Heritage Preservation and the Transforming State in Lviv: A Changing Professional Field

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Building novel connections between recent work in heritage studies, the anthropology of expertise and post-socialism, this dissertation explores a protracted crisis of heritage expertise in Ukraine. Empirically, it combines historical reconstruction of the *long durée* of the heritage profession, with an ethnography of conflicts around museums and monuments in the historic city of Lviv, Ukraine. Analysing the relationship between expertise and the changing state in post-socialist heritage preservation, the dissertation argues that comprehensive socio-political shifts, such as those that took place in Ukraine after the fall of the USSR, challenge professions the expertise and recognition of which are intertwined with state institutions.

The end of the USSR and the ensuing crisis of professional legitimacy cleaved the heritage field in Lviv, disrupting hierarchies and rearranging key positions of prestige. In the mid-2000s, heritage became a new priority in local urban development; and since 2014, the war in Donbas gave further urgency to the claims of the 'European' history of the city. These developments have created new opportunities in professions central to the recognition and maintenance of heritage in Lviv, and reinvigorated their sense of professional purpose. Parallel orders of institutional and expert legitimacies emerged in this heritage field, with distinct career trajectories. Key divisions in the field run not between the state and the third or the private sector, but often between those state actors invested in preserving vertical bureaucratic control, and those pushing for an 'opening up', with local and international allies on both sides.

Still, the public heritage infrastructure in Ukraine remains largely unchanged since the end of state socialism. Museums and universities are systematically underfunded, managed through tight bureaucratic control. Unable to change nation-wide laws and policies, municipal authorities who push for the 'heritigisation' of Lviv have engaged in a dual strategy: lobbying for decentralisation, and circumventing the national state through alliances with transnational actors and the private sector.

Without sustained financial and managerial autonomy, these institutions are in a precarious situation that compromises their capacity for critical professionalism. Alternative, non-state institutions need to secure state support if they are to gain permission to work with state property, and to translate international networks and recognition into local credentials. The result is a cautious, compromise-seeking approach to professional problems that has defined the cultural landscape of Lviv in the last decade. Interpreting these professional divisions and crises in relation to the critical heritage literature, the dissertation argues against monolithic ascriptions of expert power, suggesting that a field theory-based approach to heritage professionals can help us better assess their position and power, especially as these relate to institutional and cultural transformations of the public sector.

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A Changing Professional Field

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STATEMENT OF COPYRIGHT

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TRANSLITERATION

I predominantly used Ukrainian during my field research, to a lesser extent Russian and English. Hebrew words appear rarely; where they do, I follow the Library of Congress system.

I use a modified version of the Library of Congress system for transliterating Ukrainian and Russian. For the sake of readability I omit the transliteration of the soft sign (-ь) in both languages: e.g. український is rendered *ukraiinskyi*. In the bibliography, I render soft signs with an apostrophe (-') for the sake of accuracy. Similarly, the Russian hard sign (-ъ) is omitted in the text but rendered with -" when used in references.

In general, I use an 'i' in palatalised vowels in both languages, unless they are in a word-initiator position. Thus, both in Russian and Ukrainian, -ю and -я are rendered -iu and -ia in words, but as as -yu and -ya at the start of words: (ua.) Юлія and (ru.) Юлия is Yuliia instead of Iuliia, but (ua.) заява is zaiava. The same rule is applied to the Ukrainian -є and -ї: традицією as traditsiieiu but Євген as Yevhen. The Russian -e remains -e apart from the beginning of words, when it becomes -ye: Ельцин is rendered Yeltsin. The Russian letter -ё is transliterated as -io in words and -yo at the start, apart from names that are widely known in English in a different format: Хрущёв and Горбачёв remain Khrushchev and Gorbachev.

For the rear/central phoneme represented by -и in Ukrainian and -ы in Russian I use -y. For -й I use -i in both languages, to avoid confusion. The letter -г is pronounced and transliterated as -h in Ukrainian, but as -g in Russian; when it came to Ukrainian informants whose name could thus be rendered in two different ways, I used the language they used speaking to me, i.e. Oleh in Ukrainian but Oleg in Russian.

I abandon these rules when it comes to widespread renditions like Kyiv (instead of Kyiiv). In case of those authors in the bibliography, whose English as well as Russian or Ukrainian work is cited, and who romanised their names differently in the English publications cited, I kept two separate entries (i.e. Богдан Черкес appears as Bohdan Cherkes and Bohdan Tscherkes; likewise, Сергей Ушакин as Sergei Ushakin and Serguei Oushakine). Where romanisation was identical to the system used, and this problem did not arise, English and Russian or Ukrainian works appear under the same author.

The bulk of my fieldwork took place in Lviv, where the overwhelming majority of people spoke Ukrainian. Apart from a few encounters, especially in the Jewish and the Armenian community and with visitors, Ukrainian was the default option in all spoken and written contexts. To convey a sense of this near-monolingual experience — that is rather unusual in most of Ukraine — I refer to the Ukrainian language version of place names: Kyiv instead of Kiev, Zaporizhzhia instead of Zaporozhye.

Many place names are known in the international media in their Russian versions, but for consistency, I decided to stick with the Ukrainian version of those as well: Odesa instead of the more common Odessa and Donbas instead of Donbass. Though the commonly used English versions testify the symbolic primacy of the Russian language in the Russian Empire and the USSR, and as such they are criticised as colonial by many in independent Ukraine, incidentally, many of these places are mostly Russian-speaking anyway. The exclusive usage of Ukrainian does *not* indicate a political preference or statement on my part. However, besides reflecting what I heard on the ground, it also captures the linguistic and political distance from where many of my informants in Lviv observed the rest of the country.

I included a letter-by-letter guide to the transliteration system below. All translations in this text are mine, unless stated otherwise. Unless I indicate otherwise, the original versions of the words I cite are all in Ukrainian.

Ukrainian	**Russian**	**Transliteration**
Аа	Аа	Aa
Бб	Бб	Bb
Вв	Вв	Vv
Гг	--	Hh
Ґ ґ	Гг	Gg
Дд	Дд	Dd
Ее	Ээ	Ee
Єє	Ее	Ie ie*
Жж	Жж	Zh zh
Зз	Зз	Zz
Ии	ы	Yy
Іі	Ии	Ii
Її	--	Ii ii*
Йй	Йй	Ii
Кк	Кк	Kk
Лл	Лл	Ll
Мм	Мм	Mm
Нн	Нн	Nn

Оо	Оо	Oo
Пп	Пп	Pp
Рр	Рр	Rr
Сс	Сс	Ss
Тт	Тт	Tt
Уу	Уу	Uu
Фф	Фф	Ff
Хх	Хх	Kh kh
Цц	Цц	Ts ts
Чч	Чч	Ch ch
Шш	Шш	Sh sh
Щщ	Щщ	Shch shch
ь	ь	[omitted]**
Юю	Юю	Iu iu*
Яя	Яя	Ia ia*
'	--	[omitted]**
--	Ёё	Io io*
--	-- ъ	[omitted]**

*When in a word-initiator position: -ya, -ye, -yi, -yo, -yu

** In references -ь is -’, -ъ and -' are -”

A NOTE ON ANONYMITY

Many of my informants were people visible in the public life of the city: they wrote articles, gave interviews, and talks; their names were well-known to a public familiar with matters of heritage protection and historical research. Moreover, the institutions whose histories and present I piece together in this ethnography are easy to identify through the details I present. Choosing not to name either organisations or people would have been an unsatisfactory solution, a thin cover at best. The only way to preserve full confidentiality of research participants would have been to fictionalise the city altogether. Even then, I would have run into problems when referring to their written work or articles that mention them with names and photos. I chose to preserve the names of all the institutions in this ethnography, and to use the real names of those informants who maintain a public persona difficult to conceal. I therefore did not change the names of directors, heads of municipal departments and media-savvy activists. I anonymised everyone else: those whose written work I do not refer to, and those whose position is less easy to identify, e. g. curators, lawyers, NGO staff, and students.

I asked every interlocutor of mine whether they would want their identity anonymised; not a single one of them did. Arguably, they might not have been fully aware of the kind of proximity anthropological texts might grant them. After much hesitation I opted for this above solution with the understanding that full anonymity is paramount when research involves vulnerable communities; in spite of the financial precarity of many heritage professionals, this research did not. As they have done throughout their career, those named here will know how to respond appropriately to this ethnography if they ever feel they need to. I did my best to represent their voices and context with attention, care, respect and accuracy, and I can only hope they will approve, even when they might disagree about my analysis or the picture that emerges when multiple perspectives are conjoined.

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the professional field of heritage preservation in Lviv against the background of a changing state. It does so in order to tease out specificities of post-socialist expertise and its institutional context, and thereby to derive broader insights about expertise and the public sector in the aftermath of large societal transformations. This is achieved through a historically informed ethnography of professional and political conflicts in museums and heritage sites in the city, all of which evolve around the role and function of memorials, monuments, and exhibitions.

Based on fieldwork with heritage professionals and historians in Lviv in 2015-16, and a follow-up study in 2017 in Kyiv, I locate heritage conflicts in the context of the late-Soviet era consolidation of the heritage field, and its subsequent change during post-Soviet political transformations. I inquire into the stakes of professional work around heritage, as they evolved through a period characterised by major social and economic shifts. Such shifts amplify the voices and moves of certain actors, and more than merely underwriting daily disagreements around professional practice, occasion major rearrangements in the norms and assumptions of expertise. As I demonstrate throughout the dissertation, many formerly successful restoration professionals became sidelined after Ukrainian independence, struggling in vain to divorce their expertise and experience from the legacy of the Soviet era that granted it recognition in the first place. This is also true for professionals whose work was recognised as anti-Soviet dissent. Others managed to stay on top of the game, converting their credentials successfully. New professional groups emerged, funded through various programmes of West European 'soft diplomacy' or philanthropy, but also increasingly established locally. They are often allied with the municipal government against the controlling role of the central state[1] in the management of heritage. These competing professional groups are often in disagreement about what constitutes a basis for legitimate work in the sector, about how this work is organised, and what its public role is.

My ethnography works through the following questions: How does the comprehensive socio-economic transformation that the collapse of the USSR brought about affect the way Lviv is managed today? How do heritage regimes relate to political and economic regimes — do changes unfold at a similar pace? What happens with expertise caught up in changing institutions and social contexts? Finally, what happens to professional authority and power when expertise is in crisis?

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[1] Throughout the dissertation, I refer to central and national state interchangeably, to denote vertically organised tiers of regional administration, the heads of which are appointed by the president. Referring to the City Council, or the municipal leadership I denote locally elected authorities. I explain these institutional structures and their origins in chapters 3 and 4.

I first clarify the terms, then elaborate on why I chose to focus on the nexus of heritage-related expertise, political and institutional change.

For the purposes of this study, I define heritage as the material remnants of the past that are subject to professional, institutionalised efforts of recognition, protection and public display. This includes documentation, research, cataloguing, preservation, restoration, and occasionally reconstruction of buildings and artefacts. The Ukrainian (*spadshchyna*) and Russian (*nasledie*) terms are straightforward equivalents of the English.

I often use a cognate term, monument (ua. *pam'iatnyk*, ru. *pamiatnik*), when I refer to individual buildings that form part of heritage sites. I do so in order to convey the importance of this term on the ground: monuments were the key focus of Soviet preservation policy until the 1960s, a focus that gradually expanded to encompass ensembles as well as the surroundings of individual buildings (Geering 2019a, 2019b). Inventories and plaques on façades make the term a ubiquitous sight in the city. The word *pam'iatnyk*/*pamiatnik* has a different semantic field from the English term monument though; besides monumental buildings, it also refers to memorials: equestrian statues, commemorative signs etc. The root of the word, *pam'iat* means memory: monuments are embodiments, reminders of a past era, while memorials are prompts that are placed somewhere to incite remembering. I do not consider memorials part of heritage per se, but they are often elements of the immediate surroundings of heritage sites, placed in direct conversation with them. I therefore included conflicts around memorials in this ethnography in as much as they are were integral to the same discourses concerning the role of the past, and the purpose of interrogating or preserving it. This was often the case.

Interventions around heritage range from preservation or conservation to restoration and reconstruction: paradoxical activities in that their efforts are centred around securing the past while changing it (Jones and Yarrow 2013). Preservation or conservation are commonly understood as a "protective intervention to maintain the current condition of an artefact, building or ensemble" (Ashworth 2011: 4). Demarcating preservation from restoration poses difficulties, as managing decay already involves interventions that verge on alteration, but for the sake of simplicity, I understand restoration to involve more radical steps towards bringing the heritage site closer to what is seen as a fuller past form. Finally, reconstruction, a seldom used form of intervention since the 1970s involves the re-creation of a historic site that might not exist anymore.

The Ukrainian- and Russian-language terminology I encountered mapped on these semantic divisions, but it was used in a markedly different fashion. The equivalent of preservation, *zberezhennia* in Ukrainian and *sokhranenie* in Russian did exist, and was often used when people talked about the general idea or practice of heritage preservation, but talking about individual buildings I heard the term *restavratsiia* a lot more often, even when the intervention was more akin to what would be called preservation or conservation in English. Professionals were called

*restavrator*s too, which might have reinforced the centrality of the term. In this dissertation I mostly use the term preservation to refer to professional interventions. There has been a shift towards minimal intervention since the 1970s on both sides of the Iron Curtain, but this happened a lot slower in the USSR, so in cases when I encountered more radical alterations of heritage sites, I use restoration and reconstruction to highlight the difference.

Heritage preservation is a highly institutionalised professional field. The 20th century has witnessed heritage sites being incorporated into political and legal institutionalising processes, most prominently by nation states.[2] In the USSR, and in independent Ukraine, heritage sites belong under local, regional or national jurisdictions, and preservation work is conducted within this infrastructure. The idea of world heritage was a quintessentially post-war phenomenon. It was an attempt to conceptualise objects of cultural and natural conservation as global mandate, wrestling them away from national frameworks of protection (Brumann and Meskell 2015). When the World Heritage Convention of the UNESCO came into force in 1975, an international tier of protection was superimposed on the national political and legal apparatus.[3] Nation states nominated sites for inscription on the World Heritage List, tying global and national recognition together. The USSR ratified the Convention only in 1988 — the first Soviet heritage sites were inscribed on the World Heritage List just a few months before the dissolution of the USSR.

Thus, heritage preservation is intimately tied to state policies and infrastructures, and heritage professionals are — to a large extent — part of the public sector. The majority of the museum workers, art historians and architectural historians I worked with were also employed in public research institutions. Even private and third sector institutions in the heritage sector need to work with or around public institutions and the state administration. Moreover, heritage is mobilised in discourses that concern history, identity, values: it is not only a means of physical, but also discursive foregrounding and sidelining, inclusion and exclusion. Critical events (Das 1995), like the breakup o the USSR, reconfigure the regulatory, managerial, discursive side of heritage preservation, and the professional careers involved in them. It is thanks to these connections, that I chose heritage as a lens through which to examine post-socialist change in Ukraine.

Because of the close link between the state and heritage, the changing field of heritage preservation is also a story of a changing field of expertise. The infrastructure of the preservation and management of heritage sites, and of curation in museums was developed in the 1960-70s in

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[2] For the history of various national heritage regimes see e.g. Swenson 2013. David Lowenthal's classic work (1985) situates how preserving the past became a concern in Western Europe.

[3] The Convention did not define World Heritage. It introduced a number of criteria, that have changed through the past four decades, notably being extended to intangible heritage (customs and practices); this is partly due to the Convention's recognition of cultural relativism as a policy principle, that led to a recognition of the difference between various national traditions in their definitions of what heritage was. For a detailed overview of the criteria and their changes see Denis Rodwell's excellent summary (2013).

Lviv. After the fall of the USSR, senior employees lived through the increasing delegitimisation of the Soviet state that had created the infrastructure of their profession in the first instance. Norms of conduct, networks and skills, sources of professional legitimacy, and even individual institutions were all complexly entwined with socio-political order that became widely discredited in the course of a short period. After 1991, a new generation of heritage professionals started careers in a sector that was still state-owned and in many respects, relatively unchanged. Their efforts to navigate these hierarchies in an otherwise radically changed country, or find a way around these institutions provides an interesting angle to look at the major social, economic and political shift that came about with the break-up of the USSR. Heritage has become a key economic and symbolic resource with increasing importance for municipal urban strategy in the past decade, elevating the visibility and the stakes of this professional field. The stakes of heritage conflicts are high in today's Lviv.

The dissertation considers heritage preservation as a professional field of expertise in the sense that its practitioners gain recognition through the same institutionalised channels, aspire for similar forms or recognition and professional reward, participate in the same discourses. I chose people and institutions whose work concerned the historic centre of Lviv, whether through involvement with the buildings ascribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, with museums located within them, or nearby memorials. Similarly to many historians who analysed Soviet or post-Soviet heritage institutions (Donovan 2013, 2015, 2019; Felcher 2016; Geering 2019a, 2019b; Kelly 2015; Maddox 2014), I found the work of various professions intertwined to a point that it made sense to bring together historians and architects, curators and restorers, though bearing mind that their perspectives are constantly renegotiated in the processes of preservation work (Jones and Yarrow 2013).

Bearing in mind the above outlined relationship between the professional field of heritage expertise and the state, I structure this ethnography around a number of conflicts I observed in and around preservation institutions, museums and memorials. I attempt to locate these in broader institutional histories and professional careers, hoping to shed new light on post-socialist change from a hitherto relatively unexplored perspective.

The context of fieldwork

To be able to elaborate on the key contributions of this dissertation, I first need to flesh out the context of my fieldwork in Lviv.

My decision to research how heritage preservation changed in Lviv through post-socialist state transformation was inspired by the recognition of the ambivalent position that preservation as a a state-led sector occupied in the USSR. Contrary to earlier accounts that saw the USSR as an iconoclastic state, there is a growing consensus among historians that heritage preservation was in

fact an integral part of the cultural policy of the USSR (e.g. Deschepper 2019; Donovan 2013, 2015; Gearing 2019a, 2019b; Maddox 2014). It was also a key site for dissident movements in the last two decades of state socialism (Kozlov 2001; Pleas 2015; Risch 2011). Documentation, preservation and recognition were mandated by the state, directed at buildings and monuments that stood witness to preceding, pre-revolutionary eras the state sought to diverge from.

After the dissolution of the USSR and the ensuing sharp nationalist turn in cultural politics in Western Ukraine,[4] the ambivalence of the legacy of heritage preservation remained pervasive: now heritage professionals could claim the legacy of dissent, and hence a crucial role within the newly important project of nation-building, yet the institutions they worked in were barely changed in terms of institutional structure, funding and professional approach. Understanding the uneasy alliance between the Soviet state and its heritage professionals, and the legacy of having been part of a state apparatus of a now rejected state, I hoped that the perspective of Lviv's heritage professionals might lead to new insights about post-socialist change, especially institutional change, and the changing state.

The aspects of my fieldwork are particularly important to discuss: the tensions between the relatively intact historic buildings and drastically altered population in Lviv; the coexistence of Soviet-era preservation institutions with recently established initiatives; and the length and turbulence of the four decades my informants' careers encompass.

Lviv: intact architecture, altered demography

I could have chosen many cities to study urban change and its tension with preservation and public memory in a post-socialist context. However, very few would have offered the extremes and the intensity that Lviv does. During the first half of the 20th century this formerly Polish-Jewish-Ukrainian city went through radical demographic transformation, losing nearly all of its Polish and Jewish population. Putting an end to centuries of multiethnic coexistence, Hitler's Final Solution and Stalin's demographic policies turned Lviv into a mostly homogeneous city: the local Jewish population was exterminated in the Shoa, and the Poles were deported in the post-war Stalinist population exchange. Lviv became an ethnically and linguistically Ukrainian city upon losing over 80% of its pre-war population, and it was incorporated into the USSR. The regionally important Greek Catholic Church was banned, its priests went underground or became

[4] I use the term cultural politics in a broad sense: I refer to discourses at the intersection of political and cultural debates, as well as political and legal decisions that concern the funding, management and overall functioning of cultural institutions (museums, libraries, theatres, heritage institutions, as well as educational institutions in as much as the humanities and the social sciences are concerned). I consider heritage preservation, as well as cognate activities that concern memorials and the commemoration of past events and historic personalities to be part of cultural politics. Another cognate term, memory politics refers to those areas of cultural politics that explicitly concern collective remembering, such as commemorative events, the contents of history curricula, policies that regulate how the past might be talked about. Heritage preservation is often intertwined with issues of memory politics, as subsequent chapters will reveal.

Orthodox. Local histories of Ukrainian insurgent nationalism and German collaborationism made the city suspect in the eyes of the new leadership that struggled to domesticate the social basis of dissent. In just a decade, new geopolitical orientation was set up and a mostly new polity formed, with a new elite, part local, part made up by incomers from parts of Ukraine that had been part of the USSR since its inception.

However, genocide and deportations did not involve urbicide, and today much of the city's historic architecture remains intact. Mushrooming high-rises of the new suburbs, rather than a ruination of old districts, were the main change to Lviv's urban fabric during the four decades of the Soviet rule, when its population doubled. In the downtown areas, renaissance, baroque, classicist and art nouveau buildings continued to dominate the cityscape, even if the stucco on their facades crumbled, and buildings were often left to dilapidate. Soviet Lviv went through a large-scale industrialisation, Sovietisation and Ukrainianisation. As rural Galician Ukrainians, Eastern Ukrainians, Russians, and people from other Soviet republics flocked to Lviv for work, the city's population swell. It became a place where family histories are as diverse, traumatic and resiliently present, as those stories that vanished populations left behind; where dissent was as strong as the newly built, Soviet cultural infrastructure; and where the built environment of the old city spoke of cultural realities and class divisions that were starkly different from the official line of Soviet Ukrainian cultural politics

Since Ukraine's independence, Lviv's homogeneity grew further, as the remaining Jewish population and the city's Russian minority shrank in the 1990s. Today, it is the self-proclaimed capital of Ukrainian nationalism with a strong, regionalist identity, often sourced from and narrated through its 'European', 'multicultural' heritage. It is also an increasingly gentrified destination, a hub of higher education, white collar professionals — and a destination of sharply growing heritage tourism. The entanglement of 'heritigisation', gentrification and tourism is prominent urban development (De Cesari and Dimova 2019). Their nexus is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but recognising this tendency is crucial in the contextualisation of heritage conflicts and culture work in general.

The heritage infrastructure of Lviv: four turbulent decades

The heritage sector itself went through huge changes in the past four decades. Downtown Lviv enjoyed the highest possible, federal-level protection in the USSR since 1975, when the mediaeval core of inner city was turned into the 'State Architectural-Historical Reserve.' This was part of an expanding federal infrastructure of museums, restoration workshops and a concentration of higher education expertise in adjacent fields: history, art history, architecture. However, in spite of this symbolic status, from a financial point of view, heritage has been low on the agenda of subsequent regimes. Funding was stable but insufficient throughout the Soviet

decades, and became less stable and just as inadequate after Ukraine's independence, with a shrinking national economy.

With Ukraine's independence, the boundaries of the Reserve became the basis of a UNESCO nomination in 1996, and in 1998 the inner city was inscribed on the World Heritage list. However, this process received no government funds whatsoever: the application itself was initiated by the mayor of Lviv, and paid for by a private donor in Canada. Professional work that was required for the nomination was conducted by leading heritage professionals of the Soviet era, in institutions that were rearranged but otherwise relatively unchanged in terms of financial and managerial structures. Post-socialist change unfolds at a different pace across various sectors and locations: the transformation of the public sector, such as preservation workshops and , museums, or even state owned enterprises has been notoriously slow, much slower than in sectors infused by profit-seeking capital. In other words, the post-Soviet heritage heritage field offers a vantage point for analyses of the institutional workings of state transformation and regime change.

Few immediate consequences were visible after the inscription of Lviv's inner city on the World Heritage List. An urban strategy that would successfully utilise the acquired UNESCO status only emerged after 2006, with the arrival into the city hall of an ambitious mayor Andriy Sadovyi who sought to turn tourism and heritage into a priority area of local urban development, working together with many actors of foreign cultural diplomacy. The growing physical and geopolitical proximity of the enlarged EU further propelled these changes, Ukraine being a target country of neighbourhood policies, notably EU Eastern Partnership Policies (EPP). The German federal development agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), which normally works on more mainstream issues of development work such as sustainable development and peace-building, focuses on heritage preservation in Ukraine, and has a strong presence in Lviv.

With the growing economic and symbolic importance of Lviv's cultural heritage since the late-2000s, and the city's efforts to foreground its architectural connections to 'Europe', local NGOs and municipal institutions also benefitted from the rapid transformation of Lviv's old city into a major site of Ukrainian heritage tourism. Urban development, heritage, 'public history' have become fields that attract and absorb many graduates of history, cultural studies and architecture. Events in 2013-4 — the wave of nation-wide protests that became known as the Euromaidan revolution, the Russian annexation of Crimea, and the separatist conflict that broke out in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk — created an atmosphere where issues around identity, memory, or indeed 'Europe' were as central as they were volatile.

All in all, the heritage field was vibrant and combative during the time of my fieldwork, with growing prestige and high visibility; yet, much of its infrastructure and institutional landscape was underfunded, eroded, tied by bureaucratic protocols and political control that obfuscated many

forms of cooperation. Few places could offer such an insight into the combined effects of regime change, urban change and professional change all at once.

A multi-generational professional field

The turbulent history and present of Lviv, and the diversity of actors involved in heritage conflicts affected how I approached fieldwork in two ways. On the one hand, it threw into sharp relief the dilemmas around the boundaries of the ethnographic present, and on the other, it affected the boundaries of the social world that I had to pay attention to.

I set out to work with people who are professionally involved in issues of time: historians, architects, restoration professionals, civil servants, curators, cultural managers know historical time professionally, and whose trade is centred on accentuating the past, bringing some areas to public attention and concealing others. The period I spent doing fieldwork, heavy with conflict and uncertainty, was a time full of re-evaluations, and historical canon-making was high on the agenda. Moreover, fresh graduates worked together with people well beyond retirement age, and these 3-4 generations had between them lived through or grew up with the memories of three regimes, two wars, and experienced historical changes that stood in the way of straightforward career trajectories, often recasting the relevance of forms of symbolic capital, skills and political belonging. What was to become of the ethnographic present in this context? Was there a way to account for the breadth of time immediately at play in most of settings I observed?

To develop an approach that was appropriate for my questions and the environment I worked in, I started with a flexible conceptualisation ethnographic work; following Liisa Malkki, I approached it as 'a critical theoretical practice, a quotidian ethical practice, and an improvisational practice' (2007: 164). In other words, I wanted to keep with ethnography's potential to challenge conceptual apparatuses, do justice — both in terms of ethics and epistemology — to my informants and the broader context I describe. Finally, I was prepared to reconfigure the task repeatedly, in order to make the first two aspects possible. This led me to unexpected ventures, and much reflection about the limits of ethnography.

Initially I wanted to limit my research focus to ongoing conflicts in museums and around monuments. However, it was impossible not to take into consideration the fact that accusations and common reference points in these conflicts operated with at least 40 years of history in mind, and people's explanations featured long genealogies of professional alliances. Opting for a narrower focus would have reduced the ethnography to descriptions of professional conduct, the micro-practices through which everyday work is endowed with meaning. Following conflicts required me to pay ethnographic attention to the recent past — as defined by the actors themselves — to trace alliances and cross-check the narratives of opposed groups. The minimal temporal scope I decided to opt for had to be shaped by my informants' references. In the sense that they affected the present, bygone methods of heritage preservation and curation were well

alive — it felt more appropriate and productive to approach them as the object, rather than context, of ethnographic inquiry.

This recognition of the particular prominence I had to attach to time if I were to capture heritage conflicts in their complexity, was matched by the realisation that my interlocutors' biographical trajectories led them in and out of state organisations, local and foreign institutions. Lives of heritage professionals appeared the most straight forward focus of attention, as their stories contained the changes I were to elucidate. Similarly, the transformation of institutions was part of a larger story of changing expertise, government, geopolitics. Heritage conflicts brought together individuals and institutions in a condensed way. Professional positions and experiences, often developed over decades, collided in and around these sites; in an almost metonymic fashion, they contained much broader processes and social wholes than what my interlocutors' immediate concerns seemed to reference.

Fieldwork, then, had to take the urban fabric — the built heritage — as its starting point, and follow people shaping its fate through their life stories, institutional trajectories, drawing a portrait of a profession through time. I supplemented observation with documents, archival sources, recordings, with the. ambition of capturing conflicts across time, from several perspectives. To do so, I ventured beyond anthropology, taking inspiration from history and sociology in how I approached fieldwork. I consider this an important contribution of the dissertation, instrumental in the position from where I interrogate the existing literature on heritage, expertise and post-socialist change.

Below I briefly explain my approach to the field; I then move on to the key contributions, and discuss my methods and position as a researcher. Finally, I offer a roadmap for the chapters of this dissertation.

The field: fieldsite and social field

I came to approach the field in a twofold fashion. Wanting to pin down a historical watershed, a political-economic transformation through the built environment, I used monuments and museums as heuristic devices that pointed to dilemmas and questions, and lead me to people and institutions involved in them. Likewise, beginning with sites that I could reasonably assume to be ridden with conflict, led me to people and institutions involved, and that in turn led to their opponents, allies, in short, across their professional networks — and to other conflicts with similar stakes.

This dual attention to places and actors led me to think about two parallel 'fields': the field site, within which I was doing the research, and the field of professionals, which I was thus studying. The former emerged through tracing historic zones of the city in which conflicts took place, mapping locations relevant to these, and the offices of people involved in working with

them. The majority happened to be located in close proximity to one another, within the broadly understood historic centre: the Department for the Historic Architecture of the City Council, the preservation workshop established back in the USSR and continuing to work today, the Centre for the Urban History of East-Central Europe, the office of GIZ one storey above the Centre in the same building, several Jewish organisations, and the museums I worked with were all within a few square kilometres, most of them within walking distance from one another, in or near the UNESCO World Heritage Site. The professional field emerged through tracing different actors present in these sites, following their references to one another, gradually identifying their shared orientations and stakes. Individual life stories led to now defunct or eroded institutions that once shaped preservation in Lviv, and following people's careers between the public and the private sectors helped to approach this as a whole.

Neither the field site, nor the professional field had analytical primacy in my fieldwork; collapsing them into one another would have compromised the complexity of the account. The field site contained a broad population, residents, workplaces, tourists beyond the scope of this ethnography: privileging locations would have pushed my attention towards a neighbourhood as a whole. When it comes to urban ethnography, that is a useful approach in theorising gentrification (e.g. Herzfeld 2009) or hyperdiversity (e.g. Rosbrook-Thompson and Armstrong 2018). It is less appropriate for questions that are themselves not inherently spatially constituted, as was the case with my questions about change and expertise. Privileging the professional field would have displaced the content of their debates when it came to decisions affecting the sites themselves, and it would have occluded the connection between organisational or professional change and the changes in the built environment. Professional work coalesced around locations, brought together several professions whose concerns emerged from working with them in different capacities; it was crucial for this ethnography to account for this interplay, the way the professional field was anchored in the site, orchestrated by it, and how in return the professional field altered the site.

Two recent contributions depart from specific urban locations to trace the kinds of transformations I was interested in. Michał Murawski's recent work on the Palace of Culture and Science in Warsaw (2019), where he follows the socialist skyscraper's unlikely resistance to privatisation, weaving together analyses of symbolic legacies and political-economic transformation, and Gisa Weszkalnys' book on Berlin's Alexanderplatz (2010) that chronicles the square's redesigning in post-unification Berlin, were the closest examples for my ethnography in Lviv in their attention to the urban fabric. The two books are similar in the way they allow sites to determine contours of the ethnographic encounter, following the range of people, professions and institutions connected to them. However, both take iconic spaces identified with political regimes as their points of departure, following their afterlives in radically different political arrangements. My approach is different: the historic environment I examine was certainly not an ideological centrepiece of Soviet modernity, yet it had a tacitly privileged position. Conflicts do

not arise from the style, connotations or legacies of these sites, but rather from differences in the way management or instrumentalisation is imagined. It was partially these conflicts that led me to focus on these particular places among the other possible candidate field sites in which I could investigate my questions.

As I indicated above, the Manchester school was among the most important reference points for this ethnography: the entire dissertation could be seen as an attempt to reinterpret the Manchester school's toolkit, assessing its value for ethnography after the post-modern turn. This is particularly important in the field and its boundaries.

Even though the field was an artefact of attention whether it emerged as a location or through connections between actors, being a discrete spatial entity, my field site resembled the traditional ethnographic field site. Bounding, however, could not but be different in an urban setting than in smaller localities. Social networks and relationality were central in drawing the boundaries of the field: networks and funding flows, representatives of far removed political entities of many ranks all come to form part of it; however, divergent scales, networks appeared only through their presence in the city.

Murawski (2019) and Weszkalnys (2010) offered great examples of the virtues of single-sited, place-based ethnographies in urban contexts, and their accounts show how these locations condense various scales, sectorial divisions and social groups. I did not want to delineate the field in a similar fashion not only because of the lack of an obvious focal point. It did not make sense to cut the social field to match arbitrary boundaries of, say, the UNESCO site: following their networks, the circles of involved professionals seemed comprehensible, and the way their careers were mapped onto the urban fabric was itself an important part of the story of social and political transformation I wanted to trace.

My concern with networks and conflicts echo concerns and methods of the Manchester school ethnographers. The Manchester School's apparatus, especially situational analysis is built around these conditions. Indeed, urban anthropology became truly urban only after it found a way to increase its scope from neighbourhood studies and managed to incorporate analyses of the geopolitical context of urban phenomena (Hannerz 1980), relying on methods adapted from geographers in order to trace movement and connections in urban spaces.

I wanted to preserve the relational design of urban ethnography not merely because of the urban setting. Since I chose not to depart from a single, uniquely positioned site, it was crucial to allow professionals' agendas to indicate the relevance of places. The people whose lives I wanted to follow through major changes all formed a loose network that was still easy to comprehend as a single set of interests, agendas, stakes and backgrounds.

One way to approach this problem was through the notion of the field as developed by sociological field theory (e.g. Martin 2003). Field theory has not been widely used in anthropology; from the Bourdieusian vocabulary of which it is part, habitus and doxa have been more broadly appreciated (although see Babül 2018; also Martin's [2003] analysis of Victor Turner's early uses of the term). This might be due to the discipline's above mentioned skepticism about the epistemology and ethics of postulating wholes. Another reason could be that anthropologists tend to conceptualise field through location, whether a single site or multi-sited, bounded or not.

Field theory, as articulated in cultural sociology after Bourdieu, in its most minimal version is an approach that conceives of its objects relationally, much like network theory or structuralism. However, rather than focusing on connections (network theory) or emergent entities (structuralism), it is mostly concerned with pattern, especially patterns of interaction. A field could be describes as a number of actors and practices 'that are not necessarily situated face-to-face or in the same space, that are not necessarily personally known to one another, [but] share orientations either in agreement or in disagreement about the same stakes' (Krause 2017: 228). A field does not exist independently of its broader social context, but it refracts concerns, practices etc. in a discernible way.

It is easy to see the similar concerns of relations and networks in the Manchester School, the stakes of identifying patterns in contexts less structured spatially. In adopting a minimalist definition of the social field, I sought to preserve a balance between the desire to stay close to ethnographic description without adopting a plethora of abstract entities for explanation, and the desire to preserve the extent to which their conflicts, alliances, moves seemed patterned. This helps me underline the resilience of institutional and discursive forms, the intersecting biographies and the emic sense of unity of concerns among the heritage professionals I studied.

The professional field I worked in consisted of a loosely interlinked set of organisations (state, civic and religious), and professionals (academics, conservators, architects, museum staff and civil servants), all invested in public cultural work. These actors relied on their visibility in order to debate possible trajectories of cultural and memory politics; doing so, they wrestled with funding constraints and institutional intricacies—and, incessantly, with each other. Although their work was informed by divergent forms of expertise and politics, and their class background, age and aspirations varied widely, their work was defined by the lowest common denominator of shared engagement in history and its bearings on the built environment in the city. They were a group of professionals acutely aware of one another, which made the cultural and heritage scene in Lviv an intricate field to navigate as an ethnographer.

This was a finite social field that tended to act like an echo chamber for the debates one participated in, making it difficult to disentangle the relevance that they aspire to from that which they actually had. Actors in these conflicts strove to redraw boundaries of expertise, reimagine

infrastructures of legitimation and compete for positions from where their projects gain the definitive legitimacy and resources that could enable them to shape the future the most.

Key contributions

The key contributions of this dissertation lie at the intersection of three bodies of literature: anthropological works on post-socialism, and specifically the post-socialist state, the anthropology of heritage, and literature on experts and expertise

. Firstly, I situate this thesis in the broader post-socialist literature, and explain the concerns with change and continuity I found on the ground. I then explain why the divisions I encountered in the field matter, and what their unexpected locations suggest about the state and civil society in Ukraine. I then move on to questions around what this division means for expertise and professional authority. Bringing the above threads together, I suggest that in relation to the critical heritage literature, we reconsider monolithic understandings of expertise and the power experts can claim. Finally, I explain the relevance of this research for the literature on Lviv and its place in Ukraine.

Seconding Harri Englund and Thomas Yarrow (2013) I hold that it is beneficial to try to overcome the often present 'mutual validation of theory and place.' In other words, while this dissertation has been framed by the recent concerns that animate post-socialist research, I sought to bring in ethnographic comparisons from afar, in terms of theory and geography, e.g. works that look at non-socialist state transformations or memory politics preoccupied with other sensitivities than 20th century ethnic politics.

Post-socialist change: institutions and the public sector

This dissertation stands in dialogue with a rich literature on post-socialist change. It aspires to further our understanding of the public sector in the aftermath of the demise of the USSR, and thereby reflect both on post-socialist change, and the literature that has thematised it from various angles.

The large-scale political and economic transformation in Eastern Europe and the USSR after 1989 created the conditions for, and set the frame for what became known as the anthropology of post-socialism. The end of the Cold War translated into an upsurge of scholarly interest in, and increased access to formerly state socialist societies.

While political scientists and economists mostly worked in a framework that normalised liberal democracy and free market capitalism, and assessed change in terms of their approximation in post-socialist countries (see Verdery and Burawoy 2000, and Buyandelgeriyn 2008 for an overview), the anthropology of post-socialism has been critical of this transitology paradigm since early on.

This vast literature has dealt with the expansion of free market capitalism and the consequent abrupt changes from many vantage points: everyday life (Berdahl, Bunzl and Lampland 2000; Bridger and Pine 1998; Ries 1997), barter and informal economies (Gudeman and Hann 2015; Humphrey 2002; Ledeneva 1998; Shevhenko 2008), changing labour conditions (Burawoy and Verdery 2000; Burawoy 2001; Clarke et al. 1993; Hann 2011), dispossession and homelessness (Höjdestrand 2011), and the changing role and style of consumption (Fehérváry 2013; Verdery 1996) among others. Along with much attention to the most vulnerable social groups, a number of authors focused on moneyed elites, mostly linked to the former *nomenklatura*, and the way they retained their privilege and resources (e. g. Mendras 1999; Wengle 2015).

Post-socialist states formulated new national canons and strategies of memory politics, leading to a rich literature on history and identity (Boyer 2005; Grant 1995; Kaneff 2004; Oushakine 2009; Ssorin-Chaikov 2003, Wanner 1998), religion (Goluboff 2003; Halemba 2015; Hann 2006; Mahieu and Naumescu 2008; Pelkmans 2009; Ramet 2014; Wanner 2007), and nationalism (Verdery 1993). In the past two decades the changing geopolitical landscape and the expansion of the European Union (Follis 2012; Mikus 2015) has become an important theme, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, together with analyses of liberalism on the ground (Dzenovska 2018; Greenberg 2014; Larson 2013). This latter group of scholars analysed the discourses and identifications of people living in post-socialist societies.

This study builds on the work of anthropologists and sociologists looked at the changing role and professional life of intellectuals (Antonova et al. 1996; Boyer 2005; Oushakine 2009; Roudakova 2017; Wachtel and Wachtel 2006). Natalia Roudakova's work on the demise of an iconic institution for Soviet media, the *Pravda*, and the way this rupture led to the disintegration of the networks, professional norms and future of Soviet journalism inspired my focus on the nexus between the state and a professional field dependent on it.

My dissertation contributes to this line of literature a hitherto less explored angle: I look at a professional field that is largely part of the public sector, where managerial and institutional changes have been a lot less prominent. This allows me to problematise the the temporality of post-socialist change was not the same in the countryside and the metropole, in more and less capital-intensive sectors, and between countries where foreign investment came swiftly, and those that retained separation, supporting the development of national oligarchs (Yurchenko and Ishchenko 2020). Seconding Stephen Kotkin's observation that the disintegration of Soviet institutional structures did not take place in many sectors until the end of the first post-socialist decade, my ethnography explores what it means to work in a professional field that is heavily reliant on the state, that operates in barely changed institutions but in a radically different economic and political context, and that plays an active role in the production of post-socialist public discourse on the past.

Post-socialist change: discourses of a 'new Ukraine'

The post-socialist state transformation was but the most recent major political and economic transformation in Western Ukraine, and the ones preceding it were not far back in time. Although the post-socialist transformation is a key orientation point in this dissertation, and I set out to show what post-socialist change looks like in various heritage institutions, I find it important to problematise efforts that go into periodisation and the building of temporal canons. All the more so, because of the role my informants played in this: as cultural professionals, they were instrumental in the production of these constructs (Abu El-Hajj 2001).

This being so, this dissertation does not only contribute to our ethnographic understanding of post-socialist change, and the literature as described above. It also looks at the discursive side of state transformation: it traces efforts of temporal canon-building after the Maidan, many people's agenda that sought to elevate the recent past to a turning point on par with the collapse of the USSR. Some of my informants have been invested in producing cultural discontinuity, by cultivating reforms, a 'European' or not-Soviet present, building new museum infrastructures, media landscapes or academic communities. Others endorse cultural continuity, by reviving a Galician or Habsburg past, opening historically themed restaurants, publicly honouring pre-war Ukrainian nationalist movements, or working for a fuller Greek Catholic revival. Sometimes, the former and the latter are the same people.

In independent Ukraine, demonstrations for independence, the 2004 anti-corruption mobilisation and the 2013-4 Euromaidan events are grouped together in the emerging Ukrainian canon as revolutions that continue the 'unfinished' democratisation and strife for sovereignty. Canonising these events as revolutions is a straightforward way to mark them as watersheds, transformative events in the process of national self-realisation. Political optimism is underscored by emphasising the changes these events have brought about, rather than the problems that still persist. Despite these turbulent events, it is just as common to hear that 'nothing has changed' during the Soviet era, especially when expressing discontent with the political situation or when comparing Ukraine to 'European' countries, usually to the Baltic states or Poland. Narratives of disruptions, revolutions and change coexist with those of resilience and stagnation; optimism and reformist impetus rubs shoulders with fatigue and apathy. My interlocutors often joked about the 'next revolution', ironically commenting on uprising as a futile yet seductive way to start over, push through reforms — and ultimately remain where you started.

The emic concern with the production of discontinuity from the past, especially as it unfolds in relation to the preservation of built heritage is an important element of post-socialism on the ground. I decided to adopt a historically grounded approach to this ethnography, partly to make more room for this concern. I hoped to depart from conversations in which post-socialism and the post-socialist condition often felt like monolithic explanatory framework, when conveyed

by the majority of my informants. Instead, I found it useful to place the experiences of the post-socialist transformation into a longer history of regime changes and aspirations for change.

Lviv has been subject to enlightened absolutist and Soviet modernising projects of state-led, conscious cultural construction: my informants were as familiar with the tropes of a 'new Galicia' as they were with tropes of a 'new Ukraine', and themselves often adopted similar language. The aspiration to build a 'new Ukraine', inculcating new ethical, political or moral norms into Ukrainian citizens, was similarly a trope of post-Maidan international relations (notably Soros 2015). Some of this might be brushed off as mere political rhetoric, detached from the everyday lived experience of Lvivians. However, discussions about change and stagnation are ubiquitous, especially among people involved in cultural projects, politics or 'public history'—and the stakes are high. Change and stagnation are motives that serve as heuristic tools that are central in practices of cultural politics, where the present is expected to become a nexus that already points towards a normative idea of the future. The ability to figure out ways to produce tangible, lasting change, and unbind the future from an overdetermining past (for some), or to reconnect it with a past they feel detached from (for others) is a central guiding concern of people invested in the public life of Lviv, and, indeed, contemporary Ukraine as a whole.

Bruce Grant (1995) and Michael Gorham (2014) observed that Gorbachev's perestroika was but yet another moment when knowledge was retroactively reevaluated and the state reset the boundaries of the legitimate. In his study of a culture house in Sakhalin, Grant argues that being subject to Soviet understandings of their 'culture' the Nivkhi joined in its production and objectification, profoundly reshaping their understanding of the past (1995: 16ff). My ethnography seconds Grant in abolishing distinctions between postulated 'organic' forms of change and 'artificial' — state-led, modernist — ones. Building on his work, I situate my informants' discursive efforts to create temporal canons, or argue for reforms, ethnographically in institutional processes of change and resilience. The collapse of state socialism remains a crucial event for this ethnography, but this strategy allows me not to privilege it analytically, and avoid overusing it.

Divisions in the heritage field

It has been noted that practices of preservation and heritage management are often divided along fault lines of professional training and craft (Jones and Yarrow 2013; Yarrow 2019), ethnicity, identity and questions of nationalism (Meskell 2002, Silverman 2010), or opinions about the value or threat of commodification (Porter and Salazar 2006). I expected to encounter a similar terrain. With the recent experience of revolution and the ongoing war, I assumed that geopolitical issues and questions around belonging to Europe would animate the heritage scene in Lviv, in addition to concerns predicted by the literature. Civil society organisations are often discredited as 'foreign actors' or 'grant eaters' in Eastern Europe (Crotty 2003), so I expected to

encounter a similar discourse against actors with foreign connections. To some extent, all these expectations were correct: professional training, ethnicity, nationalism, foreign interests were indeed relevant components of heritage debates in Lviv in 2015-16.

However, the recent history of major socio-political shifts in Ukraine brought with it something crucial in addition. Disagreements I encountered among heritage professionals amounted to a split that went deeper than any of the above differences alone would suggest. Heritage professionals in the city were clustered around distinct political groups, their visions of profession had incompatible premises, their career followed separate trajectories, and their credentials were not always convertible across these fault lines. Finally, they often openly opposed each other's attempts to preserve Lviv's heritage. I encountered this among historians, conservation professionals, curators, across the public sector and in NGOs. Moreover, divisions were orchestrated by two coexisting forms of governance: while one set of professionals forged alliances with elected municipal authorities, the other relied on the regional tier of the state administration, appointed by and accountable to the president.

In other words, the professional division I witnessed and offer an ethnography of in this dissertation, aligned with and fed into a a division within the very structures of the state within which heritage preservation takes place in Ukraine. This division, and the adjacent institutional structures offered two competing models: one that favoured decentralisation and deregulation, the other, vertical hierarchies and central command. Throughout the dissertation, I trace how this intra-state division unfolded in seemingly unrelated forms and domains, such as in disputes among heritage practitioners being in favour of little intervention or large reconstructions, or supporting decommunisation efforts versus being cautious abound them. The clustering of opposing views into two main positions was somewhat counterbalanced by actors who drew on elements of the opposite side (cf. Vargha 2010; Zentai 1999), but this was not enough to equip anyone to succeed on both sides. Professionals' individual trajectories "enabled and limited position-taking in the structure of available discursive positions in relation to coexistent views" (Vargha 2010: 237).

These divisions, I argue, are best understood as a cleft in, or segmentation of, the field of heritage professionals in Lviv (cf. Bourdieu 1993; Krause 2014; Stampnitzky n.d.): while the objects of their professional concern were shared, the knowledge they mobilised, their infrastructures of decision-making and funding, and organisational alliances differed significantly. Because of how these alliances and divisions mapped onto the terrain of state and non-state actors in Lviv and beyond, by investigating them this dissertation contributes to our understanding of structural conflicts that characterise Ukraine's post-socialist state, and its relationship to civic actors and international organisations. To a large extent, I posit, these conflicts are shaped by the long institutional history of the heritage profession in Lviv reaching back sat least to the middle of the XXth century.

From the perspective of Bourdieu's field theory, it is not surprising that a professional field should be divided along factional lines. What is interesting, rather, is *where* and *how* the divisions emerge. As I demonstrate throughout the dissertation, one remarkable fact about the Lviv heritage field, is that the challenge to established state-affiliated heritage professionals who controlled museums and restoration bureaus came not from within these institutions, but from the outside: from often younger, foreign-funded and municipally-supported professionals who envisaged their role in more cosmopolitan terms. It emerged as an *alternative* to the 'old' professionals inhabiting institutions that had been established during the Soviet rule and which with Ukraine's independence became hotspots of nationalist agitation reliant on the 'vertical', central state. Instead of seeking to overtake these institutions, the challengers constructed parallel organisations with their own modes of legitimation and resources. This dynamic, I suggest, was further informed by the gradual de-legitimation, the loss of relevance, of the once-dominant forms of heritage expertise — a crisis of expertise that was particularly post-socialist.

Expertise in crisis

To appreciate the character and dynamic of this crisis, it is worth situating our discussion in relation to the anthropological literature on expertise. Marrying the long-standing exploration of native knowledge with the vivid interest in 'science as a culturally specific (and effective) form of reasoning' (Edwards et al. 2007: 5) spurred by the emergent Science and Technology Studies, over the last three decades anthropology has produced a veritable plethora of studies of laboratory (Latour 1987; Rabinow 1999) and field science (Candea 2010; Helmreich 2009), scientific networks (MacPhail 2014), epistemic cultures (Knorr Cetina 1999), and broader 'epistemologies in practice' (see contributors to Edwards et al. 2007). The anthropological science studies have taken the exploration of the social and cultural production of scientific knowledge as a lens through which to examine Western modernity and culture (e.g. Rabinow 1996). The literature is so vast and developed so quickly, I can only refer the reader to the excellent existing reviews of the field (Crick 1982; Franklin 1995). What is important for my purposes here, is that this these ethnographies of science have given the impetus to, and set the tone for, the exploration of experts and expert cultures beyond modern science itself (see Boyer 2008; Carr 2010 for overviews). A minor thread of this literature, drawing on longer-standing interest in intellectuals and knowledge work, has approached similar question from the perspective of anthropology of professions (see Boyer 2005 and Roudakova 2017 for rare examples of ethnographies of postsocialist professionals; Hull 2020 for a general overview). On the whole, the focus has predominantly been on experts' construction of their claims to knowledge, the complexity of ethical and epistemic commitments that underlie such claims, as well as embodied skilled dispositions (Boyer 2005), and enactments of expertise (Carr 2010: 18). Heeding Dominic Boyer's

(2008: 44-45) call to 'humanise the expert' by 'engaging the non-professional' and 'challenging the rationalist core' of expert work, ethnographers have produced vivid, poetic descriptions of the everyday problems, attachments, frustrations and all the human complexity entailed by different kinds of expert work (see Yarrow 2019 for a recent example). With many of these ethnographic interventions coming squarely on the side of what Boyer (2008) has called the 'experiential-performative' aspect of expertise, there has been somewhat less focus on its 'social-institutional' dimension.

It is here that this dissertation seeks to make its mark, building on and extending this rich literature, in order to capture the institutional underpinnings of the contemporary heritage profession in Lviv, their long-duree historical gestation, and the conflicts that split it into rival factions. By privileging this 'social-institutional' dimension of the heritage profession — the heritage field — in Lviv, I seek to explore what I see as a uniquely post-socialist transformation and crisis of expertise: crisis that emerges not so much in response to a politicised loss of confidence in expert claims (as seems to be the case in the contemporary West — see Eyal 2019), as in response to the transformation of the organisational infrastructure (i.e. the Ukrainian central and local state) that makes this expertises authoritative and effective.

Thus, I explore the way professional knowledge about heritage and history in Lviv is organised in relation to state and non-state professional bodies, and how it transforms — first, in relation to the transformation of the Ukrainian state itself; and second, in relation to internal struggles for recognition and domination of the various professionals that populate these bodies.

By heritage 'professionals' I understand people who rely on a social authority based on expert knowledge (see Cribb and Gewirtz 2015) about heritage, which stems from institutional and/or educational credentials largely accepted by their peers and the broader society. Institutional, legal stability facilitates the consolidation of professionalism, notably through the stabilisation of a particular group's claim to 'jurisdiction' over a specific set of problems and their expert solutions to them (Abbott 1988). Professional struggles, then, take not only within the profession (for status, recognition), but also among established professions over their jurisdictional boundaries or definitions of problems, but also between other groups with a claim to expertise (Eyal 2013). In other words: professional fields are inherently open, their boundaries, stakes, and principles of 'vision and division', to use Bourdieu's phrase, are constantly contested. Such struggles tighten the stakes of preserving professionals' ability to delineate appropriate and inappropriate knowledge, keeping sovereign-like control over the problem areas that they deal with. It is important to differentiate expertise from professions and professionals, in order to account for this semi-openness of professional fields (cf. Eyal 2013).

Examining the apparent crisis of expertise in the West, Gil Eyal (2019) notes the heightened suspicion of knowledge is a 'recursive tension of legitimacy' generated by the increased reliance

of democratic politics on 'regulatory science'. He suggests that in the final account, understandings of what expertise is, and what its role should be, depend on existing conditions of legitimacy — conditions that are bound to change; the crisis of expertise is legitimation crisis. But if, in his reading, the contemporary problematisation of expertise in the West (think of the much-talked about phenomenon of 'post-truth') has turned around trust and mistrust of experts, which Eyal understands as a nearly inevitable reaction to the reliance of political decision-making on essentially non-democratic expertise (and contestation of decision-making through contestation of expert claims) the crisis I examine in this dissertation is different. And it is this ethnographic expansion of what we understand by the crisis of expertise, that is one of the main contributions of my dissertation. Extending Eyal's methodological injunction that crises of expertise need to be understood in the context of the institutional structures that make expertise ineligible and legitimate, to Lviv's heritage profession, it becomes apparent that the key dynamic there concerns the slow transformation of expert knowers' relation to the state after the .

The crisis of confidence in professional knowledge (Eyal 2019; Schön 2001) outside of post-socialist contexts has been broadly documented: scientific conduct has been shaped by measurement and indexing practices drawn from a logic imported from economics (Furedi 2004), and publics have been turned into consumers (Strathern 2000). This amounts to a decentering of expert knowledge, away from the infrastructures, functions and people through which it previously drew authority. While many existing accounts suggest that expertise is in crisis because of a loss of public confidence, Stampnitzky (n.d.) argues for her cases in the US, that such a crisis is best conceived as a transformation of an historically situated alliance between experts and policymakers: a misalignment between those in positions of knowledge, and those in positions of power.

A comparable yet different development characterises the heritage field in Ukraine. The authority of knowledge and of the knowledgable person have a peculiar genealogy in the USSR (see eg. Apor et al. 2004), where the personal still tends to validate professional verdicts, binding knowledge and power ever closer to one another. For instance, public historical discourses resemble their Soviet-era counterparts in the attention they give to sorting out our facts from theirs: an opinion is as much a declaration of social belonging as it is a result of professional articulation. It is difficult to dissect the normative, political, professional and social components in practices that seek to demarcate opinions and their holders from each other. Though this if of course true everywhere, the particular intellectual history of the USSR allows for a sharper attention to the relational aspect of knowledge production in Lviv.

Post-Soviet political change in Ukraine has brought about a shift in what is considered legitimate credentials, prompting professionals and their publics to redraw boundaries of expertise, and to reimagine infrastructures of legitimation. Meanwhile, Soviet-era institutions

remain, their managerial and financial structures mostly unchanged. They are systematically underfunded, their professional work eroded: they are increasingly insulated as former networks have dissolved (cf. Alexander 2016), and new networks have not been developed. Around them, new organisations are established, that lack the recognition of the state, but are better equipped to develop new professional networks and alliances — these attract especially young professionals reluctant to join old public institutions.

My ethnography allows us to appreciate how in today's Lviv, heritage experts seldom find a minimum of professional standards they share. When approached by the public, their credentials are far from taken for granted, they represent issues in factions, barely ever forming a professional front that would overcome political differences. They question one another's legitimacy through dismissing the basis of their professionalism, referring to credentials rarely recognised by the competing group. The profession is fractured in terms of ranks and seniority, hierarchies, interpersonal relationships and institutional positions. In the resulting fragmented landscape, expertise is in crisis. As I trace the history and outline of this crisis, it offers a comparative perspective on that other crisis of expertise that would be familiar to English-language readers from the media, public scholarship, and even the moral panic around the notion of 'post-truth'. From this ethnographic perspective, it becomes evident that there is no single crisis of expertise — only crises, because expertise itself is not singular.

The above discussions of expertise have particular bearings in relation to a prominent trend of literature specific to heritage studies. Expertise has been problematised by a deconstructionist thread of literature now dominant in heritage studies, that is loosely referred to as the critical heritage literature (e.g. Schofield 2014; Joy 2016). These accounts focus not on 'what heritage *is*', but on 'what heritage *does*': on the power dynamics that endow it with value and relevance, often turning heritage sites into areas of exclusion. Smith's (2006) notion of the authorised heritage discourse positions expert authority against communities' sense of what heritage is, arguing that expertise is often a tool for exclusion, sometimes even the dispossession of communities from defining and managing heritage sites. Critical heritage scholars have formulated a critique that has much to offer especially in postcolonial settings, where heritage has often been mobilised or exclusion and marginalisation of the local and nearby communities, and preservation often meant a set of externally imposed criteria that sabotaged existing forms of use.

The professional field of heritage preservation in Lviv provides an interesting ethnographic context, where expertise is neither matched with an institutional context that would have the financial and symbolic means of setting the agenda of preservation, nor it is a force that would expel vulnerable communities; yet, it still has considerable power to shape the fate of these heritage sites. In other words, heritage experts are at once powerful and vulnerable. Throughout the dissertation assess what the relative vulnerability of heritage actors and the crises in the field

of heritage professionals could mean if Smith's critical claims about expert authority were to be applied in Ukraine. I argue that the divisions, institutional conditions and the working conditions of heritage professionals in Lviv today necessitate a rethinking of what *authorised* could mean in Smith's (2006) notion of the authorised heritage discourse.

Lviv vis-à-vis Ukraine: core or periphery?

National and historical questions are central to the post-independence public discourse of Ukraine in general, and Lviv offers a good entry point for an analysis of such debates. The city's specificities allow one to see exceptionally sharply the national stakes of cultural, symbolic and political sovereignty. Its history dissimilar from large urban centres in the rest of Ukraine, Lviv engenders an internal alterity. By relying on this alterity — presented in many guises: Greek Catholic, Ukrainian speaking, pro-European, Habsburg, multicultural — and formulating it in a normative fashion, the cultural elites of Lviv aspire to become a trendsetter for new visions of Ukrainian identity beyond the confines of Galicia. Though peripheral in many ways, these normative claims allow people invested in cultural politics to see Lviv as a heartland of Ukraine, a symbolic capital of 'Europeanisation', development and culture.

This self-perception is certainly at odds with the perceptions of many in the rest of Ukraine. Claims of distinctiveness are not unique to Lviv: Odesans, as described by Tanya Richardson, craft their own narratives that "refract history and geography" in a specific way, venerating Odesan cosmopolitanism and openness. I second Richardson's observation, that "Ukraine's many localities share fragments of imperial, national, ethnic, religious and social histories, yet the the salience and influence of these histories on the present differ radically" (2008:6). The nationalisation of time and territory is an incredibly powerful consolidating process since Ukrainian statehood, which aims to overcome this difference. Yet, it has not existed long enough to erase the palimpsest of past histories that constitute local frames of reference and material for stating difference.

I will argue, however, that Lviv's case is indeed peculiar, not so much because of the central role of local elites' perceived difference from the rest of Ukraine, but rather in the consequent aspirations of the city. The Galician past is significant especially when it is used in a contrastive manner to state local superiority compared to 'Soviet Ukrainians'. Odesan (or for that matter, Zakarpattian, Bukovinian or Donbasian) distinctness seldom emerges in a similarly posited dialogue with the whole nation. Rather than that, it assumes the nation as a background against which its particularity emerges. In contrast, I found that local politics in Lviv posits its own validity beyond regional boundaries. The difference that Lviv is made to stand for is held up for Kyiv and the whole nation to follow.

The current war and the legacy of the Euromaidan reconfigure cultural politics in a way that Lviv indeed appears as a city ahead of the mainstream: whether it is nationalist movements,

toppling Lenin, Soviet dissent, legitimising Bandera, or teaching in Ukrainian language in universities and nominating UNESCO heritage sites, Lviv could claim they had started much earlier than others. The post-Maidan status quo gives a stage for cultural politics of Lviv that the city claimed for itself but, arguably, never had before. It is against these aspirations and shifting terrains of political significance that heritage conflicts and public discourse start to make sense in Lviv. Moreover, the past half century saw drastic urbanisation in Western Ukraine, altering the former clichéd division between the Russified, urban east and the rural, Ukrainian west. With the emergence of a Ukrainian Lviv in the USSR, an urban centre in the western half of the country, aspirations for a new Ukrainian urbanism could develop, arguably contributing to the public visibility of heritage conflicts.

Positionality and Ethics

Who I was in the field profoundly affected the kind of ethnography I produced. I arrived without much first-hand experience of Ukraine, essentially as an outsider. Yet, I am from a neighbouring country — Hungary. Budapest is a night train's ride away from Lviv. I grew up on a more hopeful side of the post-socialist 'transition' than the one experienced by most Ukrainians in the 1990s, and Hungary joined the EU — an aspiration of most of my interlocutors in Lviv — in 2004. In terms of infrastructure and the state of public services or visa regimes, Budapest and Lviv were starkly different places. Yet, many cultural reference points, jokes, the legacies of socialist urbanism were shared — and Lviv having been part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the historic urban fabric immediately resonated with me as well.

I was very far from the classical, Malinowskian quest of encountering otherness, yet I was not at home by any means. I instinctively found my way, or so I thought, assuming things only to be reminded of differences, and anticipating difference only to encounter sameness. The dialectic of this in-between position, its liminality became a cherished aspect of my fieldwork: it kept me on my toes in terms of epistemology and reflexivity, but it also provided me with immense shortcuts when I needed to accumulate region-specific contextual knowledge.

This liminality was not only relevant for what I could know and how much I could take for granted, but also when it came to how I was perceived. Although I was an EU citizen writing in English for a Western European institution, I was from a small and geopolitically not very relevant country without significant prestige attached, a near-blank spot on many Ukrainians' imagination about the region, due to the incomprehensibility of the language, a big contrast to Slovakia, Poland or the Czech Republic. Barriers were not great between me and my informants, although many were amused by my choice of coming to Ukraine, of all places.

The fact that I worked with broadly urban, middle class people meant that that we shared a lot, and I did not need to organise this work with their vulnerability as a specific priority. In many ways, this was a fairly straightforward 'sideways' study in Laura Nader's terms (1972). Many people

I worked with were academics, worked on research projects that saw them conduct interviews and speak publicly. Apart from a number of people in the younger cohorts, they were not well versed in what anthropology could mean other than the more familiar ethnology, but by and large, they did not only engage with me as a person, but also with the research project itself.

This, and the fact that I read published works by many of my interlocutors in journals, books or online news portals, and refer to many of these in this dissertation, meant that I was not always able to grant them anonymity. I explained my reasons for this above in my *Note on Anonymity*, so here I just reiterate my hope that I have represented each and every one of them fairly, even when they would sometimes challenge my interpretations.

Finally, my experiences after the field research per se had formative impact on how I came to understand my research material. After over 3 years I spent as a full-time PhD student, I started to work in applied research and project management. I worked on EU-funded heritage-related projects, wrote grant proposals and non-academic reports about urban development, closely working with similar actors to the ones I had approached as an ethnographer. I worked with Ukrainian organisations as well, though this was purely coincidental. This gave me a more comprehensive perspective on soft diplomacy, and a broader context in which I could place actors I know from Lviv. I chose not to explicitly bring these insights into the thesis, as they emerged in a gradual, unexpected fashion, simultaneously to writing the dissertation; besides, using those experiences would have posed ethical challenges. Yet, the implicit impact of these experiences is woven in the text, and needs to be mentioned.

Research Methods

My ethnography used a broad range of methods in an effort to piece together four decades of institutional history, and trace careers that unfolded within it. Taking inspiration from ethnographers whose work is informed by a strong historical orientation (Bear 2007; Das 1995; Luehrmann 2015; Tarlo 2003), I relied heavily on interviews, archival and documentary research, as well as participant observation, bringing them together so that ethnographic insights could emerge at their juncture.

When approaching new institutions, I relied on career-focused life-history interviews, often returning to the same person several times. This yielded ca. 100 interviews, around half of which were recorded; I took detailed notes in all occasions. I spent my days in various institutions, participating in their daily workings as best as I could, I attended court cases, conferences and public events: the bulk of this material emerged from field notes based on participant observation. I complemented participant observation with extensive media aggregation about the sites and institutions I worked in: I gathered news articles, op-eds, videos, brochures and any written material I could get hold of from the past 15 years that concerned sites and actors of this

ethnography. I spent roughly 2 months in the local archive, deepening my understanding of the Soviet-era fate of religious buildings and the decisions behind these.

Below I outline the way I used these methods, and they specific ways they contributed to the ethnography overall.

Life-history interviews

Once I identified key institutional settings that would provide the core of this ethnography, I relied on a mix of participant observation and interviews. Conducting ethnography in an urban context, with my informants' professional lives being in focus, my field research differed significantly from the Malinowskian approach of constant immersion: as my work focused on their work lives, initially I found my schedule corresponded to 'office hours', much like Christoph Brumann described it in his ethnography of Kyoto's heritage preservation scene (2012a: 6). This changed as some informants allowed me in their private lives, but there are methodological implications of doing fieldwork in such a context. I found that for many professionals, especially researchers an interview request provided a concrete, welcome start of long-term engagement: many were eager to share their trajectories, and valued this as a form of peer engagement. I have often started with a request for life-history interviews: semi-structured, recorded interviews that began with a general request for the interlocutor to tell me about their life and career, for as long as it took them to do so uninterrupted. After that, I would pose specific questions about the facts of their biography emerging from the preceding narrative, as well pre-planned questions informed by my interviews with others, my reading of archival sources, and so on.

As my presence became a more customary part of their lives, they would refer back to these interviews, direct my attention to publications. I would show them archival data I found that referred to something I learnt from these interviews, prompting further discussion. Interviews thus became increasingly embedded in participant observation, and were connected to my analysis of written sources.

Preparing to and analysing these interviews, I have drawn on a rich anthropological tradition of using elicitations of autobiography: from classic ethnography and sociology (see Harrison 2008 for an overview of the method and its history), to Manchester School anthropology (Epstein 1979), to more recent work in anthropology (e.g. Day 2007; Tarlo 2003; Reed 2002; Yarrow 2011, 2019b). Examples of anthropological life-historical interviewing that most readily spring to mind, perhaps, are Vincent Crapanzano's *Tuhami: Portrait of a Moroccan* (1980) and Sophie Day's *On the Game* (2007), both exemplary in their engagement with the minutiae of biographical facts and the rich texture of oral narration, humanistic in their orientation and care for the richness of interpretation.

Crapanzano's work, as the book's subtitle suggests, falls squarely in the 'genre' of ethnographic portraits, with his interlocutor's life course and his reminiscences providing the base for examining larger questions of culture and identity. Day's account retains much of Crapanzano's attention to subjectivity, but uses individual biographical interviews to construct a larger-scale portrait of female sex work in London. I take inspiration from this work, but in virtue of the research questions that define my project, my own approach differs in some respects. Interviewing experts and professionals, I am primarily interested in their work life: I use interviews to obtain information about individuals careers, opinions about the heritage field and experiences of social and political change in the post-Soviet decades. To borrow from the historical sociologist Philip Abrams, it is not life-history per se that primarily interests me in these interviews — not the biographical course of a particular individual in and of itself — but 'life-history in the context of some specific social history' (1982: 283); in my case, the social history of Lviv's heritage profession and its institutions.

I use the terms biographical interview and life-history interview interchangeably, and always with the implicit understanding that my informants' professional lives were foregrounded. I did ask about their family background, upbringing, friendships and other personal matters, but these were folded into our conversations about their work, careers and aspirations. I often refer to their insights as testimonies. Testimonies are often understood as witness accounts that accompany and counterpose a 'crisis of historical truth' (see e.g. Skultans 1998: 50-2). They are people's accounts of events around them; testimonies were the subject matter of my professionally oriented life-history interviews. In this, they differ from biographies that are directed towards the details of individual lives and their interior, as opposed to the world that surrounds them.

The form of the conversation that my life-history interviews made for, was undoubtedly familiar to my interviewees (especially for the older ones among them) from everyday interactions with their junior colleagues: I felt that to a degree that it was possible, and in so far as they entered on personal experiences and careers, such interviews were close to emic genres of story-telling, and indeed I often witnessed older professionals telling there younger colleagues about their life course (Skinner 2012; cf. Crapanzano 1980). As with any ethnographic interview, there was room for exaggerations and rearrangements of memories. Paying attention to the ways people present facts of their lives in light of the present, I found that their accounts, triangulated with and compared to other forms of testimony, outline not only the key concerns of this present, but also longer-term stories of social and institutional change in the Lviv's heritage field.

Archival and documentary research

To gain insights into the official history of Lviv's heritage institutions and their transformation through the late-Soviet decades to today, I have relied on documents from State Archive of the Lviv Region (DALO). I worked with a research assistant, a historian, who helped me navigate the holdings, comb through relevant collections and decipher revenant documents. I also worked with holdings of the uncatalogued internal archive of the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture.

The focus of my archival research were the histories of the institutions that were central for my ethnography: the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture, the former State Historical-Architectural Reserve, and the Western Ukrainian Restoration Institute. I looked through documents that concerned other museums in Lviv: I narrowed my focus to the above mentioned ones in the course of the first half of my stay, and I wanted to understand the broader context of both the past and the present. In addition to this, I read policy documents and party decisions concerning anti-religious policies, as these were crucial for both my work at the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture, and the Golden Rose Synagogue.

Outside of the archive I read through archived journal and magazine articles of both general media (e.g. *Zbruch, Ratusha,* zakhid.net) and specialist publications (e.g. *Halytska Brama*), as well as minutes of meetings at the City Council and the Regional Administration, and of court records and decisions. I pieced together the background stories of ongoing disputes and conflicts, and chased up legal disputes my informants referred to. I read these written sources along with their accounts, hoping to outline the events from as many angles as possible, in order to contextualise testimonies I heard.

I set about reading these sources with an eye for details of individual careers and biographies on the one hand, and information about the formal functioning of heritage organisations, on the other. Such a reading necessarily had to go 'against the grain' of the archival documents: following the work of scholars such as Ann Laura Stoler (2002, 2009) who have mainly worked in the colonial archives, I had to have it in mind that details of social life within the heritage institutions that were pertinent to my work, were often 'formatted' and translated into official idiom in ways that reflected the organisational and power arrangements of the process of documentary inscription more than the social realities these documents purportedly represented.

The documents, in other words, had to be understood as performative at least as much as they were descriptive (Riles 2006). But if the project of critical postcolonial scholarship has been to 'write "un-State-d" histories that might demonstrate the warped reality of official knowledge and the enduring consequences of such political distortions' in the pursuit of 'popular histories "from the bottom up" […] that might locate human agency in small gestures of refusal and silence among the colonized' (Stoler 2002: 99), in ways that make good on the promise of microhistory to give access to the systematically unrecorded lives of the subjugated and the subaltern (e.g. Ginzburg 1980; Davis 1983), my own historical ethnography of heritage

institutions in Lviv is much more centrally focused on describing the very official realities that were produced and reproduced by the official documents I had access to.

When it came to the time-consuming work of reconstructing these institutional histories — a difficult yet nearly invisible in the final ethnographic account — I have been able to rely on these documents in order to access official facts about past developments at the institutions that I was interested in (when reading archival evidence such as decrees, official letters, or contemporary court documents, meetings of minutes and official announcements), and to capture the ways the public swath conflicts I researched (when reading media coverage and magazine articles). Official accounts, media representations, and individual testimonies all generated additional information that has proven invaluable in the course of my research.

In bringing together disparate historical moments, I was inspired by Caroline Humphrey's *Marx Went Away — but Karl Stayed Behind* (1998) and Piers Vitebsky's *Living without the Dead* (2017). Both revisiting earlier fieldworks in order to account major societal change ethnographically, through an extended period, but they differed in their execution from my ethnography. Humphrey and Vitebsky both rely on earlier fieldwork, hence filling in gaps, and reconstructing events in-between was methodologically different from my case. Another line of work that is possibly the closest in its archival-historical orientation is that of Eric Wolff (2001, 2011), and Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (1992), who use ethnography to destabilise the consensus about history by reinserting lost or marginalised perspectives. Although my goal was more modest, I wanted to capture the way transforming perspectives occlude much of the near past. Rescuing the political imaginations of possible futures by capturing the loss of compromised, past perspectives was an agenda I came to develop in line with their work.

The practical consequences of doing ethnography with such an emphasis on the dialogue between accounts gathered through interviews and participant observation, and archival and documentary research were significant. The first few chapters might appear not like conventional ethnography at first sight: they predominantly rely on documents, media coverage, legal texts and archival materials to piece together the background stories of people, institutions and professional norms that stand against one another in the later chapters that zoom on the conflicts themselves. I reconstruct the emergence of local Soviet conservation and museums, offering alternative narratives to the ones I heard, restoring complexities that are reduced by either the status quo of the present, of by the tendency of conflicts to bring out forte at the expense of nuance in opponents' positions.

The first chapters constitute what is often thought of as the context that supports ethnography, an inventory of useful knowledge when approaching a given field site. Such displays of context normally serve an auxiliary function: from a perspective of writing, separating out context helps to offload ethnographic description, to foreground interactions instead of drowning

them in technical or otherwise non-intrinsic detail. Although these chapters indeed offer an entry to the heritage scene of Lviv, in light of the considerations explained above, I take these reconstructions to belong to the core of the ethnography no less than the subsequent chapters that utilise more conventional ethnographic writing, following people, interactions, events.

Participant observation and institutional change: looking at conflicts and history

Participant observation constituted the core of my field research and grounded the insights I obtained through all other methods. The research questions I posed had a historical dimension to them; to answer them I had to explore conflicts among members of Lviv's heritage scene, the roots of which often went back decades. As I have already noted, this required bringing a plurality of methods — first of all the use of archival and documentary sources and interview accounts — in conversation with one another, and with my participatory research. I have found that ethnographic observation's central focus on positioning research subjects in relation to one another, and tracing their relationships and interactions (Evens and Handelman 2006; Hillyard 2010; Martin 2017: chapter 5; Okely 2012), make it particularly well-suited for the 'ethnography with time and transformation built into' a formulation I found useful to think with about my own research, and that, for Marshall Sahlins is 'a a distinct way of knowing the anthropological object' (2005a: 472).

To give the reader a quick glimpse of the distinctiveness of the 'anthropological object' I had to deal with in my research, it is worth mentioning that as I started to go about understanding the different professional perspectives about preserving Lviv's heritage, it quickly became apparent that many of my interlocutors not only disagreed with one another, but also offered interpretations of their own past that diverged from what was suggested by documentary research about the institutions they referred to, or other people's reminiscences of those past events. The fascinating stories I heard, and which I set out exploring and interpreting in this dissertation, were full of sharp turns and changes of positions — whether institutional or political. In the eyes of those critical of them in my field site, some of them simply did not add up.

Elderly curators in the Museum of the History of Religion claimed to have been clandestinely devout Greek Catholics during the late Soviet period in what then was an institute of scientific atheist propaganda;[5] whereas their opponents — young museum workers competing with them for power and resources — read these confessions, well-known at the Museum, as little more than turn-coat opportunism. The same curators aligned themselves with a group of

[5] I do not use this term in a derogatory fashion, but follow its Russian-language usage: it refers to planned, institutionalised measures to increase public knowledge about something.

restoration professionals at a different organisation who argued against the heritage policies of the City Council and their NGO supporters, which they claimed monetised the historic centre; they accused the City Council of selling out to local oligarchs in the hospitality industry. An analogous argument against the City Council and their internationally-funded partners was taken up by right-wing lawyers and Orthodox Jewish activists who tried to take the City to court in order to sabotage a Holocaust memorial. The accused city officials and NGO workers retorted that in Ukraine's market economy, private capital was unavoidable in urban development, and presented their memorial as a gesture to initiate dialogue about perpetration and antisemitism. Finally, museum staff and civil servants across the organisations I studied, sought to maintain a separation of church and state, balancing public expectations, pragmatism and historic evidence, but often did so in distinct ways.

Contradictory perspectives were not always a sign of open conflict within the field. Heritage debates brought together participants that belonged to different generations (e.g. fresh university graduates working in project management, with octogenarian restorers) who had trained and gained their practical expertise in starkly different contexts, and who had been exposed to very different pressures in Ukraine's changing socio-economic environment. The 'parameters' within which these peoples' careers had unfolded — that is, where one could work, what counted as a good job, what the skills and connections needed to succeed, how one approached the politics of and funding for conservation —, had changed repeatedly over the thirty years preceding my fieldwork in ways that reflected the larger transformations of the USSR and the Ukrainian state. The dissolution of the USSR discredited the legitimacy of much of the knowledge and achievement of the cultural establishment that had depended on the Soviet state (cf. Wachtel 2006), especially so in the tightly regulated industry that heritage preservation was. Yet, this did not per se make for a social disruption or an institutional void in the field; many professionals had to find new ways to legitimate what they were doing, for instance by embracing Ukrainian nationalism (cf. Verdery 1996). 25 years later, the 'old' (or 'Soviet' as they were casually dismissed by younger challengers) organisations, forms of expertise, and virtually unchanged legal frameworks, were still influential in Lviv's heritage field. My interlocutors routinely referred to at least four decades of conservation; and two and sometimes even three political regimes were woven into every other discussion about ongoing conflicts. Gathering ethnographic evidence from as many perspectives as possible was the way for me to build time and transformation into knowing the object of this ethnography.

Since I decided to work across political, institutional and generational divides of Lviv's heritage sector, I aspired to bring my interlocutors' narratives together without sliding into the position of someone evaluating or adjudicating about them. In practical terms this meant that during the fieldwork I had to gain and maintain the trust of people who openly conflicted with, or quietly disregarded, one another, with their full knowledge that I was working with their

opponents. It was tricky to navigate this 'relational' challenge during interviews and periods of participant observation, not least because I had to persuade my interlocutors that while ethnographic participation led me to become an empathetic audience for and interpreter of their perspectives, it could not involve taking sides in conflicts or passing information behind the backs of others. Thinking about how to triangulate multiple perspectives during my fieldwork, I found the work of Manchester School anthropologists, with its pronounced focus on conflict and urban change, especially insightful (Evens and Handleman 2006). Particularly instructive was Max Gluckman's interest in the role of conflict and power in sustaining and changing social structure, and his focus on negotiations within social situations, which allowed him to concentrate on the dynamics of interpersonal relations, rather than on roles and formalised hierarchies (especially Gluckman 1968 [1940]). This has inspired my overall approach of following social networks that cut through various social settings in order to map how key participants in Lviv's heritage conflicts acted, related to one another, and how they understood the shared objects of their disagreements.

In other words, as a fieldworker I moved across alliances and divisions between institutions, professionals and expert approaches, tracing how those mapped onto one another. To do so, and in order to preserve my informants' trust, I had to take their accounts seriously, relate them to one another, and explore my interlocutors' understandings without collapsing them into a singular narrative. In order to do justice to the complexity of their positions, interpretations, and understand how their accusations were motivated, I had to ask 'what really happened' from my interlocutors' perspectives, whether their understandings overlapped, and how they related to 'official truths' of archival and legal documents and heritage policies. I found that bringing incompatible accounts together and identifying key points of their overlap and contestation helped me trace an outline of the overall direction and dynamic of post-socialist change in Lviv's heritage scene in ways that would not have been possible without moving between the perspectives of individual research participants or organisations.

Piecing together these contradictory narratives, and weaving together documentary sources with participant observation, occasionally felt a bit like investigative work in that it required me to put different pieces of the research 'puzzle' together, albeit with full awareness that there is no one picture — no one truth — to assemble, and no one complete story to tell.

Thesis overview

I explore the complex field of heritage professionals through three pairs of chapters, each of which focuses on a different facet of heritage and cultural politics: first I examine the way in which historians are divided along methodological and political lines; then I trace the preservation apparatus responsible for built heritage, and the post-1991 quest for decentralisation; finally, I

focus on museums and monuments that exhibit and thematise the past, some of which used to be central for Soviet memory politics and museology, others absent. Each of these perspectives revealed connected, but subtly different challenges for heritage professionals. Taken together, they offer a holistic, if not comprehensive, portrait of this professional field.

I offer a walk through Lviv's history in Chapter 1, connecting historical legacies to the historic environment, setting up the scene for the dissertation. History is at once an object and a subject of this ethnography, and this tour allows me to hint at the intersections between monuments, regimes and lines of interpretation.

Chapter 2 follows a public debate about the public role of history, occasioned by the installation of a monument to Cossack leaders with leading role in anti-Jewish pogroms. I examine the division between patriotic and critical historians, tracing how it maps onto professional ideas about emancipatory vs. detached scholarship, sustained by parallel orders of legitimation: distinct career trajectories, divergent sources of professional legitimacy. This foreshadows divisions explored in the following chapters, and it illustrates the difficulties my interlocutors face when they try to speak across fault lines.

I move onto the preservation infrastructure of Soviet Lviv in Chapter 3, reconstructing its institutional histories by cross-reading archival sources and testimonies of my informants. Today, narratives of senior preservation professionals are anchored in anti-Soviet dissent, that acts as a rhetorical tool to secure their position and give legitimacy to their professional work. I show where the preservation apparatus of Lviv fits in Soviet heritage preservation, arguing that local professionals had little room to set the direction of their work, and that, they were much in line with official policies of the era.

Chapter 4 takes this story further, showing how municipal authorities have challenged the vertical state since 1991, aspiring to set the direction of urban development, and preservation within it. I follow the advent of an ambitious mayor who sought to develop alliances with new entrants in the heritage field, notably international organisations and NGOs. This sometimes happens at the expense of senior professionals whose place was secured in the former institutional division of labour. The resulting competition resembles the division between historians in Chapter 2.

The last two chapters zoom onto two case studies. On the one hand, Chapter 5 follows the transformation the former Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism, a Soviet propaganda institution that managed to survive with its collection and workforce intact, removing anti-religious propaganda from its master narrative. Today, it is struggling to be relevant in the contemporary cultural scene of Lviv. Occasionally it seems that this was more than a removal, amounting to privileging the previously banned Greek Catholic church. However, I argue that this was insufficient in maintaining visitor engagement, attracting young professionals, and ultimately preserving the centrality it used to have in the cultural life of the city. This is partly due to the

inability of the staff to rethink the vision behind their exhibition: neither can the Museum endorse a local, Galician agenda, nor it is able to find a way to embrace its diversity and exhibit world religions in all their forms. Their financial and organisational dependence translates into safe play and a rather compromised agenda of prioritising locally present forms of Christianity that ultimately not many visitors find interesting.

On the other hand, Chapter 6 tells the story of a Jewish memorial space next to the ruins of the Golden Rose (Turei Zahav) Synagogue, once the most significant synagogue in the region, that was blown up by the retreating German army. The Holocaust was ignored by Soviet memory politics, so the Space of Synagogues project needed to turn a fenced-off plot into place of commemoration, dealing with the thorny issue of local perpetration. The success of the eventual solution was partially thanks to the balance it managed to strike between boldness and caution: putting the Shoa out there was itself a milestone previously difficult to imagine, but avoiding explicitly naming Ukrainians as perpetrators did not push this all the way. I argue that this story exposes how inherent both the multicultural, 'European' narrative, and nationalist concerns are in the cultural politics of the city, and how their seeming paradox is easy to overcome.

The two closing chapters bring together the three key aspects of this dissertation: institutional, professional and ideological change. Through the Museum I show how the rigid organisational structure, the lack of funds and overall political dependency halts curatorial experimentation or bold agendas, while the Space of Synagogues project speaks of the kinds of alliances that can successfully circumvent problems endemic to public sector institutions, yet how they are held check by institutional hierarchies and nationalist hegemonies. I conclude with what their joint examples mean for heritage expertise and 'authoring' the heritage discourse in Lviv.

I. Locating Lviv in history: multiethnic frontier to nationalist heartland

By the end of my time in Lviv, I found that for my interlocutors in the city's heritage field, the stakes of public debates about Lviv's history, heritage and cultural politics, were defined by three challenges. First, it was the legacy of a multicultural past, and the pogroms and deportations that put an end to it during and after the WWII, often with the help of local participants. Second, the stakes of developing a Ukrainian (rather than Russophile) *urban* life were high. Consecutive political regimes, most notably Poland and the USSR, framed Ukrainian language, literature and 'culture' in predominantly rural terms. Inside the country, popular depictions contrasted a Ukrainian-speaking, rural Western Ukraine to an urbanised and Russian speaking east. Could Lviv, then, could become a contrary exemplar of *Ukrainian* — rather than post-Soviet — urbanism? Finally, my interlocutors often stated that if the city was to develop a distinct kind of urbanism, in which its built heritage was central, aspirations to Lviv's role in the country could become more pronounced. Having been a provincial imperial borderland city throughout much of its history, it could now set the trends for cultural life or urban development for the whole nation, as a regional capital. These aspirations were intensified with the outbreak of the war in the Donbas in 2014, when pro-European positions became more mainstream across the country.

This chapter offers a walk through the complex and convoluted recent history that is behind these challenges and aspirations. I use the urban fabric as a guide to outline the city's history, explaining key events and their legacies through their tangible traces. I mean 'walk' quite literally: I take the reader on a tour of locations and buildings through which I open up the city's history. The organisations housed in these buildings will be my focus in the subsequent chapters. Hence, this tour serves as a *dramatis personae* of sorts. Rather than a context without which it would be inappropriate to plunge into the ethnography, these buildings, events and institutions provide the material through which I trace, throughout the dissertation, the transformation of a professional field, and of the city itself.

Today Lviv is a much more homogeneous city than it has ever been: ca. 90% of its population are Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians,[6] many of whom are Greek Catholic.[7] The remaining 10% are ethnic Russians, with a small fraction of Jews, Armenians and Poles (each

[6] According to the 2001 data, only 1.4% of Ukrainians stated Russian to be their mother tongue, while around 9% of Russians were Ukrainian speakers (Lozynsyki 2005: 258). It is important to note that this survey did not take bilingualism into account, neither could it capture the fluidity of language use, notably switching languages due to political changes, about which it I gathered many informal stories in the stories in Lviv. Whatever the numbers, it is rare to hear any other language than Ukrainian in the city.

[7] Greek Catholics amount to 59% of the population of Lviv oblast. The second faction are Ukrainian Orthodox believers, Kyiv Patriarchy with 21.2% (Relihiyni Vpodobannia Naselennia Ukrainy 2015).

group amounting to less than 1% of the population).[8] Assimilated and mostly Ukrainian-speaking too, their presence easily goes unnoticed.

In a sense, similarly to what Berger (2010) writes about Kaliningrad, we could say that today's Lviv was born when its former diversity was erased. The little that remains of this 'dismembered multiethnicity' (Follis 2012: 181) is a hint of the several waves of demographic and political change that swept through Lviv in the past century: a former Polish-Jewish-Ukrainian merchant city lost its Jewish population to German occupation and Holocaust, and its Poles to waves of forced population exchange that became known as Operation Vistula. With more than two-thirds of the pre-WW2 population perished and displaced, the city quickly filled up with new inhabitants from the surrounding rural areas, Eastern Ukraine and Russia. By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, Lviv had not only undergone this demographic change, but also grown twofold in size. Growth has continued since Ukraine gained independence in 1991, and the city has become even more ethnically uniform.[9]

In the six centuries of its existence as part of Poland and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Lviv was always a regional borderland capital, oriented politically and economically towards Vienna and Cracow. Having been a merchant city since the 14th century, Armenian, Polish, Jewish, German and Ruthenian (Ukrainian) communities coexisted side by side. The various states and communities to which Lviv has belonged over the centuries, gave it the many names by which the city has been known: Leopolis, Lwów, Lemberg, Lvov and Lviv (Czaplicka 2005). The cityscape stands as a tacit testament to these vanished communities. Their historic attempts to build up and thereby symbolically claim urban space, left architectural traces of their presence everywhere.

The Soviet era altered the city's geopolitical context, replacing Cracow with Kyiv, Vienna with Moscow, and trade with light industry. After 1991, Lviv is the largest city in Ukraine west of Kyiv, with ca. 750 thousand inhabitants. Apart from the capital, it is the most significant producer of Ukrainian-language media, books, and other cultural goods, leading many within and beyond the city to perceive it as the unofficial — and certainly the most 'Ukrainian' — cultural capital of Ukraine. In the past decades of post-industrial transformation, tourism, education, publishing and

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[8] The Russian population was 16.1% in Lviv in 1989, while in Galician villages they never exceeded 0.5% (Lozynskyi 2005: 211). According to the first official census in Ukraine in 2001, 88.1% of the local population was Ukrainian and 8.9% was Russian, while Poles accounted for 0.88% and Jews for around 0.2% (ibid. 256ff). See also Bodnar 2010.

[9] Between 1991 and 2001 the number of Poles dropped by 30%, the number of Jews with a shocking 85% (Lozyskyi 2005: 261, 2064; Bodnar 2010: 313). Taken together with the decrease of the Russian population and the increasing prominence of Ukrainian language use, it is safe to say that Lviv today is a much more homogeneous city than ever before, including the Soviet period. A tendency that might change this is the recent economic migration of IT professionals to Lviv from all over the country, including the eastern oblasts and the IDP population arriving because of the war. This means around 13-15.000 workers in 2015 (Lviv IT Market Research 2015), and the sector is one of the focal points in the City Council's strategy for 2020.

the IT sector have become dominant in urban development, heavily prioritised by the local government.

The city's history is more than just a backdrop to the present, and monuments offer a discursive terrain on which people play out their ideological divisions and build projects for a common future. Debates around mixed legacy of the multicultural, 'European' past, insurgent nationalism, questions concerning the city's role and position in Ukraine today, as well as the key agendas of Ukrainian urban life are played out in and against the backdrop of a historic old town that is now inscribed onto the UNESCO World Heritage List. Monuments are attractive reference points for the attempts to brand the city to different national and foreign audiences. They are also prominent in the political rhetoric around issues of identity, cultural policy and geopolitics.

Discourses that venerate a multicultural past — often labelled 'felix Galicia' — and, those that refer back to the national struggle in their celebrations of the ethnically homogeneous present, have a strong purchase among Lviv's cultural elites. Both are articulated in a contrastive manner to the city's Soviet legacy. This contrast, more than anything else, informs the intellectual consensus that came to dominate Lviv after 1991, casting a selectively imagined Central European past towards a European future.[10] If examined closely, the genealogies of the way nation and culture are conceptualised in these debates reach back to Habsburg and — ironically — Soviet identity politics: ethnicity remains important and the 'national project', emancipatory and teleological. Local support for these ideas is unquestionable, but it is less certain whether they are conceived as a viable path for the rest of the country. Discussions about history, nation and identity are therefore omnipresent: public talks abound, monuments and museums are hotly contested and coffee houses feature historic decorations and private conversations often meander towards history.

I conducted fieldwork after the Euromaidan revolution that had started in Kyiv, when under pressure from Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign the association agreement with the European Union. As protests escalated, the president was ousted, Crimea annexed, and war broke out in the eastern territories of the Donbas, questions around identity politics, language and history animated the country. With the pro-European orientation, dominance of Ukrainian language in public life, and Central European historical references that have long characterised public representations of Lviv in Ukraine, suddenly were being given a place in the country's public culture that they had never had before fuelling local desires to create a 'Ukraine made in Lviv'. For five years between 2014 and 2019, it seemed as if Lviv could become an exemplar for the whole country that struggled to distance

[10] The idea of Central Europe, widely popular in the former socialist countries throughout the 1990s remains prominent in Lviv. Though binaries of east-west and non-Europe-Europe are more usual in daily conversations, Central or East-Central Europe resurface in contexts around Habsburg Galicia. For more about the concept see Wolff (1994).

itself from its Soviet legacy, and historical and contemporary ties with Russia. Presidential election results in spring 2019, in which the incumbent Petro Poroshenko, who ran with a nationalist motto ('Army. Language. Faith.'), suffered a humiliating defeat from a Russian-speaking comedian of Jewish origins Volodymyr Zelenskyi, were a cold shower for most in the local intelligentsia, as they indicated broader support for peace and social politics than identity politics the 2014-19 cycle tried to capitalise on. As I write this, Lviv might be returning to its previous status of being one of several legitimate 'options' of cultural politics in Ukraine, rather than the (self-appointed) norm. In fact, Lviv might have never had the impact many locals attributed to it anyway. However, during my fieldwork in 2015-6, and in 2017, war clearly set the terms and stakes of all discussions around heritage and memory, elevating Lviv's symbolic importance.

Historical events I describe in the rest of this chapter, constitute the shared knowledge base against which various heritage actors make their claims, much of which I picked up first in the form of anecdotes on site. This knowledge forms the common ground for committed nationalists, fierce relativists and those occupying various positions in-between, whose main arenas of friction I will discuss in other chapters of this thesis. On the one hand, it serves as the immediate backdrop to discussions of public history and the cultural front lines in Lviv. On the other hand, this overview will help me to elaborate the underlying questions of the dissertation: what do cultural political choices entail in the eyes of professionals involved? Why do they matter to respective actors? In other words: how and on what scale do heritage professionals in Lviv aspire to make a difference in Ukraine?

I divide Lviv's history along the demographic watershed of World War II. Multiethnic Lviv that had been the eastern frontier of its respective political contexts, became the western frontier of the Soviet Union and, subsequently, Ukraine. In order to explain the role that Lviv retains in Ukrainian politics, and the exceptional public prominence of history that informs this politics, I outline the political and social history of the city and recapitulate recent and present events. This prepares the ground for me to trace, in the subsequent chapter, how historiography enters the scene of memory politics and heritage conflicts, elucidating the hopes and stakes of heritage conflicts in Lviv and Ukraine on the whole.

The emergence and destruction of a multiethnic city

From a Rus principality to a Polish trading city

If you had an appointment with a friend somewhere in downtown Lviv, it would likely happen *bilia konia* — 'under the horse', that is under the bronze equestrian statue of Prince Danylo at Halytska Square, the southern end of the mediaeval quarter of the old city. Danylo Romanovych was a prince dynastically related to the rulers of the Kyiv Rus, who founded Lviv in

1256.[11] The first Eastern Slavic, Orthodox state,[12] the Kyiv Rus existed between the 9th and 13th centuries, and it was a loose federation of principalities, with a population that spoke various Eastern Slavic dialects and used Old Church Slavonic as its language of liturgy and official writing. One of the largest states in Europe at the time, it included much of contemporary Ukraine and Belarus, as well as north-western parts of what is now European Russia. As such, it is seen as the point of origin for Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian traditions of statehood. Although Danylo was dynastically related to the rulers of the Kyiv Rus, by the time of his reign Kyiv had declined in importance due to the Mongol raids, and Danylo was about to turn his principality to an independent kingdom, a political entity on its own right. In 1254, he was crowned the King of Halych and Volyn by the Pope (Magocsi 2002: 6). Political autonomy was complemented by setting up a local Orthodox metropolitanate, independent of Kyiv (ibid).

Figure 1.1. 'Let's meet under the horse!' The statue of King Danylo in central Lviv. Photo by Olha Zarechniuk

Lviv, the recently established city was soon made the capital of the Halych-Volyn principality by Danylo's son, Lev — hence the city's name. The majority of the principality's

11 Some note an already existing settlement by this period and recent archaeological research shows continuous human presence since the 5th century (Hrytsak 2000: 48), but Danylo's founding act remains the most common reference point both in academic literature and public events, such as anniversaries.

12 Prince Volodymyr (or Vladimir in the Russian tradition) accepted Byzantine Christianity as a state religion in 988 (Yekelchyk 2015: 51).

territory at the time was populated by Orthodox Slavs, but Jews, Poles, Germans and Armenians[13] were invited to settle in the cities of the kingdom that was just recovering from the Mongols' raids, in dire need of human and economic resources (Magocsi 1996: 119, Hrytsak 2000: 49). From its earliest days, Lviv was an ethnically and religiously mixed city, contrasting sharply with the surrounding, predominantly Ruthenian[14] Orthodox, countryside, a division that was to persist until the second half of the 20th century.

The connected yet distinct political trajectory of the Kyiv Rus and Halych-Volyn leave enough room for narratives that integrate Lviv to Kyiv and the broader East Slavic history, but they also allow for an emphasis on independence and political manoeuvring with Poland, Hungary and Western Christianity. This in-between position, and the resulting historiographic possibilities, were to remain crucial in the city's history.

Danylo's statue was only erected in 2001 to commemorate his 800th birthday, but plans were made already in 1947, right after Lviv was incorporated in the USSR. This is important, as it indicates the relevance of the Rus period for Soviet memory politics: historiographic and commemorative attention to the Eastern Slavic elements of its history inscribed Lviv into the Soviet state project. There is not much in the city's remaining fabric from this early period, but an attention to the Ruthenian, Orthodox elements in history was a constant feature of Soviet-era policies of cultural politics and heritage preservation. However, it was not only Soviet historiography, but Ukrainian nationalist historiography too, that stresses the Rus roots (Plokhy 2005: 165), an inevitable move when imagining Lviv as part of the modern Ukrainian state project.

Leaving Danylo's statue and heading north, we enter the once walled mediaeval centre, a tight square-shaped area arranged around a market square and a city hall, with narrow, cobbled streets. Street names indicate former ethnic divisions: Ruska, Krakivska, Virmenska (Armenian), Serbska and Staroievreiska (Old Jewish) streets are all next to Ploshcha Rynok, the Market Square. Renaissance townhouses from the 15-16th century encircle this central square, with souvenir shops on their ground floor, most of them (at least their façades) well maintained. Beyond the fortified centre, the city first spread towards the slopes of the Castle Hill — toponyms like 'Old Market Square' offer a clue about this history, but not much else is left from the oldest layers (Petryshyn and Liubytskyi 2018).

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[13] The earliest written sources about the Ashkenazi Jews who settled in Lviv date back to the mid-14th century (Kravtsov 2011: 9, Wierzbieniec 2000), Armenians arrived from Crimea (Hrytsak 2000). For more on their role in the Middle Ages see Nadel-Golobič (1979).

[14] The area was widely known as the Red Rus during this period, and its inhabitants were often called the 'Rus people' or Ruthenians. I use Ruthenian for the pre-19th century Orthodox and Greek Catholic inhabitants of Lviv and the region, who assumed Ukrainian identity, which was propagated by the intelligentsia in the 19th century, to replace the 'Rus people'/Ruthenian and 'Little Russian' ethnonyms in the Habsburg and Russian Empires, respectively (cf. Himka 1999: 8-9, Yekelchyk 2015: 39).

This central zone, the core of the area ascribed on the UNESCO world heritage list,[15] is already from the time when Lviv was incorporated into the kingdom of Poland, in 1340. The Polish period[16] lasted until 1772, and — as the wealth of the churches and old townhouses testify — it saw Lviv becoming an important regional trading entrepôt. Around a third of its inhabitants were merchants until the decline of continental trade, thanks to the rise of overseas trade routes (Hrytsak 2003: 104; Lozynskyi 2005: 270-2). To facilitate this, in 1356 the city received the Magdeburg Code that ensured local urban autonomy and the protection of the city from the overtaxation and exploitation by the local nobility. However, the Magdeburg Code favoured Roman Catholics over the Orthodox population[17] and thus was a vehicle not only of decentralisation, but of Polonisation as well.

The economic pressure to assimilate concerned the Jewish population much less. Polish noblemen leased their assets and special rights, mostly tax and custom collection to middlemen, who were allowed to collect revenue. The *arenda* system, as this became known, heavily relied on Jews (whose employment opportunities were otherwise restricted) as middlemen, and it allowed many noblemen to live far from their property. This often put Jewish middlemen at odds with their Polish and Ruthenian neighbours, a situation that eventually contributed both to the increase of Jewish presence and antisemitic responses to it (Levine 1991: 59-73). However, it did not make assimilation a necessary step for Jews in securing affluence, as opposed to the Ruthenian gentry and nobility.

By the sixteenth century, the former Orthodox dominance—both in numbers and influence —gave way to Roman Catholicism,[18] and most of the old boyar nobility assimilated to the Polish elite. The Ruthenian population of the city was only sustained by the influx of Ruthenian peasants from the surrounding countryside, supported by the remaining minority of the nobility and the Orthodox clergy. However, it is important to remember that the primary marker of identity was

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[15] Besides this former fortified area, ruins of the adjacent Vysokyi Zamok (High Castle) are also within the world heritage site, heavily tilting the balance towards Lviv's mediaeval heritage from other potential preservation priorities. only fragments remain of the 14th century stone castle, stones of which were used in the construction of the nearby Mound of Lublin, a commemorative object for the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Contrary to the old centre, this part of the UNESCO site will not feature heavily in this dissertation.

[16] The bi-confederation of Poland and Lithuania in 1596 meant that Lviv was thereby part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; this is often referred to as *Rzeczpospolita*, especially among Polish and Ukrainian historians.

[17] Discrimination should be understood predominantly in religious, rather than ethnic terms throughout this period. For instance for the admission to the Magdeburg Code a Roman Catholic oath was required of every citizen, indirectly forcing beneficiaries to convert or be marginalised: Orthodox were thus excluded from guilds and civic associations (Rubchak 2000 21-2).

[18] By the mid-16th century Roman Catholic Poles (38 %) and Germans (8 %) outnumbered Ruthenians (24%); Jews (8%), and Armenians (7%) were the other two sizeable minorities, making Lviv unique in its ethnic diversity: it was the only city in the region that was home to this many ethnic groups, all over 5% of the population (Hrytsak 2000: 50, Ther and Czaplicka 2000: 262).

religious belonging, that often coexisted with ambiguous language use; although we can trace the histories of ethno-religious groups in Lviv, neither element is stable here and it would be a gross oversimplification to read contemporary group identities back to this period.

Successful Polonisation in the period is still visible in the number of Roman Catholic churches. Most were turned into warehouses in the Soviet era, so much so that guidebooks that led visitors through this 'historic city' and its 'historic-architectural reserve' mention their histories, but discreetly refrain from providing any details about their interiors. They were simply closed off from the public. Some of them, notably the former Dominican Convent Church[19] housed museums; as did and still do as many villas and townhouses. Reopened churches are now predominantly Greek Catholic, but their aesthetics are mostly of the Roman Catholic Baroque. The Jewish presence was reduced hugely by the destruction of two central synagogues in this central zone, but recent commemorative projects as well as recovered Yiddish shop signs have altered this somewhat.

Figure 1.2. Medieval and Habsburg-era buildings in downtown. Photo by Olha Zarechniuk

[19] The Dominican church was built in the mid 18th century, replacing a Gothic church that stood at its place, while the adjacent monastery reaches back to the 16th century. Both were restored-rebuilt several times. The former currently functions as a Greek Catholic church, while the latter still hosts the collection of the Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism, now having dropped atheism and Marxist-Leninist rhetoric from its name and exhibitions. I will focus on this story in Chapter 5.

Orthodoxy and the Greek Catholic Church

The Ruthenian minority struggled to adapt to Polish rule, leading to a decisive split in the late 16th century. The resulting denominational difference is among the key reference points of Ukrainian identity in the region today. Moreover, the split illustrates the perennial ambivalence of belonging for the city's Ruthenian-Ukrainian population.

The increasingly Roman Catholic and Jewish urban life that flourished under the Magdeburg right prompted an Orthodox cultural counter-revival. This was organised by (religious) confraternities (*bratstvo*), citizen-associations affiliated with individual Orthodox churches, they worked somewhat like mediaeval guilds. Most important among them was the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood. Beyond supporting Orthodoxy, they engaged in secular, often charitable activities, mostly Ruthenian language education, healthcare and printing. They were strictly anti-Polish, teaching Greek and Church Slavonic in their schools, hoping to establish a firm Ruthenian cultural footing.

However, their activities were increasingly hostile to local Orthodox clergymen, whom they saw as morally corrupt and seeking too close a relationship with the Polish establishment. Thus they secured the right to be directly subordinate to the patriarch instead of the local bishops. Some of the Orthodox bishops pushed for unification with Rome in order to lessen the influence of far-away Constantinople and to better their position in Roman Catholic, westward oriented Poland. In return they asked for their Byzantine liturgy, the use of Church Slavonic and accepting their view about the origin of the Holy Spirit, a theological controversy that separates Eastern and Western Christianity since the 1054 schism (Magocsi 2008: 39ff). The Union of Brest was signed in 1596 and led to the establishment of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church.[20] Church Union was a concern of the Vatican since the 1054 schism between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, and it was a recurring topic for centuries, especially on religious borderlands, such as eastern Poland.

The majority of the Ruthenian Orthodox clergy eventually supported the union, but the Lviv Dormition Brotherhood continued its opposition against what they saw not only as Polonisation, but an indirect marginalisation of Ruthenians. But a century later even they gave in. The Union was originally an elite initiative — most local faithful not invested in geopolitical affairs

[20] The new church was called Uniate until 1774, when Maria Theresa renamed them as Greek Catholic, to signal their legal equity with Roman Catholics (Himka 1999: 5). For more details see Subtelny 1988: 99-102, Magocsi 1996: 160-169, *idem* 2008: 39-42, Himka 1999: 12-3.

— but it subsequently found its way to local parishes.[21] Orthodoxy lost much of its power and demographic base in Galicia during the next century, leading to the decline of Ruthenian schools and the influence of the brotherhood.

Figure 1.3. Ivan Fedorov's Soviet-era statue and the unofficial book market. Photo by Olha Zarechniuk

The Dormition Brotherhood accepted Greek Catholicism in 1708 and was abolished at the end of the century by the new Austrian leadership. By that time, the Greek Catholic Church managed to consolidate its position among the local Ruthenians and rid itself of pro-Polish connotations, to eventually become one of the vehicles of Ukrainian national mobilisation. The most significant symbol of this is the late-Baroque St. George Cathedral — located north-west from the centre on a hilltop — the only ensemble outside of the mediaeval townscape included in the UNESCO World Heritage list.

For Soviet politics, the Greek Catholic Church was unacceptable and dangerous: due to their connection to the Vatican, it was inherently suspect, not merely as a religious institution, but as a security threat. It is not surprising, that Greek Catholic Lviv was far from high on their

[21] Hann observes that it is the interstitial nature of the Greek Catholic Church that allowed for both the creation of the church over the head of the local population, and later on its destruction by the Soviet authorities (2008: xi). The "syncretism from below" (*idem* 2005), so characteristic of Greek Catholic practice (and theology) is a direct consequence of this borderline position; for more on this in a comparative context cf. Naumescu and Mathieu's (2008) edited volume.

preservation agenda. The Orthodox Ruthenian history, however, was almost as crucial as the Rus-era in anchoring Lviv's townscape in the Eastern Slavic world. On the northern end of the old centre, next to where the Dominican church-museum stands, locals often visit the open air flea-market and book market around the statue of Ivan Fedorov, one of the founders of Eastern Slavonic printing (and a famed cannon maker). Fedorov, prosecuted by Muscovite scribes whose jobs were threatened by his invention, fled to Lviv and worked there until is death in 1583. His statue was erected in 1977, to emphasise the city's ties to Moscow; today it remains among the very few Soviet-era landmarks in the old town.

Figure 1.4. The Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop. Photo by Olha Zarechniuk

Religiosity was not a legitimate part of Soviet-era commemoration, so it was mostly innovators like Fedorov, and secular, non-Polish developments like Lviv's mediaeval walls, its arsenal that received priority in conservation efforts. When churches were included for their art historic value, their gates remained close, or their interiors were repurposed. As the monuments of the inner city were organised into a protected zone, the cultural infrastructure coalesced around them: museums mushroomed and the former Bernardine Monastery came to house the regional restoration workshop.

This infrastructure is virtually unchanged today, although curatorial strategies, museums' outlook have changed significantly since 1991. Greek Catholic identity has proven crucial in the

formation of a distinctive, Galician variant of Ukrainian identity, so much so that its current prominence in Lviv hardly allows prominence for the old Ruthenian brotherhoods in local history, an odd situation in for a context where pre-19th century elements, that could cement national identity are so scarce. Overall, the mediaeval fabric today is in a much better shape than its surroundings, due to the continuous protection it has received since 1975.[22]

However, not many people talk about this architectural ensemble today: it is overshadowed by concerns about later developments, especially art nouveau architecture, and, increasingly, interwar and Soviet modernism.

Habsburg Lemberg: urban, imperial and nationalist developments

If we leave behind the mediaeval old town, within and around a large ring road we find a Habsburg city: a place that evokes Vienna, Cracow or Ljubljana even for the untrained eye — if only in a more dilapidated condition. This is a result of nearly 150 years of Austrian rule in Lviv: upon Poland's first partition among the surrounding empires in 1772, Lviv became the capital of Galicia and Lodomeria, the easternmost crownland of the Habsburg Monarchy.[23]

The population of Lviv's suburbs exceeded that of the fortified city throughout its history, but apart from a number of religious buildings and palaces, not much remains of the pre-Habsburg architecture. Urban development became rapid now, especially from the mid-19th century, as the city became denser and more urban along old radial streets (Petryshyn and Liubytsyki 2018). The city grew rapidly, its population increased fivefold by 1880, reaching a hundred thousand (Unowsky 2005:65).

Impressive public and private buildings were commissioned, among them, north-west from the centre, the imposing building of the Opera House and Ballet Theatre. The building closes off a leafy boulevard, one of the most spectacular modernist projects of the time: it covers Lviv's Poltva River, that had posed sanitary risks. The project was conducted by the Lviv Polytechnic Society, which was later organised into the first urban planning department in the city, in 1913 (Cherkes and Petryshyn 2014). With fortifications now demolished, and the construction of new buildings like the Galician Savings Bank, the with the new Museum of Industry, and the Municipal Theatre, the focal points of the city slowly moved away from the mediaeval centre. Today's Svoboda Avenue, the boulevard with the Opera House forms the westward edge of the UNESCO site: much of the Habsburg-era urban fabric therefore excluded from this highest

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[22] I will talk more about the Soviet-era preservation infrastructure in Chapter 3, and explain its developments in the three decades since 1991 in Chapter 4.

[23] The name Galicia was derived from the mediaeval Halych-Volyn principality in order to construe the legitimacy of Habsburg rule, referring back to the former brief Hungarian ownership of the territory, that could be constituted as the legal predecessor of the Habsburg leadership (Wolff 2016: 279). For a broader overview of the consolidation of the idea of Galicia see *idem* 2010.

regime of protection, including the local Diet/Sejm a few minutes walk away, which was turned into a university building in 1914.

Figure 1.5. The Lviv Polytechnic hosted an EU Eastern Partnership conference upon my arrival to the field in 2015. Author's photo

Architectural planning and development was "steady, continuous and uninterrupted" in the 19th century (Prokopovych 2008: 19), carried out by many Viennese architects. Schools, universities and administrative buildings mushroomed and the public space was increasingly a venue of political activities. Habsburg ideas of cultural change envisioned a gradual transition of

local subjects to Germans (Wolff 2010: 80-4), through a careful blend of gradual emancipation and restrictive measures about self-expression. Still, as policing and censorship eased by the end of the 19th century, and by then local folkloristic forms of art nouveau sprung up within the broad project of Habsburg modernisation. Urban developments took place in restricted areas only, though, many existing neighbourhoods, like the Jewish suburb north of the new ring road were completely neglected (Prokopovych 2009: 105-6).

Distinct nationalising tendencies are visible along traces of imperial modernity in the urban fabric. Habsburg rule abolished mediaeval privileges, such as the Magdeburg Code, and incorporated Lviv into the broader infrastructure of the Empire. Nascent national movements were the unintended consequence of Habsburg modernisation, and they made use of broadening primary schooling, broadening press and growing use of public spaces (Wolff 2010: 65).[24] Lviv emerged as a hidden capital of Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian nationalisms (Hrytsak 2003), and became a "nationalising city"25 whose importance was predominantly symbolic rather then strategic or economic. Polish elites were the generally favoured group of this transition, leaving the Ukrainian polity increasingly frustrated, and both communities more and more invested in oppositional self-organisation. The Jewish community was divided along the secular Jewish Enlightenment movement called Haskalah, and the intense religiosity of Hasidic movements. Lviv was central for both.

However, the city did not only witness the transition of former ethno-religious differences into national cleavages. Rather, it was a parallel stage for nation and empire (Prokopovych 2008: 290), simultaneously linking locals to various political and ideological scales. National presence often became orchestrated through imperial infrastructures: Franz Joseph's 1880 visit was celebrated with unexpected enthusiasm by the rural population, but it also became an occasion of competition between different ethnic factions in cities, all keen to demonstrate and affirm their significance (Unowsky 2005:64-70).

Like in the preceding periods, Ukrainian elites were split into Russophile and Galician branches in fin-de-siècle Lviv (Himka 1999: 10ff, Magocsi 2002: 99-118). Polish identity claims were less bifurcated, as their geopolitical orientation was unambiguously towards an independent

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[24] Both imperial and national identities had a limited reach though, and they coexisted with locally sourced, hybrid identities, that are often imperfectly captured in census data. Pyrah and Fellerer see Lviv as an place where autochthonous multilingualism flourished: as multilingualism was deeply rooted in local history, rather than just a result of immigration waves, hyphenated identities, code switching and complex language use coexisted with the nationalising and imperial attempts of the Habsburg era (2015: 709ff). It is worth remembering these realties: the hidden Russian and Polish threads of contemporary Lviv persist, but only agains this multilingual background can the loss of diversity be understood on a sensory level.

[25] With this concept Hrytsak follows Brubaker's classic description of the nationalising state (1996), where a nationalist elite sets in motion a process of sorting out legitimate and illegitimate citizenry, usually led by an ethno-cultural master narrative. Lviv in this perspective is seen as a locus of similar processes on a smaller scale already when these respective groups had not secured sovereignty.

Poland, the feasibility of which seemed low. Non-Russophile Ukrainians sought an autonomous eastern Galicia, while Poles saw the entire region as a starting point for a wholesale Polish cultural revival. When the Poles secured a level of local autonomy in 187326, and the language of education and administration changed to Polish, the interests of the two communities increasingly clashed. Russophile Ukrainians were marginalised and discredited in this process, which pitted populist nationalist Ukrainians and Poles against each other. The result was a compromise that allowed the institutionalisation of Ukrainian schooling. However, disparity was difficult to contain, and the coexistence of divergent relational loyalties allowed locals to avoid articulating their identity in an exclusionist manner only until the disintegration of the Empire.

The prominence of the Habsburg-era built environment, the fact that it is seen as the last semi-autonomous period in the city, and that the national canon features its prominent figures so centrally, allow for a rather selective public take on the Monarchy today. The absence of the Polish population permits 'memory laundering' (Himka 2015a) and a shifting of focus from the relative marginal position of Ukrainians at the time to the de facto—if limited—successes of nationalising movements, and often wishful depictions of multiculturalism. All the more so, because attempts of national organisation were more oppressed under the Russian Empire, where the rest of Ukraine belonged.

Galicia today engenders values of a 'European' past (Czaplicka 2000: 32; cf. Zayarnyuk 2001). The scope of historical attention is often circumscribed by present geopolitical urgencies, especially beyond the few critical voices among historians. The symbolic nature of Lviv's significance, or at least its articulations persist up to today: neither its rapidly growing industry during the Soviet era, nor the post-independence rise of the tourism and IT sectors, managed to alter the image of Lviv as a first and foremost culturally and historically relevant place, sustained by the active remembrance of the Ruthenian/Ukrainian cultural and national struggle. However, even though the primary register of the historicity of the built environment is from the Habsburg era, providing an immediate link to this era, in the following decades the population of Lviv changed beyond recognition.

Wars, pogroms, displacement: from 1914 to 1948

The 20th century brought the most abrupt changes to the city's political landscape. WWI, besides Russian conquest and Austrian reconquest, brought even more Polish and Ukrainian confrontations, and increasing hopes of Polish independence; Ukrainians in the meantime still favoured the return of the Habsburgs, though some, like Metropolitan Sheptytsyki had plans of uniting Galicia with the 'Little Russians', i. e. Eastern Ukraine, when the Russian Empire was

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[26] This was an aftermath of the 1848 revolutions and the subsequent Austro-Hungarian compromise, that necessitated administrative liberalisation across the rest of the Empire. Semi-autonomous status meant broad prerogatives for the local government especially in cultural and educational issues, and the lifting of censorship.

weakened by civil strife right after the war (Amar 2015). Upon the 1918 dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, Ukrainian nationalists declared a short-lived independence and Lviv became the capital of the West Ukrainian People's Republic, later merged with a newly emerged, and similarly short-lived, Ukrainian People's Republic, which spanned the Ukrainian territories under the former Russian empire. This political experiment, ended by the end of the summer 1919, when (after a brief Polish-Ukrainian war, for which the streets of Lviv became a battleground) Galicia was fully incorporated into the newly restored Polish Republic, which existed until WW2.

Under the republic, the ruling Polish elites pursued a heavy-handed minority policy towards Ukrainians.[27] Repression, worsened by economic depression, led to mass emigration and to disaffected veterans, students, intellectuals and various factions of revolutionary nationalists establishing the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929 (Shekhovtsov 2007).[28] Their radical faction, led by Stepan Bandera, organised political assassinations of Polish notables; today this contested legacy is seen as fascist[29] by several historians and is excused as inappropriate means towards a respectable goal by many others. Probably the most notorious place in the old city, the Kryivka pub evokes this increasing polarisation among local Poles and Ukrainians, glorifying OUN and its later established insurgent wing. The faux-historic decor, anti-Polish jokes can be taken as a tongue-in-cheek game, but for many visitors, it seems far more serious than that.

On the eve of WW2, the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop pact divided Poland between the Third Reich and the USSR; the Soviet army entered Lviv in 1939 after a short period of German occupation. This first period of Soviet rule continued until Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. OUN had high hopes for the German invasion, and their radical faction (OUN-B) declared the 'restoration of the Ukrainian statehood' in Lviv in 1941. This act was condemned by the Germans, and when the OUN refused to rescind their declaration, the Nazis imprisoned their leadership. Many of them perished in concentration camps in the course of the war, including Bandera's two brothers. Their oppression is often held as a proof of OUN not being fascist by contemporary right wing circles in Ukraine (Rudling 2012, 2013).

Seeing the failure of the OUN, Banderites—though with Bandera in absentia, in prison—established a guerrilla movement they called the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in 1943.

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[27] E.g. Ukrainian language higher education was discontinued, Ukrainian language was banned from administration (Magocsi 1996: 588-97)

[28] I cannot give a detailed outline of the political makeup of interwar Lviv Ukrainians here, but it is important to note their heterogeneity. Russophiles continued to be prominent, and many pursued compromise with the Polish leadership (see e.g. Magocsi 1996: 592-7). The reason why I only outline OUN here is its contemporary significance and their role in the brutalities of World War II as well as the guerrilla fighting against the Soviets well into the 1950s.

[29] OUN utilised Italian and German fascist ideological elements to develop a racialised, integral Ukrainian nationalism that set Ukrainian statehood that would contain all Ukrainian territories as its ultimate goal. Their leadership waged war against mixed marriages, subscribed to organic nationalism and saw political violence as a legitimate tool for gaining sovereignty (Rudling 2013: 228-9).

Initially they fought against the Germans, but as the Red Army marched closer they also began an anti-Soviet offensive. Their role is even more contested than that of OUN, mainly due to their active participation in the Holocaust, and their brutal ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia and Galicia in 1943-4, part of the 'Ukrainisation' campaign of the region, resulting in the death of 90 thousand Poles (Rudling 2013: 229). UPA cells continued an increasingly hopeless fight against the USSR even after the closure of the war, when Soviet troops entered Lviv for the second time, this time for good. Soon, UPA's ongoing activities in the countryside became the basis for Soviet images of Western Ukrainians as violent and radical nationalists. Soviet authorities eventually deported 203,000 UPA members, sympathisers and their families from Western Ukraine (Rudling 2013: 229). Many contemporary Lvivites arrived in the city in the Soviet period from villages where UPA was prominent, and since the number of deportees was so high, it is difficult to find unaffected families today. As a result, intimate and rather personal connections to anti-Soviet narratives are a given for many in Lviv today, and UPA and OUN are often literally household names.[30]

Intertwined with the rise of the right-wing resistance and collaborationism, was the predicament of Lviv's Jewish population. By the time of the German invasion, their number had grown to nearly two hundred thousand, as refugees arrived from the surrounding countryside. Before the German army entered Lviv, Soviet authorities had murdered virtually all political prisoners kept in the infamous NKVD prisons, in order to prevent them from joining the invading Germans.[31] Among them were many Ukrainian nationalists—but also Poles and Jews. These killings greatly angered the local supporters of the Ukrainian nationalists, and in line with German propaganda of liberating Lviv from the 'Judeo-Bolshevik rule' of the USSR (Berkhoff 2008:2, 72-3, Gerrits 1995), contributed to the participation of local Poles and Ukrainians in the ensuing Jewish pogroms. Where agency lies in these pogroms, whether they were a result of mob violence, genuine antisemitism, German propaganda or maybe even German coercion is hotly debated today in Lviv, and often subject to political belonging. The NKVD prison building was originally a prison used during the Habsburg era, located a short ten minutes walk away from the local parliament building. Today, the building houses the contested Lontskyi Prison Museum, one of the core locations of nationalist memory politics (see Himka 2015a).

The first pogrom was organised by Einsatsgruppen and their local collaborators in June-July 1941, and another one followed a month later. When the pogroms were over, the Lviv Ghetto was

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[30] The literature on the history of Lviv during WW2 is vast both in Ukrainian and in international academia. Lower's analysis (2004) is a good starting point, as is Amar's overview (2015). Mick (2011) analyses the incompatibility of Polish, Jewish and Ukrainian experiences of the war and Himka (2011) offers an exhaustive overview of the pogroms.

[31] Himka states their number ca. 3400 in the three prisons involved (2015a: 137). Similar massacres happened in Lutsk, Uman and Ternopil as well (Berkhoff 2088: 13-7), claiming altogether 9817 victims (Snyder 2010: 194-5).

established north of the city centre, in the industrial, predominantly working class neighbourhood of Pidzamche, that — conveniently — had a railway station. Jews were deported to concentration camps, including the local Yanivskyi camp.32 By the time of the arrival of the Soviet army, the entire Jewish population of Lviv was exterminated, with barely a few hundred survivors. Few people are aware of the history of the district today, and commemoration monuments and events are virtually absent in Pidzamche.

After the end of the war, Poland and the USSR launched Operation Vistula, the population exchange program that ended centuries of mixed settlement in the borderland areas. By 1947, more than 1.6 million Poles were deported from Ukrainian Galicia, and over half a million Ukrainians from Polish Galicia. 97% of the Jewish population was already dead by then. (Snyder 2003: 203). The few remaining Jews were Polish citizens, and as such they were offered the option of leaving for Poland, which many of them took, prompted by yet another wave of Ukrainian violence in June 1945 (Lozynskyi 2005: 199). By the end of the 1940s the new population settled and the city administration was gradually incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR and the broader USSR.

This meant that the two opposing sides, Nazi Germany and the USSR achieved something not too far from Ukrainian integral nationalists' dreams. Somewhat ironically, the 'Final Solution' and the subsequent Stalinist demographic politics together resulted in an unprecedented Ukrainisation of Lviv between 1941 and 1947 (Amar 2015, cf. Bodnar 2010, Czapliczka 2000:13). Its traditional urban majorities murdered, deported or having left voluntarily, Lviv was left a ghost town with few survivors, most of them Ukrainians.33 It soon underwent yet another large scale social engineering project, this time with a vision of a Soviet Ukrainian city. Lviv became a borderland city in a new geopolitical landscape and it needed to be firmly secured on inner side of the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian Lviv: from a difficult Soviet periphery to national core

Soviet Lviv: cultural repression, cultural expansion

The war prepared the necessary demographic conditions for Lviv to become a Ukrainian city. During the Soviet period, the city underwent cultural and political Ukrainianisation which resulted in a well formed cultural infrastructure and a predominantly Ukrainian language

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32 Yanivskyi is the Ukrainian version of the name; I use this for the sake of consistency and because the site appears in contemporary debates under this name. The Polish name was Obóz Janowski; it was a transit camp and a factory that relied on Jewish forced labour (Charlesworth 2004). There is a small memorial in the Yanivskyi cemetery, but recently the Lviv City Council has approved plans for a much larger memorial. For details about the Lviv ghetto and Pidzamche, see Zayarnyuk (2020: 157-188).

33 Estimates about the number of survivors vary, but the size of Lviv's population after the war was somewhere between 10-20% of its prewar numbers (Hrytsak 2000:58-8, Tscherkes 2000: 210).

education system, as Tarik Amar stressed in his recent monograph (2015).34 Although his position has been heavily criticised, it is becoming widely shared consensus that the Soviet era was crucial in the metamorphosis of Lviv into a Ukrainian city, in spite of the repression, censorship and relative marginalisation of Galician Ukrainians.35 Such a claim is likely to meet serious protest and even anger from most locals.

The majority of today's population migrated to Lviv from neighbouring rural areas after 1945,36 the rest belonged to a Russophile, urbanised elite that arrived from Eastern Ukraine, along with a number of ethnic Russians and people from other republics of the USSR.37 Before the war a better part of the highly skilled labour force had been Polish,38 and therefore the jobs they had occupied, had to be filled by trained newcomers from Eastern Ukraine and Russia, who were attracted there by good housing and prestigious jobs.39 The city's population doubled, and growing neighbourhoods swallowed nearby villages; the majority of the city's population lives in Soviet-era housing today (e.g. Otrishchenko 2017), even though the public image of Lviv never caught up with this development.

Continuing northeast from Pidzamche, e. g. on the Viacheslav Chornovola Avenue, the 19th century condominiums quickly give way to lines of pre-fabricated housing. Similarly, Levandivka, a Soviet-era suburb behind the Habsburg-era train station just twenty minutes walk northeast from the Market Square, is one of the most widely known neighbourhoods in Lviv, with its own local lore, slang and stereotypes.

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34 Amar stood in polemics with previous statements about Lviv being the "least Sovietized, least Russified" city in Ukraine (Ignatieff 2010[1993]: 94, see also Narvselius 2009: Szporluk 1991: 465). Unpopular as it might be among locals, the recent trend epitomised by Amar convincingly argues that Soviet and Ukrainian might have come surprisingly close to one another in the recent history of the city, and in some way, 'Soviet' was a necessary stepping stone towards 'Ukrainian'.

35 It is important to note, that Ukrainianisation was premised upon a separation of an appropriate, Soviet Ukrainian identity from the so-called 'nationalist bandits'. Between 1944 and 1952, roughly 203 thousand people were deported from Western Ukraine, around 182 thousand because of their connection to the nationalist underground. Furthermore, in 1944-5 the Soviet secret service killed 98 thousand such bandits (Risch 2011: 39). It is probably not an exaggeration to label this conflict a civil war.

36 Rural migrants came mostly from Lviv region, followed by Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Volyn and Khmelnytskyi regions in growing numbers, amounting to 6-8 thousand new residents each years after 1960 (Bodnar 2010: 310, 314).

37 The majority of Russians who arrived in Western Ukraine settled in cities (Terliuk 1997), usually first arriving in the administrative centre to then be redistributed in smaller towns. The proportion of Ukrainians was 60% in 1959, five times more than twenty years before. At the same time, Russians amounted to over 25% (Amar 2015: 11ff), but this latter development was transient: by the time of independence their numbers shrank to 15%. According to William Risch, Lviv was the least ethnically Russian city in the European part of the USSR (2011: 52).

38 In 1945 their proportion among tram drivers and artists was over 70%, and over 50% in the medical professions (Lozynskyi 2005: 199).

39 Ethnic Russians made up most of the ranks of NKVD-KGB, army and police officers, chief administrators and planners as well as the technical intelligentsia, such as economists, mathematicians (Terliuk 1997: 90-105).

The differential treatment of Easterners and Galicians resulted in a corresponding social, ethnic and spatial segmentation: the downtown and fashionable interwar villa districts were given to ideologically trustworthy newcomers, while the remaining Ukrainians and the Galician villagers who moved in the city more often lived further away and/or in worse housing conditions. They were (and are) often referred to as *rahuli*, a mocking designation of peasants, whose manners, dress and lack of polished Russian immediately gave them away as villagers (Risch 2011: 66-7). Legacies of this social geography are prevalent even today: areas are often still referred to as the 'KGB neighbourhood', people born in 'Rynok Square apartments' receive jokes about their Soviet apparatchik parents. Thus, the power disparity between rural immigrants and the Eastern Ukrainian or Russian urban community was an important aspect of the Soviet era transformation of the city (Bodnar 2010: 316-7).



TERRITORIAL EXPANSION OF LVIV

1. Lviv in the 15th century
2. Lviv in the late 17th and early 18th centuries
3. Lviv in the 19th century
4. Lviv in the 20th century
5. Lviv between 1939 and 1941
6. Lviv's present territory

*Briukhovychi has been incorporated into the city's Shevchenkivskyi raion, Vynnyky and Sykhiv into Lychakivskyi raion, Levandivka (Zhovtneve) and Bilohorshcha into Zaliznychyi raion, and Syhnivka into Frankivskyi raion.

Map 1.1. The territorial expansion of Lviv. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (2001).

Soviet authorities immediately embarked on an ambitious project of modernisation and industrialisation, in a fashion resembling in many ways the former imperial project of the Habsburgs. They needed to forge Soviet citizens out of a largely rural, unskilled population with a history they thought was 'contaminated' by insurgent Ukrainian nationalism, Polish oppression and its bourgeois ideology (Risch 2011). In these early efforts to eliminate backwardness, authorities nevertheless preserved the 'Western Ukrainian local' as a distinct deference point for local identities and they pursued a form of modernisation that did not seek to fully eliminate its specificities (Amar 2015:15-6), only the religious and nationalist components incompatible with the broader Soviet agenda.

The forced dissolution of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in 1946 was the first major step towards the Sovietisation of Western Ukraine: ties with the Vatican were unacceptable and the church was too closely linked to Ukrainian nationalist resistance. A few priests agreed to practice within the Orthodox Church, but many refused and continued their work in clandestine forms, under strong surveillance. This move was hard both on the local Greek Catholic intelligentsia and the many faithful—religiosity was rather prominent, especially in the surrounding villages, from where many new inhabitants arrived. Church property was abolished even for other denominations and the religious infrastructure of Lviv was greatly reduced. Most of the seized buildings were turned into warehouses.

While there had been some initial plans to raze the old downtown to make space for a full Stalinist transformation, they were dropped (Tscherkhes 2000: 205-22), and the ideologically problematic environment was 'neutralised' by transformations beyond the historic centre. A core element of Soviet modernisation was the transformation of Lviv into an industrial centre. The city expanded with huge speed: lacking raw materials, it was mostly machine building and metal working industries that settled in Lviv immediately after the war, and the old city was encircled by new districts of socialist housing, which absorbed the steady population growth. By the 1970s, more than 30% of the city's territory consisted of industrial buildings (Bodnar 2010). Dormitory districts like Levandivka and Sykhiv were developed in the 1950s and 1970s, respectively. These suburban, industrial areas were demographically more mixed than the segmented downtown. Having originally been villages on the edge of the city, they developed radically in the course of a few years; their urbanisation was uneven (Naumescu 2007: 71-3). These districts with their often persisting rural attachments, religiosity and kinship ties, continue to provide an aesthetic and economic context to the historic core of Lviv that often goes unacknowledged in post-independence Ukraine and fails to become incorporated in the public image of the city.

Sovietising Lviv required more than industrialisation and the repression of religiosity, which were chiefly tools meant to foster the development of a strong, Soviet Ukrainian working class. In order to match the transformation among the elites, authorities embarked on a series of

repressions among social scientists, historians and writers. In 1972-3 a campaign was launched against nationalist dissent (Risch 2011: 154), but this was only one infamous episode of the many waves of attacks that censored historians' works and removed ideologically dismissed faculty members in the 1960s and 1970s. Self-published underground literature (samvydav) flourished especially during the late Khrushchev years; many dissidents in Lviv—especially those with family ties to OUN or UPA, like the famous Horyn brothers—advocated for an independent state and condemned the ongoing cultural Russification. However, their dissent was violently curtailed and their leaders imprisoned in the late 1960s (Risch 2011: 202-204).

Even if combined with strong repression, the Soviet period also brought about an unprecedented increase of Ukrainian cultural infrastructure (Dyak 2008), language use and a national awareness. Russification was limited in Lviv, much more so than in other Ukrainian cities. After Khrushchev's cultural politics turned to favour previously ignored historic eras, as sources of historically significant monuments and artworks that could be incorporated into Soviet identities (Donovan 2015), new museums started to mushroom in Lviv. They catalogued seized church objects and organised further expeditions in the region, collecting religious and folk items. In 1975 the State Architectural Reserve was established and restoration workshops opened; together they formed an interlinked scene of archaeological and preservation work, fostering a sense of historicity that favoured mediaeval and Russophile layers of local history, rather than Habsburg or Polish elements. The leadership denounced Ukrainian nationalist movements, muted talks about the 1932-3 famine in the Ukrainian SSR, and ignored the racial ideology underpinning the Holocaust. History as conserved in architecture and exhibited in museums was thus confined to the safer areas of this ideological minefield. Yet, their work was far from unified, and the expanding cultural infrastructure of the city allowed for a certain level of internal diversity.

Slow, restricted, but persistent Ukrainisation in Lviv made the dissident movements of the 1980s a development that was not so much against all odds as many would prefer to think today. Urbanisation, the expanding higher education scene and the flourishing of Ukrainian language teaching and publishing allowed for horizontal and vertical mobility for Ukrainians in a way they lacked in interwar Poland and to the extent that was well beyond Habsburg-era developments. Due to its proximity to the Polish border, Lviv was also the main source of smuggled Western goods for other Ukrainian cities (Zhuk 2010: 49) and was comparatively less isolated than many other urban centres. Perestroika brought about the release of the imprisoned local intelligentsia.[40] Many of them followed Baltic and Polish examples of resistance and embarked on nationalist mobilisation, increasing pressure to bring the Greek Catholic Church back. The major democratic movement, Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy was prominent in Lviv and it was their circles who peacefully

[40] Possibly the most important among them were members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, including Myroslav Marynovych, Viacheslav Chornovil; intellectuals Bohdan and Mykhailo Horyn who were involved in distributing *samvydav* literature and whose radical stance to leave the Union rather than seek reforms was formative among Lviv dissidents.

marched to the St. George Cathedral in late 1989 to protest for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC). Gradually the movement gained prominence in Kyiv and stated independence as its main goal.

During the 1990 elections to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, all 24 posts representing the Lviv oblast, were won by the Rukh (Szporluk 2000: 299-300).[41] Democratic political forces, together with increasingly large fractions of the Ukrainian Communist Party, who favoured greater autonomy from Moscow, were instrumental in preparing the proclamation of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian SSR in July 1990, and in paving the road to the subsequent declaration of independence on 24 August 1990. The eventual dissolution of the USSR still came as a surprise for most locals, but a new, vocal political elite was in formation, that was to become influential in the next decade.

Independence, revolutions, war

In newly independent Ukraine, Lviv was quick to implement an ideological inversion of the Soviet period. The local council was the first to fly the yellow and blue flag officially, and between 1990 and 1993 hundreds of streets were renamed (Susak and Hrytsak 2003: 152) and Lenin statues removed, uniquely early in the Ukrainian context (Amar 2011: 375).42 Incidentally, I lived on a street named after the head of the Nachtigall Batallion, right next to the Stepan Bandera Avenue, near the Heroes of UPA Street.

Although the country was going through an overwhelming economic recession throughout the 1990s, curtailing substantial development plans, symbolic policies and measures that required less resources continued in the first decade of the 'transition'. New departments in the restructured City Council, such as the Department of Civic Participation, signalled a readiness to engage in comprehensive transformation to liberal democracy, heralding civil society as a means of democratisation. The consolidation of Lviv as a heritage city by the application for UNESCO World Heritage status—granted in 1998—was in conceptualised as a return to 'civilisation', as de-Sovietisation. The local government was an intermediary in both renaming the city's streets, and the UNESCO application; in the former case, the City Council had commissioned a group of historians to decide over the new street names, in the latter it backed the Western Ukrainian Restoration Project in developing the application and pushing it to the national level. I discuss the latter in Chapter 4.

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41 The second strongest electoral base was in Kyiv and Kharkiv (Szporluk 2000). The Democratic Block, of which Rukh was a powerful constituent, won a third of the votes in the country.

42 Lenin statues were removed first in Chervonohrad, Ternopil, Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk, all in Galicia. There were instances of vandalisation in Eastern Ukrainian cities too, but the definitive transformation of cityscapes would only happen after the 2013-4 revolution.

The 1989 reinstitution of the Greek Catholic Church, with its seat in Lviv,[43] and the accompanying religious revival brought a significant change to the role religious belonging and institutional politics plays in local politics. The UGCC had been banned, deemed a hostile political agent both because of the general communist hostility to religion, and because this particular church was seen as a link to the Vatican and a bearer of bourgeois attitudes. Another element in this hostility had been the association between the church and Ukrainian nationalists: eliminating the UGCC was seen as a tool to lessen the institutional infrastructure where nationalist ideas could be held, expressed and transmitted.

Whereas the ban made it impossible for locals to openly include their church affiliation in their articulations of the local, Western Ukrainian identity, after 1989, the church became a powerful symbolic resource in casting regional identity. After Ukraine gained its independence, the anti-Soviet legacy of the UGGC was deemed so unequivocal, and the connection with the Vatican so powerful a normative base—in lines with the key vectors of Galician identity, and a distinctly Ukrainian element thereof—, that the visibility and importance of the Church soared up rapidly. Apart from four Roman Catholic churches and a number of former church buildings that house secular institutions, most of the Roman Catholic built environment has been turned Greek Catholic. The St. George Cathedral was the seat of the Major Archbishop of the UGCC until 2005, when the seat was moved to Kyiv, but it remains one of the most important nationalist and religious landmarks of the city, and part of the UNESCO World Heritage site.

The establishment of the Ukrainian Catholic University (UCU) in 2002 further strengthened the near-hegemonic position of the Greek catholic intelligentsia.[44] Some members of the local political elite are also linked to the UGCC, at least through the means of soft power: professionals I worked with often joked about the impossibility of winning the local elections without the support of the Greek Catholic Church. During my fieldwork, high-profile civil servants and academics were fired or threatened with losing their jobs after making critical comments about the Church both in the City Council and in UCU.

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[43] Re-legalisation was facilitated by Gorbachev's meeting with Pope John Paul II; the Polish Solidarity movement had been campaigning in support of the UGCC throughout perestroika (Wilson 1997:235).

[44] The university is funded privately by an NGO whose head is the archbishop of the UGCC and it sees itself as a successor of Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytskyi's Greek Catholic Theological Academy. The unparalleled quality of the campus and the research facilities, and comparatively good salaries make UCU an influential player in the public life of Lviv well beyond the religiously inclined, as many academics choose to work there in spite of their different opinions. This, considering the mild pressure UCU exerts on its staff and students, pushes public debate further to the Greek Catholic direction.

The 1990s were spent in a fragile balance between Europe and Russia in Ukraine (Portnov 2010: 101-2; Wilson 2002: 290).45 The ten years-long presidency of Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005) was characterised by a strategic centrism, with provisional steps made towards EU association, a partnership treaty with Russia, and a partnership agreement with the NATO. This was often described as "an ideology without an ideology", an unsuccessful promotion of managerial, pragmatic rather than value-based politics (Kulyk 2010: 320-1). The constitutional consolidation of the country in 1996 enshrined Ukraine's neutrality, and perpetuated an ambiguous balance between presidential and parliamentary power. The strong centralisation of power (Kasianov 2008:45), the increasingly tight hold on media and the growing number of corruption scandals eventually amounted to a movement against Kuchma.

In the ideological vacuum, the emerging opposition was led by Viktor Yushchenko, a banker from a Ukrainian-speaking northern area. His movement increasingly relied on national-democratic political networks and around the 60th anniversary of the establishment of UPA, they began to draw history to the centre of their campaign, promoting the Rukh version: the Soviet era was recast as oppression, the short-lived republics and insurgent nationalist movements became the key points of identification. This naturally meant that the opposition gained a chiefly Western Ukrainian electoral base.[46]

The 2004 elections were a turning point for Ukraine and the position of Lviv within it. Suspecting election fraud behind the victory of Viktor Yanukovych, a pro-Russian politician, part of a powerful clan of Donbas oligarchs, Ukrainians took to the streets rallying for a repeat runoff election, a mass movement that became known as the Orange Revolution.[47] Yushchenko's nationalist opposition with history as a core ideological basis therefore became positioned against images of corruption and greed. Viktor Yushchenko won the ensuing elections, ending the bi-directional limbo of the 1990s, moving towards pro-EU foreign politics and a new style of

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45 The political manoeuvring that aimed at equidistance between Europe and Russia is often termed multi-vector policy, especially in the political science literature. Although here I concentrate on the cultural and memory political aspects of this limbo, it is worth noting that this geopolitical balancing was overarching, affecting security and energy politics especially. Ukraine was not the only country in the former Soviet orbit that engaged in this kind of politics: Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan all went through these stages at certain times. For an overview see Gnedina (2015). That realpolitik undergirds or at least corresponds to cultural and identity politics is important in situating the latter.

46 Though eventually Yushchenko became an icon of nationalist memory politics and the chief advancer of a Western Ukrainian nationalist approach for the whole country, Yushchenko only started distancing himself from Kuchma in 2002. Kasianov presents both Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party and the other main opposition party, Yulia Tymoshenko's Motherland party (*Batkivshchyna*) as electoral projects, derivatives of the Kuchma-regime, lacking any ideological core (2008: 228-9). That this is true is evident from the fact that the opposition movement was eventually joined by the socialist and the communist parties as well, beyond *Nasha Ukraiina* and *Batkivshchyna*. The electoral fraud and the Orange Revolution nevertheless reconfigured the importance of ideological content in politics in Ukraine to an extent that these initial conditions are all but forgotten now.

47 A good English language summary of the 2004 events is Wilson's *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (2005a).

memory politics that best represented the experiences of Western Ukrainians, where his electoral base lay.

The identity politics of Lviv, which constituted an internal extreme before, with its public veneration of OUN and UPA, an unambiguous European orientation and the dominance of Ukrainian language in education and administration, now became the norm promoted nationally. Yushchenko opened the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance (UINR), headed by a young historian from Lviv, Volodymyr Viatrovych. The UINR was busy elevating Ukrainian suffering (especially the Holodomor) and glorious, self-sacrificial resistance (mostly of UPA) to key position in the mould of national unity (Rudling 2013: 230-1).

Yushchenko's bid for a second term failed during the elections in 2010, but his rule left a legacy of 'heroes' and open anti-Sovietism behind, which in Lviv meant a further mainstreaming of the nationalist discourse within and without the public sphere. In 2010, when pro-Russian national politics and the disillusionment with Yushchenko led to public frustration in Western Ukraine, the far right Svoboda (Freedom) party[48] rose to unforeseen prominence, if only ephemerally. Svoboda members filled up the culture department of the Lviv City Council and cultural politics was pushed further towards ethno-nationalism that the more moderate mayor could barely balance.

Post-Orange Lviv elected Andriy Sadovyi as its mayor in 2006. Sadovyi was member of Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party until he set out to create his own party, Self-reliance (Samopomich)[49] in 2012. He was reelected twice and still is in power after more than a decade, that brought intense change and a new urban strategy. Under his leadership, the City Council became filled with junior civil servants, a welcome development in the eyes of many, clientelism in the eyes of others. It was during his reign that key institutional divisions solidified and deepened in the cultural- and the heritage scene; I will elaborate on those developments in Chapters 3-4. Sadovyi promotes local autonomy in a way that is often at cross purposes with Kyiv, a position that has led to tensions between local and national governing bodies. His position and ability to promote a consistent line of action in the city anchor his leadership firmly after his last reelection in October 2015, so much so, that amidst ongoing political turmoil, localist and regionalist voices are increasingly voiced in Lviv. Many prefer efficient—distinctly Galician—local governance dictated by the local electorate, to a politics informed by and clustered under larger scale national strategies.

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[48] The party was founded in 1993 as the Socialist-Nationalist Party of Ukraine and it went through a series of cosmetic adjustments that toned down the explicit far-right content in their public materials, which allowed them to present themselves as an alternative to Yushchenko after 2005.

[49] The name evokes the credit unions and cooperatives of early 20th century Galicia. These allowed the local population to pool resources and became highly popular in the turn of the century. Later these were demolished by the Soviet authorities (Subtelny 1988:437-8). Opting for this name consciously builds on this legacy, that is local, bottom-up and anti-Soviet, and being so provides the party with a concise historic reference point.

However, the rise of the local coexists with a major reorientation of Ukrainian politics in the past few years. The Ukraine I arrived in was not post-Orange Ukraine: it was right in the aftermath of yet another revolution, and many of my informants were conscripted to fight in the war. In November 2013, president Yanukovych refused to sign the EU Association Agreement, Ukrainians took the streets again, this time in a popular protest movement that became known as the Euromaidan. Yanukovych fled the country in February 2014, after the conflict escalated to violent clashes between police and protestors, involving more than a hundred deaths of protesters and the police. This opened the way for the former opposition to take control of the presidency. The Euromaidan drew on an unexpectedly resilient and diverse crowd, overcoming ethnic, linguistic and regional divisions (Hrytsak 2014, Onuch 2014, Yekelchyk 2015), similarly to the Orange Revolution, but eventually in a more decisive manner, partly due to the subsequent events.

The easternmost region of Ukraine, the heavily industrialised, politically pro-Russian Donbas was less enthusiastic about the prospect of EU ascension, and anti-Euromaidan protests soon escalated to separationist war, secretly backed by the Russian army.[50] Russian anxieties over NATO expansion led to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, where they are in de facto control ever since. All sides of this conflict heavily rely on historic materials they posit as antecedents, locking the conflict in an uneasy proximity with cultural- and memory politics both in Ukraine and in Russia. By 2015 the front lines froze and the conflict came to a halt. Nevertheless, a deep reorganisation of the ethnic and civic belonging that undergird the framing of political preferences has started, spurring up a new discourse about internal front lines. In a paradoxical fashion, the ongoing war is now seen to have given the long-needed impetus for civic national belonging (e.g. Hrytsak 2014, Riabchuk 2015). It is difficult to assess the long term feasibility of this transformation and its bearings on Ukraine.

During my fieldwork, the newly mainstream position of pro-EU, Ukrainian speaking elites was a recent development. The war made it feel like it was a decisive shift, a place of no return. The 2019 presidential elections were a cold shower in Lviv: over 75% of voters opted for Volodymyr Zelenskyi, an openly Russian-speaking former comedian who, contrary to the 'one nation, one language' campaign of the ruling party, sought compromise — and peace. Galicia was the only area that voted against him. Had I done fieldwork after 2019, it might have sounded more outlandish to claim to set a trend for the whole country. This thesis, then, captures a moment when war propelled certain ambitions, and issues around heritage and history switched to the highest gear: my informants sought to bring historic change, and only time will tell whether this will have bearings beyond the local.

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[50] The details of Russian involvement are hotly contested and difficult to assess, but its existence has been confirmed by many reports, for an overview see Robinson 2016. Recent monographs aiming to summarise the Ukraine crisis in English are Sakwa 2016, Wilson 2014 and Yekelchyk 2015. All are written for broader audiences and merge historical summaries with systemic political science analysis.

The polarisation of geopolitics together with the pressure it exerts on ambiguous identities, further consolidates a form of Ukrainian identity politics hitherto more prominent in Galicia. The past half century saw the urbanisation of the Western Ukrainian population, altering the former clichéd division between the Russified, urban east and the rural, Ukrainian west. With the emergence of a Ukrainian Lviv, an urban centre in the western half of the country, a westward shift occurred in the political terrain of Ukraine (Szporluk 2000: 312-4). Besides Kyiv, it is increasingly Lviv, rather than the former capital, Kharkiv that shapes the cultural and political outlook of the country.

Memory politics and historiography are major fields where this shift is played out. As such, they have been appropriated by protesters, governments and the broader public in often messy and charged ways. Amidst war anxieties, backed by the national consensus, academic historians are often complicit in blurring boundaries between the professional and personal. Post-Maidan political tendencies allowed for a nationwide mainstreaming of a local take on history, at least in the—often slightly self-inflated—view of preservation professionals in Lviv. Historical knowledge is written and disseminated against this background and its contestations stem from these current specificities. The multiethnic past and its far from simple legacies need to be dealt with in post-independence Lviv in the cultural sphere, academia and politics alike. In the next chapter, I explore the way these debates are embedded in broader political debates, tracing how the above outlined history, with its points of convulsion orchestrate contemporary negotiations of cultural politics, commemoration or urban development.

II. PUBLIC HISTORY:
SUMMONING THE PAST IN A BESIEGED PRESENT

This chapter traces how history assumes public significance in Lviv. History often gives a handle on discussions about Ukraine's current cultural or geopolitical tendencies. Discursive parallel-making is crucial in heated debates about the Holocaust that merge with discussions about Jews' participation in the Maidan, and concerns around IDPs are tied into debates around the legacy of Galician multiethnic tolerance or the contemporary 'Europeanisation' of Ukraine. In some circles during my fieldwork, soldiers were seen as heroes who were to enter a national canon in need of exemplars. Such discussions happened in private conversations, but also in professional contexts like academic history and adjacent disciplines, in public administration or NGOs.

Concerns about problematic pages of anything that could be rendered part of Ukrainian national history permeate both debates among the intelligentsia, and broader Ukrainian politics. As I showed in the previous chapter, the history of Lviv offers numerous points of engagement with violence and perpetration. In this chapter I demonstrate how history becomes a major arena for what political theorist Wendy Brown calls the culturalisation of politics (2006: 150ff), whereby political and economic questions are increasingly framed in terms of cultural and historical difference. History becomes a proxy arena where various political themes are negotiated. The language of these debates is strikingly resilient.

Conflicts around history provide the discursive contours of the heritage field: various professions across many areas of expertise related to preservation and commemoration share these debates and their stakes. Heritage work inscribes realigned narratives about the past on the cityscape and its focal points: monuments and heritage sites. Contested historical issues are inseparable from heritage work, a key process through which history is curated. The experience of participating in discussions that concern the public role of history, however, is different for those who write journal articles and those who sit on the committees that evaluate architectural tenders, those in state institutions and those employed by private or foreign organisations. The social, ideological and institutional divisions I describe here will return throughout the subsequent chapters, but they are rarely articulated as clearly as in the context I focus on here, a lecture room among historians. This makes historical debates a good entry point from where these broader stratification could be unpacked.

Apart from divergent professional dispositions, age, gender, or political choices, another factor is crucial in understanding expert debates in Ukraine. History, similarly to virtually all professional fields in the humanities and the social sciences in Ukraine, was not left intact by the collapse of the USSR, and with it, the entire infrastructures that granted legitimacy to this kind of knowledge. For an institutionally developed profession (with its typical career trajectories, canons and a certain mandate), such a crisis, threatening both the pragmatics and the symbolic aspects of

knowledge production, could take a long time to overcome. For professionals striving for recognition, recasting the boundaries of their area of expertise, its professional jurisdiction and responsibilities, or its role in society writ large is a key instrument in claims to public legitimacy (Abbott 1988). In a way, post-socialist or post-transition professional fields could be seen, as Vargha (2010: 203) observed in the context of coexisting generations of advertisers in Hungary, as 'dynamic relations moved forward by contestation of the field's relevant capital'. This will be spelled out in the next chapters, when I zoom onto various segments of the heritage field.

Instead of mapping out the entire field of academic history along with its contestations, here I focus on how a specific moment — wartime — opens possibilities for historians to bolster the position of their discipline by redrawing the boundaries of critical discourse. This focus serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, understanding institutional and ideological segmentation, the way concerns of professional conduct, nationalist or critical agendas permeate the understanding and writing of history will help me to contextualise divisions in the heritage scene in the following chapters. On the other hand, it demonstrates the way stakes are shared across disciplines, and why therefore it makes sense to conceptualise the heritage scene in Lviv as a single field in which historians, conservators, architects and others are brought together by the objects that they contest and discuss. I show how history goes public, how certain historians aim to have a decisive say in questions around monuments or influence cultural policy, arguing that the absence of institutional professionalisation of curators, conservators, and — until recently — cultural managers allows for more traditional disciplines like history and architecture to lead the public discourse on these questions. Similarly to Guha-Thakurta's observations about the institutions of art in colonial and post-colonial India (2004), the heritage field in Ukraine comes to be constituted within the scope of several changing disciplines.

I will trace the fragmentation of the field of public history paying attention to a key contestation: the heritage of vanished populations. Ukraine is a recently sovereign state with fragmented socio-historic experiences, where affirmative nationalism retains prominence, yet where the "material and discursive afterlives" of others (Richardson 2008: 6) persist and demand being reflected upon. This is especially true in Lviv where Ukrainians were a minority until the end of World War II.

Ukrainian, Jewish and Polish commemoration of historic trauma related to inter-ethnic conflict are all linked to different issues of international relations and cultural diplomacy, draw on different sources of funding, and are imbued with a different political weight domestically and as part of transnational projects. The intentions and legitimacy of donors and funders of these commemoration initiatives themselves are part of heritage debates. Notably, besides the state itself, Ukrainian rehabilitationism is supported by parts of the Ukrainian diaspora in Germany and North America; Polish commemoration is important for Poland, especially the Ministry of

Culture, a key sponsor; Jewish projects are taken up by the European Union, Germany, and the US, and various Jewish international NGOs. Different takes on history, thematic foci and methodological approaches are considered appropriate in local departments, different international centres. To complicate things further, currently popular 'multicultural Galician' local self-identifications, which stress the 'European,' non-Soviet characteristics of the city, refer to an era of ethnic and religious coexistence. This means that even actors taking local patriotic, ethnic nationalist positions in disputes about heritage need to accommodate a multicultural past in some form, if they are to demonstrate their distinctness from 'Soviet Ukraine'.

The chapter will take a debate about a contentious monument as its starting point. The monument venerates (Ukrainian) Cossack leaders,[51] whose deeds are central in contemporary narratives of nation formation,[52] but who also massacred Jews and Poles. That they — being Orthodox — also killed many Greek Catholic Ruthenians is now overshadowed by their alleged contribution to the Ukrainian cause, to the extent that in a Lviv museum Greek Catholic churches coexist with costumed 'Cossacks' who reenact traditional life. The debate will serve as a narrative lead to bring together issues around public history and decommunisation, which will help me show the centrality of legacies of ethnic discord (and especially Jewish pogroms) in Ukraine. After sketching out the debate, I will expand on Ukrainian historiography and its divisions, in order to then show how recent state interventions have shaped the publicity of history. I will tie the ethnographic example to questions around the stratification of post-socialist professional fields.

"Both sides" of a Jewish-Ukrainian debate

In autumn 2015, soon after my arrival in Lviv, the planned erection of a monument in a town some 400 km away divided the opinions of the city's intellectual circles. Similarly to Lviv, the town of Uman where this monument was to be located, is a hotspot of memory politics. Ukrainian, Jewish (and Polish) historical experiences intersect in the city (Magocsi 1996: 279-83) in

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[51] Cossacks were a mostly Orthodox, self-organised frontiersmen who inhabited the sparsely populated steppe territories of today's Eastern Ukraine and the Don area in today's Russia between the 16-18th centuries. In the Zaporizhzhia area they were vassals of Poland-Lithuania, with restricted autonomy. In 1648-57 they rebelled under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and formed an independent state, the Cossack Hetmanate (*Hetmanshchyna*). They were supported by the Orthodox peasantry and committed many atrocities against the Jewish, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic population. The state later fell under Russian control (Plokhy 2001, 2012). Uman was on the western edge of the Hetmanate and was quickly retaken by Poland. The uprisings in question were against the resumed Polish control, and yet again they involved massacres of roughly 2000 Jewish, Roman and Greek Catholic civilians (Magocsi 1996:296-300).

[52] A main reason for their importance is to contradict the Russian imperial vision that saw the territory as a creation of Catherine II (Sysyn 1991: 861). This is also linked to publicly held opinions about Cossacks as the moral ancestors of Ukrainians: attributed collective values such as democratic self-organisation, the love of justice and the centrality of sovereignty offer a moral anchorage for many today. These values are also compatible with the other crucial moral antecedent, peasant Ukrainian society.

ways that frequently lead to conflicting practices of commemoration. The relevant event, in the discussions I witnessed, was the Cossack victory in 1768 in a battle in Uman, which concluded an uprising of peasants and Cossacks against the ruling Polish nobility and their mostly Jewish middlemen. The uprising, known as Koliyivshchyna, claimed around 2000 Jewish, Catholic and Greek Catholic civilian casualties (*ibid*). The planned monument was an equestrian statue of the rebel leaders Maksym Zalizniak and Ivan Honta.

Cossacks play a central role in Ukrainian nationalist historiography. Their autonomous self-rule and armed struggle against the Polish and Russian states are often described as a part of a continuous strife for Ukrainian national sovereignty. For many, their conflicts with the neighbouring states epitomise the fate of Ukraine before the 1991 independence (Plokhy 2012). In the Soviet historiographic paradigm of class struggle, Cossacks were generally as actors in a class struggle against arbitrary feudal domination; some of this sentiment prevails today, often without awareness of its origins. Cossacks serve as an *ethnic memory anchor* (Yekelchyk 2015:99): their popularity is a result of retrospective ethnic and national identification, whereby they are turned into antecedents of contemporary ethnic Ukrainians. The Cossack legacy, however, is far from unproblematic, as the very example of Uman demonstrates.

The town is also important for Jews. Rabbi Nachman of Breslov, the founder of Breslov Hasidism, died and was buried in Uman, his grave being a site of pilgrimage — only interrupted in the seven Soviet decades — since the 18th century. The mass presence of Hasidic Jews during their annual pilgrimage has recently prompted several incidents with locals, right wing protesters and competing Jewish groups (Akao 2007). At the same time, it remains an important annual event in terms of the local economy and diplomatic ties with Israel. Crowds annually arrive from Israel to celebrate Jewish New Year and ensure good fortune for the future.

The Koliyivshchyna monument was a grassroots initiative, funded by local residents. Commemorating rebels who massacred Jews and Poles, the memorial, located near to the Hasidic Jewish pilgrimage site, presaged tensions with pilgrims and diplomatic unease with Israel and Poland.

In Uman like in Lviv, Jewish memory was a step removed from the Koliyivshchyna, quite literally: the most important ongoing project of Jewish commemoration, the Golden Rose synagogue was to be a memorial site that would directly address Ukrainians' role as perpetrators in the Holocaust, just across from a square named after the Koliyivshchyna. The irony of this spatial proximity was not lost on many involved in the project.

The first of its kind in the city, the Space of Synagogues struck a raw nerve for many among the city's intelligentsia, especially since municipal funds, and funds from the German

Federal State were involved.[53] For some among those with nationalist inclinations the synagogue memorial was a sign of the nation's memory being hijacked by foreigners. In contrast, in Uman the Ukrainian presence was being reasserted symbolically by locals themselves. The memorial in Uman therefore served as a reference point for discussions about the synagogue memorial plans in Lviv, and it regularly surfaced in conversations wherever I went.

In the week leading to the opening ceremony in Uman, in November 2015, a well known historian of early-modern Ukraine, Taras Chukhlib delivered a talk in Lviv about the monument, promising an "impartial, scientific lecture" that could soothe the unease around its installation and elaborate the position of "both sides of four historical memories (*sic)*." Chukhlib was a prominent public intellectual, a specialist of Cossack history, the head of the Cossack Research Institute and member of the National Academy of Sciences. He had also authored twelve popular history books on Ukrainian military history, Gogol, the Donbas and other themes. He ran a Youtube channel where many of his public talks were uploaded. This time his talk was held in a seminar room in the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy and several summaries were subsequently published online.

The caution with which Chukhlib's announcements and publicity materials specified the 'impartial' and 'scientific' character of the talk hinted at the proximity between historiography and politics that the lecture was supposed to overcome, or at least temporally bracket out. I accompanied two Eastern Ukrainians to this event: a historian, Olena, from Kharkiv and a Jewish student of Soviet history, Sasha from Luhansk. Both had moved to Lviv recently, Olena for a research job and Sasha escaping his war-torn hometown, where he was not safe as a pro-Ukrainian activist. Their presence promised to challenge Chukhlib's approach, which was well-known for its ethno-nationalist stance, so I expected witnessing a debate split around the use of divergent conceptual frames and norms of research ethics.

The event gathered an audience of about thirty people—predominantly Chukhlib's pupils, colleagues and some local devotees of Cossacks. The lecture itself was preceded and followed by small talk and senior colleagues exchanging their newest publications. Referring to Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch and the Annales historians, Chukhlib started with stressing the need to understand the past in its difference, without retroactively applying our ethical judgements to it. Violence was not the same in the 18th century as today. He therefore stepped up against those, like the Kyiv historian Natalia Yakovenko,[54] who 'judged' the Cossacks: Yakovenko questioned history

[53] Chapter 7 focuses on the story of the Golden Rose synagogue and the divisions within local Jewish and gentile communities. Many of the protagonists in this chapter will return there and in the chapters in-between.

[54] Yakovenko, a graduate of Lviv University, is a professor at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, the most prestigious Ukrainian university. Historians and students I spoke to unanimously said she was the most prominent historian of early modern Ukraine, and I saw her books in many people's libraries at home, even in those who did not have a special attachment to history. She was on the board of the Ministry of Education, involved in the reform of history textbooks in the early 2000-s.

textbooks' practice of depicting Cossacks as role models for young Ukrainians. Chucklib's concern was mostly about negative depictions: he did not specify whether he had comparable issues with overtly positive depictions of historical events or personalities.

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In her work, Yakovenko has stressed the mob aspect of the Koliyivshchyna uprising, also emphasising that it was anachronistic to attribute the goal of achieving a Ukrainian sovereign state to the Cossacks (e.g. Yakovenko 1997). For Chukhlib this meant that Yakovenko has crossed on "the other side of the barricade", supporting Polish or Jewish nationalist historiography, or *horribile dictu,* continuing Soviet-era explanatory methods. He found Yakovenko's satirical comments outrageous, especially her claim that there was no use in glorifying "homeless and rough people". For Chukhlib, the prominence of class explanations that Yakovenko relied on made her assessment 'Soviet'. Her critique was as much about the social composition of the Cossacks as about the usage of their story in school textbooks. Chukhlib explained that he thought Yakovenko's arguments about their class backgrounds was a simple lie, the second a proof of an anti-Ukrainian bias. By this moment it became clear that for Chukhlib, "both sides of four historical memories" did not refer to methodological alternatives: what he meant were contrasted nationalist perspectives. Methodology, for him, could be right or wrong, and sides biased towards certain events, relevant for their respective countries. Neither called for debate.

After positioning himself this way, Chukhlib detailed key events of the uprising, and placed them in the wider context of Cossack resistance and religious violence of the time. He did not explicitly address the memorial: facts were expected to speak for themselves. What he did mention though, was that the number of Jewish and Polish victims was often overestimated "several hundred times" and that the massacre's brutality did not quite stand out from contemporary events. These points tacitly conveyed that the monument would (or should) not pose a substantial threat to Jewish-Ukrainian or Polish-Ukrainian moral rapprochement, since the problematic aspects of the event it depicts are less severe than opponents would have it. He also added that "class aspects" were not enough to explain the uprising, which was instead a "shining example of social and national liberation". He did not talk about the monument itself, but the way he related history made his position evident.

When Chukhlib finished his talk, Olena, with whom I had come to the lecture, challenged him: "The past is not just a matter of science and objectivity", she said, "but it is used with a purpose to create a self-image for the community today and for the future. It is sort of a model for the development of certain forms of behaviour or for respecting some values for the future". So should the values this monument conveys be the values for a future Ukraine? And what are these values anyway? With this remark Olena immediately pushed the discussion away from factual nitty-gritty to the underlying issue Chukhlib had avoided addressing altogether. Her point touched on similar concerns about the role of school textbooks that Chukhlib mentioned—and his reply was not too different from what he had said about Yakovenko.

Responding, he acknowledged that historians had a role and responsibility in developing blueprints for future attitudes. He started to enthusiastically explain Ukraine's destiny of warfare, due to its the lack of natural borders. War was and is inevitable, he claimed: in the course of his scientific career he could barely find a single historical moment without warfare on Ukrainian territory. Naturally, he did not predict these conditions to change. "We must be prepared for this [future] war. Why do people put up monuments for military leaders? To show their generation, to show that there were times when we fought well. And we will, in the future, fight well again." Sensing the implicit point Olena was hinting at, he asked whether it was not rightful for "ordinary Ukrainians" to erect such monuments, especially when Jews already "have the right to pray for their Tsalek [sic]" on the site.

By this point it had become obvious that the pretext of the discussion was in fact the ongoing war in the Donbas, which, in his view, made it perfectly legitimate for history to be of service to the nation's current needs, especially since both parties agreed that history could not possibly refrain from its 'non-scientific and non-objective' function. Again, like the schoolchildren whose need for role models Chukhlib defended against Yakovenko, soldiers had needs that called for an affective use of history. The active parallel-making between Cossacks and soldiers fighting in the Donbas was yet another example of cherrypicking: when it came to pogrom and violence, the alterity of history was to be emphasised, while historical 'victory was to directly inspire the present as an exemplar.

When the discussion proceeded towards the slight outmodedness of erecting monuments with equestrian statues, Chukhlib could not hold his opinion back. He said:

> You know what I would erect as a monument? I would erect a monument with a laptop, you know, because they are weapons of the present. This kind of weapon, is especially a weapon for historians, it is a weapon of an informational-psychological war. It should be for everyone, we have to be creative, we have to write down our own [views], to distribute and influence, for...well, I am not the first to say this. First human brain was won over, first the minds of people in Donetsk, in areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, and then

came the troops and they raked us. But first they have won mentally. So, *pani* Olena, [when] they win mentally, whose side will you take? Please.

Before Olena could even respond, her professional credentials were already being discussed in the audience. Was she a "real historian" anyway? A senior historian scolded her for thinking in abstract terms, such as memory politics, and stated that such entities ("ideograms") do not exist in the world. Real historians think through concrete examples, he insisted, and so Olena should declare whether she agreed that the rebel leaders Honta and Zalizniak were heroes, and then simply explain what kind of statue she wanted specifically.

The discussion about factual details and sources was resumed and Olena could not argue herself out of the position of the traitor. Had she explicitly answered whether she thought Honta and Zalizniak were heroes, she would have been locked in a stalemate position: denial would have cast her out of the national consensus, depriving her of a legitimate position from where she could speak, while agreeing would have left the very framework of heroes and villains unchanged, classifying her potential points as minor cases of hairsplitting. It was impossible to move the debate to a meta-level, so everybody left without their assumptions having been challenged.

Besides the 'polemic', the event was a routine exercise of scholarly work for local historians, the likes of which I often attended. Their talks and workshops usually engaged with difficult topics—most often themes of interethnic violence against Jews and Poles. Occasionally they attempted to set the record straight about the Soviet past. In a way, these events demonstrated that patriotic circles were reflective as well, contrary to the accusations of more critical historians. A number of times historians explicitly reminded me of their work about the violence and pogroms, asking whether, upon seeing this, I agreed that accusations about Ukrainians being 'fascist' were mistaken.

References to World War II were ubiquitous and debates about the extent, meaning and consequences of Ukrainian collaboration with the invading German army were endless. In many respects Chukhlib's talk could have been about the Bandera monument in Lviv or a statue of any other 'hero' with a dubious interethnic record: the arguments and the underlying concerns would have been the same, and, as it happened here, they would have overshadowed the historic specificities in question. During such events historians often used 'facts' and 'objective knowledge' to combat opponents (representatives of the groups in question, or views attributed to 'liberals' and/or foreigners).They frequently made use of lateral comparisons, demonstrating that in Poland, Germany or elsewhere the criticised practice has its legitimate — European! — parallels, in case the very framework of their work was questioned. Like Michael Lempert's Tibetan Buddhist monks, patriotic historians anticipated public scrutiny sourced from the internationally dominant, liberal and secular norms of debate (2012a, 2012b). They articulated their reprimand as

a response to those norms, often through turning its concepts or rhetorics upside down, appropriating them for their own purposes.

There is a lot to dissect in this vignette about the arguments nationalist and critical historians use against one another, as well as professional ethics they adhere to, all premised on the ways politics encircles the disciplinary space. I will first address the idea of public history and its relationship to professional historiography, to then move towards explicit state interventions and their broader context.

Figure 2.1. Taras Chukhlib reads his lecture. Author's photo

Ukrainian historiography and public history

Between nationalist emancipation and transnational history writing

Ukrainian independence was a long-term result of the disintegration of the Habsburg and Romanov Empires, and of the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result of this, Ukrainian historiography is characterised by post-imperial—some would say post-colonial (Grabowitz 1995, von Hagen 1995, Kuzio 2002)—conditions.

Before independence, Ukrainian topics were dealt with within national and imperial, notably Polish and Russian histories (Kuzio 2006, Magocsi 1996: 12-24, Wilson 1998: 279-310, etc). Subsequently, the country being a Soviet republic, Ukrainian history needed to adhere to the framework of the overarching history of the USSR. It was heavily censored and limited by a prescribed Marxist-Leninist, materialist dialectic explanatory framework that presumed Ukrainian inferiority compared to Russia.[55] Therefore, Soviet Ukrainian historiography was preoccupied with questions of class and narratives that emphasised the shared genealogy of Eastern Slavic peoples (Wanner 1998, Risch 2011);[56] topics of Ukrainian-Soviet/Russian antagonisms were impossible to address.[57] In international academia, this meant that Ukrainians were branched together with 'stateless people of Eastern Europe' and their history was researched within Russian- or Soviet studies departments.

When it was written against these dominant narratives, Ukrainian historiography was often intertwined with nationalist movements that used their work to argue for a long-standing, distinct identity and a separate history, in order to buttress independence movements and to cement political claims. This reaches back to the turn of the 20th century and the historian Mykhailo

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[55] This inferiority was expressed within the broader Soviet ideology of brotherly peoples (*brats'ki narody*). For Ukraine, until the early 1950s this meant that Ukrainians sought compromise with Russians as the 'lesser evil' compared to Poles, Ottomans or others. After 1952 the new party line emphasised non-Russian ethnic groups' long-term desire to join Russia (Banerji 2008: 74, Schlegel 2016: 190) When Chukhlib spoke against depictions of Cossacks as a mob, he was gesturing towards this Soviet trajectory.

[56] In Galicia specifically, this meant redescribing the Polish and Habsburg period in terms of bourgeois nationalist oppression, the Union of Brest as a forced conversion, Ukrainian nationalist movements and guerrilla warfare as fascist collaborationism and the Holocaust as a tragedy of civilians rather than Jews specifically. The old Russophile Galician movement and the Dormition Brotherhood were favoured compared to Greek Catholic intellectual movements because of their Orthodoxy.

[57] Most notably these were the 1917-10 Civil War and short-lived independence, the 1932-3 famine and the activities of UPA and OUN during World War II. Events that were irrelevant from a Soviet perspective, such as the Polish-Ukrainian war in 1918 also belonged to this category.

Hrushevskyi (Plokhy 2005), who headed Ukraine's revolutionary parliament in 1917-20.[58] Characteristically, his historiographic position that claims the Kyiv Rus for Ukraine only and that plots a successive narrative towards independent statehood, has made it to school textbooks and popular media after independence. Emancipatory essentialism of this sort is to be understood as a contrastive political move; it is sustained by the ontological threat posited by persistent imperial discourses—in Ukraine's case, mainly Russian and to a lesser extent, Polish. In this respect, Ukrainian historiography has not ceased to be locked in such power disparities.

Independence did not translate Ukrainian claims of a millennium-long history to international consensus either within or without academia. The famous debate sparked by Mark von Hagen's essay 'Does Ukraine Have a History?' on the pages of the *Slavic Review* (1995) addressed the problem of hegemonic forms of historiography and emancipatory essentialism being hitherto the only voices of Ukrainian history. Von Hagen stressed that, precisely because of imperial divisions, Ukraine had been rendered invisible for international academia. Other than some figures on the fringes of Sovietology or Russian area studies in international academia, the sole group of scholars invested in the topic were Ukrainian diaspora historians in Canada and the United States,[59] whom von Hagen called "professional ethnics" (1995: 659). Those historians often leaned towards some degree of essentialism and were invested in corrective accounts and historical rehabilitation. This essentialism understands nations as organic entities in a Herderian fashion and disagrees with the constructivist emphasis on the discursive, ethnic and territorial boundary-making. Seeing independence as an opportunity when Ukrainian topics could gain momentum, and being concerned about the politics of diaspora nationalism, von Hagen urged for a corrective move. He called for new history writing that would turn the postcolonial condition of knowledge production into an asset, emphasising borderland identities and transnational connections.

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[58] Hrushevskyi is but the most visible figure in nationalist political activism and history writing, but the Ukrainian movement of the 19th itself was a diverse conglomerate of options both in the Habsburg territories and in the Russian Empire, where the Ukrainian orientation often crystallised late and only in response to oppressive acts (such as the 1867 Ems Ukaz that banned Ukrainian publication in the Russian Empire). Such policies often pushed it to become an option against pan-Slavic or pro-Russian positions. Literature that goes beyond teleological narratives in explaining the 19th century Ukrainian nationalist movement are e.g. Bilenky 2012, Hillis 2013, Sereda 2002, Zayarnyuk 2005. For an overview of 19th century Ukrainian historiography see Velychenko 1992.

[59] Several waves of emigration, predominantly from Western Ukrainian territories resulted in the formation of a significant diaspora in Canada and the US. The more recent waves mainly included anti-Soviet nationalists, many of whom took part in activities of OUN and UPA, or at least shared their nationalist sentiments (Satzewich 2003). These intellectuals set up the only significant academic infrastructure dedicated to Ukrainian studies before end of the Cold War—notably at Harvard, in Toronto, Alberta and Edmonton. Historians working in diaspora institutions usually maintained an anti-Soviet attitude and supported the mainstream consolidation of the ethno-nationalist canon (Hrytsak 2015, Himka 2005).

Many within Ukrainian academic history did take up von Hagen's challenge and produced critical works that appropriate anti-essentialist methodologies, focusing on various ethnic groups or borderlands, rethinking marxist paradigms especially in the field of social history.[60] Independence also helped to move beyond the nation as the telos and *raison d'être* of history writing. It seems that by now worries about Ukraine's post-imperial condition do not overwhelm disciplinary debates the way they did before.

However, during moments of political upheaval—e.g. around the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests—old cultural geographies have often been resurrected. Explanations return once again to Ukraine's alleged artificial existence or to the 'fragility' of Ukrainian identity (Portnov 2015), especially in international media and academia. Within Ukraine, this often translated into disproportionate focus on regional differences and the difficulties of bridging them. Regionalism reached its peak around the Orange Revolution and it was especially popular in Western Ukraine, where a sense of self-serving distinctness has a long tradition. Indeed, the 1918 declaration of a nationalist activist, according to which uniting "orderly Galicia" with Eastern Ukraine, a place "without national awareness, anarchised and bolshevised" was a leap in the dark (Tsehelskyi 1960, quoted by Amar 2015) could have been written after 1991. The largest public debated was kindled by Mykola Riabchuk's 2003 book *Two Ukraines: real boundaries, virtual wars* (*Dvi Ukrayiny: realni mezhi, virtualni viyny*). Inadvertent might this be, regionalist accounts share imperialist assumptions that point out the lack of a 'glue' that could hold such a recently emerged polity together.

The Maidan seems to have brought an end to regionalism in Ukrainian academia, or at least it terminated the debate. For many, within and without the country, the Maidan now appears a watershed, an unfortunate conflict that, with all its darker chapters and losses, still cemented civic political participation and lessened the division between Russian and Ukrainian speakers in the country (e.g. Gerasimov 2014, Hrytsak 2014, Marples 2015, Riabchuk 2015). It marks the end of lamentations about symbolic and geographic rifts, if sometimes only out of an awareness that any explorations of regional difference could symbolically play into the Donbas rebels' attempts to exploit the regional identity in the war. Whether this newly found cohesion is there to stay is difficult to assess now, but it certainly helped Ukrainian public discourse to move beyond the regionalist reductionism.[61]

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[60] The best overviews of the history writing of the past decades are Hrytsak 2015; Marples 2007 (esp. 17-30); Plokhy 2016b; Portnov 2010; and Yekelchyk 2011. Kasianov and Ther's collection (2009) assembled new voices from the transnational paradigm, Marples (2007) assessed nationalist historiography and, most recently, Plokhy's edited volume (2016a) brought together many approaches and included the question of teaching Ukrainian history. For an overview of Western academic historiography see Pyrah (2014).

[61] The academic discourse on regionalism runs parallel to public discourses about decentralisation. I will elaborate this especially in Chapter 4. Any attempt towards decentralisation has been framed as altogether distinct from federalist agendas. The coexistence of these discourses means there is likely influence between them, though this is difficult to trace.

The conclusions one takes home from the post-Maidan status quo are rather different for Ukrainian historians. Relevant as new developments in critical history are, they mostly concern a minority of Ukrainian historians, universities and cultural institutions. These scholars usually belong to the most visible and prestigious stratum of universities. Alongside their voices, hagiographic history writing prevails, supported by state funding and institutions. Serguiei Oushakine, analysing the rather similar case of Belarus, talks about the "retroactive creation of colonial subjectivity" (2013a: 308) by patriotic historians. For them, victimhood vis-a-vis neighbouring imperial powers is held up as proof of the nation's lacking historic agency. Agency and thereby responsibility are confined to the domain of heroic resistance, leaving the nation a colonial subject. Yet, contrary to South Asian subaltern positions, Oushakine sees post-Soviet coloniality to be less about stressing this confined agency, and more as an effort to underscore the totality of exploitation and erasure.

Nationalist historians are invested in demonstrating their former colonial position, since it allows for a selective take on historical legacies, and a cherrypicking of responsibilities, as we could see in Chukhlib's case. In this spirit, post-independence historiographic accounts in Lviv focus primarily on Soviet violence, often equated with contemporary 'Russian' aggression.[62] Accordingly, especially after Maidan, Ukrainian national politics has a tendency to marginalise the Soviet past and the Russian (speaking) minority, and to use Ukrainian victimhood as a legitimation for overlooking histories of Ukrainian perpetration. The reluctance to untangle these moral knots is reinforced by the salience of Russian claims—be they symbolic, economic or territorial, imagined or real. It is also aided by the virtual absence, and thereby lack of voice, of Jewish and Polish communities who could demand restitution.[63]

The Ukrainian Institution of National Remembrance (UINR) and, the Directive on Decommunisation strengthened this position further. School textbooks followed a similar, essentialist take, which might be a smooth exercise in Galicia, but poses difficulties in eastern Ukraine (Fournier 2012, Korostelina 2011, Richardson 2008). Works similar to Taras Chukhlib's are accessible to wide audiences and their voices coexist with progressives in the numerous

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[62] Brushing over the difference is itself a helpful way of reformatting the Soviet past and excluding the compatibility of a Soviet *and* Ukrainian identity.

[63] Without legitimising the one-sidedness of Western Ukrainian memory culture, it is worth noting that because population loss and deportations were so overwhelming in the region, few eyewitnesses of pogroms survived, especially in the very same location where wartime atrocities happened. It was less likely to find witnesses of the Volyn massacre than people who were linked to the guerrilla resistance of UPA after the war. Holding out until 1952, spread throughout the region, with thousands of arrests, resistance could become the stuff of family memories much easier than Jewish and Polish tragedies, where eyewitnesses were often removed from localities of violence (Rudling 2006: 180). This means that while UPA and anti-Soviet insurgence has had a wide societal base in Galicia, Polish and Jewish remembrance needed—or would have needed—to be reintroduced anew altogether.

platforms where academics discuss history.[64] Since the Maidan, history (and also non-fiction/ contemporary history) sections in bookshops expanded, and the number of popular books on these issues have grown significantly. Radically different academic norms exist side by side in these platforms and their conceptual frames are difficult to reconcile.

This tendency might come to a halt with the removal of Volodymyr Viatrovych from the directorship of UINR in 2019, upon the election of Volodymyr Zelenskyi as president. The pendulum-like dynamics characteristic before, might prove more durable than the change instantiated by the 2013-4 events. During my fieldwork, however, this tendency seemed stable, durable, potentially becoming hegemonic across Ukraine.

The salience of ethnic essentialism is partly due to the continuing support of diaspora institutions that try to pursue their own agenda in the country. After Ukraine's independence they provided the main platform for Ukrainian historians to reach international audiences through grant schemes, cooperation agreements and publication platforms. The independent state, in the speedy transition period, lacking locally sourced works, adopted Orest Subtelny's (1988) history book, a descendant of Hrushevskyi's paradigm. Subtelny's work became the cornerstone of how history is approached in Ukraine after independence (Marples 2007: 11-7). Later on, a wide range of textbooks were developed locally, but all in lines with Subtelny's narrative arch. Natalia Yakovenko, the Kyiv historian criticised by Chukhlib was instrumental in revising the educational curriculum and pushing it beyond national self-veneration.

However, these efforts have only had limited impact so far. More partisan factions of the diaspora championed the victimhood-centred approach, sought restitution and label those voices 'colonial' that allegedly exaggerate the wrongdoings of Ukrainian nationalists; these individuals and organisations continue to fund exchange programs, publications etc. Many non-partisan works were supported by these resources as well, thus a sweeping generalisation would be a simplification; yet, the aggregate impact they have had on the country is undoubtedly the consolidation of the 'Galician model' of nationalism (Hrytsak 2011: 329).

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[64] Already in 2003 the weekly newspaper *Den'* launched a discussion forum called "How to make the past your own. History as taught in schools: time to decide", bringing together historians from across the country (Marples 2007: 12). Explicit attempts of seeking compromise and polyvocality in history arrived with the Orange Revolution the year after. Later a whole online sphere developed, providing platforms for historical discussions. The popular weekly, *Ukrayinska Pravda* launched its sub-project, Istorychna Pravda *(Historical Truth)* with essays, historical guided tours and personal blogs of several intellectuals*;* there is a cross-regional platform Historians.in.ua, led by Andriy Portnov and others, featuring not only essays, interviews and reviews but also video lectures. The Lviv and Kharkiv-based Ukraina Moderna also hosts blogs, 'history lessons' and series about memory politics; it was established by Yaroslav Hrytsak, among others. All these sites directly aim to reach broader audiences and many explicitly state the betterment of public discourse about history among their goals. During my fieldwork I often heard non-historians referring to articles they read on these sites: among journalists, civil servants, museum workers these platforms were assumed common knowledge, even if they did not always read them.

Expert knowledge and the role of the political

The above intellectual divisions map onto distinct institutional positions and sources of legitimation, amounting to a bifurcation of the intellectual scene. Elena Gapova describes how, similarly to Ukraine, a new intellectual elite emerged in Belarus in the 1990s, increasingly "spoking the language" of those Western NGOs and academic institutions which allocated resources and recognition. Gapova suggests that this created a parallel trajectory of upward mobility to conventional academic institutions (2009, 2011 cf. Pershai 2002). Her analysis re-describes disciplinary debates in terms of competition for symbolic and economic capital. Rather than the quality of arguments or genuine intellectual commitment, it is intellectuals' need to secure their respective expert positions that, in Gapova's Bourdieusian reading, explains the segmentation of post-Soviet academia. The close correlation between scientific and political legitimation I outlined above, certainly supports such an interpretation. Yakovenko, Hrytsak and the internationally embedded segment of Ukrainian historians can certainly aspire for a different sources of upward mobility than Chukhlib, his colleagues and pupils. For one, it is unlikely that the talk I attended could receive much sympathy in an Anglo-Saxon academic setting. Conversely, the Institute of National Remembrance would not hire anyone like Olena.

The institutional and conceptual bifurcation one can see among historians is undoubtedly a story of old and new elites. This is true not only for historians, but also for the broader heritage scene and cultural professionals in general, which, as I demonstrate in chapters that follow, tend to split along similar lines. However, I find it important to pay attention to the intrinsic features of essentialist, primordialist knowledge itself as well. Without doing so, one runs the risk of erasing the genuine role professional norms have when people take sides. However central opportunism might be, it would not do justice to the intellectual debates themselves if they were reduced to power games. Seconding Boyer (2005), I think the complexity of these factors calls for an anthropology of experts that is not reductive either towards cultural history or political economy.

Ideas about epistemology and the boundaries between the political and the non-political in Soviet historiography help to contextualise the role of essentialism further. The humanities and the social sciences had an uneasy relationship with Soviet authorities: repeated revisions of history that occurred with each change of leadership meant that today's truth could easily become tomorrow's exorcised ideology; this caused a publicly known co-option between power and intellectuals on the one hand, an intense epistemic uncertainty on the other (Yurchak 2006: 41-7, Oushakine 2001: 208). Revealing a 'truth' as a politically charged falsity became a customary way of discarding the intellectual consensus of the preceding regime. Arguably, the collapsed USSR left the elites of its newly independent constituent republics with a sense that intellectual authority was a derivative of political authority, either when complicit in the production of state ideology, or

when defining itself through opposing it. Ukrainian independence brought hitherto the most pervasive attempt of revising historical knowledge.

Revisions often concern the content rather than the form of knowledge though, leaving nationalist historians with often hauntingly similar argumentative techniques to their Soviet-era predecessors. For the dominant Soviet and post-Soviet view, historical knowledge emerges from reconstructions of events from documented facts and witness reports. The 'truth' about the past (Brunnbauer 2004:18) was therefore mostly dependent on appropriate gathering of data and it was transparent: narrators could conceal the 'truth' by distorting facts, but this damage was reversible and the correct reconstruction would erase any need for further debate.

History was an endeavour to "make the subjective element in memory disappear" (Schlegel 2016: 184), a rather different venture than the open-ended, epistemologically aware and ever-transforming discipline as contemporary Anglo-Saxon academia sees it. The positivist attribution of ethnic ascriptions and clear group boundaries renders politics external to history: 'facts' are interest free. In this framework, knowledge is not inherently political, only when facts are not yet established or when they are abused by those in power. Likewise, political positions can be linked to knowledge, as long as they are derived from facts. This explains Chukhlib's readiness to display his politics as the only logical outcome of rational expert work. If he does his job well, warfare becomes a given and defence investments a necessity, be they cultural or military.

Critical historians I talked about before, would not agree to the possibility of such politics-free zones of historical knowledge. Their patriotic counterparts, however, had high stakes in these exercises. I saw many attempts of separating history from politics in this manner, the most radical of them being a conference on Ukrainian-Jewish relationships in January 2016, supported, among others, by the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance and the 'Patriotic Initiatives' NGO. Event flyers and social media websites confidently declared: "The project is non-commercial and apolitical (*Proekt ye nekomertsiynym ta pozapolitychnym*)". There, a local Orthodox Jewish activist, Meylakh Sheykhet[65] spoke fervently against internationally funded Holocaust memorials, which—in his view—feed into interethnic tensions by pitting Jews and Ukrainians against one another, while in reality it is "the German Nazis" who should take all responsibility. Had they stopped "blaming" Ukrainians, the two ethnic groups (Jews and Ukrainians) could immediately recognise their shared victimhood and coexist in peace. Sheykhet's views were oddly in line with Chukhlib's in spite of their rather different religious and institutional belonging. Both were ardent Russophobes seeking a dominant Ukrainian nationalist consensus, which would then leave *some* space for minority politics, but pursued in a strictly local fashion, without 'foreign money'. Jewish

[65] I will spend more time elaborating on Sheykhet's work and relations to the nationalist Ukrainian right in Chapter 7, where I follow a controversy around the ruins of the Golden Rose synagogue.

issues would be acknowledged, accommodated in the majority discourse—and made unthreatening.

Sheykhet and Chukhlib both spoke in a deeply ethnicised way, tackling issues around responsibility by dividing the world according to "ascriptive categories of hereditary nationality" (Kappeler 2009: 58) and using personal belonging to these respective categories as legitimising factors. Sheykhet, as a Jew, could address his ethnic Ukrainian audience as a token member of a 'difficult group', alleviating conscience issues, while Chukhlib could foreground 'his own people's suffering' at the expense of historical justice as a Ukrainian, whose patriotic duty was to turn his profession into an aid during war time. This meant "no great break" from their pre-1991 schooling for either of them, "for ethnic nationalism and essentialism were already inherent in Soviet ideology" (Kappeler *ibid*). It is rather difficult to challenge such "false intellectual objectivism" (Friedman 1992: 207) from within.

As evident both in Sheykhet's and Chukhlib's talks, the closed and comprehensive web of these conceptual schemes renders them bullet-proof to any criticism: truth is singular, modulated by identities assigned to all, and knowledge exists in an intimate intermingling with morality. Criticisms of an intellectual position quickly lapse into judging a person and disagreement is rendered to oppositional identities: 'facts', like people, can be 'Russian' and 'European'. A young adjunct historian I know kept showing me instances where the citizenship or ethnicity of authors function as compulsory epithets clearly fulfilling rhetorical functions in media and academia.

The compact, closed nature of nationalist argumentation prompts the above described progressive factions to pursue their own agenda in parallel to patriotic, essentialist scholars rather than in dialogue with them. There are of course areas where various factions seek compromise,[66] and in practice the rigidity and consistence of conceptual frames is of course less prominent in practice than when laid out systematically. Yet, by and large it holds true that historians in Lviv form a rather fragmented professional milieu, the atmosphere between various factions is often one of mutual suspicion and it is rare to see frictions of the likes between Olena and Chukhlib result in an approximation of viewpoints.

Their assumptions and concept-building remain incompatible. Basic disciplinary ground is lacking and professional affiliations diverge vastly, along with institutional loyalties, funding resources and strategies of legitimation. Although institutional questions and competition for resources is an important part of this hostility, I hope to have shown that the way essentialist ideas are articulated already excludes the possibility of revision. Instead, positivist takes on knowledge

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[66] A notable example was the 2004 Government Commission Report on OUN-UPA, prepared by a group of historians working in the History Institute of the National Academy of Sciences. They went to a great length to introduce at least ambiguity in the language of the report, if not addressing questions of responsibility too directly (Marples 2007: 288-317).

are stubbornly present, and its proponents, like Chukhlib claim a non-political authority for themselves.

Yet, it is exactly this fragmentation, combined with the elevated status of history in public discussions, that account for the dynamism of the history and memory scene of Lviv. Civil servants, museum staff and NGO workers were often history graduates, usually coming from the more critical and internationally connected departments of the Ukrainian Catholic University and bits of the Ivan Franko University. When I inquired about their choices of study, a number of them said it always seemed that history was the only discipline in the humanities that was 'getting somewhere', not being frozen in time.

Various NGOs and newly staffed departments of the City Council were invested in rather different kind of cultural work than museums or patriotic organisations were, mapping the above division onto a broader cultural scene and its competing elites. In the following chapters, I will expand on how these differences animated discussions about what constitutes 'foreign' and 'Ukrainian' in cultural work. Before moving on to the heritage scene and the broader cultural sphere, however, it is important to pause to outline the government's interventions in memory politics and policy, which will help to place Chukhlib, Sheykhet and their opponents in the wider intellectual landscape.

Decommunisation: "Knocking down the shackles of the past"

In the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution, president Petro Poroshenko signed a set of laws in May 2015, that became widely known as the "decommunisation package".[67] These were modelled on similar laws in the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, and among their most contested points was one that criminalised the "Communist and National Socialist Regimes". This law (317-VIII)[68] declared it a criminal offence to deny "including in the media, the criminal character of the communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991 in Ukraine." Along with this, an equally debated act of parliament (314-VIII)[69] granted social security and benefits to those who fought for independence during the 20th century and criminalised the public denial of their achievements and status.

It was outlawed to insult memory of "organisations set up by persons who suffered political repression for participation in the struggle for the independence of Ukraine in the XX century in

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[67] A good early assessment of the laws is Himka (2015b). See also Yekelchyk 2015b.

[68] Law n.317-VIII of 07.04.2015 "Pro zasludzhennia komunistychnoho ta natsional-sotsialystychnoho (natsysts'koho) totalitarnykh rezhymiv v Ukraiini ta zaboronu propahandy yikhnoii symvoliky", Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady 2015, n.26. p. 219. Available at: https://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/317-viii Previously the law was registered as draft law n.2558 (06.04.2015) and this is how most literature refers to it.

[69] Law n.314-VIII of 09.04.2015. "Proekt Zakonu pro pravovyi status ta vshanuvannia pam'iati bortsiv za nezalezhnist' Ukraiiny u 20. stolitti", Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady 2015, n.25. p. 190. Available at: https://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/314-viii Previously the law was registered as draft law n.2538-1 (07.04.2015) and this is how most literature refers to it.

Soviet prisons, camps or camp offices to fight for their civil or other rights" (317-VIII. Article 1.18); authorities of the Ukrainian People's Republic and other short-lived state Ukrainian formations in the end of World War I, "rebel, guerrilla groups that operated in Ukraine in 1917-1930 years and the goal of which was a struggle for obtaining, protection or restoration of independence of Ukraine" (317-VIII.Article 1.8). OUN and UPA are both named separately (217-VIII.Articles 1.9 and 1.10). Moreover, not only Ukrainians, but "foreigners and stateless persons" are also liable under this law (317-VIII Article 6.1-2. and 314-VIII Article 6.1-2).

Interestingly, as part of honouring the struggle for independence and its participants, "The state provides a comprehensive study of the history of struggle and independence fighters Ukraine in the 20th century" (314-VIII. Article 5.1). It also "shall take measures to raise public awareness and draw public attention to the history of struggle" (314-VIII. Article 5.2) and support NGOs engaged in such activity (314-VIII. Article 5.3). These points make it clear that this package has immediate impacts on academic research. A related proposal suggested to centralise the archival fonds of Soviet organs of repression, placing them a new archive that would be under the control of the UINR. Thereby access would be directly dependent on the state. This is not only controversial in terms of access, but especially when seen together with the fact that military archives of the German occupation are still virtually unaccessible for researchers, a situation that leads to uneven portrayals of crucial events of the 20th century, especially nationalist resistance and the Holocaust.

With this package the government seemed to become a "commissioner of [memory political] discourse and policies" (Kasianov 2015: 149). National identity issues had become inseparable from foreign policy issues already by the Orange Revolution (Yekelchyk 2008: 11), but the decommunisation laws took this to a new level. With the new laws, funding a certain line of research became not only legitimate, but desirable and the Ukrainian state a rival source of funding and institutional authority to international funding bodies. With these two parallel resources and the resulting institutional structures the whole intellectual landscape related to history and memory became implied in a battle. Similarly to Gapova's Belarus, Ukraine became divided along international and patriotic lines, the latter still animated by Soviet-era conceptual structures.

Lviv was an important locus not only because in many ways the political line propagated by the decommunisation package originated from Lviv to a large extent, and political support

stemmed from Western Ukraine as well,[70] but because on a municipal level, many Lviv politicians were supporting the international line and hoped to abandon the veneration of OUN and UPA, in favour of a more inclusive memory politics. This being so, both the radical patriotic and the critical, multiculturalist faction held a strong presence there. History being so central in local identity and tourism alike, this division of the public history scene had huge implications in Lviv.

Institutionalising national remembrance

Already in the aftermath of the 2004 Orange Revolution, newly elected president Viktor Yushchenko tried to eliminate the memory gap between different Ukrainian regions by giving nationwide prominence to the Western Ukrainian version. He promoted an anti-communist, diaspora-inspired canon with UPA and OUN at its symbolic core and the famine of Holodomor as its main locus of national suffering (see Himka 2015a, 2015b, Kasianov 2014).[71] He also established the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance in 2006, headed by Ihor Yukhnovskyi, a politician from Lviv, who participated in drafting the Act of Declaration of the Independence of Ukraine in 1991. It is suggestive of the political significance of the UINR that Yushchenko's long-term opponent and successor as president, Viktor Yanukovych immediately discontinued the Institute as a government body. UINR was turned into a research NGO upon his assuming office in 2010.[72] He also replaced the then director with a loyal, former communist historian, Valeriy Soldatenko.

As political winds turned yet again with the ousting of Yanukovych from presidency and the start of the Euromaidan, a nationalist historian from Lviv, Volodymyr Viatrovych was appointed as director. Viatrovych started out as a lecturer at the Ukrainian Catholic University, after which, between 2008-2010 he headed the Archive of the Ukrainian Security Services. He still serves as

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[70] The law about the status of fighters (314-VIII) was proposed by Yuriy Shukhevych, who belongs to Oleh Liashko's Radical Party. Shukhevych, for being the UPA-commander Roman Shukhevych's son, spent over three decades in the Gulag. He is immensely popular in Lviv's radical right circles—and among orthodox Jews represented by Sheykhet. I will expand on this friendship in Chapter 4. The two largest factions of people who proposed the other law (317-VIII)—10 people out of the 13 initiators—belonged to Shukhevych's party and to Self-reliance, the Lviv-based centre-right party headed by Lviv's mayor, Andriy Sadovyi. Without overstating 'Galician elements' in the decommunisation process, it is clear that many involved have strong links to Lviv.

[71] One could argue that even the educational policies preceding the Orange Revolution were 'crypto-Galician' to some extent. President Leonid Kuchma called Hrushevskyi's work "the historical Bible of the Ukrainian people" (quoted by Kuzio 2002: 253) at a time when although economic policies were decidedly ambiguous, school curricula following Hrushevskyi's model was adopted across the country, without any regional adaptation. This clearly Western Ukraine-centred model was far from the 'multi-vector' approach visible on other political arenas.

[72] The process was somewhat complicated, since Yanukovych first discontinued the UINR in 2010, with a presidential decree, only for the Cabinet of Ministers to immediately create a research NGO with the same name and staff. The budget of the NGO still came from the Cabinet of Ministers, so in this respect

the director of the Liberation Movement Research Centre, an NGO based in Lviv, with a focus on publishing and media activities that foster an apologetic tone about OUN-B and its leadership and depictions that see their activities as "the pinnacle of Ukrainian patriotism" (Umland 2017). As such, Viatrovych's career was premised upon the political appropriation of history, and the strategic relationship between national security, memory politics and academic history. Currently the UINR is a central executive body operating under the Cabinet of Ministers in Ukraine through the Ministry of Culture. Its role is "the realisation of governmental policies concerning the creation and renewal of national memory". Thus the end of the Yanukovych regime restored the state affiliation of UINR and ended its non-governmental status, elevating it back to its executive function.[73]

The Euromaidan gave a decisive impetus for memory work across institutional divisions, and certainly for the UINR itself to further decommunisation that assumes the similarity and commensurability of Nazi and Soviet totalitarian activities.[74] The condemnation of these regimes is only equal on paper, however. For instance while any symbol related to the USSR, as well as flags of Yugoslavia and East-European satellite countries are banned by this law, symbols like the Wolfsangel are allowed and indeed used by far-right Ukrainian groups, such as the Azov Battalion. This does not go well in diplomatic situations with the EU and especially contributed to the deterioration of Polish- and German-Ukrainian relations.

When discussing the implications of renamings in the Eastern Ukrainian city, Zaporizhzhia —where the main square and boulevard, as well as the hydroelectric station still bore Lenin's name —, Viatrovych gingerly declared that locals should learn about their new heroes (Himka 2015b). Again, connections with Chukhlib's support of soldiers with patriotic monuments were not far fetched. The new 'consensus' did not only openly foster a simplified heroising engagement with the past, but it was decidedly tilted towards a Western Ukrainian, Lviv-centred vision of canons and concerns. Although a reassessment of the Soviet era had long been overdue in Ukraine, the particular political milieu in which the process was eventually started, as well as the personnel central in its implementation was therefore far from uncontroversial.

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[73] It is important to note here that Viatrovych's only scholarly monograph (2011), a book on the Polish-Ukrainian war between 1942 and 1947, published by the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, initiated one of the largest academic debates about history in the past decade. The book became a sensitive topic in Polish-Ukrainian diplomacy upon Viatrovych's appointment as the head of UINR. It polarised the scholarly community and became an object of fierce ridicule in more critical circles.

[74] This is practice, that Dovid Katz termed "double genocide revisionism" (2016), is common in the region, with parallels, among others in Hungary and Poland. This memory politics helps externalising totalitarian experiences and subordinate questions of local collaboration to the broader illegitimacy and coercion of the political situation. See e.g Apor (2011).

Debating decommunisation

The decommunisation laws were challenged by a group of academics in an open letter addressed to President Poroshenko.[75] Olena, her husband and the director of her institute were among the signatories, together with dozens of renowned Ukraine specialists. The letter expressed concerns over the academic consequences of these new regulations as well as the moral underpinnings of promoting an uncritical attitude towards organisations that engaged in ethnic cleansing and exclusionist nationalism. Likewise, they cautioned the president about the consequences of simplifying and homogenising the Soviet era. Their letter did not stop Poroshenko from signing the laws, but it prompted response from Volodymyr Viatrovych,[76] who was involved in drafting them.

Viatrovych said that critics—despite regarding themselves as "experts in Ukrainian matters"— failed to understand the "circumstances" when the government implemented these laws and failed to recognise the importance of UPA for contemporary Ukrainians. Moreover:

> The history of the UPA, particularly its resistance to the Soviet totalitarian regime, is not simply a dramatic period of history. *It is a part of Ukrainian culture, an integral part of the tradition of the struggle for independence all the way to our times.* As a symbol of the opposition movement to the Soviet regime or to the corrupted governments of Kuchma and Yanukovych, the red-and-black flag [the UPA flag] could be seen at all three Ukrainian Maidan protests — in 1990, 2004, and 2013-2014. The Maidan Self-Defence divided itself into "hundreds" named after the main tactical divisions of the UPA, and the Banderite "Glory to Ukraine!" became the official Maidan greeting. *Ukrainian soldiers, who are defending Ukrainian independence and European freedom in the East, regard their struggle as a continuation of that of the partisans. A political signal—at the highest level—that the Ukrainian State honours those who fought for its independence is extremely important for today's soldiers and volunteers, because it means that they themselves will not be forgotten or dishonoured* (Viatrovych 2015, italics added).

Viatrovych's reply lays bare the ways scholarly and pragmatic, consequence-oriented views of history coexist in policy making. Temporal scales are played against one another, the momentary war situation legitimises a cultural policy with a far longer lifespan and thus more subtle, ambiguous consequences. What is evident from his reasoning, is not only the current 'need' to supply soldiers and Maidan protesters with an ample amount of historic precedents and

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[75] Marples at al. (2015): "Open Letter from Scholars and Experts on Ukraine Re. the So-Called «Anti-Communist Law»", Krytyka April 2015. Available at: https://krytyka.com/en/articles/open-letter-scholars-and-experts-ukraine-re-so-called-anti-communist-law

[76] Viatrovych (2015): "«Decommunization» and Academic Discussion" Krytyka May 2015. Available at: https://krytyka.com/en/solutions/opinions/decommunization-and-academic-discussion

heroes to follow, but to further the transformation of UPA into a Ukrainian *cultural* ingredient—and an indispensable one.

I referred to Gapova's analysis that redescribes ideological differences in terms of symbolic capital. Her explanation conveys that covering 'real' issues about power with ideological positions is an efficient way to alter the terms of debate. What Wendy Brown called the culturalisation of politics (2006:150ff), to which I also referred to in the introduction, follows a similar line. As was the case of history as a discipline, decommunisation certainly sets up terms of support for a new, patriotic elite. Again, historical expertise is used to depoliticise and culturalise questions around difficult historical topics: like Chukhlib, Viatrovych is after affective identifications that blur the cultural and the political; the state is hoping to redescribe politics as culture here, paradoxically by legal means. Depoliticisation is a means of 'normalisation', a forced dwindling of debates.

Indeed, in the same latter Viatrovych expressed his hopes that decommunisation would aid the depoliticisation of nationalist insurgence. Chukhlib's Cossacks and Viatrovych's UPA fighters serve as a means of bringing about "emotional regimes" (Oushakine 2013b) and aid political mobilisation. Oushakine (2013a) observes that in Russia, amidst weakening social ties and a lack of progressivist appeal, the actualisation of past events gain new momentum. According to him, lacking a new conceptual vocabulary, the aphasic Russian state now relies on reenactment of past discourses to fill the conceptual and moral void he described earlier in his monograph about the 1990s (Oushakine 2009). These points are similar to Gorham's observations about the continuity of political rhetorics from Gorbachev to Putin (2014). What we see in the mushrooming commemorative practices and resurrected public rituals in today's Russia is then a "desire for historical connectivity fulfilled through acts of memorial linking" (Oushakine 2013a: 302).

Ukraine is similar to Russia in its resilient political rhetoric, the emotive tone of memory politics and the aphasia, the academic and public inability to renew the language of history. The war now legitimises the criminalisation of critique, further consolidating the impact of decommunisation. This leaves the proponents and opponents very little room for debate.

Talking history after decommunisation

Sasha, the Jewish student with whom Olena and I attended Chukhlib's talk, posted his thoughts on Facebook a week before the event, asking what the Jewish community of Ukraine might think about the monument, and what the supporters of decommunisation might think, since the lines written under the monument are from Pavlo Tychyna, a communist official, so technically he should be illegal if one were to play according to the laws of the Institute of National Remembrance. He was using a tone that mocked serious concerns by imitating them from a proximity that made it difficult to grasp why his words were satirical. This long-standing strategy of Soviet-era dissent (see Boyer and Yurchak 2010) was a product of censorship that

attacked visible disagreement, making the imitation of form a viable strategy to escape prosecution, as it became impossible to point at problematic elements, while at the same time, often by outdoing officials in their 'diligence' to promote their position, *stiob* was a powerful vehicle of political subversion. The fact that it made sense for Sasha to express criticism in a similar way, seemingly as a good citizen engaging in decommunisation, hints at the nature of the opposition he was expecting to receive.

He did indeed receive such comments, notably from Chukhlib himself. He wrote in a comment: "I think that maybe at least few Uman Jews won't deny that they live in Ukraine, where there are national heroes, for whom this monument was erected". Later he added that "it is not their right to question these heroes' fight for their freedom". Referring to those imagined "good Jews" who might know that they need to first and foremost respect the nationalist consensus and express their identity in the remaining space, made it possible for Chukhlib to tacitly show Sasha what he expected him to do. He was promoting the kind of attitude Meylakh Sheykhet expressed in his anti-German speech.

A minority group is expected to contain its grief in a minority position corresponding to their numbers. Later, when their exchange went out of control Chukhlib used more immediate methods of shaming, such as inserting Hebrew lines into the discussion, failing to realise that Hebrew is written from right to left. When Sasha heard Chukhlib's comments about people being "defeated in their minds" in the Donbas, insult was added to injury: not only was he attacked as a Jew, but now also as someone from Donbas. Fuming next to me, whispering to his friend, a young local Jewish woman, he said: "Aren't they lovely, these armchair nationalists, who know all about the Donbas without ever having visited?! It is so easy to sit here, praise the Cossacks and think you are part of Maidan, well, why don't you go to the army then?"

In the Facebook exchange Sasha was attacked in his person, rather similarly to how Olena was suspected not to be a "real historian". Rather than convincing him that the monument was not problematic for the Jewish community, or that decommunisation laws might not rule out the quote from Pavlo Tychyna, Chukhib attacked the very basis of these opinions, the Jewish, Eastern Ukrainian person instead. In other words, he pushed the discussion outside the domain of history, where it was originally meant to be. When Sasha reacted the way he did, he followed the same pattern. Frustration and the lack of engagement with his points made it obvious that professional criticisms would be in vain, so he resorted to a counterattack of Chukhlib as a person. He labelled Chukhlib hypocritical in his nationalism from the very grounds Chukhlib attacked him: an Eastern Ukrainian from Luhansk, he was held by rebels before leaving for Lviv, an experience that gave him the moral upper hand in the game of nationalist auction.

This exchange is relevant, as it shows what a top-down policing amounts to in the lecture room. The sanctioning of academic discourse by decommunisation made the ground uneven

between patriotic and critical historians, even when the latter had access to international recognition. With Viatrovych, the UINR and the state apparatus at his back, Chukhlib was aware that the war is the main axis of public history and any legitimation has to refer to it. The polarisation is now complete. Not only historians' sources of recognition differ and methodological assumptions exclude one another: now the criminality of one is the praise of the other, leaving *stiob* the only reasonable choice of critique. With this step, history and memory partially resume their old position akin to the one they held before 1991.

The chapter has argued that a seemingly radical and isolated instance of public history can in fact serve as a litmus test of Ukraine's memory politics. By locating Chukhlib's militant nationalism in its broader context in the discipline I showed how Ukrainian memory politics has arrived at a moment when state intervention in the historical canon seems legitimate for many. This allows professional historians to claim a privileged position from where to shape state intervention, as the work of UINR and shows; the existence of such an organisation serves as a powerful source of legitimation within the field. The war has reconfigured the stakes of cultural politics and public history, enabling a previously partisan view about difficult historical moments to gain centrality.

I argued that the increasing division between patriotism and critical history was partly a question of consolidating parallel sources of legitimation, which allow both internationally embedded and state-backed takes on history to proliferate, albeit without much interaction between them. Self-sufficient as they are, these competing forms of expertise have wider implications for Ukrainian intelligentsia in broader terms; this chapter therefore hase set the scene for the ensuing sociological analysis of the wider heritage scene of Lviv.

I showed that decommunisation is a culmination of a certain intellectual trajectory, as much as it is a result of a geopolitical conflict. Control over the terms of the debate link decommunisation with earlier, Soviet attempts to reform language and dictate forms of engagement. The essentialism and the engagement with opponents' personas rather than the arguments themselves are telling parallels. However, Oushakine's observations about Belarusian coloniality seem to hold for Ukraine as well. It is victimhood and a retroactive erasure of the political self that characterise new Ukrainian policies, and as such they differ from other forms of subalternity. It is not so much a question of oppressed voices that need to be amplified, as it is efforts of cataloguing to thereby shed the burden of a morally complex, ambivalent legacy. As long as perpetration is the key experience of pre-independent statehood, transitional justice can remain a foreign concern.

As the ongoing war facilitates the usage of emotive identity anchors, instrumental takes on history appear justified for many intellectuals; in the face of separatism and regionalism, simplified

of historical legacies help to erase ambiguity. Cossack leaders can be venerated, as long as minority identities are held back and international diplomatic concerns are put on hold by conflict. This dynamics upholds the postcolonial dynamics Oushakine talks about: as long as Ukraine can demonstrate its coloniality, the currency of suffering prevails and reflective memory work can be postponed. As long as national belonging needs cementing, self-assertive cultural politics remains acceptable. By normalising these values as parts of Ukrainian culture rather than politics, criticisms are disarmed and coloniality as a discursive resource remains.

III. Heritage politics in socialist Lviv: locals in the matrioshka

The incorporation of Lviv into the USSR not only changed the political geography around the city: it also altered governmental and administrative institutions, property relations and aesthetic norms. Central planning assumed a new scope in the newly socialist city, as land and housing were nationalised and the state expanded its functions to hitherto not or only partially centralised areas. Far removed political centres (mostly Vienna and Cracow) had attempted to regulate monument protection in Lviv earlier, but never before had the heritage profession been incorporated into the state to this extent, with an institutional presence so strong. The last two decades of Soviet Lviv saw an unprecedented growth in the heritage sector: museums were opened, monuments were catalogued, restored and researched by a growing number of heritage professionals. This late-Soviet infrastructure remains the backbone of the heritage sector in Lviv today.

This chapter reconstructs the institutional structures of monument protection in the USSR, from World War II to the Gorbachev era, so as to explain the institutional context of the local heritage organisations in Lviv. I weave together a carefully reconstructed history of institutions with contemporary reminiscences of the people who worked in them. Soviet-era organisations continue to shape the heritage scene, and older professionals strive to pass on their views on preservation and curation in universities and work places. As in the case of history, professional standards exist parallel to one another, and it is impossible to understand the contemporary fragmentation of the field without reconstructing the landscape of Soviet preservation in the city. All the more so, because stakes of evaluating that past often led my informants to strategically distort their memories: many of their rhetorical agendas would go unnoticed without attempting to sett the record straight about the realities of opportunities and restrictions.

In the early, post-revolutionary years of intensive break with the past in the USSR, architectural preservation was a professional field with an insecure political position. An oft-cited video footage of the 1931 explosion that destroyed the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow under Stalin's order is often held up to show an iconoclastic state. However, the zeal of this rhetoric abated, and, parallel to this rhetoric, a vast state infrastructure was set up to catalogue, administer and restore historic monuments, especially from the 1960s onwards.

In the preceding chapters I showed how the political history of Lviv sets it apart from the rest of Ukrainian territory that had been part of the Russian Empire and was included into the Ukrainian SSR since its establishment. I demonstrated how memories of resistance and insurgence are turned into political assets after Ukrainian independence, and how they are celebrated by those who hope to work out a Ukrainian identity that is radically divorced from markers of Sovietness. Preservation occupies a specific position in these efforts: it did attract many from the patriotic circles in Lviv to start with, and heritage professionals could refer to the

hostile rhetoric around preservation to cast their work in subversive terms. Dissent as resistance imbued their profession with a political glow that made their civil servant status irrelevant.

Still, the professional practice of Soviet-era preservation professionals was shaped by the planning norms, property relations, and widely accepted preservation approach of the USSR; relevant ideas about state responsibility and civic responsibility do not necessarily expire with regimes that promoted them. Tracing how the Soviet and later the Ukrainian state articulated their presence through preservation and planning, and how Lviv adapted and resisted their efforts draws out the salience of locals being positioned in opposition to respective political centres. In contemporary Lviv, the expertise of older preservation professionals is often questioned in the new context of market capitalism and the presence of international preservation professionals. Ultimately those contemporary conflicts concern the ideal scope of state involvement. I will expand on the contemporary issues in the next chapter.

I begin by discussing the main elements of the Soviet urban transition in general and in Lviv in particular, and then turn to the local institutional landscape of preservation. I reconstructed and pieced together this history from biographical interviews and analyses of documentary sources, as well as locally published literature. Finally, I show how professional and political selves intersect in preservation professionals' discourse about their work. Throughout, I tease out what I see as the paradox of the preservation profession in Lviv: the divorce between their concern with managing and conserving 'local' monuments, and the fact that the further removed the institutions which they were subordinate were, the higher recognition their work received.

Socialist Lviv: new subject to central planning

The Soviet takeover in Lviv was not only a demographic turning point in the city's history. The new state brought with it radically new norms of urban planning, economic models and highly centralised institutions. Former links to Cracow and Vienna were severed by new borders and the consolidation of Cold War geopolitics. Lviv was now subordinate to Kyiv within the Ukrainian SSR, and to Moscow on the federal level; most policies were drafted in these two new political centres. Local government was rearranged, embedded in the institutional hierarchy of the USSR, and new local and republican authorities often reserved access to key professional positions to trusted cadres, many of them newcomers. From the demographic, political and economic swirl, the former merchant city was to reemerge as a regional industrial hub with military-strategic significance (Tscherkes 2000). In what follows, I first explain the institutions and broader goals that characterised socialist urban planning in the USSR in general, then I outline the socialist urban development of Lviv.

Governance and planning in socialist cities

The task before the new municipal authorities and their cadres was enormous. Cities had a special significance in the Soviet state project, as party officials envisioned the would-be communist society to be highly urbanised and industrially developed.[77] Hence, urban planning was crucial in the overall national planning (Bater 1980: 27-30). Soviet urban transformation in Lviv, as elsewhere, rested on three key principles: abolishment of private property (urban land and the housing stock), state ownership of the means of production, and central planning and redistributive function of the economic system (Szelenyi 1996: 278).

Taken together, these allowed Soviet authorities to maintain more—and more direct—control over urban development than under market capitalist conditions. They also meant that planning had wider scope and significance: economic and physical planning could be harmonised.[78] Since these principles were being realised within a party-state, urban development also became a means to achieve political ends. Because both economic and physical planning were carried out in a centralised fashion, it is impossible to understand the workings and scope of local government without locating them in the broader hierarchy of Soviet governance and administration.

Councils—*soviets*—at the time of the revolution and the civil war, were grassroots bodies that practiced direct democracy and they were key in the Bolshevik takeover, as temporary tools of government. With the establishment of the Soviet Union, there also emerged supra-local councils that were authorised to represent groups of councils. Every tier of the Soviet administration included councils, resulting in a somewhat confusing terminology. Thus, the highest legislative power in USSR rested with the Supreme Council (ru. *Verkhovnyi Soviet*, ua. *Verkhovna Rada*)[79], which elected the executive branch of the government, the Council of Ministers (ru. *Soviet Ministrov*, ua. *Rada Ministriv*) from its members. Although these two bodies constituted the highest tier of the USSR *de jure*, their decisions were mostly made in accordance with the Politburo, the executive committee of the Communist Party. This being so, and because most key administrative positions were held by party members anyway, the majority of economic and political decision making was reduced to fulfilling Party directives (Bater 1980: 37-40). This merger is central in, for instance, understanding the relevance of Party Congress documents in setting the agenda for ministries, as I will show in the case of monument protection below.

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[77] Urban growth is a good indicator of the relevance of cities in the USSR: between 1926 and 1989 urban population rose from 17.9% to 65.8% (French 1995: 52).

[78] There are two Russian words for planning: national economic plans and their annual subdivisions were called *planirovanie*, while physical planning of settlements subsidiary to this was termed *planirovka* (French 1995: 3). In Ukrainian this distinction is absent, both forms of planning are referred to as *planuvannia*.

[79] In what follows, when explaining the political organisation of the USSR, I give the terms in Russian first, since the official language of the USSR was Russian. Afterwards, I list the Ukrainian equivalent. However, after the first mentions I will use the Ukrainian variant, since this is the language I encountered these terms in Lviv.

On the municipal level, the City Council (*miska rada*) functioned as a decision making body responsible for local issues. Some of these issues could be decided about on a local level by Councils themselves, but the majority of them where part of state-wide policies, executed and controlled by the central government. The execution of both locally made decisions and republican or federal ones was the responsibility of the Executive Committee of the City Council (*miskvykonkom*). These relied on a number of specialist departments or units (*departament*, *upravlinnia*)[80] to deal with various professional areas—such as architecture or preservation. The executive committee consisted of the heads of these departments, its members being the chief architect, chief planner etc (Bater 1980: 43).

Councils were therefore the key territorial units of decision-making, but administration was not only organised in a territorial fashion. A hierarchically structured network of ministries, departments and offices, headed by the State Planning Committee (ru. *Gosplan*, ua. *Derzhplan*) and, ultimately, by the Council of Ministers, drafted and delivered policies according to sectorial specialisation. Derzhplan created and administered the nationwide, centralised economic plans that dictated virtually every area of Soviet life. This plan had to be implemented by ministries and lower tier specialised departments, that set goals for individual enterprise; the budget was also allocated by Derzhplan. This condition often turned ministries into interest-groups invested in securing resources for themselves, resulting in what Kornai called an economy of shortage (1992). Sectorial and territorial hierarchies thus existed in a symmetrical, albeit intertwined, fashion.

Dual subordination ensured that these two forms of administrative division were integrated, which was indispensable in an economy based on command and allocation which required strong centralisation. Each specialised agency was at once subordinate to its local council as well as the next highest level of the corresponding committee or ministry: the district construction committee to the city construction committee, that in turn to the republican ministry for construction, which, to the federal ministry of construction, and that, ultimately, to Derzhplan. At the same time, however, they were also subordinate to their respective councils: an architect's office in a city would belong under the City Council, the Ministry of Culture in the Ukrainian SSR to the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. My informants often referred to this structure as the 'Soviet matrioshka'[81] or simply the 'Soviet vertical'.

Physical planning was the responsibility of the State Committee for Construction (ru. *Gosstroi*, ua. *Derzhbud*). As is obvious from the above described division of labour, physical planning was subservient to the general economic planning (Fisher 1962: 251, Golubchikov 2004:

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[80] It is important to note these two terms: both *departament* and *upravlinnia* could be translated as department into English, but while *departament*s are formed to deal with complex policy tasks, an *upravlinnia* has a narrower focus of work. In order to capture this I translate *upravlinnia* as 'unit'.

[81] Matrioshkas, or Russian dolls are sets of, similar looking wooden dolls of decreasing size placed one inside another.

231). As such, since the fulfilment of the prescribed production quotas was the highest institutional priority, actors involved in heavy industries and adjacent areas, such as the construction of workers' housing or the development of infrastructure, could influence resource allocation more efficiently than others. This was true both for relevant ministries and state enterprises. Physical planning, then — a complex process that needed to reconcile economic, administrative, symbolic, social and cultural needs and preferences —, was often geared towards favouring extensive industrialisation in socialist cities.[82] Moreover, state enterprises often built housing for their workers themselves, and their presence could intervene in the autonomy of local government and its plans (Alexander 2004).

On the local level, general plans (ru. *genplan*, ua. *henplan*) were comprehensive documents that determined everything from infrastructural development, to housing, monument protection, landscaping, etc.—in theory. They were drafted by architectural organisations, usually within the city council itself. However, in practice, there was an endemic tension between various sectorial — ministerial — groups and local, urban interests, and a never complete divorce between local authorities and higher level decision making in the planning process. Plans functioned not only as conflicting systems of goals and constrains, but also as competing resources for justifying political manoeuvring: the existence of plans had a performative dimension to it. Thanks to this, the general plan was often merely one of the many plans that existed, each of which dealt with distinct facets of planning, without a clear strategy for their harmonisation (Bater 1980: 130-3).

Socialist cities were divided into industrial, residential, cultural zones, each with separate planning needs. Enterprises were spatially clustered, often with housing for their work force nearby, while central areas that enjoyed historic protection became places where relevant expert institutions were also located. District committees passed their sub-plans and assessments of needs up to the City Councils; specialised committees, departments within the council, all formulated requests and plans, that fed into the work of higher tiers, and, ultimately, Derzhbud. Zones were often dealt with by relevant scientific institutions and/or state agencies who held monopoly over a field: e.g. they could plan an entire industrial project or the preservation of monuments in a historic area. This upward flow of information theoretically fed into the development of top-down planning. Ratification of plans first happened locally, later on the level of the republic or eventually, Derzhbud. Planning instructions or actual plans were then passed downwards (Shaw 1983). Planning around state enterprises or areas that directly belonged to state agencies had to be coordinated with municipal authorities, but to a lesser extent; the process was not always smooth, and local authorities were often forced into rather passive roles (Bater 1980: 130-3).

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[82] This is especially true in the earlier decades of the USSR, especially under Stalin. From Khrushchev onwards, industrial expansion somewhat slowed and e.g. adequate housing became a higher priority.

Occasionally the ratification of general plans failed and cities could go on for decades without a valid plan. In other cases the plan could be drafted in Moscow, without much regard to local conditions, and then actively lobbied against by the local council. Importantly, plans were not legally binding documents, and as such, seldom was more than a fraction of the plan realised (Golubchikov 2004). Their non-obligatory status and the tedious ratification process explains why general plans were often few and far in between. For instance, the first general plan for Moscow was drafted in 1935 and the next one only in 1971 (French 1995). In short, it is often difficult to assess the extent to which general plans should be read as rhetoric statements, or pragmatic blueprints for action.

In daily decision making, local councils often merely executed orders from higher up in the hierarchy of government; they could only signal problems to higher authorities rather than being able to address them themselves. As there was no coordination between ministries, when tasks were distributed across institutions or in case it was ambiguous under who they belonged, implementation lagged. Moreover, local councils were chronically underfunded and had no means to increase their budget independently. Municipal budgets consisted of revenues of direct taxation, turnover taxes paid by local state enterprises and transfers from higher authorities (Bater 1980: 52). Especially in the 1950s, city councils often had to rely on voluntary labour to be able to cope with their workload, and salaries were low (Friedgut 1978). Councils could not increase the rent in municipally owned housing either. After Stalin's death there were repeated attempts to increase local autonomy and local budgets and to support grassroots participation, partially through voluntary organisations that relied on vast—often nominal—public membership, that paid fees (Donovan 2015). Some state functions were thereby outsourced to semi-state organisations, but these could not substitute for the shortage of resources and qualified labour in many sectors.

To sum it up, the governing and planning of Soviet cities nested in an intricate, at once territorial and sectorial hierarchy. Local planners and civil servants could rarely parry the political and economic power that ministries, subordinate departments and enterprises wielded. Yet, it was crucial for local public authorities to secure political support to counterbalance this structurally induced positional weakness if they were to retain some degree of local autonomy. Socialist Lviv was quickly integrated into this elaborate administrative hierarchy.

The socialist transformation of Lviv

Soviet urban planning was intertwined with military expansion in Western Ukraine: planning activities started already in 1939, immediately after Lviv was first annexed by the USSR (Tscherkes 2000: 207). The war swept away these first efforts; with the arrival of the German army, initial Soviet plans were interrupted. When they were resumed after the end of the war, the USSR was in an economic and domestic crisis: major cities lay in rubbles, there were huge labour shortages,

especially when it came to skilled workers. War damage was soon placed in a metonymic relationship with the country itself: repairing houses, rebuilding the infrastructure was a way to heal the body politic and restore sovereignty (Maddox 2014). Accordingly, while the 1920s and 1930s were loud with utopian debates around the ideal settlement size, appropriate aesthetic and art, post-war urban planning became driven by more pragmatic concerns: reparation works and commemoration that eventually made the 'Great Patriotic War,' a cornerstone of Soviet memory politics (Weiner 1996).

As I described above, economic planning was prioritised over physical planning in the USSR; in the postwar recession, this involved rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. In Lviv, this was carried out on the outskirts, in a simultaneous drive to rebuild, modernise, and Sovietise the city.[83] The industrial workforce (workers, technical staff, engineers) grew from 5% of the city's population in 1938 to 20% in 1950 (Amar 2015: 188). By the 1980s roughly half of the population was working in industry, construction and trade (Sekretariuk et al. 1984: 315). Most prominent among the new developments were machine building, metal processing and textile industries. Small manufactures were transformed into large enterprises as industrial production became ever more centralised. In 1945, 40% of these enterprises in Lviv oblast belonged directly under Kyiv-based or Moscow-based ministries. The all-union enterprises were later often rearranged into regional filials, but Kyiv's hold on the city did not loosen.

Industrial expansion was accompanied by an expansion of new housing districts. The construction frenzy was characteristic across the post-war USSR (Andrusz 1984: 101), but it had a specific significance in the newly annexed territories, where urbanisation was a crucial tool of the elimination of the land-owning peasantry.[84] The interwar district Novyi Lviv was expanded in Lviv, followed by the construction of entirely new districts of mass pre-fab housing, among them the biggest Sykhiv in the 1970s. It was often beneficial for local councils that many state enterprises built housing for their own workers, thereby reducing the pressure on the local government, however, this increased the political influence of these companies, at the expense of local politicians (French 1995). This further contributed to the relative insignificance of municipal governments in the Soviet institutional hierarchy.

The 'modern' housing that accompanied industrial expansion held much prestige. Curiously, however, members of the newly arrived elite did not always move to such newly built houses: instead, they were given flats in the historic centre and the adjacent areas, flats that required

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[83] On the Soviet-era urban developments of Lviv see Cherkes 2013, Dyak 2008, Posatskyy 2015.

[84] Fast urbanisation across the USSR resulted in a changing demographic composition of cities: Bishkek (Kostyukova 1994), Kaliningrad (Berger 2010) and Tbilisi (van Assche et al. 2010) are but of few major Soviet cities that received large rural populations in the 1940s onwards. The case of Lviv, then, is far from unique in this respect.

privilege to access.[85] Even today, residents of Lviv understand their city in reference to the social geography created by the Soviet era: KGB officials used to live in the art nouveau and constructivist houses in Frankivskyi district, doctors and academics on the hill near the Polytechnic University and many functionaries occupied downtown areas (Bodnar 2010, Terliuk 1997). This was not unique to Lviv: the social geography of newly socialist cities with large historic cores, like Prague and Budapest changed in a similar way. More valuable historic housing became the preferred home of the intelligentsia and some of the technical elite, while other, more dilapidated historic districts—like Pidzamche in Lviv—went through rapid degradation (Enyedi 1996, Sýkora 1999, Szelenyi 1996).

Industrialisation and housing developments reconfigured the suburban areas of Lviv. The transformation of historic areas was envisioned in a comparably striking way, though the impact of their change concerned symbolic and cultural politics more than industrial targets. The first Soviet general plan of Lviv was written in 1940 and it envisioned drastic changes in the city centre. Downtown Lviv was to be physically reoriented eastwards, its grid rationalised and boulevards widened, with a large statue of Lenin pointing towards Kyiv to orient attention.[86] Thanks to the German occupation, this plan was never implemented, and by the time the Soviet army returned, planning priorities changed.

The Second General Plan—drafted in 1946—mixed the extravagancy of the First General Plan with greater leniency to the historic centre (Heneha 2014, Tscherkes 2000). Downtown was to be left intact: apart from clearing damaged buildings, and removing the remaining signs in German, Yiddish and Polish, the only considerable intervention was the expansion of the city centre northwards, where a new avenue was planned for public events. As local Jewish historians I talked to recall, areas—mostly Jewish sites—destroyed by the German occupants were not restored. For instance the old Jewish cemetery, which had been vandalised, was now covered with concrete and a market was opened there. Unless ruined sites were symbolically relevant to the Soviet authorities, they did not spend resources on rescuing them. However, neither did they destroy monuments any further, as was the case in the nearby Ternopil where the Church of St Mary in the centre, having suffered heavy damage in the war, was demolished in 1954, freeing space for a department store; the Habsburg-era architecture, the Jewish district with all the synagogues were turned into rubble in Ternopil, and apart from a small central area, the city had

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85 'Polish bourgeois' houses that were immediately taken by the newly arrived Soviet authorities were allegedly given to the working people. However, very few working class families had the chance to move into these homes. Amar states that for instance, out of the ca. 2650 residences that were expropriated, around 2100 went to security personnel and regime functionaries (Amar 2015: 50).

86 It is often forgotten today that the Soviet leadership was not the only one to envision a radically different Lviv with ideological insignia placed to its core. The similarly ambitious Nazi master plan became a historical curiosity with Germany's defeat (Posatskyi 2002). It was also rather typical of Habsburg architectural interventions to disregard existing buildings (see Prokopovych 2009).

to be rebuilt. Lviv did not experience such heavy destruction during the war, hence, reconstruction involved less mass construction.

This more lenient approach fit the post-war turn in planning norms in general. These were the result of the expense and logistics of post-war recovery: readjustments became more acceptable and basic infrastructure and housing was prioritised. New city plans intervened less in the existing built environment and they allowed for more local variation. It was not difficult to curry favour with Moscow-based planners by arguing that the unnecessary destruction of existing building stock was wasteful. An appreciation of the past was to ground postwar rebuilding in a patriotic fashion. Karl Qualls describes how the chief architect of Sevastopol in Crimea was able to subvert a previously proposed plan, that would have had much of downtown built anew. Arguing that such expenditure was unreasonable and harmful to the commemoration of Sevastopol as a 'hero-city,'[87] he succeeded in saving much of what had been left intact by the war (Qualls 2009: 62-7).

Lviv certainly had less bargaining power when it came to its pre-WW2 past. Moreover, although the Architect's Office in the City Council accepted the 1946 *genplan*, it lacked ratification by the State Construction Committee. The city therefore existed without a valid master plan for a decade (Heneha 2014). As I argued above, this was not an exceptional situation, and because general plans had limited practical validity, it was not detrimental either. However, the lack of ratification allowed for inaction when it came to interventions in the downtown (Badiak 2014). Whereas Sevastopol was in ruins, Lviv survived the war mostly intact; if local interest was to avoid damage to the old city's existing fabric, then the absence of an efficient local government arguably served local interest better than officials (many of them newly arrived from the rest of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR) who could have been keen on pushing Sovietisation more. The lenient, unratified *genplan* together with underfunded and understaffed local authorities allowed Lviv to avoid radical interventions, regardless of its 'problematic' past.

The rather efficient industrialisation and the comparably slow Sovietisation of the cultural and architectural landscape was orchestrated by newly restructured institutions on the local and the republican level. Initially, in 1940, the local branch of the Union of Soviet Architects and the Ukrainian State Institute of Urban Planning did not match the radically new plan with an equally new staff. Though the chief architect was a newly arrived, Moscow-trained Kharkivite, many local, mostly Polish planners and architects were still employed there. Sent to ideologically framed courses in Moscow, they had to undergo thorough professional reeducation (Tscherkes 2000: 208). By the time of the Soviet reconquest—or liberation—of Lviv in 1944, almost all the Polish professionals were gone or about to leave. Planning efforts were resumed in a new fashion. The

[87] Hero-cities had special status in postwar memory politics: they survived sieges or had been the location of heroic battles. They were monumental sites whose local specificities could be turned into mementos of the Great Patriotic War, and as such, they could be used to withhold radical intervention.

new chief architect was again a Russian-trained Eastern Ukrainian. However, the remaining local intelligentsia was almost exclusively Ukrainian: they were "convenient and disproportionately prominent scapegoats" (Amar 2015: 229) in a new arrangement so suspicious of German-Ukrainian collaboration. Thus, the remaining locals were quickly overshadowed by the influx of more trusted cadres; new architectural plans were left to newcomers to design and implement.[88]

Similar tendencies characterised the medical profession, academia, positions in the party nomenklatura and the civil service (Risch 2011). The presence of newcomers was disproportionately high in all these prestigious positions. 'Galician Ukrainians' were politically suspect and inexperienced in Soviet administration and ideology work compared to imported cadres. The antagonism between newcomers and the prewar population led to a public discourse that lamented the exclusion of 'locals' (Amar 2015). These divisions gloss over the diversity of political choices both sides could harbour, but the bottom line remains true: Soviet Lviv was to a large extent administered, governed and policed by a Sovietised elite.

Lviv becomes a 'historic city'

Ukraine was devastated after World War II: museums had been looted, monuments ruined, and newly annexed territories needed to be integrated into administrative apparatus of the Ukrainian SSR. Radical Stalinist policies destroyed the preservation infrastructure across the republic that had been developed in the 1920s (Akulenko 1991: 106-22), so everything had to be set up anew in 1945. One of the first post-war emergency measures in this domain concerned three historic cities in Ukraine: Kyiv, Chernihiv—and Lviv. A special commission was organised on the highest executive level in 1945, tasked to deal with damaged architecture. Lviv was immediately included in the list of historic cities, a move that foreshadowed its significance in the heritage scene of the Ukrainian SSR.[89] As historic cities had all-union significance, this recognition guaranteed the involvement of the highest state tiers. This was to have lasting impact on the institutional development of preservation, down to the post-Soviet decades and Ukraine's first UNESCO nominations in the 1990s.

The commission revived a previously used taxonomy from the 1920s, according to which heritage objects were to be grouped into categories of federal, republican and regional

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[88] It seems that post-war restructuring plans were often reserved to the best, centrally trained architects. Thus, only Muscovite architects were invited to submit such plans for Sevastopol, the municipal chief architect, who was already in position before the war, was sidelined (Qualls 2009: 53-6). Thus, what could appear as a move against the local intelligentsia in Lviv could have had different motives than if understood only in the local context.

[89] This list initially included 20 sites across the USSR. The Committee for Architecture at the Council of Ministers of the USSR (Komarkhitektura) had issued orders regarding the protection of historic towns and the compilation of such lists; the status initially came with the oversight of the Komarkhitektura in questions around construction and preservation, but real consequences, such as zoning and higher budgets for heritage preservation and tourism development only came in the 1970s (Geering 2019b).

significance (Akulenko *ibidem*). The emergency measures only concerned federally recognised monuments, and were adoptions of measures successfully applied in historic Russian cities before. The commission issued governmental decrees, i.e., orders specific to these sites and suggested an overall legal and institutional reform that would deal with monuments on a republican scale (Akulenko 1991: 174).[90] The result was a three year long reform program between 1945-48, which led to an institutional system for preservation that was directly overseen by the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, i.e., the republican government.

The established heritage infrastructure became a ministerial concern present on all tiers of the state, fully integrated in the vertical structures I described above. The Party set the ideological framework of policies that ministerial branches relied on in the management of heritage; preservation responsibilities were shared by the Ministry of Culture and the State Committee for Construction and Architecture (Akulenko 1991: 175). As any area, the legislative dimension of monument protection was set by the Councils (ua. *rada,* ru. *soviet*) that existed at each tier of the state. The Supreme Council set the broadest frames of the heritage policy and the executive branch—the People's Commissars of the USSR—executed them. On the lower—city and regional—levels, the legislative aspect was almost nonexistent and councils usually acted as mere executive arms.

For monument protection on the ground this meant that the main decision making body was the Office of the Chief Architect of the city, which functioned at the Executive Committee of the Lviv City Council. The Architect's Office controlled the overall architectural and artistic design of the city, provided land for construction, controlled the planning and construction. (Heneha 2014). The Architect's Office had a far more comprehensive control over buildings with regional significance than over federally recognised monuments: while in case of the latter, they executed decisions that came from above, with local monuments they were free to make their own decisions, as long as they did not contradict decisions made by higher tiers.

Greater freedom usually coincided with smaller budgets, and the Lviv city budget itself was also set by Kyiv: municipal authorities were not in the position to secure additional funds by collecting tax from the citizens. Lviv was now a double periphery, at once of Moscow and Kyiv: funding was scarce, taxation, centralised. Kyiv kept the majority of funding available for museums, monuments or theatres in Ukraine. Throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, this led to a string of letters from local officials, sent to central authorities, usually through Party channels — that existed parallel to councils and all sectorial levels of hierarchy I described above — complaining about the lack of redistribution (Risch 2011: 48-9). The majority of Lviv's downtown churches and the few surviving synagogues were leased to industrial companies as warehouses. Municipal authorities had little or no control over the damage such usage posed to these monuments;

[90] When I asked employees of the successor of the main Soviet preservation institute in Kyiv, they reasoned that decrees were made because the state apparatus was still "in shambles" after the war.

moreover, they could not require repair from these contractors, or collect funds for restoration through taxation.

It is no surprise, then, that in the first postwar decade, when there was little support and political will for preservation projects, local government spending on heritage was not significant either. Not having a ratified general plan probably did not help this process either. A registry of historic monuments was created, which was to become the basis for their protection. Polish and Yiddish signs were removed from downtown facades, but besides some cleaning, the majority of preservation efforts in the 1940s and 1950s focused on repairing residential buildings; tenants were often indebted, which, combined with labour shortages meant that preservation works were delayed and often unprofessional (Badiak 2014: 59-65).

The first few major undertakings in Ukraine were restricted to federally recognised monuments, and preferences naturally reflected a certain historiography and cognate aesthetic choices: as with Pecherska Lavra and the old kremlin in Chernihiv, 'Old Rus' and Mediaeval architecture were often preferred as objects of preservation. Monument of the Kyiv Rus period, the Eastern Slavic state so central in Russian — and Soviet — historiographies of statehood were the first to be dealt with. Federally recognised monuments received their budget from Moscow and Kyiv, respectively, and their fate was also decided in the two capitals. In Lviv, remnants of mediaeval fortifications, the arsenal and Renaissance buildings were in favour, since the Baroque inner city was so strongly tied to Polish Lwów, a more contested period in Soviet historiography. When the post-war economic hurdles were overcome and the heritage infrastructure was consolidated, Lviv became one of its regional centres, with research institutions, preservation workshops and museums established.

All in all, the socialist transformation of Lviv embedded the city in a highly centralised administrative infrastructure, where many of the key agents were spatially and/or socially removed, located in centres of republican and federal authority. The new local government had little space to set its own agenda, though there was certainly some room for negotiation. The ensuing urban development was similar to that of many second-tier cities in the western USSR. Besides key monuments that shape the symbolic geography of the city, the historic areas largely remained intact, but funds for their maintenance were usually insufficient; the centre was transformed into an administrative area, losing its commercial function. Industrialisation was fast and mostly carried out on the fringes, transforming the demography of the city. But how did preservation efforts square with this centralised political setup, especially when the heritage in question had so much local relevance and potential for political contestation?

The heritage professional as a local: Nearby monuments, removed recognition

Having described the place of Lviv in the context of Soviet-wide heritage preservation policies and institutions, I will to turn to exploring the Soviet era preservation in Lviv through the biographies of three professionals, and the institutions to which they in one or another way belonged. In what follows, I describe their life stories against a historical background that reaches back to the immediate postwar years, but the focus of this part of the chapter is mostly on the Brezhnev and Gorbachov eras: it is this period, when our conservators began their careers, that continues to define the heritage field today through its reverberations. Oksana Boiko (born 1958), Lilia Onyshchenko (1956) and Roman Mohytych (1955), studied architecture together in the Lviv Polytechnic University and graduated just a few years apart from one another, between 1978 and 1981. They all embarked on careers in the field of preservation: Onyshchenko as a civil servant, Boiko and Mohytych as academic architectural historians and restoration professionals.

Their pathways and politics have evolved in divergent ways in the nearly 40 years since their graduation, but the three of them have been visible and influential in the heritage field. Major conflicts sprung up between them only after 1991, when they found themselves in different factions, disagreeing about the value and validity of the Soviet past. I will expand on those contemporary issues in the next chapter.

Here I focus on their professional practice and identity as local experts who were nevertheless embedded in the Soviet state infrastructure. All the three came from old local, Galician elite backgrounds. Professionally they all belonged to local branches of republican and federal preservation institutions. Hence, their professional and political preferences did not always coincide. There was a paradox in their work: they predominantly cared for local monuments, often thanks to a strong local, anti-Soviet identity, yet the more removed the recognition of these sites from local politics was, the more resources they could negotiate for their work—and the more prestige it wielded. The higher they were positioned in the state apparatus, the more difficult it was to see their activity as subversive, yet the more autonomy, and thereby subversion it could harbour. First I go through the heritage infrastructure of Lviv, then I turn to preservation discourses vis-à-vis the state.

Lviv in the system of Specialised Scientific-Restoration Workshops

Roman Mohytych's father, Ivan, was originally a construction engineer who took part in laying the grounds for Lviv's rapid industrialisation. Ivan Mohytych designed houses in the interwar-era residential district of Novyi Lviv and built schools and factories. He moved to Kyiv in 1961, where he ended up working for a restoration workshop and participated in the preservation works of Pecherska Lavra, the oldest monastic complex of the capital. Having found

his calling in restoration work, he returned to Lviv in 1964. Mohytych was one of the few members of the 'old' Ukrainian intelligentsia—with an OUN member father and ardent anti-Soviet politics—to reach such a high position. Later, Ivan made a name for himself as the director of the main Lviv-based restoration workshop; he was such a charismatic director, that today the remaining staff hope to rename the workshop after him.

When returning to Lviv, Ivan Mohytych had every chance to find meaningful work in the city. In 1958, the Lviv Special Scientific-Restoration Production Workshop (*Lvivska Spetsialna Naukovo-Restavratsiina Vyrobnychna Maisternia*) was opened (Vuitsyk and Pashyna 2000: 2). Before that, local heritage had been managed from Kyiv, in the institutional predecessor of the Workshop, Budmonument. A government trust, Budmonument was the outcome of the above mentioned legal reform in 1945-8: its mandate was to adopt a scientific approach to restoration and to become comprehensive institution where all aspects of preservation and maintenance work could be dealt with. The trust worked in various regions in Ukraine and had specialised workshops not only for restoration, but also for architectural design, monumental paintings and sculptures. It was reorganised into so-called 'republican specialist scientific-restoration production workshops' in 1951, that belonged under the Office of Architecture of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and received their budget from Moscow (Orlenko 2016: 89). With the new branch, Ivan Mohytych could work in an institute whose work would not be hindered by tight funding from local sources.

These restoration workshops changed their names many times.[91] Their function, however, saw little change: they were 'project-making' (*proektuvannia*) institutions, similar to those in civil engineering or construction. In the preservation field specifically, this meant historical, archival and architectural research, engineering, design work, chemical analysis as well as drafting legislative documents in the field of protection of monuments of Ukraine. The work was carried out by vertically organised branches that were nested under an umbrella organisation that coordinated their work on the republican level. That, in turn, was responsible for a given expert policy area in a comprehensive manner, from planning to execution. The scientific basis of restoration work was strictly prescribed by the relevant body of the Ukrainian Academy of Science, adding academia to the already complex institutional landscape of restoration work.

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[91] These are: Budmonument (1946-51), Ukrainian Specialised Scientific and Restoration Production Workshops (1951-69), Ukrainian Specialised Scientific-Restoration Production Department (1969-79), Institute "Ukrproektrestavratsiia" (1980-2001) and finally Ukrainian State Research and Design Institute "UkrNDIproektrestavratsiia" (2001-2016). As evident from the rather descriptive names, the most important change concerned not the institute itself, but rather its immediate administrative context: in the 1950s, instead of the old government committees for cultural-educational institutions and arts, the Ministry of Culture was created, which took over part of the monument protection functions. Instead of the Office of Architecture, the State Construction Committee was established, which began to direct and supervise the protection, repair, restoration of architectural monuments (Akulenko 1991: 181-5). New names indicate similar changes each time. The key function of the Institute did not change much though, only its efficiency fluctuated: since its inception it provided scientific and technical support of state regulatory documents in the restoration of immovable cultural heritage, participates in legal reform etc.

By the time Roman Mohytych graduated in 1978, his father had already become the director of the Lviv Workshop, which, at its peak days employed over 300 people. Current staff members remember him as an openly patriotic director, who ordered to produce their entire documentation in Ukrainian, rather than in Russian, a practice that was indeed unique. He was a member of the underground Ukrainian National Front, and under his direction, the Workshop became a haven for Ukrainian nationalists.

Their office was located in the Mediaeval walls themselves, right next to the former Bernardine monastery, where they had a separate workshop that dealt with the restoration of icons and paintings. The role of Lviv-based specialists in Ukrainian restoration was certainly significant. The Workshop opened a department for restoring vernacular wooden architecture in 1969, which gave them a unique opportunity to collect and conserve wooden churches in Western Ukraine, especially in Transcarpathia. This expertise was indispensable when it came to establishing the open-air Folk Architecture Museum, where many wooden churches were exhibited. They renovated the former Dominican Cathedral, where the Museum of Atheism was opened and several other historic buildings that were turned into cultural institutions in the early 1970s. The only stained glass window restoration workshop in Ukraine was located in Lviv as well (Vuitsyk and Pashyna 2000: 2).

Figure 3.1. The premises of the Restoration Workshop. Photo by Olha Zarechniuk

Roman Mohytych and Oksana Boiko joined the Workshop in 1981. They still refer to this decade as "the golden age of Ukrainian restoration." Boiko, who still works at the Workshop, mostly dealt with wooden synagogues and churches in various counties: she created inventories, did archival work for their documentation and worked on the inclusion of hundreds of provincial churches in local protection registries. Later, this research became the basis for her book about the Golden Rose synagogue, the former main synagogue of Lviv. She also took part in the small preservation project of the synagogue's ruins in the mid-1980s (I discuss the case of the synagogue in Chapter 6). Mohytych — now an independent architect and an associate professor at one of the universities in Western Ukraine — worked on fortresses and castles, and researched the mediaeval city grid of Lviv. Both of them, as they independently recalled in our numerous interviews and meetings, were driven by an interest in Western Ukraine and had a strong vision about saving the 'non-Russian' elements of Ukrainian history. When I first arrived at the—now unheated and dilapidated—office of the successor institution of the Lviv Special Scientific-Restoration Production Workshop, Oksana proudly showed off not only the immense amount of paperwork they produced, but also their small scale budgetary manipulations, which had helped them channel more funds to renovate sacral buildings than what they admitted in office records before 1991. Highlighting such practices of resistance helped her to maintain her self-image as a local, Galician professional, acting against a far-off Soviet state.

These professionals saw themselves as members of an international profession: they held 'European' cultural heritage in high regard, and sought out any opportunity to learn about heritage preservation outside of the USSR. They told me they valued Lvivv's historic buildings as part of world heritage long before UNESCO World Heritage nomination became a realistic prospect — in this they were not alone among Soviet heritage professionals: Corinne Geering reports that the idea existed in Soviet professional publications already in the 1960s (2019b; see also Shchenkov 2004). Local concerns and a global outlook characterised how Boiko and Mohytych, and many of their colleagues saw their professional work.

However, due to Soviet reservations about UNESCO's role in the Cold War — that, in the case of monuments mostly consisted of a critique of the organisation's overtly aesthetic approach that sidelined questions of function and social conditions (Geering 2019b: 86) — outside of a small circle of Moscow-based professionals, heritage professionals had no access to the latest publications or charters produced by international organisations. As Boiko put it, they were "cut off from foreign books and colleagues". Their resistance of Moscow-based directives mostly concerned the proportion of religious monuments they catalogued and preserved.

It is crucial to note the limits of the work of these preservation professionals. The Architect's Office—whether in Lviv or elsewhere—with its ever insufficient funds, could propose preservation works for local monuments. Those needed to be accepted on the republican tier; if, and only if these were given green light could they order the Restoration Workshop to carry on

beyond planning, to start restoration works on the ground. Even inventories and archival research was ordered by their clients, the municipal authorities, or the relevant ministries. If certain areas were already declared nationally or federally relevant, the Restoration Workshop received the resources for their work directly from Kyiv or Moscow; had local authorities chosen to do something else with those areas, their hands would have been tied.

Although the Workshop was a regional, rather than national institution, their mandate went far beyond Lviv itself. In the 1960s-1970s Lviv preservation professionals were involved in projects all-over the country. Staff members of the Lviv office opened a filial workshop in the historic city of Kamianets-Podilskyi in South-Western Ukraine and trained local experts there. Specialised restoration workshops held a legally stated monopoly over restoration work in Ukraine, therefore they were the only option to do the work in the region. Their work was tightly regulated by ministries, academic bodies that set scientific standards, and the continuous lack of funding. It was an immense work, and—especially with the politics of many staff members—a crucial activity of giving the Sovietisation process a local twist. However, often when it came to areas with specific protection regimes, other institutions were set up. One such structure was the State Historical-Architectural Reserve in Lviv.

The State Historical-Architectural Reserve and the museum-city

Unlike Boiko and Mohytych, Liliia Onyschnenko worked for the State Historical-Architectural Reserve (*Derzhavnyi Istoriko-Arkhitekturnyi Zapovidnyk—DIAZ*), established in Lviv in 1975. The protected site covered around 120 hectares and comprised mostly the mediaeval fortifications, the Renaissance central square and a number of former Roman Catholic churches from the Baroque era; all of these were given federal protection.

The Reserve was created by a decree of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. The directorate of the Reserve was established the following year, employing 30 people. Financially, the Reserve belonged under the *oblast* Executive Committee and hence the *oblast* budget, but it received an additional minimum 100 thousand rubles annually from Derzhbud. Thus, a larger part of its budget came from the republican authorities. The founding decree of the reserve states that its main goal was to advance the "preservation and wider use [of historic monuments] in the ideological and political work, educating workers in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, socialist internationalism and the friendship of people."[92]

From the late 1960s, heritage experts and government officials increasingly prioritised 'monuments of the peoples of the USSR': these were heritage sites in 'ethnic territories' the relevance of which was increasingly framed through their all-Union importance (Geering 2019b:

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[92] Decree n.297 of 12. 06. 1975. "Pro stvorennia Derzhavnoho istoryko-arkhitekturnoho zapovidnyka v m. L'vovi." Rada Ministriv Ukraiins'koi RSR. Available at: http://zakon1.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/297-75-%D0%BF For more information on the preparatory wor behind the establishment of the reserve can be found DALO R-221, 2, 7209.

132). By the 1970s, preservation of architectural ensembles became a significant priority for the expanding tourist industry of the Soviet Union (*ibidem*, 135). The establishment of the DIAZ should be seen as part of this broader trend.

Liliia Onyshchenko started working in the directorate in 1978. Her office was adjacent to the premises of the Workshop. Her daily work was rather similar to that of Mohytych and Boiko, but it was by nature confined to the boundaries of the Reserve. The Soviet approach to restoration at the time favoured radical intervention: in the first post-war decades preservation professionals generally tried to reconstruct the 'original' building in its 'most appropriate' historic moment (Goncharova 2010),[93] which necessitated a strong cooperation between archival researchers and preservation professionals. Onyshchenko participated in the management and restoration of the monuments within the territory. The work of museums, galleries or other public institutions were also overseen by the directorate. Looking back to those days in our conversations, she mainly emphasised the extent to which their hands were tied: they had no way of securing alternative funding, and the existing budget was barely enough to cover the costs of the existence of the directorate, so ambitious projects were out of question, and the Reserve focused on maintenance and inexpensive archaeological research. In response to criticisms about the quality of the restoration work they actually managed to do, she bitterly pointed to the lack of money for appropriate materials and up-to-date expertise.

Cultural institutions shared this dependence on their funding bodies; larger budgets were mostly secured through nomenklatura connections and careful lobbying among Party influentials. However, the Reserve was in an even more peculiar economic situation than others. State reserves (ru. *zapovednik*, ua. *zapovidnyk*) were an old Soviet form of institution that dated back to the first decades of the USSR and were characterised by a specific idea of withdrawal. The term, and the idea behind the approach came from nature reserves, which were areas from where *any* economic activity was withdrawn (Shtil'mark 2003: 1-2). Occasionally the broad usage of the term resulted in a confusion: nature reserves, museum/historical-reserves and, say, the Chornobyl area after the radiation catastrophe all called *zapovidnyk*; the sole connecting principle between their management needs was non-intervention and withdrawal.

This, when applied to historic areas, led to a rather specific attitude that did not consider the area as part of the living city and its evolving needs. Such reserves—whose legacy continues to shape preservation today (see Chapter 4)—are characterised by a 'museification (*muzeiifikatsiia*)'

[93] It is an interesting detail of Cold War intellectual history, that the Venice Charter, the set of guidelines for an international preservation framework in 1964 and that propagated less radical intervention, reconstruction and a clearer indication between the original and the added works, was not accessible in Russian for a decade after its publication. This being so, professional debates over the contrast between established Soviet practices and the Charter's suggestions only started after 1974. A Ukrainian translation was eventually published in 1992 (Goncharova 2014: 287-8).

approach that allows for residential use and the presence of offices, but is otherwise premised upon a complete separation of 'historic and cultural values' from economic ones. Such logic prevents the transformation of cultural values into economic assets, at least in its most immediate forms: for instance, although Lviv was recognised as a tourist destination as a 'city-museum,' which led to a moderate presence of the hospitality industry, this was spatially separate from the protected areas themselves, and it was planned accordingly, around the protected zone itself.[94] The reserve in Lviv was home to historic residential buildings, administrative buildings of preservation-related institutes and museums, many of which were opened in repurposed church buildings. Cultural institutions, such as the library in the former Jesuit church were supported too, but visitors' experience did not allow for on-site consumption.

It was possible to maintain this division in a planned economy, where all buildings in question were state owned. Onyshchenko declared that it was even efficient to have this separation, and to place government orders against locals' potential resistance when it came to restrictions on the window frames, balconies or tiles they could have. Though the Reserve was subordinate to the Regional Council, it was also embedded in the republican hierarchy, and its decisions had to be ratified by the relevant ministry. And while in terms of territory, the Reserve was more local than the Workshop, ultimately they negotiated agendas that were set for them. The wiggle room should not be ignored, and some achievements did happen against the current. Yet, Lviv ultimately fits in the trend and norms of Soviet preservation.

The example of the Lviv Specialised Scientific-Restoration Workshop and the State Historical-Architectural Reserve both show that a century-long tendency of being governed from elsewhere continued in the heritage management of Soviet Lviv. Ever since 'national' preservation as an idea gained momentum in Galicia in the 1850s, Habsburg imperial and later Polish national standards were set out elsewhere, local monuments were included in national registries (Telesko 2015). Local professionals executed, negotiated, ignored or contested these policies (Bohdanova 2008: 574-5, Prokopovych 2009: 226-30). The remote centre was first Vienna, later, after Galician autonomy in 1867, mostly Cracow. Habsburg preservation professionals preferred mediaeval monuments, Poles rehabilitated Baroque and Rococo, to highlight the Roman Catholic past of Lviv. In Soviet Lviv this continued, only policies were set in Kyiv and Moscow now, and locals were incorporated in an ever more comprehensive, vertical and removed administration, that was mostly preoccupied with yet another strand of Lviv's history: the Old Rus' and Orthodox past.

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[94] It would be interesting to analyse the similarities between Soviet zone-based protection regimes and the recent 'historic landscape approach' of UNESCO (e.g. Rössler 2006; Veldpaus et al. 2013). The tendency to move away from the protection of single monuments to a more holistic approach that pays attention to setting and context has become more pronounced in the past two decades, but synergies on the other side of the Cold War have not been explored.

Banned Greek Catholicism aside, this was conveniently 'Ukrainian' for those preservation professionals who saw their work in terms of patriotic resistance. Amidst anti-nationalist rhetoric and the loud praise of new Soviet cities it was not difficult to ignore the fact that they were local executors of a centralised, top-down policy field. Political control had always been defined by—ethnic, religious, political—distance in Lviv, a condition that has endowed the category of the local with a special glow. However, Lviv preservation professionals on the whole had not much room to shape those policies they implemented, be they about wooden vernacular architecture or federally recognised heritage. It was only the collapse of this elaborate state architecture, that allowed for this status quo to be challenged after 1991, and only gradually. Ever since collapse of the USSR, the dilemma that undergirds heritage conflicts, concerns the extent of local autonomy. Before I move on to trace those, I conclude the chapter with a brief examination of preservation professionals' identity as locals and the way they reconcile that with their position as Soviet state employees.

Expert identities: between political subversion and caretakers of federal heritage

The above described institutional histories, forms of subordination and funding structures used to shape the daily life of restoration professionals I worked with. Yet, when pushed to recount the details of the 'system' (*systema*) beyond Lviv, Boiko, Mohytych, and Onyshchenko were often reluctant to go into details; their accounts seemed thin and, I later realised, were rather inaccurate. They gladly talked about their former colleagues, but were seldom willing to go into details about how their work might fit in the broader institutional setup of Soviet preservation, despite their long careers within such institutions.

It would not have been particularly difficult to remember this, though, as from the 1950s until today their preservation work has been funded, governed, administered directly on the republican level. I gradually pieced together this history myself, from archival sources, media, and by cross-checking interviews with the very materials they gave me. It was obvious that the majority of the preservation professionals I talked to, thought of themselves as local—Galician—professionals with loyalty to local history rather than the Soviet (Ukrainian) state. They talked about their work before 1991 chiefly in terms of resistance to the Soviet project. Indeed, heritage-centred activities were often a proxy for more political opposition, especially during the first years of perestroika (Kenney 2000), which is an important reference point for many preservation professionals' accounts of resistance.

"The USSR was a barbaric state, they cared about construction and not at all about ancient monuments"—Oksana Boiko told me countless times, while she piled ever more books of "heroic restorationist colleagues" on a desk at the Workshop for me to read. Such comments were typical. Curiously, they echoed the Stalinist Party rhetoric that adopted a form of revolutionary materialism, which attributed a distinctive role to the built environment: according to this, restored

buildings would necessarily hinder the smooth adoption of state socialist ideology. In this rhetoric, old architectural forms were dismissed as embodiments of bourgeois social relations and new, revolutionary architecture was proposed to replace them. Monument protection was clearly at cross purposes with this rhetoric (Kelly 2012). Even when this radicalism abated and preservation became part of the state agenda, preservation professionals in Lviv could refer to this political rhetoric when they needed to cast themselves as dissidents.[95] The books Oksana gave me were similar to Volodymyr Badiak's essay collection *Patrimony* (N*adbannia*) (2008). In them, essays on preservation work, experiences of political repression and nation-building — all important ingredients of what is seen as an authentic life today — were often presented together.[96]

When asked to explain how such an allegedly rapacious state would tolerate the existence of institution like hers, and even fund it, Boiko, much like the authors she suggested to me to read, would insist that Soviet authorities needed to prevent active resistance of Ukrainian nationalists, did not want bad reputation internationally, or simply were not able to see how restoration professionals could fool them. The USSR-wide institutional framework was in the blindspot of her account. Her interest in restoration, for her, was the legacy of her old Galician family, especially a "Habsburg grandmother" who taught her to appreciate beauty. It was also a profession carried out by likeminded people: religious Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians were important members of this scene, their presence itself heralded as a proof for anti-establishment sentiments. In their nostalgic reminiscences of Soviet-era office life in the Restoration Workshop, elderly historians and preservation professionals talked about work through terms of intimacy, altruism and patriotic concern. Boiko's colleague Vasyl once thoughtfully said to me: "you know, most people think about survival, their children…here, I think we conservators mostly think about Ukraine."

The background against which these stories made sense was a state that appeared in almost folkloric terms. The most recurrent plots were about charismatic preservation professionals who, knowing the inner works of the 'system' or nomenklatura members, could outwit them easily. A story I heard many times, recounted the visit of Boris Yeltsin, at the time the head of the State Construction Committee in the Gorbachev's government. He came to Lviv in 1988, when Ukrainian restoration workshops were restructured yet again. Workshop employees knew he had drinking problems, so they proceeded with getting him as drunk as possible before he went on to inspect their work and sign off a document that reestablished their institute as a branch of the

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[95] For a thorough analysis of Soviet ideas of architecture and the ideological impact of home see Buchli (1999). Humphrey (2005) addresses the limitations of this idea. Kotkin's classic monograph, *Magnetic Mountain* explores elites' resistance to collective living arrangements this ideology propagated (1997), while Slezkine's recent *The House of Government* (2017) narrates the lives of the Bolshevik leadership through a micro-history of their residential lives in a building specifically designed to foster a certain kind of leadership.

[96] Badiak comes from a minority Ukrainian family from what is today Eastern Poland; in 1946, together with his parents, he was forcefully resettled in Western Ukraine.

republic-wide system. This way, Yeltsin did not even check what he was signing, or so the story went. After Ivan Mohytych, the legendary director of the restoration workshop died in 2006, Roman Mohytych included an elliptic version of the story in an obituary: "Receiving a souvenir from Ukraine, he [Yeltsin] asked: «Is it with pepper?». After a positive answer, he said, «All right» and signed the decree" (Mohytych 2007: 5).

Preservation professionals clearly had highs stakes in such stories. Many in the heritage sector today, among them a good part of the nationalist intelligentsia, retrospectively narrate their Soviet-time professional activity exclusively in terms of efforts of resistance.[97] Whether this concerned 'Soviet Ukraine' i.e. Eastern territories without Polish history, or the whole USSR, depended on the context and was often unexplained. Their desire to talk about preservation through the frame of nation-building is similar to the efforts of historians (which I described in the previous chapter) to use the current anti-Soviet political consensus to whitewash local nationalist collaborators.

Heritage professionals' marked political bias necessitated a division between systemic aspects they rejected and personal achievements they felt proud about. In this their accounts are rather similar to those of former GDR journalists in the unified Germany, as described by Dominic Boyer (2005). For the preservation professionals' moral distinctions to make sense and so that they can maintain a comfortable distance from a discarded past, it makes sense for them to take the revolutionary rhetoric of the Soviet state at face value: seen from utopian party rhetoric, restoration is an inherently anti-Soviet affair. Accordingly, local architectural historians and academics seldom question the master narrative of Soviet culpability (e. g. Badiak 2011a, 2014).

Disagreements between the centre and the periphery have been present elsewhere in the USSR and certainly Lviv has a long history of subverting state efforts.[98] However, these narratives of resistance reveal a lot more about the current anti-Soviet sentiment and the decommunisation efforts I described in the previous chapter, than the daily practice of heritage management then or now. Patriotic restoration professionals' investment in discourses in which agency is chiefly conceptualised through local resistance to the Soviet centre, are important tools to articulate their position in relation to political participation and politics itself, be it the USSR or independent Ukraine. These stories are rooted in local subject-positions of dissent, but they also curiously resonate with some accounts of the Soviet society circulating in Cold-War Anglophone

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[97] This is true not only about restoration professionals, but others who worked in museums or universities too. These narratives often deploy images of charismatic leaders who stand as icons of resistance; Ivan Mohytych is one of these people, just as Borys Voznytskyi was. Their work is currently undergoing broad canonisation, that frames their professional achievements in patriotic terms.

[98] For instance, Habsburg era preservation in Lviv was characterised by the emergence of contestation between centralised, top-down concerns and of those local, notably Polish, elites who hoped to use local built environment to make their respective presence in the city more pronounced and tangible. Often empire-wide policies that were set in Vienna had little or no bearing on what actually happened in Lviv (Prokopovych 2009: 229ff).

scholarship.[99] Both groups find possibilities of professional freedom only in resistance, because they see the Soviet state as essentially controlling and oppressive.

The convergence between these scholarly works and the current Ukrainian patriotic circles I encountered in Lviv, reveals important convergences in their moral agendas. They also reveal how selective reading can become a useful tool for purposeful forgetting: as long as contemporary heritage professionals—or for that matter, officials drafting decommunisation policies—focus on Soviet policy documents and rhetoric, with occasional victim narratives, they can maintain the convenient separation between themselves and the Soviet institutional and power structures in which they had worked, and whose various legacies continue to shape the Ukrainian state. They can uphold a drastic division between 'people' and the state (or often politics) in general.

Preservation and restoration, when it concerned objects that were deemed the most valuable, had little to do with local preservation specialists. The extensive institutionalisation of monument protection allowed Lviv to maintain a distinct position within the Ukrainian SSR as a historic city, but the terms of this special status were set elsewhere.

Many local preservation professionals had high stakes in believing the opposite, though, and they refused to see the state in its complexity, a strategy that in turn allowed them to avoid dealing with the contradictions of their identity as local patriots and civil servants in a state they had qualms with. Some of this opposition might be exaggerated now, when anti-Soviet sentiments loom large in Ukraine, but memories, images and archival material suggests it was not an exclusively retroactive position.

Whether an accurate image or an overstatement, these preservation professionals often capitalise on their former dissent. Their alleged separation from the state warrants an autonomy—and hence legitimate expertise—for them, that backs their claims in contemporary conflicts. Invasive restoration, the withdrawal of economic activities and the monopoly of old state enterprises are practices many question these days. They are inextricably linked to Soviet preservation practice and socialist urban government.

When it came to drawing boundaries between themselves and the state, ideological claims were easy to pinpoint for these preservation professionals, but for many who question their practice today, what is 'Soviet' in their practice goes well beyond such questions: subversive it might have been, their opponents see the very professionals standards of their work as a result of

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[99] The group I have in mind is the so-called totalitarian school, that concentrates on the role of the state when they conceptualise the 'Homo Sovieticus'. For a good overview of this so-called totalitarian school, the origins of which reach back to Hannah Arendt (1973) and Zbigniew Brzezinski (1971); see Fitzpatrick's essay (2007). She analyses the broader debate within Soviet historiography, that unfolded between the totalitarian and the revisionist schools. For a meta-analyses of the shortcomings of both the "anomalous totalitarianism" model and approaches that read economic/political failures through the lack of certain countries' convergence to the US or Europe, see Howard and Walters (2014).

the Soviet state these professionals hoped to subvert. In the following several chapters I move on to these dilemmas.

IV. Heritage politics in post-socialist Lviv: the quest for decentralisation

In the previous chapter, I argued that heritage work in Soviet Lviv was guided by agendas imposed on practitioners by their superiors in the 'power vertical' of the Soviet state. Soviet heritage preservation became an established field after WW2 and greatly expanded in the 1960s. Projects and institutions in Lviv did not significantly challenge existing norms in Soviet Ukrainian heritage politics. What was prioritised, and the division of labour among institutions, did not differ from those in other historic cities like Tbilisi or Kazan. Lviv was one of the main locations in the Ukrainian republic where state-led preservation was concentrated. However, regardless of its symbolic significance as a historic city, financial resources were often insufficient for more ambitious projects within the State Architectural-Historical Reserve and restoration workshops. Neither did the local government have the means to maintain the historic building stock it owned: rental and tax revenues were fixed, the city budget set in the republican capital. Hence, by the time Ukraine became an independent state, Lviv had an elaborate protection infrastructure, numerous preservation professionals and country-wide recognition; yet, monuments and historic housing was in a dire, decrepit state.

This chapter continues to tell the story of the heritage profession in Lviv, focusing on the main transformations since the fall of the USSR in 1991. As the Ukrainian statehood consolidated, the state became disentangled from party control and local government was rearranged, two crucial changes started to shape the way cultural politics was organised in Ukrainian cities. Both concerned the scope and nature of state involvement in managing the economy and society. On the one hand, non-state actors were now free to enter a field where, one way or another, everyone had been part of the state apparatus before. On the other, even with the repeated failure of decentralisation packages, municipal politicians had a chance to increase their hold on local decision-making at the expense of the top-down state administration.

In Lviv, both tendencies—in connection to one another—have been especially influential in the past decade and a half. Mayors, who head the City Council, are elected locally and as such, represent locally relevant political groups; they are accountable predominantly to their electorate. This gives them a good incentive to push for decentralisation and increased local autonomy, stepping up against representatives of the vertical state. Andriy Sadovyi became the mayor of the city in 2006, adopting a distinctive policy approach based on non-governmental partnerships and reforms in the institutional workings and staff of the civil service. This new approach to governance roughly coincided with the founding of a number of non-governmental organisations in Lviv, which have since become key actors in the heritage scene. This being so, Sadovyi's administration is an epitome of the growing decentralisation efforts, and a good case through

which to understand how the local state forms alliances with civil society organisations against the central government.

I trace the changing nature and scope of state involvement in cultural politics, focusing on decentralisation and the rise of non-state actors such as cultural NGOs supported by Western grants. I examine the entanglement of access, power and expertise in the cultural sector in Lviv. Who, with what credentials and institutional affiliation, relying on what sort of funding has been able to secure seminal positions in the heritage and museum scene of Lviv since the decay and rearrangement of the Soviet-era preservation infrastructure? In what ways have their efforts been orchestrated by (or co-opted into) governmental and municipal agendas that might run tangentially to their professional concerns? What does the past decade and the recent political turbulences tell us about the state and others as actors in cultural politics? And finally, how do these developments fit in the global tendency of collaborative, 'network governance' (Rhodes 2017)?

Describing heritage professionals' changing strategies to ensure their personal and institutional influence, strategies that often lead them in and out of the state, I argue that we need to challenge the very division between state and civil actors. We also need to pay attention to whether and how, besides international policy pressures (such as the UNESCO's) on current approaches to preservation in Lviv, these professionals' past experiences with the Soviet state apparatus and civic engagement play a role in how they engage with the Ukrainian state. This chapter sets the ground for the two case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, which explore personal and institutional choices undergirded by the institutional developments that I discuss in what follows.

The distinction between state and non-state is the central concern in the anthropology of the state, where it is often conceptualised through the metaphor of 'boundaries' (see Gupta 1995 for a classic example). However, in a context where a former totalising party-state incorporated virtually every institutional field, boundary is a misleading notion. After the demise of that state, institutions and their staff often remained in place, but they have been moved in and out of the state through the changes upon 1991, or since then.[100] I propose to look at the distribution of functions between actors (state or non-state) within the same field instead, to follow career trajectories in and out of state, between the local and the national scale and beyond. Though this approach is tailored to the post-socialist context I focus on, I think it might be productive to move beyond looking for the state/non-state boundaries when researching public institutions elsewhere, too.

[100] A good example for this is the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR) described in Chapter 2, that changed form from state institution to NGO to state institution, all in accord with the presidential cycles.

A central preoccupation of the scholarship on the post-socialist countries, especially in the 1990s, was the relationship between the state and civil society.[101] The reorganisation of state institutions and a push for civic participation was at the heart of the democratic transition that some predicted, others prescribed and many hoped for in these countries. The Soviet Union was often described as a total state that aimed to control all areas of social life; for many, this excessive involvement was credited with its collapse. The transformation of the post-Soviet state, then, unfolded in an ideological environment that predicated a link between democratisation and a redistribution of state functions. Shrinking the state, in this model, would create a space that can be filled by civil society and newly emerging, more democratic, elites.[102] Civil society and democracy—means and end in this discourse— become somewhat conflated in such models and the resulting public discourse.

Successor states of the USSR immediately became subject to neoliberal reformist pressure in the early 1990s that advocated deregulation, decentralisation and civic engagement (Ivanova and Evans 2004, Mykhnenko 2011, Wedel 2001).[103] Decentralisation has been on the agenda in Ukraine ever since, but repeated reforms amounted to only very limited transfers of decision-making and revenue-collecting powers to local administrations, without disturbing the power balance between Kyiv and the regions inherited from the times of the USSR (Swianiewicz 2006).

The advent of civic organisations has brought a more tangible change. Non-state actors have become influential in Ukrainian cultural politics and urban development. Some of them are private, some are part of (or are funded by) transnational non-governmental consortia, yet others are tools of cultural diplomacy of the neighbouring states.[104] Many of them work within funding and policy frameworks linked to EU neighbourhood policies. In this landscape, foreign-funded NGOs can support municipal projects, reducing cities' reliance on taxpayer money and the reliance on subventions from the central government. This is often critical, when municipal budgets tend to be inadequate. For municipal politicians who are invested in local autonomy,

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[101] Civil society gained centrality not only in the English language commentaries, but all over the Eastern Bloc, especially in dissident circles (see e.g. Havel 1994, Rupnik 1979). Szelényi and King argued that civil society was a code word for capitalism in these circles (2004), as the latter could not be said openly. Thanks to complex local genealogies, it is often difficult to differentiate between the prescriptive and descriptive dimension of the semantics of civil society today.

[102] Structurally, this broadly functionalist model is reminiscent of early accounts on post-socialist religiosity, i. e. that religious revival happened because there was an empty space to be filled where secular—communist—ideological work operated before. This kind of functionalism regarding civil society is salient especially in political science literature, e. g. Bernhard (1996), Howard (2003), Ottaway and Carothers (2000).

[103] Though this was the mainstream, it is worth noting that some—among them Kregel et al. (1992), Murrell (1992)— questioned the 'shock therapy' approach.

[104] Ukraine is the largest recipient of EU funds, with an annual average of 650 million euros since 2014; individual EU and NATO countries contributed much as well, notably Germany gave 786 million euros over 4 years, mostly for higher education and to reconstruction efforts (King 2019).

cooperation with such actors offers a viable way to corroborate their positions. The alliances they form, as this chapter demonstrates, cut across expected divisions between 'the state' and civil society. Divisions in heritage conflicts, then, run not between these two groups, but between the national executive (i. e. the presidential administration and the central government) and its local representatives on the one hand; and municipal authorities, joined by non-governmental or intergovernmental organisations, on the other. This, I argue, matches a global, post-Cold War trend, but it is also a result of the peculiar reorganisation of the state apparatus in Ukraine that leaves little room for power centres outside of the 'presidential vertical' (D'Anieri 2007).

To describe the transition as it impacted the heritage scene of Lviv, I focus on the reorganisation of the State Architectural-Historical Reserve into a unit in the City Council. I explain the division between presidential and municipal structures, and the way this compromises professional workflows. Following this, I show how the city administration sought to work with non-governmental organisations in the heritage field, explaining why it made sense for them to do so. I introduce actors like the Urban Centre and GIZ, and the consequences their increasingly central role had for Soviet-era state enterprises and other organisations. I return to theoretical concerns of state-civil society relationships and propose we rethink the relevance of this boundary in post-Soviet Ukraine. I suggest we look at the specificities of these public-private partnerships rather than dismissing them as token examples of contemporary urban development. While we tend to understand these kinds of partnership as indicative of neoliberal reforms, as they indeed might be in Lviv, it is important to understand that given the financial and administrative constraints on local policy-making and heritage work posed by the vertical state, the strategy of forging alternative partnerships is an attractive option for local politicians and civil servants. We thus need to understand such public-private partnerships in relation to the systemic problems of the state administration, as they are experienced by various people involved.

The birth of a division: from independence to the presidential vertical

In spring 1995, the head of the Unit for the Preservation of the Historic Environment in the Lviv City Council, Volodymyr Shvets, published an article introducing a special issue of the cultural magazine Halytska Brama (Galician Gate). The magazine was a publication of a recently established publishing house called Tsentr Yevropy (The Centre of Europe), an intellectual hub that counted many former dissidents among its authors and editors. The issue in which Shvets published his assessment of the state of historic preservation in Lviv, celebrated the 20th anniversary of the State Historical-Architectural Reserve. Lviv, he wrote, was "one of the leading cities of cultural and economic life in Central-Eastern Europe," a role that was "unfortunately disrupted by the past fifty years" (Shvets 1995: 2). He urged that the severed contacts had to be resumed, forgotten traditions, revived. "[R]elying on the favourable political conditions" Lviv

finally had to be returned to the circle of European cities— and the preservation of heritage was a key activity to do so (*ibidem*).

The favourable political conditions Shvets mentioned probably referred to the new local political apparatus that took shape in 1990. In Chapter 1, I explained that Lviv—and Western Ukraine by and large—was the support base of Rukh, the democratic, civil-political movement that grew out of the reform movements around perestroika, and was later instrumental in organising Ukraine's independence referendum (see Kenney 2000, Szporluk 2000). In response to the growing popular political movements, the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian SSR had to make concessions, and adopted new electoral legislation. For the first time, candidates could be nominated independently in the regional elections held in March 1990. In Lviv region, democratic candidates within and beyond Rukh eventually joined forces and created Demblok (the Democratic Bloc), which had a landslide victory in the first local elections in Lviv. Former dissidents and reformist politicians now dominated the higher echelons of local government; the Lviv City Council flew the yellow and blue flag (to be adopted as the national flag after independence) in April, during its first session, and the Lviv Regional Council played the anthem before it was adopted officially across Ukraine.[105] Describing these first years, virtually all professionals I worked with stressed a sense of exhilaration and consensus.

However, elections looked a bit different on the national level: only 125 seats out of the 450 went to the democratic opposition, which meant that the party nomenklatura stayed in power for the next four years (as there was no re-run of elections after the independence), with ample amount of time and institutional power to set the terms for post-Soviet reforms. D'Anieri convincingly argues that for the hardline conservative CPSU elite that ruled Ukraine, supporting independence was a way to resist unwelcome reforms forced on them by Gorbachev (2007: 77-9). With the entrenched power of this elite in the parliament, it is not surprising that the (amended) Soviet constitution was used until 1996, and many Soviet laws were in place for much longer after that. Many still are. After 24 August 1991, when the Ukrainian Supreme Council declared independence, the international community was hesitant to acknowledge state sovereignty, and Yeltsin's government in Russia was working to prevent Ukraine's complete secession. This led to rather hasty presidential elections and a referendum on independence (which approved Supreme Council's declaration) in December 1991 (D'Anieri 2007: 80). In the next three years, the division of executive power between the president, the prime minister and the parliament was far from clear. The robust, vertical executive structures remained intact, now stripped of the parallel vertical of the Communist Party *nomenklatura,* and national laws superseded federal ones, but it was far from obvious how this would develop in the first few years of independence.

105 This gesture tacitly declared the country as the symbolic inheritor of the short-lived Western Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic that existed between 1917 and 1921.

Thus, for the local political elite in Lviv, the first few years were characterised by a reformist fever and an awareness that the national government might not be in line with their agenda. As one senior civil servant told me, the fact that in 1990-1992 the Lviv Regional Council was headed by the dissident Viacheslav Chornovil, who was the 1991 presidential candidate of the Rukh, receiving the majority of the votes in Galicia, summed up this situation rather well. Local politicians were keen to stand their ground in Lviv and use the legal uncertainty for their advantage. This had major repercussions for the field of heritage preservation.

The Reserve becomes municipal

On 29 November 1990, the Executive Committee of the Lviv Regional Council announced new protection measures for an area covering 3060 hectares. They declared virtually the whole historic building stock of Lviv—buildings built between the 13th and the beginning of the 20th century—a 'historical-cultural reserve area (*istoryko-kulturno zapovidna teritoriia*)'. In so doing, they effectively extended the State Architectural-Historical Reserve over an area of the city twenty-five times larger than previously covered. Moreover, this was apparently done without any approval from the central government. Most of the newly added buildings had already been recognised as monuments of local significance.[106] The increase in the proportion of buildings that unambiguously belonged under the local administration altered the overall character of the Reserve. Besides, the decision had a strong symbolic component, as it declared hitherto sidelined historic periods worthy of protection, changing the Soviet-era focus on old Rus and mediaeval monuments.

The Reserve 'belonged' under the Lviv Regional Council. However, since the protected heritage was of federal significance, the Cabinet of Ministers oversaw its protection. This being so, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR needed to approve any changes. Yet—according to civil servants I talked to and the only monograph that mentions the events—they were never even notified when the new protection area was established (Badiak 2014): the newly elected Regional Council apparently chose to overstep its competence. As one long-term employee of the Restoration Workshop told me, the Regional Council ran a gamble, betting that once changes were made *de facto*, it would not be worth the effort for ministries to overturn them at the republican level. They tried to seize the moment and carry out reforms locally, hoping that higher tiers of the state would follow.

Career trajectories of heritage professionals I worked with suggest that this move was not simply a partisan act of the local administration. Rather, it was an orchestrated effort of the tightly knit professional community, who worked across various institutions, as I described it in the previous chapter. This community, like their counterparts in Georgia and certain parts of

[106] Out of the ca. 2000 monuments in Lviv 221 are of national significance, while the rest are of local significance.

Russia, found in preservation and local history a safe way to promote patriotic values during the late Soviet decades (Donovan 2011, 2013; van Assche et al. 2010). In Lviv, many people in the heritage profession harboured patriotic sentiments. They came from old Galician families and they were active in the social movements of the 1980s that advocated for Ukrainian language use, democratisation, and eventually, independence.

Publicly visible, this community of heritage professionals included some art historians and a number of academics. These people knew each other since their university years, and formed a rather dense social field. Because the democratic movement span the Writers' Association, clandestine Greek Catholic groups, universities and cultural professionals' circles, the division between what eventually became a group of professional politicians and those who carried on in their jobs in the cultural and educational sectors, was not yet pronounced in these early years. Onyshchenko, Shvets, Ivan Mohytych and many others had moved between organisations that belonged to very different compartments of the Soviet state. Now the state itself was in flux.

To understand what happened and how the events unfolded, it is worth returning to the protagonists of the previous chapter.[107] Liliia Onyshchenko, who worked in the directorate of the Reserve since 1978, stayed in her place during the reorganisation of the Reserve. Her husband, Volodymyr Shvets —the author of the article I quoted above— at that time worked at the Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop, together with Roman Mohytych. In several years he would become the head of the Unit for the Preservation of the Historic Environment of the Lviv City Council. With the Ukrainian sovereignty declared in 1990 and independence in 1991, the avalanche of political change that allowed many former dissidents to enter politics, reached the preservation profession as well. The charismatic head of the Restoration Workshop, Ivan Mohytych—Roman's father and Shvets's boss—became the Chairman of the Committee of Architecture and Construction in the newly elected Regional Council. Alongside this new mandate, he remained the director of the Restoration Workshop for the next five years. Working under Viacheslav Chornovil, Ivan Mohytych was able to have an overview of both the Restoration Workshop and the Unit for the Preservation of the Historic Environment, facilitating appointments across the board.

Once the Reserve was extended in 1990, in the course of a little more than a year, its directorate was eliminated and the Lviv City Council established the Department of Historical Environment Protection. The new department inherited the functions of the directorate and became its legal successor. The transition from a regional to a municipal organisation did not disrupt the daily routine of many staff members (Badiak 2014: 134-5). Onyshchenko and her colleagues continued to go to work to the same office, located just next to the Restoration

[107] The story I pieced together has not been recorded in its entirety. I reconstructed it from crosschecking informants' narratives, media coverage and laws. Often it proved impossible to gain access to documentary evidence, therefore my account should be taken with a pinch of salt. However, I am confident that the contours of the story are correct and this is a sufficient basis for my arguments concerning local politics.

Workshop. Volodymyr Shvets quit his job at the Restoration Workshop to become the head of the newly established department. Most staff members stayed on, among them Liliia Onyshchenko; now all of them worked as municipal civil servants.[108] By the time the largest changes were made in the process of turning the Ukrainian SSR into a sovereign state, the existence of the new reserve area was a simply an existing state of affairs and the Cabinet of Ministers did not take any steps to cancel it. The Regional Council's bet was successful.

The infrastructure of local government that emerged after the expansion of the area of the Reserve, and its transfer under the City Administration, continue to set the terms of heritage conflicts ever since. As I described in the previous chapter, the Soviet state consisted of "overlapping and interlocked pyramids of power" (Friedgut 1994: 4-5), composed of the Party, ministerial branches and councils. With elections having only ritual significance in the USSR, there was no room for conflict between the latter two, as the ideological monopoly of the Party set the frame for both. This changed in independent Ukraine. Now the head of the regional administration was appointed by and accountable to the president, while municipal heads—mayors—, as well as city and regional councils, were elected locally, and susceptible to a very different kind of political pressures and incentives. Political parties represented in the Parliament and in a particular Regional and City Councils, often differed.

It is not surprising, then, that this structural condition gives rise to significant hostility between mayors of regional capitals such a Lviv, and the heads of the regional administration, both of which are invested in increasing their hold on local issues. Today's heritage conflicts in Lviv ultimately boil down to a disagreement between two visions about the role of local government, the role of the state and appropriate ways of quality control: that roughly represented by the mayor and the City Administration on the one hand, and the regional state administration and ministries in Kyiv on the other. This structurally induced disagreement acts as a polarising force in local heritage conflicts, to the extent that eventually actors involved in these conflicts become, and can be recognised as, players for one or the other side. Structure of command and control, and flows of funding that come with it, not only create particular incentives for action, but also undergird a heuristic model for interpreting such action.

Although the Reserve's transformation was not done with this division in mind, many of my interlocutors thought there was no substantial difference between the Soviet and the Ukrainian executive hierarchies. In our conversations, Onyshchenko was always evasive about the details of the transition, but she stated that weaker central control over the Reserve made sense, and admitted to "tricking Kyiv" in achieving it. She thought the Reserve was a logical solution to the problem of preservation of the historic city in a state socialist system, where there was no private ownership and the work of all-encompassing state structures could be harmonised easily. But she

[108] Shvets headed the Preservation department until 1997, when he became the chief architect of the city, and eventually went back to work for the Restoration Workshop. He died in 2010.

claimed that such centralisation made little sense in the new free market conditions: now, when state enterprises ceased to have monopoly over preservation projects and many historic buildings were transferred to private ownership, it was crucial to be responsive without lengthy waiting times for approval from Kyiv. That far-away ministerial officials, usually without training in architecture, would set budgets and make decisions, had made little sense to her already earlier. A thoroughly pragmatic person, not too keen on the ideological dimension of politics, Onyshchenko wanted basic conditions met to do her job: funding, professionalism, legal stability without the burden of an overgrown bureaucracy.

Before continuing with Onyshchenko's story, it is worth noting, by way of digression, that decentralisation was a logical step for her and many of her colleagues, but it was only ever partially executed. Moreover, it is arguably and insufficient for a sector so prone and vulnerable to budget cuts. Local politicians quickly found themselves in a difficult situation: the "favourable conditions" in the local state, lauded by Shvets, could only take them so far. With the new Preservation Department they had increased control over decision making, but this did not translate to financial independence.

The neoliberal reformist pressure of the early 1990s advocated deregulation, decentralisation and civic engagement (Ivanova and Evans 2004, Mykhnenko 2011, Swianiewicz 2006). The Regional Council's move towards overtaking the function of the Reserve, could be seen as a prelude to a long series of administrative reforms in Ukraine. Decentralisation was seen as a panacea for bureaucratic problems throughout the Eastern Bloc: decentralisation and civil society went hand-in-hand in the quest for rearranging forms of political participation, within the already mentioned reformist framework that advocated for democratisation.[109] But since the 1990s, the implementation of decentralisation measures in Ukraine has consistently remained limited, informed as it was by elite interests and fears about the potential dissolution of the country so divided along regional lines (Swianiewicz 2006: 600-1); administrative reforms remain a contested issue today.

Coping with the free market: funding, regulations and the UNESCO nomination

Onyshchenko's concerns about managing heritage in a capitalist economy were valid. The marketisation of economic and property relations in independent Ukraine changed the way cities could be planned and governed. Urban space was rapidly commodified and 'broken up' along the

[109] It is important to note that this discourse is not new. The ideal of decentralisation was present in the USSR, which was established with a vision of supremacy for local councils; the long series of post-Stalinist administrative reforms, especially by Khrushchev and Gorbachev all stemmed from the realisation that the over-centralised nature of Soviet administration resulted in inefficient governance (Friedgut 1994). Khrushchev's Thaw that sought to incorporate 'people' in politics and Gorbachev's administrative reforms during perestroika both attempted to respond to this problem, if only with moderate success.

lines of private property (cf. Oushakine 2009: 15-22), which could induce conflicts between investors—chiefly the real estate sector—and preservation professionals. To prevent a situation when historic buildings or the prime downtown parcels they were located on, would be simply up for grabs, it was crucial to have regulatory bodies that would ensure that preservation standards were in order, stepping in quickly in case of violations.[110] Yet, with the dwindling stream of funding throughout the post-Soviet years of recession, alliances with investors could often appear an option preferable to no investment at all.

Across the post-socialist region, new kinds of actors started to shape urban development and the cultural politics of cities: foreign investors, private organisations and privatised state enterprises entered the scene, while the new legal environments and new planning norms were still unstable and in flux.[111] This process had a visible impact in major cities in former Eastern Bloc countries—Prague, Budapest, Bratislava and Warsaw—and in large Russian cities—especially Moscow—faster than in Ukraine (Enyedi 1996, Sýkora 1999, Szelényi 1996), where economic recession was harsher. Oksana Boiko and Ivan Mohytych both recalled how their salaries were often halted in the 1990s, expressing a sense of vocational commitment that kept them at their desks.

The Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop remained a state enterprise after 1991. It was still subordinate to the regional state administration, but it ceased to have monopoly in restoration projects. Salaries were paid by the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction, and thus were restricted, in comparison to emergent private architecture firms . Throughout the 1990s, the ties that the Workshop had to the local government, kept the flow of commissions going. However, the competition intensified, as the new companies with similar profile were often established by former colleagues. Ivan Mohytych bitterly recalled how many people left to establish their own architectural or preservation firms that were less curtailed by administrative protocols. With fewer employees, these new private establishments could also offer competitive prices. Eventually, in 2006, Mohytych himself left the Workshop for a private bureau.

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[110] In Lviv the most often mentioned examples of scandalous constructions are the Ibis Hotel on 3 Shukhevycha street, the sabotaged hotel project at 20 Fedorova street and the building of Ukreksimbank under 4 Mishkevycha square. The latter caused a huge uproar that led to the resignation of the then head of the Preservation Department in 2005. Some said he resigned out of frustration that he was unable to prevent this, others mentioned his involvement in embezzlement. It is nearly impossible to decide this question so many years later. It is enough to note that had he resigned for entirely different reasons, likely the same guesswork would have arisen anyway.

[111] The optimism that characterised Ukrainian politics in the first post-independence years, abated by the mid-1990s. With the emergence of oligarchy, formal institutions seemed incapable of constraining the behaviour of key actors, especially the president; Parliament was notoriously weak and fragmented. Political power could be marshalled against legal power, signalling that law would sometimes become subservient and instrumentalised in Ukrainian politics; law enforcement became selective and politicised (D'Anieri 2007; Yurchenko 2017).

One major cooperation between the municipal Preservation Unit and the Restoration Workshop was the nomination of Lviv's historic centre for UNESCO world heritage status. Besides the evident symbolic recognition that such status would bring, they hoped the UNESCO badge would make it easier to attract funding and boost tourism in the city.

In addition to that, a UNESCO nomination would stress the 'return' of Lviv to Europe: although the USSR was a member of UNESCO, it did not ratify the Convention until 1988, inscription on the World Heritage List was therefore a departure from the Soviet-era institutional landscape. The end of the USSR roughly coincided with the first inscriptions, that took place in December 1990. One of them, the St. Sophia Cathedral and the adjacent Pecherska Lavra was located in the Ukrainian SSR.[112]

Onyshchenko, Shvets and Mohytych hoped to turn Lviv's historic centre into a second Ukrainian world heritage site. They worked on this together, leading teams of 5-6 people from each organisation. The initiative came from the mayor, Vasyl Kuibida, but there were no separate funds allocated for the preparation of the nomination file.

Mohytych and Onyshchenko recalled the process in a long, nostalgic conversation that we had at the Preservation Department's headquarters. In 1996, when the idea emerged, they explained, the only world heritage site in Ukraine was the Pecherska Lavra in Kyiv, a complex with clear site boundaries and significance as a major religious monument. Without a self-evident demarcation of an area to be protected, the situation in Lviv was more complicated. Then came the practical difficulty of the nomination process itself: the team had no-one to consult about the practicalities. They initially proposed a much larger territory, encompassing almost the entirety of the extended reserve, as well as the district of Pidzamche.[113] Because it is nation states, rather than cities, that apply to UNESCO, and it is the state's responsibility to maintain the site (2012b), the conservators eventually opted for a much smaller territory: that of the former Reserve *before its enlargement*, where monuments already had the highest state recognition, and thus the commitment from the government to protect them. The fact that the Reserve had been abolished and integrated under the City Administration, would be no obstacle: "We did not say that we did not have the State Reserve in that form, we showed them its charter and so on, showed them its old statute," another former staff member working with Mohytych admitted. The UNESCO nomination resurrected the old Reserve.

"We printed the nomination form on a colour printer, which was difficult to find. And can you can imagine… we did not even have proper city maps back then," Onyshchenko recalled. The lack of accurate maps with geographical coordinates was a legacy of Cold War secrecy, which

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112 The other four sites are: the Kremlin and the Red Square in Moscow, the historic centre of St.Petersburg, and the Kizhi Pogost in the Russian SFSR; and the walled city of Ichan-Qal'a in the Uzbek SSR.

113 Ivan Mohytych summarised their proposal in another issue of *Halytska Brama*. See Mohytych (1996).

made the work of planners and architects increasingly difficult. Eventually they created a haphazard map using a computer program, and with the help of a Canadian volunteer. The costs of the colour prints and the short film they were required to make were sponsored privately by a Canadian Ukrainian.

Only after printing did they realise they had to add the boundaries of the territory as well, which Onyshchenko did by hand, accidentally increasing the territory, which then became official. "The more the better," laughed Mohytych. Onyshchenko added: "Nobody wanted to do the job, people kept pushing it between one another," she said, "because money was not there…In the end we could only task you [Mohytych] with doing the job." "I didn't notice, I was sitting without a salary anyway," Mohytych replied, referring sardonically to what was rather common in state institutions in the 1990s. People often went on working for months on end without a salary, let alone extra compensation for prestigious work like preparing the application for the UNESCO nomination. In the end the mayor came to the Preservation Department and threatened to fire the staff unless they sped up and did the work. As for the salaries, Mohytych and Onyshchenko only laughed when I asked when they started to get paid properly again. Historic Lviv gained UNESCO recognition in 1998.

The story of the UNESCO nomination is revealing in a number of respects. First, in a crucial way, municipal authorities repeated the Regional Council's strategy from 1990: they utilised the legally ambiguous situation of the Reserve by not admitting to UNESCO that the nominal national protection was *de facto* exercised by municipal bodies. Secondly, they did so hoping to gain international recognition, which would potentially result in greater national scrutiny of the management of these monuments, yet it could warrant a way for Lviv to bypass the authorities in Kyiv in applying for alternative funding. Lastly, the process would not have been possible without the free or exploited labour of heritage professionals, some of whom should have received their salary from the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction, while others had to do much of the job after hours without overtime payment. The application would not have not happened without all these (unpaid) contributions.

A few years after the world heritage status was granted to downtown Lviv, the Parliament issued resolutions in September 2002, and November 2003, that obliged authorities of the regional state administration to restore the functioning of the abolished and partially resurrected Reserve. The resolutions had been lobbied for by local politicians and heritage professionals opposed to the Lviv mayor. The intention was to remove the site from the municipal jurisdiction. In a further twist, this initiative was led by the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction headed at the time by Vasyl Kuibida, the ex-mayor of Lviv who initiated the UNESCO nomination. These attempts at rejigging, yet again, the governance of urban heritage in

Lviv, failed. The City Council continued to have its *de facto* hold on the territory inscribed on the World Heritage list.

The conditions in which the UNESCO nomination was developed, and the Parliament's ensuing attempt to change how the site would be governed, are indicative of the political volatility of the late 1990s-early 2000s. But they also point to the divisions that characterise Lviv's heritage field today, especially after they became even more deeply entrenched the next time Lviv's municipal authorities needed to rely on central state resources for a large-scale project. This is what I turn to in the following section.

"Lviv: a city open for the world"

On 16 December 2004, the mayor of Lviv Liubomyr Buniak addressed municipal deputies gathered in the City Council.[114] He was in a difficult situation: the runoff presidential elections a few weeks before, on 21 November, resulted in the victory of Viktor Yanukovych. Viktor Yushchenko, whom over 90% of voters in Lviv supported, was officially defeated. However, suspicions of election fraud arose immediately, leading to protests in the capital and the regions. The day after the election day, Buniak's office refused to recognise the results, declaring Yushchenko president and announcing that they were ready to take his orders.[115] As other cities followed and protests that gradually became known as the Orange Revolution were drawing more and more people's to Kyiv's Maidan square, the outcome remained uncertain. By the time of Buniak's speech, it was clear that new elections would take place soon, but anything beyond this seemed unresolved. Mayors like Buniak had all the reason to worry: with government subventions to city budgets allocated annually, financial plans for the following year were to be drawn up by the end of December. Who was in power in Kyiv could affect how much Lviv's budget would receive in subventions.

But Buniak had more than just the annual budget on his mind: Lviv was celebrating its 750th birthday in 2006 and needed extra support. The Parliament had already allocated a little over 114 million hryvnias (roughly 17.5 million euros at the time) for the "financial means for repair and installation of state-owned objects located in the city of Lviv, which are under the operational

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[114] Pres-reliz n.238. Lviv City Council, 16. 12. 2004. Available at: https://www8.city-adm.lviv.ua/2004/info/pres_2004.nsf/7557bfdde2ea2418c225640d00393763/937e45bdc47e7decc2256f6c005e0145?OpenDocument

[115] A similar decision was made by the Lviv Regional Council, where they voted no confidence to the head of the regional state administration, who is directly appointed by the president. As of 24 November, the example of Lviv was followed by three regional councils and city councils of nine major cities—Kyiv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Lutsk, Khmelnitskyi, Vynnytsia, Chernivtsi, Zhytomyr—all of which recognised Yushchenko as the president elect.



Map 4.1. The UNESCO World Heritage Site of Lviv. UNESCO (2008)

management of the ministries" for the years 2005-6.[116] The disbursement of funds, however, was

[116] Resolution of the Parliament n.1835-15 on 22. 06. 2004. "Pro zakhody shchodo pidtrymky sotsial'no-ekonomichnoho rozvytku mista L'vova u zv'iazku z 750-richchiam zasnuvannia" *Vidomosti Verkhovnoii Rady* 2004, n.45. p. 509. Available at: http://zakon2.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/1835-15 Buniak wrongly states the sum as 145 million hryvnias in his speech.

controlled by the Cabinet of Ministers. The first half of this sum would be transferred in 2005, and Yanukovych, the prime minister and winning presidential candidate, had all the reasons now to amend the sum or decrease the state's contribution to Lviv's budget to exert political pressure on Buniak.

Buniak explained that indeed, then-prime minister Yanukovych did not sign the City Council's submitted plans months before the elections, probably to put pressure on local government to use their levers to encourage local public sector employees to vote for him.[117] Moreover, the sum for the next year was now changed: instead of 65 million originally promised, Lviv was now to receive nothing. For Buniak, the situation was clear: "[s]ome people in this government still operate on the principle that Lviv should be punished. So they punish it." He was going to Kyiv, but his hopes were meagre. He implied that such national political games imperilled *world* heritage that made Lviv significant beyond the narrow temporal and spatial bounds of national politics. He finished with an upbeat claim: "Lviv is the ideologue of our independence, the spiritual centre of our fatherland, which will eventually become a truly European state. And those [politicians] who cannot distinguish between Mussolini and Bandera,[118] will be forever forgotten."

The re-run of the presidential elections brought Yushchenko to power, but this did not do much to facilitate the preservation works that downtown monuments so badly needed for the Lviv 750 celebrations. The organising committee in the Cabinet of Ministers that drew up the sum to be allocated to Lviv was appointed by the ex-prime minister Mykola Azarov. With the change of staff and Yushchenko's presidency, this committee was now dysfunctional. Lviv City Council officials were beseeching Kyiv for change in vain. Although the sum had been restored from 0 to 100 million hryvnias, nothing was transferred until September 2005. At that point, winter was approaching and soon it would be too cold to carry out restoration works. In the meantime, the City Council was going through a difficult period: deputies and the media had a growing mistrust in Buniak, the City Council's work in approving projects and addressing pressing issues—such as winter heating—stagnated. The approval of the city budget for 2006 was being delayed. On 27 September 2005, half a year ahead of scheduled elections, municipal deputies pushed Buniak to resign.[119]

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[117] As the state employees such as nurses, teachers and civil servants are all subordinate to presidential structures, it is not uncommon to pressure the leadership in state institutions to coerce employees to vote in a certain way (Yurchenko 2017).

[118] Here he refers to the resistance, among Yanukovych and his allies, to see Stepan Bandera, the leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, as anyone else but a fascist. Viktor Yushchenko's last presidential decree, at the end of his time in office in 2010, would declare Bandera a 'Hero of Ukraine'.

[119] As with so many political frictions in Lviv, the national level could be used to circumvent local enemies. Buniak appealed in Kyiv, where the court decided his dismissal was unlawful. He tried to return, unsuccessfully.

Buniak's removal from office was not to blame solely on his failure to lobby efficiently in Kyiv. Neither was the City Council's 'exemplary' rebellion against Yanukovych detrimental, since Yushchenko did assume office in the end. As any other story of this kind, the situation was more complex. For the purposes of this research, however, these events throw the limitations of local autonomy in Ukraine into sharp relief. The position of the mayor is politically exposed, yet, their office is tightly circumscribed when it comes to genuine decision making. With the city budget dependent on funds from the capital, defined and disbursed by the government and approved by the Parliament year on year,—with no minimum guarantee and hence, predictability, with its delivery often linked to political favours —, expensive urban projects with high political visibility become especially risky for municipal politicians. With Buniak's departure, the fast-approaching anniversary celebrations inevitably would be a crucial political test for the new mayor. Buniak's successor needed to be resourceful in working against such constraints, lest he remained politically exposed: accountable to local voters, yet financially dependent on Kyiv.

Celebrations were to take place on the first Sunday of May 2006, which annually hosted the City Day. However, with the delay in funding and, consequently, planning and restoring, it was obvious that this date was not feasible, especially with mayoral elections that were scheduled for March. The celebration date was postponed. In March 2006, Andriy Sadovyi won the mayoral elections. Sadovyi, who had until then been the head of the City Development Institute, a local NGO, and a deputy of the City Council, first gained public attention with his suggestion to hold a consultative referendum about granting a special administrative status to Lviv (a similar proposal had been earlier made in Kharkiv).[120] Direct republican subordination of the kind enjoyed by Kyiv and Sevastopol, would have brought a fourfold increase to the city budget, together with more substantial self-regulation. The referendum never took place after the City Council voted against it.

By 2006, when he was elected mayor, Sadovyi was the founder and head of a civic movement called Self-reliance (*Samopomich*). Building on his long-term connections, Self-reliance drafted their political programme with the help of Polish political advisors. The movement set out to promote proactive civic engagement in politics, especially at the local level, and followed a centre-right, liberal and pragmatic, ethics. The association was modelled on Habsburg-era credit cooperatives in Galicia (*Samopomich* was and remains a typical title of such cooperatives), and was an explicit call for the revival of pre-Soviet 'political culture'.

With Sadovyi's arrival into the office, the City Council adopted the slogan "Lviv: a city open for the world," a motto that conjoins the image of a multicultural past with that of an international present. In his election campaign Sadovyi promised more efficient and autonomous local government and the restoration of Lviv as the "cultural and spiritual capital of Ukraine,

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120 Referendum pro spetsial'nyi status L'vova: khronologiia podiy. Postup, 32(889). Available at: http://postup.brama.com/020307/32_2_2.html accessed February 18, 2018.

contributing to Ukrainian national revival." Thus, he offered a localised version of hybrid governance, built on civic participation in politics via non-state and international organisations and a stronger hold on local autonomy. As I will argue below, these promises were far from being independent from one another: civic and international support were the means by which Sadovyi would later challenge the presidential control Buniak and other had failed to push back.

As Lviv750 celebrations approached, Sadovyi used the occasion to demonstrate this challenge. With barely any time left for the implementation of necessary renovations, a process that required approval from Kyiv, he gave them green light without waiting for the central authorisation. Unspent funds would have needed to be returned, so city officials hastily approved major renovations around the city's central Market Square, some of which immediately drew heavy criticism. Many local restoration professionals protested these developments and a group of lobbyists of the civic network *Opora* chained themselves to the building of the City Council. The head of this network was a certain Volodymyr Viatrovych, the future head of the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance, author of the 2015 decommunisation package, and one of the protagonists of Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

In spite of these vocal criticisms and the admission of the Preservation Department that their work was not always professionally correct, Sadovyi's heavy-handed approach earned him a reputation of an efficient administrator. I was given a dozen brooches of the Lviv750 event even ten years later, during the numerous visits I paid to the City Hall. Most were given to me by young civil servants who started their careers under Sadovyi, often straight out of university; they frequently benefitted from the opportunity for social mobility created by the new leadership's keenness to match their novel approach to governance with new staff. "There was nothing here before, not a single café. You can criticise this, but you can't deny that things have changed tremendously!"—one of these young civil servants told me, gesturing around the Market Square, by the time of my research colonised by a dozen cafes with open air areas. Since 2006, Sadovyi has been reelected twice and his Samopomich became an officially registered party in 2012, with a Western Ukrainian support base and ca. 10% of seats in the Parliament.[121] Although Samopomich were almost entirely voted out in 2019, as of January 2020, Sadovyi remains in power.

Civil society and governance

In 2004, a Vienna-based Swiss historian and philanthropist, Harald Binder invested his personal funds into the creation of a private, non-profit research organisation in Lviv. The Centre for the Urban History of East Central Europe (or as it is often referred to, the Urban Centre) had

[121] The two slogans of the party were "Christian morals and common sense" and "Self-reliance, self-organisation, self-discipline." Both fit seamlessly in post-Maidan Ukraine's non-denominational religiosity (Wanner 2014) and popular forms of patriotism that promote a future-oriented, heroic work ethic.

a dual vision: on the one hand, it was meant to become an intellectual haven for academics — mostly historians and, to a lesser extent, sociologists — who hoped to carry out research in a more direct conversation with international academic institutions, and were often dissatisfied with the conditions in local Ukrainian universities.[122] Besides, the Centre's ambition was to intervene in heritage-related urban development and memory politics in a progressive fashion. Since then the Centre has grown crucial to the formation of Ukraine-based, younger generation of intellectuals who constitute a sociologically, intellectually and politically distinct group in Lviv. International researchers held talks and took up residencies there, relying on the library and digital materials (images, oral history recordings, historical maps) of the Centre. I was affiliated with them as a guest researcher, which granted me access, but received no financial support, to avoid any conflict of interest. Internationally oriented, critical scholarship is by no means confined to the Urban Centre in Lviv, but it is undoubtedly one of its key hubs. Through their curatorial work and their role in public memory projects, the visibility of researchers in the Centreis virtually unparalleled in the region.The Centre quickly seized on the City Council's readiness to collaborate in cultural projects, and actively participated in the organisation of a number of international contests for the redesigning or renovation of public spaces: the Bernardine complex, the Jewish quarter and the former Jewish cemetery. Chapter 6 elaborates the story of the Space of Synagogues project in the Jewish quarter, planned and implemented jointly by the Centre, GIZ and the City Council.

The presence of such a generously funded and well-networked institute has helped to create a loose network of young professionals, by and large committed to the same professional principles. Most of these young professionals hail from Western Ukraine, either from small towns or bigger cities like Lutsk, Ternopil and Lviv itself; however, through nationwide networks, the Centre employed people from Kharkiv and the Donbas as well. The predominant majority graduated from Lviv-based universities. Those who move on to other roles included careers taken up in the civil service, broadcasting or journalism. The Centre maintains partnerships with local university staff; it works with local Museums on joint exhibitions; and often holds conferences where academics, civil servants and NGO workers are brought together. I witnessed former staff members half-jokingly complain about the hold of the Centre on their lives: the long history of mutual favours and cooperation sometimes forge a sense of being trapped, of not being able to severe connections. As far as the Centre maintains its close links with the City Council, these young professionals remain in the orbit of the municipal leadership as well.

A creation of foreign capital and local high-skilled labour, plugged into transnational networks of historians, architects, policymakers and civil servants, seeking to 'build bridges' between the state and the civil society, the Urban Centre belongs to a type of organisations that might seem familiar to anthropologists of international development and neoliberal politics.

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[122] *Our Mission.* Available at: http://www.lvivCentre.org/en/mission/, accessed February 18, 2018.

Anthropologists have long recognised, and criticised, the role of non-state actors in various aspects of policy-making, especially in the Global South (e.g. Wedel et al. 2005). Ferguson (1994) has persuasively argued that civic and NGO participation are far from the innocent elements of democratic political life that they often appears in public discourse, especially when linked to the 'depoliticisation' of governance. It would be tempting to read the work of the Centre through the lens of global, cosmopolitan cultural diplomacy, and argue, with Schuller (2009), that such NGOs are actors that "glue globalisation" by creating a transnational, affluent middle class that hinders local-priority setting and reproducing inequalities. Yet, while there is much truth, and critical potential, to Schuller's characterisation, especially in Haiti, where he worked, and potentially in other non-governmental contexts in Ukraine, I want to resist this easy comparison and dwell more on the Centre's cooperation with the local authorities. It is important to pay attention not only to these actors themselves, but to the political infrastructure that undergirds their operation. Such a focus better reveals the role that specific features of the Ukrainian post-socialist state play in the emergence of local politicians' alliances with non-state actors such as the Centre.[123]

Schuller observes that besides disrupting the class composition and political priorities of local populations, NGOs can also hinder states' capacity to govern, by providing alternatives to the state and thereby legitimising globalisation (2009). There are two aspects to consider if we were to assess the validity of these arguments in Lviv. On the one hand, it would be problematic to deny the existence of civic engagement before 1990 in the USSR. Voluntary organisations, such as the Ukrainian Society for the Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments (UTOPIK), were instrumental in the Soviet-era heritage infrastructure of Lviv. Their contribution was an important development arising from Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist politics. They lent their expertise and funds to state preservation efforts and supplemented the work of state organisations. The extent to which membership in these organisations was voluntary could be questioned, but this does not alter the fact that civic participation was present in the USSR. It is worth reading contemporary cultural projects against this background. Since organisations like UTOPIK were part of the state, the dichotomy did not make much sense in the Soviet era.

On the other hand, civil society organisations enjoy public confidence and support that often denied local authorities. As I explained above, 'civil society' and civic participation were central themes for the dissident movement and subsequently to the—mostly neoliberal—policy recommendations and the transition rhetoric of the 1990s in these countries. This, paired with the

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[123] Following Hann and Dunn (1996), I think it is crucial to problematise the idea of civil society and the discourse about its role in democratic transformations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. It is also important to note that the separation between the domains of the state and society deserves attention on its own right as a socio-political construct (Abrams 1977; Herzfeld 1997). The adoption of a universalist—and at the same time deeply Eurocentric—notion of civil society is problematic, even when Schuller's (2009) caveats about globalisation remain valid.

subsequent oligarchic capture of state assets and the resulting economic volatility, which undermined citizens' trust in state organisations, meant that non-state organisations enjoyed greater public confidence. While mistrust has been high in the *systema* or 'the authorities' (*vlada*) among Ukrainians, non-state actors could rely on their discursive proximity to 'Europe.' In Lviv, this has mostly worked for their advantage: even those who question Sadovyi's allies argue that he merely pretends to be European, rather than discarding the notion of Europe as moral anchor. People readily move in and out of the state in Ukraine. This is epitomised by Sadovyi's Self-reliance that was reborn as the Samopomich party, or the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance, a ministerial body that became an NGO, only to be resurrected as a ministerial body again, as I showed in Chapter 2. Samopomich had a party list that sported more NGO workers than people with other kinds of professional experience; organisations like Sadovyi's City Development Institute are virtually extra limbs of the local state — especially when key leaders move from these organisations to positions of formal power.

It is important to distinguish between large international non-governmental consortia and organisations like the Urban Centre that exist in a much more locally embedded way and almost exclusively rely on local staff. The history of the past three decades shows that a blur between the state infrastructure and the cultural elite was important during perestroika and the early years of independence; likewise, it is important today: civic organisations often provide state bodies with an outlet far less discredited than their own ranks, while the state apparatus enables their activities and solidifies their presence. While Ferguson's depoliticisation is certainly a key feature of the discursive level of this trade-off, focusing on the contrast instead of the blur between these networks would force a developmental agenda on a context where it does not immediately apply. Given the political history of Ukraine, especially the recent discrediting of the state, imagined as network of morally compromised individuals, and as a 'Soviet remnant,' it is crucial to ask how non-state actors consciously enter into political alliances and pursue political goals *within* the state.

Figure 4.1. EU support to reforms in Ukraine. EU Delegation to Ukraine (2018)

Conclusion

This chapter has explored a series of moments in the post-Soviet transformation of Lviv's heritage infrastructure and the heritage field. Each of these moments, reconstructed through interview testimonies, documents and archival sources, reveals tensions between the local and the vertical state that have structured the field in lasting ways. They also illustrate the creativity with

which local actors have sought to navigate these tensions, and the surprising alliances that they formed in the process.

I have shown how the particular institutional and administrative structures at place tie municipal officials into difficult dilemmas: following protocol sometimes hinders action altogether, and push them to work under continuous uncertainty. As the disbursement of the municipal budget can become tied into political strategising on the side of the national state, municipal officials seek out alternative funding and professional alliances in order to reduce their dependence on the 'presidential vertical' (D'Anieri 2007). It is important to take this into consideration when we seek to understand the steep rise of public-private partnerships in Lviv. Although this fits a broader, global tendency in policy making, and is facilitated by tools of policy transfer and soft diplomacy, without paying attention to the local history of post-Soviet state transformation, it would be difficult to account for the way these partnerships cleave the state. This also helped me to understand the local political terrain, and particularly how anti-Soviet sentiments fit together with nationalist regionalism and sympathy towards neoliberal reforms. In the remaining chapters I zoom onto a museum and a public commemoration, asking how this division enables or curtails their professional work.

V. Agreeable exhibits: A Soviet-era museum's quest to transform

The restoration workshops and municipal departments in which Oksana Boiko and Liliia Onyshchenko worked were not the only, nor even the most visible institutions that needed to navigate the transformation of the cultural infrastructure and institutional landscape after 1991. Museums formed another piece of the state apparatus whose post-USSR existence had been characterised by institutional inertia, insufficient funding, and a transformation of professionalism.

In this chapter I follow the work of curators and scientific workers in a museum that dates back to the 1970s. The Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism was invested in the promotion of scientific atheism, and it represents a type of institution central for Soviet museology. After 1991, the Museum experienced claims by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) for their premises or artefacts, and a need to reposition themselves in a society that discarded the state that originally accounted for their existence, and institutional precarity. I trace how museum staff adapted to these changing conditions, following their struggle to remain relevant.

The Museum of the History of Religion and Culture is well known in Lviv. The Dominican Cathedral and the adjacent monastery complex is located in the central downtown of Lviv, in the UNESCO World Heritage zone, home to the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture. The Dominicans managed to live through Joseph II's purges of monasteries, but were forced to leave when the Soviet Union took hold of Lviv and the building complex became a warehouse. In 1973, the cathedral complex was converted to house the Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism. The monastery is still home to the — largely unchanged — Museum, that swapped 'atheism' in its name for 'culture', but the church building was given to the UGCC after the 1991 collapse of the USSR. The imposing Baroque building is an iconic place of downtown Lviv that appears in nearly every guidebook, and it still epitomises the Roman Catholic past of the city. Nowadays the square is a favourite wedding photo spot and a good place to stroll around. The surrounding benches are usually full of locals and visitors, who often carry newly found treasures from the neighbouring open-air book market, or sip coffee from paper cups they bought in the nearby kiosk. Crowds are much thinner inside the Museum: apart from an occasional student group, there are seldom more than a dozen visitors in the large complex.

When I announced my intention to research the Museum to a group of young professionals in the Centre for the Urban History of East-Central Europe, I was met with a mixture of amusement and disbelief. 'Nothing happens in museums, do you want to do some time travel?' — asked jokingly Oleh, a graphic designer, who often worked on the Centre's own exhibitions. He

proceeded to lament the lack of incentive on the side of museums to introduce real professionalism, complained about the lack of university programs that would prepare students for museum careers, and his own attempts to work with students. 'This thing doesn't work without money, that's the real problem, I can teach students how to combine images and text to create good explanations, but real interactive tech is another kind of expense altogether. These old museums have interesting artefacts, but it is still better to work with private museums where you can create something better just by visual storytelling.' Others largely agreed with Oleh, so in the coming weeks I heard many stories about failed cooperation, elderly museum workers who would not leave well past the pension age (their pension would not have been enough to pay the bills, let alone to eat), and their younger peers trying to carve out some room for themselves. I was approaching a contested, difficult field that testified the difficulties expert groups faced in comprehensive societal changes like the post-Soviet transition.

Figure 5.1. The Dominican Complex. Photo by Olha Zarechniuk

Dissecting professional dilemmas of museum workers in this institution, the chapter analyses the complex limits that this transition has put on their work and status. Managerial control exercised by the state, and the work of internal regulatory bodies, leave little room for organisational innovation and curatorial critique. The museum creates exhibitions that anticipate and hence cater for a culturally conservative, religious audience, with curatorial work the methods and ideals of which changed little since their establishment. The lack of vocational training in higher education or on the job, low wages, and tight bureaucratic control exercised by the state

administration of which the museums are part, mean that few young people choose museum careers today. The result, similarly to restoration described in the previous chapter, is a social field in which claims to secular professional legitimacy, and capacity to lead meaningful professional lives are difficult to uphold. The legacy of Soviet-era ideological work, professionalism perceived as anachronistic, claims by a politically powerful and culturally hegemonic Church, contributes to many museum workers' acute sense of marginality, and irrelevance.

I will elaborate on museum work from four angles: I depart from the legacy of museums' Soviet past, then move on to show how the leadership engages in strategic planning and adaptation, anticipating changes in politics. Then I show the limits of adaptation, focusing on conflicts between the way curators and priests treat sacral objects; finally, I trace how younger professionals try to establish new networks and protocols of professional work. I will conclude the chapter with an assessment of the critical capacities of museum work under these conditions.

Upholding integrity: introduction to a segmented workplace

The first time I approached a staff member in the Museum to see how to go about researching the institute's past in atheist propaganda, she insisted I met her 'young scientist' colleague, Roman. Besides working as a guide Roman tried to impose order on the chaotic, uncatalogued mess that was the internal archive. This was his way of making a living while was seeking to secure funding to publish his doctoral dissertation as a book in Poland. Right after our first meeting he announced that he had been waiting for a researcher to arrive since a long time. He had proof that workers prior to 1991 were reporting on one another, and scientific staff had given expert opinions about surveilled religious groups, such as Baptists and Pentecostals, to the Department of Culture and Ideology. Many of these people were still working there.

Roman wanted somebody 'neutral' to reveal the truth about the ideologically corrupted past of the Museum and expose senior colleagues who "just sat there, doing nothing, being so very religious". It was difficult to say whether this alleged turncoat mentality or what he saw as bad scientific standards fuelled his fervour more, but he said Ukraine was different from Poland and "Europe in general" exactly in its lack of transparency in archives or by not setting the record straight with the past. A quarter-Pole himself from an old Lviv intelligentsia family, Roman wanted decommunisation, only in a different manner from the Kyiv officials. "I don't care about the church, I am not religious, but those who worked with the KGB should be gone and stop pretending."

A few weeks later I was having coffee in an office shared by four employees, waiting for permission to copy photographs of the internal archive Roman gave me. As I was filling out a long form, Svitlana, Anastasia and Olha Serhiyivna who all worked in that office, peeked over my shoulder at the photos. Roman was sitting in the other end of the room, busy on his computer. Svitlana and Anastasia both started working there only after 1991, so the three of us looked back

to Olha Serhiyivna, hoping for interpretive clues and anecdotes. Looking at an image where a middle aged male colleague was giving a speech in front of a large Lenin bust, Olha Serhiyivna mused about the intricacies of the olden days: "I don't know who he is, maybe he was there earlier, there is no date on the photo… there were many of them, agitators. But all the same we baptised our babies secretly and restored the clothes, the icons. The censor came and looked at the headlines and he left and we just learned about religion anyhow." As I looked up I saw Roman rolling his eyes. "I don't understand how this place survived 1991" — he murmured on our way out.

These experiences threw me into the thicket of accusations and disputed legacies that characterise the Museum's efforts to secure legitimacy in the eyes of today's authorities and public. Having been unquestionably and explicitly linked to the ideological Party apparatus, the institution was once a tool that aimed to facilitate the Sovietisation of Lviv. It is without surprise then to encounter the burdensome legacy this role left the Museum with after the post-1991 redistribution of power. As religion, and especially the UGCC went through thorough rehabilitation, staff had to come to terms with the new status quo to survive as an institution and to cultivate a sense of ethical and professional consistency. Today ethical issues are on the forefront once again, as the ongoing war places an ideological toll on cultural institutions. Roman and Olha Serhiyivna diverged in their opinions about the past, yet both were concerned with professional legitimacy: either a clean cut from the past or a proven track record of resistance were ways to ensure appropriate perspectives.

In this chapter I trace the strenuous transition of the Museum from two angles. On the one hand I reconstruct the institution's history in relation to authorities and ideology; building on directors' accounts and archival sources, the 1991 transition and current manoeuvres are central to these themes. I explain how it was possible for the Museum to survive without substantially reducing staff or losing its valuable premises to the church or businesses. Forging strategic alliances in the right moment and making wise choices concerning the content of exhibitions and conferences have proven indispensable for directors to ensure survival. Curatorial perspectives are rather different. Like Roman and Olha Serhiyivna, many think about the role of ideology predominantly through their own professional engagement and politics. Their relation to Soviet era authorities or the contemporary UGCC are seldom articulated from an institutional perspective per se. Likewise, their views are indicative of their personal (and professional) visions of the Museum, mediated by pragmatically informed budgetary or institutional constraints, rather than the 'chess game' perspective of directors.

Igor Polianski sees atheist church-museums as "crystallisation points or even temples of the civic or political religion of the Soviet state" (2016: 270). These museums were symbolically accentuated because of the contrast they embodied: they were fighting arenas of rival ideologies, *churches* of militant *secular* ideas. A consciously distanced and demarcated past — in the form of

the building —was utilised as contrastive context for a future-oriented didactic message, that was displayed in the exhibitions. This observation can be taken further, considering the developments of the post-Soviet era. It is not difficult to see the contemporary Museum in Lviv as a vestige of yet another uncomfortable past, where — again — visions of an appropriate future are exhibited. Only this time with emphasis on religions relevant in Galicia and Ukraine, as self-appointed mediators between religious and secular perspectives.

The structural similarity between past and present institutional politics prompts me to explore the following questions in this chapter: what accounts for the similarity in how the Museum was positioned in relation to authorities before and now? What do Roman and Olha Serhiyivna's opinions about the legacy of the past reveal about the ways ethical, political and professional selves participate in the daily work of the Museum? In order to best approach these issues I first need to situate the Museum in the broader context of Soviet museology and anti-religious efforts. Then I proceed to trace how the director and staff members worked their way through the 1991 transition, and how they participate in institutional power play today. Taken together, these stories elucidate the consequences of the collapse of the USSR for an institution like the Museum, embedded in the former regime to such extent that it needed to justify its existence, role and costs completely anew.

Soviet museology and the birth of the museum

Many museums were established in Lviv in the mid-1960s and the 1970s.[124] As I showed in Chapter 3, this was part of broader, federal-level expansion of the preservation infrastructure (Donovan 2015; Geering 2019b). The Architectural-Historical Reserve in 1975 sealed the city's special status in the cultural sphere of the USSR: Lviv became an established tourist destination, and a regional cultural and scientific centre. This was not a local phenomenon; the period brought a rapid multiplication of new museums across the USSR, thanks to a shift in party policies. As post-war reconstructions were finished and the pressure of housing shortage gradually eased, Nikita Khrushchev announced his new program in the 22nd Congress of the KPSS in 1961. Apart from his aim to standardise and rationalise the urban environment, an effort that was going to lay the foundations for the house of communism, he also stressed the importance of building its walls, namely to strengthen the unity of Soviet people (Donovan 2013).

Cultural heritage was one of the means of articulating this unity, especially as the 20th anniversary of the 'Great Patriotic War' was approaching. The rehabilitation of sociology, a growing appreciation of folk art and the rehabilitation of previously rejected periods of the past led to a move towards an institutionalisation of a partly amateur scene of historians, preservation

124 The Pharmacy-Museum of Lviv (1966), the Museum of Folk Architecture (1971), the Oleksiy Novakivskyi Art-Memorial Museum (1972) and the Museum of Old Ukrainian Books (1976) all opened during these years.

professionals and museum workers, whose respective, unique national backgrounds would ultimately feed into a shared Soviet cultural pool, a resource base for national pride. Khrushchev's dethroning of Stalin's legacy envisioned a rule of 'the people (*narod*)' rather than the 'dictatorship of the proletariat' epitomised by the centralised rule of the leader (Donovan 2015: 468-9). Khrushchev's fall in 1964 and Brezhnev's overtaking of power did not bring about much difference in this particular policy arena: instead of the initial universalism of the Bolshevik project, the USSR after Stalin pursued an agenda of ethic and national particularism.

Since cultural institutions were designed in a centralised fashion across the USSR, museums — like archeological and historical reserves or restoration workshops — were subject to the similar directives, curatorial strategies across different the country. Arguably, the broadening of the museum scene was carried out in a comparable way to how the coherence of Soviet urbanism was achieved in the public sphere; much like the finite repertoire of motives for statues, or the standardised forms of pre-fab housing, street names, certain kinds of museums had specific significance for the Soviet project.[125] There were eleven museums of scientific atheism (Polianski 2016: 254) in the Ukrainian SSR alone.

The Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism started out as a filial of another institution: in 1965 the History Museum in Lviv established a new department with the same name, and opened an exhibition. Soon the premises became too small and the Dominican monastery complex was chosen to house the exhibition in the form of a separate museum (Skop, H. 2008: 56-7). This was an initiative of the director of the History Museum, Terentiy Novak, a trusted a war veteran, awardee of the 'Hero of the USSR' title.

Similarly to the preservation professionals of the Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop in Chapter 3, who tended to think their work was made possible by the charisma and strategic dissent of a director, some senior museum workers often thought of Novak's work in terms of outwitting the regime. However, it seems likely that the exceptionally high concentration of sacral objects left Lviv was as decisive, as personal incentives. With the closure of so many churches of different denominations, the Museum of History received several thousands of cult objects, icons and other religious artefacts after WW2, with additional thousands collecting dust in warehouses. Their value as cultural resources was gradually recognised with Khrushchev's 'historical turn' and it was only logical to figure out an appropriate way to utilise them. According to the records of the Regional State Archive, it was one of the first efforts of the newly established Museum to catalogue and restore these, and later to finish the task in the whole territory of Western Ukraine.

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[125] The centralised nature of this infrastructure led to the emergence of standard types of cultural institutions: there were museum-reserves (ru. *muzei-zapovednik*) that comprised of repurposed buildings, open-air museums (ru. *muzei pod otkrytym nebom*) where rural architecture was on display. Planetariums and anti-religious museums were important elements of a modernist public education agenda, that initially fell under the jurisdiction of the Comissariat of Enlightenment (Smolkin 2018: 35).

Though restoration works had still not been finished, the Museum opened its doors on the centenary of Lenin's birthday, 9 April 1970, for the time being as a mere corridor exhibition. It became independent and was extended to its current size after the renovations were finished in 1973. The eventual choice of Lenin's centenary was undoubtedly helpful in positioning the Museum politically, even if it could not be celebrated in full fanfare due to the not very glorious scaffolding still in place. However, this symbolic gesture achieved its aim, for better or worse becoming a symbolic anchor in Museum's the history.

Remembering the Museum's origins

Figure 5.2. Soviet-era exhibition display with a statue of Lenin. Lviv Museum of the History of Religion and Culture

Long-term staff members at the Museum had remarkably similar opinions about the reasons that might have led authorities to open an anti-religious museum in Lviv rather than elsewhere. They all stressed the threat Galician religiosity posed to the USSR, clearly seeing Lviv —and themselves—as game changers in the larger Soviet context of propaganda. The head of the Department of Armenian Christianity, Iryna Ivanivna, who started working there in 1973, having moved to Lviv from Eastern Ukraine specifically for the job, explained this as following:

> Though the advanced communist ideology was an atheist ideology, in Western Ukraine there were still many believers. Because the Soviet authorities came here later. Although the church was gradually closed, all the same, this tradition of religiosity continued. And the underground Greek Catholic Church also operated, though it was closed. And Party organs decided, in Moscow, of course, and gave an order in Kyiv, that besides just (the ideology of) atheism, courses were needed, which were introduced in all scientific and educational institutions (…) But this was not enough and so they decided that mass education of the people could happen through museums and that they need to organise such a museum in Lviv. This order was given in the late 60's.

Iryna Ivanivna's words suggest that the Museum was meant to fortify Soviet efforts of ideological change, supplementing other educational initiatives already at place. Neither she, nor her colleagues mentioned the fact that 'museums of atheism and the history of religion' were in fact inventions of militant early-Soviet cultural policy: the first such institutions in Moscow, Leningrad and Kazan were established in the 1920s and 1930s. Only the one located in the formed Kazan Cathedralin Leningrad survived WW2 and Stalin's compromise with the Russian Orthodox Church (Smolkin 2018: 63ff). With Stalin's death, Krushchev's anti-religious campaign took off already in 1954, but from 1961 in earnest, leading to renewed campaigns of secular modernisation — and the opening of new anti-religious museums.

Museum staff members never talked about these histories: either they felt that these details lost their significance, of they might have not been aware of them at all.

Iryna Ivanivna's account of the Museum's origins, just like Olha Serhiyivna's anecdote about christening babies, was an established a part of the internal institutional lore. These retrospective stories of origin were both oddly in line with the eventual outcomes of the dissolution of the USSR: Ukrainian independence and a regional identity grounded in religion. Highlighting the exceptional infrastructure of oppression in the USSR, they underscore the unique historic significance of nationalism and clandestine religiosity in bringing the Soviet state down. These stories filter out not only any uncertainty that might have existed before concerning the identity, role or relevance of the institute, but also any other take on morality and historic change, than the one that fits best the current political climate.

Even after several months after my first appearance at the Museum, when senior museum workers trusted me enough to complicate these images (they did admit to having reported on their colleagues for the KGB and having held a more materialistic views than they currently do), there were a number of themes that did not change. The subversive potential of museum work and their ability to outwit oppressive authorities in order to hold onto their Ukrainian identity or to religious views that were at loggerheads with the official party line remained leitmotifs in their accounts. Even for those workers, like Roman, who did not believe in the honesty of these stories and who sought to expose them as lies, what needed questioning was the content or the morality that informed it, never the very form itself. Being busy with proving or divulging these intimately

familiar claims, the extent to which they were tokens of dissident narratives was lost even on their fiercest critics.

Recording these stories meant I was working with highly stylised accounts that indicated a remarkable consensus about the past. Museum workers across generations and attitudes shared an inability or reluctance to collapse the background-foreground distinction between the USSR and Ukraine. Their stories rendered the image of the Soviet Union flat, ahistorical and predictable: an anti-religious, iconoclastic state, where it is impossible to distinguish between different policy periods—save perestroika, that eventually led to the dissolution of the country. These accounts often equate the USSR with the Russian SFSR or even Moscow: other areas similarly at variance with the central authorities are rendered invisible, leaving Ukraine distinctive in its opposition.

The opposition between Ukraine and the USSR that animated these narratives was not one of many possible such oppositions between Soviet republics and the central state. For instance ,curators did not seem aware of comparable anti-religious policies in non-European parts of the Soviet Union. This was interesting to observe, given the similar motives of the Communist Party in establishing elaborate infrastructures of anticlerical propaganda in several areas of the USSR where they found a 'problematic', combustible religious potential.[126] The geographic scope of the awareness of staff included Belarus, the Baltic states and Poland, beyond European Russia per se. It is difficult to say whether this was a result of intentional, top-down design or of a self-perception of centrality on the Ukrainian side.[127]

Most probably pragmatic reasons played a large role in this outlook: there were regular contacts between Leningrad and Lviv: annual instructions concerning propaganda work arrived from Leningrad and when the full exhibition was opened, inspectors came to assess its contents. Obversely, there is no trace of existing infrastructure of communication between various republics. According to archival photographs, the Museum hosted an USSR-wide congress of workers of museums of atheism in 1975. This occasion seems to be the only event when broader contacts could have been established—staff members reacted incredulously to the photo and could not recall the event or even stories from senior colleagues reminiscing about it.

It is nearly impossible to imagine how these people thought about Ukraine, the USSR and the Museum several decades ago, when the Soviet state envisioned an endless life for itself.

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126 For instance Ivan Sablin (2019) describes similar policies in Buriatia, where an eponymous museum became a comparable centre of the religious underground in the 1970s.

127 An interesting parallel is their lack of awareness of man-made famines, the likes of Holodomor, in Siberia or Kazakhstan, tragedies structurally somewhat alike to their own relatives' experience from 1932-3. (Many employees traced their family origins to Central- and Eastern Ukraine. Often their families belonged to the 'new elite' that arrived to Lviv in the late 1940s, thus they most probably had family memories about Holodomor, contrary to the population of Western Ukraine, that was incorporated to the USSR only later). This is rather symptomatic of the uniqueness locals oftentimes attribute to the Ukrainian and especially the Greek Catholic case within the Soviet context.

Neither is there much purpose in unmasking 'the real history' behind these claims. Seconding Vieda Skultans, I find that individual testimonies provide an immensely important counterpoint to official accounts of events, and their importance lies not in their accuracy or even fullness. She suggests that instead, they are "cumulative rather than abstractly generalisable" (1998: 51). In this spirit, I have aspired to convey a sense of how museum workers remember the past in an effort to trace how the weight of the present shapes what remains important in a context where remembering is a highly contested exercise. The contemporary context and outlook of professional work is frames these narratives, possibly not independently from public opinion: during my time in Lviv, most of my informants described the Museum as an old Soviet institution. Curators had high stakes in contesting this framing.

This public perception is fed by the remarkable success of the Museum's then-director, Volodymyr Haiuk in managing to save the institution from closure or restructuring in and after 1991. Haiuk's success was thanks to his efforts to be ahead of the changes in the last years of perestroika. I will relate his efforts to navigate his staff, exhibits, and the institutional structure through a turbulent period, contrasting his views on the legacy of the USSR with those of staff members, so as to flesh out how remembrance is mediated by one's position in institutional hierarchies.

To do so, I will first return to the local context of the Museum's work, elaborating on the policy context and the kinds of work undertaken.

Repressions or resourcefulness? Anti-religious propaganda in Lviv

The newly endorsed promotion of national cultures under and after Khrushchev makes, for instance, the opening of the Lviv Museum of Folk Architecture in 1971 less surprising than the creation of the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture two years later. Museums of atheism, though venerable ideological tools, were more popular decades before, especially in the 1920s and 1930s. The last major anti-clerical move of the Soviet authorities in Western Ukraine, the forced merge between the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church took place right after the annexation of these territories. Anti-religious museums had been part of the Soviet effort to eradicate religion since the very beginnings (cf. Paine 2010): already in the 1920 the People's Commissariat for Enlightenment had a museum department, which was responsible for the 'museification' of churches. In the Crimean Tatar city of Ievpatoria, and in Kazan mosques were utilised for these purposes and in Buriatia, a Buddhist *datsan* (Polianski 2016: 255-6). The height of their expansion was in the early thirties, with the beginning of a new anti-religious campaign, urged by Stalin in the 15th Party Congress in 1929 (Anderson 1991; Smolkin 2018).

The most notable among them was Leningrad Museum of Religion and Atheism, affiliated with the USSR Academy of Science (Jolles 2005: 432). The only academic institute engaging in

research on religion which enjoyed some level of liberty was located in the very same premises, indicating that matters of religion are to be dealt with by science rather than theology or their respective churches themselves.[128] After Stalin's 1941 compromise with the Russian Orthodox Church, most anti-religious museums were closed, with the exception of the one in Leningrad; a number of them were turned into history museums. Anti-religious propaganda was curtailed, or in any case it turned to different tools, notably written materials and lectures.

By the time the Lviv Museum was established, anti-religious efforts rekindled once again. Khrushchev embarked on an anti-religious program, especially after 1961, which yet again launched an attack on resilient 'survivals' of backwardness, albeit this time with different methods. Smolkin-Rothrock (2014) shows how militant atheism had proven itself inefficient by this period, with religious activity actually increasing, notwithstanding the mass scale of church closures. This led to new, seemingly more liberal approaches, whereby religion became addressed beyond its cognitive dimension: now it was treated as a complex phenomenon with aesthetic and emotive underpinnings, and museum exhibits were refashioned accordingly. Additionally, a number of secular holidays and public 'rituals' were introduced to take the void left by erased religious practices.[129] Curatorial strategies moved beyond efforts to factually disprove religious beliefs, to displaying them as erroneous forms of patrimony that were nevertheless valuable in their own domain. On the whole a surprising convergence can be observed between official attitudes to history, the built heritage and religion in the late Khrushchev and the Brezhnev era.

The Lviv Museum was conceived already in this spirit. It followed the layout and departments of the Leningrad Museum, showcasing various religions in a loosely evolutionary model, and each denomination also acted as an example of a form of psychological 'deviance'. A senior staff member led me through the exhibition halls, explaining the extent to which exhibited artefacts were the same, yet their interpretations radically different. Using the photos from the internal archive that I got hold of thanks to Roman, she explained how the former exhibition of Roman Catholicism had been centred around the brutalities of the inquisition, Islam around the self-flagellation of Shiite adherents on the Day of Ashura. Opposing these forms of religious irrationality, the very first exhibition in the Museum, 'Science and Religion' once detailed achievements such as of public health programs and the Soviet space race in a clear contrastive fashion to the displayed religions, a message that culminated in the dome of the Dominican church, where a large Foucault's pendulum was hanging. Today the exhibits themselves are largely unchanged, notwithstanding the Greek Catholic department—formerly displaying solely accusatory materials about the 'fascist activities' of the church. Guides and the text boards that

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[128] For an insightful analysis of the Soviet concept of science and its relation to atheist propaganda work see Kelly's *Religion and Nauka* (2016). See also Shakhnovich (1993)

[129] For an in-depth analysis of Khrushchev's policies see e.g. Anderson (1994: esp. 32-64); also Froese (2008: 6-7, 12-13), Polianski (2016).

accompany the exhibits encode a different kind of preferred reading in visitors (Macdonald 2006). Today there are no allusions to atheism or science. The dioramas that showed an inquisitor hanging a heretic and a Muslim adherent whipping himself in a religious frenzy, are now moved to the cellar, where visitors are taken to spooky tours. "This is how we make profit out of our Communist heritage"—the curator joked.

From 1973, when the museum became an independent institution on its own right, it was under the control of the Regional Council. Directors and chief secretaries were appointed from above, while the rest of the employees were hired internally. Censorship was exercised through the Department of Culture and Ideology within the Regional Council: inspectors arrived regularly to evaluate descriptions, guides' work and the selection of exhibits. In turn, many scientific workers were regularly asked to provide expert opinions about various religious groups, notably Pentecostals, Baptists and other heterodox denominations regarded suspicious by the authorities.[130] A few staff members were affiliated with the KGB to make sure that the transparent, visible forms of control were supplemented by more thorough form of surveillance, a method rather customary in any Soviet institution of public significance. Senior curators and scientific workers remember that this reciprocity and ideological work in general was stronger in the 1970s, and eased afterwards, mirroring broader tendencies in the political climate of the country.

Other than having a central ideological role through its expositions, the Museum also functioned as a repository for objects confiscated from various religious communities and was responsible for their restoration.[131] Museum workers worked together with the Assistant Commission of the Executive Committee of the City Council and the District Councils—a body monitoring the religious situation in the region. Together, they followed sermons and gave public lectures as well as obtained and catalogued sacral objects in order to transfer them to the collection of the Museum,[132] many from churches closed down after the war or during Khrushchev's campaign. Disputes about the fate of these objects were characteristic of the first year of independence, when arguments of religious legitimacy surfaced.

The Museum's main activities, scientific-educational work as well as restoration and acquisition of artefacts made it a fairly typical Soviet institution in the domain of public culture, though its size and scope were indeed rarely matched. There is no definite answer about the

[130] The internal archive contains several such reports, especially from the early 1980s, but due to the lack of a catalogue or numbering it is impossible to accurately refer to these.

[131] For instance a collection in the regional archive contains an order about transferring Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic cult objects which were used by Orthodox communities to the Museum at the time in 1982, one of many similar orders. DALO 1332,3, 465. 26. There are several internal documents detailing the cataloguing of items taken from closed churches and from warehouses where such items were stored after the war.

[132] DALO 1332, 3, 465.

reasons for establishing a Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism specifically in Lviv, so many decades after opening of the only other similarly grandiose anti-religious museum in Leningrad, and nearly three decades after the establishment of Soviet rule in Western Ukraine. It seems likely that it was indeed something unique to Lviv that underlay this decision, but in a different way than Iryna Ivanivna would have it: the exceptionally high concentration of sacral objects and multifaceted religious heritage left Lviv with abundant resources to utilise. With the closure of so many churches of different denominations, the Museum of History received several thousands of cult objects, icons and other religious artefacts after WW2, with additional thousands collecting dust in warehouses. Their value as cultural resources was gradually recognised with Khrushchev's 'historical turn' and it was only logical to figure out an appropriate way to utilise them. It was one of the first efforts of the newly established Museum to catalogue and preserve these, and later to finish the task in the broader region of Western Ukraine in general.

As I explained in Chapter 3, before the 1960s, the authorities had paid less attention, invited less in infrastructure and spent fewer resources on historical-cultural objects in the USSR and certainly in Ukraine. As soon as the federal-level policies changed in 1961, local implementation followed, and it appears, that in the museum scene much depended on individuals like Terentiy Novak, who had the power and Party support needed for new initiatives.[133] It seems more plausible that opting for the familiar model of anti-religious museums simply meant relying on an already existing institutional form that was the most suitable for the local conditions. The process was driven—at least partly—by the personal ambition of the director of the History Museum.

Seen from this angle, the Lviv case smoothly fits into the broader Soviet perspective, even if we take the somewhat unusual local religious history into consideration. Rather than oppressing a threat with hostile ideology, the Museum was partly an attempt to instrumentalise local religious heritage in a period of cultural infrastructure developments. A nexus of personal ambition, ideological targets and restoration needs, the fate of the Museum depended on directorial and curatorial abilities to balance these factors so as to carve out space for their own visions and values. The extent to which institutional politics could be reduced to the flagship role that ideological work bestowed on the Museum could be negotiated, and not only in the Soviet era. Below I illustrate how the above outlined conditions shaped the director's work during perestroika and after independence.

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[133] The head of the Lviv Art Gallery, Borys Voznytskyi (director between 1962-2012) and later the director of the Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop, Ivan Mohytych (director between 1980-2006) were similar charismatic figures with unparalleled impact and decision making power in the museum- and heritage scene of the city.

Swapping 'Atheism' for 'Culture': the Museum through the collapse of the USSR

Creating a resilient and versatile institution was not a straightforward process. Any museum is a complex entity, where the politics of exhibitions is closely linked to the representational possibilities of the institute as a whole (Macdonald 1998). This is further complicated by the work of affiliated scientists and restoration professionals. Forms of expertise that shape the politics of content are disparate from directorial work of political manoeuvring on an institutional scale, liaising with authorities and media, competing for funding and so on. The ways in which values and beliefs participate in such processes are different for these curators and directors, but they form a complementary nexus, mutually informing one another's work during turbulent periods.

I met Volodymyr Haiuk in front of the Museum, already after several months of involvement with curators. He was a few minutes late and easy to spot in the early afternoon crowd: a man in his sixties, with a straight posture, he was rushing towards me with quick strides. Still busy on the phone as he arrived, he immediately handed me his business card, half of which was occupied by a photo showing him in the company of Pope John Paul II in a private audience. After this I was slightly surprised that he introduced himself as a communist, proudly emphasising his university training in Moscow. "Later I also studied in Rome, at the Vatican, for two and a half years, so I was both in the Kremlin and the Vatican: I have a full education" — he added chuckling.

Haiuk was the director of the Museum between 1986 and 2004 and deputy director between 2006 and 2014. He established the Institute for Religious Studies in 1993, which he still heads. Staff members always described him as an energetic person and somebody who saved the Museum in times of great turmoil, not only managing to stay in position himself during and after the collapse of the USSR, but also retaining the staff at a time of rapidly decreasing funding. Apart from the church building, he managed to hold onto the premises in the tumult of property redistribution in the 1990s, and leave his office with the museum enjoying a solid reputation in Lviv, maintaining good relationships with various religious institutes. Even critics like Roman liked him; in fact it was him who gave me his contact details.

Immediately upon taking up directorship, Haiuk set out to change the museum from a place of static exhibitions to an institution where religions were understood as distinct approaches to the same human needs, a materialist understanding in line with the party ideology. When we met, he mused about the years of perestroika, which he thought was the best time of his life, when everybody minded their own business while the state was quietly crumbling and things were falling apart. In that chaos he could get hold of funds to buy a bus for workers, regularly pay them premia and get permissions to organise organ concerts (using an old organ inside the Dominican church) at the museum. He seemed to have thriven on uncertainty and as it became increasingly

obvious that strong winds of political change are blowing, he quickly understood that the museum could be threatened because of its legacy.

Once the centripetal forces unleashed by perestroika prevailed, Haiuk understood that his 'muscovite' reputation would not help in the newly independent state of Ukraine eager to break from past ties, so he needed to reach out to members of the new elite. "We needed a man with authority, so that no dog could bark at us, because there are so many patriots here, so many idiots, every man a patriot goddamnit, there is no normal person to be found, only patriots"— he said —"I really was a communist, I really was an atheist, although I'm not an atheist, rather a materialist, because they [the materialists] spoke the truth. I wasn't nervous [when political changes started], my main task was to save the museum itself. So that's what I did." He approached the task by convincing the authorities that Metropolitan Sheptytskyi—the head of the banned Greek catholic Church until 1944—was the museum's "client", and that an exhibition should be made for his 150th anniversary in 1990. Haiuk decided to approach the head of the clandestine church, Metropolitan Sterniuk, who lived in Lviv, his every move under KGB surveillance. Knowing he could not just call as a "KGB person" — by which he meant calling as a person known for his ties to the Party and to the *nomenklatura* — he asked his friend in the Party Committee about Sterniuk's address. He went there in person, and convinced the Metropolitan to cooperate: he gave Haiuk addresses of clandestine priests and nuns who had important relics from Sheptytskyi, which could be exhibited. The two men reached a crucial agreement:

> I agreed with him [Sterniuk] that they would bring everything, and he would open the exhibition, sanctify (*osviatyt'*) my atheist museum and open that exhibition. On the next day early morning at 9:15 they called, "You were at Sterniuk yesterday?" —"Yes."—"You said so-and-so." I said, "I have a good memory, I remember that yesterday I spoke to Sterniuk."—"Don't go there anymore"—"Okay I will not go there anymore, Sterniuk will come to me." Then people saw that we are friends with Sterniuk. Because he would have been the greatest cure for me, he was the most affected by the atheists. And then he was suddenly friends with us. And Sterniuk awarded me when the underground church returned, I was rewarded with a medal of Ukrainian Patriots. There was Khmara, Kosiv, the Horyn brothers [all nationalist public figures] and Haiuk was there, the only communist among them, I was a communist and an atheist and I was awarded that medal for Sheptytskyi's anniversary for my contribution to his revival.

The newly rehabilitated Greek Catholic clergy were initially busy with regaining their own churches, especially the small wooden churches throughout the region, former Roman Catholic buildings were not demanded urgently. After securing the Metropolitan's support Haiuk went on to broaden the scientific standing of his institute: he established the Religious Studies Institute in 1993 and invited Yaroslav Dashkevych—a historian who had spent years in Gulag—, to head it. This became a platform where leaders of various denominations were invited to participate in annual conferences and where Haiuk started to publish a book series about the "spiritual leaders"

of the country. This, and substantial networking with the Ministry of Culture in Kyiv and in the Lviv Regional Administration (where he even worked for a year later on), ensured that the Museum was protected by a network of interests, favours and symbolic reference points.

During this and subsequent meetings we had, Haiuk repeatedly likened his work to landlords or estate owners. He used the Hungarian loanword *gazda* (a regional, Galician term), to describe his efforts at preserving the Museum in the new times. *Gazda*, he explained, was a word that his Hutsul (i.e. Carpathian) family would use, roughly correspondent to the Russian and Ukrainian word *khoziain/khaziaiin*. Both terms have a semantic scope difficult to convey in English, as they describe the position of an owner-leader-boss whose responsibility is more personally shaped than disinterested managerial attitudes attributed to directors. The importance such personalised ties gained in the Soviet planned economies is a common place of regional scholarship (eg. Dunn 2004, Humphrey 1998, Verdery 1996, Yurchak 2002), and many in Lviv commonly refer to it as their 'Byzantine sociality'. Rogers in his classic essay notes how, given their lack of access to exchangeable goods, "socialist citizens trafficked in all manner of rights and obligations outside the official plan" (2006: 920), which in turn shaped social relations by-and-large. Successful managers in these conditions were then those most skilled in extending and cultivating networks of favours and debt, and Haiuk was certainly a networker extraordinaire.

What makes his actions interesting though, is neither that *khoziaistvo* is characteristic of them in an only indirectly economic context; nor the ease with which such practices transcended the domain of the Soviet socio-economic conditions that produced them. It was rather the whole affair's proximity to values and ideological matters. It was the visible divergence between the values that drove Haiuk to build relations through demonstrative gestures, and the values those gestures came to stand for, even with all participants' awareness of his lack of genuine support. Priests, 'patriots' and newly emerging politicians all suspected that Haiuk was acting out of a need to attend for his own and his staff's future prospects, and on top of this, was motivated by repugnant rejection of the new elite. He was aware that the only productive way of carving out space for themselves, and potentially for other "communists and atheists" in the new order was by playing some 'patriots' against the rest. And so he did.

A striking aspect of this story is the extent to which Haiuk was removed from customary dilemmas of genuine versus fake support. Especially considering the awareness nationalists had about his views, it is obvious that the deciding factor was in the gesture of arranging the exhibition, rather than supporting it with all honesty. It was Haiuk's communist stance—as well as the growing inertia of the political infrastructure—that allowed for the Sheptytskyi exhibition, with full KGB awareness, as the phone calls he described to me, show. For the KGB a trusted person's presence meant a certain control over dissent, while for the clandestine clergy it was the only way to gradually expand from the confinement of their underground networks.

In such conditions khoziaistvo, Haiuk's ability to navigate the intricacies of his network and his assertive directorial attitude was a precondition of success. In many respects his having the whip hand in this marketplace of valuable connections was more crucial than any loyalty he could have sworn to the Metropolitan—after all, pledging allegiance is easy. In the end when he did receive the Ukrainian Patriot medal, he was awarded for his deeds rather than his dispositions: his acts could not help but meant and achieved something he had only tangential support for. In the end, it is difficult to decide who was more successful in outwitting the other: Sterniuk, who used the communist Haiuk to foster Greek Catholic revival; or was Haiuk, who got the priest to consecrate his atheist museum? Haiuk might have thought values and ideas were an incidental aspect of the web of favours he needed weave, but in the end this reconfigured the very people he was responsible for—and his own work. His staff members, who had to implement the transition by curating new exhibitions and deciding over the sacral objects in their repository, were constrained by values and beliefs in a rather different way, and their genuineness was measured according to different standards.

Curators, priests, dilemmas

The decision about transferring the church building to the Greek Catholic Church was not an easy one, as it required the Museum to find a new place for its library. It also came with claims to 'return' sacral objects held by the Museum, a process that was mediated by the Ministry of Culture. Conflicts arose from ambiguities around the documentation of the objects in question, as the Museum was only willing to give back the objects proven to have been obtained from that particular church. This intention was eventually overridden by the social ties between a number of religiously inclined museum employees and the clergy affiliated with newly established parish. The head of the archive, Svitlana, an energetic blonde around forty, explained that some of her colleagues tried to ensure the transfer of more artefacts to the church, while others would not support anything beyond the clearly documented cases. Eventually, she said, that

> [o]n the basis of personal contacts we gave the Eucharist Church 73 objects which did not come from the church. And, well, again, on the basis of that friendship, the priest came to the museum storage and took some things that he liked. He got things for instance from the Armenian Cathedral, that he had nothing to do with. He took both Orthodox and Catholic things. Just that they were nice things, they attracted him. And he took them all. And now this has been so, perhaps for 15 years, [these things have been] deposited there. And I cannot turn this back. I find myself in such a, well…a little hostile situation... I feel that in this situation… Because I visit the Father, I am obliged under Ukrainian law to check those things annually and update the documents. And when I come to check these things the Father brings me to the sanctuary, opens the icon case, the most sacred place in the church, where women have no right to cross the threshold. He opens it and shows me the goblet. And so he provokes me, saying: "Will you go to the icon case to verify the

> number of the goblet?" That probably means "You atheist, or even, you devil with horns, will you allow yourself to do this?!" Well, here we have laws based on the norms of Christian ethics. I explain to him that "this is not your thing, you can buy things for yourself, these things should be kept in the Museum, it's not even your denomination!"

The above story highlights on the one hand an opposition between the secular Ukrainian state law and the religious regulations incommensurable with it. After the uncertainties of property restitution abated, boundaries were clear again. Even when Svitlana, as the representative of the museum, endowed herself with the authority of law, she was well aware that secular law is only of secondary relevance for the priest. This mirrors the very process in which the parish was able to obtain objects that were not rightfully theirs, thanks to the pragmatic superiority of informal relations over written law, and especially thanks to museum workers who acted as first and foremost religious individuals following Christian norms, and only additionally as representatives of their professional knowledge (e.g. about the denominational differences concerning the objects in question) or secular state regulations. Svitlana was quick to make sure that in principle she had nothing against retuning the objects that rightfully belong to the church, that she understood their point about having a better use for those cult objects than collecting dust in the Museum's collection. What she found problematic was when priests contradicted their own denominational rules in order to acquire more than their fair share.

Yet, her defensive capacities were curtailed by the fact that the priest could evoke the past of the Museum as a locus of propaganda any time. In the current status quo, where local politics is so deeply dependent on the clergy's support,[134] there would be little public doubt about his moral superiority if he tried to condemn the Museum in the press or during mass. By challenging Svitlana's faith and forcing her to choose between a religious and an expert self, the priest communicated his superiority, and Svitlana herself was fast to fill in the gaps between his words. Haiuk might have been able to make sure he was irreplaceable in the transition, and made a deal of refashioning the Museum as a uniquely situated place of mediation between secular academics and religious professionals, but he could not prevent transgressions in such everyday contexts. The consequences of the partial return of the premises and thereby the door-to-door coexistence of the parish church and the Museum made the transformation remain open-ended, and museum workers uneasy about the future.

Those like Svitlana, who were certain about their professional identity had an easier time when under pressure by church representatives. However, those museum workers who were the flag holders of cooperation with the UGCC—themselves religious and often patriotic, anxious about their past involvement in atheist propaganda—, spoke about such conflicts in rather different terms. Early in my fieldwork I was having coffee with Olha Serhiyivna, the curator who

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[134] It was a recurrent complaint that it was impossible to win the local elections if the UGCC was against someone, making most cultural institutions careful about open criticisms, or at least its tone.

had earlier told about staff members having arranged baptisms illegally during the Soviet era; and her younger colleague Anastasia, who had privately told me a lot about various ongoing conflicts between the museum and the church. A young woman in her mid-thirties who came from a Russian speaking, not too observant Orthodox background, Anastasia was married to a Russian Tatar, while Olha Serhiyivna's family had come to Lviv from a nearby village in the 1950s. She had found her Greek Catholic religiosity during the nationalist revival and remained a zealous believer ever since. She often condemned male colleagues who did not enlist in the ongoing war as 'anti-Ukrainian', and by association, against the church. She started working in the Museum in the late 1980s, and admitted to reporting on her colleagues in her first years. Though she regretted this now, she assured me that she never said anything significant: her low status as a simple secretary protected her from knowing important things at the time. Now she wore a cross, and referred to her role in curating the first Sheptyskyi exhibition at the Museum with thinly veiled sense of importance. She curated both the 1990 exhibition and a second one in 2015, when Sheptytskyi's 150th birth anniversary, was widely celebrated in Lviv with the erection of a statue, renaming of institutions in his honour, and commemorating the Metropolitan's legacy in every imaginable way. As I was asking her about church and museum relations, I witnessed an interesting moment of friction between the two of them.

As we talked, Olha Serhiyivna explained to me the current relationship between the UGCC and the museum: 'We now have a completely normal professional relationship. And they have a tolerant attitude towards us now, I think. Today we no longer feel such a biased position against them. Somehow that has been digested already. It is now forgotten. It's possible to pretend (*robliat' vyhliad*).' To this Anastasia hurried to add: "Now it is only the question of premises that is standing between the church and us." "Between the parish and us.. Between the church and us there is no [conflict]" —Olha Sehiyivna intervened immediately, visibly concerned that I will bring the wrong message home. "Yes, I had the parish in mind"—agreed Anastasia compromisingly. Olha Serhiyivna continued: "Between the parish and us. But this is only a question of premises. Because, in general, they would like to have all of these premises. Maybe they found out how they could be used by them, I think. But material questions often stand between people."

For Olha Sehiyivna to remain a good Greek Catholic while also keeping face as a curator, it was crucial to differentiate between different layers of power within the Church. Since she was the author of the anniversary exhibition about Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and one of the main organisers of the annual conference of the Religious Studies Institute, she had ample proof of cordial and cooperative relationship with the UGCC, i.e. the church. Yet, as a museum employee she did not find the claims for the premises justifiable and shared the uncertainty about the future exhibitions and the UGCC's, or in her addition in this conversation, the 'parish's' potential intentions with the premises. Anastasia and Svitlana were less affected by the legacy of the past, as both of them joined the Museum well after the Ukrainian independence. But even they had to

engage in performative acts to legitimise their work, when the symbolic legacy of the institute could become so precarious in case of the disapproval of the clergy. Svitlana could not avoid becoming a representative of a history she herself was not part of, and she needed to convey a sense of professional expertise to covey a credibility that could compete with the reference points cited by the priest.

Haiuk's alliances made it possible for the Museum to survive in the post-independence status quo and for himself to be free to express his materialist inclinations, but his staff had considerably more difficult time in cultivating relationships with religious authorities. Contrary to the dynamics of Haiuk's alliances, curators' interactions were always kept on the verge of defence by the subtle pressure of priests, pushing museum workers to anchor their professional standings in non-religious frames of legitimacy, like Svitlana, or scale down their criticisms, like Olha Serhiyivna. In both cases their own political and religious opinions were assessed and held in the spotlight. When the priest was probing Svitlana as to whether she would break religious regulations, he did so certain of his position within an organisation triumphant in local power relationships; it was precisely this certainty that necessitated careful and personal defences on the curators' side, even when they were believers. These experiences suggest that the resilience of the Museum was a result of divergent forms of participation in personal networks on the curatorial and directorial level, complementing one another and configuring individuals' personal and professional personas differently in the daily nitty-gritty of institutional politics. Visions about the Museum's future were likewise circumscribed by conditions rooted in the 1991 transition and financial scarcity.

Constrained relation-building: filling voids after a geopolitical shift

On a late September Thursday, workers of the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture gathered in one of the temporary exhibition halls of the building for their weekly assembly. As a few dozen of mostly middle aged staff members gradually filled the hall and sat down in pairs or groups, three younger colleagues were busy setting up the computer and the projector for their presentation. Anastasia, Svitlana and Nadia had all participated in the annual ICOM conference in Milan a few months earlier, as members of the small and unofficial Ukrainian team. Now they were ready to discuss their experiences with their colleagues.

The senior scientific worker, a man in his sixties, who was in charge of setting the topics of the weekly presentations, introduced his colleagues in a somewhat hesitant manner. Sending people to Milan was financially burdensome for the museum: registration fees for just one day amounted to almost a monthly salary of an average employee. As a result, the three women could participate only in one day of the week-long event. Their presentation about the conference to colleagues mixed the personal and the professional, highlighting digital technology put in use in

Figure 5.3. Young curators (left) attending the ICOM conference. Photo by 'Svitlana'

various exhibitions, daring contemporary curation techniques in a modern art museum and a few photos of the women themselves, visibly enjoying the Italian summer.

There were moments when I struggled to follow the presentation, the voices of the speakers crowded out by the chitchat in the audience.. I was inadvertently eavesdropping on gossip about a male colleague's new baby — born out of wedlock—, while a curator next to me was composing a handwritten letter. Others were paying more attention, but overall the meeting had the somewhat disengaged atmosphere that compulsory gatherings often do, as if many colleagues did not quite see how such trips, obviously enjoyable for the delegates, could count as something more than a holiday. This impression was voiced immediately as the presentation was over, with one of the widely respected senior male colleagues exclaiming: "Ladies, I understand that this world in Europe is very modern and progressive, but we have to understand that our world is our world. This is a different reality. What can we learn from this here in Ukraine?"

As some in the audience were nodding and others disagreeing, the room suddenly became loud with attention, and Anastasia and Nadia tried to formulate a defence. Ukrainians, they said, cannot just shrug shoulders and miss out on so many potential cooperations and even grant money. They stressed how supportive their foreign colleagues had been and how many meetings they were invited to, none of which they could attend, due to their short stay in Milan. Anastasia

recounted that she had given an improvised presentation about their museum, and that Finnish delegation seemed very interested in establishing a formal connection with the museum. Contemporary ICOM, the presenters said, has a strong orientation towards Africa and Asia, so then why could it not also include Eastern European countries?

The discussion took a new turn, becoming more agitated, when Svitlana brought up the Russian delegation's activities at ICOM. "We forgot to mention the political aspect as well. Excuse me, just a few more words. Russia was present at the conference and, of course, they were very active. They, of course, gave themselves the function of being the patron for all the Post-Soviet countries. They proposed to help Belarus, Azerbaijan and Georgia and so on…Ukraine this time did not take part in this, but they [the Russian delegation] held a workshop, for free, with Russian as a working language, where they had curators teaching. There was an invitation, but we did not take part in it because we had basically no time." "There were many regional committees at ICOM, and this one was specifically aimed at post-Soviet countries, and we planned to go, but on that day we already had to leave. We wanted to just go and see, just because you have to know what is going on" — Anastasia added, visibly anxious about the sensitive politics of both participating or keeping away.

Svitlana then went on explaining how the Russian ICOM works much more efficiently than the Ukrainian division, how funding is better and their multi-lingual website a useful platform of engagement. She stressed the importance of cultural diplomacy and museums' role in putting Ukraine on the map with fresh messages and visible progressive activities. They saw international engagement as a way to demonstrate Ukraine's arrival to Europe. In the few seconds of silence that followed, the former director and current deputy director of the museum, Zoriana Bilyk[135] stood up in their support. She recalled a conference in New York she participated in almost two decades before, where the Polish delegation arrived with "450 of kilos of their own published materials", while Ukrainians sent "mistresses of ministers". It was embarrassing. She passionately thanked the current director for making it financially possible for the young colleagues to participate and stressed that it was absolutely essential, even if they only have limited possibilities. They have to show their work to the world. The discussion ended with a loud debate about the uselessness of the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture and a few anecdotes about visiting conferences in Soviet Leningrad decades before.

The friction between the two sides had a strong generational element, yet their dilemmas were far from reducible to age. Neither was the sole concern of questions the three women raised

[135] Bilyk became director in 2004 and kept her position until 2014, when she made sure her candidate, the current director got the position and she stepped back as deputy. This was the exact same strategy Haiuk deployed after his directorship ended in 2004. This is an established way for former directors to stay engaged.

their desire to copy costly and fancy 'European' exhibition techniques in the Museum. At stake were visions of the Museum, both in a (geo)political sense and on the professional, curatorial level. The transition made possible by Haiuk, the aftermath of which was still negotiated on a daily basis by workers like Svitlana and Olha Serhiyivna brought about a deeper crisis of professional standards and political context. Reimagining the Museum as an institute in cooperation with theologians and academics, a tool for religious revival did not make the professional work of curators much easier to place in wider context of museums in Ukraine, Europe or the post-Soviet domain.

With Lviv's gradual shift towards 'Europe', Russian curatorial relationships had been first rejected then severed and conference participation fell headlong. Aesthetics, interpretive styles and curatorial norms with which more senior colleagues 'grew up' professionally, were becoming anachronistic, and their expertise increasingly questioned. At the same time the small salaries rarely attracted ambitious young people to work in museums, and when they did, those people were often busy finding their way out, like Roman into Polish academia. The strenuous bureaucracy the Museum inherited from the Soviet era made any curatorial innovation painstaking: any new temporal exhibition needed the approval of the 'methodological council', a body of all scientific workers. Only after each and every caption and artefact were approved by a board of senior colleagues, could green light be given. All this was topped by the general lack of funding and institutional dependency that made launching any profitable enterprise incredibly difficult for the Museum: they could not even open a gift shop without the permission of the Regional Administration.

Thus the main permanent exhibition has not changed much since the restructuring in the 1990s, either in its visual language or its content. New plans were created by a senior scientific worker who wanted to restrict the exhibition to religions of Galicia, displayed in chronological order, as they 'arrived' in the region. Due to his conservatism the visual language is imagined to be rather similar to that of the current exhibition. Among younger workers there was a consensus that in its current form the new exhibition plan would be even worse than the existing display, because it would be too historical, not very informative and overtly theological. If the new plan were realised, Islam, Buddhism and other world religions would no longer be exhibited; and as artefacts from these religions are not presented anywhere else in Lviv, the Museum's permanent exhibition would be deprived of some educational value. Anastasia thought that "this [the new plan] is nonsense, because the Museum has to educate people": her stepfather just recently asked her if Islam was the oldest religion in the world and she has even met people who thought that Christianity and Roman Catholicism were two utterly different things. Holding a mirror to local society by only representing their own history would be an obvious failure for her. A younger curator jokingly added that there should be a museum room on atheism as well, if they were to exhibit local religious phenomena in Galicia: the history of the Museum itself shows that there

was such a phenomenon and it has its own decades of prominence. In satirical fashion, this curator pointed out the seemingly holistic value of the proposed new plan, when in reality it was shaped by as careful a selection criteria as the current exhibition. According to this young curator, the idea of reorienting the museum's permanent exhibition towards 'Galician religions' reflected the reactionary, in his opinion, rise of religion in Lviv's public life.[136]

What might look like an adherence to the increasing religiosity of the public space and discourse in Lviv was actually partly a result of financial and institutional conditions. Support was much easier to obtain for working on Christian subjects, than, say, on Islam or Buddhism. Anastasia, for one, was dreaming about overtaking the Islam Department, studying Arabic in her free time, paying out of her own pocket. The head of the Jewish Department was finishing a PhD in Jewish studies and hoping one day to open a museum of Jewish Galicia. He at least could secure funding for digitalising the Judaica collection. But Christianity was much more tangibly present in Lviv and hence it was easier to maintain cooperation on the local level, be it about borrowing objects or relying on their expertise. The disastrous economic situation and the lack of financial independence of the Museum made it nearly impossible to acquire a good quality collection of objects beyond the Judeo-Christian sphere. Such constraints crippled most future-oriented policies. The Museum seemed to have gained a new, semi-secular position, where the nominal diversity of its exhibits was in an ever growing contrast with its increasingly narrow focus.

Seen with this background in mind, Svitlana, Anastasia and Nadia were trying to make up for the professional network lost with Ukrainian independence. ICOM was understood as the potential successor of Leningrad, where senior colleagues went for trainings and conferences. They were the only employees with at least some command of English, which enabled them to at least make the first steps of engagement, even when against tight budgetary constraints and skeptical colleagues. Their proposals promised the way out of the ever narrower scope of exhibitions, dependent on local, Galician religious denominations and the support of their clergies. Through these tentative new alliances, these junior workers were hoping to restore something comparable to the lost Soviet-era international relevance of the Museum, a step forward from Haiuk's move that tied the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture to local religious revival.

Conclusion: curation confined

I hope to have shown how a former locus of anti-religious propaganda managed to secure a standing in the new, nationalist and pro-Greek Catholic status quo in Lviv after Ukraine declared independence. The strategies of manoeuvring stemmed from leadership practices characteristic of the Soviet period, especially in the extent to which they fashioned directorial authority around the

[136] Soon after their trip to Milan, younger curators pushed the Museums to develop its first exhibition addressing the legacy of the Soviet era and their role in ideological propaganda. It was put curated by one of the three attendees of the ICOM conference, Nadia, and took several internal vetos, toning down, and compromises to produce. It was held in a small side-room, and never advertised widely.

favours it could build on. This partially explains the survival of the Museum in Lviv. Furthermore it is partly these strategies that account for the structurally similar position the Museum occupies in relation to the current ruling elite than it did before. Whereas they were involved in anti-religious activities before, today they aspire to become equally instrumental in the cultural life of Lviv, conceived in culturally and ethically Christian and especially Greek Catholic terms.

I also argued that the proximity to ethical and religious questions, that is granted by the condition that curators work with sacral objects is manifest in a different way for curators and scientific workers in the Museum, than for directors. Their ideological loyalties are exposed, scrutinised and utilised to a much broader extent than directors similar commitments. In this respect, ideological and institutional loyalty are assumed in different ways by different expert positions, together forming a nexus that accounts for a continuous ability to successfully negotiate the political conditions this cultural work is embedded in.

VI. Unlikely alliances: Orthodox Jews and Ukrainian nationalism against a Holocaust memorial in Lviv

On 4 September 2016 a Holocaust memorial was opened in downtown Lviv, as part of the Space of Synagogues project. The memorial was a joint effort of GIZ[137] and the Centre for the Urban History of East-Central Europe, and the Lviv City Council (LCC). Once a major Jewish centre, Lviv has not been renowned for its efforts to preserve or revive its Jewish heritage since WW2. Instead it has gained fame within and beyond Ukraine as an ethnic nationalist hotbed, where major streets are named after German collaborationists, a number of whom were involved in the Holocaust. The Space of Synagogues project seems to defy these stereotypes, and signal that there is more to Western Ukrainian memory politics than ethnic nationalism. But its fiercest opponent is a small orthodox Jewish community, that found allies among the patriotic right; they wanted to reconstruct the synagogue as a functioning sacral building.

In this chapter I attempt to make sense of this opposition by locating it in its larger political context. Rather than assuming historical attitudes to be shaped by ethnic belonging — which would make it impossible for an Orthodox Jew to join forces with the very ethnic nationalism that was in play in 20th century antisemitic atrocities—, I find it more helpful to untangle alliances along visions and values of various groups. For those involved, the site has strong representational and normative potential: what eventually stands there, embodies core values about the city, the country, religion and history. It was these values that were irreconcilable and this high visibility that made the stakes so high, the conflict so combustive. In many ways, the site is what Joel Robbins calls an *enacted example* (2015: 20), a place where adversaries fight for realising their core values. He finds ritual to be a social form that lends itself to a "realised representation" of value (2015:22); to complement Robbins' approach I propose that heritage sites, memorials and monumental architecture should be seen in similar terms to rituals.

I chose to narrate the conflict from the angle of Jewish involvement. The literature on contemporary Eastern European memory politics agree that local Jewish contributions are negligible in shaping the memory landscape (e.g. Gruber 2002, Himka 2005, 2015). While it is

[137] GIZ, or Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Corporation for International Cooperation) is an international development organisation that belongs under the German Federal Government and is active in over 130 countries. In Ukraine its office is located in Lviv and it specialises in cultural heritage-related projects. Among locals there is little or no awareness of the fact that GIZ exists outside of Ukraine as well, resulting in all kinds of interpretations of their activities, postulating various "German intentions" in Ukraine.

beyond doubt that the Jewish communities in the region have shrunken beyond recognition, I demonstrate that their support has been indispensable if are are to explain the political terrain Holocaust commemoration initiatives operate in Ukraine. Jewish support and opposition has been manifest in the whole range of attitudes between opposition and support, and — thanks to its privileged symbolic legacy concerning the Holocaust— it is a much needed political currency for both sides of the conflict. Securing support, or at least withstanding accusations of antisemitism is what gives credibility to the work of organisers and opponents alike. I will therefore tell the story of Jewish groups' enacting their authority to stand for or against the memorial, and prove the other side to be irrelevant, illicit or felonious.

This local conflict assumes an international dimension not only by the institutional connections of both sides. When opponents portray it as a violation of human rights or UNESCO standards, or when its proponents hope it to act as an exemplar in Ukraine, their rhetoric creates a dynamics I will call *structural amplification*, following Marshall Sahlins (2005b). The memorial stands in a metonymic relationship with much broader wholes: global issues are contained in its micro-context. Local actors enter the stage to protect core trans-local values they claim to be authorised to represent, and their claims gain significance precisely through referencing this larger scale; yet, in many ways these people are still first and foremost local actors.

The way the frontline emerged attests to local complexities. This conflict is not a Jewish versus gentile one, nor an ethnic nationalist vs liberal cosmopolitan one. Instead, these discourses are appropriated by clusters of stakeholders, neither of whom is purely 'local' or 'international', 'Ukrainian' or 'foreign'. By showing how structural amplification keeps both sides embedded in nonlocal discourses and networks I claim that relying on international values, funds and actors makes it possible for those involved to carve space out for alternative versions of the 'local' in Lviv.

To spell out these points I first have to introduce the Jewish community and its major organisations, touching on the marks that decades of oppressed religiosity left on their practices and knowledge. I then explain the emergence of the Space of Synagogues project and introduce its implementing organisations. After outlining the transition from a broad consensus to hostility and court trials, I address Jewish organisations' attempts to represent the Jewish community in front of a broader Ukrainian and international public. Finally I step back to draw some conclusions about the constraints that circumscribe how and what minority groups can say about their history in the midst of intensely nationalising state politics.

Being Jewish in Lviv

Jewish presence dates back to the mid-thirteenth century in Lviv (Wierzbieniec 2000: 223) and its vestiges are ubiquitous. Contrary to the common regional model of a single Jewish settlement, Jews lived in two separate quarters: within the city walls, where the ruins of the Golden Rose stand, and further northwest in the Krakivskyi district. The 'downtown' and the 'suburban' communities evolved separately, had different administration, synagogues, schools, courts, but with similar, radical socioeconomic diversity: both included affluent as well as impoverished people living in ramshackle housing (Wierzbieniec 2000). Apart from using the same cemetery, the two communities maintained some distance and disinclination (Kravtsov n.d.); the downtown community with its reform synagogue was more assimilated by the 19th century. Those who remember this division at all today often simplify it by calling the downtown community orthodox and the suburban progressive. Habsburg emancipation policies led to the growth of Lviv Jewry and by the time of the German invasion their number amounted to over a hundred thousand, a third of the city's population. Nearly all of them perished in the Holocaust, including most who escaped to Lviv from surrounding areas.

Jews of Soviet Lviv

The following over four decades, when Lviv was part of the Ukrainian SSR, are a main reference point for especially elderly Jews. Ancestors of the 6-7000 Jews[138] who currently live in Lviv came from places as far as Bessarabia or Siberia.[139] There is no precise documentation about their origins and social backgrounds, but testimonies I collected attest to large internal diversity: from war veterans, to menial labourers, engineers and doctors, they did not share much beyond Russian language and a high level of assimilation.[140] As they are usually referred

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[138] It is notoriously difficult to estimate their numbers: people with mixed ancestry might not be part of the official records and it is a widespread practice in Ukraine to be registered in another location than one's de facto residence. Organisation leaders estimate the numbers to be between 2000-9000.

[139] According to Amar (2015:264-5) around 6000 'Polish Jews', expelled from Lviv in 1940, returned from the Eastern Parts of the USSR in 1946 and most of them immediately left for Poland. In the next few years a similar number arrived from the 'Eastern *oblasts*' and they, together with the few Polish (Galician) Jews became the new Jewish community in Lviv. Soviet officials estimated the proportion of easterners around 95% in 1949. Later in the Soviet period their numbers reached 26000 (Amar 2015:281), but their numbers are on the ebb due to continuous outmigration since 1991.

[140] A small Galician town might give some loose comparative insights: the majority of the newly arriving Jews in Drohobych were without secondary education, their families were coming from regions as apart as Almaty, Odessa and Warsaw. DALO-1332, 3, 3. 1-2.

to today, especially by those who question their claims to local Jewish heritage, they are 'Soviet Jews'.

Nowadays most of them describe the Soviet era as a time of oppression and 'barbarism'. Their testimonies resonate with the current broader local abhorrence of the USSR, and I often found them strangely devoid of details. People were rarely aware that Lviv had a working synagogue until 1962[141] and many did not know about the illegal meetings Jews held in private homes that I read about in the archive,[142] suggesting their families were not part of those gatherings.

When an elderly lady during a shabbat service discovered that I could read Hebrew, she told me I was lucky: the communists made them forget their traditions, "it was like a cultural Holocaust (ru. *kulturny Cholokost*)". When I asked her if she was religious during those decades she answered she was not, nobody was, there was no synagogue anyway. "I knew I was Jewish because it was in my passport." She was referring to a key aspect of being Jewish in the Soviet Union, the so-called fifth point on Soviet passports that stated the bearer's nationality. This external ascription of Jewish identity was often not what they would have chosen to maintain themselves (Shternshis 2006: xiv) — often it was their main link to Jewishness. Lviv Jews maintained what Zvi Gitelman calls a "thin culture" (2003:49). Their Jewishness was predominantly based on a shared ethnic identity and experiences, rather than the "thick" culture of a communal language, active ritual practices or ethnic neighbourhoods.[143]

Jews were in the crossfire of Soviet policies both as a religious group, and as an ethnic group suspected of nationalism, speculation, bourgeois individualism and cosmopolitan activities.[144] Most often the latter aspects worried Soviet officials more than religion: in Lviv the accusations that eventually led to the closure of the only remaining synagogue mentioned alleged zionist agitation and black market activities.[145] In other words the Jews meant a larger threat from a class or economic perspective than as a religious group: a local official once

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141 DALO 1332, 3, 80. Detailed discussion about the possible reasons is outlined by Tarik Amar (2015: 261-81) The synagogue was reopened only in 1989.

142 DALO 1332, 3, 197. 11, 14-5.

143 Marina Shapritsky (2012) and Tanya Richardson (2009) both describe a similarly secular, 'thin' culture in Odesa that resulted from the post-revolutionary destruction of the local religious infrastructure. The more central status of Jews there, however, and the stronger generational continuity made these sentiments central enough for local Jews to be suspicious about recent 'foreign' developments of religious revival.

144 These common accusations are often mentioned in the literature about Soviet Jews: eg. Amar 2015; Chervyakov et al. 2004; Pinkus 1990 etc.

145 In a report the local head of the Council for Matters of Religious Cults, Vilkhovyi reported to Khrushchev that the synagogue was a "nationalist enterprise where nonreligious elements gathered for commerce". The campaign for the closure of the synagogue coincided with an intensive purge of economic crimes, the victims of which were predominantly Jews. (Amar 2015: 271-4)

explicitly stated that their activities have to be restrained to religious practices.[146] But religiosity was difficult to maintain for this already assimilated community, when it was so closely tied to antisemitic party policies. Synagogue attendance was low, barely rising above a few hundred in shabbats, only attracting larger crowds on Yom Kippur or Passover.[147]

Decades of assimilation and the impossibility of openly practicing Judaism left the community with few resources. Religious education was not substantial, there were no trained rabbis and most people's family histories included memories of the Holocaust as it happened elsewhere, if at all. Their communication with relatives in Israel or with Jewish educational institutions had been limited as best, their meetings were under KGB surveillance.[148] In the late Gorbachev years of liberalisation Jews had to organise themselves from nearly scratch. Moreover, since Soviet laws only recognised Jewish communities under the label *relihiyna hromada* (religious society), that were usually attached to a building, ethnic, cultural and religious aspects of Judaism were not demarcated institutionally or legally. This had to be done anew after 1991.

Years of revival and segmentation

When the revival of Jewish life started in the years of perestroika, and especially after 1991 when the restitution of religious property took place,[149] it was these 'Soviet Jews' who had to find a way to begin over the Galician Jewish history that was closed off by the violent rupture of the Shoah. In this respect the Jewish experience mirrors Lviv's experience as a whole, where post-independence politics mobilised the idea of return, that meant picking up threads that others left off for the city's almost entirely new, post-war population. Second or third generation Lvivians reached out to the pre-WW2 past and especially the Habsburg era and in doing so they had to rely on what was left in the archives and the buildings, rather than their own family memories.

Jews in Lviv are not that different from how they were in the Soviet era: a recent survey found that most of them are educated beyond secondary education (over 70%) and very few of them identify as religious (less than 10% among young adults)—although most of them stress their Jewish identity over their Ukrainian citizenry, it is only a smaller group that engages in regular cultural or religious activities (Savka and Klymanska 2012). The old socioeconomic

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146 DALO R-1332, 2, 6. 84.

147 Amar estimates ordinary attendance around 1-400 in the 1950s, and between 1000-4300 on Yom Kippur in the period between 1952 and 1959. (2015: 264, 270-1)

148 DALO R-1332, 3, 80.

149 This was a partial process, restitution happened Ukraine on a case by case basis, without a central legal framework. For details see Felcher (2016).

diversity is still visible though: especially among the elderly, who faced more restrictions entering university, many take advantage of soup kitchens and financial aid organised by charitable organisations. Another aspect this survey cannot account for is those who left Ukraine in the large migration wave to Israel and Germany between 1992-96 (Cohen and Kogan 2007, Remennick 2002): I barely knew anybody among Lviv Jews without relatives or friends abroad. Dwindling religiosity among youth might be explained by their emigration specificities: the head of the orthodox group that rejected the memorial, for instance, actively helped many of his community members to send their children to Israeli yeshivas.

Revival started on two fronts and involved the two intact former synagogue buildings: on the one hand, in 1988 the Ukrainian Writers Association and UTOPIK together helped to establish the Sholem Aleichem society, a cultural organisation that brought together many locals invested in Jewish issues. Sasha Nazar, the current director explained that they started a newspaper, *Shofar*, cleared the ruins of the Golden Rose synagogue from rubbles, revived a Jewish theatre and managed to lobby for the Jacob Glazner Shul building— the building of the Soviet-era synagogue— to be renovated and given to them. He was proud that Lviv was among the first cities of Jewish revival: newspapers wrote extensively about the initiative in Kyiv and Moscow, so Lviv stood as an example all over the USSR.[150] Sholem Aleichem is now notoriously underfunded: when I went to meet Sasha, it was January and the building was not heated. We talked, holding warm mugs of coffee and waiting for the small electric heater he just turned on to fight off the cold. Sasha was diplomatic, trying to hold a middle ground between the often hostile groups. His community held concerts, theatre programs and shabbat dinners —according to his critics he lacked vision and skills to get funding, but many liked him and his group for what they saw was a uninfluenced, local, interest-free support of Jewish culture.

In the meantime, a religious initiative emerged as well: a group of mostly older Jews, including a few Holocaust survivors registered a Jewish religious community[151] and requested the other synagogue building to be given them. This was approved in Moscow and the warehouse became the Tsori Gilead synagogue, the only functioning synagogue of Lviv. Community representatives invited Hasidic rabbi from Brooklyn—a practice that seems to be rather widespread in territories of the former Soviet Union due to the disrupted institutionally

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[150] He himself is too young to have witnessed all this, so these explanations reflect memories he heard from previous directors and other members of Sholem Aleichem.

[151] This was the same status the community attached to the last synagogue had until 1962. This required twenty members (the so-called *dvadtsatka*) who elect the director, his deputy and a secretary. For more on the institutional setup of Soviet religious groups see Kelly (2015:302-3), and for an ethnographic description Goluboff (2003: 100-7).

of training religious experts—so by 1990 the religious community was back on its feet. However, soon a conflict broke out among the founders, with impacts on the development of the community that can be felt up to now. One of the founders, Meylakh Sheykhet was accused of misappropriating charity funds and thereby publicly discrediting the community, so the *dvadtsatka* decided to remove him from the board. They successfully did so, and with this they alienated one of the most dedicated activists, who had been working on identifying and documenting mass graves already since 1987. Later on they did reestablish contact, but Sheykhet never became formally part of this group again.

Meylakh Sheykhet is the head of the small orthodox group that so adamantly opposed the Space of Synagogues project. He was born in 1954 in a deeply religious family of Eastern Ukrainian and Belorussian origin; his father was one of the key figures of the clandestine gatherings after the closure of the last synagogue. They could not display their religiosity openly before the final years of the USSR, they did not wear a kippah or grow a beard, but spoke Yiddish at home and Sheykhet began his activist life with the first winds of change in the years of perestroika. An electrician by training, he worked as a college teacher until he was able to make a living out of his "cultural activism." By then he was a seasoned traveller and after a formative stay in the US he stopped being called 'Dyma' and started wearing Jewish insignia. For many this seemed like a conversion too sudden, but archival records evince the continuity he avows. In the early 1990s he established the Ukrainian Bureau of the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ), a Washington-based human rights NGO and has been working with them ever since.

He never married, neither trained as a rabbi. After two decades of community work he established his own organisation, the Turei Zahav Jewish Society in 2009.[152] It was then that he secured premises adjacent to the Golden Rose, a small hall, and office and a yard that opens to the former entrance. He was cautious to call the hall a synagogue, as it lacks a Torah scroll and a qualified rabbi. Nevertheless, around 20-30 people gather there every Friday afternoon for a copious meal and prayers, often hosting a few guests from abroad. The physical proximity of the ruins of the synagogue is a major force of legitimation for them, a reference point they can literally touch when they describe themselves as inheritors of prewar Lviv Orthodoxy. He runs the community and his several other NGOs from the same premises; his office is decorated with letters from notable supporters, awards he received and a religious calendar. The

[152] He was active in other contexts throughout these years: other than Turei Zahav and the UCSJ, he heads the Jewish Renaissance NGO and the Faina Petriakova Scientific Centre for Jewish Art. These latter organisations mainly work in the heritage- and cultural sphere, organising conferences and study events. Often the boundaries between these organisations are unclear and all are operated from the same premises.

community has a kosher kitchen next door and they hold weekly prayers and occasional cultural events. They also deliver kosher food to elderly Jews.

When Sheykhet engages with a Jewish audience, he would often call his community a *kehillah.* Elected communal Jewish structures, like municipal councils, in Poland, the Baltic states and Ukraine were also called *kehillah* up to the interwar period (Heller 1980: 23-25). Traditionally they were organisations that represented the Jewish community in front of gentile authorities, were responsible for paying taxes and settling internal disputes. With this term, Sheykhet assumes a pre-Soviet history and a legally not recognised position in independent Ukraine. But the word makes sense for his foreign Jewish partners, and it is recognisable to any Hebrew speaker as a Biblical term. The continuity implicit here is institutional: he positions themselves as a synagogue community without a synagogue, and one with established judicial functions. Understood in a broader sense it implies a functioning ritual community, an odd claim for a group with no rabbi and with a legal form of an NGO. However, it is useful in keeping his own domain distinct from the rabbi's, as it tacitly continues the division between the downtown and the suburban community.

Sheykhet never mentioned the rabbi in front of me, but it seems plausible that he set up his own community in the aftermath of the conflict around the charity funds. Choosing not to attend the only trained rabbi's services, but instead keep distance and establish his own agenda challenges the piety, humility and observance he proclaims. When once I pushed him, he was diplomatic, announced his respect for the rabbi but stressed that his work in Tsori Gilead would not solve the issue of the Golden Rose, and it would not restore the Orthodox community here. Even though he introduces his people as the 'Orthodox community of Lviv', what he means seems more restricted. The pre-war segmentation of Lviv Jews allows Sheykhet to find a legacy for his organisation that is distinct from the active synagogue: he is trying to restore the Orthodox, 'downtown community', not the 'suburban' and in this respect his agenda is anchored as much in space as in Talmudic tradition. It is the unique position of the Golden Rose in the urban fabric that gives Sheykhet a language that resonates with the heritage discourse as well, and that includes a straightforward demarcation of responsibilities and scopes between Tsori Gilead, Sholem Aleichem and Turei Zahav, each with their respective synagogue building as focal points.

These religious initiatives were followed by a few organisations that were explicitly cultural and that rely on different international support networks. Among them the largest Jewish organisation, Hesed Arieh was established in 1998 with support from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). Hesed has a kindergarten, hosts numerous cultural activities for children and families, brings aid by distributing winter clothes and money for

renovating flats. They have an informal museum and the director, Adel Dianova is proud of their annual Klezmer Fest that she sees as an event of joy and revival, where the Jewish community can contribute to the cultural life of the city. Hillel shares a focus on youth with its student trainings, Hebrew courses and support for birthright tours—*taglit*—to Israel. These organisations concur in their presentism and what they see as a 'constructive engagement' with the majority society, their concern with the past is predominantly educational. Theology or trans-generational justice matter less for them than the contemporary community and the future of Jewish life in Lviv.

It was decades of obstructed institutionally and official silence over history that came to an end when local Jews assembled and restored their institutional presence in 1988-9. But from the earliest moments onward these hesitant initiatives were rekindled with the help of foreign donations, cooperations, ritual and historic expertise, and they remain intimately tied to organisations abroad, whether in the case of cultural activities, religion or of heritage. However, in terms of local politics, Jewish revival confined mostly to the margins of the public discourse, animating only small enclaves. The furtive way most Jews still embrace their identity in Lviv speaks of a yet hostile environment, that has only started to change visibly in the past 5-10 years. But when local, municipal projects are started, the connections mobilised and values present are different: in projects like the Space of Synagogues, Jewish organisations interact with gentile ones and articulate their identity in different relational frames.

The Space of Synagogue Project: from cooperation to court

The site that became a breeding ground of contestation between these Jewish groups and the various municipal and non-governmental organs involved, seemed like a mere deserted slot of land during my first visit in January 2015. The area where the Golden Rose synagogue stood was an icon of Eastern European Jewish life, a landmark of a former cultural and religious entrepôt for Hasidic and assimilated Jews of the region. But at that time the place fit well the long list of decaying Jewish heritage sites in Western Ukraine; all epitomes of a past markedly different in its ethnic and religious composition from the mostly Greek Catholic and ethnic Ukrainian present, and of a present that speaks mostly of neglect.

Figure 6.1. The final design of the Space of Synagogues. Photo by the Centre for the Urban History of East Central Europe

Plans with a ruin

Although nothing seemed to be happening with the site after my arrival, it had been an object of fierce debates for many years. Plans, negotiations and meetings had started in 2008, when the Centre for the Urban History of East Central Europe — a non-profit research NGO established a few years before in 2004 — organised an international conference with the title "Urban Jewish Heritage and History in East Central Europe".[153] Their idea was to bring together local Ukrainian historians, architects and museum professionals with several guests

[153] A summary of the event can be found in Matsevko (2008) at http://www.lvivCentre.org/download.php?downloadid=72 My account draws on this text and on the recollections of participants that I gathered during numerous interviews and conversations throughout the year.

from the US, Israel and Europe, to debate possible ways of preserving, discussing and displaying the Jewish heritage of Lviv, including the Golden Rose synagogue. Meylakh Sheykhet was among them, together with staff members of the Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop, the then director of the Museum of Religion and many other local experts.

Photos show a conference room full of guests, and thanks to the simultaneous translation between Ukrainian and English, many different people were able to participate beyond the confines of English speaking academia, including local historians and museum workers from the older generation. During the second day the participants were led to the fenced off ruin of the Golden Rose, where Meylakh Sheykhet and Sergey Kravtsov, a Ukrainian-Israeli architectural historian, originally from Lviv, gave them a guided tour. Moreover, there was a meeting with the then deputy mayor for human affairs, Vasyl Kosiv, who expressed interest from the city's side. The event ended on a hopeful note—for many, especially among the eventual initiators of the restoration project, these two days were seminal. This is when plans and hopes morphed into commitment and when key alliances were formed, so long lasting ones that eight years later, preparing for the opening workshop I recognised many participants from the 2008 guest list.

At that stage there was a broad consensus that "something has to be done" with the ruins, be it only a preservation of what is left of the original building, or a full reconstruction. Some wanted to realise the long hoped for project of a Museum of Galician Jewry there, others wanted a functioning synagogue, yet others a 'European style' Holocaust memorial or a Jewish cultural centre. Nowadays when participants look back at this period, most agree that everybody was ready to compromise at this stage, so when Meylakh Sheykhet and his NGO, the Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union (UCSJ) applied for a grant at the Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation to conduct an archaeological survey of the area, stakeholders and the city administration were supportive.

He secured USD 32.000 in 2009 for documenting the site and identifying its original boundaries.[154] Kravtsov, who was very sympathetic of these efforts at the time told me during an interview after the opening of the memorial, that in 2008 many stood with Sheykhet because his project seemed feasible. The decision between reconstruction and preservation was still ahead, and the steps leading to that moment were clear and uncontested: before further works, archaeological surveys were needed. Works were finished by a mixed team of restoration professionals at Ukrzakhidproektrestavratsiya (Western Ukrainian Institute for

[154] See The US Ambassadors Fund for Cultural Preservation. Annual Report 2009-2010

Restoration),[155] guest archaeologists from Israel and a long-term project was carried out by the Archaeology Institute of the National Academy of Ukraine. The conceptual plan they prepared about the preservation of the Jewish quarter of the city[156] and the virtual, 3D reconstruction of the Golden Rose made by Kravtsov,[157] were all parts of a preliminary phase, which ended with the international competition the City Council proposed. Together with the Urban Centre they assembled a jury of local and international experts, and in 2010 awarded a young German architect, Franz Reschke's design first place.[158]

The design envisioned an open, educational public space, with the outlines of the Beit ha-Midrash built from white concrete. Between this and the conserved ruins of the Golden Rose a 'Perpetuation' memorial would be installed, black stones lined up next to one another with various quotes engraved on them. Overall the memorial would adhere to an aesthetic language familiar from Holocaust memorials all over Europe, and its proponents could argue that its installation would mean a step towards European integration on a symbolic level. They pointed out that the project needed modest funds and required no bureaucratic hassle with UNESCO, that would have been the case with any new construction in the area. It was cheap, modern, reversible and so unprecedented in Lviv that organisers hoped it would inevitably incite locals' attention. However, this was at odds with visions of many others.

Foreigners and hijacked expertise: hostile preservation professionals

Not all members of the jury endorsed the final winner. Oksana Boiko, the architectural historian from the Western Ukrainian Institute for Restoration we already met in Chapter 3, voted against the winning design and undoubtedly felt marginalised, as the plan her institution made for the entire area had something different in mind, than the memorial. They wanted more reconstruction work and more archaeological elements displayed under glass, in an open-

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155 The Western Ukrainian Institute for Restoration is a state owned organisation under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Regional Development, established in the 1980s. After independence its original functions were mostly taken over by the City Council, therefore a tension can be observed between the two organisations. Currently the Western Ukrainian Institute for Restoration is on the verge of financial collapse.

156 The project was called "Regeneration of the Jewish Areas between the Fedorova, Brativ Rohatyntsyv, Staroievreiska and Arsenalna streets" and thus it included a much broader area than the Space of Synagogues project, focusing on preservation and museification rather than a comprehensive rehabilitation project that would address commercial activities as well.

157 A presentation that features his reconstruction can be found here: http://cja.huji.ac.il/Architecture/architecture-Presentation-Taz.html# (accessed 08. 12. 2016)

158 Together with the Golden Rose, two other projects were scheduled: a memorial park on the territory of the former Old Cemetery, now covered by a bazaar and memorials in the Yanivska concentration camp.

museum format, however their plans did not integrate these ideas with the broader economic function of the area. In later correspondence, the mayor and others always claimed that the eventual project was not in conflict with the framework set up by the Western Ukrainian Institute for Restoration[159] and Boiko did work on the preservation of the ruin itself, the memorial was not in line with her ideas.

In the conflict I outlined in Chapter 3, Boiko was on the side that categorically refused any new construction in the downtown, and watched any development with suspicion over potential beneficiaries. She once indignantly exclaimed: "How can you live in a city where the head of the preservation department's son gets to build a glass hotel in the UNESCO buffer zone?! It is not their principles that are wrong but you cannot trust anything in this country, look at it, it is monopoly for a new elite." She was so fed up that when we sat in her unheated office, Oksana rather showed me her work on local churches, barely mentioning the synagogue. Together with her husband she was on the board of the local Galician Party, a centre-right initiative that often organised demonstrations against allegedly problematic investments, campaigned for decentralisation and saw Lviv as Ukraine's "locomotive to Europe" — not the Europe the mayor talked about, but a normatively understood place without bribes or an overwhelming dominance of finance over culture. In her opinion even though decades of communism were 'barbaric' and damaging, preservation professionals managed to sustain the high quality of scientific work, that is becoming increasingly impossible, as the interests of the real estate industry and an emerging new elite in the city administration join forces. For her, a conservative group of heritage professionals academics and preservation professionals, the Golden Rose attested to this situation: the project had been hijacked by foreign money, dubious interests and a financially benefitting local establishment.

The leadership emblematised by the mayor Andriy Sadovyi,[160] that these criticisms targeted has made considerable efforts to present Lviv as a modernising, 'European' city, and to promote a distinctly local political culture. But Sadovyi's vision of Lviv's political culture ignored a number of alternative political projects, and not only those that would be popular in Russophile areas of Eastern Ukraine, but also those on the political right. His aspirations to shape Lviv into exemplar of the geopolitical move towards the EU that most locals thought the whole country should make, meant that he needed a fresh perspective on municipal strategy,

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[159] For instance Samopomych party leader Bereznyuk's letter to Meylakh Sheykhet. Bereznyuk, O. R. (2015, November 24). No 04-04/08-396/292341 [Letter to Meylakh Sheykhet]. Kyiv, Ukraine.

[160] Sadovyi assumed office first in March 2006 and has been reelected twice. Originally he was a member of the centre-right Our Ukraine party, but subsequently established his own party, Samopomich (Self-reliance), that he still heads besides acting as a mayor of Lviv.

tourism and cultural politics, as well as political allies, which he found among the young and foreign-trained. The Western Ukrainian Institute for Restoration and UTOPIK were thus sidelined further by the City Council that already had took over their former, pre-1991 areas of responsibility in the nineties. "The problem with these people is that they think restoration is a science, and they cannot accept that beyond the objective measures much is about taste and schools. So they don't argue, they just want you to believe them, because they are the experts, so they think." — sighed the director of the Urban Centre, when I asked her about these criticisms. The head of the preservation department agreed, shrugging her shoulders when she told me that never did any of these professionals apply to any vacancy in her department, probably because they preferred to voice loud criticisms, an easier job than hers. To their alleged *real* motivation for the Space of Synagogues project, ie. monetary gain, initiators and city officials said that it is only natural that the downtown should have a tourist infrastructure, and mistaking outdated preservation ideals for science, instead of trying to reconcile cafés with heritage sites was at once Soviet, romantic and not pragmatic. After all, people cannot live in a museum.

Foreigners and hijacked mourning: Jewish hostility and the Holocaust

Sheykhet found himself on the side of these jilted professionals in his mission to rebuild the synagogue. His opponents reckoned that was unnecessary and unrealistic: the Jewish community was so small and assimilated that they hardly needed another synagogue beyond the functioning one. Besides, not only would reconstruction be professionally problematic, it was also financially impossible. Sheykhet begged to differ and he soon launched his legal and media campaign against the City Council. His hostility was fuelled by more than just disappointment over the Golden Rose though: the crux of his unease was that the project went beyond a mere preservation of the ruin, and by adding an open-air Holocaust memorial it created a turning point in memory politics. The space invited the gentile majority to face their responsibility and Jews to remember their loss. However, Sheykhet did not see the need for Ukrainians to do this: for him it was 'Germans' funding an attack on Ukrainians instead of acknowledging their own, far bigger responsibility in the Shoa. Just like the restoration professionals who sought to uncover the *real*, financial motivation of the organisers, Sheykhet saw it in their work a plot to "conserve Jewish death instead of celebrating Jewish life in Lviv" under the pretext of the opposite, ie. breaking silence and making minority voices heard.

Sheykhet and the older generation of Jews grew up in a country that seldom mentioned the Holocaust: even though the USSR constitutionalised ethnicity, Jewish victims were only

perished members of the civic nation. The ethno-religious aspect of the Holocaust was submerged into the larger narrative of the WW2 — the Great Patriotic War of Soviet textbooks. The turn of the millennia witnessed the institutionalisation of Holocaust remembrance in the region, in which the number and quality of memorials, museums and publications often came to be seen as a measuring rod of progress, a route Eastern European countries are required to take in order to be considered as morally acceptable members of the international community. But the majority of Ukrainian historiography was busy with fixing other distortions of the Soviet-era, many of which hit a more sensitive chord for the ethnic Ukrainian majority.

Memories of Holodomor, the artificially induced famine that raged in Ukraine in 1932-33 had been silenced and diverse nationalist movements were reduced into 'fascism' and collaborationism. Ukrainian historiography has therefore been busy with narrating the struggle for independent statehood, and—the pendulum often moving to the opposite end—constructing an ethnic history where nationalist groups that participated in the local pogroms undergo a bit of moral cosmetics.[161] Customary parallels between the Holocaust and Holodomor, or the official statement that Ukraine will only recognise the Holocaust as a genocide if Israel does so with Holodomor are textbook cases of what Michael Shafir (2002) calls *comparative trivialisation.* Victimhood and national suffering gain ever more currency now, when the country is torn by war in the Donbas. Against this background it is not surprising that the Holocaust often appears as an imported, foreign concern,"a politically consequential force" (Levy and Sznaider 2006: 132), that could be instrumentalised by groups aiming to benefit from 'foreign money' or prestige. Within this framework it is difficult to conceive of Ukrainian initiatives genuinely invested in voicing local responsibility or the importance of the Holocaust.

The Space of Synagogues project stands against this background then: with its memorial, that explicitly mentions Ukrainian perpetrators it goes against the nationalist consensus. It aims to push "the limits of debatability" of certain events (Kaneff 2004:56), by shedding contemporary vocabularies of ethnic nationalism (and its persisting Soviet-era obsession with monolithic group responsibility) and adopting a different conceptual approach instead, familiar from international academia and the broad Western European political consensus. Sheykhet stands with the Ukrainian majority when he disregards the need for commemoration and suspects foreign interests. His qualms about the Holocaust industry and preservation

[161] This practice is familiar in many neighbouring countries as well, Himka and Michlic's (2013) collection brings together examples from all countries in the region. The practice has been explained and criticised widely, see for instance Bratochkin (2013), Rossoliński-Liebe (2012), Himka (2005) etc.

professionals' hunch about swindling soon emerged as parallel wings of the same critique. Heritage professionals readily accepted that Jewish religious heritage should be managed by religious Jews, and Sheykhet gladly confirmed that Ukrainian collaborationism was an unfortunate and minor aspect of German occupation, and it is inappropriate to allow 'Germans' to erect an 'accusatory memorial'. When Sheykhet says the Golden Rose was the local orthodox community's symbolic patrimony and therefore it is their right to decide about its fate, he performs being a local in a similar way to those heritage professionals who were not included in the project.

However, it is telling that neither group voiced any concerns or suspected dubious foreign interests until their agendas became irreconcilable with the winning design. Only when final decisions were made did they launch their campaign. As arguments and suspicions became increasingly polarised, Sheykhet and his allies were moving farther from the mayor towards the radical right.

On a conference they held together in 2016 in Sheykhet's headquarters about the potential of Jewish heritage to foster-interethnic peace, the keynote speaker was Yuriy Shukhevych, a radical nationalist politician, who was at the time arguing against plans for a new Holocaust memorial in Babyn Yar.[162] Increasing stakes coincided with these people seeking partners from the outer circles of the political right, stepping into a discourse that subverted and utilised key 'progressive' concepts, like multiculturalism, tolerance and self-determination. The widening rift between the originally amicable sides brought about an escalation of not only the political spectrum involved, but also of the scope of the accusations.

The conception, implementation and the funding encompassed various fields of expertise and formed an interconnected arena where everybody knew everybody else, so the fragmentation fed into the social configurations already at play in the city.[163] The growing axis of dissent needed justification, those opposing the project needed to show that their critique stood on higher than personal grounds. Hence stakes had to be high: instead of a local site and

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[162] Shukhevych is the SS Galicia leader Roman Shukhevych's son, who spent over 30 years in Gulag and 10 in exile because of his father's crimes. Upon his return he became a patriotic politician, his suffering iconic for many Ukrainians. The Babyn Yar monument in question is to be erected in Kyiv, where around 150.000 people were murdered during German occupation, among them over 30.000 Jews just in the course of 2 days. Shukhevych argued that a Holocaust memorial would exclude Ukrainian nationalists who were also murdered there and as such it would be a hegemonic distortion.

[163] There is a telling anecdote that shows how polarisation tends to wipe out the original complexity of interactions. I was told that Sheykhet approached the Urban Centre in 2016, and asked for his photograph to be removed from their publicly used materials: in order to be credible in claiming he was ignored and never consulted, he needed to alter the past. To me he never admitted any connection to the Centre whatsoever.

a few commissions it was national memory politics, UNESCO standards and human rights issues at stake. And while personal grievances or unfulfilled dreams of Sheykhet and his preservation professional friends would not have needed to elicit a response, city officials and professionals did have to launch a comeback to these elevated criticisms.

Pragmatism, democracy and memory work: arguing on the winning side

Liliia Onyshchenko, the head of the Unit for the Preservation of the Historic Environment gave a speech I attended at an event at Hesed in April 2016. The event was to raise awareness about the Space of Synagogues project, and counter the narrative Jewish people in Lviv might be hearing from Sheykhet and his supporters.

> And then come the idea through GIZ, of course, it is them who taught us that the fate of any public space must be discussed with the people who live there. (…) We invited people for coffee, asking them "what would you like to have here, you who live here?" (…) And people were very astonished (*zaskocheni*) and said, "Why are you asking us? You are in power, you do what you want. You will not listen to us." We 'swayed (*rozkruchuvaly*)' them long enough to hear, in fact, what they wanted. (…) They said "we would like if you chose a project that does not drag on for years, so still in this life we get this space in order, instead of commissioning something that is not feasible." The meeting was also attended by pan Meylakh. Pan Meylakh was directly involved in the area. His office is located there, so he vividly advised us about the future of this area. But, well, we heard from people that they did not want… something that takes many years. (…) Then we organised this international competition. We decided that it was too important to just do the research and work (alone). But an international competition is also a possibility for the world to hear about Lviv and this space.

In Onyshchenko's description local authorities appear as considerate and democratic bodies who go out of their way to administer participatory politics, even against local inertia and indifference. Not only do they take local opinions into account in a 'European' manner—learnt from the German NGO that partly sponsors the memorial—, but while adhering to international standards of commissioning the best design they put Lviv on the map for a broader audience.

True this might be, her account glosses over a number of crucial aspects. As a civil servant, she was understandably concerned about the public validity of the projects, thus she defended its inception and beneficial consequences for the city. It was also rather convenient that she

could present the opting for mere preservation as a choice rather than a partial financial necessity. Privately she would often voice frustration about how easy lobbyists have it when they "shout for UNESCO", opposed to her own constrained possibilities. "If I want to talk to UNESCO, I have to do it through the Ministry of Culture" — she would sigh, saying that it is not worth preparing all the documentation showing accusations were wrong, because it is less spectacular and powerful than indignation and "shouting wolf".

She did not address accusations about their 'foreign agenda', but that was a daily topic at the Urban Centre. In an early summer afternoon I was standing in the inner yard with Volodia, the communication manager. He was visibly overworked, smoking and staring into the sunshine. We were chatting about my upcoming trip to Kyiv, and he was explaining why he did not like the capital — Kyiv was Soviet. "They don't have a real urban life there, it is mostly dormitory districts, that is what makes it look big. But it is not a real capital like Warsaw or Stockholm. You know the first time I went to Warsaw, as I was coming back on the bus I understood what kind of country I call home… then I was a bit depressed for a few days. Then I understood that there is no other way, I have to do something, that there are all these good people and in Lviv we can show other (Ukrainian) cities what could be done, you don't have to go abroad or to Kyiv. Better to make Lviv a place from where you don't have to go away."

Similar concerns came up very often, especially during after-work drinks, when people would debate the best way to get Schengen visas or exchange gossip about famously inappropriate politicians, priests and public figures. "You have to live here, be in the middle of it every day, look at all the people in *vyshyvanka*s, all this Soviet mentality. Unless you try to bring your own version into it, nobody will" — a historian told me. These people's opportunities were circumscribed by the tight visa regime and their small salaries, so getting away was not easy, especially permanently. Even those who did, especially as students abroad, would often prefer to come back on the long run. Anya, a historian who was based in Switzerland for a few years told me the incredulity she experienced when she announced her decision of moving back for good. "This is the place that matters most to me, who would I be anywhere else? There is so much that can be done here."

Seeing these people as bearers of a cosmopolitan agenda, as predominantly global or European citizens would not allow consideration of the relevance of their local identity. Lviv was still their everyday environment, most of them imagined their life there and was predominantly invested in shaping local possibilities, rather than longing for afar. Their conversations, even when they conveyed dissatisfaction and feelings of inferiority, made it clear that it is the local that frames any cosmopolitan concern they harboured, rather than the other way around. This was also true of their thoughts about the Holocaust. Certainly their

criticisms were solidified by the foreign academic literature they had read, shared by a faction of local historians who pursued similar conceptual reforms, and who taught them in university.[164] Facing accusations that questioned their locality highlighted how much of this contestation was about the right to intervene and shape the city, when demographic ruptures, complex personal and political histories made it possible to question virtually everybody's right to do so. "You know, if we play this game of being foreigners, I could tell pan Meylakh that my family is one of the few who have local ancestry for more than five generations. And he was not even born here. Won't I have a bigger right to decide then?!"—a staff member mused.

The production of a liveable locality for these people was a main aspect of their work, and the fact that they were supported by the City Council did not make it any less true that they went against a nationalising majority view. Who was in majority in this conflict depended a lot on the scale one chose: the convenors shared the majority opinion in the international scene, while they represented an alternative in the Ukrainian context. Likewise, though Jews of Turei Zahav comprised only a small minority, they subscribed to the Ukrainian majority view about 'German responsibility'. Due to their privileged representational power of Jewish voices when it comes to the Holocaust, it was indispensable for Sheykhet to authorise himself as *the* representative of local Jews, and for the Space of Synagogues project to secure visible Jewish support. This conflict could not be publicly legitimised without such support and being able to convincingly refute accusations of antisemitism. This brings us to the ways Jewish groups articulated their positions and tried to stand for this fragmented group.

[164] Timothy Snyder's Bloodlands had just recently been translated to Ukrainian and controversial historians, like John-Paul Himka were lecturing in Kyiv, regardless of local upheaval. The Urban Centre itself housed a big library with English, Polish, Russian and German books, open for the public. Local historians like Yaroslav Hrytsak, Georgiy Kasianov, Andriy Portnov or Vasyl Rasevych could hardly be called voices of 'self-colonisation', as their opponents would have it. They were all invested in bringing about conceptual reforms in Ukrainian historiography not that different from what the Space of Synagogues project aimed for in the field of monumental heritage.

Representing Jews in Lviv

Name	Active since	Type	Director/Leader	Space of Synagogue
Sholem Aleichem	1988	cultural	Oleksandr Nazar	neutral
Tsori Gilead (synagogue)	1989	religious	Rabbi Mordechai Shlomo Bald	neutral
Hesed Arieh	1998	cultural	Adel Dianova	support
Hillel		cultural	Olena Andronatyi	support
Turei Zahav	2009	religious	Meylakh Sheykhet	opposition

Table 6.1. Jewish organisations in Lviv. Compiled by the author

Nina, a middle aged blonde with cheerfully colourful clothes, was one of the youngest regulars among the women who attended shabbats at Turei Zahav. She was less rigorous than many others, often leaving a little early and whispering to her neighbour a little too loud, but she was an established member of the group, who earlier had worked in the kosher kitchen for several years. We would often walk home together — it is not allowed to use motorised transportation on shabbat. One day she invited me for coffee the next day and suggested we go watch a movie at Hesed Arieh, the progressive Jewish NGO afterwards. As the two organisations offer radically different understandings of Judaism and their leadership is at odds, I asked her about this. Nina is divorced with a daughter in Munich and a son in Jerusalem, so she has quite some free time, which she often spends attending Jewish cultural programs. She tries to keep as many of the religious regulations as possible, but her life could by no means be called Orthodox. For her, Turei Zahav means religion and Hesed Arieh means culture. As her papers were in order, both parents being Jewish, she felt entitled to attend Sheykhet's ceremonies, but she enjoyed the more diverse, younger and culturally active atmosphere of Hesed.

Nina can reconcile the perspectives of these two organisations not only thanks to her easy going attitude, but also her lack of stakes: for her, and some local Jews being Jewish is just that, an identity, shared activities and belonging. Community leaders in Lviv cannot but be tolerant

with their members, since they cannot afford losing many of them: their existence depends on their ability to evince a local community for their donors and the public. Their rigour is always constrained by this scarcity. If Sheykhet policed the observance of his community, it might dwindle to extinction; if Hesed was not liberal in its paperwork, it might not have the membership vital to secure enough funding for its annual klezmer festival or its kindergartens, Hillel for its educational activities. Even though these organisations all compete for being recognised as major players in the Jewish life of the city, in reality they cannot afford as much difference as their guidelines would have it. However, when they appear as institutional players, representative functions come to the forefront, and they participate in gentile politics in this capacity.

Turei Zahav: glossing over difficult history

We were sitting in the corridor of the Regional Administrative Court of Kyiv in a late July afternoon with Meylakh Sheykhet. Kippah on his head, sporting dreadlocks, a long beard and black kaftan, he stood out in the packed corridor full of people dressed in smart and secular outfits, apart from an occasional cross pendant. Sheykhet was constantly on his phone, alternating between Russian, Ukrainian, English and Yiddish, arranging meetings and managing the several ongoing court cases he was involved in and needed to prepare for. We were waiting for yet another hearing of the Space of Synagogues case to start, the last one before the opening of the Holocaust memorial Sheykhet was protesting against.

The court in Kyiv seemed like the last chance for Sheykhet to change the course of events, so he was visibly anxious, assessing the probability of the judge having been bribed. Once the memorial is finished, the legal context would change in a way that would make any opposition substantially more difficult. We came with the early morning train from Lviv, carrying a large bag of documents that his two lawyers prepared for the hearing. As we were called in to a spacious room with a Ukrainian coat of arms and a large flag on the wall, we were seated behind a table facing the opposition's seats, both tangential to the high seat of the judge. Our names were noted down and it was established that the contestant from the Executive Committee of the City Council was absent, therefore the hearing did not last long. Once the lawyer presented additional evidence that was asked in the previous hearing, the judge asked if the representative of UCSJ — Sheykhet — had anything else to add. He stood up, and delivered a speech that by this time rang very familiar to me, something the variations of which I heard in many different context from him, including previous court sessions. He said:

> Your Honour, I cannot talk about the administrative procedures, but that is a sacred territory…and it is also part of the UNESCO site. They decided, the Department for the Protection of the Historic Environment (of the Lviv City Council), the Executive Committee, that there will be a memorial for the Holocaust on this territory. On this memorial there will be a board with a text that says that Ukrainians and Poles and Aryans are equally responsible for the Holocaust. We, the Jewish people (*narod*), are a people that seeks justice. We cannot accept that Ukrainian and Polish people (*narod*) would have the same responsibility as German people. I always raise the question that the Holocaust would not have happened here, if not for the German aggression (*nimets'ka ahresia*)…for the German…um…ideology about the destruction of the Jewish people. But they are going to build a memorial in the centre of the city, in three languages, (Ukrainian and) English and Hebrew, and in this manner the city will become a city of strife (*mista rozbratu*) between our peoples. We cannot accept (*vyznavaty*) this. And so I ask Your Honour to forbid the construction.

Then he proceeded to stress that the memorial is unlawful both on the national level and according to UNESCO standards. He asked the judge to at least put a ban on the construction activities until all the decisions are made. The judge was sympathetic, but pointed out that at this point the matter was procedural, in order for him to be able to even consider a ban, he needed to formally invite Lviv-Restavratsiia, the organisation responsible for the construction, to court. Though he kept his word and tried to speed up the process as best as he could, eventually Sheykhet's points were found unjustified and the memorial opened on 4 September 2016, nearly eight years after the conference.

Sheykhet's words gestured out of the court to a cultural-historical arena, stressing points he assumed were in accordance with concerns of the judge. He appeared as a representative of a 'Jewish people' rather than an organisation and addressed 'Ukrainian people' on par. The alleged sacrilege the monument poses for the orthodox community overlaps with the threat to a world heritage site, whereby the stakes are chiefly national and only Jewish besides that. All the points he made as an alleged representative of the Jewish community signalled an identity that had no reasons to interfere with broader Ukrainian tendencies around memory politics — Jews are an unproblematic polity here, who guard the same principles the majority does: adherence to international law and peaceful ethnic coexistence. Moments when this coexistence had been sabotaged, have to be rendered irrelevant and explained away in order to keep the status quo. This is a rather widespread practice among ethnic majority elites in the region (see eg. Himka and Michlic 2013, Lobont 2004, Matthäus 2004, Shafir 2002), but that seems odd when adopted by Jewish communities. It is in relation to this readiness to leave the national consensus

undisturbed that both the language of human rights and world heritage is appropriated by Sheykhet.

Figure 6.2. A quote mentioning 'Aryans' at the Space of Synagogues. Author's photo

When he referred to his own community as *narod,* 'people', something equal to Polish and Ukrainian 'people', and when he referred to the sanctity of the site for them as a group of believers, he opted for an ethno-religious understanding of Jewishness as opposed to a cultural one. It is not too difficult to hear the echoes of the Soviet ethnic and religious taxonomies in these sentences. For the judge and his legal perspective it mattered little whether Sheykhet stood there as a representative of all Jews in Lviv or just a faction of them. But it mattered that he demonstrated a position shared at once with a postulated Ukrainian majority (worrying about their misrepresentation in relation to the Holocaust), and his pious Jewish peers whose spiritual situation (and human rights!) has been harmed. Thus even though from a legal perspective the judge could stay indifferent, he was addressed as a Ukrainian by a Jew, whose misfortune paralleled the ostracisation Ukrainian nationalists often received from foreign organisations, media and academia. And interestingly enough, this attempt was structurally not dissimilar from Adel Diana's reasoning.

Hesed Arieh: a duty to cooperate

Initially Hillel and Hesed assured the organisers of their informal support and offered to inform their members about the project, but they did not want to give their logos to the information boards and leaflets. Organisers were concerned. Olena Andronatyi, the energetic leader of Hillel would come regularly to the Urban Centre for coffee, discuss the ways her organisation could facilitate the publicity of the project and she participated in the process of choosing quotes. But as a charitable organisation that depends on donors' support, she was too concerned about the negative media attention the project gained thanks to Sheykhet's efforts. She did not want to risk loosing donors, neither did Dianova. Eventually both of them joined the board and openly stood for supporting the project, which meant closer ties with the City Council—and potential additional support. The day when Hesed Arieh hosted the presentations I referred to above, the communication manager of the Urban Centre was relieved; on our way he kept repeating: "Finally, we really needed a Jewish organisation, it looked so bad that it was all non-Jews and foreigners… You know it is so easy to attack us like that, Sheykhet looks so Jewish and everybody thinks Ukraine is full of neo-Nazis anyway".

The event gradually grew emotional after the presentations ended and the director decided to give confessional speech before they gathered signatures for a support letter. She expressed support for the project and thanked the organisers, and then she said:

> I don't know... probably Sofia and Lilya would not say this, so I will. Now terrible things are happening. The city restores the Ukrainian Jewish quarter. The Jews protest. Why has become like this? You see, Ukrainian can now say and rightly so, "when we did nothing for the Jews, we were called anti-Semites. Now when we did something, we are called anti-Semites again". This is wrong, it is nonsense, right? So I urge you all, your friends and your family, support this project. Do not be afraid. You know that I have invited many more people than who are here. They did not come. I know who came are not afraid. Or bribed. (…) If you are true patriots of Lviv and true Jews, I beg you to support this project! Sign this letter, do everything to have everything completed by the end! Because it is our cause (*sprava*).

Dianova's words encouraged engagement and active support and had a broader context in mind. Just a few years before her efforts to establish afternoon classes in schools to address the Holocaust were sabotaged by the far-right party Svoboda, that then held a strong positions in the local council. She was now well aware of the rarity of municipal support and how fragile such initiatives were. Rather than caring about their agendas, ie. potential instrumentalisation

of Jewish heritage or gentrification, she saw the Space of Synagogues as a moment of building ties, proving that the Jewish community can be grateful for support instead of incessant criticisms. Her perspective betoken an experience of enmity that renders any instance of change an opportunity to grasp, to disprove prejudices. Similarly to Sheykhet, Dianova chose to adopt the majority point of view and appear unproblematic. The main difference was in the faction of the majority they chose, which mirrored the long standing antagonisms between municipal and national politics I talked about in Chapter 3. That their opinions about the memorial are genuine should not be overlooked here, neither the differences between cultural and theological perspectives on Jewishness that inform them. However, their structural similarity speaks of a shared minority experience, that cannot afford ignoring local conditions, alliances. Even with all these organisation's reliance on foreign donations, their position is primarily constrained by local politics. Even accusations revealed something similar. Sheykhet thought Dianova was a "pocket Jew": somebody who needed support for her klezmer festival, so the city administration could always just buy her to have a Jewish face for their projects. Jewish identity was a resource to capitalise on: Hesed Arieh 'sold' their Jewishness for the financial and media support of the City Council. This implicitly conveys that Hesed's vulnerability lies in its dependence on a lack of financial autonomy, while its own rather similar conditions remain in the blindspot of the moralistic reasoning.

New interventions challenged

I hope to have demonstrated that the Space of Synagogues project had become a key site where local actors pushed to forge their values into an exemplar, into a site that embodies what one should think about Ukrainian memory politics or Jewishness, similarly to what Joel Robbins calls enacted examples. This is predominantly true of Turei Zahav and the initiators of the project: a theologically informed vision of reconstruction versus a memorial that embodies a turn in memory politics, both highly invested in changing local conditions. Their supporters lined up along these two visions, finding ways to narrate it from their own values. The marginalised preservation professionals could see the reconstruction as a triumph of science and culture over finance, and Hesed members could see it as a first step towards cooperation and Jewish cultural revival. But through the international actors, money and media this struggle was amplified into a historiographic and geopolitical battle spelled out on the very physical ground of the Golden Rose's ruins. Their actions are all informed by the local legacy of ethnic nationalism and the unease around Ukrainian collaboration: for the organisers it is something that needs to be challenged and for the opponents it is a flag to hold up.

The conflict showed that Jewish support is indispensable, but that it can take peculiar forms and find odd allies. To understand this, Jewish attitudes needed to be problematised and placed in their own respective local contexts, rather than dismissed as irrelevant or crazy. I hope to have shown that that doing so renders these alliances less puzzling. It shows that orthodox Jewish identities can be bent towards Holocaust negationism, moving away from other local Jews towards the nationalist right, if only a discourse is present to join in, and commitment to resume worship at any cost is firm enough. The prerequisite for this is a political vocabulary that connects the patriotic right and the Jewish minority by offering them a framework of group responsibility, victimhood and transitional justice; it is only a somewhat ironic addition then, than this vocabulary is a continuation to Soviet historiographic traditions, against which both these groups position themselves so firmly.

The structural similarity Sheykhet sets up between Holocaust and Holodomor, Jewish and Ukrainian suffering under both the German occupation and Soviet rule, is key in the move through which he claims the case to be much more than microhistory and local politics. This is equally true to the Urban Centre's agenda, that aspired to make Lviv a good place for those who do not subscribe to ethnic nationalism. Similarly to Sheykhet, they were invested in projects much broader than the synagogue ruin per se, and tried to carve out space for their visions in the cityscape. The conflict got amplified (Sahlins 2005b) from its locality to national and 'European' memory politics: when exemplars are made and values animate the politics around them, broadening alliances as well as sharpening hostility call for larger scales. Macrohistory becomes nested in a small local site, because contestants can hold up their differences and scale up the relevance of their hostility through proving it to be an instance of global politics. The Space of Synagogues succeeded and the winning side, exhausted from the conflict could say it is a small step for international Holocaust memory politics, but a large step for Ukrainian memory politics.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation set out to analyse the heritage politics of Lviv from the perspective of the professionals involved in it. I focused on conflicts between the individuals and institutions professionally involved in the selection, maintenance, management, and interpretation of material heritage — museum collections, monuments, and memorials. In doing so, my ambition was to shed light on the post-socialist transformation of expertise and the state in Ukraine. Extending Boyer and Lomnitz's suggestion that an anthropological focus on intellectuals as social actors with "specialised engagement with forms of knowledge and their social extensions" (2005: 107) could illuminate the production of nationalist discourse, I posited that the same could be said for institutional forms of the nation state that provide the infrastructure for national thought. Heritage is a privileged arena for investigating these problems, especially in Lviv. Cross-examining professional debates and the changing state had important bearings on the nature and extent of heritage-related expertise.

Approach and Overview

I explored the complex field of heritage professionals through three pairs of chapters, each of which focused on a different facet of heritage and cultural politics: first I examined the way in which historians are divided along methodological and political lines; secondly I traced the preservation apparatus responsible for built heritage, and the post-1991 quest for decentralisation; finally, I focused on museums and monuments that exhibit and thematise the past, some of which used to be intrinsic to Soviet memory politics and museology, others of which were absent from the discourse. Each of these perspectives revealed connected, but subtly different, challenges for heritage professionals. Taken together, they offer a holistic, if not comprehensive, portrait of the discipline.

I traced how professionals are divided when it comes to the role and relevance of history in public debates about 'difficult' pasts (Chapter 2), a division that separates 'patriotic' and critical voices. This division is salient across various institutions, and broadly coincides with a division between stances that conceptualise professionalism as embedded in the national state as a political and moral project; and those which push for the autonomy of heritage institutions and expertise from it. Building on the historical record and interviews, I then reconstructed the emergence and transformation of the preservation infrastructure both during the Soviet era and after the collapse of the USSR (chapters 3 and 4), focusing on the limits of the autonomy of local professionals from the state. This allowed me to trace the slow erosion of public institutions and the emergence of a new institutional landscape after 1991, in which municipal authorities in Lviv often circumvent central (national) ones, forming alliances with non-state actors. The closing chapters

centre on two divergent examples. Dissecting the strategies of museums that were once key elements of the Soviet cultural infrastructure of the city but now struggle to retain their public relevance (Chapter 5), I looked at the limits of professional work in a financially and institutionally precarious situation, laying out the points at which professional and financial-managerial autonomy intersect. By contrast, in Chapter 6 I explored an alliance around a Holocaust memorial, where new actors in Lviv's heritage field cooperated with the City Council to create a space for reflective engagement with Lviv's difficult past within the urban fabric of the downtown. I argued that the limits of this reflexivity, and of the critique that is possible within the current institutional arrangements, speak to a political and institutional climate that prioritises conservative approaches to the past; bringing political, personal, institutional, and professional differences to the foreground.

Beyond their privileged access and symbolic position to articulate claims about the past, the perspective of heritage professionals is unique in how it is positioned vis-à-vis the urban development agenda facilitating Lviv's transformation into a historic city popular with tourists. The contemporary entanglement of heritagisation, gentrification, and tourism in urban development (e.g. Arkaraprasertkul 2019; De Cesari and Dimova 2019; Herzfeld 2009, 2010) propels them to the symbolic centre of urban change, yet often far from its financial front lines.

Setting the discourse of what constitutes valuable heritage, curating and exhibiting artefacts, and carrying out the maintenance and repair of historic buildings has largely been the remit of state institutions. Heritage is tied to central governments when it comes to attaining UNESCO World Heritage status; while lower tiers of protection are integrated into various tiers of state administration. The same goes for most museums and universities in Ukraine. In examining the conflicts and professional or political divisions surrounding material heritage in Lviv, my main goal was to explore the workings of the public sector. However, private and third sector organisations increasingly participate in the shaping of museums, monuments, and commemorative spaces as well, competing and collaborating with the state. The distribution of responsibilities around heritage and memory politics between the state and non-state actors, as well as within the state itself, has changed significantly since 1991. The diversification of options alone reveals much about the transformation not only of preservation and commemoration, but of post-socialist professions and expertise too. Mapping professional fault lines onto sectorial divisions, this ethnography situated the developments of the heritage field in a broader societal transformation, and the changing state.

The central argument of this dissertation is that the socio-economic and political upheaval that took place upon the collapse of the USSR had pivotal implications on the position and

expertise of heritage professionals whose work had hitherto been tied to the former regime, disrupting the transmission of expertise.

Arguing so, my point of departure was the broadly shared recognition that expert knowledge is inherently societal, embedded in power structures like the state (e. g. Abu El-Hajj 1998, 2001; Boyer 2005), which raises the question of what happens when such contexts are disrupted. Similar changes are explored in the literature of professionalism in sociology (Faraday 2000; Vargha 2010), and the broader thread of literature problematising post-socialist elites (Eyal 2003; Higley and Lengyel 2000; Szelényi and Szelényi 1995; Zang 2001), but these accounts generally focus on the economic elite or highly visible creative fields: professions tied to the public sector are much less visible.

Because of the 'overlapping of heritage with economic models about the ownership (and objectification) of culture' (Geismar 2015: 71), heritage is often conceptualised through the notion of *heritage regimes* (Bendix et al. 2013). Still, the 'unmaking of Soviet life' (Humphrey 2002) took place at an uneven pace across sectors and areas of life — heritage being one of the slowest. Taking the heritage sector of post-Soviet Lviv as a vantage point, I argue that the functioning and management of public institutions, specifically the challenges it poses, is inextricably linked to developments and partnerships in the non-state sector.

If expertise is tied to the social order in general, and the expertise of heritage professionals is tied predominantly to the public sector, embedded in public institutions, then the continued contestation and simultaneous erosion of national institutions indicates a crisis of expertise. Overall, I sought to demonstrate that the public sector, in particular cultural institutions, offer a hitherto rarely explored angle to understand regime change. Through mapping the crisis of expertise, the contradictions inherent to independent Ukraine could be seen from a new perspective.

In what follows, I unpack some key aspects and implications of this argument for our understanding of the heritage field in Lviv, and of post-Soviet public institutions more generally.

Desiring efficiency

Since the 1980s, in the UK and many other countries in Western Europe, a neoliberal pivot in public administration led to repeated budget cuts for cultural institutions and the civil service (Lorenz 2012;). On the surface of it, cultural institutions in Ukraine have suffered from similar withdrawal of state funding. However, as I have demonstrated, such cuts were rarely accompanied by an increase in autonomy for these institutions. Surviving institutional forms at once subordinate cultural institutions to the ministerial and municipal apparatus and curtail their managerial autonomy through tight regulations and oversight of staffing or budgetary decisions. My ethnography showed that leadership is appointed by the respective state apparatus, often without or only with nominal involvement of the professional bodies themselves. Any external

funding is capped, and the securing of alternative sources of income is complicated by the need to negotiate bureaucratic permission from the controlling institutions. As a result, administrative protocols often sabotage international partnerships, not to mention the hiring of foreign staff. This leaves museums, universities and other institutions at the mercy of their funding and controlling bodies within the national bureaucracy, forcing them to curry favours in the local or regional state administration, the municipal leadership, or in ministries.

Neoliberal cultural policies ensure cuts are compensated by revenues brought in by the market-oriented entrepreneurialism of cultural institutions, and by an influx of private capital in the form of philanthropy and private-public partnerships. These practices have become established across museums, higher education institutions, and policy making (Ekström 2019; Vivant 2011), with serious consequences for professional work throughout the public sector. Across various white-collar sectors, this de-regulation and retreat of the state has been accompanied by an explosion of what Marilyn Strathern termed the 'audit culture' (2000), the swelling of administrative tasks, and the 'twinned precepts of economic efficiency and good practice' (Strathern 2000: 2). In other words, neoliberal management rewrites protocols of control, shifting from top-down bureaucracy to flexible, more autonomous entrepreneurial management in which audit and transparency become the key mechanisms of control.

In Ukraine, these developments were rarely possible in state institutions, which instead teetered on the brink of survival. Even if in some senses the Ukrainian state has withdrawn from its previous functions and commitments, the situation in the cultural sector is significantly different from usual descriptions of the entrepreneurialism of neoliberal cultural management: museums and their professionals are forced to 'fend for themselves', but they do so not as economic agents in a free market, but through political negotiations within public bureaucracy, navigating its structures and constraints with the help of informal relationships.

With the exception of a minority of predominantly senior professionals who would prefer national-level control exercised through the vertical state apparatus, if only with increased funding, most heritage professionals in Lviv would gladly embrace deregulation, private-public partnerships, and staff cuts as means of breaking out from the current crisis of professionalism. The workings of the City Council have been curtailed by direct bureaucratic control from above; and their ability to increase the municipal budget or develop more ambitious urban development strategies have therefore been limited. Combined with the stark regional differences in Ukraine, this means that decentralisation and strong local government have emerged as the key stakes of municipal politics, supported by the EU's partnership policies framing decentralisation as a cornerstone of 'European' modernisation (Leitch 2015).

In a recognisable neoliberal idiom, in 2006, the new municipal leadership sought to push for decentralisation and the 'opening up' of public institutions in Lviv. Besides attracting highly qualified young people to work in the municipal administration, along with a move towards more

transparency in decision making — attested by the list of scandalous construction sites on the City Council's website and open access to all decisions and legal changes — this also came with a conscious drive towards involving local residents in decisions regarding public issues. As Liliya Onyshchenko's complaints in Chapter 6 indicate, securing citizen participation has not been easy.

While the neoliberal agenda has been abundantly critiqued elsewhere (for an overview, see Ganti 2014), I found that most professionals in the circles of the municipal administration and younger people in Lviv in general fully supported deregulation, decentralisation, transparency, and managerial efficiency. This was not because they were ignorant about the global critique in response to these developments elsewhere (critiques that are echoed in Ukrainian left-wing circles), but because they saw those as the lesser evil compared to what they encountered in state administration, museums, and universities. Stagnation, the infrastructural hindrances of change, and meagre wages felt prohibitive for most of them, especially those with high ambition and those without high earning spouses or family support. Admittedly, these younger professionals would not have lost out from a moderate shift towards neoliberalism anyway. Given the spectrum of legitimate political choices had been narrowed in the wake of the collapse of state socialism, throwing left wing politics into a lengthy crisis (e. g. Chelcea and Druță 2016), these professionals could easily dismiss the grounds on which much of the international critique of neoliberalism stood. Ill-functioning public institutions served as a perfect example of where those considerations might lead.

The lack of change is not inertia

When, during the winter months of my fieldwork, I visited the Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop, certain university departments, offices in museums, and the Regional State Archive, I could rarely remove my coat. Many state enterprises and public institutions struggled with heating bills, and salaries were often held back for months on end. Accounts from Liliya Onyshchenko and Roman Mohytych hint at similar conditions in the City Council of the late 1990s. Senior workers complained about the threat of their institutions being closed down, should their maintaining state bodies decide not to pay off utility debt, and many speculated that this 'starving out' was part of a political game, a consequence of the hunger of municipal or regional bodies for the prime real estate their premises represented. The Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop, and the leader of UTOPIC, for instance, harboured a nearly obsessive anxiety about their premises being turned into upmarket downtown hotels.

The sudden collapse of state infrastructures, and the rising poverty across the former USSR are well documented in the literature (Humphrey 2002; Nazpary 2000; Ries 1997; Shevchenko 2008). However, it is rarely examined how that crisis became the norm in many state institutions in Ukraine — and other post-Soviet countries, and how financial neglect and the constant sense

of being dependent on political goodwill led to the erosion of prestige, careers, and professional vision.

The wholesale reorientation of the identity politics in Lviv that Volodymyr Haiuk so pragmatically foresaw and navigated (Chapter 5), led to the loss of former, USSR-wide professional networks (Alexander 2016) and the obsolescence of the achievements of heritage professionals tied to the former regime. At the same time, most of them lacked the skills and understanding of the international institutional landscape needed for success in 'the other side of the Cold War': they seldom spoke English or German, and had no resources to establish cooperation or even learn about new developments abroad. Between a rock and a hard place, many held onto locally legitimate narratives based on anti-Soviet dissent — like Olha Serhiyivna and her colleagues in the Museum for the History of Religion and Culture (Chapter 5) or restorers like Oksana Boiko (Chapter 3), or hoped to retain relevance in the national context like Taras Chukhlib and his patriotic historian colleagues (Chapter 2).

Thanks to the retroactive delegitimisation of the past, everything that survived from the Soviet-era was an easy target for accusations of backwardness and inertia — in this respect, mainstream narratives were in line with the 'transitology' literature of the 1990s (for critiques, see Burawoy and Verdery 2000; Verdery 1996). But accusations that target senior curators, academics, or restorers as 'Soviet' rarely inquire about the infrastructural underpinnings of their confined autonomy, instead positing them as complicit in the lack of reforms.

What remains occluded in these narratives, and in much of the scholarly literature on post-Soviet state reforms — much of which is not ethnographic — (Polese 2006; Stoner-Weiss 2006), is just how little effect their decisions could have. The dependence of public institutions on the decisions of local and regional political elites fits the political economic arrangements of independent Ukraine (Allina-Pisano 2011), but this has not been explored ethnographically. The country's nationalism and cultural conservatism have been well documented, especially in Lviv (Amar 2011, Bechtel 2006), and connections between post-socialism, anti-Soviet dissent, and nationalist revival are established. However, little attention has been paid to how infrastructural, institutional arrangements push critical interventions into compromise, and how, in cultural political debates, compromise often has a nationalist hue. I consider filling this gap the most significant contribution of this dissertation.

Unlike in most Warsaw Pact countries, where new economies quickly became fuelled by foreign direct investment and transnational capital (Bohle and Greskovits 2007), the 1991 shift in Ukraine saw privatisation reliant on local capital, and the consolidation of rival oligarchic groups that built their fortunes on privatisation (Ishchenko and Yurchenko 2020). The result has been a pluralistic and competitive political field within which different oligarchic fractions competed for political control, sometimes called 'competitive authoritarianism' (Levitsky and Way 2010; Way

2006). Periods of greater consolidation of control were followed by popular mobilisations, such as the Orange Revolution in 2004, and the Maidan in 2013-14.

This arrangement has led to the preservation of Soviet-era legal and administrative forms and the surrounding informality in many sectors, notably labour and land management, as they offered insulation from international competitors (Ishchenko 2020). What is often seen as inertia in the structure of public administration might be re-conceptualised as an arrangement beneficial to those in power. I cannot offer ethnographic evidence for the intentionality of the lack of reforms, but I can testify to how widespread its consequences are for local heritage institutions. The fact that higher positions in any public sector organisation are appointed by the heads of the local or regional administration, who are themselves appointed by the president, leads to electoral coercion and anxieties around the conditionality of these positions (e. g. Matsuzato 2001). Senior preservation professionals' guesswork around who might want the pricey real estate of their premises, or curators' worries about the growing influence of the Greek Catholic Church and the pressures this might lead to, were based on an awareness of the extent to which their survival hinged on individual decisions made in the corridors of state administration.

If museum workers were cautious, recognising how confined the remit of their decision making was, municipal authorities had a different reaction. Arguably their hands were comparably tied by ministries and presidential decisions, as I showed in Chapter 3 through the example of how budgetary decisions were used as a tool for political manipulation in 2005-6, which nearly sabotaged the renovation works scheduled for Lviv's 750th anniversary. Similarly, legal uncertainties surrounding the Space of Synagogues project I explained in Chapter 6 — that the land plot was municipally owned, while the ruin itself, being part of a UNESCO World Heritage Site, was national property — pushed the City Council to immediately move ahead with the memorial space and challenge the Kyiv court. In fact, the intentional transgressions on the part of the City Council began in the nascent days of Ukrainian independence, with the decision to turn the directorate of the Architectural-Historic Reserve into a municipal unit. These examples indicate that it was often more reasonable for local officials to risk non-compliance and prioritise locally relevant work valued by their constituency than to respect protocol and accept delays and the possibility of arbitrary decisions tied to political favours.

These acts of pragmatic transgression were fed by a frustration over being unable to do their job thanks to time consuming, cumbersome administrative protocols, and because decision makers far away in Kyiv hardly understood the way the decisions they signed off pertained to Lviv. In contrast to museum staff, municipal actors repeatedly fought against these arrangements. Mayor Andriy Sadovyi's career evinces that these transgressions have often been treated by the local electorate as signs of strong leadership, especially when combined with alternative,

'European' alliances — and visible results. Still, it also speaks to the difficulties of challenging well entrenched vertical hierarchies.

With these examples in mind, it is not surprising that models starkly different from the centralised, vertical state have strong purchase for municipal actors. It is also logical that third sector organisations and international actors of cultural diplomacy like GIZ sought cooperation with the municipal leadership rather than with representatives of the presidential vertical. At the same time, professionals like the curators of the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture, and historians or preservation professionals at the Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop, had much to fear from reforms and a higher concentration of power locally. Most of them understood vertical structures to produce accountability, and harboured aversion to 'German projects' like the Space of Synagogues, the authors of which circumvented protocols around seniority.

Beyond the state non-state binary

It emerges from the above that the key fault lines of heritage conflicts in contemporary Lviv lie not between the state and society or the state and non-state actors. As I argued especially in Chapter 6, neither do they follow ethnic lines, or divide the local from the non-local. Instead, across all the organisations through which this ethnography led me, the key division lay between those who supported the vertical state, and those who opposed it in favour of decentralisation and deregulation.

This was foreshadowed by the City Council's rearrangement of the directorate of the Architectural-Historical Reserve into a municipal department, combined with an extension of its territory to include a large proportion of monuments that had local rather than national significance (Chapter 4). Throughout its history, Lviv was a regional capital of various polities, with command centres in Vienna, Cracow, and Moscow (Chapter 1). Ukrainian independence and the resulting legal-institutional uncertainties allowed the local political elite to try to localise decision making to a greater extent than had previously been possible. In a sense, much of the history of Ukrainian Lviv is a history of this attempt.

In structural terms, this division between supporters and opponents of decentralisation was visible in the heritage field in the opposition of two factions: that of professionals led by the City Council, broadly associated with the mayor's decade-long agenda of reforms; and that of political actors and professionals who looked to ministries and the vertical state for support and alliances. International actors invested in policy transfer and cultural diplomacy like GIZ, or NGOs that attempted to carve out space hitherto occupied by public institutions, like the Centre for the Urban History of East-Central Europe, would stay in line with the City Council, while struggling state enterprises or museums whose positions could come under threat supported the Regional State Administration, or ministries. The parallel existence of elected municipal authorities and the

appointed regional administration, referred to by one of my civil servant informants as a 'structural mistake' yielded itself to these divisions, de facto orchestrating professional groups beyond politics. Professional agendas, like museification versus the acceptance of capital in the downtown (Chapter 4) and patriotism versus detachment in history (Chapter 2), followed this division in most cases.

Municipal authorities were responsible for significant reform in the workings of the City Council: along with internal reforms and participation in various international networks that promote local government reforms, the mayor established a plethora of cooperations. Municipal heritage management has been characterised by collaborations with foreign state actors like GIZ or the Polish Ministry of Culture, and NGOs like the Centre for the Urban History of East-Central Europe. It even established think-tanks such as the Instytut Mista (City Institute) and municipal enterprises like Lev. Moreover, the City Council took up the management of a number of institutes that hitherto belonged to the vertical state administration, allowing for the introduction of certain changes in how they are managed.

In piecing together how this intra-state division is at the core of other, seemingly unrelated divisions between professionals, I sought to challenge perceptions of a monolithic state, and the state-society dichotomy. Connecting intra-state conflicts with the rise of public-private partnerships in the cultural sector allowed me to understand this phenomenon mobilising standard explanatory tools like the spread of neoliberal managerialism and the receding state. A holistic attention to the professional field and my agenda to cross-read changing infrastructures and norms of expertise allowed me to question 'where infrastructures have come from, who they are for, and what social effects they might be expected to have' (Knox and Harvey 2015: 166). If participants in the above conflicts were concerned about the infrastructure of heritage work, its social effects could be elucidated through interrogating the expertise embedded in them.

Expertise in the aftermath of state transformation

The Cold War was a 'cognitive organisation of the world' (Verdery 1996: 4) not only in a geopolitical sense, but in terms of professional orientations too. Above I noted that the wholesale rejection of the Soviet past in Lviv's cultural elite had serious implications for professionals who had worked in institutions crucial for the Soviet state. Among the institutions I examined in this research, the former Museum of the History of Religion and Atheism was the most obviously implicated, and I showed how the director tried to navigate the shifting political field. The difficulties of nuanced engagement turned narratives of dissent into a heuristic tool for these professionals, whose post-independence reputation hinged on retrospective demonstrations of subversion, distance, or oppression. The eruption of the war in the Donbas and the annexation

of Crimea in 2014 further deepened the hegemony of anti-Soviet (and, consequently, anti-Russian) sentiments, as I showed in Chapter 2. The relationship between the nation and its intellectuals remain interwoven, inescapable.

Had this not happened, even then, professional networks were often severed after 1991 anyway, as Catherine Alexander (2016) documented with nuclear physicists in Kazakhstan. Still, the institutions Soviet professionals had worked in remained, if often precariously. This barely studied phenomenon led to an ever-growing isolation of professionals in many former Soviet republics, and arguably contributed to growing nationalist tendencies in several places. The heritage scene in Lviv was similar, as I showed through the example of young museum workers' quest to participate in an ICOM conference (Chapter 5). The next cohort of professionals, who were partly trained in these institutions, partly gained experience abroad, or in the gradually emerging field of NGOs and foreign organisations locally, were keen to escape this insulation. Seeking to avoid crumbling state institutions, many spoke of the need to build an international network — the establishment of the Urban Centre happened in precisely this manner, with the hope of retaining young professionals who otherwise might have chosen to emigrate, or leave the sector altogether.

Professional hierarchies were disrupted, but only partially. Newcomers like the Urban Centre, or even the recently employed civil servants of the City Council needed to navigate a confined field. It was impossible to cut relations with one another, and it would have been problematic to avoid senior curators or elderly preservation professionals altogether. Integrating them was not easy either, as their experience in recruiting Oksana Boiko to the jury of the architectural plans of the Space of Synagogues demonstrates. The need to balance respect towards these institutions and their staff while abandoning old protocols was especially challenging for foreigners like the young German architect who worked on the design of the Space of Synagogues memorial. I second Strathern's observation that pre-existing social forms 'reside in how as practitioners we already think' (1999: 272): the transformation of the field of heritage experts was complex, slow, undergirded by resilient ideas about seniority, hierarchy, and professional approaches.

In the resulting, turbulent scene where divisions have not settled into an established, navigable institutional landscape, and where anxieties about nationhood have high purchase, actors are vigilant about one another's steps and intentions. As early as the first week of my fieldwork, I was asked why I spent time with certain people, and such inquiries remained routine throughout. Be careful at the City Council, Meylakh Sheykhet's lawyers warned me; some municipal civil servants rolled their eyes when I mentioned the Western Ukrainian Restoration Workshop; at a patriotic conference I was asked to prove I was not a spy.

Reformist steps like the Holocaust memorial or the small exhibition about the atheist past of the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture were executed with extraordinary caution

and care. The way exhibitions and memorial spaces respect the consensus was not a result of censorship and coercion. Rather, critique was articulated through compromise and defence, strategic anticipation of a possible backlash — a classic example of what Bourdieu called the *censorship of the field* (Bourdieu 2000: 111-114). This did not emerge from explicit policies, central command, but from within, arising from people weighing up the kind of trouble worth speaking up against. The confined diversity I encountered did not immediately seem to have serious implications for professionalism, but altogether these gestures indicate a highly normative, prescriptive environment that does not facilitate critique. 'Step by step' — some younger professionals told me; but I found it unlikely that the limits of critique could be significantly pushed without major infrastructural changes.

Heritage experts amidst a crisis of expertise

The above argument about the entanglement of political processes and expertise leads me to a key argument of this thesis. Critical heritage studies were launched on the basis of recognising the arbitrariness of heritage, its constructed nature, and, as a consequence, the way heritage is instrumental in exercising power (Smith 2006; West 2010). Poststructural, deconstructionist approaches to the role of expertise in the designation of heritage (e.g. Schofield 2014; Smith 2007) have proven productive in critiques of the institutional apparatus that grants recognition, in fostering the visibility of subaltern, especially indigenous heritage. While this literature is powerful when it comes to analyses of the hegemonic nature of expertise, they rarely problematise expertise as a field. A less militant line of works does address institutions and bureaucracies (Brumann 2012b; Brumann and Berliner 2016; Jones and Yarrow 2013; Yarrow 2017), but this focus does not always extend to the power and legitimacy granted by heritage expertise in various, especially non-Western, local contexts.

Throughout the dissertation I sought to demonstrate that major societal transformations that unsettle infrastructures of legitimacy can translate into a prolonged crisis of expert positions. Although museums and restoration workshops remain, and may as though they could exert their power in dictating historical narratives and aesthetic preferences, in reality this power is hollowed out. Salaries were unpaid for months on end, and winters spent in unheated offices after 1991. Then, with the gradual emergence of competitors who adhered to very different professional visions and possessed new skills, many state-employed heritage professionals became demoralised. Parallel orders of legitimacy exist among nationalist and critical historians (Chapter 2), senior and junior curators (Chapter 5), and Soviet-trained and younger preservation professionals (Chapter 6).

Heritage experts seldom find a minimum of professional standards they share. When approached by the public, their credentials are far from taken for granted, they represent issues in

factions, barely ever forming a professional front that would overcome political differences. They question one another's legitimacy through dismissing the basis of their professionalism, referring to credentials rarely recognised by the competing group. The profession is fractured in terms of ranks and seniority, hierarchies, interpersonal relationships, and institutional positions.

But what does this crisis of legitimacy do for how heritage is recognised and protected? I think the above outlined vulnerability of heritage actors in terms of institutional survival, reputation, and public acceptance necessitate a rethinking of what *authorised* could mean in Smith's notion of the authorised heritage discourse (2006). If the field of experts is fractured, and their visions and strategies are tied to different factions of the state apparatus that hold a managerial monopoly over heritage sites, then the gesture of authorising heritage can become a hollow one. Moreover, when ruptures like the collapse of the USSR rearrange the professional field, expertise becomes intertwined with geopolitically informed visions of good practice, as the spread of 'European' policy reforms has shown so poignantly. If experts are regularly accused of malpractice by the public and one another, if mutual hermeneutics of suspicion guides their public opinion making, then delineating expertise, political agendas, and interest becomes problematic.

What I described as a crisis of heritage expertise in post-Soviet Lviv is part of a much broader suspicion about anything from medicine (Stepurko et al. 2013) to higher education (Osipian 2009). In most cases, this is fed by infrastructural conditions that hinder work without informal arrangements, bribes etc. As such, these problems are distinct from popular mistrust described as the 'crisis of legitimacy' (Collins and Evans 2008: 10), or 'crisis of confidence in professional knowledge' (Schön 2001) documented outside of the post-socialist context. Referring to this crisis of expertise, the competing orders of legitimation, and the resulting, fractured landscape is not to deny the power of certain actors to participate in heritage-related decision making. However, I suggested that these conflicts indicate more than a storm in a professional teacup.

Final note: confined critique

Lviv-based heritage professionals and curators had few means to set the agenda of preservation or museology in the Soviet era, when command centres were far removed and institutional decision making organised vertically. Still, there was significant room to develop the city into a regionally and nationally significant institutional hub of heritage expertise, and a federally recognised historical city. This came with stable careers. Independence brought unpredictability and cuts to these institutions, and a need to rethink the bases of professional legitimacy. As old institutions lost their monopoly, but not their managerial structures, the heritage scene became highly contested. Fierce debates show that the stakes of heritage are huge in the city today.

The quest for municipal authorities to make decision making more local and decentralised, and to develop alliances that circumvent the national state have led to significant developments (also Amar 2011). Still, arguably, local decision making does not necessarily translate into more diversity in decision making. Curators in the Museum of the History of Religion and Culture, who sought to emphasise locally significant religions, or the authors of the Space of Synagogues monument who decided not to name Ukrainians as perpetrators, all did so out of a need to balance critique and professionalism with a sense of realpolitik. In the case of the former, this stemmed from an understanding that their future is tied to the approval of the Regional State Administration, in competition with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. In the latter case, the decision was made after a series of court cases against the project, which ultimately failed to sabotage it, yet they powerfully demonstrated the fragility of their success and the need to smooth sharp edges.

Ukraine is often seen as a place of fruitful anarchy: the flip side of competitive authoritarianism or insufficient state control is a plethora of initiatives. Compared to the highly centralised cultural policy of Russia or Belarus, Ukraine indeed has a broad range of voices present in media, education and the cultural sphere. Sharp regional differences further complicate this picture. Yet, it is important to note that the range of accepted voices within a given place can be extremely narrow. My ethnography attests to nationalist sentiments and the adjacent cultural conservatism that undergirds the cultural life of Lviv: a normative status quo that can result in the dismissal of civil servants critical of the church, self-censorship in curatorial work, and a constant need to tone down critical voices, all in anticipation of exclusion from the professional community. I hope to have shown how the lack of stable institutional and financial autonomy, actors in heritage politics, and cultural politics are destined to remain reactive, cautious, and compromised in their efforts to fulfil critical functions. Their experiences are indicative of a broader crisis of expertise documented elsewhere in post-socialist countries (Roudakova 2017; Wachtel 2006), and of the idiosyncrasies of the Ukrainian state.

Whether it is the lack of funds combined with dependence on the political establishment, or the need to establish themselves as legitimate players in the field in order to secure access to sites managed by state actors, heritage professionals are by and large locked into a field where departing from accepted aesthetic, historiographic, or curatorial norms can come at a price.

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