power in the city. This was traceable in a series of controversial and racialised security measures to repress reportedly high crime rates. More specifically, the municipality pursued intimidatory police raids in segregated households, forcibly evicted impoverished residents from the Avas and the Numbered Streets neighbourhoods, substantially enlarged the Municipal Police, and rolled out the above introduced citywide smart CCTV network and its central operations control room (see Chapter 6; Miskolc City Council, 2019b).

The smart surveillance system's embeddedness within an escalating array of penal policy measures is what prompted this study to critically engage with the ways in which right-wing populism defines the governance of urban segregation and marginality in what is already a deeply racially contested setting (see Dürr, 2023). The heavy securitisation of Miskolc in recent years, together with an often overtly articulated anti-Roma policy attitude, serve as pivotal empirical entry points for this thesis.

### **1.3 Conceptual background in a nutshell**

To advance its inquiry into the governance of segregation in Miskolc, the thesis develops a conceptual framework that intersects existing debates on the security-development nexus (SDN) and neoliberal urbanism. Since the SDN has been predominantly used in international geopolitical and development analyses thus far, downscaling of the SDN to the urban level is the main theoretical task and contribution of this study. The conceptual components are only briefly introduced here for reference and will be unpacked in detail in Chapter 2 together with the contribution of downscaling the SDN to the city level.

The SDN in a classic sense is a post-Cold War foreign policy orthodoxy of Western countries towards the global South. Its core logic is that security and development are

interdependent in any social context around the world, and the improvement or decline of either domain is conducive to corresponding changes in the other. For example, a stable state that can enforce order within its territorial boundaries is also expected to develop more effectively than an unstable and conflict-ridden one (Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Bossard, 2012). Critics have argued, however, that the appeal of the nexus notwithstanding, the developed world deploys it in neo-colonial and interventionist ways to further its own security and development interests while further undermining that of the global South (Chandler, 2007). For Duffield (2007, 2010), there are two key dimensions to this agenda. First, through fortified border regimes and the imposition of sovereign power, the West outlaws the circulation of undocumented migrants who are seen as security threats belonging to the dangerous, unruly, and destabilising global surplus population. Second, it deploys foreign aid with the strategic biopolitical purpose of rendering the global surplus population self-reliant *within* its own habitat, thereby containing it from afar. Taken together, the two processes contribute to the entrenchment of an overall global life-chance divide between the North and the South.

The thesis demonstrates that through the scalar adaptation of Duffield's twofold critique of the SDN, its core tenets are transferable to the city level to make sense of the neoliberal governance of urban surplus populations and segregation. The downscaling will be performed with the help of parallels from existing theorisations of the neoliberal city. Crucially, the spatial and social sorting practices of neoliberal city leaderships likewise reflect the double motivation of the sovereign circulatory containment and remote biopolitical administration of the urban poor (cf. Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Stenson, 2005). First, as widely suggested in relation to revanchist urbanism, the punitive policing and banishment of the marginalised from revitalised consumerist city centres (e.g., among many others, Davis, 1990; Sibley, 1995; Smith, 1996; Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, 2002; Coleman, 2003; Peck et al., 2009), are arguably also matters of enabling and restricting different kinds of circulation (cf. Foucault, 2007). Second, as a

corollary to welfare state diminution, urban surplus life in deprived neighbourhoods is often largely abandoned and reconceived as self-reliant, since previously extensive state-based social protection provisions have become outsourced to underfunded third parties, including civil society, church-based organisations, and community charities (see Raco, 2009; Kamat, 2004; Rose, 1996; Tickell and Peck, 1996; Berner and Phillips, 2005; Di Muzio, 2008). As these bodies tend to lack the necessary resources to fully substitute the state, they merely act as providers of bare minimum life support, thus managing poverty at a distance without attempting to resolve it (Raco, 2009; cf. Duffield, 2007).

In many cases, the neoliberal city literature has discussed penal and social policy separately thus far (for a few exceptions, see Stenson, 2005; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006). In contrast, downscaling the SDN to the city level offers an integrated view of the two domains, highlighting their close entwinement and interplay in furthering elite interests. Additionally, it views segregation through a different vocabulary informed by political and development geographical concepts, such as sovereign power, life-chance divides, circulations, biopolitics, and adaptive self-reliance, all of which are unpacked in Chapter 2.

#### **1.4 Roma discrimination in Europe: contextualising intersections of security and development**

Across Europe, the Roma have been severely over-represented in the poorest and most marginalised sections of society for centuries. They constitute the most precarious minority across practically every socio-economic domain, including educational attainment, employment and income, access to healthcare, and housing conditions, among others (Barany, 2000, 2002). They are often framed as a fundamentally European ethnic minority without a state, even though they are far from homogenous and comprise many different communities and groups (Vermeersch and Ram, 2009; Parra, 2011; Rövid, 2011). Roma minorities are

commonly subjected to prejudice-fuelled perceptions of being uncivilised and criminalistic communities who refuse to integrate, which give way to their discriminatory treatment, exclusion, marginalisation, and collective positioning as a racialised ‘surplus’ population (van Baar, 2011). Put differently, they are frequently associated with negative connotations of security threats and developmental deficiencies in various public and institutional arenas, as discussed below.

#### *1.4.1 The European Roma and security*

Policies concerning the Roma are heavily security-orientated around Europe, underpinned by a self-justificatory discourse of bringing under control a group perceived as foreign, delinquent, destabilising, and disorderly (Guglielmo and Waters, 2005). Consequently, populists routinely resort to the punitive treatment of the Roma to rally support, promoting policing as a widely endorsed shortcut to settling issues around the Roma’s racialised marginality (see Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-a; Thornton, 2015).

In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), examples of discriminatory penal populist practices and racial violence abound, ranging from forced evictions to murderous nationalist vigilantism (see Barany, 1994, 2002; Toma, 2011; Fekete, 2014; Lancione, 2019; van Baar, 2018). The surveillance, policing, and punitive social sorting of the Roma in CEE is well documented and critiqued, including in Romania (Toma, 2011; Plájás et al., 2019; Lancione, 2019) and Hungary (Virág, 2016; Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017; Horváth, 2019). The region’s post-socialist transition to a market economy after 1989, subsequent social polarisation due to rapidly rising unemployment and the shrinkage of a previously extensive welfare safety net affected the Roma the worst (Tsenkova, 2006; Mirga, 2009; Vermeersch and Ram, 2009; Ladányi, 2010 [2001]). Their overall impoverishment has been exacerbated by racialisation as they became the prime targets of nationalist extremism and scapegoated as deviants and drags on the economy, leading

to escalating hatred speech and aggression, particularly by radical far-right groups (Horváth, 1997 [1993]; Mudde, 2005; Mirga, 2009; Dósa, 2009; Csepli and Örkény, 2015; Fekete, 2016; Scheiring and Szombati, 2020).

Racialised and security-based anti-Roma discrimination is not unique to CEE, however (Sigona and Trehan, 2009; Stewart, 2009; van Baar, 2011; Huysmans, 2019; Ivasiuc, 2021). As Fekete (2014: 61) puts it, “wherever they are in Europe, they [the Roma] face a variation of a pan-European, anti-Roma racism.” For instance, in 2010, the drastic nationalist expulsion of Central and Eastern European Roma immigrants from France was justified by their collective stigmatisation as a source of danger (Parker, 2012; Gehring, 2013; Demossier, 2014). Similarly, in Italy, the Roma are widely criminalised and perceived as security threats to the non-Roma population, thereby legitimising organised encampments, informal residential security responses, and the fingerprinting of Roma immigrants, among other things (Sigona, 2005; Costi, 2010; Provenzano, 2014; Ivasiuc, 2021). Indeed, the Roma are commonly seen as the ‘internal other’ of what are otherwise well-established, civilised, and developed nation-states, and must therefore be policed and securitised (Gehring, 2013; Fekete, 2014; Guglielmo and Waters, 2005; van Baar, 2011).

#### *1.4.2 The European Roma and development*

Securitisation is only part and parcel of a broader governance landscape around Roma marginality, however. As previous research shows, Roma-related security measures are inextricably linked to developmental social policy matters, and neither domain can be understood in its complexity without the other (van Baar, 2011; van Baar et al., 2019; Kóczé, 2019; Huysmans, 2019). As van Baar (2011: 322) suggests, rather than constituting two discrete governance agendas, “social security mechanisms and the problematization of the Roma in terms of public security were two sides of the same coin”.

In tandem with security, then, the Roma are frequently approached through the policy lens of development, as visible in the swarms of social inclusion, equal opportunities, and desegregation programmes at local, national, and EU levels alike. These largely unsuccessful strategies are principally motivated by the vision to integrate, or at least emancipate, the Roma on both cultural and political fronts, and are driven by enduring perceptions of the Roma as essentially backward outsiders who require due civilising appropriation (van Baar, 2011; Fekete, 2014; Guglielmo and Waters, 2005). At the same time, even if many social inclusion programmes are otherwise well-intentioned, blanket pro-Roma policies can be counterintuitive as they often fail to recognise local diversity and situated challenges and, due to their aggregative perspective, recreate the very social binaries they are supposed to address (Rövid, 2011). In the prevailing neoliberal economic and social order, populist interlocutors routinely overlook and cover up the responsibility of the state, and particularly the elite, in favouring hegemonic narratives of the Roma's self-responsibilisation and activation (van Baar, 2011). Consequently, and taken together with the continued support of populist security-based responses to social divides, the Roma's emancipation and desegregation remain at best illusory (Vermeersch and Ram, 2009; Talewicz-Kwiatkowska, 2015; Kóczé, 2019; Körtvélyesi et al., 2020).

Given that security interventions and social inclusion policies towards the Roma are far from favourable wherever we turn, what makes this study distinctive in comparison to being conducted elsewhere in Europe? For marginalised populations on the ground, the rise of a penal populist regime in Hungary has arguably produced comparable socio-economic outcomes to those of other punitive practices elsewhere (Ferge, 2014; Boda et al., 2015). Additionally, we are witnessing the continued popularity of right-wing populism in Southern, Northern, and Western Europe alike, as exemplified by Giorgia Meloni's recent election in Italy, the ascent of the far right in Sweden, and Marine Le Pen's runner-up position in the French presidential

elections, whereby immigration, as well as questions of social inclusion and diversity, are also being challenged. Against this backdrop, what difference does it make to study the governance of Roma marginality in Hungary as opposed to liberal democracies elsewhere? As discussed below, the answer primarily inheres in the political realm rather than the socio-economic one. On the one hand, Roma-related political and policy matters are accompanied by the right-wing populist government's "noisy nationalism" (Scheiring, 2022: 3), as well as the pervasive influence of extremist and xenophobic ideologies on mainstream politics (Minkenberg, 2013; Boda et al., 2015), which set them apart from liberal democratic settings. On the other hand, punitive measures of racialised exclusion in Hungary are arguably comparable to their liberal democratic counterparts in terms of their neoliberal motivations, as well as socio-economic and material outcomes (see Ferge, 2014; Scheiring, 2022).

### **1.5 Illiberal Hungary?**

At the national level, hostility towards racial difference in Hungary remains widespread, particularly against the Roma who constitute the country's largest ethnic minority and face the most discrimination and stigma, especially as the regime tends to tolerate, side with, or even express anti-Roma sentiments (Csepeli, 2008; Fekete, 2016). This includes endorsing educational segregation, openly differentiating between the non-Roma majority and the Roma minority as 'natives' and 'non-natives', respectively, labelling of the Roma as 'immigrants' in stigmatising ways, and permitting far-right demonstrations against 'Gypsy crime', such as one in May 2020, which was allowed to go ahead despite pandemic restrictions, and no member of the government openly denounced the event in its aftermath (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020; Nepszava.hu, 2018; Tamás and Márton, 2020; Kovács, 2020).

Often in the limelight of international media as a self-proclaimed 'illiberal democracy', Hungary has undergone steady democratic backsliding since the 2010 election of Viktor

Orbán's right-wing populist Fidesz party (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015). The notion of illiberal democracy was pioneered by Fareed Zakaria (1997), who suggests that while many countries around the world have undergone democratisation, numerous democracies are not actually liberal – instead, they constitute a spectrum between libertarianism and authoritarianism in terms of political, institutional, and personal freedoms. Since Zakaria's intervention, illiberalism has repeatedly replanted itself across the world with renewed fervour as exemplified by the populist backlash after the 2007-2008 financial crisis across the world, Brexit, Donald Trump's former presidency, the ascent of 'strongman' leaders worldwide such as Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, as well as Viktor Orbán in Hungary, to name but a few (Hendrikse, 2018).

Illiberalism has garnered considerable academic interest in the past years, but its meaning has remained somewhat elusive. To start with, the term is an inherently relational signifier in that it is necessarily defined through what it is not (i.e., not liberal), and therefore it is harder to position coherently (Snyder, 2021; Laruelle, 2022). By definition, illiberalism entails the rejection of core values of liberalism such as pluralism, multiculturalism, the celebration of racial diversity, LGBTQ+ rights, individual freedoms, constitutional checks and balances, judicial independence, and freedom of press, among other things. However, liberal democratic societies are also replete with illiberal traits when it comes to the often unjust treatment of social difference, which makes pinning down the political particularities of illiberalism even more challenging (Brown, 2019; Luger, 2020). Additionally, the word 'illiberalism' is often used inconsistently and interchangeably with (neo-)conservatism and right-wing populism as a global current of varying intensity across different countries and spatial scales (Laruelle, 2022).

Furthermore, it has been widely argued that despite *also* sounding antithetical to the term neoliberalism, illiberalism is in fact an offspring thereof, and only represents a fissure in the *political* realm while leaving the core economic elements of neoliberalism unchallenged (e.g.,

Scheiring, 2022; Buzogány and Varga, 2018; Fabry, 2019). Although right-wing populist interlocutors in Hungary and beyond advocated a nationalist alternative to global liberal capitalism after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, many have suggested that this backlash against foreign investment did not translate into a new economic growth model (Johnson and Barnes, 2015; Buzogány and Varga, 2018; Appel and Orenstein, 2016; Orenstein and Bugarič, 2020). Instead, the illiberal turn is merely seen as the perpetuation of the existing neoliberal order with a tightening of political liberties necessary for upholding existing inequalities and regimes of accumulation (cf. Swyngedouw, 2022; Arsel et al., 2021; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). This tweaked arrangement has been variously described as neo-illiberalism (Hendrikse, 2018), authoritarian neoliberalism (Bruff, 2014; Fabry, 2019; Lendvai-Bainton and Szelewa, 2021), authoritarian developmentalism (Arsel et al., 2021), and national-populist neoliberalism (Scheiring, 2022).

The unique traits of illiberalism in Hungary are therefore chiefly of political rather than economic significance. In particular, they lie in the relative weakness of democratic traditions compared to the West due to the country's post-state socialist legacy, as well as Fidesz's ability to exploit this vulnerability and manipulate it to their own advantage (Boda et al., 2015). Fidesz have retained their two-thirds majority in Parliament for the fourth time in a row since 2010 in the latest 2022 elections. For over a decade under their rule, the political system has seen an incremental curtailment of constitutional checks and balances, the profound centralisation of governance, reductions to the independence of the judiciary, the government's unrestrained control over legislation, and attacks on media freedom and civil society, among other things (Greskovits, 2020; Fabry, 2020; Bárándy, 2014; Szicherle and Wessenauer, 2017). The systematic undermining of representative government and democratic accountability by the illiberal regime has led to the colonisation of mainstream media, allowing the practically unlimited dissemination of xenophobic anti-immigration state propaganda with profound

effects on public thinking, and greater resonance with and tolerance of far-right parties and racist extremism (Bárándy, 2014; Szicherle and Wessenauer, 2017; Kovács, 2020). Conversely, philanthropist, multiculturalist, human rights, as well as specifically pro-Roma organisations – which had had weak foundations anyway due to the absence of civil society during state socialism before 1989 – have been hollowed out, side-lined, or annihilated (Kelemen and Balázs, 2008; Hann, 2020; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). Consequently, the democratic backsliding process was accompanied by a more overtly nationalist rhetoric compared to liberal democracies in the West (Orenstein and Bugarič, 2020; Minkenberg, 2013). Additionally, with a feeble and fragmented political opposition, there is very little to offset the right-wing populist government's ideological dominance.

At the rhetorical level, illiberal statecraft in Hungary feeds off the cultivation of social rifts based on ethnicity, religion, citizenship, sexual orientation, and gender, which serves to deflect tensions around the distributive injustices of a fiercely neoliberal social policy onto identity-based stigma (Lendvai-Bainton and Szelewa, 2021). Hungary's shift to illiberalism is underpinned by a conservative ideological foundation that stresses the traditional values of patriotism, Christianity, family, and natalism (Csillag and Szelényi, 2015; Orenstein and Bugarič, 2020). The populist regime overtly strives to defend its proclaimed ideal of the white, hard-working, heterosexual Christian Hungarian family, from a set of threatening 'others' such as immigrants, the unemployed, the welfare-dependent, the Roma, the LGBTQ+ community, and so on (Fekete, 2016; Lendvai-Bainton and Szelewa, 2021). The purpose of actively cultivating social divides in this fashion is to ensure that losers of the class structure can reroute their anger against those represented as shared enemies of the nation (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020).

In policy terms, Orbán's government has furthered the marginality of the Roma in two main ways. First, as part of a broader economic shift from welfare to workfare (cf. Painter,

2003; Painter and Jeffrey, 2009), many Roma were channelled into a punitive and poorly paid state-based public works scheme. The programme emerged as the only alternative to receding unemployment benefits for poorer sections of society, in which the Roma are over-represented (Csepeli and Örkény, 2015; Ladányi, 2010 [2007]; Gábos et al., 2015). It mostly entails low-skilled, and often unnecessary to downright humiliating manual jobs such as litter picking, street sweeping, assisting with agricultural work in local communities, road maintenance, levy construction during floods, and so on, with the aim of rounding up the unemployed (Fekete, 2016; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015; Szabó, 2022). Many have therefore argued that the introduction of the workfare scheme merely served the demagogic and punitive disciplining of the ostensibly idle, welfare-dependent, and undeserving poor, and especially the Roma, while enabling the state to formally boast a commitment to reducing unemployment and the ‘activation’ of the jobless (Fekete, 2016; Fabry, 2020; Szabó, 2022)<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, the gravely underpaid and prospectless kinds of jobs that the previously unemployed poor were forced into did not bring about any improvements in terms of social mobility and access to competitive jobs. Instead, they merely pushed the poor, including many Roma, into further dependency and exploitation (Csepeli and Örkény, 2015; Rorke, 2019). In transitioning from welfare to workfare, then, not only did Orbán’s government wield populist identity politics to mask the injustices of a neoliberal social policy, but also skilfully introduced the binarization of racialised enmity into the very architecture of the country’s increasingly unequal class structure.

Second, Orbán’s right-wing populist regime also puts considerable emphasis on securitisation through a penal populist pro-policing stance (Ferge, 2014; Boda et al., 2015). In

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<sup>5</sup> In September 2022, the workfare scheme was considerably cut as part of austerity measures due to the ongoing economic crisis. As a result, public works will only continue to operate in one-fifth of the country, resulting in the loss of about 70,000-80,000 jobs. This has been argued to pose serious existential threats to those affected, since the workfare scheme was the last opportunity to earn money legally for many unskilled workers (HVG.hu, 2022). However, a further analysis of this development is beyond the scope of the thesis.


their campaign for the 2010 elections, Fidesz claimed that public security in the country was in crisis as the police had not been able to keep public spaces under control, particularly from widespread anti-government protests of the time. They suggested that robberies, thefts, usury, and other crimes were on the rise, and that the police were understaffed by a total of 3,500 officers across the country (NOL.hu, 2014). Subsequent Minister of Interior Sándor Pintér of Fidesz pledged to establish nationwide order within two weeks of entering office. Shortly afterwards, penal populist measures intensified. By bolstering policing across the country – as exemplified in this study through the case of Miskolc – the Roma have also been increasingly exposed to already existing discriminatory law enforcement practices and the criminal justice system (Mudde, 2005; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2007, 2009; Fekete, 2016).

### **1.6 Study composition: locating intersections**

How the previously introduced policy fundamentals of security and development are envisioned and mobilised in any context is informed by the political motivations of its incumbent regime (O'Malley, 1996). Social and penal policy in Miskolc comprise a very particular constellation of political power dynamics imposed upon a crisis-ridden, post-industrial, socio-spatially unequal, and racially divided urban patchwork. Against Miskolc's lingering post-industrial economic depression, a relatively large share of segregated Roma population, the presence of slum-like neighbourhoods, heightened racialised tensions, and the associated popularity of far-right political parties, questions around Roma marginality are more foregrounded in public, political, and discourse, compared to many other parts of Hungary (see Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3). This makes Miskolc a pertinent case study when looking at the governance of Roma marginality, although it must be remembered that, compared to the rest of the country, it is also a relatively extreme example of narratives around and responses to segregation.

The ways that decision-makers in Miskolc have manipulated and navigated sharpening social tensions and racialised electoral hostility since the 1989 regime change from state socialism to market capitalism are perhaps most profoundly reflected in their negotiation, wielding, and implementation of different conceptions of security and development in governing the city (see Buur et al., 2007). This research therefore seeks to critically untangle the architecture of shifting security and development agendas through which urban socio-spatial divides and the Roma in Miskolc have been framed, narrated, and managed. A pivotal consideration that runs across this thesis is how competing understandings of security and development gain legitimacy in governing Roma segregation in Miskolc (see O'Malley, 1996).

For the previously outlined reasons, Miskolc is a productive empirical terrain where Roma segregation, security, development, neoliberalism, and right-wing populism come together in a contested urban setting. Although there was less to researching smart urbanism and digital surveillance than initially hoped, an open and grounded approach – rather than a deductive one fixating on the initial topic – allowed these themes, and their centrality to governing the city, to come to the fore in unexpected yet productive ways. As a result, the interconnected policy agendas of security and development and neoliberal urbanism have emerged as conceptual building blocks, and Roma segregation and illiberalism serve as the contextual components of this thesis (*Figure 1*). Each topic is widely researched in itself (see Chapter 2), but their confluence exhibits multiple important gaps which will be developed throughout the thesis, both conceptually and empirically.



*Figure 1. The main building blocks of the study. My drawing.*

The interplay of the four domains in this study emerged from and is rendered concrete through Miskolc, where each theme carries particular importance in the governance and everyday life of the city. Both individually and collectively, the relationships between these vectors deserve close attention and will be unpacked as the thesis unfolds.

### **1.7 Research questions**

In view of the above, this thesis sets out to address the following questions:

- a) How is segregation in Miskolc understood in the governance, politics, and daily life of the city?
- b) In what ways are these understandings reflected in municipal approaches to penal and social policy, especially in view of right-wing populist politics in Miskolc and Hungary?
- c) How, in whose interest, and to what effect is power operationalised in the municipality's responses to segregation in the above two policy domains?

These questions are all vital for a multitude of reasons. From a research perspective, they provide an opportunity to empirically ground existing academic debates on security- and development-driven policy approaches to excluded minorities in Europe outlined earlier, and also assess how they unfold against the backdrop of illiberalism. As right-wing populist politics remains strong around the world, it is paramount to engage with its practical manifestations on the ground, thereby retaining our ability to voice informed and timely critiques of its relationships with race and segregation. In exploring the intersections of security and development at the city level, the research questions also offer an opportunity to connect scholarship on (Roma) urban segregation with hitherto chiefly international and regional studies of the security-development nexus (see Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion). The principal aims and proposed contributions of this study are, therefore, to:

- (i) operationalise the relationships between security and development at the city level as neoliberal technologies of the governance of marginality in urban cores and peripheries (thereby furthering the arguments of, e.g., Stenson, 2005; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Jensen, 2010; Reid-Henry, 2011),
- (ii) utilise this framing to establish a hitherto largely absent urban dimension to existing research linkages between security, development, and the Roma (cf. van Baar, 2018; Kóczé, 2019; Ivasiuc, 2021), and
- (iii) understand the distinctive inner workings and logics of right-wing populist statecraft at the city scale (cf. Luger, 2020, forthcoming) through the politics of urban segregation and the Roma in Miskolc.

These connections will be conceptually and contextually laboured in Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, and then mobilised in Chapters 5-7 in empirical terms.

For policy and practice, exploring the aforementioned research questions is at the heart of proposing more socially just interventions that involve the whole of Miskolc's population rather

than targeting the marginalised Roma only. As the Roma population of Miskolc continues to grow, particularly in the city's segregated neighbourhoods (see Halász, 2018; Havasi, 2018), there is an ever greater need to think about inclusionary long-term strategies that mend rather than further damage relations between the Roma and the non-Roma. Bringing together security and development as two profound underpinning logics of the governance of segregation allows for a more holistic and systematic formulation of policy responses, recognising that dealing with either domain will inevitably affect the other, and evaluating these connections can lead to more conscious and responsible choices.

In addressing the research questions, the arguments in this thesis unfold as follows. From a conceptual point of view, the interplay of security and development in governing surplus populations is just as applicable to the city scale as it is globally, thus providing a fresh perspective on understanding the politics of urban segregation. In Miskolc, the main ways that Roma marginality is being governed are a product of orchestrated penal and social policy measures, in which notions of security and development take centre stage. These matters are deeply politicised, since anti-Roma prejudice and stigma are widespread amongst the city's public, which tend to constrain emancipatory gestures and fuel revanchist views. Following Duffield (2010), the treatment of racialised poverty in Miskolc will be analysed through a dual perspective consisting of:

- i) strategies restricting the circulation of ostensibly undesirable and destabilising populations – i.e., the Roma and the poor – in and around the city through penal interventions, and
- ii) the arm's-length governance of the spatially isolated surplus population through provisioning proxy organisations and social work.

As explained in Chapter 2, both of the above listed processes are closely linked to, or motivated by, different conceptions and agendas of security and development.

As the thesis further suggests, an overall spatial tactic of concentrating and isolating the Roma and the poor from the rest of the city into the peripheral slum of Lyukó Valley is traceable in the punitive social ordering logic of the former right-wing populist municipality. Improvements to public security and lowered crime rates through revanchist evictions and municipal police enlargements merely cover up a displaced social crisis. Yet, this trajectory of securitisation is largely irreversible as the de-escalation of policing would re-expose unresolved social problems in the city and rapidly undermine the popularity of the municipal leadership. At the same time, social work efforts are limited to a bare minimum level to keep poverty at bay and without any prospects for improvement or social mobility. That said, social policy is also caught in a scalar paradox since, on the ground, the genuinely devoted and compassionate nature of community work in segregated neighbourhoods tells very different stories to structural critiques of arm's length management, paternalistic appropriation, and the calculated entrenchment of racialised divides. Overall, however, questions around addressing poverty in the fringes are being deferred as long-term goals, even though the mounting social crisis of Lyukó Valley constitutes a ticking time bomb that severely jeopardises the city's future (see Havasi, 2018).

## **1.8 Structure**

The thesis consists of six substantive chapters. Chapter 2 develops the study's conceptual framework by downscaling Mark Duffield's (2010) dual critique of the security-development nexus (SDN) to the urban level. To this end, it draws upon broader theoretical traditions of the SDN, sovereign power, biopower, the governance of the European Roma, and neoliberal urbanism. Chapter 3 establishes the necessary contextual background of the thesis through unpacking Roma marginality and a history and overview of segregation in Miskolc. Chapter 4 then presents and reflects on the methodological considerations of this research. Chapter 5

marks the beginning of the empirical analysis and discusses the production of racialised life-chance divides between the Roma and non-Roma of Miskolc through the themes of behavioural stigma, criminalisation, and territoriality. Chapter 6 takes sovereign power and circulations as its analytical devices for the rampant penal policy interventions of the 2010-2019 right-wing populist city administration of Miskolc. It scrutinises the reconfiguration of the city's circulatory landscape through forced evictions chiefly targeting the Roma in central neighbourhoods and the wholesale enhancement of policing measures. The chapter shows that together, these penal interventions redirected the circulation of racialised, undesired, and criminalised bodies and behaviours towards the fringes of Lyukó Valley while guarding the urban core against their re-entry. Chapter 7 then engages with social policy in segregated neighbourhoods through the lens of biopower. It reflects on the paradoxical co-presence of the state's necessarily incomplete outsourcing of social protection to auxiliary organisations at the structural level, thus working merely towards the self-reliance and remote containment of the excluded Roma, as well as the devotion and compassion that characterises social work on the ground in contrast. Finally, the conclusion draws together the key messages of the thesis along the above presented research questions and explores potential avenues for further study.

## 2. Conceptual underpinnings

### Chapter introduction

The idea of the security-development nexus (SDN) has been primarily used in international development research and practice thus far. The concept denotes a dominant Western foreign policy paradigm that security and development are interdependent, and one cannot be achieved without the other (Chandler, 2007). This thinking has underscored Western interventionism into the internal affairs of the developing world since the end of colonial times, as exemplified through the simultaneous mobilisation of peacekeeping operations, foreign aid, counterinsurgency, conflict resolution, and the mushrooming of international charities and humanitarian missions, among other things (ibid.; Jeffrey, 2007b; Mac Ginty, 2012). As rational as the logic of an SDN-based foreign policy may sound, however, critical scholarship has shown its manifold shortcomings. They include a propensity to aggravate post-colonial patterns of global hegemony and subordination, the continued exploitation of the global South and its vast populations rendered superfluous by global market capitalism, and the disproportionate concentration of security efforts in and around the global North to exclude threats associated with the underdevelopment and perceived instability of the global South (Chandler, 2007; Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Duffield, 2010; Keukeleire and Raube, 2013; Homolar, 2015).

The aim of this conceptual chapter is to demonstrate that the dominant logics and *modi operandi* underscoring global critiques of the SDN are productively scalable to the urban level as well. The main argument is that the SDN offers a fresh vocabulary on the governance of urban segregation and marginality through uniting critical readings of penal and social policy in a single conceptual framework. This will be developed through two main theoretical manoeuvres. First, the SDN will be considered within the global North as opposed to across the global North-South divide, drawing on some established work in this direction, including SDN-

based analyses of the European Roma (Section 2.3). Second, it will be mobilised in relation to urban cores and peripheries (Section 2.4), which will constitute the main contribution of the chapter. A heavily divided city, Miskolc carries numerous traces of the governance of its Roma minority through security- and development-driven discourses and measures seeking to entrench a deeply unjust status quo (see Chapters 3 and 5-7). This makes an SDN-based approach particularly pertinent for understanding Miskolc's contested social landscape of racialised segregation and inequality.

To expedite the above proposed contribution, theoretical traditions of the SDN are first introduced alongside their main points of contention. Second, the idea of the (neo)liberal way of development is outlined, leading up to an overview of Mark Duffield's (2010) two-pronged analysis of the SDN on the joint operation of sovereign power and biopower, which will be central to the framing of this thesis. Third, the prevalence of a generic global North-South binary underpinning critiques and foreign policy applications of the SDN will be called into question, thus assessing the transferability of Duffield's critique to smaller-scale life-chance divides within the global North. As part of this discussion, literatures intersecting the governance of the European Roma with critical accounts of the SDN will be presented. Finally, the SDN will be downscaled to the city level using existing debates on the neoliberal city around revanchism and urban biopolitics, highlighting the potential of an urban SDN in treating these two relatively isolated bodies of work in a relational fashion.

## **2.1 The security–development nexus: an overview**

In the post-Cold War global order, notions of security and development became increasingly interconnected as part of foreign policy interventions in the non-Western world (Buur et al., 2007; Chandler, 2007; Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Keukeleire and Raube, 2013). International organisations, national governments, and policy practitioners of what has come to

be known as the security-development nexus (SDN) suggest through an attractively straightforward logic that (a) the enhancement of security boosts development and an uptick in development contributes to greater stability and security, whereas (b) underdevelopment is prone to undermining security and a decline in security adversely affects development (e.g., Bossard, 2012; DFID, 2005; OECD, 2007; United Nations, 2004). Development is considered central to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict resolution in what are seen as ‘unstable’ or ‘failing’ states in the global South. The combatting of extreme poverty, malnutrition, and diseases through international humanitarian assistance are understood to de-escalate tensions and civil conflict. Similarly, political instability and warfare undermine the essential prerequisites of development such as education, access to drinking water, and basic health provisions (DFID, 2005; OECD, 2007; Chandler, 2007; Stern and Öjendal, 2010).

Following the end of the Cold War, what were seen as ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states of the non-Western world came to replace communist regimes as the primary threats to the West (Duffield, 2010; Homolar, 2015)<sup>6</sup>. From the perspective of developed countries, states are considered the pinnacles of sovereignty that guarantee peace, stability, and economic growth. Marred by internal conflicts, migration, international terrorism, and criminal activity, however, ‘failed’ states have long been deemed incapable of keeping their internal affairs under control and ensuring the basic conditions of progress (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Democratic consolidation, peace, and social welfare demand a high degree of state legitimacy, as well as an effective defence and enforcement apparatus that can ensure the security of citizens (ibid.; Duffield, 2007). ‘Failed’ states have thus become the focus of foreign policy, with Western ideals of progress and nation-building increasingly becoming entwined with security and development (Hettne, 2010; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). The imposition of Western values onto failed, conflict-

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<sup>6</sup> At least until the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war.

ridden, or post-conflict states is thus promoted as an agenda of stabilisation in the name of boosting local democratic participation and political legitimacy. In practical terms, such visions are furthered through various forms of interventionism from military peacekeeping operations to humanitarian aid and the strengthening of the NGO sector to facilitate state-building, democratisation, ‘good governance’, and political accountability in the countries concerned (Jeffrey, 2007a, 2007b, 2016; Mac Ginty, 2012).

The concept of the SDN has been subject to extensive critique, however, due to its largely repetitive and taken-for granted application in foreign policy (Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 2010; Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Keukeleire and Raube, 2013). Chandler (2007) suggests that there is limited empirical evidence for a causal relationship between security and development, and it is also unclear whether they even positively correlate. It has also been suggested that the nexus is an empty signifier that can carry numerous different meanings, and despite this elusiveness it nevertheless retains a façade of incontestable truth (Reid-Henry, 2011). Indeed, both ‘security’ and ‘development’ are enormous categories with a vast array of subfields, and therefore any account or implementation of either category is necessarily selectively defined and limited in scope (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). In turn, the manifold meanings encapsulated by both terms allows for countless ways of linking them conceptually, empirically, in policy and in practice; from development aid and humanitarian emergency relief to peacekeeping missions and the securitisation of borders (Hettne, 2010). Additionally, in places where neither development nor security is realistically achievable, or essential conditions are unmet, the nexus breaks down and loses its significance, and yet Western policymakers have been argued to fixate on its widespread application (Stern and Öjendal, 2010).

Importantly, besides debates around the concept’s definition, meaning, and utility, the SDN has been challenged for its close association with neo-colonial and neoliberal agendas (Uvin, 2002; Duffield, 2010). The way in which wealthy countries impose and enforce post-colonial

developmentalism worldwide has been termed the ‘liberal way of development’ (Duffield, 2010: 53). Legg (2007) posits that the formal ending of colonial rule and the transition to the development era was not accompanied by the disappearance of colonial forms of exploitation, subordination, technologies of rule, and categories. On the contrary, post-colonial global capitalist interventions in the name of ‘development’ have remained similarly powerful and vital to maintaining earlier lines of political and economic dependency as well as poverty, inequality, and modern slavery in today’s global South (Escobar, 2011; Pogge, 2005; Harvey, 2003; Phillips and Mieres, 2015). Rather than a genuine devotion to macro-scale economic development, interventions are restricted to symbolic, fragmented, and arbitrary small-scale token-gesture efforts, heralded by generalising one-size-fits-all discourses that nonetheless remain bereft of substantive commitment (Chandler, 2007).

Similarly, the nexus has been criticised for subordinating the development needs of the global South to the security priorities of the global North, despite the latter’s alluring foreign policy claims to benevolence, aid provision, peacekeeping, and stabilisation in the former (Chandler, 2007; Buur et al., 2007). For many, this signals an inclination on the part of the developed world to contain political instability within the territorial confines of low-income countries (Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 2001, 2007, 2010; Andersson, 2014). Such motives are exemplified by the post-9/11 discourse of the War on Terror, mobilising resources towards armed intervention in perceived ‘terrorist states’ including Iraq and Afghanistan, fortifying and securitising of national borders, and advancing policing and surveillance within high-income countries (Gregory, 2004; Katz, 2007; Chaturvedi and Painter, 2007).

## **2.2 Duffield's dual critique of the SDN**

The popularity of the SDN as a foreign policy notion of the liberal way of development prompted critics to highlight its inherently unjust practices through which global inequalities are upheld. Duffield (2007) points out that in the name of the SDN, the global North employs a range of soft and hard security measures to isolate, contain, and intervene in the global South. In doing so, it incessantly rediscovers and perpetuates underdevelopment rather than showing any systemic commitment to addressing it.

Drawing on Foucauldian theoretical traditions on the linkages between sovereign power and biopower, Duffield (2010) argues that the *modus operandi* of the SDN under the liberal way of development rests upon two key pillars. First, its geopolitical component is concerned with the securing of international borders along the perimeters of the developed world to limit the flow of the undesired surplus population and undocumented migrants into wealthy countries. Second, it entails a biopolitical element, whereby security policy attention is shifted from states to their populations, hence managing the dangers associated with underdevelopment “at a distance through new and more indirect means” (Duffield, 2001: 315). These two dynamics complement each other to maintain an overall life-chance divide (explained shortly) between the global North and South, which is never meant to be bridged, but instead perpetuated at the North's convenience and dictates (Figure 2; Duffield, 2007). Duffield's two facets of the SDN under the liberal way of development will serve as the main structuring framework for the empirical analysis of my thesis and is discussed in some detail below with reference to relevant broader debates in the literature.




Figure 2. A visual interpretation and adaptation of the key components of Duffield's (2007; 2010) critique of the liberal way of development. My drawing.

### 2.2.1 Circulation and sovereign power: the geopolitics of global developmentalism

Our first analytical pillar is sovereign power, classically defined as “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber, 2013: 78). Originating from Westphalian notions of the nation-state, the power of the sovereign fundamentally entails “the right to kill, or by refraining from killing” (Foucault, 1979: 136) within its territorial confines (Giddens, 1981; Agnew, 1994). Today, however, in many democratic states, sovereignty is no longer so much about the crude right to kill and the unchecked enforcement of the legal order as it is a rhetorical exercise of asserting state power due to extensive checks and balances on the authorities (Painter, 2015). Furthermore, sovereignty has become both de-territorialised and

re-territorialised in geographical debates. On the one hand, territorial boundaries are seen to matter less, since the world is increasingly interconnected, and the previously discussed military interventions in ‘failed’ and ‘rogue’ states from peacekeeping to the post-9/11 War on Terror campaigns also transgress the territoriality of sovereign nation-states (Jeffrey, 2015; Painter and Jeffrey, 2009). On the other hand, the fact that borders of the West have become heavily securitised against terrorist threats and undocumented migration after 9/11 testify the resurgence of territoriality as a central aspect to understanding sovereign power in today’s global geopolitical order (Kaplan, 2003; Gregory, 2004; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007).

For Foucault (2007), a major indicator of the strength of a sovereign is their effectiveness at controlling and policing circulations in their territory – be they bodies, ideas, information, vehicles, and products, among other things. Following this approach, a critical SDN perspective principally approaches sovereignty through its territorialised circulatory dimensions. In his analysis, Duffield (2010) is mainly interested in the ways that nation-states of the global North police and fortify their borders and contain the circulation of migration from poor countries through dichotomous understandings of (in)security and (under)development. In this reading, normatively established categories of ‘favourable’ kinds of circulations associated with, say, leisurely and corporate travel from wealthy regions, are fully enabled and rendered seamless. What are deemed as ‘destabilising’ circulation, however, including undocumented migration from the global South into developed countries, must be as tightly controlled, screened, and sifted through as possible (Foucault, 2007; Duffield, 2010; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Andersson, 2014). To borrow Foucault’s (2007: 64) phrasing, the primary question is, therefore, “how should things circulate or not circulate?”

The exercise of sovereign power over circulation is closely linked to security, since the ultimate purpose of the sovereign in tightening borders is to minimise the incidence of potential risk factors and adverse eventualities from entering its territory (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero,

2008). Underdevelopment is deemed to harbour dangerous and destabilising manifestations of circulation embodied by asylum seekers, cross-border smuggling networks, criminal groups, and shadow economies, among other things, and are hence incompatible with security (Duffield, 2007). In this perception, the global ‘borderlands’ are where poverty, chaos, and anarchy reside and originate from, thus posing unknown dangers to the peace and stability of the developed world (Mac Ginty, 2012; Duffield, 2001).

It is for this reason that the undesirable movement of global poverty has come to be heavily restricted by an unprecedented array of fences, walls, checkpoints, and detention centres at national borders. From Frontex and Fortress Europe to Australia, the U.S., and Israeli borders, numerous studies have discussed the security-based mechanisms that underpin the governance of global migration. Such practices include forced expulsions, incarceration, or indefinite detainment, through which the global circulation of migrant bodies is being selectively controlled based on their nationality, legal status and perceived ‘risk’ levels associated with their states of origin (Walters, 2004; Andersson, 2014; Pallister-Wilkins, 2015; Crawley, 2016; cf. Papada et al., 2020). Through these territorial practices, sovereign power is wielded to exclude, sift, and contain the threats and dangers associated with migration (Buur et al., 2007; Hampshire, 2016). In turn, security is a prerequisite for maintaining development, since it entails the “containment of the human manifestations of underdevelopment” (Duffield, 2010: 63).

The sorting of circulations into binary categories of ‘safety’ and ‘danger’, according to Duffield (2010), is reflective of a so-called life-chance divide between the global North and South, which wealthier countries are working to entrench through the liberal way of development. Van Kempen (1994: 1005) defines life chances as a person’s “long-term prospects”, drawing on Dahrendorf’s (1979) seminal work on the concept, who sees it as the opportunities that society offers to someone in a given social position. For Dahrendorf (1979),

life chances are fundamentally determined by two factors – options and ligatures. The former entails the set of choices available to an individual, whereas the latter comprise the connections and attachments that someone has with society (see also Granovetter, 1973), and thus also shares similarities with the concept of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986).

In contrast to mass consumer societies, where both options and ligatures hold plentiful resources, supplies, and potential, populations of the global South are left with far more modest prospects. Duffield (2007, 2010) argues that those living in the global North enjoy a range of social safety nets such as health, pensions, housing, employment, minimum wages, welfare benefits, as well as freedom of movement, dwellers of the global South lack such means of support and mobility (see also Hampshire, 2016). Developed countries possess the kinds of critical infrastructures that those in the global South may lack or only partially provide, including transportation, energy supplies, roads, drinking water pipelines, banking, retail, insurance, and so forth, thereby making life in the former inherently advantaged over the latter (Duffield, 2010).

The circulation of underdevelopment into the global North is feared to burden and jeopardise the established lives and the critical infrastructures of advanced societies (De Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008; Duffield, 2007). For Duffield (2010), ‘developed’ life in the global North is understood as fragile and needs to be protected from external threats, whereas life belonging to the domain of ‘underdevelopment’ is seen to reproduce itself, and therefore must be kept at bay. The geopolitical fortification of the global North, he suggests, serves to defend wealthy societies, and is thus a powerful physical indicator of the aforementioned global life-chance divide.

The above dynamics come hand in hand with rising xenophobia and a greater desire for internal homogeneity within wealthier states, alongside renewed momentum for binary ‘us’ versus ‘them’ worldviews, mostly championed by nationalist and right-wing populist

interlocutors (Bigo, 2001; Mamdani, 2002; Mac Ginty, 2012). Ironically, then, the ruling out of the marginalised from circulation through hostile border regimes and apparatuses of social control defy notions of openness and freedom trumpeted under a globalist liberal ideal (Duffield, 2010; Walters, 2004; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Bigo, 2009). Indeed, as Hindess (2001) reminds us, under the banners of liberalism, only a minority of the population is allowed to live in liberty, with the rest removed from sight and relegated to the borderlands.

Due to their stubborn unwillingness to face the repercussions of distributional injustice, (neo)liberal governments tend to act upon unwanted groups through the use of force. It is the privileged minority – that is, the elite and the state – that gets to decide what or who counts as secure or dangerous forms of circulation and, by naming them a source of threat, renders legitimate the use of sovereign force upon these dangers whenever deemed necessary (Wæver, 1995; Foucault, 1995; Flyvbjerg, 2003). To many on the receiving end of the violence of sovereign power – through which freedom for some, but not others, is thus secured – the liberal way of development remains “anything but liberal” (Larner, 2003: 512; see also Ong, 2006). However, in managing unease and maintaining an unjust system in forceful ways, the West is ultimately covering up its own shortcomings at extending a universal bare minimum of security and development to the global South (Bigo, 2002). To be sure, ‘security at home’ as a technology of sovereign power has always carried greater importance than paying attention to the global ‘borderlands’ (Beall et al., 2006).

### *2.2.2 The biopolitical governance of the global poor*

The second pillar of Duffield’s SDN framework concerns the biopolitical development policies of the West in low-income countries. He highlights a crucial change in the referents of the nexus from the previously discussed ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ *states* to their *population* (Duffield, 2010; see also Liotta, 2002; Dillon, 2007; Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Jeffrey, 2016). This was

reflected in the United Nations Development Programme's policy shift towards the idea of 'human security' (UNDP, 1994). Celebrated as a progressive agenda, the concept signals a departure from the 'hard', militaristic, and statist notions of security associated with sovereign power, towards more cordial and 'softer' expressions of power that support the essential daily security needs of people on the ground (Buur et al., 2007; Foucault, 1991; Dillon, 2007; Chandler, 2007). Key to this "humanist alternative to traditional security governance" (Homolar, 2015: 844) is the empowerment of individuals and communities to achieve resilience, wellbeing, and safety against a variety of vulnerabilities in the insecure borderlands of the global South (see also Cruikshank, 1999). These include drought, food and resource scarcity, deprivation, birth control, housing conditions, human rights infringements, and political conflict, among many other things (Homolar, 2015).

Debates on the SDN have conceptualised the human security policy discourse through the Foucauldian lens of biopolitics. In contrast to sovereignty's right to take life or refrain from doing so, biopower – exercised through *biopolitics* as a technology of government – is no longer associated with killing, submission, and destruction. Instead, it is a productive force concerned with how the biological traits of human life can become referents of political knowledge and decision-making and, in turn, be optimised across its manifold facets including birth rates, health, diet, longevity, and wellbeing (Foucault, 1979; Painter, 2015; Dean, 2010; Di Muzio, 2008). Biopolitics and the deployment of biopower are founded upon a calculative imperative to measure, quantify, administer, order, and hierarchize society to improve and nurture human life (Foucault, 1979; Brigg, 2002; Elden, 2007; Dillon, 2007).

In a conventional Foucauldian reading, biopolitics operates at the aggregate level of the population, as opposed the anatomo-politics of the individual human body (Foucault, 1979; Duffield, 2007; Painter, 2015). As part of biopolitical management, individuals are treated as members of a wider populace, whose collectively engineered conduct and life metrics

“interconnect with issues of national policy and power” (Gordon, 1991: 5). However, for Rabinow and Rose (2006), in today’s world collective considerations of human health and vitality have become inextricably entangled with the individual choices and actions at the micro scale. In turn, they suggest that besides collective interventions to boost human health and vitality factors, a definition of biopower also needs to include *individual* lives that are engaged through subjectification and ‘technologies of the self’. Underpinned by neoliberal narratives of self-responsibility, this entails getting individuals to adjust themselves through a series of self-conscious actions, practices, and appropriations (Rabinow and Rose, 2006). Importantly, the individual-scale operation of biopower is wrapped up in hegemonic understandings of what constitutes a worthy, normal, healthy, and self-sufficient subject who can improve their own vitality rather than being a passive recipient of development assistance and welfare support (Di Muzio, 2008; Raco, 2009; Homolar, 2015; Conroy, 2019).

In the global South, the majority of the population is considered to lack the vital conditions for a fully-fledged biological life. People die early from a range of risks, diseases, malnutrition, lack of hygiene, and so on, normally preventable in developed contexts (Duffield, 2010). A biopolitical thinking around basic needs has now come to inform developmental narratives as a result, focusing on enhancing the vitality and healthy reproduction of borderland populations (Di Muzio, 2008; Satterthwaite, 1999). By pointing out a series of deficiencies in human health, employment, housing, or education – areas where developed mass consumer societies normally perform well, and which are thus considered desirable traits – countries of the global North justify biopolitical interventions into the lives of remote populations of the South in the name of progress (Homolar, 2015).

However, the magnitude of development deficiencies diagnosed in the vast ‘borderlands’ considerably exceed the degree to which developed donor states are willing to help (Hindess, 2001). Consequently, development assistance aimed at distant populations is outsourced to a

set of buffer organisations including humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs), consultancy firms, as well as other international institutions (Chandler, 2007; Buur, 2005; Di Muzio, 2008; see also Jeffrey, 2007a; Jeffrey, 2016). Metropolitan states' retreat from development programmes and passing of responsibility to third parties has been described as 'governing at a distance' (Rose and Miller, 1992; Gupta and Sharma, 2006; Chandler, 2007).

The contracting of the management of global surplus populations to specialist organisations is underscored by a narrative of expertise, since these stakeholders are deemed better-placed to assess and respond to the human security needs of the societies of the borderlands than the bureaucrats of nation-states or indeed the target populations themselves (Kamat, 2004; Jeffrey, 2016; Li, 2014). Interventions of this sort operate through expert knowledge and truth claims around what the main constituents of human vitality are supposed to be and what actions should be put in place to boost the health and life chances of the population concerned, often through the use of qualitative and quantitative performance yardsticks (Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Di Muzio, 2008; Homolar, 2015). In doing so, such actions carry the assumption that inhabitants of low-income regions lack the capacity to organise and manage themselves in desirable ways. Consequently, their defective life chances and perceived incivility can only to be rectified under the supervision of some external body of authority, who direct the subject population to act upon themselves in normatively prescribed ways (Li, 2014; Baistow, 1994; Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Duffield, 2010).

Ultimately, foreign aid and developmental interventionism seek to achieve what Duffield (2010) calls 'adaptive self-reliance' within livelihoods, households, and communities of the global poor, who can sustain themselves once their minimal needs are met – which, to be clear, are far below the welfare provision standards of the global North and are often supplied informally through local family and community ties as a necessary substitute to state support

(see also Satterthwaite, 1999). In an arrangement where self-sufficiency is favoured over structural assistance as part of an elite-driven agenda that perpetuates global capitalist hierarchies, the fulfilment of needs is thus not so much material in nature as it is an exercise of lowering expectations, educating communities, and reorganising their internal relations (Duffield, 2010; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Beneath a mirage of benevolent assistance, then, liberal interventionism therefore often relapses into the paternalistic tutelage, normative trusteeship, and ‘civilising’ appropriation of target communities (Hindess, 2001; Buur et al., 2007; Jeffrey, 2008a; Li, 2014). Indeed, as Baistow (1994: 35) highlights, humanitarian empowerment agendas may carry “regulatory as well as liberatory potential”.

Through donor states’ preservation of diminished basic needs and continued interventionism in the global South, Duffield (2010) suggests that underdeveloped life can be managed locally, thereby assisting its containment and securitisation, and in turn reducing the dangers it poses to developed metropolitan societies. Besides the benign display of aid work, the aim is also to render subject populations known and secure, and it is through this process that developmental interventionism operates as a security technology in today’s global order (Duffield, 2010; Rose, 1996). Put differently, development assistance in low-income regions also promises to make life in affluent countries safer and is therefore in the latter’s continued interest (Chandler, 2007; Stern and Öjendal, 2010; Rose, 1996).

To bring the above points together, the operation of both sovereign power and biopower incorporate various elements of security and development rather than exclusively corresponding to either domain. While the sovereign enforcement of territorial boundaries is usually founded upon some form of securitisation and the use of force (e.g., police or military control, border regimes, surveillance, fences, walls, etc.), it is also motivated by the development-based objective of protecting wealthier regions, countries, or neighbourhoods against the allegedly unruly and burdensome influx of threats originating from realms of

underdevelopment. Conversely, although biopolitical intervention in the global or urban borderlands may come across as an inherently soft-touch developmental act, it is also a security manoeuvre in keeping track of remote surplus populations and governing them in their own habitats to mitigate their ostensibly dangerous circulation into the developed world. It is through these shared characteristics and co-constitutive nature that the two forms of power thereby work together to entrench a global life-chance divide (Duffield, 2010).

### **2.3 The SDN within the global North: overlooked scalar dimensions?**

Its analytical prowess notwithstanding, the SDN as a research concept remains surprisingly mired in international-scale studies, with existing debates mostly thinking about the global status quo produced by the foreign policy implications of the (neo)liberal way of development (Stern and Öjendal, 2010). A crucial conceptual challenge thus remains – Duffield (2007, 2010) sees the operation of the SDN primarily along a *global* North–South binary. Is there scope, however, to move these debates *inside* either the global North or South without hollowing out the key conceptual tenets of the SDN? And, if so, why would it matter to do so?

Although Duffield briefly remarks that the global life-chance divide across which the SDN operates “striates mass consumer societies as well” (Duffield, 2010: 65), his analysis largely overlooks the possibility of more closely engaging with such striae. As discussed earlier, his overall position is that there exists an aggregate life-chance divide – rather than a continuum – that loosely follows a North-South boundary. Furthermore, through the dual critique unpacked above, he posits that the active *reproduction* of a life-chance divide also occurs primarily along a perceived global North-South boundary. This entails both physical barriers (e.g., the border fences and controls of Fortress Europe, America, and Australia, etc.), and governing at a distance through foreign aid and treating underdevelopment “in its natural habitat” (Duffield, 2010: 63), as well as through discursive articulations and reproductions of these binaries.

With the above in mind, the fact that even the most developed parts of the world contain pockets of deep poverty nonetheless offers important space for thinking about more localised life-chance divides. As Thomas (2001: 165) suggests, “there is a North in the South, just as there is a South in the North”. Although Duffield’s account can effectively inform global-scale analyses, this somewhat generalising lens demands critical scrutiny considering that the significance of smaller-scale life-chance divides – within both the global North and the global South – should not be overlooked, as doing so would downplay the most pressing regional, national, and local social policy concerns that a global-scale lens conveniently compartmentalises into a dichotomous division of the world.

Vital to further unpacking the above is therefore to recognise the potential within the SDN’s scalability rather than treating it as a rigidly global and multilateral interpretive lens (Buur et al., 2007; Stern and Öjendal, 2010). Reid-Henry (2011) considers the scalar dimensions of the SDN one of the most important aspects of understanding core tenets of the nexus. He finds it crucial to “consider how it [the SDN] is variously promoted or resisted in different places and settings (cultural, institutional, legal, political, economic), and across and between different scales of action (the home, the region, the nation)” (Reid-Henry, 2011: 102-103). As he further emphasises, the SDN is mostly mobilised in relation to the global South in both policy and academia, resulting in a neglect of other potentially relevant locations.

Several contributions have explored what could be arguably seen as SDN’s intra-Northern manifestations. Indeed, life-chance divides and the interplay of sovereign power and biopower in policies of security and development in the global North are not new phenomena. For instance, Foucault’s notion of the ‘boomerang effects’ denotes the ways that colonial practices of subordination found their way back into the very heartlands of coloniser countries. In other words, the techniques of power and institutional operations in the colonies were also turned back onto societies in the West (Hindess, 2001; Legg, 2007). While originally applied in

colonised territories outside Europe, these techniques of power also inscribed imperialistic hierarchies of discrimination, othering, and exploitation upon European ethnic and cultural minorities who would often immigrate from the colonies themselves (Driver and Gilbert, 1998; Legg, 2007; Graham, 2013). As Hindess (2001) reminds us, the discriminatory operation of criminal justice, the policing of people of colour and the poor, and unequal social service provisions, among other things, reflect coercive practices of oppression that used to historically characterise colonised countries and still operate in Western states today.

Furthermore, a considerable body of work has engaged more closely with internal colonialism – a concept largely rooted in North American scholarship – looking at the racialised oppression of the African American, Hispanic, and indigenous communities in the United States (Allen, 2005; Gutiérrez, 2004; Chávez, 2011). The continuation of internal colonial practices into today’s world has also been usefully captured by Bhabra’s (2016: 192) notion of ‘neocolonial cosmopolitanism’ in hinting at the need to consider the unjust treatment of European minorities against a contested history of imperialism.

In addition, domestic and foreign policy issues are claimed to have become increasingly blurred (Liotta, 2002) as international and national security are both concerned with who is defined as an outsider, a migrant, and a security risk (Bigo, 2002). Border controls have shifted into nation-states’ interiors (Walters, 2004) through various forms of social sorting, surveillance, and checkpoints (Gandy, 1996; Graham, 2005; Sadowski and Pasquale, 2015). The sorting of populations in this way reflects life-chance divides between different groups of people and can all too easily relapse into, or feed off, prejudice, stigma, and discrimination (Kaufman, 2016; Brannon, 2017; Jefferson, 2018). Others have highlighted the immensely exploitative, inhumane, underpaid working conditions of modern slavery that migrants experience even in countries of the global North (Lewis et al., 2015). Despite living in otherwise wealthy countries, the life chances of these migrants, including their places of residence,

insurance, wages, living standards, and access to basic provisions, are often more reminiscent of poor regions in the global South.

The above bodies of work testify the necessity to further engage with internal life-chance divides and boundaries of security and development, for which Duffield's (2010) dual critique of the SDN can be a useful but under-utilised interpretive lens. This, of course, is not to claim that studies of pseudo-colonial subordination, isolation, and exclusion inside the borders of the global North are new. Instead, what has been highlighted here is that such perspectives support a revisited understanding of the SDN as not just a global analytical framework, but also one that is just as applicable within the developed world.

### *2.3.1 The SDN and the European Roma*

A relatively recent body of work explores the governance of the Roma in regional and national policymaking in Europe as fundamentally a question of the SDN, and these contributions are therefore key examples of the concept's application within the global North (e.g., Vermeersch, 2012; van Baar, 2011, 2018; van Baar et al., 2019; Kóczé, 2019; Rövid, 2011). Historically originating from the remote Indian sub-continent, the Roma have long been treated as the 'internal other' of Europe and never seen to belong (Goldberg, 2006; Sigona, 2005). As the largest ethnic minority in Europe, they are regularly portrayed as a welfare-dependent, superfluous, and passive social underclass that is stereotypically associated with crime, non-compliance, and itinerant lifestyles (Guglielmo and Waters, 2005; Von Burg, 2009; Gehring, 2013; Kerezsi and Gosztonyi, 2014; Bhambra, 2016; Huysmans, 2019; Kóczé, 2019).

Since the fall of state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 1989, and the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, the Roma have been repositioned as an essentially European minority without a state, and a humanitarian concern in need of particular attention. Consequently, they have become targets of a range of development, social inclusion, and

empowerment programmes (Vermeersch, 2012; Demossier, 2014; Puporka and Zádori, 1999). Simultaneously, they have been increasingly framed in security-orientated terms in EU-wide policies as well as within member states, portrayed as destabilising to social and public security (Guglielmo and Waters, 2005; van Baar, 2011, 2018). As Vermeersch (2012) argues, the governance of inter-ethnic relations in the European Union is underpinned by a logic of security that draws inspiration from the EU's foreign policy, which in turn shows that the EU's attitude to *internal* life-chance divides within its geographical boundaries is comparable to its approach to external ones (cf. Keukeleire and Raube, 2013; Overhaus, 2013).

It is against this backdrop that van Baar's (2018) work becomes key in pointing out, through an SDN lens, the previous scholarly neglect of intra-European institutional development policies targeting the Roma. He compellingly demonstrates that the widening life-chance gap between Europe's wealthy and poor has become severely racialized, both geopolitically through forced expulsions (e.g., from France in 2010, see Parker, 2012; Demossier, 2014) and ghettoization (e.g., in Italy; see Sigona, 2005; Provenzano, 2014; Ivasiuc, 2021), and also biopolitically as part of inclusion and development programmes. He further explains that the Roma have been subjected to a series of 'boomerang effects' since developmental interventions practised in the global South including the strengthening of community relations, social mobility, and assistance towards adaptive self-reliance, have also been applied to the European Roma across the continent (van Baar, 2018).

Despite widespread references in European policy strategies to bridgeable divides between the Roma and the non-Roma population, as well as enthusiastic ambitions around the former's inclusion or 'catching up' to the latter, no real emancipatory breakthrough has been achieved in Roma governance over the past decades. Improvements are usually endlessly deferred into the future, and the heavily racialised gap between Europe's rich and marginalised remains wide (van Baar, 2018; Vermeersch and Ram, 2009). Van Baar (2018) therefore draws important

parallels with Duffield's (2007, 2010) thoughts on the maintenance of global life-chance divides in an intra-European context. That said, it must be noted that van Baar (2011, 2018) transfers Duffield's conceptual framework to the European Roma relatively uncritically in his otherwise excellent analysis, leaving room for some nuanced reflections on how and why the SDN may mutate as a result of downscaling. In urbanising the SDN, the next section critically assesses such tweaks to the framework while also bringing it into conversation with the neoliberal city literature.

## **2.4 Urbanising the SDN**

Existing SDN-based studies on the European Roma and within the global North are timely and important, but the thesis aims to go further in adapting the nexus to the urban level. While vague references to intra-state policies and practices of security and development abound in the literature, less attention has been paid to approaching these issues empirically and understanding how they operate on the ground in urban cores, peripheries, and marginalised spaces (cf. Đurić and Paraušić, 2007). As argued in this section, local governments, institutions, stakeholders, NGOs, and other actors can be just as amenable to an SDN-based critique at the urban level as are sovereign states and international donor agencies.

The urban SDN is intended to serve as a political geographical lens onto the city that provides a different vocabulary for understanding the governance of urban social inequality, albeit one that benefits from existing perspectives on neoliberal urbanism for greater nuance. The purpose of this section is therefore to assess how a city-level adaptation of SDN speaks to existing urban scholarship on penal and social policy. Conscious of the abundance of established work on urban social divides, development, inequality, segregation, and security, our approach to downscaling will draw heavily on these literatures rather than attempting to devise an urban version of the SDN on a blank slate. This is not to say, though, that what follows

is simply a regurgitation or slight tailoring of otherwise well-rehearsed urban geographical concepts. Instead, it is an assessment of how such concepts enrich and fine-tune the political geographical armature of the SDN that has been largely foreign to urban inquiry thus far.

The three major questions for urbanising the SDN are as follows. First, why should the SDN be downscaled to the city? Second, how should it be done? Third, in what ways is it going to be applied to Miskolc specifically? The rest of this section responds to the first and second questions in using existing security- and development-related literatures on the neoliberal city. More specifically, it develops Duffield's (2010) two critiques of the SDN in relation to existing debates on neoliberal urbanism, thinking through the city-level dimensions of the geopolitics of circulation and the biopolitical management of surplus populations. Some links will also be made to the third question, although it demands a closer contextual evaluation of the historical, social, and political setting that Miskolc is embedded in, and will be further unpacked in Chapter 3 too.

#### *2.4.1 Why downscale? Rationale and approach*

The global trends of the liberal way of development and the operation of power across life-chance divides – as identified and dissected by Duffield (2010) – are largely present in urban settings as well. In fact, cities are in many ways containers of wider global inequalities (Aas, 2007). Due to their density, urban landscapes are compressed loci of deep and complex socio-spatial divides and enclosures (see Jeffrey et al., 2012; McFarlane, 2016), which get negotiated, governed, and acted upon in intricate ways that are largely overlooked by totalising understandings of a global- or regional-level SDN. Cities comprise territories of varying degrees of wealth, infrastructural connectivity, service provision and availability, and development more generally, as well as human and physical security, the orchestration of which are largely contingent upon the spatial practices, mobility, interests, and interventions of the

powerful. The drastic development gaps between different neighbourhoods and spaces represent an intricate microcosm of what has been broadly described a global life-chance divide, conducive to the localised reproduction of othering, stigma, and internal colonial binaries of inclusion and exclusion (Howell and Shryock, 2003; Maguire et al., 2014). Equally, as Castells (2010: 436) states, cities are at once “globally connected and locally disconnected”, signalling the ways that urban areas concentrate deep divisions of access to global flows of capital, commerce, labour, information, and goods, all linked to individual life chances. Whereas the marginalised populations are trapped in low-income neighbourhoods with few opportunities for physical and social mobility, the better-off enjoy far more freedom of movement both locally and globally. In other words, it could be argued that life-chance divides between the rich and the poor are just as poignant within cities as they are worldwide and at regional scales (Aas, 2007), thus making the SDN a useful analytical tool at the urban level.

As Giorgi and Pinkus (2006) convincingly demonstrate, there are important parallels between global and urban levels when it comes to the concerted interplay of sovereign boundary-building across wealth divides and the biopolitical management of surplus populations informed by binary conceptions of (under)development (see also Stenson, 2005). In designating whole populations as unviable, disposable, and excessive, the neoliberal city has been shown to employ a “double suspension” (Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006: 103) towards them, consisting of their (i) punitive containment through policing and spatial restriction into zones of marginality, as well as (ii) exclusionary abandonment and reduction to essential means of survival through their detachment from, or reduced access to, social protection. Despite presenting corresponding patterns in the governance of surplus populations at the international and urban scales, however, Giorgi and Pinkus (2006) do not link sovereign power and biopower to existing literatures on neoliberalism at either scale or engage with the SDN explicitly. Furthermore, neither at the institutional nor at the community level do they elaborate on the

intricacies and mechanisms of biopolitical management (e.g., the role and operations of social policy or the outsourcing of social protection) beyond identifying the dichotomous sustenance of the surplus population as disposable life versus the privileged fully-fledged existence of the better-off.

Apart from the above, although the empirical application of the SDN at the urban level is not unprecedented, corresponding conceptual appraisals remain scant. To name a few studies using the SDN in cities, Rasmussen (2007) shows the ways in which urban development in Johannesburg becomes closely linked to security through evictions and crime prevention, and is driven by the perception of the local poor as destabilising threats to the city. Jensen (2010) suggests that Cape Town's local administration upset the balance between security and development towards the former by stepping up against gangs who resisted the lasting racial injustices of the post-apartheid regime. Orjuela (2010) examines neighbourhood-level experiences of the SDN Colombo, Sri Lanka, as minorities and marginalised dwellers are treated as threats to development and security. Siman and Santos (2018) discuss pacification and policing efforts in Rio de Janeiro's favelas where, out of the country's motto 'Ordem et Progresso', they argue that establishing order comes at the behest of progress. Overall, while these studies technically utilise the SDN as their interpretive lens for critiquing the governance of urban inequality in different contexts, they tend to treat the concept as a given rather than systematically thinking through the implications of adapting a predominantly international-scale framework to the level of cities. Furthermore, to my knowledge, SDN-based empirical work that takes under scrutiny the Roma in an urban context is absent to date. It is these gaps, together with the ones mentioned in relation to the work of Giorgi and Pinkus (2006), that the discussion below endeavours to fill in a systematic manner.

#### *2.4.2 Locating sovereign power and circulations in the neoliberal city*

In the unequal realm of the neoliberal city, there is no shortage of the use of sovereign power in controlling urban circulations. However, instead of national borders, barbed wire fences, detention camps, and passport control checkpoints, we find a “dense coexistence” (Foucault, 2007: 335) of architectures of exclusion, securitised gated communities, fortified enclaves (Caldeira, 1996), walls and enclosures (Jeffrey et al., 2012), ‘skywalk cities’ (Graham and Hewitt, 2013), interdictory spaces (Flusty, 2001), and less spectacular checkpoints such as supermarket checkouts, security guards at office buildings, CCTV networks, and so on. From the macro scale downwards, expressions of the social sorting operations of sovereign power as apparatuses of security are now also understood in sub-state, urban, community, and individual levels, as well as in privately owned spaces (Hörnqvist, 2004; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Gandy, 1996; Lyon, 2003; Graham, 2006, 2011; Stenson, 2005). Instead of vast, hostile, and ungoverned global ‘borderlands’ that are perceived as harbours of terrorism and malaise, in cities we see the criminalisation of impoverished neighbourhoods, the proliferation of the informal economy and networks of control in slums that often evade formal regulatory oversight, and the racial and class-based divides that are perpetually policed, stigmatised, and physically excluded from purportedly ‘developed’ and ‘civilised’ areas of the city (Sibley, 1995; see also Kaufman, 2016; Jefferson, 2018; Fields and Raymond, 2021).

According to the neoliberal city literature, the commercialization of urban life following market deregulation brought with it a competitive urge to create aesthetic city images that appeal to investors and consumers (Peck et al., 2009; Low, 2009). In other words, private property interests have become projected onto public space (Mitchell, 2001). As Coleman (2003: 31) suggests, “the perception of these spaces as orderly, clean and safe is integral to the realization of profits”. State resources and capacities have been reoriented from providing for poorer sections of society towards the needs of the wealthy and the private sector (Wacquant,

2008a). Cities are, therefore, under increased competitive pressure to “attract and retain highly mobile capital and the footloose middle-class” (DeVerteuil, 2006: 110), which can best be achieved by fashioning positive city images.

Urban renaissance, beautification, and the consumerist revitalisation of city centres subsequently necessitate security interventions aimed at the removal of the undesirable poor, homeless, and marginalised from sight, and their expulsion to segregated peripheries. Peck et al. (2009: 51) posit that there is “a dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention in order to impose versions of market rule and, subsequently, to manage the consequences and contradictions of such marketization initiatives”. Writing on Los Angeles, Davis (1990) argues that while the paranoid securitisation of affluent residential and commercial enclaves ensures a seamless lifestyle for the wealthy, the police violently combat the stigmatised poor elsewhere in the city and erode accessible public spaces. He suggests that such a carceral realm reflects the emergence of the police state that wages its repressive, racialised and classist war against the stigmatised ‘Other’ of the city (see also Soja, 2000; Light, 2002; Katz, 2007; Henry, 2009). Crucially, then, as Fassin (2013) argues, urban policing is more interested in enforcing a particular *social* order than protecting *public* order per se (see also Coleman, 2004; Carr, 2016).

It must be noted, however, that much of the above introduced punitive city literature does not explicitly focus on circulation, nor does it approach urban exclusion and the filtering of circulations as a joint matter of security and development. Importantly, then, what an SDN perspective primarily adds to the above unpacked accounts of the neoliberal city is the question of enabling and disabling different forms of circulation. To be sure, Foucault’s (2007) accounts of circulation were likewise primarily concerned with the city level, which supports the continued relevance and applicability of analyses of circulation within the SDN at the urban scale. The revanchist city can be understood as the imposition of sovereign power to enable the

omnipotent mobility of the rich – who can just about claim any space in the city they wish – at the behest of the immobile poor, who are often stuck in devalued housing, unable to move elsewhere, banished from public spaces, and in many cases have nowhere left to stay (DeVerteuil, 2006; Harvey, 2008; Ladányi, 2010 [1988]).

Thinking through the politics of the Roma's socio-spatial segregation in Miskolc from the perspective of the SDN therefore carries significant potential, since it allows us to take traditional arguments of the revanchist city a step further. As discussed in Chapter 6, not only does the urban SDN shed light on the spatiality of the Roma's forced penal populist exclusion from central parts of the city through inspection raids, evictions, and policing, but also fleshes out its circulatory dimensions. Rather than simply representing pockets of Roma segregation near the urban core as locales of danger, the right-wing populist municipality also saw them as sources of threat to surrounding non-Roma spaces and residents. In analytical terms, then, dilapidated inner-city Roma neighbourhoods were regarded as the *origins* of undesirable circulations which posed risks to the ostensibly civilised and decent lives of the non-Roma in central parts of the city, and thus needed to be eliminated. In turn, the repressive wielding of sovereign power to exclude the Roma from Miskolc is fundamentally a matter of security-based circulatory reconfiguration rather than that of mere social displacement, which is what a conventional revanchist city reading would likely conclude (see Chapter 6).

#### *2.4.3 Welfare state diminution and biopolitics in the urban borderlands*

As discussed above, traditional literatures of urban revanchism and interdiction are primarily concerned with the operation of sovereign and disciplinary power, the use of force, violence, policing, incarceration, and surveillance in establishing and maintaining urban social rifts under the dictates of capital and the shrinkage of the welfare state. At the same time, they frequently miss the softer facet of social demarcation in the neoliberal city – namely, the

biopolitical management of impoverished and allegedly residual populations across urban socio-spatial divides through narratives of individualising self-responsibility, i.e., that everyone is in charge of their own (mis)fortune (Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Raco, 2009).

For Gandy (2006), the city is a prime location for the development of biopolitical practices and thus merits some consideration. The concept of biopolitics alone has been widely applied in studies of neoliberal urbanism, often revolving around the post-welfare abandonment of surplus life in cities, as traceable in practices of remote trusteeship, minimal provisioning, risk mitigation, disinvestment, and decentralised self-development agendas targeting the urban poor, among other things (e.g., Berner and Phillips, 2005; Selmeczi, 2012; Jeffrey et al., 2012; Zeiderman, 2013; Rossi, 2013).

The analytical considerations of intra-state and urban biopolitics largely resonate with that of corresponding studies of international development assistance in the critical SDN literature, underlining its applicability to the urban scale. As Hindess (2001) posits, the delegation of formerly direct state services to the market and civil society as part of (neo)liberal transformations is also now exercised upon surplus populations within the developed world – just like in the global borderlands. As part of a wider transformation in local governance over the last few decades, social policy, welfare support, and development tasks traditionally performed by the state have been outsourced to external actors, including civil society organisations as well as state-appointed and often privatised quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations or quangos in what has been termed the ‘unelected state’ (Wilson, 1995; Painter, 1999). These transformations in local governance have been justified by the specialist expertise of external bodies, as well as a need to accelerate and streamline decision-making and service delivery, since local governments saw a shrinkage in budgets and political influence (Imrie and Raco, 1999; Rose, 1996; Rose and Miller, 1992; Tickell and Peck, 1996; Painter, 1999). Across the globe, a proliferating array of non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) as well as community-based organisations (CBOs) have increasingly taken charge of social policy and development in slums as established forms of authority, marking an important departure from state-based approaches to urban governance (Di Muzio, 2008; Jessop, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2005). Charities and social work are now present in many deprived urban neighbourhoods, promoting the remote developmentalist agendas of adaptive self-reliance and individualised self-help in marginalised communities and livelihoods. They are hence considered key actors in supplying vital resources to these spaces, albeit with limited success and scope (Di Muzio, 2008). In fact, the growing number of social organisations trying to take over welfarist roles are left overburdened and largely incapable of dealing with splintering pockets of failing infrastructures, patchy service provision, reduced social mobility, exclusion from skilled labour options and the housing market, as well as the rise of informal networks and practices (Graham and Marvin, 2001; Di Muzio, 2008; see also McFarlane, 2010; Siman and Santos, 2018). Crucially, though, these bodies serve a biopolitical purpose of rendering urban surplus populations self-reliant, thereby assisting sovereign power in the containment of poverty rather than seeking to tackle it (see Duffield, 2010).

My aim is to look specifically at the ways that the externalisation of state functions produces biopolitical engagement with surplus populations through the civil sector and the provisioning extensions of the state. The macro-management of welfare matters under Keynesianism – or its more extreme welfarist version, i.e., state socialism, in the case of Hungary (see Jessop, 2002) – turned into localised biopolitical micro-management in the form of charities and social policy organisations following the 1989 economic restructuring (more on this Chapter 3). The outsourcing of social protection emerged as part of a symptomatic, but glaringly insufficient, response to rising poverty and segregation (see Walters, 2010). Biopolitics features in underdeveloped urban districts as various outsourced and independent NGOs aim to combat crime, juvenile delinquency, drug addiction, homelessness, early school dropouts, family

planning issues, and so on (see *ibid.*). In the urban realm, making sense of the biopolitical functions of the diminishing welfare state – much like those of foreign aid and international charitable bodies working towards adaptive self-reliance in the context of the remote borderlands (see Duffield, 2010) – therefore presents considerable research opportunities.

Alongside the shifting and increasingly indirect relationships between the state and urban surplus populations, previously politicised aspects of urban governance can now operate behind a depoliticised façade of expert management (Rose, 1996). NGOs are classically understood as platforms for political representation, dissent, and giving voice to the powerless. They occupy an intermediary position between the impoverished communities they work with, as well as broader governance structures and the state, thereby being considered the forerunners of bottom-up development agendas. The increased presence of NGOs as social policy actors may come across as alternative conduits of representative democracy in the place of traditional state provisions, particularly as they are often based in underprivileged neighbourhoods, are seen to represent their interests, and carry some authority at the local level (Kamat, 2004).

However, governance transformations and outsourced responsibilities are driven by the neoliberal ethos of pluralising decision-making while leaving hegemonic arrangements unchallenged and marginality unresolved, as the polarising effects of global capital produce ever starker wealth divides in urban space (Di Muzio, 2008). Indeed, Kamat (2004) reminds us that the way in which NGOs and CBOs have adopted a techno-managerial approach improving access to sound education, health, and housing actually diminishes the scope for democratic engagement as they implement development policies along normatively set standards that are considered beneficial for the target community. In promoting self-responsibilising biopolitical development programmes, the individual is portrayed as the cause of and solution to marginality as opposed to the macro-scale patterns of unjust state redistribution and global chains of exploitation (Cruikshank, 1999; Raco, 2009; Kamat, 2004). Conformity with the dominant

neoliberal order and promoting survival within its bounds is more important to NGOs than challenging and transforming it due to their dependence on state money and private donors (Cox, 1999; Berner and Phillips, 2005). Consequently, Kamat (2004) concludes that NGOs cannot genuinely mediate the interests of the poor as their actions reinscribe principles of neoliberalism in the affected communities while hollowing out democracy. Ultimately, then, the operation of NGOs does not signal egalitarianism, but instead the tweaking of the relationships between civil society and the state under the same neoliberal framework (ibid.).

Questions of NGO-based community empowerment and democratic representation are doubly pertinent in Hungary's illiberal governance structure today, where political and civil society freedoms are curtailed. As discussed in Chapter 3, the operation of civil society and NGOs is heavily influenced by the architecture of the illiberal state. According to Cox (1999), a feeble civil society comes hand in hand with an authoritarian and exclusionary political structure, whereas a stronger civil society can hold political leaders accountable more effectively and therefore reduce the scope for political hostility towards particular groups and communities. NGOs in Hungary can no longer operate with complete freedom and inclusion under the current regime, and some of them work as the unelected extension of the state in an often neutral to downright philanthropic guise (cf. Wilson, 1995; Jeffrey, 2007b). Although the independence of NGOs from the hegemonic neoliberal order has been widely questioned before (Cox, 1999; Kamat, 2004), the dismantling of civil society along lines of political interest makes issues around its leverage and empowerment potential even more relevant against the constraints of Hungary's political realm and is thus worthy of further exploration.

#### *2.4.4 Towards an integrated urban SDN*

Besides isolated analyses of the operationalisation of sovereign power (e.g., policing, surveillance, security checkpoints, etc.) and biopower (e.g., social work, aid provision,

governing at a distance, etc.), an SDN-based critique of the neoliberal city is also about reflecting on the *mutuality* of the two (see Stenson, 2005; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006). As implied in its name, the SDN enables us to analyse the governance of urban marginality through the interrelated notions of development and security. In other words, it urges us to think more relationally about what happens when urban security is seen in developmental terms, and the other way round. It helps us to evaluate how development and security feature in the penal and social policy-based ordering of urban space, and how particular public, political, and policy understandings of the two terms produce different constellations, strategies, and proportionalities of sovereign power and biopower. Moreover, it asks who gets to decide and demarcate (in)secure and (under)developed urban areas, what interests such choices reflect, what discourses and practices they mobilise, and with what consequences (see Hörnqvist, 2004; Stenson, 2005; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006). Through an urban SDN, seemingly unrelated issues such as racial profiling and community-building efforts in impoverished areas gain new meaning when their embeddedness within a wider spectrum of elite strategies aimed at governing, containing, and perpetuating socio-spatial inequality is recognised. In bringing two relatively discrete urban debates on sovereignty and biopolitics into conversation with each other, the SDN therefore produces a united perspective that pays attention to the operation of power over unequal neoliberal urban settings in more holistic and interlinked ways.

Rather than a mere merger of existing accounts of urban revanchism and biopolitics, however, an urban SDN analysis also needs to establish a critical dialogue between the two domains and reflect on their dynamic interplay on the ground. There is significant empirical research potential in understanding the contested linkages between the two forms of power as they are both deployed in relation to the governance of urban life-chance divides. How do sovereign power and biopower assist, reinforce, contradict, challenge, or bypass each other in the meshes of urban space? Does the proximity of people, spaces, services, institutions, and

policy measures produce even more visible, direct, tangible, and dynamic sets of interactions between sovereign power and biopower in the city compared to the often remotely scattered spaces of global-scale interventions? These are questions that an SDN-based empirical analysis of urban segregation is prepared to answer.

In the governance of segregation in Miskolc, sovereign and biopower display crucial relations that invite analysis at multiple scales. As discussed in Section 7.2 of Chapter 7, the structural social policy approach of managing Lyukó Valley's excluded Roma at a distance reinforces the penal populist social ordering interventions near the city centre that led to the concentration of marginality in Lyukó in the first place. In this arrangement, sovereign power and biopower co-produce and perpetuate the remote containment of racialised poverty. The analysis further shows, however, that the two forms of power may contradict large-scale motivations of hegemonic exclusion at the micro level, as seen in the cooperative sympathy of social workers and Municipal Police rangers towards the local community.

### **Chapter conclusion**

The journey thus far has been a conceptual exercise of shifting a debate from the global to the urban scale. The resultant urban SDN framework will serve as the theoretical engine for the thesis and frame its empirical constituents. There are three major ideas to take forward from this chapter, each of which are summarised below.

First, the theory itself. The defining characteristics of SDN and critical debates on the concept will be important to remember throughout as they will inform much of the analysis. In short, whereas the purportedly intertwined nature of security and development is the policy logic underlying the SDN, the simultaneous operation of sovereign power and biopower are the conduits through which the nexus is put to work. Duffield's (2010) dual critique productively encapsulates the operationalisation of the SDN along these lines. The hardened imposition of

territorial boundaries for circulatory control is the principal manifestation of sovereignty as part of the nexus, while intervening in the lives of remote surplus populations with the aim of making them self-reliant and keeping them afar defines the biopolitics of the SDN. Through the mutual deployment of the two kinds of power, life-chance divides are entrenched rather than relieved as developed states and communities continue to defend themselves against what they perceive as destabilising and threatening manifestations of underdevelopment (Duffield, 2010; Foucault, 1991; Buur, 2005; Dean, 2010).

Second, the scalability of life-chance divides. Although Duffield (2010) speaks of a generic global-scale life-chance divide between the developed and the developing world, zooming in on the global North reveals further and more intricate such divides within wealthier countries that are equally important (Thomas, 2001). For instance, existing research shows that there is a racialised life-chance divide between Europe's marginalised Roma minority and non-Roma majority, as well as the centrality of the SDN to the European Union's Roma governance (van Baar, 2011, 2018). Forcible repatriations and expulsions, the reassertion of national borders, the mushrooming of segregated suburban encampments, the popularity of anti-Roma policing strategies and political discourse, and social inclusion narratives emphasising the alleged importance of closing educational, cultural, and existential gaps, are all telling examples of the ways that security and development define policy thinking and actions towards the Roma (Vermeersch, 2012; Demossier, 2014; Provenzano, 2014; Ivasiuc, 2021). These considerations will remain vital to the thesis, since the governance of the Roma in Miskolc is also fundamentally driven by security and development as unpacked in Chapters 5-7.

Finally, the urban SDN. Trends and strategies associated with the SDN are in many respects similarly valid in a city as they are in Western foreign policy at the global scale. Duffield's (2010) usage of Foucauldian notions of sovereign power and biopower remain relevant at the urban level due to the scalar fluidity of their operation under the neoliberal social and economic

order (see Stanek, 2013). Be it the selective sorting of populations, the biopolitical externalisation, containment, and arm's length management of segregated and impoverished urban spaces, and the incessant policing of the life-chance divides between the rich and the poor (Duffield, 2007, 2010; Chandler, 2007), critical perspectives on the SDN apply to cities as well. For the purposes of this study, the operation of sovereign power in the neoliberal city has been linked to revanchist urbanism and penal policy, whereas biopower has been traced in discussions of urban biopolitics and the outsourcing of social policy. Given the joint operation of sovereign power and biopower working to perpetuate inequality in neoliberal settings, a critical urban SDN needs to reflect on the dynamic linkages between the two at discursive and material levels alike, as well as the ways that security and development feature and cut across both domains. The city-level narratives and manifestations of sovereign and biopolitical interventions in the name of security and development will merit close and relational consideration across the empirical analysis of the governance of segregation and the Roma in Miskolc.

### **3. Context: the Roma and segregation in Hungary and Miskolc**

#### **Chapter introduction**

Whereas the previous chapter has established the theoretical links between the SDN and the city, this part of the thesis contextualises the Roma and Miskolc, thus providing some essential background to the empirical analysis developed later. The first part of this chapter builds on Section 1.4 of the Introduction to further position the Roma in Hungary and Miskolc, who constitute the most disadvantaged minority group in the country. To this end, it problematises the very definition of the Roma, shedding light on the difficulties of delineating and researching this highly heterogenous and diversely interpreted group. The linkages between the Roma and development and security will also be discussed, including how neo-liberalisation in Hungary has produced outcomes of racialised marginality, discrimination, and penal responses comparable to Western case studies, but ones that nonetheless require nuanced reading. The second part of the chapter looks at Miskolc, discussing the implications of the city's state socialist history as an industrial powerhouse, the manoeuvring room of today's local government against a centralised state, and how urban decline and transformation have turned Miskolc into a deeply divided city. The role of development and security in the city's segregation governance will be explained and the main research sites introduced.

#### **3.1 The Roma**

In Hungary, just like elsewhere in Europe, the Roma have been marginalised, suppressed, and demonised for centuries, and still constitute the most discriminated-against minority group in the country (Barany, 1994; Csepeli, 2008). Their deprivation is among the severest in, *inter alia*, access to suitable housing, education, healthcare, and the labour market overall (Hera, 2017). The marginality of the Hungarian Roma has long been a systemic issue and poses one

of the most acute challenges for society, policy, and research alike (Egyed, 1996; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Cserti Csapó, 2003; Kazarján and Kirs, 2020).

According to the latest estimates from 2017, the Roma constitute approximately 8-9 percent of Hungary's total population, that is, around 876,000 people (Kotics, 2020; Király et al., 2021)<sup>7</sup>. A large share of the Roma is concentrated in Northern Hungary, with over one-fifth of them residing in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (B.A.Z.) County (Kotics, 2020). Many Roma live in segregated urban neighbourhoods, scattered remote villages, and ghetto-like conditions below the poverty line, often lacking any prospects for social mobility (ibid.). In Miskolc, the county capital of B.A.Z. County, the Roma make up over 10 percent of the city's population (around 16,000-17,000 people) according to the city's Roma Minority Self-Government, although some estimates suggest that this figure could be up to 15 percent (Havasi, 2018; Halász, 2018).

Typically, areas with larger proportions of Roma inhabitants tend to be punctured by heightened levels of social tensions between local Roma and non-Roma communities, and overall lower living standards, income, levels of schooling, employment, and life expectancy, among other things (Kocziszky, 2006; Czomba, 2008). In these places, public thinking is heavily influenced by everyday and political discourses of racial prejudice (Loss and H. Szilágyi, 2001; Kozma, 2020; see also Péntzes et al., 2018). A city with many Roma dwellers, Miskolc has been a site of intensifying segregation, deepening racial fault lines, and discriminatory policymaking in recent decades, which all make the subject of this thesis particularly pressing.

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<sup>7</sup> The 2022 census is going to provide the latest data on this. However, the requisite census results were not yet available at the time of writing this thesis.

### *3.1.1 Identification and classification*

But who are the Roma, after all? Ladányi and Szelényi (2000) provocatively claim that it is impossible to unequivocally answer this question. There are numerous competing understandings of the Roma's definition, grouping, and classification, which make any kind of judgement – be it academic, professional, policy-based, personal, or otherwise – incredibly complicated and sensitive (Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Vermeersch and Ram, 2009; Kotics, 2020). As Stewart (2009: 2) puts it, “the Roma will never possess the kind of clearly demarcated ‘group’ boundaries and ‘distinctive features’ that those gathered within nation-state categories have acquired.” Instead, their identity is a potpourri of discordant categorisations, counter-categorisations, labels, and self-identifications by various different groups and actors including politicians, institutions, cultural elites, and the general public (Cserti Csapó, 2003; Vermeersch and Ram, 2009).

A key debate on the definition of the Roma revolves around a classificatory struggle between the identifier and the identified. Some suggest that the Roma should be defined based on whomever the non-Roma majority considers Roma (Kemény, 1997 [1971]; Havas et al., 2000). However, this approach has been criticised for being externally imposed and prone to entrenching prejudice, stereotyping, racism, and discrimination (Diósi, 1988, 1992; Vermeersch, 2012; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Durst, 2009). Consequently, others have argued that the only politically correct practice is self-definition (Loss and H. Szilágyi, 2001; Csepeli, 2008). This is not without problems either, though, because whether a particular person identifies as Roma in a given case depends on a complicated set of circumstances, such as who is asking them, where, and when (Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000). At censuses, for instance, only about a third of Roma people in Hungary actually self-identify as Roma, and the rest claim to be non-Roma Hungarians in fear of discrimination, which makes results inaccurate (Rövid, 2011; Csata et al., 2021). In turn, there is a substantial discrepancy in the figures produced using

external categorisation compared to self-identification, and both approaches involve limitations (Csepeli and Örkény, 2015).

Additionally, the Roma are a far more variegated minority group than it is often assumed (Vermeersch and Ram, 2009). The umbrella term ‘Roma’ – which both policy language and lay discourse tend to use as a collective signifier – is in fact a vast category of remarkable internal social and cultural diversity (Rövid, 2011; Balatonyi et al., 2014; Gehring, 2013; Barany, 1994). The three major subgroups of the Romani population in Hungary are the Romungro, the Vlach, and the Boyash Roma, each of whom carry unique cultural and linguistic traits, and comprise smaller and more heterogenous communities still (Király et al., 2021). Besides, some Roma have assimilated into the majority non-Roma society while others have retained their traditions to a greater extent, some are marginalised and others are rich, and some are uneducated while others belong to the intellectual elite (Guglielmo and Waters, 2005).

Consequently, the Roma are not a uniform group that they are often represented to be, and some even argue that the Roma as a category is merely an imaginary construct serving the convenience of researchers, policymakers, and politicians (Kotics, 2020). The term Roma as a research category, a policy concept, or a word in lay discourse is thus a product of hegemonically orchestrated classificatory practices (Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Piarese et al., 2014; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015). Part of this power geometry is my own use of the blanket term ‘Roma’ to speak about an otherwise highly variegated group of people (if they can even be treated as a group as such), which inadvertently runs the risk of reproducing the very binary image of the Roma versus non-Roma classificatory regime that policymaking, political narratives, and racially fuelled animosity are founded upon in the first place. To be clear, though, in this thesis I am not researching the Roma *per se* – instead, I set out to critique the ways that they are defined and treated in policymaking and municipal governance in Miskolc, thereby focusing on the labeller rather than the labelled (see discussion of research design in

Section 4.1 of Chapter 4 for more on this). Indeed, the classificatory regimes applied to the Roma in a given context are more a reflection of the classifier than the classified, which holds plenty of space for critique (see Horváth, 1997 [1993]; Pankucsi, 2012).

### *3.1.2 The Roma and security: the ethnicization and criminalisation of poverty*

In popular imagination across Eastern Europe and beyond, the Roma have long been framed as a security threat associated with delinquent, disorderly, destabilising, and criminogenic lifestyles (Barany, 1994; Dósa, 2009; Fekete, 2016; Kotics, 2020). The criminalisation of the Roma has become heavily accentuated as part of the social polarisation that followed the 1989 regime change (Hajnáczy, 2020). Due to their marginalised position, the blame for various social predicaments was conveniently shifted onto the Roma, who have become increasingly subjected to punitive policies and hatred speech (Durst, 2015). The Roma's discriminatory and often revanchist treatment under the nascent market economies of post-socialist countries have in many ways mirrored corresponding trends of neoliberal anti-poverty measures elsewhere in the West despite considerable contextual differences (Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-a). Policies targeting the Roma have been heavily shot through with security-oriented ambitions which, while taking numerous different shapes and forms, share the common aim of containing and controlling a racialised population deemed risky and unreliable (Guglielmo and Waters, 2005; van Baar, 2018; van Baar et al., 2019).

Poverty under neoliberalism is frequently criminalised anyway (e.g., Davis, 1990; Sibley, 1995; Smith, 1996; Mitchell, 2001; Wacquant, 2007), but when some element of ethnic difference is involved – including places with large Roma communities, such as Miskolc –, then the “criminal poor” quickly turn into “criminal Gypsies” (Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-b; Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017; see also Hörnqvist, 2004). In Miskolc, after the regime change, the Roma were among the first to have become unemployed and marginalised due to the closure

of factories, a reduced demand for low-skilled labour, and waning welfare benefits (cf. Bakshi et al., 1995). Consequently, they became widely blamed for the city's social problems and economic decline, and perceived as threats to public order, civility, and safety (Ladányi, 2010 [1991]). Furthermore, sharpening post-1989 social inequality left many non-Roma lower middle-class and working-class people competing with the Roma for shrinking welfare provisions, public services, and employment opportunities. The only way for these non-Roma groups to retain some of their advantage was through the reassertion of racial difference through the demonisation of an internal Other, that is, the Roma of the city (see Chapter 5; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015). Roma-phobic views and policy measures have become far more common as a result, which the media also continues to frequently disseminate and reproduce (Dósa, 2009; Szuhay, 2013).

Many Eastern Europeans, including Hungarians, have a “Gypsy story” of their own, e.g., robbed in the streets, approached by a prostitute, tricked in a business deal, a bike stolen, etc., which all strengthen public antagonism against the Roma (Barany, 1994) and assist the common mantra that the Roma are stigmatised out of experience rather than prejudice. Similarly, subsistence crime is often identified as a specifically Roma trait and treated as a matter of irreconcilable cultural difference rather than a result of deeply rooted structural injustices (Dósa, 2009). However, there is plenty of evidence that these activities are just as much integral to the lives of the non-Roma poor, making racialised distinctions untenable, since the Roma's plight is a result of their systemic discrimination and marginalisation, rather than some inherently cultural or ethnic characteristic (Kemény, 1997 [1971]; Durst, 2009; Kotics, 2020). Ethnic labelling in such sweeping ways is highly damaging as whoever is considered Roma in this mindset will be treated as such – i.e., feared, criminalised, excluded, and punished – and the other way round. The kinds of prejudice thus engrained not only affect the poor, but also the better-off and educated Roma who might face similar forms of discrimination – or be overtly

treated as unlikely “exceptions” from what is normally assumed of Roma people “in general” – when looking for skilled jobs or trying to find rental housing in more upmarket neighbourhoods, for example (Diósi, 1988; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Csepeli et al., 1999; Rövid, 2011).

Today, legally and constitutionally, Roma identity in Hungary can only be declared through discretionary self-identification and is handled as strictly private data. During state socialism, the ethnicity of perpetrators – including that of the Roma – was recorded in criminal statistics, for example. Today, however, this is no longer permitted (Kotics, 2020). Consequently, authorities routinely claim that their actions, policies, and decision-making are not informed by ethnic data in any way. In reality, though, the Roma in Hungary commonly experience institutional discrimination from educational segregation to disadvantages on the labour and housing markets (Stewart, 2009; Zolnay, 2005).

Furthermore, the urge to respond to the social marginality of the Roma with policing measures surfaces time and time again (Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-b). Since the regime change, governments have more or less tacitly tolerated racist extremism, which is partly why such views continue to be popular today (Kállai, 2003; Mudde, 2005). Against a backdrop of heightened public paranoia towards the criminalised and demonised Roma, pro-policing sentiments are usually widely endorsed (Szuhay, 2013). This is reflected in the operation of the police, since multiple studies have shown that the Roma are disproportionately subjected to stop and search incidents, as well as condescending and discriminatory treatment (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2007, 2009; Pap, 2011; Hera, 2017; Kazarján and Kirs, 2020). Equally, the Roma’s spatial containment, denial of mobility, and subjection to surveillance, among other policing interventions, is a documented phenomenon (see Chapter 6; see also Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017).

Alleged links between the Roma and criminality have become a highly sensitive and politically charged topic over recent decades, with different groups wielding it with different degrees of explicitness and only very few openly challenging it (Kerezsi and Gosztanyi, 2014). The otherwise highly offensive and discriminatory notion of ‘Gypsy crime’ has become a catchphrase for far-right extremist political groups. The term has gained considerable traction and gets repeatedly recited in various forms for popularity gains (Szuhay, 2013; Csepele and Örkény, 2015; Kotics, 2020). The formerly far-right Jobbik party championed Romaphobia, coupled with biological arguments and fearmongering myths around the Roma’s demographic explosion that would overwhelm the “decent” Hungarian population and cripple the welfare state, thereby stressing the need to reassert non-Roma supremacy (Stewart, 2012; Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017). Simultaneously, nationalist paramilitary organisations and vigilante groups openly endorsed by Jobbik were on the rise, marching the countryside and often harassing, intimidating, and clashing with Roma communities whom they sought to ‘discipline’, particularly in places where the police were unable to intervene further due to legal restraints on their operation (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020; Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-b)<sup>8</sup>. It is against this political climate that Horváth (1997 [1993]) claimed that the Roma needed to be simultaneously protected from skinheads and the police, with the political and social elite unable to settle racist extremism reassuringly.

Today, the Fidesz government is usually unwilling to condemn racist rallies and anti-Roma groupings, as exemplified by a 2020 far-right demonstration outside the National Roma Self-Government building, where the police refused to intervene despite the crowd’s racist chanting

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<sup>8</sup> Before its consolidation and gradual disavowal of far-right political views a few years ago, Jobbik had been particularly popular in economically depressed parts of the country with higher proportions of Roma in the local population (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020). Since then, racist extremism has not disappeared; instead, it has merely regrouped under different arrangements, with some far-right voters turning to Fidesz’s punitive workfare programme (see Csepele and Örkény, 2015) while others joining a new far-right party called *Mi Hazánk* (Our Homeland).

and the ongoing pandemic restrictions on gatherings at the time. Similarly, no member of the government spoke up against the event (Kovács, 2020; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). Their silence, just like in many other similar instances in the past, could be viewed as complicity (see Csepeli and Örkény, 2015). As discussed in Chapters 5-7 later, this problem is highly acute in Miskolc too. A lack of open support towards the Roma due to their widespread societal resentment, and the absence of voices challenging racism across the political spectrum, are striking. In this setting, politicians are navigating and reproducing Roma-phobic electoral emotions and prejudice (see Section 5.2.2 of Chapter 5).

In Hungary, revanchist anti-poverty measures proliferated sharply in recent decades. Getting rid of the poor and the Roma through slum clearances has been a defining urban policy strategy under the banners of neighbourhood renewal and rehabilitation (Halász, 2018). In many cases, these interventions were at once motivated by the need to remove the Roma from sight – with racist intentions often barely masked – and eliminate or prevent the formation of segregated pockets of poverty deemed dangerous to the surrounding population (Ladányi, 2010 [1989], 2010 [2000]-a; Kemény et al., 2004; Szuhay, 2013). While slum clearances may displace the Roma from the immediate proximity of urban centres and bring these places “back under control”, they only become relocated in slums elsewhere – usually further away from job opportunities and basic social provisions – and so their marginality is at best preserved or worsened still (Halász, 2018; Podoletz, 2020; Ladányi, 2010).

In Miskolc, demolitions and forced mass displacement have been on the municipality’s policy agendas since the regime change. For instance, in 1989, the Roma were set to be relocated outside of the city to a purpose-built segregated settlement by the banks of the Sajó river, which was then successfully halted by a local Romani activist group called the Anti-Ghetto Committee (Ladányi, 2010 [1991]). Regardless of this achievement, structural changes did not follow as local governments, including Miskolc, have failed to develop a comprehensive

and functional welfare policy encompassing the provision of council housing and suitable employment, as well as educational integration policies, among other things (Zolnay, 2005). Consequently, social polarisation in the city has continued.

### *3.1.3 The Roma and development: the endless deferral of emancipation*

For decades, the dominant policy discourse around the Roma in Hungary – and Europe more broadly – has been that they are an underdeveloped minority in need of catching up to the ‘advanced’ majority. Development programmes targeting the Roma are devised and implemented in the name of the Roma’s Europeanisation and gradual societal inclusion (van Baar, 2019). However, these ‘civilising’ agendas, often cloaked in benevolent policy terms and promises of complete emancipation, are not designed to be fulfilled and do not truly assume that the Roma are capable of joining the ‘developed’ citizenry. Instead, similarly to the maintenance of life-chance divides under neoliberalism elsewhere, the Roma in Hungary continue to exist as an isolated and suppressed surplus population whose genuine social advancement would be too expensive to achieve, and it is therefore more feasible for the elite to merely conserve the status quo (ibid.; Hindess, 2001; Guglielmo and Waters, 2005; Vermeersch and Ram, 2009; Balatonyi et al., 2014). Consequently, the paternalism involved in trying to assist the Roma’s development has been argued to be conducive to ‘benevolent segregation’ (Körtvélyesi et al., 2020: 11) that otherwise fails to deliver on its stated aim of emancipation.

Historically, different political regimes in Hungary approached the Roma in different ways, but without any considerable impact upon their continued marginality overall (Barany, 1994). During state socialism, the Roma were subjected to forced assimilation because, according to communist ideology, social difference was purely a matter of class, whereas ethnic, cultural, and religious traits were deemed irrelevant (Barany, 1994; Ladányi, 2010 [1991]; Kovai, 2017).

However, assimilation attempts were often damaging and led to further exclusion, since they were applied collectively and insensitively, and prevented open dialogue about the subordinated position of the Roma rather than focusing on the genuine erasure of inequalities (Ladányi, 2010 [2001]; Puporka and Zádori, 1999). At the same time, the living standards of the Roma did improve as a result of subsidised housing, universal employment, and free healthcare (Hajnáczky, 2020).

Although many uneducated Roma people were at least employed in factories during state socialism, the ideological mirage of social equity rapidly collapsed into stark polarisation after the regime change due to industrial decline and the mass termination of unskilled labour. At the dawn of market capitalism, the Roma were the first to have lost their jobs and struggled to find alternative employment in the service-sector oriented expansion of the labour market (Kállai, 2003; Csoba, 2006; van Baar, 2011). Consequently, many had no choice but to enter the rising informal economy due to declining welfare provisions and loss of jobs (Lengyel, 2009; Durst, 2015; Puporka and Zádori, 1999). The marginalisation and segregation of the Roma accelerated considerably, exposing the grave socio-economic disadvantages that had only been artificially patched up to some extent prior to 1989 (Barany, 1994).

As van Baar (2018) suggests, differences in wealth have become racialised as the Roma are widely conflated with poverty, which in turn deepens their already stark isolation from the non-Roma. Consequently, Roma segregation and empowerment have become racial and class issues at the same time. As former Minister of Human Resources, Zoltán Balog remarked, “poverty is common, but it has a Gypsy face” (quoted in Fekete, 2016: 46). Although the Roma are certainly more present in low-income groups, poverty is by no means a “Roma problem” as they still constitute a relative minority (about one third) among the poor nationally (Ladányi, 2010 [2007]; Kotics, 2020). At the same time, according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (2022), in 2020, 66.6% of the Roma in Hungary were at risk of poverty or social

exclusion<sup>9</sup>, as opposed to only 17.1% of the non-Roma population<sup>10</sup>. In other words, the Roma are significantly over-represented below the poverty line (see also Gábos et al., 2015). However, this does not make collapsing ethnicity with poverty any less problematic.

Following the turn of the millennium, neither the welfarist social policy-oriented ambitions of the 2002-2010 left-wing government, nor the post-2010 workfare society agenda of Fidesz have been successful at mitigating Roma marginality (Törzsök, 2003; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). The former was poorly managed and not targeted enough, so the large sums of money spent on empowerment programmes often did not reach the poorest and failed to generate long-term improvements to the Roma's social mobility, housing, education, and employment, among other things (Ladányi, 2010 [2005]-a; Törzsök, 2003). As for the last decade, Fidesz's workfare scheme has been the dominant social policy approach. It has been argued that the programme indirectly targets the Roma given their higher proportion amongst the poor, thereby further exacerbating racist sentiments of the "lazy Gypsies" of living on taxpayers' hard-earned money who should be channelled into some form of employment (Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017). However, discourses of workforce activation and the stigmatisation of idleness form a combustive mix with the pre-existing racially loaded societal hostility towards the Roma. Even before the illiberal turn in 2010 (see Section 1.5 of the Introduction), the Roma had already been inseparably associated with poverty, idleness, deviance, informal activities, and welfare-dependency due to their post-regime change marginalisation, and in public discourse this image was left at best unchallenged across the political spectrum, but more often openly vilified

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<sup>9</sup> The category 'at risk of poverty or social exclusion' (AROPE for short) is defined by Eurostat (2021: Online) as "the sum of persons who are either at risk of poverty, or severely materially and socially deprived or living in a household with a very low work intensity" and "was the headline indicator to monitor the EU 2020 Strategy poverty target" (ibid.), which the Hungarian Central Statistical Office's dataset was also founded upon.

<sup>10</sup> The Hungarian Central Statistical Office uses respondents' voluntary ethnic self-identification to classify the Roma (Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2011).

(Havas et al., 2000; Sutour, 2014; Ladányi, 2010; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015). Overall, the rise of the workfare programme has therefore been criticised for perpetuating racialised inequality due to its precarious conditions and ignorance of deeper and more complex questions of Roma marginality (Csoba, 2006; Havasi, 2013; Virág, 2016).

### *3.1.3.1 Civil society and the Roma under illiberal social policy*

The government's 2030 National Social Inclusion Strategy explicitly addresses the Roma as its major target population (Government of Hungary, 2021; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). In line with the government's overall policymaking architecture, this social inclusion or 'catch-up' strategy has been formulated in a highly top-down manner with little regard to grassroots Roma organisations and civil society actors (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020; Government of Hungary, 2021). A conglomerate of pro-Roma bodies critical of the government claimed that they had been excluded from the formulation of the strategy on political grounds, since participating organisations had been selected, consulted, and offered opportunities based on their worldview rather than their commitment to emancipation (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). They further suggested that the interests of the Roma could best be articulated through the largely neglected self-organised bottom-up initiatives, without which it was impossible to create a faithful and effective empowerment strategy (ibid.).

Today, the very NGO sector, including organisations seeking to empower the poor and the Roma, is constrained by a top-down political structure. Although a wide range of civil society organisations have appeared in the past decades, their freedom, policy impact, and ability to hold the government accountable for corruption, nepotism, and discriminatory action, among other things, has remained limited due to tight state oversight and overlaps with the public sphere (Szalai and Svensson, 2018; CSCE, 2020; Hann, 2020). In Fidesz's discourse, independent national and international emancipatory, pro-Roma, and LGBTQ+ advocacy

groups, among others, are routinely perceived as jeopardies to conservative ideals of nationhood and are thus discredited, side-lined, defunded, and excluded (Hann, 2020). NGOs are selectively favoured according to their political orientation, and those tolerated or endorsed (i.e., mostly the ones that openly side with, or at least do not explicitly criticise the government) have much more room and financial means to operate (Lendvai-Bainton and Szelewa, 2021). In this sense, we are also witnessing a hollowing out of the political and the undermining of democratic integrity within civil society, in favour of greater unison in decision-making (see Cox, 1999). As a result, largely ‘risk-free’ activities such as leisure and sport now dominate the civil sector at the expense of more burning issues including fighting poverty, racism, and human rights abuses (Szalai and Svensson, 2018; Zubor, 2022). Restrictions on the liberties of civil society have had major implications for anti-Roma policies and possible responses in Miskolc in the last decade, which will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7 in greater detail.

In tandem with the disassembly of the welfare state since 1989, and again after 2010, government-friendly civil society and church-based charities have been reconceived as the provisioning state’s auxiliary arms. In this new governance constellation, the welfare duties previously fulfilled by the state have been outsourced to a parallel set of quasi-external bodies with the aim of easing the strain on core welfare functions (Miskolc City Council, 2021c; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). In the absence of alternatives, charitable NGOs in segregated neighbourhoods now serve as a ‘last outpost’ (Halász, 2018: 60, my translation) to populations who are otherwise left hopelessly bereft of basic lifelines and opportunities for social mobility.

Questions concerning Roma emancipation have become more or less the monopoly of the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta (HCSOM), which is the largest social services charity operating in Hungary (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). Their territorially targeted and complex approach to social work is called ‘presence programme’, which entails locally situated work with deprived communities, as well as development interventions based on a diagnostic

logic that seeks to identify and then address the basic needs of said communities in cooperation with local institutions and councils (Government of Hungary, 2021). However, the fact that the HCSOM are a large umbrella organisation rather than a locally rooted community initiative has raised questions about their ability to embed themselves within diverse localities and develop situated responses accordingly, as well as their willingness to consult local actors and community representatives (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020).


In Miskolc, social policy has also been largely outsourced to the HCSOM, alongside a municipal organisation called Miskolc United Social, Healthcare, and Child Welfare Institution (abbreviated as MESZEGYI in Hungarian). Since 2014, the HCSOM has been running community centres in Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets – the two main study areas of the thesis introduced later in this chapter – and has established itself as a principal community-based organisation and, essentially, a mini-welfare state in taking on basic provisioning roles in both neighbourhoods (Miskolc City Council, 2020f; Government of Hungary, 2021; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020; Havasi, 2018). The HCSOM calls upon a widespread set of services from its national network such as legal support, assistance with debt management, and finances.

While independent on paper, the HCSOM maintains close ties with the state and the municipality and can therefore be considered a buffer organisation that the state has appointed to depoliticise the otherwise fiercely disputed and politically charged question of social emancipation and the Roma in the city (Havasi, 2018), as elucidated in Chapter 7 in greater depth. MESZEGYI, on the other hand, formally belongs to the municipality and is present in Lyukó among other parts of the city, but not in the Numbered Streets, and often collaborates with the HCSOM in social work endeavours. Both organisations provide a range of communal services which would otherwise be lacking, thereby functioning as a lifeline to many poor families.

### **3.2 Miskolc: a transitioning patchwork city**

The city of Miskolc in Northern Hungary has been a key site for struggles for Romani recognition, representation, and emancipation after the 1989 regime change in Hungary. As mentioned earlier, when construction proposals were put forward for a purpose-built Roma ghetto by the Sajó river on the outskirts of Miskolc, Roma and non-Roma activists, advocates, and intellectuals came together in 1989 in the so-called Anti-Ghetto Committee and successfully challenged the ghettoization plans (Ladányi, 2010 [1991]; Barany, 2000). They later formed an independent Roma rights organisation called Phralipe (meaning ‘brotherhood’ in Romani), which was one of the first and most important such organisations in Hungary and attests to the historical significance of Miskolc in Roma rights advocacy and the unfolding of segregation governance and social inclusion policies. Struggles against discrimination in the city have continued ever since with mixed success, making this research intervention a timely critique of the city’s continued socio-spatial segregation and governance injustices.

Miskolc is the county capital of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (B.A.Z.) county and Hungary’s fourth largest city with a population of 155,476 (Ministry of Interior, 2021; *Figure 3*). It used to be the second largest after Budapest, peaking at nearly 220,000 inhabitants in the 1980s, but its population has seen a steady decline since the regime change (Miskolc City Council, 2021c; Ladányi, 2010 [1991]). After 1989, transition to market capitalism generated social stratification and mass impoverishment due to housing and land privatisation and the restructuring of the labour market (Enyedi, 1995; Szelényi, 1996; Douglas, 1997; Tosics, 2004; Sýkora, 2005; Czomba, 2008; Mihályi et al., 2011).



*Figure 3. Miskolc on the map of Hungary. My screenshot of Google Maps.*

Once an industrial powerhouse, a symbol for the “country of iron and steel” in the Eastern bloc, and a bastion for the proletariat, Miskolc was artificially bolstered in the centrally planned economy of the state socialist regime (Ladányi, 2010 [1991]). Amidst the city’s industrial boom, the state sought to emulate key tenets of socialist ideology – such as egalitarianism, central redistribution, and the neglect of urban land value – within the city’s social structure, land use, spatial functions, and architecture (Halász, 2018; Enyedi, 1992; Petrovic, 2005; Tosics, 2015). Some examples of such efforts can still be traced in the abandoned iron factory behemoths in the city (*Figure 4*), as well as the swarms of prefabricated panel block housing that continue to define Miskolc’s character (*Figure 5*) (Lengyel, 2009; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000). Following the regime change and the collapse of the industrial bubble, however, the subsequent socio-economic decline earned the city a nationwide reputation of a declining rustbelt. The closure of factories brought high unemployment, rising municipal debt arrears,

outward migration, exacerbated levels of residential and racial segregation, as well as rapidly deteriorating public security (Ladányi, 2010 [1991]; Halász, 2020).



*Figure 4. An aerial photograph of some of the city's abandoned factories. © LMP Miskolc – BAZ megye (2021). Image used with copyright owner's permission.*



*Figure 5. Prefab panel apartment blocks in the Avas area. My photograph, 2020.*

The illusion of full employment artificially maintained by the communist administration collapsed after 1989. Unskilled work had dominated the city's division of labour during the heyday of heavy industry with masses of workers drawn in from the surrounding countryside, who subsequently lacked the competitiveness in the capitalist labour market (Miskolc City Council, 2013c; see also Róna-Tas, 1996; Evans and Mills, 1999). A new post-communist underclass thus formed, who became the capitalist system's surplus population and consisted of a large number of Roma people, as explained before (Stewart, 2001; Halász, 2018). B.A.Z. County and Miskolc were hit particularly hard by the regime change given their centrality to national industrial growth under communist rule (Kneisz and Kuttor, 2006). Today, the city's ability to retain skilled labour is feeble, with many choosing to emigrate westwards to more prosperous locations where service- and knowledge-intensive job opportunities abound. The economic void left behind by the collapse of heavy industry remains unfilled today (ibid.; Halász, 2018). Large businesses and private investors are direly lacking in Northern Hungary, and the region is consequently unable to compete with Budapest's central position and economic primacy (Kocziszky, 2006).

### *3.2.1 Pathfinding and polarisation*

Stretching along the Szinva stream, Miskolc is a mosaic of many smaller historic towns and villages including Diósgyőr, Tapolca, Görömböly, Hejőcsaba, and Szirma, which were gradually incorporated into Miskolc as the city expanded (Zolnay, 2005; Halász, 2018). Due to its rapid growth and merger with smaller settlements, however, the legacy of a spatially fragmented urban fabric with multiple subcentres has remained (Zolnay, 2005). The city's architecture is a patchwork of prefabricated panel blocks, historical 19<sup>th</sup>-century city centre housing, small town garden city areas, wine cellars, villa quarters, and industrial brownfields lying side by side (Halász, 2018). As Lengyel (2009) suggests, this territorial fragmentation is

also a key reason why city leaders are struggling to manage social and racial fault lines effectively.

Grappling with post-industrial decline, Miskolc has remained on a lengthy pathfinding trajectory as the city is still trying to recover from its socio-economic crisis and countrywide stigma (Kocziszky, 2006; Halász, 2018). Tourism is on the rise with a variety of annual gastronomical and wine festivals, its theatre is a source of cultural pride, and the cave baths of Miskolc-Tapolca and the natural beauties and Palace Hotel of Lillafüred are popular tourist destinations. The University of Miskolc is emerging as a regional knowledge and research centre, and some large multinational companies such as Takata and Bosch have established themselves in new industrial plants on the outskirts (Halász, 2018). In 2006, the municipality also created an asset management company called Miskolc Holding, which is an umbrella organisation for numerous utility and public service functions from heating to public transport. It is also in charge of urban development programmes, business development, as well as rehabilitation projects, with over 2,600 employees (*ibid.*). The emergence of Miskolc Holding as an outsourced auxiliary of the local government or ‘quango’ (quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation), classically defined (cf. Wilson, 1995; Painter, 1999), signals the neo-liberalisation of the city’s governance. Most recently, the city has also been appointed as the centre of a large-scale state-funded regional economic development programme called ‘Creative Region – Limitless development’ between the county capitals Miskolc, Debrecen, Szolnok, and Nyíregyháza, showing the state’s intention to revive some of the city’s past economic power (Minap.hu, 2020c).

Employment rates have risen in past years, largely due to the public workfare programme (see Section 1.5 in the Introduction) and the aforementioned appearance of new multinational factories around the city, but these poorly paid jobs have had little effect on the city’s poverty rates overall (Miskolc City Council, 2021c; Nagy et al., 2020). To be sure, Miskolc continues

to be punctured by high rates of unemployment, continued social marginalisation, and economic recession, and has been unable to catch up with more developed parts of the country (Czomba, 2008; Halász, 2018).

### *3.2.2 In the grip of a centralised state*

An important political consideration for understanding the nature of local governance in Miskolc is the right-wing populist national government's recentralisation of decision-making powers and the hollowing out of municipal governance. Rather than funding local authorities and encouraging the continuation of devolution reforms that followed the 1989 regime change, Viktor Orbán's post-2010 cabinet reversed decentralising trends to concentrate most powers in the hands of the central state (Bárándy, 2014; Fekete, 2017; Gajzágó, 2019; see also Enyedi, 1995; Tosics, 2004). This involved the restriction of local governments' financial independence and policymaking rights, and the confiscation of public services, to fit broader national political agendas (cf. Painter, 1999).

Part of creating a "democratic deficit" (Swyngedouw, 1996: 1503) through recentralisation was to undermine oppositional local governments and favour pro-government ones in funding allocations (Hegedüs and Péteri, 2015; Balatonyi et al., 2014; Dupcsik, 2018). For instance, in 2013, when Fidesz ran Miskolc, the national government took over all of the city's municipal debt and blamed it on the preceding 2002-2010 left-wing government's ostensibly poor budgeting (Miskolc City Council, 2013d). Moreover, upon his campaign visit to the city before the 2019 local elections, Prime Minister Orbán explicitly stated that "if we want to develop, if we want investments and jobs, and if we want to implement the plans that city's previous leaders worked out so beautifully, then do cooperate, and do not be oppositional – rather, I would say that Miskolc should remain on the winning side" (Minap.hu, 2019c: 0:00-00:18, my translation). In other words, he explicitly made state funding conditional upon the victory of his

party in the local elections. Although it has been a common practice since the 1989 regime change to put oppositional local governments into a difficult position (Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-a), the process nonetheless assists the stabilisation of a centralised state apparatus today, which now holds even greater control over the allocation of resources to the already significantly weakened local governments.

Against a backdrop of centralisation, seeing past the state when thinking about governance *at any scale* in present-day Hungary is well-nigh impossible, as other actors and stakeholders carry limited weight in decision-making, which must be remembered throughout our analysis of penal and social policy in Miskolc. Even during the heyday of devolution prior to 2010, the manoeuvring room of local governments was limited when it came to deciding upon major questions including social policy, housing, and segregation (Zolnay, 2005). As Ladányi (2010 [2007]) suggests, local governments could only realistically strengthen or weaken segregation against an overarching national social policy backdrop set in Parliament. This applies doubly in today's centralised governance arrangement, which makes a state-based critique of urban decision-making particularly relevant. The state's tight control over municipal budgets and manoeuvring space renders parochial any perspective that focuses purely on the local aspects of governance without considering broader state-driven agendas (cf. Painter, 1999, 2003). For example, the fact that the national government funded the city's extensive smart CCTV development (Government of Hungary, 2017) – which became the costliest of smart developments in the city as discussed in Section 1.1 of the Introduction – reflects the generous endorsement of pro-government municipalities and local policies that resonate with the state's penal populist and pro-policing visions (see Section 1.5 of the Introduction). At the same time, the social sector receives limited state funding both nationally and locally, which the municipality in Miskolc cannot not realistically compensate for given its resource constraints,

even if it wanted to do so (see Section 7.1.1 of Chapter 7; Miskolc City Council, 2014a; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020).

The municipal administration in Miskolc is oppositional at the time of writing this thesis, having replaced Fidesz – who were in power in the city between 2010 and 2019 – in the most recent 2019 local elections, despite the Prime Minister’s ominous allusion to funding cuts quoted above. A set of new policies and governance approaches have been implemented since then, and penal populism is somewhat superseded by a philosophy of participatory decision-making, social inclusion, and the provision of council housing for the young and the poor (Minap.hu, 2020a, 2021a). During my fieldwork in Miskolc in autumn 2020, there was relatively little data available on the new local government’s penal and social policy decisions, particularly as the COVID-19 pandemic diverted attention from other governance matters. A considerable share of the empirical analysis in this thesis will therefore concern the actions of the pre-2019 Fidesz municipality. Nonetheless, I will also critically reflect on evolving local governance trends today based on policy documents and media sources, and in relation to an overall national-scale political atmosphere of right-wing populism.

### *3.2.3 Segregation in Miskolc: an overview*

The rate of socio-spatial exclusion in B.A.Z. County continues to be the highest in Hungary and is particularly concentrated in Miskolc (TÖOSZ and Miskolc City Council, 2021). According to official data from the 2011 census, 6,745 people lived in a total of 31 segregated neighbourhoods<sup>11</sup> in Miskolc (Miskolc City Council, 2021c). More recent estimates suggest,

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<sup>11</sup> The Hungarian Central Statistical Office defines a segregated neighbourhood as a “a physically contiguous part of a settlement comprising at least one housing block, or properties surrounded by four streets or public spaces, where the segregation index – the proportion of low-status residents within the working-age population, i.e., those with at most 8 years of primary schooling and those without a stable source of income – reaches 50%” (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 77, my translation). This definition is only here for reference and will be problematised in Chapter 5 in relation to the discursive production of segregation in Miskolc.

however, that this number could well be up to twice as many at around 10,000-13,000 people, which amounts to 6-8% of the city's population (Halász, 2018). Within its officially defined internal territory,<sup>12</sup> Miskolc has several smaller and scattered pockets of segregation, such as Tetenvár, Bábonyibérc, the Víkend settlement, Álmos Street and Gizella Street, and now the Numbered Streets as well, each home to less than 300 inhabitants today (ibid.; own fieldwork; Gyukits, 2016). These segregated neighbourhoods used to be larger historically but got broken down and dispersed as a result of the slum clearances of recent decades, with official statistics now reporting 16 segregated neighbourhoods in total as opposed to 31 back in 2011 (TÖOSZ and Miskolc City Council, 2021). Despite a seeming improvement reflected in this numerical reduction, however, poverty has only been displaced and increasingly concentrated in the external territories, particularly Lyukó Valley and, to a lesser extent, Pereces (Lengyel, 2009; Havasi, 2018). By and large, the state has withdrawn social provisioning from segregated neighbourhoods, letting go of those in greatest need of welfare support (Ladányi, 2010). The politics of segregation in Miskolc – which has continued, until recently, to be defined by evictions, bulldozing, and policing interventions rather than localised emancipatory action – must therefore be central to a critique of security and development in the city.

Making sense of the governance of segregation in Miskolc further invites a close consideration of the discursive political environment in which it unfolds. Importantly, B.A.Z.

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<sup>12</sup> According to the 321/2012. (XI. 16.) Government Directive on the Procedure of Spatial Organisation (2012: Online, my translation), internal territories are defined as “part of the settlement’s administrative territory – typically, the settlement’s historically developed, contiguous, built-up, or to-be-built-up parts – that are designated as such in the local construction regulations”. In the territories belonging to internal Miskolc, the council has a greater responsibility for key infrastructural provisions such as water, gas, electricity, sanitation, road maintenance, waste collection, and street lighting. Property owners are also allowed to construct houses and buildings. By contrast, external territories are defined by the same government directive as “a part of the settlement’s administrative territory that does not classify as internal territory, and primarily serves agricultural, forestry, water management, or special (e.g., mine, water basin, waste disposal site) purposes, or is uncultivated and close to nature” (ibid.: Online, my translation). In Miskolc’s external territories, basic infrastructural provisions are beyond the council’s obligations, and construction is not permitted. Put simply, the main aspects of the internal-external distinction revolve around the council’s service and provisioning responsibilities, as well as construction rights. This distinction will play an important role in my analysis of Lyukó Valley in Chapter 5.

County and its capital Miskolc are among the most problematic places in Hungary when it comes to anti-Roma sentiments in local elections. Before 2018, Miskolc's electoral constituencies were some of the nationwide strongholds for the then-far-right party Jobbik<sup>13</sup>, who had gained considerable local popularity through their openly anti-Roma position promoted through slogans such as “people’s patience has run out” and “there is no public safety in Hungary today” (Mandiner.hu, 2012: Online, my translation). As racial tensions have remained fierce ever since, non-Roma voters in Miskolc are to some degree held together by their collectively anti-Roma stance. Support for alternative socially emancipatory measures is still minimal, prompting both left and right-wing parties to formulate ever stronger anti-Roma narratives to strike a chord with a radicalising electorate in what Roma rights activist Aladár Horváth called a universal “anti-Roma grand coalition” (Horváth, 2019: n.p., my translation). The idea that political actors are seldom willing to challenge anti-Roma sentiments in fear of losing popularity deserves particular attention, since it defines the nature and mechanisms of the governance of segregation in Miskolc, and how far local actors can go in changing the central state’s discourses and policies, especially under the current oppositional local government (see Chapter 5).

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<sup>13</sup> In the 2018 general elections, they received 38.72% of votes in one of the two constituencies covering Miskolc, finishing as an extremely close runner-up to Fidesz (38.96%); in the other, they secured 28.25% of votes. Both results considerably surpassed the party’s overall national figure of 19,06% (National Election Office of Hungary, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). In the results of the latest 2022 general elections, the popularity of the far right is still discernible, although less strikingly than in 2018 for a few reasons. Since 2018, Jobbik has rebranded itself and consolidated into a centre-bound people’s party, much to the discontent of its far-right members, who split off and founded Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland), a new radical nationalist party. The consolidating Jobbik was only able to keep a small fraction of its original voter base, many of whom supported Mi Hazánk, while others turned to Fidesz. To take the election figures of Mi Hazánk as the new indicator of far-right extremism in Miskolc, they received 6.61% and 8.46% in constituencies No. 1 and 2 respectively, compared to their national average of 5.88% (National Election Office of Hungary, 2022a, 2022b, 2022c). As Mi Hazánk is a far smaller party than Jobbik used to be, these figures are less pronounced than in the case of the 2018 general elections, but nonetheless show continued local support for far-right politics.

### 3.2.4 The main study areas

This study focuses on the two largest segregated neighbourhoods in Miskolc called Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets, which have been subjected to political controversies and considerable social transformations in recent years (*Figure 6*). The rapid changes of these areas are indicative of the ways that security and development interconnect in the last decade's right-wing populist governance of Miskolc (see Chapters 5-7).



*Figure 6. Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets on the map of Miskolc. My arrangement; map data from Google Maps.*

To briefly outline segregation trends related to the two areas since the regime change, in 1992 Miskolc City Council decided to move forward with a series of systematic slum clearances, despite the Anti-Ghetto Committee's earlier-mentioned obstruction thereof just a few years earlier. Demolitions began in the early 2000s, and multiple segregated and impoverished neighbourhoods including Álmos Court, Békeszálló, and the Szondi Settlement

were removed (Halász, 2018). The marginalised and mostly Roma families affected by these clearances were forced to relocate to the Numbered Streets, Lyukó Valley, and the Avas quarters, all of which became increasingly deprived and segregated as a result. Today, due to the recent eviction of Numbered Streets and Avas residents, poverty is becoming concentrated in Lyukó Valley where many evictees found refuge. My analysis in Chapters 5-7 is primarily concerned with the socio-spatial ordering practices surrounding segregation in Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets. Both neighbourhoods are introduced below.

#### *3.2.4.1 Lyukó Valley*

Lyukó Valley (Lyukóvölgy in Hungarian) is located in the northern part of Miskolc comprising the catchment area of the Lyukó stream, and is bounded by its watersheds from the North, the West, and the East, and the administrative boundary of internal Miskolc from the South (Miskolc City Council, 2013e; Havasi, 2018). It is a sparsely built semi-rural neighbourhood on the outskirts of Miskolc (*Figure 7*) and used to be a peaceful recreational weekend house area with greenery, gardens, and nature aplenty, providing an idyllic sanctuary from the city's heavy industrial blight and pollution. Part of the area called Lyukóbánya (Lyukó Mine) was a coalmine that supplied fossils for the city's iron smelting factories, and was permanently closed in 2004 (Szenttamási, 2007).



*Figure 7. A view of Lyukó Valley. My photograph, 2020.*

In the 1980s, Lyukó slowly began to deteriorate as unemployment grew, and miners and factory workers who mostly lived in flats in the city had lost their jobs and found cheap housing in Lyukó. Many retired elderly people, who struggled to maintain their flats in the city, followed suit. New dwellers from various parts of the surrounding countryside also moved in, thereby diversifying the area's social composition, and creating internal fractures of belonging within the community (Kozma, 2020; Miskolc City Council, 2013e). Ghettoization then accelerated considerably due to slum clearances in the inner city, which drove many Roma families to the valley. As a result, Lyukó is now the largest segregated area in Hungary, with estimates of its population size ranging from 2,500 to about 4,000 (Miskolc City Council, 2014a; Havasi, 2018). What is presently often portrayed from the outside as a homogenous hotbed of criminality, danger, and decay, however, consists of a diverse group of inhabitants from retired factoryworkers and miners to poor Roma and non-Roma families, evictees, those on loans and with debt arrears, homeless people in tents who prefer not to live in homeless shelters, and others seeking to hide from the outside world for various reasons (Lengyel, 2009). According to recent estimates, over half of the area's population – and about three-quarters of under-35s – are of Roma ethnicity (Vass, 2015, cited in Havasi, 2018).

Lyukó has no schools, no permanent shops (only a van – see *Figure 8*), no churches, and no street names, and in most parts even basic infrastructural provisions are lacking (Index.hu, 2019; own fieldwork; Halász, 2018). Officially, it is not a residential area *per se*, but instead it was planned as a recreational holiday home neighbourhood (Miskolc City Council, 2013d). Most houses in the valley are decaying and unfit for safe habitation, with makeshift patches, repairs, and extensions (*Figure 9*). They were originally built as weekend cottages unsuitable for use in the winter, and lack water, sanitation, and waste disposal, making living conditions incredibly tough and health issues common (Gyukits, 2016; Balatonyi et al., 2014). They often contain one small room only, occupied by large families of 8-10 people or more. In many cases,

water is sourced from public wells, which are sometimes hundreds of metres away from the houses (Kozma, 2020; Balatonyi et al., 2014). The majority of streets are unpaved and thus seriously impede mobility, particularly when they get muddy in the rain or icy in the winter. Waste dumps along roadsides are common due to a shortage of municipal waste collection in the area (*Figures 10a and b*). Crimes, drug use, illegal home occupation, piracy of the electricity grid, thefts – including that of the very building material of houses themselves – and burglaries are reportedly common (Miskolc City Council, 2021f). Prospects for social mobility are bleak and connections to the outside world are poor.



*Figure 8. This van is the only “grocery store” in the centre of Lyukó Valley, selling basic goods by the main road. My photograph, 2020.*



*Figure 9. A house from closer up in Lyukó. My photograph, 2020.*



*Figure 10a) Streetscape and b) a waste dump in Lyukó. My photographs, 2020.*

#### *3.2.4.2 The Numbered Streets*

Originally a planned neighbourhood of a hundred purpose-built factory worker houses erected in 1909, the Numbered Streets have no individual names, but are instead numerically

denominated from one to eight (i.e., Street One, Street Two, etc.). There used to be eleven of them, but Streets Nine to Eleven were bulldozed for the renovated city stadium's car park (see Section 6.2.1.1 in Chapter 6) (Havasi, 2018; Horváth, 2019). The area was neglected for many decades, resulting in the dilapidation of the housing stock (*Figures 11a and b*), the concentration of poverty, and ethnic segregation. Impoverishment and disrepair became especially pronounced after the factory passed down the properties to the city council when it started to generate heavy losses in the 1980s and could no longer maintain workers' homes. Those who could afford to do so moved out then, while those evicted from other demolished slums in the city, including many Roma people, moved in as they had been given replacement flats in the Numbered Streets (Horváth, 2019). The area soon became the largest segregated neighbourhood in the internal territory of Miskolc and was met with increasing dissatisfaction from the surrounding non-Roma population, who saw it as a bothersome 'patch of shame' and a container of danger and incivility. Before the 2014 mass evictions (discussed in detail in Section 6.2.1.1 in Chapter 6), the area's population was 923 (Miskolc City Council, 2014a), an estimated 75-80% of whom were Roma (Havasi, 2018). Today, only around 286 residents have remained there (as of September 2020 – interview with social worker). Most of the remaining dwellers receive social assistance by the HCSOM, whose community centre was set up in the neighbourhood in recent years. The charity has been renovating some of the neighbourhood's housing stock as part of an ongoing social rehabilitation programme (*Figure 12*).



*Figure 11a) and b). Abandoned and/or decaying houses in the Numbered Streets. My photographs, 2020.*



*Figure 12. Streetscape with renovated HCSOM social housing in the Numbered Streets. My photograph, 2020.*

The municipality's approach to spatial ordering and development in Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets deserves close attention and will be studied in Chapters 5-7, which think through the ways that security and development interconnect across various manifestations of sovereign power and biopower in the governance of the two areas. Lyukó and the Numbered Streets have been treated visibly differently in the last decade in terms of penal and social policy, and comparative reflections will therefore help us to assess how securitisation and development interventions are to be understood in different parts of a heavily divided city against right-wing populist politics.

### **Chapter conclusion**

The two key contextual themes introduced in this chapter serve as important foundations for understanding the governance of segregation in Miskolc and longstanding struggles around Roma emancipation. Sensitivities around defining and understanding the Roma have been unpacked, with some discussion on how they have been treated since the regime change in relation to security and development, which helps us to position the Roma in Miskolc against a set of exclusionary measures. Miskolc's key features as a post-industrial centre and a segregated city have also been introduced.

The task ahead is to see how right-wing populism plays out in the racialised organisation of urban space in Miskolc, particularly in terms of the discourses underpinning socio-spatial ordering practices, the operation of penal populism, and the accumulation of marginality at the city's peripheries along with its social policy management. The analysis to follow in the empirical chapters must therefore be attuned to the deeply problematic ways in which the Roma continue to be discriminated against in Miskolc, how and why space matters in dynamics of their oppression, and how discourses and practices of public security and social emancipation operate in tandem to create new and exclusionary urban landscapes. The roles, responsibilities,

and manoeuvring room of the local government, the Municipal Police, social charities, and other actors need to be carefully assessed against a centralised state apparatus and a general sense of societal hostility towards the Roma in the city.

## 4. Methodology

### Chapter introduction

Speaking about the Roma in Hungary is as much an ethical and political minefield for a social researcher as it is for an activist, a politician, or a policymaker (Havasi, 2018; Kovai, 2017). As described previously, debates around the Roma are wrapped up in a contested multitude of social and political struggles, making the topic highly sensitive (see Chapter 3). Quantitative approaches are bound to neglect or remain myopic about the subjective intricacies involved in researching this area. A qualitative perspective, however, retains the necessary sensitivity and an openness to the manifold readings, lived experiences, and power structures inherent to the themes of this research (Dey, 1993; Becker, 1996; Creswell, 2013). Rather than collecting mass data through standardised questions on various segregation-related matters in Miskolc (cf. Byrne, 2002), then, I<sup>14</sup> am interested in the in-depth qualitative accounts of how marginality, securitisation, development, and the Roma are understood from different discursive positions from the officialdom to the general public. As this chapter explains, my methods were tailored to this very purpose.

This study sits at several intersections of different knowledge production domains and empirical realities. First, I am non-Roma researcher who studies Roma segregation, which demands a responsible appraisal of the limits to my entitlement. Second, I am an Eastern European person studying my home country, but embedded in, and therefore mediating my produced knowledge towards, a Western academic environment. Consequently, this chapter not only evaluates the methods used in this study along with their justification of applicability, but

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<sup>14</sup> As opposed to many other parts of the thesis, I wrote this chapter in first person to give a better sense of the first-hand and reflective experience of conducting research, and the main challenges and considerations encountered along the way.

also develops a broader epistemological discussion of my research process as a whole with personal reflections included.

The chapter begins by outlining the main methodological and research design principles. It then describes the methods used for this thesis, reflecting on the application of each in and beyond the field, including their strengths, limitations, and lessons learned. Afterwards, it discusses approaches to data analysis and ethical considerations in conducting fieldwork, as well as the impacts of COVID-19 on my research. Choices concerning the scope of this study will then be considered in relation to my positionality, and my limits of entitlement to producing knowledge about a marginalised group as a non-Roma researcher. Finally, the chapter remarks on mediating knowledges between East and West as an important consideration for conducting research in Central and Eastern Europe.

#### **4.1 Methodological design principles**

The fundamental methodological problem at stake in this study has been how best to research the state-based exclusion of vulnerable populations in a socio-spatially divided urban setting (see research questions in Section 1.7 of the Introduction Chapter). To expedite this line of inquiry, I have adopted a structural and city-scale perspective rather than a situated ethnographic account. More specifically, I have followed in the footsteps of studies that engage with the predominantly non-Roma institutional system and policymaking practices to think about the *relation between* the Roma and the non-Roma (see, e.g., Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Loss and H. Szilágyi, 2001; Csepeli, 2008; Lengyel, 2009; Dósa, 2009; Solt, 2010; Virág, 2016; Havasi, 2018; Dupcsik, 2018; Halász, 2018), rather than embedding themselves in Roma communities for extended periods of time in search of an authentic and situated voice of the marginalised (e.g., Stewart, 2001; Durst, 2011a; Szényi, 2011; Mihalovics and Fehér, 2021). In

other words, I focus on the labeller rather than the labelled, and I am mainly concerned with the ways that the powerful organise and order urban space and with what effects on the powerless.

Since segregation in Miskolc has been governed in a largely top-down manner (e.g., Ladányi, 2010 [1991]; Lengyel, 2009; Havasi, 2018; Halász, 2018; Horváth, 2019), reflecting wider national and historical trends (Kelemen and Balázs, 2008; Appel and Orenstein, 2016), a methodological approach fit for studying these arrangements needed to be formulated. Many have argued that the state has to be a prime subject of analysis when critiquing political and social injustice, disempowerment, and discrimination (e.g., Swyngedouw, 1996; McKee, 2009; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015). My choice of methods discussed in the next section were hence aimed at developing a state-oriented, as opposed to an immersive ethnographic, data collection approach necessary for a situated research perspective.

#### **4.2 Methods: facts, rationale, and reflections**

In this study I have adopted a qualitative multi-method research design that consists of in-depth semi-structured interviews, documentary analysis, and participant observation. Due to the changing regulations around the COVID-19 pandemic, I conducted my fieldwork in hybrid form with both online and face-to-face elements, and with varying intensity, from June 2020 to June 2021. The rapidly unfolding restrictions and my personal decisions as well as that of research participants only made possible a short period of in-person fieldwork between early September and late October 2020. I split the rest of the time between online interviewing and other activities such as transcribing and analysis. In the following subsections, I describe the main features of each method used in this study and discuss their application and utility in answering my research questions outlined in the Introduction chapter.

#### *4.2.1 Semi-structured interviews*

I conducted thirty-eight in-depth semi-structured interviews, thirty-two of which were one-to-one and six were group-based conversations involving two to eleven participants<sup>15</sup> (see Table 1 in the Appendix for a detailed listing of interviews). Interviewees spanned a variety of social statuses, backgrounds, and narrative positions, including policymakers, activists, social and community workers, NGO representatives, teachers, academics, members of municipal policing bodies, and residents from different parts of the city, including Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets. They were identified based on their association, experience, or involvement with the main themes of this thesis, i.e., segregation, security, and social development policy in Miskolc, through work, informed interest, or other personal experiences. During tighter periods of the lockdown, or when in-person arrangements were not possible, interviews were conducted online using Zoom, Skype, Facebook Messenger, and Viber. All of the interviews were in Hungarian and, in the twenty-four cases when the participant(s) consented, I voice recorded the conversations. Alternatively, I took notes during or shortly after the interviews, depending on the circumstances. The length of audio recordings ranges from 26 minutes to 1 hour and 48 minutes, although the actual time spent with participants was often several hours and up to half a day exploring places and talking informally about questions that were often still relevant and helpful to my study. I transcribed all voice recordings verbatim and translated the relevant sections of interviews into English. All interview material was anonymised to prevent the identification of participants.

The strength of in-depth semi-structured interviews lay in their versatility and adaptability. They were an effective way to engage various different actors for a diverse cross-section of perspectives on my research topic such as neighbourhood conflicts, personal financial struggles,

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<sup>15</sup> This includes two interviews from past research in 2018.

views on municipal security governance, and dilemmas around social housing allocation at the council level, among other things. Interviews also offered the opportunity to explore themes in detail and their semi-structured nature meant that although there was an initial set of questions at hand, the time allotted for answers and the conversation could be steered in any direction deemed relevant (Valentine, 2005; Dunn, 2010). A handful of conversations were walking interviews (see Table 1 in the Appendix), whereby the participant led me around a neighbourhood and told me stories and experiences about the streets, houses, gardens, communities, and residents as we went along, which made their narratives more tangible and allowed for a spatially embedded understanding of the key issues in the areas concerned (Evans and Jones, 2011).

I sometimes found that participants were unsure about what was expected of them, but in other cases they were more comfortable with the interviewing process and navigated their ethical possibilities around consent effectively (see Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). Some expressed a sense of uncertainty around the kinds of answers they were supposed to provide in statements such as *“I can only say my personal and subjective opinion on this”*, at which point I assured them that there were no right or wrong answers, and I was specifically interested in their own views as long as they were comfortable with expressing them. Others were more confident about their responses, with one participant saying that *“on the one hand these are my opinions, but on the other hand I think 95% of them correspond to the strict reality and are based on many years of experience.”* At times, participants would ask me to pause the recording to voice something controversial or personal, which would have often been interesting or useful for my analysis but, of course, for ethical reasons, these parts were never noted down or used further down the line. In these cases, a recurring sentiment was something along the lines of *“if I said what I really think about this I would be fired, but if you switch off the recording, I’ll tell you”*.

In a few other cases, participants would use less politically correct, racist, misogynistic, and other inappropriate expressions off the record while voice taping was paused, with one even suggesting that I should not be voice recording at all if I want to get the most ‘honest’ answers. In the rare events that inappropriate remarks were made, I felt disturbed, but tried to maintain a neutral façade to prevent the encounter from being ruined. While some readers may disagree with me on this and rightfully ask why I would not speak up in these situations or leave the conversation, I felt that as frustrating as these moments were, they constituted a necessary part of the research process itself – considering that I am researching prejudice and stigma – and I got some important data out of these conversations which I did not want to lose. On the other end of the spectrum, though, some informants would try to express themselves carefully and sensitively when referring to the Roma, and sometimes even think aloud in how best to describe issues surrounding segregation in the most considerate way.

Furthermore, I was pleasantly surprised by the responsiveness and helpfulness of the vast majority of informants, who were very accommodating, generous with their time, and made me feel welcome and comfortable throughout (see Deans, 2004). Yet, in my study I ended up critiquing the work, organisation, or affiliation of some participants in one way or another with a consequent sense of guilt. For instance, I was extremely humbled when the Municipal Police let me into their control room for a visit (see Introduction chapter) which I expected to last no longer than an hour, and yet an executive officer exclusively dedicated over half of their working day to me. The municipality, some local NGOs, and the HCSOM were also wonderfully hospitable as they arranged numerous visits and interviews, drove me to Lyukó Valley multiple times, and spent many hours helping my research. It is for these reason that I have formulated occasional critiques of the work of these organisations with a heavy heart. I must emphasise, however, that these critiques were never personal, but instead concern the wider political and decision-making context in which matters of policing, segregation, and

social work unfold in Miskolc. I am aware that many of the social workers, socially sensitive municipal guards, council employees, researchers, volunteers, and activists who participated in this study, are doing some incredibly dedicated work (as discussed in Chapter 7 by way of critiquing mainstream development literatures).

#### *4.2.2 Documentary analysis*

The in-depth analysis of 101 documentary sources was another key pillar to my research (see Table 2 of the Appendix for a detailed list<sup>16</sup>). The documents that I collected and analysed encompass a broad range of formats and styles such as development proposals and strategies, policy briefs, presentations, grey literature, official press releases, council meeting minutes, reports, legal texts, and other formal documents. They came from various sources including the municipality, the national government, ministries and institutions, the municipal and national police, the EU, local, national, and international advocacy groups, pro-human rights NGOs, and courts at the county and national level. I accessed most documents online from public archives, repositories, and the websites of relevant bodies, and also got hold of a handful with the generous help of policymakers. I translated quotes from Hungarian sources into English upon choosing to include them in the thesis text.

Discrimination is a highly complex phenomenon, and the analysed documents encompassed a range of different perspectives on social injustice through security and development policies. They were chosen based on their association with my research project's overarching themes, with the aim of exploring a variety of narrative positions rather than just a small number of interlocutors. Inevitably, however, the most abundant source of documents on segregation, security, and development in Miskolc was the City Council, or municipality, as I

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<sup>16</sup> Many – though not all – of the documents listed in the Appendix are also cited in the text. In these cases, they are referenced in the Harvard citation format and included in the Bibliography as well.

often refer to it in the thesis (see Table 2 of the Appendix). Nonetheless, many minutes of council meetings contained heated debates between representatives of different political parties, where far-right views on the verge of overt racism would clash with emancipatory and egalitarian sentiments, thereby stretching far beyond a seemingly unanimous state discourse. The critical stance of statements and reports produced by oppositional outlets, NGOs, and other organisations were likewise helpful in this regard, since they offered some insight into legal battles and other disputes at the level of institutions and organisations. Formal municipal and state documents (e.g., strategies, directives, policy papers, etc.), by contrast, tended to present issues unilaterally and through an authoritative, optimistic, and watertight problem-solving veneer. When it came to such documents, reading between the lines was key to understanding some of the choices around inclusions and exclusions of evidence, and it was through the effects of the policies proposed on the ground, and the groups mostly impacted by particular decisions, that needed to be understood in their complexity (see Jupp and Norris, 1993; Prior, 2003; Dryzek, 2006).

Consequently, it was important to assess documents' discursive weight and the realities they produce on the ground in relation to housing and labour market exclusion, mobility restrictions, educational segregation, discrimination in the criminal justice system, and so on, against a façade of inclusion and equality (Balatonyi et al., 2014; Balatonyi and Cserti Csapó, 2016; Loss and H. Szilágyi, 2001). This required a careful process of comparing the contents of official documents to real-world outcomes as well as other data sources including media and news articles, statements by human rights NGOs and activists, and interviews with critical actors and affected poor residents (see Piarese et al., 2014; Sutour, 2014). For example, the terms 'disadvantaged' or 'marginalised' would often be used as a euphemistic label for the Roma, considering the widespread conflation of the two categories in public and policy discourse alike, as established earlier in Chapter 3 (see Balatonyi et al., 2014). Similarly,

descriptions of dilapidated habitats, high rates of unemployment, issues around drug use, and the need for social development interventions and the catching-up of impoverished communities hint at development- and (human) security-based framings of neighbourhoods where the Roma are over-represented (ibid.; see Chapter 5; see also Miskolc City Council, 2014a). Furthermore, some documentary records of verbal interactions, such as speeches at council assembly sessions, would often include certain degrees of social and territorial stigma towards the Roma and the Numbered Streets and Lyukó Valley, particularly by far-right representatives (as traceable in, e.g., Miskolc City Council, 2016, 2019b).

A challenge that emerged as part of analysing documents is being able to read them with regard to their temporalities and political contexts (see Kneisz and Kuttor, 2006). For instance, at the time when Fidesz was in power in the city, policing documents would frequently speak of making Miskolc *the* safest city in the country (e.g., MIÖR, 2018), whereas since 2019 they have been merely talking about the *possibility* of making Miskolc *one of* the safest cities in the country (MIÖR, 2020) – in other words, their degree of determination and certainty appears to have decreased. These subtle yet important changes in narratives reflect the political rift between an openly penal populist right-wing city administration who wholeheartedly supported the enlargement and funding of all things policing, whereas the opposition has toned down its security narrative into something slightly less overt and bombastic.

#### *4.2.3 Participant observation and field diary*

Participant observation and site visits took place recurringly throughout my fieldwork and served an important role in my data collection process (see Table 3 of the Appendix for details). I attended a conference on public and national security, a participatory council meeting and a discussion session of community workers on organising activities, and visited the smart CCTV system's operations control room, the City Hall, and community centres in Lyukó Valley, the

Numbered Streets, the Avas district, and the city centre. I participated in a public security family event, where families and children had the opportunity to interact with various law enforcement bodies and emergency services in a welcoming neighbourhood setting. I wrote up notes from these visits – which also included notes of some of the aforementioned semi-structured interviews where voice recording was not possible – in a field diary, which also served as my general day-to-day journal to describe personal experiences in the field and aid recollection later. Apart from in-person visits and writing the diary, I also joined some Facebook groups for residents of Miskolc and conducted some online participant observation on these platforms.

Participant observation material was useful as supplementary and contextual data that helped me to understand and remember places, encounters, interactions, events, and environments in greater detail retrospectively. In the field diary, I wrote down my feelings and impressions at the end of each day spent in Miskolc, and when it came to opportunities for participant observation, notes would turn into an extension or a more detailed element of my daily diary entries. Participant observation was therefore a more focused, intense, and detailed way of writing my field diary in specific and highlighted settings. I even wrote my daily entries as a mixture of participant observation-style notes, thinking about and interpreting what happened around me that day, as well as an account of my personal reflections. In documenting my emotions and experiences in the field diary, I managed to better preserve a feel for the spaces and experiences of data collection. Furthermore, the diary assisted me considerably with the recollection of events, places, times, and encounters later on as memory fades quickly, particularly when it comes to detailed observations.

#### *4.2.4 Triangulation*

Interviews, documentary analysis, and participant observation provided different layers of understanding for what has proven to be a highly a complex research topic. The various modes

of data collection shed light on the nuanced ways in which pro- and anti-Roma grammars are couched within, articulated, and enacted in decision-making, politics, social work, and everyday life. Although useful on their own, the joint application of the above discussed methods has yielded added benefits to this study.

Interviews and documents, for example, supplemented each other effectively in terms of subjectivity and scale. Interviews alone would have resulted in an excessive reliance on participants' personal stories, recollections, and opinions which, while highly valuable due to their in-depth and embodied nature, also carried contingencies around factual inaccuracy, altered or selective recollections, and stories limited to an individual or a small group of people. Information recorded in official documents, by contrast, does not fade or change over time, and retains its precision and focus on the subject matter, which helped to cross-check and complement interview material with factual information and figures (see Prior, 2003). That said, none of the analysed documents were about specific individuals per se but would instead concern larger scales from neighbourhoods to the municipal level and beyond (see Table 2 in the Appendix). Documents' predominantly formal tone, institutionalised nature, and claims to expertise lacked the human dimension and lived experiences necessary for understanding Roma segregation, security governance, and development policy in more grounded, critical, intricate ways, for which the interviews were helpful resources.

Additionally, the above two types of data have offered valuable vantage points to different positions of power and their styles of communication (see Jupp and Norris, 1993). Interviews and documents were both informative compasses of the political climate, but in slightly different ways. Documents would mostly represent how decision-makers and interest groups would think about, debate, and clash over segregation, security, and development. However, interviews were a more direct – though certainly not representative – reflection of public

opinion on the ground, as even policymakers and experts would sometimes voice critical sentiments in interview settings, though mainly off the record.

Apart from the above, participant observation and field diary notes greatly assisted the understanding of data collected from interviews and documentary sources in gathering first-hand experiences, and allowed me to not only hear and read about how segregation, security, and development are governed in Miskolc, but also to directly experience it in practice, and gain a sense of the spaces and environments where they unfold, including impoverished neighbourhoods, the smart CCTV control room of the Municipal Police, community centres, and public spaces of the city, among others (see Table 3 of the Appendix).

### **4.3 Data analysis**

I applied a conventional thematic coding approach to analysing the data collected (the codes and subcodes are summarised in Table 4 of the Appendix). The use of codes in interview transcripts, documents, and the field diary enabled a classification of different pieces of information in a systematic manner. I analysed all transcripts, notes, and documents electronically – including handwritten notes, which I had typed up into the digital field diary as well. I proceeded with coding iteratively as a small number of initial themes informed by my early lines of inquiry (e.g., context, security, CCTV, segregation, Roma, discrimination, governance, politics, centralisation, right-wing populism) became diversified with a growing number of subtopics that emerged from the data as the analysis moved forward (see Table 4 of the Appendix).

Not only did codes therefore develop in a somewhat inductive fashion, but the crystallisation of new themes also subsequently informed the redesigning and further development of my research questions (see Section 1.7 in the Introduction Chapter). I had initially been interested in penal policy-related matters only, but as I proceeded with coding,

social policy emerged as just as central an empirical matter to the data analysed. Although I had been aware of the recurrent mentions of social policy issues at the time of data collection, I largely treated them as additional background information, and only realised their significance to my project upon coding, arranging, and interpreting my data. It was the frequency and repeated emphasis on social policy matters and their connections to public security in interview transcripts, documents, and field notes that made me understand that penal and social policy in Miskolc cannot be treated in isolation from one another when it comes to understanding the racialised governance of segregation in the city. This recognition necessitated the subsequent addition of social policy to my second and third research questions.

In turn, each of the analytical codes have helped me in different ways to address the evolving research questions and develop this thesis. The ‘context’ code was mostly descriptive in nature and aided the positioning of the study in terms of key historical processes and socio-spatial trends in Miskolc and Hungary. ‘Segregation,’ ‘policing & security,’ and ‘social policy’ were the three driving themes around which the individual empirical chapters became structured. Whereas ‘segregation’ speaks to all three research questions and features across the analysis, ‘policing & security’ and ‘social policy’ have mainly provided the backbone of the second and the third research questions in assessing municipal actions upon racialised segregation and the operation of power within them. ‘Politics’ and ‘governance’ were both cross-cutting codes that spoke to all three research questions and also informed the three empirical chapters (i.e., Chapters 5-7), since political interlocutors and the processes and actors of governance have constituted the primary subjects of analysis throughout.

## 4.4 Ethics

At every phase of the research process, ethical data collection and management were pivotal<sup>17</sup>. Wherever possible, interview participants were provided with a research information sheet, a privacy notice, and a consent form, with detailed information on the purposes of the project, the management and confidentiality of data, anonymity, the opportunity to withdraw from the study, and to retrospectively request that any data be permanently deleted, among other necessary considerations. The advance provision of information ensured that participants had enough time to familiarise themselves with both the formalities and substantive elements of the research, and they could therefore make an informed and written decision on their participation. In cases where written consent could not be obtained for various reasons (see, e.g., Section 4.6 in this chapter on positionality and interviewing marginalised residents), I always asked for verbal consent and explained the purposes of my research prior to beginning the interviews, reiterating what was written in the consent forms. For instance, when conducting interviews with residents in Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets, I could obtain written consent from the local social charities, who acted as gatekeepers, and were thoroughly briefed on my research to allow access to interviews with locals in a responsible and often supervised way.

Participant observation was overt in some cases and less so elsewhere, depending on the circumstances. Organisers of events would always be informed of my purposeful presence as a researcher. At the council meeting and the visit to the smart CCTV control room, people likewise knew the reasons behind my attendance. At public events, especially the security conference and the public security family day, where the number of participants was too large, informing everybody of my aims was simply not possible, but the public setup meant that

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<sup>17</sup> This project obtained ethical clearance prior to the start of fieldwork from the Department of Geography, Durham University, on 9<sup>th</sup> June 2020.

participant observation was justifiable if basic privacy considerations, such as preventing the identifiability of attendees, were followed. When it came to online research, I joined a few Facebook groups for locals and visitors of Miskolc, each consisting of thousands of members. They are a mixture of public and private groups, but their large numbers of members and discussions topics (e.g., road closures in the city, lost and found objects, asking for recommendations of various services, discussing news and events, etc.) make all of them virtually public. Gaining informed consent in these cases would have been difficult, particularly if I had approached users who posted or commented highly opinionated if not vulgar views (see Section 5.4.1 in Chapter 5 for a few examples), asking if I could use their comments for my work. As Willis (2019: 1) argues, observations of public or semi-public Facebook feeds are “comparable to observational research in a public space”, and therefore not having to obtain informed consent in these online contexts can be justified. I nonetheless anonymised the groups, posters, and commenters in my analysis.

#### *4.4.1 Doing no harm and giving back*

Researching a poor community surrounded by political controversy and public racial prejudice demands careful consideration to ensure that they are protected from any potential harm that taking part in this study might cause. This entails considerations such as taking care not to deepen the divide between the Roma and the non-Roma or further compromise the reputation of deprived communities at any stage of my research. Representing poor neighbourhoods involved a careful selection of data with maximum confidentiality to prevent any subsequent damage to those involved. As Hugman et al. (2011) suggest, however, it is often insufficient to simply avoid doing harm, particularly when working with vulnerable people. Indeed, a common critique towards researchers of marginality is that they make a living off of others' plight, and the only reason that marginalised or suppressed populations are interesting

to them is because they need to write a thesis or get paid, which is in itself an exploitative and potentially harmful practice (Pankucsi, 2012; Dupcsik, 2018). I also hope, therefore, that in drawing my barriers of entitlement and recognising the difficulties around conducting a situated ethnography (see Section 4.6), for example, I have protected the participants from being exposed to exploitative and time-consuming research practices. In retaining my structural focus, critiquing discriminatory policy agendas, and speaking in favour of segregated communities and the Roma, my research seeks to catalyse positive change in public and policy thinking, however minor scale these changes might be.

Another way that I tried to go beyond simple ‘data mining’ and sought to avoid the exploitation of participants for developing my own project was through giving back. In return for their time and help, I baked participants some cakes as a gift or offered to pay for a coffee, for instance. Besides, I was going to run an English class with a local community NGO to thank their assistance, but unfortunately nobody turned up to the session, most likely due to the pandemic.

#### **4.5 The impact of COVID-19 on the fieldwork**

I began to recruit participants online while still in the United Kingdom during the first COVID-19 lockdown in June 2020, both by reaching out to some of the informants of my master’s research for follow-up conversations and further contacts, and through getting in touch with local organisations, the municipality, academics, residents, as well as the Constabulary and the Municipal Police. Recruiting participants from a broad range of backgrounds and affiliations was a useful starting point for gauging diverse perspectives on policing, security, and later, segregation and the Roma. Whereas remote online research started slowly and with only a handful of interviews, being present in Miskolc from September onwards accelerated the process drastically as in-person interactions proved more productive. The number of

opportunities for data collection increased further with snowballing as participants would often put me in touch with new contacts.

For two months, data collection proceeded with excellent momentum, but regrettably, by the end of October, the new wave of COVID-19 and tightening restrictions resulted in the cancellation, postponement, or rescheduling of growing numbers of interviews and visits. I kept returning to Miskolc until I possibly could and tried to make the most of the time pressures of the mounting second wave, but my opportunities for data collection increasingly shrunk towards the tail end of the autumn, especially since I also had to prioritise my own health and that of my family. At that point, I felt a growing sense of failure and disappointment, as a few more months could have still been well spent in the field, although I was very thankful for just how smoothly the fieldwork had gone until then. From November onwards, I had no choice but to revert back to online research and managed to conduct a few more helpful interviews.

#### **4.6 Positionality: “You don’t look like someone who’s researching the Roma...”**

“One intriguing point about the encounter was her [a research participant’s] curious observation that *«how come you are researching Roma people? You really don’t look like that kind of a person»* – something that, in one form or another, is beginning to become a recurring comment. She didn’t specify whether she meant the colour of my hair and eyes, height, outfit, status, social class, being based at a UK university, or character – or perhaps a combination of multiple or all of these factors – but by the end of the conversation she did understand my aims much better and said that sometimes the appearance of a person can be misleading.” (Excerpt from my field diary)

*“You’ll stand out quite a bit there with your blonde hair and blue eyes, won’t you?”*  
(Informal conversation with a local)

During my fieldwork, I received a set of remarks like the above, which confirmed my self-awareness that, in researching Roma segregation, I was an ‘outsider’ or a ‘visitor’ for much of the fieldwork (see Durst, 2011b). Neither am I Roma, nor am I from Miskolc, and indeed my comparatively privileged position as a doctoral researcher from a UK university has repeatedly prompted questions regarding the moral and ethical challenges of being an intermediary interlocutor between vastly different spaces, settings, and identities that are often worlds apart (Durst, 2011b; Dupcsik, 2018), ranging from the segregated communities of Lyukó Valley and the modern and fully equipped office spaces of Durham University.

My choice of scope has been largely shaped, therefore, by considerations around the moral and ethical boundaries of the kinds of knowledges and outputs that I am entitled to produce as a researcher with a particular identity, background, and motivations. For instance, I could have conducted an ethnography and immersed myself in the lives of local Roma communities, had the pandemic not hindered the logistics of my fieldwork. However, there would have been significant challenges around becoming trusted, accepted, valued, and understood in relation to my research aims, representing the Roma’s voices, and producing and disseminating knowledges on their behalf. What I felt I could realistically achieve with a clear conscience – knowing that I am not exploiting anyone and not assuming the risky role of a power-laden mediator – was therefore to understand and critique the very institutional system and architectures of power that I am embedded in myself.

My options for entering segregated spaces as an external non-Roma researcher were greatly limited due to my lack of direct personal contacts in the communities of Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets. The only possibility for contacting locals was to rely on the mediatory assistance of gatekeepers, and especially the HCSOM, MESZEGYI, and the municipality. This came with the obvious limitation that the marginalised and Roma whom I spoke to in segregated neighbourhoods were in close relationships with the intermediary organisations, and their views

were therefore likely in alignment. Since the social policy organisations themselves operate with a set of externally imposed norms, value systems, and expectations (discussed in detail in Chapter 7), I probably obtained a particular version of answers that were closer to the perspective of these organisations rather than a more holistic cross-section of views within the studied neighbourhoods.

Entering marginalised communities meant that I had to abandon some traits of my researcher positionality in order for barriers to become less rigid and dialogues to develop. Using consent forms and remaining formal about my research when engaging with local participants was clearly untenable and inappropriate, since holding on to such practices of officialdom would have unnecessarily reinscribed the kinds of social gaps I wanted to transcend, at least for the time of the conversations. I did not feel comfortable wearing a mask while doing the interviews either, and only started to do so when the second wave of the pandemic was sharply on the rise, since I felt that masks came across as physical expressions of boundaries that were counter-intuitive to establishing trust and rapport.

Compared to visiting segregated neighbourhoods, my engagement with official bodies, NGOs, academics, and residents from other parts of the city needed no mediation, and I could retain a more formal attitude to my research including handing out consent forms and exchanging business cards, for instance. Upon visiting a council office and attending a municipal meeting, my conversations with participants were palpably more effortless due to a similarity in thinking and vocabulary. I found it even easier to talk to academics without getting confused looks as they understood my research aims far more clearly than members of the public, and these were the conversations where I mostly felt that we speak the ‘same language’. This all is a bitter reflection that owing to my positionality, I speak the language of the powerful rather than the marginalised (Bigo, 2002; Kovai, 2017).

#### 4.6.1 Implications of an 'outsider' narrative position

Researching the hegemon – critically or otherwise – carries the possibility of mirroring its vantage point, since developing a structuralist and state-based critique inherently implies speaking from a position of power (Kerényi, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Dupesik, 2005; Pankucsi, 2012). As a corollary, one may rightfully ponder whether my study runs the risk of reproducing – rather than challenging – the exclusionary and racialised binaries between the Roma and the non-Roma in Hungary, which in turn legitimises the discriminatory socio-political environment that it seeks to critique in the first place. This is especially pertinent as logics of development and empowerment are often created by top-down forms of 'expertise' (Cruikshank, 1999). For Neményi (2001), such a disembodied approach is hardly about the Roma *per se*, but instead merely a rearticulation of the vocabularies and value systems of a non-Roma majority approach to appropriation and social policy. As discussed before in Section 3.1.1 of Chapter 3, for instance, the very category of the Roma is a convenient and prejudice-laden conflation of numerous smaller subgroups and a result of competing (self-)identification practices. My very act of naming the Roma as a uniform group therefore follows the path established by the state and the non-Roma majority.

With the above in mind, I hope to show that a perspective that intrinsically resides within the vocabulary of the powerful (e.g., using the term 'Roma', navigating expert concepts and institutional terms related to social policy, empowerment, and security discourses, the language of development proposals, academic terms such as neoliberalism and the security-development nexus, etc., as opposed to, say, the everyday vernacular through which members of segregated communities understand their internal relations, discrimination by the non-Roma majority, limited access to resources and welfare provisions, etc.) can nonetheless play a productive role in challenging injustice. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, my intention is to critique the very *relation* between the Roma and the non-Roma, and particularly the imaginative

societal classificatory practices and oppressive power structures that bring it into being. As opposed to studying Roma communities only, a relational account can also be meaningfully developed from a non-Roma perspective, since relations encompass and concern everyone rather than just one category or the other (Dupcsik, 2018). Indeed, an analysis of discriminatory state practices can be turned back against the powerful rather than being utilised for reasserting dichotomous relations. Binary constructions need to be identified and thoroughly critiqued in order for their damaging effects to be realised, and therefore pretending that such categorisations do not exist and produce tangible outcomes would result in unrealistic conclusions.

When it comes to tackling marginality, pro-Roma NGOs emphasise the need to involve the non-Roma in emancipatory dialogues as much as Roma communities themselves, since progress is only possible with everyone on board (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020), rather than confining knowledge production efforts to insular and siloed echo chambers within either group. My work is thus hoping to play its part in continuing this dialogue from a structural and non-Roma narrative position. I am trying to utilise this position not as an end but as a means – rather than reinstating the knowledge production hierarchies between the hegemonic and the subverted groups, I am engaging with the architectures of power from ‘within’ to develop critiques that can be fed back into decision-making. Furthermore, given my privilege of being able to study at a leading Western European academic institution and embedded in a network of international scholarly platforms of knowledge sharing and production, I am hoping to take this opportunity to raise international awareness of the politics of segregation in Miskolc and Hungary.

## 4.7 Between East and West

The paths of Eastern Europe and Western Europe split in 1945, and the divide left behind by the Iron Curtain has been palpable ever since, not only in terms of social, political, and economic organisation, but also in the realm of academic knowledge production (Ferge, 2014). Although this does not make the very practice of conducting fieldwork in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) harder or less accessible (see Deans, 2004), it nonetheless requires that we account for the differences left behind by the historical legacy of the second half of the twentieth century.

My choice of using Western-produced texts as *theoretical frameworks*, in contrast to the *contextual* mobilisation of Eastern literatures on the Roma and illiberalism, is reflective of the broader international political, academic and knowledge production-related hierarchy that Eastern Europe has long been embedded in (cf. Melegh, 2006 on the East-West slope; Jeffrey, 2008, 2011 on Orientalist perceptions of the Balkans and Bosnia as developed Europe's backward Other). In the critical social sciences, CEE academia has never been a trailblazer at establishing mainstream conceptual traditions. This is chiefly because social science under state socialism was closely tied to politics and lacked the independence necessary for a critical perspective, which countries West of the Iron Curtain had long enjoyed (Kelemen and Balázs, 2008). Consequently, critical social science in CEE is much more embryonic and less developed in comparison to the West, which partly explains a lack of locally rooted theorisations and the common practice of 'importing' Western and Anglo-American concepts to substantiate empirical analyses in the region (Stewart, 2001; Kovács, 1994).

A constant quest for adapting and appropriating notions originating from the Western mainstream literature therefore remains central to a critical analysis of localised trends and perspectives. This, in itself, already carries a comparative element (Bodnár, 2001; Wiest, 2012) – what do I achieve by unpacking and rewiring Western conceptual traditions and filtering them

through the empirical terrain of a CEE case study? Learning about Western theories, bringing them to Hungary, and trying to tell a story through these interpretive lenses to a Western academic audience puts me in an intermediary role, which is less of a choice and more of a necessity due to the above differences in scholarly tradition. This, however, should not be treated as a deficiency. Instead, my mediator position shows the importance of locality and empirical embeddedness in pursuing place-based inquiry in an otherwise interconnected world.

### **Chapter conclusion**

Scoping and designing this project has involved many dimensions. The thinking process around methodological conundrums carried on throughout the research from the very start of the planning phase to the end of data analysis. Far deeper reflections were necessary than merely deciding on what methods might be suitable for this thesis and why, given the research topic's highly contested, politicised, and ethically complicated nature.

The methodological design of this project was mainly about finding the most suitable perspective on researching the state-based exclusion of marginalised Roma people. The driving principle of approaching this problem was the argument that the state should be central to analyses of social injustice (Swyngedouw, 1996; McKee, 2009; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015). Moreover, rather than seeking to develop an immersive ethnography of Roma community dynamics, the aim has been, instead, to evaluate the relations between the Roma and the non-Roma as a matter of structural and institutional discrimination.

The chosen methods of interviewing, documentary analysis, and participant observation evolved dynamically when applied in practice and worked effectively in tandem to allow for a multi-layered understanding of marginality, security, and development in Miskolc from public, political, and policy perspectives alike. Data was coded and analysed in flexible and iterative ways, which greatly contributed to the development of my research questions. I also organised

codes with the aim of answering research questions as effectively and comprehensively as possible.

Regarding the practicalities of my fieldwork, in-person research was by far the most productive period of data collection, but the digital sphere was also of great assistance in bridging logistical barriers imposed by the pandemic. Conducting fieldwork during COVID-19 was a peculiar and certainly more taxing process than in normal times, because it required considerable flexibility and adaptability. However, it was at once a rewarding experience, since the openness, enthusiasm, and hospitality of many participants and organisations made the research process much easier. Additionally, ethical matters remained crucial to my fieldwork throughout, particularly in terms of informed consent, as well as avoiding doing harm and trying to reciprocate the kindness and input of participants to the best of my ability.

Choices concerning how far I could reasonably go in researching the Roma, and what narrative position I could responsibly assume, needed abundant contemplation, which involved the limits of my entitlement to representing the Roma from an outsider positionality. I did not find it justifiable to give voice to, or speak on behalf of, the Roma, and I therefore chose to critique the state, the municipality, institutions, and governance practices instead, as highlighted in relation to my methodological design principles. At the same time, I had to ensure that this was achieved without reproducing binarizing and generalising top-down categorisations, as well as the political and policy vocabulary that are prone to entrenching existing patterns of exclusion. Additionally, my intermediary narrative position between East and West, and embeddedness in hierarchical relations of knowledge production, were just as important in setting the directions of my research as were entitlement-related choices in the field.

## 5. Life-chance divides in the making

### Chapter introduction

In Northern Hungary and Miskolc, Romaphobia is more widespread and explicit than elsewhere in the country, and homogenising perceptions of the Roma as society's 'inner enemy' (Sigona, 2003: 70; see also van Baar, 2011) are particularly vehement (interviews with local academics, residents, and community worker; see also end of Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3). The city is relatively poor on the whole due to post-industrial recession, and the middle and upper classes are slimmer than in most other Hungarian cities. In this arrangement, and against the backdrop of a post-regime change economic decline, the non-Roma working class have found themselves in a difficult social and financial position, thereby resorting to the rediscovery of difference through race rather than class. As an academic explained in an interview,

*“the gaps are very small between different social groups, and so they are competing for the same jobs and the same resources [...] with very minor differences in schooling and skills. And when there is a lot of competition and little social difference, that is when ethnic discrimination comes to the fore very strongly, because something needs to be found to justify that you are different anyway”* (interview with academic).

Racial labelling is thus not simply a generalising attitude towards poverty, but rather, it serves to reinscribe difference *within* sections of society where it is otherwise hard to find (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020). As Csepeli and Örkény (2015) suggest, the non-Roma poor are afraid of losing their status. As a result, they are eager to deflect stigma by identifying themselves as “Hungarians” as opposed to the collectively perceived group of the “Roma”, whom they can hate, discriminate against, and distance themselves from, even though there are no real differences in terms of their quantifiable social indicators, such as income and education levels (see also Diósi, 1992; Horváth, 1997 [1993]). In simple terms, the non-Roma majority

generally describes the Roma as poor and delinquent and, conversely, they widely assume that whoever is poor and delinquent is Roma (Ladányi and Szelényi, 2000; Havas et al., 2000).

Far from a simple matter of class inequality, then, this chapter suggests that life-chance divides between the Roma and non-Roma in Miskolc are *discursively crafted and deepened through the collective racialised deferral of stigma* (Szuhay, 2013; Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017)<sup>18</sup>. The above-discussed production of racialised difference is central to the analysis to follow, since it shows that there is far more to life-chance divides than the mere economic circumstances brought about by post-socialist transition and growing inequalities. To be sure, rather than a given, life-chance divides in Miskolc are in many respects actively created and engineered as post-regime change socio-spatial polarisation gets woven together with racialised associations of unruly behaviours and lifestyles, real and imagined development gaps, obsessions with crime and security, and territorial stigma in public, political, and policy parlance alike, which map onto and replay exclusionary patterns. The chapter demonstrates that the ubiquity of racialised discourse grants perpetual legitimacy to the rediscovery of perceived deficiencies commonly associated with the Roma and deprived neighbourhoods. Such narratives are vital to understanding the governance of segregation in Miskolc, since they are precursors to subsequent municipal penal and social policy measures on the ground that profoundly affect the city's social fractures, as explored further in Chapters 6 and 7.

This chapter is all about discourse. The aim here, then, is to make sense of the *narratives* through which racialised life-chance divides between the city's Roma and non-Roma get produced and aggravated (Buur et al., 2007; van Baar, 2018, 2019; Huysmans, 2019; Kóczé, 2019). Romaphobia shows no signs of losing momentum in the national and local public and

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<sup>18</sup> As explained in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter 2, life chances are the opportunities that society presents to an individual in a particular social position (Dahrendorf, 1979; Van Kempen, 1994). A life-chance divide, in turn, is a generic difference between two or more social groups in terms of their prospects.

political vernacular (see Thornton, 2015; ELTE PPK, 2019; Government of Hungary, 2021) which, as this chapter shows, also contributes to racial divides and their re-conception in security and development terms (see van Baar et al., 2019). Many of the examples discussed throughout this chapter will probably not be ‘surprising’ in themselves, since similar patterns of social prejudice, discrimination, and exclusion across the discussed discursive domains have been widely studied (e.g., Sibley, 1995; Yiftachel, 1998; Wacquant, 2007; Jensen, 2010; Jefferson, 2018; Fields and Raymond, 2021). However, they serve a different analytical purpose here. This chapter is mainly interested in what sets the security-development nexus (SDN) in motion in Miskolc, and to this end it unpacks the nature of the production, racialisation, and spatiality of life-chance divides. This is an integral part of understanding the SDN in Miskolc that also enables an informed empirical analysis of its physical manifestations in later chapters.

The main questions that this chapter asks are as follows. First, *whose security and development* do mainstream discourses around life-chance divides reflect? Second, how are these discourses produced and legitimised in different social and institutional domains? Third, how are racialised understandings of the Roma expressed in the organisation of urban space? In response to these questions, it argues that the ideas of behavioural incivility, criminal inclinations, and territorial stigma attached to the Roma dynamically reinforce each other in public, political, and policy discourse alike. Furthermore, the ascription of collective labels to the Roma along these lines is driven by the logic that the Roma’s underdevelopment and backwardness jeopardise the social, existential, and public security of the allegedly civilised and diligent non-Roma population, who in turn find it justifiable to double down and formulate further exclusionary discourses and actions.

The chapter follows a thematic structure around the various domains through which racialised life-chance divides in Miskolc are produced and underpinned by different conceptions of security and development. More specifically, it looks at the themes of behaviour,

criminalisation, and territoriality, and discusses each from the perspective of public, political, and policy discourse. The first section critically examines the stigmatising behavioural associations towards the Roma and illustrates them through the examples of welfare dependency stereotypes and the city's so-called Cohabitation Codex. The Codex is important to consider because it established normative rules of appropriate conduct with overtly racialised motivations against the backdrop of heightened tensions between Roma and non-Roma residents in one of the city's contested neighbourhoods. The second section unpacks the Roma's contentious collective association with criminality, considers the roots and implications of how racialised public security has become a 'lowest common denominator' in the city, discusses the feedback loop between hard-line populist political rhetoric and public Romaphobia, and analyses the city's crime prevention policy in relation to life-chance divides.

The third part of the chapter (Section 5.4) considers territoriality as the spatial expression of behavioural and criminalising stigma. Although the latter two terms overlap with territorial stigma, the reason territoriality is mobilised as a separate analytical theme is to focus on the specific spatial dimensions of what otherwise tend to be abstract notions concerning the Roma of the city in general. A perspective on the territorial particularities of stigma helps us to see how such detached concepts hit the ground in different parts of Miskolc and understand the main drivers of policy (in)action in specific segregated neighbourhoods, which will also be key to Chapters 6 and 7. The section evaluates the public demonisation of marginalised neighbourhoods online and offline, and the ways that the municipality frames segregation as a statistical measure of underdevelopment. Additionally, it critiques political and policy efforts to concentrate and isolate racialised poverty in the urban fringe of Lyukó Valley through a range of administrative boundary-drawing strategies, thereby deepening the already severely disadvantaged life chances of the area's population. Following the thematic analysis, the final

part of this chapter considers whether there is any hope for optimism in the governance of racialised segregation given the city's heavily fractured social fabric.

## **5.1 “It is not the skin colour – it is the behaviour”: producing (in)civility and (under)development**

The crafting of social difference between the Roma and the non-Roma demands a set of substantiating narratives that grant binarizing imaginaries increased justifiability and purchase. Central to the racialised production of life-chance divides is the assignment of allegedly culturally rooted behavioural blanket identifiers that set apart the ‘civilised’ non-Roma majority from the ‘barbaric’ Roma minority (Csepeli, 2008; Li, 2014; Kotics, 2020). Whereas a non-Roma middle-class local claimed what is quoted in the title of this subsection, they still referred to the Roma by problematising their behaviours, which indicates the continuation of social stigma through “culturally coded racism” (Duffield, 2007: ix; Žižek, 2010). Indeed, a recurring sentiment in interviews was that the Roma somehow lack the necessary forms of ‘elementary conduct’ that is to be expected of a ‘European’ and ‘civilised’ person (Dósa, 2009; Huysmans, 2019; see also Jeffrey, 2008a). For example, the kinds of informal activities frequently associated with the Roma, such as wood and metal gathering, scavenging recyclable items from disposed household waste, or overcrowding small dwellings, are more likely to be classed as deviant, stigmatised, and punished, than those committed by the non-Roma majority (Barany, 1994; Egyed, 1996; Ferge, 2014; Balatonyi and Cserti Csapó, 2016).

### *5.1.1 Behaviour in public discourse*

Looking at the everyday level, even fleeting encounters with the Roma on the ground can strengthen judgemental stereotypes among the non-Roma majority. The local quoted in the above discussed section title also told me that they seldom interact with the Roma since they

*“live in a relative bubble”* (interview with resident), but the fact that they still commented that ‘Roma behaviour’, writ large, is often problematic, indicates the importance of labelling catching on despite – or perhaps precisely due to – their sense of detachment from and apathy towards the Roma in daily life. Indeed, as a local scholar suggested, a mere instance of seeing Roma people shouting or playing loud music in public space is enough for visceral generalising responses to develop, such as *“»You see? They’re here, they’re shouting.« They’re not doing anything – they’re not robbing you. They just communicate differently with each other, right? Man, woman, loudly... And that is enough for people to say that every Roma person is like this”* (interview with academic).

In an example of the above, a local told me about a residential forum that they organised on crime and public safety in Selyemrét – a district where prostitution, involving many Roma women, is seen as a particular problem. Recalling their experiences of the event, they told me that locals were *“irritated by ... [those engaging in prostitution as] they are behaving intolerably, making noise, throwing away their condoms... well, as usual”* (interview with resident). The frequent misunderstanding and stigmatising judgement of the behaviour of Roma people in public space keeps tolerance low among non-Roma people and has been repeatedly mentioned as a nuisance to allegedly ‘civilised’ norms of living (see Vermeersch, 2012; Kerezsi and Gosztanyi, 2014; van Baar, 2018). The subjective understanding of certain behaviours often collectively attributed to the Roma, such as the ones mentioned earlier, are prone to misinterpretation or considered ‘cultural differences’, and such perceptions thereby produce the realities of where normative conceptions of life-chance divides are drawn (see Halász, 2020).

#### *5.1.1.1 Welfare dependency*

The Roma’s life chances are undermined through various forms of exclusion and discrimination in the city based on extensive prejudice and perceptions of incivility. A

noteworthy part of behavioural labelling underlying racialised tensions is the common characterisation of the Roma as dependent welfare recipients who feel entitled to free state benefits and refuse to work, in contrast to the diligent tax-paying non-Roma families (e.g., Diósi, 1992; Ladányi, 2010; Timmer, 2013; van Baar, 2019). Broader conceptions of the Roma's welfare dependency were captured in an interview with a resident:

*“These problems all began in the late ‘80s or ‘90s. [...] This generation, today’s youth, are born into this. That dad is at home, that dad doesn’t need to go to work, that we receive state benefits, that the benefits come on the 10<sup>th</sup>, and then let’s go to Spar, fill two big bags, then fun times and razzle-dazzle for four days, the music is on, and afterwards we get along somehow, go around, pick some litter, and bring some wood. And then [...] those who help – they go to them and get clothes! [...] You buy it. They don’t buy it! Because we give it to them for free! Everyone is supporting them, being like oh dear, they’re poor, they’re segregated. So [...] that’s why it’s all at the stage now where it is”* (interview with resident).

The above quote powerfully indicates the sense of resentment towards the Roma through their framing as complacent and parasitic recipients of welfare funds and donations that they do not deserve and should instead work for. Attempts at improving the life chances of the Roma through charitable deeds are therefore bound to be targeted by criticisms like the above.

The Roma's perceived sense of entitlement to welfare assistance was further illustrated by an interview with policymakers who, as part of discussing their work on social housing, compared the behaviour of the Roma to that of a non-Roma working-class couple. They told me that despite the council's recent efforts to renovate and supply more social housing than before (more on this in Section 5.5, this chapter), they felt that the Roma were never happy with the homes they were allocated, making complaints such as *“why is it that they have a bathtub and I only have a shower cabin?”*, or *“why did I get this flat and not that one?”* (Interview with policymakers). In contrast, they recalled how polite and appreciative an employed but poor non-

Roma working-class couple were in an appointment after they had failed to apply for a council flat for years. In articulating this story, they implied that the Roma were needy and difficult, whereas “*others would probably put their hands together if they could even get a small studio flat where they could begin their lives*” (interview with policymakers). Although the social housing officials are obviously committed to helping the poor, including the Roma, their perspective nevertheless inadvertently reproduced a lack of tolerance towards Roma behaviours, which they felt was a challenge to their work.

Yet, my interviews with Roma families in the Numbered Streets profoundly challenged preconceptions of welfare dependency, as all the interviewed residents were very thankful for the donations from the charities and the public rather than taking them for granted. Indeed, they saw regular donations including pastries and clothing as significant and appreciated resources. In relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, this became even more pertinent as charities supplied crucial products such as masks and hand sanitizers to locals who would have otherwise not been able to afford them, and who also sounded very grateful for these provisions (interviews with residents).

Blaming Roma women for giving birth to as many children as possible to receive additional state benefits is also a common theme of the welfare dependency discourse, in a somewhat similar fashion to the myth of the ‘welfare queen’ about black women in the United States in the Reagan era (Cruikshank, 1999; see also Sutour, 2014). For instance, a far-right councillor said in the municipal general assembly six years ago that “parents need to be enlightened [...] that children do not bring money to the family, but they take money away. [...] I would like to know whether parents in the shacks of Lyukó have any other tasks with their children than claiming the family benefit [which poor families receive after every child]” (quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2016: 31, my translation). However, as Ladányi (2010) shows, the fact that Roma families often have a large number of children has nothing to do with welfare aspirations, since

this is a trend that dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, long before such benefits were even introduced. Derogatory discourses nonetheless associate the Roma with underdevelopment as they are seen to take up excessive amounts of welfare support from taxpayers' money, drag the economy down, and hinder the growth of the rest of society who are associated with decency and a solid work ethic (van Baar et al., 2019; Kóczé, 2019).

In respect of life chances, stereotypes of the 'lazy Roma' materialise in their labour market discrimination, as employers are less likely to hire Roma applicants based on their ethnicity and behavioural stereotypes around work-avoidance (for national-scale studies proving this, see, e.g., Babusik, 2008; Kertesi et al., 2022). Residents of the Numbered Streets explained in an interview that the Roma always have to over-perform when looking for jobs in order to gain recognition – in other words, if they do just as well as the average non-Roma, they are bound to fall behind. They said that this undermines their prospects of finding a better life and therefore immensely frustrates them (interview with residents). Often before even having a chance to prove themselves, Roma jobseekers are rendered inferior to the non-Roma workforce who are allegedly more diligent and productive. As an activist remarked, "*whereas their primary experience is that they are not even good enough for sweeping the streets, and not even good enough for packing yogurt onto supermarket shelves, ... there is the narrative that they are lazy as hell and don't want to work*" (interview with activist). In other words, the behavioural preconceptions around the Roma's work-avoidance and their consequent exclusion from the labour market form a vicious cycle. This mechanism upholds notions of the Roma's backwardness and unsuitability for joining the 'developed' society through work, and thus their life chances are worsened still.

### *5.1.2 Behaviour in politics and policy*

Marginality in Miskolc is associated with a set of value-laden terms that willingly or unwillingly feed into negative stereotypes and, more importantly, (re)produce moral justifications for the further distancing and appropriation of the Roma in municipal policy as well. Normative understandings of acceptable behaviours have, in fact, been set in the city's so-called 'Cohabitation Codex', which contains various directives and legal regulations on how to behave properly as a law-abiding resident of Miskolc, put simply (for the latest edition, see Miskolc City Council, 2020e). The document sets out basic norms around issues such as acceptable noise levels, property protection practices, environmental responsibilities, behaviours in public space, waste disposal, and animal protection.

The Codex was first passed in early 2010 in response to recurring residential complaints in the Avas area about deterioration and vandalism in public spaces, littering in stairwells and defecation in elevators in prefab housing blocks, the robbing of children, noise, prostitution, and other concerns. They were reported as part of increasing racialised tensions in the local community of Avas after many Roma families had moved into the neighbourhood through a corrupted social housing scheme called the Nest-builders Programme discussed further in Section 6.1.1.1 of the next chapter (avasom/YouTube, 2010; Magyar Hírlap, 2014). The publication of the Codex marks a normative policy reaction to the aforementioned undesired ways of life both in terms of security (e.g., peace and safety in a neighbourhood, acceptable noise levels, property protection, the appropriate use of public space, etc.) and development (e.g., tidiness, housing maintenance, pet welfare, environmental responsibility, etc.) across the city (Miskolc City Council, 2020e; see Foucault, 1980; Flyvbjerg, 2003).

Importantly, the publication of the Cohabitation Codex as a normative and legally binding behavioural rulebook enabled the municipality to act upon the kinds of smaller-scale nuisances and cases of inappropriate conduct – such as making noise and littering – which had otherwise

not been severe enough to warrant police intervention (NOL.hu, 2010). In other words, the municipality rendered unlawful a previously largely neglected set of behavioural matters, thereby providing the authorities with more room to appropriate and fine those deemed unruly. Consequently, the Codex contributed to the legitimisation of revanchist and racialised municipal securitisation practices also discussed in the next chapter (cf. Thörn, 2011).

Perceptions of incivility and bothersome misconduct can, in turn, easily relapse into political demagoguery, as traceable in the words of the pre-2010 left-wing mayor at the time, who claimed that the codex made “a distinction between a majority population that leads a tranquil and peaceful life, and a minority with an out-of-place behaviour that embitters the lives of others” (then-mayor, quoted in MiNap, 2010: 1, my translation). The explicit naming of a “minority” that threatens the peace and security of their neighbours dangerously feeds into material interventions to displace, police, and banish a racialised group of residents to the fringes of the city, as explained in the Section 5.4 on territory later, as well as in Chapter 6 (see Balatonyi and Cserti Csapó, 2016).

Indeed, the controversial nature of the Codex is further reflected in the then-mayor’s words in responding to racist accusations:

“Those who do not live in North-eastern Hungary do not know that there are very serious ethnic conflicts in daily life. ... Those who do not experience them think of us as racist people. However, what we are saying is that order must be expected of every citizen, because if everything stays the same way, there will be even greater conflict” (then-mayor, quoted in HVG.hu, 2010: Online, my translation).

In this sense, the Codex was therefore mobilised against an explicitly stated landscape of racial fault lines in Miskolc and justified on the grounds of de-escalating social tension. However, the reinvention of legal regulations to justify repressive measures against the Roma, as well as the

normative codification of what counts as civilised behaviour in racially loaded ways, only reproduce prejudice and unfair treatment, thereby contributing to increased racial hostility and the further exclusion of the Roma.

Beyond the Cohabitation Codex, references to inappropriate behaviour are traceable in other municipal policy documents dealing with segregated parts of the city as well. For example, the municipal Integrated Urban Development Strategy (IUDS) states that “it is a problem that a part of the people who live there [in segregated neighbourhoods] are unwilling to improve their situation or follow the norms that are generally accepted by the city’s community” (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 88, my translation). In declaring the otherwise vague notion of ‘city’s community’ to be the normative judge of tolerable behaviours, the document also implies that those who fail to follow such expectations are excluded from this community and are considered delinquent, dangerous, and destabilising.

While at no point does the IUDS document explicitly stigmatise the Roma as its target group, and nor does the above-discussed Cohabitation Codex, it has long been shown that in the context of Hungary, and especially in Miskolc, normative distinctions between lawfulness and deviance are permeated by racialised associations (see Horváth, 1997 [1993]; Balatonyi and Cserti Csapó, 2016; Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017). In a broader study on policy discourse in Miskolc, Balatonyi et al. (2014) highlight the countless references to incivility and non-compliance, such as noisy lifestyles, illegal littering and woodcutting, lack of hygiene, poor housing conditions, infrastructural piracy, diseases, and so on. Many of these issues are particularly associated with the Roma, as explained earlier in this Section (5.1), and are seen as deficiencies compared to the order and tidiness elsewhere in the city (Barany, 1994; Ferge, 2014). Such assumptions carry particular weight when articulated in officialdom, considering that policy documents like the IUDS and the Cohabitation Codex reflect the driving logics of

municipal interventions on the ground, which may in turn directly damage the Roma's livelihoods and prospects in public and institutional spheres.

Behavioural associations and stigma create imaginative and racialised divisions by ruling out particular forms of conduct, thus accentuating the life-chance divides between the Roma and the non-Roma (see Kóczé, 2019). Indeed, the construction of clear-cut boundaries between 'civilised' and 'unwanted' forms of existence has been widely associated with exclusionary social processes (see Homolar, 2015). For example, grammars of neighbourly incivility may reinforce housing market discrimination and landlords' already stern unwillingness to rent out their properties to Roma people in the city centre in fear of damage, hygiene issues, tensions with fellow residents, rent arrears, unpaid bills, and so on. Consequently, the Roma are often trapped in shabby properties in the outskirts, including Lyukó Valley, frequently under exploitative usury arrangements, thereby remaining hopelessly tethered to the poor and underdeveloped end of the life-chance divide (interview with social worker).

## **5.2 The 'lowest common denominator' and racialised public security**

*"I always think that when talking about public security, we are actually talking about the Roma. [...] So, there is a hidden dialogue here which, in truth, is not about what we say it is about."* (Interview with resident)

Derogatory understandings of behaviour are only a small step away from being linked to security and criminality (see Hörnqvist, 2004; Huysmans, 2019). For a local community worker, public security in Miskolc is a 'lowest common denominator' among popular expectations towards policymakers, since *"public security could be improved in Miskolc for a hundred years, and the demand would still be there"* (interview with community worker). As they further suggested, mobilising security as a political agenda can be a quick and simple way to garner public popularity without having to tackle more deeply rooted social issues in the city

such as poverty, education, service provision, housing, and other related matters. Indeed, as Wæver (1995) posits, security can never be ‘maximised’ as such, and it is hence always possible to rediscover the incessant need for its improvement. In other words, what counts as a ‘satisfactory’ level of security is largely in the eye of the beholder, and thus repeatedly exposing that security in Miskolc is insufficient is an effective political trump card to back corresponding policy agendas. How security has become a vanguard problem in Miskolc needs further understanding, however, alongside the kinds of actions and decision-making practices that such narratives can subsequently legitimise.

In a basic sense, security is among the most fundamental concerns to the wellbeing and daily life of society (Thomas, 2001; Liotta, 2002). To quote a Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR) executive, “when looking at a city, its value is determined by numerous factors. This includes infrastructural supplies, healthcare, the road network, trade, employment; but ranked above all, as a priority, is public security” (quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2020a: 21, my translation). Although the term ‘security’ spans a range of different meanings (see Chapter 2) and may well encompass all the areas mentioned by the MIÖR executive, what is interesting about this quote is that public safety is singled out as *the* most vital factor for a city to be valued and successful. Irrespective of whether we consider this statement true, biased, or otherwise, it nevertheless reflects a particular philosophy in Miskolc’s decision-making and management – as probed in the Introduction chapter through the CCTV example –, the implications of which for socio-spatial relations cannot be overlooked in a city where segregation, race, and criminality are closely interwoven in public thinking.

Far from being an unproblematic notion, the ‘lowest common denominator’ requires an assessment of who or what are commonly perceived and pronounced as threats to security. Security discourses, Stenson (2005) reminds us, are never politically impartial (see also Edwards et al., 2013; Tulumello, 2018). Instead, identifying someone as a security threat is

determined by power hierarchies and political relations in a particular context. The key consideration here is which groups or individuals are in the position to call others a threat and, in turn, whose security mainstream discourses serve (Buur et al., 2007; Wæver, 1995; Stenson, 2005; Podoletz, 2020). Put differently, how do specific political and governance arrangements, as well as broader societal hierarchies, produce concrete forms of truths about security (Dean, 2010)?

Regrettably, exaggerated perceptions of criminality in the city are commonly associated with the Roma. Rather than a given, security is an elusive idea that gets produced and maintained in contestable ways (Pap, 2011; Podoletz, 2020). The foggy practice of distinguishing between tolerated and criminalised actions are “shaped by identity positions” (Orjuela, 2010: 102) as dominant non-Roma groups dictate the framing of the Roma as a security threat based on a set of generalised identifiers (see Li, 2014). As Hörnqvist suggests, behavioural stigma can quickly cascade into criminalisation if “legislators blur the line between criminal offences and an unspecified number of other behaviours” (Hörnqvist, 2004: 35). As discussed in the examples to follow, hegemonic truth-making practices about what falls inside or outside the domain of ‘security’ carries the risk of relapsing into racialised scapegoating with detrimental ramifications for the Roma (Csepeli, 2008; Ladányi, 2010 [2002]; Kerezsi and Gosztonyi, 2014; Kotics, 2020). By declaring something a matter of security, the state and powerful groups legitimise the wielding of extraordinary measures to combat the ostensible ‘threats’ that it poses to the incumbent social order (Wæver, 1995; Schwell, 2014; Podoletz, 2020; Paraušić, 2021). If such ‘threats’ carry racial connotations to begin with, then the measures that are rendered justifiable for responding to them are bound to exclude the Roma even more.

### 5.2.1 Crime in public discourse

In public discourse, a frequent argument around the association of the Roma with criminality is that it is founded upon experience rather than prejudice. In these cases, individual encounters with inappropriate behaviours or petty crime incidents can easily turn into a generalising sense of resentment towards the Roma population as a whole. For instance, a local said that *“when they break into your garden shed for the fifth time to steal your two litres of petrol, your lawnmower, and the pears you picked for your homebrew, then... this [prejudice] develops in you. Or... when your child gets lice for the third time from the Gypsy kid in class, then, well... I’m saying this because obviously this is not a problem in the ... [better-off] districts of Budapest [where I come from], so they don’t know what they are talking about”* (interview with resident). Put differently, the participant’s anti-Roma views are claimed to be a result of first-hand experiences which eventually turned into an overall sense of hostility.

As part of criminalising narratives referring to the Roma, I also came across examples of racial exceptionalism, the meaning of which is illustrated in the following example. When speaking to an old citizen guard couple at a public safety event, the husband brought up that the rangers of the Municipal Police do an important job at stopping the “locomotive blondes” (*mozdonyszőkék*) – an offensive and pejorative slang term for the Roma, and a word that otherwise means black colour in Hungarian – from burgling houses and stealing from allotments in the declining outskirts such as Lyukó Valley and Pereces. In response, the wife added, *“but not all of them are like that!”*. This is a classic instance where the Roma are viewed as a deviant group by default, but there are exceptional cases of ‘good Roma’ who defy this stereotypical ‘norm’ (Csepeli et al., 1999; Csepeli, 2008; cf. Mamdani, 2002 on ‘good Muslim’ versus ‘bad Muslim’ in the post-9/11 United States). In identifying the Roma as a uniformly criminal group, from which the ‘normal’ Roma people are exceptions, “a certain kind of aberrant, anomalous subjectivity is produced, from which true, civilized Hungarians can

differentiate themselves” (Dósa, 2009: 23). Whether culturally coded or overt, it is through articulations like the above that deeply rooted preconceptions about the ostensibly homogenous Roma population are perpetuated (see Wæver, 1995; Csepeli, 2008; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015).

Importantly, however, many other participants of this study concurred that based on their own experiences, the crime situation in the city is far less dramatic than it is often represented. While individual accounts may well vary, a general message was that they did not see Miskolc as more dangerous than any other city. A local jokingly told me that “*Miskolc is the synonym of hell, and you should get an award for even spending a week or two here*” (interview with resident). Many other interviewees agreed that there is a negative stereotype, but also agreed that it was less commonly supported by first-hand experiences. As a social worker explained, “*according to my grandmother – I am from Western Hungary – Miskolc is the most dangerous place in the world. [...] Funnily enough, people talk about public safety here, but never in specific terms*” (interview with community worker). They told me about some of the word-of-mouth horror stories that they had heard from other locals, and which were usually magnified or distorted, such as somebody claiming to have seen a decapitated man’s head in a car, whereas it turned out the man had had a heart attack, or accounts of a priest being stabbed and a homeless person killing someone with an axe (ibid.). On the other hand, neither the above quoted community worker nor many other participants from elsewhere in the city, and not even anyone that they knew, had ever suffered any crime incidents despite such a negative city image.

The role of narratives and discourses of fear is therefore considerable in shaping people’s perceptions of public safety. The discursive production of the ‘lowest common denominator’ can have very material consequences, as tellingly captured in the council’s 2019 Crime Prevention Strategy, which emphasises the power of communication in producing dominant understandings of security:

“Communication has an undisputable role in shaping public opinion and the flow of information. Unfounded horror stories and fake news can significantly undermine locals’ sense of safety, which can initiate undesirable and unjustified social processes.” (Miskolc City Council, 2019c: 46, my translation).

Scaremongering can strengthen the collective labelling of the Roma as deviants and criminals, and hence fuel security-based justifications of defending the decent non-Roma against them. Moreover, as discussed in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6, the pre-2019 right-wing populist city administration celebrated racialised slum clearances and the escalation of policing as the main reasons behind the drastic reduction of city-level crime statistics. This narrative, however, is prone to strengthening the links between the Roma and criminality in public thinking, since it implies that the evicted Roma were to blame for the higher crime rates.

### *5.2.2 Crime in politics: minefield or vicious circle?*

As Wæver (1995) argues, society does not speak for itself, but rather, somebody always needs to speak on its behalf. When a politician claims to align themselves with punitive anti-Roma discourses, in fact they are the ones to perform the speech acts of racial discrimination in the name of a wider collective. Boda et al. (2015: 886) highlight that “while the Hungarian population expresses a mixture of both punitive and liberal positions, political discourse remains almost entirely punitive.” They posit in turn that not only do political parties feed off punitive public demands, but more fundamentally, they drive and set the agenda for the reinforcement thereof (see also Costi, 2010). In other words, the demand for more liberal and socially emancipatory political narratives is almost certainly there, but there is a lack of open and large-scale political espousal of such voices today.

In mobilising an oppressive right-wing populist rhetoric, the Fidesz administration went significantly beyond simply trying to negotiate its reputation against a racialised public.

Through the active endorsement of evictions and punitive securitisation responses, they amplified existing social and territorial stigma rather than attempting to slow it down. Politics, then, is a pivotal discursive engine behind the SDN-based framings of race and marginality in Miskolc. To echo the arguments of Wæver (1995), naming something a security concern from a position of power is at once an *act* of securitisation since it paves the way for subsequent interventions in the name of addressing the security concern in question.

Widespread prejudice from the public is conducive to political framings of underdevelopment and segregation in security terms, but political discourse is also prone to amplifying vengeful populist demands amongst voters. As part of this vicious cycle, it is unclear who the culprits are, however. Does the populist framing of the Roma's underdevelopment in security terms originate from the politicians, who portray the Roma in stigmatising ways, thereby aggravating a racially loaded societal vernacular? Or does it come from public discontent through hatred speech and negative emotions, which political leaders then seek to appease? In other words, are politicians navigating a 'political minefield' whenever they say or do something about the Roma (Havasi, 2018; Kazarján and Kirs, 2020), thus risking their reputation, or are they active facilitators of a heavily racialised public discourse? Rather than attempting to locate the origin of this loop in either domain, what matters more to my analysis is the co-constitutive nature of the two domains, which form the backbone of a security-based framing of the Roma in Miskolc (see Costi, 2010).

On the one hand, there is a clear pressure on local political leaders to take tough action on crime (Tulumello, 2018; Pap, 2011). As racial intolerance remains strong in Hungary, and particularly in Miskolc, both left- and right-wing political candidates competing for leading municipal positions are eager to bid for votes by radicalising their rhetoric in punitive directions (Fleck, 2014; Boda et al., 2015). Whether through perceptions of behavioural norms or first-hand resentment, it is precisely the prejudice and societal fear detailed in the previous section

that offer effective ammunition for political forces to play on for a popularity boost. In what is otherwise present all over Europe, the widespread social acceptance of ‘Romaphobia’ (van Baar, 2011: 203) and treating the Roma as a security concern therefore come to feed ‘populist paranoias’ (Goldberg, 2006: 358) even more vigorously in Miskolc and have grown into a campaigning behemoth. A local academic suggested that *“you can win votes with anti-Gypsyism. Many votes. ... And politicians have severely capitalised on this prejudice ... which is the most disgusting thing.”* He added that *“in the public eye, the Gypsies are poor, and the Gypsies are criminals. There is nothing to sugar-coat about this. So, this is why the sorts of ‘tough’ city politics, with the CCTV etc., are always popular”* (interview with academic).

In considering the production of life-chance divides in the city, then, it is precisely the tenuous nature of racializing and criminalising discourses towards the Roma that makes extremism all the more appealing to crowds who otherwise find themselves short of alternative arguments for justifying their alleged superiority (Csepeli and Örkény, 2015; Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017). As mentioned before, the region’s relative poverty and post-industrial depression also means that the poorer sections of the non-Roma majority population are afraid of becoming further marginalised and stigmatised. They see the Roma as a potential threat and competition to their employment and social status, which grants additional support for right-wing populism in the city. Far-right interlocutors are keen to frame what they call the ‘Gypsy problem’ as the source of societal predicament and malaise and promote policing as the main ‘solution’ (Durst, 2015; Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-b).

On the flipside, it is therefore hardly surprising that backing pro-Roma standpoints tends to be unpopular, and the electorate usually denounces those who support the Roma too overtly (Diósi, 1992; Ladányi, 2010 [2002]; Kazarján and Kirs, 2020). This problem becomes particularly acute as the public tends to single out a leading figure – usually the mayor – whom they praise or curse for all of the municipality’s actions (Solt, 2010). Mayors of nearby villages

who tried to openly support pro-Roma emancipatory and social mingling programmes in the past usually failed very quickly. For instance, in the small villages of Ópályi and Gönc in Northern Hungary, pro-Roma mayors did not get re-elected after backing inclusionary agendas (interview with policymaker; Abcúg.hu, 2017).

By consequently endorsing associations of the Roma with criminality and disorder from both left- and right-wing positions, the political sphere serves to entrench rather than ameliorate racial struggles and SDN-based perceptions of life-chance divides in Miskolc. Afraid of losing their electoral base if they fail to assume a tougher stance, the left-wing parties, including the Democratic Coalition (DK) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), mirrored the right-wing populist approach for a long time. For example, MSZP's mayoral candidate in the 2014 local elections was the city's ex-police captain, Albert Pásztor, who had been forced to resign from his captaincy in 2009 after an explicitly racist statement about the omnipresence of 'Gypsy crime' in the city, claiming in a press conference that all public space robberies in Miskolc had been committed by Roma people (Index.hu, 2009; Dósa, 2009; Miskolci Napló, 2014; Horváth, 2019; see also Mátyás, 2015). Advocating the segregation of the Roma, Pásztor stressed in his statement that the police had a duty to tell the public that "co-habitation with our fellow citizens from the minority group is not working out" (quoted in Ivány et al., 2016: 188)<sup>19</sup>. In his capacity as a police captain – supposedly a trusted figure of authority – such words can be particularly dangerous in strengthening public feelings of repulsion towards the Roma, especially as his statements gained national media coverage.

On the other hand, it would be misleading to portray politicians as helpless victims of electoral pressures or to merely suggest that this is the only kind of politics that society is willing

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<sup>19</sup> What makes this statement even more damaging and unacceptable is the fact that the ethnicity of Roma perpetrators was only recorded in official crime statistics between 1971 and 1989, whereas it is legally forbidden today, as mentioned earlier in Section 3.1.2 of Chapter 3 (Barany, 1994; Stewart, 2009; Kotics, 2020).

to ‘back up’ (Wæver, 1995). On the contrary, rather than simply exploiting the populist needs the public, they also work to actively reproduce these sentiments, which are prone to spiralling out of control. From its victory in the 2010 local elections onwards, the local branch of the government party Fidesz changed gears in its anti-Roma campaign to further capitalise on people’s racialised sense of fear and promote punitive responses, thereby having rivalled the then-far-right Jobbik party in their levels of political radicalisation (see Boda et al., 2015; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015). As part of this racialised politics, a policymaker recalled that:

*“it wasn’t embarrassing to be racist under the previous [i.e. the 2010-2019 Fidesz] local government. So, for instance, it didn’t cause any outrage amongst participants when someone said in a roundtable meeting that Roma people shouldn’t enter the room. So, basically, there was a silent consensus around this”* (interview with policymaker).

Fidesz attributed the security problems in the city to the “mushrooming of slums in Miskolc between 2002 and 2010 [under the preceding left-wing local government]” (Fidesz councillor quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2019b: 10, my translation) such as Avas, the Numbered Streets and Lyukó Valley, among others, since they were seen to harbour groups of people who “cannot keep the basic rules of cohabitation” (Fidesz Miskolc, 2010: 5, my translation).

What is more, explicit racism sometimes made its way into public statements, for instance when the deputy mayor at the time praised the openly anti-Roma claims of the above-mentioned past police captain (Miskolc City Council, 2019b). Rather than acknowledging the deeply racist nature of these words, the deputy mayor did the exact opposite; he denounced the removal of Pásztor from his position in 2009, suggesting that “the truth [i.e., the idea of ‘Gypsy crime’] could not be spoken about” (then-deputy mayor, quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2019b: 19, my translation) at the time when the left-wing national government was in power. He added that it was against a barrage of “pressures and attacks” by “ultraliberal interests [...] that a new security politics had to be proclaimed” (ibid.). As we can see, then, the Fidesz administration

overtly positioned its own security politics against the city's 'disorderly' segregated minority and the pre-2010 left-wing welfarist MSZP regime whom Fidesz portrayed as pro-Roma liberals, despite MSZP's similarly problematic views on the Roma discussed in Section 5.1.2 as well as above. Through promoting Romaphobia with renewed vigour, the Fidesz municipality pushed dominant understandings of security to even more punitive registers, thereby foregrounding hard-line measures in places and social groups associated with deviance and underdevelopment. To be sure, revanchist interventions and the inhumane treatment of the Roma through widespread political hatred speech, mediatised stigma, harassment, and forced evictions (see Chapter 6), among other things, all embody and further entrench the Roma's already severe discrimination and poor life chances in the city.

### *5.2.3 Crime in policy*

Strikingly, even policy documents occasionally contain explicit associations between race and criminality. A section in the municipal Crime Prevention Strategy (CPS) draws stark contrasts between the 'orderly' and 'decent' better-off areas of the city and the Roma of segregated neighbourhoods in stating that:

“In palpably more affluent areas, the order of streets is conspicuously different from that of communities living in other, declining, or perhaps segregated areas. In these spaces, differences in socialization typically come through. In the streets of visibly poor and less looked-after territories, the order and cleanliness of public spaces and the behaviour of passers-by have a significant impact on public safety. In better-off areas, relative order prevails, and breaches of law do not typically happen in the streets. We can experience a sharp contrast to all of this in Lyukó Valley typically inhabited by the Roma minority” (Miskolc City Council, 2021f: 13, my translation).

Not only does the document therefore draw associations between wealth and public safety, hence considering security a measure of the city's life-chance divides, but it also does so in an overtly racialised narrative by explicitly discussing Lyukó Valley's disorder together with the ethnicity of its residents. While this quote could have equally been mentioned in relation to territoriality in Section 5.4 below, the deeply problematic links that it establishes between affluence, crime, and race make it particularly relevant to discussing the criminalisation of the Roma in policymaking.

Besides the above racialised element, the CPS is also a helpful empirical entry point into an SDN-based analysis of the governance of segregation in Miskolc, as it understands public security and crime as embedded in a whole host of broader social processes that need to be tackled in their complexity rather than solely through law enforcement (see Recasens et al., 2013; Kerezsi and Gosztanyi, 2014; Hera, 2017; Tulumello, 2018). The 2019 CPS highlights that the evolution of urban security perspectives and the city's changing crime scene demand a more holistic approach, since "the understanding of the topic of security has changed, more diverse demands have appeared, and new areas and questions have surfaced" (Miskolc City Council, 2019c: 5, my translation). A complex and broader understanding of security was initially adopted by the national government in 2003, and has been used in both national and local policies ever since as a guiding principle (Government of Hungary, 2013). The updated 2021 version of the CPS also suggests that "maintaining public order is an extraordinarily complex and multifaceted activity, which the police cannot be expected to fulfil alone [...]. The mission of protecting order and establishing security is attainable through social cooperation and collective work" (Miskolc City Council, 2021f: 7, my translation). This is reflected in the document's practical designations as well; beyond law enforcement bodies such as the municipal and the state police, the CPS also recognises the role of educational institutions, the United Social, Healthcare, and Child Welfare Institute of Miskolc (MESZEGYI), church and

civil society organisations, sports schools and clubs, and the local help centre for victims as key actors of crime prevention in the city (Miskolc City Council, 2019c).

Crucially, then, the CPS is a powerful indicator that penal policy has become inextricably linked to broader understandings of social policy in the city's decision-making (see Chapters 6 and 7; cf. Homolar, 2015; Hindess, 2001; Duffield, 2010). Although the 2021 version of the document still sees the "police and law enforcement bodies as the council's most important strategic partners in crime prevention" (Miskolc City Council, 2021f: 20, my translation), the significance of the CPS nevertheless inheres in drawing connections between questions of crime and public security with wider conceptions of social policy and development in recognising the role of charities and community organisations. Put differently, the document mobilises and operates across life-chance divides as referents of crime prevention, since it intricately weaves together social marginality and development deficiencies with crime in a broader understanding of security in the city. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to go a step further and empirically prove the effects of crime prevention discourse upon life chances, what is important to emphasise here instead is that the CPS *draws upon* different dimensions of underprivileged life chances to facilitate crime prevention, rather than advocating policing alone.

### **5.3 Mid-chapter reflections**

To draw together the analysis developed thus far, the public, political, and policy productions of racialised life-chance divides in Miskolc are profoundly shot through with narratives of security and development. As part of this process, the two major themes identified here, i.e., behaviour and criminality, feed off each other in a cyclical fashion to aggravate life-chance divides. The underlying argument is that due to the Roma's collectively ascribed underdevelopment, backwardness, and incivility, they threaten to destabilise the social, existential, and public security of the "civilised" non-Roma populace. This, in turn, legitimises

punitive discourses and interventions that protect the latter from the dangers posed by the former in the incumbent social order, thereby materialising, performing, and further entrenching the very development divides and segregation patterns identified, demonised, and feared in the first place. The interplay of behavioural and criminalising stigma in the framing of racialised segregation in Miskolc more broadly reflects the closely entwined nature of security and development in the governance of social difference in the city.

#### **5.4 The territorial production of life-chance divides**

As Vermeersch (2012: 1197) puts it, “symbolic exclusion may lead to territorial exclusion”. While discourses around behaviour and criminality often operate at abstract levels, territoriality renders spatially concrete the production of life-chance divides and its linkages to security and development. This section therefore discusses territoriality as a separate heuristic from the above domains of behavioural and criminalising stigma to show how such generic discourses feed off and shape public, political, and policy accounts of urban life-chance divides in Miskolc in tangibly geographical terms. Impoverished Roma majority areas, and especially Lyukó Valley, have emerged as spatial targets of criminalising narratives since deepening levels of residential segregation have led to increasingly hostile public attitudes towards dilapidated areas and their dwellers. These narratives, in turn, closely resonate with the exclusionary political and policy responses that have emerged concerning segregated neighbourhoods over the last few decades.

##### *5.4.1 Territorial stigma in public discourse*

For a non-Roma middle-class resident, “*there are places where I don’t go, and a normal person doesn’t enter*” (interview with resident). In declaring “normal” the people who stay away from slums, it is therefore necessarily the slums and their dwellers that he considered

“abnormal”. Frequently associated with informal housing occupation, usury, illegal employment, unpaid utility bills, racialised tensions, drug use, burglaries, prostitution, the spread of diseases, and unauthorised waste dumping in public areas, among other things (e.g., Miskolc City Council, 2013c, 2013e, 2021f), these “abnormal” spaces and their inhabitants are therefore replete with negative connotations (cf. Wacquant, 2007). Additionally, and surprisingly, even a researcher who otherwise claimed to have been in favour of Roma rights said that “*who the heck wants to see Roma slums when looking out their window? I wouldn’t want that either, to be honest*” (interview with academic). This statement shows just how deeply engrained stigmatising associations around incivility, lawlessness, and danger can be in influencing the personal opinions of a non-Roma individual, even if they are otherwise in favour of emancipation.

Several participants of this study assumed that concentrated pockets of poverty are likely to be more conducive to delinquency. As an academic stated, “*impoverishment and misery ruins everything. It makes you selfish. It makes you egotistic*” (interview with academic), arguing that it forces many to resort to deeds that are otherwise widely stigmatised by the better-off and non-Roma public (see Egyed, 1996; Ferge, 2014). Blaming the perceived lifestyle, incivility, and criminality of the Roma for Lyukó Valley’s present conditions, a resident from another part of Miskolc commented that “*this area had been much nicer before these people [the Roma] moved in. Wherever these people move in, the area declines*” (interview with resident), which illustrates that the source of stigma is as much territorial as it is racial in essence. A further recurring impression of Lyukó Valley was the sight of drugged people in the streets in daylight, whom multiple interview participants literally touted as “zombies” in a dehumanising fashion. Such accounts of segregated neighbourhoods in the city resonates with developmentalist discourses of what Duffield (2001) calls the ‘borderlands’ imaginary, characterised by no rule

of law, the prevalence of danger and informality, and a self-reliant population that does not belong to developed – and thus secure – forms of life (see Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008).

The degree of territorial stigma is even more palpable on social media. I joined a handful of local Facebook groups for residents of Miskolc, some of which consist of tens of thousands of members, and it did not take long for Roma-phobic posts and comments to appear on my feed. Two examples are included below to sample the vastly problematic nature of such views, which sometimes appear in serious and other times sarcastic tones (*Figures 13* and *14*). The comments in *Figure 13* are more focused on expressing disgust and contempt towards what they see as a backwards and disorderly space, as well as suggesting draconian methods to deal with them, whereas the racist jokes in thread *Figure 14* reflect people's perceptions of criminality in Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets.

For clarity, the term “nest-builders” mentioned in the bottom comment of *Figure 13* denote the mostly Roma families who obtained flats in the Avas area through a state-subsidised social housing benefit programme. However, it seems that this person used the term inaccurately to refer to the Roma more generally. The “nest-builders” controversy around a housing market fraud and the violent evictions that followed will be discussed in greater detail in Section 6.1.1.1 of Chapter 6. As for *Figure 14*, Újgyőri Square is a major public transport node in Diósgyőr, close to the Numbered Streets, and it is also where the only bus service to Lyukó Valley (No. 16) terminates – more on this in the next chapter. Multiple interviewees depicted Újgyőri Square as a major gathering spot for Roma people due to its proximity to the Numbered Streets and transport links to Lyukó Valley.

18h · 🌐

Lyukóvölgyben is kisütött a nap, s ezt látta!



.COM

**Lyukói tavasz** –

Kategóriák Közélet Miskolc Színes Lyukói tavasz Bejegyzés szerzője Szerző: Bejegyzés dátu...

👍👎🗨️ 22 9 comments

Like Comment

Bomba mehetne oda. Bóséggel.  
Like · Reply · 18 h



Like · Reply · 17 h

Lyukót sajnos szerintem már nem lehet megmenteni. 🙄🙄  
Like · Reply · 17 h

...ő dehogynem...csak a módszerek nem tetszenének néhány idiótának.  
Like · Reply · 14 h

értem, és egyetértek, nagyon is. 🙄🙄🙄  
Like · Reply · 14 h

nem is kell jól van az úgy. Oda kell karanténba tenni a koszosokat.drog tanya  
Like · Reply · 8 h

és szerintem a normális családokkal mi legyen? Az élősködő " a fészek rakok" - at kéne eltüntetni, az országból!  
Like · Reply · 1 h

### Translated text

"The sun came out in Lyukó Valley, and this is what it saw!"

Spring in Lyukó [Blog post]

"Bombs could go there. Galore."

"Unfortunately, I don't think Lyukó can be saved anymore."

"...oh, of course it could be [saved]... but the methods wouldn't appeal to some idiots."

"I see, and I agree. Very much so."

"There's no need, it's good as it is. The dirty need to be quarantined there. [It's a] drug hotspot"

"And what do you think should happen to the normal families? The parasite "nestbuilders" should be cleared out of the country!"

Figure 13. A blog post about Lyukó Valley shared in a generic Facebook group for residents of Miskolc, with some selected stigmatising comments. Source: Facebook [edited and anonymised].



## Translated text

*"Hi everyone! Could you suggest places for running near Diósgyőr?"*

*"The Numbered Streets"*



*"Lyukó Valley :D :D"*

*"Plenty of space, the forest is close by"*

*"Újgyőri [Square], you get your wallet out and then you can run! :D :D :D"*

Figure 14. A post in a public Facebook group for residents of Miskolc, with some selected sarcastic and demonising comments. Source: Facebook [edited and anonymised].

Rather than tailored to extremist political views, these Facebook groups are open to the public, and yet the administrators left the contentious posts unmoderated, with hardly any comments having appeared in defence of the Roma. It is difficult to interpret this in any other way than as a widespread acceptance of racist sentiments in the public eye (see Fekete, 2016; Horváth, 2019). The frequency and heavily demonising tone of these posts further reflect societal imaginaries about segregated neighbourhoods as decaying pockets of underdevelopment that need to be avoided or punished at all costs (Buur et al., 2007; Wacquant, 2007). Considering the two posts side by side in *Figures 13* and *14*, territorial stigma is closely associated with racialised narratives of underdevelopment and criminality.

Be it online or offline, the harmful role of exaggerated imaginaries around insecurity and underdevelopment in relation to segregated areas in public speech cannot be stressed enough. Yet, a ranger who works in Lyukó for the Municipal Police said that while “*the situation is pretty crap, humans aren’t being eaten in the streets, to put it this way. A lot of people mystify it, being like »oh dear, don’t go in there!«.* The situation isn’t that bad, but I wouldn’t call it rosy either.” With reference to safety, they added that “*the use of physical force and handcuffs were only required once over six years*” (interview with ranger) of service in the area, which hardly matches up with the series of stereotypical misconceptions of criminality discussed before. Similarly, to mention a distortion in behavioural perceptions, an independent study for the council concluded that “a common belief – which even found its way into official documents – is that people here live in lairs dug into the ground, but this is not true” (Miskolc City Council, 2013e: 9, my translation). Magnified degrees of contempt towards Lyukó are effective yet deeply damaging means of delineating and feeding into existing racial tensions and life-chance divides (Buur et al., 2007; Dósa, 2009).

Territoriality features not only in the vilification and externalisation of undesirable neighbourhoods, but also in the discriminatory treatment of Roma people in parts of the city considered more orderly, developed, and civilised. For example, multiple interview participants independently brought up that young Roma people are routinely denied entry into nightclubs for makeshift reasons. As one of them said, “*the city centre sometimes gets louder, especially on the weekends, but even then, it is not the Roma, [...] because the Roma are still not allowed in everywhere. For instance, they say that you cannot enter in jeans if the person happens to be Roma*” (interview with activist). As long as the non-Roma youth make noise, get drunk, or litter in the city, it is less frowned upon – the important thing is that they should not mingle with the Roma. In a more detailed account, an academic told me that:

*“I had a student here who once invited four of his Roma friends from Debrecen [another city in Hungary], and they couldn’t get into a single place in Miskolc throughout the entire night. This is such a brutal degree of discrimination... They cried, and the rest didn’t understand ... as they can go anywhere in Debrecen. For instance, in Miskolc, there are places that ask for club membership passes. Nobody has one, but they ask the Roma to show theirs. Do you not have one? Then you’re not even getting a coke” (interview with academic).*

The denial of entry into public nightclubs – spaces that should be open to everyone – is a brutal and saddening manifestation of the extent to which the Roma are being excluded from basic activities and spaces in the city. It seems that while the Roma are comparatively more accepted elsewhere in the country, the example of their racialised exclusion from night clubs in Miskolc shows just how deep a social divide we are talking about in this specific context.

#### *5.4.2 Territoriality in politics and policy*

In municipal decision-making, life-chance divides are territorialised through the formal delineation of segregation. Engaging with policies of segregation in different parts of the city can offer insights into the concrete spatiality of security and development (Buur et al., 2007). Territorial stigma becomes tamed in euphemistic policy descriptions of various forms of underdevelopment and deficiencies in lifestyles, health, habitat, infrastructure, and the built environment in segregated parts of the city (Balatonyi et al., 2014). The identification and naming of particular spaces through such deficits renders them more amenable to policy actions of exclusion, containment, and remote management (see Conroy, 2019).

##### *5.4.2.1 A bird’s-eye view of segregation*

The designation of segregated areas in municipal policy is fundamentally a measure of development. The previously mentioned Integrated Urban Development Strategy (IUDS) of

Miskolc City Council (2014a) adopts the Hungarian Central Statistical Office's definition of segregation mentioned in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3 (footnote 11, page 94), which is based on a set of numerical social development indicators and multiple indices of deprivation, and sets a seemingly arbitrary benchmark for what counts as segregation (see Homolar, 2015). Indeed, segregated spaces do not exist in a vacuum – instead, in adopting a quantitative definition, they are produced through arbitrary claims to objectivity and formalised delineations of underdevelopment. If we consider that, officially, a residential block with a 49% segregation index does not count as segregated, whereas another with merely one more percentage point does, the value of the definition becomes questionable as it misses any account of continuity. The fact that the IUDS (Miskolc City Council, 2014a) – the single most important document outlining key objectives for the city's development – adopts this definition without any form of questioning also paves the way for a generalised and disconnected perspective on segregation in the city.

Indeed, the IUDS presents a standardised description of individual segregated neighbourhoods in Miskolc based on a set of quantitative criteria, such as the proportion of those who completed primary school within the working-age population of the respective areas, the rate of unemployment, the share of dwellings without bathrooms, and so on (Miskolc City Council, 2014a). The local Equal Opportunities Programme of 2021, which is the main policy document for addressing social inequalities in the city, largely follows suit (Miskolc City Council, 2021c). Packed with tables, figures, and numbers, the booklet does little more than indicating key trends and problem areas.

For a community worker from a local NGO, *“I think that decision-makers in town ... generally think that they know this group [the Roma], but they don't”* (interview with community worker). To be sure, the voices of locals from each neighbourhood, pictures of the streets and livelihoods, and the day-to-day work of charities and social workers on the ground,

among other things, are completely left out from the IUDS and other policy documents dealing with segregation-related issues, thereby preventing outsiders from gaining any appreciation of what genuinely matters to locals (Miskolc City Council, 2021c). In close resonance with Homolar's (2015) account of the dominance of benchmarking practices within development programmes, municipal segregation policy adopts a disembodied and aggregative top-down perspective, which is of limited use to Roma families whose daily struggles and needs in deprived spaces are not being adequately voiced and answered. This, in turn, enables a whole set of seemingly rationalised and logical truth claims about segregation, and sets the direction of municipal policy interventions, including the sweeping evictions and slum clearances analysed in the next two chapters (see Foucault, 1980; Dean, 2010).

Operating as a *measure* of development, then, the formal account of segregation in Miskolc therefore lacks *sensitivity towards* marginalised spaces and communities. The effects of working with this quantitatively informed and arbitrarily produced understanding of underdevelopment can be profound in terms of the public perception, stigma, political narratives, and governance of impoverished neighbourhoods, precisely because of a lack of situated and subjective embeddedness in the daily struggles of marginalised people.

#### *5.4.2.2 Concentrating the margins and containing underdevelopment*

While Barany (1994) optimistically claimed a few years after the regime change that the elite would respond supportively to growing presence of Roma people in city centres, the opposite turned out to be the case. Concerningly, over the past decade, spatial ordering trends in Miskolc have been pointing towards the concentration of poverty and the Roma in a single area – i.e., Lyukó Valley – that is far enough from the centre for the non-Roma majority to worry about (Zolnay, 2005; Havasi, 2018; see also Ivasiuc, 2021). As Lengyel (2009: n.p., my translation) puts it, the accumulation of poverty in Lyukó has become the latest manifestation

of the “round dance” of segregated neighbourhoods as they are being pushed out of one part of Miskolc and re-appear elsewhere in the city (see also Halász, 2018). As discussed across the remainder of this thesis, the concentration of marginality on the outer fringe of the city over the past years is a result of various municipal spatial ordering actions and incentives targeting the racialised poor, such as spontaneous and harassing inspection raids, demolitions, and forceful evictions. Expelling marginality to Lyukó Valley is motivated by the removal of racialised ‘problem populations’ from sight, who are associated with the previously discussed behavioural incivility and criminality. In other words, it is about satisfying the security and development needs of a non-Roma majority electorate in populist ways and keeping destabilising manifestations of marginality afar.

To turn towards the neighbourhood itself, “*rumour has it that the municipality has let go of Lyukó*”, a resident who lives close to the area told me (interview with resident). Existing writings on segregation in Miskolc also tend to emphasise the municipality’s passivity around Lyukó’s decline, as opposed to the series of active punitive interventions that it has pursued in central areas of the city (discussed in Chapter 6). They likewise point out the unwillingness and inability of the city administration to improve conditions in the area, as well as the lack of alternative destinations for the displaced poor who end up there (Zolnay, 2005; Lengyel, 2009; Halász, 2018; Havasi, 2018). However, what is largely missing from these discussions is the *responsibility and vested interest* of city leaders in the physical disposal of the poor and the Roma to the city’s abandoned exterior. It is important to recognise here that the concentration of poverty in Lyukó is not just a result of decision-makers’ inaction or an unfortunate by-product of slum clearances elsewhere in the city but, as Havasi (2018) briefly mentions, a *deliberate objective* (see also Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-a on corresponding national governance trends). Although the municipality is seldom invested in Lyukó itself, it has been all the more concerned with cultivating the territory’s newfound purpose of containing the surplus

population of Miskolc at a convenient distance (see Chapter 7). This attitude is aptly exemplified by a recent debate in the municipal General Assembly between far-right and left-wing councillors and the police captain on whether Lyukó can be considered a ‘no-go zone’ (Miskolc City Council, 2020b). Lyukó’s status today reflects an orchestrated non-Roma majority agenda that works to spatially distance itself from the Roma, thereby having to minimise contact with their perceived unruliness, disruptive lifestyles, and criminality. Localising the Roma and the poor in this way strengthens the symbolic and material barriers of containing underdevelopment and insecurity while disregarding the root causes of marginality (see Chapter 6 on circulation; see also Levitas, 1996; Walters, 2010; Ivasiuc, 2021).

#### 5.4.2.3 Administering ‘no man’s land’

The concentration of poverty in Lyukó is augmented by a range of spatial tactics produced through the formalised veil of administrative boundary-drawing. At its core, this entails the curious designation of Lyukó as an *external territory* – practically a euphemism for ‘no man’s land’ (Miskolc City Council, 2013e). As also described in footnote 12 on p95 (Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3), the national government’s directive 321/2012 (XI. 16.) defines external territory as “part of the administrative territory of a settlement that does not qualify as internal area and primarily serves forestry, water management, or special (e.g., mining, water basin, or waste disposal site) purposes, and is uncultivated and close to nature” (Government of Hungary, 2012: Online, my translation). Legally, the external status deprives the area of its entitlement to essential municipal services, infrastructure, development projects, and resources (Miskolc City Council, 2013e; Havasi, 2018; BOON.hu, 2019a). At the same time, although an external territory, Lyukó does not count as separate from Miskolc either, which means that it cannot be added to the list of the most deprived rural areas as a potential recipient of state support (Miskolc City Council, 2013e). The in-betweenness of the area leaves it in an impossible situation

without key social support lifelines from the municipality and the state alike, and this administrative barrier is bound to persist in the foreseeable future. In other words, Lyukó falls outside of the realm of municipal development policies due to administrative machinations.

Even more problematically, an independent study for the council has shown that the very categorisation of Lyukó in this way is highly contentious (Miskolc City Council, 2013e). The claimed rationale behind keeping the area external to the rest of the city is its undermined land area due to the mining history of Lyukó, which theoretically limits new construction works for geological reasons and makes its conditions “unfit for permanent residence” (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 114, my translation). Without the possibility of construction works and the provision of permanent housing, the area cannot be meaningfully developed. However, records show that only about 50% of the total area of Lyukó is undermined, some of which is even covered by forests (Miskolc City Council, 2013e). In other words, keeping the entirety of Lyukó an external territory is based on flawed reasoning. Given the study’s direct links to the municipality, it is impossible for the council not to know about its findings. Yet, keeping the neighbourhood in an administrative grey area is a convenient way to justify disinvestment, abandonment, and the perpetuation of underdevelopment, which enables the use of municipal funds in internal territories of Miskolc instead.

As a result, a convenient sense of ignorance prevails, which glosses over the technical details and tries to normalise the external status of Lyukó. In a brief passage of the IUDS, even policymakers acknowledge with reference to the area that it is “beyond the carrying capacity of the city to facilitate the socialisation and integration of its residents,” (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 114, my translation), thus also alluding to normative conceptions of ‘incivility’ yet again. The municipality likewise lacks the capacity to provide any alternative housing at such a large scale in Miskolc (Havasi, 2018). While there have been empty promises to “examine the possibilities of stopping the disconnectedness of the area” (Miskolc City Council, 2014c:

26, my translation) or even to “incorporate [Lyukó] into the internal territory [of the city]” (Miskolc City Council, 2013d: 87, my translation), no changes have materialised on the ground, even though almost a decade has passed since the publication of these documents. Put simply, policy discourse on Lyukó Valley is nothing more than a blatant avoidance of responsibility that perpetuates the area’s function as a necessary ‘dumping ground’ or ‘borderlands’ for poverty and the undesirable surplus population (see Duffield, 2001).

As part of producing the ‘borderlands’, the rationales for interventions – including demolitions and slum clearances – furthered in *internal* territories of the city (see footnote 12 on p95 in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3 for formal definitions of internal and external territory) do not seem to apply to the remote and purportedly lawless space of Lyukó. Consequently, the area has become a significant recipient of the influx of the displaced poor from the city centre without the need for any additional action towards their support and emancipation. According to the IUDS, “the aim of urban development is to eradicate inhumane living conditions in the *internal* territories of the city, which are primarily a characteristic of segregated areas, and carry serious dangers to public security, public health, and the operation of the city” (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 77, my translation and emphasis). The focus on *inner territories* leaves *external* ones – i.e., Lyukó in particular – open to receiving the ‘dangerous’ outcasts displaced from their allegedly uninhabitable housing, just to relocate to similar, if not worse, circumstances. Lyukó’s territorial designation is thus an instrument of social control with marked effects on the relations between different social groups in the city (see Yiftachel, 1998), as the area is tasked with absorbing the developmental and security-related deficiencies that the inner-city populace deems undesirable.

Against these arrangements, the continuation of the cycle of slum clearances is no longer deemed necessary, nor is it realistic. As Havasi (2018) explains, the dilapidated and shabby properties and plots of land in Lyukó are mostly in private hands, and thus the council cannot

legally bulldoze the area – not that it necessarily intends to do so anyway. At the same time, the chances of extensive development schemes in social housing, infrastructural connectivity, and the provision of essential services and education necessary for social mobility are all slim due to the area's cemented status as external territory, with no holistic concept or concrete ideas that could move it forward in constructive ways (G. Fekete, 2006). Ultimately, the practice of administrative boundary-drawing, as well as the externalisation and arguably purposeful neglect of Lyukó in terms of basic provisions and infrastructural links to the 'internal' city entail all the necessary conditions for the contained production of "non-insured surplus life" (Duffield, 2007: 19), the circumstances of which barely differ from those of slums in the global South. The ways in which this underdeveloped and non-insured life is thereby reconceived as self-reliant – rather than supported by the safety net of social services, which Duffield (2007, 2010) calls 'insured life' – will be further explored in Chapter 7 (see also Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006).

The capacity of Lyukó is finite, however, and beyond a certain point it will not be able to contain the growing number of poor people who are either forced to move there or left without alternative destinations. New dwellings cannot be built for the previously explained reasons, and many abandoned ones are now being dismantled by local gangs for the use of construction materials, as a local social worker explained in an interview. Consequently, there are physical limits to the expansion of the area which appear to reach their saturation point.

The externalisation and containment of poverty in Lyukó is a sobering reminder of the municipality's inability and lack of willingness to find meaningful responses to social polarisation since the regime change (Zolnay, 2005; Lengyel, 2009; Kotics, 2020). Policy measures aimed at cementing the segregation of the city's racialised fringes resonate with the exclusionary motivations of territorial stigma in public thinking. The simultaneous isolation and distancing of poverty in space reflects elite interests to 'aestheticize' the urban core and

tame criticisms around the allegedly disturbing presence of the Roma in the city (see Chapter 6; see also Walters, 2010; Ladányi, 2010 [1989]). Amidst an illusory sense of improvement in inner Miskolc, the life chances of the poor and the Roma are becoming increasingly hopeless, fragile, and precarious (Halász, 2018). Lyukó's situation as an outcast neighbourhood underlines the ambition of city leaders to maintain and secure the divide between the Roma and the non-Roma of the city instead of bridging it (Duffield, 2007, 2010).

## 5.5 Future prospects

Considering the pessimistic picture of racialised life-chance divides painted thus far, is there any reason to believe that not all is doom and gloom? As it stands, even benevolent relations between the Roma and the non-Roma are fundamentally paternalistic, as the Roma are treated as if they were in a lower hierarchical position than the decision-makers who are there to tell them how to 'do things right'. Therefore, as an NGO worker further suggested in relation to segregation, "*until this group is treated as a problem rather than as partners, it won't really be solved*" (interview with community worker). Upon becoming framed as a 'target population' in need of corrective intervention, as is the case with the previously discussed policy documents, the Roma's voice is inherently silenced in defining policy matters.

Despite politics in the city having been plagued by Romaphobia, the new oppositional local government that got elected in 2019 has been showing some determination to break with the city's long-entrenched discriminatory attitude – and hence to cautiously dial down punitive policing-based understandings of security<sup>20</sup>. Multiple interviewees praised the new deputy mayor for her devotion to community development, bottom-up engagement, and social support

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<sup>20</sup> A detailed analysis of the new post-2019 municipality's work is beyond the scope of this thesis given that the early stages of their cycle coincided with COVID-19 lockdowns. At the time of data collection, information on the municipality's position concerning the Roma was limited, given the predominance of pandemic-related pressures and duties in autumn 2020.

programmes to help the city's poor, all of which point towards the careful surfacing of a softer conception of *human* security that centres on enabling rather than repression (TÖÖSZ and Miskolc City Council, 2021; see Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 2010). For instance, the municipality approved a council housing renovation package of 800 million HUF (=£1.87 million<sup>21</sup>) to renovate and improve living conditions in forty-two council-owned flats in the Vasgyár (Iron Factory) area (Minap.hu, 2020a). While a seemingly modest initiative, it is still an important gesture considering the added challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic at the time. More recently, in counteracting Fidesz's considerable budget cuts in the sector and their neglect of hundreds of council-owned properties, the new municipal administration has reformed the city's social housing system. Their key aims were to (i) continue flat renovations at a larger scale and therefore extend the number of available council-let properties from 4,200 to 4,800, (ii) provide needs-based rent subsidies, and (iii) keep rents well below market prices, in addition to encouraging young people to stay in Miskolc rather than leave the city for more affluent destinations (Minap.hu, 2021a).

However, making emancipatory inroads in an electoral environment still inclined towards penal populist narratives is a fragile endeavour and the municipality is forced to tread a fine line. With regard to the recent housing reform, they also stressed in response to right-wing criticism that they are “keeping an eye out for tenants who do not keep the rules of cohabitation” and “the nest-builders will not appear again” (Minap.hu, 2021a: Online, my translation). Making references to what have arguably been triggering catchphrases, such as the “rules of cohabitation”, suggests that there is a continued public demand for exclusionary narratives towards the undesirable and non-compliant Roma that the council is not yet ready to jettison (see Csepeli, 2008; Havasi, 2018). Consequently, while there are noticeable changes in the new

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<sup>21</sup> As of 12/04/2023 exchange rates.

administration's understanding of security with a sharper focus on social support programmes, tougher narratives of law enforcement and order also remain in the foreground.

Moreover, a key discursive component of this 'political minefield' (Havasi, 2018) of 'populist paranoias' (Goldberg, 2006: 358; Mudde, 2005) is the tactic of *non-communication*, or the very careful conveyance of socially emancipatory action, in ways that try to earn the support of the non-Roma majority and avoid losing votes (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). According to the 2021 Equal Opportunities Programme, an important objective is to "set the [tone of] communication accompanying interventions" (Miskolc City Council, 2021c: 18, my translation). A social policy expert recalled a powerful example of this with reference to their work in Lyukó Valley, which is worth quoting at length:

*"When I was doing Lyukó [...] it was fine to publish newspaper articles about the Roma completing a training in construction and concrete works and ... that they built a sports field as volunteers. But then it wasn't possible when, for instance, we took Roma children to Lake Balaton [a popular holiday destination in Hungary] for a week. So, we really tried to... which the deputy mayor at the time said as well, that the fun and revelry should not be visible; only when they work, get trained, and suffer. So, when they paint something themselves, or create a vegetable garden, then those things should be made visible, but when there is some sort of community event going on, then that shouldn't"* (interview with policymaker).

The selective and normatively regulated press representation of the Roma reflects a bitter reality that there is still a long way to go in making social support programmes acceptable to the wider public. By engineering press portrayals through an uneasy interplay of politics and the media, there is a genuine risk that parallel realities are entrenched, whereby the Roma only deserve the limelight when conforming to non-Roma expectations. Through this example, the social divides are further deepened as the Roma are kept separate from the rest of the city in the realm of representations too, in what reflects a highly oppressive power hierarchy. While the image of

the ‘hard-working Roma’ could probably elicit some voyeuristic satisfaction and marginal improvements to their image elsewhere in the long run, it comes at a hefty price of unfair coverage and subordination.

Besides pressures from the public, however, it must be noted that structural inequalities against a backdrop of neoliberalism and the centralised architecture of urban governance in Hungary render unreasonable any expectations towards the municipality to alleviate poverty completely and find all-encompassing measures to emancipate its marginalised population (e.g., Bárándy, 2014; Szicherle and Wessenauer, 2017). All it can do amidst the structural confines of limited budgets and public housing stock, as Ladányi (2010 [1989], 2010 [2007]) pointed out long ago, is to strengthen or weaken social polarisation (see also Zolnay, 2005; Kotics, 2020; cf. Painter, 1999; Painter, 2003). Nonetheless, it can choose its tone when addressing the Roma and the poor, and reduce the emphasis on framing segregated spaces and populations in hard-line security terms, focusing instead on constructive dialogue, bottom-up development-based perspectives, and improved welfare provisions – i.e., a developmentalist focus on human security, rather than repressive accounts revolving around the stigmatisation and criminalisation of underdevelopment (Chandler, 2007; Duffield, 2010). In the long run, backing inclusive policies with a careful and considerate communication strategy has the potential to consolidate racialised understandings of security at both official and public levels, albeit undeniably *within* the broader structural confines of the centralised national government’s overall decisions.

During the years of the Fidesz administration in Miskolc, bottom-up forms of policy engagement were practically non-existent, which the new municipality has decided to change. A policymaker remembered that “*the previous local government did not communicate with society in any way. If any kind of initiative or suggestion came their way, they dismissed it, so they expressed no interest*” (interview with policymaker). Since 2019, there have been efforts

to extend participatory governance to all parts of the city – including focus groups and localised working groups consisting of residents of segregated areas – in an attempt to synchronise local demands with future policies (Miskolc City Council, 2021b; Minap.hu, 2021b). However, as national studies have shown, there is still a long way to go in getting the most deprived residents involved in fair and equal ways (Nagy et al., 2020; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020).

For example, I attended a participatory council meeting, which followed a workshop format with representatives of local civil society members and activists brainstorming about potential creative neighbourhood initiatives that would make a difference to the lives of local communities, such as a neighbourhood market proposal and the renovation of the Avas lookout tower. On the one hand, it was refreshing to see that the civil society groups were present from all sorts of backgrounds rather than just government-friendly ones that are positively discriminated by the illiberal state (Greskovits, 2020), thanks to the political balancing of the oppositional local government against the national-scale trends explained in Chapter 3 earlier. On the other hand, no Roma people were present, and nothing was said in relation to the Roma communities, despite their considerable presence in the city at an estimated 10-16% of the population, as mentioned before (Havasi, 2018). Can an event like this be called truly participatory if it misses the voice of one-tenth to one-sixth of the city's public? It remains unclear whether this is due to a lack of invitation from the council either unintentionally or in fear of losing electoral popularity, the fragmented nature of Roma political representation which prevents them from voicing collective interests, the Roma's apprehension towards participating in a predominantly non-Roma decision-making environment, or a combination of some or all of these factors. Either way, enhancing Roma participation would be an important step towards narrowing the city's racialised life-chance divides, since the inclusion of Roma communities in key policy dialogues would offer them more direct connections to decision-making bodies and a chance to have a say in important policy matters.

The above examples illustrate that the primary concern with a top-down governance approach is that the Roma are being approached in security and development terms from the top of the urban power hierarchy. Therefore, not only are they being externally delineated as a ‘problem population’, through which the municipality grants itself legitimacy to pursue further actions – or a lack thereof – on the Roma, but their exclusion from mainstream policy discourse also forecloses any substantial improvements to their marginalised status in society. In the new municipality’s above-discussed careful steps towards inclusion, however, there is promise that the currently wide racialised life-chance divide in the city can become slowly and gradually narrowed, although there is significantly more that should be done to make any visible progress in this respect.

### **Concluding remarks**

By asking the question ‘whose security and development?’ (see Wæver, 1995; Stenson, 2005; Chandler, 2007) at the start of this chapter, I sought to understand how racialised life-chance divides are created and justified through hegemonic framings of (in)security and (under)development in Miskolc’s daily life, local politics, and municipal policy. Of course, the grammars of discrimination described in this chapter, as well as generic framings of race and segregation in the city, are hardly novel in themselves. However, they gain new meaning when understood as numerous overlapping discursive crucibles for the production of life-chance divides which, following Duffield (2010), form the basis of empirically analysing urban segregation from an SDN perspective as established in Chapter 2.

My aim in exploring a variety of discursive positions was to unpack dominant perspectives on social order in the city, as well as to discuss whose security and development needs are being articulated and in what registers. The interplay of scornful depictions of Roma behaviour, criminality, and territoriality are all bound up in connected imaginaries and productions of

(in)security and (under)development. The three discussed themes are closely linked across the domains of lay discourse, politics, and policy, and feed off one another to create a mesh of factors undermining the life chances of the Roma in generalising and damaging ways. Behavioural accounts of incivility are associated with underdevelopment, and also inform common perceptions of criminality that are connected to the non-Roma's fears and security concerns.

Segregated neighbourhoods, in turn, are the concrete targets of the aforementioned two kinds of discourses and inform generalising public disgust towards Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets as racialised containers of incivility and danger that must be kept at bay. Political interlocutors are keen to play upon social and territorial stigma as hard-line and racially infused populist narratives remain widely endorsed, particularly in relation to racialised public security as the electorate's suggested 'lowest common denominator'. That said, policymaking carries relatively little evidence of racialisation with a few exceptions, but its plentiful references to behavioural expectations and social marginality, as seen in the Cohabitation Codex and the Crime Prevention Strategy, respectively, nevertheless resonate with the normative dualization of the better-off and the segregated city, and thus legitimise potentially damaging interventions along these lines.

To revisit the key messages of this chapter, redirecting condemnation from ethnic traits to a perceived set of collective behavioural identifiers was the first examined manoeuvre through which racialised life-chance divides are furthered in Miskolc. Pointing out particular forms of conduct associated with incivility and framing them as Roma traits feed into heightened public hostility. For instance, resentment towards the Roma's perceived welfare dependency and work avoidance contrasts them to the hardworking, diligent, and respectful non-Roma, who are therefore seen as more deserving of money, resources, and housing, among other things. Accounts of deviance have immense power in political discourse and policymaking as well by

normalising particular behaviours and lifestyles while denouncing and criminalising others, as demonstrated by the Cohabitation Codex. Overall, behavioural stigma draws a stark developmental distinction between the ‘backwards’ Roma minority and the ‘civilised’ non-Roma majority.

Closely linked to behavioural vilification are perceptions of Roma criminality. Public security as a generic expectation for any city can easily become racially permeated through the spiralling of horror stories and the extrapolation of individual experiences to an entire minority group. Although people often claim that not *all* Roma are criminals, this kind of reasoning departs from the assumption that the Roma are *generally* criminals but there are always exceptions to the norm. This is highly problematic, especially as many locals feel that despite its poor reputation, Miskolc is no more dangerous than any other city from a public safety perspective. Nevertheless, building on popular criminalising prejudice, the entire political spectrum in Miskolc is shot through with anti-Roma attitudes as parties compete for votes using racialised security narratives. The chicken-and-egg dynamic of Romaphobia in radical populist political circles and the local citizenry is difficult to untangle since, while leaders play a crucial role in setting the tone, they are also pressured by the inertia of a prejudice-fuelled electoral environment, where an openly emancipatory intent is likely to receive minimal backing. In this way, the interplay of public and political criminalisation of the Roma is also responsible for the continued rediscovery and punishment of racial difference as a security problem. This, in turn, adversely affects the life chances of the Roma, irrespective of their actual criminal records or innocence. Although policy language refrains from racialisation in most cases – though not always –, it nevertheless brings together crime prevention with a complex set of developmental attributes, thereby underlining the analytical utility of the SDN to understanding the governance of segregation in Miskolc.

The final theme that draws together the previous two was the role of territoriality in the spatial manipulation of life chances. Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets are generally seen as shabby Roma quarters harbouring criminals and zombified drug addicts. Disproportionate preconceptions, cynicism, and aversion towards these areas is mimicked in the municipal decision-making strategy of producing and furthering segregation. Marking segregated spaces in disembodied and statistical ways is conducive to oversimplifications of what are otherwise complex and diverse localities with manifold individual lived realities. Furthermore, through the deliberate administrative classification of Lyukó as an external territory, municipal development responsibilities are largely relinquished, thereby leaving the area as a remote and abandoned container for the city's outcast Roma.

Despite a shifting political landscape towards social inclusion as part of recent municipal ambitions, populism and anti-Roma sentiments remain prevalent. Emancipatory measures remain limited in scope and receive selective press coverage for now, as past political failures have attested to the easy loss of popularity for those trying to back the Roma too openly. The effectiveness of participatory developments remain to be seen for the coming years, but the municipality has not yet gone far enough to get Roma communities involved. The emancipatory perspectives that such approaches promote are likely to remain subordinated to hard-line Romaphobia for some time, leaving the city's racialised life-chance divides wide open, albeit with cautious hopes for optimism in the long term.

## **6. The populist politics of security and shifting frontiers of circulation**

### **Chapter introduction**

The sustained populist obsession with public security in Miskolc entails far more than the mere rhetorical exercise of demagogically associating the Roma with criminality as discussed in the previous chapter. In fact, the rise of punitive discourses in Miskolc has been accompanied by a shift towards repressive policing tactics as the defining means of managing social difference, particularly after the right-wing populist government party Fidesz took charge. Through the securitisation plea of “let there finally be order!” (Fidesz Miskolc, 2010: 1, my translation), Fidesz won the 2010 local elections, replacing a centre-left city administration. With the backing of the national government, they promised to satisfy disillusioned voters who had been desperate to break with the stigmatised image of a post-industrial city punctured with racialised tensions. The leitmotif that “Miskolc shall become the safest city in the country” (MIÖR, 2018: 3, my translation) soon became a cornerstone of Fidesz’s nearly decade-long rule in Miskolc until 2019 (Minap.hu, 2019b). Subsequent measures of drastic securitisation and social cleansing came at the behest of welfarist agendas such as social housing provisions, inclusion, and community-building projects (Index.hu, 2014; cf. Wacquant, 2001; MacLeod, 2002; Ferge, 2014).

This chapter critically evaluates the nature of Fidesz’s renewed emphasis on hard-line policing as a penal populist recourse to sovereign power in the ordering of urban space. Drawing on the sovereign arm of the security-development nexus (see Chapter 2), the analysis shows that the municipality’s punitive interventions into the urban fabric are fundamentally a matter of reconfiguring, containing, and excluding the circulation of what are considered undesirable bodies, behaviours, and habitats in the city, while enabling those deemed worthy, peaceful, orderly, and civilised (cf. Foucault, 2007; Duffield, 2010). The identification of who or what

count as preferred as opposed to unwanted forms of circulation are intrinsically linked to the production of racialised life-chance divides dissected in the previous chapter, and the corresponding municipal wielding of sovereign power gravely facilitates the entrenchment of these divides. Following Stenson (2005), the deployment of repressive technologies of rule in Miskolc works to re-establish control over ostensibly problematic spaces and populations and drive out the unruly, thereby enhancing the non-Roma majority's perceived quality of life at the expense of the punished Roma minority.

The chapter argues that over the last decade, the penal interventions of the municipality have followed a gradual path in consolidating an altered and more socially divisive circulatory regime of security in the city. The mobilisation of sovereign power took place in three distinctive stages – disruption, diversion, and sustenance. More specifically, populist securitisation measures first disrupted circulatory patterns of Miskolc's past social order through inspection raids, evictions, and slum clearances. The municipality then redirected circulations into a new arrangement across the urban landscape through the spatially selective mobilisation of policing interventions. Finally, the altered patterns of circulation now require sustenance for populist narratives to retain credence and control over the city's future development. The chapter shows that through its excessive application, the municipality is prone to becoming 'addicted' to wielding sovereign power in oppressive ways, since any loosening of established circulatory controls would risk re-introducing the very arrangements that punitive measures were supposed to eliminate in the first place.

A focus on circulations, as opposed to simply displacement, exclusion, or stigma (e.g., among many others, Marcuse, 1985; Smith, 1996; Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, 2002; DeVerteuil, 2006; Wacquant, 2008b; Jelinek, 2010; MacLeod and Johnstone, 2012; Slater, 2009; Collins et al., 2022), allows us to see the socio-spatial implications of the municipality's penal interventions in dynamic and directional rather than static and localised terms. In this reading,

the injustices concerned are not only about displacement, but also about preventing unwanted people and behaviours from circulating into certain areas of the city and reorganising urban space accordingly. Displacement is therefore only one aspect of a broader hegemonic strategy around the dynamic reconfiguration of the city's social order through the concerted interplay of enabling the movement of the desirable and disabling the unruly. As shown throughout this chapter, a perspective on circulation considers how penal interventions redraw the map of who is allowed (or not) to circulate and where within the city, the overall directionality of pushing racialised poverty outwards from the urban core to the peripheries, and the restriction of undesirable bodies from circulating back into central areas through their containment in the outskirts.

After entering office, the Fidesz administration proclaimed a “resistance against crime” (Fidesz councillor, quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2013a: 22, my translation) and adopted a “new model of security” (Fidesz councillor, quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2013a: 6, my translation) in Miskolc, placing the vision of a safe and liveable city to the forefront of their agenda. Uniting a range of hard-line interventions under the appealing banner of improving residents' subjective sense of safety, the focus was to deliver tangible and spectacular results in a short period of time (Miskolc City Council, 2018b). The Fidesz city leadership's radical stance on urban ordering was characterised by a two-pronged top-down securitisation steamroller, comprising:

- (i) a series of slum clearances with forceful evictions and demolitions, with the aim to reduce slums' ostensible risks posed to public safety, as well as
- (ii) increased police presence in public spaces and the enforcement of the ‘rules of cohabitation’ through the establishment and rapid enlargement of the Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR) together with its citywide smart CCTV system and a central operations control room (see Introduction chapter).

The amplification of top-down social cleansing interventions thereby functioned as a vehicle for demonstrating the might of the right-wing populist municipality in punishing the supposedly disorderly territories of Miskolc, with profound effects on the city's social fabric and circulations.

The chapter begins by introducing a spatialised perspective on the circulation of perceived security risks from segregated areas into the rest of the city. It then utilises this vantage point to understand the underpinning logics of punitive municipal measures and the way they disrupted previous patterns of the circulation of danger and safety. This will be illustrated using the examples of municipal inspection raids across segregated areas of the city and forced evictions in the Avas neighbourhood. The second section discusses the diversion of circulation through the municipality's selective application of sovereign power in deprived areas and suggests that there is a marked directionality to this process. To this end, it presents a comparative discussion of the Numbered Streets and Lyukó Valley along the themes of slum clearances, mobility, police presence, and surveillance, demonstrating how the concentration of punitive interventions in the Numbered Streets and the neglect of Lyukó Valley in each domain pushed unwanted circulations outwards and into the latter neighbourhood. The third section then makes the case for the sustenance of circulation as the new and increasingly inevitable governance imperative, irrespective of the municipality's political orientation. It posits that a superficial sense of improved security was achieved by the outlawing of ostensibly destabilising circulations, which now necessitates the upkeep of bolstered policing capabilities, or else the reconfigured circulatory order collapses. This, however, comes at the hefty price of accentuated patterns of racialised exclusion and a growing social crisis in Lyukó Valley, where many of the persecuted Roma are now concentrated.

## 6.1 Disrupting circulation

On a warm and sunny autumn afternoon in September 2020, I alighted a new Skoda tram on the main square of Miskolc. An appealingly modern town hall building, beautifully renovated historical façades, lively cafés and restaurants, beds of flowers, a giant LED screen, a conspicuous “MISKOLC” sign at the far end of the square, and a view onto the green Avas Hill and its lookout tower welcomed me on my first fieldwork day and would surely make a pleasant first impression on any visitor. My subjective sense of safety – an idea that has been iteratively repeated as a crucial area of improvement for the city in policy documents, council meetings and media outlets alike (Miskolc City Council, 2018b, 2019c; Minap.hu, 2020d; BOON.hu, 2021b) – was certainly high. The orderly built environment, the highly transparent spatial layout of the square, and signs saying “CCTV is in operation” on nearby lampposts ticked all the boxes that my non-Roma middle-class positionality and frame of mind would associate with a safe environment.

However, beyond the city centre’s spectacular makeover during the past decade or so lie a series of contestable punitive municipal interventions of circulatory containment, which have affected the urban fabric in fundamental ways. Adopting the concept of circulation can help us to understand the transformation of the city centre from a criminalised space loaded with racial tension into a purified and aestheticized environment through the use of sovereign power (see Foucault, 2007; Stenson, 2005). The securitisation measures of the past decade have seen the city’s socio-spatial polarisation, whereby the ability of the marginalised post-industrial ‘surplus population’ – and particularly the Roma – to circulate in and around the city was severely undermined (see Duffield, 2010). The city centre has therefore emerged as a more pleasant and ‘liveable’ space for the non-Roma middle-class (see Flusty, 2001), of which a local resident has expressed his approval in the following way:

*“About twenty years ago, I lived in the very centre of the city. I went for a walk with my wife, onto the Széchenyi [the main street]. It was about 9 o’clock in the evening, and we thought that we would consume something and stuff. But then we didn’t think so, because we assessed the situation, and we were the only white people in the street far and wide, so we then decided to go home. [...] Today, you can peacefully go out into the Széchenyi for a walk in the evening”* (interview with resident).

In this story, the resident directly associated the security situation of the main street with the skin colour of the people present. For this non-Roma person, the aestheticization of the centre and the restriction of the circulation of unwanted Roma people into the area thus constituted the dividing line between feeling comfortable as opposed to reticent about walking around late on the main street, which resonates with the racialised prejudices of behavioural deviance and criminality discussed in Chapter 5.

If we go back in time by a decade or so, the manifold negative, criminalised, and racialised associations with slums and dilapidated neighbourhoods across Miskolc, such as drugs, litter, noise, diseases, petty crime, among other things, were seen to circulate into and directly spill over to better-off parts of the city. Such disturbances were therefore regarded as “destabilising forms” of circulation (Duffield, 2010: 53) to what right-wing populists saw as the tranquil lives, tidy habitats, and safety of the decent and law-abiding citizenry (Fidesz Miskolc, 2010). Looking at a decade-old map in the Integrated Urban Development Strategy (*Figure 15* is my adapted version of it), segregated areas – as defined and treated by the municipality in otherwise contestable ways (footnote 11, p94 in Section 3.2.3 of Chapter 3, as well as Section 5.4.2.1 in Chapter 5) – were scattered around the city in “dense coexistence” (Foucault, 2007: 335) with the adjacent ‘developed’ spaces and habitats (Miskolc City Council, 2014a).

For the populist city leadership, segregated neighbourhoods in the aforementioned spatial arrangement were not only understood as *containers* of danger and disorder, however, but also

as locales where such threats *emanate from*, thereby posing a security risk to the surrounding ‘civilised’ population (see similar arguments by Rasmussen, 2007; see also Buur et al., 2007; Foucault, 2007; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). According to the Fidesz mayor at the time, “a significant part of nest-builders and dwellers of the Numbered Streets<sup>22</sup> violated the basic rights of nearby residents on a daily basis, and especially their right to security” (quoted in Borsodihir.hu, 2018: Online, my translation). Viewing the racialised criminalisation of segregated parts of the city, and populist attempts at their removal, as matters of circulation therefore offers a productive way of understanding the geographical dimensions of the operation of sovereign power in dealing with undesirable populations and their perceived spill-over security risks to other parts of the urban core (see Buur et al., 2007; De Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008).

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<sup>22</sup> The two main sites of punitive evictions in the 2010-2019 Fidesz era were Avas (which is where the ‘nest-builders’ used to live) and the Numbered Streets. Each case will be discussed in greater detail shortly.




Figure 15. Segregated neighbourhoods in Miskolc as of 2014 according to the council's Integrated Urban Development Strategy, with the number of residents in each. Source of segregation data: Miskolc City Council (2014a). Map data from OpenStreetMap<sup>23</sup>.

As the racialised security problems associated with segregated neighbourhoods were seen to contaminate the rest of the city, commensurate municipal responses had to be justified to *disrupt* existing patterns of circulation in the name of securitisation. The dispersal and deflection of racialised danger to other, less frequented parts of the city became a driving political agenda, with the aim of reclaiming supposedly out-of-control central areas for the non-Roma majority (see Stenson, 2005; Ivasiuc, 2021). To facilitate circulatory disruption,

<sup>23</sup> OpenStreetMap data is under the Open Database License. For more information, see [openstreetmap.org/copyright](http://openstreetmap.org/copyright).

municipal sovereign power was brought to work upon segregated neighbourhoods and residents in rampant ways through slum clearances and inspection raids.

### *6.1.1 The strongmen and the slum: populist securitisation in action*

The demolitions and evictions in segregated areas of Miskolc are powerful markers of the punitive mobilisation of sovereign power in annihilating the circulation of racialised security risks in the city. The then-mayor called municipal slum clearances “one of our most important urban policy causes” (quoted in Minap.hu, 2016b: Online, my translation). As a local from the Numbered Streets reminisced, “*essentially, they wanted all the Roma to be evicted from Miskolc. That’s what they wanted...*” (interview with resident). While admitting that each segregated area within the city is bound up in a plethora of uniquely localised issues, the municipality nonetheless announced a uniform set of rampant measures towards their removal (Magyar Hírlap, 2014). Far from a situated and sympathetic way of thinking, this shows a generalising approach to the application of sovereign power in disrupting the city’s physical and social fabric, thereby ruling out what are collectively perceived as dangerous forms of circulation (cf. Chapter 5 on the disembodied policy approach to segregation).

Rather than immediately evicting residents from impoverished areas, sovereign power was wielded in incremental ways to gradually squeeze out unwanted circulations. In mobilising the newly founded Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR) and other municipal authorities, a series of intimidatory police inspection raids took place from 2013 onwards, before or alongside evictions in marginalised and predominantly Roma neighbourhoods such as Tetenvár, Bábonyibérc, Lyukó Valley, and the Numbered Streets, whereby authorities would spontaneously turn up in groups of ten to forty and carry out arbitrary checks on locals’ properties (NEKI and HCLU, 2014; HCLU et al., 2016; AJBH, 2015; Kazarján and Kirs, 2020; MIÖR, 2013, 2014). There were reports of municipal officers ordering residents to open their

fridges, take pictures of their toilets to see if they were in an acceptable condition, take account of the cleanliness and tidiness of gardens, and so on (444.hu, 2016). The inspections were later deemed discriminatory by the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, since over 90% of them were carried out in segregated and Roma majority neighbourhoods, and were also ruled unlawful in court after human rights advocacy organisations' appeals against the process (AJBH, 2015; Miskolc Court of Law, 2018; Debrecen Court of Appeal, 2019).

To echo Schwell's (2014) argument, the use of sovereign power through the inspection raids was to improve the non-Roma population's sense of safety by undermining that of the harassed Roma who were considered a security risk. Press coverage and studies of these raids repeatedly recited that the affected people had felt deeply harassed and scarred by the process, all the while the Municipal Police openly admitted that "those who respect the law should feel safe, but those trying to avoid or trick the law should absolutely not" (director of MIÖR, quoted in Sosinet.hu, 2014; see also Csóka and Herman, 2016; Kazarján and Kirs, 2020). The aim of the raids was to pressurise 'undesirable' and predominantly Roma locals to leave the area voluntarily rather than through forceful evictions, while also inciting suspicion and hostility among the surrounding non-Roma population (Kazarján and Kirs, 2020). In this sense, the raids served as a preparatory step of the municipality's punitive retaliation against the circulating security risks that the Roma of dilapidated neighbourhoods were seen to have presented to their surroundings, and also embodied the sovereign activation of an expanding municipal police.

As only a small fraction of families vacated their homes due to the harassing inspections (Havasi, 2018), however, more drastic steps were necessary to complete the disruption of circulation in the targeted neighbourhoods. While raids were a somewhat indirect way of exercising sovereignty upon the Roma in the sense that they were pressurised rather than forced to leave their places of residence, their eviction from the Avas quarter and the Numbered Streets were a merciless display of brute force. While the process sought to appease many Roma-

phobic voters, who were the primary audience of a hatred-fuelled and mediatised spectacle of slum clearances, the Roma were ruthlessly reminded of their subordinate position in society (see Fassin, 2014).

#### *6.1.1.1 Case study: the nest-builder controversy in Avas*

From 2005 onwards, Avas became one of the most contested and rapidly declining neighbourhoods of Miskolc under the centre left MSZP local government. Through a social housing programme, the state offered financial subsidies to families seeking to move into second-hand apartments in what was called the Nest-builder Programme or *Fészekrakó Program* in Hungarian. Capitalising on this opportunity, a corrupt conglomerate of lawyers, bankers, and officials tricked hundreds of poor families from deprived rural areas into agreeing to move into prefab panel apartment blocks in Avas, while unlawfully capturing the state subsidies themselves (24.hu, 2015; Index.hu, 2019). The lawyers produced fake employment certificates for families who were often jobless, and convinced them to take up loans for their apartments, which they were subsequently unable to pay back as they lacked a regular income (24.hu, 2015). Most families arrived from deeply impoverished parts of the countryside, completely unprepared for an urban lifestyle in multi-storey apartment blocks. For instance, they knew nothing about paying the utility bills (interview with community worker). Many housing estates in Avas began to dilapidate and the market value of apartments diminished rapidly as a result (Balatonyi et al., 2014). For a resident,

*“They were the kinds of people who slaughtered pigs on the seventh floor, or kept a horse on the third floor, inside their apartments. They burnt up the woodwork of the building, you know, the door, the window frames and all that, so they were basically a subcultural social stratum that couldn’t keep the basic rules of cohabitation. This was a big problem for Avas”* (interview with resident).

The Nest-builder Programme brought rising fear and resentment towards what were seen as circulating security risks associated with the newly settled-in poor of the area, as expressed in the above resident's reference to the previously discussed term 'rules of cohabitation' (see Chapter 5).

In their pre-2010 elections campaign and afterwards, evicting 'undesirable' Roma families from the apartment blocks of Avas became a priority to the city administration, thereby seeking to restore earlier patterns of social circulation in the neighbourhood. Taking advantage of the mismanagement of the social housing scheme, Fidesz soon shifted the blame onto the pre-2010 centre-left MSZP regime – who initiated the Nest-building Programme as noted above – for the neighbourhood's deterioration, and began to scapegoat the 'antisocial' Roma residents as the main source of problems in Avas (Magyar Hírlap, 2014; Havasi, 2018). They frenzied the public against the incompatible lifestyles and behaviours that kept communities in fear and upset the public order, asking "how can honest people be protected against them?" (Fidesz Miskolc, 2010: 9, my translation). Similarly, an advert for the then-mayor's Facebook page ridiculed Roma incivility through a singled-out photo allegedly taken in a "nest-builder" household, which shows a disorderly kitchen with some socks hanging off the hob<sup>24</sup>. In the image description, he said: "Do you also COOK WITH SOCKS? Press like if you support the EVICTION OF THE NEST-BUILDERS!" (quoted by Papp, 2014: Online, my translation, capitals original), thereby hoping to garner support for the evictions. Although this example only carries an implicit reference to racial stigma, the then-mayor made his anti-Roma position overt four years into his election:

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<sup>24</sup> See Papp (2014: Online) for a screenshot of the advertisement. The image is not included here due to potential copyright protection.

“I promised that we would cleanse Avas of the ‘nest-builders’ by the end of the 2010-2014 cycle. [...] By the end of August, it is expected that the under-socialised, and let’s say it out loud, mostly Roma families, who were settled in by the socialists, will move out of 105-110 properties [...] And do you know what people say when they ask where they can move? Everyone says: back home! That is, where they had come from before” (quoted in Magyar Hírlap, 2014: Online, my translation).

Although the then-mayor later denied that he had considered slum clearances a question of ethnicity (Minap.hu, 2016b), the above quote is an unequivocal indication to the contrary.

In an additional layer of legitimation linking sovereign power to populist statecraft, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán called the ‘nest-builders’ immigrants upon his visit to Miskolc in 2018, drawing parallels to his national hatred campaign against refugees from the 2015 European refugee crisis onwards (HirTV.hu, 2018). As a foundational tenet to right-wing populist discourse, the regime imbues society with fearmongering narratives of the unknown, culturally different, violent, and uncivilised refugees as a threat to the decent, hardworking, peaceful, and white Hungarian families (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020; cf. Goldberg, 2006). This way, Orbán’s speech is an illustration of how populist anti-immigration narratives were turned against the Roma as an internal enemy, thereby redrawing the inside-outside dichotomy *within* the territorial confines of Miskolc and approving of the evictions. Whereas the ‘inside’ in this narration is considered secure, reliable, and free, the ‘outside’ is anarchic, chaotic, and violent, and the circulation of these two domains thus need to be isolated to ensure the majority’s safety (see Bigo, 2001; Walters, 2004; Ivasiuc, 2021).

After the evictions, young professionals, PhD students, and academics from the University of Miskolc became the predominant occupiers of the properties (Balatonyi et al., 2014). In right-wing populist terms, the neighbourhood was thus returned to its ostensibly entitled owners, and the new residents are considered more suitable for occupying flats in Avas than the evicted

Roma, whose security risks became displaced from the neighbourhood through slum clearances (see Di Muzio, 2008; Ivasiuc, 2021).

The ‘nest-builder’ controversy demonstrates how the Roma had been framed as an outsider against a backdrop of anti-immigration enmity and popular nationalist ideologies of defending the ‘decent Hungarians’. It is this underpinning framing that drove the illiberal securitisation of Miskolc, including the tactics of homogenising spatial exclusion, the artificial maintenance of the illusion of order through a bolstered security apparatus, and the consequent future prospects of the city’s spatiality of circulation, as discussed in the rest of the chapter.

## **6.2 Diverting circulation: out of sight, out of mind?**

Consciously orchestrated or otherwise, there is a directionality to the municipality’s sovereign security interventions in terms of their circulatory outcomes. Rather than uniformly targeting all segregated neighbourhoods in the city, the sovereign interventions of slum clearances and bolstered policing have been taking place in a highly selective and spatially uneven fashion. Certain pockets of poverty have been heavily affected and policed while others completely neglected, depending on their proximity and visibility to the purportedly orderly and civilised non-Roma majority areas and populations of the urban core. This way, circulations of assumed danger have been *diverted* into less visible spaces of deprivation, thereby satisfying the security needs of penal populist municipal agendas and electoral expectations (see Virág, 2016).

This section demonstrates that the selective use of sovereign power in different parts of the city channels undesirable forms of circulation towards the remote outskirts. In this arrangement, penal populist safety measures are more concerned with securing the central parts of Miskolc than taking interventions to the peripheries in an orchestrated interplay of action and inaction (see Duffield, 2007). To illustrate this dynamic, a comparison of policing attitudes, discourses,

and practices between the peripheral area of Lyukó Valley and the nearly central Numbered Streets is developed in the following subsections. Of particular importance to the analysis will be the highly differentiated nature and intensity of punitive interventions in the two segregated areas and their implications for the production of an altered circulatory order. In further engaging with sovereign technologies of rule, the analysis to follow juxtaposes the security interventions in two neighbourhoods along four main themes: (i) selective slum clearances; (ii) securing mobility; (iii) attention and neglect in policing; and (iv) selective surveillance – with the latter introducing and unpacking the mobilisation of the smart CCTV system featured in the Introduction chapter. The outward directionality of circulatory diversion – that is, the rerouting of unwanted circulations from central parts of the city to external territories, and Lyukó Valley in particular – cuts across all four analytical themes.

### *6.2.1 Selective slum clearances*

Just under a decade ago, Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets faced a very similar set of struggles as the city's most deprived and stigmatised neighbourhoods, and the 2014 IUDS classified both as segregated areas (see Chapter 3; Miskolc City Council, 2014a). Their built environment had been continually declining for 20 years or so, as part of which large numbers of impoverished rural Roma families moved into decaying houses, often through informal letting contracts. Accounts of widespread drug use, heaps of illegal waste dumped in the streets, burglaries, housing rental usury, breeding stray dogs, infrastructural piracy, and thefts earned both places a reputation for being “dangerous Roma ghettos” (interviews with policymaker and social workers).

Despite numerous initial similarities, a key factor that set apart the fate of the two neighbourhoods in the right-wing populist security campaign was their geographical location. The Numbered Streets are a ten-minute tram ride away from the city centre. Lyukó, on the other

hand, is physically separate from the rest of the city and administratively classified as an ‘external territory’, which essentially denotes a semi-rural status on the outskirts (see Chapter 5; Miskolc City Council, 2014a). While the dense and centrally located Numbered Streets became a prime target for populist slum clearances and led to immense human rights disputes, little attention was paid to the constantly deteriorating and extensive Lyukó Valley that was too far away to matter to the populist social ordering machinery (see Section 5.4.2.3 in Chapter 5).

#### *6.2.1.1 The Numbered Streets evictions*

In the Numbered Streets – the other major target of evictions besides Avas and the site of the most extensive demolitions in the Fidesz era (Havasi, 2018; Horváth, 2019) – the municipality expended considerable effort to legitimise and execute its racialised slum clearance objectives. The wielding of sovereign power was justified in legislative, political, and material domains alike by tweaking existing institutional arrangements through a housing directive amendment, shoring up public approval with the help of a populist petition for slum clearances, and the expansion of the nearby football stadium (Horváth, 2019).

Before 2014, the neighbourhood consisted of old and relatively dilapidated council houses originally built for workers of nearby factories and were home to 923 inhabitants according to 2011 census data (Miskolc City Council, 2014a) who were mostly Roma. In 2014, the local government classed the area as “to be eliminated” (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 111, my translation; OSCE, 2016), with the initial justification suggesting that the renovated city football stadium’s parking lot needed to be enlarged and the adjacent Numbered Streets were ostensibly in the way (Miskolc City Council, 2014a; Városi Kurír, 2018). However, since the new parking lot only took up Streets Nine to Eleven, the rest of the neighbourhood soon became recast as a harbour of danger and illegality to further legitimise penal populist slum clearances. To gain what was represented as collective public approval, right-wing politicians initiated an anti-slum

petition which ended up collecting 35,000 signatories (Városi Kurír, 2018; Horváth, 2019). Indeed, the mayor kept referring to this petition as a source of electoral legitimacy for the evictions throughout, and particularly during legal feuds with human rights advocacy groups (e.g., Minap.hu, 2016b; PestiSracok.hu, 2019). As an activist explained, since the slum clearances received widespread backing – or, at best, a lack of public resistance – from most residents in Miskolc, the city leadership could mobilise discourses of ‘serving the city’s people’ and acting in the interest of ‘majority views’ (interview with activist; see also NOL.hu, 2015).

At the policy level, the municipal housing decree was strategically amended to accelerate the evictions. Those with formal and valid council housing tenancy agreements in the Numbered Streets were offered a financial compensation of up to 2 million HUF (roughly £4,700<sup>25</sup>) provided that they relocated *outside* of the administrative territory of Miskolc<sup>26</sup> (Miskolc City Council, 2014b; MTI, 2014; Amnesty International, 2014). In addition, the municipality did not renew expired tenancy agreements, terminated indefinite ones, and also evicted those with rent arrears, unpaid bills, or informal contracts without offering any support whatsoever. According to a sociological study conducted in the area at the time, far more people lived there lawfully than the municipality claimed – in fact, the vast majority of locals were dutifully paying their rent and bills, and 88% of respondents had no arrears whatsoever (HVG.hu, 2015). This suggests that the municipality likely exaggerated the degree of informality and illegality amongst residents in the area to justify as many evictions as possible, thereby fulfilling its populist vision of clearing the area of undesired inhabitants. In resonance with Flyvbjerg’s (2003) claims, the display of brute force as part of the evictions, and the concomitant desire to garner electoral support, were therefore more important to the

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<sup>25</sup> As of 12/04/2023 exchange rates.

<sup>26</sup> Following human rights appeals, the national Supreme Court later ruled the housing directive amendment unlawful and ordered its revocation (Curia of Hungary, 2015), but only a handful of families ended up leaving the city for the financial compensation anyway (Horváth, 2019).

municipality than even attempting to understand the more deeply rooted social issues of marginality in the area.

Due to concentrated municipal efforts in political, legal, and physical domains alike to legitimise and deploy sovereign power, the outcomes of the evictions were close to what the populist leadership had presumably desired. Despite human rights advocacy groups' (e.g., the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU, or TASZ for short in Hungarian), Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities (abbreviated as NEKI in Hungarian), and Amnesty International) tireless resistance and repeated lawsuit victories against the municipality's discriminatory harassment and eviction of the Roma (e.g., Curia of Hungary, 2015; Miskolc Court of Law, 2018; Debrecen Court of Appeal, 2019), the rulings came too little, too late for most of those affected (see Horváth, 2019). The immense damage inflicted by then was largely irrecoverable as most residents had been permanently evicted and their houses demolished. Only thirty-nine families comprising a total of 286 residents managed to stay in the Numbered Streets (as of September 2020, interview with social worker), most of whom are now being supported by the local community programme of the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta (HCSOM). After the municipality got rid of over two-thirds of the original population of the Numbered Streets, the security paranoias attached to the area were arguably reduced, as discussed in the following subsections. However, a significant part of the displaced population, as well as their perceived dangers previously seen to circulate in and around the Numbered Streets, were expelled to, and are now contained in Lyukó Valley.

Curiously, the municipality's slum clearances in the Numbered Streets proceeded along the very lines that their own 2014 Integrated Urban Development Strategy (IUDS) cautioned against. The IUDS suggests that:

“the physical elimination of segregated areas (i.e., demolition) does not resolve the problems of people migrating from one segregated area to the next. There is a danger that the demolition

of buildings in a given segregated area will initiate the growth of another segregated area (e.g., this is what happened in Lyukó Valley and Lyukó Mine, where the number of illegal relocations have increased in recent years, so an urban quarter's population size now lives in a segregated area, whose integration has become more difficult ...)" (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 115, my translation, brackets original).

Besides the fact that the forced removal of numerous Numbered Streets buildings and residents produced exactly the above outcome, another reason why this quote is interesting is because it hints at the directional nature of slum clearances in underlining the *movement* of displaced people between segregated areas, and particularly towards Lyukó Valley.

Out of the displaced Roma, those who stayed in the city after the Numbered Streets evictions – together with their associated incivilities and security risks supposedly threatening their surroundings (see De Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008) – primarily ended up in Lyukó Valley as one of the very few feasible and affordable alternatives (Horváth, 2019; Havasi, 2018; Halász, 2018)<sup>27</sup>. In contrast to the Numbered Streets, Lyukó fell largely beyond the purview of the municipal securitisation machinery besides a few inspection raids (MIÖR, 2013, 2014) due to its remoteness from central areas of the city, despite it being the largest segregated area in Hungary (see following subsection). As a relative vacuum to punitive sovereign interventions, Lyukó remained accessible to evictees from the Numbered Streets.

Rather than a mere instance of circulatory disruption, then, the Numbered Streets slum clearances also tell a story of a directional (and, arguably, *directed*) case of urban circulatory reordering from the perspective of sovereign power, considering that Lyukó Valley was the evictees' prime destination. Put differently, the very process of organised relocation that Anti-

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<sup>27</sup> Many evicted families also emigrated to Canada and were granted political refugee status there, and yet others scattered in other segregated areas in and near Miskolc (Horváth, 2019; Halász, 2018).

Ghetto Committee successfully blocked shortly after the regime change (i.e., the organised mass evictions of the Roma into a suburban purpose-built ghetto comprising low-cost housing – see Section 3.2.3 in Chapter 3), therefore appears to have happened in a more unplanned fashion, but with comparable outcomes in terms of driving the Roma outwards from the city and into a segregated neighbourhood outside Miskolc’s internal territory.

#### 6.2.1.2 *Is Lyukó too far to matter?*

In comparison to the significant resources expended on top-down clearances in the Numbered Streets, the municipality has paid very little attention to Lyukó Valley. In this context, the idea that anti-Roma “legislation is not about crime prevention; more likely it is about crime invention” (Mitchell, 1997: 307; see also Hörnqvist, 2004) appears to ring true in relation to the Numbered Streets evictions vis-à-vis the indifference towards Lyukó Valley. Considering the populist city administration’s punitive stance, Lyukó and the Numbered Streets could have been equally subjected to municipal criminalisation, soliciting securitisation interventions of comparable magnitudes in both neighbourhoods. However, contrary to the mass demolitions and evictions in the Numbered Streets through a brutal physical exercise of sovereign power, no such measures took place in the external territory of Lyukó Valley, and indeed the area was left largely intact. Perceived criminality can therefore continue to freely circulate on the faraway fringes of Lyukó, while similar kinds of stigmatised behaviours closer to central and better-off parts of the city were thus *deemed* criminal and more necessary to be ruled out (see Duffield, 2001; Virág, 2016).

Yet, preconceptions of circulating security threats in Lyukó Valley would surely trigger similarly far-reaching municipal security responses were they flagged in the city’s internal territory. For instance, a ranger from Lyukó explained in an interview that houses and even streets can literally disappear within weeks as buildings are being dismantled all the way down

to the base for the use and sale of building materials. He said that “*you take two weeks off from work, and then... it is as if you returned to a different planet. [...] they take the gate because it is made of iron. They take the windows, because you can burn it, and the door [too]...*” (interview with ranger). Another suggested that owners of abandoned summer houses see no point in trying to maintain their properties, due to the uncontrollable extent of burglaries and the aforementioned dismantling problems (interview with ranger; see also Miskolc City Council, 2021f). Usury and blackmailing are also claimed to be widespread; “*for example they want to buy an old lady’s house, but the old lady doesn’t want to sell it to them. And then, well, a house or two catch fire in the vicinity, and so the old lady sells it instead. ... And then we know it. And the police know it. And everyone knows it, but what can you do?*” (Interview with social worker). The quoted social worker also suggested that drug use in public spaces is a common issue in the area (see also BOON.hu, 2019b). The above conveyed stories surely fall well outside the set of tolerated behavioural norms that the populist administration was keen to campaign for elsewhere, and yet such observations are largely overlooked in Lyukó due to its remote location invisible to dwellers in the centre and the municipal administration. To be clear, there is no intention here to endorse any of the above comments on Lyukó Valley, but instead to stress that similar *perceptions* would likely elicit municipal responses elsewhere in the city.


Circulations of people from Lyukó into the city were looked upon less favourably when they used to be more common. Residents of Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets had visited each other on a regular basis before the evictions took place in the latter, with a councillor noting residential complaints of antisocial behaviour, littering, noise, and drug use along the main routes of movement between the two neighbourhoods (Miskolc City Council, 2016). Such movements happened because of family connections, personal relationships, as well as visits to drug dealers, among other things (interview with residents and social worker). Consequently, clearing the Numbered Streets was arguably also important to the municipality because the area

was seen to draw in the undesired inhabitants of Lyukó to internal Miskolc. While some of these unwanted circulations between the two areas continue due to the remaining population in the Numbered Streets and their connections to Lyukó, most of them had stopped by the time I visited the Numbered Streets in September 2020 (interview with residents). Another consequence of the forced demolitions in the Numbered Streets, then, was to severely reduce the amount of circulation to and from Lyukó Valley, thereby paving the way to the further containment and exclusion of the latter (cf. Ivasiuc, 2021). As we can see, then, there has been a clear discrepancy between municipal approaches to the two areas in terms of slum clearances, which have resulted in reorganised patterns circulations in the city. Unwanted circulations have been pushed out to the peripheries, while the populist administration could trumpet the improved peace and security of desirable forms of circulation associated with the non-Roma majority.

### *6.2.2 Securing mobility*

While the plight and allegedly antisocial behaviours of people from Lyukó are overlooked insofar as they are kept at bay outside the internal city's perimeters, measures to control and eliminate them are prompted as soon as they begin to circulate into the city. Two simple examples of spatial markers delineating and securitising divides (cf. Duffield, 2010) between Lyukó and the 'internal' city can be found in the major transport node of Újgyőri Square. The first example is the positioning of the bus stop for line 16, which connects Lyukó Valley and the city. A retired police officer explained in an interview that while most buses stop on both sides of the square to allow passengers to board without having to cross the road several times, bus No. 16 only stops at the far end of the square – but not after the roundabout – to prevent the gathering of groups arriving from Lyukó, who often display unwanted behaviours such as making noise or consuming alcohol in public space (interview with retired police officer).

Figures 16a and b show a comparison of the first stops of buses 6 to Pereces and 16 to Lyukó from Újgyőri Square, with both buses running in the same initial direction. The eliminated stop for bus 16 is shown in orange. The second and related example can be found in a nearby park, where benches were all removed following a residential request “because they didn’t want the grouping of particular kinds of behaviour in that given place” (interview with retired police officer).






Figure 16a) and b). Comparison of initial stops of buses No. 16 to Lyukó Valley and No. 6 to Peregcs. My annotations; map data from Google Maps.

Furthermore, the 2019 municipal Crime Prevention Strategy calls for regular security personnel presence on board bus 16 to “check the orderly use of public transport vehicles as requested by the service provider” (Miskolc City Council, 2019c: 32, my translation). This was prompted by a set of antisocial behaviours experienced on this line, such as drug use and littering, which multiple residents and workers pointed out in interviews. Reflecting on this, a local said that “*it is enough to board bus 16 and you’ll get a picture of the complete cross-section of society... from the unfortunate to the criminal*” (interview with resident). In other words, the service itself is seen as a carrier of threat and danger, and therefore more safety measures need to be implemented on board in the form of security guards to ensure that the ‘unwanted’ are sifted through more efficiently before they can enter the internal city (see Miskolc City Council, 2020a, 2021f). However, as people from Lyukó suggested, many locals cannot afford to buy a ticket for the bus and need to take long walks into the centre (interview with community workers), which undermines their mobility and opportunities for accessing the internal territory of the city.

Although passengers of bus 16 are not entirely prevented from reaching internal Miskolc, they are nevertheless deterred through a soft boundary-building exercise that guides and manages inbound movement (cf. Pløger, 2008; Blander et al., 2018; Thörn, 2011). Through the manipulation of mobility and associated uses of urban space, further strategies of exclusion have been created to ensure that the undesirable circulation of those considered residual and risky were contained in subtle but effective ways (cf. Rusczyk, 2019; Huchzermeyer, 2010). Albeit in far less fortified and physically glaring forms than seen in, e.g., Los Angeles (Davis, 1990) or Sao Paulo (Caldeira, 1996), among many other accounts of exclusionary neoliberal urban defence structures, the architectural engineering of Újgyőri Square and the securitisation and controlled movement of bus 16 reflect motivations to maintain socio-spatial divides between the internal parts of the city and the dangerous borderlands of Lyukó.

While circulations *from* Lyukó into internal Miskolc are being controlled, granting additional protection to officials circulating *to* the purportedly chaotic borderlands of Lyukó from internal Miskolc is also deemed justifiable and necessary, which marks the flipside of the directionality of securing mobility. For instance, a recent municipal report from 2021 talks about the responsibility of citizen guards – a set of voluntary community security organisations helping the work of the Constabulary and Municipal Police – to fulfil “special accompaniment duties for postal service employees during the payment of welfare benefits in so-called deviant districts (Lyukó Mine, Miskolc-Pereces, Tetemvár)” (Miskolc City Council, 2021a: 33, my translation, brackets original). This quote seems to imply that welfare benefits are being delivered by post and thus need to be better protected, which would be understandable in itself, but the way it overtly identifies particular neighbourhoods, including Lyukó, as ‘deviant’ to justify post officers’ enhanced safety is deeply problematic. Similarly, there were policy proposals to provide a jeep “for the safe transportation of nurses to the area” (councillor quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2013b: 14, my translation), which Balatonyi et al. (2014) claim was a

preventative security measure to facilitate safe and effective provisioning work in the segregated neighbourhood.

In contrast to the close policing of residents of Lyukó on bus 16 as *inbound* circulatory risks to the internal areas of the city, then, the *outbound* circulation of officials venturing into the borderlands of Lyukó Valley from the realm of safety merits additional protection. There is hence a directionality to the orchestration of security measures in this particular arrangement, which entails the diversion of circulations through the defensive discouragement of inbound mobility to internal Miskolc, and the securing of outbound forays into Lyukó Valley. In this example, the security-development nexus takes centre stage once again. Underdevelopment is associated with insecurity in Lyukó, which warrants the protection of those coming from the realm of development when entering these spaces, whereas those from the underdeveloped borderlands of Lyukó are understood to pose threats to the secure internal territories, and therefore need to be contained and policed accordingly.

### *6.2.3 Police presence*

The recent escalation of policing measures in the Numbered Streets as opposed to the enduring indifference towards Lyukó Valley's securitisation further directs the circulation of unwanted bodies, activities, and behaviours towards the under-policed realm of the latter. Conversely to Lyukó, the Numbered Streets are being gradually incorporated into the ostensibly safer and more 'civilised' urban landscape and are therefore more intensively policed.

#### *6.2.3.1 Policing in the Numbered Streets: a case of situated mediation?*

Somewhat surprisingly, rather than a simple spatial imbalance in the distribution of sovereign interventions between Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets, the securitisation of

the latter in the past few years is more a result of localised mediation than a top-down municipal political agenda. While policing enhancements in the Numbered Streets may seem like a logical onward progression from slum clearances in maintaining newly fashioned post-evictions circulatory arrangements, the municipality did not automatically go down this road. After the evictions were halted, the police remained disengaged from the area, and locals were still untrusting of the authorities, particularly considering their traumatic experiences of former inspection raids and forced evictions (interview with residents; cf. Jensen, 2010; Swanlund, 2017; Paraušić, 2021). As a social worker explained, *“back in 2019, a lot of residents were telling us that police patrols weren’t entering the area, their matters were not being dealt with, and the police weren’t open to them. So, they were basically left alone, and you could do whatever you wanted here”* (interview with social worker). Drug abuse problems reportedly lingered on in the neighbourhood to the disturbance of many locals in the years after the evictions (ibid.). Describing their personal encounters with drug users, a resident remembered that *“they were lying here on the ground. There was no point in telling them off as they even attacked you. They even attacked you, and you couldn’t come out here at night as there were so many of them.”* The above issues notwithstanding, the police remained passive about the Numbered Streets.

The HCSOM emerged as an unlikely auxiliary to solidifying circulatory changes and the securitisation of the Numbered Streets, which the populist municipality noisily initiated but never finished as traceable in the above accounts of ongoing security concerns. However, when the HCSOM got involved, sovereign power was mobilised in far more targeted, nuanced, and careful ways compared to the penal populist municipality’s wholesale and indiscriminate slum clearance actions. Vowing to do away with the continued security issues of the neighbourhood, the HCSOM stepped up to gauge locals’ fears through an embedded dialogue with the community and lobbied to get the police involved in ways that were reconceived as justified

forms of intervention. Meanwhile, residents united in a risky endeavour against drug dealers to take photos and gather evidence of illicit activities, which were then reported to the police at a time when the relationship between locals and the authorities was still very fragile.

As a result of the above community effort, a series of targeted raids and arrests took place between December 2019 and April 2020 whereby, in the words of a social worker, the problematic individuals were “*lifted out one by one*” (interview with social worker). When prompted about how these interventions compared to the Fidesz municipality’s intimidatory police raids and evictions of the past, they explained that “*what happened at this stage was no longer about the harassment of the residents. So, it was not about the demonstration of power [...] but it was a targeted and organised series of actions*” (ibid.). This way, from the wielding of naked power informed by generalising and racially loaded populist security preconceptions, the outlawing of dangerous circulations morphed into a locally embedded and selective set of sovereign interventions based on individualised assessment rather than collective labelling. Regardless of the selective nature of the arrests, though, this example once again demonstrates that depending on the setting and the circumstances, the state can be highly active in securitising certain spaces, and highly passive in others.

Importantly, the necessity of community-based efforts and the HCSOM’s mediation to satisfy the security needs of Numbered Streets residents suggest that the *image* of outlawing unwanted circulation was more important to the Fidesz administration when pursuing penal populist agendas than improving the local community’s experiences of security on the ground (see Schwell, 2014). Had a constructive dialogue with the local community begun earlier and without discriminatory campaigning motivations, *legitimate* concerns around the neighbourhood’s safety could have been addressed on a case-by-case, rather than collective, basis. Yet, the populist blanket approach merely worked to reinforce popular Roma-phobic

sentiments and disseminate mediatised impressions of a hard-line city administration that brought a disorderly neighbourhood under control in tough and efficient ways.

#### 6.2.3.2 Policing in Lyukó: all talk and no action?

In contrast to the Numbered Streets, securitisation efforts in Lyukó Valley have remained minimal. Keeping Lyukó at a strategic distance is paramount to maintaining an illusion of greater safety in internal parts of the city, and it is this exclusionary process that the political success of the populist administration hinged on – and indeed continues to do so, as further discussed in Section 6.3. However, as security efforts are concentrated in the internal territories, Lyukó remains largely ignored. Reflecting on the area's neglect, a local said that *“the leadership doesn't do enough to maintain order. It has no interest in doing so – why should there be order? Let's be happy that they're already there in one place, and let's try to keep them there, right? That's a solution, too!”* (Interview with resident). Following the slum clearances in Avas and the Numbered Streets, Lyukó's role as a necessary gathering space for evictees became even more amplified.

Complaints and calls for change regarding Lyukó abound amongst the city's decision-makers, including reinforced patrols and the use of drones to police the area (e.g., Miskolc City Council, 2020b, 2016, 2021f). At the same time, the repeated municipal voicing of concerns and proposed improvements to Lyukó's safety is coupled with inaction, excuses, and financial barriers to providing sufficient coverage for the area. Indeed, the annual report of MIÖR still admits that *“establishing safety in external territories is an important task for law enforcement bodies. Unfortunately, however, they cannot adequately accomplish all the challenges due to their heavy workload and staffing situation”* (MIÖR, 2021a: 17, my translation). In other words, while problems in the area continue to be discussed, they are not burning enough for the city administration to mobilise more resources and improve safety in Lyukó, as budgetary priorities

continue to lie elsewhere (cf. Jensen, 2010; Virág, 2016; Siman and Santos, 2018). The discrepancy between discursive appeals and a lack of substantive action maps well onto the broader way that ‘failing’ territories have evaded the substantive focus of sovereign security interventions, only to be managed through a set of token gestures but without transformative changes (Duffield, 2007; Homolar, 2015).

In a practical sense, action that *does* take place on the ground in Lyukó is limited to sporadic interventions, even though the council’s 2019 Crime Prevention Strategy (CPS) calls the “establishment of safe external territories ... one of the greatest challenges and most complex tasks” (Miskolc City Council, 2019c: 31, my translation). Vast swathes of land comprising countless muddy passages, bushy slopes, and other nooks and crannies not accessible by car or even on foot, have been left to a handful of horseback rangers to patrol. Police cars are only present on the relatively limited number of drivable roads. Besides, the police have a small office in the HCSOM community centre, staffed for one hour per month, and so does the Municipal Police (MIÖR), which it calls a ‘subcentre’ but is merely a container in reality (own fieldwork; *Figure 17*). While opened under the banners of extending municipal police presence to ‘necessary areas’, and with much praise for improving locals’ subjective sense of safety (Miskolc City Council, 2017a; Minap.hu, 2017; MIÖR, 2018), the subcentre’s office hours are also very minimal at one hour per week, which appears highly insufficient for serving an extensive area with several thousand residents (MIÖR, 2023). Finally, similarly to other deprived neighbourhoods, including the pre-evictions Numbered Streets, there is some evidence of the previously mentioned harassing inspection raids in Lyukó during the heyday of the punitive securitisation campaign (MIÖR, 2014), but they were scattered one-off interventions without any significant disruption to the social and circulatory order of the area from a populist securitisation perspective.



*Figure 17. The subcentre of the Municipal Police in Lyukó Valley. My photograph, September 2020.*

Lyukó's remoteness and detachment from security priorities is reflected in locals' lack of faith in the police, too. A social worker recalled stories about recurring burglaries, adding that *"well, obviously they then report it to the police, but many people no longer even do so, because there is no point; nothing is going to happen"* (interview with social worker; see also Kozma, 2020). Other interviewees later echoed this, with one of them reciting a memory of a police officer who turned up to a burglary scene but merely saw it as a chore rather than an important matter to be investigated (interview with resident). Similarly, MIÖR apparently refused to respond to a reported illegal waste dumping incident in Lyukó based on an exchange between a councillor and the MIÖR director in a municipal meeting (Miskolc City Council, 2020d). The unwillingness of the Constabulary and MIÖR to delegate substantial presence, patrols, and

investigation to the area have eroded the belief of locals that they can expect justice after becoming victims of crime (cf. Open Society Justice Initiative, 2007 on the under-policing of segregated and Roma majority areas; Barbak, 2019; Parausic, 2021). The passivity of the state in Lyukó shows that little effort is expended at controlling what are otherwise conceived as largely undesirable circulations. As a result of this neglect, the circulations of unwanted bodies and behaviours are allowed more or less free rein in Lyukó as long as they remain there and do not enter the internal territory of the city.

#### *6.2.4 Selective surveillance and the consolidation of a new circulatory order*

The latest addition to the municipal securitisation apparatus in Miskolc is the citywide smart CCTV system which, alongside more conventional policing measures such as patrols on the ground, also played an important part in directing reorganised urban landscapes of circulation. Central to understanding the role of the CCTV network in instituting a new circulatory order is once again the question of the activeness and passiveness of the municipality in particular contexts. In this case, it is traceable in the number, spatial density, and distribution of surveillance cameras in the Numbered Streets and Lyukó Valley, the rationale behind these arrangements, and the outcomes produced. As discussed in this subsection, the under-policing of Lyukó Valley is reflected in the sparse installation of cameras across the neighbourhood, whereas the Numbered Streets have a much higher density of cameras. Furthermore, the boundary between Lyukó and internal Miskolc is more intensively policed compared to the rest of the valley, which suggests an emphasis on preventing suspicious circulations from entering the internal areas of the city rather than an interest in watching Lyukó as a whole. Overall, the contrast between the surveillance of the Numbered Streets and Lyukó reflects a motivation to continue pushing the poor outwards from the urban core, as well as to further uphold a reconfigured pattern of circulatory exclusion.

Although the effectiveness of urban CCTV networks at crime reduction and their ability to tackle root causes of crime have been widely questioned (e.g., Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Flusty, 2001; Koskela, 2002; Aas, 2007; Frois, 2014), there is far more consensus around the implications of surveillance for the *displacement* of crime, the production of exclusionary environments, and social sorting (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996; Flusty, 2001; Graham, 2002; Wichum, 2013). From this study's point of view, then, the positioning of cameras can alter, contain, and enable different kinds of circulation in urban space (interview with MIÖR executives; Wichum, 2013).

Taking the role of cameras in consolidating new regimes of circulation as a guiding principle, a comparison of the extent of CCTV coverage in the Numbered Streets and Lyukó Valley can help us further understand the spatial dimensions of why and for whom securitisation measures are being rolled out across Miskolc (cf. Waever, 1995 on whose security counts). Through claims to objectivity, the official municipal narrative suggests that the placing of cameras was

“determined based on public security and crime prevention considerations, a wide-ranging assessment of the city's interests and values, and following thorough preparatory consultation. The locations of surveillance cameras were assigned on the basis of information collected from Miskolc Constabulary, Miskolc Municipal Police, the Ambulance, members of Emergency management, councillors' accounts of residential complaints, municipal corporations participating in public service delivery, and the educational and healthcare organisations that operate within the administrative area of Miskolc.” (Miskolc City Council, 2019c: 19, my translation).

A seemingly watertight, well-informed, and all-encompassing justification notwithstanding, the municipality ended up being far less generous with cameras for Lyukó Valley compared to much of Miskolc's internal territory, including the Numbered Streets. Coupled with the various

discursive and material boundary-building practices between Lyukó and the rest of the city (discussed above and in Chapter 5), as well as remote and token-gesture forms of police activation, Lyukó has also largely fallen outside smart CCTV system's purview. In the Numbered Streets, by contrast, cameras have now been installed – again, with the HCSOM's significant input – although views are split on their effectiveness (interviews with residents and social workers).

In the allocation of cameras, the securitisation of the Numbered Streets was arguably more justifiable than that of Lyukó, since the former constitute a more compact, planned, and transparent neighbourhood that is closer to the centre. A proposal to the municipal assembly detailing the installation of smart cameras in the Numbered Streets begins with the sentence that “in recent years, Miskolc City Council has taken firm steps towards establishing order and clearing up slums, since it is in our common interest to secure public order [...] across the entire area of the city of Miskolc” (Office of the Mayor of Miskolc, 2019: 2, my translation and emphasis). In leading up to discussing the planned cameras, the document implies that the smart surveillance project is in essence a continuation of the securitisation agenda initiated through the otherwise largely controversial slum clearances. While the latter worked to remove the habitats of the marginalised near the city centre, the cameras can now ensure that their presence is contained and policed in favour of the non-Roma majority society, and the Numbered Streets are being incorporated into the developed and ‘civilised’ urban realm as a result. In other words, the priorities of the project lie with protecting inner areas of the city rather than the poor fringes yet again, which are perceived as sources of threat and instability against which the more ‘orderly’ neighbourhoods of the urban core must be guarded (see Beall et al., 2006; Jensen, 2010).

Looking more closely at the spatial distribution and concentration of surveillance in the two neighbourhoods, while both the Numbered Streets and Lyukó Valley have six cameras

installed each, the geographical area and population of the former are both much smaller than that of the latter. Consequently, there is a significantly higher spatial density and per capita number of cameras in the Numbered Streets compared to Lyukó (*Figures 18 and 19*). The Numbered Streets have got six cameras for 286 residents, which equals to one camera for every 47.67 people, whereas Lyukó Valley has got the same number of cameras for 2,500-4,000 inhabitants, leaving the area with one camera for anywhere between every 416.67 to 666.67 people. Consequently, considering the per capita data, the Numbered Streets are around nine to fourteen times more intensively policed than Lyukó Valley, and while the former has got a nearly full territorial coverage of CCTV images, only a few key junctions are being monitored in the latter (see *Figure 19*).

Additionally, while the cameras are evenly distributed in the Numbered Streets, three out of the six cameras for Lyukó are concentrated at the southern tip of the neighbourhood, i.e., near the boundaries of the city's internal territory, which is arguably a further measure to keep under control the circulation of Lyukó's residents in and out of the internal city. According to a councillor, the main routes of the previously discussed movement between Lyukó and the Numbered Streets were along Torontáli, Tátra, Nemzetőr, and Testvériség Streets (Miskolc City Council, 2016). This is reflected in the positioning of two cameras on the southern edge of Lyukó that cover the movement along all four of these routes, while largely neglecting outer parts of the neighbourhood further north (*Figure 20*).





Figure 18. The location of the Municipal Police's individual cameras across the city of Miskolc, installed as of 17th September 2021. Lyukó Valley is highlighted in yellow, and the Numbered Streets are in red. My arrangement; source of CCTV location data: MIÖR (2021b); map data from Google Maps.



*Figure 19. An extract from Figure 18 for a closer image to illustrate the comparison between Lyukó Valley (red) and the Numbered Streets (yellow). My arrangement; source of CCTV location data: MIÖR (2021b); map data from Google Maps.*




Figure 20. A further enlarged and annotated version Figures 18 and 19, showing the “boundary-cameras” (circled in red) controlling key routes of movement between Lyukó Valley and the internal city. My arrangement; map data from Google Maps.

A ranger working in Lyukó suggested that more cameras would be needed in the area as they help with the reconciliation of crime incidents and discourage perpetrators, but the further expansion of the project is stuck at the moment which, according to executives of the Municipal Police, is due to funding shortages (interviews with ranger and MIÖR executives; Miskolc City Council, 2021f). However, according to the latest council decision listing all the proposed and existing cameras in 790 locations of the city, no further CCTV units are planned in Lyukó valley, whereas 559 are still yet to be installed elsewhere (Miskolc City Council, 2021g; MIÖR,

2022), which is another reflection of the municipality's passivity when it comes to policing Lyukó.

The noteworthy disparity in both the concentration and the distribution of cameras in the two neighbourhoods demonstrates that the municipal politics of security is more invested in protecting the inner parts of the city – which matters more to the non-Roma majority population's sense of safety – than policing the poor outer fringes, irrespective of the stigma and criminalising discourses attached to both neighbourhoods. Moreover, and importantly, the arrangement of cameras at the southern edge of Lyukó is another manifestation of sovereign boundary-building around the perimeters of internal Miskolc designed to filter out the inbound circulation of undesirable bodies and behaviours.

The surveillance neglect of Lyukó Valley is not only reflected in the scarcity of cameras, but also in accounts of their limited effectiveness and functionality – and, in turn, their reduced impact upon the controlling of circulations. A social worker in the area sounded sceptical about the surveillance project, claiming with reference to CCTV recordings that *“you can't really see much in them anyway”* (interview with social worker). A ranger voiced similarly cynical views that *“if anything, they will at least have a target to shoot at with their air rifles – because often that is why they [the cameras] don't work”*. In other cases, they added, *“the cameras were fitted to the wrong place, because it was installed on a concrete pole, and it doesn't matter if the cameras can be rotated on the pole, because beyond a certain angle... the pole blocks the view towards the back. And then thefts began... on the other side ... they found out about it, because if I don't see the camera, then it likely doesn't see me either!”* (Interview with ranger). It seems, therefore, that in Lyukó the cameras are of limited use in the small number that they are present and are also difficult to protect against damage. While cameras are perhaps more justifiably installed in already securitised locations such as the Numbered Streets to maintain order and exclude certain forms of circulation, they appear less useful in the ‘untamed’ outskirts of Lyukó.

Instead, the in-person presence of horseback rangers is deemed more effective compared to cameras, as the CCTV network was designed for more transparent urban built environments rather than the often opaque, winding, and ingrown paths of a hilly and semi-rural segregated neighbourhood (Miskolc City Council, 2021d).

Although residents' opinions on cameras in the Numbered Streets were somewhat split as well, they were overall more optimistic about their safety benefits than participants in Lyukó. Some locals highlighted the role of cameras in reducing thefts, others pointed out their usefulness in combatting illegal waste dumping which they said had occurred frequently outside their courtyards before the cameras were installed, and yet others emphasised their importance in keeping drug users out. On the latter point, a local commented that:

*“There is no need to be afraid. One or two might come in, but they can't buy it around here anymore. Perhaps in Lyukó still. It's very dangerous out there these days. They're selling it there, but they don't come in here. Even when they do come, they stop at the CBA [a grocery store] over there, and then they smoke it and go away. These cameras are really good. [...] Public security is much better now.”*

This quote not only illustrates the effect of cameras on locals' sense of safety, but also encapsulates the key ideas behind the containment of unwanted forms of circulation in two important ways. First, the reference to drug users stopping at the supermarket outside the Numbered Streets shows a spatially specific first-hand experience of the role of surveillance in preventing particular groups of people from entering the area. Second, by identifying drug users as originating from the dangerous outskirts of Lyukó, the respondent echoed the territorial stigma that underpins the use of cameras in upholding earlier-mentioned geographical patterns of exclusion. While Lyukó Valley has remained associated with crime and delinquent behaviours, the Numbered Streets is no longer part of a stigmatised circuit of movement.

Viewed through the lens of circulation, Lyukó has become akin to a prison without bars and walls where many undesirable people and behaviours have now been exiled (see Bauman, 1998; Aas, 2007; Foucault, 1995, 2007). While the Numbered Streets have been promoted from their status as a segregated neighbourhood to a more open realm of free circulations, in reality much of their former impoverished population, and especially those who ended up in Lyukó Valley, have in fact remained in confinement as their unwanted circulations were merely diverted to and contained in the fringes.

### **6.3 Sustaining circulation: the securitisation deadlock**


The excessive wielding of sovereign power to secure circulation can become addictive. As Foucault (2007) suggests, the demarcation of territory works to secure it, thereby granting safety to the sovereign ruling the territory. In granting this safety, the strengthening of the Municipal Police and the containment of the circulation of unaccepted behaviours and social groups have transformed the right-wing populist political ethos of securitisation into a new ‘normal’ in the life of the city. The various policing tactics accentuating spatial divisions between segregated and integrated parts of the city have afforded the state more control over some of the previously ‘disorderly’ inner neighbourhoods, and especially Avas and the Numbered Streets. At the same time, this new and fragile circulatory order – founded upon artificially created patterns of exclusion – now needs to be maintained (cf. Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2016). This requires the continued upkeep of strong policing capacities that can enforce the new order – that is, the forced containment of racialised poverty at the city’s periphery – while benign forms of development interventions in deprived areas such as community-building, educational initiatives, and social housing provision, remain side-tracked or deferred (see Siman and Santos, 2018; Fassin, 2014; Paraušić, 2021).

To consider the CCTV system, for instance, whereas the rollout of cameras reflects the punitive political visions of its creators, the surveillance apparatus also works to solidify and reproduce the new circulatory order by creating popular demand around an alleged necessity of continued securitisation. Additionally, it strengthens the focus of penal policy on the symptomatic treatment of crime without addressing its root causes (see Fyfe and Bannister, 1996). Installing cameras across the city is seen to have a knock-on effect, as their crime reduction capabilities are easy to sell to the public, thereby creating popular demand (interview with MIÖR executives). According to a community worker, “*you can never go far enough with increasing public security*” (interview with community worker; cf. Wæver, 1995; Hempel and Töpfer, 2009). With reference to neighbourhood forums and discussions, another said that “*the question of public security always comes up. ... Everyone wants two cameras in front of their flats*” (interview with community worker).

This is perhaps most powerfully exemplified by the fact that even slum dwellers – in areas where demolitions did not take place or were halted – expressed a need for more cameras and safety measures in their neighbourhoods, as interviews with members of marginalised communities and the Municipal Police both confirmed. Trends in the expansion of surveillance in Miskolc therefore square well with Graham’s (2002: 239) remark that “the more CCTV coverage becomes the norm, the more excluded areas will fight to gain coverage.” Even though the Fidesz municipality demonised and openly attacked segregated neighbourhoods, it demonstrated a “remarkable ability to claw back popular support” (Scheiring and Szombati, 2020: 728) within them by conveying the message that everyone benefits from the cameras.

The visible changes facilitated by the series of populist security interventions have arguably transformed securitisation from a political choice into a development deadlock. Following the highly noticeable alterations to the urban landscape of internal Miskolc through slum clearances and security enhancements under the pre-2019 local government, there was no turning back

from endorsing policing if popularity was to be retained in a prejudice-fuelled electoral environment. Leading up to the 2019 local elections, the then-deputy mayor boasted Fidesz’s achievements in reducing crime statistics through security interventions and stressed that when voting, the residents of Miskolc “will also choose between different political approaches to policing. They will either choose the pre-2010 one which lead to over ten thousand crimes committed [per year], or the one currently in place in Miskolc, which brought these numbers down to under four thousand” (quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2019b: 19, my translation) (see *Figure 21*).



*Figure 21. Crime statistics in Miskolc between 2006 and 2021, indicating the left-wing MSZP (red), Fidesz (orange), and joint opposition (grey) eras, with overlapping transition years in striped columns. My compilation based on data from Miskolc Constabulary (2010, 2021); Minap.hu (2019a, 2022).*

The above campaigning efforts notwithstanding, Fidesz lost the local elections in 2019, at least partly because the mayor stepped down from his candidacy due to ill health. From that point onwards, Fidesz politicians and their affiliated media have continued to push the populist securitisation agenda, but now claiming that security has been declining in the city since the oppositional local government entered office (Miskolc City Council, 2020a; Borsodihir.hu, 2020; BOON.hu, 2021a). This, however, is seldom supported by the 2020 and 2021 rates in *Figure 21*, especially that the number of crimes in 2021 was the lowest throughout the entire fifteen-year period shown. Although Fidesz are not in power at the moment, they nevertheless continue to generate pressure for securitisation that affects the city's present-day decision-making. This political undercurrent towards ongoing securitisation can indeed become a trump card for the right-wing populists' re-ascension into power in the city unless the current leadership is able to uphold convincing public safety records in the future (cf. Tulumello, 2018).

Based on the evidence available thus far, the current city administration is now confronted with the fact that the continued backing of the Municipal Police and the ongoing development of the CCTV system cannot be denounced as doing so would quickly undermine their support. This is most visibly reflected in the funding trends of the Municipal Police. In the Fidesz era, MIÖR's budget almost tripled from 256 million HUF (=£599,000) in 2013 to 799 million HUF (=£1.87 million) in 2017 and remained relatively stagnant at 679 million HUF (=£1.59 million) in 2018 and 768 million HUF (=£1.8 million) in 2019<sup>28</sup>. After the current oppositional leadership entered office, the funding of MIÖR was practically maintained at 759 million HUF (=£1.77 million) in 2020 (MIÖR, 2018, 2020, 2021a; Miskolc City Council, 2019a). Moreover, to silence right-wing populist critics who accused the city administration of hinting at staffing reductions to MIÖR, the municipality allocated extra funds for MIÖR's joint street patrols with

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<sup>28</sup> Exchange rates as of 12/04/2023.

the Constabulary and replaced their old cars (Miskolc City Council, 2020a, 2020c). As a result, it appears that while an extended MIÖR requires more funding, the new local government has no choice but to keep on spending large amounts of money on the maintenance of the organisation rather than backing socially inclusive endeavours for the city's marginalised (see also Miskolc City Council, 2021e; Tulumello, 2018; Podoletz, 2020).

As soon as funds are directed elsewhere, artificially maintained landscapes of social exclusion and the expensive containment of undesirable forms of circulation can easily collapse, leading to the reappearance of unwanted groups and social tensions in the urban core that had been swept under the carpet through penal security interventions in the first place. Consequently, there emerged one possible politics only – and that was to follow, or at least maintain, the pre-2019 levels of securitisation. In securing the 'internal' city, the illiberal local government steered the city's politics onto a new trajectory of forced consensus, where securitisation now requires a larger slice of the municipal budget and will continue to do so given the expensive upkeep. As the current mayor stated, "the General Assembly of the City of Miskolc is in complete agreement on one thing – namely, that the public security of Miskolc needs to be improved" (quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2020a: 21, my translation). Of course, this 'consensus' is to be understood not in absolute terms, but rather in the face of the numerous Roma voices that were silenced – if they had ever been able to speak – by the populist tide of securitisation in the city (cf. Cruikshank, 1999; Hempel and Töpfer, 2009; Finszter, 2014; Hall, 2017). Put simply, the security interventions played a vital part in instituting and materialising penal populist visions of security in the urban fabric of Miskolc (cf. Hall, 2017). The wielding of sovereign power through policing takes as its sole audience the non-Roma majority population of the city in a self-referential fashion, whose electoral approval is most required for the campaign to retain lasting legitimacy and dominance (see Chandler, 2007; Schwell, 2014; Wæver, 1995).

As we can see, Fidesz's politics of securitisation was conducive to the emergence of a new populist status quo (cf. Fleck, 2014; Boda et al., 2015), bringing spectacular – but merely symptomatic – responses to crime and segregation (see Koskela, 2000; Aas, 2007; Harvey, 2008). A consequent superficial sense of societal satisfaction and an ostensibly improved 'feel-good factor' (Fyfe and Bannister, 1996: 42) in the inner city has earned securitisation policies considerable support, and it seems that political popularity in Miskolc continues to hinge upon perpetuating a façade of a safer and more orderly city, all the while the social problems of the continually stigmatised Roma people remain unresolved. These narratives and actions are driven by the misconception that short-term challenges of security need to be addressed first before the city can deal with deeper systemic problems (see Ladányi, 2010 [2000]-b; Siman and Santos, 2018).

The emergence of policing as a major factor of electoral popularity paints a dark future of a heavily divided city with limited prospects for social mingling and peaceful coexistence, as the non-Roma majority population of the city remains more interested in buttressing its defences against the Roma of the peripheries rather than investing in, *inter alia*, emancipatory educational policies, social mobility, housing opportunities, and inclusiveness in the job market (see Ivasiuc, 2021). However, a renewed focus on top-down social ordering and law enforcement strategies carries a serious risk of further amplifying marginality and societal hostility towards the Roma (see Norris, 2003; van Baar et al., 2019). In this process, to paraphrase Schwell (2014), the new urban social order and patterns of circulation are becoming ever more normalised, habitual, and less questioned over time. It is precisely for this reason that a continued critique of a seemingly consolidated circulatory status quo in Miskolc remains necessary.

With all of the above in mind, questions linger on as to how long the city administration can turn a blind eye towards, or uphold, the concentrated containment of the Roma on the edges

of Miskolc (cf. Aas, 2007). Indeed, as Giorgi and Pinkus (2006: 104) note, “the more neoliberalism pushes away its residues, the more they break into its order; the farther they are expelled, the stronger their disruption through the fault lines of the social map.” Ever sharper divides and escalating tensions can compromise the security of the city as a whole, calling for even tougher police measures, which leads to a vicious cycle (see Barbak, 2019). However, as many have argued, policing methods cannot resolve racialised tensions, nor can they halt the return of disadvantaged groups into cities in the long run (Ladányi, 2010 [1989]; Pankucsi, 2012; Kerezsi and Gosztonyi, 2014; Hera, 2017). The security deadlock that Miskolc has recently entered therefore needs urgent and thorough reconsideration and de-escalation towards social support services, inclusion, and community-building, before the continued reliance on security measures to further divide the city becomes irreversible.

### **Chapter conclusion**

Circulations matter because they reflect the development visions of a city’s political leadership. The extent to which the marginalised are granted freedom of circulation across the city is a telling indicator of how socially inclusively a municipal administration behaves. The triumph of a right-wing populist approach to social ordering forebodes a deeply divided future Miskolc founded upon the racialised sorting of circulations, where key to the free and secure movement of the privileged around the internal city is the forcible repression, confinement, and disabling of that of the vilified Roma. Nearly a decade in office was ample time for Miskolc’s local government to considerably reconfigure the city’s circulatory landscape and social order, especially because their actions often carried public approval. Between 2010 and 2019, the use of sovereign power in multiple forms and phases resulted in the largely successful imposition of a penal populist vision of urban order upon Miskolc’s racially fractured society. The top-down municipal securitisation agenda disregarded human rights concerns and did not shy away

from overt anti-Roma statements either. Overall, resistance proved too little, too late when relatively powerless human rights advocacy groups – which are continually undermined by the illiberal national government – attempted to help the persecuted Roma. Despite the small successes of pro-Roma groups against the discriminatory actions of the municipality, the previous city administration managed to entrench racialised divisions through the stigmatising expulsion and policing of the Roma.

As opposed to simply focusing on displacement, a perspective on circulation has allowed us to better understand how the city's social landscape was altered through a series of sovereign interventions and strategies aimed not only at displacing unwanted bodies, but also at preventing them from re-entering the urban core. Importantly, in thinking about the municipality's active securitisation of some areas and neglect of others, we could effectively trace the selective enabling and disabling of particular circulations in different parts of the city. These spatial tactics show an overall outward directionality to the reconfiguration of circulations, whereby the Roma and the poor are forced to and contained within the neglected periphery of Lyukó.

As the chapter has argued, the municipality's use of sovereign power through slum clearances and policing efforts has profoundly affected the circulatory patterns of perceived danger and safety in the city. This took place in three distinctive phases – disruption through inspection raids and slum clearances, diversion through the uneven application of security measures between different segregated parts of the city, and sustenance, traceable in the continued political drive to maintain the policing apparatus that safeguards the newly instituted exclusionary regime of circulation.

The disruption of circulation was understood through the logic that segregated areas are not only containers of danger, but also threaten the safety of the surrounding non-Roma population (see Foucault, 2007; Buur et al., 2007; De Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008; Dillon and

Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). The populist discursive engine blaming Roma criminality and incivility for the city's poor safety has remained in the foreground throughout to enable the continued legitimisation of displacement tactics. The municipality mounted pressure upon the stigmatised Roma through a gradual toughening of sovereign impositions, starting from the inspection raids and then moving towards forced evictions, as witnessed in the case of the nest-builders of Avas. Through the evictions, divides between those seen to belong to the city and those who are not were severely entrenched, and the security of the Roma was immensely eroded in the name of improving that of the non-Roma majority.

The diversion of circulation was the process through which disruptions gained a particular directionality, reflecting populist social ordering objectives. As illustrated in the thematic juxtaposition of Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets, disrupted circulations were redirected outwards to Lyukó as the area remained unaffected by the municipal securitisation steamroller. Due to Lyukó's remoteness from the centre, unwanted circulations could be conveniently displaced there and removed from sight (see Virág, 2016; Ivasiuc, 2021). Slum clearances centred on the Numbered Streets but left Lyukó intact, which resulted in the simultaneous elimination of the localised circulation of threats in the former, as well as a reduction in ostensibly dangerous movements from the latter into the city given the strong circulatory links between the two areas.

Mobilities between Lyukó and the internal territory of Miskolc are also regulated in more minute ways that likewise reflect a directionality to circulatory control. As regards police presence, Lyukó receives little attention, because its adequate supervision purportedly exceeds municipal resources. The Numbered Streets, in contrast, are now more securitised, although through far more sensitive and locally embedded ways than what was seen during the evictions, due to the mediation of the HCSOM. Similarly, CCTV coverage is denser and more thorough in the Numbered Streets, whereas the cameras in Lyukó appear to be geared towards the

circulatory protection of the city's internal territory as reflected in their spatial arrangement. Taken together, heightened police presence and a better CCTV coverage in the Numbered Streets work to outlaw criminalised bodies and behaviours from the area and divert them to the less intensively policed territory of Lyukó Valley.

Finally, the new and fragile diverted circulatory order now needs to be maintained, otherwise it will collapse. This status quo is a trajectory that the right-wing populist leaders have successfully forced upon the city with lasting impacts. Although Fidesz is no longer in power, their security-driven urban ordering ideology now carries a legacy that points beyond the formal end of their rule in 2019 and can indeed serve their future re-election. In maintaining the centrality of public security to policy debates, they hold the current municipality hostage to the continued upkeep of a bolstered municipal policing apparatus. The effectiveness of this approach lies in right-wing populists' ability to take credit for what appears to be a tidier and more secure city today and call out any alternative development visions that may take the emphasis off security and lead to the downfall of this artificially engineered edifice of enhanced safety. If securitisation remains the municipality's primary aim, then it will no longer matter whether Fidesz are actually in power in Miskolc or not, since the city will follow their prescribed path regardless. This, however, comes at an enormous price. Persisting racial tensions in the city and Lyukó's finite carrying capacity (see Chapter 5) make the long-term containment of poverty a ticking time bomb that the municipality must realise as soon as possible to prevent it from exploding.

## **7. The scalar paradox of biopower: towards governing in proximity?**

### **Chapter introduction**

This final empirical part of the thesis takes a closer look at social policy, and especially social work, to make sense of the operation of biopower upon Lyukó Valley's segregated and marginalised population. With the end of punitive evictions and the normalisation of the security deadlock (see Chapter 6), social policy is the municipality's last strategic instrument to engage with the displaced Roma in the valley. Rather than aiming to solidify any form of territorialised local governance in the borderlands of Lyukó, however, social policy is delegated to social services organisations – namely, the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta (HCSOM) and the Miskolc United Social, Healthcare, and Child Welfare Institution (MESZEGYI) (see Chapter 3).

What, then, would be expected of this chapter, if it was to simply mimic the SDN literature's 'playbook' arguments on biopolitics (see Chapter 2)? In a nutshell, the analysis would treat the operation of biopower as the other side of the securitisation coin to entrench the city's racialised life-chance divides (see Duffield, 2010). It would suggest that the focus of social policy in Lyukó is shifted to the people living in the area to facilitate their bare minimum self-reliance in situ, thereby restricting the Roma's supposedly burdensome access to state services that are otherwise readily available to the developed internal territories (see Duffield, 2010). Consequently, the chapter would further claim that the lives of the outcast Roma are now being biopolitically administered from a distance through social work so as to cement their territorial exclusion and containment. Following normative neoliberal notions of individualised responsibility, as the argument would proceed, social services organisations in Lyukó are paternalistically appropriating the Roma to become self-reliant subjects while remaining insufficiently equipped to fully replace the state in the abandoned borderlands (see Rose, 1996;

Hindess, 2001; Buur et al., 2007; Duffield, 2007; Crawshaw, 2012; Li, 2014; McCormack and Salmenniemi, 2016). In turn, the never-ending quest for achieving the Roma's adaptive self-reliance stays inevitably futile, and the status quo gets entrenched (see Duffield, 2010).

Although a straightforward train of thought, this chapter calls into question the extent to which every element of the above reasoning remains valid the context of Lyukó Valley and, through this case study, also points out the conceptual strengths and shortcomings of the biopolitical perspective advanced in the mainstream SDN literature more generally. The discussion shows that although the above outlined 'playbook' argument mostly maps onto structural-level trends in the governance of segregation in Lyukó, it bypasses the presence of welfarist logics in municipal circles, as well as deeper intricacies that characterise the operation of biopower on the ground.

Following Rabinow and Rose (2006) and Di Muzio (2008), the chapter understands biopolitics and biopower not only as the collective optimisation of life metrics across the population (see Foucault, 1979; Gordon, 1991), but also as technologies that work on, and at the level of, individuals. Duffield's (2010) idea of a shifting governance focus from territory to people also backs a more localised – rather than merely structural – take on biopolitical management. Taken together, the aforementioned individualised perspective and the shift from territorial to people-centred governance urge us to extend our purview to the micro-level dimensions of biopower. This analytical manoeuvre allows for a more holistic account of the operation of biopower, which the mainstream development and SDN literature principally tend to understand through a macro-scale lens and with the same overall argument that biopolitics is a neoliberal technology in service of reproducing structural inequality (e.g., Duffield, 2007, 2010; Hindess, 2001; Kamat, 2004; McCormack and Salmenniemi, 2016). Although difficult to challenge structurally, such accounts largely overlook the localised aspects of the functioning of biopower, and how the state and its proxies enter the intricate community dynamics of the

impoverished population that was so brutally excluded through forced evictions and the escalation of policing (see McKee, 2009).

The chapter's driving argument, then, is that proximity matters to making sense of biopolitics. Accordingly, the operation of biopower upon Lyukó Valley's excluded surplus population should be understood as just as much a question of *governing in proximity* as that of governing at a distance (cf. Raheja, 2022; Lafaut, 2021; Mattsson, 2017). As opposed to the idea of governing at a distance, my use of the notion of 'governing in proximity' does not imply state-based governance, but instead the localised ways that social services organisations and workers govern community dynamics and engage with the poor on the ground. That said, the focus of this chapter remains on the practices of governing rather than the embodied dimensions of community life *per se*.

As discussed throughout, proximity and distance constitute a seemingly irreconcilable scalar paradox of a biopolitics that simultaneously excludes from above and emancipates from below. From above, we find macro-scale structures of a hegemonically orchestrated and necessarily insufficiently outsourced neoliberal social policy – i.e., one that systemically fails to provide the marginalised with adequate social protection due to the diminished welfare state, and also reflects the municipal agenda of containing the city's racialised surplus population at a distance rather than having to pursue costly and unpopular inclusionary policies (see Chapters 5 and 6). This trend is mostly in line with the expectations of the mainstream SDN and biopolitics literatures, although it must be noted that welfarist thinking is not at all absent from municipal decision-making circles (see also Section 5.5 of Chapter 5; Duffield, 2010; Kamat, 2004; Raco, 2009). From below, however, there is an altogether different story of devoted, caring, and compassionate social workers, local mentors, and even members of the authorities, who strive to make a difference to Lyukó's community on the ground despite their limited resources and capacities (see Foucault, 2001; Cruikshank, 1999; Lafaut, 2021; cf. McFarlane,

2010). The contradictory relationship between proximity and distance in Lyukó's governance cautions against taking at face value simplified critiques of an evil neoliberal city administration that only seeks to reproduce injustices every step of the way. Of course, this is not to undermine the overall perspective on racial and territorial exclusion advanced in the previous two chapters, but instead to add nuance to what structural critiques of biopolitics might sweepingly treat as a *thoroughly* discriminatory approach to the governance of segregation.

A reading of biopolitics that incorporates proximity through technologies of the self (see Section 2.2.2 in Chapter 2; Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Di Muzio, 2008) therefore needs to take seriously, and build upon, the inherent tensions *between* sovereign power and biopower, rather than merely reiterating the ways that they co-produce unequal neoliberal urban landscapes (cf. Chapter 2; Duffield, 2010). As Foucault suggests in relation to technologies of the self, “the coexistence in political structures of large destructive mechanisms and institutions oriented toward the care of individual life is ... one of the central antinomies of our political reason” (Foucault, 2001: 405). The idea of governing in proximity offers a productive lens for engaging this antinomy. Findings from Lyukó suggest that the caring and constructive disposition of biopower does not simply and unproblematically back up sovereign power's brutal and destructive repression of racialised marginality (cf. Duffield, 2010). Instead, at the micro level, the relationship of the two forms of power turns more intricate. Whereas governing at a distance appears to tacitly assist the unjust functioning of sovereign power, governing in proximity can, by contrast, challenge such macro-scale trends and even produce unlikely intersections that reflect goodwill, sensitivity, and understanding.

To develop the above arguments, the chapter scrutinises the work of Lyukó Valley's two social services organisations – the HCSOM, which is an NGO, and MESZEGYI, which belongs

to the municipality<sup>29</sup>. As formal state services are direly lacking in the area, these two bodies are the last provisioning outposts to many locals, and supply donations such as pastries and clothing, organise family events, maintain educational activities for children, offer health advice and support, as well as access to free laundry and bathing opportunities, among other things (see Chapters 1 and 3). MESZEGYI and the HCSOM were established in Lyukó Valley in 2010 and 2014, respectively, and their buildings are side by side in the central part of the valley (HCSOM, 2015; Miskolc City Council, 2013e). They work closely together, and while MESZEGYI specialises in family support and child protection, the HCSOM offers a broader range of further activities and opportunities. The HCSOM employs non-Roma social workers recruited elsewhere, and only a few locals for manual labour such as cleaning, whereas MESZEGYI's so-called mentors are local Roma women trained to assist fellow community members in need (TÖÖSZ and Miskolc City Council, 2017).

Drawing on the two social services organisations in Lyukó, a thematic comparison of governing at a distance and governing in proximity will be adopted throughout to demonstrate the scalar paradox underpinning the operation of biopower. In the first half of the chapter, the rise of adaptive self-reliance and the state's outsourcing of social protection to the proxy organisations will be analysed – both from a distance to highlight structural trends and inconsistencies, as well as in proximity to consider social workers' devotion and battling with local challenges. The example of adaptive self-reliance will also be discussed in this section through the same comparative lens. The second half of the chapter then draws together sovereign power and biopower to see how far they reinforce each other at a distance as well as in proximity, looking at the themes of charities as valves of social tensions, political buffering,

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<sup>29</sup> I use the terms 'charity', 'social services organisation' and 'proxy organisation' interchangeably in this chapter to refer to the HCSOM and MESZEGYI.

the purposes of education, and socially sensitive policing on the ground. The chapter concludes that without aiming to idealise the localised dynamics of support and care, we must recognise that the silent operation of governing in proximity, far from the public eye, is our only remaining hope for building a more socially inclusive politics for the city in the long run.

## **7.1 Outsourcing and self-responsibility in perspective**

Key to the biopolitical management of surplus populations and their habitats in neoliberal cities is the dual exercise of delegating the state's social protection responsibilities to third-party organisations, as well as the concomitant inculcation of aspirational self-reliance in slumdweller as a purported way of combatting their own marginality (see Chapter 2; Di Muzio, 2008; Raco, 2009). At the macro scale, structural inequalities are reproduced in Lyukó through the restricted outsourcing of state provisions. However, when viewed in proximity, these dynamics retreat into the silent devotion, kindness, and tireless community work of social services organisations in local daily life. The latter perspective reflects far more sensitivity than merely a question of neoliberal appropriation, the activation of subjects, or paternalistic trusteeship, which is how governing at a distance and charitable action are often described in the literature (e.g., Buur et al., 2007; Hindess, 2001; Kamat, 2004; Duffield, 2007; Li, 2014). To advance this comparison, both distance and proximity are discussed in the following subsections in relation to the governance of marginality in Lyukó.

### *7.1.1 At a distance*

An important point of departure for making sense of the remote municipal management of Lyukó is its very administrative designation as external territory – the contested dimensions of which have been discussed in Section 5.4.2.3 of Chapter 5 – and consequent disinvestment in the valley's development. In contrast to internal territories, in Lyukó the state is not obliged to

provide and maintain essential infrastructures such as roads, street lighting, and utilities, resulting in highly patchy provisioning across the neighbourhood with many households lacking water, sanitation, and gas (see Miskolc City Council, 2013e; Havasi, 2018; BOON.hu, 2019a). As also highlighted in Section 5.4.2.3 in Chapter 5, the municipality's reasoning behind not developing Lyukó or incorporating it into internal Miskolc is that the valley is undermined, even though this is only true for approximately half of its land area (Miskolc City Council, 2013e). The under-provisioning of Lyukó, as well as the refusal to designate it as internal territory despite its growing population and concentration of racialised poverty, hence fit broader neoliberal trends of the retreating provisioning state (cf. Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Rose, 1996; Swyngedouw, 2005) and an inability or refusal to commit more resources to addressing the escalating social crisis in the valley.

The outsourcing of social protection to proxy organisations in the borderlands plays a defining role in orchestrating Lyukó's governing at a distance and biopolitical enclosure through disinvestment (see Jeffrey et al., 2012; Rose and Miller, 1992; Duffield, 2010). Reflecting broader neoliberal trends of a shrunken welfare system, the spatially and economically disavowed surplus population of Lyukó is now viewed as non-insured life that falls outside the responsibility of the state, which in turn legitimises the "externalisation of state functions" (Swyngedouw, 2005: 2002; see also Stenson, 2005; Duffield, 2010; Miskolc City Council, 2013e). In the Integrated Urban Development Strategy (IUDS), the municipality admits that "Miskolc's financial resources alone are insufficient for taking the necessary steps towards the integration of disadvantaged families living in the internal and external territories of Miskolc. National and EU sources, as well as the involvement of civil society organisations (the Order of Malta) and churches ... are needed" (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 114, my translation, brackets original). As the municipality alone cannot deliver essential services to Lyukó, the delegation of social protection therefore became necessary, mirroring nationwide

trends of the fragmentation of funding for social emancipation, as well as the formation of a new and second provisioning system outside the state in deprived communities, spearheaded by the HCSOM (see Chapter 3; Nagy et al., 2020; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020; Government of Hungary, 2021). As this outsourced sector remains underfunded, neither nationally nor locally do third-party bodies have any realistic chances to combat life-chance divides in transformative ways (Autonómia Alapítvány, 2021).

The state's inability or lack of willingness to retain a fully-fledged provisioning foothold in Lyukó has facilitated the area's transition from collective to fragmented and individualised forms of social care (see Kamat, 2004). The recent appearance of social services organisations in the valley only brought limited successes in catering for basic community needs (see Chapter 5; BOON.hu, 2019a; Miskolc City Council, 2013e). Although the mission of charities is to deliver essential services to segregated populations in lieu of the welfare state, they struggle with both staffing and resource shortages themselves, which prevent them from supplying the levels of social protection and services available elsewhere the city.

The restricted ability of charities to cater for basic needs in Lyukó is traceable in what a social worker described as a "*limited radius of reach*" (interview with social worker), that is, the parts of the valley where the work of charities has an impact on the lives of residents. The HCSOM community centre and the MESZEGYI base are both located in the middle of Lyukó, and the farther away we go from the community centres, the fewer families attend them to take advantage of events, services, and donations. In Lyukó, the HCSOM is in regular contact with over a hundred families who receive provisions and turn up to community events, whereas MESZEGYI mentors nearly one-hundred and fifty families as of 2021 (interview with social worker; Miskolc City Council, 2021c). For an area of up to 4,000 inhabitants, the coverage of the two organisations is therefore far from all-encompassing. Put simply, then, the enormous vacuum left behind by the declining redistributive state apparatus is too large for the social

services bodies to fill, and they are unable to adequately combat the area's severe marginality as a result. Considering the social and spatial limits to charities' operations, then, a sizeable part of Lyukó therefore doubly abandoned, both in terms of the "suspension of the legal order and the restriction ... of social protection" (Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006: 103).

Since MESZEGYI formally belongs to the municipality, and is therefore a state-based organisation, it could in fact be argued that the state has not retreated from Lyukó altogether. However, as seen above, MESZEGYI's capacities and resources are very limited for the valley's size and population. In terms of its role and purpose, MESZEGYI is also more reminiscent of an outsourced provisioning body than a state organisation, considering its community-based mentoring programme and close collaboration with the HCSOM against an overall under-serviced and neglected neighbourhood that often lacks basic infrastructure, housing, and key services (Miskolc City Council, 2021c; HCSOM, 2015).

To follow Hindess (2001), the development projects founded upon promoting self-reliance do *not* assume that their recipient subjects are capable of fundamental improvements, be they done independently or even with some external help. Instead, there is simply not enough money to catalyse more profound improvements across the neighbourhood at large, and therefore a constant recourse to self-responsibilising narratives remains a convenient – albeit gravely ineffective and inherently flawed – policy approach (see van Baar, 2011, 2019). As Cox puts it, the provisioning role of social services organisations is kept at a level that is only enough for the surplus population's "survival in existing conditions rather than for the transformation of the social order" (Cox, 1999: 11).

The lack of commitment to noteworthy development in Lyukó is reflected in unfulfilled municipal policy aspirations of rendering the lives of locals complete and helping them catch up with the 'developed' society (see Duffield, 2007), as well as the continued postponement of the area's improvement. Promises of the Roma joining the 'developed' majority through

complex inclusionary strategies and action plans aimed at the integration of impoverished areas, and Lyukó in particular, tend to sound hopeful, committed, and optimistic (e.g., TÖOSZ and Miskolc City Council, 2017; Miskolc City Council, 2021c). Such proposals suggest systematic objectives such as mapping and understanding key challenges of segregated neighbourhoods and their ‘target population’ (Miskolc City Council, 2021c: 18, my translation) – in itself a top-down and externally produced developmentalist label (see Timmer, 2013) –, creating cooperative networks, and establishing tracking and monitoring mechanisms to ensure the successful implementation of programmes (see Chapter 5; Miskolc City Council, 2014a, 2021c; Homolar, 2015). However, these promises have remained continuously out of reach (see Stern and Öjendal, 2010; van Baar, 2019). The current deputy mayor poignantly illustrated the prospects of Lyukó, saying that to reverse the area’s decline, “it took thirty years to get here, so [...] it would take the same amount of time. But this is a very optimistic estimate” (quoted in HVG.hu, 2020: Online, my translation). By deferring the development of Lyukó far into the future, the quote signals a wider policy intent to conserve life-chance divides between the city’s insured and the non-insured, to use Duffield’s (2010) vocabulary, rather than re-extending the same levels of welfare provisioning and service delivery to Lyukó as elsewhere in the city.

In sum, the state’s delegation of social services to proxies in Lyukó therefore shows plentiful resemblances to the classic SDN take on governing at a distance (see Duffield, 2007, 2010). The proliferation of outsourced welfare responsibilities marks a shifting governance attitude that refocuses development efforts from Lyukó as a territory to the people living in it (see *ibid.*). As opposed to the provisions available to the developed and primarily non-Roma majority population in many parts of internal Miskolc, the biopolitical governance of Lyukó merely works towards the survival and self-reliance of the area’s segregated Roma. In creating a weaker secondary circuit of social services, the state’s aim is to provide bare minimum services locally so as to eliminate the burden that the surplus population would place on the

welfare state, and instead create an isolated container of marginality out of sight (see Buur et al., 2007; van Baar, 2011, 2019; Jeffrey et al., 2012; Li, 2014; Walters, 2010; Kóczé, 2019).

Looking solely at the structural scale through the lens of governing at a distance, the state's outsourcing of social protection to proxies appears to be a convincing case of a neoliberal biopolitics geared towards preserving the status quo of racialised injustice. The valley's classification as external territory, its distance from the city, as well as the previously discussed series of developmental inhibitions (see Section 5.4.2.3 in Chapter 5) reify the neoliberal logic of sovereign territorial containment that is now enhanced through biopolitical means (see Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006). According to the 'playbook' SDN argument, the presence of proxy organisations in Lyukó carries the message that social assistance is available *locally*, thus discouraging the marginalised from circulating back into internal territories. In turn, this arrangement assists the municipality's sovereign maintenance of the new circulatory order discussed in the previous chapter (see also Section 7.2.1 later in this chapter; Buur et al., 2007; Foucault, 1979; Dean, 2010; Duffield, 2010). The IUDS backs up these points by stating that "interventions affecting large, segregated neighbourhoods need to take place locally in order to make programmes more accessible" (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 115, my translation), with the reasoning that marginalised populations first need to be 'caught up' to the rest of society for subsequent tensions and experiences of incompatibility to be minimised (*ibid.*).

#### *7.1.1.1 Complications at a distance: the localisation debate*

Recent dilemmas in municipal policymaking regarding the provision of further localised state services in Lyukó cast doubt upon treating the area's governing at a distance as a coherent and strategic municipal plot to cement the spatial exclusion of the surplus population, however. While feasible aggregate proposals for supplying adequate social housing, infrastructure, and employment for Lyukó are lacking, there have been plans to build a new nursery and a general

practitioner surgery, with the aim to make some basic social services more accessible to locals (interviews with policymakers and academic). However, as a policymaker argued, making readily available the services for which residents of Lyukó would normally go into the internal city, such as schools, administration, doctor's appointments, and so on, would further reduce the already limited contact that Lyukó's population has with the rest of Miskolc (see Havasi, 2018; Virág, 2016). With reference to the proposed nursery, they remarked that "*thank God, it looks like it's not going to happen,*" claiming that while more convenient, it would have discouraged local parents from taking their children into nurseries in internal Miskolc, thus curbing their already fragile links to the main city and further aggravating their isolation. More generally, they suggested that those living in Lyukó "*will be able to break out of there more easily if they are more tied to the city*", and

*"the fewer public services are taken in there the better. ... At least they took the bus... we need buses... school buses... so children get to the place where they get a normal education. Now imagine that there will be children, I'm sure, who would have hardly left the settlement [Lyukó] before the age of 14"* (interview with policymaker).

Similarly, for a teacher from a nearby school,

*"then you might as well build a whole separate society for them. And that's not going to work. ... We will cement them into the situation they are in now. I don't believe in this, because we simply reproduce their societies, so there won't be mobility and there won't be progress"* (interview with teacher).

Social workers in the area likewise recognised the difficulty of the localisation dilemma, noting that having a new nursery or a school would reflect a sense of "*just let the Roma stay where they are*" (interview with social worker). The disputed nature of localising services therefore suggests that rather than a streamlined biopolitical strategy of entrenching arm's length

management, municipal policymaking also consists of voices and decisions that resonate with that of the teacher and the social worker quoted above, and overtly challenge the entrenchment of segregation.

Inclusionary sentiments in a municipal research report on Lyukó's development further demonstrate the presence of emancipatory and welfarist thinking in policymaking. The document suggests that "in any kind of development concerning Lyukó, it must be remembered that *the connection between the valley and the city should not weaken but instead become strengthened through new channels*" (Miskolc City Council, 2013e: 4, my translation, emphasis original). The report presented results from a locally conducted survey, which showed that residents expressed a far greater demand for the improvement of infrastructural provisions such as the road network, wastewater drainage, lighting, and drinking water supplies, as opposed to local services such as a school, a kindergarten, or a pharmacy (Miskolc City Council, 2013e). While these findings are almost a decade old, they nonetheless demonstrate that locals clearly demanded that their connections to the rest of the city be maintained. Of course, the expenses of mobility into the city also pose significant hindrances, and it would be helpful, therefore, to make links more frequent and affordable to prevent continued seclusion (Miskolc City Council, 2021c; Havasi, 2018). Such links have been proposed before, for instance through the school buses mentioned by the above quoted policymaker (Miskolc City Council, 2013e). While little has materialised in terms of mobility developments, and Lyukó's residents continue to struggle with arranging transport into internal Miskolc, the fact that such debates are ongoing shows that the governance of Lyukó is not all about neglect and containment.

Although proposals for the local nursery were jettisoned, the municipality did end up building a new general practitioner surgery in Lyukó near the HCSOM community centre with a GP for children and adults as well as a nurse counselling service (Minap.hu, 2021c). This, however, is not an altogether new provision, but merely an improvement to the conditions of

medical services previously confined to a temporary metal container (as was still the case at the time of my visits in autumn 2020; see Miskolc City Council, 2021h). Healthcare in Lyukó is arguably even more needed than elsewhere in the city, given the widespread lack of hygiene, poor health due to malnutrition, inhumane living conditions, drug use, and limited access to clean drinking water and basic medications. Diseases such as hepatitis also pose significant problems in the area as they spread easily through waste dumps in the streets, which rats and stray dogs scavenge and pull apart (Mihályi et al., 2011; Miskolc City Council, 2013e, 2016).

Overall, then, while some resources are being spent on localising public services in Lyukó, as seen in the example of the surgery, there is also inconsistency around whether or not a fully-fledged set of institutions and services should be established in the area. The state and municipality are not doing enough to address the continued decline of Miskolc's semi-rural segregated neighbourhood from a city-scale point of view, but policy debates do involve emancipatory narratives that hope to ameliorate Lyukó's disconnectedness from internal Miskolc. This inconsistency within decision-making signals that rather than a consciously orchestrated exclusionary tactic of managing underdevelopment in situ and from afar, there is also a sense of goodwill among policymakers to maintain the excluded Roma's connectedness to the city, thereby preventing their further isolation. Ultimately, this internal inconsistency within Lyukó's governing at a distance further underlines the limitations of applying generic critiques of the biopolitical management of surplus populations to our case study (e.g., Duffield, 2007, 2010; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Kamat, 2004; Di Muzio, 2008).

### *7.1.2 In proximity*

When viewed in proximity, the above discussed overall trends are contradicted by the embodied and micro-scale accounts of social workers on the ground, whose narratives reflect support and benevolence (cf. Diósi, 1992; Cruikshank, 1999). Indeed, the charities constitute

an essential part of the daily lives of many families and households. As a social worker from the HCSOM explained, “*we are highly present in the lives of certain families. ... the younger kids attend the children’s house, and the older ones come to our after-school activities, and in their case the Order of Malta is present to such a great extent that... we form an integral part of their lives*” (interview with a social worker). The HCSOM also supplies crucial resources for the elderly – particularly those who live alone – including delivering bread, pastries, and dog food to their homes, as well as keeping them company (ibid.). Providing support in the area cannot be done in aggregate terms, however, as multiple social workers emphasised. Locals’ specific needs, backgrounds, demographics, habitats, personalities, and many more factors are immensely diverse, and therefore require a case-by-case approach so that demands are appropriately understood and addressed. This requires abundant patience and sensitivity (interviews with social workers; see Cruikshank, 1999).

More importantly, social workers are also on the receiving end of the state’s inadequate outsourcing of social protection rather than being active mediators or facilitators of such structural agendas. Although the state’s restriction of provisions for Lyukó can be interpreted as a neoliberal symptom that ultimately benefits the better-off at the behest of the under-serviced poor, the social services organisations cannot be accused of contributing to such motivations, since structural resource restrictions affect social workers themselves, both financially and in terms of their daily struggles. As one of them remarked, swimming against the current of Lyukó’s vast marginality with such limited capacities is incredibly taxing, and failures abound, which often makes them question the point of their work and their significance to the bigger picture of poverty (see Baistow, 1994):

*“People ask me so many times... ‘what is the point of your job?’ I can’t tell, because it’s not visible, and we can’t affect large systemic problems. ... That’s why it’s often so burdensome.*

*Like... we're a drop in the sea, like... a ship got leaked, and then we're trying to get the water out with a thimble, and so it's really hard"* – they contemplated (interview with social worker).

They further noted that given the gloomy outlook of precarity in the valley, you must appreciate even the smallest achievements to avoid burning out in no time, which requires considerable mental strength and resilience. At the individual level, then, being able to put some vulnerable old people into elderly care, helping someone without heating and electricity to find accommodation in a homeless shelter in the winter, or providing good schooling foundations for some children and helping them finish their primary education, can be important milestones in this regard (interview with social worker).

Additionally, given that social workers are underpaid and overburdened themselves, arguing that they perpetuate neoliberal and hegemonic power structures to their own benefit would be unrealistic (see Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). In 2022, social workers' monthly pre-tax income ranged from 220,000 to 568,000 HUF nationally (approximately £520 to £1330 a month, respectively<sup>30</sup>) (SzMDSz, 2021). As a result, there is a dire shortage of trained social workers and welfare professionals across the country (ibid.). In the absence of financial motivations, then, those who do end up in this job are likely to be genuinely devoted to helping others rather than signing up to pursuing normative tutelage, paternalistic appropriation, and the conservation of life-chance divides in any form. Instead, they are struggling with the very conditions of poor provisioning themselves. Despite the limited resources and poor salaries, the social workers and mentors interviewed in this study were devoted to their job and firmly believed in making a difference to the lives of the poorest, however small their contributions might be (interviews with social workers and mentors). Arguably, and paradoxically, social workers are therefore exposed to the consequences of governing at a distance themselves,

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<sup>30</sup> As of 12/04/2023 exchange rates.

considering that their caring attitude and existential struggles in proximity contradict the structural motivations of the state's remote biopolitics targeting Lyukó's surplus population.

To further consider the importance of proximity, local social workers and mentors have a far greater degree of sensitivity towards the kinds of behaviours that get stigmatised from a distance. To begin with, those not originally based in Lyukó Valley take years to get to know local families and their struggles, personal relations, and community dynamics more closely (interview with social worker). The lived realities of working with families in the valley produce far more nuanced and sympathetic understandings of the variegated and unique nature of local habits and behaviours, including realisations that many families are decent and law-abiding, contrary to popular imagination. A social worker noted that:

*“So many things are beyond people's control here. And then it's so easy for others to come out here and conclude that oh dear, they're dirty, oh, they're like this and like that. But it's so hard to get by here, even with the best of intentions. And most people here are very well-intentioned. They also want to live in a better house and have a tidier garden, so... but it's not easy”* (interview with social worker).

In the absence of sufficient infrastructural supplies and municipal services, there is often simply nowhere to put household waste, for instance, since waste collection is patchy and unreliable, and limited access to clean water makes it incredibly difficult for locals to maintain even basic levels of hygiene. Although the work of the two social services organisations may appear to be an externally and remotely imposed series of civilising missions in Miskolc's peripheral slum, they gain new meaning when we consider the embedded sensitivities and compassionate accounts of social workers who experience the precarious lives and conditions of the valley's population first hand.

The charities' supportive community work takes place against what is fashioned as an open, welcoming, and constructive atmosphere. For example, the HCSOM organises a range of different community events, such as themed family days, gatherings for the elderly, pastry and clothing giveaways, litter picking, gardening, employability trainings, games and educational support for children, and gigs, among many other things. Social workers develop close personal ties with the families they support, as they often visit homes and have in-depth conversations about families' needs and problems. In other words, social work is founded upon trust and assistance (see Cruikshank, 1999; Kamat, 2004). For a worker, "*I think we're in a very good relationship with people, and they know that there's a very inclusive and open atmosphere here. So, we don't judge...*" (interview with social worker). In sharp contrast to the often hostile and formal relationships with institutions and authorities, as well as the racially loaded political environment analysed in the previous two chapters, charities' localised support is characterised by acceptance, inclusivity, care, and support (cf. Hindess, 2001).

### *7.1.3 Instilling self-responsibility through labour? A comparison between distance and proximity*

By analysing the very practices of ingraining adaptive self-reliance into Lyukó's segregated community and organising the restricted life support of the surplus population, the oxymoronic relationship between distance and proximity becomes more specific. This subsection therefore takes a closer look at how labour and stigmatising perspectives on welfare dependency are being negotiated in the biopolitics of Miskolc's externalised surplus population. On the one hand, it suggests that when viewed from afar, there is evidence of structural biopolitical agendas acting along condemnatory societal understandings of the Roma's behaviour. On the other hand, far from the paternalistic tutelage and adaptive self-reliance narratives dominating critiques of governing at a distance, the biopolitical adjustment of

marginalised lives happens in benign and supportive ways on the ground. Both perspectives are discussed below to capture their contradictory nature.

Against the backdrop of the outsourced welfare state, derogatory perceptions of the Roma's unreasonably welfare-dependent behaviour have found their way into social policy with the need to reconfigure the Roma into a self-reliant population that is adaptable to post-welfare economic conditions (see Chapter 5; Di Muzio, 2008). From a conventional SDN perspective, instilling adaptive self-reliance in Lyukó's marginalised Roma reflects a compensatory mechanism, whereby previously insured life gets outcast to the remote fringes of urban habitation, becomes reconceived as 'non-insured surplus life', and is taught how to become self-reliant against its systemically produced marginality (see Duffield, 2010). On paper, in segregated neighbourhoods the municipality is committed to "creating new jobs in large numbers to provide employment for the potential workforce who start from lower levels of training, as well as to improve their living conditions" (Miskolc City Council, 2021f: 39, my translation). However, according to a policymaker, "*the city does little about their employment*" (interview with policymaker) in reality, and alternatives to the public workfare scheme remain scarce (ibid.; see Sections 1.5 in the Introduction chapter and 3.1.3 in Chapter 3; see also Miskolc City Council, 2021c). Indeed, the oft-promoted alternative to unemployment in contemporary Hungary is the workfare programme which, in practice, has been argued to humiliate the poorest through pointless kinds of labour and conserve the existing class structure in exploitative ways given the slim chances for those involved to progress to better kinds of jobs (Ladányi, 2010 [2005]-b; Csepeli and Örkény, 2015).

At a distance, the perceived deviance and irregularity of the surplus population of neoliberal cities are being approached through a narrative of economic activation (see Farkas, 2011; cf. Raco, 2009; Schmidt, 2018). As part of this process, biopolitical interventions into the lives of marginalised communities seek to rewire welfare dependency into self-responsibility.

The aim of such programmes is therefore to transform the target group from passive recipients of social assistance to active agents of self-development (Di Muzio, 2008). For example, according to the municipality of Miskolc, MESZEGYI's citywide labour market advice service is aimed at "activating jobseekers and lastingly unemployed persons to return them to the open job market" (Miskolc City Council, 2021f: 43, my translation). Akin to Walters' (2010) argument, whereas a strong welfare state under state socialism used to manage unemployment collectively, contemporary biopolitical interventions of 'workforce activation' proceed in highly fragmented and individualised ways through small-scale services but without achieving collective breakthrough (see also Kamat, 2004). In resonance with other neoliberal contexts, however, unemployment in Lyukó cannot be addressed through narratives of individualised labour mobilisation and the inculcation of self-responsibility. Such agendas merely serve the broader biopolitical agenda of leaving the Roma population to their own devices and improving their ability to get by somehow as systemic help from the state remains largely out of reach.

In proximity, however, the fragmented inculcation of self-reliance into the surplus population turns into constructive assistance efforts, bonds of trust, and close personal relationships, as the self-reliance of the marginalised is facilitated in a sympathetic and encouraging fashion (cf. Kamat, 2004). The HCSOM and MESZEGYI supply a range of resources as mentioned before, such as a public laundry and bathroom, clothing and food donations, access to a telephone, and lice removal training, among many other things (interviews with social workers and mentors; Miskolc City Council, 2021c). Moreover, children are given the opportunity to carry out extra tasks such as helping with cleaning and tidying in the community centre. In exchange, they get some food to take home, which is particularly helpful towards the end of the month when many families struggle financially (Index.hu, 2019).

Furthermore, both social services organisations provide employment for locals in Lyukó which benefits some members of the community without any undertones of challenging welfare

dependency or necessitating behavioural adjustment. For instance, MESZEGYI's mentoring scheme offers some local Roma women a job opportunity which they would otherwise struggle to find. As the nurse told me in an interview, the local Roma families are typically still very patriarchal. Men are usually out working during the day, whereas women are expected to run the household and look after the children. As a result, women are either unemployed or can only take very undemanding jobs that do not take away from their duties as housewives. Since the mentoring position at MESZEGYI is flexible, however, Roma women can feasibly manage this job besides taking care of their families (interview with nurse).

Moreover, helping locals to acquire the soft skills necessary for better life prospects is a crucial part of social work in the valley which, at a micro scale, contrasts to distant biopolitical accounts of mere normative trusteeship aimed at conserving and entrenching life-chance divides. A social worker captured this tellingly in arguing that assistance for impoverished families “*shouldn't be understood primarily in material terms [...] but rather to help them in ways that they need in the long run*” (interview with social worker). She explained that while providing tangible kinds of help such as shoes, clothes, and furniture, is inevitably a part of their work, they are more interested in getting families to take their children to school and helping them to find jobs, for example. Besides the HCSOM's children's playhouse and after-school activities, they also offer various forms of assistance for jobseekers such as CV writing advice. Put differently, physical provisions merely satisfy immediate needs and do not make families more self-reliant and proactive further down the line. In contrast, the non-tangible skills that the charities teach require prolonged care, attention, encouragement, and close work with those whose lives and social mobility are to be improved across different dimensions and generations. At the micro scale, the benevolence behind such commitments is hence opposed to the city-level governance objective of keeping the uninsured surplus population at arm's length through a secondary and inferior provisioning system.

In response to the latter account of governing in proximity, one could suggest that the above examples do not matter in the grand scheme of things, since the biopolitics of surplus life should be understood in terms of the overall fragmentation of social protection in Lyukó. Equally, the soft, constructive, and benevolent nature of biopower has been argued to simply constitute an inherent element of governing at a distance, so there is nothing surprising about the findings discussed here (see Rabinow and Rose, 2006; Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1979). However, a detached reading only considers the biopolitical engineering of adaptive self-reliance as the remote normative appropriation of the uninsured surplus population in service of hegemonic neoliberal interests, seeking to render the Roma more governable but without having to ameliorate their marginality (see Duffield, 2007, 2010; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Raco, 2009; Buur et al., 2007; Di Muzio, 2008; van Baar, 2018). This viewpoint thus neglects the fact that for those personally involved and invested in social work, neither is the presence of social services organisations a mere token gesture towards Lyukó's survival, nor is it a technology of neoliberal appropriation that operates behind a façade of benevolence but with the ultimate aim of containing instead of resolving precarity. On the contrary, the attempts of social workers, mentors, and the nurse at helping locals to become more self-reliant and less vulnerable are not a pretence or a calculated set of containment manoeuvres – which is how some of the above-cited detached biopolitical critiques risk representing them –, but years of devotion against the odds of achieving systemic change. In other words, there is far more to a perspective of proximity than what is discernible through an account of governing at a distance.

## **7.2 Constellations with sovereign power**

Besides considering biopolitics alone, the relationship between biopower and sovereign power likewise becomes richer and more nuanced if viewed through the scalar paradox of proximity and distance (see Section 2.4.4 of Chapter 2 on the urban SDN's integrated view of

the two forms of power). According to the SDN playbook, the brutality of sovereign destruction through evictions and policing enhancements, operating alongside the biopolitical functions of social services organisations that seek to enhance living conditions in Lyukó, are supposedly two sides of the same coin and jointly perpetuate the city's racialised life-chance divide (see Chapters 5 and 6; Duffield, 2007, 2010; Di Muzio, 2008; van Baar, 2018). Having said that, biopower's supposed service of sovereign power and right-wing populist social ordering agendas at a distance turns into far more humane intersections with sovereign power at the micro scale, which likewise consist of hopeful, sympathetic, and emotionally loaded gestures. In this arrangement, besides the key role of social services organisations in supporting the Roma, some members of the authorities – otherwise expectedly hostile given the history of the inspection raids, evictions, and securitisation measures – also show remarkable compassion and sensitivity towards the community. Locally, biopower and sovereign power can therefore intersect in benign ways that challenge overall city-level trends of the exclusionary top-down interplay of penal and social policy.

### *7.2.1 At a distance: a biopolitical valve of social tensions*

From a structural point of view, the social policy approach to racialised segregation in Lyukó Valley reinforces sovereign power's exclusionary applications explored in Chapter 6 through treating deprivation as a security risk. In this interpretation, the remote management of the expelled surplus population in Lyukó is similarly important to the maintenance of concentrated marginality as were physical actions of forceful displacement and policing. Against the backdrop of a deepening life-chance divide and the state's unwillingness and inability to extend universal provisions to all, Lyukó remains a container of an escalating social crisis and is therefore still considered a security concern from the perspective of decision-makers (for a debate between councillors about the area's security problems, for instance, see

Miskolc City Council, 2020b). Managing this risk within its own boundaries without having to extend similar degrees of social protection to the area is therefore a crucial objective for maintaining incumbent socio-spatial hierarchies (see Duffield, 2010).

Although governing at a distance is often described as a mere token gesture with no systemic impact (e.g., Duffield, 2007, 2010; van Baar, 2018, 2019; Kóczé, 2019), more is at stake if we consider its structural interplay with sovereign power. Rather than a happenstance deficiency, the outsourcing of welfare provisions to social services organisations is *necessarily* insufficient. Through their provisioning work, charities in Lyukó operate as bare-minimum valves for controlling the area's social pressures and tensions, thereby preventing their further escalation and consequent destabilising spillage into the developed internal territory of the city. A study for the council reports that against the strain of concentrated poverty in Lyukó, MESZEGYI workers “play a big role in preventing tensions from escalating through their outstanding work that exceeds the supplying of basic provisions” (Miskolc City Council, 2013e: 9, my translation). This quote suggests that without the presence of MESZEGYI, social pressures and frictions within the community would have worsened still. Although the document does not discuss the potential implications of such tensions for the rest of the city, the emphasis on keeping them in check is indicative of the social services organisations' purpose in maintaining some degree of stability *locally* – that is, before tensions spiral out of control and begin to affect other parts of the city. More generally, according to the 2019 municipal Crime Prevention Strategy (CPS), proxy organisations play an important part in the city's public security (see Chapter 5; Miskolc City Council, 2019c). Cited activities include victim protection, welfare support for children and vulnerable groups, and the prevention of youth crime (ibid.). From the perspective of the powerful, what matters to governing at a distance is therefore not the elimination of poverty in Lyukó, but instead the elimination of the

*risks associated with poverty* outside of the area, thus serving parallel interests with sovereign power.

To deliver on the above aim, charities do not have to institute a full-grown provisioning apparatus in Lyukó, however. Instead, they only need to be large enough to prevent and manage the *excess* threats and destabilising impacts of the surplus population and conditions of the borderlands before they could spread past the valley's confines and jeopardise the alleged safety and civility of internal Miskolc. As long as perceived dangers remain within the neighbourhood, they do not normally prompt additional state responses. This is traceable in Lyukó's lack of formal administration in vast swathes of the valley and any resemblance to a planned urban space, the abundance of decaying and derelict properties, the gradual re-incursion of nature and wildlife into the built environment, and the considerable presence of informality, particularly further afield from the HCSOM and MESZEGYI community buildings. Weeds and bushes are overgrowing in streets and properties alike, rats are feeding on heaps of waste, mud is common, potholes aplenty, diseases are spreading, street lighting is absent from much of the valley posing night-time security concerns, and "*boar-sized*" stray dogs (interview with nurse) are breeding unchecked while threatening the safety and mobility of locals (interview with mentors). Near the time of my fieldwork, even a bear otherwise not endemic to the area entered the valley, roamed the streets, ravaged gardens, and caused considerable fright (Minap.hu, 2020b). Various informal activities, such as the production of cheap and extremely dangerous designer drugs, illicit tenancies and housing occupancies, extremely poor housing conditions, and infrastructural piracy, are also great concerns to locals (interviews with social worker and ranger).

Consequently, the supportive provisions of the proxy organisations exist side by side with informal activities, diseases, waste, and wildlife, as the former seek to battle and compensate for the destabilising effects of the latter (interviews with social worker, nurse, and mentors; see

also Durst, 2015; Paraušić, 2021). However, the state is willing to accept all these risk factors in Lyukó Valley as long as they are appropriately contained and kept out of sight through the presence and compensatory efforts of the HCSOM and MESZEGYI. Through this setup, the security-oriented exclusionary interventions effected through sovereign power (see Chapter 6) are hence being reinforced.

#### *7.2.1.2 Does right-wing populism make a difference to the exercise of biopower?*

Another key component to governing at a distance in Lyukó lies in its reconfigured relationship to right-wing populism, which has important implications for the structural interplay of biopower and sovereign power. As much as penal policy measures were accompanied by a loud, populist, anti-Roma rhetoric, outsourced social policy actions became depoliticised and buffered from mainstream political campaigns (Havasi, 2018). The involvement of proxies in social policy was an effective way to blunt the political edge of the deeply unjust sovereign penal interventions that brought about the accumulation of racialised poverty in Lyukó in the first place (see Dean, 2010; Kamat, 2004; Di Muzio, 2008). This depoliticization process could therefore effectively consolidate and normalise the effects of repressive sovereign interventions of the past. Against a general anti-Roma political climate that continues to feed off populist stigma and collective racial condemnation, proxy organisations have emerged as effective biopolitical intermediaries, whose benign community efforts in segregated and mostly Roma neighbourhoods evade electoral criticism (Havasi, 2018; see also Rose, 1996).

Central to hollowing out the political dimensions of social policy is the reframing of the governance of deprived communities as a matter of expert management. Through such narratives, present patterns of segregation – otherwise achieved by the municipality's politically infused and penal populist wielding of sovereign power – can become devoid of further political

contestation and human rights disputes (see Rancière, 1999). The municipality formally justifies the outsourcing of services to proxies by pointing out the specialist expertise of these organisations, who are thus deemed more qualified to work with impoverished populations. As stated in a council document on service delivery, “in the completion of [social provisioning] tasks, the city’s council greatly counts on the cooperation of church-based and civil society actors ... who possess considerable experience and expertise” (Miskolc City Council, 2020f: 99, my translation). They consider traditional institutional architectures of social policy obstructive to managing the problems of segregated areas as they “cannot be tackled from behind an office desk” (Miskolc City Council, 2014a: 126, my translation). Similarly, according to the national government, civil society actors “hold a knowledge base that exceeds that of state actors, and their extensive set of connections and credibility carry serious potential” (Government of Hungary, 2013: 36, my translation). The rationale for offloading tasks to proxies is, therefore, that they are supposedly better equipped to deal with the challenges of deprived communities than a conventional, detached, and bureaucratic state apparatus (see Kamat, 2004; Di Muzio, 2008). Consequently, a localised form of social work in Lyukó that builds embedded family support connections, but still receives some state support, is the preferred alternative.

The taming of exclusionary right-wing populist motives behind a depoliticised veil is also seemingly backed by the HCSOM’s ambiguous links to the government. As mentioned in Chapter 3, social inclusion matters are largely a monopoly of the HCSOM across the country, who are therefore often criticised for being a government-friendly organisation despite their formal claims to independence (e.g., Horváth, 2019; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). In contrast to the HCSOM, liberal and international charities and NGOs are widely suppressed and sidelined, as seen in the lack of opportunities given to other pro-Roma organisations in

emancipatory matters as part of the National Social Inclusion Strategy (Government of Hungary, 2021; Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020).

In Miskolc, the HCSOM's debated political ties were traceable in the Fidesz municipality's hostility towards liberal human rights organisations who protested against the Numbered Streets evictions, and its simultaneous leniency towards the HCSOM's mediation between Roma residents and the municipality in settling evictions-related disputes. For example, the court ordered that the municipality pay a 10-million-HUF (around £23,500)<sup>31</sup> forfeit for the human rights infringements that occurred during inspection raids and evictions (see Chapter 6). In turn, the Fidesz mayor praised the ruling that the fine was payable to the HCSOM rather than the liberal advocacy groups who had filed the lawsuits against the municipality in the first place, or indeed to the evicted Roma in compensation for the harm caused (Borsodihir.hu, 2018; Miskolc Court of Law, 2018). The Fidesz city administration was therefore more willing to pay the HCSOM than the liberals or the Roma, which suggests that the HCSOM is more valued within government-friendly circles. Furthermore, Horváth (2019) makes the case for the HCSOM's downright complicity in the Numbered Streets evictions, arguing that they encouraged locals to vote for Fidesz, and also endorsed so-called "non-violent evictions" (ibid.: n.p.) that otherwise produced the same end result of displacing impoverished families. Others are more reserved about the HCSOM's responsibility regarding the evictions, though, claiming that they had little say and impact on the slum clearances on the whole (Havasi, 2018). Nevertheless, the HCSOM's relative nationwide monopoly in providing social services to the Roma reflects the right-wing populist national government's overall endorsement of some civil society actors and not others (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). While social workers from the HCSOM stressed that they are politically neutral and opposed to evictions and segregation

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<sup>31</sup> As of 12/04/2023 exchange rates.

altogether (interviews with social workers), the selective outsourcing of social protection may reflect a broader right-wing populist agenda to cement and conserve the entrenchment of segregation that was achieved through the penal populist deployment of sovereign power.

That said, whether endorsing pro-government NGOs as opposed to liberal ones makes a difference to the daily lives of segregated communities against such a ‘neo-illiberal’ (see Hendrikse, 2018) backdrop of politically infused outsourcing practices is unclear. Arguably, be it shot through with party politics or otherwise, it seems that the delegation of social protection generally underperforms at meeting crucial demands in impoverished areas in neoliberal settings, no matter the sponsor (cf. Rose, 1996; Duffield, 2001; Giorgi and Pinkus, 2006; Selmeczi, 2012). The structural shortcomings of governing at a distance thus remain, since the segregation of the poor, and the lack of resources to improve their livelihoods, are often just as traceable in liberal democratic contexts as they are in the illiberal political order of Hungary. Symptomatically, then, if we were to only focus on the dynamics of social policy on the ground, it is difficult to determine whether the involvement of a more diverse set of NGOs and charities, potentially more fragmented and limited in budget, would do a better job than a single one that has comparatively more – albeit still insufficient – government backing, resources, and personnel.

Nonetheless, the way in which the biopolitical management of surplus life in Lyukó is recast as a question of expertise that transcends political debates works to neutralise and normalise a status quo previously fashioned by the deeply unjust right-wing populist application of sovereign power. In this sense, although the architecture of biopower alone is not necessarily more exploitative or conducive to entrenching inequality in Miskolc than in liberal democratic contexts, it is complicit in backing up a right-wing populist social ordering agenda by making the governance of segregation less politically contested. Put simply, then, right-wing populism matters to the way that sovereign power and biopower play off each other at the structural scale.

### *7.2.2 In proximity: intersections of support*

Moving on from the intersections of sovereign power and biopower at a distance, there are two main ways that their relationality can be discussed through the lens of governing in proximity. First, we can simply consider whether at the micro scale biopower continues to reinforce the sovereign maintenance of an exclusionary circulatory order, as is largely the case with macro-level biopolitical motivations. Second, the way that sovereign power behaves locally in Lyukó also merits consideration, including its interplay with biopower. Both points are unpacked below, drawing on the example of education for the first one, and community policing for the second.

#### *7.2.2.1 Relations with sovereign power: the case of education*

As this subsection shows, education is supposed to serve a strategic biopolitical purpose in contributing to the city's security at a distance, thus resonating with sovereign power-based security efforts. However, this resonance is lost at the micro scale, where educational motivations have nothing to do with backing up destructive sovereign interventions. The role of education in governing both at a distance and in proximity is therefore comparatively discussed to illustrate the added value of the latter to conventional SDN analyses.

At the policy level, and in line with municipal security agendas, early development both inside and outside school is seen as a pivotal element of preventing the spread of 'deviant' behaviours and facilitating change in the lifestyles and conduct of segregated communities (Miskolc City Council, 2021c). The municipal CPS likewise considers the role of education crucial to crime prevention by endorsing targeted awareness-raising campaigns for the youth on topics such as school refusal, drug use, and the prevention of victimisation, among other things (Miskolc City Council, 2019c). A driving notion behind education in deprived communities is that "youngsters should be occupied in sensible ways" (Police Captain of

Miskolc, quoted in Miskolc City Council, 2018c: 2, my translation). In the 2021 CPS, behavioural anomalies among the segregated youth are traced back to a lack of ‘meaningful’ activities, ‘excess free time’ and ‘dawdling’, against which methodical responses are deemed necessary to find useful ways of keeping them busy (Miskolc City Council, 2021f: 60, my translations; Raco, 2009). Participation in sports, for instance, is seen to reduce proneness to future drug use, alcoholism, and criminality, and thus turning children into the right direction early on and keeping them occupied will result in the upbringing of compliant, diligent, and valued members of society (Miskolc City Council, 2021f). Other reasons cited for susceptibility to youth crime include family problems, a lack of parental attention and close relationships, friends’ bad influence, quitting school, and early childbearing (ibid.; Miskolc City Council, 2021c).

In the HCSOM’s educational endeavours in Lyukó, the aim – at least when viewed from a distance – is to provide such ‘useful’ ways for children to spend their free time and receive more care and attention in a friendly atmosphere. The HCSOM community centre is home to two educational programmes – a so-called “Certain beginnings” children’s house for 0-3-year-olds, as well as an after-school educational facility (*tanoda* in Hungarian) for primary school pupils up to 14 years of age, where children take part in a range of activities such as sports, games and hikes, and receive meals as well (Miskolc City Council, 2014a; Index.hu, 2019). From a municipal crime prevention point of view, these educational programmes create spaces where misconduct is normatively problematised and corrected in relation to potentially undesired social consequences, thereby ultimately contributing to a safer city at large, in tandem with the continued enforcement of current circulatory regimes through the use of sovereign power (see Chapter 6; Rose, 1996; Dean, 2010; Timmer, 2013).

Although education is closely linked to broader security discourses at the municipal policy level, especially in relation to preventing youth delinquency, a localised account of the HCSOM

suggests otherwise, as the focus is on helping children and their parents to improve their lives and future prospects, rather than adjusting delinquent behaviours. Social workers of the HCSOM see children as the greatest hope for improving the future outlook of marginality in Lyukó and consider early education pivotal (interview with social worker). The HCSOM's children's house and after-school programme provide essential foundations for life which, in many cases, children would otherwise not be able to learn due to precarious conditions at home. In the children's house, for instance, this includes using a proper toilet, washing your hands before meals, sitting down to a table to eat, dining at set times, saying hi to the teacher, holding a pencil the right way, turning up every day, and so on (interview with social worker). Consequently, the children's house is a springboard to kindergarten and school and, as a social worker said, "*we always get feedback from kindergartens that they can tell which children came from here [the children's house] ... And it's such a good feeling to see how much they've developed ... that intervening at such an early stage of childhood will have an impact later. We really believe in this*" (interview with social worker). In the social worker's words, the emphasis is therefore not on adjusting inadequate behaviours, filtering out delinquency, and enhancing security, but instead providing foundations for future education and opportunities in life.

Crucially, the HCSOM's spaces of education are supposed to produce ripple effects as they are not only intended for children, but also for parents. By engaging kids and helping them develop useful skills, teachers in the community centre are at once fostering responsible parenting. "*In our children's house, the primary target group is not the children – well, they are too, but the parents are just as much so. You can't handle the two separately*", a social worker said, since "*it is a socialisation process for the parents too*" (interview with social worker). Indeed, the purpose of the children's house and the after-school activities in the community centre is to reach parents and involve them in an educational journey as well to facilitate better upbringing. Parents have to accompany their kids to the children's house, and

therefore attend regularly and follow the development of their children first hand. Since parents are often incredibly young due to a lack of conscious family planning – another frequently mentioned concern in Lyukó – they are also shown how to look after a little baby or toddler and raise them with love and care (Index.hu, 2019).

While practices like the above are taken for granted elsewhere, the cramped and unhealthy homes where families are often forced to live make raising children particularly challenging in Lyukó. For instance, in the crowded interiors it is sometimes difficult to even put babies down safely, so they are often carried around whilst the mother performs all sorts of household activities, resulting in health and safety dangers and frequent accidents such as scalds and burns. Moreover, many poor families have limited access to toys and children often play among the waste scattered around the streets and gardens. As a social worker noted, however, “*when they come here, we have a wide and open space where the child can crawl around, which really is... It doesn't seem like a big thing but... it makes a difference*” (interview with social worker). By providing toys and a space to play, as well as advice and support to parents, the charity contributes to a safer and healthier upbringing for the children, and more opportunities and knowledge for the parents to do so successfully while becoming more responsible adults themselves.

Far from the security- and crime prevention-based concerns noted in structural municipal documents, then, the operation of biopower through the HCSOM's educational programmes shows no signs of backing up sovereign techniques of social ordering, securitisation, and exclusion within the life of the community at the micro level. Instead, the focus of these educational programmes is to improve living conditions and set children up for a more promising educational trajectory and better life chances.

### 7.2.2.2 *Sensitive policing: sovereign power in proximity*

A micro-scale perspective on the operation of sovereign power on its own can also offer further nuance to making sense of the relationships between sovereign power and biopower on the ground. As much as sovereign power displays itself in brutal and unjust ways in the containment of circulation and penal populist securitisation measures, its grounded manifestations can sometimes contradict this in surprising ways. Participants shared several stories of friendly and approachable community police officers in Lyukó, Avas, and the Numbered Streets alike, whose kindness towards marginalised residents helped to ameliorate suspicion and fear of authorities in these neighbourhoods (interviews with community worker, policymaker, and social workers). For instance, when an office was set up for the police in the HCSOM community building, there were initial fears about its potentially intimidating effects. A policymaker who used to work in Lyukó suggested that:

*“We really protested against the idea [...] but unsuccessfully so. And then I thought that when the police officers were there, then we might as well make them more sensitive about certain topics, so we cooked a lot with them, played table tennis, and tried to kind of change their thinking. And it was actually positive... we were really surprised at how positive some of their thoughts were”* (interview with policymaker).

The initial scepticism towards the police in the community building thus became allayed as officers showed openness towards becoming involved in local matters rather than acting as strict and hostile enforcers of the law. In this example, fear of sovereign power mellowed into friendly encounters with the officers as part of joint activities.

In recent years, the concept of ‘bringing policing closer to the people’ has, in fact, underpinned a paradigm shift in the work of the Municipal Police more generally (Miskolc City Council, 2019c; MIÖR, 2018). According to a recent report of MIÖR,

“Openness, earning residents’ trust, and getting the organisation accepted is necessary and indispensable. This cannot be achieved in any other way than with municipal guards who are adequately prepared, approachable to a necessary degree, almost live together with the area’s residents, and understand, sense, and adequately respond to the problems of the area.” (MIÖR, 2021a: 11, my translation).

This is a surprising change of thinking compared to the repressive inspection raids and evictions that MIÖR used to conduct in segregated communities before. The focus now appears to be on localised engagement and, in line with this shift, the formal enactment of sovereign power is likewise becoming tamed in proximity through the promotion of embeddedness in community life.

Although Lyukó is under-policed overall, as argued before (see Section 6.2 of Chapter 6), the rangers of MIÖR who do work there are often very socially sensitive and community friendly. The everyday work of the Municipal Police’s rangers in Lyukó, as well as their sympathy towards locals and collaboration with social workers, are even more telling examples of the ways that sovereign power softens on the ground and intersects with biopower in benign ways. As a social worker from the HCSOM explained,

*“We have a really, really good relationship with the rangers. They know everyone, and they’re very nice people, so they’re really socially sensitive. [...] So, it’s humans who are working here, and what somebody’s attitude is like, what they think, how they experience things, and how they relate to people, matter a lot here, I believe. And, amongst us, only the sympathetic remain. So, those who judge, or... have problems with accepting people who live in deep poverty, do not remain”* (interview with social worker).

Being open-minded, tolerant, and accepting thus forms an inherent part of rangers' work, regardless of their affiliation with the Municipal Police that had otherwise previously played a central role in the punitive and discriminatory top-down security measures, raids, and evictions.

Importantly, therefore, the fact that social workers maintain a close relationship with the rangers means that their work as mediators of biopower and sovereign power, respectively, becomes interlinked *through* social sensitivity. As a ranger noted,

*“I’d rather they spoke to the Maltese [the HCSOM] first before letting us know if there is a problem, to see if they have any solutions to it before things turn official. And, if they don’t have a solution, then let us know, so the process isn’t too drastic. [...] For instance, there was a family where only the mother was at home, she went to work at the municipal caretakers, and then the children were left at home. This was an offence since the children were left alone and exposed to danger. But the solution here was not to lock up the mother. Instead, they figured out that the two children could be taken down to the Malta in the morning, into an activities group. Because our way of sanctioning this is not going to solve the problem. [...] So, this cannot be done by the letter of the law”* (interview with ranger).

In the localised collaboration of social workers and rangers, the penal methods associated with the populist politics of security get completely recast as an embodied and humane representation of the authorities, rooted in local familiarity and an understanding of *and* towards the community.

The above discussed social sensitivity was foregrounded in a ranger's perspective on marginality in Lyukó more generally, including behaviours that are stigmatised from afar, as well as potential ways of addressing them (cf. Chapter 5). They advocated patience and constructive dialogue with locals whose behaviour is deemed problematic, rather than resorting to drastic responses, showing sympathy for precarity and associated difficulties:

*“In Lyukó, we must give [locals] an opportunity to catch up, and then have demands. So, for me, to put it crudely, if I sit down next to you saying that you must write in Latin, or I’ll whack you on the neck twice, then you won’t know how to write in Latin simply because of that. Only if I teach you... and then say this three years later. [...] There must be expectations, and they must be kept. But for that you need to provide a pathway where things work well”* (interview with ranger).

These fine-grained experiences reflect a deep sense of compassion towards the precarious lives and livelihoods of Lyukó, and thus defy the collective kinds of racial and territorial stigma that the rest of the city and its right-wing populist political interlocutors all too easily wield.

That said, it is important to note that neither do the rangers belong to the community itself since, for many of the local Roma, *“I am still a ‘Hungarian bastard’”* (interview with ranger), nor are they seen the same way as social workers. Instead, social divides remain due to rangers’ affiliation with the formal authorities, as well as their non-Roma identity. A ranger mentioned that *“if I go there in my uniform, I am the authority. And so, they won’t relate to me or behave in the same way as with a social worker, for instance. Because I don’t see the same things from the outside. [...] There is a kind of suspicion, so to say, of anything that is a bit official”* (interview with ranger). The quote shows that although the work of rangers on the ground can take place in socially sensitive ways, some unbridgeable divides nevertheless remain in terms of their reception in the community and role as formal representatives of the Municipal Police.

All in all, then, policing in proximity in Lyukó is replete with contrasts to the destructive, discriminatory, and racially infused application of sovereign power seen in the pre-2019 penal populist municipality’s securitisation campaign. Instead, there are more socially sensitive and down-to-earth manifestations of the work of the Municipal Police, whereby not only does sovereign power become sympathetically softened in the minutia of community relations, but also operates constructively in tandem with biopower – embodied by social workers and

charities – through a close collaboration on local community affairs (cf. Stanek, 2013). The examples discussed in this section urge us to understand sovereign power not merely through the parochial set of formal institutional measures and policy decisions at a distance, but also in the expressions of benevolence even amongst the oft-criticised law enforcement bodies. Without trying to idealise the work of the authorities, it is nonetheless crucial to remain reflexive about the counter-currents of what could otherwise be conveniently portrayed as a gigantic top-down security apparatus – an approach all too often taken for granted in structural critiques of urban segregation, revanchism, as well as the SDN (see, e.g., Davis, 1990; Smith, 1996; Wacquant, 2001; Duffield, 2010; Siman and Santos, 2018).

### **Concluding remarks: the silence of biopolitics?**

To overlook governing in proximity is to render silent the struggles and dedication of those who commit their lives to combatting marginality, as well as the very hopes, aspirations, and opportunities created for those supported. A classic SDN-based understanding that portrays biopolitics simply as a form of remote paternalism and strategic arm's length containment (Duffield, 2007, 2010) deprives Lyukó's social workers, mentors, and rangers of their voice and prevents us from seeing the more intricate and localised ways that social care can emerge past the simple dilemma of more state or less state (see Raco, 2009). That said, the purpose of this chapter was not to cast doubt on the overall arguments of the thesis around the racialised governance of segregation in Miskolc and the reproduction of exclusion. Instead, it merely sought to nuance simplified understandings of a uniformly discriminatory municipality by pointing out the presence of pro-welfare accounts in decision-making, as well as the situated benevolence that characterises the personal accounts of community workers in Lyukó Valley.

To remain attentive to the above nuance in the biopolitics of excluded surplus life in Lyukó, distance and proximity must therefore be jointly considered. Together, distance and proximity

form a scalar paradox since the caring motivations of localised social work – and even policing – are often diametrically opposed to exclusionary structural trends of hardening life-chance divides between the city’s better-off and the poor. In other words, the two domains encapsulate the oxymoronic co-presence of both hegemonic currents and localised contradictions thereof (see Di Muzio, 2008; Cox, 1999). The farther we view social services organisations from, the more we can identify their embeddedness in a broader institutional system, relations to a diminished welfare state, and a neoliberal strategy of utilising outsourced bare minimum provisions to contain poverty in marginalised areas of the city. In contrast, the more we begin to zoom in on the activities of social services organisations on the ground, including supplying basic provisions, education, and employment support, the more emancipatory dedication and selfless support we discover.

Looking at biopolitics alone, the lens of governing at a distance has shown that the purpose of outsourced social work as a development strategy is not to achieve complete provisioning and welfare support in Lyukó. Instead, actions are largely restricted to promoting self-reliance among some of the local population with bare minimum social services. In this arrangement, the HCSOM and MESZEGYI are only employed as part of a broader neoliberal tactic to sustain rather than bridge the city’s racialised life-chance divide. Deferred policy promises of the future emancipation of Lyukó’s population are coupled with individualised notions of self-responsibility and self-reliance, reflecting a governance shift from Lyukó as a territory to a fraction of its inhabitants without aiming to achieve collective improvements to their living standards. The incomplete delegation of social protection to the HCSOM and MESZEGYI reflects the semi-abandonment of Lyukó’s predominantly Roma community, whose collective life chances therefore continue to lag behind the city’s developed majority. The extent to which this governance shift is a consciously orchestrated municipal strategy becomes questionable,

though, considering recent inconsistencies around the localisation of state services in the valley and its potential effects on locals' further seclusion from Miskolc's internal territory.

Governing in proximity, in contrast, allowed us to see that proxy organisations are not active facilitators of the life-chance divide between Lyukó and most other parts of Miskolc, since social workers themselves are caught up in a struggle with the area's inhumane conditions, limited available resources, and poor pay. Consequently, they are arguably more on the receiving end of insufficiently outsourced state provisions themselves than they are mediators thereof. Furthermore, and crucially, the devotion, sympathy, and personal involvement of social workers and mentors in the daily matters and challenges of community life make them genuinely believe in the difference that every small gesture can make to the lives of the poor. Through helping locals with essential provisions and teaching them key skills, the incentive to make people more self-reliant against the tough circumstances of Lyukó reflects humane sensitivity rather than paternalistic tutelage or a conscious inculcation of neoliberal self-responsibility aimed at perpetuating a divided social order.

The chapter has further claimed that as much as sovereign power and biopower function together at a distance to reproduce Lyukó's marginalised externality, their structural unison crumbles in the micro-scale dynamics of community engagement. From afar, social services organisations appear to operate as biopolitical valves of Lyukó's internal tensions, informality, abandonment, and welfare crisis, with the purpose of keeping such threats in check locally and preventing them from spreading to other parts of the city. This way, the proxy organisations reinforce the exclusionary circulatory order established through the punitive wielding of sovereign power, which is further buttressed and normalised through a veneer of depoliticised expert management. However, in proximity, social workers' pride in the progress of children attending the HCSOM's educational spaces, for instance, displays no resonances with the ways that municipal crime prevention policy discusses education as a means of improving the city's

security. Furthermore, sovereign power's situated operation is also characterised by patience and social sensitivity rather than retribution, thus collaborating constructively with biopower on the ground. Members of the authorities themselves, including police officers and rangers, have also shown remarkable openness, familiarity, and compassion with the precarity and struggles of the local population in Lyukó.

Overall, however, while such gestures of kindness may matter in the proximate spaces, they are undeniably insular and minor scale, and therefore do not fundamentally disrupt the overall logic of relegating and restricting racialised poverty to the neglected peripheries of the city. At a distance, the precarious status quo seems structurally constant in Lyukó, at least for the time being. Whether the work of social services organisations is merely covering up a ticking time bomb of a deeper social crisis in the valley is impossible to assess at this point (cf. Havasi, 2018). What we can see nevertheless is that the state is playing a dangerous game in trying to maintain the city's separation from Lyukó, both spatially and in terms of constrained welfare provisions, which are conducive to the conservation of the valley's underdevelopment. In the absence of satisfactory social services and provisioning coverage in Lyukó, manifold poverty-related problems remain, and it is only a fraction of the local population whose lives the charities can meaningfully influence. Nonetheless, this impact is essential to maintaining some degree of balance in the area that is sufficient for upholding the city's current social order.

Rather than simply fixating on biopower's neoliberal wrongdoings, though, it is also just as important a scholarly responsibility to assess where and how change is possible, even if such openings are minor. In the minutia of community work in Lyukó is a silence to biopower, operating far away from the public eye and beyond stigmatising public and political discourses. Indeed, when power is deployed overtly through repressive forcefulness, it is not difficult to notice. However, its softer, more subtle, and productive expressions play just as important a role in governing urban development (Foucault, 1979; Cruikshank, 1999; Menichelli, 2015).

Does this silence hold some promise for challenging the extreme degrees of racialised social exclusion in the city, thereby slowly beginning to heal the fractured marks that right-wing populist securitisation interventions left on Miskolc's social fabric? Although there is no intention here whatsoever to romanticise the under-provisioning and relative abandonment of Lyukó's impoverished surplus population, the aim in raising these points is, instead, to think further about the possibilities that governing from a proximity might hold and identify the very few hopes and opportunities for emancipatory gestures that are still left.

Of course, we must remember that no quest towards ameliorating poverty can ever escape "the very systems that generate and perpetuate poverty" (Berner and Phillips, 2005: 25), and we cannot expect spectacular and wholesale enhancements to Lyukó's conditions that would rapidly annihilate marginality altogether. Instead, what remains is some cautious hope for optimism that, as a result of the post-2019 municipality's greater emphasis on inclusion and community engagement (see Chapter 5), the current favouring of individual lives and small-scale development in Lyukó over collective wellbeing becomes less pronounced over time (see Kamat, 2004). Although the current municipality still has to carefully negotiate racialised hostility, populist pressures, and the security deadlock explored in the previous chapter, their emancipatory stance leaves us with some faith in the gradual betterment of Miskolc's polarised urban landscape and development divide today.

## 8. Conclusion

How the notions of security and development are understood in different areas of governance and daily life is central to the evolution of urban landscapes today. Defining what and who count as secure and developed as opposed to dangerous and backwards, and deciding what to do about them, is a political matter through and through (see O'Malley, 1996). This study has drawn upon penal and social policy as two fundamental domains through which security and development are being jointly negotiated. These negotiations not only entail the implementation of policy measures, however, but also their ideological underpinnings, paths to gaining legitimacy, choices around degrees of explicitness, limits to municipal governance, electoral expectations, social relations, the racialisation of poverty, the nature of the political playing field, the extent of governance centralisation, welfare provisions, local history, and many other associated questions.

With these complexities in mind, looking at the interlinked areas of penal and social policy through an urbanised version of the security-development nexus helps us to make sense of the governance of socio-spatial divides in today's unequal cities. This study has adapted Duffield's (2010) dual SDN framework to the city level as a conceptual toolkit that intersects penal and social policy rather than staying parochially confined to either domain. As the two policy areas are co-constitutive, their proportionality, as well as the political agendas they are enrolled in, are telling indicators of the trends and prospects of the governance of segregation in a given urban context.

The thesis has told a story of a racially polarised and politically contested city, where social fractures have been drastically magnified in the last decade through concerted municipal actions. Choices around security and development in the politics, policy, and everyday life of Miskolc have been wrapped up in a punitive atmosphere of hostility towards the city's largely impoverished Roma minority. Consequently, dichotomous delineations of safety versus threat,

decency versus incivility, order versus chaos, among other similar notions, have become deeply racialised. The use of law enforcement to establish order and get rid of the Roma has been greatly favoured over more sophisticated and deeply rooted emancipatory agendas. Although widely endorsed and conducive to speedy popularity gains, the inspection raids, evictions, and investments in policing have only served to accentuate racialised segregation in the city, which now forebodes a deepening welfare crisis as a result. The importance of this thesis therefore lies precisely in highlighting the continually unresolved and intensifying extent of Roma segregation in Miskolc and far beyond, the ongoing dominance of right-wing populist rhetoric and the popularity of Roma-phobic views in Hungary, and the lack of political will to come to terms with racialised marginality.

More broadly, the thesis has contributed to dialogues between political geography and urban geography through mobilising concepts of the former to understand the processes of the latter. In other words, the urbanisation of the SDN is as much about advancing political geographies of the urban as it is about the urban geographies of the political. This study has therefore furthered an urban account of the political geographical concepts of power, state, sovereignty, territoriality, boundaries, circulations, biopolitics, scale, and othering, as they translate into and operate within a city in often comparable ways to international security and development agendas, but in denser and more compact settings (see Painter, 2015; Jeffrey, 2015; cf. Graham, 2004; Weizman, 2007). Without necessarily thinking about warfare, peacekeeping, and fortified aid compounds, however, these concepts have retained their analytical purchase in the somewhat softer and less militaristic processes of urban social ordering and the strategies employed for the maintenance of racialised segregation. Consequently, the urban SDN perspective advocated in this research project concurs with broader and otherwise longstanding political geographical interventions that argue for moving beyond the level of nation-states as fixed territorialised containers of power, and instead

recognising the fluidity of a multitude of geographical realities where power operates, including in local and municipal governance (Agnew, 1994; Painter, 2008).

This concluding chapter starts by revisiting the main findings of the thesis structured around the three research questions, then remarks on the limitations of the research approach taken, discusses conceptual implications and potential future research avenues emerging from this study, and finally evaluates what the findings mean for the future outlook of Miskolc.

## **8.1 Findings**

Research enquiry in this thesis was developed with the motivation to critically analyse the governance of Roma segregation in Miskolc. Rather than reiterating the key messages of each chapter, the discussion of findings is instead organised along the three research questions of the project (see Section 1.7 in the Introduction chapter), thereby drawing together responses from across the thesis in a more systematic way.

### *8.1.1 Research question 1: how is segregation in Miskolc understood in the governance, politics, and daily life of the city?*

In the identification and narration of segregation, the domains of politics, policy, and the public all feed into each other in a hegemonic circle of truth-making around who and what count as secure and dangerous, or developed and underdeveloped. The production of such labels is shot through with racialised stigma towards the Roma of Miskolc, whose marginalisation and concomitant scapegoating for the city's ills were paradigmatic of post-socialist societal polarisation following the shrinkage of the labour market and the welfare state. Slim class differences between the Roma and the non-Roma poor led to the latter's radicalisation to defer stigma onto the former on exclusively racial grounds, which far-right political interlocutors capitalised on considerably (see Csepeli and Örkény, 2015).

The Roma therefore became the city's disorderly and backwards criminals in popular imagination and have been targets of far-right political hatred speech, everyday racism, and widespread discrimination. Rather than being mere verbal and written articulations of racialised hostility, such narratives produce material ramifications as they continue to underscore and perpetuate the Roma's social disadvantages and spatial segregation. Meanwhile, pro-Roma standpoints have failed to gain traction in the city and are therefore rapidly side-lined or remain under the surface. Critiquing racially fuelled public, political, and governance attitudes is therefore paramount for researchers and practitioners alike, considering that such discourses continue to dictate mainstream thinking today, granting legitimacy to policies that deepen the realities of Roma discrimination (see Kerezsi and Gosztonyi, 2014).

Importantly, then, the notions of security and development are closely entwined in the narration of racialised life-chance divides in the city, as negative connotations of both concepts are central to the production derogatory anti-Roma grammars and prejudice (see van Baar, 2018). As discussed in Chapter 5, the discursive production of life-chance divides between the non-Roma majority and the Roma minority could be traced in framings of behaviour, criminality, and territoriality.

On the behavioural front, there are frequent developmentalist references to the disorderly, uncivilised, bothersome, lazy, and welfare-dependent characteristics of the Roma in the public vernacular, which compromise mingling opportunities with the non-Roma majority and feed into extensive discrimination in many areas of life. Furthermore, dichotomous municipal policy distinctions between acceptable and intolerable conduct in the so-called Cohabitation Codex (Miskolc City Council, 2020e), for example, can inform and trigger worryingly demagogic political campaigns about the nuisances and dangers that the undesirable behaviour of certain groups may pose to the 'decent' majority (see Chapter 6 on how notions of improper conduct were mobilised to justify inspection raids and evictions).

Closely linked to framings of behavioural deviance is the Roma's widespread association with crime and delinquency in public thinking and right-wing populist rhetoric. The political foregrounding of public security as one of the city's most pressing concerns cannot be detached from the criminalisation of unwanted behaviours in a racially fractured urban landscape. In fact, the vilified public image of the Roma has long driven a competition for electoral popularity in the city, whereby both left- and right-wing politicians are keen to trumpet Roma-phobic slogans and advocate punitive measures to do away with racial frictions and unwanted spatial patterns of cohabitation. In doing so, however, politicians themselves are immensely responsible for entrenching racial tensions and enduring demonisations of Roma criminality. Additionally, such perceptions have filtrated into crime prevention policy, which sets many of its priorities along life-chance divides in the city, and also includes some stigmatising references to segregated neighbourhoods (Miskolc City Council, 2021f). Indeed, labelling the Roma as a security concern paves the way to the legitimisation of extraordinary responses to defend the supposedly decent non-Roma majority against them (see Csepeli, 2008; Wæver, 1995; Schwell, 2014; Kotics, 2020). The prevalence of racialised perceptions of security in all three discursive domains in question (public, political, and governance), thus contributes to the continued materialisation and deepening of the Roma's seclusion.

Territoriality is likewise central to the ways segregation is understood in the studied discursive realms since it renders spatially concrete the above discussed behavioural deficiencies and criminalisation. Examples from public discourse include magnified stereotypes of disorder and unsafety in poor neighbourhoods such as Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets, which are often despised as aberrant and to be avoided. Roma people also face territorial exclusion from the urban core, as seen through the denial of their access to nightclubs in the centre, for example. As regards municipal decision-making, segregation is measured and standardised in disembodied ways in official policy documents, making it a

subject of numbers and metrics rather than situated human struggles and community-level challenges. This approach is bound up with the tactic of deliberately keeping Lyukó away from the city through its designation as external territory, the legal disavowal of provisioning responsibilities, and the consequent conservation of the area's neglect. As also discussed in Chapter 7, these strategies are particularly traceable in the municipality's post-welfarist attitude of patchily delegated social provisions in Lyukó, and the arm's length governance of the area with the aim of conserving the containment of populations considered residual.

For ongoing debates on the neoliberal city, the above findings suggest that the links between social stigma, party politics, and decision-making must be carefully assessed in conjunction. The nature of these links can be indicative of whether the governance of urban social divides is underpinned by discriminatory or emancipatory visions and why. Furthermore, in critically analysing the damaging effects of punitive public and political discourses on Miskolc's racial fault lines, the findings show the wider importance of researching right-wing populist urbanism and its relationships with race and segregation. Additional inquiry in this direction could usefully compare the social and material outcomes of urban governance in an illiberal political setting, including Hungary, as opposed to liberal democratic contexts in other parts of the world, in a more systematic and targeted way. Finally, the findings highlight the central role of political geographical concept of territoriality for understanding the spatially uneven orchestration of social exclusion in urban cores and peripheries.

*8.1.2 Research question 2: in what ways are these understandings reflected in municipal approaches to penal and social policy, especially in view of right-wing populist politics in Miskolc and Hungary?*

In essence, the city's right-wing populist leadership of the previous decade followed a penal approach to dealing with racialised life-chance divides in Miskolc, thereby echoing the national

government's pro-policing stance. The bolstering of public security in the city came hand in hand with the steady undermining of social security. Against a heightened emphasis on securitisation, penal policy became heavily politicised (Chapter 6), while social policy was depoliticised (Chapter 7). Whereas a penal policy approach resorting to drastic displacements and securitisation interventions is geared towards short-sighted political gains, the inconvenient and unpopular matters of social provisioning for the Roma are best kept quiet from electoral campaigns and detached from municipal responsibilities (see Havasi, 2018; cf. Tulumello, 2018). That said, both policy domains are ultimately politically orchestrated, since the national government also closely oversaw the restricted outsourcing of social policy to the HCSOM at the expense of a plurality of other pro-Roma organisations who are less politically friendly towards the government (Polgár Alapítvány et al., 2020). More importantly, though, from a structural point of view, both penal and social policy serve the same strategy of displacing the city's undesirable Roma from central neighbourhoods and containing them at the fringes.

#### *8.1.2.1 Penal policy*

A ramped-up penal policy in the last decade was accompanied by a blaring ethno-populist political rhetoric that struck a chord with popular stereotypes around the Roma's incivility and threatening presence to the rest of the city. In some cases, the Fidesz municipal administration did not even shy away from articulating explicitly racist sentiments to garner popularity in an electoral environment shot through with Romaphobia, as seen in the cases of the Avas and Numbered Streets evictions. While the police raids and slum clearances involved a plenitude of human rights infringements, the voices of pro-Roma organisations were repressed, and court rulings against the municipality were cold comfort to the hundreds of Roma families already evicted. As a result of slum clearances and mass displacements from Avas and the Numbered

Streets, many of the city's marginalised Roma are now concentrated in the faraway peripheries of Lyukó Valley, out of sight, out of mind.

Besides slum clearances, the enlargement of the Municipal Police (MIÖR) and the construction of the city's smart CCTV network and operations control room are also key reflections of the pre-2019 local government's obsession with public security. The increased surveillance and physical patrolling of public spaces have served to improve safety records by ruling out unacceptable conduct and, more importantly, guarding the post-evictions social order (cf. Fassin, 2014). However, the penal enforcement of a right-wing populist vision of exclusionary urban development is moving towards a security deadlock. Racialised securitisation and the spatial entrenchment of life-chance divides through the exporting of poverty to Lyukó prescribed a path for the city's future trajectory in the form of security-as-development. In this setup, security is both a means and an end to protecting the realm of development from the destabilising manifestations of surplus life. As a result, the city administration is now caught in a trap, whereby significant curtailments to the Municipal Police carries the risk of rapidly undermining the city's illusory security improvements. This would, in turn, grant right-wing populists a straightforward opportunity to return to power in the city. Consequently, the ideological will of Fidesz has been imposed upon subsequent leaders irrespective of their affiliation and, even with an oppositional local government today, populist pressures continue to bubble under cautious emancipatory intentions (see also Section 5.5 of Chapter 5).

#### *8.1.2.2 Social policy*

By way of reverse association, a bolstered security apparatus comes with a modest social policy sector, as traceable in the quasi-abandonment and remote containment of the city's segregated Roma, particularly in Lyukó Valley, which is now the largest segregated

neighbourhood in Hungary (see Chapters 3 and 7). Social services are severely underfunded and outsourced to two proxy organisations, namely, the HCSOM and MESZEGYI. These bodies have largely taken over the delivery of social services in Lyukó as a secondary provisioning circuit beyond the remit of the state. At the policy level, there appears to be no inclination to facilitate large-scale and complex development programmes that could collectively improve the life chances of the city's segregated Roma. Instead, the aim is to keep the unwanted and threatening surplus population away from the internal territories of Miskolc (cf. Duffield, 2007). Now that many of the impoverished Roma have been displaced to a single part of the city's exterior, it is easier to simply keep them there rather than having to do something meaningful about ameliorating their poverty.

Furthermore, the outsourcing of social protection has largely resulted in the depoliticization of social policy matters, and a seeming detachment from right-wing populist agendas. The inconvenient political questions of addressing marginality at its heart – or, rather, a failure to do so – have been hidden from the public eye and removed from mainstream politics through the delegation of emancipatory responsibilities to the buffer organisations of the HCSOM and MESZEGYI, whose expertise in community work and empowerment is claimed to transcend political antagonism (Havasi, 2018; see Rancière, 1999). By commissioning proxies to deal with marginality, the local government can thus deflect populist criticisms over 'backing the deviant', and at the same time convert the maintenance of minimal provisions into a tick-box exercise. This depoliticization further contributes to the normalisation of a new landscape of social exclusion, alongside the security deadlock. In rendering a previously deeply politically charged topic a matter of expert management and remote development efforts, the formerly conscious political strategy of entrenching and conserving segregation may, concerningly, become less contested and challenged over time (see Schwell, 2014).

At the *policy level*, then, a focus on public security and a neglect of social security are therefore co-constitutive of a socially polarised neoliberal urban landscape now also marked by a spatially distinct racialised life-chance divide between the Roma of Lyukó and the non-Roma of internal Miskolc. This exclusionary pattern is not entirely clear, however, as many Roma continue to live in internal Miskolc, and not all Roma are poor, but there is a broad trend of concentrating marginality in one place.

That said, ongoing debates on the localisation of services in Lyukó and associated concerns of keeping the area connected to the rest of the city, rather than further segregating it, suggest that there are dissonances within what might come across as uniformly exclusionary tendencies in municipal social policy (Chapter 7). Furthermore, the local government is not in complete control over what is otherwise a nationally hollowed-out social policy sector (see Zolnay, 2005; Havasi, 2018; Kotics, 2020). Instead, its manoeuvring room is restricted to either attenuating or aggravating socio-spatial segregation, given its budgetary limits against a nationally centralised governance structure (see Chapter 3; Ladányi, 2010 [1989]; Bárándy, 2014; Fekete, 2017). Additionally, it is pressured not to support emancipatory agendas in an anti-Roma electoral atmosphere (see Chapter 5).

The analysis of penal and social policy in Miskolc tells us more broadly that politics drives and defines the SDN. The right-wing populist municipality have manipulated dominant understandings and realities of security and development in the city according to their own political visions, which are now fiercely reflected in the urban fabric through entrenched segregation and the centrality of policing to upholding the city's social order. An SDN perspective thus needs to carefully assess what aspects of security and development are being politicised or depoliticised and to what ends. In the case of Miskolc, penal policy became overtly politicised to gain electoral popularity through punishing the stigmatised Roma, while social policy was depoliticised to render invisible the inconvenience of dealing with the root

causes of displaced poverty. Additionally, evaluating where the state is active or passive in negotiating its agendas of security and development can also be revealing of the political dimensions of the SDN. In Miskolc, the municipality's active involvement in securitising the urban core and relative passivity around the fringes both in terms of policing and welfare support shows a particular constellation of action and inaction in consolidating right-wing populist interests. In short, then, the SDN is political through and through, which empirical analyses need to consider in its complexity.

*8.1.3 Research question 3: how, in whose interest, and to what effect is power operationalised in the municipality's responses to segregation in the above two policy domains?*

Following Duffield's (2010) dual interpretive framework of the SDN, the implementation of penal policy was understood as fundamentally a matter of sovereign power and the control of circulations (see also Foucault, 2007). Social policy, by contrast, was conceptualised through the operation of biopower. Key to answering this research question was, therefore, a critical appraisal of the *nature* of these two forms of power, both separately and together, including their enrolment in and service of particular political agendas, as well as their occasionally contradictory co-production of racialised exclusion at different scales. In what follows, the 'how' and 'to what effect' parts of the question are drawn together before the 'whose interest' element is addressed separately.

*8.1.3.1 The nature and effects of the two forms of power*

To consider sovereign power first, there is a distinctively circulatory dimension to its penal mobilisation in Miskolc, which has evolved in a progressive fashion. The populist municipality's security interventions were legitimised not only through social and territorial stigma per se, but also through the framing of stigmatised groups and territories as threats to

the security of surrounding parts and residents of the city who were deemed developed, civilised, and law-abiding. To effect changes to this allegedly undesirable status quo, the municipality mobilised sovereign power to first disrupt existing patterns of circulation by gradually mounting pressure on impoverished Roma dwellers through raids, and then through forcible evictions and slum clearances. Second, it diverted destabilising circulations of underdevelopment and incivility. Securitisation efforts have become focused on internal parts of the city, now including the Numbered Streets, whereas Lyukó still receives little attention. This disparity, in turn, further pushes ostensible incivility from the internal territories outwards into the city's abandoned external semi-rural slum. Third, the new circulatory order is now being maintained to prevent the demonised and allegedly dangerous Roma from re-entering the city *en masse*, whereas the circulation of the city's supposedly rightful non-Roma inhabitants are to be enabled to a maximum extent. The bolstered security interventions through the enlargements of the Municipal Police and the rollout of the smart CCTV network now maintain a façade of a more aesthetic and orderly urban interior, with marginality looming unresolved on the peripheries. Viewed through the lens of sovereign power, the maintenance of circulation has thus become an integral component to the previously summarised security deadlock.

As opposed to the repressive top-down application of sovereign power, which has carried a clear objective of social ordering, biopower's operation and relationship to racialised marginality is caught in a paradox between distance and proximity. Although at a distance biopower echoes the exclusionary entrenchment of life-chance divides and the punitive top-down operation of sovereign power, in proximity it challenges such motivations through care and devotion (see Foucault, 2001). This argument underlines the significance of scale for advancing more refined SDN-based analyses in future research. In doing so, it cautions against repeatedly and predictably arriving at the same conclusions of traditional SDN and development literatures around the exclusionary biopolitical management of remote surplus populations

without considering the intricacies of governance at the macro and micro levels alike (see more on this later in Section 8.3).

At a distance, the insufficient outsourcing of social protection to proxy organisations reinforces the aim of rendering Lyukó's surplus population self-reliant, whereby the containment of poverty through minimal provisions, a shift from collective to individual life support, and the perpetual postponement of development promises for the area all signify a refusal to address the root causes of deprivation at the structural level (see Duffield, 2010; Kamat, 2004). The operation of biopower from afar could be likened to a biopolitical valve that keeps the security threats associated with Lyukó's social tensions, informality, and territorial abandonment at a convenient distance, thus reinforcing patterns of sovereign power's circulatory adjustments discussed in Chapter 6 and summarised above. For example, education, according to municipal crime prevention policy, plays a vital role in the foreclosure of juvenile delinquency and occupies youngsters in purposeful ways, thereby combatting crime early on and improving the city's security overall (see Section 7.2.2.1 of Chapter 7). The effects of biopower, when considered from the perspective of governing at a distance, are therefore in line with the accentuation of segregation trends facilitated through evictions and security measures. In what could be described as the strategic biopolitical containment of Lyukó's concentrated surplus life, a mounting social crisis is being hazardously balanced and may eventually become detrimental to the city's development if continually ignored down the line.

Unlike municipal-scale social policy, however, the workings of biopower in proximity are far more complicated and add nuance to our SDN-based understandings of the governance of segregation. The situated devotion of social workers and mentors in Lyukó shows little resonance with exclusionary political motivations, given that they support families and even employ locals while battling with a shortage of resources and poor salaries themselves. The sensitivity of rangers likewise challenges repressive associations with sovereign power since

they show understanding and compassion towards marginality rather than merely seeking to punish it forcefully. In this sense, there are profound contradictions between a sweeping populist politics of racialised exclusion and a genuine sense of sympathy for the difficulties of poverty at the micro scale.

#### *8.1.3.2 On the interests served*

As for punitive interests geared towards entrenching segregation, there is a chicken-and-egg dynamic of public and political anti-Roma sentiments feeding off each other. While it is difficult to pinpoint a single culprit in this vicious cycle (see Section 5.2.2 of Chapter 5), we may nevertheless argue that the non-Roma public – being either silent or in favour of penal measures in most cases (see Boda et al., 2015) – and the political sphere jointly constitute a pro-exclusion camp that supports current arrangements of a bolstered penal apparatus and a dialled-down social sector (see Chapters 5 and 6). On the receiving end of punitive public sentiments, racialised political frenzy, and the corresponding wielding of sovereign power to revanchist ends before 2019, are the persecuted Roma, as well as the enfeebled pro-Roma human rights organisations (see Chapter 6).

Although the above domains of interest are more or less distinctive, and so are their relationships to sovereign power and biopower, social services organisations are caught in a paradoxical sense of in-betweenness, which adds some complexity to an otherwise gloomy overall picture of the containment of racialised poverty in Lyukó (Chapter 7). Although the HCSOM and MESZEGYI are structurally embedded in the state's outsourced social provisioning system – paradigmatic of the neoliberal retreat of the welfare state and rising inequalities –, governing in proximity reflects a different set of individual interests on the ground. Social workers and mentors celebrate every small achievement with locals in terms of community engagement and education, for instance, and commit their lives to helping those in

need, rather than pursuing some form of paternalistic appropriation or merely acting as mediators of exclusionary agendas with a humanistic guise (cf. Duffield, 2007).

Moreover, challenging discriminatory and segregating political interests on the ground is not only visible in the situated manifestations of biopower alone, but also in its joint operation with sovereign power, as social workers and rangers collaborate with the community closely and in socially sensitive ways. Proximity hence blurs the line between the interests that particular individuals, groups, or interventions are supposed to serve. However, emancipatory interactions and commitments are minor scale, and although they make a difference to some members of the community locally, they are too small to provide the necessary support for improving underprivileged life chances and challenging the city's spatially isolated social order in the grand scheme of things.

In respect of broader debates on the SDN, these findings underline the potential of engaging more closely with the empirical dimensions of circulations. Existing accounts of the SDN tend to consider circulation simply as a matter of enabling the movement of the desirable and disabling that of the unwanted surplus population through territorial exclusion and containment (e.g., Duffield, 2007, 2010; De Larrinaga and Doucet, 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; van Baar, 2018). However, these studies are less attentive to the shifting spatiality and temporality of circulations themselves as a result of the different kinds of penal interventions involved. Rather than a static given, landscapes of circulatory exclusion are actively produced, shaped, reconfigured, and fine-tuned over time through a variety of material strategies and political decisions. It is these questions that the analysis of the exercise of sovereign power in Miskolc's penal policy, and the progressive phases through which it rearranged circulations in the city, has considered more closely, thereby inviting future SDN research to further expedite similar lines of inquiry.

Furthermore, this study responds to conversations on the biopolitical management of surplus populations in the urban and global borderlands in emphasising the crucial role of scale. It largely echoes overarching critiques of governing at a distance, which suggest that biopower strategically contributes to the containment of poverty without addressing it and aims to make surplus populations self-reliant within their territorial confines through bare minimum social provisioning. Without seeking to fundamentally challenge this argument, the findings nonetheless point towards a need to nuance the overall picture of exclusion by recognising emancipatory and welfarist thinking in both policy and local-scale social work with marginalised communities.

## **8.2 Limitations of research approach and findings**

As is the case with any approach, the research perspective and findings of this study entail a set of conceptual, methodological, and practical limitations that demand some reflections. First, the social and political context of this research impose heavy restraints on the practical impacts of the thesis. Upon discussing my research with different people across the PhD journey, including friends, family, and research participants, I was repeatedly asked about what my proposed solutions were to addressing segregation in Miskolc. I would normally say that my research is highly unlikely to resolve racialised exclusion. “*So, what’s the point then, if you don’t offer a solution?*”, some would ask in turn. All I could answer to this was that there would be a range of emancipatory ways out of segregation and discrimination, but unfortunately, they are not in the interests of the political and economic elite. Welfarist and inclusionary endeavours are also considerably hindered by a centralised right-wing populist governance structure with limited resources available to local governments and the social sector, which are unlikely to gain traction in a hostile and anti-Roma political climate in the city as well as the country more broadly (see Chapters 5 and 6).

These constraints notwithstanding, in today's illiberal Hungary, it is more important than ever to speak up against oppression and maintain shrinking conduits of political dissent, which are paramount to any democracy and need to be kept alive. We must continue to articulate our critique of injustice and support emancipatory groups in their work to ensure that their voice remains heard, rather than staying silent or, worse still, providing any form of legitimacy for continued injustice (Kovai, 2017; Lukács, 2010).

To disseminate my findings, I will circulate an executive summary of the project to policymakers and experts, containing some of the main issues discussed in this thesis in a condensed and accessible fashion. In doing so, I hope that the key messages of the thesis are delivered to the municipality and the social charities to offer them a critical social researcher's perspective on the governance of racialised segregation, and that these messages will prompt some further thinking and consideration.

Apart from the above, the arguments on governing in proximity could have been further advanced through an ethnographic and embedded community study of social work. Overall, my choice of methods and data collection techniques were more suited to a structural critique of penal and social policy than an in-depth localised perspective. On the one hand, social workers, mentors, and rangers all offered some pivotal insights into their daily challenges and perspectives on segregation. On the other hand, these encounters only provided glimpses into a highly complex world, which could have been understood in more nuanced ways through getting involved with the work of charities personally, such as helping with community events and donations, rather than merely arranging visits and interviews (cf. Section 4.6 of Chapter 4 on the caveats of ethnographic enquiry in this research).

From a conceptual and practical point of view, whereas the SDN is a comprehensive framework attuned to the mutuality of penal and social policy, as well as the operation of sovereign power and biopower in the governance of urban segregation, this very

comprehensiveness may also prove too broad for smaller studies. In many cases, social and penal policy have been studied separately before (see Chapter 2 for a review of the relevant literature). However, looking at both of them makes it difficult to achieve depth over breadth in less extensive research outputs such as journal articles or conference papers, given the manifold building blocks of situating an urban SDN-based enquiry. As seen throughout, the SDN draws heavily upon concepts from political geography (e.g., sovereignty, security, territory, circulation, boundaries, biopower and -politics, self-reliance, life-chance divides, insured and uninsured life) to formulate an analysis. Coupled with debates on the neoliberal city when downscaled to the urban level, we thus arrive at an eclectic kaleidoscope of different conceptual traditions that requires extensive unpacking to be applied effectively. A monograph of this length provides ample room for such an endeavour, but shorter projects or outputs would most likely have to sacrifice either detail or comprehensiveness. For instance, in their journal article, Giorgi and Pinkus (2006) have taken a similar dual approach to critiquing sovereign power and biopower in urban settings, but looking at both themes prevented them from exploring either in real detail.

### **8.3 Implications of findings for future research**

The main conceptual contribution of this thesis is that it has ‘urbanised’ the SDN. Although the application of the SDN in cities is not unprecedented, a systematic theoretical approach to downscaling has been absent from the literature thus far. Crucially, this adapted analytical framework has allowed for an integrated perspective on the governance of urban segregation that considers the exercise, nature, and implications of both sovereign power and biopower as two profoundly co-constitutive domains. As both penal and social policy are key to making sense of segregation, a theoretical approach that jointly takes them into account and analyses their co-production of marginality in neoliberal cities, rather than treating them separately, is

similarly vital. The urbanised SDN can therefore aid future research in formulating more comprehensive and relational critiques of the politics and governance of socio-spatial inequality in neoliberal urban landscapes.

Besides its integrated vantage point, though, what difference does an SDN perspective make to existing analyses of urban inequality? Is it just another way of looking at the neoliberal city? My answer is both yes and no. Although it discusses many of the same processes and mechanisms, it does so in arguably more dynamic and flexible ways. For example, it sees circulations rather than just seclusion, punishment, displacement, and fortification, and engages with multi-scalar biopolitics as opposed to the mere outsourcing of the welfare state and the remote management of urban surplus life. Furthermore, as noted earlier, an urban SDN draws upon a political geographical vocabulary for making sense of urban divides in a way that is more attuned to the multifarious characteristics of sovereign power and biopower in enacting penal and social policy and producing urban landscapes of exclusion. Additionally, it reflects on the interplay of the two forms of power as they operate in tandem, thus yielding a more multi-layered set of findings (see Section 2.4.4 in Chapter 2, as well as Section 7.2 in Chapter 7).

In terms of its transferability, the urban SDN framework's relationships with the general and the particular constitute a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the theory can be applied universally to just about any city across the world, especially in capitalist contexts. This could well be considered a strength, since it is a relatively standard lens that is conducive to comparisons within (see the juxtaposition of Lyukó Valley and the Numbered Streets in Section 6.2 of Chapter 6; see also McFarlane et al., 2017) as well as between cities (cf. Ward, 2010; Peck, 2015; Robinson, 2016). However, with the standardised nature of the SDN comes a substantial drawback. The fixation of SDN debates on the injustices of neoliberalism makes it difficult to reach radically different conclusions from the 'playbook' arguments of Duffield

(2007, 2010) and others. In this sense, a universal application of the SDN hence runs the risk of merely reiterating the exclusionary nature of sovereign power and biopower in outlawing undesirable circulations and containing surplus life at a distance. Put differently, the SDN is stronger at critiquing the general (i.e., neoliberal trends writ large) than it is suitable for arriving at highly original findings through the particular.

It is for the above reason that scale is crucial for further developing the SDN as a whole in proactive ways to prevent it from becoming repetitive. As shown in this research through the downscaling of Duffield's (2010) critique to the urban level (Chapter 3), as well as making the case for governing in proximity rather than only at a distance (Chapter 7), there is plenty of space for extending the scalar dimensions of this conceptual framework to produce more novel findings. In taking scale seriously, the study can inform existing SDN scholarship by underlining the importance of local dynamics and contextual complications, such as dominant political ideologies, the extent to which municipal governance is centralised in a given setting, how socially and economically divided a particular city is, who the key actors are, what structural and local interests they represent, and so on. A complex view of such multi-scalar considerations allows us to appreciate the intricacies and possible countercurrents to commonly identified tactics pertaining to the maintenance of life-chance divides in and across urban communities and neighbourhoods.

Moreover, it was beyond the scope of this study to theoretically advance the concept of illiberal urbanism, which could present a productive area of inquiry (see Luger, forthcoming). Although the thesis has attended to the characteristics, logics, and manoeuvres of right-wing populism against the backdrop of illiberal statecraft in the governance of segregation in Miskolc, more conceptual interventions are needed on the broader relationships between illiberalism and the city. Apart from the study's largely empirical reflections on this intersection, there remain crucial questions around whether it makes sense to speak of the

‘illiberal city’ as such, and if so, how, and along what parameters it should be defined, and what sets it apart from (neo)liberal cities elsewhere. Can the illiberal city be understood as part of the broader category of neoliberal cities, or are the overlaps only partial? Who governs the illiberal city, if there is such a thing, and what are the key manifestations of authoritarian tendencies therein? Identifying and theorising convergences with and divergences from the extensive urban geographical debates on the neoliberal city can become an abundant and exciting conceptual field, which could, in turn, inform many subsequent empirical studies on the topic.

#### **8.4 The outlook for Miskolc**

The findings speak back to Miskolc’s decision-making and outlook on segregation, and also carry broader messages for the governance of other cities in Hungary and Europe, especially in relation to the two contextual building blocks of the study, namely, the Roma and right-wing populism (see Section 1.6 of the Introduction chapter).

To be sure, Miskolc’s prospects for social inclusion are bleak as it stands. Against a right-wing populist government that endorses top-down policymaking and a pro-policing approach to urban governance, funding cuts for oppositional local governments including that of Miskolc today, as well as the limited manoeuvring room of the city’s leaders considering the punitive electoral atmosphere, structural possibilities remain minimal for emancipating the deprived and expelled Roma of the city. This thesis joins previous critiques of anti-Roma injustices in Miskolc (e.g., Ladányi, 2010 [1991]; Zolnay, 2005; Lengyel, 2009; Havasi, 2018) in ringing the alarm bells over an untenable situation that is not only unacceptable from a human rights point of view, but is also vital for the city’s future as a whole in terms of economic growth and the demographics of a growing Roma minority against a shrinking non-Roma population. As Roma children make up an increasing proportion of the student body in schools and enter the job market in ever larger numbers as they grow up, they will become even more central to the

city's economy and daily life, which decision-makers and the elite will have to account for, whether they like it or not (see Havasi, 2013).

What the findings can realistically achieve here, then, is to stress that proximity is our only possible springboard for slowly beginning to unlearn racial hostility in political, public, and policy arenas alike, thereby making a more liveable and inclusive city for everyone. It is in these small crevices of an otherwise destructive punitive steamroller that countercurrents in decision-making can slowly emerge, if at all, to gradually alter the thinking of the non-Roma majority for the better and push back against racialised political demagoguery (see Sections 5.5 in Chapter 5, as well as the conclusion of Chapter 7). For the time being, the early stages of Roma emancipation can only take place behind the scenes, but these small steps could become ever larger and ultimately essential to the gradual amelioration of social fractures in the long term, at least to a certain extent.

For other cities in Hungary and Europe, the findings echo existing concerns around the populist exclusion of the Roma from cities and smaller settlements (e.g., Costi, 2010; Provenzano, 2014; Feischmidt and Szombati, 2017; Ivasiuc, 2021). In particular, the thesis underlines that the repressive application of penal methods to punish and contain the Roma does not address racial tensions or erase political leaders' long-term responsibility to reckon with the effects of impoverishment on the state, the economy, as well as the life of cities (see Ladányi, 2010 [1989]; Pankucsi, 2012; Kerezsi and Gosztonyi, 2014). Equally, conserving marginality on the peripheries is not conducive to a healthy city, but instead sets it up for a long-term social crisis, a continuation of hatred and fear, and the incessant rediscovery of securitisation as a drastic yet thoroughly ineffective response to the Roma's deprivation (see Solt, 2010; Szuhay, 2013). Challenging punitive policies, especially in the face of the continued presence exclusionary populist sentiments and discriminatory tendencies across Europe, therefore remains a vital moral responsibility for academics, activists, and practitioners alike.

## Appendix

Table 1. List of interviews conducted for this study.

	Date	Participant category	Affiliation	Duration	Location	Setup	Number of participants	Data recording type
1.	11/01/2018	Policymaker	Miskolc City Council	1 h 35 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Audio recording
2.	15/02/2018	Policymaker	Miskolc City Council	48 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Audio recording
3.	26/06/2020	Community worker	Dialóg Egyesület (local NGO)	1 h 13 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Audio recording
4.	29/06/2020	Community worker	Dialóg Egyesület (local NGO)	1 h 15 mins	Online (Facebook Messenger)	Video call	1	Audio recording
5.	01/07/2020	Executives	MIÖR	1 h 16 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	2	Audio recording
6.	08/09/2020	Community workers	Célpont Közösségi Tér (local NGO)	1 h 10 mins	Community hub near central Miskolc	Sit-down group interview	3	Handwritten notes
7.	08/09/2020	Policymaker	Miskolc City Council	58 mins	Bar in central Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
8.	09/09/2020	Community worker	Dialóg Egyesület (local NGO)	2 hrs	Streets of Avas district, Miskolc	Walking interview	1	Typed notes after interview
9.	10/09/2020	Community worker	Észak-Keleti Átjáró Egyesület (local NGO)	51 mins	Lobby of cultural venue in central Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
10.	11/09/2020	Resident	N/A	42 mins	Café in central Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
11.	17/09/2019	Nurse	MESZEGYI	30 mins	Community centre in Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Typed notes after interview
12.	17/09/2020	Mentors	MESZEGYI	1 h 2 mins	Community centre in Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Sit-down group interview	11	Audio recording
13.	17/09/2020	Policymakers	Miskolc City Council	1 h 28 mins	Office in Miskolc City Hall	Sit-down group interview	3	Audio recording
14.	18/09/2020	Academic	University of Miskolc	1 h	Office on the University of Miskolc campus	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
15.	22/09/2020	Security technology expert	Robert Bosch GmbH	15 mins	Temporary company exhibition stand, Gamma Park, Illatos Út, Budapest	Spontaneous interview	1	Handwritten notes
16.	23/09/2019	Social worker	HCSOM	25 mins	Community centre in Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Introductory on-site interview	1	Typed notes after interview
17.	23/09/2020	Social worker	HCSOM	1 h 24 mins	Community centre in Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
18.	23/09/2020	Resident	N/A	20 mins	Community centre in Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Typed notes after interview
19.	24/09/2020	Social worker	HCSOM	1 h 3 mins	Numbered Streets, Miskolc	Walking interview	1	Audio recording
20.	30/09/2020	Academic	University of Miskolc	1 h 1 min	Office on the University of Miskolc campus	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
21.	30/09/2020	Academic	University of Miskolc	39 mins	Office on the University of Miskolc campus	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
22.	08/10/2020	Academic	University of Miskolc	37 mins	Office on the University of Miskolc campus	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
23.	09/10/2020	Civil guard	Miskolc Crime Prevention Centre	20 mins	Vörösmarty Square, Miskolc	Spontaneous interview	1	Typed notes after interview
24.	10/10/2020	Ranger	MIÖR	56 mins	Streets of Central Miskolc	Walking interview	1	Audio recording
25.	15/10/2020	Academic	University of Miskolc	1 h 30 mins	Online (Zoom)	Video call	1	Typed notes during interview
26.	16/10/2020	Ranger	MIÖR	1 h 36 mins	Home in suburban Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording + notes
27.	21/10/2020	Academic	Geographical Institute, Loránd Eötvös Research Network, HAS	1 h	Office on the University of Miskolc campus	Sit-down interview	1	Handwritten notes
28.	22/10/2020	Resident	N/A	46 mins	Fast food restaurant in northern Miskolc	Sit-down interview	1	Audio recording
29.	27/10/2020	Residents	N/A	27 mins	Outside family home in Numbered Streets, Miskolc	Standing group interview	2	Audio recording
30.	27/10/2020	Residents	N/A	42 mins	Family garden in Numbered Streets, Miskolc	Sit-down group interview	2	Audio recording
31.	27/11/2020	Academic	Romanian Institute for Research on Minorities Issues	1 h 2 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Audio recording

32.	04/12/2020	Activist	Amnesty International	50 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Audio recording
33.	04/12/2020	Academic	HAS Centre for Economic and Regional Studies	52 mins	Online (Zoom)	Video call	1	Audio recording
34.	07/12/2020	Academic	National University of Public Service	50 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Typed notes during interview
35.	11/12/2020	Academic	National University of Public Service	25 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Typed notes during interview
36.	14/12/2020	Retired police officer	N/A	1 h 45 mins	Online (Viber)	Video call	1	Typed notes during interview
37.	08/12/2020	Activist	HCLU	53 mins	Online (Google Meet)	Video call	1	Audio recording
38.	28/06/2021	Teacher	School in B.A.Z. County	1 h 48 mins	Online (Skype)	Video call	1	Audio recording

Table 2. List of documents analysed for this study.

	Date of publication	Institution/Organisation	Department/Office/Arm/Contractor	Category	Document No.	Subject (of relevant section where applicable)	Territorial scale
1.	07/10/2020	European Commission	N/A	Annex	Annex 1 to COM(2020) 620 final	A Union of Equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation	International
2.	07/10/2020	European Commission	N/A	Annex	Annex 2 to COM(2020) 620 final	A Union of Equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation	International
3.	07/10/2020	European Commission	N/A	Communication	COM(2020) 620 final	A Union of Equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation	International
4.	29/04/2021	National Association of Local Governments (TÖOSZ) / Miskolc City Council	Best Practices Programme for Local Governments / Miskolc City Council Mayor's Cabinet	Competition application proforma	N/A	Social inclusion best practices - fighting poverty with employment provision and creation for the benefit of settlement communities	City
5.	18/08/2017	National Association of Local Governments (TÖOSZ) / Miskolc City Council	Best Practices Programme for Local Governments / Miskolc City Council Department of Human Services	Competition application proforma	N/A	Municipal best practice - Family Mentor Programme in Lyukó	Neighbourhood
6.	23/09/2019	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Contract award notice	2019/S 183-445426	Hungary-Miskolc: Surveillance and security systems and devices - result of the procurement procedure	City
7.	12/12/2018	Miskolc Court of Law	N/A	Court order	13.P.20.601/2016/95.	Ruling on the joint inspections coordinated by Miskolc Municipal Police	Country
8.	09/05/2019	Debrecen Court of Appeal	N/A	Court order	Pf.I.20.059/2019/4.	Ruling on respondents' appeal against Miskolc Court of Law order 13.P.20.601/2016/95.	Country
9.	02/2013	Miskolc City Council	Department of Urban Development and Management	Development Proposal	N/A	Spatial Development in Lyukó Valley	Neighbourhood
10.	2013	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Development Strategy	N/A	Integrated Urban Development Strategy of the City of Miskolc - I./Situation outline	City
11.	2013	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Development Strategy	N/A	Integrated Urban Development Strategy of the City of Miskolc - IV./Appendices	City
12.	2013	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Development Strategy	N/A	Integrated Urban Development Strategy of the City of Miskolc - III./Situation assessment	City
13.	2014	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Development Strategy	N/A	Integrated Urban Development Strategy of the City of Miskolc	City
14.	2014	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Development Strategy	N/A	City of Miskolc - Urban Development Concept (2014-2030)	City
15.	03/07/2008	Miskolc City Council	Mayor's Office	Development strategy	N/A	Miskolc Integrated Urban Development Strategy - Vol. 3.: Anti-segregation Plan	City
16.	11/2020	Ministry of Innovation and Technology	N/A	Development strategy	N/A	Strategy for cities with county rights in the Northeast Hungary Economic Development Zone	Region
17.	14/08/2017	Government of Hungary	N/A	Directive	129	Government directive 1529/2017. (VIII. 14.) on the preliminary regrouping of funds required for the implementation of the "Smart City-Smart Miskolc" project as part of the Modern Cities Programme	City
18.	22/09/2020	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Directives	N/A	Cohabitation Codex of Miskolc - a collection of community cohabitation norms set by central and local law	City
19.	30/11/2013	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	Director's Office	Freedom of Information Request	1861/2013.	Freedom of information request on joint residential inspections with affiliated authorities	City
20.	06/02/2014	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	Director's Office	Freedom of Information Request	5222/2014.	Freedom of information request on joint residential inspections with affiliated authorities	City
21.	05/12/2016	Prime Minister's Office Hungary	N/A	Funding document	GF/JSZF/805/9/2016.	Statement of state funding for "Smart City - Smart Miskolc" initiative as part of the Modern Cities Programme	Country
22.	31/07/2019	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	N/A	Information sheet	N/A	Data Management Information 1	City

23.	31/07/2019	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	N/A	Information sheet	N/A	Data Management Information 2	City
24.	05/04/2022	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	N/A	Information sheet	N/A	List of CCTV cameras	City
25.	20/01/2020	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	N/A	Information sheet	N/A	Area under CCTV surveillance	City
26.	30/03/2021	11 Pro-Roma NGOs (Polgár Alapítvány, Magyarország Kezdeményezés, Bagázs Közhasznú Egyesület, InDaHouse Hungary Egyesület, Romaversitas Alapítvány, Gyerekesély Egyesület, Partners Hungary Alapítvány, Számá Dá Noj Egyesület, Digi Tanoda Alapítvány, Idetartozunk Egyesület, Autonómia Alapítvány)	N/A	Joint statement	N/A	General opinion on the planned Hungarian National Social Inclusion Strategy	Country
27.	21/03/2016	Miskolc Court of Law	N/A	Lawsuit	N/A	Lawsuit filed against Miskolc City Council, Mayor's Office, and Municipal Police by the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union, Otherness Foundation, and the Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities, due to discriminatory residential inspections in segregated communities	Country
28.	07/03/2013	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	II-4234-3/2013.	Report on the completion of tasks set in the Public Security and Crime Prevention Strategy in 2011-2012 and proposal for the 2013-2014 action plan of the Public Security and Crime Prevention Strategy (Agenda item #6); Public reports and inquiries	City
29.	16/05/2013	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	IV-4234-7/2013.	Motion to approve the local council's completion of child welfare and child protection duties (Agenda item #7); 2012 annual report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary (Agenda item #8)	City
30.	18/05/2016	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	VI-314.046-9/2016.	Motion to approve annual report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2015 (Agenda item #6); Motion to sell buildable properties necessary for the use of the Housing Subsidy for Families scheme (Priority agenda item #6); Motion to amend the Urban Structural Plan of Miskolc and council resolution 21/2004. (VII.6.) on the Construction Regulations of Miskolc (Priority agenda item #4)	City
31.	20/09/2018	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	819.028-10/2018.	Motion to amend council resolution 2/2018. (III.6.) on the 2018 municipal budget and making related decisions (semester 1 correction) (Agenda item #1)	City
32.	30/01/2020	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	808.130/2020.	Public reports and comments	City
33.	28/08/2020	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	808.130-3/2020.	Motion to approve the report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2019	City
34.	30/06/2021	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	408.127-5/2021.	Motion to provide property use for the Order of Malta Hungary (Priority agenda item #1); Motion to approve report on the completion of tasks set in the Crime Prevention Strategy in 2019-2020 and approve the 2021-2026 Crime Prevention Strategy of Miskolc City Council (Priority agenda item #3); Motion to accept the 2020 annual report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary (Agenda item #5)	City
35.	28/10/2021	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	408.127-11/2021.	Motion to extend surveillance locations of CCTV system in Miskolc (Agenda item #8)	City

36.	20/06/2019	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	130.108-5/2019.	Motion to approve annual report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2018 (Agenda item #6); Motion to approve report on the completion of tasks set in the Crime Prevention Strategy in 2017-2018 and approve the 2019-2024 Crime Prevention Strategy of Miskolc City Council (Agenda item #7); Motion to approve Miskolc City Council's report on the completion of child welfare and child protection duties (Agenda item #8); Motion to extend surveillance locations of CCTV system in Miskolc (Priority agenda item #11)	City
37.	25/10/2018	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	819.028-12/2018.	Motion to formulate municipal directives on revisiting certain regulations related to public order and security and the opening times of shops at night (Agenda item #1); Motion to revisit and extend surveillance locations of public space CCTV network in the City of Miskolc (Agenda item #2)	City
38.	24/09/2020	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Meeting minutes	808.130-5/2020.	Motion to approve annual report on the work of Miskolc Municipal Police in 2019 (Agenda item #2)	City
39.	06/12/2016	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	111580-1/2016.	Formation of new policing committee; public security matters	City
40.	06/04/2017	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	465.521-6/2017.	Miscellaneous matters (Agenda item #3)	City
41.	14/02/2017	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	465.251-2/2017.	Motion to make decisions related to Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR) (Agenda item #2) Miscellaneous matters (Agenda item #4)	City
42.	14/03/2017	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	465.251-4/2017.	Miscellaneous matters (Agenda item #2)	City
43.	15/05/2018	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	210.367-3/2018.	Motion to approve report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2017 (Agenda item #2); Motion to approve report on the work of Miskolc Municipal Police in 2017 (Agenda item #3)	City
44.	24/10/2018	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	210.367-9/2018.	Motion to formulate municipal directives on revisiting certain regulations related to public order and security and the opening times of shops at night (Agenda item #1); Motion to revisit and extend surveillance locations of public space CCTV network in the City of Miskolc (Agenda item #2)	City
45.	18/06/2019	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	801.084-5/2019.	Motion to approve report on the completion of tasks set in the Crime Prevention Strategy in 2017-2018 and approve the 2019-2024 Crime Prevention Strategy of Miskolc City Council (Agenda item #2)	City
46.	26/08/2020	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	808.175-3/2020.	Motion to approve report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2019 (Agenda item #3)	City
47.	19/02/2020	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	808.175-2/2020.	Motion to set 2020 municipal budget, formulate budgetary directive and make related miscellaneous decisions (Agenda item #1)	City
48.	23/01/2020	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	808.175/2020.	Miscellaneous matters (Agenda item #2)	City
49.	03/09/2020	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	808.175-4/2020.	Motion to approve concept regarding the transformation of Miskolc Municipal Police (Agenda item #1)	City
50.	28/06/2021	Miskolc City Council	Policing Committee of the General Assembly	Meeting minutes	408873/2021.	Motion to approve report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2020 (Agenda item #1); Motion to formulate municipal directive on the designation of tolerance zones in the area of the City of Miskolc (Agenda item #3); Motion to approve report on the work of Miskolc Municipal Police in 2020 (Agenda item #2)	City
51.	27/02/2014	Legal Defence Bureau for National and Ethnic Minorities (NEKI),	N/A	Official motion	N/A	Initiation of official proceedings concerning joint inspections by Miskolc Municipal Police and affiliated authorities	Country

		Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU/TASZ)					
52.	23/09/2010	Fidesz Miskolc	N/A	Pamphlet	N/A	Campaigning material for public security and labour in Miskolc	City
53.	06/2018	Miskolc City Council	Műépítész Kft.	Partnership consultation documentation	N/A	Extension of construction zone for social service and family assistance establishments	Neighbourhood
54.	09/06/2020	Miskolc City Council	Deputy Mayor's Office	Policy brief	308344-3/2020.	Use of state-owned properties in relation to the "Smart City-Smart Miskolc Intelligent public space surveillance network" project	City
55.	20/06/2019	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Policy document	Attachment to MCC GA Resolution 52/2019. (VI.20.)	Crime Prevention Strategy of the City of Miskolc (2019-2024)	City
56.	2018-2019	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Policy document	N/A	Revision of Service Planning Concept of Miskolc City Council for 2020	City
57.	2021	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Policy document	N/A	Local Equal Opportunities Programme 2021-2026	City
58.	11/11/2015	Miskolc City Council	Miskolc Holding Zrt.	Policy presentation	N/A	Miskolc's steps towards becoming an intelligent city	City
59.	30/04/2021	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Policy strategy	Attachment to MCC GA Resolution 405/2021. (VI.30.)	Crime Prevention Strategy of the City of Miskolc 2021-2026	City
60.	11/2014	Ministry of Human Resources	State Secretariat for Social Affairs and Inclusion	Policy strategy	N/A	Hungarian National Social Inclusion Strategy II: The long-term poor - Children in poor families - Roma (2011-2020)	Country
61.	03/09/2021	Government of Hungary	N/A	Policy strategy	Attachment to Government resolution 1605/2021. (VIII. 18.)	Hungarian National Social Inclusion Strategy 2030	Country
62.	08/2015	Ministry of Human Resources	State Secretariat for Social Affairs and Inclusion	Policy strategy	N/A	Foundational policy strategy for the management of settlement-style housing for the 2014-2020 period	Country
63.	17/10/2013	Government of Hungary	National Crime Prevention Council	Policy strategy	Government resolution 1744/2013. (X. 17.)	National Crime Prevention Strategy (2013-2023)	Country
64.	23/04/2020	Government of Hungary	N/A	Policy strategy	Government resolution 1163/2020. (IV. 21.)	Hungarian National Security Strategy	Country
65.	30/10/2015	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Press release	N/A	Miskolc, the digital city	City
66.	13/08/2018	Order of Malta	N/A	Press release	N/A	Order of Malta's after-school educational facility (Máltanoda) operational in Miskolc-Lyukó Valley for two years	Neighbourhood
67.	21/04/2015	Government of Hungary	N/A	Press release	N/A	Viktor Orbán's press conference in Miskolc on the Modern Cities Programme	City
68.	19/06/2019	Miskolc City Council	Mayor's Office	Proposal	IG-309-0/2019.	Proposal to extend surveillance locations of public space CCTV network in the City of Miskolc (Numbered Streets and nearby locations)	Local
69.	01/01/2021	Ministry of Interior	Deputy State Secretariat for Data Registers	Public dataset	N/A	Population of Hungary on 1st January 2021	Country
70.	15/07/2014	Amnesty International	N/A	Public statement	EUR 27/003/2014	Hungary: Mayor of Miskolc must halt evictions of Roma	City
71.	18/05/2015	Amnesty International	N/A	Public statement	EUR 27/1672/2015	Hungary: Supreme Court finds forced evictions in Miskolc to be unlawful	City
72.	22/09/2021	Miskolc City Council	Notary Public	Report	N/A	Report on the operation of Mayor's Office of Miskolc between 1st September 2020 and 31st August 2021	City
73.	15/04/2012	Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Police	Chief Constable of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Police	Report	05000/3952-1/2013. Ált.	Report on the public safety of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, fulfilment of duties, and border control, 2012	County

74.	24/03/2015	Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Police	Chief Constable of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Police	Report	05000/1741-7/2015. Ált.	Report on the public safety of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county, fulfilment of duties, and border control, 2014	County
75.	23/11/2017	Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Council	N/A	Report	N/A	Information on the demographic changes of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County	County
76.	07/06/2019	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Report	Attachment to Miskolc City Council General Assembly (MCC GA) Resolution 51/2019. (VI.20.)	Report on the completion of tasks set in the Public Security and Crime Prevention Strategy in 2017-2018	City
77.	05/07/2021	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	N/A	Report	Attachment to MCC GA Resolution 401/2021. (VI.30.)	Annual report on the work of Miskolc Municipal Police in 2020	City
78.	27/04/2018	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	N/A	Report	Attachment to MCC GA Resolution 52/2018. (V.17.)	Annual report on the work of Miskolc Municipal Police in 2017	City
79.	14/09/2020	Miskolc Municipal Police (MIÖR)	N/A	Report	Attachment to MCC GA Proposal IG-00280-0/2020.	Annual report on the work of Miskolc Municipal Police in 2019	City
80.	06/06/2021	Miskolc City Council	Mayor's Office	Report	Attachment to Mayor's Proposal 109700-0/2021.	Report on the completion of tasks set in the Public Security and Crime Prevention Strategy in 2019-2020	City
81.	16/02/2010	Miskolc Constabulary	Chief Constable of Miskolc	Report	Appendix to MCC GA Resolution IV-83/43.566/2010.	Report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2009	City
82.	24/04/2018	Miskolc Constabulary	Chief Constable of Miskolc	Report	05010/5052-5/2018.ált.	Report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2017	City
83.	11/06/2020	Miskolc Constabulary	Chief Constable of Miskolc	Report	05010/7454-3/2020.ált.	Report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2019	City
84.	28/05/2021	Miskolc Constabulary	Chief Constable of Miskolc	Report	05010/538-7/2021.ált.	Report on the work of Miskolc Constabulary in 2020	City
85.	12/2019	European Commission	Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers	Report	N/A	A comparative analysis of non-discrimination law in Europe 2019	International
86.	2015	Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights Hungary	N/A	Report	AJB-1474/2014.	Report on the investigation of joint inspection practices coordinated by Miskolc Municipal Police, the amendment of local housing directives and directives of settlements near Miskolc, as well as the local municipality's other measures concerning housing conditions	County
87.	03/2021	Minority Rights Group Europe	N/A	Report	N/A	The Roma in Hungary: Challenges of discrimination	Country
88.	15/01/2020	Kopint-Tárki	N/A	Report	N/A	Evaluation of the implementation of the Hungarian National Social Inclusion Strategy (HNSIS)	Country
89.	27/04/2016	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights	Report	N/A	The Housing Rights of Roma in Miskolc, Hungary	City
90.	04/07/2018	European Parliament	Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs	Report	A8-0250/2018	Report on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded	Country
91.	13/11/2015	URBACT	SmartImpact	Report	N/A	Local Impacts from Smart City Planning	International
92.	14/05/2009	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Resolution	IV-80/31.520/2009.	Approval of Final Action Plan for Inner City Rehabilitation	City
93.	14/12/2020	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Resolution	174/2020. (XII.14.)	Use of state-owned properties in relation to the "Smart City-Smart Miskolc Intelligent public space surveillance network" project	Local
94.	28/10/2021	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Resolution	Attachment to MCC GA Resolution 448/2021. (X.28.)	Decision on the extension of surveillance locations of public space CCTV network in the City of Miskolc	City

95.	12/05/2014	Miskolc City Council	General Assembly	Directive	13/2014. (V.12.)	Miskolc City Council General Assembly Directive No. 13/2014 (V.12.) on the amendment of the 25/2006. (VII.12.) Council Directive on housing rentals	City
96.	28/04/2015	Supreme Court (Curia) of Hungary	Council for Municipalities	Resolution	Köf.5003/2015/4.	Termination of housing rental contracts (paragraph 23. § (3) of council directive 25/2006. (VII.12.) on housing rentals ruled unlawful and nullified)	City
97.	04/09/2020	Government of Hungary	N/A	Resolution	Government resolution 1566/2020. (IX.4.)	Appointment and duties of government commissioner for Northeast Hungary Economic Development Zone	Region
98.	15/01/2018	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Unpublished policy presentation	N/A	Integrated Action Plan of Miskolc (smart city development)	City
99.	11/11/2016	Miskolc City Council	Mayor's Cabinet	Unpublished policy presentation	N/A	Smart & Green City Miskolc	City
100.	29/10/2017	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Unpublished policy presentation	N/A	Ongoing international projects of Miskolc City - Smart City connections	International
101.	Unknown	Miskolc City Council	N/A	Unpublished policy proforma	D1	Detailed list of smart city projects	City

Table 3. List of participant observation occasions and site visits as part of the fieldwork.

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Occasion</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Organiser/Affiliation/Participant</b>	<b>Duration</b>
1.	07/09/2020	Participatory council meeting	Miskolc City Hall	Miskolc City Council	1 h
2.	08/09/2020	Guided walk	Central Miskolc	Policymaker	2 hrs
3.	09/09/2020	Community workers' meeting	Avas district, Miskolc	Local NGO	30 mins
4.	09/09/2020	Community garden visit	Avas district, Miskolc	Local NGO	1 h
5.	10/09/2020	Smart CCTV control room site visit	Györi Kapu, Miskolc	Miskolc Municipal Police	5 hrs 30 mins
6.	11/09/2020	Guided neighbourhood walk	Tampere district, Miskolc	Local NGO	2 hrs
7.	16/09/2020	Security-oriented evening participant observation	Central Miskolc	N/A	1 h
8.	17/09/2020	Community centre visit	Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Miskolc City Council	2 hrs
9.	17/09/2020	Guided neighbourhood walk	Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Miskolc City Council	30 mins
10.	18/09/2020	Community hub visit	Near Central Miskolc	Local NGO	30 mins
11.	22/09/2020	Biztonságpiac 2019–2020 VII. konferencia és kiállítás (7th Security Market Conference and Exhibition 2019–2020)	Gamma Park, Illatos Út, Budapest	Biztonságpiac Kft.	1 day
12.	23/09/2020	Community centre visit	Lyukó Valley, Miskolc	Order of Malta	3 hrs
13.	24/09/2020	Community centre visit	Numbered Streets, Miskolc	Order of Malta	2 hrs
14.	09/10/2020	Public security themed community event	Vörösmarty district, Miskolc	Local NGO	3 hrs
15.	14/10/2020	Community centre visit (second time)	Numbered Streets, Miskolc	Order of Malta	45 mins
16.	15/10/2020	Security-oriented daytime exploratory walk and participant observation	Avasalja, Miskolc	N/A	3 hrs
17.	27/10/2020	Neighbourhood visit	Numbered Streets, Miskolc	Order of Malta/residents	4 hrs

Table 4. Thematic codes and subcodes used in textual data analysis.

<b>Code</b>	<b>Highlight colour in text</b>	<b>Subcodes</b>
<b><i>Context</i></b>	Grey	National Local State socialist history Post-regime change history Decline Social fabric Economy Politics Institutions Spatial features Roma
<b><i>Politics</i></b>	Red	Illiberalism Centralisation Party politics/political climate Power relations Discourse and framing Government narrative (right-wing populist) Left-wing narrative Campaigning Far-right narrative Civil society
<b><i>Governance</i></b>	Blue	Actors and stakeholders Institutions Civil society / NGOs Community development Top-down structure Bottom-up engagement / Participation
<b><i>Segregation</i></b>	Yellow	Definitions Discourse and framing Socio-spatial connection vs isolation Roma Stereotypes and prejudice Stigma Racialisation Discrimination Structural and institutional racism Welfare dependency Self/Other binaries Internal diversity in segregated communities Non-Roma majority Urban decline Housing market Displacement and evictions

		Segregated areas of Miskolc
<b><i>Social policy</i></b>	Green	Welfare benefits and social protection Social work Social inclusion Social mobility Community matters Infrastructural provisions and gaps Health support Habitats and livelihoods Social housing Illegal occupancy and usury Job market and employment Informality Education Social sensitivity Behaviour and conduct Order and tidiness Norms, expectations, standards, benchmarks Access to services Trust Arm's length engagement
<b><i>Policing &amp; security</i></b>	Purple	Discourse and framing Poverty and crime Policing attention vs neglect Fear Perceptions of security Revanchism Homelessness and crime Drugs Illegal waste dumping Stray dogs Police raids Security as a political tool Racialisation Policing authorities Statistics Expert narratives Policing methods Smart CCTV and control room Technical issues Horseback rangers Socially sensitive policing

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