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*Thomas Hobbes and the phenomena of civil war: A textual exposition of Hobbes's commitment to the empirical and historical existence of the state of nature.*

SPENCER JOHN HARRY HARRISON

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**Thomas Hobbes and the phenomena of civil war: A textual exposition of Hobbes's  
commitment to the empirical and historical existence of the state of nature.**

**The thesis which appears on these impending pages is being presented in the hope that it shall  
attain for the author the Master of Arts in Historical Research.**

**Submitted under the aegis of the Department of Early Modern History of Durham University.**

**Designed and composed by Spencer John Harry Harrison.**

**Submitted in 2022.**

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**1) Abstract:**

Did Thomas Hobbes consider his conception of the state of nature to be based within any empirically verifiable reality?

The foundational predicates of this thesis can be reduced to two fundamental points:

1. That Hobbes's belief in the existence in the state of nature was sincere.
2. The most pertinent empirical basis for the state of nature expressed by Hobbes was civil war, specifically, the English Civil War Period.

The analytical trajectory of the thesis will endeavour, whenever possible, to pursue channels of inquiry which correspond to the two key predicates adumbrated above.

The format has been styled as a "textual exposition" because the method endorsed will seek to expose Hobbes's commitment to the existence of the state of nature from the words that he himself had written. Whether they be elements of his renowned philosophical system, or written material situated outside the terminus of his political science. Such as his correspondence, or lesser-known publications.

Secondary material written about Hobbes's state of nature, and the judgments of such authors as created them will of course be consulted at various points. However, to the primary material, containing Hobbes's own judgments on the state of nature and its relationship with civil war, is accorded the greater responsibility for validating the premises of this thesis.

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**Epistle of Dedications:**

To My Father, Gordon George Henry Harrison, late of this mortal dimension. A keen Hobbesian, who watched the development of this work with much delight. Until he was felled on August the 28<sup>th</sup> 2021 by the affliction which had assailed him those past 6 years. Fare Ye Well. May Death grant you the tranquillity which Life so frequently withdrew from your grasp. *Omni Capex Movet Urna Nomen.*

To my Mother Susan Catherine Scales, without whom my resolve to see this task to the bitter end would have crumbled away months ago. A few firm words and a constantly alternating succession of delicious repasts are the sinews of tenacity.

To Dr Adrian Green and Dr Alex Barber of the Early Modern History Department of Durham University, for enduring my many eccentricities with noble equanimity and a patience I can only define as unnatural.

To Robert Joseph Pick, Jack Thomas Grayson and Harry de Bourbon Patterson, no truer comrades to be had, either in pursuit of virtue, or of mischief.

To Akira Toriyama the creator of Dragonball and Satoshi Tajiri the creator of Pokémon. Often what a fellow does in between his professional exertions can determine his capacity to march forward into the most daunting of labours.

To Vegeta, Prince of the Saiyans. By the fact of your irrepressibility alone, driving me to attempt to transcend my limitations, both in exercise and in scholarship.

“Nothing Ventured, Nothing Have”- Prince Rupert justifying himself after threatening to raze Manchester when the mayor refused to acquiesce to his demand for two thousand pounds from the city treasury.

**Thomas Hobbes and the phenomena of civil war:**

**A textual exposition of Hobbes's commitment to the empirical and historical existence of the state of nature.**

**Preface- An historical note, a summary of Hobbes in the Civil War Period:**

During this essay, the preferred format to indicate the internal strife which ravaged the British Isles throughout the preponderance of the 1640's and the opening years of the 1650's is the "Civil War Period". Why referring to a "period" of civil wars in England at that time instead of a simple, monolithic "English Civil War" is significant in terms of both Hobbesian contextual and general Early Modern historical propriety. Akin to the modern historian, Hobbes would consistently acknowledge that the turmoil within the Stuart dominions was not merely a single historical incident, but a sequence of interconnected events, or "wars"<sup>1</sup>.

The English Civil War Period may be demarcated into three interlocking phases. The "First English Civil War" from 1642-46. A "Second Civil War" in the year of 1648. Finally, a period between 1649-52 that witnessed a victorious Parliamentary army campaigning in Ireland and Scotland. Within this thesis, it shall be demonstrated how Hobbes's conception of Civil War in England chronologically spanned all three phases of the Civil War Period in England. With his awareness of the inception of formal civil war in England commencing in 1642<sup>2</sup>, ending after the pacification of Scotland and Ireland by Cromwell in late 1651<sup>3</sup>. By defining what we may consider to be a "Hobbesian" chronology of the Civil Wars, a chronology may in turn be established to mark the moments the state of nature reasserted itself and then eventually diminished within Civil War England.

Hobbes may be observed at particular points of his discourse referring, ostensibly, to a single seamless conflict of arms, a "Civille warre"<sup>4</sup>. Upon different occasions, Hobbes may be described speaking of a plurality of conflicts, or "Civill warres". One may be tempted to diagnose a work-fatigued Hobbes with a touch of cognitive dissonance, but paying attention to Hobbes's choice of language within the context of his own discourse can provide an explanation for these discrepancies.

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<sup>1</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, (Dumfries and Galloway: Anodos, 2017), 111, 382, 386.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth*, (Chicago: University Press, 1990), 117.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, 171.

<sup>4</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 10, 381.

In the “*Review and Conclusion*” of *Leviathan*, Hobbes would lament the death of his friend Sidney Godolphin: “unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civill warre”<sup>5</sup>. As an isolated strand of dialogue, one may be persuaded that Hobbes is defining the English Civil Wars as a single conflict: a “warre” that has now reached its conclusion. But the usage of the past tense here, signified by “late” is deceptive. On the following page of the same *Review and Conclusion from Leviathan*, Hobbes would drop the past tense completely, switching to the present tense to describe a plurality of conflicts: “the Civill warres”. The present tense is maintained on the very final page of the *Leviathan* when Hobbes declared that the book was “occasioned by the disorders of the present times”.

Sidney Godolphin was killed skirmishing with Parliamentary forces in Chagford at the beginning of 1643<sup>6</sup>, during the phase of civil strife generally known as the First English Civil War. For Hobbes to describe the part of the Civil Wars in which Godolphin was slain as the “late” war, only to refer to the “warres” in the present tense a page later<sup>7</sup>, indicates that Hobbes harboured an awareness of the discord within England as a sequence of wars. The “late Civile warre” witnessing the slaying of Godolphin was a phase of the “Civill warres” which Hobbes considered to be still unfolding as he was composing those final remarks within *Leviathan*.

The cessation of important military conflict within the Stuart dominions is typically considered to be in 1651, after the pacification of Scotland and Ireland by Oliver Cromwell at the head of the New Model Army<sup>8</sup>. But seeking to identify the formal ending of the Civil War Period in the perception of Thomas Hobbes is to invite some significant controversy into the fore. In *Behemoth*, another Hobbesian text which he himself would describe as “A Dialogue of the Civil Wars of England”<sup>9</sup>, Hobbes would establish a timeline of the Civil War Period which would have its ending situated firmly in 1660<sup>10</sup>. This was the date monarchical government was restored to England with the proclamation of Charles II as king.

It can be learned through his private *Correspondence*, that Hobbes was intransigently resistant to any notion of returning to an England in which he detected even the faintest ember of civil war still

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<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, 381.

<sup>6</sup> Trevor Royle, *Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms*, (London: Little and Brown Group, 2004), 237-238.

<sup>7</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 382.

<sup>8</sup> Royle, *The Wars of the Three Kingdoms*, 624.

<sup>9</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *The Bookseller’s Advertisement to the Readers, From the Molesworth Edition of the English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, (John Bohn: London, 1845), 411.

<sup>10</sup> Hobbes, *Behemoth*, 1. Furthermore, this chronology was stipulated by Hobbes in an epistle written to Sir Henry Bennet, Baron of Arlington, located on the page before the preface of this edition of *Behemoth*. Within it, Hobbes addressed Arlington thus: “I present your Lordship with four short dialogues concerning the memorable civil war in his Majesty’s dominions from 1640-1660”.

burning<sup>11</sup>. Considering the chronology of the civil war that he established within *Behemoth* and the aversion to an embattled England exhibited in his *Correspondence*, predicting the date of Hobbes's return from his French exile at 1660 would not be an unreasonable hypothesis. Certainly, if not for the fact that Hobbes resumed his life in England at some point between the winters of 1651 and 1652.

If Hobbes was not content to return to England in 1647 on account of it having not been "pacified"<sup>12</sup> to his satisfaction, his abandonment of France after a lengthy exile of over eleven years in 1652 suggests to us that this criterion had at last been fulfilled. How can we substantively ascertain Hobbes had at last determined that England in the early 1650's, not 1660 had become tranquil enough for peace and all its attendant activities to resume? Compelling information can be relied upon to secure a measure of assurance about this hypothesis.

Hobbes ordered that his major works on civil philosophy be printed and published in England, months in advance of the date he selected to travel thither himself<sup>13</sup>. Since Hobbes fled England for France in 1640, two editions 1642, 1647, of his *De Cive* had been published on the European Continent. Neither of these editions made it to the printing presses in England, though some living there may have obtained copies from abroad. In 1647, Hobbes had another chance to order the printing of *De Cive* in England alongside the initiatives he made for its publication on the continent, yet he gave no such command. That year he confessed in a letter, after seven years of exile, that he had no "inclinations"<sup>14</sup> whatsoever to return to England. A place he still believed to be "dangerous"<sup>15</sup> for him.

Had Hobbes any positive "inclinations" toward England in 1647, as he manifestly did in 1651, he may have arranged for his *De Cive* to be circulated in print ere he returned. That the publication of both *De Cive* and *Leviathan* in England coincided with the reappearance of its author in that country, we can be assured of Hobbes's confidence in his native land as a place where life had at last crawled from beneath the suffocating spectre of civil war. A friend, Thomas de Martel, would even write him

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<sup>11</sup>Thomas Hobbes, *From the Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes*, Edited by Noel Malcolm, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), 157-8. 170.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, 157-8.

<sup>13</sup> Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Hobbes and Civil Science*, (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), 303. *With Elements of Law issued in two sections, the first in February of 1650 as Human Nature and the second as De Corpore Politico in May. The first legitimately published English translation of De Cive was circulated as Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society. Finally between April and May of 1651 came Leviathan.*

<sup>14</sup> Hobbes, *Correspondence*, 170.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, 170.

in the August of 1654 expressing his delight to hear that Hobbes was at last “content and enjoying the benefit of a tranquil life” back in England<sup>16</sup>.

Therefore, with the termination of his exile and his intention to integrate himself once more within English public life expressed in the choice of London as the distribution terminus for his newly completed opus *Leviathan*, the Civil War Period for Hobbes can be said to have ended by 1652. If Hobbes harboured such consternations as he did in the 1640's throughout the 1650's, the prospects of his making such a conspicuous return then as he did are dubious indeed. By action and word committed during this time, Hobbes betrayed an ending point of his Civil War Period chronology more congruent with those postulated by modern historians, than that which he contrived in *Behemoth*.

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<sup>16</sup> Hobbes, Correspondence, 201.

## **2) Introduction: The Matter and Form of this Dissertation-**

According to Professor Ioannis D. Evrigenis whether Hobbes sincerely thought that the state of nature existed, is “not” the “real question”<sup>17</sup> historians of Hobbes’s state of nature ought to be asking themselves. Professor Evrigenis harboured the expectation that anyone, “even with the most cursory reading”<sup>18</sup> would come to realise Hobbes believed that his state of nature existed. Stating that:

“Hobbes chapters on man’s natural condition will immediately reveal several examples of actual situations, both historical and contemporary, that Hobbes equates (to a greater or lesser extent) with the state of nature in his theory”<sup>19</sup>.

It is clear that Evrigenis is stipulating that Hobbes had directly equated these actual historical, or contemporary situations to his state of nature as the empirical proofs of its existence. Yet, it is the exact question that has formed the motive behind the composition of this thesis. The simple purpose of this entire work is to prove, with a faithful adherence to Hobbes’s written word, that his intellectual commitment to the existence of the state of nature was sincere. This disputation will exhaustively consult his own written expressions for theoretical reinforcement of its central principle.

The controversial way a number of these expressions have been treated by some critics of Hobbes’s state of nature, will also be transformed into material for the reinforcement of this thesis. Why the treatment of Hobbes’s written word by certain critics, has been categorised as controversial is well

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<sup>17</sup> Ioannis D. Evrigenis, *Fear of Enemies and Collective Action* (Cambridge: University Press, 2008), 112.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

founded in reason. As the analysis of these detractions shall aspire to convey, the way Hobbes's own word is presented would leave a reader who is less familiar with the original source of these words with the impression that Hobbes doubted the empirical truth of his own thinking.

If Hobbes's written word can be sublimated to end of those seeking the utter discredit of the state of nature as an empirically verifiable reality, the riposte of this thesis to such efforts will be enforced by an even more systematic and fastidious mobilisation of the language Hobbes used in his many descriptions of the state of nature. Due to the fecundity of Hobbes's mind, and his willingness to raise his pen in the recording of his thoughts, there is no deficit of material written concerning the state of nature to be examined within this discourse. To achieve a complete understanding of how Hobbes perceived the state of nature, no text which bears the author's name will be neglected by this investigation. Hobbes's available correspondence will be treated with as much solicitude and gravity as any of the core treatises of his political philosophy. Obscure works situated outside the conventionally recognised Hobbesian political apparatus are to be consulted. For they have within them potential to yield serious fragments of truth about Hobbes's perceptions on the state of nature.

Focusing on the language, and what the implications of this language for any descriptive statement given about the state of nature is the methodological nucleus of this thesis. Hobbes's language, intelligible to us in the form of his written word, is not the mere transcription of one of his thoughts from his mind into a leaf of parchment. It shall be considered as a conscious enactment of his commitment, or disapproval of a specific concept. In this instance: the state of nature. Hobbes for example, stipulated that civil war was one of the many places that the state of nature had manifested<sup>20</sup>. Not only is he affirming the thought by troubling himself to avow it in writing for all to behold. The act of foremost significance is the instruction Hobbes is giving his reader to envision the existence of the state of nature through all occurrences of civil war<sup>21</sup>. This is how the state of nature is able to transcend the epistemic gulf that separates the purely abstract definition of the concept from empirically verifiable reality.

Hobbes saw a profound empirical concurrence between the identifiable characteristics he ascribed to his state of nature, and what he apprehended to be the visible realities of civil war. Hobbes provided many logical conduits for his readers to transpose the state of nature from a purely hypothetical definition into an empirical one. It shall be argued that civil war was the most pertinent

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<sup>20</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan 1651 (Anodos: Dumfries and Galloway, 2017)*, 69.

<sup>21</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, And Chance*. Edited by Sir William Molesworth. (John Bohn: London, 1845), 184.

of them, and thus, the key to exercising the truth of Hobbes's commitment to the existence of the state of nature. Through the living historical context of the English Civil War Period, it shall be asserted that Hobbes gave the state of nature its most realistic and perspicuous expression. When appraised through Hobbes's own interpretations of the Civil Wars, the state of nature ceases to be a hypothetical dimension, governing a hypothetical set of people. It is transmuted into an analytical template of an historically verifiable sequence of events, its fundamental principles fulfilled through the living agency of human beings that inhabited that historical moment.

That Hobbes comprehended the state of nature in this way is no work of artifice, or a fabrication constructed from a set of vaguely coincidental utterances. To Hobbes, the evolution of his state of nature and the escalation of England from political sectionalism into open civil warfare were coterminous with each other. This is particularly explicit from the consistency with which he applied the present tense when describing the Civil Wars in *Leviathan*<sup>22</sup>, and the past tense in later works<sup>23</sup>. By acknowledging the existence of these historical events, the existence of the state of nature is also empirically validated by Hobbes through the correlation he rendered between them. By his advocacy of the present tense, Hobbes fixed the state of nature to an actual point in time. This situated it more substantively within reality, than if he had continued to merely refer to civil war abstractly after conceptually associating it with the state of nature.

A deeper stratum of empirical nuances that potentially exist between the state of nature and civil war shall also be the cynosure of analysis in this thesis. These can be identified by unveiling the interconnection of the two respective systems of causality that Hobbes had formulated for civil war and the state of nature. There are causal links, such as the moment when the sovereign authority of a commonwealth is divided, that Hobbes conceived of a simultaneous manifestation of these two states of human existence<sup>24</sup>. This conceptual, and causational symbiosis had reached an apotheosis in Hobbesian thinking by the time he produced *Behemoth*. The symbiotic connection between the operational principles of the state of nature and what Hobbes took to be the fundamental causes of the English Civil Wars, are exhibited no more sanguinely than in this text<sup>25</sup>. From Hobbes's earlier written material, the deduction that Hobbes provided empirical foundations for the existence of the state of nature through his attitude to civil war shall be consolidated. An examination of *Behemoth* will enable an even more prodigious evolution in the existential capacity of the state of nature to be

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<sup>22</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 10, 12, 69, 102, 111, 382, 386.

<sup>23</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *An Answer To A Book Published By Dr Bramhall, From the English Works of Thomas Hobbes*. (John Bohn: London, 1845), 287.

<sup>24</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 102.

<sup>25</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth*. Edited by Ferdinand Tonnies, (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1990), 108-9.

accomplished. Through his own analysis of the events which preceded the outbreak of civil war in England, Hobbes would disclose the exact point in history that he considered England to have experienced a degeneration back into the state of nature<sup>26</sup>.

It is by elucidating these deductions that Hobbes's sincere intellectual commitment to an empirically verifiable construction of the state of nature can be demonstrated most cogently. Furthermore, why the English Civil War Period, if interpreted through the rigour of Hobbesian logic, can be viewed as the optimal historical context necessary to transfix the state of nature into reality. Thus, by amalgamating Hobbes's perceptions of civil war from a full compendium of his written material, the fallacy that he did not believe in the physical existence of his state of nature can be incontrovertibly subverted.

The first chapter of this thesis shall be comprised of the effort to challenge the interpretive culture that has accumulated over three hundred and fifty years, concerning Hobbes's alleged doubt of the existence of the state of nature. Proponents of this culture, both contemporaries of Hobbes and from modern scholarship shall be confronted by exposing the deficiencies in their interpretations of the state of nature.

In the chapter that shall proceed from this, the importance of Hobbes's application of the present tense to his descriptions of civil war in *Leviathan* shall be discussed. Each instance which Hobbes delivers an inference of civil war in the present tense shall be scrutinized with academic rigour. For many of these references, their pertinence to the English Civil Wars is immediately tangible. Yet some, cloaked by Hobbes in allegory, or some rhetorical flourish, must be submitted to an analytical vivisection to ensure that the deduction of their true meaning is indeed favourable for the thesis.

A survey of the relationship between the state of nature and civil war in the earlier installations of Hobbes's political philosophy will feature in the following section of the thesis. To identify a generation of this connection, that preceded the explicitness with which it was stated by Hobbes in *Leviathan* would be highly profitable.

The subsequent chapter shall witness the analytical initiative of this thesis delve into the private correspondence of our author. Hobbes's recognition and description of the turmoil of England in this correspondence is indispensable. Through its congruence with the wider corpus of Hobbesian political philosophy, two separate contexts of Hobbes's written material are united in concord over a single, pervading theme. The Civil War as an empirical manifestation of the state of nature. Through establishing that there is a positive linguistic continuity maintained by Hobbes in his descriptions of

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<sup>26</sup> Hobbes, *Behemoth*, 102.

civil war in both his public works and his private correspondences, the general credibility of his commitment to this phenomenon as an existential conduit for his state of nature is increased. Or else, the ruminations given by Hobbes within the protective sphere of his private conversation will give the lie to his public declarations about the existence of this symbiotic connection.

In the penultimate chapter of this thesis will be situated the exploration of Hobbes's *Behemoth*, for the reasons articulated in detail above. This chapter will serve as the theoretical coagulant which shall hopefully fuse all of the previous components of this thesis into a functional edifice. After which shall be issued the conclusory remarks of this dissertation.

We shall dispense with the reckless premise that the historical existence of Hobbes's state of nature can be demonstrated beyond the reach of any doubt. Substituting it for a pragmatic assurance that by forming a uniquely Hobbesian perspective, it is then logically acceptable to embrace the possibility that it was constructed upon solid empirical foundations. The formation of this singularly "Hobbesian perspective" will involve the implementation of an analytical regime that adheres strictly to the literal forms of Hobbes's language. Where the absolute veracity of Hobbes's perceptions about the state of nature must be obtained, only the language employed to describe the state of nature in its original form is compatible with this objective.

**2.1) How context is defined within the dimension of this argument and why such a contextual alignment is considered to be the most appropriate for this thesis:**

Is it appropriate for the English Civil War Period to be classified as the historical “context” of Hobbes’s state of nature?

Defined in the most elementary way, “context” appears to be the setting. Either an historical setting, a sequence of events which a general factual consensus has been established upon. Or an intellectual setting, which seeks a meaning for a remark, or an entire text through its linguistic correlation to other culturally relevant written material.

For an example of the first definition, in a timeline of the life of Daniel Defoe, what is happening in England at the time Defoe is recorded to have done something significant in his life is classified as the “historical context”<sup>27</sup>. I.e., the “historical context” of Defoe’s birth in the year of 1660 is the “Restoration of Monarchy”<sup>28</sup>. Though in this index, rather than revealing any meaning in either of the variables, it seems to be merely a statement of what event of historical significance was happening at the time Defoe was born. According to this logic, the civil discord that afflicted England throughout the 1640’s can accurately be defined as the historical context of *Leviathan*. Hobbes himself aligned his text with this sequence of events by consistently referring to the Civil Wars in the present tense throughout it. Even more suggestive, on the final page Hobbes stated that the motive for the whole discourse was his reaction to the Civil Wars, or: “occasioned by the discord of the present times”<sup>29</sup>.

Additional evidence for this contextual alignment is available. In an epistle written to King Charles II after the Restoration, Hobbes spoke of his *Leviathan* as his way of directly intervening in the Civil Wars and as his contribution to the royalist war effort. Hobbes analogised his *Leviathan* as a weapon, wrought for the assailment of the King’s enemies. Hobbes begged the King’s apology if his book had caused any offence. Beseeching the King not to think worse of him for “snatching up all the weapons to fight against your enemies, I lighted upon one that had a double edge”<sup>30</sup>.

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<sup>27</sup> Daniel Defoe, *A Journal of the Plague Year, 1722*, (Penguin: London, 2003), vi.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, vi.

<sup>29</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 386.

<sup>30</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Seven Philosophical Problems and Propositions of Geometry. With An Apology For Himself and His Writings, 1662*. Edited by Sir William Molesworth, (Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans: London, 1845), 6.

This imagery Hobbes of brandishing a double-edged sword, with '*Leviathan*' inscribed along the fuller of the blade toward all professed enemies of the Stuart Monarchy is tantalising. Indeed, this idea that Hobbes commended his political philosophy in defence of all monarchical government is something that Hobbes himself was eager to communicate. Particularly after the Restoration of that form of government to England in 1660.

*Leviathan* Hobbes in his *Verse Life* gave this synopsis of his *Leviathan*'s purpose:

"The Book at London Printed was, and thence, Hath visited the Neighbouring Nations since; was read by many a Great and Learned Man, Known by its dreadful Name *Leviathan*. This Book Contended with all Kings, and they By any Title, who bear royal sway"<sup>31</sup>.

Hobbes fomented his allegiance to the English Monarchy with even more vehemence in the autobiographical '*Considerations upon the Reputation and Manners of Thomas Hobbes*'. Within its pages, Hobbes asserted that he "was the first that had ventured to write in the King's defence"<sup>32</sup> in 1640. Furthermore, Hobbes gave the entire purpose of his writing of *Leviathan* a distinctively royalist motive:

"For it was written in the behalf of those many and faithful servants and subjects of his Majesty, that had taken his part in the war, or otherwise done their utmost endeavour to defend his Majesty's right and person against the rebels"<sup>33</sup>.

The way Hobbes expressed his intent to augment the royalist cause in the turmoil of England during the 1640's is clear enough. However, that all such expressions of intent were conveyed after the Monarchy regained its supremacy in England should be a point of circumspection for any reader. Reminding ourselves of the reasons Hobbes stated in *Leviathan* itself for the composition of that text, the imagery of the double-edged sword wrought to vindicate the cause of the English Monarchy is obfuscated.

If we recall, it was by Hobbes's own admission that the Civil Wars, or the "discord of the present times" was indicated as the imperative behind *Leviathan*. Not, as one might have anticipated in retrospection of the earlier statements of allegiance: "occasioned by the plight of the Monarchy in the present times", for instance. The desire to contend with the King's cause is conspicuous in its absence from the reasoning Hobbes gave for his formation of *Leviathan* in the epistle dedicatory appended to that text. Hobbes stated vaguely that his "endeavour" was to "advance the civill

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<sup>31</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Elements of Law Natural and Politic, With Three Lives*. Edited by J.C.A Gaskin. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994, 259.

<sup>32</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Considerations upon the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners, and Religion of Thomas Hobbes*, Edited by Sir William Molesworth. (London: John Bohn, 1845), 414.

<sup>33</sup> Hobbes, *Considerations*, 420-21.

power”<sup>34</sup>. The King, or the monarchical form of government is not represented in this passage. Of course, if monarchy be the civil power, then the representation is consummated here. But throughout his political philosophy, Hobbes did not confine his definition of a civil power to one mode of government. It could be either a single man, a monarch, or an assembly of men, (a parliament for example)<sup>35</sup>. The truth of this alone ought to compel any reader to question the vehemence of Hobbes’s political allegiance to the Stuart Monarchy.

Nonetheless, registering a preference for either interpretation of Hobbes’s allegiance is not the conclusion which is most advantageous in this situation. Whether Hobbes wrote to contend for this power or that power, is immaterial in the context of this thesis. Hobbes’s acknowledgment of the Civil War as the historical environment which generated the *Leviathan* is the deduction of superlative importance. Furthermore, it is the truth that shall form the basis of the definition of “context” put into operation as the credibility of Hobbes’s belief in the existence of the state of nature is examined later.

By adhering to the Hobbesian definition of history given in *Leviathan*, such a qualification may justly be awarded. If in accordance with Hobbesian decree, “The Register of Knowledge Of Fact is called History”<sup>36</sup>. Making a record of anything one judges to be factual can be considered rudimentary historical practice. Therefore, because the duration of the Civil War Period preceded the composition of *Leviathan* and continued throughout it, the Civil Wars can logically be considered both historical and contemporary contexts for Hobbes’s state of nature. However, the theoretical structures that “context” has been subjected to require some clarification if a definition is to be properly employed in this thesis.

The transformation of the term “context” into the nemesis of any careless historian can be dreadfully swift if they fail to define what exactly they mean as they employ it. Especially among those with their focus upon Hobbes, it can be noted, the definitions given for “context” when relative to a particular area of Hobbesian study are quite eclectic. Regardless of how each of them elects to distinguish their sub-species of context, it can be distilled down to a set of extraneous variables or stimuli. Which they allege are responsible for the formation of a part, or the whole of Hobbes’s philosophical system and consequently give it a meaning as an integrated current within a broader epistemological nexus.

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<sup>34</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan, 1.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid, 96.*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid, 42.*

The definition formulated by Professor Oakeshott comprehended this understanding of context as a stimulus for innovative thinking. He divulged the idea that context can provide stimulation for a thinker, either as a reaction to their experience of an event of singular moment, or as a reflective impulse guided by general intellectual themes<sup>37</sup>. In its most austere form, in relation to a philosophical system, context is “the setting in which its meaning is revealed”<sup>38</sup>.

Preston King for example, betrayed a marked respect for the historical setting as a philosophical decoding instrument: “An acquaintance with the general sequence of events to which these writings were related is essential to an understanding of Hobbesian theory”<sup>39</sup>.

The English Civil War Period was the historical setting illuminated explicitly by John Bowle as the essential context for any attempting to understand Hobbesian theory. It was: “An event which determined his whole outlook in a way which modern thinkers are conditioned by the greater wars our own time”<sup>40</sup>. This fervour for the English Civil War as the elemental force which enabled the seeds of Hobbes’s political consciousness to germinate is reciprocated by two other important interpreters.

Z. Lubienski wrote thus of the civil discord in England: that “all these struggles and controversies made a deep impression on Thomas Hobbes and inspired his political writings”<sup>41</sup>. Furthermore, that: “In all his system it is easy to detect the repercussion of contemporary events”<sup>42</sup>. Jean Hampton concurs upon the point of Hobbes’s receptiveness to the Civil War. “Hobbes’s work” she stated, “was particularly responsive to the political turmoil of his day”<sup>43</sup>.

All of the contributions above maintain a perfect level of harmony with the contextual template fashioned by Oakeshott. Illustrating Hobbesian thought as “springing from an experience of political life”<sup>44</sup>, that is from Hobbes’s own experience of the political turmoil that preceded and persisted throughout the English Civil War Period.

The creed engraved upon the stylus of many of those who wear the contextualist’s robe seems to have been prefigured literally, by none other than Hobbes himself. This is something that is

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<sup>37</sup> Michael Oakeshott, *From the Introduction to the 1946 Edition of Leviathan*, (Basil Blackwell, London and Oxford, 1946), viii-ix.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, viii.

<sup>39</sup> Preston King, *Ideology of Order*, 56.

<sup>40</sup> John Bowle, *Hobbes and His Critics*, 49.

<sup>41</sup> Z Lubienski, *Hobbes’s Philosophy and its Historical Background*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1930), 181.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, 181.

<sup>43</sup> Jean Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1986), 5.

<sup>44</sup> Oakeshott, *Introduction to the 1946 Edition of Leviathan*, ix.

recognised by none other than Quentin Skinner in his *Reply to my critics*<sup>45</sup>. He cited the exact passage from *Elements of Law* which is cited below. By doing so, Skinner appeared to suggest some methodological connection between the way Hobbes strove to deduce meaning from the words he read and the historical contextual practice he himself was associated with.

Hobbes ruminated in *Elements of Law* that:

“It must be extreme hard to find out the opinions and meanings of those men that are gone from us long ago, and have left us no other signification thereof but their books; which cannot possibly be understood without history enough to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without great prudence to observe them”<sup>46</sup>.

Here we see that Hobbes has pre-empted a maxim that has been endorsed fiercely by practitioners of modern historical research. That an understanding of the times in which an author lived, the events that unfolded and the people who contributed to that intellectual milieu; can be a viable way of revealing the meaning behind the words that they commended to posterity.

Skinner gave a remarkably similar exposition of what he meant by, and what the utility was of “historical contexts” in *Reason and Rhetoric*:

“There are many elements in Hobbes’s science of politics that we have no hope of explicating unless we pay attention to the circumstances out of which they arose”<sup>47</sup>. Skinner’s contextual focus is quite versatile. On the first hand, he embraces what he calls the intellectual context. Namely “linguistic techniques”<sup>48</sup> and “rhetorical doctrines”<sup>49</sup> within “Renaissance culture”<sup>50</sup> as essential to understand if one is to successfully “contextualise”<sup>51</sup> Hobbes’s thought. But much later in the discourse, considerable credit is granted to the English Civil War Period as an equally powerful formative influence upon the conscious imperative taken by Hobbes to drastically reform his fundamental approach to civil philosophy.

Skinner explained:

“It was in consequence of brooding in the 1640’s about the causes of the English Civil War that he felt obliged to reconsider his views about the place of Rhetoric in public debate. He first hints at this

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<sup>45</sup> James Tully and Quentin Skinner, *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1988), 235.

<sup>46</sup> Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, 76-77.

<sup>47</sup> Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996), 10.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid*, 6

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid*, 7.

explanation in *Leviathan*, but it is in *Behemoth*- on the causes and course of the revolution- that he indicates most fully what prompted him to change his mind about the relations between reason and rhetoric, and hence about the idea of a civil science”<sup>52</sup>.

Therefore, according to Skinner’s interpretation, the intellectual traditions typically affiliated with the Renaissance culture prevalent at the time, and the setting of the English Civil War Period are both valid historical contexts to situate the development of Hobbes’s political consciousness within.

Professor James Tully, a friend and Cambridge contemporary of Skinner provided a succinct summary of Skinner’s approach to historical contextualism:

“That to understand a text it is necessary to understand it as a complex of linguistic actions and thus to recover what the author was doing in writing it- the text’s “point” or “force”- by placing it in its convention-governed linguistic context”<sup>53</sup>.

At a later point in the same text, Skinner himself would expand upon the meaning of his contextual approach substantially. Regarding “major works of moral and political philosophy”<sup>54</sup>, Skinner declared that:

“My own concern, however, has solely been with the question of how best to approach such works if our aim is to recover their historical identity. I have exclusively been concerned, that is, with how we should proceed if we wish to gain an understanding of the utterances that go to make up such texts, and hence an understanding what their authors may have been saying and doing in issuing just those utterances. To put the point more polemically, I have sought to argue that, if our aim is to acquire this understanding, we have no option to but to adopt an historical and intertextual approach”<sup>55</sup>.

In the extract taken from *Elements of Law*, Hobbes like Skinner above considered the texts (“books”) and the utterances they are comprised of (“significations”) as insufficient ways within themselves to understanding what their authors were possibly saying and doing (the opinions and meanings of those men”) in the writing of them. Hobbes seemed to endorse what Skinner labelled as an “historical approach” when he spoke of the indispensability of historical knowledge (“history enough”) of the “circumstances” which caused these texts and utterances to be written.

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid*, 431.

<sup>53</sup> *Tully and Skinner, Meaning and Context*, 4.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, 232.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 232.

Hobbes appeared to lament the obliqueness of human communication when he wrote that “words be the sign we have of one another’s opinions and intentions”<sup>56</sup>. Whether these words were spoken or transcribed onto paper, to Hobbes, they were unreliable marks of what was meant or intended by those who issued such words. If Hobbes thought words were capable in themselves of conveying meaning and intention efficiently, the exhortation he made to his readers to examine the history and circumstances of the words we hear and read would not have been present in his discourse.

However, there is very little in this passage from *Elements* to suggest that Hobbes favoured an “intertextual” as well as an “historical” approach. Nevertheless, his use of the word “circumstances” may provide a tenuous link to what Skinner defined as “intertextual”. The influence of a contemporary or an historical text cannot be excluded when interpreting what Skinner means when explaining the “circumstances out of which” a work of political philosophy “arose”. When specifying the influence of Renaissance Culture, its attendant linguistic techniques and rhetorical doctrines on Hobbes’s political thought, Skinner is indicating various formative “circumstances” chiefly to be found within the books Hobbes would have had at his disposal.

Skinner ruminated that in seeking to understand the meaning of certain texts, the pursuit of this understanding “may carry us far beyond the works themselves and the intellectual milieu within which they were conceived”. This going “beyond the works themselves” into other relevant texts is a forthright definition of what Skinner perhaps meant by an “intertextual approach”. The citation of another text during the explication of a principle is the most conspicuous mark available to signify that an “intertextual” approach to political philosophy is being exercised. Though not a citation in the modern sense, Hobbes felt compelled to travel beyond his own native reasoning when endeavouring to define the consequences of divided sovereign power in *Elements of Law* by referencing the “Lib. II. Chap. I. De Republica”<sup>57</sup> of Jean Bodin. In concurring from Bodin (“we must confess with Bodin”), in approving the definition of civil states with sovereign power divided between two or more political entities not as commonwealths but “the corruption of commonwealths”, Hobbes demonstrated a willingness to “go beyond” his own text and reasoning to develop his philosophical system.

Skinner was similarly adamant about the indispensability of achieving an understanding of the historical and intellectual circumstances which contributed to the formation of philosophical texts. We have “no option” but to advocate a historical and intertextual approach. We have “no hope of explicating” many elements of Hobbes’s political philosophy without an understanding of the

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<sup>56</sup> *Hobbes, Elements of Law*, 76.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid*, 167.

circumstances from which they arose. Nevertheless, it was exactly this approach which would be contested by another practitioner of historical contextualism who believed this method warranted significant modification.

Jeffrey Collins's interpretation of context is worthy of distinction in this summary, and it is one that is more closely analogous to the contextual model that will be implemented throughout this discourse. Jeffrey Collins openly declared that his work was a "contextual study"<sup>58</sup>. However, in the same breath he also announced that it was his intention to depart from the traditional definitions and method of the "Cambridge School of contextualist intellectual history"<sup>59</sup>. Naming Skinner as one of the paragons of this discursive regime, Collins expressed his views about the limitations of a mode of contextualism that focused purely on uncovering the "linguistic paradigms"<sup>60</sup> surrounding a philosophical text.

Collins lamented of the Cambridge School that: "They are less interested in viewing texts as artefacts of a given, and often more chronologically and geographically bounded, historical moment"<sup>61</sup>.

It appears at first to be Collins's emphasis on seeking the significance of a text within its "chronologically and geographically bounded, historical moment" which places him at variance with the contextualism of Skinner. Here Collins's desire to integrate Hobbes's thought within the intellectual milieu of the English Civil War Period is crucial. Collins's intention, as he plainly stated, was to bind texts, in this case, those of Hobbes, to a compounded and distinct historical moment. When we are informed by Skinner of the necessity he feels when seeking the meaning within philosophical texts to "go beyond the intellectual milieu within which they were conceived", we recognise that he has no intention to bind the extent of his search chronologically or geographically. From this, it seems clear that identifying a compacted historical moment, like the English Civil War Period, is not going to be of primary importance to Skinner in his quest to understand Hobbes's thought.

Crucially, for Collins, this "historical moment" was the English Civil War<sup>62</sup>. The ultimate purpose of his research, he confirmed, was to deliver a systematic accounting of the works of Thomas Hobbes as "artefacts of the English Revolution"<sup>63</sup>. Regarding his methodology, Collins explained that he did not intend to fully dispense with the analytical model configured by the Cambridge School. Crediting

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<sup>58</sup> Jeffrey Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2005), 8.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid*, 57.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

them with the development of a “sound hermeneutical method”<sup>64</sup>, one which was still very much compatible with his design. It would appear that Collins sought to strike an equilibrium between the venerable, but limited Cambridge style, and his own amalgam of “perhaps more traditional” historical hermeneutical practices<sup>65</sup>. “Some linguistic or intellectual contextualisation” would constitute a valuable part of his strategy<sup>66</sup>.

But Collins recognised that a coherent synthesis of the works of Thomas Hobbes and the English Civil War could not be fully achieved without “research into the political and religious history of the English Revolution itself”<sup>67</sup>. Collins’s variant of contextualism is made substantively more appropriate within the setting of this thesis because of the conclusions he was able to derive from the application of it. Pertaining specifically to the relationship between Hobbes’s intellectual development and the Civil War.

He stated categorically that, “The production and reception of Hobbes’s work were determined by the events of the English Revolution”<sup>68</sup>. Furthermore, how Hobbes’s “main works of political thought responded to the pressure of events”<sup>69</sup>.

A word must be committed in defence of Skinner however, against what is a measured but unjustified condemnation from Collins. As has been sufficiently demonstrated in the earlier treatment of Skinner’s contextualism, he did allocate a great degree of significance to the “historical moment” of the English Civil War as an imperative for the development of Hobbes’s thinking. Furthermore, by appraising Skinner’s work in binding elements of the Leviathan to the Engagement Controversy, he revealed that his search for philosophical meaning could be more historically and geographically bounded than Collins appeared to be willing to concede him credit for. In chapter ten of his *Visions of Politics*, Skinner sought to explain that one of Hobbes’s “aims in Leviathan”<sup>70</sup> was to “contribute precisely”<sup>71</sup> to the debate about the legitimacy of sovereignty acquired by conquest, or what he defined as “de facto power”<sup>72</sup>.

The theory of the Leviathan as a Hobbesian intervention in the Engagement Controversy after October 1649 is a point where the thought of Collins begins to blend with that of Skinner. Preponderantly, Collin’s reception of Skinner’s Engagement Controversy conceptualisation is

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<sup>64</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid*, 57.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid*, 59.

<sup>70</sup> Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Hobbes and Civil Science*, (Cambridge: University Press, 2002), 289.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid*, 289.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid*, 289.

welcoming. He lauded the articles from the early 1970's in which Skinner first began to postulate Hobbes's involvement in the debate surrounding the Oath of Engagement, calling them "pathbreaking"<sup>73</sup>. He continued his praise, acknowledging the view that Hobbes writing *Leviathan* within the context of the Engagement Controversy has proven "enormously influential"<sup>74</sup>. However, between Collins and Skinner, when concerning the true nature of Hobbes's intervention in the "English Revolution", it appears the cognitive blending was never destined to be more than moderate. To Collins, it was Professor Skinner's chronic negligence of the religious questions Hobbes was fundamentally engaged with that rendered his "otherwise pre-eminent scholarship"<sup>75</sup> on Hobbes "insufficient"<sup>76</sup>.

Contextualising the political thought of Hobbes within the English Revolution purely through the conduit of the Engagement Controversy, "though not incorrect"<sup>77</sup> to Collins, this conclusion "failed to fully excavate the political leanings" of Hobbes because "it has failed to grasp the fundamentally religious nature of the Hobbesian project"<sup>78</sup>. It was the oblivion that Skinner treated the religious concerns of Hobbes in his research that was his "major failure"<sup>79</sup> to Collins. Through contextualising Hobbes through his intervention in the Engagement controversy, Skinner may indeed be credited with integrating Hobbesian thought within a more historically and geographically bounded moment. But to Collins, the criticism of Skinner's contextualism was less disparaging of the method employed by Skinner, but of the extent to which he was willing to employ it in revealing all aspects of Hobbes's political thought.

Though both define the Civil War as a tenable historical context for Hobbes's political philosophy, neither attend very well at all upon how the escalation of war effected the conceptual evolution of the state of nature. A theme which will be explored in minute detail at a later point in this argument.

Professor Ioannis Evrigenis described what he believed "context" to mean before he began his exegesis of Hobbesian political philosophy in *Images of Anarchy*. Evrigenis signalled his second exposition of the Hobbesian system for the exact reason which he began his earlier work: to fortify the self-evident truth of Hobbes's state of nature. Nevertheless, advancing merely a single page into the prefatory chapter, reveals that a gradual metamorphosis in the previously uncompromising perspective on the state of nature had occurred for Evrigenis.

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<sup>73</sup> Collins, *The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes*, 2.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

He now felt compelled to “wonder whether such a condition” as the state of nature truly “existed”<sup>80</sup>. To ask: “if so, where, when, and for whom”<sup>81</sup>. Furthermore, to conduct a surgical exploration of “Hobbes’s explicit claims regarding the state of nature”<sup>82</sup>. These are now all determined by Professor Evrigenis to be “reasonable”<sup>83</sup> axis on which to set a logical course to interrogate the veracity of Hobbes’s state of nature.

Evrigenis explained the meaning of context and its relative utility in a way that is visibly concurrent with both Hobbes and Skinner:

“If authors respond to their historical settings, then closer attention to those settings should yield greater detail about the stimuli and motives behind the composition of any particular text. This closer focus seems especially apt in the case of Hobbes since it provides a prima facie explanation for his many variations on the theme of civil philosophy; it must be that the differences in his political works are the result of Hobbes response to changing circumstances, and the period that encompasses these works was sufficiently eventful to justify the publication of several different treatises in a relatively short period of time”<sup>84</sup>.

Between all three expositions of context that have been examined, “circumstances” form the basic anatomy of each definition. Fortunately, Evrigenis as with Skinner, imputed much formative responsibility to the English Civil War. However, there is greater advantage to be found within the interpretation made by Evrigenis. In light of the focus of this thesis on the symbiotic relationship between the state of nature and the Civil War, he seems particularly animated by the escalation into Civil War as the instigating force underpinning the incorporation of civil war into the Hobbesian spectrum of state of nature causation<sup>85</sup>.

Even before the outbreak of open warfare in England, Evrigenis charged the “growing political unrest in England” with exerting a transformative influence upon the aspect of Hobbes’s state of nature<sup>86</sup>. Making the “tone of the work distinctively more sinister”<sup>87</sup>. Nevertheless, he does not fail to recognise that Hobbes had not, either in *Elements of Law*, or *De Cive*, created the explicit link between civil war and the state of nature that was so incandescently displayed in the *Leviathan*<sup>88</sup>.

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<sup>80</sup> Ioannis D. Evrigenis, *Images of Anarchy: The Rhetoric and Science in Hobbes’s State of Nature*, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2014), 2.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid*, 2.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, 2.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, 2.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid*, 194-5.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid*, 88.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, 87.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid*, 194.

Evrigenis, in perfect synchronicity with the central premise of this thesis, concluded that it was the exact chronological alignment of *Leviathan's* composition with the continuity of the Civil War that made it the most historically appropriate context in which to situate Hobbes's state of nature.

As he explained: "By 1651, civil war was a much more pertinent and persuasive example than it would have been in 1640. There can be little doubt that there is some truth to this, but between the early events in England and the ongoing Thirty Years War on the continent, Hobbes already had sufficient grounds for invoking the spectre of civil war even as early as 1642, but certainly by the publication of *De Cive* in 1647"<sup>89</sup>.

Evrigenis articulates perfectly why the English Civil War Period has been selected as the historical context in order to properly validate the existence of the state of nature. Civil war is a "much more powerful and relevant example" than any other Hobbes has advanced, because he is "referring to a state of affairs that his readers were still experiencing first hand"<sup>90</sup>.

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid*, 194-5.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid*, 147.

### **3) Exposing and refuting the interpretive culture surrounding Hobbes's alleged doubt in the existence of the state of nature:**

#### **3.1) Revealing an interpretive culture within modern Hobbesian scholarship:**

If the revelation foretold by Professor Evrigenis at the beginning of this discourse were such a certainty, why would Kinch Hoekstra exhort readers to discern whether Hobbes had intended the examples he formulated for the existence of his state of nature to be viewed as merely hypothetical "illustrations" or sincere empirical "instantiations"<sup>91</sup>? Hoekstra presents the achievement of proper understanding about Hobbes's own belief in the existence of his state of nature as a fundamental procedure. An analytical phase which cannot be circumvented in the ultimate effort to determine whether or not Hobbes's state of nature has any true existential merit.

Did not Hobbes himself allow the seeds of doubt to take root by his confession that: "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, not condition of Warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so"<sup>92</sup>.

This seemingly flagrant affirmation of Hobbes's own denial has been exploited to devastating effect by critics such as Preston King and Glen Newey, Stuart Sim and David Walker. The aforementioned quotation is cited in that exact form by each of these scholars in the course of their separate refutations. It is classified by them as the incontrovertible proof that Hobbes did not consider his state of nature to have existed at all. Nevertheless, it is only Hobbes's own conviction on the matter of his state of nature that Sim and Walker upbraided. They bizarrely proceeded to argue strongly in favour of both historical and contemporary interpretations of the state of nature. Newey and King, however, occupy the opposite pole of the contention. Surmounting their own private dismissal of the existential validity of the state of nature, with what they have construed as Hobbes's own admission of denial.

Stuart Sim and his colleague David Walker, for instance, arrived at the highly relevant conclusion that: "As the Civil War demonstrated, the state of nature can re-assert itself with very little

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<sup>91</sup> Kinch Hoekstra, *Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind. From chapter four of the Cambridge Companion to Hobbes's Leviathan*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007), 118.

<sup>92</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan*, 69.

warning”<sup>93</sup>. The expectation that some compelling evidence would be included with this judgement to demonstrate how exactly the “Civil War demonstrated” how the state of nature could re-assert itself with very little warning, was disappointed. Maeve McKeown most propitiously granted the Civil War status as “empirical evidence”, appointed by Hobbes to bolster the existence of the state of nature<sup>94</sup>. But without establishing how Hobbes personal experience of the state of nature and the Civil War correlated, how can the classification of “empirical” be rationally applied to this evidence? Like Sim and Walker, McKeown neglected to substantiate her assertion of the English Civil Wars as “empirical evidence” of Hobbes’s state of nature with any reasoning beyond the statement of the hypothesis.

From Hoekstra, only similar partial ratification can be obtained. In his reading of the matter, the example of the Civil Wars were propagated by Hobbes to “persuade those who would question the very existence this condition of war”<sup>95</sup>. Confirming that it is the state of nature which Hobbes determines to be a “genuine condition of war”<sup>96</sup>, when passed through the lens of his perception of the Civil War. Stipulating that: “There can be no doubt that Hobbes’s thought was shaped by accounts of, and by his own experience of civil war”<sup>97</sup>. This is indeed a conclusive remark, one that is charged with the anticipation of some substantiation to be made to strengthen this proposition with empirical proof. Yet with no intelligible token given that Hobbes sublimated either these “accounts”, or his “experience” into his comprehension of the state of nature’s existence, the effort to contextualise the state of nature here is built upon sedimentary foundations.

However much intellectual weight is amassed behind the acknowledgment of this hypothesis, neither of these tributaries convey any matter of empirical value. What must be incorporated into the algorithm are historically verifiable moments, which will indicate an acute level of epistemological congruity between the state of nature and the English Civil War. However, a remark made by Helen Thornton possesses an edge keen enough to make a proper incision into the anatomy of this conundrum:

“For Hobbes the state of nature was a logical account of the origins of society, but it was also a constantly recurring possibility, because it was in any period of time in which a society lacked a

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<sup>93</sup> Stuart Sim and David Walker, David, *The Discourse of Sovereignty: Hobbes To Fielding*. (Ashgate, 2003), 22.

<sup>94</sup> Maeve Kckeown, *The Naturall Condition of Mankind*, (*European Journal of Political Theory*, 2019)

<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1474885118809602>.

<sup>95</sup> Hoekstra, *Hobbes on the Natural Condition of Mankind*, 111.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid*, 118.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*, 114.

common power to keep it in order. As Edwin Curley has pointed out, this was a description of England during the 1640's<sup>98</sup>.

Subscribing to a multi-dimensional variant of the state of nature strikes a greater accord with Hobbes's original design. Agreement to making such an adjustment is voiced Adrian Blau, who accused those who defined the state of nature in purely theoretical terms of committing a "simplification" of the actual reality of the concept<sup>99</sup>. "Hobbes sees civil war as one example of a state of nature"<sup>100</sup>. "Civil war means a state of nature"<sup>101</sup>. The point that is being emphatically made is that treating the state of nature as a rigid hypothetical construction will merely result in its universal inapplicability with historically verifiable contexts. As an amorphous and eminently adaptable concept, the derivation of the state of nature from a logical or abstract process does not diminish its potential utility as a descriptive mechanism for a selected historical reality.

Thornton's assessment can yield the variable necessary to begin the prosecution of the historically empirical truth Hobbes grounded his state of nature within. The "lack of a common power" or sovereign authority, is inferred by Thornton as a reciprocated characteristic that made her identification of the Civil War as a sincere instantiation of Hobbes state of nature possible<sup>102</sup>. Though the correlation she gave was little more than a footnote, it is a firm basis for more vigorous inquisition. It will be the business of another chapter to fully elaborate on the profound importance of the position Hobbes accorded for sovereignty. However, it is prudent to state now that the issue of divided sovereign authority is one of the most powerful contextual adhesives we can reply upon in the construction of this thesis.

This is why Evrigenis was in great error when he asserted that questioning the veracity of Hobbes's own belief in his state of nature was immaterial. Consequently, why Hoekstra is more than justified in his demand for those who are testing the existential credibility of the state of nature to understand that defining Hobbes's own belief is a logical prerequisite. As demonstrated above, the schism of Hobbes's alleged unbelief is a withering toxin capable of imperilling any argument made in the defence of the state of nature's existential credibility.

Unfortunately, the notion that Hobbes himself believed in the historical existence of his state of nature appears to have been extinguished with the assistance of precisely selected textual evidence. Regarding such a proposition with anything less than incredulity is challenging, especially when such

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<sup>98</sup> Helen Thornton, *The State of Nature or Eden*. (University of Rochester Press, Rochester, 2005), 1.

<sup>99</sup> Adrian Blau, *Hobbes on Corruption*. From Volume 30 of *History of Political Thought*. (Imprint Academic Limited, 2009), 12.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

<sup>102</sup> Thornton, *State of Nature or Eden*, 74.

remorseless hermeneutical rigour is applied in the procurement of remarkably compelling evidence against it. Fatally so, antagonism of the linguistic culture that has been raised in opposition will appear ever more formidable. This is once we reach the awareness that its very creative tissue is fashioned from the contradictory utterances emitted from, as it were, Hobbes's own mouth.

The first remonstrance to be appraised is from Preston King. In his *'The Ideology of Order'*, King enlisted the word of none other than Hobbes himself to ensure that the integrity of his own castigation made against the state of nature was supported by the strongest benefactor possible:

'As for those who maintained that "There was never such a time, nor condition of war" as Hobbes described, Hobbes agreed with them: "I believe it was never generally so"<sup>103</sup>.

King concluded unequivocally that Hobbes's state of nature is "not intended as a point in time"<sup>104</sup>, or as a "historical age"<sup>105</sup>. Indeed, with Hobbes's own judgement as the primary interlocutor of this deduction, the conclusion offered by King bears every accolade of propriety. Such utterances as referenced by King can be traced to the thirteenth chapter of Hobbes's *Leviathan*, where the authenticity of his citations may be proven.

The second remonstrance, in which Hobbes himself may be found as the key witness for the defence is within the *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes*, composed by Glen Newey. Newey, as with his contemporary King, launched a succinct but withering diatribe against the state of nature. He, in accord with the previous detractor, exploited "the view that Hobbes intended the state of nature to be seen as historically real" as the fatal weakness for any attempt to justify the existence of the state of nature<sup>106</sup>.

"But it is fairly clear that Hobbes does not think that the state of nature persisted in England at the time he was writing. He also says that the state of nature "never generally" existed"<sup>107</sup>.

Here, there can be detected a visible difference in Newey's riposte, when contrasted with that of King. An additional layer to the contention is presented. Newey not only denies any credibility to the general existence of Hobbes's state of nature, but conducts a marked assault upon one of the chief examples advanced by Hobbes to prove that such a condition was historically relevant: The English Civil War. Destroying the English Civil War as viable historical setting for Hobbes's state of nature

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<sup>103</sup> Preston King, *The Ideology of Order*, (Alden Press: Oxford, 1974), 189.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid*, 189.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid*, 189.

<sup>106</sup> Glen Newey, *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan*, (Routledge: London, 2008), 103.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid*, 103.

was a guileful strategy, completing his broader initiative to discredit the Civil War as an invigorating force behind the formation of *Leviathan*.

Earlier in his text, Newey stipulated in reference to the Civil War that Hobbes: “does not show that the leading ideas in *Leviathan* were produced by those disorders, in the sense that the ideas would have been radically different or not have come into being at all without them”<sup>108</sup>.

Indeed, as can be readily apprehended above, Newey obtained the necessary consolidation for his deductions with a condensed, but nonetheless accurate implementation of textual evidence. Both notions: that the state of nature was historically real, and that the English Civil War exerted any creative force over its construction are simultaneously repressed.

The remonstrance disclosed by Stuart Sim and David Walker can be distinguished from the two previously interrogated. All accounts are resolved upon the point that Hobbes doubted the existence of his state of nature. Despite this consistency, Sim and Walker in their collaborative piece react positively to the historical existence of the state of nature. They found the English Civil War to be the ideal context in which the state of nature can be brought to life.

Nevertheless, Sim and Walker, though convinced they alone have discovered the optimal historical reality for the state of nature, make no accommodation over the question of Hobbes’s own belief:

“It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of warre as this; and I believe it was never generally so”<sup>109</sup>.

Thus, we have an inference taken from Hobbes’s own lexicon. Another textually verifiable instance in which a thinker, should they desire it, can succinctly dispel any notion that Hobbes believed in the existence of his state of nature through the agency of the primary text, and of Hobbes himself. The futility of defending such a position is quite literally illuminated in black and white. Certainly, it is amplified by the fact that Hobbes’s own utterances can be shaped into the logical conduits through which these allegations can be rationalised. However, the true *Gottterdammerung* for the illusory concept of Hobbes’s own belief in the existence of the state of nature is narrated by Samuel Mintz, with the finality of a death sentence:

“And so Hobbes’s account of the state of nature is not to be taken as historical: it is a generalisation from his theory of the passions. Hobbes thought that he could detect some near approaches to the state of nature in history- for instance, in the social disorder attending civil war, or in the prefatory habits of one nation against another, or in the deplorable conditions of life in America. But these

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<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

<sup>109</sup> *Sim and Walker, Hobbes to Fielding*, 22.

serve only to confirm, not to establish, the theory, which depends in the first place upon correct reasoning from the definitions of the passions. The state of nature is the logical extreme of society without law. It is neither a historical picture nor a practical guide to conduct”<sup>110</sup>.

Mintz, it is true, relies solely upon the force of his own deductive reasoning, wholly undiluted by any inference made to Hobbes from the text. Nevertheless, the basis of his conviction over the certainty of Hobbes’s own disbelief is derived from the same linguistic ancestry as the opprobrious triumvirate considered earlier. This is the exact passage within the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan* containing Hobbes’s vast taxonomy of state of nature examples referenced twice before. The entire sequence of examples he defines as the articulation of “near approaches to the state of nature in history” both in his judgement and that of Hobbes.

The attitude of Professor Ioannis Evrigenis toward the matter of Hobbes’s own belief in his state of nature has experienced an evolution. It has been observed, in the six years that had elapsed between the production of *Fear of Enemies and Collective Action* in 2008 and *Images of Anarchy* in 2014, his willingness to interact with such an issue became more pronounced. What was once rebuked as not the “real question” those investigating the existential possibilities of the state of nature should consult, developed into the “reasonable” point of ingress into the heart of the matter.

In the essay he contributed to the 2016 *Oxford University Companion to Hobbes*, Evrigenis was driven to confront the question of Hobbes’s unbelief with an assiduity never before witnessed in any previous treatment he had accorded it. He located the linguistic axis on which he understood the true veracity of the question to be balanced: the passage that contained Hobbes’s taxonomy of examples from the thirteenth chapter of the *Leviathan*.

There was an addendum to the passage which had not been included in any citation provided by the critics examined above. One which if read in conjunction with the former, was impressive enough to disabuse any who were lead by it to believe Hobbes doubted the existence of the state of nature.

Evrigenis spoke of this fragment: “Over all the world, but there are many places where they live so now”<sup>111</sup>

Certainly, by omitting this crucial part from the citation, Hobbes can be manipulated into giving his categorical affirmation that the state of nature did not and had never existed. Were this fragment present only in the manuscript of *Leviathan*, but subject to erasure before dispatch to the

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<sup>110</sup> Samuel I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan*, (Cambridge University Press: 1962), 32-33.

<sup>111</sup> Ioannis D. Evrigenis, *The State of Nature, From The Oxford Handbook to Hobbes*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016), 231-232.

publication company, the position of those who have maintained Hobbes's doubt upon the existence of the state of nature would have been a cogent one. Nevertheless, its presence in the commercially distributed copy of *Leviathan* betrays the finality and insolubility of Hobbes's judgement on the matter. Such a lucid revelation, as it were, coming from Hobbes's own mouth, causes the supposed textually verifiable truth projected by the Hobbesian detractors considered earlier to degenerate into a precarious conjecture. Thus, with the revelation that the premise of Hobbes's disbelief in the state of nature was secured with the misinterpretation of primary source material, questioning the feasibility of these interpretations of Hobbes's state of nature seems like a thoroughly rational decision.

When transcribed from the text in the complete form Hobbes provided, it reads: "It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now"<sup>112</sup>.

Showing that any who have the diligence to attend upon Hobbes's word properly, that Hobbes did indeed concede to a measure of doubt concerning the existence of his state of nature. His doubt proceeding from the impossibility of it having extended "over all the world", i.e., having been a typical experience for every living person at any point in human history. What Hobbes did indisputably assert was that in the moment he wrote those very words, there were many people, in many places in the world, for whom he believed that the state of nature was a living reality. In all places, as Evrigenis correctly indicated, where people and civil societies "degenerate into a civile Warre"<sup>113</sup>.

Evrigenis, as it has been established by research already conducted into his work, is an uncompromising curator of the belief that the English Civil War Period is the best litmus test for the historical existence of Hobbes's state of nature. This was a categorical imperative which he felt obliged to reiterate with force in his work of 2016. His judgment delivered in this work is worthy of a full citation so that its exemplary compelling power may be witnessed:

"Hobbes's second example strikes closer to home. The readers wishing to imagine what life in anarchy would be like need no more than consider the fate of those who used to live in peace, under a single government, and who have descended into a civil war. If an encounter with the savages of America was an unlikely prospect for most of Hobbes's readers, the Civil War which had occasioned

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<sup>112</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 69.

<sup>113</sup> Evrigenis, *The Oxford Handbook to Hobbes*. 232

Hobbes political treatises at home and the Thirty Years War on the Continent would have left readers in little doubt that, the state of nature existed and could manifest itself at any moment”<sup>114</sup>.

The logic by which such a conclusion was deduced, Evrigenis attributed to the passage from *Leviathan* in which Hobbes so clearly communicated his understanding that the state of nature was, to him, both an historical and contemporary occurrence.

A more pragmatic assessment, bearing some kinship with that of Evrigenis, can be obtained from Professor Howard Warrender. Warrender would avow himself an opponent of an interpretation of the state of nature that would grant it any historical existence. Warrender favoured a predominantly “logical”<sup>115</sup> rather than a historical explanation for the origins of the state of nature. Stipulating that it “is essentially the product of logical construction and analysis”<sup>116</sup>.

Nevertheless, the force of his resolve is moderated by his recognition that this perception of the state of nature was not fundamentally shared by Hobbes himself. By citing the passage from the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan* in its unabbreviated form, Warrender registered his acknowledgement of the fact that Hobbes envisioned more than logical origins and applications for his state of nature.

From: “It may peradventure be thought, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they live so now”<sup>117</sup>. Warrender deduced that Hobbes was prepared to “cite current examples of domestic and international anarchy to show that his postulate has instances and potential application”<sup>118</sup>.

Thus, once again, with the application of that crucial passage concerning the existence of the state of nature from the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan*, a firmer understanding of how Hobbes truly perceived the capacity of this condition to exist is secured. Warrender, who sought to contend against an empirically verifiable definition of Hobbes’s state of nature, could have truncated the source material to carry his point forward with Hobbes’s support.

Professor Warrender, with his precise treatment of Hobbes’s written material has allowed to be exhibited once more the truth that Hobbes’s commitment to the existence of the state of nature was articulated through his knowledge of the contemporary disorders of his time. Pre-eminently, the “domestic anarchy” of the Civil Wars in England.

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<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, 232

<sup>115</sup> Howard Warrender, *Political Philosophy of Hobbes*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1957), 238-40.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid*, 238.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*, 240.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid*, 240.

Neither Glen Newey, Preston King, nor Stuart Sim and David Walker can be said to have demonstrated an awareness of the state of nature which gave credence to Hobbes's original design. The treatment of Hobbes's state of nature that these critics chose to endorse involved the omission of a crucial segment of a passage from *Leviathan*, which when displayed in its entirety conveyed a truth to which they were truculently opposed. Within their examinations, they desired to portray a Thomas Hobbes who was at variance with the very idea that the state of nature he postulated could exist beyond the pages it had been printed. However, reality proved to be the ultimate antithesis to this misguided illustration. Hobbes's word in its unabbreviated form, the form which was emphasised by Professors Evrigenis and Warrender, communicated that the only element of doubt Hobbes entertained about the empirical existence of the state of nature was its extent.

Nevertheless, that is not to declare that the interpretations challenged above are devoid of meaning or utility in the context of this discussion. Their weaknesses demonstrate profoundly that without a faithful adherence to the written word of Thomas Hobbes, some hypotheses advanced about his state of nature can only become a convincing, but ineluctably hollow similitude of truth. The citations provided by these critics were textually correct, but they were not complete. In neglecting to provide citations which had not maintained the original format of the source, the propositions reinforced by them are highly dubious. It is clear that the state of nature can only be divorced from reality in Hobbes's mind if fundamental expressions of his mind, in form of his written word are divorced from the text when interpreting it.

The participation of Samuel Mintz in the interpretive culture constructed around Hobbes's alleged doubt in the existence of the state of nature cannot escape scrutiny. It is true, from the investigation into his ruminations upon the state of nature, that he did not directly employ any corrupted variant of Hobbes's word in the exposition of his views. Nevertheless, he nourished the aberration of Hobbes's alleged doubt by failing to properly define the operational function of the examples Hobbes provided. By affixing the term "near approaches" to what were actually expressed as genuine empirical classifications of the state of nature, Mintz like the other detractors injected another distorted rendition of Hobbes's own belief into literary circulation. Assurance may be obtained from Hobbes himself, by a simple recourse to the text, that he did not consider his examples to be "near approaches" to the state of nature. They were his reflections upon the experience of many interconnected realities he knew to be unfolding in his world, in "many places", not in some hypothetical continuum of events, but "now".



### **3.2) An exegesis of some contemporary reactions to Hobbes's state of nature:**

#### **The reaction of Sir Robert Filmer to the Hobbesian state of nature:**

The phase of the investigation concluded above has unveiled quite a vibrant culture of apostasy surrounding the matter of Hobbes personal conviction in the existence of the state of nature. It is with sincere hope, that the inadequacy of the method employed in the promotion of such a culture has been decisively revealed. Thus far, survey of the examples of this kind of textual misinterpretation have been confined to those which came into being within the last half century. It was both exciting and troubling to discover that the origination of the method involving the sublimation of Hobbes's own written word against him to refute the existence of the state of nature, could be traced back to a time when *Leviathan* and the modern English state were both in their infancy.

The critique formulated by Sir Robert Filmer shall be the first of the contemporary dissensions from Hobbes's state of nature to be examined. Filmer begins by asserting that the state of nature is precluded by the patriarchal sovereign authority vested within every father over his family<sup>119</sup>. Rather astutely, Filmer reinforces his point by redirecting a proviso of Hobbes's own making: that in the state of nature fathers possess an absolutely sovereignty over their own families. Filmer does not provide a citation in the modern sense, but the reference he makes can be verified from the text.

Within the *Leviathan*, Hobbes does indeed declare: "For the Father being before the Institution of Common-wealths, absolute sovereigns in their own families"<sup>120</sup>.

On this point, it would seem that a practicable argument for the exclusion of a state of nature as the pre-political condition of humankind can be founded. Therein languishes Filmer's first blunder. Hobbes did not only visualise his state of nature as a condition people suffered before the ordinance of civil societies. It was also engineered as a post-political state, when states once peaceful, degenerated into civil war. It is the post-political aspect of the state of nature which Sir R.F utterly fails to elaborate upon. For a critique of Hobbes's state of nature to be truly incisive, an examination must be conducted upon each of the many examples Hobbes provides. Regarding that made by Filmer, he accosted but one example: that of the primitive condition of native Americans. An example of the state of nature he found facile enough to destroy with one flourish of logic. A state of

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<sup>119</sup> Sir Robert Filmer, *Observations on Mr Hobbes's Leviathan. From Contemporary Responses to the Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, (Thoemmes Press: Bristol, 1995), 4.

<sup>120</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 131.

nature cannot possibly reign over them because, familial government is present in their society<sup>121</sup>, however primitive in comparison to Caroline England. If we assault only the most vulnerable of Hobbes's examples and exclude all others from the analytical gaze, we may well concur with Filmer and "wonder how the right of nature can be imagined by Mr Hobbes"<sup>122</sup>.

The absence of the eminently more pertinent example of civil war from Filmer's castigation is conspicuous. For adversaries of Hobbes's state of nature, the Civil War is the unquestionably the most formidable example given by Hobbes, and consequently the toughest to reconcile with absurdity. Present it under any of the choice appellations that is the optimal fit for your historical narrative, but the fact that the Civil War happened yields no margin for negotiation. Sir Robert Filmer, according to Rogers: "a committed Royalist and for his pains spent much of the Civil War as a prisoner in Leeds Castle"<sup>123</sup> would not have lacked for awareness of the civil discord that had transpired in England. Perhaps it was Filmer's spiritual outrage, at what he saw as a blasphemous subversion of Genesis that moved him to negate the full spectrum of evidence Hobbes had presented.

"But if it be allowed (which is yet most false) that a company of men were at first without a common power to keep them in awe; I do not see why such a condition must be called a state of war of all men against all men: indeed if such a multitude of men should be created as the earth could not well nourish, there might be cause for men to destroy one another rather than perish for want of food; but God was no such niggard in the creation"<sup>124</sup>.

Thus, the scriptural account of the origins of humankind can be transformed into the mithridate for the "horrid condition of pure nature"<sup>125</sup> advanced by Hobbes. But the biblical antidote does not bring Filmer's response any closer to a resolution of the post-political threat of the state of nature. The persuasive force of Filmer's disputation is vitiated immeasurably, by his consistent refusal to engage with the element of Hobbes's state of nature that is not concerned with the originations of civil society. Regrettably, the critical momentum of Filmer's "*Observations*" on Hobbes state of nature must incur another devastating injury.

Filmer's expostulations against the state of nature, we have determined, are to be accorded little merit based on the paucity of the evidence consulted. It is incredible to think, that Filmer could hope to secure a compelling negative verdict after only a partially digesting the total plethora of evidence

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<sup>121</sup> Filmer, *Observations*, 4.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

<sup>123</sup> Rogers, *Contemporary Responses*, ix.

<sup>124</sup> Filmer, *Observations*, 5.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

available. More abjectly, the same hermeneutic discrepancy identified in the defective refutations given by King, Newey, Sim, Walker and Mintz can be detected in Filmer's accounting. What appeared to be an arbitrary generalisation from Hoekstra, that readers of Hobbes have "long denied" that he himself believed in the existence of his state of nature can now gain a measure of justification. For Sir Robert Filmer can now be added to the taxonomy of those who adhere to the same interpretative misconception.

"Mr Hobbes confesseth and believes it was never generally so, that there was such a jus naturae, and if not generally, then not at all, for one exception bars all if he mark it well"<sup>126</sup>.

From the presence of "never generally so", it can be concluded with little doubt that the part of Hobbes's *Leviathan* which occasioned this response from Filmer was that passage of the thirteenth chapter so very belaboured in this discourse. Filmer stating: "if not generally, then not at all" confirms that he, like the modern detractors, deduced a complete denial of the state of nature's existence by misinterpreting Hobbes's initiative to limit the existential scope of that phenomenon. Furthermore, the epistemic foundation of this deduction seems to have been constructed from an admission of Hobbes's own doubt about the existence of the state of nature, obtained through the circumscription of the original textual material. Like the modern detractors challenged earlier, Filmer neglected to mention that it was only over all the world that Hobbes had refused to believe his state of nature could legitimately exist. Had he referenced this expression in its entirety, those reading his tract would have learned Hobbes did in fact believe that the state of nature existed in many places of the world.

Filmer may condemn Hobbes for defaming God as a niggardly creator, but this does not diminish his own niggardliness. This is laid open to the core by the very selective interrogation he decided to conduct of the available primary evidence Hobbes provided on his state of nature. The Filmer incident is another signal case which reinforces the need for extreme circumspection when we consider any proposal of Hobbes's supposed disbelief in the existence of the state of nature. The imperative that Hobbes's sincere commitment to the existence of the state of nature can only be refuted with the implementation of misconstrued textual evidence is augmented once more by Filmer's decision to transcribe Hobbes's written word incompletely. Filmer may indeed have mistaken Hobbes's "confession" that there was no general state of nature as a genuine rejection of the belief in the existence of the state of nature as a whole. Nevertheless, this does not deprive the spirit of this counter-argument of the necessity to correct Filmer for, however inadvertently, causing Hobbes's true convictions regarding the existence of the state of nature to be distorted. An

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<sup>126</sup> *Ibid*, 4.

interpretation of the state of nature is separated from its true Hobbesian essence when the textual basis for it diverges from what Hobbes had intended to be read.

### **The reaction of Dr or Bishop John Bramhall to the Hobbesian state of nature:**

The scholarly reaction of John Bramhall placed under the gaze of this analysis, originates from a book of Bramhall's own devising published in 1658. Called "*The Catching of Leviathan*", within it Bramhall sought to demonstrate that the principles Hobbes had extolled throughout *Leviathan* were "not only destructive to all Religion, but to all societies"<sup>127</sup>. There is not an atom of the *Leviathan's* physiognomy that is not touched by Bramhall's censure in this studious polemic. However, only those points of his censure which are directed toward Hobbes's state of nature are to be upbraided here.

The credit which was rightfully denied Filmer for his very textually circumscribed refutation of *Leviathan* can certainly be awarded to Bramhall. No example from the entire spectrum of empirical proofs Hobbes supplied to validate the existence of his state of nature was neglected by him<sup>128</sup>. Bramhall expressed, like Filmer, a similar spiritually motivated outrage toward what implications he believed the state of nature had upon the axioms of human origination embraced by Christianity. The whole concept of a state of nature was a "drowsie dream" of Hobbes's "own feigning"<sup>129</sup>. Bramhall challenged the fundamental essence of the Hobbesian vision of the natural condition of humanity. Declaring his adherence to the biblical explanation of the origins of human civilisation. Stipulating that:

"The primigenious and most natural state of mankind, was in Adam before his fall, that is, the state of innocence. Or of the state of corrupted nature, that was in Adam and his family after his fall. But there was no such state of meer nature as he imagineth"<sup>130</sup>.

In Bramhall's judgment, there was never a time after the fall of Adam that humanity was without either religion, laws, government, or society. Bramhall decried the very notion of such a state of circumstances as an affront to God himself. Stating that:

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<sup>127</sup> John Bramhall, *The Catching of Leviathan. From Contemporary Responses to the Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, (Thoemmes: Bristol, 1995), 115.

<sup>128</sup> *Ibid*, 155.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid*, 155.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid*, 155.

“If there were any such barbarous savage rabble of men, as he supposeth, in the World, it is both untrue and dishonourable to the God of nature”<sup>131</sup>.

Thus, we behold coming from Bramhall, an expostulation of Hobbes’s state of nature which contains an admixture of personal and religious opprobrium. To both Bramhall and Filmer, the very idea that there had been a time in human history where a war between all people had been the normative state of life was abhorrent, and implausible.

The point of fundamental divergence between their two refutations, as insinuated before, was the range of evidence Bramhall and Filmer thought expedient to interrogate in their respective expostulations of Hobbes’s state of nature. Bramhall proved himself the more redoubtable of critics in this pursuit. Even providing a verdict about all instances of civil war as empirical manifestations of the state of nature. Bramhall’s opinion about the absence of any kind of civic order during a time of civil war was paradoxical when compared to that of Hobbes. Societies in a state of civil war experienced a proliferation of governors and laws, Bramhall had asserted.

Times of civil war to Bramhall: “are so far from being without” the essential features of civil society, that they seemed to “abound overmuch” with them. “Making policy not only to seem, but to be double”<sup>132</sup>.

By this point, Bramhall’s engagement with the state of nature has proven to be perfectly measured, and reasonable. As a Bishop, the religious tone of his excoriation of the seemingly atheistic implications of Hobbes’s state of nature is warranted by his avocation. Yet the merit of Bramhall’s refutation can be challenged by recognising the same defect present in every critique cited in this analysis, both of contemporary and modern extraction. Bramhall’s error was a critical misinterpretation of Hobbes’s definition of the state of nature. Like those that were examined before, Bramhall failed to infer the proper meaning from the language Hobbes used to describe his state of nature.

Bramhall accused Hobbes of “fancying to himself a generall state of nature, which so far from being generall, that there is not an instance to be found if it in the nature of things, where mankind was altogether without laws and without governours”<sup>133</sup>.

Yet, as we have been made highly cognisant by the study made of the passage when Hobbes considered the generality of the state of nature, he said it was “never generally so, over all the word”. If the text is construed precisely, the truth is that Hobbes did not perceive a general state of

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid, 155.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, 155.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 175-6.

nature where all of humanity were simultaneously devoid of government and laws. The extent of the state of nature was acknowledged by Hobbes to be limited to “many places” in the world, and not the whole world to begin with. Therefore, another refutation of Hobbes’s state of nature can be regarded with circumspection on account of the author failing to provide a sound interpretation of the source material.

### Interpretations of the State of Nature from those who corresponded with Hobbes:

Those with whom Hobbes had shared ideas convivially through written correspondence did not allow this fellowship to manipulate their true judgment about the state of nature.

#### Francois Peleau- Autumn 1656:

In a letter dated between October and November, Peleau expressed his frustration to Hobbes about the abundance of scepticism he had encountered concerning the existence of the state of nature.

Peleau declared to Hobbes that: “I am being hounded with syllogisms designed to prove to me that the state of nature in the strict sense (such as you show it to be in your Politics) has never existed in the world”<sup>134</sup>.

Peleau had plainly attempted to remonstrate with these apostates. He stated to Hobbes that he had elaborated the state of nature as a pre-political condition<sup>135</sup>, “argued that this state still exists in America”<sup>136</sup>, but “it is no use”<sup>137</sup>.

Peleau then exhorted Hobbes to leaven his current knowledge of the state of nature with any further wisdom Hobbes may have not yet divulged to him: “Please enlighten me on this, so that I may force these stubborn people to see reason”<sup>138</sup>.

What this fragment of Hobbes’s correspondence yields is that, to a very relative degree, there was an intractable culture of opposition to the premise that Hobbes’s state of nature could potentially exist in France. The situation that Peleau described, of being “hounded with syllogisms” to disprove

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<sup>134</sup> *Francois Peleau, 1656, From the Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes, Edited by Noel Malcolm, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), 331.*

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid, 331.*

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid, 331.*

<sup>137</sup> *Ibid, 331.*

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid, 332.*

the existence of the state of nature may be flagrant hyperbole. But it does demonstrate that there was at least some vestige of opposition to this concept in a part of France. The range of this opposition may not be confined to Bordeaux, the location from which Peleau writes. He may be speaking of the expostulations of those with whom he is in correspondence. These correspondents may be scattered throughout France and Europe.

What is manifest is the fervour of Peleau's conviction in the existence of the state of nature, and his willingness to employ any argument he can obtain in the effort to convert inveterate pessimists.

#### Francois Peleau- Winter 1656:

In this letter dated to the winter of 1656, Peleau passes his judgment on examples illustrating the existence of the state of nature which Hobbes must have presented to him upon a request from Peleau in a previous letter.

Peleau began by thanking Hobbes courteously for his response. Stating that he was: "very satisfied with" Hobbes's "reply to my last queries"<sup>139</sup>. These "queries" may very well be the plea for enlightenment about the state of nature Peleau had exhorted from Hobbes in previously examined letter.

Peleau then expressed his dissatisfaction with the examples Hobbes had enumerated for him in the previous letter (which unfortunately does not survive). Frankly confessing to Hobbes that: "the examples you give fail, in my view, to illustrate accurately enough the state of nature"<sup>140</sup>.

Fortunately, the examples over which Peleau confessed to being dissatisfied does not include the Hobbesian interpretation of civil war as an instance of the state of nature. Peleau only rejected the instances of "soldiers who serve in different places"<sup>141</sup> and "masons who work under different architects"<sup>142</sup> as defective illustrations of the existence of the state of nature.

Peleau recognised a "war of minds"<sup>143</sup> between people proposing changes in policy within a single government<sup>144</sup> as one of the "examples"<sup>145</sup> he gave which in his opinion "illustrate your state of nature as purely as possible"<sup>146</sup>.

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<sup>139</sup> Peleau, *Correspondence of Hobbes Vol I*, 424.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid*, 424.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, 424.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid*, 424.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid*, 424

<sup>144</sup> *Ibid*, 424.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid*, 424.

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid*, 424

This is not incongruous with the definition and existential scope Hobbes had expressed for the English Civil War in *Behemoth*. He regarded the conflict of constitutional ideas between the Royal and Parliamentary factions as actual civil war.

Hobbes determined that the attempt by the Parliament to coerce the King into giving his royal assent to the constitutional alterations they had proposed were “an actual rebellion”<sup>147</sup>.

Furthermore, Hobbes reflected that after Parliament began to put the Militia Ordinance into execution, and the King dispatched his Commissions of Array: “though it were a war before, yet there was no blood shed; they shot at one another nothing but paper”<sup>148</sup>. Confirming that in Hobbes’s perception, an actual state of civil war had existed prior to the efforts of the belligerent factions to mobilise their armies. It was the “war of minds” taking the form of the propositions and counter-propositions between the King and Parliament, which constituted the existence of this state of civil war.

Therefore, it can be concluded that Peleau, though doubting some of Hobbes’s examples, concurred with Hobbes and the central premise of this thesis that one of the most optimal instances of the existence of the state of nature was civil war. It is highly suggestive of the historical context of Peleau’s remarks on the “war of minds” that he asked: “doesn’t it often happen among the members of a single parliament?”<sup>149</sup>.

Peleau with this remark could very possibly have been reflecting upon the inter-parliamentary turmoil that preceded and continued throughout the Civil War period in England. Although, intrinsic discord within French ‘Parlements’ may also have been possible subjects of this remark.

Nevertheless, both institutions as multitudes of men with political power could logically inhabit Hobbes’s definition of a governing body in civil discord with each other, or another fundamental constitutional element, the King for example. Therefore, the vagueness of Peleau’s reference to “members of a single parliament” without any national distinction, by the nature of its vagueness, can be said to encompass parliamentary institutions wherever they happened to exist in the world at that point of history Peleau was writing. However, given that this is a Frenchman in correspondence with an Englishman recently returned from exile, the parliaments of their native states are the most likely objects of reference here.

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<sup>147</sup> Hobbes, *Behemoth*, 107.

<sup>148</sup> *Ibid*, 109.

<sup>149</sup> Peleau, *Correspondence of Hobbes Vol I*, 424.

## The significance of Hobbes's usage of the present tense when describing civil war in

### Leviathan:

This impending section will focus solely upon explaining how the relationship between the present tense and civil war in the *Leviathan* is the key to understanding why Thomas Hobbes believed that the state of nature physically existed. But before beginning this exposition aright, it would be helpful to reiterate how exactly this proposition is relevant to the fundamental question advanced by the thesis. From the introduction, the reader ought to have learned that the driving imperative of this work was not to prove that Hobbes's state of nature had categorically existed or could exist. Instead, more pragmatically, that if viewed from a certain perspective, what will be termed the "faithfully Hobbesian" perspective, it is possible for the state of nature to be seen as something that is empirically real.

Hence why Hobbes's own intellectual commitment the existence of the state of nature is the crucial variable to be ratified in this argument. If Hobbes did not sincerely think that the state of nature existed, as many have alleged, his own written word would be divested of any power as the substance we would use to create a solid foundation for belief in the state of nature. Without the intellectual conviction of Hobbes himself behind it, postulating that the most effective method for bringing about a realisation of the existence of the Hobbesian state of nature can be built from his own philosophical principles is absurd.

Therefore, destroying the "interpretive culture" of Hobbes's supposed doubt in the existence of the state of nature concept was selected as the primary function of the introduction to this thesis. The axis upon which the destruction of this fallacy was determined took the form of a single passage from the thirteenth chapter of Hobbes's *Leviathan*. The analysis conducted in the introduction upon this passage revealed that it had been cited incorrectly by those of Hobbes's detractors who were found to be complicit in the propagation of this interpretive culture. Accepted in the way which they had presented this extract, it does indeed appear that Hobbes expressed an incontrovertible doubt about whether the state of nature had existed. However, if the quotation is reconstructed and the components which were removed are restored to the positions given them by Hobbes originally, it is the idea of Hobbes's self-doubt which is firmly contravened.

From an uncorrupted reading of the controversial passage, anyone may learn that Hobbes did indeed express some measure of disbelief about the existence of the state of nature: "I believe it was never generally so, over all the world"<sup>150</sup>. In other words, as a global phenomenon affecting every person and society on the planet. However, the "but there are many places, where they live so

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<sup>150</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 69.

now”<sup>151</sup> which followed this statement of doubt was consistently neglected in each interpretation of this passage that was examined. The failure to notice, or the deliberate refusal to convey that Hobbes had referred to the state of nature in the present tense: “many places, now” was the error which made the fomentation of that interpretive culture possible. Recognition of this fact is the predicate on which an empirical framework for the belief in the existence of the state of nature can finally begin to be developed.

Though it is formative to this thesis, the potential of the present tense reference from the thirteenth chapter alone to be considered as decisive proof has been impaired by the fact it is disputed in such volume. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to demonstrate that throughout the *Leviathan*, the present tense was systematically applied to the state of nature and should not be dismissed as a precarious linguistic anomaly.

The introduction of this thesis ought to have brought the reader into acquaintance with the author Glen Newey and his two spuriously corroborated assertions concerning Hobbes’s perception of the state of nature. Newey’s stance may have been tenable, if he did not seek to reinforce his proposition that Hobbes did not intend for the state of nature to be perceived as historically real by truncating a quotation from *Leviathan* to procure a false admission from Hobbes himself. The exegesis of the most prominent references to civil war from *Leviathan* in this chapter will function as another pretext to engage with Newey. He alleged that it was “noticeable now few references there are to civil wars and their consequences” in *Leviathan*<sup>152</sup>. On this basis, he instructed his readers to disassociate the “leading ideas” of *Leviathan* from the historical context of the Civil War and its potential effects on Hobbes’s thinking<sup>153</sup>. The pending chapter, given the scope of its discussion is the perfect ground from which to challenge and defeat another solecism generated by Glen Newey.

In the order in which such references appear in the text, we must consult the third chapter of *Leviathan* to witness the first time Hobbes would fuse the present tense with the state of nature. Though ostensibly, this is a reference purely to the English Civil War in the present tense and not the state of nature: “our present civile warre”<sup>154</sup>. To understand how it is logically possible to claim that a reference to the English Civil War in the present tense ought to be perceived also as a reference to the state of nature, it is necessary to return to the thirteenth chapter.

Hobbes would kindly enumerate some of the “many places”, that he considers the state of nature to be incumbent upon the people living in them. Below the famous analogy of the “savage people in

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<sup>151</sup> *Ibid*, 69.

<sup>152</sup> Newey, *Routledge Guidebook*, 26.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid*, 26.

<sup>154</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 10.

many places of America"<sup>155</sup>, which appeared in two previous descriptions of the state of nature<sup>156</sup>, is an example which Hobbes included in neither *Elements of Law* nor in *De Cive*.

This is civil war, or as Hobbes himself introduced it: "the manner of life, which men have formerly lived under a peaceful government, use to degenerate into, in a civile warre"<sup>157</sup>.

What we can stipulate with confidence is that by the time Hobbes came to write *Leviathan*, he had formulated a symbiotic connection between his concept of the state of nature and the condition of civil war. Not only in this instance did Hobbes avow his conviction to the existence of the state of nature before the eyes of the reader. He indicated that for those who wish to observe the state of nature reflected within the mirror human experience, they need only pluck from history one of the innumerable times civil wars have divided a once peaceful society.

Thus, civil war IS a Hobbesian state of nature. What this means, is that within the linguistic context of the *Leviathan* at least, any reference to civil war ought to be treated as a reference to the state of nature. So, it is in accordance with the linguistic criteria Hobbes himself established for the reader, that it is logically practicable to eliminate the linguistic distinction that prevented the state of nature and civil war from achieving conceptual unity before the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan*.

This demonstrates how the "Hobbesian" perspective on the existence of the state of nature is no mere invention of convenience to make the exposition of the thesis a smoother task. It is a rigorous, empirical procedure, each of its logical principles are distilled from the material wrought by action of Hobbes himself.

To say that civil war is the leitmotif of the *Leviathan* is not a desperate sentiment. Civil war and its terrible vicissitudes permeate the very anatomy of this discourse. In the mind of Deborah Baumgold, it was the "quintessential Hobbesian theme"<sup>158</sup>

Yet the presence of civil war upon the pages of *Leviathan* is only of advantage at this stage of the argument if Hobbes has introduced them within the present tense. Many are purely metaphysical constructs with no clear connection to reality, the first literal reference to civil war is one example: "Civille Warre, Death"<sup>159</sup>.

The knowledge that civil war represents the physical death of the state/commonwealth is not to be rebuked. But to stipulate that the advent of civil war hypothetically causes the death of political

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<sup>155</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 69.

<sup>156</sup> Hobbes, *Elements of Law*, 80. Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive*, (*Anodos: Dumfries and Galloway*, 2019), 4.

<sup>157</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 69.

<sup>158</sup> Deborah Baumgold, *Hobbes' Political Theory*, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1988), 127.

<sup>159</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 3.

society forges no tangible connection to either the state of nature or to an empirically verifiable historical context. Civil war may be registered as a cause of the state of nature, but the impression here is of two distinct conditions that are separate links of the same chain of causality. Were the *Leviathan* to contain references to civil war of this purely abstract and atemporal character, communicating any possibility for the existence of the state of nature would belong in the imagination.

Fortunately, Hobbes permitted the existential capabilities of the state of nature to be broadened gradually as readers progress deeper into the text. If one is resolved upon exposing this symbiosis between the English Civil War and Hobbes's state of nature, the thirteenth chapter is the moment this conceptual transfusion occurs. In the very instant Hobbes transcribed the words from his mind onto the parchment, he believed the state of nature to already have been manifested upon earth in the form of a civil war. Zeal for the cause brings the English Civil War immediately into the vanguard of our thoughts. But the objective critic may remark upon Hobbes's marked reluctance to associate this statement with any geographical setting or specific sequence of events. What places? What civil war? We only receive a fraction of the illumination we desire, that it is happening "now", yet with tenacity, this flickering ember will prove to be sufficient.

Further light is shed upon the matter when we discern that Hobbes attached the possessive pronoun "our" to the present tense reference from the third chapter. This evinces to us that Hobbes claims to have some definite degree of personal association with this civil war. Hobbes, an exiled Englishman of royalist affiliation, speaking of the recent "delivering up of the King to his Enemies"<sup>160</sup> and describing such an altercation as "treason"<sup>161</sup>. The natural historical setting that materialises for these words is the English Civil War. Yet in an investigation where the standard of absolute academic rigour must be the operative spirit under which it is prosecuted, this extract is still an untrustworthy basis for a belief in this kind of connection to be maintained.

The civil war has been claimed by Hobbes as his own personal affair, the King has been betrayed and set amongst his adversaries, unfortunately, which civil war? Which King? Where? Are still appropriate questions to ask. The state of nature languishes in the epistemic gulf between abstraction and reality, Hobbes has provided neither historical place, nor event that we can categorically assimilate it within without falling into conjecture. It would not be until the nineteenth chapter of the *Leviathan* that the union between the English Civil War and the state of nature would be substantively officiated by Hobbes in the text.

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<sup>160</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

Whilst complementing the statesmanship and vision of the late King James, Hobbes initiated the most fundamental evolutionary stage in the existential realisation of the state of nature concept:

“And this was it our most wise King, King James aymed at, in endeavouring the Union of his two Realms of England and Scotland, Which if he could have obtained, had in all likelihood prevented the Civile warres, which make both those Kingdomes at this present, miserable”<sup>162</sup>.

To begin with, the naming of King James alone is propitious, for being deceased since 1625, he could not have been delivered up to his enemies at the time Hobbes was writing the *Leviathan*. The only King who had reigned over England and its dominions up to that point since the passing of King James I was his son, Charles I. Therefore, “the King” to whom Hobbes refers in the present tense in the third chapter can be none other than His Majesty Charles the First. Subsequently, we have the naming of the realms of England and Scotland, which admittedly would have been a triviality had the eulogy of King James ended there. Nevertheless, Hobbes prevented this from becoming merely a wistful rumination about the unfinished state-building policy of a deceased monarch by making the incompleteness of this policy a root cause of the civil war currently ravaging those kingdoms.

The significance of being able to capture “Realms of England” “the Civile warres” “make both those Kingdomes at this present” within a single citation is almost unspeakable. An evolution is the most pertinent term to describe this development. The state of nature in that moment gained the credibly defined geographical and historical demarcation that it had lacked since it was first articulated by Hobbes in *Elements of Law*<sup>163</sup>. The familiar tendency we have observed in Hobbes for historical obfuscation is absent. These are no two kingdoms of abstraction that Hobbes has generated to delight in the thought of them being made miserable by a civil war. These are the twin realms of England and Scotland, which Hobbes acknowledges are being made miserable by civil war at the very moment he was working on this part of the *Leviathan*.

Now, gratefully, there is a viable historical setting for the previous present tense references from the third and thirteenth chapters of the text. A fundamental premise was established that within the context of *Leviathan* and this thesis, all instances of civil war ought to be judged simultaneously as instances of the state of nature. It is only as a consequence of this formative step that the historical context for all present tense references to the state of nature can be confirmed as the English Civil War. If the passage above is read through the prism of this fundamental law, it is actually the state of nature which at present makes the Kingdoms of England and Scotland miserable. It was by strict adherence to the word of Hobbes himself that this conclusion was reached. As such this perspective

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<sup>162</sup> *Ibid*, 111.

<sup>163</sup> *Hobbes, Elements*, 77-81.

on the existence of the state of nature can still yet claim to be “faithfully Hobbesian” in its method and logical approach.

From the examination made upon the present tense references from the third, thirteenth and nineteenth chapters of the *Leviathan*, a sensible conclusion is that Hobbes had intended for the state of nature to be set within a realistic historical dimension. Through the agency of those who were actively fighting out the English Civil War, those living in England and Scotland had reverted back into a state of nature. Fortunately, there is another present tense reference that does countenance another considerable expansion of the contextual proportions of the state of nature to be made.

This expansion witnessed Hobbes fully integrate the state of nature within the sectional attrition which he considered to be at the causal nexus of all civil discord in the Kingdoms of England and Scotland. As Hobbes vehemently defended the principle of indivisible sovereignty as a guarantor of peace, through the English Civil War the state of nature was inducted into this conflict:

“If there had not been an opinion received of the greatest part of England, that these powers were divided between the King, and the Lords, and the House of Commons, the people had never been divided, and fallen into this Civile Warre; first between those that disagreed in Politiques; and after between the Dissenters about the liberty of Religion; which have so instructed men in this point of Sovereign Right, that there be few now (in England), that do not see, that these Rights are inseparable, and will be so generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace; and so continue, till their miseries be forgotten, and no longer, except the vulgar be better taught than they have hitherto been”<sup>164</sup>.

“This” may not be a solid enough token that Hobbes was indicating the civil war currently raging over the Stuart dominions. Yet still, it may have been more apparent to one who was reading Hobbes’s work within a short time of its circulation, when the Civil War was far from a distant memory. On the previous three occasions, Hobbes had signalled his application of the present tense with either “present” or “now”. “This” is more chronologically versatile and could be as appropriate in reference to something that had happened recently as something currently happening. Several pages later, Hobbes would express how civil war was still making England and Scotland miserable. Therefore, logically, it would be impossible in this instance for Hobbes to speak of the Civil War as an article of the past if he was to lament the misery it was unleashing in a chapter he would compose very soon in the future.

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<sup>164</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 102.

However, Hobbes did provide more cogent evidence that this reference to the state of nature was firmly set in the present tense. He wrote of his anticipation that the principle of the indivisible sovereign authority would be “generally acknowledged, at the next return of Peace”. “Next return” portended an expectation of peace to be restored in the future, not that peace had returned. Just as “will be” represented hope for the enlightenment of the people in post-bellum England, not for an enlightenment that had already begun to take effect. For Hobbes, civil war and thus the state of nature was still the incumbent condition of at least two of the three kingdoms at the moment this passage departed from his pen.

Hobbes in this passage placed an emphasis upon the belligerent factions involved in English Civil war, and what he perceived to be one of the fundamental matters driving them to make war upon each other. By doing so, we are encouraged to visualise a contextual bonding between the English Civil War and the state of nature which is far more comprehensive than any of the previous analysis has revealed. Civil war ceases to be merely an intrinsic cause and an archetype of the state of nature. Hobbes had just incorporated what he determined to be reasons for the outbreak of war in England into the causal spectrum of the state of nature. Dividing individual sovereign prerogatives, such as the right of military command, from the whole essence of sovereign power as a cause of the English Civil War, concurrently becomes a normative way of bringing the state of nature into existence. Whereas before, Hobbes had given no suggestion that divergent causal sequences belonging to the English Civil War ought to be regarded as part of the state of nature’s existential reasoning. Before it was proposed that civil war simply elicited a relapse into the state of nature, detailed characteristics related to the emergence of this war were not elaborated upon at this time.

Even as Hobbes named the Realms of England and Scotland, the reader could procure a distinct idea of the geographical extent of the state of nature. However, the anthropical range of this condition was left in profound ambiguity. For a historical contextualisation of the state of nature to be a successful way of making it transcend from the abstract into reality, this state of nature requires a living human population and identifiable faces. Better still, singular individuals or factions through which the principles of the state of nature can be seen to have been enacted within a historically verifiable setting.

The person of the “King” being Charles I, the men of the “Lords” and the “House of Commons” being the Parliament of England are the principal agents Hobbes has selected to give the state of nature a variety of human aspects and pull it from metaphysical darkness. What Hobbes intended to signify by “the people” is a little less than certain. They have been “divided” and “fallen into” the Civil War, does it risk an anachronism to assert that Hobbes means the entire populace of England?

The baseborn individual did have a position of great importance in the machinery of Hobbesian philosophy. Each human agent living in the state of nature was the bearer of the sovereign power which would be relinquished to the supreme authority upon the foundation of a state<sup>165</sup>. Hobbes stressed that it was essential for every individual to participate in the act of association that would institute a commonwealth by the collective forfeit of natural sovereign right to a supreme authority<sup>166</sup>. Therefore, given that Hobbes appreciated human beings individually and collectively as the “matter”<sup>167</sup> and “artificer”<sup>168</sup> of the commonwealth, it is not likely that he would limit the definition of “the people” to consist of a special set of people apart from the aggregate of English subjects.

Theoretically at least, the individual is accorded a station of great importance in Hobbesian thinking. From what we can perceive in his remarks about the function of individual human beings, the very institution and sustenance of the commonwealth is dependent on their action. Which for Hobbes is critical. The entire purpose, or “end” he had envisioned for the institution of a commonwealth was the permanent exodus from a state of war<sup>169</sup> and the establishment of a peaceful society<sup>170</sup>. Without the co-operation of every individual in the act of instituting a commonwealth, these ends for which the concept of a Hobbesian commonwealth was devised would be void.

Thus, the anthropological range of the state of nature at the time of the English Civil War will govern: the King himself, those men of the Houses of Parliament, all current and former subjects of the English Crown. For it does not seem consistent at all with Hobbes’s style to encourage us to consider the misery of “the people” as a variable distinct from the misery of a whole kingdom. Given that he classified the people singularly and as a compact body as the basic political atoms of the kingdom, were the kingdom as a whole political entity to regress into a state of nature, the people as its living matter would simultaneously regress into this condition of nature.

The formation of a more empirically vibrant state of nature concept is taking place within this discourse. Illustrating that there is a complex level of alignment in Hobbes’s mind between the identifiable characteristics of the English Civil and the state of nature is an effective way of demonstrating that he was committed to an empirically verifiable definition of this concept.

The course of the discussion shall now be commended toward a more cryptic present tense reference located in the thirty-eighth chapter of the *Leviathan*. Hobbes appears to add a new layer

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<sup>165</sup> *Ibid*, 96.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid*, 96-7.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid*, 93.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid*, 100.

of intricacy to the dual system of causality he had fashioned for the Civil War and the state of nature. The purely secular imperative for drawing the Stuart Realm back into the state of nature has been diluted by an indisputably religious element. It was previously shown, how Hobbes upbraided the fallacy that the sovereign authority possessed by the King could be divided among subordinate entities such as the Parliament as a conduit for the state of nature to emerge through. Here Hobbes proclaimed that violent collision over the infringement of religious doctrine into the natural authority of the law was a force capable of reanimating the state of nature. True to his disposition on the indivisibility of sovereign power, Hobbes advocated for the volition of the sovereign over the commonwealth to be the only judge on how far religious directives were to encroach upon the influence of civil laws:

“But because this doctrine (though proved out of places of Scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; I doe but propound it; maintaining nothing in this, or any other paradox of Religion; but attending the end of that dispute of the sword, concerning the Authority , (not yet amongst my Countrey-men decided), by which all sorts of doctrine are to bee approved, or rejected; and whose commands, both in speech, and writing, (whatsoever be the opinions of private men), must by all men, that mean to be protected by their laws, be obeyed. For the points of doctrine concerning the Kingdome of God, have so great influence on the Kingdome of Man, as not to be determined, but by them, that under God have the Sovereign Power”<sup>171</sup>.

Earlier in the chapter this passage is extracted from, Hobbes would express his sincere attitude that the biblical attitude concerning obedience to the laws supervised by the temporal sovereign were a guide to “avoid the calamities of Confusion, and Civill war”<sup>172</sup>. This passage and its colleague from the eighteenth chapter perfectly capture the connection Hobbes had formulated between the friction caused by chronic indeterminacy around the proper execution of sovereign power in the commonwealth, and the potential regression of that commonwealth back into the state of nature. Whether the motive was religious or secular, any attempt to forcibly apportion out the authority that naturally resided within the person of the sovereign was a self-destruct sequence for a peaceful commonwealth, which could, and had invited the return of the state of nature.

Both are deemed by Hobbes to be equally unforgivable ways of assaulting the principle of indivisible sovereignty. The “dispute of the sword”, in other words the Civil War was the progeny of this mortal transgression. If under the epithet “dispute of the sword” hides the English Civil War, this can be securely attributed as another causal layer to the advent of the state of nature. Considering Hobbes,

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<sup>171</sup> *Ibid*, 250.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid*, 246-7.

an Englishman, named the combatants of the melee in question as “my Country-men” this does strongly implicate the men fighting in the English Civil War as the belligerent forces in his allusion. In addition to this positive sign, Hobbes does not betray anything to suggest that this “dispute” should be classified as a hypothetical construction. It is “not yet decided”, it has not ceased, therefore it was unfolding at the moment Hobbes was labouring over this section of the *Leviathan*. By detecting this mark that the present tense had been in operation as this was written, the English Civil War as it was fought amongst Hobbes’s country men is the logical candidate for the true object of this remark. Meaning that, as Hobbes was bringing his work on the *Leviathan* to a denouement, he still believed Stuart England to be trapped within the Civil War, and thus a state of nature.

The following reference that shall be put to the question is located in the pages preceding the “*Review and Conclusion*”. The heading of the chapter is “The Difficulty of Of Obeying God And Man Both At Once”<sup>173</sup>, this and the content beneath seem to be a recapitulation of the earlier points we examined concerning the indeterminacy around the proper execution of sovereign power. The way obedience to either the doctrines of faith (as set forth in the scripture) and the command of the temporal sovereign (as set forth in the civil laws) puts the people of “Christian Common-wealths”<sup>174</sup> at variance with one another is propounded by Hobbes as “The most frequent praetext of Sedition, and Civile Warre”<sup>175</sup>. Here, as twice before, the issue around the indeterminacy of obedience due by the citizen creates a portal for the state of nature into the commonwealth by transgressing the principle of indivisible sovereignty.

It is possible to ascertain that Hobbes had the English Civil War in mind when this sentiment was recorded because the “difficulty”<sup>176</sup> of contradictory obedience, just like the “dispute” over it from the previous reference, is “not yet sufficiently resolved”<sup>177</sup>. The causation of the civil wars of both references can be synchronised without the presence of any significant incongruity between them. It is not beyond the scope of reason to conclude that Hobbes’s England falls into the category of a Christian Commonwealth. Hobbes discussed this exact problem in a letter written to William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire. Hobbes reflected on “Episcopall authority”<sup>178</sup> and the “abondance of abuses committed by Ecclesiasticall person and their Officers” lately in England<sup>179</sup>.

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<sup>173</sup> *Ibid*, 319.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid*, 319.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid*, 319.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid*, 319.

<sup>177</sup> *Ibid*, 319.

<sup>178</sup> *Hobbes to Cavendish, Correspondence*, 120.

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid*, 120.

Expressing his certainty to Lord William that: “I am sure that Experience teaches, thus much, that he dispute for precedence betwene the spirituall and civill power, has of late more then any other thing in the world, bene the cause of civill warres, in all places of Christendome”<sup>180</sup>

England was undoubtedly classified as one of the many “places of Christendom” Hobbes had alluded to. The passage concerning the frequency of conflict between the spiritual and civic obedience from *Leviathan* bind these chains of causality together.

Furthermore, the application of the present tense in both situations completes the contextual amalgamation that was instigated by the detection of an unmistakable thematic link between them: division of sovereign authority as a “praetext” or cause of civil war. “Experience teaches”, meaning that it had not ceased to inform about the congruence of this type of conflict with the dissolution of a commonwealth into a state of civil war at the time Hobbes wrote the words. The issue had not been sufficiently resolved by the time Hobbes began to work on that chapter of *Leviathan*. Thus, affirming the place of this remark within the present tense, and the context of Civil War causation.

In light of what had been discovered in the previous examination, becoming convinced of the veracity of these next references was no great challenge to the logical template of this thesis.

When divorced from the context in which it was placed by the sub-heading given by Hobbes, “Whence comes to it, that in Christendome that has been, almost from the time of the Apostles, such justling of one another out of their places, both by forraign, and Civile war?”<sup>181</sup> has only the most tentative bearing within any empirical reality. Yet when juxtaposed alongside the extracts examined above, the empirical consequence of this passage appears more lucidly.

By saying “there has been, almost from the time of the Apostles” Hobbes could potentially be indicating vicissitudes he would like us to understand to be happening at the time he is writing. Semantically, this could be interpreted as the description of an historical situation which supervened from across a millennium and has endured into the time Hobbes was still composing *Leviathan*. It is easy to simplify it in the mind as “this is the way it is, and it has been this way since this time in the past”. If this is the case, Hobbes has lamented once more, the invidious destiny of Christian states, a classification to which England and its dominions certainly belong, to perpetually destroy themselves. Including the addendum to this passage within the scope of this interrogation could bring the understanding of whether Hobbes is discussing hypothetical or historical circumstances into greater clarity.

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<sup>180</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *The Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes Volume I*, Edited by Noel Malcolm, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994), 120.

<sup>181</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 330.

Directly succeeding “Civill war?” Hobbes wrote: “such stumbling at every little asperity of their own fortune, and every little eminence of that of other men? And such diversity of ways in running to the same mark, Felicity, if it be not Night amongst us, or at least a Mist? Wee are therefore yet in the Dark”<sup>182</sup>.

“We” Hobbes uttered in reference to himself and all Christian people under the collective term of “Christendome”. “Are yet in” provides a solid indication that Hobbes is framing what he has articulated in the present tense. He, the people who were the atoms that make up “Christendome” and the people of England were submerged in the darkness of war, civil war and thus the state of nature. If this logic is utilised, the sub-heading that was formerly mentioned, possessed similar linguistic properties to confine the entire paragraph beneath it into the present tense. “The Church Not Yet Fully Freed of Darkness” served as the harbinger of an historical, not just a metaphysical darkness, epitomised by Hobbes as a succession of seemingly eternal internecine conflicts that troubled Christianity to the moment Hobbes commended his grief over it into writing<sup>183</sup>.

The final three civil war/state of nature references which can be identified to have been presented by Hobbes in any grammatical tense are located within the “Review and Conclusion” to *Leviathan*. I say any grammatical tense rather than present tense as I have on each previous occasion, because the first two of these references appear to have briefly transported the English Civil War into the past tense. This action is worth elucidating, for Hobbes in making his final allusion to the English Civil War alternated its mode of delivery back into the present tense. How on any rational level Hobbes could have spoken of the Civil War as something alternately to have happened and be happening will be addressed at a later point in this section.

The setting for the first reference was a panegyric to the memory of Hobbes’s “most noble and honoured friend Mr Sidney Godolphin”<sup>184</sup>. Aside from this rapturous soliloquy being a literal prefiguration of the exalted manner Hobbes would write of Godolphin in the epistle dedicatory to this book, the war in which he perished is spoken of as though it had ended.

The honoured Sidney Godolphin was “unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late Civille Warre”<sup>185</sup>.

Surmising that the “late” was pertinent only to the slaying of Godolphin in the beginning of the war is in an abuse of the syntax that is clearly before us, and in itself would be a minor anachronism. It would indeed be appropriate to state the slaying of Godolphin as an article of the past, having been

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<sup>182</sup> *Ibid*, 330.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid*, 330.

<sup>184</sup> *Ibid*, 381.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid*, 381.

perpetrated in a time before the text in which it figured had been written. Nevertheless, it is unquestionably the “late Civile Warre”, not the “lately slain in the beginning of the Civile Warre” which would be required to keep the Civil War in the present tense within the context of the *Leviathan*. For Hobbes to have considered England’s ordeal with the state of nature to now belong in the past, is a contingency that cannot be thought of to be at all subversive to the perspective formed by this thesis. For, to acknowledge that something has past is not to reduce it back to a purely abstract definition. For its duration, to a person living as it unfolded, their comprehension of the Civil War would have fallen within the perception of two interconnected realities: the historical and the contemporary.

Now in Hobbes’s perception, the Civile Warre ceasing briefly to be a contemporary reality, by becoming the “late”, is merely the motion of this event into a purely historical conception of reality. The Civil War i.e., the state of nature, having existed in Hobbes’s estimation, retains a residual faculty of its former existence through his memory of it having been a living phenomenon. Therefore, for those concerned with validating the existence of the state of nature from Hobbes’s written word, a past tense reference is no detriment to this procedure reaching a decisive level of validation. For that which has ceased to exist contemporaneously, can begin to exist historically through its consignment to memory and then into literature.

In this way, the applicability of the terms “reality” and “existence” to the state of nature is preserved. Through a former incarnation of the state of nature upon earth, the grim prospect of a future existence among us can be logically entertained. This Hobbes called “Prudence”<sup>186</sup> or a “Praesumption of the Future, contracted from Experience of time Past”<sup>187</sup> and to him was highly relevant in this context.

“For he hath seen by what courses and degrees, a flourishing State hath first come into civile warre, and then to ruine; upon the sights of the ruines of any other State, will guesse, the like war, and the like courses have been there also”<sup>188</sup>.

Such a remark demonstrating that, in the case of those who adhere to Hobbes’s teaching about the existence of the state of nature, the possibility that we could witness the recurrence of this condition is a reason to keep it firmly entrenched within our fundamental conception of reality. The existence having been acknowledged; the state of nature becomes an apocalyptic lesson that need

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<sup>186</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid*, 12.

only be “contracted” from history for an incentive to show gratitude for a level of political security which our predecessors at the time of the Civil War would have prayed fervently for.

The reference which succeeded this, one may observe Hobbes begin to use the civil/war state of nature in the manner adumbrated above. The subject of his discourse shifted to a matter, which may give a solid inclination as to the point in the duration of the Civil War Hobbes was writing this piece of his philosophy. The issue for which Hobbes contested with some ardour was the legitimacy of a claim to sovereign power by right of conquest. Furthermore, the obligation due the conqueror, as legitimate sovereign, by the those vanquished by his military forces. The reasoning as to why any person ought to see submission to a conqueror as the rational course of action was provided by Hobbes in the form of the Civil War. The literary tense Hobbes has advocated in this instance is not revealed so clearly in the syntax as we would like:

“And because I find by divers English Books lately printed that the Civile Warres have not yet sufficiently taught men, in what point of time it is, that a Subject becomes obliged to the Conquerour; nor what is Conquest; nor how it comes about, that it obliges men to obey his Laws: Therefore for farther satisfaction of men therein, I say, the point of time, wherein a man becomes the subject of a Conqueror, is that point, wherein having liberty to submit to him, he consenteth, either by expresse words, or by other sufficient sign, to be his Subject”<sup>189</sup>.

The situation we encounter is similar to that of the preceding reference. However, the difference comes in the fact that Hobbes provides no resolute indication of tense before “Civille Warres”. The unnamed literature to which Hobbes refers does not exclusively belong in the past tense either. The books have been “lately” printed suggesting some continuity with the present, because the printing of them cannot indefinitely be said to have ceased. Furthermore, the act of Hobbes reading such literature is plainly something so recent to him as not to be regarded as an article of the past: “I find”. If Hobbes had introduced his point with “I hath found”, then reason could be consulted to permit the past tense some influence in this decision. But Hobbes selected “find”, yielding the impression that these observations are considered by Hobbes to be currently relevant to what was happening at the moment these thoughts were articulated upon the page before us.

Thus far, only the “divers English Books” perused by Hobbes can themselves be concluded to have some orientation in the past tense. Having been, by Hobbes’s own admission, printed and acquired by him at some unspecified point that was antecedent to the writing of this passage. Now, pertaining to the Civil Wars raised by Hobbes in this passage. It would be careless in the extremity to extrapolate the past tense from the “divers English Books” into our appraisal of them. Analysis of the

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<sup>189</sup> *Ibid*, 382.

preceding reference demonstrated cogently that if Hobbes was to regard the Civil Wars as a purely historic entity, this had been signified by “late”. This is flagrantly not the case here. That Hobbes has enlisted the example of the Civil Wars as a guide to amend the future conduct of his contemporaries, is no decisive token that this was not an exhortation to take counsel from what was happening at that moment. Hobbes had spoken of the Civil War as a font of political and philosophical wisdom at an early point in the *Leviathan*, between passages which referred to the War in the present tense: “Never knowing (till perhaps a little after a Civill warre) that without such arbitrary government, such Warre must be perpetuall”<sup>190</sup>.

Therefore, we cannot regard this way of using the Civil War as indicative of an obscure method created by Hobbes to bring the past tense into operation. A study of the Civil War as an exercise in the better understanding of civic prudence had been associated by Hobbes before he would lament the misery the War was causing to England and Scotland. In this instance, a solution could be formulated from the marked tendency of Hobbes to use “war” and “wars” interchangeably, as many modern historians have, when discussing the English Civil Wars.

If the Civil War is digested in the mind as segments of time, with distinct events, rather than a single seamless block of time, the understanding that it ought to be interposed between the past and the present tense can be distilled from it. It is possible to make the assertion that Hobbes was designating those vicissitudes of the Civil Wars that had already taken place as worthy material for those wanting in political wisdom to attend upon. He had done so in that part of *Leviathan* when he defined prudence as learning from the experience of those things that had happened. Hobbes likely understood that he could refer his audience to those stages of the Wars which had concluded, without fully immersing the Civil War in the past tense. The men he found to be wanting in knowledge could learn from a war that had not ended because there were recognisable stages of the war that had come before the present stage of war, and thus, could be examined.

The nomenclature of “Conquerour”, “Conquest” and “Submit” adds further confusion to the business of determining the most appropriate literary tense for this statement. Few would contradict that to speak of a conqueror, his conquest and the correct way a conquered people can submit to his laws is to speak of a war brought to a successful denouement by this person. It cannot be a chance conjunction of ideas that Hobbes in his *Review and Conclusion* would make his first reference to the Civil War in the past tense, and then proceed to argue vehemently for the rationality of pledging obedience to a conqueror. A complete and unbroken sovereign authority, as we know, is the way of sustaining peace within the Commonwealth and keeping the state of nature

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<sup>190</sup> *Ibid*, 371.

from emerging. Hobbes attempted to nullify the negative connotation produced by “Conquest” by defining it as the “Acquiring of the Right of Sovereignty by Victory”. How can a war logically be still fought if victory has been achieved by one of the belligerent parties involved? The possibility remains that Hobbes’s meaning was not directed toward an actual restoration of sovereign authority in England through military victory (conquest). Instead of this idea, Hobbes speaking in anticipation of a conquest he believed to be imminent is an equally reasonable conclusion.

Foremost, it can be stated that Hobbes followed his infamous custom of contextual obfuscation in each instance within the *“Review and Conclusion”* that the wisdom of obedience to a conqueror is disputed by him. The natural corollary of such a practice when noted by the reader is to question whether the object can logically be related to any definable moment in history. However, when certainty is the only acceptable parameter in such an investigation, relying upon the implication that a conqueror has achieved victory in the English Civil War is not a viable judgment to make. In the first chapter of the second part of the *Leviathan* entitled “Of Commonwealth”, the methods by which Hobbes considered one to have legitimately acquired sovereignty were expounded. The description appended to the first way: “by Naturall force”<sup>191</sup>, though not literally classified by Hobbes as Conquest, was dictated by the exact principle that enabled the former:

The attaining to this Sovereign Power, is by two ways. One, by Naturall force; as when a man maketh his children, to submit themselves, and their children to his government, as being able to destroy them if they refuse, or by warre subdueth enemies to his will giving them their lives on that condition”<sup>192</sup>.

Within its intrinsic meaning, it is hardly at variance with:

“So that Conquest (to define it) is the Acquiring of the Right of Sovereignty by Victory. Which Right, is acquired, in the peoples Submission, by which they contract with the Victor, promising Obedience, for Life and Liberty”<sup>193</sup>.

In both iterations of the acquisition of sovereign authority by “force” or “conquest”, victory in war was the process of enablement for the arrogation of this power to the conqueror. Neither of the instances in which this manner of sovereign ascendancy is discussed, can be said to have been necessitated by Hobbes’s recognition of a climax being brought to the fighting in the English Civil War.

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<sup>191</sup> *Ibid*, 97.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid*, 97.

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid*, 383.

In a chapter succeeding the statement of “Naturall force” as a means to attaining sovereign power, Hobbes would repine about the misery still being wrought upon the Kingdoms of England and Scotland by the Civil Wars. Therefore, we cannot treat the subject of sovereign acquisition by “force” or “conquest” as a positive signification that Hobbes is speaking exclusively within the context of a definite end that had come to the English Civil War. Perceiving that Hobbes had interposed “the Civile warres” within a chapter exhibiting such heavy connotations of a state of war made redundant by a conquering entity achieving victory. A perfunctory gaze could be misconstruing this as a sign that Hobbes was writing this final extract of *Leviathan* in a moment where the first tentative rays of peace were descending upon the former dominions of the Stuart Dynasty.

However, these passages elaborating upon the restoration of sovereignty by military victory appear in the guise of an apology or set of instructions, for those who wish to obtain moral justification for submission in the event of a potential conquest. This is exactly how Hobbes defined the purpose of his *Review and Conclusion* in the extract of “Reputation and Manners” which was examined in the introduction to this thesis<sup>194</sup>.

The frugality which seemed to rule Hobbes when giving any positive affirmation that his text was contextually linked to the progression of the Civil War, did not prevent him from providing his readers with a visible taxonomy of evidence proving that this was his intention. One would harbour some expectation that his acknowledgment of the termination Civil War he had cited on multiple occasions would be commensurately less vague. A page earlier in the “*Review and Conclusion*”, the excavation of a genuine past tense reference appeared to be a certainty. But Hobbes’s comprehension of the English Civil War as a plurality of conflicts, or “warres” firmly repudiates this fallacy. The “late” war of which Hobbes spoke in this instance, was merely one of the “warres” that had come to an end, which had been recognised by Hobbes as an historical part of the phenomenon the English Civil War as a whole. One war, or phase of the conflict may have ended, but the wars and the state of nature had not yet finished challenging Hobbes and his contemporaries. This is substantiated powerfully by the final reference located within the very final block of dialogue located within the *Leviathan*.

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<sup>194</sup> Hobbes, *Reputation Of*, 420-421.

**Present tense in *Leviathan* concluding remarks:**

“And thus I have brought to an end my Discourse of Civill and Ecclesiasticall Government, occasioned by the disorders of the present time”<sup>195</sup>

In this extract from the closing paragraph on the final page of the *Leviathan*, Hobbes summarised without any obfuscation that the disorders (or the civil unrest within the Stuart realm) was the impulse that effectively gave birth to the work we have before us. The argumentation assembled above sought to give a meticulous demonstration of how an empirically verifiable interpretation of the state of nature can be given a solid foundation in reality beyond merely a metaphysical one.

Specifically, it is when filtered through the personal perspective of the Civil War from Hobbes himself that we can accrete together from scattered fragments of text concerning those events. If we trust that Hobbes has spoken to us candidly through his written word, there is no reticence around the issue some may have of reading what is printed before us literally. The sincerity, the gravity of Hobbes’s conviction as he composed this incredible work is the predicate upon which, perhaps recklessly, the credibility of the thesis has been gradually permitted to be built. That Hobbes was speaking of what he understood to be an empirical truth each time he made the state of nature the focus of his discourse, is the ultimate truth this entire system of arguments seeks to validate.

Thankfully, there is no dearth of material to be converted into the potential life-force of this embryonic truth. From the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan*, we can establish definitively for the first time in this text that Hobbes believed the state of nature and the English Civil War to have existed across perfectly coterminous trajectories of time. This thematic conjunction was transformed into an intimate conceptual symbiosis when Hobbes stipulated that there “many places” where the state of nature was happening “now”, and that all places that had degenerated into civil war ought to be recognised as an example of it. We know from references in previous and subsequent chapters, that Hobbes clearly regarded the Civil War as something that was happening “now” by his advocacy of the present tense when introducing it into his discourse. Certainly, within the context of the *Leviathan* at least, we were able to behold a seamless linguistic and conceptual blending of “Civille Warre” and “state of nature”. Making the logic that all references to civil war ought to be treated as references to the state of nature a highly sound method of interpreting these parts of Hobbes’s political philosophy.

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<sup>195</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 386.

Now, with the reference to the “disorders of the present time” cited above, there can be no error over the presence of the Civil War and the state of nature in proximity to Hobbes’s conscience as he guided *Leviathan* through to its concluding remarks. Hobbes, as can be readily obtained from this discourse would disguise the Civil War under an epithet when it suited his whim to do so: for example, “dispute of the sword”. After the corpus of the text has been so heavily saturated with naked allusions and ostentatious portents concerning the Civil War, it does not seem like an adventurous feat of conjecture when asserting that beneath the crude semblance of the “disorders” reside the Civil Wars.

Once this is accepted, it is possible to establish that the state of nature was, to Hobbes at least, a ubiquitous and cognitively energising presence throughout the composition of his *Leviathan*. The dubiousness that has chronically hindered the beleaguered remark of the thirteenth chapter from being viewed critically as a pure expression of Hobbes’s commitment to the existence of the state of nature has been removed. It was no capricious brain spasm or epistemic anomaly left by Hobbes, but a conscious affirmation of the idea that the state of nature reflected the frequently terrible vicissitudes of human experience upon earth. Set within a vibrant system created to legitimise the state of nature as not only a philosophical, but an empirical truth. Hobbes harboured no pretensions to omniscience or infallibility. To the contrary, when it concerned the state of nature, Hobbes was insistent that his reader did not rely vicariously on the fruits of his reasoning if they happened to find it inadequate. Hobbes exhorted every potentially irresolute reader to go forth into the world, to reach into their own memory to find the experience which equated to a greater extent with his description of the state of nature.

“It may seem strange to some man, that has not well weighed these things; that Nature should thus disassociate, and render men apt to invade, and destroy one another: and he may therefore, not trusting to this Inference, made from the Passions, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience. Let him therefore consider with himself...<sup>196</sup>”

“And he may therefore, desire perhaps to have the same confirmed by Experience”<sup>197</sup> Experience as history, the memory of things past, or even those things currently happening was the empirical conduit which transported the state of nature into reality. Those of Hobbes’s readers who had knowledge of the Civil War, or the plight of Christian Commonwealths throughout Europe, were invited to consult with these experiences to validate the state of nature for themselves.

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<sup>196</sup> *Ibid*, 69.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid*, 69.

“Let him therefore consider with himself”. Hobbes had convivially cast down the gauntlet to any of his readers who were mistrustful of his exposition of the state of nature and invited them to derive a more appropriate method of explaining it from what life at that time could furnish for them.

To Professor Evrigenis, the invitation issued by Hobbes to his readers to consider the potential realities of the state of nature for themselves deserved to be called “thought experiments”<sup>198</sup>. With only a perfunctory gaze, the presence of this phrase represents something seriously antithetical. To experiment upon a concept within the boundaries of our thought alone is to confine it to a purely hypothetical reality. What Evrigenis’s adoption of this term seems to connote is the ultimate disenfranchisement of the state of nature from any empirical existence. Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that Hobbes did not invite his readers to think for themselves about the state of nature situations he presented to them. In the act of thinking about the examples Hobbes gave of the state of nature, are we ourselves not opting into the “thought experiment” concept?

The definition of the state of nature as a “thought experiment” certainly seems to be grounded within the text, this point is not worth challenging. However, it would be remiss to accept the limitation of the state of nature to the vitiated form existence as a mere “thought experiment” would afford it. That Hobbes was treating the examples he enumerated for the existence of the state of nature as empirical conditions has been explicitly stated. The definition of the state of nature as a “thought experiment” shall be concurred with, but only as one aspect of the state of nature’s existential capability.

Professor Evrigenis also inclined unequivocally toward a perspective of the state of nature that was multifaceted and existentially versatile. To him, the collection of examples from the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan* ought to show us that the state of nature “is not simply some far off land, an irrelevant exercise in antiquarianism, or a thought experiment, but a condition that one may encounter daily, in one form or another”<sup>199</sup>. For those of us ruminating upon these things in the relatively peaceful idyll of modern life, Hobbes’s place in history and the place of his intended readers must be remembered. Between the Thirty Years War and the English Civil War Period, the lives of many of his contemporaries had been encompassed by experience or rumour of war. To Evrigenis, these historical behemoths were “offered vivid reminders” of the perils of the state of nature to any who would doubt it<sup>200</sup>.

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<sup>198</sup> Evrigenis, *Images of Anarchy*, 2, 244.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid*, 244.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid*, 244.

The Civil War was merely one of a multitude of case studies Hobbes afforded to guide the reader toward the realisation he thought to be ineluctable. The basic premise of this thesis is that it is the optimal case study for any Hobbesian critic, who may believe that his commitment to expounding an empirically real definition of the state of nature is built upon unstable foundations.

Hobbes seemed to have envisioned only one serious cause for anyone wishing to keep the state of nature suspended in this conceptual abeyance between reality and imagination. Simply that they had not contemplated, or “weighed” it well enough<sup>201</sup>.

The existential capacity of the state of nature can be expanded to incalculable proportions by understanding that it was as indivisible from Hobbes’s conceptualisation of civil war, as the prerogatives of sovereignty were from each other. Granted, Hobbes had elucidated us to the many divergent forms that the state of nature could take. Therefore, the state of nature cannot rightfully be called a condition of civil war in all instances. The kings of independent sovereign states cannot be said to be at civil war with each other when a situation of open warfare has supervened between them<sup>202</sup>.

Hobbes’s command was that all instances of civil war regardless of the time, location and the factions contesting for the supremacy, ought, within the context of his political philosophy be identified as physical manifestations of the state of nature. Any example of civil war from history, or hypothetically generated would suffice to fulfil the conceptual template created by Hobbes. That is why the English Civil War has been selected as the paragon of the state of nature, the exemplar of all examples. It was not an artefact of history or an eloquent fiction. In the period of time Hobbes was elaborating on state of nature in the *Leviathan*, the war had driven in his friend Francis Godolphin to his death. It was making the kingdoms he once called home miserable. Hobbes was able to present the state of nature as a familiar, imminent and relatable threat when it was assimilated within the Civil War.

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<sup>201</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 69.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid*, 69-70.

5) Examining the connection between the condition of civil war and the state of nature in *Elements of Law and De Cive*

In the previous section of this thesis, the chief concern was to illuminate the highly intimate connection Hobbes had formed between his state of nature concept and the condition of civil war. This was accomplished by demonstrating how the language he used made the state of nature a descriptive template for an empirically, and historically verifiable reality. Furthermore, how this was the best means of understanding why Thomas Hobbes's philosophical commitment to the existence of the state of nature should be taken seriously.

A continuous emphasis was placed upon the English Civil War, as the superlative of various empirical settings Hobbes had introduced to bring the state of nature to life in the mind of his readers. The Civil War was selected to be the exemplar of all examples, because there was a contextual depth between them that Hobbes had failed to express toward any of the alternative case studies that he presented for the state of nature. Through the conduit of civil war, Hobbes considered the state of nature to be happening at the moment he was writing those very words.

Such was also the case with the example he gave of the indigenous peoples of America. All times that civil war had manifested and the primitive civilisation of the indigenous peoples of America were two of the "many places" Hobbes perceived as having brought the state of nature into existence. Yet the superiority and greater relevance of civil war as an example of the state of nature upon earth was demonstrated through the sheer disparity in the attention Hobbes had given it in his discourse. The comparison with the attention received by the example of the "savage peoples of America" is stark. As the previous chapter should have exhibited clearly, the example of civil war was deemed pertinent enough by Hobbes to be a point of reference from the beginning of the *Leviathan* to the very final paragraph.

The indigenous peoples of America, however, after being raised to prominence in the chapter containing Hobbes's formal description of the "Naturall Condition of Mankind" would not grace the page again until the passage in which Hobbes ruminated upon "The Beginning and Progresse of Philosophy"<sup>203</sup>. Within this theme, the "Savages of America"<sup>204</sup> would be accorded some minor significance. Their presence being necessary so that Hobbes could appraise their philosophical credentials. They were "not without some good Moral Sentences"<sup>205</sup> and they "have a little

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<sup>203</sup> *Ibid*, 361.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid*, 361.

<sup>205</sup> *Ibid*, 361.

Arithmetick, to adde, and divide in Numbers not too great"<sup>206</sup>. However, despite these promising qualities, the standards imposed by Hobbes in this instance for the attainment of philosophy eluded them: "But they are not therefore Philosophers"<sup>207</sup>. Thus concluded the participation of the indigenous peoples of America in the exposition of Hobbesian political philosophy found in *Leviathan*.

The significance of such an appearance, though proving that Hobbes had not entirely forsaken it as a philosophically relevant construct, is negligible compared to the impression left by Hobbes's excessive treatment of the Civil War in his final treatise.

It had been asserted in the previous chapter, that Hobbes's acute receptiveness to the vicissitudes of civil discord in the Stuart Dominions was the motivational force that compelled Hobbes to officially incorporate civil war into his definition of the state of nature. Before *Leviathan*, the idea that Hobbes had not "explicitly" revealed any connection between the state of nature and civil war was raised by Professor Ioannis Evrigenis<sup>208</sup>.

To become fully cognizant of the extent to which this is true, the way Hobbes defined the state of nature in his earlier political treatises must be explored thoroughly. If the veracity of Evrigenis's assertion is proven and the condition of civil war is not subject to the same confidence that Hobbes's would show it in *Leviathan*, any of the alternative ways Hobbes attempted to validate the existence of the state of nature must be examined. By doing so, the initiative of the thesis to demonstrate the consistency of Hobbes's conviction in the existence of the state of nature can be pressed further without having to rely exclusively on his reaction to the English Civil War as a foundation for his belief. Taking the supposed absence of the condition of civil war from the definition of the state of nature in these earlier works into account, the point to accentuate is that Hobbes was no less serious about guiding his reader toward the realisation that the state of nature was an empirical and dangerous reality.

Hobbes's understanding of what he believes to be the society of the indigenous peoples of America enjoys an impressive longevity as an instantiation of the state of nature. Hobbes would construct two variants of the state of nature before civil war would be formally assimilated into the existential framework of the concept found in *Leviathan*. In the two iterations of the state of nature that were created before *Leviathan*, the society of the indigenous peoples of America would be the only empirical setting produced by Hobbes that would be set in the present tense. The correlation

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<sup>206</sup> *Ibid*, 361

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid*, 361.

<sup>208</sup> Evrigenis, *Images of Anarchy*, 194.

between Hobbes's utilisation of the present tense and the state of nature was explained fastidiously. The conclusion reached about this linguistic phenomenon was, that the present tense functioned as a method of interlocution for Hobbes's true perception about the existence of the state of nature.

Therefore, the same linguistic principles established in the previous chapter shall govern the treatment of any instance in which Hobbes delivers a remark concerning the state of nature in the present tense in the ensuing analysis. As in the previous chapter, the recognition of Hobbes's application of the present tense to the state of nature shall be converted into an epistemic litmus test. Enabling us to determine the commitment of Hobbes to the state of nature as an empirical truth, certainly more accurately than if such a deduction were to be made from any secondary account published about Hobbes's state of nature. A surgeon tasked with gauging the asperity of a brain tumour would be pronounced insane if he declared that the extraction of a nail particle from the left thumb were all that he required to form his prognosis.

**The introduction of the example of the indigenous peoples of America into Hobbes's early philosophy:**

**From *Elements of Law*:** "The estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature itself is destroyed, and men kill one another (as we know that it is, both by experience of savage nations that live at this day, and by the histories of our ancestors"<sup>209</sup>.

**From *De Cive*:** "But it is easily judg'd how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of Mankind, or of each single Man, a perpetuall War is: But it is perpetuall in its own nature, because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by Victory: for in this state the Conquerour is subject to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a Miracle, if any, even the most strong should close up his life with many years, and old age. They of America are Examples hereof, even in this present Age: Other Nations have been in former Ages, which now are indeed become Civill, and Flourishing"<sup>210</sup>.

As in *Leviathan*, the example of the indigenous peoples of America are delivered confidently in the present tense. Yet his perception of this setting seems to be the only instrument used by Hobbes at this point in the development of the state of nature to give it any validation in his present world.

With Professor Evrigenis, the problem with the example of the indigenous peoples of America is the distance this problem would have been from the readers Hobbes sought to convince with it:

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<sup>209</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 80.

<sup>210</sup> Hobbes, *De Cive*, 4.

It “might prove that such a condition had existed or that it even exists”, but the example of the indigenous Americans “do not prove that it is one that Hobbes’s readers need to worry about”<sup>211</sup>. More egregiously, “If that of the contemporary savages shows that the state of nature still existed, it nevertheless did so by showing that it existed far away”<sup>212</sup>. Yet the point behind elucidating this example of the indigenous Americans is not to gauge its efficacy, but to harness it as evidence that Hobbes was still committed, in the absence of Civil War, to an empirically viable conception of the state of nature.

From the brevity of the language that Hobbes utilised to present his point about the primitive Americans, its position within Hobbes’s mind as a self-evident truth requiring little explanation is apparent. “As we know that it is” is unmistakably a fiat, delivered not exactly in a peremptory way, but categorical enough for us to know that Hobbes would have permitted no compromise upon it. Bringing “Know” and “It is” into focus allow us to capture Hobbes’s confidence and resolution in this information perfectly. Hobbes is laying down a commandment, rather than tentatively floating a pliable strand of thought that the reader can openly dispute with him. From this extract of Hobbes’s description of the state of nature within *Elements of Law*, the conclusion that Hobbes unequivocally believed that his state of nature existed can be taken with little apprehension. His commitment to the exemplification of his state of nature concept through the behaviour of the indigenous peoples of America, is as absolute as it would be for the example of civil war in *Leviathan*.

The treatment of the example of the indigenous peoples of America in *De Cive* is even more succinct than *Elements*. However, the conviction of Hobbes was no less powerfully articulated, in spite of the greater dearth of language we can clearly observe around the conveyance of the point. The diminished expenditure of language when Hobbes described the connection between the society of primitive Americans and the state of nature, rather than suggesting a crisis of faith, shows how his confidence in this example had been reinforced since he had first stipulated it. Saying that the indigenous peoples “are examples” of the state of nature, was no less a forceful declaration of allegiance than “know” or “It is”. It is merely a more concise way of communicating it. Perhaps Hobbes, being conscious of having explained it in his previous treatise, determined that this abbreviated form was sufficient. Ultimately, that Hobbes believed his concept required such a minimal amount of argumentation to validate it to the reader, strongly betrayed his brazen certainty that it would be embraced as an absolute and indisputable truth. The fact that Hobbes did not waver

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<sup>211</sup> Evrigenis, *Images of Anarchy*, 75.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid*, 75.

in his devotion to the example of the indigenous peoples of America in over a decade of intellectual development, proved that his commitment to it transcended beyond ordinary belief.

Furthermore, as he would years later when composing *Leviathan*, both within *Elements of Law* and *De Cive*, we can observe the native American example introduced in the present tense. The significance of this has been belaboured to an excess in the previous chapter. However, it is still essential to reiterate that wherever Hobbes applied the present tense to a description of the state of nature, we are dealing with a phenomenon that he believed to be incumbent at the very moment he was writing about it. Not a hypothetical, rhetorical, or abstract construct. Hobbes was reminding the reader that the state of nature was not merely an artefact of history, or the vagary of his imagination. The people that he understood to be the living avatars of this condition “live at this day”- “even in this Present Age”. At this moment in time, Hobbes’s perception of the way that the indigenous peoples of America lived, was no less an absolute proof that the state of nature could become a part of the terrestrial experience of the modern human being, as civil war became at the time he was writing *Leviathan*.

The condition of civil war, so pervasive a validating instrument in the *Leviathan*, was not given even the most cursory attention in either of these expositions of the state of nature. Negating the absence of any explicit affirmation of a connection between the state of nature and civil war from Hobbes in these instances, it is still possible for a logical precedent to be established in favour of it. The empirical nucleus at the centre of any Hobbesian definition of the state of nature is war. Whether it was in *Elements or De Cive*, the conceptual symbiosis Hobbes had envisioned between war and the State of nature was cogently and succinctly stated:

**From *Elements of Law*:** “The estate of men in this natural liberty is the state of war”<sup>213</sup>.

**From *De Cive*:** “It cannot be deny’d but that the natural state of men, before they entr’d into Society, was meer War”<sup>214</sup>.

**From *Leviathan*:** Out Of Civil States, There Is Alwayes Warre Of Every One Against Every One Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, is as of every man, against every man”<sup>215</sup>.

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<sup>213</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 168.

<sup>214</sup> Hobbes, *De Cive*, 4.

<sup>215</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 68.

The way that Hobbes would linguistically, and therefore conceptually blend war with the state of nature, prefigured the blending of civil war and the state of nature that would be implemented in the *Leviathan*. Between war and the state of nature, occurred a blending that could more properly be called a fusion compared with that which we can witness with civil war. All instances of the state of nature are classified by Hobbes as forms of war, and vice versa. A complete and flawless epistemic union. Civil war, however, though in essence a form of war and therefore an instance of the state of nature, cannot describe a state of nature generally. Due to the absurdity that would be incurred of classifying all cases of war as civil war. A distinction Hobbes himself would be careful to illustrate in *Leviathan*.

Nevertheless, the silence of Hobbes over the matter of civil war, and its relationship with the state of nature in his earlier works could be turned to the advantage of a person seeking to discover some tangible connection between the two that predated *Leviathan*. It is true that Hobbes, in either of these expositions, did not state explicitly that civil war ought to be construed as an example of the state of nature. Yet the logical trajectory upon which one could arrive at such a conclusion had been clearly drawn by Hobbes himself. Civil war could quite simply be said to qualify as an expression of the state of nature, due to its intrinsic quality as a universally accepted variation of war.

Though this verdict does not seem to transgress against the logical principles set by Hobbes in any way, the realistic force generated by the assimilation of civil war into the general definition of the state of nature in either of these texts is diluted by the fact that Hobbes's language around war is purely metaphysical. In *Leviathan*, the emphasis is upon a state of war that is happening in many places, now, whereas the two versions of the state of nature that preceded it contained no empirical tissue that allowed the reader to transfix this definition of war into reality. Nevertheless, that any tangible correlation between the state of nature and civil war had not been properly established by Hobbes in either of the state of nature descriptions from *Elements and De Cive* is highly problematic. Furthermore, placing our faith in a plausible syllogism: (all instances of the state of nature are classified as war, civil war is classified as war, therefore, civil war ought to be classified as an example of the state of nature), would fail to alleviate the logical barrier erected by Hobbes's silence on the matter.

Without identifying a more explicitly written affirmation of the correlation between the state of nature and civil war in either of these texts, the viability of this connection is entrusted to something as unstable as an extrapolation. Therefore, a more puissant vehicle of logic must be constructed to transport this vital correlation from mere possibility, into the realm of certitude. From our reading of *Leviathan*, it was established that one of the contingencies that witnessed a society regress back into the state of nature was the civil war that would result from an attempt to divide the authority of the

sovereign between two or more political factions. Hobbes was unequivocal about the level of accountability he ascribed to this kind of struggle in England for the outbreak of the Civil Wars.

Coming to an understanding that Hobbes had created an integrated system of causality for both the state of nature and civil war, was a realisation that enabled a more intimate conceptual unity to be forged between them. Such a result could possibly be obtained by delving into the system of causation Hobbes fashioned around civil war in his earlier political treatises. If the scope of the analysis is permitted to expand beyond the chapters in which the state of nature is formally described in each of these earlier works, it may be possible to uncover that it actually possessed a far more advanced level of conceptual intimacy with the state of nature originally.

As in *Leviathan*, if positive evidence of this deeper conceptual unity can be obtained from his earlier texts, a more cogent linkage between the state of nature and the condition of civil war can be proposed without having to nurture any kind of conjecture-based indeterminacy. Most propitiously, Hobbes was as explicit in his vilification of civil war in the two earlier parts of the political doctrine that he composed before the *Leviathan*.

**Hobbes as he summarised civil war from the *Elements of Law*:** “The greatest inconvenience that can happen to a commonwealth, is the aptitude to dissolve into civil war”<sup>216</sup>.

**Civil war as summarised by Hobbes from *De Cive*:** “Civill War, and the Right of the private Sword, which certainly is much worse than any subjection whatsoever”<sup>217</sup>.

Civil war as a representation of the physical death of a political state has already been identified as one of the fundamental impressions that Hobbes propagated about the condition of civil war in general from the *Leviathan*. Hobbes emphasised that a commonwealth, or state, ceased to exist the moment civil war commenced and the people who were once subject to this sovereign power were now returned to the state of nature. Within *Leviathan*, the forthright manner Hobbes advocated when revealing the conceptual relationship that existed between the state of nature and the condition of civil war made the recognition of this theme an exercise in simple dialectal arithmetic. Civil war was the death of the commonwealth. The state of nature was happening in many places, at this moment, such as in all commonwealths that have degenerated into civil war. It was simple because Hobbes’s usage of the term: civil war, was on the whole, very consistent.

In the effort to have the symbiosis between civil war and the state of nature revealed by Hobbes in the two earlier instalments of his political philosophy, the language we encounter has impeded,

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<sup>216</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 140.

<sup>217</sup> Hobbes, *De Cive*, 37.

rather than expedited this procedure. The terminological consolidation which proved so accommodating in the harvesting of *Leviathan*, proved to be, as it were, a linguistic diaspora in its predecessors. Hobbes introduced a set of nomenclature that could potentially have been configured to be synonymous with civil war. Though the varying terminology carry within them similar connotations to civil war, the appearance of an entirely different word where one thought it more contextually appropriate is potentially disorientating. Therefore, a ratification of this nomenclature performe must be conducted if some semblance of logic is to be preserved.

From the summary of civil war that Hobbes provided in the *Elements of Law*, the term “dissolve” is most worthy of attention. If dissolution occurs when the commonwealth transitions from a peaceful condition into one of civil war, we can safely ascertain that Hobbes envisioned the complete demise of the commonwealth once civil war had supervened. Now a tentative connection between the state of nature and civil war can be secured. For, in the chapter concerning the “Estate and Right of Nature”, the state of all people outside of civil society was that of nature<sup>218</sup>. If this society, once peaceful and intact, has been dissolved by civil war, the people residing within are transported into the state of nature. If a commonwealth cannot subsist once civil war breaks out within it, how can these people so afflicted be said to reside anywhere but the state of nature? Hobbes had made the distinction clear enough.

The position to declare that Hobbes had formed a conceptual bond between the state of nature and the condition of civil war, merely after the analysis performed above, is ultimately more favourable. Previously, an unstable logical inference could only be made about this connection. Using the syllogism constructed from the principle that civil war ought to be classified as a state of nature, because Hobbes described the state of nature in essence as war. Now, the possibility that Hobbes would have tacitly concurred to this deduction need no longer be exploited at the risk of betraying the sanctity of his written word. It is present for any reader to behold that: in the transition from peace to the condition of civil war, the commonwealth is dissolved, and the state of nature resumes upon this dissolution. Therefore, under this circumstance, the condition of civil war not being instantaneous, and persisting after the dissolution of the commonwealth, can be classified as an instantiation on the state of nature.

It is at this point, emboldened by the seizure of this small victory, that the troublesome variance in the nomenclature pertaining to civil war must be confronted. It is of great advantage to be reminded that Hobbes equated civil war with the physical demise of the commonwealth. It shall be argued

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<sup>218</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 77-81.

that Hobbes did so in the *Elements of Law*, but by concealing the term “civil war” under the names of “sedition” and “rebellion”.

Hobbes’s description of the “violent death” of the commonwealth from Chapter XXVII “OF THE CAUSES OF REBELLION” within *Elements of Law*:

“In this chapter I shall show briefly, by what causes, and in what manner, they be again destroyed; not meaning to say anything of the dissolution of a commonwealth from foreign invasions, which is as it were the violent death thereof, I shall speak only of sedition, which is also the death of the commonwealth, but like that which happeneth to a man from sickness and distemper”<sup>219</sup>.

How, indeed, is it possible to discern whether Hobbes was using “civil war”, “rebellion”, and “sedition” interchangeably? Firstly, in the extract above, Hobbes adumbrated two of the fundamental disasters that could destroy a commonwealth: a successful foreign invasion and sedition. As we know, Hobbes would specify in a later chapter of *Elements of Law*, that civil war represented the dissolution of the commonwealth. If there was a distinction in Hobbes’s reckoning between civil war and sedition as divergent circumstances that brought a commonwealth to its demise, would not “civil war” be present alongside “foreign invasions” and “sedition” in Hobbes’s exposition? It is a highly plausible assertion that Hobbes deemed the mention of civil war alongside sedition completely ultroneous, because in his comprehension, civil war was indistinguishable from sedition. Consulting the wider context of Hobbes’s political philosophy can motivate a greater understanding of this.

In the extract above, Hobbes analogised the death of a commonwealth by sedition as like that of a man eventually succumbing to sickness. That the death of the commonwealth results, and the state of nature resumes is the point worth commending to memory. In *Leviathan*, a similar concept can be encountered: “Sedition, Sickness”<sup>220</sup>. However, immediately succeeding this, comes the notorious: “Civill War, Death”<sup>221</sup>. Witnessing civil war and sedition side by side in a brief explanation of how a commonwealth can be deprived of life, surely contravenes the former point. Demonstrating that, Hobbes did indeed conceive of a linguistic, and therefore conceptual distinction between civil war and sedition.

Nevertheless, there is a substantial level of descriptive congruence between the state of nature, civil war and sedition which reinforce the claim that Hobbes perceived no significant disparity of epistemological meaning between them. Foremost, in the dissolution of the peaceful

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<sup>219</sup> *Ibid*, 162-63.

<sup>220</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan*, 3.

<sup>221</sup> *Ibid*, 3.

commonwealth, that entire triumvirate encapsulate the causation, fact and consequence of its death. Even if there is a discrepancy of time to be considered between the act(s) of sedition and the outbreak of the civil war, in the understanding of Hobbes, this does not dislocate the cause from the effect at all. But rather establishes a stronger continuity. The time-sensitive definition of war that Hobbes devised in *Elements of Law*, which he refined in *De Cive and Leviathan* ought to be a sufficient means of articulating this.

The Hobbesian definition of war from *Elements of Law*:

“For WAR is nothing else but that time wherein the will and intention of contending by force is either by words or actions sufficiently declared”<sup>222</sup>.

The Hobbesian definition of war from *De Cive*:

“For what is WAR, that same time in which the will of contesting by force, is fully declar’d either by Words or Deeds?”<sup>223</sup>.

The Hobbesian definition of war from *Leviathan*:

“For WARRE consisteth not in Battel onely, of the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the Will to contend by Battell is sufficiently known: and therefore the notion of Time is to be considered in the nature of Warre”<sup>224</sup>.

For those who may not regard the act or process of sedition as rightfully part of the event of the civil war, it is certainly part of that continuity of rebellion, in which the will and intention to contend with the sovereign for the supreme authority is sufficiently known. Few historians would dispute the relevance of a discussion concerning the causation and approach to a civil war in a discourse about the war proper. Whether Hobbes classified sedition as a separate entity from the actual vicissitudes of a civil war, or as a sobriquet for civil war itself, in either contingency, sedition remains a vital component in the regression of a peaceful commonwealth back into the state of nature.

Hobbes regarded sedition and civil war synonymously, is an assertion which we derived from his chapter on the causes of rebellion from *Elements of Law*. Further elucidation of this linguistic compaction can be obtained from *Leviathan*. From this remark, written in a style highly redolent of Bacon in his *Essays*, Hobbes’s description of sedition, certainly within the context of his political theory, are more befitting of civil war.

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<sup>222</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 80.

<sup>223</sup> Hobbes, *De Cive*, 4.

<sup>224</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 68-69.

“And From Distrust Of Their Own Wit” from Chapter XI of *Leviathan*:

“Men that distrust their own subtilty, are in tumult, and sedition, better disposed for victory, than they that suppose themselves wise, or crafty. For these love to consult, the other (fearing to be circumvented) to strike first. And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell, to hold together, and use all the advantages of force, is a better stratagem, than any that can proceed from subtilty of Wit”<sup>225</sup>.

In this passage, there are two ways in which Hobbes speaks of sedition as if it were actually civil war. He remarks that men distrusting their own wit in the act of sedition are “better disposed for victory”. Particularly if we address the “*Review and Conclusion*” of the *Leviathan*, it is possible to understand the great extent to which Hobbes associated the concept of “victory” with civil war. There is a particular point, in which we find Hobbes exercising his disappointment that the Civil War transpiring in England had failed to educate his contemporaries about the obedience lawfully due a conqueror by a subject of a conquered nation. Within this dialogue (centred on the rights of a conqueror in a civil war), we find that Hobbes’s conception of victory is frequently utilised to encapsulate both the act of conquest and the right gained from the conquest itself.

1. “Conquest, is not the Victory it self; but the Acquisition by Victory, of a Right, over the persons of men”<sup>226</sup>.
2. “But he that upon the promise of Obedience, hath his Life and Liberty allowed him, is then Conquered, and a Subject, and not before. The Romanes used to say, that their Generall had Pacified such a Province, that is to say, in English, Conquered it, and that the Countrey was Pacified by Victory”<sup>227</sup>.
3. “Likewise, if a man, when his Country is conquered, be out of it, he is not Conquered, nor Subject: but if at his return, he submit to the Government, he is bound to obey it. So that Conquest (to define it) is the Acquiring of the Right of Sovereignty by Victory. Which Right, is acquired, in the peoples Submission, by which they contract with the Victor, promising Obedience, for life and Liberty”<sup>228</sup>.

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<sup>225</sup> *Ibid*, 55.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid*, 382.

<sup>227</sup> *Ibid*, 382.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid*, 383.

It may be perfectly rational to conclude that Hobbes could conceive of the possibility of victory in sedition and civil war, political circumstances that are entirely separate, but equally fatal to a peaceful commonwealth. But there is too flawless a similitude in the characteristics that were ascribed to sedition and civil war by Hobbes, for any sense to be made from these admittedly different words conveying separate meanings within this context. However, the similitude evinced between the identifiable characteristics of sedition and civil war may not yet prove to be enough to compel a reader toward the approbation of their linguistic concord. Nevertheless, there can be procured from *Elements of Law* a passage which Hobbes (prefiguring the remark from *Leviathan* cited above), spoke frankly about the aptitude of those deficient in wit to achieve victory in civil war/sedition from those with more refined intellectual capabilities.

“And when there was any contention between the finer and coarser wits, (as there often hath been in times of sedition and civil war) for the most part these latter carried away the victory and as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour than they give to others, it cannot be imagined how they can possibly live in peace”<sup>229</sup>

There is little detail of significance to distinguish this passage from its contemporary from *Leviathan*. The only detail that is absent from the version expounded in the *Elements of Law*, is the fact Hobbes was struck by the necessity of elaborating upon why those who “distrust their own subtility” or of “coarser wits” are more apt to seize the victory in civil war/sedition. In relation to the principle we are attempting to establish, the version from *Elements* proved to be the more didactic. The concept of victory, which Hobbes has associated with sedition and civil war separately in *Leviathan*, has been introduced in reference to both circumstances simultaneously. If sedition and civil war could be credited with even the slightest degree of conceptual autonomy within the context of Hobbes’s philosophical system; it is highly incongruous that Hobbes (the paragon of logic and order), would not take the care to define them individually. Thus, to create a better deterrent than a mere exchange of lexis for a reader who might, for whatever reason seek to find some epistemic harmony between them. If Hobbes regarded sedition as merely the seed “sickness” of civil war and the eventual death of the commonwealth, why would Hobbes give a prognostication of victory in the sedition if a man distrusted his own wit if a civil war would follow closely upon the heels of it? Surely the anticipation of victory ought to be more appropriate within the context of a discussion about the fortunes in a civil war proper, and not merely its prefatory episode. Finally, Hobbes remarked upon the ubiquity of battle for men involved in sedition: “And in sedition, men being alwayes in the procincts of Battell”. If sedition were not an alternative way to refer unto a civil war proper, would not the reality of men

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<sup>229</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 93.

being constantly in the premises of battle with one another be more pertinent to a description of civil war itself? After all, Hobbes instructed us to identify as war/civil war, any situation in which the will or intention to contend by battle was manifestly declared by word or action. What is sedition if not the will or intention of a faction to arrogate to themselves the power that rightfully belongs to their sovereign ruler.

If, as it has been confidently ascertained, that there is in reality, a seamless linguistic blending of the terms “civil war” and “sedition” within the context of Hobbes’s political philosophy. Due to a similar terminological fusion identified between the state of nature and civil war, all manifestations of “sedition” logically ought to be interpreted as references to the state of nature. If civil war and sedition in Hobbes’s mind be one and the same, civil war being an instance of the state of nature would yield a definition of sedition in Hobbesian nomenclature that enjoys a parity of meaning with it. Signifying that, though there was a marked, but ultimately superficial lexical divergence to penetrate, the desired conclusion that the conceptual symbiosis between the state of nature and the condition of civil war preceded the revelation of it in *Leviathan* was eventually achieved. The concept of sedition as a conduit to the state of nature is not something that was introduced in *Elements of Law*, only to be reinstated years later in *Leviathan*. A reading of *De Cive* can also procure positive evidence of this fundamental correlation.

Sedition, Civil War and the State of Nature: from chapter V “Of Dominion, Of the causes and first beginning of civill Government”:

Seeking to prove the existence of “That power, greater than which cannot by men, be convey’d on a man, we can ABSOLUTE”<sup>230</sup>, Hobbes wrote: “This same may be confirm’d by experience in all the Cities which are, or have ever beene,; for though it be sometimes in doubt, what Man, or Counsell, hath the Chief Command, yet ever there is such a Command, and alwayes exercis’d, except in times of Sedition, and Civill War, and then there are two Chief Commands made out of one: Now those seditious persons who dispute against absolute Authority, doe not so much care to destroy it, as to convey it on others; for removing this power, they together take away Civill Society, and a confusion of all things returns”<sup>231</sup>.

As in the examples acquired from *Elements of Law and Leviathan*, sedition and civil war appear contiguously. Observing them as separate terms, it has been addressed before, is a façade. The superficiality of this difference is unveiled when, once more, the information following the appearance of the terms described them simultaneously. Hobbes’s description of the fracturing of

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<sup>230</sup> Hobbes, *De Cive*, 31.

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid*, 31.

absolute authority after sedition and civil war appeared in sequence, referring to a unity of circumstance. Hobbes neglected to provide a unilateral prescription for the consequences of both sedition and civil war upon absolute sovereignty, because there was no alternative situation to clarify. Hobbes leaves us no reason to doubt that the “seditious persons” he postulated could not be culpable in the destruction of civil society, by instigating both sedition and civil war without there being any greater distinction but letters between them.

The adjective “seditious” used within this syntax, is certainly applicable to the “persons” involved in both the sedition and civil war Hobbes was speaking of. If it was not Hobbes’s intention for the adjective “seditious” to be associated those fomenting civil war and sedition alone, would he not have been struck by the exigency of enlisting a more compatible term? Illuminated by this investigation, it is manifest that “sedition” and “civil war” are as synonymous in the common philosophical parlance of Thomas Hobbes as “conquest” and “victory”. With the exception that sedition and civil war, to Hobbes, meant nothing less than the forcible destruction of the commonwealth by the division of the sovereign authority. Conquest and victory, very much antipodal terms, meaning the restoration of the commonwealth by the forcible arrogation of all rights of sovereign authority within one or more persons.

The knowledge that copies of *Elements of Law and De Cive* were in circulation, well before the first effusion of blood in the Civil War is an antediluvian truth. So, surely the connection between the state of nature and civil war, so invigorated by the examination of *Leviathan* can only be diminished from an investigation of texts written in advance of the historical fact? The reality has contravened this expectation, for the composition of these texts reside within the historical scope of the Civil War. This is confirmed by the remarks Hobbes made concerning the existential scope of the Civil War in *Behemoth*, which were examined in the previous chapter.

The only inconvenience one can expect to confront in the endeavour to bring this connection into a position of philosophical credibility, is the linguistic eclecticism of Hobbes’s ratiocinations concerning civil war. Which, if we fail to disabuse ourselves of instantaneously, can beguile us with the delusion that Hobbes meant anything other than civil war when he deployed such nomenclature as: “sedition”, “rebellion”, “tumult” and “right of the sword”. All are but varied lexical shapes, moulded from the same linguistic clay.

The next passage is as “explicit” an affirmation of this connection to be found within the earlier iterations of Hobbes’s political system, within the boundaries of this terminological discord, that Professor Evrigenis could hope for:

“For multitude, though in their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in their designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though they agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to another; yet, in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the state of hostility, and not of peace: like the seditious Jews besieged in Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies, yet fight amongst themselves”<sup>232</sup>.

“Tumult” is a word encountered once before in the course of this analysis. The difference of meaning it has within the language of Hobbesian politics from “sedition”, “rebellion” and thus from “civil war” is purely cosmetic. Therefore, it is to be dismissed with no fear of causing debasement, or distortion to the linguistic parameters that Hobbes had originally instituted for the reader to make sense of his discourse. The “men in tumult” are described by Hobbes as existing in the “state of hostility” amongst themselves. Once again, we discover that another linguistic variation has obtruded the momentum of this deduction.

To ratify that this “state of hostility” Hobbes had interposed here is nothing but another appellation for the state of nature, a return to “Of the Estate and Right of Nature” is warranted. In clause twelve, Hobbes described the state of nature as an “estate of hostility and war”<sup>233</sup>. Therefore, whenever Hobbes spake of a “state of hostility” as he did in the extract above, he was notifying his reader to the presence of the state of nature. Which hath already been shown to be manifested through sedition, i.e, through civil war. How can men, once living within a peaceful commonwealth, who are now in tumult amongst themselves be described in any other state than civil war?

Further corroboration of this equivalence between the state of hostility and civil war can be obtained from the remarks Hobbes made in *Elements* concerning the consequences of succession in a monarchy:

If a monarch should die without his will declared for a successor, Hobbes presumed that it was the will of the monarch for his subjects to “return again to the state of anarchy, that is, to war and hostility”<sup>234</sup>. The purpose of a successor, for the subjects of a deceased monarch Hobbes expounded, was to “bequeath them peace”<sup>235</sup> and to “keep them from sedition amongst themselves”<sup>236</sup>.

In this extract, the “state of anarchy”, or “war and hostility” is directly equated to subjects in “sedition amongst themselves”, or in civil war. Having such terminology following from the other in such intimate proximity, demonstrates the linguistic kinship Hobbes envisioned between them.

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<sup>232</sup> *Hobbes, Elements, 110.*

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid, 80.*

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid, 134.*

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid, 134.*

<sup>236</sup> *Ibid, 134.*

Thus, solidifying the meaning obscured behind this miscellany of different-seeming words: the conceptual association between the state of nature and civil war.

This may yet have failed to persuade of the semantic compatibility between “tumult” and “sedition”. Yet, any dissenter with a serviceable eye could notice that the adjective “seditious” was applied to the historical Jewish renegades that Hobbes incorporated to illustrate his point about men in tumult within a disordered commonwealth rightfully belonging in the state of nature. Furthermore, the most simple but coruscating proof that men who are in tumult within a commonwealth are in a state of civil war with each other, is the intercession of the word “Peace”. These men are in the state of nature “and not of peace”.

If we commend ourselves once more back to the “Of the Estate and Right of Nature”, Hobbes accentuated for us that “the time which is not war is PEACE”<sup>237</sup>. In the dichotomy of war and peace which Hobbes transcribed to us, there is no intermediate territory which one may languish in confusion between them. These men in tumult are “not” at peace with each other, therefore there is a state of war amongst them. Civil war or sedition, either of these terms can solicit an appropriate description without transgressing the operational principles of this thesis.

Furthermore, there is an appendix to the passage cited above. By displaying it, the greatest measure of assurance can be gained from Hobbes that all “men in tumult”, deserving to be charged as “seditious” are languishing in the state of nature.

“Whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men hath done any act: it is to be understood, that every particular man in that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part only. Secondly, though thus assembled with the intention to unite themselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man hath right to everything, and consequently, as hath been said, chap. XIV, sect. 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing: and therefore, meum and tuum hath no place amongst them”<sup>238</sup>.

We ought not to be dismayed in the slightest, by the appearance of, ostensibly, a new condition Hobbes had created for the ordering of human life. This “estate in which every man hath a right to everything” is none other than the state of nature, named by Hobbes for one of its fundamental characteristics in this case. Returning once more to “Of the Estate and Right of Nature” is the remedy needed to prevent the growth of any new linguistic organism. In the state of nature there is a fundamental right of men to everything: i.e “every man by nature hath right to all things”<sup>239</sup>. In this

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<sup>237</sup> *Ibid*, 80.

<sup>238</sup> *Ibid*, 110.

<sup>239</sup> *Ibid*, 79.

instance, “all things” can be concluded to enjoy absolute linguistic parity with “everything”. As a reiteration of the same natural right in the next chapter will avail: “For seeing that by nature every man hath a right to every thing”<sup>240</sup>. Thus, by describing these “men who are in tumult”, as in a “state of hostility amongst themselves”, as “seditious” and “in that estate in which every man hath right to everything” Hobbes firmly situated them within the state of nature. Thus, in a state of civil war.

Finally, the next point which can be exploited to achieve a greater degree of substantiation is the matter of “meum and tuum”. Or, in the roughest translation into English from the original Latine, the lawful institution of “What is mine and what is thine”. The best articulation of “meum” and “tuum” which fastens the linguistic indeterminacy of “tumult” and “civil war” together within the state of nature perfectly is procured not from “Of the Estate and Right of Nature” but a later chapter: “The Incommodities of Several Sorts of Governments Compared”.

Within it, Hobbes explained in exhaustive detail how controversy over “meum and tuum” can lead to the destruction of the sovereign power within a commonwealth and project the subjects of that commonwealth into civil war. “Meum and tuum”, or “propriety”<sup>241</sup>, within the context of Hobbesian political philosophy appears cover roughly what right a person has to possess or “enjoy”<sup>242</sup> anything, once he relinquishes his natural right to everything to a sovereign body upon the foundation of a commonwealth. Hobbes view on propriety, or the right to possess anything within both the state of nature and a civil society is something of a paradox. Hobbes would contend with us that, even though, ostensibly, in the state of nature we have a right to claim anything. This right is in truth, a poisoned chalice. Upon being apprised of the fact that every other person living within this state of nature also may recourse to this indiscriminating right to claim everything (even what we think is our own), we realise we have a right to nothing<sup>243</sup>.

Hobbes explains that our right to propriety in anything, or “meum” and “tuum”, is “derived from the sovereign power”<sup>244</sup>. Meaning that the insuperable might of the sovereign authority over the commonwealth is the only guarantor we have against the despoilation of our property from others. Therefore, what little we may have under the aegis of the government, it is ours by the government’s benevolent protection. Thus, it is in the best interest of any person who cherishes his propriety in anything to maintain the government. Without it to enforce what ought to lawfully belong to whom, there is no true propriety in anything. No government, no commonwealth, the state of nature resumes its dominion over all people who were once secured by the sovereign’s

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<sup>240</sup> *Ibid*, 82.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid*, 137.

<sup>242</sup> *Ibid*, 137.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid*, 137.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid*, 137.

limitless power. Subjects, in light of this, ought to have no quarrel about any tax or contribution a sovereign may invoke upon them. So this (as I construe it from *Elements*), in essence, is Hobbes perspective upon “meum and tuum” and the context that was necessary to establish before making the following citation.

“For the second grievance concerning meum and tuum, it is also none, but in appearance only. It consisteth in this, that the sovereign power taketh from him that which he used to enjoy, knowing no other propriety, but use and custom. But without such sovereign power, the right of men is not propriety to anything, but a community; no better than to have no right at all, as hath been shewed Part I. chap. XIV, sect. 10. Propriety therefore being derived from the sovereign power, is not to be pretended against the same; especially when by it every other subject hath his propriety against every other subject, which when sovereignty ceaseth, he hath not, because in that case they return to war amongst themselves. Those levies therefore which are made upon men’s estates, by the sovereign authority, are no more but the price of that peace and defence which the sovereignty maintaineth for them”<sup>245</sup>.

For any clarification that may be required concerning Hobbes’s consternation about the potentiality of dispute over the sovereign’s right to arbitrate the propriety of their subjects to cause civil war, the chapter “Of the Causes of Rebellion” can be addressed. Any resistance to the right of the sovereign to levy taxation upon their subjects is comprehended by Hobbes under “The third opinion” that can “disposeth men to sedition” (civil war): “That the sovereign power may be divided”<sup>246</sup>. As we know from the previous analysis conducted upon the division of sovereignty, that in Hobbes’s estimation, it constitutes nothing less than the destruction of that sovereign power and subsequently the dissolution of the entire commonwealth.

Considering now the “men who are in tumult”. If “meum and tuum hath no place amongst them”, as Hobbes asserts, then they are in a place where there is no sovereign power, or commonwealth to determine for them what they may lawfully enjoy propriety in. Should sovereignty be “divided” and therefore “ceaseth” as a result of the contumacy of any great number of subjects toward the command of their sovereign concerning meum and tuum. Then they, “in that case return to war amongst themselves”. Thus, are conveyed ignominiously into a state of “tumult”, “sedition”, “rebellion”, “civil war”, “estate of hostility” ad infinitum. The point is, that by piercing through the numerous layers of this linguistic conglomerate that Hobbes has laid before us, the bedrock we eventually strike beneath it is the conceptual symbiosis between the state of nature and civil war.

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<sup>245</sup> *Ibid*, 137.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid*, 166.

It may be an overwhelming constraint of logical finesse to realise the intricacy of the linguistic calculus necessary to construct, if this symbiosis is to seem coherent in any proto-*Leviathan* context. It proves not a little maddening, that Hobbes engaged with the concept of civil war in *Elements of Law* by diffusing it into his discourse through a multitude of synonyms. This virtually polyglot approach to the dissemination of his politics, inevitably makes the assemblage of a solid, adhesive philosophical model necessary to comprehend of the state of nature and the civil war unilaterally. Therefore, the rigorous taxonomizing of all existing nomenclature thought to be conceptually affiliated with civil war was an absolute exigency. The compatibility of the state of nature and the condition of civil war must be fully explicated, if they are to efficiently function as the material elements of a synthetical evaluation of Hobbes's philosophical commitment to the existence of the state of nature. To accomplish this, it was essential that a legitimate, purely textually derived lexicon for the precise interpretation of all possible Hobbesian terminology likely concomitant to civil war was made operational.

Among the miscellany of Hobbesian political lexis, there remains yet one errant linguistic construct to dismantle. The meaning behind Hobbes's utilisation of the word "Sword", ought to be a key point of intervention for any labouring to expand the existential proximities of "civil war" in early Hobbesian political philosophy. For this purpose, attention must be directed into the vicinity of the opening chapter of *De Corpore Poltico*: "Of the Requisites to the Constitution of a Commonwealth". From it we may be made cognisant of the various prerogatives, or "rights" that entail "sovereign power"<sup>247</sup>. Of this set, only two for the present need concern: "the power of judicature"<sup>248</sup> and "the power of defence"<sup>249</sup>. These powers, which belong to every person in accordance with natural right, or in the state of nature. Are relinquished to the sovereign authority, that is concomitantly upon the institution of a commonwealth. Now the sovereign body may be sole judge all legal "controversies"<sup>250</sup> and "deliberations concerning war"<sup>251</sup>. This is because, "every man hath already transferred the use of his strength"<sup>252</sup>, i.e right to dispose of such matters.

The emblem which Hobbes selected to represent the right to harness judicial and military force was that of the "Sword". In the hand of the sovereign disposing of legal business, we have the "sword of justice"<sup>253</sup>. In times which an external, or internal threat arises to assail the tranquillity of the

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<sup>247</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 114.

<sup>248</sup> *Ibid*, 113.

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid*, 113

<sup>251</sup> *Ibid*, 113.

<sup>252</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

<sup>253</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

commonwealth, the sovereign unsheathes the “sword of war”<sup>254</sup>. According to Hobbes: “And consequently those two swords are but one, and that inseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power”<sup>255</sup>. So, now there is the “right of the sword”<sup>256</sup>, which, as explained by Hobbes, may be said to govern the legal ability of the sovereign to dispense of judicial and military force as they think prudent. But how does the comprehension of these two sovereign prerogatives have any epistemic significance when considered within a discussion of the correlation between civil war and the state of nature? The significance begins to materialise when the course of Hobbes’s exposition of sovereign power shifts, to consider what occurs when subjects of the commonwealth arbitrarily reclaim their right to the sword.

A fiat stands out from Hobbes in this dialogue: that “it is unlawful for any private man to make use of his own sword for his security”<sup>257</sup>. This “right of the private sword”<sup>258</sup>, is juxtaposed by Hobbes with “the experience of that miserable estate, to which men are reduced by long war”<sup>259</sup>. This use of the private sword is nothing less than the execution of judicial or military force by subjects who have no right to do so. How this can lead to civil war in a commonwealth derives from what Hobbes called: “The error concerning mixed government”<sup>260</sup>. Hobbes stipulated that it was wrong to deduce a “mixture of sovereignty” from a mixture of government<sup>261</sup>. Though there may be elements of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy blended within a single commonwealth, there is but one of these political elements which embodies the sovereign power<sup>262</sup>. Hobbes predicted that the outcome of any disagreement among the subjects of a commonwealth over “whom they have distributed the rights of sovereign power”<sup>263</sup>, would be civil war.

A “war” within a commonwealth, “wherein the private sword hath place again”<sup>264</sup> is undoubtedly a civil war. If the conflict over the perception of the distribution of sovereign power that leads to war, is between the subjects or citizens of a commonwealth alone, it cannot be any other form of war than civil. For, who else are they fighting but themselves? Hobbes had associated his definition of the private sword with that of the state of nature, and thus civil war at an earlier point in the chapter: “and this is the private sword, and the estate of war again reduced”<sup>265</sup>. The tendency of

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<sup>254</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid*, 112-113.

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid*, 113.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid*, 114.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>259</sup> *Ibid*, 114.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid*, 167.

<sup>261</sup> *Ibid*, 116.

<sup>262</sup> *Ibid*, 116.

<sup>263</sup> *Ibid*, 116.

<sup>264</sup> *Ibid*, 116.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

Hobbes to list terms he disposed of synonymously in a contiguous order is well marked from his treatment of sedition and civil war. That a reference to civil war is behind the usage of term “private sword” in the context of a commonwealth in turmoil is therefore not implausible.

Those with whom responsibility resides for fomenting disagreement over the allocation of sovereign power, Hobbes avers, are those subjects who have “devised a government as they think mixed of three sorts of sovereignty”<sup>266</sup>. The reasoning behind this treacherous attitude, according to Hobbes, is the envisioning of themselves in the “hard condition”<sup>267</sup> of “absolute subjection”<sup>268</sup>, which they also call “slavery”<sup>269</sup>. Therefore to “avoid”<sup>270</sup>, or “ease”<sup>271</sup> this condition of slavery which they equate with unitary sovereign power, they seek to divide the rights of sovereignty between “some great assembly”<sup>272</sup>. One assembly for the creation of new legislation, one for judicial business and the other for the administration of those laws<sup>273</sup>. The familiarity of this to some sequence of English historical events is becoming quite tangible. The attempt to implement this erroneous vision of mixed sovereignty causes the “greatest inconvenience that can happen to a commonwealth”, “the aptitude to dissolve into civil war”, to become a reality:

“And supposing it were so: how were this condition which they called slavery eased thereby? For in this estate they would have no man allowed, either to be his own judge, or own carver, or to make any laws unto himself; as long as these three (assemblies) agree, they are as absolutely subject to them, as a child is to the father, or a slave is to the master in the state of nature. The ease therefore of this subjection, must consist in the disagreement of those, amongst whom they have distributed the rights of sovereign power. The division therefore of the sovereignty, either worketh no effect, to the taking away of simple subjection, or introduceth war; wherein the private sword hath place again. But the truth is, as hath already been shewed in 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 precedent sections: the sovereignty is indivisible; and that seeming mixture of several kinds of government, not the mixture of the things themselves (sovereign powers), but confusion in our understandings, that cannot find out readily to whom we have subjected ourselves”<sup>274</sup>.

The train of this discussion about the capacity of the division of sovereign power within a commonwealth to cause civil war has already carried us toward the chapter: “Of the Causes of

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<sup>266</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>269</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>271</sup> *Ibid*, 116.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid*, 115.

<sup>274</sup> *Ibid*, 116.

Rebellion". But another visitation is pertinent in this context to be reminded of how the "third opinion" that Hobbes denoted to have contained the spark of rebellion (civil war) was; "that the sovereign power may be divided"<sup>275</sup>. In the effort to distil a connection to civil war from "private sword" more substantially, this disputation over divided sovereignty is the environment which can make the facilitation of this reaction possible. The connection is made when Hobbes asserted that the private sword had a "place again" within the war that would be introduced into this commonwealth by the attempt to divide its sovereign power among more than one political body. We are informed by common sense, and the knowledge accrued upon this matter from the analysis previously conducted, that the introduction of war among the subjects of a single commonwealth is to be addressed as nothing but civil war.

The use of the "private sword" within this context, the internecine war that could potentially erupt among the subjects of a commonwealth over the correct appointment of sovereign power is the moment that its association with civil war can begin. Whenever Hobbes has referred to the right of the sword, or private sword returning among the subjects of a commonwealth, what he indicated was the regression of those subjects into the state of nature through the conduit of civil war. In *Leviathan*, if we recall, in one of the few terminological digressions Hobbes made from his customary advocacy of "civil war" in this text, he signified it under the appellation of "dispute of the sword, not yet among my countrymen decided".

It was the symbiosis between the division of sovereign power by the subjects of a commonwealth and the causation of civil war, which enabled a link with the actual Civil War of the 1640's to be successfully formed. Hobbes did not envision a purely hypothetical commonwealth which was brought into dissolution and civil war by the attempts of its subjects to redefine the essence of its sovereign power. It was THE Commonwealth of the Stuart Monarchy which was described by Hobbes as having been reduced to these inconveniences by a dispute over the legitimate wielder of its sovereign authority.

But is to declare that the thinking of Hobbes was pre-eminently dictated by what he saw as the looming, ineluctable doom of England as he composed *Elements* such a quixotic venture? He does, at some points seem to be endowed with a precognitive ability that would envy the Delphic oracles. Especially when remarking upon the fate of Kings when the peril of divided sovereignty is experienced:

"And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the rights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib. II. Chap. I. *De Republica*, that they are not rightly to be called

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<sup>275</sup> *Ibid*, 166.

commonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths. For if one part should have the power to make the laws for all, they would by their laws, at their pleasure, forbid others to make peace or war, to levy taxes, or to yield fealty and homage without their leave; and they that had the right to make peace and war, command the militia, would forbid the making of other laws, than what themselves liked. And though monarchies stand long, wherein the right of sovereignty hath seemed so divided, because monarchy of itself is a durable kind of government; yet monarchs have been thereby diverse times thrust out of their possession. But the truth is, that right of sovereignty is such, as he or they that have it, cannot, though they would, give away any part thereof, and retain the rest"<sup>276</sup>.

Right to command the militia, right to levy taxation, two of the fundamental objects of contention between the King and the Parliament, which Hobbes would later elaborate upon massively in his discourse of the English Civil Wars: *Behemoth*<sup>277</sup>. Both of these issues can be witnessed in positions of great significance in Hobbes's prophetic illustration of a monarch being "thrust out of their possession". It is highly suggestive that Hobbes, who having named numerous alternative forms of government: (democracy, aristocracy, tyranny, absolute subjection, enslavement, dictatorship, republic), selected monarchy in this extract as the most appropriate form to exemplify the inconveniences of divided sovereign authority. As it would be in *De Cive and Leviathan*, even in the earliest manifestation of Hobbesian political philosophy, it is revealing of Hobbes's worldly preoccupations when he devotes such a quantity of dialogue to the causation, description, and apprehension of civil war. Hobbes was only less explicit in *Elements of Law*, and in being less explicit, he showed us that civil war was interconnected with a vaster range of his political thinking than if he had simply instructed readers to translate "civil war" into "state of nature" as he did in *Leviathan*.

Through the challenge of having been forced to conduct an incremental transfusion of meaning from a variety of linguistic subsidiaries, the conceptual equilibrium between the state of nature and civil war has ultimately been fortified. This connection, which was thought only to have been made explicit in *Leviathan*. Had an obscure inception in *Elements of Law*, but through the many vagaries of Hobbesian philosophical language, reached a level of conceptual maturity commensurate with the state of nature itself. Professor Evrigenis, though lamenting it having not been explicit enough, conceded in a later publication that Hobbes's description of the state of nature from the *Elements of Law* was more "informative" than its more vaunted successor from *Leviathan*<sup>278</sup>. Whether Hobbes intended for this labyrinth of terminology to function as a deterrent, or to expose himself as a

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<sup>276</sup> *Ibid*, 166-67.

<sup>277</sup> *Hobbes, Behemoth*, 27, 80.

<sup>278</sup> *Evrigenis, Fear of Enemies and Collective Action*, 113.

haughty wordsmith. Becoming conversant to the fact that Hobbes was able to surreptitiously fill his discourse with ruminations upon civil war without overtly commending that phrase to the page, is perhaps one of the most salubrious truths for any state of nature existentialist to absorb from Hobbes's teachings.

6) **De Corpore, Hobbes's Correspondence and On Liberty and Necessity- Seeking an Explicit Affirmation of the Connection Between the State of Nature and Civil War that preceded *Leviathan*:**

Admittedly, this textual analysis of the state of nature has proceeded upon a strange chronological trajectory. Having placed the consideration of Hobbes's ventilations on the state of nature from the *Leviathan* in the vanguard of this discourse, only for a regression into a study of the state of nature from the earlier manifestations of his political philosophy to be made. Selecting *Leviathan* as the point of ingress into this disputation and directing the course of it back in time to its literary predecessors, made impeccable sense in light of the ultimate purpose of the thesis. The occasion which this thesis was first embarked upon, was the culmination of a desire to challenge the infamous allegation that Hobbes expressed no serious intellectual commitment to the existence of the state of nature. This allegation was supposedly founded upon proofs extracted directly from the pages of *Leviathan*. Therefore, *Leviathan* seemed the most appropriate literary theatre to wage the first of a series of destructive counter-argumentative phases which would eventually see this spurious allegation ruthlessly but logically, confounded and crushed.

Furthermore, Professor Evrigenis stated that the *Leviathan* was the first of his political treatises in which Hobbes would make the empirical connection between the state of nature and the English Civil War(s) properly explicit. This empirical connection, or symbiosis, as it has been referred unto consistently throughout this thesis, is the theoretical skeleton of the entire concept being postulated here. Naturally, the text in which Hobbes was stipulated to have affirmed this connection explicitly, with his own indelibly written word, merited immediate investigation.

Discussion of the varied and bountiful fruits of this investigation were commended to an earlier section of this dissertation. Thus, it will suffice at this advanced stage to remark only that a level of consolidation for this empirical connection was attained, far eclipsing what was initially expected of the analysis to achieve. Having reached such a level of epistemic clarification from the work thus completed at that point, proceeding any further or backward in the chronology of Hobbes's published material would seem superfluous. It would have, but for the crusading impulse ignited by another allegation about the state of nature which occasioned as much perplexity as the former. The perplexity of it was only deepened, however. Chiefly by the cognisance that its authority could be traced to Professor Evrigenis, responsible for providing such invaluable guidance over the matter of Hobbes's explicitness in *Leviathan* about the state of nature and civil war. In this instance, the allegation concerning the state of nature was that Hobbes's earlier treatises contained no textual

evidence of this connection of any parity with the explicitness to found within *Leviathan*. Coming from an author who had manifestly, (having lately read it in the previous chapters of his book) researched these earlier Hobbesian treatises with an impressive, almost microscopic assiduity. Such a controversy was ironically, as erroneous as the first: propounded by a set of dissenters who distorted Hobbes's own convictions with such an imprecise treatment of his written material.

The success encountered upon delving into *Leviathan's* philosophical ancestry in search of this connection, was, subjectively speaking, as tangible as that gained from the incursion into *Leviathan* itself. A mature, prolifically explicit association between the state of nature and the condition of civil war, was found to have enjoyed a vibrant existence within the broader context of earlier Hobbesian political philosophy. Prefiguring the explicitness of *Leviathan* by over one lustrum of Hobbes's life in exile from England. Even as early, perhaps, as the twilight of the 1630's, the epistle dedicatory of *Elements of Law* to the Earl of Newcastle dating from the 9th of May 1640<sup>279</sup>. Meaning the entire work had to have been completed in the months, possibly years leading up to that date.

Certainly, from his admirable work of the ordering and editing of Hobbes's lamentably fragmented correspondence, Noel Malcolm has been persuaded sparks of insight that would eventually crystallise into *De Corpore* had been composed at an indeterminate point in 1636<sup>280</sup>. The ruminations in question being the object of discussion between Hobbes and Sir Kenelm Digby, in some correspondence we can chart through the winter that spanned the years of 1636 and 1637<sup>281</sup>.

The course of this analysis now moves forward a little in the chronology of Hobbes's writing. Moving forward from the pieces of *Elements of Law* known to have been completed by Hobbes before the 9th of May 1640, and *De Cive*, before November 1641<sup>282</sup>. The focus shall tarry briefly upon a collection of striking utterances obtained from the first chapter of *De Corpore*. The sincerity of Hobbes's antipathy to civil war has been marked throughout the respective treatment accorded to both *Elements and De Cive*. As we know, the forebodings cast by Hobbes against civil war in these texts was either purely speculative, or was compelled by a knowledge of history which he was not inclined to divulge in any detail. The impact of these apprehensions concerning civil war, are diluted by the factual absence of civil war in England at the time Hobbes would have written them. The present tense was applied when Hobbes referred to the state of nature, but only in disclosure of the famous example of the primitive society of the indigenous peoples of America. Given the distance and general unfamiliarity of the majority of Hobbes's readers with the affairs of the indigenous

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<sup>279</sup> *Hobbes, Elements, 20.*

<sup>280</sup> *Malcolm, Correspondance, 49.*

<sup>281</sup> *Hobbes, Correspondance, 42-43.*

<sup>282</sup> *Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 327.*

Americans. Hobbes's attempt to convince them that the state of nature existed and ought to be feared, in Evrigenis's opinion, fell drastically short of the objective.

In the *Leviathan*, Hobbes's denunciation of civil war was often so passionate it, seemed like Hobbes was transported from his usual sardonic, level-headed equilibrium, into a hysterical episode. The actual eruption of war into the realms of Charles I, caused a profound emotional mutation in the language Hobbes would employ to describe civil war in his philosophical writings. Whereas before, in *Elements of Law*, for example, Hobbes would describe civil war as an "inconvenience". Several years of war would witness the mutation of the rather innocuous term "inconvenience" into the far less ambiguous term "calamity"<sup>283</sup>.

To state that this linguistic shift was profound, is a claim that could very easily weather an accusation of ostentation. If one, as a simple exercise in human psychology, would ask of any rational person whether they would rather suffer an inconvenience or a calamity, is to ask whether they would prefer to invite a lesser evil upon themselves in place of a greater. Who but a penitent would elect for the latter? For Hobbes to describe civil war as an inconvenience one day, and to describe it as a calamity on another, represents a severe escalation in his antipathy to civil war, on a personal and philosophical level. The evolution of this language, and the shifting disposition it indicated toward civil war can be first identified not in *Leviathan*, but in extracts from *De Corpore*.

**Extracts displaying the evolution of Hobbesian language around civil war from *De Corpore*:**

"But the utility of moral and civil philosophy is to be estimated, not so much by the commodities we have by knowing these sciences, as by the calamities we receive by not knowing them. Now, all such calamities as may be avoided by human industry, arise from war, but chiefly from civil war; for from this proceed slaughter, solitude, and the want of all things"<sup>284</sup>.

"Seeing, therefore, from the not knowing of civil duties, that is, from the want of moral science, proceed civil wars, and the greatest calamities of mankind, we may very well attribute to such science the production of the contrary commodities. And thus much is sufficient, to say nothing of the other praises and contentment proceeding from philosophy, to let you see the utility of the same in every kind thereof"<sup>285</sup>.

The first impression that such statements as these ought to convey, is the fact of their presence in a discourse predominantly intended to be philosophical reflection on the natural faculties of the human being. As the title dictates: "*De Corpore*"- "The Body", one would have expected to find a

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<sup>283</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 104, 188, 246.

<sup>284</sup> Hobbes, *De Corpore* 190.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid*, 191.

systematic presentation of Hobbes's observations about the functions of the human mind and body. As distinct from say, "*De Corpore Politico*"- "The Body Politic", which is a discussion of all things pertaining to the foundation, functions, variations, attributes and dissolution of a political society, or a commonwealth. One would have expected the cited passages above to be more compatible within a discussion of a body politic, where the danger of civil war and its malignant effects would be more relevant. Nevertheless, with particular emphasis on *Leviathan* when making this statement, Hobbes could always create a margin to transform the exposition of a scientific principle into a colourful allegory of civil war. Many of the references to civil war that have been interrogated in an earlier section of this thesis fall into this category. Hobbes remarks about "Trayne of Thoughts Unguided" is paramount. Where the reader may witness the gradual conversion of an inquisition into the propensity of a person's thoughts to move erratically, into a "Discourse of our present civile warre"<sup>286</sup>, "delivering up the King to his enemies"<sup>287</sup> and the "price of treason"<sup>288</sup>.

Another example which lucidly illustrates this tendency in Hobbes, is from his rather edifying classification of human emotions. The reader may bear witness to a fervent castigation of the dreaded civil war, evolving from the simple imperative to provide a scientific diagnosis of the word "Melancholy". "Melancholy: subjects a man to causeless fears"<sup>289</sup> becomes "Madnesse: strange and unusual behaviour"<sup>290</sup>. Then from the "several kinds of Madnesse"<sup>291</sup> come "excesses" of the "passions"<sup>292</sup>. From this is deduced "Evil"<sup>293</sup>. Passion then somehow begets the conspiracy of an enraged multitude<sup>294</sup>. Until Hobbes situated his definition of madness within the nucleus of a very graphic lamentation about fratricidal conflict:

"For what argument of Madnesse can there be greater, than to clamour, strike, and throw stones at our best friends? Yet this is somewhat less than such a multitude will do. For they will clamour, fight against, and destroy those, by whom all their lifetime before, have been protected, and secured from injury. And if this be Madnesse in the multitude, it is the same in every particular man. For as in the middest of the sea, though a man perceive no sound of that part of the water next him; yet he is well assured, that part contributes as much, to the Roaring of the Sea, as of any other part, of the same quantity: so also, though wee perceive no great unquietnesse, in one, or two men; yet we may

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<sup>286</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan, 10.*

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid, 10.*

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid, 10.*

<sup>289</sup> *Ibid, 38.*

<sup>290</sup> *Ibid, 38.*

<sup>291</sup> *Ibid, 38.*

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid, 38.*

<sup>293</sup> *Ibid, 38.*

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid, 38.*

be well assured, that in their singular Passions, are parts of the Seditious roaring of a troubled Nation"<sup>295</sup>.

This extraction from Hobbes is constituted with pathos, as it is with rancour in equal measures against the abjectness of civil war. Indignation suffuses with grief, Hobbes gives what is as much an entreaty for peace, as it is a vituperation against the irrationality of those who would cause strife with those that they ought to be working hard with to co-exist. Hard reading thought it is, there can be no doubt that such a remark functions as a perfect case study to illustrate how Hobbes often yielded to the compulsion to allow discourse of a nominally scientific, or philosophical origin to be subsumed within the contextual hegemony that civil war imposed upon Hobbesian philosophy.

*De Corpore*: a compendium of knowledge gathered over a lifetime of inquisition about motion, optics, the faculties of the human body and mind; we find was no less susceptible to being impregnated with the malignant tumour of civil war which perpetually festered within Hobbes's conscience. In the language utilised by Hobbes to describe civil war to us in *De Corpore*, we can discern a greater linguistic kinship with *Leviathan*, than with either *Elements* or *De Cive*. The outbreak and continuity of civil war within the bosom of Hobbes's homeland, was in no small way culpable for the asperity of the linguistic estrangement we can observe between *De Corpore* and its philosophical antecedents.

Hobbes's condemnation, indeed, the very essence of his fundamental perspective on civil war by the time he inscribed those passages into *De Corpore* had ascended to a wholly different plane. At this point, a demonstration of this linguistic kinship would be appropriate. It can serve as the first step to roughly determining the time when Hobbes may have commended those remarks about civil war in *De Corpore* into writing.

Hobbes's usage of "calamity" to describe civil war from *Leviathan*:

From Chapter XVIII- OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVERAIGNES BY INSTITUTION:

"And commonly they that live under a Monarch, think it the fault of Monarchy; and they that live under the government of Democracy, or other Soveraign Assembly, attribute all the inconvenience to that forme of Common-wealth, whereas the Power in all formes, if they be perfect enough to protect them, is the same, not considering that the estate of Man can never be without some incommodity or other; and that the greatest, that any forme of Government can possibly happen to the people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, that

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<sup>295</sup> *Ibid*, 38.

accompany a Civill Warre; or that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and a coercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge”<sup>296</sup>.

From Chapter XXX- OF THE OFFICE OF THE SOVERIGN REPRESENTATIVE:

“And because, if the essential Rights of Sovereignty (specified before in the eighteenth Chapter) be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved, and every man returneth into the condition, and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is the greatest evill which can happen in this life)”<sup>297</sup>.

From Chapter XXXVIII:

“It is a thing worthy to be well considered, of all men that desire (by obeying Authority) to avoid the calamities of Confusion and Civill war, what is meant in Holy Scripture, by Life Eternall, and Torment Eternall”<sup>298</sup>.

“Calamity” as a descriptive term is applied to civil war within two sub-contexts, both of which ought to be familiar to the reader by this point. We have observed from *De Cive*, how Hobbes stipulated that any form of government was preferable to civil war. Stating that civil war was “worse” than any kind of “subjection” he could imagine. But neither in *De Cive*, nor in *Elements of Law*, where, as we know, Hobbes described civil war as the “greatest inconvenience”, does he make use of “calamity”. Here in *Leviathan*, Hobbes made the point that there are bound to be inconveniences in the lives of peoples under any kind of government. In a manner similar, but far more brutal when compared with the brevity of the remark from *De Cive*. Hobbes fulminated categorically that there can be no inconvenience a person can suffer under any form of government, which can equate to the “miseries, and horrible calamities” that attend civil war.

Clearly, when juxtaposing the two descriptions, in the latter from *Leviathan*, as with *De Corpore*, there are various empirical factors to Hobbes’s conception of the state of nature which were not present in the earlier iterations. As if the imagery evoked by: “slaughter, solitude, and the want of all things”, “the greatest calamities of mankind”, “that dissolute condition of masterlesse men, without Subjection to Lawes”, “rapine, and revenge” did not bring civil war to its most insidious apotheosis within the language of Hobbesian political philosophy.

Nonetheless, Hobbes had yet to elevate civil war to an ever-higher position of malignance. By Chapter XXX of *Leviathan*, it was simply the “greatest evill which can happen in this life”. Veritably, a moment where any state of nature existentialist would be glad to find themselves well seated. Civil

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<sup>296</sup> *Ibid*, 104.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid*, 188.

<sup>298</sup> *Ibid*, 246-47.

war, and thus the state of nature, had supplanted death itself in Hobbes's judgment as the insuperably evil force for humanity to contend against in terrestrial life. In *De Cive*, Hobbes declared that "Death" was the "chiefest of natural evils"<sup>299</sup>. This sentiment toward death is even replicated by Hobbes at an earlier stage in *Leviathan*. In Chapter XIII, in the course of listing the variegated "incommodities" of life in the state of nature, the "continuall feare, and danger of violent death"<sup>300</sup> was introduced as the "worst of all"<sup>301</sup> he had previously mentioned. Civil war was a key element of Hobbes's consideration of the state of nature in this section. Yet it is manifest, in this moment, as he composed the famous thirteenth chapter, the evil of civil war was still subordinated to the ubiquitous menace of violent death in the hierarchy of terrestrial evils.

Upon setting forth to the task of composing chapter thirty, civil war had cast down death from its supremacy as the greatest of natural evils. Only to have been advanced even further into Hobbes's perception of terrestrial evil by the time he wrote the thirty-eighth chapter. Here we can witness, unless the transcription of the text be at fault, the conceptual assimilation of "Civill war" with the Christian platitude of "Torment Eternal". Given that, for Hobbes, the calamities of civil war have already exceeded the evil of a violent death. It is no great stretch of the imagination to conclude that a civil war, which Hobbes classified as the greatest evil a person could possibly encounter in their lives, could be considered as an earthly manifestation of the eternal torments typically reserved for those consigned to Hell.

From the extracts that have been examined above, the intervention of actual civil war into the life of Thomas Hobbes had altered the very calculus he employed to determine the hierarchy of worldly evils. Death itself had been conquered by civil war. The Four Horseman of the Apocalypse had been ritualistically fused into a single grotesque dread entity: the Behemoth, Civil War. The linguistic unity discovered to have existed between *Leviathan* and those extracts from the opening chapters of *De Corpore*, seems to offer an impressive degree of corroboration to the idea that the timing of their writing must also have been closer. If the timing can be properly verified, this part of *De Corpore* can be identified as a forgotten link; marking a very substantial evolution in the way Hobbes had conceptualised civil war between *De Cive and Leviathan*.

To begin with, it would appear that the margin for determining the time when these remarks were added to *De Corpore* is dishearteningly vast. *De Corpore* was published in 1656, five years after *Leviathan* and four years after Hobbes returned to England from his self-imposed exile in France. Yet, according to Noel Malcolm, the correspondence between Hobbes and Sir Kenelm Digby in the

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<sup>299</sup> Hobbes, *De Cive*, 3.

<sup>300</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 69.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid*, 69.

winter of 1636, some form of a prototype of *De Corpore* was already in production. This provides a gaping temporal rift of twenty years in which those remarks of civil war could have potentially been transcribed. However, the congruence of the language is highly suggestive of a time shortly preceding, coterminous, or subsequent to the composition of *Leviathan*. Situating such a vehement diatribe against civil war in a time before the outbreak of actual civil war in England, would make it a confusing anachronism. Here it would be pernicious to fall in with the tendency of many, to believe that the first chapter of a book was consequently the first to be written by the author.

There can be one of two possible contingencies to explain this predicament. The first is that these reflections of the origins and utilities of philosophy, which constitute the opening dialogue of the first chapter of *De Corpore*, were written at some point before the Civil War. But the remarks about the calamities of civil war were incorporated as Hobbes continued his work on *De Corpore in France* as the Civil War raged across the channel. The second contingency is that: the entire chapter was written at some point after the outbreak of the Civil War, replacing, or absorbing earlier material that may have been created beforehand.

Analysis of the language from the texts themselves can enable some measure of chronological orientation to be established for the writing of *De Corpore*. The evolution of civil war from “inconvenience” to “greatest evil” is relevant once more in this context. In *De Cive*, written before early 1642. Death was postulated by Hobbes to be the chief of all natural evils for humanity. In a later edition of *De Cive*, published in the Netherlands in 1647, this is not a sentiment which Hobbes had thought to amend. By 1647, Death was still Hobbes’s chief of natural evils. In *De Cive*, the malignant effect of civil war for humanity had been elevated discernibly. Rather than the greatest inconvenience a commonwealth could suffer. The people themselves became the key recipients of the injury resulting from civil war. Civil war was now worse than any kind of government, or “subjection” a person could live under.

In *De Corpore*, we find that Hobbes’s conception of civil war has been elevated to a higher plane of negativity. Hobbes had now inculcated civil war with the “greatest calamities of mankind”. Yet in this description, Hobbes does not go so far as to express that it is the greatest natural evil a person can suffer in their lives, as he did in *Leviathan*. Hobbes claimed that it was beyond dispute that civil war and its effects were “great evils”. Yet though by his admission a “great evil” it cannot be determined to be a statement of vilification on the level of those from *Leviathan*. However, even by the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan*, death had still attained a higher place in the hierarchy of natural evils devised by Hobbes.

J.C.A. Gaskin concluded that the key “implication” that we should draw from Hobbes’s *Verse Life*, was that the working period on *De Corpore* was (1647-1655)<sup>302</sup>. A closer examination of *Verse Life*, in conjunction with a study of Hobbes’s *Correspondence* around the year of 1646 reveal this to be a fallacy.

By proposing this chronological framework, Gaskin asserted that the year in which work was commenced by Hobbes on *De Corpore* was 1647. However, by following the sequence of events rendered by Hobbes himself in *Verse Life*, an earlier date is recommended. This text in itself is not the easiest to interpret, admittedly. But Hobbes does give solid dates for some of the most significant developments in his life. “In the year sixteenth hundred and forty”<sup>303</sup> is given as the date of Hobbes’s exile to France: “Therefore to Paris well-beloved I go”<sup>304</sup>. From this axis, 1642 can be ascertained as the date Hobbes gave for the publication of *De Cive*: “Two years elaps’d, I published in Print My book *de Cive*”<sup>305</sup>. After our arrival at 1642, the interpretation becomes slightly more treacherous: “Then I four years spent to contrive which way To Pen my Book *de Corpore*, Night and Day”<sup>306</sup>. So, did Hobbes spend four years thinking about the way to write *De Corpore*, or was he actively writing and conducting research toward *De Corpore* in tandem? Either way, we have now arrived at the year 1646. Hobbes noted at this point that the Civil War had raged for four years<sup>307</sup>, and that the Prince Charles: “the Kingdom’s Heir” had descended upon Paris with his retinue<sup>308</sup>. It is also at this time, remaining within 1646, that Hobbes mentioned his progress on *De Corpore* once more. This time instead of indicating his action with “contrive”, we are confronted by this from Hobbes: “My Book *de Corpore* then I design’d”<sup>309</sup>.

If “design’d” is to be interpreted literally, and Hobbes was merely beginning his first efforts toward the writing of *De Corpore* in 1646, after four years spent in its contrivance from 1642. The date at which work began, if this interpretation is accurate, still precedes the date advanced by Gaskin by a year. Taking both contingencies into account, we may definitively conclude that Hobbes had begun working on *De Corpore* by the year of 1646, perhaps earlier. But assembling a cogent sequence of events that is chronologically precise from *Verse Life*, is a task where contradictory details must be reconciled to bring harmony to the account. After all, Hobbes included the eruption of the Civil War among the portentous events he recorded under the year of 1640.

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<sup>302</sup> Gaskin, *Elements*, 283.

<sup>303</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Prose Life*, Edited by J.C.A. Gaskin, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994), 258.

<sup>304</sup> *Ibid*, 258.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid*, 258.

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid*, 258.

<sup>307</sup> *Ibid*, 259.

<sup>308</sup> *Ibid*, 259.

<sup>309</sup> *Ibid*, 259.

The year of 1640 and its events of great portent, from Hobbes's *Verse Life*:

"I'th interim breaks forth a horrid War, injurious to my Study, and a Bar. In the year sixteenth hundred and forty, then Brake out a Sicknesse, whereof many Men Of Learning, languishing, gave up their breath At last, and yielded to impartial death. Wherewith when seized, he reputed was The Man that knew Divine and Human Laws. The War's now hot, I dread to see it so, Therefore to Paris well-belov'd, I go"<sup>310</sup>.

Only to lament: "Of Civil War, and with its four years Rage"<sup>311</sup> when Prince Charles arrived in Paris in the year of 1646. If we accept Hobbes's first recollection for the date at which the Civil War in England began, the War, if it had raged for four years from this date would settle this part of the chronicle within 1644. Meaning, absurdly, that the Prince had fled to France before the armies of His Father the King had been decisively crushed by the New Model Army. If Hobbes truly considered the most appropriate date for the beginning of the English Civil War to be 1640, then surely the line from his *Verse Life* ought to have read: "Of Civil War, and with its six years Rage". Yet as we have it before us, by that point in the chronicle, the war had raged for four years, taking us back to 1642 if we deduct the four from 1646, the year of the Prince's arrival in Paris. After the "Two years elaps'd"<sup>312</sup> from 1640, Hobbes extolled the triumph of his *De Cive*, but also struck a more plangent note with: "England in her sad Pangs of War"<sup>313</sup>. Demonstrating that Hobbes was eminently conscious of Civil War in England by the year of 1642.

Nevertheless, Hobbes had visibly furnished two contradictory dates for the inception of the English Civil War. Therefore, to obtain a strong measure of clarification about the timing of Hobbes's progression with *De Corpore*, recourse must be made to his correspondence. The first of note, is a letter addressed not by Hobbes himself, but addressed to Hobbes by his friend Samuel Sorbiere. The informativeness of this letter is not vitiated in any way for not coming from the pen of Hobbes himself. Much within it is to be learned about the intellectual and professional dispositions of Hobbes by September of 1646.

Sorbiere wrote to Hobbes in this instance, mixing congratulation with commiseration. His congratulation was occasioned by the knowledge that Hobbes had allegedly been recruited into the household of Prince Charles. The occasion for his commiseration was in acknowledgment of the disruption that this would cause to his intellectual proceedings.

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<sup>310</sup> *Ibid*, 258.

<sup>311</sup> *Ibid*, 259.

<sup>312</sup> *Ibid*, 258.

<sup>313</sup> *Ibid*, 258.

Sorbiere begins:

“But, most excellent Sir, now that you have been promoted to the service of the Prince, will you have enough time left to keep your hand in with the work which needs to be done every day?”<sup>314</sup>.

Concluding that Sorbiere is referring to a disruption to Hobbes’s progress on *De Corpore* from an expression so nebulous as “the work which needs to be done every day” is precarious enough. Fortunately, toward the close of this correspondence, Sorbiere gives some disclosure which may assist us in banishing the shadow around this unidentifiable “work”.

“How worthy of you is that duty which has been laid upon you! How fortunate your country will be when it receives a King full of wisdom and imbued with your teachings! I am glad, and congratulate you with all my heart, whatever loss we may perhaps suffer through that delay to that promised part of your *Elements*”<sup>315</sup>.

So, buried within this exuberant panegyric to Hobbes’s virtue as a man and a paragon of intellect, we alight upon the identity of the “work”. Which had been “promised” by Hobbes, but Sorbiere repined would be delayed due to Hobbes’s introduction into the Prince’s service: “*Elements*”. Not to be conflated with the “*Elements of Law*” which we have been made acquainted already in the course of this thesis. This “*Elements*” to which Sorbiere referred can only be *De Corpore*, which far from being a separate work, was in fact one of the three of Hobbes’s philosophical “*Elements*”. Therefore, should the “*Elements*” of Sorbiere’s conversation prove in time to be *De Corpore*, we may confute Gaskin in the knowledge that a part of *De Corpore* had been “promised” by Hobbes, and had most certainly been written up before September 1646.

Hobbes’s reply to this letter, dated from Saint Germain on the 4th of October 1646, provides the confirmation necessary to make the proper deduction about Hobbes’s professional status at this time. The silence of Hobbes about the “work” on the “*Elements*”, which Sorbiere had alluded is a grave disappointment. Nevertheless, by the application of the present tense to his response to Sorbiere’s question about his position in the Prince’s company, the veracity of his duties at the time is assured.

“I acknowledge your goodwill in congratulating me on my present employment, but beware of thinking it is more than it is. For I am only teaching mathematics, not politics”<sup>316</sup>.

So, most fortuitously, we have it, as it were, from Hobbes’s own mouth that he was indeed employed as a tutor, albeit only in mathematics, to Prince Charles. Now, there is a way some redress

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<sup>314</sup> *Hobbes, Correspondence, 137.*

<sup>315</sup> *Ibid, 137.*

<sup>316</sup> *Ibid, 140-141.*

can be achieved from the silence of Hobbes in this instance about the identity and progress on his "*Elements*". A letter from Hobbes to Sorbiere, dated to the 16th of May 1646 can be the deliverance from the censorship Hobbes elected to enforce around the matter of his "*Elements*" later that year.

Within, Hobbes announced to Sorbiere that it was intention to retreat to Montauban. Primarily, he stated, to spend time in the company of his friend Thomas de Martel. However, there was "another reason"<sup>317</sup> to which Hobbes confessed for his seeking out the relative seclusion of Montauban. It was a solicitude toward the pressing demands of his philosophical work<sup>318</sup>.

Or: "which is that I aim to be able to devote my time more freely there to finishing off the first part of my *Elements*. We shall leave around the end of next month, or a little sooner"<sup>319</sup>.

Unfortunately, the autumn of 1646 was to find Hobbes in Saint Germaine, at the court of Prince Charles, instead of the salubrious idyll he planned with de Martel in the French countryside. Nonetheless, this extract from May 1646 is not without considerable edification. Hobbes's language concerning the progress he had made up to that point on his "*Elements*", indicated that work had commenced some time before that date. Hobbes was looking forward to devoting more of his free time to "finishing off" the first part of his *Elements*. The impression we are left with is of a work nearing its completion, or at least of a work which substantial progress has been made. If we are to concur with Hobbes, and carry with us into the future, a vision of *De Corpore* requiring only finishing touches in the summer of 1646, then there is even greater reason to refute the chronology set by Gaskin.

Once more, *De Corpore* was in fact published in 1656. Work upon it began at an indeterminate point after 1642, continuing through the 1650's to this date. Recorded information pertaining to this piece of Hobbes's philosophical system, much like all others is sparse. Therefore, a fissiparous miscellany of letter fragments and contextually relative utterances are the building material we are left with to construct a less than adequate chronology of Hobbes's progress on this work. Noel Malcolm would have us believe that *De Corpore* was in its infancy as early as 1636. Gaskin, at the other extremity of this labour spectrum, discerned no reason to believe work had begun before 1647. Jeffrey Collins, when summarising the activity of Hobbes in the year of 1644 felt confident stating that:

"In 1644 he published a short work on vision, the *Tractus Opticus*, and contributed to Father Mersenne's *Ballistica*. Otherwise, Hobbes laboured on *De Corpore*, seemingly unexercised by events

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<sup>317</sup> *Ibid*, 127.

<sup>318</sup> *Ibid*, 127.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid*, 127.

unfolding in England”<sup>320</sup>. The source which figures as the basis for Collin’s is a letter dated from the 27th of December 1644 between Sir Charles Cavendish and John Pell.

However, the more durable source of illumination available to us upon the matter of Hobbes’s progression with *De Corpore* in the mid 1640’s is the surviving correspondence. For those who may have been quick to accuse Hobbes of empty bravado in May of 1646. Through Sorbriere, in September 1646, we learn that he, along with an indeterminate group of people residing in France at that time were aware that Hobbes was indeed making progress on this piece of his *Elements*. Those with whom Hobbes enjoyed fellowship during his exile, many who were scientifically or philosophically inclined, would have certainly been conversant with this labour. The great similitude in the ways Hobbes described civil war in both *De Corpore and Leviathan* provides additional enlightenment about this matter. The employment of the term “calamity”, in conjunction with the empirical richness of the description of civil war from *De Corpore* was prodigious. Indicating a tectonic upheaval in Hobbes’s perspective about the concept of civil war, highly distinct from definitions previously rendered in his earlier political treatises. This places it firmly within the operational vicinity of *Leviathan*.

What it is possible to deduce is that all work on *De Corpore* must have been consigned to a state of abeyance. Whilst Hobbes was spurred, sometime after the settlement of Prince Charles in Paris, to begin formulating his majestic *Leviathan*. Before the Prince descended upon Paris with his retinue in June of 1646, Hobbes had written optimistically to his friend Sorbriere about his hopes for the imminent completion of *De Corpore*.

**Hobbes to Sorbriere on his expectations for *De Corpore* in June of 1646:**

“The reason why I am taking so long over the first section of my *Elements* is partly laziness, but mostly the fact that I find it difficult to explain my meanings to my own satisfaction. For I am seeking to achieve in physics and metaphysics what I hope I have achieved in moral theory, so that there may be no room for any critic to write against me. However, I do not doubt that I shall finish it before the end of the year, provided I live and am in good health”<sup>321</sup>.

This extract confirms that Hobbes had made considerable progress with *De Corpore* by the middle of 1646. So much so, that Hobbes anticipated the end of the work by the close of that very year. The similarity of the language Hobbes used to describe civil war in *Leviathan and De Corpore* is suggestive of some chronological affinity. There is no doubt that the sentiments expressed concerning civil war in the first chapter of *De Corpore* exhibited a rancour, certainly more in accord

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<sup>320</sup> Collins, *Allegiance of Hobbes*, 88.

<sup>321</sup> Hobbes, *Correspondence*, 133.

with Hobbes's attitude to civil war from *Leviathan*. Correspondence between Hobbes and Sorbiere provides the nearest thing to confirmation that can be obtained, that Hobbes had indeed completed a substantial portion of this work by the summer of 1646. The remarks concerning civil war are in located in the first chapter. So, if the premise that Hobbes arranged these chapters as they were written in chronological order is accepted, these sentiments concerning civil war were expressed some time after the publication of *De Cive*. Perhaps between Mid-1642 and before the summer of 1646. Still a considerable vacuum of time. Yet if the *De Corpore* we have in the form before us is the chronological successor of *De Cive*; it means that the remarks situated within it concerning civil war represent a definite link in the conceptual development of civil war, in the context of Hobbesian political philosophy between *De Cive and Leviathan*. Making an explicit connection between the state of nature and civil war a feature of Hobbes's political thinking before *Leviathan*.

**Further evidence of an explicit correlation of the state of nature and civil war in the interim period between *De cive and Leviathan*:**

**From *On Liberty and Necessity*:**

The purpose of delving into the corpus of Hobbes's earlier written material, was to demonstrate that an explicit connection between the state of nature and the condition of civil war had been constituted before the advent of *Leviathan*. Figuring not merely as a concept that had been introduced at this stage in Hobbes's intellectual life, but that had been developed to a level where its complexity was almost equivalent with his interpretation given in *Leviathan*.

It is tempting to fully absolve Professor Evrigenis of his folly when proclaiming that no explicit link had been devised in these works. As the previous section ought to have revealed, the links were so well concealed by Hobbes beneath a seemingly capricious lexicon of interchangeable terminology. Yet the preponderance of this vast nomenclature could be condensed into two common linguistic elements. Which proved to be the state of nature and civil war. Though this exercise enabled an unprecedented, but ultimately lucrative pressure to be placed upon the analytical faculties of the author. One is left with a residue of bewilderment, especially when contemplating the ease that would have resulted if Hobbes had been moved by the spirit of forthrightness when dealing with this connection in his earlier expositions, that compelled him to say in *Leviathan* effectively: "Civil war is a manifestation of the state of nature".

However, there existed a highly legible affirmation of this connection, written some time before the ascendancy of *Leviathan*. This affirmation showed an explicitness that arguably overmatched the affirmation Hobbes embedded within the pages of *Leviathan*. The ‘*Questions Concerning Liberty Necessity and Chance*’ were published in 1654. Though by Hobbes’s own admission, were composed some years before in 1646. Taking the form of a letter to the Charles Cavendish, the Marquis of Newcastle. With Hobbes confirming in the epistle dedicatory: “which was written in 1646”<sup>322</sup>.

Enclosed tightly within this disputation, languishes an utterance which can function as an optimal vector of reinforcement for this symbiotic connection between the state of nature and civil war.

In the course of this epic dialectical maelstrom, John Dering, known familiarly within the Hobbesian community as Archbishop Bramhall would fatefully declaim that:

“There was never any time when mankind was without governor, laws, and societies”<sup>323</sup>.

Bramhall is of course repudiating that a Hobbesian state of nature ever existed in any empirical, or historical capacity. Within this context, it is axiomatic that any referral to a time without government, law, or society is a referral to the state of nature.

Hobbes’s response is almost mollifying, but no less explicit about the position of civil war in relation to the existence of the state of nature:

“It is very likely to be true, that since the creation there never was a time in which mankind was totally without society. If a part of it were without laws and governors, some other parts might be commonwealths. He saw there was paternal government in Adam; which he might do easily, as being no deep consideration. But in those places where there is a civil war at any time, at the same time there is neither laws, nor commonwealth, nor society”<sup>324</sup>.

As Hobbes would in *Leviathan* some years in the future, the existential scope of the state of nature would be moderated in *Liberty and Necessity*. Correcting Bramhall that the definition of his state of nature did not dictate a total absence of government, law and society from the world at any historical moment. But rather a panorama of the world where human civilisation was frequently apportioned into tranquil and partially, or completely disorderly societies. By saying that: “There never was a time in which mankind was totally without society”. Hobbes prefigured his phrasing of the same statement from *Leviathan*: “never was, generally, over all the world”.

The only way in which this earlier version diverges from *Leviathan* is the brevity. In *Leviathan*, civil war was a prominent place, within a dissemination of multiple places where Hobbes determined

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<sup>322</sup> *Hobbes, Liberty and Necessity*, 25.

<sup>323</sup> *Ibid*, 183.

<sup>324</sup> *Ibid*, 183-84.

that the state of nature had manifested. In *Liberty and Necessity*, civil war is the only place Hobbes thought expedient to introduce as an empirical instantiation of the state of nature. A decision, which consequently gives the example of civil war, as an existential conduit of the state of nature, a far greater impact in this text. Such was its primacy in the forefront of Hobbes's mind at that time, the dynamic force of civil war alone was deemed to be more than sufficient to carry his point to the mark. Requiring no augmentation at all from the other examples Hobbes had formulated, and no doubt held in reserve.

Thus, if the exhaustive findings from *Elements and De Cive* exhibited in the previous chapter do not meet the qualification for explicitness by any academic standard. Furthermore, if the attempt to situate the remarks from *De Corpore* within the wider chronology of Hobbesian written material fell short of expectation. The extract from *Liberty and Necessity* could not be mistaken for anything less than an explicit affirmation of Hobbes's conception of civil war as an existential conduit for the state of nature. Proving emphatically the error of Professor Evrigenis, in stating that there was no explicit evidence of a conceptual association between the state of nature and civil war before the composition of *Leviathan*.

Certainly, before *Leviathan*, Hobbes may have been reluctant to cap off any empirically invigorating remark about the state of nature, or civil war, by referencing the condition of England at the time he was writing. To discover England at the source of Hobbes's many apprehensions about civil war in *Elements of Law*, required the removal of several tightly fitted masks and the alleviation of many heavy curtains. Yet, by apprising oneself with the general strife within English political life at that time. Many correlations can be established between the language Hobbes employed, and the events that gave them cause. The correlation between Hobbes's preoccupation with civil war in *Elements of Law* and the sectional tension escalating within England, are reinforced powerfully by the fact of Hobbes's exodus to France after dedicating *Elements* to the Earl of Newcastle.

Whatever the consensus is among historians about the true reasoning behind Hobbes's flight to France, he consistently reiterated through his writing that a terrifying precognition of impending civil war was the spur to his flanks. With the exception of his *Verse Life*, where he claimed that the war was already "hot" by the time of his departure to Paris<sup>325</sup>, accounts spanning his life corroborate with each other neatly.

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<sup>325</sup> Hobbes, *Verse Life*, 258.

For example:

From a letter dated to the 12<sup>th</sup> of April, addressed to John Scudamore:

“The reason I came away was that I saw words that tended to the advance the prerogative of kings began to be examined in Parliament. And I knew some that had a good will to have me troubled and might for anything I saw in their honesties make both the words and the witnesses. Besides I thought if I went not then, there was nevethelesse a disorder comming on that would make it worse being there then here”<sup>326</sup>.

The reasoning for his exodus to France, provided by Hobbes here is twofold. Nevertheless, though he may have confessed to feeling the pricks of consternation from the reputation his *Elements of Law* was gaining with the Parliament. The apprehension of a “disorder comming on” in England at this time was an equally potent motivator for obliging Hobbes to seek refuge in France.

From *The Prose Life*, written in the twilight of Hobbes’s life, around 1676. Hobbes is represented by himself in the third person:

“The that most notorious Parliament was summoned in England. Its sessions began on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of October 1640. He understood, having consulted with some of those who were of the Parliament during the first three or four days of the session, that civil war was unavoidable. Fearing for his safety, he returned to France”<sup>327</sup>.

In this account of Hobbes’s exodus, the fear he confessed to in 1641 of chastisement from the Parliament about his *Elements of Law* is omitted. Nearing his ultimate decline from life, Hobbes had either forgotten, or thought it of little significance. In spite of this immense causal lapse, the advancement of time and mortality had clearly left the foresight of civil war unscathed as one of the imperatives that drove him from his homeland. Indeed, by this stage in Hobbes’s life, if the written word is to stand as proof for the conscience, Hobbes’s foreknowledge of civil war was the only cause necessitating his evacuation to France.

It may be because Hobbes was initially so concerned about his reputation, that he always stopped short of stating: “for example the present state of England” ect, when ventilating his apprehensions about civil war in his earlier works. It is clear from his letter to John Scudamore, that Hobbes was highly anxious about personal consequences pending the possible the detection of any affront to the Parliament of England in his *Elements of Law*. Even in *De Corpore*, where Hobbes described civil war in such graphically sanguinary terms, the plight of England was not recognised. Hobbes would not be

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<sup>326</sup> Hobbes, *Correspondence*, 115.

<sup>327</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *Prose Life*, Edited by J.C.A Gaskin, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1994), 246.

so taciturn about how the civil discord within England truly affected him within the protective sphere of his own private discourse.

**Deducing the state of nature from correspondence between Hobbes and Sorbiere:**

In another letter to his friend Samuel Sorbiere, Hobbes frankly divulged various trepidations. Concerning initially, the potential adversity that could befall him from the association of his book *De Cive* with the name of the Prince of Wales. Which then resolved into a general complaint about the deterrent effect the present disordered state of England was having upon his desire to return home. Hobbes repined to Sorbiere that he would “willingly have paid a great deal”<sup>328</sup> for the inscription “Academic Tutor to His Serene Highness the Prince of Wales” to be erased from the title page of the 1647 edition of *De Cive*<sup>329</sup>. Hobbes’s desire to have this solecism rectified was not a passing fancy, a sense of great urgency is conveyed in the postscript.

He emphasised: “that it is of the utmost importance both to me and to the Prince of Wales that the inscription, or rather the whole portrait, should be removed”<sup>330</sup>.

Hobbes may have been touched by a genuine solicitude for how this association would have redounded upon the royal dignity of the Prince of Wales, and consequently wider cause of English Royalism. This certainly seems the case, at an earlier point in the letter Hobbes acknowledged how the general opprobrium which he believed his work was regarded could have devastating political consequences for the Prince and those closely affiliated with him. Hobbes claimed that:

“Those who are at present in power in England are assiduously searching and seizing upon any pretexts on which to stir up popular ill feeling against the royal family”<sup>331</sup>.

Hobbes accentuated the possible negative repercussions for the Prince of Wales specifically:

“So when they see his name set before political theory which offends the opinions of almost everyone, his enemies will attack him in a haughty and hateful way, claiming that he is now revealing what sort of sovereignty he expects, and intends to demand”<sup>332</sup>.

But the fear he expressed on his own behalf in the postscript, was corroborated with far greater frequency in various earlier parts of this communique. Shortly after the section above, which would

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<sup>328</sup> *Hobbes, Correspondence, 157.*

<sup>329</sup> *Ibid, 157.*

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid, 159.*

<sup>331</sup> *Ibid, 157.*

<sup>332</sup> *Ibid, 157.*

have done credit to any person propounding to be a leal adherent of the royal cause. Hobbes expressed a concern, which can be used to understand the true vicissitudes of Hobbes suffered from his exile in France.

There were “people at the Prince’s court”<sup>333</sup> who were “ready to aggravate”<sup>334</sup> Hobbes’s “every fault”<sup>335</sup>. More invidiously for him, Hobbes was convinced that, “whatever ill consequences follow” from the circulation of *De Cive* with the inscription bearing the name of the Prince of Wales<sup>336</sup>, they would all be “blamed”<sup>337</sup> on Hobbes’s “carelessness and vanity”<sup>338</sup> to his “great dishonour”<sup>339</sup>.

Hobbes would recourse to an even greater extremity to absolve himself to Sorbiere, and any other person who might have been made privy to the contents of this letter. Any truth of his position as the Prince of Wales’s “tutor” or “servant” was forcefully denied<sup>340</sup>. The capacity of service to the Prince of Wales was peremptorily disclaimed: “I am not the Prince of Wales’s tutor, nor any sort of servant of his”<sup>341</sup>. The absurdity of this denial is compounded, given the number of written affirmations to this service that existed from Hobbes, preceding and subsequent to the time this letter was written.

The letter to Sorbiere in October of 1646, for example. When Hobbes visibly accepted the felicitations expressed by Sorbiere in a previous letter about his “present employment” to the Prince of Wales. The nature of his relationship with the Prince at this time seemed to have been well remembered by Hobbes in both the *Prose and Verse* summarisations of his life.

From *Prose Life*:

“By this time there were amongst the Parliamentarians many who took the King’s part, and they joined the Prince of Wales (who is now King) in Paris. He (Hobbes) was by then planning to stay on the estates of certain friends of his of the Languedoc nobility, and had already made arrangements to move, taking with him such things as were necessary for his work. However, on being recommended to the Prince of Wales as a teacher of mathematics, he decided to remain in Paris”<sup>342</sup>.

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<sup>333</sup> *Ibid*, 157.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid*, 157.

<sup>335</sup> *Ibid*, 157.

<sup>336</sup> *Ibid*, 157.

<sup>337</sup> *Ibid*, 157.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid*, 157.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid*, 157.

<sup>340</sup> *Ibid*, 158.

<sup>341</sup> *Ibid*, 158.

<sup>342</sup> *Hobbes, Prose Life*, 247-48.

This reminiscence corresponds in all particulars with the account that we can derive from his correspondence at the time.

From *Verse Life*:

Hobbes remarked that after the civil war had raged for four years, the Prince of Wales came to Paris with a retinue of brave and noble men. Within his book *De Corpore*, he then designed to write all of the things ready to his mind. After which he was disrupted: "My Prince's studies I then waited on, But could not constantly attend my own"<sup>343</sup>.

Therefore, we can observe most clearly, that Hobbes was content to be associated in this capacity with the court of the Prince of Wales for at least two periods in his life. The first being the immediate phase of his employment, between July 1646 to some indeterminate point before March 1647; and in the time after the ascension of the Prince of Wales to the throne of England in 1660. In the time that elapsed after October 1646, when Hobbes accepted Sorbriere's congratulatory missive about his having been "promoted to the service of the Prince". An event, or a succession of events must have occurred which poisoned the sense of gratification Hobbes initially received from his association with the Prince's court. So that by March of 1647, Hobbes was prepared to forswear the existence of any official affiliation with the Prince of Wales and his court. Even to a friend such as Sorbriere who would have been fully cognizant about the true nature of Hobbes's presence at Saint Germain, having plainly discussed such activity in detailed correspondence.

The origin of this willingness to forswear any formal allegiance to the royal court situated in Saint Germain, can be detected within the letter itself. This document is replete with positive admissions of Hobbes's own consternation for himself. The first reason he disclosed for the personal risk generated by the association of De Cive with the name of the Prince of Wales, can be interpreted as a general feeling of insecurity coming from the development of the Civil War. I.E: "given the times we are in"<sup>344</sup>.

This reference may be too vague to forge a cogent connection between the apprehensions Hobbes was feeling toward the reputation of his work and his fear of the Civil War. Hobbes, in all possibility, may have anticipated a backlash to his work from those residing in France at the time. "The times" in itself is no great token. Nevertheless, when juxtaposed with Hobbes's remark about "those who are at present in power in England", a broader path to the source of Hobbes's fear can be traced. Hobbes's fear of possible retribution from the English Parliament on account of his work is well documented from his letter to Viscount Scudamore. This fear, if we recall, was one half of the dual

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<sup>343</sup> Hobbes, *Verse Life*, 259.

<sup>344</sup> Hobbes, *Correspondence*, 157.

reasoning which drove him into his self-enforced exile to begin with. In this letter to Sorbiere, six years later, the dread occasioned within Hobbes toward the reaction of the Parliament to his work had not abated in the slightest.

Hobbes recalled in the autobiographical work: "*Considerations upon the Reputation of Thomas Hobbes*", that the reputation of his *Elements of Law*, or "his little treatise in English"<sup>345</sup> with the Parliament would have brought "him into danger of his life" had the King not dissolved that Parliament in May of 1640<sup>346</sup>. Upon the institution of the Long Parliament in November of that year, allegedly fearing the same retribution he anticipated earlier that year, Hobbes "doubting how they would use him, went over to France, the first of all that fled"<sup>347</sup>.

Rather, the menace of vicissitudes within England seemed to have become somewhat magnified by Hobbes's eventual desire to exchange his exile for the familiarity of home:

"Secondly, this title will prevent me from returning to my own country, if the desire to return ever comes over me- and I do not see why I should not wish to return, if it permitted, when England has been somehow or other been pacified"<sup>348</sup>.

From this account, Hobbes was encompassed by "enemies"<sup>349</sup>, who Hobbes intimated were "not few"<sup>350</sup>. These appeared to be arrayed on both sides of the Channel. However, the threat of dishonour at the Prince's Court at Saint Germain seemed to have been eclipsed from the beginning by the menace of civil war in England. Here, the rumour of Hobbes's pragmatic attitude to political allegiances is given some measure of credence. The wording concerning the pacification of England, appears to be the foretelling of a parliamentary victory in the Civil War. Earlier, Hobbes admonished Sorbiere that those in power in England at that time were actively proselytising discontent against the royal family, and that his offensive views could be injurious to the royal cause if he were associated with it. This means that, certainly within Hobbes's judgement, the adversaries to the royal cause: the Parliamentary forces, held the supremacy in England by this point.

The dominion of Parliament, however, was by no means complete, because Hobbes stated that England had yet to be "pacified". Meaning that, though Hobbes recognised the momentary advantage of Parliament in its war with the King, the war itself had not yet been brought to a conclusion satisfactory enough to entice Hobbes from his exile. The fact he says the "title" i.e the

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<sup>345</sup> *Hobbes, Reputation Of*, 414.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid*, 414.

<sup>347</sup> *Ibid*, 414.

<sup>348</sup> *Hobbes, Correspondence*, 157-58.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid*, 158.

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid*, 158.

page bearing the inscription of his association with the Prince of Wales, “will” prevent him from returning to England is indicative of how Hobbes believed the war would resolve. If Hobbes envisioned the ultimate triumph of the royal cause, what reason would he have to consider his professional affiliation with the Prince of Wales an obstacle to his return? Plainly, Hobbes expected those who were in power in England at the time Hobbes wrote this letter: the Parliament, to still hold the supremacy once England was without civil war: or “pacified”.

Hobbes was driven from England by his precognition of civil war. Hobbes was now precluded from fulfilling his desire to return to England, because peace had not yet returned to necessitate his desire to travel. Formerly, it was not until *Leviathan* that unimpeachable confirmation could be obtained that the English Civil War itself, was the place of civil war which Hobbes perceived the rise of the state of nature. The way Hobbes described England within this letter, enables the deficiencies of Hobbes’s treatment of civil war in *Liberty and Necessity* to be remedied. It was the tract *on Liberty and Necessity*, not *Leviathan*, where Hobbes would explicitly ordain civil war as an empirical realisation of the state of nature.

Such a truth could only be wrung from the pages of *Elements of Law and De Cive* with a rigorous campaign of linguistic cross-examination. But there, in *Liberty and Necessity*, Hobbes propagated it in a perfectly transparent way. There was a grave infirmity to this otherwise superlative description: the absence of any historical or geographical dimensions to the association he created between civil war and the state of nature. An empirical seed had been planted, we are informed that all places where there is civil war, are places without government, law, and society, thus states of nature. A reading of *Elements and De Cive* ought to have supplied these fundamental attributes of a Hobbesian state of nature. Therefore, with an understanding of the Civil War, we can be assured that such a description is compatible with England at that time. Yet still, Hobbes was silent.

The variable which completed the unification of civil war and the state of nature from *Liberty and Necessity* was the single word “pacified”. Within the broader context of Hobbesian writing, reference to a country that had not yet been pacified, was a reference to a country that was at war. We know from Hobbes’s description of the state of nature, that it and war were indivisible conditions. Therefore, wherever Hobbes perceived war, the state of nature was also at the forefront of his vision. Hobbes viewed war and peace as a strict bifurcation, without any neutral or intermediary states between them. Humanity was living within one, or the other. If Hobbes’s “own country”, or England had not been pacified, it was still ravaged by war. Thus, in Hobbes estimation, still trapped within a state of nature.

The fact that Hobbes is making this statement within the private sphere of his own correspondence is even more edifying. Hobbes's undiluted candour about the consternations he was suffering concerning his allegiance and reputation are there to behold. Is it a strain upon credulity to conclude that such candour was also present when Hobbes gave his appraisal of the current state of England? Absolutely not. To deceive Sorbiere about what he thought was condition of England at that moment would be incongruous, after such guileless confessions were included within the same communication. It is difficult to maintain the sanity of the claim that Hobbes was insincere about the conviction he expressed in the existence of the state of nature. Particularly when the very thing has been attested to not only in innumerable places within the body of his intellectual works, but also in the confidence of those he trusted within his private correspondence. How mistaken Hobbes was when he declared: "This is a tiresome letter because of its contents"<sup>351</sup>. Little knowing the indispensability of its contribution when conducting the state of nature/civil war composite through two separate contexts of Hobbes's written material. A place without peace, is a place where the state of nature reigns.

There is another item of Hobbes's correspondence written in May of 1648, which can further legitimise the conclusion which has been drawn from the letter previously examined. Addressing William Cavendish, the third Earl of Devonshire from Saint Germain, Hobbes described England once more in language befitting a description of the state of nature. The letter from William Cavendish to which Hobbes was making reply, sadly no longer exists. Yet from Hobbes's response, it is possible to comprehend that he was answering an invitation from the Earl to attend him in England. Since expressing a reluctance to return from his exile to Sorbiere a year earlier, Hobbes's attitude toward returning to a war-torn England had not altered. Furthermore, it seems he could not be moved to change it, even by the entreaties of his friend and former master.

"And seeing your Lordship may perhaps come over, I thinke it best to reserve that business until you come. If I understand your letter, you aske me what inclinations I have to the place you are now in. I have no inclinations to the place where there is so little security, but I have such inclinations to your lordship as I will come to any place (if I may have a passe) where your lordship shall be. When I consider how dangerous a time there is lie to be for peaceable men, I am apter to wish you on this side, then my selfe on that side the sea"<sup>352</sup>.

How can certainty be established that the place to which Hobbes confessed to having "no inclinations" was England? Hobbes, as the letter dictated, was writing from Saint Germain in France,

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<sup>351</sup> *Ibid*, 158.

<sup>352</sup> *Ibid*, 170.

possibly still at the court of the Prince of Wales. Hobbes located the William Cavendish of “that side” of the sea. It is possible that Hobbes was talking about America. The home of the primitive native Indian civilisations was notoriously reputed by Hobbes to be a place without security. This is unlikely however, the sides of the sea which Hobbes refers are definitely the sides of the Channel. This is reinforced by one of the annotations attached to this letter by the editor Noel Malcolm. Who stipulated that one of the core subjects within this correspondence, was that the Earl of Devonshire was seeking to fill the position of tutor to his son in England<sup>353</sup>. If the Earl, soliciting Hobbes’s advice and possibly his own services for the position, desired to know Hobbes’s inclinations to the place that he was now in, it is highly unlikely that this “place” could have been any other than England. Now that the location has been fixed, the actual description Hobbes appended to this “place” will be addressed. None, or “little security” is a characteristic that Hobbes had attributed to the state of nature on multiple occasions.

In the *Elements of Law*, the quality of insecurity within the state of nature is clearly rendered in this passage:

“And for this cause, every man’s right (howsoever he be inclined to peace) of doing whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth with him still, as the necessary means of preservation. And therefore till there be security amongst men for the keeping of the law of nature one towards another, men are still in the estate of war, and nothing is unlawful to any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity”<sup>354</sup>.

If men are “still in the estate of war” “till there be security amongst” them, occupation of the state of war, i.e the state of nature, predicates no security.

This passage from *De Cive* establishes the lack of security for all people living the state of nature more explicitly than the former:

In the state of nature: “The cause of mutual fear consists partly in the natural equality of men, partly in the mutual will of hurting: whence it comes to pass that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to ourselves the least security”<sup>355</sup>.

This attitude toward security would be reinforced further by Hobbes in *Leviathan*. The absence of security is still one of the principal identifiable characteristics he ascribed to the state of nature:

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<sup>353</sup> *Ibid*, 171.

<sup>354</sup> *Hobbes, Elements*, 103.

<sup>355</sup> *Hobbes, De Cive*, 2.

In the state of nature, "From Diffidence Warre And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself"<sup>356</sup>

Furthermore, "For the Lawes of Nature, if themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, and but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature, (which every one hath kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely, if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every other man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against other men"<sup>357</sup>.

If the pursuit and maintenance of peace was the coagulating essence binding of all the laws of nature that Hobbes had devised. Such a statement encompassing what Hobbes thought regarding the tendentiousness of a person's propensity to keep to the laws of nature in the state of nature, informs us much about why Hobbes would have been so hesitant about returning to an England riven by civil discord. In the letter of 1647 to Sorbiere, Hobbes's belief that there was some "Power" erected in England was coherently stated. Stated with equal coherence, was Hobbes's belief that this "Power" was incapable of creating the level of security that would have encouraged him to abandon his exile. There was no peace for the laws of nature to be safely observed. England though in the grip of some new "power", had not been sufficiently "pacified" for Hobbes to consider it habitable for "peaceable men"<sup>358</sup> like himself.

Thus, we can be assured that when Hobbes is speaking of a place with little, or no security for those living within it, he is referring to a place that subsumed within the state of nature. England, from the description provided within this letter to the Earl of Devonshire was one such place that, offering Hobbes so "little security" at that time, was still in his judgment to be considered as a "dangerous"<sup>359</sup> state of nature.

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<sup>356</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan, 68.*

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid, 94.*

<sup>358</sup> *Hobbes, Correspondence, 170.*

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid, 170.*

**7) Behemoth and the Sovereign's Indivisible Right to the Militia- calculating the exact historical moment England regressed into the state of nature:**

The previous sections of this thesis have been devoted to the vindication of a single truth. That primarily, Hobbes's conception of the state of nature was a direct reflection of his experience of civil war in England. There was another empirical situation that Hobbes viewed as a manifestation of his state of nature. The lives of the indigenous peoples of America. This was given it's due. But the analytical focus remained unshakably poised upon the example of civil war. Like civil war, the discordant civilisation of the native Americans was judged to be one of the "many places" where the state of nature was happening "now". But throughout the corpus of Hobbes's philosophical and privately written material, his preoccupation with civil war was hegemonic in comparison. Interest in the savage peoples of America was confined preponderantly to the chapters containing Hobbes's formal description of the state of nature. With his attention in each rendition typically materialising in little more than a sentence. Enclaves of interest were discernible in unexpected provinces of Hobbes's wider literature<sup>360</sup>. Yet in comparison with the issue of civil war, such obscure references are but atoms of sediment in an oceanic compendium of text.

As he approached the twilight of his long and eventful life, Hobbes was moved to write a work that came to be popularly known as *Behemoth*. A work which he personally described as a "dialogue of the Civil Wars of England"<sup>361</sup>. It is the aim of this section of the thesis to demonstrate, that the dedication of Hobbes to civil war as an empirical manifestation of the state of nature was not exhibited so transparently as in *Behemoth*. For those who understand the English Civil War as the most optimal of all historical contexts that the state of nature can be applied to, *Behemoth* should mark the true philosophical apotheosis of this thinking. If the best interpretation of the state of nature is as a descriptive or analytical template, constructed so that the presence of the state of nature may be identified within human society. Nowhere do we witness this analytical template

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<sup>360</sup> Hobbes, *De Corpore*, 190.

<sup>361</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *The Bookseller's Advertisement to the Readers, From the Molesworth Edition of the English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, (John Bohn: London, 1845), 411.

more systematically implemented than in Hobbes's personal historical account of the English Civil Wars found in *Behemoth*.

The full exhibition of this symbiotic connection between the state of nature and the English Civil War as a feature of *Behemoth* is well recognised.

This encomium written by Richard Ashcraft about the utility of *Behemoth* to Hobbesian scholarship is an example of this:

"The placing of Hobbes's political thought in its historical context-and specifically, viewing it as a direct response to an interpretation of the English Civil War-necessarily has the consequence of increasing the value of *Behemoth*, Hobbes's own analysis of that event. Students (and scholars) who to know not only how the Civil War shaped Hobbes's political thinking but also why it retained its central place in his thought nearly twenty years after he wrote *Leviathan* will have to turn to *Behemoth* for answers"<sup>362</sup>.

A more adroit vindication of the governing imperative behind the decision to investigate *Behemoth* in this thesis could not have been dredged up from any other location. Much time was invested in the introduction of this thesis to validating why the English Civil War itself, ought to be defined as one "context" of Hobbes's political theory. It is a proclivity of the Skinnerite order to reduce the definition of "context" to a regimented corroboration of language, or "utterances". While the viability of this format has in no way been disputed by this thesis, having applied it extensively as each piece of Hobbes's written material was examined. Failing to perceive the actual historical event, or moment, as a tangible component of "context" was acknowledged as a limitation to this definition. The sequence of events that is the English Civil Wars can be incorporated into this definition of context, because the thought-generating influence of the event is reflected in each "utterance" pertaining to it.

This expanded contextual dimension is endorsed by Stephen Holmes in the introduction he wrote for *Behemoth*:

"Hobbes developed an analytical framework for discussing sedition, rebellion, and the breakdown of authority in his earlier works, particularly in *De Cive*, and *Leviathan*. His decision, late in life, to provide an account of the political convulsions that struck England between 1640 and 1660 gave him the opportunity to apply this framework historically"<sup>363</sup>.

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<sup>362</sup> *Hobbes, Behemoth, 1990 Edition, Back Cover.*

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid, vii-viii*

As with Richard Ashcraft, the act of analysing the events of the Civil War with the “analytical framework”, i.e with the state of nature equipped as the analytical template, is the moment when this framework becomes historically viable. Therefore, an examination of *Behemoth* is necessary, so that the state of nature can be exhibited within living history. If Hobbes can be shown to have synchronised the operating principles of his state of nature within what he portrayed as a true historical accounting of the English Civil Wars, it only serves to increase the futility of any attempt to discredit his commitment to the empirical existence of the state of nature.

From each construal of Hobbes’s philosophical system, indispensable knowledge has been gained concerning the exact moment in a political crisis that Hobbes perceived the interposition of the state of nature. This is the moment where the sovereign authority of a Commonwealth, represented by a set of sovereign “rights”<sup>364</sup> is divided. When this occurs, the commonwealth is dissolved and the people who once lived within its jurisdiction experience a relapse into the state of nature<sup>365</sup>. The classification of civil war as a form of the state of nature in Hobbes’s perspective has been well vindicated by this point. Therefore, the life-giving moment for the state of nature that we seek, is the moment Hobbes affirms the war between the King and Parliament to have begun. With the advent of the state of nature, ineluctably comes war.

The heading of this chapter alluded to the right of the militia. What this is, in Hobbesian parlance, is simply the right of the sovereign to wage war. By recruiting, mobilising and commanding military forces from his own subjects. The reason why this particular sovereign right is suggested in the title to be the cynosure of this analysis, is due to the pre-eminence Hobbes gave this right over the others that he formulated. When encountering this right of the militia in Hobbes’s discourse, the implication is that should this right be annexed from the aggregate, then the whole concept of sovereignty ceases to exist. Below, it shall be demonstrated that this axiom has a formidable historical precedent in Hobbes’s philosophical writings.

Evidence of the Supremacy of the sovereign right of war from *De Cive*:

“All judgment therefore in a City belongs to him who hath the swords, (i.e) to him, who hath the supreme authority”<sup>366</sup>

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<sup>364</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan, 102.*

<sup>365</sup> *Ibid, 103.*

<sup>366</sup> *Hobbes, De Cive, 30.*

Hobbes could not have made the point so succinctly than he did in the final citation. The “supreme authority” in a commonwealth, was the entity that had the military forces of the land at their discretion: or “him who hath the swords”. Hobbes perceived no limit to the administrative capability of a sovereign ruler with the authority to direct military business.

Evidence of the Supremacy of the sovereign right of war from *Leviathan*:

Between the composition of his earlier works and the formulation of *Leviathan*, England had passed several miserable years in civil turmoil. With regard to what Hobbes perceived to be the ideal requisites of a sovereign entity in a commonwealth, the consensus established in the earlier instalments of his political philosophy resonated with strident force throughout *Leviathan*. With an indisputably greater force than both of these previous treatises combined. *Leviathan* inaugurated what ought only to be defined as a radicalisation in what Hobbes envisioned the powers of a sovereign to entail. The four fundamental sovereign rights, which were standardized in *Elements of Law and De Cive*. Are found to have proliferated by the time Hobbes came to set them forth in *Leviathan*.

The expansion of the fundamental prerogatives of sovereignty in *Leviathan*:

1): To be “Judge Of What Is Necessary For The Peace And Defence Of His Subjects”, 2): To be “Judge Of What Doctrines Are Fit To Be Taught Them”, 3): The legislative right. Or: The Right Of Making Rules, Whereby The Subject May Every Man Know What Is So His Owne, As No Other Subject Can Without Injustice Take It From Him, 4): “To Him Also Belongeth The Right Of All Judicature And Decision Of Controversies”, 5): “Of Making War, And Peace, As He Shall Think Best”, 6): “Of Choosing All Counsellours And Ministers, Both Of Peace, And Warre”, 7): “Of Rewarding, And Punishing, And That (Where No Former Law Hath Determined The Measure Of It) Arbitrary”, 8): Finally the determination “Of Honour And Order”<sup>367</sup>.

From this taxonomy of the rights of sovereign power delineated by Hobbes above, one cannot fail to apprehend that their number has increased twofold.

The right of the “Sword”, or as we now know it to be the right of the sovereign to administrate all things of military significance, retained its ascendancy over all other rights of sovereign authority in *Leviathan*. The first signification of this, was Hobbes’s statement about the obsolescence of “Covenants” without the presence of the “Sword”<sup>368</sup>. The covenant was the formal agreement of a multitude of people to relinquish their natural rights to a sovereign entity, so that a commonwealth

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<sup>367</sup> Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 100-102.

<sup>368</sup> *Ibid*, 94.

could be constituted<sup>369</sup>. These covenants said Hobbes, were mere “Words”. Of “no strength to secure a man at all”<sup>370</sup>, i.e. to keep a person out of the state of nature, “without the Sword”. This provides us with a perspicuous hint about what Hobbes believed the true sinews holding a commonwealth together to be.

The second and most profound signification of this military ascendancy, is the reciprocal association Hobbes created between the first and fifth right of sovereign power. By the time Hobbes came to the formation of Leviathan, he was as preoccupied with the foundation and preservation of peace as he was with the problem of civil war. As Hobbes’s condemnations of civil war reached their climax in *Leviathan*, so too did his effort to impress upon his reader the exigency of augmenting all peaceful measures in civic life. If Hobbes viewed civil war as the greatest evil and calamity a person could endure in their terrestrial existence by this point. The need to secure peace and a permanent escape from this condition became the “finall Cause, End, or Design” of the foundation of a commonwealth and the establishment of an absolute sovereign power<sup>371</sup>.

Because the “End of this Institution”<sup>372</sup>: the commonwealth, was “the Peace and Defence of them all”<sup>373</sup> the subjects of that commonwealth<sup>374</sup>. It was necessary to postulate a sovereign entity with the undiluted power to:

“Be Judge both of the meanes of Peace and Defence; and to do whatsoever he shall think necessary to be done, both beforehand, for the preserving of Peace and Security, by prevention of discord at home and Hostility from abroad”<sup>375</sup>.

The facility to accomplish all of these obligations, was contained within and made possible by the entitlement of the sovereign entity to govern all actions and measures associated with the making of war. This is clarified by the description Hobbes appended to the right of making war and peace:

“Ninthly, is annexed to the Sovereignty, the Right of making Warre, and Peace. That is to say of Judging when it is for the publique good, and great forces are to be assembled, armed, and payd for that end; and to levy mony upon the Subjects, to defray the expenses thereof. For the Power which by the people are to be defended, consisteth in their Armies; and the strength of an Army, in the union of their strength under one Command, which Command the Sovereign Instituted, therefore

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<sup>369</sup> *Ibid*, 94.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid*, 94.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid*, 93, 100.

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid*, 100.

<sup>373</sup> *Ibid*, 100.

<sup>374</sup> *Ibid*, 100.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid*, 100.

hath; because the command of the Militia, without other Institution, maketh him that hath it Sovereign"<sup>376</sup>.

The supremacy of the right of war and military command over all other sovereign prerogatives is only logical in this context. If the end of a commonwealth is peace and security for its subjects. The duty of the sovereign to defend their subjects, and preserve this peace is paramount to all of their additional obligations. Hobbes was unequivocal about the source of this peace preserving, subject defending power: it "consisteth in their Armies". This was why Hobbes stipulated that it was the right of war, or the "command of the Militia", that made the entity that possessed this right the absolute sovereign power in the commonwealth. The command of the militia made "him that hath it Sovereign". Through this ratiocination, the pre-eminence of civil war and the security of peace are merely two facets of the same coin of Hobbesian logic. If retention of sovereign authority in its entirety was imperative to keep the commonwealth from dissolving into civil war, it is logical that the right which endowed the sovereign with the power to attend to all others would be the one Hobbes defended most vociferously.

Civil war was the grievous lesson, Hobbes exhorted toward the end of *Leviathan*, that ought to instruct those who vilified absolute sovereign power as arbitrary, that:

"Without such government, such Warre must be perpetuall; and that it is Men, and Arms, not Words, and Promises, that make the Force and Power of the Laws"<sup>377</sup>.

This correlation between Hobbes's recognition of the lessons of civil war and the clarity to understand his vision of sovereignty was trumpeted by Francois Du Verdus in a letter of December 1655.

Du Verdus vaunted Hobbes as the: "only person to have demonstrated, from the nature of civil society, that the authority of the state is absolute and indivisible"<sup>378</sup>.

This truth was something subjects "cannot truly understand without hating civil war and without being content to live in peace among themselves under the power of the state"<sup>379</sup>.

So, Du Verdus recognised that it was Hobbes's understanding of the calamities of civil war which influenced his recourse to a more absolute definition sovereign power. It is valuable corroboration from a man who knew Hobbes personally, that the vicissitudes of civil war contributed heavily to the

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<sup>376</sup> *Ibid*, 101.

<sup>377</sup> *Ibid*, 371.

<sup>378</sup> Francois Du Verdus, 1655, *From the Correspondence of Thomas Hobbes*, 228.

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid*, 228.

final conception of Hobbesian absolute sovereignty. It was something which could not truly be understood without possessing a vilification of civil war which indelibly marked Hobbes's thinking. None of the sovereign rights which kept a commonwealth intact were valid, without the ability of the sovereign power to prepare for and wage war. Hobbes's own judgment on these matters give great authority to the proposition that it was his exposure to the Civil Wars of England which intensified his conclusions on the problems of civil war and indivisible military power.

Evidence of the supremacy of the Sovereign Right of War from *A Dialogue of the Common Laws of England*:

This discourse, one of the more obscure of Hobbes's publications, was written as a Socratic dialogue. Which was the exact form Hobbes's discourse within *Behemoth* was to be delivered. The system is simple but effective. Hobbes invents a scenario where he can best exhibit the rationality of his mind. By allowing the argumentation to be fought between two facets of his own conscience, he could propose questions that were attuned precisely to the wisdom that he desired to impart to the readers through answering his mock detractor.

Unlike the disputation Hobbes had fought earlier in his life with Archbishop Bramhall, this discussion was entirely of Hobbes's own design. Thus, Hobbes need have only relied upon his own discretion for the severity of the opposition, and the timing of their eventual capitulation. By challenging himself in a way that could not be taken out of proportion, Hobbes could display the full majesty of his logical machinery. Without, of course, risking the mutual affrontery and spite that was always a potential consequence when two equally opinionated people confronted each other in a conventional battle of wits.

In the opening remarks of the *Dialogue*, Hobbes in the guise of the Philosopher, asks his fictional opponent and the reader: "What hope then is there of a constant peace in any nation, of between one nation and another?"<sup>380</sup>. The answer Hobbes gave himself was that obedience to a king, or a common power, and their laws was the only way that the constancy of peace may be preserved in any political society<sup>381</sup>. Stating that, in a manner highly redolent of *Leviathan*, that: "the scope of all human law is peace, and justice in every nation amongst themselves, and defence against foreign enemies"<sup>382</sup>. Bearing this continuity with *Leviathan* in mind, the next phase of Hobbes's argument in

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<sup>380</sup> Hobbes, *Dialogue of the Common Laws*, 7.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid*, 8.

the *Dialogue* can be anticipated. In *Leviathan*, if we recall what was examined in the previous section, the power of the sovereign to implement the laws of the commonwealth to their full efficacy in the pursuit of peace, consisted in the armies of the sovereign and his right to command them.

It ought to have come as no surprise to a reader who had knowledge of this, that in the *Dialogue of Common Laws* Hobbes's maxim concerning the purpose of civil laws proceeded toward an identical corollary. But before reaching this inevitable conclusion, as he did in *Leviathan*, Hobbes reminded the reader that without laws the entirety of human civilisation would languish in the state of nature<sup>383</sup>. With the resultant commonality of all things, "slaughter"<sup>384</sup> and "continual war of one upon another"<sup>385</sup> typically to be inflicted upon all people suffering in a Hobbesian state of nature.

What followed was as vibrant an encomium of sovereign military power to be found within any treatise of Hobbes political philosophy. Essentially, the authority of all laws was nullified without a sovereign of military aptitude to enforce their authority with his own personal military capabilities. Stating that:

"If a nation choose a man, or assembly of men, to govern them by laws, it must furnish him also with armed men and money, and all things necessary to his office; or else his laws will be of no force, and the nation remains, as before it was, in confusion"<sup>386</sup>.

Hobbes pressed the point further:

"The King cannot make his laws effectual, nor defend his people against their enemies, without a power to levy soldiers; and consequently, that he may lawfully, as oft as he shall really think it necessary to raise an army, I say raise it, and money to maintain it"<sup>387</sup>.

In Hobbes's mind, the King of England was, and had been the only one to whom sole authority of mobilising and commanding the military forces of the nation rightfully belonged. It had always been the "ancient right of the Kings of England"<sup>388</sup>. The Earl of Clarendon, by no means a proponent of the Hobbesian political doctrine. Nonetheless claimed to have spoken similar words in defence of the King's right to the militia in the 1641 Parliament, when the Militia Bill was first advanced to be deliberated in the Commons. Quoting himself verbatim in his *History of the Rebellion*, Clarendon

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<sup>383</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>384</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid*, 9.

<sup>386</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>387</sup> *Ibid*, 10.

<sup>388</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

expressed to the Commons that: “There could be no doubt that the power of the militia resided in the King, in whom the right of making war and peace was invested”<sup>389</sup>.

Within the *Dialogue of Common Law*, Hobbes formally amalgamates his philosophical prose with a strategic deployment of historical knowledge. This, to a primitive degree, was a custom that has been inaugurated into the standard practice of Hobbesian scholarship in *Leviathan*. For one who is historically aware, references to the English Civil Wars are perceptible at the core of every Hobbesian discourse examined in this dissertation. Yet, the tendency of Hobbes to conceal them behind various graphic allegories (the Roman Penny from *Leviathan* for example), betrayed his reluctance to openly seek validation for his philosophical deductions from his deep reservoir of recent historical knowledge. Though, by the time Hobbes came to compose his *Dialogue of Common Laws*, he was troubled by no such coyness. Indeed, we can observe that history itself, and the lessons it had engraved upon Hobbes’s conscience, had become the fundamental legitimising influence for the pronouncements he made about English Law.

The Magna Carta was the document he cited to prove the historical legitimacy of his claim that the military prerogative of England had always belonged to those that held the office of King<sup>390</sup>. In the course of his defence of the King’s sovereign right control the military affairs of the nation, Hobbes spoke of the Long Parliament of 1640 with great censure. He placed the responsibility of the late Civil War solely upon their treacherous activity. “By the major part of their votes the rebellion was raised”<sup>391</sup>, accusing the Long Parliament of orchestrating their rebellion: “with the design to put down monarchy, and to that end maintained”<sup>392</sup>. The reason why the Parliament sitting at that time denied that the King had the right to mobilise an army to subdue rebellion was because the Parliament themselves, in Hobbes’s reckoning, had contrived their remonstrance with the desire to subdue the kingdom for themselves with that military power<sup>393</sup>. The Long Parliament of that time, alleged Hobbes, “murdered their King”<sup>394</sup>. No sooner had they done this, they “took upon them(selves) the sovereign power”<sup>395</sup> and began committing the abuses that they had previously excoriated the King for against the people now under their dominion “at their own discretion”<sup>396</sup>.

Whereas Hobbes, in *Leviathan*, had disguised what he saw as the Parliamentary betrayal of the King within an allegory of the rate of exchange between the present English currency and the ancient

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<sup>389</sup> Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, *The History of the Rebellion*, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2009), 100-101.

<sup>390</sup> *Ibid*, 11.

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>392</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid*, 17.

Roman specie. Here before us in the *Dialogue*, his words reflected the attitude of his conscience more directly. It was flagrant “murder”, and the men of the Long Parliament were the assassins culpable for it. The attitude of Hobbes’s conscience concerning the causal roots of the Civil Wars would be reflected even more directly, and acerbically in *Behemoth*. *Behemoth* having been a dialogue constructed around the vicissitudes of the English Civil War explicitly, is the piece of Hobbes’s vast bibliography that his thoughts about the War are distributed with the least apprehension for how any extraneous Parliamentary entity might have reacted. Furthermore, it is the text in which the formal synthesis of history and Hobbesian political philosophy occurred. As both Ashcraft and Holmes indicated, this text is one which Hobbes takes the core principles of his political apparatus and validates them through their application to an analysis of a sequence of historical events as the working format of that analysis.

### 7.2) *Behemoth*, the Militia Ordinance and the inception of the state of nature in England:

So, after following the lineage of Hobbes’s judgments on the sovereign right of war back to the source. It can be established that there had been, up to the moment Hobbes began to compose *Behemoth*, a legitimate and unwavering consensus in his thinking about this matter. Indeed, though his commitment to these principles cannot be said to have wavered, they certainly evolved as time progressed. With the sovereign right to dispose of military affairs becoming the unrivalled guarantor of laws and peace in Hobbes’s conception of an ideal commonwealth. Experience of civil war and what he perceived as a physical manifestation of the state of nature in England, warned him peremptorily against postulating any alternative to achieving the conditions for a lasting peace. *Behemoth* witnesses the most passionate exegesis of Hobbes’s resolve to unite all of the peace-preserving rights of sovereign power within one political entity. More so because of Hobbes’s willingness to depend upon the persuasive force of historical knowledge to bolster his judgment. Perhaps Hobbes attained the realisation by this point in his life that reference to actual historical events were a better way of situating the principles of his political philosophy within reality. Particularly a historical reality that his contemporaries would have been undoubtedly familiar with, and thus more likely to associate with the principles he evoked within each historical moment.

To find the exact point that England degenerated into a state of nature, the moment Hobbes considered the war to have begun is vital to locate. For it is at the moment that civil war commences, that due to its classification in Hobbesian philosophy as an empirical form of the state of nature, that the state of nature also commences. There are other criteria to be fulfilled in this

analysis. The next concerns Hobbes's definition of war. Which, according to Hobbes, is incumbent between two belligerent parties when one of them expresses the will to contend with the other by battle, by word, or by action. The state of nature being at all times in Hobbes's perception, as a state of war. This state being incumbent between two belligerent parties brings with it the ascendancy of the state of nature. The final criteria to be adhered to is the matter of divided sovereignty and its consequences for the commonwealth that experiences it. As Hobbes decreed, if any part of the prerogatives of sovereign authority were to be separated from the whole, the sovereignty, and thus the commonwealth itself would dissolve. Bringing about a regression of the people in that nation of broken sovereign authority into the state of nature.

As with his attitude in *A Dialogue of the Common Laws*, the weight of the responsibility for the war resided with the Parliament. Therefore, to discover the point of inception for the Civil War in *Behemoth*, it is to their putative abuses attention must be addressed. Hobbes's judgment of the Parliament in *Behemoth* was remorseless. They "destroyed the peace of the kingdom" and "by the help of Presbyterian ministers, and of ambitious ignorant orators, they reduced this government into anarchy"<sup>397</sup>. The use of "anarchy" in the place of what might have been more pertinently civil war, or the state of nature is no great irritation. Hobbes as early as *Elements of Law* had linguistically blended his definitions of civil war and the state of nature under the name of "anarchy"<sup>398</sup>. Therefore, the utmost assurance may be obtained that Hobbes in this instance is charging the Parliament of England and their conspirators with reducing England into a state of nature.

In an answer to Bishop Bramhall's 1654 *Catching the Leviathan*, Hobbes placed the term anarchy more clearly within its historical context, referring to the time "when this nation very lately was an anarchy, and dissolute multitude of men"<sup>399</sup>. Further reinforcing the contextual alignment of the word "anarchy" as a synonym of civil war, with the actual historical setting of the English Civil War itself.

The statement of the fact is fortuitous, but Hobbes's affirmation alone is not enough to determine the moment of its inception. Hobbes's consideration of the implications of the Militia Ordinance is the more appropriate province to seek for this conclusion.

Hobbes's description of the Militia Bill that was advanced during the proceedings of the 1641 Parliament:

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<sup>397</sup> Hobbes, *Behemoth*, 109.

<sup>398</sup> Hobbes, *Elements*, 134.

<sup>399</sup> Thomas Hobbes, *An Answer to Bishop Bramhall*, From IV of the Molesworth Edition of the Collected Works of Thomas Hobbes, (John Bohn: London, 1845), 287.

“They had a bill in agitation to assert the power of levying and pressing soldiers to the two Houses of the Lords and Commons; which was as much to take from the King the power of the militia, which is in effect the whole sovereign power. For he that hath the power of levying and commanding the soldiers, has all other rights of sovereignty which he shall please to claim”<sup>400</sup>

Aside from being arguably the most unequivocal admission of Hobbes’s conception of the supremacy of the sovereign right of military power, it confirms that the moment we are seeking for is the moment Parliament usurped the right of the King by mobilising their own military forces.

Hobbes reiterated in a later phase of *Behemoth*, that the pretensions the Parliament expressed through the militia bill proved that they “desired in effect the absolute sovereignty of England”<sup>401</sup>.

The consequences of the King being divested of his right to the militia by Parliament, is another point of sovereign power which Hobbes and the Earl of Clarendon are found to have concurred upon distinctly. Clarendon’s tone when issuing his opinion about the Bill afoot in the Commons was moderated compared to the Hobbesian polemic. The firmness of his conviction, that it was invariably wrong for the King to even contemplate the acceptance of such terms as were proposed in the Bill, is no less directly expressed than Hobbes’s was. Recollecting the events of February 1642 in the part of his history that he began writing in 1646, Clarendon seemed astonished at the implication of the constitutional modifications for which the Parliament had sought the royal assent of King Charles. Clarendon stipulated that the matter of the militia was one that was of “consequence and concernment to his (the King’s) sovereign power”<sup>402</sup>.

Furthermore:

“The granting of which would absolutely divest him of all regal power”<sup>403</sup>.

Clarendon pressed the severity of this demand by stating that the King could not have been furnished with a more “popular” reason to take up arms. As he would have been acting in the defence of himself and his lawful powers. Clarendon thought it imperative at that moment that the King:

“Preserve that power in his hands which the law had vested in him, and without which he could not be King”<sup>404</sup>.

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<sup>400</sup> Hobbes, *Behemoth*, 80.

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid*, 97.

<sup>402</sup> Clarendon, *History of the Rebellion*, 121.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid*, 121.

<sup>404</sup> *Ibid*, 121.

The gravity of the potential discord that could be wrought by this constitutional battle over the right to control the militia, contrasted in Clarendon's mind with another issue raised in that Parliamentary session. This was the Bill afoot to exclude the bishops from their traditional participation in the deliberations of the House of Lords. Though Clarendon conceded that this was a matter pertaining to the King's sovereign power. He determined that no more "unpopular" reason for the King to base his defiance of Parliament could be created<sup>405</sup>. Clarendon spoke with insouciance about the need to preserve this particular attribute of the King's sovereign power:

"Which few men thought essential, and most men believed prejudicial, to the peace and happiness of the kingdom"<sup>406</sup>.

If Clarendon can speak with such nonchalance about an issue that was disputed in this Parliamentary session, it only serves to magnify the gravity of the Militia Bill to the contentions of that moment. The implication from the way Clarendon disregarded the motion to expel the bishops from the Lords, is that its counterpart, the motion to divest the King of his power to govern the military affairs of England, was essential to the peace and happiness of the kingdom. Clarendon, along with his contemporary Hobbes, clearly indicated for us which office the entire sovereign capacity resided. In the Militia.

Military historian Charles Carlton echoed the concord found between Hobbes and Clarendon on this grave matter. Asserting that in 1642: "It was widely recognised that the control of the armed forces was so basic an issue that it might well be the fittest subject over which the nation could go to civil war"<sup>407</sup>.

He claimed ironically that one of the only elements of agreement to be found at this time between the King and his Parliament stemmed from the mutual recognition of this axiom of state<sup>408</sup>. Not that the King believed that it was right for the Parliament to arrogate to themselves this power that was traditionally a regal charge. "By God not for an hour" he was reported to have exclaimed when rebuking a Parliamentary commission sent to obtain his assent to the Militia Bill<sup>409</sup>, "you have asked of me that was never asked of King and with which I would not trust my wife and children"<sup>410</sup>.

Carlton insisted that the source of this agreement, was more of a mutual recognition of an axiom of the time. That both the King and Parliament understood that the power to govern the military affairs

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<sup>405</sup> *Ibid*, 121.

<sup>406</sup> *Ibid*, 121.

<sup>407</sup> Charles Carlton, *Going to the Wars: The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638-51*, (Routledge: London, 1992), 38.

<sup>408</sup> *Ibid*, 38.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid*, 38

<sup>410</sup> *Ibid*, 38.

of the kingdom was: “whence political power came”<sup>411</sup>. Considering this, the sanguine determination of Parliament to acquire, and of the King to retain this power is made more sensible to the conscience of a modern person. Thus, to a degree, bringing the consensus on the workings of the Early Modern English state within the consensus on the supremacy of the sovereign right of military authority propagated by Hobbes.

Hobbes then claimed that after disregarding the King’s negative response to the various attempts made to persuade his assent of the Bill, the Parliament put themselves into “a posture of defence”<sup>412</sup>. This “posture” ought to put us in mind of a similar term Hobbes employed in *Leviathan* when he gave his definition of war. Hobbes explained that a “posture of gladiators”<sup>413</sup> was simply a way of describing the readiness of a belligerent power to engage another in war, whether they be two nations, or factions within the same government. Hobbes said that those that adopted the gladiatorial posture, had also attended to the acquisition of all material necessary to wage war. This is how Hobbes defined the defensive posture he described the Parliament to have assumed after the declaration of the Militia Ordinance. “It was a putting of themselves into arms, and under officers such as the Parliament should approve of”<sup>414</sup>.

It is at this point that Hobbes, according to his own criteria, concluded that the Civil War had begun. If the Parliament have placed themselves, in defiance of the King’s refusal to relinquish his sovereign power, into this “posture of defence”. They have declared their will to contest with the King, by battle, for this sovereign power. In Hobbes’s rumination, not only was this “posture of defence” a motion of open warfare toward the King. The continual efforts launched by the Parliament to inveigle the King into accepting their propositions were an “actual rebellion”<sup>415</sup>. In the Hobbesian perspective, the war had commenced well in advance of the actual mobilisation of forces and collision of arms. The sovereign power of the kingdom had been, at first coveted, and then outright arrogated by the Parliament by their accession to the Militia Ordinance. After Hobbes, through the administration of A in the dialogue of *Behemoth* adumbrated the events enumerated above for B. Hobbes through the interlocution of B recognised that by this point, that “they”, the Parliament, “have taken from the King, not only the militia, but also the legislative power”<sup>416</sup>.

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<sup>411</sup> *Ibid*, 38.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid*, 100-101.

<sup>413</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan*, 68-9.

<sup>414</sup> *Hobbes, Leviathan*, 101.

<sup>415</sup> *Hobbes, Behemoth*, 107.

<sup>416</sup> *Ibid*, 102.

A concurred with this, but reminded B that by seizing the military power from the King, the Parliament have claimed the whole of the political power within the kingdom:

“They have so; but I make account that the legislative power (and indeed all power possible) is contained in the power of the militia”<sup>417</sup>.

What greater positive affirmation from Hobbes can be obtained that the Civil War had begun? Parliament had successfully executed a transfusion of sovereign power from the body of the King into themselves. The King would mobilise and command his own military forces during the Civil War. But now that this power was also disposed of by the Parliament, the sovereign authority which had been intact before the ratification of the Militia Ordinance was now riven between two competing political entities. As Hobbes had reiterated on countless occasions, if the sovereign authority of a commonwealth was annexed or sequestered by an ambitious party, the division of the said sovereign authority instigated a complete dissolution of that commonwealth. The petitions and counter-petitions that sallied forth from the Parliament and the Court did, in Hobbes’s mind, constitute a formal exchange of warlike manoeuvres. Remarking on the decision of the Parliament to form an army under the generalcy of the Earl of Essex, and of the King to put the Commissions of Array into execution, Hobbes said:

“Hitherto, though it were a war before, yet there was no blood shed; they shot at one another nothing but paper”<sup>418</sup>.

The verdict is unmistakable. Even before the mobilisation of military forces and the shedding of blood, Hobbes perceived a state of war in existence between the King and the Parliament. The Militia Bill, or Ordinance was the first paper shot discharged in hostility, and ultimately the harbinger of the birth of the Civil War soon to be christened in English blood later that year. A final remark from Hobbes concerning the state of England will represent the last occasion that validation shall be sought from Hobbes’s *Behemoth*:

“When the business was now brought to its height, by the levying of soldiers and seizing of the navy and arms and other provisions on both sides, that no man was so blind as not to see they were in an estate of war one against another”<sup>419</sup>.

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<sup>417</sup> *Ibid*, 102.

<sup>418</sup> *Ibid*, 109.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid*, 117.

Hobbes declaring that the business was “brought to its height” by the mutual preparations of war made by the King and Parliament, means that it had already begun to escalate before this process was initiated. The event that triggered this escalation, that led to the eventual arraying of military forces by two parties within the Kingdom of England against each other, was undoubtedly in Hobbes’s eyes the passing of the Militia Ordinance. It formalised the division of the sovereign authority within the kingdom, which the belligerent parties of the Civil War would soon fall into slaying each other to possess. Hobbes frequently stipulated that there was no alternative condition for a once peaceful commonwealth that had experienced a division of sovereign authority to be reduced, but civil war and the state of nature. Therefore, in discovering that the moment the Parliament passed the Militia Ordinance to have fulfilled the defining criteria, the Hobbesian beginning of the English Civil War has been decisively located. Thus, concomitantly, the moment the English state regressed into a state of nature has been fixed to an empirically verifiable moment in history.

If the fact that Hobbes did not exercise the greatest assiduity regarding dates in his discourse of the Civil Wars is an obstacle to the full realisation of this argument, a simple consultation of a reliable history can furnish the date.

Michael Braddick dated the order from the Parliament to put the Militia Ordinance into execution to the fifth of May 1642<sup>420</sup>. But for a Hobbesian judgment of the beginning of the Civil War, this is too early. Hobbes stated that the war was already “brought to its height” before either of the belligerent parties sought to mobilise their military forces. However, the fifth of March, the date Braddick appointed to the passage of the Militia Ordinance into law by the Parliament<sup>421</sup>, is more contextually appropriate. Hobbes demanded a manifest will to go to war, declared by either word or action, was essential for a state of civil war to be legitimately incumbent in the context of his thinking. It was only after the passage of the Militia Ordinance that Hobbes decided that the Parliament were intent on war with the King, and “resolved to take from him his royal power, and consequently his life”<sup>422</sup>.

No further affirmation of the moment the Parliament thrust the Militia Ordinance into legislation, as the moment the nation of England lapsed simultaneously into civil war and the state of nature in

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<sup>420</sup> Michael Braddick, *God’s Fury and England’s Fire: A New History of the English Civil Wars*. (Penguin Group, London, 2009), 192.

<sup>421</sup> *Ibid*, 186.

<sup>422</sup> Hobbes, *Behemoth*, 102.

Hobbes's judgement is required. It is manifestly present in writing, first that Hobbes perceived the existence of his state of nature concept in every place where civil war had supervened. Secondly, that both the state of nature and civil war were simultaneously brought into existence by a forcible attempt of a faction to arrogate to themselves the sovereign authority of a nation, and thus to divide that sovereignty by result. Finally, how these two strands of causation were unified and enacted through the events which preceded and witnessed the outbreak of Civil War in 1642 England.

**Conclusory remarks:**

*Behemoth* represented the zenith of the symbiotic connection between the state of nature and the condition of civil war in Hobbesian political philosophy. This connection possesses a formidable conceptual lineage in the genealogy of Hobbesian thinking. A lineage which, as this thesis has exhaustively sought to demonstrate, can be traced back to the very genesis of Hobbesian political theory in *Elements of Law*.

The passages selected from *Leviathan* in particular, exhibited that the symbiosis between the state of nature and civil war had transcended the metaphysical limits that had circumscribed it in the earlier iterations of Hobbes's political philosophy. The prevalence of the Civil War at the time Hobbes was writing *Leviathan*, allowed him to explicitly contextualise the state of nature within an empirically viable reality. Hobbes could only speculate about a civil war he thought highly possible in the time that he wrote *Elements of Law and De Cive*. The conceptual unity between the state of nature and civil war was present and advanced to an impressive level of complexity in these works. However, their contents seemed less likely to lead to the validation of Hobbes's belief in the existence of the state of nature, because there was no actual civil war to reflect the characteristics Hobbes had appended to the state of nature. Therefore, the fact that the war he presaged had yet to materialise, prevented him from representing the state of nature as an empirically viable reality by assimilating it within a sequence of historical events.

By the time came for Hobbes to direct his attention to the formation of *Leviathan*, the inception of the English Civil War presented Hobbes with a solid empirical conduit to enable his state of nature to be traversed from a purely abstract definition into reality. Without the constitutional friction in England ripening into open warfare, Hobbes would have been bereft of the powerful logical precedent which allowed him to classify civil war as one of the "many places" which he considered his state of nature to be happening "now". The conceptual unity between the state of nature and civil war had been affirmed explicitly by Hobbes as early as 1646, in *Liberty and Necessity*. Yet, as Hobbes had not delivered this affirmation in the present tense, or with reference to current events, it remained confined to a purely abstract dimension. It was only in *Leviathan* that Hobbes began the systemic application of the present tense to references to civil war, within the context of his political philosophy. Thus, with the effect of associating the state of nature with an event which none could rationally question the factual basis of: "our present Civile Warre".

However, the formativeness of the way Hobbes treated civil war in *Leviathan* should not be permitted to vitiate the contribution of any other piece of Hobbes's written material. The seminal merit of *Liberty and Necessity* cannot be allowed to escape recognition. It contained an explicit formalisation of the connection between the state of nature and civil war. This was an evolutionary step which Hobbes had consistently prevaricated from in *Elements of Law and De Cive*. By evaluating this action in *Liberty and Necessity*, it is easy to diminish its significance by averring that it would have been done on a more fundamental scale in *Leviathan* anyway. Not only does the admission from *Liberty and Necessity* serve to make the conceptual lineage of this connection more expansive and richer. It subverted Professor Evrigenis's misapprehension of the timing of this affirmation, by displaying an explicit statement of the connection between the state of nature and civil war which invariably preceded *Leviathan*.

Before the introduction of *Liberty and Necessity* into the discourse, the effort to subvert this misconception had been retarded by the deficiency of another source. Remarks which positively linked the state of nature and civil war were enclosed within the first chapter of Hobbes's *De Corpore*. Through an analysis of these remarks, it was discovered that there was a visible linguistic congruence between *De Corpore and Leviathan*. This linguistic congruence was revealed in the nomenclature Hobbes employed to describe civil war and the state of nature: "calamity". Yet, proving that the explicitness of this connection from this chapter of *De Corpore* had prefigured *Leviathan* could not be accomplished to the standard this investigation ultimately desired to achieve. The *Dialogue of Liberty and Necessity* could be dated precisely to 1646, such a date was avowed by Hobbes himself.

The fact that *De Corpore* was published in 1656, after a gestation period that encompassed over a decade, made the act of determining whether the remarks from the first chapter preceded *Leviathan* a matter of dangerous conjecture. If Hobbes adhered to a strictly chronological structure when assembling the chapters of *De Corpore*, having evidence that Hobbes was working on it as early as 1644, any utterance located within the first chapter may very well have preceded *Leviathan*. Hobbes toiled for so long with *De Corpore* and very likely made innumerable modifications to the manuscript over the years it was in progress. It is an equally feasible a conclusion that the remarks affirming the connection between the state of nature and civil war were incorporated into the first chapter after the completion of *Leviathan*. Therefore, it is to the great credit of *Liberty and Necessity* that this indeterminacy was cogently rectified, and the pre-*Leviathan* explicitness of this connection proven.

The analysis of the corpus of Hobbes's written material conducted here, has endeavoured at all points to adhere faithfully to the original formats of Hobbes's written word. It was manifestly demonstrated that the most optimal method of deducing the truth of Hobbes's commitment to the existence of the state of nature, was to interpret his written word as literally and fastidiously as possible. Great inferences are not required to construct a formidable argument for Hobbes's commitment to the existence of the state of nature, he affirmed it explicitly on numerous occasions. In the instances where his affirmation was less explicit, the material to construct the logical premises for this commitment were provided by Hobbes himself in the language he used to link the state of nature and civil war together contextually. This was demonstrated in the chapter which delved into *Elements of Law and De Cive*. A single linguistic consensus was distilled from a multitude of ostensibly different nomenclature, which if the surface was scratched, blended harmoniously together.

By channelling the expressions that Hobbes made in his private correspondence through the linguistic consensus that had been established from his political philosophy, the contextualisation effort was able to achieve a more sophisticated level of validation. The private writing and the public can be identified as two separate contexts of Hobbesian thought. It was discovered that there was a descriptive congruence in the way Hobbes discussed civil war within the private sphere of his own correspondence and the way the state of nature was defined in his political philosophy. As a consequence of this critical discovery, Hobbes's correspondence could be assimilated within a new broader context of utterances that elicited a connection between the state of nature and civil war that spanned the entirety of Hobbes's written material.

Hobbes's contemporaneous observations about the condition of England in the 1640's allowed the state of nature to traverse deeper into an empirically verifiable reality, because for the first time, Hobbes was applying the descriptive mechanisms used to identify his state of nature in his political thinking to an actual instance of civil war in the physical world. This tendency to rely on a perception of the disorders within the dominions of the Stuart Kings as an empirical proving ground for the principles of his political philosophy, was escalated in *Leviathan*. Furthermore, it was apotheosised and perfected in *Behemoth*. Prior to the existence of this text, Hobbes had incorporated the state of nature into the reality of an England riven by civil war, in *Behemoth* an exact historical moment could be identified for the regression of the English nation into the state of nature. This was facilitated by the unification of the two strands of causality that Hobbes had demarcated for the state of nature and civil war. The moment these trajectories intersected, and the state of nature and

civil war emerged simultaneously into existence was the moment sovereign power in England was divided. The moment, in Hobbes's reckoning, that the Parliament had made their will to contest the right to the political supremacy of England in war with the King manifestly known: was the legislation of the 1642 Militia Ordinance on the 5<sup>th</sup> of March.

A fitting final point to consult is what possible implications this research could have upon an Early Modern historian's understanding of Thomas Hobbes and his state of nature? The research presented in this dissertation cannot claim full acclaim for recognising and defending the sincerity of Hobbes's commitment to the existence of the state of nature. As this argument strove to demonstrate at several junctures of this essay, it was Hobbes himself who was the first to proactively engage with entities that may have attempted to dispute the sincerity of his position on the state of nature. In the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan*, any potential historic objections to the existence of the state of nature were addressed. Furthermore, within the same affirmation, Hobbes pre-empted any future dissention and erected a powerful barrier against it. Hobbes explicitly limited the existential scope of his state of nature to "many places" instead of "generally" in the Early Modern world. By doing so, Hobbes rendered untenable all future refutations of his belief in the existence of the state of nature that were based upon the allegation that he could not have seriously perceived a general, world-encompassing concept of the state of nature. Hobbes's commitment to the existence of the state of nature cannot be legitimately challenged by invalidating a version of the state of nature in which Hobbes himself did not support.

Nevertheless, despite the clarity of Hobbes's exposition, contemporary and modern critics alike failed to distinguish the nuances of Hobbes's true belief from the text. Different interpretational perspectives wrought havoc with the veracity of Hobbes's written word. Hobbes's crucial declaration that the state of nature existed in "many places", seemed invisible to critics like Robert Filmer, Preston King and Glen Newey. For whom Hobbes's confirmation that the state of nature was "never generally so" was the only utterance in that highly informative passage worthy of attention. By referencing only the latter and negating the former from the citation, Hobbes could erroneously appear to have withdrawn his own personal conviction in the existence of the state of nature. Thus, the imperative behind the formulation of this research was born. As it was stated in the abstract of the thesis, the simple motive was to bring some semblance of order to the confusion of judgment which Hobbes's perception of the state of nature seemed to have occasioned for some of his critics. But this initiative was not wholly original. Professor Ioannis D. Evrigenis was the indispensable pioneer who chose to challenge the propensity of readers to distil an impression of

Hobbes's disbelief in the state of nature from the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan*. It was his essay on the state of nature from the *Oxford Handbook of Hobbes* which inspired the rigorous, textually interpretive method exercised throughout the analysis conducted upon Hobbesian writing in this thesis.

Though admirable and fundamental, it was suggested earlier that Professor Evrigenis did not go far enough with his analysis. This is where the contribution of this research to the existing corpus of work devoted to Hobbes's state of nature exceeded all of its predecessors. Evrigenis recognised that an explicit linguistic and conceptual connection existed in Hobbes's writing between civil war and the state of nature. However, it was beyond the scope of his research to accurately determine at what point in Hobbes's written thought this connection materialised. Evrigenis was convinced that no such connection had been explicitly established by Hobbes prior to the thirteenth chapter of *Leviathan*. By thoroughly analysing the linguistic correlations between the terminology employed by Hobbes to refer to both civil war and the state of nature, it was revealed that such a connection was conceived by Hobbes as early as 1640 in *Elements of Law*. This connection was re-affirmed consistently in Hobbes's philosophical and private writings years before the conception of the *Leviathan*. These were developments which had also escaped the scrutiny of Professor Evrigenis.

Another deficiency which this research aspired to address was the lack of primary textual consolidation around the connection between civil war and the state of nature. Perceptive scholars such as Professor Evrigenis, Kinch Hoekstra, Adrian Blau and Helen Thornton recognised the symbiosis between the English Civil War Period and the state of nature in Hobbes's work but failed to seek further validation from the text. Given that the credibility of the frequently cited passage from the thirteenth chapter was disputed (however wrongfully), it was determined that a systematic classification of present tense references to the Civil War from *Leviathan* was required to dilute the corruption. In the accomplishment of this, it is hoped that this research can be considered to have exerted more than any other work in the effort to situate Hobbes's state of nature within an empirically verifiable historical reality: The English Civil Wars.

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