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MATTHEW JAMES HEDGES

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# **The Post-Arab Spring Regime Security Strategy of the United Arab Emirates**

**Matthew James Hedges**

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA)

Durham University

## **Abstract**

### **The Post-Arab Spring Regime Security Strategy of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)**

Matthew James Hedges

The persistence of authoritarian governance in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) has long been the focus of much discussion in the social sciences. Studies have sought to explain how and why authoritarian states are able to maintain power through turbulent periods. In particular, theories of civil-military relations, most of it originating in Western academia, has often provided the theoretical foundation for exploring regime security in non-democratic societies. This thesis acknowledges and builds upon these studies, but recognises how paradigms applied to explore the phenomenon of authoritarian resilience are inadequate when applied to the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Across the Gulf monarchies, the authoritarian leader holds a supreme position within the state, a position amplified by traditional socio-cultural links such as tribalism, the ability to co-opt much of the religious establishment and, of course, the social contract particular to much of the Gulf monarchies, Rentierism in its varied forms. As a result, the importance of regime security is prioritised over that of the nation and of the state. When summarised and applied universally, two approaches are generally taken to maintain the security of the regime; enforcement of power and maintenance of power. The method highlighted within this thesis emphasises the direct oversight and micro-management built into a monarch's system of control and authority. At the centre of this strategy is the supervision of the human network that not only provides their reign with legitimacy but also their conduit for control.

This thesis develops a new model for regime security that acknowledges the socio-cultural characteristics of traditional authoritarian states. Corporate and clientelist elements support the structuring of power that is designed to principally defend the regime. These sectors have long been prioritised and nurtured by elites in a bid to maximise control over capabilities and persons within these fields. The regime's control of the military and surveillance sectors help amplify their enforcement of power, while the micro-management of the economy and industrial sectors aid the sustained ability to maintain power. This paradigm is defined as the neo-corporate praetorian (NCP) model, and it assumes the dual-tiered structure of power within a modern authoritarian state.

This thesis develops these observations to explore how the Abu Dhabi ruling family has fused the federal identity of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) into prioritising the security of the regime over that of the nation and the state. The case study of the UAE is unique because of the multiple images of identity and their network of allegiances across the UAE. Examined further, this concentration of power within the regime is focused further through maternal, tribal and kinship bonds that are deliberately nurtured to provide sustained security and continuity.

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## List of Abbreviations

Abu Dhabi Defence Force	(ADDF)
Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company	(ADDHC)
Abu Dhabi Executive Council	(ADEC)
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority	(ADIA)
Abu Dhabi Investment Council	(ADIC)
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company	(ADNOC)
Advanced Military Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Centre	(AMMROC)
Air Force and Air Defence	(AFAD)
Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah	(BMBK)
Chief Executive Officer	(CEO)
Counter-Intelligence	(CI)
Crown Prince Court	(CPC)
Emirates Advanced Investment	(EAI)
Emirates Defence Investment Company	(EDIC)
Federal National Congress	(FNC)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office	(FCO)
General Head Quarters	(GHQ)
Gross Domestic Product	(GDP)
Gulf Co-operation Council	(GCC)
Gulf States Newsletter	(GSN)
Higher College of Technology	(HCT)
Information and Communications Technology	(ICT)
Intellectual Property	(IP)
Import Substitution Industrialisation	(ISI)
International Financial Institutions	(IFI)
Internet Service Provider	(ISP)
Joint Aviation Command	(JAC)
Joint Special Operations Command	(JSOC)
Khalifa bin Zayed	(KBZ)
Maintenance Repair and Overhaul	(MRO)
Memorandum of Understanding	(MOU)
Middle East and North Africa	(MENA)
Mohammed bin Rashid	(MBR)
Mohammed bin Salman	(MBS)
Mohammed bin Zayed	(MBZ)
National Electronic Security Authority	(NESA)
National Development Plans	(NDP)
National Media Council	(NMC)
National Oil Companies	(NOC)
Neo-Corporate Praetorianism	(NCP)
Non-Commissioned Officers	(NCO)
Non-Governmental Organisations	(NGO)
Offset Program Bureau	(OPB)
Original Equipment Manufacturer	(OEM)

Politically Relevant Elites	(PREs)
Presidential Guard	(PG)
Privately Owned Champions	(POC)
Public Private Partnerships	(PPP)
Ras al Khaimah	(RAK)
Rentier State Theory	(RST)
Saudi Arabian National Guard	(SANG)
Signals Intelligence Authority	(SIA)
Small and Medium Enterprises	(SME)
Sovereign Wealth Funds	(SWF)
Special Forces	(SF)
State Owned Enterprises	(SOE)
Structural Adjustment Packages	(SAP)
Supreme Petroleum Council	(SPC)
Telecommunication Regulatory Authority	(TRA)
Trucial Oman Scouts	(TOS)
Umm al Quwain	(UAQ)
United Arab Emirates	(UAE)
United States of America	(USA)
United States Special Operations Command	(SOCOM)
Union Defence Force	(UDF)
United Kingdom	(UK)
Value Added Tax	(VAT)
Vice President	(VP)
Virtual Private Network	(VPN)
Voice Over Internet Protocol	(VOIP)

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## Chapter 1 – Introduction

Methods of political governance have been heavily impacted by technological developments and social-economic modernisation. While this has altered global systems of political interaction, there are still traditional tenets by which many states practice their authority. This is of particular significance for authoritarian states due to their application of multifaceted methods of control and lack of formal accountability. For the states of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – the evolving challenge of maintaining control and authority is a complicated challenge as the ruling monarchs balance traditional power mechanisms that legitimise their authority with dynamic socio-political conditions.

Traditional governance systems are defined by their claim and belief in the ‘sanctity of the order and the attendant powers of control as they have been handed down from the past’<sup>1</sup>. Tradition extends the capabilities of a state, and when bonded to its identity, provides a powerful platform from which to significantly expand its power. This concept is firmly grounded within the GCC states who all share the institution of monarchy and continue to operate above society, thus providing multiple avenues from which to extrapolate supplementary power and authority. Their main challenge is how to maintain authority amid an array of evolving threats.

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<sup>1</sup> M Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, trans. AM Henderson & T Parsons, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1947, p.341

The institution of monarchy is still a present fixture across the world. It's degree of influence varies from that of an absolute monarchy through to a symbolic institution. With each example and setting comes a number of factors which impede, or enhance its authoritative capabilities.

The GCC states have grown as extensions of households that ruled the area before their states were formally established, and therefore, the socio-political dynamics within each state provides exclusive lenses for analysis. The relationship between monarch and society is central in understanding how, and where, pressure is applied to influence domestic power dynamics. The network of factors which support these interactions is deeply ingrained in the tradition of each society. In turn, these unique characteristics have become part of a central strategy for the monarchs to reinforce the fundamental basis upon which their authority is built upon.

Having identified the heightened influence of personal relationships within the politics of GCC societies, this dynamic becomes a predominant lens for which to observe the exercise of power and authority. This hypothesis acknowledges the gravitation of power towards the elites.

While the topic of authoritarian longevity has been discussed at length, there has been a lack of detailed and specific analysis into the GCC states. The observations about the longevity of the GCC monarchies have utilised broad postulations, with the majority falling short of the required inspection regarding the relationship between internal dynamics and managed

security perceptions. It is within this scope that this thesis attempts to provide a unique case study of the evolving governance strategy within the UAE.

### **Federation; Power or Curse**

The UAE is a member of the GCC. As a state it was founded in 1971. It is a federation of 7 Emirates – Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al Khaimah, and Sharjah – each one having its own relationship with its particular micro-climate of socio-political dynamics. As a result of the overlapping fabric of social relations and authority, the federal identity of the UAE has the potential ability to weaken its union. This was the cause of significant tension within the UAE's earlier years; as power solidified, so did the state's stability.

While the seven Emirates are technically equal in constitutional power, Abu Dhabi is the capital Emirate and possesses the vast majority of the state's oil reserves that have been used to develop the state in Abu Dhabi's image. There is a stark contrast in socio-economic conditions across the Emirates, with the capital hosting all major federal bodies and acting as the central diplomatic hub for foreign relations. Therefore, the management of the state by the Abu Dhabi ruling family is the single most important factor in the development of the UAE.

The founder of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, carefully managed the relationship between the Emirates and the collective development of the state; after his death in 2004, there has been a seismic shift in political relations. The subsequent leadership of his successor, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, has faced different threats, leading to the postulation that governance within the UAE has also evolved. This thesis therefore seeks

to analyse the predominant threats to Abu Dhabi's ruling family and how its members have managed to protect themselves from these issues.

Christopher Davidson,<sup>2</sup> the leading scholar on the contemporary UAE, has written several books analysing in detail the development of Abu Dhabi<sup>3</sup> and Dubai<sup>4</sup>. He builds upon previous works of Frauke Heard-Bey,<sup>5</sup> Hendrik Van Der Meulen,<sup>6</sup> and Wilfred Thesiger,<sup>7</sup> all of whom have analysed the UAE from societal and historical accounts. Yet, it is in a recent monograph,<sup>8</sup> that Christopher Davidson attempts to challenge the orthodox notions of how the modern day GCC states are reacting to the challenges of modernisation. He postulated that the GCC monarchies 'will be gone in the next two to five years'.<sup>9</sup> While his estimation of the GCC longevity has proved to be wrong, the theoretical argument presented throughout the study is strong and built upon a wide berth of scholarship. Christopher Davidson understands that many of the conditions that were apparent in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia during the Arab Spring are consistent, if not magnified within the GCC states, because of the skewed social contract between the region's monarchs and citizens.

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<sup>2</sup> C Davidson, *The United Arab Emirates: A Study in Survival*, Lynne Rienner, London, 2004

<sup>3</sup> C Davidson, *Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond*, Hurst & Co, London, 2011

<sup>4</sup> C Davidson, *Dubai: The Vulnerability of Success*, Hurst & Co, London, 2009

<sup>5</sup> F Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States To United Arab Emirates*, Longman, London, 1982

<sup>6</sup> H Van Der Muelen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, PhD Thesis, Tufts University, 1997

<sup>7</sup> W Thesiger, *Arabian Sands*, Penguin, London, 2007

<sup>8</sup> C Davidson, *After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies*, Hurst & Co, London, 2012

<sup>9</sup> C Davidson, *After the Sheikhs*, p.vii

Whilst Christopher Davidson examines the macro-trends of the post-Arab Spring GCC, Kristian Ulrichsen examines the case study of Qatar, whose dynamics are somewhat unique. His innovative study, *Qatar and the Arab Spring*,<sup>10</sup> observes Qatar's development-focused and political Islam oriented foreign policy ideology, and highlights how this was translated into policy through the turbulent period. Kristian Ulrichsen gravitates his analysis around Qatar's foreign policy, largely ignoring internal issues. What is evident in his thesis, and many other studies about other GCC states,<sup>11</sup> is the lack of analysis into how the mechanisms of power and control are changing to suit a new political reality, leveraging a unique angle that the research seeks to pursue. There is a wide gap in the field of research on the micro-decisions employed by states to protect themselves.

Kristian Ulrichsen followed with a book on the UAE, tracing the coaxial development of Emirati foreign and domestic policies.<sup>12</sup> While literature pertaining to the UAE has been limited in scope, he has been able to illustrate the key drivers for the state's united policy, while also explaining the impact of those decisions within the federation's identity. What this means however is that Kristian Ulrichsen over-emphasises the role of formal rational institutions within the UAE and overlooks the domestic dynamics that also drive policy

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<sup>10</sup> KC Ulrichsen, *Qatar and the Arab Spring*, Hurst & Co, London, 2014

<sup>11</sup> DB Roberts, *Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City-State*, Hurst & Co, London, 2017

D Held & KC Ulrichsen (eds.), *The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order*, Routledge, London, 2011

<sup>12</sup> KC Ulrichsen, *The United Arab Emirates; Power, Politics, and Decision Making*, Routledge, London, 2016

decisions within the UAE. This thesis argues that while a state-level approach, such as that utilised by Kristian Ulrichsen could be useful when analysing security strategy, the internal dynamics that support a reign within an authoritarian state provide greater influence on issues of governance than their foreign relations. This thesis, however, acknowledges the fact that 'there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence – direct or indirect – of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself'.<sup>13</sup> As a result, it is crucial for an investigation into an authoritarian state's management of modernisation to incorporate elite dynamics.

David Roberts attempts to examine the development of the UAE Armed Forces and its effectiveness; however, his lack of tangible evidence and vague hypotheses are symptoms of a clear misunderstanding of the topic. He states that 'there is little evidence of preferential promotion of royals in contemporary UAE operations. More generally, there is no forging of exclusionary identity-based military'.<sup>14</sup> Only elementary research shows this to be inaccurate at Staff Pilot Major General Sheikh Ahmed bin Tahnoon al Nahyan is the Chairman of the National Service and Reserve Authority,<sup>15</sup> Rear Admiral Pilot Staff Major General Sheikh Saeed

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<sup>13</sup> G O'Donnell and P Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986, p.19

<sup>14</sup> DB Robert, 'Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World', *Security Studies*, Vol.29, No.2, 2020, p.30

<sup>15</sup> 'Chairman of the National Service and Reserve Authority Lecture', *National Defence College*, 19<sup>th</sup> February 2018, available online, <http://www.ndc.ac.ae/en/chairman-of-the-national-service-and-reserve-authority-lecture>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

bin Hamdan bin Mohammed al Nahyan is the Commander of the UAE Navy,<sup>16</sup> and Sheikh Zayed bin Hamdan was injured while on overseas operations in Yemen.<sup>17</sup> It is hypothesised that the UAE Armed Forces has come under increased control of the Abu Dhabi ruling family since the Arab Spring, and that this is illustrated by clear changes.

Therefore, due to the lack of detailed and accurate contemporary case studies, this thesis will present the case study of the UAE. It aims to complement the current field of scholarship by seeking to address the following research question: To what extent has the UAE's regime security strategy has been affected by the Arab Spring? The assumption is that the principal threat to the UAE originates from domestic, rather than foreign sources. It hopes to illustrate why changes have been made to the UAE's internal governance structure, and in what and whose image. The initial postulation is that, since the Arab Spring, there has been an increasing centralisation of the state's power, rising bureaucracy, a move towards a unitary state, and the future of the UAE has been bound to the survival of the Abu Dhabi ruling family.

## **Structure**

The thesis is organised into ten chapters. In this first chapter there is a brief outline as to the context of the thesis and how it is structured. The second discusses the theoretical foundation

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<sup>16</sup> 'UAE Naval Forces Commander, Pakistani counterpart discuss cooperation', *WAM*, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2019, available online, <http://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395302775675>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>17</sup> 'UAE Leaders welcome Sheikh Zayed bin Hamdan home after Yemen injuries', *The National*, 19<sup>th</sup> February 2018, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-leaders-welcome-sheikh-zayed-bin-hamdan-home-after-yemen-injuries-1.706108>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

of authoritarianism and consequent observations about how authoritarian states maintain their position in power. Identifying the connection between traditional institutions and their societies focuses attention on the regime and leadership of the state. This leads to the third chapter that explores and defines regime security. While this domain lacks rigid and formal theory, this thesis discusses the main objectives and practices within a regime security strategy, providing the conceptual foundations for this thesis. The two fundamental tenets of a regime security strategy are the enforcement and the maintenance of power. Based upon these observations, the fourth chapter constructs the theoretical framework and provides a theory of neo-corporate praetorianism (NCP) to display how the state manages power.

Once the theoretical framework is addressed, the fifth chapter explores the historical precedent of regime security set by the founder of the state, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan. This enables a contextual foundation for the analysis of the internal security dynamics within the Abu Dhabi ruling family. As a result of the cumulative foundation of knowledge, the thesis will subsequently explore the four pillars of the NCP, the UAE's regime security strategy. It will be broadly split between the enforcement and maintenance of power.

The sixth chapter assesses how the regime's control of the military has been adapted following the Arab Spring. Surveillance will follow this and Chapter Seven will deal with the evolving tools being employed to increase the state's observation and control of society. Having examined the enforcement mechanisms within a regime security strategy, the following chapters assess how regimes are able to maintain their positions in control. Chapter eight details changes made to the regime's management and political control of the economy, and how this is adapted to optimize continuous revenue generation. Chapter nine will explore

how, in-step with the economy, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has managed to control the industrial sector.

By evaluating the changes made to the UAE's regime security strategy through the paradigm of NCP, this thesis provides a unique theoretical construct that builds upon contextual nuances, rather than applying an incompatible theory to a specific case study. The application of the NCP against the UAE is furthermore distinctive as a result of the lack of academic research into its domestic political relations and the further complication presented by its federal identity.

## Chapter 2 - Determining Value of Authoritarian Society

Debates exploring the distinction between democratic and non-democratic governments have built upon millennia of intellectual debate.<sup>18</sup> Modern observations have sought to identify different government typologies by quantifying the measurement of government political output upon society. At one end an anarchistic state, delivers little to no output; at the other a totalitarian state, an overarching monolith. Juan Linz contributes by defining a totalitarian state through the classification of 'a political ideology, single mass party, concentrated power in an individual and his collaborators, and one where those in authority cannot be dislodged by institutional or peaceful means'.<sup>19</sup>

The spectrum and the forms of a totalitarian state are identified and expressed within a modern and Western-oriented political world. Due to the lack of relevant factors for non-western non-democratic states - such as manifestations of legal-formal organisations, political ideology, and space for debate – therefore the term totalitarianism is not accurate. Instead, a non-democratic non-totalitarian state is best described as authoritarian. Linz defines authoritarian states as:

'political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities without extensive nor

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<sup>18</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, GRF Ferrari (ed.), T Griffith, trans., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, Aristotle, *Politics*, E Barker, trans., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995

<sup>19</sup> JJ Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, Lynn Rienner Publishers, London, 2000, .p67

intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones'.<sup>20</sup>

In essence, Juan Linz's definition of authoritarianism is best understood as democracy's juxtaposing ideology. Authoritarianism is the political practice of unbalanced power in a social clique that is not accountable through formal means and processes. In contrast to totalitarianism, authoritarianism has a wider utilisation, with traditional forms of governance, legitimacy, and power thread through its identity.

### **Traditional and personal politics**

While the practice of political administration has evolved as a result of the impact of technological and philosophical development, methods of traditional political rule still hold significant influence, especially across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Max Weber acknowledges this observation through his three forms of legitimate rule: legal authority, traditional authority and charismatic authority.<sup>21</sup> Hisham Sharabi later advanced Max Weber's theory and reacquainted it within the modern MENA by postulating the theory of

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<sup>20</sup> Juan J Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: the Case of Spain", in E Allard and Y Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, Westermarck Society, Helsinki, 1961, .p255 in JJ Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, .p159

<sup>21</sup> Max Weber, *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, A M Henderson and T Parsons, trans., Free Press, Glencoe, 1947, .p328

neo-patriarchy.<sup>22</sup> Fundamentally, neo-patriarchy acknowledges that whilst Western modernism has influenced the evolution of governance within the MENA, traditional features of society still emit a powerful, and even controlling degree of influence. Traditional authority is defined by Max Weber as, 'if legitimacy is claimed for it and believed in on the basis of the sanctity of the order and the attendant powers of control as they have been handed down from the past'.<sup>23</sup>

A predominant feature of neo-patriarchy is the conception of centralised leadership. This is characterised by values of personalism, proximity, informality, balanced conflict, military prowess and religious rationalization.<sup>24</sup> James Bill and Carl Leiden contribute to this hypothesis by arguing that the sovereign or leader is the prominent actor within the state and 'he is surrounded by advisors, ministers, military leaders, personal secretaries, and confidants. The one thing that all members of this inner circle share is unquestioned personal loyalty to the leader'.<sup>25</sup> The centrality and supremacy of political leadership within the MENA is further bolstered by the fact that 'their internal structures remain rooted in the patriarchal values and social relations of kinship, clan, and religious and ethnic groups'.<sup>26</sup> It could be said that neo-patriarchal states can continue operating in a similar structure to that of past generations, albeit within contemporary mechanisms.

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<sup>22</sup> H Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, Oxford University Press, USA, 1988

<sup>23</sup> M Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, p.341

<sup>24</sup> J Bill and R Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East*, Addison Wesley Longman, New York, 2000, .p118

<sup>25</sup> JA Bill and A Leiden, *The Middle East Politics and Power*, Allyn and Bacon, Boston 1974, .p106

<sup>26</sup> *ibid*, p.8

John Peterson builds upon the narrative of traditional power mediums influencing the political structure within the MENA by saying that:

‘Even though the state has replaced the tribe as the primary political unit, it still relies heavily on various tribal components. The most obvious and most important of these is the ruling family, whose political position is absolute...complementing the family elite is a second elite group composed of the shaykhly clans from other major tribes in the state’.<sup>27</sup>

John Peterson’s emphasis on the role played by traditional power structures in contemporary politics helps to illuminate formal and informal power networks and dissect ruling coalitions within the state. This understanding has heightened significance across the MENA, and in particular the monarchies of the GCC, as a result of their shared monarchical system of centralised rule and authority.

Michael Hudson observes the monarchies of the GCC as a product of their society by hypothesising that ‘the ideal Arab monarchy, perfectly legitimized, entirely congruent with the values of the traditional political culture, would be an Islamic theocracy governed by the

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<sup>27</sup> JE Peterson, ‘Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 31, No.3, Summer 1977, pp.306-

ablest leaders of a tribe tracing its lineage to the Prophet'.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, according to Hudson, the GCC monarchies satisfy Max Weber's three forms of political rule by providing traditional, legal, and legitimate mediums of support. While a state may illustrate the basis for support based upon Max Weber's premise, this does not account for the methods and principle for the continuation of their rule.

### **Authoritarian stability**

The ability for authoritarian states to maintain their rule has been widely discussed, with literature focused around regional conditions<sup>29</sup> and theoretical issues. Samuel Huntington contributes to the later debate by identifying three potential courses of action authoritarian leader's may face when seeking to prolong their power; he calls this, the 'King's Dilemma'.<sup>30</sup> The first option is to reduce power (potentially abdicating) and continue to modernize, paving the way for a constitutional monarchy; the secondly to combine monarchical power with popular authority; and the third to maintain the status quo as the sole source of authority and quell efforts that undermine the incumbent authority.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> M Hudson, 'Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy', Yale University Press, New Haven, 1997, .p167 in G Gause, 'The Persistence of Monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula: A Comparative Analysis', in J Kostiner (ed.), *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Colorado 2000, .p169

<sup>29</sup> R Owen, *Rise and Fall of Arab Presidents for Life*, Harvard University Press, London, 2012

<sup>30</sup> SP Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, .p177

<sup>31</sup> *ibid*

While Samuel Huntington's analysis illustrates the predominant options for the state's leadership, there is a critical aspect highlighted within his hypothesis regarding what the main concern for the head of state actually is. This is due to the fact that there are different images and constructions of power within states, and that these have differing priorities. Brian Job illustrates this view from within the context of security analysis by postulating four predominant concerns; 'the security of the individual citizen, the security of the nation, the security of the regime, and the security of the state'.<sup>32</sup> Through the acknowledgement of differing threats and concerns, this thesis is directed towards identifying the predominant security concern of an authoritarian state, and the strategy with which this threat manifestation is combatted. This is based upon the assumption that there are differing strategies for different security perceptions.

In order to understand whose security is an authoritarian state primarily preoccupied, it is important to acknowledge that security is a contested construct. Barry Buzan partially agrees and hypothesizes three pillars of security context: the individual, the state, and the international system.<sup>33</sup> He develops this by arguing that 'states are the principal referent object of security because they are both the framework of order and the highest source of governing authority'.<sup>34</sup> Barry Buzan's postulation is framed within a liberal Western

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<sup>32</sup> BL Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and State Securities in the Third World', BL Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma; National Security of Third World States*, p.15

<sup>33</sup> B Buzan, *People, States and Fear; An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991, p.1

<sup>34</sup> *ibid*, p.40

understanding of a state and as a result, often contradicts the reality in illiberal, non-Western countries. In case studies such as that presented in this thesis, informal structures and organisations heavily contribute to the power of a state, and therefore undermine the primacy of the state as the predominant concern; instead, this thesis ‘depicts society as a mélange of social organisations rather than a dichotomous structure’<sup>35</sup> and therefore hold a heightened value in relation to the centralised state.

Illiberal countries are identified by Brian Job, as weak states,<sup>36</sup> in contrast to liberal equivalents; this is as a result of their brittle constitutions, lack of a separation of powers, and a blurring of public and private ownership. Robert Rotberg further builds upon this distinction by expanding on a wider set of principles and circumstances that designate the title of a weak state; ‘Weak states include a broad continuum of states: they may be inherently weak because of geographical, physical, or fundamental economic constraints; or they may be basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks’.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Joel S Migdal, *State in Society, Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p.49

<sup>36</sup> ‘Job describes the differences between strong states and weak states by saying, ‘In simplistic terms, the troubles of Third World states arise because they do not possess the qualities of “strong states” – essentially the characteristics of the Western, democratic industrialized nation-states’, BL Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and State Securities in the Third World’, BL Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma; National Security of Third World States*, p.19

<sup>37</sup> RI Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States’, in RI Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003, p.4

Viewed another way, strong states meet 'challenges with minimum reliance on hard power'.<sup>38</sup> Central to the concept of state strength is the prioritisation of the internal dimension to threat construction. This is heightened within a weak state and further acknowledged by Robert Jackson who hypothesizes that 'for weak states, the domestic sphere is actually far more dangerous and threatening than the international sphere'.<sup>39</sup> Steven David also contributes to the focus of internal, rather than external security, for authoritarian states, by saying that 'since 1945 wars within states have outnumbered wars between states, a gap that is especially pronounced in the third world'.<sup>40</sup> By emphasising internal and institutional threats, third world security must principally gravitate around the array of factors which impact internal dynamics and the political structure of the country in question. This is seen in contrast to Western conceptions of security that have traditionally portrayed the concept via coercive, and predominantly militaristic lenses.

### **Civil-Military Relations in an Authoritarian State**

As a result of the prominent focus of the role of conventional security forces within most states, and in particularly research towards authoritarian states, much of the literature pertaining to authoritarian survival strategies is often framed within a western-orientated civil-military relations spectrum.

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<sup>38</sup> R Falk, 'Framing an Inquiry', in A Saikal (.ed), *Weak States, Strong Societies, Power and Authority in the New World Order*, I.B.Tauris, London, 2016, p.13

<sup>39</sup> R Jackson, 'Regime Security', in A Collins (ed.), *Contemporary Security Studies*, p.148

<sup>40</sup> SR David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, January 1991, p.238

Samuel Huntington's landmark contribution is a key example of this orientation, as he explains that not only are the political and military worlds inherently different, but that 'politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their profession'<sup>41</sup>. The clear delineation of tasks rejects an application of Samuel Huntington's premise towards authoritarian states because of the overpowering influence of informal and unofficial power networks that support their rule.

Morris Janowitz also contributes to the orthodox discussion of civil-military relations through the prism of professionalism. While he argues that the two domains will increasingly merge 'due to technical innovations',<sup>42</sup> there will still be inexplicable tensions between the two spheres. A professional army would be 'amenable to civilian political control because he (the ruler) recognises that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force',<sup>43</sup> and thus the democratic virtue of the separation of powers further splits the application of civil-military relations theory in authoritarian states from their democratic acquaintance.

Another predominant issue highlighted from literature is the common feature of the military's direct involvement and intervention in politics. While this symptom has been consistently observed throughout history, the twentieth century saw a heightened

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<sup>41</sup> SP Huntington, *The Soldier and State*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1964, .p70

<sup>42</sup> M Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait*, Free Press, Glencoe, 1960, p.31-32

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*, p.420

engagement; specifically, within illiberal countries. Samuel Finer analyses this behaviour, arguing that the military does have a 'disposition to intervene',<sup>44</sup> however it may be deterred through its expression of professional values. The military's 'consciousness of having an identity that is separate from, and yet juxtaposed with the civilians and the politicians',<sup>45</sup> does however distance the two realms from each other. While the military may argue its potential intervention as an obligation to protect the national or institutional interest, the military does so on the basis of a responsibility to society.

The military may feel a degree of social responsibility towards society, however Finer notes that 'a number of states exist where the military have not hitherto intervened and where they show no current signs of wishing to do so. Such states include the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Kingdoms of Arabia'.<sup>46</sup> The acknowledgement herein is supported by Manfred Halpern who states that 'there has never been a tradition in the Middle East of separating military from civilian authority'.<sup>47</sup> As a result, for authoritarian states in the MENA region, including those within the GCC, you cannot distinguish between civilian and military domains. Therefore, the limitation of traditional civil-military relations theory highlights its incompatibility with the scope of this research.

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<sup>44</sup> S Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Westview, Boulder, 1988, pp.23-71

<sup>45</sup> *ibid*, p.71

<sup>46</sup> S Finer, 'The man on Horseback-1974', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.1, No.1, November 1974, pp.15-16

<sup>47</sup> M Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa*, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1963, p.251

Whilst there has been a broad consensus about the inappropriate application of civil-military relations theory towards the MENA, there has still been an exploration of potential avenues. Theories have identified a broad range of models, including: a pre-Erdogan praetorian guard in Turkey,<sup>48</sup> a parallel military in the guise of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),<sup>49</sup> and a corporate entity whose power is exhibited (both within uniform and when select officers transition into the civilian domain), most commonly analysed in Egypt<sup>50</sup> and Israel.<sup>51</sup> Region-specific theoretical models have on the other hand focused on the military's intervention and contention of domestic politics.<sup>52</sup>

While the predominant examples of MENA civil-military relations do investigate clear patterns, and have some utilisation for orthodox theory, the aforementioned examples all exhibit degrees of democratic and republican governance. This is not to say that Turkey, Iran,

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<sup>48</sup> SA Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2007

<sup>49</sup> N Schahgaldian, *The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic*, RAND, Santa Monica, 1987

<sup>50</sup> H Albrecht, 'Authoritarian Transformation or Transition from Authoritarianism? Insights on Regime Change in Egypt?', in B Korany and RI-Mahdi (eds.), *The Arab Revolution in Egypt and Beyond*, American University of Cairo Press, Cairo, 2012

<sup>51</sup> E Etzioni-Halevy, 'Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.22, No.3, Spring 1996, pp.401-417

<sup>52</sup> JC Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension*, Council on Foreign Relations, Prager, New York, 1969

E Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*, Prager, London, 1970

A Peraltmutter, 'The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Towards a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.1, No.3, 1969, pp. 382-404

Egypt, or Israel don't possess certain features of authoritarianism, but that there is a clear distinction with other MENA states, such as the GCC states, that possess the majority of features associated with authoritarian regimes.

This distinction acknowledges that traditionally-oriented authoritarian states have fewer formal bodies and constituencies that they could claim to represent, or more informal factions that determine political and social dynamics, and are therefore incompatible with orthodox civil-military theory. Instead, this thesis argues that for a traditionally supported authoritarian state, the predominant relationship that upholds the system of rule is between the political and military elites, and not between the civil and military elites.

### **Political-Military Relations link**

While there is a plethora of literature on civil-military relations, political-military relations do not have a formal body of knowledge. Where the former acknowledges the separation of civilian and military domains, with the enforcement of the military's subservience to civilian authorities, political-military relations observe a competition for authority among similarly powerful institutions. Civil-military relations determine the subservience to civilian oversight whereas political-military relations conclude fidelity to the executors of the state's power. This assumes differing objectives between civilian and military entities, with the rivalry for political power being the primary objective. This observation is magnified within an illiberal state, due to the heightened concentration of power within the ruling authority and the prevalent existence and power of in-formal mechanisms that wield considerable influence. The result of the political-military hypothesis is a concentrated power centre that dictates and

orchestrates strategic objectives to suit its own interests, be it in the civilian or military domains, or most commonly, a combination of both.

Due to the lack of engagement with the field of political-military relations, studies into MENA authoritarian states most commonly apply incompatible theory towards their case studies. Examples include Mehran Kamrava's assessment of MENA civil-military relations which was centred around the perception that 'Middle Eastern leaders and states have sought to professionalize the armed forces'.<sup>53</sup> His perception of this phenomenon was based upon 'the introduction of modern military equipment, established procedures for recruitment and promotions, and advanced training'.<sup>54</sup> Kamrava has not only attempted to theorize an entire region filled with idiosyncrasies, but like others he has utilized an orthodox civil-military relations theory to justify his hypothesis; namely a developed version of Huntington's premise of professionalism. While this could be compatible with MENA states that exhibit traces of republicanism, his observation is not compatible with traditionally managed authoritarian states such as the GCC states.

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<sup>53</sup> M Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.115, No.1, Spring 2000, p.67

<sup>54</sup> M Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.115, No.1, Spring 2000, pp.67-68

Florence Gaub also attempts to survey political-military relations within the MENA by acknowledging that the region has been 'much more prone to military meddling'<sup>55</sup> and as a result, requires a more in-depth understanding of the social context. This observation indicates two predominant hypothesis of the political-military relationship: heightened role of the military in politics and society, and an intimate bond between the political establishment, military, and society. Florence Gaub however continues to orientate her analysis through a traditional civil-military relations scope, arguing that civilians seek to maintain control over the military whilst still maintaining operational efficiency. This is highlighted through two means of control: 'objective control is a set of mechanisms, whereas subjective control is essentially a basic agreement of the military and society on values and identity'.<sup>56</sup> Seen in another way, subjective mechanisms build upon Parsons social-systems<sup>57</sup> theory that identifies the interpretation of a society's values as 'center stage in the analysis of power, structure, and change'.<sup>58</sup> As a result of Florence Gaub's looser gravitation to Western-oriented values, there is an ability to utilize aspects of her subject control hypothesis to explain how the political-military relationship operates.

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<sup>55</sup> F Gaub, *Guardians of the Arab State, When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania*, Hurst & Co, London, 2017, p.183

<sup>56</sup> F Gaub, *Guardians of the Arab State*, p.56

<sup>57</sup> T Parsons, *The Social System*, Free Press, Glencoe, 1951

<sup>58</sup> JS Migdal, *State in Society, Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, p.4

It is especially relevant for traditional authoritarian states to integrate the multitude of domestic forces under their authority as a means of diversifying their sources of authority, legitimacy, and power. Through the illustration of the political-military relationship, and the measures taken to manage it, the most contentious issues within the state will be highlighted.

### **Is the Military a tool or a threat?**

Due to the competition and balancing of power between political-military institutions, the coercive capabilities of the military provide additional tools with which to impose an agenda. This can be used to support the reign of an actor or directly intervene to command authority. As a result of the general lack of development, both in terms of human capital and technological development, authoritarian states within the MENA have carefully managed their militaries in order to reduce their potential domestic capability.

Kamrava postulates that the traditional authoritarian states of the MENA are tribally dependent monarchies. Supporting his postulation, he notes that Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) is 'made up entirely of recruits from the country's various tribes whose service is a form of tribal levy.... The National Guard ensures al-Saud's dominance over other tribes'.<sup>59</sup> While his acknowledgement of domestic social linkages is a crucial point in understanding the political-military relationship, his classification is unsupported by evidence, whilst also lacking an in-depth analysis of how this tribal support is manipulated and executed to back the regime

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<sup>59</sup> M Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.115, No.1, Spring 2000, p.89

in question. Instead, Kamrava simply argues that tribally dependent monarchies rely on ‘one or more loyal tribal contingents to counterbalance the regular military’.<sup>60</sup> As a result, this thesis will provide a clear and robust example of Mehran Kamrava’s unsubstantiated hypothesis.

Acknowledging that an authoritarian state’s predominant threat, and capability to defend against it, originate from intrinsic sources, it is critical to understand how the state balances these conditions. Because members of the military are sourced from society there is already a foundation for the subjective means of control. The degrees of competition between dominions of the military, and with the civilian domain, carry a heightened danger for the political-military establishment, as the military possesses a unique capability to dictate terms and forcefully enter politics mostly notably through a coup d’état.

Coups d’état are defined as ‘the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder’.<sup>61</sup> Understanding that there are critical and non-critical segments of the state and that the coercive apparatus is the ultimate guarantor of security,<sup>62</sup> or the fundamental tool in acquiring power, there is a requirement to examine measures to defend against such a practice within a political - military framework.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>61</sup> E Luttwak, *Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook*, p.26-27

<sup>62</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, Adelphi Paper 324, Routledge, London, 1998, p.18

By contrast, coup-proofing is the set of practices implemented to protect against a coup. James Quinlivan defines coup proofing as ‘the set of actions a regime takes to prevent a military coup’.<sup>63</sup> James Quinlivan highlights five common characteristics of coup proofing strategies within the Middle East: exploitation of tribal and kinship ties, parallel armed forces, multiple internal security agencies, fostering of expertness (professionalism), and the financing of these measures.<sup>64</sup> Quinlivan’s study encouraged a wider and more diverse investigation into coup proofing strategies with scholars such as Hannah Albrecht,<sup>65</sup> Risa Brooks,<sup>66</sup> Sheena Greitans,<sup>67</sup> Mehran Kamrava,<sup>68</sup> Hicham Nassiff,<sup>69</sup> and Jonathan Powell<sup>70</sup> contributing to the field. Some theories, such as those presented by Risa Brooks, follow a

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<sup>63</sup> JT Quinlivan, ‘Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East’, p.132

<sup>64</sup> *ibid*, p.133

<sup>65</sup> H Albrecht, ‘Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes Amid the Arab Uprisings’, *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 20, No.1, 2015, pp.36-54

H Albrecht, ‘The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d’etat in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013’, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.41, No.4, 2014, pp.659-687

<sup>66</sup> R Brooks, Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes

<sup>67</sup> S Greitans, Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism

<sup>68</sup> M Kamrava, ‘Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East’

<sup>69</sup> H Nassif, ‘Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite Behavior in the Arab Spring’, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.130, No.2, 2015, pp.245-275

<sup>70</sup> JM Powell, *Coups and Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing*, PhD Thesis, University of Kentucky, Lexington, 2012

more formalised configuration whereas others, such as Johnathan Powell and Hicham Nassif, examine the structural approaches employed to discourage treachery.

Crane Brinton,<sup>71</sup> Milan Svoblik,<sup>72</sup> and Ekkart Zimmerman<sup>73</sup> all concur that coups are only able to occur when elite interests converge; some are opportunists, band wagoning on social action, while others are driven by incentives. The regime exploits its ownership of the coercive apparatus to leverage its relationship with PREs and does so by reinforcing the value of the security apparatus through nation and state building ventures: role in independence struggles, driver of modernisation, and the uniformed identity of specialised units, departments, and personnel. The latter gains more traction within authoritarian states, due to the principal doctrine and strategic mission of many of its prominent military organisations e.g. Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and in the UAE, the previously formed independent Emirate forces of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and Ras al Khaimah (RAK).

The structuring of power through the political-military prism identifies the determining role that social ties have upon the distribution of power within a traditional authoritarian state. While there may be modifications to membership of the elite strata, the underlying prerequisite is that appointed actors originate from a communal pool. This ensures that

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<sup>71</sup> C Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, Vintage, New York, 1965

<sup>72</sup> MW Svoblik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*

<sup>73</sup> E Zimmerman, 'Towards a Causal Model of Military Coups d'Etat'

subjective management of the military and society is optimised and contributes to a prolonged and stable authoritarian state.

As a result, traditional authoritarian states have a range of resources and liabilities that can either strengthen their positions or expose them to a wide range of threats. In turn this creates an array of security concerns that can be measured by various means. The same security dynamic could be used either to enhance a state's power or, for individuals or clans to wield greater influence. The determining role that social networks have within traditional authoritarian states, provide the foundation from which to design a coherent and unified security strategy.

## Chapter 3 - Regime Security Strategy

According to democratic peace theory, liberal democratic states are less likely to engage in a state of war with another democratic state. The resulting hypothesis is that illiberal states are more liable to encounter inter-state conflict. Due to the fact that liberal and illiberal states have contrasting security perceptions, there is a need to examine how internal security dynamics function and organise in response to threats within an illiberal state. Therefore, to investigate security concerns in an authoritarian state, the principal requirement is to analyse the internal dynamics and political structure of the country in question.

Within the same analytical deduction lies securitisation theory. The theory of 'securitisation is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial effects'.<sup>74</sup> Because of the subjectivity of threat construction, securitisation theory hypothesizes that there is a requirement to politicize, or securitize the potential impact of a threat, thus allowing an appropriate response. Therefore, securitisation only manifests through discourse, and 'the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such'.<sup>75</sup> As result, securitisation theory expanded scholarship's interpretation of threats incorporating environmental, economic, social, and political issues. This has enhanced the ability to evaluate third world security, given the theory's focus on domestic issues.

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<sup>74</sup> B Buzan, O Wæver, and J de Wilde, *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*, p.25

<sup>75</sup> *ibid*, p.25

Notwithstanding, securitisation theory is fundamentally flawed on two levels; on one hand its application observes actor level discourse and not the inherent qualities of the referent object; secondly, it is measured by the feedback from the message's audience. Both factors are unreliable channels in illiberal states due to the high levels of direct and indirect repression. Through an actor's emphasis of a given threat, it creates a security dilemma, as the emphasis paid to the issue in turn reduces the actor's position. Without direct engagement with the securitising actors and their audiences, the application of securitisation to this thesis is limited. While there are inherent threats to states in the developing world, and regimes often manipulate such threats for political gain, this thesis is applying the notion that, instead, a regime security strategy treats threats in a manner so as not to fall into the insecurity dilemma. This means that threats are managed discreetly and in a pre-emptive manner so as not to empower the threat.

Due to the combination of the domestic focus of threat construction and the fact that power is disproportionately concentrated within an authoritarian state, it is critical to examine the political and social architecture that houses potentially competing entities. When observing power structures within a state there are three predominant locales; the government, the regime, and the state. They are all primarily concerned with the maintenance of their own position within the larger apparatus. The government is the body that manages the state, yet is still controlled by the elite group of personnel known as the regime. Ferran Brichs and Athina Lampridi-Kemou define the regime as, 'more than government – it is the structure moulded by power relations in their control of the 'state' resource. We also use this term to

define elites who have the capacity to shape that structure'.<sup>76</sup> The state is the larger socio-political community, and the apparatus of institutions that distribute political goods.<sup>77</sup>

The array of threats from domestic forces prompt third world elites to prioritise their own security over others; however, in doing so, they reduce their own sense of security, and that of their population, contributing to the perception of growing domestic threats. The emphasis placed on domestic and institutional threats forms the crux of Brian Job's interpretation of an insecurity dilemma. He further explains that, 'national security has to be seen as distinct from state security and regime security, with each component of society competing to preserve and protect its own well-being'.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, it is essential for this thesis to highlight and

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<sup>76</sup> F Brichs & A Lampridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World', in F Brichs (ed.), *Political Regimes in the Arab World*, p.33

Peter Mann defines a regime as 'an alliance of dominant ideological, economic, and military power actors, coordinated by the rulers of the state', and sets the context for the clarification of the UAE's power dynamics as it focuses on the elite personnel who exercise the state's power, and not the wider society that contributes to the state's existence. M Mann, *The Sources of Social Power; Volume II, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.18

<sup>77</sup> Robert Rotberg's list of political goods include; security, law & order, healthcare, education, logistics, economy and finance, civil society and regulation of the environment, RI Rotberg, 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States', in RI Rotberg (ed.), *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* p.3

<sup>78</sup> BL Job, 'The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and State Securities in the Third World', BL Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma; National Security of Third World States*, p.18

Richard Tardanico contributes to this line of argument by arguing that, '*not to be overlooked is that regimes may act in their own organizational interests*'. R Tardanico, "State, Dependency, and Nationalism: Revolutionary

distinguish national security from state security and regime security. Giacomo Luciani defines national security as 'the ability to withstand aggression from abroad';<sup>79</sup> Robert Jackson defines state security as 'the condition where the institutions, processes, and structures of the state are able to continue functioning effectively, regardless of the make-up of the ruling elite',<sup>80</sup> and regime security as 'the condition where governing elites are secure from violent challenges to their rule'.<sup>81</sup>

The competing interpretations of security put into evidence a multitude of strategies to achieve the independent goals of the elites and the state; regime security policies are by nature different to national and state security policies. These are also in competition with each other as they attempt to promote their significance to foster their own survival.<sup>82</sup> Thus, unless there is a shift in internal power, the reigning body of authority will continue to undertake measures, predominantly in the short term, to secure its position. Therefore, in an authoritarian state, the security of the regime always supersedes that of the state and the nation. This is further clarified by Job:

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Mexico, 1924-1928", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 24, 3, July 1982, p.402 in M Mohamedou, *State-Building*

<sup>79</sup> G Luciani, 'The Economic Content of Security', *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol.8, No.2, 1989, p.51

<sup>80</sup> R Jackson, 'Regime Security', p.162

<sup>81</sup> *ibid*

<sup>82</sup> Barry Buzan suggests, however, that in fact the differing interpretation of security are in fact, differing priorities of state security. The three components of a state are; idea of a state, physical base of a state, and the institutional expression of a state. B Buzan, *People, States & Fear; An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Pearson Longman, Harlow, 1991, p.65

‘in practice many states become locked into this preliminary status, i.e., with strong despotic and weak infrastructural powers, as a quasi-permanent condition. Either because they prefer this status quo or, more usually, because they are unable to move beyond the raw exercise of coercion to compliance through more peaceful means, regime powerholders sustain themselves through this imbalance of state despotic and infrastructural power’.<sup>83</sup>

The predominant focus on regime security being presented as despotic and sultanistic in form is extremely limited, as it isolates physical defence from the broader array of factors that influence the regime’s strategic management of affairs. The lack of account for the totality of options available to protect and enhance the regime’s position in power has resulted in an under-researched topic and an overly simplistic approach to the wider considerations of influencing factors. Furthermore, definitions of regime security, such as that earlier postulated by Robert Jackson often present a contradictory argument by applying a Western and liberal conception of security to non-Western illiberal states. Through Robert Jackson’s emphasis on coercive threats instead of the non-kinetic threats that are more prevalent within illiberal states, this thesis requires a more robust definition of regime security. Mohammed Mohamedou’s typology is more fitting, ‘Regime Security is the idiosyncratic set of dispositions, orientations, and strategies of a particular regime as it seeks to maintain its

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<sup>83</sup> BL Job, ‘The Insecurity Dilemma: National, Regime and State Securities in the Third World’, BL Job (ed.), *The Insecurity Dilemma; National Security of Third World States*, p.18

physical presence, establish and perpetuate legitimacy, and further its permanent and ad hoc interests'.<sup>84</sup>

Building upon the hypotheses of Mohammed Mohamedou and Robert Jackson, this thesis defines regime security as the array of measures taken to insulate the political elites from an array of internal and external threats, which in turn may have a coercive and non-kinetic character. This thesis concurs with Milan Svolik, Aristotle,<sup>85</sup> and Job who argue the prominent threat to authoritarian regimes originates from internal sources.<sup>86</sup>

### **Regime Security Application**

Regimes undertake a wide range of programs and strategies to insulate themselves from threats. Counter-balancing of state institutions<sup>87</sup> and elite personnel,<sup>88</sup> selective

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<sup>84</sup> M Mohamedou, *State-building and regime security: A study of Iraq's foreign policy making during the Second Gulf War*, PhD Dissertation, New York City University of New York, New York, 1996, p.111

<sup>85</sup> 'Still democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy. For in oligarchies there is the double danger of the oligarchs falling out among themselves and also with the people...', Aristotle, *The Politics*, Book 5,

<sup>86</sup> M Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*

<sup>87</sup> SR David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No.2, January 1991, pp. 233-256

<sup>88</sup> M Herb, *All in the Family*, 1999

concentration of power within core sectors,<sup>89</sup> effective foreign policy management,<sup>90</sup> co-optation,<sup>91</sup> and the restriction of freedoms,<sup>92</sup> or enforcement of the state's power<sup>93</sup> are all common techniques employed to secure the regime. Opinion on this issue is now split. Scholars such as Gregory Gause argue that the strategic management of foreign relations has ensured the survival of many authoritarian states,<sup>94</sup> whereas scholars such as Daniel

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<sup>89</sup> S Greitens, *Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism*, PhD Thesis, Harvard University, Boston, 2013

<sup>90</sup> G Gause, 'The Persistence of Monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula: A Comparative Analysis', in J Kostiner (ed.), *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*

<sup>91</sup> JM Powell, *Coups and Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing*, PhD Thesis, University of Kentucky, Kentucky, 2012

<sup>92</sup> SL Yom, 'Understanding the Durability of Authoritarianism in the Middle East', *The Arab Studies Journal*, Vol 13/14, No 2/1, Fall 2005, pp.227-233

<sup>93</sup> E Bellin, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.44, No.2, January 2012, pp.127-149

<sup>94</sup> 'the success and failure of monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula in the twentieth century had more to do with the position of Arabian countries in the regional security picture and the international political economy than with their particular domestic characteristics', G Gause, 'The Persistence of Monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula', p.168

There is a prominent argument within literature that hypothesises that the survival of authoritarian regimes is inherently linked to external security assistance. This was accurately applied when the GCC was under the tutelage of the British and recently under the US, however, this is not the most important factor of authoritarian longevity, and an angle that this thesis does not aim to answer. For research on this topic see; C Spencer, 'The Middle East: Changing from External Arbiter to Regional Player', in R Niblett (ed.), *America and a Changed World*, Chatham House, Wiley-Blackwell, London, 2010; K Ulrichsen, *Gulf Security: Changing Internal and External Dynamics*, The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance,

Brumberg hypothesize two domestic components to successful regime security strategies; effective political and economic management.<sup>95</sup> While Gregory Gause's argument has its merit, although ultimately inaccurate,<sup>96</sup> Russell Lucas' more inclusive analysis builds on Daniel Brumberg's postulation, indicating that the resources available to a regime – political, economic, and social – and the utilisation of them 'provide a key for regime survival'.<sup>97</sup> Joel Migdal contributes to this discussion by explaining that the regime has to provide both 'an elaborate set of institutions to dole out sanctions and material incentives, as well as to package state services and sanctions in a coherent and meaningful set of symbols'.<sup>98</sup> It is on this basis, and because the domestic environment dominates threat construction within weak states, that this thesis focuses on the changes made to the UAE's regime security and not on national or state security.

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and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics (LSE), London, 2009; K Selvik and S Stenslie, *Stability and Change in the Modern Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2011

<sup>95</sup> D Brumberg, 'Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World', in R Brynen, B Korany, and P Noble (eds.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1, Theoretical Perspectives*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995, p.235

<sup>96</sup> It can be argued that the lack of US support for Hosni Mubarak swung the pendulum in favour of the popular uprisings, and ultimately led to his overthrow, however, decades of isolation for North Korea's regimes have proven Gause's postulation invalid.

<sup>97</sup> R Lucas, 'Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalisation in a Middle Eastern Regime Type', *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 36, No.1, 2004, p.111

<sup>98</sup> JS Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, p.208

Johannes Gerschewski's three pillars of stability<sup>99</sup>- legitimization, repression, and co-optation-<sup>100</sup> provide the fundamental basis around which this framework, and many regime security strategies ultimately concur. Legitimacy is a powerful and evocative notion, and when observed within MENA society, has an augmented value. The complexity in defining and measuring legitimacy would confer an unnecessary distraction for this thesis, especially as, potentially, there are issues of legitimacy across the entire Emirati socio-political spectrum; from within the innermost circle of the royal family<sup>101</sup> through to the state's relationship with expatriates. Additionally, the fragmented and federal structure of the UAE presents the argument that there are competing notions of legitimacy within the UAE. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the singular regime security strategy of the Abu Dhabi elites, and not any other of the competing interpreters of security.

In principle, there is a strong case for the inclusion of legitimacy within the analysis of the UAE's regime security strategy. In order, however, to be able to illustrate tangible examples, this thesis will focus on the repressive and co-optative aspects of regime security strategies.<sup>102</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> This is not to be confused with Francis Fukuyama's three pillars of stability (modern and strong, obey the rule of law, and to be accountable) F Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order*, Farrar, New York, 2011

<sup>100</sup> J Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes'

<sup>101</sup> Ibn Khaldun discusses legitimacy within tribal Arab culture at great length throughout *The Maqqadimah* Chapter 3 in particular.

<sup>102</sup> This is in direct contrast to Ian Hurd who says 'it is unreasonable to use the difficulty of proving any one motivation to justify the retreat to the default position that privileges another, without requiring similar proof... We have no better reason to assume coercion [or self-interest] than to assume legitimacy'. I Hurd, 'Legitimacy

While Johannes Gerschewski's hypothesis is useful, it is important to highlight that 'the choice of components for one's strategy of survival is severely constrained by available resources, ideas, and organizational means. Even though each person constructs his or her own strategy, their existing resource base and the control over access to resources limit the range of strategies in an area'.<sup>103</sup> Acknowledging the wide array of interrelating factors that can influence a regime security strategy, the principal requirement is to highlight the key resources and political goods that can empower it.

Regimes view resources and personnel as commodities, over which they have full control.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, the most effective analysis of a security strategy must concentrate on evaluating the regime's strategic management of personnel and commodities in their pursuit of greater strength. As a result, it becomes essential 'to identify the typology of its actors and their relevance, the dynamics that govern their relationships, the power resources at their disposal and their respective position in society'.<sup>105</sup> Thus, by understanding the complexities of the

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and Authority in International Politics', *International Organisation*, Vol.53, No.2, 1999, p.392 in J Baylis, JJ Wirtz, and CS Gray, *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p.108

<sup>103</sup> *ibid*, p.27

<sup>104</sup> Gregory Gause's postulation that the success of regime security in the GCC has rested upon foreign relations (G Gause, 'The Persistence of Monarchy in the Arabian Peninsula: A Comparative Analysis') is in fact contradictory because, in order to secure your position, you reduce your own sovereignty. This thesis argues, that in fact the aim of regime security is to increase power and control.

<sup>105</sup> F Brichs & A Lampridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World', in F Brichs (ed.), *Political Regimes in the Arab World*

relationship between regime, society, and resources, there can be an accurate analysis of how each relationship has been co-opted, in order to enforce the UAE's regime security strategy. This will consequently highlight that regimes such as the UAE have two primal concerns: to physically protect themselves from coercive threats, and secondly, to be able to finance these measures.

Regimes have a structural advantage over their populations due to their ability to structure the inter-relationship between themselves, society, and the resources of the state. This enables regimes to fortify the position of their politically relevant elites (PREs) [all regime personnel are part of the elites]<sup>106</sup> to ensure the regime's continuation of power and authority. Therefore, the co-existence between the regime, society, and resources forms the basis of regime security strategy in the UAE, and throughout the GCC.

The parallel strategy to co-optation is repression, with a state's security apparatus being the primary organisation tasked with its enforcement. Regardless of the nature of governance, monarchy or republican, power has traditionally gravitated around coercive elements.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> 'the Gulf's Kings and Emirs rule at the head of large families that share in executive authority through cabinet and other positions. The ruler cannot simply replace the Prime Minister when discontent rises, either because he is the Prime Minister (Saudi Arabia and Oman) or the Prime Minister is his nephew, uncle or cousin. About one-third of the Cabinet positions of each of the GCC states, including many of the most important ones, are held by ruling family members', G Gause, *Kings for all Seasons: How the Middle East's Monarchies Survived the Arab Spring*, p.27

<sup>107</sup> D Lutterbeck, 'Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.39, No.1, 2013, p.30

Nazih Ayubi suggests that the military is one of three poles of power across the MENA, along with the President and the Party.<sup>108</sup> The military has traditionally held an elevated position within MENA society and, in some cases, has even been the primary vehicle for state and nation building.<sup>109</sup> The combined observations have witnessed PRE's exploiting the institution's sole legitimate ownership of coercion for its own means.

The emphasis placed on the military over other elements within the arsenal of a state's security apparatus indicates academia's priority towards conventional military forces and lack of greater engagement with the wider security architecture. This has resulted in the common analysis of the military being considered an institutionally more significant and dominant actor within the domestic politics of an authoritarian state that the case may be. This is supported by the fundamental assertion that 'military forces, trained to fight a foreign aggressor, have always been a dubious instrument for civil-war purposes'.<sup>110</sup> While the military possesses the physical strength and capacity to intervene in politics, and historically more so in authoritarian states, this overlooks the wider range of organisations that can provide comparable intervention and power capabilities.

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<sup>108</sup> N Ayubi, *Política y Sociedad en Oriente Próximo. La Hipertrofia del estado árabe*, Bellaterra, Barcelona, p.300-301 in F Brichs and A Lampridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World', in F Brichs (ed.), *Political Regimes in the Arab World*, p.24

<sup>109</sup> L Anderson, 'Dynasts and Nationalists: Why Monarchies Survive', in J Kostiner (ed.), *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, p.55

<sup>110</sup> H Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Penguin Books, London, 2017, p.549

Largely due to dynamic geopolitical events, analyses into regime security practises during the Arab Spring have been limited, with scholars often misinterpreting potential threats to incumbent regimes. Gregory Gause and Sean Yom are an example of this analytical trend; they highlight how the cultural and social characteristics of Arab monarchies have insulated their reign, but they fail to critically engage with how modernisation threatens the utilisation of these traits. Due to the fact that the institution of monarchy is based upon traditional tenets, it is intrinsically susceptible to the processes of globalisation and modernisation.<sup>111</sup>

### **Regime Security Basis**

This thesis argues that due to the connection between regime and society, and to the fundamental principle that the regime's power originates from its control of internal sources of contention, the UAE's regime security strategy rests upon its management of political, economic, and social structures to strengthen its own position. Regimes similar in structure and form to the UAE, employ methods to ensure loyalty and allegiance to the regime through a combination of co-optation and intimidation.<sup>112</sup> It can be inferred that there are two prominent strategies aimed at regime security: Enforcement of power (control of the coercive apparatus: Coup – Proofing) and Maintenance of power (strategic management of resources: Co-optation).

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<sup>111</sup> SP Huntington, 'The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies', *Daedalus*, Vol.95, No.3, 1966, pp.76-788

<sup>112</sup> H Albrecht & O Schlumberger, "'Waiting for Gadot"; Regime Change Without Democratization in the Middle East', *International Political Science Review*, Vol.25, No.4, 2004, p.372

## **Enforcement of Power; Strategic Management of the Coercive Apparatus**

The literature regarding states enforcement of power gravitates around two predominant theoretical avenues: authoritarian resilience and coup-proofing. Authoritarian resilience tends to examine the 'institutionalised systems of rule'<sup>113</sup> and requires micro and macro level investigation into the state's enforcement of power. Coup proofing is the method and strategy employed to protect and deter potential coups d'état (coups). Both theoretical approaches are preventative measures; they agree that the state's priority is the maximisation of power and control. When applied to weak states, both theories aim to ensure the state's monopoly over the use of violence, leading to the foundation of a successful regime security strategy.

The regime, primarily concerned with its own security, is threatened from its own security services due to the concentration of power within the coercive apparatus. Because of the perpetual co-existence of both the monarchy and the coercive apparatus within GCC culture and society, there is an inherent and fixed relationship between these sectors of the state. The concentration of power within the regime, and the exploitation of tribal linkages have enabled select individuals to undermine their greatest adversary, the coercive apparatus, by ensuring traditional tenants of patriarchy and patrimonialism, thus opposing considerable

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<sup>113</sup> S Heydemann and R Leenders, 'Authoritarian Governance in Syria and Iran', in S Heydemann and R Leenders (eds.), *Middle East Authoritarianisms: Governance, Contestation, and Regime Resilience in Syria and Iran*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2013, p.5

force against an institutionalised professional entity.<sup>114</sup> Due to the danger posed by other members of the regime and the state, the coercive apparatus, is often cultivated irregularly, aiming to ensure short-term regime security but disregarding long-term strategic capabilities. If there is too much reliance on the coercive apparatus however, the regime would face what Ronald Wintrobe referred to as the dictator's dilemma, whereby 'the more the repressive apparatus stifles dissent and criticism, the less the dictator knows about how much support he or she really has among the people'.<sup>115</sup>

In addition to the institutional connection between the regime and the coercive apparatus, there are often additional and parallel security entities established to ensure a continued defence against an array of threats. Hannah Arendt explains how 'the continuous competition between offices, whose functions not only overlap but which are charged with identical tasks, gives opposition or sabotage almost no chance to become effective'.<sup>116</sup> This concept of an army to watch an army is well accepted within academia, with Mehran Kamrava identifying these instruments as the parallel military.<sup>117</sup> Risa Brooks explains that 'these organisations tend to have overlapping mandates, and personal loyalty is emphasised'.<sup>118</sup> The connection between the regime and the sprawling array of organisations designed to protect it from

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<sup>114</sup> This is however changing as the UAE Armed Forces becomes more proactive in regional engagements, and thus is required to become more professionalised.

<sup>115</sup> R Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p.335

<sup>116</sup> H Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, p.528

<sup>117</sup> M Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East'

<sup>118</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, p.37

other state bodies and personnel are the most sensitive connection within the state and thus, often maintain a direct connection bypassing other formal command structures. Risa Brooks supports this and postulates that parallel coercive entities perform five functions: to monitor, defend, prevent, balance, and specialise in their core responsibility.<sup>119</sup> Risa Brooks' however fails to explain why the military is prioritised for development over their civilian counterparts, and instead, like others before, pools all domestic agencies within the umbrella of the internal-security agency. The lack of distinction is not only an issue with Risa Brooks, but also with authoritarian resilience and regime security literature. This is due to the fact that civil-military relations theory often underpins this theoretical approach and is not able to discuss the array of socio-political dynamics across different security organisations in non-democratic states.

Traditionally, dynastic regimes in the MENA region have relied on the military (of tribal levies) for protection, often resorting on foreign mercenaries, alien to the local culture, who stand above the inter-tribal conflict that often challenged regime security perceptions.<sup>120</sup> Whilst the regime may employ other strategies for insulation, 'almost all armies in the region have assumed ultimate responsibility for maintaining the regimes, either because power is controlled by the military or as a result of its alliances with the regimes' elites'.<sup>121</sup> To reduce the contestation of power, key personnel from tribes and influential kinship affiliations are

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<sup>119</sup> *ibid*

<sup>120</sup> Circassians and Chechens in Jordan and Syria. Assyrians, Turkomans, and Kurds in Iraq.

<sup>121</sup> F Brichs and A Lampridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World', in F Brichs (ed.), *Political Regimes in the Arab World* p.23

often engaged into elite circles, particularly within the coercive apparatus. This not only fulfils the aim of empowering these select institutions, but also strengthens the bond between the regime and its core support base. A clear example of neopatriarchy that identifies strength with personal proximity. The requirement to balance personnel across such sensitive instruments requires a strong management capability, as any failure can result in new fiefdoms and coalitions. Instead, competition should be encouraged across all coercive elements, thus reducing the structural capability of one aspect to contest the current status quo.

Eva Bellin's hypothesis acknowledges the theoretical limitation presented by orthodox civil-military relations and authoritarian resilience, by instead framing repressive dependence around coercive elements instead of solely the military. In this sense, there is a strong and clear message that multiple organisations carry a capacity to extend the state's power, and that within an illiberal society there is not a hierarchy of power in capacity alone, but also in its connection to PREs.<sup>122</sup> Sheena Greitens attempts to define coercive institutions as 'a cluster of organisations collectively responsible for intelligence and internal security',<sup>123</sup> however this observation falls short of the multifaceted utilisation these security focused organisations are capable of. Instead, coercive institutions are those that possess innate traits of kinetic and suppressive behaviour. This builds upon Sheena Greiten's observation to

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<sup>122</sup> For example, you an elite figure can be the Minister of Interior (MOI) but due to the domestic structuring of power and legal capabilities, this could only be a figure holder position.

<sup>123</sup> SE Greitens, *Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism*, PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 19<sup>th</sup> April 2013, p. 11

include organisations, such as the conventional military, that may be primarily externally focused, but capable of utilisation within a domestic sphere.

The lack of distinction between military and civilian counterparts is not only prevalent within authoritarian resilience literature but is also emboldened by rapid technological advances. By investing and excelling in internal security mechanisms, coup-proofing strategies demonstrate how the insecurity dilemma accurately exhibits the threat perception and reactions of regimes such as the UAE.

Nonetheless a regime can't just build and develop its coercive apparatus to protect it from perceived threats, as either its growth will be stunted towards perceived threats at a specific time<sup>124</sup> or inevitably this apparatus will develop to become a threat itself: Max Weber coined this contradiction 'the paradox of the sultan'<sup>125</sup> whilst Holger Albrecht refers to it as the principal-agent problem.<sup>126</sup> The intelligence apparatus and land forces (army) are the most sensitive departments for a regime, due to the access to sensitive information and large manpower; this also explains why many GCC monarchies have prioritised the development of the Air Force, as its small manpower and equipment can be controlled with relative ease.

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<sup>124</sup> E.g. the Maginot line in France.

<sup>125</sup> M Weber, *Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, p.231-232

<sup>126</sup> "the "principal-agent problem", that is, the paradox of establishing the coercive power designed to support the incumbency, while avoiding that this power within the state turns into a very threat for the incumbency', H Albrecht, 'The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups D'état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013', p.665

Other examples include specialised units such as the special forces and the newly created cyber units.

While Risa Brooks examined the aspect of coercive control, Jonathan Powell and Hicham Nassif examined structural and organisational methods of control. Johnathan Powell highlights how, due to the significance of the military, its organisational interests must be seriously considered.<sup>127</sup> An example of this in practice is Kheder Khaddour's examination of the link between the loyalty of the Syrian military to the Assad regime and the military housing provided for many of its commissioned officers.<sup>128</sup> Nassif, on the other hand, examined the vertical hierarchy of the coercive apparatus – combined the military and the police, but disaggregated by rank as 'senior officers who have the authority to issue directives depend for the actual implementation of their orders on their subordinates' willingness to execute them'.<sup>129</sup> The relationship between military and civil units across the MENA's coercive apparatus is unique, thanks to the institutional links born from the development of the

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<sup>127</sup> JM Powell, *Coups and Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing*

<sup>128</sup> K Khaddour, *Assad's Officer Ghetto: Why the Syrian Army Remains Loyal*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4 November 2015, available online <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/11/03/assad-s-officer-ghetto-why-syrian-army-remains-loyal-pub-61449> , date accessed 29th August 2016

<sup>129</sup> H Nassif, 'Generals and Autocrats: How Coup-Proofing Predetermined the Military Elite Behavior in the Arab Spring', pp.247-248

security services upon the state's creation. Scholars such as Ash Rossiter,<sup>130</sup> Athol Yates<sup>131</sup> and Zoltan Barany<sup>132</sup> have analysed the development of local security forces in the Arabian Gulf highlighting the distinct development of civil units from their military counterparts.

Eva Bellin postulates that the Arab Spring highlighted the fact that 'the coercive apparatus is pivotal to determining the durability of authoritarian regimes in the Arab World'.<sup>133</sup> This is further elaborated with the assertion that 'authoritarianism has proven exceptionally robust in the MENA region because the coercive apparatus in many MENA states have [sic] proven exceptionally able and willing to crush reform initiatives from below'.<sup>134</sup> While Eva Bellin highlights that the regime limits and regulates all power commodities within the state, this can also lend to the argument that 'if the state's coercive apparatus remains coherent and

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<sup>130</sup> A Rossiter, *Britain and the Development of Professional Security Forces in the Gulf Arab States, 1921-71: Local Forces and Informal Empire*, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 2014

<sup>131</sup> A Yates, 'Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964-2015', *Journal of Arabian Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, 2016, pp.182-200

<sup>132</sup> Z Barany, *The Formative Movements That Shaped the Gulf Arab Militaries*, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Washington DC, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2020

<sup>133</sup> E Bellin, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons From the Arab Spring', p.142

<sup>134</sup> E Bellin, 'Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders' in MP Posusney and MP Angrist (ed.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, p.27

Jill Crystal has a similar line of argument and suggests that it is due to the size and motivation of the coercive apparatus in MENA countries that has contributed to the ongoing success of authoritarian regimes in MENA. J Crystal, 'Authoritarianism and its Adversaries in the Arab World', *World Politics*, Vol.46, No.2, 1994, pp.262-289

effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy'.<sup>135</sup> When faced with the last-ditch necessity to repress, states often rely on mercenaries or foreign assistance to undertake high risk and contentious decisions.<sup>136</sup>

Subsequently, it is not only the balancing of coercive institutions, but in addition, the structural disposition of these entities which highlights the key concerns and variables with which coup proofing strategies can be accurately examined. The natural limitation of this analytical approach, however, is the access to anthropological data that could be used to classify and categorize the structural disposition of these entities because of their sensitive nature.<sup>137</sup> Exactly because of this sensitivity, it is only largely possible to examine the anthropological structure of the elite's, and not that of most personnel.

The institutionalisation of a coercive apparatus is often observed in relation to the wider society and elite personnel. In a GCC context, armed forces of the region's states are often an extension of society organised around the premise of elite utility. Building on Kamrava's listing

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<sup>135</sup> T Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, And China*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979, in Bellin, 'Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders', p.25

<sup>136</sup> F Halliday, *Mercenaries: Counter-Insurgency in the Gulf*, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1977

<sup>137</sup> Information regarding manpower numbers and background information (e.g. nationality, religious sect, tribal membership, and Emirate residence) is extremely sensitive in the GCC because of their fragile societies and social makeup. A standout example is Bahrain where most the population adheres to Shi'a Islam, whilst the regime and PRE are Sunni. To reduce the validity of regime's opposition there has been a process of social engineering (granting Bahraini citizenship to Sunni Arabs) to recalibrate societal demographics.

of the GCC states as tribally dependent monarchies,<sup>138</sup> Steffen Hertog highlights the fact that throughout the process of state building, PREs were awarded fragments of the state, including aspects of the coercive elements, to create new sources of patronage, legitimacy, and ultimately control.<sup>139</sup> Steffen Hertog further emphasises that, 'GCC militaries are neither vanguards nor "people's armies", but rather large, passive and dependent clienteles of individual regime figures'.<sup>140</sup> Therefore, it is crucial for a tribally dependent monarchy to ensure loyalty, and to do so by co-opting PREs to ensure efficient control and stability over the state apparatus.<sup>141</sup>

This management strategy can be referred to as omnibalancing; Steven David defines it as, 'the need of leaders to appease secondary adversaries, as well to balance against both internal and external threats in order to survive in power'.<sup>142</sup> By highlighting the need to manage the complex interaction of threats to a regime, Sheena Greitens supports this thesis' theoretical grounding in the insecurity dilemma by explaining that regimes 'face a fundamental trade-off between designing their internal security apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against rival elites'.<sup>143</sup> The assumption

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<sup>138</sup> M Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', p.71

<sup>139</sup> S Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of Coup-Proofing', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 43, No.3, 2011, p.401

<sup>140</sup> *ibid*, p.402

<sup>141</sup> V Perthes (ed.), *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change*

<sup>142</sup> SR David, 'Explaining Third World Alignment', *World Politics*, Vol.43, No.2, January 1991, p.236

<sup>143</sup> S Greitens, *Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism*, p.7

presented is that regimes can either do one or the other, not both. In most cases, there is an attempt to balance the development of coercive capabilities. Scholars such as Risa Brooks highlight that many MENA regimes have failed to balance the institutional development of their coercive apparatus, and resultantly undermine the 'combat potential of the armed forces'.<sup>144</sup>

Common coup proofing methods of threat and reward are the most prevalent within the literature. However, beyond these deductions lie the analytical question of effectiveness. There is a paradoxical deduction that claims that the methods employed in coup-proofing in fact make the regime weaker:

'The preference of incumbents to avoid coup d'état [sic] at any cost often leads to the establishment of identity-base militaries, ethnic exclusion, and consequently increasing risk of civil war. Authoritarian rulers' anticipation of the dire consequences of losing office through coups might lead them to employ extraordinary measures, such as diversionary wars or violent repression. Coup proofing can also reduce military effectiveness, with detrimental effects on combat capacities and on the military's deployment against domestic threats'.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>144</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, p.10

<sup>145</sup> H Albrecht, 'The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military Coups d'état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013', p.662

Holger Albrecht's postulation should be seen in line with the insecurity dilemma, as both theories envisage an adverse reaction to methods aimed at strengthening one's position. Instead of measuring the perceived effectiveness of the coup-proofing strategy employed, there will instead be an examination of the methods and strategy employed. This is largely since, it is not only very difficult to measure the effectiveness of a coup proofing strategy, but it is also only effective in relation to present threats. Just because a coup succeeds or fails in one instance it does not mean it would have the same result in the future, nor that the targeted regime has successfully, or unsuccessfully coup-proofed itself. Furthermore, as each society has a variation of mediating variables that as such are managed differently, it would be inaccurate to postulate a general coup proofing theory, or a conclusion as to why coup proofing can be an ineffective strategy.

This thesis utilises the insecurity dilemma to argue that the UAE prioritises regime security over national and state security. The assumption therefore is that a regime's primary threat originates from domestic sources and is dealt with by a range of interconnecting agencies with overlapping responsibilities. As a result, the enforcement of a regime's power is crucial to its survival; to exercise this, the regime must depend upon its ultimate guarantor; the coercive apparatus.

### **Maintenance of Power**

Instead of focusing on the question of why authoritarian regimes seek to maintain their position of power – this thesis assumes that the predominant driver of policy is self-survival – it is more relevant to explore the measures implemented to secure and maintain the serving regime's position. Giacomo Luciani postulates that 'all states can be autonomous in the short

run, but in the longer run their ability to act autonomously from society is linked to their revenue foundations'.<sup>146</sup> Elaborating on Samuel Huntington's argument that incumbent powers are permanently faced with the option of reducing or increasing their power and authority<sup>147</sup> this section will deal with the measures taken to maintain the regime's position in power.

When the maintenance and stability of the GCC states are observed, the predominant analytical feature is rentierism, the dominant role oil has played in the development of the region's economy. This, however, overlooks fundamental idiosyncrasies that must be investigated. In a traditional authoritarian state, only the political elites are involved in the strategic development of the state's accrument of resources; both the creation and the nurturing of contributing dynamics. Within this scope, it is crucial to map the network of privilege between the regime and their kin as there are often multiple strategies employed to maximise the regime's maintenance of power.

Scholars have observed a series of actions within authoritarian regimes that have appeared to devolve power and authority but are commonly balanced through mechanisms that in fact increase the regime's power and authority. This hypothesis concurs with Juan Linz's postulation that limited pluralism, political and or economic, are key features of authoritarian governance. Rentier state dynamics complicate Juan Linz's understanding of limited pluralism

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<sup>146</sup> G Luciani, 'Resources, Revenues, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Beyond the Rentier State?', in R Brynen, B Korany, and P Noble (eds.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, p.211

<sup>147</sup> SP Huntington, *Political Order and Changing Societies*, Chapter 3

within authoritarian states because political and economic powers are intertwined around the regime's ability to manage and distribute rental income.

The compounding influence of rental income within a rentier state greatly impacts the political-economic relationship between the regime and society. While within a traditional authoritarian state the regime constructs informal coalitions and networks to manage the state and its resources, one of the gravest dangers to this strategy is the potential for clear and accountable transactions. Raymond Hinnebusch supports this postulation by further explaining that 'all authoritarian states are threatened by democratization, but their receptivity to liberalisation varies according to their social base'.<sup>148</sup> Therefore, there is a requirement to analyse the social dynamics and structure, which are developed through the state's and regime's ownership and distribution of resources. This is summarised by Terry Karl who says that rent 'rewards the control of production, not the activity of the owner'.<sup>149</sup>

The intimate relationship between a state's management of resources and ability to employ its coercive apparatus, highlight the regime's foundation of power. The ability to control and manage potentially competing applications of force, ultimately determine the survival of a regime; however, it is a regime's priority to ensure this scenario does not transpire. Thus, the maintenance of power is, as previously highlighted, a complementary priority within a regime security strategy.

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<sup>148</sup> RA Hinnebusch, 'Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization: Syria', in R Brynen, B Korany, and P Noble (eds.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, Vol.2, p.226

<sup>149</sup> TL Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p.6

The failure to manage economic and fiscal realities threatens all regimes, let alone those which are not built upon formal rational-legal institutions of legitimacy. History is flooded with examples of political turmoil resulting from economic instability;<sup>150</sup> Sheikh Shakhbout's downfall in 1966, Zine ben Ali's expulsion in 2011, and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) under Gorbachev 1991. The underlying premise is that fiscal performance is inherently linked to regime stability.<sup>151</sup>

A regime's ability to maintain its power through its control of resources is critical to ensure its long-term security. The principal threat to authoritarian regimes and their control of resources has been discussed as far back as Aristotle, who hypothesised the link between independent wealth generation and democracy.<sup>152</sup> Others, more recently, have highlighted the importance of social contracts such as that within the GCC states which are commonly

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<sup>150</sup> Giacomo Luciani, rather hastily signalled to Saudi Arabia as a successful example of industrial diversification leading to economic and stability, however, in principle, he understands that economic diversification is the long-term key to stability. G Luciani, 'Resources, Revenues, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Beyond the Rentier State?', in R Brynen, B Korany, and P Noble (eds.), *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World, Vol.1*, pp.211-228

<sup>151</sup> Matthew Gray disagrees by saying, 'even as rents have made states wealthier, they have not made them more internally stable'. M Gray, 'A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf', Occasional Paper No.7, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Doha, 2011, p.13

ML Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?', *World Politics*, Vol.53, No.3, April 2001, pp.325-362

<sup>152</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics*, Book 6, Chapter 5

referred to as societal co-optation. These discussions serve as a framework for the connection between the production of wealth and the regime's ability to emit power. The elevated value of socio-cultural characteristics of the GCC, such as religious, tribal and cultural dynamics, has contributed more of an understanding in the persistence of authoritarian rule<sup>153</sup> than the simplified argument of rentier state theory.

The tribal and societal networks in the MENA region predate the vast resources that now guide state society relations. Given the allocation and management of resources by the regime, however, tribal and societal relations are fortified in a manner that continues their strategic utilisation for the enhancement of the regime's rigidity. This dynamic supports the interpretation that the political economy relationship within an authoritarian state is designed to retain cohesion among the elites and maintain exclusivity to promote allegiance. Therefore, instead of examining the how state, economy or society manages political economy challenges, the regime's management of personnel and resources forms one of two central aspects of a regime security strategy: the maintenance of power.

### **Revenue Generation in MENA**

The link between state, resources, and society is distinctive when observed within the rentier state theory. The monarchical and authoritarian nature of governance is combined with the strategic and fiscal value of the state's resources, reinforcing the regime's central

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<sup>153</sup> R Patai, *The Arab Mind*, Scribners, New York, 1973

F Ajami, *The Arab Predicament*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981

A Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991

ownership<sup>154</sup> of the state and its political goods. As a result, it is critical to investigate and highlight how the state, and the regime manage and allocate the production and resources of political goods.

Oil is a defining feature of the GCC states and has been central to their monumental development<sup>155</sup>. According to OPEC the combined oil reserves of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE total at least 40% of the global total;<sup>156</sup> the UAE alone possesses 8.1%. Thus, it is rational for these states to exploit their reserves and position within global markets for fiscal and political gain.<sup>157</sup>

Scholarship has observed the trend of the reliance of commodity sales within the Middle East, predominantly through Hossein Mahdavy's rentier state postulation. He defines rentier states as 'those countries that receive on a regular basis substantial amounts of external economic rent'.<sup>158</sup> Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani<sup>159</sup> provide the most constructive improvement of early rentier state theory, and their theoretical development builds upon four assumptions:

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<sup>154</sup> L Anderson, 'The State in the Middle East and North Africa' *Comparative Politics*, vol. 21, 1987, .pp1-18

<sup>155</sup> G Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1994

<sup>156</sup> Kuwait holds 8.4%, Qatar Holds 2.1%, Saudi Arabia holds 22%, and the UAE has 8.1%, 'OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves, 2015', *OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016*

<sup>157</sup> The 1973 oil embargo is the most extreme example of this potential strategy.

<sup>158</sup> H Mahdavy, 'The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran', .p428 in MA Cook (ed.), *Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1970, .p43

<sup>159</sup> H Beblawi and G Luciani, *The Rentier State*, Croom Helm, London, 1987

substantial rent generation, reliance on predominantly external rent, generation of rent requires limited manpower, and lastly the attained rent is concentrated in the hands of a few.<sup>160</sup> Because of this theoretical recalibration there has been a greater utilisation of the term towards GCC states.

Giacomo Luciani complements the rentier narrative by identifying the economic disparity between rentier or allocation states and production states. Allocation states distribute the states accrued external rents, whereas production states require the involvement of the majority in the generation of wealth. Jacques Delacroix differs from Giacomo Luciani proposing the term 'distributive state'.<sup>161</sup>

The theoretical connection between the regime, resources, and society assists this thesis' investigation into how the UAE, and other allocation rentier states across the GCC, reinforce their position in power.<sup>162</sup> Whilst efforts have been made to diversify the economy, with the state often leading this effort in several strategic areas, the culture of a rentier state still dominates. Thus, social contracts within GCC states echo a combination of the effect of a rentier state, a neo-patrimonial society, and the tribal dynamics that predate the formal

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<sup>160</sup> H Beblawi, 'The Rentier State in the Arab World', in H Beblawi and G Luciani (eds.), *The Rentier State Vol. II*, Croom Helm, London, 1987, .p51

<sup>161</sup> J Delacroix, 'The Distributive State in the World System', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 15, 1980, pp.3-21

<sup>162</sup> G Luciani, 'Allocation vs Production Sates: A Theoretical Framework', in G Luciani (ed.), *The Arab State*, pp.65-

construction of the region's states. It is in this vein that this thesis agrees with Michael Herb who postulates that oil, or the effects of a rentier state are 'an intervening variable'<sup>163</sup> and not a framework for analysis of the larger political structure. This is based upon the argument that if oil-based wealth was such an influencing and overarching feature of society, then there would be no variation between the political systems of all rentier states.

The narrative of the effect of rentierism can trace its genesis to Joseph Shumpeter who in 1954 highlighted, as summarized by Pete Moore,<sup>164</sup> the requirement to analyse the relationship and effect, between the method of resource manipulation and the influence of this process upon society and the economy; this is referred to as the 'fiscal sociology of the state'.<sup>165</sup> It can be hypothesized that by controlling the mechanisms of wealth generation you can direct and manipulate the inter-relationship between the rent or resource, society, and the elite that manage resource's extraction.

Because of the myriad of variables that can influence society, scholarship remains vigilant of the evolving effect of rentier state theory (RST) upon society. Michael Ross outlines three predominant side effects of rentierism: rentier effect, repression effect, and the

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<sup>163</sup> M Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*, p.241

<sup>164</sup> PW Moore, 'Rents and Late Development in the Arab World', *2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, American Political Science Association, 5<sup>th</sup> September 2004, p. 6

<sup>165</sup> J Shumpeter, 'The Crisis of the Tax State', in AT Peacock (ed.) *International Economic Papers*, Macmillan, London, 1954, p.17, in *ibid*

modernization effect.<sup>166</sup> The situation of Michael Ross' hypothesis is based upon the assumption that rentierism and particularly oil rentiers, have a fundamental tendency towards autocracy, or lack of democratic principles. Samuel Huntington also notes this relationship because the dependence on oil rents 'enhances the control of the state bureaucracy'.<sup>167</sup> This has prompted a series of investigations analysing the socioeconomic impact of rentier society within the GCC states. Steffen Hertog and Oliver Schlumberger provide thorough examples of the relationship between socioeconomic features and rentierism by exploring the impact of secondary rents<sup>168</sup> and patrimonial capitalism<sup>169</sup> respectively.

Kiren Chaudhry builds upon RST's common themes by arguing that because of the varying degree and value of rent there have been 'profound implications for a host of domestic relationships. The most important change is the decline in domestic taxation in general, and direct taxation in particular'.<sup>170</sup> Kiren Chaudhry concurs with Michael Ross's typology of rentier behaviour and exposes how, because of the gap between wealth generation and

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<sup>166</sup> M Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?', pp.332-338

<sup>167</sup> S Huntington, 'Democracy's Third Wave', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.2, Spring, 1991, p.32

<sup>168</sup> S Hertog, 'The Sociology of the Gulf Rentier Systems: Societies of Intermediaries', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol.52, No.2, 2010, pp.1-37

<sup>169</sup> O Schlumberger, 'Structural Reform, Economic Order, and development: Patrimonial Capitalism'

<sup>170</sup> KA Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth; Economies and Institutions in the Middle East*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997, p.188

distribution, the political community is weak, and thus often assists the analytical conclusion that oil rents, or rentier states, have an intimate connection with authoritarianism.

Concurrently, the strength of rentier states is dependent upon the value of their renting commodity. In the case of the GCC states, high oil prices have enabled a degree of political freedom for the region's elites. However, all three of Michael Ross's rentier effects can be evidenced in this case. Rentier effect is seen in the forms of salary and pension increases,<sup>171</sup> repression effect can be identified through the development of coercive mechanisms used to enforce the regime's position or authority,<sup>172</sup> and modernization effect is perceived in the absorption of external rents, which manipulates a decrease in social desires for education, and, in the eyes of Ronald Inglehart, results in a reduced inclination for democratic and liberal values.<sup>173</sup>

Michael Ross argues that rentier regimes respond to domestic threats in one of three ways; taxation effect, spending effect, and class formation effect.<sup>174</sup> Michael Ross's postulation

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<sup>171</sup> Reuters, 'Qatar Hikes Salaries, Pensions for State Employees', *Arabian Business*, 7<sup>th</sup> September 2011, available online, <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar-hikes-salaries-pensions-for-state-employees-419346.html#.WADkt5PDTwc>, date accessed 14<sup>th</sup> October 2016

<sup>172</sup> "Bahrain: Unchecked Repression", *Human Rights Watch*, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2015, available online, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/bahrain-unchecked-repression>, 14<sup>th</sup> October 2016

<sup>173</sup> R al-Naikb, *Education and Democratic Development in Kuwait: Citizens in Waiting*, Chatham House, London, 2015

<sup>174</sup> M Ross, 'Does Resource Wealth Cause Authoritarian Rule', *The Economics of Political Violence*, World Bank Research Group, Princeton University, March 18-19 2000, pp.11-12

illustrates how the array of interactions between the state, resources, and society is manipulated to secure the regime's rentier nature. The influence of differing variables, and the strategic decision-making environment, enable distinctly separate case studies to integrate Michael Ross's framework and further evolve and contribute to rentier literature.

The commonality of power centrality within rentier states leads to the assumption that any short-term survival strategy is based upon the exploitation of rental income. This is because the power of the rentier state is twined with its redistributive capabilities and thus represents the crux of the rentier state's vulnerability. To ensure long term regime survival there must be a process of diversification away from the reliance on the short term's commodity of rent. If this is not managed carefully, the state's ownership of resources, and thus its power, are critically diminished and must seek new forms of rent to support its heightened position of ownership. Ferran Brichs and Athina Lampridi-Kemou concur by explaining that:

'Once power is gained over income-generating resources, the relation established to citizens is no longer one of collection but of distribution, which enormously weakens the populations negotiation capacity, while strengthening the elites' power and authority'.<sup>175</sup>

This premise accurately assists the investigation into the relationship between GCC states and their citizens. When merged with social tenants and principles, Ferran Brichs and Athina

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<sup>175</sup> FI Brichs and A Limpridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World', in FI Brichs (ed.), *Political Regimes in the Arab World: Society and the Exercise of Power*, .p26

Lampridi-Kemou's hypothesis helps ground this thesis' investigation into the evolving regime security strategy of the UAE.

### **Co-optation**

Along with repression and legitimation, Johannes Gerschewski postulated that co-optation was one of three pillars of stability for an authoritarian regime.<sup>176</sup> Legitimation 'is a strategy that seeks an individual's acceptance of rule',<sup>177</sup> repression is 'the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions',<sup>178</sup> and co-optation is, 'the capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors (or a group of actors) to the regime elite'.<sup>179</sup> Joshua Stacher builds upon this by emphasising the requirement for co-optation, explaining that it is 'necessary for any authoritarian regime because it is a mechanism that allows for a government to extend power and garner support within society'.<sup>180</sup> This thesis acknowledges a regime's requirement to leverage support and

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<sup>176</sup> J Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes'

<sup>177</sup> M Josua, 'Co-optation as a Strategy of Authoritarian Legitimation: Success and Failure in the Arab World', *Authoritarian Regimes in Comparative Perspective: Theoretical and Empirical Issues*, 6<sup>th</sup> ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, 25-27<sup>th</sup> August 2011, p.5

<sup>178</sup> C Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol.10, 2007, p.2 in, J Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes', p.21

<sup>179</sup> J Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes', p.22

<sup>180</sup> JA Stacher, 'Adapting Authoritarianism: Institutions and Co-optation in Egypt and Syria', PHD Thesis, University of St. Andrews, 2007, p.36

acquiescence from society, and given their disproportionate control of resources, it becomes necessary to examine the role of co-optation within a rentier state.

The objective of co-optation is to diversify and strengthen the support base of the regime. In contrast to the strategic management of the coercive apparatus, co-optation is traditionally non-repressive/aggressive. Barbara Geddes expands this postulation by saying; 'Authoritarian governments, like others, need to be able to distribute benefits to active supporters and coalition partners, to achieve passable economic performance in order to sustain mass acquiescence, and to maintain adequate coercive capacity to get through the inevitable times when they fail to deliver'.<sup>181</sup>

In a bid to skirt these economic vulnerabilities, regimes often look for new sources of rent or income generation. State led development, and the liberalisation and privatisation of the commercial sector has enabled the GCC social contract to adapt its co-optive identity while still allowing for a centrality of the state in its relationship between the regime and its citizens. The result has seen what is perceived as independent wealth generation, but in fact is still heavily dependent on public sector spending and therefore, is nothing more than the recycling of the funds generated within a rentier society aimed at displaying a liberalising state image, but being in fact re-invented methods of control and ownership.

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<sup>181</sup> B Geddes, 'What do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years', p.138

Central to the practise of co-optation within the GCC is the creation and exploitation of neo-patrimonial linkages. From this viewpoint, patterns of control are reinforced, as adoptive and complementary forms of rent are exploited as a means of insurance for the regime. This enables the creation of a regime security strategy that is strong and flexible enough to ensure the state's control and delivery of resources, as well as enhance its own role in relation to society, as a distributor of these commodities.

By understanding that 'the background of the elites has an important impact on the homogeneity of the ruling group',<sup>182</sup> this research can focus on the connections and basis to which allegiance and loyalty are enforced within the UAE. Nadine Kreitmeyr-Koska concurs and summarises the importance of an economically focused strategy; 'Arab regimes seek, above all, to enhance economic and social opportunities for regime-loyal economic and social actors while, at the same time, offloading socio-economic responsibilities on to them in order to capitalize on reforms, and thus to reinforce authoritarian rule'.<sup>183</sup>

If not implemented correctly, economically orientated survival strategies can foster further weakness, with Daniel Brumberg examining the common situation regimes find themselves in:

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<sup>182</sup> F Brichs & A Lampridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World' in F Brichs (ed.), *Political Regimes in the Arab World*, p.12

<sup>183</sup> N Kreitmeyr-Koska, *Neo-Liberal Networks and Authoritarian Renewal: A Diverse Case Study of Egypt, Jordan & Morocco*, p.8

'[regimes] create a "lose-lose game by imposing social and economic costs without creating the market incentives that promote production... unless regimes have external financial resources in the form of loans or grants to prop up this failing strategy, the only effective long-term solution is to adopt structural measures'.<sup>184</sup>

The anxiety induced in times of financial depression often inspire states to rashly implement policies that greatly aggravate economic and social tensions. While these economically focused policies may ultimately weaken the regime's long-term political platform, the assumption is that economically liberalising policies are easier to control than those of a specific political nature. Resultantly, many regimes attempt to gradually implement economy liberalising policies and thus refrain from reactionary measures, thus, maintaining an autocratic style of leadership.

Scholarship acknowledges the fact that the GCC states 'redistribute wealth in such a way that enables the rentier elite to wield power'.<sup>185</sup> This has enabled them to procure loyalty, and resort to means of inconspicuous co-optation in times of tension as shown by Bahrain,<sup>186</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> D Brumberg, 'Authoritarian Legacies and Reform Strategies in the Arab World', in R Brynne, B Korany, and P Noble (eds.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 1, Theoretical Perspectives*, p.237

<sup>185</sup> HA Barari, 'The Persistence of Autocracy: Jordan, Morocco and the Gulf', p.102

<sup>186</sup> L Louër, 'The Arab Spring Effect on Labor Politics in Bahrain and Oman', *Arabian Humanities*, Vol.4, 2015

Kuwait,<sup>187</sup> Oman,<sup>188</sup> Qatar,<sup>189</sup> Saudi Arabia,<sup>190</sup> and the UAE<sup>191</sup> during the height of the Arab Spring. It has also been shown that the regime must permit a liberalised economy to enable wealth accumulation independent of the state, in a bid to release it from its own self-constructed financial burden.<sup>192</sup> Nevertheless, Ferran Brichs and Athina Lampridi-Kemou underscore the danger posed by impending economic instability:

‘The real development of Arab societies and their respective economies would have facilitated the emergence of other independent elites in the competition for power, as well as the appearance of sectors of the population willing to and capable of making their voices heard, which, in turn, would have resulted in accumulation losses for the elites controlling the state’.<sup>193</sup>

Co-optation is the fundamental tactic employed within a regime security strategy that seeks to maintain power. This is because co-optation provides the dual-faceted opportunity for the

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<sup>187</sup> F Dazi-Heni, ‘The Arab Spring Impact on Kuwaiti “Exceptionalism”’, *Arabian Humanities*, Vol.4, 2015

<sup>188</sup> L Louër, ‘The Arab Spring Effect on Labor Politics in Bahrain and Oman’

<sup>189</sup> O Winckler, ‘The “Arab Spring”: Socioeconomic Aspects’, *Middle East Policy Council*, Volume 20, No.4, Winter 2013

<sup>190</sup> M Herb, *The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2014, p.17

<sup>191</sup> C Davidson, ‘The United Arab Emirates: Frontiers of the Arab Spring’, *Open Democracy*, 8<sup>th</sup> September 2012

<sup>192</sup> The economic visions of the GCC states (e.g. Saudi 2030, UAE 2021, Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 etc..) are an example of this strategy formation.

<sup>193</sup> Brichs, F & Lampridi-Kemou, A, ‘Sociology of Power in Today’s Arab World’, p.27

regime to increase its own fiscal and societal strength, while sponsored under the illusion of liberalisation. On the one hand the regime can give and on the other it can take away.

## **Conclusion**

Due to the skewed balance of power within authoritarian states, the security interests of the regime often supersede those of the state and the nation. Its sole objective is the continuation of power, and it achieves this by overcoming threats which predominantly originate from within its own ruling coalition; it does so either by force or through financially redistributive mechanisms. Regime security does not have to be distinct from considerations of national and state security, however due to the exclusive interest of the regime, it becomes a strategic requirement to widen a connection to the security concerns of the regime. As a result, the co-optation of PREs ensures a wide support base that is incentivized to support the security concerns of the regime.

It has been demonstrated that while the maintenance of a regime's power has been the most effective long-term strategy to safeguard its survival, the ability for a regime to enforce its will is its most fundamental and primary concern. It is therefore evident that a regime security strategy must incorporate both short- and long-term strategies: on one hand relying upon traditional societal tenants, whilst on the other still incorporating modern and contemporary methods in order to meet the evolution and threat that change, and modernisation can introduce. Consequently, this thesis hypothesizes that a successful regime security strategy is based upon two structural priorities; enforcement of power and maintenance of power.

## Chapter 4 - Neo-Corporate Praetorianism

Studies into authoritarian longevity have often isolated analytical approaches and applied unsuitable theoretical paradigms to illustrate their findings. As a result of the lack of contextual nuance and measurable implications, the field of regime security is widely underdeveloped.

The study of authoritarianism within the MENA is largely divided, with the regimes of the Arabian Peninsula receiving far less attention than their republican counterparts. While the geographical split is clear, 'the basis of legitimacy of the non-democratic rule is traditional (at least for parts of the population and the elites) and that therefore these monarchies should not be confused with modern authoritarian regimes'.<sup>194</sup> The discrepancy illustrated by Juan Linz supports the postulation that studies into regime security often examine formal structures and legislation, and yet do not adequately account for the heightened significance of internal socio-political dynamics; something which traditional authoritarian states, such as monarchies, are built upon.

While formal structural configurations can clearly illustrate the tangible manifestations of power, due to the heightened role of social dynamics within traditional authoritarian states, the place-holder and their inherent characteristics are of equal importance. Mehran Kamrava's tribally dependent monarchy or Quinlivan's coup-proofing theory would therefore

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<sup>194</sup> JJ Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, p.10

have been amplified if applied to empirical evidence. The lack of applied theoretical paradigms neglects further potential avenues from which to gather analytical observations.

In consequence, the expanded scope of regime security hypothesized herein acknowledges the requirement to examine both the formal construction of power and the social network that provides the structure with a complimentary base of support. The dual approach proposed by the enforcement and maintenance of power therefore becomes the domain to showcase these power dynamics; both through formal institutions and the titleholder.

**Ownership** The lack of formal theories and paradigms that explore the dynamics of governance within traditional authoritarian states provides a unique opportunity to accurately investigate this reflection. Not only are incompatible theories often applied, but even when this is the case, the MENA monarchies are largely under researched. There is therefore a requirement to establish a more rigid and applicable framework that builds upon previous observations, acknowledging their strengths and limitations, to support the creation of a new paradigm that recognises both cultural and political aspects.

The significant focus of the thesis assumes the appreciation and acknowledgement of non-western concepts for illustrating the power dynamics within an authoritarian state. However, there is a structural limitation in supporting this as it is mostly supported by Western literature. As a result, there is an awareness of the limitations postulated insofar that more often than not this body of literature observes a linear approach to the state. This thesis however elevates the power of the state into another body, that of the regime. It is therefore

argued that the state is owned and operated by the regime, thus supporting the focus on this centralised power clique.

## **Structural Observations**

Understanding the complex nature and multidimensional array of factors that impact this research: i.e. the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) system of analysis provides a strong foundation from which to initiate a preliminary evaluation of structural factors. This analytical system offers a wide contextual framing of a specific and targeted question, one that cannot accurately be answered without such a perspective. Reinforcing this, Robert Axelrod and Michael Cohen state that ‘analysing a complex system or environment ‘gives us a grounded basis for inquiring where “leverage points” and significant trade-offs of a complex system may lie’.<sup>195</sup> While useful in preparing the contextual design, the PMESII system can only be viewed as a supplement and guide for other such design frameworks.

The assessment of political, social, and security related factors provides a targeted base from which to observe the location and utilisation of power within a state. Traditional authoritarians, such as those within the MENA, emphasize a neo-patriarchal relationship among political, social, and security related elites. These can further be categorized through

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<sup>195</sup> R Axelrod and MD Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity: Organizational Implications of a Scientific Frontier*, Basic Books, New York, 2000, p.21, in BM Ducote, *Challenging the Application of PMESII-PT in a Complex Environment*, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command And General Staff College, Kansas, 2010, p.3

what James Bill and Carl Leiden postulate as vertical and horizontal layers<sup>196</sup> of social stratification. The former tier accommodates family, tribe, kinship, ethnicity, religious sect, and professional, recreational and political associations. The later weighs on levels of power, wealth, and prestige. Each filter can be utilised and expanded in its application towards a case study, however there must be observable and measurable characteristics to support the claims that support their usage. Consequently, there is an acknowledgement that along with the role being fulfilled by the individual social factors play a compounding role in the relative power of the individual.

### **Corporate Praetorianism**

The network of elites that support the reign of authoritarian states has long been a driving factor in the study of regime security. The recent focus into MENA authoritarian states however has built upon a longer trajectory of orthodox theory that has predominantly utilised and compared the region to Western focused values and case studies. These have included comparisons with fascism in Europe,<sup>197</sup> military dominated regimes in former communist states<sup>198</sup>, and Latin America throughout the 20th century.<sup>199</sup> The role and configuration of

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<sup>196</sup> JA Bill & C Leiden, *The Middle East: Politics and Power*, p.58

<sup>197</sup> C Moore (ed.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, Basic Books, New York, 1970

W Laquer, *International Fascism, 1920-1945*, Harper & Row, London, 1966

<sup>198</sup> LJ Cohen & JP Shapiro (eds.), *Communist Systems in Comparative Perspective*, Doubleday, New York, 1974

<sup>199</sup> SM Lipset & A Solari (eds.), *Elites in Latin America*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967

A Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971

A Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973

elites was rarely a focus within the field of authoritarianism, however Guillermo O'Donnell's bureaucratic authoritarianism<sup>200</sup> noticeably illustrated the mechanisms that have invigorated the examination of wider structural inferences.

Bureaucratic authoritarian states are defined by seven characteristics: elite support, weighted influence of military personnel, forced imposition into sectors previously restricted, reduction in liberal policies, centralised economic planning, depoliticization of social issues, and restriction of political advancement.<sup>201</sup> Oriented around the context of South America, Guillermo O'Donnell accurately highlights the pursuit of power by the region's armed forces and the tactics that they employed to achieve this objective. He follows a Western-oriented assessment whereby he guides his hypothesis around the concept of the separation of power between civil and military domains. Not only does Guillermo O'Donnell assume coherent and separate identities between these actors, but establishes that they also have conflicting objectives. This perspective has contributed to the literature on a praetorian state, with the notion defined as 'one in which the military tends to intervene and politically could dominate the political system'.<sup>202</sup> Praetorianism draws upon a much larger body of knowledge, however the modern utilisation of the term obfuscates an application with traditional authoritarians.

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<sup>200</sup> G O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkley, 1973

<sup>201</sup> G O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Argentine 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective*, J McGuire, trans., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, p.33

<sup>202</sup>A Perlmutter, 'The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities', *Comparative Politics*, Vol.1, No.3, April 1969, p.383

While traditional authoritarian states also embrace a heightened role for the military and security services within society, they are distinct from their modern equivalents through their embrace of a shared identity. Instead of erasing social structures, these linkages become stronger conduits for influence and extrapolation. It is within this image that the unity of society, seen through the neo-patriarchal lens, is expanded, to support the functionality of both society and the state. Where ownership is delegated to the regime, this is in turn responsible for the allocation for resources across society. Supported through the lens of the rentier state theory, the accumulation of power by traditional monarchies within MENA has promoted the growth of corporate influence within the state; namely that of the regime.

The most defining feature of a corporate state is 'the absence of an autonomous or powerful party'.<sup>203</sup> Furthermore, Amos Perlmutter explains that in addition to corporate interests, 'historical and classical corporate institutions'<sup>204</sup> form predominant sections of the state. The combination of traditional power structures within the dynamics of a formal, modern, and somewhat liberal state are illustrated by Perlmutter's Corporate Praetorian model:

'In the corporate praetorian model two structural forms, corporatism and clientelism, converge. The government is the most powerful patron. Composed of military and technocratic groups, it dominates the corporatist social system. The

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<sup>203</sup> A Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism, A Comparative Institutional Analysis*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981, p.38

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, p.38

military, the church, and the governmental ministries with their bureaucrats and technocrats are autonomous corporatist groups, while the functional-economic corporations are not.... Although the military, the church, and the technocrats serve as the regime's main source of support, the military is the most powerful, acting as the arbitrator of the corporatist system'.<sup>205</sup>

The illustration of power centres within a corporate praetorian state revolves around the two primary strategies within a regime security strategy: enforcement and maintenance of power. In doing so, Amos Perlmutter's hypothesis clearly illustrates how key political portfolios can be manipulated to bureaucratize and minimize levels of influence, and or empower select institutional organisms to increase control.

**Neo-Corporate Praetorianism (NCP)** Widespread attempts to illustrate the structuring of political power have largely framed paradigms within modern systems of governance. Whereas in some systems that have experienced wholesale change, MENA monarchies continue to rule through the same conduits of influence that have supported their reign over generations.

Modernisation has been a further influence on models of governance with Anthony Giddens arguing the consequential relationship between modernisation and globalisation. As a result of the strengthened bonds between global communities there has been a counter-reaction

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<sup>205</sup> *ibid*, .p43-44

by states to increase their own domestic authority and control. This has attempted to renegotiate the relationship between the state and society through what Anthony Giddens hypothesized as the institutional dimensions of modernity: surveillance, military power, industrialism and capitalism.<sup>206</sup>

Modernity's system of connected governance argues the isolation of each dimension from the political sphere, yet still maintains a direct relationship with each other aspect. When refined and combined with the basic premise of a regime security strategy, the fundamental requirements for survival remain; enforcement and maintenance of power. Industrialism and capitalism are sectors involved in the generation and management of resources that enable a regime to maintain its power while the military and surveillance capabilities allow for the enforcement of power. The fifth category, the religious establishment, is one by which the state can maintain and sculpt its legitimacy and thus enlarge the scope of its dominion. These domains have a heightened profile and significance over other portfolios as a result of their capacity of power. This trend is noted by Steffen Hertog who asserts that the 'corporate system is not composed of equally powerful corporations'.<sup>207</sup>

The application and merging of the institutional dimensions of modernity to Amos Perlmutter's corporate praetorian model, assists in the construction of a framework that identifies the locales of sovereign power within a modern state. This model is called the Neo-Corporate Praetorian (NCP) state.

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<sup>206</sup> *ibid*, .p59

<sup>207</sup> *ibid*, .p266




Figure 1 Author's Neo-Corporate Praetorianism (NCP)

The NCP state is firmly centred around executive power, and directly managed and overseen by a concise unit of leadership. While the NCP is a modern manifestation, it is a paradigm that accurately illustrates where and how power is managed by traditional authoritarian leaders within the modern world. This is based upon the assertion that there is a dual-tiered structure of executive power with the five supreme domains of power isolated to ensure the state's maximal power and authority.

Residing at the core of the NCP model is the identity of a traditional state. The government is the foremost position of power within the state, with the regime exercising ultimate authority. Due to the heightened attributes of neo-patriarchy within traditional authority, the regime's network of control can be tangibly observed through shared bonds of kinship, tribe, and technocratic profession. As a result, by identifying what characteristics institutions and their senior management exhibit, the regime security strategy of the NCP can be identified

and highlighted. The implications of these observable changes are analysed to illustrate the drivers of said regime security strategy.

A structural imperative of any traditional and authoritarian society is the monopoly on the utilisation of violence and coercion, aimed at deterring would-be-aggressors from territorial and sovereignty abuses, and directly linked to the surveillance, industrial, and economic dimensions of the state. While the military is predominantly externally focused, due to its significance in matters of national, state, and regime security, the military's personnel and capabilities carry substantial clout. Furthermore, the fragile environment within authoritarian states has prompted many regimes to offset and induce numerous checks and balances into the leadership of the military and the wider coercive apparatus to ensure full compliance and oversight.

The resulting institutional reform has evidenced specialised roles for various aspects of the military; domestic agencies, such as the Ministry of Interior (MOI), are primary organisations of internal security and surveillance, however various aspects of the military are often drafted into the effort to watch the watchers.<sup>208</sup> The premise for a heightened application of surveillance capabilities within a NCP state is to ensure the direct 'supervision of the activities of subject populations' and maintain a capability that is able to control information.<sup>209</sup> Within

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<sup>208</sup> A paraphrase on Satires who said 'Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies?', or, who will guard the guards themselves? Satires, *Juvenal*, Satvra VI, 347-348, P Labriolle and F Villeneuve, trans., Belles Lettres, Paris, 1967, p.72

<sup>209</sup> A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p.58

the advent of modernisation, the surveillance capabilities of a state have been magnified, and thus, have contributed to the militarisation of a NCP state.

There is a long-established link between the military and domestic industrial capabilities, with a prominent claim that the military drives domestic innovation. As a tool of coercion, the military is always planning to advance capabilities to overpower adversaries and challenges. Where close cooperation between the military and industry has evolved, tangible results of this relationship have often contributed to the revolution of military affairs (RMA). In order to develop, manufacture, and understand the use of modern applications and platforms, the military and wider coercive apparatus require a constant stream of educated personnel to utilise these contemporary systems. This, in turn, demands the prioritisation of higher education and innovation. Through the process of technological modernisation, newly acquired transferable skills also provide the industrial base with added benefits, not only the optimisation of domestic industrial capabilities (also referred to as the military industrial complex [MIC]) but also as a by-product, an increasing influence on the national economy. It is crucial for NCP states to maintain control and ownership of resources, through investments, partnerships, and joint ventures with third party actors; a common strategy to attract the necessary intellectual property (IP) and technology transfer to build domestic industrial capabilities.

Through the increase and advancement of productive capabilities, the state can generate a larger volume of revenue. Because the long-term survival of the NCP state is based upon its ability to procure and co-opt capabilities to ensure the status quo of power relations, this is crucial for the selective maintenance of the social contract. The parallel foundations of the

NCP state, the enforcement and maintenance of power, therefore remain at the centre of the NCP state and of a coherent regime security strategy.

The inclusion of the religious establishment with a NCP state framework highlights how irrational and emotive propensities directly assist the legitimation of the state within such a context. Religion can often be used directly, or indirectly within the state-building process, and can assist the anchoring of society to traditional tenants, thus reinforcing the empowered position of the regime within a NCP state. This, in turn, fortifies the link between the religious establishment and regime within a state, providing the latter with a substantial power base. The NCP regime must, however, maintain control over religious discourse and impose 'state sponsored "traditional" views' which Daniel Brumberg later clarifies, are normally based upon the 'emphasis on state authority and the claims of community'.<sup>210</sup>

The NCP paradigm builds upon cooperative theories to provide accurate and targeted values from which to explore and test in order to explain how the regime security strategy of the UAE has been impacted by the Arab Spring. By acknowledging the heightened role socio-cultural characteristics play within a traditional authoritarian state, this thesis can focus on the most applicable factors to the regime's utilisation of power conduits.

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<sup>210</sup> D Brumberg, 'Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No.4, 2002, p. 63

## **Empirical Collection (Methodology)**

Research into authoritarian states is by nature a delicate task due to their highly securitised environments. This is exacerbated when analysing the concerns of a regime because of its exclusive membership and control of the state. Therefore, when analysing changes to the regime and its management of the state, both qualitative and quantitative approaches could be undertaken.

A solely qualitative approach can be used to illustrate perceived changes within the regime; however, the analytical output would be limited and underutilised because of its partial and subjective character. Quantitative research methods such as a longitudinal cross-sectional study could also be used to calculate changes within the regime and across the state apparatus. This would allow for a calculated and tangible output that illustrates changes over a given time period to the social makeup of the regime. For maximised yield however, these methods must be combined to provide a detailed ethnography containing narrative oral histories with a quantifiable image to illustrate changes to the regime and its control of the state. As a result, a mixed methods quantitative and qualitative methodological framework should be applied to fully examine the intricate network of the regime across the state.

Chiefly primary source information from public sources is prioritised, and supplemented by scholarly and policy-related collections.<sup>211</sup> This thesis prioritises the gathering of information

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<sup>211</sup> National Archives at Kew, Foreign Office (FO) and Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) Archives, Durham University's Middle East Documentation Unit (MEDU), Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies (IAIS) library at the University of Exeter and the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) in Abu Dhabi.

from predominantly state-run and commercial organisations. Due to the arbitrary nature of legislation and strict repression of sensitive public information within the UAE, this thesis has to acknowledge that the state's publication of information may not be completely accurate. On the other hand, because of the UAE's strict publishing legislation, the fact that these sources publish information from within the UAE provides legitimacy for their utilisation within this research.

As official primary sources, these are critical in the examination of the UAE's evolving regime security strategy. In addition to state-owned outlets, private entities also can provide useful data sources; however, their significance comes second to official outlets. If this thesis were to examine state or national strategy, there would be a different focus of data sources, but because it focuses on a small elite group, the combination of official documentation and ethnographic input maximises the thesis's tangible contribution. The result of the distinction and focus on the regime is the assumption that actors and interests are not homogenous. Therefore, empirical data must be detailed and sustained to avoid assumptions and simplistic observations.

The UAE's authoritarian identity questions the reliability of official sources tests, however to avoid potentially endangering the researcher or human sources, it should be recorded as fact. It is in this vein that by analysing official statements and reports, data collected will be open source and thus appropriate for utilisation in this study. Furthermore, Gulf States Newsletter (GSN) can be utilised as a valuable resource in this study due to its proprietary and reliable information. It is able to achieve this because it anonymises sources and contributors. As a result, GSN contributes as much to the contemporary study of the GCC as John Lorimer's

*Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia* once did for policy circles in colonial times.<sup>212</sup>

In combination with remote data gathering, interviews will be undertaken with individuals who have experience and expertise in the areas highlighted within the research. Interviews about experiences and ethnography of the regime would be conducted, but due to the sensitivity participants would not be members of the elite group. This is to provide security and safety for the researcher and participants, but in doing so, challenges the accuracy of potential methods. Interviews will help to augment the predominantly ethnographically focused data, as this aspect is underdeveloped within academic and policy circles. Interviewees will be informed about the aims of the research prior to engagement (letter of introduction highlighting the researchers background, research aims and measures that will be taken to protect the individual), and recorded as anonymous personnel to avoid safety, ethical and professional repercussions. It is crucial that any information recorded arises from informed consent and, as a result, only candidates that formally agreed to participate in the research and their comments anonymously included.

While interviews can be conducted virtually, personal interactions carry far greater reward as rapport can be built and used as social capital to extend interviews. Furthermore, ethical considerations forbid electronic conversations with subjects within the UAE because of strict cyber security laws and advanced surveillance technology. A fundamental concern is the

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<sup>212</sup> JG Lorimer, *The Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia (Part 1: Historical/ Part II: Geographical and Statistical, 9 Vols)*, Archive Editions, Gerrards Cross, 1986

outlawing of voice over protocol (VOIP) software, and thus the risk for the researcher and interviewees is extreme and preventable. As a result, no interviews will be conducted through virtual means.

Semi structured interviews will be conducted with participants, as this method allows conversations to follow a predetermined path whilst enabling candidates to lead the conversation towards their background and personal experience, potentially uncovering new information. Structured interviews in turn could overlook potential additional information brought by the interviewed candidates and as a result could limit the usefulness of the interviews. Furthermore, as data will be combined from public sources and interviews, the utilisation of questionnaires would not elicit vital evidence as it would instead illustrate points of view, and not tangible discoveries. Interviews will be recorded, transcribed and stored digitally, both online and offline, and used solely for the aim of the research. Upon conclusion of this thesis, any information pertaining to the interviews will be destroyed.

The UAE authorities have an arbitrary and broad interpretation of what is deemed sensitive and secretive information.<sup>213</sup> While legal interpretations could dispute the UAE's reading of information, to avoid any doubt and to circumvent Emirati sensitivities, this thesis relies upon information deemed appropriate for official circulation, as released by the UAE News Agency,

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<sup>213</sup> S Salama, 'UAE widens scope of penal code to fight corruption', *Gulf News*, 5<sup>th</sup> December 2018, available online, <https://gulfnews.com/uae/uae-widens-scope-of-penal-code-to-fight-corruption-1.60767814>, date accessed, 15<sup>th</sup> June 2019

WAM. Where information has been circulated and distributed publicly up by local and international media outlets, these have also been utilised as evidence.

Evidence collected of individuals, including their ethnographic and technocratic background will be recorded and measured through a longitudinal cross-sectional to illustrate how social factors have been influenced changes to the regime following the Arab Spring. Measuring this over a set period of time, and evaluating the changing network dynamics across the state will allow a tangible illustration of evidence that will provide a case study that contributes to a body of knowledge that is largely lacking such detailed material. As a result, the research methodology will identify and evaluate the case specific variables that influence and shape the evolution of the regime's security strategy.

In essence, a mixed methods research design is required to elicit the maximum amount of appropriate data. The processing of official data with supplementary documentation and interview participation will allow for the thesis to contribute to a field of research that lacks sufficient tangible evidence.

## Chapter 5 – Regime Security Strategy Precedent in Abu Dhabi

Having examined the distinct security perceptions of a regime, this chapter will explore how threats have been perceived and counteracted by previous generations of Abu Dhabi elites. A historical foundation will provide an accurate context of the UAE's current regime security strategy as the predominant security concern from institutional and familiar ties has remained a constant. Therefore, by analysing how security conceptions of regime security have developed, this thesis can illustrate how the predominant conduits of power are exploited to support the regime.

While evidence has shown humans settling in the Emirates for thousands of years,<sup>214</sup> this thesis focuses on the modern-day, post-Sheikh Zayed UAE. To accurately frame the effect of the Arab Spring upon the UAE's regime security strategy, a contextualisation and evaluation of how previous rulers have managed threats within the UAE will assist the cultural and original context that this case study presents.

The UAE is a federal state with seven Emirates; Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al Khaimah (RAK), Sharjah, and Umm al Quwaim (UAQ), and is located at the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula with a presence on both the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. The British empire assisted the development of the UAE's federation; however, it was primarily due to

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<sup>214</sup> DT Potts, 'Before the Emirates: an Archaeological and Historical Account of Development in the Region ca 5000 BC to 676 AD', in I al Abed and P Hellyer (eds.), *United Arab Emirates, a new perspective*, Trident Press, London, 2001, pp.28-69

the leadership of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan (the founder and ruler of the UAE until his death in 2004) which united the federation. While initially turbulent, the reign of Sheikh Zayed was calm and progressive, and built upon the failures of his elder brother Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan al Nahyan. On reflection, the only noteworthy internal source of contention to Sheikh Zayed emerged in the immediate aftermath of his death, when speculation around the selection of his successor complicated lineage progression.<sup>215</sup>

There are three predominant eras of the UAE's political history that will be analysed to highlight how threats to the ruling elites emerged and the mechanisms used to mitigate them. These eras are Al Nahyan rule in Abu Dhabi during the UAE pre-unification (1761-1968), the process of unification (1968-1971), and the reign of Sheikh Zayed (1966-2004). This chapter will then illustrate how the Abu Dhabi ruling family viewed the Arab Spring (2011).

### **Pre-Unification UAE; Al-Nahyan Rule in Abu Dhabi (1761-1968)**

Before the UAE's formation, the Emirates' tribal identities were distinct and often promoted intense levels of competition. Until oil was discovered in the UAE, specifically within the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, the political economy of the Emirates' was largely built on trade and pearling. This provided the littoral focused territories of Dubai, Sharjah, and RAK with significant influence and wealth because of their ability to attract persons and commodities. The southern Emirate of Abu Dhabi, however lay on the periphery, due to its geographical

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<sup>215</sup> CD Davidson, 'After Sheikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession in Abu Dhabi and the UAE', *Middle East Policy*, Vol.13, No.1, Spring 2006, pp.42-59

distance from these trading hubs and harsher desert environment. This also explains why, because of Abu Dhabi's land focused settlements, tribal ties carry more significance; as opposed to the maritime and outward looking maritime empires of the Qawasim and later the Maktoums.

During the era of oil discovery in the UAE, and under the auspices of the British Empire, Emirati society was segmented so its ruling elites could 'identify tribal groups loyal to them in order to define their [geographical] boundaries'<sup>216</sup>. The established limits cemented tribal ties and relationships, and apart from a few standout examples, such as the switch of allegiance of the Zaabi tribe from RAK to Abu Dhabi,<sup>217</sup> froze the societal hierarchy that persists to this day<sup>218</sup>. While federal sympathies still exist, since Sheikh Zayed's death, the Abu Dhabi ruling family had undertaken a carefully balanced strategic program to centralize political power and social capital within the Southern Emirate.

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<sup>216</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, p.12

<sup>217</sup> The evolution of the Zaabi tribe and its allegiance from the Qawasim in RAK to the Al Nahyan's in Abu Dhabi is a key example.

<sup>218</sup> Not only are the rulers of each Emirate head of the family, and thus head of the most important tribe in that area, but also, those surrounding the monarch form similar groupings and relationships that have not changed. Kazim notes that the driver behind this strategy was for the British to maximise oil concessions and weaken institutional capabilities and so strengthen foreign hegemony within the region. AA Kazim, *Historic Oman to the United Arab Emirates, From 600 A.D. to 1995: An Analysis of the Making, Remaking and Unmaking of a Socio-Discursive Formation in the Arabian Gulf, Part 1*, PhD Thesis, The American University, Washington D.C., 1996, P.513

The resulting urbanisation of Emirati tribal communities would have theoretically concluded in a dilution of traditional principles and networks. Juxtaposing this, however, is the observation that kinship and tribal relations have increased in significance within the UAE. This contradicts Andrea Rugh's hypothesis that 'Emiratis have replaced tribal identities with national identities to trigger the distinctions that are important today'<sup>219</sup>

Tribal pedigree and legacy is especially powerful in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi where 'among the original tribal population of the UAE the Bani Yas are still the most numerous single tribe'.<sup>220</sup> The Bani Yas is the tribe in which the Al Nahyan's, and the Maktoum royal family of Dubai, form predominant sections (or clans). Clarence Mann, John Kelly, Lorimer, Frauke Heard-Bey and Hendrik Van Der Meulen have all attempted to summarise the sections of the Bani Yas suggesting that there are 13, 14 major and 6 minor,<sup>221</sup> 15, 20 or 27 separate sections respectively.<sup>222</sup> Clarence Mann does, however, highlight that 'the primary subdivisions of the Bani Yas are numbered at thirteen, but it is entirely possible that this breakdown may change with additional research in this relatively remote area'.<sup>223</sup> Hendrik Van Der Meulen's most recent calculation aligns with Frauke Heard-Bey's summary of the most significant Bani Yas

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<sup>219</sup> A Rugh, 'Backgammon or Chess? The State of Tribalism and Tribal Leadership in the United Arab Emirates', in U Rabi (ed.), *Tribes and States in a Changing Middle East*, p.76

<sup>220</sup> F Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates; A Society in Transition*, p.27

<sup>221</sup> JB Kelly, *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, Faber & Faber, London, 1964, p.36

<sup>222</sup> These are listed in Appendix 1 Sections of the Bani Yas

<sup>223</sup> C Mann, *Abu Dhabi, Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom*, Khayats Beirut, 1964, p.17

sections, both agreeing on a similar number; 8-10 predominant sections. While there are multiple sections of the Bani Yas, only the al Nahyan's have the right to succession.

A small family unit, the Al Nahyan's are the Al Bu Falah subsection of the Bani Yas<sup>224</sup> and have enjoyed the support from other subsections of the Bani Yas for the duration of their leadership in Abu Dhabi; in particular the Manasir. Originating from Liwa and later settling in Buraimi and more recently Abu Dhabi city, the Bani Yas have been 'one of the most compact and powerful tribes of Trucial Oman; their range is practically co-extensive with the territories of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi'.<sup>225</sup> John Lorimer's earlier observation has continued to ring true, where the Bani Yas and the Al Nahyan section have controlled Abu Dhabi continuously since 1761.

**Political Violence Among the UAE Elites** While in control of a vast swath of territory, the Al Nahyan family had been at odds with not only other Emirate's rulers, in particular the Qawasim (Qassimi) families in Sharjah and RAK<sup>226</sup> but also tribal rivals from within their own territory and even their own family.

The contestation of land has been a moot point for the al-Nahyan's, with the Buraimi oasis, and Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser tunbs standout examples. The Al-Nahyan control

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<sup>224</sup> hereon simply referred to as the Al Nahyan.

<sup>225</sup> JG Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, Superintendent Government Printing, Calcutta, 1915 p.1932

<sup>226</sup> JB Kelly, *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*, p.60

of Buraimi is especially significant due to its emotive and intangible link to the Al-Nahyan and Bani Yas, as well as its position in regard to the oil fields of the UAE. Control of the oasis pitted the al-Nahyan's against the Al Bu Said Sultan of Muscat as well as the Na'im of Ajman and the Wuhaabi's of Saudi Arabia.<sup>227</sup>

Ultimately and helped by the British, the Al-Nahyan's kept control of Buraimi and the surrounding areas, thus ensuring geographic integrity and, ultimately, regime authority. It is also from Buraimi and later Al Ain that the founder of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed, built his personality and disposition, and, resultantly, prioritised his ties to the Western city with Clarence Mann stating that 'it is through him [Sheikh Zayed] that Abu Dhabi exerts its influence upon the Bedouin tribes'.<sup>228</sup> While over time there has been an attempt to defer to technocrats, this thesis will illustrate the renaissance of tribal and kinship relations within Abu Dhabi's executive branch.

The position of the Bani Yas within the UAE's political structure was contested mainly by the Qawasim of Ras al Khaimah and Sharjah who had built a substantial maritime empire that spread across the Persian Gulf. An opponent of the British Empire and its enforcement of regional hegemony, the Qawasim's trading monopoly threatened the Bani Yas and the British as they looked to concurrently increase their power and standing in the region, what is now the UAE's territory. The British, in turn, exploited the threat potential of the Qawasim's, and, after several raids and subsequent neutering agreements (such as the 1820 General Treaty

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<sup>227</sup> *ibid*, p.61

<sup>228</sup> C Mann, *Abu Dhabi, Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom*, p.109

for the Cessation of Plunder and Piracy by Land and Sea and the 1853 Perpetual Maritime Truce)<sup>229</sup> internal UAE power dynamics firmly swung in favour of Abu Dhabi; Uzi Rabi notes that ‘once the power of the Qawasim had been curtailed, that of the Bani Yas – a land power – began to grow correspondingly’.<sup>230</sup>

Al-Nahyan rulers appointed regional representatives across their territory in a tactic aimed at ensuring the continuation of their authority. These representative agents were present at strategic, population dense areas such as; Dhafrah, Tarif, Jabal al Dhannah, Das Island, Buraimi, and Dalma Island.<sup>231</sup> In the modern day, the ruler of Abu Dhabi maintains official representative offices in the Eastern<sup>232</sup> and Western<sup>233</sup> regions of Abu Dhabi, both of which are staffed by royal family personnel. It was crucial for Emirati authorities to physically project their leadership and power across elements of society, and the representative office ensured this. This form of rule is often referred to as a chiefdom which is defined as ‘an intermediate political structure between tribe and state, incorporating features of both’.<sup>234</sup>

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<sup>229</sup> U Rabi, ‘Oil Politics and Tribal Rulers in Eastern Arabia: The Reign of Shakhbut (1928-1966)’, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.33, No.1, May 2006, pp.37-50

<sup>230</sup> *ibid*, p.39

<sup>231</sup> F Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 103-112

<sup>232</sup> Sheikh Tahnoon bin Mohammed al Nahyan in Al Ain, Eastern Region <http://erd.ae/en/portal/20ac468d-ae7f-4bf1-a74f-58daeca461bc.aspx>

<sup>233</sup> Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed al Nahyan, Madinat Zayed, [https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/departments/department\\_detail?docName=ADEGP\\_DF\\_135812\\_EN&\\_adf.ctrl-state=17lcvf3y2r\\_4&\\_afrLoop=15724755292232468#](https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/departments/department_detail?docName=ADEGP_DF_135812_EN&_adf.ctrl-state=17lcvf3y2r_4&_afrLoop=15724755292232468#)

<sup>234</sup> U Rabi, ‘Oil Politics and Tribal Rulers in Eastern Arabia: The Reign of Shakhbut (1928-1966)’, p.40

Because of the varying array of threats to the Al-Nahyan family, the manipulation and fostering of tribal and kinship ties was, and still is, crucial for its survival. In such a condensed unit of power, any attempt to disturb power relations (which during the pre-unification UAE was mainly based upon the relationship with other tribes and the British) was the primary, and often lethal threat to rulers due to their capacity to re-structure power relations. Therefore, it will be shown, the weight placed on the family and tribe is both the biggest strength and a latent threat to the Sheikhs of the UAE.

The Al-Nahyan monopoly of power in Abu Dhabi started in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, with the reign of Sheikh Falah providing the foundations for the Al-Nahyan legacy. Over the next two hundred years, three rulers died of natural causes while in office, three rulers were deposed by family members (twice by brothers, and once by a son), and eight rulers were murdered (all but one were killed by family members).<sup>235</sup>

The threat posed by family members is noted by Gordon Tullock who claims that ‘if you look over history, the number of times that a King is known to have been killed by his eldest son is by no means trivial. I frequently say that this is the commonest cause of death of kings’.<sup>236</sup> Likewise, it has been shown that political violence has been a commonality within Emirati politics for generations, and the Al-Nahyan’s are not the only example of inter-family quarrels

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<sup>235</sup> A Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, pp.220-227

Appendix 2 Transfer of Leadership in Abu Dhabi (1761 – Present)

<sup>236</sup> G Tullock, *The Social Dilemma of Autocracy, Revolution, Coup D’Etat, and War*, p.84

within the UAE. The last assassination by a fellow royal family member within the UAE<sup>237</sup> occurred in 1972 when Sheikh Khalid Mohammed of Sharjah was murdered by the ousted Sheikh Saqr who was 'hoping to regain the rulership'.<sup>238</sup> Sheikh Saqr was subsequently exiled, and Sheikh Sultan Mohammed al Qassimi appointed ruler.<sup>239</sup> Sheikh Sultan al Qassimi was later victim of a coup attempt in 1987 by his own brother, Sharjah Crown Prince, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Mohammed al Qassimi.<sup>240</sup>

History demonstrates that threats to Emirati rulers have been most pronounced when originating from fellow royal family members. Tribal sections were often pragmatic in their support of potential rulers; however, most stayed out of inter-family contests, and instead were more likely to participate in inter-Emirate strife. This was also true for external actors who attempted to exploiting tribal factions within the UAE in an attempt to initiate a coup in

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<sup>237</sup> The UAE's first foreign minister, Saif Ghubash, was accidentally assassinated in 1977 when a gunman missed his target, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Abdel Halim Khaddam.

<sup>238</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, p.156

<sup>239</sup> RS Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States*, The MacMillan Press, London, 1978, p.196

<sup>240</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates* , p.156

Another branch of the Qawasim lineage, the Qassimi's of RAK, have also experienced considerable political turbulence. The former Crown Prince of RAK, Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr al Qassimi, was removed from the line of succession by his father and ruler of RAK, Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al Qassimi. Sheikh Khalid has made several attempts to reassert his claim to power ('RAK Ruler's Death to Test Saud's Leadership', *Gulf States Newsletter (GSN)*, Vol.34, No.888, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2010

Abu Dhabi,<sup>241</sup> and for the UAE assisting the potential overthrow of a neighbouring monarch.<sup>242</sup> This period of Emirati history is scorned upon by the modern-day authorities, and substantial attempts have been made to reconfigure Emirati history and thus re-write Abu Dhabi's bloody past.<sup>243</sup>

Numerous reports suggest that because of the series of assassinations, the mother of Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan and Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, Sheikha Salama bint Butti, demanded her sons pledge an oath 'to refrain from any conspiracy',<sup>244</sup> and Mann notes this was a factor in

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<sup>241</sup> During the political turmoil of 1818-1820, the Sheikh of Bahrain and Sultan of Muscat were deeply involved in the political wrangling of Sheikh Mohammed and Sheikh Tahnoon bin Shakhbut. C Mann, *Abu Dhabi, Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom*, p.26

<sup>242</sup> When Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani of Qatar was deposed by his Son Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa in 1995, while residing in Abu Dhabi, he attempted to regain power through a counter-coup, but ultimately failed. Sheikh Zayed was accused of assisting Sheikh Khalifa in his attempts to regain power by Doha.

<sup>243</sup> In official documentation, while there is mention of Abu Dhabi's bloody past, these are often overlooked with the deliberation strategic direction of alternate discourses. See, JMA Al-Hajji, *Qasr al-Hosn, The History of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi 1793-1966*, Centre for Documentation and Research, Emirates Printing Press Dubai, 2004, AM el Reyes (ed.), *New Perspectives on Recording UAE History*, Ministry of Presidential Affairs, National Centre for Documentation & Research, Abu Dhabi, 2009

In a tribute book to Sheikh Zayed edited by Land, previous accounts of Emirati history are reimagined. Sheikh Diab who by previous accounts was murdered by his cousin, Hazza, was according to Land was simply '*succeeded by his eldest son*'. S Land (ed.), *Zayed: A Man Who Built a Nation*, Media Prima, London, 2004, p.26

<sup>244</sup> C Mann, *Abu Dhabi, Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom*, p.81

the resulting political stability of Abu Dhabi.<sup>245</sup> Additionally, this formed a complementary factor into the bloodless transfer of power from Sheikh Shakhbut to Sheikh Zayed.

Driven by the dissatisfaction of Shakhbut's behaviour and inflexibility towards modernisation, the Al Nahyan ruling family<sup>246</sup> lobbied support from the British,<sup>247</sup> and signed a letter on the 4<sup>th</sup> August 1966 that was presented to Glen Balfour-Paul, the acting political agent in Abu Dhabi.<sup>248</sup> Sheikh Shakhbut initially rejected the family's call for his resignation, and even when his palace was surrounded by troops, maintained defiance. A contingent of soldiers entered the palace and escorted him out where he was put onto a plane, flying directly to London. Glen Balfour-Paul notes that Sheikh Salama bin Butti was deliberately misinformed of events

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<sup>245</sup> Lienhardt notes that 'to kill a brother is considered as only slightly less shameful and disastrous than to kill a father'. P Lienhardt, *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia*, A Al-Shahi (ed.), Palgrave, London, 2001, p.179

<sup>246</sup> Al-Nahyan notes that 'according to Shaikh Zayid, he was compelled, with the full approval and encouragement of the family, to replace Shaikh Shakhbut'. MZ Al-Nahyan, *With United Strength*, H.H. Shaikh Zayid Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, *The Leader and the Nation*, Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), Abu Dhabi, 2004, p.138

<sup>247</sup> Hendrik Van Der Meulen and Frauke Heard-Bey both concur that opposition to Shakhbut within the family reached a point of no return as Shakhbut's behaviour had started to upset tribal alliances to the al-Nahyan, thus Shakhbut was removed to appease and stabilise the political balance of tribal support to the Al-Nahyans. F Heard-Bey, 'The Gulf States and Oman in Transition', pp.20-21 in H Ven Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, pp.48-49

<sup>248</sup> PRO, FO 371/185527, Foreign Office to Certain Missions, 6 August 1966, in U Rabi, *Oil Politics and Tribal Rulers in Eastern Arabia: The Reign of Shakhbut (1928-1966)*, p.49

during this period, and hypothesis that Zayed was willing to use force to remove Shakhbut.<sup>249</sup>

It is apparent that the history and legacy of previous generations was etched into the mentality of Sheikh Zayed and other elite figures within the UAE's leadership when the decision was made to oust Sheikh Shakhbut.<sup>250</sup>

**Political Opposition.** The Al-Nahyan rule of Abu Dhabi has carefully managed and exploited traditional principles and values to mediate concerns and qualms. However, having been heavily exposed to alien cultures and peoples from an early period, the other Emirates were by nature more progressive and thus contrasting in their non-utilisation of tribal and traditional tenants. Therefore, alternate forms of opposition, often organised through formal groupings appeared where concerns and demands could be met. Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi had to contend and contest influence and subterfuge by competing forces from outside their own neighbourhood; most predominantly the Wahhabis and Qawasims.

Because of the declining pearling industry in Dubai during the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, and the perceived dilution of traditional societal morals and identity due to the influx of expatriates and modern education syllabi, political opposition movements emerged within

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<sup>249</sup> PRO, FO 371/185527, Political Agency, Abu Dhabi to HG Balfour-Paul, Bahrain Residency, 14 August, 1966, U Rabi, *Oil Politics and Tribal Rulers in Eastern Arabia: The Reign of Shakhbut (1928-1966)*, p.50

<sup>250</sup> Several factors have been highlighted for Shakhbut's dismissal; however, it was his inability and reluctance to utilise the oil wealth for the development of Abu Dhabi that contributed to his demise.

the trading city. The predominant example is the reform movement,<sup>251</sup> with a modern reinterpretation in the guise of the UAE branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, *Al-Islah*.<sup>252</sup> Other vehicles of political mobilisation within the Arabian Gulf have rallied around the causes of Arab nationalism, communism in the 1970s (Front for the Liberation of Occupied Eastern Arabia [FLOEA] also known as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf [PFLOAG],<sup>253</sup> National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf [NDFLOAG]), and xenophobia towards expatriates (Dubai National Front).

By comparison, and in the pre-unified UAE, political organisation were used for extensions of power. A clear example was the reform movement. This was used by Sheikh Mana bin Rashid al Maktoum in 1929 and 1938, to usurp the British backed Sheikh Said bin Maktoum.<sup>254</sup> While Mana bin Rashid partially succeeded in 1929, ruling the Emirate for two days, the British

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<sup>251</sup> AA Kazim, *Historic Oman to the United Arab Emirates, From 600 A.D. to 1995: An Analysis of the Making, Remaking and Unmaking of a Socio-Discursive Formation in the Arabian Gulf, Part 1*, p.454-474

<sup>252</sup> M Hedges and G Cafiero, 'The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in the GCC'

<sup>253</sup> Elsewhere across the region the PFLOAG had caused considerable instability and while its socialist gravitating ideology was evident within some sections of the Emirati population, Sheikh Zayed's management of the UAE economy and society repelled its ideological attraction. It is noted that because of the UAE's commercial and financial prosperity, as well as political and security capabilities, the PFLOAG was not able to significantly inject itself into Emirati society.

<sup>254</sup> AA Kazim, *Historic Oman to the United Arab Emirates, From 600 A.D. to 1995: An Analysis of the Making, Remaking and Unmaking of a Socio-Discursive Formation in the Arabian Gulf, Part 1*, p.465

intervened 'with orders from Haworth to cancel Sheikh Mana's appointment'.<sup>255</sup> Later however in 1938, Sheikh Said bin Maktoum faced a more serious threat largely due to his over-indulgence in the appropriations of trading income. Christopher Davidson notes that the opposition to Sheikh Said became so powerful that it was able to establish a parallel political apparatus including a new *majlis*.<sup>256</sup>

After several skirmishes, and with assistance from neighbouring Emirates, Sheikh Said liquidated the reform movement, and with it, the power of the merchant class.<sup>257</sup> Quietly, however, he amalgamated many of the proposals requested by the reform movement.<sup>258</sup> There were three facets to Sheikh Said's success in retaining power: support from the British, emphasis on traditional and tribal ties for leverage,<sup>259</sup> and some of the earliest forms of co-optation, emerging from the initial phases of the UAE's rentier economy.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> S Yanai, *Transformation of Gulf Tribal States; Elitism and the Social Contract in Kuwait, Bahrain and Dubai, 1918-1970s*, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton, 2014, p. 82

<sup>256</sup> C Davidson, *Dubai; The Vulnerability of Success*, Hurst & Co, London, 2008, p.33

<sup>257</sup> In contrast, the Kuwaiti Royal family failed to blunt the power of the merchant class and now form a substantial formalised opposition bloc to the Emir.

<sup>258</sup> AA Kazim, *Historic Oman to the United Arab Emirates, From 600 A.D. to 1995: An Analysis of the Making, Remaking and Unmaking of a Socio-Discursive Formation in the Arabian Gulf, Part 1*, p.473

<sup>259</sup> MM Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates: A Modern History*, Croom Helm, London, 1978, p.128

<sup>260</sup> C Davidson, 'Arab Nationalism and British Opposition in Dubai, 1920-66', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.43, No.6, 2007, p.890

## Regime Security Measures

Threats to the pre-unification UAE were countered by two predominant strategies; tribal co-optation and external security assistance from the British.

**Inter-Marriage.** Marriage between tribes has been a successful and widely utilised tactic within numerous regime security strategies, as the futures of the interested tribes are bound together to vest and increase interest in the others survival.

One prominent example of the strategic utilisation of marriage bonds is the relationship between the Al-Nahyan and the Manasir tribes<sup>261</sup> in Abu Dhabi. The Manasir were very important in Abu Dhabi, especially at the height of the pearl trade, and 'had intermarried with the townsfolk and therefore undertook the responsibility of protecting the town. In return they expected the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi to support them'.<sup>262</sup> Clarence Mann explains, for instance, that Khalifah bin Zaid 'was the most logical choice (for leadership), considering his age and the additional advantage of his being related through his mother to the Manasir tribe'.<sup>263</sup> Therefore, a large degree of the success attributed to Khalifah bin Zaid originates from his tribal pedigree, and should be seen in context of Sheikh Saqr who failed forge strong ties with the Manasir, he was subsequently assassinated.<sup>264</sup>

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<sup>261</sup> The Manasir is not part of the Bani Yas, however according to Van Der Meulen is their closest tribal ally. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.153

<sup>262</sup> JMA Al-Hajji, *Qasr Al Hosn*, p.227

<sup>263</sup> C Mann, *Abu Dhabi, Birth of an Oil Sheikhdom*, p.77

<sup>264</sup> *ibid*, p.p229

Andrea Rugh notes that it was a common and well exploited tactic of the Al-Nahyan's to foster kinship ties through marriage.<sup>265</sup> The mother of Sheikh Shakhbut and Sheikh Zayed, Sheikha Salama was from a prominent commercial family, and several connections can be made with parallel branches of the Al-Nahyan royal family; in particular, the Mohammed bin Khalifah lineage.<sup>266</sup> Sheikh Tahnoon bin Mohammed al Nahyan, of the Mohammed bin Khalifah lineage is the current ruler's representative in the Eastern Region, and based in the tribal heartland of Al Ain, helping to cement the Al-Nahyan leadership across the Emirate.<sup>267</sup>

Sheikh Zayed was noted to have married nine times and fathered at least 30 children, 19 of which were male. He was known to have strategically utilised marital agreements to expand his own tribal links, and incorporated women from the tribes of the Bu Shamis, Mishaghin, Bu Smara, Bani Qitab, Manasir, Dhawahir, and the Darmaki. Andrea Rugh notes how each

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<sup>265</sup> A Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, p.136

<sup>266</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, pp99-100

<sup>267</sup> Sheikh Tahnoon bin Mohammed al Nahyan Biography, available online, <http://erd.ae/en/portal/C55827FB-8FAE-496D-82E4-BFCB990BA5A3.aspx>, date accessed, 27th December 2016

Sheikh Tahnoon was Chairman of the powerful Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and a member of the Supreme Petroleum however, was removed prior to the death of Sheikh Zayed, along with other Mohammed bin Khalifa descendants in July 2004, to ensure the uncontested continuation of power from Sheikh Zayed to his sons, and not to other branches of the Emirati royal family.

marriage, except for Sheikh Fatima Mubarak al Ketbi,<sup>268</sup> were largely strategic and political in nature; each marriage swung the tribal power balance in favour of Sheikh Zayed,<sup>269</sup> and away from other family rivals.

The mother of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Sheikha Fatima al Ketbi, is from the al-Qitab tribe. Descending from Buraimi, they had often disrupted oil explores, but beyond this they had traditionally not held much significance. Due to the power now emitted by Fatima al Ketbi's descendants, there is now a considerable presence of the al-Qitab tribe across the political and military spectrum, and always near the sons of Sheikha Fatima. As a result, while the Al-Nahyan leadership has exploited traditional linkages for traditional forms of support, they have also fostered a potential threat. As a result, a myriad of new kin-focused ties are emerging to balance and equalise potentially opposing forces within the tribal spectrum.

**External British Support.** British interest in the security and stability of the UAE, and later in the leadership of the Al-Nahyan's provided an impetus for the centralisation and prioritisation of regime security around the Abu Dhabi and Dubai elites. The British were predominantly concerned with their commercial supremacy across the GCC, in particular in securing maritime routes to India, and this required an increasing micromanaged approach to the UAE. This led them to exploit leaders, helping them with resources in a bid to secure British

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<sup>268</sup> 'This presumably made theirs a love marriage [Sheikh Zayed and Sheikha Fatima] but given Zaid's tendency to marry wives from strategically important tribes, this could not have been a bad marriage in the late 1950s when he was still Wali of Buraimi' AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership*, p.84

<sup>269</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership*, pp.82-87

interests within the UAE. The attempt was initially produce a more egalitarian tribal system, under the authority of London's chosen leaders. In order to ensure the longevity of London's regional policy success the British had to, in some cases, intervene directly,<sup>270</sup> and establish permanent representation.<sup>271</sup>

The position of the British was a doubled-edged sword for the UAE elites. On one hand, in accordance with growing Arab nationalist sentiment, the British Empire was unwanted as it was perceived to have no legitimacy for its position within the region. However, for the rulers of the Emirates, they often relied upon the British for their own survival,<sup>272</sup> and as such weakened their position, setting a historical example of the UAE's insecurity dilemma.

A former British military officer, Lieutenant Colonel David Neild was the commander and founder of both the Sharjah and RAK defence forces indicating the necessity of external actors for security assurance. Furthermore, the British were integral at significant points within the UAE's political history (1929 and 1938 coups in Dubai, usurping of Sheikh Shakhbut, and the UAE's ability to hold onto Buraimi/Al Ain from the Saudis'), highlighting how integral the British were in maintaining the status quo in favour of the UAE elites.

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<sup>270</sup> 11<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> November 1809 battle at Ras al Khaimah.

<sup>271</sup> Political officer in Bahrain, and later in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.

<sup>272</sup> J Onley, 'Britain and the Gulf Sheikdoms, 1820-1971: The Politics of Protection', *Centre for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Doha*, 2009 p.12

## **Unification (1968-1971)**

The combination of growing oil reserve discoveries in Abu Dhabi, looming departure of the Arabian Peninsula's long-term external security guarantor, and the preliminary progression towards political unity that had already occurred, had laid the groundwork for the unification of the UAE. Tribal competition and anxiety, however proved to be the largest hindrance to the UAE's establishment.

While the Emirates that were to later make up the UAE, identified themselves as separate administrative units that were tribally organised around a chief and a ruler, the evolving presence of the British within the Arabian Peninsula had already started to federalise policy and responsibilities. Two examples of this were the Trucial Oman Scouts and the British Political Resident; both entities were responsible for the establishment of the territories of modern-day Bahrain, Qatar and UAE.

Initial steps towards the UAE's unification comprised of the 1952 Trucial States Council<sup>273</sup> and the meeting of the 18<sup>th</sup> February 1968 in Dubai where it was agreed that Abu Dhabi and Dubai would form a union covering 'foreign affairs, security, defence, social services, and immigration'.<sup>274</sup> From this meeting a subsequent invitation was sent to the rulers of the other trucial states as well as the rulers of Bahrain and Qatar. Ten days later, another meeting took place, where the rulers of all 9 invited states attended and agreed to establish a federation

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<sup>273</sup> KG Fenelon, *The United Arab Emirates: An Economic and Social Survey*, p.21

<sup>274</sup> *ibid*, p.22

that was governed by a supreme council of rulers. This was called the Federation of the Arab Emirates.

The short-lived federation collapsed at its last meeting on the 21<sup>st</sup> October 1969. Ibrahim Al Abed claims that part of the reason for the federation's initial failure was 'inherent in the charter of the federation itself....its purpose was, in part, to reinforce the respect for each one of them [each emirate] for the independence and sovereignty of the others'.<sup>275</sup> Many insecurities and fallacies were evident in the federation's Emirates arguments and perceptions of their independence and strength, with most, if not all, intimidated and anxious about the role of Abu Dhabi in any future federation.

Subsequently, the UAE was formed on the 2<sup>nd</sup> December 1971, without Qatar, Bahrain, and RAK, with a provisional constitution that was later made permanent, 25 years later in July 1996. While through the UAE's early history several constitutional inconsistencies were ignored, and the Emirate of RAK joined a year after the UAE's formation, there were still several vulnerabilities within the federation.

The UAE's capital was initially, and later formally, based in Abu Dhabi with federal laws taking precedent over Emirate level jurisdiction. The UAE is headed by the President and the Vice

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<sup>275</sup> I Al-Abed, 'The Historical Background and Constitutional Basis to the Federation', E Ghareeb and I Al-Abed (eds.), *United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective*, Trident Press, London, 1997, .p108

President (VP), who theoretically have five year terms. According to the UAE Cabinet,<sup>276</sup> the President and VP, sit below the Supreme Council, which is composed of the rulers of all 7 Emirates and enacts decisions made by the UAE Cabinet. The cabinet houses the Prime Minister, two deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of the UAE, and General Secretariat - <sup>277</sup> Federal National Council (FNC), and the Federal Judiciary Authority. As of August 2020, there are 32 cabinet ministers.<sup>278</sup>

### **Unification difficulties**

During the UAE's formation, Sheikh Zayed encountered several substantive problems; retention of the federation's unity, repelling foreign aggression, and ensuring security and stability.

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<sup>276</sup> 'Federal System', *UAE Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/federal-system>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> December 2016

<sup>277</sup> 'Cabinet', *UAE Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/about-the-cabinet> , date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> December 2016

<sup>278</sup> 'Federal Government Entities', *UAE Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/federal-government-entities>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> December 2016

Ministry of Defence (MOD), MOI, Ministry of Presidential Affairs (MOPA), Ministry of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MICAD), Ministry of Culture and Knowledge Development (MCKD), Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and the Future (MOCAF), Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Community Development (MOCD), Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and Prevention (MOHAP), Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation (MOHRE), Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs (MFNCA), Ministry of Justice (MOJ), Ministry of Climate Change and Environment (MOCCAE), Ministry of Energy and Industry (MOEI), Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MOID).

**Retention of the Federation's Unity.** Sheikh Zayed was clearly the principal candidate for leadership within a unified federal state as a result of his charismatic personality and efficient utilisation of wealth. The Emirate of Dubai was expected to take the lead in the union but through Zayed's unifying presence he was deemed the best leader.

Initially in a pre-oil UAE, the power dynamics and balance of what was to be the seven Emirates was somewhat equal. However, overtime with more oil wealth, Abu Dhabi has centralised its position as the political, economic, and administrative centre of the UAE.<sup>279</sup> To put this into context, even before the UAE was formed, Abu Dhabi contributed 50 per cent, later increasing to 90 per cent of the Trucial States Fund in 1967 and 1968 respectively.<sup>280</sup> Heard-Bey also states that Abu Dhabi makes up 87% of the UAE's territory,<sup>281</sup> and thus lends to the argument of an Abu Dhabi centralised state. Aqil Kazim highlights this:

'Oil wealth made Abu Dhabi wealthier...this situation provided these small Emirates with a concrete argument for unification. Aside from gaining economic power over

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<sup>279</sup> Al-Tabtabai notes that in the 1950s when the UAE was at its least developed, the poorer Emirates maintained little to no contact with the outside world and lived in somewhat isolation. A Al-Tabtabai, *Al-Nizam al-ittihadi fi al-imarat al-arabiyya: Dirasa muqarana* [The Federal System in the UAE: A Comparative Study], N.p. n.p. 1978, p.383, in M Herb, *The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE*, p.86

<sup>280</sup> MM Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates; A Modern History*, p.139

<sup>281</sup> F Heard-Bey, 'The United Arab Emirates: Statehood and Nation-Building in a Traditional Society', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.59, No.3, Democratization and Civil Society, Summer 2005, p.359

the other Emirates, Abu Dhabi also gained political power in relation to them, as its oil wealth had allowed it to develop its defence and police forces'.<sup>282</sup>

None the less, there was still a requirement to ensure the consent and satisfaction of the Emirates rulers to ensure a stable union. Practically this meant the devolution of powers, representation of each Emirate's rulers within national bodies, and the strategic employment of diversified tribal engagement within the UAE's state apparatus. The fundamental challenge for Sheikh Zayed was how he would ensure Abu Dhabi's centrality in the future of the union, whilst also discouraging inclinations for independence from the other six Emirates.

While Abu Dhabi was the leading actor within the UAE's unification, competition with Dubai and other Emirates over the UAE's constitutional structure severely hampered Sheikh Zayed's attempts to ensure the federation's legacy. It is reported that he was close to resigning over his assumed failure to retain the federation's identity.<sup>283</sup> With the 1971 federation declaration only a temporary agreement, Sheikh Zayed had to ensure a formalised constitution that would not only bind the federation's Emirates, but would also promote Abu Dhabi to a position of leadership.

The UAE's original constitution demanded Sheikh Zayed to quickly find ways and means to formalise the long-term unification of the UAE. The first draft permanent constitution

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<sup>282</sup> AA Kazim, *Historic Oman to the United Arab Emirates, From 600 A.D. to 1995: An Analysis of the Making, Remaking and Unmaking of a Socio-Discursive Formation in the Arabian Gulf, Part 1*, p.740

<sup>283</sup> MZ Al-Nahyan, *With United Strength*, p.108

hypothesised by Zayed sought a “hard” unification where most of the Emirate’s powers would be federalised, and the country’s President amassing significant prowess. To arrest suspicions that Abu Dhabi would be too powerful within this, Sheikh Zayed proposed to empower the FNC<sup>284</sup> and offset Abu Dhabi’s perceived dominance. Zayed assumed he would always succeed in amassing power through the tribes should it be necessary within a formal mechanism such as the FNC.<sup>285</sup> This proposal was rejected by Dubai and RAK as they felt power was concentrated too far in Abu Dhabi. To appease some of the other rulers ‘he [Zayed] bankrolled every one of the ruling families - incumbent in their fortresses or modest new palaces – in order for them to maintain their status and respond to ever-increasing demands made on their largesse’.<sup>286</sup> This empowered and elevated the Emirate’s rulers within their own domains, whilst also co-opting their position to the livelihood and leadership of Abu Dhabi.

Following further pressure from the FNC, the rulers of Dubai and RAK had to stubbornly resist overtures to further federalise the UAE. While the smaller and poorer Emirates acknowledged their relative position to Abu Dhabi, the Emirates of Dubai<sup>287</sup> and Ras al Khaimah stood firmly

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<sup>284</sup> Because of a weak civil society and limited political power outside of official channels, the FNC never has had significant power. The UAE’s ruling families were not only distinct from expatriates at an early period but were also invested in local matters through commercial activity, and as such have always been able to direct policy to suit their own strategic imperatives, thus the FNC has always been only a veneer of participatory politics.

<sup>285</sup> M Herb, *The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE*, p.124

<sup>286</sup> F Heard-Bey, *The United Arab Emirates: Statehood and Nation-Building in a Traditional Civil Society*, p.363

<sup>287</sup> Sheikh Rashid’s deteriorating health loosened his opposition to a strong union and enabled Sheikh Zayed to unite the Federation.

to their conceptions of grandeur and strength and believed they could continue the status quo of relative political equality to Abu Dhabi, whilst still benefitting from the capital's heightened spending burden.

Initially inter-Emirate competition meant that for the first few years of the UAE's existence, there was a lot of financial waste and multiplicity of effort. In areas, such as immigration and defence, the Emirates were forced to work together, as there was an understanding of the greater combined strength, if not in regard to external adversaries, in regard to each other. John Peterson summarises the delegation of powers within the UAE as; 'Areas of sovereignty not specifically assigned to the UAE government fall to the individual amirates [sic], which jealously guard their autonomy. Even when certain powers, such as defence, constitutionally come under the jurisdiction of the federal government, local control persists in practise'.<sup>288</sup>

The delegation of constitutional powers and responsibilities was made clear in articles 116<sup>289</sup> and 122,<sup>290</sup> which, in summary, is the federal control of matters, unless not explicitly stated.

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<sup>288</sup> JE Peterson, 'The Future of Federalism in the United Arab Emirates', in HR Sindelar and JE Peterson (eds.), *Crosscurrents in the Gulf: Arab, Regional and Global Interests*, The Middle East Institute, Routledge, London, 1988, p.198

<sup>289</sup> 'The Emirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the Union by this Constitution. The Emirates shall all participate in the establishment of the Union and shall benefit from its existence, services and protection'.

<sup>290</sup> 'The Emirates shall have jurisdiction in all matters not assigned to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in accordance with the provisions of the two preceding Articles'.

Given Abu Dhabi's central position within the UAE's wealth generation, a feature that has greatly increased over time, the federation has organically evolved towards Sheikh Zayed's original vision of a centrally administered state without much difficulty.

**Repelling Foreign Aggression.** Aqil Kazim suggests that the British constructed a unique insecurity discourse for Emirati audiences that securitised the threat of Arab Nationalism, Iran, Oman, and Saudi Arabia to ensure its continued commercial advantage.<sup>291</sup> The manipulating of potential threats to the Emirate's rulers, the British could not only solidify the position of their vassal leaders, but also ensure that they united, to form a federation that was strong enough to independently repel foreign aggressions. James Onley suggests that the UAE's rulers understood how central the presence of the British was to the continued security and stability of the region and even offered to pay for their continued residence within the GCC.<sup>292</sup>

Even though he wrote his thesis after the event, Aqil Kazim's hypothesis of British involvement in threat manipulation can be challenged, as on the eve of the United Kingdom's official withdrawal from the GCC, Iranian troops seized the UAE, and claimed the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. This event highlighted the vulnerability of the

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<sup>291</sup>AA Kazim, *Historic Oman to the United Arab Emirates, From 600 A.D. to 1995: An Analysis of the Making, Remaking and Unmaking of a Socio-Discursive Formation in the Arabian Gulf*, Part 1, p.739

<sup>292</sup> Abu Dhabi to Foreign Office, 10 Jan. 1968, PREM 13/2209 (TNA, London), cited in Sato, "Britain's Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964-68", p.108 (n.54); The Times, 22 Jan 1968, p.1; The Times, 26<sup>th</sup> Jan 1968, p.5, in J Onley, *Britain and the Gulf Shaikdoms*, p.22 (n.85)

newly formed UAE. However, since Iran's seizure of the UAE's islands, the UAE has not been affected by existential threats.<sup>293</sup> Iran is however the UAE's foremost external threat.

Where previous insecurities had existed, the UAE was largely able to secure its geographic integrity,<sup>294</sup> albeit without its Islands that Iran seized. A significant factor for the continued security of the Persian Gulf was the presence of the US replacing the UK as the region's security guarantor.

**Development of the Coercive Apparatus.** To provide an indigenous security capability for the UAE, the British formed the Trucial Oman Scouts (TOS) (initially levies, and managed by the British) in 1951, with its headquarters in Sharjah with each Emirate possessing independent police forces.<sup>295</sup> Initially managed by the British, the TOS were used for an array of tasks including the delivery of security to rural areas. Upon the looming departure of the British, the TOS were amalgamated; into the local police forces (later independent Emirate level brigades) and into the Ministry of Defence, and in 1971 the Union Defence Forces (UDF).

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<sup>293</sup> Michael Herb agrees and clarifies that while Saudi Arabia's dispute with the UAE over Buraimi delayed Riyadh's decision to acknowledge the UAE until 1974, this did not present a credible threat to the UAE. M Herb, *The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE*, p.99

<sup>294</sup> Border disputes with Oman and Saudi Arabia have however continued into the modern day. These are not perceived as strategically critical issues by the Emirati authorities.

<sup>295</sup> Later the TOS were incorporated into local police forces.

Corresponding with political concerns, the management of the federal military forces was split between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with the ruler of Dubai being named the Minister of Defence. This power-sharing agreement became part of a larger rationale within the UAE federation, which attempted to cater and appease most tribes, so as not to formalise the dominance of any single grouping. To ensure Abu Dhabi's legacy and oversight of the military, Sheikh Zayed installed his sons Khalifa (now the ruler) and Sultan within the immediate leadership of the MOD<sup>296</sup> and the Abu Dhabi Defence Force (ADDF).<sup>297</sup>

Each Emirate managed the hiring of their independent forces and incorporated both national and foreign personnel.<sup>298</sup> This bolstered the rule of the emirate's leader in relation to other emirates as they could develop their forces as they wished. This allowed for the delivery of security and stability, and contributed to the repulsion of ideological trends such as the PFLOAG within the UAE. Therefore, the ADF was established in 1965, mirroring similar units in Ajman, Dubai, Sharjah, and RAK, and was a larger and more powerful force than the UDF.

While these units were constructed to deliver safety and security to the Emirates' they were attached to, John Peterson notes that they also 'protected the rulers and their families from attempted coups, which more often than not derived from within the ruler's family, as well

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<sup>296</sup> MM Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates*, p.139

<sup>297</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, P.121

<sup>298</sup> A Yates, 'Western Expatriates in the UAE Armed Forces, 1964-2015', *Journal of Arabian Studies*, Vol.6, No.2, December 2016, pp.182-200

as threats from their neighbours'.<sup>299</sup> Khalifa contributes to this analysis by arguing that the seven rulers were reluctant 'to transfer control over such a force (a centralised and concentrated military) to a higher authority might also mean the transfer, or, at least, the division of loyalty and allegiance of the men involved, something the rulers were reluctant to accept'.<sup>300</sup> It was not until 1976 that the independent forces merged with the UDF into the UAE Armed Forces, and twenty years later, the final independent brigades of Dubai and Sharjah were merged, forming the Central and Northern Commands of the UAE Armed Forces.

Hendrik Van Der Meulen noted that not only did Abu Dhabi fund the development of the UAE's two most important security apparatus, UAE Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior, but that the UAE Armed Forces were deliberately constructed heavily in favour of Abu Dhabi. As with Abu Dhabi's control of the military, Sheikh Zayed had to very carefully manage the development of capabilities nationally without being seen to overstep his constitutional limitations.<sup>301</sup> Partially because of this lop-sided development, the various Armed Forces across the Emirates had to unify as they became less and less relevant: 'Military logic dictated a unity in command and equipment, and for Shaikh Zayid, lack of unity in the armed forces

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<sup>299</sup> JE Peterson, 'The Future of Federalism in the United Arab Emirates', pp.213-4

<sup>300</sup> AM Khalifa, *The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation*, Saqi Books, London, 1989, p.80, in K Ulrichsen, *the United Arab Emirates*, p.64

<sup>301</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, pp.97-1000

reflected adversely on the unity project as a whole. For this principle, he was willing to renounce his position as President'.<sup>302</sup>

In conclusion, it becomes clear that there was a dual-pronged approach to the delivery of security and stability that would form the template of the UAE's future strategy; maintenance of power and enforcement of power.

### **Post-Unification; Reign of Sheikh Zayed (1971-2004)**

The reign of Sheikh Zayed was unprecedented; he was one of the UAE's longest ever serving monarchs, he secured the federation of the UAE, and safeguarded a stable succession. Thus, much of the success of the modern-day UAE is attributed to him.<sup>303</sup>

Before Sheikh Zayed became ruler, Abu Dhabi was desperately poor. Zayed's leadership and liberal economic policies encouraged the growth and development of Abu Dhabi and the UAE. Zayed's reign prioritised the development of infrastructure, building roads<sup>304</sup> and transit hubs, connecting communities, modernising the education syllabi, constructing modern defensive capabilities, leading the development of women's rights, and helping to firmly place the UAE on the international scene later. Mohammed Abdullah summarises the impact of Sheikh Zayed's reign:

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<sup>302</sup> MZ Al-Nahyan, *With United Strength*, p.209

<sup>303</sup> This is in context of the obvious underutilisation of funds by his predecessor.

<sup>304</sup> The construction of the Sheikh Zayed road that connects the UAE's Emirates is an extremely symbolic gesture that has been recently trumped by the Emirates Road and the Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Road.

‘The gigantic growth in oil revenues after 1974 enabled Abu Dhabi, which already provided 90 per cent of the federal budget, to increase her contribution. As a result of which, modernisation has rapidly become a reality in the other Emirates where federal expenditure on roads, schools, houses, clinics, electrification, agriculture, and fisheries has transformed the lives of the people’.<sup>305</sup>

The progress of Emirati society delivered by Zayed, prevented any significant threat from forming within the UAE. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed notes that Sheikh Zayed faced three predominant challenges to his reign; ensuring a strong union to maintain the UAE’s national security, building a strong policy of deterrence, and fostering a strong and positive image of the UAE internationally.<sup>306</sup> Beyond these assertions, Sheikh Zayed also faced what John Peterson has called structural weaknesses; a rentier economy, a heterogeneous population, an authoritarian governance system, the Iranian threat, and the unequal dispersion of wealth both among the citizens and Emirates.<sup>307</sup> There was, however, another threat to Zayed’s reign as highlighted by Christopher Davidson: uncertainty. In summary, while the UAE was united and developing under Zayed, Christopher Davidson credits much of this success to the guardianship of the Emirates ruling families, and to Zayed.<sup>308</sup>

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<sup>305</sup> MM Abdullah, *The United Arab Emirates*, p.142

<sup>306</sup> MZ Al-Nahyan, *With United Strength*, pp.217-219

<sup>307</sup> WA Rugh, ‘The United Arab Emirates: What Are the Sources of Its Stability?’, *Middle East Policy*, Vol.5, No.3, Sept 1997, p.15

<sup>308</sup> C Davidson, ‘After Sheikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession In Abu Dhabi and the UAE’, p.43

The remaining question was; what would happen to the stability of the UAE after Sheikh Zayed's reign, especially as he had been so integral to the union's stability? Given the historical context that has been presented here, there was understandably apprehension over possible future succession issues and the ability for Sheikh Zayed's heir, like his father, to ensure the integrity of the union. Thus, the manifestation of threats to Sheikh Zayed's reign mostly became evident in his last days.

**Tribal Completion; Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah (BMBK) Threat** Given Sheikh Zayed's delicate management of tribal relations, it was clear that he understood the power and threat that the tribes of the UAE possessed. This section illustrates how a parallel section within the al Nahyan family posed a potential threat of legitimacy, and the means with which Sheikh Zayed managed the clan.

This family unit is the BMBK, and there are the sons of Khalifah bin Zayed bin Khalifah, who was Sheikh Zayed's Uncle, and his father, Sheikh Sultan's, older brother.<sup>309</sup> They were deemed so powerful that Hendrik Van Der Meulen hypothesized that Sheikh Zayed could not have been ruler without the support of the BMBK.<sup>310</sup> This is due to the fact that due to laws of primogeniture they possessed a stronger claim than Sheikh Zayed.

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<sup>309</sup> Sheikh Khalifah bin Zayed bin Khalifa did not however hold rule in Abu Dhabi, even though he was the eldest son of Zayed bin Khalifah.

<sup>310</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, P.110

During the early period of Sheikh Zayed's reign, there was much speculation about how tribal dynamics could either support or weaken his reign. John Peterson illustrates this dynamic by stating that 'given the weakness of the Bani Sultan (descendants of Shaykh Shakhbut's and Shaykh Zayid's father), there is considerable speculation that the rival Bani Muhammed might try to wrest away leadership of the Al Nahyan after Zayid's death'.<sup>311</sup> By understanding the origins of Sheikh Zayed's most prominent threats, a targeted investigation illustrates how he mediated these manifestations. To immediately face the tribal threat posed by the BMBK, Sheikh Zayed paired several of his sons with BMBK family members to integrate their bloodline into his lineage.

As a reward for their loyalty, Sheikh Zayed kept the BMBK lineage well represented within his leadership; especially as his own nuclear family was largely unable to support his position due to death, exile, or in the case of his sons, excessive youth. This enabled the BMBK to be ever present within Emirati politics. In a bid to offset the potential threat posed by the BMBK, Sheikh Zayed installed his eldest son, Khalifa (who was 20 at the time) to the post of Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler of Abu Dhabi.<sup>312</sup> This provided the first example of Sheikh Zayed prioritising the development of his own lineage rather than appeasing tribal competitors.

While Khalifa's appointment was an overt move to ensure the security of Zayed's lineage, he was, in fact, the son of a BMBK descendent, Sheikha Husa bin Mohammed al Nahyan, and as

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<sup>311</sup> JE Peterson, 'The Future of Federalism in the United Arab Emirates', in HR Sindelar and JE Peterson (eds.), *Crosscurrents in the Gulf: Arab, Regional and Global Interests*, p.204

<sup>312</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership*, p.88

such, BMBK descendants could not claim under-representation within Abu Dhabi politics.<sup>313</sup> This was another indication of Sheikh Zayed's critical understanding of the requirement to manage tribal relations and was one of ten marriages between his children and the BMBK lineage.<sup>314</sup>

Beyond the selective marriage arrangements of him and his sons, Sheikh Zayed was acutely aware of parallel Al-Nahyan lineages, and of the danger of the BMBK. This resulted with a steady expulsion of BMBK descendants within positions of power in Abu Dhabi throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with Zayed's sons or their allies assuming most newly available positions. This process was finalised on the eve of Sheikh Zayed's death, and Sheikh Khalifa's ascent, when the last remaining figures of the MBK lineage, Tahnoon, Surur, and Saeed, were removed from powerful federal positions (the Supreme Petroleum Council [SPC] and Abu Dhabi Executive Council [ADEC] in particular) prior to Zayed's death to ensure the uncontested continuation of power by the Bani Zayed lineage. Kristian Ulrichsen notes however that while Khalifa neutered family threats upon his political ascension, he 'buttressed his social support by reaching out to influential tribal groups across Emirati

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<sup>313</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.111

See Appendix 3 Highest Positions of the Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah (BMBK) under Sheikh Zayed

<sup>314</sup> See Appendix 4 Marital connections between Bani Zayed and Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah

This contrasts with Sheikh Mubarak bin Mohammed bin Khalifa whose children have not married directly into the Bani Zayed, and thus, are not largely represented within departments of power within the UAE.

For a family tree of the Bani Mohammed bin Khalifa (BMBK) and a wider examination of the family group see AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership*, p.87

society'.<sup>315</sup> This indicates an appreciation on Sheikh Khalifa's behalf to the significance in tribal linkages within the UAE.

**Succession Stability.** The last remaining challenge for Zayed was ensuring the peaceful transition of power to his sons. The growth of revenue from oil and blossoming relationship with western states, especially in regard to the War on Terror, provided the UAE with a stable platform to grow and develop without structural pressures and difficulties. Anthony Billingsley states that there are two broad categories of succession practise in the Middle East; 'those that apply primogeniture or a variation of that principle in their succession arrangements and those that, according to Black, are based in traditional Islamic practises whereby "patrimony is divided equally among all sons"'.<sup>316</sup> While in Saudi Arabia, with such a vast royal family, primogeniture is an easy solution to a difficult problem, the incumbent monarch is fundamentally concerned with the continuation of power to his own blood and kin.

While for the duration of his tenure Sheikh Zayed attempted to cultivate the leadership of his sons, there were naturally only a few who would stand out as possible successors; Khalifa,

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<sup>315</sup>'C.P. Khalifa Holds the Purse Strings as Abu Dhabi's Younger Generations Emerge', *Gulf States Newsletter (GSN)*, Vol. 26, No.683, April 3, 2002, p. 5 in K Ulrichsen, *The United Arab Emirates*, p.70

<sup>316</sup> A Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2001, p.53, in A Billingsley, *Political Succession in the Arab World: Constitutions, Family Loyalties and Islam*, Routledge, London, 2009, p.117

Sultan, and Mohammed. It so happened that they were also his three eldest sons, and resultantly, would suggest Zayed's preference for a policy of primogeniture.

Khalifa was designated Zayed's heir from as early as 1966<sup>317</sup> and under Zayed's reign held the title of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Supreme Commander,<sup>318</sup> Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council, Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), and head of the SPC. Given his long term position as deputy to Zayed, it was generally accepted that Khalifa would succeed his father however, according to Davidson there were multiple suggestions that Sheikh Zayed's third son, Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) would ascend to President of the UAE.<sup>319</sup>

Before MBZ however was Sultan. He had been heavily influential within Abu Dhabi and even commanded the ADDF and later the Union Defence Forces (UDF). Due to 'personal problems'<sup>320</sup> however, he faded into obscurity and therefore didn't pose a threat to either Khalifa or Mohammed.

MBZ had also steadily risen through the military and could thus continue to generate support and loyalty from the military. While the ruler of Dubai, Mohammed bin Rashid has been the

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<sup>317</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.118

<sup>318</sup> Hierarchical senior than the Minister of Defence.

<sup>319</sup> C Davidson, 'After Sheikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession In Abu Dhabi and the UAE', P.46

<sup>320</sup> JE Peterson, 'The Future of Federalism in the UAE' in HR Sindelar III and JE Peterson, (eds.), *Crosscurrents in the Gulf*, p.204

Minister of Defence, MBZ has long held practical control of the UAE Armed Forces; firstly, he was commander the Air Force & Air Defence (AFAD) and secondly, Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces. His charisma and aptitude for leadership drew many to conclude that even from an early age, he was the son most similar in form to Zayed. As a result, when MBZ was appointed Deputy Crown Prince in 2003<sup>321</sup> there were suggestions that this was possibly to streamline his path to leadership.

While MBZ had accelerated his path to possible competition with Khalifa, he possessed a trait of strength that his elders Khalifa and Sultan could not match; unlike them, Mohammed formed part of a family bloc referred to as the *Bani Fatima* that consisted of 6 full brothers; Mohammed, Hamdan, Hazza, Tahnoon, Mansour, and Abdullah. This meant that naturally, Mohammed had a stronger base to assume power than either Khalifa or Sultan. Furthermore, and significantly, the Bani Fatima 'have between them gained important control over foreign affairs and parts of the military, domestic intelligence, information services, and other institutions closely connected to national security'.<sup>322</sup>

By imposing themselves, from an early point within the institutions of power, the Bani Fatima quickly became a significant political force within Abu Dhabi. Thus, while Sheikh Khalifa's appointment as ruler eventually proved to be smooth, the threat potential of the Bani Fatima

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<sup>321</sup> 'His Highness Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, Crown Prince', *Ruler's Representative Court, Al Ain*, available online, <https://aard.gov.ae/en/portal/1A27AC75-7DE3-4EC5-B624-9EF99A00533B.aspx>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>322</sup> C Davidson, *After Sheikh Zayed*, p.48

provided the rationale for the swiftness in Khalifa's seizure of power. Davidson notes that it was in fact Khalifa's position in regard to tribal and kinship alliances that empowered his credentials and thus ensured his tenure.<sup>323</sup>

## **Arab Spring (2010)**

While Sheikh Zayed's tenure faced many threats, the 2010 Arab Spring challenged the UAE in a manner which it hadn't experienced before. For the Abu Dhabi ruling family, the Arab Spring illustrated how alternative systems of governance threatened incumbent rulers. The downfall of authoritarian leaders who were previously seen as untouchable acted as a sign that no regime in the region was totally safe. This was magnified when popular uprisings occurred on the Arabian peninsula. Working through the GCC's Peninsula Shield Force, Saudi Arabia and the UAE deployed military troops and police officers to assist the Bahraini royal family retain control. While sectarianism was blamed as the primary motive for the protests,<sup>324</sup> there was a clear sensitivity around the proximity of developments in Bahrain and the need to issue a collective show of force in response to these protests.

Acknowledging the insecurity dilemma's hypothesis that a regime's most predominant threat derives from internal sources, the Arab Spring elevated the danger posed by domestic communities. The UAE's social relations are viewed through two distinct pillars; the

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<sup>323</sup> C Davidson, *After Sheikh Zayed*, p.46

<sup>324</sup> F Kane, 'UAE and Saudi Arabia send forces to Bahrain', *The National*, 5<sup>th</sup> March 2011, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/uae-and-saudi-arabia-send-forces-to-bahrain-1.425312>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2020

hierarchical structure of the native community, and the subsequent interaction between UAE citizens and its expatriate population. Both communities carry distinctive risks, however the Abu Dhabi ruling family has followed other regime security strategies to manipulate these factions for pillars of strength. Whilst the regime is by its very nature a concentrated faction, to survive it must broaden its membership and affiliation by incorporating and integrating a wider network of support; if no one has a vested interest in its survival then it will always remain insecure and vulnerable.

Acknowledging the need to drive and maintain new avenues of loyalty and support, the Abu Dhabi ruling family broadcast a key message; the regime consisted of the sons of the Father of the Nation, Sheikh Zayed.<sup>325</sup> While this was directed mainly at the native community, this was also successful in driving the support of the expatriate population. Jean-Jacques Rousseau explains the success of this tactic:

‘The earliest of all societies, and the only one, is the family; yet children remain attached to their family only as long as they need him [sic] for their own survival... The family is, then, if you will, the first model of political societies; the leader [sic] if the analogue of the father, while the people are like the children’.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> <http://www.ourfatherzayed.ae/eng/web.html#The%20Legend%20Lives%20on>, accessed 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2015

<sup>326</sup> JJ Rousseau, *The Social Contract and the First and Second Discourses*, S.Dunn (ed.), Yale University Press, New Haven, 2002,.p156

While the UAE's federal identity had developed throughout the reign of Sheikh Zayed, the accumulation of wealth and resultant gain of political power by Abu Dhabi has caused considerable disparity across the UAE. This has created tension between the rulers of the seven Emirates, who are all headed by the families of the most powerful tribes in those regions. The mosaic of identities and affiliations which, are encouraged to bolster traditional legitimacy and authority, have converged with a reforming of the identity of the state. While still not constitutionally amended, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has secured sovereign control of the state.

The accumulation of capital by the state has provided the UAE's regime with a central position between resources and society, thus allowing them to manipulate social relations by strategically allocating funds to its population. Over time however, and exposed during the Arab Spring, 'a real generational gap has emerged between the political elite and the majority of the population'.<sup>327</sup> Therefore, while the regime's maintenance of power has traditionally relied on subtly appeasing elite figures, the discretion previously enjoyed throughout this process was eroded, exposing how the regime exploited the state.

While it is argued that rental income has been a constant generator of support for the regime, so has the nurturing of direct interpersonal ties. There are multiple examples of social dynamics being exploited to amplify elite cohesion across the MENA,<sup>328</sup> however, due

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<sup>327</sup> V Perthes, 'Politics and Elite Change in the Arab World', p.4

<sup>328</sup> S Heydemann, *Authoritarianism in Syria: Institutions and Social Conflict, 1946-1970*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999

to the centralised system of traditional governance within the UAE, there is an emphasis on patrimonial relationships. The highly concentrated leadership within the Abu Dhabi ruling family has a clear preference for blood relations and kinship association, with the nuclear Bani Fatima clan a clear example. This strategy provides the regime with discreet and flexible protection as it operates within legitimised socio-cultural channels. While there is an awareness of a wide range of social threats, and their elevation during the Arab Spring, the maintenance of elite ties has remained the predominant focus.

**The Custodian of Abu Dhabi** Following the death of Sheikh Zayed on the 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2004 his eldest son Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed was appointed President of the UAE.<sup>329</sup> The third eldest son of Sheikh Zayed, Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) was appointed as Crown Prince and this partnership has overseen a period of significant growth and stability for the UAE.

Sheikh Khalifa led the UAE through the Arab Spring, circumventing major pressures and providing a stability unparalleled across the region at the time. The long term planning and management of the state and its resources allowed the Abu Dhabi ruling family to adapt to

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A Baram, 'Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies 1991-96', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 29, No.1, February 1997, pp.1-31

SE Baroudi, 'Sectarianism and Business Associations in Postwar Lebanon', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol.22, No.4, Fall 2000, pp.81-107

<sup>329</sup> 'His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan', *United Arab Emirates, The Cabinet*, available online, <https://www.uaecabinet.ae/en/details/federal-supreme-council/his-highness-sheikh-khalifa-bin-zayed-al-nahyan>, date accessed, 10/08/2020

the exceptional circumstances. For example, in January 2011 the Abu Dhabi Executive Council (ADEC) announced the hiring of over 6,000 unemployed Emirati nationals<sup>330</sup> in an attempt to ward off discontent and adverse socio-economic conditions. This is a clear example of the maintenance of power pillar being executed in practice, as the regime was attempting to co-opt a sizeable portion of the native population in reaction to a negative stimuli.

In addition to the UAE's increase in co-optive practices, there was also a surge in repressive measures. The most overt example was the hostility towards organisations that sought to compete with the monarchy and the system of government; namely the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, al-Islah. In response to a letter, accruing 133 signatories, requesting more representative power, 5 backers were arrested<sup>331</sup> and became known as the UAE-5. By the end of 2012, 7 members of al-Islah had their Emirati citizenship revoked<sup>332</sup> and 94 members of al-Islah arrested;<sup>333</sup> many of whom had signed the letter the year before. The rapid crackdown on civil society showed the length the regime was willing to go to, in order to enforce its power in response to the Arab Spring.

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<sup>330</sup> 'Abu Dhabi's Job Move "Historic": Writer', *Gulf News*, 18<sup>th</sup> June 2011

<sup>331</sup> M Hedges & G Cafiero, 'The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the GCC', p.138

<sup>332</sup> S Kerr, 'UAE confirms move against Islamist group', *Financial Times*, 22<sup>nd</sup> December 2011, available online, <https://app.ft.com/content/f33e0200-2c8a-11e1-aaf5-00144feabdc0>, date accessed, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>333</sup> O Salem, '94 Emiratis charged with compromising UAE security', *The National*, 28<sup>th</sup> January 2013, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/94-emiratis-charged-with-compromising-uae-security-1.458803>, date accessed, 11<sup>th</sup> August 2020

The combination of effective maintenance and enforcement of power resulted in a continued period of stability for the UAE. Likewise, Khalifa was able to stabilise political relations within the Abu Dhabi ruling family. However, on the 25<sup>th</sup> January 2014, Sheikh Khalifa suffered a stroke and was largely unable to rule leading to the unofficial ascension of MBZ. As a result, this initiated a sizeable shift in power. To the international audience this was unofficially recognised when MBZ travelled to India in 2017 on an official state visit.<sup>334</sup>

The subsequent rule of MBZ has been dominated by a security focused approach. MBZ has a military background and has followed a long authoritarian tradition of appointing security elites into significant positions. This supports the regime security strategy pillar of the enforcement of power due to the role of the military, as a proprietor of quantitatively advanced technology and enforcing the regime's power, thus enabling a platform to possess an unequal distribution of power.<sup>335</sup> This has been exploited by the UAE Armed Forces itself and its ranking leadership who have often found pathways into the political and civilian

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<sup>334</sup> 'India - UAE Joint Statement during State visit of Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi to India (January 24-26, 2017)', 26<sup>th</sup> January 2017, *Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India*, available online, <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27969/India++UAE+Joint+Statement+during+State+visit+of+Crown+Prince+of+Abu+Dhabi+to+India+January+2426+2017>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>335</sup> In Russia this is seen in the guise of the *Siloviki*. The term *siloviki* comes from the phrase *silovye struktury* (force structures) and refers to the bodies that control the coercive power of the state. *Siloviki* refers to individuals of these organizations who have entered politics along with Vladimir Putin. I Bremmer and S Charap, 'The Siloviki in Putin's Russia: Who They are and What They Want', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2006-07, pp83-92

sphere. Hisham Sharabi expands this hypothesis by arguing that ‘the most advanced and functional aspect of the neopatriarchal state is its internal security apparatus, the *mukhabarat*’.<sup>336</sup> Due to the UAE’s securitisation of a wide degree of issues, the comprehensive security apparatus has enjoyed a significant upgrade and investment.

The internal instability illustrated across the MENA provided MBZ with a legitimate platform to enhance the power of the military. When further legitimised through progressive education initiatives, a new era of technocratic personnel has materialized within the state. The working hypothesis of this thesis is that key military and technocratic personnel have transitioned into the political elite,<sup>337</sup> thus ensuring a greater control of the state apparatus by the Abu Dhabi ruling family. These actors have been granted elite status through a combination of tribal, kinship and technocratic qualities. Ferran Brichs and Athina Limpridikemou discuss how this strategy is compounded and strengthened by socio-cultural characteristics:

‘In the wake of the independence processes, the struggle for state control brought military men to power as well as dominant men from political parties. These men formed very tight-knit, guarded groups. Once in power, these ‘clans’ ensured their

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<sup>336</sup> H Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p.7

<sup>337</sup> Bellin discusses the often common patrimonial linkages between the military and political elites in; E Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective’, *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, January 2004, .pp139-157

permanence by only allowing other elites to access power if they came from spheres close to their own – the military, political parties, the region, the family, the tribe or the community'.<sup>338</sup>

The ascension of MBZ to de-facto ruler of Abu Dhabi prompts the investigation to focus on the changes implemented during his reign. By focusing on subsequent changes, this thesis can effectively highlight how the UAE's regime security strategy has been impacted by the Arab Spring.

## **Conclusion**

The historical context of the Bani Yas legacy helps to highlight not only where threats have surfaced, but also, serve as a guide for future generations to circumvent potential pitfalls and continue family rule. The measures implemented by Sheikh Zayed – inter-marriage, external support, development of coercive apparatus, tribal competition, and succession stability – are reinforced through the region's cultural setting and are complemented by personalistic traits that bolstered Sheikh Zayed's leadership.

The character and aptitude of the ruler has on times also played an integral role in the ability to survive in office. This observation builds upon elite theory as it acknowledges the distinct behavioural characteristics of elites, and in the context of the Al Nahyan family, supports the clear contrast in leadership capability of Sheikh Zayed from his predecessor Sheikh Shakhbut.

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<sup>338</sup> FI Brichs and A Limpridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World', .p32

Sheikh Zayed clearly understood what was necessary to strengthen and fortify his lineage. He was however burdened by his family's bloody past, and this is evident in his attempt to delicately side-line his long-time allies, the BMBK lineage. As such it is also obvious that Sheikh Khalifa prioritises the continuation of Al Nahyan rule over that of a potential BMBK rule. This assessment concurs with traditional tribalism theory such as Khaldun's *asabiya* which prioritises blood ties.

Modernisation's impact on socio-political relations has clearly had a determining effect on threat manifestations, however traditional intrinsic dangers to monarchical regimes still endure. Given the historical narrative and context of Emirati history, and subsequent manipulations of personnel and power structure within the UAE, there is clearly an explicit understanding within the mind-set of Emirati rulers that the primary threat to regime security is from internal threats; the Arab Spring has magnified this. The same traditional measures employed to insulate the regime from internal threats are still utilised in the modern day. The factors which contributed to the political turbulence caused by the Arab Spring however, are significantly different to that previously experience by the UAE's rulers.

Due to the clear clan network MBZ possess in contrast to KBZ, changes made within his reign should be examined in more detail as it is hypothesised that this would prompt significant modifications in a bid to secure his reign. This will provide the critical point of analysis which will examine how the UAE's regime security strategy has been impacted by the Arab Spring.

## Chapter 6 - Military Consolidation

This chapter addresses the state's dimension of military power, which is defined as 'the control of the means of violence'.<sup>339</sup> Rupert Smith advances this definition helping to aggregate its application and highlight the dual identity of 'both the physical means of destruction – the bullet, the bayonet – and the body that applies it'.<sup>340</sup> Acknowledging the differing aspects of military power, this chapter will illustrate how the UAE's regime security strategy has explicated the state's Armed Forces in order to optimise its post-Arab Spring regime security strategy.

The UAE Armed Forces exhibit traits of both a 'tribally dependent monarchy' and a 'dual military'.<sup>341</sup> However, as it has developed, there are also examples of 'autocratic-officer politicians'<sup>342</sup> emerging. The self-reinforcing cycle of military-led modernisation empowering the organisation's leadership - who thus promote greater investment and significance in the organisation - signifies how and why the UAE Armed Forces and its personnel have recently grown in stature and significance within the UAE.

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<sup>339</sup> A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, p.58

<sup>340</sup> R Smith, *The Utility of Force, The Art of War in the Modern World*, Penguin, London, 2006, p.6

<sup>341</sup> M Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East', p.71

<sup>342</sup> *ibid*

Information pertaining to the today's UAE Armed Forces is, by nature, largely limited to sensitive reports and commercial analysis. In the academic sphere, Victor Gervais,<sup>343</sup> Anthony Cordesman,<sup>344</sup> Zoltan Barany<sup>345</sup> David Roberts,<sup>346</sup> Hussein Ibish,<sup>347</sup> and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) annual military balance<sup>348</sup> monographs are the most prominent sources of accurate analyses of the UAE military.

In his 2011 PhD thesis, Victor Gervais analysed the development of the UAE military illustrating its structure as a simple, and formal hierarchy (chain of command).

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<sup>343</sup> V Gervais, *Du Pétrole à L'Armée: Les Stratégies de Construction De L'État Aux Émirats Arabes Unis*, Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'École Militaire, No.8, 2011,

<sup>344</sup> AH Cordesman, *Iran and the Gulf Military Balance*, Centre for Strategic and International Affairs (CSIS), Washington DC, 4<sup>th</sup> October 2016, available online, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-and-gulf-military-balance-1>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> July 2017

<sup>345</sup> Z Barany, *Military Officers in the Gulf: Career Trajectories and Determinants*, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 5<sup>th</sup> November 2019

<sup>346</sup> D Roberts, 'Bucking the Trend: The UAE and Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World', *Security Studies*, Vol.29, No.2, 2020, pp.301-334

<sup>347</sup> H Ibish, *The UAE's Evolving National Security Strategy*, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW), Washington DC, 6<sup>th</sup> April 2017

<sup>348</sup> *Military Balance 2017*, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Routledge, London, 2017

*Tableau I- Chaîne de commandement des forces armées des Émirats arabes unis*




Figure 2. Victor Gervais interpretation of UAE Armed Forces Structure<sup>349</sup>

Gervais' simplified interpretation of the UAE Armed Forces chain of command overlooks several entities and over-emphasises others. Missing from his analysis are the Special Forces (SF), Presidential Guard [PG] (or at the time of Victor Gervais's writing, the Emiri Guard), Critical Infrastructure and Coastal Protection Authority (CICPA), Joint Aviation Command (JAC), and the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA) – renamed the Signals Intelligence Agency (SIA) at an undisclosed time - who manage all the UAE's electronic forms of communications, including the military's. Therefore, through Figure 3 Military Hierarchy,

<sup>349</sup> V Gervais, *Du Pétrole à L'Armée: Les Stratégies de Construction De L'État Aux Émirats Arabes Unis*, p.117

this thesis proposes a more accurate and detailed structure that illustrates the PG as a parallel military vehicle whose principal goal and concern is the protection of the Abu Dhabi royal family.

The resurgence of the UAE MOD has been largely underplayed within scholarship, with scholars such as Victor Gervais distracted by the ceremonial title of the Minister of Defence for the ruler of Dubai.<sup>350</sup> The common fixation of the symbolic executive leadership of the MOD has caused analysis to overlook the influence and power of the practical elite figures within the MOD. The UAE's MOD return to significance highlights several strategic considerations in the post-Arab Spring era: Why has a civilian defence organisation re-appeared after the Arab Spring? Does it have a practical use or is its role designed to limit that of the military? Who are the personnel drafted into the organisation and how much power do they have?

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<sup>350</sup> While the ruler of Dubai has always been the UAE's Minister of Defence, his position has little to no power within the actual security apparatus. This is illustrated by the lack of involvement by Mohammed bin Rashid within security-orientated displays and engagements.




Figure 3 Military Hierarchy

While theoretically thought-provoking, the return to prominence of the UAE’s civilian MOD serves as a medium to reward some elite figures, side-line potential threats, and diversify and proliferate analytical and strategic capabilities. The manifestation of the UAE MOD in Abu

Dhabi, and within the same physical location as the UAE Armed Forces General Headquarters (GHQ), serves as a signal and declaration by the UAE authorities to remould the institutional power structure and dynamics of the state's Armed Forces. This reflects an intention to increase competition among the multiple components of the coercive apparatus and thus stem any potential kinetic threat emerging from a power base beyond the direct control of the political elites.<sup>351</sup>

The manufactured competition among the strategic institutions of the UAE Armed Forces has accelerated in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and serves as a key illustration of one aspect of Risa Brooks' interpretation of the maintenance of power.<sup>352</sup> Other strategies postulated by Risa Brooks include the courting of military elites, increased non-military support, and development of extensive counter-intelligence capabilities. These approaches are henceforth analysed to assess, how in response to the Arab Spring, the UAE's regime security strategy has prioritised the careful management of personnel, resources, capabilities, and wider societal support, with the aim of enhancing the military's ability to defend the regime.

### **Courting of Military Elites**

A common strategy employed in a regime security strategy is the enhanced courting of elite military figures. Multi-confessional societies such as Iraq, Jordan, and Syria stand as

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<sup>351</sup> Gaub warns however that if 'armed forces are not capable of acting or thinking collectively, they will lack the first necessary ingredient to be a political actor (and will be inefficient security actors)'. F Gaub, *Guardians of the Arab State; When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania*, p.7

<sup>352</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*

prominent examples of confessional, and often minority, ownership of the state's security portfolio. Risa Brooks summarises this much-applied strategy through the lens of heightened effectiveness. 'Appointing individuals from the same religious, tribal, ethnic or regional group to key military positions is one of the most persuasive and effective ways by which political leaders secure the support of their armed forces'.<sup>353</sup>

In the context of the UAE, the strategy to court military elites is firmly rooted within the intra-federal and intra-tribal dynamics of the state. Primarily due to the power-generated through the concentration of natural resources in the southern Emirate, Abu Dhabi has been able to fix permanently the development of the UAE Armed Forces to the strength and stability of the Bani Yas tribe. This has ensured the physical concentration and demographic imbalance of the UAE Armed Forces is suited in favour of Abu Dhabi's strategic outlook over others from within the federation.<sup>354</sup>

In image and practise, Abu Dhabi is central to the capabilities of the UAE Armed Forces as it hosts the state's Armed Forces GHQ, National Security Council (NSC), and main air, land, and naval bases, ensuring that any significant development can only occur from Abu Dhabi and with the political authorisation from the PREs therein. The resurgence of the MOD, with its

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<sup>353</sup> *ibid* p.32

<sup>354</sup> Barany concurs by explaining that 'aspiring officers in most GCC states go through a rigorous vetting process that is focused more on political reliability – e.g., the proven allegiance of one's relatives and clan to the ruling family – than on intellectual, physical, or psychological, suitability'. Z Barany, *Military Officers in the Gulf: Career Trajectories and Determinants*, p.2

predominant presence rehoused within the GHQ main building, further distinguishes how even though the ruler of Dubai is the MOD, Abu Dhabi remains integral to the state's warfighting capabilities.

1. Sheikh Zayed Bridge
2. Maqta Bridge
3. Mussafah Bridge
4. Sheikh Khalifa Bridge
5. Al Dhafrah Air Base
6. Presidential Palace
7. Al Bateen Air Base
8. Joint Aviation Command
9. State Security Department (SSD) Headquarters
10. Crown Prince Court (CPC)
11. UAE Armed Forces Headquarters



Figure 4 Map of Abu Dhabi island showing critical infrastructure, military presence, and political entities

What this means in practise is that while the UAE Armed Forces are estimated to have around 63,000 active service personnel,<sup>355</sup> at any given time most of these persons are engaged in exercises and administrative duty in Abu Dhabi, further reinforcing the fixed posture of Abu Dhabi within the state. The unified identity demonstrated by the UAE Armed Forces position suggests a cohesive organisation (*esprit de corps*) that is capable and willing to meet the demands requested upon it by the state's leadership.

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<sup>355</sup> *Military Balance 2017*, p.410

Table 1 Partial list of Military Bases in UAE<sup>356</sup>

Military branch	Base name	Emirate
Air Force	Al Dhafra <sup>357</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Khalifa bin Zayed Air College <sup>358</sup>	Abu Dhabi

<sup>356</sup> M al Rashedi, *The UAE National Security Strategy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Future Warfare Paper, United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, Virginia, 2005

AH Cordesman & KR al-Rodhan, *Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars*, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Praeger, London, 2006, pp.283-315

‘Military Camps’, *Al Jazirah Equipment and Technical Services*, available online, <http://www.jetsemirates.ae/military.html>, date accessed, 15th July 2017

‘General Head Quarters of UAE Armed Forces Directorate of Military Works’, *Al Badr Carpentry*, available online, [http://www.albadarcarpentryllc.com/general\\_head\\_quarters\\_armed\\_forces.html](http://www.albadarcarpentryllc.com/general_head_quarters_armed_forces.html), date accessed, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2017

<sup>357</sup> ‘Al Dhafra Air Base’, *Air Force Central Command*, available online, <https://www.afcent.af.mil/Units/380th-Air-Expeditionary-Wing/News/Tag/95930/al-dhafra-air-base/>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>358</sup> ‘Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid attends air cadet graduation – in pictures’, *The National*, 4<sup>th</sup> December 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-attends-air-cadet-graduation-in-pictures-1.681396>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

	Al Bateen Air Base <sup>359</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Sas al Nakhel <sup>360</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Liwa Air Base <sup>361</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Qusaiwera Air Base <sup>362</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Al Safran <sup>363</sup>	Abu Dhabi

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<sup>359</sup> K Shaheen, 'Liwa base extends defence reach', *The National*, 6<sup>th</sup> January 2011, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/liwa-base-extends-defence-reach-1.564805>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>360</sup> 'Iomax delivers first production Archangel to the UAE', *Arabian Aerospace*, 29<sup>th</sup> August 2015, available online, <https://www.arabianaerospace.aero/iomax-delivers-first-production-archangel-to-the-uae.html>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>361</sup> K Shaheen, 'Liwa base extends defence reach', *The National*, 6<sup>th</sup> January 2011, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/liwa-base-extends-defence-reach-1.564805>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>362</sup> 'Construction of Buildings for Armed Forces at Qusaiwera Air Base', *GISCO*, available online, <http://www.gisco.ae/projects/construction-buildings-armed-forces-at-qusaiwera-airbase>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>363</sup> D Cenciotti, 'The F-35 Plays Starring Role in Exercise "INIOCHOS 2019" in Greece', *The Aviationist*, 12<sup>th</sup> April 2019, available online, <https://theaviationist.com/2019/04/12/the-f-35-plays-the-starring-role-in-exercise-iniochos-2019-in-greece/>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

	Al Minhad <sup>364</sup>	Dubai
<b>Land Forces</b>	Zayed Military City <sup>365</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Al Nahyan Military Camp <sup>366</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Al Ain Infantry Command School <sup>367</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Baniyas Regiment Camp <sup>368</sup>	Al Ain
	Al Hamra Camp <sup>369</sup>	Abu Dhabi

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<sup>364</sup> ibid

<sup>365</sup> J Nicholson, 'UAE Ground Forces unification celebrations at Zayed Military City – in pictures', *The National*, 11<sup>th</sup> January 2016, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-ground-forces-unification-celebrations-at-zayed-military-city-in-pictures-1.187398>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>366</sup> G Duncan, 'UAE traffic: Many roads across the Emirates slow this morning', *The National*, 30<sup>th</sup> September 2018, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/transport/uae-traffic-many-roads-across-the-emirates-slow-this-morning-1.775324>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>367</sup> 'Completed Projects; Command of Military Works Projects [CMW]', *Capriole Construction Co.LLC*, available online, [http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed\\_projects.html](http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed_projects.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>368</sup> 'Projects', *Okaz Construction*, available online, <http://okaz-uae.com/projects/>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>369</sup> 'Sheikh Mohammed watches over UAE national service military exercise – in pictures', *The National*, 8<sup>th</sup> April 2018, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-watches-over-uae-national-service-military-exercise-in-pictures-1.719867>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

	Mushrif Camp <sup>370</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Al Bateen Camp <sup>371</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Mahawi Military Camp <sup>372</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Tarif Camp <sup>373</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Manama Camp <sup>374</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Wadi Shabuk Camp <sup>375</sup>	Dubai
	Royal Guards Camp, Nad al Sheba <sup>376</sup>	Dubai

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<sup>370</sup> 'Completed Projects; Command of Military Works Projects [CMW]], *Capriole Construction Co.LLC*, available online, [http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed\\_projects.html](http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed_projects.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>371</sup> 'Completed Projects; Command of Military Works Projects [CMW]], *Capriole Construction Co.LLC*, available online, [http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed\\_projects.html](http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed_projects.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>372</sup> 'Sheikh Mohammed visits military training camp', *The National*, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-visits-military-training-camp-1.53577>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>373</sup> 'Our Projects', *Time Electro & Contracting Company W.L.L.*, available online, <http://www.timeelectro.ae/projectList.php?cat=14>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>374</sup> 'Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed visits military recruits at Al Manama Camp', *WAM*, 2<sup>nd</sup> November 2014, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395271800616>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>375</sup> 'Government Projects; General Head Quarters Armed Forces', *Al Badr Carpentry (ABC) L.L.C.*, available online, [http://www.albadrcarpentryllc.com/general\\_head\\_quarters\\_armed\\_forces.html](http://www.albadrcarpentryllc.com/general_head_quarters_armed_forces.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>376</sup> 'Military Camps', *Al Jazirah Equipment & Technical Services*, available online, <http://www.jetsemirates.ae/military.html>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

	Thouban Military Camp <sup>377</sup>	Fujairah
	Masafi Camp <sup>378</sup>	Fujairah
	Royal Guard Regiment Camp <sup>379</sup>	Ras al Khaimah
	Al Rafada Military Camp <sup>380</sup>	Sharjah
	Al Falah Military Camp <sup>381</sup>	Sharjah
	Melha Camp <sup>382</sup>	Sharjah
<b>Naval Forces</b>	Mina (Port) Zayed <sup>383</sup>	Abu Dhabi

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<sup>377</sup> 'Military Camps', *Al Jazirah Equipment & Technical Services*, available online, <http://www.jetsemirates.ae/military.html>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>378</sup> 'Projects', *Okaz Construction*, available online, <http://okaz-uae.com/projects/>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>379</sup> 'Military Camps', *Al Jazirah Equipment & Technical Services*, available online, <http://www.jetsemirates.ae/military.html>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>380</sup> 'Military Camps', *Al Jazirah Equipment & Technical Services*, available online, <http://www.jetsemirates.ae/military.html>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>381</sup> 'Our Projects', *Time Electro & Contracting Company W.L.L.*, available online, <http://www.timeelectro.ae/projectList.php?cat=14>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>382</sup> 'Completed Projects; Command of Military Works Projects [CMW]', *Capriole Construction Co.LLC*, available online, [http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed\\_projects.html](http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed_projects.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>383</sup> T Ramavarman, 'French Naval Base Opens Today', *Khaleej Times*, 27<sup>th</sup> May 2009, available online, <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20090526/ARTICLE/305269881/1002>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

	Ghantoot <sup>384</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Das Island <sup>385</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Delma Island <sup>386</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Sir Bonnair Island <sup>387</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Al Tawila Camp <sup>388</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Ras Ghumais <sup>389</sup>	Abu Dhabi
	Jebel Ali <sup>390</sup>	Dubai
	Mina Rashid <sup>391</sup>	Dubai
	Khor Fakkan <sup>392</sup>	Dubai

<sup>384</sup> 'Naval Base Ghantoot', *Zublin Strabag*, available online, [https://www.strabag-international.com/databases/internet/\\_public/content30.nsf/web30?Openagent&id=F484D4F1EF792DA8C125811B005682CC](https://www.strabag-international.com/databases/internet/_public/content30.nsf/web30?Openagent&id=F484D4F1EF792DA8C125811B005682CC), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>385</sup> 'Our Projects', *Time Electro & Contracting Company W.L.L.*, available online, <http://www.timeelectro.ae/projectList.php?cat=14>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>386</sup> 'Government Projects; General Head Quarters Armed Forces', *Al Badr Carpentry (ABC) L.L.C.*, available online, [http://www.albadrcarpentryllc.com/general\\_head\\_quarters\\_armed\\_forces.html](http://www.albadrcarpentryllc.com/general_head_quarters_armed_forces.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>387</sup> 'Projects', *Okaz Construction*, available online, <http://okaz-uae.com/projects/>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>388</sup> 'Completed Projects; Command of Military Works Projects [CMW]', *Capriole Construction Co.LLC*, available online, [http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed\\_projects.html](http://www.capriole-construction.com/completed_projects.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>389</sup> 'Government Projects; General Head Quarters Armed Forces', *Al Badr Carpentry (ABC) L.L.C.*, available online, [http://www.albadrcarpentryllc.com/general\\_head\\_quarters\\_armed\\_forces.html](http://www.albadrcarpentryllc.com/general_head_quarters_armed_forces.html), date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>390</sup> M Wallin, *U.S. Military Bases and Facilities in the Middle East*, American Security Project, June 2018

<sup>391</sup> 'United Arab Emirates', *The Military Balance 2009*, Routledge, London, 2009, p.269

<sup>392</sup> 'United Arab Emirates', *The Military Balance 2009*, p.269

	Fujairah <sup>393</sup>	Fujairah
	Mina Sakr <sup>394</sup>	Sharjah
	Mina Khalid <sup>395</sup>	Ras al Khaimah

Due to the lack of publicly available information on the social stratification of UAE Armed Forces personnel, information is limited to official statements and reports of military elite figures at events, and, Emirati military casualties from the war in Yemen.<sup>396</sup> The latter has unveiled a trend whereby Emiratis from the poorer and northern Emirates, were more likely to be non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and thereby sent to front line action in Yemen.<sup>397</sup>

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<sup>393</sup> K Shaheen, 'Liwa base extends defence reach', *The National*, 6<sup>th</sup> January 2011, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/liwa-base-extends-defence-reach-1.564805>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>394</sup> 'United Arab Emirates', *The Military Balance 2009*, p.269

<sup>395</sup> 'United Arab Emirates', *The Military Balance 2009*, p.269

<sup>396</sup> Due to the authoritarian nature of governance within the UAE, the collection of information pertaining to the social stratification of the UAE Armed Forces is difficult to collect. This means that only generalised statements can be made when referring to the social and tribal make-up of the UAE Armed Forces.

<sup>397</sup> 'Rising Death Toll in Yemen Raises Tough Domestic Questions for Abu Dhabi', *Gulf States Newsletter (GSN)*, Vol.40, No.1,022, 22 September 2016

Emirati Casualties by Emirate in Yemen Conflict -  
01 June 2015 - 11 November 2017




Figure 5 Emirati Casualties by Emirate in Yemen Conflict<sup>398</sup>

On the other hand, Emirati military elites often exhibit clear traits of tribal- and -or kinship affiliation to senior figures within the Al Nahyan royal family. This is further strengthened by the presence of Al Nahyan members within the military hierarchy with Sheikh Khalifa bin

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<sup>398</sup> See Appendix 5 Emirati Martyrs in Yemen

Zayed, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ), and formerly Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed<sup>399</sup> all possessing superior titles within the Armed Forces.<sup>400</sup>

Going beyond the immediate leadership, there are several royal family members who also wield considerable influence within the UAE Armed Forces. The two most senior serving ruling family members are Major General Pilot Sheikh Ahmed bin Tahnoun, Chairman of the National Service and Reserve Authority (NSRA)<sup>401</sup> and Major General Sheikh Saeed bin Hamdan Al Nahyan, Commander of the UAE Naval Forces.<sup>402</sup> The appointment of royal family

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<sup>399</sup> Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed was previously Chief of Staff, however was removed from all Federal and Emirate-level positions in the mid 1980s. JE Peterson, 'The Future of Federalism in the UAE', in HR Sindelar III and JE Peterson (ed.), *Crosscurrent in the Gulf*, p.204, in H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.121

Van Der Meulen also notes that 'Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed reportedly has considerable popularity amongst the most important tribes of the Emirate [Abu Dhabi]'. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.128

<sup>400</sup> The participation and career of MBZ within the UAE Armed Forces prepared him for his later position of leadership as head of the Abu Dhabi, and UAE Royal family. His charisma and professional attitude enabled him to develop a strong following within the UAE Armed Forces, and with the contrasting image of his brothers Khalifa and Sultan within the UAE Armed Forces, MBZ is perceived as the UAE's 'strong man'.

<sup>401</sup> WAM, 'Ahmed bin Tahnoun receives members of Youth National Service Council', 12<sup>th</sup> April 2017, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302608348>, date accessed, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2017

<sup>402</sup> WAM, 'UAE's Hamdan bin Zayed inaugurates ADNOC's Central Control Centre on Das Island', Zawya, 10<sup>th</sup> October 2017, available online, [https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/UAEs\\_Hamdan\\_bin\\_Zayed\\_inaugurates\\_ADNOCs\\_Central\\_Control\\_Centre\\_on\\_Das\\_Island-WAM20171010112050113/](https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/UAEs_Hamdan_bin_Zayed_inaugurates_ADNOCs_Central_Control_Centre_on_Das_Island-WAM20171010112050113/), date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> November 2017

members to the position of branch commander after the Arab Spring can only extend the notion that, a significant component to the UAE's post-Arab Spring regime security strategy is to prioritise the retention of loyalty from the military elites, and it creates 'a constituency with a vested interest in the status quo'.<sup>403</sup> This strategy also has the benefit for the regime of maintaining a live observation of the military's morale and sentiment, thus heightening the probability of foreseeing future issues and challenges to the current political condition.<sup>404</sup>

Assessing the role of tribal affiliation within the UAE Armed Forces and drawing on US State Department intelligence, Hendrik Van Der Meulen notes that:

'the Abu Dhabi ruling family has the command of the Armed Forces firmly in its grip, entrusting the key commands only to members of other Bani Yas clans and its Dahhiri allies...all key military positions of command of authority under these three Abu Dhabi ruling family members (Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, and Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed) are held by members of only the Bani Yas and Dhawahir tribes'.<sup>405</sup>

Victor Gervais underpins Hendrik Van Der Meulen's analysis highlighting that fact that the appointment of Vice-Admiral Ahmed Mohammed Al Sabab al Tenaiji as Chief of UAE Naval

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<sup>403</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, p.32

<sup>404</sup> Gaub notes how this strategy ensured the survival of King Hussein of Jordan in the 1957 crisis. F Gaub, *Guardians of the Arab State; When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania*, p.67

<sup>405</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, pp.96-97

forces in 2007 represented the first appointment of a non-Bani Yas member to serve as commander of the UAE Navy.<sup>406</sup> This trend has been observed within other service branches of the UAE Armed Forces, whereby Bani Yas members have traditionally controlled the Air Force & Air Defence (AFAD)<sup>407</sup> and Land Forces; however, in recent years, members of other tribes have been allowed to infiltrate the highest echelons of authority within the UAE Armed Forces.

While the specialisation of assets and personnel within the AFAD and Navy may explain a possible recalibration of values away from nepotism and towards professionalism,<sup>408</sup> it is unlikely that this would extend to the Land Forces. As the largest branch within the Emirati military, the UAE Land Forces will continue to be led by Bani Yas tribal members and their allies, especially as the Abu Dhabi Emirate is the largest in geographic size and population and is the closest to the most proximate land-based threat, Saudi Arabia.<sup>409</sup>

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<sup>406</sup> 'il est le premier commandant émirati de cetter branche à n'être ni lié aux Bani Yas ni originaire d'Abu Dhabi', V Gervais, *Du Pétrole à L'Armée: Les Stratégies de Construction De L'État Aux Émirats Arabes Unis*, p.146

<sup>407</sup> The AF&AD was under the stewardship of Lieutenant General Mohammed bin Zayed between 1986 and 1990, Major General Khalid bu-Ainnain (Mazari section of the Bani Yas) between 1998 and 2006 thereafter, like the Navy, non-Bani Yas members assumed positions of leadership. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.144

<sup>408</sup> The fact that the Navy is now commanded by a member of the UAE royal family suggests that any future attempt to install values of professionalism will likely be led by member of the royal family.

<sup>409</sup> The issue of professionalism within the Armed Forces presents a difficult situation for a regime as on the one hand, while a professional military would be more capable of countering threats, in doing so it also becomes a threat to the regime (especially as the means to come professional moves the personnel away from social and

The current commander of the UAE Land Forces is Staff Major General Saleh Mohammed bin Mujrin Al A'meri,<sup>410</sup> a descendent of the *Awamir* section of the Bani Yas, a tribal branch that, as Meulen notes, constitutes 'one of the strongest traditional pillars of support for the Bani Yas tribe in Abu Dhabi'.<sup>411</sup> Other leading figures from the Land Forces include the current Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Hamad Mohammed Thani al Rumaithi (*Rumaithat* section of the Bani Yas)<sup>412</sup>, who previously served as Deputy Chief of Staff under Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and as Director of Military Intelligence.

In the newly reformed Ministry of Defence there is Major General Dr. Khalifa al Rumaithi<sup>413</sup> (brother of Chief of Staff), who had previously served as Chief of Logistics- while, elsewhere, Major General Mohammed Khalfan al Rumathi is the Commander in Chief of Abu Dhabi Police, Member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council,<sup>414</sup> and Chairman of the National Crisis

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informal ties to which many regimes rest upon). If, however, professionalism was slowed within the Armed Forces, the tactical effectiveness of the military and the regime security strategy would be lower.

<sup>410</sup> WAM, 'UAE Armed Forces observe 41st Unification Day Anniversary', 6<sup>th</sup> May 2017, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302612461>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2017

<sup>411</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.160

<sup>412</sup> *ibid*, p.144

<sup>413</sup> 'UAE Talks with US Transport Chief', *The National*, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2015, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-talks-with-us-transport-chief-1.27759>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> February 2017

<sup>414</sup> 'Major General Mohammed Khalfan al Rumaithi', *Abu Dhabi Executive Committee*, available online, <https://www.ecouncil.ae/en/ADGovernment/Pages/MemberDetail.aspx?mid=19>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2017

and Emergency Management Authority (NCEMA). These cases in combination with other given examples, show the power, influence, and trust in the Rumaitat section by the Al Nahyan royal family.

Other tribes such as the al-Zaabi's, Sudan (*Suwaidi*), Al Bu Muhair (*Muhairi*), and the Mazari (*Mazrouei*) are heavily represented across the UAE Armed Forces, and further add weight to the notion that there is a deliberate strategy by the, MBZ-led, Al Nahyan royal family to court the military elites.

Another observation from the courting of military elites is the proximate relationship between many of the military elites and Mohammed bin Zayed, specifically that from when he was Head of the Air Force and later Chief of Staff. While many of those who were in constant professional proximity with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed have subsequently gone on to leadership positions within the military, many have now been redirected to civilian positions; often with heightened importance and significance.<sup>415</sup> Therefore, the conclusion is that the rule of Mohammed bin Zayed is evidence of a growing nexus between the Abu Dhabi regime and the military whereby each one's survival will rest upon the others.

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<sup>415</sup> Examples include; UAE Ambassador to Australia, Obaid al Ketbi, former Deputy Commander in Chief of Abu Dhabi policy and leader of UAE military operations in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan; UAE Ambassador to South Africa, Mahash al Hamli, former Director of Security Cooperation at UAE MOFA and Former Head of Military Intelligence and Security, GHQ.

While tribal affiliation had been a determining principle in the promotion and selection of military elites, additional factors such as kinship affiliation and technocracy started to influence military elite membership as early as 2005. The development and modernisation of the UAE Armed Forces during the early 21<sup>st</sup> century suggest that a drive towards professionalism was instigated by the country's leadership thus amplifying the value of technocracy.

This postulation is linked to the development of technology as the value of technical and logistic units is rising alongside their kinetic counterparts. Where offensive units were able to muster even the most fundamental capability rapidly – and hence were traditionally the primary defensive capability - due to evolving threat manifestations and the forms in which these threats can manifest, the wider coercive apparatus is equalising its significance alongside their kinetic counterparts. This would explain the UAE's (and others) professionalism drive.

As the direct bonds of kinship are moving away from MBZ's military tenure, there are novel relationship drivers emerging whereby a combination of tribal and technocratic values is driving officer succession. The struggle between these two motivations has caused significant tension within the management of the grander military institution; however, due to a wider and more entrenched support base, personnel with a powerful tribal background are still more often advancing to the upper echelons of the UAE military hierarchy.

While the Arab Spring has warranted the development of MBZ's military professionalism drive with the aim of providing a capable military force to defend the regime, it has also reinforced

the requirement for an enhanced patrimonial selection criterion. A dual structure is increasingly emerging within the UAE armed forces; operationally effective entities are being managed by personnel with intimate links to MBZ, and those deemed less of an immediate threat are being led by technocrats.

### **Increase in Non-Military Support**

Since the start of the Arab Spring the UAE Armed Forces have significantly grown in stature; both literally and figuratively. The increasing application of military force, monumental escalation in defence spending, and wider civil-military engagement across the UAE, have successfully strengthened the role of the UAE Armed Forces within the post-Arab Spring UAE.

The UAE has recently been referred to as ‘little Sparta’, a term coined by former US Defence Secretary General James Mattis,<sup>416</sup> due to the state’s focus and proficiency in military endeavours. This development can be traced back to the 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 terrorist attacks since which ‘the UAE has arguably become Washington’s closest Gulf ally, with extensive military and intelligence cooperation, and deep economic ties as the largest U.S. export market in the Middle East’.<sup>417</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> R Chandrasekaran, ‘In the UAE, the United States has a Quiet, Potent Ally Nicknamed “Little Sparta”’, *Washington Post*, Al Dhafra Air Base, Abu Dhabi, 9<sup>th</sup> November 2014

<sup>417</sup> ‘UAE-US Economic Relationship’, *Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington DC*, available online, <http://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-relations/key-areas-bilateral-cooperation/uae-us-economic-relationship>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> July 2017, in H Ibish, *The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy*, p.6

Exploiting the renewed focus, the UAE became the regional vanguard in overseas military operations, as well as being the first Arab state to deploy combat troops to Afghanistan to join the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003,<sup>418</sup> whilst also sending troops to Albania, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen.<sup>419</sup> The UAE has also initiated the construction of two military bases, in Eritrea and Somaliland,<sup>420</sup> and is also offering direct military cooperation to several countries including Egypt, Somalia,<sup>421</sup>

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<sup>418</sup> SA Makakhleh, 'UAE Troops Spare No Effort to Bring Peace to Afghanistan', *Gulf News*, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2011, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/uae-troops-spare-no-effort-to-bring-peace-to-afghanistan-1.856240>, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017

<sup>419</sup> 'Armed Forces', *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/information-and-services/justice-safety-and-the-law/armed-forces>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> November 2017

C Lussato, 'MALI. La France un peu moins isolée... Un peu', *L'Orbs*, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2013, available online, <http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/guerre-au-mali/20130121.OBS6101/mali-la-france-un-peu-moins-isolee-un-peu.html>, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017

'An Enduring Partnership for Peace and Stability: The U.S. – UAE Defense and Security Relationship', *U.S. – UAE Business Council*, February 2015

'Why is the UAE Building a Military Base in Somaliland', *BBC*, 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2017, available online, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-39051551/why-is-uae-building-a-military-base-in-somaliland>, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017

<sup>420</sup> 'The Gulf's "Little Sparta"; The Ambitious United Arab Emirates', *The Economist*, 6<sup>th</sup> April 2017, available online, <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21720319-driven-energetic-crown-price-uae-building-bases-far-beyond-its>, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017

<sup>421</sup> 'Somali PM Visits UAE Military Training Centre in Mogadishu', *WAM*, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2017, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302644025>, date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> November 2017

and the Seychelles,<sup>422</sup> having been able to forge greater military relationships across the MENA region.

Regarding the strengthening of the UAE's military engagement with Western powers there is a trend towards more frequent joint operations and training exercises with Australia, France, Italy, South Korea, UK, and the United States of America (USA). France has formalised its strong relations with the UAE by establishing a naval base in Abu Dhabi,<sup>423</sup> and several other states utilise the many military and logistical bases of the UAE for overseas operations. The UAE's position within the GCC is of heightened significance to the West. This is shown by the deployment of cutting-edge technology to Abu Dhabi instead of other regional states. Washington has a forward operating base (FOB) in every GCC state however Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi 'is the only overseas airbase to host the United States "fifth-generation" F-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet'.<sup>424</sup> Through enhanced military engagements and formal cooperation within the UAE, foreign partners have directly enhanced the image and capability of the UAE Armed Forces.

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<sup>422</sup> 'UAE, Seychelles Sign Accord for Military Cooperation', *WAM*, 21<sup>st</sup> December 2009, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/seychelles-opens-coast-guard-base-built-with-uae-support-1.929203>, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017

<sup>423</sup> 'UAE is France's Major Trading Partner in the Region: French President', *WAM*, 24<sup>th</sup> May 2009, accessed online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395228377358>, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017

<sup>424</sup> D Majumdar, 'The F-22 Raptor is the World's Best Fighter (And it Has a Secret Weapon That is Out in the Open)', *The National Interest*, 29<sup>th</sup> November 2016, in H Ibish, *The UAE's Evolving National Security Strategy*, p.19

Under the stewardship of MBZ, the UAE has increased its overseas military operations at great pace. However, in doing so, it has faced two predominant challenges; dealing with personnel loss and sustaining a positive image through sacrifice.<sup>425</sup> The UAE's foray into Yemen is a strong example of these challenges, especially as the country's incursion into Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Mali are not covered as broadly or undertaken with the same ferocity.

Following the death of over 50 soldiers from one missile attack in 2015,<sup>426</sup> the UAE initiated an annual martyr's day commemoration to honour fallen soldiers.<sup>427</sup> Anticipating casualties from overseas operations, the UAE Armed Forces would have to appropriately manage how the combatants would be remembered; an especially poignant point within the context of a small Emirati population.

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<sup>425</sup> 'military values such as discipline, bravery, obedience, honesty, political impartiality are generally valued in society', F Gaub, *Guardians of the Arab State; When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania*, p.82 Gaub suggests that increased military engagement has a detrimental effect on the image of a state' military (ibid, p.80). This thesis postulates however that the deployment of the UAE's Armed Forces is designed to enhance their image, and thus contribute to the post-Arab Spring regime security strategy.

<sup>426</sup> On the 4<sup>th</sup> September 2015 Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Toshka ballistic missile at a military base within the Marib province. The missile hit an ammunition storage facility and killed over 100 soldiers from the Saudi-led coalition. The death of over 50 Emirati soldiers was the largest death toll since the UAE's formation in 1971.

<sup>427</sup> 'Martyrs' Day Statement by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan', *Emirates News Agency (WAM)*, 29<sup>th</sup> November 2015, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395288638027>, date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> August

The result of the implementation by the government of this cultural mourning trend directs elite figure visits to martyr's home,<sup>428</sup> the construction and visit to Martyr Monument (*Wahat al Karama*<sup>429</sup>), and subsequent release of songs,<sup>430</sup> publishing of poems,<sup>431</sup> and social media campaigns<sup>432</sup> to generate group feeling and sentiment towards the deceased,<sup>433</sup> and the mission they embarked on. Furthermore, the office of the 'Martyr's Family Affairs' was established within the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Court, and Sheikh Khalifa Bin Tahnoun Bin Mohammad Al Nahyan (of the BMBK branch) was appointed as director.<sup>434</sup> The domestic tension caused by the political sensitivity of martyrs within Emirati society was reported in GSN when due to a combination of a high death toll and a concentration of casualties coming

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<sup>428</sup> O Obina, 'Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed offers condolences to families of martyrs', *The National*, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-offers-condolences-to-families-of-martyrs-in-pictures-1.72908>, date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2017

<sup>429</sup> <https://www.wahataalkarama.ae/?lang=en>, date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2017

<sup>430</sup> 'Tribute – Heroes of the UAE- Anthem Ft. Adel Ebrahim & Musicians of World Official', 1<sup>st</sup> December 2015, available online, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hZeZynIQW0I>, date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2017

<sup>431</sup> 'We Salute you, Heroes of the Emirates', 1<sup>st</sup> November 2015, available online, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eprry-lHrRw>, date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2017

<sup>432</sup> "عظم الله أجرك يا وطن", (May Allah reward you, oh nation), and "[#martyrs' mothers a pride to the UAE](#)"

<sup>433</sup> M Butti, I Denizli, and T Chelali, *The Martyr and the Nation: The UAE, Turkey, and Algeria*, Delma Institute, 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2017, available online, <http://delma.io/en/draft/the-martyr-and-the-nation-the-uae-turkey-and-algeria>, date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2017

<sup>434</sup> WAM, 'Director of the Martyrs' Families' Affairs Office visits martyrs' families', *Gulf News*, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2016, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/director-of-the-martyrs-families-affairs-office-visits-martyrs-families-1.1930404>, date accessed, 11<sup>th</sup> November 2017

from the northern and poorer Emirates; 'a brother of RAK Emir Sheikh Saud Bin Saqr was held for a night in Abu Dhabi following what was described as 'public dissent' over Yemen'.<sup>435</sup>

Overseas engagement has complicated the task of enhancing the UAE Armed Forces' image due to the high societal cost of Emirati casualties. It has therefore been crucial to resist internal pressures to ease external operations, thus ensuring the continued development of military capabilities. This is based on the assumption that only a capable and united military force will be able to ensure the secure of the regime and allow it to act as a key pillar of the UAE's regime security strategy. The requirement for an efficient military has directed the continued investment and prioritising of the UAE Armed Forces and the ecosystem that supports it, thus ensuring not only the institution's sustained capability but also, empowering it to present itself as a vehicle of modernisation within the UAE. This has resulted in a vibrant environment of interlocking and supporting entities in both the public and private sectors.

Driving the UAE Armed Forces development are the consistently high levels of military spending. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) the UAE's military spending has significantly increased in the last twenty years, while military spending as a percentage of national GDP has also remained high.<sup>436</sup> From 1997-2014, the UAE's actual

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<sup>435</sup> 'Signs of Strain in UAE Reflected in Abu Dhabi-RAK Tensions', *Gulf States Newsletter (GSN)*, Vol.40, No.1,012, 31<sup>st</sup> March 2016

<sup>436</sup> Scholars such as Cordesman have noted the unreliability of publicly listed arms transfers and expenditure reports. This means that there are only vague estimations with seminal reports published highlighting aspects of arms purchases.

military spending has quintupled, while spending as a percentage of GDP has slightly decreased. Both values however increased following the Arab Spring, and resultantly illustrate the importance of the UAE Armed Forces to the UAE's regime security strategy.<sup>437</sup>




Figure 6 UAE Military Spending in Real Terms & as % of GDP<sup>438</sup>

The UAE has not only quantitatively increased its defence spending, but also qualitatively. During the period of increased defence spending, the UAE has imported some of the world's most advanced weaponry including the F-16 Block-60 (which was at the time of purchase,

<sup>437</sup> Gaub notes that 'coups are least likely in states with high military spending'. F Gaub, *Guardians of the Arab State; When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania*, p.32

<sup>438</sup> 'SIPRI Military Expenditure Database', *Stockholm Institute Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)*, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017

more advanced than what the US Air Force possessed), Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defence (THAAD), Falcon-eye satellite, and the Predator UAV, and a consistent focus on command, control, communications, computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)<sup>439</sup> showing a determination by the UAE to advance its qualitative edge. By maintaining an elevated defence spending level, the Armed Forces receive perceived benefits and 'symbolic rewards'<sup>440</sup> which in turn preserve loyalty and prestige in the strategically important mechanism within the UAE's regime security strategy.

Foreseeing the impending uptake in military spending, the UAE executed an offset policy in 1992 in a bid to augment future defence spending. Since its creation, the Tawazun Economic Council (TEC) [formerly known as the Offset Programme Bureau (OPB)] has successfully 'created over 70 projects in various economic and industrial sectors with a total investment over AED 10bn'.<sup>441</sup> Furthermore, Matar Al Rumathi claims successfully implemented offset projects between 2010-2014 created 1,010 jobs, generated \$1.04bn in sales, and encouraged \$1.3bn in investment to the UAE.<sup>442</sup>

The tangible successes of the UAE's offset programme within the UAE's defence sector include the Advanced Military Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Centre (AMMROC),

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<sup>439</sup> M Hedges, 'The UAE's C4ISR Transformation', *Defense Procurement International (DPI)*, Winter 2014

<sup>440</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, p.26

<sup>441</sup> M Al Romaihi, *Tawazun Economic Council*, Abu Dhabi International Offset Conference (ADIOC), Abu Dhabi, 18<sup>th</sup> February 2015

<sup>442</sup> *ibid*

Tawazun Dynamics, Etihad Ship Building (ESB), Tawazun Precision Industries (TPI), Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), and Al Taif, while other commercial and non-defence sector related programs include Dolphin Gas, Asmak Fish Farm,<sup>443</sup> and the Al Raha Beach Resort in Abu Dhabi.

Further complicating analysis of the UAE's defence spending is the lack of clarity towards the state's outsourcing of military capabilities. Where arms sales are monitored by governments, non-government organisations (NGO's), and peace activists, the recruitment of foreign personnel for an array of roles within the UAE Armed Forces is not as stringently monitored or recorded. While foreign personnel were previously directly hired by the UAE Armed Forces, a series of legal and contractual mechanisms has now diverted this process through 3<sup>rd</sup> party, and state-owned entities. While it is alleged that the UAE has hired a contingent of Colombian soldiers to support the UAE's PG,<sup>444</sup> through the online behaviour or several commercial entities, it is clear that that many, and predominantly technical service entities, contract foreign personnel to assist the UAE military.<sup>445</sup> While this provides an enhanced short-term

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<sup>443</sup> <http://www.asmak.biz>

<sup>444</sup> M Mazzetti & EB Hager, 'Secret Desert Force Set Up By Blackwater's Founder', *The New York Times*, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2011, available online, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html> , 5<sup>th</sup> February 2018

<sup>445</sup> 'Ordnance Technician Vacancy', *Lockheed Martin*, available online, <https://search.lockheedmartinjobs.com/ShowJob/Id/104091/Ordnance-Technician/> , date accessed, 5<sup>th</sup> February 2018 'People who work at AMMROC', *LinkedIn*, available online, <https://www.linkedin.com/search/results/people/?facetCurrentCompany=%5B%221383123%22%5D>, date accessed, 5<sup>th</sup> February 2018

capability for the UAE Armed Forces, unless there is a wider enhancement of the UAE workforce, there will be a reliance on foreign service personnel for future UAE operations.

While there have been obvious industrial and commercial results, military purchase by the UAE Armed Forces has also acted as a means for the development of Emirati society; primarily as an initiator for education, research, and innovation. This has seen heightened engagement between the UAE Military, local industry, and local and foreign educational institutions. Masdar University,<sup>446</sup> Khalifa University,<sup>447</sup> Higher College of Technology (HCT), UAE University (UAEU), Abu Dhabi University (ADU), and Zayed University (ZU) are the leading Emirati institutions with whom the development of human capital and technology development is channelled through. This has directly contributed to the strengthening of Emirati society through the enhancement of technological and engineering capabilities.

As the UAE Armed Forces develops and modernises, so the skills required to succeed evolve. As a result, a supplementary support network and infrastructure that advances in-line with the Armed Forces modernisation is required. Therefore, the UAE Armed Forces will continue to exploit and support a society-wide infrastructure that can augment their capabilities and

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'Crew Chief (APG)', *Orion Talent*, 12<sup>th</sup> December 2017, available online, <https://www.orientalent.com/ammroc/#211667554068112>, date accessed, 5<sup>th</sup> February 2018

<sup>446</sup> Masdar was constructed with direct assistance from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

<sup>447</sup> Before Khalifa University was merged into a partnership with Masdar University and the Petroleum Institute, it was a private institution owned by the current, as of August 2017, Minister of Higher Education, HE Hussein al Hammadi. <http://www.kustar.ac.ae>

provide a support network that enhances the image of the Armed Forces within the civilian sector.

### **Development of Extensive Counter-Intelligence (CI) Capabilities**

The predominant military organisation that provides a CI capability is the UAE Presidential Guard (PG). Like other states within the Middle East, the PG is best described as a praetorian guard in the sense that it adheres to a classical interpretation of the term,<sup>448</sup> or seen better, as a dual (or parallel) military unit whose sole modus operandi is directed inwards; and whose main aim is to safeguard the security of the regime in Abu Dhabi.

The PG's Headquarters are located at Al Bateen Air Base, separate to UAE Armed Forces GHQ, and is additionally the only military base (that is not a branch headquarters) that is situated on Abu Dhabi Island. This is therefore a deliberate physical statement to signify informal intent as to whom bears the responsibility of acting as the regime's last line of defence; it clearly acts as a counterweight to conventional forces. PG units are stationed in all of the 7 Emirates and therefore illustrate how the praetorian role of the PG is exercised across the UAE's federal landscape.

On the eve of the Arab Spring in 2010, the Emiri Guard was reconfigured as the PG and was designed to mirror the amphibious capabilities of the US Marines and the British Royal

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<sup>448</sup> Instead of Amos Perlmutter's modern interpretation which describes a praetorian state as 'one in which the military tends to intervene in the government and has the potential to dominate the executive'. A Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Time*, Yale University Press, London, 1978, p. 93

Marines. Overseeing its development was the former Commander of Australian Special Forces, Major General Mike Hindmarsh (Ret.).<sup>449</sup> While employing a high-level foreigner to manage one of the most sensitive units within the Armed Forces may signal the intention to improve a significant and specialised capability unit, it also highlights how the ultimate guarantee of regime security in the UAE falls on expatriates and not Emirati personnel. This hypothesis would also allow security decisions to be firmly controlled by the political elites who Ibish takes this further by saying that ‘the UAE has sought to address its military manpower shortfall by using private security firms and mercenaries’.<sup>450</sup> While a significant number of expatriates, and predominantly Western personnel, were incorporated into the UAE Armed Forces, as of 2014, a reversal of this trend had already started to occur.<sup>451</sup>

Dual military units such as the PG exist to ‘counterbalance and watch over the professional armed forces’.<sup>452</sup> While the PG, or its predecessor the Emiri Guard had existed for several decades, the Emirates of Dubai, Ras al Khaimah, and Sharjah had each possessed their own

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<sup>449</sup> ‘Foreign Military Service – MAJGEN M HINDMARSH (RETD)’, *Senate Estimates Brief*, FOI 030/18/19, February 2016, available online, [http://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/030\\_1819\\_Docs.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/FOI/Docs/Disclosures/030_1819_Docs.pdf), date accessed, 13<sup>th</sup> August 2019

<sup>450</sup> H Ibish, *The UAE’s Evolving National Security Strategy*, p.19

<sup>451</sup> Expatriate personnel were often employed in an official capacity as serving officers, retaining their previously held rank, but were being syphoned off onto private sector contracts from 2014. In the civilian sector, scores of foreign personnel were fired from sensitive positions in 2013. The Economist, ‘*Sending the Foreigners Home*’, 13<sup>th</sup> June 2013, available online, <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21581783-sacking-foreign-civil-servants-may-become-regional-trend-sending>, date accessed, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2017

<sup>452</sup> M Kamrava, ‘Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East’, p.82

independent military brigades in an attempt to operate a constant defensive capability against, what was previously a more fractured federation. The dissolution of these Emirati level Brigades has seen the UAE grow stronger, with the PG evolving away from solely protecting the Al-Nahyan royal family, towards becoming a more specialised entity. This shift has resulted in its deployment to several combat zones - such as Afghanistan and Yemen- to develop expertise and capabilities.

The accelerated development of the PG highlights the strategic intention to rapidly develop a significant capability, especially in contrast to regular branches. The aim is to balance conventional forces and deny a physical threat to emerge from within the UAE Armed Forces. Due to the critical mission of the PG, an aggressive modernisation policy has been undertaken, which has seen a relatively high budget for greater specialisation, as well as an intensive training program and elevated exposure to combat, to prepare the PG for emerging threats such as those born out of the Arab Spring across the MENA.

The PG's training has taken place with several foreign states, however, the 2014 \$150 million training deal with the US Marine Corps<sup>453</sup> serves as the most prominent indication of what type of capability is being pursued by the Emirati authorities. While there is a multi-branch dimension to the PG, it is predominantly a land-based focused branch that has increasingly

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<sup>453</sup> 'United Arab Emirates (UAE) – Blanket Order Training', *Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)*, 8<sup>th</sup> January 2014, available online, [http://www.i2insights.com/library/fms-dsca-announcements/fms-2014-united\\_arab\\_emirates-uae-13\\_46.pdf](http://www.i2insights.com/library/fms-dsca-announcements/fms-2014-united_arab_emirates-uae-13_46.pdf), date accessed, 4<sup>th</sup> August 2017

specialised in counter-insurgency and urban warfare; a signal of how the PG could be used domestically.

While conventional branches of the Emirati military perform at a consistent operational tempo, the PG has a higher drive, prompted by its ideological and professional foundation towards the protection of the Abu Dhabi political authority. The PG has tri-service capabilities; however, it also works alongside its conventional colleagues. A key example is the allocation and management of rotary wing aircraft within the UAE Armed Forces; JAC manages the UAE Armed Forces rotary-wing fleet however the PG has its own fleet of rotary-wing aircraft and is therefore able to self-sustain its own operations without wider UAE Armed Forces assistance. This is further supported by the fact that the PG's internal communications run separately to the rest of the Armed Forces; a fact that is extremely significant given the UAE's transition towards C4ISR<sup>454</sup> and development in domestic surveillance capabilities.

The PG's multi-branch capability is further enhanced when it is considered that the UAE's Special Operations Command (UAESOC) falls within its remit. UAESOC retains its own command structure, yet is still managed by the PG. The relationship between the PG and UAESOC is akin to that of US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), with the latter handling what is termed the tier 1 units; the most specialised and elite units.

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<sup>454</sup> M Hedges, 'The UAE's C4ISR Transformation'

The investment and development of the PG firmly attaches the unit to the Abu Dhabi ruling family; specifically, MBZ. In turn, its personnel benefit from the intangible reward of membership to its perceived status, and through their membership, illustrate the successful strategy undertaken by the regime elites to co-opted military personnel. Furthermore, only Emiratis are permitted to join the PG, and their operators must not have any foreign ancestry. While seen as a professional entity, similar neighbouring units, such as the SANG, are predominantly patrimonial in recruitment and design.

Since the Arab Spring, the UAE's regime's security strategy has slightly prioritised capability development and professionalism over nepotism and tribal affiliation. This postulation would explain why the unit with the highest strategic priority – the Presidential Guard - is led by expatriate personnel, especially if the perceived threat to the regime originated from personnel within the country and political elite.

### **Military-led state building by MBZ**

The contrasting lack of military engagement by the UAE Armed Forces until 2004, and the subsequent acceleration of overseas operations assists this thesis' proposition that since MBZ's ascension to political power, the UAE regime has utilised the military to undertake a post-Arab Spring state-building endeavour in MBZ's image.<sup>455</sup>

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<sup>455</sup> Hussein Ibish postulates that this development goes back to the first gulf war stating that 'the period following Desert Storm initiated a UAE military development drive principally guided by MBZ that has continued, and gained steam, since.' H Ibish, *The UAE's Evolving National Security Strategy*, p.13. While Ibish is not wrong as MBZ held tenure as head of the Air Force and Chief of Staff in the years following the first gulf war, it was his

The obvious acknowledgement that the military possesses intrinsic qualities that can sustain the ecosystem of support for the regime and also provide the tools to physically defend the regime, explain why such a high priority has been given to the development of the military. The intimate link between the UAE regime and the military further demonstrates the argument, with leading members of the royal family and their kin appointed to senior positions across the military.

Besides the already discussed systems, employed to foster elite support and control, there has been a renewed requirement to elicit wider support for the military from Emirati society; i.e. expand subjective control of the military. Tangible results have appeared through formal mechanisms such as military-led economic development and knowledge investment,<sup>456</sup> but also through community-targeted programs. Central to these has been the image of MBZ as the nation's and the military's figurehead. This has resulted in a stronger, and more legitimate interpretation of MBZ and the UAE regime as the nation's leadership.

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appointment to Crown Prince that thrust his hand over the military and drove its development to a speed unseen.

<sup>456</sup> Military led modernisation as postulated by Huntington (S Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, p.203)

While there has been a numerical increase in the platforms employed by the UAE Armed Forces, there has also been a numerical increase in its personnel.<sup>457</sup> This expansion enables the UAE's regime to possess a larger and more capable unit of protection. When the regime can portray the increase of military personnel as a result of the attempt to develop economic, educational, and societal capabilities within the Emirati society, the regime can meet multiple security challenges while still focusing on their own primary concern; regime security.

In a further attempt to foster the military's development and build support and legitimacy across society, on the 7<sup>th</sup> June 2014 the UAE issued Federal Law No.6 to initiate and construct a national military service and reserve force.<sup>458</sup> While aimed at developing social skills and fostering national (N.B. not federal) sentiment, the national service law was created to evoke greater societal responsibility and understanding: 'The law aims to instil values of loyalty and sacrifice in the hearts of the citizens, linking them with the teachings of religion and the socialisation of different generations in terms of leadership characteristics, physical power and self-reliance, responsibility and discipline, respect of law, and time'.<sup>459</sup>

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<sup>457</sup> Florence Gaub notes how smaller militaries are more likely to initiate a coup and resultantly, the inflation of the UAE Armed Forces is another example of how the UAE's post-Arab Spring regime security strategy is looking to protect itself from future threats. (F Gaub, *Guardians of the Arab State; When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania*, p.39)

<sup>458</sup> 'Khalifa Issues Federal National Service and Reserve Law', *WAM*, 7<sup>th</sup> June 2014, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395262684433>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> October 2017

<sup>459</sup> *ibid*

The centrality of the military as the leader of morality and national character is magnified when orientated towards the geographical and political disposition of the military towards Abu Dhabi. The manufacturing of nationalist and unionist sentiment directly assists the UAE regime security strategy as it can through the process of development, modernisation, and conscription, re-educate and recreate the narrative of a modern-day UAE.

Furthermore, of the nine national service centres (military bases and training camps designated for national service) provided for the seven Emirates, four of the five training centres and three of the four military bases are located within the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.<sup>460</sup> This means that there is a heightened probability that the majority of Emirati males will have to travel to Abu Dhabi for national service and become accustomed to an Abu Dhabi-centric view of the military, and its mission to provide the nation's (and regime's) security. This furthermore enhances society's perception of the military, and therefore increase its legitimacy within society thus strengthening the UAE's regime security strategy.

The rewriting of sympathies and loyalties from a federal identity to one of a nation not only strengthens the state and the nation, but also the regime as the harbourer of such an identity. The cohesive identity shown within the UAE Armed Forces echo's that of the political endeavour undertaken to transition the UAE from a federal to a unitary state.

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<sup>460</sup> <https://www.uaensr.ae/Pages/default.aspx>

## Post-Arab Spring Implementation

Since the Arab Spring the UAE has attempted to enhance and fuse the state's and the nation's security culture to one which inherently follows a regime-oriented vision. This is a political-military culture and it 'refers to the subset of the larger political culture that influences how members of a given society view national security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations'.<sup>461</sup>

Central to this process has been the position and role of the UAE Armed Forces. As the domestic institution with the largest threat potential to the incumbent regime however, it has been critical that the development of the UAE Armed Forces has been for the prioritised purpose of advancing the UAE's regime security over that of the nation and the state.

While elsewhere across MENA, militaries have seen heightened engagement in inter-state and intra-state conflict, the UAE has constructed a baseline of positive sentiment towards the state's security issues and established the application of the UAE Armed Forces as the sole owner of legitimate force within the UAE. This observation has developed after years of restructuring and re-organising coercive capabilities with the UAE. Its primary aim to reduce inter-Emirate competition and thus to strengthen the federal state. The appearance of parallel military units such as the PG in the UAE or the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG)

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<sup>461</sup> TU Berger, 'Norms, Identity, and National Security', in CW Hughes & LY Meng (eds.), *Security Studies, A Reader*, Routledge, London, 2011, p. 187

in Saudi Arabia exist as a counterweight to the traditional military but are advertised as specialised units to differentiate them from their conventional counterparts.

The result of the nation-building exercise of MBZ is the evolution of an Emirati political-military culture that has, in response to turbulent external stimuli, developed the image of a secure but hospitable state. The newly developed Emirati political-military culture has empowered the regime to advance military capabilities whilst also extending political control, actively circumventing traditional and contemporary security challenges. Brooks assists this postulation by highlighting the significance of military development in regime security: 'Maintaining social support and eliminating contenders for power can lessen the need for measures detrimental to battlefield efficiency, but does not free these regimes from the need to cultivate military support'.<sup>462</sup>

On the one hand, the UAE Armed Forces professional drive has warranted a significantly higher operational tempo, at home and abroad, while still maintaining the pursuit of selective appointments and sociological control of elite personnel. As also observed, the reinterpreted political-military culture has sought to publicly securitise security issues and thus legitimise any following reaction. Concurrently, this process has effectively rewritten the UAE's security-focused social facts to align with an Abu Dhabi focused interpretation.

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<sup>462</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, p.52

The legacy of infighting within the Al Nahyan ruling family has scared the political elites' perception of their internal vulnerabilities. The Arab Spring compounded the appearance and multitude of domestic threats, and as the primary threat manifestation, the UAE Armed Forces have been the principal and foremost entity within the UAE's post-Arab Spring regime security strategy. This analysis has seen the dual approaches of the maintenance of power and the enforcement of power being applied to the regime's management of the UAE Armed Forces.

## Chapter 7 - New Tools for State Control

Due to the speed of technical innovation, information is more readily accessible than it has ever been. This has provided avenues for empowerment but also for control. The Iranian Green Movement of 2009 and the Arab Spring have shown how groups have used technological innovation for political gain. The backlash from the Iranian regime and other regional states to these movements illustrate how the state has wrestled back power in times of instability. In an authoritarian state, the regime seeks to maintain control of forces that can potentially threaten its 'absolute authority';<sup>463</sup> in this sense, surveillance can be interpreted as a modern and updated expression of sultanism. While the regime's control of the military was previously examined, this chapter will explore how surveillance capabilities have developed to maximise the regime's control of surveillance since the outbreak of the Arab Spring. This will therefore illustrate the importance of surveillance for a successful regime security strategy.

Initially, the recording of information was, according to Anthony Giddens, 'a mode of administration notation'.<sup>464</sup> The single direction of information and its control by the recording administration empowered governors to solidify their authoritative positions. Anthony Giddens further clarifies that 'the concentrated focusing of surveillance as "governmental" power is largely, if not completely, a phenomenon of the modern state'.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> M Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, p.347

<sup>464</sup> A Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, p.41

<sup>465</sup> *ibid*, p.49

With the advent of the internet and mobile technology, people's access to information and international social interaction has served as a medium of empowerment,<sup>466</sup> liberation,<sup>467</sup> and control.<sup>468</sup> The global proliferation of information has even prompted scholars such as John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt to claim that alongside the political, economic, and military elements of power, information is emerging as an equal within the field of national security.<sup>469</sup> This thesis agrees with this postulation.

In step with technological developments and the increased scope of information ownership, is the concept of surveillance. The field of surveillance is vast, incorporating issues ranging from state led mass surveillance, through to the collection of individual data required to

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<sup>466</sup> M Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2012

J Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1962

<sup>467</sup> L Diamond, 'Liberation Technology', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No.3, July 2010, pp. 70-84

R Deibert & R Rohozinski, 'Liberation vs. Control: The Future of Cyberspace', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.21, No.4, October 2010, pp.43-57

<sup>468</sup> 'The bottom line is that probable cause can never do enough alone to keep up with the way technology empowers and expands surveillance and concomitantly invades privacy and shifts the balance of power from the citizenry and to the state', P Ohm, *The Surveillance Regulation Toolkit: Thinking Beyond Probable Cause*, in D Gray & SE Henderson (ed.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Surveillance Law*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp.495

R Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 26, No.3, July 2015, pp.64-78

<sup>469</sup> J Arquilla & D Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy*, RAND, Santa Monica, 1999, p.1

process institutional requests (e.g. individuals health records). As a result, surveillance can be viewed negatively, positively, or neutrally.

Negative concepts such as those hypothesised by Jeremy Bentham, Max Horkheimer, and Michel Foucault are often defined through the perceived relationship between information collection, societal discipline,<sup>470</sup> and coercion. At the forefront of this debate is the orthodox perception of panopticon - <sup>471</sup> and its modern reinterpretation superpanopticon -,<sup>472</sup> and it is through this lens that Michel Foucault defines surveillance: ‘a person that is under surveillance “is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information, never a subject in communication” ’.<sup>473</sup> Within the modern context, Michel Foucault’s definition is inaccurate, and the negative connotations of surveillance are an oversimplification of the potential benefits generated by surveillance. Furthermore, the limitation presented by Michel Foucault in this instance critically underplays the understanding that surveillance can be a multifaceted notion; due to technological developments hypothesised by Web 2.0, it is claimed that

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<sup>470</sup> M Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, A Sheridan, trans., Vintage, New York, 1977

K Haggerty & R Ericson, ‘The Surveillance Assemblage’, *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000, pp.605-622, in D Lyon, ‘Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique’, *Big Data & Society*, 2014, July – December, p.2

<sup>471</sup> J Bentham, *The Panopticon Writings*, M Bozovic (ed.), Verso, London, 1995

<sup>472</sup> M Poster, *The Mode of Information*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990

<sup>473</sup> M Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, Vintage, New York, 1977, p.200, in C Fuchs, ‘New Media, Web 2.0 and Surveillance’, *Sociology Compass*, Vol. 5, No.2, 2011, p.136

surveillance now consists of the collection and control of information, and the potentially unintentional behaviour of the individual who owns and distributes such information.<sup>474</sup>

Stuart Armstrong counters and explores the ways and means by which society directly benefits from forms of surveillance.<sup>475</sup> His contextual examples showcase how crime, medicine, research, and even human behaviour can benefit from heightened forms of surveillance. The results of surveillance help humanity to progress, as patterns and relationships captured from large data sets empower researchers to identify causal factors and linkages which can advance human society. Furthermore, with more access to more information subjects can counter and neutralize perceived violations<sup>476</sup> and elicit greater accountability e.g. citizen journalism. Surveillance is therefore understood to have both positive and negative values dependent upon context and relative strength of civil society and commercial sectors.

Anthony Giddens builds upon this field of literature to illustrate both negative and positive aspects of surveillance and does so by defining the concept neutrally; surveillance is the

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<sup>474</sup> 'On the internet, the separation between "objects of information" and "subjects in communication" that Foucault described for historical forms of surveillance no longer exists... this permanent, creative online activity becomes the object of surveillance'. Ibid, p.140

<sup>475</sup> S Armstrong, 'Life in the Fishbowl', *AEON*, 30<sup>th</sup> September 2013, available online, <https://aeon.co/essays/the-strange-benefits-of-living-in-a-total-surveillance-state>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> February 2018

<sup>476</sup> S Mann, J Nolan, and B Wellman, 'Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments', *Surveillance Society*, Vol.1, No.3, 2003, pp.331-355

‘control of information and the superintendence of the activities of some group by others’.<sup>477</sup>

The neutral notion hypothesised by Anthony Giddens firmly adheres to the wide concept of surveillance and ensures that there are both positive and neutral aspects within its capability. The neutral definition postulated by Anthony Giddens allows the research to acknowledge both the coercive and constructive dimensions of surveillance, and thus provides a framework which provides a nonaligned observation of the concept.

A further dimension identified within the field of literature pertaining to surveillance is the influence of modernity upon its conception. In contrast to traditional surveillance<sup>478</sup> Gary Marx defines new surveillance as the ‘scrutiny of individuals, groups and contexts through the use of technical means to extract or create information’.<sup>479</sup> This chapter embraces the modern and predominantly electronic mediums of surveillance that have focused contemporary research into its current forms.

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<sup>477</sup> A Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence*, p.2

<sup>478</sup> ‘Traditional surveillance is limited. It relies upon the unaided senses and was characteristic of pre-industrial societies – information tended to stay local, compartmentalized, unshared and was often unrecorded, or if kept, difficult to retrieve and analyze in depth’, GT Marx, ‘Preface: “Your Papers Please”: Personal and Professional Encounters with Surveillance’, in K Ball, KD Haggerty, and D Lyon (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies*, Routledge, Milton Park, 2012, p.XXV

<sup>479</sup> *ibid*

The digitisation of society has prompted the mass collection of personal data and, accordingly, the speed to which it can be accessed by an increasing number of actors;<sup>480</sup> from state security agencies to local council institutions, through to a wide array of commercial entities who have directly, or indirectly accumulated information upon a user or users. This has provoked a split in academic approaches towards surveillance whereby several approaches have emerged; legal and ethical aspects,<sup>481</sup> technological development,<sup>482</sup> employment tactics,<sup>483</sup> and the perceived motivation for the level of surveillance undertaken.<sup>484</sup>

While it is important to understand the applications and approaches of surveillance, it is equally important to highlight the means and restrictions for the collection, access, and use of surveillance data. In practice, this means the degree to which said information can be collected, accessed and used varies dramatically depending on laws and regulations within each state.<sup>485</sup>

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<sup>480</sup> This chapter will focus on the state's ownership and control of surveillance capabilities, akin to Max Weber's postulation that only the state can legitimately possess the means of violence.

<sup>481</sup> A Edwards, *Regulation and Repression*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1988

<sup>482</sup> Z Bauman & D Lyon, *Liquid Surveillance*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013

<sup>483</sup> D Lyon, *Surveillance Society, Monitoring Everyday Life*, Open University Press, Buckingham, 2002

<sup>484</sup> S Cohen, *Visions of Social Control: Crime, Punishment, and Classification*, Polity Press, Oxford, 1985

<sup>485</sup> Within many states, surveillance information is often unobtainable due to secrecy laws and further issues of confidentiality. Furthermore, there are issues of commercial sensitivity and ethical reservations which are limiting greater and more streamlined access to information. This is an ever-important topic as commercial companies are holding more and more data which can be used by the state. A Holpuch, 'Tim Cook says Apple's

Acknowledging the intrinsic limitations within the field of surveillance, this chapter will explore the UAE's surveillance capabilities from the three major academic perspectives of the field: legal, technological, and engagement strategy.

The legal dimension of surveillance provides the just foundation for state capabilities and its pursuit and control of information. With legal justification, the UAE can enhance its surveillance capabilities and as a result enforce its regime security strategy. It is imperative for a successful regime security to have the appearance of applying stringent laws to maintain order, and to be seen acting within the same laws it imposes on society.<sup>486</sup> In many cases, the Emirati authorities justify the enforcement of surveillance related laws by appealing to

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refusal to unlock iPhone for FBI is a "civil liberties" issue', *The Guardian*, 22<sup>nd</sup> February 2016, available online, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/22/tim-cook-apple-refusal-unlock-iphone-fbi-civil-liberties>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2018

<sup>486</sup> Peter Pomerantsev disagrees and uses the case of Putin's Russia to suggest how authoritarian states mock the state's laws publicly, and thus reassert their position of authority of their competitors and the general public. P Pomerantsev, 'The Kremlin's Information War', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.26, No.4, October 2015, pp.40-50

cultural sensitivities e.g. protection of children,<sup>487</sup> extremism,<sup>488</sup> and immoral sexual conduct.<sup>489</sup>

The ring-fencing of surveillance laws has been complicated by the speed and progress of technological development. While traditional surveillance was physical and required manual effort, technology has enabled the automatic and intelligent capturing, processing, and analysis of information, and thus has magnified the array of surveillance capabilities at the state's disposal. In this vein, it is crucial to examine how the UAE has managed this technological process in order to enhance its regime security strategy.

Analysis of surveillance engagement tactics is a crucial requirement when examining how the UAE has utilised a growing array of surveillance tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to augment its regime security strategy. This will illustrate how the UAE has incorporated micro and macro approaches to the engagement of surveillance to ensure the UAE's regime security strategy stays abreast of technological developments.

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<sup>487</sup> D Guha, '20 Do's and Don'ts on Social Media', *999 Magazine*, UAE Ministry of Interior, September 2016, pp.16-23, available online, <https://www.moi.gov.ae/DataFolder/magazine2016/Sept/999%20SEPTEMBER%20-%202016.pdf>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>488</sup> N Al Ramahi, 'Parents Warned Extremists Will Use Internet to Recruit Their Children', *The National*, 28<sup>th</sup> May 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/parents-warned-violent-extremists-will-use-internet-to-recruit-their-children-1.12760>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>489</sup> S Dhal, 'Cybersex in the UAE', *Gulf News*, 23<sup>rd</sup> September 2010, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/crime/cybersex-in-the-uae-1.686035>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2018

This framing empowers analysis to explore the formal and informal mechanisms which are employed to enhance the regime's control of the state's surveillance capabilities.

## **Legal Dimension**

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent employment of legislation such as the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act),<sup>490</sup> and the exponential speed to which technology has globally developed,<sup>491</sup> there has been a significant and legal increase in the international community's ability to conduct domestic surveillance.

Where citizens of democratic states assume a degree of legal rights and protections from the state, the state is also held to account for its actions and therefore it faces punishment for illegal engagement. In an autocratic state, these same civil protections do not exist and concurrently, surveillance tends to be more overt.

Attempts have been made to halt and restrict the dilution of personal rights, with an increasing number of interested parties managing daily privacy exposures; regulatory bodies,

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<sup>490</sup> S Chesterman, *One Nation Under Surveillance, A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom Without Sacrificing Liberty*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011

<sup>491</sup> In context, the UAE only had 20% of its population accessing the internet in 2000 yet by 2016, 91.6% of the population (which had tripled in the same period) had access to the internet. 'Internet Growth and Population Statistics, United Arab Emirates', *Internet World Stats*, available online, <https://www.internetworldstats.com/me/ae.htm>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2018

privacy/pressure groups, technology developers/providers, government policy makers, data controllers, and data subjects.<sup>492</sup> Due to the speed of technology development and its adoption, governments have not been able to effectively manage surveillance legislation, and have more often than not, fallen towards either the over-deployment or an under-deployment of surveillance legislation.<sup>493</sup> It is noted by Lawrence Lessig that 'governments (democratic and authoritarian alike) can most certainly regulate the internet, both by controlling its underlying code and by shaping the legal environment in which it operates'.<sup>494</sup> In other words, while some states attempted to limit access to the internet others have looked to control what is already accessible online. This observation is further convoluted within the UAE due to the state's federal identity; 'national-level initiatives are greatly overshadowed, however, by the e-government efforts of Dubai... for the most part, other Emirates have failed to match Dubai's stellar progress'.<sup>495</sup>

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<sup>492</sup> CJ Bennett & CD Raab, *The Governance of Privacy, Policy Instruments in Global Perspective*, MIT Press, London, 2006, p.220

<sup>493</sup> R Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege'

'Net Losses: Estimating the Global Cost of Cybercrime, Economic impact of Cybercrime ii', *Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, McAfee, 2014, available online, [https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy\\_files/files/attachments/140609\\_rp\\_economic\\_impact\\_cybercrime\\_report.pdf](https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/140609_rp_economic_impact_cybercrime_report.pdf), date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2018

<sup>494</sup> L Lessig, *Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace*, Basic Books, New York, 1999, in S Kalathil & TC Boas, *Open Network Closed Regimes, The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2003, p.3

<sup>495</sup> Ibid, p.110

Building upon Lawrence Lessig's hypothesis, this section will assess the UAE's legal approach to surveillance; firstly, through the state's architecture of control, and secondly, through the domain of legislation.<sup>496</sup>

### **Architecture of Control**

The UAE's approach to electronic surveillance has accelerated since the Arab Spring; however, as a global centre of commerce and trade, the control of electronic forms of communication has always been an issue for Emirati authorities. Due to the small, rich expatriate population, however, the UAE has been able to effectively manage rights concerns within its borders. Due to the speed of technological development it has been nearly impossible for any state to pre-empt cyber vulnerabilities and, instead, many (including the UAE) initially look to institutional forms of control or the architecture of control.

Central to the UAE government's control and dispersion of information is the state's ownership and management of the ICT sector.<sup>497</sup> The state's ownership envelops not only government bodies, ministries, and security establishments, but also media and telecommunications organisations. Through the combined control of information generation

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<sup>496</sup> Ronald Deibert concurs with Lawrence Lessig designating first-generational controls as the limitation of physical access and second-generation controls as the legal and regulatory environment in which states can restrict access. R Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege', p. 66

<sup>497</sup> See Appendix 6 Partial List of UAE Public Sector Bodies Online

and dispersion, the UAE has attempted to ring-fence the parameters to which it believes it can effectively survey society.<sup>498</sup>

Sitting atop of the UAE's electronic surveillance command structure is the Signals Intelligence Agency (SIA). Due to the secretive nature of the UAE's cyber-surveillance sector, it is not explicitly clear what mandate SIA has. However, a clearer assessment can be made of its predecessor the National Electronic Security Authority (NESA). It is a 'federal entity responsible for the advancement of the nation's cybersecurity, expanding cyber education and creating a collaborative culture rooted in information technology and innovation'.<sup>499</sup> It is important to note that all electronic forms of communication within the UAE pass through SIA -<sup>500</sup> previously NESA. Until the UAE Armed Forces can independently operate their own

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<sup>498</sup> 'The government of the UAE has sought to maintain control over ICTs for both censorship and financial gain, though it is more open to information than many of its neighbours. The state owns virtually all broadcast media and applies guidelines to reporting', Kalathil & TC Boas, *Open Network Closed Regimes, The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*, p.108

<sup>499</sup> SIA Overview, *LinkedIn*, available online, <https://www.linkedin.com/company/uaenesa/>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2017

<sup>500</sup> Article 14, Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2012, On The Establishment of the National Electronic Security Authority, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, available online, [http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest\\_laws/federal\\_decree\\_law\\_3\\_2012\\_en.pdf](http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws/federal_decree_law_3_2012_en.pdf), date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2018

networks, their communications will also pass through SIA,<sup>501</sup> thus ensuring expanded civilian oversight over the military. Ibish notes that in 2014 the 'country reportedly established a cyber command within the General Headquarters of the national armed forces that runs in parallel to NESAs and specifically serves the military'.<sup>502</sup> However, as there has been no formal confirmation of the military's cyber capability, it is assumed SIA will maintain this ability until otherwise stated. As a result of SIA's monopoly on the production of knowledge and its duplicity of security capability, its manifestation clearly exhibits a coup-proofing mechanism, one which has been created directly in response to the Arab Spring.

The UAE's cyber-surveillance capability was expanded when NESAs was formally established on the 13<sup>th</sup> August 2012 through Federal Decree No 3 of 2012.<sup>503</sup> It was not until 2014 however, that NESAs started publishing official policies and standards; National Security Strategy, National Information Assurance Framework, Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy, and UAE Information Assurance Standards.<sup>504</sup> The establishment of a strategic entity immediately after the Arab Spring, and the break between its establishment and its operations, highlights not only the kneejerk reaction to a perceived threat by the Emirati

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<sup>501</sup> B Thomas, 'UAE Military to Set up Cyber Command', *Defence World*, 30<sup>th</sup> September 2014, available online, [http://www.defenseworld.net/news/11185/UAE\\_Military\\_To\\_Set\\_Up\\_Cyber\\_Command#.WmM1lyN0fVo](http://www.defenseworld.net/news/11185/UAE_Military_To_Set_Up_Cyber_Command#.WmM1lyN0fVo), date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>502</sup> B Thomas, 'UAE Military to Set up Cyber Command', *Defence World*, 30<sup>th</sup> September 2014, in H Ibish, *The UAE's Evolving National Security Strategy*, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 6<sup>th</sup> April 2017

<sup>503</sup> Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2012, On The Establishment of the National Electronic Security Authority

<sup>504</sup> P MacGloin & M al Jneibi, 'The Components of National and International Cyberspace Governance', *RSA Conference 2015*, Abu Dhabi, 4-5 November 2015

authorities, but that its threat potential to the UAE regime was perceived to be significant.<sup>505</sup>

If ICT-based threats were not considered so immediate, the UAE would not have invested as much time and money to combat them.

As noted by Mehran Kamrava,<sup>506</sup> Sheena Grietens<sup>507</sup> and Volker Perthes,<sup>508</sup> there is a requirement and subsequent strategy to ensure the longevity of a regime; one that requires careful management of institutions that can carry a threat.<sup>509</sup> While the strategic management of personnel within the UAE Armed Forces has been previously examined, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has extended this same strategy to NESAs. This has materialised in the intimate fusion of regime personnel and PREs. Initially NESAs were 'guided by a board of directors elected by the Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Security';<sup>510</sup> however, as the institution has developed, a close-knit operational team has formed that has clear and direct links to Abu Dhabi Crown Prince MBZ. Through the careful maintenance of trusted kin

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<sup>505</sup> The development of the Arab Spring and the manifestation of ICT based threats neuters earlier observations of the UAE's perceived ICT vulnerabilities, such as that hypothesised by Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas; '*public internet use poses little threat to the regime's stability*'. Kalathil & TC Boas, *Open Network Closed Regimes, The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*, p.109

<sup>506</sup> M Kamrava, 'Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East'

<sup>507</sup> S Greitens, *Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism*

<sup>508</sup> V Perthes (ed.), *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change*

<sup>509</sup> R Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*

JT Quinlivan, 'Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East'

<sup>510</sup> O Danino, 'Conflict in Cyberspace: The Case of the Middle East', in O Danino (ed.), *Conflict in Cyberspace: The Case of the Middle East*, French Institute for Strategic Analysis, France, 2015, p.291

and personnel across the surveillance apparatus, MBZ has again co-opted the security focused elites, and is using this platform to help secure his lineage and their eventual tenure of leadership.

According to Federal Decree Law No.3, which formally established NESAs, the organisation was to directly report to the UAE National Security Advisor,<sup>511</sup> who as of the 14<sup>th</sup> February 2016 was Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan:<sup>512</sup> full brother to MBZ. Furthermore, Tahnoun bin Zayed's deputy,<sup>513</sup> the Minister of National Security, is the eldest son of MBZ, Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan (KbMBZ).<sup>514</sup> The first Director General of NESAs was Major General Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed's superior, Jassim al Zaabi, when the pair were working closely together at the Abu Dhabi-based, and MBZ-led, SWF Mubadala.

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<sup>511</sup> Articles 6 & 7, Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2012, On The Establishment of the National Electronic Security Authority

<sup>512</sup> 'President Names Tahnoun Bin Zayed as National Security Advisor', *UAE Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/president-names-tahnoun-bin-zayed-as-national-security-advisor>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2018

'Tahnoun Appointed National Security Advisor', *WAM*, Gulf News, 14<sup>th</sup> February 2016, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/tahnoun-appointed-national-security-adviser-1.1672367>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2016

<sup>513</sup> WAM, 'Mohammed bin Zayed Attends Official Reception in New Delhi', *Emirates 24/7*, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2017, available online, <http://www.emirates247.com/news/government/mohamed-bin-zayed-attends-official-reception-in-new-delhi-2017-01-26-1.647063>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

<sup>514</sup> C Malek, 'Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed Appointed Head of National Security', *The National*, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2016, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-khalid-bin-mohammed-appointed-head-of-national-security-1.197959>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2018

At an unknown point, NESAs first Director General<sup>515</sup> was promoted to the position of Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Office,<sup>516</sup> and subsequently as a member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council and then as head of its Department of Finance. After the SIA had emerged and assumed the responsibilities of NESAs, it was appointed a new Executive Director, Mohammed al Kuwaiti.<sup>517</sup> He is a Dhawahir tribal member, and therefore has close paternal ties to MBZ and the Bani Yas. In addition to his role in SIA, Kuwaiti was appointed as head of cybersecurity within the government of the UAE, further illustrating his key role within this sector.<sup>518</sup>

The web of interconnecting relationships across NESAs leadership highlights how, since the Arab Spring, the MBZ led-UAE has successfully courted political elites, fostering intimate ties within an increasingly concentric circle of trusted personnel. This has helped to secure the

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<sup>515</sup> Jassim al Zaabi's deputy at NESAs was Zayed al-Otaiba, the brother of the UAE Ambassador to the US and is reportedly a key conduit for American firm's engagement with NESAs.

<sup>516</sup> 'Chairman of Abu Dhabi Executive Office', *General Secretariat of the Executive Council*, available online, <https://www.ecouncil.ae/en/ADGovernment/Pages/MemberDetail.aspx?mid=23>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2017

<sup>517</sup> 'Dr. Mohamed Al-Kuwaiti, Executive Director, Signals Intelligence Agency (SIA)', *RSA Conference*, Abu Dhabi 2017, available online, <https://www.rsaconference.com/speakers/dr-mohamed-al-kuwaiti>, date accessed, 7<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>518</sup> 'President approves new structure of UAE Government', *WAM*, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2020, available online, <https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395302853277>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

regime and is also laying the groundwork for a future Khalid bin Mohammed bin Zayed-led UAE.

On a federal level, each of the UAE's seven Emirates have their own civilian cyber security authorities (in addition to the MOI personnel) that advise and strategize how Emirate-level bodies will exercise their own cyber-security issues. This aligns with James Quinlivan's coup-proofing strategy,<sup>519</sup> as the regime has created multiple security organisations with overlapping responsibilities, ensuring as a result a persistent counter-intelligence capability across the multi-tiered system of governance. This suggests that the fracturing of UAE cyber security and surveillance capabilities has been prompted to enhance the UAE's regime security strategy, and to ensure that no security entity beyond the direct control of the Abu Dhabi regime is capable of mounting a significant challenge to the Abu Dhabi-based political elites. Only on occasion have high profile Emirati's criticised the elevated surveillance capabilities of the post Arab Spring regime security strategy.<sup>520</sup> They have often done so knowingly, and hence, other less-public mechanisms are employed to voice certain concerns.

Each of the Emirate-level cyber-security institutions are subservient to NESAs and the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA). The TRA was established through Federal

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<sup>519</sup> JT Quinlivan, 'Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East'

<sup>520</sup> Emirati political scientist, Abdulkhaleq Abdulla was arrested by Emirati state security officials in January 2017 after he advocated greater freedom of speech. Another free speech advocate who was arrested after his advocacy work was Ahmed Mansour. In 2018 he was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Law No.3 of 2003<sup>521</sup> and it has two principle aims; ‘The role of TRA focuses on two fields: regulating the telecommunications sector, and enabling government entities in the field of smart transformation’.<sup>522</sup> The TRA is thus the leading entity within the governance of day-to-day online engagement across the UAE and is leading the state’s development towards wider ICT adoption and development.

Compliant to the TRA’s governance are the UAE’s four telecommunications networks; Etisalat, Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company (EITC) with its two owned brands Du and Virgin, and Swyp. Any mobile or internet connection is required to subscribe to one of these networks, and in many cases, users cannot choose between networks; onshore business and homes must subscribe to Etisalat, while in free-zone and new-built areas, subscribers must sign to Du<sup>523</sup> Virgin<sup>524</sup> is a new entity within the UAE’s ICT sector, and only offers mobile connections. Swyp is owned by Etisalat and is an age-restricted mobile network that heavily relies upon data usage.<sup>525</sup>

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<sup>521</sup> Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003, *Regarding the Organisation of Telecommunication Sector*, in Official Gazette, Edition 411, Year 34, April 2004

<sup>522</sup> ‘About TRA/ Vision, Mission & Values, *TRA*, available online, <https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/about-tra/about-tra-vision-mission-and-values.aspx>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

<sup>523</sup> In free zones, subscribers have no choice but to subscribe to Etisalat or Du.

<sup>524</sup> UAE-based franchise of the Richard Branson owned Virgin Group.

<sup>525</sup> ‘Etisalat Launches New Mobile Service SWYP Targeting Youngsters’, *ITP.net*, 10<sup>th</sup> September 2017, available online, <http://www.itp.net/614624-etisalat-launches-new-mobile-service-swyp-targeting-youngsters>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

Within the field of surveillance, the UAE has opted to enhance its architecture of control through PPPs and SOEs.<sup>526</sup> Leading this effort is Etisalat, the UAE's largest and oldest telecommunications and internet service provider (ISP). Etisalat was created in 1976 and is 60% owned by the UAE Government.<sup>527</sup> Among Etisalat's board members, many hold additional positions within the public sector and are leading actors within the UAE's private sector,<sup>528</sup> and therefore the lack of public/private separation leads to a persistent surveillance of all telecommunication activities within the Etisalat network. The EITC is the UAE's second licensed telecommunications provider and owns two brands; Du and Virgin. EITC was founded in 2006<sup>529</sup>, however its initial offering, Du, was established a year later in 2007 and its second offering, Virgin, was launched in 2017.<sup>530</sup> EITC is 39.5% owned by Emirates Investment Authority (UAE Government), 19.75% owned by Mubadala (Abu Dhabi Government), 19.5% owned by Emirates Communications and Technology (Dubai Holding), and the remaining shares owned by public shareholders.<sup>531</sup> Like Etisalat, many of EITC's board of directors hold

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<sup>526</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations*

<sup>527</sup> Etisalat, *Company Profile*, available online, [https://www.etisalat.ae/en/about-us/etisalat\\_corporation.jsp](https://www.etisalat.ae/en/about-us/etisalat_corporation.jsp), date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

Etisalat, 'Ownership Structure', available online, <http://www.etisalat.com/en/ir/corporateinfo/ownership-structure.jsp>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

<sup>528</sup> See Appendix 7 Etisalat Board Members as of 2016 and their Public-Sector Connections

<sup>529</sup> EITC, *Emirates Integrated Telecommunication Company PJS (du) Publishes its Financial Results for Q2 2017*, Press Release,

<sup>530</sup> Ibid

<sup>531</sup> DU, *Company Overview*, available online, <http://www.du.ae/about-us/investor-relations/company-overview>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

additional public-sector portfolios,<sup>532</sup> and further highlight the depth of the regime's control in the state's ICT sector. The state's ownership of the UAE communications sector has not changed since the Arab Spring; however, the portfolio of entities within it have increased. This suggests this change has been for cosmetic, not organisational purposes.

The UAE's concentrated field of ICT ownership and management has led Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas to postulate that 'the government of the UAE has sought to maintain control over ICTs for both censorship and financial gain'.<sup>533</sup> This hypothesis is in line with other areas of observation within the UAE's governance system,<sup>534</sup> and it is often through these two lenses that the state's decisions to limit access to the internet, social media, and third-party applications can be understood.

Akin to Anthony Giddens' definition of surveillance is the concept of control; both of information and the subject that digests and produces that said information. An intrinsic capability within surveillance is the ability to manufacture and limit what information is accessed. Joan Ferrante postulates that 'censorship, surveillance, and sanctions are used to convey and enforce norms',<sup>535</sup> and provides the grounding for an exploration of how censorship and propaganda mechanisms are used to enhance surveillance capabilities.

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<sup>532</sup> See Appendix 8 Du Board of Directors and their Public-Sector Connections

<sup>533</sup> Kalathil & TC Boas, *Open Network Closed Regimes, The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*, p.108

<sup>534</sup> Strategic use of sovereign wealth funds.

<sup>535</sup> J Ferrante, *Sociology: A Global Perspective*, Cengage Learning, Stamford, 2015, p.148, in, S Morley, J Turner, and K Corteen (ed.), *A Companion to State Power, Liberties, and Rights*, Policy Press, Bristol, 2017, p. 242

In parallel to the UAE's ability to control information is its programme to create and propagate information. The media is not only a medium to generate support for the political elites, but 'a vital companion function is to trash and discredit alternatives to the authoritarian status quo',<sup>536</sup> thus ensuring social control and observation of dissident narrative and organisation. In essence, states seek to control the media, so they can 'convey their strength and puff up their claims to legitimacy while undermining potential alternatives'.<sup>537</sup>

Central to this capability is the National Media Council (NMC).<sup>538</sup> Established per Federal Law 1 of 2006, the NMC is a federal government body that monitors what information is published within the UAE, and how it is presented. The NMC is supported by the state's direct and indirect ownership of the predominant sources of information to the UAE public. This allows them to potentially restrict, or sanction media outlets. A further amendment was made to federal law in 2017 expanding the NMC's capacity to censor electronic publications.<sup>539</sup> The composition of the NMC's board of director's (see Table 2 National Media Council Board of DirectorsTable 2 National Media Council Board of Directors) exhibits the same feature of

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<sup>536</sup> C Walker & RW Orttung, 'Breaking The News: The Role of State-Run Media', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.25, No.1, January 2014, p.72

<sup>537</sup> *ibid*

<sup>538</sup> <http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us>

<sup>539</sup> 'Mohammed bin Rashid Issues Decision Organising Media Content', *UAE, The Cabinet*, available online, <https://www.uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/mohammed-bin-rashid-issues-decision-organizing-media-content>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

patrimonialism that seemingly runs throughout the wider state operating apparatus within the UAE. It is seemingly clear that while the leading members of the NMC hold additional portfolios within other areas of the executive branch, they are assisted by technocrats from federal level entities. In July 2020, the NMC was merged with the Federal Youth Authority into the Ministry of Culture and the Emirates News Agency, WAM, was transferred to the Ministry of Presidential Affairs.<sup>540</sup> The prompt acceleration of centralised state control of information creation clearly illustrates a strong reaction to potential threats emerging beyond the regime’s direct control.

Table 2 National Media Council Board of Directors<sup>541</sup>

Name	Role	Other role(s)	Tribe
Dr. Sultan al Jaber	Chairman	Cabinet Member and Minister of State and CEO of ADNOC	
Noura al Kaabi	Chairwoman	UAE Cabinet Member and Minister of Culture	Bani Ka’b

<sup>540</sup> President approves new structure of UAE Government’, *WAM*, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2020, available online, <https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395302853277>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>541</sup> ‘Board of Directors’, *National Media Council (NMC)*, available online, <http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/Pages/BoardofDirectors.aspx>, date accessed, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2018

		and Knowledge Development	
Dr. Ali Rashid al Nuaimi	Board Member	Member of the Executive Council	Na'im
Ahmed al-Jarman	Board Member	Assistant Foreign Minister for Political Affairs	
Mouza Ali al Hameli	Board Member	Head of Organisational Department at Ministry of Presidential Affairs	Hawamil of the Bani Yas
Amina al Rustamani	Board Member	CEO of TECOM Group	No tribal connection as family is foreign in origin
Mona al Marri	Board Member	Director General of the Government of Dubai Media Office	Murrah

Sheikh Sultan bin Ahmed al Qasimi	Board Member	Chairman of the Sharjah Media Corporation	Qawasim
Mansour Ibrahim al Mansoori	Director General	Board Member of the Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority	Manasir

While the UAE-owned print media industry only caters for a daily audience of less than one million (of an estimated population of seven million), the state’s controlled ownership of the print sector shows (prominent pre-digital communication medium) how this potential threat medium was controlled for maximal efficiency (See Table 3 UAE-Owned Newspaper Broadsheet Circulation and Ownership). Furthermore, any official government statement or information release is first published by the WAM,<sup>542</sup> thus helping to craft and direct presentations of information.<sup>543</sup> Foreign print media outlets are permitted to enter the domestic UAE market, but are held prior to entry for censorship review. This results in the full, partial, or non-release of the media format.<sup>544</sup>

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<sup>542</sup> <http://wam.ae/ar>

<sup>543</sup> C Walker & RW Orttung, ‘Breaking the News: The Role of State-Run Media’

<sup>544</sup> MN Al Khan, ‘Media Matters: Meet The Censors’, *Gulf News*, 25<sup>th</sup> April 2007, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/general/media-matters-meet-the-censors-1.463677> , date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup>

Table 3 UAE-Owned Newspaper Broadsheet Circulation and Ownership

Type	Name	Circulation	Ownership
Newspaper	Al-Bayan	105,000	Dubai Government - Dubai Media Incorporated
Newspaper	Gulf News	104,000	Al-Tayer <sup>545</sup> , Al Rostamani <sup>546</sup> , and Al Majid <sup>547</sup> families
Newspaper	Al-Ittihad	95,000	Abu Dhabi Government - Abu Dhabi Media
Newspaper	Khaleej Times	90,000	Galadari Printing <sup>548</sup>

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Enhanced control of information flows does however create the dictator's dilemma whereby due to the increased ability to create and source information, the state's narrative is now weaker and 'finds itself called to account for anomalies between its view of events and the public's'. C Shirky, 'The Political Power of Social Media', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 90, No.1, January/February 2011, p. 36

<sup>545</sup> The Al-Tayer family are a branch of the Bani Yas tribe to which both, the Abu Dhabi and Dubai ruling families originate from. The Al Tayer have married into the Al Maktoum dynasty, and many of its members have held senior public-sector positions. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.192

<sup>546</sup> Prominent business family with no intrinsic tribal connections.

<sup>547</sup> Arab tribe of non-UAE origin. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.197

<sup>548</sup> Prominent merchant family of Iranian origin. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.199

Newspaper	The National	80-90,000	International Media Investments (IMI) - Was created by Abu Dhabi Government but now independent
Newspaper	Emarat al-Youm	80,000	Dubai Government - Dubai Media Incorporated
Newspaper	Al-Khaleej	37-60,000	Taryam Omran Taryam and Dr. Abdullah Omran Taryam <sup>549</sup>

The UAE is limited in its ability to monitor and control social media portals and blogs, and instant messaging services. Like many other states it has, on occasion, restricted access<sup>550</sup> and implemented legislation targeting undesirable social media activity.<sup>551</sup> Due to the ability of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to mask a user's online activity, they present a viable threat

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<sup>549</sup> Abdullah Omran Taryam was the Former UAE Minister of Justice. The Taryam family are members of the Al Ali tribe, and in relation to the Emirate of Sharjah, the Taryam family are extremely powerful. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.45 & 221

<sup>550</sup> G Warren, 'Yes, Skype's blocked in the UAE, what now?', *Gulf News*, 2<sup>nd</sup> January 2018, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/guides/tech/yep-skype-s-blocked-in-the-uae-what-now-1.2150373>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2018

<sup>551</sup> M Al Sadafy, 'Dubai Police monitoring social networking sites round the clock', *Emirates* 24/7, 4<sup>th</sup> April 2012, available online, <http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/dubai-police-monitoring-social-networking-sites-round-the-clock-2012-04-04-1.452143>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2018

to a regime. The UAE's legal perception of VPNs is contradictory as article 1 of federal law 12 of 2016 seems to outlaw their use,<sup>552</sup> however later clarification by the TRA illustrated their lawful usage.<sup>553</sup> They are however technically difficult to discover and intercept, and therefore weaken the state's legal ability to enforce their restriction. In essence, where possible, the UAE has attempted to halt access to contradictory information and mediums of communication beyond its direct control. The process of surveillance enhancement has significantly developed in the post-Arab Spring era, with Ronald Deibert suggesting that a similar process has occurred in other less technically savvy states.<sup>554</sup>

As technology has developed, there have been attempts by the state to re-exert its influence over the broadcast (television) and online sectors. While it is relatively simple to restrict physical newspapers, and the publishing of information therein, restricting and controlling

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<sup>552</sup> Article 1, Federal Law 12 of 2016, 'Whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery, shall be punished by temporary imprisonment and a fine of no less than Dh500,000 and not exceeding Dh2,000,000, or either of these two penalties', WAM, 'UAE Federal Laws Tackle Media Governance, Cybercrime', *Khaleej Times*, 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2016, available online, <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/UAE-federal-laws-NMC-media-governance-cybercrime>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2018

<sup>553</sup> 'Telecommunications Regulatory Authority Issues Statement on the Use of VPN to Clarify Media Reports', WAM, 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2016, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395298419036>, date accessed, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>554</sup> 'Cyberspace authoritarianism, in other words, has evolved over at least three generations of information controls'. R Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege', p.65

information transmitted live by satellite, or by remote and independent actors online is a far different endeavour. In a bid to enter and dominate the domain of broadcast media, every federal level government owns an array of media channels, with Abu Dhabi Media and Dubai Media Incorporated, the state's two leading media conglomerates, owning the most diverse portfolios.<sup>555</sup>

The UAE also permits foreign broadcast channels to be received within the UAE; however, through legal and technological restrictions, the state is able to control what is transmitted to UAE audiences.<sup>556</sup> This is a crucial battleground for the regime, and 'state-controlled media must make it a mission to reassure these regime mainstays that the incumbent ruler (or ruling circle) stands secure, making continued unity and loyalty to the regime the "smart play"'.<sup>557</sup> The state's propaganda apparatus has developed a wide array of capabilities across multiple

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<sup>555</sup> Abu Dhabi Media owns Al Emarat TV, Abu Dhabi TV, Abu Dhabi Sports Channel, Yas, Majid TV, National Geographic Abu Dhabi, and Abu Dhabi Drama<sup>555</sup>. Dubai Media Incorporated<sup>555</sup> owns Sama Dubai<sup>555</sup>, Dubai Zaman<sup>555</sup>, Dubai Sports<sup>555</sup>, Dubai Racing<sup>555</sup>, and Dubai One<sup>555</sup>.

'The media outlets in question may be owned and run by the state, or they may be nominally private but in fact under government control'. C Walker & RW Orttung, 'Breaking the News: The Role of State-Run Media', p.71

<sup>556</sup> Black market satellite boxes are illegal, however, are still very popular across the UAE. A Ahmed, 'Counting The Cost of Illegal TV', *The National*, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2015, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/technology/counting-the-cost-of-illegal-tv-1.633036>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>557</sup> C Walker & RW Orttung, 'Breaking the News: The Role of State-Run Media', p.74

Domestic Emirati media is heavily focused towards cultural references and suggests this is the prominent target audience for its strategic communications campaigns.

platforms and resultantly has illustrated the importance of appealing to emotional and cultural sensitivities, to which a patrimonial and traditional political system adheres to.

Through the strategic ownership and control of the UAE's ICT architecture and the commercial outlets that operate within its domain, the regime is able to efficiently and discreetly manage the 'underlying code'<sup>558</sup> of the state's access to the internet. This ensures that society is exposed to its propaganda and has limited access to information where possible. While a degree of information control has been made possible by the Emirati authorities, the capture of narrative through the controlling array of media ownership ensures the domination of political narrative over the UAE's population.<sup>559</sup>

Since the Arab Spring, the UAE has visibly increased its ownership of the state's ICT architecture. In addition, traditional methods of creating and dispersing information have remained within the gravity of state control. These combined factors have allowed the UAE to expand its domain of surveillance within the post-Arab Spring period.

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<sup>558</sup> L Lessig, *Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace*, Basic Books, New York, 1999, in S Kalathil & TC Boas, *Open Network Closed Regimes, The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*, p.3

<sup>559</sup> 'Access to information is far less important, politically, than access to conversation', C Shirky, 'The Political Power of Social Media', p.35

EC Murphy, 'Theorizing ICTs in the Arab World: Informational Capitalism and the Public Sphere', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.53, No.4, 2009, pp.1131-1153

## Domain of Legislation

The UAE's legal system is dominated by its constitution and penal code. Both consider Islamic Sharia law as the main source of law for the state.<sup>560</sup> The UAE has previously struggled to efficiently implement legislation targeting ICT based threats.<sup>561</sup> ICT based threats range from state orchestrated espionage through to NGO hacktivists, terrorists, and commercially focused criminals. Since the Arab Spring however, ICT platforms have empowered social activism and opposition to authoritarian states across MENA, and subsequently, there has been a significant uptake in the volume and potency of surveillance legislation. Upon this basis, ICT and cybercrime threats do envelop a wide range of threats, however, when limited to their impact on regime security, both are focused on the level of direct engagement with the state. This section will therefore assess the extent to which the UAE's post Arab Spring surveillance legislation has been implemented to strengthen its regime security strategy.

As previously discussed, surveillance is a broad concept that is not just a modern construct; its modern capabilities have however transformed its potency. Like any state the UAE has implemented a wide array of laws that have empowered the state's surveillance capabilities; however, as the state has matured and technologies evolved, new legislation has been created to counter reinterpreted threats. Due to the importance of the UAE' surveillance

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<sup>560</sup> *United Arab Emirates Constitution of 1971 with Amendments through 2004*, Abu Dhabi, Constitute Project, 1971, available online, [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United\\_Arab\\_Emirates\\_2004.pdf](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2004.pdf), date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>561</sup> *UAE Security Forum: Bridging the Cybersecurity Talent Gap*, Conference Report, Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Washington, Event Report 2, 2016

specific legislation, dated 1971 – present, and across 17 laws, the follow Table 4 UAE’s Surveillance Legislation lists each law.

Table 4 UAE’s Surveillance Legislation<sup>562</sup>

<b>Law</b>	<b>Date</b>
Article 30 of 1971 Constitution	2 <sup>nd</sup> December 1971
Federal Law No.15 of 1980 Concerning Press and Publications <sup>563</sup>	16 <sup>th</sup> November 1980
Federal Decree No.3 of 1987 Penal Code	8 <sup>th</sup> December 1987
Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003 Regarding the Organization of Telecommunications Sector <sup>564</sup>	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2003
Federal Law No.2 of 2004 Popular Register and Emirates Identity Card Program	29 <sup>th</sup> September 2004

<sup>562</sup> For a detailed summary of each law, see Appendix 9 Summary of UAE’s Surveillance based Legislation

<sup>563</sup> Federal Law No.15 of 1980, available online, <http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Lists/LawsandLegislationsList/Attachments/55/قانونم%20المطبوعات%20والنشر.pdf> , date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 1980

<sup>564</sup> Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003, Regarding the Organization of Telecommunications Sector, *Telecommunications Regulatory Authority*, Abu Dhabi, Official Gazette, Edition 411, April 2004, online, <https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/about-tra/legal-references/law.aspx> , date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Federal Decree No.1 of 2006  Cyber Crimes Law <sup>565</sup>	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2006
Federal Law by Decree No.5 of 2008  Amending the Provisions of the Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003 <sup>566</sup>	2008
Cabinet Resolution No. (42/23) of 2008 Session No.3 <sup>567</sup>  Regarding the Abolition of the Supreme Committee for the Supervision of the Telecommunication Sector and delegating its function to the Board of Directors of the TRA	2008
National Media Council Resolution No.20 of 2010	2010
Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2012 <sup>568</sup>  Establishment of National Electronic Security Authority (NESA)	13 <sup>th</sup> August  2012

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<sup>565</sup> Federal Law No. (1) of 2006, Electronic Commerce and Transactions, available online, <https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/about-tra/legal-references/law.aspx>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>566</sup> Official Gazette, Edition 485, October 2008

<sup>567</sup> 'Legal References', *Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA)*, available online, <https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/legal-references.aspx>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>568</sup> Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2012, On The Establishment of the National Electronic Security Authority, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, available online, [http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest\\_laws/federal\\_decree\\_law\\_3\\_2012\\_en.pdf](http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws/federal_decree_law_3_2012_en.pdf), date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Federal Decree Law No.5 of 2012 <sup>569</sup> Combatting Cybercrimes	13 <sup>th</sup> August 2012
National Media Council Chairman's Decision No.35 of 2013 Advertising Content <sup>570</sup>	2013
Federal Decree Law No.7 of 2014 <sup>571</sup> Combatting Terrorism Offences	20 <sup>th</sup> August 2014
Federal Decree Law No.2 of 2015 <sup>572</sup> Combatting Discrimination and Hatred	15 <sup>th</sup> July 2015
Federal Law No.11 of 2016 <sup>573</sup> Competencies of the National Media Council	21 <sup>st</sup> July 2016

<sup>569</sup> Federal Decree Law No.5 of 2012, Ministry of Justice, 13<sup>th</sup> August 2012, available online, [http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest\\_laws/cybercrimes\\_5\\_2012\\_en.pdf](http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws/cybercrimes_5_2012_en.pdf), date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>570</sup> 'Media in the UAE', *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/media/media>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>571</sup> Federal Decree Law No.7 of 2014, Ministry of Justice, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2014, available online, <https://moj.gov.ae/documents/21128/86231/Federal%20Law%20No%207%20of%202014%20On%20Combating%20Terrorism%20Offences.pdf/d8e6e696-e44b-45eb-8c30-ca2cb2ff6ce5>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>572</sup> Federal Decree Law No.2 of 2015, Ministry of Justice, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2015, available online, [http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest\\_laws2015/FDL\\_2\\_2015\\_discrimination\\_hate\\_en.pdf](http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws2015/FDL_2_2015_discrimination_hate_en.pdf), date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>573</sup> Federal Law No.11 of 2016, available online, <http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Lists/LawsandLegislationsList/Attachments/56/شان20تنظيم20%واختصاصات20المجلس20%واختصاصاته>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Federal Decree Law No.12 of 2016 <sup>574</sup>	21 <sup>st</sup> July 2016
Council of Ministers Decree No.23 of 2017 <sup>575</sup> Concerning Media Content	2017

While the UAE's 1971 constitution protects free speech, there has been a growing trend of reforms that have tested this right. According to Freedom House,<sup>576</sup> Reporters without Borders,<sup>577</sup> and Human Rights Watch<sup>578</sup> the UAE has significantly enhanced its surveillance capabilities in contrast to the 1971 constitution. As a society structured around Islamic sharia law, 'officials claim that their sole desire is to censor socially inappropriate material, primarily pornography, although there is some evidence that political sites are also blocked'.<sup>579</sup>

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<sup>574</sup> 'UAE President Issues Federal Laws', *WAM*, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395298018406>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>575</sup> 'Mohammed bin Rashid Issues Decision Organising Media Content', *UAE, The Cabinet*, available online, <https://www.uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/mohammed-bin-rashid-issues-decision-organizing-media-content>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>576</sup> *United Arab Emirates*, Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2016

<sup>577</sup> Ranking 2017, *Reporters Without Borders*, available online, <https://rsf.org/en/ranking>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>578</sup> 'UAE: Authorities Enhance Surveillance of Critics', *Human Rights Watch*, 12<sup>th</sup> January 2017, available online, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/uae-authorities-enhance-surveillance-critics>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>579</sup> Kalathil & TC Boas, *Open Network Closed Regimes, The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*, p.109

The growing power, and vagueness, of surveillance legislation within the UAE suggests that the Emirati authorities are emphasising the targeting of political dissidents and not just socially inappropriate material; 'far from being made obsolete by the internet, authoritarian regimes are now actively shaping cyberspace to their own strategic advantage'.<sup>580</sup> This observation is clarified by the five most stringent surveillance laws in the UAE, as follows:

Federal Law No.15 of 1980. Prohibits the publishing of criticism directed at the President or the rulers of the UAE, and further limits the broadcasting of sentiment which could offend mainstream social sensibilities.<sup>581</sup> The vague parameters to Federal Law No.15 of 1980 ensure a prominent foundation for a wide scope of judicial powers.

Federal Law No.5 of 2012. Focuses on cybercrime targeting security, financial, and individual privacy issues and abuses. The cybercrime law has made significant headlines as its religious and social grounding has influenced stringent defamation laws. Notable examples of the severity of the cybercrime law were the cases of an Indian national imprisoned for filming and uploading to YouTube a video<sup>582</sup> of a UAE government employee assaulting a driver after a

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<sup>580</sup> R Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege', p.64

<sup>581</sup> D Bardsley, 'The 1980 UAE Press and Publications Law', *The National*, 17<sup>th</sup> January 2015, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/the-1980-uae-press-and-publications-law-1.107607>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>582</sup> DesertFoxDubai1, *UAE Dubai Official Beating Indian Driver*, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2013, available online, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JseN0wyClkg>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

driving altercation,<sup>583</sup> and the arrest of an American citizen who had criticised his UAE employer on Facebook.<sup>584</sup> In the former case, the crime the Emirati committed (assault) held a maximum sentence of a year in jail and a AED DH100,000 fine, while the Indian national who uploaded the video to social media (filming without permission or deformation) faced a maximum sentence of two years in jail or a fine of up to AED DH20,000.<sup>585</sup> Federal Law No.5 of 2012 increases the judiciary capabilities in combatting online offences and illustrates how within a year of the Arab Spring the UAE had already reacted to the potential from online threats through stringent legislation.

Federal Law No.3 of 2012 established NESAs. It illustrates how in such a short period after the Arab Spring, the UAE reacted by establishing its own signals intelligence (SIGINT) focused entity. While there is not a great deal of information pertaining to NESAs, through Federal Law

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<sup>583</sup> H Strange, 'Videomaker Arrested After Filming UAE Official Beating Driver', *The Telegraph*, 18<sup>th</sup> July 2013, available online, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/dubai/10188514/Videomaker-arrested-after-filming-UAE-official-beating-driver.html>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>584</sup> AP, 'American Arrested in UAE After Criticising Employer on Facebook', *The Telegraph*, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2015, available online, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/unitedarabemirates/11453658/American-arrested-in-UAE-after-criticising-employer-on-Facebook.html>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>585</sup> A clear example of what Larry Diamond called *Liberation Technology* and Mann defined as *Sousveillance*.

L Diamond, 'Liberation Technology'

S Mann, J Nolan, and B Wellman, 'Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments'

No.3 and a few publicly available presentations,<sup>586</sup> which heavily focus on the initial period of cybersecurity policy creation, the UAE's cybersecurity and intelligence capabilities have been significantly enhanced. It is also telling that NESAs were created in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, and further signifies how the state's security capabilities were being upgraded to counter potential threats.

Federal Law No.7 of 2014. Illustrates the vast parameters of what is deemed terrorism within the UAE. It is clear from Articles 1, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, and 34<sup>587</sup> that the counter-terrorism law of 2014 is aimed at more than just conventional terrorist threats. Federal Law No.7 of 2014 does also illustrate the state's perception of authority hierarchy, placing the serving political elites on par with the state's institutions.<sup>588</sup> This suggests that state and national security are comparative interests to the UAE and are yet subordinate to regime security. With the development of surveillance legislation increasing in the post-Arab Spring era, the reemphasis of the UAE's power structure in favour of the regime assists this thesis postulation that surveillance has been a fundamental issue for the UAE's evolving regime security strategy.

The Council of Ministers Decree No.23 of 2017 significantly increased restrictions upon the media sector and ensures that published digital media within the UAE are registered with the

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<sup>586</sup> P MacGloin & M al Jneibi, 'The Components of National and International Cyberspace Governance', *RSA Conference 2015*, Abu Dhabi, 4-5 November 2015

<sup>587</sup> Article texts are in Appendix 10 Text of Articles Pertinent to Political Targeting Federal Law No.7 of 2014 – Combatting Terrorism Offences

<sup>588</sup> Article 1,9,10,11,14,15, and 34 of Federal Law No.7 of 2014

NMC, and a content review is exercised prior to publishing.<sup>589</sup> While ‘the new regulations do not bring about much tangible change to the regulatory landscape... The key takeaway is that digital media is now very much in scope’.<sup>590</sup> If indeed, decree No.23 of 2017 updates earlier media laws to incorporate digital media, it is unlikely that an effective censorship review programme can be established to monitor, prior to publication, the wide array of online media sources. Although previous laws had supported the notion that the UAE was understanding how best to construct legal frameworks for an effective surveillance programme, the incorporation of electronic media platforms under the NMC’s content review, highlights how some challenges are still being met through deterrence.

Figure 7 *Timeline of UAE Surveillance Legislation* shows the timeline of implemented surveillance legislation and the moving average (dotted), both of which illustrate the recent and significant increase in surveillance legislation. The increased pace to which the UAE has implemented legislation that enhances the state’s surveillance capabilities is testament to the increased power of the state, its understanding of technological capabilities, and a heightened awareness of vulnerabilities across society. While the implementation of

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<sup>589</sup> Censorship is a highly utilised tactic within MENA, with Mellor accurately explaining the legislator environment; ‘if Egyptians want to know about Egypt, they are better watching al-Jazeera, while a Qatari is better served by reading Arab newspapers from outside Qatar to keep informed of what is happening inside Qatar’. N Mellor, *The Making of Arab News*, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2005, p. 145, in E Murphy, ‘Theorizing ICTs in the Arab World: Informational Capitalism and the Public Sphere’, p.1140

<sup>590</sup> ‘Digital Media Now Firmly Within the UAE’s Regulatory Scope’, *Baker McKenzie*, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017, available online, <https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/10/digital-media-uae-regulatory-scope/>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

legislation has increased significantly from 2003, the post-Arab Spring period has witnessed a monumental surge in surveillance regulations; every year since the Arab Spring the UAE has introduced legislation that enhances the state’s surveillance capability. This suggests that domestic surveillance has formed a critical component in the state’s response to the Arab Spring and is resultantly a key pillar of the UAE’s post-Arab Spring regime security strategy.




Figure 7 Timeline of UAE Surveillance Legislation<sup>591</sup>

## Technological development

As one of the richest countries in the world, the UAE has been heavily exposed to the speed of technological development. The state’s citizens and residents have benefitted from this

<sup>591</sup>Table 4 UAE’s Surveillance Legislation

ecosystem of innovation and are rewarded through unparalleled access<sup>592</sup> to new forms of information and communication. From the state's point of view, it has also infinitely multiplied the array of sensors and mediums by which it can solicit information, exercise control, and direct behaviour. David Lyon postulates that there are three main forms of data sources within the field of surveillance: directed, 'where a human operator obtains the data'; automated, where 'the data are gathered without a human operator intervening'; and volunteered data, that is 'in a weak sense "volunteered" by the user who gives out information'.<sup>593</sup> These three data sources align with Gary Marx's conception of new surveillance, which is defined as 'the use of technical means to extract or create personal data',<sup>594</sup> to illustrate how widely distributed modern sources of information have become.

There are two main concerns when assessing the impact of technological development upon contemporary surveillance capabilities. Firstly, how does a state best manage the increased sources of information; secondly, how have technological developments impacted social and power dynamics within society.<sup>595</sup>

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<sup>592</sup> Both literally through empowering legislation, and figuratively through fiscal health.

<sup>593</sup> in D Lyon, 'Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique', p.5

<sup>594</sup> GT Marx, 'What's new about the "new surveillance"? Classifying for change and continuity', in SP Hier and J Greenberg (eds.), *The Surveillance Studies Reader*, Open University Press, Maidenhead, 2007, p.85

<sup>595</sup> Ibid, p.5

Whenever there has been an advance within a technological domain, there has always been a subsequent degree of control applied to ensure the technology is appropriately managed.<sup>596</sup>

What is unique today however is the anarchistic realm within which information is owned, stored, and accessed;<sup>597</sup> the state is no longer the principal proprietor of information. While the state attempts to monopolise ownership of information,<sup>598</sup> and maintain maximal observation of this information, technological developments have inevitably advanced the state's surveillance capabilities.

New surveillance is defined by its low visibility, cost-effective mechanism, remote and often automated extraction, array of mediums surveyed and cross referenced, and the volunteered nature to which the vast array of information is now accessible.<sup>599</sup> This means that larger data

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<sup>596</sup> The appropriate use of a technology is by nature a contextual perspective. Evgeny Morozov explores the management of the internet to explore both national-level and socio-political controls. E Morozov, 'Whither Internet Control?', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.22, No.2, April 2011, pp.62-74

<sup>597</sup> Rob Joyce, the head of the US National Security Agency's (NSA's) Tailored Access operations (TAOs) gave a public presentation where he discussed cyberspace vulnerabilities, making particular reference to 3<sup>rd</sup> party weaknesses and subsequently exploits. USENIX Enigma Conference, 'USENIX Enigma 2016 - NSA TAO Chief on Disrupting Nation State Hackers', filmed 27<sup>th</sup> January 2016, YouTube Video, 34:55, Posted 28<sup>th</sup> January 2016

<sup>598</sup> Prominent example being the restriction of technological platforms that deny the state arbitrary observation and control. 2010 dispute between the UAE and Blackberry over the basing of servers illustrates this point. A Hammond, 'UAE Says Blackberry Dispute Resolved Before Deadline', *Reuters*, 8<sup>th</sup> October 2010, available online, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackberry-emirates/uae-says-blackberry-dispute-resolved-before-deadline-idUSTRE6970S320101008>, date accessed, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>599</sup> SP Hier & J Greenberg, 'Editors' Introduction: Contemporary Surveillance Studies', pp.87-88

sets can now be collected, evaluated, and disseminated within a shorter time frame, and often with a higher degree of accuracy.<sup>600</sup>

Due to the high degree of sensitivity and the wide scope of innovative surveillance capabilities, it is inherently difficult to illustrate the UAE's capabilities in this respect. Details of even the simplest surveillance capabilities are registered as state defence secrets as per

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<sup>600</sup> This process is often referred to as big data.

articles 159,<sup>601</sup> 160,<sup>602</sup> and 170<sup>603</sup> of Federal Law No.3/1987 - The UAE Penal Code.<sup>604</sup>

Furthermore, in December 2018, article 170 of the penal code was significantly expanded to

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<sup>601</sup> 'Shall be sentenced to term imprisonment, every public servant, or a person commissioned with a public service, who discloses a secret entrusted to him concerning state defense. The penalty shall be life imprisonment if the crime is perpetrated during war time'

<sup>602</sup> 'Shall be sentenced to term imprisonment: 1. Whoever endeavours to obtain by any illicit means a state defense secret without the intention of delivering or disclosing it to a foreign country or to one serving its benefits. 2. Whoever propagates by any means a state defence secret. 3. Whoever devises or uses a communication means or information technology to attain, deliver or disseminate a state defense secrets (sic). The penalty shall be life imprisonment if the crime occurs during war time'

<sup>603</sup> 'The following shall be considered a state defense secret: 1. Military, Political, Economic, industrial, scientific and security information which are by nature known exclusively to persons having capacity thereto and the state interest requires that such information have to remain secret for others. 2. Correspondence, written instruments, documents, drawings, maps, designs, pictures, coordinates and other items, which disclosure shall reveal the information referred to in the preceding paragraph and for which the state interest requires that they be kept secret from others than those in charge of their preservation or use. 3. News and information concerning the armed forces, the ministry of interior, the security forces, and their formation, manoeuvres, equipment, supplies, staff and other items which may affect military affairs, war and secret plans, unless a written authorization has been given by the authority in charge of their publication and diffusion. 4. News and information relating to measures and procedures that are adopted to detect the crimes provided for in the present chapter and arrest the perpetrators; as well as news and information relating to the conduct of investigation and trial in case the competent investigation authority or the court prohibits their diffusion'

<sup>604</sup> Federal Law No.3, 1987, UAE Penal Code, Judicial Department, available online, <https://www.adjd.gov.ae/sites/Authoring/AR/ELibrary%20Books/E-Library/PDFs/Penal%20Code.pdf>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

broaden its definition of classified information.<sup>605</sup> Subsequently, specific UAE surveillance capabilities are principally concealed under the guise of state secrets, and any disclosure of information is predominantly exposed by third party vendors; i.e. beyond the control of Emirati authorities.

Only on occasion are details of such capabilities formally published within the UAE. Two such programs stand out as formally publicised surveillance programs: Dubai 2021 Smart City policy<sup>606</sup> and the Falcon Eye Surveillance system in Abu Dhabi.<sup>607</sup> In Dubai, the first phase of a city-wide physical surveillance system has been connected meaning that ‘thousands of CCTV cameras of various Dubai government agencies will now provide live feed to a central command centre’.<sup>608</sup> The centralised command centre will use an automated facial recognition system to monitor known suspects and could be potentially combined with biometric forms of identity to create a fully operational mass-surveillance capability.

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<sup>605</sup> S Salama, ‘UAE widens scope of penal code to fight corruption’, *Gulf News*, 5<sup>th</sup> December 2018, available online, <https://gulfnews.com/uae/uae-widens-scope-of-penal-code-to-fight-corruption-1.60767814>, date accessed, 15<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>606</sup> The Smart Dubai framework is expected to be installed across the nation following its successful implementation in Dubai. <https://2021.smartdubai.ae>

<sup>607</sup> WAM, ‘Abu Dhabi Launches New Surveillance System’, *Emirates 24/7*, 13<sup>th</sup> July 2016, available online, <http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/abu-dhabi-launches-new-surveillance-system-2016-07-13-1.635659>, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>608</sup> A Al Shouk, ‘Dubai CCTV Cameras to use AI, Facial Recognition’, *Gulf News*, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/dubai-cctv-cameras-to-use-ai-face-recognition-1.2163726>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Likewise, the Falcon Eye system in Abu Dhabi centralises a citywide network of cameras to enable federal level security authorities to promptly respond to issues. Other instances can be found online to highlight domestic surveillance capabilities;<sup>609</sup> however, only reported cases and successful operations are communicated by local authorities. This therefore obstructs an accurate understanding of the current scope and development of technological surveillance capabilities.

While military purchases are often announced, as a requirement of international legislation and to symbolise the state's power, surveillance platforms are not yet subject to the same international trade laws. Furthermore, by nature, surveillance capabilities are more effective when unknown by the target audience; operational security (OPSEC) protocols cannot be tailored to circumvent specific surveillance platforms. This results in the limited ability to illustrate, with certainty, what platforms and systems have been purchased and installed to assist the UAE's evolving surveillance capabilities.

Nonetheless, there are four prominent examples of the surveillance capabilities currently utilised by the UAE authorities. The first is the series of efforts undertaken to observe an

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<sup>609</sup> A Ali, '13 Social Media Accounts Shut Down for Selling Drugs in UAE', *Gulf News*, 15<sup>th</sup> October 2017, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/crime/13-social-media-accounts-shut-down-for-selling-drugs-in-uae-1.2106100>, date accessed, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2018

Emirati human rights activist, Ahmed Mansour.<sup>610</sup> On three separate occasions, Mansour was a target of electronic hacking attempts. While they can only be alleged to have been conducted on behalf of the UAE authorities, through the illegal disclosure of corporate documents from the company<sup>611</sup> that reportedly executed the exploits,<sup>612</sup> and technical research undertaken by Toronto University research group, Citizens lab, there is significant evidence to suggest that the UAE had authorised the deployment of legal interception methods for national security purposes. The high level of capability<sup>613</sup> supposedly sanctioned by the UAE was illustrated through the execution of three previously unknown exploits (zero-days exploit),<sup>614</sup> and led Apple, whose product was targeted for lawful interception, to issue a global security update.<sup>615</sup>

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<sup>610</sup> B Marczak and J Scott-Railton, 'The Million Dollar Dissident', *The Citizen Lab*, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2016, available online, <https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>611</sup> <http://www.hackingteam.it>

<sup>612</sup> M Marquis-Boire and E Galperin, 'A Brief History of Governments Hacking Human Rights Organisations', *Amnesty International*, 11<sup>th</sup> January 2016, available online, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/01/brief-history-of-government-hacking-human-rights-organizations/>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>613</sup> An example of Ronald Deibert's third-generational control. R Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege', p.68

<sup>614</sup> B Marczak and J Scott-Railton, 'The Million Dollar Dissident', *The Citizen Lab*, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2016, available online, <https://citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>615</sup> D Tynan, 'Apple Issues Global iOS Update After Attempt To Use Spyware on Activist's iPhone', *The Guardian*, 25<sup>th</sup> August 2016, available online, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/25/apple-ios-update-arab-activists-iphone-spyware>, date accessed, 27<sup>th</sup> January 2018

While it is within NESAs legal mandate to conduct lawful interception, the outsourcing of intelligence capabilities to private organisations, highlighting the determination of the Emirati authorities to leverage modern technological mechanisms for national, state, and regime security concerns.<sup>616</sup> This is most clearly highlighted in the development of capabilities by firms such as Darkmatter, Beamtrail, and CyberPoint, and their role in targeting state targets.<sup>617</sup> This strategy also helps to mediate the small pool of naturalised citizens and provides a platform for professional and apolitical actors to engage in matters of security, thus further empowering the UAEs regime security strategy.

In three previous cases, the UAE temporarily blocked the instant messaging platforms provided by Research in Motion's (RIM) Blackberry platform,<sup>618</sup> WhatsApp,<sup>619</sup> and more

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<sup>616</sup> The targeted surveillance capability illustrated is defined by Ronald Deibert as the third-generation control. R Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege', p.68

<sup>617</sup> C Bing and J Schectman, 'Special Report – Inside the UAEs secret hacking team of US mercenaries', *Reuters*, 30<sup>th</sup> January 2019, available online, <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-spying-raven-specialreport/special-report-inside-the-uaes-secret-hacking-team-of-u-s-mercenaries-idUKKCN1PO1A6>, date accessed, 7<sup>th</sup> June 2019

<sup>618</sup> S Shuey, 'UAE Regulator to Suspend Blackberry Services From October 11', *Gulf News*, 1<sup>st</sup> August 2010, available online, <http://gulfnews.com/business/sectors/telecoms/uae-regulator-to-suspend-blackberry-services-from-october-11-1.662333>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>619</sup> MA Droubi, 'UAE Residents Welcome Unblocked Whatsapp Voice Calls', *The National*, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/uae-residents-welcome-unblocked-whatsapp-voice-calls-1.92973>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2018

recently Skype.<sup>620</sup> Firstly, in the immediate aftermath of emerging protests (Green Revolution of 2009) within Iran, a UAE-wide software upgrade for Blackberry mobile phones was deployed.<sup>621</sup> After the upgrade illustrated critically negative effects on those systems, it was discovered that the upgrade was in fact a spyware programme.<sup>622</sup> As the ongoing political disturbance in Iran was organised primarily by mobile technology and social media, the UAE's reaction of deploying mobile spyware worked as a pre-emptive attempt to increase observation of its population at a moment of heightened regional wide political sensitivity. This case acts as a precursor for the UAE's reaction to the Arab Spring.

While the UAE claims that it is a national security requirement to have the ability to monitor all forms of communication within the country,<sup>623</sup> more thorough infrastructural mechanisms

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<sup>620</sup> 'Skype Users in the UAE Urge Rethink of VoIP Policy', *The National*, 31<sup>st</sup> December 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/skype-users-in-the-uae-urge-rethink-of-voip-policy-1.691702>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>621</sup> B Thompson, 'UAE Blackberry Update was Spyware', *BBC*, 21<sup>st</sup> July 2009, available online, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8161190.stm>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2017

<sup>622</sup> Ibid

<sup>623</sup> 'The Authority shall enjoy, in urgent cases, and after consulting the National Security Advisor, the prerogative to monitor, penetrate, process, eliminate, jam, or block the communications network, the information systems, and the communications and email devices that belong to any person or entity that appears to the Authority as having participated in any act that may affect the State's security, doctrine, economy, heritage, civilization, public system, social peace, international and regional relations, or vital utilities altogether with the public and private parties working therein, or that may affect the life or funds of any person in the State, provided that the competent public prosecution is informed of the measure taken by the Authority in such cases within one week, so that it can conduct its affairs in respect of such measure'. Article 14, Federal Decree Law No.3, 2012

have been employed to maintain a persistent surveillance of the UAE population. The decision to block instant messaging platforms and voice over internet protocol (VoIP) platforms was intended to secure government access to servers in order to provide the means to intercept, what was previously inaccessible to the UAE authorities. Both Blackberry<sup>624</sup> and WhatsApp provided the UAE with the legal and technical means to intercept conversations over their platforms, however this episode showed the UAE's difficulty in balancing domestic security concerns and membership to international regulatory networks.<sup>625</sup> VoIP remains a highly contested issue within the UAE and in an attempt to reduce dissatisfaction with these restrictions, the UAE authorities have created their own VoIP programs; however, both users at each end of a conversation have to download the UAE created programmes in order for these to work.<sup>626</sup>

While the UAE has on occasion shown an aptitude for acquiring greater information oversight across society, the widely publicised attempts to control independent mediums of information have only resulted in short-term victories.

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<sup>624</sup> A Hammond, 'UAE Says Blackberry Dispute Resolved Before Deadline', *Reuters*, 8<sup>th</sup> October 2010, available online, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackberry-emirates/uae-says-blackberry-dispute-resolved-before-deadline-idUSTRE6970S320101008>, date accessed, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2018

<sup>625</sup> E Murphy, 'Agency and Space: The Political Impact of Information Technologies in the Gulf Arab States', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.27, No.6, 2006, p1064

<sup>626</sup> 'Media Statement on Etisalat Launch of Internet Calling Plans', *Etisalat*, 8<sup>th</sup> January 2018, available online, [https://www.etisalat.ae/en/about-us/media\\_center/press\\_releases/internet\\_calling\\_plans.jsp](https://www.etisalat.ae/en/about-us/media_center/press_releases/internet_calling_plans.jsp), date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

While the Emirati authorities wrestle with gaining access to currently utilised programs, new platforms emerge, further multiplying the efforts needed to maintain an authoritative role within society. Christian Fuchs positions this predicament within the Web 2.0 fixture explaining that ‘the users are producers of information, but this creative communicative activity enables the controllers of disciplinary power to close gain insights’.<sup>627</sup> The creation of Emirati owned communication platforms shows an understanding of the requirement to control the means of interaction and mirrors the state’s ownership of traditional media entities.<sup>628</sup> This shows that while the UAE has reacted to the potential threat potential of the ICT domain, it reacted with strength, understanding that it can in fact leverage this anarchic field for greater utilisation. The transition in Emirati surveillance strategy shows a maturity that has accepted the uncontrollable pace of technological development, and a willingness to alter the parameters of its control.

### **Engagement tactics**

Due to the broad nature of surveillance, its contemporary capabilities are vast. From the directed targeting of users<sup>629</sup> through to the mass and automated collection of information,<sup>630</sup> nearly every aspect of modern day society is encapsulated within some form of surveillance. As previously highlighted, this can either be viewed as a positive development through the

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<sup>627</sup> C Fuchs, ‘New Media, Web 2.0 and Surveillance’, p.140

<sup>628</sup> M Lynch, ‘How the Media Trashed The Transitions’, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.26, No.4, October 2015, pp.90-99

<sup>629</sup> R Deibert, ‘Cyberspace Under Siege’

<sup>630</sup> Z Bauman and D Lyon, *Liquid Surveillance*

enhanced means of access,<sup>631</sup> or negatively through the empowered means to which the state can control information and society.<sup>632</sup> This section will illustrate how the UAE has embraced the development of technology to boost its surveillance capabilities in the post-Arab Spring era.

Many scholars have discussed how globalisation and modernisation have disrupted the relationship between the state and its citizens. Tim O'Reilly's *Web 2.0*,<sup>633</sup> Jan Van Dijk's *Digital Democracy*,<sup>634</sup> and Emma Murphy's *ICT and the Gulf Arab States*<sup>635</sup> argue that technological advances have eroded the state's position in favour of its population. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt concur, and postulate that technological developments have not only increased sources of information but have drastically altered the relationships of power that result from the changing dynamics presented by technology. This is summarised in simplified terms by 'the shifting from one-to-many broadcast media (e.g. traditional radio and television) to many-to-many interactive media',<sup>636</sup> or as defined by Manuel Castells as mass self-communication.<sup>637</sup>

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<sup>631</sup> M Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope – Social Movements in the Internet Age*, Wiley, Chichester, 2012

<sup>632</sup> C Shirky, 'The Political Power of Social Media; Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change'

<sup>633</sup> T O'Reilly, 'What Is Web 2.0'

<sup>634</sup> J van Dijk, 'Digital Democracy: Vision and Reality'

<sup>635</sup> E Murphy, 'ICT and the Gulf Arab States: A Force for Democracy?'

<sup>636</sup> J Arquilla & D Ronfeldt, *The Emergence of Noopolitik*, p.7

<sup>637</sup> M Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope*

The changing power dynamic illustrated by the flow of information has the ability to erode the traditional tenants of power and authority that states such as the UAE rest upon. Foreseeing this issue, many countries have either pre-empted technological evolution where possible, or have utilised the same modern technologies for a traditional purpose. This has ensured the power of the state not being diluted by the advance of technology and suggests that 'subsequent assertions about the technology's political effects are usually made without consideration of the full national context in which the Internet operates in any given country'.<sup>638</sup> It will in fact be argued that the UAE is encouraging more online engagement in an attempt to control and manage a larger and more interconnected web of information that heightens its regime security strategy.

Underpinned by UAE Government Strategy 2011-2013,<sup>639</sup> UAE Vision 2021,<sup>640</sup> Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030,<sup>641</sup> and Dubai Strategic Plan 2021,<sup>642</sup> the UAE has fast become a leading supporter of eGovernment adoption.<sup>643</sup> Dating back to 2001, the UAE has been rapidly exploring and implementing avenues for enhanced online government solutions to ensure

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<sup>638</sup> S Kalathil & TC Boas, *Open Network Closed Regimes, The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*, p.2

<sup>639</sup> 'UAE Strategy 2011-2013', *UAE Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/uae-strategy-2011-2013>, date accessed 3<sup>rd</sup> February 2018

<sup>640</sup> <https://www.vision2021.ae/en>

<sup>641</sup> *The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030*, The Government of Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, November 2008

<sup>642</sup> <https://www.dubaiplan2021.ae/dubai-plan-2021/>

<sup>643</sup> 'eGovernment deals with facilitating the operation of government and the distribution of governmental information and services', AM Al-Khouri, 'eGovernment Strategies The Case of the United Arab Emirates', *European Journal of ePractice*, No.17, September 2016, p.127

the state's continuing ability to foster innovation, and economic and social growth. This means however that while the population has greater access to governmental services, the state experiences increased levels of exposure. This in turn can make the state vulnerable due to higher degrees of accountability on the one hand or on the other could 'increase citizen satisfaction and further solidify the political regime'.<sup>644</sup>

The state's self-imposed openness is felt within every aspect of its online presence. From Federal level utilities operators, through to official social media profiles of leading Emirati political elites, the UAE state apparatus has emerged online; albeit without a formal online presence for the head of state, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed.<sup>645</sup> Importantly, while a large portion of government services have migrated online, there is still a requirement for the physical review of documentation and requests by civil servants. On the official portal of Dubai eGovernment, the most advanced and open eGovernment structure within the UAE, there is a list of 504 government service items currently listed upon its website.<sup>646</sup> The listing of capabilities is split between Government department, service, and service classification, and

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<sup>644</sup> S Kalathil and TC Boas, *Open Networks, Closed Regimes*, p.110

<sup>645</sup> There is a clear appreciation for the potential vulnerability of sousveillance, as postulated by Steve Mann, Jason Nolan, and Barry Wellman. Sousveillance is the reflection of surveillance activities upon those deemed to be under observation. Due to the high exposure of information on politically relevant elites (PREs), now made possible through their own foray into modern technologies, they are now subject of surveillance by the global public. S Mann, J Nolan, and B Wellman, 'Sousveillance: Inventing and Using Wearable Computing Devices for Data Collection in Surveillance Environments'

<sup>646</sup> 'Dubai Government Service Directory', *Government of Dubai*, available online, <http://www.dubai.ae/en/ServiceDirectory/Pages/default.aspx>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

each item is further qualified by the documents required to process the request and if the application can be made online.

Sr.No	Department	Service	Classification Level 1	Classification Level 2
1	Dubai Municipality	Request of issuance/ renewal of Occupational Health Card	Public Health & Safety	Public Health and Safety Services - Individuals
2	Dubai Municipality	Request for Food Export/Food Health certificate	Public Health & Safety	Certification/Accreditation/Registration
3	Dubai Municipality	Request for Food Consignment Release permit.	Public Health & Safety	Permit/ NOC - Food Control
4	Dubai Municipality	Request for Testing of Structural and Construction Materials	Projects & Infrastructure	Laboratory Tests
5	Dubai Municipality	Request to approve Releasing of food consignment for Re-export Purpose	Public Health & Safety	Permit/ NOC - Food Control
6	Roads and Transport Authority	View and Pay Salik Violations	Roads Users	Salik
7	Dubai Police	Request to visit a detainee	Services permits	
8	Dubai Municipality	Request to Permit simple modifications/ additions to an existing building(s)	Projects & Infrastructure	Building and Construction Services
9	Dubai Municipality	Request to transfer food consignment from Dubai ports to other Emirates and vice versa	Public Health & Safety	Permit/ NOC - Food Control
10	Roads and Transport Authority	Request for NOC for Mobility with extra load - weight or dimensions	NOC and Permits	Right of Way
11	Dubai Municipality	Request of Fees owed for the Hotel facilities & restaurants	Legal/financial services	Financial Services
12	Dubai Municipality	Request for decoration permit	Urban Planning & Construction	Building Permits and Licenses
13	Dubai Municipality	Request for the gate level of the entrance to the building	Urban Planning & Construction	Building Permits and Licenses
14	Dubai Municipality	Request to approve food Items Destruction	Public Health & Safety	Permit/ NOC - Food Control
15	Dubai Municipality	Request for Calibration of Laboratory equipment and instruments	Accreditation & Certification	Laboratory Tests and Calibration Services
16	Dubai Municipality	Request to get a copy of approved engineering drawings	Urban Planning & Construction	Building Permits and Licenses
17	Dubai Municipality	Request for planning permits	Urban Planning & Construction	Services/ Planning Permits
18	Dubai Municipality	Request for Building permit application cancellation	Urban Planning & Construction	Building Permits and Licenses

Figure 8 Government Service Directory<sup>647</sup>

<sup>647</sup> 'Service Details', Dubai eGovernment, available online,

<http://www.dubai.ae/en/ServiceDirectory/Pages/ServiceDetails.aspx?ServiceID=1135&Identity=17134560>,

date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

**Service Description**

This service enables the customer to obtain or renew occupational health cards, where this service is mandatory and eligible by all the workers in health institutions and relevant public health; such as restaurants, hotels, factories, nurseries, barber shops and others and personnel working in hazardous occupations. This service is provided by Public Health services Department. Note: 1. The card should be issued within 30 days after arriving to the country or after issuing the resident visa) 2. Card is valid for one year only. 3. Annual renewal of card should be within 30 days from the expiry date. 4. Card could be received from 12:00 to 2:00 during the working hours 5. Fines will be imposed in case of issuance/renewal/complete the medical tests delays.

**Service Requirements**

1. Copy of passport
2. Recent photo
3. Copy of entry visa/ residence
4. Old occupational health card (In case of renewal)
5. Payment Voucher
6. Payment receipt

**Service Fees**

1. Issuance/ renewal of Occupational Health Card: 100.0 AED
2. Fines for delay in applying for the issuance / renewal/OH card having medical examinations in the specified date: 300.0 AED
3. Issuance of card replacement during 3 months from the card issuance date: 20.0 AED
4. Issuing a replacement of the OH card receipt: 50.0 AED

**This service is provided by**

Online  
Traditional Offline

**Channels :**

Web - [Click Here](#)

Over the counter -

mPhone Hybrid - 20

mTablet Hybrid - 20

Mobile Specific Website - <https://portal.dm.gov.ae/SCWebUI/DataDetails.aspx?servicecode=3163>

**Service Center**

Customer Care Email: [smmulla@dm.gov.ae](mailto:smmulla@dm.gov.ae)

Customer Care Phone: 800900

Customer Care Fax: 04-7033645

Customer Care Working Hours: 7:30am - 2:30pm

Figure 9 Service Details<sup>648</sup>

When the services offered by Dubai eGovernment are compared to other public-sector entities, it is clear that only issues which are perceived to be non-critical and commercially-focused are available for online processing. For instance, and by comparison, the UAE MOI currently offers 15 online services which are listed within its crime security database. Clay Shirky suggests that the observation of the UAE's online focus of economic matters is to preempt social dissatisfaction.<sup>649</sup> This thesis however postulates that the UAE's reluctance to

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<sup>648</sup> *ibid*

<sup>649</sup> 'a public sphere is more likely to emerge in a society as a result of people's dissatisfaction with matters of economics or day-to-day governance than from their embrace of abstract political ideas', C Shriky, 'The Political Power of Social Media', p.35

dilute governance over security related issues is more inclined to the UAE's micro-managed and stringent approach to regime security.

While there are many e-services offered across the array of online UAE government portals most are handled in Arabic and English, with occasional departments further offering the capability to submit documentation in other commonly spoken languages in the UAE. Government departments that handle predominantly domestic Emirati issues, however, are only published in Arabic.<sup>650</sup> This supports the argument that many of the government transformation plans that have been published by the GCC states (e.g. UAE Vision 2021) are primarily for foreign, not domestic audiences.<sup>651</sup> Domestic audiences and constituents remain serviced by the state in informal and traditional mechanisms so as not to dilute the authority and legitimacy of the regime.

To further highlight distinction between policies taken to target domestic and foreign audiences will be the comparison of parallel governance strategies taken by the Emirates of Dubai and Abu Dhabi. In the Emirate of Dubai (which is inhabited by a large majority of foreign residents), a fusion of a traditional form of governance has transitioned online through the

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<sup>650</sup> Federal National Council, available online, <https://www.almajles.gov.ae/Pages/FNCHome.aspx> , date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>651</sup> K Ulrichsen, *The Politics of Economic Reform in Arab Gulf States*

Hisham Sharabi's neopatriarchy augments the execution of culturally distinct strategies as the traditional and cultural nuances within Emirati society distinguish them from their foreign counterparts. H Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society*

Mohammed bin Rashid Smart Majlis.<sup>652</sup> Meanwhile in Abu Dhabi, the traditional tribal heartland of the state's power, the Crown Prince Court (CPC) has sponsored the deployment and engagement of physical majlis's across Abu Dhabi in a bid to foster and sponsor Emirati community engagement akin to that of a pre-modern UAE.<sup>653</sup> The CPC also regularly hosts high level lectures whereby leading political figures and subject matter experts discuss topics to an audience of politically relevant elites.<sup>654</sup> The distinction in engagement tactics between the characteristically different and socially contrasting cities of Abu Dhabi and Dubai highlights how superficial the UAE's eGovernment strategy is and emphasises how the process of modernisation in the country is restricted to non-critical areas of governance.

The development of online government capabilities has significantly increased the volume of information immediately accessible to it. Previously, personally identifiable information (PII) was handled by the data holders of each item, and not fused with other sources due to limitations within the wider state apparatus. At present, nonetheless, due to the encouragement of eGovernment services, and the management by the state in this manner, there are infinitely more opportunities for the state to handle and analyse society.

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<sup>652</sup> <https://www.mbrmajlis.ae/en#home>

<sup>653</sup> The emphasis on informal and interpersonal ties is both a form of empowerment for the traditional form of legitimacy that the Abu Dhabi leadership rests upon and the suggestion that 'historical experiences have led Arabs to place far greater trust in information which is transmitted informally'. M Fandy, 'Information Technology, Trust and Social Change in the Arab World', *Middle East Journal*, Vol.54, No.3, 2000, pp.378-394, in E Murphy, 'Agency and Space: The Political Impact of Information Technologies in the Gulf Arab States', p.1068

<sup>654</sup> 'Majlis Mohammed bin Zayed', *Crown Prince Court*, available online, <https://www.cpc.gov.ae/en-us/thecrownprince/Majlis/Pages/default.aspx>, date accessed, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2018

Fusing the UAE's eGovernment strategy with its surveillance capabilities is the advanced identification system that designates ownership of information to a user. Underpinning this system of control is the Emirates ID project. Initiated in 2004 under Federal Law No.2 of 2004,<sup>655</sup> and later updated by Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2017,<sup>656</sup> Emirates ID is a federal identification card which stores biometric and personal data. Every resident of the UAE is required by law to own such a card and attributes every public service and request to this form of identification. When the biometric attributes are combined with other PII such as passport, resident visa, bank details, telephone numbers, information requests, or complaints, the state can effectively observe, manage, and direct the resident's life remotely.

A prominent example of the potential power wielded by the centralised identity management system is the legal requirement to connect this form of identification to the residents' mobile number(s) (all of which are handled by a majority of state-owned entities). This unifying initiative was launched through the TRA's 'My Number, My Identity' program on the 12<sup>th</sup> June 2012.<sup>657</sup> The campaign was shadowed by the establishment of the UAE's SIGINT establishment NESAs, only three months later, and illustrates how the 'My Number, My

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<sup>655</sup> 'Laws and Legislation', *Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship*, available online, <https://www.id.gov.ae/en/emirates-id/laws-and-legislation.aspx>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>656</sup> *ibid*

<sup>657</sup> N Hanif, 'Every Mobile Phone User in the UAE Must Re-Register SIM Card', *The National*, 28<sup>th</sup> June 2012, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/every-mobile-phone-user-in-the-uae-must-re-register-sim-card-1.396199>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Identity' operation was evidently a crucial requirement in ensuring the legal mass collection of personal data.

The fusion of biometric data to a mobile number is a very powerful data source, as the PII attributes all activities undertaken by that device to an individual, their location, and wider pattern of life. This means that every mobile phone subscriber can, at a minimum,<sup>658</sup> be located at any given time. The process of information collection and attribution designation was later expanded beyond mobile phones to ISPs.<sup>659</sup> The result is a persistent watch of the UAE's residents, and the enhanced ability to observe every aspect of their pattern of life.

While the 'My number, My identity' campaign is a retrospective and live surveillance capability, the UAE also has a preventive online surveillance proficiency. As earlier shown, the internet is heavily controlled within the UAE. Its access, legal enforcement, and information propagation is well documented and aligns with Elliot Cohen's postulation of a 4-step strategy for effective state control of the internet; corporatize, sanitize/propagandize, militarize, and globalize.<sup>660</sup> The UAE employs a blocking mechanism to restrict access to deemed

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<sup>658</sup> Spyware and other legal interception programs can further remotely activate the microphone and camera on smartphone, as well as access electronic data stored on the device and through 3<sup>rd</sup> party providers, and thus offer audio, video, and text intelligence at the state's request.

<sup>659</sup> C Malek, 'UAE Ministry to Link ID Cards With the Internet to Crack Down on Child Abusers', *The National*, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2014, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/technology/uae-ministry-to-link-id-cards-with-the-internet-to-crack-down-on-child-abusers-1.340210>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>660</sup> ED Cohen, *Mass Surveillance and State Control: The Total Information Awareness Project*, Palgrave, New York, 2010, p.84

inappropriate websites; predominantly pornography but also politically sensitive issues. Online activists, anonymous, ‘published a list of 24,000 URLs and keywords blocked in the country’.<sup>661</sup>



Figure 10 UAE Blocked Website Image, February 2018

In pursuit of the UAE’s attempt to effectively control the internet within its borders the UAE restricts websites and provides an official source of information and mechanism to broadcast this online. State broadcasts have been forced to transition onto digital formats for fear of losing the position of authority.<sup>662</sup> Should a foreign entity disseminate unfavourable stories

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<sup>661</sup> M Croucher, ‘Hackers List “sites banned by Emirates”’, *The National*, 6<sup>th</sup> July 2012, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/hackers-list-sites-banned-by-emirates-1.603227>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January

2018

<sup>662</sup> <http://wam.ae/ar>

and information, it is the responsibility of the governing authority to present what it perceives to be the truth.

The UAE has developed a sophisticated strategic communications capability, by which it has unified an extended its online presence through media institutions and social media profiles of government figures, to ensure the continuing domination of narratives. Through combined information campaigns, the UAE is effectively combatting narratives deemed false or contrary to that of the UAE regime. This capability is especially evident in the UAE's 2017-2018 confrontation with Qatar, as state-owned media outlets, those operating within the UAE, and UAE public figures maintain discourse cohesion in opposition to the neighbouring state. The UAE has furthermore blocked access to Qatari owned media outlets within the UAE and outlawed the online display of support for Qatar.<sup>663</sup> Marc Jones supports this argument by showing how online bots have been deployed to bolster the social media discourse against Qatar, with the hashtag, #AlJazeeraInsultsKingSalman, one example of a reported campaign to spread condemnation against Qatar.<sup>664</sup>

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<sup>663</sup> T AlSubaihi, 'Supporting Qatar on Social Media a Cybercrime, says UAE Attorney General', *The National*, 7<sup>th</sup> June 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/supporting-qatar-on-social-media-a-cybercrime-says-uae-attorney-general-1.31515>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>664</sup> M Jones, 'Hacking, bots and information wars in the Qatar spat', *Monkey Cage, Washington Post*, 7<sup>th</sup> June 2017, available online, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/07/hacking-bots-and-information-wars-in-the-qatar-spat/>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> February 2018

The UAE has demonstrated a clear understanding of how technological development has enhanced the state's surveillance capabilities. In addition to the upgraded offensive surveillance capabilities, the UAE has maximised its passive over watch mechanisms, and has resultantly created a larger intelligence database with which to leverage.

Viewing the online domain as another sector within which it can, and should dominate, the UAE regime has sought to expand its traditional domain of control over a sector that has the intrinsic capability to be easily beyond the state's reach. The increased information requests demanded upon citizens has accelerated the state's observation of society and has been legitimised through the veil of government modernisation.

## **Conclusion**

It is clear that, in response to the Arab Spring, the UAE has enhanced its surveillance capabilities. Due to technological developments, and the previous lack of deployment, much of these advances have been within the virtual domain. Legitimised through a proactive eGovernment programme, the UAE state apparatus has been able to collect vast streams of private and public data and collate this alongside a network of information provided by state-owned institutions and the wider commercial sector. This has amplified the state's surveillance capabilities as its domination of information and narrative has provided the means for the state to leverage more control over society.

The shift in state surveillance capabilities emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, notably through the creation of NESAs. NESAs empower the rapid mass surveillance capability of UAE society, and is directed by a concentric leadership team that has intimate

ties to MBZ. Assisting NESA's surveillance capability are the UAE's structural and legal foundation which further define and solidify the parameters to which the UAE's surveillance capabilities can effectively monitor. The UAE's process of understanding cyber threats has evolved from failed attempts to control small domains through to the redefining of parameters that now provide the state with a platform for an effective observation of information and communications.

The propagation of information and the enforcement of an official state message has assisted the authoritative position of the regime as the crafter of this narrative. This favours the ability to enforce a will or produce a deterrence or punishment for whoever disagrees with the party line.<sup>665</sup> In many cases this form of information management reconstructs the truth and becomes an effective tool of manipulation; through the delivery of an effective message, national, state, and regime security, concerns have been fused for the benefit of the latter. As this restricts the behaviour of society, or provides the context to observe behaviour, the control of narration is just as important for the study of surveillance.

Weary of the effects that technology might have upon the UAE's societal dynamics, the Abu Dhabi regime has sought to limit the practical impact of technology upon the most sensitive aspects of the UAE state and society. This has created a two-tiered system, whereby issues relating to Emirati citizens remain firmly rooted in interpersonal and traditional relationships. This is to ensure the effective maintenance of the clientelist relationships that solidify the

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<sup>665</sup> E Noelle-Neumann, *The Spiral Silence: Public Opinion, Our Social Skin*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993

regime's rule, and the societal culture that provides legitimacy for the regime's authority. Technological platforms are being used to elicit support from the Emirati population and are often fused with cultural symbols and messages to maximise strategic messaging campaigns. Where innovation has more widely employed is generally restricted to areas of commercial and non-critical affairs; sectors which more openly involve the foreign population and resultantly are more naturally exposed to external stimuli.

Understanding the inherent dynamism within technological evolution, the UAE has tried to stay abreast of developments controlling the system of architecture through formal institutions and hierarchical personnel structures.<sup>666</sup> While these have so far proved sufficient at supporting the UAE's regime security strategy, their continuing adjustment to technological developments is crucial in their ability to enhance the UAE's regime security strategy.

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<sup>666</sup> S Heydemann, *Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World*

## Chapter 8 - Strategic Economic Management

The strategic management of the coercive apparatus provides the regime with an ability to enforce its power at will, but it is the primacy of power maintenance<sup>667</sup> that ensures the long-term survival of any political establishment. Christopher Davidson supports this postulation and applies it to the context of the UAE by claiming that 'of equal if not greater importance to Abu Dhabi's economy since the 1970s have been the channelling of surplus oil revenues into long term overseas investments'.<sup>668</sup> This chapter will therefore examine the extent to which the Abu Dhabi ruling family has exploited the UAE's economy to strengthen its regime security strategy.

In the wider context, the management of economic resources has increasingly been viewed as a security issue.<sup>669</sup> Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver explain this clearly by stating that 'unless a state is self-reliant in the resources required to feed its population and industry, it needs access to outside supplies. If that need is threatened, the national economy can be clearly

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<sup>667</sup> O Schlumberger, 'Structural Reform, Economic Order, and Development: Patrimonial Capitalism'

<sup>668</sup> C Davidson, *Abu Dhabi; Oil and Beyond*, p.73

<sup>669</sup> M Flournoy & R Fontaine, 'Economic Growth is a Security Issue', *The Wall Street Journal*, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2015, available online, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/economic-growth-is-a-national-security-issue-1432683397>, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2018

K Zukrowska, 'The Link Between Economics, Stability and Security in a Transforming Economy', *NATO Economic Colloquium*, 1999, pp.269-283

and legitimately securitized'.<sup>670</sup> Likewise, Matthew Gray observes 'the blurring of economic and military aspects of security'<sup>671</sup> and makes reference to Peter Moore<sup>672</sup> and Gregory Gause<sup>673</sup> who have also observed the hypothesis of a securitised economy in a GCC setting.

Within his hypothesis of institutional dimensions of modernity, Anthony Giddens claims that the economy is synonymous with capitalism,<sup>674</sup> defining the latter as 'the insulation of the economic from the political against the backdrop of competitive labour and product markets'.<sup>675</sup> While Anthony Giddens adheres to a clear, free market interpretation of the economy, Ian Bremmer reinterprets the role of the economy in the modern day through state led capitalism which is defined as 'a system in which the state dominates markets, primarily for political gain'.<sup>676</sup> When Ian Bremmer's hypothesis is coupled with observations of economically-induced societal stratification,<sup>677</sup> widespread corporatism within the Arab

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<sup>670</sup> B Buzan, O Wæver, and J de Wilde, *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*, p.105

<sup>671</sup> M Gray, *A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf*, p.13

<sup>672</sup> PW Moore, 'Late Development and Rents in the Arab World', pp.8-11

<sup>673</sup> G Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic Security and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*, 1994

<sup>674</sup> A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge, p.55-56

<sup>675</sup> Ibid, p.59

<sup>676</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market*, p.43

<sup>677</sup> TR Dye & JW Pickering, 'Governmental and Corporate Elites: Convergence and Differentiation', *The Journal of Politics*, Vol.36, No.4, November 1974, pp.900-925

World,<sup>678</sup> and the perceived connection between corporatism and authoritarian rule,<sup>679</sup> there is a clear relationship between the management of the economy and the manipulation of societal ties for political gain; a hypothesis that is Weberian in nature.<sup>680</sup> Oliver Schlumberger refers to this trend as patrimonial capitalism.<sup>681</sup>

While as a single entity the UAE clearly symbolizes the rentier state classification, the micro-dynamic distribution of rental commodity within the UAE reveals a more complicated perspective. This is because 92.2 billion barrels of the UAE's proven 97.2 billion barrels are

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<sup>678</sup> NH Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, IB Tauris, London, 1995

A Ehteshami and EC Murphy, 'Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.17, 1996, pp.753-772

<sup>679</sup> A Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis*

G O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, Studies in South American Politics*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1979

<sup>680</sup> 'On the one hand it is generally possible to go far toward attaining a monopoly of the management of productive enterprises in favour of the member of the class and their business interests. On the other hand, such a class tends to insure the security of its economic position by exercising influence on the economic policy of political bodies and other groups'. M Weber, *Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, p.426

<sup>681</sup> 'This economic order emerges in environments where political control over the economy is highly concentrated and where informal modes of interaction between state and business dominate over formal rules and laws.' O Schlumberger, 'Structural reform, economic order, and development: Patrimonial capitalism', pp.622-623

located within the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.<sup>682</sup> This concentration of natural and economic resources, in combination with the previously discussed RST provides a strong argument not only for the centralization of the UAE's power in Abu Dhabi, but also explains why this research focuses exclusively on the strategic management of the UAE by the Abu Dhabi ruling family.<sup>683</sup> Kristian Ulrichsen does note that while oil is concentrated in Abu Dhabi, this only accounted for 28.3% of the national UAE GDP in 2013.<sup>684</sup> This suggests that while oil has enabled the construction of the state in Abu Dhabi's image, there are now additional sources of revenue generation beyond the structural ownership of Abu Dhabi.

Implicit within the UAE's federal identity is Abu Dhabi's requirement to distribute funds generated from oil extraction to the other six Emirates. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that there is significant economic disparity between Abu Dhabi and the

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<sup>682</sup> 'The UAE and Global Oil Supply', UAE Embassy in Washington DC, available online, <http://www.uae-embassy.org/about-uae/energy/uae-and-global-oil-supply>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> January 2016

<sup>683</sup> An analysis of the UAE's political economy is extremely complicated due to the UAE's federal nature, unequal distribution of resources and subsequent generation of finances across the state's seven Emirates, as well as the high proportion of foreign population who has no relation to the state's resources. Christopher Davidson has approached this predicament by analysing Abu Dhabi and Dubai in separate volumes. As this thesis examines the UAE's regime security strategy, an Abu Dhabi focused approach will direct the analysis into the evolving political economy dynamics.

<sup>684</sup> "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2015 Article IV Consultation with United Arab Emirates", *IMF*, International Monetary Fund Press Release No. 15/370, August 4, 2015, in K Ulrichsen, *The United Arab Emirates; Power, Politics, and Policymaking*, p.87

other Emirates.<sup>685</sup> Comparative oil reserve figures may account for the skewed distribution of funds; it should be noted that by controlling the vehicle for revenue generation, the Abu Dhabi elite initiated a process whereby authority would become increasingly centralized.<sup>686</sup> Furthermore, the long-term economic control of the UAE's rental income has allowed Abu Dhabi to build and cement clientelist relationships. The result has witnessed state led economic diversification directed by an increasing number of SOEs resulting with PPPs with domestic and international partners, thus serving the dual benefit of revenue generation and co-optative maintenance.

The regime's central role in the development of the economy has empowered it to grow 'accordingly into an inflated, self-perpetuating and self-interested bureaucracy'.<sup>687</sup> The state and the regime can, and has, effectively structured human capital to complement its strategic objectives however, under healthy financial conditions the state's 'power is still fragile and

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<sup>685</sup> S Chubin, A Litwak and A Plascov, *Security in the Gulf*, The Adelphi Library 7, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Gower, Aldershot, 1982, .p22

<sup>686</sup>This is supported by literature that postulates a relationship between rentierism and authoritarian governance. See generally ML Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy', S Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, M Herb, 'No Representation Without Taxation? Rents, Development and Democracy', and E Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism In Comparative Perspective'

'Reshuffle allows MBZ to increase Abu Dhabi's interest in UAE Federal affairs', *Gulf States Newsletter (JGSN)*, Vol. 40, Issue 1,010, 18<sup>th</sup> February 2016

<sup>687</sup> A Ehteshami and EC Murphy, 'Transformation of the Corporatist State in the Middle East', p.754

vulnerable to rapid social changes and economic crises'.<sup>688</sup> Eva Bellin concurs and highlights that 'the economic contraction suffered by the Middle East over the past twenty years was triggered by the decline in public investment that followed the fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s'.<sup>689</sup> The focus on the state as the driver of the economy and national growth aligns with the state-led capitalism model. As the directing force of economic development, the state's failure to provide sufficient jobs, growth, and social advancement contributed to the outbreak of the Arab Spring.<sup>690</sup>

Bassam Haddad merges analyses of the state's ownership of resources and the effect that this has on societal relations within MENA, by hypothesising that the clashes witnessed in the Arab Spring were a symptom of the friction between the traditional elites and the newly empowered economic elites.<sup>691</sup> In the GCC context, the relationship between traditional and economic elites<sup>692</sup> has directly contributed to the political tensions in Kuwait<sup>693</sup> and has also

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<sup>688</sup> Ibid, p.756

<sup>689</sup> E Bellin, *The Political-Economic Conundrum: The Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa*, Middle East Series, Carnegie Papers, No.53, November 2004, p. 4

<sup>690</sup> L Guazzone & D Pioppi (eds.), *The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East*

<sup>691</sup> B Haddad, 'Syria, the Arab uprisings, and the political economy of authoritarian resilience', *Interface: a journal for and about social movements*, Vol. 4, No.1, May 2012, p.122

<sup>692</sup> PW Moore and BF Salloukh, 'Struggles Under Authoritarianism: Regimes, States, and Professional Associations in the Arab World'

<sup>693</sup> SL Yom and G Gause, 'Resilient Royals: How Arab Monarchies Hang On'

provided a platform for extremist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to breed.<sup>694</sup> By contrast to Kuwait the ruling PREs of the UAE never relaxed their dominance of the private and commercial sectors. This ensured that it was never required to establish any power-sharing agreements or mechanisms of coordination with the commercial and economic sector.<sup>695</sup>

Concurrently, due to the reality of the UAE's oil and gas finite reserves, and their turbulent market prices, the UAE's PREs have encouraged economic diversification.<sup>696</sup> This has highlighted an impending challenge; by diversifying the economy away from natural resources, not only the number of participants in the generation of wealth increased, but also,

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<sup>694</sup> C Freer, *Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Gulf Monarchies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018

<sup>695</sup> S Hertog, *The Private Sector and Reform in the Gulf Cooperation Council*, Research Papers, LSE Kuwait Programme, London, 2013

For more on state-business relations; Evans hypothesised a 4-pronged framework for the analysis of the state's relationship with the business community; firstly, a requirement to understand the internal structure of the state; secondly, an assumption that the business community can be reshaped by state policies; thirdly, policies that renegotiate the state-business relations weaken the state's relationship with the commercial sector; fourthly, a growing requirement to institutionalise social groups to ensure easier reform implementation. P Evans, 'State Structures, Government-Business Relations, and Economic Transformation', in S Maxfield and BR Schneider (eds.), *Business and the State in Developing Countries*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1997, pp.66-67

<sup>696</sup> The Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, *The Government of Abu Dhabi*, Abu Dhabi, November 2008

Lessons have been learnt from the turbulence in global oil markets during the 1990's and have paved the way for subsequent development.

can potentially reduce the importance of traditional institutions on which the current power structure rests upon, weakening the position of the current PREs. Thus, it becomes equally important to diversify sources of revenue to not only strengthen revenue generation but also to maintain the state's disproportionate control of resources.

Through the combined aspects of authoritarian governance and tight economic control, there is a potential for the leadership to misinterpret their economic situation. Robert Wade<sup>697</sup> and Chalmers Johnson<sup>698</sup> analyse how economies often suffer as a result of the leadership's separation from society and the false reading they have of their circumstance.<sup>699</sup> It is therefore no coincidence that the GCC's most developed democracy is Kuwait,<sup>700</sup> since 'the private sector is well placed to play an organisational and financial role within the opposition'.<sup>701</sup> This example illustrates how communities that lay beyond the direct control

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<sup>697</sup> R Wade, *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990

<sup>698</sup> C Johnson, 'Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan', in FC Deyo (ed.), *The Political Economy of The New Asian Industrialism*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987

<sup>699</sup> B Haddad, *Business Networks in Syria; The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2012

<sup>700</sup> A Nosova, *The Merchant Elite and Parliamentary Politic in Kuwait: The Dynamics of Business Political Participation in a Rentier State*, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, London, 2016

<sup>701</sup> S Haggard and RR Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*, Princeton University Press, Princetown, 1995, p.30

of the state represent a significant threat; an analysis the UAE regime has certainly acknowledged.

While the relationship between the state and the business community is of significant interest and is widely discussed within political economy literature,<sup>702</sup> given the focus of this thesis on regime security, and not state or national security, there is a greater requirement to look at regime-focused and state led ventures rather than the micro-dynamics of the wider public-private sector relationship;<sup>703</sup> this is not to argue that the regime and state act unilaterally, but that their perception of interests is significantly different and thus warrants a separate analysis.

With an accurate understanding of state led economic investment and development, Ian Bremmer's state led capitalism model provides the adequate framework for this thesis' research concerns. The theory of State led capitalism emerged through the combination of failed neo-liberal reforms, high natural resource ownership, and the return to prominence of the big state. While Ian Bremmer's postulation is a new concept for many states, 'the governments of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia and other countries had begun building their own versions of state led capitalism long before the Western financial crisis sparked a global

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<sup>702</sup> M Valeri & S Hertog (eds.), *Business Politics in the Middle East*

B Geddes, 'Challenging the Conventional Wisdom', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.5, No.4, October 1994, pp.104-118

<sup>703</sup> This has a greater usage within the UAE's industrial sector where the private sector has a greater influence in matters, than in the state's economy.

recession'.<sup>704</sup> For the GCC, state led capitalism has been the optimal model of political economy, as it builds upon the rentier state theory to ensure the state's authoritative position within society. Through institutional giants such as those hypothesised by Ian Bremmer – namely national oil corporations (NOCs), state-owned enterprises (SOEs), privately owned champions (POCs), and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) - the state can continue to direct strategic initiatives that strengthen the fiscal health of the state's economy and provide the platform for human capital development.

The substantive political economy<sup>705</sup> hypothesis provides an additional layer of analysis for the study of the state's relationship with the business community, as it acknowledges the social structure to which the power dynamics are based upon.<sup>706</sup> Nonetheless, Ferran Brichs and Athina Limridi-Kemou contradict this by arguing that, in fact, while pre-rent dynamics are important, through the control of finances and the system that control them, the ruling authority can remanufacture state relations.<sup>707</sup> With this in mind, it is key to highlight that it

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<sup>704</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market, Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, p.46

<sup>705</sup> KA Chaudhry, 'Prices, Politics, Institutions: Oil Exporters in the International Economy', *Business Politics*, Vol.1, No.3, 1999, p.334, in, PW Moore, 'Rentier Fiscal Crisis and Regime Stability: Business-State Relations in the Gulf', *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol.37, No.1, Spring 2002, p.38

<sup>706</sup> 'to incorporate the pre-rent state-society dynamic into an analysis of post-rent political order and relationships' M Gray, *A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf*, p.12

<sup>707</sup> 'Once power is gained over income-generating resources, the relation established to citizens is no longer one of collection but of distribution, which enormously weakens the populations negotiation capacity, while strengthen the elites' power and authority [sic]'. FI Brichs and A Limpridi-Kemou, 'Sociology of Power in Today's Arab World', in FI Brichs (ed.), *Political Regimes in the Arab World: Society and the Exercise of Power*, .p26

is a combination of the historical and contemporary societal dynamics that provides an accurate basis for the understanding of the UAE's political economy.

Due to the ever-changing nature of economy there is a constant requirement to create and enforce reforms<sup>708</sup> that enhance efficiency and, in the case of an authoritarian state, ensure the state's dominant role.<sup>709</sup> Therefore, in order to understand how the economy has been manipulated to strengthen the UAE's regime security strategy, it is crucial to assess how and why reforms in this respect have been implemented.<sup>710</sup> Since the full array of subsequent changes cannot be foreseen, economic reforms also manifest a significant danger for an incumbent regime;<sup>711</sup> therefore, the state's central position as the owner and distributor of resources supports the focus upon the state.<sup>712</sup> As a consequence, the observation of the UAE as a rentier state combined with its monarchical system of governance, justifies this chapter's focus on the regime's security management.

This chapter will analyse how the UAE's economy has been managed to strengthen the post-Arab Spring regime security strategy through the model of state led capitalism and the

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<sup>708</sup> B Haddad, *Business Networks in Syria; The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience*

<sup>709</sup> S Heydemann, 'Networks of Privilege: Rethinking the Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East', in S Heydemann (ed.), *Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited*, Palgrave Macmillan, , Basingstoke, 2004

<sup>710</sup> HJ Barkey (ed.), *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East*, St Martin's Press, New York, 1992

<sup>711</sup> Huntington, SP, *Political Order in Changing Societies*

S Haggard & R Kaufman (ed.), *The Politics of Economic Adjustment*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995

<sup>712</sup> B Haddad, *Business Networks in Syria; The Political Economy of Authoritarian Resilience*

privileged economic network that combine to support the centralised management of the UAE economy. State led capitalism is defined through its ‘four primary actors: national oil corporations, state-owned enterprises, privately owned champions, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)’,<sup>713</sup> and the privileged economic network is defined as the ‘network of business and state actors who collaborate to manage access to economic benefits – disregarding their formal juridical separation into private and public actors’.<sup>714</sup> Ultimately, this chapter illustrates to what extent, since the Arab Spring, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has significantly enhanced the UAE’s regime security strategy through the effective manipulation of the state’s economy.

### **National Oil Corporations (NOCs)**

NOCs (and any other resource that empowers rentier culture) were established to leverage state-owned resources. As previously discussed, oil and gas revenues have contributed a sizeable amount to the UAE’s GDP.<sup>715</sup> Of the UAE’s oil proven reserves, 95% are located within the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. The Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah also leverage oil and gas reserves within their territory, however, due to their relatively marginal reserves, contribute to a considerably lesser degree to the local economy.<sup>716</sup> While article 23 of the UAE’s

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<sup>713</sup> I Bremmer, ‘State Capitalism Come of Age, The End of the Free Market?’, p.42

<sup>714</sup> S Heydemann, ‘Networks of Privilege: Rethinking the Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East’, in S Heydemann (ed.), *Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Revisited*, p.29

<sup>715</sup> From 60% in the 1980s down to between 34.3% and 20% in 2011-2016.

<sup>716</sup> ‘The Dubai Supreme Council of Energy (DSCE) oversees Dubai’s energy policy development and coordination...Sharjah, which is a minor producer of condensate and natural gas, established a national oil

constitution states that ‘the natural resources and wealth in each Emirate shall be considered the public property of that Emirate’,<sup>717</sup> it has become abundantly clear that the UAE’s federation would have not survived had Abu Dhabi not shared its oil wealth across the state’s 7 Emirates. Within this context, Abu Dhabi is the predominant focus of the NOC analysis.<sup>718</sup>

An analysis of the political economy of rentier states does by definition focus on the production and exploitation of that said resource. Michael Herb argues however that ‘oil is important — how could it not be in these states? (GCC) – but only as an intervening variable. Oil explains nothing about politics until we understand how it effects existing political institutions’.<sup>719</sup> Using Michael Herb’s observation this section analyses the regime’s management of oil and gas. The guardianship of Abu Dhabi’s natural resources is primarily handled by the SPC and is described by Davidson as ‘Abu Dhabi’s highest financial body’.<sup>720</sup> This is primarily attended to by the Abu Dhabi ruling family and their close kin. The 2018 structure of the SPC is as follows:

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company in 2010’. ‘Country Analysis Brief: United Arab Emirates’, *U.S. Energy Information Administration*, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2017, available online, [http://www.iberglobal.com/files/2017/emiratos\\_eia.pdf](http://www.iberglobal.com/files/2017/emiratos_eia.pdf), date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>717</sup> ‘Article 23’, *UAE Constitution*, 1971

<sup>718</sup> Christopher Davidson analyses with great depth the intra-Emirate politics surrounding the UAE’s oil reserves and states that the SPC ‘plays a major role in the policymaking process, as it approves all oil-related policies and development projects for the companies falling under the umbrella of the State-Owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company’. C Davidson, *The United Arab Emirates; A Study in Survival*, p.244

<sup>719</sup> M Herb, *All in the Family*, p.241

<sup>720</sup> C Davidson, *The United Arab Emirates; A Study in Survival*, p.102

Table 5 SPC Members as of March 2018<sup>721</sup>

<b>Title</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Tribe</b>
Chairman	Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas
Vice Chairman	Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas
Member & Vice Chairman of Abu Dhabi Executive Council	Sheikh Hazza bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas
Member & Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Presidential Affairs, and UAE Cabinet Member	Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas
Member & Managing Director of Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and Member of the Executive Council	Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas
Member & Director of Abu Dhabi Investment Authority	Sheikh Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas

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<sup>721</sup> 'Supreme Petroleum Council', ADNOC, available online, <https://www.adnoc.ae/en/about-us/supreme-petroleum-council>, date accessed, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018

(ADIA) and Member of the Executive Council		
Member & Chairman of the Department of Transport and Member of the Executive Council	Sheikh Dhiyab bin Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas
Member & Minister of Energy	Suhail Mohamed Faraj al Mazrouei	Bani Yas
Secretary-General	Hamad Mubarak al Shamsi	Al bu Shamis - Formerly of the Na'im
Member & ADNOC CEO	Dr. Sultan bin Ahmed al Jaber	Al Ali
Member & Secretary General of the Executive Council	Dr. Ahmed Mubarak al Mazrouei	Bani Yas
Member & CEO Mubadala	Khaldoun Khalifa al Mubarak	
Member & Chairman of the Department of Finance and Member of the Executive Council	Riyad Abdulrahman al Mubarak	

Member & Chairman of the Department of Energy and Member of the Executive Council	Eng. Awaidha Murshed al Marar	Marar - Section of the Bani Yas
Member	Eng. Abdullah Nasser al Suwaidi	Sudan - Section of the Bani Yas
Member	Suhail Fares Ghanem al Mazrui	Mazar - Section of the Bani Yas
Former Member <sup>722</sup>	Sultan bin Zayed al Nahyan	Bani Yas
Former Member	Hamad al Hurr al Suwaidi	Sudan - Section of the Bani Yas
Former Member	Mohammed Habroush al Suwaidi	Sudan - Section of the Bani Yas

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<sup>722</sup> WAM, 'Khalifa Restructure Supreme Petroleum Council', *Emirates 24/7*, 25<sup>th</sup> June 2011, available online, <https://www.emirates247.com/news/government/khalifa-restructures-supreme-petroleum-council-2011-06-25-1.404511>, date accessed, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Former Member & Secretary  General	Jawan Salem al Dhaheri	Dhaheri –  Section of the  Bani Ma'in <sup>723</sup>
Former Member	Khalifa Mohammed al Kindi	Sudan -  Section of the  Bani Yas

Of the sixteen members of the SPC, at least twelve are members of the Bani Yas tribal grouping: Both the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SPC have sons on the board of the SPC, and of the seven present descendants of Sheikh Zayed, four are also descendants of Sheikha Fatima. The strength of relationship between the ruling family members within the SPC indicates both the significance of the SPC to the ruling family, and who within the ruling family is of significant power. This is based upon the hypothesis that the Abu Dhabi ruling family is not a monolithic entity and that distinctive cliques can be identified through their members' affiliation.

Within the post-Arab Spring period the dominant Al Nahyan faction is the Bani Fatima. Their representation has been fortified within the SPC since the Arab Spring and is illustrated through amendments to its membership in 2011 and 2016. In June 2011 Khalifa bin Zayed appointed Abdullah Nasser al Suwaidi as Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) Director

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<sup>723</sup> Hendrik Van Der Muelen notes that the Bani Ma'in originate from Kish island and other surrounding territories in Iran. H Van Der Muelen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.365

General<sup>724</sup> and was listed among a council consisting of twelve people. Five years later, and two years after Sheikh Khalifa's stroke, there was another reshuffle with Hazza bin Zayed, Dhiab bin Mohammed bin Zayed and Dr. Sultan al Jaber, and Khaldoon al Mubarak appointed to the SPC.<sup>725</sup> Simultaneously, Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed, the second oldest son of Sheikh Zayed, Hamad al Hurr al Suwaidi, Mohammed Habroush al Suwaidi, and Khalifa Mohammed al Kindli were all relieved of their responsibilities from the SPC. It is noted by GSN that the 2016 appointments illustrate 'the dominance of Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ) and his Bani Fatima brothers'.<sup>726</sup> The increased concentration of power among the Bani Fatima within the SPC, after the Arab Spring demonstrates how important strategic control of the state's natural resources is for the regime.

Accordingly, while the regime keeps a tight control of the strategic management of the SPC, the principal organisation mandated to operate the production of natural resources within the UAE is the ADNOC. The Emirates of Dubai and Sharjah also have their own natural resources organisations but are incomparable to ADNOC's role within the UAE's political

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<sup>724</sup> Wam, 'President Khalifa Revamps Supreme Petroleum Council', *Khaleeji Times*, 27<sup>th</sup> June 2011, available online, <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/20110626/ARTICLE/306269986/1002>, date accessed, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>725</sup> A McAuley, 'UAE President Reshuffles Supreme Petroleum Council of Abu Dhabi', *The National*, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2016, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/uae-president-reshuffles-supreme-petroleum-council-of-abu-dhabi-1.159318>, date accessed, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>726</sup> 'SPC Changes Tighten MBZ Grip', *Gulf States Newsletter (GSN)*, Vol.40, Issue 1,012, 31<sup>st</sup> March 2016, p.7

economy and will subsequently not be analysed within this work.<sup>727</sup> ADNOC was founded in 1971, following the growth of revenue from oil extraction dating back to 1958.<sup>728</sup> Today, however, ADNOC is the 12<sup>th</sup> largest producer of oil in the world<sup>729</sup> and has onshore and offshore, oil and gas, exploration and drilling capabilities.

While oil wealth has provided the platform for the Emirate of Abu Dhabi to secure its leading role with the federation and the global stage, there has been a growing transition away from a sole focus on natural resource extraction. ADNOC has been at the forefront of this development, with changes to its leadership team and corporate strategy presenting valuable examples of the innovative policy.

Starting in 2013 and coinciding with the Abu Dhabi Company Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO) concession of 2014,<sup>730</sup> several technocrats and close associates of MBZ who were already working within the energy sector had started to rise within the UAE's political arena. The two prominent examples were Suhail bin Mohammed Faraj Fares al Mazrouei and Dr. Sultan bin

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<sup>727</sup> The Emirates National Oil Company (ENOC) is owned by the Government of Dubai while the Sharjah National Oil Company (SNOC) is owned by the Government of Sharjah.

<sup>728</sup> 'Our History', *Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)*, available online, <https://www.adnoc.ae/en/about-us/our-history>, date accessed, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>729</sup> 'Strategy 2030', *Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)*, available online, <https://www.adnoc.ae/en/strategy2030>, date accessed, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>730</sup> The expiration of the ADCO concession is significant as it marked the point to which negotiations for contract renewals were to take place. As the contract was later reduced from 65 to 40 years, changes to the leadership of ADNOC around this period illustrated the UAE's reimagined strategy to natural resources governance.

Ahmed al Jaber, who were appointed as Minister of Energy and Minister of State, respectively. Al Jaber was later, in February 2016 appointed as Director General of ADNOC.<sup>731</sup> Both al Mazrouei and al Jaber are alumni of ADNOC and the MBZ-led SWF Mubadala; 'Al-Mazrouei was Al-Jaber's number two at Mubadala'<sup>732</sup> which proves the strength of the relationship between the two leading figures within the UAE's energy structure. Furthermore, it is worth noting that contrary to the traditionally patriarchal policies across the GCC, both Mazrouei and al Jaber are relatively young for the responsibilities placed upon them.

While Suhail bin Mohammed al Mazrouei's rapid rise through ADNOC and Mubadala suggests a degree of technocratic weighting, Sultan al Jaber's rise illustrates the evolution of Emirati natural resource policy.<sup>733</sup> Al Jaber had led the UAE's engagement with renewable technology as he 'established Masdar, Abu Dhabi's pioneering renewable energy initiative, and served seven years as its CEO, guiding its global contribution to clean technology and sustainable

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<sup>731</sup> 'Khalifa Appoints Sultan al-Jaber as Director General of ADNOC', *WAM Emirates News Agency*, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2016, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395291637840>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Ulrichsen notes that ADNOC was traditionally an entity close to Sheikh Khalifa, and al Jaber's appointment exhibited another symptom of the power shift from Khalifa bin Zayed to Mohammed bin Zayed. K Ulrichsen, *The United Arab Emirates; Power, Politics, and Policymaking*, p.228

<sup>732</sup> 'UAE Reshuffle', *Gulf States Newsletter (GSN)*, Vol.40, Issue 1,010, 18<sup>th</sup> February 2016

<sup>733</sup> L Graves, 'Sultan al Jaber: New Man at ADNOC Helm Has the Right Energy Mix', *The National*, 16<sup>th</sup> February 2016, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/sultan-al-jaber-new-man-at-adnoc-helm-has-the-right-energy-mix-1.202477>, date accessed, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2018

development'.<sup>734</sup> His subsequent rise within ADNOC, and other public-sector institutions such as the NMC and the Abu Dhabi Ports Company (ADPC), illustrates how his evolutionary take on economic, industrial, and energy policy is supporting the UAE's projections for the future.<sup>735</sup>

Al Jaber's appointment as ADNOC CEO coincided with low oil prices (hovering around \$30 per barrel in February 2016)<sup>736</sup> and illustrated the new direction Abu Dhabi was going to take with regards to its energy policy. He has since commenced an efficiency strategy, titled ADNOC Integrated 2030 Strategy,<sup>737</sup> which has identified multiple mechanisms to decrease costs and increase profits,<sup>738</sup> and has also instructed the consolidation of multiple subsidiaries.<sup>739</sup> In

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<sup>734</sup> 'Masdar Board of Directors', *Masdar*, available online, <http://www.masdar.ae/en/masdar/detail/masdar-board-of-directors>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>735</sup> WAM, 'UAE's ADNOC Group to Continue its Transformation, says Al Jaber', *Zawya*, 3<sup>rd</sup> January 2017, available online, [https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/UAEs\\_ADNOC\\_Group\\_to\\_continue\\_its\\_transformation\\_says\\_Al\\_Jaber-WAM20170103123040071/](https://www.zawya.com/mena/en/story/UAEs_ADNOC_Group_to_continue_its_transformation_says_Al_Jaber-WAM20170103123040071/), date accessed, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2018

<sup>736</sup> M West, 'Just How Low Can Oil Prices Go and Who is Hit Hardest?', *BBC*, 18<sup>th</sup> January 2016, available online, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35245133>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>737</sup> '2030 Strategy', *ADNOC*, available online, <https://www.adnoc.ae/en/strategy2030>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>738</sup> D Munro, 'ADNOC's CEO Institutes Seismic Shift in Corporate Strategy', *Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington Blog*, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2016

<sup>739</sup> 'UAE Giant ADNOC to Consolidate Three Firms in Efficiency Drive', *Reuters*, 18<sup>th</sup> October 2016, available online, <https://www.reuters.com/article/emirates-adnoc-consolidation/uae-oil-giant-adnoc-to-consolidate-three-firms-in-efficiency-drive-idUSL8N1CO1WX?type=companyNews>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

addition, Al Jaber has overseen the restructuring of ADNOC's subsidiaries, replacing six chief executives with 'well-regarded internal technocrats to key positions of influence'.<sup>740</sup>

While there have been attempts to optimise oil and gas production within an era of contracted prices, the UAE has initiated a strategy that seeks to ensure the state's future livelihood. Through the appointment of technocratic personnel and empowered by long-term strategic plans, the Abu Dhabi ruling family is attempting to lay the foundations for a long-term and stable future that can survive after its oil reserves are finished. Charles Hankla and Daniel Kuthy explore this enduring vision by suggesting that 'truly stable authoritarian regimes tend to have individual leaders with very long time horizons (far beyond those of stable democratic leaders), providing them with stronger incentives to choose policies, like free trade, that may contribute to long-run economic growth'.<sup>741</sup> This observation is enhanced when the rentier state social contract is applied, as it is crucial for a leader within such a state to provide resources and thus ensure the continuation of procured legitimacy and authority.<sup>742</sup>

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<sup>740</sup> 'ADNOC Restructuring Continues Apace', *The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)*, 20<sup>th</sup> May 2016, available online, <http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1544237538>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>741</sup> CR Hankla and D Kuthy, 'Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.57, 2013, p.495

<sup>742</sup> U Abulof, "'Can't Buy Me Legitimacy": The Elusive Stability of Mideast Rentier Regimes', *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 2015, pp.1-25

In combination with its lean oil and gas production, the UAE is building the Middle East's first civilian nuclear power station<sup>743</sup> and the world's largest solar panel field.<sup>744</sup> While these programs will not provide the same financial benefits of their oil and gas counterparts, nor the same rentier state social contract, they demonstrate an understanding of the requirements necessary to support a future state. The UAE's oil and gas reserves will continue to provide a sizeable contribution to the state's GDP and government budgets, but as a finite resource that will deplete within the current leadership's lifetime, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has initiated the process, following the Arab Spring, to provide the foundation for a post-oil economy, and thus ensure their long-term longevity. It can be concluded that the enhancement of the state's NOCs is a clear pillar of the UAE's post-Arab Spring regime security strategy.

### **State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)**

SOEs are defined by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as 'any corporate entity recognised by national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership...enterprises that are under the control of the state, either by the state

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<sup>743</sup> Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Washington D.C., 'How The UAE is Pioneering Peaceful Civilian Nuclear Energy in the Middle East', *Smithsonian.com*, 3<sup>rd</sup> January 2018, available online, <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/sponsored/uae-pioneering-peaceful-nuclear-power-middle-east-180967322/>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>744</sup> L Graves, 'Construction Begins at Abu Dhabi's Largest Solar Panel Field', *The National*, 4<sup>th</sup> May 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/construction-begins-at-abu-dhabi-s-largest-solar-power-project-1.32040>, date accessed, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2018

being the ultimate beneficiary owner of the majority shares or otherwise exercising an equivalent degree of control'.<sup>745</sup> SOEs are prominent across the world as they have enabled planned economies to dictate and lead market share and development. SOEs also provide ample social benefits and support the development of infrastructure whilst also delivering, often subsidised services to the state's population.<sup>746</sup> As a result, SOEs tend to be judged through a matrix of their value to society and their delivery of financial returns.<sup>747</sup>

Due to the UAE's small population, and concentrated group of PREs, the UAE's SOEs are by nature vulnerable.<sup>748</sup> The delivery of service and capability is deemed as necessary as the requirement to generate funds is, and therefore illustrates why most SOEs have a large emphasis on professionalism, technocracy, and profit; i.e. they cannot simply haemorrhage funds. To achieve this, there is often a dual tier of management that directly correlates to

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<sup>745</sup> OECD, *OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises*, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2015 Edition, p.14

<sup>746</sup> Ibid, p.17

<sup>747</sup> PWC, *State-Owned Enterprises; Catalysts For Public Value Creation?*, April 2015, p.6

<sup>748</sup> SOEs are often criticised for their lack of transparency, inefficient management, and potentially negative burden on the state's economy. Hashem notes an observation of the IMF that 'about 92 per cent of Abu Dhabi's total debt maturing last year and this and beyond comes from its SOEs - Dubai's SOE debt accounts for about 60 per cent of its total. The two emirates represent 90 per cent of the UAE economy (Abu Dhabi 60 per cent and Dubai 30 per cent). If SOEs in both emirates do not do well, the whole economy will be in peril'. E Hashem, 'UAE State-Owned Concerns Must Show the State Forward', *The National*, 28<sup>th</sup> June 2013, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/uae-state-owned-concerns-must-show-the-way-forward-1.288245>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

national and foreign participation; board level members often dominated by Emiratis and the active management often dominated by foreign employees.<sup>749</sup> This is further clarified by the fact that the state does, in most cases, own the SOEs through one of its SWFs; a more condensed vehicle with which the regime has a greater degree of control. Table 6 shows the SOEs that are owned by the government of Abu Dhabi, and not owned or run exclusively by SWFs<sup>750</sup>.

*Table 6 SOEs in Abu Dhabi*<sup>751</sup>

<b>State Owned Enterprise</b> <sup>752</sup>	<b>Ownership vehicle</b>
Abu Dhabi Airports Company (ADAC)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>753</sup>
Abu Dhabi Health Services Company (SEHA)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>754</sup>

<sup>749</sup> OECD, *OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises*, p.18

<sup>750</sup> As the thesis and chapter focuses on the UAE regime security strategy and is thus focused on the direct role of the Abu Dhabi ruling family, this section will only focus on SOEs linked to the government of Abu Dhabi. For information on SOEs in other Emirates read S Hertog, 'Defying the Resource Curse, Explaining Successful State-Owned Enterprises in Rentier States', *World Politics*, Vol.62, No.2, April 2010, pp. 261-301

<sup>751</sup> The UAE refers to SOEs as Government Related Entities (GREs).

<sup>752</sup> Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority, *2015 Accountability Report*, Abu Dhabi, 2015

<sup>753</sup> 'Who we are', *Abu Dhabi Airports Company*, available online, <http://www.adac.ae/english/who-we-are/who-we-are/>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>754</sup> 'SEHA 2013 Annual Report, Delivering the Right Care for the Right Patient', *Abu Dhabi Health Services Company*, 2013

Abu Dhabi Media Company (ADMC)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>755</sup>
Abu Dhabi National Exhibitions Company (ADNEC)	Government of Abu Dhabi
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>756</sup>
Abu Dhabi Ports [Company] (ADPC)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>757</sup>
Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>758</sup>
Abu Dhabi Water & Electricity Authority (ADWEA)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>759</sup>
Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC)	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>760</sup>

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<sup>755</sup> 'Khalifa Establishes Abu Dhabi Media Company', *WAM*, 6<sup>th</sup> June 2007, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395227857102>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>756</sup> 'Our History', *Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)*, available online, <https://www.adnoc.ae/en/about-us/our-history>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>757</sup> 'General Directions', *Abu Dhabi Ports Company*, May 2011

<sup>758</sup> 'Overview', *Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange*, available online, Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX), <https://www.adx.ae/English/Pages/AboutUs/Whoweare/default.aspx>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>759</sup> 'Abu Dhabi Water and Electric Authority', *Abu Dhabi Digital Government*, available online, <https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/departments/adwea>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>760</sup> 'Emirates Nuclear Energy Company (ENEC), *U.S – U.A.E Business Council*, available online, <http://usuaebusiness.org/members/emirates-nuclear-energy-corporation-enec/>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Etihad Aviation Group	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>761</sup>
Etihad Rail Company	Government of Abu Dhabi <sup>762</sup>
First Abu Dhabi Bank	Abu Dhabi Investment Council owns 33.5%, Mubadala owns 3.7%, and other UAE entities and Individuals own 52.1% <sup>763</sup>
National Health Insurance Company	Government of Abu Dhabi owns 80% <sup>764</sup>

By comparison to the UAE's SWFs, the Abu Dhabi owned SOEs are nearly entirely utilities and service-based entities, and resultantly are not primarily focused on revenue generation. This suggests that the SOEs owned and operated by the government of Abu Dhabi are designed to deliberately subsidise the economy and society so as to ensure its long-lasting

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<sup>761</sup> 'Etihad Aviation Group', CAPA Center For Aviation, available online, <https://centreforaviation.com/data/profiles/airline-groups/etihad-aviation-group>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>762</sup> *Etihad Rail Fact Sheet*, available online, <https://www.etihadrail.ae/sites/default/files/pdf/factsheets.pdf>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>763</sup> 'Ownership Information', *First Abu Dhabi Bank*, 31<sup>st</sup> December 2017, available online, <https://www.nbad.com/en-ae/about-nbad/investor-relations/shareholders/ownership.html>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>764</sup> 'The National Health Insurance Company', *Abu Dhabi Digital Government*, available online, <https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/departments/daman>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

attractiveness.<sup>765</sup> Furthermore, as many of these institutions are exposed to internationally competitive markets, they must in turn adapt and enforce internationally accepted governance strategies.<sup>766</sup> Nonetheless ‘the federation’s (UAE) largest corporate groups and financial institutions, whether owned by shareholders or directly by the state, are dominated by either the UAE’s federal government or a member of one of the seven ruling families’.<sup>767</sup> This is to ensure the continued dominance of the state in the wider economy and exploit structural mechanisms to control every aspect of society.

While incentives and political pressure have attempted to diversify the domestic economies of the MENA, many ‘regimes are loath to privatize public enterprises because these enterprises serve as key sources of state patronage (jobs for the masses, lucrative posts for political cronies) and so are crucial to the regime’s strategy of building support at the mass and elite level’.<sup>768</sup> Khaled Al Mezaini takes this further in the case of the UAE by saying that it is crucial for the regime’s survival to ensure a relationship dynamic of dependence.<sup>769</sup> This can be expanded to explain why rentier states are often reluctant to diversify their

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<sup>765</sup> G Lahn, *Fuel, Food and Utilities Price Reforms in the GCC A Wake Up Call for Business*, Chatham House, London, Research Paper, June 2016

<sup>766</sup> The GCC’s airlines are often criticised for perceivably subsidising their airlines and undercutting the global competitive market.

<sup>767</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market; Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, p.94

<sup>768</sup> Bellin, E, *The Political-Economic Conundrum: The Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa*, pp.6-7

<sup>769</sup> K Almezaini, ‘Private Sector Actors in the UAE and their Role in the Process of Economic and Political Reform’, in S Hertog, G Luciani, and M Valeri (eds.), *Business Politics in the Middle East*, p.51

economies, especially as their exposure to international markets significantly increases the potential for criticism surrounding their fiscal performance.<sup>770</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap Wilde support this postulation by explaining that ‘although genuine economic security issues are relatively rare, normal and politicized economic activity frequently spills over into other sectors, with security consequences’.<sup>771</sup>

The role played by SOE’s in the UAE’s economy has ensured that no particular group can emerge from within the commercial sector to rival the power of the state and thus the regime.<sup>772</sup> Should the market swing in favour of private industry, the state would either co-opt them<sup>773</sup> or change the legislative parameters to favour the SOE.<sup>774</sup> Abu Dhabi’s monopoly on utilities and critical infrastructure further empowers the role played by the state and the

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<sup>770</sup> G Luciani, ‘Allocation vs Production States: A Theoretical Framework’, in G Luciani (ed.), *The Arab State*, p.76

<sup>771</sup> B Buzan, O Wæver, and J de Wilde, *Security, A New Framework for Analysis*, p.109

<sup>772</sup> Steffen Hertog supports this by postulating two reasons for the success of SOEs in the GCC; absence of populist mobilization and the fact the regime and decision-making authority is highly centralized.

<sup>773</sup> A prominent example is Hussein Hammadi. His investment firm, Emirates Advanced Investments (EAI) had made a series of significant purchases, including the establishing of a high technology university, Khalifa University of Science and Technology. Several of his assets were subsequently incorporated into SOEs and SWFs, and Hammadi was appointed as Minister of Education and Cabinet Member in 2014. ‘Cabinet Member’, *United Arab Emirates The Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/details/cabinet-members/his-excellency-hussain-bin-ibrahim-al-hammadi>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>774</sup> An example is the telecommunications sector which has slowly increased its membership to 4 companies; all of which are owned in the majority by the state.

regime<sup>775</sup> as they can exploit control of national infrastructure to achieve political gains while also providing a central ability to shape the domestic economy to suit their own strategy and outlook. While there has been no significant change to the domain of SOE's since the Arab Spring, this still reinforces their dominant role within the UAE's regime security strategy.

### **Privately Owned Champions (POCs)**

POCs 'are companies that remain in private hands (though governments sometimes hold a large minority stake) but rely on aggressive material support from the state to develop a commanding position in a domestic economy and its export market'.<sup>776</sup> Ian Bremmer expands by saying that 'the UAE's private sector is dominated so heavily by companies owned directly by various members of the seven families that the concept of national champions doesn't really apply'.<sup>777</sup> While Ian Bremmer's postulation is ultimately accurate, his oversimplification of the UAE's context distracts from an in-depth analysis of the subject in question.

Since the discovery of oil, many GCC states adopted an aggressive expansion of the private sector, with Adam Hanieh explaining that 'the Gulf capitalist class has emerged rapidly and in "hothouse" fashion—from state-supported and family-based trading groups in the 1960s and

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<sup>775</sup> Steffen Hertog disagrees and when speaking generally, he says that 'instead of using them as political tools, they (GCC monarchies) are taking pains to signal that the business of their public sectors is only that: business'. S Hertog, 'Defying the Resource Curse, Explaining Successful State-Owned Enterprises in Rentier States', p. 262

<sup>776</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market; Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, p.67

<sup>777</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market; Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, p.97

1970s to the domination of a few massive conglomerates in the contemporary period'.<sup>778</sup>

While this had led the business community to become a credible threat to the incumbent regime<sup>779</sup> in several GCC states, the UAE has embraced diversification whilst still firmly pursuing a state capitalist model.

Due to the significant growth in the non-oil economy of the UAE, the private business community has clearly been prioritized as an enabling force from an early point in the history of the UAE.<sup>780</sup> This is however a tale of two cities as the Emirate of Dubai has led diversification efforts while Abu Dhabi has been more frugal and thus has ensured that economic growth remains firmly tied to the state;<sup>781</sup> Martin Hvidt claims that initially the Emirate of Dubai had pursued a service economy while the Emirate of Abu Dhabi pursued industrialization.<sup>782</sup> This meant that while many of successful private ventures appeared in Dubai as in Abu Dhabi, the state-maintained control of strategic and infrastructural assets.

A further component that has enabled such a stark contrast between the UAE's two largest Emirates is the provision of free zones. These provide a foreign entity with full ownership

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<sup>778</sup> A Hanieh, *Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States*, p.2

<sup>779</sup> Namely Kuwait. M Herb, 'A Nation of Bureaucrats: Political Participation and Economic Diversification in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates', pp.375-395

<sup>780</sup> M Hvidt, 'The Dubai Model: An Outline of Key Development-Process Elements in Dubai', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.41, 2009, pp.397-418

<sup>781</sup> C Davidson, 'The Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai: Contrasting Roles in the International System', *Asian Affairs*, Vol. 38, No.1, March 2007, pp.33-48

<sup>782</sup> M Hvidt, 'The Dubai Model: An Outline of Key Development-Process Elements in Dubai', p.378

rights, as opposed to their comparative ‘on-shore’ alternative, who require Emirati nationals to own 51% of the commercial entity. To illustrate the contrasting approach to economic diversification and economic liberalism, Abu Dhabi has four free-zones<sup>783</sup> whilst Dubai has twenty.<sup>784</sup> It is therefore evident that Abu Dhabi has a more nationalized approach to business within its Emirate given the clear prioritization of asset retention as a recipe for the success of the Emirate’s private sector. Providing context to the lacking private sector development in Abu Dhabi, of the top ten largest companies by value traded on the ADX, eight are SOEs.

*Table 7 Top 10 Buyers and Sellers on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange<sup>785</sup>*

<b>Company</b>	<b>Share</b>	<b>Ownership</b>
Dana	74.3%	Foreign Owned
Aldar	8.3%	SOE

<sup>783</sup> Two Four54, Abu Dhabi Airport Free Zone, Masdar City Free Zone and Technology Park, and Khalifa Industrial Zone.

<sup>784</sup> Dubai Airport Free Zone, Dubai Auto Zone, Dubai Care and Automotive Zone, Dubai Design District, Dubai Flower Centre, Dubai Gold and Diamond Park, Dubai Healthcare City, Dubai Industrial City, Dubai International Academic City, Dubai International Financial Centre, Dubai Internet City, Dubai Knowledge Park, Dubai Logistics City, Dubai Maritime City Authority, Dubai Media City, Dubai Multi Commodities Centre, Dubai Outsource Zone, Dubai Science Park, Dubai Silicon Oasis, Dubai Studio City, National Industries Complex, Dubai Textile City, Energy and Environment Park, International Humanitarian City, Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority, Jumeriah Lake Towers Free Zone, Dubai Production City.

<sup>785</sup> ‘Top 10 Buyers and Sellers’, *Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange*, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018, available online, <https://www.adx.ae/English/Pages/Data/ReportandCharts/ChartCenter/Top10BuyersSellersbySymbol.aspx>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Etisalat	1.0%	SOE
National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD)	1.1%	SOE
Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB)	0.8%	SOE
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank (ADIB)	1.1%	SOE
RAKPROP	5.0%	SOE
Union National Bank	1.0%	SOE
ESHRAQ	4.6%	Private, Emirati owned
TAQA	2.8%	SOE

While the listing on the ADX does not accurately reflect the nature of POCs, it does highlight the deficiency in the development of private institutions within Abu Dhabi. Those private institutions that do exist in Abu Dhabi tend to be, on nearly every occasion, family institutions and if particularly successful, directly linked to the Abu Dhabi ruling family, and or, owned by a member of the Bani Yas.<sup>786</sup> Family business are especially common in Abu Dhabi; however,

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<sup>786</sup> This observation follows Steffen Hertog's islands of efficiency postulation and aligns with a patrimonial understanding of society. S Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats; Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*, P.21

they have rarely publicly listed their firm upon the ADX.<sup>787</sup> The National Investor (TNI) published a report in 2008 which evaluated the proportion of tribal members per board seats in Abu Dhabi based companies.<sup>788</sup> Half of the top 10 were Bani Yas affiliates.<sup>789</sup> The concentration of tribal affiliation within the private sector of Abu Dhabi suggests that still within the economy, links to the Abu Dhabi ruling reign supreme.

Specific successes within Abu Dhabi POCs can be identified; however, their apparent collusion and cooperation with the state suggests a form of commercial co-optation. These POCs exist in specific sectors and contribute to a clearly defined pre-determined goal. One example is the field of defence, which includes private firms such as Emirates Advanced Investments (EAI),<sup>790</sup> International Golden Group (IGG),<sup>791</sup> and Baynunah Group.<sup>792</sup> All have direct tribal and kinship relations to the Al Nahyan ruling family, whilst also exhibiting clear professional links that would enable these firms to have a definite advantage within the commercial

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<sup>787</sup> M Kassem, 'Family Businesses Continue to Shun Public Listing', *The National*, 23<sup>rd</sup> November 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/family-businesses-continue-to-shun-public-listings-1.678270>, date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>788</sup> 'TNI Market Insight', *The National Investor*, 13<sup>th</sup> May 2008, available online, [https://www.hawkamah.org/uploads/1469026337\\_578f90218eb7c\\_Powermatters.pdf](https://www.hawkamah.org/uploads/1469026337_578f90218eb7c_Powermatters.pdf), date accessed, 24<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>789</sup> Mazrouei, Qubaisi, Suwaidi, Rumaithi, and Muhairi

<sup>790</sup> <http://www.eaig.ae>

<sup>791</sup> <http://www.igggroup.ae>

<sup>792</sup> <http://www.baynunagroup.com/index.html>

sector.<sup>793</sup> Likewise, the Al Nahyan ruling family have their own private enterprises, which they use to generate greater private finances; these include Royal Group<sup>794</sup> and the Bin Zayed Group.<sup>795</sup> In essence, while the larger POCs may make a significant contribution within certain sectors, they are entirely dependent upon the state for contracts and as a result cannot be deemed to be entirely private.

Abu Dhabi's state led capitalism strategy for commercial development has ensured that the relationship between the ruling family, tribes, and wider community is not impacted by altered dynamics.<sup>796</sup> The reluctance to allow an independent power centre not only secures the hierarchical and authoritative position of the state, but also that of the regime as owner of the resources that direct the development of the UAE economy.<sup>797</sup> As there has been no substantial change to the field of private commercial enterprise within Abu Dhabi, there seems to have been a deliberate campaign to ensure the control of a sector within which a potential adversary could emerge.

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<sup>793</sup> K Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates; Between the Majlis and the Market*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2014

<sup>794</sup> <http://www.royalgroupuae.com/about-us.html>

<sup>795</sup> <http://www.binzayed.com>

<sup>796</sup> K Young, *The Political Economy of Energy, Finance and Security in the United Arab Emirates; Between the Majlis and the Market*, p.67

<sup>797</sup> S Heydemann, 'Networks of Privilege: Rethinking the Politics of Economic Reform in the Middle East', p.1

## Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)

SWFs play an instrumental role for the state as they not only generate economic, political, and social benefits, but also serve a tool of legitimisation. There are multiple definitions for SWFs,<sup>798</sup> but Andrew Rozanov's original postulation and definition provides the foundations for research into the topic. In summary: 'The funds (SWFs) are set up with one or more of the following objectives: insulate the budget and economy, from excess volatility in revenues, help monetary authorities sterilise unwanted liquidity, build up savings for future generations, or use the money for economic and social development'.<sup>799</sup>

SWFs differ from other forms of state-owned assets and investments, such as public pension funds, development funds, and state-owned enterprises, due to the objectives and structure of each form. According to Sara Bazoobandi, 'SWFs are usually funded from surplus government income and often held outside their country of origin. In order to protect the sovereign wealth, in most cases, SWFs are managed separately from other types of public investment funds'.<sup>800</sup>

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<sup>798</sup> 'Sovereign Wealth Funds, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices, "Santiago Principles" ', *International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds*, October 2008

'What is a SWF?', *Sovereign Wealth Fund Research Institute*, available online, <https://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund/>, date accessed, 9<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>799</sup> A Rozanov, 'Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?', *Central Bank Journal*, May 2005

<sup>800</sup> S Bazoobandi, *The Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds*, p.6

SWFs are by nature, generally secretive about their investments and ‘it is difficult to reliably identify where GCC surpluses have been identified’.<sup>801</sup> This results in the analysis that it is not only impossible to accurately verify the size of SWFs, but that without official declaration it is also impossible to know exactly what SWFs invest in and for what purpose. Andrew Rozanov’s definition of a SWF helps to simplify concerns and categorisations of SWF, as he hypothesises that SWFs either prioritise financial and commodity investment or are structured towards societal development. In essence SWFs achieve both but are prioritised towards one or the other.

Due to the UAE’s federal identity, SWFs within the UAE are creations of an individual Emirate’s government and not a national institution. Given Abu Dhabi’s ownership of the state’s oil reserves, it was able to establish its SWF’s very early. This has allowed Abu Dhabi to strategically invest in projects and mechanisms that enhance the Emirate, and the state’s economy and help advanced human capital for the preliminary objective of the Abu Dhabi ruling elites. The five SWFs owned by Abu Dhabi are the ADIA,<sup>802</sup> Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC),<sup>803</sup> International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC), Mubadala,<sup>804</sup> EAI,<sup>805</sup> and Invest AD (also known as Abu Dhabi Investment Company).<sup>806</sup> In the neighbouring

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<sup>801</sup> A Hanieh, *Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States*, p.95

<sup>802</sup> <http://www.adia.ae/En/home.aspx>

<sup>803</sup> <http://www.adcouncil.ae>

<sup>804</sup> <https://www.mubadala.com>

<sup>805</sup> <http://www.eia.gov.ae>

<sup>806</sup> <http://www.investad.com>

Emirate of Dubai, there are three SWFs according to Sara Bazoobandi;<sup>807</sup> Dubai World,<sup>808</sup> Dubai Holding,<sup>809</sup> and the Investment Corporation of Dubai.<sup>810</sup> For the purpose of clarification, this chapter will analyse the Abu Dhabi focused SWFs, and not those in other Emirates as they are of peripheral interest to the Abu Dhabi ruling family.

### **Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)**

Abu Dhabi's initial engagement of SWFs was through the creation of ADIA in 1976. Its mission 'is to sustain the long-term prosperity of Abu Dhabi by prudently growing capital through a disciplined investment process and committed people who reflect ADIA's cultural values'.<sup>811</sup> According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI), ADIA holds USD 828 billion worth of assets<sup>812</sup> making it the world's 4<sup>th</sup> largest SWF.<sup>813</sup> ADIA is funded by the budget surplus of the Abu Dhabi government and contributes to any shortfall when necessary, although its

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<sup>807</sup> S Bazoobandi, *The Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds*, pp.98-102

<sup>808</sup> <http://www.dubaiworld.ae>

<sup>809</sup> <https://dubaiholding.com/en/>

<sup>810</sup> <https://www.icd.gov.ae>

<sup>811</sup> Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), 'Mission', *Annual Review 2016; A Legacy in Motion*, 2017, available online, [http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/2016/pdf/ADIA\\_2016\\_Review\\_01\\_FULL.pdf](http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/2016/pdf/ADIA_2016_Review_01_FULL.pdf), date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>812</sup> Khaldoon al Mubarak however claimed that '*Abu Dhabi has \$1 trillion under investment*'. USUAEBUSINESSCOUNIL (@USUAEBIZCOUNCIL), 27<sup>th</sup> February 2018, 1340

<sup>813</sup> 'Fund Rankings', *Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute*, June 2017, available online, <https://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

priority is towards a longer-term investment strategy.<sup>814</sup> As a result, there is a higher significance in analysing the personnel who make up the leadership of ADIA, rather than the assets in their control, as they oversee and manage the entity with which the Abu Dhabi ruling family can depend upon for their future livelihood and security. Hendrik Van Der Meulen concurs and notes that ‘the most important decision-making authority under the ruler is the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA)... The importance of this fund to the ruling family and the nationals of the Emirate, as well for the country as a whole, is clear’.<sup>815</sup>

The current ruler of Abu Dhabi, Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan has been the Chairman of ADIA since its creation in 1976.<sup>816</sup> Until 2010, Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed al Nahyan had led ADIA as Managing Director, but after his death in 2010, his full brother Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed took charge.<sup>817</sup> The decision to appoint Hamed bin Zayed to the position of Managing Director

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<sup>814</sup> ‘The Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi provides ADIA with funds that are allocated for investment and surplus to its budgetary requirements and its other funding commitments’, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), ‘Governance’, *Annual Review 2016; A Legacy in Motion*, 2017

<sup>815</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.93

<sup>816</sup> H bin Zayed al Nahyan, ‘Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Marks 40<sup>th</sup> Anniversary’, *Press Release*, Abu Dhabi, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2016, available online, [http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/ADIA\\_40th\\_Anniversary\\_Open\\_Letter\\_Press\\_Release\\_English.pdf](http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/ADIA_40th_Anniversary_Open_Letter_Press_Release_English.pdf), date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>817</sup> Sheikh Ahmed bin Zayed had been Managing Director of ADIA for 13 years however was killed in a gliding accident in Morocco in March 2010. Subsequently, his full brother, Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed was appointed as ADIA Managing Director on the 14<sup>th</sup> April 2010. B Hope, ‘Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed named ADIA Chief’, *The*

suggests a significant consideration for tribal and family alliances. This is further reinforced through the 2005 appointment of Mansour bin Zayed to the ADIA board,<sup>818</sup> illustrating the requirement to bolster such a strategically important institution with close family members.

While ADIA has typically reshuffled its directorial board every three years,<sup>819</sup> since the death of Sheikh Zayed in 2004, there has been only a marginal change to the membership of the ADIA board. The ADIA board is dominated by sons of Sheikh Zayed, and it has increasingly denied access to other tribes. Since 2007 four directors have been removed from the board (See Table 8). It is also telling that changes to the board made in 2013, one year before Sheikh Khalifa's stroke, illustrated a degree of stability as they kept the same board members of 2010. Subsequently, changes made to the 2017 board of directors (after Sheikh Khalifa's death) removed three members; Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed, Jua'an Salem al Dhaheri, and Hamad Mohammed al Hur al Suwaidi. This is significant as the incapacity of Sheikh Khalifa during this time suggests that his deputy at ADIA, MBZ, initiated these changes to suit his own strategy and outlook. Firstly, the removal of Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed from the ADIA board of directors removed a potential competitor of MBZ and finalises the total eradication of a public

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*National*, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/sheikh-hamed-bin-zayed-named-adia-chief-1.531542>, date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>818</sup> 'Khalifa Appoints Mansour as ADIA Board Member', *WAM*, 8<sup>th</sup> June 2005, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395227444392>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>819</sup> B Hope, 'Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed Names ADIA Chief', *The National*, 14<sup>th</sup> April 2010, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/sheikh-hamed-bin-zayed-named-adia-chief-1.531542>, date accessed,

13<sup>th</sup> April 2018

profile for Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed. Secondly, while Jauan Salem al Dhaheri passed away in 2013,<sup>820</sup> Hamad Mohammed al Hur al Suwaidi was appointed as Head of Abu Dhabi Accountability Authority.<sup>821</sup> These changes resulted in five descendants of Sheikh Zayed (Bani Yas) manning the ADIA board of directors and are joined by two technocrats who are also Bani Yas tribal members. Simply put, this means that the ADIA board is now entirely composed by Bani Yas figures.

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<sup>820</sup> A DiPaola, 'Abu Dhabi Investment Authority Director Jauan Al Dhaheri Dies', *Bloomberg*, 5<sup>th</sup> May 2013, available online, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-05/abu-dhabi-investment-authority-director-jauan-al-dhaheri-dies>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>821</sup> 'Two Officials Take Oath Before Abu Dhabi Crown Prince', *WAM*, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2017, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302601294>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Table 8 Evolution of the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) Directors

2007 <sup>822</sup>	2010 <sup>823</sup>	2013 <sup>824</sup>	2017 <sup>825</sup>
Khalifa bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Khalifa bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Khalifa bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Khalifa bin Zayed (Bani Yas)
Sultan bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Sultan bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Sultan bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Mohammed bin Zayed (Bani Yas)
Mohammed bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Mohammed bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Mohammed bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Mansour bin Zayed (Bani Yas)
Ahmed bin Zayed	Mansour bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Mansour bin Zayed	Hamed bin Zayed

<sup>822</sup> 'Khalifa Reshuffles ADIA's BoD', WAM, 4<sup>th</sup> January 2007, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395227772438>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>823</sup> 'Board of Directors', 2010 Review; Prudent Global Growth, Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Abu Dhabi, 2011, available online, [http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/Annual\\_Review\\_Website\\_2010.pdf](http://www.adia.ae/En/pr/Annual_Review_Website_2010.pdf), date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>824</sup> 'Sheikh Khalifa Restructures ADIA's Board', Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, 9<sup>th</sup> April 2013, available online, <https://www.swfinstitute.org/swf-news/sheikh-khalifa-restructures-adias-board/>, date accessed, 17<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>825</sup> 'Board of Directors', Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), available online, [http://www.adia.ae/En/Governance/Board\\_Of\\_Directors.aspx](http://www.adia.ae/En/Governance/Board_Of_Directors.aspx), date accessed, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<i>(Bani Yas)</i>		<i>(Bani Yas)</i>	<i>(Bani Yas)</i>
Mansour bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Sheikh Hamed bin Zayed replaced Sheikh Ahmed following his unexpected death <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Hamed bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>
Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Mohammed Habroush al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>
Mohammed Habroush al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Mohammed Habroush al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Mohammed Habroush al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Khalil Mohammed Sharif Foulathi <i>(Al bu Falah of the Bani Yas)</i>
Jua'an Salem al Dhaheri <i>(Dhawahir<sup>826</sup>)</i>	Jua'an Salem al Dhaheri <i>(Dhawahir)</i>	Jua'an Salem al Dhaheri <i>(Dhawahir)</i>	

<sup>826</sup> The Dhawahir are a strong and powerful tribe in Abu Dhabi that has a long history of alliance with the Bani Yas.

Hamad Mohammed al Hur al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Hamad Mohammed al Hur al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Hamad Mohammed al Hur al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	
Saeed Mubarak Rashid al Hajiri <i>(Sunni of Iranian origin)</i>	Khalil Mohammed Sharif Foulathi <i>(Al bu Falah of the Bani Yas)</i>	Khalil Mohammed Sharif Foulathi <i>(Al bu Falah of the Bani Yas)</i>	

The role of ADIA in ensuring there are sufficient ‘financial resources to secure and maintain the future welfare of the Emirate (Abu Dhabi)’<sup>827</sup> clearly acts as the principal mechanism to ensure the regime’s long-term maintenance of power. This observation acts as illustration and response to Giacomo Luciani’s postulation that ‘all states can be autonomous in the short run, but in the longer run their ability to act autonomously from society is linked to their revenue foundations’.<sup>828</sup> Through ADIA’s augmentation of oil revenues, the Emirate of Abu Dhabi can ensure its long-term future and security. The adjustment to the ADIA board of directors after the Arab Spring, and following the stroke of Sheikh Khalifa, shows an enhanced

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<sup>827</sup> ‘Investment Strategy and Portfolio Overview’, *Annual Review 2016; A Legacy in Motion*, 2017, p.14

<sup>828</sup> G Luciani, ‘Resources, Revenues, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Beyond the Rentier State?’, in R Brynen, B Korany, and P Noble (eds.), *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*, p.211

strategy to condense power within a network of closely-related personnel and trusted tribal technocrats. Therefore, the adjustment made to ADIA's board showcases a key dynamic of the UAE's post-Arab Spring regime security as it sought to maintain close control of a strategic investment vehicle in time of economic turbulence.

### **Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC)**

Where ADIA's role is to preserve 'some part of the revenues from a depleting resource for future generations and spending needs',<sup>829</sup> and evaluates global opportunities for maximum financial return, the Abu Dhabi Investment Council is tasked with a similar mission but for 'domestic and regional investments'.<sup>830</sup> ADIC was established in 2006, through Article 4 of the Law 16 of 2006, as a breakaway addition to ADIA.<sup>831</sup> ADIC took ADIA's domestic investment portfolio and used this as a basis to expand an interest in the wider MENA region. Like ADIA, ADIC keeps many of its investments a secret. Nonetheless, it has publicised the investment in many SOEs including; National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD), Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB), Union National Bank (UNB), Al Hilal Bank, Abu Dhabi National Insurance Company,

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<sup>829</sup> KA AISweilem, A Cummine, M Rietveld, and K Tweedie, *A Comparative Study of Sovereign Investor Models: Sovereign Fund Profiles*, The Centre for International Development and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard, 2015, available online, [https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/sovereignwealth/files/fund\\_profiles\\_final.pdf](https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/sovereignwealth/files/fund_profiles_final.pdf), date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018, p. 7

<sup>830</sup> *ibid*

<sup>831</sup> 'Khalifa Issues Law Forming Abu Dhabi Investment Council', *WAM*, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2006, available online, <http://wam.ae/ar/print/1395227670129>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Abu Dhabi Aviation Company, and the Abu Dhabi Investment Company (or also known as Invest AD).<sup>832</sup>

Upon its inception Khalifa bin Zayed chaired ADIC,<sup>833</sup> and it was noted in 2015 that the ADIC board would be assessed every three years.<sup>834</sup> While there have been three announcements made in reference to the ADIC board, only two amendments have been made. Firstly, the appointment of MBZ as ADIC chairman in 2015 and secondly, the removal of Khalifa Mohammed al Kindli. Currently in total, the ADIC board has four members of the Al Nahyan ruling family; MBZ, Sultan bin Zayed, Mansour bin Zayed, and Hamdan bin Zayed. Joining them are Habrroush al Suwaidi, Eisa Mohammed al Suwaidi, and Younis Haji Khoori.

Habrroush al Suwaidi is member of the Sudan clan of the Bani Yas and has extensive experience within the finance and investment sector within Abu Dhabi. He was previously the Managing Director of ADIA and member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council,<sup>835</sup> but is still one of its

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<sup>832</sup> 'Investment Strategy', *Abu Dhabi Investment Council*, available online, [http://www.adcouncil.ae/?page\\_id=41](http://www.adcouncil.ae/?page_id=41), date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>833</sup> WAM, 'CORRECTED-Abu Dhabi's crown prince is new chairman of ADIC in board revamp -WAM', *Reuters*, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2015, available online, <https://www.reuters.com/article/emirates-swf-adic/corrected-abu-dhabis-crown-prince-is-new-chairman-of-adic-in-board-revamp-wam-idUSL8NOZ70OI20150622>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>834</sup> The National Staff, 'Sheikh Khalifa Reshuffles Abu Dhabi Investment Council Board', *The National*, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2015, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/sheikh-khalifa-reshuffles-abu-dhabi-investment-council-board-1.100036>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>835</sup> H Van Der Muelen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.157

board of directors. Concurrently, he has also been listed as ‘advisor to the President’,<sup>836</sup> thus suggesting not only a powerful domestic role but also a close relationship to Khalifa bin Zayed. Another ADIC board member, Eisa Mohammed al Suwaidi is also from the Sudan clan of the Bani Yas. He also had a career within ADIA, where he was previously the Director of the Bond and Equity department.<sup>837</sup> He is also chairman of the Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB) and Chairman of Emirates Telecommunication Corporation (Etisalat), whilst also being a board member of several SOEs and public-sector institutions.<sup>838</sup> The last figure currently upon ADIC’s board is Younis Haji Khoori. He is currently the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance<sup>839</sup> and is also a board member of the General Pension and Social Security Authority.<sup>840</sup>

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<sup>836</sup> WAM, ‘Khalifa Restructures ADIA’s Board’, *Emirates* 24/7, 8<sup>th</sup> April 2013, available online, <https://www.emirates247.com/news/government/khalifa-restructures-adia-s-board-2013-04-08-1.501851>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>837</sup> H Van Der Muelen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.157

<sup>838</sup> Eisa Mohammed al Suwaidi is a board member of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company for Distribution, International Petroleum Investment Company, Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, Emirates Investment Authority

‘Board of Directors Profiles’, *Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank*, available online, <https://www.adcb.com/about/investorrelations/financialinformation/ARsite/2014/eissa-mohamed-al-suwaidi.html>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>839</sup> ‘Organisational Structure’, *United Arab Emirates Ministry of Finance*, available online, <https://www.mof.gov.ae/En/About/ocAndInstitutes/Pages/oc.aspx#>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>840</sup> ‘Board Member’, *General Pension and Social Security Authority*, available online, <http://gpssa.gov.ae/en/Pages/DirectorsDetails.aspx?DirectorId=13>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

While Khalifa Mohammed al Kindli was removed from the ADIC directors in the 2015 announcement, he is still a very important figure. According to Hendrik Van Der Meulen the family of Khalifa al Kindli is ‘an important lineage within the Sudan section’,<sup>841</sup> also making him a member of the Bani Yas. It is no coincidence that in 2012, al Kindli was appointed as Chairman of the UAE Central Bank,<sup>842</sup> and given his previous roles as director of the treasury department and as finance director at ADIA and ADNOC respectively, his transition out of ADIC illustrates no significant action.

Table 9 Evolution of the ADIC Board of Directors

2007 <sup>843</sup>		2010 <sup>844</sup>		2015 <sup>845</sup>	
Chairman	Khalifa bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Chairman	Khalifa bin Zayed (Bani Yas)	Chairman	Mohammed bin Zayed (Bani Yas)

<sup>841</sup> H Van Der Muelen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.148

<sup>842</sup> S Kerr, ‘UAE Central Bank Announces New Chairman’, *Financial Times*, 7<sup>th</sup> November 2012, available online, <https://www.ft.com/content/3d8bc29a-28d7-11e2-b92c-00144feabdc0>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>843</sup> ‘Khalifa Reshuffles Abu Dhabi Investment Council’, *WAM*, 4<sup>th</sup> January 2007, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395227772462>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>844</sup> ‘Khalifa bin Zayed Issues Emiri Decree Reshuffling Abu Dhabi Investment Council Board’, *Emirate of Abu Dhabi Executive Council General Secretariat*, 7<sup>th</sup> April 2010, available online, [https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/ShowProperty?nodeId=%2FWCC%2FADEGP\\_ND\\_157028\\_EN&adf.ctrl-state=asqxktyab\\_4](https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/ShowProperty?nodeId=%2FWCC%2FADEGP_ND_157028_EN&adf.ctrl-state=asqxktyab_4), date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>845</sup> ‘Board of Directors’, *Abu Dhabi Investment Council*, available online, [http://www.adcouncil.ae/?page\\_id=18](http://www.adcouncil.ae/?page_id=18), date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Board Member	Sultan bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Sultan bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Sultan bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>
Board Member	Mohammed bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Mohammed bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Mansour bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>
Board Member	Mansour bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Mansour bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Hamed bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>
Board Member	Hamed bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Hamed bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Mohammed bin Habroush al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>
Board Member	Mohammed bin Habroush al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Mohammed bin Habroush al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Managing Director	Eisa Mohammed al Suwaidi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>

Board Member	Khalifa Mohammed Al Kindi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Managing Director	Khalifa Mohammed Al Kindi <i>(Sudan of the Bani Yas)</i>	Board Member	Younis Haji Khoori
Board Member	Younis Haji Khoori	Board Member	Younis Haji Khoori		

The strategic requirement to offset ADIA's domestic and regional role, and to augment financial returns with societal development shows a more politicised mission for the ADIC. The stable membership of the ADIC board through a time of political turmoil suggests a tightly knit core of trusted and capable people. The transition in leadership to MBZ after Khalifa bin Zayed's stroke and after the Arab Spring, does however further evidence the increased power grab by MBZ from an array of strategically important vehicles. This was further demonstrated by the announcement on the 21<sup>st</sup> March 2018 that ADIC was integrated in Mubadala.<sup>846</sup> MBZ's increased presence in revenue generating institutions not only seeks to protect his, and his

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<sup>846</sup> WAM, 'UAE President Issues Law Restructuring Abu Dhabi Investment Council', *Press Releases*, Mubadala, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2018, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/uae-president-issues-law-restructuring-abu-dhabi-investment-council>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

family's, role in the future UAE economy, but that he can continue to manage those funds to ensure the efficient supply of co-optive capital within Emirati society.<sup>847</sup>

## **Invest AD**

Invest AD is a wholly owned subsidiary of ADIC and its aim is to 'to provide excellent returns for investors who increasingly are looking to allocate assets to GCC and MENA markets'.<sup>848</sup>

Like other SWFs, there is only a partial array of information available on the investments made by Invest AD. According to Khaled Al Sweilem, Angela Cummine, Malan Rietveld and Katherine Tweedie, Invest AD's 'specialisation is in frontier and emerging markets, particularly in Africa and the Middle East'.<sup>849</sup> As Invest AD has gradually left the gravity, the larger SWF's, ADIA and ADIC, Invest AD is not deemed a strategically important SWF for analysis. This is additionally supported by the fact that there are currently no members of the Abu Dhabi ruling family upon Invest AD's board of directors.<sup>850</sup>

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<sup>847</sup> 'need to be able to distribute benefits to active supporters and coalition partners, to achieve passable economic performance in order to sustain mass acquiescence, and to maintain adequate coercive capacity to get through the inevitable times when they fail to deliver' B Geddes, 'What do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years', p.138

<sup>848</sup> 'Our History', *Invest AD*, available online, <http://www.investad.com>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>849</sup> KA AlSweilem, A Cummine, M Rietveld, and K Tweedie, *A Comparative Study of Sovereign Investor Models: Sovereign Fund Profiles*, p.6

<sup>850</sup> <http://www.investad.com/board-of-director>

Table 10 Invest AD Board of Directors

Role	Name
Chairman	Mohammed Ali al Dhaheri ( <i>Dhawahir</i> )
Board Member	Mariam Saeed Ghobash
Board Member	Amer Saleh al Ameri ( <i>Azwamir</i> )
Board Member	Athra Ibrahim al Zaabi ( <i>Za'ab</i> )
Board Member	David Beau ( <i>Foreign national</i> )
Board Member	Dhaen Mohamed al Hameli ( <i>Hawamil</i> )
Board Member	Saoud Essa al Mulla ( <i>Murrah</i> )

Assuming that the notion of clientelism<sup>851</sup> is rife within the UAE, and that the Abu Dhabi ruling family is central to the state's management and ownership of material resources and their investment,<sup>852</sup> the board of Invest AD exemplifies why they are not as important for the UAE's post Arab Spring regime security strategy.

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<sup>851</sup> Defined by Luis Roniger as 'clientelism involves asymmetric but mutually beneficial, open-ended transactions based on the differential control by individuals or groups over the access and flow of resources in stratified societies'. L Roniger, *Hierarchy and Trust in Modern Mexico and Brazil*, Praeger, London, 2002, p.1, in S Hertog, *Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats; Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*, p.21

<sup>852</sup> 'Oil, in other words, created great leeway to accommodate elites in various arenas but also permitted the creation – and funding – of important islands of bureaucratic efficiency, vertically linked to the Al Saud and no one else'. *ibid*, p.17

## International Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) & Mubadala

While Mubadala was established in 2002, its forefather, the IPIC, was founded in 1984<sup>853</sup> and was since chaired by Mansour bin Zayed. The IPIC was instituted through Emiri Law 3 of 1984, and it was 'initially a 50:50 joint venture between the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) and the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)'.<sup>854</sup> Like other SWFs, the IPIC sought to utilise Abu Dhabi's oil reserves for long-term investments; however, it focused on the means by which the UAE's natural resources sector could be enhanced. As a result, the IPIC fell 'under the umbrella of the Supreme Petroleum Council'.<sup>855</sup> After Mubadala's creation, it became clear that there was a duplicity of effort, often creating unnecessary competition and, resultantly, on the 21<sup>st</sup> January 2017<sup>856</sup> the IPIC merged with Mubadala.

Before its fusion with Mubadala, the board of the IPIC clearly depicted the dominance of Abu Dhabi political elites. Its Chairman was Mansour bin Zayed and its last Managing Director, the

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<sup>853</sup> 'Our History', *Mubadala*, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/who-we-are/our-history>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>854</sup> 'International Petroleum Investment Company', Credit Research, *Unicredit*, 8<sup>th</sup> March 2011, available online, [https://www.research.unicreditgroup.eu/DocsKey/credit\\_docs\\_2011\\_114693.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=n03ZZLYZf5miL7MI684NjxlHtzYjzK-LBjvcijOr3ys=](https://www.research.unicreditgroup.eu/DocsKey/credit_docs_2011_114693.ashx?EXT=pdf&KEY=n03ZZLYZf5miL7MI684NjxlHtzYjzK-LBjvcijOr3ys=), date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>855</sup> C Davidson, *Abu Dhabi; Oil and Beyond*, p.75

<sup>856</sup> 'Mubadala Investment Company; A Global Champion for Economic Growth in Abu Dhabi', *Mubadala*, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2017, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/ipic-mubadala-merger>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

current Minister of Energy, Suhail al Mazrouei;<sup>857</sup> had succeeded Khadem al Qubaisi in the organisation. Every member of the board of directors was a member of a tribe from within the Bani Yas (Table 11), a factor that, far from being a coincidence, clearly illustrates the importance of traditional alliances within the structure of strategically important institutions.<sup>858</sup>

Table 11 Last Directors of the IPIC

2015 <sup>859</sup>	
Chairman	Mansour bin Zayed <i>(Bani Yas)</i>
Deputy Chairman	Mohammed Dhaen al- Hameli

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<sup>857</sup> J Everington, 'Boardroom reshuffle at IPIC', *The National*, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2015, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/boardroom-reshuffle-at-ipic-1.22512>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>858</sup> Due to the fact that the IPIC only released its first 'consolidated financial statements in 2007', and that no other information was released pertaining to the IPIC board of directors, there can only be an illustration of the last known directors. 'Financial Information and Reports', *Mubdala*, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/investors>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>859</sup> 'UAE Energy Minister is New MD of Abu Dhabi's IPIC After Board Revamp', *Reuters*, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2015, available online, <https://www.reuters.com/article/emirates-ipic/uae-energy-minister-is-new-md-of-abu-dhabis-ipic-after-board-revamp-idUSL5N0XJ5AG20150422>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

	<i>(Hawamil section of the Bani Yas)</i>
Managing Director	Suhail al Mazrouei <i>(Mazar section of the Bani Yas)</i>
Board Member	Hamad Mohammed al-Hurr al- Suwaidi <i>(Sudan section of the Bani Yas)</i>
Board Member	Nasser Khalifa al- Suwaidi <i>(Sudan section of the Bani Yas)</i>

Board	Eissa
Member	Mohamed Ghanem al- Suwaidi <i>(Sudan section of the Bani Yas)</i>

Where IPIC acted as an infrastructure and savings-focused SWF and ADIA 'is a classic example of a savings fund',<sup>860</sup> Mubadala is a strategic investment vehicle whose mandate is to 'support economic diversification through investment and development in strategic sectors... deliver sustainable financial returns and contribute to social development'.<sup>861</sup> In sharp contrast to the other SWFs, Mubadala is very public with its investment portfolio and strategy as it is through these high-profile endeavours that the organisation can increase its domestic and international standing.

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<sup>860</sup> KA AISweilem, A Cummine, M Rietveld, and K Tweedie, *A Comparative Study of Sovereign Investor Models: Sovereign Fund Profiles*, p.7

<sup>861</sup> 'Our Organisational Structure', Annual Review 2016, *Mubadala*, Abu Dhabi, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/annual-review-2016/en/our-leadership>, date accessed, 19<sup>th</sup> March 2018

Mubadala is self-referred to as a SOE,<sup>862</sup> but it is better classified as a SWF.<sup>863</sup> Since its creation, Mubadala has been led by MBZ and has acted as the vanguard for the modernisation of the UAE. According to Christopher Davidson, Mubadala has acted as the central focus point for high technology products and ventures and has used its access to vast oil wealth to employ a highly skilled workforce, amongst them a sizable percentage of Emiratis, so as to capitalise on this concerted effort.<sup>864</sup> An evaluation of the UAE's modernisation effort would suggest that the strategic construction of Mubadala and the subsequent implementation of economic visions such as Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 and UAE Vision 2021 were part of a much longer-term strategy of economic and social development by MBZ.

It is evident from the evolution of leadership personnel within Mubadala since 2008 that there has been a clear strategy to build domestic capabilities with foreign personnel and slowly transfer this responsibility to domestic actors. While the board of directors has remained nearly exclusively Emirati– with the two foreign nationals assuming the roles of Chief Financial Officer and Chief Legal Consul - the accompanying investment committee and executive management has slowly homogenised.

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<sup>862</sup> 'Board of Directors', *Mubadala*, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/who-we-are/board-of-directors>, date accessed, 22<sup>nd</sup> March 2018

<sup>863</sup> S Bazoobandi, *The Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds*, pp.91-96

KA AlSweilem, A Cummine, M Rietveld, and K Tweedie, *A Comparative Study of Sovereign Investor Models: Sovereign Fund Profiles*, p.7

<sup>864</sup> C Davidson, *Abu Dhabi; Oil and Beyond*, pp.80-81




Figure 11 Line graph showing evolution of Mubadala Executive Leadership<sup>865</sup>

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<sup>865</sup> Data gathered from Appendix 11 Evolution of Mubadala Leadership 2008-2018

Due to the developmental role played by Mubadala domestically, the evolution in leadership towards an Emirati-dominated board of directors mirrors the wider and national developmental strategy promoted by MBZ. This has ensured that both Mubadala and MBZ, are portrayed as modernising forces that reward technocratic excellence. Additionally, the fact that Mansour bin Zayed, who is both a full brother of MBZ and is married to the daughter of Dubai Ruler Mohammed bin Rashid (MBR), was appointed the vice chairman of Mubadala, following the integration of IPIC and ADIC into Mubadala, signifies both the importance of Mubadala to MBZ but also the growing power of Mansour bin Zayed. While Mubadala's board of directors is characteristically less tribal than other strategic entities, this suggests a greater appreciation for the value of professionalism within the developmental focused SWF.

Tribal affiliation still plays a moderating influence for membership affiliation within Mubadala; however, an increasing trend is emerging which is evidencing the mix of technocratic excellence and kinship affiliation to MBZ leading. Prominent examples have

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illustrated that this mix has led to the rapid promotion and growth in stature of said individuals; to use Steffen Hertog's observation, this mechanism would be called technocratic clientelism.<sup>866</sup> Five examples highlight this postulation:

The first example is Sultan al Jaber who was initially clarified as a CEO of the wholly Mubadala owned subsidiary, Masdar, in 2011<sup>867</sup> and later as CEO of Mubadala Energy. He has since gone on to assume a position within the UAE Cabinet and as Minister of State; meanwhile he is also Chairman of the NMC, Group CEO of ADNOC, and Chairman of Abu Dhabi Ports Company.<sup>868</sup> His sharp rise should be seen in context of his relatively weak tribal heritage, as this further supports his political rise on the tangible and commercial successes that he initially mustered during his tenure at Mubadala.

The second example is Homaïd al Shimmari. While, in likeness to Sultan al Jaber, al Shimmari also lacks the tribal heritage to accredit his rise within Mubadala, he possesses a career within the UAE Armed Forces where he left with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and specialised in military maintenance, procurement, and logistics.<sup>869</sup> Al Shimmari is among the longer serving

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<sup>866</sup> S Hertog, *Prince, Brokers, and Bureaucrats; Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia*, p.28

<sup>867</sup> 'Annual Report 2011', *Mubadala*, 2011

<sup>868</sup> 'His Excellency Dr. Sultan bin Ahmed Sultan al Jaber', *United Arab Emirates The Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/details/cabinet-members/his-excellency-dr-sultan-bin-ahmad-sultan-al-jaber> , date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>869</sup> 'ADSB – The Company', *Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB)*, available online, <http://www.adsb.ae/team/homaïd-abdulla-al-shimmari/>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

directors of Mubadala and was initially listed in the 2009 Annual Report as Executive Director for Aerospace.<sup>870</sup> He has since been credited with establishing and driving defence industrialisation within the UAE and has overseen the creation of Mubadala's aerospace and defence arm, and the Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC). He is now Mubadala Group Deputy CEO, Chief of Human Capital & Corporate Services, and is also chairman of EDIC, Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), and Board Member of Mubadala Petroleum, Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company (Masdar), GLOBALFOUNDRIES and Du – Emirates Integrated Telecommunications Company PJSC.<sup>871</sup>

The third example is Mohammed al Bawardi al Falasi. Al Bawardi is a member of the Dubai-based *Bani Yas* tribal affiliate, *al-Bawardi*,<sup>872</sup> which in turn is also a chain of the *Al bu Falasah*. He has had a long tenure at Mubadala serving as MBZ's deputy as he was listed as Vice-Chairman of Mubadala from 2008-2014, after which he was not listed on corporate Mubadala documentation. In 2014 Bawardi was listed as Under Secretary of the Ministry of Defence,<sup>873</sup> and in the 12<sup>th</sup> UAE Cabinet reshuffle in 2016, he was listed as Cabinet Minister and Minister

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<sup>870</sup> 'Annual Report 2009', *Mubadala*, 2009

<sup>871</sup> 'Homaïd al Shimmari', *Mubadala*, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/who-we-are/investment-committee/homaïd-al-shimmari>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>872</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.193

<sup>873</sup> 'Defence Secretary Meets Abu Dhabi Crown Prince', *Ministry of Defence and The Rt Hon Sir Michael Fallon MP*, 30<sup>th</sup> October 2014, available online, <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/defence-secretary-meets-abu-dhabi-crown-prince>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

of State for Defence Affairs.<sup>874</sup> His relationship with MBZ goes back to his, and MBZ's tenure in the military; Hendrik Van Der Meulen notes that in 1997 'Muhammad al-Bawardi is the Director of the Private Office of UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Lt. General Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid Al-Nuhayyan'.<sup>875</sup> The close relationship between MBZ and Mohammed al Bowardi illustrates not only the centralization of power around the former, but that through an array of institutions under the direct control of MBZ, he has been able to cultivate and co-opt a new generation of leaders who will support him during his own inevitable reign.

The fourth is Jassem al Zaabi. His tribal pedigree has firmly rooted his family's allegiance to the Al Nahyans, as in 1968, Sheikh Zayed invited the *Al Za'ab* tribe to resettle in Abu Dhabi, from Ras al Khaimah, in a bid to readjust the domestic tribal dynamics of the UAE in Abu Dhabi's favour.<sup>876</sup> As a result, the *Al Za'ab* are well represented within public sector offices. During Al Zaabi's time at Mubadala, going back to 2008, Al Zaabi had been responsible for the

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<sup>874</sup> 'Sheikh Khalifa Approves The New 12<sup>th</sup> Cabinet of the United Arab Emirates', *United Arab Emirates The Cabinet*, available online, <https://www.uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/sheikh-khalifa-approves-the-new-12th-cabinet-of-the-united-arab-emirates>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

He had also previously served as Secretary General of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council from 2004-2011. He was since alleviated from his position by Khalifa bin Zayed when he appointed Ahmed Mubarak al Mazrouei to the position as Secretary General. 'Khalifa Appoints Ahmed al Mazrouei as Secretary General of Abu Dhabi's Executive Council', *WAM*, 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2011, available online, [http://wam.ae/ar/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1289996157259&pagename=WAM%2FWAM\\_E\\_La\\_yout&parent=Collection&parentid=1135099399983](http://wam.ae/ar/servlet/Satellite?c=WamLocEnews&cid=1289996157259&pagename=WAM%2FWAM_E_La_yout&parent=Collection&parentid=1135099399983), date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>875</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.194

<sup>876</sup> H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, p.164

firm's ICT-related investment. During this period, he worked closely with MBZ's eldest son, Khaled bin Mohammed bin Zayed, and their close working relationship has reflected into the wider public and security sector. As far back as 2013, al Zaabi was noted to have become Director General of NESAs and as per its mandate, it would defer to the National Security Advisor and his deputy. In the case of the later, this was Khaled bin Mohammed. In February 2017, Khalifa bin Zayed appointed Al Zaabi to the Abu Dhabi Executive Council whereby he assumed the role of Chairman of the Executive Committee Office and Member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council.<sup>877</sup> A further correlation of time spent at Mubadala with a rising public sector career is illustrated through the trajectory of Jassem al Zaabi.

The lastly overt example of a how a successful career within Mubadala has led to political success and greater responsibility is Mubadala CEO, Khaldoon Mubarak. Due to his position at the helm of Mubadala throughout its growth, Mubarak has likewise risen in significance. He has now assumed the positions of Chairman of the Executive Affairs Authority and a member of the ADEC.<sup>878</sup>

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<sup>877</sup> WAM, 'Khalifa Issues Emiri Decree on Abu Dhabi Accountability and Housing Authorities, Executive Committee of Abu Dhabi', *Emirates 24/7*, 19<sup>th</sup> February 2017, available online, <https://www.emirates247.com/news/government/khalifa-issues-emiri-decrees-on-abu-dhabi-accountability-and-housing-authorities-executive-committee-of-abu-dhabi-2017-02-19-1.648389>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>878</sup> 'Member Detail', *General Secretariat of the Executive Council*, available online, <https://www.ecouncil.ae/en/ADGovernment/Pages/MemberDetail.aspx?mid=7>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

Through the five aforementioned examples a trend is emerging, whereby Mubadala is becoming a significant base for upward mobility within the public sector. The increased emphasis on nationalisation is evidenced through the numerical increase in Emirati board members and reduced presence of foreigners among the Mubadala's senior leadership; this trend is markedly distinct from when the Arab Spring erupted. The transition of these figures onto wider political positions further highlights the symbolic role played by Mubadala within the UAE's political community and is also symbolic of the discreet response made by the UAE's political establishment to the Arab Spring. MBZ's careful nurturing of Mubadala since 2002 is a clear example of a method used to pre-empt the crown prince dilemma, as he has used Mubadala as a vehicle for co-option and alliance building, and in this way ensuring his smooth ascension to power.

### **Emirates Investment Authority (EIA)**

The EIA is unique in the sense that it is a federal level entity that 'is mandated to strategically invest funds allocated by the Federal Government to create long-term value for the UAE and contribute to the future prosperity of the country'.<sup>879</sup> The EIA was created through Federal Decree Law No.4 of 2007 and later amended by Federal Decree Law No.13 of 2009. Sara Bazoobandi explains that the state's unequal distribution of natural resources and wealth led to the creation of the EIA; however due to its low profile and position within Abu Dhabi,<sup>880</sup>

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<sup>879</sup> 'Guiding Principles', *Emirates Investment Authority*, available online, <http://www.eia.gov.ae>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>880</sup> S Bazoobandi, *The Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds*, p.96

the EIA still regarded as a solely Abu Dhabi-focused entity. It not pertinent to analyse further the EIA here, taking into account its lack of specific focus on the Abu Dhabi regime.

### **Effective Privileged Economic Network**

Fundamental to the UAE's post-Arab Spring regime security strategy is the manipulation and cultivation of relationships and alliances. This is further exemplified within the state capitalism framework that emphasises 'the existence of close ties binding together those who govern a country and those who run its enterprises'.<sup>881</sup>

In the UAE the relationship between the state and the PREs is extremely close. Khaled Al Mezaini supports this observation by hypothesising that 'the relationship between merchant elites, social elites and the ruling families of the UAE are and have been based on the patrimonial regime, with a political-economic exchange between the political elites and merchant elites'.<sup>882</sup> By means of the state led capitalist model, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has successfully structured the hierarchy and organisation of the state-society in its favour; in this way, the regime has ensured that not only is its fiscal future secure but that through effective co-optation, there is a long-term strategy to align aspects of society to the ruling family. In other words, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has efficiently exploited the finite resource of oil to permanently structure society in its image.

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<sup>881</sup> I Bremmer, 'State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free Market?', p.44

<sup>882</sup> K AlMezaini, 'Private Sector Actors in the UAE and Their Role in the Process of Economic and Political Reform', in S Hertog, G Luciani, and M Valeri (eds.), *Business Politics in the Middle East*, p.65

The state's handling of oil and the economy has created a dual tiered society in which the state remains a monolith within official and corporate sectors and the limited private sector remains fairly open and competitive to a mainly foreign participating environment. Concurrently, the development and sustainment of a healthy private sector is a critically important vision for the regime, as it can alleviate the burden of employment, growth, and expenditure. In this vein the state has to maintain a delicate balancing act as foreign nationals desire greater commercial openness and flexibility, while 'many groups who form the core constituencies of these regimes (for example, public sector workers, bureaucrats, army officers, crony capitalists) staunchly oppose economic reform, and embracing it would put the regimes' political foundation at risk'.<sup>883</sup> The aspect of fiscal sociology which separates the interests of national citizens from their foreign counterparts further complicates the potential for a future healthy economy as 'policies that are detrimental to private business hardly affect nationals qua investors'<sup>884</sup>. While within the UAE there is a significant separation between Emirati nationals and foreign citizens, due to the latter's relative insignificance to the UAE's rulers, it is the socioeconomic position and relationship of the UAE's citizens that takes precedent.

It is henceforth critically important to highlight the feature of agency within the UAE's management of the economy. In each of the four pillars of the state capitalist model, the Abu Dhabi ruling family has clearly illustrated a degree of pre-meditated control and organisation.

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<sup>883</sup> Bellin, E, *The Political-Economic Conundrum: The Affinity of Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East and North Africa*, p.7

<sup>884</sup> S Hertog, *The Private Sector and Reform in the Gulf Cooperation Council*, p.40

The characteristics of the regime focused economic network are tribal affiliation, kinship relationship to MBZ, and increasingly, technocratic success. Within each strategic level entity, it has been shown that these three values have been the determining factor within which the regime has fallen back on to strengthen its grip and control over economic affairs.

Due to the increased concentration of power in the post-Arab Spring era, there are now only a handful of overly powerful entities that manage the UAE's strategic economy; SPC, ADNOC, ADIA, and Mubadala. Through these four institutions, the wider array of state assets and the ecosystems they interact with can be managed by a small team of carefully selected personnel. The micromanagement approach to affairs ensures that this small and trusted team can deal with multiple assets whilst delegating specialist roles to technocratic personnel, ensuring control but also providing support and encouragement to persons who can empower the state's capabilities. It also acts as a mechanism of upward social mobility and evidences a clear series of examples for those who want to increase their stature and power within society. In this way, the regime can continue to co-opt the PRE's and reward aspects of society for their contribution to assets that enhance the state's economic power.

The network of infrastructural control and management has clearly been enhanced following the Arab Spring. This suggests that it has been a deliberate strategy to retain a tight control over economic activities. The state's dominant role within the Post-Arab Spring economy highlights the deliberate central planning and gravitation around the state. This ensures that state-society relations can continue to be directed in favour of the state, and thus prevent any independent power centre from emerging beyond the direct control of the regime.

## Chapter 9 - Industrial Control

The stability of the UAE, like that of other rentier states, was deeply shaken by the Arab Spring. Debates surrounding the rentier social contract and the role of the state in social and national development ushered in a period of public accountability and the subsequent state response. Where possible, authoritarian states enhanced methods of co-optation; however, this strategy is only possible if the coffers are aplenty. As a result, it becomes a strategic mandate of the state to ensure a sustained lifecycle of fund generation. While the previous chapter examined how the Abu Dhabi ruling family has managed economic resources to strengthen its regime security strategy, this chapter will explore how the development of the UAE's industrial sector has also been employed as a key complementary measure towards achieving the same goal.

According to Anthony Giddens, 'modern industry is intrinsically based on divisions of labour, not only on the level of job tasks but on that of regional specialisation in terms of type of industry, skills, and the production of raw materials'.<sup>885</sup> In this regard, and as a clearly defined rentier state, the foundation for the development of the UAE's industry originates from the regime's management of natural resources. This in turn reinforces the lens of state led capitalism in assessing how markets have been used to extend the political and economic

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<sup>885</sup> A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Stamford, 1990, p. 76

leverage of, in this case, the Abu Dhabi ruling family.<sup>886</sup> This is due to the fact that the state's assets are in fact owned and directly managed by the regime, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Industry is a core concept within Anthony Giddens' dimensions of modernity, with it described as 'the main axis of interaction of human beings with nature in conditions of modernity'.<sup>887</sup> Industry is thus defined as 'a group of productive enterprises of organizations that produce or supply goods, services, or sources of income'.<sup>888</sup> The management and development of industry is often seen in conjunction with that of the economy, encompassing the commonly understood process of industrialisation. While 'the aim of [economic] diversification is spreading risk by creating a variety of income sources; industrialization in its broadest understanding is the process of creating these diverse income sources'.<sup>889</sup> Scholars

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<sup>886</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market; Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?* , Portfolio/Penguin, New York, 2010, p.52

<sup>887</sup> A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Stamford, 1990, p.60

<sup>888</sup> M Hvidt, *Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Records and Future Trends*, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics and Political Science, January 2013, p.9

According to the United Nations (UN), there are 21 categories to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). 'Broad Structure', *International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities*, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, Revision 4, New York, 2008, .p43

<sup>889</sup> M Hvidt, *Economic Diversification in GCC Countries: Past Records and Future Trends*, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics and Political Science, January 2013, p.9

such as Matthew Gray,<sup>890</sup> Peter Moore,<sup>891</sup> and Gregory Gause,<sup>892</sup> amongst others, have discussed how economic issues are increasingly becoming viewed as traditional security threats, and therefore are being interpreted in a more conventional way. It is within this context that this chapter seeks to examine how the strategic management of industrial development has been used to develop the UAE's economy and, in turn, its regime security strategy.

Global industrial development has occurred asymmetrically, with the MENA region being classified as one of late developers.<sup>893</sup> To exemplify this trend within the UAE's context, it is claimed that 'in early 1966, the capital [Abu Dhabi] had about 30 vehicles'<sup>894</sup> while it is

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<sup>890</sup> M Gray, 'A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf', *Occasional Paper No.7*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2011, p.13

<sup>891</sup> PW Moore, 'Rents and Late Development in the Arab World', *American Political Science Association*, 5<sup>th</sup> September 2004

<sup>892</sup> G Gause, *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1994

<sup>893</sup> SD Krasner, *Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism*, University of California Press, London, 1985

GJ Ikenberry, 'The State and Strategies of International Adjustment', *World Politics*, Vol.39, No.1, October, 1986

J Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988

<sup>894</sup> R Ghazal, 'When Abu Dhabi had 30 cars', *The National*, 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2011, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/when-abu-dhabi-had-30-cars-1.432812>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2019

reported that in 2010 there were 2,260,000 cars registered in all of the UAE.<sup>895</sup> Because the UAE has a primitive industry, it is dependent on foreign support for its development; both in terms of technology and manpower. Importantly, however, while 'it is more difficult for the capitalist countries to manage their economies than formerly was the case, given accelerating global economic interdependence',<sup>896</sup> it can be argued that the UAE is making use of the increased international commercial competitiveness for their own strategic benefit.<sup>897</sup> The best example of this phenomenon is the UAE's economic investment in allied states for augmented strategic gain,<sup>898</sup> as it binds these states to the future of the UAE.

Observing the broader MENA context, many of the region's states are classified as rentiers due to their dependence on the sale of natural resources for a significant portion of their coffers; these states are thus required to develop the necessary infrastructure that allows them to exploit the available raw resources. In this vein, it is now common for every form of largescale public sector procurement to extrapolate some form of reinvestment in the local

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<sup>895</sup> 'United Arab Emirates', *World Health Organisation (WHO)*, available online, [https://www.who.int/violence\\_injury\\_prevention/road\\_safety\\_status/2013/country\\_profiles/united\\_arab\\_emirates.pdf?ua=1](https://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/2013/country_profiles/united_arab_emirates.pdf?ua=1), date accessed, 2<sup>nd</sup> February 2019

<sup>896</sup> A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, p.76

<sup>897</sup> Anthony Giddens adds to this observation by stating that 'modern industry is intrinsically based on divisions of labour, not only on the level of job tasks but on that of regional specialisation in terms of type of industry, skills, and the production of raw materials' A Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, p.76

<sup>898</sup> Financial investments include the purchase of Manchester City Football Club (MCFC) and the management of several overseas ports by Dubai Ports World (DP).

industry. David Becker expands by explaining how states maximise profits for domestic and political gain:<sup>899</sup>

‘The underlying mechanism is the production for exportation of mineral products, conducted such that a portion of the earned surplus is captured by the local state. The surplus share accruing to the state is distributed thus: to support the state apparatus financially, to develop other economic sectors related distantly or not at all to mineral production; and to provide economic benefits to mobilized, vocal societal elements in hopes that they will refrain from challenging the existing structures of political domination and social control’.<sup>900</sup>

There are also formal legal and commercial contracts that ratify the state’s strategy of financial redistribution and contract augmentation. These are commonly known as offsets and are defined as ‘one way of industrializing while at the same time conserving on foreign exchange, and perhaps even reducing the overall financial burden’.<sup>901</sup> Offsets are a central mechanism within the UAE’s large-scale state purchases, most regularly employed in the

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<sup>899</sup> This argument is expanded to include any source of income. For example, while Jordan has no hydrocarbon reserves, the monarchy monopolises foreign aid for its own political benefit. S Greenwood, ‘Jordan’s “New Bargain:” The Political Economy of Regime Security’, *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No.2, Spring 2003, pp.248-268

<sup>900</sup> D Becker, ‘Bonanza Development and the New Bourgeoisie’, in D Becker at al, (eds.), *Postimperialism*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987, in NN Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State; Politics and Society in the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2006, p.235

<sup>901</sup> RE Looney, *Industrial Development and Diversification of the Arabian Gulf Economies*, JAI Press, London, 1994, p.239

aviation and defence sector and have in recent times been used to structure industrial development.

The UAE's industrial development is best examined through the same prism of state led capitalism that was explored in the previous chapter. This places national oil corporations (NOC's), state owned enterprises (SOEs), privately owned national champions (POC's), and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as the vanguards of industrial development.<sup>902</sup>

State led capitalism is distinct from state capitalism as a result of the regime's inherent ownership of resources; while many previous communist states were state capitalists, state led capitalism is distinct because of the direct involvement, ownership and manipulation of the economy by the regime. This is due to the neo-patrimonial nature of authoritarian society that is inherent within state led capitalists. As previously highlighted, neo-patrimony is a 'style of leadership where a sovereign – a monarch or a president – is at the center of an elite web, with subordinate elites that are submissive to the leader but between which the leader encourages competition'.<sup>903</sup> State led capitalists exploit their rentier dimension to structure power to the benefit of the regime, and it was shown in the previous chapter that Abu Dhabi ruling family is no different in this guise. This chapter will likewise illustrate how networks have been constructed to fortify the UAE regime from within the industrial sector.

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<sup>902</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market; Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations?*, Penguin, London, 2010, p.54

<sup>903</sup> M Gray, 'A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf', *Occasional Paper No.7*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2011, p.7

It is equally important for state-capitalists to maintain the ability to exercise power, and in that vein the development of the industrial sector is key. This strategy not only improves the literal accumulation of finances, but is also 'used by state élites for the purposes of "state-building"'.<sup>904</sup> This observation assists the analysis of industrial development as a pillar of the UAE's regime security strategy<sup>905</sup> because 'state capitalists see markets primarily as a tool that serves national interests, or at least those of ruling elites'.<sup>906</sup> In essence, state led capitalists such as the UAE, do use the veneer of state or nation-building to construct new forms of legitimacy whilst maintaining a priority on buttressing their own security interests.

There is a careful balancing act required to ensure that the development of the economy and industry does not endanger the incumbent regime. Matthew Gray explains that there is 'a recognition that more active and entrepreneurial state capitalism can assist in providing state longevity... regimes are taking a more considered and strategic look at their longer-term roles

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<sup>904</sup> M Chatelus and Y Schemeil, 'Towards a New Political Economy of State Industrialization in the Arab Middle East', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.16, 1984, in NN Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State; Politics and Society in the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2006, p.291

<sup>905</sup> Mark Gasiorowski furthers this argument by saying that 'in the absence of others sources of legitimation, a regime can often gain legitimacy by carrying out popular policies', MJ Gasiorowski, 'Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case of Pahlavi Iran', in EE Azar and E Moon (eds.), *National Security in the Third World; The Management of Internal and External Threats*, Center for International Development and Conflict, Edward Elgar Publishing, Aldershot, 1988, p.237

<sup>906</sup> I Bremmer, *The End of the Free Market; Who Wins The War Between States and Corporations?*, Portfolio, Penguin, London, 2010, p.52

as well as their weaknesses and survival strategies'.<sup>907</sup> As a result, there are differing strategies employed to develop industrial and economic assets whilst still continuing the requirement to ensure the regime is continually insulated. Nazih Ayubi highlights this policy dilemma by explaining that 'the state appears to be obliged to sacrifice one of its two pillars of legitimacy: welfarism or developmentalism':<sup>908</sup> Consequently, it is a political requirement for an autocratic regime, such as the UAE, to sustain developmental programs that both develop the capacity to incur finances whilst also providing a social platform that manages forms of legitimation. Whilst numerous scholars have discussed evolutionary images of rentierism, this thesis postulates that the rentier states of the GCC are attempting to move towards a more diversified economy that remains micro-managed by the regime but is exploited to generate additional streams of legitimation. This chapter will therefore highlight how industrial development and its many accompanying strategies have worked to maximize political control across society.

### **National Development Plans (NDPs)**

NDPs are a common trend across the GCC, given that all of the concerned states face similar vulnerabilities and threats. According to Matthew Gray, 'most of these states set strategic goals and visions rather than seek to centrally plan or manage the economy'.<sup>909</sup>

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<sup>907</sup> M Gray, 'A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf', *Occasional Paper No.7*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2011, pp.21-22

<sup>908</sup> NN Ayubi, *Over-Stating the Arab State; Politics and Society in the Middle East*, I.B. Tauris, London, 2006, p.336

<sup>909</sup> M Gray, 'A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf', *Occasional Paper No.7*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2011, p.32

Fundamentally, the primary difficulty encountered by GCC states in this respect is implementing a successful transition from a resource-dependent economy to a diversified one. NDPs illustrate the strategy that these states will undertake in assisting their efforts towards economic diversification. The most prominent example of an NDP in the region is Saudi Vision 2030<sup>910</sup> however, the UAE had initiated its own roster of NDPs over a decade before.

Some of the UAE's NDPs have included UAE Vision 2021,<sup>911</sup> Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030,<sup>912</sup> Dubai Strategic Plan 2015<sup>913</sup> & 2021,<sup>914</sup> and Abu Dhabi Urban Planning Vision 2030.<sup>915</sup> More recently, in November 2018 at the second annual government meeting, seven new NDP's and one hundred initiatives were unveiled. These NDP's not only illustrate the UAE's economic growth targets, but were also aimed at showing evidence of the progress made thus far in the country's development.<sup>916</sup>

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<sup>910</sup> Saudi Vision 2030 is a NDP created and promoted by the then, Deputy Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman. This was created with the intention of highlighting how Saudi Arabia was aiming to develop its industrial and economic base.

<sup>911</sup> <https://www.vision2021.ae/en>

<sup>912</sup> <https://www.ecouncil.ae/PublicationsEn/economic-vision-2030-full-versionEn.pdf>

<sup>913</sup> <https://www.dubaipplan2021.ae/dubai-plan-2021/>

<sup>914</sup> <https://www.dubaipplan2021.ae/dubai-plan-2021/>

<sup>915</sup> <https://www.ecouncil.ae/PublicationsEn/plan-abu-dhabi-full-version-EN.pdf>

<sup>916</sup> S Salama, 'UAE Outlines National Development Plan', *Gulf News*, 27<sup>th</sup> November 2018, available online, <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/uae-outlines-national-development-plan-1.60609687>, accessed on, 7<sup>th</sup>

There has been a steep increase in the number of NDPs created in the UAE since the Arab Spring, leading to the hypothesis that this is due to the regime's acknowledgement of the economic vulnerabilities the state faces. It is important to note that while NDPs illustrate a roadmap for progress they do not guarantee success, an observation corroborated by Kristian Ulrichsen.<sup>917</sup> While many of the NDPs have been composed in particular economic circumstances, becoming irrelevant after a short time. The most prominent examples of short term strategic NDPs are the Qatar Vision 2030 and the Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2016.

Due to the political and economic nature of such programmes, NDPs are attached to the individuals or institutions who generate them. It was Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) who led the Saudi Vision 2030, while Dubai ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum is often the public face of economic and societal development within the UAE.<sup>918</sup> Through the state led capitalism model, it is clear that NDPs have been constructed to expand the state's reach, increase scope of co-opted persons, and develop the state and society in the image of a person or persons. However, Abu Dhabi, has adopted a subtler approach, wherein the state, as opposed to a specific individual, is for the most part the figurehead in development. This is part of a carefully manufactured nation building strategy that seeks to

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<sup>917</sup> KC Ulrichsen, *The Politics of Economic Reform in the Arab Gulf States*, Centre for the Middle East, Rice University, 2016, p.13

<sup>918</sup> CM Davidson, 'The United Arab Emirates: Economy First, Politics Second', in J Teitelbaum (ed.), *Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf*, Hurst & Co, London, 2009

generate support around the UAE as a singular nation and state, and with MBZ as its figurehead and father. This ensures a greater emotional link with the regime and whomever its sitting ruler is.

The highest authority responsible for structuring the UAE's and Abu Dhabi's development is the Abu Dhabi Executive Council (ADEC). The Abu Dhabi Executive Council is 'like a council of ministers, with the Chairman of the Executive Council effectively a Prime Minister';<sup>919</sup> an observation Christopher Davidson agrees with.<sup>920</sup> The ADEC is an indicator of tribal and more recently, kinship dynamics around the Abu Dhabi Crown Prince MBZ, whom, since 2007, has demonstratively reorganised the ADEC for his own power base.<sup>921</sup>

The appointment in 2019 of two of MBZ's sons, Khalid and Theyab, to the ADEC illustrates the shift in dynastic lineages from Khalifa bin Zayed's to MBZ's descendants; a dramatic change in power dynamics between the two brothers. By contrast in 2019 only one son of Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan, Mohammed bin Khalifa, is still part of the ADEC.<sup>922</sup> This move puts in evidence MBZ's lineage expansion, growing influence and power in the ADEC, and thus in the industrialisation and economic development of the UAE.

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<sup>919</sup> H van der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, PhD Thesis, Tufts University, 1997, p.94

<sup>920</sup> C Davidson, *Abu Dhabi; Oil and Beyond*, Hurst & Co, London, 2009, p124

<sup>921</sup> Appendix 12 Evolution of The Tribal and Kinship Dynamics Within the Abu Dhabi Executive Council (ADEC)

<sup>922</sup> Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed appointed his sons Sultan and Mohammed to the ADEC in 2007 but only the latter remains part of the Council.

Moreover, through his management of personnel on the ADEC, MBZ has balanced tribal and kinship principals to deliver a platform that supports his own agenda. As a starting point, MBZ has resorted to endorsing tribal links as a means of dominating the ADEC. Concurrently, it is important to note that there has been a decrease proportionally in the number of Bani Yas members on the ADEC.<sup>923</sup> In combination with this, while there were five sons of Sheikh Zayed on the ADEC in 2007, they were of mixed maternal heritage. By 2019, not only were there four sons of Sheikh Zayed in the ADEC, but they were all from the same power bloc, the Bani Fatima. This shift demonstrates MBZ's strategy to monopolise the ADEC with figures from his own kin, thereby increasing his control and influence.

Understanding the potential risks emanating from within his family, MBZ has supplemented what would have previously been limited to tribal alliances for kinship and technocratic ability. Due to their lesser to non-existing power within the ruling elite, these figures do not represent a threat to the regime; their positions rely on their success and allegiance to the regime and their directives; should they fail, they are easily replaceable for others with similar technical capacities. Notable non-ruling family figures exemplifying the implementation of this strategy are Jassem al Zaabi, Saif al Hajeri, Falah Mohammed al Ahabbi, Sara Awad Issa Musallam, Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak, and Mohammed Khalifa al Mubarak, all of whom are members of the ADEC and who have professional history at Mubadala where MBZ is the

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<sup>923</sup> In 2007 78% of the ADEC were Bani Yas tribesman (14/18), while there 64% in 2010 (9/14), 60% in 2016 (9/15), and 63% in 2019 (12/19).

Chairman. This demonstrates a direct link between having a strong relationship with MBZ and a successful career as a technocrat within the UAE.

Furthermore, the shrinking and expansion of the ADEC, before and after the Arab Spring, signals a deliberate strategy to initially consolidate and then fortify the political power which has been generated by the political establishment. The ADEC shrunk from 18 members in 2007, of which 14 were Bani Yas members, down to 14 members in 2010, of whom only 9 were from the Bani Yas. The ADEC was then expanded by one member in 2016, before being expanded to 19 members in 2019 – 12 Bani Yas figures are currently part of the council. The dynamics of personnel appointment to the ADEC illustrates the transition of power to MBZ, establishing him as ADEC's locus.

From looking at the evolution of the ADEC, it is possible to identify that there has been a dominant influence of tribal and kinship factors in the development of the Council. Furthermore, the reduction in size of the ADEC at the height of the Arab Spring until a gradual increase in its membership from 2016 shows how ruling family members are aware of the potential competitive threat from other elites and are extremely selective about their admission to such strategic entities. The singular factor that illustrates the development of the ADEC is the rise of MBZ and his utility of the ADEC for the development of his own power base.

By controlling the body that directs the creation of strategy, the regime can keep a constant oversight of development and progress to suit their own agenda across a wide array of sectors. The dynamic observed within the ADEC is also noted by Matthew Gray who explains

this strategy saying that it ‘serves both the practical aim of maintaining the political status quo, and the simultaneous appearance of being consultative with society’.<sup>924</sup> This underpins a neo-patrimonial system of governance that controls economic and industrial concerns; one which is structured vertically with the principal at the top. This is best shown through the state led capitalist model as it places the regime centrally through each entity.

### **National Oil Company (NOC)**

The UAE’s financial base has originated from the sale of its natural resources. Investment flooded the UAE to develop the production and export of its petroleum products. The strategic management of the National Oil Company (NOC) and its domestic ramifications was previously discussed in chapter 8. This section will assess how the NOC has been used to facilitate the development of infrastructure, human resources, and financially generating assets.

While the aim for the Abu Dhabi ruling family is to diversify away from oil, which is intrinsically an unstable asset, it continues to be the backbone of the state’s economy. This is formalised within the still enforced 1979 Federal Industrial Law<sup>925</sup> which, as summarised by Fatima al Shamsi, was still centred around the base of profits derived by the oil and gas sector; ‘1. For

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<sup>924</sup> M Gray, ‘A Theory of “Late Rentierism” in the Arab States of the Gulf’, *Occasional Paper No.7*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2011, p.25

<sup>925</sup> *Federal Law No.1 of 1979*, Ministry of Finance, available online,

<https://www.mof.gov.ae/Ar/lawsAndPolitics/govLaws/Documents/20%201979%اقتصادىقانون20%201979%اقتصادى>

[شئون20%الصناعة20%اقتصادى.pdf](#), date accessed, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2019

the Government to prepare a productive base capable of allowing manufacturing industries to thrive and thereby reduce the reliance on oil'.<sup>926</sup>

The predominant NOC within the UAE is the ADNOC, and within its conglomerate lay multiple entities that provide both upstream and downstream services. According to the 2015 ADNOC sustainability report there are '20 diversified and integrated group companies',<sup>927</sup> illustrating how far developed ADNOC is. Moreover, ADNOC employs 'nearly 65,000 employees',<sup>928</sup> of which it was reported in 2014, ADNOC wanted 75% to be Emirati nationals.<sup>929</sup> Presumably, this is in response to the ADNOC sustainability report that highlights only 34.1% of the workforce are Emirati nationals.<sup>930</sup> While this is a relatively low figure, given the low numbers of Emiratis in the country (less than ten percent of the total population), those employed by ADNOC represent a substantial cut of the total Emirati population in the country.

By comparison to strategic level entities such as the SPC, the ADNOC board of directors made up of technocrats. This illustrates the absent features of tribalism and kinship shown so predominantly elsewhere in the country's industrial arena.

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<sup>926</sup> FS Al Shamsi, 'Industrial Strategies and Change in the UAE During the 1980's', in A Abdekarim (ed.), *Change and Development in the Gulf*, Macmillan, London, 1999, p.83

<sup>927</sup> ADNOC Group Sustainability Report 2015; *Taking Innovation to New Heights*, ADNOC, 2015, p.8

<sup>928</sup> ADNOC Group Sustainability Report 2015; *Taking Innovation to New Heights*, ADNOC, 2015, p.15

<sup>929</sup> HM Kumar, 'ADNOC to Spend \$5bn on Capacity', *Gulf News*, 29<sup>th</sup> October 2010, available online, <https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/adnoc-to-spend-5b-on-capacity-1.703468>, date accessed, 11<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>930</sup> ADNOC Group Sustainability Report 2015; *Taking Innovation to New Heights*, ADNOC, 2015, p.30

Table 12 ADNOC Executive Management<sup>931</sup> - As of 12<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<b>Role</b>	<b>Name</b>
Chief Executive Officer (CEO)	Dr. Sultan Ahmed al Jaber
Director, Upstream Directorate	Abdulmunim Saif al Kindy
Director, Downstream Directorate	Abdulaziz Abdulla Alhajri
Director, Marketing, Supply & Trading Directorate	Khaled Salmeen
Director, Executive Officer Directorate	Omar Suwaina al Suwaidi
Director, Finance and Investment Directorate	Matar Hamdan al Ameri
Director, Business and Commercial Support Directorate	Rashed Saud al Shamsi
Director, Human Capital & Administration Directorate	Ghannam al Mazrouei
Chief Legal Counsel, Legal, Governance and Compliance	Salem Mohammed al Darei
Manager, Health, Safety & Environment	Abdulla al Marzooqi
Manager, Audit & Assurance	Ahmed Abujarad

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<sup>931</sup> 'Executive Management', ADNOC, available online, <https://www.adnoc.ae/en/about-us/executive-management>, date accessed, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2019

The lack of tribal or kinship relationships among the ADNOC board of directors denotes an emphasis on technocratic ability. This would exemplify how important it is for the Abu Dhabi ruling family to have an efficient and working NOC that can deliver regular funds to support the development of the state and thus shield the regime.<sup>932</sup> This observation is supported by Steffen Hertog<sup>933</sup> and Matthew Gray

It is within this context that the appointment of Sultan al Jaber as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 2016<sup>934</sup> indicated an acknowledgment of the required changes for ADNOC and the UAE to diversify and evolve its industrial capabilities. According to Sultan Al Jaber, the mission entrusted to him by MBZ was to initiate a 'step-change, comprehensive transformation'.<sup>935</sup> This was heralded as a cataclysmic event for the UAE as Al Jaber had previously made a career at Mubadala where he was Head of Energy and launched the renewable energy company Masdar. The combination of Al Jaber's background and the slump in global oil prices illustrated the path the UAE would be making in regard to its dependency on the production

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<sup>932</sup> This is a short term strategy, but the long term issue must 'make use of oil revenues to create a viable economy that will sustain a relatively high level of income after the oil era'. AA Kubursi, *Oil, Industrialization & Development In The Arab Gulf States*, Croom Helm, London, 1984, p.3

<sup>933</sup> S Hertog, 'Lean and Mean: The New Breed of State-Owned Enterprises in the Gulf Monarchies', in JF Seznec and M Kirk (eds.), *Industrialization in the Gulf: A Socioeconomic Revolution*, Routledge, London, 2011

<sup>934</sup> 'Khalifa Appoints Sultan Al Jaber As Director-General of ADNOC', *WAM*, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2016, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395291637840>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>935</sup> E Crooks, 'Sultan Al Jaber: changing the mindset of a 50-year-old institution', *Financial Times*, 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2019, available online, <https://www.ft.com/content/48884808-3a73-11e9-b72b-2c7f526ca5d0>, accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

of oil. In July 2020, Sultan al Jaber was appointed as Minister of Industry and Advanced Technology, a new organisation designed to foster and initiate the UAE's industrial development.<sup>936</sup> Due to al Jaber's career trajectory it becomes clear that his symbolic rise is an illustration of the regime's attempt to increase its control and leadership of industrial development.

Firstly, ADNOC has attracted a series of investments from foreign firms into the UAE's oil and gas sector. This has come from renewing onshore concessions,<sup>937</sup> awarding new offshore concessions,<sup>938</sup> issuing a \$3bn international bond,<sup>939</sup> listing of ADNOC distribution,<sup>940</sup>

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<sup>936</sup> President approves new structure of UAE Government', *WAM*, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2020, available online, <https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395302853277>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>937</sup> 'ADNOC Awards China's CEFC 4% Interest in ADCO Onshore Concession', Press Release, *ADNOC*, 21<sup>st</sup> February 2017, available online, <https://adnoc.ae/en/news-and-media/press-releases/adnoc-onshore/2017/adnoc-awards-china-cefc-interest-in-adco-onshore-concession>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>938</sup> 'ADNOC signs offshore concession agreements with Total', *WAM*, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2018, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302675461>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>939</sup> 'ADCOP successfully issues US\$3 billion bond', *WAM*, 6<sup>th</sup> November 2017, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302644482>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>940</sup> 'ADNOC Distribution revenue and profit increases in 2017', *WAM*, 14<sup>th</sup> February 2018, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302667456>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

competitive block licensing,<sup>941</sup> and a \$550m investment for US firm Baker Hughes for a 5% stake in ADNOC drilling.<sup>942</sup>

The decision taken by Sultan al Jaber as head of ADNOC to generate supplementary revenue streams from asset sales and partnership agreements is one which runs contrary to its previous policy, and thus highlights a novel approach to the management of the NOC.<sup>943</sup> With oil at a lower sustained price, it was crucial for ADNOC to attract sizeable funds to ensure a long-term profitability. In this mindset, ADNOC was able to successfully spread its risk and exposure to the international market. This means that the foundations of the UAE's financially generating resources remain stable, and thus are able to provide the regime with the enduring capability to deliver funds for even the most basic public services.

Secondly, ADNOC is seeking to modify its profile to accommodate demand and spread risk. This is coming mainly in the form of investment and development within the petrochemical sector. ADNOC CEO Sultan al Jaber estimates that by 2050 the petrochemical industry will

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<sup>941</sup> 'ADNOC awards Eni-PTTEP Consortium two offshore exploration blocks', *WAM*, 12<sup>th</sup> January 2019, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302731813>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>942</sup> 'ADNOC, BHGE form strategic partnership to grow ADNOC Drilling into fully-integrated drilling and well construction business', *WAM*, 8<sup>th</sup> October 2018, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302712590>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>943</sup> This is again noted by Matthew Gray as one of his pillars of late rentierism. '*Feature 4: An "energy-Driven vs. an "Energy-Centric" Economy*', M Gray, 'A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf', *Occasional Paper No.7*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2011, p.30

grow by 60% within the GCC region.<sup>944</sup> It is clearly not only an objective for ADNOC to invest in the petrochemical market, but also for the wider industrial sector within the UAE. This was heavily stressed by a cooperation agreement that granted to 'build on Mubadala's diverse portfolio of refining and petrochemicals assets and support ADNOC's international Downstream investment ambitions'.<sup>945</sup>

This should be seen in connection with investments made both domestically and abroad by ADNOC, into the petrochemical sector. In the UAE, ADNOC announced in May 2018 a \$45bn investment to develop 'the world's largest integrated refining and petrochemicals facility'<sup>946</sup> in Abu Dhabi. In the accompanying statement by ADNOC the company estimated that this single investment would contribute 1% annually to the UAE's GDP.<sup>947</sup> Apart from investing in

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<sup>944</sup> J Gnana and S Khan, 'Regional Petchems to Grow by 60% by 2050, says ADNOC CEO', *The National*, 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2018, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/regional-petchems-to-grow-by-60-by-2050-says-adnoc-ceo-1.783468>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>945</sup> 'ADNOC and Mubadala to Jointly Explore Global Investment and Growth Opportunities as ADNOC Expands its Downstream Footprint', Press Releases, *Mubadala*, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2018, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/adnoc-and-mubadala-jointly-explore-global-investment-and-growth-opportunities>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>946</sup> 'UAE Economy Set For Dh165 billion petrochemical boost', *The National*, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2018, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/uae-economy-set-for-dh165-billion-petrochemicals-boost-1.730304>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>947</sup> F Rahman, 'ADNOC Unveils \$45bn Expansion of Ruwais Complex', *Gulf News*, 13<sup>th</sup> May 2018, available online, <https://gulfnews.com/business/energy/adnoc-unveils-45b-expansion-of-ruwais-complex-1.2220790>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

the petrochemical industry directly, there are additional benefits such as the creation of homes, jobs, and development of the wider non-oil sector that will assist the UAE's diversification.<sup>948</sup> The \$45bn investment also seeks to enhance and accelerate the UAE's production of oil, increasing its daily capacity by more than 65%.<sup>949</sup>

Looking abroad, ADNOC took an equal 50% share in a partnership with Saudi Aramco for an investment to jointly develop the Ratnagiri refining and chemicals complex.<sup>950</sup> When assessing the decision by ADNOC to invest in a foreign market, the factors of leadership, state of current economic market, and strategic foresight indicate a long-term plan to fortify ADNOC's investment in the oil and gas sector. While India had not been a close partner of the GCC states, its recent warming of relations has generated enormous commercial potential and has, in this case, prompted the development of the UAE's petrochemical industry. As one of the world's largest markets who is situated in close proximity to the UAE, it only makes sense to strengthen the position of ADNOC as a leading producer of petrochemicals for the Indian market and beyond.

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<sup>948</sup> S Kerr, 'Adnoc plots \$45bn downstream investment boost', *Financial Times*, 13<sup>th</sup> May 2018, available online, <https://www.ft.com/content/092a2170-56aa-11e8-bdb7-f6677d2e1ce8>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2018

<sup>949</sup> 'UAE Economy Set For Dh165 billion petrochemical boost', *The National*, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2018, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/uae-economy-set-for-dh165-billion-petrochemicals-boost-1.730304>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>950</sup> 'ADNOC, Saudi Aramco and India Consortium sign framework agreement to explore US\$44 billion mega refinery development', *WAM*, 25<sup>th</sup> June 2018, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302696036>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

ADNOC has a large responsibility to develop infrastructure within the UAE and this has only increased since the Arab Spring. In an attempt to fortify its own domestic and international position within the natural resources market, ADNOC has attracted and dedicated funds to boost its development. This has seen an influx in investment towards petrochemicals and has aided the development of public infrastructure towards rural areas.<sup>951</sup> While the UAE seeks to diversify its own energy sources, it must still continue to exploit its own oil reserves.

While fundamentally oil and, in particular ADNOC have provided the basis for the initial and constant contribution of funds to the UAE's industrial sector and economy, they have also provided the backbone for further investments across the UAE's investment network.<sup>952</sup> This is evidenced by the state led capitalism model.

It has been shown by the array of investments made by ADNOC, and through its partnerships that the oil and gas sector is being used as a conduit for wider industrial development and diversification. While oil prices have dipped momentarily, they will naturally increase again

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<sup>951</sup> The clearest example is Al Ruwais within the Abu Dhabi Emirate. J Dennehy, 'Ruweis 2.0: How ADNOC is Transforming Abu Dhabi's Oil Town into a Modern City', *The National*, 10<sup>th</sup> September 2018, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/ruweis-2-0-how-adnoc-is-transforming-abu-dhabi-s-oil-town-into-a-modern-city-1.768875>, date accessed, 25<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>952</sup> This is further verified by ADNOC itself who state that 'We are one of the world's leading energy producers, and a primary catalyst for Abu Dhabi's growth and diversification'. 'About US', *ADNOC*, available online, <https://www.adnoc.ae>, date accessed, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2019

as demand grows and resources dry up.<sup>953</sup> ADNOC is therefore positioning itself to be able to contribute to the UAE's revenue stream in times of both high and low prices, and thus expand the regime's financial fortification; this enables the prolongation of the rentier bargain that secures the Abu Dhabi ruling family.

While ADNOC is leading industrial development within the natural resources market, the UAE has also maintained its pursuit of a civilian nuclear program. This was initiated before the Arab Spring in 2008 with the establishment of the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC).<sup>954</sup> The consistent trajectory suggests that the UAE's nuclear policy has not been affected by the Arab Spring. The Barakh power plant came operational and connected to the UAE's national electric grid in 2020.<sup>955</sup> It is important to note, however, that this development symbolises an attempt to extrapolate additional legitimacy from the state's population through its sponsorship and advocacy towards high-tech and progressive technologies.<sup>956</sup> This is further illustrated through other such high-technology focused strategic programs such as Etihad Rail, Masdar, and the UAE Space Agency.

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<sup>953</sup> 'World Oil Demand', Oil Market Report, *International Energy Agency*, 15<sup>th</sup> March 2019, available online, <https://www.iea.org/oilmarketreport/omrpublic/>, date accessed, 25<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>954</sup> *Sustainability Report 2015*, Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), Abu Dhabi, 2015, available online, <https://www.enec.gov.ae/doc/enec-sustainability-report-2015-58a2bac9d5bd5.pdf>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> May 2019

<sup>955</sup> 'Barakh nuclear power plant connects to UAE grid for first time', *The National*, 19<sup>th</sup> August 2020, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/barakah-nuclear-power-plant-connects-to-uae-grid-for-first-time-1.1065538>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>956</sup> M Kamrava (ed.), *The Nuclear Question in the Middle East*, Hurst & Co, London, 2012

The development of the UAE's natural resource management since the Arab Spring has been one of investment, diversification, and modernisation. This is to ensure that while the regime has been able to insulate themselves from future instable price fluctuations, it will always be able to ensure the fundamental maintenance allowances are met. In such a strategic sector, the regime will continue to dominate, balancing a micro-managed approach to the modernisation of the sector.

### **State owned enterprises (SOEs)**

The state is a key driver of industrialisation, as it is the main motor of capital through its sale of natural resources. The UAE has stood out from many fellow states within the GCC due to its business-focused image. Scholars such as Christopher Davidson,<sup>957</sup> Michael Herb,<sup>958</sup> and Nabil Sultan, Beverly Metcalfe, and David Weir<sup>959</sup> have all discussed the business first approach taken by the UAE, often positioning this strategy as one in contact to every political action. The Emirate of Dubai is often heralded for its diversification and assertive business image. The rest of the UAE has often fallen by the wayside in these regards to SOE's within

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<sup>957</sup> CM Davidson, 'The United Arab Emirates: Economy First, Politics Second', in J Teitelbaum (ed.), *Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf*, Hurst & Co, London, 2009

<sup>958</sup> M Herb, *The Wages of Oil: Parliaments and Economic Development in Kuwait and the UAE*

<sup>959</sup> NA Sultan, BD Metcalfe, and D Weir, 'Building the Foundation for a Post-Oil Era: The Case of the GCC Countries', NA Sultan, BD Metcalfe, and D Weir (eds.), *The New Post-Oil Arab Gulf; Managing People and Wealth*, Saqi Book, London, 2011

industry; however, in recent years there has been a concerted effort to streamline commercial operations in a bid to maximize revenue and capability.

Since the Arab Spring there has been an orchestrated strategy by the Abu Dhabi ruling family which has seen a process of commercial consolidation occurring across the UAE. The first substantial merger was between the National Bank of Abu Dhabi (NBAD) and First Gulf Bank (FGB) into the First Abu Dhabi Bank (FAB) in 2017.<sup>960</sup> It is now reported that FAB is now one of the largest Middle Eastern banks by calculation of total asset value.<sup>961</sup> The second major merger was between Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank (ADCB), Union National Bank (UNB), and Bank Al Hilal<sup>962</sup> in January 2019. The third was the unification of Khalifa University, Petroleum Institute, and the Masdar Institute in 2016.<sup>963</sup> The consolidation of significant financial and education assets not only reduces competition, making it easier for the Abu Dhabi ruling

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<sup>960</sup> J Everington, 'FGB and National Bank of Abu Dhabi choose merged name: First Abu Dhabi Bank', *The National*, 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2017, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/fgb-and-national-bank-of-abu-dhabi-choose-merged-name-first-abu-dhabi-bank-1.643908>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>961</sup> 'Investor Presentation', *First Abu Dhabi Bank (FAB)*, February 2019, available online, <https://www.bankfab.com/-/media/fabgroup/home/about-fab/investor-relations/pdfs/fab-investor-presentation-feb-2019.pdf?view=1>, date accessed, 25<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>962</sup> S Khan, 'UAE banks ADCB and UNB agree on merger and takeover of Al Hilal', *The National*, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2019, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/economy/uae-banks-adcb-and-unb-agree-on-merger-and-takeover-of-al-hilal-1.819488>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>963</sup> The National Staff, 'Abu Dhabi Approves Merger of Universities and Billions in Projects', *The National*, 13<sup>th</sup> October 2016, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/abu-dhabi-approves-merger-of-universities-and-billions-in-projects-1.192240>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> March 2019

family to control the market economy, but also strengthens the SOE's throughout a period of economic downturn. The strategy implemented by the Abu Dhabi ruling family illustrates the prioritisation of efficiency and performance, whilst never relenting their grip on the strategic financial sector which supports the management of the state.

Focusing attention in the banking sector is crucial for the UAE's regime security strategy as large parts of the UAE's diversified economy are positioned within the financial sector. The UAE has become a global hub for the transit of finance, and while the UAE Dirham is pegged to the US dollar, the development of the UAE's banking sector can strengthen the state's economy through the collection of assets and attraction of funds. Through this endeavour, the SOE's can lend money cheaply for domestic projects and contribute to the development of Emirati society. Indeed, the UAE has highlighted the banking sector as a crucial target for Emiratisation. As a result, the banking sector is not only employed to develop industrial capabilities, but also to provide the basis for the development of human capital.

While the process of consolidation has occurred, with the state maintaining control of several assets, it has also initiated a process whereby it is seeking to reduce its ownership of several assets and enterprises. This postulation was observed through the establishment of the Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company (ADDHC) in March 2018.<sup>964</sup> It was later reported that its portfolio would include seven service-based state-owned enterprises; Abu Dhabi Airports, Abu Dhabi Ports, Abu Dhabi National Exhibition Centre, Abu Dhabi Media, Abu Dhabi Power

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<sup>964</sup> 'UAE President Issues Law Establishing Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company', *WAM*, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2018, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302671868>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> May 2019

Company, Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi, and Abu Dhabi Health Services Company.<sup>965</sup>

Through the recalibration of several marque services from public to, possibly and eventually, private institutions, the regime is slowly looking to disconnect direct responsibility for these services. The fact that the aforementioned institutions are predominantly tertiary industries signifies how the government is looking to displace its responsibility of such simplistic capabilities. By contrast, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) is a fully fledged SOE that maintains its position as a modernising entity.

The ADDHC was created as a public joint stock company and was initially chaired and vice-chaired by Jassem al Zaabi and Theyab bin Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan. It was later publicised that Tahnoun bin Zayed was appointed as Chairman of the ADDHC.<sup>966</sup> While MBZ has his second son as Deputy Chairman of the ADDHC, the former chairman is a longstanding ally in Jassem Al Zaabi, and the current chairman is MBZ's full brother Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan; thus, further illustrating the immense weight MBZ places on kinship and tribal relations. This is further supported by the remaining board members of the ADDHC, all of whom again illustrate the same personalistic traits echoed throughout the administration of MBZ's growing tenure.

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<sup>965</sup> H Sayegh and A Cornwell, 'Abu Dhabi's Airports, Ports and Power Firms Moved to New Holding Company', *Reuters*, 29<sup>th</sup> May 2019, available online, <https://www.reuters.com/article/abu-dhabi-services-holding-co/abu-dhabis-airports-ports-and-power-firms-moved-to-new-holding-company-idUSL8N2350N0>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> May 2019

<sup>966</sup> 'Mohammed al Suwaidi Appointed CEO of Abu Dhabi Development Holding', *WAM*, 19<sup>th</sup> May 2019, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302763455>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> May 2019

Table 13 Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company Board of Directors<sup>967</sup>

Dr. Mugheer Khamis al Khalil	Chairman of the Department of Community Development and member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
Major General Mohammed Khalfan al Rumaithi <i>Rumaithat – Section of the Bani Yas</i>	Commander-in-Chief of Abu Dhabi Police and former member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
Sheikh Abdullah bin Mohammed al Hamed <i>Qubaysat – Section of the Bani Yas</i>	Chairman of the Health Department and member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
Dr. ali Rashid al Nuaimi <i>Na'im</i>	Chairman of the Abu Dhabi Department of Education and Knowledge (ADEK) and former

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<sup>967</sup> 'UAE President Issues Law Establishing Abu Dhabi Development Holding Company', WAM, 4<sup>th</sup> March 2018, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302671868>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> May 2019

	member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
Owaida Murshid al Marrar <i>Murar – section of the Bani Yas</i>	Chairman of the Department of Energy and member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
Saif Mohammed al Hajeri	Chairman of Economic Development and member of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
Falah Mohammed al Ahbabi <i>Ahbab</i>	Head of the Department of Urban Planning and Municipalities
Mohammed Khalifa Ahmed al Mubarak	Director General of the Abu Dhabi Finance Department
Mohammed Sultan Ghanoum al Hamli <i>Hawamil – Section of the Bani Yas</i>	Managing Director

Mohamed Hassan al-Suwaidi <sup>968</sup>	Chief Executive Officer
<i>Sudan – Section of the Bani Yas</i>	Ex-Mubadala

The development of SOE's within the UAE since the Arab Spring have shown a clear strategy to reduce waste and competition, whilst also centralising management to retain a tighter control of affairs.<sup>969</sup> This allows a more coherent structure to remain under the direct observation of state elites. It is crucially important for the regime to maintain tight control over SOE's due to the fact that they are designed to be financially profitable entities, but also because they are exposed to international financial currents. This means that SOE's are not able to operate exclusively like they do in their own state, but by international norms and laws. As a consequence, there is a delicate balancing act for authoritarian regimes, such as the UAE, to ensure tight control over financial affairs whilst also exploring avenues for financial gain. This observation explains why there has been a tightening of the ownership and management in SOE's, thus reinforcing the patrimonial power structure of the UAE regime's traditional power base.

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<sup>968</sup> Reuters claim that Suwaidi is the Managing Director, but this is in contrast to WAM, the UAE's official news agency.

<sup>969</sup> S Hertog, 'Public Industry as Tool of Rentier Economy Diversification: The GCC Case', in G Luciani (ed.), *Resource Blessed: Diversification and the Gulf Development Model*, Gerlach Press, Germany, Gulf Research Center, 2012, pp.115-139

SOE's are obvious strategic vehicles for authoritarian states such as the UAE, who are exposed to delicate population dynamics, to leverage greater control over affairs with as little requirement for direct oversight. They lead domestic industrial affairs through the subsidised execution of contracts which support regime allies through preferential contract awards. The Abu Dhabi ruling family has however largely forgone an intimate management of SOE's since the Arab Spring and has instead merged multiple assets into larger entities. The amalgamation of assets demonstrates how the regime security strategy principle of control has been applied to the domain of SOEs to further the regime's control of affairs.

### **Privately owned national champions**

Due to the large-scale investment and development of the state within the industrial sector, primarily through SOEs and SWFs, there does not tend to be much room for private actors to enter the sector. Khaled al Mezaini notes that 'defining the boundaries between what is private and what is public in the UAE is challenging, owing to a lack of clarity in the state structure'.<sup>970</sup> The Abu Dhabi ruling family has in this case, effectively closed the space for large-scale private enterprises to grow, only empowering those which it can directly control. This has created a warm relationship between the regime and several merchant elite families such as the Al-Otaiba's, Al-Rumaithi's, and the Al-Muhairi's.

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<sup>970</sup> K AlMezaini, 'Private Sector Actors in the UAE and their Role in the Process of Economic and Political Reform', in S Hertog, G Luciani, and M Valeri (eds.), *Business Politics in the Middle East*, p. 50

The intimate relationship between successful private businesses and the state is attached through affiliations with the local ruling family in the Emirate of establishment.<sup>971</sup> The UAE Ministry of Economy stated that ‘the SME sector represents more than 94 per cent of the total number of companies operating in the country and provide jobs for more than 86 per cent of the private sector’s workforce’.<sup>972</sup> While these figures illustrate that the bulk of private business within the UAE are SME by nature, the fact that the most successful SME’s are those owned by merchant families isn’t discussed. This is because of both their longevity in the market and also their privileged legal position within the UAE.

Private Emirati entities play an important role for the regime as they are an important outlet through which the regime can distribute benefits relatively cheaply from the state’s accrued rent in an attempt to prolong the rentier bargain. These benefits can come in the form of preferential contracts, greater access to state officials, specific licenses, and other commercial advantages that are not applicable to foreign entities. By appeasing the business community, the regime can depoliticize any competition through co-optation, maintaining the image of

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<sup>971</sup> Khaled al Mezaini looks into this in more detail. K AlMezaini, ‘Private Sector Actors in the UAE and their Role in the Process of Economic and Political Reform’, in S Hertog, G Luciani, and M Valeri (eds.), *Business Politics in the Middle East*

<sup>972</sup> ‘The Impact of SMEs on the UAE’s Economy’, *UAE Government*, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2017, available online, <https://www.government.ae/en/information-and-services/business/crowdfunding/the-impact-of-smes-on-the-uae-economy>, date accessed, 25<sup>th</sup> March 2015

what Christopher Davidson noted, 'economy first politics second'.<sup>973</sup> It is within this vein that SMEs and potential POCs play a vital role in a successful regime security strategy.

As it has been highlighted the UAE is one case in which the concept of successful POCs does not particularly align. The selective co-option of private entities by the regime is however a key strategy for authoritarian states to maintain their ability to manage matters of economic and industrial concern. To a great extent there are no large-scale private companies within the UAE that engage, at the strategic level within the industrial sector, due mainly as a result of the state maintaining a monopoly over large public sector contracts. As a result of the disconnect between private entities and public sector development and the former's exposure to market forces, the private sector involvement in the process of industrialisation has been fairly stagnant since the Arab Spring. Khaled al Mezaini suggests 'this is because SMEs are excluded from policy-making processes, and well-connected large family businesses always win government contracts'.<sup>974</sup> Therefore, while the co-optation of private industrial firms and organisations can be an important strategic option for the regime, it has not been one employed by the Abu Dhabi ruling family as part of its targeted post-Arab Spring regime security strategy.

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<sup>973</sup> CM Davidson, 'The United Arab Emirates: Economy First, Politics Second', in J Teitelbaum (ed.), *Political Liberalization in the Persian Gulf*, Hurst & Co, London, 2009

<sup>974</sup> K AlMezaini, 'Private Sector Actors in the UAE and their Role in the Process of Economic and Political Reform', in S Hertog, G Luciani, and M Valeri (eds.), *Business Politics in the Middle East*, p.54

## Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)

Central to the UAE's industry strategy is the role played by SWFs. Sara Bazoobandi notes that 'the government of Abu Dhabi has particularly focused on diversification of the national economy from the oil sector, via transfer of technological development for the domestic non-oil sector, as one of the core investment strategies for its various SWFs'.<sup>975</sup> By understanding that the Abu Dhabi ruling family focuses its process of industrialisation through SWFs, where domain of control was described in chapter 8, it remains crucial to understand how this process has occurred and if so, has it developed in any particular way after the Arab Spring?

As previously mentioned, the UAE's largest SWF ADIA does not publicise its investments and therefore it is impossible to independently verify what involvement it has had in the evolution of the UAE's industrial sector. Instead, the domestic role played by Emirati SWFs has been largely led by Mubadala, with defence sector focused firms such as Tawazun and EDIC also supporting the industrialisation effort.

A key trend that is clearly visible within the SWF's industrialisation drive is the 'further emphasis on joint venture investments'.<sup>976</sup> While the UAE SWFs can directly engage in joint ventures with foreign firms, offsets have become a key vehicle for the UAE as they encourage and demand joint cooperation among projects.

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<sup>975</sup> S Bazoobandi, *The Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds; A Case Study of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates*, p.75

<sup>976</sup> S Bazoobandi, *The Political Economy of the Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds; A Case Study of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates*, p.93

Within the UAE, offsets were handled by the OPB. The utilisation of defence sales for economic diversification was acknowledged by MBZ and has since led the development of offsets and their related projects. Pattarawan Nanakorn concurs and states that ‘the OPB was initiated and chaired by the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and functioned independently except for the formal coordination with the GHQ’.<sup>977</sup> Given the fact that MBZ has a strong professional and personnel link to the security services within the UAE, it is important to highlight the fact that he used this relationship to initiate his diversification plan. In 2012 the OPB was renamed as the TEC, and it is affiliated to a domestic, defence and industrial focused SWF named Tawazun, with nearly all of its business units developing from offset related projects.<sup>978</sup>

While there have been several changes to the UAE offset law, most recently in 2010<sup>979</sup> and 2015,<sup>980</sup> there has been a concerted attempt to align the offset policy to NDP’s such as economic vision 2030. This is highlighted in the offset agreement:

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<sup>977</sup> P Nanakorn, *The Offset Programme as a Development Tool in the UAE*, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 2009, p.154

<sup>978</sup> It is noted by Pattarnawan Nanakorn that by 2008 there were at least 33 successful joint ventures originating from the offset program. P Nanakorn, *The Offset Programme as a Development Tool in the UAE*, PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 2009, p.142

<sup>979</sup> ‘History and Changes in the UAE Offset Program’, *Blenheim Capital Partners*, 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> September 2011

<sup>980</sup> ‘Tawazun Economic Program Guideline’, *Tawazun Economic Council (TEC)*, 2015/2016 Edition, available online, <https://tec.tawazun.ae/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/06/Tawazun-Economic-Program-Guidelines-2015-2016.pdf>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2019

### 1.3 Objectives of Tawazun Economic Program

1. Create Knowledge based economy
2. Diversify the UAE's economy
3. Grow the Industrial Base of the UAE
4. Create business opportunities for UAE private sector
5. Generate exports
6. Produce employment opportunities for UAE Nationals in high-tech fields<sup>981</sup>

It becomes clear that there is a widescale policy, by state-managed entities to publicly drive industrial development. The role of offsets within the UAE will remain, at least in theory, a key vehicle for diversification as it is assumed that the UAE will maintain high levels of defence spending.

The OPB was instrumental in the initial development of the UAE's SWFs. In 1997 Dolphin Energy, which is a gas pipeline from Qatar to the UAE and Oman, was established.<sup>982</sup> Figures

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<sup>981</sup> 'Tawazun Economic Program Guideline', *Tawazun Economic Council (TEC)*, 2015/2016 Edition, available online, <https://tec.tawazun.ae/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/06/Tawazun-Economic-Program-Guidelines-2015-2016.pdf>, date accessed, 29<sup>th</sup> March 2019, p.4

<sup>982</sup> 'About Us', *Dolphin Project*, available online, <http://www.dolphinenergy.com/about>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> March 2019

such as Khaldoon Mubarak (Mubadala CEO) drove the UAE's SWF-led industrialisation, firstly through Dolphin Energy, and later through the establishment of Mubadala in 2002.<sup>983</sup>

Mubadala has made strong process in the diversification drive since its creation, nevertheless since the Arab Spring there has been more of a process of consolidation rather than expansion within the domain of industrialisation. This is illustrated through the amalgamation of IPIC and ADIC into the Mubadala Investment Company and the establishment of the EDIC in 2014. Other such acquisitions included Yahsat's procurement of Thuraya in 2018,<sup>984</sup> merger of Dubai Aluminium (DUBAL) and Emirates Aluminium (EA) into Emirates Global Aluminium (EGA) in 2014,<sup>985</sup> and Mubadala's absorption of Advanced Technology Investment Company in 2011.<sup>986</sup> Due to the state's monopoly within the SWF and public sector domains, the decision to merge multiple assets should be viewed as an attempt to increase efficiency and

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<sup>983</sup> 'Better Together', *The Business Year*, UAE 2018, available online, <https://www.thebusinessyear.com/uae-2018/better-together/interview>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>984</sup> 'Yahsat Completes Thuraya Acquisition and Appoints New CEO', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 5<sup>th</sup> August 2018, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/yahsat-completes-thuraya-acquisition-and-appoints-new-ceo>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>985</sup> 'Emirates Global Aluminium Officially Incorporated', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 7<sup>th</sup> April 2014, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/emirates-global-aluminium-officially-incorporated>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>986</sup> 'Advanced Technology Investment Company is integrated into Mubadala Development Company', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 16<sup>th</sup> February 2011, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/advanced-technology-investment-company-integrated-mubadala-development-company>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

commercial acumen; instead of having 3 SWF's, all owned and managed by the same entities competing for the same contract, there will instead be a single large conglomerate managing large scale public sector investments.

There has not been a lot of domestic investments by Mubadala since the Arab Spring, however they have continued to partner with foreign companies and states to expand their industrial portfolio. Prominent examples include the co-investment program between Mubadala and the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF),<sup>987</sup> establishment of the UAE-China Joint Investment Fund,<sup>988</sup> intention to establish a \$400m European tech fund,<sup>989</sup> Masdar's £1.5bn investment in an offshore wind farm in the UK,<sup>990</sup> initiation of production at new oil

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<sup>987</sup> 'Russian Direct Investment Fund and Mubadala Establish co-investment program', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2013, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/russian-direct-investment-fund-and-mubadala-establish-co-investment-fund>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>988</sup> 'Mubadala Development Company, China Development Bank Capital (CDBD), and China's State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) establish UAE-China Joint Investment Fund', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 14<sup>th</sup> December 2015, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-development-company-china-development-bank-capital-cdbc-and-chinas-state>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>989</sup> 'Mubadala to launch \$400 million European tech fund', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 13<sup>th</sup> June 2018, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-launch-400-million-european-tech-fund>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>990</sup> 'Masdar Invests in £1.5bn Offshore Wind Farm; Expands its Presence in the UK Wind Energy Market', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 25<sup>th</sup> September 2014, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/masdar-invests-15bn-offshore-wind-farm-expands-its-presence-uk-wind-energy-market>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

field in Thailand,<sup>991</sup> Mubadala's investment in mining operations in Spain,<sup>992</sup> and Mubadala Petroleum's acquisition of a 20% interest in an offshore concession in Egypt.<sup>993</sup> By comparison, one of Mubadala's largest investments within the UAE since the Arab Spring was for AED 82.5m, and 'the funding will be used to accelerate several innovative technology development projects that focus on differentiating concepts from the Fourth Industrial Revolution'.<sup>994</sup> The comparison between domestic and international investment in the industrial sector signifies that while Mubadala is keen to increase its involvement, it is clearly not a sector of large-scale importance.

Instead, Mubadala has paid more attention in delivering its promise of strategic investment and development of human capital. Training programs targeting all levels of Emirati society

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<sup>991</sup> 'Mubadala Petroleum Starts Production at its third oil field in Thailand', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 18<sup>th</sup> June 2015, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-petroleum-starts-production-its-third-oil-field-thailand>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>992</sup> 'Mubadala and Trafigura create joint venture to invest in base metals', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 29<sup>th</sup> June 2015, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-and-trafigura-create-joint-venture-invest-base-metals>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>993</sup> 'Mubadala Petroleum completes the acquisition of a 20 percent interest in the Nour Concession in Egypt', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 9<sup>th</sup> December 2018, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-petroleum-completes-acquisition-20-percent-interest-nour-concession-egypt>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>994</sup> 'Mubadala puts R&D front and Center with multi-million AED commitment', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 14<sup>th</sup> November 2017, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-puts-rd-front-and-center-multi-million-aed-commitment>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

from school children,<sup>995</sup> university students,<sup>996</sup> university graduates,<sup>997</sup> and general Emirati youth.<sup>998</sup> It is clear through Mubadala's strategy that it is hindered by limitations inherent to Emirati society; namely the dearth of human capital. It is crucial for an authoritarian state such as the UAE to develop an industrial base, but not one that is so advanced that it affects the domestic political-economic conditions as this can have a serious impact on the regime's ability to control society.

Offsets however will continue to retain their focus on attracting cooperation in the development of the UAE's industrial sector. Due to the fact that offsets are primarily employed within the defence sector, it is here where there has been an advancement in the

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<sup>995</sup> 'ADEC, Boeing, and Mubadala launch afterschool program for UAE Youth', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 17<sup>th</sup> April 2016, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/adec-boeing-and-mubadala-launch-afterschool-program-uae-youth>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>996</sup> 'With the support of Abu Dhabi Education Council, Mubadala and BAE Systems sign Cooperative Agreement to develop future Emirati talent', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 14<sup>th</sup> September 2015, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/support-abu-dhabi-education-council-mubadala-and-bae-systems-sign-cooperative-agreement-develop>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>997</sup> '42 Emirati technicians graduate from Strata's aerostructures training program', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 8<sup>th</sup> September 2014, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/42-emirati-technicians-graduate-stratas-aerostructures-training-program>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>998</sup> 'Abu Dhabi Ship Building Launches Emirati Trainee Program', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 26<sup>th</sup> October 2016, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/abu-dhabi-ship-building-launches-emirati-trainee-program>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

development of national capabilities. Mubadala, EDIC, and Tawazun are the three main SWF entities that are involved within the UAE's defence sector.

Since their inception, Mubadala and later Tawazun have spearheaded the UAE's defence sector-led industrialisation. MBZ is the chairman of both entities and, as it will be illustrated, these organisations have been instrumental in his implementation of strategic industrial development. Throughout their existence, Mubadala and Tawazun have had differing portfolios with separate agendas. Nonetheless, this created unnecessary competition within the already restricted public sector industry in the UAE and, resultantly, multiple assets from both entities were merged into EDIC in 2014.<sup>999</sup>

Since the merger, Mubadala has assumed an official position wherein the assets it has held are of significant strategic value to the defence sector and the capability development of the UAE Armed Forces; this is because its most successful companies were all maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) operations servicing the UAE Armed Forces platforms, thus helping to fill a capability void through PPPs. These partnerships included ADSB, Al Taif, AMMROC, and Bayanat.

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<sup>999</sup> 'Emirates Defence Industries Company Launched', *Mubadala*, 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2014, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/emirates-defence-industries-company-launched>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup>

ADSB was ‘founded in 1995 through cooperation between the Government of Abu Dhabi and Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS)...ADSB started as a pre-offset venture’.<sup>1000</sup> However, since its inception, ADSB has evolved to the point where it is now able to manufacture and maintain the UAE’s naval vessels. ADSB cooperated with French firm, *Constructions Mecaniques de Normandie (CMN)* to design and build six Baynunah-class corvettes.<sup>1001</sup> With the UAE possessing such a small navy (IISS estimates a strength of 2,500 personnel),<sup>1002</sup> it has been crucial for the UAE’s security capability to develop a broader understanding of naval engineering. Through the successful PPP, ADSB has been able to deliver this, whilst also acting as a platform for which a grander industrialisation and economic diversification process can occur. ADSB has signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Babcock in 2013,<sup>1003</sup>

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<sup>1000</sup> ‘Financial Information Reports’, *Abu Dhabi Ship Building*, available online, <http://www.adsb.ae/the-company/investors-information/financial-information-reports/>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1001</sup> D Black, ‘Warships made in Abu Dhabi to be Sold Abroad’, *The National*, 16<sup>th</sup> February 2012, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/business/warships-made-in-abu-dhabi-to-be-sold-abroad-1.381429>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1002</sup> *Military Balance 2014*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Routledge, London, 2014, P.349

<sup>1003</sup> ASC Staff, ‘Abu Dhabi Ship Building and Babcock sign MoU’, *Middle East Logistics*, 16<sup>th</sup> September 2013, available online, <https://www.logisticsmiddleeast.com/article-9191-abu-dhabi-ship-building-and-babcock-sign-mou>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

Strategic Marine in 2017,<sup>1004</sup> and most recently, with Leonardo<sup>1005</sup> and Fincantieri<sup>1006</sup> in 2019, thus highlighting the prolonged importance of ADSB beyond the implementation of the Baynunah corvette delivery.

Al Taif Technical Services is a land-focused MRO company whose primary client is the UAE Armed Forces. It is the product of a joint venture with DynCorp in 2006<sup>1007</sup> whose announcement stated that ‘DynCorp International will provide all personnel, equipment, tools, materials, supervision, and services necessary for GMD [General Maintenance Directorate] operations’.<sup>1008</sup> This means that while Al Taif is an Emirati owned entity, through Mubadala, it has outsourced all land-based maintenance operations, with no caveat of

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<sup>1004</sup> ‘Strategic Marine and Abu Dhabi Ship Building Sign MoU’, *Strategic Marine*, available online, <http://www.strategicmarine.com/strategic-marine-and-abu-dhabi-ship-building-sign-mou/>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1005</sup> ‘Abu Dhabi Ship Building, Italy’s Leonardo team up for naval collaboration’, *Naval Today*, 19<sup>th</sup> February 2019, available online, <https://navaltoday.com/2019/02/19/abu-dhabi-ship-building-italys-leonardo-team-up-for-naval-collaboration/>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1006</sup> ‘Fincantieri and Abu Dhabi Shipbuilding: Future Collaboration in the UAE’, *Fincantieri*, 21<sup>st</sup> February 2019, available online, <https://www.fincantieri.com/en/media/press-releases/2019/fincantieri-and-abu-dhabi-shipbuilding-future-collaboration-in-the-uae/>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1007</sup> ‘DynCorp International Awarded Maintenance Contract With UAE Land Forces’, *DynCorp*, 21<sup>st</sup> December 2006, Virginia, available online, <http://ir.dyn-intl.com/static-files/d94696cf-4820-45da-b164-08fab2402af5>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1008</sup> ‘DynCorp International Awarded Maintenance Contract With UAE Land Forces’, *DynCorp*, 21<sup>st</sup> December 2006, Virginia, available online, <http://ir.dyn-intl.com/static-files/d94696cf-4820-45da-b164-08fab2402af5>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

limitations, to a foreign and privately-owned company. Strategically, this means that while Emirati engineers can be trained to maintain the UAE's land-based platforms, the Abu Dhabi regime can control the development of such capacity by instructing the private firm accordingly.

AMMROC 'is a joint venture company owned by Emirates Defense Industries Company (EDIC), Lockheed Martin Corporation and Sirkorsky Aerospace Services (A Lockheed Martin Company)'.<sup>1009</sup> AMMROC was established in 2010 and while not formed directly as an offset, Lockheed Martin was awarded offset credits for its crucial partnership in the company. Like ADSB, AMMROC works with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to provide MRO capabilities and training for equipment that is supplied by Lockheed Martin (and its present subsidiary, Sikorsky) for the UAE Armed Forces. This covers the majority of both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft including, but not limited to, F-16s, C-130, and the UH-60 Black Hawk. As a result, the UAE's most advanced platforms are maintained by a coalition of experienced foreign personnel, allowing the continuation of capability that is not dependent on a potentially politicised national workforce. Since the Arab Spring however, AMMROC has not grown or expanded, having only signed one MOU, with BAE systems in 2019,<sup>1010</sup> to illustrate

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<sup>1009</sup> 'A Message From Our CEO', *AMMROC*, available online, <https://ammroc.ae>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1010</sup> 'BAE Systems, Ammroc to Open MRO facility in Al Ain', *Trade Arabia*, 18<sup>th</sup> February 2019, available online, [http://tradedearabia.com/news/IND\\_351233.html](http://tradedearabia.com/news/IND_351233.html), date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

any development in capability. The UAE did however go on to acquire Lockheed Martin's 40% stake in AMMROC.<sup>1011</sup>

Bayanat is another example of the successful PPP model in the UAE as it evolved from the Military Survey Department (MSD) of the UAE Armed Forces in 2011.<sup>1012</sup> By expanding its operations and workforce, Bayanat can follow the example set by others within the defence industry to supplement experienced foreign manpower within a strategic domain that is critically understaffed.

Tawazun, on the other hand, focuses on manufacturing and has developed its array of capabilities through the transfer of technology and intellectual property (IP). Intimately linked to the UAE's offset program, Tawazun attempted to centralize industrialisation projects within the defence sector, highlighting its desire to work across a broad array of fields; land systems, aerospace, precision manufacturing, munitions, weapons systems, advanced materials, naval systems, and other technologies and systems.<sup>1013</sup> It is estimated that between 2007 and 2015 Tawazun 'launched more than 40 joint venture defence, munitions,

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<sup>1011</sup> M Selinger, 'Edge takes over AMMROC', *Jane's*, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2020, available online, <https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/edge-takes-over-ammroc>, date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

<sup>1012</sup> 'Mubadala Launches Bayanat for Mapping & Surveying', *Mubadala*, 15<sup>th</sup> February 2011, Available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/mubadala-launches-bayanat-mapping-surveying>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup>

April 2019

<sup>1013</sup> 'Tawazun Economic Program Industrial Development Unit', *Tawazun*, Presentation, Abu Dhabi, July 2012

aerospace, automotive and metals-oriented companies'.<sup>1014</sup> This was translated into a series of entities that, whilst demonstrated a degree of capacity, have not proven to be significant commercial or strategic successes; exceptions include Nimr, Abu Dhabi Autonomous Systems Investments (ADASI), and Tawazun Dynamics.

After several years of unnecessary competition between the UAE's publicly held defence sector firms, EDIC was established in December 2014.<sup>1015</sup> Within three months, its portfolio had incorporated 16 companies that were previously held by Mubadala and Tawazun.<sup>1016</sup> It was estimated that EDIC held \$871.2m in assets and employed 4,800 people 'with the workforce expected to rise to 10,000 once the company is fully integrated'.<sup>1017</sup> While EDIC served as the central state entity operating within the UAE's defence sector, it did not change the direction to which the process of industrialisation is heading within the UAE.

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<sup>1014</sup> 'Aerospace and defence sector diversifying Abu Dhabi's economy', *Oxford Business Group*, available online, <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/set-fair-sectors'-contribution-economic-diversification-set-grow-further>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1015</sup> 'Emirates Defence Industries Company Launched', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 2<sup>nd</sup> December 2014, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/emirates-defence-industries-company-launched>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>1016</sup> 'EDIC adds five new defence services companies announces senior management', Press Release, *Mubadala*, 21<sup>st</sup> February 2015, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/edic-adds-five-new-defence-services-companies-announces-senior-management>, date accessed, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2019

<sup>1017</sup> 'Aerospace and defence sector diversifying Abu Dhabi's economy', *Oxford Business Group*, available online, <https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/overview/set-fair-sectors'-contribution-economic-diversification-set-grow-further>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

Contrastingly, the strategically vital MRO operations handled by EDIC are combined with a wide manufacturing portfolio that is managed by Luc Vigneron,<sup>1018</sup> the former CEO of Thales. Above him sits a board which is chaired by Khaled Al Qubaisi. The Vice Chairman is Major General Pilot Fares Khalaf Khalfan Al- Mazrouei, and other board members include Badr Al Olama, Lieutenant-General Aqab Shaheen Al-Ali, and Matar Ali Al Romaithi. The mixture between military and civilian personnel showcases the desire to prioritise the UAE Armed Forces requirements whilst also allowing for a degree of commercial activity.

Further illustrating the UAE's attempt to consolidate commercial activities and invigorate defence related undertakings, a new government company EDGE was inaugurated to absorb and manage all major defence related activities. EDGE took control of EDIC, Tawazun and Emirates Advanced Investments Group (EDIC).<sup>1019</sup> The accelerated amalgamation and control of defence related activities enhances the regime's grip on strategic affairs.

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<sup>1018</sup> 'About Us', *EDIC*, available online, <https://edic.ae/#about>, date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

<sup>1019</sup> A Helou, 'UAE launches 'Edge' conglomerate to address its "antiquated military industry" ', *Defense News*, 6<sup>th</sup> November 2019, available online, <https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2019/11/06/uae-launches-edge-conglomerate-to-address-its-antiquated-military-industry/>, date accessed 20<sup>th</sup> August 2020

While the UAE defence industry repeats its commitment to develop human capital and contribute to multiple NDPs,<sup>1020</sup> the core focus remains on maintaining a capability that is in fact in direct competition to those prescribed objectives; to ensure a working capability but with the ability to micro-manage who and what is developed.

These organisations all sit under the direct control and observation of MBZ and thus further corroborate the hypothesis that the closer an institution is to MBZ, the more significant its premise and capability is. The fact that MBZ had a professional career within the UAE Armed Forces, and through this vehicle he has used to augment military purchases for industrial development through the entities he chairs, shows that his journey to office has long considered strategic scenarios that have included security, industrial, and economic concerns.

## **Conclusion**

Since the Arab Spring, the UAE has consolidated its industrial sector under a centralised structure that is ever-more connected to the regime. This is largely displayed through the domination of the state within this process and the overall lack of private sector entities.

While there have been genuine attempts to develop the UAE's industry, and thus follow through with the publicised NDPs, only made marginal progress has been made. Khaled al Mezaini explains that 'despite these economic changes, the dynamics of the political structure

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<sup>1020</sup> 'Vision & Mission', *Tawazun*, available online, <https://www.tawazun.ae/home/about-us/vision-mission/>,

date accessed, 18<sup>th</sup> April 2019

of the UAE have remained authoritarian. This emphasises how economic development and liberalisation have enhanced the survival of the rentier structure'.<sup>1021</sup>

While the UAE fits into Matthew Gray's late rentierism and Ian Bremmer's state led capitalism postulations, it has been demonstrated that, indeed, the Gulf state has evolved these assertions by applying a strategic mandate to the industrialisation process. For example, the role played by SWFs are 'to ensure a source of income after the basic rents that currently sustain it are exhausted, as well as to serve other purposes'.<sup>1022</sup> As Matthew Gray leaves space for a debate around what role SWFs can play, the UAE's utilisation of offsets and development of the defence and new technology sectors showcase how the rentier model is only the most basic block for analysis within an increasingly complex and multidimensional environment. As technology evolves and states adopt more modern techniques and methods, there will be a modern evolution of what the rentier state model stands for and how it is being applied.

What will not change, however, is the rentier state's control of industrialisation. With specific sectors targeted, the regime has illustrated what it deems important for its own direct security, and which can carry a potential capacity for the fostering of future support and allegiance. As a result, and because of its technical grounding, there is a wider lack of tribal dynamics within the UAE's industrialisation process. Instead technocratic values and

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<sup>1021</sup> K AlMezaini, 'Private Sector Actors in the UAE and their Role in the Process of Economic and Political Reform', in S Hertog, G Luciani, and M Valeri (eds.), *Business Politics in the Middle East*, p. 45

<sup>1022</sup> M Gray, 'A Theory of "Late Rentierism" in the Arab States of the Gulf', *Occasional Paper No.7*, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2011, p.35

experience is of higher strategic significance; a contrasting value to that seen elsewhere within the UAE's regime security strategy.

## Chapter 10 – Conclusion

There is no doubt that the UAE's regime security strategy has been developed through a coherent policy following the Arab Spring. However, the fundamental question of this thesis has been to what extent the Arab Spring has affected the UAE's regime security strategy.

Features of the Arab Spring that have had a determining impact on the UAE's regime security strategy have clearly included economic pressure, changing societal dynamics, and ICT advances. In each pillar of the NCP, there are clear examples of the UAE's reaction to the Arab Spring. The tangible increase in military spending, development of technological capability by the security services, an evident and defined network of personnel linked directly to MBZ across the state apparatus, and an increased scope of power by this network, demonstrates that a consistent strategy has been undertaken to enhance the regime's power following the Arab Spring.

As the fundamental pillar of support, the regime's control of the security services has tangibly increased following the Arab Spring. While a series of measures have been implemented to align the focus of these organisations to the regime, they have also been instrumental in the nation building process that has accelerated following the Arab Spring. The securitisation of threat manifestation has legitimised the UAE's rapid development of the armed forces and security services while primarily serving to fortify the UAE's regime security strategy. The careful management of personnel has successfully fortified the relationship to the regime,

and has established the groundwork for a long lasting relationship that will continue onto the next generation.

In parallel, while the state has increased its exposure to international markets through economic and industrial diversification, it has retained a tight control of affairs through its strategic layering of manager and ownership dynamics. The strategy demonstrated a clear network of tribal and personnel kin whom are a blend of technocrat and conviction. Due to its exposed nature, the commercial sphere will have to maintain a delicate balance of controlled growth. Undoubtedly, this will see a less homogenous network develop than in the security field, but, at the highest levels of strategic decision making will continue to be directed by an elite network.

The UAE regime's perception of the Arab Spring as a threat was most apparent in the dramatic advancement of a security strategy that was undeveloped beforehand. The UAE's micro-managed, often obscure, response to the Arab Spring meant that only the detailed investigation into the elite's control of affairs – employed by this research – could unveil this strategy.

However, it is equally plausible that the UAE developed a regime security strategy following the ascension of MBZ to the role of de-facto ruler. MBZ's nurturing of interpersonal ties has been particularly impactful to the UAE's regime security strategy – he has become the central pivot to which all power linkages lead. The neo-patrimonial organisation of affairs emphasises the modified character of relations. MBZ's administration of security and economic conduits,

to which he has long-built considerable power-bases, are now providing him with a strong foundation with which he has – and can continue to expand.

MBZ's organisation of societal ties dictates both the enforcement and maintenance of power. He has established groupings obedient to him and patiently expanded them through similar determining factors. While in essence they have technocratic qualities, there is often a red thread of tribal and kinship affiliation. The most significant discovery within this network is the incorporation of his sons Khaled and Theyab into his own network. This provides the grounding for the construction of the Bani MBZ legacy.

Through his exploitation of alliances, MBZ has utilised advances in technical capability to augment the response to perceived security threats. By engaging in such tactics, MBZ can entrust a significant image of security through the deployment of relatively overpowered capabilities managed by a compacted section of elites. In parallel, and across the state apparatus, MBZ has visibly expanded the state's exposure but has been careful to preserve authority at all costs; either through objective or subjective forms of control. The power of the latter has slowly started to manifest itself through more obvious means, with the federal identity of the UAE evolving into an MBZ-led Abu Dhabi-centred nation state.

The Arab Spring certainly impacted the UAE's regime security strategy, accelerating the process of consolidation that is transforming the federal image of the state into that of a singular nation. Personnel linkages are of an even heightened relevance with proximity to MBZ and other regime personnel the valuation of a person's significance. In essence, while

the dangers of modernisation and development were demonstrated across MENA, the UAE reacted by consolidating the dynamics to its ruling coalition.

**Contribution** This thesis has provided an original contribution to the field of security studies as it applies to the GCC states. The analysis of the growing nation-state of MBZ's UAE has not been discussed in any great length, and where this has occurred it has been extremely general and targeted to a specific aspect of grander national security. The regime security strategy applied provides the basis for a focused investigation into the methods used by authoritarian regimes to maintain power, and allows for comparisons to be made with other examples.

The methodology employed provides a successful example of how research into authoritarian regimes can be undertaken by obtaining primary source information through publicly available channels. This must be cross-examined with additional sources to illustrate the impact of such information. By gathering information through innovative, predominantly online channels, researchers can avoid unnecessary exposure or physical vulnerability when undertaking fieldwork in contentious environments.

**Limitations** A fundamental argument within this thesis is the focus on regime, and not national or state security. This presupposes a domestic and elite-focused threat. Alternatively, a regime security strategy could focus on its relationship to groups outside of these dynamics, and even to external threats. Furthermore, threats to national and state security are not autonomous from regime security dynamics, and likewise, many regime security dynamics are of interest and value to that of national and state security. The management of the state by the elites illustrates a specific view and context and may overlook other immediate threats.

The assumption therefore is that these other threats are not perceived to be as much of a direct interest as those highlighted within this thesis.

While the unique methodology applied to this thesis has illustrated the extensive possibility of data sources, the limitations of the utilised sources are acknowledged because of their manipulation by authoritarian figures. This means that information released by official outlets is only permitted, within a specific lens, because it is of use to the regime. Therefore, in contrast, the lack of independent sources within the UAE directs the investigation towards official sources. This effectively means that only the information released by the regime can be subject to analysis.

The dependence on online information, may cause an inference of overestimation towards certain traits which may only exist in theory. Even though analysis is based upon official sources, without cross-referencing this with human sources it may remain only theoretical in nature. The deficiency in actor discourse does limit the validity of the research findings; however, acknowledgement of the increased control by the regime across the state apparatus cannot be disputed.

Finally, while a strong argument has been made to define the UAE's regime security strategy as one of the Abu Dhabi ruling family, the lack of engagement towards elite dynamics with other Emirates, and thus the retention of the federation, could overlook a potentially significant aspect of the UAE's regime security strategy. This could be further expanded to incorporate the regime's perception and handling of affairs with expatriates who make up the majority of the UAE's residents.

**Scope for future research** The unique structural framework designed within this thesis can be duplicated and applied to many case studies of similar standing. Similar case study investigations could examine the remaining GCC states, Iran, Syria, Jordan, as well as with non-geographically adjacent states such as Russia, China, and Venezuela. Comparisons could be drawn across multiple examples to help refine how regimes are reacting to waves of modernisation.

Alternatively, having defined regime security, an analysis of the UAE's national and state security strategy evolution following the Arab Spring could be undertaken. This would illustrate how different tactics and mechanisms have been deployed in relation to the same threat.

## Appendices

### Appendix 1 Sections of the Bani Yas

<b>Bani Yas sections</b>	<b>JB Kelly<sup>1023</sup></b> (1964) 14 major and 6 minor	<b>Heard-Bey<sup>1024</sup></b> (1982) 20+	<b>Van Der Meulen<sup>1025</sup></b> (1997) <b>8 Major</b> and <i>19 minor sections</i>
Al Bu Falah <b>Al-Falahi</b> <b>Al-Nahyan</b>	Major Section	Al bu Falah	<b>Mazari</b> 6,800
Hawamil	Major Section	Al bu Mahair	<b>Sudan</b> 3,000
Maharibah <b>Al-Mehairbi</b>	Major Section	Al Bu Falasah	<b>Al Bu Muhair</b> 2,500
Mazari <b>Al-Mazrouei</b>	Major Section	Rumaithat	<b>Hawamil</b> 2,500
Al Mishaghin	Major Section	Qubaisat	<b>Maharibah</b> 2,500
Qubaisat <b>Al-Qubaisi</b>	Major Section	Mazari	<b>Qubaisat</b> 2,000

<sup>1023</sup> ibid

<sup>1024</sup> Frauke Heard-Bey refers to 10 of the 20 prominent sections of the Bani Yas in F Heard-Bey, p.412

<sup>1025</sup> H Van Der Muelen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*,

Rawashid	Major Section	Hawamil	<b>Rumaithat</b> 2,000
Rumaithat <b>Al-Romaithi</b>	Major Section	Maharibah	<b>Al Bu Falah</b> 1,000
Al Bu Falasah <b>Al-Falasi</b> <b>Al Maktoum</b>	Major Section	Al Mishaghin	<i>Halamah</i> 1,000
Al Bu Mahair <b>Al-Muhairi</b>	Major Section	Sudan (Suwaidi)	<i>Qumzan</i> 1,000
Sudan <b>Al-Suwaidi</b>	Major Section		<i>Rawashid</i> 1,000
Al Murur	Major Section		<i>Al Bu Hamir</i> 700
Qumzan <b>Al-Qamzi</b>	Major Section		<i>Al Bu Amin</i> 500
Subais	Major Section		<i>Al Mishaghin</i> 500
Al Bu Amin <b>Al-Ameemi</b>	Minor Section		<i>Al Sultan</i> 500
Araifat	Minor Section		<i>Al Thuhailat</i> 500
Duhailat	Minor Section		<i>Al Urayfat</i> 500
Halalmah	Minor Section		<i>Bani Shikir</i> 500
Khamarah	Minor Section		<i>Dhailat</i> 500
Thumairat	Minor Section		<i>Khamarah</i>

			500
			<i>Marar</i> 500
			<i>Nuwasir</i> 500
			<i>Qanaisat</i> 500
			<i>Qasal</i> 500
			<i>Saba'is</i> 500
			<i>Thamairat</i> <b>500</b>
			<i>Al Bu Falasah</i> 0 - this is because they are Dubai based

## Appendix 2 Transfer of Leadership in Abu Dhabi (1761 – Present) <sup>1026</sup>

Departure method	Name, date, and method
<b>Deposed</b>	<p><b>Shakhbut bin Diab</b> (1793-1816), deposed by son, Mohammed bin Shakhbut<sup>1027</sup></p> <p><b>Mohammed bin Shakhbut</b>, (1816-1818), deposed by brother Tahnun with help from father, Shakhbut bin Diab<sup>1028</sup></p> <p><b>Shakhbut bin Sultan</b> (1928-1966), deposed by Sheikh Zayed with assistance by the British<sup>1029</sup></p>
<b>Murdered</b>	<p><b>Diab Isa</b> (1761-1793), after killing his Uncle, Zaid Muhammed, Diab was killed by his victim's son, Hazza<sup>1030</sup></p> <p><b>Tahnun bin Shakhbut</b> (1818-1833), shot and stabbed by brothers Khalifa and Sultan respectively<sup>1031</sup></p> <p><b>Khalifa Shakhbut</b> (1833-1845), killed by a distant cousin, Isa Khalid<sup>1032</sup></p>

<sup>1026</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, pp.30-71

<sup>1027</sup> *ibid*, p.37

<sup>1028</sup> JG Lorrimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, p.464

<sup>1029</sup> H Tammam, *Zayid bin Sultan: The Leader on the March*, Dai Nippon Printing, Tokyo, 1983

<sup>1030</sup> AdL Rush (ed.), *Buraimi Memorial*, SA Memorial, Vol.1: 31, 1991, Slough, in *ibid*, p.35

<sup>1031</sup> *ibid*, p.38,

JG Lorrimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia, Geographical, Statistical and Historical Edition*, Slough, 1986, p.765

<sup>1032</sup> AdL Rush (ed.), *Buraimi Memorial*, p.55

	<p><b>Isa Khalid</b> (1845-1845), killed two months after assuming presidency by the nephew of his victim, Khalifa Shakhbut<sup>1033</sup></p> <p><b>Said Tahnun</b> (1845-1855), having fled Abu Dhabi, he was killed whilst trying to return to Abu Dhabi<sup>1034</sup></p> <p><b>Hamdan Zaid</b> (1912-1922), murdered by his predecessor, Sultan, and half-brother, Saqr<sup>1035</sup></p> <p><b>Sultan Zaid</b> (1922-1926), Saqr, who assisted Sultan in the murder of Hamdan, invited Sultan to dinner and murdered him. Thereafter Hamdan's son tried and failed to kill Sultan's son, Khalid<sup>1036</sup></p> <p><b>Saqr Zaid</b> (1926-1928), murdered by the family of Sultan<sup>1037</sup></p>
<b>Natural Death</b>	<p><b>Zaid Khalifa</b> (1855-1909)<sup>1038</sup></p> <p><b>Tahnun Zaid</b> (1909-1912)<sup>1039</sup></p> <p><b>Zayid Sultan</b> (1966-2004)<sup>1040</sup></p>

<sup>1033</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, p.43

<sup>1034</sup> JG Lorrimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, p.768

<sup>1035</sup> P Lienhardt, *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia*, p.180

<sup>1036</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, p.63

<sup>1037</sup> P Lienhardt, *Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia*, p.181

<sup>1038</sup> AB Rugh, *The Political Culture of Leadership in the United Arab Emirates*, p.62

<sup>1039</sup> AdL Rush (ed.), *Buraimi Memorial*, p.92

<sup>1040</sup> CD Davidson, 'After Sheikh Zayed: The Politics of Succession in Abu Dhabi and the UAE'

**Appendix 3 Highest Positions of the Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah (BMBK) under Sheikh Zayed**

Name	Role
<b>Sheikh Hamdan</b>	UAE Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Abu Dhabi Public Works
<b>Sheikh Mubarak</b>	Minister of Interior
<b>Sheikh Tahnoon</b>	Ruler's Representative in Al Ain, Member of the Supreme Petroleum Council (CPC), Director of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), and Deputy Chairmanship of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council
<b>Sheikh Saif</b>	Chairman of Abu Dhabi Planning Department and Minister of Health
<b>Sheikh Khalifa</b>	UAE Minister of Hydraulic and Electric Power
<b>Sheikh Surur</b>	Chairman of UAE Central Bank, and Chairman of ADEWA, Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC), Chairman of Abu Dhabi's Department of Justice, and Chamberlain of the Presidential Court

#### Appendix 4 Marital connections between Bani Zayed and Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah

Bani Sultan bin Zayed	Relationship	Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah
Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan	Married	Sheikh Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa
Sheikh Khalifah bin Zayed	Son of	Sheikha Hassa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa
Sheikh Sultan bin Khalifa	Married	Sheikha Sheikha bint Saif bin Mohammed
Sheikha Shammah bint Zayed	Married	Sheikh Surur
Sheikh Sultan bin Zayed	Married	Sheikha Shamsa bint Mohammed bin Khalifa

Bani Mohammed bin Khalifah	Relationship	Bani Zayed
Sheikh Hamad bin Hamdan bin Mohammed <i>"Rainbow Sheikh"</i>	Married	Sheikha Elizah
Sheikh Sultan bin Hamdan bin Mohammed	Married	Sheikha Aishah bin Khalifa bin Zayed
Sheikha Salamah bint Hamdan bin Mohammed	Married	Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed
Sheikha Shamsa bint Hamdan bin Mohammed	Married	Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed
Sheikh Tahnoon bin Mohammed	Married	Sheikha Shamsa bint Zayed bin Sultan
Sheikh Hamad bin Tahnoon bin Mohammed	Married	A daughter of Sheikh Khalifa
Sheikh Mansour bin Tahnoon	Married	A daughter of Sheikh Khalifa

## Appendix 5 Emirati Martyrs in Yemen

Name	Date	Emirate	Link
Hazim Obeid Khlfan Al Ali *	23-Jun-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395283976921.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395283976921.html</a>
Abdul Aziz Sarhan Saleh Al Ka'abi	16-Jul-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/mena/uae-armed-forces-officer-dies-in-yemen">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/mena/uae-armed-forces-officer-dies-in-yemen</a>
Saif Youssef Ahmed Al Falasi	20-Jul-15	Dubai	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395283521387.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395283521387.html</a>  <a href="http://gulftoday.ae/portal/3613f26a-45f2-413d-bd12-88a9761c38d8.aspx">http://gulftoday.ae/portal/3613f26a-45f2-413d-bd12-88a9761c38d8.aspx</a>
Juma Jawhar Juma Hammadi	08-Aug-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284133772.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284133772.html</a>  <a href="http://www.scoopnest.com/user/gulf_news/671190699010875393">http://www.scoopnest.com/user/gulf_news/671190699010875393</a>
Khalid Mohammed Abdullah Al Sehhi	08-Aug-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284133772.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284133772.html</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/friends-for-life-and-in-death">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/friends-for-life-and-in-death</a>
Fahim Saeed Ahmed Al Habsi	08-Aug-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284133772.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284133772.html</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/friends-for-life-and-in-death">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/friends-for-life-and-in-death</a>

Abdul Rahman Ibrahim Eissa Al Baloushi*	12-Aug-15	Dubai	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284314194.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395284314194.html</a>  <a href="https://www.cpc.gov.ae/en-us/mediacenter/Pages/PressRelease_Detail.aspx?press_Id_ar=1289&amp;press_Id_en=1289">https://www.cpc.gov.ae/en-us/mediacenter/Pages/PressRelease_Detail.aspx?press_Id_ar=1289&amp;press_Id_en=1289</a>
Mohammad Khaled Mohammad Mamdi	04-Sep-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Mohammed Khalid Ibrahim	04-Sep-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Mohammed Al Hussein Al Hosani	04-Sep-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Suhail Rashid Suhail Hilal Al Mazroeu	04-Sep-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>

			<a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602740">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602740</a>
Mohamad Ali Hassan Ahmed Al Houssani	04-Sep-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families</a>
Abdulla Saeed Al Kalbani	04-Sep-15	Ajman	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602739">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602739</a>
Sultan Obaid Al Kaabi	04-Sep-15	Ajman	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602740">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602740</a>
Abdullah Ali Hassan Al Hammadi	04-Sep-15	Ajman	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCNOR40V720150921">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCNOR40V720150921</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/mohammed-continues-to-offer-condolences-to-families-of-martyrs-2015-09-06-1.602528">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/mohammed-continues-to-offer-condolences-to-families-of-martyrs-2015-09-06-1.602528</a>
Fahd Ali Mohammed Ahmed Al Baloushi	04-Sep-15	Ajman	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285566116.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285566116.html</a>

Fahad Ali Mohammed Ahmed	04-Sep-15	Ajman	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285655523.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285655523.html</a>
Hazaa Rashid Mohamad Rashid Saleh Al Kaabi	04-Sep-15	Ajman	<a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/governme nt/20150916/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-continues-solemn-duties-across-uae">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/governme nt/20150916/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-continues-solemn-duties-across-uae</a>
Saad Mohammed Al Ahbabi	04-Sep-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Butti Ayel Misfer Al Ahbabi	04-Sep-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Abdulah Khalifa Al Nuaimi	04-Sep-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Abdullah Khalifa Matar Al Nuaimi	04-Sep-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>

			<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Mohammad Saleh Al Ahbabi	04-Sep-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Omar Rashid Al Maqbali	04-Sep-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Saeed Rashid Al Neyadi	04-Sep-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285513861.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285513861.html</a>
Saeed Ahmed Obaid Al Marri	04-Sep-15	Dubai	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285566116.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285566116.html</a>
Ali Hussein Hassan Abdullah Taher Al Baloushi	04-Sep-15	Dubai	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285569150.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285569150.html</a>
Issa Ibrahim Al Badaoui	04-Sep-15	Dubai	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html</a>
Walid Ahmed Al Dhanhani	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/emirati-widows-grief-soothed-by-birth-of-son">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/emirati-widows-grief-soothed-by-birth-of-son</a>

Mohammed Saeed Al Saraidi	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736</a>
Khalifa Abdullah Al Saraidi	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736</a>
Khalifa Mohammed Al Yammahi	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736</a>
Rashid Saeed Al Yammahi	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602736</a>
Jasim Saeed Al Saadi	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150913">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150913</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/governme">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/governme</a>

			<a href="#">nt/rulers-emiratis-and-expatriates-continue-to-show-support-for-families-of-martyrs</a>
Saeed Salem Masoud Al Seraidi	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285357487.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285357487.html</a>
Saud Mohammed Al Saadi	04-Sep-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html</a>
Ali Hassan Al Shehi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/martyrs-day-2015/resilience-was-this-martyrs-forte">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/martyrs-day-2015/resilience-was-this-martyrs-forte</a>
Obaid Saeed Al Mazouri	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://7days.ae/Families-remember-45-UAE-soldiers-killed-in-Yemen">http://7days.ae/Families-remember-45-UAE-soldiers-killed-in-Yemen</a>
Mohammed Saeed Balsadriyah Al Khateri	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Rashid Mohammad Matar Al Mosafiri	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirat</a>

			<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">es/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Obeid Saeed Rashid Al Mazroui	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Al Shatti Abdullah Al Sayad	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Yousuf Abdullah Al Ali	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/45-uae-sons-martyred-in-yemen-nation-mourns-2015-09-07-1.602368</a>
Obaid Saeed Al Shamsi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150912">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150912</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/he-asked-us-to-give-the-uae-flag-to-his-son">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/he-asked-us-to-give-the-uae-flag-to-his-son</a>

Ahmed Mohammed Ali Al Shehi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150916">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150916</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families</a>
Rashid Saeed Rashid Al Habsi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150916">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150916</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families</a>
Abdel Saleh Absullah Al Shahhi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150918">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150918</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families</a>
Abdullah Omer Mubarak Al Jabri	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150918">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150918</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families</a>

Ali Hussein Al Baloushi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150918">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150918</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/governments/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/governments/20150908/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-praises-loyalty-and-dignity-of-uae-heroes-families</a>
Adil Saleh Abdullah Al Shehhi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285335027.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285335027.html</a>
Sultan Saleh Al Shehi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html</a>
Rashid Mohammed Al Shehi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html</a>
Abdullah Ahmed Al Shumaili	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html</a>
Salem Rashid Al Shehi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html</a>
Sulieiman Jasim Al Baloushi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html</a>
Rashid Ali Al Shehi	04-Sep-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285548932.html</a>
Yousuf Hassan Yusuf Al Obaidli	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602737">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602737</a>

Ahmed Ghulam Abdul Kareem Lengawi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602738">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602738</a>
Waleed Mohammed Al Yasi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602738">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/uae-mourns-martyrs-condolences-pour-in-2015-09-08-1.602738</a>
Hamed Mohammed Al Baloushi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150913">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150913</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/rulers-emiratis-and-expatriates-continue-to-show-support-for-families-of-martyrs">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/rulers-emiratis-and-expatriates-continue-to-show-support-for-families-of-martyrs</a>
Mohammed Ismail Yousuf	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150913">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150913</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/rulers-emiratis-and-expatriates-continue-to-show-support-for-families-of-martyrs">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/rulers-emiratis-and-expatriates-continue-to-show-support-for-families-of-martyrs</a>
Rashid Mohammed Abbas Al Baloushi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150922">http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-idUSKCN0R40V720150922</a>

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Jamal Majed Al Muhairi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285513861.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285513861.html</a>
Khalifa Bader Jawher	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285513861.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285513861.html</a>
Saif Issa Al Naqbi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html</a>
Rashid Nasser Al Zaabi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html</a>
Hassan Mohammed Al Tunaiji	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html</a>
Rashid Mohammed Al Baloushi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html</a>
Khalifa Bader Suleiman Abdullah	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285570273.html</a>
Ghalib Amir Saleh Al Marri	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285655523.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285655523.html</a>
Ghaleb Amer Saleh Amer Hallabi	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/sharjah-streets-to-be-named-after-martyrs-1.1599034">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/sharjah-streets-to-be-named-after-martyrs-1.1599034</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/martyrs-day-2015/remembering-the-sacrifice-list-of-uae-martyrs-in-operation-restoring-hope">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/martyrs-day-2015/remembering-the-sacrifice-list-of-uae-martyrs-in-operation-restoring-hope</a>

Mohamad Ismail Mohamad	04-Sep-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/mohamed-continues-visits-to-families-of-fallen-emirati-servicemen-2015-09-06-1.602445">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/mohamed-continues-visits-to-families-of-fallen-emirati-servicemen-2015-09-06-1.602445</a>
Saeed Obaid bin Fadil Al Ali	04-Sep-15	Umm Al Quwain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395285009611.html</a>  <a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/mohammed-continues-to-offer-condolences-to-families-of-martyrs-2015-09-06-1.602528">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/mohammed-continues-to-offer-condolences-to-families-of-martyrs-2015-09-06-1.602528</a>
Essa Ibrahim Hamad Mohamad	04-Sep-15		<a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/martyrs-day-2015/remembering-the-sacrifice-list-of-uae-martyrs-in-operation-restoring-hope">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/martyrs-day-2015/remembering-the-sacrifice-list-of-uae-martyrs-in-operation-restoring-hope</a>
Ahmed Hebtan Nour Mohamad Al Baloushi	01-Oct-15	RAK	<a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/prayers-for-uae-martyr-ahmed-al-baloushi-2015-10-03-1.605392">http://www.emirates247.com/news/prayers-for-uae-martyr-ahmed-al-baloushi-2015-10-03-1.605392</a>
Khamis Rashid Al Abdouli	06-Oct-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen</a>
Ahmed Khamis Malullah Al Hamadi	07-Oct-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/martyrdom-is-a-heavenly-gift-say-families">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/martyrdom-is-a-heavenly-gift-say-families</a>
Mohammed Khalfan Al Siyabi	07-Oct-15	Abu Dhabi	<a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen</a>

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Ali Khamis bin Ayed Al Ketbi	07-Oct-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/martyrdom-is-a-heavenly-gift-say-families">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/martyrdom-is-a-heavenly-gift-say-families</a>
Yousuf Salem Ali Al Kaabi	07-Oct-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/four-more-emiratis-martyred-in-yemen</a>  <a href="http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/martyrdom-is-a-heavenly-gift-say-families">http://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/general/martyrdom-is-a-heavenly-gift-say-families</a>
Abdulsalam Abdulkarim Abdulrahim Al Fuqaha	11-Oct-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/body-of-uae-serviceman-arrives-in-abu-dhabi">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/body-of-uae-serviceman-arrives-in-abu-dhabi</a>
Sultan Saeed Mohamad Abdullah Al Mazrouie	11-Oct-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Mohamed-bin-Zayed-offers-condolences-to-family-of-martyr-Al-Mazrouie/71691.htm">http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/Mohamed-bin-Zayed-offers-condolences-to-family-of-martyr-Al-Mazrouie/71691.htm</a>
Hadif Humaid Al Shamsi Al Taher	18-Oct-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395286840304.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395286840304.html</a>
Hamoud Al Ameri	24-Oct-15	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395287093172.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395287093172.html</a>
Nasser Hassan Mohammed Al Baloushi	24-Nov-15	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395288426433.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395288426433.html</a>

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Sultan Mohammed Al Ketbi	17-Dec-15	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395289361259.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395289361259.html</a>
Abdullah Juma Hassan Al Shamsi	14-Feb-16	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395291573533.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395291573533.html</a>  <a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/general/1395291619858.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/general/1395291619858.html</a>
Obaid Salem Al Badwawi	22-Feb-16	Ajman	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395291927565.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395291927565.html</a>
Mohammed Rashid Al Dhahnani	29-Feb-16	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395292203389.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395292203389.html</a>
Mohammed Obaid Al Hmoudi	15-Mar-16	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395292929657.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395292929657.html</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-leads-condolences-for-families-of-the-pilots-killed-in-yemen">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-leads-condolences-for-families-of-the-pilots-killed-in-yemen</a>
Zayed Ali Al Kaabi	15-Mar-16	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395292929657.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395292929657.html</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-leads-">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-mohammed-bin-rashid-leads-</a>

			<a href="#">condolences-for-families-of-the-pilots-killed-in-yemen</a>
Ahmed Mohammed Ahmen Al Zeyoudi	14-Jun-16	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296720674.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296720674.html</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-offers-condolences-to-families-of-pilots-killed-in-yemen">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-offers-condolences-to-families-of-pilots-killed-in-yemen</a>
Abdullah Mohammed Saeed Al Yamahi	14-Jun-16	Fujairah	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296720674.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296720674.html</a>  <a href="http://www.thenational.ae/uae/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-offers-condolences-to-families-of-pilots-killed-in-yemen">http://www.thenational.ae/uae/sheikh-mohammed-bin-zayed-offers-condolences-to-families-of-pilots-killed-in-yemen</a>
Ali Mohammed Taresh Al Kaabi	21-Jun-16	Ajman	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296997277.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296997277.html</a>
Mohammed Nasser Rashid Al Dhahiri	21-Jun-16	Al Ain	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296997277.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395296997277.html</a>
Rashid Ahmad Abdullah Al Habsi	05-Sep-16	RAK	<a href="http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395299616044.html">http://www.wam.ae/en/news/emirates/1395299616044.html</a>  <a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/martyr-laid-to-rest-in-ras-al-khaimah-1.1892138">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/martyr-laid-to-rest-in-ras-al-khaimah-1.1892138</a>
Saeed Anbar Juma Al Falasi	22-Sep-16	Dubai	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/emotional-farewell-for-uae-martyr-in-dubai-1.1900672">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/emotional-farewell-for-uae-martyr-in-dubai-1.1900672</a>

Rashid Ali Mohamed Al Dhahoori	04-Feb-17	RAK	<a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/two-brave-emirati-soldiers-martyred">https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/two-brave-emirati-soldiers-martyred</a>
Obaid Jowhar Obaid Al Mazrouei	04-Feb-17	Sharjah	<a href="http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/general-command-of-uae-armed-forces-announces-martyrdom-of-serviceman-2017-02-05-1.647621">http://www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/general-command-of-uae-armed-forces-announces-martyrdom-of-serviceman-2017-02-05-1.647621</a>
Nader Mubarak Eisa Soliman	17-Feb-17	Dubai	<a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/bodies-of-two-uae-martyrs-who-died-in-yemen-arrive-in-abu-dhabi-1.54797">https://www.thenational.ae/uae/bodies-of-two-uae-martyrs-who-died-in-yemen-arrive-in-abu-dhabi-1.54797</a>  <a href="http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302598278">http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302598278</a>
Soliman Mohammed Soliman Al Dhohouri	17-Feb-17	Dubai	<a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/bodies-of-two-uae-martyrs-who-died-in-yemen-arrive-in-abu-dhabi-1.54797">https://www.thenational.ae/uae/bodies-of-two-uae-martyrs-who-died-in-yemen-arrive-in-abu-dhabi-1.54797</a>  <a href="http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302598278">http://wam.ae/en/details/1395302598278</a>
Khalid Ali Ghareeb Al Baloushi	24-Feb-17	Dubai	<a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/tributes-paid-to-serviceman-killed-in-yemen-ahead-of-al-warqa-funeral-1.29438">https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/tributes-paid-to-serviceman-killed-in-yemen-ahead-of-al-warqa-funeral-1.29438</a>
Zakaria Sulaiman Obaid Al Zaabi	17-Mar-17	Sharjah	<a href="https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-soldier-who-died-serving-country-in-yemen-laid-to-rest-1.80679">https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/uae-soldier-who-died-serving-country-in-yemen-laid-to-rest-1.80679</a>
Abdullah Mohammad Eisa Al Hammadi	25-Apr-17	Sharjah	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/uae-soldier-martyred-during-mission-in-the-country-1.2016851">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/uae-soldier-martyred-during-mission-in-the-country-1.2016851</a>
Hassan Abdullah Al Beshr	03-May-17	RAK	<a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/news/government/UAE-soldier-martyred-in-Yemen">https://www.khaleejtimes.com/news/government/UAE-soldier-martyred-in-Yemen</a>

Samir Mohammad Murad Abu Bakr	12-Aug-17	Ajman	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878</a>
Ahmad Khalifa Al Bloushi	12-Aug-17	Al Ain	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878</a>
Mohammad Saeed Al Hassani	12-Aug-17	Fujairah	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878</a>
Jasim Saleh Al Zaabi	12-Aug-17	RAK	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/families-mourn-four-uae-soldiers-martyred-in-yemen-1.2072878</a>
Sultan Mohamed Ali Al Naqbi	12-Sep-17	RAK	<a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/two-uae-soldiers-martyred-">https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/two-uae-soldiers-martyred-</a>
Nassir Gharib Al Mazrouie	12-Sep-17	Sharjah	<a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/two-uae-soldiers-martyred-">https://www.khaleejtimes.com/nation/abu-dhabi/two-uae-soldiers-martyred-</a>
Ali Saeed Saif Al Mesmari	17-Oct-17	Fujairah	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/two-uae-pilots-martyred-in-yemen-1.2107963">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/two-uae-pilots-martyred-in-yemen-1.2107963</a>
Bader Yahiya Mohammad Al Marashdeh	17-Oct-17	Sharjah	<a href="http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/two-uae-pilots-martyred-in-yemen-1.2107963">http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/society/two-uae-pilots-martyred-in-yemen-1.2107963</a>
Saeed Al Kaabi	28-Oct-17	Fujairah	<a href="https://www.khaleejtimes.com/news/government/martyred-uae-soldier-saeed-al-kaabi-laid-to-rest-in-fujairah-">https://www.khaleejtimes.com/news/government/martyred-uae-soldier-saeed-al-kaabi-laid-to-rest-in-fujairah-</a>

## Appendix 6 Partial List of UAE Public Sector Bodies Online

National	Government	Ministry of Cabinet Affairs and the Future <sup>1041</sup>
		Ministry of Climate Change and Environment <sup>1042</sup>
		Ministry of Community Development <sup>1043</sup>
		Ministry of Culture and Knowledge Development <sup>1044</sup>
		Ministry of Defence <sup>1045</sup>
		Ministry of Economy <sup>1046</sup>
		Ministry of Education <sup>1047</sup>
		Ministry of Energy & Industry <sup>1048</sup>
		Ministry of State for Federal National Council Affairs <sup>1049</sup>
		Ministry of Finance <sup>1050</sup>
		Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation <sup>1051</sup>
		Government.ae <sup>1052</sup>

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<sup>1041</sup> <https://www.mocaf.gov.ae/en>

<sup>1042</sup> <https://www.moccae.gov.ae/en/home.aspx>

<sup>1043</sup> <https://www.mocd.gov.ae/en/home.aspx>

<sup>1044</sup> <https://mckd.gov.ae/sites/MCYCDVar/en-us/pages/home.aspx>

<sup>1045</sup> [http://www.mod.gov.ae/index\\_en.html](http://www.mod.gov.ae/index_en.html)

<sup>1046</sup> <https://www.economy.gov.ae/english/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>1047</sup> <https://www.moe.gov.ae/En/Pages/Home.aspx>

<sup>1048</sup> <https://www.moei.gov.ae/en/home.aspx>

<sup>1049</sup> <https://www.mfnca.gov.ae/en/>

<sup>1050</sup> <https://www.mof.gov.ae/en/pages/default.aspx>

<sup>1051</sup> <https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>1052</sup> <https://government.ae>

		Ministry of Health and Prevention <sup>1053</sup>
		Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation <sup>1054</sup>
		Ministry of Infrastructure Development <sup>1055</sup>
		Ministry of Interior <sup>1056</sup>
		Ministry of Justice <sup>1057</sup>
		Ministry of Presidential Affairs <sup>1058</sup>
		Ministry of State for Happiness <sup>1059</sup>
		Ministry of Tolerance <sup>1060</sup>
	Media	Emirates News Agency (WAM) <sup>1061</sup>
		National Media Council <sup>1062</sup>
	Security	AECERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) <sup>1063</sup>
		Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship <sup>1064</sup>
		Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) <sup>1065</sup>

<sup>1053</sup> <http://www.mohap.gov.ae/en/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>1054</sup> <https://www.mohre.gov.ae/en/home.aspx>

<sup>1055</sup> <https://www.moid.gov.ae/en-us/pages/default.aspx>

<sup>1056</sup> <https://www.moi.gov.ae/en/default.aspx>

<sup>1057</sup> <http://ejustice.gov.ae/portal/page/portal/eJustice%20MOJ%20Portal/HomePages/Home%20Page%20HQ>

<sup>1058</sup> <https://www.mopa.ae/EN/TheMinister/Pages/hhmessage.aspx>

<sup>1059</sup> <https://www.mocd.gov.ae/en/home.aspx>

<sup>1060</sup> <https://www.tolerance.gov.ae/Default.aspx>

<sup>1061</sup> <http://wam.ae>

<sup>1062</sup> <http://nmc.gov.ae/ar-ae>

<sup>1063</sup> <https://www.tra.gov.ae/aecert/en/home.aspx>

<sup>1064</sup> <https://www.id.gov.ae/en/home.aspx>

<sup>1065</sup> <https://www.tra.gov.ae>

	Telecommunications	DU <sup>1066</sup>
		Etisalat <sup>1067</sup>
		Virgin <sup>1068</sup>
Federal	Government	Abu Dhabi Digital Government <sup>1069</sup>
		Government of Ajman <sup>1070</sup>
		Dubai E-Government <sup>1071</sup>
		Fujairah e-government <sup>1072</sup>
		RAK.ae <sup>1073</sup>
		Sharjah e-government <sup>1074</sup>
		Umm al Quwain E-Government <sup>1075</sup>
	Security	Abu Dhabi Systems & Information Centre (ADSIC) <sup>1076</sup>
		Dubai Electronic Security Centre <sup>1077</sup>

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<sup>1066</sup> <http://www.du.ae/personal>

<sup>1067</sup> <https://www.etisalat.ae/en/index.jsp>

<sup>1068</sup> <https://www.virginmobile.ae>

<sup>1069</sup> <https://www.abudhabi.ae/portal/public/en/homepage>

<sup>1070</sup> <https://www.ajman.ae/en>

<sup>1071</sup> <http://www.dubai.ae/en/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>1072</sup> <http://fujairah.ae/en/pages/default.aspx>

<sup>1073</sup> <https://www.rak.ae/wps/portal>

<sup>1074</sup> <https://www.sharjah.ae/index.aspx>

<sup>1075</sup> <http://egd.uaq.ae/en/home.html>

<sup>1076</sup> Abu Dhabi Systems & Information Centre (ADSIC), *Annual Report 2016*, Abu Dhabi, available online, <http://vpr.ae/newsletter/adsic/Annual-Report/en/index.html#p=16>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

<sup>1077</sup> Dubai Electronic Security Centre, *Dubai Cyber Security Strategy*, Version 2.0, Government of Dubai

## Appendix 7 Etisalat Board Members as of 2016 and their Public-Sector Connections<sup>1078</sup>

Position	Name	Public sector positions
Chairman	Eissa Mohamed al Ghanem al Suwaidi	<i>Managing Director, Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC)</i>  <i>Chairman, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank</i>  <i>Board Member, ADNOC Distribution</i>  <i>Board Member, International Petroleum Investment Company</i>  <i>Board Member, Emirates Investment Authority</i>
Vice Chairman	Sheikh Ahmed Mohd al Dhahiri	<i>Vice Chairman, Abu Dhabi National Hotels Company</i>  <i>Board Member, Abu Dhabi Aviation</i>  <i>Board Member, National Bank of Abu Dhabi</i>
Board Members	Mohammed Sultan al Hameli	<i>Director General, Department of Finance</i>  <i>Chairman of the Board of Directors, National Health Insurance Company</i>  <i>Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank</i>
Board Members	Abdullah Salem al Dhaheri	<i>Director, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company</i>  <i>Chairman of the Board of Directors, National Gas Shipping Company</i>  <i>Chairman of the Board of Directors, Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company</i>  <i>Chairman of the Board of Directors, Abu Dhabi National Ports Operating Company</i>  <i>Chairman of the Board of Directors, Petroleum Services Company</i>  <i>Board Member, Abu Dhabi National Oil Refining Company</i>  <i>Board Member, ADNOC Distribution</i>

<sup>1078</sup> Etisalat, *Corporate Governance 2016*, Emirates Telecommunications Group Company (PJSC), pp. 12-17

Board Member	Hesham Abdulla al Qassim	<i>Vice Chairman and Managing Director, Emirates National Bank of Dubai</i> <i>Chairman, Emirates Islamic</i> <i>Vice Chairman, Dubai Real Estate Corporation</i> <i>Board Member, Dubai International Financial Centre</i>
Board Member	Essa Abdulfattah al Mulla	<i>Governor, Dubai International Financial Centre</i> <i>Chairman, Dubai Financial Market</i> <i>Member, Supreme Fiscal Committee in Dubai</i> <i>Member, Supreme Legislation Committee in Dubai</i> <i>Board Member, Free Zones Council</i>
Board Member	Abdulfattah Sayed Sharaf	<i>Group General Manager and Chief Executive Officer, HSBC Middle East</i>
Board Member	Mohammed Hadi al Hussaini	<i>Board Member, Emirates National Bank of Dubai</i> <i>Board Member, Emirates Islamic Bank</i> <i>Board Member, Dubai Real Estate Corporation</i> <i>Board Member, Emaar Malls Group</i>
Board Member	Abdelmonem bin Eisa bin Nasser Alserkal	<i>Founder, AlSerkal Avenue</i> <i>Managing Director, Nasser bin Abdullatif Alserkal</i>
Board Member	Khalid Abdulwahid AlRustamani	<i>Vice Chairman, A.W. Rostamani Group</i> <i>Vice Chairman, Commercial Bank of Dubai</i>
Board Member	Otaiba Khalaf Ahmed Al Otaiba	

## Appendix 8 Du Board of Directors and their Public-Sector Connections<sup>1079</sup>

Position	Name	Public sector positions
Chairman	Ahmed Bin Bayt	<i>Member, Emirates Investment Authority</i> <i>Member of the Board of Trustees, Mohammed bin Rashid School of Government</i> <i>Member of the Board of Trustees, Zayed University</i>
Vice Chairman	Khaled Balama	<i>Executive Director, Real Estate, Abu Dhabi Investment Council</i> <i>Board Member, UAE Central Bank</i> <i>Board Member, General Pension and Social Security Authority</i> <i>Board Member, Emirates Development Bank</i>
Board Member	Saeed Al Yateem	<i>Assistant Undersecretary, Budget and Revenue Affairs, Ministry of Finance</i>
Board Member	Ziad Galadari	<i>Chairman, Galadari Investments</i> <i>Board of Directors, Dubai World Trade Centre</i>
Board Member	Homaid al Shemmari	<i>Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace and Engineering Services, Mubadala</i> <i>Board Member, Mubadala Investment Committee</i> <i>Chairman, Emirates Defence Industries Company (EDIC)</i>
Board Member	Fadhel al Ali	<i>Group Chief, Customer Experience and Digital Officer, First Abu Dhabi Bank</i> <i>Board Member, Dubai Financial Services Authority</i> <i>Board Member, Abu Dhabi Capital Group</i>
Board Member	Masood Mahmood	<i>Chief Executive, Yahsat</i> <i>Board Member, EMEA Satellite Operators Association</i>

<sup>1079</sup> Du, *Board of Directors*, available online, <http://www.du.ae/about-us/corporate-governance/board-of-directors>, date accessed, 21<sup>st</sup> January 2018

Du, *Annual Report 2015*, Dubai, 2015

		<i>Chairman, Du Investment Committee</i>
Board Member	Abdullah Al Shamsi	<i>General Manager, United Arab Shipping Agencies</i> <i>Vice President, Dubai Shipping Agents Association</i> <i>Chairman, Dubai Properties Group</i>
Board Member	Mohamed al Suwaidi	<i>Executive Director, Investment, Emirates Investment Authority</i>

## Appendix 9 Summary of UAE's Surveillance based Legislation

Law	Date	Description
Article 30 of 1971 Constitution	2 <sup>nd</sup> December 1971	'Freedom to hold expressions and express them orally, in writing or by other means of expression shall be guaranteed within the limits of the law' <sup>1080</sup>
Federal Law No.15 of 1980 <i>Concerning Press and Publications</i> <sup>1081</sup>	16 <sup>th</sup> November 1980	'Federal Law No.15 for 1980 Concerning Press and Publications regulates printing and publishing licensing and activities in the UAE and it applies to traditional media content such as newspapers, magazines and television broadcasting, as well as digital media content. The law sets out guidelines on materials which are prohibited from publication and penalties imposed on the publishing company and associated staff if found in violation of the Publications Law'. <sup>1082</sup>  'The Publications Law covers all forms of content, whether published digitally or via traditional media,

<sup>1080</sup> Article 30, *United Arab Emirates Constitution of 1971 with Amendments through 2004*, Abu Dhabi, Constitute Project, 1971, available online, [https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United\\_Arab\\_Emirates\\_2004.pdf](https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2004.pdf), date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1081</sup> Federal Law No.15 of 1980, available online, <http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Lists/LawsandLegislationsList/Attachments/55/قانون%20المطبوعات%20والنشر.pdf>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 1980

<sup>1082</sup> 'Media in the UAE', *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/media/media>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

		and is arguably broad enough to cover art and films. The Publications Law sets out matters that should not be published, which include matters relating to religion and public morals'. <sup>1083</sup>
Federal Decree No.3 of 1987 Penal Code	8 <sup>th</sup> December 1987	Issuance of UAE Penal Code
Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003 Regarding the Organization of Telecommunications Sector <sup>1084</sup>	15 <sup>th</sup> November 2003	The TRA regulates the UAE's Information and telecommunications sector (ICT)
Federal Law No.2 of 2004 Popular Register and Emirates Identity Card Program	29 <sup>th</sup> September 2004	Creation of the Emirates ID program which 'included recording personal and vital data for all population in the state and keeping them in electronic databases in coordination with the competent authorities, and issuing the Emirates ID Card for each individual to be registered and to contain the Emirates ID number, readable data and data stored on an electronic chip, which can be used in all entities'. <sup>1085</sup>

<sup>1083</sup> S Saleem, 'Content Regulation in the UAE: "The World of Wolf Street"', *Al Tammimi & Co*, February 2014, available online, <http://www.tamimi.com/law-update-articles/content-regulation-in-the-uae-the-wolf-of-wall-street/>, date accessed 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1084</sup> Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003, Regarding the Organization of Telecommunications Sector, *Telecommunications Regulatory Authority*, Abu Dhabi, Official Gazette, Edition 411, April 2004, online, <https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/about-tra/legal-references/law.aspx>, date accessed, 26th January 2018

<sup>1085</sup> 'About ICA', *Federal Authority for Identity and Citizenship*, available online, <https://www.id.gov.ae/en/emirates-id/about-emirates-id.aspx>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Federal Decree No.1 of 2006 Cyber Crimes Law <sup>1086</sup>	30 <sup>th</sup> June 2006	Was introduced, however due to its inability to disrupt cybercrimes, it was replaced by Federal Law no.5 of 2012
Federal Law by Decree No.5 of 2008 Amending the Provisions of the Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003 <sup>1087</sup>	2008	Update of Federal Law by Decree No.3 of 2003
Cabinet Resolution No. (42/23) of 2008 Session No.3 <sup>1088</sup> Regarding the Abolition of the Supreme Committee for the Supervision of the Telecommunication Sector and delegating its function to the Board of Directors of the TRA	2008	Empowerment of the TRA
National Media Council Resolution No.20 of 2010	2010	'The NMC Content Guidelines require all media companies to comply with specific criteria including respect for the principles of Islamic beliefs and the cultural heritage of the UAE'. <sup>1089</sup>

<sup>1086</sup> Federal Law No. (1) of 2006, Electronic Commerce and Transactions, available online, <https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/about-tra/legal-references/law.aspx>, date accessed, 26th January 2018

<sup>1087</sup> Official Gazette, Edition 485, October 2008

<sup>1088</sup> 'Legal References', *Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA)*, available online, <https://www.tra.gov.ae/en/legal-references.aspx>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1089</sup> S Saleem, 'Content Regulation in the UAE: "The Wold of Wolf Street"', *Al Tammimi & Co*, February 2014, available online, <http://www.tamimi.com/law-update-articles/content-regulation-in-the-uae-the-wolf-of-wall-street/>, date accessed 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

		<p>‘According to Decision No. 20 of 2010, all the audio, visual, print and digital media institutions in the UAE should adhere to media content standards contained in the Federal Law No.15 for 1980 Concerning Press and Publications and other media regulations in force. The Chairman’s decision emphasizes national standards for prohibited media content as set out in the Press and Publications Law. The decision requires all media institutions to keep a record or archives of all media material which were produced, printed, distributed or broadcast in the last three consecutive months. They must also provide the council with monthly reports showing compliance to these standards’.<sup>1090</sup></p>
Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2012 <sup>1091</sup> Establishment of National Electronic Security Authority (NESA)	13 <sup>th</sup> August 2012	Creation of NESA, and the definition of its structure, capability, and ability to engage in matters of security

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<sup>1090</sup> ‘Media in the UAE’, *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/media/media>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1091</sup> Federal Decree Law No.3 of 2012, On The Establishment of the National Electronic Security Authority, Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, available online, [http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest\\_laws/federal\\_decree\\_law\\_3\\_2012\\_en.pdf](http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws/federal_decree_law_3_2012_en.pdf), date accessed, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Federal Decree Law No.5 of 2012 <sup>1092</sup>  Combatting Cybercrimes	13 <sup>th</sup> August  2012	'Laws for the protection of privacy and reputation, defamation apply while using social media'. <sup>1093</sup>  'amendment to the Federal Law No.5/2012 has made the use of fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by any means to commit a crime, punishable'. <sup>1094</sup>
National Media Council Chairman's Decision No.35 of 2013  Advertising Content <sup>1095</sup>	2013	'According to the decision, all advertisements that are produced, placed or distributed within the UAE or imported into the UAE must abide by the national standards for media content and the Federal Law No. 15 of 1980 Concerning the Press and Publications. All specialised advertising such as that related to medicine, drugs, food, promotional campaigns, special offers, real estate or universities and educational institutions must obtain prior approvals from the competent authorities'. <sup>1096</sup>

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<sup>1092</sup> Federal Decree Law No.5 of 2012, Ministry of Justice, 13<sup>th</sup> August 2012, available online, [http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest\\_laws/cybercrimes\\_5\\_2012\\_en.pdf](http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws/cybercrimes_5_2012_en.pdf), date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1093</sup> 'Media in the UAE', *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/media/media>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1094</sup> AV Rajan, R Ravikumar, and M Al Shaer, 'UAE cybercrime Law and Cybercrimes – An Analysis'

<sup>1095</sup> 'Media in the UAE', *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/media/media>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1096</sup> 'Media in the UAE', *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/media/media>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Federal Decree Law No.7 of 2014 <sup>1097</sup>  Combatting Terrorism Offences	20 <sup>th</sup> August  2014	Combatting terrorism law designates what constitutes terrorism activity, and the penalties for such involvement.  The law provides ample space for enhanced surveillance capabilities upon subjects.
Federal Decree Law No.2 of 2015 <sup>1098</sup>  Combatting Discrimination and Hatred	15 <sup>th</sup> July  2015	'criminalises any act that triggers religious hatred and/or insults religion through any form of expression, which covers speech and the written word, books, pamphlets or online media. The law prohibits any act that would be considered as insulting God, his prophets or apostles or holy books or houses of worship or graveyards'. <sup>1099</sup>

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<sup>1097</sup> Federal Decree Law No.7 of 2014, Ministry of Justice, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2014, available online, <https://moj.gov.ae/documents/21128/86231/Federal%20Law%20No%207%20of%202014%20On%20Combating%20Terrorism%20Offences.pdf/d8e6e696-e44b-45eb-8c30-ca2cb2ff6ce5>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1098</sup> Federal Decree Law No.2 of 2015, Ministry of Justice, 15<sup>th</sup> July 2015, available online, [http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest\\_laws2015/FDL\\_2\\_2015\\_discrimination\\_hate\\_en.pdf](http://ejustice.gov.ae/downloads/latest_laws2015/FDL_2_2015_discrimination_hate_en.pdf), date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1099</sup> 'Media in the UAE', *UAE Government*, available online, <https://government.ae/en/media/media>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

Federal Law No.11 of 2016 <sup>1100</sup> Competencies of the National Media Council	21 <sup>st</sup> July 2016	Law updated the scope of the NMC and empowered the organisation following a corporate rebranding. <sup>1101</sup>
Federal Decree Law No.12 of 2016 <sup>1102</sup>	21 <sup>st</sup> July 2016	Amendment to Federal Decree Law No.5 of 2012  'Article 1 provides for replacing the text of Article 9 of Federal Law No. 9/2012 as follows: Whoever uses a fraudulent computer network protocol address (IP address) by using a false address or a third-party address by any other means for the purpose of committing a crime or preventing its discovery, shall be punished by temporary imprisonment and a fine of no less than AED500,000 and not exceeding AED2,000,000, or either of these two penalties'. <sup>1103</sup>

<sup>1100</sup> Federal Law No.11 of 2016, available online, <http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/NMC/Lists/LawsandLegislationsList/Attachments/56/شان%20تنظيم%20واختصاصات%20المجلس%20واختصاصاته>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1101</sup> 'Smart Media: National Media Council to "digitise" sector with new applications', *National Media Council*, 4<sup>th</sup> February 2017, available online, <http://nmc.gov.ae/en-us/Media-Center/news/Pages/Smart-Media-National-Media-Council-to-'Digitise'-Sector-with-New-Applications.aspx>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

'UAE President Issues Federal Laws', *United Arab Emirates, The Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/uae-president-issues-federal-laws>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1102</sup> 'UAE President Issues Federal Laws', *WAM*, 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2017, available online, <http://wam.ae/en/details/1395298018406>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1103</sup> 'UAE President Issues Federal Laws', *United Arab Emirates, The Cabinet*, available online, <https://uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/uae-president-issues-federal-laws>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<p>Council of Ministers Decree No.23 of 2017<sup>1104</sup></p> <p>Concerning Media Content</p>	<p>2017</p>	<p>Specific Regulation of Digital Media, and a clearer definition of the role of NESAs.</p> <p>There is also a new requirement to gain approval from the NMC before publishing documentation within the UAE.<sup>1105</sup></p>
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<sup>1104</sup> 'Mohammed bin Rashid Issues Decision Organising Media Content', *UAE, The Cabinet*, available online, <https://www.uaecabinet.ae/en/details/news/mohammed-bin-rashid-issues-decision-organizing-media-content/>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

<sup>1105</sup> 'Digital Media Now Firmly Within the UAE's Regulatory Scope', *Baker McKenzie*, 31<sup>st</sup> October 2017, available online, <https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/10/digital-media-uae-regulatory-scope/>, date accessed, 26<sup>th</sup> January 2018

**Appendix 10 Text of Articles Pertinent to Political Targeting Federal Law No.7 of 2014 – Combatting Terrorism Offences<sup>1106</sup>**

Article 1	<p>In implementation of the provisions of the present Law, the following terms and expressions shall have the meanings assigned thereto, unless the context requires otherwise:  Terrorist Result; Inciting fear among a group of people, killing them, or causing them serious physical injury, or inflicting substantial damage to property or the environment, or disrupting security of the international community, or opposing the country, or influencing the public authorities of the country or another country or international organisation while discharging its duties, or receiving a privilege from the country or another country or an international organisation.</p> <p>Internationally Protected Persons;  1. Kings and presidents of other states including any member of an organisation that perform the functions of head of state under the constitution of the concerned state, prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs as the time of presence of any of the aforementioned persons in the state, along with their family members who accompany them.</p> <p>2. Representatives or public officials of other states or an international governmental organisation, within the period during which such persons, along with their family members supported thereby, receive the prescribed special protection under the international law.</p>
Article 9	<p>Capital punishment shall be imposed on whoever attempts to commit or commits any aggression against the safety of the President of the State, his deputy or any of the members of the Federal Supreme Council, their heir apparents, deputies or family members, or deliberately endangers their life or freedom for a terrorist purpose.</p>
Article 10	<p>Life imprisonment shall be imposed on whoever uses or threatens the use of violence to urge the head of state, his deputy or any of the members of the Federal Supreme Council, their heir apparents or deputies to perform or abstain from performing an act that falls within their legal competence.</p>
Article 11	<p>Life imprisonment shall be imposed on whoever uses violence or threat of it to urge the Prime Minister of any of his deputies, or the ministers, the Chairman of the Federal National Council or any of its members of the members of the judiciary, to perform or abstain from the performance of an act that legally falls within their competence.</p>
Article 14	<p>Capital punishment or life imprisonment shall be imposed on whoever commits an action or inaction intended for threatening the State's stability, safety, unity, sovereignty or security, which contradicts the basic principles underlying the governance system of the State, or with the purpose of making a coup and taking over the power, illegally invalidating the provisions of the constitution or preventing one of the State's institutions or the public authorities from practising their activities, or prejudicing the national unity of the social security.</p>
Article 15	<p>Temporary imprisonment shall be imposed on whoever declares, by any means of communication, his opposition to the state, or to the ruling system therein or his non-allegiance to its leadership.</p>
Article 34	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Temporary imprisonment for no more than 10 years shall be imposed on whoever knowingly promotes or supports a terrorist organisation, person or offence, whether verbally, in writing or by any other method.</li> <li>2. Temporary imprisonment for no more than 10 years shall be imposed on whoever: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Knowingly possesses, in person or through someone else, any documents, print or recordings of any kind that encompass promotion or supporting of any terrorist organisation, person or offence if intended for distribution of access by others.</li> </ol> </li> </ol>

<sup>1106</sup> Federal Law No. 7 of 2014, On Combatting Terrorism Offences, 20<sup>th</sup> August 2014,

	b. Knowingly possesses or acquires any printing, recording or publishing mean used or intended to be used, even if temporarily, for the printing, recording, circulating or publishing any of the aforementioned.
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## Appendix 11 Evolution of Mubadala Leadership 2008-2018<sup>1107</sup>

2008 <sup>1108</sup>		2009 <sup>1109</sup>		2010 <sup>1110</sup>		2011 <sup>1111</sup>		2012 <sup>1112</sup>	
Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ
Vice Chairman	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi	Vice Chairman	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi	Vice Chairman	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi	Vice Chairman	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi	Vice Chairman	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi
Member	Hamad AlHurr al Suwaidi	Member	Hamad AlHurr al Suwaidi	Member	Hamad AlHurr al Suwaidi	Member	Hamad AlHurr al Suwaidi	Member	Hamad AlHurr al Suwaidi
Member	Nasser Ahmed Khalifa alSowaidi	Member	Nasser Ahmed Khalifa alSowaidi	Member	Nasser Ahmed Khalifa alSowaidi	Member	Nasser Ahmed Khalifa alSowaidi	Member	Nasser Ahmed Khalifa alSowaidi
Member	Ahmed Ali al Sayegh	Member	Ahmed Ali al Sayegh	Member	Ahmed Ali al Sayegh	Member	Abdulhamid mohammed Saeed	Member	Abdulhamid mohammed Saeed
Member	Mohamed Saif al Mazrouei	Member	Mohamed Saif al Mazrouei	Member	Mohamed Saif al Mazrouei	Member	Mahmood Ebraheem al Mahmood	Member	Mahmood Ebraheem al Mahmood
Group CEO and Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Group CEO and Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Group CEO and Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Group CEO and Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Group CEO and Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak

<sup>1107</sup> Board of Directors, Investment Committee, and executive level management

<sup>1108</sup> 'Annual Report 2008', *Mubadala*, 2008

<sup>1109</sup> 'Annual Report 2009', *Mubadala*, 2009

<sup>1110</sup> 'Annual Report 2010', *Mubadala*, 2010

<sup>1111</sup> 'Annual Report 2011', *Mubadala*, 2011

<sup>1112</sup> 'Annual Report 2012', *Mubadala*, 2012

Chief Operating Officer (COO)	Waleed al Mokarrabal Muhairi	Chief Operating Officer (COO)	Waleed al Mokarrabal Muhairi	Chief Operating Officer (COO)	Waleed al Mokarrabal Muhairi	Chief Operating Officer (COO)	Waleed al Mokarrabal Muhairi	Chief Operating Officer (COO)	Waleed al Mokarrabal Muhairi
CFO	Carlos Obeid	CFO	Carlos Obeid	CFO	Carlos Obeid	CFO	Carlos Obeid	CFO	Carlos Obeid
Executive Director, Strategic Planning and Portfolio Management	Alexej Ogorek	Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa	Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa	Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa	Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa
Executive Director	Derek Pozycki	CEO, Mubadala Oil and Gas & Executive Director, Energy & Industry	Maurizio La Noce	Executive Director, Finance	Moiz Chakkiwala	Executive Director	Homaid al Shemmari	Executive Director, Aerospace	Homaid al Shemmari
Executive Director, Acquisitions	Hani Barhoush	Executive Director, Real Estate	John Thomas	Executive Director, Group Treasury	Matthew Hun	Executive Director	Hani Barhoush	Executive Director, Industry	Ahmed Yahia
Executive Director, ICT	Jassem Mohammed al Zaabi	CEO, Mubadala Infrastructure	Rod Mathers	Executive Director, Construction Management Services	Rod Mathers	Executive Director	Suhail Mahmood al Ansari	Executive Director, Information and Communications Technology (ICT)	Jassem Mohamed al Zaabi
Executive Director, Real Estate and Hospitality	John Thomas	Executive Director, Services Ventures	Laurent Depolla	Executive Director, Structured Finance and Capital Markets	Derek Rozycki	Executive Director	Ahmed Yahia al Idrissi	CEO and Executive Director, Mubadala Petroleum	Maurizio la Noce

Executive Director, Communications	Kate Triggs	Executive Director, Aerospace	Homaïd al Shemmari	Executive Director, Group Communications	Kate Triggs	Executive Director	Jassem Mohammed al Zaabi	CEO, Masdar	Sultan Ahmed al Jaber
Executive Director, Services	Laurent Depolla	Executive Director	Jassem Mohammed al Zaabi	Chief Information Officer	Ajit Naidu	Executive Director	Ali Eid al Mheiri	Executive Director, Mubadala Healthcare	Suhail Moahmood al Ansari
Executive Director, Healthcare	Mark Erhart	Executive Director, Healthcare	Mark Erhart	Executive Director, Healthcare	Suhail Mahmoof al Ansari	CEO, Oil	Maurizio la Noce	Vice-President, Mubadala Real Estate and Infrastructure	Abdulla al Shamsi
Executive Director, Group Treasury	Matthew Hurn	Executive Director, Acquisitions	Hani Barhoush	Executive Director, Mubadala Capital & Mergers and Acquisitions	Hani Barhoush	Executive Director	Laurent Depolla		
Executive Director, Energy & Industry, CEO, Mubadala Oil and Gas	Maurizio La Noce	Executive Director, Finance	Moiz Chakkiwala	Executive Director, Mubadala Services Ventures	Laurent Depolla	Executive Director	Ibrahim Ajami		
CEO, Mubadala Infrastructure	Rod Mathers	Executive Director, Project & Corporate Finance	Derek Rozycki	Executive Director, Mubadala Industry	Ahmed Yahia al Idrissi	CEO, Masdar	Sultan Ahmed al Jaber		
		Executive Director, Group Communications	Kate Triggs	Executive Director, Mubadala Energy & Oil and Gas	Maurizio la Noce				

		Chief Information Officer	Ajit Naidu	Executive Director, Mubadala Aerospace	Homaid al Shemmari				
				Executive Director, Real Estate & Hospitality	Peter Wilding				
				Executive Director, Mubadala ICT	Jassem Mohammed al Zaabi				

2013 <sup>1113</sup>		2014 <sup>1114</sup>		2015 <sup>1115</sup>		2016 <sup>1116</sup>		2017 <sup>1117</sup>	
Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ	Chairman	MBZ
Vice Chairman	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi	Vice Chairman	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi					Vice Chairman	Mansour bin Zayed
Member	Hamad AlHurr al Suwaidi	Member	Hamad AlHurr al Suwaidi	Group CEO & Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Group CEO & Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Board Member	Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi
Member	Nasser Ahmed Khalifa alSowaidi	Member	Nasser Ahmed Khalifa alSowaidi	Deputy Group CEO & CEO Emerging Sectors	Waleed al Mokarrib al Muhairi	Deputy Group CEO & CEO Emerging Sectors	Waleed al Mokarrib al Muhairi	Member	Suhail Mohammed Faraj al Mazrouei

<sup>1113</sup> 'Annual Review 2013', *Mubadala*, 2013

<sup>1114</sup> 'Mubadala Annual Review 2014', *Mubadala*, 2014

<sup>1115</sup> 'Annual Review 2015', *Mubadala*, available online, 2015, <https://www.mubadala.com/annual-review-2015/en/our-leadership>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>1116</sup> 'Annual Review 2016', *Mubadala*, 2016, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/annual-review-2016/en/index.html>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

<sup>1117</sup> 'Who we Are', *Mubadala*, available online, <https://www.mubadala.com/en>, date accessed, 23<sup>rd</sup> March 2018

Member	Abdulhamid d mohammed Saeed	Member	Abdulhamid d mohammed Saeed	CEO Technology & Industry	Ahmed Yahia al Idrissi	CEO Technology & Industry	Ahmed Yahia al Idrissi	Member	Mahmood Ebraheem al Mahmood
Member	Mahmood Ebraheem al Mahmood	Member	Mahmood Ebraheem al Mahmood	CEO Energy	Dr. Sultan al Jaber	CEO Energy	Amed Saeed al Calily	Member	Abdulhamid Mohammed Saeed
Group CEO and Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Group CEO and Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak	Chief Human Capital Officer	Khaled Abdulla al Qubaisi	Chief Human Capital Officer	Khaled Abdulla al Qubaisi	Group CEO & Managing Director	Khaldoon Khalifa al Mubarak
Deputy Group CEO and CEO Emerging Sectors	Waleed al Mokarrab al Muhairi	Deputy Group CEO and CEO Emerging Sectors	Waleed al Mokarrab al Muhairi	Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace and Engineerin g Services	Homaïd al Shimmar i	Chief Executive Officer, Aerospace and Engineerin g Services	Homaïd al Shimmar i	Deputy Group CEO & CEO, Alternative Investments and Infrastructure	Waleed al Mokarrab al Muhairi
Chief Executive Officer, Energy	Sultan Ahmed al Jaber	Chief Executive Officer, Energy	Sultan Ahmed al Jaber	Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa	Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa	Deputy CEO, Chief of Human Capital and Corporate Services	Homaïd al Shimmar
CEO, Aerospace & Engineerin g Service	Homaïd al Shemmari	CEO, Aerospace & Engineerin g Service	Homaïd al Shemmari	Chief Financial Officer	Carlos Obeid	Chief Financial Officer	Carlos Obeid	Chief Strategy & Risk Officer	Ahmed Saeed al Calily
Chief Human Capital Officer	Khaled Abdulla al Qubaisi	Chief Human Capital Officer	Khaled Abdulla al Qubaisi					CEO, Technology, Manufacturin g & Mining	Hmed Yahia al Idrissi
Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa	Chief Legal Counsel	Samer Halawa					CEO, Petroleum & Petrochemical s	Mussabbeh al Kaabi

CFO	Carlos Obeid	CFO	Carlos Obeid					CEO, Aerospace, Renewables, and ICT	Khaled Abdullah al Qubaisi
CEO Technology & Industry	Ahmed Yahia al Idrissi							Executive Director	Hani Barhoush
								Chief Legal Officer	Samer Halawa
								Chief Financial Officer	Carlos Obeid

## Appendix 12 Evolution of The Tribal and Kinship Dynamics Within the Abu Dhabi Executive Council (ADEC)

ADEC members 2007 <sup>1118</sup>	ADEC members 2010 <sup>1119</sup>	ADEC members 2016 <sup>1120</sup>	ADEC members 2019 <sup>1121</sup>
Chairman of ADEC Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Chairman of ADEC Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Chairman of ADEC Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Chairman of ADEC Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>
Saeed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Vice-Chairman of ADEC	Vice-Chairman of ADEC	Vice-Chairman of ADEC

<sup>1118</sup> 'The Executive Council, Policy Agenda 2007-2008; The Emirate of Abu Dhabi, *The Executive Council*, available online, <https://eaa.gov.ae/en/docs/policy-agenda-2007-08.pdf>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2019

<sup>1119</sup> 'Mohammed Reappointed Chief of Abu Dhabi Executive Council', *Gulf News*, 13<sup>th</sup> December 2010, available online, <https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/mohammad-reappointed-chief-of-abu-dhabi-executive-council-1.728600>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2019

Kareem Shaheen makes reference to notable figures, such as Saeed bin Zayed, Tahnoon bin Zayed, Sultan bin Khalifa, Ahmed bin Saif, and Rashid al Hajeri, who were left out of the ADEC. K Shaheen, 'Sheikh Hazza Appointed to Abu Dhabi Executive Council', *The National*, 13<sup>th</sup> December 2010, available online, <https://www.thenational.ae/uae/government/sheikh-hazza-appointed-to-abu-dhabi-executive-council-1.553734>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2019

<sup>1120</sup> Amiri Decree No. (1) of 2016, *The Official Gazette*, General Secretariat of the Executive Council, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition, 29<sup>th</sup> February 2016

<sup>1121</sup> 'Member's Profiles', *Abu Dhabi Executive Council*, available online, <https://www.ecouncil.ae/en/ADGovernment/Pages/MemberProfiles.aspx>, date accessed, 8<sup>th</sup> February 2019

	Hazza bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Hazza bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Hazza bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>
Tahnoon bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Hamed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Hamed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Tahnoun bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>
Diab bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Mohamed bin Khalifa al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Mohamed bin Khalifa al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Hamed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>
Hamed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Sultan bin Tahnoon al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Sultan bin Tahnoon al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Mohammed bin Khalifa al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>
Sultan bin Khalifa al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Secretary-General of the ADEC Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi <i>Al Bu Falasah of the Bani Yas</i>	Secretary-General of the ADEC Ahmed Mubarak al Mazroui <i>Mazar - Section of the Bani Yas</i>	Khalid bin Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>
Mohammed bin Khalifa al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Khaldoun Khalifa al Mubarak	Khaldoun Khalifa al Mubarak	Theyab bin Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>
Ahmed bin Said al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Ahmed Mubarak al Mazroui	Mugheer Khamis al Khalil	Sultan bin Tahnoon al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>

	<i>Mazar - Section of the Bani Yas</i>		
Sultan bin Tahnoon al Nahyan <i>Bani Yas</i>	Deputy Secretary- General of the ADEC Hamad al Hurr al Suwaidi <i>Sudan section of the Bani Yas</i>	Saeed Eid al Ghafli <i>Ghafalah</i>	Secretary-General of the ADEC Ahmed Mubarak al Mazrouei <i>Mazar - Section of the Bani Yas</i>
Secretary-General of the ADEC Mohammad Ahmad al Bowardi <sup>1122</sup> <i>Al Bu Falasah of the Bani Yas</i>	Nasser Ahmad al Suwaidi <i>Sudan section of the Bani Yas</i>	Ali Majeed al Mansoori <i>Manasir</i>	Khaldoun Khalifa al Mubarak
Khaldoun Khalifa al Mubarak	Abdullah Rashid Khalaf al Otaiba <sup>1123</sup>	Mohammed Khalfan al Rumaithi <i>Rumaithat of the Bani Yas</i>	Jassim Mohammed Buatabh al Zaabi <i>Za'ab</i>

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<sup>1122</sup> He was previously the Director of the Private Office of MBZ. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the United Arab Emirates*, p.194

<sup>1123</sup> Hendrik Van Der Meulen notes that the Otaiba's are one of two prominent "non-tribal" merchant families 'with close long-standing ties to the Al-Nuhayyan'. H Van Der Meulen, *The Role of Tribal and Kinship Ties in the Politics of the UAE*, pp.134-135

Rashid Mubarak <sup>1124</sup> Al Hajeri <i>Sunni of Iranian origin</i>	Major General Obaid al Ketbi <i>Bani Qitab</i>	Riyad Abdul Rahman al Mubarak	Mugheer Khamis al Khalil
Jou'an Salem al Daheri <i>Dhawahir</i>	Mugheer Khamis al Khalil	Abdulla bin Mohamed bin Butti al Hamed al Qubaisi <i>Qubaysat of the Bani Yas</i>	Abdulla bin Mohamed bin Butti al Hamed al Qubaisi <i>Qubaysat of the Bani Yas</i>
Hamad al Hurr al Suwaidi <i>Sudan section of the Bani Yas</i>	Majid Ali al Mansouri <i>Manasir</i>	Ali Rashed al Nuaimi <i>Na'im</i>	Awaidha Murshed al Marar <i>Al-Marar of the Bani Yas</i>
Nasser Ahmad al Suwaidi <i>Sudan section of the Bani Yas</i>		Oweidah Murshed al Murar <i>Al-Marar of the Bani Yas</i>	Saif Mohamed al Hajeri
Major General Saeed Obaid al Mazroui <i>Mazar - Section of the Bani Yas</i>			Falah Mohammed al Ahbabi <i>Ahbab</i>
Abdullah Rashid al Otaiba			Mohammed Khalifa al Mubarak

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<sup>1124</sup> His brother, Saeed Mubarak al Hajeri was previously on the ADIA Board of Directors.

<p>Ahmed Mubarak al Mazroui <i>Mazar - Section of the Bani Yas</i></p>			<p>Major General Faris Khalaf al Mazrouei <i>Mazar - Section of the Bani Yas</i></p>
			<p>Sara Awad Issa Musallam</p>

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