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study of children's moral identity in China and
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ABSTRACT

Can culture shape moral identity? A comparative study of children's moral identity in China and England

by

Pian Shi

This PhD thesis presents a general picture of young adolescents' moral views and behaviour in two countries. The study also examines the assumption that culture plays a role in forming young people's moral views and moral behaviour and the implications for moral education and moral evaluation.

The study is a large-scale cross-sectional comparison between primary school children in China and England. The sample consists of 1,950 primary school students between 8 and 13 years old (average age=10.2, standard deviation=0.9). The 1,768 Chinese participants are from eight public schools in the capital city (Beijing) and three smaller cities in China. 107 British participants are from two similar state-funded schools in northeast England (Durham and Newcastle), and 75 were recruited online from various cities across England (e.g. London, Newcastle, Durham and Edinburgh). The British sample is smaller than expected because of COVID-19.

All the participants took part in a questionnaire survey. A subset of 278 randomly selected participants joined in a game observation operationalising some of the moral issues in the survey.

The questionnaire survey mainly concerned children's self-reported moral identity (the self-reported importance of the moral values of fairness, kindness/not hurting and honesty) and their intended behaviour in response to these moral values. The second research tool in

the study was a game-based activity to observe actual behaviour. A sub-group of the survey sample participated in the game and they were requested to act independently on charity donation and distribution tasks. Their survey responses on their moral identity, intentions and motivations were then compared with their actual behavioural responses in the game. Consistency between students' behavioural intentions in the survey and their actual behaviour in the game was evaluated.

The main findings of the study are the following:

- (1) There is a gap between young adolescents' moral values, value commitments (intentions) and actual moral behaviour.
- (2) Young adolescents have a similar self-reported importance of moral identity and moral trait understanding to adults.
- (3) Young adolescents from both countries reported a relatively solid moral identity and showed similar behaviour patterns (to be generous or fair in different situations). They also considerably overlap in their understanding of important moral traits. However, the Chinese adolescents generally achieved a higher mean score for reported moral identity and demonstrated stronger consistency of behaviour than the British adolescents.
- (4) There were some indications that cultural similarities and differences exist between China and England from the young adolescents' perspectives. The cultural difference in individualism between China and England is not as big as the difference in collectivism.
- (5) It was found that personal values and nationality predict moral identity and behaviour to different degrees. Moral identity and behaviour intention are predicted by both personal values and nationality. Actual moral behaviour is only predicted by nationality. Consistency of moral behaviour is only predicted by personal values. Norm priming (e.g. being told what most peers do) is related to actual moral behaviour but not to consistency of behaviour.
- (6) Student socioeconomic background is related to moral identity and moral behaviour.
- (7) The study not only linked moral identity to actual moral behaviour but also to consistency of behaviour. It revealed that cultural and socioeconomic differences should be considered when exploring whether moral identity predicts moral behaviour. This is ignored in some existing research in this field, producing potentially misleading results.

(8) Generally, the study implied that moral education and moral evaluation need to be more practical and fairer, and consider moral dilemmas (value clashes) in real life, potential social desirability, how understanding and expression can bias measuring tools, unobservable motivations behind behaviour and students' different socioeconomic backgrounds. The gap between moral thoughts (intentions) and actual behaviour implies that future studies and moral evaluations should rely less on self-reporting/introspection and focus more on moral behaviour itself. The fact that the combination of individual-level cultural values and nationality predicts students' moral identities and behaviour intentions implies that educators should pay attention to the influence of national cultural values on students' morality when focusing on cultivating their personal moral values. Learning from the moral education model in a different culture requires considering the influence of local culture on the model's outcome. Norm priming (e.g. being told most peers' generous behaviour) can help with motivating students' moral behaviour. Moral identity can help shape students' moral behaviour. However, many other factors should be considered when attempting to shape students' moral behaviour by strengthening their moral identity. Value commitment through actual behaviour in real life need to be strengthened to reach a mature morally-based identity for adolescents.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE CONTEXT OF THE RESEARCH

This chapter gives a brief introduction to the research questions and the research design. It then presents the research context and the moral education issues that the research addresses. It also discusses the rationale for a comparative study between China and England using young adolescents. The current education systems and moral education (or value education) in the two countries are reviewed and compared. Finally, the chapter describes the structure of the thesis.

1.1 Introduction

This research is conducted to fill a gap in the existing literature by presenting the findings of a comparative study involving 1,950 children in primary schools in China and England. It examines primary school students' moral identities and other related moral views and behaviour in different cultural backgrounds and country contexts. The project involved developing a survey and a game observation to reveal how the children's moral identity was reflected in their ideas (the self-reported importance of moral values and value commitments) and behaviour (observed moral behaviour and behaviour consistency). It examined similarities and differences in moral identity, cultural values and other ideas and behaviour regarding morality in samples from the two countries. Finally, the study examined the extent to which cultural background can explain differences in the moral identities and related behaviour of young adolescents from the two countries. It also aimed to produce a general picture of young people's morality in different cultures.

Moral identity can be understood as a kind of personal identity concerning morality. There are various definitions of moral identity in the literature. However, this study operationalises it as a personal perception of moral values (or principles) as displayed in ideas (the self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intentions) and actual

behaviour. A stronger moral identity implies greater consistency between moral cognition and moral actions (which is also called moral consistency in this thesis). Therefore, there are two aspects of general moral identity: cognitive moral identity (the self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intentions) and moral behaviour consistency in reality.

Even though moral identity is an implicit concept, in studies, it has been measured using explicit means such as self-reporting questionnaires, self-description interviews, participant observations and experiments. The most widely used measures, such as the Self-reported Importance of Moral identity Questionnaire (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and Good-Self Assessment (Arnold, 1993), only focus on cognitive moral identity, although they agree that a strong moral identity will lead to firm moral consistency. Some researchers relate moral identity to actual ethical behaviour (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, little research has so far linked moral identity to behaviour consistency.

As the structured review presented in Chapter Four shows, a few research studies emphasise moral integrity when measuring moral identity. However, testing is limited to how one's moral behaviour conforms to moral principles in response to a series of moral scenarios on paper rather than in real-life contexts. Like behaviour intentions, the problem with this kind of hypothesis testing is an inconsistency between what people think they will do in a virtual situation and how they behave when it happens in real life (Turiel, 2002). Therefore, extensive work is needed to effectively measure consistency between moral thoughts and actual moral conduct.

This study examines moral identity in two cultural contexts and assesses the role of culture and the social environment in which children grow up. Some researchers have mentioned that a limitation in their studies on moral identity or morality is not having taken into account cultural influence (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; Pratt et al., 2003; Samuels, 2018). Culture is reflected in the mental responses of cognition, emotion and motivation, and people's behaviour in actual social settings (Tang, 2017). Some studies suggest that moral development is influenced by culture (Rochat et al., 2009; Youniss & Yates, 1997). This study

investigates the extent to which culture influences moral identity by comparing samples from China and England.

This study examines the moral identity, related moral views and behaviour of young adolescents in two different cultural contexts – China and England – by investigating the following research questions:

Question 1: What are the overall moral views of primary school children in different countries?

Question 2: How is the consistency between children's self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intentions? And is there consistency between children's reported behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in real life?

Question 3: What are the similarities and differences in moral identity and other related moral views and behaviour of primary school children in China and England?

Question 4: Are there cultural similarities and differences between China and England from the children's perspective?

Question 5: Are any differences in moral identity and related behaviour linked to children's cultural differences?

Question 6: Does strong moral identity (self-reported importance of moral values and value commitments) predict children's moral behaviour and behaviour consistency in real contexts? Does moral motivation predict moral behaviour?

1.2 The conceptual basis for moral education in schools

School education puts a strong emphasis on children's understanding and development of

good behaviour and high moral values. A general expectation in most education systems is that children should have opportunities to learn about high moral values and uphold them in real-life circumstances.

Before thinking about approaches to moral education and their effectiveness, one problem is deciding what moral values and behaviour are. The ability to identify what is moral or immoral is the criterion to assess children's morality and the impact of moral education. Moral perceptions vary over time and across societies and cultures (Kılıç, 2012, cited in Sevim, 2021). According to the various definitions discussed in Chapter two, morality broadens from the value of justice (respecting rules) to care, then to loyalty, authority and purity over time and with the deepening of research in this field. Different cultures believe different values belong to the moral domain. For example, while female circumcision is seen as necessary and moral in some societies, it is considered a violation of rights and immoral in others (Hitlin & Vaisey, 2010). Cultural differences can even exist in the perceived meanings of universally accepted moral values such as justice and welfare (Buchtel et al., 2015; Vauclair et al., 2014). For people in cultures that put emphasis on autonomy, justice and fairness are often viewed as equity. Outcomes are distributed in proportion to personal effort. A distribution of equity that would cause potential detriment to less deserving others would not be viewed as immoral. However, people in duty-based communal cultures often perceive justice and fairness as an issue of equality, with all individuals deserving equal outcomes, and moral judgments are based on whether a self-beneficial outcome will cause others to suffer (Schäfer et al., 2015; van der Toorn, 2010; Wu et al., 2014).

Even the concept of morality itself is understood and interpreted differently by people from different cultures. Buchtel et al. (2015) show that the Chinese emphasise being uncivilised when they talk about immoral behaviour, while Westerners call harmful behaviour immoral. Specifically, spitting, cursing, and dropping litter are typical immoral types of behaviour for the Chinese, whereas criminal behaviour such as killing, stealing and hurting others is more likely to be called immoral by Westerners. The Chinese are inclined to separate criminal behaviour from immoral behaviour in their minds.

Moral precepts that determine whether a behaviour is moral or immoral also vary according to the situations people encounter and individual differences. In the moral behaviour judgments discussed in Chapter two, it is difficult to judge if a behaviour decision is moral or not when it comes to situations in which moral values clash (e.g. moral dilemmas). People from different cultures may consider a behaviour decision to be more or less moral than the other. As moral dilemmas like the trolley problem are not related to real life, Dan (2012) provides the example of giving one's seat to those in need on public transport, which happens in students' daily lives. Students come across a clash of moral values: "everyone should take responsibility for his own actions" or "each passenger has equal rights in public transport" vs "being caring" or "being helpful to others." Any behaviour choices based on the above moral values are correct. In this case, it is not easy to judge whether not giving one's seat to needy people is moral or not. Of course, individuals' choices and moral judgments are influenced by cultural expectations and social acceptance. For example, in cultures emphasising duties toward one's community, personal resources are culturally expected to contribute to the common good (Boer & Fischer, 2013). However, there are still individual differences in moral perceptions between people with the same culture. Sevim (2021) shows that prospective teachers in Turkey develop a different understanding of morality which will influence students' moral perceptions when the prospective teachers start teaching.

Various inconsistent understandings of moral values and behaviour caused by variations in time, society, culture and contexts and individual differences complicate moral education and the development of evaluative criteria for morality. Potential cultural differences still need to be considered when discussing even widely agreed moral values or concepts.

Another issue moral education faces is the lack of measures to adequately evaluate the impact of moral education curricula or programmes on students' moral values and actual behaviour. Students seem to have solid moral values or socially appropriate behaviour intentions when they are assessed with examinations. Most of the time, they have cognitive knowledge of right and wrong and can answer simple questions about how they are expected to behave in moral contexts. However, their actual behaviour may deviate from the moral values and

intentions they have established when they are not being supervised by teachers, and especially outside school (Dan, 2012).

Moral behaviour is an external demonstration of one's moral values. Solid moral values will drive a strong commitment to moral standards in various contexts. However, moral value education does not achieve its aim if consistent moral behaviour has not been developed. Therefore, a commitment to moral values in real-life situations is an essential indicator for assessing the moral values taught in schools. However, consistency of moral behaviour is usually ignored in studies which evaluate students' moral values. Students are asked to think about how important it is for them to have specific moral values at the cognitive level, but they are rarely required to reflect on how much their actual moral behaviour conforms to their moral values and intentions. Attempts need to be made to measure students' moral values in practice. Truly understanding students' moral values is a necessary premise in any attempt to improve their moral education.

Moral education in schools has been criticised because of discrepancies between students' moral beliefs and behaviours (Harrison, 2020). For example, Dan (2012) suggests that underestimating the gap between students' moral cognition and conduct is one of the internal difficulties in Taiwan's moral education. Bajovic and Rizzo (2021) explain this disconnect between adolescents' moral thoughts and actions from a theoretical perspective. Their study also implies that increasing the consistency between students' moral thoughts and actions is a universal teaching concern. In order to minimise moral behaviour inconsistency, some researchers in the education field have tried to explain the phenomenon by identifying possible relevant factors. Maturity, parenting style and peers' and teachers' behaviours affect children's moral values and corresponding moral behaviour (e.g. Arain et al., 2017; Eisenberg-Berg, 1979; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Gibbs, 2003; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Kohlberg, 1984; Nucci, 2001; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004; Turiel, 2002). However, more extensive contexts that can influence parents, peers and teachers have been overlooked, such as the cultural context. Schools and families are embedded in a societal fabric. Sometimes multiple (contradictory) messages are conveyed to children by adults, social circumstances, cultural

practices and societal arrangements. These messages affect the consistency between children's ideas and behaviour (Turiel, 2002). Shared interaction patterns (Adebanjo, 2015) afforded by culture reinforce children's moral behaviour.

The cultural disparity is ignored when successful educational interventions take place in different countries. However, if an education approach is effective in some countries, it does not mean it will also be effective in other countries with different cultural contexts. It is necessary to consider the interaction between social norms and education (Samuels, 2018). For example, collectivist cultures and societies encourage bonding with traditional families and social institutions more than individualist cultures and societies (Gorman-Smith et al., 2004; Jarrett, 1997; King et al., 2005; Sheidow et al., 2001; Wandersman & Nation, 1998). It has been found that family and academic factors rather than the school environment predict prosocial behaviour among Chinese elementary school students (Ma, 2003). However, replications of this study in countries with non-collectivist cultures (e.g. White people) have not revealed the same trend (e.g. Choi et al., 2011; Flouri & Sarmadi, 2016). Therefore, the cultural context needs to be considered when educational interventions, especially moral ones, are made in different countries. This also implies that school is not the only place where children learn morality. Perpetuating socially moral values is a broader social phenomenon, of which school is only a part.

The concept of moral identity and some related theoretical models (for details, see section 2.2.2 in Chapter two) explain why there is a gap between people's moral judgment and reasoning and their behaviour and why people demonstrate inconsistent moral behaviour in different situations. Empirical research shows that a strong moral identity predicts a strong behavioural commitment to moral values (for details, see section 2.3.4 in Chapter two). Therefore, to bridge the gap between moral thoughts and behaviour, it will be beneficial to explore young adolescents' moral identity and the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour.

1.3 The rationale for comparing China and England

The purpose of this comparative research is to fill the gap in cross-cultural research on moral identity. Most research on morality has been conducted in American and European countries (e.g. Cohen et al., 2014; Graham et al., 2011; Hardy et al., 2014). Asian countries are underrepresented in intercultural studies on moral identity published in English. Studies omit to treat the origins of respondents as an independent variable because of the small proportion of Asian respondents in the whole sample. Only limited cross-culture research has been conducted on moral identity (e.g. Vitell et al., 2016).

China is an Eastern country and it is widely viewed as having collective-interest values (e.g. Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Samuels, 2018). In contrast, Britain is a representative Western country (AISHeddi et al., 2019; Graham et al., 2011). It scores highly for individualism in intercultural research (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). It is an individualistic culture in which priority is given to individual aspects of the self, such as the individual's well-being, autonomy and the right to privacy (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). The individualism index developed by Hofstede (<https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/>) indicates each country's level of individualism. China has an individualism score of 20, and the United Kingdom 89, which is a sharp contrast.

China and England have very different experiences of and approaches to political democracy, colonialism, post-colonialism and economics. China is a republic, while England is a constitutional monarchy. Economic variation and educational performance (shown by PISA data) vary between China and England. England is a developed country, while China is a developing country. British tradition is closely related to colonisation and Christianity. Chinese tradition is influenced by Confucian harmony. Differences in economics, culture, politics and society between the two countries play a crucial role in influencing and shaping the values in the two countries and teaching these values (Brown et al., 2021).

Nevertheless, there are some similarities between China and England. Both countries face

globalisation and internationalisation. Exchanges of culture, education ideas, trade and immigration link the countries. Moreover, both countries face the same challenges: economic productivity, employability, multiculturalism, terrorist attacks and violence in society and social movements. Both countries expect to meet the challenges through education (Brown et al., 2021). Another shared aim of education in both countries is to cultivate responsible citizens. Connections between the countries lead to similarities in value education between the two countries. The following sections provide some details of the education systems and the value education in China and England.

1.3.1 The education system and moral education (value education) in China

The education system in modern China has four levels: preschool, primary school, secondary school and higher education. In the pre-school stage, kindergartens are mainly for children aged from 3 to 5 (or 6). Formal schooling starts at the age of 6 or 7 in primary school and lasts for six years. Students then go to a regular secondary school, which is divided into junior secondary and senior secondary school, each with 3 years of schooling. Primary and junior secondary schools provide compulsory or universal education, which means that all children have to finish nine years of free education. In parallel with the regular secondary school are various vocational and technical secondary schools, mainly at the senior secondary level. Higher education institutions are colleges and universities that provide undergraduate and postgraduate courses.

There are different levels of moral values in moral education in China. The highest level is ‘developing great virtue’ (*ming da de*) (from the speech of Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 13th National People’s Congress on March 10th, 2018). Children should develop patriotic feelings. Specifically, students’ confidence in the pathways, theory, system and culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics should be enhanced. Therefore, they are inspired to shoulder the important task of national development (Dong, 2018; Feng, 2019). The middle level is ‘obeying social morality’ (*shou gong de*) (from the speech of Chinese President Xi

Jinping at the 13th National People's Congress on March 10th, 2018), which involves core socialist values at the social level. The aim of abiding by public morality should be freedom, equality, justice and the rule of law (Gu, 2019; Su et al., 2018). The third level is 'keeping personal morals' (*yan si de*) (from the speech of Chinese President Xi Jinping at the 13th National People's Congress on March 10th, 2018), which is considered strictly private morality. Strict personal ethics means following a social moral code so as to realise self-supervision, self-restraint and self-improvement, and act nobly and match words with deeds (Wang, 2008).

Value education in China is generally called moral education (*de yu*). Moral education is an umbrella concept that consists of education in communist ideology and faith, patriotism, core socialist values, Chinese national excellent virtue (Xi, 2013, 2018), mental health (Huang, 2000) etc. The value education in China has a theoretical Marxist atheist foundation (Li et al., 2004).

The importance of moral education is emphasised in national education (Dong et al., 2020). The Outline of the National Programme for Medium and Long-term Education Reform and Development (2010-2020) proposes "cultivating students through virtue and integrating core socialist values in the whole process of national education in China" (Section Two in the Outline, available at [国家中长期教育改革和发展规划纲要（2010-2020年） - 中华人民共和国教育部政府门户网站 \(moe.gov.cn\)](http://www.moe.gov.cn)). However, there are still special moral education courses at different schooling levels, like any other curriculum subject.

Taking compulsory education (1-9 school years) as an example, the subject of Moral Education is divided into different topics according to the students' age-related mental development. In primary schools (1-6 school years), the two topics are Moral Character and Life (for students aged 7-8) and Moral Character and Society (for students aged 9-12). In junior high schools (students aged 13-15), the subject is called Ideology and Morality. The aim is to comprehensively deal with issues such as morality, law, national conditions and mental health (*Compulsory Education Curriculum Standards, 2011*). There are unified

textbooks for different school terms. The specialised course teachers lead the courses according to the unified syllabus and criteria issued by the Department of Education. Teachers are encouraged to creatively organise student activities in and outside class based on the syllabus, criteria and textbooks.

The updated *Compulsory Education Curriculum Standards 2022* unifies the three moral education curricula for compulsory education under the same name, ‘Morality and Law,’ in a nine-year curriculum system. The updated curriculum consists of five general themes: political identity (national identity), moral cultivation, the rule of law, healthy personality and sense of responsibility. The political identity theme aims to strengthen students’ identification with the Communist Party of China, socialist China and Chinese traditional culture. The moral cultivation theme shapes students’ moral views and behaviour in daily life, the family, the community and future occupations. The law theme aims to equip students with a sense of democracy, equality, justice, law-abiding and self-protection. The healthy personality theme aims to make students confident, self-esteeming, rational, friendly, helpful, open-minded, tolerant of difference, adaptable etc. The responsibility theme helps students grow into responsible and actively involved citizens. The five themes run through each school year. However, different values are taught for each theme according to the different ages of the students.

Moral education is taught using two approaches. One is textbook-based teaching in the classroom. Back to life is the keynote of the current wave of curriculum reform in moral education (e.g. *A guide to Moral Education in Primary and Secondary Schools*, 2017; *The Guiding Outline of a Comprehensive Practical Activity Curriculum in Primary and Secondary Schools*, 2017). Students understand and discuss values with teachers and each other with examples from daily life. Activities include (but are not limited to) debate, situational performance, painting, writing and reading in the classroom. The other approach is practice and engagement. Students are involved in community service. They experience various professions and visit various public places during school time. Students are also encouraged to engage in the above activities privately outside school time. Parents and

communities are encouraged to provide students with as many public service opportunities as possible. Other school activities also help students understand values, such as a morning meeting held every Monday morning when the national flag is raised, a weekly class meeting and regular activities for Young Pioneers. Teachers are encouraged to emphasise values in their teaching of other subjects. Students are evaluated with paper examinations, behaviour observations, interviews, self-assessments and other-assessments (e.g. teachers and peers) (*Compulsory Education Curriculum Standards*, 2022).

Moral education in China still faces some challenges and problems in practice. For example, teachers do not quickly and easily abandon their traditional role of slavish followers of textbooks and take on a more interactive attitude to them (Tang & Wang, 2021; Zhu & Liu, 2004). The differentiation and creativity requirement in curriculum reform challenges teachers and students at the same time. Another serious problem is that many teachers of Moral Education do not admit the various problems existing in society and try hard to avoid them (Zhang, 2017). Teachers often try to build up an ideal virtual situation while refusing to acknowledge social problems. Teachers fear they cannot appropriately deal with controversial or sensitive social problems. They feel it is easy and safe to follow the teaching materials and examples provided in textbooks (Zhu & Liu, 2004). However, the contents in textbooks may still be too ideal and simple compared with real-life situations (Shu, 2016). On the other hand, the students might feel this moral education is not relevant to or helpful in their social lives (Zhu & Liu, 2004). They still struggle to independently make moral decisions in real life (Hu, 2010). College entrance policy is predominantly based on students' scores, which is a barrier to moral education curriculum reforms (Tang & Wang, 2021). Students are regarded as passive recipients instead of active agents who can reason, react and change the environment. In the eyes of some traditional educationists and practitioners, students will definitely form a kind of moral character and behave morally as they expect in any real situation. Individuals' moral reasoning skills and their relationship with the environment are considered unimportant (Yang, 2021).

1.3.2 The education system and value education in England

State-funded compulsory education is divided into key stages in England. The Early years' foundation stage starts from age 3 to 4. Primary education is subdivided in two key stages. Key stage 1 is Infants (ages 5 to 6 by August 31), and Key stage 2 is Juniors (ages 7 to 10 by August 31). Secondary education also has two key stages. Key stage 3 is for ages 11 to 13, and key stage 4 is for ages 14 to 15. Key stage 5 is post-16 education.

Value education in England covers moral, political, civic, character and virtue education. Value education in England has been informed by Personal, Social and Health Education (PSHE) (latterly Personal, Social, Health and Economic education, PSHEe), Citizenship Education (CE) and Religious Education. Fundamental British Values and Character Education are “two forms” of the “current wave of values education” taking hold in schools (Vincent, 2018, p.2).

For students' moral development, Ofsted (The Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills) guides provision in schools. In the guidance, schools are expected to develop “(1) students' ability to recognise the difference between right and wrong and to apply this understanding in their own lives readily, and recognise legal boundaries, and in doing so, respect the civil and criminal law of England; (2) understanding of the consequences of their behaviour and actions; (3) interest in investigating and offering reasoned views about moral and ethical issues and ability to understand and appreciate the viewpoints of others on these issues” (*Schools Inspection Handbook for September 2022*, Provision 301).

Religious education is not included in the national curriculum, but it is compulsory in all maintained schools in England. The education “gives students particular opportunities to promote an ethos of respect for others, challenge stereotypes and build an understanding of other cultures and beliefs” (*Religious Education in English Schools: Non-statutory Guidance, 2010*, p.8). The values delivered by religious education are inclusion, democracy and human

rights. The syllabus is local. Schools are free to develop curricula based on their agreed local syllabus. The curriculum can be taught separately or combined with other curricula. Some good-practice examples are also given in the guidance, such as pupils with a solid commitment to sharing their experience in a safe context, allowing pupils to interact with different religions and non-religious groups locally, and theme days.

PHSEe is also a non-statutory but compulsory curriculum in all state-funded schools. It includes drug education, financial education, sex and relationship education (SRE) and the importance of physical activity and diet for a healthy lifestyle, according to an updated policy paper in 2019 (*Introduction: Relationships Education, Relationships and Sex Education (RSE) and Health Education*). The education aims to “help students make informed decisions about their wellbeing, health and relationships and to build their self-efficacy. Pupils can also put this knowledge into practice as they develop the capacity to make sound decisions when facing risks, challenges and complex contexts. These subjects can support young people to develop resilience, to know how and when to ask for help and to know where to access support” (*Statutory Guidance on Relationships Education, Relationships and Sex Education (RSE) and Health Education*, updated in 2021). The schools have the freedom to develop curricula to fit the needs of their students. It is suggested that the curricula be combined with other national curriculum subjects such as Science, PE, Citizenship and Computing. Practical examples are not specifically provided in the guidance.

Character education aims to contribute to promoting pupils’ spiritual, moral, social and cultural (SMSC) development. Character education can be implemented in various curricular and extra-curricular activities, including assemblies, subject lessons, dedicated character education lessons, sports, performance art clubs, outward-bound activities, hobby clubs and subject learning clubs. These opportunities help young people to explore and express their character and build the skills they need for resilience, empathy and employability (*Character Education Framework Guidance*, 2019). A list of organisations which support character education and development in children and young people is provided at the end of the guidance.

Citizen education is included in the national curriculum in England for key stages 1-4 (Department for Education, 2013). It helps to provide pupils with knowledge, skills and understanding to prepare them to play a full and active part in society. In particular, citizenship education should foster pupils' keen awareness and understanding of democracy, government and how laws are made and upheld (*Statutory Guidance*, 2013). The education emphasises the values of confidence, responsibility, respecting differences, active engagement as a citizen and a healthy and safe life. Students are also encouraged to take as many opportunities as possible to improve their knowledge, skills and understanding, such as taking responsibility in school and the community, interviewing people who contribute to society and considering social and moral dilemmas.

Promoting Fundamental British Values is part of a school's existing duty to develop students' Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural (SMSC) development. The British values are generally summarised as democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance of those with different faiths and beliefs (*Promoting Fundamental British Values as Part of SMSC in Schools*, 2014). Teachers of all subjects are required to promote 'fundamental British values' (Department for Education, 2013). The guidance for schools also lists some examples of actions to promote British values, for example, including British values in suitable parts of the curriculum, ensuring that all pupils in the school have a voice that is listened to and considering the role of extra-curricular activities, including any run directly by pupils, in promoting fundamental British values.

The teaching and school inspection guidance does not provide suggestions for schools and teachers to assess students' achievement in value education. The brief expectation is that students will achieve as a result of the school's teaching effort. Ofsted gives guidance to schools regarding inspecting students' personal development, including pupils' spiritual, moral, social and cultural development, religious education, citizenship education, modern British values, development of character and wider development. Inspectors will visit lessons, observe students' behaviour and talk with students to collect evidence of their achievement in

personal development.

Value education in England faces some challenges and problems. For example, teachers' different or limited understanding of values (British values) is a problem (Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017). Stress on national identity, or Britishness, is not appropriate in some contexts in which young people have other national backgrounds and develop multiple identities (Ong, 1999, 2004; Osler & Starkey, 2005). The guidance on moral education (British values) is very brief. Teachers have the freedom to develop the most appropriate pedagogical response to meet their students' needs. However, this assumes unlimited resources of time, creativity and energy and overlooks the fact that teachers are coping with the demands of multiple policies (Ball et al., 2012). Students are provided with limited opportunities to engage when issues are addressed (e.g. migration, stereotyping, terrorism, voting and elections). Students often proceed to do written work after watching a video clip and a brief question-and-answer session (Vincent, 2019).

The education systems in China and England are similar. For example, the division of schooling stages is similar. In both countries, there are primary education, secondary education and higher education. The starting ages for each education stage are similar. For example, in China, primary education starts at age six or seven, and in England, it starts at age five.

Value education and moral development are emphasised in both Chinese and British compulsory education, although they are named differently. There are differences and similarities in the content of value teaching. Regarding the similarities, in both countries, democracy, justice, equity, tolerance of difference, respecting the law, citizenship, healthy personality and safe and healthy life are keywords mentioned in education policy papers (e.g. *Compulsory Education Curriculum Standards, 2022* in China; *A guide to Moral Education in Primary and Secondary Schools, 2017* in China; *The Guiding Outline of a Comprehensive Practical Activity Curriculum in Primary and Secondary Schools, 2017* in China; *Statutory Guidance, 2013* for Citizen Education in England; *Schools Inspection Handbook for*

September 2022 in England) . Researchers have compared documents on value education produced in two recent decades (1997-2018) in China and England. They have found that justice, the rule of law, harmony, tolerance, respect for diversity, non-discrimination, intercultural understanding and equality are mentioned in both Chinese and British value education (Brown et al., 2021). It is suggested that most of these values be taught in subjects across the curriculum in both countries. For example, Fundamental British Values and Personal, Social, Health and Economic Education in England and Core Socialist Values in China should be emphasised in all suitable national curricula. Policy papers in both countries suggest that students learn about these values through knowledge, understanding and practice (especially community service and volunteering).

One shared issue in value education in China and England is that most value teaching focuses more on students' understanding, attitude and knowledge than their behaviour (Brown et al., 2021).

However, there are also differences in the value education in the two countries. First, value education in both countries emphasises specific national identities. For example, communism, collectivism, socialism and Chinese culture are emphasised in Chinese value education (*Compulsory Education Curriculum Standards, 2022; A guide to Moral Education in Primary and Secondary Schools, 2017*), while individual liberty and Britishness (Promoting Fundamental British Values) are emphasised in British value education (*Promoting Fundamental British Values as Part of SMSC in Schools, 2014*). Second, religious education has a place in value education in England because England has a rich heritage of religious diversity (*Religious Education in English Schools: Non-statutory Guidance 2010*). However, religion receives little attention in Chinese value education (Wang & Uecker, 2017), although students are encouraged to respect different cultures (*Compulsory Education Curriculum Standard in 2022*). Third, value education policies reflect specific national contexts in the two countries. Confucian and socialist ideals are explicitly reinforced in policy papers in China. However, the role of education in generating a workforce and growing the economy is clear in England (Brown et al., 2021). The curricula for value education are more unified in China

than in England.

The similarities and differences in education, especially value education, in the two countries make young adolescents' moral views and behaviour similar and/or different.

1.4 Why young adolescents are the target group

Adolescence can be separated into three stages: early (ages 10-13), middle (ages 14-16/17), and late (ages 17-19 and beyond) (Resource Centre for Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention, 2003; Healthy Children.org by Brittany Allen, MD, FAAP & Helen Waterman, DO).

This study focuses on young adolescents because it is the initial development stage of moral identity (Davidson & Youniss, 1991; Hart et al., 1995). This means that young people are actively developing a sense of moral behaviour, moral perceptions, actual behaviour and its consequences at the social and individual levels. However, existing research regarding moral identity focuses on middle or late adolescents and adults more than on young adolescents (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Black & Reynolds, 2016; Gotowiec & Mastrigt, 2019; Rua, Lawter & Andreassi, 2017; Xu & Ma, 2015). A close check of the moral identity development of early adolescents is needed. Checking the factors predicting early adolescents' moral identity will provide evidence for moral education in primary schools.

Some studies agree that moral identity forms in the period of adolescence. For Blasi (1995), identity does not typically emerge as an essential source of moral motivation until young adulthood. Blasi (1995) also assumes that identity and morality are two psychological systems that initially develop independently and later become integrated or united in some individuals during or following adolescence. Moral motivation stems from identity when a mature identity is centred on moral concerns. Davidson and Youniss (1991) argue that developmental and social transformations occurring across the threshold into adolescence allow moral identity to develop for the first time. Sustained reasoned commitment to pro-social action is absent in childhood but can be found among adolescents (Hart et al.,

1995). There is also evidence implicating that moral identity will emerge around the early stage of adolescence. Empirical research shows that essential changes in the self are experienced between early and middle adolescence. These changes seem to result in a structure close to Identity Observed (Blasi & Milton, 1991) (discovering the real and genuine part of oneself or producing inner feeling, which is the first step in shaping identity).

Moral identity is organised around a set of moral traits (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Research suggests that adults from Western countries (e.g. England) and Eastern countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia) show different moral traits. Different understandings of moral traits may orient moral identity in individualist and collectivist cultures (AlSheddi et al., 2019). It is necessary to check whether there are any differences and similarities between different cultures after the initial stage of developing moral identity.

Some studies investigate differences and similarities in children and middle adolescents' morality in different countries. For example, Rochat et al. (2009) compare fairness in distribution behaviour among 3 to 5-year-olds in seven places (China, Peru, Fiji, the USA and three different urban sites in Brazil). Gorard et al. (2010) investigate the sense of equity among 14 to 15-year-old students in six countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic, England, France, Italy and Japan). However, these studies are not about moral identity and do not focus on early adolescents. A few studies include young adolescents in surveys on moral identity (e.g. Hardy et al., 2014; Patrick et al., 2018; Sonnentag & Barnett, 2016). However, there are few Asian respondents in the Caucasian-dominated samples and consistency between moral thoughts and moral behaviour is ignored.

In short, comparative research focusing on early adolescents is needed for two purposes. First, examining early adolescents will fill the gap in existing moral identity research regarding different age groups. Second, understanding the factors contributing to moral identity in early adolescents will provide a reference for moral education to promote consistency between moral thoughts and corresponding actions from an early stage.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This thesis consists of eleven chapters. Chapter one explains the research context and focuses on the purpose of and rationale for a comparative study of young adolescents. Chapter two reviews the literature on identity, morality, moral identity and the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour. Chapter three reviews the literature on culture and the relationship between culture and moral identity. Chapter four provides the research questions, the research tools and a description of the sample. Chapter five describes the similarities and differences between the Chinese and English respondents' background information, moral identity, related moral views and behaviour (e.g. moral behaviour, moral motivation and understanding of moral traits) and culture-related variables. Chapter six presents the moral identity regression models, and Chapter seven the moral behaviour consistency regression models. How moral identity predicts actual behaviour and behaviour consistency is described in chapter eight. Chapter nine provides the observation notes during the survey and the game observation. Chapter ten presents limitations and a discussion. Chapter eleven summarises and draws implications.

1.6 Summary

This study is a large-scale cross-sectional comparison between primary school children in China and England. It examines primary school students' moral identity and other related moral views and behaviour in different country contexts with different cultural backgrounds. The study aims to respond to several issues in moral education: the potential discrepancy between students' moral values and behaviour, practical assessments of students' moral values and behaviour and moral education models and concepts exchanged across cultures. The study also addresses some limitations in existing research on moral identity, including limited research linking moral identity to the consistency of moral behaviour, the limitation of measuring moral behaviour through self-reported past behaviour or behaviour intentions, cultural bias and non-involvement of Asian countries and young adolescents being underrepresented in existing research.

There are three reasons for conducting comparative research between China and England. First, China and England represent two different cultures regarding the collectivism-individualism cultural division. Second, similarities and differences in the education systems and moral education (value education) in the two countries will lead to some similarities and differences in young adolescents' moral views and behaviour.

CHAPTER TWO

MORAL IDENTITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOUR

This chapter presents a review of the literature on identity, morality, moral identity, moral behaviour and the relationships among them. First, several aspects of identity are presented, including definitions of identity, forms of identity in different societies, cultures and contexts, the relationship between identity and behaviour and how adolescents form identity. The chapter then presents a definition of morality and measures of it used in existing studies. Cultural differences in the foundations and importance of morality are emphasised. Understanding identity and morality helps to understand moral identity because moral identity is closely related to them in terms of its definition, formation, development and relationship with behaviour, and cultural differences

The chapter summarises the conceptual understanding of moral identity in the literature and how the concept is explained in theoretical models in terms of common traits, degrees and dimensions, when and how moral identity forms and develops, the factors influencing moral identity in adolescents and adults, and how moral identity is measured. Cultural differences in moral identity are also presented. The literature on moral identity helps with the research questions and design of the present study. It includes how moral identity is defined, the rationale for examining young people's moral identity, the influencing factors that should be considered when understanding moral identity, how to measure moral identity and the possibility of cultural influence in moral identity.

Finally, the literature on moral behaviour is reviewed, including its definition, cultural differences in moral behaviour judgements, measuring moral behaviour and the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour. The literature covers the rationale for linking moral identity to moral behaviour, the measure of moral behaviour and the understanding of

moral behaviour in different cultural contexts.

2.1 Identity and morality

Moral identity is literally related to identity and morality. Moral identity has been defined as “the degree to which being a moral person is important to an individual’s identity” (Hardy & Carlo, 2011a, p. 212). Some researchers suggest that moral identity integrates morality and identity when these aspects of personality develop in a particular stage of growth (Blasi, 1995; Bergman, 2004; Damon, 1984; Davidson & Youniss, 1991; Hart, 2005). Therefore, these two concepts (identity and morality) need clarification in order to understand moral identity. For example, understanding when and how identity forms is helpful to understand when and how moral identity forms later; investigating the relationship between identity and behaviour can benefit the understanding of linking moral identity to moral behaviour; defining and understanding morality is an essential precondition for identifying individuals’ moral identity in terms of the self-reported importance of ‘being a moral person’ and examining cultural differences in identity and morality helps for understanding of the hypothesis of cultural influence on moral identity.

2.1.1 Identity

a. Definition of identity

Identity is an explicit or implicit answer to the question, ‘who am I?’ The identity question is responded to by realistically appraising oneself and one’s past by considering one’s culture and particularly one’s ideology and social desirability. Identity leads to unity or integration among some elements of one’s past and expectations for the future. These elements include one’s productive integration in society from both objective and subjective perspectives, a basic sense of rootedness and well-being, self-esteem, confidence and a sense of purpose (Erikson, 1950, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1962, 1968a, 1968b, 1974, 1982). Identity is a kind of general self-evaluation of the interaction between oneself, the objective environment and one’s internal characteristics. It encompasses all aspects of the self, such as physical attributes,

preferences, values, personal aims, habitual behaviour, personality traits and personal narratives (McAdams, 1995).

Stets and Burke (2000) argue that identities develop through processes of self-categorisation and identification. Gaertner et al. (2012) suggest that identity is also often contrasted across three levels: (1) the individual self, including unique features that differentiate an individual from others, e.g. I am a vegetarian, I am pretty, I am smart, I am confident, I am a moral person; (2) the relational self, including close interpersonal relationships and roles, e.g. I am a mother, I am a wife; and (3) the collective self, including core social group memberships/identities, e.g. I am Chinese, I am a student at school, I am a charity volunteer, I am an employer.

The social structure suggests a taxonomy similar to that from the personality perspective: (1) ego identity, referring to the more fundamental subjective sense of continuity which is a characteristic of personality; (2) personal identity, denoting the more concrete aspects of individual experience rooted in interactions (and institutions); and (3) the notion of social identity, designating the individual's position in the social structure (Côté, 1996).

Moral identity comes under the umbrella concept of identity. Moral identity is an individual view of the self that emphasises one's moral characteristics to differentiate oneself from others. If moral identity is a kind of self-identification regarding morality, it has the same features as identity: objective (external) and subjective (internal) perspectives reflecting the interaction between the self and the objective environment and linking between one's past and future.

b. Identity, society, culture and context

All the forms of identity (even 'ego identity' or the 'individual self') involve interacting with society and culture, especially in contemporary life. Patterns of identity formation have varied across different periods of social structure. Social structure has evolved from the pre-modern to the early-modern to the late-modern period. The distinction between

pre-modern and early modern corresponds to a widely accepted sociological distinction between folk and urban societies, or agricultural and industrial societies, or *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. Production was a defining feature of social relations in early-modern society. In late-modern society, production has declined relative to consumption as technology has supplanted labour and created more surpluses (Gergen, 1991; Giddens, 1991).

For ego identity or the individual self, identity commitment was determined by others in pre-modern society (society required its members to adopt their identities early in life). Self-chosen identity commitment predominated in early-modern society (individuals were expected to construct their identities as they came of age). However, a lack of stable long-term commitments emerges as predominant in late-modern society (individuals are encouraged to discover their identities through consumption and by pleasing others) (Gergen, 1991).

For personal identity or the relational self, identity is formed based on an uncritical acceptance of others' appraisals and expectations which produced blending into a community or institutions in pre-modern society. However, in early-modern and late-modern societies, an individual shapes their personal identities to be accepted by the community while maintaining the distinction of their biography and image (Côté, 1996).

In the past, social or collective identity was mainly determined by one's inherited characteristics (e.g. sex, race, and parents' social status). Then, it became increasingly based on personal accomplishment and material attainment, while in late-modern society, it becomes a matter of impression management. Situational appraisals can be more critical in specific social encounters than one's social background or accomplishments (Gergen, 1991).

All three of the above identities have evolved from passive acceptance to strategic adaptation to situational approval while maintaining distinction in moving social structures and cultural contexts. Assimilations and contrasts of identities (Hawley et al., 2005) also imply that identity is social. Assimilation refers to individuals defining themselves by taking on

attributes of the groups they classify themselves within (Stevens et al., 2017), creating a feeling of belonging (Vignoles et al., 2006). Individuals also establish distinctiveness by distinguishing their unique characteristics from others (especially from outgroups). In general, any self-categorisation or identification is formed through reflection on others in social exchanges (Breakwell, 1986; Gabriel et al., 2012; Simon, 1997).

The dual-cycle model of identity formation (Luyckx et al., 2008) views identity development as a set of explorations and commitments and reveals the importance of social exchange. The first stage in developing identity (the first cycle) involves exploring identity among a wide range of choices and making commitments. The second stage (the second cycle) focuses on the evaluation of the identity commitment by talking with others and reflecting. If the outcome of the evaluation is positive, people will increasingly identify with this commitment and integrate it into the self. However, if the result is unsatisfying, the first cycle of a broader exploration of alternatives might be reactivated.

According to the above literature, forms of identity and identity formation are influenced by society and culture. One's identity will not always remain the same once it forms. It may be adjusted according to a changing environment and others' reactions or evaluations of one's identity. If this is true, it will also be true of moral identity. It is, therefore, possible for the external environment, such as culture, to influence moral identity.

Stryker (1984) proposes that multiple identities are managed in a 'hierarchy of salience'. The relative importance or salience of identity is, to a certain extent, context-dependent. For example, if a woman and her child work and study in the same school, when they are at school, being a teacher is more important than being a mother for the woman (Gatersleben et al., 2014).

Another hierarchy of salience is based on motivational self-primacy. The individual, relational and collective identities are hierarchised in the perceptions of individuals, according to which identity is the more fundamental or primary self (Gaertner et al., 1999;

Gaertner et al., 2002). Socially transmitted norms and ideals of what it means to be a good person are internalised. The self-system is built according to cultural standards and values. Norms in Western cultures (e.g. North America, northern and western Europe, and Australia) highlight agency, uniqueness, and personal success (Bellah et al., 1985; Cahoon, 1996). An independent or individual self-system is encouraged in Western countries (Markus & Kitayama, 1991a, 1991b; Triandis, 1989). Norms in Eastern cultures (e.g. China, India, Japan and South East Asia) emphasise commonality, connectedness and the importance of others (De Vos, 1985; Hsu, 1948; Leung, 1997). An interdependent or collective self-system is predominant in these cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991a, 1991b; Triandis, 1989). The individual self tops the motivational hierarchy in Western cultures but is subordinate to the relational and collective selves in Eastern cultures (Brewer & Chen, 2007). Conversely, a study with Chinese, British and American respondents shows that the hierarchy of motivational self-primacy has cultural stability (Gaertner et al., 2012). The study reveals that both Chinese and British participants value the individual self more than the relational and collective selves. Both American and Chinese participants disproportionately associate their future aims with the individual self rather than the relational and collective selves. Therefore, the individual self is superior to the relational and collective selves for people from different cultures.

The concept of a 'hierarchy of salience' of multiple identities (Stryker, 1984) suggests that the three levels of identity (personal, relational and collective) are universal among individuals. However, the salience of the three levels of identity is different for people in different cultural contexts. It is related to which identity level is encouraged in one's culture. The 'hierarchy of salience' makes it possible to explore the link between moral identity and culture.

c. Identity and behaviour

Identity also involves some elements of the ideal self and functions as the ideal principle of action (Blasi, 1984, 1993; Callero, 1985; Sparks & Shepherd, 1992). Erikson (1964) proposes that identity is rooted in the very core of being true to oneself in action. For example, individuals' personal health-related identities represent a core domain in the self-system.

They can drive individuals to pursue health behaviours consistent with their sense of self or 'who they are' (Conner, 2010). College students who self-identify as regular smokers smoke cigarettes more frequently than students who do not consider themselves regular smokers (Harris et al., 2008). Environment-friendly identity is significantly related to pro-environmental action and intention (including consumption behaviours) (Gatersleben et al., 2014; Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010).

However, identities do not lead to all the corresponding behaviours if some are not easy to perform. The influence of identities on behaviour can be explained by the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1974). The TPB suggests that the intention to perform a behaviour is predicted by three factors: (1) attitudes (is it a good or bad thing to do?), (2) subjective norms (what do others think I should do?), and (3) perceived behavioural control (can I do it?). Even if people get a positive perception of their identity from themselves and others, identity cannot be transformed into consistent behaviour if it is not easy to perform. For example, an environmental identity can be related to recycling, buying Fairtrade and avoiding flying on holiday, but not to reducing car use for work or shopping. The strongest predictor of environment-friendly behaviours is perceived behavioural control. The intention to behave more sustainably is most strongly related to how easy participants think it is. Reducing car use in daily life is not as easy as other energy-saving behaviours (Gatersleben et al., 2014). This argument also supports the finding that ease of action is critical (Kaiser & Wilson, 2004).

The above literature suggests that identity will drive the corresponding action under the motivation of the ideal or true self. However, identity does not necessarily guarantee the corresponding action when subjective or objective factors influence the action. The relationship between identity and behaviour provides clues for linking moral identity to behaviour, as will be discussed in other sections later.

d. Identity for adolescents

Forming identity is a lifelong process (Erikson, 1968). The sensitive period in this process is

the years of adolescence (Erikson, 1968; Yales & Youniss, 1996; Youniss & Yates, 1997). An increased sense of identity is triggered by physical changes during puberty, cognitive development and social opportunities and expectations. Erikson (1968) states that identity is shaped in socio-cultural contexts with other people supporting, testing, and (not) recognising adolescents' identities, with a limited number of identity options.

Marcia (1966) identifies two critical identity formation processes, exploration and commitment, and distinguishes four identity statuses according to the amount of exploration and commitment: (1) identity diffusion – the adolescent has not yet committed to a specific developmental task and may or may not have explored different alternatives in that domain; (2) identity foreclosure –the adolescent has made a commitment without much prior exploration; (3) identity moratorium – the adolescent is in a state of active exploration but has not made significant commitments; and (4) identity achievement – the adolescent has completed a period of active exploration and has subsequently committed.

Two dual-cycle models of identity formation have been proposed based on Marcia's model. One model distinguishes between exploration in breadth and in-depth (Luyckx, Goossens & Soenens, 2006; Luyckx, Goossens, Soenens & Beyers, 2006). The other assumes that identity is formed in the continual interplay between commitment, reconsideration and in-depth exploration (Crocetti et al., 2008; Meeus et al., 2010). Both models agree that adolescents explore their identities from among a wide range of options through comparison and reconsideration in the first stage. They then tend to consolidate identities once they are determined.

A review of 66 longitudinal studies on adolescent identity formation from 2000 to 2010 shows that commitment and exploration increase. In contrast, reconsideration of alternative identity commitments decreases. Concerning adolescents' identity statuses, reductions in diffusion, moratorium, and foreclosure have been observed along with stability in identity achievement. For individual adolescents, identity stability is higher over shorter time intervals. Identity is generally more stable in adulthood than in adolescence. Foreclosure is

the most stable identity status in both adolescents and adults (Meeus, 2011).

If moral identity integrates identity and morality, the development of identity in adolescence makes it possible that moral identity emerges in that stage. Adolescents' relatively unstable identity would imply that their moral identity is not stable either.

2.1.2 Morality

a. The definition and meaning of morality

Morality is a topic studied in the field of psychology, and research has resulted in the foundations of morality being broadened. Views range from individual-centred to community-centred views to divinity ethics.

Piaget (1932, 1965) created the cognitive development theory of child development. He suggested that the core of morality is respecting rules, which further develops into notions of justice. Kohlberg (1969), who extended Piaget's cognitive development approach, constrained morality in individuals' understanding of justice and fairness. However, the idea of limiting morality to the domain of justice was criticised by Gilligan (1982). He proposed an alternative foundation of morality: care. Gilligan thought that women, more than men, based their moral judgments and actions on concerns about their obligations to care for, protect, and nurture those they are connected with, particularly vulnerable people (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987). Researchers have hypothesised that morality has different foundations. When morality is limited to two foundations (harm/welfare/care and justice/rights/fairness), it is defined as protecting the welfare and autonomy of individuals (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt, 2008). Practices that do not protect or help individuals are seen as moral deviation (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Turiel (1983, p.3) defined morality as "prescriptive judgments of justice, rights and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other." At that stage, the domain of morality was seen as individual-centred.

Haidt and Bjorklund (2008) extended the foundations of morality by adding three ethical views of morality (Shweder, 1990). The resulting five foundations of morality are (1) harm/care (concern about violence and others' suffering, including compassion and care); (2) fairness/reciprocity (the norms of reciprocal relations, equality, rights and justice); (3) ingroup/loyalty (moral obligations related to group membership, such as loyalty and expectations of preferential treatment for ingroup members relative to outgroup members); (4) authority/respect (moral obligations related to hierarchical relations such as obedience, duty, respect for superiors and protection of subordinates); and (5) purity/sanctity (the moral ideal of living in an elevated, noble and less carnal way based on intuition about divinity, feelings of moral disgust and purity of body, mind and soul).

The five foundations of morality extend the domain of morality from individual-centred views to perspectives involving larger groups and institutions (Graham et al., 2012). The first two foundations (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) underlie and motivate the ethical concerns of the ethic of autonomy and are called 'individualising' foundations. The next two (ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect) are the psychological foundations of community ethics. The fifth foundation, purity/sanctity, is the psychological foundation of the ethics of divinity (Haidt & Graham, 2007). These last three are called binding foundations. Empirical research has found the five different moral foundations in diverse samples (e.g. Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2012). Combining the individualist and collectivist approaches to morality, it is defined as a system of "interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible" (Haidt, 2008, p.70).

b. Everyday morality

In contemporary morality studies conducted using moral vignettes and thought experiments in unnatural settings, such as hypothetical ethical dilemmas (e.g. trolley problems), the concept of everyday morality has been proposed (e.g. Blasi, 1984; Hofmann et al., 2014). Haan (1982, 1983) argues that everyday morality must be sensitive to people's experiences in ordinary life situations. Its definition highlights non-heroic everyday respect for morality

(Blasi, 1984; Davidson & Youniss, 1991). The focus of research on everyday morality has moved from moral reasoning in previous research to concrete prosocial behaviours (or intentions) (e.g. Shelton & McAdams, 1990).

There are three dimensions of everyday morality: (1) empathy – a vicarious emotional response to another person; (2) pro-social inclination – responding to everyday situations that are distinctly pro-social; and (3) the sensitivity of morality. The sensitivity of morality can be divided into three levels: (1) being sensitive to social issues and humanitarian themes (social morality) (Shelton & McAdams, 1990); (2) a pro-social response directed towards persons, known as the moral agent (interpersonal morality) (Rushton, 1980; Staub, 1978); (3) anonymous pro-social responding without knowledge of or a relationship with the person benefiting from the response (Conn, 1981; Nelson, 1973).

Moral and immoral events observed and reported by American and Canadian adults in their daily life are categorised in eight dimensions: (1) care/harm; (2) fairness/unfairness; (3) loyalty/disloyalty; (4) authority/subversion; (5) sanctity/degradation; (6) liberty/oppression; (7) honesty/dishonesty; (8) self-discipline/lack of self-discipline. Participants mention the care and harm most frequently, followed by fairness and unfairness, and honesty and dishonesty (Hofmann et al., 2014).

There is a wide range of morality. Clarifying this range is beneficial to capture one's moral identity by identifying whether or not one's self-reported importance of values is related to morality. The concept of everyday morality suggests that morality is usually limited to 'prosocial' behaviour in daily life. This helps understand people's moral identity in daily life.

c. Moral foundations-the importance of morality across cultures

The five foundations theory is a cultural-psychological theory and a nativist theory. Virtues are cultural constructions, and children develop different virtues in different cultures and historical eras. However, the range of available human virtues is constrained by the five sets of intuitions that human minds are prepared to have. Cultures select areas of human potential

that fit their social structure, economic system and cultural traditions, and adults work to cultivate these virtues in their children (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Therefore, the dimensions or foundations of morality will be different in different cultural contexts.

In cultural contexts where individuals are the fundamental units of moral value, care and justice are emphasised, and authority and tradition have no value (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). However, research in cultural psychology suggests that in non-Western nations issues related to ingroup loyalty, authority, respect and spiritual purity are often essential parts of the moral domain (Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1998; Shweder et al., 1997).

People with different political tendencies will appreciate different moral values despite living in the same national culture. It has been found that liberals endorse individualising foundations (harm, fairness) more than conservatives. In contrast, conservatives endorse the binding foundations (ingroup, authority, purity) more than liberals (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2012; Haidt & Graham, 2007).

It should be noted that issues related to harm, fairness and justice appear to be found in all cultures, including non-Western ones (Hauser, 2006; Wainryb, 2006). Graham et al. (2011) also support the idea. Individualising traits are prototypical of moral people in both Saudi and British samples. On the other hand, binding features are also highly prototypical of moral people, but only in a Saudi sample with collectivist culture (AlSheddi et al., 2019).

Cultural differences in the importance of moral foundations imply that people from different cultures will emphasise different foundations. Therefore, people from different cultures will have different understandings of important moral traits that moral people should have. People from different cultures will have different understandings of 'being a moral person'. This will be discussed more in later sections.

2.2 Moral identity

2.2.1 The definition of moral identity

Many researchers agree that moral identity is composed of two parts: self-reported importance of moral values, or how important it is to be a moral person; and moral action commitment (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Black & Reynolds, 2016; Hart et al., 1998; Narvaez et al., 2006). In this kind of definition, moral identity is perceived not only as an explicitly psychological activity but also as visibly moral actions. Moral identity is expected to lead to a significant correspondence between one's moral principles and actions. The stronger one's moral identity is, the more consistent one's moral behaviour is with moral thought in natural contexts (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bergman, 2004). The combination of moral thinking and moral actions makes moral identity more concrete, visible and understandable.

On the other hand, some researchers still only consider individuals' self-reported importance of morality at the cognitive level. This has been interpreted in different ways. For instance, moral identity is conceptualised as how moral virtues are central or essential to one's identity (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Blasi, 1995; Krettenauer & Victor, 2017). In this conceptualization, moral identity is also articulated as self-description or self-identification as a moral person (Hart et al., 1995; Youness & Yates, 1999). Most of these conceptions are based on individuals' psychological or ideological activities concerning personal morality.

According to the definitions of identity (see section 2.1.1.a), moral identity is one sub-dimension of identity. It is an objective perspective on the individual self regarding morality. Researchers also consider that identity is being true to oneself in action (e.g. Erikson, 1964; Conner, 2010; Whitmarsh & O'Neill, 2010; Gatersleben et al., 2014, see section 2.1.1.c). Therefore, moral identity is demonstrated in both self-evaluation and actual actions.

Given that one purpose of the present research is to explain the discrepancy between espoused moral values and moral behaviours among people from different cultural backgrounds, consistency between moral thoughts and moral actions has to be included in

this thesis's definition of moral identity. Therefore, I define moral identity as the self-reported importance of moral values (or principles) both in thought and actual conduct. Consistency between moral cognition and moral actions will be a crucial criterion to measure the degree of moral identity.

2.2.2 Theoretical models of moral identity

Mainstream theoretical models of moral identity are built from three perspectives. One is a cognitive-developmental perspective, represented by the Self Model of Moral Functioning (Blasi, 1983, 1984, 2005) and the Moral Ideal Self (Hardy et al., 2014). Another is a social-cognitive perspective, represented by the Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The third is an integration perspective (Shao et al., 2008), which combines the cognitive-developmental and social-cognitive views.

The theoretical models tell how the concept of moral identity is raised and how moral identity regulars moral thoughts and behaviour. Blasi's (1983) Self Model of Moral Functioning explains the discrepancy between moral judgment and moral action by means of the concept of moral identity. Hardy's Moral Ideal Self Model links moral identity to moral behaviour in daily life. The two models explain why a solid moral identity can motivate moral behaviour while a weak moral identity cannot, given weak self-cognition. However, the model can only explain well-stably consistent actions of moral exemplars or future-oriented moral behaviour because a long process of moral reasoning is involved. It cannot explain why people sometimes behave morally but sometimes do not. The model also does not cover cases in which people behave automatically in unexpected situations without moral reasoning. Aquino and Reed's (2002) Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning explains automatic moral behaviour in everyday life and cases of unstable moral behaviour in different contexts from a social-cognition perspective. Finally, Shao et al. (2008) suggest integrating the self-cognitive and social-cognitive models to allow moral identity explain the transition between moral thoughts and moral behaviour as much as possible.

The present study is mainly based on Blasi's (1983) Self Model of Moral Functioning and the Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning proposed by Aquino and Reed (2002). The Self Model of Moral Functioning provides a theoretical basis for examining the potential gap between moral thoughts and behaviour, especially considering the gap as an indicator of moral identity in the present research. Blasi's (1983) model suggests that the stronger one's moral identity is, the smaller the gap between moral judgment and moral behaviour is. Aquino and Reed's (2002) Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning make the linking of moral identity to behaviour consistency across different situations (e.g. scenarios in a questionnaire v.s. the actual contexts in a game) reasonable for the current study. Aquino and Reed's (2002) model suggests that individuals with a weak moral identity are more likely to change their behaviour according to specific situations than individuals with a strong moral identity. The relationship between the two aspects (internal and external) of moral identity and moral behaviour proposed by the model provides a theoretical basis for checking the relationship between students' (internal and external) motivations and their moral behaviour for the current study.

a. The Self Model of Moral Functioning

The Self Model of Moral functioning is based on the cognitive-developmental model initially proposed by Piaget (1932, 1965) and later extended by Kohlberg (1971). The core of the cognitive-developmental model is that a person's moral reasoning predicts their ethical behaviour. However, Blasi (1983) argues that Piaget's cognitive-developmental model mainly focuses on moral reasoning. Behavioural outcomes depend on people's moral knowledge and their capacity to use this knowledge. According to the model, nothing else can interrupt the process, from moral judgment to moral behaviour. The model assumes that cognition has a logical structure and emphasises cognitive balance by resolving all moral contradictions through assimilation and accommodation. It ignores the discrepancy between moral judgment and behaviour outside the cognitive balance.

To address the limitations of Piaget's cognitive-developmental model, Blasi (1983) suggests a

Self Model of Moral Functioning in which moral judgment is not sufficient to motivate moral action but requires motives originating from within one's identity (Zaha, 2010). It explains the discrepancy between moral judgement and moral actions when a person demonstrates a sustained commitment to acting on their moral beliefs or not (Blasi, 1983, 1984). According to Piagets' rational cognitive-developmental model, the inconsistency between moral judgment and moral action is purely a result of inadequate knowledge. Therefore, moral identity should be maintained by updating moral cognition with emerging moral situations in real life (Blasi, 1983). Blasi's model was also inspired by Haan (1978), who proposed that non-cognitive personality variables mediate between moral judgment and moral action. These personality variables include content decisions, moral attitudes and values, personality style when approaching moral problems, ego processes and actions themselves (when they can be observed). However, Blasi (1983) criticised Hann for ignoring the guiding role of cognitive principles and emphasised the concreteness of situations. Committing to Piaget's cognitive principle and embracing Hann's idea that other variables may mediate moral reasoning and moral action, Blasi introduced the Self Model, which involves the concept of moral identity.

The Self Model has three components. First, the model posits that people must assess whether they have the responsibility to act according to their moral judgment (what is the right or moral thing to do) (Blasi, 1984). Second, a person's moral identity motivates the behavioural commitment to moral judgement. The moral identity reflects individual differences in the degree to which being moral is a central or essential characteristic of the sense of self (Blasi, 1995). For example, a person with a solid moral identity may have values and ideals (such as being honest and fair) which are more central to their notion of self than someone with a weak moral identity. When a person's identity is centred on morality, the desire to live in a manner consistent with one's sense of self can serve as a critical moral motivation (Blasi, 1984). The third component of the Self Model is the tendency of individuals to strive for self-consistency and the attitudes and strategies to resist temptation. This tendency provides the motivational impetus for moral action according to moral judgment (Blasi, 1983). A counter-defensive strategy mediates the consistency between moral judgment and resistance to temptation (Grim et al., 1968).

There are several characteristics of the model. (1) It is cognitive. The model explains cognitive activity bridging the gap between moral judgement and moral action. The cognitive process involves assessing the responsibility to act on a moral judgement and maintaining self-consistency against temptation and conflicting needs. (2) It suggests that ‘the self’ is defined with ordered characteristics. First, the model assumes that people define themselves with various traits, attitudes and perceptions. However, this is not the whole picture. These characteristics can be referred to as ‘the self’, and they function when they are ordered and organised as ‘essential’, ‘central’ and ‘deep’. For example, social norms and abstract criteria for justice only lead to strict obligations if being a member of the social group or being a just person is part of the individual’s core definition. The self is relevant to morality in two ways: being moral and behaving morally may or may not be part of the essential self; moreover, for different people, different moral feelings (e.g. compassion, love, obedience, justice) may characterise the self (McDougall, 1980; Meacham, 1975; Blasi, 1983). (3) The model assumes that self-consistency varies among individuals. It is reasonable to hypothesise that the quality, scope and strength of self-consistency depends on specific characteristics of the self. These mediators can be the degree of inclusiveness within the self of events, aspects or traits in one’s personality; their degree of hierarchisation and cohesiveness; the degree of sensitivity to inconsistency; and the degree of focusing on the self or self-awareness (Blasi, 1983).

Even though the Self Model of Moral Functioning extended Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg’s (1971) cognitive development model, some limitations have been pointed out. First, it only explains moral behaviour performed after thoughtful consideration (Hardy & Carlo, 2005). It fails to account for the possibility that most ‘everyday morality’ may be tacit, automatic and driven by moral priming or activation rather than calculative reasoning (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez, 2008; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). Second, the model ignores the dynamic and multi-faceted nature of personal identities (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Consequently, it narrowly only applies to individuals for whom moral identity occupies the most central location within the self. It does not say much about when and in what situations moral

identity will be (or will not be) experienced as part of the sense of self relative to other identities (Aquino et al., 2008). This second limitation suggests that the character perspective may not be helpful in explaining behavioural inconsistencies exhibited by many individuals in different situations, including ones with different social backgrounds (Hart, 2005). Researchers who are critical of the model interpret Blasi's 'moral identity' as something enduring and stable over time. It nicely explains moral exemplars' strong commitment to their moral beliefs. Moral exemplars are frequently and consistently dedicated to moral causes in different situations (Shao et al., 2008).

However, the criticism that the model does not consider inconsistent behaviour in different situations can be responded to with propositions that Blasi made when he proposed the model (Blasi, 1983). Blasi made seven propositions responding to a series of possible empirical questions. Three of the seven propositions responded to the failure to act on moral judgements. One proposition suggested that moral action directly depends on moral choice in specific situations. An abstract understanding of certain moral criteria is no guarantee that a particular situation will be viewed as relevant to them. In fact, there is no guarantee that the situation will even be seen as relevant to morality. There may be individual differences in readiness to process reality in moral terms, probably related to one's interests, education, and experience. This can be interpreted as different people having different understandings or interpretations of the same situation. The capacity to relate situations with morality depends on the personal background. Moreover, even the same person will not have precisely the same moral understanding of similar situations. The ability to relate situations to people's abstract moral criteria really depends on the specific situation and relevant personal background. The other two propositions help explain inconsistent behaviour in situations in which moral judgement will not lead to action when powerful personal needs and interests conflict with the direction of the movement judged to be moral. Moreover, some individuals do not have strategies to resist temptation. Different situations may involve different personal needs or temptations. Sometimes, self-consistency is overwhelmed by powerful personal needs or temptations, and sometimes, it is not. Alternatively, some people do not have enough strategies to resist all temptations in different situations. Therefore, inconsistent behaviour

happens in different situations.

b. The Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning

One prominent characteristic of the Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning (Aquino & Reed, 2002) is that it explains inconsistent behaviour in different situations from the perspective of social cognition. This feature differentiates the model from the Self Model of Moral Functioning. The model is grounded on social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1991a, 1991b) and assumes that self-regulatory mechanisms transfer moral reasoning into action. Self-regulation is rooted in moral standards and self-sanctioning through which moral agency is exercised. In the course of socialisation, moral standards are constructed from information conveyed by direct tuition, evaluative social reactions to one's conduct and exposure to self-evaluative standards modelled by others. Once formed, these standards serve as guides and deterrents for action. People refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards because such behaviour would bring self-sanctioning. However, self-sanctioning does not always stop behaviour inconsistent with moral standards. There are many psychosocial excuses with which self-sanctioning can be disengaged from immoral conduct. Self-regulatory mechanisms do not come into play unless they are activated. Selective activation and disengagement of personal control lead to different behaviour in different circumstances, even for persons with the same moral standards (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, 1999).

People are able to justify immoral behaviour while keeping their moral standards by means of psychosocial processes involving cognitive strategies. These strategies include analysing or adapting to social situations. For example, detrimental conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by considering that it serves socially worthy or ethical purposes. In everyday life, much aggressive behaviour is justified as protecting honour and reputation (Cohen & Nibett, 1994). Another excuse for immoral behaviour is called displacement of responsibility. People will behave in ways they typically avoid if a legitimate authority accepts responsibility for the effects of their conduct (Diener, 1977; Milgram, 1974). Moreover, group decision-making is another common motivator that makes considerate

people behave inhumanely. Any harm done by a group can always be mainly attributed to the behaviour of others (Bandura et al., 1975). Therefore, people act more cruelly when there is group responsibility than when they need to personally take responsibility for their actions (Bandura, 1999). The social cognitive theory generally links moral standards with moral or immoral behaviour in social contexts by means of a cognitive self-regulatory mechanism.

The Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning has been employed to perceive and conceptualise moral identity from a social perspective (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Moral identity is described as a self-regulatory mechanism that motivates moral actions (e.g. Blasi, 1984; Damon & Hart, 1992; Erikson, 1964; Hart et al., 1998). In this model, moral identity is still defined as a character, which is the same as in the Self Model of Moral functioning. However, the updated model extends moral identity from just self-concept to social self-schemata. Moral identity is a self-concept organised around a set of moral traits. It may also be amenable to a distinct mental image of what a moral person is likely to think, feel and do (Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994). It is presumed that a person's moral identity may have a social referent that can be any social construction (e.g. a real membership group, an abstracted ideal or a known individual). Aquino and Reed (2002) theorise that moral identity has both private and public aspects (e.g. Hart et al., 1998). The private aspect of moral identity is labelled 'internalisation' and the public aspect 'symbolisation.' The symbolisation dimension stresses one's sensitivity to being a moral person in the view of the public. Internalisation emphasises the importance of satisfying the self-standard of morality. Data show that both dimensions predict self-reports of volunteering. However, only the internalisation dimension predicts actual donation behaviour by high school students (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

The Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning embeds the transition from moral thoughts to moral actions in complicated social contexts. It assumes that whether moral beliefs finally lead to corresponding moral actions is not only influenced by self-concept (internalisation) but also by social self-schemata (symbolisation). When moral identity is salient in the internalisation rather than the symbolisation dimension, consistent moral behaviour in different contexts is more likely to be maintained. Various studies support this argument. For

example, individuals with more central internal moral identities show higher levels of self-control (self-regulation) than those with more central symbolic moral identities. Individuals who perceive themselves as ethical (self-concept) will be more likely to practise self-regulation and behave ethically than people who are acting ethically for the sake of appearances or to conform with organisational norms (social self-schemata) (Rua et al., 2017).

One limitation of the model is that it cannot explain cases in which people are willing to pursue a moral course of action even when under situational pressure (Shao et al., 2008). However, some empirical research has weakened this limitation a little. For example, when people expect their behaviour to be recognised, the symbolisation dimension of moral identity increases prosocial behaviour for people whose internalisation dimension of moral identity is low. When ethical behaviour cannot be recognised, the symbolisation dimension of moral identity does not significantly predict volunteering behaviour. However, people who are only high in the internalisation dimension of moral identity still commit to moral behaviour (Winterich, Aquino et al., 2013) when their behaviour is not recognised. Similarly, recognition increases charitable behaviour by individuals with high symbolisation. However, recognition does not increase charitable behaviour when internalisation has already been motivated (Winterich, Mittal et al., 2013). This implies two things. One is that for people whose symbolisation dimension is at a high level in their moral identity, their behaviour is more likely to be influenced by situations, especially if the internalisation dimension is at a low level at the same time. The other implication is that behaviour is not likely to be influenced by situations when people have a high internalisation dimension of their moral identity and a low symbolisation dimension at the same time. According to this result, it can be hypothesised that moral exemplars or people who can maintain their moral commitment under situational pressure are high in the internalisation dimension and low in the symbolisation dimension of their moral identity.

2.2.3 The common traits of moral identity

According to the character-based conception of moral identity, moral identity concerns how important it is for individuals to identify themselves as moral people (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002). Moral identity traits depend on a personal understanding of the characteristics of morality. Culture and political tendencies influence the foundations of morality (see section 2.1.2.c). Therefore, the moral traits individuals use to identify themselves may vary. In order to develop a measure to capture moral identity which is suitable for anyone, it is necessary to examine whether there are universal moral traits which are widely accepted.

Blasi's (1984) analysis suggests that there may be several non-overlapping moral traits that compose each person's unique moral identity. However, a set of shared moral traits is likely to be central to most people's moral self-definition. Aquino & Reed's (2002) empirical research explored nine salient moral traits with the highest frequencies out of 376 non-overlapping traits to identify a moral person mentioned by 228 undergraduates in an American university. The nine selected traits are caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest and kind. These traits are perceived as the main aspects of moral identity, and they can be mapped onto at least a part of an individual's moral identity.

Aquino & Reed's research (2002) did not involve a sample with diverse cultural backgrounds, political tendencies and ages. However, their result partially overlaps with that of a study conducted across cultures, political orientations, age groups and social contexts. For example, moral traits related to harm, fairness, and justice appear to be found in all cultures, including non-Western ones (Hauser, 2006; Wainryb, 2006). The harm and fairness foundations are universal among people with different political orientations (Haidt & Graham, 2007). The result of another study with only samples from non-Eastern countries is, to a great extent, in line with Aquino & Reed's (2002) research. Both adults and late adolescents in Canada rated trustworthiness, honesty/truthfulness, integrity, kindness/care, fairness/justice and being good citizens as typical of a moral person (Pratt et al., 2003). Dependability, faithfulness,

genuineness, honesty, loyalty, reliability, responsibility, sincerity, trustworthiness and truthfulness are the most frequently mentioned important moral identity traits self-reported by a wide range of age groups from 14 to 64-year-olds in family, school and work contexts (Krettenauer et al., 2016).

2.2.4 The degree and the dimensions of moral identity

The idea of being a good or moral person may have different levels of centrality in people's self-concepts (Blasi, 1984). According to Blasi (1984), the moral identity reflects individual differences in the extent to which being moral is a central or essential characteristic of the sense of self. When a person's identity is centred on morality, the desire to live in a manner consistent with one's sense of self can serve as critical moral motivation. For example, individuals with a medium level of moral identity are more likely to behave honestly. They depend more on the absence of temptation than active resistance to temptation. In contrast, individuals with high moral identities exhibit honesty without actively resisting temptation. Although individuals with low moral identity attempt to resist temptation and behave with 'limited honesty', they fail more often than they succeed (Xu & Ma, 2015). This implies that people with a strong moral identity are more likely to resist the temptation to offend their moral sense of self than people with a weak or medium moral identity. In other words, consistency between the moral sense of self and moral behaviour can indicate how strong one's moral identity is and whether being a moral person is central to people's self-concept.

Moral identity can be strengthened or temporarily made salient by external activations. The social-cognitive perspective of moral identity proposes that people vary in the degree to which their moral identity is salient. This salience includes chronically trait-like moral identity and temporary state-like moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Shao et al., 2008). The salience of trait-like moral identity refers to a state in which a set of moral traits are central in defining personal identity. This is a relatively stable moral self, and it is chronically accessible. In contrast, situational factors can

activate the moral aspect of identity for those who do not put moral traits at the centre of self-identity, and moral identity salience is temporarily achieved (Shao et al., 2008). Participants in a primed moral identity condition have described their personal stories, which are more related to how they view themselves as moral people than those who are not primed (Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2011; Carter, 2013; Reed et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2016; Shang et al., 2020; Skarlicki & Turner, 2014). Primed moral identity salience yields effects that are essentially equivalent to those of chronic salience (Aquino et al., 2009; Reed et al., 2007).

When the concept of moral identity was proposed by Blasi(1983), it was typically described as being primarily deliberative, internally ideal and responsible (Blasi, 2004; Colby & Damon, 1992; Moshman, 2011). However, other researchers proposed that moral identity involves more factors and complicated processes. For example, Aquino & Reed (2002) suggested that moral behaviour is not only driven by the importance of satisfying the self's standard of morality. It may also be motivated by the desire to be a moral person in the view of the public. Therefore, moral identity has been extended primarily from the personal or internal perspective to the public or social perspective. The two opposite dimensions of moral identity are compatible with Erikson's (1964) public-private dimensions of self-importance.

On the basis of the concept of the discrepancy between the actual self and the ideal self (Higgins, 1978), some researchers have divided moral identity into the actual one and the ideal one (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Shang et al., 2020). Actual moral identity refers to how much individuals actually assign to themselves moral traits or a distinct mental image of what a moral person is likely to think, feel and do, while ideal moral identity refers to how much individuals would like to assign to themselves moral traits or a distinct mental image of what a moral person is likely to think, feel and do. The gap between actual moral identity and ideal moral identity is defined as moral identity discrepancy. The further away actual moral identity is from ideal moral identity, the greater the moral identity discrepancy is, and the more people are willing to show compensatory behaviour to reduce or at least maintain (not expand) that discrepancy (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1987). Moreover, Shang et al.

(2020) find that men's average moral identity discrepancy is smaller than women's. Women's moral behaviour shrinks their moral identity discrepancy more than men's.

Some researchers have proposed that not all moral behaviours are accompanied by an intentional process of reasoning and judging. Some moral behaviours are more automatic, habitual and unconscious (Hardy & Carlo, 2005; Hulseley & Hampson, 2014; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Shao et al., 2008). To explain automatic moral behaviour, it is necessary to understand the role of self-schemata and situational factors. For some people, moral identity primarily involves one particular moral schema. It may be a mental image of what it means to be a moral person, action scripts or event representations of specific morally relevant behaviour (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Stets & Carter, 2006). The schema guides how individuals perceive, interpret and respond to their social environment. For schemata to be utilised in social contexts, they must be accessible or readily activated (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2005). As a practical example, consider a woman whose identity is centred on kindness and whose conception of kindness includes holding doors open for other people when entering a building. According to Lapsley and Narvaez, this woman will probably have readily available kindness schemata in place. She will not need to consciously deliberate on each opportunity to hold a door for another person but she can function automatically in many situations (Hardy & Carlo, 2005).

Another group of researchers have argued that habitual moral actions will form moral identity. For example, Hulseley & Hampson (2014) proposed a theory of moral expertise termed the habitus model. They argued that moral beliefs are made central through action. Acting on beliefs affects how people see themselves and simultaneously strengthens their beliefs. This increases the likelihood that they will repeat the actions. The pattern of action that becomes a habit forms the basis of a personal disposition that forms a part of moral identity. Moral expertise develops from explicit learning, deliberation and practice, like all expertise. Habitual responses to moral situations begin as consciously considered actions and later become intuitive. Like the social-cognitive model, the habitus model also focuses on aims, beliefs and social perceptions. Typically, fully explicit internalised social rules and norms

which are available for evaluation play a part in acquiring moral expertise at the point at which clear goals direct moral habit formation (Ajzen, 1991; Baumeister et al., 2011; Wood & Neal, 2007). Youniss and Yates (1997, 1999) support the idea of adolescents doing community service through empirical research. Their study shows that habit formation emerges through service during the formative period of youth. Everyday morality evolves from habitual action into a defined identity. Once in place, a call to action is turned on when someone in need is encountered.

The idea of the degree of moral identity explains the importance of being a moral person, as self-identification has different levels for different individuals. Only people whose moral identity is salient among their various identities are expected to maintain consistency between moral values and behaviour and behave consistently morally in different contexts (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004; Shao et al., 2008). Researchers have also subdivided moral identity into different dimensions: internal vs. external; public vs. private; ideal vs. actual. The degree and dimensions of moral identity further explain consistency or inconsistency between moral thoughts and moral behaviour in people's daily lives. The concepts of salience and dimensions of moral identity also provide clues to capture people's moral identity in terms of degree and dimensions.

2.2.5 The formation and development of moral identity

There are two different theories of how moral identity forms. One view is that identity and morality are two psychological systems that initially develop independently. They become integrated or united as moral identity in some individuals during or following adolescence (Blasi, 1995; Bergman, 2004; Damon, 1984; Hart, 2005). In Blasi's (1995) model, identity does not typically emerge as an essential source of moral motivation until young adulthood. Moral motivation stemming from identity results when a mature identity is centred on moral concerns. However, one of the limitations of Blasi's model is that it gives little explanation of how and why some individuals centre their identity on moral concerns (Hardy & Carlo,

2005).

The opposite view is that morality and identity are two aspects of the same developmental system. The developmental and social transformations occurring across the threshold into adolescence allow the development of a moral identity for the first time (Davidson & Youniss, 1991). Davidson and Youniss (1991) provide more details on how moral identity forms. They suggest that moral actions (e.g. civic service in daily life) lead to a moral identity, which in turn leads to further moral actions and solidifying moral identity. Service allows young people to practise moral behaviour and gives them an opportunity to experience themselves as effective moral actors within particular social norms. They project themselves as having skills and responsibility for addressing social problems. Consequently, they have taken a significant step toward incorporating morality into their identities. Everyday morality evolves from habitual actions into a defined identity (Youniss & Yates, 1999). Behaving altruistically is actually a way of expressing the moral self (Hart & Fegley, 1995).

There is evidence of early signs of moral identity in childhood (Thompson, 2009). For instance, Kochanska et al. provide important insights into the development of preschoolers' moral selves (integrating moral values into one's sense of self) as a precursor of adolescents' moral identity (Kochanska, 2002; Kochanska et al., 2010). Krettenauer et al. (2013) investigate the development of the moral self in middle childhood. There is evidence that children's moral self-concept becomes increasingly predictive of moral emotions and social behaviour between the ages of 5 and 12 (Sengsavang & Krettenauer, 2015). Specifically, as children comply with parental demands or rules, they begin to see themselves as 'good' boys or girls. Their behaviour is consistent with their parent's instructions and seems to be internally driven without sustained or salient parental control (Kochanska, 2002). According to attributional and self-determination theories, children who engage in committed compliance probably attribute it to their own wishes and aims, and they experience a sense of choice, autonomy and self-generation, which may lead to the integration of committed compliance with their own selves (Grolnick et al., 1997; Grusec & Goodnow, 1994; Ryan & Deci, 2000). Kochanska's (2002) longitudinal research revealed that only committed

compliance against temptation is significantly related to children's future moral self, which in turn regulates internalised conduct. The finding shows that moral value commitment driven by internal motivation exists among children (4-5 years old). This evidence indicates that voluntarily embracing caregivers' norms begins to form a moral self at an early age. A consciously perceived moral self may mediate both early and later aspects of moral development in ways that contribute to the growth of moral identity (Navaez & Lapsley, 2009).

Even though children show some signs of developing moral identity, most studies agree that moral identity initially develops during adolescence or afterwards. According to Blasi (2001, 2004), mature moral identity is achieved when individuals selectively and deliberately infuse moral values with personal importance by integrating them in their sense of self. Subjective identity is necessary to provide a solid desire to maintain consistency with one's sense of self as a moral person. Therefore, moral identity is typically not experienced until at least adolescence, and even after that, it is not present in most individuals. Only adolescent and adult moral exemplars seem to completely meet the criteria for mature moral identity (Colby & Damon, 1992). Not only do moral exemplars define themselves in moral terms, but their personal desires and moral actions are in line with their moral principles (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Matsuba & Walker, 2004; Monroe, 2004; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Reimer, 2003; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004).

Some factors (e.g. schemata, a sense of responsibility, value commitment, identity formation) related to the formation of moral identity develop better in adolescence than in childhood. Moral identity is primarily about one moral schema: a mental image of what it means to be a moral person (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Stets & Carter, 2006). The formation of moral identity should involve building a rich network of chronically accessible moral schemata (Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). Compared to adolescents, children probably have fewer moral schemata, and those they do have may be less elaborate and less accessible for information processing (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). A sense of responsibility is another basic element of moral identity (Blasi, 1984; Youniss & Yates, 1999). Although children have a basic understanding of right

and wrong, they feel less responsibility to do what is right than adolescents (Nunner-Winkler, 2007). A reasoned commitment to pro-social action is consistently absent in childhood but can be found among adolescents (Hart et al., 1995). Adolescents are more sensitive than children to the expectations, attitudes and needs of others (Carlo, 2006). In addition, adolescents are more principled and less focused on external factors like punishment and reciprocity (Damon & Hart, 1992). Empirical research shows that essential changes in the self occur between early and middle adolescence. These changes seem to result in a structure close to what has been called 'identity observed'. Identity observed refers to discovering the real and genuine part of oneself or producing inner feelings, which is the first step in constructing identity (Blasi & Milton, 1991).

Reimer et al. (2009) show that trends in the development of moral maturity exist among high school students (11-19 years old). Principled idealism (e.g. I am ethical; I live by principles) is prominent in the moral understanding of urban adolescents. High school seniors make more self-attributions of moral trait factors than first-year students. However, only caring-dependable and principled-idealistic traits (e.g. I am caring; I am reliable) are significantly associated with volunteerism. Adolescent moral exemplars (14-18 years old) understand that their actions should be similar to their aims and moral traits. This implies that moral exemplars' internal values are demonstrated through external actions. However, both moral exemplars' and ordinary young people's core selves are close to moral pride at the same level. This implies that moral maturity is a developmental process for all individuals.

Research has shown that moral identity development is not restricted to adolescence or early adulthood. It is a lifelong process that expands well into adulthood (Krettenauer et al., 2016). Krettenauer et al. (2016) show that value-based and context-based moral identity changes between adolescence and adulthood. Among moral-related virtues, reliability, responsibility, integrity, consistency, ethics and being law-abiding are more critical for older people. In contrast, being open-minded, understanding, hardworking and proud tend to be more important for younger people. The cross-context difference in moral identity increases between the ages of 14 and 25 years and declines after age 25. This means that younger

people tend to choose different moral values in different contexts (e.g. family, work, school and community), while older people do not.

A meta-analysis of 111 studies on moral identity finds that the mean age of all the respondents surveyed is 25.3 years (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). The youngest people targeted in these studies are mainly middle and late adolescents (e.g. Adler, 2013; Gu, 2013; Hardy, 2005; Hardy et al., 2014; Hardy et al., 2015; Hart et al., 1999; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; Pratt et al., 2003; Stets & Carter, 2012; Taylor-Collins et al., 2019; Zaha, 2010). A few studies also cover early adolescents (e.g. Aldridge, Ala'I et al., 2016; Aldridge, Fraster et al., 2016; Coskun & Kara, 2019; Hardy et al., 2012; Patrick et al., 2018; Patrick et al., 2019; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012; Sonnentag & Barnett, 2016; Yang et al., 2018). However, in some studies, early adolescents account for a small proportion of the whole sample (e.g. Aldridge, Ala'I, et al., 2016; Hardy et al., 2012). It is noteworthy that a study in Turkey focuses on 7-11-year-olds (mean age 8.5) and provides a complete sample of early adolescents and children (Coskun & Kara, 2019).

Research shows that moral identity emerges around adolescence, especially late adolescence. However, some elements of moral identity can be found in young adolescents, such as moral understanding. There are two reasons why most research on moral identity surveys late adolescents or adults (graduate students) rather than young adolescents. One is that moral identity is believed to be better developed in late adolescents and adults than in young adolescents. The other reason is that it is easier to measure late adolescents' and adults' moral identities than young adolescents'. However, this does not necessarily mean that research on young adolescents' moral identity should be ignored.

2.2.6 Factors influencing moral identity

The formation of moral identity is influenced by two sets of elements: personality (or individual characteristics) and social influence (Hart et al., 1998, 1999; Hart, 2005).

Personality refers to the traits that characterise an individual's typical style of behaving, thinking, feeling and personal achievements. Social influence includes the family environment, the school climate, the working environment, participation in moral actions, access to institutions and social culture. The following sections present the factors influencing the moral identity of adolescents and adults. It is worth noting that most studies equate moral identity (especially that of adolescents) with prosocial behaviour or community service. Some researchers admit that community service does not capture the whole meaning of moral identity, but it is an essential element of moral identity (e.g. Hart et al., 1999).

a. Factors influencing adolescents' moral identity

Regarding personality, adolescents' internalised and externalised behaviour problems (e.g. feeling withdrawn, feeling worthless, bullying and arguing too much) are negative predictors of moral identity measured using community service. Reading comprehension (an academic achievement test) positively predicts adolescents' moral identity. Female and white adolescents are more likely to develop a solid moral identity than males, blacks and Hispanics (Hart et al., 1999). Moral confidence is also crucial for adolescents to maintain consistency between moral beliefs and moral behaviours by resisting peer pressure, making unpopular choices and speaking up for their beliefs (Bown et al., 2014; West-Burnham & Jones, 2007). Studies on moral rebels (people who follow their moral convictions despite social pressure not to do so) (e.g. Sonnentag & Barnett, 2013; 2016) support this. They find that moral courage motivates adolescents to stand up for what they believe is moral despite the pressure to conform. The characteristics of moral courage include (1) self-esteem (confidence in one's abilities and beliefs); (2) little need to belong (little desire to be a part of a group); (3) self-efficacy (a sense of competence to succeed in completing a task or reaching a goal); (4) assertiveness (the ability to respond to situations in a strong and clam manner) and (5) social vigilantism (a tendency to express one's beliefs to others). Social efficacy is also a mediator between moral identity and stopping anti-prosocial behaviours. It indicates that adolescents with high levels of moral identity are more likely to help victims of bullying when they view themselves as socially competent (Patrick et al., 2019). In addition, prosocial moral reasoning and empathy in adolescence also predict a prosocial disposition in adulthood

(Eisenberg et al., 2002).

Regarding social elements, the family environment such as attachment to caregivers (Walker & Frimer, 2007), child-parent joint activities, parents' income (Hart et al., 1999), parental demandingness (Pratt et al., 2003) and overall family support (Hart et al., 1998) are positive predictors of adolescents' moral identity. Furthermore, parental use of inductive discipline, which helps children appreciate the consequences of their actions for themselves and others, appears to be related to the internalisation of moral values (Hoffman, 2000). Early and middle adolescents who have received inductive discipline and have felt accepted by their mothers report a high level of moral identity (Patrick & Gibbs, 2016). It is of particular interest that parental expressions of disappointed expectations (when viewed favourably by adolescents) foster their moral self-identity (Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). This implies that adolescents' perceptions of disciplinary techniques play an important role. Patrick and Gibbs (2012) show that adolescents' favourable views of inductive discipline are positively associated with their moral identity. However, perceptions of withdrawal of love and assertion of power have no significant influence on moral identity. Parental warmth has been positively linked to a greater internalisation of moral values in the self (Hardy et al., 2008). There is also a positive relationship between the strictness of parenting for male late adolescents and a strong emphasis on moral values (moral self-ideals) (Pratt et al., 2003). Parents' expectations are also essential for adolescent care exemplars to show consistently caring behaviour (Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004).

The school climate is also associated with adolescents' moral identity (Schachter, 2005). For example, adolescents' (11-17 years old) feelings of belonging (school connectedness) and positive relationships with their peers and teachers (social connectedness) positively relate to their development of moral identity (Aldridge, Ala'i, et al., 2016; Riekie et al., 2017). Peers' representations and expectations are essential for adolescent care exemplars to show consistently caring behaviour (Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004). Chentsova-Dutton and Tsai (2010) find that adolescents' identity development is enhanced when schools accept differences (affirming diversity). Clear rules positively impact

adolescents' development of moral identity. This implies that when schools communicate and enforce a system that fairly and equitably establishes clear rules, it positively impacts students' development of moral identity. Moreover, there is a positive relationship between adolescents' (11-15 years old) confidence in reporting incidents and seeking help from school and their development of moral identity (Riekie et al., 2017). However, studies focusing on early and middle adolescents (Aldridge, Ala'i, et al., 2016; Riekie et al., 2017) find the relationship between teacher support and adolescents' development of moral identity is not strong. Another study finds that teachers' ethical leadership (making fair and balanced decisions) is positively related to undergraduates' (late adolescents) moral identity (Arain et al., 2017).

Similarly to clear school rules for adolescents, it has been argued that transitional rituals in kindergarten can help little children develop moral identity (McCadden, 1996). Transitional rituals refer to moving a routine from one bounded instructional situation or activity to another (Lombardi, 1992). Transitional rituals represent a terminal point of rule reinforcement, language internalisation and authority internalisation (Manning, 1987). Following these rituals indicates that the little children have internalised the organisational language and morality of the classroom.

Adolescents' moral identity can also be developed by taking part in community service and other prosocial actions. For example, Youniss and Yates's (1997) ethnographic study of young people volunteering at a soup kitchen as part of a high school social justice class shows that such experiences can form a moral identity in young people. Similarly, studies have shown that community involvement (prosocial action and civic engagement) benefits adolescents' development of moral identity (Jones et al., 2014; Pratt et al., 2003; Taylor-Collins et al., 2019). Adolescent moral exemplars are more likely to identify themselves with moral traits than their non-moral exemplar counterparts (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer, 2003; Reimer et al., 2009).

Access to institutions and the community is found to benefit the development of adolescents'

moral identity. Hart et al. (1999) find that adolescents' moral identity is fostered by encouraging involvement in social institutions (e.g. clubs and teams). However, this does not ensure the same level of development of moral identity as a commitment to voluntary service. Power (2004) argues that a community-only approach (e.g. weekly community meetings to discuss school rules and policies) would be effective in fostering the development of moral culture (or atmosphere), individuals' moral responsibility and moral selves. Other empirical studies support this argument (e.g. Grady, 1994; Higgins-D'Alessandro & Power, 2005). Damon and Gregory (1997) propose a 'youth charter' approach to developing adolescent moral identity. They argue that basing moral education in the community rather than in school influences young peoples' moral identity. They also argue that a community as a whole can provide many opportunities for young people to be involved in service activities, which in turn can contribute to their moral commitment and the development of their moral identity. Nasir and Kirshner (2003) posit that cultural practices and the institutional context play essential roles in shaping the development of moral identity. The findings regarding the moral identity of students in a Muslim school and youth participation in community service support their proposition.

Some studies also find gender and age differences in adolescents' (12-18 years old) moral identity, for example, girls have stronger moral identity than boys (Arnold, 1993; Patrick et al., 2018). Moreover, longitudinal research has shown that moral self-ideals (ideals that moral qualities are essential for the self) are slightly stronger at age 19 than at 17, although the difference is non-significant (Pratt et al., 2003). This result is consistent with research which shows that adolescents' identification with moral virtues is stable across the adolescent years (Arnold, 1993; Patrick et al., 2018). Pratt et al. (2003) found no gender difference in moral self-ideals, but this result is inconsistent with Barriga et al.'s (2001) research with a similar age group. The study finds that late female adolescents demonstrate greater moral self-relevance than males.

b. Factors influencing adults' moral identity

Moral exemplars' consistent and extraordinary prosocial behaviour, which is seen as a proxy

for moral identity, is related to their advanced personal development and learning ability. For example, research shows that young adult moral exemplars are more advanced in moral reasoning, faith development and identity formation than their peers (Mastsuba & Walker, 2004). Recipients of awards for bravery or altruism have more positive emotions (e.g. hope and optimism) and stronger abilities to overcome and learn from diversity than their peers (Walker & Frimer, 2007).

Adults' moral identity is strengthened or activated by external stimulations. For example, reading a certain amount of young adult fiction is positively related to consistency between moral principles and intentions to behave morally (a part of moral identity), which is mediated by empathetic concern for emerging adults (Black & Barnes, 2021). Mar and Oatley's (2008) theory of empathetic simulation suggests that the primary effects of reading occur via reader engagement with fictional characters. By empathetically taking the perspective of fictional characters, readers practise social cognition.

Adults' moral identity is temporarily activated by moral priming. This means that people show stronger moral identity (demonstrated by test scores, moral-related self-description and moral behaviour) after situational stimulation. Researchers have set writing tasks with morality-related words (high moral priming) and with unrelated words (low moral priming) to check whether participants' moral identities can be activated. The personal stories of participants in the highly morally primed group were more related to how they view themselves as moral persons than those of the other participants (Aquino et al., 2009; Carter, 2013; Reed et al., 2007; Reed et al., 2016; Skarlicki & Turner, 2014). Similar moral identity-activating experiments (e.g. a word puzzle, a live radio fund drive) have produced the same results (e.g. Aquino et al., 2011; Shang et al., 2020). Carter (2013) demonstrates the importance of moral identity activation. In his research, participants whose high moral identity had been activated were less likely to behave immorally when they were pressured to do so by other group members, while participants without moral identity priming were more likely to act immorally when under the same pressure. It is notable that moral identity priming is more effective for women than men (Kennedy et al., 2017; Reed et al., 2012;

Shang et al., 2020; Winterich et al., 2009). Moreover, women who have supported a non-profit fewer times in the past respond to priming more strongly than others (Shang et al., 2020).

Moral motivation is another significant element that can impact the consistency between moral principles and actions. The more one wishes to be a moral person, the more one strives for moral consistency (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). Nonetheless, the self-reported importance of moral values is an internalised motivation engine. Individuals may agree that morality is essential to them yet express different motives (Krettenauer, 2011). For example, individuals may have motives for moral action (e.g. an intention to help someone in need), but they may also be motivated to prioritise moral concerns over personal and conventional issues (e.g. to help someone in need even at considerable personal cost) (Frankena, 1963). Moral decision-making and motivation are complex and partly subject to the external environment (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017).

Self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2012) holds that a motivation to satisfy social expectations or cultural norms can be external or internal to the self. For instance, when it is applied to helping behaviour, internal (autonomous) motivation is expressed in a desire to care for others and value the act of helping positively. Conversely, external motivation is rooted more in a desire for social approval (Weinstein & Ryan, 2010). External motivation may influence the consistency between moral thought and moral action as this consistency is 'socially expected'. Internal and external motivations correspond to the internalisation and symbolisation dimensions of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the private and public dimensions of identity (Erikson, 1964).

Sometimes, internal motivation also influences moral consistency. People with the same level of socio-cognitive reasoning may decide on different courses of action according to salient personal aims and beliefs (Brabeck, 1995; Rest & Narvaez, 1995, cited in Pratt et al., 2003; Eisenberg, 1995). According to Krettenauer & Victor (2017), external moral identity motivation decreases with age, whereas internal motivation increases. People of all ages have

both internal and external moral motivations and experience gradual changes over time. Adolescents (19-25-year-olds) score highest for external moral identity motivation and significantly more than young adults (26-45-year-olds), who score lowest. At work and school, lower self-reported importance of moral values significantly correlates with higher external moral-identity motivation.

According to the above studies, adolescents' moral identity is mainly influenced by personal character (e.g. gender, ethics, moral confidence and courage), the family environment, the school climate and community service. Adults' moral identity is influenced by moral reasoning ability, external stimulation and motivation. Possible influencing factors should be considered as much as possible when exploring the link between culture and moral identity.

2.2.7 Measures of moral identity

Many researchers agree that moral identity is composed of two parts: self-reported importance of moral values or how important it is to be a moral person; and a action commitment to values (e.g. Black & Reynolds, 2016; Narvaez et al., 2006; Reed & Aquino, 2002; Schlenker, 2008). A high proportion of measures of moral identity just focus on examining respondents' moral values or self-evaluations of morality but fail to cover corresponding moral behaviour and moral consistency (e.g. Hardy et al., 2010; Krettenauer & Victor, 2017; Reed & Aquino, 2002; Reynolds & Geranic, 2007).

Some attempts have been made to relate moral behaviour to moral identity. Measures of moral behaviour can generally be categorised into two groups: behavioural intentions (e.g. Aquino et al., 2009; Crimston et al., 2016) and actual behaviour in daily life or experimental environments (e.g. Gotowiec & Mastrigt, 2019; Rua et al., 2017). Moral behaviour intentions are tested using paper and pencil questionnaires concerning moral values or principles in one's mind. There are two kinds of tests of real behaviour: respondents or others reporting the frequency of moral conduct in a certain period (e.g. Hardy et al., 2014; Hart & Fegley, 1995;

Pratt et al., 2003); and researchers observing moral conduct on-site in appositely designed experiments (e.g. Winterich et al., 2013). However, these tests do not measure moral behaviour as a part of moral identity but outcomes of moral identity or a variable dependent on moral identity (e.g. Hardy et al., 2017; Neesham & Gu, 2015), for instance, whether one's moral cognition predicts one's moral behaviour. Even though a predictable correlation can be seen as an indication of moral consistency, the degree of moral consistency is not viewed as an integral part of the moral identity scale.

It is worth noting that some studies emphasise moral integrity when moral identity is measured (e.g. Black & Reynolds, 2016; Schlenker, 2008). However, the testing is restricted to how moral behaviour conforms to moral principles in response to a series of scenarios on paper rather than in real-life contexts. Just like intended behaviour, the problem with this kind of hypothesis testing is that there is an inconsistency between what people think they will do in a virtual situation and how they behave when it happens in real life (Turiel, 2002). Therefore, extensive and necessary work is still required to effectively measure consistency between moral thoughts (or intended behaviour) and actual moral conduct.

2.3 Moral Behaviour

2.3.1 The definition of moral behaviour

'Moral behaviour' refers to two different categories of behaviour and types of rules (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009): (1) things people are expected to do and not do (Fishkin, 1982); (2) prosocial behaviour and avoiding antisocial behaviour. Moral behaviour usually manifests itself as avoiding doing harm or actively promoting the well-being of others by helping, sharing with or caring for others (Miller et al., 2011). A study with more than 700 students from American universities participating finds that students' understanding of ethical or moral life can be categorised into nine themes: guidelines; doing the right thing; altruism; respect; doing no harm; faith; justice; retrospection, and evaluation; and good examples (Hudson & Pearson, 2018).

Most moral behaviour research focuses on volunteering, civic service, community engagement and charitable actions. Specifically, these actions involve helping, donating time to charitable causes, donating money or things, emotional responding, fundraising and sharing (e.g. Baumsteiger & Siegel, 2019; Hardy et al., 2015; Gotowiec, 2019; Gotowiec & Mastrigt, 2019; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; Joosten et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2014; Paulin et al., 2014; Winteric et al., 2013).

Moral behaviour also has context characteristics (e.g. business, marketing, sport) or is related to an existing professional or organisation ethical code (e.g. in the workplace or school). In schools and colleges, not cheating in examinations and academic work is viewed as moral behaviour (e.g. Silver & Abell, 2016; Wowra, 2007). Prosocial behaviour of athletes includes not intentionally breaking the rules of the game, helping an opponent off the floor and encouraging a teammate (Kavussanu et al., 2013; Shields et al., 2018). In marketing, avoiding unethical consumption (e.g. not buying counterfeit products, minimising the consumption of environment-unfriendly goods, avoiding excessive consumption to save natural sources) and ethical consumption (e.g. buying re-cycled goods) are viewed as ethical consumer behaviour (e.g. Atif et al., 2013; Brace-Goven & Binay, 2010; Li et al., 2016). In the workplace, obeying a code of ethics is seen as ethical behaviour, for example, increasing service users' range of opportunities (Levin & Schwartz-Tayri, 2016); not intentionally working slowly (Greenbaum et al., 2013); and behaviour leading to justice (Brebels et al., 2011).

Some researchers divide prosocial behaviour into public and private from a motivational perspective. For example, donating money into a collection box at a cash register is seen as public moral behaviour, while donating money anonymously is private (Gotowiec & Mastrigt, 2019). Similarly, Carlo and Randall (2002) have developed a scale that assesses six dimensions of prosocial behaviour, including public and private dimensions. The six dimensions are (a) altruistic behaviour (without expectation of a reward), (b) emotional responding behaviour (when others are upset), (c) dire prosocial behaviour (when others are experiencing an emergency), (d) anonymous (private) prosocial behaviour (when others are

unaware of who is helping), (e) compliant prosocial behaviour (on another's request) and (f) public prosocial behaviour (when others witness the helping).

Some studies find that moral behaviour also has gender differences. Women and girls tend to show more prosocial behaviour than men and boys (Carlo, 2006). Specifically, girls are more likely to offer emotional and altruistic prosocial behaviour than boys. However, boys tend to behave more prosocially than girls when others observe their behaviour. No significant gender differences have been observed in volunteering behaviour, direct prosocial behaviour, compliant prosocial behaviour and anonymous prosocial behaviour (Patrick et al., 2018).

However, there are theories on what is morally right behaviour at a deeper level. One example is Kant's deontological ethics (Kant, 1999). Kant argues that the motivation behind behaviour determines whether or not the behaviour is morally right. Generally, people's behaviour is driven by three motivations: (1) acting on duty, that is, doing it because of oughtness and respect for the law; (2) doing it for its own sake or self-satisfaction; or (3) doing it for another reason, i.e. as a means to some further end. One of the core points in Kant's deontological ethics is that an individual is only morally praiseworthy if she performs virtuous acts out of a recognition that those acts are required of her (i.e. out of respect for the moral law itself). Behaviour has no moral worth if people have been got used to acting in that manner or to self-pleasing or just as a means to some further end. For example, an individual behaves honestly if he or she thinks behaving in that way is what he or she is required to do. The only purpose of the behaviour is to respect the law. By comparison, an individual behaves honestly because he or she just enjoys doing that; or being honest would give him or her an excellent reputation which helps his or her business. Even though the three honest behaviours seem the same, their motivations are different. Kant believes that honest behaviour respecting a moral law has moral value, but the other two are not moral behaviour.

Another popular theory is utilitarian ethics (Bentham, 1789; 1961; Mill, 1861), which is widely used to interpret moral judgments in sacrificial moral dilemmas (e.g. Bègue & Laine, 2017; Greene et al., 2001; Greene, 2008; Koenigs et al., 2007; Lombrozo, 2009; Patil et al.,

2021). Classical utilitarianism aims to maximise aggregate welfare. It is impartial beneficence, which means that we should help others as much as possible from a completely impartial perspective, giving no special weight to ourselves or our family or friends.

Utilitarian ethics is different from deontological ethics. Utilitarianism favours maximising welfare by any means (Mill & Crisp, 1998), which emphasises the consequence. From the perspective of utilitarianism, judging behaviour as morally right or wrong is uniquely based on deliberative processing involving a cost-benefit analysis to find the act that leads to the greatest good (Greene, 2008). Deontologism often forbids causing harm, especially instrumentally (Kant, 2005), which emphasises motivation and respecting universal law. The two ideas of moral behaviour agree that self-sacrifice is required when necessary and that self-interest or well-being should not motivate behaviour.

Researchers have criticised the negative dimension of utilitarian ethics (Kahane et al., 2018). Instrumental harm happens to an innocent minority to promote the greater good. Some familiar rules (e.g. harming innocent people, lying or breaking promises) can be broken when it is necessary to achieve a better outcome. Some researchers also claimed that moral dilemmas only capture the negative dimension of utilitarianism, which is not actual utilitarianism (Kahane, 2014; Kahane & Shackel, 2010; Kahane et al., 2015).

According to the above research, there are various categories and contexts of moral behaviour. Moral behaviour in specific contexts is closely related to these contexts. For example, moral behaviour in the context of athletics may be related to sports competition rules and doping, which does not apply to people who are not engaged in professional sports. Students' common understanding in daily life and moral behaviour in research are altruistic behaviour. This suggests that current research regarding moral behaviour measures behaviour in universal contexts. The gender difference in moral behaviour and the concepts of deontological and utilitarian ethics show the complexity of judging moral behaviour. Caution should be exercised when discussing and coming to conclusions about participants' moral behaviour when making comparisons. It is not easy to judge whether one behaviour is more

moral than another, considering the difficulty in detecting the motivation behind behaviour and different understandings of the consequences of behaviour.

2.3.2 Cultural difference in judging moral behaviour

Some studies suggest that there are cultural differences in judging behaviour as morally right or wrong. Most people in different cultures would agree that some behaviour, such as killing and lying, is wrong. However, they show different attitudes to morally acceptable behaviour in different contexts (Fu et al., 2001; Lee et al., 1996, 2001). For example, people living in East Asian countries are more reluctant to make utilitarian judgments in moral dilemmas (e.g. the trolley problem). Specifically, young Chinese adults are less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others in the ‘trolley problem’ moral dilemma and are less likely to consider such action right than British respondents. The cultural difference is more pronounced when the consequences are less severe than death (Gold et al., 2014).

Another example is that Canadian and Chinese young adolescents (7-11 years old) show different moral choices and evaluations of lying when facing the dilemma of helping a collective or an individual (Fu et al., 2007). Chinese children choose to lie to help a collective but harm an individual. They rate it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rate truth-telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children do the opposite. With increasing age, Chinese children’s choices and moral evaluations increasingly favour the interests of the group over truthfulness. Similarly, Canadian children are increasingly inclined to protect the individual at the expense of honesty as they age (Fu et al., 2007). These findings suggest that enculturation processes may play an essential role in children’s development of moral behaviour judgment.

Another study shows that people from America are more likely to endorse sacrifice than people in China in Japan. However, among Western countries, America is the country most likely to endorse sacrifice, while among Eastern countries, China and Japan are least likely to

endorse sacrifice (Awad et al., 2020).

One of the possible explanations of the difference in utilitarian-nonutilitarian/deontological moral behaviour judgments is the independent-interdependent cultural difference between Eastern and Western countries. People from a society with low relational mobility or an interdependent culture are less likely to make utilitarian judgments. This is not because they are more likely to make deontological judgments but because they wish to avoid the responsibility (or the negative reputation that may result) for making utilitarian judgments (Hashimoto et al., 2022). Another study supports this speculation. For the trolley problem dilemma, the proportion of Chinese respondents who decide to switch the lever to neutral is much bigger than that of British respondents. It can be interpreted that the Chinese respondents are less willing to take responsibility for the decision. Their reluctance to act may be exacerbated because of their more interdependent self-construal. They care more about others' opinions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The Chinese might be more worried about being negatively perceived by others if they cause harm to someone when making a decision (Gold et al., 2014).

The possible cultural difference in moral behaviour judgments entails that cultural differences should be considered when comparing moral behaviour in two different cultures. People from different cultures may judge whether or not behaviour is moral or not according to different perspectives. It is difficult to say whether one perspective is better or more reasonable than another. It is not easy to judge which cultural group's behaviour is more moral than another.

2.3.3 Measures of (im)moral behaviour

Measures of moral or immoral behaviour are generally classified into three types. The first is moral or immoral behaviour observations in set tasks, for example, donating money or time for a sample of undergraduates or older adults (Lee et al., 2014; Winterich et al., 2009;

Winterich et al., 2013); cheating or not in a task with a monetary reward for undergraduate participants (Rua et al., 2017; Stets, 2011); allocating lottery tickets (DeCelles et al., 2012; Sanders et al., 2018); and voluntarily spending time on a survey without a reward (Winterich, Aquino, et al., 2013). Some observations of behaviour are possible regarding natural events in daily life, such as donors' donation behaviour during a live radio program (Shang et al., 2020).

The second type is self-reports of moral or immoral behaviour. This can be further subdivided into two cases. One is reporting past moral or immoral behaviour, for example, reporting the frequency of cheating in academic exams or work in the past for undergraduate respondents (Reynolds et al., 2014; Wowra, 2007); reporting volunteering in the workplace (Zhu et al., 2020); reporting the frequency of public prosocial behaviour (e.g. donating money into a collection box at a cash register); reporting private prosocial behaviour (e.g. donating money anonymously) (Gotowiec & Mastrigt, 2019); and reporting the frequency of civic involvement since starting high school for high school students (Porter, 2013). The other is reporting behavioural intentions, for example, to help others or moral behaviour in hypothetical scenarios (Conway & Peetz, 2012; Stets & Carter, 2012), a scale of helping or hurting intentions (Gotowiec, 2019) and ethical consumption intentions (Vitell et al., 2016).

The third type is other-reported moral or immoral behaviour. For example, participants' supervisors report their helping behaviours in an organisation (Zhu et al., 2020); middle and late adolescents' environmental-friendly behaviours/civic engagement rated by their parents (Hardy et al., 2014; Hardy et al., 2015); peers rating how prosocial behaviour statements describe participants (Hardy, 2005); and teacher-rated student moral behaviour intentions (Sonntag & Barnett, 2016).

Some limitations of various behaviour measures have been pointed out. One limitation of self-reported behaviour measures is social desirability (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). It is challenging to rule out social desirability affecting self-reported behaviour measures and behaviour observations if respondents notice a survey's real purpose. Turiel (2002) suggests

there is a gap between behavioural intentions in scenarios and actual behaviour in real contexts. One limitation of other-reported behaviour is that reporters (e.g. parents) may have an overly optimistic or positive view of their children (the target group) (Hardy et al., 2014). Another limitation is that others may not witness all of participants' behaviour (Reynolds et al., 2014). In particular, bystanders cannot know the different motivations for observed prosocial behaviour (Carlo et al., 2003). However, some studies have demonstrated that self-reports of counterproductive workplace behaviour highly correlate with other reports (Patrick et al., 2018; Van Iddekinge et al., 2012).

To minimise social desirability bias when using self-reported measures of prosocial behaviour, studies can employ both self-reports and other-reports simultaneously for the same behaviour scale (Hardy, 2005; Patrick et al., 2018; Sonnentag & Barnett, 2013; Sonnentag & Barnett, 2016). However, one study finds that the results of self-reports and other-reports are inconsistent. For example, moral identity is positively related to self-reports of prosocial behaviour rather than peer reports (Hardy, 2005).

The limitations of behaviour measures should be considered in developing the moral behaviour measure in the current research. Since some limitations are not easy to avoid, discussion of the results of measuring moral behaviour should be cautious because the limitations can influence the results.

2.3.4 The relationship between moral behaviour and moral identity

Most studies discuss moral identity and moral behaviour separately. Some argue that moral identity is the best predictor of moral actions and commitments (Damon & Hart, 1992). Several mechanisms explain why moral identity predicts moral behaviour, for example, humans' natural desire to maintain self-consistency (e.g. Blasi, 1983; Blasi, 2004), goal integration (e.g. Colby & Damon, 1992, 1995), moral schemata (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004) and self-narratives (e.g. Reimer, 2003).

Regarding the goal integration mechanism, Colby and Damon (1992) suggest that moral motivation results from integrating moral aims in the sense of self. Some studies also support the idea by showing that adolescent care exemplars refer more to moral aims in their self-descriptions than the comparison group (e.g. Hart & Fegley, 1995). Regarding the moral schemata mechanism, Aquino and Reed (2002) argue that moral identity is related to a distinct mental image of what a moral person is likely to think, feel and do. The mental image can be any social referent, such as an actual known or unknown moral exemplar or God. Moral schemata result from personal interaction with members of one's network, like parents, friends, workmates and peers. Once formed, these moral schemata represent an established and rigid prototype of interaction patterns with other people (Young, 1999). One study finds that middle and late adolescents who frequently joined social activities are more likely to report that they want to be like a moral exemplar than those who did not. Moreover, adolescents who had the habit of joining social activities were more likely to report having friends who also joined a wide range of social activities than those who did not (Taylor-Collins et al., 2019). Regarding the self-narrative mechanism, some researchers propose that a life narrative in which one recalls a highly positive childhood is more likely to predict prosocial commitments and aims in the present and future (McAdams, 2006; McAdams et al., 1997). A study with brave, caring exemplars shows that recalling critical events in life narratives distinguishes exemplars from ordinary people. A more optimistic affective tone pervades exemplars' life stories than those of the comparison group. There is strong evidence of early life advantage in terms of sensitisation to the needs of others, the presence of helpers and a relative absence of enemies, and more secure attachments are positively related to prosocial motivation and moral identity in life narratives (Walker & Frimer, 2007).

Studies employing qualitative measures show that moral identity is associated with moral actions (e.g. donating, helping, sharing and community service) (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Hardy, 2006; Porter, 2013; Sanders et al., 2018.). A quantitative meta-analysis literature review of 111 studies indicates that moral identity does predict moral behaviour. However,

according to the average effect size ($r=0.22$), it does not extraordinarily predict moral behaviours (regardless of the kind of moral behaviour) (e.g. Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Some studies not included in the literature review also find signs that moral courage characteristics are more important in predicting adolescents' tendency to act on their moral beliefs under social pressure than moral identity (Sonnentag & Barnett, 2016).

A few studies focus on moral identity and behaviour integrity (e.g. Schlenker, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2009). Integrity involves keeping promises and doing what one says one will do. It is a moral-related trait (Krettenauer et al., 2016; Pratt et al., 2003). Schlenker et al. (2009) propose that people who are less committed to principles should attach less importance to the moral aspects of their identities. Black and Reynolds (2016) emphasise that moral integrity is essential for moral identity. They refer to moral integrity as the desire to make intentions and actions consistent. Wowra (2007) even argues that one way to measure the centrality of moral identity is to examine an individual's relative commitment to a principled ethic. Wowra applies Schlenker's (2006) integrity scale to measure moral identity. However, the integrity of behaviour is usually checked with a paper-and-pen questionnaire rather than actual behaviour observation.

The relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour is partially influenced by way of measuring moral behaviour and what moral behaviours are being measured. Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) reveal that self-reports and other reports of past moral behaviour are more strongly associated with moral identity than observed moral behaviour and self-reports of behavioural intentions. There is a more specific finding regarding the relationship between the dimensions of moral identity and different types of moral behaviour. Gotowiec and Mastrigt (2019) find that different types of prosocial behaviour are differentially associated with the internalisation and symbolisation dimensions of moral identity (proposed by Aquino & Reed, 2002). The symbolisation dimension of moral identity predicts all prosocial behaviour (donating time, effort and resources; civic engagement, prosociality in groups and emotional responding). However, the internalisation of moral identity is only positively related to civic engagement. Some studies find that adolescents' and adults' moral identity

does not predict or negatively predict self-reports of public prosocial behaviour (Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2014; Hardy, 2006; Patrick et al., 2018). However, moral identity can positively predict teacher-reported public prosocial behaviour (Patrick et al., 2018).

The prediction of moral actions by moral identity is restricted by age. Moral identity emerges at a particular age and matures as individuals grow older. It is typically assumed that moral identities are formed in adolescence and become firm in adulthood (Krettenauer & Hertz, 2015). Therefore, moral identity may be more predictive of actual behaviour in adulthood than in childhood (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). Two empirical studies also indicate that the moral self does not predict later community involvement by adolescents. However, the influence of moral behaviour on adolescents' formation of moral identity is strong (Pratt et al., 2003; Youniss & Yates, 1997).

The literature provides the theoretical and empirical foundations for linking moral identity to moral behaviour and consistency of behaviour in the current study. However, some studies also show a weak relationship between moral identity and behaviour which is influenced by the measures of moral behaviour and moral identity. Attention should be paid to the design of the current study. Age differences in the relationship between moral identity and behaviour should be considered when the results of the current study are discussed. According to the above literature, the link between moral identity and behaviour in young adolescents is weak.

2.4 Summary

Identity is a self-evaluation of the interaction between oneself, the objective environment and one's internal characteristics. The foundations of morality range from an individual-centred view (e.g. harm/welfare/care/reciprocity and justice/rights/fairness) and a community-centred view (e.g. ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect) to divinity ethics (e.g. purity of body, mind and soul). Moral behaviour is usually manifested as avoiding doing harm or actively promoting others' well-being by helping, sharing and caring for them. Moral behaviour has gender, motivation and context differences. However, it is complicated to judge whether

behaviour is moral or not. The motivation behind the behaviour, the consequence of behaviour and cultural differences are all reference factors to judge moral behaviour.

Moral identity is an objective perspective on the individual self (or self-identity) regarding morality. In the current study, it is composed of two parts. One is the self-reported importance of moral values or the importance of being a moral person. The other is consistency between moral thoughts and moral behaviour. Much research focuses on the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour. Moral identity is generally developed through moral behaviour, and moral identity predicts moral behaviour. Blasi's Self Model of Moral Functioning explains that moral identity is a cognitive activity bridging the gap between moral judgement and moral action. Hardy's concept of the moral ideal self helps explain people, such as moral exemplars' consistency between moral ideas and behaviour in different contexts. Bandura's Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning suggests that moral identity motivates moral behaviour and keeps behaviour consistent in different contexts through self-regulation and self-sanctioning. Another model (integration of the character and social-cognitive perspectives) is suggested which can explain both moral reasoning-driven and automatic moral behaviour in everyday life.

There are cultural differences and similarities in moral identity traits. There are also individual differences in the degree of moral identity, which explains why some people have high consistency between moral thoughts and moral behaviour while others do not. People have a strong moral identity when being moral is a central or essential characteristic of the sense of self. Moral identity is subdivided into different ways, for example, external vs. internal moral identity and actual vs. ideal moral identity. These divisions help explain the discrepancy between moral thoughts and moral behaviour. They predict consistent moral behaviour across contexts. Moral identity begins to form during or after adolescence, but early evidence emerges in childhood. The formation of moral identity is related to individual characteristics (e.g. gender, moral confidence, social factors, emotion, reasoning ability) and social factors (e.g. parenting, family income, school climate, community service, social expectations, cultural norms).

There are several limitations of the existing research on moral identity. First, most studies on moral identity link moral identity to self-reported past moral behaviour or behavioural intentions. However, little research links moral identity to actual moral behaviour in real contexts or to the consistency of behaviour (consistency between moral behaviour intentions and actual behaviour). Second, most studies focus on the moral identity of late adolescents or adults. However, limited research targets early adolescents' moral identity. Third, Asian countries, especially China, are underrepresented in most research in English.

The literature generally provides references for defining and observing moral identity and moral behaviour in young adolescents for the current study. It also provides theoretical and empirical foundations for linking moral identity to moral behaviour, explaining the discrepancy between moral thoughts and behaviour and exploring cultural differences in moral identity. The measures of moral identity and moral behaviour in the current study should be developed based on existing measures while considering their limitations as much as possible. The literature review has also revealed that young adolescents' moral identity is overlooked in existing research for various reasons, and this needs to be focused on.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF CULTURE

This chapter presents a review of the literature on the concept of culture, including the definition, categories, dimensions, stability and measures of culture, and general cultural differences between Eastern and Western countries. The relationship between moral identity and culture is also discussed. Two theories which help explain cultural differences in moral identity are reviewed.

Reviewing the definition, categories and dimensions of culture will determine the scope of culture as focused on in current research. Examining cultural stability and previously found cultural differences between Eastern and Western countries will provide a foundation for the cultural comparison in the present research. This study aims to reveal whether these cultural differences are the same as those found previously and whether there are any new findings from the perspective of young adolescents. Existing cultural measures will provide a reference for developing a tool to capture the culture of young adolescents in England and China. Finally, reviewing theories which explain the relationship between culture and moral identity will strengthen the rationale for linking culture to moral identity in the present research.

3.1 Culture

3.1.1 The definition of culture

Researchers define culture in various ways. Culture is a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or one category of people from others (Hofstede, 2011). The programming of the mind includes shared cognition, emotions, motivations, values, beliefs and identities (House et al., 2004; Tang, 2017). Values are at the core of

culture (Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars, 1993). Culture is also externalised in common behaviours in social settings (Tang, 2017). Culture is relatively long-lasting through transmission across generations, such as in interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives (House et al., 2004). It is always a collective phenomenon defined by mind, behaviour or time (Hofstede, 2011).

3.1.2 Categories of culture

Researchers categorise culture in different ways. It can characterise groups of individuals interacting within the same geographical area or space, for example, the culture of tribes, nations and organisations. It can also be applied to collectives formed by sharing certain features of the members, such as the culture of genders, occupations (e.g. engineers versus accountants), ethnic groups and social classes (Hofstede, 2011).

However, the nature of culture depends on the level of aggregation focused on. Societal and national cultures reside in (often unconscious) values, in the sense of broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Organisational cultures reside in (visible and conscious) practices: how people perceive what goes on in their organisational environment (Hofstede, 2001).

3.1.3 The dimensions of culture

According to the definition of culture, it distinguishes a group or category of people from others. Therefore, the dimensions of culture relate to the factors which give rise to cultural differences. The dimensions of culture also allow comparisons among cultures (Hofstede, 2011). Researchers find that values, norms and schemata cause cultural variation (Leung & Morris, 2015). Values, norms and schemata influence people's behaviour through different psychological mechanisms. The following section details each dimension of culture and how it influences people's behaviour. Understanding the dimensions of culture provides clues to

how to capture the culture of a group of people. It also provides ideas for developing cultural measures and comparing cultures in the present research.

a. Values

Values are the criteria people use to select and justify actions and evaluate people (including the self) and events (Schwartz, 1992; 1999). Cultural values represent implicitly or explicitly shared abstract ideas about what is good, right and desirable in a society (Williams, 1970).

Hofstede (2011) proposed six dimensions of values based on his large-scale empirical research in the 1970s (Hofstede, 1980) and the combined efforts of other researchers (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Minkov, 2007). The six dimensions are “(1) small power distance vs. large power distance (related to different solutions to the basic problem of human inequality); (2) weak uncertainty avoidance vs. strong uncertainty avoidance (related to the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future); (3) individualism vs. collectivism (related to the integration of individuals in primary groups); (4) masculinity vs. femininity (related to the division of emotional roles between women and men); (5) long-term vs. short-term orientation (related to the choice of focus in people’s efforts: the future or the present and past); (6) indulgence vs. restraint (related to gratification versus control of basic human desires related to enjoying life)” (Hofstede, 2011, p.8).

Another widely accepted set of value dimensions was proposed by Schwartz et al. (2012). It consists of 19 narrowly-defined values based on 10 original values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2016). The value dimensions are: (1) self-direction (thought); (2) self-direction (action); (3) stimulation; (4) hedonism; (5) achievement; (6) power(dominance); (7) power (resources); (8) face; (9) security (personal); (10) security (societal); (11) tradition; (12) conformity (rules); (13) conformity (interpersonal); (14) humility; (15) universalism (nature); (16) universalism (concern); (17) universalism (tolerance); (18) benevolence (caring); (19) benevolence (dependability). The 19 dimensions can also be ordered in three ways according to the motivational aim of each value. There are conflicts or compatibility between values. The first value division is between growth, anxiety-free and self-protection,

anxiety-avoidance. Values belonging to the Growth, anxiety-free group are more likely to motivate people to grow and self-expand when they are free of anxiety (e.g. tolerance of differences). Values in the self-protection and anxiety-avoidance group are directed at protecting the self against anxiety and threat (e.g. obeying rules). The second value division is social focus and personal focus. This division is between concern with outcomes for the self (e.g. the value of personal achievement) and for others (or for established institutions) (e.g. the value of social security). The third value division is between two pairs of conflicting value sets: openness to change vs. conservation, and self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement. The values of openness to change emphasise readiness for new ideas, actions and experiences. They contrast with conservation values that emphasise self-restriction, order and avoiding change. Self-enhancement values emphasise pursuing one's own interests. They contrast with self-transcendence values that emphasise transcending one's own interests for the sake of others.

The above two studies identifying values (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz et al., 2012) are large-sample cross-cultural empirical studies including wide ranges of countries with different background variables (e.g. languages, religions, geography and economics). Respondents rated statements regarding habitual behaviour, ideas in daily life or situations at work. Both research efforts identified universal national values rather than unique individual values. Each country is positioned relative to other countries using its mean score on each dimension. Therefore, a dimension is an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures (Inkeles & Levinson, 1969). These identified values have been found (through replication in different countries) to have similar meanings for different groups of people. The equivalence of meanings is necessary for effective cross-culture comparison (Schwartz, 1992).

The difference between the two studies is that Hofstede's dimensions of cultural values are work-related. The data were collected from staff in an international cooperation, and some of the survey questions were about the management and satisfaction with working for the company. In contrast, Schwartz's dimensions of cultural values focus on the culture in

different societies. The respondents were mainly school teachers and undergraduate students. Teachers play an explicit role in value socialisation. They are presumably key carriers of culture and are probably close to the broad value consensus in societies rather than at the leading edge of change. University undergraduate students were chosen as the other group in the sample due to their accessibility and the availability of student data from other values studies with which comparisons might be made (Schwartz, 1992).

Another difference between the two sets of dimensions is the basis of the division. Hofstede's value model is built on attitude differences at the national level in the same working environment. Respondents of different nationalities work for the same cooperation. In contrast, Schwartz's value model is created based on the motivation behind the values. However, there are still some overlaps between the two models. For example, both models identify the relationship between individuals and collectives (individualism and collectivism) and focus on lifestyle (e.g. personal security, tradition, tolerance of differences, personal achievement, leading an enjoyable life, obeying rules, and power control). The biggest difference between the two models is that social gender consciousness is not included in Schwartz's model.

b. Norms

Norms refer either to what is commonly done, what is normal or what is commonly approved and socially sanctioned (Cialdini et al., 1991). Compared with values, which are subjective beliefs, norms are intersubjective. They locate the source of cultural influence in the surrounding group and the individual's perception of it (Leung & Morris, 2015). Norms are generally perceived as in-group values. In a given social group, there are two types of norms: (1) descriptive norms or 'is' norms (the perception of what most people do); (2) injunctive norms or 'ought' norms (the perception of what most people approve or disapprove of) (Cialdini et al., 1991, p. 203).

Norms can also be classified in other ways, such as objective norms (average beliefs or behaviours in a group) vs. subjective norms (what individuals perceive to be typical in a

group) (Becker et al., 2014; Hirai, 2000), and should be vs. as is (House et al., 2004). The three divisions are essentially the same. They emphasise two aspects of norms: objective facts (dominant values or behaviours in a group) and perceived objective facts (personal views of the mainstream values or behaviour in a group). People adhere to descriptive norms because they provide easy default behaviour options and facilitate cooperation between group members. Injunctive norms are moralised, so people adhere to injunctive norms out of moral emotions, such as shame for wrongdoing (Cialdini et al., 1991).

c. Schemata

Schemata refer to the dynamic cognitive knowledge structures regarding known concepts, entities and events used by individuals to efficiently encode and represent new information (Harris, 1994). For example, one's college class schema would include knowledge regarding typical traits (e.g. the professor, students, classroom, reading material and tests) and the relationships between them (e.g. the professor assigns reading material and administers tests to the students) (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).

Schemata act as templates guiding and organising thoughts and behaviour. Since human experience is, to a large degree, culturally constructed, it would be fair to maintain that many schemata are cultural (D'Andrade, 1995; Malcolm & Sharifian, 2002; Rice, 1980; Shore, 1996; Strauss & Quinn, 1997). Individuals' schemata are similar due to shared experiences and exposure to social cues regarding others' perceptions of reality (Schein, 1985). However, different cultural groups may have similar cultural schemata, although their historical-cultural development may not have been the same (Sharifian, 2008). For example, English is a standard cultural schema for many countries. However, not all English-speaking countries have the same culture. Cook (1994) distinguishes three types of schemata: world schemata, text schemata and language schemata. 'World schemata' refers to the schematic organisation of world knowledge. 'Text schemata' refers to the typical ordering of facts in the real or a fictional world. 'Language schemata' refers to generalised knowledge about the grammar of a language "(Cook, 1994, p.15).

Like values, schemata are also subjective. However, schemata only influence behaviour in moments in which they are activated or put to use as filters in one's information processing. For example, when reading a story about an individualistic or collectivistic warrior or being exposed to iconic images representing the central characteristics of a culture, people's subsequent behaviour will be more inclined to the cultural characteristics which have been activated, even though their personal cultural inclination is different from the activated culture (Hong et al., 2000; Oishi et al., 2000; Trafimow et al., 1991; Wong & Hong, 2005). Schemata generally explain situation-specific cultural differences.

Values, schemata and norms account for cultural differences from different perspectives. Values usually distinguish cultural patterns at the country level over a long time period (Hofstede, 1993; Schwartz, 2006). They emphasise the stability and generality of cultural patterns across situations (Leung & Morris, 2015). However, value heterogeneity within a culture and cultural tendencies varying dramatically from one situation to another cannot be interpreted as a general group value. Value variation within a culture can be related to ethnic and regional subcultures (Baskerville, 2003), social roles, personality and other individual differences (McSweeney, 2002). Variations in value tendencies within the same group can be related to specific contexts. For example, some researchers have found that individualistic and collectivistic values vary greatly within countries and much less across countries than is traditionally portrayed (Oyserman et al., 2002). Japanese consumers are traditional about kitchen appliances but technical about toilet supplies (Osland & Bird, 2000).

Cultural phenomena that are not well explained by values can be addressed by considering the influence of schemata and norms. Schemata can "explain why many cultural patterns are situation-specific rather than context-general and offer an account of the instability and malleability of cultural patterns. Schemata provide a more nuanced picture of how a person's temporary motivations or life experiences, such as working in a multicultural context and living abroad, change their likelihood of expressing behavioural patterns characteristic of their heritage culture" (Leung & Morris, 2015, p.1032).

Like schemata, norms account for situation-specific cultural differences well because norms represent typical responses to specific situations. However, they explain the stability and persistence of cultural patterns of social behaviour better than schemata (Leung & Morris, 2015). Individuals in a country may have different values but generally agree on the same perception of societal norms. Because of this shared perception, they will exhibit similar patterns of conduct, at least when in public (e.g. Yamagishi et al., 2008). Norms explain how newcomers to a culture learn to align their behaviour with others without necessarily embracing new values (Leung & Morris, 2015). Bardi and Schwartz (2003) suggest that people may follow norms in a situation even when the normative behaviour contrasts with their values. When external pressure is absent, the personal importance of values may influence behaviour more.

Values as guiding principles in life may activate schema and norms. Motives and aims influenced by values may activate schemata (e.g. Cohen, 1979). Kwan et al. (2014) argue that values perceived as widely shared might activate certain normative expectations.

Research on cultural values focuses on relatively stable cultural differences at the macro or national level (e.g. Beugelsdijk et al., 2015; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2012). Research on schemata activation introduces approaches such as priming that can explain situational and temporal variations in behaviour and biculturalism (e.g. Gardner et al., 2002; Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2004; Tavassoli, 2002). Research on norms may help understand individual-level mediators of country differences in patterns of judgments, decisions and behaviour. Norm-based cultural research also reveals a cultural phenomenon of reconciling individual malleability with societal persistence and micro-level fluctuation with macro-level stability (e.g. Chiu et al., 2010; Wan et al., 2007; Zou et al., 2009).

Value-based cultural research generally explores cultural differences based on a general situation and emphasises specific situations less than norm-based and schema-based cultural research. Even though Hofstede (1980) identified the individualism-collectivism cultural difference in a company rather than in a collective, it is sometimes understood more broadly,

ignoring the specific context.

Different cultural studies call for different focuses on the dimensions of culture. The present study focuses on the relationship between national culture and moral views and behaviour. The stable and general-situation cultural differences between China and England are focused on more than temporal and specific-situation cultural differences. However, examining young adolescents' moral behaviour relates to a specific situation. Therefore, the present study mainly focuses on cultural values to examine cultural differences and similarities between the two countries. Cultural norms and schemata are also considered to some extent in the present research to observe how they influence young adolescents' behaviour in the context of cultural values.

3.1.4 The stability of culture

Cultures are embodied in the material and social world and are dynamic rather than static. Cultures shift and change historically through cultural mixing, diffusion and transculturation (McEwan & Daya, 2016). Culture generally exists on three spatial scales: local, national and global. Cultural globalisation seems to weaken the cultural distinctiveness between regions and countries. The idea is that everywhere is becoming the same because of the movement of people, objects and images worldwide through telecommunications, language, radio, music, cinema, television and tourism (Jackson, 2004).

Shurmer-Smith and Hannam (1994) argue that cultural globalisation is developing in two ways. One is that the world is dominated by supposedly superior cultural traits from advanced countries – so-called Westernisation or Americanisation. The other is that various cultures mix through interconnections and time-space compression, developing into a new universal cultural pattern. Cultural influence is not unidirectional. Western culture influences non-Western countries. However, in turn, music, food, ideas, beliefs and literature worldwide continually flow into the cultures of the West. Whether the influence is one-way or two-way,

people worldwide are becoming increasingly similar in their consumption, lifestyle, behaviour and aspirations through cultural globalisation.

However, some theorists argue that national cultures remain stronger than global cultures. First, the cultural monopoly of the West is not complete since the apparent cultural sameness is limited in scope and only concerns the consumption of certain products and media images. The possibility of Westernisation eroding centuries of local histories, languages, traditions and religions is far-fetched. People in different parts of the world respond differently to images and products from the Western world (McEwan & Daya, 2016). Taking culinary culture as an example, fast food from Western countries (e.g. Kentucky Fried Chicken and McDonald's) has been localised in China. Even McDonald's globally unified store decoration style has to be changed to integrate with the surrounding cultural buildings in some areas of China. Chinese people embrace Western culture but still maintain some Chinese characteristics to make it well accepted. Second, it is also essential to acknowledge the cultural vitality and confidence of countries and people worldwide (McEwan & Daya, 2016). For example, aware of the threat of Western culture to national culture, Chinese traditions are emphasised in many ways. Traditional Chinese literature, opera, folk art, gymnastics, crafts, rituals, customs and habits which vanished after 1949 have resurfaced and become popular again. Traditional culture has now deeply affected ordinary Chinese people (Yu, 2013). The culture is embedded in many details of people's daily life, such as food, entertainment and customs.

Societies will probably generally become more individualistic, with less emphasis on hierarchy and more focus on indulgence and enjoying life because of economic and technological developments. However, these changes are primarily the same for societies worldwide, while the fundamental differences between societies rooted in each society's historical and institutional legacy remain (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015). Beugelsdijk et al. (2015) also show that the average scores of national values increase for individualism and indulgence and decrease for power distance between two groups of samples (born between 1902 and 1958 and born after 1958). Changes also vary among countries. For example,

individualism and indulgence increase less in America than the global average increase. However, greater or smaller changes in values in different countries have not altered the essential cultural differences between countries observed by Hofstede (1980, 2001) a couple of decades ago.

Cultural globalisation means neither singular cultural dominance nor bounded local culture. At the macro level or national level, countries' cultures are changing gradually with globalisation. However, they always retain some of their own characteristics, such as religions, customs and language. However, at the individual level, people's thinking and behaviour is easily changed by a temporarily changed environment. For example, a study shows that university students who were raised and have studied in mainland China showed more social learning (copying solutions to problems from others) in an artefact-design task than native British students. However, Chinese immigrants raised in China currently studying in England and Chinese students raised and studying in Hong Kong were similar to British students regarding social learning in the same task. The participants' individualism and collectivism tendencies were not predictors of their social learning behaviour. The only predictors were sex and the country where they currently lived (mainland China, England, Hong Kong) (Mesoudi et al., 2015). Personal discovery and creativity are highlighted in Western education, while East Asian education emphasises rote learning from teachers (Tweed & Lehman, 2002). Therefore, it is suggested that people in the West are less likely to copy others than people from East Asia (Chang et al., 2011). The influence of the cultural environment can explain different social learning behaviours in four cultural groups (native Chinese students, Chinese immigrant students, Hong Kong students and British students). Chinese participants who studied in Hong Kong and England have recently shifted from Eastern 'high social learning' (copying solutions to problems from others) to Western 'high asocial learning' (solving problems independently) (Chang et al., 2011). British culture indirectly influences participants who were born and studied in Hong Kong because Britain once governed Hong Kong. Participants currently studying in England are directly influenced by living in a Western cultural environment. Moreover, the Chinese immigrant students are from three highly Westernised cities (Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou) in China. In contrast,

the participants born and raised in mainland China were from a small city (Chao Zhou). The small cities in China are less Westernised than the big cities. It is reasonable that the participants from small Chinese cities showed more social learning than the other three groups (British students, Chinese immigrant students and Hong Kong students).

Apart from macro-cultural environments, specific situations with cultural features can influence people's cultural values and behaviour orientations. Many studies have demonstrated that individualism-collectivism priming can change participants' cultural values (e.g. Briley & Wyer, 2002; Gardner et al., 1999; Gardner et al., 2004; Kimmelmeier et al., 2002; Lee et al., 2000). For example, American university students expressed more support for voluntary euthanasia (physician-assisted suicide) when they were primed with an individualistic writing task than when they were primed with a collectivistic writing task (Kimmelmeier et al., 2002). The study also indicated that individualism emphasises personal uniqueness, self-determination and self-actualisation, which are positively associated with attitudes to assisted death. In another example, European-American undergraduates who were primed with collectivism-oriented tasks were more willing to help others and viewed assisting as a social obligation than those who were primed with individualism-oriented tasks (using a word search: 'we' vs. 'I'; 'ours' vs. 'mine'; 'interdependent' vs. 'independent'). A similar pattern was also found among participants from collectivistic cultures (e.g. Hong Kong). Participants from Hong Kong who were primed with the same individualism-oriented tasks showed greater individualistic tendencies than those who were not (Gardner et al., 1999). Even though Hong Kong has been influenced by an individualistic culture for historical reasons, the study showed that participants from Hong Kong still held stronger collective values than individual values. However, one of the limitations of the study is that Hong Kong is not representative enough of a collective culture.

The extent to which people's values, judgments, cognition and behaviour are influenced also depends on the form of cultural influence and people's original cultural backgrounds. For example, a meta-analysis of the literature on individualism and collectivism priming finds that the effect of individualism and collectivism priming on values is most notable in studies

using context-based tasks that cue values (e.g. tasks involving similarities and differences with family and friends, a Sumerian warrior story, and group imagination). However, the effect is smaller when language-based tasks are used for priming (e.g. a pronoun circling task, a scrambled sentence task and a pure language task) (Oyserman & Lee, 2008). The review also reveals that priming effectively impacts both individualists and collectivists. However, the impact on self-concept, relationality and values is greater for individualists than collectivists.

Even with cultural globalisation, the relative stability of culture at the national level provides the possibility of linking national cultural differences with moral views and behaviour. However, the greater changeability of culture at the individual level because of external stimulation implies that the average degree of a particular cultural inclination may vary among cities within one country. This is because cities may have different opportunities for exposure to other cultural influences. Therefore, city differences should be considered when sampling and discussing the results of comparative research.

3.1.5 Measures of culture

Two aspects of cultural differences are generally measured: values (how things should be, the desired state) and practices or norms (how things are, the actual state, socially shared and accepted rules and behaviour) (Wagner & Moch, 1986). Schemata are usually used for priming with tasks with different cultural characteristics (e.g. reading stories and writing) to observe people's responses or openness to the schemata (Leung & Morris, 2015). In this way, whether priming influences people's original behaviour or ideas can be investigated. Even though it is a way to observe cultural differences by comparing people's reactions to the priming with schemata, it is not as direct as comparing values, practices or norms. It checks the influence of schemata on people's inherent behaviour or thoughts more than cultural differences.

Regarding the reporting method, culture is measured as self-perceptions (self-referenced values and practices) or perceptions of others in one's society (group-referenced values and norms). In short, culture is measured by asking four types of questions: "What do I prefer to do?", "What does my group actually do?", "What should my group do?", and "What do I actually do?" (Sun et al., 2014, p. 347). Regarding the level of culture, studies mainly focus on national culture and organisational or marketing culture. Measures of national culture will be discussed in more detail since the present study is a cultural comparison at the national level.

a. Value-based measures

A person's values may lead to their attitudes and behaviour. Values have been considered the core element in culture (Hofstede, 1980). The pioneer culture measure was developed by Hofstede (1980, 2011), who found six dimensions underlying national differences: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity, long-term vs. short-term orientation, indulgence vs. restraint. Four original dimensions of value orientations (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism vs. collectivism, masculinity vs. femininity) were summarised in responses to a work-related value survey by 116,000 IBM employees in 50 different countries (Hofstede, 1980). Respondents rated work-related value statements from 1 to 100 according to their importance (e.g. "Have challenging work to do, work from which you can get a personal sense of accomplishment," "Have a job which leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life") (Hofstede, 2001, p. 256).

Some researchers argue that the scale was limited to measuring cultural differences in the workplace because all the items were designed with working contexts (Oyserman et al., 2002; Brewer & Venaik, 2011). However, Hofstede emphasised that power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity are meaningfully related to various economic, political and psychological variables (Hofstede, 1980). For example, although power distance originally referred to how less powerful members of organisations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede, 2011), it can also extend to a country's

acceptance of status and power differences between people (Lynn & Gelb, 1996). Power distance suggests that followers and leaders endorse a society's level of inequality. Power and inequality are fundamental facts in any society. All societies are unequal, but some are more unequal than others (Hofstede, 2011). Hofstede's cultural dimensions are widely applied to measure national cultural differences, especially in consumer studies (Dawar & Parker, 1994; Lynn & Gelb, 1996; Lynn et al., 1993; Roth, 1995; Steenkamp et al., 1999; Yenyurt & Townsend, 2003). Some researchers have developed new scales based on Hofstede's work (e.g. Donthu & Yoo, 1998; Erdem et al., 2006). Hofstede was one of the pioneer researchers to use factor analysis to measure culture, and he generally found different cultural patterns at the national level according to the mean scores for survey items (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015; Hofstede, 2011). However, Hofstede's measures are not ideally suitable for all population groups. For example, Oyserman, Coon and Kimmelmeier (2002) note that some items in Hofstede's scale assess individualism focused on the workplace. Although the scale has proved useful for organising research on cultural differences (Leung & Morris, 2015) it is not suitable for students who are not working.

Based on Hofstede's six cultural dimensions, the prominent basic proxy for distinct cultures is individualism-collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Sun et al., 2014). The Portrait Values Questionnaire developed by Schwartz (1992, 1994) specifies the individualism-collectivism category with nine value groups according to the interest the values serve. Participants are invited to indicate the extent to which each of 56 values represents a guiding principle in their lives on a scale from 1 (not important) to 7 (supreme importance). These values are categorised into three sets according to responses by participants from 20 countries representing diverse cultures. One set of values (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction) serves individual interests. Another set of values (benevolence, tradition, conformity) serves collective interests. A third set of values (universalism) serves mixed interests on the boundary between individual and collective interests. Research which employs Schwartz's scale shows that individualist values are strongly endorsed in the United States and the collectivist subset is strongly endorsed in China (Triandis et al., 1990). This result is consistent with Hofstede's result that

individualism tends to prevail in developed and Western countries while collectivism prevails in less developed and Eastern countries. Japan occupies a middle position in this dimension (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010).

Some measures differentiate cultural differences more straightforwardly. For example, physician-assisted suicide is viewed as a cultural phenomenon, and an individual's attitude to it indicates their individualism or collectivist value orientation. Research shows that individualistic value orientation at the individual level is positively related to supporting physician-assisted suicide (Kemmerlmeier et al., 2002). This research replicates six items from a measure of attitudes to euthanasia adapted from Lee et al. (1996) and Rogers (1996). Sample items include "Euthanasia is acceptable if the person is old and has a terminal illness" and "Euthanasia is a humane act." Participants indicated their responses on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

b. Behaviour-based measures

Values can explain, influence and predict behaviour (Roccas & Sagiv, 2010; Rokeach, 1973). Schwartz et al. (2016) show that behaviour is primarily motivated by one value and inhibited by values conceptually opposed to it. For example, behaviours that control others for one's benefit are likely to be inspired by power values and inhibited by self-transcendence values. This implies that a set of behaviours will be linked most strongly with one specific value rather than other values.

The Everyday Behaviour Questionnaire (Schwartz & Butenko, 2014; Schwartz et al., 2016) was developed based on cultural value sets designed by Schwartz (1992). The measure consists of 19 values which are interpreted by 85 behaviour-based items. It has been validated that a group of three to six behaviours in the measure are motivated most strongly by the expected one of the 19 values rather than the other 18 unexpected values (Schwartz & Butenko, 2014). The behaviour-based items serve three main interests: individual interests (e.g. self-direction: "Choose to do a task alone rather than with other people"; face: "Feel offended when someone questions my competence"), collective interests (e.g. conformity:

“Wait for the green light before crossing the street, even when no cars are coming”; tradition: “Practice my cultural traditions, e.g. eat or avoid particular foods”) and mutual interests (universalism: “Do my best to understand the views of a person with whom I disagree strongly”) (available from Schwartz personally by email). Participants were asked to rate the frequency with that they had performed each behaviour in the previous year.

Singelis et al. (1995) argue that the individualism-collectivism value division is broad, and people may vary and have some different attributes in the general individualistic or collectivist group. For example, some individualists (e.g. Americans) link self-reliance with competition, while others do not. Some collectivists (e.g. Japanese) emphasise in-group harmony very much, and others do not (Triandis, 1995). Therefore, Singelis et al. (1995) further divide the general individualism-collectivism dimensions. Both individualism and collectivism are categorised in horizontal and vertical patterns. Their 32 specific behavioural intention and habit items assess individual tendencies among the four patterns. In the horizontal collectivism (H-C) cultural pattern people view themselves as members of the in-group and all members are equal (e.g. “If a co-worker gets a prize, I feel proud”). In the vertical collectivism cultural pattern (V-C) people still view themselves as members of the in-group but the members of the group are not equal. Serving and sacrificing for the in-group are an essential aspect of this pattern (e.g. “I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group”). In the horizontal individualism cultural pattern (H-I) the self is independent and everyone is equal (e.g. “One should live one’s life independently of others”). In the vertical individualism cultural pattern (V-I), the self is still independent but inequality and competition are expected (e.g. “It is important that I do my job better than others”) (pp. 255-256).

For horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism, some researchers have applied typical behavioural intentions to represent the four cultural tendencies in various scenarios in daily life. In a survey respondents were encouraged to choose among four behavioural intentions which was the most right for them (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998; Triandis et al., 1998). For example, the way to handle the bill. Options: Split it equally, without regard to

who ordered what (H-C); Split it according to how much each person makes (V-I); The group leader pays the bill or decides how to split it (V-C); Compute each person's charge according to what that person ordered (H-I). Finally, each national sample's average frequency of choices was calculated, and the dominant choice implied a cultural orientation. It was assumed that a scenario-based test would reduce the respondents' social desirability bias compared to an item-rating test. It is more difficult for respondents to judge social desirability among four choices in a scenario than a single statement (Triandis et al., 1998).

Tang (2017) argues that the majority of behaviour-based measures of culture are attitudes (e.g. how a person thinks about an activity), predictions (e.g. what will a person do) and past actions (e.g. what a person did), just like the measures introduced above. A few measures involve actual behaviour observation in a designed experimental environment. For example, Tang (2017) gave pairs of participants from different countries or the same country a financial incentive allocation game (called an ultimatum game) to test their fairness value. Utz (2004) designed a coin-winning game (32 rounds of a give-or-take-some dilemma) to test participants' cooperation with their partners. Participants with a dependent or individualistic orientation would be primarily concerned with their own gains. In contrast, individuals with an interdependent or collectivist orientation would also care about the interests of their partners.

Sentence completion is a more or less behaviour-based measure. For example, the Twenty-Statement Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) asks respondents to finish twenty statements that start with the words 'I am...'. The answers are identified as either individualistic (e.g. I am interesting) or collectivistic (e.g. I am a husband). The higher percentage of the two types of answers indicates an individual's cultural orientation.

c. A mixed value and behaviour-based measure

House et al.'s (2004) Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) expanded Hofstede's five dimensions to nine. They maintained the labels power distance and uncertainty avoidance and further divided collectivism into institutional

collectivism and in-group collectivism and masculinity-femininity into assertiveness and gender egalitarianism. Long-term orientation was redefined as future orientation. Two more dimensions were developed: humane orientation and performance orientation. The main feature of the 78-item scale is that it measures each cultural dimension in the form of values and practice separately. Taking the institutional collectivism dimension as an example, the item for the value is “I believe that in general leaders should encourage group loyalty even if individual goals suffer.” The item for the practice is “I believe that in general, leaders encourage group loyalty even if individual goals suffer.” (Brewer & Venaik, 2011, p. 10). The purpose of the mixed value and behaviour measure is to check the extent to which self-perceived values and group-perceived social practice overlap. However, the result was that the values and social norms were negatively related for seven of the nine dimensions, meaning that self-perceived values and group-perceived social practice are inconsistent.

d. Critiques of culture measures

Sun et al. (2014) criticised two main issues existing in culture measures. First, some measurement items do not describe what they are supposed to measure. For example, Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism subscale has little to do with collectivism. Hofstede (1980, p. 148) defined individualism-collectivism as “the relationship between the individual and the collectivity and how people live together.” However, Hofstede’s individualism-collectivism dimension actually measures an individual’s dependence (or interdependence) on their organisation (Earley & Gibson, 1998). The collectivity is restricted to companies (Hofstede, 2001) or even families according to the items (e.g. “Have a job which leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life”) and the general statement on how respondents should rate all the items (“Please think of an ideal job, disregarding your present job. In choosing an ideal job, how important would it be to you to ...”) (Hofstede, 1980, p. 419). One explanation of the inconsistency between the items and the definition of the targeted dimension is that the attributes to distinguish broad individualism and collectivism are narrowly checked through an individual’s ideal job choice. These attributes may include autonomy and self-orientation, the right to private life, family ties and conformity of behaviour (Hofstede, 2001).

Other researchers also argue that some items included in cultural instruments do not measure what they are supposed to measure according to the literal expression (Bearden et al., 2006; Furrer et al., 2000; Sharma, 2010; Taras et al., 2009). Schwartz and Butenko (2014) provide some responses to the argument when they link values and behaviours. For behaviour-based culture instruments, some items seem to demonstrate many cultural values. For example, “a researcher may be motivated to write an article by self-direction, achievement, conformity, power or security values. Nonetheless, many behaviours express one value more than they express other values. For example, seeking excitement to break one’s routine expresses primarily stimulation values, and manipulating others to obtain what one wants expresses primarily power-dominance values” (p.801). Sometimes, it is not easy for value-based cultural instruments to set a boundary between values. Schwartz (1992) suggests that there are compatibilities among values. For example, both power and achievement emphasise social superiority and esteem; and both achievement and hedonism are concerned with self-indulgence. This implies that some of the items are related to more than one value. On the other hand, understanding the compatibility of values also depends on respondents coming from different countries. Schwartz’s (1992) research shows that sets of compatible values were not found in all 40 samples from 20 countries.

The other problem with cultural instruments is the mathematical mean score of the self-referenced values or practices within a group (Sun et al., 2014). This critique argues that culture also describes how people think society as a whole looks like or should look like a shared system within a social group (Mueller & Wornhoff, 1990). Hofstede (2001, p. 17) maintains, “Cultures are not king-size individuals. They are wholes, and their internal logic cannot be understood in the terms used for the personality dynamics of individuals”. This argument may sound reasonable, but respondents have an operational problem. For example, House et al.’s (2004) GLOBE model measures national culture through self-referenced values (how things should be done) and group-referenced practice (how things are actually done in society). Hofstede (2006) criticised the group-perceived measure in the GLOBE model. His

point is that respondents should have the comprehensive experience to gain insight into the tendencies of the whole society in practice. The so-called group perception is from a personal perspective. It is still a personal understanding or interpretation of group practice limited by individuals' living contexts and life experiences. For example, undergraduates who have not worked in society may have a different impression of social practice from that of a man with rich working experience. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) suggest that people behave more consistently with their personal values when normative pressures are weak, but they may behave in ways opposed to their values when under intense normative pressure. This implies that even self-referenced actual behaviour reporting can also reflect group norms. Most importantly, the self-reference measure is easy for all respondent groups.

There are some criticisms of the limitations of value-based and behaviour-based approaches. Measurements of self-reports of values "often fail to accurately reflect the mental responses of cognition, emotion and motivation that are produced spontaneously as people behave in actual social settings" (Kitayama, 2002, p. 89). As was mentioned above, behaviour-based approaches can be divided into self-reported perceived behaviour (e.g. behaviour intentions) and observations of actual behaviour. The problem with perceived behaviour is the gap between people's behavioral intentions and actual conduct. In contrast, behaviour observation better captures participants' actual behaviour in particular contexts. Another advantage of behaviour observation is that designed contexts can provide the same environment in which to compare participants' behaviour, which reduces the number of environmental variables (Tang, 2017). However, there are still some limitations of the behaviour observation approach. Behavioural experiments are more costly than survey-based research because of extra facilities, instruments, coordination and incentives (Peng et al., 1997). Another limitation is that the design of an experiment does not trigger all the participants' behaviours. For example, the monetary incentive in a game did not seem to trigger some participants' fairness-related behaviour because the money did not attract them (Tang, 2017).

Research generally employs values, norms and schemata to explore issues related to cultural differences. However, values and norms are used more than schemata to reveal cultural

differences. Value-based and behaviour-based cultural measures are widely used to measure cultural differences. However, there are some limitations to some of the existing measuring approaches. For example, some scales do not measure what they are supposed to measure; asking respondents what they perceive a group's values or norms are may be beyond their insight ability; self-reported values and behaviour intentions do not necessarily reflect actual behaviour; and behaviour observation is more reliable but more costly than self-reporting. These limitations should be considered when a cultural measure is developed for the present research. Moreover, an easy and direct way to examine cultural differences is preferred since the respondents in the present research are young adolescents.

3.1.6 General differences between Eastern and Western culture

In research involving cross-cultural comparisons, respondents from Eastern and Western countries are often used as proxies for the different cultures (e.g. Lee & Green, 1991; Lee & Kacen, 2008; Shukla & Purani, 2012). Graham et al. (2011) identify South Asia, East Asia and Southeast Asia as areas with Eastern cultures and the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Western Europe as having Western cultures. For the first time, Hofstede (1980) accidentally revealed several sets of polar opposite cultural differences between groups of countries in a large international sample involving 76 countries around the world. Other researchers expanded the contrasting opposite differences from the original four to six (Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Minkov, 2007). It was proposed that the polar opposite is an aspect of culture that can be measured relative to other cultures (Hofstede, 2011).

Hofstede (1980) explored cultural differences among more than 50 countries worldwide from the perspective of social relationships. He used a scale from 0 to 100. According to the average score of respondents' self-reports, each country was positioned relative to other countries along six dimensions. A high or low mean score indicates a strong or weak group position along each cultural dimension. Hofstede (2011) identified the countries with low and high scores for each dimension. For example, power distributed unequally (power distance) is

more acceptable in East European, Latin, Asian and African countries and less acceptable in Germanic and English-speaking Western countries. East and Central European countries, Latin countries, Japan and German-speaking countries tend to tolerate ambiguity and unstructured situations (uncertainty avoidance) more than English-speaking, Nordic and Chinese people. People from developed and Western countries are less integrated into groups (individualists) than people from less developed and Eastern countries (collectivists). Japan occupies a middle position. Gender discrimination (masculinity) is more prevalent in Japan, German-speaking countries, some Latin countries like Italy and Mexico, and English-speaking Western countries than in Nordic countries, the Netherlands and some Latin and Asian countries like France, Spain, Portugal, Chile, Korea and Thailand. People from East Asian countries and Eastern and Central Europe focus on the future (long-term orientation). However, people from America, Australia, Latin America, Africa and Muslim countries focus on the present and past (short-term orientation). People in South and North America, Western Europe and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa tend to enjoy life as much as possible. In contrast, people from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Muslim countries are inclined to control their basic human desires. People in South and North America, Western Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa tend to allow free gratification (indulgence). However, most people in Eastern Europe, Asia and the Muslim world tend to control gratification (restraint).

Even though there is no clear line between two fixed groups of countries overall, in Hofstede's (1980, 2011) six dimensions of cultural difference, there is still a division pattern. For example, Asian and English-speaking countries (developed countries) are at opposite poles for most dimensions. Eastern and Central European countries and Asian countries are in the same group for most dimensions. Japan is an exception. For some dimensions, it is in the middle between Eastern countries and Western countries, or even closer to Western countries. Eastern countries generally value hierarchy, restraint and collective consciousness. Western countries emphasise equality, individualism and indulgence more. However, the cultural differences that Hofstede found are in a workplace context because the survey was conducted with staff in an international company, and some items in his measures are related to the workplace.

Schwartz (1999) reveals the cultural value differences among countries. Unlike Hofstede's research, the cultural differences found by Schwartz are not limited to any specific contexts. Countries in different geographical areas were found to have specific orientations towards six groups of values in Schwartz's research. The six groups of values are pairs of opposites: conservatism (social order, respect for tradition, family security, wisdom) vs. affective autonomy (pleasure, an exciting life, a varied life) and intellectual autonomy (curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity); mastery (ambition, success, daringness, competence) vs. harmony (unity with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty); egalitarianism (equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty) vs. hierarchy (social power, authority, humility, wealth). English-speaking nations (e.g. America, Canada, Australia and England) tend to emphasise mastery and affective autonomy values at the expense of conservatism and harmony values. East European nations (e.g. Poland and Russia) emphasise the opposite set of values. Unlike Hofstede's research, respondents from mainland China were represented in Schwartz's research sample. People from Eastern countries (e.g. mainland China, Hong Kong, Korea) value hierarchy. Egalitarianism and intellectual autonomy are emphasised more in Western European countries (e.g. Italy, France and Spain). Latin America (e.g. Brazil) and Japan are at a medium level for all six groups of values. However, they are closer to the orientation of Eastern countries.

There are similarities between the above two sizeable international research findings (Chang et al., 2011). First, the cultural dimensions of the two studies overlap. For example, "power distance" in Hofstede's research is similar to "hierarchy vs. egalitarianism" in Schwartz's analysis, with both focusing on equity or lack of equity. The "indulgence vs. restraint" dimension in Hofstede's study is similar to the "affective autonomy vs. conservatism" dimension in Schwartz's study. Both emphasise self-desire (or interest) or lack of it. Second, both studies find that Eastern and Western countries are generally at opposite poles of various cultural dimensions. For example, hierarchy and restraint or conservatism are valued in Eastern countries. At the same time, equity and individual indulgence are emphasised in Western countries. Finally, Japan is an exception among Eastern countries. It deviates from

the pattern of most Eastern countries.

According to the national differences in cultural dimensions above, it seems that people from most Western countries care more about personal independence and individual development. However, group integration rather than self-interest is valued in most Eastern countries. Therefore, a prominent way to differentiate cultures is individualism vs. collectivism (e.g. Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Kashima et al., 2001; Oyserman et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1992; Triandis, 1995, 2007). Individualism and collectivism are conceptualised as opposites by researchers (e.g. Hui, 1988) especially when comparing European, American and East Asian cultures (e.g. Chan, 1994; Kitayama et al., 1997; Yamaguchi, 1994). Social scientists propose that individualism prevails more in industrialised Western societies than in other societies, especially in more traditional societies in developing countries (e.g. Inglehart, 1997; Sampson, 2001).

Some studies suggest that European Americans are the most individualistic group (e.g. Freeberg & Stein, 1996; Gaines et al., 1997; Rhee et al., 1996). A meta-analysis of cross-culture literature reviewing 83 references finds that America, other English-speaking countries and (Western and Central) Europe form the Western culture frame, sharing a high level of individualism, with America a little bit more individualistic than other Western countries. Americans are higher in individualism and lower in collectivism than East Asians. However, the individualism-collectivism difference is more apparent when comparing Americans with Africans and Middle Easterners than East Asians. Within the collectivism cluster, the Chinese are higher in collectivism than the Japanese and Koreans. Asian Americans are lower in individualism than European Americans. Generally, America and China are typical representatives of individualism and collectivism respectively. Unfortunately, China, especially mainland China, and England, are still under-represented in the samples in cross-culture research. Among the 83 reviewed works, only five studies involved Chinese samples, and none included a British sample (Oyserman et al., 2002).

Researchers have also found some cultural differences in self-concepts, self-esteem, emotions,

attribution styles, obligations, social behaviour, organisational behaviour and consciousness between Eastern and Western countries. However, most of these are related to or can be explained by individualism-collectivism differences. Since China represents Eastern culture very well and is a focus in the present research, evidence involving Chinese samples will be presented as much as possible. For example, European American undergraduates use more personal trait descriptors (and sometimes fewer social role descriptors) than Asian Americans, Chinese people, Indians, Kenyans, and Koreans (Dhawan et al., 1995; Ma & Schoeneman, 1997; Rhee et al., 1995; Trafimow et al., 1991). Self-esteem contributes more to the life satisfaction of American undergraduates than that of Hong Kong undergraduates. Likewise, relationship harmony contributes more to the life satisfaction of Hong Kong undergraduates than that of American undergraduates (Kwan et al., 1997). European Americans are higher in self-competence than Chinese people (Tafarodi & Swann, 1996). Chinese undergraduates feel more affected by the achievements and transgressions of affiliated others (e.g. siblings or children) (Stipek, 1998). American students find individuating information more valuable than relational information, with the reverse being true for Chinese students (Gelfand et al., 2000). European American undergraduates see their parents as more respectful of their independence than Chinese American students. They also rate their relationship with their parents as more emotionally supportive and mutual. They feel more comfortable asking their parents for support than Chinese American undergraduates (Wink et al., 1997). The above evidence is supported by the finding that individualism is correlated more strongly with personal identity, and collectivism is associated with the social identity (Wink, 1997).

Regarding social behaviour differences, research shows that Americans tend to make decisions based primarily on personal preferences. In contrast, the Chinese tend to make decisions based primarily on normative considerations (Riemer et al., 2014). Japanese and Hong Kong students report spending more time with in-groups than out-groups. However, European Americans spend equal amounts of time within- and out-groups (Gudykunst et al., 1992). They report having more freedom to decide which groups to belong to than Indians (Verma, 1985). Whereas American college students report that they treat close friends, co-workers and business owners similarly, Chinese people (Hui et al., 1991) and Brazilians

(Pearson & Stephan, 1998) do not. Americans interact with more people more frequently, whether on a one-to-one basis or in small groups, than Hong Kong students do (Wheeler et al., 1989). Americans are less obliging and use fewer avoiding, integrating and compromising communication styles than Taiwanese students (Trubinsky et al., 1991). Americans praise group leaders who allow group members to insult one another for providing an open forum, whereas Hong Kong Chinese students find such group leaders incompetent (Bond et al., 1985). European Americans are less likely to use equality norms in interactions with in-group members than Chinese students (Leung & Bond, 1982, 1984). American managers' performance improves when instructions focus on individual efficacy. However, Chinese managers perform efficiently when instructions emphasise group efficacy (Earley, 1994). The above findings of national differences in social behaviour support the idea that individualists feel more comfortable interacting with strangers, communicating more directly and working alone. In contrast, collectivists prefer to develop in-group relationships and express forms of face-saving and cooperative intentions.

Nevertheless, some would dispute this apparent dichotomy: individualism and collectivism are not necessarily polar opposites (Schwartz, 1990). For instance, individualists might attach more importance to serving universal aims than collectivists, including equality for all, social justice and 'world peace'. Conversely, an individualist might show more concern than a collectivist for a stranger's welfare (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Leung & Bond, 1984; Triandis et al., 1988). Schwartz (1990) suggests that 'types of values' should be reclassified as communal (collectivist) and contractual (individualist) according to social structures rather than value characteristics. In communal societies, conformity, tradition and interpersonal pro-social values are privileged. Conversely, self-direction, stimulation and the universalistic subset of pro-social values are more important to people living in more contractual societies.

Apart from using individualism-collectivism to identify national cultural differences, there are other ways to classify national cultures. For example, human societies have been broadly divided into 'guilt' and 'shame' cultures. The former describes Western countries (e.g. Britain and the United States), and the latter describes East Asian countries (e.g. China) (Tangney &

Dearing, 2002). People experience shame and guilt when they violate standards or norms (Hobblitzelle, 1987; Lewis, 1987; Tangney, 1991). Shame typically involves being negatively evaluated by others, while guilt typically involves being negatively evaluated by oneself (Smith et al., 2002). In other words, shame has an external orientation (driven by others) and guilt has an internal orientation (driven by the self) (Wong & Tsai, 2007). Shame and guilt have different understandings in different cultures. For example, Chinese people feel guilt when they violate an absolute standard and shame when breaking a situation-specific standard. However, shame and guilt are not distinguished like this in Western culture (Bedford & Hwang, 2003).

Nisbett et al. (2001) make East-West comparisons of cognition. They describe Eastern culture as holistic cognition and Western as analytic cognition. Holistic cognition views the world from multiple perspectives, simultaneously concentrating on the whole field and focusing on the relationship between the object and the context. Analytic thinking is characterised by viewing things in isolation, away from their contexts. People with analytic cognition tend to apply abstract rules without considering specific contextual details.

Markus and Kitayama (1991) explore the Eastern and Western cultural differences in self-construal. In Markus and Kitayama's self-construal theory, self-construal refers to how people view themselves. They suggest that people hold divergent views of the self. The variation is in what they believe about the relationship between the self and others, especially the degree to which they see themselves as separate from others or connected with them. They also suggest that Easterners see the self as part of a social relationship in which everyone's behaviour is determined by others' thoughts, feelings and actions concerning the relationship. This kind of self-construal is identified as interdependent. Westerners' self-construal focuses on the self's inner feelings, ideas and activities and is characterised as independent self-construal. The concept of an interdependent self is also associated with understanding the world as an interconnected whole rather than separate parts (Bond et al., 1985), which aligns with Eastern holistic philosophy (Nisbett et al., 2001). It is also supported by the different social cognitions of friendship between Icelandic and Chinese

children (7-9-year-olds) (Fang & Fang, 1994). A universal tendency across cultures is that concern with self-interest in making friends decreases with age. However, the extent of this reduction for Icelandic children is lower than that for Chinese children. The significant difference is that Chinese children pay more attention to interpersonal relationships when they make friendship decisions, while Icelandic children give more importance to commitment. The result supports the view that contractual relationships are privileged in the West, while interdependent relationships are more valued in East Asia. However, Fang and Fang's (1994) finding is based on respondents' self-reported decisions regarding dilemmas related to friends and self-reported reasoning for their decisions.

The shame-guilt, holistic-analytic and interdependent-independent self-construal divisions all reveal the cultural difference in dealing with the relationship between individuals and society or collectives. Easterners value the connection between themselves and others (including the environment). They try to adapt or integrate themselves into the collective. However, Westerners tend to see themselves as independent. It seems that all the divisions go back to the original one: individualism-collectivism.

Moreover, holistic-analytic cognition equals the uncertainty avoidance dimension in Hofstede's culture framework. Both address the fact that ambiguity is more tolerated in Eastern culture than in Western culture. Shame and interdependent self-construal cultures correspond to the 'harmony' orientation in Schwartz's dimensions, which refers to Eastern culture. Easterners are inclined to maintain a harmonious relationship by making their feelings, thoughts and behaviour consistent with those of others.

Finally, East Asian culture is also characterised as Confucianism. For more than 2500 years, the teachings of Confucius have significantly influenced people's lives and behaviour (Yan & Sorenson, 2004). Confucianism influenced China, South Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore to different degrees (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Triandis, 1989; Yan & Sorenson, 2004). 'Confucian' means 'The Way of the Cultivated Person'. The core values in Confucian philosophy are social order, harmony, face-saving, humility, a sense of group orientation,

respect for social hierarchy and reciprocity in exchange (Cheung et al., 2001; Chung & Pysarchik, 2000; Kim et al., 2005; Lee & Green, 1991; Nguyen et al., 2009; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Roy, 2013). The features of Confucian culture are reflected to different degrees in Hofstede's and Schwartz's cultural models and the shame-guilt, holistic-analytic and interdependent-independent self-construal cultural divisions. For example, the Confucian culture in East Asian countries is labelled 'long-term orientation'. People with long-term orientation are inclined to develop their self-esteem continually, sacrifice today's pleasures for tomorrow's success and avoid improper behaviour that could ruin their reputation (Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Hofstede & Minkov, 2010; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).

In a word, there are several ways to distinguish between Eastern and Western cultures. Hofstede (1980) proposed six dimensions of culture (power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualist-collectivist, short/long-term orientation, masculinity and indulgence). Schwartz (1999) suggested three pairs of values (conservatism vs. autonomy; mastery vs. harmony; egalitarianism vs. hierarchy). There are also several other cultural divisions: guilt-shame cultures (Tangney & Dearing, 2002), holistic-analytic cultures (Nisbett et al., 2001) and interdependent-independent self-construal cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Most of these divisions concern cultural divergence in how people deal with the relationship between themselves and society or collectives. People from Eastern countries emphasise the connection between themselves and others (including the environment). They try to adapt or integrate themselves into the collective. However, people from Western countries value independence. Therefore, individualism-collectivism is a mainstream proxy to differentiate Eastern and Western cultures. The individualism-collectivism division explains cultural differences in self-concept, self-esteem, emotion, attribution style, obligation, social behaviour, organisational behaviour and consciousness between Eastern and Western countries. Specifically, hierarchy, restraint and conservatism are valued in Eastern countries. People in these countries prefer to consider situational factors (other people and things around them) when thinking and acting. Equity, individual development and achievement are emphasised in Western countries. Westerners tend to think and behave according to their inner feelings or self-interest.

Although the findings of existing studies do not lead to a consistent grouping of Eastern and Western countries, a general division is possible. Eastern countries are generally those in South Asia, East Asia, Southeast Asia and Eastern and Central Europe. Western countries mainly include the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and those in Western Europe. However, there are some exceptions. For example, Japan and Korea do not show the typical characteristics of Eastern countries' in some cases. Hong Kong and Taiwan are not as representative of Eastern culture as mainland China. Some cross-cultural research does not reveal remarkable cultural differences, which may be for two reasons. One is possible cultural globalisation. The other is that some representative countries, such as mainland China, are under-represented in the sample.

However, research also shows that the cultural difference or distance between Eastern and Western cultures has shrunk. Beugelsdijk et al. (2015) followed Hofstede's (1980) original approach, testing around 100 countries' cultures. They found that all the countries, on average, became more individualistic, indulgent and valued hierarchy less than 45 years ago. Moreover, the US, a typical representative of the Western or individualistic culture, increased less in individualism and indulgence and decreased less in power distance than the average level. Generally, the result implies that the cultural difference among countries still exists but has shrunk in Power distance, Individualism vs. Collectivism and Indulgence vs. Restraint.

The cultural difference between Eastern and Western countries provides a reference for the present research linking cultural differences between China and England to moral views and behaviour. The widely used individualism-collectivism cultural division reflects different relationships between individuals and society or collectives. It covers a wide range of thoughts and practices close to young adolescents' daily lives. The under-representation of mainland China in English research on comparative culture makes it necessary to conduct research that includes a reasonably sized sample from mainland China.

3.2 Theories on the influence of culture on moral identity

3.2.1 Moral Foundation Theory

Moral universalism assumes that individuals value the same moral principles regardless of their cultures (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Shweder, 2012). However, moral foundation theory holds that cultural variation in morality is deep and important (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and it may orient moral identity in individualist and collectivist cultures (AlSheddi et al., 2019). Moral foundation theory extends the limited moral domains of justice and care proposed by Kohlberg (1969) and Gilligan (1982) to five psychological foundations. These are labelled harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity. Cultures vary in the degree to which they build virtues on these five foundations.

Researchers in moral psychology agree that morality is about protecting individuals. Justice and care both matter to protect individuals. Turiel (1983) identifies justice and care values as individual-centred moralities. Shweder (1990) argues that individual-centred moralities reflect one of three widespread moral ethics. Morality is considered to be specified in three ethics: 'the ethic of autonomy', 'the ethic of community' and 'the ethic of divinity.' In the 'ethic of autonomy,' the moral world is assumed to be made up exclusively of individual human beings, and the purpose of moral regulation is to protect the choices of individuals and to promote the exercise of individual desire in the pursuit of personal preferences (Shweder et al., 1997, p. 140). Harm/care and fairness/reciprocity are moral goods because they help to maximise the autonomy of individuals and protect individuals from harm caused by authorities and by other individuals. In contrast, the 'ethic of community' sees the world not as a collection of individuals but as a collection of institutions, families, tribes, guilds and other groups. Moral regulation aims to protect the moral integrity of the various positions or roles that constitute a society or a community (Shweder et al., 1997). Essential virtues in this ethic are ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect. Finally, the 'ethic of divinity' is based on the belief that God or gods exist and that the moral world is composed of souls housed in bodies.

(Bloom, 2004). Each soul is a gift from God. “The purpose of moral regulation is to protect the soul, the spirit, the spiritual aspects of the human agent and nature from degradation” (Shweder et al., 1997, p. 138). The moral goods in this ethic include purity, sanctity and the suppression of humanity’s baser more carnal instincts.

The three clusters of moral foundations proposed by Shweder (1990; et al.,1997) were combined into two by Graham et al. (2009): individualising and binding foundations. The individualising foundations match the ethic of autonomy and emphasise the rights and welfare of individuals. The binding foundations correspond to the ‘ethic of community’ and ‘ethic of divinity’ and emphasise group-binding loyalty, duty and self-control. Regardless of how the five moral foundations are classified, researchers agree that they exist in all cultures but vary to some degree (Shweder et al., 1997; Graham et al., 2009, 2011).

Moral foundation theory is based on the idea that morality is both innate and learned and is a combination of nativist and empiricist approaches. It has been proposed that human beings come equipped with intuitive ethics (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Moral intuitions derive from innate psychological mechanisms that have co-evolved with cultural institutions and practices (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). Marcus’s (2004) understanding of innateness explains innate but modifiable mechanisms. He uses the metaphor that genes create the first draft of the brain and experience later edits it. Similarly, human beings have the five foundations as part of their evolved first draft, but there is heritable variation (Bouchard, 2004; Turkheimer, 2000). Virtues are cultural constructions, and children develop different virtues in different cultures and historical eras. The available range of human virtues is constrained by the five sets of intuitions that human minds are prepared to have. Cultures select areas of human potential that fit their social structures, economic systems and cultural traditions, and adults work to cultivate these virtues in their children (Haidt & Joseph, 2008). Marcus (2004) prefers the term ‘virtues’ to ‘values’ since the former focuses on morality and strongly suggests cultural learning and construction.

Moral foundation theory has been applied to moral differences across the political spectrum.

Political liberals are primarily concerned with harm and fairness, whereas political conservatives construct moral systems more evenly using all five foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Graham et al., 2009). Moving beyond politics, the theory is also employed to describe East-West differences in moral concerns and moral identity. For example, Eastern participants show stronger concerns about the in-group and purity than Western participants. Eastern participants even show slightly more concern about harm, fairness, and authority (Graham et al., 2011). Eastern participants (Saudi Arabians) generate both individualising and binding features as prototypical moral people. They identify highly with moral people who possess either individualising or binding features. Western participants (British) tend to list only individualising features of prototypical moral people. British people also only identify with moral people who evidence individualising traits but not binding features (AlSheddi et al., 2019).

3.2.2 Self-construal Theory

Moral Foundation Theory proposes that moral identity varies among countries. Markus and Kitayama's (1991) self-construal theory suggests that people's commitment to moral principle, which is a component of moral identity, appears to different degrees in different cultural backgrounds. The theory proposes that people hold divergent views of the self. The variation concerns what they believe about the relationship between the self and others, especially the degree to which they see themselves as separate from others or as connected with them. The essence of this view is a conception of the self as an autonomous independent person, which is referred to as an independent construal of the self. Similar labels are individualist, egocentric, separate, autonomous, and self-contained. It is assumed that more individuals in Western cultures will hold this view than in non-Western cultures. In many Western cultures, there is a belief in the inherent separateness of distinct persons. The normative imperative in this culture is to become independent from others and to discover and express one's unique attributes (Johnson, 1985; Marsella et al., 1985; Miller, 1988; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). People in such a culture tend to construe themselves as

individuals whose behaviour is organised and made meaningful primarily by referencing their internal thoughts and feelings rather than others' thoughts, feelings and actions. However, individuals in many non-Western cultures insist on a fundamental connectedness of human beings to each other. A normative imperative in these cultures is to maintain this interdependence among individuals (DeVos, 1985; Hsu, 1985; Miller, 1988; Shweder & Bourne, 1984). Unlike the independent self, the significant feature of the interdependent self is that more concern is given to the public components of the self.

Markus and Wurf (1987) suggest that one of the essential functions of self-construal is that of motivating persons and moving them to action. A person with an independent view of the self should be driven to actions that express one's important self-defining inner attributes (e.g. being hardworking, caring, independent and powerful). A person with an interdependent view of the self should be motivated to perform actions that enhance or foster one's relatedness or connection with others. Sometimes, people with independent and interdependent selves may show similar behaviours on the surface. However, the driving power behind their actions is different (De Vos, 1973; Maehr & Nicholls, 1980). For example, working hard to get a place at university for people with an independent self would be to pursue personal achievement, while for people with an interdependent self, it would be to meet the expectations of their parents.

These construals of self and others are conceptualised as part of self-relevant schemata used to evaluate, organise and regulate one's experience and action. As schemata, they are patterns of one's past behaviour and patterns for one's current and future behaviour (Neisser, 1976). Markus and Wurf (1987) call the self-regulatory schemata the self-system. This is consistent with self-regulation in moral identity, which motivates moral actions (Blasi, 1984; Damon & Hart, 1992; Erikson, 1964; Hart et al., 1998). The social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986, 1991a, 1991b) of moral identity suggests that moral reasoning is transferred into actions through self-regulatory mechanisms. Self-regulation is rooted in moral standards and self-sanctioning in which moral agency is exercised. In the course of socialisation, moral standards are constructed from information conveyed by direct tuition, evaluative social

reactions to one's conduct and exposure to the self-evaluative standards modelled by others.

The independent and interdependent selves in self-construal theory (or inner and public self-concepts) are compatible with the internalisation and symbolisation dimensions of moral identity. Internalised moral identity refers to the self-reported importance of being a moral person. Symbolised moral identity refers to being a moral person in the eyes of others. It is suggested that moral behaviour is not only driven by the importance of satisfying the self's standard of morality. It may also be motivated by a desire to be a moral person in the public view. Both internalised and symbolised moral identity can predict self-reports of volunteering. However, only internalised moral identity is positively related to real donation behaviour (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Research also indicates that moral behaviour is more likely to be influenced by situations in which the symbolisation dimension is at a high level in people's moral identity, especially if the internalisation dimension is at a low level at the same time. In contrast, moral behaviour is not likely to be influenced by situations when people are high in the internalisation dimension and low in the symbolisation dimension of moral identity at the same time (Winterich, Aquino et al., 2013; Winterich, Mittal et al., 2013). It is assumed that people with independent selves are more likely to commit to their moral principles in situations than people with interdependent selves, especially under situational pressure to deviate from their moral values (Miller, 2007).

Generally, moral foundation theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and self-construal theory (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) both hold that people's moral identity will vary in terms of content and moral value commitment in different cultural contexts. According to moral foundation theory, individuals with different cultural tendencies tend to identify as moral persons with different average moral foundations. Studies also support theoretical speculation. Western people tend to only identify people with harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations as moral people. However, Eastern people are inclined to list all five moral foundations (and particularly in-group/loyalty, authority/respect and purity/sanctity) as the traits that a typical moral person should possess. According to self-construal theory, people with independent selves (most Westerners) are likely to behave

according to their moral principles in situations, especially under situational pressure which is inconsistent with their moral values. In contrast, the moral behaviour of people with interdependent selves (most Easterners) are likely to be influenced by situations (other's thinking, feelings and actions). Their moral principles will be compromised under the pressure of moral violation.

According to the two theories which explain the influence of culture on moral identity, it is expected that there will be a difference in moral identity in terms of moral traits and consistency of behaviour between young adolescents from England and China. However, most existing findings are based on late adolescents and adults, and in particular the moral foundation research (e.g. AISheddiet al., 2019; Graham et al., 2011). It is necessary to check whether the difference in moral traits and consistency of behaviour in the moral identity of young adolescents is the same as in late adolescents and adults.

3.3 The correlation between culture and moral identity

Moral identities are formed and activated within contexts characterised by social relationships, group identities and an understanding of morality (Moshman, 2013). In the present study, moral identity consists of two parts: self-identification as being a moral person (moral principles) and consistency between moral principles and moral actions. Research indicates that cultural elements influence components of moral identity.

Blasi (1984) argues that people's moral identities can vary in content. This content refers to various moral values with which individuals identify themselves or their guiding moral principles in life (which moral values are more important than others). It corresponds to the first part of moral identity: the self-reported importance of being a moral person. Moral foundation theory classifies moral values as either 'individualising' or 'binding' ones. It also reveals that differences in the predominance of morality may orient different moral identities in individualist and collectivist cultures (Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2012). In Western culture, in which individuals are the fundamental units of moral value, care and

justice are valued (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). The values of care and justice are individual-centred. However, in-group loyalty, authority, respect and spiritual purity are essential parts of the moral domain in Eastern cultures (Haidt et al., 1993; Jensen, 1998; Shweder et al., 1997).

Researchers have found universal moral values across cultures. Harm, fairness and justice appear to be found in all cultures including non-Western ones (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 1984; Graham et al., 2011; Hauser, 2006; Wainryb, 2006). Gorard et al. (2010) investigate the sense of equity among 14-15-year-old students in six countries (Belgium, the Czech Republic, England, France, Italy and Japan). They find that students in all these countries have a similar sense of equity and similar reasons for perceived unfairness. Pre-school children's self-interest in distributive justice noticeably decreases between the ages of three and five in both Eastern and Western cultures (Rochat et al., 2009). However, there is a possible sampling bias in Aquino and Reed's (2002) research. For example, less than 20 of the 226 respondents are Asian, and all the respondents are in an American context. Even though Asians represent a sizable proportion of the 34,476 respondents in Graham et al.'s (2011) study, the survey was conducted using a website in English. This means that all the respondents could access a website in a Western country and could use English. The Asian respondents probably live in Western countries. Moreover, it is not reported which Asian countries the respondents came from. According to existing studies, Japan, Korea and even Hong Kong are not the most typical representatives of Eastern cultures. Mainland China is under-represented or even absent in the samples in comparative studies on moral identity (e.g. AlSheddi et al., 2019; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Vitell et al., 2016).

External environments also influence moral identity, such as the family environment (e.g. parenting style, parents' expectations) and the school climate (See 2.2.4 Chapter Two). It has been concluded that adolescents having a positive perception of the strictness of their parenting and inductive discipline is beneficial to the development of their moral identity and their moral value internalisation (Patrick & Gibbs, 2012; Pratt et al., 2003). The mainstream parenting styles in Eastern and Western countries are different. It has been suggested that

children in Western societies are encouraged to think independently and have self-directed freedoms (Newfield, 1996). In contrast, Confucianism regulates Chinese culture and a harsh and controlling parenting style is conventional in Chinese society (Huang, 2013; Jia et al., 2009; Leung et al., 1998). Authoritarian parental control is considered unacceptable in Western countries (e.g. U.S.) but acceptable in Eastern countries (e.g. China) (Kern et al., 2014; Lui & Rollock, 2013; Scharf et al., 2011). It seems that the strict parenting style in Eastern culture is more beneficial in developing children's moral values than in Western culture.

It has also been found that an inclusive and equal school climate is another cultural predictor of moral identity. School climate is mainly a question of teacher-student support (Colarossi & Eccles, 2003; Pianta et al., 1997; Roeser et al., 1998), student-student support (Bachman & O'Malley, 1986; Eccles & Midgley, 1989; Loukas et al., 2006) and opportunities for autonomy in the classroom (Connell & Ilardi, 1987; Kasen et al., 1990; Way et al., 2007). It has been reported that power distance (hierarchy) between teachers and students tends to be higher in Eastern countries (e.g. China) than in Western countries (e.g. America, the Netherlands) (Bear et al., 2014; Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). 2009 PISA (the Programme for International Student Assessment) data show that adolescents (15-year olds) in Western countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States) report more positive teacher-student relationships and attitudes to school than those in Eastern countries (e.g. China and Singapore) (Lee, 2014). However, some studies have found the opposite. According to Bear et al. (2014), Jia et al. (2009) and Yang et al. (2013) students in China view their school climate more favourably than students in America. The difference tends to be greatest after elementary school (Bear et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2013). Chinese students also scored higher for liking school and fairness of rules than American students (Yang et al., 2013).

It has been suggested that the difference in students' perceptions of school climate between Eastern and Western countries is related to cultural differences. (1) Chinese culture's social harmony norm promotes positive attitudes to school and prosocial behaviour (Chuang-Hall &

Chen, 2010; Ran, 2001). The social harmony norm also means that Chinese students are expected to regulate both their own behaviour and that of their peers (Chen & French, 2008; Chen et al., 2010). Students who disrupt learning, harm others or otherwise compromise social harmony in the classroom or school are likely to experience public negative evaluations by peers and teachers and peer rejection (Chang, 2004; Chen et al., 2010). Research indicates that this occurs much more often in Chinese than in American schools (Chen et al., 2010). (2) Teachers are highly respected not only by students in the classroom but throughout Chinese society (Gao, 2008). Research suggests that higher status is usually perceived more positively by others (Way et al., 2008). Therefore, the high status of teachers in China might lead Chinese students to be less critical of teachers and the teachers to be more supportive of their students. (3) Chinese students follow social norms and refrain from criticising persons in authority (Yau et al., 2009). It seems reasonable that Chinese students will view school rules as fairer. This is supported by a cross-cultural study of classroom discipline in Grades 7 to 12 conducted by Lewis et al. (2005). They find that compared to students in Australia and Israel, students in China have the strongest beliefs that their teachers' disciplinary actions are justified. (4) Chinese students spend significantly more time with their teachers and peers in school than American students. Chinese students usually have the same teachers for more than a year. All of these factors promote connectedness between students and teachers and among peers (Jessor et al., 2003; Jia et al., 2009; Tian et al., 2012).

Moral motivation is another crucial element that impacts moral consistency between principles and actions, which is the other part of moral identity. In collectivistic cultures, the self is viewed as interdependent (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). A person's identity is primarily determined by whom they know or relate to, not by their personal traits, beliefs and attitudes. According to Wang (2012), the social or public self is strongly prioritised in Chinese culture. For Chinese people, self-justification depends more on others' attitudes than on their beliefs, attitudes and criteria (Kitayama et al., 1997; Kitayama et al., 2004). Hence, the desire to maintain social conformity may sometimes lead Chinese individuals to compromise their moral beliefs. From this point of view, the moral identity motivation for Chinese people seems to derive from external more than internal sources,

while the opposite may be true for Westerners.

The difference between internal- and external-driven sources between Eastern and Western countries is consistent with evidence that Easterners care more about others' evaluations of their behaviour and Westerners care more about self-assessment (Bedford & Hwang, 2003). Moreover, East-West cultural differences in cognition and self-construal also support this (for details, see section 3.1.6). Easterners tend to focus on contexts including others' thinking, feelings and behaviour, while Westerners view things more independently and absolutely (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett et al., 2001). However, consistent moral behaviour in different contexts is more likely to be maintained when internal rather than external motivation is salient in moral identity (Rua et al., 2017).

Generally, there may be different tendencies in Western and Eastern countries regarding the self-reported importance of moral values and the consistency of moral behaviour. According to the independent- and interdependent-oriented cultural value difference between Western and Eastern countries, individualising-centred moral values (e.g. fairness and honesty) will be predominant among Westerners. In contrast, binding moral values (e.g. loyalty, humbleness, respect) are salient among Easterners. One study shows that both 'individualising' and 'binding' values are perceived as important for a moral person in Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia (AISheddi et al., 2019). Students' perceived positive parenting style and school climate in Eastern countries such as China seem more beneficial to moral value internalisation than in Western countries (e.g. America).

Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) observe that moral identity is more predictive of moral behaviour in individualist cultures than in collectivist cultures. AISheddi et al. (2019) argue that inconsistency between the self-reported importance of moral values and moral behaviour in collectivist cultures is a result of cultural bias in measures on moral identity. For example, Reed & Aquino's (2002) widely used scale only focuses on individualising-centred moral values. 'Binding' moral values, which are more critical for Easterners, are absent from the instrument. However, Hertz and Krettenauer (2016) propose that the different degrees of

consistency of moral behaviour between individualistic and collectivistic countries are due to opposite cultural orientations ('independent' and 'interdependent' self-construals). Moral actions result from a desire to be consistent with one's self-concept. People in an individualistic culture are motivated to gain independence by external pressures, social conventions and other's opinions. Consistent moral behaviour is more likely to be maintained in different contexts for individualists (Miller, 2007). However, people tend to define themselves according to social relationships and group membership in collectivist cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b). This interdependent self-construal sometimes makes people compromise their moral principles to adjust to the demands of others and to maintain harmony within their group (Markus & Kitayama, 2003).

According to the literature reviewed, some studies link cultural factors to moral identity or to morality related to moral identity. Cultural factors influencing moral identity include values at the national, family environment and school climate levels. Moral identity for people in different cultures may vary in terms of moral values, consistency of behaviour, moral motivation and moral identity predicting behaviour. The cultural factors influencing moral identity and various expressions of differences in moral identity proposed by existing studies are worthy of reference in the present study. For example, the family environment and school climate should be considered cultural factors. Family and school are two essential living environments for young adolescents, the target group in the present research.

3.4 Summary

Culture is a collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or one category of people from others. This programming includes shared cognition, emotions, motivations, values, beliefs and identities. Culture is also externalised in common behaviour in social settings. Culture can be categorised according to the geographical area or the group, such as nation, organisation or tribe. Culture varies in values, norms and schemata. The cultural difference among countries is smaller than before because of globalisation. However, some national cultural characteristics still exist. In general, individual-level

cultures, such as people's thinking and behaviour will change more easily in a temporarily changed environment than in national culture.

Culture is usually measured as values, behaviour or a mixture of the two by means of individual-perceived or group-perceived self-reports. However, there are limitations to the existing measures of culture. For example, national culture differences are narrowed down to organisational contexts, the expression of each item in a behaviour-based scale responds to more than one value and group-perceived self-reports are still based on individual perceptions.

Researchers find a general cultural difference between Eastern and Western countries regarding values and social relationships. China and England are, respectively, typical representatives of Eastern and Western countries. One prominent path for differentiating culture is individualism and collectivism. The individualism-collectivism difference is demonstrated in different ways, including self-concepts, self-esteem, emotions, attribution styles, obligations, social behaviour, organisational behaviour and consciousness.

People from different cultural backgrounds generally show moral identity differences regarding moral traits and commitments to moral principles. Cultural differences in moral identity are supported by the Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and Markus and Kitayama's (1991) self-construal theory. Specifically, cultural factors such as the family and school environment, individual-collective-centred values and interdependent-independent self-construals are related to the importance of moral traits and value commitments in people's selves. The importance of moral traits and value commitments are components of moral identity.

Existing studies on cultures and morality provide a theoretical and empirical foundation for the present study to link cultural differences to moral identity. The under-representation of China, especially mainland China, in existing comparative research on moral identity entails a need for comparative research with a sizable Chinese sample (the proportion of Chinese

sample is similar to that of other countries in the whole sample). The present study will focus on and compare Chinese and British cultures from the perspective of individualism-collectivism value inclinations. Moreover, norms, school climate and family environment and other culture-related factors will also be examined and discussed.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

This chapter presents the research design and methods of this study. The chapter explains comprehensive details of the research questions, design, tools, procedures and research ethics in this study. There is a detailed section on how missing data is handled in the analysis. The study includes a structured review and a quasi-experiment. The methods of these two research designs are explained. Finally, study samples from China and England are described and compared at the end of this chapter.

4.1 Research questions and design

This study examined young adolescents' moral identity in two different cultural contexts – China and England. The following research questions were raised as the basis of this study:

Question 1: What are the overall moral views of primary school children in different countries?

The current research assessed young adolescents' general moral views (including moral identity, moral traits understanding and moral motivation), breaking the boundary of countries.

Question 2: How is the consistency between children's self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intention? And is there consistency between children's reported behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in real life?

The study estimated the gap between children's reports of their self-reported importance of

moral values and value commitment intention and the gap between children's reported behavioural intention and actual behaviour in real life. The similarity and differences in the gap between the two countries were also checked.

Question 3: What are the similarities and differences in the moral identity and other related moral views and behaviour of primary school children in China and England?

Moral identity consists of two dimensions in the current study: self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intention. The study closely assessed the similarities and differences in the two dimensions of moral identity between the children from the two countries. The study also assessed the similarities and differences in children's understanding of moral traits, behaviour motivation, and behaviour consistency that are related to the moral identity between the two countries.

Question 4: Are there any cultural similarities and differences between China and England from the children's perspective?

The cultural similarities and differences were assessed mainly by comparing children's personal cultural values between the two countries. The similarity and differences in children's perceived school environment, parenting, norms and other thoughts and behaviours that reflect culture were assessed.

Question 5: Are any differences in moral identity and related behaviour linked to children's cultural differences?

The study assessed the relationship between children's moral identity and their cultural differences (personal cultural values and nationalities). The study also assessed the relationship between children's behaviour consistency and their cultural differences (personal cultural values and nationalities) and cultural norm primings.

Question 6: Does strong moral identity predict children’s moral behaviour and behaviour consistency in real contexts? Does motivation predict moral behaviour?

The study investigated the prediction of moral identity to moral behaviour further. To respond to existing research findings, the study first checked the prediction of moral identity to actual moral behaviour. Then, the relationship between moral identity and the consistency of behaviour was assessed, and a regression model was constructed using motivation as the predictor of actual moral behaviour.

Even though the current research mainly focuses on a comparison between Chinese and British young adolescents in terms of morality and culture, the general picture of the whole young group’s moral views, behaviour and personal value inclination was assessed before a comparison was made. The following summary table (Table 4.1) presents the research design and methods used to respond to each research question of this study.

Table 4. 1: Summary of research design, sample, and methods of analysis

Research Questions	Research Design	Research Tools	Sample	Analysis
RQ1: What are the overall moral views of primary school children in different countries?	Cross-sectional	Paper-pencil questionnaire	Chinese and British samples (the whole sample)	Percentages and means
RQ2: How is the consistency between children’s self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intention? And is there consistency between children’s reported behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in real life?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comparative for the consistency of behaviour • Cross-sectional for behaviour tendency of the whole sample 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paper-pencil questionnaire • Game-based Behaviour observation 	Chinese and British samples (the whole sample)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number comparison for identifying the consistency of behaviour • Percentages or means for the whole sample’s behaviour tendency
RQ3: What are the similarities and	Comparative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paper-pencil questionnaire 	Chinese sample vs.	Cohen’s effect size, Percentage comparison

differences in the moral identity and other related moral views and behaviour of primary school children in China and England?		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Game-based Behaviour observation 	British sample	
RQ4: Are there any cultural similarities and differences between China and England from the children's perspective?	Comparative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paper-pencil questionnaire • Game-based Behaviour observation 	Chinese sample vs. British sample	Cohen's effect size, Observation
RQ5: Are any difference in moral identity and related behaviour linked to children's cultural differences?	Correlational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paper-pencil questionnaire • Game-based Behaviour observation 	Chinese and British samples (the whole sample)	Linear regression models, Binary logistic regression models
RQ6: Does strong moral identity predict children's moral behaviour and behaviour consistency in real contexts? Does motivation predict any moral behaviour?	Correlational	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Paper-pencil questionnaire • Game-based Behaviour observation 	Chinese and British samples (the whole sample)	Binary logistic regression models, Linear regression models

4.2 Structured review of existing studies to identify moral identity scales

A structured review was conducted to determine whether there are validated and tested moral identity scales suitable for this study or existing measures that can be used after further development for the context and age of participants. It should be acknowledged that this is not a systematic review. However, it was done following the basic approach of a systematic review. The review does not cover books, unpublished articles or published articles that were not included in the mainstream databases. Therefore, some measures of moral identity would be omitted by the review. The review is just to get a general picture of the measures of moral identity.

4.2.1 Study selection

Two rounds of searches were conducted to select research linking moral identity to moral behaviour. The first round of search is in a broader range of database than the second one. The second one is a supplement to the first one.

The initial literature search for studies looking at the measures of moral identity was conducted using the comprehensive academic database from Durham University Library, which integrates a wide range of databases in psychological, sociological and educational fields, such as, but not limited to ERIC, PsycInfo, ASSIA, British Education Index, Social Services Abstract, Educational Research Abstract and Web of Science. The term used for the initial search was ‘moral identity’ AND ‘measure* OR scale* OR questionnaire* OR test* OR instrument*’. The search result identified 3,211 records of journal articles related to the measures of moral identity.

The first round of search mainly focused on the research involving moral identity measurement in a wide range of databases. However, much research in the first round of search was found not to link moral identity to moral behaviour. Examining how moral behaviour is included as a part of the measurement of moral identity is one of the purposes of the structured review. To make sure to screen out as much research on moral identity linking moral behaviour as possible within a limited time, a second search was only conducted through several specific databases, including ERIC, PsycInfo, ASSIA, British Education Index, Social Services Abstract, Educational Research Abstract and Web of Science. This time, the terms used for the search were ‘moral identity’ AND ‘action OR behaviour OR volunteer OR engagement’. The second round of search is to include more research linking moral identity to moral behaviour, which was missed in the first round of search through the database of Durham University Library. The second round of search resulted in a list of 1,077 records.

The combined search identified 4,288 records and was taken forward for screening according

to the inclusion criteria. The two searches were conducted up to June 2020.

4.2.2 Inclusion criteria

A study would have to meet four requirements simultaneously to be selected for inclusion.

(1) ‘Moral identity’ has to be defined clearly in the study since it is necessary to make sure the measure employed in the research is for moral identity. Some research topics (e.g. ‘moral self-relevance’, ‘moral self-image’, ‘moral self’, ‘moral values’, and ‘ethical preference’) are pretty similar to moral identity but are not defined as ‘moral identity’ precisely by the researcher (e.g. Barrig et al., 2001; Cornelissen et al., 2013; Johnston & Krettenauer, 2011; Pitesa & Thau, 2013). These research studies are excluded. The literature review only focused on the measures of moral identity rather than other similar topics in morality. Therefore, only research topics identified as ‘moral identity’ will be included. Moreover, studies on ‘group moral identity’, ‘organisational moral identity’, or ‘professional moral identity’(e.g. Levin & Schwartz-Tayri, 2016; Matherne, 2009; Matherne et al., 2018; May et al., 2015) are excluded because the purpose of the review is to examine the measures on moral identity in everyday life, not in particular contexts. These studies emphasised the self-perception of special moral traits which benefit an organisation or profession (e.g. concern for membership within an organisation and working attitudes toward clients). It is not the universal ‘moral identity’ that this study focuses. In a word, only research with a clear definition of ‘moral identity’ that is suitable for individuals in daily life is included. However, some studies which focus on ‘ethical identity’ and ‘pro-social identity’ are included since these terms are defined the same as the ‘moral identity’ is defined in most of the research (e.g. Atif et al., 2013; Hardy, 2006).


(2) The study has to be an empirical design with a specific research method explanation of the measure of moral identity. Studies on moral identity priming or moral identity intervention are excluded because moral identity is not actually measured (e.g. Neesham & Gu, 2015).


(3) To examine how moral behaviour is linked to moral identity measurement, the inclusion of moral behaviour is a selection criterion for the two rounds of searches. The behaviour of the target samples has to be linked with a moral value. For example, assessing cases on the basis of behaviour and actions under the categories of harmful or helpful to others or related to an existing ethical code in a profession or organisation. Consequently, self-directed health-related risk-taking behaviours (e.g. drug use and unsafe sex) were excluded since avoidance of these behaviours may be primarily not morally motivated. Some studies on leadership behaviours, such as transactional and transformational leadership behaviours (e.g. Olsen et al., 2006), which are not clearly identified as moral behaviours in organisations, are also excluded.

(4) The study should be published in English and accessible in full text.

After a brief screen filter based on the abstract, 182 studies were selected among 4288 results from the databases. After a full-text checking and removing the overlap between databases, 56 studies were obtained. Among the 56 studies, 25 records were repeatedly shown in at least two databases within the search range. The repeated articles were recorded only once. Moreover, 21 other relevant research were gathered through a backwards citation search, especially from other systematic review research (e.g. Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016). The final list includes 77 studies (See Figure 4.1).

Figure 4. 1 Literature selection about measures on moral identity





4.2.3 Coding of the selected research

Each selected study is coded for six characteristics: (1) definition of moral identity; (2) moral identity scale; (3) measure of moral behaviour; (4) the context for moral behaviour; (5) age group of the sample and (6) cultural contexts. These characteristics reflect: How the ‘moral identity’ is understood or defined by researchers; Does moral behaviour is included in the moral identity scale; Does the measure test the ‘moral identity’ that the research defines; Does moral value commitment is measured as a proxy of moral identity; What kind of moral behaviour has been focused on by researchers so far; How is moral behaviour measured; What is the age group the study focuses on; Is the cultural bias considered or not.

a. Code of moral identity definition

Some researchers categorised the existing conceptualisation of moral identity into two groups:

(1) character perspective and (2) social-cognitive perspective (Shao et al., 2008). However, the current research emphasises that moral value commitment is an essential dimension of moral identity. Furthermore, the moral identity of the current study is defined as a combination of self-reported importance of moral values and commitment to moral values. Therefore, the code of moral identity definition is classified based on the emphasis of the current study. The three groups are (1) self-identity with moral traits, (2) commitment to moral values or (3) a combination of the above two classifications. The ‘self-identity moral values’ category includes definitions around self-identity (or self-description, self-concept, self-perception, self-image, ideal-self, sense of self, essential-self, self-character) with moral qualities, traits or values. For example, the widely cited definition is “a self-conception organised around a set of moral traits” (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1424). The “commitment to moral values” category refers to all the definitions of moral value commitment through action. For example, a typical definition is “a commitment to one’s sense of self to lines of action that promote or protect the welfare of others” (Hart et al., 1998, p. 515).

b. Code of moral identity scale

The moral identity scales are named and specified with item or question examples.

c. Code of moral behaviour measure

All the selected literature linked moral behaviours to moral identity. The moral behaviours are either included in the moral identity scale or measured separately as an outcome of moral identity. The moral behaviour measures of both cases are coded in the same way. The report way of moral behaviour is coded as (1) self-reports / other reports of past moral behaviour; (2) self-reports / other reports of behavioural intention; (3) observed actual behaviour. Some scales do not specify whether to measure past behaviour or behavioural intention. For example, “I give advance notice when unable to come to work” (Adler, 2013) and “I speak up when someone is bullied” (Aldridge, Ala’I, et al., 2016). They are coded as (4) self-reports / other-reports of past behaviour & behaviour intention. These items imply behaviour habits that continue from the past to the future. The code of moral behaviour type is classified as (1) prosocial or antisocial behaviour (including community service, volunteering, donation and

distribution, and commitment to moral values); (2) behaviour in organisations (e.g. academic cheating or ethical leadership); (3) customer or marketing behaviour; (4) sports behaviour. Even though the last three categorisations are also related to prosocial or antisocial behaviour, they are in particular contexts. These measures of moral behaviour in specific contexts are not suitable for all respondents. For example, customer or marketing behaviour does not apply to youth. Therefore, they are categorised separately.

d. Code of the age group of the sample

The age of participants is coded as age groups according to the age range of participants provided by the research. It is coded as (1) Early adolescents (13 years old or below); (2) Middle adolescents (14-17 years old); (3) Late adolescents (17-19 years old), and (4) Adults (above 19 years old). For a few studies, the exact age information of the sample was not available. The missing age information was coded as ‘unavailable’.

e. Code of cultural contexts

The current research is comparative between countries. Therefore, one of the purposes of the review is to check whether the national difference is considered in the measures of moral identity. The review examines the distribution of studies in Asian countries and Western countries. The review also checks whether participants’ nationality is taken as an influencing factor (or controlled variable) for moral identity if the sample is diverse in countries. The code of cultural contexts is categorised according to the country the sample was drawn. Some research controlled the variable of respondents’ ethics or race. However, it is not a comparison among specific countries.

4.2.4 General result of the review and discussion

a. The definition of moral identity

65 records out of the 77 references emphasised two characteristics of moral identity (e.g. Adler, 2013; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Barclay et al., 2014; Cohen et al., 2014, full list see Table A1 in Appendix) in the definition. One characteristic is that moral identity reflects the importance of moral values in one’s self-identity. The other is that moral identity is reflected

in the commitment to moral values. The rest of the references highlighted one characteristic more than the other. 9 references stressed the characteristic of self-identity with moral traits (Arnold, 1993; Crimston et al., 2016; Hardy et al., 2014; Hardy et al., 2015; Jia et al., 2017; Sanders et al., 2018; Shields et al., 2016; Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010; Stevens & Hardy, 2011). Only 3 references stressed the commitment to moral values that express a strong moral identity (Aldridge, Alai et al., 2016; Aldridge, Fraser et al., 2016; Hart et al., 1998). It is not to say these references did not recognise the other characteristic of moral identity in the definition. Generally, most of the research in the review identified moral identity from two perspectives: internal self-identity with moral qualities and external behaviour, which expresses a commitment to moral qualities.

b. The measures on moral identity

Generally, the measures on moral identity for the final 77 references are categorised into three groups. Each group of measures emphasises the two characteristics or dimensions of the moral identity in definitions differently. The three groups are (1) investigating the moral self-reported importance or centrality of moral qualities to one's identity, (2) assessing value commitment, and (3) a combination of the above two approaches. Most of the references employ only one scale to measure moral identity. However, 5 references use two or more different scales developed by different researchers (e.g. Black & Reynolds, 2016; Brown, 2013; Hardy et al., 2014; Hardy et al., 2015; Miles & Upenieks, 2018) to measure the moral identity in order to verify the results with each other. The different scales used in the same references are grouped into different categories accordingly. The frequency of applying each type of measure in research and some limitations will be analyzed briefly in the following section.

Measures on self-identity with moral traits only are the biggest group. 40 references that employed one or more scales assessed respondents' moral identity only by capturing how respondents identify or describe themselves with moral traits. There are 9 scales in this group: (1) Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002); (2) Good-self Assessment (Arnold, 1993; Barriga et al., 2001; Harter &

Monsour, 1992)/ Good-self Interview (Arnold, 1993); (3) Ethical Identity Scale (Shaw & Shiu, 2003); (4) Moral Ideal Self Scale (Hardy et al., 2014); (5) Moral Aspects of Identity (Cheek et al., 1985, cited in Hardy et al., 2015); (6) Moral Identity Interview (Kocabiyik & Kulaksizoglu, 2014; Krettenauer et al., 2016); (7) Prototypical Moral Self-descriptors Scale (Walker & Pitts, 1998); (8) Characteristics Bipolar Design (Stets & Carter, 2011, 2012; Stets, 2011); (9) Virtue Identity Measure (Taylor-Collins et al., 2019). The Internalisation subscale of the Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) is the most frequently used among the nine scales. 25 out of the 40 references used this scale. The 9 scales capture respondents' moral identity in two ways, respectively. One is the direct approach. Respondents were asked to rate how important a list of moral traits is to them, such as the Internalisation subscale of the Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The other is an indirect approach. Respondents are asked to describe themselves freely or rate their characteristics with a given mixed set of moral and non-moral traits, such as the Moral Identity Interview (Kocabiyik & Kulaksizoglu, 2014) (full list, please see Table 4.2).

This scale group is mainly developed based on Blasi's (1983) 'Self-model' of moral functioning. According to this theory, the tendency for a person to behave morally mainly depends on the extent to which moral beliefs and values are integrated into the personality and, more specifically, into one's sense of self (Blasi, 1983, 1984). The criterion to judge the strength of one's moral identity is whether their moral identity is stronger than their other identities or whether they tend to identify themselves as a moral person rather than a person with other characteristics. Compared with the 'direct approach' (e.g. Moral Ideal Self Scale), the 'indirect approach' is more likely to avoid the social desirability bias. Respondents are provided with both moral qualities and non-moral qualities. They are less likely to figure out what is checked through the survey.

However, there is still a limitation of the 'indirect approach'. Researchers gave an example to explain the limitation. It can be assumed that "individual A and individual B complete a relative measure of moral identity that focuses on the moral self concerning a work-oriented

identity. If A has a strong moral identity and a weak work-related identity, whereas B has a strong moral identity and a strong work-related identity, then a relative measure would suggest that A's moral identity has greater self-reported importance than B's" (Shao et al., 2008, p. 522). The comparison method is relative, not absolute. Therefore, the approach would not be valid for the comparison between individuals.

The combination approach (self-reported importance of self-identity and value commitment) is the second big group. 26 out of 77 research employed one or more scales measuring both dimensions of moral identity. Two scales are included in this group. The Self-reported Importance of Moral identity Scale (SMI Scale) (Aquino & Reed, 2002) was widely used in 26 references. The scale checks how important it is for individuals to be a person with moral traits (Internalisation subscale) and how their behaviour expresses their moral values (Symbolisation subscale). The scale was developed based on the cognitive-developmental model and socio-cognitive approach (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Respondents are invited to visualize in their mind the kind of person who has some characteristics (caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest and kind). Then respondents imagined how that person (it could be the respondents themselves or someone else) would think, feel, and act. Finally, respondents are asked to rate ten statements on the Likert Scale when they have a clear image of what this person would be like.

The SMI Scale was validated by many studies and is considered the most well-developed self-report measure (Hardy & Carlo, 2011; Shao et al., 2008). It emphasises both dimensions of moral identity. However, there are still limitations. For example, the respondents are asked to rate themselves with a group of moral traits as a whole. It would give rise to confusion for some respondents who think some of the moral traits are important for them and some of the moral traits are not. For example, a person might see himself as kind but not hardworking. They have difficulty rating the self-reported importance of a group of moral traits together. Another researcher also pointed out the limitation (e.g. Miles & Upenieks, 2018; Shao et al., 2008). Another limitation is the Symbolisation subscale, which checks an individual's

self-reported importance of moral traits reflected in actions (Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, the actions, for example, wearing clothes, having hobbies, and reading books and magazines, are limited for people who tend to show their moral qualities externally in daily life (item example: “I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics”) (Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1428). They would happen fewer to individuals than actions such as membership or activities engagement in charity organisations to express their moral values. The limitation was also addressed by Hertz and Krettenauer (2016). It may explain the less internal validity of the symbolisation subscale than the internalisation subscale, accounting for its lower predictive effect (Hertz & Krettenauer, 2016).

Another scale also captures both dimensions of moral identity (self-reported importance of moral traits and value commitment). It is Moral Identity Questionnaire (MIQ) developed by Black and Reynolds (2016). The scale emphasises the essential aspect of moral identity—moral integrity. Black and Reynolds (2006) criticised the SMI Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) does not assess the importance of acting according to moral precepts or integrity. However, it is found that the Symbolisation subscale of the SMI Scale does assess individuals’ external behaviour demonstration commuting moral values. The scale ignores the commitment to moral values despite situational influences. Black and Reynolds’ (2006) Moral Identity Questionnaire makes up for this ignorance (item example: “I will go along with a group decision, even if I know it is morally wrong”) (p. 128).

The third group of scales only assesses one’s moral identity by focusing on moral value commitment. 11 references emphasised the importance of moral behaviour or value commitment in different situations to indicate one’s moral identity. The scales can be divided into two categories. One is the approach that checks the behaviour to stick to moral values or moral principles despite any influences, for example, the Honesty from the Personal Values Scale (Scott, 1965). The other is the approach that checks specific past moral behaviour or intention, such as helping and civic engagement, for example, Moral Action Scale (Aldridge, Ala’i, et al., 2016) (full list, please see Table 4.2).

One of the limitations of the approaches is that moral behaviour is equated with moral identity. The part of moral self-identity is skipped. Some researchers proposed that moral actions (e.g. civic engagement) lead to moral identity (Davidson & Youniss, 1991). Moral exemplars are more likely to describe themselves with moral qualities than others (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer, 2003; Reimer et al., 2009). However, moral actions are not the only factor influencing moral identity. The causal relationship between moral actions and moral identity has not been proved. Therefore, moral behaviour would not be the whole picture of moral identity. Another problem is that respondents' all moral behaviour is captured by self-report rather than observation, which would cause social desirability (Hardy & Carlo, 2011). However, it is impossible to say that behaviour observation can completely avoid social desirability. Turiel (2002) also suggested a gap between behavioural intention in scenarios and actual behaviour in real contexts through empirical research. Participants were more likely to break the rules in real contexts than in scenarios in the research. Therefore, observed behaviours seem to be more trustful than self-reports of behaviours.

Another problem is the content of moral behaviours. Some research limited moral actions to voluntary community service (e.g. Hart et al., 1998). Sometimes the frequency of individuals' community service is influenced by their available time and opportunities or even by parents' tendency of involved in community service with children or school assignments for social activities for youth. Therefore, it would not assume that all the respondents get the same access to community service. It seems that the self-reports of past moral behaviour are less fair for some respondents than observed behaviour in an experimental environment or behaviour intention in given scenarios.

Table 4. 2: The list of measures on moral identity with reviewed references

Type of Scales	Name of Scale	Description	Frequency	Research
	1) Internalisation subscale of the Self-reported Importance of Moral identity	Direct approach Item example: “Being someone who has these	25	Aquino et al., 2009; Brown, 2013; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Gotowiec, 2019; Hardy et al., 2014; Hardy et al., 2015; Hardy

Self-identity with moral traits only	Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) or adapted versions	characteristics is an important part of who I am.”		et al., 2017; He & Harris, 2014; He et al., 2015; Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Kavussanu et al., 2013; Kavussanu et al., 2015; Lee et al., 2014; Matherne & Litchfield, 2012; Mulder & Aquino, 2013; Ring et al., 2018; Sage et al., 2006; Sanders et al., 2018; Shields et al., 2015; Shields et al., 2016; Shields et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2014; Stevens & Hardy, 2011; Vitell et al., 2016; Winterich et al., 2009
	2) Good-self Assessment or adaption (Arnold, 1993; Barriga et al., 2001; Harter & Monsour, 1992)	Direct approach Item Example: “Identifying the importance of qualities to sense of self, e.g. kind, fair”; “How important is it to you that you are honest?”	7	Arnold, 1993; Hardy, 2005; Hardy, 2006; Hardy et al., 2015; Patrick et al., 2018; Porter, 2013; Sonnentag & Barnett, 2016;
	3) Moral Aspects of Identity (Cheek et al., 1985)	Direct approach Item example: “How important are my personal values and moral standards to my sense of who I am?”	1	Hardy et al., 2015
	4) Moral Ideal Self Scale (Hardy et al., 2014)	Direct approach Item example: “How much it (50 moral traits) describes the type of person [they]	3	Hardy et al., 2014, 2015; Miles & Upenieks, 2018

		really want to be?”		
Self-identity with moral traits only	5) Ethical Identity Scale (Shaw &Shiu, 2003)	Direct approach Item example: “It’s really important that I do the things which make me a better person rather than just enjoying myself”	1	Atif, 2013
	6) Characteristics Bipolar Design (Stets & Carter, 2011; 2012; Stets, 2011)	Direct approach Example: Individuals are to think about what kind of person they thought they are for 12 pairs of characteristics and place themselves along a continuum between the two contradictory characteristics, e.g. honest/dishonest	4	Stets & Carter, 2011, 2012; Stets, 2011; Miles &Upenieks, 2018
	7) Virtue Identity Measure (Taylor-Collins et al., 2019)	Direct approach Example: Vignettes are provided describing realistic social exchanges and ask whether and to what degree the participants see themselves as acting like the character in the	1	Taylor-Collins et al., 2019

		moral story		
Self-identity with moral traits only	8) Prototypical Moral Self-descriptors Scale (Walker & Pitts, 1998)	Direct approach Example: Participants were asked to rate each of the self-descriptors (moral traits) on how well they describe themselves	1	Nickerson, 2004
	9) Moral Identity Interview (Krettenauer et al., 2016; Kocabiyik & Kulaksizoglu, 2014)	Indirect approach Example: Participants are asked to describe the characteristics (moral or non-moral traits) of the self.	2	Krettenauer et al., 2016; Kocabiyik & Kulaksizoglu, 2014
Moral value commitment only	1) Moral Action Scale (Aldridge, Ala'I, et al., 2016)	Item example: "I speak up when someone is bullied"	2	Aldridge, Ala'I, et al., 2016; Aldridge, Fraser, et al., 2016
	2) Honesty from Personal Values Scale (Scott, 1965)	Item example: "I always tells the truth, even though it may hurt myself or others"	1	Borchert, 2012
	3) Moral Identity Test (Coskun & Kara, 2019)	Item example: Responding "I warn", "I abstain", or "I don't care "to moral behaviour items	1	Coskun & Kara, 2019
	4) Moral Identity Questionnaire	Item example:	1	Guivernau, 2001

Moral value commitment only	adapted from (Bredemeier & Shields, 1996)	“When some kids see someone being hurt, they immediately seek to help” vs. “When other kids see someone being hurt, they hope others will step in to help”		
	5) Self-reports of Voluntary Service (Hart et al., 1998)	Item example: “Whether participants had “performed any volunteer or community work through such organisations as Little League, scouts, service clubs, church groups, or social action groups”	1	Hart et al., 1998
	6) Integrity Scale (Schlenker, 2006)	Item example: “It is foolish to tell the truth when big profits can be made by lying”	2	Wowra, 2007; Schlenker, 2008
	7) Symbolisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	Item example: “I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics”	2	Paulin et al., 2014; Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010;
	8) Description of Moral Principles (Interview samples) (Skubinn & Herzog, 2016)	Item example: Sticking to one’s ethical principles even in situations in which they	1	Skubinn & Herzog, 2016

		have to decide quickly or in which there is an temptation to do otherwise		
Combination approach (moral traits & moral value commitment)	1) Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	<p>Item examples:</p> <p>“Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am”;</p> <p>“I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics”</p>	26	Adler, 2013; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2011; Barclay et al., 2014; Baumsteiger & Siegel, 2019; Black & Reynolds, 2016; Brebels et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2014; Cote et al., 2011; Crimston et al., 2016; Gotowiec & van Mastrigt, 2019; Gu, 2013; Ilie, 2013; Jia & Wang, 2018; Mayer et al., 2012; Newman & Trump, 2017; Penrose & Friedman, 2012; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Reynolds & Geranic, 2007; Rua et al., 2016; Sunil & Verma, 2018; Winterich, 2008; Winterich et al., 2013; Xu & Ma, 2015; Yang et al., 2018; Zaha, 2011
	2) Moral Identity Questionnaire (Black & Reynolds, 2016)	<p>Item examples:</p> <p>“One of the most important things in life is to do what you know is right.”</p> <p>“I will go along with a group</p>	1	Black & Reynolds, 2016

		decision, even if I know it is morally wrong.”		
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c. Measures on moral behaviour

Only 27 references included moral behaviour in the scale of moral identity. However, 73 studies linked moral behaviour to moral identity as an outcome. Most references linked prosocial/antisocial behaviour to moral identity (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2011). A few references focused on organisational behaviour (e.g. Adler, 2013; Aquino et al., 2009), customer/marketing behaviour (e.g. He et al., 2015; Jiao & Wang, 2018; Vitell et al., 2016) and sports behaviour (e.g. He & Harris, 2014; Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Rojas, 2001, for the full list, see Table 4.3). Most references examine respondents’ self-reports/other reports of past moral behaviour or intention (e.g. Cote et al., 2011; Crimston et al., 2016, full list, please see Table A1 Appendix). Only 18 references linked observed moral behaviour (e.g. donation, cheating and sharing) to moral identity (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2011; Barclay et al., 2014; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Gu, 2013; Jiao & Wang, 2018; Miles & Upenieks, 2018; Mulder & Aquino, 2013; Newman & Trump, 2017; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Rua et al., 2017; Sanders et al., 2018; Stets & Carter, 2011; Stets, 2011; Winterich, 2008; Winterich et al., 2009; Winterich, Aquino et al., 2013; Xu & Ma, 2015).

It is worth noting that a few researchers applied more than one approach in their study to check the link between moral identity and moral behaviour (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009; Barclay et al., 2014; Gu, 2013; Jiao & Wang, 2018; Miles & Upenieks, 2018; Mulder & Aquino, 2013; Stets & Carter, 2011). Most research compares the differences between the prediction of moral identity to self-reports of moral behaviour intention (or past moral behaviour) and the observed moral behaviour. It would be a good way to make the result more convincing. Some researchers supposed that self-reports and observed behaviours would differ (e.g. Gu, 2013). However, most of these studies assessed and measured two different moral behaviours with two different approaches and even with two different samples.

For example, Aquino and Reed (2002) checked undergraduates' past volunteering and high school students' observed donation behaviour, respectively and compared the predictions of moral identity to the two moral behaviours. Gu (2013) checked self-reports of time donation and observed money donation with two different groups of undergraduates. The design would not enhance the validity of the research result. First, the moral behaviours checked in two ways are not the same. They may lead to two different degrees of relationship with moral identity even though they are checked in the same way. For example, giving time (especially to a moral cause) is seen as more reinforcing one's moral identity compared to giving money (Reed et al., 2016). Secondly, there is an age difference in moral behaviour. For example, the preference for donating time or money is related to participants' age. Older people are more likely to donate time than younger ones (Reed et al., 2016). Therefore, it would be more valid to check the same behaviour in two ways with the same sample than check two behaviour in two ways with different samples, for example, checking money donation intention and observing money donation to the same charity.

No reviewed research linked moral behaviour consistency to moral identity. According to the review, most of the researchers agree with the idea proposed by Blasi (1984) that moral identity is a commitment, based on a sense of self, to actions that promote or protect the welfare of others. Researchers proposed that a strong moral identity motivates people to maintain self-consistency (e.g. Aquino et al., 2009; Blasi, 1983; 2004; Erikson, 1964; Winterich, Aquino, et al., 2013) and leads to a commitment to moral beliefs and values in any situations (especially temptation or pressure of moral deviation) (Black & Reynolds, 2016; Schlenker, 2006, cited in Wowra, 2007, 2008). Therefore, most researchers have tested the link between moral identity and moral value commitment (intention or actual behaviour). A few research checked the prediction of moral identity to both intention and actual behaviour. In all the reviewed references, the value commitment was examined through the frequency of behaviours or the amount of money or time donated. No study identified in this review process considered behaviour consistency as another commitment to moral values or self-consistency. Behaviour consistency can be understood as a moral value commitment in

two situations (scenarios and real contexts)—the consistency between behavioural intention and actual behaviour. It is supposed that people with a solid moral identity would behave consistently for the same moral event in any situation (whether in the hypothetical scenario or real context).

Table 4. 3: The list of moral behaviours linked to moral identity as an outcome with reviewed references

Moral behaviour	Behaviour Example	Frequency	Research Example
<p>1) Prosocial/antisocial behaviour (including community service, volunteering, donation and distribution, commitment to moral values)</p>	<p>Voluntary service, charitable engagement, cooperation, helping behaviour, sharing behaviour, cheating in the game, moral disengagement</p>	<p>52</p>	<p>Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009; Aquino et al., 2011; Arnold, 1993; Barclay et al., 2014; Baumsteiger & Siegel, 2019; Black & Reynolds, 2016; Conway & Peetz, 2012; Cote et al., 2011; Crimston et al., 2016; Gotowiec & van Mastrigt, 2019; Gotowiec, 2019; Gu, 2013; Hardy, 2005; 2006; Hardy et al., 2014; Hardy et al., 2015; Hardy et al., 2017; Hart et al., 1998; Jia et al., 2017; Jiao & Wang, 2018; Kocabiyik & Kulaksizoglu, 2014; Lee et al., 2014; Miles & Upenieks, 2018; Mulder & Aquino, 2013; Newman & Trump, 2017; Nickerson, 2004; Patrick et al., 2018; Paulin et al., 2014; Penrose & Friedman, 2012; Porter, 2013; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Reynolds & Geranic, 2007; Rua et al., 2016; Sanders et al., 2018; Schlenker, 2008; Shields et al., 2015, 2016; Smith et al., 2014; Sonnentag & Barnett, 2016; Stets & Carter, 2011; Stets &</p>

			Carter, 2012; Stets, 2011; Stevens & Hardy, 2011; Sunil & Verna, 2018; Taylor-Collins et al., 2019; Winterich, 2008; Winterich, 2009; Winterich et al., 2013; Wowra, 2007; Xu & Ma, 2015; Yang et al., 2018; Zaha, 2011
2) Organisational behaviour in (company, office or school)	Citizenship at work; lying at work; bullying and aggression at work; leading behaviour; counterproductive behaviour; cheating; vandalism; smuggling; stealing; unethical pro-organisational behaviour; academic cheating; being fair	11	Adler, 2013; Aquino et al., 2009; Borchert, 2012; Brebels et al., 2011; Brown, 2013; Cohen et al., 2014; Ilie, 2013; Matherne & Litchfield, 2012; Mayer et al., 2012; Shields et al., 2016; Skarlicki & Rupp, 2010;
3) Customer/marketing behaviour	Environmental friendly consumption; purchasing -cause-related marketing sponsor brand; being honest;	5	Aquino et al., 2009; Atif, 2013; He et al., 2015; Jiao & Wang, 2018; Vitell et al., 2016;
4) Moral behaviour in sports	Aggression; cheating; unfavourable communication; doping; antisocial behaviour to opponents;	8	Rojas, 2001; He & Harris, 2014; Kavussanu & Ring, 2017; Kavussanu et al., 2013; Kavussanu et al., 2015; Ring et al., 2018; Sage et al., 2006; Shields et al., 2018;

d. Age of participants and cultural bias

11 out of 77 references included early adolescents in the research samples (e.g. Aldridge, Ala'i et al., 2016; Aldridge, Fraser, et al., 2016; Arnold, 1993, full list, see Table A1 Appendix). The youngest average age is 8.5 years old (Coskun & Kara, 2019). Fifty-seven references only targeted late adolescents or above. The age of the participants is not available in one reference.

e. Cultural contexts

9 out of 77 references made participants from Asian countries account for a considerable

proportion of the sample (e.g. Atif et al., 2013; Coskun & Kara, 2019; Cote et al., 2011; Gu, 2013; Rojas, 2001; Reynolds & Geranic, 2007; Vitell et al., 2016; Xu & Ma, 2015; Yang et al., 2018). The Asian countries include China, Japan, Turkey and India. The rest references mainly targeted Western countries, such as America and European countries. The result aligns with Hertz and Krettenauer's (2016) review. Two references are comparative research that considered the national cultural differences (e.g. Atif, 2013; Vitell et al., 2016). Participants' national background is not available in nine references.

4.2.5 Summary of the structured review

Measures on moral identity have been reviewed closely among 77 selected references. Most references emphasise both dimensions of moral identity (self-identity with moral traits and value commitment) in definitions. However, more than half references only captured one dimension of the moral identity in the scale. When moral identity was measured, self-identity with moral traits was focused on more than value commitment.

Nineteen different scales on moral identity are employed by researchers. The Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) is a widely used measure in the reviewed research. The 19 scales are categorised into three groups: (1) checking self-identity with moral traits only, (2) checking value commitment only, and (3) a combination of the above two approaches. Only two scales are developed to capture both dimensions of moral identity: the Self-reported Importance of Moral identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the Moral Identity Questionnaire (Black & Reynolds, 2016). The scales that emphasised the value commitment dimension of moral identity just checked respondents' moral behaviour in situations of temptation or pressure against their moral values, for example, the Moral Identity Questionnaire (Black & Reynolds, 2016) and the Integrity Scale (Schlenker, 2006, cited in Wowra, 2007).

The relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour is checked in most reviewed

research. It is to verify the speculation that a strong moral identity motivates people to keep self-consistency displayed through behaviour that sticks to moral values. Observed actual moral behaviour is linked less to moral identity by researchers than self-reports/other-report of behavioural intention and behaviour in the past. Prosocial/antisocial behaviour in daily life is focused more than behaviour in other unique settings, such as the office or sports competitions. However, moral value commitment is only judged by the frequency of moral behaviour. Researchers ignore another kind of value commitment—the consistency between intention and actual behaviour. No research in the review linked behaviour consistency to moral identity.

The study samples were largely participants from Western countries, and very few studies selected samples from Asia. Research on moral identity and behaviour mainly targeted late adolescents and adults. Young adolescents are underrepresented in the review research.

Since the current research defines moral identity as a combination of internal self-identity with moral traits and external behaviour which commits to moral values, the scale should include both dimensions of moral identity. Therefore, the scale of moral identity for the current research is developed based on the existing scales: the Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) and the Moral Identity Questionnaire (Black & Reynolds, 2016). The adapted scale should be suitable for the targeted group (young adolescents) and minimise the limitations of the existing scales. Given the limitations of self-reports of past moral behaviour and intention, the current research will link observed actual behaviour to moral identity. Besides that, behaviour consistency will also be linked to moral identity further to explore the prediction of moral identity to moral value commitment.

4.3 Research tools

Since the survey is supposed to be conducted in China and England, the questionnaire for the survey and the posters used in the behaviour observation in English are translated into Chinese. The Chinese version is translated back into English by two persons whose language

levels are equivalent to native speakers both in Chinese and English. The translated English version and the original English version are compared. The similarity in terms of words and expressions is above 95%. The online software FLESCH INDEX and a pilot checked the wording for the survey. The questionnaire is understandable for 8-year-olds and above. The demographic data is also collected through the questionnaire.

4.3.1 Measure on moral identity

Moral Identity Scale consists of two subscales. One subscale (Self-reported Importance of Moral Values) assessed how important to identify oneself with moral traits. The subscale is an adapted and simplified version based on the Internalisation subscale of the Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Aquino and Reed's scale selected nine common moral traits (caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind) to invoke respondents' moral identity. The limitation of the scale mentioned in the review is that the respondents were invited to rate the nine moral traits as a whole (for more detail, please see section 4.2.4 in Chapter Four). In order to make it simple for young adolescents, only three moral traits (fairness, kindness/not hurting and honesty) are selected. The three moral traits are also viewed as universal across cultures according to the Moral Foundation Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) and other research findings (e.g. Hauser, 2006; Krettenauer et al., 2016; Pratt et al., 2003; Wainryb, 2006). The three items in the subscale go like this: "It is important for me to treat other people fairly".

The other subscale psychologically examined respondents' commitment to the three self-identity moral traits (fairness, kindness/not hurting and honesty). The subscale is an adapted version based on the Moral Integrity subscale of the Moral identity Measures (Black & Reynolds, 2016). There are three items to respond to the three self-identity moral traits. The items go like this: "If I know that my best friend did something bad in my classroom, I will tell the teacher when asked about it".

Respondents were invited to rate each item on a 5-degree Likert Scale (from Agree strongly to disagree strongly). At the same time, there are five numbers (1-5) to represent each degree; the bigger the number is, the more strongly the agreement is. It is to make young respondents understand how to rate each item easily. Therefore, the degree Likert Scale also can be viewed as a point Likert Scale at the same time. The variables from the scale are viewed as real number values for all the analyses in the current study. Negative questions were reversed in scoring when data was entered. A higher average score of items from two subscales means a more solid moral identity. In order to be more accurate for comparison, all the mean scores are kept to one decimal place. Other variables on the Likert Scale, including personal cultural values, cultural norms, parenting, and school environment, will be analysed in the same way as the variable of moral identity.

There are several reasons that all the variables on Likert Scale are given priority to be analyzed as numerical variables rather than ordinal variables. Firstly, real numbers are given as a reference to respondents to rate the degree of agreement or disagreement easily. It is reasonable to take the variables as numerical ones. Secondly, the ordinal variables are not conducive to combining all items in a scale into one final result for each respondent. Finally, the scale is adapted from existing scales (Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale by Aquino and Reed (2002) and Moral identity Measures by Black and Reynolds (2016)) which are also analyzed as a numerical variable by researchers.

To verify the result with numerical variables, some comparison analyses will be conducted again with moral identity as an ordinal variable. Other variables on the Likert Scale, including personal cultural values, cultural norms, parenting, and school environment, will be analysed in the same way as the variable of moral identity. To get an ordinal variable, the five degrees will be clipped into three main degrees: 'Agree', 'Middle', and 'Disagree'. The frequency of '5-Agree strongly' and '4-Agree not strongly' will be put together, and so do the '1-Disagree strongly' and '2-Disagree not strongly'. The frequency of '3-Middle' will be kept as it is. A higher average frequency of 'Agree' on items from two subscales means a stronger

moral identity. A higher average frequency of “Disagree” on items from the two subscales means a weaker moral identity. The odds ratio between “Agree” and “Disagree” will be the indicator of comparison. The results of other variables on the Likert Scale will be explained in the same way (the results of the comparison for the variables on the clipped 5-degree Likert Scale are in the Appendix).

Reliability is established using Cronbach’s coefficient alpha for internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha=0.52$). According to the factorial analysis, the sex items of the scale load on two factors in total. All three items of the Self-reported Importance of Moral Values Subscale load on one factor, and all three items of the Value commitment Behaviour Intention Subscale load on the other factor. It validates the structure of the scale.

4.3.2 Measure on behaviour consistency

Sharing and donation behaviour was observed widely by research on moral identity in the review. Therefore, the current research will assess sharing and charitable behaviour consistency. Behaviour intention is checked through two scenarios about sharing and donation on a questionnaire. For example, respondents are invited to respond to the hypothetical donation scenario: “If you get 2 pounds/20 RMB as a reward for joining a game. Some poor children in the world cannot eat healthy food and drink clean water. You are told that your donation of money can help them. You are free to make any decision. What will you do?” Respondents can choose the amount of money they intend to donate from the five provided options (donate 0-2 pounds/0-20 RMB in increments of 50 pence/5RMB). The sharing scenario goes like this: “You are asked to share some small fun gifts between a stranger and yourself. What will you do?” Five options are provided to respondents (1. Give yourself more; 2. Give the stranger more; 3. Give all to yourself; 4. Give all to the stranger; 5. Share equally). The intentional donation is a real numerical variable, and the intentional distribution is a categorical variable.

The actual behaviour observation was conducted through a face-to-face game-based activity.

The activity is about sharing and donation, which is similar to the hypothetical scenarios in the questionnaire. The consistency between participants' intentions and actual behaviours will be assessed. Participants were gifted eight colourful bouncing balls and were asked to distribute these between themselves and the researcher (myself) at first. Participants were told they could make any decision. They can keep all the balls to themselves or return all of them to the researcher. Next, each participant is given £2 (or 20RMB) as a reward for joining the game. They can then donate none, some, or all of that money to a charity program (Save the Children in England/ Free Lunch in China). Participants are told they can take away the balls and money they decided to keep for themselves after the game. The number of distributed balls to the researcher and the donated money will be recorded.

The donation behaviour consistency refers to the gap between participants' donation intention and their actual action for the real donation task. The gap is the difference between the money the participants intended to donate and what was actually donated in the game. Therefore, the gap value ranges from -2pounds (or -20 RMB) to +2pounds (or +20RMB). The interval between the gap values is 0.5 pounds because participants were given four 0.5 pounds (or four 5 RMB) in survey and game observation. They only could donate times of 0.5 pounds. The '-2pounds' means that the participants donated 2 pounds less than they intended to. The '+2pounds' means that the participants donated 2 pounds more than they intended to. The middle of the gap range (0 pounds) indicates that the participants donated the same as what they reported in the survey. Therefore, donation behaviour consistency is a real number variable.

When comparing the intentional and actual distribution behaviour, the observed distribution behaviour will be transferred into a categorical value from a numerical value to match the variable of distribution intention in the questionnaire. Therefore, the specific number of distributed balls in observation will be transferred into general distribution types to match the options in the survey. For example, it will be coded again as 'distribute equally' if the participants gave four bouncing balls to the researcher. It will be coded as 'distribute more or (less) balls to the stranger' if the participants gave more (or less) than four bouncing balls

(5-7 balls or 1-3 balls) to the researcher and so on. It will be coded as ‘keep all the balls for self’ or ‘distribute all to the stranger’. The distribution behaviour consistency is obtained by comparing participants’ intentional and actual distribution decisions. It is a categorical value: (1) distributing less than intention; (2) distributing more than intention; (3) distributing the same as intention.

4.3.3 Cultural norm primings during the behaviour observation

The game observation is conducted in three different situations: (1) no norm; (2) descriptive norm (what in-group members commonly do in a situation), for example, tell the participants that most of their peers have donated most of the money (or very little money) they get from the game; most of their peers have distributed most of the bouncing (or few) balls to the researcher; (3) injunctive norm (imbued with oughtness), for example, some positive posters about helpfulness and charity are put on the surface of the desk for the game. The conditions are set to check the norm cultural influence on participants’ actual moral behaviour and the consistency of moral behaviour. It is a categorical variable: (1) descriptive norm—benefit self; (2) descriptive norm—benefit others; (3) injunctive norm; and (4) no norm.

4.3.4 Measure on personal understanding of moral traits

The scale for personal moral values is developed based on Value Attributes (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017), which was also modified from the Good Self-Assessment Interview (Arnold, 1993). In Krettenauer & Victor’s (2017) research, participants are provided with 80 value attributes to select 12-15 attributes that, in their personal view, define ‘the core of a highly moral person’. However, to make it easier and simpler for the participants in the current research, some overlapping attributes are removed. For example, ‘good’, ‘nice’, ‘altruistic’, and ‘kind’ are removed because they are similar to ‘friendly’ and ‘helpful’. Finally, 45 attributes are left for the scale. Respondents are asked to select the qualities they think a moral person should have. Then they are asked to rank the top three important moral traits of

a moral person. The selection frequency for each trait will be counted. The variable is to investigate young adolescents' view of important qualities for a moral person, which is the moral foundation of moral identity.

4.3.5 Measure on moral motivation

Moral motivation is assessed by one item in the questionnaire. Respondents were asked to respond with the motivation of a hypothetical moral behaviour ("If you hand over a wallet you found on the ground in a park to the Lost and Found Office, who would you expect to thank you or praise you the most?"). Respondents are provided with seven options, including different people in daily life (parents, teachers, friends, self, wallet owner, Lost and Found Office officer, and nobody).

Researchers have proposed Symbolisation and Internalisation (public or private) dimensions of self-reported importance of moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Erikson, 1964). The Symbolisation (public) dimension stresses one's sensitivity to being a moral person in the public view. In contrast, the Internalisation (private) dimension emphasises the importance of satisfying the self-standard of morality. The two dimensions would be interpreted as two kinds of motivation for being a moral person: self-standard of morality (internal motivation) or other people's views or praise (external motivation).

Suppose respondents expect thanks from parents, teachers, friends, wallet owner or officer. In that case, their behaviour is viewed as motivated by the public. Otherwise, their behaviour is motivated by self (or unconsciousness). The frequency of each option was counted, and the options were categorised into two groups: internal motivation and external motivation. Some respondents probably expected different groups of people's positive responses to their behaviour. However, they were asked to choose the option they expected the most. It would imply the dominant motivation of their moral behaviour.

It was shown that moral behaviour and behaviour consistency are influenced by motivations (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Brabeck, 1995; Eisenberg, 1995; Rest & Narvaez, 1995, cited in Pratt et al., 2003). The current research expects to explore the relationship between motivation and moral behaviour (and the consistency of moral behaviour) for young adolescents.

4.3.6 Measure on personal cultural values

The national culture of the two countries in the current research is examined through a behaviour-based personal value scale. The scale is also expected to capture young adolescents' personal value inclinations. The scale of personal cultural values is revised from the Everyday Behaviour Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2016). The original measure consisted of 19 specific values interpreted by 85 behaviour-based items. The behaviour-value relations were tested. It was validated that a set of three to six behaviours in the measure was motivated most strongly by the expected one of the 19 values rather than the other 18 unexpected values. The primary content aspect of a value is the goal or motivational concern it expresses (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990). The values serve three main interest orientations according to their goal or motivational concern: individual interest (e.g. achievement, self-direction and face), collective interest (e.g. conformity, tradition and benevolence) and universal interest (universalism and security). Universal-interest values (e.g. nature and animal protection) are between individual-interest and collective-interest values, which means that they serve both individual and collective interests. (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). The target sample of the original measure is adults. In order to make it easy, understandable, and close to young adolescents' lives, one value about national security (Security-Societal) is removed. Two behaviour items respond to each value. Only the value of 'universalism' (concern universal issues) is expressed by one item. Some items are revised with the ones which are more accessible in young adolescents' daily life. For example, the 'Security-personal' value, most of the items in the original measure are about consumption behaviours, which do not happen in young adolescents' daily life. Therefore, they are

replaced with the item “I never eat sweets or food given by strangers to me”. Finally, there are 18 specific values left in the current scale. They are folded into 13 general values. Each value is responded to with two items except one value (universalism-universal issues) responded to by one item. Finally, the current scale consists of 25 items.

The 13 general values are grouped into the three subscales accordingly. The three subscales are (1) individual-interest cultural values, (2) collective-interest cultural values and (3) mutual-interest cultural values. Respondents also will be invited to rate each item on a 5-degree Likert Scale (from Agree strongly to disagree strongly). A high average score of items for each subscale means a strong value tendency.

The 25 items of the scale check 13 different general values. The Cronbach’s coefficient alpha is not checked. The factorial analysis is conducted to check the items’ internal consistency for each value and the scale structure. The results show that all the two items for each value load in only one factor. All the loading values are more than 0.7.

There are two values, ‘Universalism-concern universal issues’ (commitment to equality, justice and protection for all people) and ‘Benevolence’ (dependable, responsible and caring), overlapping with the moral traits for moral identity in the current research. Therefore, they are removed when the relationship between moral identity and cultural values is analysed.

The following section will explain why the current research selects the Behaviour-based Value Scale. **First, why is the scale behaviour-based?** Culture implies a shared set of beliefs and practices that constitute a kind of mind programming (Murphy, 1999). The behaviour-based approach combines values and their corresponding behaviour demonstrations. It is validated that there is a significant relationship between one’s personal values and a set of behaviours motivated and predicted by the corresponding value (Fischer,

2006; Leung & Morris, 2015; Schwartz et al., 2016). Notably, the values interpreted by specific behaviours in daily life are understandable for young adolescents.

Secondly, why is it an individual-reported-based rating rather than a group-reported-based rating? Cultural characteristics are based on shared beliefs and practices. Therefore, the scale items should be designed from the group rather than the individual perspective. The items should go like this: “Most of the people around me always wait until any cars have come to a complete stop before crossing the street” rather than “I always wait until any cars have come to a complete stop before crossing the street”. However, the culture scale in the current research is individual-reported-based. There are two reasons for doing this. First, the collection of individuals’ personal values can be viewed as a group tendency. The tendency of cultural values among young adolescents can be obtained from the data. Young adolescents’ personal values and behaviours are influenced by the general values and norms on a country level through parents and teachers. Therefore, the data would reflect the national cultural values to some extent. Secondly, from practice, it is difficult for teenagers to report or estimate the average characteristics within their group, even the peer group.

4.3.7 Measure on cultural norms

The cultural norms include descriptive norms and injunctive norms. Cialdini et al. (1991) distinguished descriptive norms as what ingroup members commonly do in a situation; injunctive norms as what ingroup members approve. The current scale is revised based on the Culture Importance Measures (Alsheddi et al., 2019). Three items in the current scale respond to descriptive norms to check whether people around young adolescents influence their understanding of moral traits. The item goes like this: “My parents think it is important to have the traits or qualities I have ticked off for a moral person”. One item is about the injunctive norms: “It is important that people living in England/China have the traits or qualities I have ticked off above”. It checks whether young adolescents’ moral understanding is influenced by the ‘oughtness’ or ‘approval’ in a country. The items are on Likert Scale. A high average score for items means respondents are influenced by injunctive norm or

descriptive norm strongly. The cultural norms are collected to compare the Chinese and British cultures from the perspective of norms besides the cultural values. It is expected to investigate how is the influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on young adolescents' moral understanding in the two countries.

Reliability is established using Cronbach's coefficient alpha for internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.71$). According to the factorial analysis, all four items of the scale load on one factor. It validates the structure of the scale.

4.3.8 Measure on cultural schema

Respondents' language spoken at home is usually checked as a cultural schema. Research showed that English with knowledge about American or Anglo-Saxon culture evokes individualism. However, other non-Western languages (e.g. Chinese) are assumed to evoke collectivism (e.g. Bond & Yang, 1982; Kimmelmeier & Cheng, 2004; Marian & Kaushanskaya, 2004; Ralston, Cunniff, & Gustafson, 1995; Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002; Tavassoli, 2002; Trafimow et al., 1997; Watkins & Gerong, 1999; Watkins & Regmi, 2002; Yang & Bond, 1980). It is expected that respondents' different languages (English vs. non-English) spoken in daily life would strengthen their different cultural value inclinations (individualism vs. collectivism), which would influence their moral identity to some degree.

4.3.9 Background information collection

Background information included respondents' age, sex, school environment and family background. The student-reported family background includes the birthplace (country) of the respondents and their parents (caretakers), respondents' parents' (caretakers') jobs, parenting style and whether the respondents are the only child in the family or not.

According to the existing research, moral identity has age and sex differences (e.g. Arnold, 1993; Patrick et al., 2018; Pratt et al., 2003). Therefore, respondents' age and sex are collected as controlled variables. The birthplace of respondents and their parents (caretakers) would influence respondents' personal cultural values and moral identity. For example, a child was born and lives in England with parents who were born and used to live in an Asian country. The child's personal values would be influenced by both cultures of England and Asian countries. Children's multicultural background would influence their moral identity and moral understanding as well.

Parents' birthplaces will be grouped into Western and Eastern countries (Non-Western countries), representing individualistic and collectivistic cultures. The division is mainly based on the index developed by Hofstede (<https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/>), indicating each country's level of individualism and collectivism.

The influence of students' perception of parenting and school (or teachers' and parents' support and involvement) on students' academic outcomes, behaviour and skills have been explored by many researchers (e.g. Gorard & See, 2013; Hampden-Thompson & Galindo, 2017; Higgins & Katsipataki, 2015; Kokotsaki, 2016; Lam et al., 2012; Siddiqui & Ventista, 2018). Some research showed that the school environment and parenting are related to adolescents' moral identity (e.g. Arain et al., 2017; Hart et al., 1998; Patrick & Gibbs, 2012). The school environment is checked through six items about teachers' behaviour regarding honesty, fairness and support from young adolescents' perspectives. For example, the item goes like this: "I feel teachers always treat all students fairly". Perceived parenting is checked through another five items, similar to those for the school environment. All items are on Likert Scale, and a high average score of items for each scale means a positive school environment or parenting. The reliability of the two scales is established using Cronbach's coefficient alpha for internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha=0.63$ for Parenting Scale; Cronbach's $\alpha=0.74$ for School Environment Scale). According to the factorial analysis, all the items of

each scale load on one factor. It validates the structure of the scales.

The jobs of respondents' parents are categorised into four groups based on classes provided by the Office for National Statistics (2010): (1) 'professional' (e.g. teacher, lecturer, lawyer, architect, doctor, dentist, artist, engineer, manager, company director, senior civil servant...), (2) 'intermediate' (e.g. professional sports, plumber, electrician, nurse, journalist, policeman, accountant, librarian, secretary...), (3) 'working/routine class' (e.g. farmer, driver, waiter, cleaner, hairdresser, courier, caretaker, shop assistant, gardener, labourer...) occupations, (4) 'having no jobs' (e.g. housewife). The four groups are ranked from one to four. The rank order was mixed in the questionnaire to minimise social desirability. Respondents are asked to choose the group of jobs most similar to their parents (caretakers). They are also provided with an option to write down the specific name of their parents' or caretakers' jobs or any clues about the jobs if they do not know which group to choose. The variable of job is computed in two ways: (1) the higher level of the jobs between two parents is counted for each case, (2) the cases in which both parents who are in the 'professional' group are counted. The cases where both parents who are in the 'working class' group or 'having no job' group are counted.

The parental socioeconomic position is often measured through qualifications, occupation or the household's highest status (Early et al., 2022). Parents' jobs would reflect their educational background and income to some extent. However, it cannot be an absolute indicator of comparing the educational background and income of the respondents' families between the two countries. There would be differences in the payment for the same jobs between the two countries. However, there is a slight difference in skills, knowledge and qualification required for different levels of jobs between the two countries. Therefore, parents' jobs would provide a reference for comparing the educational background more than the income of respondents' families between the two countries.

Whether participants have siblings or not in their family is checked through the survey. It is expected that participants with siblings would be more likely to share and be generous.

Participants who join in the game observation will be interviewed about whether they have pocket money and their attitudes toward the 2 pounds (or 20 RMB) they are rewarded in the actual game (do they think the money is too much or not). The variables will be coded ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Pocket money and participants’ attitudes toward the awarded money would reflect the economic conditions of participants’ daily life. It is suggested that the economic condition would be related to participants’ behaviour in contexts regarding cash or gifts. For example, the participants who have pocket money or think 2 pounds are not a big deal would not care about the given cash or gifts too much in the game and would show generous behaviour.

Age is a numerical variable. The rest of the background factors are categorised variables. They are turned into dummy variables when entering into the regression models. The data analysis will be conducted by IBM SPSS 26.0.

4.4. Procedure

A pilot was conducted with around twelve students from each country to test the questionnaire’s understandability and time the survey. It shows that some of the 4th graders in England are younger than eight years old, and they had difficulty finishing the questionnaire by themselves. The 4th graders in Chinese schools are generally eight years old or older than that. Therefore, the 4th graders from England were not included in the sample. Therefore, the British sample includes 5th and 6th graders. Chinese sample includes 4th, 5th and 6th graders. The questionnaire took less than 30 minutes for average students to complete, and the observation took around 5 minutes for each student.

The sample from both countries is a convenience sample. All the schools and some students from an extracurricular training school involved in the survey were introduced by my (the researcher’s) previous workmates, friends in China, and friends in England whose work was related to primary schools. One or two classes for each targeted grade were selected from

each school. One class for each targeted grade is included in the sample for small schools (schools in England) with only one class for each grade. For large schools with more than one class for each grade (schools in China), two classes for each targeted grade are included in the sample. The first and the last classes (e.g. class no.1 and class No.4) are selected according to the order number of the classes. The purpose of selection is to avoid the sampling bias caused by the potential of ranking classes according to students' academic performance.

The outbreak of Covid-19 influenced the survey. A part of the British sample (75 students, taking 41% of the whole British sample and 4% of the overall sample from the two countries) was recruited through survey links on social media (e.g. Facebook). The British students who responded to the survey online lost the chance to join the observation. Students from one British school just completed the questionnaire survey offline without joining the observation because of the lockdown for Covid-19.

Most respondents completed the survey in their classrooms during school time, with the teachers and researcher (myself) present. Teachers and the researcher only helped send out the survey papers and helped respondents understand the survey's questions. To test the social desirability caused by the school setting, around 30 primary school students from an extracurricular training school in Tang Shan City were selected to do the questionnaire and the observation game outside the school environment. Most participants did the questionnaire and joined the observation game on the same day. Most participants did the questionnaire before the observation game. However, there is a possibility that students' behaviours in the observation game would be influenced by the answers they gave to the corresponding hypothetical questions in the questionnaire. To test the possibility, half of the participants in two schools joined in the game observation before finishing the questionnaire.

Most schools have 30-40 students in each class. Due to time constraints both for schools and the researcher, only about one-third of the students for each class can be selected for the game.

Generally, twelve participants were selected randomly from each class for the game-based behaviour observation. Each through a 'raffle game', and the genders were selected evenly. The 'raffle game' went like this: each participant drew a ticket at will from the tickets pool. For each class, the participants who got tickets with a number (12 or smaller than 12) could join the game, and the participants who got the blank tickets just lost the chance. In order to make the selected participants for the game equal in gender, there were two separate tickets pool for boys and girls. There were six tickets with a number on them in each ticket pool. Girls were assigned tickets with odd numbers and even numbers for boys. Moreover, the number from small to big is the order for them to join the game individually. Participants from the training school in Tang Shan City were selected randomly in the same way. Fewer students were selected in some schools and the training schools because of the time limit. Students from three schools did not join the game observation because of their busy schedules or because it was not easy to access by transport (e.g. the Chinese school in the rural area).

Finally, 278 participants were invited to join the observation on an individual basis in a private classroom of their school. Each participant took a very brief interview during the observation. However, some students did not respond to the questions during the interview within a limited time. They seemed to need more time to think about the interview questions. Only the researcher and one participant were involved in the game each time. Students were told that they could make any decision and even could distribute and donate all the balls and money to themselves or the researcher. They could take all the balls and money that they keep to themselves away. Each participant confirmed that they understood the task before starting. Before starting the distribution task, each participant was asked whether they liked the bouncing balls and the colour of the balls. It is to observe whether participants keep fewer balls for themselves because they do not like the balls or the colour of the balls. After distribution and donation, each participant was interviewed about the reason for their decisions. In order to be consistent with the donation scenario in the survey, participants were given four fifty pence or four five RMB as a reward. A charity box was placed on the desk in front of the participants for donation. Participants were also interviewed about their pocket

money weekly and did they think 2 pounds or 20 RMB as much money for them. It checks participants' attitudes toward money and whether they donated the rewarded money because they did not care about it. Participants did not know what the game was before entering the classroom. After finishing the game, they are told not to tell other students who have not joined it.

In order to match participants' moral identity, personal cultural values, moral behaviour intention, other information in the questionnaire and actual behaviour in observation, the abbreviation of participants' mother's or father's name and participants' date of birth were required after they finished the whole game tasks. The same information was also required when the participants did the questionnaire survey. Therefore the link between the survey and game observation for the same respondent will be based on the information (parents' name and respondents' birthday). The participants' names were not required for research ethics and social desirability.

The twelve participants from each class in the observation are divided into three groups randomly (genders are also grouped evenly). Each group of participants completed the observation tasks under each of the three cultural norm primings (descriptive norm, injunctive norm and no norm). For descriptive norm priming, students from only one school were told that their peers before them kept most bouncing balls and money they got from the game to themselves. The rest of the participants under descriptive norm priming were told the opposite that their peers before them distributed the most bouncing balls to the researcher and donated the most money they got from the game.

4.5 Research ethics

Before the survey, ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of Durham University. The survey can be considered a normal classroom practice because it only involves views and behaviour in students' daily life. The ethical approval obtained from Durham University allows the survey only with the information sheet of the head teachers of

participating schools (if the head teachers think it is unnecessary to notify the parents) (see Information Sheet for Schools in Appendix). The head teachers got the information sheet and thought that it was not necessary to get consent from parents. Some head teachers in Chinese schools even asked to take a look at the questionnaire before agreeing to participate in the survey. The researcher got the DBS check (Disclosure and Barring Service, a criminal records check by the police officer) for observing the game alone with students in a room at the request of British headteachers. Participants were informed of the purpose of the survey and how safely their responses were handled and kept. The participants also knew the survey would have no impact on them. Participants knew they could quit if they did not feel comfortable with the survey. Participants got the information through brief written instructions on the questionnaire (see Survey in English in Appendix) and orally. To uphold anonymity, participants did not sign any consent.

Identifiable information was not collected in the whole survey. Before the survey started, participants were told that they could ignore any questions they felt uncomfortable answering or quit the game (the behaviour observation) at any time. They were also assured that their answers and behaviour during the survey and game would not be released to others except the researchers. In order to make the participants feel comfortable and relaxed during the whole survey, the researcher wore casual clothes and made a brief self-introduction. The researcher recorded the observation for each student after the student finished the whole task and left the classroom.

4.6 Missing data

The questionnaire return rate is 100% for the students who were present on the day when the survey was conducted in both countries. Several students, in total, were absent from the class according to the information provided by their teachers, and they did not complete the questionnaire. All questionnaires are effective except for some missing data (see Table 4.4). Two reasons probably cause the missing data. One is that a few respondents failed to finish all the items within the given time (around 30-40mins) because of a lack of interest, patience

or desired reading ability. The items in the first half of the questionnaire show a low percentage of ‘no response’. However, the items close to the end of the questionnaire show a relatively high ‘no response’ rate. The other reason is that some respondents may feel uncomfortable responding to some questions. The missing data for each variable does not always happen in the same group of respondents. Therefore, the percentage of missing data for different variables varies. However, the percentage of missing data in all 59 variables is less than 5%. The missing values will be replaced with a default value to include the whole dataset in the substantive analysis. The missing values for real number variables (e.g. age) will be replaced with the overall mean score. The missing data for categorical variables and ordinal variables (e.g. jobs, birthplace, items on the Likert Scale) will be coded with ‘no response’. To further discuss the validity of the analysis results, the missing data for relative variables will be replaced with counterfactual data to check whether it will change the results achieved.

Table 4. 4: The percentage of missing data and validity of the responses

	Valid Response	Invalid Response	Missing Data (59 variables)
Survey in China	1,768	0	0-2.2
Survey in England	182	0	0-3.3

4.7 Population and sample

4.7.1 The whole sample

The whole sample includes 1,950 respondents (M=10.2, SD=0.9, missing data=41; 935 girls, seven students identified their gender as ‘other’, missing data=17), mainly from 10 primary schools. Two hundred seventy-eight participants (M=10.2, SD=0.9, missing data=1; 141 girls) were selected randomly from the whole sample to join in the observation game.

90.5% of the respondents were born in China, while 8.4% were born in England. The rest of

the respondents' birthplace includes Africa (0.1%), America (0.1%), Congo (0.1%), France (0.1%), Georgia (0.1%), India (0.1%), Italy (0.1%), Kazakstan (0.1%), Myanmar (0.1%), Portugal (0.1%), Romania (0.1%) and Spain (0.1%). 90.5% of the respondents reported their two parents were born in China, and 6.7% reported that their parents were born in England.

55.5% of respondents have at least one parent (caretaker) doing the 'professional' job. 15.8 % of the respondents' parents' higher job level is the 'intermediate' job, and 25.4 % is the 'working' job. In comparison, 2.4% of the respondents have at least one parent(caretaker) who does not have a job. Seventeen respondents did not report any parents'(caretakers) jobs. 22.2% of respondents have both parents (caretakers) doing the 'professional' job. 16.2% of respondents have both parents (caretakers) doing the 'working' job, and 1.9% of respondents have both parents who have no jobs.

Most respondents (97%) reported that they speak the official language of the country where the survey was conducted most of the time at home. 0.3 % of the respondents speak another language, and 1.7% of the respondents speak another language and the official language equally most of the time at home. 31.1% of the respondents are the only child in their families.

4.7.2 The sample from China

The sample in China was mainly drawn from 8 primary schools for convenience. Two schools are located in Beijing, the capital of China. Two are located in Bei Hai City of Guang Xi Province, in southern China. Three are situated in Lan Zhou City of Gan Su Province, in western China. One is in Tang Shan City of He Bei Province, in northern China. Among the eight schools, seven are situated in urban areas, being classified as having an average level of teaching quality locally. Just one school runs in a rural area, which is far behind the average level. However, considering the regional difference, the seven schools in the urban areas would differ in teaching quality. For example, the average schools in Beijing would be

superior to their counterparties in other small cities even though they are all considered the average schools locally. Generally, there are three levels among the eight participating schools regarding teaching quality. Schools in Beijing would be the top, schools in Lan Zhou city, Bei Hai city and Tang Shan City would rank second, and schools in rural areas would come third. All the schools are public.

In each school, two classes were randomly selected from each grade (4th, 5th and 6th graders) except the school in Tang Shan City. The participants from the school in Tang Shan City were selected from an after-school care centre near the school. They are also 4th, 5th and 6th graders. Five students in all were absent when the survey was conducted in schools. Therefore, they did not join the questionnaire survey and the game observation. Finally, 1,768 students from 7-13 years old (M=10.2, SD=0.9, 837 girls) were involved in the questionnaire survey. 254 participants were selected randomly from the 1,115 participants who took the questionnaire survey and joined in the game observation. They are from 5 out of the 8 participant schools. The other 3 schools refused to get their students to join the game observation because they thought their school timetable did allow for the game. The schools with less than 72 participants for the game observation are for the same reason (e.g. LGPPS and BHSE) (see Table 4.5).

Table 4. 5: The number of participants in China

Name of School	Participants for Questionnaire	Participants for Game Observation
YTPS (Beijing City)	4 th graders: 76 5 th graders: 82 6 th graders: 78	None
BJLFPS (Beijing City)	4 th graders: 71 5 th graders: 70 6 th graders: 68	4 th graders: 24 5 th graders: 24 6 th graders: 24
WJBPS (Lan Zhou City)	4 th graders: 107 5 th graders: 107 6 th graders: 108	4 th graders: 24 5 th graders: 24 6 th graders: 24
LGPPS (Lan Zhou City)	4 th graders: 92 5 th graders: 107 6 th graders: 88	4 th graders: 12 5 th graders: 12 6 th graders: 12
LYPS	4 th graders: 45	None

(Lan Zhou City)	5 th graders: 66 6 th graders: 59	
BHSES (Bei Hai City)	4th graders: 90 5th graders: 88 6th graders: 80	#*4 th graders: 24 #*5 th graders: 24 #*6 th graders: 12
BHES (Bei Hai City)	4th graders: 88 5th graders: 78 6th graders: 86	None
TSEPS (Tang Shan City)	4th graders: 6 5th graders: 13 6th graders: 15	*4 th graders: 6 5 th graders: 6 6 th graders: 2
Total	1,768	254

* Half of the participants did the game before they finished the questionnaire.

For descriptive norm priming during the game observation of sharing and donation, participants were told that other students who did the game before them kept the most bouncing balls and the money.

The respondents from China are indigenous. All the respondents were born in China, except three students born in France, America, and Vietnam. Most respondents' parents (or caretakers) were born in China, except for two students whose one parent (caretaker) was born in France or Vietnam. All the Chinese respondents speak Chinese most of the time at home, except two respondents who reported that they speak Chinese and another language equally.

56.7% of the Chinese respondents' parents' higher job level is a 'professional' job, 15.6 % is an 'intermediate' job, 24.8 % is a "working" job, and 2.1% is 'having no jobs'. 23.1% of the respondents have both parents doing 'professional' jobs. The respondents whose both parents are doing 'working' jobs or have no jobs take 25.7%.

There is a noticeable difference in the Chinese sample (capital city vs. smaller cities vs. rural areas). Students' parents' jobs that imply education background or economic situation may differ between big and smaller cities and rural areas. For the students from the two schools located in Beijing (capital city), 75.1% of the students have at least one parent doing a 'professional' job. 9.4 % of the students have both parents doing 'working' jobs or having no jobs. However, for the students from schools in smaller cities, 53.2% of the students have at least one parent doing a 'professional' job. 28.4 % of students have both parents doing

‘working’ jobs or having no jobs.

In contrast, for the students from schools in rural areas, 32.4% of the students have at least one parent doing a ‘professional’ job. 50.6 % of students have both parents doing ‘working’ jobs or having no jobs (see Table 4.6). Therefore, the difference in students’ parents’ jobs between different areas is evident.

Table 4. 6: The percentage of parents’ jobs (Capital city vs. Smaller cities vs. Rural areas)

Samples	At least one parent doing a ‘professional’ jobs	Both parents doing ‘working’ jobs or have no jobs
Capital city (Beijing) (N=445)	75.1	9.4
Smaller cities (N=1,153)	53.2	28.4
Rural areas (N=170)	32.4	50.6

33.4% of the Chinese respondents are the only children in their families.

4.7.3 The sample from England

The sample from England includes 182 students from 8-13 years old (M=10.2, SD=0.9, 98 girls). 107 participants are from two primary schools in Durham and Newcastle, respectively. Participants are from 5th and 6th graders. The pilot before the survey showed that some 4th graders are younger than eight years old in British schools, which is different from Chinese schools. The students younger than eight years old have difficulty completing the survey independently. Therefore, 4th graders were not included in the British sample. There is only one class for each grader in the two participant schools. Two students were absent when the questionnaire survey was conducted. Therefore, they did not join the questionnaire and the following game observation. In addition to the 107 participants recruited offline from schools, 75 responses are from the survey online during the lockdown. Therefore, the sample from the online survey covers more areas in England, including London, Edinburgh, and Liverpool. However, more than half of the online participants are still from England (around Durham and Newcastle) (see Table 4.7). 24 participants were selected randomly from the primary

school in Newcastle to join the game observation.

Table 4. 7: The number of participants for the survey in England

	Name of the school (Area)	Participants for questionnaire	Participants for game observation
Offline Survey	STPS (Newcastle)	5 th graders: 29 6 th graders: 29	5 th graders: 12 6 th graders: 12
	BPS (Durham)	5 th graders: 23 6 th graders: 26	
Online Survey	(Ayr)	1	
	(Bow)	1	
	(Cambridge)	1	
	(Durham)	26	
	(Edinburgh)	2	
	(Exeter)	1	
	(Ferryhill)	2	
	(Liverpool)	1	
	(London)	12	
	(Newcastle)	23	
	(Sedgefield)	1	
	(Stockton)	1	
	(Sunderland)	1	
(Trimely St Martin)	1		
(Winchester)	1		
Total	182		

Most of the respondents were born in England. 9.5% of the respondents were born in other countries (including China, Africa, Congo, Italy, Kazakstan, America, India, Myanmar, Portugal, Romania, Spain and Georgia). It is worth noticing that one respondent was born in China (her parents were born in England). 3.4% of the respondents from England reported that they speak another language (not English), and 17.3% speak English and another language equally most of the time at home.

72% of the respondents reported that they have both parents (caretakers) born in England and other Western countries (e.g. Germany, Belgium, Lithuania, Australia, Italy and Poland) (the responses for only one parent's birthplace are included). 13.7% of the respondents reported

that they have both parents (caretakers) born in non-Western countries (e.g. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria and Pakistan) (the responses for only one parent’s birthplace are included). 8.2% of the respondents reported that their parents were born in Western and non-Western countries.

44.5% of the British respondents’ parents’ higher job level is a ‘professional’ job, 18.7% is an ‘intermediate’ job, 30.8% is a ‘working’ job, and 4.4 is ‘having no jobs’. 13.7 % of the respondents have both parents doing ‘professional’ jobs. 30.7% of the respondents have both parents doing ‘working’ jobs or having no jobs.

13.9% of the respondents from England are the only children in their families.

4.7.4 The comparison between the samples from two countries

The average age of the samples from the two countries is similar. Most respondents from both countries are between 9 and 11 years old (see Table 4.8). The samples from both countries are gender evenly.

Table 4. 8: The percentage, mean value and SD for the age of participants from China and England with missing data

	7ylds	8ylds	9ylds	10ylds	11ylds	12ylds	13ylds	Mean	SD	No Response
China N=1,768	0.1	0.8	22.6	33.5	33.3	7.4	0.1	10.2	0.9	2.2
England N=182	0.0	1.6	15.9	47.8	29.7	1.1	2.2	10.2	0.9	1.6

According to the respondents’ birthplace, the samples from both China and England are generally indigenous (see Table 4.9). However, the sample from China is more indigenous than the British sample according to the birthplace of their parents (caretakers) and the

spoken language at home. The percentage of Chinese respondents who are the only child in their families is higher than British respondents.

Table 4. 9: The percentage of respondents' birthplaces with missing data

	China (birthplace)	England (birthplace)	Other countries (birthplace)	No response
Respondents from China N=1,768	99.9	0	0.1 (1 response)	0
Respondents from England N=182	0.5 (1 response)	88.9	9.0	1.6

Generally, most respondents from both countries have parents (caretakers) doing jobs. However, more respondents from China are raised by parents (caretakers) who are doing 'professional' jobs (see Table 4.10). It would indicate that Chinese respondents are generally raised in families with higher education backgrounds than those from England. The result will not be reversed, even though the 'no response code' is replaced with the counterfactual values.

Table 4. 10: The percentage of the jobs of respondents' parents with missing data

Statistical Methods	Job Groups	China	England
The higher level between the two parents' jobs is counted for each case.	(1) 'Professional' Group	56.7	44.5
	(2) 'Intermediate' Group	15.6	18.7
	(3) 'Working class' Group	24.8	30.8
	(4) 'Having no jobs' Group	2.1	4.4
	No response code: No response for either parents (caretakers)	0.8	1.6
Both of the parents' jobs are in the same group.	(1) 'Professional' Group	23.1	13.7
	(2) 'Working class' & 'Having no jobs' Groups	25.7	30.7

China (N=1,768); England (N=182)

4.8 Summary

This study mainly examined young adolescents' moral identity in two different cultural

contexts (China vs. England). On the one hand, the study generally pictured young adolescents' moral views and behaviour across cultures. On the other hand, the differences and similarities in moral identity and related moral views and behaviours between the two countries' young adolescents were checked.

The study reviewed 77 references, focusing on the measures of moral identity and moral behaviour. The most important finding is that most research linked moral identity to self-reported or other-reported moral behaviour intention or past behaviour rather than observed actual behaviour or behaviour consistency. The Moral Identity Scale and Moral Behaviour Observation in current research are developed based on the reviewed measures. The understandability of young adolescents and some limitations of the existing measures, for example, the limitation of self-reported behaviour and value commitment is missing in some moral identity scales, are considered.

The whole sample includes 1,950 respondents. Most of them are indigenous and from cities. The average age of the whole sample is around ten years old. The gender is generally even. More than half of the respondents have at least one parent doing a 'professional' job. It is worth noting that there is a difference in parents' jobs between respondents from big cities and smaller cities. Taking respondents from China as an example, the proportion of respondents from big city having parents' doing 'professional' jobs is bigger than those from smaller cities.

There are differences between the two countries' samples. First, the Chinese sample is bigger than the British sample. Secondly, the Chinese sample is more indigenous than the British sample. Thirdly, the proportion of Chinese respondents from big cities is bigger than British respondents. The proportion of Chinese respondents having parents doing 'professional' jobs is bigger than British respondents.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA DESCRIPTION

This chapter describes the data regarding respondents' moral identity and related moral views and behaviour. The description of respondents' personal cultural values and perceived norms are also included in this chapter. For each data group, the trend and feature of the whole sample will be described first. Then the Chinese and British samples will be described separately and compared. The discussion and implication of the data will be presented in Chapters Ten and Eleven.

The results demonstrated in this chapter mainly respond to the following research questions:

Question 1: What are the overall moral views of primary school children in different countries?

The research finds that primary school children generally think that being kind (not hurting), honest and fair are important values for themselves. Moreover, they have a similar understanding of important moral traits to adults, such as being honest, polite, respectful, fair, loyal, friendly and so on.

Question 2: How is the consistency between children's self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intentions? And is there consistency between children's reported behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in real life?

The research shows that children's value commitment intentions are not always consistent with their self-reported importance of moral values, such as being honest. Children's actual donation and sharing behaviour are not necessarily consistent with their intentions.

Question 3: What are the similarities and differences in moral identity and other related moral views and behaviour of primary school children in China and England?

The research reveals that both Chinese and British children reported a relatively high mean score on the overall moral identity scale. Children from both countries showed a similar intention trend when facing moral contexts. They tended to be generous to needy children when facing a donation scenario while being fair when responding to a distribution task. For the differences, Chinese children reported a higher mean score on the moral identity scale than British children. Chinese students showed a more consistent donation and sharing behaviour than British children. Chinese children reported that their behaviour is driven by internal factors than external factors. British children reported the opposite trend. Chinese children reported that their moral trait understanding is influenced more by injunctive norms (what the country or society approves) than the descriptive norm (what most people do). However, British children showed the opposite inclination.

Question 4: Are there cultural similarities and differences between China and England from the children's perspective?

The research finds that Chinese and British children reported a similar mean score on the universal-interest value subscale. However, Chinese children reported a higher mean score on the collective-interest value subscale than British children. British children reported a higher mean score on the individual-interest value subscale than Chinese children. Moreover, children's perceived parenting and school environment, self-reported behaviour motivation, moral trait understanding and influencing norms demonstrated in this chapter also reflect the cultural similarities and differences between the two countries.

The variables (e.g. moral identity, personal cultural values, cultural norms, parenting and school environment) on the Likert Scale are analysed in two ways. The results of the 5-point Likert Scale are presented in this Chapter. The results of the clipped 5-degree Likert Scale (the clip details, see Chapter Four) are presented in Appendix. The substantive results are the same, however the data are analysed.

5. 1 Description of moral identity

5.1.1 Moral identity—the whole sample

The whole sample gets a relatively high score on the overall moral identity (M=4.6, SD=0.5). According to the mean score, respondents' reported value commitment intention is consistent with their reported self-reported importance of moral values (see Table 5.1). The respondents from the two countries showed that the importance of the three moral values to themselves is slightly different. Respondents generally reported that being honest is a more important moral value (M=4.7, SD=0.8) to themselves than the other two values. However, respondents reported an obviously weaker intention of commitment to being honest (M=4.3, SD=1.1) than the other two self-reported importance of moral values (kindness and fairness) (M=4.6, 4.7). The analysis is conducted again with the moral identity as an ordinal variable (a clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (see Table A2 in Appendix).

Table 5. 1: The mean score of the 6-item Moral Identity Scale (Self-reported importance of moral values and Value Commitment Intention Subscales) with missing data (whole sample)

Items	Mean	SD	No response (%)
Kindness (not hurt)(A6) (Self-reported Importance of Moral Value)	4.5	1.1	0.4
Kindness (not hurt)(A1) * (Value CommitmentIntention)	4.6	0.9	0.5
Honesty (A4) (Self-reported Importance of Moral Value)	4.7	0.8	0.3
Honesty(A3) (Value Commitment Intention)	4.3	1.1	0.3
Fairness (A5)* (Self-reported importance of Moral Value)	4.6	1.0	0.8
Fairness(A2)* (Value CommitmentIntention)	4.7	0.7	0.3
Total Moral Identity Scale	4.6	0.5	
Subscale (Value)	4.6	0.7	
Subscale (Commitment)	4.6	0.6	

*Reversescored; N=1,950; The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree

strongly), a higher score means a stronger moral identity.

5.1.2 Moral identity —the comparison between the samples from two countries

Generally, respondents from both countries reported a relatively high score on the total Moral Identity Scale. However, Chinese respondents reported a higher mean score ($M=4.6$, $SD=0.5$) than British respondents ($M=4.3$, $SD=0.6$). The difference in scores on the total Moral Identity Scale between the two samples is medium (Effect size=0.6). It would indicate that Chinese respondents reported an obviously higher moral identity than British respondents. Moreover, Chinese respondents gained a higher score on two subscales of the Moral identity Scale (Self-reported importance of moral values and Value Commitment Intention) than British respondents (see Table 5.2). The difference in the score on the subscale of Self-reported importance of moral values between the two samples is slight (Effect size=0.3). However, the difference in the score on the subscale of Value Commitment Intention between the two countries' respondents is big (Effect size=0.8). The scores and the effect size value would indicate that the respondents from the two countries generally have a similar idea that having some moral qualities is important for themselves. However, Chinese respondents reported that they tended to commit to their moral values much more than British respondents.

For the self-reported importance of moral values, the respondents from both countries reported a lower score on the 'self-reported importance of not hurting others' than the other two items (being fair and honest). The respondents from the two countries also reported the highest score on the 'self-reported importance of being honest' (see Table 5.2). It implies that young adolescents from China and England have similar ideas that being honest is more important than being fair and kind (or not hurting), while being kind is the least important among the three moral traits.

For the value commitment intentions, Chinese and British respondents demonstrated similar intentions of committing to being kind (or not hurting) (Effect size=0). It is worth noting that both Chinese and British respondents reported the weakest intention of committing to being honest among the three moral value commitments. However, there are differences in commitment intentions to being honest and fair between the respondents from the two countries. One difference is the commitment intention to being fair. Chinese respondents tended to commit to being fair more than British respondents (Effect size=0.6). Another noticeable difference is the commitment intention to being honest. Chinese respondents reported a much stronger intention to commit to being honest than British respondents (Effect size=0.9). The analysis is conducted again with the moral identity as an ordinal variable (a clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (see Table A3 in Appendix)

Table 5. 2: The mean score of the 6-item Moral Identity Scale (Self-reported Importance of Moral Value and Value Commitment IntentionSubscales) with missing data (China vs. England)

Items	Samples	Mean	SD	Effect size	No response (%)
Kindness (not hurt)(A6) (Value)	China	4.5	1.1	0.2	0.5
	England	4.3	1.3		0
Kindness (not hurt)(A1) * (Commitment Intention)	China	4.6	0.9	0	0.6
	England	4.6	0.8		0
Honesty (A4) (Value)	China	4.7	0.8	0.3	0.2
	England	4.5	1.0		0.5
Honesty(A3) (Commitment Intention)	China	4.4	1.0	0.9	0.3
	England	3.4	1.3		0
Fairness (A5)* (Value)	China	4.7	0.9	0.3	0.8
	England	4.4	1.2		0
Fairness(A2)* (Commitment Intention)	China	4.8	0.7	0.6	0.3
	England	4.4	0.9		0
Total Moral Identity Scale	China	4.6	0.5	0.6	
	England	4.3	0.6		
Subscale (Value)	China	4.6	0.6	0.3	

	England	4.4	0.8		
Subscale (Commitment)	China	4.6	0.6	0.8	
	England	4.1	0.7		

*Reverse scored; N=1,950; The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree strongly), a higher score means a stronger moral identity.

5.1.3 Moral identity—the comparison between the capital city and smaller cities in China

In order to compare the self-reports of moral identity differences between the students from Beijing (the capital) and smaller cities, a few students (thirty-four) who were surveyed outside school were removed from the sample for comparison. It is expected to avoid the possible social desirability difference (in school vs. outside school) between the subsamples. Students from Beijing generally reported lower scores on the Total Moral Identity Scale and two subscales than students from smaller cities. Moreover, students from Beijing showed a slightly bigger gap between their self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment behaviour intention than students from smaller cities, according to the mean score comparison (see Table 5.3).

Table 5. 3: The mean score of the 6-item Moral Identity Scale (Self-reported Importance of Moral Value and Value Commitment Intention Subscales) (Capital city vs. Smaller cities in China)

	Capital city (Beijing) (N=445)	Smaller cities (N=1289)
Subscale (Value)	4.6	4.7
Subscale (Commitment)	4.4	4.7
Total Moral Identity Scale	4.5	4.7

The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree strongly), a higher score means a stronger moral identity.

5.1.4 Moral identity—the comparison between online and offline samples in England

Respondents recruited online generally reported a slightly higher score on the total Moral Identity Scale and Self-reported Important Moral Value Subscale than respondents recruited offline. However, Respondents recruited online generally reported a slightly lower score on the Value Commitment Behaviour Intention Subscale than respondents recruited offline (see

Table 5.4). Generally, all the score differences are not noticeable.

Table 5. 4: The mean score of the 6-item Moral Identity Scale (Self-reported Importance of Moral Value and Value Commitment Intention Subscales) (Online sample vs. Offline sample in England)

	Online sample (N=75)	Offline sample (N=107)
Subscale (Value)	4.5	4.3
Subscale (Commitment)	4.1	4.2
Total Moral Identity Scale	4.3	4.2

The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree strongly), a higher score means a stronger moral identity.

5.2 Description of moral behaviour intention

5.2.1 Moral behaviour intention—the whole sample

75.6% of the whole sample intended to donate all the 2 pounds to the charity program, and the mean of the donated money is 1.8 pounds. It implies that the entire respondents tended to donate most of the money in the survey. However, their sharing tendency is generally different from the donation. 73.2% of the whole sample preferred to distribute the gifts evenly between themselves and the stranger. A small proportion of respondents did not intend to donate or share (see Table 5.5).

Table 5. 5: Percentage of donation and sharing intention in the survey with missing data (the whole sample)

Donating all (2 pounds)	Donating more (1.5 pounds)	Donating half (1 pound)	Donating less (0.5 pounds)	Donating Nothing	Mean (pounds)	No response
75.6	13.0	7.3	2.1	1.8	1.8	0.2
Sharing all	Sharing more	Sharing half	Sharing less	Sharing Nothing		No response
8.8	9.5	73.2	3.5	4.5		0.5

N=1,950

5.2.2 Moral behaviour intention—the comparison between the samples from two countries

Generally, the respondents from both countries show the same tendency to distribute money

and gifts. Regarding distributing money, respondents from the two countries tended to distribute more to others than themselves (see Table 5.6). However, respondents preferred to share equally when distributing fun gifts (see Table 5.7).

However, there are some differences between the two samples. A more considerable percentage of Chinese respondents tended to donate or distribute most of the money or the fun gifts they get than British respondents (donation: 90.5% vs.70.3%; sharing: 19.8% vs. 4.4%, see Table 5.6, 5.7). The mean value for donated money shows that the Chinese respondents tended to donate more than the British respondents (1.8 pounds vs. 1.6 pounds). Even though the missing data is considered, the result is not changed.

Moreover, there is an immense difference in the percentage of ‘sharing nothing’ between the Chinese and British respondents regarding gift distribution compared with money donation (donation:1.8% vs. 2.7%; sharing: 2.2% vs. 26.4%). One possible reason is that money and fun gifts mean differently to young adolescents in England. They prefer fun gifts to 2 pounds. They probably imagined the fun gifts as what they wanted or something expensive in their mind. Therefore, fun gifts mean more to them than the 2 pounds. The other possible reason is that the objects for distributions are different. Giving more money to needy children is more important than distributing more fun gifts to a stranger. Needy children need more generous help than a stranger who is not in need.

Table 5. 6: Percentage of donation intention with missing data and the mean of the donated money (China vs. England)

Samples	Donating all (2 pounds)	1.5 Pounds	1 Pound	0.5 pounds	Donating Nothing	Mean (pounds)	No response
China	77.5	13.0	6.2	1.4	1.8	1.8	0.2
England	57.1	13.2	18.1	8.2	2.7	1.6	0.5

N=1,950

Table 5. 7: Percentage of sharing intention with missing data (China vs. England)

Samples	Sharing all	Sharing more	Sharing equally	Sharing less	Sharing Nothing	No response
China	9.5	10.3	74.5	3.0	2.2	0.5
England	2.2	2.2	60.4	8.2	26.4	0.5

N=1,950

5.3 Description of actual moral behaviour

5.3.1 Actual moral behaviour—the whole sample

The respondents' actual reaction to sharing and donation responding to the behaviour intention in the questionnaire survey is checked through a game observation. The overall sample of the game observation demonstrated a similar behaviour trend in actual tasks as that in the survey. They were still inclined to donate all the money (72.3%) and share equally (69.1%) (see Table 5.8). However, the percentage is slightly lower than that in the survey. The mean of donated money in the game observation is slightly lower than in the survey (1.7 pounds vs.1.8 pounds).

Table 5. 8: Percentage of actual donation and sharing behaviour in the game (the whole sample)

Donating all (2 pounds)	Donating more (1.5pounds)	Donating half (1 pound)	Donating less (0.5pounds)	Donating Nothing	Mean of donated money in the game (pounds)
72.3	12.2	9.4	2.9	3.2	1.7
Sharing all (8 balls)	Sharing more than 4 balls	Sharing half (4 balls)	Sharing less than 4 balls	Sharing Nothing	Mean of distributed balls to the researcher (number)
7.6	20.2	69.1	2.9	0.4	5

N=278

5.3.2 Actual moral behaviour—— the comparison between the samples from two countries

Chinese and British participants demonstrated different donation tendencies in the game observation. 78 % of Chinese participants in the game donated all the rewarded money (20 RMB, which equals 2 pounds roughly). However, British participants preferred to donate half of the rewarded money (41.7%) or less than half (16.7%+29.2%). Therefore, the mean donated money of the British sample is one pound less than that of the Chinese sample (1.8 vs. 0.8 pounds, see Table 5.9).

Table 5. 9: Percentage of donated money and the mean of donated money in the game observation (China vs. England)

Samples	Donating all (2 pounds)	1.5 Pounds	1 pound	0.5 pound	Donating Nothing	Mean of donated money in the game (pounds)
China	78.0	13.4	6.3	1.6	0.8	1.8
England	12.5	0.0	41.7	16.7	29.2	0.8

N=278

The trends of participants' sharing behaviour in the game for both countries are similar. More than half of the participants from both countries shared the bouncing balls equally with the researcher (see Table 5.10). The trend is also similar to that of the survey for both countries. However, there are some differences between the two samples. For example, none of the Chinese participants kept all the balls to themselves. In contrast, a small portion of British participants did. The proportion of Chinese participants who gave all the balls to the researcher is bigger than that of the British participants. The mean of distributed balls to the researcher for Chinese participants is one ball more than that for the British respondents.

Table 5. 10: Percentage of sharing behaviour and the mean distributed balls to the researcher in the game (China vs. England)

Samples	Sharing	Sharing	Sharing	Sharing	Sharing	Mean of balls

	all	more	equally	less	Nothing	distributed to the researcher
China	7.9	20.5	69.3	2.4	0.0	5
England	4.2	16.6	66.7	8.3	4.2	4

N=278

5.4 Description of behaviour consistency

5.4.1 Behaviour consistency—the whole sample

More than half of the whole sample showed behaviour consistency in the two tasks. More than half of the respondents donated or shared the same as they intended in the survey (see Table 5.11). Moreover, more than ten percent of the participants donated (12.2%) or shared more (21.9%) than they intended. More than ten percent of the whole sample donated less (16.2%) or shared less (12.9%) than they suggested (see Table 5.11). The ‘no response’ code is caused by no response for the corresponding item of the survey questionnaire or participants’ identity information (e.g. parent’s initials) for the survey, and the game does not match. Therefore, the cases are removed from the sample when the regression models are conducted.

Table 5. 11: The percentage of the difference between behavioural intention and actual behaviour (the whole sample)

	Intention < Reality	Intention=Reality	Intention > Reality	No response
Donation	12.2	70.1	16.2	1.4
Sharing	21.9	64.0	12.9	1.1

N=278

5.4.2 Behaviour consistency—the comparison between the samples from two countries

75.6% of the Chinese participants donated the same as they intended. Most of them donated 2 pounds both in the survey and game observation. However, one participant donated nothing in the survey and game observation. Therefore, it is still identified as a behaviour consistency.

In contrast, only 12.5% of the British participants showed consistency between their donation intention and actual donation. The proportion of Chinese respondents who donated more than their intention is bigger than that of British respondents. However, the percentage of British respondents who donated less than they intended is much bigger than that of Chinese respondents (see Table 5.12). The sharp contrast is not changed significantly even though the sensitivity analysis is conducted with the ‘no response’ code.

The mean of the differences in the amount of money between respondents’ donation intention and actual donation reflects the general consistency of the respondents from each country. The mean for participants from China is +0.01 pounds, which indicates that the average amount of money Chinese participants actually donated is 0.01 pounds more than they intended. By comparison, the mean (-0.9 pounds) for British participants implies that the participants actually donated 0.9 pounds less than they suggested on average (see Table 5.10; the specific differences in the amount of money between intention and actual donation for each country’s sample, see Table A4 in Appendix).

Table 5. 12: The percentage of donation behaviour consistency with missing data (China vs. England)

Samples	Intention < Reality	Intention=Reality	Intention > Reality	Mean*	No response
China	13.1	75.6	10.2	+0.01	1.2
England	4.2	12.5	79.2	-0.9	4.2

N=278; * ‘-’ means the money respondents donated is less than their intention; ‘+’ means the money respondents donated is more than their intention;

The percentage of participants from the two countries who shared fewer than they intended is similar. However, there are also differences between the two countries’ samples. 66.5% of Chinese participants actually shared the same as they intended. By comparison, 37.5% of British participants behave consistently in the distribution task (see Table 5.13). However, the proportion of British participants who actually shared more than their intention is bigger than that of Chinese participants.

Table 5. 13: Percentage of sharing behaviour consistency with missing data (China vs. England)

Samples	Intention < Reality	Intention=Reality	Intention > Reality	No response
China	20.5	66.5	11.8	1.2

England	45.8	37.5	16.7	0
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N=278

Generally, Chinese participants demonstrated similar behaviour consistency in both money donation and gift-sharing tasks. More than half of the Chinese respondents donated and consistently shared with what they suggested in the survey. However, the British respondents demonstrated more consistent sharing behaviour than donation behaviour.

5.4.3 Behaviour consistency—— the comparison between the capital city and smaller cities in China

Students who did the game observation outside school are still removed from the comparison sample. It is to minimise the social desirability difference between subsamples. The proportion of students (from Beijing) who donated less than their intention is slightly smaller than that of students from other smaller cities (see Table 5.14). Furthermore, the proportion of students (from Beijing) who distributed fewer balls than their intention is slightly smaller than that of students from other smaller cities (see Table 5.15).

5.4.4 Behaviour consistency—— the comparison between students in school and outside the school in China

In order to compare students' behaviour differences between different observation environments, students from Beijing are removed from the comparison sample. It is to avoid the influence of city differences on students' behaviour. The proportion of students (observed outside school) who donated less money than their intention is smaller than that of students (observed in school) (see Table 5.14). Moreover, the proportion of students (observed outside school) who distributed fewer balls than their intention is smaller than that of students (observed in school) (see Table 5.15).

Table 5. 14: The percentage of donation behaviour consistency (comparison between different Chinese subsamples)

Samples	Intention < Reality	Intention=Reality	Intention > Reality
Beijing (observed in school) (N=72)	22.6	67.6	7.8
Smaller cities (observed in school) (N=168)	9.6	80.1	10.2
Smaller city (observed outside school) (N=14)	14.2	78.6	7.1

Table 5. 15: The percentage of distribution behaviour consistency (comparison between different Chinese subsamples)

Samples	Intention < Reality	Intention=Reality	Intention > Reality
Beijing (observed in school) (N=72)	29.6	60.6	9.9
Smaller cities (observed in school) (N=168)	16.9	69.9	13.3
Smaller city (observed outside school) (N=14)	28.6	64.3	7.1

5.5 Description of participants' pocket money and their attitudes toward money

More than half of the participants reported that they had pocket money for the whole sample. However, the proportion of British participants who have pocket money is more considerable than Chinese participants (see Table 5.16).

Table 5. 16: Percentage of participants who have pocket money

Sample	Having pocket money	Having no pocket money
The whole sample (N=278)	57.6	42.4
Chinese	55.5	44.5
England	79.2	20.8

More than half of the whole participants thought the rewarded money (2 pounds or 20RMB) was too much. A small proportion of participants thought the awarded money was ok or had no idea how much the money was (see Table 5.17).

Checking the samples from the two countries separately, a remarkable difference in participants' views of money is observed between the two countries. More than half of the Chinese participants thought the rewarded money was enormous. However, more than half of British participants believed that the rewarded money was not too much. The proportion of Chinese participants who thought the money was ok or had no concept of the money is more significant than that of British participants (see Table 5.17).

Table 5. 17: Percentage of participants' attitudes toward rewarded money (2pounds or 20 RMB)

Samples	The money is too much	The money is not too much	The money is ok or has no idea
The whole sample (N=278)	63.7	27.7	8.6
China	67.0	24.0	9.0
England	29.2	66.7	4.1

5.6 Description of motivation of moral behaviour

The data shows that the whole sample's moral behaviour (handing over a wallet found on the ground in a park to the Lost and Found Office) is driven by internal motivation (self or nobody's thanks or praise) more than external motivation (parents, teachers, friends, officers and the owner's thanks or praise)(see Table 5.18; the percentage of each option, see Table A5 in Appendix).

Table 5. 18: Percentage of moral behaviour motivations with missing data (the whole sample)

Internal motivation	External motivation	No response
53.4	45.8	0.8

N=1,950

The Odds ratios show that the Chinese respondents are 3.5 times more likely to be motivated by internal factors to behave morally than their counterparts (see Table 5.19). The missing data is taken into consideration to validate the result. A sensitivity analysis is conducted as what has been done for other variables previously. The Odds ratio is still 3.2. Therefore, the result is not affected significantly.

Table 5. 19: Percentage of moral behaviour motivations with Odds Ratios and missing data (China vs. England)

Samples	Internal motivation	External motivation	No response	Odds Ratios
China	56.2	43.1	0.7	3.5
England	26.9	71.5	1.6	

N=1,950

The comparison between the two samples regarding each option has similarities and differences. Respondents from both countries reported they expected friends' thanks or praise the least. Both Chinese and British respondents expected parents' praise more than teachers'. The top two motivations for respondents from both countries are the wallet owner and nobody. The similarities imply several points. First, young adolescents' moral behaviour would be more motivated by adults or authorities than by peers. Secondly, teachers are less authorized than parents in young adolescents' minds. Thirdly, respondents' responses would be based on a realistic perspective. Teachers and friends are less likely than parents to be present (in the park) when they behave morally. Therefore, they are unlikely to be praised by teachers or friends. The wallet owner is most likely to thank and praise respondents. Therefore, a considerable percentage of respondents from both countries reported that they expected thanks or praise from the wallet owner. However, Chinese respondents choose the option of 'nobody' most frequently. In contrast, British respondents chose the option of 'wallet owner' most frequently (see Table 5.20).

Table 5. 20: Percentage of whose thanks or praise the respondents expected with missing data (China vs. England)

Samples	Parents	Teachers	Friends	Owner	Officer	Nobody	Self	No response
China	9.9	2.9	0.4	25.3	4.6	50.2	6.0	0.7
England	6.7	1.6	0.0	52.2	11.0	25.8	1.1	1.6

N=1,950

5.7 Description of the moral traits understanding

5.7.1 The understanding of moral traits—the whole sample

All forty-five given good traits were selected by the whole sample to varying degrees as the traits that a moral person should have. ‘Honest’ comes to the top. 35.1% of the whole sample think honesty is an important trait that a moral person should have. ‘Polite’ comes second (18.7%), and ‘grateful’ comes third (17.8%). ‘Exemplary’ is selected the least by the whole sample (0.7%) (For more details, see Table A6 in Appendix).

5.7.2 The understanding of moral traits—the comparison between the sample from the two countries

The samples from the two countries share a similar pattern. First, the trait ‘honest’ is included in the top three important moral traits in the ranking for respondents from both countries. Secondly, there is a relatively immense overlap between the two countries regarding the top ten rankings. Six traits are listed in the top ten for both countries, including ‘honest’, ‘polite’, ‘respectful’, ‘fair’, ‘loyal’, and ‘friendly’ (see Table 5.21).

Turning to the differences, the trait ‘honest’ is at the top of the important moral traits among Chinese respondents. And then is the trait ‘grateful’, which is followed by the trait ‘polite’. Turning to the British sample, the trait ‘friendly’ comes to the top. The following are ‘hard-working’ and ‘honest’ traits that share the same percentage.

Among the top ten important moral traits, Chinese and British adolescents also show different understanding. For example, Chinese adolescents value being grateful, humble, selfless and confident more than British adolescents. In contrast, British adolescents emphasise ‘knows right and wrong’, ‘hard-working’, ‘helpful’, and ‘patient’ more than Chinese adolescents.

All of the forty-five traits have been selected as the most important moral traits to different degrees. However, some traits account for a fairly small proportion (e.g. exemplary, religious,

strong). Unlike the Chinese sample, six traits have not been selected by the British respondents at all. It includes ‘compassionate’, ‘selfless’, ‘optimistic’, ‘perseverant’, ‘exemplary’, ‘consistent’, and ‘self-disciplined’. It is worth noting that Chinese and British adolescents mention ‘religious’ as an essential moral trait. However, the proportion of British adolescents who selected ‘religious’ is bigger than that of Chinese adolescents (For more details, see Table A7 in Appendix).

Table 5. 21: The percentage of the top ten most important moral traits selected by respondents with missing data (China vs. England)

Ranking	China (%)	England (%)
1	Honest (37.7)	Friendly (19.6)
2	Grateful (19.2)	Hard-working (17.7)
3	Polite (19.1)	Honest (17.7)
4	Respectful (17.2)	Knows right/wrong (16.9)
5	Fair (17.1)	Respectful (16.9)
6	Loyal (17.0)	Polite (16.8)
7	Friendly (10.5)	Loyal (15.9)
8	Humble (9.7)	Helpful (14.0)
9	Selfless (9.6)	Fair (13.1)
10	Confident (9.5)	Patient (9.3)
No response	(2.5)	(3.7)

N=821

5.8 Description of behaviour-based personal culture values

5.8.1 Behaviour-based personal cultural values——the whole sample

The whole sample reported the strongest inclination toward universal-interest values among the three dimensions of cultural values. They were also inclined to collective-interest values more than individual-interest values (see Table 5.22). The analysis is conducted again with the personal cultural value as an ordinal variable (a clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (see Table A8 in Appendix)

Table 5. 22: Mean score of Cultural Value Subscales (the whole sample)

Cultural Value Subscales	Mean	SD
Individual-interest Value Subscale	3.2	0.4
Collective-interest Values Subscale	3.9	0.6
Universal-interest Values Subscale	4.1	0.8

N=1,950; The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree strongly), with a higher score meaning a stronger value inclination.

5.8.2 Behaviour-based personal cultural values—the comparison between the sample from the two countries

The mean scores show that the respondents from the two countries showed the same personal values inclination pattern (see Table 5.23 in Chapter Five). Both Chinese and British respondents were inclined to universal-interest values more than the other two dimensions of values. Respondents from both countries reported stronger collective-interest values than individual-interest values.

There are slight differences between the two samples' individual-interest (Effect size=-0.3) and universal-interest values (Effect size=0.1). British respondents reported slightly stronger individual-interest values than Chinese respondents. However, Chinese respondents reported slightly stronger universal-interest values than British respondents.

For specific values, the value of effect size shows that respondents from both countries reported very slightly different value inclinations toward 'personal security', 'personal achievement', 'self-direction' (independent thinking and action), and 'stimulation' (opening to change), 'face' (caring about self-image), 'commitment to tradition', 'conformity' (restraint of actions), and 'universalism' (difference tolerance) (Effect size < 0.5).

There are considerable differences between the two samples according to the effect size value. First, Chinese respondents reported stronger collective-interest values than the British

respondents (Effect size=0.7). For the specific values in each dimension, Chinese respondents generally demonstrated weaker inclinations toward ‘hedonism’ (enjoying life) (Effect size=-0.9) and ‘power’ (controlling people or resources) (Effect size=-0.9) than British respondents. However, Chinese respondents showed a stronger inclination toward the value of ‘universalism’ (caring for universal issues) (Effect size=0.7) and ‘benevolence’ (dependability/ responsibility/caring) (Effect size=0.9) than the British respondents. The analysis is conducted again with the personal cultural value as an ordinal variable (a clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (see Table A9 in Appendix)

Table 5. 23: Mean score of Personal Cultural Value Subscales (China vs. England)

Cultural Value Subscales	Culture Values	samples	Mean	SD	Effect size
Individual-interest cultural value Subscale	Personal Security(B1/B2) (safety)	China	4.6	0.7	0.4
		England	4.3	1.0	
	Achievement(B3/B7) (personal success)	China	4.2	0.8	0.2
		England	4.0	0.9	
	Hedonism(B11/B19) (pleasure, enjoying life)	China	2.1	1.0	-0.9
		England	3.1	1.1	
	Power(B21/B24) (control over people and resources)	China	1.5	0.8	-0.9
		England	2.2	1.0	
	Self-direction(B17/B18) (independent thought and action choosing)	China	3.3	0.9	0.2
		England	3.1	1.1	
Stimulation(B12/B20) (opening to change)	China	2.8	1.2	-0.4	
	England	3.3	1.0		
Humility(B6/B23) (humble)	China	3.7	1.0	0.7	
	England	3.0	1.0		
Face (B15/B25) (self-image)	China	3.0	1.2	-0.4	
	England	3.5	1.0		
Collective-interest cultural value Subscale	Tradition (B4/B13) (commitment and acceptance of the customs)	China	3.5	0.9	0.1
		England	3.4	0.9	
	Conformity (B5* /B22) (restraint of actions)	China	3.9	0.9	0.4
England		3.5	0.9		
Benevolence (B8/B16) (dependability/responsibility/ caring)	China	4.5	0.8	0.9	
	England	3.8	0.9		
Universal-interest cultural value Subscale	Universalism (B9 /B14) (tolerance)	China	4.1	0.9	-0.1
		England	4.2	0.8	
	Universalism (B10) (caring for universal issues of	China	4.2	1.2	0.7
		England	3.4	1.3	

	nature & animals protection)				
Individual-interest Cultural Value Subscale	China	3.2	0.4	-0.3	
	England	3.3	0.4		
Collective-interest Cultural Value Subscale	China	4.0	0.6	0.7	
	England	3.6	0.6		
Universal-interest Cultural Value Subscale	China	4.1	0.8	0.1	
	England	4.0	0.8		

*Negative question; N=1,950; Missing data = 0.2-1.8%; The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree strongly), with a higher score meaning a stronger value inclination.

5.9 Description of parenting

The whole sample reported a relatively high score on perceived parenting (M=4.3, SD=0.8; for more details, see Table A11 in Appendix). It indicates that respondents generally perceived positive parenting at home. Looking at the items on the scale closely, the whole sample got the highest mean score on ‘encouraging parenting’ (M=4.5, SD=1.0) and the lowest mean score on ‘equal parent-children relation’ (M=4.0, SD=1.4) among all the parenting styles. It implies that respondents generally had the most positive experience of being encouraged by parents or caretakers than other parenting styles. They generally had the least positive experience of enjoying an equal relationship with parents or caretakers at home.

The respondents for the two countries reported very similar perceived parenting (Effect size=0.1, see Table 5.24). The effect size value also shows that Chinese and British respondents experienced the same in terms of ‘encouraging parenting’ and ‘equal parents-children relationship (parents and children getting along in an equal and respectful way)’ (Effect size=0). The respondents reported slightly different perceived parenting regarding ‘supportive parenting’, ‘fair family rules’, and ‘honest parenting’. Chinese respondents generally reported less supportive parenting than British respondents (Effect size=-0.2). However, Chinese respondents reported they experienced fairer family rules (Effect size=0.3), and their parents were more honest with them than British respondents (Effect size=0.2).

Chinese respondents got the highest mean score on ‘encouraging parenting’ among all the parenting styles. In contrast, British respondents gained the highest mean score on ‘supporting parenting’. Chinese respondents reported the lowest mean score on ‘equal parents-children relationship’. In contrast, British respondents reported the lowest mean score on ‘honest parenting’. The analysis is conducted again with parenting as an ordinal variable (a clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (see Table A12 in Appendix).

Table 5. 24: Mean score of Parenting Scale with missing data (China vs. England)

Items	Samples	Mean	SD	Effect size	No response (%)
Encouraging (B26)	China	4.5	1.0	0	1.2
	England	4.5	0.8		1.1
Supportive (B27)	China	4.4	1.1	-0.2	1.1
	England	4.6	0.8		1.1
Fair (family rules) (B28)	China	4.4	1.2	0.3	0.8
	England	4.0	1.2		2.7
Equal (parents-children relationship)(B29)	China	4.0	1.4	0	1.4
	England	4.0	1.2		2.2
Honest (parenting)(B30)	China	4.1	1.3	0.2	1.6
	England	3.8	1.3		1.6
Total Parenting Scale	China	4.3	0.8	0.1	
	England	4.2	0.7		

N=1,950; The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree strongly), with a higher score meaning more positive parenting.

5.10 Description of school climate

Like parenting, the whole sample reported a positive perceived school climate (M=4.3, SD=0.8, for more details, see Table A13 in Appendix). The whole sample reported the lowest score on ‘equal teachers-students relationship’ (M=3.9, SD=1.4) and the highest score on ‘fair school rule’ (M=4.6, SD=1.0) among all the aspects of school climate.

Generally, there is a slight difference in the reported school climate between the two samples from the two countries (Effect size=0.4, see Table 5.25). Respondents from the two countries also reported that they experienced slightly different school climates regarding encouragement, support, equal teacher-students relationship and being treated fairly by

teachers (Effect size < 0.5). Both Chinese and British respondents reported the lowest mean score on ‘equal teacher-student relationship’ among all the aspects of school climate.

However, there is a medium difference in the reported school climate in terms of ‘honest teaching’ and ‘fair school rules’ between the two samples. Chinese respondents reported that they experienced fairer school rules, and their teachers were more honest with them than British respondents (Effect size = 0.5). Chinese respondents obtained the highest mean score on ‘fair school rules’ among all the aspects of school climate (M = 4.6, SD = 0.9). British respondents got the highest mean score on ‘encouraging’ and ‘supportive’ teaching (M = 4.3, SD = 1.0). The analysis is conducted again with the school climate as an ordinal variable (a clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (see Table A14 in Appendix).

Table 5. 25: Mean score of School Climate Scale with missing data (China vs. England)

Items	Samples	Mean	SD	Effect size	No response (%)
Encouraging (B31)	China	4.5	1.0	0.2	1.5
	England	4.3	1.0		1.1
Supportive (B32)	China	4.2	1.2	-0.1	1.4
	England	4.3	1.0		1.1
Equal (teacher-students relationship) (B33)	China	4.0	1.4	0.3	1.1
	England	3.6	1.4		1.6
Fair (treatment of students) (B34)	China	4.4	1.2	0.4	1.0
	England	3.9	1.3		1.6
Honest (teaching) (B35)	China	4.5	1.0	0.5	0.9
	England	3.9	1.2		1.6
Fair (school rules) (B36)	China	4.6	0.9	0.5	0.9
	England	4.1	1.2		1.6
Total Schooling Scale	China	4.3	0.7	0.4	
	England	4.0	0.9		

N = 1,950; The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5 = agree strongly, 1 = disagree strongly), with a higher score meaning a more positive school environment.

5.11 Description of cultural norms

Generally, the whole sample got a higher mean score on the Total Injunctive Norm Scale (M = 4.5, SD = 1.0) than on the Descriptive Norm Scale (M = 4.2, SD = 0.8, for more details, see

Table A15 in Appendix). It implies that the overall respondents' understanding of moral traits is influenced more by injunctive norms than descriptive norms. The mean score value also shows that the overall respondents' understanding of moral traits is more consistent with their parents' (M=4.5, SD=0.9) than teachers' (M=4.3, SD=1.0) and peers'(M=3.8, SD=1.3). It implies that respondents' moral views are influenced more by their parents than by teachers and peers.

The Effect size value shows that Chinese and British respondents' moral understanding is influenced similarly by overall descriptive norms (Effect size=0.1, see Table 5.26). Among the three descriptive norms, teachers' and peers' influence on Chinese respondents' moral understanding is the same as that on British respondents' (Effect size=0). Chinese respondents' moral views are influenced slightly more by parents than by British respondents (Effect size=0.2).

The apparent difference between the two samples is the injunctive norm. Chinese respondents' moral views are influenced more by social or national approval than British respondents (Effect size=0.8). The analysis is conducted again with the cultural norm as an ordinal variable (a clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (see Table A16 in Appendix).

Table 5. 26: Mean score of Cultural Norm Scales with missing data (China vs. England)

Items	Samples	Mean	SD	Effect size	No response (%)
Descriptive Norm (Peers)	China	3.8	1.3	0	2.2
	England	3.8	1.2		3.7
Descriptive Norm (Teachers)	China	4.3	1.0	0	2.4
	England	4.3	0.9		3.7
Descriptive Norm (Parents)	China	4.5	0.9	0.2	2.2
	England	4.3	1.0		3.7
Total Descriptive Norm Scale	China	4.2	0.9	0.1	
	England	4.1	0.8		
Injunctive Norm Scale	China	4.6	0.9	0.8	2.1
	England	3.8	1.4		3.7

N=821; The score is calculated based on a 5-point Likert Scale (5=agree strongly, 1=disagree strongly), with a higher score meaning a stronger norm inclination.

5.12 Summary

This chapter describes the general picture of young adolescents' moral identity, relative moral views, behaviour and perceived culture. At the same time, Chinese and British respondents shared similarities in moral identity, understanding of moral traits, moral behaviour patterns, cultural values and norms. However, there are still some differences between the two samples.

5.12.1 The whole sample

The whole sample gets a high mean score on the overall Moral Identity Scale. The whole sample's overall value commitment is consistent with their overall importance of moral values. However, for specific values, there is a gap between their moral value and value commitment intention regarding honesty. The whole sample demonstrates a broad understanding of moral traits a person should have. 'Honest' comes to the top. However, 'exemplary' is selected the least by the whole sample.

For moral behaviour, the whole sample tended to donate the most rewarded money to a charity program. At the same time, they were inclined to distribute gifts equally to a stranger. The whole sample demonstrated a similar actual behaviour pattern in the game observation as their intention in the survey. However, there is still a proportion of respondents who actually donated or shared less than their suggestions. The whole sample reported that their moral behaviour was driven by internal factors more than external factors.

The whole sample reported the strongest inclination toward universal-interest values among the three dimensions of cultural values. They were also inclined to collective-interest values more than individual-interest values. The whole sample reported a positively perceived parenting and school environment. The whole sample reported that their understanding of moral traits is influenced more by the injunctive norm than the descriptive norm.

There are some differences between respondents from big and smaller cities. For example, Chinese respondents from a big city reported a lower average score on the Total Moral Identity Scale than those from smaller cities. However, the proportion of students from a big city who donated less than their intention is slightly smaller than that of students from smaller cities.

The potential social desirability difference caused by different places the survey and game observation conducted is not observed according to the data. For example, unexpectedly, the British responses online showed a higher average score on the Total Moral Identity Scale than those offline. Chinese participants who joined the game observation outside school showed more consistent behaviour than those who joined the game observation in school.

5.12.2 Similarities in moral views, moral behaviour and cultures between the two samples

The respondents from both countries generally reported a relatively strong moral identity. Chinese and British respondents have the similarity that having some moral qualities (e.g. being fair, honest and kind) is essential to themselves. They also have similar ideas that being honest is more important than being fair and kind (or not hurting). However, being kind is the least important of the three moral traits. Young adolescents from both countries generally showed commitment intention to their moral values. It is worth noting that both Chinese and British respondents reported the same commitment intention to being kind (not hurting). They also reported the weakest intention of committing to being honest among the three moral value commitments.

Respondents from both countries have some similar understanding of moral traits. First, the trait 'honest' is included in the top three important moral traits in the ranking for respondents from both countries. Secondly, there is a relatively massive overlap between the two countries

regarding the top ten rankings. Six traits are listed in the top ten for both countries, including 'honest', 'polite', 'respectful', 'fair', 'loyal', and 'friendly'.

The Chinese and British respondents demonstrated the same pattern of behaviour intention in the questionnaire survey. Respondents from both countries generally intended to donate all the money to charity and equally distribute gifts to a stranger. They also demonstrated a similar behaviour pattern in the observed sharing task, consistent with the general sharing intention trend. Therefore, the proportion of respondents who actually shared fewer with a stranger than they suggested is similar between the countries. For behaviour motivation, both Chinese and British young adolescents' moral behaviour would be more motivated by adults or authorities than peers. Teachers are less authorized than parents in young adolescents' minds.

Both Chinese and British respondents were more inclined toward universal-interest values than individual-interest and collective-interest values. They also reported a stronger tendency toward collective-interest values than individual-interest values. They have a similar inclination toward universal-interest and individual-interest values. The overall respondents' understanding of moral traits is influenced more by injunctive norms than descriptive norms. Chinese and British respondents' moral understanding is influenced similarly by overall descriptive norms. Specifically, their parents influence their understanding of moral traits more than teachers and peers.

Respondents from both countries reported they experienced similar parenting at home, especially being encouraged and enjoying an equal relationship with their parents. Their perceived school climate is not considerably different. Respondents from both countries reported the lowest mean score on 'equal teacher-student relationship' among all the aspects of school climate.

5.12.3 Differences in moral views, moral behaviour and cultures between the two samples

Apart from similarities, the respondents from the two countries also have differences in moral views, moral behaviour, behaviour motivation and cultures. Chinese respondents showed a stronger overall moral identity than British respondents. Importantly, they tended to commit to their moral values much more than British respondents. Specifically, Chinese respondents reported a much stronger intention to commit to being fair and honest than British respondents.

Chinese and British respondents have different understandings of moral traits. For example, Chinese respondents selected all of the forty-five traits as the most important moral traits to different degrees. However, British respondents did not select some traits (e.g. compassionate, selfless, optimistic, perseverant, exemplary, consistent, and self-disciplined).

Chinese respondents demonstrated more generous intention and actual behaviour than British respondents, especially money donation. Chinese respondents generally showed a more consistent behaviour for both money donation and gift sharing. However, the proportion of British participants who actually shared more than their intention is bigger than that of Chinese participants. Chinese respondents' moral behaviour is more likely to be motivated by internal factors (e.g. self) than external factors (e.g. teachers, parents, peers and others).

Chinese respondents reported a slightly stronger collective-interest value inclination than British respondents. Specifically, Chinese respondents generally demonstrated weaker inclinations toward the value of 'hedonism' (enjoying life) and 'power' (controlling people or resources) (included in the individual-interest value dimension) than British respondents. Chinese respondents' moral views are influenced much more by the injunctive norm (social approval) than British respondents. Respondents from both countries reported a more different perceived school climate than parenting. Generally, Chinese respondents reported that they experienced slightly more positive parenting and school climate than British

respondents.

The proportion of British participants who have pocket money is more considerable than that of Chinese participants. The percentage of British respondents who thought the rewarded money (2 pounds or 20RMB) is not too much is bigger than that of Chinese respondents.

CHAPTER SIX

THE REGRESSION MODELS OF MORAL IDENTITY

Chapter Five described the general moral identity of the whole sample and the similarities and differences in moral identity between the samples from the two countries. The whole sample gained a relatively high mean score on the total Moral Identity Scale ($M=4.6$, $SD=0.5$). The respondents from both countries generally reported a similar mean score on the Self-reported Important Moral Value Subscale (Effect size=0.3). However, there are still some differences in moral identity between the two samples. For example, Chinese respondents showed a higher mean score on the total Moral Identity Scale (Effect size=0.6) and Value Commitment Intention Subscale than British respondents (Effect size=0.8).

Some differences and similarities between the samples from the two countries were also found in the background information, such as parents' jobs, parents' origins, parenting styles, school environment, only child or not in the family and spoken language at home. Moral identity also has age and sex differences (e.g. Arnold, 1993; Patrick et al., 2018; Pratt et al., 2003). These are sampling differences rather than nationality, which might help explain differences in self-reports of moral identity.

The following section will explain young adolescents' moral identity differences between the two countries with the available background information. It also checks how much personal cultural values and nationality explain the different degrees of moral identity between the respondents from the two countries when sampling differences are controlled.

The results demonstrated in this chapter mainly respond to research question 5: Are any differences in moral identity linked to children's cultural differences? The regression models show that the variation in children's reported moral identity are predicted by their personal

value difference and national difference when some background variables are controlled. For the British sample, children's moral identity is also related to their spoken languages.

6.1 Regression models of the overall moral identity

This section will check how much the available variables, especially cultural values and nationality, predict the overall moral identity variation (the total Moral Identity Scale). Regression models are constructed to examine the background predictors in predicting moral identity. Another model is created to check how the three dimensions of cultural values (Individual-interest, Collective-interest and Universal-interest Cultural Values) and nationalities explain the young adolescents' overall moral identity variation when the background predictors are controlled.

6.1.1 Regression model to filter the background predictors of overall moral identity

The primary background factors include age, sex, parents' or carers' occupation, the only child in the family, parenting style, and school environment. They are the shared background variables between the Chinese and British samples.

First, linear regression models are generated to include background variables as predictors (independent variables) of the overall cognitive moral identity (dependent variable). The numerical variables include age, parenting style, school environment, and moral identity. Parents' or carers' occupation, Sex and the only child in the family are dummy variables (categorical variables) (see Section 4.3 in Chapter Four). The linear regression model with 'stepwise-entry of variables' (all the background variables are added to the model together to see their combined prediction) shows that the combined variation in the background variables predicts 10% of the overall moral identity variation ($R^2=0.10$).

The other linear regression model with 'forward entry of variables' (background variables are added to the model individually to see which background variables are predictors) indicates

that only three background variables are related to overall moral identity. The school environment is the strongest predictor, followed by parenting style. The respondents who reported more positive parenting and school environment have a stronger moral identity. Sex is the weakest one among background predictors. Girls keep a stronger moral identity than boys and other sexual identifiers (see Table 6.1).

Comparing the two model summaries, the three background variables (parenting, school environment and sex) contribute the same prediction proportion as all background variables ($R^2=0.10$). The school environment explains 8% of the variation in moral identity ($R^2=0.08$). Parenting explains 2% of the variation in moral identity (R^2 value increasing from 0.08 to 0.10). The prediction of sex is very weak because the R^2 value almost does not change.

It indicates that the rest of the background variables, such as parents' jobs, the only child in the family or not, and age, are not related to overall moral identity too much. Therefore, school environment, parenting style and sex will be controlled as the background predictors in the following linear regression analysis for the whole sample.

Table 6. 1: Coefficients for the model predicting the overall moral identity from background variables (Forward entry of background variables)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
Positive school environment	0.14	0.21
Positive parenting style	0.10	0.15
*Girl or not	0.05	0.04

N=1,950; Dependent variable: overall moral identity (Total Moral Identity Scale)

*Dummy variables

6.1.2 Regression model to filter the special predictors (family origin and language) for the British sample

The family origin and language variables are diverse only for the British sample. The following linear regression analysis observes if the family origin and spoken language at

home (independent variables) predict the British sample's overall moral identity variation (dependent variable) when the basic background variables are controlled. The two independent variables are dummy variables (categorical variables) (see Section 4.3 in Chapter Four). The variables of family origin and spoken language at home are added to the model individually (forward entry variables) when other predicting background variables (school environment, parenting and sex) are added as covariates in the model.

Only 'speaking England and another language equally at home' enters the model when other basic background variables are controlled. It predicts 2% of the variation of the overall moral identity (R^2 value increasing from 0.09 to 0.11). Respondents who speak two languages at home tend to report a weaker moral identity than those who only speak English or another language at home ($\beta=-0.15$). Family origin (parents' birthplace) is not related to the overall moral identity.

6.1.3 Regression model to filter to cultural predictors

A linear regression model with three blocks is built to observe whether personal cultural values and nationalities (independent variables) are still associated with the overall moral identity (dependent variable) when background predictors are controlled. Personal cultural values are numerical variables, and nationality is a dummy variable (categorical variable) (see Section 4.3 in Chapter Four). The three background factors (school environment, parenting style and sex) were entered into the model simultaneously as covariates in block 1. The three dimensions of cultural values (individual, collective, and universal-interest values) are added forward to the model in block 2. It is to check which groups of cultural values would predict the overall moral identity. And then, the variable of nationalities (living in China or England) will be added forward in the model in block 3. It aims to check whether nationalities or living in different countries is related to the overall moral identity when all the available sampling differences are controlled.

The result shows that the three dimensions of cultural values and nationality still enter the model when background predictors are controlled. It implies that personal cultural values and nationality are predictors of the overall moral identity when predicting background variables are controlled. The three background variables can predict 10% of the overall moral identity variation. Cultural values can predict 5% more (R^2 value increasing from 0.10 to 0.15). Moreover, the nationalities of the respondents can explain 2% of the variation of the overall moral identity (R^2 value increasing from 0.15 to 0.17).

Among the three dimensions of cultural values, individual-interest cultural values are the strongest predictor ($\beta=-0.15$, see Table 6.2). It implies that the respondents inclined toward individual-interest cultural values would hold a weaker overall moral identity if all relevant background factors were the same. The second predictor is the universal-interests cultural values. The result indicates that universal-interest cultural values are associated with moral values positively ($\beta=0.16$). The respondents with stronger universal-interest cultural values would keep a stronger overall moral identity than others when other variables are the same. The collective-interest cultural values are the weakest indicator for predicting overall moral identity ($\beta=0.06$). The respondents who hold stronger collective-interest cultural values reported a stronger overall moral identity when other variables are the same.

When the variables of background information and personal cultural values are controlled, the variable of respondents' nationalities (residential country) still contributes to the prediction. Respondents living in China still tend to report stronger moral identity than respondents in England when available background variables and personal cultural values are controlled ($\beta=0.17$). It implies that young adolescents' self-reports of overall moral identity have a national difference.

Table 6. 2: Coefficients for the model predicting the overall moral identity from personal cultural values and nationality with background predictors controlled

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
Dimensions of personal cultural values——Individual-interest	-0.20	-0.15

——Universal-interest	0.09	0.16
——Collective-interest	0.04	0.06
*Nationality (living in China or not)	0.30	0.17

N=1,950; Dependent variable: overall moral identity

*Dummy variables

6.2 Summary

Generally, only three background variables predict the overall moral identity. The school environment is the strongest background predictor, followed by parenting, and sex is the weakest. Respondents who feel a positive school environment or parenting reported a strong overall moral identity. Girls tend to hold a stronger overall cognitive moral identity than boys and other sexual identities. The unique background variables for the British sample are family origin and spoken language in the family. However, only spoken language explains the variation in the overall moral identity of the British sample.

When the three background variables are controlled, the cultural values still predict overall moral identity. As the strongest predictor, individual-interest cultural values negatively predict the overall moral identity. Universal-interest cultural value is related to the general moral identity positively. Collective-interest cultural values are the weakest predictor, positively predicting moral identity.

Respondents' nationalities still explain moral identity variation when personal cultural values and background predictors are controlled. Chinese respondents are more likely to hold a stronger moral identity than British respondents when other factors are the same. It indicates that the moral identity differences are not only related to the sampling differences but also the country difference.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE REGRESSION MODELS OF BEHAVIOUR CONSISTENCY

The data description in Chapter five shows that participants across the two countries generally showed three kinds of behaviours in two given contexts: (1) behaved the same as their intention, (2) did more than their intention, and (3) did less than their intention. The closer the participants' action is to their intention, the more their behaviour is identified as consistent. Generally, more than half of the whole sample showed consistent behaviours in both tasks.

However, there are some differences between samples from the two countries. Chinese participants demonstrated a firmer consistency between their intention and actual conduct than British respondents. A considerable difference exists between the participants' behaviours from the two countries in the donation task. The proportion of Chinese participants who donated the same as or more than they suggested is much bigger than that of British participants. There is a smaller gap between Chinese and British participants in sharing behaviour consistency.

First, this chapter will examine how the background variables (including pocket money and attitude toward money) and related cultural variables explain the differences in behaviour consistency among the participants from the two countries. The related cultural variables include personal cultural values, norm primings and nationality. Unlike Chinese participants, British participants are diverse in spoken language at home and family origins. Therefore, the British sample will be checked individually with the variables of spoken language and family origins, just like the overall moral identity regression model. After all the background variables are controlled, the association between the cultural variables and behaviour

consistency will be observed.

The findings shown in this chapter respond to the research question 5: Are any differences in moral behaviour linked to children's cultural differences? The regression models showed that the variation in children's donation behaviour consistency is related to their national difference when some background variables are controlled. The variation of children's sharing behaviour consistency is predicted by their value inclination difference when some background variables are controlled.

7.1 Regression models of donation behaviour consistency

Linear regression models are built to observe the background predictors (independent variables) of behaviour consistency (dependent variable). Then another regression model is run to examine how culture-related variables (independent variables) predict behaviour consistency (dependent variable) when the predicting background variables are controlled.

7.1.1 Linear regression models to filter the background predictors

The numerical variables include age, parenting style, and school environment. Parents' or carers' occupation, Sex, the only child in the family, participants' attitudes toward money, and pocket money are dummy variables (categorical variables). Donation behaviour consistency (depending on the difference between the actually donated money and the money intended for donation) is a numerical variable (see Section 4.3 in Chapter Four). A regression model with 'entered entry of variables' (all the background variables are added to the model together to see their combined prediction) shows that the percentage of combined prediction of all the background variables is around 10% ($R^2=0.10$). The second model with "forward entry variables" (all the background variables are added to the model individually to see which variables are predictors) demonstrates that three background variables are filtered as predictors. They are parents' (carers') jobs, the only child in the family or not and the school environment. The three background variables together explain 9% of the variation of

donation behaviour consistency. Parents' (cares') job is the strongest predictor, explaining 5% of the variation ($R^2=0.05$). It is followed by the variable 'the only child in the family or not', explaining 2% of the variation (R^2 value increasing from 0.05 to 0.07). The school environment is the weakest predictor explaining only 2% of the variation (R^2 value increasing from 0.07 to 0.09). The model shows that the rest of the variables, such as age, sex, parenting style, school environment, and participants' attitudes toward money and having pocket money or not, are not associated with donation behaviour consistency.

The coefficients indicate that parents' jobs negatively predict participants' consistent donation behaviour. It implies that participants with parents who do 'working' jobs or have no jobs are more likely to donate less than their intention than other participants (whose parents do 'professional' jobs or 'intermediate' jobs) ($\beta=-0.24$, see Table 7.1). The 'only child in the family' positively relates to the consistent donation behaviour ($\beta=0.15$). It can be interpreted that participants who are the only child in their family are less likely to donate less than their suggestion compared with the participants who have siblings. Finally, the school environment is negatively associated with consistent donation behaviour ($\beta=-0.15$). It implies that the more positive the school environment participants reported, the less they donated than what they intended.

Table 7. 1: Coefficients of the model predicting donation behaviour consistency from background variables (forward entry of background variables)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
* Parents' job——'working' jobs vs. other jobs	-0.30	-0.24
*Only child or not	0.17	0.15
Positive school environment	-0.11	-0.15

N=274; Dependent variable: donation behaviour consistency

*Dummy variables

7.1.2 Regression model to filter the cultural predictors

A linear regression model with four blocks is built to check how the three key dimensions of personal cultural values, norm primings and nationality predict donation behaviour

consistency with controlled background variables. Personal cultural values are numerical variables. Norm priming and nationality are dummy variables (categorical variables) (see Section 4.3 in Chapter Four). First, the three background predictors (parents' jobs, only child in the family and school environment) are entered into block 1 simultaneously to be controlled. Then, the three cultural value groups are added forward to block 2 when the background variables are controlled. Then the norm primings are added forward to block 3 when background variables and personal cultural values are controlled. Finally, the participants' nationality is added forward to block 4 when all other predicting variables are controlled.

The three dimensions of personal cultural values and norm primings are not included in block 2 or block 3 of the model when background predictors are controlled. It indicates that participants' inclination toward individual, collective or universal-interest cultural values are not associated with their donation behaviour. The cultural norm primings are also not related to participants' donation behaviour.

However, participants' nationality predicts 15% of the variation of donation behaviour consistency when other variables are controlled (R^2 value increasing from 0.09 to 0.24). The coefficient of 0.42 for the nationality variable means that participants living in China are less likely to donate less than their intention than those living in England (see Table 7.2). It implies that participants' donation behaviour consistency is related to their country's differences besides their other background differences.

Table 7. 2: Coefficients of the model predicting donation behaviour consistency from nationality with other variables controlled (forward entry of residential countries)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
*Nationality—living in China or not	0.79	0.42

N=274; Dependent variable: donation behaviour consistency

*Dummy variables

7.2 Regression models of sharing behaviour consistency

The same as donation behaviour, participants also demonstrated three kinds of sharing behaviour: (1) distributed the same as they intended; (2) distributed more than they intended; (3) distributed less than they intended. Since more than half (64%) of the participants distributed precisely the same as their intention, participants who distributed more or less than they intended are two kinds of exceptional cases. Therefore, instead of focusing on most participants' behaviour, examining the predictors of exceptional cases (distributed more or less than intention) would be more straightforward.

7.2.1 Regression models to filter the background predictors

Two binary logistic regression models are constructed to examine the prediction of background variables (independent variables) to sharing behaviour consistency (distributing more or less than intention, dependent variable). The sharing behaviour consistency is a categorical variable (sharing more or fewer balls than intention). The first model (with all the background variables being added to the model) checks how all the available background variables predict the variation of sharing behaviour. Like the model predicting donation behaviour consistency, the background variables being added to the model simultaneously are age, sex, parents' (carers') jobs, the only child in the family, parenting style, school environment, and participants' attitudes toward money and pocket money. The model with all background variables entered shows that the background variables contribute 5.1 to the overall percentage correct (overall percentage correct value increasing from 65.3 to 70.4). It implies that all the available background variables only explain 5.1% of the variation of the sharing behaviour.

The other binary logistic regression model is built with all the background variables added to the model individually to observe which variables are predictors. The result shows that only sex is the background predictor of the sharing behaviour. The odds of 2.52 for the sex mean that girls are 152% more likely than boys to distribute fewer bouncy balls to the researcher than intended (see Table 7.3). However, the overall percentage correct did not change after

the sex variable was entered in the model. This implies that sex is not a strong predictor. The rest of the background variables are not related to sharing behaviour consistency.

Table 7. 3: Odds of binary logistic regression model predicting sharing behaviour consistency (distributing more or less than intention) from background values (forward entry of background variables)

Predicting Variables	B	Exp(B) or odds
Sex—Girls vs. Boys	0.92	2.52

N=98; Code of dependent variable: distributing less than intention =1; distributing more than intention=0

7.2.2 Regression model to filter the cultural predictors

A binary regression model with four blocks is built to check how the culture-related variables explain the variation of sharing behaviour consistency. Like the regression analysis of donation behaviour consistency, the culture-related variables still include personal cultural values, norm primings and nationality. First, the background predictor (sex) is controlled in block 1. Then, the three culture-related variables are added to block2, block3 and block4 forward, respectively, to observe whether they are predictors when other predicting variables are controlled.

The result demonstrates that only the collective-interest cultural value predicts sharing behaviour. The collective-interest cultural value would explain 4.1% of the variation of the sharing behaviour consistency (the overall percentage correct value increasing from 65.3 to 69.4).

The odds of 2.11 (see Table 7.4) imply that participants inclined toward collective-interest cultural values are 111% more likely to distribute less than they intended than those who are not. It would be interpreted that participants who keep solid collective-interest cultural values are more likely to distribute less than their intention than those who do not.

Table 7. 4: Odds of binary logistic regression model predicting sharing behaviour consistency (distributing more or less than intention) from three dimensions of cultural values (forward entry of cultural value dimension variables)

Predicting Variables	B	Exp(B) or odds
Dimensions of personal cultural values —Collective-interest	0.75	2.11

N=98; Code of dependent variable: distributing less than intention =1; distributing more than intention=0

The variables of the other two dimensions of cultural values, cultural norm primings and nationality, are excluded from the model. It indicates that they are not associated with participants' sharing behaviour consistency.

7.3 Regression models to filter special predictors for British sample

Linear regression models are built to examine the prediction of British participants' family origins and spoken language at home to their donation behaviour consistency when other background variables are controlled. All other relevant background variables, including age, sex, gender, the only child in the family, parents' job, the school environment, parenting style, pocket money and attitudes toward the rewarded money, are controlled in block 1. Then, the variable of family origins and spoken language are added individually to block 2 of the model. The result showed that neither family origin nor spoken language is included in the model, implying that participants' family origin and spoken language at home are unrelated to their donation behaviours if other available background variables were the same.

Following similar steps as the model of donation behaviour consistency, binary regression models are built to check the prediction of the two unique background variables to British participants' sharing behaviour consistency. The result indicates that the two unique variables do not predict sharing behaviour consistency.

7.4 Summary

This chapter checked background and culture-related predictors of participants' behaviour consistency in two contexts (donation and sharing tasks). Linear regression models were run

to observe the predictors of donation behaviours. In contrast, binary logistic regression models were built to check the predictors of sharing behaviours.

For the background predictors, three background variables predict the donation behaviour consistency. The strongest one is the participants' parents' (carers') occupation. Participants who have parents doing 'working' jobs or having no jobs are less likely to show consistent behaviour in the donation task than those whose parents (carers) are doing other jobs (e.g. 'professional' and 'intermediate' jobs). The second strong predictor is the only child in the family or not. The participants who are the only child in their family are more likely to donate consistently with their intention than those with siblings. Finally, the reported school environment is the weakest predictor. The more positive the participants reported their school environment, the less consistently they would donate with their suggestions. In contrast, participants' sharing behaviours are only predicted by sex. Girls are more likely to distribute balls inconsistently with their intention than boys. Moreover, the unique background variables (spoken language and family origins) are not associated with the behaviour consistency of British participants.

None of the three dimensions of personal cultural values predicts donation behaviour consistency. Participants' sharing behaviours are related to the collective-interest cultural values, unlike donation behaviour. Participants who are inclined toward collective-interests cultural values are more likely to distribute fewer balls than their suggestions than those who are not.

Cultural norm primings are related to neither behaviours consistency (donation or sharing). The participants' nationality predicts the variation of donation behaviour consistency rather than sharing behaviour consistency. Chinese respondents are still less likely to donate less than their intention than British participants when other variables are the same.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PREDICTING MORAL BEHAVIOUR FROM MORAL IDENTITY AND MORAL MOTIVATION

This chapter demonstrates how moral identity and behaviour motivation predict actual behaviour and behaviour consistency. Existing research has shown that a solid moral identity would lead to a commitment to values (e.g. Reed & Aquino, 2002; Black & Reynolds, 2016). It suggests that strong moral values would predict corresponding behaviour in the actual contexts, such as donation, sharing and civic engagement (e.g. Porter, 2013; Sanders et al., 2018; Winterich, Aquino, et al., 2013). The behaviour observed in this study is about sharing and helping. The Moral Identity Scale is about the values of being kind (not hurting others), honest and fair. Even though measured values and observed behaviours are not matching each other perfectly, they are all related to widely accepted moral traits. Most existing research focused on adults or late adolescents in this field. One of the analyse' purposes is to check if young adolescents' moral identity predicts their actual moral behaviour as adults and late adolescents do. Another purpose is to validate the revised Moral Identity Scale by comparing its prediction of moral behaviour with similar measures in existing research.

This chapter will also check the association between moral motivation and moral behaviours. It suggests that individuals identify their self-reported importance of moral values based on two stimuli: Symbolisation and Internalisation (or public and private views) (e.g. Reed & Aquino, 2002; Erikson, 1964). The symbolised motivation stresses one's sensitivity to being a moral person in public view. At the same time, 'Internalisation' emphasises the importance of satisfying the self-standard of morality. Reed and Aquino's (2002) research also showed that only a strong internalised moral identity would predict actual donation behaviour among high school students. Therefore, the present study will examine the prediction of two kinds of motivations for three kinds of moral behaviour (value commitment intention to moral values,

actual moral behaviour and moral behaviour consistency) among young adolescents.

Most of the research on moral identity examined the predictors (e.g. self-reported importance of moral values, motivations) of moral behaviour intention or actual moral conduct. Few studies focus on the consistency between intention and actual behaviour. The present study will examine the prediction of moral identity and moral motivation to behaviour consistency among young adolescents.

Finally, the current analysis will consider the sampling difference more than previous research. Sex and age were usually controlled in the regression models in the previous study (e.g. Black & Reynolds, 2016; Aquino & Reed, 2002). However, participants' backgrounds (e.g. economic situation, parenting styles and school environment) and culture-related differences are ignored by most previous research. Therefore, the current research will compare the predictions of moral identity to moral behaviour when more background variables are controlled and only sex and age are controlled. Norm primings in behaviour observation are a different design from previous research. Even though it has been shown that norming primings are not related to behaviour consistency, they will be controlled together with sex and age in order to compare the result with previous research.

The findings shown in this chapter mainly respond to research question 6: Does strong moral identity (self-reported importance of moral values and value commitments) predict children's moral behaviour and behaviour consistency in real contexts? Does moral motivation predict moral behaviour? The regression models showed that moral identity predicts both moral behaviour and behaviour consistency to some extent. Moral motivation is only related to value commitment intention.

8.1 Regression models predicting actual moral behaviours from moral identity

Two regression models should be built to check the prediction of the moral identity

(independent variable) to each actual moral behaviour (donation and sharing, dependent variables) with different sets of controlled variables. The first model examines the prediction of the moral identity to moral behaviour with only sex, age and norm primings controlled. Suppose the moral identity predicts actual behaviour when three variables are controlled. In that case, the other model will be generated to check whether moral identity still predicts actual behaviour when more variables are controlled.

8.1.1 Linear regression models predicting donation behaviour from moral identity

The actual donation behaviour is the amount of donated money, which is a numerical variable. A linear regression model with sex, age, and cultural norm primings controlled (as covariates) shows that the overall moral identity explains 8% of the variation of the donation behaviour (R^2 value increasing from 0.02 to 0.10). However, the variables of sex, age and cultural norm primings are not very strong predictors of donation behaviour according to the R^2 value. They only contribute 2% to the prediction.

When the three variables are controlled, moral identity still predicts actual donation behaviour. The coefficients of 0.30 for the overall moral identity imply that a strong moral identity would lead to actual donation behaviour (see Table 8.1). The stronger moral identity participants reported, the more money (the rewarded money) they would donate to the charity in the task.

Table 8. 1: Coefficients of the model predicting actual donation behaviour from moral identity (forward entry of overall moral identity)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
*Sex — Girl or not	0.07	0.07
Age	0.01	0.01
*Norm primings — non-primings vs. primings	-0.02	-0.02
*Norm primings — injunctive norm primings or not	0.07	0.06
*Norm primings — descriptive norm primings (benefit others) or not	0.10	0.09
Overall moral identity	0.25	0.30

N=278; Dependent variable: actual donation behaviour

*Dummy variables

However, when other variables (e.g. parents' occupation, the only child in the family, pocket money, attitudes toward money, school environment, parenting style, personal cultural values and nationality) are controlled (as covariates) in the model, the overall moral identity does not predict the donation behaviour.

Participants' nationalities, school environment, and cultural norm primings are three predictors of donation behaviour among all the background variables. Participants' nationality explains 37% of the donation behaviour variation ($R^2=0.37$). The other two variables contribute only 2% of the prediction (R^2 value increasing from 0.37 to 0.39). Chinese participants donated more than British participants ($\beta=0.61$). A positive school environment leads to generous donation behaviour ($\beta=0.11$). Participants under non-priming donated less money than those under cultural norm primings ($\beta=-0.10$, see Table 8.2).

Table 8. 2: Coefficients of the model predicting actual donation behaviour from background variables (forward entry of variables)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
Nationality—living in China or not	1.08	0.61
Positive school environment	0.08	0.11
*Norm primings—non-primings vs. primings	-0.11	-0.10

N=278; Dependent variable: actual donation behaviour

*Dummy variables

8.1.2 Linear regression model predicting sharing behaviour from moral identity

The sharing behaviour is the amount of shared bouncing balls, which is also a numerical variable. Two linear regression models are built in the same way as donation behaviour (see Section 8.1.1) to observe whether moral identity predicts sharing behaviour when age, sex and cultural norm primings or more variables are controlled. The first model shows that the overall moral identity explains 1% of the variation of actual sharing behaviour in the observation when three variables (age, sex and cultural norm primings) are controlled simultaneously (R^2 value increasing from 0.08 to 0.09). The three controlled variables

together explain 8% of the sharing behaviour variation ($R^2 = 0.08$).

Similarly to donation behaviour, moral identity is also positively related to sharing behaviour ($\beta = 0.12$, see Table 8.3). It indicates that the stronger the participants reported their moral identity, the more bouncy balls they would distribute to the researcher in the game observation.

Table 8. 3: Coefficients of the model predicting actual sharing behaviour from overall moral identity (forward entry of overall moral identity)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
*Sex—Girl or not	-0.28	-0.10
Age	0.004	0.003
*Norm primings—non-primings vs. primings	-1.00	-0.35
*Norm primings—injunctive norm primings or not	-0.87	-0.30
*Norm primings—descriptive norm primings (benefit others) or not	-0.25	-0.08
Overall moral identity	0.28	0.12

N=278; Dependent variable: actual sharing behaviour

*Dummy variables

However, the second model shows that the overall moral identity does not predict actual sharing behaviour when other background variables are entered forward and controlled in the model. It is the same case as donation behaviour.

Among all the variables, primings and having pocket money or not are predictors of the sharing behaviour. They together explain 5% of the sharing behaviour variation ($R^2 = 0.05$). Participants who were told that their classmates distributed most of the balls to the researcher gave more balls to the researcher than those under other primings or non-priming ($\beta = 0.18$). Moreover, participants who had pocket money gave fewer balls to the researcher than those who did not ($\beta = -0.12$, see Table 8.4).

Table 8. 4: Coefficients of the model predicting actual sharing behaviour from background variables (forward entry of variables)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
*Norm primings—primings (benefit others) vs. other primings or non-priming	0.55	0.18
*Having pocket money or not	-0.33	-0.12

N=278; Dependent variable: actual sharing behaviour

*Dummy variables

8.2 The prediction of moral identity to moral behaviour consistency

The section will check the prediction of overall moral identity to donation and sharing behaviour consistency separately with other predicting variables controlled. According to the model for donation behaviour consistency in Chapter seven, participants' parents' occupation, the only child in the family, reported school environment and nationality are related to donation behaviour consistency. Sex and collective-interest personal cultural values explain the variation of sharing behaviour consistency. It was shown that norm primings are not related to behaviour consistency.

Behaviour consistency is determined by the gap between participants' intentions and actual behaviour in current research. However, participants' intentions varied. For example, the money participants intended to donate is different. It varied from none to 2 pounds. The behaviour consistency varies as well. For example, one consistency may be that some participants intended to donate nothing or 0.5 pounds, and they actually did the same. Another consistency may be that some participants intended to donate all the money (2 pounds), and they actually did the same. It is supposed that moral identity is related to commitment to moral values. Donation consistency can be viewed as a commitment to being helpful. Intending to donate nothing or a little does not express a helping value too much. Therefore, only the cases in which the participants intended to donate all the money (2 pounds) are kept in the regression model. On the one hand, intending to donate all the money is a prominent helping value expression. On the other hand, it is fair to regress the behaviour consistency to moral identity when all the participants intended to donate the same money.

The cases of sharing behaviour consistency are cleaned similarly to the donation behaviour consistency. Only the cases in which participants intended to distribute the gift equally are kept because fair distribution delivers the value of being fair. The regression analysis still focuses on two ways of distributing the bouncy balls: distributing (more vs. less) balls to the researcher than their intention.

8.2.1 The prediction of moral identity to donation behaviour consistency

The donation behaviour consistency is still a numerical variable. The linear regression model is built with age, sex and norm primings being added together to the model as covariates (controlled variables). The donation behaviour consistency is the dependent variable. Moral identity is the independent variable. The model shows that moral identity explains 3% of the variation of the donation behaviour consistency when only age, sex, and norm primings are controlled (R^2 value increasing from 0.01 to 0.04). Moral identity positively predicts donation behaviour consistency ($\beta=0.15$, see Table 8.5). Participants who reported a strong moral identity are more likely to show donation behaviour consistency than those who did not. However, when more predictors such as parents' job, only child or not, school environment and nationality enter into the regression model, moral identity cannot predict behaviour consistency. The four variables are proven to predict donation behaviour consistency in Chapter Seven.

Table 8. 5: Coefficients of the model predicting donation behaviour consistency from moral identity (forward entry of variables)

Independent Variables	Unstandardized B Coefficients	Standardized B Coefficients (β)
Overall moral identity	0.13	0.15

N=206; Dependent variable: donation behaviour consistency

8.2.2 The prediction of moral identity to sharing behaviour consistency

The sharing behaviour consistency is still a categorical variable (more or fewer shared balls than intention). The binary regression model is built with age, sex and norm primings being added together to the model as covariates (controlled variables). The sharing behaviour consistency is the dependent variable. Moral identity is the independent variable. The model shows that moral identity predicts sharing behaviour consistency positively when only age, sex and norm primings are controlled. Furthermore, moral identity still predicts the consistency of sharing behaviour when one more predictor (personal cultural values) enters the model. The variable of collective-interest values is shown to predict sharing behaviour consistency in Chapter Seven. The moral identity contributes 2.3 to the overall percentage correct (overall percentage correct value increasing from 88.4 to 90.7), which means that the moral identity explains 2.3% of the variation of the sharing behaviour consistency. The odds of 0.02 for moral identity indicate that participants reporting a strong moral identity are only 2% likely to share fewer balls with the researcher than their intention (see Table 8.6). It indicates that participants who reported a strong moral identity are less likely to share fewer balls than their intention.

Table 8. 6: Odds of binary logistic regression model predicting sharing behaviour consistency (distributing more or less than intention) from moral identity (forward entry of background variables)

Predicting Variables	B	Exp (B) or odds
Overall moral identity	-3.87	0.02

N=43; Code of dependent variable: distributing less than intention =1; distributing more than intention=0

8.3 Regression models predicting moral behaviour from moral motivation

This section will present the results of moral motivation prediction for three kinds of moral behaviours. Three regression models are generated with other predicting variables controlled.

N=1,950; Dependent variable: commitment intention to moral values

*Dummy variables

8.3.2 The prediction of behaviour motivation to actual moral behaviour and moral behaviour consistency

Behaviour motivation and sharing moral consistency are categorical variables. Actual behaviour (donation and sharing) and donation behaviour consistency are numerical variables. Four regression models are built individually, with behaviour motivation as the independent variable and actual moral behaviour as well as behaviour consistency as the dependent variables in the four models, respectively. Regression models show that behaviour motivation is unrelated to any actual moral behaviour or behaviour consistency, even without any other predicting variables being controlled.

8.4 Summary

This chapter has checked whether actual moral behaviour and behaviour consistency can be predicted by overall moral identity and whether behaviour motivation predicts three kinds of moral behaviour. First, overall moral identity predicts actual donation and sharing behaviours with the same controlled variables (sex, age, cultural norm primings) as the existing research. The results are consistent with the previous study. Strong moral identity leads to actual moral behaviours. The stronger moral identity the participants reported, the more money and balls they donated and distributed to others in game observation. However, when more influencing variables are entered and controlled in the model (e.g. nationality, school environment, participants' attitudes toward money), the moral identity does not predict the actual moral behaviours anymore.

Another finding is that the consistency of donation and sharing behaviour can be predicted by moral identity when sex, age and norm primings are controlled. Moral identity cannot predict the consistency of donation behaviour anymore when other predicting variables (e.g. parents'

job, only child, school environment and nationality) are controlled. In contrast, the consistency of donation behaviour can still be predicted by moral identity when one more predicting variable (personal value) is controlled.

Behaviour motivation predicts value commitment intention, even when other predicting variables are controlled. Respondents who reported an inclination of internal behaviour motivation tended to hold a firm commitment intention to their moral values. Behaviour motivation does not predict actual moral behaviours or behaviour consistency.

CHAPTER NINE

OBSERVATION NOTES FROM THE RESEARCHER

This chapter will describe some observations during the survey and game observation from a researcher's perspective. The observation mainly includes schools' physical environment, gatekeepers' (or teachers') attitudes toward the survey, students' responses to the whole game observation and specific tasks. The information is collected from the researcher's observation and brief interviews with participants. It is not a systematic observation with several observers observing from different perspectives. To minimise the subjective bias of the researcher, teachers' and students' actions will be described as objectively as possible, and initial responses from participants will be quoted as much as possible.

Some possible explanations or interpretations of the observed phenomenon will be presented. However, the explanations and interpretations do not mean any positive or negative conclusions. Some observed differences between the two countries may not be actual because the observer would ignore some details that make the education in the two countries similar. The limited and personal observation is viewed only as additional background details other than the collected data. Furthermore, some observations also reveal the limitation of the game observation design.

The predictors of respondents' moral identity are mainly based on respondents' self-reports of data and their actual behaviour during the game observation. Some personal observations outside the research design would provide additional evidence explaining young adolescents' moral views and behaviour across the two countries. The research focuses on the association between students' moral identity and culture. Some details about the school environment, students and teachers' attitudes and behaviours in the study may implicitly express the cultural values or norms.

9.1 Schools' physical environment and teaching

The eight schools are located in the capital city (Beijing) and three smaller cities (e.g. Lan Zhou, Bei Hai and Tang Shan) in China. One out of the eight schools is located in a rural area in Lan Zhou city. Compared with the six schools with around 1000-2000 primary students, the other two schools are relatively small. One is in Beijing, and the other one is in Lan Zhou. There are around 800-900 students in each school. Most students in the seven schools are locals. In contrast, 30% of the students in the other school in Beijing are mobile residents (they do not have the residential identity card in Beijing, called Hukou). 20% of the students in the relatively small school in Lan Zhou are Hui Minorities. Compared with the participant schools in China, the two schools in England are much smaller (one is in a big city, Newcastle; the other is in a smaller city, Durham). There are only around 200 students in each school. The campus of the seven Chinese schools is relatively big. Only one school with fewer students in Beijing occupies a smaller campus which is similar to that of the two schools in England.

All the participant schools in China and England are equipped with modern teaching equipment, such as multimedia teaching tools. The observed difference between schools in the two countries is the seating arrangement in the classroom. Students have individual study desks and chairs, and the seats are arranged in row-and-column in Chinese classrooms. However, British students are grouped. Each group of students sits around a big table or (several desks put together) in classrooms. Chinese students have less activity space than British students in classrooms. There are more students in Chinese classrooms than that in British classrooms.

There is no national ranking for primary schools in China. Some regional rankings can be taken as a reference, for example, Beijing. The two schools in Beijing are the fourth grade out of four. Generally, the seven schools in urban areas are average or above average in the cities they are located in terms of teaching quality. However, they are not the very 'top' schools in the public mind. The school in the rural area is less competitive in terms of teaching

resources than the other seven schools. Both schools in England are rated as ‘good’ according to children’s services and skills (Ofsted) ranking, the second grade out of four (1. Outstanding; 2. Good; 3. Requires improvement; 4. Inadequate).

The national curriculum for primary schools (including English/Chinese, math, science, music, P.E., history and art) is taught in the research schools in both countries. Since the research focuses on moral and cultural values, the researcher observes the core values delivered to students by schools from their websites. Personal, Social, Health, and Economic (PSHE) education and British values are two clear demonstrations displayed on the websites of the two schools in England. “Students are equipped with values and skills required by life and work to make them desired citizens in the wider world ” (quotation from the Website of one participant school, the quotation is paraphrased to uphold anonymity). The core values expressed on the websites include ‘Respect and tolerance diversity’, ‘Responsible’, ‘Care’, ‘Hard-working’, ‘Honest’, ‘Fair’, ‘Equal’, ‘Democracy’, ‘Liberty’, ‘Integrity’, and so on. Embracing diversity (e.g. culture, religion) seems to be one of the critical values that students are expected to hold. It is said on the website of one British School:

“Our children have various native languages besides English, and we embrace how we are all different and equal.”(the quotation is paraphrased to uphold anonymity)

It is also said that the core values weave through all the disciplinary curricula in schools on the website of one British school.

The moral or value education in Chinese primary schools is presented through *Morality and Law*, a national mandatory curriculum in primary schools. The textbooks for the curriculum are unified. It aims to educate students on basic moral norms in personal life, family life, school life, social and public life and national life (cited from the Curriculum Standards). The Curriculum Standards also encourage the core values of Chinese socialism (Prosperity, Democracy, Civilization, Harmony, Freedom, Equality, Justice, Rule of law, Patriotism, Professionalism, Integrity and Friendliness. The unified curriculum and standards apply to all

eight research schools in China. According to the news or activity reports on schools' websites, patriotism education (loving the collective, motherland, and socialism) is a prominent theme.

Under the guidance of the national moral education outline, some schools still highlight their characteristic school mission or values. For example, one research school in China expresses its mission like this:

“Running the school and educating students with a moral models' spirit” (quotation from its website, the quotation is paraphrased to uphold anonymity).

Another example is that the school with 20% minority students highlights the “national unity”. It is also demonstrated through school events reports on its website.

9.2 Gatekeepers (or teachers', parents') attitudes toward the study

The gatekeepers from all the schools involved in the study were happy with their students participating in the survey or game observation. Even though busy teaching schedules had been set in every school (the schedule seems busier in some Chinese schools than in British schools), the researcher was allowed enough time and space to complete the survey and game observation with students. The British schools required the researcher to present the DBS check (Disclosure and Barring Service, a criminal records check by the police office), especially for the game observation, to ensure the students are safe with the researcher individually. The Chinese schools did not ask for any identification, maybe because the researcher had been working with the schools for years as a researcher of a program from Beijing Normal University in China. The researcher's identity has been confirmed.

The researcher was welcomed by leading teachers from all the target classes. Most of the teachers helped send out the questionnaires, maintained students' discipline for the survey and game observation, and even helped students understand some questions for the survey.

Students were asked to complete the survey independently (freely responding based on fully understanding the questions). Students were told that the survey was anonymous and that others (except the researcher) would not know their answers, including their teachers. They are free to make their answers. Students were told the rules about the survey when teachers presented. However, a few teachers seemed to cross the line for some reason. For example, a male student asked the meaning of the option ‘other’ for the question about sex.

—*The teacher responded: “Come on ! Tick off the ‘Boy’, please! Do not make fun”.*

Another example: a male student responded ‘Disagree’ to the statement “I always feel shy (or unconfident, or embarrassed) when others praise me”. The teacher passed by the student and noticed his answer (probably by chance). Then, the teacher told the student:

—*“You may misunderstand the statement. How can you not feel shy when you are praised?”*

The student did not refute the teacher’s suggestion. The researcher tried to ensure the student understood the statement and completed it freely when noticing the teacher’s behaviour. The teacher said to the researcher politely:

—*“ I know him very well. He did not behave like that (not shy when he got praise).”*

For the game observation, which is more time-consuming than the survey, one school from China refused to join in because the gatekeeper worried that their teaching schedule would be interrupted. Their students participated in a similar study before. They found their teaching order was affected by the game-based observation. Fortunately, the gatekeeper was happy with the survey.

For the money involved in the game observation, the gatekeeper from one Chinese school worried that the cash was sensitive for young students in the school environment. She even

worried about parents' reaction to their kids being back home from school with some cash. The gatekeeper probably knows that some parents care about their kids accessing cash daily. The same case also happened to British parents. The gatekeeper of the British school emailed the researcher the day after the game observation was conducted. She requested the researcher explain the rewarded money for students to a pair of parents who wanted to know why their kid was back home with cash. The researcher was told that the girl did not have pocket money. She did not explain satisfactorily to her parents how she got the cash. The parents did not believe that their kid was rewarded with cash for just joining a game at school.

9.3 Participants' responses to the study and the researcher

Generally, participants from both countries loved the survey and game observation because they brought excitement and entertainment to their learning routine in school. Some students take the game observation for fun. However, some students were a little bit nervous. For example, the researcher scattered some rubbish (waste paper balls) at the classroom door for the observation game. It was to check if participants would notice the litter and clean them. Some students noticed that and picked them up in the dustbin. However, some students did not. About the waste on the floor, a few students responded like this during the interview:

——*“I was a little bit nervous about the game. So I did not notice the litter on the floor.”*

——*“I was completely focusing on the game. So I ignored other things and walked toward the desk for the game directly.”*

——*“I thought the litter on the floor was a part of the game. So I just leave it alone.”*

Another interesting thing happened about the litter on the floor. A Chinese boy cleaned the litter when he was taking his turn doing the game. However, he did not go back to continue his class immediately after finishing the game. He stayed outside the room for the game and observed what was going on for the next student. He broke into the door once the next student finished the game and wanted to talk with the researcher. He saw the litter that he had

cleaned was on the floor again (the next student did not clean the trash). He picked up the litter in the dustbin again without any hesitation. He seemed more relaxed than other students in front of the researcher. The researcher knew about the student from his teacher. His teacher said that he was very active at school but did not reach his full potential in academic learning.

Even though participants confirmed that they could keep the money and bouncy balls for themselves, a few students doubted it was just a test. They thought they could not really take the money and balls away after the game. They believed it after the researcher double-confirmed that. However, the double confirmation happened after the students finished the task. Participants who finished the game observation were told not to release the details about the game to their classmates who had not completed the game. Every participant promised that in front of the researcher. However, the release happened in every school.

The students welcomed the researcher. The interaction between students and the researcher was generally relaxing. The researcher visited some schools two or three times to complete the survey and the game observation on different days. Since the second visit, students from most schools felt free to say hello to the researcher like friends. A British girl even directly praised the researchers for her nice coat. Some Chinese students also told the researcher that she looked pretty today. Some Chinese students did not want to leave the classroom immediately after the game observation. They were curious about the real purpose behind the game and wanted to talk more about the game with the researcher. After the game observation, one Chinese girl even wanted to talk about her privacy (parent-child relation) with the researcher. The girl said:

——“*You look like a psychological tutor. I love talking with you and sharing my secrets with you.*”

However, some students take the game observation and the researcher more seriously. They viewed the researcher as a teacher even though the researcher did emphasise she was a PhD student rather than a teacher. Some students seemed to care about what the researcher thought

of their behaviour. For example, a few Chinese participants distributed more bouncy balls to the researcher. They even kept the balls in a colour that they hated themselves. They said:

—“*Teacher (referring to the researcher) deserves more balls, and I want to give the balls in their favourite colour to the teacher.*”

—“*Teacher works hard and deserves more balls*”.

—“*My parents told me that do not give others what even yourself do not like.*”

9.4 Students’ attitudes toward the rewarded money

Participants showed different attitudes towards money. When the Chinese participants were asked why they would like to donate the money, many students replied:

—“*I do not need money. If I want something, my parents will buy me.*” or “*Money is useless for me.*”

On the other hand, the participants from England did not respond like that to the same question.

There are also some similar answers between the participants from the two countries. For example, many participants from both countries donate the money because they think the poor children need more money than they do and want to help. Furthermore, they kept some money for themselves because they wanted to buy something for themselves or their siblings.

Some participants from both countries seemed to have no idea about the money when they were asked: “do you think 2 pounds (or 20 RMB) are too much or not?” It seemed a difficult question for them to answer within a given time. They could not answer the question after thinking about it for around 30 seconds. For the sake of limited time, the researcher could not allow more time for them to answer the question.

Some participants seemed to show social desirability when dealing with the rewarded money. For example, some participants were very hesitant about how much to donate. The expressions on their face told that they wanted to keep the money rather than donate it. One participant decided to take all the reward money away and went back to the classroom. However, she returned a few minutes later and wanted to donate all the money without any reason. Another participant also decided to keep all the money and told the researcher that he had recently donated to another charity.

9.5 Students' attitudes toward the bouncy balls

Most of the participants of different school years expressed that they liked the balls and the colours of the balls. However, lower graders were more interested in the balls than higher graders. Girls were more interested in colourful balls than boys. A few participants said they were not interested in the balls or hated their colours. When asked, all participants seemed free to tell the researcher their feelings about the balls.

The most popular explanation for their distribution among participants from both countries is that “distributing equally or fairly is the best solution to benefit everyone”. The eight bouncing balls are in four colours and even in number. Many participants even pay attention to distributing the colours evenly. Respondents' similar reaction to the distribution of the balls from the two countries is consistent with their shared ‘equity’ tendency that the survey statistics showed. A few participants gave all the balls to the researcher because they did not like them. Some participants just kept one or two balls because they thought that was enough for them or had similar balls at home.

There are some unique distributions except for the equal way. Some participants kept all the balls in the colours they did not like and gave their favourite ones to the researcher. Their explanation goes like this:

——“*My parents told me it is not good to give others what you do not like.*”

A few participants did the oppositely. They distributed all the balls of the colours they hated to the researchers. Moreover, they honestly said they would keep all the balls if they were all in the colours they liked.

9.6 Students' reactions to the purpose behind the game observation

It had been mentioned that some participants were curious about the purpose of the game observation. Some students smiled after being told the game rules. It seemed that they knew the game was related to some questions in the survey. The guess was echoed by a brief interview with some students from one Chinese school. Students were asked if they linked the game tasks to the survey questions during the interview. Some students admitted that:

——*“Of course! I knew the game responded to the questionnaire.” or “The game was the same as the questions in the questionnaire.”*

Students were asked if they recalled how they responded to the related questions before completing the game tasks. Some students responded like this:

——*“Yes, I recalled it. However, I wanted to do that initiatively in the game (even without a questionnaire).” or “No, I did not.”*

9.7 Interpretation

9.7.1 Different senses of teaching approaches delivered by seat arrangements

According to the teaching quality ranking and teaching equipment, the research schools in the two countries are roughly equal. However, Chinese schools are more extensive than British schools in a student capacity.

The most apparent observed difference between the physical environment of the classrooms

between the two countries is the seating arrangement for students in classrooms. British students sit in a cluster-type (small circles) arrangement, while Chinese students are arranged in a row-and-column layout. The different seating arrangements between the research schools in the two countries may be caused by the space of classrooms. It was mentioned that there are more students in Chinese classrooms than that in British classrooms. The space is smaller in Chinese classrooms than that in British classrooms. Insufficient space may limit the seating arrangement in Chinese classrooms.

Apart from the classroom space difference, the different seat arrangements may express two different teaching approaches. The classroom environment directly expresses the educational philosophy (Proshansky & Wolfe, 1975). The educational philosophy may be from the gatekeepers rather than teachers, at least in China. The seating arrangement in each school is unified, and teachers are not free to make a difference most of the time. Some researchers concluded that row-and-column seating expresses a teacher-centred approach where the instructor is the primary focus in the classroom. In contrast, student-centred lessons are displayed as cluster-type seating arrangements (Blackmore et al., 2011; Martin, 2002). In a cluster-type layout, two or four tables are put together so that small groups of students face one another. Students around tables are not always oriented toward a teacher, and eye contact is not controlled by teachers (Marx et al., 2000). The seating arrangement also reflects teachers' (or gatekeepers') purpose of teaching. For instance, a seating arrangement in rows may be chosen to improve information dissemination. In contrast, small groups may promote student interactions (McCorskey & McVetta, 1978). The row seating arrangement makes students comply with requests from teachers easily (Wannarka & Ruhl, 2008). Getzels (1974) also discussed how different desk arrangements presuppose teachers' different ways they view students. A rectangular arrangement of fixed desks and the teacher at the front implies an empty learner to be filled with knowledge. A circular arrangement assumes a social learner.

According to the seating arrangement in Chinese schools, it is supposed that education, at least primary education, in China has not entirely gotten rid of the teacher-centred teaching

concept. Even though a student-centred approach has been encouraged in Chinese schools with a series of educational reforms (e.g. *Outline of National Medium and Long Term Education Reform and Development Plan, 2010-2020*), classroom management does not seem to serve the reform intention. Alternatively, the influence of the seating arrangement on teaching and learning has not been taken into consideration seriously when the student-centred approach is encouraged in Chinese schools. The row-and-column seat arrangement that implies a teacher-centred teaching concept may influence Chinese students' view of the teacher's role and the teacher-student relationship. Chinese students would not expect an equal relationship between them and teachers because the row-and-column seating arrangement implies that the teacher controls the class and students comply with the requests. Studies on Chinese international students also support the argument. International students tend to expect a hierarchical relationship with their teachers or supervisors, who are expected to act as a guide or parents to exercise control over the research. Western teachers prefer to be friendly critics and facilitators (Ryan, 2000, 2005). In contrast, British students in cluster-type seating arrangements would be more likely to develop equal relationships between themselves and teachers.

Some evidence shows that the cluster-type seating arrangement would benefit the interaction between teacher and students, peer interaction and cooperative learning. For example, students tend to ask more questions to teachers in semi-circle seat arrangements (Marx et al., 2000; Rosenfield et al., 1985). Cluster-type seating encourages more talking, brainstorming, and cooperation among peers (Hurt et al., 1978; Norazman et al., 2019; Rosenfield et al., 1985). Teachers would work closely with individuals and groups rather than the whole class (Patton et al., 2001). However, the row seating arrangement would make the individual assignment more productive (Wannarka & Ruhl, 2008). The previous study also found that Chinese students preferred a structured learning environment with the teacher in control to maintain a harmonious classroom. They viewed spontaneous discussion as unorganised, unplanned and unstructured (Li, 2004, cited in Ho, Holmes, et al., 2004). Therefore, Chinese students are supposed to get used to completing tasks and thinking individually under the control of teachers. British students would have a stronger sense of cooperation, embracing

and criticising different ideas.

As a factor of the classroom environment, the seating arrangement has a preconceived cultural image (David & Wright, 1975). Much existing literature tends to attribute Chinese students' silence in group discussions to the Chinese culture, which values harmony highly. Maintaining harmony is more likely to preclude public criticism or debate (Argyle et al., 1986; Durkin, 2004; Littlewood, 1996). Apart from that, however, Chinese students' silence may also be caused by their lack of communication skills because the seat arrangement does not facilitate their communication in a group. Therefore they are not used to many verbal interactions with the teacher or peers in formal learning situations (Wang, 2010). It also can be interpreted as a culture but not the value of harmony. The seat arrangement can be seen as an implicit culture, influencing students' behaviours and values such as equality, cooperation, and interpersonal communication. Therefore, the different seating layouts between Chinese and British schools may express different cultural images.

9.7.2 Similarity and difference in highlighted core values

Core values delivered to students in schools between the two countries are similar, such as 'honest', 'fair', 'equal', 'responsible', 'freedom', 'integrity', 'friendly', and so on. However, there are different highlighted values between schools in the two countries. Patriotism is a universal value that research schools in China highlight. British schools put the value of 'tolerancing and understanding diversity' at the top of the value list. That is probably because students are diverse in origins, languages and religions in British schools. In contrast, students have a more unified origin background in Chinese schools.

Another observed difference regarding values between the two countries is understanding 'shyness'. The Chinese teacher's dialogue with the student about the statement of shyness during the survey indicated that the teacher thought being shy when getting praise was good quality. Coincidentally, one British student asked the teacher what 'shy' means in the

statement during the pilot survey. It may be interpreted that being shy often does not happen to students in their daily lives, or they are not familiar with the emotional concept. However, that may be just a coincidence. That student just does not understand the word 'shy' by chance. He does not represent the average British students' understanding of 'shyness'.

9.7.3 Parenting styles

Students' attitudes toward money would reflect their parenting style. Both Chinese parents and British parents show similarly cautious attitudes toward their kids accessing cash, according to the reactions of Chinese gatekeepers and British parents to the game observation involving money. Some parents from both countries are sensitive to kids having cash. Their sensitivity would reflect that they lack the consciousness of educating their kids' money value and financial management skills. Another possible reason is that parents do not want their kids to access real economic society early because they do not allow them to consume alone in real life. Pocket money reflects parents' approval of their involvement in the economic socialisation of their children (Furnham, 2001). Moreover, pocket money also implies parenting values such as autonomy (children can make spending decisions by themselves), rule setting (rules for pocket money), or family responsibility (concerning sources of extra money as well as household responsibilities and saving) (Furnham, 1999). Therefore, the parents who do not want their kids to access cash (pocket money or allowance) may ignore their parental roles in educating their kids concerning economic socialisation, family responsibility or autonomy.

The different parenting styles are reflected by students' different reasons for donating money between the two countries. According to Chinese students' responses, their parents meet all their material demands, so they do not need any money. However, none of the British participants responded like Chinese students. There is a high consensus that parents teach their kids to postpone gratification through pocket money rules (Furnham, 2001). The universal reason for participants who wanted to keep some rewarded cash in the game is to

buy some sweets or small toys for themselves or their siblings. That would imply that the participants' unnecessary needs are not always satisfied by their parents. Some Chinese parents seem to spoil their children more than British parents.

9.7.4 Social desirability

Even though both students and teachers were happy with the survey, they seemed to be under the pressure of social desirability to various degrees. Teachers cared about their students' responses to the survey because some teachers tried to guide their students to respond to the questions according to their own judgements, such as sex identification and understanding about 'being shy'.

The cluster-type seating arrangement put British students at risk of peer pressure when completing the survey in the classroom. Seating around a table made students see each others' responses more easily than the rows-and-column seat arrangement. Therefore, British students seemed at risk of experiencing peer pressure more significantly than Chinese students during the survey.

Both British and Chinese students seemed to show social desirability during the game observation. For example, some Chinese students ignored the litter in the classroom for game observation because they focused on the games entirely. However, the student who did not perform very well in academics seemed relaxed during the game observation. A few Chinese students viewed the researcher as a teacher and favoured the researcher when distributing the bouncy balls. It also would be interpreted that Chinese students respect teachers. However, it also can be understood in another way. The student-teacher relationship is not as relaxing and equal as the peer relationship. Therefore, students are under pressure and try their best to behave well when interacting with teachers. The student sharing her secret with the researcher rather than her teachers may provide evidence to the speculation. Some students do not want to be open to their teachers. Some Chinese students recalled their responses to

the corresponding questions in the survey when they completed the tasks for the behaviour observation. There is a potential risk that some students show consistent behaviour out of social desirability. Some clues imply that students may consciously care about their behaviour, guess the desired behaviour and show it. For example, after returning to her classroom, a Chinese participant changed her mind and returned her money. Some students' curiosity about the real purpose behind the game indicates that they took the tasks seriously. A student seemed to find an excuse (he said he did donate before) to take the money away.

Other factors would influence some students' behaviour during the game observation. For example, some students probably would not behave authentically because they did not believe in the game rule that they could take the money and bouncy balls away. The thought may cause their altruistic behaviour. Students who knew the game rules and their classmates' performance before joining the game may experience peer pressure. All the above possible social desirability is the limitation of the research design. The discussion of the data results in the following section should consider all the possible social desirability.

9.8 Summary

The information collected through observation provides clues to cultural similarities and differences between the two countries. The cultural similarities and differences are generally demonstrated through classroom seat arrangements, observed school core values, parenting styles and social desirability.

A few examples show cultural similarities. First, 'honest', 'fair', 'equal', 'responsible', 'freedom', 'integrity', and 'friendly' are emphasised in both Chinese and British schools. Secondly, teachers and parents in China and England are cautious similarly about children accessing cash in daily life. Thirdly, teachers and students in both countries seem to be under social desirability during the survey and game observation.

Some examples implicate cultural differences. First, different seat arrangements in Chinese and British classrooms would implicate different teaching concepts, teacher-student

relationships and teaching outcomes. Secondly, students and teachers have a different understanding of 'shyness' between the two countries. Different values are emphasised in Chinese and British schools, such as 'patriotism' and 'tolerancing difference and diversity'. Thirdly, participants' different attitudes toward money and donation between the two countries implicate different parenting styles. For example, British parents seem more inclined to teach their kids to postpone gratification through pocket money rules than Chinese parents.

It is necessary to emphasise that the implication is based on the researcher's limited and unsystematic observation. It only can be a possible reference when the data is discussed. The observed social desirability should be considered a limitation of the research design.

CHAPTER TEN

DISCUSSION

This chapter mainly presents the discussion and possible explanations for the findings of the research questions and existing literature linking to the findings. The research questions and design will be reviewed first. Some possible limitations will be explained then. The limitations would make understanding and explaining the research result cautious.

The primary purpose of the research is to compare the moral views (moral identity and moral trait understanding) and behaviour (value commitment intention, actual moral behaviour and behaviour consistency) of young adolescents from two different cultural contexts: China and England. According to the existing studies on the cultural difference (see 3.1.6 in Chapter Three), China and England represent the Eastern and Western cultures, respectively, to some degree. The primary purpose of the research is achieved by responding to a set of research questions:

- (1) What are the overall moral views of primary school children in different countries?
- (2) How is the consistency between children's self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intentions? And is there consistency between children's reported behavioural intentions and actual behaviour in real life?
- (3) What are the similarities and differences in moral identity and other related moral views and behaviour of primary school children in China and England?
- (4) From the children's perspective, are there any cultural similarities and differences between China and England?

(5) Are any differences in moral identity and related behaviour linked to children's cultural differences?

(6) Does strong moral identity (self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment) predict children's moral behaviour and behaviour consistency in real contexts? Does moral motivation predict moral behaviour?

The research design involves a survey and behaviour observation. It includes 1,950 primary school students with an average age of around 10 years old from the two countries. A structured review on the measures of moral identity was conducted to select the referenced scales of moral identity first. Finally, the main body of the questionnaire was developed based on the validated Scales of Moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Black & Reynolds, 2016) and Behaviour-based Cultural Values (Schwartz, 2016). Participants' moral identity (Self-reported importance of moral values and Value commitment intention), moral behavioural intentions, behaviour motivation, behaviour-based personal cultural values, perceived parenting and school climate are examined through the survey. The actual moral behaviours are observed through sharing and donation games in an experimental environment. Participants' behaviours consistency is checked by comparing the observed moral behaviours and the corresponding behavioural intentions in the survey. The self-reported importance of moral values, moral value commitment intention, actual moral behaviour and behaviour consistency together make up the general picture of young adolescents' moral identity in current research.

10.1 The possible limitations of the research

There are several limitations of the current study. First, limitations exist in the sample regarding size and diversity. The sample from the northeast of England is smaller than the Chinese sample. The Chinese sample includes a reasonable amount of participants from the capital city (Beijing). However, a few British participants from London were involved in the

survey, influenced by COVID-19. The respondents in the Chinese sample are substantially more likely to have one or more parents with a professional occupation than British respondents. The sample from NE England comes from a region of relatively high disadvantage (see Table 4.9 in Chapter Four). The sample difference needs to be recalled when the two are compared.

No students from rural areas in the samples of the two countries were involved in the game observation. According to the regression model in the current research, donation behaviour consistency is related to participants' socioeconomic backgrounds. Participants with parents who do 'working' jobs or have no jobs are more likely to donate less than their intention than other participants (whose parents do 'professional' jobs or 'intermediate' jobs) (see 7.1.1 in Chapter Seven). Taking the comparison within the Chinese sample as an example, the percentage of Chinese young adolescents from cities who have parents doing 'professional' jobs is much bigger than those from rural areas in China (see section 4.7.2 in Chapter Four). Young adolescents from rural areas would perform differently from those from urban regions. Therefore, the research result would not reflect the moral behaviour of the whole population.

Second, respondents' responses would be influenced by the potential social desirability. The interval between the survey and the game observation should have been longer to minimise the potential of social desirability in the game observation. According to the brief interview with some participants from one Chinese school, a few students recalled how they responded to similar questions in the survey when they did the tasks in the observation (see section 9.6 in Chapter Nine). Students who behaved like this probably took the initiative to keep their words and deeds in line. Moreover, respondents' reports and behaviour would also be influenced by the school environment.

The probability of social desirability can never be ruled out. However, the validity of the survey and game observation is not entirely affected by the potential social desirability. Participants still responded and behaved diversely instead of demonstrating the same pattern. Moreover, the students who did the survey and observation game outside the school

demonstrated similar results as those in school (see section 5.1.4 & 5.4.4 in Chapter Five).

Some expressions of the scales would be understood differently by individuals, especially respondents from different cultural backgrounds. Some respondents would be sensitive to the negative questions or words on the scales. For example, participants with harmonious interpersonal relationship inclination would be influenced by the sensitive word ‘angry’ in the item for ‘facing saving’ value. That would influence their responses. The contexts in the items should be considered carefully. For example, the items for ‘personal achievement’ value should not be restricted to school performance. Only focusing on school performance would be biased for the respondents from countries with more severe academic competition than in other countries. Furthermore, some negative words and interference factors of context should be avoided in the expression. As the context information, the ‘friendship’ made the respondents face a moral dilemma between honesty and loyalty. The core idea of items would be overwhelmed by inappropriate words and context information. These limitations are discussed in detail in the following sections.

Given the various understanding and expression biases, cautiously explaining the results for some special items in the scales is reasonable. However, the difference in the understanding of the items also is beneficial. The respondents’ different understanding of the items would help explain the cultural difference or different moral understanding of the young adolescents from a different perspective.

Finally, the questionnaire for primary school students should be as short and precise as possible. Even though the percentage of missing data for most items is below 5%, the non-response rate of the items in the second half of the questionnaire is higher than that of the first half. According to the factor analysis (see section 4.3.8 in Chapter Four), the string of items from the parenting subscale is loading in one ‘factor’, which means that the items are similar. The school climate subscale is the same case. Therefore, the number of items from each subscale can be reduced.

Even though the limitations regarding sample size and diversity, social desirability and differences in understanding due to personal and cultural differences, the overall result is not entirely influenced by the limitations. However, the following discussion and explanation of the research result should be cautious, considering the potential limitations.

10.2 The similarities and differences in young adolescents' moral identity between the two countries

Some comparisons were made between the respondents from the two countries regarding the Moral Identity Scale (Self-reported importance of moral values and Moral value commitment intention). There are some similarities and differences.

One similarity is that young adolescents from both countries got a relatively high mean score on the overall Moral Identity Scale, especially on the Self-reported Importance of Moral Value Subscale regarding kindness/not hurting, honesty and fairness. It implies that Chinese and British young adolescents think being kind, honest and fair is important to them on average. The result is consistent with the Moral Foundation Theory (AISHeddi et al., 2019; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, see section 3.2.1 in Chapter Two). The Moral Foundation Theory suggests that harm/care, honesty and fairness are valued in most Eastern and Western cultures. The current research showed similar evidence. The research result also aligns with the existing research finding that kindness, honesty and fairness are overlapping moral traits that compose individuals' moral identities (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Another similarity is that the respondents from both countries showed a similar tendency of moral value commitment intention. Both Chinese and British respondents showed lower commitment intention to being honest than fair and kind (not hurting). However, the mean score on the self-reported importance of being honest that they reported is as high as being fair and kind. The similar commitment tendency implies a similar attitude toward a moral dilemma between Chinese and British adolescents. The item about the commitment to 'honesty' involves two specific figures in respondents' daily life——'best friend' and

‘teacher’, which is quite different from the other two items. The questions about kind and fair behaviour are “I will not go along with a group decision to hurt others” and “It is not ok to cheat in a game if the rewards for winning are high”. The statement for the commitment to ‘honesty’ moral value goes like “If I know that my best friend did something bad in my classroom, I will tell the teacher when asked about it”. Respondents face the dilemma of commitment between friendship and the moral value of honesty. For teenagers, loyalty to friends (not snitching in English parlance) may supersede the pull towards honesty. Existing research showed that trust and loyalty become central moral concerns in friendship relations (Berndt, 1992; Hartup, 1993; Keller & Edelstein, 1993; Sullivan, 1953). The developmental importance of close friendship among adolescents (7-15-year-olds) is equally universal in Western and Asian cultures (e.g. Iceland vs. China) (Keller et al., 1998). Keller and his colleagues also found that most participants from both cultures judged keeping promises or being loyal to a friend as morally correct. It would explain that both Chinese and British respondents scored lower for the item about honest behaviour than the other two items about kind and fair conduct.

One difference between the two countries’ samples is that Chinese participants scored a slightly higher mean score on the overall moral identity than British participants’ (Effect size=0.6). It implies that being honest, kind and fair are valued more among Chinese respondents than British respondents. The finding is in line with the previous finding that Easterners showed slightly more concerns about harm and fairness than Westerners (Graham et al., 2011).

The apparent difference between Chinese and British respondents is their self-reports of commitment to being honest. Chinese participants gained a much higher mean score on honesty commitment intention than British respondents (Effect size=0.9). In the same way, they reported a similar mean score on the self-reported importance of being honest (Effect size=0.3). It implies that both Chinese and British young adolescents think being honest is essential. However, they respond differently to a specific scenario regarding being honest.

There are several possible explanations for the difference in the commitment to being honest. One is about the cultural difference in dealing with interpersonal relationships. Another reason would be the different understanding or interpretation of the statement of the scale. Adolescents' different sensitivity to social desirability across cultures also would explain it. Lastly, the difference in commitment to being honest can be interpreted from the perspective of cultural differences in moral judgement. The following section will detail the four possible explanations one by one.

First, the commitment difference between the two countries' samples would be interpreted as the cultural difference in interpersonal relationships. Interpersonal relationships and respecting authority are valued in most Eastern cultures rather than Western cultures (Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Some research compared Chinese and Icelandic children when they faced an interpersonal-moral conflict (e.g. Fang & Fang, 1994; Keller et al., 1998). The research indicated that Chinese and Icelandic children developed the significance of close friendship. However, Chinese children paid more attention (self-reports) to interpersonal relationships with everyone in the event when making a decision involving a close friend and classmate. In contrast, Icelandic children gave more importance to friendship commitment. Going back to the current research, suppose both Chinese and British young adolescents care about friendship loyalty equally. However, Chinese young adolescents may be more concerned about interpersonal relationships (e.g. teacher-student relationships or teacher authority) than the British. Therefore, Chinese young adolescents tend to prioritise the latter when facing the dilemma between friendship and being honest to (or respecting) authority.

Another possible reason for the marked difference in the honesty commitment intention between the two samples is the different understanding or interpretation of the statement. Some respondents, especially the British respondents, may think that 'did something bad' in the statement refers to the friend making a face at the teacher, for example. It is not seriously bad behaviour which is quite different from some destructive behaviours like committing a crime. In the former case, some respondents would put priority on friendship. This could also

explain why Chinese and British students similarly agree strongly with honesty as a value. However, there is a difference in telling the truth to a teacher between Chinese and British students.

Another explanation could be young adolescents' different sensitivity to social desirability across cultures. Maybe the Chinese students are more motivated to give the socially desirable answer, and/or the British young adolescents are prepared to be less honest about unimportant issues (reporting friends' subtle naughty behaviour). The Chinese children responded to the survey face-to-face in school, so although their responses were reported anonymously, they might have felt under pressure to respond in a certain way. However, a large proportion of the English children responded to the survey online (but the differences between the online and other British responses are slight, see section 5.1.4 in Chapter Five).

Finally, the cultural difference in moral judgement would lead to the commitment difference. Suppose the response tendency of the being honest commitment intention truly reflects the respondents' judgment or perceived acceptance of morally correct behaviour. Chinese respondents were inclined to respect the universal rule about being honest. They tend to be honest regardless of their friends' loyalty, which inclines them to 'deontological ethics' (Kant, 1999, see section 2.3.1 in Chapter Two). However, the British respondents seem to be less respect for the law of being honest unconditionally than Chinese respondents. However, both Chinese and British respondents reported a similar mean score on the item of self-reported importance of moral value 'being honest is important for them'. The result is consistent with the previous finding that most people in different cultures would agree that some behaviour, such as killing and lying, is wrong. However, they would show different attitudes toward morally accepting the behaviour in different contexts (Fu et al., 2001; Fu et al., 2007; Lee & Ross, 1997; Lee et al., 2001). For example, the research found that Chinese and Canadian children (7-11-year-olds) rated lying negative. However, they showed different attitudes towards lying in specific scenarios. Chinese children rated lying for a collective less negative than Canadian children. In contrast, Canadian children rated lying for a friend less negative than Chinese children (Fu et al., 2007).

Participants' moral identity would be influenced by their different attitudes towards interpersonal relationships, understanding of the statements, the potential social desirability and judgment of the moral dilemma. Of course, apart from these factors, family background, parenting, school climate, gender, and personal cultural values would also contribute to the similarities and differences. Another section will present more details and discussions about the influencing factors of participants' moral identity in the regression models (see section 10.4 in this Chapter).

10.3 The similarities and differences in young adolescents' moral behaviour between the two countries

Respondents from both countries show two similar behaviour patterns. One is that they tended to share stuff (toys) with others equally in game observation and questionnaire survey. The eight bouncing balls are in four colours and even in number. Many participants even paid attention to distributing the colours evenly. The most popular explanation among participants from both countries during the interview in the distribution task is that 'distributing equally or fairly is the best solution' in the distribution task. It is consistent with the previous research evidence that fairness is a universal moral value across cultures (Blasi, 1984; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Graham et al., 2011; Hauser, 2006; Wainryb, 2006). Children over five years old tend to be fair in sharing across cultures (Rochat et al., 2009).

The other similar behaviour pattern is that they tended to share toys equally while donating more money to needy children. This behaviour pattern is apparent in behavioural intention. There is a possible explanation for participants not distributing money between themselves and the needy children as equally as they shared the bouncy balls with a stranger (or the researcher). The popular reason among participants for the donation is that they thought the needy children needed the money more than themselves (from the interview). However, the stranger (or the researcher) is not in need. Therefore, participants tended to show more generous behaviour toward needy children than strangers who did not need help. It implies

that young adolescents tend to make moral judgement or reasoning (being fair or generous) depending on the situation.

Another explanation for the similar donation behaviour pattern is that the provided money may not be a temptation for some participants (especially Chinese participants). Some Chinese participants said the money was useless during the interview (see section 9.4 in Chapter Nine). Therefore, it would be easier for these participants to show generous behaviour. The concern was mentioned in other research. For example, the monetary incentive of the designed game did not seem to trigger some participants' fairness-related behaviours because the money did not attract them (Tang, 2017).

There are differences in moral behaviours between Chinese and British participants. Generally, Chinese participants' actual behaviours are more consistent with their intentions than British participants in toy ball distribution and money donation tasks. The result seems opposite to the speculation based on the Self-construal Theory (Markus & Kitayama, 1991a, 1991b, see section 3.2.2 in Chapter Three), which suggests that people with independent self are more likely to commit to their moral principles across situations than people with interdependent self (Miller, 2007). It implies that more individuals in Western cultures hold independent selves and are more likely to show value commitment than most people in non-Western cultures, characterised as interdependent self-construal. Suppose the speculation from the theory is true. In that case, the British participants' actual behaviour should commit more to their donation and distribution intention than the Chinese participants. However, the result of the current research is not like the assumption. One of the possible reasons is that cultures do not influence young adolescents' moral behaviour as adults. The other possible reason is that Chinese participants were more sensitive to the experimental environment than the British participants. Chinese participants were more concerned about the present researcher's view of their donation and distribution behaviours when making behaviour decisions than British participants. They deliberately made their behaviours consistent with their suggestions in the survey because of being observed. If it is the case, it seems that Chinese participants' actual behaviours are more likely influenced by situations and others'

thoughts or feelings. In contrast, the British participants' behaviours are less affected by situations. They commit to their inner feelings and thoughts more than Chinese participants. If the case is actual, the results seem to support the Self-construal Theory in another way.

An enormous difference between the two countries' samples exists in the money donation task. A clear majority of young adolescents in the British sample actually donated less than they said they would, taking a much more considerable proportion than Chinese participants (79.2% vs.10.2%). Another interesting phenomenon is that British participants showed very generous behaviour intentions in the survey scenario of donation, which is close to the Chinese participants (although still less generous than Chinese participants). However, British participants were much less generous than Chinese participants when they were provided real cash. The money involved might have meant more to the English participants living in a more deprived area and less to the Chinese participants who thought money was useless for them. Here, participants from the two countries showed somewhat different attitudes towards money during the game observation. The brief interview during the game observation revealed that some Chinese young adolescents' needs were met by their parents daily. They did not need pocket money or rewarded money to buy something themselves. However, the British participants did not show the same attitude towards money. They kept some rewarded money for themselves because they wanted to buy something for themselves or their siblings. Generally, both Chinese and British young adolescents tended to help needy children with money in moral scenarios (behaviour intention). However, cash is more attractive to British participants than to Chinese participants in real contexts. It would be related to their different desire for money.

The cultural difference in distributive justice reasoning would also explain the donation behaviour difference. There are three types of norms in social exchange or resource distribution situations (Deutsch, 1979, cited in Carson & Banuazizi, 2008; Leventhal, 1976): equality, equity (merit), and need. The equality norm guides the resource allocator to divide the resource equally among all recipients regardless of their needs and individual contributions. The equity (merit) norm guides the allocator toward a resource distribution

based on the individual recipients' contributions. The need norm leads the allocator to allocate resources to those individuals who need the resource the most. Empirical research showed that the more collectively orientated children would be more likely to apply the norm of need and equality in distributive justice situations. However, the more individualistically orientated children would prefer to apply the norms of merit (Carlo et al., 2001; Carson & Banuazizi, 2008). Turning to the current research, British students seemed to distribute money and gifts based on the need norm in the questionnaire survey. However, they tended to distribute money based on the merit norm in real life. That may be because they thought the money in the game observation was gained by themselves. They deserve to keep some or even more money because of their contribution. However, they did not make practical efforts on the hypothetical money in the questionnaire survey. Therefore, they intended to donate money based on the receptors' needs rather than contributions. In contrast, Chinese participants consistently distributed money and stuff based on the need or equality norm in the survey and game observation.

Generally, British participants showed more consistent and generous behaviour when actually facing toys than money. In the balls distribution task, the proportion of British participants who distributed fewer balls to the researcher than they suggested is just a little bit bigger than that of Chinese participants (11.8% vs.16.7%) . In contrast, the percentage of British participants who spread more balls to the researcher than they intended is bigger than that of Chinese participants (45.8% vs. 20.5%) . One possible reason is that the balls were not so attractive to British participants as they imagined the fun gifts when they answered the related question in the survey. The question in the survey did not describe the fun gifts specifically. Therefore, they tended to share more balls than they suggested with the researcher. However, they can buy anything they want with the rewarded money. That is probably why British participants were more generous in distributing balls than donating money.

The data description and observation only provide a general picture of the similarities and differences in young adolescents' moral behaviour between the two countries. Participants' behaviour intention, actual behaviour and behaviour consistency would be influenced by their

different attitudes towards money, toy balls, moral judgement and the potential social desirability. Of course, apart from these factors, the family background, parenting, school climate, gender, and cultural values and norms could also contribute to the similarity and differences. Another section (see section 10.5 in this Chapter) will present more details and discussions about the influencing factors of participants' moral behaviour based on the regression models.

10.4 The predicting factors of young adolescents' moral identity

Generally, only three background variables significantly predict participants' overall cognitive moral identity. The school climate is the strongest background predictor, followed by parenting style. Sex is the weakest one. Respondents who feel a fair, equal and supportive school environment or parenting reported a strong moral identity. The result is basically in line with the previous findings on the association between children's moral identity and teachers' behaviour, parenting and sex. First, existing research found that teachers' ethical leadership (e.g. teachers making fair and balanced decisions) is positively related to late adolescents' moral identity (Arain et al., 2017). However, some research also found that the relationship between teachers' support and early/middle adolescents' moral identity development is not strong (Aldridge, Ala'i, et al., 2016; Riekie et al., 2017). Even though the school climate is the strongest predictor of respondents' moral identity in current research, it only explains 8% of the variation of the moral identity ($R^2=0.08$, see 6.1.1 in Chapter Six). Therefore, the current result also indicated that the relationship between school climate and moral identity is not very strong. Second, the current result supports the previous research finding that family support positively predicts adolescents' moral identity (Hart et al., 1998). Lastly, the result is also consistent with the previous conclusion that girls hold a stronger moral identity than boys (Arnold, 1993; Patrick et al., 2018).

Age is unrelated to respondents' moral identity. The irrelevant relationship between age and moral identity in the current study is consistent with the discovery that adolescents' identification with moral virtues is stable across adolescent years (Arnold, 1993; Patrick et al.,

2018). Other research found that developmental trends of moral maturity exist among high school students (Reimer et al., 2009). Identity does not typically emerge as an essential source of moral motivation until young adulthood (Blasi, 1995). The average age of the sample in the current study is around ten years old, probably the period before moral identity develops sharply. Therefore, it is reasonable that age is not related to young adolescents' moral identity in the current research.

It was expected that students growing up in a family with parents having decent jobs and siblings would have a higher moral identity than the other students. Generally, decent jobs require high education background and also mean considerable income. It was expected that students from wealthy families would be more generous and helpful. Students who have siblings would learn to share and be fair well. However, the result is different from what expectation. Parents' jobs and having siblings in the family do not predict respondents' moral identity. One of the reasons may be that the respondents are too young to know their parents' jobs exactly. Therefore, their reports are not accurate enough. The other possible reason would be that some parents work at home through the internet, for example, online business and stock trading, which would bring more income than working in the office. The respondents would also misunderstand it as their parents having no jobs. The third reason may be that family income would be related to children's moral behaviour rather than moral values. The previous research suggested that affluent parents are positively associated with children's community service (Hart et al., 1999).

When the three background variables are controlled, personal cultural values still predict the overall moral identity (see section 6.1.3 in Chapter Six). Individual-interest cultural values are the strongest predictor. Respondents with individual-interest cultural values are more likely to hold a weaker moral identity than those who are not. In contrast, respondents holding stronger universal-interest or collective-interest cultural values are more likely to show a stronger moral identity who are not. The result implies that a person's moral identity is predicted by his or her individual-interest value inclination more than collective and universal-interest value inclination. For example, suppose a person holds strong universal and

individual-interest values simultaneously. In that case, the person is more likely to hold a weak rather than a strong moral identity.

When all the available background variables and personal cultural values are controlled, nationality (living in different countries) still predicts moral identity (see section 6.1.3 in Chapter Six). It implies that Chinese respondents still hold a stronger moral identity than British respondents if other variables are the same. The moral identity in the current study is about kindness, fairness and honesty. The regression analysis with controlled variables provides further evidence to support the previous finding that Easterners showed slightly more concerns about harm and fairness than Westerners (Graham et al., 2011), even considering the differences in socio-economics and personal value tendency. The result also implies that young adolescents' moral identity is not only related to their personal differences but also to their national difference.

British respondents' language is related to their self-reported importance of moral identity. However, the relationship is not very strong (R^2 value increasing from 0.09 to 0.11). The respondents' who speak English and non-English language equally at home reported a lower mean score on the moral identity scale than those who only speak English or another language at home. The result is different from the expectation. As discussed in Chapter Four, English evokes individualism more than non-English does. The current research showed that respondents inclined to individualism tended to report a lower mean score on the moral identity scale (See Chapter Six). Therefore, it is expected that British respondents who only speak English at home would be inclined to individualism more and get a lower score on the moral identity scale than other British respondents who only speak non-English or English and non-English equally at home. It is difficult to explain why the result is different from the expectation.

10.5 The predicting factors of young adolescents' moral behaviour

Three background variables are predictors of consistency in donation behaviour: parents' jobs,

the only child in the family, and the school climate. The first two variables are positively related to consistent donation behaviour. At the same time, the third one is negatively related to consistent donation behaviour (see section 7.1.1 in Chapter Seven).

Participants who have parents doing ‘professional’ or ‘intermediate’ jobs are more likely to show consistent behaviour in donation than those who have parents doing ‘working’ jobs or having no job. The result supports the speculation that children from affluent families would be generous when dealing with money. It also is in line with some existing research findings. Many research had explored the relationship between education, income, occupation and donation. Generally, individuals with higher education or more income are likely to donate more (e.g. Todd & Lawson, 1999; Van Slyke & Brooks, 2005; Wilhelm et al., 2008; Yamauchi & Yokoyama, 2005).

It is supposed that family financial status is positively associated with children’s donation behaviour. In that case, it is reasonable that the only child in their family participants are more likely to donate as or more than they suggested than those who have siblings. Children who are the only child would get more resources from their parents than those who have siblings to share them. The result also supports the speculation from the interview during the game observation. Chinese and British participants’ different attitudes towards money would be related to their donation behaviour. It was found that Chinese participants cared less about money than British participants through interviews (see section 9.4 in Chapter Nine). Statistic data shows that the proportion of Chinese respondents with parents doing ‘professor’ or ‘intermediate’ jobs is bigger than that of British respondents (see Table 4.9 in Chapter Four). It would imply that Chinese respondents’ average family income is higher than British respondents. Therefore, Chinese young adolescents’ indifferent attitude to money and their family’s affluent financial situation would make them show generous and consistent behaviour in the donation task.

Finally, it cannot be explained that participants who reported a more positive school climate showed less consistent donation behaviour. It is opposite to the expectation that a positive

school climate would drive consistent moral behaviour.

For distribution behaviour consistency, sex is the only background predicting variable (see section 7.2.1 in Chapter Seven). Unlike boys, girls are more likely to distribute fewer balls than suggested. There are two possible explanations for the results. Research showed that women and girls tended to show more prosocial behaviours than men and boys (Carlo, 2006). However, when others observe their behaviours, boys tend to behave more prosocially than girls. There is no gender difference in anonymous prosocial behaviour for adolescents (Patrick et al., 2018). The participants may consider the researcher involved in the tasks an observer. That is probably why boys showed more consistent distribution behaviours than girls. However, the donation behaviour consistency does not show a gender difference. The other reason is the colourful bouncy balls for the distribution task. They would be more attractive to girls than to boys. Therefore, girls were attracted by the balls and tended to keep more balls to themselves than they intended. In the research experiment, children's (especially boys) tendency to share more nonpreferred than preferred stuff (e.g. food) (Birch & Billman, 1986). That is a possible reason boys distributed more balls they were not interested in than suggested to the researcher.

Unexpectedly, when background predictors are controlled, none of the three key dimensions of cultural values (individual, collective and universal-interest) predicts the consistency in donation behaviour. However, collective-interest cultural values predict distribution behaviour consistency negatively. Participants with stronger collective-interest cultural values tended to show less consistent distribution behaviour when the variable of sex was controlled. The result is incompatible with the idea that the sense of interdependence nurtured by the community would promote children's collective and reduce their self-interest values (Rochat et al., 2009). It is also opposite to the previous finding that Asian (Chinese and Indian) children shared more (food) than American children (Rao & Stewart, 1999).

When the background and personal cultural value variables are controlled, Chinese participants are still more likely to show more consistent behaviour in donation than British

participants. However, when other variables are controlled, there is no national difference in distribution behaviour consistency. It seems that young adolescents' donation behaviour consistency is not all related to their financial status (e.g. family income, attitudes towards money). It is still associated with national differences. One of the differences between China and England is the cultural differences—in collectivism vs. Individualism. According to Hofstede's (2011) cultural model (see section 3.1.3 in Chapter Three), the cultural dimensions of individualism-collectivism and power distance are significantly correlated with wealth. He argued that correlations with culture usually disappear after controlling for national wealth. However, the result of the current study does not support Hofstede's argument. Young adolescents' donation behaviour consistency is still related to national differences when their socioeconomic background is controlled.

Comparing the predictors of commitment intention to moral values, actual moral behaviour and moral behaviour consistency, there are some similarities and differences. Age is not related to any of the three moral behaviours (see Chapters Seven & Eight). It implies that the moral behaviour of young adolescents is in a stable period. The school climate is related to the three kinds of moral behaviour (value commitment intention, actual donation and donation consistency) (see Chapters Seven & Eight). At the same time, parenting style is only related to value commitment intention (see Chapters Seven & Eight). It indicates that young adolescents' moral behaviour (especially the actual behaviour) is influenced by the school environment more than parenting.

Donation behaviour (both actual behaviour and behaviour consistency) has a national difference (see Chapters Seven & Eight). In contrast, sharing behaviour has no national difference. It implies that Chinese and British young adolescents have different sensibilities about money rather than stuff (toys). Personal cultural values are associated with value commitment intention more than any actual moral behaviour (see Chapter Eight). It implies that cultural values are more related to behaviour on the conscious level than actual actions.

Cultural norm primings are not related to young adolescents' behaviour consistency (see

sections 7.1.2 & 7.2.2 in Chapter Seven) but actual behaviour (see sections 8.1.1 & 8.1.2 in Chapter Eight). Participants who knew about peers' behaviours (especially peers' generous behaviour) tended to behave more generously than those who did not. Cultural priming is not associated with behaviour consistency, probably because the norm primings were conducted after the questionnaire survey. It was too late for participants to change their behaviour intention in the survey to keep their behaviour consistent. Another possible reason is that the norm primings were about generosity rather than consistent behaviour. Therefore, participants' behaviour consistency was not primed. However, the influence of norm primings on participants' donation and sharing behaviour would explain why some participants donated or distributed more than their suggestion.

Only descriptive norm (telling the participants that their peers' generous behaviour) positively relates to actual distribution behaviour. However, both descriptive and injunctive norms (charity posters) are positively associated with donation behaviour (see Chapter Eight). The result is generally consistent with the existing findings that persons who are dispositionally or temporarily focused on normative considerations are most likely to act in norm-consistent ways (Berkowitz, 1972; Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964; Gruder et al., 1978; Leung & Morris, 2015; Miller & Grush, 1986; Nolan et al., 2008; Rutkowski et al., 1983; Schwartz & Fleishman, 1978). The researcher in the game observation deliberately told part of participants how their peers did before they decided on donation and distribution. Therefore, it is confident that the participants did focus on the designed descriptive norms. However, charity posters that serve as the injunctive norm were put on the table for the distribution task. Participants were not reminded to look at posters on the table. It does not guarantee that targeted participants would focus on them. Their attention would be attracted by the bouncy balls instead. Norms should primarily motivate behaviour when activated (made salient or otherwise focused) (Cialdini et al., 1990). The charity posters (injunctive norm) maybe not influence participants' distribution behaviour as descriptive norms do in the current study. Another reason may be that the charity posters are about donations (or helping) more than sharing. Cialdini et al. (1990) also suggested that the greater semantic proximity between the normative messages and target behaviour, the stronger the resultant activation

should be. The posters activated participants' donation behaviour more effectively than distribution behaviour.

Participants responded differently to the two kinds of descriptive norms (benefiting others and benefiting self). Participants who were under any descriptive norm primings donated more than those who were not under any norm primings. However, participants who were only under the descriptive norm (benefiting others) distributed more balls to the researcher than those who were not (See sections 8.1.1 & 8.1.2 in Chapter Eight). It implies that young adolescents are more sensitive to the norm that encourages benefiting others than other norms in moral contexts. Participants under the norm priming that encourages benefiting self still donated more money than those under non-norm priming. It seems unreasonable. They should keep more money to themselves (and donate less) to follow the descriptive norm. However, the result is consistent with previous research on descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning (Roberts et al., 2019). The descriptive-to-prescriptive reasoning refers to how the information about how the group members are doing (descriptive norm) influences people's beliefs about how the group members should do (prescriptive norm). The research found that both children and adults reasoned that individuals should engage in positive behaviour (and should not engage in negative behaviour), regardless of the group's norm. It implies that even children have remarkably adult-like beliefs about what is positive and negative (Killen et al., 2013; Smetana et al., 2014). The finding suggests that children do not blindly follow a descriptive-to-prescriptive tendency. Their beliefs about what is the most common or good can override the descriptive norms. Turning back to the current research, the (benefiting self) descriptive norm still encouraged generous donation behaviour the same as the (benefiting others) descriptive and injunctive norms. It may be because students believe that generous donations and help are positive and prescriptive behaviour (they should do). They tended to stick to the prescriptive norm even though they were under the descriptive norm that went against their beliefs.

Participants' financial situation is related to their moral behaviour to some degree. It is worth noting that participants who had pocket money were more likely to keep more bouncy balls

than those who did not (see section 8.1.2 in Chapter Eight). It seems that the result is not reasonable. Students with pocket money are freer to get the toys they want than those who do not have pocket money. Therefore, students with pocket money would care about the bouncy balls less than those who do not have pocket money. However, according to the brief observation interview, some participants thought money was useless because their parents could buy anything they wanted (see section 9.4 in Chapter Nine). Therefore, participants without pocket money are not necessarily materially deficient and care more about bouncy balls than participants with pocket money. Conversely, participants with pocket money would be subject to more restrictions on consumption or materials because they have to buy something they want with their limited pocket money. They would be taught by their parents or caretakers how to save money or make consumption plans. Therefore, they would care more about the bouncy balls in observation than those without pocket money.

10.6 Cultural similarities and differences between China and England

One of the purposes of the current study is to check the differences in moral identity between the two countries' young adolescents and whether the differences are associated with the different cultures between Eastern and Western cultures that the two countries represent. Before responding to the above questions, examining the cultural similarities and differences between the targeted young adolescents from the two countries is necessary.

10.6.1 The similarities and differences in personal cultural values between the two countries

The personal cultural values of the two countries are examined by scoring participants' behavioural habits in daily life. The behavioural habits demonstrate specific values (see section 3.1.5 in Chapter Three; section 4.3.6 in Chapter Four). The average of a collection of individuals' scores identifies a national cultural value tendency (see section 4.3.6 in Chapter Four). Schwartz's cultural value model (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2016) classified the cultural values into three groups according to the interest purpose behind each value:

individual (personal) interest, collective (social) interest and universal (or mixed) interest (both personal and collective interests). The result showed that Chinese participants, on average, demonstrated a greater collective-interest value tendency than British participants (Effect size=0.7). The values of individual interest are displayed slightly less among Chinese participants than British participants (Effect size=-0.3). However, Chinese and British respondents reported almost the same universal-interest values tendency (Effect size=0.1). Chinese participants still hold slightly stronger universal-interest values than British respondents (see section 5.8.2 in Chapter Five).

The similar inclination toward universal-interest values for Chinese and British young adolescents indicates that the universal-interest values are between collective and individual-interest values (Schwartz, 1992). However, previous research also argued that universalism (understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people) is valued more among individualists than collectivists. Collectivists' caring about collective interest does not extend beyond in-group members to out-group members (Leung & Bond, 1984; Triandis et al., 1988). However, a slightly stronger inclination toward universal-interest values among Chinese respondents than British respondents is inconsistent with the existing argument. It may be because the sense and engagement of caring about universal issues such as the environment is being emphasised more and more in Chinese education. The Chinese young adolescents reported a much higher score on the item of 'universalism' (caring for nature and animals) than the British young adolescents (Effect size=0.7, see Table 5.23 in Chapter Five). It further supports the speculation.

The general cultural values difference between the two countries is basically in line with the finding of previous research, which employed Schwartz's other cultural value scale: individualist values are endorsed strongly in the United States, and the collectivist subset is supported strongly in China (Triandis et al., 1990). The result is also consistent with the collectivism-individualism division pattern for East-Western cultures (Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Sun et al., 2014). Most existing research on cultural differences focuses on adults or late adolescents. The current study provides evidence that the cultural

division pattern is also displayed among young adolescents to some extent.

Some interesting findings are noteworthy for the 13 specific values scattered in the three dimensions of cultural values. The overall mean score of individual-interest values is lower for the Chinese sample than the British sample. However, the Chinese participants scored higher in four specific values within the dimension of individual-interest values than the British participants. The four values are ‘personal security’, ‘personal achievement’, ‘self-direction’, and ‘humility’ (see Table 5.23 in Chapter Five). The different attitudes toward ‘being humble’ between the two countries’ samples align with the previous finding (Schwartz, 1999). In Schwartz’s (1999) research, People from Eastern countries (e.g. mainland / Hong Kong China, Korea) value hierarchy more than Western Europeans. The ‘hierarchy’ expresses the value of ‘humility’ to some extent. Monkhouse and his colleagues (2013) showed that Confucian values, including humility, were not entirely eroded in Eastern culture by rapid modernization and wealth creation.

The other three values, ‘personal security’, ‘self-direction’ (independent thoughts and action choosing), and ‘personal achievement’, are supposed to be valued more among Westerners rather than Easterners. The existing cultural models (e.g. Hofstede’s model and Schwartz’s model) propose that self-interest and independence are emphasised more in Western countries than in Eastern countries. (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1999). However, the unexpected result also can be explained reasonably by the current parenting, education in China or the specific expression of the statements from the Personal Cultural Value Scale in current research.

‘Personal safety’ is valued more among Chinese respondents than British respondents would be explained by the more Chinese families having an only child than British families. According to the background information data, the proportion of Chinese participants who are the only child in their families is bigger than that of British participants (33.4% vs. 13.9%, see Chapter Four). The only child is cherished in Chinese families, and parents are really concerned about the well-being of their children, especially security. Chinese children are constantly told something like “Do not eat anything given by a stranger.” or “Watch out for

the vehicles on the roads.” It perfectly matches the statements about the ‘personal security’ value in the scale. That is probably why Chinese participants scored higher on ‘personal security’ than British participants.

The ‘self-direction’ is valued more among Chinese respondents than British respondents would be explained by the current Chinese education reform that encourages critical thinking and cooperation. For the value of ‘self-direction’, the two items to check respondents’ independent thinking and action tendency are: “ Like doing tasks alone rather than with other people (item B17)” ; “Examine the ideas behind rules before obeying them (item B18)” (see Table A10 in Appendix). One item (B17) is checking independent action or cooperation; the other item (B18) is checking independent thinking or not. Chinese participants gained a higher combined score for the two items than British participants. However, Chinese participants got a higher score in independent or reasoning thinking and a lower score in independent action than British participants when the two items were checked separately (see Table A10 in Appendix). It means that reasoning thinking and cooperative learning are preferred among Chinese young adolescents more greatly than British adolescents. According to the cultural models and other relevant research, collectivists emphasise group characteristics and prefer group learning (Yuen-Yee & Watkins, 1994; Sullivan, 1996; Tang, 1996; Park, 2002; Hofstede, 2003). Therefore, it is reasonable that cooperative learning is predominant among Chinese participants. The reasoning or critical thinking is supposed to be less encouraged in Eastern cultures than in Western cultures. Eastern cultures emphasise compliance with social order, respecting authority, collective harmony, and dogmatism about knowledge. Students in this kind of culture tend to value instilled learning and be reluctant to ask questions, express individual opinions, and challenge teachers to save ‘face’ and avoid shame (Cocroft & Ting-Toomey, 1994; Ho, 2020; Hofstede, 2003; Li & Wegerif, 2014; Ting-Toomey, 1988). However, the Chinese young adolescents in the current research demonstrated the opposite thinking tendency to the existing research findings. The tendency of cooperative learning and reasoning thinking displayed among the Chinese participants in the current research may be due to the ongoing education reforms in China. The Chinese government released the ‘National Guidelines for Medium and Long-Term Educational

Reform and Development (2010–2020)', which focused on students' skill development, such as independent inquiry, cooperation, communication, and problem-solving. To achieve the education goal, some pedagogical approaches and interventions have been introduced and piloted in Chinese schools, for example, Philosophy for Children (P4C) (e.g. Gao, 2015, 2019; Wu, 2021), Flipped classroom for cooperative learning (e.g. Fan, 2018). Therefore, it is reasonable that Chinese students got a higher score on 'independent thinking' and a lower score on 'independent action' than British students.

The value of 'personal achievement' is supposed to be valued more in Western cultures than in Eastern cultures. However, the current education situation in China and the expression of the items may justify the survey result that Chinese respondents valued personal achievement more than British respondents. The items are "I always put a lot of effort into studies and sports in order to get a good result (item B3)" and "I always try to impress my teachers or my classmates by working extra hard (item B7)" (see Table A10 in Appendix). The items are about respondents' performance, especially academic performance at school. The target of education reform in China has shifted to the overall development of citizens (Wu, 2021). However, schools and students are still under tremendous pressure of severe competition for university or high school entrance examinations (Phuong-Mai et al., 2005). Academic performance is still significantly emphasised at school. It is still a fundamental criterion for evaluating students' and teachers' work. Chinese parents are also very concerned about their children's academic performance. Therefore, studying hard is encouraged dramatically in China. Turning to the expression of the scale items, one item links respondents' academic performance to others' (teachers and peers) perceptions of the respondents, while the other does not. It is worth noting that Chinese respondents only gained a higher score on the item that involved others' perceptions than the British respondents (see Table A10 in Appendix). It implies that studying hard is motivated more by teachers' and peers' perceptions for Chinese participants compared with British participants. It seems that the result is consistent with the Self-construal Theory and other arguments on the cultural difference (see Chapter Three) that Easterners tend to focus on the contexts, including others' thinking, feeling and behaviours,

while Westerners view things more independently and absolutely (Markus & Kitayama, 1991a, 1991b; Nisbett et al., 2001). Easterners care about others' evaluation of their behaviours more, and Westerners care about self-assessment more (Bedford & Hwang, 2003). Therefore, it is reasonable that Chinese young adolescents got a higher mean score on the 'personal achievement' value.

British sample gained a higher score than the Chinese sample in four values from the individual-interests value dimension of the cultural value scale in the current study: 'face', 'power', 'hedonism', and 'stimulation'. The value of hedonism and stimulation refers to living pleasant, exciting and varied life. The dominance of enjoying a pleasant, diverse and exciting life among British young adolescents is consistent with the previous findings by Schwartz (1999) and Hofstede (1980) (see Chapter Three). The researchers found that most people in Western countries tend to have free gratification (indulgence). However, most Easterners control gratification (restraint).

One result opposite the existing cultural models is the respondents' different tendencies on the value of 'power' between the two countries. According to cultural models by Hofstede (1980) and Schwartz (1999), the value of 'power distance' and 'hierarchy' are valued more in Eastern countries than in Western countries. It implies that Easterners value social power, authority, and wealth more. In contrast, equality and social justice are emphasised more in Western countries. The two items corresponding to the 'power' value in the cultural scale in current research check the respondents' attitudes towards controlling other people and resources (wealth). British respondents gained higher scores in both items than Chinese respondents, which is opposite to expectation. One of the possible explanations for the unexpected result is cultural globalisation. Societies probably become more individualistic, with less emphasis on hierarchy (Beugelsdijk et al., 2015). Western culture also influences China. Equality and justice are emphasised a lot, especially in school education in China. The core socialist values guiding all the Chinese citizens' behaviour, especially students', include 'prosperity', 'democracy', 'civility', 'harmony', 'freedom', 'equality', 'justice', 'rule of law',

‘patriotism’, ‘dedication’, ‘integrity’, and ‘friendship’. The ‘National Guidelines for Medium and Long-Term Educational Reform and Development (2010–2020)’ emphasised that the core socialist values should be integrated into national education. That probably is why the sense of ‘power control’ is not as pervasive among Chinese respondents.

Another unexpected finding is respondents’ different attitudes toward the value of ‘face’. The value of ‘face’ is supposed to be predominant among collectivists (Triandis et al., 1990). It refers to maintaining one’s public image and avoiding humiliation in Schwartz’s cultural model (Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz et al., 2016). The value of ‘face’ can be interpreted as ‘face-saving’ and pervasive in interpersonal relationships in Chinese culture (Kwong & Cheung, 2003; Zane & Yeh, 2002). The two items corresponding to the value go like this: “I don’t like talking about my mistake (item B15) ”; “I feel angry when someone does not believe in my ability (item B25)” (see Table A10 in Appendix). According to the face-negotiation theory, saving face and losing face represent two critical constructs in interpersonal interactions (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). Face-saving is maintained by fulfilling one’s expected social roles. Failure to fulfil expectations or responsibilities of one’s social roles causes the loss of face, leading to negative emotions, such as humiliation, shame, guilt, and loss of self-esteem (Ho, Fu, et al., 2004; Yang & Kleinman, 2008). The item “I don’t like talking about my mistake” expresses the idea of trying to save face. Chinese participants got a slightly lower score in this item than British participants, but almost the same as British participants. The item (B25) implies that someone is confident in their ability and cannot accept others questioning their ability, which expresses losing face. Chinese participants got a much lower score on this item than British participants (see Table A10 in Appendix). It is crucial to make the Chinese sample a lower overall mean score on the value of ‘face’ than the British sample. There is a sensitive word, ‘angry’, in this item, which may signal negative behaviour. ‘Being angry with others’ or ‘disagreeing with others’ is inconsistent with the predominant value of ‘maintaining harmony interpersonal relationships’ in Eastern culture (Bond et al., 1982; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Even if it is related to ‘saving face’, the Chinese are not willing to destroy harmonious interpersonal relationships. It is probably why Chinese respondents got a much lower score on this item than British

respondents.

Furthermore, in Western culture, people tend to attribute losing face to factors external to their ability. However, individuals from Eastern cultures (i.e. Chinese) may perceive face-losing as personal failure or incompetence (Ting-Toomey & Kurogi, 1998). Tjong and Yong (2004) proposed that students from Confucian heritage cultures (CHC) (e.g. China, Vietnam, Singapore, Korea, and Japan) have personal barriers to learning, such as shyness and lack of confidence. Chinese respondents gained a lower score than British respondents in the item is, probably because of their valued shyness, lack of confidence and maintaining harmony. The speculation is supported by the higher score gained by the Chinese sample on the value of ‘humility’ and ‘conformity’ (action restraint) compared with the British sample (see Table 5.23 in Chapter Five). The observation during the survey also provides evidence of different attitudes towards ‘shyness’ between the two countries (see Chapter Nine). Chinese teachers thought being shy was good quality, while some British students did not understand what being shy meant.

Generally, the similarity and differences in personal cultural values indicate that cultural differences and cultural globalisation are already displayed among the young generation. Most of the research on culture focuses on middle and late adolescents or adults (e.g. Beugelsdijk et al., 2015; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2016). The present study shows that cultural differences and homogeneity emerge among young adolescents. The cultural characteristics displayed among young adolescents are basically consistent with what is found among adults, which supports the socialisation hypothesis that “one’s basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one’s preadult years” (Inglehart, 1990, p.68) and remain largely stable after that.

All the evidence suggests that Western countries (e.g. Britain) still keep the typical culture of individualism, autonomy, self-orientation and less conformity. Some details imply that Eastern countries (e.g. Chinese) still maintain a collectivistic culture characterised by hierarchy, respecting authority, harmony and interdependence (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz,

1992, 1999, see section 3.1.3 in Chapter Three). However, the cultural difference in terms of individualism, power distance or hierarchy between China and England is slight. It is consistent with Beugelsdijk et al.'s (2015) research finding that cultural difference has shrunk.

10.6.2 The similarities and differences in perceived parenting, school climate, and cultural norms between the two countries

National culture can be broadly defined as a national group's values, beliefs, norms, and behavioural patterns (Leung et al., 2005). Some researchers also defined it as information acquired by learning from other individuals through mechanisms such as imitation or teaching. Culture is usually transmitted across generations and leads to different behavioural patterns among genetically similar groups (Danchin et al., 2004; Richerson et al., 2003). There are two purposes for checking the perceived parenting, school climate and norms among young adolescents. One is to check the two countries' cultural similarities and differences displayed through adults' behaviour from young adolescents' perceptions. The other is to check if there are any similarities and differences in the cultural learning environment for young adolescents between the two countries. Parents, teachers, and peers are people teenagers frequently interact with in their daily lives. Their behaviour would be learnt and imitated by young adolescents. However, learning and imitation happen once the behaviours or ideas are observed and understood. Therefore, cultural learning environments need to be examined through young adolescents' perceptions.

The perceived parenting and school climate are mainly about whether respondents feel parent-child and teacher-student relationships are supportive, encouraging, equal, fair and honest. 'Care', 'fairness', and 'honesty' are universally recognised moral values across Eastern and Western cultures (Graham et al., 2011). Generally, Chinese and British respondents got relatively high scores on Parenting Scale and School Environment Scale. They also reported a similar (slightly different) perceived parenting (Effect size=0.1) and

school environment (Effect size=0.4) (see sections 5.9 & 5.10 in Chapter Five). It implies that ‘Supportive’, ‘encouraging’, ‘equal’, ‘fair’, and ‘honest’ are valued universally among parents and teachers in the two countries. Young adolescents in the two countries live in a similar cultural learning environment.

Chinese respondents reported slightly more positive child-parents and students-teachers relationships than British respondents. The result is inconsistent with the previous findings on parenting in China. It was found that a harsh and controlling parenting style is still a conventional method in Chinese society (Huang, 2013; Jia et al., 2009; Leung et al., 1998). The hierarchy is not reflected in Chinese adolescents’ reported teacher-student relationship. The current result is inconsistent with the previous conclusion that power distance (hierarchy) between teachers and students tended to be higher in Eastern countries (e.g. China) than in Western countries (e.g. America and Netherlands) (Bear et al., 2014; Hofstede & Minkov, 2010). One possible reason is that schools are influenced and governed by national education policies that emphasise the core values such as equity, fairness, and honesty. Teachers would be more careful about their behaviour and attitude than parents when interacting with children. The national education policies also influence Chinese parents’ behaviour and values regarding upbringing. Moreover, Chinese parents are influenced by the Western parenting style, which characterises equality, encouragement and democracy through self-reading and parenting training.

To further check how culture influences young adolescents from the two countries, respondents’ perception of moral traits is linked to descriptive and injunctive norms. The data revealed that Chinese young adolescents’ morality is influenced more by the injunctive norm (the perception of what society approves) than the descriptive norm (the perception that most people actually do) (see section 5.11 in Chapter Five). However, the tendency is reversed among British respondents. The result aligns with the existing research findings on the difference in norm conformity between Eastern and Western countries. It was found that individuals from Eastern countries are more strongly affected by injunctive norms than individuals from Western countries (Gelfand & Harrington, 2015). Western cultures value

descriptive norms more than injunctive norms (Savani et al., 2012).

Another possible interpretation of the differences in norm conformity regarding morality between the two countries is Kohlberg's (1958, 1981, 1984) Theory of Moral Development. Kohlberg proposed that people experience six developmental stages for moral reasoning that cannot be reversed before reaching moral maturity. People at the third moral developmental stage justify their moral actions according to the approval or disapproval of others around them. In contrast, people who move to the fourth stage justify their activities according to social conventions or authority. Even though Kohlberg's theory focuses on the cognitive rationale for making moral decisions, it reflects the different stages of people's inference of a moral standard. People are supposed to move from the self-interest orientation stage to the social order or even the universal ethical principles orientation stage. Researchers also claimed that "children of high socioeconomic background develop more rapidly along the sequence and are more likely to attain higher levels of moral judgment" (Hetherington & Parke, 1979, p. 613). Going back to the current study, the Chinese respondents mainly referred to social and national approval when thinking about moral traits. In contrast, British respondents tended to refer to individuals' perceptions around them when thinking about moral characteristics. The Chinese respondents' referencing stage seems to be higher and more inclined toward authority than the British respondents. It may be because Chinese respondents, on average, live in more affluent families than British respondents.

10.6.3 The similarity and differences in the understanding of moral traits and behaviour motivation between the two countries

The result showed that 'honest', 'polite', 'respectful', 'fair', 'loyal', and 'friendly' are listed among the top 10 critical traits of a moral person for both countries' young adolescents (see Table 5.21 in Chapter Five). These moral traits almost overlap with the universal moral traits (e.g. harm/care, honesty, and fairness) proposed by other research (AISheddi et al., 2019; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). It indicates that both Chinese and British

young adolescents have a similar understanding of moral traits. The universal moral traits are central to young adolescents' moral understanding across cultures.

The current research also reveals an inconsistency with the previous finding. Loyal and respectful are viewed as the binding moral foundation (Haidt & Graham, 2007). It was found that they are not prototypical of the moral person in individual cultures (e.g. Britain) (AlSheddi et al., 2019). However, in the current study, adolescents in both collective and individual cultures perceive them as critical moral traits.

Some qualities such as 'clean', 'strong', 'proud', 'healthy', and 'fun', which are not stereotypical understanding of moral traits, are selected as critical moral traits by some respondents from both countries. Moreover, British adolescents mentioned these untypical understandings of moral traits more frequently (8.3%-5.6%) than Chinese adolescents (2.1%-0.1%). Notably, 8.3% of British adolescents thought 'being funny' is an essential moral trait. In comparison, only 2.1% of Chinese adolescents had the same idea (see Table A7 in Appendix). The tendency to value 'being funny' as a fundamental moral trait is responded to by another research finding that 10-11-year old British pupils widely thought a sense of humour is an important quality for being a good person (See, 2018). It is unnecessary to say that young adolescents who selected untypical moral traits have not developed mature morality or have an inappropriate understanding of morality. The finding implies that a minority of young adolescents from both countries develop a different version of morality from the widely accepted one.

There are differences in moral understanding across cultures when young adolescents develop moral awareness. For example, 'humble' and 'selfless' are fundamental moral traits reported by young Chinese adolescents. However, they take a relatively low proportion among British adolescents. In contrast, 'hardworking' is valued by British adolescents as an essential moral trait. However, it is not among Chinese adolescents (see Table A7 in Appendix). The result implies two points. First of all, the predominance of 'humble' and 'selfless' as moral traits among Chinese adolescents is consistent with the Eastern or collective culture characterised

by previous research (e.g. AlSheddi et al., 2019; Singelis et al., 1995). Secondly, there is an inconsistency with previous research findings. ‘Hardworking’ is only widespread among British adolescents as an essential moral trait, inconsistent with Aquino and Reed’s (2002) finding, which revealed that ‘hardworking’ is a universal moral trait across countries. The current result reflects the cultural bias in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) research. Western countries were dominant, while Eastern countries, especially China, were underrepresented in Aquino and Reed’s (2002) research samples.

All the given 45 qualities in the survey were selected by Chinese adolescents, more or less. In contrast, ‘compassionate’, ‘selfless’, ‘optimistic’, ‘perseverant’, ‘exemplary’, ‘consistent’, and ‘self-disciplined’ were not selected at all by British adolescents. ‘Selfless’, ‘perseverant’, ‘consistent’, and ‘self-discipline’ are related to self-control or self-interest control according to the meaning of the words. It implies that British adolescents do not think the qualities of restraint are important for a moral person. It is responded by the cultural model (Hofstede, 1980) that most people in South and North America, Western Europe, and Sub-Sahara Africa tend to control gratification (restraint) less than in Eastern Europe, Asia and the Muslim world. It is also in line with another finding of the current study that ‘conformity’ (restraint of actions) is valued less among the British sample than in the Chinese sample.

Religion influences British adolescents’ moral awareness more than Chinese adolescents’, but not too much. ‘Religious’ was more frequently mentioned as an essential moral trait by British adolescents than Chinese adolescents (1.8% vs. 0.9%) (see Table A7 in Appendix). None of the British and Chinese primary schools involved in the current study is missionary schools. However, Religious Education was emphasised officially in the Education Reform Act (ERA) of 1988 and eventually led to a multi-faith approach to religious education all over state-funded schools in England (Barnes, 2008, 2009; Barnes & Wright, 2006; Jackson, 2015; O’Grady, 2005). Even though the researcher criticised the limitations of religious education in British schools, primary school students still have basic knowledge of diverse religious traditions worldwide (Benoit, 2021). In contrast, most Chinese do not affiliate with a religious tradition (Goldman, 1986; Yang, 2004). In the syllabi of Chinese primary and

secondary schools, political education and moral education have a Marxist theoretical foundation (Li et al., 2004). Chinese students are not as exposed to religious knowledge or faith as British students. The Chinese sample only included a small percentage of Hui minority students with Muslim traditions. It is reasonable that British young adolescents are more likely to view 'being religious' as an important moral trait than Chinese adolescents because the former group are exposed to religion more than the latter group. However, the British young adolescents' response is different from another research finding that British undergraduates did not think 'religious' was a quality a moral person should have (AISheddi et al., 2019).

The difference in behaviour motivation between the two countries' samples is not in line with the Self-construal Theory (see section 3.2.2 in Chapter Three) that distinguishes the Eastern and Western cultures. In collectivistic cultures, the 'self' is viewed as interdependent (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). According to Wang (2012), the social or public self is strongly prioritised in Chinese culture. For Chinese people, self-justification depends more on others' attitudes than on their beliefs, attitudes and criteria (Kitayama et al., 1997; Kitayama et al., 2004). It is speculated that moral motivation for Chinese people stems from external more than internal sources. In contrast, the opposite may be true for Westerners. However, Chinese adolescents in the current research reported that their moral behaviour was motivated by private sources (e.g. self or nothing) more than public sources (e.g. parents, teachers, and peers). In contrast, British adolescents' moral behaviour was more driven by the public than private sources (see section 5.6 in Chapter Five). It is noteworthy that more than half of the Chinese respondents reported that they behave morally for nothing. It would be interpreted that acting morally is habitus and unconscious among most Chinese respondents.

10.7 Is young adolescents' moral identity related to culture

The primary purpose of the comparative research is to examine whether the difference in young adolescents' moral identity between two countries is associated with the cultural difference between the two countries. The statistical data showed differences in culture and

self-reports of moral identity between young adolescents in the two countries. First, Chinese young adolescents reported a stronger moral identity than British adolescents. Secondly, the cultural difference between the two countries' samples is demonstrated by the self-reports of personal cultural values. Individual-interest cultural values are predominant among British young adolescents. Collective-interest cultural values are emphasised more among Chinese adolescents than British adolescents. Lastly, the two countries' cultural differences are also reflected in the different perceived school climates, parenting styles, behaviour motivation, and understanding of moral traits reported by young adolescents (see section 10.5 in this Chapter).

Regression analysis showed that school climate and parenting style are positively associated with young adolescents' moral identity. Moreover, three dimensions of cultural values also explain the moral identity variation (See Chapter six). However, the cultural value variable is individual-levelled rather than national-levelled because the value tendency is reported from an individual rather than a group perspective. It only means individuals with strong collective or universal-interest cultural tendencies would have a strong moral identity. In contrast, individuals who value individual-interest cultural values would show a weak moral identity. Chinese and British adolescents demonstrated different cultural value trends on average. It just means that collective-interest cultural values are salient among Chinese adolescents and individual-interest cultural values are salient among British adolescents. However, it is not guaranteed that all the respondents with strong collective-interests cultural values are Chinese adolescents and all those with solid individual-interest cultural values are British adolescents. Therefore, the relation between individual-levelled cultural values and moral identity does not account for the influence of national-levelled cultural differences on young adolescents' moral identity. It only indicates that young adolescents' moral identity is related to their personal cultural value inclination.

When all the relative variables are controlled, the variable of nationality (living in China or England) still explains the moral identity variation (See Chapter six). It indicates that young adolescents living in China hold a stronger moral identity than those living in England when

other factors (such as sex, school environment, parenting style, and individual-levelled cultural value inclination) are the same. It implies that the young adolescents' moral identity difference between the two countries is related to their different residential countries. The current study revealed some cultural differences between China and England. However, it does not guarantee that young adolescents' moral identity is related to the national cultural difference. The variation in young adolescents' self-reports of moral identity would be related to other national differences which are not examined.

10.8 The prediction of moral identity to moral behaviour

The regression model of current research shows that solid moral identity predicts both donations and sharing behaviours when only age, sex and norm primings are controlled. The result is in line with the findings of previous studies (Aquino & Reed., 2002; Black & Reynolds, 2016; Gotowiec & Mastrigt, 2019; Rua et al., 2017; Xu & Ma, 2015). However, these research on moral identity targeted adults or late adolescents. The current research explores the prediction of moral identity to actual moral behaviour among the younger group.

Furthermore, moral identity predicts donation and distribution behaviour consistency as expected when only age, sex and norm primings are controlled. It shows the positive relationship between moral identity and moral integrity empirically. The result supports the Self Model of Moral Functioning proposed by Blasi (1983). It implies that students with a weak moral identity are likely to show a gap between their moral thoughts and behaviour. The variation in students' moral identity would explain the gap between their moral thoughts and behaviour. The result is also echoed by the Social-cognitive Model of Moral Functioning proposed by Aquino and Reed (2002). Students' moral behaviour is influenced less by situations when they are high in moral identity than those low in moral identity. Therefore, students who reported a strong moral identity responded similarly or even precisely the same to both scenarios in the questionnaire and real situations in game observation. However, students who reported a weak moral identity did not.

It is consistent with some existing research (e.g. Black & Reynolds, 2016; Schlenker, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2009). The previous research just employed the paper-and-pen questionnaire to justify the relationship between moral identity and moral integrity. The current research explores the relationship through actual behaviour observation.

Sex and age were usually controlled among demographic variables in the regression models when previous research tried to link moral identity to actual donation and helping behaviours. Other background variables, such as socioeconomic background and cultural differences, were ignored by some previous research (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2011; Crimston et al., 2016; Gu, 2013; Lee et al., 2014). The moral identity does not predict donation or sharing behaviours or donation behaviour consistency when more variables are controlled, such as culture-related variables (school climate, nationality), participants' pocket money, parents' job, and only child or not in the family. It implies that cultural bias and socioeconomic variables should be considered when exploring the prediction of moral identity to moral behaviour.

10.9 The prediction of moral motivation to moral behaviour

Moral motivation is related to value commitment intention. Participants who reported their behaviour was driven by internal motivation were more likely to intend to commit to their moral values than those who reported their behaviour was driven by external motivation. The result is consistent with some existing findings and suggestions. Commitment to moral values (integrity) is positively related to helping behaviour for self-principled and altruistic motives (Schlenker, 2008). When internal rather than symbolic (public) motivation is salient, consistent moral behaviours across different contexts are more likely to be maintained (Rua et al., 2017). The positive correlation between internal motivation and behaviour intention also justifies the validity of the Value Commitment Intention Subscale of the Moral Identity Scale for the current research to some extent. It is developed based on the Moral Integrity Subscale of the Moral Identity Questionnaire (Black & Reynolds, 2016), which measures how much value participants place on acting according to moral principles. The positive

correlation between internal motivation and behaviour intention indicates that students whose behaviour is motivated by internal factors are more desired to act according to their moral values. The result is consistent with the main idea of Black and Reynolds' (2016) measure of moral identity.

However, moral motivation is not related to actual behaviour or behaviour consistency. It is inconsistent with some research finding that 'Internalization' predicts actual charity behaviour (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Winterich, 2008; Winterich et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2014). One possible explanation is that the average age of the sample in the current research is smaller than those research. Young adolescents' moral motivation has not developed strongly enough to drive actual behaviour. Internal moral motivation increases with age (Krettenauer & Victor, 2017).

10.10 Summary

According to the data analysis, there are several key findings: (1) There is a gap between moral values, value commitments or behavioural intention and actual moral behaviour for young adolescents from both countries, more or less; (2) Young adolescents reported a relatively strong moral identity and showed a moral behaviour pattern. There is no age difference in self-reported moral identity and any kind of moral behaviour; (3) Young adolescents show a similar understanding of moral traits as adults; (4) The socioeconomic background is related to the actual behaviour and donation behaviour consistency rather than intention; (5) Young adolescents' moral identity is related to cultural variables, including individual and national-levelled cultural differences (nationality), perceived parenting and school environment; (6) Donation behaviour consistency is related to nationality while sharing behaviour consistency is related to personal cultural values. However, cultural norm primings are associated with neither behaviour consistency; (7) The Chinese sample reported a stronger moral identity and showed more consistent moral behaviour than the British sample; (8) There is cultural difference and similarity between Chinese and British young adolescents; (9) The moral identity does not predict actual donation or sharing behaviours or

donation behaviour consistency when more variables (including culture-related and socioeconomic variables) are controlled; (10) Measuring and understanding young adolescents' moral views, and behaviour is more complicated than expected when some factors are considered, such as potential social desirability and different understandings of the expression of the items on scales.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter first reviews the key findings. Then some potential implications of the findings will be presented, including young adolescents' moral development, the role of culture in moral education, and some concerns about moral education and evaluation for educators, researchers and policymakers.

11.1 Key findings

The study reveals a general picture of young adolescents' moral views (moral identity and moral trait understanding) and behaviour (intention, actual behaviour and behaviour consistency). It also examines the cultural similarity and differences between China and England from a young adolescent's perspective. Finally, the research checks the predictors (including nationality/culture differences) of moral identity and related behaviour. There are several significant findings:

(1) To some extent, there is a gap between moral values, value commitments (behaviour intention) and actual moral behaviour for young adolescents from both countries. The gap between behaviour intention and actual behaviour refers to behaviour consistency. The gap between moral values and value commitment would be related to the moral judgment on the moral dilemma (see section 10.2 in Chapter Ten). However, in this study, behaviour consistency (donation and sharing) varies by parents' jobs (socioeconomic background), being the only child in the family, the school climate, individual sex, personal cultural values and nationalities (see section 10.5 in Chapter Ten). There is no clear age difference in behaviour intention, actual behaviour and behaviour consistency, which suggests that the development of moral behaviour is relatively stable during young adolescents, from 8 to 12 years old.

(2) Young adolescents have developed a proper moral understanding. First, young adolescents generally think that being kind (not hurting), honest and fair are essential values for themselves. Secondly, young adolescents have a similar understanding of important moral traits to adults.

(3) Behaviour intention, actual behaviour and behaviour consistency are predicted by the variables of culture, socioeconomic and motivation to different degrees. The prediction of the perceived school environment is stronger than that of parenting to moral behaviour. The prediction of personal cultural values to moral behaviour intention is stronger than to actual moral behaviour and behaviour consistency. Nationality difference is only associated with behaviour intention and donation behaviour (both actual behaviour and behaviour consistency). The socioeconomic background is related to actual behaviour but not behaviour intention. Moral motivation only predicts moral behaviour intention (see section 10.5 in Chapter Ten).

Cultural norm primings are related to actual moral behaviour rather than behaviour consistency. The descriptive norm (telling the participants what their peers did) is positively related to both donation and distribution behaviour, while the injunctive norm (charity posters) is only positively associated with donation behaviour. The result is generally consistent with the existing findings that persons who are dispositionally or temporarily focused on normative considerations are most likely to act in norm-consistent ways (Berkowitz, 1972; Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964; Gruder et al., 1978; Leung & Morris, 2015; Miller & Grush, 1986; Nolan et al., 2008; Rutkowski et al., 1983; Schwartz & Fleishman, 1978).

(4) Cultural similarities and differences exist between the samples from China and England from a young adolescent's perspective. The cultural similarity is reflected through personal values, behaviour patterns, parenting, school environment, moral trait understanding and social desirability. Both Chinese and British young adolescents emphasise universal-interest values. Chinese and British adolescents generally reported a similar

perceived parenting style and school environment. Young adolescents demonstrated a similar behaviour pattern (intending to distribute gifts fairly while donating more money). It implies they have similar moral judgement or reasoning according to specific situations. They also reported a considerable overlap of moral traits understanding. Young adolescents from both countries showed social desirability more or less during game observation.

Cultural differences could exist in personal values, moral trait understanding, cultural norms, classroom seat arrangement, and interpersonal relationships. Generally, collective-interest values are more common among Chinese young adolescents. In contrast, individual-interest values are slightly prevailing among British young adolescents. Even though a few individual-interest values are valued more among Chinese adolescents, it further demonstrates the characteristic of a collectivistic culture to some extent. For example, the predominance of ‘humility’ value among Chinese respondents reflects the hierarchy in Eastern culture (Schwartz, 1999). It is indicated that humility still plays a role (even though not a very strong role) in some Eastern countries such as China, Vietnam and Singapore) in updated research on culture (Monkhouse et al., 2013). Chinese adolescents’ perceptions of moral traits are influenced more by injunctive norms than descriptive norms. It is the reverse for British adolescents. Moreover, ‘humble’ and ‘selfless’ are reported as critical moral traits by Chinese adolescents rather than British adolescents. Some observations during the survey and experimental tasks even reflect the cultural differences between the two countries. Seat arrangements are different in the classrooms of the two countries, which implies a different teacher-student relationship and teaching concept. The teacher and student have a different understanding of ‘shy’. Chinese participants were more sensitive to the researcher’s feelings or thoughts when making distribution decisions than British participants.

The examined cultural similarity and differences generally align with the cultural distinction of collectivism-individualism for Eastern and Western countries by prior research (e.g. Hofstede, 1980; Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Sun et al., 2014; Triandis et al., 1990). It also supports the cultural models (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1992, 1999; Schwartz et al., 2016) and Self-construal Theory (Markus & Kitayama, 1991a, 1991b) (see

Chapter Three). In collectivistic or Eastern cultures, hierarchy, harmony, respecting authority, and interdependent self-construals are valued. In contrast, individualistic or Western cultures value individual development and independent self-construals. Some universal issues, such as concerns about nature and the environment, are valued by both Eastern and Western cultures. Basic moral understanding and moral judgment are universal among young adolescents from both cultures.

(5) Young adolescents from the two countries show similarities and differences in moral identity and related behaviour. More than half of the young adolescents from both countries reported that being honest, fair and not hurting others is important for themselves (self-reported importance of moral values). It further supports the Moral Foundation Theory that most Eastern and Western cultures value harm/care, honesty, and fairness (Al-Sheddi et al., 2019; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). These values are universal moral traits that compose individuals' moral identities across cultures (Aquino & Reed, 2002).

Chinese adolescents show an overall stronger moral identity than British adolescents based on self-reports. Chinese adolescents reported a stronger moral identity (self-reported importance of moral values and moral value commitment intention) than British adolescents regarding not hurting, honesty and fairness. Chinese adolescents also demonstrated higher behaviour consistency than British adolescents in donation and distribution. Chinese adolescents showed stably consistent behaviour in donation and distribution. In contrast, British adolescents behaved more consistently in the distribution task than in the donation task.

However, the result may not be the case if social desirability, the expression and understanding bias of certain items in the scale are considered. For example, the much bigger gap in commitment to 'honesty' value between the adolescents from the two countries might be caused by several possibilities. One possibility is that adolescents from the two countries respond differently to a moral dilemma between the loyalty of friendship and honesty (or respecting authority). Chinese adolescents prioritised honesty or respecting the teacher's

authority over friendship loyalty. In contrast, British adolescents responded to the dilemma differently. Other possibilities are a different understanding of being honest or a different sensibility to social desirability between young adolescents in the two countries.

(6) The variation of moral identity is related to the school environment, parenting, sex, and individual and national-levelled cultural differences (personal values and nationality) to different degrees. Individual and national-levelled cultural differences predict the young adolescents' moral identity when other predictable variables (e.g. school climate, parenting style and sex) are controlled. Young adolescents with strong individual-interest values are likely to show weak moral identity. In contrast, young adolescents with strong collective or universal-interest values are likely to show strong moral identity. When the individual-levelled value differences are controlled, Chinese young adolescents still show a stronger moral identity than British adolescents. The result further shows that the individual-centred moral foundation such as fairness, honesty and care are universal but valued more among collectivistic than individualistic individuals and countries. It supports AISHeddi, Russell, and Hegarty's (2019) findings. The result is consistent with the prior research findings on teachers' ethical leadership and family support on adolescents' moral identity (Arain et al., 2017; Hart et al., 1998). It also supports the sex difference in moral identity that girls hold a stronger moral identity than boys (Arnold, 1993; Patrick et al., 2018).

(7) The consistency of donation and sharing behaviour is predicted by different cultural variables. National-levelled cultural difference (nationality) rather than individual-levelled cultural difference predicts donation behaviour consistency when other predictable variables (e.g. parents' jobs, the only child in the family, and the school climate) are controlled. Chinese adolescents are more likely than British adolescents to show consistent donation behaviour (donate the same or more money than they intended) even though socioeconomic and school climate variables are controlled. However, individual-levelled cultural difference rather than national-levelled cultural difference predicts distribution behaviour consistency when another predictable variable (sex) is controlled. Young adolescents who hold strong

collective-interest values are more likely to exhibit consistent distribution behaviour (distribute fewer balls to the researcher than they suggested) than those who do not.

(8) The moral identity does not predict actual donation or sharing behaviours or the consistency of donation behaviour when other predicting variables are controlled. The result is inconsistent with some existing findings that a strong moral identity predicts actual moral behaviours such as donation or allocation (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2011; Crimston et al., 2016; Gu, 2013; Lee et al., 2014).

11.2 Implications

11.2.1 The status of young adolescents' morality

According to the top 10 important moral traits for being a moral person reported by young adolescents (e.g. 'honest', 'polite', 'respectful', 'fair', 'loyal', and 'friendly'), it implies that young adolescents across cultures have the similar understanding of morality as the adults and other peers. According to the research with adults samples under Moral Foundation Theory (Graham et al., 2012; Graham et al., 2009), 'harm/care' (concern about violence and the suffering of others, including compassion and care) and 'fairness/reciprocity' are basic moral traits for people under different cultures. Other research also argued that harm, fairness, and justice appear in all cultures, including non-Western ones (Hauser, 2006; Wainryb, 2006). Young adolescents' understanding of moral traits in the present research sample overlaps greatly with adults.

The relatively strong moral identity in the form of self-reported importance of moral values and value commitment intention among the samples from both countries implies that moral identity emerges among young adolescents across cultures. The values of 'fairness', 'honesty', and 'kindness' are the universal moral foundations for moral self-identification among young adolescents, which is the same as that among adults (AISHeddi et al., 2019; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Pratt et al., 2003). The moral identity scale applied in the current

study did check whether young adolescents would identify themselves with moral traits, which is a sign of moral identity development (Blasi, 2001, 2004). The moral identity scales, which are similar to the one applied in the current study, are widely used and validated among late adolescent and adult samples (e.g. Aquino & Reed, 2002; Black & Reynolds, 2016; Hardy, 2006; Jiao & Wang, 2018; Pitesa & Thau, 2013; Xu & Ma, 2015). The current survey showed that the revised scale is understandable for young adolescents from both countries. More than half of the respondents strongly agreed that being honest, fair and not hurting others is essential for them. It is evident that most young adolescents from both countries develop a moral identity on a cognitive level.

The achievement of moral identity maturity is displayed by defining self in moral terms; personal desires and moral actions are in line with their moral principles at the same time (Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Matsuba & Walker, 2004; Monroe, 2004; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Reimer, 2003; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004). Young adolescents in the current research demonstrated a relatively high inclination toward moral self-identification. However, their value commitment behaviour intention is not perfectly consistent with their moral values. Furthermore, moral identity does not predict actual moral behaviour when more variables are controlled. According to the data, it implies that moral identity maturity is not entirely reached among young adolescents. The moral identity immaturity among young adolescents implies that the crucial and challenging part of building a morally-based identity for young adolescents lies in value commitment displayed by actual behaviour. Strong self-importance of moral values on a cognitive level can be easily achieved.

However, the expression and understanding bias of the scales and the potential social desirability also influence the results of moral identity measures. It is challenging to conclude young adolescents' moral identity. Further exploration is needed to observe young adolescents' moral identity.

11.2.2 Practical concerns of moral education for educators

One of the key findings of the current study is that self-reports of moral values do not necessarily match self-reports of moral behaviour intention and are even less consistent with actual conduct (even when known to be under observation). Holding solid moral values does not necessarily mean consistent moral behaviour across situations. It implies that educators should pay attention to students' moral behaviour while considering their understanding, attitude and knowledge of moral values.

Some findings of the research also imply that educators should realise the difficulties students encounter when turning moral beliefs into actions. The current research showed that one difficulty young adolescents face is dilemmas. One dilemma is between being strictly honest and friendship loyalty in the survey. Another dilemma is being generous to unknown others or siblings in the game observation (some participants wanted to keep the money or bouncy balls for their siblings, according to the interview in Chapter Nine). Young adolescents are often equipped with many moral beliefs, and the legitimacy of any of them is no stronger or weaker than others (Dan, 2012). When there is a clash among these moral beliefs in concrete situations, they prioritise the clashed moral beliefs differently. Therefore, the moral values taught in schools will lead to different behaviour results for different students in specific contexts.

Based on the evidence of the current study, it can be suggested that moral educators should seriously realise the possible moral value clashes students face when addressing the gap between moral values and behaviour. The problem is that no universal value ranking can be used as a reference for students to make moral decisions when they face moral value clashes. If there is a ranking, that would be due to social norms. According to the literature review in Chapter Three, in some collective-centred societies, binding moral foundations such as respecting authority and group loyalty are emphasised, and collective interest is prioritised over individual interest. The current research showed that even within the same culture, neither Chinese students nor British students showed a very consistent moral trait ranking

(the most important trait for a moral person). The most important moral qualities mentioned by students were scattered in almost the given 45 moral traits in the current research. The inclination or trend summarised from students' responses is just relative. As the discussion in Chapter One, there is no utterly consistent understanding of moral character. The potential moral value clashes students face raise a question: how is morality taught to help students bridge the gap between moral values and behaviour in real life? Or can it be taught?

The moral dilemma is used as learning material in moral education. It involves more than one option, all of which can be supported by competing values (Berkowitz, 2011; Christensen & Gomila, 2012). The conclusion of a moral dilemma is often a 'should' question for students to discuss rather than a concrete answer (Galbraith & Jones, 1976). The moral dilemma is applied to promote students' multiperspective thinking, moral judgement competency and critical self-reflection (Clare, Gallimore, & Patthey-Chavez, 1996; Narvaez, 2002). The moral issue in a moral dilemma is not black or white. There always are 'grey areas' in the story which offer space for students to discuss. Suppose there is no concrete answer to some moral dilemmas. In that case, the moral gap caused by value clash situations is challenging to avoid through teaching and learning.

Another difficulty students would encounter is the failure to resist the temptation of actual materials, especially money. The current study indicated that moral behaviour consistency involving cash is related to participants' socioeconomic background (e.g. parents' jobs, only child or not in the family and attitude towards money) (See section 7.1.1 in Chapter Seven and section 10.5 in Chapter Ten). The current study also shows that the proportion of Chinese participants having parenting doing 'professional' jobs in the big city is bigger than that of participants in small cities (See section 4.7.2 in Chapter Four). It implies that the participants' average family income in the big city would be higher than those in small cities. The students from the big city showed less inconsistent donation and sharing behaviour than those from small cities (See section 5.4.3 in Chapter Five). It implies that students from families with good economic conditions are more generous than those without good economic conditions. According to the interview with some students presented in Chapter Nine, students who do

not care about money too much showed more generous behaviour than those who do. All the evidence implies that the attraction of money to students with different socioeconomic backgrounds is different. Students with good economic conditions would be more resistant to the temptation of money than those without good economic conditions. As discussed in Chapter Ten, it is acknowledged that students' reporting of parents' jobs may not be accurate enough. However, all the evidence, including Chinese and British students' different attitudes toward money, would indicate that the difference in students' socioeconomic backgrounds is somewhat related to their behaviour.

The influence of socioeconomic on students' moral behaviour in the current study implies that educators need to understand the essential trait of human frailty properly. One of the barriers that moral education faces are each individual's diverse socioeconomic background. It would be impractical to expect all the students to achieve the same level of morality without thinking of their personal situations.

Another practical concern for educators is developing students' moral behaviour and keeping it consistent across situations. Research on the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour implies that helping students build a moral-based identity would benefit moral education (e.g. Gibbs, 2003; Hardy, 2005). The positive relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour (and behaviour consistency) in the current research implies that moral identity would help shape students' moral behaviour. However, the prediction of moral identity to moral behaviour disappears when more variables are controlled. For example, when parents' jobs, the only child in the family or not, the school environment and nationality are controlled, moral identity does not predict the consistency of donation behaviour anymore. It implies that many other factors mediate the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour. Lee et al. (2014) also claimed that a strong moral identity does not unconditionally lead to charitable behaviour. The relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour in the current research implies that many factors should not be ignored when expecting to promote students' moral behaviour by building their moral identity.

11.2.3 The role of culture in moral education

The current study reveals the influence of personal values and nationality differences on the self-reported importance of moral values and behaviours. Generally, collective-interest values on both personal and national levels are positively related to moral cognition (moral identity and moral behaviour intention). It implies that collective-interest values cultivation is generally beneficial to developing solid moral views. In contrast, individual-interest values cultivation would hinder the development of solid moral views.

All three dimensions of personal cultural values are predictors of moral identity. Collective-interest value is the weakest predictor related to moral identity positively. Individual-interest value is the strongest predictor, which is related to moral identity negatively. It implies that students' individual-interest value inclination is more crucial than their universal and collective-interest value inclinations for their moral identity development. For students' moral identity cultivation, it is reasonable to strengthen their collective-interest value inclination while minimising their individual-interest value inclination.

The current study also finds that adolescents living in a collectivist culture (e.g. China) still show a stronger moral identity than those living in an individualistic culture (e.g. England) when personal value inclination is controlled. It implies that national cultural differences play a role in influencing young adolescents' moral development beyond a personal preference for values. Therefore, the negative effect of national culture (e.g. individualism) on the outcomes of moral education should be considered while cultivating young adolescents' personal value tendency toward collectivism. It also implies that implementing a moral education project in a country where individualism prevails does not necessarily expect the same effect as in a country where collectivism prevails.

The observed cultural difference between Eastern and Western countries represented by China and England also implicates the importance of localisation when learning from each others' moral education approaches or ideas between Eastern and Western countries. For

example, even though human autonomy in personal choice is universally valued, its meaning and expression vary in education in different cultural contexts. In Western or individualistic societies, individual choice and personal decision make a hallmark of children's development and socialisation. However, autonomy in non-Western countries is expected to be realised by increasing conformity to received social duties, the dictates of authorities, and the desires of groups to which individuals have strong identifications (Greenfield et al., 2003). Therefore, the approach to emphasise the value of autonomy in value education would be different in different cultural contexts.

The positive relationship between norm primings (e.g. participants were told most of their peers' generous donation behaviour) and students' actual moral behaviour implies the important role of norm primings in moral education. Positive norm primings would be a motivation for moral behaviour. However, the norm primings in the current study were conducted under an observed environment. It cannot be ruled out that norm priming works only when the participants know they are observed.

11.2.4 The challenges for a reasonable, accurate and fair evaluation of morality

The current research also brings implications for the practical evaluation of moral behaviour and the complication of judging or comparing moral behaviours between individuals. For example, the gap between moral beliefs, intention and actual behaviour suggests that educators and researchers consider the adequate evaluation of young people's morality. The motivation behind the behaviour and the behaviour consequence make the behaviour judgment and comparison more complicated than expected. Moreover, the current research finding prompts educators and researchers to pay attention to another issue: how to assess whether one behaviour is more moral than the other.

Suppose we recognise the significance of the gap between moral cognition and moral conduct. In that case, the evaluation of young people's morality should be conducted carefully. The

gap between moral values, intentions, and actions suggests that moral evaluation in school should rely less on self-reporting moral values or moral choices and focus more on observing moral behaviour. Perhaps the same is true for those academic research on morality.

Young adolescents' moral behaviour was examined through questionnaires and game observation. However, the motivation behind the actual donation and sharing behaviour was not collected statistically. According to the 'deontological ethics' by Kant (1999), motivation is an indicator of moral behaviour. Behaving out of duty rather than other motivation is moral. The motivation behind young adolescents' behaviour is not easy to observe or collect. Even if collected, it may be influenced by the potential social desirability. Therefore, the motivation behind moral behaviour should be considered when evaluating students' moral behaviour for educators and researchers in this field. Moreover, observing real motivation is another problem worth thinking about deeply.

Behaviour consistency is generally determined by the gap between participants' intentions and actual behaviour in current research. However, some special cases of behaviour consistency or inconsistency lead to thinking about the judgment of good and wrong behaviour (or moral behaviour). For example, one case of behaviour consistency may be that the participant intended to donate 0.5 pounds or nothing, and he or she actually did the same (see section 8.2 in Chapter Eight). One inconsistency case may be that the participant intended to donate two pounds, and he or she actually donated only 1.5 pounds. It is difficult to say which behaviour is morally good and which is morally wrong according to a simple standard of consistency. To some extent, the inconsistent behaviour did help the needy children more than the consistent behaviour.

Issues are not limited to judging the behaviour, morally good or not. Participants' behaviour in the game observation raises another issue: how to assess the degree of moral behaviour? Some participants in the game observation donated more money or distributed more balls than they intended. Some participants donated or distributed the same as they intended to (see section 5.4.1 in Chapter Five). How to judge which behaviour is more moral? Turning back to

the discussion on the motivation behind the behaviour, we should consider why some participants donated or distributed more in the real situation than they suggested in the scenarios (the behaviour task in real and the scenario are almost the same). Does the potential social desirability influence their behaviour in the game observation? The game observation with the researcher presenting would bring greater social desirability to some participants than the completely anonymous survey. The influence of social desirability makes assessing the degree of moral behaviour more challenging.

The above issues discovered by the current study imply that judging moral behaviour is very complicated in real situations. Simple evaluation criteria are not good enough to make an accurate evaluation. Various cases should be considered when evaluating moral behaviours in real life.

Another implication the current research brings to moral evaluation is that the measurement tool itself increases the challenge of assessing morality. The remarkable gap between the moral value and moral behaviour intention in terms of being honest among the British sample may be caused by young adolescents struggling to make the moral decision between honesty and loyalty. A few Chinese adolescents may face the same problem. The item's purpose is to check whether respondents would commit to their moral value of being honest in a specific context. However, it is unexpected that the context is too complicated for respondents and makes them fall into a moral dilemma. As mentioned previously, we cannot tell which moral value is stronger or weaker than the other (moral clashes). It is morally reasonable if respondents failed to commit to being honest because of being loyal to best friends. In other words, sacrificing honesty for friendship loyalty differs from lying for self-interest. The latter choice is more morally unacceptable than the former one.

There is another possibility that needs to be considered. If respondents were sensitive to the survey and had insight into what the item was supposed to check, they would give the desired answer even though it was not their real idea. If it is true, giving an untruthful response is a way of lying. Therefore, only checking the item's rating is not validated for checking

respondents' commitment to honesty. In contrast, respondents who prioritised loyalty over honesty and reported their real thoughts seemed more honest than those who gave a desired misreporting.

The unexpected cases caused by the measure suggest that educators and researchers should analyse or interpret the evaluation result cautiously. The survey involving contexts would challenge the moral evaluation more than that does not.

11.2.5 Implications for moral education policymakers

In many societies, policymakers have issued different policies to strengthen young people's moral development, character attributes and citizenship. Turning moral values into actions in social life is one of the moral education goals education policymakers strive to achieve. In order to achieve this goal, policymakers in some countries such as China and Britain develop guidance emphasising linking moral value teaching to students' real life and community engagement (for details, see Chapter One). However, current research findings imply that policymakers need to know the practical difficulties (including but not limited to value clashes and individual socioeconomic background) young people would encounter in moral contexts of real life. Instead of teaching students how to be moral, policymakers need to think about teaching them how not to be immoral (Dan, 2012). Students should be encouraged to reflect on their inconsistent behaviour in daily life and what causes it. Policymakers should further consider whether inconsistent moral behaviour can be solved through simple teaching, learning, discussion and social practice.

The current research finds that the national culture influences students' moral views and behaviour beyond their personal values. It implies that the policymakers need to consider the national culture or social norms which would be opposite to the moral values schools teach. Students' values and behaviours formed by school would be influenced by national culture or social norms when they are out of school. The moral values and behaviour encouraged by

schools would be challenged by social media (Morgan, 2016) or parenting (Velea & Farca, 2013). Therefore, policymakers should bear the influence of deep-rooted national culture and social norms on school moral education in mind.

The influence of socioeconomic background on students' moral behaviour and the difficulty of finding behaviour motivation challenge the policymakers to think about the fairness and effectiveness of judging or comparing students' moral behaviour. Suppose that rich people and poor people donate the same amount of money. Is it equally easy for them to make the same moral decision? Who encounters more difficulties in making moral decisions? Alternatively, suppose that one student donates to help needy people while the other donates for self-image. In that case, are their behaviour on the same moral level?

Generally, morality is a tricky concept to interpret, evaluate or even educate effectively. The gap between students' moral values and behaviour influenced by possible value clashes and socioeconomic factors suggests educators and policymakers think about a more practical way to teach morality. The complicated motivation behind moral behaviour, individuals' different socioeconomic background and the limitation of the self-reported rating assessment tool imply that educators, policymakers, and perhaps researchers should consider which kind of assessment is fairer when they evaluate or compare students' moral behaviours. The deep-rooted national culture or social norms should be considered by educators and policymakers when introducing and localising a moral education model from another culture. It also suggested that the outcomes of school moral education would be influenced by national culture or social norms.

11.3 Summary

According to the research findings, there are several implications: (1) Some evidence implies young adolescents have developed moral identity. The evidence includes students reporting a relatively high mean score on the self-reported Moral Identity Scale and showing a proper understanding of moral traits. However, inconsistent moral behaviour among some young

adolescents would imply an immature moral identity if consistent moral behaviour and value commitment mean a mature moral identity. (2) Moral education should be more rational and practical, considering students' socioeconomic backgrounds and possible moral dilemmas. National culture should be considered when students' personal values are emphasised for moral education. It also implies that national culture's influence on moral education should be considered when a moral education model or program is introduced from another culture. It is reasonable to strengthen students' collective-interest value inclination while minimising their individual-interest value inclination. (3) Moral identity can help shape students' moral behaviour. However, many other factors should be considered when shaping students' moral behaviour by strengthening their moral identity. (4) Norm priming (e.g. letting students know their peers' moral behaviour) helps motivate moral behaviour. (5) Students' moral evaluation is more challenging than expected, considering the gap between self-reported moral values, moral behaviour intention and observed moral behaviour, behaviour motivation, behaviour consequence and the accuracy of assessment tools for students' moral evaluation. Educators, policymakers and researchers need to think about a fairer way to evaluate or compare students' moral behaviours.

11.4 Conclusion

The current study gets a general picture of young adolescents' moral views and behaviour across cultures. It mainly covers moral identity and a set of essential factors around moral identity, including the understanding of moral traits, moral behaviour motivations, behaviour intention, actual moral behaviour, moral behaviour consistency and the relationships between moral views and behaviours. The study also checks the cultural similarities and differences between Eastern and Western countries represented by China and England from a primary school student's perspective. Finally, the cultural difference is linked to the variation in moral identity and related moral behaviour between young adolescents in the two countries.

The study is to respond to several issues about moral education worldwide. One issue is that moral education aims to build students' moral values and behaviour. Building strong moral

values in school moral education is emphasised more than shaping consistent moral behaviour across contexts in daily life. However, strong moral values do not necessarily mean solidly consistent moral behaviour. Another issue is whether assessing students' moral behaviour or morality only through self-reported moral values or behaviour intention is an effective way or not. How much do self-reported moral values or intentions predict consistent moral behaviour in real contexts? The third issue concerns students' inconsistent moral behaviour across contexts in moral education. What are the influencing factors of inconsistent moral behaviour? The final issue is how much national culture influences the outcome of moral education. Do national cultural differences matter when the moral education model and the program are introduced from another culture?

In order to respond to the above moral education issues, the current study develops scales and a behaviour observation experiment to examine primary school students' moral views, behaviours (especially behaviour consistency) and perceived cultural values. The study finds a cultural difference between China and England from school students' views. The gap between moral values and behaviour in real life does exist among primary school students. Chinese and British young adolescents develop more similar than different moral views and behaviour. Moral identity predicts actual moral behaviour and behaviour consistency to some degree. However, socioeconomic and cultural factors weaken the prediction of moral identity to moral behaviour. Both students' personal cultural values and national differences are related to their moral views and behaviour. The study also reveals that assessing moral values and behaviour is complicated when other factors are considered. They are but are not limited to the potential understanding of differences caused by different cultures or individual differences, social desirability, personal socioeconomic background, the real motivation behind behaviour, behaviour consequence and possible limitations of the research design.

The study's findings imply that moral development for young adolescents has a slight national difference. Moral identity emerges among young adolescents but is not mature enough. Moral value commitment through actual behaviour in real life should be addressed to reach a mature moral identity. The influence of national cultures on moral education

outcomes should not be ignored when developing the young generation's morality and employing models, programs and interventions from different cultures. The study's findings also raise some questions on moral education and evaluation for educators, policymakers and even research: how is morality taught to help students bridge the gap between moral values and behaviour in real life? Or can it be taught? How to evaluate moral behaviour more fairly? Moral identity can help motivate moral behaviour. However, many other factors mediate the relationship between moral identity and moral behaviour, which should be paid attention to by educators. Educators and policymakers need to realise the difficulties (e.g. value clashes and material temptation) students would encounter when they turn moral values into actions. Moral evaluation needs to rely on examining students' actual moral behaviour more than self-reported moral values and intentions. Judgment and evaluation of moral behaviour are complicated. Much work needs to do to make it fairer, considering students' different behaviour motivations, the possible limitations of assessment tools and students' socioeconomic background differences. For researchers, interpreting and understanding the results of the moral assessment and comparison between countries should be cautious because it involves many influencing factors.

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APPENDICES

Table A1 : Reviewed literature list

No	Literatures	MI Definition	MI Scale	Behaviour in MI Scale	Moral Behaviour Outcome	Age Group	Culture context
1	Adler (2013) (Study 2)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino &Reed, 2002) (Item examples: “Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am”; “I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics”).	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (organisational behaviour-citizenship at work)	Adults Age arrange=35-45 years old)	America
2	Aldridge, Ala’I, et al. (2016)	Commitment to moral values	Moral Action Scale (Aldridge, Ala’I et al., 2016) (Item example: “I speak up when someone is bullied”).)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (prosaically behaviour-empathic concern)	None	Early & middle adolescents Age arrange=12-17 years old)	Australia
3	Aldridge, Fraser, et al. (2016)	Commitment to moral values	Moral Action Scale (Aldridge, Ala’I et al., 2016)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention	None	Early & middle adolescents	Australia

			(Item example: "I speak up when someone is bullied")	(prosocial behaviour-empathic concern)		Age arrange=12-17 years old)	
4	Aquino & Reed (2002) (Study 5,6)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item examples: See No.1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour-volunteering) Observed behaviour (cans donation)	Middle & late adolescents Mage=16.7-19.7 years old	America
5	Aquino et al. (2009) (Study 1,2,3, 4)	Self-identity of moral traits & commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: "Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am")	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (marketing behaviour, organisational behaviour -lying at work) Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour -cooperation)	Late adolescents & adults Mage=20.1-20.7 years old	America
6	Aquino et al. (2011) (Study 4)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item examples: See No.1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring,	Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour-money donation)	Late adolescents & adults Mage=21.2 years old	Canada

				compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)			
7	Arnold (1993)	Self-identity of moral traits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good-self Assessment (Arnold, 1993) (Example: Identifying the importance of qualities to the sense of self, e.g. kind, fair) • Good-self Interview (Arnold, 1993) (Question example: “When I asked you to choose the three qualities that are most important to you, how did you decide which qualities those are?”) 	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour–being respectful, fair)	Early, middle and late adolescents Age arrange=12-18 years old)	America
8	Atif (2013)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ethical Identity Scale (Shaw &Shiu, 2003) (Item example: “It’s really important that I do the things which make me a better person rather than just enjoying myself”) 	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (customer behaviour-environment-friendly consumption)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=19-64 years old)	China, America, Spain, France, and Germany (comparative research)
9	Barclay et al. (2014) (Study 1, 2)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to	Self-reports of behavioural intention (antisocial behaviour-despising)	Late adolescents & adults	Canada

		moral values	(Item examples: See No.1)	moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Observed behaviour (antisocial behaviour-revenge)	Mage=19-20 years old	
10	Baumsteiger & Siegel (2019)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item examples: See No.1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (prosocial behaviour-helping)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=18-71 years old)	America
11	Black & Reynolds (2016)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moral Identity Questionnaire (Black & Reynolds, 2016) (Item examples: “One of the most important things in life is to do what you know is right”; “I will go along with a group decision, even if I know it is morally wrong”) Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale 	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour -volunteering)	Late adolescents & adults Mage=32.4 years old	International (English-speaking respondents)

			(Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item examples: See No.1)				
12	Borchert (2012)	Self-identity of moral traits & commitment to moral values	Honesty from Personal Values Scale (Scott, 1965) (Item example: "I always tell the truth, even though it may hurt myself or others")	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. honest)	Self-reports of past behaviour (organisational behaviour-bullying, aggressive at work)	Adults Mage=42 years old	Caucasian
13	Brebels et al. (2011) (Study 1, 2)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item examples: See No.1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports/other-reports of behavioural intention (organisational behaviour-leading behaviour)	Adults Mage=24.6, 43.7 years old	Netherlands
14	Brown (2013)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5) Adapted Good-self Assessment (Barriga et al., 2001) (Item example: See No. 7)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (organisational behaviour -counterproductive behaviour)	Adults Age arrange=19-73 years old	Caucasian /White
15	Cohen et al. (2014)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to	Self-reports/ other-reports of past behaviour (organisational	Middle and late adolescents & adults	America The race is a

	(Study 1, 2, 3)	to moral values	(Item example: See No.1)	moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	behaviour-e.g. cheating, vandalism, smuggling and steeling)	Age arrange= older than 15 years old	controlled variable
16	Conway & Peetz (2012) (Study 3)	Self-Identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Adaption from Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None 5	Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour–money donation)	Adults Mage=35.9 years old	America
17	Coskun & Kara (2019)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Moral Identity Test (Coskun & Kara, 2019) (Item example: Responding “I warn”, “I abstain”, or “I don’t care” to moral behaviour items)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values)	None 3	Early adolescents Mage=8.5 years old	Turkey
18	Cote et al. (2011) Study 1	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No.1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour- water consumption allocation)	Late adolescents& adults. Age arrange=18-26 years old	Japan
19	Crimston et al. (2016)	Self-identity of moral trait	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino &	Self-reports of past behaviour& intention	Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial	Adults	America

			Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No.1)	(Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	behaviour- money & organ donations)	Mage=43 years old	
20	Gotowiec & van Mastrigt (2019) (Study 1, 2)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No.1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour- helping, charity)	Adults Mage=35.7 years old	America
21	Gotowiec (2019) Study 1	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No.5)	None 6	Self-reports of past behaviour & behavioural intention (antisocial behaviour- aggression)	Adults Mage=38.6 years old	America
22	Gu (2013) (Study 1, 2)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No.1)	elf-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair,	• Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour-time donation)	Late adolescents & adults Mage=19.8, 21.7years old	Japan

				friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	• Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour-money donation)		
23	Rojas (2001)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Moral Identity Questionnaire adapted from (Bredemeier & Shields, 1996) (Item examples: “When some kids see someone being hurt, they immediately seek to help” vs. “When other kids see someone being hurt, they hope others will step in to help”)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. helping, doing the right thing etc.)	Self-reports of behavioural intention (sports behaviour-aggression & cheating)	Early and middle adolescents Age arrange=13-15 years old	India
24	Hardy (2005)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	A revised version of the Adapted Good-self Assessment (Barriga et al., 2001) (Item example: See No. 7)	None	Self-reports/ other-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour- Altruistic behaviours)	Late adolescents & adults Age arange=19-35 years old	European America
25	Hardy (2006)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	A revised version of the Adapted Good-self Assessment (Barriga et al., 2001) (Item example: See No. 7)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour- helping)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=19-35 years old	European America
26	Hardy et al.	Self-identity of	• Internalisation subscale of	None	Other-reports of past	Early, middle	America

	(2014)	moral traits	<p>Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5) 9V</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moral Ideal Self Scale (Hardy et al., 2014) (Item example: “Self-description with moral or non-moral traits”) 		behaviour (prosocial/antisocial behaviour-helping, cheating, aggression)	and late adolescents Age arrange=10-18 years old	
27	Hardy et al. (2015)	Self-identity of moral trait	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5) Moral Self-relevance adapted from Good-self Assessment (Barriga et al., 2001) (Item example: “How important to you is it that you are honest”) Moral Ideal Self Scale (Hardy et al., 2014) (Item example: “Self-description with moral or non-moral traits”) 	None	Other-reports of past behaviour (prosocial/antisocial behaviour-charity, civic engagement, aggression and rules breaking)	Middle and late adolescents Age arrange=15-18 years old	European America

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moral Aspects of Identity (Cheek et al., 1985) (Item example: “How important are my personal values and moral standards to my sense of who I am?”) 				
28	Hardy et al. (2017)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial/antisocial behaviour - helping & aggression)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=18-25 years old	European America
29	Hart et al. (1998)	Commitment to moral values	Self-reports of Voluntary Service (Hart et al., 1998) (Item example: “whether participants had “performed any volunteer or community work through such organisations as Little League, scouts, service clubs, church groups, or social action groups”)	Self-reports of past behaviour (voluntary service)	Self-reports of past behaviour (antisocial behaviour (fighting))	Middle, late adolescents & adults Age arrange=14-21 years old	America
30	He & Harris (2014)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (organisational behaviour-unfavourable communication)	Adults Mage=34.3 years old	Britain

			(Item example: See No.5)				
31	He et al. (2015)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (customer behaviour (purchasing -cause-related marketing sponsor brand)	Adults Mage=35.2 years old	Unavailable
32	Ilie (2013)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No.1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour (organisational behaviour -unethical proorganisational behaviour)	Adults Mage=24.1 years old	White
33	Jia et al. (2017)	Self-identity of moral traits	Moral Identity Interview (Krettenauer et al., 2016) (Question example: Participants were instructed to select 12 to 15 attributes that according to their own personal view, defined “the core of a highly moral person”)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour -environment friendly behaviours)	Late adolescents Mage=19.5 years old	America
34	Jiao & Wang (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention	• Self-reports of behavioural intention	Late adolescents & adults	White

	(Study 1, 3, 4)	moral values	(Item example: See No.1)	(commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	(customer behaviour-e.g. being honest) • Observed behaviour (antisocial behaviour-cheating)	Age arrange=18-36 years old	
35	Kavussanu & Ring (2017)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (sports behaviour -doping)	Middle, late adolescents & adults Age arrange=16-40 years old	Britain
36	Kavussanu et al. (2013) (Study 1)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour(sports behaviour-physical aggression)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=18-33 years old	Britain
37	Kavussanu et al. (2015) (Study 1)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour(sports behaviour-antisocial behaviour to opponents)	Late adolescents & adults Mage= 21.2 years old	Caucasian
38	Kocabiyik &	Self-identity of	Moral Identity Interview	None	Self-reports of behavioural	Adults	Unavailable

	Kulaksizoglu (2014)	moral traits & Commitment to moral values	(Kocabiyik & Kulaksizoglu, 2014) (Question example: Describing characteristics of the self)		intention (moral dilemma)	Age arrange=20-25 years old	
39	Lee et al. (2014) (Study 1)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour-money donation)	Late adolescents & adults Undergraduates & staff in university	America
40	Matherne & Litchfield (2012)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (organisational behaviour-unethical pro-organisational behaviour)	Adults Mage=23.3 years old	America
41	Mayer et al. (2012)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Other-reports of past behaviour (organisational behaviour-ethical & unethical leadership)	Adults Mage-30, 35 years old	Caucasian
42	Miles & Upenieks (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to	Modified version of Characteristics Bipolar Design (Stets & Carter, 2012)	None 20	• Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour	Adults	Unavailable

		moral values	(Item example: “Rate a list of traits according to how much it describes the type of person you are”) Moral Ideal Self Scale (Hardy et al., 2014) (Item example: “How much it (50 moral traits) describes the type of person [they] really want to be?”)		-charitable donation, volunteering, authority and purity) • Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour -money donation)		
43	Mulder & Aquino (2013) (Study 1, 2, 3)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	• Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial/antisocial behaviour) • Observed behaviour (prosocial /antisocial behaviour—cheating, money donation)	Adults Mage=30.6, 21.4, 20.3 years old	European countries
44	Newman & Trump (2017) (Study 3)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Observed behaviour (money and time donation)	Adults Mage=35 years old	Unavailable

45	Nickerson (2004)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Prototypical Moral Self-descriptors Scale (Walker & Pitts, 1998) (Item example: Participants were asked to rate each of the self-descriptors (moral traits) on how well they describe themselves)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour- helping, volunteering, donation etc.)	Early, middle and late adolescents Age arrange=13-18 years old	Caucasians
46	Patrick et al. (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Moral Self-Relevance Measure adapted from Good-self Assessment (Barriga, et al., 2001) (Example: Respondents are asked to circle 8 of 32 possible qualities (both neutral and moral) that they consider extremely important to their sense of self)	None	Self-reports/other-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour-school and community activities, time donation)	Early and middle adolescents Mage=13.4 years old	America
47	Paulin et al. (2014)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Symbolisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: "I often wear clothes that identify me as	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous,	Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour engage in charitable events)	Late adolescents Undergraduates (the first year)	Unavailable

			having these characteristics”.	helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)			
48	Penrose & Friedman (2012)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour & behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour-concerns for other community)	Adults Age arrange=22-69 years old	America
49	Porter (2013)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Modified version from Good-self Assessment (Arnold, 1993) (Item example: “Being responsible, someone others can depend on”)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour-civic engagement)	Middle and late adolescents Mage=17.4 years old	America
50	Reed & Aquino (2003) (Study 3)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Observed behaviour (prosocial-money donation)	Adults Mage=26.2 years old	America
51	Reynolds &	Self-identity of	Self-reported Importance of	Self-reports of past	Self-reports of past	Adults	Caucasian&

	Geranic (2007)	moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	behaviour (prosocial/antisocial behaviour -cheating, charitable giving)	Age arrange=18-44 years old	Asian
52	Ring et al. (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (Sports behaviour -doping)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=18-55 years old	Britain
53	Rua et al. (2016)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Observed behaviour (antisocial behaviour -cheating)	Late adolescents Mage=19.9 years old	America
54	Sage et al. (2006)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (sports behaviour -moral & immoral behaviour)	Middle and late adolescents & Adults	Britain

			(Item example: See No. 5)			Age arrange=16- 40 years old	
55	Sanders et al. (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour -sharing)	Adults Mage=20 years old	Netherlands
56	Schlenker (2008) (Study 1, 2)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Integrity Scale (Schlenker et al., 2008) (Item example: “It is foolish to tell the truth when big profits can be made by lying”)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. honest, duty, commitment to principle)	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial/ antisocial behaviour-e.g. helping, volunteering, lying, cheating, stealing)	Late adolescents & adults undergraduates	Unavailable
57	Shields et al. (2015)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (antisocial behaviour -moral disengagement)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=18-23 years old	White/Caucasian
58	Shields et al. (2016)	Self-identity of moral traits	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour–helping; organisational behaviour-academic honesty)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=18-27	America

						years old	
59	Shields et al. (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (sports behaviour-helping, harmful, verbal abuse etc.)	Adults Age arrange=18-27 years old	White/Caucasian
60	Skarlicki & Rupp (2010)	Self-identity of moral traits	Symbolisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: "I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics".	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of behavioural intention (organisational behaviour -being fair)	Adults Mage=28.5 years old	France
61	Skubinn & Herzog (2016)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Description of Moral Principles (Interview samples) (Skubinn & Herzog, 2016) 10B (Example: Sticking to one's ethical principles even in situations in which they have to decide quickly or in which there is a temptation to do otherwise)	Self-reports of past behaviour (Commitment to ethical principle)	None	Unavailable	Unavailable
62	Smith et al. (2014)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (prosocial behaviour -commitment to moral values e.g. loyalty)	Adults Mage=36.1 years old	America Race is a control variable

			(Item example: See No. 5)				
63	Sonnentag & Barnett (2016)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Good-self Assessment Scale (Harter & Monsour, 1992) (Item example: Participants were asked to rate the extent to which possessing each pair of moral qualities is important to their sense of self or identity)	None	Self-reports/ other reports of behavioural intention (antisocial behaviour -moral rebel)	Early and middle adolescents Age arrange=12.5-15 years old	Unavailable
64	Stets & Carter (2011)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Characteristics Bipolar Design (Stets & Carter, 2011; 2012; Stets, 2011) (Example: Individuals are to think about what kind of person they thought they are for 12 pairs of characteristics and place themselves along a continuum between the two contradictory characteristics, e.g.honest/dishonest)	None	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Self-reports of past behaviour or behavioural intention (prosocial/antisocial behaviour-being honest, helping, charitable giving or not etc.) Observed behaviour (prosocial/antisocial behaviour -cheating or not in a test) 	Late adolescents & adults undergraduates	California
65	Stets & Carter (2012)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Characteristics Bipolar Design (Stets & Carter, 2011; 2012; Stets, 2011) (Example: Individuals are to think about what kind of person	None	Self-reports of past behaviour or behavioural intention (prosocial/antisocial behaviour-being honest, helping, charitable giving	Late adolescents & adults undergraduates	California

			they thought they are for 12 pairs of moral characteristics and place themselves along a continuum between the two contradictory characteristics, e.g. honest/dishonest)		or not etc.)		
66	Stets (2011)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Characteristics Bipolar Design (Stets & Carter, 2011; 2012; Stets, 2011) (Example: Individuals are to think about what kind of person they thought they are for 12 pairs of characteristics and place themselves along a continuum between the two contradictory characteristics, e.g. honest/dishonest)	None	Observed behaviour (prosocial/antisocial behaviour—cheating or not in a test)	Late adolescents & adults Undergraduates	California
67	Stevens & Hardy (2011)	Self-identity of moral traits	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (antisocial behaviour -aggression)	Early, middle and late adolescents Age arrange=13-19 years old	Fiji Island
68	Sunil & Verma (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour-civic	Middle and late adolescents & adults	Unavailable

		moral values	(Item example: See No. 1)	(commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	engagement)	Age arrange=15-30 years old	
69	Taylor-Collins et al. (2019)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Virtue Identity Measure (Taylor-Collins et al., 2019) (Example: Vignettes are provided describing realistic social exchanges and ask whether and to what degree the participants see themselves as acting like the character in the moral story)	None	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour -helping, money and goods donation, etc.)	Middle and late adolescents Age arrange=16-20 years old	Britain
70	Vitell et al. (2016)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Self-reports of behavioural intention (customer behaviour -buying recycled products)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=18-35 years old	America, France, Spain, India and Egypt (comparative research)
71	Winterich (2008) (Study 1,2,3, 4)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring,	Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour- money donation)	Late adolescents & adults Age	America

				compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)		arrange=18-74 years old	
72	Winterich et al. (2009)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Internalisation subscale of Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 5)	None	Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour-money donation)	Late adolescents & adults Age arrange=19-47 years old	America
73	Winterich et al. (2013)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Observed behaviour (prosocial behaviour-money and time donation)	Adults Mage=50 years old	America
74	Wowra (2007)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Integrity Scale (Schlenker, 2006) (Item example: "If done for the right reasons, even lying and cheating are ok")	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. honesty, fairness, justice, etc.)	Self-reports of past behaviour (Antisocial behaviour-academic cheating)	Late adolescents Mage=18.6 years old	America
75	Xu & Ma (2015)	Self-identity of moral traits &	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino &	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention	Observed behaviour (antisocial	Late adolescents &	China

		Commitment to moral values	Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	(commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	behaviour-cheating in a game)	adults Age arrange=18-32 years old	
76	Yang et al. (2018)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour (Antisocial behaviour -cyberbullying)	Early, middle and late adolescents Age arrange=11-19 years old	China
77	Zaha (2011)	Self-identity of moral traits & Commitment to moral values	Self-reported Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino & Reed, 2002) (Item example: See No. 1)	Self-reports of past behaviour & intention (Commitment to moral values, e.g. caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind)	Self-reports of past behaviour (prosocial behaviour- volunteering)	Late adolescents Mage=19 years old	California

The stages of adolescence are separated into three: early (10-13 years of age), middle (14-16/17 years of age), and late (17-19 years of age and beyond)

Table A2: Percentage of 6-item Moral Identity Scale (Self-reported importance of Moral Value and Value Commitment Intention Subscales)(clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (the whole sample)

Items	Agree	Middle	Disagree
Kindness (not hurt)(A6) (Self-reported importance of moral Value)	87.3	3.8	8.5
Kindness (not hurt)(A1) * (Value Commitment Intention)	88.6	5.9	5.0
Honesty (A4) (Self-reported importance of moral Value)	92.0	3.6	4.2
Honesty(A3) (Value Commitment Intention)	78.7	12.5	8.5
Fairness(A5)* (Self-reported importance of moral Value)	90.3	2.6	6.3
Fairness(A2)* (Value Commitment Intention)	93.5	3.6	2.6
Subscale (Value)	89.9	3.3	6.3
Subscale (Commitment)	86.9	7.3	5.3
Total Moral Identity Scale	88.4	5.3	5.9

N=1,950; *Reverse scored; The percentage of no response code for six items ranges from 0.3%-0.8%.

Table A3: Percentage of 6-item Moral Identity Scale (Self-reported Importance of Moral Value and Value Commitment Intention Subscales) with Odds Ratios (clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (China vs. England)

Items	Samples	Agree	Disagree	Odds Ratios
Helpful(A6) (Self-reported importance of moral Value)	China	87.8	8.0	1.8
	England	82.4	13.7	
Helpful (A1) * (Value Commitment Intention)	China	89.0	5.2	1.9
	England	90.1	2.7	
Honesty (A4) (Self-reported importance of moral Value)	China	92.7	4.2	1.0
	England	85.1	3.8	
Honesty(A3) (Value Commitment Intention)	China	82.2	7.3	5.2
	England	45.0	20.9	
Fairness(A5)* (Self-reported importance of moral Value)	China	91.0	5.8	2.1
	England	83.5	11.0	
Fairness(A2)*	China	94.2	2.4	2.0

(Value Commitment Intention)	England	86.3	4.4	
Total Moral Identity Scale	China	89.5	5.5	1.9
	England	78.7	9.4	
Subscale (Value)	China	90.5	6.0	1.7
	England	83.7	9.5	
Subscale (Commitment)	China	88.5	5.0	2.2
	England	73.8	9.3	

* Reverse scored; China (N=1,768); England (N=182)

Table A4: Percentage of differences in the amount of money between respondents' donation intention in the questionnaire and actual donation in the game observation (China vs. England)

Money Difference*	China (N=254)	England (N=24)
-2 pounds	0.4	16.7
-1.5 pounds	1.2	8.3
-1.0 pound	3.1	29.2
-0.5 pounds	5.5	25.0
0 pound	75.6	12.5
+0.5 pounds	9.1	0
+1.0 pound	2.4	4.2
+1.5 pounds	0.8	0
+2.0 pounds	0.8	0
No response code	1.2	4.2

*“-” means the money respondents donated is less than their intention; “+” means the money respondents donated is more than their intention; “0” means the same between actual donation and intention.

Table A5: Percentage of whose thanks or praise the respondents expected with missing data (the whole sample)

Parents	Teachers	Friends	Owner	Officer	Nobody	Self	No response
9.6	2.8	0.4	27.8	5.2	47.9	5.5	0.8

N=1950

Table A6: Percentage ranking of important moral traits (the whole sample)

1. Honest (35.1)	2. Polite (18.7)	3. Grateful (17.8)	4. Respectful (17.2)	5. Loyal (16.9)
6. Fair (16.6)	7. Friendly (11.7)	8. Confident (9.3)	9. Humble (9.3)	10. Selfless (8.5)
11. Self-disciplined (6.6)	12. Knows right/wrong (6.4)	13. Patient (6.3)	14. Accepting (6.2)	15. Helpful (6.0)
16. Perseverant (5.9)	17. Rule abiding (5.6)	18. Consistent (5.5)	19. Loving (5.4)	20. Hard working (5.2)
21. Healthy (5.0)	22. Optimistic (4.7)	23. Responsible (4.6)	24. Rational (4.5)	25. Careful (4.3)
26. Knowledgeable (4.0)	27. Courageous (3.9)	28. Sociable (3.9)	29. Reliable (3.4)	30. Sharing (3.1)
31. Good listener (3.0)	32. Wise ((3.0)	33. Fun (2.9)	34. Independent (2.9)	35. Thrifty (2.6)
36. Empathetic (2.4)	37. Cooperative (1.8)	38. Forgiving (1.6)	39. Open-minded (1.5)	40. Compassionate (1.5)
41. Clean (1.3)	42. Strong (1.3)	43. Religious (1.1)	44. Proud (0.8)	45. Exemplary (0.7)

N=821; Missing data=0.02

Table A7: Percentage ranking of important moral traits (China vs. England)

China (N=714)	Frequency	England (N=107)	Frequency
1. Honest	37.7	1. Friendly	19.6
2. Grateful	19.2	2. Hard working	17.7
3. Polite	19.1	3. Honest	17.7
4. Respectful	17.2	4. Knows right/wrong	16.9
5. Fair	17.1	5. Respectful	16.9
6. Loyal	17	6. Polite	16.8
7. Friendly	10.5	7. Loyal	15.9
8. Humble	9.7	8. Helpful	14
9. Selfless	9.6	9. Fair	13.1
10. Confident	9.5	10. Patient	9.3
11. Self-disciplined	7.8	11. Responsible	9.3
12. Perseverant	6.8	12. Loving	8.5
13. Consistent	6.4	13. Confident	8.4
14. Accepting	6.1	14. Grateful	8.4
15. Patient	5.9	15. Fun	8.3
16. Rule-abiding	5.9	16. Strong	7.5
17. Optimistic	5.4	17. Accepting	6.6
18. Loving	5.1	18. Clean	6.5
19. Healthy	5.1	19. Humble	6.5
20. Rational	4.9	20. Forgiving	5.6
21. Knows right/wrong	4.9	21. Good listener	5.6
22. Careful	4.7	22. Healthy	5.6
23. Helpful	4.6	23. Proud	5.6
24. Knowledgeable	4.4	24. Independent	4.7
25. Sociable	4.3	25. Wise	4.6
26. Courageous	4.2	26. Reliable	3.7
27. Responsible	3.8	27. Rule abiding	3.7
28. Reliable	3.4	28. Sharing	3.7
29. Hard-working	3.2	29. Open-minded	2.8
30. Sharing	2.9	30. Religious	2.8
31. Thrifty	2.9	31. Careful	1.9
32. Wise	2.8	32. Knowledgeable	1.9
33. Independent	2.6	33. Courageous	1.8
34. Good-listener	2.6	34. Rational	1.8
35. Empathetic	2.5	35. Cooperative	0.9
36. Fun	2.1	36. Empathetic	0.9
37. Cooperative	1.9	37. Sociable	0.9
38. Compassionate	1.8	38. Thrifty	0.9
39. Open-minded	1.3		

40. Forgiving	1.0		
41. Exemplary	0.9		
42. Religious	0.9		
43. Clean	0.5		
44. Strong	0.4		
45. Proud	0.1		

Table A8: Percentage of Cultural Value Subscales (clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) (the whole sample)

Cultural Value Subscales	Agree	Middle	Disagree
Individual-interest values	47.7	14.1	37.0
Collective-interest values	68.6	11.4	19.2
Universal-interest values	72.5	13.4	13.0

N=1,950

Table A9: Percentage of Cultural Value Subscales (clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) with Odds Ratios (China vs. England)

Cultural Value Subscales	Items	Samples	Agree	Disagree	Odds Ratios
Individual-interest Subscale	Personal Security (B1/B2) (Safety)	China	89.4	5.2	2.8
		England	77.2	12.4	
	Achievement (B3/B7) (personal success)	China	77.2	7.4	1.6
		England	69.6	11.0	
	Hedonism (B11/B19) (pleasure, enjoying life)	China	20.1	65.3	0.3
		England	40.1	35.2	
	Power (B21/B24) (control over people and resources)	China	7.0	85.0	0.3
		England	14.8	59.4	
	Self-direction (B17/B18) (independent thought and action choosing)	China	50.6	33.7	1.3
		England	34.6	30.8	
	Stimulation (B12/B20) (opening to change)	China	37.5	45.8	0.5
		England	49.2	27.7	
	Humility (B6/B23) (humble)	China	59.0	22.4	2.6
		England	37.1	36.5	
Face (B15/B25) (self-image)	China	41.6	38.2	0.4	
	England	53.0	21.4		
Total Individual-interest Subscale	China	54.0	37.9	0.9	
	England	47.0	29.3		
Collective-interest	Tradition (B4/B13) (commitment and acceptance of the customs)	China	59.1	30.9	1.2
		England	54.9	34.7	
	Conformity (B5*/B22) (rules/interpersonal)	China	66.7	19.8	1.6
		England	50.6	24.4	

Subscale	<i>Benevolence (B8/B16)</i> (caring/dependability)	China	84.1	5.5	3.5
		England	60.5	13.7	
	Total Collective-interest Subscale	China	70.0	18.7	1.6
		England	55.3	24.3	
Universal-interest Subscale	<i>Universalism (B9/ B14)</i> (difference tolerance)	China	73.6	13.7	0.5
		England	77.5	7.4	
	<i>Universalism (B10)</i> (caring for universal issues, e.g. nature & animals)	China	72.0	11.8	3.1
		England	48.3	24.2	
	Total Universal-interest Subscale	China	72.8	12.8	1.4
		England	62.9	15.8	

* Reverse scored; China (N=1,768); England (N=182); Missing data =0.2 - 1.8%

Table A10: Mean scores of items in Cultural Value Subscales with Effect size (China vs. England)

Cultural Value Subscales	Items	Samples	Mean	SD	Effect size
Individual-interest Subscale	<i>Personal Security (B1)</i>	China	4.5	1.0	0.2
		England	4.3	1.1	
	<i>Personal Security (B2)</i>	China	4.8	0.9	0.7
		England	4.2	1.4	
	<i>Achievement (B3)</i> (personal success)	China	4.2	1.1	-0.1
		England	4.3	1.0	
	<i>Achievement (B7)</i> (personal success)	China	4.3	1.1	0.5
		England	3.8	1.2	
	<i>Hedonism (B11)</i> (pleasure, enjoying life)	China	1.7	1.2	-1.1
		England	3.0	1.4	
	<i>Hedonism (B19)</i> (pleasure, enjoying life)	China	2.5	1.5	-0.5
		England	3.2	1.5	
	<i>Power (B21)</i> (control over resources)	China	1.5	1.0	-0.8
		England	2.4	1.3	
	<i>Power (B24)</i> (control over people)	China	1.5	1.0	-0.4
		England	1.9	1.2	
	<i>Self-direction (B17)</i> (independent action choosing)	China	2.4	1.5	-0.5
		England	3.1	1.4	
	<i>Self-direction (B18)</i> (independent thought choosing)	China	4.2	1.2	0.8
		England	3.1	1.4	
<i>Stimulation (B12)</i> (opening to change)	China	3.4	1.6	-0.3	
	England	3.8	1.3		
<i>Stimulation (B20)</i> (opening to change)	China	2.2	1.4	-0.5	
	England	2.9	1.5		
<i>Humility (B6)</i> (humble)	China	3.4	1.5	0.3	
	England	3.0	1.5		

	Humility (B23) (humble)	China	4.0	1.4	0.7
		England	3.0	1.3	
	Face (B15) (self-image)	China	3.3	1.6	-0.2
		England	3.6	1.3	
	Face (B25) (self-image)	China	2.8	1.5	-0.5
		England	3.5	1.3	
Collective-interest Subscale	Tradition (B4) (commitment and acceptance of the customs)	China	4.6	0.9	0.1
		England	4.5	0.8	
	Tradition (B13) (commitment and acceptance of the customs)	China	2.5	1.6	0.2
		England	2.2	1.5	
	Conformity (B5*) (rules)	China	4.4	1.1	0.5
		England	3.8	1.2	
	Conformity (B22) (interpersonal)	China	3.3	1.5	0.1
		England	3.2	1.3	
	Benevolence (B8) (caring/responsibility)	China	4.4	1.0	1.0
		England	3.4	1.3	
	Benevolence (B16) (dependability)	China	4.5	0.9	0.5
		England	4.0	1.0	
Universal-interest Subscale	Universalism (B9) (difference tolerance-idea)	China	3.7	1.4	-0.1
		England	3.9	1.0	
	Universalism (B14) (difference tolerance-people)	China	4.4	1.0	-0.1
		England	4.5	1.0	
	Universalism (B10) (caring for universal issues nature & animals)	China	4.2	1.2	0.7
		England	3.4	1.3	

* Reverse scored; China (N=1,768); England (N=182); Missing data =0.2 - 1.8%

Table A11: Mean score of Parenting Scale with missing data (the whole sample)

Items	Mean	SD	No response (%)
Encouraging (B26)	4.5	1.0	1.2
Supportive (B27)	4.4	1.1	1.1
Fair (family rule) (B28)	4.3	1.2	1.0
Equal (parent-child relation)(B29)	4.0	1.4	1.5
Honest (parenting)(B30)	4.1	1.3	1.6
Total Parenting Scale	4.3	0.8	

N=1,950

Table A12: Percentage of Parenting Scale (clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) with Odds Ratios and missing data (China vs. England)

Items		Agree	Disagree	Odds Ratios	No response
Encouraging (parenting)	China	86.4	6.1	0.4	1.2

(B26)	England	84.6	2.2		1.1
Supportive (parenting) (B27)	China	82.0	9.1	0.3	1.1
	England	91.2	3.3		1.1
Fair (family rule) (B28)	China	82.1	10.4	1.6	0.8
	England	68.1	13.7		2.7
Equal (parent-child relation) (B29)	China	68.5	19.4	0.7	1.4
	England	66.0	13.2		2.2
Honest (parenting) (B30)	China	74.2	12.8	1.5	1.6
	England	63.7	16.4		1.6
Total Parent Scale	China	78.6	11.6	0.9	
	England	74.7	9.8		

China (N=1,768); England (N=182)

Table A13: Mean score of School Climate Scale with missing data (the whole sample)

Items	Mean	SD	No response (%)
Encouraging (B31)	4.4	1.0	1.4
Supportive (B32)	4.2	1.2	1.3
Equal (teacher-student relation) (B33)	3.9	1.4	1.2
Fair (treatment of students) (B34)	4.4	1.2	1.0
Honest (teaching) (B35)	4.4	1.1	1.0
Fair (school rule) (B36)	4.6	1.0	1.0
Total School Climate Scale	4.3	0.8	

N=1,950

Table A14: Percentage of School Climate Scale (clipped 5-degree Likert Scale) with Odds Ratios and missing data (China vs. England)

Items		Agree	Disagree	Odds Ratios	No response
Encouraging (teaching) (B31)	China	83.6	6.0	1.2	1.5
	England	78.0	6.5		1.1
Supportive (teaching) (B32)	China	75.8	11.3	0.5	1.4
	England	80.7	6.0		1.1
Fair (school rule) (B36)	China	89.2	5.4	2.4	0.9
	England	70.8	10.4		1.6
Fair (treatment of students) (B34)	China	82.3	9.9	2.2	1.0
	England	68.1	18.1		1.6
Equal (teacher-student relation) (B33)	China	69.9	18.1	1.6	1.4
	England	55.5	22.5		1.6
Honest (teaching) (B35)	China	85.8	6.9	3.0	0.9
	England	64.8	15.4		1.6
Overall school climate	China	81.1	9.6	1.6	

	England	69.7	13.2		
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China (N=1,768); England (N=182)

Table A15: Mean score of Cultural Norm Scales with missing data (the whole sample)

Items	Mean	SD	No response (%)
Descriptive Norm (Peers)	3.8	1.3	2.4
Descriptive Norms (Teachers)	4.3	1.0	2.6
Descriptive Norms (Parents)	4.5	0.9	2.4
Injunctive Norms	4.5	1.0	2.3
Total Descriptive Norm Scale	4.2	0.8	
Total Injunctive Norm Scale	4.5	1.0	

N=821

Table A16: Percentage of Culture Norm Scale (clipped 5-degree Likert Scale)with Odds Ratios and missing data (China vs. England)

Items		Agree	Disagree	Odds Ratios	No response
Descriptive Norm (Peers)	China	61.4	14.7	0.8	2.4
	England	59.8	11.2		3.7
Descriptive Norm (Teachers)	China	76.7	6.0	0.6	2.5
	England	77.5	3.8		3.7
Descriptive Norm (Parents)	China	83.9	4.0	1.3	2.4
	England	75.7	4.7		3.7
Total Descriptive Norm Scale	China	74.0	8.2	0.8	
	England	71.0	6.6		
Injunctive NormScale	China	85.8	4.6	7.0	2.2
	England	57.0	21.5		3.7

China (N=714); England (N=107)

Appendix: Information Sheet for Schools



Dear Head Teacher

Important: Pupil survey for Young Adolescents' Moral Development Project.

Thank you for participating in the project on the young adolescents' moral development led by Education Department of Durham University.

We would like to conduct the survey with **all years 5 and 6 pupils**. **1)** We have developed a **short questionnaire** that takes about **25 minutes** of a pupil's time to complete. This **questionnaire will** be conducted on a **class basis** in students' classroom. The language of the questions should be simple enough for students to manage independently. However, some pupils may need questions to be read aloud, or may ask for help. This is fine, as long as no guidance is given about what to answer then please provide a staff member's help. **2)** **About 12 participants** will also be selected randomly (e.g. selecting every third student in a certain order) from each participating class to take part in a **small sharing game** on a **one-to-one basis**. It takes about **5 minutes** for each student. The game can be conducted in a private **corner** in students' classroom or a completely empty room on another day. The whole survey will be completed at school during normal hours.

The questionnaire is about pupils' behaviour and thoughts in their daily life. The game will go like normal activities in school. No identifiable information will be collected. Pupils can ignore any questions which they feel uncomfortable to answer or quit the game at any time. All the stuff about the **survey will** also be provided by the researcher. **Students who answer the questionnaire will get a pencil as a reward, and students who take part in the game will get 2 pounds as a reward.**

We appreciate your participation in conducting this survey. If you need any further information regarding this survey then please do not hesitate to contact:

Shi Pian.

School of Education, Durham University, Leazes Road, Durham, DH1 1TA

07340572036_pian.shi2@durham.ac.uk

Following team members can also be contacted:

Professor Stephen Gorard(s.a.c.gorard@durham.ac.uk);

Head teacher's Signature _____ Date _____

(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) _____

Researcher's Signature _____ Date _____

(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS) _____

Appendix: Survey in English



This is a questionnaire about your behaviour, and your views on your daily life. Your answers will be totally **confidential**. This means that your teachers, parents and other classmates will never see what you write. Only the researcher will see it, and they will not know who you are. So please fill it in as honestly as you can, and take your time to answer.

This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers—we are just interested in your own thoughts. If you are unsure about any of the questions please ask for help. You can miss out any questions you don't feel comfortable to answer.

Part 1

Please write down the first two letters of your mother's first name here _____.

Please say how much you agree with the following statements, from "agree strongly" (5) to "disagree strongly" (1). Please tick(✓) only one numbered box on each line.

Agree strongly ← → Disagree strongly

	5	4	3	2	1
1. I will go along with a group decision to hurt others, even if I know it is wrong.					
2. It is OK to cheat in a game if the rewards for winning are high.					
3. If I know that my best friend did something bad in my classroom, I will tell the teacher when asked about it.					
4. It is important for me to act honestly in most things I do.					
5. It is not important for me to treat other people fairly.					
6. It is important for me to do the least harm to other people.					

Please read the stories below and remember to be honest about what you would do, then please tick(✓) in the box next to the statement that you agree with the most:

7. You get 2 pounds as a reward for joining a game. Some poor children in the world cannot eat health food and drink clean water. You are told that your donation of money can help them. You are free to make any decision, will you?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donate 1.5 pounds to needy children | <input type="checkbox"/> Donate 2 pounds to needy children |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donate 50 pence to needy children | <input type="checkbox"/> Keep all the money for yourself |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Donate 1 pound to needy children | |

8. You are asked to share some small fun gifts between a stranger and yourself, will you?

- Give yourself more Give the stranger more Give all to yourself
 Give all to the stranger Share equally

9. If you hand over a wallet you found on the ground in a park to the Lost and Found Office, who would you expect to thank you or praise you the most?

- Parents Teachers Friends Yourself The owner of the wallet
 The officers of the Lost and Found Office You are not expecting anyone's thanks or praise

Part 2

Please say how much you agree with the following statements, from "agree strongly" (5) to "disagree strongly" (1). Please tick(✓) only one numbered box on each line.

Agree strongly ← → Disagree strongly

	5	4	3	2	1
1. I always wait until any cars have come to a complete stop before crossing the street.					
2. I never eat sweets or food given by strangers to me.					
3. I always put a lot of effort into studies and sports in order to get a good result.					
4. I always enjoy traditional family activities at home (like having a big home-made meal with family at Christmas, New Year, or Eid).					
5. I often break the rules that parents or teachers set for me.					
6. I always feel shy(or unconfident, or embarrassed) when others praise me.					
7. I always try to impress my teachers or my classmates by working extra hard.					
8. I often help my family members to do housework (e.g. washing plates, clearing table).					
9. I always try to understand other people's ideas, even if I do not agree with them.					
10. I always join in activities to help protect nature (e.g. donate to animal protection projects or water trees).					
11. I really do not like doing difficult tasks.					
12. I really like choosing new and unusual places to visit, or special food to eat.					

Agree strongly ← → Disagree strongly

	5	4	3	2	1
13. I regularly attend religious services (e.g. church, mosque or temple).					
14. I do not hate people with different kinds of lifestyles to me.					
15. I don't like talking about my mistakes.					
16. I always keep promises I make to friends or family members.					
17. I prefer doing tasks alone rather than with other people.					
18. I always look for the ideas behind any rule before obeying it.					
19. I eat food or have drinks even when I am not hungry or thirsty.					
20. I really like doing risky things, for the thrill of it.					
21. I think rich people are good role models.					
22. I always keep my opinion to myself, and don't argue openly with others.					
23. I never show off my achievements to friends.					
24. I often force others to agree to my favorite game or idea.					
25. I feel angry when someone does not believe in my ability.					
26. My parents (carers) are always happy with my progress at school.					
27. My parents (carers) always support me when I am facing challenges.					
28. I always get fair punishment for breaking any rules at home.					
29. I feel that my parents (carers) and I are equals at home.					
30. I feel that my parents (carers) always tell me the truth.					
31. My teachers are always happy with my progress at school.					
32. My teachers always support me when I am facing challenges at school.					
33. I feel equal to my teachers at school.					
34. I feel teachers always treat all students fairly.					
35. I feel that teachers always tell the truth to students.					
36. I always get fair punishment for breaking any rules at school.					

Agree strongly ←→Disagree strongly

	5	4	3	2	1
37. I feel that my parents (carers) always treat all the children at home fairly.					
If you don't have any brothers or sisters, please ignore NO.37, and tick the box <input type="checkbox"/> I don't have brothers or sisters.					

PART 3

The following questions are about yourself, please tick(✓) in the box or write answer in the given space.

1. When were you born?	Month_____Day____Year_____
2. How would you describe your gender?	<input type="checkbox"/> Girl <input type="checkbox"/> Boy <input type="checkbox"/> Other
3. Which country were you born in ?	Please name the country_____
4. Which countries were your parents(or carers) born in? (Leave blank if you do not know.)	Parent/carer 1 _____ Parent/carer 2 _____
5. What language do you speak at home most of the time?	<input type="checkbox"/> English <input type="checkbox"/> Another language <input type="checkbox"/> English and another language
6.What are your parents'(or carers') jobs? (Please tick (✓) in the box next to the job group which is most similar to your parent's or carer's). Or write the name of their jobs.	Parent/carer 1 <input type="checkbox"/> Professional sports, plumber, electrician, nurse, journalist, policeman, accountant, librarian, secretary... <input type="checkbox"/> Farmer, driver, waiter, cleaner, hairdresser, courier, caretaker, shop assistant, gardener, laborer... <input type="checkbox"/> Teacher, lecturer, lawyer, architect, doctor, dentist, artist, engineer, manager, company director, senior civil servant... <input type="checkbox"/> He/she does not have a job <input type="checkbox"/> Or write the name of his/her job_____
	Parent/carer 2 <input type="checkbox"/> Professional sports, plumber, electrician, nurse, journalist, policeman, accountant, librarian, secretary... <input type="checkbox"/> Farmer, driver, waiter, cleaner, hairdresser, courier, caretaker, shop assistant, gardener, laborer... <input type="checkbox"/> Teacher, lecturer, lawyer, architect, doctor, dentist, artist, engineer, manager, company director, senior civil servant... <input type="checkbox"/> He/she does not have a job <input type="checkbox"/> Or write the name of his/her job_____

Part4

1、 Among the following qualities or traits which do you think a moral person should have? Please **tick(✓)** next to the words you think are, you can tick more than one word.

confident	loyal	fair	reliable	helpful	friendly	accepting	sociable
forgiving	knowledgeable	respectful	loving	responsible	clean	fun	rule-abiding
passionate	honest	selfless	sharing	grateful	optimistic	rational	religious
humble	strong	cooperative	courageous	thrifty	polite	healthy	careful
patient	perseverant	empathetic	proud	independent	exemplary	wise	consistent
hard-working	self-disciplined	knows what is right/wrong		open-minded		good listener	

2、 For the above traits or qualities that you have **ticked✓**, please **rank the top three** according to their importance(please **write down** the word in the given space).

Top one _____ **Top two** _____ **Top three** _____

3、 For the above traits or qualities that you have ticked , please think about how much you agree with the following statements, from "agree strongly" (5) to "disagree strongly"(1). Please **tick(✓)** only one numbered box on each line.

	Agree strongly ← → Disagree strongly				
	5	4	3	2	1
1) The traits or qualities I have ticked ✓ above represent what most students around me think a moral person is like.					
2) Teachers think it is important to have the traits or qualities I have ticked ✓ above .					
3) My parents think it is important to have the traits or qualities I have ticked ✓ above .					
4) It is important that people living in the UK have the traits or qualities I have ticked ✓ above .					

Thank you for your answers!

Appendix: Survey in Chinese

这是一份关于你在日常生活中的行为和观点的问卷。你的答案完全是保密的。老师、家长以及其他同学都不会看到你写了什么。只有研究员能看到你的答案，但是他们也不知道你是谁。所以请你充分利用时间如实回答问题。

如果你对任何问题有疑问都可以向老师寻求帮助。你也可以跳过任何你不想回答的问题。

这份问卷不是测试，答案没有对错之分——我们只想知道你真实的想法。感谢你的回答！

第一部分

请用汉语拼音写出你母亲的名字_____

请你想一想你对以下说法赞同的程度，从“非常同意（5）”到“非常不同意（1）”。请在每行中对应的一个数字下打(✓)。

	非常同意 ←————→ 非常不同意				
	5	4	3	2	1
1.如果伤害某个人是集体做出的决定，即便我知道那是错的，我也会跟从。					
2.如果游戏的奖励很丰厚，为了赢得奖励，在游戏中作弊也是可以的。					
3.如果我知道我最好的朋友和另一个同学在教室里一起做了错事，当老师问我的时候，我会告诉老师。					
4.做大部分事情的时候都保持诚实，这对于我来说很重要。					
5.公平对待他人对于我来说不重要。					
6.尽量少伤害别人对于我来说很重要。					

请阅读下面的故事并且如实回答你会怎么做，请在你最赞同的描述前面的方框里打(✓)：

1.你因为参加了一个游戏而得到 20 元钱的奖励。世界上一些贫困儿童没有健康的食物可以吃，没有干净的水可以喝，而你被告知捐款可以帮助他们。你可以自由做决定，你将会：

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 捐 15 元钱给贫困儿童 | <input type="checkbox"/> 捐 20 元钱给贫困儿童 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 捐 5 元钱给贫困儿童 | <input type="checkbox"/> 把所有的钱都留给你自己 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 捐 10 元钱给贫困儿童 | |

2. 你被要求在你和一个陌生人之间分配一些好玩儿的小礼品，你将会：

- 分给你自己更多的礼品 分给陌生人更多的礼品 把全部礼品都分给你自己
 把全部礼品都分给陌生人 平均分配礼品

3. 如果你在公园的地上捡到的一个钱包并上交到失物招领处，你最期待得到谁的感谢或表扬：

- 父母 老师 朋友 你自己 钱包的主人
 失物招领处的工作人员 你不期待任何人的感谢或表扬

第二部分

请你想一想你对以下说法赞同的程度，从“非常同意（5）”到“非常不同意（1）”。请在每行中对应的一个数字下打(✓)。

非常同意 ←————— 非常不同意

	5	4	3	2	1
1. 我通常会等到所有的车都彻底停下来之后再过马路。					
2. 我从来不吃陌生人给的糖果或食物。					
3. 我经常在学习或是体育运动上花费很多精力以便得到好的成绩。					
4. 我经常参加传统的家庭活动（例如在中国春节、阳历新年或开斋节的时候和家人一起吃一顿家里做的大餐）。					
5. 我经常打破家长或老师给我设定的规则。					
6. 当别人表扬我的时候，我通常会感到害羞（或不好意思、不自信）。					
7. 我经常通过非常努力的学习来给老师或同学留下好印象。					
8. 我经常帮助家人做家务（例如洗碗、擦桌子）。					
9. 我通常会试着理解他人的想法，虽然我并不赞同。					
10. 我经常参与保护大自然的活动（例如为动物保护项目捐款或给树木浇水）。					
11. 我真的不喜欢完成有困难的任务。					
12. 我的确喜欢选择一个新的或不寻常的地方去游玩，或品尝特别的食物。					

非常同意 ←————→ 非常不同意

	5	4	3	2	1
13.我定期参加宗教活动 (例如去教堂、清真寺或是寺庙)。					
14.对于生活方式与我不同的人,我并不讨厌。					
15.我不喜欢提起自己犯过的错误。					
16.我通常对我的朋友或家人遵守承诺。					
17.我喜欢独自完成任务,而不是与他人合作。					
18.在遵守规则之前,我通常会弄清楚它背后的含义。					
19.我会在不饿或不渴的时候吃东西或喝东西。					
20.为了寻求刺激,我喜欢做一些冒险的事情。					
21.我认为有钱人是好的学习榜样。					
22.我通常会保留自己的意见,而不是公开和别人争论。					
23.我从不向朋友炫耀我取得的成绩。					
24.我经常强迫他人参加我喜欢的游戏或是听从我的主意。					
25.当别人不相信我的能力时,我感到很生气。					
26.我的父母(照顾者)对我在学校里取得的进步总是感到开心。					
27.当我遇到挑战的时候,我的父母(照顾者)总是很支持我。					
28.当我打破家里的规矩时,我得到的惩罚通常是合理的。					
29.在家里,我通常感觉我和父母(照顾者)之间是平等的。					
30.我感到我的父母(照顾者)总是对我说真话。					
31.我的老师对我在学校里取得的进步总是感到开心。					
32.当我在学校里遇到挑战的时候,我的老师总是很支持我。					
33.在学校里,我通常感到我和老师之间是平等的。					
34.我感到老师通常公平对待所有的学生。					
35.我感到老师总是对学生说真话。					
36.当我打破学校里的规则时,我得到的惩罚通常是合理的。					

	5	4	3	2	1
37.我感到我的父母(照顾者)对家里所有的孩子都是公平的。					
(如果你家里没有兄弟姐妹,可以不答第37题,然后在□里打✓) →	<input type="checkbox"/> 我没有兄弟姐妹。				

第三部分

下面的问题是关于你的信息,请在对应的答案前面的方框内打(✓)或是把答案写在横线处。

1.你是什么时候出生的?	月份_____年份_____
2.你如何描述自己的性别?	<input type="checkbox"/> 女孩 <input type="checkbox"/> 男孩 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他
3.你出生在哪个国家?	请写出国家名_____
4.你的父母(照顾者)出生在哪个国家?	父母(照顾者)1 _____ 父母(照顾者)2 _____
5.你在家大部分时候说哪种语言?	<input type="checkbox"/> 中文 <input type="checkbox"/> 其他语言 <input type="checkbox"/> 中文和其他语言各一半
6.你父母(照顾者)的工作是什么? (请在和你父母或照顾者工作最相似的那一组工作前的方框内打(✓))。或者直接把他们的工作写在横线处。	<p>父母(照顾者)1</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 专业运动员、水暖工、电工、护士、记者、警察、会计、图书管理员、秘书..... <input type="checkbox"/> 农民、司机、餐厅服务员、保洁员、美发师、收银员、保姆、售货员、园丁、劳动工人..... <input type="checkbox"/> 老师、讲师、律师、建筑师、医生、牙医、艺术家、工程师、经理、公司主管、政府官员..... <input type="checkbox"/> 他/她不工作 <input type="checkbox"/> 或者请写出他/她的工作_____
	<p>父母(照顾者)2</p> <input type="checkbox"/> 专业运动员、水暖工、电工、护士、记者、警察、会计、图书管理员、秘书..... <input type="checkbox"/> 农民、司机、餐厅服务员、保洁员、美发师、收银员、保姆、售货员、园丁、劳动工人..... <input type="checkbox"/> 老师、讲师、律师、建筑师、医生、牙医、艺术家、工程师、经理、公司主管、政府官员..... <input type="checkbox"/> 他/她不工作 <input type="checkbox"/> 或者请写出他/她的工作_____

第四部分

1、以下这些特征或品质中，你认为**哪些（可以选择多个）**是有道德的人应该有的？
（请你认为的词语旁边打✓）

自信	忠诚	公平	可靠	帮助	友好	包容	乐于交友
原谅	博学	尊重	关爱	负责	整洁	幽默	遵守规则
热情	诚实	无私	分享	感恩	乐观	理智	宗教信仰
谦虚	强壮	合作	勇敢	节约	礼貌	健康	非常认真
耐心	坚持	同情	自豪	独立	榜样	聪明	善于倾听
努力	自觉自律	知道对错	思想开放	言行一致			

2、对于以上你已经打✓的特征或品质，请你按照重要性排列出前三名

第一重要_____ 第二重要_____ 第三重要_____

3、对于以上你已经打✓的特征或品质，请你想一想你对以下说法赞同的程度，从“非常同意（5）”到“非常不同意（1）”。请在每行中对应的一个数字下打(✓)。

	非常同意 ←————→ 非常不同意				
	5	4	3	2	1
1.我所打✓的特征或品质也代表了大部分同学的想法。					
2.我的老师们认为拥有我所打✓的特征或品质很重要。					
3.我的爸爸妈妈认为拥有我所打✓的特征或品质很重要。					
4.拥有我所打✓的特征或品质对于生活在 中国 的人们来说很重要。					

感谢你的回答！