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*The role of Shared Leadership in building
Purpose-driven, Performance-oriented and
People-centric startup social ventures: An inductive
three-path model about the antecedents, characteristics
and outcomes of team leadership in early-stage social
enterprises in India*

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The role of Shared Leadership in building Purpose-driven, Performance-oriented and People-centric startup social ventures:

An inductive three-path model about the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team leadership in early stage social enterprises in India

Paroma Bhattacharya

While there has been a growing academic interest in social entrepreneurship in the last few years, there is a dearth of research about how people lead and follow in startup social venture teams, in order to drive successful organizations. Addressing this research need, my doctoral dissertation used a leadership angle, to understand the development and performance of startup social enterprise teams. While the findings are applicable across different contexts, the primary research focused on early-stage social enterprise teams in India, given the large number of startup social ventures and booming social innovation ecosystem in the country. I used a mixed-methods research methodology to inductively generate and test theory on the research topic. First, through a qualitative study, I conducted interviews with founders and team members across 30 startup social venture teams in India. The research findings highlighted the presence of Shared Leadership in the participant teams, and led to the creation of an inductive three-path model outlining the antecedents, characteristics and team and venture-level outcomes of shared leadership in successful startup social ventures. Second, through a quantitative study, I collected data, using a multi-source online survey, from 70 startup social venture teams in India, to test a part of the three-path leadership process model generated in the first study. The results largely supported my research hypotheses and showed that team social cause passion (congruence), founder's empowerment behaviour and followers' proactive behaviour predicted shared leadership in startup social ventures. Further, shared leadership, mediated by continuous team learning behaviour, predicted the overall venture performance in such social enterprises. My dissertation contributes to the domains of Social Entrepreneurship Development, Leadership Development and Team Development literature, by explaining how shared leadership emerges in early-stage social enterprise teams and clarifying the role of Shared Leadership in building Purpose-driven, Performance-oriented and People-centric startup social ventures.



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characteristics and outcomes of team leadership in
early stage social enterprises in India

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

○ AMJ – Academy of Management Journal.....	257
○ ASA – Attraction-Selection-Attrition Framework.....	14
○ CSR – Corporate Social Responsibility.....	21
○ CTLB – Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.....	241
○ CTW – Common Team Wavelength.....	161
○ EL – Empowering Leadership.....	30
○ FPB – Followers’ Proactive Behaviour.....	247
○ FEB – Founder’s Empowerment Behaviour.....	247
○ HP – Harmonious Passion.....	70
○ HRM – Human Resource Management.....	50
○ LMX – Leader Member Exchange.....	25
○ MLM – Middle Level Management.....	38
○ MSME – Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises.....	15
○ MT – Mutual Trust.....	247
○ MWB – Mental Well Being.....	49
○ NVT – New Venture Team.....	27
○ OP – Obsessive Passion.....	71
○ PL – Paradoxical Leadership.....	37
○ SCP – Social Cause Passion.....	70
○ SE – Social Entrepreneurship.....	18
○ SEBI – Securities and Exchange Board of India.....	15
○ SL – Shared Leadership.....	30
○ SROI – Social Return on Investment.....	46
○ SVP – Social Value Proposition.....	46
○ TEP – Team Entrepreneurial Passion.....	27
○ TFL – Transformational Leadership.....	35
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DEDICATION

Dedicated to all the social changemakers in India and across the world – thank you for making the world a better place.

“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed, citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.”— Margaret Mead

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, the world has seen immense growth in the number of individuals and organizations addressing social issues through the medium of Social Entrepreneurship, which is “a process involving the innovative use and combination of resources to pursue opportunities to catalyze social change and/or address social needs” (Mair & Marti, 2006, pg. 37). Social entrepreneurs are individuals who create innovative long term solutions for pressing social problems and deliver these solutions through the vehicle of social enterprises (Alvord et al., 2004). While there are several different definitions for a ‘social enterprise’ across academic literature, this thesis defines social enterprises as for-profit, non-profit or hybrid organizations (Yunus, 2007) that create social wealth (Mair & Marti, 2006) through social entrepreneurial activities (separate from social service and social activism activities – Martin & Osberg, 2007; Dacin et al., 2010) and these organizations have social impact as their key measure of success and organizational vision (Austin et al., 2006).

Since social entrepreneurs take an organizational approach to create long lasting social impact, the organization and related key resources play a critical role in achieving and maximizing the impact goal of the social venture. Focusing on human capital as an important organizational resource, there is ample literature and research, both in the corporate and non-profit sector, that has proven that effective human resource management has a direct impact on an organization’s performance capacity (Mesch, 2010; Drucker, 2010). Social entrepreneurs are unique socially-motivated individuals running unique socially-driven organizations, characterized by the inherent innovativeness of entrepreneurship, as well as, the distinct core mission of creating value for the purpose of social impact (Lurtz & Kreutzer, 2012). Hence, the talent/human capital that they need must also be similar in mindset, skills and disposition, because, having a team that matches the vision and momentum of the social entrepreneur, will be critical to the success of the social enterprise. For example, in commercial startup ventures, entrepreneurs must have team members, who themselves have entrepreneurial capabilities and spirit, and who pioneer and drive innovative processes and growth within the organisation (McGinnis & Verney, 1987). While these learnings are equally relevant and applicable for early stage social enterprise teams, there is also an added unique dimension of working towards a social mission/vision, in the startup social venture context. Given that “social enterprises seek to affect positive change and create social value through entrepreneurial innovation” (Smith et al., 2012, pg. 465), these contemporary organizations aim to balance social impact creation with entrepreneurial problem solving, while also ensuring long term financial sustainability for the ventures (Smith et al., 2012).

Due to these competing demands that are inherent in these hybrid organizations, founders are often faced with several leadership challenges, especially in the startup stage (Smith et al., 2012). For example, drawing from Paradox Theory (Lewis, 2000; Smith & Lewis, 2011; Smith et al., 2012), social entrepreneurs must accept, differentiate and integrate these competing demands, in order for such startup organizations to thrive and survive; and building a sense of ownership and community within the startup team is a crucial part of handling intra-organizational conflicts or challenges that may arise due to the hybrid nature of the organizations (Smith et al., 2012). Similarly, fostering a sense of organizational

identification among team members is a tough process in hybrid and multifaceted organizations like social enterprises, and this poses quite a leadership challenge for startup social entrepreneurs (Hsieh et al., 2016). Applying Schneider's ASA (Attraction-Selection-Attrition) framework (1987) to the startup social enterprise context, it is critical for founders to hire, retain and develop the right kind of team members, who are personally aligned to the vision and values of the organization (Schneider, 1987; Schneider et al., 1995; Hsieh et al., 2016). These team centric processes have a great influence on organizational identification in startup social enterprises; which in turn, significantly impacts the performance of the team members and the organizations at large. (Hsieh et al., 2016).

Hence, given the unique team related leadership challenges that are faced by startup social entrepreneurs, as well as, the important relationship between startup teams and the growth of these early stage impact organizations, the chosen focus/target and unit/level of analysis for this doctoral dissertation is a startup social enterprise team. In particular, this thesis will focus on work teams in startup social ventures and will explore the antecedents, processes and outcomes of leadership at the team-level, in an early stage social enterprise context. In recent times, work teams have emerged as the "core building blocks of organizations" (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 3), across the academic and practitioner worlds. Aligned to the growing global importance attributed to work teams, the proposed thesis topic is relevant to the future direction of management research, given its focus on startup social enterprise work teams as the intended research target/unit of analysis. "Work teams and groups come in a variety of types and sizes, cutting across different contexts, functions, internal processes, and external linkages. However, several features provide a foundation for a basic definition. Work teams and groups: (a) are composed of two or more individuals, (b) who exist to perform organizationally relevant tasks, (c) share one or more common goals, (d) exhibit task interdependencies (i.e., workflow, goals, knowledge, and outcomes), (e) interact socially (face-to-face or, increasingly, virtually), (f) maintain and manage boundaries, and (g) are embedded in an organizational context that sets boundaries, constrains the team, and influences exchanges with other units in the broader entity" (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 5). Hence, the data collection for the dissertation focuses on startup social enterprise work teams that adhere to the criteria/definition outlined above.

The dissertation explores the phenomenon of leadership in a startup social enterprise team context, by studying the characteristics of team-level leadership processes and models in early stage social ventures, and also outlines the important antecedents and subsequent team-level outcomes of the emergent team-centric leadership processes in such impact organizations. The thesis aims to look beyond just the social entrepreneur and focuses on leadership development at the team level, within early stage social enterprises (early stage refers to organizations that are under 5 years old). It is important to draw attention to entrepreneurial team members, and the team as a collective leadership body, in early stage social enterprises, given their critical role in venture success (as outlined earlier) and considering the fact that currently, there is an almost glorified focus solely on the social entrepreneur (Short et al., 2009), also known as 'Heropreneurship' (Papi-Thorton, 2016), in the academic and practitioner worlds. Spanning across two research studies, the thesis first attempts to build theory around the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership processes in early stage social enterprises; following which the dissertation proceeds to test and validate the emergent theoretical model related to team-level leadership in startup social ventures.

While the findings of the thesis will be applicable across several contexts, the primary research focused on team-level leadership development in early stage social enterprises in India. India is an exciting and extremely relevant landscape to study with reference to this topic, because currently, there are approximately 2 million social enterprises in the country (sector and model agnostic criteria; British Council, 2016), out of which, 57% of the ventures are under 5 years old, placing them in the early stage category (British Council, 2016). In July 2020, the Government of India announced that 99% of the businesses in India are in the micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) category and hence, the country has a rich and thriving startup industry, given that startups/early stage ventures (including small/medium startup social ventures) fall within the MSME category (Times of India, 2020). Furthermore, some of the key barriers to growth that these social enterprises face are lack of appropriate managerial skills in the organization, difficulty in recruiting staff and specifically, finding and retaining junior to mid level talent (British Council, 2016). Hence, the human resource challenges faced by these organizations greatly justify the need for the proposed research topic. Given the size of the startup and social enterprise industry in India, there is also a very large and active social enterprise support ecosystem in the country. There are more than 190 entrepreneurship incubators and accelerators (NASSCOM, 2017) in India (with a majority of them also focusing also on startup social ventures), along with a thriving impact investment sector that has attracted more than “US\$ 5 billion (€ 4.4 billion) in the form of impact investments” for social enterprises in the country over the last few years (Intellicap, 2019, pg. 71). There is also a significant national level push towards entrepreneurship (and social entrepreneurship) from the government, with the rise of several government supported startup incubators and programs across the country (Intellicap, 2019; ANDE India, 2017). Most recently in June 2020, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) announced that it will be introducing a new financial instrument called the Social Stock Exchange to facilitate the exponential growth (and successful funding) of social ventures in the country (SEBI, 2020). Hence, given the size of the startup social venture industry in India, the context specific and practical findings of the dissertation will be of great value to a number of early stage social enterprises and social venture support organizations; thus having the potential of creating real-world field impact in the domain of social entrepreneurship in India. In terms of nomenclature, these impact-centric organizations will be referred to as either early stage social enterprises and/or startup social ventures across the dissertation.

1.1) Research Contributions

This thesis aims to make three major contributions to academic literature. First, the examination of the chosen topic will help to advance research in the domain of *Social Entrepreneurship Development*; with a particular focus on the literature about startup entrepreneurial teams, in the social enterprise context. While the important role of startup venture teams in enterprise success has been highlighted in entrepreneurship literature (Beckman et al., 2007; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Beckman & Burton, 2011; Glaser et al., 2016), specific research has not been conducted about the characteristics, outcomes and influences of team leadership in the unique context of early stage social enterprises. Extant research about social enterprises has mainly been concentrated in the domain of organizational theory, related to the hybridity of these impact organizations, and greater research attention must be given to organizational and team related factors – such as

organizational activities, workforce composition, organization design, inter-organizational relationships, and organizational culture – that play a critical role in the trajectories and outcomes of these social ventures (Saebi et al., 2019; Battilana and Lee, 2014). Further, a recent review of social entrepreneurship research by Gupta, Chauhan, Paul and Jaiswal (2020) highlighted that effective recruitment, management and development of employees is one of the biggest challenges faced by social entrepreneurs today, and hence, future research in the social enterprise domain must focus on human capital related themes such as team maintenance, development and retention, and the role of participative human resource management practices in such organizations. Thus, adopting a team-centric organizational lens towards startup social enterprises, this thesis will aim to generate theory about the different antecedents and characteristics of team level leadership processes in these impact organizations; and will also examine the influence of such team-centric leadership processes on the team and venture level outcomes of early stage social ventures.

Second, the proposed research in this thesis will also advance *Leadership Development* literature. The main contribution of the thesis to the leadership development field will be to generate valuable academic theory about leadership processes and constructs at the group level, in the context of new venture teams. Apart from researching the salient characteristics of team level leadership processes and constructs in early stage social enterprises, the thesis will also examine the leadership approach in startup teams by considering the characteristics of founders, followers and teams altogether, to understand how team-level leadership emerges and develops in startup social ventures. A recent review of leadership process models by Fischer, Dietz and Antonakis (2017) highlights that future leadership process research should be multi-level and multi-process in nature. There is a need for multi-level research about leadership processes that will explore the “multilayered reality of leadership in organizations” (Fischer et al., 2017, pg. 1747), by examining leadership characteristics and processes at the individual level of the leader and follower, at the dyadic level of leader-member relationships, as well as, at the collective level of the team. Similarly, there is also a need for researchers to construct and build multi-process models and theory about leadership processes, in order to take “into account that leadership produces effects via multiple paths” (Fischer et al., 2017, pg. 1747) in an organization. Thus, the doctoral thesis will make an important contribution to the leadership literature by theorizing and presenting a multi-process (an inductive three-path model, as discussed in Chapter 7) and multi-level leadership process model, that explores leadership characteristics, constructs and processes at the individual (leader/follower), dyadic and team level in startup social venture teams. Further, an extensive review of leadership development literature by Day and Dragoni (2015) revealed that the topic of support mechanisms aiding leadership development is one that is also relatively underexplored. Hence, there is huge scope for research in this domain and shedding light on team and organizational level factors/processes that facilitate team leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprises in particular, will be a unique theoretical contribution in the field of leadership development.

Third, the thesis will make important academic contributions to the field of *Team-centric* literature. A review of team-focused literature by Kozlowski and Bell (2013) has revealed the need for future team research to identify different factors “that determine the effectiveness of different types of teams” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 10). “Understanding what factors constrain and influence effectiveness for different types of teams will enable theoretical

progress and better targeted interventions” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 11). “This issue currently represents a major gap in theory and research” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 11) and generating research in this domain will result in the development of meaningful theories, applications and interventions designed to enhance team effectiveness across different types of teams (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). A recent review of research about work teams by Mathieu, Hollenbeck, van Knippenberg and Ilgen (2017) also highlighted that future team-centric research must focus on the role of member characteristics, team task characteristics and team composition/structure in shaping the emergence and dynamic development of team processes in contemporary organizations. Finally, linking the domains of leadership and team research, a review of literature related to leadership outcomes by Hiller, DeChurch, Murase and Doty (2011) mentioned that future leadership research must try to integrate “micro and macro investigations of leadership” (Hiller et al., 2011, pg. 1171) by exploring the multi-level outcomes of leadership in an integrated and interlinked manner, by examining leadership outcomes, such as “motivation, emotion, attitudes, and performance levels” (Hiller et al., 2011, pg. 1172), at the individual, team and organizational level. Hence, the proposed thesis topic can directly address these research needs by first, examining team characteristics and processes that contribute to the emergence and development of team level leadership in startup social venture teams; and second, by highlighting the impact of the different team leadership processes and constructs on team and venture level outcomes – such as team member attitudes, team well being and team/venture performance – in the context of early stage social ventures.

In sum, through theory generation, theory testing and theory elaboration on the underexplored topic of ‘the Emergence and Development of Team Leadership in Early Stage Social Enterprise Teams in India’, the thesis can make a unique contribution to the growing academic body of work about social entrepreneurship, team-level leadership, team processes, team development and team performance; with a specific focus on team level leadership development in startup social ventures.

1.2) RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Overall Research Question

What are the antecedents, characteristics, and outcomes of Team Leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprise teams?

- Sub Question 1
What are the antecedents and characteristics of team leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprise teams?
- Sub Question 2
How do team leadership characteristics shape the team processes in startup social enterprise teams?
- Sub Question 3
How do the team processes in startup social enterprise teams influence venture performance, team well being and other team level outcomes in these organizations?

1.3) Scope of Research (Conceptual Research Framework)

The scope of research outlined in Table 1 below provides an overview of the proposed thesis topic, covering the overall themes and structure of the doctoral dissertation. Secondary research, in the form of an in-depth and extensive literature review, was conducted for each sub-research question, and the academic themes examined in the literature review, helped to shape the content and design of the primary research and data collection across the entire thesis project.

Overall Research Question		
What are the antecedents, characteristics, and outcomes of Team Leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprise teams?		
Sub Question 1 What are the antecedents and characteristics of team leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprise teams? ↓	Sub Question 2 How do team leadership characteristics shape the team processes in startup social enterprise teams? ↓	Sub Question 3 How do the team processes in startup social enterprise teams influence the venture performance, team well being and other team level outcomes in these organizations? ↓
Secondary Research (Literature Review)		
Overview of Social Entrepreneurship (SE) Literature		
<i>(Further review of relevant topics and themes outlined below, based on gaps identified in SE literature)</i>		
TOPICS & THEMES - Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Startup Teams ○ Individual Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Team Members ○ Entrepreneurial Leadership Identity Development in Startup Team Members ○ Team Entrepreneurial Passion in New Venture Teams - Team Centric Leadership Development Theories → ○ Shared Leadership ○ Empowering Leadership ○ Team Self Leadership ○ Identity Based Leadership ○ Transformational Leadership ○ Paradoxical Leadership - Team Centric-Organizational Processes → ○ Talent Attraction, Retention and Engagement ○ Relational Models Theory & Group Dynamics ○ Team Life Cycle ○ Team/Organizational Learning ↓		TOPICS & THEMES - Venture Performance - Team Well Being ↓

Primary Research Design (Mixed Methods Approach)
Approach Theory Generation, Theory Elaboration and Theory Testing Methodology <u>Qualitative Research</u> → - Semi Structured Interviews - Participant Observation/Context Immersion <u>Quantitative Research</u> → - Cross-Sectional and Multi-Source Survey Research Participants - Startup Social Entrepreneurs (Founders) - Team Members of Startup Social Enterprises

Table 1: Scope of Research (Conceptual Research Framework)

Chapter 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The research focus of this thesis draws from different domains of literature. Hence, in this chapter, I will review existing literature across different academic fields, that contribute to our understanding of the following key themes of this doctoral dissertation:

Key Themes	Domain of Literature
The Field of Social Entrepreneurship – Literature Overview	○ Social Entrepreneurship
Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Startup Teams	○ Entrepreneurship
Team-Centric Leadership Development Theories	○ Leadership Development
Team-Centric Organizational Processes	○ Team Development
Team and Venture Level Outcomes in Startup Social Enterprises	○ Entrepreneurship ○ Social Entrepreneurship ○ Team Development

Table 2: Literature Review Framework

First, in Section 2.1, I will examine the extant literature in the Social Entrepreneurship domain, in order to highlight the key themes and theories that have already been studied, as well as, to identify the important gaps in the literature that require further research attention. Based on the gaps identified in the SE literature overview, I will delve deeper into relevant topics and themes from the Leadership, Team, Entrepreneurship and SE domains, in order to address the key research gaps related to the team composition and characteristics, leadership structures, organizational processes, and venture outcomes of startup social ventures. In Section 2.2, I will examine the unique individual and collective characteristics of members in entrepreneurial startup teams. Next, in Section 2.3, I will explore important team-centric leadership development theories, that are most relevant in the context of startup social ventures, to understand the types of team-centric leadership approaches that may emerge as a result of the unique characteristics of entrepreneurial startup teams. In Section 2.4, I will examine important team-centric organizational processes and constructs, that may emerge as a result of team-level leadership approaches, in startup teams. Finally, in Section 2.5, I will explore important team and venture level outcomes in early stage social ventures – namely social venture performance and team well being – that may emerge as a result of team-level leadership approaches and team-centric organizational processes in startup social enterprises.

It should be noted that the theories, constructs and research angles presented in the following sections must be viewed as conceptual input for the purpose of generating theoretical debates based on the gaps in the extant literature. While these theories and research gaps have guided the design of the primary research process, the specific thematic focus areas that ultimately form the core of this dissertation have, in fact, emerged out of the

empirical data collection that was conducted; as part of a grounded theory approach and inductive research methodology for the doctoral research project.

2.1) The Field of Social Entrepreneurship – Literature Overview

Social Entrepreneurship (SE) research has grown rapidly in the last decade, and a majority of the studies in this field have been concentrated in the domain of organizational theory, focused on clarifying the definition, structure and hybrid identity of social enterprise as a novel organizational form (Gupta et al., 2020; Saebi et al., 2019; Battilana and Lee, 2014). Specifically, a large number of studies have focused on defining the hybrid nature of social enterprises, with several different definitions and debates emerging about how to define the “unit of analysis” (Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 3). After reviewing 395 top-tier journal articles, Saebi et al. (2019) found that most papers converged on the definition that a social enterprise is a hybrid venture that effectively combined a social mission with innovative and entrepreneurial activities (Saebi et al., 2019; Zahra et al., 2009), to create explicit social value/social impact (primary objective), while also ensuring financial sustainability through economic value creation (Saebi et al., 2019; eg: Doherty et al., 2014; Austin et al., 2006; Mair & Marti, 2006; Sharir & Lerner, 2006).

Similarly, several studies have also focused on comparing and contrasting social enterprises to other similar or associated forms of organizations or entrepreneurship, in order to highlight the unique characteristics and tensions of the dual objectives of hybrid social ventures. For example, some notable papers compare SE to commercial entrepreneurship to shed light on the implications of the core/explicit mission of social impact creation (eg: Zahra & Wright, 2016; Bacq et al., 2016; McMullen & Warnick, 2016; McMullen, 2011); while other studies contrast SE with Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), to differentiate social ventures on the basis of their innovative approach and entrepreneurial nature (eg: Shepherd & Patzelt, 2011; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Similarly, other articles have compared SE to non-profit/philanthropic organizations by placing a focus on the angle of financial sustainability and entrepreneurial interventions of social ventures (eg: Doherty et al., 2014, Pache & Santos, 2013; Certo & Miller, 2008). Finally, several studies have further highlighted a number of associated forms of hybrid entrepreneurship that might fall under the broad umbrella of SE (Saebi et al., 2019), such as sustainable entrepreneurship (an added environment focus through a triple bottomline – eg: Dean & McMullen, 2007), institutional entrepreneurship (social intrapreneurs working in larger organizations – eg: Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009) and developmental entrepreneurship (a focus on systemic social change – eg: McMullen, 2011) – which further segments social entrepreneurs into social engineers (“social entrepreneurs who bring about institutional change by altering existing social systems” – Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 6), social constructivists (those who “develop scalable solutions to social problems” – Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 6), and/or social bricoleurs (those who use frugal innovation to “address local problems” – Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 6) (Zahra et al., 2009). Ultimately, by combining and compiling the various definitions and forms of social enterprises that exist, SE can be viewed as an umbrella term and a multidimensional

phenomenon, that can succinctly summarized through this 2 × 2 matrix (Figure 1 below) “that distinguishes SE ventures based on the type of social mission (social value creation for or with beneficiaries) and economic activity (integrated with or separate from the social mission)” (Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 7).

		Social mission	
		For beneficiaries (beneficiaries are solely recipient)	With beneficiaries (beneficiaries are part of value creation process)
Economic mission	Differentiated (commercial revenue cross-subsidizes social mission)	(Quadrant A) Two-sided value model	(Quadrant B) Market-oriented work model
	Integrated (beneficiaries are paying customers)	(Quadrant C) One-sided value model	(Quadrant D) Social-oriented work model

Figure 1: “A typology of Social Entrepreneurship” (Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 7).

Looking beyond institutional theory, a recent review of social entrepreneurship literature further highlighted that extant studies in this domain were conducted either at an individual (focused on the social entrepreneur), organizational (focused on the venture) or institutional (focused on the external ecosystem) level of analysis, and very few studies adopted a multi-level approach to studying SE (Saebi et al., 2019). A majority of the studies conducted at the individual level of analysis focused on the motivations, personality traits and actions of social entrepreneurs (Stephan & Drencheva, 2017), primarily in the pre-venture formation stage (Saebi et al., 2019). There is a need to look beyond the founders and examine the characteristics of team members/followers who work in such ventures, as well as, study the distal outcomes of individual-level factors on team processes and outcomes at an organizational level (Saebi et al., 2019). At the organizational level of analysis, research is focused on the management, growth and success of social enterprises (Saebi et al., 2019). Different studies explore diverging paths with regards to venture performance and outcome variables (eg: antecedents for successful fund raising – Calic & Mosakowski, 2016; or partnerships required for successful scaling and growth – de Bruin et al., 2017), and the overall research findings appear to be fragmented to some extent (Saebi et al., 2019). There is a need to move beyond case-based research and focus on the key antecedents of social venture performance (with comprehensive measures of success) and the performance and/or failure trajectories of such hybrid enterprises, differentiated from commercial companies (Saebi et al., 2019). Finally, most studies at the institutional level of analysis have focused on measuring the social impact created by SE (eg: Rawhouser et al., 2017), as well as, the role of ecosystem players in facilitating or hampering the growth and resource acquisition of social enterprises (Zhao & Lounsbury, 2016; Saebi et al., 2019). However, similar to the gaps at the organizational level of analysis, there is a great need to explore how social impact and social venture performance can be structured and measured in a more comprehensive and meaningful manner, across the various models, sectors and stages of social enterprises that exist in the social innovation landscape (Saebi et al., 2019).

Building on the trends and gaps identified through their extensive literature review, Saebi et al. (2019) created a multi-stage and multi-level framework that outlined the key themes in the SE domain that have received the most attention, as well as, important areas that require further research exploration. As seen in Figure 2 below, the research themes have been segmented into the pre-formation and post-formation stage of the venture, and have also been categorised according to the individual (micro), organisation (meso) or institutional (macro) level of analysis (Saebi et al., 2019). Most of the research to date has focused on the micro-level factors related to social entrepreneurs, as well as, meso/macro level factors related to venture performance and outcomes of social impact creation (Saebi et al., 2019). However, there is a lack of knowledge about meso-level factors related to the creation, composition and management of new venture teams in the SE domain (Saebi et al., 2019). “Much of the SE literature focuses on the founding entrepreneur while ignoring entrepreneurial teams in the formation and growth of social ventures” (Short et al., 2009 in Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 17). Hence, further research must be done about the characteristics and groups dynamics of social venture teams and how such factors might influence the performance of these hybrid organizations – for example, it might be interesting to explore how the entrepreneurial team’s passion for the social cause might affect venture success (Saebi et al., 2019). Similarly, there is a need to examine team processes and mechanisms (such as decision making rights, allocation of resources, internal power relations, impact of team size etc.), as well as, the role of the founder/the appropriate leadership approach required for a successful social venture team, at various stages of organizational growth and performance (Saebi et al., 2019). Finally, there is also a need to conduct more multi-level research, studying the linkages of various factors across the different levels (as well as, laterally from the pre-formation to the post-formation venture stage), and the subsequent effects of these factors on venture performance (Saebi et al., 2019).




Figure 2: “Social Entrepreneurship as a Multistage, Multilevel Phenomenon” (Saebi et al., 2019, pg. 14)

The focus areas and research questions outlined in Chapter 1 directly address some of the key research gaps outlined above (at the meso/team/organizational level) and hence, my doctoral dissertation can make a significant contribution to the SE literature, by shedding light on meso-level mechanisms (using a team-centric leadership lens) that can further explain the unique nature and outcomes of hybrid social ventures. Thus, in order to connect the research needs identified in this section back to the topic of this doctoral dissertation, I will focus the following sections of the literature review on key themes at the 'meso' (team/organization) level of analysis. Drawing from different domains of literature (as outlined in Table 2), I will delve deeper into the Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Startup Teams, Team-Centric Leadership Development Theories, Team-Centric Organizational Processes, and finally, Team and Venture Level Outcomes in Startup Social Ventures.

2.2) Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Startup Teams

The research target/unit of analysis of the thesis project is a startup social enterprise team and thus, it is important to study theories and concepts that shed light on the characteristics and conditions of entrepreneurial startup teams. Hence, this section of the literature review will focus on the individual and collective characteristics of Entrepreneurial Startup Teams. I will first profile important individual characteristics of entrepreneurial team members in terms of their behavioural traits. Next, I will examine the concept of Entrepreneurial Leadership Identity Development among team members, in relation to their unique behavioural characteristics. Finally, I will study the group-level concept of Team Entrepreneurial Passion, in the context of team-level entrepreneurial leadership development in early stage ventures.

Individual Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Team Members

"Intrapreneurship is a term used to describe entrepreneurial behaviors within an existing organization" (Moriano et al., 2014, pg. 105). Intrapreneurship or intraorganizational entrepreneurial behaviour can manifest itself both at the individual and organizational level (Krauss et al., 2005; Stull & Singh, 2005; Wakkee et al., 2008), and is characterized by the traits of risk taking, innovation and proactiveness (Moriano et al., 2014). While academic research has been done to profile intrapreneurs and entrepreneurial team members in a commercial context, practitioner organizations have also tried to define a social intrapreneur in the context of corporations or large organizations, stating that a social intrapreneur is an individual "who applies the principles of social entrepreneurship" inside major corporations or organizations, "to develop and promote practical solutions to social or environmental challenges where progress is currently stalled by market failures" (Allianz et al., 2008, pg. 4). However, there is a dearth of research about the profile of an entrepreneurial team member in the specific context of early stage social enterprises. In this context, a profile refers to the individual characteristics (knowledge, skills, competencies) of such individuals (O'Reilly et al., 1991), as well as, their individual identity, which is defined as "a function of varied experiences that allow people to gain insight about their central and enduring preferences, talents, and values" (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 139).

As outlined in Chapter 1, social enterprises are unique organizations with social impact as their core mission and if operating in the startup stage, they are further characterized by a dynamic and challenging work environment. Similar to an entrepreneur working in a startup

environment, entrepreneurial team members also “thrive on risk and uncertainty” and are “inclined towards action”, but they also “understand the need to tie into the processes and business case elements of the venture” (Allianz et al., 2008, pg. 13). Such individuals must be proactive in nature and in particular, must exhibit team/work-unit oriented proactive behaviour, which refers to self-initiated actions that relate to work unit-oriented tasks which “aim to benefit the work unit as a whole by introducing constructive changes” in the team/organization (Wu et al., 2018, pg. 294). It is also important for such members involved in the entrepreneurial process to engage in self-regulation, both with a promotion focus (wherein the prospect of growth and development drives individual action) and prevention focus (wherein the need for safety and security drives individual action) (Brockner et al., 2004). “For certain aspects of the entrepreneurial process (e.g., generating ideas with the potential to be successful), greater promotion focus is necessary”, while for other aspects of the startup process “(e.g., doing the “due diligence” when screening ideas), greater prevention focus is necessary” (Brockner et al., 2004, pg. 203). Thus, social entrepreneurs need entrepreneurial individuals, with such behavioural traits, in their startup teams in order to perform well. Further, particularly in the social enterprise context, it is important for team members in social ventures to possess the individual behavioural traits of passion for a cause (which is a strong personal inclination towards a self-defined cause) (St-Louis et al., 2016), pro-social motivation (which is an individual’s personal inclination to do good for others) (Grant, 2008) and champion behaviour (which is an individual’s perseverance and determination to champion and fight for the social cause of the venture, even when faced with adversity) (Howell et al., 2005). As such, in order to assess the person-organization fit, the characteristics and preferences of the individual must be matched to the characteristics of the organization (O'Reilly et al., 1991) and hence, it is important to explore the profile of such entrepreneurial team members working in these social ventures. This research is critical, considering startup social ventures often have small teams and each team member must possess risk appetite, initiative and self-driven motivation to perform, in order to match up to the entrepreneur’s momentum. Hence, researching the profile of entrepreneurial team members working in startup social ventures is of great academic value, because it is important to hire and invest in the development of the right kind of people who fit the unique needs and culture of the hybrid organizations.

Entrepreneurial Leadership Identity Development among Startup Team Members

As outlined above, entrepreneurial team members possess certain traits and characteristics that are similar to entrepreneurs, and given the fact that trait similarities between leaders/supervisors and followers/subordinates are considered to be an important antecedent in the context of Leader Member Exchange (LMX) relationships (Lord et al., 2016), entrepreneurial team members working with entrepreneurial leaders in a startup social enterprise, is an interesting new topic to research in the field of leadership literature. Research in the LMX domain has found that “an initial attraction is formed between leaders and members who are similar in affect and personality..which encourages leaders to view a particular follower’s performance more favorably and delegate more work to him or her” (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 145). Hence, this leads to mutual trust and commitment between leaders and team members and strengthens their working relationships and most importantly, delegation by the leader can subsequently develop “broader leadership capacity” among team members (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 145). This is directly aligned to the topic that this thesis aims to research: factors leading to the development of team level leadership capacity among entrepreneurial teams in startup social enterprises.

It will be interesting to understand whether entrepreneurial qualities can actually be inculcated or developed among team members, through a process of 'Self View' development and/or 'Dynamic Skill' development (Day & Dragoni, 2015). Self views refer to "one's self-concept or self-construal" and it has an "important influence on individual emotions, cognitions, and behavior" (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 137). More importantly, "it is thought that particular types of leadership-related self-views in terms of leadership self-efficacy, leader self-awareness, and leader identity are important components of the leader development process" (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 137). Dynamic Skill Theory combines self views (cognition and emotion) with skills (action and thought), and proposes a holistic approach to leader development (Fischer, 1980; Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Fischer & Bidell, 2006; Fischer, 2008; Mascolo & Fischer, 2010; Day & Dragoni, 2015). Finally, it is also interesting to draw a connection between the development of entrepreneurial teams and Self Leadership theory. Self Leadership often exists in the presence of a supportive external leader (Manz, 1986) and it is defined as "a self-influence process and set of strategies that address what is to be done (e.g., standards and objectives) and why (e.g., strategic analysis) as well as how it is to be done . . . [it] incorporates intrinsic motivation and has an increased focus on cognitive processes" (Manz, 1991, p.17 in Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 188). Based on this definition, the concepts of self leadership and entrepreneurial leadership within teams seem to have similar characteristics, and hence, studying how self leadership could potentially manifest itself among entrepreneurial team members in startup social enterprises, is an important and interesting new research angle in the leadership domain. Hence, studying these existing leadership concepts from the unique lens of team level leadership in startup social enterprises will be a valuable academic contribution to the leadership development literature.

There is also a growing body of literature about the construct of Entrepreneurial Leadership, which can be defined as a "perpetual and relational process of working together to mobilize business opportunities in an organizational context in pursuit of entrepreneurial goals" (Sklaveniti & Tzoumpa, 2018, pg. 238 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018). Connecting the fields of entrepreneurship, leadership and management, Entrepreneurial Leadership theory proposes that there is often an overlap between the functions of entrepreneurs, leaders and managers in startup ventures, and this combination of entrepreneurial, leadership and managerial activities is of great importance to new venture creation and venture performance (Penrose, 1959; Schjoedt & Valencia, 2018 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018). In the context of venture creation and venture management, an entrepreneurial leadership approach involves knowledge/learning exploration "in the form of search, risk-taking, experimentation, discovery and innovation", and an entrepreneurial management approach involves knowledge/learning exploitation through the means of "choice, refinement, efficiency and implementation" (Schjoedt & Valencia, 2018, pg. 157 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018). Depending on the different situations faced by startup enterprises, individuals/founders shift between the roles of entrepreneurs, leaders and managers, in order to tackle the different situations appropriately (Schumpeter, 1934; Penrose, 1959; Mintzberg, 1989; Schjoedt & Valencia, 2018 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018). This perspective ties in with the fact that Entrepreneurial Leadership in social enterprises is faced with the contextual peculiarity of uncertainty (Sklaveniti & Tzoumpa, 2018 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018). Given that "entrepreneurial leadership in social enterprises involves the management of constraints", leaders in startup

social enterprises must tackle problems and deliver solutions with creativity and improvisation, by adapting to the dynamic external environment (Sklaveniti & Tzoumpa, 2018, pg. 254 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018). This flexible and adaptive learning and leadership approach applies to all types of startup social enterprises, across different stages of organizational growth (Bell & Whittington, 2018 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018). However, it must be noted that Entrepreneurial Leadership theory mainly focuses on and emphasizes the role of the founder/entrepreneur in venture growth (Schjoedt & Valencia, 2018 in Harrison & Leitch, 2018) and thus, it neglects the critical role of startup teams as a whole in venture performance. Hence, there is a need to fill this big research gap in Entrepreneurial Leadership literature, and the proposed thesis topic can address this research need by examining how the leadership, management and entrepreneurship objectives of startup social enterprises can be achieved collectively at the team level, and how the principles of Entrepreneurial Leadership can be embodied and fulfilled by the startup social enterprise team as a whole, in the form of Team/Collective Leadership in early stage social ventures.

Team Entrepreneurial Passion in New Venture Teams

Entrepreneurial team members are considered to possess the entrepreneurial capabilities of innovation, creativity and determination, and hence, it will be important to understand how the innovative and passionate spirit of entrepreneurial team members can be harnessed and developed in the best way in early stage social enterprises. To this end, the theories and literature around Entrepreneurial Passion become particularly relevant. Here, passion is defined as the “love, attachment, and longing for one’s work; meaningfully positive emotions; positive feelings directed at activities specifically relevant to entrepreneurs; and a strong inclination toward an activity that one loves, that one invests a significant amount of time and energy in, that one finds important, and that defines one” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 286-287). Till date, a majority of the passion related research in the context of entrepreneurship has been conducted at the individual level of the entrepreneur, even though “teams found and lead the majority of new ventures and entrepreneurship is more of a socially distributed process than it is the enterprise of a solo, heroic leader” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 283). Hence, answering a broader research call (Harper, 2008; Cardon et al., 2017) to move “beyond a conception of entrepreneurship as embodied in a lone hero-founder” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 286) and, instead, to view entrepreneurship as a “socially distributed process that involves joint action possibilities and team entrepreneurship” (Harper, 2008, pg. 614 in Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 286), Team Entrepreneurial Passion (TEP) focuses on the concept of entrepreneurial passion at the collective level of groups/teams (Cardon et al., 2017). “TEP is defined as the shared intense positive feelings for a collective team identity” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 285) and it is specifically focused on new venture teams (NVTs), which are groups of individuals who are “chiefly responsible for the strategic decision making and ongoing operations” of new ventures (Klotz et al., 2014, pg. 288 in Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 283). Given this explicit focus on NVTs and a collective team identity, the concept of TEP is extremely important and relevant to the thesis topic and must be applied to the unique startup social enterprise context.

The manifestation of TEP in a team can vary on two levels: Passion Focus Variety and Passion Intensity Separation (Cardon et al., 2017). Passion Focus Variety refers to the possibility of two types of TEP based on shared identities existing within a team – monofocal or polyfocal TEP (Cardon et al., 2017). “In an NVT with a monofocal shared team identity,

the team has one primary role identity that it focuses on and is passionate about” and teams with a polyfocal shared identity will have “multiple and distinct role identities” and will be passionate about multiple and distinct objectives/activities (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 289). On the other hand, Passion Intensity Separation refers to varying degrees of focused passion among individual team members and is caused by the “dispersion in the level of activation of emotion experienced by team members” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 289). Different team contexts can give rise to different combinations of passion focus variety and passion intensity separations, thus leading to varying levels of TEP emergence (Cardon et al., 2017). For example, “NVTs with team passion diversity that is low in focus variety and low in intensity separation will form monofocal TEP” and “NVTs with team passion diversity that is high in focus variety and low in intensity separation will form polyfocal TEP” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 292). Alternately, “NVTs with team passion diversity that is high in focus variety and high in intensity separation” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 293) may not form TEP at all, because in a turbulent team environment with “high levels of turnover or conflict, team members would likely not have the opportunity to share their individual identities and affect with each other” and thus, this team environment will not be conducive to TEP emergence (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 289-290). In this way, varying types of TEP emergence directly and indirectly influence team culture, team processes and team performances over time (Cardon et al., 2017) and hence, it is an important concept to study when researching startup success and growth. While the emergence and influence of TEP will vary across the different life stages of a venture, the startup stage is of particular importance, because research has found that “the emergence of TEP is most likely to commence at early stages in the life of a venture, when the team first comes together” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 290). Hence, given the importance of TEP to startup literature and the gaps in the current research about entrepreneurial passion (not enough studies conducted at the team level), the thesis topic can make valuable contributions to this domain by exploring several unique research angles and possibilities related to TEP in the context of startup social ventures.

For example, the research topic can explore the unique and specific conditions under which TEP can emerge in a startup social enterprise and also the specific influence it has on the culture, processes and performance of early stage social ventures. It can also explore whether a particular kind of TEP combination – focus variety and intensity separation combination – is unique to a startup social enterprise context and how this can influence team level leadership in such ventures. It will be also important to explore whether TEP and collective leadership identity can emerge even in a weak or turbulent early stage social venture environment (due to high turnover or lack of resources), given the common passion of social impact that is inherent to the social enterprise context. In other words, does an inherent common shared social vision have a unique effect on the emergence and influence of TEP, and in turn, team level leadership, in NVTs? Finally, it will also be crucial to study the role of founders in the emergence of TEP in startup social enterprises: How do founders and their individual passions influence the development of TEP and collective team identities in the early sensemaking stage of group formation? And given the focus of the thesis topic to look beyond the social entrepreneur, it will be interesting to understand how founders with strong ties to their ventures may positively or negatively influence the emergence of a strong team identity and team entrepreneurial passion, and how the dual identities and passions of founders and teams can possibly be balanced and integrated in a startup social enterprise environment. Hence, as outlined above, the thesis topic can answer the research call to extend the application of TEP theory to more complex modern team contexts (Cardon et al.,

2017), by contributing to the literature from the unique lens of relating TEP to Team Level Leadership in startup social enterprises, in India.

2.3) Team-Centric Leadership Development Theories

While the literature outlined above adopts a team/organization-centric approach in order to examine the thesis topic, it is also important to apply a leadership lens to the doctoral research questions. At the individual level of leadership development, once the 'identity' of entrepreneurial team members, who engage in self-level or team-level leadership activities, has been profiled and established; organizations can create initiatives that will nurture this leader identity development at the team/collective level (Day & Dragoni, 2015). Research has shown that leader identity development is closely linked to the development of leadership skills, and this in turn, motivates individuals to take up leadership roles and activities in organizations (Lord & Hall, 2005; Day & Dragoni, 2015). This ties in well with the academic debates around whether an employee can be taught or nurtured to become a leader (Doh, 2003). Research proves that leadership competencies can indeed be nurtured among middle level managers by crafting a conducive learning and development system, by providing challenging developmental assignments and access to developmental opportunities to managers, aligned with their individual learning orientations (Dragoni et al., 2009). Considering existing research advocates that the positive influence of talent development on organizational performance depends on organizational factors, as well as, the creative use of individual human resources (Sonenshein, 2014), it is important to research further about the individual and collective leadership preconditions needed for the development of this team level leadership approach in an organization. In particular, studying this research topic from the angle of collective leadership development in startup social venture teams, and the support mechanisms and conditions needed to aid team level leadership in such impact organizations, will be an important research contribution to the field; especially given that a review of leadership development literature by Day and Dragoni (2015) highlighted the need for further research and theory building in this domain.

Given that the focus of the research project is leadership development at the team level, the literature review will not focus on 'great man' leadership theories that are intended for the individual leadership development of founders. Instead, in the first part of the upcoming section, I will delve into Team-Centric Leadership literature in detail, and I will examine concepts of Shared Leadership, Empowering Leadership and Team Self Leadership, because these team-centric leadership theories focus on the manifestation of leadership at the follower and team level. Following the review of team-centric leadership literature, in the second part of this section, I will also briefly touch upon other leadership theories, such as Identity Based Leadership, Transformational Leadership (the team angle) and Paradoxical Leadership, because such theories may have important implications for startup social enterprise teams, and may also interact with the effects of team-level leadership in early-stage social ventures.

(i) Team Centric Leadership Theories

Shared Leadership (SL)

Team-Centric Leadership Development theories form an important body of literature that is very relevant from the perspective of the chosen research topic. Contributing to this field of leadership development literature is critical for future academic research in the leadership domain, because at its core, leadership is ultimately a process of mutual influence that is co-created by leaders and followers (Day & Dragoni, 2015; Lord et al., 2017). In particular, the team-centric leadership concepts of Shared Leadership (SL), Empowering Leadership (EL) and Team Self Leadership (TSL) are very relevant to the dissertation topic of Team Level Leadership Development.

While a significant amount of research has been conducted in the domain of Shared Leadership, there is no single integrative definition of SL (Kozlowski et al., 2016). It can almost be considered an umbrella term for different models of shared team leadership, because it comprises of different SL approaches of how leadership is shared and distributed among teams, and it also encompasses elements from other popular leadership theories such as Leader Member Exchange (LMX), Transformational Leadership, Empowering Leadership and Functional Leadership (Perry et al., 1999; Kozlowski et al., 2016). However, despite the diversity and variance of the SL approach, the SL definition that was proposed by Pearce & Congor (2003a, pg. 1) has been quite widely accepted and it states that SL is “a dynamic, interactive influence process among individuals in groups for which the objective is to lead one another to the achievement of group or organizational goals or both” (in Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 33). Several academic researchers have proposed various SL models over the years. For example, Hiller et al. (2006) outlined a four dimension SL process: “planning/organizing, problem solving, support/consideration, and developing/mentoring” (Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 34); while Carter et al. (2015) appropriately used a social network perspective to outline SL as a multifaceted “distribution of influence within a team” that encompasses various leadership factors and processes (Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 34). Hence, at the core of the SL approach, lies a process in which leadership is “collectively held by the team and is shared or distributed across its members” and “different SL frameworks conceptualize what is shared and how it is shared across team members differently” (Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 23).

The emergence, as well as, the effectiveness of SL in a team depends on a few facilitating factors. For example, the emergence of SL depends greatly on the nature of the leader-follower relationship within the team (Day & Dragoni, 2015). The followers must view their leader as legitimate and they must trust the leader and also each other as team members (Day & Dragoni, 2015). Having this mutual trust creates a common understanding that leadership can flow between leader and follower identities across team members, and this convergence of individual identities into collective identities leads to a shared leadership structure schema (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). However, if there is a divergence in individual and collective identities, then problems will arise in the SL claiming and granting process (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). Hence, when studying SL in the context of startup social enterprise teams, it will be important to be research factors that can cause diverging individual and collective identities, and also be aware of potential mitigating factors such as providing clarity, credibility and visibility of leadership structure schemas within teams

(DeRue & Ashford, 2010). The effectiveness of SL depends greatly on the processes and culture/environment within a team (Day & Dragoni, 2015). “The structure of leadership processes within a team indicates its degree of shared leadership capacity”, and this SL capacity is, in turn, “enhanced when team members feel comfortable voicing their views, see value in each other’s contributions, and hold a shared purpose” (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 147). SL is also closely linked to Self Leadership, and thus, potentially to self identities of entrepreneurial team members/leaders, and research has found that “sharing leadership among self-led individual team members” has had “a powerful effect on the collective performance of individual employees within team contexts” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 206). Given the close ties to entrepreneurial self-leadership/identity and the fact that social enterprise teams are inherently characterized by a shared social purpose and vision, the SL approach is very relevant and important when researching team level leadership development in a startup social enterprise context. Finally, while the academic focus on SL leadership and adoption of SL practices by organizations has increased over the last few decades, this field is still considered under researched and there is a great need for more nuanced and detailed research in this domain (Lord et al., 2017). A review of team-centric leadership literature by Kozlowski, Mak and Chao (2016, pg. 34) has revealed that future SL research must focus on “(a) team and contextual characteristics that enable the emergence of SL; (b) leadership behaviors that can facilitate its development, propagation across members, and growth; and (c) conditions that influence how the sharing of leadership can evolve, shift, and change over time”. Hence, the thesis topic directly addresses these research needs and gaps, and can make valuable academic contributions to the leadership literature, by studying the emergence and effectiveness of SL, from the lens of team level leadership development, in the unique startup social enterprise context.

Empowering Leadership (EL)

Another leadership approach that is closely linked to SL is Empowering Leadership (EL). Social network perspectives often consider EL to be a part of the overall SL framework (Perry et al., 1999; Carter et al., 2015; Kozlowski et al., 2016). EL involves “passing on influence to followers as part of the leadership process” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 205), and in this leadership approach, “followers not only participate in the management process, but to a significant degree become their own leaders” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 205). The following excerpt by Drescher, Korsgaard, Welpe, Picot and Wigand (2014) best describes the symbiotic relationship between EL and SL in work teams – “Whereas empowering leaders give members control over their own tasks and build their confidence, shared leadership involves members having influence over each other. Consequently, shared leadership is about accepting one another as leaders as opposed to being self-empowered by a single leader. Thus, a group leader may be very empowering but retain most of the authority and influence (Carson et al., 2007). That said, empowering leadership and shared leadership may mutually influence each other. Empowering leaders, in seeking to enhance the meaningfulness of group members’ roles, may enable them to engage in leadership functions, thereby fostering shared leadership. Similarly, shared leadership may lead to empowerment as group-members employ positive influence techniques (e.g., encouraging, giving advice) that build group members’ confidence.” (Drescher et al., 2014, pg. 773).

EL leads to a positive internal team environment and the effectiveness of EL techniques, such as coaching, are further augmented in the context of a novel, dynamic and disruptive external environment (Morgeson, 2005; Lord et al., 2017). This is because research has

found that EL improves a team's problem solving capacity and in turn, team effectiveness; and thus, has a positive effect on the overall performance outcomes of the team (Pearce and Sims, 2002; Pearce et al., 2004; Stewart et al., 2011). As outlined above, EL leads to proximal team outcomes such as the creation of an empowerment climate, "characterized by information sharing, autonomy, and team accountability" (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 208), and distal team outcomes such as effective team performance (Fischer et al., 2017). Hence, given the novel and dynamic external environment that startup social enterprises operate in, it is important to study how EL could relate to team level leadership development as well as favourable organizational performance in startup social ventures. Finally, research has shown that both, EL and SL, are closely linked to Self Leadership (Stewart et al., 2011).

Team Self Leadership (TSL)

Self Leadership is "a comprehensive self-influence perspective that concerns leading oneself toward performance of naturally motivating tasks as well as managing oneself to do work that must be done but is not naturally motivating" (Manz, 1986, p. 589), with the help of intrinsic motivation, as well as, facilitative internal and external forces, such as the presence of an empowering leader (Stewart et al., 2011). Self Leadership operates at both, the individual, as well as, the team level (Stewart et al., 2011). While Individual Self Leadership is interesting to explore from the perspective of self identities of entrepreneurial team members, Team Self Leadership (TSL) is more relevant to the research topic in the context of Team Level Leadership Development. Similar to individual self leadership, TSL operates as a continuum and as assessed by Manz (1990, 1991, 1992), the degree of TSL depends on the degree to which teams are "allowed to exercise self-influence over the what (standards and objectives), why (values and strategic reasons for the objectives), and how (the actual performance of the work) of work team performance" (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 190). The movement of individuals and teams along the self leadership continuum depends on certain internal and external forces at both, the individual, as well as, the team level (Stewart et al., 2011). Internal forces operating at the individual level are intrinsic natural rewards, thought self leadership, emotional regulation and personality; and at the team level are team composition, task characteristics, shared mental models, cohesion and the presence/absence of conflict (Stewart et al., 2011). While the individual level factors are generally interesting from the perspective of self identities of entrepreneurial team members, some of the team level internal forces are even more relevant for the specific thesis topic. For example, the team composition factor focuses on the significance of the team's "raw materials", ie. the importance of having collaborative team members with "beneficial characteristics" (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 202), and this perspective directly relates to the research angle of recruiting and nurturing entrepreneurial team members for impactful entrepreneurial ventures. Research about the task characteristics factor has shown that TSL is more useful when the team's tasks are creative in nature (Stewart et al., 2011), and this directly relates to the fact that a core mandate of startup social enterprises is to creatively and innovatively solve/address complex social problems. Also, a shared mental model and a shared purpose is very important for the success of TSL (Stewart et al., 2011), and as mentioned earlier, startup social enterprise teams are uniquely characterized by a common vision and higher social purpose. Apart from these relevant internal forces, several important external forces also influence the TSL continuum (Stewart et al., 2011).

When it comes to external forces, several factors overlap between the individual and team level, and they include training, external team leadership, rewards systems, organizational

structure/culture and national culture (Stewart et al., 2011). First, “training has been shown to increase the use of self-leadership strategies and ultimately performance” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 205) and while the effects of self leadership training have been studied at the individual level, the topic of team level training is not well researched (Stewart et al., 2011). Hence, the thesis can fill this research gap by exploring the effects of team level training/capacity building on TSL, leading to Team Level Leadership Development, in startup social enterprises. Second, almost as a paradox to the concept, the presence of conducive external leadership is an integral and necessary factor that positively influences the degree and effectiveness of TSL in teams (Manz, 1991; Manz & Sims, 1987, 1990, 1991; Stewart et al., 2011). Transformational Leadership, Empowering Leadership and Shared Leadership, on the part of other leaders, have all been linked to TSL and the presence of these leadership approaches have a positive influence on the collective leadership capacity of teams (Stewart et al., 2011). As outlined by Manz & Sims (1987), in the case of TSL, the leader’s primary role is to “a) support the team’s success by facilitating the team’s self-leadership and (b) help the team to interact effectively with the environment” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 206) and the success of self leading teams depends greatly on the actions and effectiveness of the external team leader (Morgeson et al., 2010; Stewart et al., 2011). Hence, these findings place great importance on the role of the founders in nurturing team/collective level leadership in startup social enterprises, and the thesis can greatly contribute to leadership literature by researching the founder/social entrepreneur’s role, in relation to the interaction and relationship between SL, EL and TSL in the context of Team Level Leadership Development in early stage social ventures.

Another external force that influences TSL is reward systems, and research has found that paid performance-based rewards, as well as, peer evaluation systems are effective reward mechanisms within teams (Stewart et al., 2011). However, paid rewards are not feasible in a resource-strapped startup social enterprise environment (particularly in India) and hence, it is important to research the types of intrinsic and external rewards that will work in the unique context of early stage social ventures. Such research can also greatly contribute to addressing the pressing problem of poor talent retention due to lack of financial resources/low salary in startup social enterprises (British Council, 2016). Organizational structure and culture also influences TSL (Stewart et al., 2011). In terms of organizational structure, lower levels of centralization and formalization have a positive influence on TSL (Tata & Prasad, 2004; Stewart et al., 2011). With respect to organizational culture, an empowerment climate (Seibert et al., 2004; Stewart et al., 2011) and a ‘high involvement organizational context’, in which “workers are given information about various work-related issues (i.e., processes, quality, customers, performance, competitors, organizational changes) and are granted power to make work-related decisions” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 209), are factors that facilitate TSL and team effectiveness (Cohen et al., 1996; Spreitzer et al., 1999; Stewart et al., 2011). It will be interesting to build on this existing knowledge and explore how TSL will operate within the unique organizational structure and culture of startup social ventures. Finally, national culture is an important influencing force for TSL and studies has found that TSL is more easily accepted in collectivistic cultures, and self leading teams in collectivistic cultures tend to be more effective and productive (Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997, 2001; Stewart et al., 2011). Since India is believed to have a largely collectivistic culture (Verma & Triandis, 1999), studying the emergence and effects of TSL is very relevant to the unique context of Team Level Leadership Development in startup social enterprises in India. While research has found positive effects of self leadership on individual level outcomes,

there have been mixed results about the effects of TSL on team performance outcomes (Stewart et al., 2011). This is because the outcomes of TSL are often “context dependent at the team level” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 195). and also, the measurement of TSL outcomes is not very well developed at the “team level of analysis” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 193). Hence, given that the concept of TSL is very important from the collective leadership development perspective, and the fact that prior research has probably been conducted in a western and commercial context, it is crucial to research the effects and outcomes of TSL at the team level, in the unique context of startup social enterprises in India. Hence, in this way, the proposed research topic can make a valuable academic contribution to the field of TSL and team-centric leadership literature.

(ii) Other relevant Leadership theories

Identity Based Leadership

The field of Identity Based Leadership literature is also important to explore, with regards to the research topic. Till date, identity theory has been applied to the social enterprise domain, only at the individual and organizational level (Wry & York, 2017). It has explored how the competing logics of social welfare and financial gain interact with each other and in turn, influence the identities of social entrepreneurs and their social enterprises; creating either single minded, mixed or balanced entrepreneurs with varying degrees of focus and commitment on either social aims, financial aims or both together (Wry & York, 2017). However, it will be interesting to extend the application of identity theory beyond just the entrepreneur and the enterprise, and apply it to the startup social enterprise team as a whole. The thesis topic can research the characteristics of collective identities of early stage social venture teams, and it can also explore an important question: How can collective team leadership identities develop if there is also a presence of a potentially resistant/conflicting identity logic, in the form of the founder/social entrepreneur’s individualistic/visionary leadership identity (Cardon et al., 2017; Stewart et al., 2017)? Hence, by exploring such unique research angles, the thesis topic can make valuable and much needed team-based and context-specific research contributions, to the identity theory domain (Wry & York, 2017), from the context of team level leadership in startup social enterprises in India.

The first step, in identity theory, is to understand self concepts, which are considered to be antecedents to leadership identities and behaviors (Johnson et al., 2012; Lord et al., 2016). There are three levels of self concepts: Individual Selves, which relate to “one’s distinctiveness from others in terms of traits or abilities”; Relational Selves which “are defined in terms of role relationships”; and Collective Selves which are defined in relation to ‘group membership’ and ‘collective identities’ (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 126). Leadership Identity Construction is based on these self concepts and leadership identities consist of three elements: Individual Internalization, which is a state where individuals incorporate either a leader or follower identity into their self concepts; Relational Recognition, which refers to associations that individuals make between their self identities and their roles within a team, particularly the roles of leaders and followers; and, Collective Endorsement, which relates to the leader or follower identities that individuals are connected to/endorsed for, in a larger social context (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). The concepts of Collective Selves and Collective Endorsement, in turn, influence the creation of Collective Identities, which are of great importance to the research topic of team level leadership and collective leadership

development in startup social enterprises. “Leaders and followers who embrace collective selves are expected to have high collective commitment in goal pursuit” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129), and “followers with strong collective identity orientations would have a high tendency to build charismatic leader–follower relationships, leading to positive organizational outcomes” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129).

The positive organizational effects of collective identities are especially relevant to the startup social enterprise context. A “shared sense of group membership” helps teams in “tackling uncertainty and adapting to new situations with creativity and innovation” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129) and “collective identities also support more distributed forms of leadership which may be essential for modern organizations to succeed” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129). Given that startup social enterprises are contemporary organizations that operate in a dynamic work environment, characterized by change, complexity and innovation, it is critical to study the way collective identities and collective leadership can be nurtured in such an organizational context. However, collective identities can also present the danger of stereotyping, ethnocentrism and favouritism emerging within teams (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; Lord et al., 2016) and hence, these potential negative effects and related mitigating factors must also be considered and researched in a startup social enterprise context. It must also be noted that “the construction of a leadership identity occurs when claims and grants of leader and follower identities are endorsed with reciprocal grants and claims” and leader and follower identities can also shift between team members as a part of the leadership process (DeRue & Ashford, 2010). Finally, it is also important to remember that identities are in fact multi-level, and all three identity levels – individual, relational and collective – must be engaged as part of a holistic leadership development process (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sluss & Ashforth, 2008; Sluss et al., 2012; DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Lord et al., 2016). All these factors present interesting research angles from the perspective of the thesis topic. For example, how can the founder/social entrepreneur engage with the three self concept/identity levels of his/her/their team members and successfully nurture a collective identity for the team? How is the leadership claiming and granting process structured when it comes to a collective leadership identity for the team? And finally, how can the leadership identity construction process be managed in order to nurture team/collective leadership development in early stage social ventures? Hence, by exploring such angles, the thesis can make important academic contributions to the leadership development literature, from the startup social enterprise and collective leadership context.

Transformational Leadership (TFL)

In addition to reviewing the leadership theories outlined above, it is also valuable to examine the effects of Transformational Leadership (TFL), with a specific focus on the role of TFL in influencing and nurturing team level leadership in organizations. TFL is extremely relevant to the team/collective level leadership context, because “a core objective of TFL is to empower followers to develop their ability to become leaders” (Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 24). Burns (1978) was the first author to introduce a formal theory of TFL and he highlighted a clear distinction between Transactional Leadership, which is a leadership style where “leaders establish reciprocal exchange relationships with their followers”, and Transformational Leadership, which is a leadership approach in which “leaders encourage followers to transcend their own self-interest for the good of society and raise themselves and followers to “higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns, 1978, pg. 20)” (in Kozlowski et al., 2016,

pg. 24). TFL, as opposed to vertical or transactional leadership, “offers a purpose that transcends short-term goals and focuses on higher order intrinsic needs” of employees (Judge & Piccolo, 2004, pg. 755). Bass (1985) characterized TFL by four processes/dimensions: “Idealized Influence is the degree to which the leader acts as a role model and causes followers to identify with the leader; Inspirational Motivation includes articulating a vision of the future that is inspiring to followers; Intellectual Stimulation involves encouraging followers to challenge assumptions, take risks, and be creative;..Individualized Consideration, the leader spends time attending to each follower’s needs and development” (Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 24). These four influence processes are very important in terms of building team capacity in a startup social enterprise context; particularly ‘Intellectual Stimulation’ which enhances the ability of team members to thrive in a dynamic work environment, such as in early stage social ventures. It is also very important to study TFL in the context of building Team Level Leadership in startup social enterprises, because the two concepts seem to have a symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, collective identities are considered to be an antecedent of TFL (Johnson et al., 2012; Lord et al., 2017), and on the other hand, TFL further facilitates the development of collective identities by uniting team members with a common higher goal (Stets & Burke, 2000; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003; Lord et al., 2016). Hence, research shows a positive influence of transformational leadership on the development of collective level leadership in organizations; particularly when complemented with the presence of organizational identification, which is defined as a “perception of oneness with or belongingness to the organization” (Ashforth & Mael, 1989, pg. 34). It has also been proven that transformational leadership improves the work engagement of employees by having a positive influence on their personal resources and resiliency (Hobfoll et al., 2003); although this research has been conducted in the context of a commercial resourceful work environment (Tims et al., 2011). Given that early stage social enterprises are uniquely characterized by employees identifying with a core social mission and working in a resource constrained environment, it will be interesting to further elaborate on how transformational leadership can influence Team Level Leadership in startup social ventures, by interacting with the factor of organizational identification and/or building important personal resources of team members to counteract the limited resources available.

It is also important to note that while TFL has a positive effect in terms of team empowerment, it can also have a dual negative effect, in terms of increasing feelings of dependence on the leader (Kark et al., 2003; Lord et al., 2017). Research has found that the presence of social identification mediates the TFL relationship with empowerment, while a follower’s personal identification with his/her/their leader mediates the TFL relationship with increased dependence (Kark et al., 2003; Lord et al., 2017). Hence, it will be interesting to research whether, in spite of a social entrepreneur’s strong leadership presence, such negative effects of TFL can be potentially mitigated with the presence of a strong common vision and a unique social enterprise context. Thus, given the overall positive influence of TFL on the development of team leadership capacity (Kozlowski et al., 2016), I can explore important research angles such as: Are founders/social entrepreneurs more inclined to be transformational leaders, given the context of a higher social purpose? Are the positive effects of transformational leadership further amplified in the unique social enterprise context, given the presence of a common social vision? And given the school of thought that believes that certain leadership styles can be developed among individuals (Avolio et al., 2009; Lord et al., 2017), can TFL be developed among founders, with the objective of, in

turn, developing collective leadership among startup social enterprise teams? Finally, a majority of TFL research, till date, has focused on the influence of TFL at the individual level (Kozlowski et al., 2016). Hence, there is a great need to conduct research about team-centric TFL and study the effects of TFL in terms of team processes and outcomes (Kozlowski et al., 2016). A review of team-centric leadership theories by Kozlowski, Mak & Chao (2016) has also revealed that TFL literature is missing concrete context specific research, and future team centric TFL research should give importance to team contexts and contextual moderators. Hence, the thesis can greatly contribute to this evident gap in leadership literature by researching team-centric TFL in the unique and specific context of Team Level Leadership Development in startup social ventures.

Paradoxical Leadership (PL)

Given the organizational hybridity of social enterprises and the fact that social entrepreneurs are constantly trying to harness the productive tensions between the paradoxical goals of social impact creation and financial sustainability (Battilana et al., 2015), it is important to also examine the concept of Paradoxical Leadership (PL) – due to the high relevance of this leadership approach from the perspective of the leaders and founders in startup social ventures. PL behaviour can be defined through five behavioural-processual dimensions “(1) combining self-centered-ness with other-centeredness; (2) maintaining both distance and closeness; (3) treating subordinates uniformly, while allowing individualization; (4) enforcing work requirements, while allowing flexibility; and (5) maintaining decision control, while allowing autonomy” (Zhang et al., 2015, pg. 541). As contemporary organizations become increasingly complex and dynamic, leaders and teams are moving away from an “either–or” approach to people and venture matters, and are instead moving towards a “both–and” approach, where paradoxical concepts are treated as interrelated and handled together in a balanced way (Zhang et al., 2015, pg. 541). This paradoxical approach is even more relevant to social enterprises, since these ventures are inherently characterized by organizational hybridity and deal with the competing demands of social impact creation and financial sustainability (Smith & Besharov, 2019). Given the hybrid nature of these impact organizations, the founders and leaders strive to sustain the unique hybridity through a model of ‘structured flexibility’, which can be implemented through the ‘interaction and adaptive enactment’ of the two stable organizational features of ‘paradoxical frames’ and ‘guardrails’ (Smith & Besharov, 2019). Paradoxical frames involve the “leaders’ cognitive understandings of the two sides of a hybrid as both contradictory and interdependent”, and guardrails consist of “formal structures, leadership expertise, and stakeholder relationships associated with each side—that together facilitate ongoing adaptation in the meanings and practices of dual elements, sustaining both elements over time” (Smith & Besharov, 2019, pg. 1). Hence, with such structures in place, “opposites can coexist harmoniously and interdependently to form a continuously changing and transforming totality” in hybrid organizations (Zhang et al., 2015, pg. 539). This paradoxical approach to organizational management is particularly appropriate in the context of startup social enterprises in India, because research has shown that the “Eastern approach to paradoxes is to embrace, integrate, and transcend apparent opposites, in contrast with predominant Western analytical thinking, in which information is processed by breaking the whole into parts” (Zhang et al., 2015, pg. 539). However, extant research about PL, in the context of social enterprises, has mainly focused on the founders/leaders’ ability to practice PL skills to successfully drive their teams to achieve hybrid venture goals, at the organizational level. Future PL research in the SE domain must also explore how PL behaviour by the founder

can spread to or be shared with other core team members or with the group as a whole (Smith & Besharov, 2019), in order to successfully fulfil the hybrid goals of such organizations. Thus, this thesis can fulfil this research need by examining how PL manifests itself in startup social enterprises and how it can interact with or function alongside other forms of team-centric leadership approaches (such as EL and/or SL) in early stage social ventures.

2.4) Team-Centric Organizational Processes

After gaining an in-depth understanding of entrepreneurial startup teams and team-centric leadership theories, it is important to take a process approach and examine research about team-centric organizational constructs and processes that are closely interlinked with team-level leadership in startup social ventures. The following section reviews four key team-centric processual constructs, in order to effectively examine team/organizational processes that contribute to the emergence, development and subsequent outcomes of Team Level Leadership in early stage social enterprises. First, I will explore the constructs of Talent Attraction, Retention and Engagement to understand how these human-capital related processes can be harnessed to attract and retain entrepreneurial team members with desirable characteristics for startup social ventures. Second, I will examine the constructs of Relational Models Theory and Group Dynamics to understand how relational team processes (that are interlinked with team-level leadership) can contribute to the effective functioning of startup social venture teams. Third, I will review the construct of Team Life Cycle, to understand how the various processes related to team life cycles can shape the emergence, development and outcomes of team level leadership in startup ventures. Finally, I will examine the process of Team Learning, to understand how this critical team process/behaviour can shape the team/venture level outcomes of startup social ventures.

Talent Attraction, Retention and Engagement

Given that hiring and goal setting are often the first important steps of effective talent management, theories about 'capability reinforcement' and 'structural elaboration' as a means of harnessing the performance power of underqualified and overqualified managers respectively, in entrepreneurial ventures (Ferguson et al., 2015), are potentially interesting to study from the early stage social enterprise context. The potential negative and positive effects of hiring new personnel, promoting/developing existing personnel and/or restructuring roles to have more responsibilities and ownership (Ferguson et al., 2015), on the development of team level leadership in early stage social enterprises need to be researched further in order to determine the influence of recruitment and job role development on team level leadership development in startup social ventures.

After the hiring and goal setting stage, the effective engagement and performance management of employees are often key focus areas from the Top Management Team (TMT) and Middle Level Management (MLM) perspective. Considering the high risk appetite and personal initiative of entrepreneurial team members (Moriano et al., 2014) and given that startup environments often require entrepreneurial individuals who take risks, deal with uncertainties and have high personal initiative in order to perform, it will important to understand how theories about the relationship between proactivity and performance of

individuals in conventional organizations (Glaser et al., 2016) can be applied to the early stage social enterprise context. Proactivity and Performance related research must be conducted to specifically understand the organizational settings most conducive for the development of effective team level leadership in startup social ventures. The thesis aims to understand the extent to which ‘discipline’ and ‘control’ mechanisms such as “clear standards of performance and behaviour”, and ‘stretch’ mechanisms such as “shared ambitions and collective identity” (Glaser et al., 2016, pg. 1345), influence the performance of entrepreneurial team members and the development of collective team level leadership among team members. The doctoral dissertation will attempt to uncover the most conducive combination of these organizational factors, in order to outline a strong ‘performance management context’ (Glaser et al., 2016) that best nurtures team level leadership in startup social ventures.

Alongside performance management, it is also important to consider the angle of talent retention. Given that high employee turnover has several negative effects on organizational growth (Ou et al., 2017) and the fact that it is a recurring and pressing problem faced by startup social enterprises in India today (British Council, 2016), theories related to talent retention must be studied, in the context of building and retaining leadership talent in early stage social ventures. Here, it is relevant to apply learnings from the vast body of literature about TMTs and MLMs, ie. second and third line leadership. TMTs and MLMs play an important role in organizational strategy creation and implementation (Wooldridge et al., 2008). The classification of TMTs as second line and MLMs as third line leaders is grounded in literature that advocates the founder/founding team to be the first line leadership and a separate entity from the top management team (Beckman et al., 2007; Cruz et al., 2010). TMTs play a very important role in startup ventures and work closely with founders to seek out opportunities, solve problems and drive strategy and performance with limited startup resources (Ferguson et al., 2015). At a more advanced startup stage, MLMs come into the picture and serve as important “organizational linking pins” (Glaser et al., 2016, pg. 1341) navigating between various stakeholders and they directly work on implementing the strategic goals set by TMTs, while also working closely with employees at lower levels in the organization (Glaser et al., 2016). The loss of human capital, caused by TMT or MLM exits, can threaten the longevity and sustainability of the venture, by negatively affecting team culture and organizational climate (Cardon et al., 2017), disrupting organizational activities and efficiency, and shrinking the ‘talent pool’ for team level leadership and leadership succession (Ou et al., 2017). Turnover scholars have studied how leadership styles, leader actions, leader behaviours and/or leader traits have influenced follower loyalty and retention (Hom et al., 2017; Ou et al., 2017) and one such important theory has explored how leader humility, defined as “a leader’s orientation grounded in a transcendent self-concept, desiring accurate self-knowledge, appreciating others, and keeping an open mind” (Ou et al., 2017, pg. 3), has reduced team/follower exits (Owens et al., 2013; Ou et al., 2017). Research has found that humble leaders can reduce team member exits by improving their job satisfaction and increasing their loyalty to the organization by better satisfying their needs (Owens et al., 2013; Ou et al., 2017). This is because humble behaviour by leaders increases the job satisfaction of team members “by fulfilling their innate needs for competency, autonomy, and relatedness. That is, they validate subordinates’ competency needs by valuing their abilities and acknowledging their accomplishments, while soliciting their opinions and ideas. Such leaders also meet subordinates’ autonomy needs by involving them in decision making and encouraging their suggestions on how to attain unit goals. Further, humble leaders satisfy

subordinates' relatedness need by respecting them as equals and avoiding manipulation. Fulfilment of such innate needs has been found to promote job satisfaction and job loyalty" (Ou et al., 2017, pg. 6). Hence, as outlined in the excerpt from Ou et al. (2017) above, the positive workplace conditions created by humble leaders improve talent retention (Ou et al., 2017) and the positive effects of leader humility on team members are very closely linked to the positive Outcomes of Team Centric Leadership Development, which will be discussed in detail in the next section of the literature review. Hence, it will be important to study whether founders can display humility in their leadership and management style and the influence of such humble behaviour on the emergence of team level leadership development in the context of startup social ventures.

However, it is also critical to account for the particular features of specific team contexts when studying these theoretical concepts, because such models and theories will gain practical relevance only when applied to specific contexts and situations (Johns, 2006; Ou et al., 2017). Scholars have claimed that the positive influence of leader humility may not be seen in dynamic work environments that undergo constant change (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007; Ou et al., 2017). Unfavourable or unpredictable work conditions may lead to team disunity, miscommunication and hampered shared task understanding among team members, leading to negative effects on leadership development and organizational growth (van Knippenberg et al., 2004; Ndofor et al., 2015; Ou et al., 2017). Hence, in these situations, leaders must take extra measures to improve talent retention by building a shared organizational identity, ensuring open and honest communication and striving for trust, accountability and participative decision making (Dooley et al., 2000; Edwards & Cable, 2009; Ou et al., 2017). Over the past few years, scholars have repeatedly emphasized the importance of 'contextual circumstances' in determining the practical effects of theoretical concepts (Owens & Hekman, 2012) and have urged future researchers to bridge the micro and macro research divide by generating and applying theories to real world contexts (Hitt et al., 2007; Ou et al., 2017). Hence, the thesis topic can make valuable research contributions to this domain by exploring unique angles, such as: Given that startups often have diverse teams and a dynamic work environment, how can the positive effects of humble leadership on team retention, and in turn, team leadership development, be maintained and sustained in the context of early stage social ventures? Does a shared social vision, that is characteristic to a social enterprise, uniquely influence the manifestation of such management theories in a real world setting? Hence, in this way, the research topic can explore the emergence of collective leadership development in the unique context of startup social ventures in India.

Relational Models Theory and Group Dynamics

Even though leadership is defined as a group oriented "social influence process through which individuals determine a group's objectives, motivate task behavior in pursuit of these objectives, and influence group maintenance and culture" (Wellman, 2017, pg. 596), a majority of leadership literature has focused on the "great person" perspective and the traits and characteristics of individual leaders (Borgatta et al., 1954; Weber, 1968; Wellman, 2017). While individual-focused leadership research has provided us with many valuable leadership-related insights, it is important to note that there are several group level mechanisms that also contribute to collective leadership emergence in an organization (van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003; Wellman, 2017). To this end, Relational Models Leadership Theory makes significant contributions to team-oriented leadership literature by highlighting

the role of group-based factors and emphasizing the importance of group context in relation to team level leadership emergence (Wellman, 2017). It also focuses on the way leadership activity changes throughout different organizational life stages and considers leadership emergence to be influenced by and intertwined with the group identity context (Wellman, 2017). Hence, given that the thesis topic aims to look beyond the founder/social entrepreneur in order to generate leadership research at the team/group level, the holistic approach of relational model theory, in relation to collective leadership dynamics (Wellman, 2017), makes it a very relevant body of literature to explore, in terms of the doctoral research questions.

“Relational models leadership theory considers leadership an emergent phenomenon” (Wellman, 2017, pg. 598) and it studies both, formal and informal group mechanisms and behaviours, ie. ‘enacted leadership structures’, that contribute to leadership emergence in an organizational context (Wellman, 2017). In order to understand team level leadership development, it is first important to understand the various phases that a team goes through in an organization. While earlier theories of group development outlined a fixed sequence of four group development stages – Forming, Norming, Storming and Performing (Hare, 1973; Tuckman, 1965), current relational models theory focuses on group development in the form of four important team activities – Sensemaking, Interacting, Challenging and Cementing (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Wellman, 2017). The first activity, ‘sensemaking’, is an important one and it refers to the process of team members developing initial ‘cognitive scripts’ about each other, their work and the organization as a whole (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Wellman, 2017). This forms the basis for the other activities of ‘interacting’ with each other based on the cognitive scripts, ‘challenging’ each other when the scripts are questioned or contradicted, and ‘cementing’ and institutionalizing the group’s shared script as a core part of the organizational context (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Wellman, 2017). These four activities of group development are also interesting from the research topic perspective, because it may be valuable to understand how team level leadership can grow and develop through different group development stages and processes in a startup social enterprise context.

The ‘sensemaking’ process is of particular importance to leadership emergence and relational model theory because the initial interactions between team members influence how they view and perceive each other and these perceptions, in turn, cause them to converge on a particular group relational model (Wellman, 2017). According to relational model theory, groups can adopt four types of relational models – or ‘cognitive templates’ – to structure group activities; namely, Authority Ranking, Communal Sharing, Equality Matching and Market Pricing relational models (Fiske, 1991, 1992; Fiske et al., 1992; Fiske & Haslam, 1996; Haslam & Fiske, 1999; Wellman, 2017). While “the authority ranking relational model is based on a hierarchical ordering of group members” (Wellman, 2017, pg. 600), “the communal sharing relational model is based on consensus, unity, and conformity among group members” (Wellman, 2017, pg. 600). On the other hand, in the equality matching relational model, “group members are seen as distinct but equal partners” (Wellman, 2017, pg. 600), while the market pricing relational model focuses on making group decisions “based on prices, returns on investment, or other cost-benefit ratios” (Wellman, 2017, pg. 600). Given that hierarchical leadership systems are not conducive for team/collective level leadership development, and the fact, that leadership behaviour connected to financial compensation (Wellman, 2017) is not feasible in a resource-strapped and impact-focused startup social enterprise context; the authority ranking and market

pricing relational models, respectively, do not hold much relevance to the proposed thesis topic. On the other hand, a communal sharing approach involves several group members regularly engaging in leadership behaviour, and an equality matching approach may give rise to 'distributed leadership' (DeRue, 2011), "where one group member at a time engages in leadership behavior, but the active leadership role rotates among members" (Wellman, 2017, pg. 600), and hence, these two relational models are quite relevant to the research topic of team level leadership development in startup social venture teams. Research has shown that, in most cases, "group members are more likely to use the communal sharing or authority ranking relational model to guide their leadership activities than the equality matching or market pricing relational model" (Wellman, 2017, pg. 601). Hence, while it will be critical to apply the communal sharing relational model to the research context of the thesis, it will also be interesting to explore whether the equality matching model can also play a role, alongside communal sharing, in nurturing team level leadership in a startup social enterprise context. It will be particularly important to study the role of sensemaking processes in nurturing such models, and in turn, catalyzing team level leadership development, in early stage social ventures.

Another concept that is closely linked to the relational processes of group development/group dynamics is Team Member Exchange (TMX). "At the individual level, TMX reflects the level of reciprocity in exchanges between a member and her or his group in sharing ideas, feedback, efforts, resources, expertise, and recognition. TMX thus represents the overall quality of a member's relationships in the group. High-quality TMX relations are characterized by mutual trust and respect and involve exchanges of resources and support beyond what is necessary for task completion" (Farmer et al., 2015, pg. 585). These reciprocal social exchanges between individual team members have been linked to higher identification among team members (Farmer et al., 2015), as well as, positive member job performance (Farh et al., 2017). Thus, from the perspective of this thesis, it will be interesting to understand how these reciprocal TMX relationships operate at the dyadic member-member level and at the collective level of the team, how such TMX relationships are shaped by team-level leadership processes, and how TMX in turn can influence important team/venture level outcomes (beyond member performance) in startup social ventures.

Team Life Cycle

While the sub-sections above focus on the Team Composition (hiring/retention) and Team Formation (group dynamics) stages, it is also crucial to study the entire Team Life Cycle as a whole. A work team's life cycle involves 5 key phases: 1) Team Composition; 2) Team Formation, Socialization and Development; 3) Team Effectiveness, Processes and Enhancements; 4) Team Leadership and Motivation; and; 5) Team Continuance and Decline (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). When researching the phases/life cycle of teams, it is important to be aware of four critical conceptual focus areas that are integral to the investigation of work teams: (1) Multilevel Influences, (2) Contextual Constraint and Creation, (3) Task or Workflow Interdependence, and (4) Temporal Dynamics (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). The first focus area, Multilevel Influences, refers to the fact that "individuals are nested within teams, and teams in turn are linked to and nested in a larger multilevel system" and hence, "this hierarchical nesting and coupling, which is characteristic of organizational systems, necessitates the use of multiple levels—individual, team, and the higher-level context—in efforts to understand and investigate team phenomena" (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 6). The

second focus area, Contextual Constraint and Creation, draws upon the fact that “teams are embedded in an organizational context and the team itself enacts a context for team members” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 6). Hence, team focused research must keep in mind that team outcomes and processes may be influenced by a broader organizational context, involving factors such as culture, leadership, organizational structure, technology, as well as, the internal and external organizational climate (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). The third focus area, Task/Workflow Independence, approaches team-centric literature from an organizational systems perspective and highlights the fact “the centrality of workflow interdependence” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 6) is an issue that clearly distinguishes work teams from small groups (Goodman et al., 1987; Kozlowski & Bell, 2013), and hence, interaction requirements and organizational constraints that are related to tasks workflows must be given significant consideration in team-centric research and practice (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). Finally, the fourth focus area, Temporal Dynamics, highlights the fact that “time is an important characteristic of work teams” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 7). “Team constructs and phenomena are not static” and hence, when researching teams, it must be kept in mind that “teams have a developmental lifespan; they form, mature, and evolve over time” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg 7). Hence, it is critical to consider the factor of time, in order to conduct sound academic research on team processes and team effectiveness (Mohammed et al., 2009; Kozlowski & Bell, 2013).

Kozlowski and Bell's (2013) review of team-centric research also revealed specific research needs related to the different phases of a team's life cycle. For example, as part of the 'Team Formation, Socialization and Development' phase, further research must be done to describe, validate and extend newer models of work team development, that are specifically created for work teams (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). Similarly, with regards to the 'Team Effectiveness, Processes and Enhancements' phase, there is a need to conduct research about team learning, separate and distinct from individual learning, as a team process that is fundamentally linked to team effectiveness (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). More importantly, given that past team research has established collective efficacy as an important contributor to team effectiveness, further research must be conducted about this topic, addressing issues such as “levels of analysis concerns in measurement, articulation of the underlying processes by which collective efficacy is formed and has effects, and examination of potential contextual moderators” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 76). Given that most of the research about this topic is quite conceptual, there is a strong research need to conduct empirical studies that clearly demonstrate that “collective mood or group emotion contribute to team effectiveness” (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 77). Further, research must also be conducted about team training, covering the factors of “content (what), timing (when), and techniques (how)”, in order to highlight the impact of training, delivered specifically at the team level, on overall team effectiveness (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 77). Next, with regards to the 'Team Leadership and Motivation' phase, there is a great overall need to generate theory and research that is specifically targeted at the team level, instead of individual level theories that are generalized to the team context (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). And finally, with regards to the 'Team Continuance and Decline' phase, basic research must be conducted to “examine the effects of group longevity on team processes” and long term organizational effectiveness (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 79). The proposed thesis topic can make valuable contributions to team life cycle research and address the different research needs outlined above, by examining various team processes (learning, training, team development, etc.) that lead to the emergence of collective leadership at the team level in

startup social ventures, and how this team leadership, in turn, influences team outcomes and organizational performance in the long term. Lastly, given that there is also a need to conduct research about “the underlying characteristics that distinguish different types of teams” in order to highlight “better targeted interventions for enhancing team effectiveness” across team types (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013, pg. 74), the proposed thesis topic can address this research gap from a leadership angle, by researching the different types of leadership models that might emerge in startup social venture teams and how these different leadership forms can influence team outcomes and organizational performance across different types of early stage social enterprises. Finally, it must be noted that the vast majority of literature on team life cycles focuses on teams embedded in larger (predominantly commercial) organizations. Hence, the dissertation can make an important contribution to this field by elaborating on team life cycle theories and generating new insights from the context of startup (social) ventures.

Team/Organisational Learning

Another important subject to consider is the influence of team-centric leadership and team mechanisms and processes on team and organisational level learning; which in turn affects organisational effectiveness and performance (Murray & Moses, 2005). Organisational learning can be defined as the process of “encoding inferences from history into routines that guide behavior” in order to achieve organisational goals and targets, and the broad term of ‘routines’ includes “the forms, rules, procedures, conventions, strategies, and technologies around which organizations are constructed and through which they operate”; as well as “the structure of beliefs, frameworks, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowledge that buttress, elaborate, and contradict the formal routines” (Levitt & March, 1988, pg. 320). It is very important to understand the role of team constructs and processes in shaping organisational learning, given that organisations as a non-human unit cannot learn, and in reality, the individuals and teams do the actual learning; in turn shaping the learning, actions and decisions of the organisation as a whole (Murray & Moses, 2005). The team is a critical and central factor for organisational learning because it serves as a vehicle and liaison device, functioning as an ‘interlinking pin’ “between learning at the individual and organisational level” (Murray & Moses, 2005, pg. 1197). The topic of team and organisational learning is a particularly relevant research angle in a startup social enterprise context because organizations faced with complex uncertainties and a dynamic work environment, such as startup social ventures, rely more heavily on shared team understandings and team learning processes, than organisations “dealing with simpler, more stable environments” (Levitt & March, 1988, pg. 327). Further, given that extant research has proven that “learning behaviour in teams is positively associated with team performance” (Edmondson, A., 1999, pg. 354), it will be important to apply a process approach to studying team learning in startup social enterprises in order to understand both, the team learning behaviours and dynamics, as well as, the team learning outcomes that influence the overall organisational performance (Edmondson, A., 1999).

For the purpose of the doctoral dissertation, it is important to understand the objective-focused categories of learning – such as value driven learning, efficiency driven learning, structured driven learning and simplistic driven learning – in startup teams (Murray & Chapman, 2003; Murray & Moses, 2005). It is also crucial to understand the magnitude of changes (small, large, multiple, etc.) leading to effective learning and the more temporal categories (continuous, evolutionary, dynamic) of organisational learning and how such

learning factors influence organisational performance. From the objective-focused learning perspective, it will be particularly relevant to research the presence or absence of value driven learning in startup social enterprise teams and how the connection to the social cause or the enterprise vision shapes the organisational learning and in turn the organisational outcomes and performance. With regards to the magnitude and temporal learning perspective, it will be important to research how startup social enterprise teams learn and evolve over time. When it comes to the frequency and magnitude of learning, it is widely believed that slower, larger and patient changes are more beneficial for organisational performance than more frequent, smaller and multiple changes (Levitt & March, 1988). Hence, it will be important to research the presence or absence of purposeful gradual and evolutionary learning (Deakins & Freel, 1998); as well as the characteristics and causes of such learning; in startup social enterprise teams and how this in turn relates to the success or failure of such organisations. Similarly, continuous learning over time, which includes a system and culture of continuous improvement, has also been positively connected to organisational growth and performance (Wang & Ahmed, 2003). An important feature of continuous learning is a system of triple loop learning; which includes a combination of single loop learning (lower level learning – which is related to error detection, correction and repetitive actions, routines and behaviours), double loop learning (higher level or dynamic learning – which is connected to proactiveness for error prevention and the individual or team level capacity to interpret and adapt to the working environment in a strategic manner) and most importantly, triple loop learning (which is related to organisational ambition, courage, knowledge creation and an interactive and iterative process of higher degree creative input and organisational unlearning when required) (Murray & Chapman, 2003; Wang & Ahmed, 2003; Murray & Moses, 2005). Triple loop learning fosters strong perseverance among teams for the organisation's beliefs and approach; hence, team members would not abandon their beliefs easily when faced with challenges, unless they are forced to make changes or shifts when faced with the possibility of failure to reach the organisational goals (Wang & Ahmed, 2003). Given the impact-focused approach of social enterprises, it will important to research how Team Level Leadership influences the presence/absence, characteristics and causes of continuous triple loop learning in startup social venture teams and how this in turn has an effect on the success or failure of such organisations. Additionally, it is also relevant to research the concept of absorptive capacity of organisations – which is defined as the learning capacity of the individuals and teams in the organisation – in order to understand how and why (exploring the relationship with Team Level Leadership) certain startup social enterprises can have higher or lower absorptive capacity (and stronger or weaker culture/system of learning), and how this impacts the success or failure trajectories of early stage social ventures (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990).

Finally, while it is important to study the nature and presence of team and organisational level learning (given that this learning is positively related to organisational performance), it is equally critical to identify and research the types of learning that are associated with poor organisational outcomes and organisational failure of startup social enterprises. One such type of negative learning is superstitious learning, which is related to erroneous inferences and a false or misguided sense of learning, success or failure in an organisation (Levitt & March, 1988). Such superstitious learning traps can push a nascent venture towards failure and hence, it is important to identify the causes, characteristics and presence/absence of such erroneous learning in startup social enterprise teams; in order to understand the team dynamics that are related to this type of negative learning, and how that can lead to the

success or failure of an organisation. Another important perspective that must be considered is that organisations can also succeed or fail depending on the team's capacity or aptitude to learn from failure (Dahlin et al., 2018). Error or failure learning is defined as "the process by which individuals, groups, or organizations identify error or failure events, analyze such events to find their causes, and search for and implement solutions to prevent similar errors or failures in the future" (Dahlin et al., 2018, pg. 254). Different teams will react differently to failure learning triggers (three categories – opportunity to learn, motivation to learn, and ability to learn) and these team reactions and dynamics will determine how well or how poorly teams can learn from and adapt to 'spurious successes' and 'spurious failures' (Dahlin et al., 2018). "An increase in spurious events leads to noisier learning processes because the cause–effect analysis becomes more complex, which in turn introduces difficulty in learning from both successes and failures" (Dahlin et al., 2018, pg. 265). In the fast paced and uncertain work context of startup social enterprises, it is important for these firms to learn from failure and fail quickly to keep on evolving and growing; and hence, it will be important to understand the causes, characteristics and team circumstances (and the relationship with Team Level Leadership) that shape a startup social venture's capacity to learn from failure, and how such team learning processes or constructs can influence the short term and long term success, failure and outcomes of such organisations.

2.5) Team and Venture-Level Outcomes in Startup Social Enterprises

After examining the role of team-centric processual and leadership factors that contribute to team leadership emergence in startup social enterprises, the research focus must be turned towards the effect of Team Level Leadership on the team and venture level outcomes of early stage social ventures. In the section below, I will first outline the doctoral dissertation's chosen approach for social impact performance measurement and then, in order to highlight the potential influence of Team Level Leadership Development on the success of early stage social enterprises, I will briefly examine the influence of Team Composition factors, Team Centric Leadership factors and Team Constructs/Processes on startup venture performance. Finally, I will also explore the concept of Well Being, in order to understand how team level leadership and other team processes can influence the well being of team members, in the context of startup social ventures.

Venture Performance

(i) Performance Measurement of Startup Social Enterprises

Since a social enterprise is characterized by a Social Value Proposition (SVP) at the core of its framework (Austin et al., 2006), the thesis will focus on success/outcomes/performance of these organizations mainly from the lens of sustainable social impact creation (and other performance indicators that support this goal). Several approaches have been taken to measure the success of impact organizations, ranging from the Triple Bottom Line approach, which states social, environmental and economic indicators as organizational measures of success (Hall, 2011), to the Social Return on Investment (SROI) approach, which calculates "the social impact of a business or nonprofit's operations in dollar terms, relative to the

investment required to create that impact and exclusive of its financial return to investors” (Lingane & Olsen, 2004, pg. 118). However, since the sampling criteria for the startup social ventures included in the primary research (for the thesis) is model agnostic (includes for-profit, non-profit and hybrid social enterprise models) and sector agnostic (all impact sectors), it is important to choose a performance measurement approach that can be applied to all models and sectors. Hence, the thesis will take into account some of the conventional success metrics for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), such as revenue growth, growth in the number of team members, product/service innovation, process innovation, product/service quality, product/service variety, and user (customer/beneficiary) satisfaction (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003); but will also draw from Theory of Change literature, in order to measure success through an increase in an organization’s impact ‘outputs’ and ‘outcomes’ over time, in order to stay true to the Social Value Proposition of a social enterprise (Funnell & Rogers, 2011).

(ii) Influence of Team Composition factors on Venture Performance

Research has drawn connections between the success of an organization and the recruitment, management and engagement of its team. In conventional management, as well as, non-profit management literature, it has been widely recognized that well structured human resource management practices have a positive effect in driving an organization’s growth and performance (Delaney & Huselid, 1996). In a commercial startup venture context, academics such as Beckman and Burton have published several papers about the relationship between the profile and structure of a venture’s founding team and TMT, and it’s path to securing venture capital and a successful public offering (Beckman et al., 2007; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Beckman & Burton, 2011). It will be interesting to draw inferences from this literature and apply to it to the specific context of Team Level Leadership Development and the performance of startup social ventures.

Practitioner surveys of social enterprises in India have found that one of the main reasons why startup social enterprises fail to scale is because of challenges in finding and retaining mid-level and junior level talent (Intellectap, 2012; British Council, 2016). It has also been found that a key reason for the mid-level talent retention challenge, is the ‘Founder Syndrome’, which refers to a situation where founders/social entrepreneurs are unable to delegate work and pass control to others, resulting in dissatisfied mid-level managers, high attrition and poor venture performance (Intellectap, 2012). The ‘Founder Syndrome’ is particularly alarming in small startup social enterprise teams, where the work of every team member is of extreme importance. Hence, an important theoretical contribution of the thesis could be to apply a leadership lens to this topic, by juxtaposing the ill effects of the Founder Syndrome to the positive effects of Collective Leadership on an organization’s performance, and studying these factors from the context of Team Level Leadership in early stage social enterprises.

(iii) Influence of Team Centric Leadership factors on Venture Performance

“Shared leadership refers to a team property whereby leadership is distributed among team members rather than focused on a single designated leader” (Carson et al., 2007, pg. 1217) and this leadership approach focuses on team members leading “each other toward goal achievement” (Wang et al., 2014, pg. 181 in Lord et al., 2017, pg. 444). Empirical research has found that organizations that use a SL approach, have seen a positive effect of SL on the organization’s performance (Carson et al., 2007); in part because, SL leads to higher levels of trust in the team, which in turn enhances member/team/venture performance (Drescher et al., 2014). Drawing from the body of literature that suggests that the appropriate leadership approach of an organization depends on the life stage of the organization (Baglia & Hunt, 1988; Miller & Friesen, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Smith & Miner, 1983; Smith et al., 1985), extant research shows that in the startup venture stage, it is important to have a shared leadership environment that will ensure ownership of all team members towards a common goal; in turn, positively influencing startup performance (Ensley et al., 2006; Day & Dragoni, 2015). Collective leadership identity is considered to be a “powerful resource for group actions” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129) and “normative common goals and collective identities can drive organizational vision and goal pursuits, create solidarity for group stakeholder actions, and mobilize people power for social actions” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129). Hence, a common sense of identity and purpose among teams creates an “impetus for action, a motivational mechanism beyond an interest-based perspective of personal benefits” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129); and thus, has a positive influence on team performance (Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003; Lord et al., 2016).

Closely linked to Shared Leadership and collective leadership identities is the concept of Empowering Leadership and research has found that this style of leadership also has distal outcomes of improved team performance (Fischer et al., 2017). Similarly, Transformational Leadership, which is considered an antecedent to Shared Leadership, is said to nurture collective identity construction (Lord et al., 2016) and facilitates exceptional team performance (Lord et al., 2017). This is because “transformational leaders not only inspire each follower to perform better, but also motivate their followers as a collective to achieve positive group outcomes” (Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 24) and “transformational team leadership is positively related to team potency over time..” (Kozlowski et al., 2016, pg. 27). Hence, overall, recent reviews of leadership literature have shown that all forms of team centric-leadership approaches – Transformational Leadership, Leader-Member Exchange, Shared Leadership and Functional Leadership – have had positive outcomes in terms of team performance (Kozlowski et al., 2016). Since the construct of Team/Collective Level Leadership Development (the focus area of of this dissertation) draws directly from such team-centric leadership theories (Day & Dragoni, 2015), a unique contribution of this thesis will be to explore the effects of Team Level Leadership, as a manifestation of extant team-centric leadership theories in early stage social enterprises, on the success and performance of such startup social ventures.

(iv) Influence of Team Constructs and Processes on Venture Performance

Apart from Team-Centric Leadership, other team related constructs and processes have also been linked to organizational performance. For example, studies have found that leader humility, and in turn, a positive organizational climate, have a favourable influence on performance at the individual, team, and organizational level (Ou et al., 2015; Owens et al., 2013; Owens & Hekman, 2016; Ou et al., 2017). Similarly, research has also found important linkages between Team Entrepreneurial Passion (TEP), team outcomes and team performance (Cardon et al., 2017). First, depending on a shared or conflicting understanding of TEP between team members, TEP influences team member exits – due to irreconcilable differences between individual level and team level passion focus – as well as, entries of new team members, and this in turn, affects team passion diversity and team performance (Cardon et al., 2017). Second, TEP positively influences the quality of team processes at the startup stage, because shared emotions and a common team identity “motivates group members to work toward collective goals, reinforces exchanges among members, and promotes cooperation rather than conflict” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 294).

However, it must also be noted that a shared mindset and a high degree of TEP may also “hinder the team’s ability or willingness to engage in constructive conflict”, thus, “leading to more win-lose resolutions of conflict” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 295), which may have a negative influence on team outcomes (Cardon et al., 2017; Faraj et al., 2011). Next, research has also found that TEP has a positive influence on NVT performance, because a “shared passion may fuel the team’s drive to set more challenging goals and to actively pursue those goals” and this “greater action readiness of the team” will lead to “more focused and motivated efforts toward achieving organizational goals and, therefore, to better team and organizational performance” (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 295). Finally, it is also important to note that too little TEP or too much TEP may hinder, rather than enhance startup team performance (Cardon et al., 2017). Hence, given the important linkages between TEP and NVT outcomes and performance, it will be important to research the positive effects, as well as, potential negative effects and related mitigating factors, of TEP on the development of team/collective leadership, and in turn, the success, longevity and sustainability of early venture teams; in the unique context of startup social ventures.

Team Mental Well Being

Finally, the concept of team mental health and mental well-being (MWB) is a relevant topic to cover when researching the influence of Team Level Leadership Development on the team and ventures level outcomes of startup social ventures. Mental health and well-being is defined as a “state of well-being in which every individual realizes his or her own potential, can cope with the normal stresses of life, can work productively and fruitfully, and is able to make a contribution to her or his community” (WHO, 2014; quoted in Stephan, 2018, pg. 290). MWB is largely categorised into two types – Hedonic well-being (which is related to happiness in terms of pleasure attainment and pain avoidance) and Eudaimonic well-being (which is related to self realization and self determination) – and eudaimonic well-being in particular is very relevant to the startup social enterprise context which is characterized by the self motivation of working for a higher purpose in a proactive and self-initiative driven

work environment (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Stephan, 2018). While extant research has focused on the antecedents and characteristics of hedonic and eudaimonic well being from an individual perspective (Ryan & Deci, 2001), it is necessary to also research antecedents and characteristics of MWB from a group or collective perspective in a startup social enterprise context. This is because research has shown that MWB and a group's affective tone can have significant outcomes at the team and organisational level, such as building team persistence/resilience, fostering proactive work behaviours and contributing to firm performance (Stephan, 2018; Bindl et al., 2012); and hence, it will be important to research how Team Level Leadership Development in startup social enterprise teams relates to MWB outcomes at the team level in such organisations, and how that in turn influences the performance of the early stage social ventures.

In recent times, there has been an increasing academic interest in the construct of Entrepreneurial MWB. In fact, a recent special edition issue (2019) of the *Journal of Business Venturing* (consisting of eight papers) focused exclusively on the past, present and future of Well Being in the Entrepreneurship domain (Wiklund et al., 2019). Entrepreneurial Well Being can be defined as “the experience of satisfaction, positive affect, infrequent negative affect, and psychological functioning in relation to developing, starting, growing, and running an entrepreneurial venture” and this definition integrates both the hedonic and eudaimonic perspectives (Wiklund et al., 2019, pg. 579). The authors of the special edition issue emphasize the need for future entrepreneurial research to be embedded within the external “context of socio-economic change” (Wiklund et al., 2019, pg. 580). Hence, an interesting research angle to explore could be to check whether this definition must be adapted in any way to fit the specific social entrepreneurship context; to include the inherent factors of cause motivation and impact achievement. For example, it will be interesting to see how the eudaimonic well-being characteristics of self actualisation and self determination (Ryff, 2019) function in the social enterprise context; and also how the degree of pro-social motivation of social enterprise founders and team members (Kibler et al., 2018) can influence (positively and/or negatively) individual/team level MWB and firm level outcomes. “A recent review of dependent variables used in entrepreneurship research” (Wiklund et al., 2019, pg. 582) has revealed that firm performance is the most dominant dependent variable used in this domain (Shepherd et al., 2019; Wiklund et al., 2019). However, scholars are increasingly highlighting the need to study MWB, not only as an important antecedent of firm level outcomes, but also as an important dependent variable itself (Ryff, 2019; Wiklund et al., 2019). Hence, the doctoral thesis project can make an important contribution to entrepreneurial well being domain, by studying individual and team level MWB in the specific startup social enterprise context. Given that the entrepreneurial journey is not a static experience and that “majority of new businesses fail” when faced with several startup challenges (Wiklund et al., 2019, pg. 582), it will be valuable to understand how individual/team MWB can change over time depending on the different venture stage, and how the MWB factors can influence the success or failure of teams in the startup social enterprise context. Further, it will be interesting to explore how important factors and team processes such as autonomy, collaboration and positive or negative emotions (as part of team dynamics) can shape individual/team MWB in the context of startup social ventures (Wiklund et al., 2019).

Extant MWB research has focused on both, the entrepreneur/founder/leader's MWB and how that relates to the organisational decisions taken by the founder which can determine

the success or failure of the organisation (Stephan, 2018); as well as the employee/follower's well being and how that relates to Human Resource Management (HRM) practices in organisations and overall organisational performance (Van De Voorde et al., 2012). While both the leader and follower MWB perspectives must be taken into account, the concept of team level MWB is even more relevant to the doctoral dissertation, because the research questions focus on understanding how Team Level Leadership Development influences team and organisational level outcomes in startup social ventures. In fact, in recent times, several scholars in the entrepreneurship domain have highlighted that well being of followers who work in startup enterprises is an under-researched topic that deserves future attention (broadening the focus beyond MWB of founders/leaders), because follower and team MWB are important factors that can influence the recruitment, engagement and retention of team members in new ventures (Wiklund et al., 2019). Team MWB can also be understood through the concept of Team Psychological Safety (TPS) which is defined as "a shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking" (Edmondson, 1999, pg. 350) and can be described as a "team climate characterised by interpersonal trust and mutual respect in which people are comfortable being themselves" (Edmondson, 1999, pg. 354). TPS is "a group-level construct, meaning that the construct characterizes the team as a unit rather than individual team members" (Edmondson, 2003, pg. 5) and for this collective level construct to function effectively, the team members must have a shared understanding and converging perspective on what MWB and TPS represents in the context of their team (Edmondson, 1999). While TPS is usually a tacit construct within teams (Edmondson, 1999; 2003), it will be interesting to study how Team Level Leadership relates to the presence/absence, antecedents and consequences of tacit or explicit TPS within startup social enterprise teams and how this variation, in turn, influences organisational performance. TPS is also closely linked to team learning because it facilitates group level learning and is "positively associated with learning behaviour in organisational work teams" (Edmondson, 1999, pg. 355). The group level MWB construct is further linked to organisational performance because research has proven that "team learning behaviour mediates between team psychological safety and team performance, pg. 355). However, TPS alone is "not sufficient to ensure learning behaviour" and "without a clear and compelling shared goal", team members may not be motivated enough to engage in collective learning behaviours (Edmondson, 2003, pg. 34). Given the compelling social vision of a startup social enterprise, it will be interesting to understand how the presence of shared impact-focused goals of startup social ventures influence the learning behaviour and TPS (in relation to Team/Collective Level Leadership) of such teams, and how that in turn relates to organisational performance. Researchers in the MWB and TPS field have called for further research about TPS in different kind of team contexts (Edmondson, 2003), and have also highlighted the need for multi-level and longitudinal research design in this domain in order to truly understand the relationship between MWB and organisational performance (Van De Voorde et al., 2012; Wiklund et al., 2019). Hence, the doctoral dissertation can contribute to the highlighted research need by exploring how Team/Collective Level Leadership Development can influence team level MWB outcomes and organisational performance in the unique context of startup social ventures.

Chapter 3

METHODOLOGY

The doctoral dissertation consists of two research studies, with both studies answering the three sub-questions under the main research question; from a qualitative, as well as, quantitative research perspective. Relevant secondary (literature review) and primary research (data collection) were undertaken to satisfactorily answer each sub-research question, which in turn answered a part or whole of the overarching research question (as outlined in Table 1 in Chapter 1). In this chapter, I will first explain the foundation of the methodological approach taken in this thesis (Section 3.1). Next, I will discuss the key methodological research contributions made by the thesis (Section 3.2). Finally, I will provide an overview of the overall research design and framework used for the doctoral dissertation (Section 3.3).

3.1) FOUNDATION OF METHODOLOGY IN THIS THESIS

Mixed Methods Approach

As outlined in the earlier section, the extensive literature review draws from important academic debates, in order to shape a relevant primary research framework for each of the thesis studies. The thesis used a combination of theory generation, theory elaboration and theory testing approaches (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007); and hence, an appropriate mixed methods research methodology was undertaken, across the doctoral dissertation (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). A mixed methods methodology refers to an approach where a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods are used across different phases of a research process (Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004; Skovdal & Cornish, 2015), starting from research design and sampling, to data collection, data analysis and contextualization (Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). The choice of a research methodology depends on the nature of the research project/question and in many cases, a research investigation may have multiple research aims and sub-questions (Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). Thus, in such a scenario, where a research project has varied aims and questions that can't be fully "addressed by a single research approach or strategy" (Brannen, 2004, pg. 283 in Seale et al., 2004), it is appropriate to use a multi-method approach where qualitative and quantitative methods are used to build on each other, support each other and complement each other in an iterative manner (Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004; Skovdal & Cornish, 2015). For example, the doctoral dissertation draws inspiration from the robust mixed methods approach of Edmondson's iconic work (1999) on "Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams", which first used preliminary qualitative research for theory generation, followed by quantitative survey research for theory testing, and finally, a third phase of follow-up qualitative research for further theory clarification and elaboration.

Despite potential resource constraints and tensions that can arise from a multi-method strategy, qualitative and quantitative methods can be effectively combined by giving a different amount of weightage to each approach across various aspects of the research project (Creswell, 2002; Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004; Skovdal & Cornish, 2015). The aim and focus of each research phase will determine how much importance to assign to

each approach (qualitative or quantitative) in that phase, and will also influence the sequencing or time ordering of these approaches throughout the research investigation (Morgan, 1998; Bryman, 2001; Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). While the sequencing may vary according to the research investigation, in a typical and iterative mixed methods approach, qualitative methods are first used to generate a hypothesis, which is then tested using quantitative methods, and finally, qualitative methods may once again be used to explain and explore emerging trends and patterns in the data collected (Bamberger et al., 2010; Skovdal & Cornish, 2015). This multi-method strategy also ties in well with the chosen grounded theory approach where data is gathered through several methods (primarily, but not exclusively, qualitative methods), including “observation and unstructured interviews in the initial stages, then more structured forms of data collection as the study becomes more focused” (Dey, 2004, pg. 80 in Seale et al., 2004). Hence, given the multiple aims of theory generation, theory testing and theory elaboration across the two research studies of the doctoral dissertation, an iterative mixed methods approach, as outlined above, was applied across the research investigation (as highlighted in the latter half of this methodology section). Further, given the growing interest in mixed method strategies in the domain of social science research, as well as, the increasing acceptance that qualitative and quantitative methods are complementary research approaches (Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004), this thesis can make valuable contributions to the social science research methodology domain, by applying a mixed method approach to the unique research context of team/collective leadership development in startup social enterprises in India.

Methodological Foundation

As part of the doctoral dissertation, the mixed method research project first began with a qualitative study for theory generation and elaboration, followed by a quantitative study for theory testing and model validation. The research questions in this thesis aimed to examine a “Black Box” topic (a topic that has been “previously studied, but key questions remain”) – namely, antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-centric leadership – in the “Blue Sky” context (a new domain of research inquiry) of startup social venture teams and SE (Murphy et al., 2017, pg. 299). Therefore, I first adopted a Grounded Theory approach in the qualitative research study, because such a methodological approach is appropriate for theory generation and elaboration with regards to ‘black box’ and/or ‘blue sky’ research topics (Murphy et al., 2017; Edmondson & McManus, 2007). Grounded Theory was first introduced by Glaser and Strauss in 1967 (Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004) and this theory focuses on “generating theory through research data rather than testing ideas formulated in advance of data collection and analysis” (Dey, 2004, pg. 80 in Seale et al., 2004). The grounded theory approach was created with the objective of generating theory that is born out of real world findings and empirical research, and thus, is grounded not just in academic value, but also practical relevance (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). In terms of philosophical underpinnings, my research drew more from the Strauss and Corbin (1990) school of thought for grounded theory, which subscribed to a relativist ontological approach and subjectivist epistemological perspective (Annells, 1997). This approach to grounded theory typically commenced with “a pre-identified problem or curiosity and a sensitizing question” (Annells, 1997, pg. 124) about a phenomenon, and aimed to inductively develop theory that is grounded in real world findings (demonstrating trustworthiness of data), through an iterative process of data collection and analysis (Annells, 1997). Given that the aim of the thesis is to make valuable academic and practical

contributions in the fields of leadership development, team development and social enterprise development, a grounded theory approach is extremely appropriate for the dissertation research topic.

“Though it involves elements of both deductive and inductive inference, grounded theory clearly privileges neither form of inquiry” (Dey, 2004, pg. 91 in Seale et al., 2004), and given the “practical priorities of grounded theory” (Dey, 2004, pg. 91 in Seale et al., 2004), this methodological approach subscribes to ‘abduction’ as the preferred form of reasoning (Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). The process of abduction can be defined as moving “from a conception of something to a different, possibly more developed or deeper conception of it. This happens through our placing and interpreting the original ideas about the phenomenon in the frame of a new set of ideas” (Danermark et al., 1997: 91; quoted by Dey, 2004, pg. 91 in Seale et al., 2004). “Following Jensen (1995: 148), Danermark et al. (1997: 91) go on to characterize this mode of reasoning as a process of reconceptualization, whereby we describe, interpret or explain something within a new framework” (Dey, 2004, pg. 91 in Seale et al., 2004). Abduction can thus be considered a flexible synthesis of both the inductive and deductive approaches, and can relate “an observation to a theory (or vice versa)”, and ultimately “results in an interpretation” (Dey, 2004, pg. 91 in Seale et al., 2004). Hence, “using abductive inference is thus a matter of interpreting a phenomenon in terms of some theoretical frame of reference”, in order “to explain some aspect of the phenomenon under investigation” (Dey, 2004, pg. 91 in Seale et al., 2004).

Given that the mixed methods dissertation adopts a combination of theory generation, theory elaboration and theory testing approaches (Colquitt & Zapata-Phelan, 2007), a combination of inductive, deductive and abductive approaches were used, across the two research studies. First, the qualitative study used an inductive or ‘back tracking’ research approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1971; Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004; Fischer et al., 2017) for theory generation and construct definition/elaboration; followed by the quantitative study, which used a deductive or ‘forward tracking’ approach (Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004; Fischer et al., 2017) for theory testing and model validation. Thus, overall, combining these two perspectives, abduction appeared to be the most relevant approach for the mixed methods research project and was used as the guiding form of reasoning throughout the doctoral dissertation. Further, the abductive approach used in this thesis was founded on the four core principles of grounded theory – Emergence (being open to new patterns and themes that emerge during the data collection and analysis process), Constant Comparison (constantly iterating between extant data/literature and emerging/new data findings to generate theory), Theoretical Sampling (choosing data sources purposefully to ensure that they are relevant and illuminating to the research question) and Theoretical Saturation (continuing to collect and analyze data until emerging findings add no new dimensions to the emerging theoretical model) (Murphy et al., 2017; Walsh et al., 2015; Charmaz, 2014) – in order to ensure trustworthiness of the theory generated in the doctoral dissertation. A detailed description of the methodological approach of each individual study is outlined in Chapter 4 (Study 1) and Chapter 8 (Study 2) respectively.

Target Sampling

Given that the research investigation applied a mixed methods design and a grounded theory approach, it was important to use the ‘theoretical sampling’ approach, which involves a process of “constructing a sample which is meaningful theoretically because it builds in

certain characteristics or criteria which help to develop and test your theory and explanation” (Mason, 1996: 94; quoted by Gobo, 2004, pg. 416 in Seale et al., 2004). This process allows “theory to germinate and grow by continually moving backwards and forwards between ideas and data” (Dey, 2004, pg. 84 in Seale et al., 2004). When selecting a sample using this approach, it is also important to note that “the greater the contrast in settings, the sharper the points of comparison” (Dey, 2004, pg. 84 in Seale et al., 2004). Hence, for the purpose of this thesis, it was important to select a relevant research participant group in the first phase, that would facilitate the process of theory generation, and subsequently, theory testing and theory elaboration. Further, this research investigation involved two rounds of data collection (first qualitative and followed by quantitative data collection), which ties in well with the principles of theoretical sampling, which recommend choosing successive sources of data, “selected to test or refine new ideas” emerging from the data collected (Dey, 2004, pg. 80 in Seale et al., 2004).

When designing the sampling strategy for the doctoral research studies, it was important for me to carefully create a holistic theoretical sampling approach that catered to all the needs of the research topic. For this purpose, I adopted a *variance* approach with respect to the sampling strategy for both studies. The qualitative study included a combination of the ‘emblematic case’ sampling procedure, which allowed for a comparison between average, excellent and emerging (including experimental and deviant cases) samples (Gobo, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004) of startup social enterprise cases, as well as, ‘purposive sampling’, which also took into account extreme or contrasting cases such as failed startup social ventures, in order to cover all possible cases and situations (Gobo, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). The quantitative research study involved the usual statistical sampling methods that are commonly associated with surveys and questionnaires (Gobo, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004), which included data collection from various subsets of research participants (Gobo, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004), representing different team sizes, startup life stages and success/failure cases of early stage social enterprises in India. Giving attention to such “variation in performance outcomes of the cases studied” (Antonakis et al., 2019, pg. 6) has become a standard for high quality research (with respect to variance studies); as expected by top-tier leadership and management journals today (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Antonakis et al., 2019). Hence, such a sampling strategy can ensure representativeness of the data and in turn, the research findings could potentially be generalized with regards to the insights about general team structures, processes and settings (Gobo, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004) that facilitate team/collective level leadership development in startup social ventures.

Finally, as part of a robust mixed methods approach, it is also important to have multiple sources of data in order to ensure data credibility (Webb et al., 1966; Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004) and also, to effectively test theoretical insights across different data sets (Hammersley, 1996; Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). The thesis focused its primary research (data collection) on early stage social enterprises in India. Drawing from studies that effectively used triangulated and multi-source research data to create a solid research framework (for example: Dutt et al., 2015), I conducted multi-source primary research for this thesis, through interviews, participant observation and surveys with 3 participant groups:

- a) Social entrepreneurs (founders) running startup social enterprises in India
- b) Second line leaders (core team members) working in startup social enterprises in India

- c) Third line leaders (where applicable) and team members working in startup social enterprises in India

Each research participant group provided important data for each of the sub-research questions, in turn informing the overarching research question. For the qualitative study, I conducted triangulated data collection, using semi-structured interviews and participant observation, and gathered data from 30 startup social venture teams in India – covering 3-4 participants per team (87 individuals spanning across the three research participant groups outlined above). I already had access to a data set of several early stage social entrepreneurs and startup social enterprise teams in India (for the qualitative study), given my extensive past experience, working as a Social Business Coach at UnLtd India, a leading early stage social enterprise incubator in India. Founded in 2007 and based in Mumbai, UnLtd India has incubated over 270 early stage social entrepreneurs, working across various impact sectors and organizational models (for profit, non profit and hybrid) and operating at various stages of startup growth (UnLtd India website, 2020). Hence, given the diversity of enterprises in terms of sector, model and organizational growth stage, UnLtd India's network of early stage social enterprises was chosen as the research sample base for the first qualitative study. Capitalizing on the diversity of UnLtd India's network of startup social enterprises, the research sample featured important contrasts and variations in terms of impact sector (health, education, environment, etc.), organizational model/legal structure (for-profit, non-profit, hybrid), team size (a minimum of at least 2-3 team members), team composition and backgrounds (students, community workers, corporate and development professionals, etc.), leadership structures (formal/informal), organizational life stage (pilot/ideation stage to early/late scale stage), as well as, organizational performance (high growth, average growth, low/stagnated growth and failure/shut down). Hence, this sampling variation ensured the representativeness, and in turn, the generalizability of the data collected. Keeping in mind the theoretical sampling principle of grounded theory, ventures that were sampled had an explicit social mission and were also at different stages of startup growth, in order to be able to take a *process* study view of evolving social venture team trajectories, across various stages of the startup journey. The variation in the sampling approach was also intentional, in order to be able to find common themes about the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-centric leadership, regardless of the various categorical differences among the startup social venture teams that were sampled. Following the qualitative study (Study 1), I made use of my professional network of social enterprise incubators, accelerators and fellowships in India to further recruit an appropriate data set of startup social enterprise teams for the quantitative study. For Study 2, I conducted a cross-sectional and multi-source survey with 70 startup social venture teams in India (covering 3-4 participants per team, spanning across the three research participant groups outlined above), and the data sample once again included similar variations, as listed above for the qualitative study. A detailed description of the specific research samples used for each of the studies can be found in Chapter 4 (Study 1) and Chapter 8 (Study 2) respectively.

Data Collection

Mixed methods research strategies use different approaches of data collection and analysis in order to fulfil the various aims of a research investigation (Hammersley, 1996; Brannen, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). Hence, the doctoral dissertation used a combination of the following multi-method approaches to collect primary data, across the two research studies:

- a) “*Triangulation*, where one type of data (usually quantitative) is used to corroborate another type of data (typically qualitative), as when theoretical insights are derived from one type of data which are also put to the test on another dataset.
- b) *Facilitation*, where collecting one type of data facilitates the collection of another type of data; for example, when qualitative interviewing methods are first employed in preliminary pilot work in order to help design a large-scale pre-coded survey.
- c) *Complementarity*, when two different sets of data are employed to address different but complementary aspects of an investigation; for example, qualitative data are used to understand social processes while quantitative data are employed to examine associations and their statistical generalizability to parent populations.” (Brannen, 2004, pg. 284 in Seale et al., 2004).

As a first step of data collection for theory generation (Study 1), I used the qualitative research method of recorded Semi Structured Interviews. Based on the academic and practitioner literature that I reviewed (secondary research), an appropriate interview questionnaire was created, covering a broad range of themes and topics that were relevant to the overall thesis research questions (Rapley, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). I engaged in effective and interactive interviews with the research participants, by building rapport with the interviewees, while maintaining neutrality (Rapley, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004), by drawing on my own experience of working with startup social entrepreneurs and social enterprise teams in India. For the purpose of theory generation and theory elaboration, I conducted Semi Structured Interviews with representatives from all the research participant groups (social entrepreneurs, second/third line leaders, team members), with the objective of generating a wide range of responses from each participant group (multi-source and triangulated data), in relation to the research topic. I also used the technique of Participant Observation/Context Immersion, where possible, by observing the team meetings of a few selected startup social enterprises (depending on availability) in the qualitative data set. This immersive research approach was undertaken in order to gather more nuanced and triangulated qualitative data about the team dynamics and team interactions of the selected organizations. Following the first phase of data collection and analysis, I proceeded to use the quantitative research method of Surveys/Questionnaires (Study 2). The multi-source, cross-sectional and pre-coded online survey was created based on the research findings from the first qualitative study, and was designed to quantitatively test and validate the hypotheses and theoretical model that emerged from the qualitative theory generation. A detailed explanation of the specific data collection approach for each study has been outlined in Chapter 4 (Study 1) and Chapter 8 (Study 2) respectively.

Data Analysis

The qualitative data collection was followed by data analysis, involving the ‘coding’ of the interview data, which is a process of data reorganization and recontextualization (Tesch, 1990) within a theoretical frame of reference, in order to generate new theories, insights and research findings (Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004). According to the grounded theory approach, data coding takes place in three phases – open, axial and selective (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) – and these three coding methods create “a framework for conducting systematic data analysis” (Dey, 2004, pg. 84 in Seale et al., 2004). “Open Coding refers to a preliminary process of ‘breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing and categorizing data’ (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61). Axial Coding involves ‘a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making connections

between categories' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 96). And Selective Coding involves 'selecting the core category, systematically relating it to other categories, and filling in categories that need further refinement and development' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 116)" (Dey, 2004, pg. 81 in Seale et al., 2004). Examples of core categories in the selective coding phase include causality, classification, process, strategy, etc. (Glaser, 1978; Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004); and this final phase deepens and enriches "the analysis, while also forming a framework around which to weave a story-line" for the entire research project (Dey, 2004, pg. 85 in Seale et al., 2004).

Hence, in this way, the qualitative data analysis process moved from 'open' to 'axial' to 'selective' coding (Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004), resulting in the emergence of primary, secondary and tertiary themes within the data analysis; which in turn, finally, led to the creation of a thematic network of important research findings related to the research topic (Skovdal & Cornish, 2015). With regards to the doctoral research project, it must also be noted that the contrasts/variations in the chosen sampling approach and triangulation in the chosen data collection approach, in turn, led to contrasts/variations in the analyzed data/research insights; thus, resulting in methodologically sound academic findings, and representativeness and generalizability of the data collected and analyzed. The thematic higher order codes generated from the qualitative data analysis led to the creation of an inductive theoretical model, that emerged out of the empirical insights from the qualitative data collection.

Overall, I used the Tabula Geminus (or 'twin slate') approach (Kreiner, 2016) of Grounded Theory to conduct abductive data collection and analysis (as opposed to the Gioia approach – tabula rasa or 'blank slate' – to generate grounded theory) (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) in Study 1 (Murphy et al., 2017). "The Tabula Geminus—or "twin slate"—approach shares many of the same assumptions as the Gioia approach, with the primary difference being that the twin slate approach allows for the early integration of existing literature and informant-generated themes" (Murphy et al., 2017, pg. 295). This approach has been discussed by several grounded theorists (such as Locke, 2015; Van Maanen et al., 2007), and was formalized recently by Kreiner (2016) (Murphy et al., 2017). This efficient and effective "both/and" strategy "allows researchers to readily establish a research focus in a project without becoming overwhelmed by every single piece of datum, each of which may seem equally important if all prior theory is deliberately excluded during data collection and analysis" and it also ensures that "the theoretical model that emerges is impactful in that it stands a particularly strong chance of impacting ongoing scholarly conversations, in contrast to "silo-style" grounded theories that are novel but may be disconnected from prior work" (Murphy et al., 2017, pg. 295-296). The twin-slate approach to grounded theory has been widely accepted in management literature and has been featured in several publications in top-tier management journals (eg: Moss et al., 2021), across both the micro- (eg: Hollensbe et al., 2008; Kreiner et al., 2006; Treviño et al., 2014) and macro- (eg: Kreiner et al., 2015; Smith et al., 2010) levels of organizational research (Murphy et al., 2017).

Further, the inductive theoretical model that emerged in Study 1 was used as the basis to create the hypotheses and model pathways that were tested and validated through the second quantitative study. A multi-source, cross-sectional and pre-coded online survey was carefully designed in order to get the appropriate data from a representative data set. The quantitative data collected was then analysed through descriptive statistics, correlation and

regression analysis in SPSS, and mediation analysis using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013). A detailed explanation of the specific data analysis strategy for each study has been outlined in Chapter 4 (Study 1) and Chapter 8 (Study 2) respectively.

Hence, grounded in the mixed methods approach of inductive data collection and data analysis outlined above, the doctoral dissertation aims to make valuable academic and practical research contributions to the fields of leadership development, social enterprise development and team centric research, in the unique context of team/collective leadership development in startup social enterprises in India.

3.2) METHODOLOGICAL RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS

While there are several examples of top-quality entrepreneurship studies that have used a qualitative research methodology, scholars have also highlighted that in the past, quantitative research studies published outweighed qualitative research papers, and secondary research (review or synthesis of extant literature) was often the key data source, even though it may not have always been a better data collection approach in all cases (Ireland et al., 2005). Further, scholars and top journals in the management domain have encouraged future researchers to use more qualitative approaches and mixed research methods in order to build and test inductive theories across the fields of social entrepreneurship development, leadership development and team development (Gupta et al., 2020; Mathieu et al., 2017; Ireland et al., 2005; Gephart, 2004). Hence, the doctoral thesis directly contributes to these methodological research needs by using an effective mixed methods research methodology (with a strong qualitative research base) and it also has a solid primary research foundation, given the rich data collected from different research participant groups. Further, scholars have highlighted the need for more multi-process and multi-level research to be conducted across the domains of social entrepreneurship, leadership and team-centric literature (Fischer et al., 2017; Mathieu et al., 2017; Lord et al., 2016; Battilana and Lee, 2014). The doctoral thesis also directly responds to these research needs. The dissertation comprises of multi-level data analysis, at the individual and dyadic level (leader/follower), team/group level and firm/venture level, and also presents an inductive three-path (multi-process) model exploring the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of startup social ventures (outlined in Chapter 7). Finally, considering team-level leadership in early stage social enterprises is a topic that is greatly under-explored, and the fact that top management journals have expressed an interest in studies that use impact centric variables to connect entrepreneurship/management research to social outcomes (Tihanyi, 2020; George, 2016; Ireland et al., 2005), the thesis once again makes a unique research contribution by considering social impact performance as an important outcome variable when researching the effect of Team Level Leadership on the success, performance and outcomes of early stage social enterprises in India.

In sum, as outlined in this Methodology section, the doctoral dissertation aims to make unique research contributions to the academic fields of 1) Social Entrepreneurship Development; 2) Team Centric Leadership Development; and 3) Team Centric Research, by using a mixed methods approach to apply a unique research lens and context of Team Level Leadership Development in Early Stage Social Enterprises in India. An outline of the ethical

considerations (with regards to data collection) of the doctoral dissertation can be found in Appendix H.

3.3) OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

The first three chapters (Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology) thus far have provided an in-depth background and explanation about the research topic and context, extant research gaps and scope for theoretical contributions, as well as, the methodological approach followed in this doctoral dissertation. Before moving to the next chapters which report the research findings across both the qualitative and quantitative studies (Chapters 4 – 8), Figure 3 provides a summary and overview of the doctoral dissertation research framework below:




Figure 3: Overview and summary of the doctoral dissertation research framework

Chapter 4

INTRODUCTION TO THE QUALITATIVE STUDY AND FINDINGS FROM THE STUDY – PART 1 –

Introduction, Methodology, Antecedents and Leadership Processes

The following four chapters (Chapter 4-7) will introduce, report and discuss the research findings from the qualitative data analysis of Study 1, and each chapter will be connected to a specific aspect (sub-section) of the overall dissertation research question. In Chapter 4, I will first outline the methodology and research design used for Study 1, for qualitative data collection and analysis. Second, I will provide an overview of the profile of the 30 organizations that were interviewed as part of the data collection (to provide a framework for startup data categorization) and third, I will outline the qualitative research findings related to the specific research angle of the characteristics and antecedents of team level leadership in startup social enterprise teams in India. Chapter 4 will present the qualitative research findings that are related to the first sub-research question of the dissertation:

What are the antecedents and characteristics of team leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprise teams?

In Chapters 5 and 6, I will outline the qualitative findings related to the research angles of team level processes and team/venture level outcomes of team/collective level leadership in startup social enterprises respectively. Within each qualitative findings chapter, the emergent theoretical constructs will be reported and illustrated in detail and each construct explanation will feature a construct definition (in relation to extant literature), qualitative findings about that construct in the interviews, quotes from founders and team members that illustrate the findings, as well as, a brief overview of how that construct is linked to the overall inductive narrative (a detailed explanation about linkages and relationships between constructs can be found in Chapter 7). Finally, in Chapter 7, I will tie all the research findings across the chapters together and will discuss the overall inductive narrative and the emergent theoretical model about the characteristics, antecedents and team/venture level outcomes of team level leadership in startup social enterprises in India.

4.1) METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN FOR STUDY 1 (QUALITATIVE RESEARCH)

Drawing inspiration from school of thought that advocates that more management theories must emerge from the East (Barkema et al., 2015) and given that the research question (particularly in the Indian context) has been greatly underexplored in academic literature, Study 1 has focused on theory generation and elaboration in the unique domain of Team Level Leadership in early stage social enterprises in India. Theory generation and elaboration are further justified because a recent review of leadership development literature by Day and Dragoni (2015) revealed that support mechanisms and conditions that aid different/novel types of leadership development is a topic that is underexplored and there is a need for 'construct definition and theory building' in this domain. Adopting a grounded theory and inductive or 'back tracking' research approach (Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004;

Fischer et al., 2017), the primary research undertaken adopted an appropriate inductive qualitative research methodology (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2008) in order to answer the three sub-research questions, as outlined in Chapter 1.

Data Collection

As a part of the first study, I conducted the qualitative data collection in India and interviewed 87 research participants, which included founders and team members (including second line and third line leaders) from across 30 Indian startup social enterprises. From each organization, I interviewed the founder, along with 1-3 team members, (depending on the size of the team), covering 2-4 individuals per organization. All the startup social enterprises that were selected as part of the data sample had at least, a minimum of 2-3 team members, and the sample included a mix of very small teams (2-5 people), medium sized teams (5-15 people), large teams (15-30 people) and a few cases of very large teams (30+ people, in organizations at a slightly more advanced early scale/scale stage). The life stage of the organizations in the sample ranged from very early startup stage (0-2 years) to medium-term growth stage (2-5 years) to early scale/scale stage (5-7 years); with two additional examples of more advanced social enterprises (8-10 years). The organization sample base featured important contrasts/variations in terms of impact sector, organizational model/legal structure, team size, team composition/background, number of co-founders, leadership structures, organizational life stage, as well as, organizational performance. I included a wide range of case variation and contrasts in order to be able identify common themes that were generalizable across different types of startup social enterprises, and I also included organizations at different life stages and different levels of growth/performance, in order to be able to differentiate how various leadership and team processes affected team/venture outcomes and performance, over a period of time, across different types of social ventures.

The interview questionnaire featured 15-20 semi structured questions and the questions were constructed based on the key themes related to the research topic and were also shaped and informed to some extent, by the thematic literature review that was done prior to the data collection. Before designing the interview questionnaire, I conducted a preliminary literature review to identify research gaps in the fields of social entrepreneurship development, leadership development and team development – following the ‘twin-slate’ approach to grounded theory (Murphy et al., 2017; Kreiner, 2016). Based on the broad research gaps identified, I crafted semi-structured questions that aimed to inductively explore broad topics related to team formation and composition, leadership processes, team processes, team outcomes and trajectories of venture performance, in startup social enterprises. During each specific interview, I further improvised and asked follow-up questions to the participants, depending on their answers, in order to have an inductive exploratory approach and to gather as much qualitative data and insight as possible. The interviews were conducted either in person in Mumbai or on the phone/via Skype for research participants that were based outside of Mumbai and each interview was approximately 45 minutes – 1 hour long. The full interview questionnaire can be found in Appendix A. Sample transcripts of interviews with a team member (of an average/high growth enterprise) and a founder (of a low/stagnated growth or failed enterprise) can be found in Appendices B and C respectively. In addition to the interviews, I also conducted participant observation and context immersion by attending the team meetings of a few organizations and tried to conduct the interviews at the on-site office locations of the startups in Mumbai (where possible). This immersive approach was adopted in order obtain valuable

context specific insights about team dynamics, non-verbal or implicit cues about team behaviour and visual observations of the work environment of the startup teams being interviewed. I visited the office locations and observed the work environment and team dynamics of 10 social startups, out of the 30 startup teams in the qualitative data set (the rest of the startups either did not have their own dedicated office space or were based outside of Mumbai). I recorded the explicit and implicit observations made during such context immersion experiences (as well as, observations made during the semi-structured interviews) through hand-written field notes.

Hence, through the combination of semi structured interviews and participant observation/context immersion, I gathered meaningful qualitative data from a rich, diverse and large data set of startup social enterprises in India. The design and process flow of the qualitative study has been summarized in the Table 3 below:

ITEM	DESCRIPTION
Location	○ Mumbai/Phone/Skype (Outstation Interviewees) ○ UnLtd India Office/Social Enterprise Office/Cafés
Duration	○ 5 weeks (on-site)
Data Collection	○ <u>Semi Structured Interviews</u>: In Person and Phone/Skype (for outstation interviewees and individuals who were unable to meet in person) ○ <u>Participation Observation/Context Immersion</u>: Attending/observing team meetings of selected organizations and visiting the office locations and work environment of a few startup teams
Data Observation and Recording	○ All participant interviews were recorded on an audio device. ○ Team meeting observations were recorded through hand written field notes ○ The interviews lasted for approx. 45 minutes – 1 hour each. ○ I also wrote hand-written notes during all the interviews, to highlight interesting insights or responses from the research participants
Number of Research Participant Organizations	○ 30 social enterprises (early stage to early scale) that are a part of the UnLtd India incubation network ○ <i>The participant list was created in consultation with the UnLtd India team (in order to get the best possible variation amongst the startups) and based my own past interactions with some of the selected social enterprises.</i>
Number of Interviewees per organization	○ 2-4 interviewees per organization (on average, 3 interviewees per enterprise) ○ <i>Interviewees include the founder(s) and team members (including second and third line leaders)</i>
Sample Contrast and Variation	○ Impact sector (health, education, environment, etc.) ○ Organizational model/legal structure (for-profit, non-profit, hybrid) ○ Team size (a minimum of at least 2-3 team members) ○ Team composition/background (students, community workers,

	corporate/development professionals, etc.) ○ Leadership structures (formal/informal) ○ Organizational life stage (pilot/ideation to early scale stage) ○ Organizational performance (average growth, high growth, low/stagnated growth, failure/shut down)

Table 3: Data Collection Design and Process Flow for Study 1 (Qualitative Research)

Data Analysis

Following semi structured interviews, as well as, participation observation/context immersion, with the research participants, the research data was analysed using thematic coding in order to connect the emergent findings with existing relevant literature (Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Charmaz, 2008; Huang & Pearce, 2015). I used the research support software NVivo for the coding procedure, accompanied by the complementary process of iterative memo writing (using Microsoft Word). In the first stage of open coding or first cycle coding, the interview transcripts were examined and analysed through a combination of grammatical coding methods, which focus on the categories, attributes and basic features of the data; as well as, elemental coding methods, which create focused coding filters to set the foundation for second cycle coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Saldaña, 2015). The various first cycle coding methods that were used have been outlined below (as described in Saldaña, 2015):

Grammatical Methods

- Attribute Coding – Creating codes based on basic organizational features
- Simultaneous Coding – Coding multiple themes across the same data set/section
- Sub-coding – Organizing and categorising data and emergent codes

Elemental Methods

- Structural coding – Creating codes based on the specific interview questions or themes
- Descriptive coding – Creating labels and summaries to enable code indexing
- Process coding – Creating codes based on processes, action constructs and ‘ing’ words/verbs
- In Vivo coding – Using the exact language of the research participants as codes
- Causation coding – Identifying conceptual pathways

Even though several coding methods were used, the coding approaches that emerged to be the most important were Process Coding, Causation Coding and In Vivo Coding. Given that the thesis research topic focuses on the study of team and leadership centric processes, antecedents and outcomes, the methods of process coding and causation coding can be considered to be the most relevant for this line of enquiry. Further, since the doctoral dissertation adopts an inductive grounded theory approach, the method of In Vivo coding appropriately captured the emergent insights from the field in the voice of the research participants themselves. Overall, the coding methods used a *process* study approach, in order to explore *how* important processes related to team-level leadership emerged, developed and influenced team/firm outcomes in startup social ventures; as well as, a *variance* study approach to understand why the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes

of team-level leadership processes varied across different types of social ventures (based on venture performance). After the open coding or first cycle coding stage, I moved to the axial coding or second cycle coding stage, where the first cycle codes were summarised, reconfigured and categorised in a more meaningful way, by making connections and linkages between different themes and categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Saldaña, 2015). During this phase, selected interview transcripts were coded multiple times, each time using a different research angle/lens – namely characteristics, antecedents and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social enterprises – with each lens corresponding to the specific sub-research questions. This iterative and cyclical coding process led to the emergent of more focused thematic connections and categories, which in turn led to the final stage of selective coding or synthesis, where the overall codes were organized and synthesised into main thematic categories, relevant sub-categories and a few specific/focused codes under each sub-category (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Saldaña, 2015). Here, it must be noted that “coding is not a precise science; it is primarily an interpretive act” (Saldaña, 2015, pg. 217) and while I followed an inductive coding approach, my own cognitive filters or lenses might have also influenced the specific codes that were selected (Saldaña, 2015). The final list of codes that emerged out of the qualitative data analysis has been outlined in Appendix D.

Alongside the coding process outlined above, I also simultaneously engaged in the qualitative method of analytic memo writing, as part of the ‘process of qualitative enquiry’ (Saldaña, 2015). Analytic memos can also “serve as an additional code-and-category-generating method” and adds further structure and clarity to the coding process (Saldaña, 2015, pg. 54). Multiple such analytic memos were written over a long period of time (featuring my reflections about the thematic categories and codes identified), with each new memo clarifying the data analysis further. In addition to the *process* (and variance) study approach used during the coding stage, the analytic memo writing also used a *variance* study approach, to understand the variation in the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team leadership processes across successful and unsuccessful startup social ventures (to shed light on *why* these factors differed across different types of ventures). Finally, through the iterative process of thematic coding and analytic memo writing (Saldaña, 2015), I began to transition into the domain of theory building and theory generation, which in turn led to the creation of an emergent theoretical model about the characteristics, antecedents and team/venture level outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social enterprise teams in India. The detailed explanation of the inductive model that emerged based on qualitative data analysis can be found in Chapter 7. Thus, overall, the data collection and analysis processes followed were aligned to the classic methods used by researchers to generate grounded theory (subscribing to the methods introduced by Strauss and Corbin in 1990), as illustrated in Figure 4 below:




Figure 4: "An elemental model for developing "classic" grounded theory" (Saldaña, 2015, pg. 56)

Through the data collection and data analysis methods (rooted in the ‘twin-slate’ approach to grounded theory – Murphy et al., 2017; Kreiner, 2016) outlined above, Study 1 laid the foundation for the doctoral research project by outlining the characteristics of team-level leadership processes/models that can be found across different startup social ventures (with contrasting findings between high growth/successful and low growth/unsuccessful ventures), as well as, the related team and organizational factors and processes that contribute to the emergence, development and outcomes of this team-level leadership approach in early stage social ventures. Hence, the qualitative study applied a *leadership development lens* and adopted a combination of both *process* and *variance study approaches*, at the *team level*, in order to answer the three sub-research questions of the doctoral dissertation about characteristics, antecedents and outcomes of team leadership in startup social ventures.

4.2) INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH FINDINGS IN STUDY 1

The qualitative research findings that emerged from the data coding process were categorized in a comparative manner (*variance study approach*) according to the growth/success level of the startup social enterprises in the qualitative data set; in order to understand how and why the antecedents, characteristics and team/venture level outcomes of Team Level Leadership differed between successful and unsuccessful startup social ventures. The organizations were divided into four main categories – High Growth, Average Growth, Low/Stagnated Growth and Failure (Shut Down) – which will be explained in the section below. These categories were defined in accordance with the widely accepted performance standards in the startup and social enterprise industry and reflect the startup’s

capability and performance in terms of delivering their products/services/programmes to their intended customer/beneficiary group as well as, attracting the necessary resources (human/financial/social capital) required to run an organization effectively. Examples of such social startup performance criteria include growth in terms of the number of customers and beneficiaries, funding sources and income, team size and team retention rate, impact outputs and outcomes (in line with the organizational theory of change); as well as, growth in terms of location/market expansion, strategic partners and advisors, product/program diversity, to name a few. These industry accepted performance standards are also in line with widely used academic scales in the management domain about firm performance. The four levels of social venture performance, that have been used to categorize the participant ventures, are based on the items in the firm performance scale for small and medium sized businesses by Wiklund and Shepherd (2003) – which was further adapted to accommodate the impact goals that are unique to startup social ventures. This adapted scale was also used as part of the quantitative study (Study 2) and can be found in the full scale list in Appendix F.

For the purpose of simple reporting and ease of data analysis, the four categories were combined into two main brackets related to the overall success or failure of the organizations – namely, High/Average Growth Cases (Success) and Low Growth/Shut Down Cases (Failure). I placed the organizations in the qualitative data set into these respective categories based on answers to performance related questions from respondents in the interviews, through insights from the partner incubator UnLtd India and through a review of publicly accessible information about the startups available on social media platforms, through electronic news articles and directly on the organizational websites. My past experience of working directly with the incubatees in the UnLtd India network and my knowledge of how some of the organizations have performed over time have also informed my decisions for the process of startup categorization.

Table 4 below provides an overview of the 30 organizations in the qualitative data set, in terms of the number of organizations in the various different categories – related to organizational characteristics of growth stage, team size, number of founders/co-founders, organizational model, primary impact sector, as well as, organizational life stage and level of performance. The ‘growth stage’ of a venture refers to the growth/success of an organization in terms of it’s social impact creation, financial sustainability and growth in team size and this category has been divided into four sub-categories – high growth (large scale success), average growth, (moderate success), low/stagnated growth (slow/poor performance) and failed venture (paused or shut down core operations). The category of ‘team size’ indicates the number of full-time and part-time team members in the organization (including the founders) and includes four sub-categories – small (2-5 people), medium (5-15 people), large (15-30 people) and very large (30+ people). The category of ‘number of founders/co-founders’ indicates the number of individuals who started/are running the ventures as a co-founding team, and includes three sub-categories – single founder, two co-founders and three co-founders. Even though the data set included single founder and multi-co founder teams, all the ventures had one clear CEO, who was the main person in charge of the organization, and most of the founder-focused insights in the following chapters will relate to the founder/co-founder who is the CEO of the organizations. The ‘organizational life stage’ category indicates the number of years that venture has operated for (years of existence) and this category includes four sub-categories – early stage (0-2 years), medium term (3-5

years), early scale/scale stage (6-7 years) and advanced stage (8-10 years). The category of 'organizational model' indicates the legal form and/or business model of the ventures and includes three sub-categories – non-profit, for-profit and hybrid (both for-profit and non-profit) organizational models. Finally, the category of 'primary impact sector' indicates the main/primary impact sector connected to the core intervention of the ventures (organizations may create impact in more than one sector) and includes nine sub-categories – Healthcare, Environment, Agriculture, Education, Livelihoods, Youth Development, Skill Development, Women Empowerment and Affordable Housing.

As outlined below, there is a good spread of organizations across most categories, which provided enough variation to compare and contrast the cases, in order to generate generalizable inferences and insights across the different categories. It must be noted that categorization given below is based on the state of the ventures at the time of the qualitative data analysis, and the state/stage of the organizations may have changed/evolved since that time. The findings reported in Chapters 4-7 include quotes and examples from all 30 organizations in the data set, and I have referenced examples from each and every venture (anonymously) in one or more sections of the chapters ahead. A detailed (anonymous) breakdown of all the ventures (with information about every venture and the organizational characteristic categories) can be found in Appendix E.

ORG. CHARACTERISTICS	CATEGORY	NO. OF ORGS IN THIS CATEGORY
GROWTH STAGE <i>(with regards to Social Impact Creation, Financial Sustainability and Team Growth)</i>	High Growth <i>(Large Scale Success)</i>	15
	Average Growth <i>(Moderate Success)</i>	8
	Low/Stagnated Growth <i>(Slow/Poor Performance)</i>	5
	Failed Venture <i>(Paused or Shut Down)</i>	2
TEAM SIZE <i>(includes full-time and extended/part-time team members)</i>	Small <i>(2-5 people)</i>	10
	Medium <i>(5-15 people)</i>	14
	Large <i>(15-30 people)</i>	2
	Very Large <i>(30+ people)</i>	4
NUMBER OF FOUNDERS/ CO-FOUNDERS <i>(All teams had one clear CEO)</i>	1 Founder	14
	2 Co-Founders	12
	3 Co-Founders	4
ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE STAGE <i>(Years of operation)</i>	Early Stage <i>(0-2 years)</i>	5
	Medium Term <i>(3-5 years)</i>	16
	Early Scale/Scale <i>(6-7 years)</i>	7
	Advanced <i>(8-10 years)</i>	2

ORG. CHARACTERISTICS	CATEGORY	NO. OF ORGS IN THIS CATEGORY
ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL <i>(Legal/Business Model)</i>	Non-Profit	9
	For-Profit	15
	Hybrid <i>(both for-profit and non-profit structure)</i>	6
PRIMARY IMPACT SECTOR <i>(Primary sector of intervention)</i>	Healthcare	3
	Environment	7
	Agriculture	5
	Education	4
	Skill Development	2
	Youth Development	3
	Livelihoods	3
	Women Empowerment	2
	Affordable Housing	1

Table 4: Categorization of the 30 organizations in the data set for the qualitative study

The following section of this chapter will outline the qualitative research findings related to the specific research angle of the characteristics and antecedents of team-level leadership (related to the first sub-research question, as outlined in Chapter 1) in startup social enterprise teams in India. There are four main constructs or categories that will be discussed in this chapter, with each construct/category having further sub-categories that form a part of the overall inductive narrative. The first two constructs focus on the antecedents, while the latter two concepts focus on the characteristics of team-level leadership in startup social ventures. The data analysis revealed that first and foremost, a Congruence in the Social Cause Passion between the founder/leader and the team member (and in turn, social cause passion congruence in the team as a whole) was the main pre-antecedent and anchoring construct that led to the emergence and creation of a strong Dyadic Relationship between the founder/leader and the team member (characterized by leader empowerment behaviour, follower proactive behaviour and founder-member mutual trust). This strong Founder-Member relationship (based on Empowering Leadership) was, in turn, the antecedent that contributed to the emergence of Team Level Leadership in successful startup social ventures. It was discovered that leadership model that was practiced across average/high growth teams was very team-centric in nature and was characterised by the features of a Shared Leadership (SL) model (Team/Collective Level Leadership). However, it was also found that this SL model was most effective when it was balanced by the practice of Paradoxical Leadership (a balance of control and stretch mechanisms in the team) by the founder/leaders in the social venture teams. An overview of the four constructs that will be outlined in this chapter can be found in Figure 5 below (the full three-path model will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 7):




Figure 5: Antecedents and Leadership Processes in the Inductive Three-Path Model

4.3) Social Cause Passion (SCP)

Construct Definition

The new inductive construct of Social Cause Passion (SCP), which emerged out of the qualitative data analysis, builds on the existing individual level concept of ‘passion for a cause’ which is defined as “a strong inclination toward a self-defining cause that is loved and valued, and in which people invest a significant amount of time and energy” (in the context of volunteering) (St-Louis et al., 2016, pg. 263). However, the new construct of SCP differs from ‘passion for a cause’ in two very clear ways.

First, while ‘passion for a cause’ is an individual level concept in the domain of social psychology and personality literature, SCP is a multi-level construct, more relevant to organizational behaviour and social entrepreneurship literature, and it can manifest itself at the individual, dyadic, team, as well as, organizational level (as found in the interview data). Second, it is not a self defined cause for the purpose of volunteering, but instead focuses on the specific social cause of the startup social venture. Hence, this dissertation defines the new focused construct of SCP as *a strong sense of identification with and conviction for the specific social cause of the startup social venture, and this positive feeling of social cause passion manifests itself in a multi-level way across the individual, dyadic, team and venture level.*

Despite the differences outlined above, SCP is still conceptually related to the individual level personality-related concept of ‘passion for a cause’, which has two dimensions – harmonious and obsessive passion (Vallerand et al., 2003; St-Louis et al., 2016). “Harmonious passion (HP) emerges from an autonomous internalization of an activity in

one's identity" and "takes place when a person engages in the passionate activity with a feeling of choice and without any contingencies attached to it" (St-Louis et al., 2016, pg. 263). Hence, by engaging with HP, individuals (typically volunteers) experience positive outcomes, in terms of favourable effects on "task satisfaction, well-being, and health" (St-Louis et al., 2016, pg. 263). On the other hand, "obsessive passion (OP) derives from a controlled internalization of the activity in the person's identity" and it "occurs when the individual feels an uncontrollable urge to partake in the activity that he or she loves" (St-Louis et al., 2016, pg. 264). Hence, given the pressure associated with the activity in terms of self-worth or social acceptance, individuals and volunteers who engage with OP typically experience negative outcomes in terms of unfavourable effects on their health and well-being. Connecting these dimensions back to the qualitative research findings, SCP is closely related to HP given the fact that individuals (leaders and team members) make the conscious decision to continually engage with their focused passion for the social cause of the startup social venture. Further, similar to the outcomes of HP, the data analysis revealed that one of the ultimate team level outcomes of SCP (given the presence of other mediating and moderating factors) is the positive mental well being of team members (discussed in depth in Chapter 6 and 7); and hence, it can be said that SCP is a manifestation of HP in the context of startup social ventures.

The construct of SCP also draws inspiration from the team level concept of Team Entrepreneurial Passion (TEP) in the entrepreneurship literature. TEP is defined as the level of "shared intense positive feelings for a collective team identity" (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 285) and it is specifically focused on new venture teams (NVTs), comprising of individuals who are "chiefly responsible for the strategic decision making and ongoing operations" of new ventures (Klotz et al., 2014, pg. 288 in Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 283). Given the explicit focus on NVTs and a collective team identity, the construct of TEP is extremely relevant to the unique context of startup social ventures. The manifestation of TEP in a team varies on two levels: Passion Focus Variety and Passion Intensity Separation (Cardon et al., 2017). Passion Focus Variety refers to two possible types of TEP based collective identities existing within a team – monofocal or polyfocal TEP (Cardon et al., 2017). A new venture team with a monofocal shared identity has a primary/main role identity that it is passionate about, while a team with a polyfocal shared identity can have several distinct role identities and thus, can be passionate about multiples different objects or activities (Cardon et al., 2017). On the other hand, Passion Intensity Separation indicates the varying degrees of shared passion among individual team members and is caused by the "dispersion in the level of activation of emotion experienced by team members" (Cardon et al., 2017). Different team contexts can lead to different combinations of passion focus variety and passion intensity separation, thus resulting in varying levels of TEP emergence across startup teams (Cardon et al., 2017). For example, NVTs that have collective passion diversity that is low in focus variety and intensity separation will form and experience monofocal TEP, while teams having collective passion diversity that is high in focus variety but low in intensity separation will exhibit polyfocal TEP (Cardon et al., 2017). Conversely, teams with collective passion diversity that is both high in focus variety and intensity separation, may not develop TEP at all, because in turbulent team environments with "high levels of turnover or conflict, team members would likely not have the opportunity to share their individual identities and affect with each other" and hence, such team environments would not be conducive to the emergence of TEP (Cardon et al., 2017, pg. 289-290). Hence, in this way, variation in the types and levels of TEP emergence can influence team culture, processes and performance over time (Cardon et al., 2017) and

therefore, it is an important construct to take into account when examining startup development and performance. While the emergence and influence of TEP may vary across the different life/growth stages of a venture, the early startup stage is of particular importance for TEP development, because extant research has showed that TEP emergence is most likely to start at the early stage of a venture, when the team is first formed and when they first interact together (Cardon et al., 2017).

Drawing from the concept of Entrepreneurial Passion, SCP can be similarly conceptually categorized as a multilevel and multi pronged 'construct' related to Emotion/Feeling operating at the individual, dyadic, team and organizational level (Cardon et al., 2009). Different combinations of Entrepreneurial Passion and TEP levels interacting with types of entrepreneur and team profiles lead to different venture paths, processes and outcomes for different organisations (Cardon et al., 2009). Similarly, the concept of SCP can be applied to the startup social enterprise context to examine how the different combinations of SCP levels and team leadership profiles can lead to different social venture paths, processes and outcomes for the startup impact ventures. However, SCP also clearly differs from TEP in three clear ways. First, SCP has an explicit focus on the social cause of startup social venture (rather than general entrepreneurial passion in the case of TEP). Second, TEP is purely a team level construct, while SCP is a multi-level construct that manifests itself across the individual, dyadic, team and venture level. Finally, SCP is inherently typically monofocal in nature (while TEP can also be polyfocal) given the dedicated passion for the social cause of the startup venture. This monofocal nature of SCP also distinguishes this new construct from the existing concept of pro-social motivation, which can be defined as an individual's "desire to expend effort to benefit other people" (Grant, 2008, pg. 49). Similar to the concept of passion for a cause, pro-social motivation is also a general individual level inclination towards creating social impact, while SCP is a more specific, typically monofocal and multi-level construct that is focused on the clearly defined social cause of the startup social venture. However, it must be noted that some social enterprises create dual or triple impact related to more than one social cause because of the nature of their social business model – for example, one of the social startups in the qualitative data set creates meaningful jobs for a marginalized community by employing them to produce an environmentally sustainable product, and hence creates dual impact connected to the social causes of livelihood generation and environmental sustainability. In such cases, founders and team members may have polyfocal SCP, which can lead to the potential danger of having split priorities and motivations within the team, which in turn can create a lack of convergence about the social cause passion in the team. This lack of convergence or incongruence of SCP within the team can in turn have a negative effect on the team/venture level outcomes of the startup social venture (as observed in the interview data). Hence, in such cases, it is extremely important for the founder to communicate the social vision of the venture as a single coherent mission statement that integrates all the impact areas and social causes together, so that the SCP, in this case, is connected to overall social vision of the startup social venture (thus becoming more monofocal in nature and in turn leading to more favorable outcomes at the team/venture level).

Five Dimensions of Social Cause Passion (SCP)

The qualitative data analysis revealed that SCP in startup social venture teams features 5 key dimensions – namely, SCP Intensity, Congruence, Embeddedness, Resilience and Spillover. This chapter will focus only on the first two dimensions, SCP Intensity and

Congruence, as antecedent constructs for the entire inductive narrative. SCP Embeddedness will be discussed as a mediating team process in Chapter 5 and SCP Resilience and Spillover will be discussed as team level outcomes in Chapter 6. The overview of the five SCP dimensions have been given in Figure 6 below:




Figure 6: Five Dimensions of Social Cause Passion (SCP)

a) Social Cause Passion Intensity –

SCP Intensity was first observed at the individual level of the founder/leader and team member and can be defined as the degree of intensity of the leader or follower's individual passion for the social cause and collective vision of the organization. This is the starting point of the inductive theoretical model and the anchoring theme of the entire inductive narrative. A high degree of SCP Intensity was observed at the individual leader/follower level typically due to three main reasons –

- A personal connection with the social cause
- An educational training and/or professional background that is directly related to the social cause, and/or
- A general social exposure to/general strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture.

First, the founder and/or the team member had a high degree of SCP intensity if he/she has a strong personal connection to the specific social cause of the startup social venture, due to past experiences of significance (could be positive/motivational or negative/traumatic) in his/her/their personal life that are directly related to that specific social cause. For example, one of the interviews revealed that the founder of a social venture, focused on mental health and wellbeing for caregivers, has a high degree of SCP Intensity for the cause because she, herself, was a caregiver for someone who was close to her, in the past, and she wanted to improve the lives of

other caregivers like her in the country. She was also a trained psychologist by profession which further strengthened her SCP Intensity.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So I’m a counselling and health psychologist; so by education, I’m a psychologist. And I’ve always sort of wanted to make some sort of difference in people’s lives, that’s always been a priority for me. And psychology was interesting, which is why it happened. Otherwise, it was a toss between social work and psychology for me. And in terms of [the venture] happening, it was through my own personal experience of being a caregiver for someone with alcoholism. So that was tough & interesting and I wanted to do something for caregivers and family members of people who suffer from alcoholism. But then, the idea sort of grew from there and I didn’t want to limit it to just alcoholism. It actually started out just from there and it just became really big (laughs). I didn’t expect it to become so big.” – Founder</i>	Founder of a mental health venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Intensity due to a personal connection with the social cause

Table 5: Illustrative Quote for High SCP Intensity

Similarly, the co-founder of another social enterprise, working on affordable housing for low-income communities, revealed that one of the core members in his team had a high degree of SCP Intensity because he himself came from a low-income rural community and his personal background was representative of the customer target segment of the venture; and hence, he was dedicated to the social cause of the organization, because he wanted to create a better standard of living for himself and his community in the future.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“..There was a person named [team member], so he was the site engineer. So he was very much active and he used to take a lot of initiatives on his own, so he was a very young person, the youngest amongst the team. He was very enthusiastic about the work, what we were doing, and he used to take initiatives and come up with various ideas or feedback based on the site situations or the place he has to visit...Because I think – personally I think he came from a rural background and he had seen people living in such conditions, horrible conditions, so I personally feel that he had a thing within himself to change the way these people lived. That is why he put an extra effort to do more things.” – Co-Founder</i>	Co-Founder of an affordable housing venture (speaking about a team member in that venture) – illustrating a high degree of SCP Intensity due to a personal connection with the social cause

Table 6: Illustrative Quote for High SCP Intensity

Second, the founder and/or the team member had a high degree of SCP intensity if his/her/their educational and/or professional background was directly or closely related to the impact-centric focus area of the startup social venture. For example, one of the interviews with a founder of a social enterprise focused on training paramedical professionals in the field of healthcare and development of low income

children with developmental disabilities, had a high degree of SCP Intensity because she was a child psychologist herself by training and profession.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So I completed my Masters in Clinical Psychology and I started working as a psychologist with children, and worked with a lot of underprivileged children, children who stayed in foster care and remand homes. And then I wanted to do a lot of work with the clinical population, that’s children with developmental disorders, which is how I started working with the child development center. And later on realized that the bigger problem is that they are not enough professionals to train, to work in this sector, because the number of children with developmental disorders are increasing and the number of trained people are not there, even in a state like Maharashtra or a city like Mumbai, which is the most developed cities of India. And that’s when I decided that I do not want to function more as a clinician as much as a trainer to others so that whatever knowledge I have gathered in working with these children, I need to now start disseminating it to other people who can become the next line of teachers or trainers for these children and that’s how I started the foundation with the vision that the first goal is going to be training and capacity building of people who may not necessarily be paramedical professionals, because that’s a resource-expensive setup but at least get teachers or parents or social workers, or people who are interested generally in helping children; get them to become a part of this group of trainers and facilitators of the children.” – Founder</i>	Founder of a healthcare education venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Intensity due to an educational training and/or professional background that is directly related to the social cause

Table 7: Illustrative Quote for High SCP Intensity

A similar interview with a team member from another social enterprise, focused on the mental health of caregivers, revealed that she had a high degree of SCP Intensity because she herself was training to be a psychologist and therapist, and based on her own first-hand professional experience in the mental health sector, the social cause and specific focus area of the venture really resonated with her.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I'm currently doing my Master's in Psychology and I came across [the venture] more than a year back. And I had just finished my Bachelor's at that time and I was just going through some internships for the summer and stuff. And I came across [the venture]'s post looking for volunteers and I looked up the website and stuff; and it was dealing with mental health caregivers. Now what I realized is caregivers as a whole is like a very ignored population in mental health/when you look at mental health. Because even when I was interning during my second year, there was a lot of..I don't know, some kind of gap in caregiver knowledge, in terms of how do they deal with their own stress. So I thought, "Why isn't there something like this?" and I didn't ever think about looking it up. But [the venture] just came across and then I approached [the founder] and yeah, things worked out. And then I started working with [the venture]."</i> – Team Member	Team member in a mental health venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Intensity due to an educational training and/or professional background that is directly related to the social cause

Table 8: Illustrative Quote for High SCP Intensity

The third and final reason that a founder or team member displayed a high degree of SCP intensity was because he/she/they had a strong general interest in or social exposure to the specific social cause of the startup social venture (in the form of a hobby, idealistic passion, social exposure, a strong curiosity or sense of admiration related to the social cause of the startup social venture). For example, one of the interviews with a founder of a social enterprise, focused on environmental education for children, revealed that she had a high degree of SCP Intensity because she had been exposed to environmental issues during her Master's degree, which resulted in her taking up upcycling of household products as a hobby, which in turn solidified her passion for the environment and ultimately led her to start her own environment focused social venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"So basically, I've studied Finance & Business; but while I was studying in the UK for my Master's degree, I took a module called 'Entrepreneurship' & my professor was very interested in social enterprises & that's how I first got introduced to the concept of social enterprise. And also in the UK, there's like a huge movement around upcycling; so that's where I kind of looked at a couple of stores where they sold upcycled products & that was the first time I got interested. When I moved back here, I took up a full time job, but also started upcycling over the weekends; & then I just decided to take a plunge & start upcycling full time; and that's how I started the organization."</i> – Founder	Founder of an environment venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Intensity due to a general social exposure to/general strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture

Table 9: Illustrative Quote for High SCP Intensity

Another interview with a core team member of a social enterprise, working to improve the employability skills of low-income youth, revealed that she had a high degree of

SCP Intensity because she herself had witnessed/been exposed to the skill-building programs of the organization while she was a student in college and her admiration for the cause and the work of the startup led her to, first, volunteer for the organization and then ultimately, resulted in her leaving her comfortable corporate job to work for the social venture full time.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I happened to be in the same college where they started working from. I was a part of [college name] and there I was working as a student coordinator. So I was directly interacting with the age groups that [the venture] works for. And like, this program, this entire experiential learning was like a very new thing for me, because in normal colleges there is no question of experiential learning or that kind of exposure that they get in normal college education. And it is one of the premium girls' colleges of [Indian city]. So obviously, this entire program was very very interesting and we really pushed the college also to give an opportunity to the students to become a part of this program, so I kind of knew [the venture] even before joining them. And it's just a coincidence that they have also like known me for almost 3 years before I actually became a full time employee; I was part of the various programs that they organize and sometimes volunteered for them as well. Yeah, so, I could like align myself to the kind of approach that they have. They are an extremely student centric organization, so it's always about the students and how we can improve their exposure and their placement opportunities and their internships. So I think that was the major thing that really attracted me to join this organization. And apart from this; this was like the school and youth experience that I have; I started my career with [well-known corporation]. I was there in their core operations team for almost 6 years; so, I come from a corporate background. And I always wanted to be a part of a social organization and I'm lucky enough to get a chance to do so." – Team Member</i>	Core team member of a skill development venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Intensity due to a general social exposure to/general strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture

Table 10: Illustrative Quote for High SCP Intensity

In contrast, in some low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises, team members were not always directly motivated by the specific social cause of the startup venture. They did not typically have much personal connection, or an educational/professional background directly related to the social cause, or a strong interest/exposure to the specific social issue. Instead, in most cases, they had other self-interest related reasons behind why they joined those social sector organizations or were motivated by their personal pre-existing relationships with the founders of those ventures. Hence, in general, they appeared to have a lower degree of SCP Intensity than team members in more successful ventures. For example, a core team member in a low/stagnated growth social startup, working on income generation for a low-income community, mentioned that she had joined the venture simply because she wanted to get some volunteering experience in the social sector, and did not even know much about the specific social cause before joining the social enterprise.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So, I mean, I am an engineer by education. I always wanted to get into social impact space. However, being from a conventional background I never had the exposure or I had no idea on how things work here or how to go about it, with the career, etcetera, etcetera. So during an event if I came across [the venture], I thought I would volunteer with them for whatever they are working on. It was nothing specific, so I just worked with them for a couple of months and I thought [the venture] has a very good idea, so I really liked it in terms of what they wanted to do. And even they were very much happy to have me in the team on a full-time basis, so that’s actually how I got into [the venture]. Then I did an extensive research of I want to work with this organization or that organization, I mean this is a very good start to get started in the social space.” – Team Member</i>	Core team member of a livelihoods venture – illustrating a low degree of SCP Intensity

Table 11: Illustrative Quote for Low SCP Intensity

While the three reasons discussed above all led to the emergence of a high degree of SCP Intensity at the individual level, the interviews revealed that the passion intensity, which arises from either a personal connection to the social cause and/or an educational/professional background that is directly related to the social cause, is perhaps more powerful in nature (in terms of the level of experienced emotional intensity for the individual and the focused/targeted nature of the SCP and it’s subsequent effects in the workplace); as compared to the passion intensity that arises out of a general social exposure to/general strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture. It is important to note that in some cases, team members joined the startup social ventures because they had a general interest in the social sector and wanted to have jobs/careers that were meaningful with a higher purpose. Given that their passion was quite generic when they joined and not monofocal in terms of the specific social cause of the organization, their initial SCP Intensity might have been low at the beginning. But after working in the organization over time and due to a high degree of SCP Focus Embeddedness in the team (discussed later), they began to develop a more monofocal passion for the social cause of the venture and in turn, transitioned to developing a higher degree of SCP Intensity over time. Hence, SCP Intensity must not be considered a static construct dimension, but rather a dynamic continuum of experienced emotional intensity for the specific social cause, that can change, evolve and reach a higher (or lower) degree of intensity at an individual level, over time. Finally, it must also be noted, that sometimes, a high degree of SCP Intensity can emerge at the individual level due to a combination of the factors listed above.

The analysis of the interviews have revealed that founders/leaders and team members in average or high growth enterprises (success cases) typically had a high degree of SCP Intensity, which acted as an important pre-antecedent that led to the emergence of SCP Congruence in the team, and in turn, contributed to the

development of team level leadership in startup social ventures. On the other hand, founders/leaders or team members in low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises were typically found to have a lower degree of SCP Intensity, which led to a lower level of SCP Congruence in the team and in turn, hindered the emergence of team level leadership in such early stage social enterprises. Thus, the first dimension of SCP Intensity acts an important precursor and antecedent to the second dimension of SCP Congruence, which is discussed in the next point.

b) Social Cause Passion Congruence –

Building on the first dimension of SCP Intensity, the second dimension of SCP Congruence can be defined as the degree of convergence or divergence (congruence or incongruence) of the SCP Intensity, within the team, for the specific impact-centric focus area of the startup social venture. Relating this dimension to the construct of TEP and to the first point of SCP Intensity, SCP Congruence can be considered as the degree of ‘Intensity Separation’ in the team related to the passion for the social cause of the organization (Cardon et al., 2017). Congruence (or incongruence) of SCP occurs first at a dyadic level between a leader/founder and a team member, and then in turn at the group level, within the team as a whole. Similar to the first dimension of SCP Intensity, a high degree of SCP Congruence was observed at the dyadic and/or the group level due to a combination of the following three key reasons –

- A strong shared sense of personal-level connection with the social cause
- A shared educational or professional background that is directly related to the social cause, and/or
- A general shared social exposure to/shared strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture.

It must be noted that a high degree of SCP Congruence can emerge at the dyadic and group level due to a combination of the three factors listed above. While the reason or source of high SCP Intensity can differ between the founders and team members, a strong convergence in their levels of SCP Intensity results in a high degree of SCP Congruence and strong shared passion for the social cause of the startup venture, within the founder-member dyads and in turn, the team as a whole.

The reasons that contribute to the emergence of a high degree of SCP Congruence in the team can be supported through some examples from the interviews conducted. The first reason of shared personal-level connection can be illustrated through the example of an organisation, in the interview data set, that was a community-based social venture, focused on the empowerment and holistic development of low-income youth from that community. The founder and the team members all belonged that to low-income community themselves and having grown up and lived in that community for most of their lives, each of them had a very strong shared personal-level connection to the social cause of the organization. In fact, some of the team members were previous participants of the field outreach programmes that were led by the founder and their stories were inspiring examples of impact, where they completed the full circle of moving from beneficiaries to team members to community leaders. Hence, given this common community bond, there was a strong shared

sense of personal-level connection between the founder and the team members, and within the group as a whole, and this in turn, led to had a high degree of SCP intensity, and in turn SCP congruence, within the team. This shared sense of personal-level connection and subsequent SCP Congruence between the founder and team members, and the group as a whole, has been illustrated through the quotes (from both the founder and a team member) below:

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I belong to a very poor family. I had both my parents, but my mother looked after me. I always wished to be a doctor, to achieve something. But I could not finish my education because of the financial conditions of our family. I also felt that I must do something for the country, but I was not educated...I wished to do something for my community and to give back something to society...These children (team members/fellows) were not able to continue with education. Now they are getting a bit interested. I said that unless you are educated, you will not be able to progress. I tell them a lot about my life. I am not educated at all, and I have absolutely no means of earning. So, I keep telling them how difficult it is for me to earn money, that I am not getting a job. Anywhere, you get a job only if you are educated. They know a lot about my life, my struggles and difficulties...When we have meetings, I keep telling them (team members/fellows), giving examples that even for writing reports, I require help from others. If you are able to do it yourself, then you don't need anyone else and you can then advance further. I am limited here, but you can go further, and bring about a lot of change. This is the way I work, and give a lot of examples. Don't think that you are poor and so you cannot progress. If you use the might of the pen and you use it well, you can go a long way. We have Abdul Kalam Azad who had been our President. He too came from a very poor family and used to study at night under the street lamp. He worked hard and grew to become the President of our country. You could also aspire to do so. One of us can also get there." – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a community development venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Congruence due to a strong shared sense of personal-level connection with the social cause
<i>"I also belong to the low-income community. In my childhood, I used to play more, and did not show interest to study. I saw [the organization's] sessions being conducted. I joined that. There, studies were also given importance along with play. They used to teach that just play is not right, education is also required with it. So, with play, I started studying too. In that way, gradually, I saw an improvement in myself. Earlier I used to only play, but now I started studying too. Earlier I used to fail in my results. That improved, and my family members also noticed it, and said, yes this is good. In this manner, I cleared my 10th...With this, later, I started fellowship under [the organization]. They used to get us to the [the organization's] sessions' day trip. I realized the importance that the work that [the founder] was doing, I noticed the improvement in myself, so I thought if I can improve with this interest, then I can help my friends to improve too.</i>	

<i>The group I used to hang out with first, many members were addicted to cigarettes, had foul language, etcetera. They were also not too interested in any studies, and I too was like them. When I noticed an improvement in myself, I thought that I should help my friends too, that they were on the wrong way. That's how I started with a fellowship. I helped them join us. Gradually, this got better. I thought that one person cannot do much, but if some people join, then they can go to different communities and do some good work. Like if we improved, we can help the society to improve too. Similarly, many of my friends got into the fellowship after a few years. And now, we are graduating.” – Team Member</i>	

Table 12: Illustrative Quotes for High SCP Congruence

The second reason for high SCP Congruence, related to a shared education or professional background that is directly related to the social cause, is well illustrated through the example of an organization working towards paramedical training and education, focused on early childhood development of low-income children with developmental disabilities. The founder and most of the team members in this venture were pediatric doctors and child psychologists by training and profession and hence, every person in the team had a very strong and focused passion for the health, wellbeing and holistic development of children from low-income communities. This high level of SCP Intensity experienced by the founder and the team members at an individual level, resulted in a high degree of SCP Congruence at the dyadic and the team level, due to the strong bond of having a shared educational and professional background that was directly related to the social cause of the organization. Even though the business model and core activities of the organization required the team/faculty members to be more student-facing (teaching paramedical courses about early childhood development) rather than having direct interactions with low-income children, the team as a whole learned how to develop their teaching skills and finetuned their intervention approach as an organization, given their common shared sense of purpose and passion for the overall vision of the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“...All of us came from clinical background. When you are dealing with one-on-one, one child in the clinic, one family in the clinic, it's very different than what you do at the institution. Sometimes you can apply some principles of that over here but not all the time. Here you have to use a group approach, a cohesive approach. And so they both [team members] have learned a lot in this journey in terms of running an institution, especially for [team member with leadership role], ensuring that the follow up with the industry and doing paperwork...” - Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a healthcare education venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Congruence due to a shared educational or professional

<i>“So I think that approach overall has always been very open and something that we have followed throughout, that it’s always child-centric. So in [the organization] it is always student centric and what is it that’s going to benefit the student...I think it evolved because it helped all of us to gain some more understanding in the academic field. Because we come medical and clinical backgrounds so for us it means that maybe we are doing a lot of hard work. But at the same time we are also learning a lot about academics. Like running a course can be quite different as compared to working with a child...So I think our roles evolved by us experiencing this, and week on week where you would sit and discuss that how there has been some situation in the class or some feedback or some response, and how should we make it as part of our process. So it’s been a very organic thing as well if I may say in terms of growing our processes.” – Team Member</i>	background that is directly related to the social cause

Table 13: Illustrative Quotes for High SCP Congruence

Finally, the third reason, of having a general shared social exposure to/shared strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture, was illustrated across several interviews with founders and team members of environment-focused social ventures, where the founders and team members had a strong shared interest in the environment and sustainability. For some, eco-friendly activities (like upcycling) were personal hobbies while for others, making pro-environment choices (like going plastic-free) was an important part of their lifestyles. But regardless of the specific motivations, this strong individual level interest in the environment led to a high degree of SCP Intensity (at the founder/member level) for the social cause of environment-focused ventures, which in turn, resulted in a high degree of SCP Congruence between the founders and team members, and within the collective group as a whole. This high level of shared interest in the social cause was also found in education-focused social ventures. For example, in a high growth social venture focused on alternative education for low-income children, the team as a whole made the conscious decision to look for congruent values – related to child-protection and child-centric interaction – when hiring new employees, in order to strategically recruit team members who would also have the same type/level of shared passion for the cause as the existing team. Hence, in this way, the co-founders, team members, and the group as a whole, consciously crafted/created a team with high SCP Congruence, in a strategic and processual manner using cause-centric recruitment protocols (as illustrated through the quote below):

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“There needs to be a match at two levels, one is with respect to the skill and the expertise to interact with kids, to understand them. And the other is the core values that the person may have. The core values needs to be in some way aligned with the organization values and we have certain non-negotiables as per our child protection policy that, say, corporal punishment is something that we highly discourage, so those are key factors that we tend to see in the person's approach. What we see in the candidates is versatility in the profile that the person brings in, that can be as simple as I know three languages so that I can be comfortable with kids.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in an education venture – illustrating a high degree of SCP Congruence due to a general shared social exposure to/shared strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture

Table 14: Illustrative Quote for High SCP Congruence

In a contrasting case of low SCP Congruence, the founder of a social venture, focused on sustainable fashion and textile waste management, seemed to display a higher degree of SCP Intensity and connection to the social cause than her team member, who appeared to be more motivated by his personal relationship and rapport with the founder, than the cause itself. This SCP Incongruence (or low level of SCP Congruence) at the dyadic level, coupled with other team and leadership conditions (such as lack of shared leadership and a fragmented team structure) resulted in the founder being unable to mobilize her team members to work together cohesively as one collective unit in the long run, for the greater good of the social venture (as seen in her interview and through the venture's performance in real life).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“My mom was running a garment manufacturing unit in [a local area] in [major Indian city], which is where I heard the word [name of organization, which is also a local term for waste fabric] for the first time and where I realized that there was this problem of this waste fabric that was coming out in huge quantities every single day. And if so much was coming out of one unit; then looking at tailoring hubs like [a local area] and [a local area] and all these areas; imagine the problem. So I started researching it and realized that ethicality and sustainability in fashion is quite a sort of buzz topic in the west, but not necessarily something that had - at least 3 years ago - had not trickled down to India yet. People had started talking about the wastefulness of the fashion industry and how it's an extremely polluting industry & it's not..pollution and fashion were never like two things that really ever went together. So [the organization] started really just very organically with looking at like, 'Okay, how can we offset this waste and what can we do with it'.” – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a sustainable fashion venture – illustrating a low degree of SCP Congruence between the founder and a team member

<i>“..In the end, the main thing which will keep me tied is the..is more the friendship with [the founder]. It’s like I’m really..like I get excited to see..to like Skype with her and see where she is in her/the process of putting the brand out and seeing how it’s affecting her, how it’s affecting her consumers. Forget about the consumers, it’s actually more about her and it’s really..I think by hearing her talk I learn a lot about..she mirrors a part of myself also, so it’s really good for me to see that mirroring.” – Team Member</i>	

Table 15: Illustrative Quotes for Low SCP Congruence

While the individual reasons outlined above can all contribute to the emergence of passion congruence in an organization, it must be noted that at the dyadic and group level, a high degree of SCP Congruence realistically emerges due to a combination of the three factors listed above. This is because the individual reasons for SCP Intensity can vary across founders and team members; but regardless of the reason, a high degree of SCP Intensity at the individual level will result in a strong sense of SCP Congruence at the dyadic level and within the team as a whole. Given that the degrees of individual level SCP Intensity can evolve over time, the related construct of SCP Congruence is also not a static concept, but rather a dynamic continuum of shared/collective emotional intensity for the specific social cause, that can grow, evolve and reach a higher degree of congruence at the dyadic and team level, over time (due to factors like SCP Focus Embeddedness which will be discussed later in this chapter and in greater detail in Chapter 5).

The qualitative data analysis has revealed that founder-member dyads, and in turn, the team as a whole, in average or high growth enterprises (success cases) typically had a high degree of SCP Congruence (ie. low degree of SCP Intensity separation), which acted as an important antecedent that led to the emergence of team level leadership, and in turn, had a positive effect on group level processes (connected to team/venture level outcomes) in startup social ventures. On the other hand, founder-member dyads, and the team as a whole, in low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises were typically found to have a lower degree of SCP Congruence, which hindered the emergence of team level leadership, and in turn, had a negative effect on group level processes (related to team/venture level outcomes) of such early stage social enterprises. The second dimension of SCP Congruence acts as an important antecedent to the third dimension of SCP Focus Embeddedness, which is discussed in the next point.

c) Social Cause Passion Embeddedness –

Emerging as a result of high SCP Intensity at the individual level and SCP Congruence at the dyadic and group level, the third construct dimension of SCP Embeddedness can be defined as the degree to which an impact-centric focus (related to the specific social cause of the venture) is embedded and institutionalized into the psyche (memory), processes and culture of the team, via the mechanism of Mission Reinforcement (which includes activities such as regular team communication about the social vision/goals and regular team exposure to the social

impact created by the organization). This team level process will be discussed in-depth in Chapter 5.

d) Social Cause Passion Resilience –

SCP Resilience is a multi-level outcome of the mediating team process of SCP Embeddedness/Mission Reinforcement and can be described as the degree of resilience, at the individual, team and venture level, to keep working towards the social goal of the enterprise, regardless of the challenges that the founders, team members and the teams/ventures are faced with. This multi-level outcome, which is the fourth dimension of the overall construct of SCP, will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

e) Social Cause Passion Spillover –

Social Cause Passion Spillover is the fifth and final SCP dimension and can be defined as the spillover of the values and ethics of the social cause of the organization (and the principles of the impact sector at large) from the professional context to the personal life/context of the founders, members and the team as a whole. This impact spillover resulted in the individual and group level adoption of the social cause (living, embodying and championing the values of the social cause) outside of the team's immediate work context. This individual/team level outcome will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.

The 5 individual dimensions, outlined above, interact with each other to form the broader construct of Social Cause Passion (SCP) within the team. The 5 dimensions operate at different levels, have unique characteristics and interact with each other in complex ways. SCP Intensity is a pre-antecedent and anchoring construct for the qualitative analysis and operates at the individual level of the founder and/or team member. This individual passion intensity in turn leads to the emergence of SCP Congruence, which is a key antecedent construct for the entire inductive narrative, and it can be found first at the dyadic level, and then in turn, at the team level. Building on the dyadic and group level passion congruence, SCP Embeddedness emerges as an important team/venture level mediating process (which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5) that shapes and influences the impact-centric processes, protocols and culture of the whole organization. This impact-centric organizational focus, in turn, gives rise to the multilevel outcome of SCP Resilience, as well as, the individual and group level outcome of SCP Spillover. Despite the causal nature of the linkages described above, it must be noted that the relationship between these 5 dimensions is not always linear because they are all interconnected and they influence each other and reinforce each other in a dynamic way. For example, while a high degree of SCP Congruence at the dyadic and team level leads to a high degree of SCP Embeddedness at the group level, this passion focus embeddedness can also in turn strengthen and positively influence the level of SCP Congruence in the team; given that it reinforces the monofocal passion for the specific social cause of the startup social venture. Hence, the 5 individual dimensions, and in turn, the overall construct of SCP as a whole, must not be viewed as static constructs, but rather a dynamic continuum of interconnected dimensions. The strength of each dimension can be understood as a degree rather than as a static value and each dimension can move and evolve along this continuum and reach a higher (or lower) degree of power; thus influencing each other at the individual, dyadic and team level, over time. An overview of the five dimensions of SCP can be found in Table 16 below.

In terms of the bigger picture, the interviews have revealed that average or high growth enterprises (success cases) typically had a higher degree of SCP Intensity at the individual level of founders and team members, SCP Congruence at the dyadic and team level, SCP Embeddedness at the team/venture level, SCP Resilience at the individual/team/venture level and SCP Spillover at the individual and/or group level. On the other hand, low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises usually displayed a lower degree of SCP Intensity at the individual level, SCP Congruence at the dyadic/team level, SCP Embeddedness at the team/venture level, SCP Resilience at the individual/team/venture level and SCP Spillover at the individual/group level. Hence, given the influence of SCP, as a whole, on the success trajectory of a startup social enterprise, it is critical for this new concept to be introduced and explored in relation to early stage social venture teams and social venture performance.

SOCIAL CAUSE PASSION (SCP)			
#	SCP Dimension	Level of Operation	Type of Mechanism
1	Intensity	○ Individual level of Founder/Team Member	○ Pre-antecedent (anchor for narrative)
2	Congruence	○ Dyadic level between Founder and Team Member ○ Team Level	○ Antecedent (anchor for narrative)
3	Embeddedness	○ Team level ○ Venture level	○ Mediating Process
4	Resilience	○ Individual level of Founder/Team Member ○ Team level ○ Venture level	○ Outcome
5	Spillover	○ Individual of Founder/Team Member ○ Team level	○ Outcome

Table 16: Five Dimensions of Social Cause Passion (SCP)

Link to the next construct

The interviews revealed that SCP Intensity and Congruence led to the emergence of a strong dyadic leader-follower relationship, between the founder and team members in average or high growth startup social ventures (success cases). SCP Congruence results in a common wavelength and shared social cause passion between the founder and the team member, which in turn gives rise to a strong reciprocal relationship between them; characterised by empowerment behaviour by the leader, proactive behaviour by the follower and mutual trust between the both of them. This dyadic construct has been explained in the next point below.

4.4) Strong Dyadic Leader-Member Relationship (based on Leader Empowerment Behaviour, Member Proactive Behaviour and Mutual Trust)

Construct Definition

In average or high growth startup social ventures (success cases), SCP Congruence at the dyadic level led to a common shared rapport between the founder/leader and the team members and this in turn, led to the emergence of a strong dyadic relationship between the founder/leader and the follower. This critical symbiotic relationship between the founder and the team member is characterised by empowerment behaviour by the leader, reciprocal proactive behaviour by the follower and mutual trust between the both of them. As a first step, the founder/leader practices Empowering Leadership (EL) or Empowerment Behaviour, in order to empower the team member and to groom him/her/them into taking up more leadership responsibility in the team. EL is often considered to be a part of the overall SL framework (Perry et al., 1999; Carter et al., 2015; Kozlowski et al., 2016) and according to Ford & Fottler (1995), it involves “passing on influence to followers as part of the leadership process” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 205). In this leadership approach, “followers not only participate in the management process, but to a significant degree become their own leaders” (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 205); which in turn indicates a high level of work-unit oriented proactive behaviour by the members in the team (Wu et al., 2018). In average and high growth startup social enterprises, the founder consciously invests time and resources to train and develop the leadership potential of the follower, and makes formal and informal efforts to groom the follower to take on more leadership responsibility in the team. In reciprocation to this Empowerment behaviour by the leader, the follower displays Proactive Behaviour and takes active ownership of his/her/their tasks at the individual and team level. The team member also engages in mirroring and role modeling of the founder’s leadership approach, thus displaying an eagerness to learn and proactively grow into a leadership role within the team. This reciprocal leader empowerment behaviour and follower proactive behaviour is further strengthened through a strong sense of mutual trust and a common wavelength (as a result of a shared passion for the startup social cause) between the founder and the follower. This mutual trust is manifested first, through a display of trust by the founder in the form of his/her/their willingness and ability to grant freedom to the follower to engage in autonomous leadership behaviour and actions in the team. This display of trust is then reciprocated by the team member when he/she/they take active ownership of his/her/their individual work responsibilities and perform the tasks satisfactorily to completion; in turn, earning and maintaining the trust displayed by the leader. This virtuous cycle of mutual trust reinforces the founder’s willingness and ability to engage in Empowerment Behaviour and the follower’s willingness and ability to engage in Proactive Behaviour. Hence, in this way, both the founder and the follower experience feelings of happiness, work satisfaction and motivation to continue to invest in their work tasks and relationships, as a result of the strong dyadic leader-member relationship.

Three Mechanisms of Reciprocal (EL-based) Leader-Member Relationships

The qualitative data analysis revealed that leader-member dyadic relationships are fruitful when there are mutually reinforcing positive exchanges of empowering leadership by the founder, proactive followership by the team member and a strong display of mutual trust between the leader and the follower. The virtuous reciprocal elements of this dyadic leader-member relationship comprise of 3 main elements – Empowerment behaviour by the founder (which includes mentoring and grooming behaviour by the leader), Proactive behaviour by

the follower (comprising of mirroring and active ownership by the follower), and Mutual Trust between the leader and the member (which includes a display of trust by the leader, that is reciprocated by the earning of trust/proving of commitment by the follower). These three elements of the leader-member dyadic relationship are explained in further detail below:

a) Founder's Empowerment Behaviour –

The interviews revealed that in average or high growth enterprises (success cases), founders engaged in EL by practicing Empowerment behaviour in the context of his/her/their leader-member dyadic relationships. As part of this EL approach, the founder/leader displayed two specific types of Empowerment behaviours:

- Mentoring and investing time in the personal/professional growth of the follower
- Grooming the follower to take up leadership responsibilities in the team

First, the founders made a conscious effort to mentor, train and invest time and resources into the growth and development of the followers' leadership potential in the team. The mentoring would typically start off with some amount of hand-holding and training for the followers. Following this, the mentoring would gradually move to a more hands-off experiential learning approach where the founders would provide direction to the followers and then let the followers tackle the task on his/her/their own ('learn on the job'), while always being available in case the team members needed additional support or guidance ('having their back'). In this way, the founders provided a nurturing and supportive environment for the followers to learn and grow and this EL approach required a significant amount of time, conscious effort and self awareness/discipline from the founders/leaders. Building on this mentoring behaviour, the founders would then formally and/or informally groom the followers to take up leadership responsibilities in the team. This approach to leadership grooming from within the organization ('within the system') would typically start off with the founders involving the team members in important discussions, activities and decisions at the macro level of the organization. This strategic involvement helped the followers to develop big-picture thinking capabilities and strategic leadership skills and in turn, enabled them to zoom out of their individual day-to-day tasks and think more at the macro level about the organization. The founders would consciously or sub-consciously use this strategic involvement phase as a 'feeler' (or trial period) and if they were satisfied with the engagement and performance of the followers, they would then either formally or informally 'invite' the team members to take up more leadership responsibility in the team. In this way, team members were groomed and empowered to take up more leadership responsibility in the team, which eventually led to the formation of a distributed team leadership approach, rather than the leadership being centralised with the founders. But this grooming behaviour did not just benefit the followers; it led to positive effects for the founders as well, because they managed to build a core team and/or co-founder-like capacity (in terms of skill, strategy and mental capacity) within the organization, which enabled them to share the emotional burden and pressure, related to running a startup social venture, with other trusted members in the team.

Some of the interviews can help to illustrate the founder's empowerment behaviour in average or high growth startup social ventures. In an average growth mental health venture, the founder mentored and groomed the team member into a leadership role

and built the team member's capacity to function in a co-founder capacity, by involving her with strategic impact-focused activities and exercises related to the macro level of the organization. The founder had previously done strategic impact-focused activities/exercises such as Empathy Mapping, Problem Tree Analysis and Theory of Change with an incubator (UnLtd India). She decided to do these exercises again with a core team member (a hands-on mentoring and experiential training approach) in order to come to a common understanding about the enterprise through a strategic impact-centric lens. At the end of the exercises, the core team member had not only developed co-founder level skills but also empathised with the founder on an emotional level ('got on the same page') by acknowledging how tough it must have been for the founder to do all that work by herself for so long (building skill-based and emotional level co-founder capacity).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I think we sat down and had a very very lengthy discussion. I sat down with her and did the UnLtd Empathy Map and the Problem Tree and all of that with her, because I needed her to see Adveka from a different perspective; because she'd only been a volunteer till then; & she was going to start taking on more responsibility..."</i> <i>...I did those Empathy Maps. The first induction workshop that UnLtd had done in that the school thing on the slope, Retreat House, or something like that, where we had done the Problem Solving Tree, the Empathy Map & one more thing..Stakeholders, yes. So I did all of that with her; I did the Theory of Change with her. I think we sat for two days and at the end of the two days, she was just like, "How are you doing this?" (laughs). And I was like, "Welcome to my world; Hello" (laughs). So I did all of that because I was like, "I need you to be on the same page now, so we're going to power through this". Because all through those two days, she was like, "I don't know these answers! I do not have them". And I was like, "It's ok; they'll come to you. I was here two years back; I have almost cried as well; don't worry" (laughs). – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of an average growth mental health venture – illustrating Founder's Empowerment Behaviour (as a part of a Strong Dyadic Leader-Member Relationship)
<i>"Because we have UnLtd India giving us a guideline, a structure, like you know these are the kind of goals, parameters for goals and all of that; so once we have that, we work on it. Theory of Change, for example. She has already done all of the goal setting before, so I also do it. Just taking Theory of Change as an example and the outcomes or whatever we want; so I also do it. I do the Empathy Map, I do Stakeholder Understanding and all of that and then we compare it and then we're like, if there are any points missing, or if there's something that additionally I've written that she may not have covered, or she's covered and I've not – then we see what fits, what does not fit, what's common, what I'm not understanding." – Team Member</i>	

Table 17: Illustrative Quotes for Founder's Empowerment Behaviour

In a different example, the founder of an average growth environment enterprise groomed a junior team member into a leadership role by throwing her into the deep end of the work right from the beginning. The founder believed that if she gives people responsibility, with direction and just throw them into it; they will figure it out by themselves, without too much hand holding in the long run. The junior team member's interview, in turn, confirmed that she felt the positive effects of this EL approach – she thought that founder was not a selfish or bossy leader because she believed that when the founder grows personally/professionally, she makes her team grow with her. She mentioned that, in order to upskill her to reach the level of a leadership role, she was first given tasks (by a senior colleague – as advised by the founder) which were visibly and tangibly possible for her to achieve without much training (to build her confidence), and then she was slowly exposed to more demanding tasks with more support and guidance.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So my belief is that if you like just throw people into and give them like responsibility, they figure it out, so there’s very little hand holding that’s involved. First month, there’s hand holding and then I give her [team member], like I said I give her the goals.” – Founder</i> <i>“She’s extremely dedicated, extremely focused, extremely hard working and in one year we’ve really seen a huge progress. So I didn’t know she was an introvert and I just kind of basically made her jump into the process of doing like vendor management, which is as extrovert as it gets, because you have to call and negotiate for rates and stuff. And she really kind of held her own in that domain and one time she actually came to me and she told me in a very candid moment where her friends & her parents actually encouraged her to come back to [the organization], because her personality changed working here.” – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of an average growth environment venture – illustrating Founder’s Empowerment Behaviour (as a part of a Strong Dyadic Leader-Member Relationship)
<i>“[The founder’s] leadership style is, something that she won’t boss you; she’s like not a boss person. But you know like a perfect leader; if she’s growing, she will expect her company to grow with you, her staff members to grow with you. She’s not self centred when it comes to growth. That’s the best thing about her, about working under her..” – Team Member</i> <i>“To grow from intern to Business Development Head; initially all those tasks which were simpler for me, like handling the social media pages or talking to people on Whatsapp messages, like I said it was really difficult for me to directly jump on a call. So from there, [senior colleague] used to help me out a lot. Initially, she used to give the tasks which she thought were visibly possible for me to get it done without much training, then slowly she let me handle the calls, she made me do the calls and she explained it to me. First, she made 5-10 calls herself, in front of me. What to talk, what to say, how to say and then she gave the calls to me and asked me to follow her lead.” – Team Member</i>	

Table 18: Illustrative Quotes for Founder’s Empowerment Behaviour

In contrast to this, the founder of a livelihoods focused social venture with low/stagnated growth revealed that she found it too time consuming (and not worth the effort) to hire/train/groom junior interns and would rather work with experienced individuals on a project to project basis (rather than as a cohesive team in the long term). She did not have a very positive outlook about her past team leadership experience with junior team members and she displayed a transactional boss-employee perspective with regards to the team. She thought that perhaps what she really needs is an assistant who will simply do the work as per her instructions. She also used quite transactional language and mentioned that she was focused on just getting the work done and getting 'her money's worth/getting what she paid for' with respect to the employees in her team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Yeah that two months was kind of she [team member 1] was really good at what she did. I wouldn't say she was really good at what she did, but she was worth what I was paying her. She was getting stuff done, she was useful to have around, unlike [team member 2] who I felt mentally had a lot of potentially but either I wasn't able to harness it or because she was working remotely there was a communication gap or whatever it was." – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of Empowerment Behaviour by the Founder in the venture (weak dyadic leader-member relationship)
<i>"I've been like getting queries for interns and things like that, but I have after my stint with [team member 1] realized that I don't want. And I had interns before that as well actually, more like my stint with the interns before that, that I don't want anyone to come and to work with me for less than a period of 3 to 4 months. Because by the time they get hold of things, it's 2 months and so if they are coming for just like 6 weeks and all – it's not like a graphic design studio where I can just be like open a computer, open Photoshop, edit these images. That kind of work is not this thing..."</i>	
<i>...Currently I am not really looking at interns and stuff. I do have a couple of people who in fact I am speaking to at the moment to kind of bring in as collaborators on smaller projects...Both designers who are willing to take on the project like a project, not like employment but as a project. So they get paid for a deliverable, that sort of thing.</i> <i>...Currently what I really feel I need which will come when I move to [a city in India] is hiring someone who is – who for lack of a better word, I could call my assistant, someone who I could say, okay, go do this, cut this into 10-inch strips, do that, do this, those kinds of things." – Founder</i>	

Table 19: Quotes illustrating a lack of Empowerment Behaviour by the Founder

Hence, the interviews revealed that as compared to successful social enterprises, mentoring and grooming junior team members into leadership roles as part of an EL approach was not that big a priority for founders in low/stagnated growth or failed

social ventures. But in cases where the founders displayed a strong EL approach and Empowerment behaviour (typically in more successful ventures), the team members in turn engaged in Proactive Behaviour with respect to their work and their relationship with the leader. This reciprocal proactive behaviour by the followers has been explained in the next point below.

b) Followers' Proactive Behaviour –

The interviews revealed that if founders engaged in EL and Empowerment behaviour, the team members typically responded with Proactive behaviour in the context of his/her/their work and leader-member dyadic relationships. As part of this positive reciprocal dynamic, the follower typically displayed the following two specific types of Proactive behaviour:

- Mirroring (role modeling) the founder's leadership behaviour
- Taking Active Ownership of their work and treating the venture as their 'own' organization

Proactive team members consciously or sub-consciously mirrored or role modeled the founder's leadership behaviour, in order to self-groom and upskill himself/herself/themselves into a more leader-like persona and profile. The followers would mirror and rolemodel various aspects of the leader's behaviour that they found inspirational and they would imbibe these characteristics or behaviours into their own leadership/self-leadership approach. Examples of leader behaviours that followers would emulate include the way founders delegated work, managed people in the team, appreciated or recognised member achievements, handled mistakes or member failures, and maintained social and professional relationships with individual team members and within the group as a whole. Through such mirroring behaviour, followers were proactively (either consciously or sub-consciously) self-grooming themselves into being more 'leader-like', in order to be seen more favourably by the founders and were in turn, setting the stage for them being granted more leadership responsibility in the team (by the founders) in the future. Alongside conscious or sub-conscious mirroring behaviour, followers also took Active Ownership in their individual work and behaved visibly proactive and engaged with the team/venture as a whole. As part of this proactive behaviour, followers actively took initiative to introduce or manage important tasks in the organization and displayed accountability for their own tasks, as well as, for the team's tasks as a whole. A key feature of this proactive ownership and accountability was that several followers mentioned that they felt like the startup venture was their 'own' organization – they felt that they played a key role in running the venture and the organization belonged to them; rather than simply being just another employee within the organization. This feeling of belonging, ownership and identification with the organization, in turn, reinforced and fuelled the Proactive behaviour of the followers, in terms of proving their commitment towards the organization as a whole.

Interview insights from the same organizational examples (from successful social ventures), used to describe the Empowerment behaviour by the founders in the previous point, can be used to illustrate the reciprocated proactive behaviour by the followers. In the case of the average growth mental health startup venture, the team

member that was mentored and groomed by the founder had a high level of respect and admiration for her leader and consciously tried to imbibe elements of the founder's leadership behaviour into her own leadership style. She considered the founder to be her mentor, leader, friend, philosopher and guide. She actively mirrored and modeled the founder's leadership approach – for example, the way founder managed people, showed appreciation towards members in the team, etc. In turn, she believed that she must also be a role model for her team members (colleagues, as well as, people that she managed directly), displaying ownership and accountability towards the organization as a whole. Hence, here, the team member intended to start a role modeling ripple effect within the team because she felt a strong sense of ownership and identification with the organization and thus, felt responsible for the actions, behaviour and performance of the other team members and for the venture as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I take my inspiration from [the founder] so I would say what she's doing is what I try do." – Team Member</i>	Quotes from a team member in an average growth mental health venture – illustrating Follower's Proactive Behaviour (as a part of a Strong Dyadic Leader-Member Relationship)
<i>"...There will be long messages, it will be like, "Way to go", blah blah blah. There will be a lot of enthusiasm on [the founder's] part, I'm not very expressive, I'm like, "You've done good work; you must know it", it's like that. I've learned from her, like you know; it's good to give people feedback, so I also try to do that. I recently conducted a workshop with the three volunteers acting as co-facilitators, so it went brilliantly. So I told them personally, I texted each of them personally, spoke to each of them personally, that you know, 'This and this part you did brilliantly, it was amazing, this thing that you said'. – Team Member</i>	
<i>"...So I think of her as my mentor and also like everything: friend, philosopher, guide; like very clichéd thing. Yeah, that's why I believe it's very collaborative." – Team Member</i>	

Table 20: Illustrative Quotes for Followers' Proactive Behaviour

In the case of the other average growth environment focused social enterprise, the junior team member had initially joined the startup venture as an intern because she found the venture idea/social cause exciting, but had no prior background or exposure to the environment sector. However, after being inducted, mentored and groomed by the founder (as well as by her predecessor, who transitioned out of the venture a short while after this team member joined), her passion and ownership towards the social cause and her identification with the venture as a whole evolved and grew to a much higher degree of intensity. The team member also mirrored/shadowed the founder's leadership style and tried to train her junior team members the same way that she was trained by the founder and her other senior colleagues. She provided hand holding support to her interns but did not 'sit on their head' (no micro-management), similar to the way that she was mentored and trained. Hence, just like the mental health venture, in this case as well, the mirroring by the team member led to a ripple effect of rolemodeling behaviour within the organization. The team member mentioned that she now (after being inducted, trained and

groomed) felt very connected to the whole idea of the company and the impact the enterprise creates. This cause connection coupled with the supportive and empowering leadership approach from the founder and her senior colleague, made the enterprise feel like her second family and in turn, she felt like she wasn't just working for the company, but instead was working for her 'own' business.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I'm just mirroring [the founder]; I'm just shadowing her..Mostly I would sit with them (her interns) and work because that's how I was trained. Because I was trained right from scratch, I just don't assume that they would know everything or that they can handle it. I just sit there; it's like not on their head, but I would sit aside & let them do their work, but still have a check on them indirectly..Yeah, because of her leadership style, it influenced me with my [functional] team. It was her positive way of dealing with us; I was inspired to deal similarly with my team." – Team Member</i>	Quotes from a team member in an average growth environment venture – illustrating Followers' Proactive Behaviour (as a part of a Strong Dyadic Leader-Member Relationship)
<i>"My initial idea of joining the company is the reason I feel really connected to the whole idea of the company; plus the impact the company is making. Second, the overall team approach..even like..the approach from [the founder], the initial approach from [the team member's immediate predecessor], everyone – it really made you feel like a second family here and not like a company. So that is something that makes you feel connected, as part of a product and as your company – it makes you feel that you're not doing it for the company; you're doing it like it's your own business". – Team Member</i>	

Table 21: Illustrative Quotes for Followers' Proactive Behaviour

However, in the case of the low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture, that was mentioned in the last point, the follower's potential for proactive behaviour was stifled by the lack of empowerment behaviour by the founder. The team member was actually self-motivated to work proactively for the venture because of her passion for the social cause and she also admired the founder's organized/disciplined work ethic and her resilience to work through tough challenges. In fact, she said that she picked up these behaviours from the founder and tried to act them out herself, thus consciously mirroring the founder's behaviour. However, despite this mirroring behaviour, the leader-member dyadic relationship was not very strong because the follower's initiative was not reciprocated with EL behaviour the leader. The founder herself acknowledged that she is not very good at delegation and she must learn how to delegate better, and the team member in turn mentioned that the founder was the 'whole and sole' of the enterprise. The team member believed that everything (including working with beneficiaries) revolved around the founder and every action by the leader influenced the performance of the enterprise (thus, alluding to a very founder-centric structure). This was illustrated by the fact that the team member's inputs were considered by the founder only in the context of the 'HOW' of the work, but not the 'WHY'/bigger picture of the work. At the end, the final decision was made by the founder alone. Hence unlike other successful ventures, in this organization, the founder did not groom the team member to build her strategic leadership

capacity. Hence, the follower's initial self-motivation was stifled by a lack of EL by the founder and eventually the team member left the organization (mentioned the cause of exit as 'personal reasons') and started her own social venture (in the same livelihoods domain) a short while later.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I am not someone who delegates very well, so trying to do that." – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a low/stagnated growth ventures venture – illustrating how a lack of Founder's Empowerment Behaviour hindered Follower's Proactive Behaviour (weak dyadic leader-member relationship)
<i>"She being the founder, the entire work of [the organization] molds in her decision. So that way whatever fundamentals that she used to agree on and work upon and whatever she chose as a working style. So that she being the whole and sole of [the organization], I think that's the way it is, that's the way it has been running.." – Team Member</i>	
<i>"She would ask me like what is my opinion about these and these targets been pending and what are my preferences and what do I think about it and she would tell me that so and so things work better. So, we used to come down to a common point which was like I would give her my perspective to it and she would think about it and then we would just finalize things." – Team Member</i>	

Table 22: Quotes illustrating how a lack of Founder's Empowerment Behaviour hindered Followers' Proactive Behaviour

In contrast to this weak leader-member relationship, other successful teams featured conscious empowerment behaviour by the founder and reciprocated proactive behaviour by the follower, which in turn was reinforced by a strong sense of mutual trust as part of this positive dyadic relationship. This reinforcing aspect of mutual trust between the founder and the team member is explained in the next point below.

c) Founder-Member Mutual Trust –

In average or high growth social ventures, the founder's empowerment behaviour and the follower's reciprocated proactive behaviour is further reinforced through a strong sense of mutual trust, a common wavelength and a shared rapport (typically due to their shared passion for the startup social cause) between the founder and the follower. This strong mutual trust at the dyadic level comprised of the following reciprocal behaviour by the leader and follower:

- Displaying of trust by the founder
- Earning of trust by the team member

The interviews revealed that first, the leaders displayed trust in the follower in terms of his/her/their willingness and ability to grant freedom to the followers to engage in autonomous behaviour and leadership actions in the team. This ability to grant freedom to the followers was typically preceded by empowerment behaviour where the founders included the the team members in important team/leadership tasks, in order to groom him/her/them to take up leadership responsibilities in the team. Reciprocating the founder's display of trust, the follower in turn actively strives to

earn and maintain the trust of the leader by proving his/her/their commitment to the team and by performing well, not only in relation to their individual tasks, but also when involved in important team/leadership tasks by the leader. Thus, this reciprocal display and earning of trust by the founder and the follower results in a virtuous cycle of mutual trust which reinforces the founder's willingness and ability to engage in Empowerment Behaviour and the follower's drive and ability to engage in Proactive Behaviour. As mentioned earlier, the foundation for this strong sense of mutual trust and shared rapport arises from a high level of SCP Congruence at the dyadic level, where the founder and the team member have either a shared personal connection to the social cause, a shared educational/professional background related to the social cause and/or a general strong interest in/exposure to the social cause of the startup social venture. This converging level of SCP Intensity and this high degree of SCP Congruence establishes a strong sense of mutual understanding, respect and rapport between the leader and the follower, and this shared passion in turn results in a strong bond of mutual trust between both of them.

The same organizational examples (from successful social ventures), that were earlier used to describe founder empowerment behaviour and follower proactive behaviour, can be further used to illustrate the mutual trust between the founder and the member; which is the third aspect of a strong reciprocal dyadic leader-member relationship. In the case of the average growth mental health social venture, both the founder and the team member agreed that they trusted each other and shared the same personal and professional values, because of their shared professional mental health background. Hence, they mutually agreed that team/venture-level decision making was a simple and harmonious process for them. In some cases, the final decision would lie with the founder, even though the team member was free to take the lead or go through with an idea/initiative, if the founder thought it made sense for the organization. The founder, in turn, had faith in the team member's ability to take the lead in running programs or dealing with external stakeholders (beneficiaries), because she already had proven herself by taking more initiative in the team and by building positive rapport with their external stakeholders (beneficiaries). After the team member had proven her commitment to the organization (through positive performance), the founder explicitly invited the team member to take on more leadership responsibility in the team. When it came to taking the lead, the team member didn't usually have to do a lot of convincing with regards to implementing new ideas because she and the founder were on the same wavelength when it came to the vision of the venture. The founder trusted the motivation behind the team member's ideas and knew that they will fit the enterprise vision and hence, she did not question the member's ideas in most cases. This led to effective idea generation and implementation within the team and the team member successfully took the lead on several occasions within the social venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So it doesn’t take a lot of convincing, because same wavelength..when she’s even mentioned an idea or an organization, I know where it’s sort of coming from and where it’s going to fit into the [organization’s] vision. So then I don’t really question it that much. I don’t think it’s ever happened where I’ve had to really sort of question her idea and been like, ‘You know what, I don’t think this is something that we can do’.” – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of an average growth mental health venture – illustrating a Founder-Member Mutual Trust
<i>“Making the plans for what kind of therapies/interventions we’re going to use was something that I did and I said, ‘You know what, this what we’re doing and if you have inputs, like whatever inputs you have, let’s add that and go ahead with it’. So on this particular project, yeah, I do the things and [the founder] just has like checks it, just like, ‘Okay, all this going well’.” – Team Member</i>	
<i>“There was a lot of autonomy and there was this one conversation where [the founder], this was one of the more serious conversations we’ve had, where she was like, ‘I would like you to come on board full time, you can do whatever you want with [the organization’s] projects, if you want to start a new project/program, you’re free to do so, we can develop it together. So whatever ideas you have, we can do it under the [the organization’s] umbrella’. – Team Member</i>	

Table 23: Illustrative Quotes for Founder-Member Mutual Trust

In the case of the average growth environment-focused social enterprise, the founder regularly displayed trust in the team member and she mentioned that for specific situations and activities, she completely let the member take the lead, to the point where the team member became indispensable to that particular function in the venture. In fact, if the team member were to go on leave for a short while, she would actually have to train the founder about how to fill in for her – signaling the high level of freedom given to her by the founder and representing the strong mutual trust and respect between the both of them. The follower in turn mentioned that work was divided weekly between her and the founder, depending on who could handle the task well (matching skills), and this equitable task division emerged as a result of open communication and a sense of mutual trust between the both of them.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“She’s like Head of Marketing I would say; she’s basically like indispensable right now with the function that she does.” – Founder</i> <i>“Social media, I’ve no idea what’s going on, like I tell her to send me the message she has developed for the week, which I can send to my people..Like her department; the way she handles it – is that if she went on leave for two days, I wouldn’t know what to do...she really [emphasis] really handles it and all of that... She has the freedom, so of course she discusses with me and I give her my thoughts, but her thoughts are really important in that. I mean, if she goes on leave, like she’ll have to give me a training for two days before she goes.” – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of an average growth environment venture – illustrating a Founder-Member Mutual Trust
<i>“As a combined or joint approach, [the founder] & I work mostly like; it just doesn’t make you feel like you’re overburdened with it or stressed with it. Whatever work it is, we make sure it is equally divided and the first thing is, who is able to handle it well. If I’m still not confident with that work, [the founder] would take it up by herself. If she’s like travelling or caught up in meetings, I do the work assigned for her. So that’s not an issue with us; there’s proper communication with us”. – Team Member</i>	

Table 24: Illustrative Quotes for Founder-Member Mutual Trust

In contrast, in the livelihoods social venture with low/stagnated growth, the founder did not display a lot of trust in the team member and she also acknowledged that she was not very good at delegation and she must learn how to delegate better. She also used quite individualistic/authoritative language (needs an ‘assistant’ who she can say ‘do this/do that’ to) and did not seem to be thinking too much from the dyadic or team level. However, the reason why the founder did not trust the team member too much was because of past negative experiences with that member (highlighted below), which illustrated that the follower did not succeed in (or try hard enough to) earning the trust of the founder. This lack of mutual trust was born out a weak and non-reciprocal dyadic relationship between the founder and the member – the foundation was not strong to begin with.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“[Team member’s] role was to manage groups, but she didn’t end up doing that because I found that there were a lot of issues happening between her and the groups. So she was – initially like I started her on working with – so she was great at coordination, like with calling up someone and saying okay, you need to get this done or I am sending you this or you need to do this whatever, that kind of stuff she was good with. But like say she was working with the [beneficiary] women..and she would – like she wouldn’t look at quality. So things would, she would – I will send her to [location] for two days and she would be happy to go because she would be going back home, I would send her with stuff and say, okay, get this done and bring in back. And she would come back with stuff</i>	Founder of a low/stagnated livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of Founder-Member Mutual Trust

<i>that was not done properly and then blame it on the women and then the – but it was her job to make sure that it was done properly. And the women would say things like but she just leaves it with us and she is on her phone all the time. So, we are doing what she tells us to do. And I couldn't believe either over the other. The point was that work wasn't getting done.” – Founder</i>	

Table 25: Illustrative Quote for Low Founder-Member Mutual Trust

Overall, average or high growth startup social ventures featured a high incidence of strong dyadic relationships, comprised of leader empowerment behaviour, follower proactive behaviour and a strong sense of mutual trust. Such positive reciprocal dyadic relationships are mutually beneficial for both the founders and the followers – a win-win scenario. Empowerment behaviour and a display of trust by the founders resulted in the followers experiencing feelings of happiness, work satisfaction and motivation to continue to proactively engage in their work tasks and relationships within the team. In turn, the proactive behaviour and earning of trust by the followers led to positive effects for the founders in terms of building a shared core team/co-founder-like capacity within the team; which enabled them to share the emotional burden and high pressure, related to starting and running a startup social venture, with other trusted members in the team.

All of these leadership exchanges and interactions between the leader and the follower lead to the activation and development of the individual follower's leadership potential (Individual Leadership Potential Activation), and in turn, the individual follower takes up more leadership responsibility in the team (slowly moving from a leader-driven Empowering Leadership relationship to a more Shared Leadership relationship). In low/stagnated growth or failed startup social enterprises, this dyadic relationship is characterized by low mutual trust between the founder and the follower, lack of time investment and effort by the founder in training and developing the leadership potential of the follower, lack of formal or informal efforts by the founder to groom the follower to take on more leadership responsibility in the team, lack of willingness by the founder to grant freedom to the follower to engage in autonomous leadership behaviour in the team and the presence of a directive leadership approach with evidence of micro-management behaviour on the part of the founder/leader. All of these factors hinder the emergence of follower proactive behaviour and given the lack of reciprocal leader-follower relationships, there is not much successful activation or development of the individual follower's leadership potential and in turn, not many individuals end up taking more leadership responsibility in the team (thus, lacking the presence of an EL or SL model).

Link to the next construct

The interviews revealed reciprocal leader-member dyadic relationships (in average or high growth social ventures), comprising of leader empowerment behaviour, follower proactive behaviour and mutual trust between the founder and the team member, led to the activation of the follower's individual leadership potential. Multiple such positive dyadic relationships between the leader and the followers in such teams resulted in the activation of the leadership potential of multiple team members, which in turn led to the activation and development of the collective leadership potential of the team as a whole. Hence, the leaders and team members first engaged with an Empowering Leadership approach (the

reciprocal dyadic relationships) and then naturally transitioned to a more Shared/Collective Leadership approach within the team. This SL construct has been explained in depth in the next point below.

4.5) Shared Leadership (Activation of Collective Leadership) in the team

Construct Definition

In average or high growth startup social ventures, multiple reciprocal dyadic relationships between the founders and the team members (characterised by leader empowerment behaviour, follower proactive behaviour and mutual trust) lead to the activation of the collective leadership potential in the team, which in turn leads to the emergence of a shared team-level leadership model within the startup social enterprise. This construct elaborates on the concepts of Team Self Leadership (TSL) and Shared Leadership (SL) Capacity in the leadership literature (Day & Dragoni, 2015; Manz, 1990, 1991, 1992; Stewart et al., 2011). First, the effectiveness of SL depends greatly on the processes and culture/work environment within a team (Day & Dragoni, 2015). The structure of a team's leadership process model indicates the degree of "shared leadership capacity" within that team, and this SL capacity is further "enhanced when team members feel comfortable voicing their views, see value in each other's contributions, and hold a shared purpose" (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 147). Second, similar to individual self leadership, TSL operates as a continuum and the degree of TSL is shaped by the degree to which teams are "allowed to exercise self-influence over the what (standards and objectives), why (values and strategic reasons for the objectives), and how (the actual performance of the work) of work team performance" (Stewart et al., 2011, pg. 190). The movement of individuals and teams along the TSL continuum relies on certain internal and external forces, at the individual and team level (Stewart et al., 2011). Internal forces at the individual level are represented by intrinsic natural rewards, thought self leadership, emotional regulation and personality; and at the team level, such forces operate through mechanisms such as team composition, task characteristics, shared mental models, cohesion and the presence/absence of conflict (Stewart et al., 2011). Additionally, given that the interviews revealed that repeated individual level empowerment eventually leads to collective team level empowerment, the inductive SL model can also be connected to the extant construct of Team Empowerment. Kirkman & Rosen (1997; 1999) define Team Empowerment in terms of four dimensions: potency, meaningfulness, autonomy, and impact. Potency refers to "the collective belief of a team that it can be effective", meaningfulness refers to "a team's experiencing its tasks as important, valuable, and worthwhile", autonomy is "the degree to which team members experience substantial freedom, independence, and discretion in their work" (such as with decision making) and impact refers to "when a team produces work that is significant and important for an organization" because they actively seek to collectively understand feedback about the team's work from other people in the organization (Kirkman & Rosen, 1999, pg. 59).

Building on these constructs, in the startup social enterprise context, all these concepts come together to catalyse the emergence of 'Collective Leadership Development/Activation'; which can be defined as the activation of followers' collective leadership potential resulting in shared leadership behaviour by the team as a whole. The first step is to activate the individual leadership potential of each follower; and repeated activation of the individual

leadership potential of the members (through reciprocal EL leader-follower behaviour), in turn leads to the activation of the collective leadership potential at the team level (given the presence of other conducive factors). This activation of the collective leadership potential of the team members, in turn leads to the emergence of a Shared Leadership model at the team level. In average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases), this construct is characterized by team members engaging in SL behaviour (high SL capacity), taking collective leadership responsibility and ownership of the team goals and enterprise vision, and engaging in leadership behaviour, actions and processes at the team level as a collective unit. Such team level leadership processes include team level work accountability check-ins, team level goal-related brainstorming and decision making, team level feedback mechanisms and learning procedures, etc. The characteristics of the SL model in successful startup social ventures can also be understood through the lens and four dimensions of Team Empowerment (Kirkman and Rosen, 1997; 1999) – potency (collective belief in the effectiveness of the team's SL ability), meaningfulness (the team experiencing its SL work as worthwhile), autonomy (the team experiencing freedom given by the leader to engage in SL work) and impact (the team collectively creates work that has a direct impact on the goals of the organisation). The impact dimension is particularly relevant for the context of startup social ventures where all activities ultimately must contribute to the social purpose of the venture.

In low growth or failed startup social enterprises, there is a lack of 'collective leadership engagement/activation'; wherein the collective leadership potential of the team as a whole has not been activated, due to the absence of the respective conducive factors or variables. Hence, there is not much presence of a Shared Leadership model in these startup ventures. Such teams typically lack team level leadership behaviours or processes related to accountability, ownership, feedback, learning, etc. In some cases, the leadership potential of some individual followers might be activated but not of the team as a whole; and in other low growth/failed cases, neither the individual leadership potential of the followers nor the collective leadership potential of the team was activated (the presence of micro management and a directive leadership approach was observed).

Cultural and Processual Mechanisms of Shared Leadership

In terms of a typical SL team structure, most teams had a core leadership team – comprised of a founder (or co-founders) and a few core team members who were invited to take up leadership roles (by founder/co-founders) – that was mainly formed in order to tackle strategic and administrative tasks, and was not meant to create a sense of hierarchy in the organization. This core leadership team along with the other team members formed the larger venture team that handled larger team-level activities and processes together in an egalitarian, participatory and democratic manner. The interviews revealed that in average or high growth startup social ventures, the Shared Leadership (SL) model that emerged in such teams – due to collective leadership activation – had the following key structural and processual dimensions (described in depth below):

- Egalitarian Culture and Collaborative Approach to team-level leadership responsibilities (Shared Principles)
- Shared Protocol about the team-level leadership processes of –
 - Task Division
 - Decision Making
 - Goal Setting and Planning

- Accountability and Ownership

a) Egalitarian Team Culture and Collaborative Approach to team-level leadership responsibilities (Shared Principles) –

The qualitative data analysis highlighted that the SL model in a successful startup social venture was characterised with an egalitarian team culture and a collaborative approach to undertaking and executive team-level leadership responsibilities. This democratic team culture and approach included a strong collective sense of identification with the team as a group and the members of such teams frequently used collective language in their interviews, such as 'We/Us' rather than 'I/Me'. The organizational structures related to such SL models also appeared to be more distributed and less hierarchical in nature. In smaller teams, there was little to no sense of hierarchy and in slightly larger teams, team members claimed that the seemingly hierarchical titles and positions only existed for official/administrative reasons and the team culture in reality did not reflect those positions, but instead was more democratic and egalitarian in nature. Everyone in the team felt that they had a 'right' and 'duty' towards contributing to and shaping the future of the venture. The founder and the team members functioned together as a unit, at the same psychological level, and adopted a collaborative and participatory approach to undertaking and executing team-level responsibilities. Such team leadership responsibilities included decision making, goal setting and planning, task division and creating accountability, and these team-level leadership processes have been described in the next point below. Further, this collaborative and egalitarian team leadership approach, in the SL model of a successful social venture, is closely related to the associated and complementary team-level process of Supportive Team Member Exchange, which has been explained in detail in Chapter 5. Unique to the startup social enterprise context, some interviews revealed that in successful social ventures, this democratic approach transcended beyond just the team, and also contributed to a respectful and egalitarian interaction between team members and the beneficiaries and/or low income users of the organization. Team members in such democratic organizations (using an SL approach), did not look down upon low-income beneficiaries/users or simply consider them transactional workers/producers for the venture; instead they saw them as equal stakeholders in the organization and this egalitarian approach was reflected in their daily interactions with the users/beneficiaries. This was an interesting insight, that was unique to social enterprises, about how an SL approach can help shape egalitarian relationships between team members and low-income beneficiaries of startup social ventures. Another unique and fascinating cultural insight that emerged from the interviews was that sharing food and having a team lunch was considered an important part of this egalitarian SL approach and this aspect of sharing a meal together appeared to act as an equaliser in the team, where everyone in the organization – from the founders, to the team members, to the low-income users/beneficiaries or producers – were all on the same level when enjoying a meal together. This team bonding activity that contributed to the democratic SL model is perhaps characteristic of the national culture in India, where sharing food as a group is a very important cultural phenomenon. Hence, in this way, the interviews revealed insights about the SL approach, that were not

just unique to the social enterprise context (which often deals with individuals who come from low-income backgrounds), but that also shed light on interesting cultural factors that perhaps further contributed to the way that SL models manifest themselves in startup social venture teams in India. Thus, overall the egalitarian approach of SL models in startup social ventures further help to reinforce the value-centric nature (shared principles) of such purposeful organizations.

Interview excerpts from some organizations help to clearly illustrate this egalitarian and collaborative feature of SL models in successful startup social ventures. For example, a core team member of a high growth environment focused social enterprise, who was groomed into a leadership role by the co-founders, mentioned that there was no hierarchical demarcation within her team and that the co-founders, team members and beneficiaries were all considered to be on an equal level, with equal rights in the team. Her interview also clearly illustrates the unique insights about egalitarian interactions between team members and low-income beneficiaries, as well as, about how food sharing acts as an equalising activity within the team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Maybe because we three, me, [co-founder 1], and [co founder 2], we just get into everyone's space and just be there. It is not like they are running the company and they are working for us or these are the helpers, that kind of demarcation I have not seen ever. We all have lunch together, we all sit down on the floor and have it, the dabbas [tiffin boxes] are shared, the lunch is shared thoroughly and there is no demarcation at all anywhere about anything. You are in need of money? How much money do you want? Okay, take it. You have some problems, physical problems, family problems; whatever is the problem. What is the problem? So and so, so and so, yeah, discuss it and let's help it. It is as simple and straight as that. So I think because of that, people don't think much that how do I tell them, that's why maybe it's open. In the tailor's room, I just go and sit down on the floor and I can work with the helpers, I do the thread cutting and whatever the girls are doing. So anyone will do anything, that's why it's all a mix, it's all gelled... ...They [beneficiaries] are team members because their ideas are directly taken into consideration. They don't have to go through levels or permissions. If they say, 'I think we should do it like this', nobody will ever for a second tell them, 'do you really think so?' or 'why are you doing this? Why are you making any change?' It is first rule – we can try? Yes. And they just try it." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth environment venture – illustrating the egalitarian culture and collaborative approach in the venture (part of SL model)

Table 26: Illustrative Quote for Egalitarian Culture and Collaborative Approach (SL)

In another example from a high growth youth and community development social venture, one of the team members explained how the five defined values of the organization (personal/professional growth and development, ownership,

entrepreneurship, social orientation and fun) were co-decided by all the five members of the core team in an egalitarian manner. This shared leadership approach played an important role in shaping the organizational culture, values (shared principles) and team interaction dynamic/environment in the social venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...For a while they [co-founders] have been wanting to have a team which will hold the culture which is very loving, nurturing, also like they feel like a group of friends working together. And for me it really connected. I connected to that a lot. In the beginning when it was – it was just five of us. It was exactly like that. So we would all work together. We would meet to share updates with each other. But it would be very – it was like sitting with a group of friends and over tea or explaining, okay this is what happened, this is what happened. So in terms of culture, that's the year we also set those five values, which she was telling you about. And that was also co-decided. Like, all of us came together and kind of shared and pushed back on certain things and then we decided what those five values were." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth venture focused on youth and community development – illustrating the egalitarian culture and collaborative approach in the venture (part of SL model)

Table 27: Illustrative Quote for Egalitarian Culture and Collaborative Approach (SL)

The first dimension of an egalitarian culture and collaborative approach (shared principles) to team-level leadership responsibilities shapes the second dimension of SL models in successful social ventures, which is the shared protocol about the team-level leadership processes in the organization. Characteristics about such shared processual protocols are explained further in the next point below.

b) Shared Protocol about team-level leadership processes –

The egalitarian and collaborative approach of an SL model (shared principles) in turn shapes the emergence of a shared protocol amongst team members about how to undertake and execute important team-level leadership processes. The four key team-level leadership processes that were identified in the qualitative data analysis were Task Division, Decision Making, Goal Setting and Planning and acting with Accountability and Ownership towards the organization as a whole. The important team process of learning and innovation was also clearly identified in the interviews, but this process will be examined as part of a separate detailed section on Team Learning in Chapter 5 (related to mediating team processes). While the SL model in a startup venture inculcated a distributed and democratic approach in the team, the specific processual protocols (related to the processes mentioned above) varied from team to team, wherein some teams take a flat approach to team processes, while other teams were largely democratic in nature, but the final onus of taking decisions or enforcing deadlines may lie with the founder or the core leadership team. Despite this variation, the common element across all successful social ventures was that the teams mutually agreed up and upheld a Shared Protocol about team-level leadership processes. Thus, regardless of whether the SL model was completely or partially flat

in nature, the team protocol about the way the SL activities were executed in the organization, was 'shared' and mutually agreed upon by the team members – the Shared Protocol had collective team buy-in and hence, was a key feature of the SL model in such ventures. The actual process of collectively agreeing upon such shared team protocols was done through formal and informal team discussions and other methods of organizational sensemaking, and this specific protocol-making process will be discussed in further detail in the 'Common Team Wavelength' section in Chapter 6. The specific shared protocols about important team-level leadership processes have been described below.

- **Task Division**

As part of the SL model, the division and allocation of key venture tasks, functions and activities were done in a democratic and egalitarian manner, even though the exact approach or method of task division varied from venture to venture. In some teams, the tasks were divided between the founder and the team members depending on the individual's skill and interest level in that particular activity or function, and even the founders would approach their own task allocation with a similar egalitarian approach. In other teams, team members were asked to identify functional areas that they were passionate about and wanted to contribute to, and depending on their interest level, specific tasks were allocated to them and they could lead that function; while still being required to contribute to a pool of team activities that required the whole team's participation. Finally, some very early stage teams also had a more ad-hoc (albeit potentially unstructured) approach to task division, where some team tasks were allocated based on an individual team member's time availability and in case that person was too busy at the last moment, the task would get handed over to the team at large, with everyone (or some of the team members) chipping in to complete the task on time, depending on who was available at that time. This 'chipping in' approach has been discussed in greater detail in the section about 'Supportive Team Member Exchange' in Chapter 6. However, this chipping in approach works favourably only in teams where there are other focusing factors and guardrails in place, and without the presence of accountability mechanisms, this ad-hoc approach can have negative outcomes on the venture's performance; as observed in some low/stagnated growth or failed social enterprises. It must also be noted that given the dynamic nature of a startup environment, some teams also used a combination of the task division approaches outlined, depending on the needs of that particular venture at a specific point of time. Regardless of which task division method a team adopted, the team protocol related to that chosen task division approach was 'shared' and collectively agreed upon by the team as a whole.

The interviews can help illustrate the shared protocol around task division. In a high growth environment focused venture, the team member mentioned that her team usually had a group of tasks for the week or the month and then the tasks were just allocated among the team based on what the people want to do, what they are good at and what interests them; so that someone doesn't get stuck doing a task that they don't like, enjoy, or that they are not good at.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Task allocation is based on who is "good at what and what interests you, which is very, very important. Because now like for example, what interests – I am very bad at money, finance, and [co founder 1] is very good at that, so it obviously falls in his bucket, everything related to finance. Then [co founder 1] is, according to me and everybody agrees, he is not very good with all colors and combinations and design, so it obviously comes to me. And [co founder 2] is extremely good at people handling, I mean the customer handling, the people as in not the employees, the customer management and interactions, that obviously goes to her. It is like whatever we enjoy, we have got that task and we are just doing it on a daily basis, so there is no burden as such that now I don't know how to do this and I'm just stuck; I'm just doing this for the sake of it." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth environment venture – illustrating shared protocols about task division in the team (part of SL model)

Table 28: Illustrative Quote for Shared Protocols about Task Division (SL)

In a similar example from an average growth livelihoods and artisan focused social venture, the founder herself admitted that she does not like dealing with large groups of people, while the team member performs well in such situations requiring public interactions with customers and other stakeholders. Hence, in such scenarios, the founder passes on the responsibility to the team member and asks her to take charge in that situation. Thus, through this display of mutual trust and egalitarian task division, the founder and the follower complement each other with their strengths and weaknesses and balance each other out, for the larger good of the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I'll give you an example, we don't do exhibitions, we hate exhibitions because I am somebody who is very comfortable talking to two or three people. When it comes to more, I don't enjoy, I just feel very out of my comfort zone. I still do it if I have to, it's not that I am someone who won't do it, but I don't enjoy it. So I think that's where [team member] steps in and I tell her, can you take over this? So I guess we know how to balance each other well. So if there are some things that are not necessarily my plus points, they are hers, so that's when I can ask her to step up and be like you take care of this and I know I don't have to worry about it." – Founder</i>	Founder of an average growth livelihoods venture – illustrating shared protocols about task division in the team (part of SL model)

Table 29: Illustrative Quote for Shared Protocols about Task Division (SL)

On the other hand, in a low growth environment focused venture, the founder and team member mentioned that they took a rotating approach to task division, where team activities responsibilities would rotate between team members in a somewhat adhoc basis. The founder admitted that this

unstructured approach might work at the early start up stage, but could negatively harm the firm's performance in the long run. In the case of this particular startup, there were not many guardrails or accountability mechanisms in place to counter balance the unstructured albeit democratic leadership approach (this theme is explored in greater detail in section 4.6 about Paradoxical Leadership), and this enterprise did in fact experience low and stagnated growth in terms of venture performance.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Yeah, so it's like – as a simple example – to take on documentation, so when we have a meeting and when we discuss all the things, so suppose I am the person who will be documenting for this time, I will document all the minutes of meetings and whatever we have discussed and what we came into – some of the ideas which we have kept to think or ponder separately or afterwards. So if I am doing the documentation this time, so on other meetings someone else will be doing it. On the next meeting, someone else will be doing it, it's like that." – Team Member</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a low/stagnated growth environment venture – illustrating the negative effects of unstructured albeit shared task division
<i>"..If we are exchanging the role, the kind of efficiency with which I may work, the same efficiency the other person might not work. And that also again hampers the operations or some activities. Like if I do – and at the same time one more thing is like so whenever I do certain activity and I take 5 hours, so immediately if you are on a decision-making role or leadership role, you immediately give that activity to the other person and you say you also do it in 5 hours without considering their learning pace or their doing pace. So I or sometimes my brother [co-founder], they tend to relate with their own experience saying I did it in 6 hours or I did it in 5 hours, so you do in 5 hours..."</i>	
<i>...In the long run, this would be harmful, but right now because it at an early stage level and mostly the work..doesn't involve so many problems and deep things." – Founder</i>	

Table 30: Quotes illustrating the negative effects of Shared Task Division (without enough accountability mechanisms in place)

Hence, as illustrated above, shared protocols about task division may have varied from venture to venture, but the common theme across successful social enterprises was that such teams took a democratic and egalitarian approach to the task allocation, when dividing and distributing the various activities and functions within the organizations.

- **Decision Making**

Similar to Task Division, the team's shared protocol to Decision Making in an SL model, varied from venture to venture. In some teams, the founder and the

core leadership team (if applicable) would first democratically consult the larger team and take their inputs relating to a certain issue, and then it was agreed collectively that the final decision would be taken by the founder or core team. In other teams, the team mutually agreed that certain topics/issues had to be demarcated according to strategic priority and urgency (triaging), and decisions related to certain non-urgent issues would be collectively discussed and decided by the whole team, while other more urgent or high priority issues were decided by the founder or core leadership team. This structured (partially shared, partially hierarchical) approach to decision making was observed more in slightly larger teams in high growth social ventures. In smaller teams which were comprised of only the founder and a few team members, decision making was handled in a more case-to-case basis. For example, in some situations, the team member could take the lead on a decision but would have to first get the founder on board with the idea and demonstrate that the idea or decision would work favourably for the venture. In other cases, the final decision would rest with the founder, but he/she/they would consult/inform the team about the decision in a transparent manner and would provide the team with a clear and logical reason about why that decision was taken. Regardless of the decision making approach undertaken, the common themes for the shared protocol about decision making, across such teams, were transparency and honesty – it was mutually agreed by the whole team that all team members needed to be informed and consulted about the decision making process in an honest and transparent manner.

The interviews can help to illustrate the shared team protocol about decision making. For example, in a high growth education venture (with a slightly larger team than other average growth ventures), focused on learning disorders among low-income children, minor and micro-level decisions were taken by the team collectively, after a group discussion about the specific matters at hand. For bigger decisions, the team would jointly approach the second-line team leader (who would then consult the founder if required) to explain the reason behind their request and after receiving the approval from the founder/leader, the team could go ahead with their decision.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"If there are minor decisions like for the sessions being taken or the teaching aids or the lesson plans, all those things, if it's a small thing then the team itself takes the decision. If we want we do discuss it with the other members of the team. For example if we have to buy something, then we need an approval from [team leader] ma'am. So that's when we talk to her, we explain her why exactly we need this teaching aid, and how are we going to use it, and then she approves it. But even if that teaching aid is expensive or it's something that she's not – she is herself very confused about it, then she'll talk to [founder] ma'am, take her permission as to these things have been happening, can we approve it, then [founder] ma'am gives the approval and then the approval is passed on to us."</i> – Team Member	Team member in a high growth education venture – illustrating shared protocols about decision making in the team (part of SL model)

Table 31: Illustrative Quote for Shared Protocols about Decision Making (SL)

In another example from a smaller average growth agriculture focused venture, the founder and the team member each handled specific functions and both of them have mutually agreed that they are free to take the decisions for their own segments. When dealing with doubts or challenges in decision making, the team member consults the founder to get her expert opinion, in order to take the best decision possible for the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...Now the idea is that we've divided the segments, so I am free to take decisions in the segment that I want to. Like in the B2C, I am free to take decisions in. I just – whenever I have my doubts, I just have to share it with or I would just ask [the founder] because she has been doing the business for some time, right, so she would have a better idea..."</i> <i>...So we've divided that among each other right now, so then it doesn't matter whether it's B2C or B2B. Then it's like, you do this and I do this and then we just have to finish it off so that we can then really go on strongly then from there."</i> – Team Member	Team member in an average growth agriculture venture – illustrating shared protocols about decision making in the team (part of SL model)

Table 32: Illustrative Quote for Shared Protocols about Decision Making (SL)

In contrast, in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods focused venture, the founder revealed that her decision making approach was quite unstructured and random, and that she would consult certain external stakeholders regarding different decisions that she had to make, on a case-to-case basis. However, interestingly, the founder did not talk about taking any inputs from her own team members when making a decision for the organization. In turn, an interview with one of her former team members also confirmed that all the decisions were taken by the founder alone and she did not have much

decision making power. Hence, this sheds light on the lack of shared leadership and shared decision making in this team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Right now there is no system to be honest. It's more like either if I have kind of come across a kind of situation before, kind of assessing against those learnings, whether what should do, or kind of speaking to a couple of people who know [the organization], so say someone like you or say my mom or say friends who have been buying from [the organization] for a while or customers who have become friends, that sort of thing, depending on what the decision is of course."</i> – Founder	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of shared decision making in the team
<i>"Decisions were usually taken by her only. I don't know, there was no decision-making happening by my side."</i> – Team Member	

Table 33: Quotes illustrating a lack of Shared Decision Making in the team

Thus, as outlined above, the shared protocols about decision making varied across the ventures, depending on the team structure in those organizations. However, regardless of who would take the final decisions (founder/core team/full team as a whole), the common theme across all the successful organizations was that the team members would always be consulted and included in the decision making process (in some capacity – depending on the situation).

- **Goal Setting and Planning**

In an SL model, the team's shared protocol about Goal Setting and Planning was very similar to its approach to decision making, as outlined above. In some teams, the founder and the core leadership team (if applicable) would first consult with the larger team in a democratic way and take their inputs and ideas relating to their individual goals, as well as, the collective goals of the organization. After gathering the team's inputs in a participatory way, it was then agreed collectively that the strategic finetuning and finalization of the organizational goals would be done by the founder or core team. In other teams, the team mutually agreed that the topics and goals that were more related to collective team priorities would be discussed and finalized by the team as a whole, while other goals that required more strategic and macro level insights would be handled by the founder or core team. In smaller teams which were comprised of only the founder and a few team members, followers could democratically shape their own individual goals in consultation with the founders, while more strategic organisational goals were decided by the founder in consultation with members in the team. In the event that the goals had already been set by the founders before the team members joined or in case they were decided by the founders as a matter of strategy of priority, the leaders would make it a point to explain the goal setting process

and logic to the team members and get their buy-in about the existing goals and plans for the venture. Further, any future goals would be decided after taking the inputs of the new team members who joined the organization at a later point. Regardless of the approach undertaken, the unifying characteristics of the shared protocol about goal setting and planning, across such ventures, were transparency and collective buy-in – it was mutually agreed by the whole team that all team members needed to be informed and consulted about the goal setting and planning process in a transparent manner, so that everyone in the group would feel a collective sense of ownership to the goals of the venture.

An interview with a team member from a small (average growth) livelihoods focused enterprise illustrated how the founder and her (and other team members) worked together in a very democratic manner to undertake and execute the important team-level responsibility of annual goal planning for the social venture. She also explained how they collaboratively worked together to regularly plan, execute and review week-to-week collective goals and activities, on an ongoing basis. Her interview also illustrated the use of collective language, because she used words like ‘We/Us’, thus highlighting the collective sense of duty she/the team felt towards the organization at a macro level.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“We go backwards, what we think of is what will be the goal of the year that we want to achieve. I think the backward integration process helped us, that you find what’s the goal of the year and then you go back and see what are the activities you can do to reach that goal and what is your timeline, so by when you will reach it and also who is supposed to do what to reach that goal.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth livelihoods venture – illustrating shared protocols about goal setting and planning in the team (part of SL model)
<i>“Generally, we decide upon a day that this is going to be the discussion day, most of the times on Mondays, so that you can plan the week ahead or after 15 days, you have meeting to review, we just decide upon a day and a time in that day, which would be suitable and then we have a discussion...</i> <i>...Some of the times it’s a review discussion of what we have done in the past and how much of it has worked and how much of it has not, it is status discussion. Or some of the times it’s a goal that you want to achieve, so you decide what’s going to be the strategy and what are the things that you need to achieve that. So we kind of write down the things that we need to achieve in order to get to the goal, so some of the discussions are at that, some of the discussions are sheer brainstorming in terms of branding, marketing.” – Team Member</i>	

Table 34: Illustrative Quotes for Shared Protocols about Goal Setting and Planning (SL)

In a slightly larger (high growth) agriculture venture, one of the team members working in the field (in a remote location) mentioned that even though the goals and targets are mainly set by the founder, he consults the workers and team members working on the field site (also known as CRP – Community Resource Person) to understand their personal capacity to produce/yield agricultural output. The founder acknowledges that the field staff will have the best insight into what is possible or not possible, and based on their practical inputs, he decides the final goals and targets, keeping in mind the feasible output capacity of field team members. Hence, through this democratic approach, the founder also ensured that team members in the field are only given goals that they can handle and did not overburden them with work.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“...Mostly [the founder] discusses that this year we have to do this much, and lets us know, or mails it too. He tells us that this is our capacity and it’s better if we do it. He asks us how much we can do best. Until now [the founder] sir has asked me, you have the proper idea about the field, how much do they do, how much a CRP does, how much can they do and what amount will be better for them? So he asks us questions, and accordingly we answer. He assigns only that much work which is possible for them. He does not burden the CRP with work.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth agriculture venture – illustrating shared protocols about goal setting and planning in the team (part of SL model)

Table 35: Illustrative Quote for Shared Protocols about Goal Setting and Planning (SL)

In contrast, in a failed social venture working with female victims of sex trafficking, the founder admitted that he did not have a fixed or formal approach for goal setting. Goals were set for the team/venture mainly by him, in consultation with another core team member (second line leader), and in the case of a disagreement, he mentioned that his own personal goals would usually take priority. Performance/goal reviews and appraisals also happened in a random and adhoc manner. An interview with one of his team members confirmed that the founder preplanned everything and most of the goals were set by him alone. Hence, the quotes below illustrate that there was a lack of shared leadership and shared goal setting within this venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"We obviously didn't have a structure for each person in terms of goal setting, I don't think we had this big organization process in place where you sort of look at promotions and what are your goals this year and appraisals and things like that..Honestly, appraisals just happened when they wanted to, when they came up to me and said, look I need a raise and try and negotiate it...There was not a formal process in place..."</i> <i>...Organizational goals are just mostly me, working with second line leader] again on cases, this is what we have achieved, this is where we need to get. And yeah again, on the business side it was mostly my goals, right. And sometimes we did disagree on some goals in which case I sort of I think I had to make my goal sort of take priority, but yeah we sort discuss things." – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a failed social venture focused on women empowerment – illustrating a lack of shared goal setting and planning in the team
<i>"We divide the work but most of the things, they are set by [the founder] actually. He preplans everything and discusses with us." – Team Member</i>	

Table 36: Quotes illustrating a lack of Shared Goal Setting and Planning in the team

Hence, through these interviews, it has been demonstrated that in successful organizations, the SL process of goal setting and planning was done in a democratic and participatory manner, with team members being actively consulted (in some capacity – depending on the organization) about their personal and/or organizational goals of the ventures.

- **Acting with Accountability and Ownership**

After egalitarian task division, transparent decision making and democratic goal setting and planning, teams with SL models also had a strong shared protocol about how to act with collective accountability and ownership, in order uphold the decisions, goals and values of their organizations. Accountability and ownership were inculcated, exhibited and enforced in several ways across the successful social venture teams. For example, in such ventures, team review meetings were regularly scheduled, where everyone in the team had to give individual updates about their individual tasks and everyone collectively had to review the task progress and hold each other accountable to the individual and venture goals. These scheduled team review sessions would happen in-person on a weekly/bi-weekly/monthly basis, in the team's office or meeting space and more ongoing progress reviews and check-ins would happen online, mainly via WhatsApp and sometimes via group conference calls (audio or video). During these review meetings and regular check-ins, team members agreed to be transparent about their work progress, with the shared understanding that they were part of a safe work environment, where people can be honest with each other without being penalised or judged. It was the shared expectation that if an individual cannot get his/her/their task done or reach their goal on time, then

they should ask for the help of their team mates in order to complete the activities and meet the venture goals within the given timeline/deadline. While there was collective ownership about these shared accountability protocols, it was also mutually agreed by everyone that the final onus of ensuring team discipline and accountability was with the founder or core leadership team. In fact, several interviews revealed the importance of ensuring an optimal balance between having shared purpose/collective protocols and enforcing organizational discipline and accountability in startup social ventures. This aspect of balance has been described in detail in the next section related to ‘Paradoxical Leadership’ and ‘Control-Stretch Balance’ within the team.

The interviews can shed light on how this shared accountability and collective ownership worked practically within the organizations. The co-founder of a high growth environment venture explained how the team used shared accountability mechanisms such as a shared to-do list (via technological mediums) and structured updates in face-to-face meetings to foster a shared sense of ownership and discipline for all team members (including the co-founders) and within the group as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“We have regular meetings in which we have tasks defined and are followed up in the next meetings. So, we have a to-do list. We use to use Asana (app) initially, and now we maintain it on an Excel sheet. Because of this, we can track the entire work, how things are progressing. This is where the roles and responsibilities are divided, like who does what, how much time it needs to be done in, and is it done or not, all that we can understand, and if it’s not happening, then why.</i> <i>Once this is managed well, it’s easy to understand who is doing the work, how long will it take, all this is divided well, defined well, and is listed out in one place. This reduces all confusions. That is the most important. Additionally, regular updates about what is happening and what is not happening and why in the meetings is required, discussions regarding what’s happening and why are things not happening. So, meetings and to-do list I think are very important.” – Co-Founder</i>	Co-founder of a high growth environment venture – illustrating shared protocols about acting with accountability and ownership in the team (part of SL model)

Table 37: Illustrative Quotes for Acting with Ownership and Accountability (SL)

In another interview, a team member in an agriculture focused venture (with above-average growth) revealed that all team members had to maintain their own progress journals and also log their updates on a shared Google spreadsheet (shared virtual Excel sheet), in a transparent manner. The progress journals of each team member were further discussed during the team’s weekly meetings (on a fixed day). Hence, using this shared team protocol about accountability, the team effectively used a combination of

technological platforms and face-to-face meetings to create and maintain ownership within the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...We had everything planned out like what work to be done by what team. There is an Excel sheet, which we have to maintain, journals we have to maintain, so these are checked by [CEO] herself. Right now, we have conducted demos in all the nine states, that file I have maintained it, I have placed in Google docs so I have shared with all three of them [co-founders]. Daily I maintain it, I put on the data and all and this data is reflected over there on my Google sheet and shared by them, so they check it every day. If they have got some doubt what's wrong with this trial, why this case is not closed, it directly comes to me so I address them like that." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average/high growth environment venture – illustrating shared protocols about acting with accountability and ownership in the team (part of SL model)
<i>"Team meetings, they are done weekly, probably Friday or Saturday, like that. Everyone is there, we have got some meeting room. First I will go, then [name of a team member] will go, then [name of another team member] will go. We have got our journals, we have to maintain that, we go over there, we note down the points, whatever new work they have given, we have to address it like that." – Team Member</i>	

Table 38: Illustrative Quotes for Acting with Ownership and Accountability (SL)

In contrast, the founder of a low/stagnated growth social venture, working on sustainable fashion, mentioned that she was dissatisfied with the lack of ownership displayed by one of her key team members. Instead of the team member owning every part of the task and being fully engaged in it, the founder had to actually chase her to get the job done. An interview with that specific team member revealed that there was no formal shared accountability or reporting process in place in the venture, due to which the team-level updates and discussions were more random and adhoc. The team member also mentioned that she in fact had gotten too busy with other tasks (outside of the venture) and couldn't dedicate much time to the enterprise any more. Hence, by combining insights from both the interviews, it can be understood that a lack of a shared protocol about team-level accountability systems led to poor team member engagement in the organization.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Because like [team member] is the Product Designer; right? She's the one who I would have expected to completely own the product and be obsessed with it and be obsessed with the finishing and the zipper and the details and everything. But that just didn't happen with her; that's just not who she is; you know. And also she has a lot of other things going on in her personal & professional life, that she's just not able to bring ownership. It's really..our relationship is more about me chasing her. And me kind of saying, "Ok, here are three options, pick one". So in a sense, I'm designing it, you know. I'm just getting her to say yes or no, which is not how it should be at all." – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a low/stagnated growth venture focused on sustainable fashion – illustrating a lack of shared ownership and accountability in the team
<i>"...We didn't really have a step by step process. I mean I had a design process that I shared with her, like this is how I think it would work and of course, she having worked in this, having done this process over and over again, also shed light: "You know what, this is feasible, this is not feasible". So it was constant communication that we had back and forth that has led to where we are right now; like even right now, towards the point..it got busy. I got busy and I couldn't dedicate time..." – Team Member</i>	

Table 39: Quotes illustrating a lack of Shared Ownership and Accountability in the team

Thus, as outlined above, the examples from the different interviews have illustrated that successful organizations had a clear shared protocol about team-level accountability, and such teams used a combination of technological and face-to-face platforms to inculcate and practically execute collective ownership (for tasks and goals) within the ventures.

Thus, while the overall SL processual and structural dimensions were common or similar across the different successful social startups, the specific features or manifestation of each process or dimension varied slightly from venture to venture – as illustrated by the interview examples outlined above. The data analysis revealed that common processual dimensions aside, the SL model (a combination of shared principles and protocols) across each successful startup social enterprise had three common characteristics:

- It was context-specific – The exact manifestation of the SL model varied across the different ventures, depending on the specific ethos/fabric, member composition and organizational values of that particular team or organization.
- It was co-created and mutually agreed upon – Connected to the earlier point, the SL model was co-created and mutually agreed upon by the founders and the core team members in a collaborative way, to fit the unique needs and circumstances of the specific social venture.
- It was inclusive and adaptable – In the spirit of collective buy-in and mutual agreement, the SL approach that was initially crafted by the core team members was inclusive and adaptable in nature (even though the core values of the organization

largely remained the same, serving as a moral compass), in order to accommodate and plug in the needs and opinions of new team members who joined later.

Hence, given the context-specific, co-created, mutually agreed upon, inclusive and adaptable nature of the SL approach, the SL model (a combination of shared principles and protocols) of each successful social enterprise was contextually unique and connected to the specific identity of that particular startup social venture. The following excerpt from an interview with a team member in a high growth education venture beautifully illustrates the various ways in which SL was embedded into the team's culture, psyche and processes and perfectly sums up the collective findings related to Shared Leadership that I discovered across several interviews with successful social venture teams.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"We see shared leadership here. I would say induction plays a big role, or in each big program or in the role of each member of the organization, the openness is visible. There is a democratic way in communication, and such a platform is already created by the organization. That's why even the new joiners readily accept the culture...Everyone sits together during the Thursday meetings and share with each other. There is a platform for transparency such that the views are easily shared. So, the shared leadership is sustained. There is no burden on any single person. Also, no one is more important or less important. Everyone is doing something in their own field. This is visible." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth education venture – illustrating the all-encompassing presence of SL in the venture/team

Table 40: Illustrative Quote for Shared Leadership in a successful social venture team

Link to the next construct

The shared principles (egalitarian culture and collaborative approach) and shared protocols to team-level leadership responsibilities in the SL model of successful social ventures, truly inculcated a democratic ethos and a strong collective identity for those startup teams. However, some low/stagnated or failed ventures also exhibited some elements of the SL model, even though they were largely unsuccessful in their venture performance in the long run. Hence, one of the key factors that differentiated successful and unsuccessful ventures was the presence of paradoxical leadership – that is an optimal balance between shared purpose/protocols and accountability/discipline – alongside the SL models in the successful teams. This construct has been explained in detail in the next section below.

4.6) Paradoxical Leadership – Balance between Control/Discipline and Stretch Mechanisms in the Team

Construct Definition

The insights from the qualitative data analysis indicated that the balancing presence of Paradoxical Leadership (PL) moderated the positive effects of SL in successful startup social ventures. This construct draws from the extant theory about paradoxical leadership (Zhang et al., 2015) and links it to the concepts of ‘control/discipline’, ‘stretch’ and ‘organizational ambidexterity’ from the leadership performance management literature (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Glaser et al., 2015). Paradoxical leadership behaviour comprises of the following five behavioural-processual dimensions that create ‘structured flexibility’ in the team: “(1) combining self-centered-ness with other-centeredness; (2) maintaining both distance and closeness; (3) treating subordinates uniformly, while allowing individualization; (4) enforcing work requirements, while allowing flexibility; and (5) maintaining decision control, while allowing autonomy” (Zhang et al., 2015, pg. 541).

At a micro-organizational level, the paradoxical leadership approach in hybrid ventures can manifest itself in the form of balancing control/discipline and stretch mechanisms within the team, in order to achieve organizational ambidexterity. As defined by Ghoshal & Bartlett, (1994), Control/Discipline mechanisms induce “individuals to voluntarily strive to meet all expectations generated by their explicit or implicit commitments. Establishing clear standards of performance and behavior, having a system of candid and fast-cycle feedback, and applying sanctions consistently help to instill discipline” (Glaser et al., 2016, pg. 1345). On the other hand, stretch mechanisms refer “to a context in which employees voluntarily strive for more, rather than less, ambitious objectives. Developing a shared ambition and collective identity, along with promoting a sense of personal accomplishment, contributes to the establishment of stretch” (Glaser et al., 2016, pg. 1345). When combined together, discipline and stretch mechanisms define and shape the strength of a team’s performance management context (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Glaser et al., 2016).

Balance between Control and Stretch Mechanisms within the Team

The qualitative data analysis confirmed the presence of control/discipline and stretch mechanisms in the startup social ventures and revealed that the founders and leaders of the successful enterprise teams managed to optimally balance the interaction between competing factors (through the means of paradoxical leadership); and this in turn potentially moderated the positive effects of SL and had a favourable influence on the team and venture level outcomes of the organizations in the long run.

a) Control/Discipline Mechanisms

The interviews revealed that in startup social enterprises, control/discipline mechanisms manifest themselves in the form of formal or informal processes or actions that enforced or asserted the importance of job role ownership, work task accountability, goal ownership/accountability, transparent information sharing, commitment to work quality, and timeliness for work deadlines. Examples of control/discipline mechanisms in successful social startups included scheduled and regular individual/team work updates at group forums (such as weekly team

meetings) to instil a spirit of collective accountability, regularly mentioning the team's short term and long term goals during team interactions (such as meetings, WhatsApp groups, one-on-one conversations, etc.) in order to embed the individual and collective ownership of the team goals into the team psyche, using tech-enabled information sharing systems to inculcate group accountability, and discussing individual/team mistakes and failures at group forums in order to collectively learn from the mistakes and co-create a solution together as a team (with group buy-in).

The control mechanisms in the startup teams are closely interlinked with the shared protocols about accountability and ownership, as part of the SL model (as outlined by the startup examples in the earlier point). To further illustrate this point, the following excerpt from an interview with the co-founder of a high growth venture, focused on livelihood generation for low-income women, showcases how her team used a combination of control mechanisms – technological platforms and face-to-face meetings – to foster accountability and discipline within the group. The team used a shared task list on a work management app called Wunderlist, and they would each check and update this shared checklist in a transparent and on-going manner. The co-founder would also monitor this checklist to maintain discipline in the team, without micro-managing the team members and letting them take self-driven control of their responsibilities by themselves. In addition, they also conducted weekly team meetings on a fixed day, where everyone had the opportunity to share updates, give and receive feedback and collectively report and review the task/goal progress of individual members and the group as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"So we have a very transparent app that we use for tasks, it's called Wunderlist. So we also use professional tasks, so if there's something that I have delegated, I specifically put it up and they would tick it when they get done with it. So that for every minutest thing we don't have to keep reporting, and it's a shared task list, so everybody knows that." – Founder</i>	Co-founder of a high growth livelihoods venture – illustrating the presence of control/discipline mechanisms in the venture/team
<i>"So every Monday morning, everybody knows that you don't have to take up any meeting or do anything because you are in the office doing a team meeting. So Mondays, a good half day goes into reporting what we have done and the progress and everybody knows about everything, giving feedback, and then we are also planning for the coming week." – Founder</i>	
<i>"Also..the team meeting structure was a big hit because people felt like they were involved or a part of something bigger than what they are doing currently, it also gives them a lot of scope for feedback. Everybody has opinions. They love to share it, saying this is not right – so we take it as feedback. We also give feedback. So especially the background context that we create is that of openness. Everybody has to – it's not criticizing, it's feedback. Everybody has to take in that thing." – Founder</i>	

Table 41: Illustrative Quotes for Control/Discipline Mechanisms in the team

In successful ventures, the process of team-level accountability and transparent information sharing (control mechanism) were not just restricted to the main team members in the head offices, but it also involved getting important information and insights from team members and beneficiaries working in the field (sometimes in remote areas). A team member from an average growth agriculture venture explained how the team used a special software app called FieldSense to gather important on-site data and insights from the field staff in a systematic manner. Through this app, field staff shared information with their team leaders (in the office) in a transparent manner. In this way, the process of team accountability and information sharing was also bottom-up in nature, and the important insights from the field routinely informed the actions and decisions of the team in the head office, in relation to the strategies and performance of the whole venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“For field staff we have got FieldSense, a software app, we have purchased it. [Field staff member] is having one trial outside in [name of remote village], so he goes over there, for that I have to create his visit on FieldSense. Then I will be tracking him where he is going, the punch-in time, the check-in time and at what time he has reached over there, all will be noted down. So, there is a facility in the app itself. And how was the outcome from the dealer. In the field itself, there are various forms like what will be the information regarding the farmer, information regarding the product he has given to the farmer, then the land acquired by him and which product he has suggested to him.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth agriculture venture – illustrating the presence of control/discipline mechanisms in the venture/team

Table 42: Illustrative Quote for Control/Discipline Mechanisms in the team

b) Stretch Mechanisms

On the other hand, stretch mechanisms in startup social ventures operated in the form of formal or informal processes that reinforced a shared social purpose/vision, shared team principles and protocols, a focus on personal and collective growth and development, and a shared social cause-focused team identity (in the form of SCP congruence). Examples of stretch mechanisms in the successful startup ventures included designing the team’s culture, values and processes to be based on the shared social purpose/vision, spending time and effort in co-creating shared team principles and protocols about team-level processes and ensuring collective team buy-in for such rules and routines, regularly mentioning the team’s shared social cause/vision during team interactions (such as meetings, WhatsApp groups, one-on-one conversations, etc.) in order to embed the collective ownership of the shared social vision into the team psyche, meaningful leadership and team interactions which ensured that team members felt supported enough to continually learn, grow and thrive (personally and collectively) in the organizations, aligning personal goals to organizational goals, etc.

The stretch mechanisms in the social ventures are closely interlinked with the shared team principles and protocols as part of the SL model (as discussed through SL examples, earlier in this chapter), as well as, the process of mission reinforcement

within the team (which will be discussed in Chapter 5). The following excerpt, from an interview with a team member working in a high growth social venture focused on youth development, illustrates how the core team members sit together to collectively decide how their personal work goals align to the overall organizational goals (connected to the social vision). The co-founders and team leaders actively try to get the whole team's collective buy-in when making decisions about organizational goals, in order to ensure that everyone is moving together in the same direction.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"..Whatever decisions we take as an organization, normally we involve our core team and we decide what exactly we want to achieve in the whole year. Beginning of the year we sit together, we see how our goals are aligned with the organizational goal, and then we set up some goals for us, and we all try to move in one direction. So, I think that's the approach we take at management level and similarly it goes down.</i> <i>Yeah, everybody is free to express their opinion, and everybody's opinion is heard. Obviously, leaders have to make their own decisions based on the conversation and they have to have everybody's buy-in. So we try to do that most of the time. We are a very people-centric organization, so we take care of our people..."</i> <i>– Team Member</i>	Team member in an high growth venture focused on youth development – illustrating the presence of stretch mechanisms in the venture/team

Table 43: Illustrative Quote for Stretch Mechanisms in the team

An interview with a team member from a high growth education venture showcased how SL was embedded into the team's culture and psyche through various stretch mechanisms, that were designed to instil a shared sense of ownership and an inclusive participatory approach in the team. Examples of such mechanisms included having a fixed day of the week to conduct team-learning oriented discussions where everyone was encouraged to share their views/give feedback, appointing a different team member each time to run the team meetings every week, enabling team members to take initiative/run new programs and encouraging several different team members to participate in the various member-led programs/initiatives that were run in the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...Any one day is decided as office day. On that day, sharing of views and discussion on all that happened in that week, giving and receiving feedback is conducted...We encourage each other to participate in the various programs, like I mentioned earlier, the DIY [Do It Yourself] workshop during Diwali [Indian festival]. We encourage different people to participate instead of the same person each time...For team meetings, a facilitator is chosen per week. It will be a new person each week. This is taken up willingly by the person. The facilitator makes a few pointers for discussion and shares with the team. The meeting generally goes on for 1 to 1-1/2 hours in which the views on the pointers are shared, and then</i>	Team member in an high growth education venture – illustrating the presence of stretch mechanisms in the venture/team

<i>there is a cross discussion on those views.” – Team Member</i>	

Table 44: Illustrative Quote for Stretch Mechanisms in the team

c) Paradoxical Leadership – Control-Stretch Balance in the Team

The end objective of both the control/discipline and the stretch mechanisms in the startup social enterprises were to ensure the positive performance of the organization in the pursuit of the firm's dual goals of social impact creation and financial sustainability. In average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases), this construct was characterized by an optimal impact-focused balance between control/discipline and stretch mechanisms, which was orchestrated through the practice of PL by the founders and leaders of the ventures. In some cases, the solo founders themselves consciously practised PL; while in other cases, co-founder teams, founder-second line leader dyads or core leadership teams displayed contrasting yet complementary leadership approaches (a manifestation of PL), which in turn imbibed control-stretch balance within the teams. Average growth enterprises typically had informal or semi-structured (often implicit) control/discipline mechanisms, as well as, an explicit central focus on the stretch mechanisms. High growth enterprises had more formal or structured (often explicit) control/discipline mechanisms or processes, with an equally important and defined (if not greater) focus on stretch mechanisms. Low growth or failed startup social enterprises lacked an optimal impact-focused balance between these two mechanisms. In such enterprises, founders or leaders did not successfully practice PL and hence, there were little to no control/discipline mechanisms in place; or in the other extreme case, had too much of a focus on discipline/control with not much focus on the stretch mechanisms of shared team protocols or collective social cause identity. It must be noted that the balance between 'control/discipline' and 'stretch' mechanisms in such teams must be viewed as a dynamic continuum (not a static state), constantly changing and evolving alongside the organization's growth journey, as well as, the founders' and leaders' evolving capabilities to practice PL successfully in their ventures.

The interviews can help to illustrate how the founders and leaders in successful organizations practised PL to ensure an optimal balance between control and stretch mechanisms in the teams, for the greater good (and better performance) of the startup social ventures. The solo founder of an average growth environment focused venture mentioned that she mostly tried to take the middle ground when making decisions, by incorporating the views of the team members in the decision making process. However, sometimes she had to be a bit more authoritarian when taking some strategic decisions, if she strongly believed in her stand (in the case of two completely opposing views), unless there was a strong counter argument to her decision. Even if she had to be a bit more directive when making some decisions, she would inform the team members about her thinking and make them understand her rationale. This disciplined approach to decision making worked as a control mechanism in her team, ensuring that the venture stays on the right path. At the same time, she balanced her approach by constantly keeping the team members involved and updated about all the new activities of the organization in a transparent

manner, and by ensuring that the team members were always engaged and motivated about the bigger social vision and goals of the venture; in order to make them feel like they are contributing to a larger purpose. This vision-oriented team motivation and communication in turn worked as a stretch mechanism in the team. Hence, in this way, this founder practised PL with her team, to create an optimal control-stretch balance within the venture as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So what I believe is that I’m pretty collaborative as a leader; so I like to find a solution that’s sort of middle ground for everyone. But having said that; it’s not always easy..like there are going to be disputes when you completely oppose; there are two opposite sides. So..if I’m in that space..because it’s my company and because I’m a solo founder; I don’t have a co-founder relationship – at that point I sort of have to be a little authoritarian and kind of make sure that the decision is based on what I believe, unless there’s a very strong argument on that side. If that does happen, like where I’m very authoritarian, then I try and kind of get that team member involved with what my thinking behind it was and not just kind of be like, “Ok; this is what I think, this is how it’s going to be”. So I am very open..I also tend to get very excited, so I like to bring the team in on every conversation. So I talk to them about every new thing that happens; it’s not that I kind of wait for it and there are certain things that they’re not privy to or whatever..I also believe that it’s a really big part of my job as a leader to kind of keep them motivated and keep them involved with the story and make them realise that things are happening on a constant basis, even though it may not seem that way on the surface – because that’s when they feel like they’re a part of a larger story.” – Founder</i>	Founder of an average growth environment venture – illustrating the presence of paradoxical leadership (control-stretch balance) in the team

Table 45: Illustrative Quote for Paradoxical Leadership (Control-Stretch Balance) in the team

In another example, the co-founder of a high growth and more advanced social venture, focused on youth skill development, revealed that he and his co-founder balanced each other out in terms of their leadership approaches (a manifestation of PL) and as a leadership team, they consciously tried to achieve an optimal balance between control and stretch mechanisms within the organization. Even though this venture had already scaled quite successfully and was performing quite well, the co-founder mentioned that they were still striving to find the right balance between performance/goal achievement and creativity/innovation. This particular statement illustrates the point that practising control-stretch balance must not be viewed as a static state or singular milestone, but rather, as a dynamic continuum, that evolves and changes alongside the leaders’ capability to practice PL, as well as, the growth journey and changing needs of the social ventures.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Yeah, I think this balance between getting the work done and delivering, hitting targets, meeting goals, expectations. So that balance with creativity, innovation, new idea, etcetera is hard. And again, I think this does – and this is an area where you know [co-founder] and I probably balance each other well but I am – I lean much more towards let's focus, let's do one thing really well and focus on what we are doing well and let's continue to do it. He is more, you know we need new ideas, we need to innovate, we need to be creative, we need to try new things, etcetera.</i> <i>So I think ultimately maybe that balance is there but I would say that balance is a challenge, right, of making sure that we are meeting the expectations that we have in achieving what we promised to ourselves and promised to our funders and all of that, while at the same time growing and innovative and being creative for the future."</i> – Co-Founder	Co-founder of a high growth venture focused on skill development – illustrating the presence of paradoxical leadership (control-stretch balance) in the team

Table 46: Illustrative Quote for Paradoxical Leadership (Control-Stretch Balance) in the team

Apart from PL practised by solo-founders or by co-founding teams, the interviews revealed that dyads of founders and second line leaders (core leadership team) in successful social ventures also practised PL to ensure a balance of control and stretch mechanisms in the team. The founder of a high growth startup, working in the field of healthcare education, mentioned that she consciously practised a mix of both authoritarian (representing control), as well as, democratic (representing stretch) leadership, depending on the situation, in order to have the best possible outcomes for the venture. Interestingly, an interview with a team member from this enterprise revealed that she thought that the founder had a more democratic (stretch-focused) leadership approach, while the second line team leader had a stricter (control-focused) leadership style. These contrasting yet complementary leadership styles seemed to manifest in the form of a combined paradoxical leadership approach by the founder and the second line team leader. The team member further confirmed that as a core leadership team, the founder and the team leader effectively managed to create accountability and drive performance, while ensuring that they are always supportive and available for the team members, in case anyone needed any help.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I always feel that I have to use a mix of being yes, a little authoritative at times by saying that we need to do this, and there I can't take a lot of opinions because I know that it has worked in the past and it is going to work. There are some areas where I know I would not be able to decide or I know I need opinions or I need to take everybody together to understand what we need to do in this. So there I would still use a very democratic approach and say that okay, let's all put our heads together and decide on a path that we need to achieve. One is using a lot of different approaches."</i> – Founder	Quotes from the founder and a team member of a high growth venture focused on healthcare education – illustrating the presence of paradoxical leadership (control-stretch balance) in the team

<i>"[The founder] ma'am, I think that she is someone who leads by the example, by herself being the person she wants us to be. Like for example, I have seen very few people who are as dedicated to the movement or to the cause as she is. And her leadership style, I don't know for the leadership style, whether it's the right word, but her style is not directive. She always asks, she lays down the outcome that we have to reach but then she takes our inputs as to what do you think you could do, do you think could do this for us...</i> <i>...[Second line team leader]'s approach is – she is very particular about timelines but at the same time she is quite hard, quite a hard taskmaster when it comes to quality in that sense so there have been a lot of times when content has gone back and forth. And about [second line team leader], I think that she is always – she is what I feel as a leader she is got my back. So I feel that support from her, that if she tells me something and I tell her that this topic I am not feeling confident to do, then she gives me the support. I will help you prepare the content, you go ahead, you do it, I am there. So I am there to guide you...</i> <i>...They [founder and second line team leader] make us sit down and say this is what we have to do, this is by when we have to do, so they make that time to sit with us and explain that this is what has to be done, and it has to be done by this time, it has to be done to this quality and then after that you have to let us know whether you can do it or if you cannot do it then what are the problems that you are having and how we can help you." – Team Member</i>	

Table 47: Illustrative Quotes for Paradoxical Leadership (Control-Stretch Balance) in the team

In contrast, the co-founder (CEO) of a low/stagnated growth environment venture mentioned that he had experienced the negative effects of being too democratic (stretch mechanism) without having the necessary checks or control factors in place. He had followed a very democratic leadership approach where all the organizational decisions were taken in a bottom-up and participatory manner. However, not every decision was suited to be handled this way and in some cases, being overly democratic without having some discipline mechanisms in place, led to the bottom-up approach being a bottleneck in the decision making process. Due to this, the achievement of some important venture milestones got delayed; which in turn negatively influenced the firm's future trajectory. A team member from this venture further confirmed the same point, mentioning that the team took too long to make decisions and sometimes the leaders should have just stepped in and enforced a decision so that the job would get done. Thus, the quotes below illustrate how a lack of PL, with too much 'stretch' and too little 'control' mechanisms, negatively impacted the team's decision making and the overall future trajectory of the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"In few decision-making things, like so bottom-up approach, it delayed the entire decision-making process because we wanted to do it more of a democratic way wherein everyone needs to be involved in the entire aspect. So that delayed the process of taking the decision and going into the actions, so this process delayed. For example, even this project, [name of organization] was started through UnLtd India as part of their incubation program..But because I started off with my brother or a couple of other friends, to formally register itself, like there was a lot of delay in that, and understanding from where to get registered and how would the long-term thing looked like and all. But instead of that I think we could have registered in [name of city] and gone ahead and sort of later after our entire Master's or something, we could have just changed our location and other things." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Quotes from the co-founder and a team member of a low/stagnated growth environment venture – illustrating a lack of paradoxical leadership (control-stretch balance) in the team
<i>"I will say that it takes time for decision-making probably. Since we are very open kind of thing, we spend time on discussions and all, so it takes time to accept everyone's yes for the idea, and you have to spend time for discussion on that. So this could be one thing which I think so in democratic leadership, this could be one thing where it takes time on taking a decision. But rather in hierarchy, when management takes a decision, everyone has to do what's taken. So this I would say that it takes time in decision making." – Team Member</i>	

Table 48: Quotes illustrating a lack of Paradoxical Leadership (Control-Stretch Balance) in the team

On the other hand, an interview with the founder of another low/stagnated growth venture, working on livelihood generations, revealed that there was too much 'control' and a lack of 'stretch' mechanisms in her team. The founder had a directive leadership approach, with a presence of micro-management within the team. Due to her inability to delegate, build collective ownership and/or practice PL, she struggled with hiring and building a dedicated and motivated team in the long run. An interview with an associate team member (working as a beneficiary co-ordinator with the founder, as well as, a partner organization as a liaison employee) in this organization further revealed that the founder had quite a transactional relationship (focused solely on work deliverables – representing control) with her beneficiaries (extended team members – who are also part of another partner community organization), and that these beneficiary-level employees did not know much about the founder, the vision of the organization or how it benefitted them. This lack of connection to the founder or the larger purpose sometimes made the work feel like a burden and the team member felt that the founder should have dedicated more time to build a deeper relationship with the beneficiaries/field team members, to ensure that the team as a whole worked better; instead of just having a transactional relationship, with not much effort put into building collective team relationships (stretch mechanisms) and not much time investment put into developing the skills of the beneficiary team members. Thus, the quotes below illustrate how a lack of PL by the founder, with too much 'control' and too little 'stretch' mechanisms, negatively

impacted the level of engagement, motivation and retention of the team members in the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“...I really still struggle with delegation. I think I struggled with finding the right kind of people because I am thinking of oh, these, these jobs need to be done whereas actually maybe something else needs to get done as well. And maybe I haven’t identified that because I am just too comfortable doing it on my own, not realizing that if somebody else were to do it, it will make everything quicker. Or even if I realize it, just being like oh but I’ll never find a person like this, where will I find a person like this? I think that that inability to identify what is it that the organization needs in terms of what needs to be delegated and what needs to remain with me, and then also in terms of not being able to find the right kind of people...Obviously there is a gap somewhere in where I am looking or what I am looking for and which maybe I haven’t defined or identified properly.” – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and an associate team member of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of paradoxical leadership (control-stretch balance) in the team
<i>“They (beneficiary team members) only know that [the founder] is a designer, and she makes these different pouches, etcetera...That’s all they know...”</i>	
<i>...Sometimes it is a burden, but an order coming to the organization has to be fulfilled, so they complete the order...</i> <i>...I would wish that..if she keeps coming like she used to earlier, and conduct workshops to teach the trainees here for products from her boutique that are popular, and then develop us too, it will help our relationship to deepen and get better. That would be better in my opinion.” – Associate Team Member (Beneficiary Coordinator)</i>	

Table 49: Quotes illustrating a lack of Paradoxical Leadership (Control-Stretch Balance) in the team

Link to the overall narrative

As outlined through the examples above, founders and leaders in successful impact organizations managed to practice an effective paradoxical leadership approach and ensured the optimal balance of control and stretch mechanisms in the team. The practice of PL and the presence of control-stretch balance, in turn amplified the positive effects of SL in the team and had a favourable influence on various team processes and team/venture level outcomes in the long term. The moderating effects of PL have been discussed in further detail in Chapter 7.

Chapter 5

FINDINGS FROM THE QUALITATIVE STUDY – PART 2 –

Team Processes

This chapter outlines the qualitative research findings related to the important team processes in startup social enterprises and how team-level leadership (shared leadership) shapes these emergent team processes in startup social ventures. The findings presented in this chapter are related to the second sub-research question of the dissertation:

How do team leadership characteristics shape the team processes in startup social enterprise teams?

Four main team processes will be discussed in this chapter, and each processual team construct further has sub-categories that play an important part in the overall inductive narrative. Section 5.1 in this chapter will cover the first team process of Mission Reinforcement (connected to Social Cause Passion [SCP] Embeddedness) and the data analysis revealed that this impact-centric process had a positive effect on the important purpose-driven outcomes of SCP Spillover and SCP Resilience (outlined in Chapter 6) in startup social ventures. Section 5.2 discusses the second team process of Continuous Team Learning and the interviews outlined that this performance-centric process had a favourable effect on the overall performance and success of the teams/ventures (explained in Chapter 6). Section 5.3 delves into the third team process of Supportive Team Member Exchange and this member/people-centric process, in turn, positively influenced the mental wellbeing of the team members in the ventures (discussed in depth in Chapter 6). Finally, Section 5.4 outlines the fourth team process of Common Team Wavelength and this group level concept appeared to have strengthened and influenced the relationships between all the other constructs in the overall inductive narrative. Three out of the four concepts (Mission Reinforcement, Continuous Team Learning and Supportive Team Member Exchange) covered in this chapter operated as mediating team processes (mediating the positive effects of SL on team/venture level outcomes) and formed the basis of the three-path inductive model (outlined in detail in Chapter 7), while the fourth one (Common Team Wavelength) functioned as a moderating team process for the three-path SL model, in startup social ventures. An overview of the four constructs that will be discussed in this chapter can be found in Figure 7 below:




Figure 7: Team Processes in the Inductive Three-Path Model

5.1) Institutionalization of Mission Reinforcement within the Team – Social Cause Passion (SCP) Embeddedness

Construct Definition

Given the impact-oriented nature of social enterprises, this construct is particularly important for the startup social venture context and represents the element of SCP Embeddedness (one of the five pillars of SCP in the team – as discussed in detail in Chapter 4). It builds on the extant concept of Vision-Mission Communication (by the leader, in an organisational context), which is an important element that is frequently mentioned throughout the charismatic leadership literature. Vision can be described as “an ideal that represents or reflects the shared values to which the organization should aspire” (Baum et al., 1998, pg. 44) and it can be considered as “an ideal and unique image of the future” (Kouzes & Posner, 1987, pg. 85) for an organization (Baum et al., 1998). In the startup social venture context, the vision is the central compass of a mission-driven organization and it represents the social impact that the venture wants to create through its core work and on-ground activities. A good vision/mission statement should have the attributes of “brevity, clarity, abstractness, challenge, future-orientation, stability, and desirability or ability to inspire” (Baum et al., 1998, pg. 46), should have clear and compelling content (from a powerful mental imagery perspective – Carton & Lucas, 2018) and should be regularly communicated to team members in an organization (typically by leaders) in order to inspire them to work hard towards goals that are aligned with the overall vision (Baum et al., 1998).

The interviews revealed that a central focus on the social vision was a common theme across all the successful social ventures, and this mission focus was embedded into the team psyche, culture, processes and structures of such organizations. This embedded

nature of the SCP can be explained through the extant construct of 'Institutionalization', which is the processization and habitualization of 'values and norms of conduct' in an organization (Lioukas and Reuer, 2015). In the startup social enterprise context, institutionalization refers to the organizational embeddedness and habitualization of values and norms of conduct related to the venture's social cause and vision. The qualitative data analysis highlighted that in the successful startup teams, SCP Embeddedness was institutionalised through the mechanism of 'Regular Mission Reinforcement in the Team'.

Two Pillars of Regular Mission Reinforcement (SCP Embeddedness)

The interviews revealed that in average growth or high growth startup social ventures (success cases), SCP Embeddedness through the mechanism of 'Regular Mission Reinforcement in the Team' was practically implemented at the team level via two key institutionalised processes:

- **Regular Team Communication** about the start-up social venture's Mission/Vision, Values, Field Impact created (or that the team aims to create) and Impact Goals that the enterprise strives to achieve through it's work
- **Team Exposure** (occasional, if not regular) to the Field Impact created by the start-up social venture, on the ground through it's core activities

a) Regular Team Communication about the Impact Focus of the Venture

In average or high growth social ventures, the founders and team members engaged in regular team communication about the organizational mission/vision and social impact created. This impact-focused group level communication ranged from being formal, informal, verbal and/or non-verbal in nature across different ventures and took place through mechanisms such as visual and non-verbal representation of the venture's vision and impact in the team's work space, regular written and verbal updates/celebration of impact goals achieved, regular written and verbal sharing of impact stories from the field and regular written and verbal reference to the vision, values and impact goals during team forums such as team meetings, team goal planning exercises, team leadership training, new team member hiring and induction, team performance reviews, etc. The founders and the team members also made it a point to consistently communicate the social vision and goals of the venture when interacting with external stakeholders, in forums such as stakeholder feedback meetings, board/funder meetings, partner/investor pitch sessions, etc.

The insights from the interviews and participant observation/context immersion shed light on the points mentioned above. For example, I travelled across Mumbai to the offices and workspaces of several of the start-up social enterprises in the qualitative data set and through participant observation and context immersion, I observed the various visual (non-verbal) representations of the organizational vision and social impact in the physical workspaces of these ventures. In one case, the office space of a very successful education start-up focusing on social and emotional learning for low income children had various images and posters (pictured below in Photograph 1) representing the vision, mission and values of the organization (hand-made by the team members), hung across walls in the communal area where the team gathered together for work and non-work activities. Such posters not only livened up the workspace but also seemed to have a positive influence on the team members, who

would regularly look at the images and posters and refer to the contents of the posters during team discussions, as well as, during meetings with external visitors.



Figure 8 (Photograph 1): A poster, hand-made by team members, representing the values of the social enterprise (related to the core activities of the startup in the field of education), was hung up in the centre of the communal work space in the venture office (Photograph taken by the doctoral candidate).

In another case, an average growth social venture, focused on environmental education for children, did not have a large enough team to have an office and instead, the team members worked out of the founder's house. The makeshift communal work area was filled with the venture's products (featuring imagery related to the social vision of the organization) and these visual product representations of the company's core work (pictured in Photograph 2) made the founder's home space feel like an actual workspace for the team members and served as a constant reminder to the team members about the end impact that they were working towards.



Figure 9 (Photograph 2): An example of one of the products of the venture, with vision-focused imagery. The makeshift communal work space in the founder's home was filled with such products and the team members were surrounded by these products while they worked on their laptops on the founder's dining table (Photograph taken by the doctoral candidate).

The interviews illustrated the more verbal, written, formal and informal forms of impact-oriented team communication. For example, the same high growth education venture that was mentioned earlier (with regards to the visual poster in the office space) also focused a lot on impact-oriented communication during the induction of new team members. The induction process was formally structured and the clear communication (verbal and written) of the vision, mission and values of the organization was embedded and institutionalised into the induction processes and organizational culture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"After joining, there is an induction process of approximately one week, in which the entire work, the work culture, the focus of [the venture] is explained to them. And simultaneously, a part of the [the flagship field activity] program is run in [the venture], seeking equality and excellence in diversity; is also conducted here itself during this induction, so that the culture and the method of work is taught to them [the new team members]. They have the opportunity to understand the values of [the venture] plus the culture during this program. We also have some readings, and discussions on the readings. This is part of the learning. This is how induction is conducted." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth education venture – illustrating Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture (Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness)

Table 50: Illustrative Quote for Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness (Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture)

In another high growth social venture focused on community development, ownership to the cause, social entrepreneurship and social orientation impact were part of the explicit (formally defined) values of the organization and the co-founder mentioned how the team had co-created these values and the group as a whole strived to embody all these values and place the cause and social impact at the core of their work. An interview with a team member from this venture further confirmed that the team regularly discussed and reflected upon these values and principles during group forums such as annual team retreats. Hence, through the process of defining cause-centric organizational values and regularly communicating and reflecting about these impact-focused organizational principles, collectively as a team, the central focus on the social mission of the venture became embedded and institutionalised into the team culture and processes of this organization.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So when we started [the venture], a couple of years ago, we did the small workshop where we said what are our five values that we stand for? And what [first] emerged was growth, which was our person growth and organization growth, which means that each of us will have our own learning journeys in our life. Second one was ownership, so how we show ownership and how is cause going to be at the center of our work. Third was social entrepreneurship – not social entrepreneurship but being entrepreneur. Because we are in social sector we cannot afford to waste, afford to – how can you be more calculative in terms of the work, how can we use our networks, resources to what we are doing..The fourth is social orientation, which is basically in whatever we do we cannot not have social issues centered around it. And the fifth one was fun. So always creating, keeping us space, which is fun.” – Co-Founder</i>	Quotes from the co-founder and a team member in a high growth venture focused on community development – illustrating Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture (Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness)
<i>“...I think every beginning of the year we have retreats where all the team members go together. And generally we keep revisiting those values and see what else is required and what needs to be – there are beyond values also, do we need to add something? Do we need to do something more in certain areas specifically?” – Team Member</i>	

Table 51: Illustrative Quote for Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness (Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture)

It must be noted that, regular communication about the vision, mission and values of the organization was something that initially flowed from the founders to the team members. However, due to the emergent SL approach in successful social ventures, eventually this institutionalised impact-oriented team communication would get taken on as a collective leadership responsibility (even though the founder continued to play an important role) and ultimately, it became embedded into the team protocols, psyche and culture. The following excerpt from an interview with the co-founder of an average growth venture, focused on education for hearing impaired children, nicely illustrates how initial team communication about the social cause by the co-founders

eventually led to SCP Embeddedness and collective ownership of the venture's vision by the team as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I feel now people – we all share an equal goal. Earlier, it was more from the volunteering aspects, but now people share an equal vision...initially since everyone was new, so [co-founder] and me used to communicate our vision all the time in our meeting. And we need to repeat that.</i> <i>The reason of attrition was to make them understand what's the actual vision, what we need to do while we are over here. Yes, there are other organizations as well who are working similarly and so why are we existing. So these questions need to be very clear. So we made those questions clear in their mind, and I think now they have shared equal responsibility, equal vision with us." – Co-Founder</i>	Co-founder of an average growth venture focused on education for hearing-impaired children – illustrating Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture (Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness)

Table 52: Illustrative Quote for Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness (Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture)

b) Team Exposure to Field Impact

Apart from regular impact-focused team communication, team members in successful ventures were also routinely exposed – not just the experienced team members working in program roles but also the new comers and team members working in indirect support function roles – to the field impact created by the social venture. Typically, founders and leaders in such ventures would institutionalize the team's exposure to field impact through processual mechanisms such as encouraging team attendance for field visits or field events, facilitating interaction between beneficiaries/customers/users and the team members, adding elements of field exposure to team member job roles, etc.

The interviews and participant observation can illustrate the findings outlined above. For example, an interview with a team member from a very successful waste management focused social venture revealed that, even though she had been in the organization for just two months (at the time of the interview) and despite the fact that her role was in the support function of business development, she still had the opportunity to meet important stakeholders in the waste management domain and engage with the field activities on the ground. This field exposure led her to experience high job satisfaction and a personal sense of impact and fulfilment. Hence, this interview was a great example of how adding elements of field exposure to the job roles of all team members (also in support functions) can lead to the institutionalization of regular mission reinforcement in the team as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“Yeah I decided to stay because I’m loving my job. I get to travel, I get to meet so (emphasis) many people. I don’t like to anticipate who I’m going to meet; like that day I just went for a meeting, found out he’s the Assistant Commissioner of some municipal corporation.. if I knew, I would be a little nervous before meeting him, but I didn’t know about it..I’m not very good in language but still I do it (laughs); so that’s one thing (translated); it’s making me confident. Second is, I always (emphasis) wanted to work in environmental engineering; that was always my forte, which I’m getting to do here, on a ground (emphasis) level. Not just on paper, on ground level, so that’s the best part about it.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth venture focused on waste management – illustrating Team Exposure to Field Impact (Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness)

Table 53: Illustrative Quote for Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness (Team Exposure to Field Impact)

In another interview, a team member from an average growth agriculture focused start-up revealed that he was only in his third month of working with the venture (at the time of the interview) and he had never worked in a social enterprise before. Even though, he was handling the function of sales and marketing (a support function that is not directly related to field/beneficiary activities), he was exposed to the factory/field site, beneficiaries and field impact right from the start of his journey with this venture. That field experience helped the new team member to understand the importance of the social mission of the organization and also helped him to imbibe the shared sense of purpose in the team (SCP Congruence) as a whole. Hence, this interview was a good example of how facilitating field visits for team members can regularly reinforce the mission of the venture within the team, and that in turn, leads to a higher degree of SCP Embeddedness (and SCP Congruence) within the group as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So I have to be frank – being new to this company and actually new to a social enterprise as such, what I was – I didn’t have any previous experience, so I didn’t know how a social enterprise works or something like that. But then I went to the factory for it’s opening and looking at people who were working for us and all those things. It was a good experience like that, so that is what I gathered. Whatever you are doing, it has to also help the people who we claim we are helping. For example, farmers or a women’s cooperative and all those things.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth agriculture venture – illustrating Team Exposure to Field Impact (Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness)

Table 54: Illustrative Quote for Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness (Team Exposure to Field Impact)

In contrast, low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises often failed to regularly articulate and communicate about the vision/mission and impact to the team (in a focused/monofocal way) and thus, such teams had a low sense of shared purpose and a low degree of SCP Embeddedness. There was also very little or irregular direct field exposure for all team members and this led to a low degree of individual and/or

team level ownership to the social impact created by the venture (low degree of SCP Intensity and Congruence within the team). For example, the beneficiary coordinator in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods focused venture mentioned in her interview that the beneficiaries/artisans only knew the founder as a designer who gives them production orders and they did not know much about the social vision and intended impact of the venture. Hence, there was no shared sense of purpose or collective ownership among the beneficiaries, even though they were the ones who were meant to benefit from the work of the venture. The beneficiary coordinator, who worked with the venture's partner organization but also functioned as a team member for the founder, also mentioned that the individuals like the founder and organizations such as this social venture should put more effort into interacting with the beneficiaries and engaging them with the impact of the work being done, instead of just having a transactional producer-buyer relationship, with no impact-oriented communication or interaction. This absence of impact-oriented communication with the beneficiaries (who functioned as extended team members for the venture) led to a lack of shared purpose and ownership among the artisans and within the team as a whole. This in turn resulted in the founder experiencing several accountability and trust issues and a sense of frustration when working with the beneficiaries and her team members.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"They [the beneficiaries] only know that [the founder] is a designer, and she makes these different pouches, etcetera. Even from rags or old material, we can make something good out of it. That's all they know. They know that she is a designer named [the founder], that's all..."</i> <i>...I feel somewhere that the organizations for whom we take orders for products, they should be communicating with us continuously, and the products that we make here under skill developed should also be promoted in their boutiques. It would be better if they can conduct some workshops for the new girls that come and work for us. Because when there is an order, there is communication, but when the order is fulfilled, there is absolutely no communication till the next order. This should not be the case, in my opinion. They should also be concerned and ask if we need anything and if we can be helpful in any way. We too are an organization, and we are always in need of such skillful people who can help develop skills of the girls here." – Beneficiary Coordinator</i>	Quotes from the founder and an associate team member (beneficiary coordinator) in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating low SCP Embeddedness (due to a lack of Mission Reinforcement and Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture)
<i>"I will send her [team member] to [Indian city] for 2 days and she would be happy to go because she would be going back home, I would send her with stuff and say, okay, get this done and bring in back. And she would come back with stuff that was not done properly and then blame it on the women and then the – but it was her job to make sure that it was done properly. And the women would say things like but she just leaves it with us and she is on her phone all the time. So, we are doing what she tells us to do. And I couldn't believe either over the other. The point was that work wasn't getting done." – Founder</i>	

Table 55: Quotes illustrating Low SCP Embeddedness (lack of Mission Reinforcement and Regular Team Communication about the impact focus of the venture)

In another low/stagnated growth venture focused on sustainable fashion, an interview with a team member (who worked in the design function) revealed that she was not fully immersed into the core field activities of the venture. Given her limited/lack of direct exposure to the core work and field impact created, she felt a bit distant from the venture and as a result, was not as engaged with the organization (at the time of the interview) as compared her past involvement with the team. Another team member from this venture also confirmed that he had no interaction with the end beneficiaries/artisans and there was no connection to the field impact whatsoever. Interview insights from this venture, as well as the excerpts from the interviews of the previous low growth venture outlined above, revealed that the absence of institutionalised impact-focused team communication and regular team exposure to direct field impact, leads to a more transactional nature of work relationships, with a lack of shared purpose or impact-centric ownership within the team. This, in turn, results in a low degree of SCP Embeddedness within the team and venture as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Since I was not aware of the styles of crocheting techniques that existed, I had to understand the basics, which [the founder] of course helped from time to time. And since I'm not completely immersed in the process, I don't have full exposure to it. So whatever little I did gather last year, you know, my design input has been purely based on that. So trying to understand concepts for a shoot as of now and seeing how they want to go about the colour combinations for the new collections. But unfortunately, this year I've been more distant and not as engaged as I was last year because of the workload that I've been having with the other projects." – Team Member 1</i>	Quotes from team members in a low/stagnated growth venture focused on sustainable fashion – illustrating low SCP Embeddedness (due to a lack of Mission Reinforcement and Team Exposure to Field Impact)
<i>"I have no clue of the actual team behind; like who is actually doing the craftsmanship and I haven't met anyone else." – Team Member 2</i>	

Table 56: Quotes illustrating Low SCP Embeddedness (lack of Mission Reinforcement and Team Exposure to Field Impact)

In contrast, the institutionalisation of regular mission reinforcement within the team in successful social ventures, inculcated a strong sense of shared purpose among the team members, which in turn led to the internalization of the venture's social vision and impact-centric values by the group as a whole. This, in turn, resulted in a high degree of SCP Embeddedness with the team/venture.

Link to the overall narrative

While extant literature has positively linked vision communication to follower and venture outcomes, the doctoral research project goes beyond just linking impact

communication to venture performance, and also focuses on the relationship between regular mission reinforcement in the team (SCP Embeddedness) and the related outcomes of SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover experienced by the individual team members and the collective team as a whole (explained in detail in Chapter 6).

5.2) Continuous Team Learning Behaviour – Embedded Team Learning Environment

Construct Definition

This construct of continuous team learning behaviour, operating within an embedded team learning environment, is aligned with the extant theory about continuous team learning (at the group level) which can be defined as “as an ongoing process of reflection and action, characterized by asking questions, seeking feedback, experimenting, reflecting on results, and discussing errors or unexpected outcomes of actions. For a team to discover gaps in its plans and make changes accordingly, team members must test assumptions and discuss differences of opinion openly rather than privately or outside the group” (Edmondson, 1999, pg. 353). This set of team activities constitutes as team learning behaviour, “as it is through them that learning is enacted at the group level” (Edmondson, 1999, pg. 353). By connecting the theories of Learning and Sensemaking (Schwandt, 2005), this construct of continuous team learning behaviour can also be understood from the lens of organisational sensemaking, such that an embedded team learning environment follows a tripartite process similar to that of organisational sensemaking – namely (1) *cognitive* learning (thinking about organisational learning when conducting activities, routines and events); (2) *linguistic or verbal* learning (talking about organisational learning through various activities, processes and routines); and (3) *conative* learning (adopting or implementing organisational learning related behaviour through processes, routines and events with commitment and consistency throughout the team) (Basu & Palazzo, G., 2008).

The qualitative data analysis revealed that in average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases), the construct of continuous team learning was institutionalised within the organizations through processual mechanisms such as regular team interactions or forums for learning, daily or weekly team learning routines, learning-focused feedback mechanisms, learning-focused mistake rectification, learning-focused team appreciation, learning-focused team values/culture, etc. This continuous learning also included an embedded culture of learning from failure. Average or high growth enterprises typically engaged in regular and continuous team learning behaviour, and this ongoing behaviour was embedded into the team psyche, processes and culture – creating a rich continuous learning environment within the team. The embedded and shared understanding of team learning processes and culture in successful social enterprise teams can be potentially linked to the team’s shared mental model about learning in the organisation because extant research shows that the shared mental model of a task (in this case the task would be to collectively engage in embedded learning routines) mediates team learning behaviour and team effectiveness (Van den Bossche et al., 2011). Continuous team learning manifested itself in a team when important learning-oriented team interaction processes became embedded into the organisational psyche and system, and this in turn, built the team’s natural inclination, orientation and capacity for learning. In contrast, in low/stagnated growth

or failed enterprises, there was a lack of structured or embedded continuous team learning behaviour, and team learning was not institutionalised into the organizational processes or culture.

Five Mechanisms of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour

The interviews revealed that in average growth or high growth startup social ventures, Continuous Team Learning Behaviour was institutionalised within the teams through the regular practice of the following five key team learning mechanisms:

- Knowledge Exchange
- Feedback Seeking
- Experiential Learning
- Learning from Success
- Learning from Failure

a) Knowledge Exchange

This team learning mechanism performed the function of 'Learning for Development' at the level of the individual, team and venture as a whole. In successful ventures, teams engaged in continuous learning behaviour through regular (daily, weekly or monthly) formal or informal exchange of knowledge, ideas, information, skills and/or resources (eg: books, videos, article links, learning materials) – that was directly or indirectly related to the work of the organisation. This formal or informal knowledge exchange was operationalised through team activities like focused group brainstorming sessions about a particular topic, learning-oriented group catchups/meetings, and, intra-team skill sharing and resource sharing (in person or using technology); in order to facilitate individual learning for personal and professional development of team members, as well as, to catalyse overall team learning for organisational development. This team learning mechanism also included the aspect of information or data sharing, whereby the successful teams had structured or semi-structured processes in place to regularly share important work and venture related updates and information with each other, in an organised and systematic way. In several cases, the teams effectively used WhatsApp or sophisticated tech-enabled information sharing systems, which further aided and structured the knowledge and data sharing processes. This routine of information sharing and work-related knowledge exchange helped the team members to learn about each other's work updates, and enabled the team to take important data-driven decisions, based on up-to-date information and data, related to the overall progress, performance and impact of the venture.

Interview excerpts from various different organizations can help to illustrate this team learning mechanism of Knowledge Exchange. For example, a team member working in a small average-growth environmental venture, mentioned that the founder has a habit of sharing resources with her. The team member does not have a marketing background and since this skill is important for her function, the founder shared relevant marketing-related articles with her and consciously set aside time for the team member to just read the resources and incorporate the newly learned skills and ideas into her work. This knowledge-sharing initiative by the founder not just prioritised the personal learning and development of the team member, but also

helped the individual member to contribute to the venture's performance as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"As I'm not from the marketing background; [the founder] always has the habit of sharing. Initially she used to make a day for me to just read articles related to marketing, so that I can incorporate the ideas I get from marketing to the organization's benefit." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average-growth environment venture – illustrating Knowledge Exchange in the team

Table 57: Illustrative Quote for Knowledge Exchange (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

In another interview, a team member (who was also a second line leader) in a high-growth education venture explained how the team as a whole had weekly interactions, which was dedicated to sharing insights, stories and learnings that team members had experienced in the field, while interacting with the students (their beneficiaries). These targeted learning spaces were focused on crafting learning narratives and knowledge sharing (rather than operating as accountability mechanisms), and team members shared their insights with each other using a mix of face-to-face creative storytelling, as well as, interactive tech-enabled learning systems such as BearShare. In addition to these weekly learning spaces, the team also organised group level training sessions throughout the year, where either external speakers or internal team members themselves trained the larger group to learn new skills (and gain new knowledge) related to the work of the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"So, one system that we put in place is we have a weekly interaction, which is an office day where there is no one on the field, where we are in office. And a larger part of the meeting goes on how was your week, which really helps in getting to know the experiential feelings or thoughts related to any of the interaction that they have had in the week. So that facilitation feedback and interaction meeting is also structured in such a way that it may not be told to the entire group, but we get in interactive learning systems and you do it via BearShare or you do it via a narrative, a story or it can involve any kinds of mediums, so as to make it more creative also and it doesn't sound like accountable, okay, tell me what did you do – what happened. Because that objective information is fed through our monitoring and evaluation systems, so that's not the focus. The focus is more on the interaction that they have had with the students, so that's one for sure. Otherwise, we have had trainings that happen at different pit stops during the year, which involve training in the area of soft skills, communication or teamwork or technical skills, which is in the area of how to use drama in the class, how to use storytelling in the class, how to use art or how do we do behaviour management. As per the needs we kind of get in external trainers or one of us does the training." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high-growth education venture – illustrating Knowledge Exchange in the team

Table 58: Illustrative Quote for Knowledge Exchange (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

b) Feedback Seeking

In successful ventures, the team learning mechanism of Feedback Seeking performed the function of developing the team's 'Aptitude and Capacity for Learning'. In such teams, team members and the group as a whole regularly engaged in feedback seeking behaviour in order to get valuable feedback and suggestions for improvement, on a continual basis from key internal and external stakeholders such as team members, customers, beneficiaries, advisors, etc. This formal or informal learning behaviour enabled the teams to keep learning about how to improve the growth of the enterprise further. Such feedback seeking behaviour was embedded into several organisational processes and mechanisms (processized in a formal or informal way) such as team meetings, external stakeholder meetings, individual/team goal review sessions and ongoing (formal and informal) interactions with beneficiaries, customers and other important stakeholders. Such an institutionalised culture of feedback seeking truly reflected the teams' aptitude or inclination for learning, as well as, the high absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) of the teams to continually engage in learning activities on an ongoing basis.

An interview with a founder of a high growth social venture, focused on healthcare education, beautifully illustrated how the leaders in that team had successfully created a safe and non-judgemental team learning environment with structured feedback mechanisms and a strong team learning culture; in order to invite constant feedback and learning insights from the internal team members, as well as, important external stakeholders such as their beneficiaries (students). The founder explained how she (along with the core leadership team) had created safe channels for giving and receiving feedback, through which both team members and beneficiaries could give feedback to a trusted third party actor (instead of being uncomfortable with giving direct feedback to each other in the team). There was a lot of explicit focus on learning and feedback seeking from internal and external organizational stakeholders, and there were clear guidelines in place about the feedback giving/receiving process in the team. There were both formal and informal ways to engage in the feedback process, with the formal approach involving giving feedback in a confidential way to a formal third party actor (the university), and the informal approach involving communicating feedback in a safe manner through a trusted/respected faculty member (an impartial team member). Further, there was a strong culture of learning/sharing at the team/enterprise level and this was reinforced through regular/open communication, daily team sharing about insights from work/field, constantly learning from each other/picking up skills/incorporating feedback into one's own working style, as well as, informal lunch meetings between beneficiaries and team members to get direct candid feedback from students/alumni.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I think a lot of feedback comes back from the faculty also to us. They say that "I don't want to do this; or I didn't like the way". What we've done is [name of senior faculty member] ma'am who is our mentor, leader over there and comes with that experience. We have kept her to even take/collect this feedback from the faculty. We've told her that sometimes it may be difficult for them to just approach me and tell me what is going wrong, but it will be easier for them to come to you and talk to you. From her when the feedback comes, that so and so faculty is not happy with these and these things, that's a lot of learning for me and [second line team leader] to take and learn that okay, probably we need to change this and it should not be this way and we should change our strategy for dealing with this first-hand." – Founder</i>	Founder of a high growth venture focused on healthcare education – illustrating Feedback Seeking in the team
<i>"So what we do is we keep a session with the students with the university where we are not there. So we want the students to directly interact with the university faculty who may come only once a year to meet them, or twice a year, and give active feedback to them about us, all of us, as to what you see as this person's role and what do you see, how you are benefitted from this person, this faculty. So we get a lot of feedback from there and that feedback session with the university in the absence of the students helps us understand perspectives." – Founder</i>	
<i>"So there is pot lunch with the students, getting all the faculty. When one batch of certificate course students were passing out, doing feedback sessions again by calling all the faculty for lunch. So they do a lot internally with the faculty and whenever there is time." – Founder</i>	

Table 59: Illustrative Quote for Feedback Seeking (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

In another example, the founder of an average growth agriculture venture explained how her team had a culture of seeking regular user feedback (from both customers and beneficiaries) and the team as a whole systematically looked at consumer and beneficiary data in order to rectify their mistakes and take quick actions and measures to reach the desired outcomes of the social venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...We work on a lot of data so we kind of pull out reports, we pull up – whether it's a consumer feedback or data from Amazon or data from farmers, we sit on it and we kind of do a thorough analysis, and we say, you know what, maybe this is what went wrong, let's see if we can do XYZ, and see if this kind of changes the result. So it's more of a trial and error method. So once the mistake is identified or the error is identified, we try to see that what measures we can take to change or to get the desired outcome." – Founder</i>	Founder of an average growth agriculture venture – illustrating Feedback Seeking in the team

Table 60: Illustrative Quote for Feedback Seeking (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

Finally, apart from such structured feedback mechanisms (as outlined through the examples given above), successful ventures also had an ingrained culture of seeking spontaneous feedback from team members and stakeholders, using more informal methods, to learn, grow and adapt in real time. For example, the co-founder of a high growth environment venture mentioned how the team regularly used team lunches to informally communicate and exchange feedback with each other, about what worked or did not work, with regards to the on-going tasks of the members in the team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"You keep getting feedback on real-time...so mostly we sit and have food, all of us have food together, so at that time you get that informal communication of others, what is happening and what's not happening, so that has helped." – Co-Founder</i>	Co-founder of a high growth environment venture – illustrating Feedback Seeking in the team

Table 61: Illustrative Quote for Feedback Seeking (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

c) Experiential Learning

This dynamic learning mechanism helped the team members to harness the power of 'Learning on-the-go'. When team members joined successful startups, they were encouraged to 'dive right in' to the work. They were equipped by the founders and senior team members to 'jump right into the deep end' of their core work by taking strong ownership for their tasks right from the beginning. While the founders and team leaders did provide mentoring/training support (and initial hand holding when needed), followers usually learned how to work in their job roles by learning 'on-the-job', through a process of experiential learning (trial and error; learning on-the-go). This experiential learning process often groomed the team members into future team leaders in the enterprise and also contributed to high work satisfaction, high professional development (steep learning curve) and high collective organisational ownership among the members of the team. The experiential learning process also included regular and rapid team-level brainstorming, where team members were encouraged to engage in regular/spontaneous idea generation through team discussions (and sometimes from structured processes), and this in turn, led to a high level of on-the-go learning, innovation and creativity within the teams and ventures. In this way, the dynamic and ongoing process of 'learning on-the-go' at the individual and team level, further institutionalised the mechanism of 'continuous' team learning behaviour within the startup social ventures.

For example, in an average growth environment venture, the founder believed that her team members would learn best if they were just thrown into the deep end of the responsibility, and they would figure the work out themselves, by learning on-the-job. Through this experiential learning approach, she provided direction and training (through an external virtual trainer) to one of her team members, but then the member was allowed to generate new ideas and figure out her own working style, in terms of achieving the deliverables for the team/venture as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So my belief is that if you like just throw people into and give them like responsibility, they figure it out. So there’s very little hand holding that’s involved. First month, there’s hand holding and then..I give her the goals. So I tell her what I want to achieve through social media..so she’s come up with her own like ideas for what kind of content should be, what’s relatable for the parents; so I define the target audience for her. I’ve told her what pages to look at for good content, but then how to translate that into us/our page is something she’s done. So we even did trainings in the middle, like I was following this online trainer and I paid for that course and we both trained on that. So I would tell her, “Ok, this is the training that you’ve done this week and this person has created this entire content pipeline, now let’s see how we can translate that for us”. So then she would come up with ten ideas for what we can do.”</i> – Founder	Founder of an average growth environment venture – illustrating Experiential Learning in the team

Table 62: Illustrative Quote for Experiential Learning (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

Similarly, a team member working in a livelihoods venture (average growth) mentioned that for her, a lot of the learning happened on-the-job, by experientially learning from real-life examples and failures. Further, the founder would also accompany the team member to external meetings and demonstrate how to conduct the meeting (role modeling) and in this way, the team member learned how to adapt her work approach through experiential training and learning.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“I think a lot of learning has been on the job and through a lot of real life failures I think. And also [the founder] used to take a lot of time in reviewing my emails and then coming to a meeting, so she could teach me through real life examples, how she’s talking to people and how we are presenting in front of others. So I think the adaptation of the role was on the go through the job.”</i> – Team Member	Team member in an average growth livelihoods venture – illustrating Experiential Learning in the team

Table 63: Illustrative Quote for Experiential Learning (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

In some larger or more advanced organizations, the experiential learning processes were even more structured than the examples outlined above. The founder of a high growth livelihoods venture explained how he used the concept of a ‘crack team’ to facilitate on-the-go brainstorming and continuous idea generation within the organization. Every quarter, the founder would issue a brainstorming challenge related to a specific problem that the venture was facing, and team members across organizational levels and functions had a chance to join the ‘crack team’, and in this team, they would democratically brainstorm and generate ideas to solve the problem. As part of this team process, they would pick the best ideas and also implement these solutions in an agile way in order to learn and gain insights from the immediate results of the crack team’s solutions. At the end of the quarter, the crack team would be dissolved and a new crack team would be formed in the next quarter to solve

another organizational challenge in a similar way. Hence, through this innovative team mechanism of regular idea generation and experiential learning, the team as a whole got into a habit of on-the-go ideation, testing, experimenting (trial-and-error), problem solving and continuous learning, for the greater good of the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“The way a crack team works is that I will send out an email in terms of the problem that we want to solve, and I'll send it to my reporting managers, my reportees, and then I'll ask them to circulate it amongst their teams. And whoever is willing to join a crack team is more than welcome. Then we make a Google Group around the crack team and we conduct two meetings every week. And anyone can join. Down to my lowest team member, he can also join, so no problem on that. In the crack team we have a proper sort of a democratic process where each member has to speak at least five points that will help solve the problem, one by one. Then we put all the points together and then we start discussing. That has in general been very helpful, two of the main problems that we were trying to solve for a long run, very interesting ideas came out of the crack teams, which we are implementing right now...</i> <i>...They are run for finite duration, generally a quarter. And at the end of the quarter we would have implemented some of the ideas and seen their results. Then these crack teams are dissolved and then the new crack teams are made.” – Founder</i>	Founder of a high growth livelihoods venture – illustrating Experiential Learning in the team

Table 64: Illustrative Quote for Experiential Learning (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

d) Learning from Success

This team learning behaviour was operationalised through the mechanisms of group level appreciation and recognition, and talking about success stories within the organization. Leaders (and in turn, followers and the team as a whole) celebrated and appreciated every big or small work related success and consciously gave one-on-one (eg: through individual text messages or at an individual feedback meeting) and group recognition (eg: through WhatsApp group messages or at a team meeting) to team members when they did something well. The details of the success stories were shared with the whole team, not only to express appreciation or recognition, but also to inspire the larger group to learn from the success stories. Through learning-oriented discussion and reflection of the success stories, team members were encouraged to improve their own work (individually and collectively) by acting on the valuable insights and learnings (what worked well in those specific cases) gained from the success stories; in order to recreate such successes again in the future.

For example, a team member from a high growth venture, focused on pediatric healthcare education, mentioned that the team had a culture of sharing good things/success stories. The individual who performed well would receive verbal and written (one-to-one) appreciation and perhaps also some non-financial incentives (such as the opportunity to participate in the annual conference of the organization, in

an important role), but more importantly, the success stories would also be shared in weekly team meetings, in order to facilitate a positive exchange of success-related learning insights within the larger team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So it’s always verbal, is always written or a certificate of appreciation that is given and we also have discussions amongst us. Because in weekly meetings we share this part. And I think what we also do is one part of communication is we also share good things. This happened and then [name of team member] helped me or [name of senior team member] ma’am helped me..and this happened. So I think that kind of exchange of information also creates a positive environment. And for faculty, of course we have annual conference. So at those conferences they get a chance to be a faculty or participate in larger role and not just as a faculty.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth venture focused on pediatric healthcare education – illustrating Learning from Success in the team

Table 65: Illustrative Quote for Learning from Success (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

In another example, a second line team leader in a high growth venture, working on community development, mentioned that her team had a culture of celebrating every small success. The individual who did something well would be verbally appreciated in front of the whole team (face-to-face and via WhatsApp) and sometimes, the success story would also be shared publicly with external stakeholders (via Facebook). A team member from this venture further elaborated that the intention of the celebrations went beyond verbal appreciation and served as learning opportunities for growth. She mentioned that it need not be that someone needed to do something spectacular to get appreciated – even if a team member had done a small action that helped prevent a mistake or saved an initiative from failure, then that action was brought to everyone’s notice and highlighted with attention – serving not just as appreciation, but also as a learning opportunity for the whole team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“..We go all out. Like for smallest of things there’ll be like, get a cake Like we really love to celebrate the smallest of things that happen..when we meet every day in the morning, we like to share that with everybody else or on the group we have on WhatsApp. If it’s something very specific to our program, we end up sharing that on our Facebook and all of these things. Or if we feel like, just a lot of group hugs happen. So yes, we do try to celebrate it in that format.” – Second Line Team Leader</i>	Quotes from a second line team leader and a team member in a high growth venture focused on community development – illustrating Learning from Success in the

<i>“..The team itself is..already appreciating you verbally, of course, but it’s also so much of constantly, I would say, giving you opportunities and also making you realize that you know what, you’ve done it well, so now this is your next step and you can do it more. So it doesn’t stop at one thing but it’s how do you make it like a journey which is always growing...If there is something which happened which could have happened wrong but you know what, one thing just like saved it. It need not become the best to tell you that you’ve done well but how you even saved one thing. I think those are the small, small ways in which one is appreciating the effort and bringing that to everybody’s notice and highlighting it. And also I think opening up more opportunities..brought to the group’s notice, told to the person, at times even celebrations, cakes..” – Team Member</i>	team

Table 66: Illustrative Quotes for Learning from Success (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

e) Learning from Failure

Successful social venture teams engaged in the team learning behaviour of ‘Learning from Failure’ through the processual mechanisms of identifying and rectifying mistakes, and openly acknowledging and talking about failure within the team. Leaders (and in turn, followers and the team as a whole) discussed and learned from every big or small work-related failure or error and consciously had one-on-one (eg: through an individual meeting) and group feedback discussions (eg: through a team meeting) with team members, in order to learn from the mistake/failure. The details of the mistake/failure were shared with the whole team, not only to rectify the mistake, but also to encourage the larger group to learn from the failure. Through learning-oriented discussion and reflection of the failure stories, team members were encouraged to improve their own work (individually and collectively) by acting on the learnings and insights gained from the mistake/failure, in order to avoid making similar mistakes in the future. The learning-oriented team culture ensured that the team members were not afraid to make and learn from their mistakes and trial-and-error was not just acceptable, but in fact encouraged too. This aspect of being able to make mistakes and learn from them in a safe way is also closely related to the team-level psychological safety that was present in such organizations (the concept of Team Psychological Safety has been discussed in greater detail in the section on TMX, later in this chapter). Thus, through such continuous team learning behaviour, the startup teams learned how to fail fast and smart and in turn, the ventures managed to create a culture of learning from success, as well as, from failure.

For example, the co-founder of a high growth environment venture explained how the open and free work environment in the organization encouraged all the team members to explore new ideas and allowed them to make mistakes, fail safely and learn and grow through a process of trial-and-error. This positive and safe team culture of learning from failure, in turn led to the continuous development of new ideas and initiatives (led by team members) within the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"The openness or freeness environment and the professional environment that as long as you do your work well, you are free to explore and make mistakes, it will be appreciated that you tried something new, all this helps people to try new things, learn from it, irrespective of whether you are successful or fail in it. This helps people to grow and helps to explore more things instead of fearing and not doing anything. This helps people a lot to grow. This helps your team and your organizations also. Something totally new comes out from this exploration. Many times [team member] also has told us some techniques and methods by which we can make the paper bags faster, and has developed new methodologies. These things happen many times." – Co-Founder</i>	Co-founder of a high-growth environment venture – illustrating Learning from Failure in the team

Table 67: Illustrative Quote for Learning from Failure (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

Similarly, a team member in an average-growth agriculture venture explained that the founder had clearly communicated to the team, that it was completely acceptable for team members to make mistakes (across all levels of the organizations). It was an explicit team protocol that in case someone made a mistake, he/she/they just needed to take responsibility for it and learn from it, and then the team as a whole would collectively try to resolve the error and put some backup plans into action – thus, also demonstrating the presence of SL in the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...So [the founder] has been quite clear on that as well, so it's okay to make mistakes at [the organization]. So she has always believed in that and she has vocally spoken about it as well. So it's okay to make mistakes or to at least accept whatever has gone wrong. So we really stand for that, even our delivery executives or anybody who does the packaging. So we usually communicate this message to everybody that stand up for the mistake. It's okay to make mistakes. And of course then we come up with some – so we usually have some backup plans for us if things go wrong. Then as a team we collectively try to resolve the mistake as soon as possible." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth agriculture venture – illustrating Learning from Failure in the team

Table 68: Illustrative Quote for Learning from Failure (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour)

In contrast, the interviews highlighted that there was a lack of constructive and continuous team learning behaviour in low growth/stagnated and failed startup social ventures. For example, interviews with the founder of a failed social venture, working on women empowerment, revealed that in his team, they handled mistakes depending on the severity or degree of failure. There was no common team approach to handling mistakes or learning from failure, and it ranged from the second line team leader getting quite verbally upset with the team members, to the founder feeling like he used to be taken a for a ride by the team members because he was not strict enough in his approach. The second line team leader in this venture further revealed in her interview that she felt they (the founder and her) could not address mistakes/failures very openly in the team, and instead had to approach the

conversation diplomatically when pointing put what was/was not acceptable in the team. Hence, excerpts from both these interviews highlight that this team lacked a safe team learning culture/environment, because the leaders and members could not speak freely about mistakes (in a non-judgemental way), and thus, they were unable to learn from their failures in a constructive way (which hindered their ability to collectively grow as a team).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"It depends on the degree of failure, right. With most mistakes, still I think [second line team leader] and I took slightly different approaches on this. [Second line team leader]'s approach is more she would give them a few chances and then get quite upset with them, right. I don't think I got as upset as I would with a lot of the workers, social workers...But it also backfired on me. I've noticed people take me for a ride because of that. And it's something I haven't been able to change very much about myself...just with me, I felt like some social workers took me for granted and sort of felt like that they could get away with whatever they did because I don't yell at them, I don't say things..."</i> <i>...It depends on the severity of the mistake. If it's a small mistake, we can correct it, we just work with them and say, look, what can you do. I think there was one time we had a severe mistake where we had to let go of one of the social workers because she was sort of responsible for the mistake and that's the most severe we have done." – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a second line team leader in a failed venture focused on women empowerment – illustrating a lack of Learning from Failure in the team
<i>"When there is a mistake, we are not able to tell it on the face very straightforwardly but in a very diplomatic way we mold them, this is not acceptable, this is not acceptable."</i> <i>– Second Line Team Leader</i>	

Table 69: Quotes illustrating a lack of Learning from Failure in the team

On the other hand, a team member in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture mentioned that according to her, the founder was constantly seeking feedback from external advisors/mentors and in the process, would get too distracted by too many inputs from experts/well-wishers and this in turn, had led to unfocused and unproductive learning (at the founder and venture level). She thought that the founder was too close to the venture to view the feedback objectively and she needed to learn how to filter through the feedback with clarity, in order to make clear and definitive organizational decisions. Hence, she thought that this unfocused learning and decision-making by the founder hindered the founder/venture's ability to move forward with clarity (about the venture's vision). The excerpt below also sheds light on the fact that the onus of seeking feedback and learning from those inputs seemed to rest solely with the founder, and the team members did not seem to be too involved in the learning processes in the venture (a lack of SL). Thus, in this team, there was a lack of focused and continuous learning behaviour at the team level, which hindered the ability of the team/venture to progress forward in a focused way.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“..Whatever I’ve added about you know the visual constantly being changed; because of the people involved or the constant feedback or you know mentors who are there/involved with [the venture]. That is something that I think [the founder] maybe needs to identify herself where it becomes a lot more easier..you know, “This is the vision that I have and this is the way I want to go about working on it”...But I feel like you know, she’s too close to it sometimes and because there’s an emotional attachment to it, it can be..it can backfire & really work..have a negative impact...If there’s a stall in the process because of XYZ reasons that are outside your control, to see clarity through that and then go to the other side and move forward. Sometimes, because of the proximity there and her close sort of involvement with [the venture], it tends to really hinder the process of moving forward. And that is something I think as a leader, she would have to address or you know maybe get clarity on how she would go about doing that.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating unfocused and distracted learning in the team (by the founder)

Table 70: Quote illustrating unfocused or distracted learning in the team (by the founder)

Link to the overall inductive narrative

As outlined above, successful startup social venture teams engaged in continuous team learning behaviour through the regular practice of the processes of Knowledge Exchange, Feedback Seeking, Experiential Learning, Learning from Success and Learning from Failure. This embedded and institutionalised team learning environment in turn had a positive influence on the team and venture level performance of such early stage social enterprises, and contributed significantly to the overall success trajectories of these impact organizations (explained in detail in Chapter 6).

5.3) Supportive Group-Level Team Members’ Exchange (TMX)

Construct Definition

This team level construct builds on the individual level (individual perception about member-member relationships) concept of Team Member Exchange (TMX). The original TMX construct can be defined as a social exchange relationship developed between fellow team members within interdependent team settings (Farh et al., 2017; Seers, 1989). “TMX relationships can vary in strength” (Farh et al., 2017, pg. 1117) and “compared to weaker TMX relationships, strong TMX relationships are marked by the mutual exchange of desirable resources and a heightened sense of mutual commitment, obligation, and trust” (Farh et al., 2017, pg. 1117). Hence, TMX quality must be considered in order to accurately “assess the reciprocity between a member and the peer group”, which in turn indicates “the member’s perception of his or her willingness to assist other members, to share ideas and feedback and in turn, how readily information, help, and recognition are received from other members” (Seers, 1989, pg. 119). Hence, the reciprocation of support is a key feature of a strong TMX relationship and “high-quality social exchanges are characterized by high levels of mutual trust, respect, and loyalty” (Chen & Klimoski, 2003, pg. 594). The presence of

supportive team-level TMX relationships are important for individual and team-level outcomes in a venture (such as team-level MWB, which will be discussed in Chapter 6), because the quality of a TMX relationship not only “indicates the effectiveness of the member’s working relationship to the peer group” (Seers, 1989, pg. 119); but extant literature has also “linked strong TMX relationships to favorable outcomes on the basis of social exchange theory and the assumption that members are motivated to reciprocate the benefits they receive with more positive work attitudes, higher identification with teammates, and increased creativity and citizenship behaviors benefiting the collective” (Farh et al., 2017, pg. 1117). Applying all these empirical research findings to the context of the doctoral research project, the construct of ‘Supportive Group Level TMX’ can be defined as a supportive group level social exchange – characterized by team psychological safety, supportive work interactions and open team communication – between members within the team unit as a whole. Average or high growth startup social enterprises typically displayed (and fostered) stronger and high quality supportive group level TMX within the team, whereas low/stagnated growth or failed ventures – experiencing low team psychological safety, poor interdependent work relationships and a lack of open team communication – typically encountered weaker and low quality group level TMX within the team.

Three Pillars of Supportive Group Level TMX

The qualitative data analysis revealed that in successful startup social ventures, the process of Supportive Group Level TMX was manifested within the teams through the following three team-level mechanisms:

- Team Psychological Safety
- Supportive Work Interactions
- Open Team Communication

a) Team Psychological Safety

This dimension of Supportive Group Level TMX is centred around the extant concept of Team Psychological Safety (TPS) which is defined as “a shared belief that the team is safe for interpersonal risk taking” (Edmondson, 1999, pg. 350) and this team-level mechanism can be described as a “team climate characterised by interpersonal trust and mutual respect in which people are comfortable being themselves” (Edmondson, 1999, pg. 354). TPS is “a group-level construct, meaning that the construct characterizes the team as a unit rather than individual team members” (Edmondson, 2003, pg. 5) and for this collective level construct to function effectively, the team members must have a shared understanding and converging perspective on what Mental Well Being (discussed further in Chapter 6) and TPS mean in the context of their team (Edmondson, 1999). In average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases), this mechanism was characterized by the emotions of friendship, solidarity and a ‘family-like’ spirit and work culture in the team (which can perhaps be a manifestation of the collectivistic nature of the national culture in India – Marchese, 2001), freedom and encouragement to voice opinions and to take/act on personal or team initiatives, supportive actions to rectify mistakes, presence of individual and team appreciation and absence of team politics or value judgements. Team members had a say/voice with regards to team/venture issues and decisions were not forced upon them. Everyone was encouraged to take initiative and give ideas, within a safe team environment where no ideas were shot down (without being

taken into account) or considered stupid. There was a high level of mutual trust and respect within the team, along with a strong sense of collective solidarity and loyalty to the team/venture as a whole. TPS was also closely interlinked with the team learning mechanism of learning from failure (as outlined in the previous section in this chapter). In teams with a high level of TPS, team members felt safe enough to make mistakes, hold each other accountable for errors in a non-judgemental way, and collectively learn from the failures to grow together as a team. On the other hand, low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises had more transactional founder-member and member-member interactions. As a result, such ventures often lacked a family-like work culture or friend-like rapport with regards to intra-team relationships and team members did not always feel comfortable enough to voice their opinions or take initiative. Hence, such teams often had a lower level of TPS as compared to successful social ventures. Due to low TPS, such teams also lacked the important cultural aspect of being able to learn from failure in a safe way.

The interviews can help to illustrate the presence of TPS in successful teams. For example, a team member in an average growth venture, working on mental health, explained how the team work environment was a safe and non-judgemental space, where team members felt free and safe enough to come up with ideas or voice their opinions. They were not afraid of looking stupid in front of their colleagues and were not worried about judged by others in the team. Due to the high level of TPS in the organization, team members could direct all their energies into working hard for the venture (rather than getting caught up in office politics), and this led to a productive work environment with a lot of new ideas being generated by everyone (full time team members, as well as, volunteers) in the team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“...Nothing is shot down, you come up with more ideas. You’re not afraid to talk about anything or any particular issue with a program, or what could be done, what could not be done. The energies are being focused in the right direction. I’m not bothering about what this person’s going to think or whether I’m going to look stupid...I’m focusing my energies on what we can do for [the venture]. So that focus is there; like we don’t even to look at anything else...</i> <i>...It’s a safe space for all of us. I can say anything that’s on my mind about work or anything. I know it will be respected, it will not be analyzed or judged. So if I want to say something, “You know what, we should have a completely different strategy about social media” and it could be radical – just like a hypothetical thing – and like I can still put it up; so the volunteers also [can do the same]”.</i> – Team Member	Team member in an average growth venture focused on mental health – illustrating Psychological Safety in the team

Table 71: Illustrative Quote for Team Psychological Safety (TMX)

In another example, the founder of a high growth agriculture venture explained how everyone in his team felt safe and secure enough to be able to hold each other, including the founder, accountable for mistakes or errors made, in a non-judgemental way. The team members felt free enough to speak their mind and no decisions were

enforced on anyone – everyone felt valued and heard, which in turn led to a high level of team-level job satisfaction. This free and open team work environment had a high level of TPS, which in turn, also led to a team culture of learning from failure. Everyone in the team, including the founder, could constructively learn from their mistakes, in order to grow collectively for the greater good of the venture. An interview with a team member of this venture further revealed that the everyone in the team worked together like a family. The positive (and safe) team work environment enabled the team members to work cohesively as a family, and they felt collectively responsible for contributing to the social mission of the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“[Team member 1], [Team member 2], [Team member 3] who do the work, anybody from their department, if they feel that I am making a mistake, they can directly tell me. That sort of liberty I have given to them. So, I can know where I am going wrong. Also, I try to understand what is their view, because unless I do that, I will just be enforcing my decisions on them. If they will not be free to speak their mind, then they might not be working whole-heartedly. We do have a few people but whoever is with us is here working wholeheartedly. Nobody is being forced.” – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and a team member in a high growth agriculture venture – illustrating Psychological Safety in the team
<i>“We work together like a family. Nobody feels like it’s not their job. Everybody works together...People who work here don’t think that this is just work. They take up their tasks as responsibilities of the family and as family members, for feeding food to the people, and if we work well, people will be aware of the good that we are doing.” – Team Member</i>	

Table 72: Illustrative Quotes for Team Psychological Safety (TMX)

In contrast, the interviews highlighted that low/stagnated growth or failed teams exhibited low levels of TPS. For example, an interview with the founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture revealed that her team did not have a safe team environment where team members could constructively learn from failure. In the event that a team member made a mistake, the founder would judge how to react to that mistake based on the perceived genuineness or authenticity of the circumstances behind that error. The founder explained how she could be quite harsh on the team members/beneficiaries if she felt that the member’s excuse behind that mistake was not acceptable enough or if the team member did not try hard enough to fix the error. The onus to fix the error would lie solely on the individual member and if the mistake was not rectified to the founder’s standards, she would actually tell that particular team member that she could not trust her anymore (thus leading to low TPS in the team). Hence, there was no evidence of a safe team culture where members were allowed to make mistakes and learn from them in a safe and non-judgemental way. Instead, it seemed like quite a strict and authoritarian work environment where the focus was just on fixing the mistake rather learning from it constructively (through an individualistic rather than collective approach). Thus, in this team, there was a lack of TPS, which negatively impacted the interactions

between the founder and the team members, and hindered the ability of team members to learn from their mistakes in a safe way.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"If it's a time bound thing, for example if there is a client that needed to have their order three days ago and you already delayed it and then you go and mess it up and then something else or you don't communicate to me and then you disappear for ten days for a wedding when there is an order that needs to be fulfilled and you know it, those sort of things are little more like 'what the hell.' Whereas other things like someone not doing such a good job or not finishing it well. So I'll give the same example in two ways, so say they are stitching a [name of traditional handicraft product] and she is stitching this line and I tell her this is crooked, make it straight. She just says, yeah I'll do it. So I don't look at it again. I want to take it back later and I'm packing it, I discovered that she hasn't fixed it. Then when I meet her the next time, I said, "You know, I can't trust you because I told you to do that and you didn't do it and it shows badly on us and we're not going to get the order" and you know things like that. But on the other hand if I tell her to fix it and she fixes it but it's still not exactly what I wanted, then maybe my explanation wasn't clear enough. The next time I tell her listen, what I meant by that was I needed you to do this. At least she tried. That differentiates between being a mistake that...It is really whether the mistake was made out of like just 'it's okay' or whether there is a genuine mistake. Because if it was a genuine mistake, then we all make them, but if it was a mistake that was like oh, I hope she doesn't notice it so I just let it be, then I am a little less kind to that." – Founder</i>	Founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of Psychological Safety in the team

Table 73: Illustrative Quote for a lack of Team Psychological Safety (TMX)

b) Supportive Work Interactions

The second TMX dimension of Supportive Work Interactions indicates the team members' ability to balance working autonomously with independence, while also effectively contributing to activities that require intra-team interdependence. The interviews revealed that successful social venture teams featured a characteristic 'chipping-in' approach, where everyone took ownership of their own responsibilities, while at the same time being willing and able to chip in when required, and support each other in order to get the work done. Team members were not afraid to ask each other for help and there was a common understanding within the groups that all the group members 'had each other's backs' and they expected each other to step up when required; to support each other and the team as a whole, for the greater good of the organization. This approach of chipping in and supporting each other came naturally to team members in successful ventures, given the presence of psychological safety within the teams (as mentioned in the point above). This 'chipping-in' work approach is also characteristic to startup ventures, because in the early stages of an enterprise's journey, every team member needs to pitch in ('wear many hats') and do what's needed (alongside excelling at their work) in order to collectively drive the venture forward. Hence, the supportive nature of work

interactions within such teams fostered a goal-oriented sense of intra-team collaboration (instead of competition) within successful social ventures.

For example, an interview with a team member in a high growth healthcare startup illustrated how all the members in that team went above and beyond their specific job roles to ‘chip in’ and help each other out – not just by offering support in the time of need, but also by regularly engaging with each other (offering ideas and suggestions) collaboratively on an ongoing basis.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“I think because we are very small team, everybody goes beyond their job roles to do multiple things. I think that’s the kind of interesting thing about our group that we’re not just defined by our roles, we are – we reach out to offers, suggestions, offer ideas or we do things together if somebody needs time – somebody needs help, because time is a constraint, we are lagging behind or anything, we chip in together. That’s the biggest benefit of being part of this group.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth healthcare venture – illustrating Supportive Work Interactions in the team

Table 74: Illustrative Quote for Supportive Work Interactions (TMX)

Similarly, a team member in a high growth social venture, working on technical skill development, mentioned that in his team, no team member was expected to work alone. If someone lacked knowledge about a particular task, the team would help him/her out, and if someone was an expert in a specific topic, the team would try to learn from that individual’s skillset and expertise. Hence, through this supportive exchange of skills and knowledge within the group, the team worked well together in a very collaborative manner.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“Every person here has a helping nature. No team member is alone. It’s not that every person has to look after their own job. Every team member, whatever he or she does, big or small, has to be done as a team work. You cannot think that this is all I will do. It could be anybody, be it your boss or your colleague, we try to work together collaboratively. So, if someone isn’t aware of how a particular job should be done, we all try to help him understand it. If someone else is an expert at something, we try to learn from that person. We try to give and take all information, and work together as much as possible. That is our strongest point, working in collaboration with each other.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth venture focused on technical skill development – illustrating Supportive Work Interactions in the team

Table 75: Illustrative Quote for Supportive Work Interactions (TMX)

An interview with a team member of a high growth education venture revealed a unique way of looking at this ‘chipping-in’ approach in the team. The member explained that her team had a shared leadership approach, and within this approach, team members must develop ‘attachment with detachment’ to their work tasks, because this ability will enable them to fulfil their tasks with ownership and integrity,

while also allowing them to move from task to task (and chip in to help each other) without getting overly protective or stuck with their primary task/responsibility. This unique and dynamic approach was also conducive for higher levels of personal/collective growth and development and continuous learning within the team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“Shared leadership has instilled ownership values in the people. When you share something, each one is owner...</i> <i>...I heard a common thing from many other organizations that were there that you generally get attached with something that you are doing, you start taking ownership of that activity. But in shared leadership there is a concept of attachment with detachment, which is tricky but important. If you have detachment with something you are attached with, that gives you the chance to go ahead, and develop. If you stay attached and stuck there, then development somewhere stops. That is the key of shared leadership. If you get stuck there, then it is not shared. This is very important.”</i> <i>– Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth education venture – illustrating Supportive Work Interactions in the team (a unique SL perspective)

Table 76: Illustrative Quote for Supportive Work Interactions (TMX) – A unique SL perspective

Further, the co-founder (CEO) of the same high growth education venture (as outlined above) explained how members in her team not only helped each other out, but also publicly acknowledged the support received, through messages on the team’s WhatsApp group, publicly handing out visual appreciation notes within the office space, etc. Such group mechanisms of thoughtful recognition and appreciation of team members, not only created a positive work environment but also reinforced and encouraged the cycle of supportive work interactions within the team/venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“One of the things that we do is that on the WhatsApp group where there is a lot of love. There’s a lot of like a shouting out for ‘thank you’s’ and stuff. And because there is a lot of sharing of responsibility – so volunteer engagement is under one person, but when the volunteer orientation days are planned, he [team member] gets help from at least one or two other people in the team to come. Then he makes it a point on the same day in the evening to on the WhatsApp group shot out thanks da-da-da-da for helping out with today’s volunteering...Once every few months we do like – [second line team leader] had put up these little appreciation notes which are stuck on the soft boards in both rooms and people basically pulled those out and if they was something that someone did, you hand the appreciation note to someone.”</i> – Co-Founder (CEO)	Co-founder (CEO) of a high growth education venture (same as above) – illustrating Supportive Work Interactions in the team

Table 77: Illustrative Quote for Supportive Work Interactions (TMX)

In contrast, a team member in a low/stagnated growth venture, working on sustainable fashion, mentioned that he mainly worked and communicated with the

founder (and did not interact much with the other team members). Another team member from this venture further confirmed that the team as a whole would not meet up or talk with each other very often. Thus, due to this centralised team structure, where all the work and communication happened through the founder, team members could not build strong relationships with each other, leading to low TMX within the team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"It's pretty much like a one point contact and I know [the founder], like whatever we discuss, whatever I show her, she then forwards it to her army of people who give her feedback and she processes that feedback and gets back to me. So for me, [the founder] is pretty much the only one point contact." – Team Member 1</i>	Quotes from team members in a low/stagnated growth venture focused on sustainable fashion – illustrating a lack of Supportive Work Interactions in the team
<i>"I mean, when we would meet, it would be like once in a while. So us like having a sit down with everyone else who also have inputs in [the venture], was not often..I mean, we didn't do that often." – Team Member 2</i>	

Table 78: Quotes illustrating a lack of Supportive Work Interactions (TMX) in the team

c) Open Team Communication

The third TMX dimension of Open Team Communication was featured consistently across most of the interviews and the data analysis revealed that founders and members in successful ventures described the communication and interaction within the team as being open, spontaneous, conversational, democratic, honest and authentic in nature. Alongside TPS and supportive work interactions within the teams, the process of open team communication worked perfectly as a complementary team mechanism that tied all the different dimensions together, to foster and inculcate Supportive Group Level TMX within such ventures. Ranging from being structured, semi-structured and sometimes even unstructured, the communication between the founders and the members, and within the team as a whole, appeared to function as a 'constant back and forth conversation'. The communication channels were characterised by spontaneity, openness and informality, and there appeared to be no hierarchical boundaries or restrictions with regards to the nature, medium or tone of communication. This type of open communication facilitated a safe space for free flowing discussion within the team. The channels of communication were open and conversational, just like between friends. The communication and interaction was also instantaneous and moved/evolved rapidly, to keep up with the fast paced and dynamic work culture of startup social ventures. The use of technology, to craft such open communication channels, was repeatedly consistently across all the interviews. Successful teams used a lot of technological mediums (WhatsApp, Skype, Social Media, Conference Calls) to communicate with each other and to self manage/lead the team (through the SL approach described in Chapter 4). Team meetings were regularly run using technology (alongside regular face-to-face meetings) and structured WhatsApp groups (with clear group usage guidelines) mirrored the real life team structures (smaller WhatsApp groups for sub-teams and one large group for the whole team) and work culture within such ventures. Several SL and Learning related team processes like knowledge exchange, group level appreciation,

feedback seeking and goal planning/review were also done on such WhatsApp groups. The founders and team members also used technology to share new things with each other in a personal and professional context, to inspire each other to work harder and also to keep learning new things at an individual, team and organisational level. Thus, the medium of technology facilitated and institutionalised the practice of open team communication within such ventures. In contrast, the team communication channels in low/stagnated or failed enterprises were more closed and perhaps implicitly restrictive in nature. The tone and objective of communication were often transactional (focused on work-related give-and-take) and sometimes lacked the spontaneous free-flowing conversations that were common in successful ventures.

For example, interviews with the co-founder (CEO) and two team members from an average growth education venture revealed that the tone and channels of communication in that team were very open, free and egalitarian in nature. This non-hierarchical tone of communication helped to create a close bond between team members and also significantly shaped the flat SL structure within the organization. WhatsApp was the main channel that team members used to communicate with each other on a regular basis (apart from face-to-face interactions) and it played a big role in facilitating the open team communication in this venture. All group members (including the CEO) were part of the team's shared WhatsApp group and this tech platform was used by members to constantly stay engaged with each other, to express appreciation to one another, to share news with each other, to have team discussions, etc.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I do not consider [team member 2] as my head, [team member 2] does not consider me as her head, so it's an attitude that we are all equals, and we are all equally responsible for whatever is going on. And this has been because of the environment that somehow got created within this structure...I think communication is the key role in this particular structure, how free you are in your communication with others, in that aspect...For example, [CEO] is elder to us, [team member 2] is elder to me..[another team member] is younger to me, but we all treat each of us in a very same level scale. So, the tone of our communication has been very friendly. It's not that if you are my boss, I am supposed to speak with x amount of respect...So, the communication that we have in our organization, it's a very friendly kind of communication, hence we have that closeness and this is how this flat structure was created automatically." – Team Member 1</i>	Quotes from the co-founder (CEO) and two team members of an average growth education venture – illustrating Open Communication in the team
<i>"Everything is on WhatsApp. If any news is like good or bad, we share it on WhatsApp and everyone comes to know, each and every member is on that group." – Team Member 2</i>	
<i>"I appreciate it in front of everyone that he has done this and because of this we have achieved this. Generally it's all these kinds of things are discussed in WhatsApp group, like we send the breaking news, and then people will send their thumbs up or kisses or smileys or whatever. So, that kind of engagement is there." –</i>	

Table 79: Illustrative Quotes for Open Team Communication (TMX)

In another example, a team member (second line team leader) from a high growth venture, focused on youth/community development, explained how her team used a communication mechanism called ‘circles’ of communication (or ‘circles’ of silence) to create an open and honest team work environment, with a high level of team psychological safety. Team members would consciously set aside time to have circles of silence with each other, and in these safe team circles, they would express their emotions, give feedback to each other and also revolve conflicts in a peaceful and non-judgemental way. The team member also explained that all team discussions in the venture were done in a ‘circle’ format, in order to create a non-hierarchical space (reflective of the SL in the team and also representative of the organizational values) that facilitated open and honest communication within the team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“I mean everything we do is in a circle, again not making it feel like a hierarchy.” – Team Member (Second Line Team Leader)</i>	Team member (second line team leader) in a high growth venture focused on youth/ community development – illustrating Open Communication in the team
<i>“So one thing is space. For example, we were always looking for a space which feels or kind of physically embodies these values. We never wanted to have a space which was anything else, which is not free, flexible, fun...So yes, we value a lot of things like doing those circles of silence together, trying to make sure that we eat together...we constantly keep having conversations with each other, which are pushing towards being more authentic and open, again which have values [part of organizational values]. So we push for those things very deeply... because with people you are dealing with different kind of emotions, you are dealing with all kinds of conflicts, so we prefer to be open and honest about them. We provide a lot of feedback to each other constantly. And it's not just [co-founder 1], [co-founder 2], and me providing to everybody else, we actively seek it from the other way round also.” – Team Member (Second Line Team Leader)</i>	

Table 80: Illustrative Quotes for Open Team Communication (TMX)

In contrast, in a failed social venture (working on women empowerment), the founder mentioned even though he tried to keep the lines of communication open, the team members always were a bit fearful to approach him and hence, he was unsuccessful in creating open and free communication channels within the organization.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“..The lines to me were always open and I was very conscious of never raising my voice to anyone or sort of making sure they are always comfortable around me, they never had to fear me. Though honestly I wasn't very successful at this, they always had a little bit of fear but it's something I kept trying to do.” – Founder</i>	Founder of a failed venture focused on women empowerment – illustrating a lack of open communication

	in the team

Table 81: Quote illustrating a lack of Open Communication in the team

Similarly, a former team member from another low/stagnated livelihoods venture mentioned that the tone of communication between her and the founder was very professional, and quite transactional (purely work oriented) in nature (unlike the friendly, open and informal communication in successful ventures).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“...It was very professional between me and [founder] ma’am...I can say for sure that there was no communication error between us ever professionally. So, she was very clear to what she wanted me to do and I was very clear that whatever things are to be done in what way...” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of open and informal communication (very transactional in nature) in the team

Table 82: Quote illustrating a lack of friendly and informal communication in the team

Link to the overall inductive narrative

As outlined above, successful startup social venture teams engaged in supportive group level TMX through the team level mechanisms of team psychological safety, supportive work interactions and open team communication. This safe and collaborative team work environment not only had a favourable effect on the team and firm level performance of such organizations, but also positively influenced the mental well being of the team members within the startup social ventures (explained in detail in Chapter 6).

5.4) Common Team Wavelength (about Team Processes, Values, Culture and Goals)

Construct Definition

The term ‘common wavelength’ was used in several interviews (spanning different organizations) and hence, it was appropriate to use the same terminology to describe this team phenomenon. Connecting this construct to the literature about group development stages, this shared understanding of team processes, values, culture and goals can be understood as a part of the ‘shared sensemaking’ stage where team members agree upon ‘cognitive scripts’ about each other, their work and the organization as a whole (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Wellman, 2017). However, in the case of the successful ventures studied in this research project, this shared understanding did not only take place in the initial stages of group formation; but instead was a dynamic construct characterized by a constantly evolving, interactional and up to date (not static) shared understanding of team processes, culture and goals within the team. Team members collectively engaged in the process of organizational sensemaking in order to develop a shared understanding of organisational tasks, routines, relationships, structures, processes and culture. Organizational

sensemaking “involves a tripartite view of its essential processes: (1) cognitive, which implies thinking about the organization’s relationships with its stakeholders and views about the broader world (i.e., the “common good” that goes beyond what’s good for business), as well as the rationale for engaging in specific activities that might have an impact on key relationships; (2) linguistic, which involves ways of explaining the organization’s reasons for engaging in specific activities and how it goes about sharing such explanations with others; and (3) conative, which involves the behavioral posture it adopts, along with the commitment and consistency it shows in conducting activities that impinge on its perceived relationships” (Basu & Palazzo, G., 2008, pg. 124). By drawing from the collective knowledge and learning experiences of the team as a whole, the process of organisational sensemaking contributes to the creation of organizational mental models – which “constitute the frameworks of organizational rationalities and belief systems on which formal analyses, policies and procedures are based” (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995, pg. 1059); and shared “organizational schemata or interpretive schemes” – which are “frames of reference shared among members of an organization or its subgroups” (Balogun & Johnson, 2004, pg. 525). Shared team mental models can be divided into four types or categories – related to (1) technology/equipment; (2) job/task; (3) team interaction; and (4) knowledge about team members (Mathieu et al., 2000) – and these shared mental models are closely linked to the emergence of team processes, as well as, team effectiveness (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010).

In average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases), the construct of ‘Common Team Wavelength’ (CTW) was characterised by a common level of team understanding, wherein the team members had an explicit (or in some cases partially implicit) shared understanding of different team processes and protocols (related to SL activities, team communication, team work relationships, accountability, etc.), expected team culture/values and overall organisational goals and vision. The team members had either verbally discussed and agreed upon this shared understanding, or in some cases, there was an implicit agreement (psychological contract) in the team about the shared understanding of team processes or culture. In such successful ventures, the team members made sense of the organisation’s past, present and future by drawing/learning from the team’s collective knowledge and learning experiences (shared sensemaking) and this led to a strong common wavelength within the team as a whole. However, in low/stagnated growth or failed startup social enterprises, there was a lack of explicit shared understanding or collective sensemaking among team members about the different team processes or protocols, expected team culture, values and/or overall organisational goals or vision. In such cases, most team members had not verbally or explicitly discussed or agreed upon on this shared understanding. Certain cases had an implied non-verbal understanding about team processes among team members; however the lack of explicit or formal shared understanding often led to some miscommunication and a mismatch of expectations, between the founders and team members, and within the team as a whole.

Dual Nature of Common Team Wavelength (CTW)

The qualitative data analysis revealed that in average or high growth startup social ventures, the Common Team Wavelength was characterized by a sense of shared understanding about team processes, principles, protocols, culture and goals, and this shared wavelength often had a dual nature, with a combination of the following complementary dimensions:

- Explicit Shared Team Understanding

- Implicit Shared Team Understanding

a) Explicit Shared Team Understanding

The interviews revealed that the common team wavelength in successful social venture teams was characterized by a shared understanding (of team processes, cultures and goals) that was verbal and explicit in nature. Founders and members in such teams consciously invested time and effort to explicitly discuss and agree upon the shared group protocols, principles and expectations related to team-level processes, work culture, organizational values and ownership for venture goal achievement. This explicit shared understanding was either verbal (discussed regularly at group forums such as team meetings, social bonding activities, team reviews, etc.) and/or written (through written/visually represented group values, documented discussion meeting notes, through emails and WhatsApp groups, etc.). This explicit and structured approach to crafting a common team wavelength was observed to some extent in average growth enterprises, but more so in high growth ventures, which had more advanced/developed team structures and processes in place.

For example, a team member from an average growth venture, focused on disability education, explained that in that team, all team discussions and decisions were handled using a consensus-based democratic voting approach. The team had 8 members (including the co-founders), and it had become a norm that in a team discussion, every team member would take a stand and voice their opinion about the matter at hand, and in the end, at least 5 out of the 8 people needed to agree upon the final decision or collective group stand related to the specific topic being discussed. This SL approach to decision making also led to effective knowledge exchange within the team, because team members had the opportunity to learn from each other's opinions and perspectives. Thus, using this explicitly defined 'rule of 5' mechanism, the team members consistently ensured that everyone in the group had an explicit shared team understanding (and agreement) about all team-level decisions and discussions within the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...Everything happens in consensus manner. Out of 8, 5 has to agree to something and then that 5 will at least make the other 3 realize that how things could be done...I think now it has become a norm. Now everybody quite understands it that we will have to at least take a stand, even if you know it or don't know. Even if you don't know it, then at least somebody who is taking a stand, take knowledge from him and see how correct or how wrong he is...So in terms of involving things, if you know it, you will give your stand. If you don't know it, take the knowledge from those people, understand it, and decide it and do it." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth venture focused on disability education – illustrating Explicit Shared Team Understanding

Table 83: Illustrative Quote for Explicit Shared Team Understanding (CTW)

On the other hand, the founder of a high growth education venture explained how her team had formal and structured processes in place to ensure that everyone in the team (including new team members) had a clear shared understanding about the explicitly defined values and culture of the organization. Through processual mechanisms such as

value-focused induction workshops for new recruits and clearly defined value-centric policies, all team members were on the exact same page about the non-negotiable ethics and principles of the venture. This common team wavelength in turn ensured that everyone in the team was completely aligned and committed to the value-centric culture and ethos of the organization.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"The people that we have, they are so aligned with our culture. So every time we are inducting people, this value workshop business happens where right from respect for people to accountability everything gets spoken, these are our five core values. This is what we do. And whatever we do it essentially comes from the plane of this value set that we carry. That is communicated. We have a strong set of negotiables and non-negotiables. So they know that these are a couple of things that we are not going to negotiate upon. So there is this crisper communication that happens right from day one. They know what they are getting into. So like...there is this whole policy that [the venture], we still do not have an office. We work from our school." – Founder</i>	Founder of a high growth education venture – illustrating Explicit Shared Team Understanding

Table 84: Illustrative Quote for Explicit Shared Team Understanding (CTW)

b) Implicit Shared Team Understanding

Alongside an explicit understanding of common team wavelength, the interviews also revealed some extent of implicit shared team understanding in successful startup social venture teams. Closely linked to the high degree of SCP Congruence within such teams, there appeared to also be an implicit and non-verbal mutual understanding between founders and team members (and within the team as a whole), about the team's expected approach to specific group processes, work culture and goal accountability. These implicit and tacit shared mental models (functioning like a team psychological contract) were manifested within the team through reciprocal mechanisms such as founders/leaders/senior team members role modeling the expected/ideal behaviour in order to inspire the followers; and the members, in turn, mirroring the founders/leaders' behaviour in order to demonstrate proactivity and leadership potential, build more rapport and mutual trust between each other and display behavioral congruence within the team. In most cases, the implied values and principles associated with the specific social cause of the startup venture significantly shaped the implicit shared team understanding about the expected and ideal behaviour (in relation to different processes, principles, protocols, culture and goals) within the team. This implicit (and sometimes unstructured) approach to creating a common wavelength in the team was observed both in average and high growth enterprises, but more so in average growth ventures, which were yet to create more advanced/developed team structures and processes, and relied more on a tacit shared understanding between founders and team members, and between the group as a whole. However, an implicit and non-verbal approach to creating team understanding was also observed in low/stagnated growth or failed ventures; but in such cases, the unsaid nature of team protocols combined with a low degree of SCP Congruence between leaders and followers often led to a mismatch of expectations and a lack of common wavelength within the team.

For example, insights from an interview (and participant observation) with a team member in an average growth venture (focused on artisan livelihoods) illustrated how the founder and her (and other team members) had an implicit shared team understanding about how to uphold the principles and value-centric ethos of the organization. There was a clear unsaid (tacit) sense of shared understanding about organizational ethics that everyone was expected to uphold (team psychological contract) and the team members were aware of the issues that would not be tolerated and values that were non-negotiable to the team. In this case, the implicit common team wavelength emerged as a result of high SCP Congruence within the team and the strong organizational ethics were shaped as a result of the implied principles attached to the startup's social cause of providing fair, respectful and sustainable employment to rural women artisans in India. The team member's interview also clearly featured the use of collective language because she regularly used words like 'We/Us' rather than 'She/I'; thus highlighting the high degree of common wavelength within the team and the collective sense of duty she/the team felt towards the organization as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I think for any team to bond, it's very essential that their core value should be the same, that's something which I completely believe in. And I think implicitly without any written, so we know that there are certain things which we will not tolerate, we will not tolerate any kind of corruption, bribery aspect in business. We will not tolerate disrespect for anybody involved. So it's never been that we have written it all, but implicitly as people we believe that and I think that is important." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth livelihoods venture – illustrating Implicit Shared Team Understanding

Table 85: Illustrative Quote for Implicit Shared Team Understanding (CTW)

Similarly, interviews with the founder and team members of an average growth mental health startup revealed that because all the members in the team had a shared professional background (they were all trained as psychologists), their inherent professional traits/qualities (such as empathy, understanding and handling conflicts effectively) automatically translated into their work and led to a common team wavelength about the core values and activities of the venture. Further, during team-level discussions related to decision making, the founder and the core team member didn't need to convince each other too much about their personal stands or new ideas because they were on the same page about the venture's social cause and vision. This implicit shared team wavelength (which emerged as a result of SCP Congruence) in turn made team-level SL processes (like decision making and team learning) quite smooth, effective and collaborative in nature.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...Being empathic, being collaborative, being understanding are the core values of psychologists, of counselling psychologists/therapists. Because we imbibe that into our work, it kind of gets translated into who we are as people." – Team Member 1</i>	Quotes from the founder and two team members in an average growth

<i>"I think that understanding that we're all there from the mental health background, so we at least know what we're talking about. So I mean...everything doesn't need to be explained to them [volunteers], unless like you have doubt and you see them..there's some faltering, then you just subtly just correct them and then we just talk over it." – Team Member 2</i>	venture focused on mental health – illustrating Implicit Shared Team Understanding
<i>"...Whatever decisions we've had to take, it's been a discussion between [team member 1] and me. And again, I think we both have immense faith in each other to make the right call either way. So she doesn't have to convince me too much and I don't have to convince her too much, because we're sort of very much on the same wavelength when it comes to mental health, which helps a lot because she'll immediately get why I'm saying what I'm saying and vice versa." – Founder</i>	

Table 86: Illustrative Quotes for Implicit Shared Team Understanding (CTW)

In contrast, the founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture mentioned that she had not thought of or explicitly defined any organizational values. Further, she revealed that there was a mismatch of work expectations in the venture, because she had been too friendly/casual in the past and had not clearly communicated what she expected in terms of work commitment from the members in her team. Thus, due to poor communication between the founder and the members and a lack of explicitly defined organizational values/expectations, there was a low level of shared team understanding (about goals/values) within the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Honestly not like that I have thought of and written down anything [values]." – Founder</i>	Founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a low level of CTW in the venture
<i>"..That whole friendly approach hasn't really worked too well. I still want to retain that but also I think what I missed out on doing was putting across very clear this is what I need, this is what you are expected to do, and this is what I will pay you for...It was more like oh, friends, friends, friends, that sort of thing. So just being more clear on what is expected, what is – like what I am expecting from the whole thing, understanding what they are expecting from the whole thing and sort of trying to maintain that relationship more as a work thing than making it personal. Because the kind of people that I think I would end up hiring – if I make it personal, what happens is you give an inch and they make a mile sometimes." – Founder</i>	

Table 87: Quotes illustrating a low of level of CTW in the venture

Similarly, a team member in another low/stagnated growth startup, focused on sustainable fashion, also mentioned that her venture did not have any explicitly defined organizational values either (unlike successful social ventures).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“..[the venture] doesn’t have set in stone values...no, I didn’t notice anything.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in a low/stagnated growth venture focused on sustainable fashion – illustrating a lack of explicit shared team understanding in the venture

Table 88: Quote illustrating a lack of explicit shared team understanding (CTW) in the venture

Link to the overall inductive narrative

As outlined above, successful startup social venture teams displayed the presence of a strong common team wavelength, which was grounded in a complementary combination of explicit and implicit shared team understanding about group processes, work culture and organizational goal accountability. The antecedent factor of a high degree of SCP Congruence appeared to have played an important role in shaping the common team wavelength in successful ventures, and in turn, this shared wavelength played a significant role in shaping the shared team principles and protocols, as part of the SL model within such teams (explained in detail in Chapter 4). This construct also appeared to have strengthened the relationship (operating as a moderating team process) between all the other constructs in the inductive narrative (as outlined in Chapter 7).

Chapter 6

FINDINGS FROM THE QUALITATIVE STUDY – PART 3 –

Team and Venture Outcomes

This chapter discusses how the team processes outlined in Chapter 5 influenced or contributed to important team and venture level outcomes in startup social ventures. The research findings presented in this chapter are related to the third sub-research question of the dissertation:

How do the team processes in startup social enterprise teams influence venture performance, team well being and other team level outcomes in these organizations?

There are four main team/venture outcomes that will be outlined in this chapter, and each outcome construct has further sub-categories that play an important role in completing the overall inductive narrative. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 will first discuss the purpose-centric team/venture outcomes of SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover respectively, which emerged as a result of Mission Reinforcement within successful social ventures. Section 6.3 will then outline the important Team/Venture Performance Outcomes (measures of success) that emerged in average/high growth social enterprises, as a result of Continuous Team Learning in such teams. Finally, Section 6.4 will delve into the team level outcome of Mental Well Being, that emerged as a result of Supportive TMX in successful venture teams. An overview of the four outcome constructs that will be outlined in this chapter can be found in Figure 10 below:




Figure 10: Team/Venture Outcomes in the Inductive Three-Path Model

6.1) Social Cause Passion (SCP) Resilience

SCP Resilience is the fourth dimension of the over-arching construct of Social Cause Passion that has been introduced in this thesis. Resilience can be described as an individual or team's ability to persist "in a course of action despite experiencing negative outcomes" (Howell et al., 2005, pg. 645). This individual or collective behaviour of persistence and task perseverance enables individuals and teams to "stand their ground rather than yield" (Bowles and Flynn, 2010, pg. 769) when faced with obstacles and "persist in the face of adversity" (Howell et al., 2005, pg. 649). In the context of startup social ventures, this dimension can be understood as the degree of persistence and resilience of the founders, team members and the team as a whole, to keep working towards the social vision of the enterprise, regardless of the challenges that the individuals or the teams are faced with. SCP Resilience – which is fuelled by an intense passion for the social cause of the organization at the individual, team and venture level (as a result of a high degree of SCP Congruence and SCP Embeddedness within the team – explained in Chapter 4 and 5 respectively) – can also be understood in terms of individual and collective persistence-related 'Champion Behaviour' (Howell et al., 2005) for the startup's social cause. In successful early stage social ventures, founders, team members and the group as a whole displayed the following resilience-focused champion behaviours (adapted from Howell et al., 2005):

- Showing determination and perseverance in overcoming personal and professional obstacles, at the individual or collective level, in order to work towards the social vision and goals of the organisation
- Overcoming small and large barriers faced in their work (at the individual and collective level) in order to achieve the social vision and goals of the organisation
- When faced with a problem, seeking the help of experts/people (from outside the organization) who can solve the problem, in order to fulfil the social vision and goals of the organization

Founders, members and teams, that displayed the resilience-focused champion behaviours outlined above, used the startup's social cause and vision as a grounding compass to help keep themselves focused and motivated in the face of adversity; which in turn helped them to handle and overcome the various individual and collective (personal/professional) obstacles that they faced, for the greater good and survival of the startup social ventures. This SCP-driven resilience behaviour is critical for the survival of early stage social enterprises, given the various personal and professional obstacles and barriers that are typical to the fast-paced nature and constantly evolving environment of the startup landscape. The interviews revealed that founders and members (and the team as a whole) in average or high growth social ventures (success cases) displayed a high degree of SCP Resilience and purpose-driven resilience behaviour. In contrast, founders and members (and the group as a whole) in low/stagnated or failed enterprises showed a lower degree of SCP Resilience and a lack of cause-focused resilience behaviour, at individual and/or collective level, often contributed to the slow growth and/or failure of such venture teams.

Three Levels of SCP Resilience

SCP Resilience is a multi-level construct and manifests itself at three levels in a startup social enterprise – the individual level of the founder and team members, the team level and the venture level as a whole. At each level, there are certain factors that influenced the

degree of SCP Resilience experienced, and this resilient behaviour in turn influenced certain individual, team and venture level outcomes. The qualitative data analysis shed light on how the mechanism of SCP Resilience operated at each of the three levels, as outlined below:

- Personal SCP Resilience (Individual level)
- Collective SCP Resilience (Team level)
- Organizational SCP Resilience (Venture level)

a) Personal SCP Resilience (Individual level)

Founders and team members in successful startup social ventures displayed a high degree of Personal SCP Resilience at the individual level. Due to high levels of SCP Intensity at the individual level and SCP Congruence at the dyadic and venture levels, these leaders and members exhibited resilient behaviours when faced with personal or professional barriers and obstacles in their work. The interviews revealed that founders and members faced several personal barriers and these obstacles in their personal lives had the potential to negatively impact their professional lives and work in the social ventures. Examples of such personal barriers included financial insecurity and economic pressure (due to the low salaries and resource-strapped nature of the startup social enterprise context), time-consuming personal commitments that encroached upon the work with the social venture, logistical and geographical problems such as the increased distance between the physical location of the work-site and the residence of the individuals working in the ventures, etc. Founders, in particular, experienced a great amount of pressure to personally finance the startup social venture, while also ensuring their own long-term economic security. While the personal obstacles were the main source of anxiety for the founders and members, some of them also faced professional barriers such as a lack of function-specific or sector-specific work experience, in relation to the core activities of the startup social venture. Even though most individuals across all the ventures experienced at least some of these personal or professional barriers, the founders and members in successful teams displayed a high level of cause-driven resilient behaviour and managed to overcome these obstacles, so that they could continue to work towards the social goals and vision of the impact venture. They overcame the personal and professional obstacles through strategies such as function-specific upskilling and learning, sector-specific knowledge acquisition and credibility building, personal livelihood diversification for improved financial security, better time management, etc. – depending on the type of the obstacles they faced. Driven by the passion for the venture's social cause, such acts of personal resilience led to different kinds of individual level outcomes such as personal and professional learning and development, improved work performance, improved team member retention (continuing to work in the organization) and overall mental well being of the founders and members in the startup teams. In contrast, in low/stagnated growth or failed social enterprises, founders and team members displayed a lower degree of Personal SCP Resilience (due to low SCP Intensity and SCP Congruence). The inability to persist against obstacles or resiliently overcome personal and professional barriers (due to low cause-driven SCP Resilience) led to poorer team member retention, lower levels of learning and development, poorer work performance, and an overall poorer state of mental well being for the founders and members in such teams, as compared to individuals working in successful ventures.

The findings in the interviews help to illustrate this construct dimension better. For example, the CEO of a high growth environment venture explained that his fellow co-founder strongly believed that training external stakeholders to create environmental awareness would greatly increase the impact of the organization. Even though he faced obstacles in terms of lack of support from the CEO (the interviewee), as well as, failure during the pilot training activities; he persisted, did not give up and tried again with a different customer segment, and ultimately succeeded in overcoming these barriers – and ended up creating extended social impact, while also earning revenue to ensure financial sustainability for the venture. Hence, this example highlights the strong SCP Resilience, at individual level, of the co-founder.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Another thing is that I was very hard-headed on saying that we need to focus, focus, and focus, and we could not do training. And [co-founder] was always of a view that training should be done because it is our extended impact and sometimes we also earn from it and it is also creating awareness, putting it out to the universe and it will help us in some ways...he kept on pushing it, eventually I said, 'okay, if you want to do it, you do it'. So, he said, 'okay', he made a plan and it was very difficult, so initially he couldn't finish it but then he said, 'no, I want to do it again with a different set of customers' and then we started doing corporates and we realized that it was bringing us good money and a lot of visibility. So, now, we do it." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	CEO of a high growth environment (talking about his co-founder) – illustrating Personal SCP Resilience (at the individual level)

Table 89: Illustrative Quote for Personal SCP Resilience

In another example, a team member in a high growth skills training venture explained how she started her journey in the organization as a junior trainer and initially, every day was a challenge for her. But as she got exposed to the full impact of the enterprise, her determination and ownership for the cause grew – she persisted in the face of challenges, gave her best to overcome personal hurdles and she is now a second line leader in the organization. She believed that she was able to be resilient and rise up the ranks in the organization, because she can bring about a change in the enterprise and because she feels like she 'owns' the organization – thus demonstrating her strong personal level SCP Resilience.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"..Now almost 4-5 years of journey...every day really it's like a challenge for you, every moment is a challenge for you. Initially, I did not realize because I was just a part and a parcel, like just a small part, I am just a trainer. But later on as I started exposing myself to the other particular part and certainly I really feel that today I am at this particular level and somehow trying to do my best to my organization because I feel that I own it, so that kind of a feeling has made me to bring a current change even in the organization and even as an individual." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth venture focused on skills development – illustrating Personal SCP Resilience (at the individual level)

Table 90: Illustrative Quote for Personal SCP Resilience

In contrast, a team member (a designer who worked part time with the venture) from a low/stagnated growth sustainable fashion venture revealed how her workload with other projects (outside of the venture) has increased, and thus, she had been less engaged and more distant with the social enterprise. Given her inability or motivation to overcome the personal level obstacles (rising workload) and the fact that she was not fully immersed in the impact creation process with the beneficiaries, it can be deduced that a lack of connection and exposure to field impact of the venture led to low SCP Resilience, at the personal level, for the team member.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...I'm not completely immersed in the process, I don't have full exposure to it. So whatever little I did gather last year, you know, my design input has been purely based on that...But unfortunately, this year I've been more distant and not as engaged as I was last year because of the workload that I've been having with the other projects." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a low/stagnated growth venture focused on sustainable fashion – illustrating a lack of Personal SCP Resilience (at the individual level)

Table 91: Quote illustrating a lack of Personal SCP Resilience

b) Collective SCP Resilience (Team level)

Given the high level of Personal SCP Resilience exhibited by founders and members, successful startup social venture teams also displayed a high degree of Collective SCP Resilience at the team level. Due to the high levels of SCP Congruence and SCP Embeddedness (via Regular Mission Reinforcement, as highlighted in Chapter 5), such teams were highly passionate about the social vision of the ventures, focused on the social goals of the organization as their central priority and exhibited cause-driven resilient team behaviour when faced barriers or obstacles in their work. Examples of obstacles faced at the team level included a lack of financial and human resources (working in a resource strapped environment), micro-level operational barriers or roadblocks, inexperience or blind spots related to certain internal team/organizational issues, external factors that directly influenced the team's workload or work space, etc. When faced with such barriers, successful teams exhibited a high level of purpose-driven resilient behaviour and overcame these obstacles because of their determination and passion to do justice to the social goals of the organization. They collectively overcame such barriers through a range of team-level strategies such as chipping in and pooling together resources to get the job done on time, adapting the team work approach and work environment to accommodate any external influencing factors that affected the team, as well as, engaging in reflection, feedback and team learning behaviour to identify areas of inexperience and/or blind spots and taking the appropriate corrective actions or training/development steps required to fill those gaps, in order to move forward for the greater good of the venture. Such actions of SCP Resilience enabled the teams to manage obstacles, mistakes or failure in a proactive and pragmatic way, and that in turn led to positive team-level outcomes such a high level of team learning and development, better team performance and overall positive mental wellbeing of the team as a whole. On the other hand, low/stagnated growth or failed venture teams

displayed a lower degree of Collective SCP Resilience (due to low levels of SCP Congruence, SCP Embeddedness and Personal SCP Resilience within the teams). A lack of cause-driven resilient behaviour at the team level led to a lower level of team learning or development, poorer team performance and a poorer state of collective mental wellbeing (or group affect) for the team as a whole.

For example, a team member (second line leader) in a high growth venture, focused on youth development, mentioned that one of the biggest strengths of the team's leadership approach was the ability to build a strong sense of loyalty, among the team members, towards the organization's beneficiaries (students). Every team member felt a sense of responsibility and accountability towards the beneficiaries, and this high level of purpose-centric team ownership enabled team members to keep persisting even when they made mistakes. The team's culture emphasised that if someone made a mistake, they should own up to their actions, not give up and work together to resolve the errors, for the greater good of the venture. Hence, this value-driven team culture of learning from failure (closely linked to TPS and Supportive TMX outlined in Chapter 5) led to a high level of Collective SCP Resilience within the team as a whole.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I think, building commitment and loyalty has definitely been one of the biggest strengths of the entire leadership approach and that's the reason why, even our core team, like a SRM [Student Relationship Manager], feel that onus that they have towards the students; the direct beneficiaries. Because that thing is like inculcated that you have to take responsibility, you're accountable for your actions. Sometimes it may have not worked, but then, it's still your responsibility. You have to like take the blame for it. You can always rework. It's not going to be the end for you; you can always come around; you will always get a second chance...And because of the openness that is there, you can always share your issues and problems that you faced. And even if you make a genuine mistake and you own it up...then, people try to resolve it; people try to not judge you for that. So I think, that has been because of the culture that we have; the value system that we are trying to inculcate in our people." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth venture focused on youth development – illustrating Collective SCP Resilience (at the team level)

Table 92: Illustrative Quote for Collective SCP Resilience

In another example, a team member in an average growth venture, working on disability education, explained that in the two years of organizational existence, the team had experienced several unexpected obstacles, in terms of raising funds or with regards to the operational delivery of their core activities. However, the team felt a strong sense of ownership towards their beneficiaries (disabled students) and did not want to let them down. This in turn, instilled a high level of Collective SCP Resilience and a 'we-can-do-it' optimistic attitude amongst the team members, which enabled them to keep moving forward, regardless of the hurdles they faced as a team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...We have completed 2 years...before also we did not have money, now also we don't have money, let's do it, money will come. Someone somewhere will bring in the funds... I mean 2 years ago where something that you thought, will it happen or not happen, now...let's try it, it will happen. From somewhere or other it will happen. We have to do it...You've already gone too far with these students, so it's not an option to tell them tomorrow that basically there's nothing that we can do. So now come what may, you have to go forward." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth venture focused on disability education – illustrating Collective SCP Resilience (at the team level)

Table 93: Illustrative Quote for Collective SCP Resilience

In contrast, interviews with the co-founders of a failed social venture (working in affordable housing) revealed that they had also faced financial hardships (like the average growth team mentioned above) within the first two years of starting up, but they chose not to pursue the venture path any further and ended up selling their concept to a larger construction company. They admitted that they were unable to overcome the challenges they faced, and did not try to adapt or pivot the model (to stay true to their social goals) and instead chose to sell/lose direct control of their purposeful solution. Following the sale of the concept, they were not very involved with the venture anymore (more of a consultant role) and they weren't sure whether their solution was even reaching the intended low-income target group (via the larger company). Hence, they were no longer creating the intended social impact in line with the vision of the company, and this lack of cause-centric perseverance in the face of adversity, indicated a low level of Collective SCP Resilience among the co-founding team of this venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"So I must say that the organization evolved...not the way the we expected, but we saw some challenges with respect to the logistics and scalability and so these were the typical challenges which we saw during our involvement with [the venture]...So considering these challenges, we decided to – we got actually an offer from a company based in [major Indian city]...So we decided to sell this concept to them...So we are not directly involved, but we do consulting – part-time consulting and as and when required, we help them...So they do have a social impact angle as well, but they do other activities as well. So they are a big construction company and this you can say is a part of their social CSR activities or the social impact activities driven from that." – Co-Founder 1</i>	Quotes from the co-founders of a failed venture focused on affordable housing – illustrating a lack of Collective SCP Resilience (at the level of the co-founding team)

<i>“...Our financial cash flows were very poor for [the venture], which actually resulted in we could not take any kind of monetary benefits from [the venture], not even for our sustenance. Then it became very financially demanding also...So I don't know if we are creating that impact to the end consumer because what we were doing earlier was we were directly addressing to the customer or a family who was living in slum...That was not a viable business model for [the venture]...in the long run...That was not a sustainable way to go forward, at least for both of us, and that's where we changed this model...I frankly don't know after the last 12 months if my solution has reached to the bottom of pyramid.” – Co-Founder 2</i>	

Table 94: Quotes illustrating a lack of Collective SCP Resilience

c) Organizational SCP Resilience (Venture level)

As a result of the Personal SCP Resilience displayed by founders and members and the Collective SCP Resilience exhibited by the team as a whole, successful social enterprises ultimately inculcated and displayed a high degree of Organizational SCP Resilience at the venture level. Due to high levels of SCP Embeddedness and Personal/Collective SCP Resilience within the venture teams, such enterprises developed a strong intrinsic sense of Organizational SCP Resilience. This cause-driven resilience in turn enabled such organizations to face, handle and overcome a range of different firm-level internal and/or external obstacles, in order to continue to work towards fulfilling the social vision of the ventures. Typical firm-level external obstacles that the ventures faced included a rapidly evolving external startup landscape, a lack of credibility in the external ecosystem, increasing market competition, new market trends or external events that threatened the survival or performance of the ventures, etc. Examples of internal organizational obstacles faced by the enterprises included a lack of human and financial resources (resource strapped environment), macro/higher level operational roadblocks or issues, legal or governance related issues and barriers, things not going according to plan with regards to financial or social goal achievement, etc. Successful ventures faced, handled and overcame such internal and external obstacles through firm-level strategies such as resource planning and mobilization, strategic collaborations and partnerships to boost performance and credibility, adapting the organizational work approach to keep up with external factors and trends, pivoting the business model when faced with unavoidable internal or external factors, etc. Such ventures braved through difficult obstacles due to the high levels of SCP Embeddedness within the organizations and the strong sense of social cause passion within the teams. Ventures that displayed a high level of Organizational SCP Resilience turned out to be hardy organizations in the long term, and such cause-driven firm resilience led to positive enterprise-level outcomes, in terms of the performance, growth, longevity and survival of the startup social ventures. In contrast, low/stagnated growth or failed social ventures displayed a lower degree of Organizational SCP Resilience (due to low levels of Personal/Collective Resilience and SCP Embeddedness within the teams). As a result of the lack of intrinsic venture level SCP Resilience, such organizations achieved poorer outcomes in relation to their performance, growth, longevity and survival in the long run.

For example, the co-founder (CEO) of an average growth education venture explained how as an organization, they realised that their initial intervention was too short in duration and was not having the intended impact that it was supposed to, in the lives of the beneficiaries (students). When faced with this critical challenge, the team and the venture persevered, learned from their failure and revised/improved their model to have a longer and more impactful intervention with their beneficiaries (closely connected to the team learning behaviour of learning from failure outlined in Chapter 5). Thus, this ability to persist in the face of failure indicates a high level of Organizational SCP Resilience within this venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“We used to organize workshops, open-ended workshop on different [topics] – like from using newspaper the toilet structure that you can make or something, something, basic science concepts based. Then we realized that children are getting very excited..but again when we go back we see children have again fallen back to the same system...when exams are coming they behave this in the same way they used to behave. There is no difference that we are creating. So then we realized that maybe the intervention that we are doing is very small and it is not creating anything. So we need to have a prolonged exposure...So, we started with the thought process that we should have a weekend activity...This is what we thought that we would design exercises and every Sunday those activities and exercises, through that we would push them through practical hands-on learning.” – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Co-founder (CEO) of an average growth education venture – illustrating Organizational SCP Resilience (at the venture level)

Table 95: Illustrative Quote for Organizational SCP Resilience

In another example, the founder of a high growth healthcare education enterprise highlighted how the team and the organization faced a lot of hurdles and fought a lot of battles in the initial startup stage. One of their biggest challenges was related to getting university-endorsed certification for their paramedical courses and as a venture, they faced a lot of bureaucratic barriers. However, as a team and venture, they were very clear about their vision and the impact they wanted to create, and hence, they persevered in the face of adversity and successfully grew as an organization that created meaningful impact (thus demonstrating a high level of Organizational SCP Resilience).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“So initially we were fighting a lot of battles related to how to streamline ourselves; what exactly is what we want to do?...We had a lot of difficulties in the Central Government because we got the affiliation to run the course as per the rehab norms of India, because that's a necessity in India now, to be a rehab professional you need a rehab certification. So the rehab council was ready to give us a certification but they said you cannot use the certification unless you are a university-affiliated program, and we want only state run universities....So despite having the ability to run a certified course, which is a rarity in India to get a license for certification, we could not use it...So we learned a lot in all this. We learned a lot of hassles that could be faced with government and a lot of bureaucracy that occurs in this sector. But we also learned how to deal with it and how to work a way out, because our vision was very clear that we want to train people irrespective of whether we get the certification, whether we have a university affiliation.” – Founder</i>	Founder of a high growth venture focused on healthcare education – illustrating Organizational SCP Resilience (at the venture level)

Table 96: Illustrative Quote for Organizational SCP Resilience

In contrast, the co-founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture revealed that the organization had faced some financial hardships and were struggling with financial sustainability. However, unlike the successful ventures outlined earlier in this section, this venture team decided to shut down the organization temporarily and suspend their production activities, instead of persevering in the face of challenges – even though pausing operations would have a negative impact on the livelihoods of their beneficiaries (low-income cobblers). Thus, this decision to pause enterprise activities indicated a low-level of Organizational SCP Resilience within this venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“Like I said, even though we have been doing good sales, because of the additional expenses – like I said, we do pay cobblers also pretty high, so because of which there is no profit as such. In some ways, we would say we are little behind in terms of – we were not even breaking even. So it was getting a little difficult for us because we don't have a lot of funding....So we were not very sure, like how do we take from that stage to a completely much, much higher stage where we will be comfortable. So we thought we'll just close it up for some time and figure out...So we thought we'll give it a break, so that is the reason why we temporarily suspended the production.” – Co-Founder</i>	Co-founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of Organizational SCP Resilience (at the venture level)

Table 97: Quote illustrating a lack of Organizational SCP Resilience

Link to the overall narrative

The qualitative data analysis revealed that there was a strong presence of SCP Resilience at the individual, team and venture level in successful startup social enterprises. Related to the over-arching construct of Social Cause Passion (SCP), a high degree of SCP Intensity at the

individual level, SCP Congruence at the dyadic and team level, as well as, SCP Embeddedness at the team and venture level – all contributed to the emergence of a high level of Personal, Collective and Organizational SCP Resilience in successful social enterprises. Such displays of multi-level cause-driven resilience, in turn influenced key individual, team and venture level outcomes such as Team Learning, Individual/Team Mental Well Being and Team/Venture Performance.

6.2) Social Cause Passion (SCP) Spillover Effect

Construct Definition

This construct is the fifth and final dimension of the central concept of Social Cause Passion (SCP) and refers to the spillover of the principles of the specific social cause of the startup venture (and the ethics of the social impact sector in general) from the founders and team members' professional context to their personal lives. This SCP spillover resulted in the personal/individual or team level adoption of the social cause (living the principles of the social cause) beyond the professional context (outside of the work context). This new concept of SCP Spillover draws from the vast body of work-family enrichment literature, self-consistency literature and knowledge spillover literature. In work-family literature, spillover is defined as "the effects of work and family on one another that generate similarities between the two domains" (Edwards & Rothbard, 2000, pg. 180) and such "work-family spillover can be behavioral or affective in nature" (Illies et al., 2009, pg. 87). As such, spillover similarities between two domains can be described in terms of "affect (i.e., mood and satisfaction), values (i.e., the importance ascribed to work and family pursuits), skills, and overt behaviors" (Edwards & Rothbard, 2000, pg. 180). Behavioural spillover can, in turn, be linked to empowerment spillover because extant research "suggests that psychological resources (i.e., employees' perceptions of confidence, meaningfulness, control, and impact) that are developed in one domain can spillover to impact other domains" (Chen et al., 2019, pg. 324). Examining the concept of 'behavioural spillover' (Thøgersen, 1999) particularly from a social impact lens, extant research in the environmental domain suggests that "acting in a pro-environmental way changes (i.e., increases or decreases) a person's likelihood or extent of performing another/other pro-environmental behaviour(s)" (Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014, pg. 381). This research finding can be explained through self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) which states that "people form attitudes by observing and inferring from their own past behaviour and the contexts in which the behaviour took place" (Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014, pg. 382) and there is empirical evidence proving that "behaving pro-environmentally in a given domain might not only change the attitude towards that behaviour, but might also activate a general disposition in the individual, which might influence future behaviour also in other domains" (Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014, pg. 382). Further, adding the lens of Aronson's self-consistency theory (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962; Dickerson et al., 1992; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), extant research also suggests that "acting consistently across pro-environmental behaviours, leading to positive spillover from one behaviour to another, may be motivated by the desire to avoid cognitive dissonance and the uneasiness it bears" (Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014, pg. 382) with regards to "one's self-concept as a competent, moral, reliable person" (Lanzini and Thøgersen, 2014, pg. 382).

Thus, drawing from empirical research outlined above, the new concept of SCP Spillover, that has emerged out of the qualitative data analysis, highlights that founders and team members who work in startup social ventures experienced a social impact spillover effect, whereby they transferred the social impact principles and values practised in their professional context to their personal lives as well (outside the work context). Average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases) had greater evidence of such social impact spillover effects at the individual or team level; whereas low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises had a lower incidence of founder, team members or the group, as a whole, experiencing such social impact spillover effects, in their personal lives.

Three Behaviours of SCP Spillover

The interviews revealed that founders and team members, in successful social ventures, experienced the SCP Spillover Effect (positive behaviour change related to the values of the specific social cause of the venture) by performing three main activities, outside the work context:

- Active practice of impact principles (outside the work context)
- Impact-centric knowledge acquisition and sharing (outside the work context)
- Influencing others (outside the work context) through champion behaviour

a) Active practice of impact principles (outside the work context)

Founders and team members in successful social venture teams engaged in the active practice of impact principles (related directly to the startup's social cause and with the moral ethos of the impact sector at large) at an individual and/or team level, outside of the direct work context. While founders of successful social ventures often started the ventures at a point where they already practised the social impact principles in their personal lives, it was been observed that team members often joined the venture because they had a passion or interest for the cause (but they may or may not have actioned the passion in their personal lives). Hence, through the intensive and rewarding process of committing and contributing to the social cause of the startup venture, team members began to make a value-centric behavioural shift in their personal lives as well. Hence, in this way, founders, team members and the team as a whole internalised (and acted upon) the values and principles of the venture's social cause, inside and outside the work context.

This SCP spillover behaviour can be illustrated through some interview excerpts from successful social ventures. In one case, the co-founder (CEO) of a high growth education venture, focused on social and emotional learning among low-income children, explained that the members in her team were deeply influenced by the social cause and values of the organization and a lot of the professional development choices that they made in their personal lives (outside of the venture context) were shaped by their impact-focused experiences in the enterprise. For example, two team members had taken a deep interest in counselling and psychology (inspired by their work in the venture) and had decided to upskill themselves by taking certification courses in counselling-related topics, outside of their work context.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I think that just a lot of their professional choices I think have also been influenced a lot by the way that – the kind of exposure and opportunities they've got. Like [Team Member 1] started out, she was a [name of popular Indian fellowship program] Fellow and then she started working with us. Last year she has taken a very, very deep interest in counseling and psychology. She is doing an REBT [Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy] course on weekends. [Team Member 2] is enrolled – in fact today was her interview at [well respected social work university in India] for a certificate course in something." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Co-founder of a high growth education venture (talking about her team members) – illustrating active practice of impact principles outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

Table 98: Illustrative Quote for the active practice of impact principles outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

In another example, a team member in an average growth mental health venture explained that due to the kind of work she did in the organization, she had honed her personal skills (outside of the venture context), with regards to her own professional development in the mental health field. Given her exposure to the work and values of the venture, she had learned how to empathetically and confidently speak to and handle different beneficiary segments, dealing with different physical or mental illnesses. She had learned how to actively practice these skills and principles outside of her work context, which greatly helped in her professional journey (she was studying to get a mental health related degree at the time of the interview).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Personally, I've just gotten a lot of chance to increase my ability to talk in public or to take sessions, which is needed..once you're out in the mental health field, you need that kind of ability...And apart from that, how to write sessions, or how to think in a different manner when you're dealing with different groups of various illnesses; say with cancer patients or special needs children. Like there's a difference with every kind of approach, like it's not going to be like a textbook approach....So [the venture] has given me that chance of thinking differently; in terms of every population." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth venture focused on mental health – illustrating active practice of impact principles outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

Table 99: Illustrative Quote for the active practice of impact principles outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

b) Impact-centric knowledge acquisition and sharing (outside the work context)

Founders and team members in successful social enterprises regularly engaged in impact-centric knowledge acquisition and sharing – related directly to the startup's social cause and/or the moral ethos of the impact sector at large – outside of the direct work context. The process of knowledge acquisition was done by gathering information related to the social cause of the venture, through industry articles and reports, books, media/newspaper articles, documentaries, podcasts, social media channels, external training sessions and self-organised learning visits/events. Founders and team members would then share these resources with each other – within the team as a whole, as well

as, with others outside the team – casually during social bonding time, face-to-face free/break time at work or via technology (using non-work email threads or social media channels such as WhatsApp, Facebook or Instagram).

For example, a team member working in an average growth environment venture explained that when she joined the organization, she did not know much about the difference between recycling and upcycling, but due to the process of impact-centric knowledge acquisition and knowledge sharing within the team, she had learned a lot more about such topics in the environment domain. The founder and the team members engaged in this spillover behaviour by regularly reading articles or watching videos related to the environment and sustainability in their free time and they shared these resources with each other, primarily using social media channels such as WhatsApp and Facebook. The team would also discuss the resources shared, collectively as a group, and this in turn, would deepen the team members' knowledge about that particular topic.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Initially, I had no idea there's a difference between recycling and upcycling. But as a team, when we got to learn things – it's just not that we were confined to learning about vinyl records only or confined to learning about the products or raw materials which were used...We even had the curiosity and urge to know what are the different types of upcycling. We developed that on our own; not only me, there was an intern – [name of intern], even she said, "oh there's so much to it; we had no idea about it all"...After learning it as a team, after discussing few topics or few links, few articles, we got to know about it; so that's how we learnt about it...We just don't concentrate on the work work thing and provided our startup being related to kids, if we come across something that's related to kids or something garbage/recycling thing. Today itself, we just greeted each other "good morning" on WhatsApp; there was this link that she [founder] came across on Facebook and she shared with me, like you know, "see this is happening; this is such a good thing". That is something, it's not just work things that we talk about." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth environment venture– illustrating impact-centric knowledge acquisition and sharing outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

Table 100: Illustrative Quote for impact-centric knowledge acquisition and sharing – outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

In another example, the co-founder (CEO) of a high-growth education enterprise mentioned that even when the team had a week-long break from work, some of her team members had self-organised and gone on a learning trip to another city, to visit and learn from a few other organizations that were working in the same field as this social venture. Hence, through this example, the founder illustrated how even in their holiday time, team members tried to learn, gather and share cause-centric knowledge with each other (outside the work context).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“Like last week we had a term break for the programs team, a weeklong break...Five of them went, they travelled to [name of city], and they visited two-three other organizations. So learning orientation...it's just like I am grateful that it has happened...even in off-times they will try and find ways to figure out how we can create some learning for us.” – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Co-founder (CEO) of a high growth education venture (talking about her team members) – illustrating impact-centric knowledge acquisition and sharing outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

Table 101: Illustrative Quote for impact-centric knowledge acquisition and sharing – outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

c) Influencing others (outside the work context) through champion behaviour

Founders and team members in successful social ventures consciously or subconsciously (through role modeling) tried to influence others – their friends, family, acquaintances and community at large – to make socially conscious changes in their behaviour (related directly to the startup’s social cause and/or to the ethics and moral ethos of the impact sector at large). Often they engaged in this SCP-related influencing/role modeling process through the mechanism of champion behaviour – by championing and advocating for the social cause outside the organizational context (Howell et al., 2005). Specifically, the aspect of influencing the community at large can be tied to knowledge spillovers in entrepreneurship theory (Yang et al., 2010), which states that “knowledge spillovers are the direct or indirect transfer of knowledge from one party to another” (Gilbert et al., 2008) and such spillovers are “the external benefits from knowledge creation that is enjoyed by parties other than the party investing in the creation (Agarwal et al., 2010, p. 272)” (Shu et al., 2014). Similarly, with regards to the social impact spillover effect, direct (team members, customers and beneficiaries) and indirect (friends, family members and the community at large) stakeholders of startup social enterprises seemed to benefit from the social impact created by the early stage social ventures (and the SCP Intensity and Congruence within such teams).

Insights from the qualitative data analysis revealed that founders and team members working in environment-focused startup firms experienced a high degree of SCP Spillover when they started actively practicing the principles of recycling and waste segregation in their own homes and started to make more environmentally and socially conscious decisions in their everyday lives. They consciously and subconsciously (through role modeling) began to influence and motivate their friends, family members and even housing society members (community at large) to recycle and segregate waste on a regular basis (influencing others to make a change). For example, the founder of an average growth environment venture explained how both she (the founder) and her team members strongly lived by the sustainability-focused values of the organizations in their personal and professional lives. They believed that they should ‘walk the talk’ and the founder knew and trusted that the team member would never use plastic packaging, even if the founder was not around. Taking this even one step further, the team member

also influenced and inspired her entire extended family to take up eco-bricking, and thus, she successfully championed the environmental cause within her larger community.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I think obviously environment is like, I mean I'm calling it a value, but that's something that we both are really like now and about and that's been one really big positive. Everyone who's worked with me, at home has also started kind of exercising these things. Now her [team member's] entire extended family has started eco bricking, they started doing things like that. So that's a value that we try to have in our personal life as well...I know for a fact that, even behind my back if she was to send out a product, it would not go in plastic, because that's something that we stand for, so that's something that's also been communicated, that "We must walk the talk..." – Founder</i>	Founder of an average growth environment venture (talking about herself and her team member) – illustrating champion behaviour (influencing others) outside the work context

Table 102: Illustrative Quote for champion behaviour (influencing others) outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

In another case, through the process of context immersion (during the interview stage), I observed several rows of eco-bricks outside the office of a high growth social venture, working to catalyse youth change makers to run and lead community development projects. One of the co-founders of the ventures was also working with another voluntary organization in a personal capacity, to engage in sustainability and eco-bricking related community development projects (outside of the context of his start-up venture). The co-founder had made the eco-bricks (along with some of his acquaintances) as part of the activities with the other organization. He had strategically placed the eco-bricks (pictured in Photograph 3) outside the entrance of the office space of his social venture. Apart from acting as an aesthetically pleasing decoration and storage area, the eco-bricks also served as a visual cue (a conscious and subconscious act of champion behaviour by the co-founder) to the team members and external visitors about the social cause of sustainable community development and acted as a visual mechanism of environmental awareness creation for the local community at large (which was directly and indirectly related to the social cause of the start-up social venture). Hence, in this way, the co-founder engaged others (outside of his direct venture context) in the social cause, through visual and non-verbal mechanisms of awareness creation, social cause advocacy and champion behaviour.



Figure 11 (Photograph 3): Rows of eco-bricks lined outside the office of a community development focused social venture – illustrating non-verbal champion behaviour outside the work context (Photograph taken by the doctoral candidate).

Finally, a team member in an average growth venture, working on education for the disabled, revealed that half of the team members in that organization worked for a big multinational investment bank (for their day jobs); and now, as result of a spillover effect (due to their champion behaviour), their employer (the large multinational organization) had also started hiring people with disabilities as support staff, on payroll. Thus, this excerpt illustrates the power and impact of the SCP Spillover effect, in terms of the ability of the team members to influence social change within their personal and professional communities (outside of the venture’s work context).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“I mean though 8 of us are – like 4 of us, we were from [large investment bank]...I work with [large investment bank], so we have a lot of support staff. We have a lot of employees who have disabilities, hearing disabilities and all. Now, [large investment bank] has started taking them into their payroll.” – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth venture focused on education for the disabled – illustrating champion behaviour (influencing others) outside the work context

Table 103: Illustrative Quote for champion behaviour (influencing others) outside the work context (SCP Spillover)

In contrast, there was little to no mention of such SCP Spillover behaviours in the interviews with the founders and team members of low/stagnated growth or failed social

ventures. Thus, it can be deduced that low levels of SCP Congruence and SCP Embeddedness in such organizations hindered the emergence of SCP Spillover Behaviours within such venture teams.

Link to the overall inductive narrative

The qualitative data analysis revealed that there was strong evidence of SCP Spillover behaviour at the individual and team level in successful social ventures. Interlinked with the overall concept of SCP, a high degree of individual-level SCP Intensity, dyadic and team-level SCP Congruence, and team/venture-level SCP Embeddedness, all contributed to the emergence of the three SCP Spillover Behaviours outlined above, among founders and team members in successful social enterprises. This multi-pronged SCP Spillover behaviour had the power to create an impact-focused ripple effect at the individual, team and community level – thus, influencing a novel (unexpected) type of social change within the internal and external ecosystem of the startup social enterprises. Such meaningful SCP Spillover effects in turn, also contributed positively to the Mental Well Being of the founders and team members in such social ventures.

6.3) Learning-Driven Venture Performance Outcomes

Construct Definition

Given that the target sampling approach was model-agnostic (data set included for-profit, non-profit and hybrid social enterprise models) and sector-agnostic (data set included all impact sectors), the definition of this construct was shaped from the inductive insights about the performance measurement approaches that the startup social ventures followed, spanning across all social venture models and sectors. Social enterprises have hybrid goals related to both financial sustainability and social impact creation. Hence, this construct of Learning-Driven Team/Venture Performance Outcomes first draws from Wiklund and Shepherd's (2003) approach to measuring small and medium-sized business performance (SME Performance), and then combines it with insights from Theory of Change literature, in order to also measure performance and success through an increase in an organization's impact 'outputs' and 'outcomes' over time, in order to stay true to the Social Value Proposition of a social enterprise (Funnell & Rogers, 2011). Further, based on the inductive insights that emerged from the qualitative data analysis, this construct can further be explained through the small, large or major (multi-pronged) changes – related to organization building – that occurred in the startup social enterprise teams (driven by the process of continuous team learning behaviour) and the connected team/venture level performance outcomes that were achieved, in relation to these learning-driven changes in the team or the organisation. Finally, the interview insights revealed that successful social ventures greatly valued performance indicators related to human capital management and also included such metrics when measuring organizational performance. Hence, apart from indicators related to social impact creation, financial performance and organization building, this construct also includes success metrics related to the growth in team size, the increased retention of the team members (attrition rate) and the growth in the number of people taking up leadership responsibility in the ventures (representing the contribution of the team members to their individual and organisational goals) – in turn, indicating the overall team engagement and team performance.

Five Categories of Venture Performance Outcomes in Social Enterprises

The research findings related to this construct were informed by the interview data and participation observation insights emerging from the qualitative data analysis, as well as, from secondary information that I reviewed about the performance of the startup social ventures. This secondary information was reviewed and gathered through a variety of sources such as verbal feedback about the ventures from the research partner incubator (UnLtd India), public information on the venture websites, venture impact reports (published on their websites), media articles about the ventures, as well as, my previous experience while working with some of the ventures during my tenure as a social business coach at UnLtd India.

Based on all the qualitative research findings, the main outcomes that the startup social venture teams aimed to achieve (their measures of success) can be placed into the following five outcome categories:

1) Social Impact Creation

These outcomes led to the achievement of the impact goals of the ventures and were directly related to social impact creation in the lives of the users/customers/beneficiaries (achievement of the impact outputs and outcomes according to the venture's Theory of Change).

2) Financial Sustainability

These outcomes were related to the in-flow and out-flow of funds, and contributed to the financial sustainability and overall economic health of the social ventures.

3) Hybrid Goal Achievement

These outcomes were hybrid or dual in nature because they contributed to the achievement of both the impact goals, as well as, the financial goals of the ventures.

4) Human Capital Management and Development

These team-centric outcomes were related to human capital management and indicated the growth, retention, engagement and contribution of the members in the team.

5) Organization Building

These outcomes were connected to general organizational milestones that contributed to the overall organizational health and growth of the ventures, and helped to build a strong operational/organizational foundation for such enterprises. Such outcomes also contribute to hybrid goal achievement.

Building on these five categories mentioned above and based on the insights from the qualitative data analysis, this construct can be tangibly explained and measured through the following small, medium and large learning-driven organizational changes and the connected

indicators of organizational performance – related to social impact creation, financial sustainability, hybrid goal achievement, human capital management and organization building – as outlined in Table 104 below:

Learning-Driven Organisational Changes	Related Performance Indicators or Outcomes	Outcome Category
Increased Impact Clarity/Focus or Improvement – ○ Focused (learning-driven) improvement in the core impact offering delivered to beneficiaries and customers	Increased and improved social impact creation due to: ○ Improved Product/Service/ Programme Quality (in terms of the delivery of the offering) ○ Improved Customer and/or Beneficiary satisfaction (in terms of impactful user experience)	SOCIAL IMPACT CREATION
○ Improvement in the method of impact assessment and the way the impact data is used to make organizational decisions	○ Growth in the delivery of core activities that contribute to the impact goals and intended outputs (eg: number of trainings delivered to school children) of the organization ○ Growth in the achievement of the impact goals and intended short/medium/long term impact outcomes (eg: reduction in student drop out rate) of the organisation	
Learning-driven diversification of key venture focus areas (users, products, geographies) – ○ Product, programme or service diversification	Increase in sales (financial outcomes) and social impact outcomes due to: ○ Increase in product/service/programme variety (number of new products, services or programmes) ○ Increase in product/service/programme innovation (in terms of the features of the offering)	HYBRID GOAL ACHIEVEMENT

○ User target group (beneficiary and/or customer) diversification	○ Growth in the number of customers and/or beneficiaries ○ Growth in the types of users (customers/beneficiaries) served (in terms of intentional demographical diversity)	
○ Adding new locations and geographies	○ Growth in the number of areas/regions served (increased market presence due to geographical expansion)	
Model Pivot – ○ Pivoting the organization’s core business model and focus area (in terms of user target group, core offering, revenue model, etc.) based on data-driven organizational learning (and/or due to external circumstances)	Improved social impact creation and financial sustainability due to: ○ Staying on track with the venture’s theory of change, by pivoting or adapting the model, in order to achieve (stay true to) the short term, medium term and/or long term impact outcomes of the organization ○ Boost in sales (financial outcomes) through improved market relevance and/or market presence ○ Ensuring organizational longevity and venture survival	HYBRID GOAL ACHIEVEMENT
Improved Funding Strategy – ○ Reviewing financial data and making learning-driven improvements to the revenue/fundraising strategy of the venture (in terms of the appropriate legal form of the organization, types of funders or investors to target, fundraising process improvement, improved sales strategy, etc.)	Improved financial sustainability due to: ○ Growth in Revenue earned and/or Funds Raised (and achieving or moving closer to the point of financial break-even) ○ Growth in the number of funders and/or investors funding the organization ○ Growth in the type (profile diversity) of funders and/or investors	FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY

Changes in Team Structure and/or Team Management – ○ Hiring new team members ○ Creating new leadership roles and responsibilities in the team ○ Creating new incentives (financial and non-financial) for team members and improving the organizational work culture/environment to increase the motivation, engagement and performance of team members	Improved and increased contribution of team members to overall venture performance due to: ○ Growth in the number of full-time and part-time team members (growth in team size) ○ Increased team member productivity and performance ○ Growth in the number of team members who are retained/continue to work in the organisation (those who do not leave the organization) ○ Improved team member (employee) job satisfaction and well being	HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
Learning-driven changes or improvement to operational functions and micro/macro organizational processes – ○ Auditing and improving operational functions and organizational processes ○ Auditing and improving venture governance structures to improve the organization's external credibility ○ Auditing and improving (or rebranding) the venture's external brand identity	Improved organizational operations and increased social impact creation and financial sustainability due to: ○ Process innovation or improvement in the organization (reduction of operational barriers) ○ Growth in the number of advisors, expert mentors, board members and industry-specific compliance certifications for the organization (ensuring good governance and market credibility) ○ Growth in the organization's network and visibility (increased/improved online presence, increase in the	ORGANIZATION BUILDING (in turn leading to Hybrid Goal Achievement)

	number of online followers, etc.)	
○ Adding new strategic partnerships	○ Growth in the number of strategic partners that help to ensure improved social impact delivery and financial sustainability	

Table 104: Learning-Driven Organizational Changes and Related Performance Outcomes

The qualitative data analysis revealed that average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases) had a higher incidence of team learning-driven small, large or major (multi-pronged) changes organizational changes that in turn led to positive team/venture level performance outcomes (related to the five outcome categories outlined above). On the other hand, low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises had a lower incidence of such learning-driven changes, which in turn hindered organizational success and led to poorer team/firm performance outcomes (across the five categories). Table 105 below showcases a few selected excerpts from the interviews conducted, in order to illustrate the qualitative research findings about some of the sub-themes that emerged, in relation to the five categories of team/venture performance, in successful social ventures:

Outcome Category and Details	Illustrative Quote	Type of Venture
SOCIAL IMPACT CREATION – Increased impact clarity leading to improved programme quality and beneficiary (in this case, students) satisfaction	<i>"I feel like the way that we articulate our work also has changed a lot. We moved from Life Skills Development to Social Emotional Learning. Social Emotional Learning still remains a key part of what we say our work is about, but now we talk about Social Emotional Learning as one aspect of the larger goal of mental health programs in schools. I think that that's one definite change in the way that we talk about our work and how we see it ourselves because a lot of the experience inside schools that we have has also shown us what the impact of our work, what the scope of that impact is. It doesn't necessarily just limit itself to saying that we'll talk about communication skills and collaboration, but it allows for kids to bring</i>	High Growth Venture (Education)

	<i>stories of their personal experiences, sometimes pleasant, sometimes not so pleasant, sometimes things that they want more help with, sometimes just a way for them to express and vent.” – Co-Founder</i>	
Improvement in programme clarity and structure leading to increased programme (impact) quality and stronger/more attractive value proposition for beneficiaries and related stakeholders	<i>“We have gone through a lot of legwork and I can see that so far – like four years down the line; our courses have become more stronger, people are coming to us for doing courses I think with mouth-to-mouth publicity, because we are not doing any kind of branding as such right now. So that tells us that, okay, now people want to know about the courses even in middle of the year, or some parent or some teacher would call us. I think over the years, we are also becoming much more streamlined in terms of the approach of what kind of academic work we want to do. So I think that’s become much more clearer with a lot of hard work over the years.” – Team Member</i>	High Growth Venture (Healthcare Education)
HYBRID GOAL ACHIEVEMENT –		
Growth in the number of programmes offered and growth in the types of beneficiary target groups reached	<i>“We started with 1 programme, that was support group and just one population that we were working with..And now, we have so many programmes. We’re working with different kinds of mental health issues & physical issues. Cancer, dementia, autism, developmental issues and we have different programmes now; like we have different partnerships.” – Team Member</i>	Average Growth Venture (Mental Health)
Growth in the number of customers and/or beneficiaries (in this case, students) due to a change in the programme structure (number of cohorts per year)	<i>Initially, we used to have around some 70-100 students a year, over the time now we are touching around 200 now and last year almost about 270-280 students have done last year...Initially, we used to do three batches a year, three months each and now we are doing almost some 6 to 7 batches in a year.” – Founder</i>	High Growth Venture (Skill Development)
Pivoting the business model	<i>“There have been a lot of changes in the business model and its structure. This is like a plant. Since it was planted, it is growing and taking shape. When we</i>	High Growth Venture (Agriculture)

	<i>started, the only thing that has remained constant is our goal, which is our first priority being the farmers and secondly the environment. These two have always been our priorities. Besides these, things kept changing...Then [earlier], we worked directly with raw materials. The raw products given by the farmers, we cleaned a bit and then sealed it. Then, we gradually moved to highly valued products such as cookies and chikki [local Indian dessert] and sweets. These are the high-value products. We never thought that we would go into food processing but now it is a very important part of our business.” – Founder</i>	
FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY – Improved sales strategy leading to better cash flow and higher revenue generation	<i>“So by February 2017 I had good amount of clarity. I formed a proper plan. I came back and I just executed that plan. So what I did from May 2017 – even till December 2017 is just focus on the 5 products, just got a lot of restaurants onboard, you know, 10 to 15 restaurants and just started maintaining cash flows in that so that I can survive and stay afloat. So that was the whole thing. And then after that then look at B2C and a lot of other things which at least we should have that basic income. So now we are doing around 1 lakh [Indian Rupees] turnover every month... So I would say 2-1/2 years went in the full supply chain building of it and even understanding how to actually stay – the understanding of the business. So then now I am able to just focus on markets and just expand the team, get more people onboard, then create more B2B markets, more B2C markets, create verticals, straight systems, a lot of things like that.” – Founder</i>	Average Growth Venture (Agriculture)
Improved funding strategy leading to successful equity investment and streamlined plan about how each business function would contribute to the overall income of the venture	<i>“...So generally we try to make a financial model at the beginning of the year and somehow we have been raising funds also. We have done couple of rounds of equity rounds also; so fundraising approach has also evolved I guess over a period of time. Also we’re looking more into equity funds. So we have an initial model for the year, the numbers that we’re looking at, each businesses how much they would contribute.” – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	High Growth Venture (Waste Management)

HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT – Growth in team size and time/resource investment into people leading to improved team member retention rate	<i>“...I joined the team 3 years back. There were just 9 people then. And now, we have a team of more than 45 people. I mean, if we include all the interns and volunteers, it’s more than 50 now. So that has been the growth of [the venture] and we have designed policies and procedures and inducted people...So, yeah, it’s a big team now; we’re in the scale up phase, which is a pretty tricky thing. I mean, you have to be extra careful to hire the right set of people who are there for you, for a longer period of time. I mean, obviously, you can’t really control attrition; up to a certain level only. But if you invest in the people – and that’s been my experience – if people are interested in the core work that you do; especially in the social sector; if that work interests them, then they stick longer. And if you make their lives a little easier, that’s always appreciated and we’ve been lucky to hire the right kind of people. Attrition is pretty much in control now.” – Team Member</i>	High Growth Venture (Youth Development)
Successful field operations and geographical expansion due to growth in the number of experienced field staff (through recruitment of required skillset), as well as, effective training and promotion of field team members (grooming people into leadership roles from within the system)	<i>“We are working in 2 districts, [name of districts]..Out of 3 [field coordinators], one was promoted into that level, like who is more into training and procurement. Two field coordinators who are working with other organizations, so they are graduates, they have 5 to 6 year experience; they have done the similar job of managing the field. Because for field coordinators, we try to promote CRPs [Community Resource Person] but the skillset is completely different....We have promoted more him as procurement and training....It was a very gradual process because for more than 6 months I was directly training him, I was getting him to the service provider, how to talk, how to formalize everything, how to talk with the [name of state government] official because we are buying sapling from them, how to ensure the quality of those things, so he went through a very gradual process from July till January, 7 months, to come to that level.” – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	High Growth Venture (Agriculture)
ORGANIZATION BUILDING – Process improvement and improved	<i>“I think more systems and processes are in place now than before, set ways in</i>	High Growth Venture

strategic partnership building (through a streamlined process)	<i>which to do things and more monitoring...Also, I think our strategy to move ahead is more clear now in terms of previously we were just kind of shooting out everywhere, we thought government was the way to go and the government funding model...but we have kind of streamlined ourselves a little bit more and we have figured out a way that works...I mean we are still reaching out to multiple potential partners but it's all in a similar kind of partnership, rather than reaching out to government, private, small NGOs [in a fragmented way]..." – Team Member</i>	(Healthcare)
Improvement in organizational processes and structures (in part due to support from external social enterprise incubators) leading to growth in the size of the team (as well as, strategic approach to the type of people to be recruited)	<i>"So, I think between 2013 and 2016 was the key time for us to just get programs-wise organized and structured, and get some of our systems and processes in case. 2015-2016 onwards I think we started very critically looking at how we are growing and how we are viewing people who come into the organization and what their role will be...I think that that was another key milestone for us because 2013 to 2016 with Atma [education accelerator] and UnLtd [startup social enterprise incubator] what happened for us was that because we had absolutely no systems, no structure, we were basically just the three of us with some stuff in our head and some documents on a laptop and trying kind of things out. So 2013 to 2016 allowed for us to get all of the documented, recorded. Actually write down processes, have an SOP, have a – how do you recruit people? What is the system? All of that got sorted out. And then once people started coming in and by 2016 we had a team of five full-time and four part-time people." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	High Growth Venture (Education)

Table 105: Quotes about team/venture performance from founders and team members of successful social ventures

In contrast, low/stagnated growth or failed ventures did not have much evidence of sustained and improved performance outcomes (as per the five outcome categories), and conversely, such teams actually reported decreased/lower venture performance (as compared to the previous performance of these organizations). For example, the founder of a low/stagnated growth enterprise, working on youth development, mentioned that due to a lack of funding, his team actually had to reduce the number of beneficiaries (children) they worked with and also had to cut down on the size of the team itself.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Now we have limited ourselves. Earlier we used to work with many children. We also started the fellowship program for [the venture]. We used to train the fellows, who were called CSCs, community sports coach. We would train them and they would conduct sessions in their own communities...We used to have 17 before, and now we have limited to 7. We don't have enough funding to pay them." – Founder</i>	Founder of a low/stagnated growth venture focused on youth development – illustrating a decline in impact outcomes due to lack of funding

Table 106: Quote illustrating a decline in impact outcomes and lack of financial sustainability in a low/stagnated growth venture

Similarly, the co-founder (CEO) of another stagnated growth livelihoods venture revealed that the number of beneficiaries (low-income cobblers) that his team worked with, had actually gone down over the years, to the point that they decided to only engage with the cobblers on a contract basis, instead of keeping them on the organization's payroll (thus, indicating a decline in the actual impact outcomes of the venture – in terms of providing sustainable and meaningful employment to the low-income cobbler community).

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"We also had 2 cobblers at one point – 3, actually at one point – who were on payroll and then it went down to 2. And then eventually we decided to work with them more on a contract basis, rather than keeping them on payroll." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Co-founder (CEO) of low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a decline in the number of beneficiaries (decreased impact and hybrid goal outcomes)

Table 107: Quote illustrating a decline in the number of beneficiaries (impact/hybrid goal outcome) in a low/stagnated growth venture

Link to the overall inductive narrative

As outlined above, successful startup social venture teams worked towards and achieved performance outcomes across five categories – related to social impact creation, financial sustainability, hybrid goal achievement, team/human capital development and organization building – and these outcomes were driven by small, medium and large (multi-pronged) changes that occurred in the organizations, as a result of Continuous Team Learning

Behaviour (explained in Chapter 5). Ultimately, the achievement of such performance outcomes determined the success, survival and longevity of the start-up social ventures.

6.4) Team Mental Well Being (MWB)

Construct Definition

The construct of Mental Well Being (MWB) can first be understood from the lens of Hedonic and Eudaimonic Well Being. Hedonic well-being is focused on subjective well-being and refers to the experience of happiness, in relation to attaining pleasure and avoiding pain (Kahneman et al., 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2001). It consists of three components – life satisfaction, the presence of positive affect and the absence of negative affect (Diener et al., 1999); and while life satisfaction contains a cognitive/evaluative element, affect is considered to be emotion-based (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff, 2019). On the other hand, eudaimonic well-being is focused on psychological well-being, relates to self-realization and represents the degree to which an individual can be viewed "as being fully functioning, rather than as simply attaining desires" (Ryan & Deci, 2001, pg. 147). Eudaimonic well-being relates to the ability of being resilient and adaptable in the face of adverse situations (Ryff, 2019) and it typically emerges when an individual experiences success in meaningful and self-determined activities (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff, 2019). Eudaimonic MWB is particularly relevant in a startup social venture context because the purpose-driven nature of the work could potentially contribute to higher levels of self realization, and such feelings related to the fulfilment of an individual's self purpose are core to this form of MWB. MWB can also be understood in terms of a Mental Health and Well Being Continuum (Stephan, U., 2018), ranging from the presence of Positive Well Being Symptoms (leading to positive well being and high quality of life; Stephan, U., 2018) – such as the evidence of Eudaimonic Well being (optimal functioning) and/or Hedonic Well being (happy, content, satisfied) (Stephan, U., 2018) and/or Active Learning of New Behaviour Patterns/Solving New Problems/Resilience (Van Mierlo et al., 2007); to the presence of Negative Well Being Symptoms (leading to ill being and low quality of life) – such as Psychological Distress (sad, anxious, tense), Mental Disorder (impairment of daily functioning) (Stephan, U., 2018) and/or Psychological Strain/Emotional Exhaustion (Van Mierlo et al., 2007). At the team level, the MWB Continuum can also be understood from the perspective of Group Affective Tone, with the presence of positive affect/mood in the team having a positive influence on the job satisfaction, proactivity and motivation of team members; and vice versa, with the presence of negative affect/mood in the team having a negative effect on team members' proactivity, motivation and job satisfaction (Bindl et al., 2012).

In average or high growth enterprises (success cases), MWB was characterized by the presence of eudaimonic well being, as well as, evidence of hedonic well being (presence of positive MWB symptoms and absence of negative MWB symptoms) at the leader, follower and team level. Such teams also had a positive group affective tone, wherein the general positive affect/mood in the team favourably influenced the job satisfaction, proactivity and motivation levels of the team members and the group as a whole. In contrast, low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises often featured a lower incidence of eudaimonic well being and hedonic well being (positive MWB symptoms) and there appeared to be a seemingly higher incidence of negative MWB symptoms (such as psychological strain or emotional

exhaustion) at the level of the leader, follower or the team. Such teams sometimes experienced a negative group affective tone and the presence of a negative affect/mood in the team, in turn negatively influenced the job satisfaction, proactivity and motivation levels of members in the team and the group as a whole.

Dimensions of MWB in the team

The insights from the interviews and participant observation revealed that the construct of MWB was manifested in startup social venture teams through the following dimensions:

- Positive/Negative MWB Symptoms (including Hedonic MWB)
- Eudaimonic MWB (including Job Satisfaction)

a) Positive/Negative MWB Symptoms (including Hedonic MWB)

In successful startup social ventures, founders and team members experienced positive MWB symptoms such as being happy, content and satisfied (Stephan, U., 2018) with their work life (evidence of Hedonic MWB in the team) and as a group, the team had an overall positive group affective tone. The interviews also revealed the active absence of negative MWB symptoms in the team and the team members actually mentioned that they thoroughly enjoyed their work life and found their work environment to be positive and stress-free. The mental health and mental peace of team members were actively prioritised in such teams, and supportive team member exchanges and high levels of team psychological safety contributed to the mental wellbeing of the team as a whole, in successful ventures. In contrast, in low/stagnated growth or failed ventures, there was evidence that founders and team members had experienced negative MWB symptoms such as being anxious, tense or frustrated with their work life (Stephan, U., 2018). In such teams, founders in particular (but also some team members) experienced negative MWB symptoms such as feeling overburdened and frustrated with work and there was evidence of work-related burnout, psychological strain and emotional exhaustion (Van Mierlo et al., 2007). Given that they had invested a significant amount of finances, taken salary cuts, and had put in a lot of valuable time and effort into building their ventures, founders in low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises often felt dejected and frustrated with the fact that their venture trajectories did not work out as planned.

For example, a team member in a high growth livelihoods venture mentioned that there was an explicit focus on the 'quality of life' of team members in the venture. They made the mental wellbeing of team members a priority and also organised special MWB spaces like meditation activities in the office. As a result, team members felt motivated to work and contribute, due to the positive energy and empowering work climate in the organization.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...The culture is very empowering, so here you always feel motivated to do something because the energy is created in such a way that you feel that this needs to happen, so it's more of quality. I think here the focus has been given more on quality, quality of life. So we have systems where we have started meditation also like after coming to the office, we have started with meditation and everything, so it is helping us to enhance ourselves." – Team</i>	Team member in a high growth livelihoods venture – illustrating Positive MWB Symptoms (including Hedonic MWB) at the team level

Member	

Table 108: Illustrative Quote for Positive MWB Symptoms at the team level

In another example, a team member from an average growth mental health venture explained that the mental peace of team members was actively acknowledged and prioritised in the organization (given the close link to the social cause of the enterprise). The founder and the team members gave each other space to take care of their mental well being and everyone was understanding of each other's mental health needs. They demonstrated this understanding by asking each other 'what's wrong?', giving the day off when needed and enjoying leisure activities together as friends – thus, creating a comforting and stress-free work culture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...I think, it's mainly because again we're psychologists; we provide each other with that kind of support and understanding in our personal lives. So let's say if I'm having a bad day, so she'll [founder] ask me what's wrong. If I want to take a break, if I can't handle it, it's okay. I can finish the work the next day. So, my mental peace is important and personally for me also, that's very important that my mental peace is acknowledged...Having that respect for each other translates into a lot of things...We had casual dinners, lunches, stay overs, we watch movies, so like things that friends would do." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth venture focused on mental health – Illustrating Positive MWB Symptoms (including Hedonic MWB) at the team level

Table 109: Illustrative Quote for Positive MWB Symptoms at the team level

In contrast, a team member in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture revealed that the founder would get quite stressed out by day-to-day challenges within the team and she would openly express these stressful emotions to team members as well. When asked about potential improvements in the team's leadership approach, he mentioned that according to him, the founder needed to take things less seriously and should try to not get too bogged down by negativity. This excerpt clearly demonstrated that the founder had experienced negative MWB symptoms on more than one occasion, and this negativity was apparent to the team members as well – thus, negatively influencing the overall group affective tone.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I think number one would be to take it less seriously. In terms of I mean, don't be too bogged down by the negatives. Like for example, she showed my branding to [another team member] and he didn't like it at all and he was very clear that he didn't like it, and she was very..she felt it very strongly. She's like, "Oh My God, He doesn't like it all, Oh no!". I was like, "Relax, What's the big deal?"...That's the way [the founder]'s always been; she's been a bit dramatic, in terms of when there is a huge spanner in the works...But I think that's something that she would like work on...not to get too bogged down by every negative you hear and</i>	Team member in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture (talking about the founder) – illustrating Negative MWB Symptoms in the venture

<i>take every problem as a new chance of possibility...yeah, number one would be taking too much stress about the negatives..." – Team Member</i>	

Table 110: Quote illustrating Negative MWB Symptoms

b) Eudaimonic MWB

In average or high growth social enterprises (success cases), founders and team members experienced a high level of Eudaimonic MWB because they felt a deep sense of personal fulfilment, given the meaningful and purposeful nature of their work in the ventures. By contributing to a social cause and being connected to a bigger social purpose and vision, founders and members (and the group as a whole) experienced high levels of job satisfaction, and this in turn, led to a high degree of proactivity, work motivation, optimal functioning, active learning behaviour, problem solving and personal/collective/organizational resilience (explained earlier in this chapter) – which are symptoms of Positive MWB and Eudaimonic MWB within the team (Van Mierlo et al., 2007). A high degree of SCP Congruence and SCP Embeddedness also appeared to contribute to the presence of Eudaimonic MWB within such teams. On the other hand, low/stagnated growth or failed social enterprises had a low degree of SCP Congruence and SCP Embeddedness, and coupled with the presence of negative MWB symptoms (lack of hedonic MWB), founders and team members (and the group as a whole) in such teams experienced a low level of Eudaimonic MWB. This, in turn, led to a lower degree of job satisfaction, proactivity and work motivation (at the individual and group level) within such venture teams. Further, founders in such teams also experienced feelings of guilt and conflict as they tried (and sometimes failed) to balance living up to the social vision and goals of the enterprise, while also trying to earn a decent livelihood for themselves. Such negative and conflicting emotions along with high levels of burnout often led to the founders slowing down, temporarily pausing and sometimes, even shutting down, their startup social ventures. This dilemmatic nature of negative MWB symptoms appeared to be unique to social enterprises, because apart from ensuring their personal financial security, founders also experienced the added ethical and emotional burden of not letting down their beneficiaries and customers (who often belonged to low-income and vulnerable groups); while also providing sustainable livelihoods for the team members working in their ventures. Finally, when founders experienced such negative MWB symptoms (along with a lack of Eudaimonic MWB), their emotions would often trickle down to their teams; sometimes resulting in a negative group affective tone in low/stagnated growth or failed social venture teams.

For example, a team member in a high growth community development venture explained that she had never felt stressed out in her job, in the last five years that she had worked with the organization. The high level of SCP Congruence and Supportive TMX in the team had created a stress-free work culture and everyone in the team was resilient in the face of challenges and adversity (which is a representation of Eudaimonic MWB), because of their collective drive and passion for the social cause of the venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"..We are all passionate people about the cause which we are working on, that anyway drives us to show up every day, push. Challenges are like insanely a lot. There are enough challenges to bring us down every single minute. But because we hold each other and we have this culture, I feel it keeps really stress-free. Like, I've never felt stressed in the last five years, I would say..." – Team Member</i>	Team member in a high growth venture focused on community development – illustrating Hedonic and Eudaimonic MWB

Table 111: Illustrative Quote for Hedonic and Eudaimonic MWB

In another case, a team member from an average growth livelihoods venture mentioned that she really enjoyed her work and ever since she had joined the organization, the social enterprise was the first thing that she would think of when she woke up in the morning. She felt a strong sense of fulfilment with regards to her personal learning/development in the venture, and regardless of the successes and failures of the organization, she felt inspired and empowered by her organizational journey. Thus, this excerpt clearly demonstrates the high level of job satisfaction and eudaimonic MWB experienced by the team member in this venture.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...I enjoy doing what I do. It's never been a boring dull day for me since March. I've never like woken up and been like oh, I don't want to work...I don't think there has ever been a day where I have not thought of [the venture] the first thing when I wake up in the morning. It's rare to me...I think when you come into a social venture, you come with the idea that you are going to empower others, but I think it has happened that it has also empowered me along the journey because I have learned so many things. I was always learning new things every day. And by this I don't mean that we have only seen successes, there have been so many things which we have failed at, but I think it has been a very important learning point, so by that aspect I think it's been a very beautiful journey for the past one year." – Team Member</i>	Team member in an average growth livelihoods venture – illustrating Hedonic and Eudaimonic MWB

Table 112: Illustrative Quote for Hedonic and Eudaimonic MWB

In contrast, the founder of a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture revealed that she had experienced a rocky entrepreneurial journey (good and bad days) and had found it challenging to earn a livelihood for herself while also balancing the social impact creation of the venture. She had also struggled to balance her own professional development alongside trying to delegate more, in order to become a better leader. This excerpt demonstrated that the founder felt overburdened by her dual priorities (social impact and personal financial sustenance), and thus, had experienced negative MWB symptoms, alongside a lack of eudaimonic MWB. Further, an interview with an associate team member (beneficiary co-ordinator) from this venture also revealed that the beneficiaries and extended team members in the organization also sometimes felt that the venture's work was a burden for them (and

they just completed the work in a transactional/obligatory manner). Thus, overall, the lack of eudaimonic MWB, at both the founder and member level, negatively influenced the affective tone in the team.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"It's been an up and down sort of thing...it's been challenging because also trying to make sure that I am earning something from it but also trying to make sure that I am addressing the social part that I set out to address. At the same time, trying to grow personally to make sure that – I am not someone who delegates very well, so trying to do that...it has its good days but it also has its bad days..." – Founder</i>	Quotes from the founder and an associate team member in a low/stagnated growth livelihoods venture – illustrating a lack of Eudaimonic MWB
<i>"...Sometimes it is a burden, but an order coming to the organization has to be fulfilled, so they complete the order..." – Associate Team Member (Beneficiary Coordinator)</i>	

Table 113: Quote illustrating a lack of Eudaimonic MWB

Link to the overall inductive narrative

Founders and team members in successful startup social enterprises experienced positive MWB symptoms (including hedonic MWB) and there was strong evidence of eudaimonic MWB and positive group affective tone among such venture teams. The antecedent factors of a high degree of SCP Congruence and SCP Embeddedness, along with Supportive Group Level TMX appeared to have contributed to the presence of Positive MWB within such teams, and this in turn, positively influenced the SCP Resilience (and in turn, team/venture performance) at the individual, collective and venture level as a whole (as explained earlier in this chapter).

Chapter 7

OVERVIEW OF THE INDUCTIVE THREE PATH MODEL Summary of the Inductive Qualitative Narrative

7.1) THEORETICAL MODEL OVERVIEW




Figure 12: Inductive Three-Path Model

7.2) THEORETICAL MODEL NARRATIVE

This chapter summarises all the various constructs discussed so far (in Chapters 4, 5 and 6) and connects them together, into a coherent and interconnected inductive narrative, in order to answer the overall research question outlined in Chapter 1:

What are the antecedents, characteristics, and outcomes of Team Leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprise teams?

The qualitative data analysis revealed the presence of a three-path process model within successful startup social venture teams – encompassing the cause-related antecedent factors, team/leadership related processual mechanisms and team/venture level outcomes of team-level leadership development in early stage social enterprises in India. The model starts off as convergent, from the antecedent factors to the constructs related to team-centric leadership processes; and then it diverges into three paths, with each path having a team process-related mechanism and associated team/venture level outcome variables. The interviews also highlighted the presence of two moderating mechanisms that influenced the strength of the relationships between the different constructs across the whole model. The different elements of the three-path model, and how they relate and connect to each other, to form a holistic inductive narrative, has been described in the following sections below.

The first two sections, 7.2.A and 7.2.B, focus on the relationship between the antecedents (Social Cause Passion) and independent variables (related to team-centric leadership) in the inductive model, in order to answer the first sub-research question, outlined in Chapter 1:

What are the antecedents and characteristics of team leadership emergence and development in startup social enterprise teams?

Sections 7.2.C to 7.2.F build a narrative around the three divergent paths from Shared Leadership (independent variable), discussing the relationship between the independent variables (related to team-centric leadership), mediating team processes (mission reinforcement, team learning and team member exchange) and dependent variables (venture performance, team well being and other team/venture level outcomes) in the inductive three-path model. Finally, Sections 7.2.G and 7.2.H shed light on moderating team mechanisms (paradoxical leadership and common team wavelength) and how they influence the relationship between the other variables in the inductive narrative. Overall, sections 7.2.C to 7.2.H aim to answer the second and third sub-research questions outlined in Chapter 1:

How do team leadership characteristics shape the team processes in startup social enterprise teams?

How do the team processes in startup social enterprise teams influence venture performance, team well being and other team level outcomes in these organizations?

7.2.A) Antecedent Variables – Social Cause Passion (SCP) Intensity and Congruence

The new concept of ‘Social Cause Passion’ (SCP) emerged as an important primary antecedent construct that defined the path for the entire inductive narrative, across all the other variables. Drawing from the extant concepts of passion for a cause, pro-social motivation and team entrepreneurial passion, SCP is a multilevel and multi-pronged ‘construct’ related to Emotion/Feeling operating at the individual, dyadic, team and organizational level (Cardon et al., 2009). It can be defined as a strong sense of identification with and conviction for the specific social cause of the startup social venture, and this positive feeling of social cause passion manifests itself in a multi-level way across the individual, dyadic, team and venture level. SCP manifests itself through 5 key mechanisms in startup social enterprise teams –

- (i) **SCP Intensity (Individual Level) –**
The degree of intensity of the leader or follower’s individual passion for the social cause and collective vision of the organization
- (ii) **SCP Congruence (Dyadic and Team Level) –**
The degree of convergence or divergence (congruence or incongruence) of the SCP Intensity, within the team, for the specific social cause focus area of the startup social venture
- (iii) **SCP Embeddedness (Team and Venture Level) –**
The degree to which the social cause focus is embedded into the psyche (memory), processes and culture of the team, via mechanisms such as team meetings, brainstorming sessions, learning routines, etc.
- (iv) **SCP Resilience (Individual, Team and Venture Level) –**
The degree of individual, collective and organizational resilience within the team to keep working towards the social goal of the enterprise, regardless of the challenges that the team members are faced with
- (v) **SCP Spillover (Individual and Team Level) –**
The spillover of the principles of the specific social cause of the startup venture (and the ethics of the social impact sector in general) from the founders’ and team members’ professional context to their personal lives

Average or high growth enterprises (success cases) typically exhibited a high degree SCP Intensity at the individual level of founders and team members, SCP Congruence at the dyadic and team level, SCP Embeddedness at the team/venture level, SCP Resilience at the individual/team/venture level and SCP Spillover at the individual and/or group level. In contrast, low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises displayed a lower degree of SCP, across all the five dimensions outlined above. SCP as a whole (a combination of the five pillars) influenced every part of the inductive narrative, and the stronger the SCP, the stronger the relationship between the different constructs in the narrative.

Out of the five SCP dimensions, the two main mechanisms that were important in the antecedent stage were SCP Intensity and SCP Congruence. Defined as the degree of intensity of the leader or follower’s individual passion for the social cause and collective vision of the organization, SCP Intensity was the starting point for the three-path model and was the anchoring theme of the entire inductive narrative. A high degree of SCP Intensity

was observed at the individual level of the founders and team members, due to the presence of one or more of the following three reasons –

- A personal connection with the social cause
- An educational training and/or professional background that is directly related to the social cause, and/or
- A general social exposure to/general strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture.

The interviews revealed that founders/leaders and team members in average or high growth enterprises (success cases) exhibited a high degree of SCP Intensity, which acted as an important pre-antecedent that led to the emergence of SCP Congruence at the dyadic level and within the team as a whole. This high level of SCP Congruence, in turn, contributed to the development of team-level leadership in startup social ventures. On the other hand, founders/leaders or team members in low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises typically displayed a lower degree of SCP Intensity, which led to a lower level of SCP Congruence between the leaders and the members, and within the group as a whole. This lower level of SCP Congruence in turn, hindered the emergence of team-level leadership in such early stage social enterprises. Thus, the first dimension of SCP Intensity acted as an important precursor and pre-antecedent to the second dimension of SCP Congruence, which is discussed below.

SCP Congruence was the main antecedent construct that set the foundation for the entire inductive narrative and it directly contributed to the emergence of several shared team-level leadership processes and mechanisms across the entire three-path model (as discussed later in this chapter). In successful startup social ventures, congruence (or incongruence) of SCP first occurred at a dyadic level between a leader/founder and a team member, and then in turn at the collective level, within the team as a whole. Building on the first dimension of SCP Intensity, a high degree of SCP Congruence was observed at the dyadic and team level due to a combination of the following three reasons –

- A strong shared sense of personal-level connection with the social cause
- A shared educational or professional background that is directly related to the social cause, and/or
- A general shared social exposure to/shared strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture

It must be noted that the interconnected degrees of SCP Intensity at the individual level and the resultant SCP Congruence at the dyadic and team level can evolve over time. Thus, SCP Congruence must not be treated as a static construct dimension, but rather as a dynamic continuum of shared/collective emotional intensity for the specific social cause of the venture – that can grow, evolve and reach a higher degree of congruence at the dyadic and team level, over time (due to factors like SCP Embeddedness, etc).

The interviews revealed that in average or high growth enterprises (success cases), founder-member dyads, and in turn the team as a whole, displayed a high degree of SCP Congruence, which acted as an important antecedent factor that contributed to the emergence of team-level leadership in such teams. This high level of SCP Congruence and the resultant team-level leadership processes in turn, had a positive effect on important team

processes in the three-path model (connected to team/venture level outcomes) in startup social ventures. In contrast, in low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises, founder-member dyads, and the group as a whole, typically displayed a lower degree of SCP Congruence, which hindered the emergence of team-level leadership in such teams. The lower levels of SCP Congruence and the lack of team-level leadership in turn, negatively impacted the emergence of critical team processes (related to team/venture level outcomes) in such startup social ventures.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"I have nothing to say to this apart from the fact that they are ridiculously passionate. Most of them have a personal story. So somebody has a learning-disabled child. Somebody has a learning-disabled nephew. That brings them together. Somebody has an autistic kid – that brings them together." – Founder</i>	Example of SCP Intensity among team members (due to a personal connection to the cause) leading to SCP Congruence in a high growth venture
<i>"I think everybody is quite passionate about the work. The age that you can see of every team member is quite young. So I think everybody is driven with the passion of working with the community, one; and of course for me personally I want to work passionately with the community and create some – specifically empower women since we are working with women quite closely. So these are the values that I personally have attachment towards." – Team Member</i>	Example of SCP Intensity and SCP Congruence in an average growth venture
<i>"I think because their "why" and our "why" sort of matches. They were able to – their cultural outlook or their outlook toward work is very open and contemporary which we are able to offer. We are able to take care of their needs of being in power, being recognized and also to a certain amount show growth financially, position wise, work wise and somewhere personal growth. I think all those things keeps them here." – Co-Founder</i>	Example of SCP Congruence leading to high team member retention (an indicator of successful venture performance) in a high growth venture

Table 114: Illustrative Quotes for Social Cause Passion (Intensity and Congruence)

7.2.B) Independent Variables – Team-centric Leadership Processes

The qualitative analysis highlighted that the interconnected antecedent constructs of SCP Intensity and Congruence had a strong influence on the emergence of the important team-centric leadership processes and mechanisms at the dyadic level – empowerment behaviour by the leaders, proactive behaviour by the followers and founder-member mutual trust. SCP played an important role in shaping strong dyadic relationships between the leader and the follower because high levels of SCP Intensity at the individual level and SCP Congruence at the dyadic level and group level, ensured that the leader and the follower were on the same wavelength; thus giving rise to a strong dyadic relationship that activated the individual follower's leadership potential. The repeated activation of the individual member's leadership potential, in turn led to the activation of the team's collective leadership potential, which directly contributed to the emergence of a shared leadership approach within successful social venture teams.

The interviews revealed that congruence between the leader and follower's social cause passion intensity at the individual level led to strong dyadic leader-follower relationships – which formed the foundation of the first-level independent variables, related to empowering leadership (EL) based exchanges between the founders and the team members. Average and high growth startup social enterprises (success cases) were characterised by a strong dyadic relationship (reciprocal exchange) between the founder and the follower (and between the team leader and the team member when relevant, depending on the size of the team). Characteristics of such positive and mutually reinforcing dyadic relationships included a strong sense of mutual trust and a common wavelength (typically about passion for the social cause) between the founder and the follower, conscious efforts by the founder to develop the leadership potential of the follower, formal and informal efforts by the founder to groom the follower into taking on more leadership responsibility in the team, the willingness of the founder to grant freedom to the follower to engage in autonomous leadership behaviour and activities in the team (displaying trust); and – mirroring and role modeling of the founder's leadership approach by the follower, active steps by the follower to take ownership of individual work responsibilities and perform tasks well (earning trust) and feelings of happiness, work satisfaction and motivation to continue work engagement experienced by the follower, as a result of the strong dyadic relationship with the leader.

These dyadic relationships were fruitful when there were strong reciprocal exchanges between the leader and the follower (grounded in Empowering Leadership), which included strong 'mentoring', 'grooming' and 'displaying trust' behaviours by the leader, which were in turn reciprocated by 'mirroring', 'taking ownership of work' and 'earning trust/proving commitment' behaviours by the follower. These reciprocal elements of the dyadic founder-member relationship can be categorized into the following three behavioural mechanisms:

(i) Founder's Empowerment Behaviour

- Mentoring and investing time in the growth of the follower
- Grooming the follower to take up leadership responsibilities

(ii) Followers' Proactive Behaviour

- Mirroring (role modeling) the founder's leadership behaviour
- Taking Active Ownership of their work and treating the venture as their 'own' organization

(iii) Founder-Member Trust

- Displaying of trust by the founder – The leader displays trust in the follower by including him/her/them in important team/leadership tasks
- Earning of trust by the team member – The follower earns the trust of the leader by proving his/her/their commitment to the team and performing satisfactorily when involved in important team/leadership tasks by the leader

In successful teams, the reciprocal EL based exchanges between the leader and the follower led to the activation and development of the individual follower's leadership potential (Individual Leadership Potential Activation), and in turn, the individual follower took up more leadership responsibility in the team (slowly moving from a leader-driven Empowering Leadership model to a Shared Leadership model). In low/stagnated growth or failed startup

social enterprises, this dyadic relationship was characterized by lower levels of mutual trust between the founder and the follower, lack of time and effort investment by the founder in training and developing the leadership potential of the follower, lack of effort by the founder to groom the member to take on more leadership responsibility in the team, lack of willingness by the founder to grant freedom to the follower to engage in autonomous leadership behaviour in the team and the presence of a directive leadership approach with evidence of micro-management behaviour on the part of the founder or leader. Given the lack of reciprocal EL leader-follower relationships in such cases, there was not much successful activation or development of the individual follower's leadership potential and in turn, not many members displayed proactive behaviour and did not end up taking more leadership responsibility in the team (thus, lacking the presence of an EL or SL model in such ventures).

The interviews revealed that multiple and repeated positive dyadic relationships between the leader and the followers in successful social venture teams led to the activation of the leadership potential of multiple team members, which in turn resulted in the activation and development of the collective leadership potential of the team as a whole (given the presence of other conducive factors). Hence, the leaders and team members first started with an Empowering Leadership approach (reciprocal dyadic relationships) and then organically moved to a Shared/Collective Leadership approach within the venture.

'Collective Leadership Development/Activation' can be defined as the activation of followers' collective leadership potential resulting in collective leadership behaviour by the team as a whole. This activation of the collective leadership potential in the team in turn led to the emergence of a **Shared Leadership** (SL) model within the venture. In average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases), this SL model was manifested in the form of teams taking collective leadership responsibility and ownership of the venture goals and vision and engaging in leadership behaviour, activities and processes at the group level, as a collective unit. The interviews revealed that the SL model that emerged in successful venture teams – due to collective leadership activation – had the following key structural and processual dimensions:

- Shared Principles – Egalitarian Culture and Collaborative Approach to team-level leadership responsibilities
- Shared Protocols about the team-level leadership processes of –
 - Task Division
 - Decision Making
 - Goal Setting and Planning
 - Accountability and Ownership

In low/stagnated growth or failed startup social enterprises, the collective leadership potential of the team as a whole has not been activated, due to the absence of the necessary conducive factors outlined above; and hence, such teams lacked the presence of an SL model. Such ventures displayed an absence of collective leadership behaviours or mechanisms related to egalitarian culture building and/or shared protocols about team-level leadership processes such as task division, decision making, goal setting and accountability. In some cases, the leadership potential of some individual followers might have been activated but not of the group as a whole; and in other low growth/failed cases, neither the individual leadership potential of the followers, nor the collective leadership potential of the

team was activated (due to the presence of micro-management and a directive leadership approach).

Given the context specific, co-created, mutually agreed upon, inclusive and adaptable nature of the SL models observed in the qualitative data analysis, it can be concluded that the SL approach of each successful social enterprise was contextually unique and connected to the specific identity of that particular startup social venture. Finally, the presence of an SL model paved the way for important team-level mediating processes and related team/venture level outcomes in successful social ventures. SL led to the emergence of three distinct process-outcome paths in such venture teams, and the three-path model has been described in the following sections below.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"We [co-founders] are very democratic. I think we are also very trusting because we just leave the responsibility. We're like do it your way but do it. So if given a chance, we would not like to micromanage. We like to work with motivated, passionate individuals. We don't like to follow-up or work with people who are irresponsible or who avoid responsibility. So we ourselves are responsible people and we love to work with such people, and we would like to keep the structure as flat as possible so that there is team reporting in it. It is a team rather than an organization." – Co-Founder</i>	Example of Founder Empowerment Behaviour, Follower Pro-active Behaviour, Mutual Trust and SL in a high growth venture
<i>"Somewhere the one word that I used with them is 'I trust you, it's okay, move, even if you fall down'...The minute you know that someone is there at the back of you who believes and trusts you, suddenly the potential just seems to be exponentially high. I mean it's just something that I have been learning over time and it's just reinforcing the fact that there is still an opportunity for people to – I believe people are way better than what they claim to be, it's just that giving them an opportunity is the only difference." – Founder</i>	Example of Founder Empowerment Behaviour and Mutual Trust leading to the activation of the follower's leadership potential in a high growth venture
<i>"In terms of the good things, it helps provide for a workspace where you want to positively contribute rather than a job that I have to do, so makes you want to give more than what you can or what is expected of you. So we have had examples where it is not expected of them but they have gone over and beyond their time and their effort and done the work, done more of the work to their capacities. And when one works from their heart, you feel that it's a product that's worth it – the effort that is worth it. The energies are together and flowing. We are laughing in the office, we are cracking jokes. That's the kind of environment that gets built in as a result of this structure." – Co-Founder</i>	Example of EL leading to Followers' Proactive Behaviour and a positive work environment in a high growth venture
<i>"In the beginning..it was just five of us...So we would all work together. We would meet to share updates with each other...it was like sitting with a group of friends and over tea or explaining, okay this is what happened, this is what happened. So in terms of culture, that's the year we also set those five values...And that</i>	Example of co-created and adaptable shared team protocols as part of the SL culture in a high growth venture

<i>was also co-decided. Like, all of us came together and kind of shared and pushed back on certain things and then we decided what those five values were...So as years went...with every new person joining in, we would do conversations around and the culture kind of bloomed from there...” – Team Member</i>	
<i>“...Shared leadership is not possible with one person. You need an entire group with those thoughts and approach, or you should learn to develop a group of people who believe in shared leadership. If that is not done, then it’s very difficult with just one person.” – Team Member</i>	Example of team-level ownership for SL in a high growth venture
<i>“I don’t think I was very good at getting the others involved in the decision making process. I didn’t have the faith in them to do it.” - Founder</i>	Example of a lack of EL, Mutual Trust and/or SL in a failed social venture

Table 115: Illustrative Quote for Team-centric Leadership Processes

7.2.C) Path 1 from Shared Leadership – Institutionalization of Mission Reinforcement (SCP Embeddedness) in the team (Mediating Team Process) → SCP Resilience and Spillover (Outcome Variables)

The first diverging path of the inductive model relates to the mediating team process of Institutionalization of Mission Reinforcement (SCP Embeddedness) and the associated outcome variables of SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover. The positive effects of SCP Congruence and SL activation and development (as outlined above) within successful social ventures, led to the emergence of team-level shared leadership activities such as taking collective ownership and accountability for work tasks and goals (which includes the impact goals of the SE) within such teams. These cause-driven antecedents and ownership-related SL behaviours in turn gave rise to the group-level process of **‘Institutionalization of Mission Reinforcement within the Team’**. This construct represents the mechanism of **SCP Embeddedness**, which is one one of the five pillars of SCP in the team (as outlined earlier). This mediating team process builds on the concept of Vision/Mission Communication (by the leader, in an organisational context), an important concept that is frequently mentioned across the charismatic leadership literature. The qualitative data analysis revealed that a consistent focus on the social vision of the organization was a common trend across all the successful social ventures. This central mission focus was internalised by all the team members and it was embedded into the team psyche, culture, processes and structures of such organizations. SCP Embeddedness can be explained through the construct of ‘Institutionalization’, which can be defined as the processization and habitualization of ‘values and norms of conduct’ in an organization (Lioukas and Reuer, 2015). In the context of startup social enterprises, institutionalization refers to the habitualization of values, principles and norms of conduct related to the organization’s social vision. The interviews highlighted that in the successful startup teams, SCP Embeddedness was institutionalised through the processual mechanism of ‘Regular Mission Reinforcement in the Team’.

In average growth or high growth startup social ventures (success cases), SCP Embeddedness (via the mechanism of ‘Regular Mission Reinforcement in the Team’) practically operated at the team level through two main institutionalised processes:

- **Regular Team Communication** about the start-up social venture’s Mission/Vision, Values, Field Impact created (or that the team aims to create) and Impact Goals that the enterprise strives to achieve through it’s work
- **Team Exposure** (occasional, if not regular) to the Field Impact created by the start-up social venture, in the field through it’s core activities

In low/stagnated growth or failed venture teams, there was a lack of regular institutionalised communication, about the vision/mission and impact, to the team and hence, such teams had a lower sense of shared purpose than successful teams. Further, there was not much evidence of direct field exposure for all members in the team; thus leading to lower levels of individual/collective connection and motivation, for the social impact created, within such ventures. In contrast, the institutionalisation of regular mission reinforcement in successful social ventures fostered a strong sense of shared purpose among the group, which led to the internalization of the organization’s social vision and values by the team as a whole. This institutionalised reinforcement of the social mission of the organizations, in turn, resulted in a high degree of SCP Embeddedness with the teams and ventures. The interviews also revealed an unexpected team-related outcome related to SCP Congruence – with regards to the shared mission-driven culture (SCP Embeddedness) in successful social venture teams. Individuals who did not share the same high level of SCP Intensity and Congruence as the rest of the team, or members whose values did not align with the shared team protocols/principles of the ventures, would sooner or later leave the venture (or would be let go from the enterprise), because they did not fit into the work culture of the organizations. This passion and shared value incongruence was one of the key reasons why people would leave the social ventures – because overall, such organizations had good team retention rates, due to the high level of ownership that team members felt towards the shared social purpose of the ventures.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“Actually, two people we had to let go because they did not fit in with the culture of the organization – the honesty, the dedication, the feeling of ownership which each of us have to the organization, they did not feel that, so their work was not suitable for us. So that is why we had to let them go.” – Team Member</i>	People were let go from this high growth venture due to lack of alignment with shared mission-driven team culture
<i>“People who don’t really understand the idea behind upcycling; they don’t develop the interest. That’s the issue we face the most of the people who left.” – Team Member</i>	People left this average growth venture due SCP Incongruence

Table 116: Illustrative Quotes about the Effects of SCP Incongruence (in the context of High SCP Embeddedness)

While extant literature has already linked charismatic vision communication to positive follower and venture outcomes, the doctoral dissertation makes a unique academic contribution by focusing on the relationship between regular mission reinforcement in the

team (SCP Embeddedness) and the related outcome effects of SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover experienced at the individual, team and venture level. The positive effects of SL, mediated by regular mission reinforcement (SCP Embeddedness) within the team, resulted in a high level of **SCP Resilience** (first outcome in this path) within the startup social ventures. SCP Resilience is the fourth dimension of the five-pronged construct of Social Cause Passion and can be defined as the degree of persistence and resilience of the founders, members and the team as a whole, to keep working towards the social vision and goals of the enterprise, by overcoming the obstacles that the individuals, teams and ventures are faced with. SCP Resilience is fuelled by a strong passion for the social cause of the organization at the individual, team and venture level, as a result of a high degree of SCP Congruence (shared passion intensity) and SCP Embeddedness (institutionalised mission focus) within the teams. The qualitative data analysis revealed that SCP Resilience was a multi-level construct that operated at three levels in a startup social enterprise:

- Personal SCP Resilience (Individual level)
- Collective SCP Resilience (Team level)
- Organizational SCP Resilience (Venture level)

In successful startup social ventures, founders, members and the team as a whole displayed the following cause-driven resilience behaviours at the individual, collective and venture level (adapted from the concept of ‘champion behaviour’ by Howell et al., 2005):

- Showing determination and perseverance in overcoming personal and professional obstacles, at the individual or collective level, in order to work towards the social vision and goals of the organisation
- Overcoming small and large barriers faced in their work (at the individual and collective level) in order to achieve the social vision and goals of the organisation
- When faced with a problem, seeking the help of experts/people (from outside the organization) who can solve the problem, in order to fulfil the social vision and goals of the organization

Nurtured by the presence of a high degree of SCP Intensity, SCP Congruence and SCP Embeddedness, this strong SCP-driven resilience behaviour proved to be critical for the survival of early stage social enterprises, because it enabled the teams to become hardy, resilient and capable of overcoming a wide range of individual, team and venture level obstacles that are typical to the resource strapped nature and rapidly changing environment of the startup landscape. The interviews highlighted that in average or high growth social ventures (success cases), founders, team members, and the group as a whole, displayed a high degree of SCP Resilience. This multi-level cause-driven resilience also influenced important multi-level outcomes such as Team Learning, Individual/Team Mental Well Being and Team/Venture Performance. In contrast, low/stagnated or failed enterprises exhibited a lower degree of SCP Resilience, at the individual, collective and organizational level, and this lack of cause-driven resilience behaviour often contributed to the slow growth and/or failure of such venture teams.

Apart from SCP Resilience, the positive effects of SL, mediated by regular mission reinforcement (SCP Embeddedness) within the team, also resulted in SCP Spillover Effects (second outcome in this path) experienced by the founders, team members and the group as a whole. **SCP Spillover** is the fifth and final dimension of the central multi-pronged concept

of Social Cause Passion (SCP) and can be defined as the spillover of the principles of the specific social cause of the startup venture (and the general ethics of the impact sector at large) from the founders' and team members' professional context to their personal lives. This cause-driven passion spillover led to the individual or team level adoption of the social cause values (imbibing the core principles of the social cause) outside of the work context (beyond the professional context). The qualitative data analysis revealed that founders and team members, in successful social ventures, experienced and actioned the SCP spillover effect (positive behaviour change related to the values of the specific social cause of the venture) by performing three main activities, outside the work context:

- Active practice of impact principles (either related directly to the startup's social cause and/or the value-driven ethos of the impact sector at large) outside of the direct work context
- Impact-centric (either related directly to the startup's social cause and/or the value-driven ethos of the impact sector at large) knowledge acquisition and sharing outside of the direct work context
- Influencing others (friends, family, community at large) to make a socially conscious change in their behaviour (either related directly to the startup's social cause and/or the moral ethos of the impact sector at large) (cause-driven champion behaviour)

Average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases) exhibited greater evidence of such social impact spillover effects at the individual or team level; whereas low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises displayed a lower incidence of the individual followers or the team as a whole experiencing such social impact spillover effects.

Hence, in this first diverging path of the inductive narrative, all the impact-centric activities that take place due to regular mission reinforcement in the team (such as regular team communication about impact goals/values and team exposure to field impact created by the venture) inculcated a strong sense of shared purpose among the team, which led to the internalization of the organization's Impact Vision and Values by the team members. This **PURPOSE-driven mechanism led to cause-driven resilience building and impact-centric value internalisation**; and this, in turn, resulted in a high degree of SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover at the individual, team and venture level, in successful startup social enterprises.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"..We take our teams..back to our rural areas...usually all of the members visit the community..." – Team Member</i>	Example of Mission Reinforcement through field exposure in an average growth venture
<i>"In WhatsApp group, I keep sending videos to inspire them and align them with the vision...The organization's vision and theirs should not move apart." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Example of Mission Reinforcement through vision communication in an average growth venture
<i>"Like mountain trekkers who always try to scale heights in spite of the constant fear of falling, there are lots of struggles, but there is the happiness that the work that we do is showing some result, it's not like nothing is happening. If that was the case, we could</i>	Example of Collective and Organizational SCP Resilience in a high growth venture

<i>have stopped in three or four years. It has been seven years since and the force that has kept it running is that the customer satisfaction is kept in mind and their attitude towards [the venture] when they buy products from us, the way our farmers are associated with us, the changes that have come about in their lives, these things give us happiness.” - Founder</i>	
<i>“...The main value that I feel everybody should have is this eco-social concept of our organization that what they are doing is for an environmental and social cause...we try to ask them to bring plastic from home and teach their children about it...There is an eco-social aspect...that everybody should inculcate in their day-to-day life, in their work ethics.” – Co-Founder</i>	Example of active inculcation of SCP Spillover behaviour in a high growth venture
<i>“As an organization we never sat and discussed about the goal.” – Team Member</i>	Example of a lack of Mission Reinforcement in a failed social venture

Table 117: Illustrative Quotes for SCP Embeddedness, SCP Spillover and SCP Resilience (Path 1)

7.2.D) Path 2 from Shared Leadership – Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (Mediating Team Process) → Team and Venture Performance Outcomes (Dependent Variable)

The second diverging path of the inductive model relates to the mediating team process of Continuous Team Learning and the associated outcome variable of Team and Venture Performance. The positive effects of SL development in successful social ventures led to the activation of the team’s collective leadership potential to carry out shared leadership processes like team learning activities and taking collective ownership/accountability for work tasks and goal achievement. These SL behaviours in turn gave rise to the important phenomenon of a **Continuous Team Learning** environment that was embedded deep into the psyche of the team through team processes, protocols and culture. Continuous learning includes a system and culture of continuous improvement (over time) in an organisation; and this has been positively connected to organisational growth and performance (Wang & Ahmed, 2003). An important feature of continuous team learning is the degree/level to which it is embedded into the structure of a team or organisation and it draws on the extant concept of team learning behaviour, which is a group-level learning mechanism defined as “an ongoing process of reflection and action, characterized by asking questions, seeking feedback, experimenting, reflecting on results, and discussing errors or unexpected outcomes of actions” (Edmondson, 1999). This construct of continuous team learning behaviour comprises of a tripartite process similar to that of organisational sensemaking –

- (1) *cognitive* (thinking about organisational learning when conducting activities, routines and events);
- (2) *linguistic or verbal* (talking about organisational learning through various activities, processes and routines); and
- (3) *conative* (adopting or implementing organisational learning related behaviour through processes, routines and events with commitment and consistency throughout the team) (Basu & Palazzo, G., 2008).

In successful social ventures, Continuous Team Learning Behaviour was institutionalised at an organizational level, through the regular practice of the following five collective learning mechanisms:

- Knowledge Exchange
- Feedback Seeking
- Experiential Learning
- Learning from Success
- Learning from Failure

The interviews highlighted that average or high growth enterprises typically engaged in regular and continuous learning behaviour through the five processual mechanisms outlined above. This ongoing learning behaviour was embedded deep into the team psyche, processes and culture, which in turn created a rich continuous learning environment within the team. On the other hand, in low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises, there was an absence of a structured and embedded continuous team learning environment and team learning behaviour was not institutionalised into the organizational processes or culture. The qualitative data analysis ultimately revealed that the presence of continuous team learning behaviour in successful startup social enterprises, in turn had a positive influence on the team and venture level performance of such organizations, and significantly shaped the overall success trajectories of these early stage social ventures.

The positive effects of SL activation and development, mediated by continuous team learning behaviour, resulted in positive learning-driven **Team/Venture Performance Outcomes**. When a team collectively engaged in continuous team learning through the regular practice of collective learning mechanisms – such as Knowledge Exchange, Feedback Seeking, Experiential Learning, Learning from Success and Learning from Failure – it created an active, embedded and well-functioning continuous team learning environment. This ongoing practice of Continuous Team Learning equipped the team with a regular inflow of important learning and data-driven insights about their work/the venture; which in turn enabled them to routinely make small, large or major (multi-pronged) performance-related changes within the startup social enterprise – thus increasing the team/venture's responsiveness and adaptability to learning insights and venture/market trends and demands. These changes, which are a result of a **PERFORMANCE-oriented learning mechanism**, in turn led to learning-driven firm/team-level performance outcomes within the startup social venture.

This outcome variable can be defined and measured through small, medium and large learning-driven organizational changes and the associated indicators of organizational performance (as outlined in Table 104 in Chapter 6):

- Social Impact Creation
- Financial Sustainability
- Hybrid Goal Achievement
- Human Capital Management and Development
- Organization Building

Average or high growth startup social enterprises (success cases) had a higher incidence of such learning-driven changes (because of the regular practice of continuous team learning mechanisms) leading to positive team and venture performance outcomes; whereas low growth or failed enterprises have a lower incidence of such changes (no regular practice of continuous team learning) leading to poorer team/firm performance outcomes.

Thus, as outlined above, in successful startup social ventures, the five-part venture performance outcomes of social impact creation, financial sustainability, hybrid goal achievement, human capital development and organization building were driven by small, medium and large team/organizational changes that occurred due to the embedded practice of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour; and the achievement of such performance outcomes ultimately determined the success, growth and survival of the early stage social enterprises in the long run.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...We create opportunities for everyone to take on leadership so it doesn't rest on just a few people. There are different ways in which we make that happen and I feel a lot of credit just goes to the team only for even making that happen. For example, last year...they created this whole DIY [Do It Yourself] month or DIY months, which means that every week there is one person in the team picks up a skill that they have and then that's a learning for the rest of the team. And then they run that, facilitate that also. They keep having these kinds of opportunities for everyone to get together..." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Example of SL leading to a culture of Learning in a high growth venture
<i>"The decisions are quick...you convey your message at that instant, you get a reply/feedback the other minute; so the time taken to reach a decision is very short...that has led to many more projects...that's why we handle many projects at one time, because of the quick decisions." – Team Member</i>	Example of shared decision making (SL) and a team culture of quick feedback (learning) leading to better enterprise performance, in a high growth venture
<i>"The organisation has taken a whole different turn. When I started, I started with just upcycling anything I got my hands on; used various different materials... We had our products on 25 online platforms and 5 different cities in physical stores and we were supplying all over the country and fulfilling a few external international orders as well. But there was no mindset & behaviour change; I kind of felt like I was hitting the ceiling with what the potential was for upcycled products in the country...So that's when I kind of realised the power of children and how much they can kind of do if their energies are put in the right direction and so I just thought of the concept. I started working with a mentor as well; around the same time and in a period of 3 months, I basically got from idea, initial concept to having a product ready for the market and having a new brand & all of that...there's a lot of stuff happening in the Education space & like the potential for where we can use this is way larger; the market</i>	Example of learning from failure (at the individual/founder level and team level) leading to a pivot in the business model and increased impact/hybrid goal outcomes in the long run

<i>is way larger and the possible mindset & behaviour change impact that I can create is also way larger. So that's basically something that we're doing right now and I'm super excited about and that's how it's kind of progressed over the years.” – Founder</i> <i>...After the failure we had; I brought in this team together & I said, “What was the reason for the failure?” and like we brainstormed about that; and you know we all took our own responsibility and that communication was important.” – Founder</i>	
<i>“The attrition has gone down drastically. I think that is because of our approach. People feel strongly for the cause and they feel that they’re doing their jobs to the best of efforts, with less, I would say, direct day to day micromanagement..They are given that like independence...Take ownership for your work, take it seriously; even if there is nobody to actually review it...So I think that has been like one of the biggest strengths affecting performance.” – Team Member</i>	Example of EL and SL (precursor to Continuous Team Learning Behaviour) leading to high team retention (indicator of venture performance) in a high growth venture
<i>“[The venture] has evolved into a company that has products which are completely unique, they are high in quality, they are hand embroidered by artisans, the embroidery is completely made and conceptualized by them. And we make products for artists...So now it's gone to a company [which is] sort of made by artisans and made for artists.” – Founder</i>	Example of how an improvement in product quality (learning) led to improved beneficiary and customer engagement (hybrid goal outcomes) in an average growth venture
<i>“[The venture] is spreading but not really advancing...We are not able to communicate about our work to others. We did not receive any training for that and hence are lagging...I wish to have some more training on it, so we have some more improvement. If we gain knowledge, we can then share it to others.” – Team Member</i>	Example of poor venture performance due to lack of member training and knowledge exchange (lack of team learning) in a low/stagnated growth venture

Table 118: Illustrative Quotes for Continuous Team Learning Behaviour and Team/Venture Performance (Path 2)

7.2.E) Path 3 from Shared Leadership – Supportive Group-Level Team Member Exchange (Mediating Team Process) → Team Mental Wellbeing (Dependent Variable)

The third and final diverging path of the inductive model relates to the mediating team process of Supportive Group-Level TMX and the associated outcome variable of Team Mental Wellbeing. The positive effects of SL led to the activation of the team’s collective leadership potential to carry out group-level leadership activities, such as shared leadership responsibilities, shared decision making and supporting/helping team members through collaborative team work. These SL behaviours in turn gave rise to the emergent group-level phenomenon of **Supportive Group-Level Team Members’ Exchange (TMX)**. This team-level construct draws from the extant individual-level (individual perception about member-member relationships) concept of Team Member Exchange (TMX) and in the context of this research project, the mediating variable of ‘Supportive Group-Level TMX’ is defined as a

supportive group-level social exchange that is characterized by the following three team-level mechanisms:

- Team Psychological Safety
- Supportive Work Interactions (chipping in for each other's work)
- Open Team Communication

TMX quality is an important aspect to be considered and the reciprocation of peer group support is a defining feature of strong TMX relationships and "high-quality social exchanges are characterized by high levels of mutual trust, respect, and loyalty" (Chen & Klimoski, 2003, pg. 594). The qualitative data analysis revealed that average or high growth startup social enterprises displayed (and fostered) strong and high-quality supportive group-level TMX within the team; and there was a clear presence of mutual respect, trust and loyalty within the group, high team psychological safety, supportive work interactions (chipping in for each other's work and helping each other out) and open communication between the founders, members and within the team unit as a whole. In contrast, low/stagnated growth or failed venture teams experienced low mutual trust, poor interdependent work relationships, low team psychological safety and lacked open team communication; and thus, exhibited weaker and low-quality group-level TMX within the team. Hence, as outlined above, successful startup social venture teams that engaged in supportive group-level TMX created a safe and collaborative team work environment, which had a positive effect on the mental well-being of the team members and the group affective tone within the startup social ventures (in addition to a favourable effect on the team and firm-level performance outcomes of such organizations).

The positive effects of SL activation and development, mediated by supportive group-level TMX, in turn resulted in the emergence of positive **Team Mental Well-Being** symptoms within successful social ventures. The presence of supportive group-level TMX relationships are important for individual/team-level outcomes in an organization because the TMX quality "indicates the effectiveness of the member's working relationship to the peer group" (Seers, 1989, pg. 119). Extant literature has also linked strong TMX relationships to favourable team-level outcomes such as positive work attitudes, higher team identification, increased work motivation and creativity, and higher organizational citizenship behaviours (Farh et al., 2017). Hence, supportive group-level TMX is a **PEOPLE-driven (human-centric) interaction mechanism** which fostered the presence of positive MWB within the team. Mental-Well Being (MWB) can be defined in terms of a Mental Health and Well-Being Continuum (Stephan, U., 2018) which ranges from the presence of Positive MWB Symptoms such as the evidence of Eudaimonic Well being (optimal functioning and high level personal fulfilment), Hedonic Well being (happy, content, satisfied) (Stephan, U., 2018) and/or Active Learning of New Behaviour Patterns/Solving New Problems/Resilience (Van Mierlo et al., 2007); to the absence/presence of Negative MWB Symptoms such as Psychological Distress (sad, anxious, tense), Mental Disorder (impairment of daily functioning) (Stephan, U., 2018) and/or Psychological Strain/Emotional Exhaustion (Van Mierlo et al., 2007). This MWB Continuum can also be understood from the team-level perspective of Group Affective Tone, wherein the presence of positive group affect/mood had a favourable influence on the job satisfaction, proactivity and motivation of members in the team; and conversely, the presence of negative group affect/mood had a negative effect on the proactivity, job satisfaction and motivation of individual team members and the group as a whole (Bindl et

al., 2012). Hence, overall, the qualitative data analysis revealed that the outcome variable of Team MWB was manifested in early stage social ventures through the following two dimensions:

- Positive/Negative MWB Symptoms (including Hedonic MWB)
- Eudaimonic MWB (including Job Satisfaction)

In average or high growth enterprises (success cases), there was evidence of eudaimonic well-being and hedonic well-being (presence of positive MWB symptoms and absence of negative MWB symptoms) at the leader, follower and team level. These teams also displayed a positive group affective tone, and the general positive team affect/mood favourably influenced the job satisfaction, proactivity and motivation levels of the team members and the group as a whole. On the other hand, low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises exhibited a lower incidence of eudaimonic well-being and hedonic well-being, and in such teams, there was typically a higher incidence of negative MWB symptoms (such as psychological strain or emotional exhaustion) at the individual and/or group level. These teams were also prone to experiencing a negative group affective tone, and the presence of occasional negative team affect/mood, in turn lowered the job satisfaction, proactivity and motivation levels of founders and members in the venture, and the team as a whole. Hence, as outlined above, the antecedent factors of SCP Congruence (passion) and SCP Embeddedness (purpose), along with the presence of SL mediated by Supportive Group-Level TMX, contributed to the emergence of Positive MWB within successful social venture teams; and this in turn, also favourably influenced the SCP Resilience (and in turn team/firm performance) at the individual, team and venture level.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"My initial idea of joining the company is the reason I feel really connected to the whole idea of the company; plus the impact the company is making. Second, the overall team approach...it really made you feel like a second family here and not like a company; so that is something that makes you feel connected...it makes you feel that you're not doing it for the company; you're doing it like it's your own business...The supportive approach has influenced the organization's performance. As an organization we really want to work, we don't really have the stressed feeling like, "so much work"...we look forward for Mondays..and Saturdays/ Sundays too, we're happy to work on it. There's nothing like work thing is very stressful to you...working as a supportive team; like we can work seven days a week." – Team Member</i>	Example of how Supportive TMX positively influenced team MWB and team performance in an average growth venture
<i>"..The culture was friendly from the last three years. And I'm here after three years only because of the culture. Because there they give you support every time, every single day...that attracts you because now I am satisfied that what I am doing, they are supporting me, and they give me freedom to do whatever I want to do...That's why the retention is high." – Team Member</i>	Example of how Supportive TMX led to job satisfaction and high team retention (indicator of venture performance) in a high growth venture
<i>"The positive influence is the help in completing any kind of work. Like I said, all the tasks, like at the time when the end-year event organization was a challenging task, that task was completed only</i>	Example of how SL led to Supportive Work Interactions which in

<i>through shared leadership. So I would say that is a positive sign.” – Team Member</i>	turn led to effective task completion (contributing to overall venture performance) in a high growth venture
<i>“...We have seen people who when we trust them, sort of may not do the work or might be cheating us or do things that – or might say they are doing something but not actually do it...I think some of the negatives for me were if I couldn’t trust someone, it became very difficult to work with that person...I wasn’t very good at coaching them or sort of getting them gain my trust...it’s something I struggled with.” – Founder</i>	Example of how low TPS (trust) and poor TMX negatively influenced the founder’s MWB and team culture in a failed venture

Table 119: Illustrative Quotes for Supportive TMX and Team-Level MWB (Path 3)

7.2.F) Purpose, Performance, People – The Three-Path Model

To summarise, building on the strong foundation of Shared Leadership, the PURPOSE-driven mediating mechanism of Regular Mission Reinforcement in the Team (SCP Embeddedness) led to the purpose-centric team level outcomes of SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover; the PERFORMANCE-oriented mediating mechanism of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour led to positive venture/team-level performance outcomes; and the PEOPLE-driven mediating mechanism of Supportive Group-Level TMX led to a people-centric team-level outcome of Team MWB. The **three P Mechanisms** outlined in the inductive model (**Purpose, Performance, People**) provide an important theoretical contribution to the field of social entrepreneurship literature, given the unique hybrid nature of the goals of social ventures.

It must further be noted that the three outcome variables may be quite interconnected; wherein they might influence each other. For example, positive team MWB can lead to higher team engagement/performance, which will result in positive venture performance outcomes. And vice versa, the achievement of venture-level impact goals can give rise to a sense of positive MWB and fulfilment among the team. Further, working in a startup venture that achieves impact outcomes can contribute to the emergence of eudaimonic MWB in the team, which in turn can lead to positive social impact spillover effects experienced by the team members and the group as a whole. Vice versa, social impact spillover effects experienced by team members can also contribute to positive team MWB, which in turn can drive favourable team/venture performance outcomes.

7.2.G) Paradoxical Leadership (Control-Stretch Balance) – Moderating Variable (related to Leadership Process)

Apart from the constructs and linkages outlined above, the successful emergence and optimal functioning of the three-path model in the inductive narrative was also influenced by two moderating processes – Control-Stretch Balance (Paradoxical Leadership) and Common Team Wavelength. The first moderating process (from a leadership lens) to consider is the balancing presence of Paradoxical Leadership (PL), which appeared to have

moderated the positive effects of the interconnected constructs across the entire inductive narrative. This moderating leadership mechanism links the extant construct of paradoxical leadership (Zhang et al., 2015) to the concepts of 'control/discipline', 'stretch' and 'organizational ambidexterity' from the leadership performance management literature (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Glaser et al., 2015). The qualitative data analysis revealed that PL is characterized by the optimal impact-focused balance between control/discipline and stretch mechanisms within the team. In the startup social enterprise context, control/discipline mechanisms refer to formal or informal processes or actions that enforce or assert the importance of work task accountability and goal ownership; whereas, stretch mechanisms represent formal or informal processes that reinforce a shared social purpose/vision, collective team motivation and a shared SCP-focused team identity.

The interviews highlighted the presence of control and stretch mechanisms in startup social enterprises and revealed that the founders and leaders of successful teams were able to optimally balance the interaction between the two competing factors (through the means of paradoxical leadership); which in turn seemed to moderate the favourable effects of SL and had a positive influence on the performance of the ventures in the long run. Average or high growth social venture teams exhibited an optimal impact-focused balance between control/discipline and stretch mechanisms, which was manifested through the presence of PL (practised by the founders/leaders) within the ventures. In contrast, low/stagnated growth or failed startup social enterprises often lacked an optimal balance between these two mechanisms, because founders/leaders did not successfully practice PL in such teams. It is important to note that the balance between 'control/discipline' and 'stretch' mechanisms in such teams must be viewed as a dynamic continuum (not a static state), constantly evolving alongside the organization's growth journey, as well as, the leaders' evolving capabilities to practice PL in these ventures. Striking an optimal impact-focused balance between control/discipline and stretch mechanisms enabled the practice of PL to positively influence effective shared leadership development, as well as, team performance. On the other hand, the inability to strike a balance between the two competing mechanisms negatively influenced the emergence of SL, team MWB and team performance/engagement in the social ventures.

Hence, as outlined above, the moderating construct of control/stretch balance (via Paradoxical Leadership) seems to have played an important role in strengthening the links between the variables throughout the entire inductive narrative. I found the following key themes in successful social ventures, that had a high degree of control-stretch balance (and evidence of paradoxical leadership) within the teams:

First, control-stretch balance appeared to have strengthened the relationship between the first-level independent variables (Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Trust) and the second-level/main independent variable (Shared Leadership Development) because an optimal control/stretch balance implemented by the leader (directed towards the followers and the team) facilitated a team work environment that was conducive to the development of effective SL in the team.

Second, PL seems to have strengthened the relationship between the independent variable (SL) and the first mediating team process (Regular Mission Reinforcement)

because optimal control-stretch balance prioritised the stretch (shared social purpose) mechanism of SCP Embeddedness within the team, alongside the control mechanisms of goal achievement for the startup social venture.

Third, control-stretch balance appeared to have strengthened the relationship between SL and the second mediating team process (Continuous Team Learning) because optimal control/stretch balance drove both, control-specific SL behaviour such as accountability to complete work tasks and fulfil work deadlines, as well as, stretch-specific SL behaviour such as crafting a collective identity and collective ownership to organizational goals, based on the common social purpose of the venture. A balance of collective control/stretch behaviours and mechanisms led to focused continuous team learning where learning processes (such as knowledge exchange, feedback seeking, experiential learning, etc.) not only drove collective accountability towards goal and performance-oriented learning. but also prioritised collective learning about the social impact created by the venture.

Fourth, PL also seems to have strengthened the relationship between the second mediating team process (Continuous Team Learning) and the related dependent variable of Team/Venture Performance Outcomes, because optimal control-stretch balance ensured that continuous team learning drives both social and financial performance, leading to the overall achievement of social (stretch), financial (control) as well as other team/organisational (control/stretch) goals/outcomes.

Fifth, optimal control-stretch balance appeared to have strengthened the relationship between the SL and the third mediating team process (Supportive Team Level TMX) because PL drives both control-specific SL behaviour such as accountability/ownership to complete work tasks and fulfil work deadlines, as well as, stretch-specific SL behaviour such as crafting a collective identity and collective commitment to organizational goals, based on the common social purpose of the venture. Both these control and stretch SL behaviours strengthened the emergence of Supportive Team Level TMX, wherein team members not only helped each other to get their work done (chipping in to achieve control), but also enjoyed a shared sense of solidarity, trust and loyalty based on the collective social goals/identity of the team as a whole.

Finally, PL also seems to have strengthened the relationship between Supportive Team Level TMX and the connected outcome variable of Team MWB, because when team members supported each other and engaged in control behaviour to get their work done, they were able to meet work deadlines and achieve their goals; in turn leading to them experiencing positive MWB symptoms (emerging from work/goal achievement) at the team level. Similarly, when team members engaged in stretch behaviour to enjoy a shared sense of purpose and ambition with each other, they experienced eudaimonic MWB (fulfilment of a higher purpose) at the group level.

Hence, to summarise, a key factor that differentiated successful and unsuccessful social venture teams, was the presence of PL – that is an optimal balance between shared purpose/principles/protocols and accountability/discipline mechanisms – alongside the SL models in the successful social ventures.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"Though there are systems, processes & hierarchy, in terms of that there is one level & then there's the next band & the next band; but beyond that, we're pretty much a fairly democratic organization. There are procedures and approvals that are required, but I think they are just to make the work more smooth, so that, we never land up in some kind of trouble when it comes to any audits or if the government wants any kind of data, we are able to provide that. And the data that we have in our records is authentic. And for that, we have worked on various systems & procedures. But, when it comes hierarchy, it's like rather a flat organization. Everybody is more or less on the same level. There is no water tight compartment." – Team Member</i>	Example of how PL appeared to co-exist with and moderate the positive effects of SL and led to better organizational compliance (related to organization building – a venture performance indicator) in a high growth venture
<i>"I have given them complete freedom of making choices...But just let me know the objective behind going in for a particular thing and they get that kind of freedom...I think it is practical..and yet giving a lot of space to be for every person, for every person who is unique to be the way he or she is and not really completely changing or molding yourself to be like what your leader or your manager expects you to be...we know that each one of us is unique and yet we are all interdependent. And only because of us being with each other, the interconnectedness which is there, that the program is running so beautifully." – Second Line Leader</i>	Example of how PL positively influenced the relationship between SL and Supportive TMX in a high growth venture
<i>"..We try and track it every two weeks and not micromanage because micromanaging is a bad habit. It gives you a lot of stress, it takes a lot of time, and most of the time it demotivates people. So, they become owners and then they drive it and then we come back, we discuss again, then we see where we have reached." – Co-Founder (CEO)</i>	Example of how Control-Stretch Balance strengthened the relationship between EL and SL in a high growth venture
<i>"..There has to be a person, in any flat structure also, who needs to draw a line, that we have already given 10 days for discussion, now we need to take a stand. If we do not have this in the flat structure, which happens sometimes in our case, sometimes somebody voluntarily draws a line but sometimes it's difficult to take that call, so as soon as somebody draws a line, then decision-making happens quickly and also the execution process can start early. Otherwise, this flat structure can also fail easily." – Team Member</i>	Example of how greater PL/Control-Stretch Balance is needed in an average growth venture, in order to strengthen the relationship between SL, Team Learning and Venture Performance,

Table 120: Illustrative Quotes for Paradoxical Leadership (Control-Stretch Balance)

7.2.H) Common Team Wavelength – Moderating Mechanism (related to Team Process)

The second moderating process (from a team-centric lens) to consider is the collective common wavelength in the team with regards to team processes, protocols, principles, culture and goals. The term 'common wavelength' was used several times across several interviews (across organizations) during the qualitative data collection. In the context of the

doctoral dissertation, this construct of 'Common Team Wavelength' (CTW) can be defined as a common team understanding wherein the team members had an explicit (and/or in some cases partially implicit) shared understanding of different team processes and protocols (related to team communication, decision making, accountability, etc.), expected team culture/principles/values and overall organisational goals and vision. The interviews revealed that in successful social ventures, CTW was characterized by a dual nature, with a combination of the following dimensions:

- Explicit Shared Team Understanding
- Implicit Shared Team Understanding

In successful social ventures, the members in the team had either verbally discussed and mutually agreed upon or implicitly bought into a shared understanding about team processes and culture. This, in turn, led to a strong common wavelength within the group as a whole. In contrast, in low/stagnated growth or failed enterprises, there was a lack of explicit collective sensemaking among team members about shared team protocols and principles related to team processes, culture and organizational goals. In such ventures, members in the team had not verbally discussed or agreed upon this shared team understanding. Some low performance teams had an implied non-verbal understanding about team processes among the team; however the lack of an explicit shared wavelength and understanding often led to a mismatch of expectations within the venture as a whole. Hence, as outlined above, successful venture teams exhibited the presence of a strong common team wavelength, characterized by a complementary combination of explicit and implicit collective understanding about team-level processes, culture and goal accountability. It must also be noted that the antecedent factor of SCP Congruence played an important role in shaping CTW in successful venture teams.

CTW is an important team mechanism that appeared to have played an important moderating role for several variable relationships across the whole narrative. I found the following key themes in successful social ventures, that had a high degree of common team wavelength within the teams :

First, CTW appeared to have strengthened the link between the Independent Variable (SL) and the first mediating team process (SCP Embeddedness) because a shared team wavelength about the SL responsibilities of the team would drive collective ownership towards the importance of regular mission reinforcement within the team, in order to ensure that the whole team is on the same page with regards to the vision/mission and values of the social venture.

Second, CTW seems to have strengthened the link between Regular Mission Reinforcement/SCP Embeddedness and the associated outcome variables of SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover. This is because CTW potentially strengthened the positive effects of regular impact-centric team communication and team exposure to field impact, by ensuring that the whole team was on the same page about the group expectations related to collective/organizational resilience, as well as, the impact-centric value-based behaviour expected from the team. Hence, the CTW about the shared cause-driven resilience behaviour and the expected team behaviour with regards to value embodiment, strengthened the internalization of the organizational values by the team members; which in turn strengthened the SCP Resilience and

SCP Spillover effects experienced by the team as a whole in the startup social ventures.

Third, CTW appeared to have strengthened the link between SL and the second mediating team process (Continuous Team Learning Behaviour) because a shared team wavelength about the SL responsibilities of the team would drive a common alignment and collective ownership towards continuous team learning (CTW about collective learning processes and culture). Hence, team members shared a common understanding about the team expectations regarding the continuous team learning mechanisms of knowledge exchange, feedback seeking, experiential learning, learning from success and learning from failure.

Fourth, CTW seems to have strengthened the link between Continuous Team Learning and the associated dependent variable of Team/Venture Performance Outcomes, because a shared team wavelength about the team expectations regarding the continuous learning mechanisms ensured common alignment, collective ownership and collective prioritisation of team/venture goal achievement.

Fifth, CTW appeared to have strengthened the link between SL and the third mediating team process (Supportive Group-Level TMX) because a shared team wavelength about the SL responsibilities of the team, led to a supportive team work environment where everyone was on the same page about the team's work tasks/goals, protocols, principles, processes and culture. This, in turn, fostered mutual trust and the willingness to support fellow members within the team as a whole.

Finally, CTW seems to have strengthened the link between Supportive Group-Level TMX and the associated dependent variable of Team MWB, because a shared understanding of collective protocols and principles led to a low-conflict and high-support team work environment (a high level of TPS), where team members supported and trusted each other. And this, in turn, led to the team members experiencing positive MWB symptoms (absence of negative MWB symptoms or stressors) at the team level.

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>"...What we do is we put down all the values in the first slide of the PPT that we do whenever we are having review meetings or training meetings, so that it's a reinforcer for us." – Founder</i>	Example of how explicit shared team understanding (CTW) had a positive influence on Mission Reinforcement in a high growth venture
<i>"..We have consciously made the [goal setting] process much longer this year, because we feel as the team is growing, if the last person on the team is not aware of what we want to achieve, it will be very difficult for the organization to follow through with our commitments and our goals. So, this year we are, in fact, spending even more time and we are trying to</i>	Example of how CTW in a high growth venture strengthened the linkages between the SL mechanism of Goal Setting, the Learning

<i>use/follow a certain format to have these discussions. First, at the senior management team level and then, in our teams; specifically for the departmental goals. "How you want to see? How do you want to measure? What are the indicators & timelines?" I think, to get your team's buy in, it's very important; only then can you deliver...In the discussions, we're not really rushing through anything; it's being thought through...So, it's been like a long process; so that everyone is on the same page." – Team Member</i>	mechanism of Feedback Seeking and Venture Goal Achievement/Performance
<i>"There's been a lot of people who have come and gone over the last couple of years..And some of those experiences have not been very good; because things are kind of loose and casual & friendly...I've had to really go out of my way to show these people how seriously I take [the venture]. I think somewhere they don't get that sometimes...because everything is so casual and chill, they think [the venture] is a side project for me; but it's my life..So I make it clear how serious this is..it's just been this whole negotiation of boundaries." – Founder</i>	Example of how lack of CTW hindered the emergence of SL and/or SCP Embeddedness (and led to low Founder MWB) in a low/stagnated growth venture

Table 121: Illustrative Quotes for Common Team Wavelength

In sum, the inductive three-path model (comprising of team-level mechanisms related to Purpose, Performance and People) in successful startup social venture teams consisted of antecedent variables related to the venture's social cause, independent variables related to team-level leadership processes, mediator variables related to team processes, dependent variables related to multiple team and venture-level outcomes, and moderating constructs related to leadership and team-centric processual mechanisms. All of these different elements in the three-path model are interconnected and came together to form an inductive qualitative narrative about the emergence, development and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social enterprises in India. In the next chapter, the quantitative study will zoom in and focus on the second diverging path of this inductive model, related to shared leadership, continuous team learning behaviour and the associated outcomes of team/venture performance.

Chapter 8

METHODOLOGY AND FINDINGS FROM THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY –

Path 2 of the Inductive Three-Path Model

As outlined in Chapters 4-7, the qualitative study led to the discovery of an inductive three-path model (Purpose, Performance and People) that explained the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social venture teams in India. Building on the theory generated in the qualitative study, this chapter will focus on the quantitative study that was undertaken in order to test a part of the inductive three-path model. The quantitative study focused solely on Path 2 (from Shared Leadership) of the inductive model, which was related to the Performance of startup social ventures. In this model, I first tested the relationship between the antecedent variables of Team Social Cause Passion (representing SCP Congruence at the Team level), Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Mutual Trust and the independent variable of Shared Leadership. Second, I tested the relationship between the independent variable of Shared Leadership and the dependent variables related to Venture Performance, via the mediating variable of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour. This study focused only on testing the simple and linear process model for Path 2 and did not include the moderating constructs outlined in Chapter 7.

In this chapter, I will first outline the research model and hypotheses for the quantitative study (Section 8.1). Second, in Section 8.2, I will outline the methodology and research design used for the study. Third, in Section 8.3, I will explain the data collection procedure, and provide an overview of the study participants and the measures used for the survey questionnaire. Fourth, in Section 8.4, I will outline the data analysis process undertaken as part of the quantitative study. Finally, in Sections 8.5 and 8.6, I will report the results that emerged out of the data analysis, and will provide an overview of the findings respectively (the subsequent discussion of the findings can be found in Chapter 9).

8.1) Research Model and Hypotheses

Drawing on the inductive theory and reasoning outlined for Path 2 (as part of the three-path model) in Chapter 7, I propose the following research model (Figure 13) and hypotheses for the quantitative study:




Figure 13: Path Model illustrating the Research Hypotheses for Study 2

The research hypotheses, that have been illustrated in the path model above, have been listed systematically below:

Antecedents to Independent Variable (IV)

Hypothesis 1a: Team Social Cause Passion (Congruence) is associated with Shared Leadership (SL) in startup social venture teams.

Hypothesis 1b: Founder's Empowerment Behaviour is associated with Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams.

Hypothesis 1c: Followers' Proactive Behaviour is associated with Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams.

Hypothesis 1d: Founder-Member Mutual Trust is associated with Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams.

Hypothesis 1e: Team Social Cause Passion, Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Mutual Trust are jointly associated with Shared Leadership (have a combined effect on SL) in startup social venture teams.

Hypothesis 1f: Team Social Cause Passion is associated with Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams, via the mediating processes of Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Mutual Trust.

Independent Variable (IV) to Mediator

Hypothesis 2: Shared Leadership is associated with Continuous Team Learning Behaviour in startup social venture teams.

Mediator to Dependent Variable (DV)

Hypothesis 3a: Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Total Venture Performance in startup social venture teams.

This hypothesis is further broken down into sub-parts by dividing Total Venture Performance (DV) into the five sub-categories of Venture Performance (as outlined in Chapters 6 and 7).

- *Hypothesis 3b:* Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with

Financial Sustainability (Venture Performance Indicator 1) in startup social venture teams.

- *Hypothesis 3c*: Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Team/Human Capital Development (Venture Performance Indicator 2) in startup social venture teams.
- *Hypothesis 3d*: Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Hybrid Goal Achievement (Venture Performance Indicator 3) in startup social venture teams.
- *Hypothesis 3e*: Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Organization Building (Venture Performance Indicator 4) in startup social venture teams.
- *Hypothesis 3f*: Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Social Impact Creation (Venture Performance Indicator 5) in startup social venture teams.

Independent Variable (IV) to Dependent Variable (DV) via Mediator

Hypothesis 4a: Shared Leadership is associated with Total Venture Performance in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.

This hypothesis has also been further broken down into sub-parts by dividing Total Venture Performance (DV) into the five sub-categories of Venture Performance (as outlined above).

- *Hypothesis 4b*: Shared Leadership is associated with Financial Sustainability (Venture Performance Indicator 1) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.
- *Hypothesis 4c*: Shared Leadership is associated with Team/Human Capital Development (Venture Performance Indicator 2) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.
- *Hypothesis 4d*: Shared Leadership is associated with Hybrid Goal Achievement (Venture Performance Indicator 3) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.
- *Hypothesis 4e*: Shared Leadership is associated with Organization Building (Venture Performance Indicator 4) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.
- *Hypothesis 4f*: Shared Leadership is associated with Social Impact Creation (Venture Performance Indicator 5) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.

8.2) METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN FOR STUDY 2 (QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH)

The mixed methods approach of the doctoral thesis draws inspiration from a number of recent papers, appearing in top management journals, that used a combination of inductive theory building through qualitative research, followed by theory testing on the same or similar research participant groups using quantitative methods (for example: O'Neill & Rothbard, 2017; Huang & Pearce, 2015; Little et al., 2015). Building on the theory generated in the qualitative study, Study 2 adopted a theory testing and deductive or 'forward tracking' approach (Dey, 2004 in Seale et al., 2004; Fischer et al., 2017). Study 2 used an appropriate quantitative research methodology for model validation (Holton & Burnett, 2005), in order to examine the relationship between the emergent characteristics/processes, antecedents and team/venture-level outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social enterprises in India (focused on Path 2 of the inductive three-path model outlined in Study 1). The age of the organizations (0-4 years, ie. early stage), the team size (3-15 core team members), the focus of the ventures (ie. social impact) and the geographical location of the enterprises (ie. India) were considered as controlled variables when recruiting research participant teams for the data collection stage.

I conducted a pre-coded, multi-source and cross-sectional online survey using the survey software Qualtrics and received responses from 70 startup social enterprise teams in India (243 individual respondents), with at least 3-4 representatives per team (including one response from the founder/CEO and at least 2-3 responses from team members in every venture). The pre-coded survey was carefully designed to include well-known scales used in publications from top-tier management journals. Each scale corresponded with a construct/variable or relationship/pathway to be tested (as part of Path 2 of the emergent theoretical model, as outlined in Chapter 7) and some specific scale items were appropriately adapted to be applicable for the startup social venture context (at the team level). The detailed list of scales (including the original vs. adapted items) can be found in Appendix F. The survey was first piloted with a startup social enterprise team and based on the feedback received from the respondents (related to the ease of understanding the items, the user-friendly flow of the survey and the length of the questionnaire), the survey was further revised and then finally launched.

I used my professional network of social enterprise incubators, accelerators and fellowships in India to recruit the research participant teams for the data collection. In order to receive a large number of responses from social startup teams across the country, I created outreach partnerships with 20 key players in the social enterprise ecosystem in India. A list of these outreach partners can be found in Appendix G. In exchange for extensive circulation of the doctoral survey among their startup networks, the outreach partner organizations were promised access to a published practitioner report featuring key findings from the dissertation, branding/visibility for the partner organization (in the form of their name and logo) in the published report, as well as, an invitation to a knowledge dissemination workshop where I will share the final practical insights from the dissertation with the partner organizations, in order to help them with their core work of supporting early-stage social entrepreneurs in the country. The thematic and geographical diversity of the outreach partners (and in turn, their diverse startup networks) resulted in the collection of survey responses from a rich and diverse data set, within the boundaries of the control variables outlined above. I also successfully used social media platforms (such as LinkedIn, Twitter,

Facebook Communities, WhatsApp Groups and Google Groups) to promote the survey and recruit research participants teams from across the country.

Survey Design For Study 2

This sub-section illustrates the approach that was used to design the quantitative survey. I considered factors such as the type of startup social ventures to include in the data collection stage, the number of respondents required per team, the incentives for survey respondents, etc. These factors were taken into account because they would influence the feasibility and robustness of the data collection process and would form the basis of the sampling strategy. The detailed survey design has been outlined in Table 122 below:

ITEM	DESCRIPTION
Research Participant Team Eligibility Criteria	○ Years of Operation of the organization – 6 months to 4 years (startup stage) ○ Organizational model – For-profit, non-profit and hybrid social impact organizations ○ Geography – Tier 1, 2 and 3 cities in India ○ Number of Founders – Teams with single and/or multiple co-founders are eligible but one of the co-founders must be the clear team leader (CEO/Managing Director/main person in charge) ○ Team Size – Minimum 3 and maximum 15 core (full time and/or part time) team members (not including contract workers, production workers or service staff)
Profile of respondents and number of respondents per team	○ At least 3 participants per social enterprise (minimum 3; maximum 4) ○ This included one response from the Founder/CEO/Managing Director (main person in charge) and 2-3 responses from team members per organization
Number of survey rounds	○ Cross-sectional and multi-source survey for the purpose of the doctoral dissertation
Sample size	○ 70 startup social enterprise teams in India ○ 243 individual respondents in total
Duration	○ The survey was open for two months
Survey Mode	○ Online – Qualtrics (survey software)
Language of the survey	○ English (the majority of startup teams in urban settings in India are fluent in English) ○ However, if the founder felt that a core team member from their organization who speaks Hindi (or another regional language) should fill out the survey, then they were free to take the initiative to translate the survey for him/her and help that team member to fill out the form with their assistance (with his/her/their permission and informed consent)

Incentives for survey respondents	○ Amazon India voucher (worth Rs. 500/-) per individual respondent – these vouchers were only released if a minimum of 3 members and a maximum of 4 members (including the founder/CEO/Managing Director) from the team filled out the survey ○ Short feedback to be sent to every respondent team about how that individual startup team compared to the average team response ○ Invitation (for the respondents and outreach partners) to a knowledge workshop (about the research findings, at a later stage) – the workshop will be conducted as an online webinar (there could be a face-to-face workshop in the future depending on the future situation, given COVID19) ○ Access to the practitioner report with the research findings and practical insights for the field

Table 122: Data Collection Design for Study 2 Quantitative Research

Survey Process Flow For Study 2

This sub-section outlines the process flow (flow of activities) for the quantitative survey. I included factors such as key activities and important milestones for the pre and post data collection stages; to first, ensure that the data collection/analysis would be conducted in a structured manner, and second, to create a meaningful research impact plan to disseminate the research insights and practical findings to the research participants, outreach partner organizations and practitioners in the field. The detailed process flow, for the data collection and data analysis stages, has been outlined in Table 123 below:

SR. NO.	ACTION ITEM	DESCRIPTION
1	Scale Review and Survey Launch	○ The survey items were finalised through an exhaustive process of scale/item review and adaptation; using well known scales used in publications from top quality management journals ○ A simple and user-friendly survey was launched (using Qualtrics – mobile version was also enabled)
2	Survey Pilot	○ The survey was piloted with a startup social enterprise team in order get feedback related to the ease of understanding the items, the user-friendly flow of the survey and the length of the questionnaire ○ Based on the feedback received from the respondents, the survey was further revised and then finally launched
3	Survey Outreach	○ 20 outreach partnerships were created with key actors in the social enterprise ecosystem in India – including incubators, accelerators, fellowship programs, funds/foundations and universities – to promote the survey in their startup networks ○ In addition, social media platforms such as Google Groups, LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook Groups and WhatsApp groups were used extensively to find and recruit research participant teams
4	Follow Up and Incentives – Amazon	○ I tracked the respondent completion rate of each team and disbursed gift vouchers for complete teams on a daily basis for

	India Vouchers	two months ○ I also sent regular follow up emails to the research participant teams and partner organizations in order to the maximum possible responses from complete research participant teams
5	Cleaning up of Survey Data	○ After two months of survey data collection, I collated the survey data from all the respondent teams and cleaned up the data in Microsoft Excel
6	Analysis of Survey Results	○ I analysed the survey data through descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis using SPSS; and mediation analysis using PROCESS (Hayes, 2013)
7	Reporting/Writing Survey Results	○ I then proceeded to write down and report the survey results and discussion as part of the doctoral dissertation
8	Incentives – Startup Feedback	○ After the final submission of the doctoral dissertation, I will collate short feedback for every respondent team about how the individual startup teams compared to the average team response, and I will share the confidential individual team feedback with the respective respondent teams
9	Incentives – LSE Workshop for SEs	○ A few months later, I will organise an online webinar (knowledge workshop) for the respondent teams and outreach partner organizations (face-to-face workshop to be postponed, dependent on the current COVID-19 situation) ○ I will share the research insights with the respondent teams in a useful and practical way during the workshop
10	Incentives – Share Practitioner Report with SEs	○ I will share the research findings through a practitioner report summary of the doctoral dissertation, with the respondent teams, outreach partner organizations and practitioners in the field (to create field-based research impact outside of academia)

Table 123: Data Collection and Data Analysis Process Flow for Study 2 (Quantitative Research)

8.3) Data Collection

Target Sampling

As part of the quantitative study, I collected and analysed data from 70 startup social venture teams, using an online questionnaire. This sample included 243 individual respondents across 70 teams and featured 3-4 respondents (including the Founder/CEO) per startup social enterprise venture. In order to participate in the research study, the teams and respondents had to fulfil the following eligibility criteria:

- The organization should be between 6 months to 4 years old (startup stage)
- The organization must be explicitly focused on social impact creation (core mission)
- The organization should have between 3-15 core (full-time) team members (not including support/contract staff)
- If the organization has more than one co-founder, then there should be one co-founder who is the clear/official CEO/Executive Director
- The survey must be filled out by only the Founder who is the official CEO, along with 2-3 core (full-time) team members – If the team was small in size with more than one

co-founder, then the co-founder who is not the CEO could fill out the survey in the ‘team member’ role

I recruited the eligible startup social venture teams through the use of outreach partners and social media platforms (as outlined earlier in this chapter) and the respondents filled out an online survey via the Qualtrics platform. The eligibility of the teams was assessed through initial eligibility questions on the survey, which screened out ineligible respondents and teams, depending on their responses. The participants were informed that the survey was voluntary and if 3-4 people per team (minimum 3 people and maximum 4 people; including the Founder/CEO) completed the questionnaire, then each respondent from that team would receive an Amazon India voucher worth Rs. 500/-. The confidentiality of the responses was also ensured. The participants were also told that once the data analysis is completed, they will receive confidential team feedback about their team’s collective response, access to a practical report with the research insights and invitation to a knowledge dissemination workshop about the research findings. 67 out of the 70 teams that participated in Study 2 were new ventures that did not participate in Study 1, and only 3 teams were common across both Study 1 and Study 2. The majority of participants from the same teams filled out the survey in a staggered manner (spread across two months), and I also cross-checked the team responses with publicly available information about the venture teams on the organizational websites, as well as, engaged with them via email when sending out survey reminders and disbursing the gift vouchers. All these checks ensured the authenticity of the data received (that the survey was truly completed by the designated participants). Further, apart from multiple attention check items in the survey, I also added an extra text question at the end of the survey to gauge participant engagement/attention, and most participants filled out that text question with feedback and comments about the survey experience. Several participants found the survey to be a valuable learning and reflection experience for themselves and for their team as a whole – as demonstrated by the quotes below:

Illustrative Quote	Context
<i>“This is a very good survey to understand the strengths of our organization as a team. The flow of the survey was excellent. It was a good experience to recall the work culture we are having at our organization while filling the survey form.”</i>	Survey Participant (Team Member)
<i>“The survey was quite elaborate and while replying to some of the questions I could clearly identify some of the areas where we need to focus and improve as a team.”</i>	Survey Participant (Founder)
<i>“The questions were quite appropriate and analysis of answers given by the team can help us build a better working environment and solve the unseen problems that we might we have overlooked in the past.”</i>	Survey Participant (Team Member)

Table 124: Feedback from Survey Participants (submitted through the Qualtrics survey)

Hence, all the factors outlined above – the new sample base (very few overlapping teams from Study 1), authentic responses from participants across teams, as well as, engaging and attentive survey feedback from respondents – ensured trustworthiness of the data collected.

An overview of the characteristics of the 70 teams can be found in Table 125 below:

Category	Description
Number of Founders	• 36 teams with single founders • 21 teams with two co-founders • 13 teams with more than two co-founders.
Organizational Model	• 33 For-Profit Social Enterprises • 29 Non-Profit Social Enterprises • 8 Hybrid Social Enterprises (both for-profit and non-profit organizational models)
Impact Sector	The participating startup ventures worked in a range of impact sectors – covering the following 13 impact sectors (ventures were allowed to pick more than one impact sector): • Livelihoods/Income Generation • Education • Environment • Healthcare • Energy • Civic Engagement and Public Policy • Social Sector Partnerships or Services • Hygiene and Sanitation • Water • Disaster Management • Gender Equity and Inclusion • Agriculture • Youth and Community Development
Venture Location	The ventures were spread all across India, spanning Tier 1, Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities and collectively covered 36 different cities/locations in India.
Organizational Pivot	Out of 70 ventures, 19 organizations had pivoted their business model during their organizational tenure.
Years of Organizational Existence (Operations)	The mean organizational age was 2.49 years (SD = 1.17).
Team Size	The mean team size (core full-time members) was 6.61 (SD = 3.45).
Gender of Founder/CEO	• 19 female founders • 50 male founders • 1 founder preferred not to reveal his/her/their gender
Age of Founder	The mean age of the founder was 32.51 years (SD = 6.99)

Table 125: Overview of the 70 teams that participated in the quantitative study

Measures

This section will provide an overview of the various measures used in the cross-sectional survey. A detailed list of the survey items (including the original measures of the adapted items) can be found in Appendix F.

a) Team Social Cause Passion

This scale represented the SCP Congruence at the team level, which was the anchoring antecedent in the path model. In order to measure this construct, I adapted the thirteen items in the Team Entrepreneurial Passion Scale (Cardon, Gregoire, Stevens, & Patel, 2013) to represent the specific impact-centric angle of the team's passion for the social cause of the venture (instead of entrepreneurial passion in a commercial venture). The original scale was also used in a team-level study by Santos and Cardon (2019). An illustrative item from this scale is "We, as a team, find it exciting to figure out new ways to solve unmet market needs that address the social problem of our organization". Another illustrative item is "We, as a team, find it enjoyable to search for new ideas for products/services/programmes that address the social problem of our organization". The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach's α for this scale was .93.

b) Founder's Empowerment Behaviour

This construct was measured with the twelve items from the Leadership Empowerment Behaviour Scale (Ahearne, Mathieu & Rapp, 2005). The scale featured four sub-scales (3 items per sub-scale) measuring 'Enhancing the meaningfulness of work', 'Fostering participation in decision making', 'Expressing confidence in high performance' and 'Providing autonomy from bureaucratic constraints'. This twelve-item scale was also used to measure Empowering Leadership by Zhang and Bartol (2010). This scale was only filled out by the team members in the 70 startup social venture teams, who responded to the items based on their working relationship with the founder/CEO of their startup. Given that the survey was a part of a team-level study, the items were adapted to reflect team-level language ('we/us' instead of 'my/me'). An illustrative item from the 'Enhancing the meaningfulness of work' sub-scale is 'My team leader helps us understand how our individual objectives and goals relate to that of the organisation'. The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach's α was .96.

c) Followers' Proactive Behaviour

This concept was measured with the Taking Charge at Work Scale (Morrison and Phelps, 1999). The original scale had ten items but one item was removed for this study because the wording of that item appeared to be quite hard for the average survey respondent to comprehend (based on feedback from the pilot round of the survey). The nine items that were used were adapted in order to change them from 'third person' reporting ('this person..') to respondent 'self-report' wording ('members in my startup team..'). This scale was only filled out by the founders of the 70 teams, who responded to the items based on their observations of the work approach of the team members in their ventures. An illustrative item from this scale is "Members in my startup team often try to change how our work is executed in order to be more effective". The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

Cronbach's α was .90.

d) Founder-Member Mutual Trust

I measured this construct with the Affect-based Trust Scale (McAllister, 1995). The original scale had 5 items but for the purpose of this study, one of the items was divided into two parts, to make it easier for the survey respondents to understand. The revised six-item scale was filled out by both founders and team members, and the language was slightly adapted/customised in both cases, depending on the specific category of respondents. An illustrative item (used for team members) is "In my startup team, the Founder/CEO/Managing Director and team members (we) can both freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes with each other". Another illustrative item (used for founders) is "In my startup team, the Founder/CEO/Managing Director (me) and team members have made considerable emotional efforts for our working relationship." The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach's α for the scale filled by team members was .94 and for the scale filled by founders was .86. For the purpose of analysing the results, I first calculated the mean score for Founder-Member Mutual Trust, as reported by team members and founders separately, and then aggregated the scores of these two separate variables to the team level. Then, I calculated the combined mean score of Founder-Member Mutual Trust per team (mean score of the two individual variables combined), and aggregated the score of this new combined variable to the team level.

e) Shared Leadership

This construct was measured with the eight-item Shared Leadership scale by Mihalache, Jansen, Van den Bosch and Volberda (2014). Two of the items were adapted to make them more suitable from the lens of a startup social venture (rather than a commercial firm). A few words in some of the items were replaced with synonyms, in order to make the statements easier for the respondents to understand. An illustrative item from this scale is "All team members jointly determine the implementation of new ideas related to our organisational vision". Another illustrative item is "All team members work with each other to make critical decisions". The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach's α was .91.

f) Continuous Team Learning Behaviour

I measured this construct with the Team Learning Behaviour Scale (Edmondson, A., 1999). The original scale had seven items, but two extra items were added to reflect/cover the different team learning behaviours that were discovered as part of the qualitative study (outlined in Chapter 5). One of the items in the original scale was reverse coded, but this was changed for the survey in order to make the item easier for the respondents to understand (not reverse coded). An illustrative item from the revised nine-item scale is "We, as a team, regularly take time out to figure out ways to improve our team's work processes". Another illustrative item is "We, as a team, tend to handle differences of opinion directly as a group" (which was reworded from the original reverse-coded item to make it easier to understand for the survey participants). The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach's α was 0.88.

g) Venture Performance

This construct was measured with the Subjective Business Success Scale (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2003). The original scale had ten items and some of these items were adapted to be more suitable for social enterprises (rather than commercial ventures). Three items were removed because they were more suitable for commercial ventures, and an additional eight items were further added to the scale to reflect/cover the different venture performance indicators/outcomes that were discovered as part of the qualitative study (outlined in Chapter 6). The updated and revised scale that was used had fifteen items, covering five sub-scales related to different performance indicators. The scale included one sub-scale item for financial sustainability, two sub-scale items for team/human capital development (Cronbach's α was 0.56, but the two items were measuring two different team-related performance indicators), four sub-scale items for hybrid goal achievement (Cronbach's α was .72), four sub-scale items for organization building (Cronbach's α was .75) and four sub-scale items for social impact creation (Cronbach's α was .77). An illustrative item for the team/human capital development sub-scale is "Growth in the number of full-time and part-time team members". An illustrative item for the social impact creation sub-scale is "Over the past year, our organization has performed well with regards to growth in the achievement of the impact goals or outcomes (eg: reduction in student drop out rate) of the organisation". This scale was filled out only by the founders and they were asked to respond to the items keeping in mind the venture's performance over the past one year. The response scale ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach's α for the full fifteen-item scale was .90.

h) Control Variables

I considered nine control variables, including Founder/CEO's Age, Founder/CEO's Gender (dummy coded such that Male [M] = 1)¹, Years of existence for the organization (operations), Number of core (full-time) team members, Number of founders, Organization Model (with dummy variables for For-Profit and Hybrid social ventures), Organizational Pivot (dummy coded such that organizations that have not pivoted [N] = 1) and Total Effect of COVID19. To measure the Total Effect of COVID19, I created a three-item scale assessing the effect of COVID19 on the team's work approach (internal team interaction), interaction with external stakeholders and delivery of core venture activities. An illustrative item for this scale is "To what extent has the current COVID19 pandemic affected the way the team members work with and interact with each other in the organization?". The response scale included the following options – (1) Not sure; (2) Not at all; (3) Very Little; (4) Somewhat; (5) To a great extent. Cronbach's α for the COVID19 scale was .71. Except for COVID19 scale which was answered by all respondents (including team members), all the other control variable items were answered only by the founders of the 70 teams.

¹ Out of 70 founders, 1 person picked the Gender option 'Prefer not to say'. For the purpose of reporting, this founder has been included under the 'Male' category. Throughout the rest of the dissertation, I have also included 'they' as a pronoun to include a non-binary representation of gender.

8.4) Data Analysis

For the quantitative study, I conducted a cross-sectional survey, collecting data from both founders and team members across 70 startup social venture teams, in order to carry out a team-level study of the path model outlined in Figure 13. The analysis of the cross-sectional and multi-source data was carried out at the level of the team, and the individual responses of the respondents from every team were aggregated to the team level (Chan, 1998; Santos and Cardon, 2019). This team-level aggregation approach follows the Additive composition model of data analysis and it is a widely used composition model in team level studies (Chan, 1998). “In such models, the meaning of the higher level construct is a summation of the lower level units regardless of the variance among these units...The typical operational combination process is a simple sum or average of the lower level scores on the lower level variable to represent the value on the higher level variable. The validity of the additive index (e.g., the mean) constitutes empirical support for the composition.” (Chan, 1998, pg. 236). Thus, in line with this additive composition approach, the values of all the variables in the quantitative study were aggregated to the team level. Using SPSS, I first analysed the descriptive statistics and correlation between all the variables; following which, I conducted simple linear regression analyses to test the various different hypotheses outlined earlier in this chapter (*H1a – H1e, H2 and H3a – H3f*). Finally, I used the PROCESS function (compatible with SPSS) developed by Andrew F. Hayes (2013; Model 4) to conduct a mediation analysis, to test the hypothesized mediation effects estimated in hypotheses *H1f and H4a – H4f*.

Data Aggregation

To justify the aggregation of the individual scores to the team level (as per Chan’s additive composition model), I calculated the value of r_{wg} (which is a within-group agreement index – James et al., 1993), as well as, ICC(1) and ICC(2) (which are intraclass correlation coefficients – Bliese, 2000), in order to demonstrate the validity and confirm the reliability of the aggregated group-level scores at the meso-level of analysis (Chiu et al., 2016; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000; Chan, 1998). Based on the recommendation by Smith-Crowe et al. (2013) regarding the use of null distribution to calculate r_{wg} , I have reported the r_{wg} values for both uniform, as well as, slight skew null distributions; because we can expect that respondents may have a positive leniency bias in their scores, when evaluating their leaders, team members and/or colleagues (Chiu et al., 2016; Rego et al., 2013). This approach of calculating ICC(1), ICC(2) and r_{wg} (based on slight skew null distribution) to justify data aggregation has been used in several papers published in top-tier academic journals – for example, Chiu et al. (2016), Bono et al. (2007), Liao and Rupp (2005), and Bono and Judge (2003) (Biemann et al., 2012). “Although there is no absolute standard value for these aggregation indices (Biemann, Cole, & Voelpel, 2012), previous studies have suggested that an r_{wg} value greater than .70 is sufficient to justify the aggregation (Bliese, 2000). For ICC[1] and ICC[2], the general recommend cutoffs are .12 (James, 1982; Schneider, White, & Paul, 1998) and .60 (Glick, 1985), respectively” (Chiu et al., 2016, pg. 1712). However, given that ICC(2) is greatly influenced by the number of respondents from each team, the small average team size (on average, 3 people per team) in the Study 2 data sample is the likely explanation behind the lower than recommended ICC(2) value for some of the variables, as shown in Table 126 below (Chiu et al., 2016; Gong et al., 2009). “Multiple recent studies have suggested that ICC(2) values greater than .25 are still acceptable in cases where high

r_{wg} and ICC(1) values as well as significant F test results are observed (e.g., Dietz, van Knippenberg, Hirst, & Restubog, 2015; Dong, Liao, Chuang, Zhou, & Campbell, 2015)” (Chiu et al., 2016; pg. 1712). Therefore, based on the ICC(1), ICC(2), r_{wg} values and significant F test results obtained for Study 2, the data aggregation approach for the aggregated variables was justified for this team-level study, as outlined in Table 126 below:

Variable Name	ICC(1)	ICC(2)	r_{wg} —uniform	r_{wg} —slight skewness	F Test	p value
Team Social Cause Passion	.33	.63	.98	.96	2.71	$p < .01$
Founder’s Empowerment Behaviour (reported by team members only)	.55	.75	.98	.96	4.05	$p < .01$
Founder-Member Mutual Trust (reported by team members only)	.49	.70	.92	.86	3.33	$p < .01$
Shared Leadership	.22	.49	.93	.84	1.96	$p < .01$
Continuous Team Learning Behaviour	.26	.55	.94	.87	2.24	$p < .01$
Total Effect of COVID19	.26	.55	.77	.63	2.22	$p < .01$

Table 126: Data Aggregation Justification for Study 2 – ICC(1), ICC(2) and r_{wg}

Note: I have reported the values for variables that were scored by team members only or by the whole team (I have not included variables that were reported only by the founders). ICC(1), ICC(2) and r_{wg} were calculated using the Excel tool designed to accompany Biemann et al. (2012).

8.5) Results

Table 127 below outlines the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables that were used as part of this study. After establishing the correlations between the variables, I conducted regression analyses to test the various research hypotheses that were outlined earlier in this chapter. The results from the regression analyses are outlined in Table 128 below. As Step 1, I tested *Hypotheses 1a – 1e* (from the antecedent variables to the independent variable in the path model). In this step, I estimated coefficients in a model, using the independent variable as the outcome, and the regressions for *Hypotheses 1a – 1f* are represented in Model 1 (Model 1-1 to 1-6 respectively) in Table 128. In Step 2, I tested *Hypothesis 2* (from the independent variable to the mediator in the path model) and I estimated coefficients in this model using the mediator as the outcome (represented as Model 2 in the regression table). Next, in Step 3, I tested *Hypotheses 3a – 3f* (from the mediator to the dependent variables in the path model). For this step, I ran six different regressions, representing one main (cumulative) dependent variable and five sub-variables connected to the overall dependent variable. I estimated coefficients in these six models

using the six different dependent variables as outcomes and the regressions for *Hypotheses 3a – 3f* are represented in Models 3 – 8 in Table 128. In Step 4, I used coefficients from Model 1 (Model 1-1 to 1-6) to estimate the mediation effects outlined in *Hypothesis 1f*. Finally, in Step 5, I used coefficients from Models 2 – 8 to estimate the mediation effects outlined in *Hypotheses 4a – 4f*. The results for the mediation analyses are outlined towards the end of this Results section.

In Step 1, I first examined whether Team Social Cause Passion (TSCP) predicted Shared Leadership (SL) in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 1a*). Model 1-1 represents the association between the control variables and SL. As shown in Model 1-2, TSCP did positively predict SL ($b = .79, p < .01$). Next, I tested whether Founder's Empowerment Behaviour predicted SL in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 1b*). As outlined in Model 1-3, it did, positively ($b = .64, p < .01$). Next, I examined whether Followers' Proactive Behaviour predicted SL in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 1c*) and as shown in Model 1-4, it did predict SL positively ($b = .31, p < .01$). Next, I tested whether Founder-Member Mutual Trust predicted SL in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 1d*) and as outlined in Model 1-5, it did predict SL positively ($b = .68, p < .01$). Finally, I examined whether TSCP, Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Mutual Trust jointly predicted SL in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 1e*). As shown in Model 1-6, Founder's Empowerment Behaviour ($b = .51, p < .01$) and Followers' Proactive Behaviour ($b = .19, p < .01$) did positively predict SL (as a combined effect), while TSCP and Founder-Member Mutual Trust did not jointly predict SL in startup social venture teams (the results were not significant). Hence, as outlined above, the findings in this study supported *Hypotheses 1a – 1d* and partially supported *Hypothesis 1e*.

In Step 2, I examined whether SL predicted Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB) in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 2*). Model 2-1 represents the association between the control variables and CTLB. As shown in Model 2-2, SL did positively predict CTLB ($b = .71, p < .01$). Hence, the findings from the regression analysis supported *Hypothesis 2*.

In Step 3, I examined whether Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB) predicted the Total Venture Performance in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 3a*). Model 8-1 represents the association between the control variables and Total Venture Performance. As shown in Model 8-2, CTLB did positively predict Total Venture Performance ($b = .79, p < .01$). Additionally, I conducted five separate regression analyses to test whether Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB) was associated with the five sub-variables of Venture Performance (Financial Sustainability, Team/Human Capital Development, Hybrid Goal Achievement, Organization Building and Social Impact Creation) in startup social venture teams (these five sub-variables cumulatively formed the overall dependent variable of Total Venture Performance). First, I examined whether CTLB predicted Financial Sustainability (Venture Performance Indicator 1) in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 3b*). Model 3-1 represents the association between the control variables and Financial Sustainability. As shown in Model 3-2, CTLB did not predict Financial Sustainability (the results were not significant). Next, I tested whether CTLB predicted Team/Human Capital Development (Venture Performance Indicator 2) in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 3c*). Model 4-1 represents the association between the control variables and Team/Human Capital Development. As outlined in Model 4-2, CTLB did predict this sub-variable positively ($b = .88, p < .01$). Next, I examined whether CTLB predicted Hybrid Goal Achievement (Venture

Performance Indicator 3) in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 3d*). Model 5-1 represents the association between the control variables and Hybrid Goal Achievement. As shown in Model 5-2, CTLB did predict this sub-variable positively ($b = .62, p < .05$). Next, I tested whether CTLB predicted Organization Building (Venture Performance Indicator 4) in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 3e*). Model 6-1 represents the association between the control variables and Organization Building. As outlined in Model 6-2, CTLB did predict this sub-variable positively ($b = .95, p < .01$). Finally, I examined whether CTLB predicted Social Impact Creation (Venture Performance Indicator 5) in startup social venture teams (*Hypothesis 3f*). Model 7-1 represents the association between the control variables and Social Impact Creation. As shown in Model 7-2, CTLB did predict Social Impact Creation positively ($b = .83, p < .01$). Hence, as outlined above, the findings in this study supported the overall *Hypothesis 3a*, and the sub-hypotheses *H3c*, *H3d*, *H3e* and *H3f*, but did not support the sub-hypothesis *H3b*.

In Step 4, I examined whether Team Social Cause Passion (TSCP) predicted Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams, via the mediating processes of Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Mutual Trust (*Hypothesis 1f*). I relied on the PROCESS function developed by Hayes (2013; Model 4) to perform the bootstrapped estimation of this mediation effect. The results showed that both Founder's Empowerment Behaviour (mediation effect = .54, 95% confidence interval [CI] = .30 to .83) and Followers' Proactive Behaviour (mediation effect = .12, 95% confidence interval [CI] = .02 to .29) had a significant mediation effect, but Founder-Member Mutual Trust had a non-significant one (mediation effect = .14, 95% confidence interval [CI] = -.10 to .31). Hence, as outlined, the results partially supported *Hypothesis 1f*.

In Step 5, I once again used the PROCESS function (Model 4) to estimate the mediation effects outlined in *Hypotheses 4a – 4f*. I examined whether Shared Leadership (SL) predicted Total Venture Performance in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (*Hypothesis 4a*). Supporting *Hypothesis 4a*, the results showed that Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB) had a significant mediation effect (mediation effect = .53, 95% confidence interval [CI] = .08 to 1.21). Additionally, I conducted five separate mediation analyses to test whether SL was associated with the five sub-variables of Venture Performance (Financial Sustainability, Team/Human Capital Development Hybrid Goal Achievement, Organization Building and Social Impact Creation) in startup social ventures (these five indicators cumulatively formed the overall dependent variable of Total Venture Performance), via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB). First, I examined whether SL predicted Financial Sustainability (Venture Performance Indicator 1) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of CTLB (*Hypothesis 4b*). The results showed that CTLB had a non-significant mediation effect (mediation effect = .04, 95% confidence interval [CI] = -.75 to 1.20). Hence, *Hypothesis 4b* was not supported. Next, I examined whether SL predicted Team/Human Capital Development (Venture Performance Indicator 2) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of CTLB (*Hypothesis 4c*). Supporting *Hypothesis 4c*, the results showed that CTLB had a significant mediation effect (mediation effect = .93, 95% confidence interval [CI] = .42 to 1.59). Next, I examined whether SL predicted Hybrid Goal Achievement (Venture Performance Indicator 3) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of CTLB (*Hypothesis 4d*). The results showed that CTLB had a non-significant mediation effect (mediation effect = .51, 95% confidence interval [CI] = -.12 to

1.32). Hence, *Hypothesis 4d* was not supported. Next, I examined whether SL predicted Organization Building (Venture Performance Indicator 4) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of CTLB (*Hypothesis 4e*). Supporting *Hypothesis 4e*, the results showed that CTLB had a significant mediation effect (mediation effect = .55, 95% confidence interval [CI] = .02 to 1.29). Finally, I examined whether SL predicted Social Impact Creation (Venture Performance Indicator 5) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of CTLB (*Hypothesis 4f*). The results showed that CTLB had a non-significant mediation effect (mediation effect = .47, 95% confidence interval [CI] = -.03 to 1.19). Hence, *Hypothesis 4f* was not supported. Hence, as outlined above, the findings in this study supported the overall *Hypothesis 4a*, and the sub-hypotheses *H4c* and *H4e*, but did not support the sub-hypotheses *H4b*, *H4d* and *H4f*.

Table 127: Correlation and Descriptive Statistics of Research Variables (N = 70)

Measures	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	M	SD
1. Founder/CEO's Age																						32.51	6.99
2. Founder/CEO's Gender (F = 0; M = 1) ²	-.20																					.73	.45
3. Years of existence for the organization (operations)	.28 [*]	.02																				2.49	1.17
4. Number of core (full-time) team members ³	.26 [*]	.13	.46 ^{**}																			6.61	3.45
5. Number of founders ⁴	-.08	-.01	.00	.13																		1.67	.78
6. Organization Model – For Profit (NFP = 0; FP = 1; Hybrid = 0)	-.04	-.00	.06	-.02	-.19																	.47	.50
7. Organization Model – Hybrid (NFP = 0; FP = 0; Hybrid = 1)	-.01	.02	-.10	.15	.15	-.34 ^{**}																.11	.32
8. Organizational Pivot (Y = 0; N = 1)	.03	.11	-.14	-.05	-.07	-.16	-.07															.71	.46
9. Total Effect of COVID19	-.04	-.05	.12	-.08	-.04	.07	-.36 ^{**}	-.14														4.09	.53
10. Team Social Cause Passion	.17	-.23	-.16	.08	.22	-.22	.34 ^{**}	-.25 [*]	-.37 ^{**}													4.34	.37
11. Founder's Empowerment Behaviour	.16	-.22	-.13	.05	.47 ^{**}	-.25 [*]	.23	-.18	-.29 [*]	.81 ^{**}												4.37	.53
12. Followers' Proactive Behaviour	-.09	.07	-.31 [*]	-.11	.05	-.19	.20	.13	-.35 ^{**}	.40 ^{**}	.22											4.09	.54
13. Founder-Member Mutual Trust	.12	-.34 ^{**}	-.12	.06	.36 ^{**}	-.29 [*]	.19	-.15	-.32 ^{**}	.76 ^{**}	.80 ^{**}	.48 ^{**}										4.27	.48
14. Shared Leadership	.07	-.11	-.19	.08	.39 ^{**}	-.27 [*]	.37 ^{**}	-.04	-.33 ^{**}	.74 ^{**}	.82 ^{**}	.50 ^{**}	.79 ^{**}									4.15	.41
15. Team Learning Behaviour	.11	-.11	-.16	.18	.41 ^{**}	-.18	.32 ^{**}	-.06	-.34 ^{**}	.69 ^{**}	.76 ^{**}	.48 ^{**}	.73 ^{**}	.81 ^{**}								4.07	.40
16. Performance – Finance Goals	.05	.19	-.06	.38 ^{**}	-.14	.09	.06	.04	-.34 ^{**}	.24 [*]	.08	.32 ^{**}	.14	.22	.23							3.46	.99
17. Performance – Team Goals	.05	.21	-.31 ^{**}	.19	.08	-.15	.13	-.01	-.33 ^{**}	.35 ^{**}	.29 [*]	.45 ^{**}	.28 [*]	.31 ^{**}	.49 ^{**}	.43 ^{**}						3.64	.82
18. Performance – Hybrid Goals	.09	.05	-.10	.22	-.05	-.09	.14	-.01	-.25 [*]	.43 ^{**}	.32 ^{**}	.34 ^{**}	.37 ^{**}	.26 [*]	.36 ^{**}	.58 ^{**}	.46 ^{**}					3.86	.71
19. Performance – Org. Building	.13	.08	-.20	.12	.20	-.18	.15	-.06	-.26 [*]	.56 ^{**}	.49 ^{**}	.41 ^{**}	.47 ^{**}	.51 ^{**}	.57 ^{**}	.33 ^{**}	.54 ^{**}	.58 ^{**}				3.92	.73
20. Performance – Impact Goals	.23	-.08	-.15	.16	-.08	-.07	.13	-.04	-.14	.52 ^{**}	.34 ^{**}	.44 ^{**}	.47 ^{**}	.42 ^{**}	.48 ^{**}	.54 ^{**}	.47 ^{**}	.74 ^{**}	.70 ^{**}			4.04	.60
21. Venture Performance TOTAL	.15	.08	-.21	.23	.03	-.13	.16	-.03	-.30 [*]	.56 ^{**}	.42 ^{**}	.48 ^{**}	.47 ^{**}	.45 ^{**}	.56 ^{**}	.63 ^{**}	.69 ^{**}	.87 ^{**}	.85 ^{**}	.89 ^{**}		3.87	.59

Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ($p < .05$)

Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). ($p < .01$)

² Out of 70 founders, 1 person picked the Gender option 'Prefer not to say'. For the purpose of reporting, this founder has been included under the 'Male' category.

³ This number includes the core (full-time) team members in the venture (involved in core activities), and does not include support staff or contract employees.

⁴ This variable had three categories – Single Founder, Two Co-Founders, More than Two Co-Founders. For the purpose of reporting, the variable has been recoded into Single Founder = 1, Two Co-Founders = 2, More than Two Co-Founders = 3. Even if the venture had more than one founder, every venture in the sample had one founder who was the clear CEO/Leader in the enterprise, and this individual was the one who filled out the survey in the 'Founder' role.

Table 128: Results of Regression Analysis (N = 70)

Measures	Shared Leadership						Team Learning		Performance – Finance		Performance – Team		Performance – Hybrid		Performance – Org. Building		Performance – Impact		Performance – TOTAL	
	Model 1-1	Model 1-2	Model 1-3	Model 1-4	Model 1-5	Model 1-6	Model 2-1	Model 2-2	Model 3-1	Model 3-2	Model 4-1	Model 4-2	Model 5-1	Model 5-2	Model 6-1	Model 6-2	Model 7-1	Model 7-2	Model 8-1	Model 8-2
Intercept (Constant)	4.65/.48**	.44/.71	1.36/.48**	2.91/.63**	.81/.56	.04/.54	4.50/.47**	1.20/.52*	5.92/1.17**	3.68/1.82*	5.44/.96**	1.50/1.39	5.12/.96**	2.34/1.46	4.76/.94**	.48/1.33	4.22/.81**	.48/1.12	4.88/.74**	1.33/1.02
Founder/CEO's Age	.01/.01	-.00/.01	-.00/.00	.01/.01	.00/.01	-.00/.00	.01/.01	.00/.01	-.00/.02	-.01/.02	.01/.01	.01/.01	.01/.01	.00/.01	.02/.01	.02/.01	.02/.01	.01/.01	.02/.01	.01/.01
Founder/CEO's Gender (F = 0; M = 1)	-.08/.10	.04/.08	.04/.07	-.10/.09	.15/.07*	.06/.06	-.10/.10	-.04/.07	.25/.24	.30/.24	.37/.20	.45/.18*	.04/.20	.10/.19	.18/.19	.27/.17	-.08/.17	-.00/.15	.10/.15	.18/.13
Years of existence for the organization (operations)	-.07/.04	-.01/.03	-.02/.03	-.04/.04	-.02/.03	.00/.03	-.08/.04	-.03/.03	-.23/.10	-.19/.11	-.36/.09**	-.28/.08**	-.15/.09	-.10/.09	-.21/.08*	-.13/.08	-.17/.07*	-.10/.07	-.21/.07**	-.14/.06*
Number of core (full-time) team members in the organization	.01/.02	-.00/.01	.01/.01	.01/.01	-.00/.01	.01/.01	.02/.01	.02/.01	.15/.04**	.13/.04**	.08/.03**	.06/.03*	.06/.03*	.05/.03	.04/.03	.02/.03	.05/.02	.03/.02	.06/.02*	.04/.02*
Number of founders	.17/.06**	.12/.04**	-.02/.04	.17/.05**	.05/.04	-.01/.04	.18/.06**	.06/.04	-.25/.14	-.34/.15*	.01/.11	-.15/.11	-.10/.11	-.21/.12	.14/.11	-.03/.11	-.09/.10	-.24/.09*	-.03/.09	-.17/.08*
Organization Model – For Profit (NFP = 0; FP = 1; Hybrid = 0)	-.11/.09	-.01/.07	.01/.06	-.06/.09	.07/.07	.06/.05	-.04/.09	.04/.06	.09/.23	.11/.22	-.27/.19	-.23/.17	-.14/.19	-.11/.18	-.24/.18	-.20/.16	-.08/.16	-.04/.14	-.15/.14	-.12/.12
Organization Model – Hybrid (NFP = 0; FP = 0; Hybrid = 1)	.20/.16	.12/.12	.23/.10*	.18/.14	.31/.11**	.25/.09**	.13/.15	-.01/.11	-.36/.38	-.43/.38	-.38/.31	-.49/.29	-.09/.31	-.17/.30	-.20/.31	-.33/.27	.04/.26	-.07/.23	-.14/.24	-.24/.21
Organizational Pivot (Y = 0; N = 1)	-.07/.01	.14/.08	.11/.07	-.08/.09	.08/.07	.10/.06	-.08/.10	-.03/.07	-.11/.24	-.07/.24	-.30/.20	-.23/.18	-.15/.20	-.10/.19	-.28/.19	-.20/.17	-.14/.17	-.07/.15	-.20/.15	-.13/.13
Total Effect of COVID19	-.18/.09*	.01/.07	.00/.06	-.08/.08	.03/.07	.08/.05	-.19/.09*	-.06/.06	-.61/.21**	-.51/.22*	-.45/.18*	-.28/.17	-.30/.17	-.18/.17	-.32/.17	-.14/.16	-.09/.15	.07/.13	-.29/.13*	-.14/.12
Team Social Cause Passion		.79/.11**				-.01/.14														
Founder's Empowerment Behaviour			.64/.07**			.51/.11**														
Follower's Proactive Behaviour				.31/.08**		.19/.06**														
Founder-Member Mutual Trust					.68/.08**	.17/.11														
Shared Leadership								.71/.09**												
Team Learning Behaviour									.50/.31		.88/.24**	.62/.25*	.95/.23**	.83/.19**	.79/.18**					
F Test	3.66**	10.63**	16.25**	5.51**	14.35**	19.80**	3.87**	13.78**	3.79**	3.74**	3.91**	5.58**	1.30	1.88	2.12*	4.16**	1.46	3.56**	2.61*	5.15**
R ²	.36**	.64**	.73**	.48**	.71**	.82**	.37**	.70**	.36**	.39**	.37**	.49**	.16	.24	.24*	.41**	.18	.38**	.28*	.47**
ΔR ²		.29**	.38**	.13**	.35**	.47**		.33**		.03		.12**	.08*		.17**		.20**		.18**	

Note: The table presents unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors for each measure (presented as B/Std. Error).

*Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). (*p < .05)

Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). (p < .01)

8.6) Overview of the Findings

The findings from the correlation and the regression analyses generally supported my predictions (except *H3b* and partial support for *Hypothesis 1f*), while the results of the mediation analyses partially supported my predictions related to mediation effects in the path model (did not support *H4b*, *H4d* and *H4f*). Table 129 below provides an overview of the various research hypotheses outlined in this study, indicates whether or not they were supported by the findings and reports the results. Figure 14 presents the revised path model, indicating the results from the quantitative study. A detailed discussion of the research findings can be found in Chapter 9.

Table 129: Overview of the Results of the Quantitative Study

#	RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS STATEMENT	SUPPORT FOR HYPOTHESIS	RESULTS
H1a	Team Social Cause Passion (Congruence) is associated with Shared Leadership (SL) in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .79, p < .01$
H1b	Founder's Empowerment Behaviour is associated with Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .64, p < .01$
H1c	Followers' Proactive Behaviour is associated with Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .31, p < .01$
H1d	Founder-Member Mutual Trust is associated with Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .68, p < .01$
H1e	Team Social Cause Passion (TSCP), Founder's Empowerment Behaviour (FEB), Followers' Proactive Behaviour (FPB) and Founder-Member Mutual Trust (MT) are jointly associated with Shared Leadership (have a combined effect on SL) in startup social venture teams.	Partially Supported* <i>*The results for TSCP and MT were not significant</i>	(FEB) $b = .51, p < .01$ (FPB) $b = .19, p < .01$
H1f	Team Social Cause Passion (TSCP) is associated with Shared Leadership (SL) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating processes of Founder's Empowerment Behaviour (FEB), Followers' Proactive Behaviour (FPB) and Founder-Member Mutual Trust (MT).	Partially Supported* <i>*MT had a non-significant mediation effect</i>	FEB – (significant mediation effect = .54, 95% CI = .30 to .83) FPB – (significant mediation effect = .12, 95% CI = .02 to .29)
H2	Shared Leadership is associated with Continuous Team Learning Behaviour in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .71, p < .01$
H3a	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Total Venture Performance in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .79, p < .01$
H3b	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Financial Sustainability (Venture Performance Indicator 1) in startup social venture teams.	Not Supported	Results were not significant

<i>H3c</i>	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Team/Human Capital Development (Venture Performance Indicator 2) in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .88, p < .01$
<i>H3d</i>	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Hybrid Goal Achievement (Venture Performance Indicator 3) in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .62, p < .05$
<i>H3e</i>	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Organization Building (Venture Performance Indicator 4) in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .95, p < .01$
<i>H3f</i>	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour is associated with Social Impact Creation (Venture Performance Indicator 5) in startup social venture teams.	Supported	$b = .83, p < .01$
<i>H4a</i>	Shared Leadership is associated with Total Venture Performance in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.	Supported	Significant mediation effect = .53, 95% CI = .08 to 1.21
<i>H4b</i>	Shared Leadership is associated with Financial Sustainability (Venture Performance Indicator 1) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.	Not Supported	Non-significant mediation effect = .04, 95% CI = -.75 to 1.20
<i>H4c</i>	Shared Leadership is associated with Team/Human Capital Development (Venture Performance Indicator 2) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.	Supported	Significant mediation effect = .93, 95% CI = .42 to 1.59
<i>H4d</i>	Shared Leadership is associated with Hybrid Goal Achievement (Venture Performance Indicator 3) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.	Not Supported	Non-significant mediation effect = .51, 95% CI = -.12 to 1.32
<i>H4e</i>	Shared Leadership is associated with Organization Building (Venture Performance Indicator 4) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.	Supported	Significant mediation effect = .55, 95% CI = .02 to 1.29
<i>H4f</i>	Shared Leadership is associated with Social Impact Creation (Venture Performance Indicator 5) in startup social venture teams, via the mediating process of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour.	Not Supported	Non-significant mediation effect = .47, 95% CI = -.03 to 1.19




Figure 14: Revised Path Model illustrating the results from Study 2

Note – The solid black arrows indicate that the hypotheses were supported while the dotted black arrow indicates that the hypothesis was not supported. The solid green arrows/lines indicate that the hypotheses were partially supported. The solid blue arrow/line indicates that out of a set of sub-hypotheses, a few hypotheses were supported; while the dotted blue arrows indicate the sub-hypotheses that were not supported.

Chapter 9

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Building on the theoretical research gaps/needs highlighted in Chapters 1-3 and my primary research findings outlined in Chapters 4-8, this final chapter aims to tie the theory and empirical findings together, through a high level discussion about team-level leadership in startup social ventures. In Section 9.1 of this chapter, I will first summarise and discuss my research findings, across both the studies conducted. Next in Section 9.2, I will discuss the theoretical implications of my findings, in relation to the key research contributions that I will make through this doctoral dissertation (as outlined in Chapter 1). In Section 9.3, I will outline the practical implications of my research for founders and team members in startup social ventures, as well as, for social enterprise support organisations such as incubators, accelerators, and other key actors in the social innovation ecosystem. Next in Section 9.4, I will outline the limitations of my research studies, as well as, avenues for future research that build on the research findings of my thesis. Finally, in Section 9.5, I will present the conclusion of the doctoral dissertation.

9.1) Summary and Discussion of Research Findings

The analysis of the research findings from the qualitative study led to the discovery of an inductive three-path model that explained the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in successful startup social venture teams. The new multi-faceted and multi-level construct of Social Cause Passion (SCP) emerged as the main pre-antecedent factor that anchored and guided the entire inductive narrative. Founders and team members in successful social ventures typically displayed a high level of SCP Intensity at the individual level, which contributed to a high level of SCP Congruence at the dyadic and team level. SCP Congruence between founders and members in turn shaped strong dyadic leader-member relationships, comprising of reciprocal exchanges of Empowerment Behaviour (Empowering Leadership) by the Founders, Proactive Behaviour by the Followers and a strong sense of Founder-Member Mutual Trust. Such mutually reinforcing leader-member relationships led to the activation of the individual leadership potential of the followers, and the presence of multiple strong founder-member relationships in the team, in turn contributed to the activation of the collective leadership potential of the group as a whole. As a result of the antecedent factors outlined above, the activated collective leadership potential in turn translated into the emergence of Shared Leadership (SL) within startup social venture teams. SL models in successful teams featured an egalitarian and collaborative work culture (shared principles), alongside shared team protocols about leadership processes such as Task Allocation, Decision Making, Goal Setting and Planning, and Practicing Accountability with the ventures. The antecedents and characteristics of team-level leadership outlined above formed the initial convergent part of the inductive theoretical model, and building on the strong foundation of Shared Leadership, the model diverged into three distinct paths, related to SL-driven team processes and associated team or venture-level outcomes.

The first path of the three-path model was related to the **Purpose** of the startup social ventures. In this path, I observed that SL contributed to the emergence to SCP Embeddedness in successful startup social ventures, via the team process of Regular

Mission Reinforcement. This team process operated through the practice of Regular Team Communication about the impact-centric organizational vision and Regular Team Exposure to the Field Impact created by the venture; and as a result of these purpose-centric mechanisms, the passion for the social cause of the enterprise got deeply embedded and institutionalised into the culture and psyche of the team as a whole. SCP Embeddedness in turn led to two important purpose-focused outcomes at the team and venture level. The first outcome that I observed was SCP Resilience at the individual, team and organizational level, and this outcome enabled founders, members, teams and ventures as a whole to persist in the face of adversity, for the greater good of the social venture. The second outcome I observed was SCP Spillover at the individual and team level, and this novel purpose-centric outcome mechanism represented the spillover effect experienced by individuals and teams as a whole, in terms of practicing the impact principles of the venture, acquiring and sharing knowledge about the social cause and championing the social vision of the venture (by influencing others), outside the immediate work context. Hence, as described above, the first purpose-centric path in the inductive model sheds light on the team-level process and outcomes that shaped the emergence of resilient and passionate individuals and teams that championed and fought for the social cause of the ventures, inside and outside the work context.

The second path in the three-path model was connected to the **Performance** of the startup social ventures. In this path, I found that SL contributed to the emergence of Continuous Team Learning Behaviour in successful startup social enterprise teams. This team process operated through the regular practice of team-level learning mechanisms such as Knowledge Exchange, Feedback Seeking, Experiential Learning, Learning from Success, and Learning from Failure. As a result of these performance-driven learning mechanisms, the process and behaviour of continuous team learning became embedded and institutionalised into the structures, systems, psyche and culture of the ventures as a whole. Continuous Team Learning Behaviour shaped the emergence of alert, mindful, proactive, adaptable and goal-driven teams, which in turn favourably contributed to the important organizational level outcome of Social Venture Performance. As hybrid organizations in the startup stage, I observed that early stage social enterprises typically measured and worked to achieve performance outcomes related to five key performance categories – namely, Social Impact Creation, Financial Sustainability, Hybrid Goal Achievement, Team/Human Capital Management and Development, and Organization Building. The process of Continuous Team Learning appeared to strengthen the ability of the venture teams to achieve some or all of these five performance indicators, and in turn, favourably contributed to the Total Venture Performance of successful startup social enterprises. Hence, as discussed above, the second performance-driven path in the inductive model sheds light on the team-level processes and outcomes that shaped the creation of successful social ventures, that survived, thrived and effectively achieved hybrid organizational goals.

The third and final path in the inductive three-path model was connected to the **People** who worked in the startup social venture teams. In this path, I found that SL contributed to the emergence of Supportive Group-Level Team Member Exchange (TMX) in successful startup social ventures. This team process operated through the mechanisms of Team Psychological Safety, Supportive Work Interactions ('Chipping-In' approach) and Open Team Communication; and as a result of these people-centric mechanisms, the regular practice of supportive and safe exchanges between members in the team became

embedded and institutionalised into the processes, psyche and culture of the startup social ventures. Supportive Group-Level TMX shaped the emergence of a respectful, mindful, non-judgemental and safe team environment, space and culture in successful social enterprises, which in turn positively contributed to the Mental Well Being (MWB) of the founders, members and the team as a whole. Individuals working in safe and supportive teams experienced Positive Well Being Symptoms, and the teams overall experienced Hedonic MWB and Eudaimonic MWB, which in turn led to a high level of individual and collective job satisfaction and a positive group affective tone in such successful social ventures. Hence, as described above, the third people-centric path in the inductive model sheds light on the team-level processes and outcomes that shaped the emergence of supportive, respectful and safe social venture teams, where members were happy, content, fulfilled and experienced positive mental well being.

Apart from the constructs and outcomes outlined in these three paths, I also discovered two additional processes that appeared to influence the efficacy of the inductive three-path model. First, I found that the practice of Paradoxical Leadership (PL) by the founders and leaders in successful social ventures led to the optimal Balance between Control and Stretch Mechanisms in the teams, and this leadership process appeared to moderate the positive linkages between the various constructs and outcomes in the inductive three-path model. In particular, I observed that the practice of PL by founders and leaders, alongside the practice of SL by the team as a whole, appeared to strengthen the positive effects of SL on team-level processes and outcomes in successful startup social ventures. Second, I found the presence of a Common Team Wavelength in successful social ventures teams and this team-level mechanism was operationalised through the practice of Implicit and Explicit Shared Team Understanding about team processes, goals, values and culture. This team process appeared to moderate the positive relationships between the various constructs and outcomes in the three-path narrative and was particularly useful from the perspective of collective sensemaking and the creation of shared team protocols and principles, as part of the SL model in successful social ventures.

Thus, as described above, the novel and inductive three-path model of **Purpose, Performance and People** (three P mechanisms) that was discovered as part of the qualitative study provides a rich and unique explanation about the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social venture teams. Finally, it must be noted that while the constructs in this inductive model have been divided into three distinct paths; in reality, the paths are often quite interconnected and mutually reinforce each other, to collectively shape the team-level processes and outcomes of successful startup social ventures.

Building on the qualitative research findings and theory generated in Study 1, I then proceeded to test the 'Performance' path of the three-path model in Study 2. In the quantitative study, I focused on the antecedents (TSCP, Founder Empowerment Behaviour, Follower Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Mutual Trust) and characteristics of team-level leadership (SL) in startup social venture teams and specifically zoomed in on the second divergent path from SL, related to Continuous Team Learning and Social Venture Performance. The findings of the quantitative study largely supported my research hypotheses for Path 2 of the inductive model. However some hypotheses were partially supported, while a few others were not supported, and the explanation for these results have

been discussed below.

First, with regards to *Hypothesis 1e* (partially supported), I found that when combined with Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Founder-Member Mutual Trust, Team Social Cause Passion (Congruence) did not positively predict Shared Leadership (as part of a combined effect) in successful social venture teams (even though individually, it did predict SL positively). The non-significant direct association of TSCP with SL (as part of a combined effect) can be explained by the fact that in *Hypothesis 1f*, TSCP is actually mediated by Founder's Empowerment Behaviour and Followers' Proactive Behaviour, with the two mediator variables having a significant mediation effect on SL. Hence, this result aligns with my findings in the qualitative study, where TSCP was in fact the main pre-antecedent in the inductive narrative, but it was then mediated by a strong dyadic relationship between empowering leaders and proactive followers, in order to lead to the emergence of SL in startup social venture teams.

Second, similar to the result outlined above with regards to *Hypothesis 1e*, I found that when combined with Founder's Empowerment Behaviour, Followers' Proactive Behaviour and Team Social Cause Passion (TSCP), Founder-Member Mutual Trust (MT) did not positively predict Shared Leadership (as part of a combined effect) in successful social venture teams (even though individually, it did predict SL positively). Further in *Hypothesis 1f* (partially supported), the results showed that when combined Founder's Empowerment Behaviour and Followers' Proactive Behaviour, Founder-Member Mutual Trust did not have a significant mediation effect on Shared Leadership in startup social venture teams. However, MT was strongly correlated to SL and it also positively predicted SL independently. It could be possible that if there is a high degree of SCP Congruence between founders and members, then there is already a strong sense of implicit mutual trust between both of them; and this leads to a strong dyadic leadership featuring Founder Empowerment Behaviour and Follower Proactive Behaviour, which in turn positively predicts and has a significant mediation effect on SL. Hence, explicit MT is perhaps less important/relevant in predicting SL, and could simply be considered an implicit facet of SCP Congruence. While this post hoc explanation could be plausible, it needs to be further tested. Further, it must be noted that out of the 70 teams in the sample for the quantitative study, 50 teams (a majority) had male founders/CEOs (71.42%) and the results of the correlation analysis (Table 127) showed that Founder-Member Mutual Trust had a strong negative association with the Founder/CEO's Gender ($b = -.34$, $p < .01$). Hence, it is possible that the results of MT's mediation effect on SL may have been different if there was a more even spread of male and female founders in the sample, and perhaps, MT as a construct may be operating differently in startup social venture teams that are led by female founders (as compared to teams led by male founders). Once again, this post hoc explanation must be tested further.

Third, with regards to *Hypotheses 3b* and *4b* (both not supported), I found that Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB) did not predict Financial Sustainability (Venture Performance Indicator 1), and neither did it have a significant mediation effect on that sub-variable of social venture performance. However, the results of the correlation analysis showed that Financial Sustainability had a strong positive association with Follower's Proactive Behaviour ($b = .32$, $p < .01$), as well as, a significant positive association with TSCP ($b = .24$, $p < .05$). It is possible that TSCP-driven Proactive Behaviour by a few individual followers, alongside Strategic Leadership (not part of the inductive model) by

founders and the core leadership team, might be more relevant in predicting the specific strategic performance indicator of Financial Sustainability (as compared to SL and/or CTLB). However, this post hoc explanation must be tested further.

Finally, I found that the hypotheses related to Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB) were partially supported. CTLB positively predicted Total Venture Performance and four out of the five performance sub-variables – Team/Human Capital Development, Hybrid Goal Achievement, Organization Building and Social Impact Creation (but did not predict Financial Sustainability – *H3b*). Further, CTLB had a significant mediation effect on Total Venture Performance and two out of the five performance sub-variables – Team/Human Capital Development and Organization Building. However, CTLB did not have a significant mediation effect on Financial Sustainability (*H4b*), Hybrid Goal Achievement (*H4d*) and Social Impact Creation (*H4f*) – even though it did positively predict the latter two performance sub-variables in startup social venture teams. It is possible that SL mediated by CTLB might be most effective at predicting the performance indicators of Team/Human Capital Management and Organization Building, which can be considered ‘organizational support’ indicators that aid ventures in achieving the other ‘core strategic’ performance indicators of Financial Sustainability, Hybrid Goal Achievement and Social Impact Creation. Team/Human Capital Management and Organization Building are also ‘internal’ facing organizational indicators that are easier to achieve and measure in the short term, and in reality, ventures often need to achieve these proximal organizational outcomes first, in order to be able to achieve the more distal outcomes related to financial, social (impact) and hybrid indicators of venture performance. In other words, startup social venture teams need to first have a solid foundation with a strong and motivated team, alongside strong and structured organizational processes, in order to be able to achieve the strategic outcomes related to the financial, social and hybrid goals of the ventures. It is also possible that the proximal performance indicators of Team/Human Capital Management and Organization Building might also mediate the positive effects of CTLB on the distal performance indicators of Financial Sustainability, Hybrid Goal Achievement and Social Impact Creation. Further, it must be noted that the mean organizational age of the ventures in the sample was 2.49 years ($SD = 1.17$), which is relatively young. Given that startup social enterprises spend a significant amount of time of piloting, testing (their solutions), hiring team members and building up their organizations; in reality, it often takes a lot of time for these organizations to see tangible results/outcomes with regards to Financial Sustainability, Hybrid Goal Achievement and Social Impact Creation. Hence, if the mean organizational age of the startups in the sample would have been a bit higher (startups that have existed for longer), then perhaps the results of CTLB’s mediation effect on these sub-variables of performance might have been different. However, all the post hoc explanations outlined above must be tested further. Finally, it must be noted that overall, CTLB did positively predict and have a significant mediation effect on Total Venture Performance, which supports my overall predictions outlined in the inductive path model.

Hence, overall, the research findings from Study 1 led to the emergence of an inductive three-path model (Purpose, Performance, People); and Study 2 tested and proved the validity of the Performance path (Path 2) of the model (the majority of the research hypotheses were supported). Study 2 also shed light on some important factors to be considered (hypotheses that were partially supported or not supported) that will help me to further clarify, test and refine the three-path model related to the antecedents, characteristics

and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social venture teams.

9.2) Theoretical Implications and Research Contributions

In this section, I will discuss the theoretical implications of my research findings and I will also showcase how these findings contribute to academic literature in the domains of Social Entrepreneurship Development, Leadership Development and Team Development. Overall, by looking beyond the social entrepreneur and shifting the focus onto the startup social venture team (Short et al., 2009), the research findings of this dissertation advance theories of social entrepreneurship by making important and required contributions to the meso-level (team/organizational level) of research exploration in SE literature (Saebi et al., 2019) – specifically, by outlining the unique antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social ventures (through the integration of relevant constructs from the leadership development, team development and SE domains).

Social Entrepreneurship Development

First and foremost, the research findings from the doctoral dissertation contribute to the academic field of Social Entrepreneurship Development literature. While new venture teams in commercial startup firms have been frequently studied in the domain of entrepreneurship literature, the topic of startup social enterprise teams has been greatly under-researched, especially from the lens of leadership and team development (Beckman et al., 2007; Beckman & Burton, 2008; Beckman & Burton, 2011; Glaser et al., 2015). The research findings of my thesis address this important research gap in a number of novel ways.

First, a major contribution of this thesis is the discovery of the multi-faceted concept of **Social Cause Passion (SCP)**. This new construct differs from the existing concepts of passion for a cause (Rip et al., 2012; St-Louis et al., 2016), pro-social motivation (Grant, 2008) and team entrepreneurial passion (Cardon et al., 2017), due to its monofocal nature and focused passion, at the individual, dyadic, team and venture level, for the specific social cause of the startup social venture. This multi-pronged and multi-level construct is unique to impact organizations and the social enterprise context and the five sub-dimensions of SCP – Intensity, Congruence, Embeddedness, Resilience and Spillover – contribute to the social entrepreneurship literature by shedding light on the unique purpose-driven journey and life cycle that founders, members and teams go through in social enterprises – starting from the motivation behind founding/joining (and continuing to work in) a social enterprise (SCP Intensity), to relationship and trust building at the dyadic and team level (SCP Congruence), to collective sensemaking and leadership/team process development (SCP Embeddedness), to displaying individual, collective and organizational persistence for goal achievement (SCP Resilience), to finally creating impact themselves (as ‘champions’ of change) in their own personal/professional communities, outside of their work context (SCP Spillover). The novel construct of SCP also clearly distinguishes startup social venture teams from commercial new venture teams, because commercial startup teams do not display a monofocal passion for a specific social cause and are motivated by entrepreneurial efforts in general and perhaps the firm’s commercial product offering in particular. Hence, this unique characteristic of startup social venture teams (SCP) can help researchers to understand the motivations, dynamics, protocols, principles, processes and outcomes of such impact organizations in a

more contextual and nuanced way.

Second, a majority of extant research in the social enterprise domain has focused on the traits of social entrepreneurs ('great person' leadership theories) and the hybrid nature of social ventures (organizational theory), and the dissertation findings directly respond to recent calls by scholars in the social entrepreneurship field demanding greater academic attention for organizational and team related factors that explain the formation, evolution and performance of startup social ventures. Specifically, a review of social entrepreneurship literature has highlighted the need to study organizational themes such as organizational activities, workforce composition, organization design and organizational culture (Battilana and Lee, 2014), as well as, leadership/team-centric themes such as participative human resource management practices and factors related to team maintenance, development and retention (Gupta et al., 2020; Dacin et al., 2010) – in order to understand the critical role of these factors in influencing the life cycles, trajectories and outcomes of startup social ventures. The dissertation findings fill these research gaps and advance the literature in this domain by presenting a novel and inductive three-path model that sheds light on the trajectories of successful startup social enterprise teams, through the exploration of important themes such as Team Social Cause Passion, Shared Leadership, and Team/Leadership Processes and Outcomes related to the Purpose, Performance and People of early stage social ventures. The thesis first highlights the initial convergent path of successful startup social ventures comprising of SCP Congruence, strong dyadic relationships between Empowering Leaders and Proactive Followers and the emergent phenomenon of Shared Leadership (SL) in the team. Following that, it proceeds to shed light on three divergent paths from SL, leading to nuanced insights about important team processes and associated team/venture-level outcomes that can enable startup social venture teams to build mindful and impactful organizations that are **Purpose-driven, Performance-oriented** and **People-centric** in nature. The complexity, depth and breadth of the **three-path model** is indeed an important contribution of this dissertation, because it combines key themes and constructs from different bodies of literature, to present a rich inductive narrative about the leadership, team and organizational factors that shape the dynamic and purposeful journeys of successful startup social ventures.

Third, the doctoral dissertation makes an important contribution to the social enterprise domain through the research findings related to **Social Venture Outcomes and Performance**. Researchers have faced several challenges when trying to define how hybrid organizations measure financial as well as social outcomes, and there is a lack of consensus among scholars about how to assess the performance of social ventures in a meaningful way (Battilana and Lee, 2014). Keeping in mind that social ventures vary greatly across different impact sectors and organizational forms, the research findings in this thesis define Social Venture Performance in a model agnostic (generalizable across for-profit, non-profit and hybrid social enterprise models) and sector agnostic (generalizable across all impact sectors) way, by categorizing Total Venture Performance into five sub-categories of venture outcomes – Social Impact Creation (related specifically to social goals), Financial Sustainability (related specifically to financial goals), Hybrid Goal Achievement (related to indicators that contribute to both social and financial goals), Team/Human Capital Development (related to team/human capital outcomes) and Organization Building (related to indicators that contribute to overall organizational/process development). These five categories of venture performance are important specifically for social enterprises in the

startup stage because they cover all the important indicators that early stage social ventures need to consider and measure in order to be successful in the long run. The clarification of these indicators of Social Venture Performance also clearly distinguishes the research findings from extant measures of Venture Performance, related to commercial new venture teams, as well as, larger commercial organizations. Apart from the five sub-categories of Social Venture Performance, the research findings also highlight two additional team-level outcomes that can be linked to social ventures. The first team-level outcome is the novel construct of SCP Spillover that was discovered as part of the inductive model. This concept contributes to the literature by showcasing that successful social enterprises can have an unexpected and highly desirable outcome of the team members functioning as the 'champions' of the social cause, by acting on the principles/values of the social venture in their daily personal lives, as well as, by influencing their personal and professional communities (outside the work context) to also make a social change – thus, indirectly contributing to the social goals of the venture. The second team-level outcome that was discovered as part of the inductive model is Team Mental Well Being (MWB). This construct highlights that by working in successful social venture teams, members in the organization display positive MWB symptoms at the individual and group level and experience high levels of Job Satisfaction and Eudaimonic MWB – which in turn, contributes to the team/human capital development goals (such as team retention of the venture). Hence, the dissertation findings highlight these novel team-level indicators that should also be a part of the theory related to Social Venture Performance and Outcomes. Further, extant studies about Social Venture Performance have often adopted the 'Triple Bottom Line' (People, Planet, Profit) approach to understanding and measuring social enterprise performance (Hall, 2011). This dissertation contributes to the literature and extends that line of thought, by proposing the updated Purpose-Performance-People approach to designing and running startup social enterprises and measuring social venture performance. This holistic approach is more inclusive and model-agnostic in nature, because it includes Performance instead of profit (thus, including non-profit social ventures), and it also prioritises the overall Purpose of the organization (including impact for beneficiaries and contributing to the planet), as well as, the wellbeing and development of the People who are a part of the ventures. Finally, the dissertation not only clarifies the various important outcome categories for social enterprises, but also sheds light on the important leadership and team processes that contribute to the emergence and achievement of these important team and venture-level outcomes of startup social ventures.

Fourth, the doctoral dissertation also makes some overall contextual and methodological contributions to social entrepreneurship and management literature. A recent review of social entrepreneurship literature has highlighted the need for more contextual research (in terms of country of origin or enterprise-level factors) in this domain, and has also called for more mixed-methods studies about social enterprises that use both qualitative and quantitative techniques, including qualitative methods such as thematic coding analysis and inductive content analysis (Gupta et al., 2020). This thesis directly responds to these research needs by presenting research findings that are context-specific to India, from the contextual lens of team leadership development in startup social ventures, and also uses a mixed-methods approach for theory generation and testing – including a grounded theory and inductive analysis approach in the qualitative study, and a multi-source field-based survey in the quantitative study. Finally, the doctoral dissertation also responds to the repeated calls from top management journals (like Academy of Management Journal – AMJ)

over the past two decades, for more management studies to be focused on social issues and to produce business research with the potential to create social impact in the real world (Tihanyi, 2020; George, 2016; Ireland et al., 2005). My doctoral dissertation makes a critical and important contribution to the field of management research by highlighting the important leadership and team factors required to build startup social ventures that are Purpose-driven, Performance-oriented and People-centric in nature.

Leadership Development

The second academic field to which the doctoral dissertation contributes is the domain of Leadership Development literature. An extensive review of leadership development literature has brought forward the research need to extend the body of work around team-centric leadership development (Lord et al., 2017) and to also examine support mechanisms that influence/nurture leadership development, particularly at the level of groups/teams (Day and Dragoni, 2015). The findings in my thesis address these research needs in several ways, through the unique lens of startup social venture teams.

First and foremost, the doctoral dissertation contributes to the body of literature on **Shared Leadership (SL)**. While a significant amount of research has already been conducted about SL in the leadership domain, the topic is still considered under-researched and scholars have highlighted the need to conduct more detailed and nuanced research about the actual formal and informal processes and structures within different types of organizations that contribute to team-centric leadership development (particularly shared leadership) in specific contexts (Lord et al., 2017; Day & Dragoni, 2015). The research findings in this thesis directly address this important research need. The results from the qualitative study first highlight that most successful startup social venture teams adopt a Shared Leadership approach as the primary leadership approach in the team, and the quantitative study further tests and validates this claim. The inductive model then sheds lights on the various formal and informal processual factors that manifest in startup social venture teams as part of the SL model and clarifies the practical way in SL operates in new social venture teams – through an egalitarian and collaborative work culture (shared principles) and shared team protocols about leadership processes such as task division, decision making, goal setting and planning, and practicing accountability and ownership within the ventures. The research findings highlight that the SL approach seen across startup social ventures are context-specific, are co-created and mutually agreed upon by members in the team, and are inclusive and adaptable in nature, in order to incorporate the views and opinions of newer members who join the team at a later stage. Such findings also help to distinguish the SL models adopted in startup social venture teams from those that may be seen among work units in larger commercial organisations. This is because the aspects of co-creation of the SL approach from the time of inception and the adaptable nature of SL protocols are unique to dynamic startup context – given that new venture teams play a critical role in shaping the team structure and culture, but also face a lot of member entry and exits in the team growth stage (as opposed to work units with relatively steady team composition and stable team dynamics in larger organisations).

Researchers have also highlighted the need to explore “how team members’ leadership capabilities combine to produce a collective level of leadership capacity” (Day & Dragoni, 2015, pg. 149), as well as, the need to study the team and contextual factors that contribute

to the emergence and effectiveness of shared leadership, especially in the presence of an existing formal leader (Kozlowski et al., 2016; Day & Dragoni, 2015). Hence, the second key contribution of the doctoral dissertation to the leadership domain is to directly address these important research gaps by clarifying the specific role of leaders and followers in the emergence, development and effectiveness of SL in startup social ventures. The research findings explain how Empowering Leadership (the presence of the formal leader/founder) and Followers' Proactive Behaviour contribute to the emergence of SL and collective leadership capacity in startup social venture teams. The results from the qualitative and quantitative studies confirm the fact that Empowering Leadership (EL) by the founder acts as an important antecedent to SL, in startup social venture teams; and by **clarifying the critical relationship between EL and SL**, the doctoral dissertation makes a significant contribution to the domain of team-centric leadership literature. However, the research findings highlight EL is not the only antecedent to SL in startup social enterprises, and that a high level of Team Social Cause Passion (Congruence), mediated by the Founder's Empowerment Behaviour and Follower's Proactive Behaviour, collectively contribute to the emergence of SL in successful social venture teams. Building on the solid foundation of SCP Congruence at the dyadic level, founders and members engage in strong dyadic relationships, through which empowering leaders mentor and groom their team members to take up leadership roles (formally/informally invite them to take up leadership responsibility) and proactive followers in turn mirror and role model the leadership actions of the founders and display active ownership for their work responsibilities. This dyadic reciprocal exchange of displaying and earning trust (by founders and followers respectively), as well as, claiming and granting leadership responsibility (by followers and founders respectively) leads to the activation of the individual leadership potential of the proactive team members. The presence of multiple such strong dyadic relationships along with a high level of SCP Congruence in the team, results in the activation of the collective leadership potential of the group as a whole (the mirroring of leadership behaviours by followers also causes a ripple effect of collective leadership in the organization) – which in turn, leads to the emergence of SL in startup social ventures.

Apart from shedding light on the antecedents of SL in early stage social enterprises, the doctoral dissertation also highlights the role of **Paradoxical Leadership** (practiced by founders, second line team leaders or the core leadership team – alongside team-level leadership) in determining the effectiveness of SL in the ventures. The inductive study found that founders and leaders in successful social ventures were able to effectively strike an optimal balance between control/discipline and stretch mechanisms in the team, by practicing Paradoxical Leadership (alongside SL), and this in turn, appeared to moderate, strengthen and sustain the positive effects of SL in startup social ventures. While the importance of paradoxical leadership for hybrid organizations (in terms of dual goal achievement) has already been highlighted in extant literature (Smith and Besharov, 2019), the doctoral dissertation makes an important contribution by highlighting that the presence of Paradoxical Leadership (practiced by founders and leaders), alongside Shared Leadership (practiced by teams) plays an important role in contributing to the effectiveness of SL in startup social ventures. Hence, as outlined above, the research findings in this thesis make significant contributions to the field of leadership development, by shedding light on the antecedents and characteristics of SL, and clarifies the important and distinct roles of founders and followers in the emergence and effectiveness of SL in startup social ventures.

The dissertation also highlights the team and venture-level outcomes of SL in early stage social enterprises, which will be explained in the next section about Team-centric literature.

Finally, the research findings also make important contextual and conceptual contributions to the domain of leadership development literature. Recent reviews of leadership development literature have shown how “the leadership construct has developed from a static focus on stable individual attributes and behavioural styles to a more contextualized, dynamic, multi-level, multi-person construct that guides emerging roles and identities, and in the process affects many organizational outcomes” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 129) and scholars have highlighted that future leadership research must focus on the multi-process and multi-level nature of leadership in order to examine the multiple complex paths and trajectories of leadership within teams and organizations (Fischer et al., 2017). The research findings in this thesis directly address these important research needs by presenting an **inductive, multi-level and multi-process model that showcases three distinct paths from SL**, and highlights how the antecedents and characteristics of SL contribute to the emergence of important team processes and team/venture level outcomes in startup social ventures. Scholars have also called for further research to be conducted about how leadership manifests itself in different contexts, and the unique context-specific findings must be clearly articulated (Day & Dragoni, 2015). There is also an increasing need for conducting multidisciplinary research and generating leadership insights from other fields (Lord et al., 2017). “..Demographic trends suggest that organizations in future will be more multicultural, more global, and multi-focused – focused not just on the bottom line in terms of profits, but also on social and sustainability issues..” and future leadership research will “..need to adopt an integrated approach that captures such constructs in explaining how leaders catalyze complex goals, change, and long-term visions” (Lord et al., 2016, pg. 130). Hence, there is an increasing need for synergies between different theories and approaches (Kozlowski et al., 2016), and a growing focus on context-specific leadership research, particularly with reference to innovative and contemporary organizational structures and social impact focused organizations. (Lord et al., 2016; Lord et al., 2017). Hence, the research findings of the doctoral dissertation are very much aligned to this new direction of leadership research and makes valuable contributions to the emerging landscape of leadership development literature. By incorporating findings from various different constructs and contexts, the thesis adopts an integrated multi-disciplinary approach and links various important concepts in the domains of leadership development, social enterprise development and team development. Hence, in turn, the doctoral dissertation generates valuable multifaceted insights about antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership, in the unique context of startup social enterprises in India.

Team Development

The third academic domain to which the doctoral dissertation contributes is the field of Team Development and Team-centric literature. A recent review of literature about work teams called for greater research attention on how member and team (composition, structure and task) characteristics contribute to the emergence and development of important team processes, especially in the context of contemporary organisations (Mathieu et al., 2017). Further, a review of team-centric literature also highlighted the need to study organizational processes and leadership constructs linked to team effectiveness and important team outcomes, explicitly at the team/group level (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013; Hiller et al., 2011). The

research findings of my doctoral dissertation address these critical research gaps by contributing to the domain of Team-centric literature in a number of ways, from the unique perspective of startup social venture teams in India.

First, the dissertation contributes to the team-centric literature about **Relational Models and Group Dynamics**. In particular, the research findings highlight the important role that the process of Collective Sensemaking plays in shaping the culture, team structure, group dynamics, team processes and team/venture outcomes of startup social venture teams. While extant research about Sensemaking does highlight the importance of this process in developing a group's shared cognitive script about the organizational context (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Wellman, 2017), the research findings of the thesis extend the theory by clarifying how collective sensemaking in the form of shared group principles and protocols shape the emergence, development and effectiveness of Shared Leadership and Collective Team Processes in early stage social ventures, and showcases that this team process is extremely important in the startup context. Successful startup social venture teams simultaneously engage in collective sensemaking across three different paths and lenses – namely purpose-driven sensemaking, performance-oriented sensemaking and people-centric sensemaking; and this multi-layered and multi-faceted approach to collective sensemaking plays a critical role in shaping the SL approach, mediating team processes (across the three paths of the inductive model) and team/venture-level outcomes in such organizations. The construct of sensemaking is also closely linked to relational model theory because initial interactions and shared cognitive scripts between team members ultimately shape the group relational model approach that the team converges upon (Wellman, 2017). While extant research has shown that most teams use either the authority ranking or communal sharing relational model (as compared to the equality matching or market pricing relational model) to shape leadership and team processes, the findings of the doctoral dissertation show that successful startup social venture teams do in fact adopt an equality matching model (where team members are viewed as distinct contributors yet equal partners) alongside a communal sharing model (centered around consensus and unity in the team) (Fiske, 1991; Wellman, 2017); and the unique combination of these two approaches shape the emergence, development and effectiveness of SL and team processes in such ventures. Hence, through the rich and nuanced insights of the inductive three-path model, the thesis clarifies the role of multi-layered collective sensemaking in shaping the group relational models (and in turn, leadership and team processes) in successful startup social venture teams.

Second, the doctoral dissertation contributes to the literature about **Team Life Cycles**. A review of team-centric literature has highlighted the need to conduct more detailed research about the different stages of a team's life cycle (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013) and this thesis specifically addresses research gaps about the life cycle phases of 'Team Effectiveness, Processes and Enhancements' and 'Team Leadership and Motivation' (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). Scholars have called for greater research attention for the underlying team-level processes and contextual factors that influence team leadership and team effectiveness and have highlighted the need for more empirical studies to be conducted on these topics (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). Further, there is also a great need to study the role of team learning (as separate from individual learning) in determining the collective efficacy of the team (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). The findings of this dissertation directly address all of these important research gaps. The inductive three-path model highlights that Shared Leadership

(driven by SCP Congruence and EL-based dyadic relationships) leads to the emergence of three distinct and important team processes – Mission Reinforcement (SCP Embeddedness), Continuous Team Learning Behaviour and Supportive Group-Level TMX – in startup social ventures; and these mediating team processes are in turn linked to important team and venture-level outcomes. Mission Reinforcement (SCP Embeddedness) in particular is an important team process that is unique to startup social ventures (and will not be found in commercial new venture teams) and the discovery of this purpose-driven team process is an important contextual contribution of the research findings. Study 2 in this thesis also specifically zooms in on the group-level process of team learning and presents important findings about the antecedents (SL), characteristics (continuous practice of knowledge exchange, feedback seeking, experiential learning and learning from success and failure) and outcomes (social venture performance) of continuous team learning behaviour in startup social ventures. The results of the quantitative study confirm the hypothesis that SL predicts Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (CTLB) in early stage social enterprises, and also highlights that while CTLB has a significant mediation effect on Total Social Venture Performance, it is more effective in predicting and shaping the proximal outcomes of Team/Human Capital Development and Organization Building (as compared to the more distal outcomes of Financial Sustainability, Social Impact Creation and Hybrid Goal Achievement), in the early startup stage of such organizations. Finally, the discovery of the five dimensions of SCP – Intensity, Congruence, Embeddedness, Resilience and Spillover – as part of the inductive model, presents an overall novel perspective about team life cycles in the unique context of startup social ventures. Hence, through these empirical results, the doctoral dissertation makes important contributions to the literature about team life cycles and team processes (in particular, team learning), in the context of startup social ventures.

Third, the doctoral dissertation contributes to the literature about the **Team Level Outcomes** of leadership and team processes in work teams (from the specific lens of startup social ventures). Scholars have highlighted the need to conduct an integrated research investigation about the multi-faceted and multi-level outcomes of team and leadership processes in work teams, with a special focus on the emotions, attitudes, motivations and performance levels of members at a group level (Fischer et al., 2017; Hiller et al., 2011). The research findings of this thesis directly respond to these important research needs. While there are a number of studies on team effectiveness and performance, this dissertation clarifies the role of SL, mediated by Continuous Team Learning Behaviour, in contributing to the achievement of important team and venture-level performance outcomes. However, the main contribution (to the domain of team-centric literature) of the inductive model is to highlight how SL, mediated by different team processes, leads to other important team-level outcomes (apart from performance) – namely **Team Mental Well-Being (MWB)**, SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover at the team level. While extant research about MWB in the entrepreneurship domain has focused mainly on the well-being of founders at the individual level, scholars have called for greater research attention for the MWB of followers in startup ventures (Wiklund et al., 2019). Further, researchers have highlighted that MWB is often examined as an antecedent to firm and team performance, and there is need to study MWB as an important dependent variable and team outcome itself (Ryff, 2019; Wiklund et al., 2019). Hence, the findings of the dissertation make a significant contribution to the literature in this domain, by showcasing how SL mediated by Supportive Group-Level TMX (comprising of Team Psychological Safety, Supportive Work Interactions/Chipping-in approach and Open Team Communication) contributes to Team MWB (as a

dependent/outcome variable) in successful startup social ventures; and sheds light on how members in such teams experience and display positive MWB symptoms, in the form of positive group affective tone, job satisfaction, hedonic MWB and eudaimonic MWB linked to the larger social purpose of the venture. The outcome of Team MWB is also linked to the other important team-level outcomes observed in the inductive model – namely SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover. Eudaimonic MWB and group affective tone have been linked to outcomes of team persistence/resilience (Stephan, 2018; Bindl et al., 2012); and thus, even though it is not directly outlined in the three-path model, the positive MWB symptoms experienced by the team members can also be used explain the outcomes of individual and collective SCP Resilience, as observed in successful startup social ventures. SCP Resilience helps team members to stay motivated and engaged in the face of adversity and can positively influence team member retention and overall firm performance (as observed in the qualitative study). Finally, the novel outcome of **SCP Spillover** that was discovered as part of the inductive model (linked to the sense of fulfilment experienced through eudaimonic MWB) highlights a unique team-level outcome of purpose-driven SL in startup social ventures, wherein team members championed the cause of the organization, in their personal lives (while also influencing others around them), outside their immediate work context. Hence, the discovery of the new outcome construct of SCP Spillover (at the team level) is an important contribution of this thesis to the domains of social entrepreneurship and team development literature.

Finally, the research findings also make important methodological contributions to the field of team-centric literature. A recent review of studies about work teams (in JAP) has highlighted the need to advance the research about team work through new theory generation (Mathieu et al., 2017, and scholars have called for more studies to use a grounded theory approach to build theory (Edmondson & McManus, 2007), accompanied by quantitative and mixed-methods studies to test the inductive theories generated (Mathieu et al., 2017). The doctoral dissertation directly addresses these research needs through an inductive and mixed-methods research design – by first, using a grounded theory approach to generate theory (in the qualitative study) about an inductive three-path model explaining the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social ventures; and second, by testing a critical part of the model (Path 2 from SL related to team learning and social venture performance) through the survey in the quantitative study.

In sum, as outlined above in Section 9.2, the research findings of the doctoral dissertation make important conceptual, contextual and methodological contributions to the academic domains of social entrepreneurship development, leadership development and team development literature – by applying a team-level leadership lens to examine the development trajectories of startup social ventures. While several important theoretical implications have been discussed above, the most important cross-domain findings that contribute to a deeper and nuanced understanding of SE and trajectories of early stage social enterprises at the meso-level (team/organizational level) of analysis (Saebi et al., 2019) are – the role of Team Social Cause Passion and Shared Leadership (alongside Paradoxical Leadership) in shaping important team-level processes; in turn predicting Social Venture Performance (and other significant team outcomes such as Team Mental Well-Being), as part of a novel 3-Path Model (Purpose, Performance and People) in startup social ventures.

9.3) Practical Implications

Building on the theoretical implications of the research findings, in this section I will outline the practical implications of the inductive three-path model for founders and team members working in early stage social ventures, as well as, for social enterprise support organisations working with startups in the social innovation ecosystem. I will also briefly outline my research impact plan with regards to the practical dissemination of my research findings.

Implications for Founders of Startup Social Ventures

The findings of my doctoral dissertation have several important practical implications for the founders of startup social ventures. First, founders should assess the Social Cause Passion (SCP) Intensity of potential team members during the hiring and recruitment stage, in order to ensure that the startup team is composed of individuals who share a strong passion for the specific social cause of the venture – thus, leading to a high level of SCP Congruence in the team. By ensuring a person-organization fit right from the beginning at the hiring and induction stage, founders can recruit (and appropriately induct) team members who will be motivated to continue working with the enterprise in the long run due to their passion for the venture's social cause (leading to high team member retention); and this in turn, will lead to fewer member exits resulting from a mismatch (or incongruence) between the motivations of the member and the culture of the organisation (as observed in some of the interview excerpts that were highlighted in Chapter 7). Second, founders must consciously practice Empowering Leadership (EL) and invest time, effort and resources into mentoring and grooming proactive followers, in order to empower them to take up more leadership responsibility in the team. This EL approach of grooming junior team members from within organization/system to become leaders (building co-founder capacity within the team vs. hiring only experts, consultants or senior employees) in the venture has a positive effect on the overall shared leadership culture, work environment, member ownership and short/long-term member performance in startup social ventures. Third, founders must consciously craft a team environment and structure that is conducive to the development of Shared Leadership (SL) in their ventures and must learn how to delegate and share leadership responsibilities with their team members in an egalitarian way, in order to build up the SL capacity of their startup social venture teams.

Fourth, founders must also learn how to practice Paradoxical Leadership (PL), alongside SL, when leading their teams, in order to ensure an optimal balance of stretch mechanisms (such as a purpose-driven SL approach) and control/discipline mechanisms (such as creating checks and guardrails that inculcate a sense of collective accountability for goal achievement). If founders are able to effectively practice PL, while also facilitating SL in their teams – then, as leaders, they will be able to ensure that the positive effects of SL are sustained in a productive way (not too much stretch and not too much control); in turn, leading to favourable team/venture-level outcomes and positive venture performance. Fifth, founders must create an organizational structure and culture that is conducive for the development of the three-path model and must understand that their participation in the SL approach (along with the practice of PL) plays an important role in the emergence of the three processes of Mission Reinforcement, Continuous Team Learning and Supportive Group-Level Team Member Exchange within their startup social ventures. In particular, founders must create a positive and non-judgemental team environment where members

feel safe and supported enough to engage in continuous team learning and supportive TMX – by enabling team members to freely voice their opinions/feedback, openly communicate with each other, support each other (chipping-in approach); while also giving them the freedom to learn and grow on the job (experiential learning), and also to learn from their failures (through trial and error). Founders also play a particularly important role in reinforcing the mission of the venture (ensuring SCP Embeddedness) by regularly communicating the startup's vision to the team members (from new member induction, to regular team meetings, to annual goal planning) and by routinely exposing all team members to the field impact created by the organisation. Finally, founders must put the appropriate systems and processes into place to regularly measure the important team/venture-level outcomes outlined in the three-path model – namely the five subcategories of Social Venture Performance, Team MWB, SCP Resilience and SCP Spillover. By consciously prioritising and measuring the achievement of these critical team/venture-level outcomes, founders can truly build impactful and mindful startup social enterprises that are purpose-driven, performance-oriented and people-centric in nature.

Implications for Team Members in Startup Social Ventures

Building on the implications for founders, the research findings of the doctoral dissertation also have several practical implications for members and teams (as a whole) of startup social ventures. First, when joining an organization, members must carefully consider and assess if they have a strong passion for the social cause of the venture, in order to ensure an appropriate person-organization fit (leading to SCP Congruence in the team), starting right from the recruitment and induction stage. This initial check for passion congruence by potential new joiners will ensure that members will feel motivated to continue working for the enterprises even in the face of adversity or financial hardships (which is common in a resource-strapped social startup context), and will lead to fewer members exiting the venture due to a mismatch between the expectations of the member and the culture/focus/startup reality of the organization. Second, team members should display proactive behaviour and ownership for the social cause of the venture right from the beginning of their organizational journey – because this will enable them to gain the trust of the leaders (and other team members), which in turn, will help them to take up more leadership responsibility (individually and collectively) within the team. Team members should not think that they 'work for' the startup, but instead, should adopt a co-founder mentality and think that they 'own/run' the enterprise (along with the founder) – in order to engage in successful and trusting dyadic relationships with the founders, as well as, to build/boost their personal ownership, commitment and accountability for the goals and vision of the startup social venture. Third, the egalitarian participation of team members plays a critical role in the emergence, development and effectiveness of SL in startup social ventures. Members must collectively invest significant time and effort into co-creating and shaping the team's shared principles and protocols related to the practice of SL in the venture. The committed participation of all team members in the collective sensemaking stage will ensure that the entire team has a common wavelength and shared understanding about the SL processes, culture, values and goals of the startup social venture. At the same time, early/core team members must ensure that they are inclusive in their approach and must adapt and revisit the team's shared principles and protocols, in order to incorporate the views and values of new team members who join later – in turn, ensuring collective buy-in and a dynamic SL team culture and common team wavelength, that evolves alongside the growth of the team over time.

Fourth, team members also play a critical role in ensuring the emergence, development and effectiveness of the important team processes of Continuous Team Learning and Supportive Group-Level TMX. Individually and collectively, members must ensure that they create a safe, supportive and non-judgemental team environment that is conducive to team learning and supportive team member interactions – by facilitating and contributing to a positive team culture that encourages people to safely give and receive feedback, exchange skills and knowledge with each other, learn from each other's successes and failures, freely express emotions and opinions, chip in to help each other out and openly communicate with every member in the team. Team members should also put effort into spending time with each other in a non-work context – such as sharing a meal together and engaging in other team bonding activities – because such informal interactions help to build a friendly, family-like culture within the startup social venture team. Such positive formal and informal team interactions will in turn lead to a positive group affective tone and will favourably influence the team's overall mental well-being. Finally, team members should consciously practice the SCP Spillover Effect by actively championing the cause of the venture, outside their immediate work context. By actively practicing the principles/values of the venture in their daily lives, proactively acquiring and sharing impact-centric knowledge and resources with others and influencing others in their personal/professional communities to also make a behavioural change – team members can act as 'champions' of change outside the work context, thus amplifying the indirect social impact of the startup social ventures. Hence, as outlined above, team members play a critical role in crafting and shaping the organizational trajectories of purpose-driven, performance-oriented and people-centric startup social ventures.

Implications for Social Enterprise Support Organizations

Finally, the research findings of the thesis also have important practical implications for social enterprise support organisations such as funders, incubators, accelerators and other organisational actors/players working with startups in the social innovation ecosystem. First, funders, donors and investors should carefully screen and assess applicants/social entrepreneurs when providing financial support and should select founders who display a high level of SCP Intensity. They should also assess the level of SCP Congruence within the startup social venture team when deciding whether to award financial support to a particular founder and/or venture. Considering SCP Intensity and SCP Congruence in the context of financial investment is important because these factors can serve as important indicators for funders to assess the founder/team/venture's commitment and resilience in the face of adversity or hardships in the future. Funders and investors often tend to favour experienced founders with highly skilled and competent teams when awarding financial support – however, skills and competence can be also built over the time (through the support of incubators, accelerators and mentors). Hence, funders should also be open to founders and teams that may not be as experienced but display a high level of passion, commitment and resilience for the social cause of the venture – because such qualities often ensure that such founders and teams will not give up or shut down operations in the face of obstacles and will persist (and pivot, if necessary), in order to survive and thrive in the long run. Second, incubators, accelerators and other ecosystem players should also include and involve team members of startup social ventures in the incubation support/training and development process. Most incubation/non-financial support programs in the current social innovation

landscape are focused only on founders, and as seen through the results of the research findings, the team members and the collective group as a whole play a critical role in shaping the success trajectories and outcomes of startup social ventures. Hence, there is a great need for more incubation/training programmes to be created for team members in startup social enterprises, in order to build the collective leadership capacity (and overall skill and competence levels) of such early stage social venture teams.

Third, the hands-on support provided by incubators to startup social entrepreneurs, in the early stages of their entrepreneurial journey, plays a critical role in shaping the success trajectories of these organizations; and such incubation support is often focused mainly on business development and/or the founder's leadership development. However, drawing from the insights of the inductive three-path model, incubators should also set team-process related milestones as part of their incubation program, in order to aid and support founders in creating robust structures, processes and values that facilitate regular mission reinforcement, continuous team learning and a supportive TMX environment in their startup social ventures. Such type of process development and organization building support will help founders to build strong, resilient, mindful and effective impact organizations. Fourth, funders, donors and incubators should use the five performance indicators of Social Impact Creation, Financial Sustainability, Hybrid Goal Achievement, Team/Human Capital Development and Organization Building to measure the overall success of social impact organisations. Using these model-agnostic and sector-agnostic performance indicators will enable the success metrics in the social enterprise sector to be generalizable and inclusive in nature, which in turn will support the creation of more generalizable (macro-level) reports and practical research studies about the social innovation landscape at large. Finally, funders, incubators, accelerators and other key decision makers and influencers in the social innovation ecosystem should advocate for the updated triple bottomline approach of 'Purpose, Performance and People' and should measure the success of the social ventures not just based on their performance, but also in terms of other important outcomes such as Team MWB and the indirect impact of the SCP Spillover effect in the community at large. Hence, through the systemic adoption of the three-path model perspective, social enterprise support organisations can play an important role in catalyzing the emergence, development and performance of successful startup social ventures that are purpose-driven, performance-oriented and people-centric in nature.

Research Impact

As part of the research impact of my doctoral study, I will first provide customised and confidential feedback to all the teams that participated in the research studies, in relation to their trajectories as part of the three-path model – I will compare every team's response with the average team response overall, across several indicators, and will provide confidential team-level feedback accordingly. Second, I will create a practical report of my research findings and I will share this report with all the teams that participated in the research studies, as well as, with the social enterprise support organizations that served as partners for my doctoral project. And finally, I will conduct one or more online knowledge dissemination workshops to share the research findings with the participant teams and ecosystem partners – in order to help them to use the findings to strengthen the trajectories of their own organizations (or in the case of partner incubators, to strengthen the trajectories of the ventures that they support). After conducting the workshops, I will aim to share the

practical report (of research findings) with the social innovation ecosystem in India (and other countries) at large.

9.4) Limitations and Future Research Directions

The doctoral dissertation has several research limitations, which also highlight important directions for future research. The limitations of the research studies, as well as, potential future research directions, have been outlined below:

Need for a longitudinal approach

Scholars have repeatedly called for the use of longitudinal studies to advance team-level research in the domains of leadership development and team development (Fischer et al., 2017; Mathieu et al., 2017). However, the thesis did not adopt a longitudinal approach, and instead used cross-sectional and multi-source qualitative and quantitative studies to examine the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social venture teams. Building on the promising research findings of this dissertation, I aim to conduct longitudinal studies about the temporal trajectories of the three-path model, in order to expand the scope and validity of this research topic in the future. In particular, I would like to study the evolution and outcomes of Social Cause Passion (Intensity, Congruence, Embeddedness, Resilience and Spillover) across time; thus, exploring this novel construct as a continuum of SCP, rather than as a static concept. Further, I would also like to study the evolution of SL in startup social venture teams across time, and how temporal factors may influence the effect of SL on important team processes, and in turn, the achievement of team/venture-level outcomes (including critical distal outcomes of Social Venture Performance).

Accounting for the complexities of startup social venture teams

One of the main reasons I chose not to conduct a longitudinal study for the dissertation is the complex and constantly evolving nature of startup social venture teams. Early stage social enterprises have dynamic and unconventional team structures, as compared to more stable or conventional/commercial organisations. These early stage ventures often have a combination of full-time and part-time team members, as well as, paid and unpaid volunteers, interns or consultants/freelancers; and all these human resources work together to create a functioning team. Not every startup has the same team structure (for example; for-profit ventures will vary from non-profit ventures); and hence, there was significant variation in the structure and nature of the startup social enterprise teams that were included in the research studies. Further, the studies included single founder, as well as, multi founder teams (to expand the respondent pool and collect data that can be generalised to various types of teams). In order to expand the respondent pool and to have more variation, I also included organizations across impact sectors, organizational models (for-profit, non-profit and hybrid social ventures) and different startup stages, as part of the data sample, for both research studies. While all the variations and factors outlined above may have unexpected effects on the trajectories of the participant teams, I have controlled for all these factors as part of the quantitative study. In the future, I would like to enrich the three-path model further, by conducting contextualized research about the sub-set of ventures in the research sample – by comparing results for single founder vs. multi-founder teams,

comparing the trajectories of very nascent ventures with organizations at a more advanced startup stage, contrasting for-profit vs. non-profit social ventures, comparing trajectories of social ventures across impact sectors, etc.

Comparing the trajectories of successful and failed startup social ventures

While it was quite simple to include a good number of average and high growth enterprises in the data sample for the thesis project, it was harder to find an equal number of low growth enterprises or failed cases (given that social enterprise support organisations and incubators don't often keep track of or regularly engage with startups that have failed). Similarly, while it was possible to connect with the founders of the failed organisations, it was much harder to get in touch with the former employees of such organisations. Hence, the number of average or high growth startups was much higher than low/stagnated growth startups or failed cases in the overall data set, and this is a research limitation that must be considered. In the future, I would like to conduct a more in-depth study about the trajectories of low/stagnated growth or failed ventures, particularly to explore the topics of organizational resilience and mission drift. Further, in reality, several startups fail due to the personal reasons connected to the founder's personal circumstances (not always connected to organizational factors) and given that this aspect was not covered in the thesis findings, I would like to explore the personal circumstances of the founders of failed ventures and analyse how these factors influenced founder MWB and resilience in the context of their startup social ventures.

Expanding the scope and depth of analysis

In the quantitative study, I have only tested a part of the inductive three-path model (Path 2 from SL related to team learning and venture performance) and have also not included any moderators in the analysis. This is because I first wanted to test and validate a simple and linear process model, before adding more complexity in terms of multiple paths and moderating variables. Further, I did not use advanced quantitative research methods or statistical tools such as Structural Equation Modeling for Study 2, given the relatively small sample size (N = 70 teams), and also due to the limitations of my personal skillset, with regards to advanced quantitative research methods. In the future, I plan to conduct longitudinal quantitative studies for all the paths of the model, in order to test and validate the entire inductive three-path model. I also plan to further build on my knowledge of advanced quantitative research methods, in order to expand the depth and rigour of analysis. Further, I plan to also closely examine the role of the moderator variables (Paradoxical Leadership and Common Team Wavelength) in shaping the effectiveness of the trajectories of the various paths in the model. In particular, I would like to generate and test more nuanced theoretical insights about practice of Paradoxical Leadership by the founder/leaders, alongside Shared Leadership by the team, in order to present a rich, contextual and rigorous analysis of the process of leadership development in the unique context of hybrid social ventures. Finally, I would also like to expand the depth of analysis for the qualitative study, in order to create rich, detailed and more nuanced theoretical narratives for each of the paths of the inductive model that were outlined in Study 1.

Theory development and scale development for new constructs

Through the qualitative research findings, I discovered two novel concepts – namely, the overall construct of Social Cause Passion (with the five dimensions) and the outcome of SCP Spillover in particular. However, for the quantitative analysis, I did not test the path model related to SCP Spillover; and I tested SCP Congruence at the team level, by adapting

an existing scale for Team Entrepreneurial Passion (Cardon et al., 2013) to fit the specific context of startup social ventures. However, in the future, I would like to conduct separate in-depth mixed-methods studies about the overall construct of SCP, as well as, the outcome variable of SCP Spillover – in order to generate more inductive theory about these new constructs; as well as, to develop, test and validate new scales that appropriately measure these novel concepts. Further, I would like to enrich the theory about SCP even further, by contextualising the insights and scales for this construct specifically for startup social ventures, as well as, for more advanced impact organisations (at scale stage). Finally, the important impact bottomline of Environmental Sustainability was beyond the scope of the doctoral research project – however, given the growing importance of this topic in current times, I would like to further examine and incorporate the ‘Planet’ factor as the 4th ‘P’ mechanism (as part of the inductive path model) that may contribute to our understanding of social enterprises that are purpose-driven, performance-oriented, people-centric and planet-conscious in nature.

The context of India

Both the research studies in the doctoral dissertation were conducted with startup social venture teams based in India. However, the research findings did not include any contextual factors that were unique to the geographical context of India. While the region-agnostic nature of the results is favourable from the perspective of generalizing the thesis findings across different geographical contexts, there is also a great research need to conduct more contextual management research that is set in the Global South (Barkema et al., 2015). Hence, in the future, I would like to account for the national culture of India (collectivistic in nature – Marchese, 2001) as a factor and variable that may influence and shape the group dynamics and trajectories of startup social venture teams in India. Further, I would also like to explore the trajectories of startup social ventures with unconventional team structures – what could be called ‘Jugaad’ (a Hindi word representing a bricolage approach – Radjou et al., 2012) team structures that include a combination of full-time team members, part-time consultants or interns, pro-bono consultants or advisors, pro-bono junior and experienced volunteers, as well as, members who work only remotely/virtually with the venture. I have observed that founders in India often adopt such a ‘Jugaad’ team approach (often due to a lack of financial resources required to pay full team salaries) and given that scholars have highlighted the changing nature of teams and how they are moving away from traditional notions of work teams (Mathieu et al., 2017; Edmondson, 2012), I would like to understand the characteristics, trajectories and performance of such contemporary and unconventional startup social venture teams, in the unique landscape of the social innovation ecosystem in India.

Accounting for other support mechanisms for team and leadership development

The research findings of the doctoral dissertation focus explicitly on the team and leadership related factors that explain the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social ventures. However, the qualitative study highlighted a few other important themes, which were not included in the inductive three-path model, that I would like to explore further. For example, the use of technological mediums and social media platforms (like WhatsApp groups and shared group software platforms) was a recurring theme in the qualitative interviews, in relation to team processes in startup social ventures. In the future, I would like to examine the role of such technological mediums, as intra-organisational support mechanisms, in shaping the emergence, development and

effectiveness of SL and other team processes in early stage social ventures. Further, several interviews cited the important role that incubators and mentors played in shaping the leadership capabilities of the founders and the organisational trajectories of the startup venture teams. In the future, I would like to examine how various external support mechanisms, via the medium of social enterprise support organisations in the social innovation ecosystem, can catalyze and shape the emergence, development and outcomes of SL (especially in terms of team/firm performance) in early stage social ventures. Finally, the quantitative study was conducted in 2020 amidst the COVID19 pandemic and this factor may have influenced the answers of some of the respondents. While I have controlled for the effect on COVID19 on the participant teams, I would like to further examine the effects of COVID19 on the emergence, development and performance of startup social ventures – including how some startup ventures may have successfully pivoted their business models to survive during the pandemic; how some teams may have struggled and perhaps shut down their operations due to the shock of this external event; and more interestingly, how some individuals/founders may have actually channelled the pressing social needs of the pandemic into a passion/determination for social change and how this may have catalyzed the creation of new startup social ventures, that specifically aimed to alleviate the challenges that people faced as result of this global crisis.

Thus, to conclude, the research limitations outlined above have consciously and serendipitously inspired the important avenues of research that I would like to explore further in the future.

9.5) Conclusion

By responding to the research needs highlighted by scholars across multiple domains of management research, the findings of my doctoral dissertation make important academic contributions to the fields of social entrepreneurship development, leadership development and team development literature. Through a combination of theory generation, theory testing and theory elaboration approaches, and the use of an appropriate mixed-methods methodology, this thesis presents important impact-focused management research that explains the antecedents, characteristics and outcomes of team-level leadership in startup social venture teams in India. The inductive three-path model that was discovered as part of my doctoral study will help researchers to understand the unique way in which leadership and team processes function in startup social enterprise teams, and how these team-level factors shape the trajectories and outcomes of such early stage social ventures. Through the results of my dissertation, I encourage more researchers to study the various factors that can help a startup social venture team to survive and thrive in the long run. Inspired by my inductive three-path model of Shared Leadership in startup social ventures, I urge a new collective of academics and practitioners, in the social enterprise domain, to explore how founders, members and social enterprise support organisations can build impactful organisations that are purpose-driven, performance-oriented and people-centric in nature.

Chapter 10

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Interview Questionnaire (Study 1)

Category	Questions
Overview (2 Questions)	- Basics: - Name - Organization Name - Designation - Function/Department - Can you tell me a bit about your background and how you found/what led you to join the organization?
History (2 Questions)	- Can you tell me about your journey with this organization so far (duration, background, experience, etc.)? - Can you tell me about the history and journey of the organization so far (mission, context, growth, etc.)?
Leadership (11 questions)	- Describe the leadership structure in your team/organization. - Who takes on leadership roles in the team? - How did the team leader(s) emerge? - How are the leadership roles and responsibilities managed/distributed within your team? What kind of tasks do the leaders perform? - How did the leader's role change/evolve over time? - How do the team leaders behave? How do they function? What common traits/recurring behaviours do they exhibit? - Describe the leadership style/approach of your team/organization. - Team leader's Leadership style and how it evolved - Collective leadership style (if applicable) and how it evolved - How was the team's leadership approach decided? How did it evolve over time? - Can you tell me about the leadership processes in your team/organization that make the above leadership approach possible? - Systems/Activities - Values/Culture - Recruitment/Induction - Team Meetings & Interaction (Bonding) - Information Sharing/Internal Communication - Goal Setting, Planning & Strategizing - Ideas/Creativity/Proactivity - Decision Making

Category	Questions
	11. Do you take up a leadership role in your team? What is your role and how do act upon it? ○ What is your own leadership style? ○ How did your own leadership role/style change/evolve over time? 12. How are failures/mistakes handled in the team? How are successes/appreciation shown in the team? 13. Apart from the clear team leaders, do members in your team lead each other? If yes, could you describe how they do it? (Situational examples) 14. What are the strengths of your team's leadership approach? 15. What are the improvement areas/down side of your team's leadership approach?
Team/Organizational Outcomes (3 questions)	16. How do you think your team's leadership approach affects your organization's success/performance? 17. How do you think your team's leadership approach affects the learning and development of the team members? 18. How do you think your team's leadership approach affects the team retention/turnover and longevity of the organization?
Miscellaneous (Other)	19. Is there anything that you think I missed that you would like to mention with regards to your team and/or leadership in your venture?

Appendix B - Sample Interview Transcript (Team Member - Average/High Growth Enterprise)

Interviewer

[Respondent name], tell me a bit about yourself, your background and how and why did you join [name of the venture]?

Respondent

I completed my graduation from the Somaiya College, Mumbai University. At that time, Kaivalya Education Foundation is already working, they had the Gandhi Fellowship, and it is still working. They came to our college and introduced it to us. Even in my college days, I used to be active in different types of social work and organizations and used to like it. Gandhi Fellowship was a similar platform where there was a lot of opportunity for me to explore myself and to work on the leadership theme. I found it very interesting and did a 2-year fellowship with them. So, after my graduation, I went to Rajasthan for 2 years. Luckily, our batch got the opportunity to go to two different places: one is Churu Jhunjhunu, a rural area, and the other is Udaipur and Dungarpur, the tribal area. So, in the two years, I got to know of those two places.

After that, I worked in Grammangal, an organization that works in Maharashtra, with children. During my fellowship journey, I had some clarity that I wanted to continue in this field, specifically in education with children. So, to explore it further, I joined the Grammangal organization. They had many centers, and the work was good for learning. I joined them. After that, I took a break for personal reasons. During that break, I had a lot of reflection on the things that I wished to work on, like the education sector. I believe that the rote method that we have in our education sector, it is not very effective. I won't say it's absolutely ineffective because it is associated with a part of our learning, but there were a few things missing, that even I faced in my life.

I was reading a few things, and I happened to read about [the venture]. I realized that this is exactly what I wish to do. This is not getting tapped, which is actually very important but is taken very lightly. The communication will happen, and there is nothing great in working in a team, but for that, what to speak on emotions, that keeps happening. We keep getting such comments. But it is important in our life, and because it does not happen, so many things go wrong in our life, to the extent of suicide or violence. That's why I joined [the venture]. The picture I had in my mind and the vision of [the venture] matches to a great extent.

Interviewer

Nice. When did you join?

Respondent

2015.

Interviewer

What role did you join in, and what is your role now? How has it evolved?

Respondent

I joined as a program manager. [The venture] started in 2013 and was at quite an initial level. I used to look into the government partnership. Everyone was a facilitator, interacting with the children, being on field, but along with that, whatever was research based, what is happening in that field, so these were the three layers of work. There was a lot of focus on research as well as government partnership and facilitation.

Now, my role is that of a senior program manager, wherein I coordinate with the team of program coordinators, a part of government partnerships also is handled by me. The program coordinators do it and I am in coordination with the program coordinators in that aspect. I have just taken up a bit of teacher training, which is one of my interest areas when I joined. Now, I have an active role in it, along with facilitation.

Interviewer

What was the process of your growth from program manager to senior program manager?

Respondent

I worked for around 2 years as a program manager. Last year, I was promoted to a senior program manager. The reason for this growth was change in the team structure and increase in my responsibilities. Because I have gained experience in quite a few things, like handing over, handling the team that is now bigger. Like I said, teacher training is one of my interest areas, and since I joined, I had been working on it. So, I think these are the reasons.

Interviewer

You've been here three years. In these three years, how have you seen [the venture] grow or change as an organization?

Respondent

There is openness at the organization level. The openness was not for just anything. After conceiving an idea, there was a lot of thought and reflection on it. I have seen this here a lot. After the reflection, looking into the options and how realistic the options are. Even with our children, we see the graph of impact and feasibility. So here, all options are seen through the graph. If we wish to add something new into it, what is its impact and its feasibility. All these things are considered before making changes.

When I joined, we used to work with the children of 5th, 6th and 7th standard. In the second year, the 4th and 9th standards were added, on research basis. There were a few inputs from us, some experience from some others, all these things were considered.

Now, today, [the venture], the [spinoff venture] has started, where we work with children from KG to the youth projects, for youth of 18 years age. It has grown in such a way, on scale level. When I had joined, [the venture] was working with just one school. After I started working, we increased to seven schools. And now, we are working with two wards. With proper planning, we gathered people while simultaneously ensuring that nobody is forced, giving due regard to everybody's views, we grew together. Because of this, our team has received a lot of support. It is not the case of 'I have to work,' it is a case of 'It is my work.'

Interviewer

Now you are in two wards. How many schools does it mean?

Respondent

Last year, it was 10 schools, 5 of L ward and 5 of M-West. This year, it'll increase to around 14-15 schools.

Interviewer

Okay. And in the team, now there are 20 people, right?

Respondent

Yes.

Interviewer

So, how is the team structure?

Respondent

CEO, HR, and then our HOP, head of program, two senior program managers, myself and my colleague, a program manager, three program coordinators. Under them, there are four fellows who get a fellowship of 1 year on the ground. There is also the admin department. There was a member for communication and fundraising, but not anymore. Interviews are being conducted to fill that position.

Interviewer

Between all these people, how is it decided that who is going to do what, dividing responsibilities?

Respondent

Some things have come in naturally. When I started, the team was smaller. Program manager – and at that time, the fellowship was not there. Fellowship was introduced just last year. This is the second year of fellowship. So, it was vague at that time. When fellowship was introduced, there was discussion on what would be the role of the fellows. Last year, when we were working, we noticed that managing program with partnership or other things was very hectic. Focusing on all these things was very challenging. So, the need of a middle post was obvious and then the program coordinator role was introduced. There were two types of program coordinators that was introduced, for the two wards, two program coordinators for the government partnership and one program coordinator for the short-term workshops through the year. Accordingly, the layers and roles were decided, according to the need.

Interviewer

How is the reporting? Does everyone report to their senior?

Respondent

Yes. There is not a lot of structure to the reporting. If there is anything related to the government, I see the whole coordination. The program coordinator will come and report to me. Related to short-term, the other senior program manager who is my colleague is connected. Anything related to NGOs is handled by our program manager, [name of team member]. So whoever goes to the NGO centers reports to him.

The program manager and senior program managers report to the HOP. But as I said, this is a little overlapping. Sometimes it does happen that the fellows go and speak directly to the HOP or HR senior. So, there is no strict hierarchy as such. The structure is just made for a guidance, in case there is any problem – if the fellows have any problem, they first go the program coordinator, the program coordinator goes to the program manager or senior program manager, and the senior program manager goes to the HOP. This is a structure made, but as I said, there is no hierarchy. So, if anyone has to speak about any issues or interests, even fellows can go and speak directly to the HOP, or to the program manager, senior program manager. That's the way it works.

Interviewer

Apart from the fellows, everyone is taking on some sort of a leadership role.

Respondent

Yes. And even in fellows – the fellowship is designed such that for the first six months, we tell the fellows their tasks. After six months, we introduce little things wherein they are pushed so they take initiative in thinking the way to perform the tasks. For example, the fellows of this year, at the end of

the year, they are saying that they are interested in the short-term workshop and I would enjoy working in anything related to that, some are interested in partnerships, some are showing interest in content development. So, after six months, these things are started in an informal way.

To give an example of this, during the Diwali vacation, when the schools are closed and the workshops are on, we introduced them to DIY, Do It Yourself, in which any one of your skills which you would like to do with a group, like poem, dance, painting, anything, any experience, you have to share it with your team on a particular day. This was going on during the entire vacation. Each one was choosing their team and was designing a 30-40 minutes program. So, this is how they are pushed to encourage them.

Interviewer

Okay. These leaders at different levels, were they all hired for those roles or have there been situations when someone, like you, became from program manager to senior program manager? Have there been any more cases where they have been promoted?

Respondent

My colleague [name of team member] and me had joined at the same time. After 2 weeks, she too was promoted to senior program manager from program manager.

Interviewer

Okay. How would you describe [name of co-founder/CEO]'s leadership style to managing the whole team?

Respondent

She is very receptive, open. When I told you about the organization structure, these people have made the structure. Like [co-founder/CEO] will agree with it, I have seen our co-founder, [name of other co-founder], too. They have kept the environment of the organization very open. If something is not possible, there is a way of putting it across, like assertive communication, this is very good in her. She has immense patience. I have never seen [co-founder/CEO] angry in my three years here. She takes everyone's views, and respects diversity. She manages all this very well. Each will have their own view, some may like something while others may not, this point is accepted. Everything is communicated. It is never like she takes decisions at her level without informing. Every little thing is communicated with the team. Appreciating everyone. In a small team, it might be relatively easier to do something, but now even with 20 team members and three simultaneous programs: [name of flagship project/spinoff venture], Youth Project, and here, yet, each person is appreciated through e-mail or message, every time. So, she is very active in it. She does not forget anyone.

Interviewer

In these three years, how have you seen [co-founder/CEO]'s leadership style change or grow in any way?

Respondent

I have noticed one thing. There are sometimes when we need to say no to avoid burden on us. Initially, I noticed [co-founder/CEO] used to take a lot of burden on herself. She never said no for anything. But again, saying no assertively and at the same time distributing the burden to others, this I have seen evolve in her. So, we could see the effectiveness too.

Interviewer

And because there are so many leaders in the organization, how would you describe the collective leadership culture?

Respondent

Could you elaborate it please?

Interviewer

How would you describe the work culture or the work environment, the way all the leaders behave and the team behaves and works together?

Respondent

We see shared leadership here. I would say induction plays a big role, or in each big program or in the role of each member of the organization, the openness is visible. There is a democratic way in communication, and such a platform is already created by the organization. That's why even the new joiners readily accept the culture. The culture is not accepted entirely, but the mentor-mentee platform is maintained. Everyone sits together during the Thursday meetings and share with each other. There is a platform for transparency such that the views are easily shared. So, the shared leadership is sustained. There is no burden on any single person. Also, no one is more important or less important. Everyone is doing something in their own field. This is visible. If someone likes to speak, then they will make presentations, but that doesn't mean that those who don't prefer speaking don't know anything, but that means that they prefer working without speaking. This is also respected.

Interviewer

When you joined, how were you inducted into this culture?

Respondent

Actually, as I said, when I read about [the venture], I immediately connected with it. I still remember, during the interview, the environment was so light, there was no burden, I didn't feel like I was in some new place. Even when I asked the views of the new recruits, they too had the same experience. They all feel it's their own place. So, there was never the need to accept any type of new culture since it's already my own thing. The connection was already there.

In my view, our recruitment process itself has this filter, because if the thoughts and work culture don't match, then there can be problems.

Interviewer

Right. How do you run the recruitment process? What do you look for in people?

Respondent

For fellowship, we already have it on our website in addition to other social media. There is a form on the website which they fill up. Recruitment is typically for fellows. We study those applications and we call for a screening call so they understand what it is actually, because many times, people don't read the full thing. We realize this during the screening call that they are not even aware about some things like it needs to be done in Mumbai, or that it's a commitment of a year, etcetera. After the screening call, they are called for a discussion, not interview. We get to know their experience.

In the second round, we prepare demos. In our workshops, they get a chance to do it with the children. They are given a 15-20 minutes slot. We observe how they interact. We don't look for anything specific but at least there should be a comfort level with the children. We check for that. After that, there is a discussion on the demos, and then a situation is given to them. For instance, we need to go to government schools where sometimes we are not even welcomed, in such situations, what will you do. We understand what are their thoughts and views when working in teams. So, this is the process.

Interviewer

When they join, how are they inducted?

Respondent

After joining, there is an induction process of approximately 1 week, in which the entire work, the work culture, the focus of [the venture] is explained to them, and simultaneously, a part of the [name of project] program is run in [the venture], seeking equality and excellence in diversity, is also conducted here itself during this induction, so that the culture and the method of work is taught to them. They have the opportunity to understand the values of [the venture] plus the culture during this program. We also have some readings, and discussions on the readings. This is part of the learning. This is how induction is conducted.

Interviewer

Okay. You described the shared leadership approach. To make this approach happen, what are some of the activities or processes that happen in the organization?

Respondent

Like I said, there are many platforms that are created. One of them is for transparency, like Thursday is our office day. This year it can be a Wednesday. But any one day is decided as office day. On that day, sharing of views and discussion on all that happened in that week, giving and receiving feedback is conducted. This is also a platform for mentor-mentee where at a personal level, you can speak to your mentor, or the mentor can guide you on how to progress. We encourage each other to participate the various programs, like I mentioned earlier, the DIY workshop during Diwali. We encourage different people to participate instead of the same person each time.

We also have someone from the team always going out for some or the other workshop, like a theater workshop, something in drawing, etcetera. So then, these people will train their teams in-house for the same. Opportunities for this are created. This is for all, and it is a process of learning.

Interviewer

How are the team meetings run?

Respondent

For team meetings, a facilitator is chosen per week. It will be a new person each week. This is taken up willingly by the person. The facilitator makes a few pointers for discussion and shares with the team. The meeting generally goes on for 1 to 1-1/2 hours in which the views on the pointers are shared, and then there is a cross discussion on those views. Sometimes minutes are taken for the meetings and sent across.

Interviewer

Do you have any team activities or team interactions outside of the professional work contents?

Respondent

A lot. Like we just had a vacation for a week, and half of the team went out somewhere together. One week before that, we had a retreat where all of us had gone out. We also speak to each other offline, go out for tea, shopping. It depends on interests also. Like I don't like shopping but there is a group who does, so they go; or going out for movies, it all depends on what they like to do. It's not that the entire team needs to go out together every time. Even if someone wants to go on their own, there is no issue, it all depends on their interests.

Interviewer

Are there any structured team building or team bonding training activities?

Respondent

All that is during summer, Diwali, like we had gone for the retreat, so it's done on and off. Like we will have a farewell for those we are finishing their fellowship. So, we will have something for them. Birthdays are celebrated, so that is one of the platforms. So through such small things – like in April, we had an end-year event of all our schools, all the 92 groups. All the children in the 92 groups, which is around 2000, all have to present something. The preparations for this started from around February end up to March end. It was obviously a very hectic schedule with people working for around 9-10 hours per day. So, we learnt how to do it. We also conducted a gathering where we showed pretentious reviews of movies, for fun, just to relax a little bit. Also, we have a monthly [name of project] program for a day. We discuss a lot of things about the children and it is also connected with our life. If someone wants to celebrate something, like say Christmas, that is also done, and 31st night party decoration. So, as the ideas come, they are done considering the impact and feasibility.

Interviewer

Like you said these ideas, how are people encouraged to give new ideas or be more proactive?

Respondent

Because of the open culture I mentioned, most of the times during lunch break, everyone tries to sit together. It's not possible all the time due to classes and sessions, but whoever is there, sit together for lunch. During lunch or over tea, there are discussions about something coming up, something that can be done. So, there are many chances for such conversations and sharing of plans and ideas. If the fellows get any idea, they share with the PCs, the PCs share with seniors, we can send any ideas, and if it's possible to implement, it's done. That's how it goes.

We also have game nights.

Interviewer

Cool. Are there any common team behaviors or team values that you notice everyone has or is expected to have?

Respondent

I see a lot of collaboration, helping each other, understanding each other. Like I said, everyone does not have all the skills, but depending on who excels in what, for example [name of team member] excels in drafting reporting or e-mail structure, so I can just send a rough draft to him which he polishes. If anything creative needs to be done, then he comes to me. [name of another team member] is approached if anything has to be done in a neat and clean way. So, everyone has their own skills. These areas of skill came to be known because of the various platforms created here. So, we came to know who is interested and excels in which field. So, this collaborative approach has a big impact.

Even today, two of our PCs went for a short-term workshop. So, the tasks were divided according to interest, like someone preferred working with specific material, etcetera.

Interviewer

Okay. How are decisions usually taken?

Respondent

Most of the times, decisions are made after discussions. It many times depends on the level of the decision. Only if necessary, the views of all the members is taken. Sometimes decisions are taken at only the HR level. If it's a big decision to be made, then it's discussed and taken. It again depends on the need.

Interviewer

When you are setting the goals for the whole organization and also for every person, how is that process done?

Respondent

At the beginning of each year, two full days are allocated specifically for that, as to how to go forward and the journey ahead. The entire team is involved in that process. The way we reached here and how to go ahead, what are our strengths and what can we do with it, all this is discussed for two days with the whole team. A rough plan is made and then dispersed. Then, the team of [name of flagship project/spinoff venture] sat separately and discussed, the main pointers, the government group was separate, this way it is dispersed. But the first two days are all the groups together. [co-founder/CEO] had designed the road ahead, but views were taken from everybody. How many government schools were approached, what is our bandwidth, how much more can we do, or like how helpful is the current structure and do we need to change and do anything new or stay the same.

If any decision is taken, it is shared and discussed. Like we made a decision: until last year, the children of 6th and 7th standards had an end-year event. This year we realized that if we have to increase our network and give more children a platform to express themselves, we need to organize it for all the children. We shared this thought and got views from everyone. There was also the consideration that it would mean it would be more than 2000 people, it would turn out very hectic. Last year we had organized for the 7th standard in April, after the school year was over, but this was done during the school year. So, our entire timeline was to be altered. So, this was shared with the entire team. We spoke about the positives about this and also how hectic it would be. Everyone expressed their views and said what can be done. And even though it was a very difficult task, since the decision was taken collectively, and a lot of thought was put into it, it was possible. As I mentioned, people put in a lot of effort, and even worked 10-11 hours per day.

Interviewer

How do you communicate or share information with each other internally?

Respondent

We have WhatsApp group, e-mail. We have a separate government e-mail group and we have a collective individuals group.

Interviewer

How would you describe the nature or tone of the communication? How do you all speak to each other?

Respondent

Even though we have a lot of fun with each other, when communicating, we do respect each other, and at the same time, we communicate assertively. Even if we don't like something, there is no blaming. In our weekly meetings, we had many challenges, like when we had discussions on how to keep our workplace clean, or many times the person having the keys turns up late, the inconveniences caused, or sometimes PCs have sent reminders for some reports or MNEs that are not completed. In such situations, no single person is targeted. The entire group is addressed. So, there is no blaming, that is the attempt. This is how we communicate.

Interviewer

Building on that, if someone does make a mistake or an error or has a failure, how is that handled in the team?

Respondent

There are two-three layers. It is never seen as any big or small mistake; a mistake is a mistake. Firstly, it is addressed in a group, but if it is felt that it should not be repeated, then the mentor personally speaks to that person. If the mentor too feels that it is not possible, then the mentor will take help of the HOP or if the program manager is a mentor, he will be asked. If the HOP is handling, then he will ask [co-founder/CEO]. This is how it is handled, and then the responsible person is addressed. So, it goes up till the mentor-mentee level, and so far nothing has gone beyond it.

Interviewer

Okay. If someone does something well, how is the appreciation shown in the team?

Respondent

Again, it is addressed to the full team, and [co-founder/CEO] herself sends a mail to the entire team. For example, we have shifted from there to here, in which the whole team was involved, but our admin, [name of team member] handled many things at the same time, which is commendable. He was specifically mentioned by [co-founder/CEO] and appreciated how he singlehandedly managed the process. Of course, we also appreciated. So, this is done through e-mails and discussed in groups.

Interviewer

Okay. And apart from everyone taking leadership role depending on their work, are there situations where someone goes beyond their work and does something extra, and people follow that person, or help each other extra?

Respondent

Yes, this has happened many times.

Interviewer

One example.

Respondent

Yes, I'm thinking about it. Now, the roles of fellows are typically related to the school affairs, but many times, PC roles, like visiting schools, or attending some workshop, but there is another workshop that needs their time, they take the time from their schedule and helping in some design. Similarly, my role does not involve managing fellows, but when I see any problems, then I do help.

I mentioned about the retreat. There was nothing assigned to the PCs or fellows in particular. But on PC and one fellow volunteered to design the whole process of the retreat which was implemented. It was a team leading activity but with fun. They were not assigned to do it, but they volunteered.

So, there are many examples where in small things, something as simple as making coffee for say [name of team member] is upset and tired, which [name of another team member] noticed, she makes coffee for her without being told. Speaking to someone if they are troubled, such initiatives keep happening.

Interviewer

How do you divide the work between you and [name of second line team leader]? How is that work relationship like?

Respondent

About [second line team leader], she sees everything overall, in which teacher designing part is done by both of us together, and the government part, I update her. We also meet once a week for planning. We have weekly plans, and these plans are divided among us.

Interviewer

What is her leadership style?

Respondent

She too is quite open, and very supportive. She is a pre-planner. If something is anticipated, she knows how to plan for it and keeps the environment conducive to the plan, like related messaging, sending reminders, so she is very good in planning.

To give an example, we had a week off, and tomorrow we have to resume. So since yesterday itself, she kept sending messages, at a fun level, like 'come on, vacation over,' like that. Or even sending reminders about who has the keys, how is coming first, taking care of such small things. So pre-planning is her strength. She is very good at it.

At the same time, she is very understanding too. It happens sometimes that we feel irritated and lose patience on someone who does not understand something. So, some kind of irritation is seen in program managers and fellows too. But she takes them to some other mood, distracts them, and says such things keep happening, and sees for different ways of doing it.

Also, being able to empathizing, how new it can be for him. As simple as, if he has been asked to write a report. We expect him to write it in a particular way, but that report comes without any formatting or structure. So, the communication has to be clear at our level. We have to be that prepared. We have to bring about that improvement in ourselves instead of saying that he does not do it right. This characteristic is very strong in her.

Interviewer

You worked with [co-founder/CEO] for three years and before, there were three of them, now just her. How have you see her role as founder change? What is she focusing on?

Respondent

Initially, the tasks of fundraising or partnership were divided between [name of other co-founder] and [name of other co-founder] too. As I said, when I joined, [co-founder/CEO] never spoke a lot. Even now, she speaks only if required. It's her nature to be quiet. In spite of that, she has changed herself a lot in ways of decision making or making presentation, saying no and communicating it, delegating responsibilities, these are changes that I have noticed in her.

Interviewer

And you are also managing people. How do you describe your own leadership skill?

Respondent

Again, I too am open. I feel at times I try to push more. My strength too is my planning, like anticipating things and sending reminders. I too do those things.

Interviewer

And in three years, how have you seen your own leadership style change?

Respondent

Initially, I too used to take the burden of the entire task on myself, but gradually, I started realizing that this is not possible and delegation is important. Also, allowing the members to have a say because

they might have experience or better knowhow in a task, and the expectation is set that when we are doing our tasks, the other person should also do it. So, to go into the process and say, okay fine I did so much, the other person is in the process, he will do, So, this patience level of getting the other person to do it and waiting for them to finish it, that has increased.

Interviewer

Great. So overall, how you would say the shared leadership approach has influenced [the venture]'s performance as an organization positively or negatively?

Respondent

The positive influence is the help in completing any kind of work. Like I said, all the tasks, like at the time when the end-year event organization was a challenging task, that task was completed only through shared leadership. So I would say that is a positive sign.

There is no negative sign as such but maintaining this positive aspect needs to be the focus. If it gets distracted, then I'm not sure how it will be.

Interviewer

You mean keep the culture ...

Respondent

Yes, maintaining the culture. It's not difficult, but it will require effort, not just by one person, but each and every person has to do it. So everyone should be motivated.

Interviewer

And how would you say the shared leadership approach has influenced the growth, learning and development of the team members?

Respondent

Shared leadership has instilled ownership values in the people. When you share something, each one is owner, and if I'm not wrong, it will be not done because it's my job, because it's my own thing, and the focus is on how to do better. If I have to do something better, I have to be better. For that, we then keep pushing ourselves for the learning process. Like I said, even when we have so many tasks, many of our people still go for workshops, like a fitter workshop, drawing workshop, and sharing the experience. Also, I might feel that there is this particular thing where we need to build more on it, for my team, because of the cross-learning, this is motivated. Something might feel very interesting, so how to do it.

Interviewer

Okay. Do you have any activity for official training and development?

Respondent

Yes, we keep having our in-house training activities. Our [name of project] workshops are part of in-house training. We also the induction process, and later, as and when we feel the need, we call various [Unclear] and get it done.

Interviewer

How do you feel the shared leadership approach has influenced the retention of the team members? The ones who left, why did they leave; and the ones who are still here, like you, what is your motivation to stay?

Respondent

Whoever has left us has mostly left for learning, because if I speak about my batch, there was a member named [name] who has opened his own organization. He dreamt of starting an organization in his own village, so he applied his learning from here to his venture. Among the last year's fellows, some went to TISS Hyderabad. So, it has been for some further learning in the same path.

So, whoever has left are still connected. The main motive is learning, that is what we have noticed. Even this year, some people are leaving, still the main area is for learning.

Like I said, I am still here, it's because of the culture and the learning. I don't feel that it's over. [the venture] is evolving year by year, and expanding in some way or the other each year, so there is a lot of open space for my own learning.

Interviewer

And the rest, what do you feel why the rest are here? The same reasons, learning and culture?

Respondent

I think, yes.

Interviewer

Okay. Last two questions are summary and you've mentioned a lot. So, if you've something to add, what do you say are the overall strengths of this shared initiative approach? What has worked really well? You've mentioned a lot of things, anything you want to add?

Respondent

We had done a fellowship of [name of fellowship], me and [co-founder/CEO], and there too, there was a lot of discussion on shared leadership. I heard a common thing from many other organizations that were there that you generally get attached with something that you are doing, you start taking ownership of that activity. But in shared leadership there is a concept of attachment with detachment, which is tricky but important. If you have detachment with something you are attached with, that gives you the chance to go ahead, and develop. If you stay attached and stuck there, then development somewhere stops. That is the key of shared leadership. If you get stuck there, then it is not shared. This is very important.

Interviewer

Very interesting. And are there any other downsides or improvement areas of this approach? One you said is the constant effort to keep it so. Any other downsides?

Respondent

Balancing it. As I said, many things associated with it are tricky. People's emotions are associated. Everyone's style of work is different, style of expression is different, views are different. So it is a strength, but since style is different, if the balance is not there, then it might get messy. So it is quite important.

Again, shared leadership is not possible with one person. You need an entire group with those thoughts and approach, or you should learn to develop a group of people who believe in shared leadership. If that is not done, then it's very difficult with just one person.

Interviewer

Right. Okay. So I have gone through all the questions. Anything that I have missed that you want to mention about? Your team, your leadership, [the venture]?

Respondent

I have spoken quite a lot.

Interviewer

No, it's very useful. Thank you so much. Very useful, very interesting, particularly the attachment-detachment aspect, it's very interesting. Thank you. You have a lot of wisdom to share.

END

Appendix C – Sample Interview Transcript (Founder – Low/Stagnated Growth or Failed Enterprise)

Interviewer

Okay, so say something so I know it's picking up your voice.

Respondent

Can you hear me?

Interviewer

Yes, I hear you. All right. Okay, so [name of founder], maybe you can start by telling me a bit about your background and what, when, how did you start [the venture]?

Respondent

Okay. When you say background, I am assuming my career background right.

Interviewer

Your career background, yeah.

Respondent

Okay. I studied engineering at Georgia Tech in Atlanta and then I left that and I worked as a tech consultant at Capgemini and I did that I was basically managing small team. I started off individual and then after a year I started managing a small team and worked for 2-1/2 years, became a senior consultant, worked with the team in India as well at the same time.

Then I left that and I started [the venture] in 2014, right. What is your question again, what do you want me to get into?

Interviewer

Background and how, when, and why did you start [the venture]?

Respondent

I was volunteering with an NGO in college and we were looking at different grassroots issues in India: education, sanitation, healthcare, gender obviously and a bunch of other issues, right. And there was this one particular organization working on domestic violence in India. And so I found that entire topic fascinating at that point and I started learning more about it, reading more about it. And then I met someone here in India who was working with trafficking survivors and it was sort of where the journey started.

We were talking about what were the challenges of trafficking survivors, how could we go about fixing it, right? And a big challenge was reintegration, how do you get them back to society? And so that is sort of where the first idea came up and then we were sort of working on it for a few months afterwards, actually a few years afterwards.

The initial idea was between 2010 and 2011 but by the time I actually came down and set it up, it was 2014. That's my journey starting.

Interviewer

Right and how has the organization evolved to where it is today?

Respondent

In terms of staffing or in terms of overall evolution?

Interviewer

Just goals, the focus, the vision.

Respondent

Sure. I think coming in we weren't really sure what we were doing, right. We didn't know the trafficking space really well; we didn't understand the garment industry very well. Actually we sort of you know getting a sense of what sectors and try to evolve a model that could work where we were able to ensure job placement for every woman, every beneficiary, and at the same time where the factories and other stakeholders were benefitting out of it, right.

That was our first set, our first sense of evolution. So, it took us a while. For example, initially we weren't sure how to work in a factor space. So, we spent time in the factory to figure out how do we get these women to come and work in the factor, how do you ensure the confidentiality is maintained, how do you ensure that the factory gets incentivized by it? And then we look at the markets. If you remember, we tried going B2C; we tried going [Unclear] a brand that didn't work. And then we moved B2B, that seemed to work much better. So we started bringing brands onboard and placing orders.

Now we figured the job part of it and then we had to figure out – then we realized jobs weren't enough for these beneficiaries, we need a lot more. Then we started – the places that we were staying at that point weren't the best places to be staying in, there were really rundown shabby accommodations and there was no one providing them counseling or providing them any sort of emotional support.

We realized the next thing to do was provide emotional support, provide housing, provide – just give them a comprehensive package right so that they could come out of these shelter homes and then we sort of own every process that's required to reintegrate them and that sort of what we ended up doing.

Interviewer

That's what it's now.

Respondent

That's what it is now.

Interviewer

How was your journey been as the founder or the entrepreneur?

Respondent

Honestly, this is probably the 4 years I've learned the most, right, it's probably my most educational 4 years. I think the first, the first year was challenging in a different way in a sense that I didn't really understand the sector, right, so to understand what impact measurement was and to understand the ideas you have may not really make sense in the sector because you are dealing with a group of people that you really don't understand because the sort of they've have a different mindset and different culture and different experiences than you have, right.

So, I think it took me a while to just understand social impact itself. It almost took me about a year to do that honestly. And then it came down to sort of understanding different sectors, understanding what my strengths were and where to apply my strengths and also learning things like building relationships with people, right, which wasn't a big strength of mine before but it's something that evolved through the last 4 years and how to network with people and how to get them excited about what you are doing and get them onboard to sort of collaborate with us.

And yeah, and I think one thing I've really learned in the last 4 years is what my strengths and my weaknesses are. What are the things I am really good at, what are the things I probably shouldn't be doing and I should probably getting help for it or getting people to work with me on those things. That has sort of broadly been my 4 years of learning.

Interviewer

Okay. How has your role as the founder evolved, what were you doing before and what are you doing now?

Respondent

I think one big evolution and I am sure this is true for most founders is that the level of work you are doing evolves. In the beginning you are sort of doing everything, from like getting the goods transported, getting my t-shirts transported to like speaking with beneficiaries every single day to see, make sure they are fine. All that. I am just – so we'll get into this in a bit but you know I am not part of [the venture] anymore, I am sort of like.

Interviewer

I am not sure. Yeah, sorry.

Respondent

We get to that in a bit. I am a trustee now but I am not into day-to-day operations, right. I am more talking to like month ago when I was still attached, still like working full-time.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

By then sort of everything was running smoothly. The only thing I had to really do was like if there was any crisis I had to go and fix the crisis or if it is building relationships, I had to build relationships. The rest of it, working with beneficiaries, working with existing partners, making sure everyone was going to work, making sure everyone was getting trained, all of this was taken care of by staff. There was a big evolution from where I had to do everything to where I had sort of been able to outsource most of my work, almost all the daily operations to staff.

Interviewer

Then how did the transition happen from that to you being a trustee now.

Respondent

What happened was about a year ago, a little over a year ago – so we were looking to expanding [the venture], right, so we set up our Bangalore operations and we set up Bombay afterwards. I think this was after we left [Unclear] and then in both these cities we weren't able to get a lot of beneficiaries. A small amount of beneficiaries were coming. And in fact today in Bangalore we are the largest reintegration organization, the police, the ministry; all of them send all the beneficiaries they get to us. So, we are pretty much getting everyone. It wasn't that we hadn't made those relationships, it wasn't that they were all women who weren't interested, we just couldn't find women to begin with.

And we thought that might solve once we came to Bombay. But in Bombay again we weren't able to find women. And then we looked at Delhi. In Delhi we weren't able to find. Then we tried to speak to people in Calcutta. And initially there was a lot of interest, and then we said, give me a list – I said give me a list of 20 people who will join the program today, looking for jobs. And they couldn't come up with a list of 20 people, right.

Then lots of things were happening, I was like where are these women, I can't find these beneficiaries. And I think I learned a few things, I learned that a lot of these NGOs were sort of – their definition and the way they've done the research I don't think was entirely accurate, right. And so the numbers weren't as large on the ground and as they were making it out to be, right.

The numbers – we were looking at studies then. One study said that about 3000 to 4000 women across India are rescued every year which I think is not a big number. Then we looked at another study that IGM had done about a year ago and IGM is world's largest rescue organization, right. They are all over the world, they are based in DC, they have a big office and they have five offices in India or six offices in India.

They did a study in India, they literally counted every single sex work in India which is both voluntary and involuntary and they only found 10,000 sex workers in Bombay, right, which is a very small number if you really think about it. And if you assume that about 70% are they are voluntary, and you look at 30% right, it's about 3000. And so we started looking at it, we started to realize the numbers aren't pretty big which is why we weren't able to see those numbers coming into our program.

Then we sort of had lot of discussions internally and said, where does [the venture] want to go then after this? Because I mean we can help the guys who are coming in right now, but I am not needed for that. The ones that are getting rescued in Bombay and the ones who are getting rescued in Bangalore, we have given them factories [Unclear] we have enough jobs available, right, we have the money for it. If it is just these two cities, there is no need for me to be there. If you continue expand and sort of grow much larger, then this probably makes sense for me to be there. I really didn't think there is scope for growing.

And so that's when we sort of took a call. So there was a lady called [name of second line team leader] who is sort of my right hand person and she was running the whole Bangalore operations. I said why don't you take over the organization, you sort of know how to [Unclear] and I will become a trustee. I'll give my inputs where I can, and that's how the transition happened.

Interviewer

Right, okay. What's her official title then, she is like the CEO or?

Respondent

She is also a Trustee. We are both trustees, so she also runs the organization. And she also doesn't do it full-time, she does part-time because again there is not that much work for us either. So she has, she works with UNICEF or USAID for part-time, someone for part-time, and she works here part-time.

Interviewer

Okay. This is the non-profit arm or is it both or everything together.

Respondent

We just shut the brand, we shut the whole for-profit arm.

Interviewer

Okay.

Respondent

It didn't make sense to have a for-profit arm if we didn't have a brand.

Interviewer

So now you are selling B2B.

Respondent

Yeah, it's just B2B and the entire non-profit.

Interviewer

Okay. Then how many people are in the team now?

Respondent

Now is only [second line team leader] and a social worker.

Interviewer

[Name of team member]?

Respondent

No, [team member] is not there anymore. [Team member] used to be part of my team here in Bombay, a social worker in Bangalore but even that social worker has actually just left. So really [second line team leader] and a social worker in Bangalore. The two.

Interviewer

Okay. Then can you describe the relationship now between you, [second line team leader], social worker, like how is the work distributed.

Respondent

Again if you go back a few months ago when we used to have, and we had a bigger staff than now, right. So [second line team leader] would report directly to me, [second line team leader] was in charge of all of everything that was going on in Bangalore. So, all the social workers and within the social workers there was sort of a hierarchy. So, she would make sure that everything is been run over there. And then I had [team member] over here and [team member] – so I took care of everything in Bombay and the overall thing and [team member] was sort of like she is sort of helping with everything, right.

So, we had like one or two like part-time staff in Bombay and so she would coordinate with them and she would work, so she was sort of like a social worker but at a higher level than social worker. So, she would also speak with the social workers in Bangalore, right. So, the two people who really reported to me are sort of [second line team leader] and [team member] and they have people who they work with afterwards.

Interviewer

What was the team size then?

Respondent

I think the largest was probably 8 or 9 people.

Interviewer

Okay. So it was always you, [second line team leader], [team member] and then some people under them.

Respondent

Right.

Interviewer

Those people were – what were their roles, social workers.

Respondent

Mostly social workers or some sort of – yeah, not a decision-making capacity, a little lower than that.

Interviewer

[team member] was Bombay and [second line team leader] was Bangalore and that was the only role differentiation between them.

Respondent

No, no, [second line team leader] was far more senior.

Interviewer

Okay.

Respondent

[second line team leader] was almost like a partner to me. So, we would work very closely in ideating what to do in taking the organization forward and things like that. [team member] was a younger person, [team member] is much younger, and not at all experienced. She was a mix of things, she was part social worker, she was part sort of an assistant to me, part bunch of things, right, sort of I made her manager of people as well. But [second line team leader] is far more senior. [second line team leader] is the only one I used to ideate with, so [second line team leader] and I used to sit together and plan things out and say how do we solve this problem or solve for that problem.

Interviewer

And how did [second line team leader]'s role evolve, how did she emerge as this new leader of the organization?

Respondent

It was quite interesting. [second line team leader] actually – it happened, so about 3 years ago, 3-4 years ago we were looking for a social worker. So we put it up in one of these dev net [ph] jobs, one of these websites and at that time I had this other friend who was a partner called [former co-founder], and he was running the Bangalore operations then. And [second line team leader] replied saying you guys sound interesting, can we meet. So, we met and she wasn't coming as a social worker, we met and we spoke, we liked her, she liked us. We said why don't you just come and volunteer for a few hours every day. She is someone with about 20-30 years' experience in social and that space.

So she came and both [former co-founder] and I liked her a lot. She was fantastic at her job and whatever she did and she really knew what she was talking about. I think one challenge we had until then is with social worker and counselors, we felt there was a difference in our approach to a lot of things versus their approach in our mindset, right. Things like marriage or sort of how we have – I am struggling to find this, but sort of with women's issues, right, sort of the definition we look at about her having authority or her having agency, right, which we felt a lot of social worker and counselors are lacking because they came from a certain mindset that didn't have that.

And the same thing with religion for example. We felt they struggled to understand that to not differentiate between religions. While they believed that intellectually, they weren't able to put that in practice.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

Right and that's something we saw [second line team leader] could do very well and that really attracted us to [second line team leader], we really liked [second line team leader] for that. Then I asked [second line team leader] if she would like to be a counselor, right, and so she said, yes and so we replaced the counselor we had at that point. So we asked to her to leave and then we bought [second line team leader] onboard.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

So [second line team leader] came onboard as a counselor.

Interviewer

First voluntary and then counselor.

Respondent

And then become counselor. But she is a certified counselor, she is a counselor.

Interviewer

Yeah.

Respondent

She started working with us very closely and then [name of former co-founder] was leaving, so I had to find a replacement for [former co-founder] and ...

Interviewer

[Former co-founder] is your co-founder.

Respondent

Sort of, yeah, sort of. I mean I had another main co-founder, [former co-founder] was sort of someone who – but yeah, so [former co-founder] was leaving, he was taking care of the entire Bangalore operations; he was a full-time staff there. And he was leaving and I hadn't replaced him and we were looking and I thought [second line team leader] was just the best person to replace him, she had sort of already been there, she knew what we were doing.

So I asked [second line team leader] if she was open to replacing him. She agreed. So she came onboard and she replaced him. And that's sort of how our relationship started building up, right, and then I started dealing with [second line team leader] much closer, until then [former co-founder] was the one mainly dealing with her. And I found her to be fantastic person, someone who is very passionate about the cause, a lot of experience. And one of the few people I have seen who I could sort of convey my ideas to and who could at the same time work with the beneficiary group. Because until then our challenge was sort of ethical moral stances I took was always difficult to convey to a social worker or a counselor who was really the person dealing with the beneficiaries, right, so there was always...

[second line team leader] sort of was a very good bridge between me and them. We built a great relationship and I started giving her a lot more, a lot of freedom, and lot of space, and she also started appreciating it. And because she is experienced, she could handle it and we're pretty much partners right now, we work together on everything. I don't take decisions without asking her and she doesn't take decisions without asking me.

Interviewer

How long back did she start engaging with [the venture]?

Respondent

2015, I think.

Interviewer

2015.

Respondent

I could be wrong.

Interviewer

I'll ask her. Before I continue, you started with a co-founder right, how was that, like when did he leave.

Respondent

I started with one primary co-founder which is [primary former co-founder], and the [other former co-founder] came along later. But [other former co-founder] was not involved much with ideation and those things, it was mostly [primary former co-founder]. [Primary former co-founder] left pretty soon, I think it was in about a year he left [Unclear]. But [former co-founder] continued for a while. [former co-founder] then came on a staff as well. He became full-time staff for about a year and then he left to do his MBA.

Interviewer

Okay, cool. How would you describe [second line team leader]'s leadership style?

Respondent

With [second line team leader], what's interesting is – now, the one challenge I have is that I have always seen things from [second line team leader]'s perspective, it's harder for me to see it from a social worker's perspective, right, because sort of sometimes they opened up to me when they have had challenges with her. But at the same time it's not as easy for them to open up to me as it's for [second line team leader] to just call me and say this is happening, I speak to her. And [second line team leader] is one I speak to on a daily basis, right.

The one sense I have gotten of [second line team leader] is there are people who either are very fond of her or really dislike her, right. I still don't understand why that is, but I've seen social workers either get very fond of and sort of listen to everything she says, really work with her or constantly complain about her or call me up and say she is doing this and she is doing that.

And perhaps my guess is it comes out of the trust factor. It comes out whether [second line team leader] trusts that person or not. The moment I think she trusts someone, that person, she behaves in a way where that person, that social worker likes her. And if she doesn't trust that person, I think she behaves in a way that that person doesn't like her very much. That's my observation with her.

Interviewer

How have you seen her leadership approach evolve from beginning to now?

Respondent

So she is someone who has a lot of leadership experience. She came with lots of experience, 20-25 years' experience. It's not like it evolved significantly, because she came in with an already evolved process. It wasn't she didn't start as a low level employee. I don't know if you can really talk to how it

evolved because like I said I think she came with some ideas and set processes and she sort of just has been doing the same thing.

Interviewer

How would you describe your own leadership style?

Respondent

I think a little like [second line team leader] I also have – it also depends on how much I trust a person. If I trust someone's work and their ability, I give them a lot of freedom to work, I give them a lot of space. But if I don't, I struggle to work with a person who I can't trust entirely. I am not talking about trust in terms of honesty, but I am talking trust in terms of delivering the work, right. If I say do XYZ, then they'll be able to actually do XYZ, right. And honesty is also obviously important but aside from that as well, so being able to do XYZ.

Interviewer

How would someone earn your trust, how would the trust be built?

Respondent

I think what I typical do is I will throw small projects at them and see how they approach it, how they perform at it and depends on how I evaluate the performance. If I feel like they are matching up and they are doing well and I sort of give them more tougher challenges and bigger project. If I feel like they are struggling a bit and not feeling confident, then I sort of I don't have that – I don't trust that person entirely then.

Interviewer

In a situation where they don't live up to the challenge, how do you work with them?

Respondent

It has been a challenge for me over there, right because I don't think I am great coach, right as opposed to a lot of other leaders who I think are good at coaching their employees. I don't have the patience for it typically. That is something I've been trying to change myself as well, learn to coach who I work with. So honestly, in the past I usually gave them 4-5 months to see if they can cope up and if they can't, if I don't feel like they are coping up, again it depends on what level they are at, right. If it is a social worker it's fine, she can sort of get away with it, but if it's something more senior – like I had replaced someone before [team member] because I just wasn't happy. Or even the counselor I replaced before [second line team leader], right, so after a point if I am not happy then I just – if I can find someone better I will...

Interviewer

Okay. And in the case that you do end up trusting that person, how do you – what is the working relationship?

Respondent

[second line team leader] is a classic example, right. [second line team leader] is someone who I completed trusted eventually and now she just an equal partner. Every decision I will run by her whether in Bombay or Bangalore and we work very closely together. I brought her on as a trustee.

So once I trust that person, I just let her do what she wants, right, I have faith that she has the right intension and she knows what the goal is.

Interviewer

Right. This trust-based leadership approach that you have, how did it emerge and how did it evolve?

Respondent

I don't know how it emerged and evolved, I think as a worker and employees I think it came down to me not – perhaps it came down to me struggling to coach people. It was just easier to throw things at them and see if they could handle it or not, right, then realize that if they could handle it, then I could trust them. And also, I am not someone who likes micromanaging, I like letting people do their thing. And so it always made it easier for me when I have to trust someone. It made my work easier for me.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

I don't know if that make sense or not.

Interviewer

Yeah, I am trying to understand the process more, so you get someone, you give them a task or challenges and then you'd see if they handle it.

Respondent

Right.

Interviewer

What was happening in the middle, like how did they know what they needed to do or how did they develop the capability to do it? Was there anything else, any other inputs that were going?

Respondent

Obviously when they had questions or whatever they come up to me and ask, [Unclear] some other things and so obviously the first time I won't throw them – let's take an example, for example let's take [team member]. Initially with all the factory relationships, I am into factory relationships. Now [team member] will do that, not anymore but until she was here she used to build our relationships right. So, initially I made her relationships, I did all the work with factories and then the first set of women who wanted to go to the factories, I took them there, I took [team member] along with me. Second time around she took them, right, and I saw how it went.

And the third time around so I started getting her more comfortable with the factories employees and factory staff, right, so then like I would see how she was responding to that.

And when I felt that she was responding well and when she was able to cope up with them and make sure that – and they were comfortable with her, then I got comfortable with [team member] as well. Eventually she handled all the relationships with the factories. She handled the relationships with NGOs.

Interviewer

Okay. You handhold them for the first time and then observe and see how it's going.

Respondent

Right.

Interviewer

Accordingly take a call.

Respondent

Exactly, yeah.

Interviewer

Okay, got it. Just like you described this, to make the sort of trust based leadership approach possible where you in an ideal scenario want to trust them, give them more freedom and delegate work, what were some of the activities or processes, formal or informal, that were – that you were doing in the background to practically implement this environment where you can trust them and delegate to them?

Respondent

So you are talking about how is...

Interviewer

Ideally you were trying to build a team where they were proactive, they took initiative, they were accountable and you can trust them and you can give them work. So, what were some of things that you were doing in the background that made this environment possible?

Respondent

I don't think I did anything consciously, I did the things I did subconsciously, sort of that just happened. I think one thing was very clear about was that there was – even though [second line team leader] and I were the most senior member in the team, there was nothing that we couldn't do, right. Working with a particular beneficiary, that's going and picking up and going somewhere or going and talking to a factory worker, everything was sort of fair game for us right, there was no – there was no sense of this is below my pay grade, this is below my level to do, right. It just came down to time availability, it was just more of that. That was something that all the staff were very clear about.

And even simple things, when I would go to Bangalore, I go to visit the beneficiaries – because there weren't enough chairs, 20 beneficiaries and they were never have enough chairs, so we would always sit on the floor, right. Those are small things that they were just never used to right, and that sort of really that got them passion about [the venture] and work with social workers, right. Then they saw an interest and they sort of got interested in the different approach that we were taking compared to what they'd seen at other offices.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

I think one thing I realized soon enough is that we had to sell that passion because it's the only way we can get them to – I can build faith in them right, it's only when they take initiative, only way they won't cheat us or lie to us or be dishonest right. Of course at the same time the other thing is they realized that the line to me was always open, if someone had a problem with [team member] or a problem with [second line team leader], they could always talk to me. Of course if there is a problem with me, there is no one they could talk to. But yes, the lines to me were always open and I was very conscious of never raising my voice to anyone or sort of making sure they are always comfortable around me, they never had to fear me. Though honestly I wasn't very successful at this, they always had a little bit of fear but it's something I kept trying to do.

Interviewer

Okay. So to build on this, and you described it already a bit. Like what was the team culture, work environment like? Were there any values that were unsaid or even you set them that everyone must live up to?

Respondent

There were obviously unsaid values, there was a lot of passion in the team, right. They loved the work they were doing, especially because this is a very tough group of women to work with and we always dealt with crisis. There would be – runaways were common and we had – I mean we had some severe issues, we had two very severe cases. We had one woman who got raped once and we had one woman who died around [Unclear] so it was very tough. But the thing is [Unclear] and sort of there is a bond I think and everyone is sort of working together and kind of figuring out what to do. And I think that sort of built passion in our organization in a way that probably won't do in most organization, especially most for-profit companies.

Interviewer

Right, okay.

Respondent

Yeah I think the just the issues we were working in automatically brought a lot of passion in the people, it automatically brought a lot of energy in people, right.

Interviewer

And how were decisions taken in the team?

Respondent

Most of the decisions are taken by me and [second line team leader], right. Anything to do with Bangalore, [second line team leader] would sort of have an idea and she would run it by me or I would have an idea and I used to run it by her and we sort of take a mutual decision. Anything on the business side I sort of took alone, I didn't really consult [second line team leader] because she was not very involved in the business side, she was mostly involved on the social side.

But [Unclear] a lot of decisions we made on the business side, a lot of decisions over there. But yeah I don't think I was very good at getting the others involved in the decision making process. I didn't have the faith in them to do it. I didn't trust [team member] for example to get involved in that part of the work. But yeah, so just mostly [second line team leader] and me sort of doing that.

Interviewer

Okay. Things like goal setting or planning, strategizing, how was that process done in the team.

Respondent

For each employee or for the project or.

Interviewer

For each person and for the organization as well.

Respondent

We obviously didn't have a structure for each person in terms of goal setting, I don't think we had this big organization process in place where you sort of look at promotions and what are your goals this year and appraisals and things like that.

Interviewer

Okay.

Respondent

Honestly, appraisals just happened when they wanted to, when they came up to me and said, look I need a raise and try and negotiate it.

Interviewer

Okay.

Respondent

There was not a formal process in place.

Interviewer

And organizational goals.

Respondent

Organizational goals are just mostly me working with [second line team leader] again on cases, this is what we have achieved, this is where we need to get. And yeah again, on the business side it was mostly my goals, right. And sometimes we did disagree on some goals in which case I sort of I think I had [Unclear] my goal sort of take priority but yeah we sort discuss things.

Interviewer

And if then there was no formal goal-setting for each person, how do they know what to do, like the role allocation?

Respondent

It was just daily work with [second line team leader] and I give them, right. Not daily, regular work that [second line team leader] and I gave them right, so every few days. So for example, [team member] would have 3 or 4 things that she has to do, right. [second line team leader] would say – with each social worker she would say okay, you need take care of this particular person when she gets her HIV medicine, you need to make sure that this happens, right.

It wasn't super organized to be honest, it was sort of [second line team leader] and I deciding.

Interviewer

Okay. How are team meetings run?

Respondent

We didn't have team meeting, we used to have team calls. We would do – so [second line team leader], me, would be the in the call and the others, whichever social workers, and then [team member] would be on the call.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

Again team calls are just mostly [second line team leader] and I talking to each other about what is happening and then sometimes it's social worker – if there is a particular situation and a social worker give an input that and say this is what happened to this girl, this is what happened to that girl, we are taking her to this hospital, or we're taking her to that training center. That is what happened in the factory. That's the story then one social worker gives us a story, but largely it was [second line team leader] and I discussion what to do. Intentionally we had some more staff on because we wanted them to also listen in and sort of have an idea of how we are thinking and where the organization is going, right, so they are not left in the dark.

Interviewer

Okay. Did you have any team interactions outside of the work context, like any informal?

Respondent

No not really, I was not very good at that.

Interviewer

Okay. How did you, if you did, encourage team members to come up with new ideas or be more proactive?

Respondent

That usually again came from [second line team leader] or [team member], right, and both of them came on giving them that space to do it. Again the staff below them weren't very – were pretty junior staff, right. Social workers are sort of looking after day to day activities. I don't know if [second line team leader] did it in some way with her workers, but on this side it was just giving her that space to come up with the ideas and think and not be discouraging.

With [second line team leader] obviously she was far more senior, so there was already [Unclear] sort of discussing every idea together. With [team member] it was giving her the space and saying, look, if you have an idea come up to me and tell me what it is and we will discuss the idea openly and sort of weight the merits. But she also had – I think she also had a comfort of coming up with ideas and coming with solutions for beneficiaries. One thing I am telling her is it's one thing to come up with ideas but you got to figure how to execute it right, because always you come up with ideas and I don't want to listen to ideas, I want a plan. I want you to come and say this XYZ is what I am going to do to make this work and go and do XYZ.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

Suppose you want to take all the beneficiaries to a park one day, tell me when you want to take, what the funds required are, how are you going to go about doing it and then go and do it, right. Don't just come and tell me I want to do this and then expect me to sort of plan everything out for you.

Interviewer

If they gave you a plan and you were happy with it, then what would happen after that?

Respondent

I'll ask her to go ahead and go with it and just whatever money you need I will fund it and you can go ahead and...

Interviewer

This happened often when they would come up with an idea.

Respondent

Yeah, whenever I thought the idea made sense, it would happen. But honestly, most of the times they would come and it wouldn't get executed right. And I wasn't very good at following up with them on execution, I would say okay, it's your idea, you go and execute it, I am not going to sit and [Unclear]. When they did decide to execute it, it got executed.

Interviewer

And if someone made a mistake or there was an error or a failure, how was that handled in the team?

Respondent

Again, it depends on the degree of failure, right. With most mistakes, still I think [second line team leader] and I took slightly different approaches on this. [second line team leader]'s approach is more she would give them a few chances and then get quite upset with them, right. I don't think I got as upset as I would with a lot of the workers, social workers. They would usually just [Unclear] but yeah so when I – I was just looking back at when I used to work and obviously everyone makes mistakes at work, and for me it was always easier when someone just sort of sat me down and spoke to me instead of going off there and yelling at you whatever, right.

So that sort of the approach I took over here as well. But it also backfired on me. I've noticed people take me for a ride because of that. And it's something I haven't been able to change very much about myself. But I also realized why I behave and solve problems a certain way because I realized that I don't know – just with me, I felt like some social workers took me for granted and sort of felt like that they could get away with whatever they did because I don't yell at them, I don't say things.

Interviewer

Right. And if a mistake had been made, what would you do to rectify it?

Respondent

It depends on the severity of the mistake. If it's a small mistake, we can correct it, we just work with them and say, look, what can you do. I think there was one time we had a severe mistake where we had to let go of one of the social workers because she was sort of responsible for the mistake and that's the most severe we have done.

Interviewer

Okay.

Respondent

But otherwise it's usually it depends on the severity, and we sort of work with them and say, how can we make sure this doesn't happen again? What went wrong and sort of analyze what went wrong and see if it was that person's mistake or it was just circumstance or we had to change something in our processes. Sometimes we probably had – we put it our processes in place take care of it. Yeah.

Interviewer

And these conversations were one to one or in a group.

Respondent

It depends on who it was. If it was someone who was reporting to [second line team leader] directly, either [second line team leader] spoke to that person, or [second line team leader] and I spoke to that person. But it was [team member] or it was – it wasn't much [second line team leader] involved – if it was [team member] or someone else in Bombay then I would directly speak to that person.

Interviewer

Okay. If someone did something well or there was success, how was it appreciated in the team?

Respondent

The Thursday calls we used to have, we used have calls on Mondays and Thursdays and that's sort of when we would bring it up and appreciate it and say this is a great job, thanks for doing this and sort of achieved. Because of this, because of whatever you did this person is happy and this person is better off in the factory or this person is doing well, right.

Again I think [second line team leader] is better at doing this than I was, [second line team leader] has a better handle on being able to manage this and sort of appreciate people honestly and those lessons I think I could learn from [second line team leader] on that.

Interviewer

These appreciations were one to one or in a group.

Respondent

They would happen on the call.

Interviewer

Group call, okay. How were the internal communication channels between you guys, how was the information shared?

Respondent

I would mainly talk to [second line team leader] and [team member]. [team member] would speak to all the social workers, all the people in Bombay and all the people in Bangalore. [second line team leader] would speak to people in Bangalore and all social workers in Bangalore directly. So the social workers in Bangalore weren't reporting to [team member], they were sort of looking at her as a peer, right. So if there is something they wanted to – they had some ticketing issues or some sort of issues, they would call her up and say look we have an issue, some accounting issue whatever.

And then of course there will be Monday and Thursday calls when we would sort of do calls. That is sort of our way of getting everyone on the same page and making sure everyone was up-to-date on what's going on.

Interviewer

Right. Did you have any rules or boundaries in terms of sharing information, who knows what or things like that?

Respondent

With beneficiaries, yes it was confidentiality rules, but beyond that not really, it was pretty much beneficiaries.

Interviewer

Okay. Did you notice any situations where apart from you leading the team somebody else took the lead or took charge and the people followed them?

Respondent

[second line team leader], quite often, right. In fact I don't think most of our social workers even don't know who leads the organization, they don't know if I lead it or [second line team leader] leads it, right. So I've given her pretty much a free reign in Bangalore which is why now she is obviously leading the organization itself. She is someone who is – like I said, someone who has been a leader for many years, someone who has been capable, she is sort of been able to.

And a lot of her ideas and visions were all aligned and ethics and morality were aligned, so it sort of made sense to give her that space.

Interviewer

Right, okay. Anyone else apart from her where you saw they took initiative and led something, a task or motivated others.

Respondent

I think with small projects here and there, nothing major.

Interviewer

Okay. So these small projects, okay, like were there any commonalities, what sort of situations would lead to this one team member helping another or if you can describe one situation, that's also fine.

Respondent

I am a little lost, so you are saying one situation where someone...

Interviewer

When someone, like preferable say the social worker, someone has taken really come up with something or taking an initiative and the others have followed that person. Describe such a situation to me, any example.

Respondent

I don't think there has been a time where one of them took a leadership role where others have followed that person. I can't think of one right now.

Interviewer

Okay. So, this trust-based leadership approach that you took and now even [second line team leader] takes, how do you think that has influenced or affected [the venture]'s performance so far positively and negatively?

Respondent

I think a few advantages we have seen in that is that I think it's built passionate people and built a sense of wanting to be a part of the organization. And especially for what you've seen with social workers is they've all worked in environments where there is absolutely [Unclear] they worked in other NGOs where there is no trust, there was a lot of micromanagement. So to leave that and come here, it's a big change for them which they appreciate, right.

So on one hand we've seen them become more passionate about the issue and the issue of what we do and build a fondness for us. On the flip side we've also seen that it takes – it gets taken advantage of, right. We have seen people who when we trust them, sort of may not do the work or might be cheating us or do things that – or might say they are doing something but not actually do it, right. So, we've seen both sides of it.

Interviewer

Okay.

Respondent

And it always becomes a challenge when it is second, when it is the latter, because it takes time to detect. And once we detect we don't know what all has gone wrong in the past, right, and that's been our challenge with it I think.

Interviewer

Okay. How do you think this trust based leadership approach has influenced the personal development of the team members?

Respondent

When you say personal development, you mean how they grow or.

Interviewer

Their growth in the organization, their learning.

Respondent

I think looking at [team member], I feel like she is – from the time she started to by the time she left, she left in December, I had seen her really evolve in what she was able to do. She had come straight out of college and joined us and when she came out of college she was sort of quite capable and sort of excited about everything but wasn't able to really execute much. But I think over the – I think she worked for 2 years, I don't remember how long she worked exactly, but over the 2 years that she worked for, she really sort of matured and become better at doing things and understood how to execute, executing the tasks and sort of understand how to work in an organization. Because I think a lot of her ideas before that were wild [ph] ideas, things that weren't really executable, but she really learned how to think about things that could be executed, and how to work towards it. Yeah.

Interviewer

How do you think the leadership approach influenced the team retention, the ones who left why did they leave; and the ones who stayed, why did they stay.

Respondent

So [team member] left because we were shutting down the operations. So we shut down Bombay entirely, we only are running our Bangalore operations right now. So obviously we had people leave and this is what the transition was happening. But before that I mean there was people who we let go off for one reason or another either because they are not performing or because – we had one person let go because she didn't, because she sort made a big mistake.

Otherwise it was just – I think one by one, like I feel like I've let go more people than actually left. There have been a certain number of people who left because of – there were a small, there were a group who [Unclear] had a lot of fight with [second line team leader] and left us, right. Like I said [second line team leader], either people really like her or they hate her. The ones who hate her, they sort of had fights with her and left. So it was that group.

So, it really came down on demand and supply, so when we needed them we sort of take them in, and then we wouldn't have a need for them. Because suppose we have lot of beneficiaries come in, we would hire 2 or 3 more. Those we may not need them in Bombay, it was sort of just flow that way. But the main reason we were seeing was mainly because either they had been let go for one reason or other.

Interviewer

Performance.

Respondent

Performance or I mean deceit has been a big deal as well, right.

Interviewer

Deceit.

Respondent

Yeah lots of lying and sort of that is what, or they couldn't get along.

Interviewer

Okay. The ones who stayed, why do you think they stayed.

Respondent

I think two reasons, one was the passion for the cause. I think secondly, it's because they saw – this is just my assumption, they saw a difference in the way we work and the NGOs they typically worked with, right, where people just had more space and more power to do things.

Interviewer

Okay. Okay. All right. Yeah, now I've got a good overview. I have two last questions and you've answered it along the way but if you have to add anything. What would you say are overall the strengths of the leadership approach that you took, like what worked well?

Respondent

I think the strengths were what each of us could really to bring what she could to the table, right, in terms of – so I think our team as a whole was more efficient, right because [second line team leader] and I did not have to micromanage each person and they did not have to micromanage anyone else. Each person brought their strength to the fullest, right. And so I think the organization as a whole was more efficient and there was more trust between people. And the fact that they realized [second line team leader] and I were doing any kind of work, or sort of treated them as equals, right, I think made them also appreciate the work better, made them also appreciate the team environment, the work environment better. And so I think those are some of the positives of trust based approach.

I think some of the negatives for me were if I couldn't trust someone, it became very difficult to work with that person, right. I wasn't very good at coaching them or sort of getting them gain my trust. And perhaps someone who could do that might be better off, but it's something I struggled with.

And secondly, when you do trust someone and they sort of take you for a ride, you sometimes don't realize that they are taking you for a ride, right. One advantage of micromanaging or sort of looking at nitty-gritty is it's hard to be taken for a ride then, right.

And that's one of the places – I mean we've lost a lot of money in that, they sort of made mistakes and all that...

Interviewer

Okay. Like some few pop-up questions have come up. Did you do – were there any formal efforts for retraining or development and do you think retention was a problem for you.

Respondent

Yeah, definitely it was a problem for us. Especially social workers who weren't happy with [second line team leader] was a challenge.

Interviewer

You shut down Bombay now and now it's just Bangalore. So like what do you see the future for [the venture].

Respondent

I see it very simple right. We did right now is we sort of we signed a JV with an organization and they do most of our work now, right. Before we ran everything, we ran the housing, we ran everything. Now they run the housing and do everything, right. So, they take care of the food, the housing, they supervise the training, and they do all of it. Now what we are planning on doing is having a social worker and [second line team leader]. [second line team leader] does the counseling and the social worker sort of is with them day-to-day taking them to hospital or taking to them training, make sure it works out. That's what we are going to maintain. And as beneficiaries come in and go out, we sort of we take care of them. That's sort of the vision for that right now.

Interviewer

Okay. Is there any you would have done differently? This current position that you are in right now, like what are your feelings about it, is there anything you would have done differently or do you think this is a natural progression.

Respondent

I think things would have been very different, if we found a group of beneficiaries it would have helped. But considering that wasn't the case and we really did look for years and years and years, I don't think there was much – this was just the way it would end. I don't think there is much left for us to do.

Interviewer

Right.

Respondent

Yeah. But I think had we been able to find groups of beneficiaries, I think the whole situation would have been very different. We would have had a much larger team, we would have had people heading in different cities and things like that.

Interviewer

And this one social worker who is left, like did you hire her or she was one of the original people who retained.

Respondent

No, social workers keep changing. So, the current social worker also just left a few weeks ago. So, we are now looking for another social worker. Currently we are in the hiring process. If you know somebody.

Interviewer

Noted. Great. I am done with all my questions. Anything you think I've missed that you want to mention about the team or leadership or organizational dynamics.

Respondent

No, I think you are pretty thorough with your questioning.

Interviewer

Okay, good. I am glad to hear that.

What do you...

END

Appendix D – List of Codes (Study 1)

OVERALL CONSTRUCT CATEGORY	MAIN THEMATIC CODE CATEGORY	SUB-CODES/ SUB-CATEGORIES	FURTHER SUB-CODES (IF APPLICABLE)
Antecedent/ Anchoring Construct	Social Cause Passion (SCP)	SCP Intensity	○ A personal connection with the social cause ○ An educational training and/or professional background that is directly related to the social cause, and/or ○ A general social exposure to/general strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture.
		SCP Congruence	○ A strong shared sense of personal-level connection with the social cause ○ A shared educational or professional background that is directly related to the social cause, and/or ○ A general shared social exposure to/shared strong interest in the social cause of the startup social venture.
		SCP Embeddedness	(outlined later in the table)
		SCP Resilience	(outlined later in the table)
		SCP Spillover	(outlined later in the table)
Leadership Processes	Strong Dyadic Leader-Member Relationship	Founder Empowerment Behaviour	○ Mentoring ○ Grooming
		Follower Proactive Behaviour	○ Mirroring ○ Active Ownership
		Founder-Member Mutual Trust	○ Displaying of trust by the founder ○ Earning of trust by the team member
	Shared Leadership	Egalitarian Culture and Collaborative Approach to team-level leadership responsibilities	
		Shared Protocol about	○ Task Division

OVERALL CONSTRUCT CATEGORY	MAIN THEMATIC CODE CATEGORY	SUB-CODES/ SUB-CATEGORIES	FURTHER SUB-CODES (IF APPLICABLE)
		the team-level leadership processes	- Decision Making - Goal Setting and Planning - Accountability and Ownership
		Overall Characteristics of SL Model	- Context-specific - Co-created and mutually agreed upon - Inclusive and adaptable
	Paradoxical Leadership – Balance between Control/Discipline and Stretch Mechanisms in the Team	Control/Discipline Mechanisms	
		Stretch Mechanisms	
		Paradoxical Leadership – Control-Stretch Balance in the Team	
Team Processes	Institutionalization of Mission Reinforcement within the Team – Social Cause Passion (SCP) Embeddedness	Regular Team Communication about the Impact Focus of the Venture	
		Regular Team Exposure to Field Impact created	
	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour – Embedded Team Learning Environment	Knowledge Exchange	
		Feedback Seeking	
		Experiential Learning	
		Learning from Success	
		Learning from Failure	
	Supportive Group Level Team Members' Exchange (TMX)	Team Psychological Safety	
		Supportive Work Interactions	'Chipping-In' Approach
		Open Team Communication	
	Common Team Wavelength (about Team Processes, Values, Culture and Goals)	Explicit Shared Team Understanding	
		Implicit Shared Team Understanding	
Team and Venture Level Outcomes	Social Cause Passion (SCP) Resilience	Personal SCP Resilience (Individual level)	
		Collective SCP Resilience (Team level)	
		Organizational SCP Resilience (Venture level)	
	Social Cause Passion (SCP) Spillover Effect	Active practice of impact principles (outside the	

OVERALL CONSTRUCT CATEGORY	MAIN THEMATIC CODE CATEGORY	SUB-CODES/ SUB-CATEGORIES	FURTHER SUB-CODES (IF APPLICABLE)
		work context)	
		Impact centric knowledge acquisition and sharing (outside the work context)	
		Influencing others (outside the work context) through champion behaviour	
	Learning-Driven Venture Performance Outcomes	Total Venture Performance	
		Social Impact Creation	
		Financial Sustainability	
		Hybrid Goal Achievement	
		Team/Human Capital Management and Development	
		Organization Building	
	Team Mental Well Being	Positive/Negative MWB Symptoms	○ Hedonic MWB ○ Group Affective Tone
		Eudaimonic MWB	○ Job Satisfaction
Inductive Three-Path Model	Purpose	Purpose-driven processes and mechanisms	
	Performance	Performance-oriented processes and mechanisms	
	People	People-centric processes and mechanisms	
	3 'P' Model	Building a purpose-driven, performance-oriented and people-centric startup social venture	

Appendix E – Venture Overview (Study 1)

ORG NO.	GROWTH STAGE	TEAM SIZE	NO. OF FOUNDERS	ORG. LIFE STAGE	MODEL	PRIMARY IMPACT SECTOR
1	High Growth	Medium	1	Early Scale/ Scale	Non Profit	Healthcare
2	High Growth	Large	2	Medium Term	Hybrid	Environment
3	High Growth	Medium	2	Medium Term	For Profit	Agriculture
4	High Growth	Large	3	Medium Term	Non Profit	Education
5	High Growth	Medium	1	Early Scale/ Scale	For Profit	Agriculture
6	High Growth	Medium	1	Early Scale/ Scale	For Profit	Environment
7	High Growth	Very Large	2	Medium Term	Hybrid	Skill Development
8	High Growth	Medium	2	Advanced	Hybrid	Youth Development
9	High Growth	Very Large	2	Early Scale/ Scale	Non Profit	Youth Development
10	High Growth	Medium	1	Medium Term	Non Profit	Education
11	High Growth	Medium	1	Early Scale/ Scale	Non Profit	Skill Development
12	High Growth	Very Large	2	Medium Term	For Profit	Livelihoods
13	High Growth	Medium	1	Medium Term	Hybrid	Healthcare
14	High Growth	Medium	2	Early Scale/ Scale	Non Profit	Women Empowerment
15	High Growth	Very Large	3	Early Scale/ Scale	For Profit	Environment
16	Average Growth	Medium	1	Early Stage	For Profit	Agriculture
17	Average Growth	Medium	2	Early Stage	Non Profit	Education
18	Average Growth	Small	1	Medium Term	For Profit	Livelihoods
19	Average Growth	Small	2	Early Stage	Hybrid	Agriculture
20	Average Growth	Medium	3	Early Stage	For Profit	Agriculture
21	Average Growth	Small	1	Medium Term	For Profit	Environment
22	Average Growth	Small	1	Medium Term	Non Profit	Healthcare
23	Average Growth	Medium	3	Medium Term	For Profit	Education
24	Low/ Stagnated Growth	Small	2	Medium Term	For Profit	Environment
25	Failed/Shut Down	Medium	2	Early Stage	For Profit	Affordable Housing

ORG NO.	GROWTH STAGE	TEAM SIZE	NO. OF FOUNDERS	ORG. LIFE STAGE	MODEL	PRIMARY IMPACT SECTOR
26	Failed/Shut Down	Small	1	Medium Term	Hybrid	Women Empowerment
27	Low/ Stagnated Growth	Small	2	Medium Term	For Profit	Environment
28	Low/ Stagnated Growth	Small	1	Advanced	Non Profit	Youth Development
29	Low/ Stagnated Growth	Small	1	Medium Term	For Profit	Livelihoods
30	Low/ Stagnated Growth	Small	1	Medium Term	For Profit	Environment

Appendix F – Survey Item List (Study 2)

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA (4 items)				
Criteria 1: Are you the <u>main person in charge</u> (Founder/CEO/Managing Director) OR a <u>team member</u> working in a startup social impact organization in India? <i>(Only Founders/CEOs/Managing Directors and team members working in a startup social impact organization in India are eligible to participate in the survey)</i>	Yes/No	Eligibility Criteria		
Criteria 2: Is <u>creating social impact in India</u> the main focus of your startup organization? <i>[Only organizations that have a primary focus on creating social impact (this includes sustainable impact) in India are eligible for the survey. All impact sectors and all organizational models (for-profit, non-profit or hybrid impact organizations) are welcome].</i>	Yes/No			
Criteria 3: Is the startup social impact organization (that you are a part of) <u>between 6 months to 4 years old</u> (existence of operations)? <i>(Only organizations that are between 6 months to 4 years old are eligible for the survey)</i>	Yes/No			
Criteria 4: Does your startup social impact	Yes/No			

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
organization have <u>a minimum of 3 team members and maximum of 15 team members</u> (including at least 2 other team members apart from the founder/co-founders)? <i>(Only organizations that have between 3-15 team members (including at least 2 other team members apart from the founder/co-founders) are eligible for the survey. This includes only full time or part time team members who work with the main activities and operations of the organization - not contract workers who in production, manufacturing, etc.)</i>				
SECTION 1 – ABOUT YOU (12 items)				
1) Your Age	(text box)	Information Variables (including a few Control Variables)		
2) Your Gender	Male, Female, Other, Prefer not to say			
3) Your Location (City)	(in order to decide the location for the F2F workshop (incentive) in the future)			
4) Your highest level of education	Lower than 10th Standard, 10th Standard, 12th Standard, Bachelors, Masters, PhD, MBA, Diploma, None, Other			
5) How many years of work experience do you have (formal employment in an organization)?	(text box)			
6) Have you worked in the social impact sector before (before you joined your current organization)?	Yes/No			

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
7) Have you worked in a startup before (before you joined your current organization)?	Yes/No			
8) Have you worked in a startup social enterprise before (before you joined your current organization)?	Yes/No			
9) Have you worked as an entrepreneur before (before you joined your current organization)?	Yes/No			
10) If yes, how many years of work experience do you have as an entrepreneur (before you joined your current organization)? (logic question)	(text box) (to appear if the answer to the above question is yes)			
11) Please enter the email address that is linked to your Amazon India account. [We need this information in order to send you an Amazon India Gift Voucher worth Rs. 500 as a 'Thank You' for completing this survey. The voucher will be sent to the email address that you enter above; when at least 3 members of your team have completed the survey (maximum 4 respondents per team; including the Founder/CEO/Managing Director)].	(text box)			
12) How did you hear about this survey? Please enter the name of the organisation, platform or person that referred you to this survey.	(text box)			
SECTION 2 – ABOUT THE ORGANISATION (15 items)				
13) Organization name	(text box)	Information		

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
14) Organization website	(text box)	Variables		
15) What is the name of the founder/CEO/Managing Director (main person in charge) of the organization?	(text box)			
16) How long have you worked in this organization (when did you join the organisation)?	(text box)			
17) What is your role in the team?	Founder/CEO/Managing Director (main person in charge of the organization) OR Team Member (to direct the logic of the form)			
18) What is the specific title of your role in the team (eg: programme manager, etc.)	(text box)			
19) How long has the organization been operating (years of existence)? [for founder only]	(text box)	Control Variables		
20) Which year was the organization started? [for founder only]				
21) Number of current full-time team members in the organization [for founder only]	(text box)			
22) Number of current part-time team members in the organization [for founder only]	(text box)			
23) How many founders does the organisation have? [for founder only]	Single Founder, Two Co-founders, More than Two Co-Founders			
<i>[The survey must be filled out by only the main person in charge (Founder/CEO/Managing Director) and 2-3 other team members in order for the</i>				

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
<i>responses to be valid. If you are a co-founder who is not the CEO/Managing Director, please return to the question 'What is your role in the team?' and select the 'Team Member' option to continue further. Only one response for the CEO/Managing Director role can be considered per organization.]</i>				
24) What is the model of the organisation? [for founder only]	For Profit, Non Profit, Hybrid (Both of the above)			
25) What social impact sector does the organization work in? [for founder only]	Healthcare, Education, Environment, Energy, Water, Hygiene & Sanitation, Livelihoods/Income Generation, Civic Engagement, Social Sector Partnerships or Services, Other (please specify)			
26) Has your organization undergone a pivot or a significant strategic organizational change from the time the organization started until now? [for founder only]	Yes/No			
27) If yes, please elaborate on the pivot or strategic change that your organization went through. [for founder only]	(text box)			
SECTION 3 – ABOUT YOUR PERCEPTION OF THE TEAM (13 items)				
28) Keeping in mind how your startup team (as a whole) has been working, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Keeping in mind how your startup team (as a whole) has been working, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Team Social Cause Passion (Congruence)	Santos, S.C. and Cardon, M.S., 2019. What's love got to do with it? Team entrepreneurial passion and performance in new venture teams. Entrepreneurship	Having in mind how your team has been working, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
We, as a team, find it exciting to figure out new ways to solve unmet market needs that address the social problem of our organization	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.		Theory and Practice, 43(3), pp.475-504.	For us, it is exciting to figure out new ways to solve unmet market needs that can be commercialized.
We, as a team, find it enjoyable to search for new ideas for products/services/programmes that address the social problem of our organization	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Searching for new ideas for products/services to offer is enjoyable to our team.
We, as a team, are motivated to figure out how to improve our existing products/services/programmes to better solve the social problem of our organization	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We, as a team, are motivated to figure out how to make existing products/services better
We, as a team, find it really exciting to scan the environment for new opportunities related to the social cause of our organization	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Scanning the environment for new opportunities really excites my team
Inventing new solutions to problems related to the social cause of our organization is an important part of who we are as a team.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Inventing new solutions to problems is an important part of who we are as a team
We, as a team, get excited to participate in the process of building and running a new social impact organization	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Establishing a new company excites us
Owning and/or running our own social impact organization energizes us as a team	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Owning our own company energizes my team
We, as a team, find it enjoyable to nurture a new social impact organization through its emerging success	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			For our team, nurturing a new business through its emerging success is enjoyable
Being the founding core team of a social	(1) Strongly disagree; (2)			Being the founders of a

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
impact organization is an important part of who we are as a team	Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			business is an important part of who we are
We, as a team, really like finding the right people to market our social product/service/programme to, in order to achieve our social impact goals	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We really like finding the right people to market our product/service to.
We, as a team, get excited to find the right people to work for our social impact organization	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Assembling the right people to work for our business is exciting
Pushing our team members (each other), to make our social-impact organization better, motivates us as a team	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Pushing our employees and our team to make our company better motivates us
Nurturing and growing a social impact organization is an important part of who we are as a team	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Nurturing and growing companies is an important part of who we are as a team
SECTION 4 A ABOUT YOUR YOUR INTERACTION WITH THE FOUNDER/CEO/MANAGING DIRECTOR (18 items) (For team members only)				
29A) My team leader (the Founder/CEO/Managing Director)	Keeping in mind your interaction with the Founder/CEO/Managing Director (main person in charge of the organization), please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Founder's Empowerment Behaviour	Ahearne, M., Mathieu, J., & Rapp, A. 2005. To empower or not empower your sales force? An empirical examination of the influence of leadership empowerment behavior on customer satisfaction and performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(5): 945-955.	
helps us understand how our individual objectives and goals relate to that of the organisation	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5)			My manager helps me understand how my objectives and goals relate to that of the

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
<i>(Enhancing the meaningfulness of work)</i>	Strongly agree.		Also used in: Zhang, X., & Bartol, K. M. 2010. Linking empowering leadership and employee creativity: The influence of psychological empowerment, intrinsic motivation, and creative process engagement. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 107-128.	company. <i>(Enhancing the meaningfulness of work)</i>
helps us understand the importance of our work to the overall effectiveness of the organisation <i>(Enhancing the meaningfulness of work)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager helps me understand the importance of my work to the overall effectiveness of the company <i>(Enhancing the meaningfulness of work)</i>
helps us understand how our specific role fits into the bigger picture of the organisation <i>(Enhancing the meaningfulness of work)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager helps me understand how my job fits into the bigger picture <i>(Enhancing the meaningfulness of work)</i>
makes many decisions along with us (by involving the team) <i>(Fostering participation in decision making)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager makes many decision together with me. <i>(Fostering participation in decision making)</i>
often consults us on strategic decisions <i>(Fostering participation in decision making)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager often consults me on strategic decisions. <i>(Fostering participation in decision making)</i>
asks for our opinion on decisions that may affect us <i>(Fostering participation in decision making)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager solicits my opinion on decisions that may affect me. <i>(Fostering participation in decision making)</i>
believes that we can handle demanding tasks <i>(Expressing confidence in high performance)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager believes that I can handle demanding tasks. <i>(Expressing confidence in high performance)</i>
believes in our ability to improve even when we make mistakes	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree			My manager believes in my ability to improve even when I

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
<i>(Expressing confidence in high performance)</i>	nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			make mistakes. <i>(Expressing confidence in high performance)</i>
expresses confidence in my ability to perform at a high level <i>(Expressing confidence in high performance)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager expresses confidence in my ability to perform at a high level. <i>(Expressing confidence in high performance)</i>
allows us to do our job in our way <i>(Providing autonomy from bureaucratic constraints)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager allows me to do my job my way. <i>(Providing autonomy from bureaucratic constraints)</i>
makes it more efficient for me to do my job by keeping the rules and regulations simple <i>(Providing autonomy from bureaucratic constraints)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager makes it more efficient for me to do my job by keeping the rules and regulations simple. <i>(Providing autonomy from bureaucratic constraints)</i>
allows us to make important decisions quickly to satisfy customer and/or beneficiary needs <i>(Providing autonomy from bureaucratic constraints)</i>	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			My manager allows me to make important decisions quickly to satisfy customer needs. <i>(Providing autonomy from bureaucratic constraints)</i>
30A) In my startup team, the Founder/CEO/Managing Director and team members (we)	Keeping in mind the interaction between the Founder/CEO/Managing Director (main person in charge of the organization) and the team members, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree	Founder-Member Mutual Trust	McAllister, D. J. 1995. Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 24-59.	Affect-based trust

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
	with each statement.			
have a sharing relationship	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We have a sharing relationship. We can both freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes.
can both freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes with each other	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			
can talk freely to others about difficulties at work and know that others will want to listen	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			I can talk freely to this individual about difficulties I am having at work and know that (s)he will want to listen.
both would feel a sense of loss if we could no longer work together	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We would both feel a sense of loss if one of us was transferred and we could no longer work together.
can share problems with others and they know that the others would respond kindly and constructively	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			If I shared my problems with this person, I know (s)he would respond constructively and caringly.
have both made considerable emotional efforts for our working relationship	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			I would have to say that we have both made considerable emotional investments in our working relationship.
Please select "strongly agree" for this response (attention check item)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
SECTION 4 B – ABOUT YOUR PERCEPTION OF THE TEAM MEMBERS (15 items) (For founders only)				
29B) Members in my startup team often try to	Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Taking Charge (Follower's Proactive Behaviour)	Morrison, E. W., & Phelps, C. C. 1999. Taking charge at work: Extrarole efforts to initiate workplace change. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4): 403-419.	
adopt improved procedures for doing our job.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often tries to adopt improved procedures for doing his or her job.
change how our work is executed in order to be more effective.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often tries to change how his or her job is executed in order to be more effective.
bring about improved procedures for the team.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often tries to bring about improved procedures for the work unit or department.
put in place new work methods that are more effective.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often tries to institute new work methods that are more effective for the company.
make constructive suggestions for improving how things operate.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often makes constructive suggestions for improving how things operate within the organization.
correct a faulty procedure or practice.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often tries to correct a faulty procedure or practice.
eliminate redundant or unnecessary procedures.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5)			This person often tries to eliminate redundant or unnecessary procedures.

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
	Strongly agree.			
implement solutions to pressing problems in the organization	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often tries to implement solutions to pressing organizational problems.
introduce new structures, technologies, or approaches to improve efficiency.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This person often tries to introduce new structures, technologies, or approaches to improve efficiency.
				This person often tries to change organizational rules or policies that are non-productive or counterproductive. – removed because tough for respondents to understand
30B) In my startup team, the Founder/CEO/Managing Director (me) and team members	Keeping in mind the interaction between the Founder/CEO/Managing Director (main person in charge of the organization) and the team members, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Founder-Member Mutual Trust	McAllister, D. J. 1995. Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1): 24-59.	Affect-based trust
have a sharing relationship.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We have a sharing relationship. We can both freely share our ideas, feelings, and hopes.
can both freely share our ideas, feelings, and	(1) Strongly disagree; (2)			

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
hopes with each other	Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			
can talk freely to others about difficulties at work and know that others will want to listen.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			I can talk freely to this individual about difficulties I am having at work and know that (s)he will want to listen.
both would feel a sense of loss if we could no longer work together.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We would both feel a sense of loss if one of us was transferred and we could no longer work together.
can share problems with others and they know that the others would respond kindly and constructively	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			If I shared my problems with this person, I know (s)he would respond constructively and caringly.
have made considerable emotional efforts for our working relationship.	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			I would have to say that we have both made considerable emotional investments in our working relationship.
Please select "strongly agree" for this response (attention check item)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			
SECTION 5 - ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE OF WORKING WITH THE TEAM (17 items)				
31) In my startup team,	Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Shared Leadership	Mihalache, O.R., Jansen, J.J., Van den Bosch, F.A. and Volberda, H.W., 2014. Top management team shared leadership and organizational ambidexterity- A moderated mediation framework.	
All team members jointly determine the implementation of new ideas related to our organisational vision	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			All members jointly determine the implementation of new business

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
All team members are jointly responsible for setting strategic objectives	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.		Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 8(2), pp.128-148.	All members are jointly responsible for setting strategic objectives
All team members collectively determine the planning of major operational activities in the organisation	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			All members collectively determine the planning of major operations
All team members encourage each other to set high expectations for our work	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			All members encourage each other to high expectations in the work
All team members encourage each other to focus on common goals	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			All members encourage each other to draw on common goals
All team members work with each other to make critical decisions	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			All members call each other to make critical decisions
All team members encourage each other to jointly evaluate the performance of our organisation	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			All members encourage each other to jointly evaluate business performance
All team members encourage each other to cooperate with each other	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			All members encourage each other to cooperate
32) Keeping in mind how your startup team (as a whole) has been working, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Keeping in mind how your startup team (as a whole) has been working, please indicate the extent to which	Continuous Team Learning Behaviour (Team Learning)	Edmondson, A., 1999. Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams. Administrative science	

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
	you agree or disagree with each statement.		quarterly, 44(2), pp.350-383	
We, as a team, regularly take time out to figure out ways to improve our team's work processes	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We regularly take time out to figure out ways to improve our team's work processes
We, as a team, tend to handle differences of opinion directly as a group	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This team tends to handle differences of opinion privately or off-line, rather than addressing them directly as a group - Reverse coded (changed for the survey)
Team members go out and get all the information they possibly can from others - such as customers, beneficiaries or others stakeholders of the organisation	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Team members go out and get all the information they possibly can from others - such as customers or others parts of the organisation
We, as a team, frequently seek new information that leads us to make important changes in our work	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			This team frequently seeks new information that leads us to make important changes...
In our team, someone always makes sure that we stop to reflect on the team's work process	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			In this team, someone always makes sure that we stop to reflect on the team's work process
People in our team often speak up to test assumptions about issues under discussion	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			People in this team often speak up to test assumptions about issues under discussion
We, as a team, invite people from outside the team to present information, give feedback or have discussions with us about our work	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			We invite people from outside the team to present information or have discussions with us

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
In our team, we regularly learn things on the job (there is a lot of learning on the go) – New item	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			
In our team, we learn from each other's success in different ways (eg: celebrating every small achievement) – New item	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			
SECTION 6 - ABOUT THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ORGANIZATION (15 items) (For founders only)				
33) Over the past year, our organization has performed well with regards to	Keeping in mind the performance of the organization over the past year, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement.	Venture Performance	Wiklund, J. and Shepherd, D., 2003. Knowledge-based resources, entrepreneurial orientation, and the performance of small and medium-sized businesses. Strategic management journal, 24(13), pp.1307-1314.	
Revenue and/or Funding growth (Financial Sustainability)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Revenue growth
Growth in the number of full-time and part-time team members (Team/Human Capital Development)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Growth in the number of employees
Growth in the number of team members who are retained/continue to work in the organisation (those who do not leave the organization) (Team/Human Capital Development)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			New Item added in survey
Growth in the number of customers and/or	(1) Strongly disagree; (2)			New Item added in survey

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
beneficiaries (Hybrid Goal Achievement)	Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			
Product/service/programme innovation (Hybrid Goal Achievement)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Product/service innovation
Product/service/programme variety (number of new products, services or programmes) (Hybrid Goal Achievement)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Product/service variety
Growth in the number of areas/regions served (geographical expansion) (Hybrid Goal Achievement)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			New Item added in survey
Process innovation in the organization (Organization Building)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Process innovation
Growth in the number of strategic partners (Organization Building)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			New Item added in survey
Growth in the number of advisors and expert mentors for the organization (Organization Building)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			New Item added in survey
Growth in the organization's network and visibility (online presence, branding, etc.) (Organization Building)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			New Item added in survey
Product/service/programme quality (Social Impact Creation)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree			Product/service quality

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
	nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			
Customer and/or beneficiary satisfaction (<i>Social Impact Creation</i>)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			Customer satisfaction
Growth in the delivery of core activities that contribute to the impact goals (eg: number of trainings delivered to school children) of the organization (<i>Social Impact Creation</i>)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			New Item added in survey
Growth in the achievement of the impact goals or outcomes (eg: reduction in student drop out rate) of the organization (<i>Social Impact Creation</i>)	(1) Strongly disagree; (2) Disagree; (3) Neither agree nor disagree; (4) Agree; (5) Strongly agree.			New Item added in survey
				Sales growth – Removed
				Net profit margin – Removed
				Adoption of new technology – Removed
SECTION 7 - HOW COVID19 HAS AFFECTED YOUR ORGANIZATION (7 items)				
34) To what extent has the current COVID19 pandemic affected the way the team members work with and interact with each other in the organization?	(1) Not sure; (2) Not at all; (3) Very Little; (4) Somewhat; (5) To a great extent	Acknowledging the potential effect of the current situation with regards to survey response (Control Variable) + gathering relevant information given the current situation + to have an	New Scale	
35) Please elaborate on how/whether the current COVID19 pandemic has affected the way the team members work with and interact with each other in the organization.	(text box)			
36) To what extent has the current COVID19 pandemic affected the way the startup team	(1) Not sure; (2) Not at all; (3) Very Little; (4) Somewhat; (5)			

ITEMS USED IN SURVEY	RESPONSE SCALE	CONSTRUCT	SOURCE	ORIGINAL ITEMS
works with and interacts with customers/beneficiaries, partners and other external stakeholders of the organization?	To a great extent	adaptive survey design		
37) Please elaborate on how/whether the current COVID19 pandemic has affected the way the startup team works with and interacts with customers/beneficiaries, partners and other external stakeholders of the organization.	(text box)			
38) To what extent has the current COVID19 pandemic affected the delivery of the core activities (related to the delivery of the product/service/programme) of the organization?	(1) Not sure; (2) Not at all; (3) Very Little; (4) Somewhat; (5) To a great extent			
39) Please elaborate on how/whether the current COVID19 pandemic has affected the delivery of the core activities (related to the delivery of the product/service/programme) of the organization.	(text box)			
40) Is there anything else you would like to tell us related to this section or about the survey in general (the topic, the questions, the themes, the experience, the flow, etc.)? (optional).	(text box)			

Appendix G – List of Ecosystem Partners for Survey Distribution (Study 2)

#	Organisation	Category	Website
1	UnLtd India	Incubator	https://unltdindia.org/
2	Upaya Social Ventures	Fund	https://www.upayasv.org/
3	Amani Institute India	Fellowship	https://amaniinstitute.org/
4	Centre for Advancement of Philanthropy (CAP)	Social Enterprise Support	https://capindia.in/home/#!main
5	The Better India (The Better Home)	Magazine; Marketplace	https://www.thebetterindia.com/
6	AIC-RMP	Incubator	https://www.aic-rmp.org/
7	Startup Oasis (by CIIE-A)	Incubator	http://startupoasis.in/
8	CIIE (IIM-A)	University Incubator	https://cie.co/index.html
9	Acumen Fund	Fellowship	https://acumen.org/fellowships/
10	Jagriti Yatra (Google Group)	Fellowship	http://www.jagritiyatra.com/
12	Villgro	Incubator	https://www.villgro.org/
13	Gandhi Fellowship (Piramal Foundation)	Fellowship	https://gandhifellowship.org/
14	Social Alpha	Incubator (Fund)	https://www.socialalpha.org/
15	ISB Mohali Net Impact Club	University Network	https://www.isb.edu/net-impact-club
16	MASH Project Foundation	NGO (Ecosystem Builder)	http://www.mashglobal.org/
17	Google for Startups (India)	Accelerator	https://startup.google.com/
18	Teach For India	Fellowship	https://www.teachforindia.org/
19	Atma	Accelerator	https://atma.org.in/
20	Mantra4Change	Incubator	https://mantra4change.com/

Appendix H – Ethical Considerations of The Doctoral Dissertation

The following ethical considerations were considered with regards to the data collection for the doctoral dissertation:

- Human Participants: The doctoral research project included primary data collection with human participants (founders and team members of startup social enterprises in India). The mixed methods project included 87 individual participants for the qualitative study and 243 individual participants for the quantitative study.
- Participant Consent for Data Collection: The qualitative research involved semi structured interviews (both in person in Mumbai and on the phone); approximately 30-60 minutes per participant (45 minutes on average). The interviews were recorded (audio); with permission from the participants. The researcher also conducted participant observation and context immersion (observing the team interactions whenever possible). The quantitative research involved online surveys that the individual participants responded to remotely. Participant consent was given by every participant for all the forms of data collection outlined above.
- Confidentiality: No security-sensitive data, commercially sensitive data and patentable data was collected. No personal identifiable data was collected for the quantitative research (apart from participant email addresses in order to disburse the Amazon India gift vouchers) and no personal information was shared from the qualitative research (all quotes and transcripts were anonymised). Any published work will only include macro level/group level insights and no individuals or organisations will mentioned anywhere in the text. If using direct quotes from interviews, no names will be mentioned. If any participants choose to withdraw their consent, then data from those participants will be omitted from the study and their responses can be deleted if required.
- Data Security: I have full responsibility for data management and will store the data securely in my personal password protected archives. My supervisors can have access to the data if requested and have access to the data findings. The interview transcription agency (Editage Author Services – part of Cactus Communications) that was used was given access to the interview recordings for the purpose of transcription. The data will not be shared or accessed by anyone else.
- External Ethical Approval: The doctoral research project received external ethical approval from the grant provider (ERC); because it is part of the larger ERC Grant 'Individual Action through Social Organisations: The case of poverty' (IATSO). The grant funded the research project, in collaboration with Durham University and LSE.

A detailed explanation of the ethical considerations (ethical protocol followed and supporting documentation required) can be found in the Ethics Form that was been submitted separately as part of the Ph.D. Progression Review 2019 and the Ph.D. Confirmation Review 2020 (at Durham University Business School).

Chapter 11

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