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‘Transediting’ Saudi Arabia by the BBC: a corpus-driven critical discourse analysis study of representations and power negotiation, 2013–2015

A thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in

Translation Studies

At the University of Durham

2019

By

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&

Dr Alex Bellem

Abstract

Translators in newsrooms routinely apply what Bielsa and Bassnett (2009, p.10) refer to as ‘absolute domestication’ in which the source text (ST) is ‘transedited’ (Stetting, 1989, pp.371-82). This can lead to power ‘abuse’ and ‘ethnocentric violence’ against the ST, language and culture (Venuti, 1995). By incorporating corpus tools and critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Wodak and Meyer, 2016), this research investigates, first, the key themes that the BBC Monitoring Middle East (BBCM-M) service tended to focus on when reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output from 2013 to 2015 in relation to other British news sources reporting in English, second, the representations of Saudi Arabia disseminated by the BBCM-M and the extent to which it contributed to such representations and, third, the power dynamics between the Arabic source and English target texts through transediting.

The study reveals three key themes that characterise the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia: identity, action and status and relations. There are four main representations of Saudi Arabia: 1) as filled with men of authority, who are unlike women, with real agency, 2) its rivalry with Iran and reliance on the US, 3) its three-dimensional image in relation to terrorism and 4) its paradoxical portrayal in relation to: power, policies and development. Importantly, these are ‘anchored’ to stereotypical ‘social representations’ (Moscovici, 2000) that fit into the ‘system of representations’ of Arabs and Muslims in Western media and literature (Said, 1978). The study also exposes a power imbalance in favour of English both prior to and during the ‘transediting’ process, which enabled the active contributions of BBCM-M professionals to these representations. This research demonstrates how translation in a cross-cultural context such as news translation can be an apparatus of ‘coloniality of power and knowledge’ (Quijano, 2000). It also shows how a certain ‘system of representations’ can be sustained across time, languages and cultures via the constant reproduction of certain images that ‘anchor’ the same ‘social representations’ that exist in that system.

Acknowledgement

I am sincerely grateful to my supervisory team, Dr Qing Cao and Dr Alex Bellem, for their expertise, guidance and continuous support of my PhD research. I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr Cao and appreciate him as a mentor for I have learnt various skills that I will take with me beyond my PhD studies from his patience, competence, understanding and immense knowledge. His constant guidance helped me to creatively solve problems, whether technical or structural that occurred in the course of the analysis and writing. His way of thinking is individualistic and I owe it to him that I learnt to accept and celebrate my individuality in a world where researchers are expected to approach research topics, such as of my research, in a certain manner or otherwise deemed not critical enough.

Besides my supervisory team, I would like to thank my eternal cheerleaders, my mother, Jamīlah, and father, ʿAli. They have always believed in me. They taught me to dream big and follow those dreams. I am also grateful for the emotional support of my sisters, Mahā, Munā and Ālāʾ, and brothers, Muḥammad and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān. Their sense of pride in me has kept me going in difficult times. I also want to thank my friend Āsmāʾ for her thousands-of-miles-away encouragement and support.

Besides my family and friends in Saudi Arabia, I want to thank my family in the UK, all of my marvellous friends and amazing neighbours, the Morris. I want to express my special gratitude to my friends: Fāṭimah, Īmān, Fātin and Ānʿām. They have been with me through the good, the bad and the unexpected!

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Declaration

The material contained in the thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree in this or any other institution. This thesis is the result of my own work.

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Note on Transliteration

This research deals with Arabic news items that were translated by the BBC Monitoring Middle East Service (BBCM-M) into English, so it is entirely unsurprising to find Arabic terms and names borrowed and used in English. As a result, and because this thesis relies on linguistic-based analysis, it is important to briefly discuss the use of Arabic terms in the document.

From Chapter 1 to 4, Arabic terms and names (journalists, royalty and authors) are transliterated into English using the IJMES transliteration system presented in Figure 1. This is because these names and terms in these chapters, which precede the analysis do not serve as linguistic evidence derived from the data. That being said, there is a list of words that the IJMES system suggests not to transliterate as they have 'accepted English spellings' and thus 'should be spelled in accordance with English norm', such as Hizbullah and Osama bin Laden (Cambridge Core, 2019). Therefore, these are spelled as such instead of transliterated. However, when discussing news sources from which the BBCM-M selected their news items, such as al-Quds al-Arabi, the BBCM-M's spellings of those news sources are used for easier following when discussed in the analytical chapters 5 to 11.

From Chapter 5 to 11, when Arabic names (such as royalty, journalists, organisations and news sources) and terms (like 'jihad') are derived from the data, they are written as spelled by the BBCM-M, that is to say not transliterated nor spelled in accordance with the English norm. That being said, inconsistencies in spelling in the data itself such as 'Shaykh' and 'Sheikh', do occur. Moreover, misspellings and grammatical mistakes appear in the BBCM-M translations, such as 'the Houthi', which the BBCM-M spells as 'Huthi'. When directly quoted, terms are enclosed in quotation marks because they serve as linguistic evidence derived from the data. When not directly quoted, terms are spelled as they appear in the BBCM-M to avoid any possible confusion in following the analysis. Finally, there are a few names that appear in these chapters but do not serve as evidence as they are referred to in the sense of background information. These are transliterated using the IJMES system.

In all chapters, however, when Arabic terms are quoted from publications, they are spelled as they appear in those publications. Finally, names of countries, cities and treaties are spelled as they are commonly known in English, such as Qatar and Treaty

of Darin. However, less common cities, such as al-Dirʿiyya, are transliterated using IJMES system.



IJMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC, PERSIAN, AND TURKISH

Consonants

A = Arabic, P = Persian, OT = Ottoman Turkish, MT = Modern Turkish

	A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT
ء	ʾ	ʾ	ʾ	—	ز	z	z	z	z	ك	k	k *or* g	k *or* ñ	k *or* n
ب	b	b	b	b *or* p	ژ	—	zh	j	j				*or* y	*or* y
پ	—	p	p	p	س	s	s	s	s				*or* ğ	*or* ğ
ت	t	t	t	t	ش	sh	sh	ş	ş	گ	—	g	g	g
ث	th	s̲	s̲	s	ص	ṣ	ṣ	ṣ	s	ل	l	l	l	l
ج	j	j	c	c	ض	ḍ	ż	ẓ	z	م	m	m	m	m
چ	—	ch	ç	ç	ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	t	ن	n	n	n	n
ح	ḥ	ḥ	ḥ	h	ظ	ẓ	ẓ	ẓ	z	ه	h	h	h[1]	h[1]
خ	kh	kh	h	h	ع	ʿ	ʿ	ʿ	—	و	w	v *or* u	v	v
د	d	d	d	d	غ	gh	gh	g *or* ğ	g *or* ğ	ي	y	y	y	y
ذ	dh	z̲	z̲	z	ف	f	f	f	f	ة	a[2]			
ر	r	r	r	r	ق	q	q	ķ	k	ال	ʾ[3]			

[1] When h is not final. [2] In construct state: at. [3] For the article, al- and -l-.

Vowels

	ARABIC AND PERSIAN		OTTOMAN AND MODERN TURKISH	
Long	ا or ى	ā	ā	words of Arabic and Persian origin only
	و	ū	ū	
	ي	ī	ī	
Doubled	ـِيّ	iyy (final form ī)	iy (final form ī)	
	ـُوّ	uww (final form ū)	uvv	
Diphthongs	ـَوْ	au *or* aw	ev	
	ـَيْ	ai *or* ay	ey	
Short	ـَ	a	a *or* e	
	ـُ	u	u *or* ü / o *or* ö	
	ـِ	i	ı *or* i	

For Ottoman Turkish, authors may either transliterate or use the modern Turkish orthography.

Figure 1: Transliteration system (Ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu, 2019)

List of abbreviations

BBCM-M	BBC Monitoring Middle East Service
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
DHA	Discourse-Historical Approach
DTS	Descriptive Translation Studies
RC	Reference corpus
SC	Study corpus
ST	Source text
TET	Transedited text
TS	Translation Studies
TT	Target text
WST	WordSmith Tools
4UKBS	A reference corpus built from 4 UK Broadsheets, namely *The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Guardian* and *The Observer*

Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

The role of media discourse in shaping public opinion has long been a significant matter of discussion in interdisciplinary studies. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) examined the effects of news on public opinion, finding that news coverage in media outlets determines the importance of news and its credibility, because news that receives more coverage is more likely to be discussed and reflected on in the public domain. Indeed, Cohen (1963, p.13) argues that 'the press may not be successful in telling us what to think but is stunningly successful in telling us what to think about'. However, later studies show that under specific conditions news reports 'do tell people what to think by providing the public with an agenda of attributes' (Wanta, Golan and Lee, 2004, p.364).

Thus, news does not represent an objective reality; instead, it represents a reframed reality. Fowler (1991, p.4) argues that news does not consist of 'facts' but 'representation of facts' and that the events chosen for these representations are carefully selected according to complicated cultural criteria rather than by the importance of those events. Fowler also demonstrates that news has to be brought to the audience through some sort of medium. This medium, regardless of type, carries social values that may constitute a certain viewpoint on the reported happenings because it is operated by employees in an institution of production that must follow the conventions of the job (Fowler, 1991, p.25).

With this in mind, the processes of news-gathering and news-making in today's world are not dependent on local news agencies. Driven by the forces of globalisation, which has been defined as 'a process of interaction and integration among the people, companies, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology' (Globalization101.org, 2015), non-English news output is monitored and translated on a daily basis by many organisations such as the BBC Monitoring Service, a BBC division that observes world news outlets and translates their top stories into English (BBC Monitoring, 2019).

These organisations present their mission as solely to overcome language barriers; thus, the BBCM claims to help understanding 'The world through its media'

(Monitoring.bbc.co.uk, 2019). Through this, the BBC claims a high degree of transparency and authenticity, stipulating that its role is limited to bringing what has been said in a specific nation, culture or country to the English reader via translation rather than original writing or composition.

However, once translated, news is no longer a mere representation of facts carefully selected in accordance with specific criteria and reported from a certain ideological stance. This is because it endures further complex processes in both the pre-translation and translation stages, where there are aspects that undermine the claims of transparency and authenticity made by the BBCM-M or any news organisation that uses translation in the process of news-making.

In the pre-translation stage, two processes involving selectivity take place: theme selection and news source selection. These are selective because they are more likely to be pre-planned and governed, or at least influenced, by specific norms, ideologies or aims of the institution carrying out the translation process.

Indeed, the process of theme selection is open to selectivity because editors in news organisations decide which stories are to be translated and which are not, thus determining the 'macrostructures', 'global meanings' or 'global topics' of their coverage (Van Dijk, 2009, pp.1-33). The selectivity lies in the fact that what is regarded as top news by the BBC or any other news organisation is dependent on what Fowler (1991) refers to as 'news values', or newsworthiness, and based on criteria that differ from one culture to another (pp.13-17).

Thus, what is considered a top story by a Saudi news organisation such as the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), for instance, may or may not be worth reporting by BBCM-M simply because it does not meet the criteria set by the BBC editors. These news organisations thus play the role of 'gate-keepers' (Bourdieu, 1977), who filter what the public domain – the English reader in the case of the BBCM-M – receives.

The second selective process in the pre-translation stage, the selection of news sources, governs the nature of the news items that are selected for translation, for news sources do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, they are situated ideologically, politically, socially and economically, making them more likely to report from a certain point of view exhibited in their linguistic constructions, which are not likely to be arbitrary, as each form of expression has an ideological distinction (Fowler, 1991, p.4).

During the stage of translation process itself, the translator selects a certain overall strategy such as ‘domestication’ versus ‘foreignization’ (Venuti, 1995) to deal with the news item in question. These strategies are achieved by selecting specific translation procedures (also known as techniques) like omission, addition, modulation or adaptation (see Vinay and Darbelnet, 1958, pp.84-93).

As much as the selection of one strategy over another or one technique over another can be guided by the linguistic complexities of the news item at hand, it can also be ideologically motivated and institutionally regulated. Thus, the ‘entextualization’ phenomenon, in which the ST ranks below the prevailing journalistic purposes, is prevalent in the industry (Kang, 2007, pp.219-42). This lower position is driven by the desire for fluency that leads to the acceptability of the TT, which is rooted in the concept of good translation, a notion for which theologians over the generations have tried to establish criteria. Views differ, but clarity, accurateness, naturalness and acceptability are the most four widely accepted criteria (Larson, 1984). Even if translators in action may not achieve all four aims, their translation products may still meet institutional and public acceptability. An acceptable translated news article may be thus natural but not necessarily accurate, simply because news editors and readers seek better fluency.

Another crucial factor that weakens the claim of transparency and authenticity in translated news is the distinction between the original and target readerships, as all readerships differ in terms of socioeconomic status[1] (Fowler, 1991, p.4). So, BBCM-M, for instance, could be reporting on Saudi Arabia from an ideological position that is different from that of other news agencies, which could lead to polarisation in news reporting.

This shows that news in general is neither perfectly authentic nor transparent, let alone news that has undergone the complex process of translation by an individual working

[1] ‘Socioeconomic status is commonly conceptualized as the social standing or class of an individual or group. It is often measured as a combination of education, income and occupation. Examinations of socioeconomic status often reveal inequities in access to resources, plus issues related to privilege, power and control.’ (American Psychology Association, 2015)

in an institution that is situated under political, social and economic constraints and intended for an audience with a background that differs socioeconomically from that of the original audience.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

By its nature, translation, regardless of its many definitions and fields of practices, is a process that involves a transfer and change of some sort and degree. Van Doorslaer (2012b, pp.1046-59) argues that any transfer always implies a change. Therefore, it could be argued that translators in newsrooms are following the traditions of their news production jobs and that the processes of theme and news sources selection are not designed and restrained any more than is traditional and customary in the news business. Hence, driven by the desire for acceptability of the TT by the target audience in a given society at a given period of time, translators might conform to the norms of the target culture.

In doing so, cultural or religious references made by the original news agency may need to be moulded for the target audience and its situation, presumed knowledge, ideology and expectations. The one strategy that is commonly used to achieve this moulding is domestication, and that is where the root of the problem lies. Venuti (1995) defines domestication as a strategy of translation that is used for the purpose of producing a TT that is less strange and more fluent by eliminating and modifying foreign elements of the ST. It is contrary to 'foreignization', which he defines as a strategy that is used for the purpose of producing a TT that retains some of the foreign elements of the TT in order to introduce them to the target audience (Venuti, 1995, p.20).

In newsrooms, however, translators routinely apply what Bielsa and Bassnett (2009, p.10) refer to as 'absolute domestication', in which translators not only get the message across to the target readers while taking into consideration the target situation, but also move beyond this to omitting large sections of the ST, adding new parts that feature their own interpretations and perspectives, contextualise and shift the original viewpoint of the news item for the purpose of easy reading.

Although primarily discussing literary translation, Venuti (1995) argues that translators, encouraged by reviewers' and publishers' desire for fluency in English, exercise 'an

ethnocentric reduction of the foreign text to receiving cultural values' (p.15). Translators thus tend to domesticate rather than foreignize when translating into English, concealing an ethnocentric violence against the source language and a cultural hegemony over the culture of that text by relocating it into the target culture.

When domestication is chosen, there are three crucial factors that have to be taken into consideration: first, it is worth noting that translators use a subjective, presumably shared knowledge that differs from one translator to another, or what Van Dijk (2004) calls the notion of 'common ground' with the audience, as the foundation on which he or she judges concepts to be foreign or familiar and the text as fluent or natural, as well as executing corresponding edits via translation. Second, translators applying domestication position themselves in an invisible position, because they seek to leave no traces of the foreign in their translation products. Third, target readers in the case of translated news are more likely to not be able to examine the original STs due either to language barriers or to not having physical or electronic access to the original news source from which the domesticated news item is selected, whether due to censorship or more practical concerns like cost and distance.

Consequently, newsroom translators are no longer translators in the classical sense; they play a far greater role that transcends the traditional role of the translator to the role of an editor, or a 'transeditor' (Stetting, 1989, pp.371-82) or even a 'rewriter in the service of power' through which 'manipulative' practices can take place juxtaposed to translation practices (Lefevere, 1992, p.13). Thus, in this thesis, translators are referred to as transeditors who transedit STs and produce 'transedited texts' (TETs).

This power invested in the role of the transeditor can be hazardous, because image transmission is inevitable in 'every act of information distribution' (Van Doorslaer, 2012a, pp.122-27) and can lead to many consequences, the most important of which is a false projection of a writer's, culture's or nation's image (Lefevere, 1992). It is crucial, however, to note that the false projection can be either in the service of the projected nation or against it, as Lefevere (1992, p.xii) indicates: 'rewriting is manipulation, undertaken in the service of power, and in its positive aspect can help in the evolution of a literature and a society'. It can also do the opposite; therefore, Lefevere uses 'repress', 'destroy', 'hinder', 'censor' and 'forgotten' to describe the

unfavourable effect that ‘patrons’ can have through the power they enjoy on the rewritten texts. Centrally, the false image, whether or not it is in favour of the text, author or nation, can lead to sustaining a certain image that is no longer relevant, resist change in a certain image, amplify, diminish or even create an image that has no empirical basis in reality. This could influence the views of the represented group about itself and of the TT recipients about the represented group, because texts can have the power to change attitudes, values and beliefs, especially when it comes to social relations and identities (Fairclough, 2003, p.8). This is even more hazardous when the public’s main source of information on foreign nations is the news due to limited access to those nations, as media can be a powerful source of stereotype creation (Fujioka, 1999).

1.3 Rationale and Research Questions

Fowler (1991, pp.3-4) explains how language affects cognition, arguing that language plays a ‘cognitive role’ by giving the receivers (an English-speaking audience of transedited news in this case) formulated mental images that accompany the experience they already possess. Said (1978) argues that since 1798, when Napoleon attempted to take over Egypt, the West, especially the British, French and later the Americans, created a ‘system of ideas’ about the East and Arabs in general and Muslims in particular. Importantly, this system is composed of distorted and stereotypical images and is maintained and reproduced to this day by and in the West.

Saudi Arabia is a rich case study for this investigation for three main reasons: first, it has restrictive visa laws. At the time of writing, there are six main types of visas in Saudi Arabia: 1) work 2) business 3) hajj *wa-ʿumra* and 4) visitor (itself divided into family visitor and business visitor) 5) accompanied and 6) diplomatic (Sauditourism.sa, 2016). All visas are primarily for Muslims, business-persons, family members or diplomats, meaning that an average person who is not a Muslim cannot visit the Kingdom strictly for tourism. Due to this limited access to Saudi Arabia, news serves as the primary source from which large numbers of people around the world obtain knowledge about Saudi Arabia, making it valuable to examine the depiction of Saudi Arabia that is transmitted to the English-speaking world by an English-language news organisation like the BBC.

Second, Saudi Arabia constitutes a fertile framework for such cross-cultural research because it has commonly been depicted in Anglo-American media with a critical tone, as both enemy and ally (see chapter 4). Therefore, examining how it has been represented by the BBCM-M, a branch of an English news organisation, using news output originally in Arabic can help reveal whether the BBC is creating, sustaining, changing or challenging the canon of Saudi Arabia's representations in particular and of the East, Arabs and Muslims in general. This is because Saudi Arabia is an Eastern country with great influence in both the Arab and Muslim worlds.

Third, taking into consideration the potential power 'abuse' against the source language and the possible cultural hegemony of English via transediting (Venuti, 1995), it will be worth examining how the BBCM-M deals with Arabic news items on Saudi Arabia in order to deliver them to a certain readership in a given English-speaking society at a given time (2013–2015), via transediting or 'rewriting in the service of power' (Lefevere, 1992). This exploration can unveil power negotiations through transediting into English. Thus, the following research questions are formulated:

In relation to other British news sources reporting in English,

1) What are the key themes that the BBC Monitoring Middle East service (BBCM-M) focused on in reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output during 2013 to 2015?
2) How was Saudi Arabia represented in the BBCM-M's coverage of Arabic news output for the English reader in the 2013–2015 period?

And

3) What are the forms of rewriting chosen by the BBCM-M's transeditors when reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic-language news items from 2013 to 2015? What are the dynamics of power between the source language (Arabic) and the target language (English) based on those forms of rewriting?

1.4 Data, Theories and Method

1.4.1 Data Nature and Research Boundaries

In order to answer these questions, the study focuses on Internet-retrieved Saudi Arabia-related news items that have been transedited and published by the BBCM-M.

These are English TETs of Arabic news items that were originally written and published by Arabic-speaking news sources. This means that the study does not take into account all BBC platforms (TV, other online services such as Facebook, Twitter and its official mobile application). Instead, it focuses only on TETs of news articles by BBCM-M that can be found and accessed in online databases. Importantly, these TETs are archived in the database in digitised, written, form. However, in tracing and collecting the STs for the qualitative critical discourse analysis (CDA), two STs had to be transcribed by the researcher from audio-visuals, because it became clear that the BBCM-M had produced TETs based on those audio-visuals (see chapter 10 for a full explanation).

Moreover, this research does not take into consideration nonverbal elements of the translated news items, such as photographs, because the data retrieved is in plain text form. Hence, the research focuses solely on the textual elements of the translated items, unless otherwise required to do so in the course on the analysis. This is because an exhaustive study of all BBC platforms that report on Saudi Arabia was not feasible, given that a sole researcher was involved, working within a limited timeframe.

1.4.2 Theories and Method: Chapter Breakdown

This thesis has 11 chapters, 6 of which report on 2 analytical units. These are a two-level corpus analytical unit presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7 and a three-level CDA unit presented in chapters 8, 9 and 10. The corpus analytical unit tries to answer the first and second research questions related to unveiling the key themes in the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output and the representations of Saudi Arabia in that coverage. Together, they constitute the body of knowledge on Saudi Arabia constructed by the BBCM-M and transmitted to the English reader, which can help identify the social representations to which these communications on Saudi Arabia are shaped by the BBCM-M's practices (Moscovici, 1961). The CDA unit aims to answer the third question related to the forms of rewriting (Lefevere, 1992) through transediting and the power relations between Arabic and English (Venuti, 1995).

The remaining chapters (1 through 4 and 11) are the introduction, literature review, methodology, contextual background and discussion and conclusion, in that order. This first chapter introduces the research, states the research problem, justifies the

selection of Saudi Arabia as a case study and presents the research questions. The second chapter reviews the literature relevant to the adopted theories, social representations theory (Moscovici, 2000) and rewriting theory (Lefevere, 1992), and the selected methodological tools, CDA and corpora. It also reviews the literature on the Anglo-American depictions of Islam and the Arab world and research into the depictions of Saudi Arabia. The third chapter presents the methodological tools to be exploited in the analysis – the discourse-historical approach (DHA) to CDA (Wodak and Meyer, 2016) and corpus tools – and the rationale behind employing them. It also presents details on the source, size and rationale of the data or study corpus (SC) and the reference corpus (RC) that were designed and built for the purposes of this research.

The fourth chapter presents a brief history of Saudi Arabia and its critical system of representations in Anglo-American media, where it is both an ally and an enemy. It also gives background information on the BBCM-M and the 20 identified Arabic news sources from which it selected Arabic news items for its coverage of Saudi Arabia between 2013 and 2015. The eleventh chapter, the discussion and conclusion, considers the findings in light of the reviewed literature, pointing out the findings' significance and how they contribute to the wider debate about translation as a cross-cultural activity. Finally, the limitations of this research are noted and suggestions for future avenues of study are offered.

Chapter 2: Literature Review and Significance of the Study

2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces and discusses key concepts that inform the analysis and surveys the literature relevant to this research. It consists of six sections, the first two of which focus on the theories adopted: social representations theory (Moscovici, 2000) and rewriting theory (Lefevere, 1992). In section three, through a focus on the field of the study, translation and the genre of the data (news media), the relevant literature on the interfaces between translation studies (TS) and the news media are presented. In section four, the relevant literature on TS, news-making and CDA surveyed, and gaps in that literature are identified. In section five, the literature on the portrayals in Anglo-American media of Islam and Arabs in general and Saudi Arabia in particular is reviewed in order to identify the common depictions on Arabs, Muslims and Saudi Arabians and to highlight the gaps in the literature that this study is intended to help fill. Finally, in section six, the scholarly areas to which this research contributes are presented, thus highlighting the significance of the thesis.

2.2 Social Representation Theory

2.2.1 Origin, Basic Concepts and Criticism

In 1898, the French sociologist Émile Durkheim presented the notion of ‘collective representation’, which he argues to be one of the systems through which social phenomena can be understood (1953). The collective representations system holds that there are ideas, beliefs and practices shared among members of a society that enable them to think, conceive and evaluate objects in that society. These collective representations remain unchanged across time and are thus involuntarily inherited by one generation from its predecessor; on this view, individuals in a given society are restricted to its shared ideas. As an alternative, he proposes ‘individual representations’, which are located in the consciousness of each individual and are thus related to people rather than shared by all members of a given society.

More than six decades later, in 1961, Serge Moscovici brought the ‘collective representations’ concept back for discussion. He criticised the fixed status of the collective representations suggested by Durkheim (1947; 1953; 1982), presenting the

social representations theory (Moscovici, 2007) and forming the basis of one of the key theories in the study of social reality, i.e. social psychology.

According to Moscovici (1981), Durkheim's collective representations do not take into consideration the possibility of an exchange between individual and collective representations, thus neglecting the dynamic nature of modern society. He argues that individual representations can become shared collective representations through normalisation processes effected by communication. The source of representations is in fact the social groups who are concerned with structuring a society rather than the society itself, indicating that different social representations of a given object can be regulated or normalised as a shared consensus in a certain society by the societal structure of that society. Moscovici presents multiple definitions of social representations, one of which clearly shows its two main functions to be as follows:

A social representation is a system of values, ideas and practices with a twofold function: first, to establish an order which will enable individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual group history. (Moscovici 1973, p.xiii)

'Representations', according to Moscovici (1984, p.24) intend to 'make something unfamiliar, or unfamiliarity itself, familiar'; this is possible through one of two main operations: 'anchoring and objectification' (2007). Anchoring involves attaching the familiar or known meanings to the unfamiliar or new phenomenon through communication based on the existing beliefs, values and practices that are known and shared by members of the society in which those individuals exist. This ascribes the unfamiliar phenomenon a familiar meaning according to which those individuals can position themselves in relation to the newly familiar phenomenon. Examples of devices that can be used to achieve anchoring are thematic anchoring and naming.

Themes, according to Moscovici, are located in representations and occupy a micro-level in the structure of those representations (2000, p.163). Moreover, themes 'have

been created by society and remained preserved by society' and 'never reveal themselves clearly' (Moscovici, 2000, p.182). In thematic anchoring, themes can be ascribed meanings from already known and shared ideas, whereas by using a naming device, 'we extricate [the novel phenomenon] from a disturbing anonymity to endow it with a genealogy and to include it in a complex of specific words, to locate it, in fact, in the identity matrix of our culture' (Moscovici, 2000, p.46).

The second process by which familiarising the unfamiliar takes place, objectification, aims to ascribe more material qualities to the abstract phenomenon, thus making it more susceptible to the senses. In Moscovici's terms, 'what is perceived replaces what is conceived' (2000, p.51). According to Hall (1997), 'representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to other people'; 'connects meaning and language to culture' and it is 'an essential part of the process by which meaning it produced and exchanged between members of a culture' (p.15). This practice of communication, especially of new ideas, between members of a culture requires a system of ideas that are already known and shared among those members of the culture through which communication of the new ideas is possible by 'mapping' them into what is already known or what Hall refers to as 'taken-for-granted knowledge' (Hall, 1973, p.57). Accordingly, 'language comes from within us – from the individual speaker or writer; that it is this speaking or writing subject who is the author or originator of meaning' (Hall, 1997, p.34). Hall's notion of taken-for-granted knowledge is somewhat similar to Moscovici's (2000) social representations through which mapping (Hall, 1973, p.15) or anchoring (Moscovici 2000, p.46) takes place.

According to Moscovici (1988, p.221) representations can be classified into three types: hegemonic, emancipated and polemic representations. Hegemonic representations are those prevailing and collective representations among the members of a society who are in control, such as politicians. Emancipated representations are related to a group of society that enjoys a lesser degree of control than those related to the first type, and these representations help those members of society to think and act 'with a certain degree of autonomy with respect to the interacting segments of society' (Moscovici 1988, p.221). Finally, polemic representations are related to negotiation between social groups; they are based on

‘antagonistic relations’ and ‘intended to be mutually exclusive’ (Moscovici 1988, p.221).

However, this classification has been criticised as vague and sometimes involving discrepancies (Höijer, 2011). Similarly, the theory as a whole has been criticised as ‘fragmented and sometimes contradictory’ (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, p.139). These drawbacks have arguably led to challenges in its applications (Litton and Potter, 1985). The classification has been criticised due to its ‘a) ambiguities in defining social representations, b) social determinism, c) cognitive reductionism and d) the apparent lack of a critical agenda’ (Voelklein and Howarth, 2005, p.3). Nonetheless, social representation theory still provides an apparatus for analysing, understanding and explaining meaning-making processes of social phenomena through communicative concepts. Therefore, more than 50 years after its introduction, social representation theory still enjoys wide acceptance in many disciplines ranging from psychology and cultural studies to media studies.

2.2.2 Media Communication and Social Representation: Relevant Literature

Based on the genre of the data in hand (transedited news items), the interface of media studies and social representation theory is of relevance, and two recent studies can be briefly fruitfully surveyed in this regard: Höijer (2011) and Sarrica, et al. (2018).

Höijer (2011, p.3) argues for using social representation theory to unravel ‘how the media and citizens socially represent societal and political issues colouring our age, or some specific time period’. It also shows how anchoring and objectification can be exploited as conceptual devices in studying communication, including the media. While retaining a connection to media studies, but focusing more on the new forms of communication that make up social media, Sarrica, et al. (2018) examine the Italian community’s reaction towards earthquakes that struck Italy: L’Aquila (in 2009) and Emilia (in 2012), immediately after the events took place, after a couple of days and in the medium-long term. They argue that via social media, the community was involved in processes of making meaning of those social realities that aimed at ‘recovering meaning and control of their world’ (p.321). The analysis shows that adopting new forms of communication – that is to say social media – ‘social representations processes and functions: cognitive coping, social sharing of emotions, preserving self-

efficacy, boosting identity, and community empowerment' can be achieved (p.321). Even as the various forms of social media were used to give information on the new social reality caused by the earthquakes, as well as 'material coping, then they favored the social sharing of emotions and joint remembering, and finally they contributed to claiming voice and control' (p.321).

2.3 Translation Transcends Cross-Linguistic Activities

Despite the fact that the different phases of TS have overlapped, there is a large body of literature that speaks of TS's 'turns', moments at which translation scholars shifted their focus from translation as a linguistic phenomenon to studying it as first a cultural and then a social phenomenon in order to obtain an improved understanding of this relatively young field. For example, Snell-Hornby (2010), who presented a systematic study of the turns of translation studies, describes and bounds each turn on the basis of the orientation of the translation scholars and the developments they encouraged through their achievements.

Thus, the following three subsections survey the relevant scholarly reactions to the linguistic turn, or prescriptive TS, which dictates how translators should translate and which regarded translation as a merely cross-linguistic activity. Then, the cultural turn of TS, which takes into consideration the cultural exchange in translation and its potential for constructing power, is presented. Finally, and moving beyond the notion of translation as a cultural activity, the relevant literature in which translation is considered an activity in the service of power in society is surveyed.

2.3.1 Translation Products' Value in the Target Language System

In the 1950s and the 1960s, TS underwent what was called a linguistic turn that viewed translation largely from the perspective of language, detaching other aspects like culture, history and society. The approach that the scholars adopting this turn took to translation was prescriptive, which began to be challenged by many theorists who began to take into consideration the sociocultural functions of language. Hence, a drift away from telling translators how to translate towards describing translation as it is, that is to say a descriptive approach to translation, took root. Many challenging reactions to the prescriptive approach to translation were published, which established the field of descriptive translation studies (DTS).

One influential reaction was polysystem theory, which drew on comparative literature and Russian formalists for its foundation. Translated texts had previously been considered to have a lesser value than their original counterparts. However, Even-Zohar (1978) argues that TTs are segments of the target language culture, as he sees 'translated literature as a particular literary system' (2004, p.192). Hence, translated literature is a subsystem of the polysystem of the overall literary system. Even-Zohar provides a comprehensive theoretical account of how translated literature participates in developing literary systems. Importantly, he sees literature as a dynamic system that is constantly influenced by other systems like economics, politics, culture and language itself. Hence, what used to be seen as low literature may later become 'high' literature or *vice versa* with the establishment of the polysystem, which he defines as 'a multiple system, a system of various systems which intersect with each other and partly overlap, using concurrently different options, yet functioning as one structured whole, whose members are interdependent' (Even-Zohar, 1979, p.290).

The relationship between the polysystem and the subsystem, Even-Zohar argues, is exhibited in a) which texts are chosen for translation and b) whether to accept or reject the existing norms of the polysystem. The first factor relies on the polysystem of the receiver and the second on the position of the translated literature and the chief agent of translation (1978, pp.192-93). Although Pym (1998, pp.116-24) criticises the concept of 'systems' as poorly defined as well as based on 'leaps of faith', Even-Zohar's contributions have promoted the emergence of new research topics in TS by providing the newly established field with a unique theory and method (Bassnet, 1993, p.142). Not only is the theoretical framework proposed by Even-Zohar applicable to all types of texts, it also takes into consideration the cultural dimensions of translation analysis. In spite of terminological differences, it also forms the basis on which the theoretical framework of the present study develops, the rewriting theory (Lefevere, 1992), which is discussed below.

2.3.2 Translation as a Constructing Power

Lefevere, Bassnett, Lambert and Hermans collaborated with the polysystemists, which brought to the fore the concepts of manipulation and cultural turn. Rebelling against

overly linguistic approaches to TS and the prescriptive view of translation, Bassnett published *Translation Studies* (1980), in which she argues that the cultural context has to be taken into consideration when developing concepts in the field; this began the cultural turn in TS.

In 1985, Hermans published *The Manipulation of Literature: Studies in Literary Translation,* which gave rise to a group known as the manipulation school, although that term has occasioned debate, because some scholars do not view the group as a 'school' in the conventional sense. Hermans (1985) offers a concise account of both the group's key positions and the debate over the group's name:

> The group is not a school, but a geographically scattered collection of individuals with widely varying interests […]. What they have in common is, briefly, a view of literature as a complex and dynamic system; a conviction that there should be a continual interplay between theoretical models and practical case studies; an approach to literary translation which is descriptive, target-oriented, functional and systemic; and an interest in the norms and constraints that govern the production and reception of translations, in the relation between translation and other types of text processing, and in the place and role of translations both within a given literature and in the interaction between literatures. (Hermans, 1985, pp.10-11)

Regardless of the debate about the group's name and despite its origin in literary translation, the manipulation school or group encouraged a new movement in which translation is perceived 'from the point of view of the target literature' as manipulation, because 'all translation implies a degree of manipulation of the source text for a certain purpose' (Hermans, 1985, p.11). Lefevere's rewriting theory that he suggested in (1992) is pivotal due to its view of literary translation as a form of rewriting in which manipulative practices take place and affect the literary text's image in the target culture. However, prior to discussing the rewriting theory, the early works of Lefevere, which led to formation of that theory, are reviewed.

In 1981, Lefevere defined the term 'refraction' to mean 'the adaptation of a work of literature to a different audience, with the intention of influencing the way in which that

audience reads the work' (Hermans, 2004, p.127). Accordingly, he defined 'refracted texts' as:

> 'texts that have been processed for a certain audience (children, for example)', or changed to meet a specific poetics or ideology'. (Gentzler, 2004, p.137)

In 1984, with the aim of examining ideological constraints, he introduced the concept of 'patronage' (Gentzler, 2004, p.137). In 1985, the concept of refracted texts was refined to become the more commonly known term 'rewritten texts', which Lefevere views as texts that have been written based on other texts in which deliberate adaptations of the rewritten texts take place to conform to certain poetics, ideologies or, frequently, both (Hermans, 2004, p.127).

Bassnett and Lefevere (1990) reject linguistic theories of translation and call for an emphasis on the pivotal role played by culture in the translation process and translators' subjectivity. Therefore, the focus moves from a ST-TT comparison to the relationship between culture and translation (Bassnett and Lefevere, 1990, p.11). The 1990 volume contains twelve essays by different authors revolving around a similar idea: the relation between translation and culture. By redefining translation theory and methodology, these essays tackle a wide range of issues, such as film translation, feminist translation, cultural appropriation, translation success, translation as manipulation, translation and power and ideology. Like identity, translation is crucially seen in this work as a formative power that reconstructs the identities of cultures and nations and consequently their national images, thus rewriting the literature itself (Bassnett and Lefevere, 1990, p.65).

Elaborating on his work with Bassnett, Lefevere continued to develop his ideas in his widely quoted *Translation, Rewriting, and the Manipulation of Literary Fame* (1992), in which he views literary translation as a form of rewriting in which manipulative practices take place and affect the literary text's image in the target culture. This view of translation as a kind of rewriting makes it a form of power practice that affects literary evaluation in a given culture at a given time. In this book, Lefevere adopts the Russian formalists' notion of systems through which literature is viewed as a system of the systems that make up the system of culture, which he defines, also from a formalist view, as follows:

> A complex system of systems composed of various sub-systems such as literature, science and technology. Within this general system, extraliterary phenomena relate to literature not in a piecemeal fashion but as an interplay among subsystems determined by the logic of the culture to which they belong. (Steiner, 1984, p.112)

Lefevere (1992, p.11) argues that the systems are ‘open to each other’ and influence one another. Thus, the process of manipulation involved in activities such as editing, critiquing and translating is not conducted in isolation; rather, it is affected by a nexus of factors. The main factors that control the logic of the culture are either inherent in the literary system or external to that system. Coming from outside the literary system and more concerned with the ideology than the poetics of literature are patrons who can be a person or ‘a group of persons, religious body, political party, a social class, a royal court, publishers and last but not least, the media, both newspapers and magazines and larger television corporations’ (Lefevere, 1992, p.15); they attempt to regulate ‘the relationship between the literary system and the other systems, which, together, make up a society, a culture’ (Lefevere, 1992, p.11).

By contrast, the first control factor involves professional ‘critics, reviewers, teachers, [and] translators’ who are more concerned with the poetics of literature and attempt to control the ‘literary system from the inside within the parameters set by the second factor, the patronage or patrons. In other words, ‘the patron delegates authority to the professional where poetics is concerned’ as ‘the patrons count on these professionals to bring the literary system in line with their own ideology’ (Lefevere, 1992, pp.11-12).

Therefore, patrons enjoy and practice power, which can ‘further or hinder the reading, writing, and rewriting of literature’, reflecting a Foucauldian perspective on power as more than ‘a repressive force’ for it can bring about ‘good’ consequences such as ‘pleasure or forms of knowledge’ (Lefevere, 1992, p. 12). He then presents case studies, one of which examines French, English and German translations of Anne Frank's *The Diary of a Young Girl*. Lefevere argues that translations differ according to the dominant ideological beliefs of the translators at a given time and in a given culture. He finds that the German translation manipulates the ST by softening the language used to describe the Nazis’ treatment of the Jews, because Germans at the

time of the translated version’s publication were trying to erase the negative stigma of the Nazis (Lefevere, 1992, pp.71-75).

In 1998, Bassnett and Lefevere, viewing translation as a cultural interaction, showed how certain issues, such as the construction of a writer's image through translation and the formation of cultural capital, need to be studied with an interdisciplinary approach, as none of translation studies, cultural studies and linguistic studies is solely sufficient to address such issues. They presented three models of translation analysis to examine this cultural interaction: the Horatian model, the Jerome model and the Schleiermacher model (Bassnett and Lefevere, 1998, pp.4-9). Importantly, they elaborate on two concepts presented by the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu: cultural capital and the textual grid. The latter concept is presented as a device of translation analysis through which an examination of what is expected to be said in a certain culture and a certain genre of writing can be performed (Bassnett and Lefevere, 1998, pp.12-24). They argue that translation has three motivations: cultural interaction, cultural capital transmission and entertainment (Bassnett and Lefevere, 1998, pp.41-56). Finally, they analyse several examples of translations, including the translation of Virgil’s epic, *The Aeneid*, from Latin into English, to show how cultural capital is transferred (Bassnett and Lefevere, 1998).

2.3.3 Translations as Sites of Power Negotiation

This section aims to pinpoint the main features of the post-cultural turn in TS, which began taking into consideration the sociological aspect of the field and led to a postcolonial understanding that takes into consideration the impacts of colonisation in intercultural communication or translation.

2.3.3.1 Translation as an Apparatus of Ethnocentric Violence

Focusing on Venuti's seminal *The Translator's Invisibility* (1995), which shifted the focus from analysing translations (texts) to analysing translators (humans) and their position in the process of translation (action), the main arguments in the post-cultural TS turn are presented below.

Venuti’s focus on translators rather than their translations can be traced to Bourdieu (1977) and other sociologists. Not only does Bourdieu criticise the current methodologies of social science, he also presents his own theory of practice (1977,

p.17). This theory is an investigative framework for analysing human conduct. It contains the following main concepts: field (where the interaction takes place), habitus (all knowledge gained by agents from family and education) and capital, which is divided into the three types of social (the people that the agents know), economic (how much money the agents have) and cultural (the education the agents have received).

Analysing these concepts enables a better understanding of human interaction and power negotiation between agents in any social field. Although Bourdieu's sociological work is concerned with Kabylia (Algeria) and France, his *modus operandi* in analysis has proven fruitful in TS for investigating power negotiation between social agents (translators, editors and commissioners) who function within the social world. Other French scholars whose sociological perspective has influenced TS to take this new direction include Bruno Latour, John Law and Michel Callon, who have published many works explaining and developing their approach to science and technology (Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Callon, 1987; 1990; Latour, 1987; 2005; Callon and Law, 1997; Law, 1997; 1999; 2007).

Focusing specifically on Venuti's work, the following is a critique of his claim on the power play between the source and target languages and cultures through the choice of translation strategy. Venuti (1995) calls for defiance of the convention of judging a translation product by its readability and closeness to a natural form of the TL, because he regards retaining foreign elements in the TL for the readers to explore as important. He argues that this allows the readers to experience the foreign culture of that SL and enriches them with new concepts by taking them to that foreign land of the original text (Venuti, 1995, p.20).

He distinguishes between two translation strategies: domestication (or acculturation) and foreignization. Through domestication, changes made in transferring the text will be less visible to the target readers or listeners because the translator would have taken the liberty of modifying any foreign elements in the source text, such as religious or cultural references, so that it meets the readers' existing knowledge and expectations (Venuti, 1995, p.20). On the other hand, foreignization involves consciously keeping foreign elements so that target audiences are aware of the fact that the text they are reading or listening to is a translated text and not the original. By

selecting one of these strategies, the translator is either visible (via foreignizing) or invisible (via domestication) in his translation.

Venuti argues that there is an Anglo-American cultural hegemony that is exercised by translation through domestication rather than foreignization. He uses the term 'invisibility' to describe the 'translator's situation and activity in contemporary British and American cultures' (1995, p.1). Venuti gives the reasons for this phenomenon in the English-language world, arguing that translators are inclined to prudence and a 'fluent', 'readable' and 'idiomatic' TT that readers, reviewers and publishers will deem 'acceptable' if it 'reads fluently' (1995, pp.305-6).

Venuti (1995) argues that by foreignizing, translators 'can introduce discursive variations, experimenting with archaism, slang, literary allusion and convention to call attention to the secondary status of the translation and signal the linguistic and cultural differences of the foreign text' (pp.310-11), thus challenging the cultural values of the Anglo-American world, which violently domesticates the source text and culture. Therefore, foreignization for Venuti is the ethical strategy, although he admits the apparent contradiction in this stance. First, a certain amount of domestication is inevitable in every act of translation for a certain target audience. Second, there is a similarity between the domestication and foreignization strategies, which are 'equally partial in their interpretation of the foreign text, but they [foreignized texts] tend to flaunt their partiality rather than concealing it' (1995, p.34). Third, the term 'foreignization' is a 'subjective and relative term', because 'it depends on the dominant values of the receiving culture' and once the translation 'departs from those values', foreignization is achieved (Munday, 2012a, p.221).

With the goal of unveiling the ideological aspects of translation practices, Venuti argues (1998, p.48), that publishers in the UK and the US tend to select works that are easily assimilated into the target culture, a practice that is most likely to appeal to their 'narcissistic' cultural and 'aggressively' monolingual readers. Thus, both a cultural and a political hegemony of the Anglo-American culture, which Venuti never clearly defines, are achieved. He claims that selecting one translation strategy over another not only reveals the preference of the translator, publisher or even the institution where they work, but also highlights the attitude they have towards the source language and

culture, or their ethics, for domestication involves an ethnocentric violence committed by the target culture.

He supports this claim by presenting graphs that show the low percentage of books translated into English compared to those that remain untranslated, a phenomenon he calls a trade imbalance. He also attacks the contracts on which translators work as being biased against them in both their type and in not recognising the translators. Controversially, he calls for defying this tradition via adopting foreignization rather than domestication when translating into English, a strategy that will liberate translators, educate the English readers who expect to find their own culture in the source culture and earn translators a more visible position.

However, Venuti's call for action to defy traditional English translation practice by adopting foreignization has been criticized as 'over-generalised' and based on a 'simple thesis' and selective examples (Bjork, 1997, p.72). Moreover, his book is regularly criticized for 'the lack of historical context' that is promised in its subtitle of the book itself, *Translator's invisibility: A history of translation*, for he focuses on the seventeenth century and neglects the fact that domestication had been practiced earlier (p.72). The concept of foreignization that Venuti encourages has been criticized as opaque because he only gives examples of this strategy and stops short of systematically and clearly defining it. Pym (1996), who fiercely attacks Venuti's contribution in terms of concepts, arguments and supporting examples, argues against Venuti's hypothesis on the basis of the popularity of the practice of domestication in translations outside the English-language world, such as Spain, France and Brazil (p.170).

Although Venuti attempts to raise awareness to the power play hidden in domestication, the term itself fails to demonstrate his point. He advocates for foreignization and cultural resistance but does not show how domesticated translations would be any different if foreignization were indeed adopted. A survey of the critiques of Venuti's work shows that it focuses mainly on the foreignization concept and how Venuti fails to define it or selectively presents examples of it. However, the concept of domestication is taken for granted, because it is the most common strategy used by translators everywhere – or at least in Spain, France and Brazil – and since antiquity, as Pym (1996, p.170) claims. Consequently, translators

shamelessly flaunt their adoption of domestication; it is also becoming the standard strategy especially in news translations, where absolute domestication prevails.

To take Pym's counter-argument to Venuti's claim about the cultural hegemony of the Anglo-American publishing industry on the basis of the commonality of the practice elsewhere in the world or at different times as a reason to invalidate Venuti's hypothesis overlooks the potential cultural and political hegemony of any target language and culture over any source language and culture, especially in the case of translating into English, 'the one master-language of our post-colonial world' (Bassnett and Trivedi, 1999, p.13), which brings us to postcolonial theory (Said, 1978).

2.3.3.2 Postcolonial Studies and Postcolonial Translation Theory

A consensus among theorists on a single definition of postcolonial theory simply does not exist; however, the following description covers its key tenets. Postcolonial theory 'is considered part of the interdisciplinary field of cultural theory or cultural studies, which draws on anthropology, sociology, gender studies, ethnic studies, literary criticism, history, psychoanalysis, political science and philosophy to examine various cultural texts and practices' (Robinson, 2014, pp.12-13). It tries to find the manifestations of European colonisation in philosophical and literary writings from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, produced by former colonies as a form of resistance to the coloniser or by authors who are regarded as influenced by the heritage of colonisation and who thus perceive the colonised as inferior in many aspects of their lives.

Edward Said's (1978) work presented a unique account of the concept that became the foundation on which postcolonial theory was established. His contribution, despite criticisms of over-generalisation in his analysis of French, British and American colonisation to draw conclusions on the whole of Western or European colonisation, his selectivity in textual data and the hazy concept of 'power' he employs, remains widely quoted, passionately debated and regularly taught in both the West and the East.

In *Orientalism,* Said shows that 'the colonised' has always been, and still is, the East, ('the Orient'), because Orientalism has two main aims: either to prepare for colonisation or to legitimise a colonisation. The concept of Orientalism, for Said, is 'a

style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident” (1978, p.3). In the employment of the binary opposite notion from post-structuralism, he argues that the West – namely France, Britain and later America – used contrast to create the ‘Orient’ (40), which, in the writings of the influential Orientalists, is un-human, unwise and outlandish compared to the human, wise and normal West. Making a clear distinction between ‘us’ (the West) and ‘them’ or ‘the other’ (the East) is, for Said, not only extremely biased but also serves imperialist goals (1978, p.123).

He argues that the West first created the canon of ‘Orientalist knowledge’ during Napoleon’s attempt to conquer Egypt when he founded the *Institut d’Égypte* that published 23 volumes by academics after the French invasion. This knowledge, as Said argues, has promoted a false image of the Orient. The problem for Said is that Orientalism is ‘science’ and thus not perceived as merely ‘personal testimony [or] subjective impression’ (1978, p.191). Due to ‘citations of predecessor scholars in the field’, Orientalism has been restored (1978, p.77): the Arab elite can and indeed have incorporated Anglo-American Orientalist conceptions into its own culture and have thus restored Orientalism.

This canon of knowledge is, from a Foucauldian point of view, ascribed to power, for knowledge is power. After the end of French and British colonisation, Americans enjoyed this power, because they replaced the power enjoyed by the French and British over the Orient through which hegemony was achieved and is still reproduced today, all on the basis of the traditional but fabricated knowledge of the Orient. This, according to him, has legitimised and still underpins the West’s colonial manoeuvres in the East, leading to civil wars, corruption and disorder.

Another Foucouldian influence is traced in Said’s notion of discourse; he argues that Orientalism can only be traced in examining discourses ‘by which the European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient politically, sociologically, military, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-enlightenment period’ (1978, p.3).

Said’s pioneering argument on the goals of Orientalism, in which he overtly links it to colonialism, and his claim that Orientalism is reproduced to this day have earned him a controversial position that persists to this day. He inspired subsequent discussions

on postcolonial theory and practice in both West and East across a wide range of disciplines.

In the field of postcolonial studies, there are three main sub-fields or approaches according to which the definition, aims and questions of a postcolonial study can change; the first is 'post-independence studies', which focus on the 'the survival of the colonial legacy in independence' examining certain postcolonial cultures, such as 'India, various African nations or the West Indies' to investigate the issues of politics, place and self and language (Robinson, 2014, pp.14-15). The second approach is 'post-European colonisation studies', which allow scholars to examine a historical event within a more comprehensive geopolitical context. This field explores European hegemony over former colonies and aims at 'undermining the cultural and political hegemony of Europe'. Moreover, it enables scholars to examine their own culture's experience under colonial power in parallel with other postcolonial cultures (Robinson, 2014, p.15).

The third approach is 'power relations studies', which is adopted in this thesis; it dismisses 'the conservative response that such-and-such post-colonial phenomenon isn't true of *us*, or of the culture we value', because it takes into consideration 'power relations that until recently have been repressed, idealized or universalized' (Robinson, 2014, p.15). Based on the description of the three approaches above, it becomes clear that the last approach has the broadest definition of the concept of 'the colonised', for it is not restricted to those belonging to former colonies of the European colonisation, as is true of the first and the second approaches. It is suitable for a case study of Saudi Arabia, which was not colonised by Eurocentric powers in the traditional sense.

It is important to draw a distinction here between the two concepts of 'colonialism' and 'coloniality'; it is the latter that is more pertinent to Saudi Arabia than the former. 'Colonialism denotes a political and economic relation in which the sovereignty of a nation or a people rests on the power of another nation, which makes such nation an empire' (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p.243). 'Coloniality', on the other hand, which was first introduced by the Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano (2000) and has mainly been used to refer to Eurocentric hegemony over Latin America in relation to the colonial project, 'refers to long-standing patterns of power that emerged as a result of

colonialism, but that define culture, labor, intersubjective relations, and knowledge production well beyond the strict limits of colonial administrations' (Maldonado-Torres, 2007, p.243)

This coloniality is attached to the notion of modernity, Quijano argues, on which the colonial project of the European powers was built. Thus, the end of the colonial era did not mark the discontinuation of the colonial project or its aims, rationale and practices, for 'what is termed globalization is the culmination of a process that began with the constitution of America and colonial/modern Eurocentered capitalism as a new global power' (Quijano, 2000, p.215). In other words, although the advent of 'coloniality' is linked to the discovery and conquest of the Americas, it presented a 'model of power' on which the 'modern identity' is based (Quijano, 2000, pp.215-6). According to Quijano (2000) the 'social classification of the world', which is based on 'the idea of race' defined as 'a mental construction that expresses the basic experience of colonial domination' is one of the 'axes' of 'the coloniality of power', which he describes as a 'model of power' in which a structure of control and hegemony is established. This axis has 'a colonial origin and character' that is more 'durable and stable' than colonialism itself: 'Therefore, the model of power that is globally hegemonic today presupposes an element of coloniality' despite the end of colonialism (p.215).

Coloniality of power can take the following forms: control of economy, control of authority, control of gender and sexuality and control of subjectivity and knowledge (Quijano 2007, pp.168-87; Grosfoguel 2007, p.214). Thus, coloniality lives, as Maldonado-Torres explains, 'in books, in the criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of self, and so many other aspects of our modern experience' (2007, p.243) This shows that 'coloniality' does not simply refer to what came after the colonial era, that is to say the postcolonial phenomena, for it continues to live among us, within us and between us.

Both coloniality and Said's Orientalism are based on the notion of 'othering', which is the process by which the identities of a 'collective or individual' are constructed through highlighting the difference or the 'alterity' of another collective or individual; 'the othering process' is inevitably connected to what Baumann refers to as 'the selfing process' (2004, pp. 18-19). Therefore, Jackson and Hogg (2010, p.520) explain the

difference between the two groups as based on ‘in-group favouritism and outgroup bias’. They argue that the othering process can have different behavioural outcomes, ranging from the invisibility of the othered individual or group to a hypervisibility that leads to an essentialist view of the other. The othering process is normally indirect, due to ‘the prescribed social requirements of polite behaviour and positive communication’ (Jackson and Hogg, 2010, p.520). However, it can be traced in discourse by locating the mechanisms through which the othering process is achieved linguistically, such as pronouns that denote ‘the self’ and ‘the other’.

Driven by post-structuralist thought and the popularity of postcolonial theory in fields ranging from literature to anthropology, translation theorists were inspired to engage in postcolonial research, where power relations are the meeting points between translation studies and postcolonial theory. Translation has three main roles in postcolonial theory. Robinson (2014, p.31), describes them as follows: a) ‘a channel for colonisation’ that is linked to education and ‘overt or covert control over markets and institutions’; b) ‘a lightning-rod for cultural inequalities continuing after the collapse of colonialism’; and c) ‘a channel of de-colonisation’.

Also aiming at highlighting the crucial role of translation in ‘redefining the meanings of cultural and ethnic identity’ via the power play though language at the crossroads of cultures, Bassnett and Trevidi (1999) collected and published papers focusing on postcolonial theory in relation to translation studies from Britain, the US, Brazil, India and Canada. The contributions in the book revolve around the similarity between two forms of intercultural writing. These are postcolonial writings, in which writers transpose a culture, in contrast to literary translators who transpose a language (ibid., p.20), and the ‘cannibal’ trait of translation with its ability to colonise a text, a source text and the possible result of founding a ‘new language’ through translation in a postcolonial context (p.45).

Lefevere's (1999, p.77) examination of translation shows ‘how reality is constructed for the reader’ from the interaction of the original and the translation. He highlights the importance of ‘the conceptual level’ in the act of translation, for translators do not only operate at a linguistic level. Rather, they operate at both textual and conceptual levels, or ‘grids’. He argues that ‘both the writer of the original and the translator are faced with the two grids’. Thus, the translator has ‘to find ways of manipulating the grids in

such a way that communication becomes not only possible, but interesting and attractive' (Lefevere 1999, p.77).

At the intersection of postcolonial theory, the poststructuralist approach and the feminist agenda, Spivak (1993) sheds light on the role translation plays in promoting ideologically motivated images of the other. She criticises the ideological impact of Western feminists in the act of translating the literature of the 'Third World' into English and the manipulations it entails in the form of assimilating the culture and identity of those belonging to Third World countries into those of Westerners. In doing so, she attempts to deconstruct the presupposed shared feelings among all feminists and criticises English-speaking feminists' readers for expecting feminist writings from outside Europe to be translated into English simply because it is the language of power. She argues that this view marginalises non-English feminists by removing their cultures and identities. She calls on Western feminists in countries of hegemony to show solidarity with feminists of Third World countries by learning their languages and thus understanding the other.

It is virtually impossible to refer to Spivak's work and not cite her foundational paper 'Can the subaltern speak?' (1988), which goes into areas that Orientalism did not: the issue of gender and the agency of women (Schwarz and Ray, 2008). In this paper, Spivak asks whether Hindu women can speak for themselves or whether there is somebody else, an outsider, doing that for them and most likely going to take advantage of them. She cites the Hindu practice of 'Sati', according to which Indian women who become widowed are burned with their dead husbands. This practice can be seen by outsiders, such as English soldiers, as a crime against women and worthy of abandoning, thus having a white man save a brown woman from the patriarchy of a brown man in the society in which she lives. She argues that, in this instance, the brown woman was not permitted to speak; in fact, she cannot speak because there is 'no space' for her to do (1988, p.103).

Elaborating on Spivak's (1993) argument that English, the language of ex-colonisers, receives a hegemonic status over the language of the colonised via translation, Niranjana (1992) argues that translation is a discourse that informs 'the hegemonic apparatuses that belong to the ideological structure of colonial rule' (p.33).

Focusing on translations into English, Niranjana describes ‘translation as a practice that shapes, and takes shape within, the asymmetrical relations of power that operate under colonialism’ (1992, p.2). Therefore, there is a representation of the East that has been rewritten in the service of colonial power, and literary translation is but one example. There is thus a need for a ‘speculative, provisional and interventionist’ role to be played by translators (1992, p.173). Moreover, she stresses the importance of deconstructing ‘essentialist anti-colonial narrative’ in order to ‘show their compliancy with the master narrative of imperialism’ by the postcolonial intellectual (1992, p.167). According to Niranjana, the postcolonial is ‘still scored by an absentee colonialism’ (1992, p.8).

Crucially, she condemns the Western slant of TS and points out its chief shortcomings as follows: a) TS has scarcely considered the issue of asymmetrical power in the act of translating between different languages; b) translation theory in the West is defective for the majority of the notions ‘text, author, and meaning’ upon which it is founded are ‘based on an unproblematic, naively representational theory of language’ thus, repressing ‘the non-West’; and c) the ‘humanistic enterprise’ of translation contributes to the discourse of colonial hegemony in the philosophy of the West by constructing a conceptual idea about it (pp.48-9).

With the survey of the relevant literature about the theoretical framework now complete, the following section reviews the relevant literature regarding the genre of the data, media discourse, in the field of translation studies.

2.4 Translation Studies and News-Making: Transediting

Owing to globalisation, editors routinely select, translate and publish foreign news articles in the news production process. Despite the vital role in the processes of news production that translation plays, most earlier studies have overlooked its importance. In acknowledgment of the importance of translation in news production and its probable social consequences in terms of image building and modification, the following is a survey of relevant literature at the intersection of translation and news media.

Prior to the publication of the foundational *Translation in Global News* by Bielsa and Bassnett (2009), the position of translation in translation-mediated news was unclear.

The book contains seven chapters that unveil the strategies undertaken by several global news agencies, chiefly Reuters, Agence France-Presse (AFP), and the Associated Press (AP). The book proves the dominance of the strategy of absolute domestication in news translation as the translation products are intended to be consumed by the target readership. Therefore, the ST is ‘tailored to suit’ the target readers' expectations and needs. Crucially, the authors argue that the national roots of news agencies are directly related to their topic selection and de-selection principles.

The scholars who investigated the role of translation in journalism came to realise that news is created rather than collected and that news translation involves heavy editing. Fowler (1991) discusses the first finding, which is that news is not gathered or found; rather, it is made. It does not represent reality. He argues that news is an end product of multiplex processes of selection based on culture-bound factors that determine the worthiness of news items. With a deconstructionist viewpoint, Fowler sheds light on the cognitive effect that language has on opinion formation. In doing so, he employs and combines the theories of semiotics, semantics and content analysis to assess news production processes. He does this by analysing both American and British quotations, which makes the publication accessible to a wider readership. However, not specifying the type of effects such texts have on societies is one of the weaknesses of Fowler’s work. Moreover, he stops short of addressing translated international news and its effect on both source and target societies.

Stetting (1989, pp.371-82) discusses the second finding, which is that news translators tend to edit their TTs heavily. Sharing the view of functionalist theories that believe a translator is entitled to perform changes on texts according to the demands of the text’s function, she reveals the editing practices that have always operated in conjunction with the activity of news translation. Some of the many examples she cites are adding, omitting or substituting according to the target audience's expectations. Accordingly, she uses the neologism ‘transeditor’ (from translator and editor, meaning the foreign news workers in newsrooms) to demonstrate the dependence of news translators on editing practices. This view is adopted in the present study research, thus, the practice is regarded as transediting rather than translating news articles according to certain cultural, economic, political and societal criteria.

In the same vein, Van Doorslaer (2010a, pp.180-84) draws attention to the declining status of the ST in journalistic translation, thus emphasising the issue of 'authorship' and showing that the act of translating in newsrooms is a process that encompasses more than linguistic transfer. In fact, it is a mixture of two inseparable activities: editing and translation, because 'real' translators are absent in newsrooms (Van Doorslaer, 2010a, pp.180-84). Davier (2014) also tackles the issue of authorship and its consequences by examining the processes of news-making at two news agencies: AFP and Agence télégraphique suisse. She undertook a week-long observation and conducted interviews with journalists and chief editors at both agencies. Her findings suggest that 'rapidity, accuracy of information, and adaptation to the audience' and other journalistic demands made journalists view their jobs as editors rather than translators (p.53). This negative perception of translation leads to a product in which the role of translator is invisible, ignoring translation training for young journalists and neglecting the importance of revising their end products (pp.53-72).

Similarly, Van Doorslaer (2010b) reveals the impact of translation on the process of producing the news. He begins by surveying current works on translation and news production, showing how challenging translation can be in the news production context, as the rules of selecting and de-selecting news items dictate not only the whole process of production but also the process of translation (pp.182-84). Finally, he argues that in this situation, a ST is no longer vital, as translators do not rely solely on it. Instead, translators relay on other, earlier related texts, so the ST becomes an accumulation of many sources.

The declining status of the ST and the role translation plays in news-making is an area of research that is undervalued in the making not only of English news but also of Arabic news (Darwish, 2006, pp.52-77). Darwish (2006) examines al-Jazeera in order to investigate the influence of translated news from English into Arabic on news-making. The results show that al-Jazeera has maintained a balance in news presentation between Arabic traditions and Western democracy. However, the competition among Arab news TV channels to be international has led to excessive dependence on translated foreign news. Consequently, foreign news has had to undergo processes of reframing and recontextualisation in order to suit the target viewers.

2.5 Translation Studies, News-Making and Critical Discourse Analysis: Relevant Literature

CDA focuses on power relations in discourse and examines discourse examples that are not fabricated but rather extracted from real, everyday interactions. A brief survey of the contributions at the intersection of international news-making, CDA and TS shows that, when CDA is applied in TS, the role of translation in news-making remains overlooked; meanwhile, when news discourse is examined using CDA approaches, the studies are generally monolingual, which highlights an alarmingly understudied area at the intersection of news-making, CDA and TS.

2.5.1 Translation Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis: Overlooking Translation in Newsrooms

TS scholars have used Halliday's systemic functional grammar, which distinguishes the metafunctions of language – the ideational, interpersonal and textual – in order to bring discourse analysis (DA) closer to TS. Encouraged by functionalists and advances in applied linguistics in the 1970s, the 1990s witnessed a greater interest in DA among TS scholars. Notable contributions that used Halliday's model of DA that investigate language as communication in TS and thus have a linguistic orientation in common include House (1997), Baker (1992), Hatim and Mason (1990) and Munday (2012b).

House (1997) was the first to adopt Halliday's three variables of register – field, tenor and mode – to which he associates the strands of meaning (the ideational, interpersonal and textual) to present a model of a comparative ST-TT analysis in an attempt to highlight the 'fundamentally misguided' functionalist approaches that neglect the ST while focusing on the TT. In House's DA model, a translation can be either overt or covert. The former is introduced to the audience as a translation rather than an original while the covert is a translation that is presented to the audience as an original text. House suggests that since the ST and TT in overt translation function in two different realms, equivalence must be established at the level of register and language, rather than at the text function. Conversely, in covert translation equivalence can be achieved at the level of text function and genre. To do so, a cultural filter is used, through which cultural elements are changed. As this may require equivalence

at the language and genre levels, House insists that overt and covert translations are not polar opposites; indeed, a translation can have a certain degree of both.

In addition to House (1997), Baker (1992; 2011) is a pioneer whose work laid down the theoretical framework for the interaction between Halliday's systemic functional grammar and TS. She focuses on the textual function of language by examining equivalence at a variety of levels: word, above-word, grammar, thematic structure, cohesion and pragmatic (Munday, 2012a, p.144). Hatim and Mason (1990; 1997) go beyond Baker's focus on the textual function to examine the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions of language and integrate the level of discourse in their three-layered model. They thus go 'beyond register analysis to consider the pragmatic and semiotic dimensions of translation and the sociolinguistic implications of discourses and discourse communities' (Munday, 2012a, p.137).

Although Hatim and Mason explore a variety of text types and combine Halliday's notions of culture and ideology, their approach is 'linguistics-centred, both in its terminology and in the phenomena investigated' (Munday, 2012a, pp.154-55). This also applies to the two other major contributions of translation scholars in investigating translation using Halliday's model: Baker's (1992; 2011) and House's (1997), because they are linguistically oriented. Crucially, all three contributions in their analysis focus on English and can thus cause problems when applied to 'non-European languages, whose conceptual structure may differ crucially' (Munday, 2012a, p.154).

2.5.2 Critical Discourse Analysis and News: Monolingual Majority

CDA is a popular approach to media studies investigation. Several studies have adopted CDA to investigate both print and oral media discourses, but most are monolingual and thus do not examine the role of translation in media texts. Indeed, a survey of the key studies that apply CDA approaches to news analysis shows that they deal with only one language, starting with Van Dijk's (1988a) inquiry into power in discourse, in which he takes into consideration the dimension of cognition. This contribution is an advanced view of news, because it argues for the necessity of analysing news items as structures of discourse. In doing so, Van Dijk tackles the concept of news schema 'which represent the overall content and the conventional

form of news reports' (1988a, p.vii). He goes on to examine other structures of news – style and rhetoric – arguing that all these structures of news are of great importance for analysing and understanding news production (by journalists) and comprehension (by the audience), as the latter is socially dependent, which he discusses in terms of cognition and psychology. He offers a theoretical framework of analysis that draws on cognitive psychology. Arguing for a systematic analysis of news reports as constituting a form of sociocultural practice, Van Dijk (1988b) calls for and presents several case studies as part of a systematic analysis of news reports that goes beyond the micro-level analysis of phonemes, grammar, morphemes, syntax and semantics to take into account macro-level factors like coherence, style, rhetoric and scheme.

Van Dijk (2006) also examines a media text, an editorial of the *Sunday Telegraph,* to investigate the relationship between discourse and ideology, finding that a neoliberal ideology controls the editorial, which exhibits how ideologies are socially reproduced by social institutions. In doing so, Van Dijk argues that people's ideologies are expressed, acquired and modified via written or oral texts. Therefore, in order to identify ideologies, a researcher must apply a systematic DA. Van Dijk's proposed framework of analysis overcomes the drawback of conventional social science approaches to ideology analysis because it takes into account the sociocognitive property of ideology. Moreover, he focuses on how people reproduce these ideologies through texts.

Ideologies, according to Van Dijk, are a special form of socially shared beliefs because they differ from sociocultural knowledge. They can be expressed, acquired, developed and disintegrated. As to what they are not, ideologies are not personal beliefs and are not all or always negative. Crucially, ideologies have several social and cognitive functions, one of which is that they 'organise and ground the social representations shared by the members of (ideological) groups' and control the 'mental models' that produce and reproduce ideological discourse (2006, p.117). Although Van Dijk's contributions at the interface of media studies and CDA are novel in calling for an approach using ideological analysis that combines two classical approaches (the context-based approach and the text-based approach – while incorporating macro-level issues into media textual analysis, they are focused on the analysis of prejudice,

discrimination and racism in the representation of one group in a discourse produced by another more powerful group in a certain language, generally English.

Fairclough is another figure who applied his approach to CDA to investigate media texts in particular. In *Media Discourse* (1995b), he applies his approach to CDA in order to bridge the gap between the micro-level textual analysis and the macro-level perspective of social theory, thus bringing together linguistics and media studies. In the analyses he presents, a wide range of media texts from radio, TV and print are investigated. In the last chapter of the book, he conducts an in-depth analysis of Crimewatch UK, a BBC TV programme, in which he investigates how 'the poor' as a term is used. The analysis shows that although the poor are the protagonists of the media text, they are shown as 'goals not actors'. In those instances in which the poor act, they 'flock', which Fairclough argues to be a derogatory verb that de-humanises the poor. Thus, he highlights the relation between media discourse and broader social and cultural processes.

Fairclough (2003), taking a similar approach to achieve analogous aims, draws on the works of social theorists such as Bourdieu, Wacquant and Habermas when he suggests a social framework for text-based DA. He again calls for connecting micro- to macro-level analysis by pointing out the weaknesses of textual analysis and proposing that textual analysis should be undertaken from a social analysis viewpoint. He then provides a wide range of textual varieties to test his framework: written, televised or broadcast on radio.

Another publication by CDA pioneers that employs that approach to investigate media texts, although it also looks at other genres, is Wodak, et al. (2009), a foundational work because it not only employs critical discourse but also tackles the intriguing issue of national identity. Borrowing some crucial concepts from earlier works, such as habitus (Bourdieu,1977) and the nation as an imagined community (Anderson, 1991), this volume concentrates on applying CDA to 'sameness' rather than 'otherness' in the formation of national identity in an European context; it thus departs from previous works that are otherwise similar.

Adopting the Vienna School of DA, which views discourse as 'integrating various different positions and voices' (Wodak, et al., 2009, p.39), the authors analyse a

variety of discourses – public, semi-public and semi-private – such as focus group interviews, texts from media, commemorative speeches, political lectures and many others in order to identify and describe the construction of national identity.

The authors also pay attention to an important socio-political change in the course of their analysis: Austria's accession to the EU. They find that five macro-level strategies are pivotal to the discourse of national identities: 'constructive strategies, strategies of relativisation or justification, strategies of perpetuation, strategies of transformation, and disparagement and/or destructive strategies' (Wodak, et al., 2009, pp.199-200). The strength of this monograph lies in its analytical framework, which can be applied to analysing any other Western European country while its weakness lies in its monolingual nature.

A survey of the recent studies at the juncture of media studies and CDA shows that they follow in the footsteps of the major contributions discussed above by investigating power in a monolingual situation: Zhang (2014), Fauzan, Subroto and Poedjosoedarmo (2014), Iqbal, Danish and Iqbal (2014), Pasha (2011), Bilal, et al. (2012) and Alo and Ajewole-Orimogunje (2013).

2.6 Depictions in Anglo-American Media

To avoid over-generalisation, the terms 'Anglo-American' and the 'West' are used interchangeably in this thesis to refer to the shared linguistic and cultural heritage of the people who inhabit the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Thus, it is important to highlight that it does not refer to Canada, France, Germany or any other Western language and culture.

Prior to surveying the specific representations of Saudi Arabia in the Western media, the representations of Islam, Saudi Arabia's official religion, and the Arab world and the Middle East, where Saudi Arabia is located, must be explored. Thus, section 5.1 reviews the relevant literature on Anglo-American media depictions of Islam and the Arab world. Section 5.2 offers a survey of the relevant literature on the depictions of Saudi Arabia in Anglo-American media.

2.6.1 Depictions of Islam and the Arab World: Relevant Literature

'Not knowing the language is only part of a much greater ignorance' (Said, 1997, p.ii)

The representations of Islam, Arabs and the Middle East in Western media are argued to have been and to remain highly selective. Regardless of the various motives suggested by different scholars, this selectivity leads to only one outcome: reductionist, stereotypical and oppositional – to the West – depictions of the Arabs, Islam and Middle East, in general, in the West.

One common reductionist view is that 'all Arabs are Muslims and all Muslims are Arabs' (Shaheen, 2003). However, this is a false presupposition, for 'only 12% of Muslims are Arabs' (Shaheen, 2003, 171). Indeed, most Arabs are Muslims, but not all of them are, nor are all Muslims of Arab descent; in addition to Sunni Islam, the largest sect of Islam, over 20 religion communities exist and are practiced in the Arab world, deriving mainly from Islam, Christianity and Judaism (Baer, 2016).

In the same reductionist fashion, the Western media depicts a visual representation of Arabs that is stereotyped in relation to costumes, complexion and facial features; for example, they are shown as having olive complexions, dark hair and sharply hooked noses (Ridouani, 2011). However, while Arabs can be dark-haired, they can be redheads or even blondes (Shora, 2009, p.42). They also may have brown, green or blue eyes, just as they can have white, black or olive-toned skin: 'Arabs cut across the racial spectrum because they are a multi-racial, heterogenous group' (Shora, 2009, p.42).

As a consequence of this reductionist and stereotypical visual depiction, Ridouani argues that Arabs and Muslims have always been alienated as the other or rather the 'enemy' (Ridouani, 2011). This continues to be the case, for 'the West promotes almost the same stereotypes for Arabs and Muslims' since the Crusades, which are mainly crafted via the deformation of Islamic concepts such as the term "Islam" itself and "Jihad"':

> Literally, the concept 'jihad' is not confined in violent acts and war as it is conceptualized and recognized in Western world, but it is open to different acts and performances that a Muslim can perform. Jihad, for example, can be applicably related to an individual 'refraining from wrongdoing', to a 'woman

> agonizing in child-birth', to a 'man struggling and endeavouring to up-bring his family', besides, of course, taking a 'holy war' as a defence but never as an attack. In this respect, the analogy between the principles of Islam and violent acts is a distortion of facts that is caused primarily by the Western deliberate ignorance of Islamic principles. (Ridouani, 2011, p.3).

The reduction and distortion of Islamic principles attributable to ignorance have encouraged the media to become addicted to three main representations of Islam: 'the Terrorist, the Veiled Woman, and the Demon Demagogue'; these have been argued to have now become stereotypes of American perception of Muslims, which 'cannot' be limited to these three images that the media seems to be enthusiast about' (Spayde, 1994, as cited in Kamalipour and Gerbner, 1995, p.195). Said (1978) discusses this phenomenon of selectivity extensively, tracing it back to Orientalism.

In his trilogy *Orientalism* (1978), *The Question of Palestine* (1992) and *Covering Islam* (1997), Said highlights the imbalance in power between the East, namely the Arab and Muslim world, and the West, namely England, France and later the US. This, he affirms, stems from the colonial power that once defined the West and shaped the Orient's image in Western perception. It is notable that academics, journalists and other elites (e.g., oil companies) in the West reproduce and maintain this power imbalance via institutions and organisations.

Said's 1997 argument is that Islam is 'covered'. In other words, it is unknown in Western, namely American, news unless in relation to 'newsworthy' topics, such as 'oil' and 'terrorism', which are heavily determined by certain organisations and their interests. Accordingly, Muslims are selectively shown 'as oil suppliers, as potential terrorists, and more recently, as bloodthirsty mobs' (p.6).

Said shows the ramifications of the selectivity in the coverage of Islam in how the West responds to events from the East. These responses do not occur in isolation from events that take place in the East of which the West has scant knowledge. To make his point, Said shows how the oil shortage from which the West had struggled since the 1970s and the little knowledge of the Western media on the Iranian revolution led to an inflammatory response to the hostage crisis in Tehran. Said shows how the 'misleadingly full' knowledge consisting of Western media and the 'cool, relatively

detached instruments of scientific, quasi-objective representation' has shaped, and continues to shape, an oversimplified and uninformed image of Islam in the West. Selective knowledge of an alien and distant nation can mistakenly be perceived as full knowledge with the power to call for or justify certain reactions.

The power of such representations did not go unnoticed; concerned over 'the role of the media in promoting or harming good community relations with London's Muslim communities', London's left-wing mayor, Ken Livingstone, ordered a study in 2006 to examine news articles on Muslims published in one week (Greater London Authority, 2007). The findings showed that 91% of the 352 British articles examined 'demonised' Muslims. As Livingstone puts it in the foreword, 'one of the most startling findings of this report is that in one typical week in 2006, over 90 per cent of the media articles that referred to Islam and Muslims were negative. The overall picture presented by the media was that Islam is profoundly different from and a threat to the west.' (Greater London Authority, 2007, p.xi).

This echoes an examination of the output of two leading American news magazines, *Time* and *Newsweek*, which shows that, although American media report on certain realities of Arab peoples, the centre of attention is what is perceived as 'important to the United States and its people such as oil, wealth and Israel's safety' (Kamalipour and Gerbner, 1995, pp.151-62). This analysis covered a four-year period (1990–1993) and concluded that these news magazines 'repeatedly depicted Arabs as lacking democracy, unity, and modernity'; they are also shown as 'living in the past, moving rapidly towards fundamentalism, and treating guest workers as slaves.' A study of the representations of all Arab nations (including Saudi Arabia) in the two news magazines resulted in 50.00% unfavourable representations by *Newsweek* compared to 20.51% favourable representations, while *Time* had 45.46% unfavourable representations compared to 20.52% favourable representations; the remaining articles were 'neutral' (29.49% in *Newsweek* and 34.02% in *Time*) (Kamalipour and Gerbner, 1995, p.154).

A more recent and more extensive examination of the depictions of Muslims in the British media was carried out by Baker, et al. (2012), who investigated the noun collocations surrounding Muslims. The inquiry used a corpus of 143 million words of news articles from British newspapers published between 1998 and 2009. Their findings suggest the prevalence of the following categories: 'ethnic/national identity,

characterizing/differentiating attributes, conflict, culture, religion, and group/organizations', with the category of 'ethnic/national identity' being the most salient in terms of frequency and 'conflict' in terms of lexical richness (i.e., containing more word types than other categories). The findings empirically show a reductionist depiction of Muslims, who are shown as a 'homogeneous group that is distinctly separate from non-Muslims'. Moreover, 'Muslims were also represented as easily offended, alienated, and in conflict with non-Muslims' (Baker, et al., 2012, p.255). This shows that Arabs, Muslims and the East, as Said argues, have largely been represented in a selective and unfavourable manner.

2.6.2 Depictions of Saudi Arabia: Relevant Literature

'So instead of trying to find out more about the country, the reporter takes hold of what is nearest at hand, usually a cliché or some bit of journalistic wisdom that the readers at home are unlikely to challenge'. (Said, 1997, pp.ii-iii)

There is a large body of literature on Saudi Arabia's history, economy, education and policies. As to the representations of Saudi Arabia, most are in academic discourse featuring a writer who describes the Saudi culture, traditions and way of life with a special focus on women, the religious police and foreign workers. This literature shows Saudi Arabia both as contradicting (Patel, 2018) and according with Western understandings and expectations (Forrest and Corcoran, 2013).

However, there is limited research that examines how Saudi Arabia is represented and perceived in Anglo-American media discourses. Interestingly, a survey of the few studies that examine the depictions of Saudi Arabia and Saudis (mainly women) in English-speaking media shows a disproportion in focus, as most studies focus on American rather than British media. There has thus been insufficient examination of Saudi Arabia's representations by British media outlets and the perception of Saudis in Britain.

One of the few studies that take Saudi Arabia as a case study in the examination of representations in a British press outlet is al-Hejin (2012). Aiming to bring together CDA and TS by highlighting the meeting points between the two, al-Hejin conducts an examination in which he investigates the BBC's coverage on utterances articulated by Saudi Arabian women in Saudi Local Arabic (SLA), which have then been transcribed into written Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) to be published on the BBC's Arabic

website, then eventually translated into English for the English BBC News website. Applying Fairclough's dialectical-relational approach, which al-Hejin expands to cover both STs and TTs, the study concludes that there are 'substantial transformations which cannot be dismissed as inevitable constraints of the news genre or translation'. This is because these 'transformations'… 'are more likely to reflect prevailing narratives of Muslim women being "submissive" and "oppressed"' (p.311).

Similarly, the available literature on the depictions of Saudi Arabia in the West mirrors the main characteristics of the depictions of Muslims and Arabs in Western media: they are reductionist representations based on stereotypes. The stereotypically based reductionist views of Saudi Arabia appear to revolve primarily around women, religion and terror. For example, a study that compares the representations of Saudi women in the *Washington Post* to those of American women in the *Arab News*, a Saudi Arabian newspaper, shows that Saudi women are 'oppressed' and desperate for 'Western liberation', while the Saudi Arabian newspaper, in an attempt to make Saudi women resist Westernisation and hold on to 'Islamic purity', shows American women as enjoying 'shallow freedoms'. Interestingly, although the Saudi Arabian newspaper shows American women in a 'pejorative' depiction, it shows them as trying to understand Saudi Arabia's culture and way of life and 'praising' Saudi traditions. They thus have a 'positive' attitude towards Saudi Arabia. It is notable that both the *Washington Post* and the *Arab News* focused on 'disciplining the female body' (Mishra, 2007, p.259).

Another study also shows that two groups of American readers, one exposed to only verbal data and the other exposed to both verbal and photographic data, of a *National Geographic* story on Saudi Arabia shows three main similarities in their interpretations. First, 'all participants characterized Saudi Arabia as a country caught between tradition and modernity, and as a society where religion plays an important role and in which women have fewer rights than in the USA' (Mendelson and Darling-Wolf, 2009, pp,806-7). Second, both groups linked Islam to the country's 'inability to fully modernize' and 'restrictive gender roles'. Third, the following images are brought to their minds when hearing 'Arab' or 'Saudi': 'oil, desert, camels, Aladdin, headdresses, and, on several occasions, terrorism' (Mendelson and Darling-Wolf, 2009, p.807). The key difference between the groups was that the one shown both photographic and textual data 'expressed more stereotypical views of the subjects' in comparison to

those whom have been shown textual data only (Mendelson and Darling-Wolf, 2009, p.798).

These stereotypes are alleged to feed a sense of bias that shapes Western perspectives on Saudi Arabia. An analysis of instances of both electronic and print media covering Saudi Arabia in the West and Saudi print and electronic media exposes this bias in reporting on the Kingdom in both media (Koors, 2014). That study shows that the Western media, driven by the quest for oil, neglects Saudi culture and policies in an effort to avoid criticizing the Saudi monarchy and thus promotes reductionist and stereotypical depictions.

Interestingly, Koors suggests that Saudi media and literature, which are strictly controlled and censored by the government, contribute to the way the country is perceived by the West, because it does not show the diversity in the Kingdom out of a desire and attempt to gloss over its class differences. Two different motives by different agents (the Saudi government and Western media) both cause Saudi Arabian images to be perpetuated in a reductionist and stereotypical frame; they both 'prevent Saudi voices, those of the citizenry, from appearing in news stories' (Koors, 2014, p.77).

Razek and Awad (2012) examine the impact of the stereotypical threat created by media regarding Saudi Arabia students' success and social integration in an unnamed American university. Their findings suggest that Saudi Arabia students are aware that the stereotypes created by the media arouse feelings in their fellow students that 'range from passive depression to rage and anger' (p.42). To the students, 'the most disturbing' stereotypes about Saudi Arabia promoted in the media were those related to social justice issues. Other offensive stereotypes included: 1) claimed Saudi discriminatory behaviours against women, 2) claims of injustices and unfair laws effective in Saudi Arabia, and 3) neglecting the cultural achievements of Saudi Arabia as a modernized country (p.42).

2.7 Significance of this Study

The present study is significant on many levels. At the case study level, there is a gap of knowledge in the literature on Saudi Arabia's representations and perception in

British media outlets. The literature review reveals that studies of a similar nature are largely focused on the United States and thus do not pay enough attention to the UK. Another significance of this study is in the understudied area of research concerning the pivotal role of news translation in processes of a discursive nature such as globalisation (Bielsa, 2009, p.4; Pérez-González, 2012, p.171, Schäffner, 2004, p.120). These studies neglect the translator's role of rewriting in the service of power found in today's news-making. This is hazardous because it in turn 'has led to the assumption that information can circulate unaltered across different linguistic communities and cultures' (Bielsa, 2009, p.14). Thus, the present study contributes to the existing literature on the role of translation in such practices. This research also contributes to the scant literature on the application of CDA approaches to discourses that go beyond institutions, languages and cultures, as the vast majority of existing CDA studies are concerned with only one language.

The novelty of this research not only lies in applying CDA to translated textual data; in addition, the language pair that it examines is of special importance. It takes into account translation between distant languages in terms of language families – Arabic and English – while the majority of the few previous contributions of a similar nature have focused on Indo-European languages such as English and French.

Moreover, this research is of significance because it examines translation into English as a possible tool of power imbalance, or ethnocentric violence, in a cross-cultural situation. Thus, the research will help fill the gap in the literature on the Anglo-American cultural hegemony in translation achieved through domestication (Venuti, 1995). Furthermore, the incorporation of corpus tools into the investigation is also an important advance. The innovative employment of technology in textual analysis offers rigor to the application of CDA through the computer-generated quantitative findings that control the susceptibility to bias in CDA, which is a qualitative approach. This research is also significant because both the specialised SC and the RC were designed and built by the researcher; they are thus neither ready-made nor exploited prior to this research. The results of the present study will provide a strong basis for future researchers interested in deconstructing stereotypes, reframing recontextualised realities and the modification of Saudi Arabia's national image in news articles translated from Arabic into English.

Chapter 3: Critical Discourse Analysis and Corpora as Tools of Investigating Power Negotiation in Transediting

3.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an overview of the data and the methodological tools adopted, CDA and corpora. It is divided into two main parts. The first is concerned with the methods, including their definitions, origins, basic concepts and limitations. This leads to explaining how the incorporation of corpus tools in the methodological framework of this research serves to mitigate key limitations of CDA. The second part is concerned with the collected data. It describes the SC, the RC and the collected Arabic news items (the STs). These are described in terms of relevant information such as source, rationale, process of collection, size and representativeness of data set.

3.2 Methodological Tools

A survey of the two adopted methodological tools – CDA and corpora – follows. To better understand these tools, a brief but inclusive account presents the definitions and origins, limitations and key approaches of CDA. Similarly, the definition, origin and development and chief types and tools of the corpus approach are reviewed below.

3.2.1 Critical Discourse Analysis: An Instrument of Investigating Power Imbalance

3.2.1.1 Definitions and Origin

The first tool to be discussed is CDA, which grew out of a reaction against the structural linguistics of the 1960s and 1970s. The foundations of CDA were laid many years before it was established as a widely accepted approach to language study in the humanities and social sciences. It was the work of Fowler, et al. (1979) where the initial ideas of CDA were discussed. However, the term CDA was not used at that point. It was only after Fairclough published *Critical Discourse Analysis* (1995a) that the term gained popularity in academic circles.

CDA is a candid approach to language study; it clearly defines where it comes from and what it aims to do. It comes from a political effort ‘to explain existing conventions as the outcome of power relations and power struggle’ (Fairclough, 1989, p.2). It is also designed to ‘to answer questions about the relationships between language and society’ (Rogers, et al., 2005, p.365). This is to see how ideology and power in

societies are expressed, sustained and changed through language (Weiss and Wodak 2002, p.12).

CDA is a loose combination of approaches founded in linguistics to analyse both written and spoken language (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Critical linguistics attempts to 'show how language and grammar can be used as ideological instruments' and aims at uncovering what is implicit in texts, such as their underlying ideologies and assumptions (Machin and Mayr, 2012). The term 'critical linguistics' was first deployed in 1979 by a group of researchers at the University of East Anglia: Fowler, Hodge, Kres and Trew (Fowler, et al., 1979). Language, according to this group, is a social practise of social institutions through which beliefs, ideas and attitudes are made into common sense. Culture is thus an integral part of language (Fowler, et al., 1979).

Fairclough, along with many other linguists, criticised critical linguistics for not improving the connection between 'ideology, power and language' (Fairclough, 1992), which is the essence of any 'critical' examination of language (Fairclough, 1989, p.5). CDA was developed as a means of overcoming this drawback in critical linguistics. There are many approaches to CDA. The three key approaches to CDA are the dialectical-relational approach (Fairclough, 1989; 1992; 1993; 1995a; 2000; 2003), the socio-cognitive approach (Van Dijk, 1993; 1998; 1990; 2001; 2006; 2009; 2015) and the DHA (Wodak and Meyer, 2016), which is the approach adopted in this thesis.

3.2.1.2 The Discourse-Historical Approach: The Adopted Approach

On the basis of critical theory and symbolic interactionism, Reisigl and Wodak developed a systematic framework of CDA known as the DHA (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.18); it investigates how power relations and ideologies are reproduced through linguistic and extra-linguistic structures (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.25). The concept of context in the DHA is comprehensive and has four dimensions: 'the co-text and co-discourse', 'the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships between utterances, texts, discourses and genre', the 'social variables and institutional frames' and the extra-linguistic 'socio-political and historical contexts' (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, pp.30-31). Like other CDA approaches, the concepts of text, discourse and context are vital to both theory and application, but despite certain theoretical similarities, different approaches ascribe different definitions to these concepts. For example, the concept of discourse is vital in the DHA and viewed as 'a cluster of context-dependent semiotic

practices that are situated within specific fields of social actions, related to macro topics, linked to argumentation, socially constituted and socially constitutive (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.27). Another vital concept, text, is considered here to be part of the discourse.

According to the 10 principles outlined by Reisigl and Wodak, the DHA is interdisciplinary and problem oriented. It allows researchers to combine theories and methods so that a better understanding and analysis can be achieved. These scholars also note the necessity of studying from inside, so that if the analysed object is to be theorised or a thorough analysis is required, field work and ethnographical analysis must be included. The research strategy is complex, combining abductive reasoning, inductive procedures and, if feasible, deduction, thus moving between the empirical and theoretical. The approach examines intertextual and interdiscursive relationships. The historical context is crucial in interpreting texts and discourses and thus enables 'the reconstruction of how the recontextualisation functions as an important process of linking texts and discourses intertextually and interdiscursively over time' (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.32).

In adopting this approach, categories and methods must be changed, adapted and expanded according to the problem under investigation in a given case study. The DHA views grand theories as foundations while 'middle-range theories' provide a 'better theoretical basis'. Finally, the results should be made accessible to the public and made use of by experts (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, pp.31-32).

(Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p.96) suggest the following eight steps of analysis:

1. Activation and consultation of preceding theoretical knowledge

2. Systematic collection of data and context information

3. Selection and preparation of data

4. Specification of the research question and formulation of assumptions

5. Qualitative pilot analysis

6. Detailed case studies

7. Formulation of critique

8. Application of the detailed analytical results

Although these eight steps of analysis may seem straightforward, Wodak, et al. have refined the framework many times, and changed the suggested procedures (Reisigl, 2008; Reisigl and Wodak, 2001), which can complicate the application of the DHA approach. The different editions of the framework suggest different applications of the technique of triangulation, through which a researcher increases the validity of his or her research and achieves more rigour through the fusion of qualitative and quantitative paradigms, although this complicates the framework for researchers who wish to apply it. Reisigl (2008, p.10) argues for triangulation to be carried out prior to the analysis (during data collection), whereas Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p.96) had earlier argued that it must be done during analysis, not prior to it.

However, as is explained in the methodology chapter, the present study applies triangulation during the analysis, as time limits prevented triangulation from being performed during data collection. Triangulation during the data collection phase would have entailed collecting data in a variety of forms and from sources other than BBCM−M), which would inevitably have increased the size of the data to the point that it could not have been handled within the time limits (three years) of this research.

3.2.1.3 Limitations

CDA understands societies as shaping languages and shaped by languages; language is a social constructing force (Machin and Mayr, 2012). Thus, CDA can also be described as a committed analysis of texts that aims to investigate texts for the purpose of political and social change (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997, p.258). This overt commitment to political and social change caused CDA to be criticised for a lack of objectivity; it has been argued that CDA practitioners conduct their research with a predetermined political or social stance. However, due to the broad acceptance of CDA as a plausible approach to language study and its widespread growth, many researchers rely on its tools regardless of these shortcomings. It remains important to discuss the key pitfalls of CDA approaches – subjectivity, randomness and over-interpretation – although a full discussion of CDA's limitations lies beyond the scope of this thesis.

Even if CDA provides valuable knowledge in terms of unveiling the ideological stances embedded in discourses, many critics see flaws in this approach to language study. The primary criticism at both the theoretical and methodological levels revolves around CDA's openness to bias in the selection of social theory and methods of analysis. Hence, it is logical to discuss the issue of CDA's subjectivity first. Despite its success in obtaining a solid reputation in the social sciences, CDA has been accused of subjectivity rooted in the political commitment of CDA scholars. This commitment is especially significant issue matter if the analyst is not a member of the social group whose discourse he or she is examining, which may lead to interpretations that are not necessarily made by the members of that social group. Indeed, CDA scholars themselves pointed out that this approach will never be objective, as it always starts from a particular stance and its conclusions will always be incomplete (Fairclough, 1989).

Schegloff (1997), for instance, argues that a political and critical engagement with DA tends to lead to subjectivity, because discourse analysts imprint their political bias into their data (Schegloff, 1999). However, CDA researchers argue that most social sciences research is conducted from a political position. In fact, Van Leeuwen (2009) views CDA's transparent political motivation to be a strength point rather than a weakness:

> Critical Discourse analysts … are aware that their work is driven by social, economical and political motives, but they argue that this applies to all academic work, and that CDA at least makes its position explicit. And they feel no need to apologize for the critical stance of their work. (pp.277-92)

Another response to the accusation of a CDA bias rooted in the political commitment of the analyst is Fairclough's justification of the difference between an analyst's interpretation and that of the average reader. He points out that 'readers' answers are likely to be different from' his interpretations, 'and this should not be regarded as grounds for consternation but as worth exploring in itself' (Fairclough, 1989, p.11). He argues that the analyst's interpretation is valid as long as it is documented and self-aware. He argues that members' resources (MRs) – the analyst's beliefs that will unavoidably influence his or her interpretation (Fairclough, 1989, pp.92-93) – have to

be recorded and monitored in order to distinguish any extraneous MRs employed in making the concluding assessment:

> [I]f analysts are drawing upon their own MR to explicate how those of participants operate in the discourse, then it is important that they be sensitive to what resources they are themselves relying upon to do analysis. At this stage of the procedure, it is only really self-consciousness that distinguishes the analyst from the participants she is analysing. (Fairclough, 1989, p.138)

In addition to the subjectivity of CDA, Widdowson (1995) attacks CDA for not taking into account the processes of production and consumption of a discourse, along with the variety of ways in which the discourse can be interpreted. Moreover, CDA has been criticised, at the theoretical level, for vagueness of its key concepts and the arbitrariness of its theoretical basis. Widdowson (1995), for example, alleged that CDA practitioners will use any social theory they deem in demand at the time of the study they conduct. He also 'accused CDA of blurring important distinctions between concepts, disciplines, and methodologies' (Blommaert, 2005, p.31). For instance, he raised objections to the extensive use of unclear and meshed concepts like 'cohesion' (Widdowson, 1995, p.512).

Widdowson (2000, pp.18-19), for instance, uses the British National Corpus (BNC), which is a corpus of 100 million words collected from various sources of both spoken and written discourses, in order to validate the findings of Fairclough's (1995b) study, which concluded that the author represented the poor people as animals that flock, which is dehumanising and degrading. The author in the discourse under investigation, according to Fairclough, has abused power relations so as to marginalise the poor and present them as animals. However, Widdowson alleges that Fairclough has over-interpreted the lexical item 'flock'; he discovered, after searching for the lemma 'flock' in the BNC, that it is actually associated in 17 instances with humans rather than animals. This means that corpus tools could have controlled Fairclough's subjectivity, which led him to focus on 'flock' and over-interpret its ideological importance.

Another major criticism of CDA is the random, unsystematic and fuzzy methods of data collection for qualitative linguistic analysis. Widdowson (1998) pointed out the unsystematic character of CDA by analysing three major books in the field: *Critical discourse analysis* (Fairclough, 1995a), *Texts and practices* (Caldas-Coulthard and

Coulthard, 1996) and *Language as ideology* (Hodge and Kress, 1993). Although he accepts the notion that some grammatical features like nominalisation and passives can have a 'greater ideological valency' (1998, p.148), Widdowson accuses CDA scholars of bias due to their partial analysis of texts, with analysts choosing the portions of texts that they feel could hold ideological significance.

This selection of data could lead to ignoring other important parts of a text that might contradict the analyst's interpretations. This issue is hazardous due to the epistemological premises of CDA, which seeks to apply its findings to serve socio-political objectives, such as unveiling the 'linguistic abuse' of a minority in a certain society and using the findings to create social change. This generalisation of conclusions in turn questions the representativeness of CDA studies, as analysts generalise their findings, which are based on selectively chosen data, to serve that socio-political goal.

In addition, many CDA studies do not present detailed explanations of the methods used and the basis on which data was collected, at least in the early years of the approach. This obscurity as to methods of data collection applied by CDA scholars provoked criticism of CDA approaches as not as rigorous as other academic research.

Stubbs (1997) notes that 'there is very little discussion of whether it is adequate to restrict analysis to short fragments of data, how data should be sampled, and whether the sample is representative' (p.7). He criticises Fairclough's (1995a) study on public language for not backing up his argument that public language is becoming informal with quantitative proof to show the extent to which it is actually becoming informal. More importantly, Stubbs criticises Fairclough for not giving a detailed explanation of the ways he reached his conclusions. Despite their criticisms, Stubbs (1997) and Widdowson (1998) do acknowledge the importance and even the nobility of CDA's aims. They believe that CDA approaches should and can be strengthened in order to achieve their intended objectives. While Widdowson (1998) suggests ethnographical evidence in the form of reader response to back up or refute the findings of the analyst, Stubbs (1997) calls for a comparative approach on the basis of enormous amounts of linguistic data, which is a call for corpus-based CDA:

> The text analyses must quite simply be much more detailed. Analyses must be comparative: individual texts must be compared with each other and with data

> from corpora. Analyses must not be restricted to isolated data fragments: a much wider range of data must be sampled before generalisations are made about typical language use. And a much wider range of linguistic features must be studied, since varieties of language use are defined, not by individual features, but by clusters of co-occurring features: this entails the use of quantitative and probabilistic methods of text and corpus analysis. (Stubbs 1997, p.10)

Thus, CDA's insights can be useful in uncovering the ideological significance embedded in discourses provided that a means of controlling the analyst's subjectivity is implemented: using corpora for the purpose of obtaining quantitative proof is one way to support the analyst's qualitative findings.

Another danger in CDA is the analyst's potential focus on a particular lexical item in the discourse solely because it confirms his or her intuition: this is known as over-interpretation of a lexical item. For example, Fairclough's (1995b) interpretation of a discourse on poverty on the lexical item 'flock'. As discussed above, Widdowson (2000) tried to validate these findings and discovered that Fairclough had over-interpreted the lexical choice of 'flock', which confirms the danger of CDA to over-interpret.

This danger of over-interpretation can also be motivated by the analyst's use of MRs that differ from those that the target audience may use in interpreting a given discourse. The analyst bases the findings on the assumptions that he or she thinks that the target audience will make from reading or hearing the discourse under investigation. However, the socio-cultural background of the analyst and the average reader differ, which inevitably entails different interpretations. It should be noted, however, that a difference in interpretation is not an issue in and of itself, because different interpretations within the target audience are quite possible. The problem, rather, is generalising the findings without audience-based proof of how they might respond to the discourse. O'Halloran and Coffin highlight this issue:

> In their act of highlighting ideological meanings in a text, critical linguists read a text with a particular goal, one which the more casual reader would not have. So how do analysts know that they are not over-interpreting the text from the perspective of the casual reader as a result of who the analysts are, the values

they carry (often liberal-left), their own specific goals, and the amount of effort they are putting into reading it? (2004, p.276)

3.2.1.4 Adapting the Discourse-Historical Approach to Critical Discourse Analysis: A Rationale

The rationale for adapting the DHA to CDA is twofold: first, it is related to the genre of the data in question. The data set of this research is news, which is not 'facts' but a 'representation of facts' (Fowler, 1991, p.4). Thus, the assumption in this research is that news is a discourse that has a discourse trajectory that cannot be overlooked. Unlike other CDA approaches, the DHA offers the potential of tracing that trajectory through analysis of interdiscursive relationships along with the intertextual analysis that most other CDA approaches employ.

The discourse trajectory is especially important for this thesis because the data set in question is not merely a news discourse but a transedited news discourse that was written in Arabic by news sources, then collected and translated by the BBCM-M into English. The translation products have undergone a complex process through which they went beyond linguistic, institutional and cultural barriers to conduct a form of communication known as international news. Thus, intertextual analysis on its own would not be sufficient to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the data. The DHA is also a good option for this research for another reason related to the genre of the data, as it takes into account the historical dimension that is vitally relevant to this study. The researcher here is focused on understanding the representations of Saudi Arabia in BBCM-M translated news from 2013 to 2015, which requires a historical understanding of the events that occurred over that timeframe.

Secondly, the DHA is adopted due to its design, which attempts to mitigate the key drawbacks of CDA approaches such as 'theoretical eclecticism and unreflexive modernism' (Pennycook, 2001, p.87). Theoretical eclecticism refers to the analyst's openness to subjectivity, which is a drawback common to all CDA approaches. For example, Van Dijk, the founder of one of the key approaches, has been criticized for making 'social and political judgements' before undertaking analysis (Wilson, 2001, p.411). Similarly, Fairclough's approach to CDA has been criticised by Widdowson, a leading critic of CDA, for being insufficient in terms of textual analysis despite his 15 years of research in the same area. In addition, he sees Fairclough's approach as 'not

actually a method of analysis but an approach to interpretation' (Widdowson, 2004, p.159).

Although the subjectivity of the researcher can never be completely eliminated, as interpretations are always positioned in one way or another, it can be controlled (Baker, 2006). Triangulation is one way to do so; it is based on the notion that discursive phenomena, when approached theoretically and methodologically from an interdisciplinary perspective, can provide a less subjective, more detailed picture, since the researcher is committed to taking into consideration a range of viewpoints (Wodak, et al., 2009, p.9). Triangulation can be achieved at many levels, with Denzin (1978) describing four kinds: triangulation of source, in which data is collected from various sources; triangulation of investigator, in which more than one analyst is involved in the research; triangulation of theory, in which more than theoretical insight is taken into account to examine the phenomenon; and triangulation of method, in which several methods of data collection are adopted.

The DHA is designed to overcome the drawback of subjectivity of CDA scholars by calling for triangulation at both the theoretical and methodological levels to reduce the researcher's subjectivity. Wodak uses both linguistic and contextual triangulations in their approach. In doing so, they offer a four-level model of 'context', which is defined as follows:

i. the immediate text of the communicative event in question (for example, the conversation between friends or a negotiation between managers, thus a particular detailed transcript of talk);
ii. the intertextual and interdiscursive relationship between utterances, texts, genres and discourses (e.g. transcripts of individual interviews with the respective participants involved in the conversation or negotiation, other conversations with the same participants in different settings, reports about ongoing negotiations in minutes or emails, and so forth);
iii. the extralinguistic social (e.g. physical gestures, facial expressions, postures, etc.) and environmental (e.g. room size and layout) variables and institutional frames (e.g. latent or formal hierarchical structure, informal power relations in a friendship, cultural constraints and conventions, etc.) of a specific 'context of

situation' (derived, for example, from observer notes and reflections on direct observations of the communicative event); and

iv. the broader sociopolitical and historical context which discursive practices are embedded in and related to (e.g. knowledge derived from ethnography of the relationships, aspects of the broader social and cultural macro-environment that influence the talk and conversations). (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, pp.30-31)

Because the nature of the data collected for this thesis is mainly textual, the extra-linguistic features dimension will not be examined here, unless required in the course of the analysis. Moreover, because the data genre is transedited news items, both the ST's and the TET's contexts have to be considered, thus redefining the context in the DHA model to include the context of the STs.

This shows that the DHA has three main advantages that led the researcher to consider it an effective methodological framework: i) viewing discourse as a travelling discourse across languages, cultures and institutions, ii) controlling for embedded subjectivity through triangulation at both the linguistic and contextual levels and iii) taking into consideration the historical context of the linguistic inquiry.

3.2.2 Corpus Tools: Definition, Origin and Developments

The term 'corpus' is Latin for 'body' (Muhvic-Dimanovski and Socanac, 2009, p.477). In linguistics, it means an enormous collection of either written or spoken texts which is computerised as a representative sample of a certain language variety (O'Keeffe and McCarthy, 2010, p.3). The basic form of this practice, with an analysis of linguistic variety depending on large samples of words, is known from the13th century, when scholars manually examined the Christian Bible; the first concordance of the Bible was by Anthony of Padua, who was born in 1195 (O'Keeffe and McCarthy, 2010, p.2).

By the late 1950s, the first computerised concordances appeared, with the aid of punch-card technology. At that time, it took over a day to analyse around 60,000 words (O'Keeffe and McCarthy, 2010, p.4). While technology had substantially improved by the 1970s, it was the 1980s and 1990s that saw the application of corpus tools as today's linguists understand them (O'Keeffe and McCarthy, 2010, p.5). The corpus approach was used in fields ranging from lexicography to second-language acquisition and pedagogy. Corpus-based analysis differs from corpus-driven analysis; in the

latter, the corpus is the empirical source from which a linguistic phenomenon is identified without a prior intuition, while in the former, the corpus is used to validate a prior expectation or intuition and hence serves as an additional method of validation (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001).

3.2.2.1 Key Types and Tools

There are many types of corpora. They can be monolingual, bilingual or even multilingual. Depending on the goal set by the analyst, different types of corpora can be used in an analysis. It should be noted, however, that different scholars use different terms for the same corpus types; for the purpose of avoiding confusion and repetition, only the main types of corpora are discussed here.

We begin with the RC, which represents the benchmark against which keywords, or characteristic words, are calculated, identified and generated in a keyword list. This type commonly consists of a large collection of words (often millions of words) that is representative of a certain language (Baker, 2006, p.30). Specialised corpora, on the other hand, are built for studying features of a specific genre or variety of language such as newspapers or academic essays. They are constructed with specific criteria set by the analyst; these criteria can be further restricted by specifying a period of time from which the words are to be selected (Baker, 2006, p.26).

The diachronic corpus is another key type. A diachronic corpus is 'built in order to be representative of a language or a language variety over a particular period of time, making it possible for researchers to track linguistic changes within it' (Baker, 2006, p.29). Since this type of corpus takes into account the diachronic changes in a specific variety of a language, it helps mitigating the common criticism levelled at corpus analysts, which stipulates that corpus studies neglect the fact that 'as society changes language changes with it' (Baker, 2006, p.29).

Finally, and commonly related to the field of translation, are parallel corpora, which are used to train translators, carry out the everyday work of translation and study the act of translation, as in matters of translation techniques, strategies and style. They have 'two or more versions of the same texts; first as original texts and then their translations in the other language(s)' (Mikhailov and Cooper, 2016, p.5).

Many tools have been developed and commonly incorporated in corpus-based linguistic inquiry through which 'counting, sorting and presentation of linguistic features' are performed; key tools include WordSmith (WST), AntConc, Wmatrix and Xaira (Litosseliti, 2010). With the aid of software, enormous amounts of linguistic data can be examined for 'collocations, keyness, semantic preference and semantic prosody' (Mautner, 2009, p.37), so analysts can choose between these tools in accordance with the aim of their particular studies (Laviosa, et al., 2016, p.53).

3.2.2.2 WordSmith Tools: An Overview

Römer and Wulff (2010) state that the most commonly chosen software options are WST (developed by Mike Scott and released by Oxford University Press), Antconc (developed by Laurence Anthony and released by Osaka University Graduate School of Engineering) and MonoConc Pro (by Michael Barlow). It is no surprise to find that all three provide similar functions, as they are all designed to serve similar purposes such as teaching English as a second language, exposing language learners to real examples of language in the classroom and highlighting salient patterns in language use. The similar functions include concordances, through which a word can be sought and shown in various contexts within the corpus, keyword and wordlist creators, through which promising areas of investigation can be identified and problem areas can be highlighted, and cluster generators, through which multi-word units such as idioms and collocations can be investigated and sorted alphabetically or by frequency.

There is no single set of tools that can be considered the 'best'. Rather, the suitability of certain tools over others depends almost completely on the case study itself, its goals and the expertise of the analyst involved. Thus, the most suitable set of tools for this thesis may not be the best for another case study serving different aims and conducted by a different analyst with expertise in a different area. That being said, WST is selected for this thesis for the simple reason that it is the most widely used set of corpus tools, and the assumption here is that, when a particular piece of software is widely used, reviews and solutions for possible technical errors that might arise when using those tools are more likely to be accessible; this logic proved helpful in the course of the analysis.

WordSmith was developed by Mike Scott at the University of Oxford in 1996. Since then, the WST have been refined numerous times. Hence, the description of the tools

here will be based mainly on version 7, the current version at the time of the analysis. This package of tools needs to be purchased, downloaded and installed on 'a reasonably up-to-date computer and running Windows XP or later' (Lexically.net, 2016). After downloading and installation, the user needs to obtain an access code which can be bought for £50. Once the code is obtained, the user can use the tools immediately. For users to get started, they have to upload texts that must be in 'plain text format, HTML or XML format, or converted to plain text' (Lexically.net, 2016).

Figure 2: A screenshot of WordSmith 7 tools starting page

As the screenshot in Figure 2 shows, the three main WST are Concord, Keywords and Wordlist. The Concord tool will generate a concordance after a search word is typed; the program looks up the word in the selected texts and displays its collocates. The Keywords tool will 'locate and identify key words in a given text' by comparing the frequency of its occurrence in the selected corpus to a larger RC. It must be noted, however, that keywords in corpus linguistics carries a different sense from the classical sense: in corpus linguistics, it means 'words which occur unusually frequently in comparison with some kind of reference corpus' (lexically.net, 2019a), while the latter simply means words of cultural importance as Williams (2014) notes: keywords are 'significant, indicative words in certain forms of thought'. He also argues that 'certain uses bound together certain ways of seeing culture and society' (p.15). Hence, in

corpus linguistics, the term ‘key keywords’ means the most unusually frequent word types in the corpus at hand: the word types at the top of a keywords list.

The Keywords tool automatically generates a keyword list based on comparing two wordlists: a wordlist from a SC and a wordlist from a RC (usually larger than the corpus in question) and more representative (Goh, 2011): ‘to compute the “key-ness” of an item, the program therefore computes its frequency in the small word-list, the number of running words in the small word-list, its frequency in the reference corpus, the number of running words in the reference corpus and cross-tabulates these.... Statistical tests include: the classic chi-square test of significance with Yates correction for a 2 X 2 table and Ted Dunning's Log Likelihood test, which gives a better estimate of “key-ness”, especially when contrasting long texts or a whole genre against your reference corpus’ (lexically.net, 2017a).

The generated keywords list includes all word types that are unusually frequent or unusually infrequent in the corpus in question. The former are positive keywords and appear at the top of the keywords list with a positive value, whereas the latter are negative keywords and appear at the bottom of the keywords list with a negative value. To avoid confusion in this thesis, negative keywords are called ‘keywords with negative values’ and positive keywords as ‘keywords with positive values’.

Before describing the Wordlist tool in more detail, it is important to note the distinction between ‘tokens’ and ‘types’. Scott defines tokens as the running words in a corpus that may or may not be repeated, while types are all the unique words in a corpus. For example, a corpus can have 100,000 tokens but contain only 50,000 types, with the rest being repeated words (lexically.net, 2017b). The term ‘word types’ is used throughout the thesis to refer to unique words in the corpus under investigation.

The Wordlist tool generates word lists based on one or more ASCII or ANSI[2] text files. The word lists are automatically generated either according to their frequency in the corpus in question, which is the common way and the adopted way in this research, or alphabetically. One can also generate a word index list (Lexically.net, 2019b). The

[2] ASCII text, ANSI text, Text Only and DOS text are all names for plain text (Lexically.net, 2017d).

index can be exploited to generate a wordlist cluster, which is similar to a wordlist but consists of more than one word. To generate a wordlist, the starting page asks for the user to select the texts from which the wordlist is to be generated.

In this thesis all three WST are exploited in the corpus analysis, which is conducted at two levels. The first is the categorisation and description of the wordlist and the keywords list that are generated from the data. This serves to highlight the most salient themes in the corpus, which will direct the selection of keywords and frequent words for the second level of the analysis. The second level is the interpretation of those lists; the wordlist serves as a jumping-off point and is followed by the keywords list, because the latter complements and, more importantly, validates the interpretations of the former. Both levels will help in unveiling the most salient representations of Saudi Arabia in the corpus in hand.

The salient word types in terms of frequency are examined in their larger contexts with the help of concordance lines and word clusters. Concordance lines (also known as a keyword in context [KWIC]) of a specific word type are generated empirically by WordSmith 7 via the Concord tool, which shows all the instances in which the word type occurs in the corpus. The concordance lines can be sorted according to the position chosen by the researcher, such as centre, R1, R2, R3…, L1, L2, L3 …, so they can be arranged according to similar patterns based on their specific positions, which helps the researcher locate similar patterns in analogous positions.

In case it is not feasible to examine all the concordance lines of a specific word type for being numerous, word clusters are used in the frequency-based (Wordlist) analysis, which will help highlighting patterns in which that word type occurs frequently. The word clusters are empirically generated via WordSmith 7's Concord tool. Once the concordance lines of a word type, such as 'we', are found, the following commands have to be selected: 'compute', then 'clusters'. The length and frequency of the cluster can be set by the researcher, which is an important asset in terms of flexibility. A cluster can consist of two or more words and have a frequency of one or more. The minimum frequency of word clusters, is set at five occurrences, and the length of the cluster is three words, unless otherwise required by the analysis. The number of words in the cluster is increased as needed later in the process.

The keywords list is also used in the interpretation, with the collocations of the most unusually frequent (keywords with positive values) and unusually infrequent (keywords with negative values) word types to be exploited. The collocation relationship shows the strength of collocates of a specific search term that will be computed. This is empirically done through the following steps: clicking on 'concord', typing the word type of focus, clicking on 'collocates' at the bottom bar and then selecting 'relationship' from the 'compute' menu. The software will then require a wordlist to be generated in order to provide what is known as a collocation list, a table that contains the following: the serial number of words, the collocates of the search word starting with the search words at the top, the strength of the relationship between the search term and the collocate represented in a mutual information (MI) score and many alternative statistical scores, with the number in red font indicating the highest frequency of the collocate and search word occurring together in that specific position.

In this research, however, it is the MI score by which the collocation list is sorted. MI is defined as follows:

> A Mutual Information (MI) score relates one word to another. For example, if *problem* is often found with *solve*, they may have a high mutual information score. Usually, *the* will be found much more often near *problem* than *solve*, so the procedure for calculating Mutual Information takes into account not just the most frequent words found near the word in question, but also whether each word is often found elsewhere, well away from the word in question. Since *the* is found very often indeed far away from *problem*, it will not tend to be related, that is, it will get a low MI score. (Lexically.net, 2019c).

3.2.2.3 Corpus Tools Incorporation: A Rationale

The methodological framework for this research is both qualitative and quantitative. The researcher is attempting to mitigate the chief weaknesses of each paradigm through effecting an interdependence of each on the other (McMurray, Scott and Pace, 2004, p.262). Thus, corpus tools are incorporated in the design of the methodological framework of corpus-driven analysis. This means that no prior intuition regarding the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output between 2013 and 2015 was expected and would be validated; rather, it is the empirical source from which a linguistic phenomenon is identified (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001, pp.84-85).

First, in a linguistic examination, quantitative findings are certainly worth examining. However, due to the fact the CDA is concerned with ideological significance, qualitative findings are equally crucial (Fairclough, 2003, p.6). Second, although the DHA assists researchers to control their potential subjectivity, corpus tools are employed in the analysis to help increase that control by generating semi-automated quantitative results. Moreover, corpus tools can help mitigate other crucial pitfalls of CDA such as selective choice of texts and over- and under-interpretation.

Third, the employment of corpora in this research has several advantages for both the quantitative and qualitative analyses: a) the advances in linguistic analysis software will help in analysing a vast quantity of texts in a relatively short time. This means that a quantitative analysis of large data could be performed automatically or semi-automatically in a far shorter time than would be required if it were done manually; b) corpora will help detect regularities and irregularities in the textual data, such as dominant words or subjects, which will help in the qualitative analysis; c) even though the corpus type for this research is not a parallel corpus, which is common in corpus-based translation studies in which STs and TTs are aligned and examined as such, with the aid of such software, comparative analysis of source texts (STs) and target texts (TTs) will become easier in the qualitative analysis, where a certain TT can be generated with a click rather than going through the whole data set of the specialised corpus of the BBC's translations to compare with a specific ST.

3.3 Data

3.3.1 The Study Corpus: English Transedited Texts

3.3.1.1 Source and Rationale

Corpus-based discourse analysis can be based either on pre-built or custom-made corpora (Baker, 2006, p.25). This research, however, is based on a specialised corpus that was designed and built by the researcher herself. The source of the collected data is the BBCM−M. The SC consists of translated news articles related to Saudi Arabia that were selected from Arabic news outlets and translated into English by the BBCM-M. In other words, the SC consists of English TETs of Arabic news items related to Saudi Arabia.

There are several reasons for building a corpus from scratch instead of using a publicly accessible one: first, a corpus that exactly suits the research needs – Saudi-related news articles translated by the BBCM-M from 2013 to 2015 – does not exist to the researcher's best knowledge. Second, building a corpus gives the researcher a taste of the collected data and may help in formulating a hypothesis for later testing rather than starting the research with a completely blank slate (Baker, 2006, p.25).

The decision to collect data from the BBCM-M in particular was driven by the fact that the BBC is among the most influential news organisations in the world. Indeed, in 2014 and 2015, when this this chapter was first written, the BBC's Global Audience Measure shows that 308 million individuals weekly took in the contents of BBC's three platforms: online, TV and radio (Bbc.co.uk, 2015). Moreover, the English BBC World Service has proven to be the most popular of all BBC services, with 52 million consumers. Not only do these figures reveal the powerful influence of the BBC; they also indicate the universality of that influence. These figures make clear that the BBC is a trusted organisation that millions of people around the world turn to for news. Hence, if Saudi Arabia's representations via translated news are to be studied in a British context, a trusted, powerful and global wire service should be chosen, and the BBC is clearly the most adequate choice.

3.3.1.2 Timeframe Rationale (March 2013–March 2015)

On Friday 11 January 2013, the late King ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud of Saudi Arabia issued two royal decrees by which he appointed, for the first time in the history of the country, 30 Saudi Arabian women to the formerly all-male *majlis al-shūrā*, that is to say the advisory council. The royal decree has an amendment that clearly states that there will not be less than 20% women on the council (ArabianBusiness.com, 2019).

This event highlighted a shift in internal Saudi policies and the country's socio-political reality, especially concerning the controversial status of women in the Kingdom. Thus, it received widespread media coverage both nationally and internationally. It was welcomed by many as a step in the right direction of empowering women. A 2014 survey of women in parliament by the Inter-Parliamentary Union shows that, after this move, Saudi Arabia was fourth in involving women in the political system among Arab countries (Archive.ipu.org, 2014).

Therefore, and taking into consideration the possible false accumulation of news coverage immediately after the event of focus took place (January 2013), it was decided to collect the data over the 1 March 2013–1 March 2015 period. The timeframe was deliberately restricted to two years because a large number of news articles published by the BBC on Saudi Arabia were expected, and a multi-method study like this thesis, in which the researcher aims to increase the validity of her research and achieve more rigour through the fusion of qualitative and quantitative paradigms, requires considerable time and effort. That being said, it is important to note that when the 2013–2015 timeframe is used, it means 1 March 2013 to 1 March 2015.

3.3.1.3 Data Collection Process

The data was collected in the light of Reisigl and Wodak's (2001) data collection criteria, meaning with a special focus on specific political units, specific periods of time relating to an important discursive event, specific fields of political action especially the formation of public attitudes, opinions and will and specific genre. The data was collected from the Factiva database, which includes all articles published by the BBCM-M from 25 September 1998 (Dur.ac.uk, 2015). Using the search form rather than the free text search option, the word 'Saudi' was typed as search word and the phrase 'in Arabic' was typed as the phrase that had to be included in the articles, and the result language was set to English, as Table 1 below shows. Although it is common in corpus analyses to use a variety of search terms to ensure that all relevant data is collected, the search term used here was only 'Saudi', because this adjective was deemed sufficient to generate news articles related to Saudi Arabia, whether they included 'Saudi women', 'Saudi men', 'Saudi people', 'Saudi government', 'Saudi nation', 'Saudi society' and so on.

All of these words	Saudi
At least one of these words	-
None of these words	-
This exact phrase	in Arabic
Date	01/03/2013 to 01/03/2015
Source	BBC Monitoring Middle East
Author	All Authors
Company	All Companies
Subject	All Subjects
Industry	All Industries
Region	All Regions
Language	English
Results Found	3,148
Timestamp	26 March 2016 17:11

Table 1: Search summary from Factiva

The parameters applied in the search ensured that articles outside the focus of this research would be excluded. These are articles that the BBCM-M does not translate but are published in English by the Arab news outlets themselves. For example, the Saudi News Agency writes in both Arabic and English. Hence, the BBCM-M simply takes the English version and republishes rather than spending the time and effort to translate the Arabic article. The search results had a 3,148 articles, but only the first 101 news articles in terms of relevance[3] to the search query were collected.

3.3.1.4 Study Corpus Size

The SC is 101 news items compromising 118,444 words. An initial categorisation shows that the news articles came from 20 different original sources (Al-Quds al-Arabi

[3] Factiva have three options of sorting the result of a research query: 1) based on relevance, which is calculated in relation to the search options set prior to starting the search, 2) oldest articles first and finally 3) most recent articles first.

website, Akhbar al-Khalij website, al-Ayyam, al-Dustur website, al-Hayat website, al-Jazeera.net website, al-Jazirah website, al-Safir website, al-Sharq al-Awsat website, al-Siyasah website, al-Watan website, Elaph website, Ra'y al-Yawm, SPA news agency website, Tishrin website, al-Arabiyah TV, al-Jazeera TV, Syrian TV satellite service, Middle East Arabic press review from BBC Monitoring and finally a source named As listed). These original news sources were selected by BBCM-M as sources of their Saudi-related news and are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

3.3.1.5 Study Corpus Representativeness

Although many studies have proven to be successful and representative despite being based on small corpora. For example, Baker (2006, p.29) shows how Shalom (1997) effectively identifies lexical and grammatical patterns based on a corpus of personal adverts that is less than 20,000 words long. Another example of a relatively small corpus-based study also given by Baker (2006), is Stubbs (1996), which involves a comparative analysis of two letters totalling just under 550 words (2006, p.28). He successfully identifies recurring patterns, which clearly demonstrates the possibility of successful corpus-based examinations using a small-sized collection of texts.

The correct corpus size thus depends on the nature of the analysis. For example, Baker (2006, p.28) argues that if the aim of a corpus is to examine 'the discursive construction of particular subject', as is the case in this thesis, the corpus designer should focus when collecting texts on the possibility of that subject occurring in the collected texts rather than collecting millions of words that may or may not contain the subject under examination. Thus, even though corpus-based studies are commonly based on an enormous number of words, quality can be more important than quantity in some case studies.

It could be argued that the number of words in the collected data for this thesis (118,444) represents a relatively small-sized corpus compared to corpora of millions of words. This does indeed limit the representativeness of this thesis. However, as the design of this study is both quantitative and qualitative that investigates transedited texts, a data set of 101 TETs was deemed to be a reasonably sized sample for this PhD thesis. This is because in addition to the English TETs from the BBCM-M, the Arabic STs of specific news items were collected from their official news sources.

These STs are exploited in the comparative ST-TET CDA and are attached as appendices to this thesis, which is discussed in the CDA unit.

3.3.2 Reference Corpus: Mainstream UK News (4UKBS)

3.3.2.1 Rationale

Although a RC has to be larger in size than the SC to serve as the benchmark on which the calculations of key-ness are based, other criteria that make a corpus an appropriate RC are variable. Scott and Tribble (2006, p.64) argue that 'the issue of reference corpus selection is far from decided' and that the selection of the RC is based on the goals of the research in question. Thus, a large number of corpus linguistics studies have used the BNC both as a source of data (see McEnery, Baker and Hardie, 2000) and as a RC (see Ensslin and Johnson [2006] and Xiao and McEnery [2005]).

However, the explanation of the keyword-generation process above shows the importance of the RC, because the identification of a word type as a keyword in a specific corpus and the descending order of the keywords on a list are based on that RC.

Therefore, the BNC was discarded as the RC in this thesis because the aim of the research is to identify how Saudi Arabia was linguistically represented in BBCM-M coverage from 2013 to 2015 through Arabic news transedited into English. Taking into consideration the impact that the RC's genre can have on a keyword list, a RC consisting of news was compiled. This is because a linguistic item can inaccurately be identified as a keyword by being unusually frequent in WordSmith 7, even if it is simply a frequent linguistic item in news, the genre of focus. Thus, instead of using the ready-made BNC, the researcher decided to build a RC that serves the specific goals of this thesis.

The RC for this thesis was collected from four UK news broadsheets: *The Daily Telegraph, The Times, The Guardian* and *The Observer*, which are referred to as '4UKBS' below. Although it is clear that the political stances of newspapers are up for debate, these broadsheets were chosen specifically because they are widely distributed and are commonly situated on the left-right spectrum of political stances. The first two are commonly identified as centre-right, and the latter two are centre-left

(Media Bias/Fact Check, 2019), so they are reasonably representative of mainstream UK news.

Although using a RC that is built by the researcher may invite criticisms of subjectivity, the decision is supported by Goh's (2011) findings; that paper is one of the few studies to examine other factors that impact the outcome of keywords and the extent to which they do so. Goh (2011) offers a statistical analysis of the impact of genre, diachrony, corpus size and varietal difference (British versus American) of the RC on keyword calculation results, which 'indicate that genre and diachrony are more important factors to consider than other factors when choosing a RC, especially in that the differences in these two factors, unlike those in other factors such as corpus size and varietal difference, bring about a statistically significant difference in the number of the keywords.' (Goh, 2011, p.239).

This shows that the multi-genre nature of the BNC may affect the calculations of the keywords in this case study, as the BNC is derived from oral texts (10 million words), fiction (17 million words), popular magazines (16 million words), newspapers (11 million words), academic sources (16 million words) and other sources (30 million words) (Corpus.byu.edu, 2019). Another reason for discarding the BNC as the RC is that the BNC is not as recent as the SC; the latest edition of the BNC when this chapter was written[4] (the BNC XML Edition) was released in 2007, whereas the SC consists of items published between 2013 and 2015, so the SC may have specific terms that are related to that timeframe that would affect the statistical outcome of the keyword list and would not expose the unique characteristics of the BBC's reporting on Saudi Arabia during that timeframe[5].

[4] A later edition known as the BNC2014 was released; however, it mainly covers the spoken part of the corpus as the written part was to be released in autumn 2018.

[5] A test was carried out in order to validate this claim. Two keyword lists were generated, the first using the BNC as the RC and the second using the 4UKBS. The results shows that the keyword list generated using the BNC was longer (900) than the one using the 4UKBS (461). This validates the claim that using a multi-genre RC would enrol additional words that may have been labelled as keywords in the SC due solely to the fact that they did not exist in the

The data for the RC was collected by taking the diachrony, genre, size and national variety into account. As to diachrony, the timeframe for the data collection was set to be identical for that of the SC (2013–2015). The genre was restricted to news only, with a focus on the four broadsheets noted above for purposes of representativeness. The size of the RC was deemed appropriate, as it is eight times larger than the SC, and the national variety is set to British English because the SC is news produced by a British organisation. This will empirically show the uniqueness of the BBC's reporting on Saudi Arabia from transedited news in comparison to mainstream UK news discourse on Saudi Arabia during the same timeframe.

3.3.2.2 Data Source

The RC was also collected using the Factiva database, which was easily accessible through the Durham University licence. On the database starting page, the 'search form' option was selected: the timeframe was set to 2013–2015: the search term was 'Saudi' in the 'all of these words' box, and the sources were limited to *The Daily Telegraph* (UK), *The Guardian* (UK), *The Observer* (UK) and *The Times* (UK). The return of the query was 4,512 Saudi-related news articles published by the four UK broadsheets during the 2013–2015 timeframe.

3.3.2.3 RC Size

Although the Durham University licence used in accessing the database permitted all 4,512 news articles to be viewed, a single user of that licence can only download 1,300 news articles. Thus, the first 1,300 news articles, in terms of relevance, (comprising 949,336 words) were downloaded as the material to be loaded in WordSmith 7 to create the 4UKBS RC. The collected data is sufficient in size, as a RC for the SC in this thesis of nearly a million words is nearly eight times the size of the SC (118,444 words).

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benchmark corpus due to its multi-genre nature or different timeframe (see Appendix 3 for the keyword list based on the 4UKBS).

3.3.3 Arabic News Items Corpus: STs

In addition to the SC and the RC, STs in Arabic were collected; it should be noted, however, that only the STs of the texts selected for the comparative ST-TET analysis embedded in the CDA were chosen (see Table 2).

Serial	Source	Date of publication	Title	Examined in
1	al-Quds al-Arabi	4/4/2013	طالب بتشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي بالسعودية يرأسه شخص من خارج الاسرة الحاكمة الوليد بن طلال يهاجم «الاخوان» ويؤيد انتخاب مجلس الشورى «دمارا».. اعتبر «الربيع العربي» وقال ان «الجزيرة» قناة للشارع و« للزعماء العربية»	CDA: Case study 1
2	Arabic (AFP)	6/4/2013	الوليد بن طلال يؤيد انتخاب أعضاء مجلس الشورى في السعودية وتعزيز صلاحياتهم	CDA: Case study 1
3	al-Quds al-Arabi	6/10/2013	مادة استشراقية دسمة من السعودية	CDA: Case study 2
4	al-Quds al-Arabi	21/10/2013	نفوذ السعودية وانتهاكات حقوق الانسان	CDA: Case study 2
5	al-Quds al-Arabi	18/4/2014	سعوديون هاربون من القلمون يسلمون أنفسهم لسفارة بلادهم في بيروت	CDA: Case study 2
6	al-Arabiyah	15/11/2013	600 سعودي انضموا إلى صفوف 'القاعدة' في سوريا حلقة 'صناعة الموت' تكشف مصير أخطر مطلوب سعودي	CDA: Case study 3
7	al-Arabiyah	30/11/2013	الرد الشرعي على المتطرفين	CDA: Case study 3
8	al-Jazeera	24/11/2013	تفاعلات الاتفاق النووي الإيراني عربيا	CDA: Case study 3
9	al-Jazeera	10/3/2014	أزمة العلاقات الخليجية إثر سحب السفراء	CDA: Case study 3

Table 2: The collected STs for the comparative ST-TET analysis in the CDA unit

The following chapter contextualises the case study by presenting the relevant background information on Saudi Arabia, the BBCM-M and the Arabic sources selected by the BBCM-M to report on Saudi Arabia between March 2013 and March 2015.

Chapter 4: Saudi Arabia's History and the Control Factors in its Representations by the BBCM-M, 2013–2015

4.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with analytically presenting the background information needed for this research. It is divided into three main sections. First is some background on Saudi Arabia. The second is a description of the processes which the data has undergone, which is shown in Figure 3, and presenting background information on the Arabic news sources from which the BBCM-M selected its coverage; the third is to describe the BBCM-M service.



Figure 3: The processes that the BBCM-M's TETs have undergone

The data was originally 101 Arabic news items on Saudi Arabia, written and published by 20 Arabic news sources. These articles were all selected, transedited and published by the BBCM-M as English TETs on Saudi Arabia. In Lefevere's (1992) terms, these transedited products constitute a knowledge that has been constructed on Saudi Arabia. This is made possible in the English literary system by two control factors: the patron and the professional. The knowledge, however, came from an Arabic literary system and focused on Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Arabic news sources (publishers or editors) represent the patron that controls the Arabic literary system

according to certain ideologies, while Arabic-speaking journalists are the professionals responsible for bringing the poetics, the form, of the literature to satisfy the ideological demands and preferences of the patron.

When the BBCM-M's staff (editors or publishers) selected news items on Saudi Arabia from the Arabic literary system to construct that knowledge for the English literary system, they became a second patron, responsible for controlling that literary system in terms of ideology, while the transeditors who work at the BBCM-M are the professionals responsible for making the poetics of that English literature meet the ideology set by their patron: the BBCM-M. Together, the Arabic news sources and the BBCM-M constitute the control factors in the representations of Saudi Arabia, or more generally the knowledge on Saudi Arabia constructed by the BBCM-M for the English reader during the 2013–2015 period.

4.2 Saudi Arabia: A Background

4.2.1 The Unification

Saudi Arabia, officially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (commonly abbreviated as KSA), forms 90% of the Arabian Peninsula; it shares borders with Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (Bowen, 2014, p.2). According to an official report, the 2018 population of Saudi Arabia was 33,413,660 (General Authority for Statistics, 2019).

Before Saudi Arabia was founded, the Arabian Peninsula was made up of sheikhdoms and emirates inhabited by nomadic tribes. The unification of Saudi Arabia led those clashing tribes to unite on a religious basis by pledging allegiance to ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Al Saʿud, commonly referred to in English as Ibn Saud (Lipsky, 1959). The unification of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has gone through three stages: the first Saudi State (1744–1818), the second Saudi State (1843–1891) and the third Saudi State (1902–present) (Niblock, 2006).

The First Saudi State was founded in AD 1744 in al-Dirʿiyya, a village in the centre of Najd, when Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿud, the great grandfather of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Al Saʿud, the father of Ibn Saud, was expelled from the village of al-ʿUyayna for his religious influence on the people. Al-shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb agreed

to start a reform movement by which the Islam practiced by the majority of Najd dwellers was purified of polytheistic and heretic practices (Niblock, 2006, p.23).

According to Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿud and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, people in Najd in the early eighteenth century were ignorant and superstitious (Al-Hariri-Rifai and al-Hariri-Rifai, 1990). They practiced a deformed version of Islam that contradicted the basic monotheistic teachings of the religion (Bowen, 2014, p.172). Examples include praying for a person as a form of mediation between the person and Allah. In addition, people worshiped graves, stones and trees, a practice that is forbidden in Islam and makes its practitioner guilty of *shirk* (idolatry).

By enforcing a law that is solely based on al-Qurʾan wa-l-sunna (the holy Qur'an and the sayings of Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him), al-shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, with political support provided by Ibn Saud called for reform, known in Arabic as *al-daʿwa* based on the principle of *al-tawḥīd* 'the one-ness of God and all that pertains to his universe' (Niblock, 2006, p.23). An important practice that ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb called for is al-jihad, the Arabic form of 'Jihad'. The Oxford dictionary defines 'Jihad' as 'a struggle or fight against the enemies of Islam' and as 'the spiritual struggle within oneself against sin' (English-English Oxford Dictionary, 2017). However, here it falls within the scope of the first definition because it means the act of fighting disbelievers and Muslims who have strayed from the correct path of Islam by engaging in polytheistic practices.

Al-jihad broadened the first Saudi State's power over the majority of the Arabian Peninsula. The religious reformation named after its advocate Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, *al-daʿwa* al-Wahhābiyya or 'Wahhabism', gained Ibn Saud hegemony over many tribes and sheikhdoms at that time. It helped ibn Saud win their allegiance, because 'Wahhabism provided a novel impetus for political centralisation.… With the importance of jihad in Wahhabi teachings, conquests of new territories became possible'. The essential pillars of the Wahhabi movement involved distribution of *al-daʿwa* al-Wahhābiyya, 'the purification of Arabia of unorthodox forms of religiosity' and the implementation of al-Shariʿa, (English 'Shari'a'), on the Arabian Peninsula (Al-Rasheed, 2010, p.17). However, the First Saudi State came to an end in AD 1818, when Ibrāhīm Bāshā, the governor of Egypt took over al-Dirʿiyya with the aid of the Ottoman army.

Although the reign of Faisal ibn Turky (1843-56), has been called ‘the most successful stage of the second state’ (Niblock, 2006, p.29), in AD1828 his father, Imām Turky ibn ʿAbd Allah ibn Muḥammad ibn Saʿud founded the second Saudi State and made Riyadh its capital after the failure of an earlier attempt in AD 1820 by Prince Mishāry ibn Saʿud. However, an internal power struggle caused the state to collapse and fall to the hands of ibn Rashīd, who then exiled Al Saʿud clan to Kuwait (Al-Rasheed, 2010, p.37). In AD 1902, ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Faisal Al Saʿud recaptured Riyadh and brought his family to live in it, reviving Al Saʿud’s hegemony over the Arabian Peninsula and founding the third Saudi State. On 19 September 1932, an announcement of the unification of Saudi Arabia under the name The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was issued in a royal decree (Mofa.gov.sa, 2017).

4.2.2 Before and After Oil

The economic developments encouraged by the discovery of oil in 1938 radically changed the sociopolitical status of the kingdom and paved the way for international trading and relations. Before the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia, the country was poor (Mokyr, 2003), and its people were mostly nomadic. The economy depended on different activities, according to the resources that existed in each province. For example, the inhabitants of Hijaz, the western area, were largely farmers who depended on subsistence agriculture and trading due to their contact with people arriving from across the world to perform hajj in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Moreover, fees or tax collected from those Muslims arriving in the kingdom to perform hajj provided a steady source of national revenue. While the people in the eastern province, the home of the famous oil well in Dammam no. 7, were also mainly farmers before oil was discovered; their main product was dates. In addition, as the eastern province is near the Arabian Gulf, some people were fishermen and merchants before the discovery of oil.

That discovery changed life in Saudi Arabia and was encouraged by many factors in both Saudi Arabia and the West. For the Saudis, the Great Depression led to decrees on the number of Muslims travelling to observe hajj: ‘An average of 100,000 pilgrims per year came during 1920s… this number fell to 40,000 in 1931 and continued to decline’, leading to a quest for alternative revenue sources (Mokyr, 2003). For the West, the outbreak of World War II meant that steady sources of cheap crude oil had to be

found, which expedited the exploration for oil on the Arabian Peninsula. In May 1933, Ibn Saud signed an agreement with the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) to explore for oil in the eastern region and other areas in the kingdom (Zuhur, 2011).

Five months later, California Arabia Standard Oil Company (Casoc) was founded as a branch to manage the concession. The name was changed in 1944 to the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO), then to Saudi Arabian Oil Company/Saudi Aramco in 1988 (Zuhur, 2011). In 1935, ARAMCO (as it is commonly known) started drilling. However, it was not until 1938 that oil was found in commercial quantities in the kingdom's eastern region, namely in Well No. 7 in Dammam with '1,585 bpd at a depth of nearly 1½ kilometers' (Saudi Aramco, 2017). ARAMCO, is considered 'the world's most valuable company' at approximately 'US$10 trillion'. It is the largest oil producer on a daily basis and possesses 'the world's largest proven crude oil reserves' (Salihovic, 2015, p.198).

4.2.3 Western Relations

Saudi Arabia has long had a close relationship with the United States and Britain, although the US had an isolationist position towards Saudi Arabia in the 1920s (Najran, 2009). By contrast, the UK was one of the first Western countries to acknowledge Saudi Arabia by signing the Treaty of Darin to protect its many interests in the region. The US, however, dramatically changed its views, especially after World War II started.

4.2.3.1 Anglo-Saudi Relations

The 1915 Treaty of Darin (also known as the Darin Pact) between Ibn Saud and the British government represented by Sir Percy Cox marked the beginning of the formal relationship between Saudi Arabia and Britain. Under its terms, the British secured protection for their protectorates (Qatar, Kuwait and the Emirates) from Ibn Saud (Chaudhry, 1997). In return, Ibn Saud enjoyed the recognition of the British government. Hijaz, Najd, al-Aḥsāʾ and their dependencies were recognised as 'the countries of Bin Saud and of his father before him' (Leatherdale, 1983, p.372). This represents the first international recognition of Ibn Saud's sovereignty. In addition, Ibn Saud was to receive £5000 annually from the British government under the Darin Pact. More importantly, he was guaranteed the protection of the British government: 'in the

event of aggression by any foreign power on the territories of the countries of the said Bin Saud.... The British government will aid Bin Saud to such extent and in such a manner as the British government after consulting Bin Saud may consider most effective for protecting his interests and countries' (Leatherdale, 1983, p.372). In many ways, the territories of Ibn Saud had become a British protectorate.

Twelve years later, in 1927, the Treaty of Jeddah was signed between Ibn Saud's son, Prince Faisal ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud, and Gilbert Clayton, the British Commissioner and Plenipotentiary (Leatherdale, 1983, pp.380-82). The treaty maintained good relations between Ibn Saud and the British government as well as their protectorates, 'His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and of Najd and its Dependencies undertakes to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the territories of Kuwait and Bahrain, and with the Sheikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, who are in special treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty's Government' (Leatherdale, 1983, pp.380-82). It also facilitated the performance of hajj for Muslims of British nationality or in any of the British protectorates. Ibn Saud, in return, received the British government's recognition of 'the complete and absolute independence of the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Hijaz and of Najd and its Dependencies' (Leatherdale, 1983, p.380). This treaty concludes with the abrogation of the Darin Pact of 1915.

Nowadays, Saudi Arabia is 'UK's largest trading partner in the Middle East… with approximately 200 joint ventures, which are estimated to be worth around £11.5 billion'; there are more than 6,000 UK corporations exporting merchandise to the kingdom' (Institute of Export & International Trade, 2019). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provides UK firms with trading and export possibilities in transport, water, health, education and energy sectors (Institute of Export & International Trade, 2019). One of the best-known deals between Saudi Arabia and the UK is 'the biggest arms deal the world has seen' (Feinstein, Holden and Pace, 2013): the multi-billion-pound al-Yamāma arms deal. The deal was basically arms for oil as the Kingdom, in the first al-Yamāma arms deal signed in 1985 by the Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sulṭān ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz and Michael Heseltine for £43 billion, agreed to supply '400,000 barrels of oil per day' to BAE Systems in return for '96 Panavia Tornado ground attack aircraft, 24 Air Defence Variants (ADVs), 50 BAE Hawk and 50 Pilatus PC-9 aircraft, specialized naval vessels, missiles, shells, support services and various infrastructure works' (Feinstein, Holden, and Pace, 2013, p.35). A second al-Yamāma arms deal

was signed in 1988 by Prince Sulṭān ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz and the UK's Defence Secretary George Younger with a £10 billion price tag (Campaign Against Arms Trade, 2017). However, the Saudis increased the supply of oil up to 600,000 barrels per day due to the fall in oil prices in 1989, which influenced the instalment periods for both deals (Phythian, 2000).

There have been many accusations of secret commissions being paid by BAE systems, the British arms firm which signed the Al Yamamah deal with the Saudi Arabian government, to Prince Bandar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud, the signatory on Saudi Arabia's part. It was rumoured that £30 million were wired to the Prince every three months for almost over a decade. This was done by inflating the prices of each Tornado from £16 to £21 million (Leigh and Evans, 2017). In 2004, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigated the payments made under the terms of the deal and arrested two suspects in relation to the case (Durham, 2015). However, in December 2006, the SFO stopped the investigation after Prime Minister Tony Blair's governments interfered to stop it for reasons of 'national and international security', as stated in the House of Lords statement (Durham, 2015, p.123). Nonetheless, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) commenced an investigation due to the involvement of a US bank account in the transfer of the money paid to the Saudi prince; although not convicted of bribery, BAE Systems was fined $400 million by the US DOJ (Durham, 2015, p.124).

Although this scandalous incident caused a temporary slowdown in Anglo-Saudi relations, as when Saudi Arabia threatened 'to cancel a giant new defence contract with Britain and to curtail cooperation fighting terrorism' (Biegelman and Biegelman, 2010, p.202), diplomatic, political and economic relations between the two countries remained intact, showing just how powerful the Anglo-Saudi relationship is and how far government officials on both sides will go to maintain it.

4.2.3.2 Saudi-US Relations

Since the 1930s, Saudi Arabia has had a close relationship with the US, especially after the discovery of oil. Indeed, the oil concession was secured by the American oil company Socal, and the quest for oil began with US aid (Zuhur, 2011). Despite their many disagreements over the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the two countries enjoy a

close bilateral relationship described as ‘the closest special relationship’ the US has with a country in the Middle East (Dumbrell and Schäfer, 2009, p.188). This relationship is not solely economic, as the two nations became allies in the anti-Communist war in Afghanistan; they shared security interests in limiting the Soviets’ power in South Asia. The Saudi Arabian alliance with the US in the War in Afghanistan was in some ways a means of rebuilding Saudi-US relations after the oil embargo of the 1970s, which left scars on relations between the two countries (International Business Publications, 2007, p.57); this shows that, underneath the surface strength of the decades-long relationship between the two countries, tensions do exist. These tensions are directly connected to several incidents from that embargo to the September 11 attacks in 2001.

The first incident to be discussed here is the oil embargo imposed by members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on the US and other countries that supported Israel in response to US resupplying Israel with weapons in the Arab-Israeli war (also known as the Yom Kippur War) in 1973. As King Faisal ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud put it, ‘America's complete Israel support against the Arabs makes it extremely difficult for us to continue to supply the United States with oil, or even remain friends with the United States’ (International Business Publications, 2007, p.57). However, reality contradicts King Faisal’s statement, as Saudi Arabia remained a friend to the West, especially to the United States, by stabilising oil prices through increasing its production and by fighting alongside the US against the USSR (International Business Publications, 2007, p.57).

In another military cooperation that enhanced the Saudi-US relation, Saudi Arabia allied with the United States in 1991 in the Gulf War when Iraqi leader Ṣaddām bin Hussein, invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. On 7 August 1990, Operation Desert Shield was ordered by US President George H.W. Bush to protect Saudi Arabia from Iraqi troops. This operation became Operation Desert Storm after the deadline given to Iraq by the UN Security Council (midnight of 16 January 1991) to withdraw its troops expired (Bowman, 2003, p.202). A US-led coalition of 34 countries was formed to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The military action that led to re-establishing Kuwait’s sovereignty was a ground attack that lasted for a hundred hours (Bradford and Black, 2006). In addition to the strong political relationship that Saudi Arabia and the United States enjoy, Saudi Arabia is, according to The Office of the United States Trade

Representative (USTR), the 10th largest trading partner of the US, 'with $71 billion in total (two ways) goods trade during 2013. Goods exports totalled $19 billion; Goods imports totalled $52 billion'. (Ustr.gov, 2017).

The second factor that led to difficulties in the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia was several anti-Western attacks in both the Kingdom and the US. In June 1996, an explosion injured 300 Americans at a military compound in the eastern part of the kingdom (BBC News, 2015). Another was the Riyadh bombings in March 2001 that killed an American and a Briton (BBC News, 2015). Most importantly, 15 of the 19 al-Qaʿida attackers on 11 September 2001, in which about 3000 people died, had Saudi Arabian passports, and the late spiritual leader of al-Qaʿida, Osama bin Laden, was Saudi Arabian by birth. These developments led to scrutiny of the Kingdom's regime and policies (Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee, 2006). These attacks continued after 11 September 2001 in Saudi Arabia; prior to the visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2003, a bomb killed 35 people in Riyadh in a complex for Westerners (Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Foreign Affairs Committee, 2006).

Although Saudi Arabia denied any involvement in the attacks and expended efforts to combat terrorism nationally and internationally, including joining the counter-ISIL coalition in 2014, Washington continue to harbour concerns over the Saudi Arabian efforts to fight ISIL; their ongoing involvement in the Yemen war has been called a proxy war against its Shiite regional rival Iran rather than an effort to counter Dāʿish (commonly known as ISIS or ISIL); Saudi support of opposition fighters in Syria is another way of standing against Iran, which backs Syrian President Assad's regime (Silander, Wallace and Janzekovic, 2017). Nonetheless, Saudi-US relations have survived these setbacks, which emphasises both the strength and necessity of those relations for both nations.

An example of recent legislation, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), is provided here to show the importance of Saudi-US relations to both sides. JASTA was first introduced as a bill in late 2009, then re-introduced in September 2015 in the Senate (Congress.gov, 2017). The Senate passed the bill in May 2016. However, four months later, on 23 September 2016, US President Obama vetoed the legislation, an action that he saw necessary to maintain the immunity of sovereign

entities, including foreign governments. Obama argued that JASTA would place the United States at 'significant risk' if other countries passed similar bills (Agence France-Presse, 2017). This in turn would expose the US military, government officials and diplomats to lawsuits by foreign nationals. However, the Senate, on September 28, 2016, overrode the veto (Congress.gov, 2017).

Although the legislation does not name Saudi Arabia, it will allow September 11 victims' families to sue Saudi Arabia, because the alleged funding Saudi Arabia gave to al-Qaʿida and its lack of efforts to counter terrorism fall under the liability for suing sovereign entities in this legislation.

Nonetheless, the US remains a close ally to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, when current President Donald Trump fulfilled promises made in the 2016 election campaign to ban Muslims from entering the United States of America as a form of curbing terrorism, nationals from Saudi Arabia were not included in the country list of countries to which the ban applies (Revesz, 2017). Regardless of the motives behind this decision and the controversy it caused, it emphasises the strong interdependence, mutual interests and close relations between the two countries; Saudi-US relations are simply too precious to be toyed with.

4.2.4 Saudi Arabia's Contemporary Representations in Anglo-American Media

A relatively recent, at the time of writing this chapter, survey of the Anglo-American media portrayals of Saudi Arabia shows that it is both as the enemy of the West and an ally of Western governments. The two depictions have something in common, which is Saudi Arabia's threat to Western values of democracy, freedom and human rights. Below are several examples of such portrayals of Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia is depicted in Anglo-American media as an enemy to Western values. For example, in 1995 the Saudi government executed 192 people, of whom 148 were foreign workers (Ham, Shams and Madden, 2004). This staggering number of executions in less than a year drew both national and international media attention that showed Saudi Arabia's as a barbaric, repressive and discriminatory country. Another frame of the enemy is Saudi Arabia's representation in Western media as actively funding or passively supporting terrorism. As Laurent Murawiec, former

defence analyst at the RAND Corporation[6], summed it up in a July 2002 briefing to the Pentagon's Defence Policy Board, 'the Saudis are active at every level of the terror chain, from planners to financiers, from cadre to foot soldiers, from ideologist to cheerleader' (Murawiec, 2005, p.xiii).

Another incident in which this depiction of Saudi Arabia was manifested in Western media was Saudi Arabia's opposition of the US-led coalition to disarm Iraq; the Kingdom refused to provide the US troops to use military bases on Saudi soil. This led Saudi Arabia to be depicted as unwilling to act against terrorism. Because the war was promoted by Western politicians and media as 'a war on terror' in order to stop Ṣaddām Hussein from using weapons of mass destruction, the Saudi decision reinforced the representation of the country in Western media as what Byman (2005, p.125) calls a 'passive sponsor of terrorism'.

Countries that passively support terrorism are those that knowingly refuse to stop terrorist activities on their territory (Byman, 2005). One form of passive sponsorship Saudi Arabia is alleged to practice involves allowing NGOs to fundraise and transfer money to terrorist groups. Another form is bribing terrorists to stay off Saudi Arabian territory. Simon Henderson, an expert in Saudi Arabian affairs, states in a *Wall Street Journal* article that 'before 9/11, Western officials say that senior princes were paying off bin Laden to avoid targeting the kingdom altogether' (Henderson, 2004).

This alleged link of Saudi Arabia to terrorism is rooted in the Islamic doctrine that Saudi Arabia adopts and allegedly spreads globally, Wahhabism, which is the same faith these dangerous terrorist groups, such as al-Qaʿida and Dāʿish, follow. Wahhabism is commonly seen as the strictest form of Islam, which takes literal interpretations from al-Qurʾan wa-l-sunna as the only two sources of law. The dilemma here lies in the controversy of Saudi Arabia's textbooks, which are printed by the Saudi Ministry of Education and taught to students in religious classes in the Kingdom and exported worldwide. It is claimed that Saudi Arabia has been disseminating violent beliefs around the world (Byman, 2005). For example, in 1979, the Kingdom is said to have spent $75 billion to spread their belief around the world (Stern, 2012). The textbooks

they export are said to teach violence, radical Islam and intolerance to other religions like Christianity and Judaism.

Another reason for linking Saudi to terrorism may be that Saudi Arabia is said to fund terrorist organisations. For example, in 2009, former First Lady and current Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in a confidential cable to the US Treasury Department, which was made public by Wikileaks, that Saudi Arabia was hindering US attempts to combat terrorism in the US and around the world (Wikileaks.org, 2015). She clearly states that 'donors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide' and that 'Saudi Arabia remains a critical financial support base for al-Qaʿida, the Taliban, LeT[7], and other terrorist groups, including Hamas[8], which probably raise millions of dollars annually from Saudi sources, often during Hajj and Ramadan' (Wikileaks.org, 2015). A third reason for linking Saudi Arabia to terrorism could be the anti-Western attacks that have occurred on its territory.

In addition to representing Saudi Arabia as the enemy, a look at current Anglo-American news either on television or in newspapers shows that Saudi Arabia is commonly depicted as an ally: a friend and trading partner of Anglo-American governments. However, in these media depictions the tone is mostly, if not always, critical of this alliance between Saudi Arabia and Western governments. The criticism is largely of the internal policies of the Kingdom, such as the ban on women driving, which are said to clash with the Western values of democracy, freedom and modernity, on foreign policies, especially in relation to arms deals and most recently in the war in

[7] 'Lashkar-e-Taiba, also known as Army of the Pure or Army of the Righteous, is an Islamic militant organization based in Pakistan'; it was founded in 1990 by Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad Saʿīd (Cassman, 2017).

[8] Ḥamās, or Hamas as usually spelled in English, is a Palestinian liberation movement founded in 1988, during the first Palestinian Intifada against Israel. Although many support Hamas' cause, the movement continues to be engaged in violent activities and is thus regularly listed as a terrorist group (Wiktorowicz, 2004, pp.112-13).

Yemen and the Saudi-Qatari conflict and, last but hardly least, on the false dichotomy between the West and Islam, the official religion of Saudi Arabia.

Despite the fact that the investigation of the appalling incident of the Saudi journalist Jamāl Khāshuqjy's death in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul is still ongoing at the time of writing and regardless of the uncertainties in relation to the body of the journalist and the suspects involved, one thing is certain: this type of critical reporting on Saudi Arabia as an ally to Western governments expanded to depict the kingdom as a threat to the freedom of speech practiced by journalists.

As examples, below are some headlines in popular Western news outlets that highlight the alliance between Saudi Arabia and Anglo-American governments in a critical light: 'The government says Britain needs to trade with Saudi Arabia. It's a myth' (Wearing, 2018); 'How much is Britain's relationship with Saudi Arabia worth?' BelfastTelegraph.co.uk, 2018); 'Britain has sold its soul to the House of Saud. Shame on us' (Jones, 2018); 'The Pentagon Loves Saudi Arabia, in Sickness and in Health' (Zenko, 2018); and 'How Saudi Arabia became the U.S.'s BFF, and why the Khashoggi disappearance won't change it' (Barfi, 2018). These samples show that Saudi Arabia's recent depictions in the Anglo-American media, whether as enemy or ally, are generally of a critical nature that is framed as a threat to Western values.

4.3 The 20 Arabic News Sources: The First Patron

Prior to describing the Arabic-language sources, two points must be noted. First, the majority of newspapers discussed below use the term 'independent' to describe their editorial policies. However, examining the ownership of these newspapers shows that the term is used broadly and, in some cases, inaccurately. For example, the al-Hayat newspaper prides itself on being an 'independent newspaper', even though it is owned by Saudi Prince Khālid ibn Sulṭān Al Saʿud, which calls into question its independence as a newspaper. Thus, using 'independent' below only refers to the claimed editorial policy that the outlet claims on its official website. Second, obtaining background information on some of the lesser-known sources, such as the Syrian satellite TV as opposed to al-Jazeera, was not an easy task, because there is scant public information about them in reliable references. Thus, the description below of some of the sources is briefer in some cases than others. However, the most basic and relevant

background information is provided for each source that combines to make up the first patron.

4.3.1 Dailies

In chapter three, it became clear that the data collected from the BBCM-M's 2013–2015 coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news outlets came from 20 news sources. An initial analysis shows that 17 out of the 20 sources are daily newspapers; the remaining 3 are TV channels. Of the dailies, six are located in the UK, three in Saudi Arabia and the remaining seven elsewhere in the Arab world.

4.3.1.1 Based in the UK

The UK-based news sources are al-Quds al-Arabi website, Raʾy al-Yawm, Elaph website, al-Hayat website, al-Sharq al-Awsat website and the Middle East Arabic Press Review from the BBC Monitoring service. Three of these (Al-Quds al-Arabi, Raʾy al-Yawm and Elaph) are banned in Saudi Arabia, as Table 3 shows.

Name	Located	Editorial Policy (ownership)	Establishment	Reported articles by BBCM-M (out of the 101 articles)	Status in Saudi	Current Editor	Orientation
Al-Quds al-Arabi website	London	independent (1989-2013) Qatari government-owned (2013-present)	1989	31	banned	Sanāʾ al-ʿAlūl	pan-Arab
Raʾy al-Yawm	London	Independent	2013	5	banned	ʿAbd al-Bāryʿ Aṭwān	pan-Arab
Elaph website	London	Independent	2001	10	banned 2006-2009, then, banned 2010-present	ʿUthmān al-ʿUmayr	pan-Arab

Name	Located	Editorial Policy (ownership)	Establishment	Reported articles by BBCM-M (out of the 101 articles)	Status in Saudi	Current Editor	Orientation
Al-Hayat website	London	owned by Saudi royal Prince Khalid bin Sultan	1946 in Lebanon, 1988 in London, 2002 online website, 2005 Saudi Arabian copy	10	permitted	Zuhayr Quṣaybāty Saʿūd al-Raiys and Ibrāhīm Bādy	pan-Arab
Al-Sharq al-Awsat website	London	owned by Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG)	1978	9	permitted	Ghassān Sharbal	pan-Arab
Middle East Arabic press review from BBC Monitoring	Reading	publicly-funded	1939	1	permitted	Sara Beck	independent

Table 3: News sources based in the UK

4.3.1.1.1 Al-Quds al-Arabi

Meaning ‘Arab Jerusalem’, this banned source in Saudi Arabia takes the first position in terms of the number of articles translated by BBCM-M: 31 articles, out of the 101 articles, comprising 34,591 words. Al-Quds al-Arabi is an international daily newspaper that was established in 1989 by Palestinian expatriate ʿAbd al-Bāry ʿAṭwān, who was its editor-in-chief from 1989 to June 2013 (Atwan, 2016). ʿAṭwān is

the reason that this newspaper has earned an admired reputation as a prominent pan-Arab[9] daily.

In 1996, ʿAṭwān travelled to Afghanistan to interview Osama bin Laden; they spent three days together in a cave (Atwan, 2008). This exclusive interview earned attention for his daily paper, in both the Arab world and the West. Moreover, the well-known fatwayān [10] of Bin Laden in which he declared 'holy war on Americans' were published in al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.

ʿAṭwān wrote many books on al-Qaʿida, such as *The Secret History of al-Qaʿida* and *After Bin Laden: al-Qaʿida, The Next Generation,* gave many lectures in universities and became a regular guest on many international news outlets like CNN, Sky and BBC (Rugh, 2004, p.172). The newspaper, while it was under ʿAṭwān, was known for criticising many Arab governments for their treatment of the Palestinian cause and for their dependence on the US and toleration of its ally Israel (News.bbc.co.uk, 2018). This daily has been banned several times by governments in Arab countries like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Syria (Bariatwan.com, 2016). Its founder, ʿAṭwān, has a candidly critical view of the Gulf monarchies in general and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular due to their international and national policies, especially in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Thus, the daily is currently banned in the Kingdom for generally criticising the Saudi regime and its relationship with the US.

On his official webpage, ʿAṭwān wrote an article in which he highlighted the consequences of his critical stance against Gulf States and Israel: 'I have sometimes received death threats from Arab, Western and Israeli security services. The Zionist lobby in Europe and the US has waged a fierce battle against me' (Bariatwan.com, 2016). Due to financial difficulties, al-Quds al-Arabi was sold to the Qatari government, after which ʿAṭwān resigned as editor-in-chief. In an article entitled 'Gulf states and Israel won't silence me' on The Electronic Intifada, ʿAṭwān clarifies that the reason for

[9]Pan-Arabism is an ideology that strives to unite all Arabs of the Middle East, regardless of their religion, together 'under the banner of a large Arab single State'; motivated by Western nationalism, pan-Arabism rejects Western interference in the Arab world (Cherkaoui, 2010).

[10] The Arabic dual of 'fatwa', which is 'a ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized authority' (English-English Oxford Dictionary, 2016).

his resignation was not related to the oil Gulf countries' monarchies of which he had been critical; rather, it was due to 'events and the requirements of third parties' (The Electronic Intifada, 2018).

However, Sanāʾ al-ʿAlūl took the position of editor-in-chief when ʿAṭwān suddenly resigned after Qatar bought the newspaper in 2013. Currently, this pan-Arab, London-based newspaper has three platforms: an official website, a Twitter account and a Facebook page. It is printed internationally in London, New York and Morocco and circulates widely in most of the Arab world and some European countries (Rugh, 2004, pp.171-72).

The current owner of al-Quds al-Arabi, the Qatari government, has an ongoing political conflict with Saudi Arabia. Thus, a continued critical stance against the Kingdom remains possible in al-Quds al-Arabi's reporting on Saudi Arabia, despite ʿAṭwān's resignation. Therefore, despite his departure, it remains banned in Saudi Arabia.

4.3.1.1.2 Raʾy al-Yawm

Meaning 'today's opinion', this newspaper is also based in London. It was also founded and owned by ʿAṭwān. Out of the 101 articles, there are five news items from this news source, as Table 3 shows. After he resigned as editor-in-chief of al-Quds al-Arabi in 2013, he founded this newspaper. Journalists, according to ʿAṭwān, should be free to write independently of the hegemony of governments. To achieve this, ʿAṭwān founded Raʾy al-Yawm, as spelled by the BBCM-M. It is a website, thus, frees him from the costs of printing, publishing and distributing a physical paper. He is thus in no need of governmental funding that would, he argues, limit the newspaper's journalistic transparency and objectivity (Raʾiy al-Yawm, 2018a). In addition to ensuring journalistic freedom, ʿAṭwān was motivated to establish the online newspaper by the fact that 95% of al-Quds al-Arabi's readership access its content through online podiums such as Facebook, Twitter and website, while only 5% read the actual newspaper (Raʾiy al-Yawm, 2018a). Therefore, in line with the audience's preference, ʿAṭwān founded Raʾy al-Yawm, the first pan-Arab online-only newspaper in Arabic.

Like al-Quds al-Arabi, Raʾy al-Yawm is banned in Saudi Arabia. The ban was imposed in August 2015. In an article published on the website, ʿAṭwān, as editor-in-chief, comments on the decision of the Saudi government to ban it. He argues that his objective criticism of the Kingdom's involvement in Yemen was the reason for the ban

and concludes the article with suggestions of software that would allow a Saudi reader to access the site (Raʾiy al-Yawm, 2018b).

4.3.1.1.3 Elaph

Similarly, Elaph, from the Arabic ilāf meaning ‘the coming together’, is an online-only newspaper (Ilāf, 2018). It is also London-based and banned in Saudi Arabia. Elaph was the first Saudi and the second Arabic newspaper, after the Emirati al-Jarīda, that is solely available online (Mellor, et al., 2011, p.64). It was founded in 2001 by the Saudi-born businessman and journalist, ʿUthmān al-ʿUmayr (Al-Malki, et al., 2012, p.54). Due to disseminating ‘a certain stream of thought’ (Arab News, 2018a), the newspaper was first banned in Saudi Arabia in 2006; the ban was lifted in 2009 (Arab News, 2018a). Nonetheless, another ban was imposed in 2010 and continues to the present day. Although these allegations have not been proven, the successive bans imposed by the Saudi government have been attributed to the newspaper’s publishing an article on the Shiʿi Kuwaiti-born cleric Yāsir al-Ḥabīb, who commonly insults respected Sunni Muslims (Aljazeera.net, 2019) such as al-ṣaḥāba (the companions of the Prophet Muhammad Peace be upon him) and the Prophet’s wife ʿAʾisha bint abu Bakr.

Unlike al-Quds al-Arabi and Raʾy al-Yawm, Elaph is Saudi-owned. Al-ʿUmayr is known for his good relations with the Saudi Royal family, especially King Fahd and King Salmān (Maroc.mom-rsf.org, 2018). The Saudi-British businessman and journalist started his journalistic career in Saudi Arabia, working as a correspondent for al-Jazirah in the Kingdom (Arab News, 2018b). He then moved to London, where he worked as a correspondent for the newspaper there. Next, he became the editor-in-chief of al-Majalla, then a Saudi-owned and London-based newspaper (Arab News, 2018b). There are 10 news items from this news source in the data set.

4.3.1.1.4 Al-Hayat

Al-Hayat, as spelled by the BBCM-M, means ‘the life’ in Arabic, is a London-based newspaper. However, it was first launched in Lebanon in 1946 by Kāmil Marwa (Shoult, 2006, p.276). In 1988, it was relocated to London and started international distribution through the Dar al-Hayat Information Centre (Al-Ḥayāt, 2018). In 1996, al-Hayat was among the first Arabic newspapers to launch an online presence with the same content of the original newspaper. However, in the year 2002, the newspaper’s

webpage started to report news as it happened, so the content of the website changed to take advantage of the new advances in technology and the new directions that readers started to take (Al-Ḥayāt, 2018).

Three years later, in 2005, a Saudi Arabian edition was launched. It focuses on Saudi-related issues; the current co-editor-in-chief of the Saudi copy is Saʿūd al-Raiys, while the current editor-in-chief is Zuhayr Quṣaybāty (Al-Ḥayāt, 2018). However, the website from which the BBCM-M selected the 10 news articles was edited by Ibrāhīm Bādy, a Saudi Arabian journalist who wrote plays and novels in addition to his career as a reporter (Al-Ḥayāt, 2018).

4.3.1.1.5 Al-Sharq al-Awsat

Al-Sharq al-Awsat, which means 'the Middle East' in Arabic, is another London-based pan-Arab daily. Permitted and distributed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it was founded in 1978 in London by Hishām and Muḥammad ʿAli Ḥāfiẓ, 'sons of a well-known Saudi publisher' (Rugh, 2004, p.169). The first chairman was Prince Aḥmad ibn Salmān ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud, and it is owned by the Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG). It is printed in 14 cities simultaneously 'and is currently the only newspaper to own the Arabic syndication rights to three renowned international publications, the *Washington Post*, *USA Today*, and *Global Viewpoint*' (Aawsat.com, 2018a). Its current chairman is Prince Badr ibn ʿAbd Allah ibn Farḥān Al Saʿud, who assigned Ghassān Sharbal, a well-known Lebanese journalist, to be its editor-in-chief (Saudi Research and Marketing Group, 2018). Out of the 101 news articles, there are 9 articles coming from this news source.

4.3.1.1.6 Middle East Arabic Press Review from BBC Monitoring

This news source is the Arabic version of the BBC Monitoring Service, which observes events in the Middle East and comments on them in Arabic. In the data set, there one news article coming from this news source. The current director of the BBC Monitoring service is Sara Beck. As background information on the BBC Monitoring service is presented below (see section 3), no further details are presented here.

4.3.1.2 Based in Saudi Arabia

There are three Saudi-located newspapers from which the BBCM-M selects Arabic articles on Saudi Arabia to transedit: al-Jazirah, al-Watan and the SPA. The BBC's

coverage of these sources, however, is disproportionate compared to its coverage from UK-based news sources, as out of the 101 news articles, there is only one news item from each source in the 2013–2015 study period. Table 4 presents a brief description of these news sources.

Name	Located	Editorial Policy (ownership)	Establishment	Reported articles by BBCM-M (out of the 101 articles)	Status in Saudi	Current Editor	Orientation
Al-Jazirah website	Riyadh	private	1960, then launched its website in 1996	1	permitted	Khālid ibn Ḥamad al-Mālik	pro-Saudi
Al-Watan website	Abha	state-funded/Saudi-owned	2000	1	permitted	ʿUthmān ibn Maḥmūd al-Ṣīniy	pro-Saudi
SPA news agency website	Riyadh	state-owned	1971	1	permitted	ʿAbd Allah ibn Fahd al-Ḥusayn	pro-Saudi

Table 4: News sources based in Saudi Arabia

4.3.1.2.1 Al-Jazirah Website

Not to be confused with the Qatar-based newspaper al-Jazeera, this news source is a website for the al-Jazirah newspaper (literally meaning ‘the island’, in reference to the Arabian Peninsula) by al-Jazirah Corporation, which was founded in 1960 by ʿAbd Allah ibn Muḥammad ibn Khamīs, a Saudi Arabian poet, author and historian. Its headquarters are in Riyadh, and it is pro-Saudi government and pro-Islamic. It is ‘one of the leading and most popular Arabic dailies and has branches in more than 30 cities inside and outside of the Kingdom’ (Shoult, 2006, p.277).

It is an ambitious newspaper, as was made clear in its attempt to improve its production and circulation by entering a partnership with Goss International in 2013, an American organisation established in 1885 in Chicago that ‘supplies press and finishing systems including the most automated and productive web offset presses in the world for magazine, newspaper, catalog, packaging, direct mail and other printing applications’ (Goss International, 2018).

The current editor-in-chief is Khālid ibn Ḥamad al-Mālik. Al-Jazirah Corporation is ‘at the forefront of digital news production in Saudi Arabia’; al-Jazirah is the first Saudi online newspaper, as it launched its website in 1996, and is the first newspaper in the Middle East to launch a phone app (Wan-ifra.org, 2018). It also publishes three weekly magazines: *Telecom and Digital World Magazine, Auto Club Magazine* and *Cultural Magazine*.

4.3.1.2.2 Al-Watan website

This is a news website of the Saudi Arabian newspaper al-Watan, literally meaning ‘the homeland’. It was established in 2000 by the Saudi Khālid al-Faisal, then the governor of ʿAsīr Province (Shoult, 2006, p.277). It is pro-Saudi government; its current editor-in-chief is ʿUthmān ibn Maḥmūd al-Ṣīniy, a Saudi journalist and author. Its headquarters are in Abhā, a city in southwest Saudi Arabia in ʿAsīr Province. It has other publishing services outside the Kingdom: London, Amman, Cairo and New York (Shoult, 2006, p.277).

4.3.1.2.3 SPA news agency website

SPA, established in 1971, is the official Saudi Arabian national news agency. It aims to be a central body that collects and distributes ‘local and international news in the kingdom and abroad’ (Spa.gov.sa, 2018). It is part of the Saudi Ministry of Information, and its current editor is ʿAbd Allah ibn Fahd al-Ḥusayn. ‘SPA is a founder member of the federation of the Arab News Agencies, the Gulf News Agency, the International Islamic News Agency and the Pool of News Agencies of the Nonaligned Countries’ (Spa.gov.sa, 2018). It publishes Arabic, French and English bulletins, and its website is accessible in Arabic, Persian, English, Russian and French.

4.3.1.3 Based in other Arab Countries

Seven dailies out of the twenty dailies from which the BBC selected Arabic news based outside Saudi Arabia but still in the Arab world: Akhbar al-Khalij website (Manama), al-Ayyam (Khartoum), al-Dustur website (Amman), al-Jazeera website (Doha), al-Safir website (Beirut), al-Siyasah website (Kuwait) and Tishrin website (Damascus). A brief description of these dailies is presented in Table 5.

Name	Located	Editorial Policy (ownership)	Establishment	Reported articles by BBCM-M (out of the 101 articles)	Status in Saudi	Current Editor	Orientation
Akhbar al-Khalij website	Manama	independent	1976	1	permitted	ʿAbd al-Munʿim Ibrāhīm	pro-government
Al-Ayyam	Khartoum	independent	1956	1	permitted	Maḥjūb Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ	independent
Al-Dustur website	Amman	independent until 2009/ State-funded	1967	2	permitted	Muṣṭafā al-Riyālāt	pro-government
Al-Jazeera.net website	Doha	state-funded	2001	1	permitted	Muḥammad al-Mukhtār	pan-Arab

Name	Located	Editorial Policy (ownership)	Establishment	Reported articles by BBCM-M (out of the 101 articles)	Status in Saudi	Current Editor	Orientation
Al-Safir website	Beirut	independent	1974-till Dec 2016	1	permitted	Ṭalāl Salmān	pan-Arab/ later pro-Hizbullah and the Syrian Baʿth Party
Al-Siyasah website	Kuwait	independent, but the former information minister might have a share in it	1965	1	permitted	Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Aziz al-Jar Allah	pro-government
Tishrin website	Damascus	state-owned and run	1975	1	permitted	Muḥammad al-Bayraq	pro-Baʿth Party

Table 5: News sources based in other Arab countries

4.3.1.3.1 Akhbar al-Khalij Website

Literally meaning ‘Gulf news’, this independent pro-government newspaper was founded on 1 February 1976; it is the first Arabic daily newspaper in the Kingdom of Bahrain (Akhbar-alkhaleej.com, 2019). It was established by the businessman Maḥmūd al-Murdiy and has a wide distribution system covering all regions of the Bahrain and the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia, where 39,000 copies are printed and distributed. It is read by more than 170,000 readers daily. The current editor-in-chief

is ʿAbd al-Munʿim Ibrāhīm (ibid). In the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia, there is one news item coming from this news source, as Table 5 shows.

4.3.1.3. 2 Al-Ayyam

From the Arabic 'the days', this independent newspaper was founded 'on the eve of the Sudan's independence in January 1956' (Hamad, 1991). Its editor-in-chief is Maḥjūb Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, who founded it with Bashīr Muḥammad Saʿīd (a prominent publisher and editor in Sudan) and Maḥjūb ʿUthmān. This newspaper aided the development of Sudanese journalism and continues to be a landmark in that field today. However, it has had an eventful history, especially after 'the first military coup led by General Aboud in November 1958' when independent Sudanese newspapers were faced with two options: 'either to publish as a mouthpiece of the regime or to face closure'; al-Ayyam chose the second option and 'remained closed for almost half the period of military rule' (Hamad, 1991), only reopening in 1960. Out of the 101 news articles, there one news item from this newspaper's coverage of Saudi Arabia during the timeframe of this research.

4.3.1.3.3 Al-Dustur Website

From the Arabic meaning 'constitution', al-Dustur is a Jordanian daily that was founded and edited by Maḥmūd and Kāmil Sharīf. It was private until 2009, when the Jordanian government bought a share (al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, 2018). It is pro-government and is the second most popular daily in Jordan, after al-Raʾiy, in terms of distribution and circulation (al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, 2018). Al-Dustur was founded in Jordan in 1967 in a merger of two newspapers: Falasṭīn (Arabic for 'Palestine') and al-Manār, which were published in Palestine by a company called the Jordanian Press and Publishing Company, which also publishes al-Dustur (al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ, 2018). Its current editor-in-chief is Muṣṭafā al-Riyālāt (al-Dustūr, 2018); there are two news items coming from this source.

4.3.1.3.4 Al-Jazeera Website

This news website is part of the al-Jazeera media network, an influential and controversial Arab world network. The network was founded in 1996 in Qatar by its Emir, al-shaykh Ḥammad ibn Khalīfa al-Thāniy, who helped it to stand on its feet by providing a loan of $137 million in the foundational stages (Miles, 2010, p.136).

However, the Emir claims not to interfere in the decisions made by the network's editorial team (Sterling, 2009, p.66). The network is made up of the following: 'Al-Jazeera Satellite channel (Arabic), al-Jazeera English, al-Jazeera Documentary, al-Jazeera Sport, al-Jazeera Mubasher (Live), al-Jazeera Media Training and Development Centre, al-Jazeera Centre for Studies, al-Jazeera Mobile, al-Jazeera.net (the Arabic web site) and al-Jazeera English Online (the English web site)' (Aljazeera.com, 2018).

The Arabic al-Jazeera.net website, the specific source used in this thesis, was founded in 2001. Out of the 101 news articles, there is one news item from that source and seven news items from the Arabic al-Jazeera satellite channel (see below). Currently, the network operates 'more than 65 bureaus across the globe' and has electronic media that 'broadcast[s] to more than 220 million households in more than 100 countries'; it 'has more than 3,000 staff members across the world, including more than 400 journalists from more than 60 countries' (Aljazeera.com, 2018).

The network has a prestigious national and international reputation; al-Jazeera English has received awards from the 'International Emmys, The Royal Television Society, The Monte Carlo Film Festival, YouTube, The Foreign Press Association, The Association of International Broadcasters and Amnesty International' (Aljazeera.com, 2018). It is, however, controversial especially in relation to its alleged ties to al-Qaʿida and its critical views on some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Miles (2010) describes other accusations made against al-Jazeera journalists such as carrying out espionage for various bodies, including Ṣaddām bin Hussein and Mossad.

4.3.1.3.5 Al-Safir Website

Al-Safir, meaning 'the Ambassador' in Arabic, was a Lebanese daily newspaper of a political type. It was founded in 1974 by journalist Ṭalāl Salmān, who was its editor-in-chief, and closed in December 2016 (al-Safīr, 2018). The newspaper provoked criticism for being especially critical of Israel. It had its share of harassment, most notably the bombings of its bureau in 1980 and several attempts to blow up its editor's house, along with an attempt to assassinate him in 1984 (Dajani, 1992, p.53).

It was the only Lebanese newspaper that did not stop printing during the Israeli invasion in 1982 despite the Israeli siege on the capital (Fisk, 2001, p.319). Moreover,

it was suspended by the Lebanese government three times, the latest of which was in 1993, when a court order was issued to suspend the newspaper for a week for 'publishing a document containing information that must remain sealed for the safety of the state' [translated] (al-Safīr, 2018).

The information referred to is the Arabic translation of an Israeli proposal presented by the head of its negotiating delegation with Lebanon to the Lebanese delegation in Washington (Rugh, 2004, p.97). The decision was met with broad objections, and the newspaper enjoyed popular solidarity from various political movements in the face of its decision to publish it. The amendment of Decree 104 on the print press prevented the newspaper from being suspended before the verdict was issued (Dajani, 1992, p.40). In addition to daily coverage, al-Safir published the following supplements: al-*Safīr al-Riyāḍiy, Nuṣūṣ min Ṣaḥāfat al-ʿAdū* and *Afkār wa-Akhbār* (al-Safīr, 2018). There is one item on Saudi Arabia from this news source in the data set.

4.3.1.3.6 Al-Siyasah Website

Meaning 'the politics' in Arabic, it is published by Dar al-Seyassah Press Publishing Printing and Distribution Co. Its editor-in-chief is Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Aziz al-Jar Allah, a Kuwaiti journalist and author who is a 'merchant, loyalist in writing, and critical of Iranian/Shiʿa influence' (Selvik, 2011, p.482). The newspaper began publishing in 1965 as a weekly, becoming a daily in 1967 (Selvik, 2011, p.482). It is alleged that Jābir al-ʿAli al-Ṣbāḥ, a former Kuwaiti information minister, has an ownership share in the newspaper, leading it to be 'more liberal' than its rival, Raʾy al-Yawm (Selvik, 2011, p.482). There is one news article from this news source in the data in hand.

4.3.1.3.7 Tishrin Website

Tishrīn al-Awwal from the Assyrian calendar means 'October', the name is a reference to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. It is a state-owned and state-run political daily founded in 1975 (al-Wiḥda, 2018). It is published by the al-Wehda Foundation for Press, Printing, Publishing and Distribution in the Syrian Arab Republic (al-Wiḥda, 2018). Its current editor-in-chief is Muḥammad al-Bayraq (Syrianownews.com, 2018). This newspaper took, and is still taking, a leading role in promoting the Syrian regime during the devastating civil war that broke out in 2011. Samīra al-Msālmi, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper at that time, was fired from her post when she wrote only that 'there

was a military operation in Deraa' (Starr, 2015, p. 69).Out of the 101 news articles, there is one news article coming from this source.

4.3.2 TV Channels

Among the 20 news sources from which the BBC selected news items, three are TV channels: two 24-hour news TV channels (Al-Arabiyah TV and al-Jazeera) and one satellite TV channel that is not restricted to news (Syrian TV satellite service). These are presented in Table 6.

Name	Located	Editorial Policy (ownership)	Establishment	Reported articles by BBCM-M (out of the 101 news items)	Status in Saudi	Current Editor	Orientation
Al-Arabiyah TV	Dubai	independent	2003	9	permitted	Turky al-Dakhīl	pan-Arab
Al-Jazeera TV	Doha	state-funded	1996	7	permitted	Aḥmad ibn Sālim al-Yāfʿiy	pan-Arab
Syrian TV satellite service	Damascus	state-owned	1960	2	permitted	Fawwaz abu Shaʿar	pro-government

Table 6: TV channel news sources

4.3.2.1 Al-Arabiyah TV

Meaning 'the Arabic one', al-Arabiyah is a pan-Arab 24-hour TV news channel in Arabic. It is presented by the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), which was founded and owned by the Saudi Arabian businessman Walīd al-Brāhīm (Birkinbine, et al., 2016, p.276); it is located in Dubai in the UAE. It was founded in 2003, at the time of the Iraq war, as a reaction to the Qatari Emir, who allowed al-Jazeera network to critically scrutinize Saudi rulers by not meddling in the network's editorial choices

(Sterling, 2009, p.66); ever since, it has been in a rivalry with al-Jazeera. Its current general manager is the Saudi Arabian journalist Turky al-Dakhīl. The BBCM-M selected nine items on Saudi Arabia from this news source.

4.3.2.2 Al-Jazeera TV

This is also an Arabic 24-hour news channel and is part of Qatari-based al-Jazeera network discussed above. The satellite channel was founded in 1996 (Sterling, 2009, p.66). Its current deputy managing director is Aḥmad ibn Sālim al-Yāfʿiy, a Qatari journalist. The BBCM-M selected seven items from this news source, whose home base makes it important to provide some background information on the Saudi-Qatari conflict.

The Qatari-Saudi relationship has had its share of tension, due mainly to a border issue that resulted in the death of two Qatari soldiers and the imprisonment of a third in 1992 (Cordesman, 2003). This dispute lasted for years and was ended by an agreement signed by the Qatari Foreign Minister al-shaykh Ḥammad ibn Jāssim al-Thāniy and his Saudi counterpart Saʿūd al-Faisal in 2001.

However, despite Doha's restrictions on the influential pan-Arab newspaper al-Jazeera, tensions arose in the Saudi-Qatari relations due to criticisms of the Kingdom in the newspaper. For example, in 2002, Saudi Arabia decided to recall its ambassador to Qatar due to fierce criticism of the Saudi royal family broadcast on al-Jazeera after the Crown Prince at the time, ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud, announced a Palestinian peace initiative. This brief overview shows the history of conflict between Saudi Arabia and Qatari-owned news networks like al-Jazeera.

4.3.2.3 Syrian TV satellite service

This is a TV channel owned and run by the Syrian government. It is directed by Fawwaz abu Shaʿar and is part of Syrian Broadcasting and Television (Kraidy, 2009, p.158), specifically the Syrian Arab Television and Radio Broadcasting Commission (SATRBC) under the control of the Syrian Ministry of Information (Project Gutenberg, 2019). It is not a news channel. Rather, it is one of three channels that air a variety of programmes such as soap operas, sports shows, documentaries and newscasts. It started broadcasting in 1960 (Kraidy, 2009, p.157) and, as was the case with the Tishrin newspaper, took part in combating criticisms of al-Asad's regime on other news

outlets after the Syrian civil war began (Project Gutenberg, 2019). There are two news items on Saudi Arabia taken from this source by the BBCM-M.

4.3.3 ‘As listed’

In the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news items, accumulation of texts are grouped together, transedited and then published with ‘As listed’ for the source of the items. There are six news items of this nature in the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia from 2013 to 2015. The first such item came from the following Lebanese newspapers: al-Nahar, al-Akhbar and al-Safir. It was then transedited into English and given the title ‘Highlights from Lebanese press 21 Mar 13’. The second news item is entitled ‘Highlights from UK Arabic press 19 Mar 13’. The sources from which this news item was accumulated are al-Hayah Online (also spelled al-Hayat by the BBCM-M), al-Sharq al-Awsat Online and al-Quds al-Arabi Online. The third has the title ‘Highlights from UK Arabic press 27 Mar 13’ and comes from al-Hayah Online, al-Sharq al-Awsat Online, al-Quds al-Arabi Online and Ilaf.com (also spelled Elaph by the BBC). The fourth is entitled ‘Highlights from UK Arabic press 4 Apr 13’ and was accumulated from the al-Hayah Online, al-Sharq al-Awsat Online, al-Quds al-Arabi Online and Ilaf.com. The fifth has the title ‘Highlights from UK Arabic press 18 Mar 13’ and is from al-Hayah Online, al-Sharq al-Awsat Online and al-Quds al-Arabi Online. Finally, the sixth accumulated news item is titled ‘Highlights from Lebanese press 18 Apr 13’ and comes from al-Nahar Online, al-Akhbar Online and al-Safir Online.

4.4 BBC Monitoring Service: The Second Patron

On 1 January 1922, the BBC was established by John Reith. The BBC Monitoring Service was established in 1939 by the company as a part of the World Service group; it observes foreign news in ‘TV, radio, press, internet and news agencies’, analyses and translates them into English for local and international consumption. It ‘covers 150 countries’ and is ‘available in 100 languages’ (BBC Monitoring, 2014). It is based in Caversham Park in Reading, England (BBC News, 2016), with other international offices in Delhi, Cairo and Moscow, among many others. The BBC is on a licence fee scheme by which it pays for ‘TV, radio and online services’ (Bbc.co.uk, 2019). The focus of this thesis is the BBCM-M, which is part of the BBC Monitoring service. It specifically observes news articles written and circulated in the Middle East in several languages, including Arabic, Hebrew and Persian. Then, the editors select top news

articles to be translated into English for international consumption (BBC Monitoring, 2014). However, for this research, only the TETs of Arabic STs are examined, as explained in chapter 3.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided the contextual background information needed for this research, first on Saudi Arabia, second on the first identified patron (the 20 news sources from which the BBCM-M selected news items on Saudi Arabia from 2013 to 2015) and third on the second patron involved in the construction of knowledge about Saudi Arabia for the English reader: the BBC Monitoring Service.

The first section showed the changes in the economic status of the Kingdom after the discovery of oil, which is directly linked to the international interest in the country in terms of alliances and trading. It also shows how the Kingdom has strong and seemingly unshakeable relationships with Britain and the US. However, the same section also showed how the Anglo-American media tends to represent Saudi Arabia in a critical tone even when it is represented as the ally. The criticism revolves around the notion that Saudi Arabia is a danger to Western values like freedom of speech and human rights.

The second section presented information on the first patron, the 20 news sources from which the BBCM-M selected news items. Interestingly, 6 of the 17 dailies are located in the UK itself, 3 in Saudi Arabia and 7 in rest of the Arab world. The remaining news sources are TV news channels and accumulations of news items, which the BBCM-M refers to as coming from ‘As listed’ and states the news sources from which these items were compiled. The third section presented the second identified patron responsible for the construction of knowledge on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output to the English reader, the BBCM-M. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 together comprise the corpus analytical unit.

Chapter 5: Corpus Inquiry of themes and Representations at the First Level

5.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the first level of the corpus analysis, categorisation and description, while the second level, interpretation, is presented in chapters 6 and 7. All three chapters aim to reveal the central themes that the BBCM-M focused on when using Arabic news sources to report on Saudi Arabia to the English reader in the 2013–2015 timeframe and the representations of Saudi Arabia in that coverage. Together, the themes and the representations disseminated constitute a body of knowledge that has been constructed about Saudi Arabia and communicated to the English reader by the BBCM-M.

In Moscovici's terms, this communication is enabled via a system of social representations that includes 'values, ideas and practices' by which the 'unfamiliar' is made 'familiar' or the 'abstract' is made 'material' (1973, p.xiii). This eventually allows the participants in that communication to orient themselves regarding the communicated knowledge because it is made familiar to them or tangible using the already known system of social representations. Thus, identifying the knowledge communicated can unveil the system of social representations on which it was anchored or objectified (Moscovici, 1961) to communicate it to the receiver.

To do so, the first and second research questions will be answered. These are:

In relation to other British news sources reporting in English,

1) What are the key themes that the BBC Monitoring Middle East service (BBCM-M) focused on in reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output during 2013 to 2015?
2) How was Saudi Arabia represented in the BBCM-M's coverage of Arabic news output for the English reader in the 2013–2015 period?

At both levels of analysis, a lexical approach based on frequencies (the wordlist analysis) is adopted first. Then, a key-ness approach to analysis based on log-likelihood values (the keyword list analysis) is conducted. Both the wordlist generated from the SC and the keywords list generated by automatically comparing the SC to the RC are examined.

5.2 Wordlist

In line with Baker's (2006, p.121) approach, the first tool of WordSmith 7 exploited is Wordlist, which can provide 'the researcher an idea about what to focus on'. The wordlist generated from the SC contains 8,074 word types. It shows the word types in the SC, their frequencies and their frequencies 'as a percent of the running words in the text(s) the word list was made from, the number of texts each word appeared in and that number as a percentage of the whole corpus of texts' (Lexically.net, 2017c). It is important to note that this analysis is limited to the 115 most frequent word types in the SC. This is because, first, a full examination of the 8,074 word types is not necessarily helpful; the lower a word type is located on a wordlist, the less frequent it is and, unlike the keywords analysis, the less potentially significant the word type is. Second, analysing the full wordlist would render an in-depth analysis unfeasible due to the time and effort involved.

Thus, the focus in the wordlist categorisation, description and interpretation is limited to the most frequent 115 word types, which is sufficient to identify the salient word types in terms of frequencies in the SC. The wordlist from WordSmith 7 of these 115 words is presented in Appendix 1.

Elaborating on Bierwisch (1970), Van Dijk and Kintsch (1977; 1983) argue that 'the meaning of discourse is not limited to the meaning of its words and sentences. Discourse also has more global meanings, such as topics or themes. Such topics represent the gist or most important information of a discourse and tell us what a discourse is about.

In order to identify the themes in the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output, the 'semantic fields', which have been defined as the 'potential meanings' carried in any word in any language and 'partly governed by a social code and partly individualized by the unique features of whoever utters or interprets the word' (Scholes, 1980, p.207), are drawn in order to manually categorise the 115 word types of focus into themes based on their semantic fields. These themes will in turn highlight the BBCM-M's focus when reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output.

It should be noted, however, that this categorisation, is also, in some cases, based on the concordance lines of the word types. In other words, with the aid of WST, the linguistic co-contexts of some of the word types are examined in order to determine their semantic fields in their contexts in which they appear in the SC. For example, ‘source’ and ‘website’ concordance lines show that most, more than half, of the co-contexts in which they appear refer to news organisations. Thus, categorised as word types of corporate identity. To clarify, 94 concordance lines of ‘source’, out of the 162, refer to news organisations as the following shows: ‘Source: Elaph website, London’, ‘Source: al-Safir website, Beirut’ and ‘Syrian TV satellite’. Similarly, 139 out of the 141 concordance lines of ‘website’ refer to websites of news soures as the following examples show: ‘Al-Quds al-Arabi website’, ‘Al-Siyasah website’ and ‘Elaph website’. Thus, categorised as word types of corporate identity, namely organisations.

From the semantic field-based categorisation of the 115 most frequent word types in the SC (see Appendix 2 for the initial manual categorisation of the 115 word types), several themes can be identified, including personal identity, cultural identity, action, relation, statistics, politics, definite versus indefinite, asking for information versus giving further information (time and actor), quantifiers of count words (any, some and all), addition and comparison. However, the three most salient overarching themes, in terms of number of word types, are the following: i) identity, ii) action and status and iii) relations. Therefore, the following sections primarily discuss those salient overarching themes and the subthemes that fall under them, as Table 7 below shows:

Overarching Theme	Subtheme	Word types	Total number of word types
identity	personal identity	'people' (freq. 171), 'abd' (128), 'minister' (153), 'president' (151), 'prince' (144), 'bin' (213), 'he' (613), 'they' (352), 'them' (234), 'we' (335), 'us' (304), 'I' (240), 'its' (555), 'their' (344), 'his' (288),	43
	geographical identity	'Qatar' (151), 'states' (255), 'Gulf' (266), 'Syria' (314), 'Iran' (286), 'Yemen' (155), 'state' (205), 'Riyadh' (155), 'country' (154), 'Middle' (135), 'East' (131), 'London' (130), 'Arabia' (773), 'Arab' (282), 'kingdom' (218), 'region' (174), 'countries' (263)	
	cultural identity	'Muslim' (128), 'Arabic' (164), 'Saudi', (1,881), 'Syrians' (314), 'British' (207), 'Iranian' (178)	
	corporate identity	'government' (136), 'corporation' (202), 'website' (141), 'source' (162), 'Qa'idah' (184)	
action and status	present action	'says' (314), 'do' (130), 'visit' (137)	17
	continuous action	'broadcasting' (202)	
	past action	'said' (261), 'reserved' (228)	
	perfect action	'been' (236)	
	present status	'has' (631), 'have' (482), 'are' (647), 'is' (1,530), 'be' (558)	
	future status	'new' (156)	
	past status	'was' (442), 'were' (157)	
	possible versus certain action and status	'may' (174), 'will' (468)	
relations	aligned relations	'with' (1,005), 'for' (788), 'against' (227), 'but' (208),	14
	unaligned relations	'relations' (145), 'and' (3,683), 'between' (261),	
	other relations	'by' (830), 'about' (246), 'after' (157), 'or' (389), 'because' (133) 'from' (532), 'if' (141)	
Total number of word types			74

Table 7: The Themes and Subthemes drawn from the categorisation of the top 115 word types on the Wordlist

5.2.1 Identity Theme

The term 'identity' is derived from 'the Latin root *idem* implying sameness and continuity' (Bratton, 2015, p.116). Despite its history, it was only in the twentieth century that 'identity' became widely used in psychodynamic and sociological discussions (Scott, 2014, pp.328-29). Both psychodynamic and sociological theories challenged the essentialist view of identity as being 'the unique core or essence to identity- "the real me"', insisting instead on 'the invented or constructed character of identity' (Scott, 2014, pp.328-29). However, a precise definition of the term 'identity' in modern sociology remains heavily contested, as Scott argues:

> There is no clear concept of identity in modern sociology. It is used widely and loosely in reference to one's sense of self, and one's feelings and ideas about oneself, as for example in the terms 'gender identity' or 'class identity.… It is sometimes assumed that our identity comes from the expectations attached to the social roles that we occupy, and which we then internalize so that it is formed through the process of socialization. Alternatively, it is elsewhere assumed that we construct our identities more actively out of the materials presented to us during socialization, or in our various roles. (2014, p.331).

Therefore, it is not feasible to provide 'a single, overarching definition of what it is, how it is developed and how it works' (Lawler, 2014, p.2). This is 'because what identity means depends on how it is thought about' (Lawler, 2014, p.2). Thus, following Lawler's argument, 'identity' in this thesis is defined based on the context in which it arises, thus taking on both meanings: 'the public manifestations of identity' (roles) and 'the personal, ambivalent, reflective and reflexive senses the people have of who they are' (Lawler, 2014, p.7). This results in the identification of the identity theme (43 word types) as manifested in the SC through 4 subthemes—personal, geographical, cultural and corporate identities. Thus, 37.4%[11] of the top 115 word types examined are related to the identity theme.

[11] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of identity-related most frequent word types, 43, divided by the total number of word types examined, 115, multiplied by 100: (43) ÷ 115 X 100 = 37.4%

5.2.2 Action and Status Theme

The second overarching theme is action and status with 17 word types, or 15%[12] of the 115 word types, as Table 7 above shows. Based on the identified word types, 'action' is defined as a procedure of doing something whether physically or metaphysically, while 'status' is defined as the state or condition of something or someone. Despite some difference in their definitions, words of action can empirically overlap with status and vice versa. For example, 'criticised' can be undertaking the action of criticism, as in 'X criticised Y'. However, with a change in perspective, it can be understood as the status of being criticised as in 'the Y was criticised by X'. Thus, action and status are grouped as one theme here. However, there are certain word types that are restricted to status, such as 'new', while others like 'says' are restricted to action.

The theme of action in the wordlist is mainly apparent in verbs, which have high frequencies in the wordlist. They highlight the subthemes of present, continuous, perfect, past and future actions, depending on context. These actions differ in their nature, as some involve physical or concrete actions that have a demonstrable effect, such as 'do', while others are more abstract, such as 'says'. However, this distinction is not clear-cut, as some verbs, 'reserved', can be both physical and metaphysical.

5.2.3 Relations Theme

The third identified overarching theme at the top of the wordlist is relations, with 14 word types, or 12.2%[13] of the top word types examined. As the research adopts a lexical approach to analysis, relational words that denote a relation or a connection are indicators of this theme. It could be argued that function words like prepositions and conjunctions are normally insignificant in discourse analysis because they 'have little or no identifiable meaning' … and only 'accomplish important grammatical functions' (Márquez and Macarro, 2008, p.64). Hence, only lexical words should be

[12] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of identity-related most frequent word types, 17, divided by the total number of the examined word types, 115, multiplied by 100, as follows: (17) ÷ 115 X 100 = 14.78%, which can be rounded to 15%

[13] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of relations-related word types at the top of the wordlist, 16, divided by the total number of the word types examined, 115, multiplied by 100, as follows: (14) ÷ 115 X 100 = 12.2%

examined as they ‘have a more readily identifiable meaning and can occur by themselves as minimal utterances’ (2008, p.64). This approach argues that nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs and interjections are content words, while determiners, pronouns, prepositions and conjunctions are function words that fulfil a grammatical purpose in the sentences in which they occur. However, function words can also be lexical words.

For example, Baker shows how the conjunction ‘and’ may ‘be indicative of a particular discourse’ when it is ‘repeatedly used to stress a connection between two objects of discussion (e.g. sex and violence on television)’ (2006, p.123). Hence, certain function words in the following analysis are treated as content words because they highlight specific significance and are analysed as such based on their relatively high frequencies. The relational words that are identified in the corpus can be regarded as both lexical and functional if their co-context suggests that is appropriate (see Table 7 above).

Thus, as Table 7 shows, 74, or 64.3%, of the 115 word types at the top of the wordlist revolve around three main overarching themes. These are, in descending order of frequency and thus salience: i) identity, ii) action and status and iii) relations.

5.3 Keywords List

After comparing the SC wordlist against a wordlist generated from the RC, the 4UKBS corpus, the keyword list has 461 keywords. Unlike the wordlist, a keyword that comes at the bottom of the list can have significance, because it may show the unusually infrequent reporting of that word type in the SC when compared to the RC. Therefore, both keywords of positive and negative key-ness values are taken into consideration in the categorisation and description below. These are also interpreted in their co-context in chapters 6 and 7.

The keyword list shows the frequencies of the word types in the SC texts in which they are identified as keywords, the percentage that frequency represents, the number of texts in which they are identified, their frequencies in the RC, those frequencies in the RC as percentages, the statistical value of keyness calculated by the software using a log-likelihood statistical test, the strength of that keyness calculated with a log-ratio statistical test and finally the *p* value (see Appendix 3 for the full keyword list). The *p*

value is used in the statistical tests that WordSmith 7 tools use. It can be set by the user so that a statistical probability must be smaller than or equal to a given level in order to for a word type to be identified as a keyword by the software. The *p* value 'ranges from 0 to 1. A value of .01 suggests a 1% danger of being wrong in claiming a relationship, .05 would give a 5% danger of error. In the social sciences a 5% risk is usually considered acceptable' (Lexically.net, 2019d).

In the keyword list (Appendix 3), however, it should be noted that the complete *p* value is not shown due to the space restrictions of Word documents. None of the *p* values of the generated keywords was higher than .05. In other words, none of the *p* values above are of statistical significance in social sciences. Thus, instead of stating that the *p* value of 'dilemma' is 0.0000002300, it is listed as 0.00.

All 461 keywords shown in the keyword list are of significance because they are either unusually frequent word types (with a positive Log-L value) or unusually infrequent word types (with a negative Log-L value) compared to other British news sources reporting on Saudi Arabia in English during the 2013–2015 period. In other words, there are 461 word types in the SC that are unusually frequent or unusually infrequent in comparison to the RC, the 4UKBS.

In order to understand the significance that these word types hold, a closer examination using the third tool of WordSmith 7 tools (Concord) must be carried out. The Concord tool allows for querying a specific search term for the purpose of showing all occurrences of that term (or concordance lines) in the corpus in question. This in turn enables the researcher to examine the collocations of that word type and obtain contextual information from the corpus. Overall, this process is commonly referred to as KWIC.

Using the findings of the wordlist analysis as a starting point, the following categorisation and description will mainly be directed towards the three identified salient overarching themes in the wordlist analysis: identity, action and status and relations, with special focus on keywords of high keyness value, whether positive or negative.

5.3.1 Identity Theme

Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 show keywords with both negative and positive values that are related to the first overarching theme, identity, along with their respective keyness values, Log-L, in brackets. These keywords of identity are manually categorised, based on their semantic fields, into the following subthemes: personal (Table 8), geographical (Table 9), cultural (Table 10) and corporate identity (Table 11).

5.3.1.1 Personal Identity Subtheme

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
personal identity (proper names)	'Abdallah' (Log-L, 398.43), 'Usayri' (26.36), 'Urayfi' (26.36), 'Shahrani' (26.36), 'Rubaysh' (26.36), 'Qari' (26.36), 'Mahmud' (26.36), 'Khalifah' (26.36), 'Zayid' (30.76), 'Uways' (30.76), 'Rubay'ah' (30.76), 'Milfi' (30.76), 'Ma'sum' (30.76), 'Khujah' (30.76), 'Khashuqji' (30.76), 'Khalid' (26.66), 'Jarradi' (26.36), 'Rashid' (26.36), 'Husayn' (41.69), 'Awdah' (101.06), 'Muhammad' (88.11), 'Abd' (384.83), 'Aziz' (239.22) 'Zu'bi' (232.89), 'Asad' (228.49), 'Bin' (213.29), 'Faysal' (149.40), 'Sa'ud' (123.04), 'Salih' (110.25), 'Hasan' (109.56), 'Ruhani' (105.46), 'Bandar' (99.85), 'Sa'idi' (96.67), 'Harami' (92.28), 'Ahmad', 'Qaradawi' (81.59), 'Alawi' (79.97), 'Dawsari' (74.70), 'Saqr' (70.31), 'Tumayhi' (65.91), 'Shaddukhi' (52.73), 'Nasir' (52.30), 'Zufayri' (48.34), 'Shubukshi' (48.34), 'Mamduh' (48.34), 'Mansur' (46.38), 'Saqqaf' (39.55), 'Shamsan' (35.15), 'As'ad' (35.15), 'Yusuf' (34.56),	personal identity (related to female gender)	'woman' (-38.41), 'women' (-39.29), 'she' (-202.76), 'her' (-246.36)
		personal identity (other)	'own' (Log-L, -29.46) 'my' (-24.70), 'David' (-51.50), 'his' (-27.42), 'Mr' (-248.27), 'human' (-36.80),
		-	-

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
personal identity (proper names)	'Banna' (29.11), 'Sabah' (37.64), 'Nayif' (39.55), 'Bu' (39.55), 'Dhiyabi' (65.91), 'Nuri' (25.62), 'Hizam' (43.94), 'Asad's' (43.94), 'Shayi' (43.94), 'Sa'd' (43.94), 'Ishqi' (43.94), 'Walid' (63.40), 'Nusur' (39.55), 'Najm' (52.73), 'Sultan' (31.80), 'Turki' (31.65), 'Sa'dun' (39.55)	-	-
personal identity (titles and careers)	'spy' (32.40), 'writer' (36.03), 'ambassadors' (88.92), 'custodian' (47,37), 'Dr' (198.15), 'anchor' (128.94), 'emir' (31.65)	-	-
Total number of keywords with positive values	76	Total number of keywords with negative values	10

Table 8: Categorisation of Personal Identity Keywords (with positive and negative values)

Table 8 above shows that the keywords with positive values relating to the personal identity subtheme (total number 76) are limited to two identified categories: proper nouns and titles and careers, with the former being more salient in terms of number of keywords than the latter (69 keywords are proper nouns, while 7 are of titles and careers).

It should be noted, however, that the first category, proper names, is known to be one of the types of keyword likely to be identified by the software as unusually frequent. Therefore, the minimum frequency was set to three in order to avoid identifying a proper name as a keyword when it is only 'incidental to the story' (Lexically.net, 2019e). Any proper name that is mentioned less than three times in the SC is thus not identified as unusually frequent when compared to the RC.

The second category in the personal identity subtheme, titles and careers, is mainly of a governmental nature, such as ‘spy’ (32.40), ‘ambassadors’ (88.92), ‘custodian’ (47, 37), which refers to the title normally bestowed upon Saudi Arabian kings (The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques), and ‘emir’ (31.65). Looking at the keywords with negative values of personal identity, it becomes clear that those relating to the female gender are salient among the keywords of personal identity subtheme with negative values as ‘woman’, ‘women’, ‘her’ and ‘she’ all have negative keyness values.

5.3.1.1 Geographical Identity Subtheme

Theme	Respective ‘keywords’ with positive values	Theme	Respective ‘keywords’ with negative values
geographical identity (Arab countries and cities of conflict[14])	‘Sanaa’ (58.57), ‘Jawf’[15] (41.69), ‘Asal’[16] (43.94), ‘Qatar’ (117.70), ‘Doha’ (79.46), ‘Lebanon’ (61.38), ‘Dar'a’ (52.73)	geographical identity (specific geographical area)	‘Europe’ (-25.18), ‘west’ (-26.84), ‘south’ (-31.07), ‘western’ (-31.09), ‘American’ (-35.30), ‘city’ (-43.96), ‘Pakistan’ (-55.40), ‘north’ (-58.28), ‘America’ (-63.91), ‘Britain’ (-99.31), ‘UK’ (-248.17)

[14]The process of placing a city or country into a conflict zone is based on two principles: first, if the country is involved in a war (like ‘Syria’) or internal conflict (like ‘Lebanon’), then it is a place of conflict. Second, if the city or country is in conflict with the focus of this research, Saudi Arabia, as Qatar is, then it is a place of conflict in relation to that focus of research. Thus, although Qatar was not engaged in a war at the time of writing this chapter, it is categorised as a country of conflict because it has been in a serious, ongoing disagreement with Saudi Arabia. It also explains why Saudi Arabia is not categorised as country of conflict despite its engagement in a war with the Huthi group in Yemen, at the time this chapter was writing. Rather, it is categorised in a separate category entitled ‘Saudi-related cities’.

[15] Despite the similarity in both pronunciation and spelling of ‘Al-Jawf’ province in Saudi Arabia and ‘Al-Jawf’ province in Yemen, the concordance lines show that the keyword ‘Jawf’ only refers to the Yemeni province.

[16] A KWIC examination shows that it refers to Khan al-Asal city in Syria.

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
geographical identity (Arab countries and cities of agreement)	'Gulf' (155.20), 'GCC' (274.05), 'Amman' (100.89), 'Jordan' (52.92)	geographical identity (power and natural resources)	'gas' (-48.57), 'energy' (-96.96), 'oil' (-330.10)
geographical identity (Saudi Arabia-related cities)	'Jedda' (74.95), 'Kingdom' (236.29)	-	-
geographical identity (Non-Arab countries and cities)	'Geneva' (30.47)	-	-
geographical identity (other)	'States' (186.59), 'territories' (29.71), 'governorate' (30.60), 'governorates' (37.64), 'regional' (72.47)	-	-
Total number of keywords with positive values	19	Total number of keywords with negative values	14

Table 9: Categorisation of Geographical Identity Keywords (with positive and negative values)

The keywords with positive keyness values of the second noticeable subtheme, geographical identity, are mainly names of cities and countries with 19 keywords. Most of these keywords refer to Arab locations, as Table 9 above shows. The identified Arab countries and cities are sorted into the following categories: 1) Arab countries and cities of conflict, 2) Arab countries and cities of agreement and 3) Saudi-related cities. In addition, the keywords of this subtheme include words that refer to geographical identity but not to specific places, such as 'territories' (29.71). On the other hand, the keywords with negative values of the geographical identity subtheme highlight: 1) specific geographical areas such as 'Europe' (-25.18) and 'west' (-26.84), and 2) power and natural resources related to specific geographical areas, such as 'gas' (-48.57) and 'oil', which holds the highest negative value among all keywords in this category: (-330.10).

5.3.1.1 Cultural Identity Subtheme

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
cultural identity (religion-related)	'shi'i' (224.10), 'fatwas' (31.64), 'creed' (27.67), 'scholars' (185.16), 'ahl' (51.10), 'sunnah' (87.88), 'wa' (79.09), 'jama'ah (83.49), 'shi'is' (96.67), 'Shaykh' (92.99), 'Azhar' (52.30) 'ummah' (33.28), 'God' (25.52), 'Salafi' (24.68), 'mujahidin' (62.93)	cultural identity (language related)	'English' (-34.00)
cultural identity (related to countries or nationalities)	'Qatari' (154.56), 'Syrian' (311.18), 'Yemeni' (175.66), 'Jordanian' (159.51), 'Iranian' (139.38), 'Egyptian' (60.96), 'Russian' (49.07), 'Kuwaiti' (39.99), 'Bahraini' (26.61), 'Saudi' (1360.89), 'Lebanese' (112.24)	-	-
Total number of keywords with positive values	26	Total number of keywords with negative values	1

Table 10: Categorisation of Cultural Identity Keywords (with positive and negative values)

The keywords with positive values of the third subtheme of identity, the cultural identity, can be categorised into two categories: 1) religion-related and 2) country- or nationality-related. However, there are two keywords, 'scholars' and 'Shaykh' that require further investigation because they can refer to different subthemes. 'Scholars' can refer to scholars in disciplines who carry out research or to scholars of religion. Similarly, 'Shaykh', which is also written as 'sheikh', may mean in Arabic a religious

leader, or it can refer to royalty or a tribal ruler (Sluglett and Currie, 2015, p.97) like Shaykh Khalīfa bin Zāyid, the leader of the United Arab Emirates.

With the aid of KWIC examination, it becomes clear that both keywords are religious and categorised as such based on their co-contexts. The contextual surroundings of 'scholars' are 'Muslim scholars, Islamic scholars, religious scholars and Saudi scholars against Hezbollah'. By contrast, the co-contexts of 'Shaykh' reveal that it is not religiously restricted as it is used in contexts that are related to royalty, such as 'Qatar's Emir Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad', 'Kuwaiti Emir Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad' and 'Shaykh Muhammad bin-Zayid'. However, the religious references are far more prevalent (out of the 23 instances, only 5 refer to royalty). Hence, 'Shaykh' is categorised as a religion-related keyword.

With regards to the keywords with negative values of the cultural identity subtheme, 'English' (-34.00) is the only one. A KWIC examination of it reveals that 100 of the 102 instances of this keyword in the BBCM-M's reporting lies in the header of the transedited articles, which means that the BBCM-M neglects this keyword more than what the negative keyness value shows as all but two instances refer simply to the language into which the Arabic news articles are translated.

5.3.1.1 Corporate Identity Subtheme

The fourth and final subtheme of the theme of identity, corporate identity, is identified in two main categories: news organisations and sources, and institutions. The institutions category has two main types: a) keywords related to government and b) keywords related to militant and terrorist groups, with the latter being more salient (12 keywords to 7), as Table 11 below shows.

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
corporate identity (news organisations and sources)	'Quds' (329.65), 'Arabi' (393.50), 'Sharq' (192.69), 'Awsat' (171.73), 'Ilaf' (65.91), 'Bbc' (165.39), 'Hayat' (95.74), 'Jazeera' (89.04), 'Arabiyah' (79.09), 'Elaph' (75.29), 'Bbcmep' (439.41), 'Raʾy' (57.12), 'Factiva' (457.78), 'Broadcasting' (815.34), 'Corporation' (744.56), 'Monitoring' (352.13), 'Safir' (28.13), 'Yawm' (42,39), 'Nahar' (39.55), 'Newspaper' (133.69), 'Dustur' (52.73)	corporate identity (institutions related to governments)	'white'[17] (-28.65), 'court' (-36.19), 'office' (-37.20), 'police' (-43.66)
		corporate identity (institutions related to terrorist and militant groups)	'Islamist' (-39.64), 'rebels' (-69.53)
corporate identity (institutions related to governments)	'leadership' (53.69), 'Shura' (43.32), 'ministry' (65.57), 'homeland' (29.43), 'embassy' (55.73), 'authorities' (64.82), 'institutions' (33.01)	corporate identity (other institutions)	'newspapers' (-141.40), 'bank' (-32.09)
corporate identity (institutions related to terrorist and militant groups)	'MB'[18] (244.96), 'Da'ish' (75.78), 'Qa'idah' (808.52), 'Huthist' (105.46), 'Huthi' (41.72), 'Huthis' (33.28), 'Huthists' (123.04), 'Hizballah' (114.25), 'Qa'idah's' (79.09), 'Nusrah'[19] (75.78), 'organization' (301.86), 'organizations' (218.81)	-	-
Total number of keywords with positive values	40	Total number of keywords with negative values	8

Table 11: Categorisation of Corporate Identity Keywords (with positive and negative values)

[17] 'White' (-28.65) is restricted to the 'White House' as the KWIC shows.

[18] A reference to the Muslim Brotherhood as is evident from the concordance lines.

[19] A refers to the Nusrah Front as is evident from the concordance lines.

It should be noted that both 'organization' (301.86) and 'organizations' (218.81), see Table 11 above, are categorised under the keywords that refer to terrorist and militant groups, for they are largely related to the al-Qaʿida terrorist organisation based on their co-context (see chapter 7).

Comparing the total number of keywords with positive values, of all four subthemes (76+19+26+40= 161), to those with negative values, (10+14+1+8= 33), reveals that there are vastly more positive than negative: 161 keywords versus 33 keywords. Keywords with positive values represent 82.99%[20] of the keywords of identity compared to 17.01%[21] of keywords with negative values. A total of 194 keywords with either negative or positive values out of the 461 keywords on the list are related to the theme of identity in the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output. That works out to 42%[22] of the keywords being related to the identity theme. In order to reveal what this means, a closer look at the keywords must be taken.

5.3.2 Action and Status Theme

The second theme identified in the keyword list is action and status with a total of 103 keywords, whether negative or positive, or 22%[23] of the keyword list (see Tables 12, 13 and 14 below). As noted above, action word types can overlap with status word types and *vice versa*. Thus, action and status are grouped together in the keywords with negative values and presented below in Table 14 as the potential themes these keywords highlight can be either action or status. However, some keywords are

[20] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of keywords with positive values divided by the total number of (keywords with positive values plus keywords with negative values) multiplied by 100, as follows: 161 ÷ (161 + 33) X 100 = 82.99%.

[21] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of keywords with negative values divided by the total number of (keywords with positive values plus keywords with negative values) multiplied by 100, as follows: 33 ÷ (161 + 33) X 100 = 17.01%.

[22] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of identity-related keywords, both with negative and positive values, divided by the total number of keywords on the keywords list multiplied by 100, as follows: (194) ÷ 461 X 100 = 42.08%

[23] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of identity-related keywords with both negative and positive values, divided by the total number of keywords on the keyword list multiplied by 100, as follows: (103) ÷ 461 X 100 = 22.34%.

restricted to status, such as ‘dilemma’, and other words that are restricted to actions, such as ‘says’. They are therefore categorised separately. Table 12 below presents the keywords that highlight the action-related keywords while Table 13 shows the status-related keywords, categorised manually based on their semantic fields they highlight into subthemes, and their log-likelihood values.

Theme	Respective ‘keywords’ with positive values	Theme	Respective ‘keywords’ with negative values
action (metaphysical/ abstract and verbal)	‘notes’ (31.08), ‘express’ (330.10), ‘says’ (256.35), ‘adds’ (230.63), ‘question’ (72.02), ‘discusses’ (46.38), ‘stresses’ (24.97), ‘asks’ (32.05), ‘considers’ (29.04), ‘saying’ (123.33), ‘dialogue’ (55.70), ‘commenting’ (42.39), ‘talk’ (35.72), ‘asked’ (112.40), ‘affirmed’ (48.34) ‘emphasized’ (45.91), ‘realized’ (74.70), ‘stressed’ (74.39), ‘considered’ (55.93), ‘pointed’ (28.83), ‘addition’ (51.10), ‘elaborating’(29.11), ‘wonders’ (25.93), ‘criticized’ (29.11), ‘constitutes’ (25.62), ‘represented’ (25.41), ‘specialized’ (30.76), ‘unattributed’ (48.34), ‘informed’ (26.66)	action (other)	‘production’ (-90.47), ‘strikes’ (-41.58), ‘risk’ (-31.33), ‘set’ (-26.51), ‘share’ (-28.56)
action (concrete/physical)	‘visit’ (217.19), ‘happened’ (28.29), ‘changes’ (26.79), ‘mobilization’ (26.36), ‘financing’ (51.31), ‘donations’ (24.68), ‘implementation’ (24.14), ‘initiative’ (40.17), ‘sedition’ (31.88), ‘presence’ (26.23)	-	-

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
action (both metaphysical and physical)	'interview' (77.11), 'carries' (32.19), 'adopting' (25.93), 'responding' (113.50), 'measures' (35.49), 'conspiracies' (28.13), 'observes' (27.38), 'owned' (37.53)	-	-
action (uniting)	'supports' (63.29), 'supporting' (32.54), 'mediation' (31.10), 'cooperation' (84.89), 'meetings' (27.62), 'consultations' (26.36), 'networking' (24.77), 'organized' (30.76), 'permission' (304.57), 'coordination' (58.89)	-	-
action (dividing)	'confrontation' (45.72), 'interference' (47.70), 'interfering' (26.36), 'disturbances' (45.91) 'terrorism' (87.72), 'withdrawal' (25.24), 'espionage' (44.60)	-	-
action (corrective/remedial)	'reconciliation' (26.74), 'rapprochement' (105.69), 'understanding' (40.80), 'understandings' (29.11)	-	-
Total number of keywords	68	Total number of keywords	5

Table 12: Action-related keywords and the themes they highlight

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
status (rise)	'developments' (43.91), 'trends' (33.48), 'inflation' (37.47)	status (other)	'world's' (-71.60), 'observer' (-94.72), 'daily' (-94.36), 'war' (-26.64),
status (concerning)	'dilemma' (26.74), 'issue' (166.80), 'issues' (127.46), 'deviant' (24.97)	-	-
status (round)	'ring' (66.62), 'cell' (46.96), 'circles' (24.14)	-	-
status (other)	'charitable' (24.18), 'duality' (48.34), 'situation' (95.32), 'viewer' (26.76), 'qualitative' (24.97), 'moderator' (33.28)	-	-
Total number of keywords	16	Total number of keywords	4

Table 13: Status-related keywords and the themes they highlight

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
action and status (pairs of opposites)	'seen' (-25.20), 'said' (-96.90), 'remains' (-28.73), 'growth' (-31.78), 'global' (-93.84), 'limited' (-229.45), 'cut' (-45.04), 'supply' (-40.88), 'high' (-36.27), 'low' (-38.80)
Total number of keywords	10

Table 14: Action- and Status-related keywords (with negative values) and the themes they highlight

In a similar manner to the previous theme, the unusually frequent word types in the BBCM-M's reporting on Saudi Arabia are larger in number than the unusually

infrequent (81.55%[24] compared to 18.44%[25]). These unusually frequent word types are manually categorised into two main sets of keywords, actions and status. The action theme is highlighted by six subthemes: 1) metaphysical, 2) physical, 3) both metaphysical and physical, 4) uniting, 5) dividing and 6) remedial actions. The second main set of keywords with positive values denote only the status theme; there are 16 keywords of this type. They revolve around the following subthemes of status: rise in status, concerning status, round status and other status.

The keywords of action and status that have negative values are mainly pairs of opposites, as Table 14 shows, such as 'seen' (-25.20) versus 'said' (-96.90) and 'remains' (-28.73) versus 'growth' (-31.78). In addition, there are action-related and status-related keywords with negative values and are categorised as such in Tables 12 and 13 above.

5.3.3 Relations Theme

Table 15 below shows keywords with both negative and positive values that denote relations, along with their respective log-likelihood values.

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
aligned relations (exclusion versus specification)	'except' (351.02), 'especially' (118.80), 'particularly' (56.80), 'namely' (54.08), 'pertaining' (35.15), 'concerning' (34.61)	comparison	'less' (-28.33), 'biggest' (-43.45), 'largest' (-26.13)
aligned (with relations)	'brothers' (31.94), 'agreement' (75.77), 'bilateral' (50.52), 'alliance' (32.05), 'sisterly' (30.76), 'ties' (55.96), 'contacts' (25.56), 'membership' (25.93)	contradiction	'but' (-188.55), 'yet' (-43.12)

[24] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of keywords with positive values divided by the total number of (keywords with positive values plus the keywords with negative values) multiplied by 100, as follows: 84 ÷ (84 + 19) X 100 = 81.55%.

[25]The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of keywords with negative values divided by the total number of ('keywords' with positive values plus the keywords with negative values) multiplied by 100, as follows: 19 ÷ (84 + 19) X 100 = 18.44%.

Theme	Respective 'keywords' with positive values	Theme	Respective 'keywords' with negative values
aligned (against relations)	'differences' (105.05), 'tension' (42.12), 'disagreement' (38.08)	other	'family' (-36.33), 'out' (-24.34),
aligned (inclination)	'stands' (41.70), 'stances' (37.64), 'stand' (33.28), 'sides' (32.44), 'stance' (55.88), 'position' (42.16)	-	-
unaligned relations (cause and effect)	'indicates' (48.43), 'hence' (46.69), 'therefore' (84.10), 'thus' (39.80), 'repercussions' (30.30)	-	-
general 'keyword' of relations	'affairs' (68.60)	-	-
Total number of 'keywords'	29 'keywords'	7 'keywords'	

Table 15: Relations-linked keywords and the themes they highlight

In a similar vein to the identity and action and status themes, the keywords with negative values are disproportionally fewer than those with positive values in the relations theme. Positive keywords make up 80.56%[26] of the relations theme, compared to 19.44%[27] for negative keywords. Together the keywords with both positive and negative keyness values in the relations theme represent 7.80%[28] of the keyword list.

The keywords with positive values are categorised into two main categories, aligned relations and unaligned relations. The term 'aligned' is used here to reflect the aligned nature of the semantic meaning that the keywords have in isolation. For example, the keyword 'sisterly' highlights an alignment towards 'with-relations' rather than 'against-relations', whereas the keyword 'tension' highlights 'an against-relation' rather than

[26] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of keywords with positive values divided by the total number of ('keywords' with positive values plus the keywords with negative values) multiplied by 100, as follows: 29 ÷ (29 + 7) X 100 = 80.65%.

[27] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of keywords with negative values divided by the total number of ('keywords' with positive values plus the keywords with negative values) multiplied by 100, as follows: 7 ÷ (29 + 7) X 100 = 19.44%.

[28] The equation used to produce the percentage is the total number of relations-related keywords, both with negative and positive values, divided by the total number of keywords on the keywords list multiplied by 100, as follows: (29 + 7) ÷ 461 X 100 = 7.80%

‘with-relations’. Conversely, the term ‘unaligned’ is used to show that the keywords that fall into this category do not denote either ‘with-relations’, or ‘against-relations’ when examined out of context.

The keywords of relations with negative values, on the other hand, represent only 19.44% of the total of keywords on the theme of relations. They are mainly words of comparison like ‘less’ (-28.33) and ‘biggest’ (-43.45), words of contradiction such as ‘but’ (-188.55) and other words like ‘family’ (-36.33).

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter has deployed a categorisation and description of the wordlist generated to reveal three main overarching themes in the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output between March 2013 and March 2015: i) identity, ii) action and status and iii) relations. They were first identified in the SC through the high frequency of word types highlighting subthemes denoting the identified theme. The wordlist categorisation and description not only showed the salience of those themes but also the exact salience of each theme in the SC, based on the number of most frequent word types that are connected with each theme. The identity theme represents 45% of the top 115 word types on the wordlist, the action and status theme represents 15% and the relations theme represents 14%. Together, the three identified themes represent 74% of the 115 most frequent word types in the SC.

The unusual frequency and unusual infrequency of word types in the SC compared to the RC (the 4UKBS) have confirmed the salience of those themes, as the semantic field-based categorisation and description of the 461 keywords on the keyword list generated showed that 42% of keywords were related to the identity theme, 22% to the action and status theme and 7.80% to the relations theme. This means that 71.8% of the keywords with either negative or positive values refer to the same identified themes, which confirms their salience in the SC. These themes in the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia can be sorted in order of salience as follows: identity, then action and status and, lastly, relations.

Chapters 6 and 7 offer an interpretation of the top 115 word types on the wordlist generated and the keyword list in order to uncover the main representations of Saudi

Arabia that the English reader receives when the BBCM-M uses Arabic news output, with a special focus on the identified three main overarching themes.

Chapter 6: Corpus Inquiry of themes and Representations at the Second Level (Part 1)

6.1 Introduction

The first level (categorising and description) helped identify the three main themes that the BBCM-M tended to select when reporting on Saudi Arabia using Arabic news output during the 2013–2015 timeframe. In order of salience, they are identity, action and status and relations. With a special focus on these three themes, chapters 6 and 7 present the main findings of the second level of the analysis, interpretation, in which the 115 top word types on the wordlist and the keyword list were interpreted with the aid of concordance lines, word-clusters, collocations and collocation relationships.

It should be noted that in the interpretation of the keywords, both keywords with negative values and keywords with positive values are analysed. This is because both can indicate a significance in the BBCM-M coverage of Saudi Arabia in relation to other British news sources, that is to say the 4UKBS. The keywords with negative values indicate the unusual infrequency of certain word types while the positive values indicate the unusual frequency, of certain word types. Thus, the former highlights the BBCM-M's little attention paid to those word types and in turn the themes they highlight while the latter indicates the opposite, that is to say the BBCM-M's special focus on certain word types, thus paying attention to the themes they highlight.

As this is a corpus-driven analysis in which the researcher was guided by the data in both investigation and interpretation, a full account of the interpretation of both the wordlist and the keyword list cannot be presented within the word limits of this thesis. Therefore, it was decided to design the interpretation level of analysis so that the main findings of the corpus-driven investigation are presented, followed by supporting empirical evidence derived from that investigation. This evidence is made up of the mechanisms through which each representation of Saudi Arabia was constructed and identified.

The interpretation shows, first, that in the BBCM-M's coverage from Arabic news output between March 2013 and March 2015 Saudi Arabia is mainly portrayed in a political setting. Second, it shows that there were four main representations of Saudi Arabia in the BBCM-M's coverage. These are 1) dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women, 2) connected to its rivalry with Iran and its reliance on the

US, 3) having a three-dimensional image in relation to terrorism and 4) portrayed in a paradoxical image in relation to power, policies and developments.

The following presents the key two findings, the political framing of Saudi Arabia and the main four representations of Saudi Arabia (two representations in this chapter and two in chapter 7), supported by the relevant evidence taken from the interpretation of the wordlist and the keyword list generated by WordSmith 7 from the SC.

6.2 Saudi Arabia in a Political Frame

When the keywords of relations with negative keyness values were examined, ‘family’ (-36.33) stood out as the only noun in the category. A KWIC examination of ‘family’ did not only show that the BBCM-M overlooks this particular word type when reporting on Saudi Arabia but also that it was mainly used to report on the ‘royal family’ and the ‘ruling family’, as 14 out of the total 22 occurrences of ‘family’ refer to the ‘Saudi royal/ruling family’. The remaining occurrences of ‘family’ that are related to Saudi Arabia either refer to the families of al-Qaʿida members or those of Saudi nationals detained in prisons. This suggests that Saudi society is reduced to three main types of families: royalty, terrorists’ relatives or detainees’ families.

This corresponds to the finding of the collocation analysis of ‘Saudi’, as the identified semantic categories according to which the strongest 99 collocations of ‘Saudi’ were categorised are mainly of political nature (see Table 16 below). The collocation analysis of ‘Saudi’ revealed 222 collocates in the SC. Figure 4 shows only the 25 strongest collocates of ‘Saudi’, as determined by MI scores.



N	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_L	T	Log_R	Set Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	SAUDI	1.03	6.04	27.81	95.32	7...1	43.33	0.00	20	1,936	30	30	10	16	2	2		1,876		2	2	16	10
2	ARABIA'S	0.04	6.04	16.34	12.89	12...8	5.91	5.75	10	36	1	35			1				35				
3	ARABIA	0.59	6.03	25.25	60.22	3...5	27.66	1.28	17	789	11	778	2	5	3		1		772			1	5
4	MONARCH	0.02	5.91	13.91	8.08	56.22	3.93	6.79	5	16	0	16							16				
5	OWNED	0.03	5.65	15.05	9.05	71.22	5.00	5.83	5	26	0	26							26				
6	BAHRAINI	0.01	5.62	12.26	5.51	26.55	3.10	7.18	2	10	0	10								6	4		
7	AMBASSADOR	0.04	5.49	15.83	9.78	85.62	5.87	5.20	8	36	8	28	1		2	5			24	1		3	
8	UAE	0.04	5.20	15.38	8.03	62.00	5.67	4.99	4	34	5	29	1		1	3			6	4	7	11	1
9	YOUTHS	0.02	5.18	13.96	6.23	37.50	4.46	5.67	4	21	2	19				2			17		2		
10	DAILY	0.02	5.15	12.96	5.16	26.01	3.76	6.12	5	15	3	12	1		1	1			1				11
11	ELAPH	0.01	5.12	12.29	4.54	20.29	3.36	6.42	1	12	2	10			1		1			10			
12	AUTHORITIES	0.04	5.12	15.97	8.58	72.53	6.37	4.57	8	43	4	39	1	2		1			35	3	1		
13	ANALYSTS	0.01	5.07	11.71	4.01	16.08	3.07	6.63	2	10	1	9		1					7			1	1
14	WRITER	0.02	5.04	12.86	4.83	23.53	3.76	6.02	8	15	6	9	1	1	2	2			6	2	1		
15	EMBASSY	0.03	5.04	14.86	6.83	47.08	5.31	5.02	5	30	5	25	1		1	3			23	1			1
16	PAN	0.02	4.96	13.30	4.99	25.82	4.11	5.67	8	18	5	13	1	4							12	1	
17	STRATEGY	0.01	4.94	12.34	4.20	18.36	3.49	6.12	4	13	1	12			1				5	2		3	2
18	INTERIOR	0.02	4.93	13.57	5.15	27.79	4.32	5.48	7	20	1	19		1					18				1
19	DEPUTY	0.01	4.83	12.00	3.71	14.98	3.34	6.12	6	12	3	9	1	2					5		3	1	
20	BORDER	0.03	4.78	14.95	6.04	40.34	5.62	4.57	4	34	11	23	1	1	2	7			11	6	1	3	2
21	BAHRAIN	0.02	4.76	13.81	4.91	26.82	4.62	5.12	7	23	7	16		2	2	3				1	6	1	8
22	CHIEF	0.01	4.67	11.84	3.31	12.59	3.33	5.97	4	12	4	8			3	1				5	3		
23	SCHOLARS	0.03	4.62	13.90	4.55	24.48	4.80	4.85	5	25	6	19	2	1	1	2			19				
24	INTELLIGENCE	0.03	4.59	13.88	4.47	23.81	4.79	4.83	6	25	2	23		1	1				21	2			
25	CITIZENS	0.01	4.53	11.93	3.04	11.32	3.45	5.71	4	13	0	13							11			1	1

Figure 4: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of ‘Saudi’, based on MI scores

As Figure 4 shows, ‘Arabia’s’ is the strongest collocate of ‘Saudi’, with the highest MI score; it frequently takes the R1 position (‘Saudi Arabia’s’). This is to be expected, as the name of the country is, after all, ‘Saudi Arabia’, so high MI scores in this context are hardly surprising. Nonetheless, ‘Arabia’s’ also belongs to the second most salient category in terms of number of collocations of ‘Saudi’: countries and places, as Table 16 shows.

Semantic fields	Collocations	Number of collocates
political/government	‘monarch’, ‘ambassador’, ‘authorities’, ‘interior’, ‘embassy’, ‘deputy’, ‘intelligence’, ‘chief’, ‘internal’, ‘ministry’, ‘leadership’, ‘minister’, ‘officials’, ‘policy’, ‘king’, ‘prince’, ‘leaders’, ‘official’, ‘security’, ‘strategy’, ‘foreign’	21
countries and places	‘Bahraini’, ‘UAE’, ‘Arabia's’, ‘Arabia’, ‘Iraqi’, ‘Bahrain’, ‘Sanaa’, ‘kingdom’, ‘Yemen’, ‘Yemeni’, ‘US’, ‘Qatar’, ‘Jordan’, ‘Lebanon’, ‘Arab’, ‘Qatari’, ‘border’, ‘Egypt’, ‘place’, ‘Saudi’	20
population/society	‘youths’, ‘analysts’, ‘women’, ‘analysts’, ‘writer’, ‘national’, ‘Dr’	7
media related	‘Elaph’, ‘daily’, ‘pan’, ‘media’, ‘newspaper’	5
proper nouns	‘Sau’d’, ‘Faysal’, ‘Abdallah’, ‘abd’, ‘Muhammad’, ‘bin’	6
Economy	‘economic’	1
Prepositions	‘in’, ‘on’, ‘by’, ‘between’, ‘after’, ‘over’, ‘under’	7
Actions	‘owned’, ‘return’, ‘led’, ‘visit’, ‘told’, ‘attack’, ‘did’, ‘change’, ‘said’, ‘based’, ‘has’	11
Relations	‘alliance’, ‘rapprochement’, ‘relationship’, ‘particularly’, ‘ties’, ‘relations’, ‘only’, ‘especially’	8
Numbers	‘#’	1
Information	‘information’, ‘report’, ‘document’	3
Direction	‘towards’, ‘position’	2
militant group	‘MB’	1
Other	‘efforts’, ‘meeting’, ‘decision’, ‘role’, ‘influence’, ‘that’	6

Table 16: The strongest 99 collocates of ‘Saudi’

Table 16 demonstrates that the 99 strongest collocations of ‘Saudi’ fall mainly into the following categories: political/government, countries and places, population/society, media related, proper nouns, economy, prepositions and actions, relations, numbers, information and direction. Based on the number of collocations that make up each category, two emerge as salient: political/government (21 collocations) and countries and places (20 collocations). The salience of these two categories in the strongest

collocations of ‘Saudi’ in the corpus reflects the frequent and strong association of Saudi Arabia with political and governmental topics in relation to specific countries and places. To uncover the nature of this association, an analysis of the concordance lines of ‘Arabia’s’, the strongest collocate of ‘Saudi’, must be carried out.

The concordance lines of ‘Arabia’s’ show two frequent patterns: ‘Saudi Arabia’s refusal’ and ‘Saudi Arabia’s support’. The examination of the larger contexts of these patterns through KWIC depicts Saudi Arabia as mainly refusing ‘to receive the Iranian foreign minister’ and ‘to allow the appointment of government ministers from Hezbollah’ while supporting the ‘Syrian opposition’ and the ‘Egyptian regime’. Thus, Saudi Arabia, based on the strong associations it has in the BBCM-M’s coverage, is primarily portrayed in a political frame.

6.3 The First Two Main Representations of Saudi Arabia

6.3.1 Dominated by Men of Authority and Distant from (Acting) Women

The first identified representation of Saudi Arabia in the coverage of the BBCM-M is as linguistically dominated by men of authority and kept distanced from women in general and (acting) women in particular. This was achieved via the linguistic mechanisms detailed below.

6.3.1.1 Unusually Infrequent Reporting on Women

The male pronoun ‘he’ appears in the 23rd position of the SC wordlist, with a frequency of 613. A search for the female pronoun ‘she’ makes it clear that it is overlooked in the SC; it was found on the keyword list with a negative value (-202.76), meaning it is unusually infrequent. In fact, word types related to the female gender are clustered at the bottom of keyword list and hold relatively high negative keyness values: ‘woman’ (-38.41), ‘women’ (-39.29) and ‘her’ (-246.36). Remarkably, most of the few instances where women or woman are reported on in the BBCM-M’s coverage comes from al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper, with 73.17%[29] of instances of ‘women’ and ‘woman’ coming from that source (see Tables 17 and 18).

[29] The number of occurrences of ‘women’ and ‘woman’ from al-Quds al-Arabi divided by the total number of occurrences of the same keywords multiplied by 100, as follows: 30 ÷ 41 X 100 = 73.17%

N	Concordance	File
1	‘and when the honour of their women is violated, they will the…’	Syrian TV satellite service, Damascus
2	‘that does not allow the women to drive cars.’	Elaph website, London
3	‘demand that Saudi women be allowed to drive.’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
4	‘we want progress for Saudi women within the teachings …’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
5	‘he pointed out that ‘Saudi women driving cars will lead to…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
6	‘of preparations by Saudi women to break the law that bans…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
7	‘in the world that prevents women from driving, the Saudi…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
8	‘diseases, and pregnant women to postpone performing the…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
9	‘bastion to protect not only women in Saudi Arabia but the women…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
10	‘is an economic burden on women as well.’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
11	‘not violate the honour of women, nor will we destroy house…’	Syrian TV satellite service, Damascus
12	‘on the protection of women from violence.	As listed
13	‘despite the ‘importance’ of women not driving cars in Saudi…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
14	‘included the release of women in Saudi prisons and…’	Al-Hayat website, London
15	‘itself as a saviour of women from the claws of …’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
16	‘the universal right of women in Saudi Arabia to drive…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
17	‘passage over the dilemma of women, which has become…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
18	‘1960s, to the appointment of women as members of the Shura…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London

N	Concordance	File
19	‘claims of the massacre of women and children by the regime…’	As listed
20	‘per cent representation of women, and having EU officials…’	As listed
21	‘the question of women driving has become…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
22	‘on the question of women driving cars, which causes…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
23	‘is the bastion of women against the lagging…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
24	‘Saudi cleric on the issue of women driving cars and…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
25	‘defy the ban. Ironically, women in Saudi Arabia, who…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
26	‘bin-Abd-al-Aziz to include women in the Shura Council…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
27	‘form trends and support for women causes, called…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
28	‘ovaries and wants them for women alone and wants to…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
29	‘employees in all fields. Women started flying planes…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
30	‘the subject of empowering women against the backdrop…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
31	‘civil rights for both women and men together?’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
32	‘break the law that bans women from driving.’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
33	‘to equality between men and women and a living example…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
34	‘Shura Council, and allowing women to participate in limited…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
35	‘by saying that allowing women to drive in Saudi Arabia…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London

N	Concordance	File
36	‘others, segregation against women in law and practice,…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
37	‘even the entry of 30 women as members of the Shura…’	Al-Jazirah website, Riyadh

Table 17: KWIC of ‘Women’ in the SC

N	Concordance	File
1	‘he also says ‘the said woman has long complained…’	Al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai
2	‘Al-Walid employed a Saudi woman as a pilot of his jet…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
3	‘effects on the body of a woman. We do not have the…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London
4	‘the Muslim ‘other’ woman from the grip of the Muslim…’	Al-Quds al-Arabi website, London

Table 18: KWIC of ‘woman’ in the SC

Tables 17 and 18 list all instances of ‘women’ and ‘woman’ in the SC and the original news source in which they occur, revealing that al-Quds al-Arabi is the BBCM-M’s preferred news source when reporting on Saudi women, who receive scant coverage compared to Saudi men.

6.3.1.2 Women as Acted Upon and Men of Authority as Acting

When the sparse coverage of Saudi women was examined closely, it became clear that the concordance lines generally show Saudi women as being acted upon rather than as acting, although there are a few instances that show women as full-fledged agents:

1) Al-Walid bin Talal remarks that ‘women started flying planes a while ago’;
2) ‘he pointed out that ‘Saudi women driving cars will lead to’,
3) ‘even the entry of 30 women as members of the Shura Council for the first time, or the great programme by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques for scholarships abroad’;

4) ‘the Amnesty International's report came on the eve of preparations by Saudi women to break the law that bans women from driving’;
5) ‘he also says ‘the said woman has long complained that she and her husband have been accused of maintaining links with al-Qaʿida’.

Nonetheless, an examination of the larger context shows that these instances where Saudi women are shown as agents are in fact reported by men of authority (1, 2 and 5) and/or the actions are permitted by men of authority (3). Only number 4 ascribes genuine agency to Saudi women.

In fact, the instances of women as acting are in quotes from males. 1) Saudi Prince Al-Walid bin Talal was answering a question about banning women from driving in Saudi Arabia: ‘I have female Saudi employees in all fields. Women started flying planes a while ago’. 2) The same Prince Al-Walid showed his stance on the same controversial topic of women’s driving in the Kingdom by explaining the potential economic benefit of allowing women to drive in the future: ‘He pointed out that ‘Saudi women driving cars will lead to the departure of around 500,000 to 1 million drivers in the Kingdom, not only because the driver is a stranger, but also because he is an economic burden on women as well’. Similarly, 5) shows a woman as an agent, but only in a quotation by a male in authority, Dr Bin-Hizam, who commented on ‘a lady in the city of al-Qasim who has sent her son, 15, to Syria’. He added, ‘the said woman has long complained that she and her husband have been accused of maintaining links with al-Qaʿida’.

The instance in which women are full-fledge agents in acts permitted or initiated by men of authority, 3) ‘the entry of 30 women as members of the Shura Council for the first time’, refers to the late King ʿAbd Allah ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud, who allowed women to enter the consultative council. However, the only instance in the entire SC in which women are shown as acting agent is number 4 above, which comes from an editorial entitled ‘Saudi Arabia’s influence and human rights violations’ published by al-Quds al-Arabi. It discusses Saudi Arabia’s ‘human rights violations’ on both the national and international levels. The instance in which Saudi women are shown as acting appears in the phrase ‘the Amnesty International's report that came on the eve of preparations by Saudi women to break the law that bans women from driving’. This agency given to Saudi women here is narrated by Amnesty International rather than a

Saudi woman, thus, not presenting a genuine Saudi woman's voice in the reported news item.

In order to understand the bias in the representations of Saudi women, which is disproportionate as they are shown more as acted upon than acting, a collocation analysis of 'women' was conducted. It confirmed the finding that women are mostly shown as acted upon rather than acting in the SC (see Figure 5).

File Edit View Compute Settings Windows Help

N	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_L	T	Log_R	Set	Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	WOMEN	1.00	11.66	22.08	10...1	43...8	6.08	0.00		6	37	0	0						37					
2	OF	0.01	4.30	13.58	3.50	9.75	4.75	-6.80		5	25	19	6		2		3	14				2	3	1
3	SAUDI	0.01	4.25	11.16	2.18	3.80	3.14	-5.67		2	11	4	7					4			4		2	1
4	#	0.01	4.19	11.11	2.05	3.43	3.14	-5.72		5	11	6	5	3		2		1				2	2	1
5	TO	0.01	3.74	11.14	1.07	1.05	3.34	-6.41		2	13	4	9	1	2		1			5		1	2	1
6	AND	0.01	3.52	10.92	0.49	0.25	3.29	-6.64		3	13	5	8		1	1	2	1		4	1	2	1	
7	IN	0.01	3.45	10.09	0.28	0.08	2.87	-6.33		2	10	1	9	1						6		2	1	
8	THE	0.01	3.31	13.12	-0.05	0.00	4.92	-8.05		6	30	17	13	1	6	9		1			5	2	4	2

Figure 5: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of 'women', based on MI score

Figure 5 shows that 'women' collocates mainly with 'of', 'Saudi', '#', 'to', 'and', 'in' and 'the', with the preposition 'of' being the strongest collocate, especially in the L1 position in the corpus, based on MI scores. Table 19 shows the KWIC of that collocational pattern along with the prepositional meaning from Oxford English dictionary based on the co-context of each occurrence.

N	Concordance lines (KWIC)	The prepositional meaning (from Oxford English dictionary)
1	‘not violate **the honour of women,** nor will we destroy house…’	‘expressing the relationship between a part and a whole with the word denoting the part functioning as the head of the phrase’.
2	‘on **the protection of women** from violence.’	‘followed by a noun expressing the object of the verb underlying the first noun’.
3	‘despite the **‘importance’ of women** not driving cars in Saudi…’	‘expressing the relationship between a general category or type and the thing being specified which belongs to such a category’.
4	‘included **the release of women** in Saudi prisons and…’	‘followed by a noun expressing the object of the verb underlying the first noun’.
5	‘itself as **a saviour of women** from the claws…’	‘followed by a noun expressing the object of the verb underlying the first noun’.
6	‘the universal **right of women** in Saudi Arabia to drive…’	‘expressing the relationship between a part and a whole with the word denoting the part functioning as the head of the phrase’.
7	‘passage over **the dilemma of women**, which has become…’	‘expressing the relationship between a general category or type and the thing being specified which belongs to such a category’.
8	‘to **the appointment of women** as members of the Shura…’	‘followed by a noun expressing the object of the verb underlying the first noun’.
9	‘claims of **the massacre of women** and children by the regime…’	‘followed by a noun expressing the object of the verb underlying the first noun’.
10	‘per cent **representation of women**, and having EU officials…’	‘followed by a noun expressing the object of the verb underlying the first noun’.
11	**‘the question of women** driving has become…’	‘expressing the relationship between a general category or type and the thing being specified which belongs to such a category’.

N	Concordance lines (KWIC)	The prepositional meaning (from Oxford English dictionary)
12	‘on **the question of women** driving cars, which causes…’	‘expressing the relationship between a general category or type and the thing being specified which belongs to such a category’.
13	‘is **the bastion of women** against the lagging…’	‘followed by a noun expressing the subject of the verb underlying the first noun’.
14	‘cleric on the **issue of women** driving cars…’	‘expressing the relationship between a general category or type and the thing being specified which belongs to such a category’.

Table 19: KWIC of the collocational pattern ‘of women’

Examining the concordance lines of this collocational pattern shows that the strongest collocation of ‘women’ is ‘of’ in the following senses, in descending order of frequency:

1. ‘followed by a noun expressing the object of the verb underlying the first noun’,

2. ‘expressing the relationship between a general category or type and the thing being specified which belongs to such a category’,

3. ‘expressing the relationship between a part and a whole. With the word denoting the part functioning as the head of the phrase’

4. and ‘followed by a noun expressing the subject of the verb underlying the first noun’ (English-English Oxford Dictionary, 2018).

The first three patterns are the most frequent senses of the preposition ‘of’ in the concordance lines of the pattern ‘of women’. They primarily show that the images of Saudi women in the corpus revolve around the following: women as submissive and vulnerable citizens, women with limited rights and the importance of the honour of women.

Pattern (1) shows ‘women’ as objects of the following verbs: ‘protect’, ‘release’, ‘save’, ‘appoint’, ‘massacre’ and ‘represent’, representing women as vulnerable citizens who need protection from ‘violence’ and ‘inequality and partiality’, as in ‘Report on statements by Abdallah al-Mu'allimi, Saudi Arabia's permanent envoy to the UN, on

explaining the reasons for Saudi reservations about two clauses in the UN declaration on the protection of women from violence', 'Saudi scholars' fatwas provide it with live [ammunition] that it considers a stumbling block on the road to equality between men and women and a living example of the backwardness of that foreign 'other.' 'International feminism designs itself as a saviour of women from the claws of inequality and partiality against them'.

The same pattern also shows women as having limited basic human rights in Saudi Arabia, as in 'This legendary duality has been ingrained as a fixed image promoted by the local media since King Abdallah assumed power… to the appointment of women as members of the Shura Council, and allowing women to participate in limited elections at the municipal and chambers of commerce level'.

The second frequent pattern shows 'women' as being topics of 'importance', 'dilemma', 'question' and 'issue'; men discuss these topics and decide what to do about them, as in 'The ideas of a Saudi cleric on the issue of women driving cars and the current campaign to take place on 26 October' and 'on the question of women driving cars,… the Saudi prince said: "I have female Saudi employees in all fields. Women started flying planes a while ago. We publicly demand that Saudi women be allowed to drive"'.

The third frequent pattern expresses the relationship between a part and a whole with the word denoting the part functioning as the head of the phrase. The identified parts in the corpus are chiefly 'rights' and 'honour', signalling the importance of these parts in the representations of women in the corpus. A larger context of 'rights' is 'in which she said that the United States "supports the universal right of women in Saudi Arabia to drive cars"'. This means that the voices that attract the BBCM-M's attention when reporting on Saudi Arabian women's rights are the authoritative voices of Saudi Arabian men and globally powerful official voices like the US and Amnesty International, not the Saudi women's.

This empirically demonstrates that Saudi women in the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia are generally overlooked; whenever they are reported on, they are usually depicted in positions of being submissive and acted upon. Conversely, Saudi men with

various forms of authority – governmental, royal or religious – appear to attract the BBCM-M's attention when reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output and are depicted as full-fledged agents who are even, at many cases, given the opportunity to tackle women's issues.

This focus on the agency of Saudi men of authority is evident in the keywords related to metaphysical and abstract actions, which make up the most salient category of actions in the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia. When they were examined in relation to their associations, it became clear that they are restricted to men of authority. Collocation analyses of the keywords 'says' and 'adds' show that they strongly collocate with proper nouns referring to men and the male pronoun 'he'. That pronoun is the eighth strongest collocation of 'says' and the second strongest of 'adds', as Figures 6 and 7 show.



N	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_L	T	Log_R	Set	Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	SAYS	1.00	8.58	25.17	10...7	2...2	17.67	0.00		13	314	0	0						314					
2	SAIDI	0.09	8.03	15.84	18.99	82.91	3.86	3.84		1	15	12	3					12			1		2	
3	HARAMI	0.07	7.77	14.94	15.43	59.83	3.45	3.90		1	12	12	0					12						
4	ZU'BI	0.14	7.55	16.95	20.88	11...1	5.07	2.57		1	26	26	0					26						
5	QARADAWI	0.07	7.36	14.53	13.15	50.63	3.44	3.49		2	12	11	1					11			1			
6	RESPONDING	0.06	6.69	13.33	9.17	31.58	3.13	3.09		2	10	10	0		1	4	5							
7	QUESTION	0.09	6.52	14.69	11.09	49.38	4.08	2.14		3	17	16	1			16								1
8	HE	0.26	6.25	20.11	26.48	31...1	10.90	-0.97		6	122	112	10	2			15	95		6	4			
9	I	0.09	5.37	14.77	7.86	37.23	4.98	0.39		5	26	3	23		2	1				21	2			
10	ISSUE	0.06	5.29	12.69	5.30	17.39	3.51	1.31		4	13	9	4			8	1				2	1		1
11	AL	0.14	5.01	19.49	15.32	16...5	11.91	-2.51		10	151	123	28	1	4	5	113			14	5	4	3	2
12	YEMEN	0.06	5.00	12.40	4.43	13.39	3.49	1.02		4	13	8	5			4	3	1					3	2
13	QATAR	0.04	4.66	11.31	3.04	7.03	3.04	1.06		1	10	5	5		1	3	1			3	1			1
14	BIN	0.05	4.65	12.27	3.56	9.71	3.59	0.56		3	14	13	1				13			1				
15	ALSO	0.05	4.63	11.80	3.25	8.12	3.32	0.76		2	12	10	2					10			1	1		
16	THERE	0.06	4.61	12.95	3.90	11.83	4.07	0.16		5	18	1	17			1				10	3	3	1	
17	NO	0.06	4.57	12.57	3.57	10.01	3.83	0.29		4	16	1	15			1				4	1	7	1	2
18	IRANIAN	0.04	4.56	11.48	2.93	6.78	3.18	0.82		5	11	6	5	3	1	1	1			2		2	1	
19	THIS	0.09	4.51	16.07	6.26	31.58	7.09	-1.56		7	55	30	25	2	24	3	1			13	6	1	4	1
20	IRAN	0.05	4.23	11.84	2.37	4.99	3.54	0.13		3	14	5	9	1	1	3				4	2		2	1
21	SYRIA	0.05	4.19	12.00	2.36	4.99	3.66	0.00		4	15	11	4			7	4				1		1	2
22	GULF	0.04	4.06	10.72	1.67	2.61	2.98	0.47		3	10	4	6		2	2					3			3
23	WE	0.04	3.89	11.29	1.42	2.05	3.36	-0.09		6	13	0	13							8	4			1
24	IS	0.06	3.88	15.65	3.00	9.13	7.16	-2.28		8	59	2	57	2						1	24	16	9	7
25	THAT	0.06	3.82	16.46	3.08	9.97	8.31	-2.79		11	80	4	76					4		49	2	9	4	12

Figure 6: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of 'says', based on MI score



Figure 7: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of ‘adds’, based on MI score

A broader look at all 45 collocations of ‘says’ and all 9 collocations of ‘adds’ shows that not a single collocate refers to a female proper noun or to the female pronoun ‘she’. This confirms the BBCM-M’s focus on men when reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news, as the most unusually frequent metaphysical actions are generally performed by men. Moreover, as is revealed by the proper nouns in the collocate list of ‘says’, the men who perform the act of saying are men in authority: ‘Dr Muhammad al-Sa’idi’, a Saudi Islamic preacher, ‘Jabir al-Harami’, chief editor of the Qatari newspaper al-Sahrq, ‘Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi’, a Sunni Islamic cleric who is head of the International Union for Muslim Scholars and the Syrian Information Minister ‘Umran al-Zu’bi’. This shows the BBCM-M’s discursive construction of Saudi Arabia’s image through the perspective of men of authority.

6.3.1.3 Othering Women and Selfing Men of Authority

A wordlist-based analysis of the personal identity subtheme highlights an othering process that clearly takes place in the SC; the majority of word types that signify that subtheme appear in the form of the self versus the other (see Table 20).

The Self Word types	The Other Word types
'we' (no. 37, freq. 335), 'I' (no. 57, freq. 240)	'they' (no. 35, freq. 352), 'them' (no. 59, freq. 234), 'their' (no. 36, freq. 344)

Table 20: The most frequently used pronouns for the self and the other

Examining the top three-word clusters of the selfing pronoun, 'I', shows that the Saudi self is the most frequent self in the corpus, as Table 21 shows. In fact, *all* instances that specifically refer to that 'Saudi self' are restricted to men in different forms of authority, with 19 of the 45 instances of the selfing pronoun 'I' referring to Saudi Arabians (no. 2, 3, 6, 11, 12, 15, 18, 19 and 20). Number 11, 'Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi', has the highest frequency in the SC. Remarkably, all instances of the Saudi self, when examined in their larger linguistic co-context, refer to men of authority, as Table 21 makes clear.

N	Refers to	Identity (from context if available or out of context)	Gender	Frequency
1	Robert Jordan	US Ambassador in Riyadh between 2001 and 2003	male	1
2	Al-Walid bin Talal	Saudi Arabian prince	male	2
3	Salman al-Dawsari	chief editor of Saudi Arabian al-Iqtisadiah newspaper	male	1
4	Dr Ftimah al-Samadi	Jordanian researcher specialising in Iranian affairs at the al-Jazeera Centre for Studies	female	2
5	Dr Amir al-Musawi	Iran's Cultural Attaché to Algeria	male	1
6	Husayn Shubukshi	Saudi writer and political analyst	male	2
7	Dr Ubayd al-Wasmi	law professor at Kuwait University	male	1

N	Refers to	Identity (from context if available or out of context)	Gender	Frequency
8	Dr Muhammad Sari'ati	advisor to former Iranian president Muhammad Khatami in Tehran	male	2
9	Tammam Salam	Lebanese Prime Minister	male	4
10	Jabir al-Harami	chief editor of al-Sharq, Qatari newspaper	male	2
11	Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi	Saudi Islamic preacher	male	9
12	Muhammad al-Milfi	a Saudi journalist specialising in security affairs	male	2
13	Jihad al-Khazin	was chief editor of the Lebanese Daily Star	male	3
14	Ali al-Jarradi	publisher and chief editor of the Yemeni newspaper al-Ahali	male	1
15	Ibrahim al-Nahhas	professor of political science at King Saud University in Saudi Arabia	male	1
16	Al-Zu'ibi	Syrian Information Minister	Male	3
17	Abd al-Baqi Shamsan	professor of political sociology at Sanaa University	male	3
18	Dr Sadaqah Fadil	a member of the Saudi Shura Council and Foreign Policy Committee	male	1
19	Dr Abdallah al-Askar	Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Shura Council	male	1
20	Dr Tawfiq al-Rubay'ah	Saudi Minister of Trade and Industry Dr Tawfiq al-Rubay'ah	male	1
21	Chris Van Hollen	Congressman and member of the Democrat leadership at the US House of Representatives	male	1
22	Dr Turki Saqr	a columnist in Syrian government owned newspaper Tishreen	male	1
Total frequencies			45	

Table 21: The selfing pronoun 'I'

An analysis of the details presented in Table 21, the authority that the Saudi Arabian self enjoys takes various forms:

1) royal, such as Saudi Prince Al-Walid bin Talal;
2) journalistic or academic, such as Salman al-Dawsari, chief editor of al-*Iqtisadiah* newspaper, Husayn Shubukshi, Saudi writer and political analyst, Ibrahim al-Nahhas, professor of political science at King Saud University and Muhammad al-Milfi, a Saudi journalist specialising in security affairs;
3) governmental, such as Dr Sadaqah Fadil, a member of the Saudi Shura Council and Foreign Policy Committee and Dr Abdallah al-Askar, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Shura Council and the Saudi Minister of Trade and Industry Dr Tawfiq al-Rubay'ah
4) and religious (Islamic), such as Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi.

However, the analysis of the selfing pronoun, 'we', reveals that the Saudi 'we' is not the most commonly occurring 'we', as Table 22 shows. Instead, it frequently refers to the Syrian Information Minister al-Zu'bi and Omani Foreign Minister bin Alawi (both occur seven times in the top three-word clusters of 'we' [numbers 1 and 2 in Table 22]). However, when the occurrences of the Saudi 'we' (numbers 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18 and 19) are examined, it is clear that, as with 'I', it is mainly used in relation to men of authority, except for number 9, which shows that only 2 of the 12 instances of the Saudi self refers to Dr Madhawi al-Rashid, a Saudi-born author and professor of social anthropology living and working in the UK.

N	Refers to	Identity (from context if available or out of context)	Gender	Frequency
1	Al-Zu'bi	Syrian Information Minister	male	7
2	bin Alawi	Omani Foreign Minister	male	7
3	name not given	editor of al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper	N/A	3
5	Yusuf al-Kuwaylit	journalist at *al*-Riyadh newspaper	male	1
6	Bandar bin Sultan	Saudi Intelligence Chief Prince	male	2
7	Mansour al-Turki	Saudi Major General	male	1

N	Refers to	Identity (from context if available or out of context)	Gender	Frequency
8	Abd al-Bari Atwan	an Arabian journalist who was the founder of the London-based newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi, then resigned and became the editor-in-chief of Raʾy al-Yawm newspaper	male	2
9	Madhawi al-Rashid	Saudi Arabian-born author and professor of social anthropology living and working in the UK	female	2
10	Dr Turki Saqr	a columnist in Syrian government owned newspaper Tishreen	male	1
11	Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani	Sheikh of Qatar	male	1
12	Salman al-Oudah	Saudi Islamic preacher	male	1
13	Mishari al-Dhayidi	journalist at al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper	male	2
14	Tammam Salam	Lebanese Prime Minister	male	2
15	Al-Qaradawi	Islamic scholar and preacher	male	3
16	Dr Abdallah al-Shammari	Saudi academic and researcher	male	1
17	Vladimir Putin	Russian President	male	1
18	Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi	Saudi Islamic preacher	male	1
19	Faris Bin Hizam	Saudi journalist	male	1
20	Dr Ubayd al-Wasmi	law professor at Kuwait University	male	1
Total frequencies				40

Table 22: The selfing pronoun 'we'

When the top three-word clusters of the othering pronoun, ‘they’, are examined, it became clear that the othered Saudis (numbers 1, 2, 7, 11, 18 and 21 in Table 23) are ‘Saudi activists’, ‘Saudi scholars’, ‘Saudi leaders’, ‘Saudi officials’ and Saudi women.

N	Refers to	Frequency
1	Saudi activists	1
2	Saudi scholars	2
3	many Arab countries	1
4	mujahidin in Syria	1
5	Baghdad and Riyadh	1
6	US-Russia interests	1
7	Saudi leaders	2
8	Arabs	1
9	Saudi-Iranian relations	1
10	merchants and factories	1
11	Saudi officials	2
12	Syrians displaced in Lebanon	1
13	Huthist group	2
14	40% of owners of Saudi media channels outside the Kingdom	1
15	Yemenis	1
16	Sudanese citizens living in Saudi Arabia	1
17	opinions of Saudis	1
18	the notables of al-Qatif	1
19	social networks of terrorists	1
20	disagreement between Saudi Arabia and the US	1
21	Saudi women	1
22	Syrian people did not carry rifles	2
23	many countries	1
24	MB [Muslim Brotherhood] members	1

Table 23: The othering pronoun ‘they’

Based on the finding that Saudi women are not related to the ‘Saudi self’ because they do not appear on the concordance lines of the selfing pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’, it is not surprising to find that ‘Saudi women’ are othered in the SC, as Table 23 makes clear. However, examining the larger context of ‘Saudi scholars’ shows that it is the ‘Saudi religious scholars’ who are othered here. This is interesting as they were identified as a major part of the ‘Saudi self’ in terms of frequency in the analysis of the selfing pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’. Similarly, Saudi governmental bodies were identified as parts of the ‘Saudi self’, so it is interesting to find that ‘Saudi leaders’ and ‘Saudi officials’ are shown as othered in Table 23.

However, when the concordance lines relating to the othered Saudi religious scholars were examined, it became clear that the othering of those religious bodies further defines the ‘Saudi self’ when related to religion, because the othered Saudi religious scholars are those who are specifically described in the SC as thought to be extreme but ‘very modest, smooth, simple, and eager to preserve the book of God and the Sunnah of the messenger’. Similarly, ‘Saudi officials’ and ‘Saudi leaders’ are othered when events connected to them are related, in accordance with the syntax of the sentences in which they occur. Thus, unlike ‘Saudi women’ who are othered and given little attention, Saudi governmental bodies and religious scholars are not systematically othered in the SC.

6.3.1.4 Proper Nouns, Titles and Careers of Men

On the wordlist, the word types related to the personal identity subtheme are also related to authoritative bodies in society like ‘minister’ (no. 95, freq. 153), ‘president’ (no. 96, freq. 151) and ‘prince’ (no. 100, freq. 144). Similarly, the two main sets of keywords with positive values that denote the personal identity subtheme, proper nouns and titles and careers, highlight authoritative bodies. Interestingly, all the unusually frequent proper nouns, titles and careers in the SC are related to men who enjoy the authority in question, save for a few instances.

All titles and careers have an authority of some sort, whether governmental like ‘emir’ (31.65), ‘ambassadors’ (88.92), ‘custodian’ (47.37) and ‘spy’ (32.40) or societal like ‘writer’ (36.03), ‘Dr’ (198.15) and ‘anchor’ (128.94). A KWIC examination of these titles and careers showed that the authority enjoyed by the holders of these titles and

careers is mainly of a political nature and is enjoyed by men; for example, the concordance lines of the keyword ‘emir’ refer to the Emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, and the Emir of Qatar, Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. Similarly, the keyword ‘Ambassadors’ refers to male ambassadors from the US, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Qatar and the UAE. Interestingly, the concordance lines of the keywords related to societal authority, ‘Dr’ and ‘writer’, are not restricted to men, as ‘Dr Madhawi al-Rashid’ appears in the concordance lines of both ‘writer’ and ‘Dr’. This is notable as this particular woman was also identified in the analysis of the selfing pronoun ‘we’, where two instances referred to her. Her appearance in the KWIC analysis of the titles related to the societal authority associated with ‘Dr’ and ‘writer’ means a brief biographical account of her is required.

Dr al-Rasheed, in Arabic al-Rashīd but spelled al-Rashid by the BBCM-M, is, at the time of writing this thesis, a Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences Middle East Centre (About Me, 2018). The significance here lies in the fact that, although she is a descendent of al-Rasheed dynasty who ruled parts of modern Saudi Arabia and is commonly referred to as a Saudi author and academic, she is not a Saudi citizen despite once having a Saudi passport. Her passport was withdrawn by the Saudi authorities after they warned her not to publish her PhD thesis in 1997, which she did; they viewed it as a negative depiction of Saudi Arabia’s founder, King ʿAbd al-ʿAziz bin Saʿud (YouTube, 2018a). Prior to Saudi Arabian unification in 1932, Dr al-Rasheed’s family fought against the al-Saud dynasty to gain control of the Arabian Peninsula. Her grandfather was Muḥammad bin Ṭalāl al-Rashīd, the last Prince of Emirate of Ḥāʾil, also known as the Emirate of Jabal Shammar ‘the mountain of the Shammar tribe’, which is located in the north central area of Najd in today’s Saudi Arabia (Vassiliev, 2013).

This shows that the only woman who is selfed and commonly attracts the BBCM-M’s attention does not actually count as a Saudi woman. Indeed, she refuses to be introduced as such and always refers to herself as ‘كاتبة واكاديمية من الجزيرة العربية’, which is literally translated as ‘a female author and academic from the Arabian Peninsula’.

When the analysis of keywords related to proper nouns was undertaken, it proved to be challenging to identify the people behind the unusually frequent proper nouns in the BBCM-M’s coverage solely from the keyword list, for two simple reasons: these

proper nouns are out of their contexts, and they appear separated from any title or surname with which they are normally associated. Therefore, a KWIC examination was carried out by which each proper noun (whether first name or surname) was examined in its co-context (see Appendix 4).

An initial examination of the concordance lines of the keywords ‘Uways’, ‘bin’, ‘bu’, ‘Salih’ and ‘Rashid’ shows that few occurrences refer to females. For example, although ‘Rashid’ is a common Arab male name, the KWIC examination shows that 6 of its 12 occurrences refer to Dr Madawi al-Rashid’s surname; the remainder refer to the male first name ‘Rashid’. Similarly, 2 out of 27 instances of ‘Salih’, which is also a common Arab name for males, refer to ‘Huda al-Salih’ from the Saudi-owned pan-Arab newspaper al-Sharq al-Awsat.

Concerning ‘bin’, which literally means ‘the son of’ brings in the Nasab in the Arabic naming system; Nasab refers to the genealogy of an individual including their patronym (Notzon, et al., 2005, pp.20-21). The KWIC examination showed that 4 of 213 instances of the keyword ‘bin’ refer to news presenter ‘Khadijah bin-Qinnah’ in Doha. Similarly, the KWIC of ‘bu’, originally ‘abu’ and literally ‘the father of’, shows that two of nine instances refer to the surname of ‘Rosanna Bu-Munsif’, a female journalist at the al-Nahar newspaper in Lebanon. Finally, the KWIC examination of ‘Uways’ showed that all seven instances refer to ‘Ghadah Uways’, a Lebanese news presenter who lives in Doha, Qatar.

This shows that although women are identified as in the concordance lines of the keywords ‘Uways’, ‘bin’, ‘bu’, ‘Salih’ and ‘Rashid’, the majority of the concordance lines in fact refer to men such as ‘Abdallah bin Abdul-Aziz’. ‘Uways’, however, refers solely to ‘Ghadah Uways’, confirming that the BBCM-M discursively constructs an image of Saudi Arabia that is mainly focused on men of authority.

Moreover, the proper noun analysis also revealed a specific pattern: the dominance of men of authority in the keywords under examination such as the late Saudi king, ‘king Abdallah bin Abdul-Aziz’, specific male religious elites like ‘prophet Muhammad bin Abdallah’, Saudi religious leaders like ‘sheikh Muhammad al-Urayfi’ and ‘Muhammad al-Sa’idi’, male Saudi writers and thinkers such as the late ‘Jamal Khashuqji’ and Saudi leaders of terrorist groups such as al-Qaʿida’s leader in Yemen, ‘Ibrahim al-Rubaysh’. This shows that most, if not all, of the unusually frequent word

types that are related to proper nouns, titles and careers in the SC refer to men in authority. A further examination shows that the few instances in which women identified as unusually frequent in the data may be false positives, because similar spellings of male and female Arabic names caused the software to inaccurately identify a word type as unusually frequent. Interestingly, the name of Dr 'Madhawi al-Rashid', who is no longer a Saudi national, comes up in these few instances. Thus, the neglect of women in the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news is consistent, which shows how the first representation of Saudi Arabia in the SC was identified.

Coupled with the passiveness of Saudi women, this neglect of Saudi women colours the image of Saudi Arabian women with suppression and submissiveness. This, with the special focus on men, who enjoy authority, contributes to colouring the image of Saudi Arabia with masculinity and authority.

6.3.2 Rivalry with Iran and Reliance on the US

The second identified representation of Saudi Arabia in the BBCM-M's coverage is its image in relation to its rivalry with Iran and its reliance on the United States of America.

The focus on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is linguistically constructed through unusually frequent coverage on the division in Islam between Sunni Islam versus Shiʿi Islam, in which Saudi Arabia and Iran are the main players, opposing each other's interests either in conflicts and proxy wars in the region or acting against the Islamic sect of which the other is the most powerful representative. In relation to conflicts and proxy wars, there is a special focus on Syria, Yemen and Qatar. The Saudi reliance on the US is evident in the salience of Saudi-US relations in the SC, which shows it as having a pivotal role in shaping the future of Saudi Arabia and in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, the most common collocational pattern of the strongest collocation of 'Saudi', 'Arabia's', shows that there is a special focus on Saudi Arabia's 'support' and 'refusal', two acts directly related to its rivalry with Iran, as is detailed below.

6.3.2.1 Saudi-Iranian Rivalry

The linguistic construction of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry is achieved in several mechanisms detailed below.

6.3.2.1.1 Unusually Frequent Reporting on Shiʿi-Sunni Conflict

The third identity subtheme, cultural identity, is highlighted by keywords in the SC that are either related to religion or related to countries or nationalities. The religion-related keywords fall into three categories. The first is generally related to Islam: ‘fatwas’ (31.64), ‘creed’ (27.67), ‘scholars’ (185.16), ‘Shaykh’ (92.99), ‘ummah’ (33.28) and ‘God’ (25.52) as all of which are related to Islam in general. The second category involves words related to one of the two main Islamic sects: ‘shi'i’ (224.10), ‘ahl’ (51.10), ‘sunnah’ (87.88), ‘wa’ (79.09), ‘jama'ah (83.49), ahl al-Sunna wa-al-Jamāʿa refers to the adherents of Sunni Islam, ‘shi'is’ (96.67), ‘Azhar’ (52.30) and ‘Salafi’ (24.68), all of which refer to either Sunni or Shiite Islam. Finally, the relation to fighters who adhere to Islam is limited to the keyword ‘mujahidin’ (62.93).

In terms of number of keywords, the second category has the highest number. Not only does the keyword ‘shi'i’, meaning people who have adopted Shiite Islam, have the highest positive keyness value (224.10), but the plural form ‘shi'is’ also appears with unusual frequency in the SC, again with a relatively high positive keyness value (96.67). In other words, in a SC on Saudi Arabia (a largely Sunni country), word types related to Shi’is, who represent only 10–15% of Saudi Arabia’s total population (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019), are the most unusually frequent among all religion-related keywords. This focus is ideologically significant as ‘the relationship between Saudi Sunni and Shia has always been characterized by conflict’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).

Thus, the BBCM-M’s focus on the Shiite sect of Islam when reporting on Saudi Arabia highlights the rivalry between Islam’s two main sects, which is also evident in an analysis of the concordance lines of the keyword ‘ummah’. *Al-umma*, or ‘ummah’ as spelled in the data, is an inclusive concept that ‘does not recognize any geographical, linguistic or racial barriers’; it transcends the notion of an ideological community and is rather a ‘set of beliefs within a community, an exemplar of a community’ (Ataman, 2003, p.91).

The analysis showed that ‘ummah’ is used in three main patterns in the SC, none of which refer to Islam as currently being united. First, ‘ummah’ is used to show the possibility of uniting divided Muslims when Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī speaks of how the Islamic *umma* ‘was strong’ and Muslims can unite. Second, it is used to exclude Shi’is

rather than include them, as in the quotation the BBCM-M uses by Dr Sabir Abd-al-Da'im, Dean of the Faculty of Arabic Language at the University of al-Azhar: 'Saudi scholars are keen on clearing the ummah nation from any deviations, particularly attempts to spread Shiism'. The third pattern of using 'ummah' to highlight division rather than unity occurs in relation to the terrorist group al-Qaʿida. For example, 'Al-Qaʿida used these seemingly "innocent" accounts to play on the sensitive chords of identity, affiliation and the "ummah"'.

Focusing on the Shiʿi versus Sunni division in 'ummah', a collocation analysis of the keyword 'Shi'i' shows that its strongest collocate, based on MI scores, is 'tide' in the R1 position, as Figure 8 shows.



Figure 8: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of 'Shi'i', based on MI score

It is interesting to find, from the concordance lines of the pattern 'Shi'i tide', that the 'Shi'i tide' is threatening the Gulf States, as, for example, in the following concordance line: 'Shaykh of al-Azhar stressed al-Azhar's[30] rejection of the Shi'i tide and

[30] Al-Azhar is a Sunni mosque in Cairo, Egypt. It was founded in AD 972 by the Fāṭimid caliphate and in 1171 became a university-mosque that has had a powerful influence in the Islamic world – religiously, intellectually and politically – through the present day (Dodge, 1960).

interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf countries'. The Gulf States have citizens who adhere to Shiite Islam; in Kuwait, for example, 30% of the population are Shi'is, while religious affiliation in Bahrain is currently 70% mostly Shiʿi Muslim, with the remaining 30% of various faiths. This shows that the Shiite threat to Gulf States referred to in the corpus comes mainly from the outside rather than internal dangers and is visualised through the 'tide' metaphor. Thus, the BBCM-M's special focus on the divisions in Islam is directly related to Iran, because the source of the 'Shi'i tide' that threatens the GCC States has to be from outside those states. It also must have an overwhelmingly Shiite population, and the source has to perform the act of spreading, propagating or supporting Shiite groups beyond its borders. The only country that meets all these criteria is Iran.

6.3.2.1.2 Special Focus on Saudi-Iranian Proxy Wars and Conflicts: Syria, Yemen and Qatar

A concordance lines analysis shows Saudi Arabia as acting against that Iranian 'Shi'i tide' by taking a stand against the interference of Hizballah in Syria's civil war. 'Hizballah', as it is spelled in the SC, means 'party of God'. It is an Iranian-backed extremist group that was established in 1985; it follows Shiite Islam and is largely located in Lebanon (Norton, 2018).

The Saudi Arabia stance towards Hizbullah is identified from the following concordance lines that show Saudi Arabia acting, with the blessings of shuyukh al-ʾAzhar, against the 'Shi'i tide' for the welfare of the Gulf states: the 'Shaykh of al-Azhar stressed al-Azhar's rejection of the Shi'i tide and interference in the internal affairs of the Gulf countries', 'Al-Azhar clerics hail Saudi scholars' stance against Hizballah, Shi'i 'tide', Dr Afaf al-Najjar, Dean of the Faculty of Arabic and Islamic Studies at al-Azhar University 'explained that "the role of Saudi scholars is important in terms of warning of the Shi'i tide"' and 'Shaykh Rasmi Ajlan, member of the World League of al-Azhar's Graduates in Cairo noted that "the Shi'i tide tried to invade the kingdom of Saudi Arabia itself and tried even to control the holy mosques in Medina and Mecca"'.

When the cultural identity subtheme was examined in terms of frequency, it became clear that it is identified in word types of language, nationality and religion, with an emphasis on the latter two. Notably, an examination of the word types that make up the nationalities category reveals a discursive construction of Saudi Arabia that is

specifically related to Syria and Iran. ‘Syrians’ (no. 40, freq. 314) is the second most frequent nationality on the wordlist after ‘Saudi’ (no. 8, freq. 1,881), followed by ‘Iranian’ (no. 76, freq. 178).[31] This leads to a number of questions, such as, ‘Why is “Syrian” is the second most frequent nationality on the wordlist of a corpus on Saudi Arabia?’ and, ‘What is the nature of relationship between “Saudi” and “Syrians”, if any?’

These questions are answered by the findings of the wordlist analysis of the geographical identity subtheme, which suggest that the BBCM-M’s reporting on Saudi Arabia is directed towards zones of conflicts, particularly those in which Iran and Saudi Arabia are involved, such as Qatar, Yemen and Syria. The wordlist suggests that the semantic focus of the geographical identity subtheme is conflict rooted in the bitter Saudi-Iranian rivalry; the countries in which Saudi Arabia and Iran are clashing appear at the top of the wordlist. These countries are ‘Syria’ (no. 39, freq. 314), ‘Yemen’ (no. 93, freq. 155) and ‘Qatar’ (no. 97, freq. 151). ‘Iran’ also appears at the top of the list in geographic terms (no. 44), with a high frequency (286).

In order to unveil the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the salient countries of Syria, Yemen and Qatar, three-word cluster analyses of both the relations word types ‘with’ (no. 13, freq. 1,005) and ‘against’ (61, freq. 227) were conducted. They did not only confirm the salience of the countries in which Iran is involved in the SC but also defined the relationship Saudi Arabia has with them as mainly critical, threatening and worsening.

The analysis of the three-words clusters of ‘with’ and ‘against’ shows that the most common cluster of both is ‘X Saudi Arabia’[32], where ‘X’ stands for either ‘with’ or ‘against’. When the cluster ‘with Saudi Arabia’ was examined, it became clear that the

[31] The word type ‘British’ (no. 68, freq. 207) was not taken into consideration because 206 of its 207 instances refer to the following disclaimer: ‘(c) 2014 The British Broadcasting Corporation. All Rights Reserved. No material may be reproduced except with the express permission of The British Broadcasting Corporation.’

[32] The analysis of the three-word clusters of ‘with’ shows that it appears most often in the disclaiming phrase ‘may not be produced except with’. However, clusters 9 through 56 show certain relations with ‘with Saudi Arabia’ being the most common cluster, with a frequency of 42. Thus, it is regarded as the most common among meaningful appearances.

most common patterns are the following: ‘relationship with Saudi Arabia’ (freq. 3), ‘relations with Saudi Arabia’ (freq. 4), ‘rapprochement with Saudi Arabia’ (freq. 7), and ‘border with Saudi Arabia’ (freq. 6). However, an examination of these clusters shows that most of the Saudi relations in the corpus are depicted critically, as Table 24 shows.

Serial	Nature of relationship	Example
1	currently critical, but seeking reconciliation	‘Ruhani… says he wants to establish cordial relationship **with Saudi Arabia’**
2	currently critical, but has to be reconciled	‘new rulers in Yemen have to have good relationship **with Saudi Arabia’.**
3	currently critical and if reconciled will lead to problems	‘the relationship **with Saudi Arabia** would be useless for Iraq and would raise the objection of the Iranian leadership’,
4	currently critical and if reconciled will lead to a positive outcome	‘Al-Sadr and al-Hakim on supporting the rapprochement **with Saudi…** and that the Saudi leadership can influence the Iraqi national reconciliation process in a positive way’.
5	weakening	‘Yemeni tribes loyal to Saudi Arabia in these regions were overpowered, leaving only the influential sheikhs who differed in their political stands and their weak relations **with Saudi Arabia** due to its policy opposed to the popular revolution in Yemen’.
6	currently critical and will worsen	‘Tehran and Damascus have a strategic decision to escalate the confrontation **with Riyadh** rather than the rapprochement with it’.

Serial	Nature of relationship	Example
7	strong	'Al-Azhar is proud of its historical and deep relations **with Saudi Arabia**'.
8	hesitant	'the Iraqi Government under the leadership of Nuri al-Maliki, is divided over the rapprochement **with Saudi Arabia** between a line represented by al-Sadr and Ammar al-Hakim'.
9	on the verge of crisis	'Yemen: there are signs of a diplomatic crisis **with Riyadh** over workers'.
10	becoming dangerous to the Saudi Arabian security	'has become a danger threatening the security of the kingdom in view of the control of the Huthis over vast tracts on the border **with Saudi Arabia** and in view of the Shi'i current that may besiege it from the south'
11	leading to discontent from Yemenis towards Saudi Arabia	'the manifestations of the Yemeni people's indignation against Saudi Arabia were evident in many popular activities, armed tribal confrontations on the border **with Saudi Arabia**…'

Table 24: Saudi Arabian relations from the analysis of the 'with Saudi Arabia' cluster

Notably, the larger context analysis of the same three-word clusters shows that the critical relations that Saudi Arabia has are with Yemen (six instances), Iran (one), Qatar (one), MB in Egypt (one), al-Azhar (one), influential Yemeni sheikhs (one), Damascus and Tehran (one instance) and Iraq (eight). These appearances make clear the special focus on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry and the by-products of this dispute: critical relationships with countries in which Iran is involved, such as Yemen, Qatar, Syria and Iraq.

In a similar vein, the analysis of the three-word clusters 'against Saudi Arabia' shows that Saudi Arabia in connection with Yemen, Syria and Iran. The relations are mainly coloured with threat and shown as worsening, as is shown in and supported by the examples in Table 25.

Serial	Nature of relationship	Example
1	threatened by terrorism and the Huthi in Yemen	'the security and ideological threats to Saudi Arabia come from two sides.… represented by Da'ish… and… al-Huthi group…hold extremist ideologies **against Saudi Arabia**.'
2	unaccountable for funding terrorism	'Bin-Saqr cites a campaign led by the government of Nuri al-Maliki in Iraq **against Saudi Arabia** over the past few months, which involved accusing the kingdom of supporting terrorism'
3	threatened by other countries,	'the Saudi Hizballah, along with its brothers, the Bahraini, Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese Hizballah, has practically created a highway for the movement… This explains the extra Iranian self-confidence and the repeated threats **against Saudi Arabia** and Bahrain'
4	not threatened by the Omani's links to Iran	'this means that Oman's contacts with Iran should not necessarily be targeted **against Saudi Arabia** or the GCC'.
5	discontented by Yemenis	'the Yemeni people's indignation **against Saudi Arabia**… in Riyadh in 2000'
6	escalated against	'regarding the Jedda meeting, the atmosphere is extremely confusing, as President Bashar al-Asad has escalated his rhetoric **against Saudi Arabia** and made comments that do not imply he is keen on forgiving Jordan gratuitously'.
7	charged by the UN of human rights violations	'the charges **against Saudi Arabia** include details of violations of human rights, such as torture… Both were later released but have been banned from travel abroad'.

Table 25: Saudi Arabian relations from the analysis of the 'against Saudi Arabia' cluster

The word type ‘between’ is equally as important as ‘with’ and ‘against’ in revealing the relations Saudi Arabia is depicted as having in the SC. Thus, the four-word cluster ‘between Saudi Arabia and’ was examined. It showed that ‘between’ is restricted to ‘The United States’ (freq. 1), ‘UAE and Qatar’ (freq.1), ‘Russia’ (freq. 1), ‘Qatar’ (freq. 3), ‘Its neighbours’ (freq. 1), ‘Iran’ (freq. 5) and ‘France’ (freq. 1). This further supports the argument that the BBCM-M’s construction of the image of Saudi Arabia is based largely on its rivalry with Iran, which exacerbates the Kingdom’s troubled relationship with Qatar. Thus, the countries most associated with Saudi Arabia are ‘Iran’ (five instances) and ‘Qatar’ (three).

Examining the unusually frequent Arab countries or cities of conflict shows that the BBCM-M focuses on a common element when reporting on Saudi Arabia in relation to conflict; Iran has a role in the country or city of conflict, such as ‘Sanaa’ (58.57), ‘Jawf’ (41.69), ‘Asal’ (43.94), ‘Lebanon’ (61.38) and ‘Dar'a’ (52.73). Of course, Iran has long played a role in Lebanon (the first Arab country of conflict) since the Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982, where Hizbullah was founded. Between 2013 and 2015, Hizbullah played a key role in the sectarian divisions in Lebanon over the Syrian civil war. Iran also plays a significant role in that civil war (the second identified Arab country of conflict), which is also related to the Shiʿi-Sunni conflict even though it was not the main reason for the war. The Syrian conflict was detected in the following keywords: ‘Asal’ (43.94), which the KWIC shows as referring to the second half of the name of the Syrian city Khan-Alasal, and ‘Dar’a’ (52.73), another city in Syria.

In a similar manner, Iran plays a role in the Houthi-Saudi war in the third identified country of conflict ‘Yemen’, which is detected in the keyword: ‘Sanaa’ (58.57), the Yemeni capital and ‘Jawf’ (41.69), the largest Yemeni province on the border with Saudi Arabia. The Iranian involvement in Yemen involves arming and otherwise backing the Shiite militia group al-Houthi (Kronenfeld and Guzansky, 2014, pp.90-91), which is systematically spelled in the SC as al-‘Huthi’.

Among the Arab countries and cities of conflict in the BBCM-M’s coverage on Saudi ‘Qatar’ comes up as the most unusually frequent Arab country; it has the highest positive keyness value (117.70). Its capital, ‘Doha’, also appears as a keyword with positive keyness value (79.46), which means that the BBCM-M places a special focus

on Qatar when representing Saudi Arabia in relation to Arab countries with which it is in conflict.

Also highlighting the focus on the Saudi-Qatari conflict by the BBCM-M is the analysis of the second most unusual keyword in the relations theme, ‘differences’, which belongs to the against-relations subtheme and has positive keyness value (105.05). Examining the concordance lines of ‘differences’ reveals the following patterns in the R1 position: differences within (one instance), differences with (four), differences which (two), differences were (two), differences under (two), differences resulting (one), differences over (six), differences on (three), differences of (one), differences no (one), differences in (two), differences here (one), differences have (one), differences existing (one), differences emerged (one), differences break (one), differences between (eight), differences at (one), differences as (one), differences are (one), differences and (one) and differences among (two).

As this analysis shows, the most common two patterns are ‘differences between’ and ‘differences over’. Indeed, not only does ‘between’ frequently follow ‘differences’, but it also collocates strongly with it; a collocate list analysis shows that it is the strongest collocate with an MI score of 6.55 (see Figure 9).



Figure 9: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of ‘differences’, based on MI score

The strong MI score of ‘between’ as a collocate to ‘differences’ and the red font in the R1 position in Figure 9 mean that in the SC these two word types frequently come in the pattern ‘differences between’. When the concordance lines of this pattern were examined, it became clear that six of the eight instances were specifically related to the GCC-Qatar conflict (six of nine instances refer to GCC-Qatar conflict’), with a special focus on Saudi Arabia, such as ‘differences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, ‘differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia began in the mid-nineties’ and ‘differences between Qatar and the three other Gulf states’. This highlights the particular attention that the BBCM-M pays to the Saudi-Qatari conflict when using Arabic news sources to report on Saudi Arabia. The second pattern, ‘differences over’, explains the nature of these differences, as it becomes clear that the main differences between the GCC and Qatar are over Qatar’s ‘foreign policy towards Iran’, ‘foreign issues’, ‘Al-Buraymi oasis, headquarter of the Gulf central bank and other issues’. This shows that, although the coverage of Saudi Arabia by the BBCM-M includes words of different relations – with, against and neutral – Saudi Arabia’s differences with Qatar attract unusual attention from the BBCM-M when transediting news reports on the Kingdom.

The BBCM-M’s special focus on the Saudi-Qatari conflict is also evident from its focus on the Muslim Brotherhood group, MB or al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. The Muslim Brotherhood is an Islamist revival group that was established in Egypt after the British rule by Ḥasan al-Bannā in 1928 (Aboul-Enein, 2003). This group was a pioneer in implementing the ideologies of *al-Salafiyyah*, or simply Salafism, such as the thought of the Salafist scholars Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāniy and Muḥammad ʿAbduh, and in politicising Islam (Aboul-Enein, 2003). The MB was created with a reformist aim and to oppose the Western domination of Egypt. Later, the group’s followers became more violent and participated in the plot of assassinating of Prime Minister al-Nuqrāshiy Bāshā and Judge Aḥmad al-Khāzindār, which eventually caused the assassination of their leader, al-Bannā. This group was classified as a terrorist group by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and UAE in 2014; they accused it of attempting to topple their regimes (Foreign Affairs, 2019).

This group lies at the root of the crisis between Saudi Arabia and Qatar; it is designated as a terrorist group by the former and funded by the latter. In addition to supporting the MB, the Saudi-Iranian feud is another reason behind the recent, at the time of

writing this thesis, Qatari diplomatic crisis with Saudi Arabia, because Qatar has been said to have a foreign policy in relation to Iran that contradicts the interests of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states.

Thus, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Bahrain, with the Kingdom in the lead, imposed a trade and diplomatic embargo on Qatar, claiming that Qatar had been funding terrorist groups such as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and Ḥamās across the Middle East for decades (McKeown, Haji and Ferguson, 2016, p.322). These four countries also listed '59 individuals and 12 organisations on a "terror list"' (Aljazeera.com., 2017). The list includes the Chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī, and 18 prominent Qataris. Although Qatar rejects the list as 'baseless' (Aljazeera.com., 2017), it does admit to close links with Iran, which is not acceptable to Saudi Arabia, which believes that Iran is bringing instability to the region and jeopardising the interests of the GCC countries.

A collocate examination of 'Qatar' shows that it has 22 collocates in the corpus. These are verbs such as 'supported', 'says', 'has' and 'is', adjectives like 'Muslim' and 'Saudi', nouns like 'Arabia' (the second part of the name of the country of Saudi Arabia) and 'state', prepositions like 'from', 'by', 'and', 'to', 'with', 'for, 'on', 'of' and 'in', pronouns like 'he', and functional terms like 'that', the determiners 'a' and 'the' and the Arabic definite article 'al', as Figure 10 shows.



N	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_L	T	Log_R	Set	Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	QATAR	1.03	9.67	24.15	11...7	1...6	12.43	0.00		10	155	2	2		1		1		151		1		1	
2	SUPPORTED	0.12	8.09	15.01	16.69	55.93	3.30	2.24		2	11	4	7	1			3			4	3			
3	MUSLIM	0.07	5.96	12.60	6.61	20.55	3.11	0.24		2	10	0	10								2	2	4	2
4	STATE	0.09	5.95	13.96	6.36	32.90	3.94	-0.44		2	16	16	0				16							
5	FROM	0.05	4.67	12.84	3.99	11.59	3.96	-1.82		3	17	14	3					14		2				1
6	SAYS	0.04	4.66	11.31	3.04	6.76	3.04	-1.06		1	10	5	5	1			1	3			1	3	1	
7	ARABIA	0.05	4.43	13.22	3.62	10.29	4.37	-2.36		7	21	16	5	2	3	3	6	2				2		3
8	HAS	0.04	4.42	12.60	3.22	8.16	3.93	-2.06		3	17	0	17							16				1
9	THAT	0.04	4.04	15.03	3.40	10.32	6.30	-3.85		3	45	31	14	1	9			21			5	1	4	4
10	BY	0.03	3.74	11.36	1.10	1.20	3.46	-2.46		3	14	8	6		3		1	4		1		2	2	1
11	HE	0.03	3.70	10.34	0.82	0.69	2.92	-2.02		2	10	7	3	1	1	3	2			1	1	1		
12	AND	0.03	3.57	15.13	1.28	1.81	6.79	-4.61		8	55	25	30	2	4	6	2	11		19	2	1	3	5
13	TO	0.03	3.50	14.49	0.85	0.85	6.12	-4.38		6	45	23	22	8	5	3	3	4		6	3	2	6	5
14	WITH	0.02	3.47	11.08	0.38	0.18	3.40	-2.73		4	14	7	7		1			6				2	2	3
15	SAUDI	0.03	3.46	12.86	0.48	0.29	4.63	-3.64		7	26	17	9	4	4	7	2				2	1	4	2
16	IS	0.02	3.38	12.02	0.17	0.05	4.04	-3.34		3	20	5	15	1	2	2				12	1	2		
17	FOR	0.02	3.33	9.98	0.02	0.00	2.85	-2.38		5	10	5	5	1	2			2		3		1	1	
18	A	0.02	3.29	12.07	-0.12	0.00	4.11	-3.50		5	21	3	18	1	2						9	5	1	3
19	THE	0.02	3.02	16.31	-2.22	4.69	8.76	-6.02		9	100	44	56	8	9	25	2			2	18	14	9	13
20	ON	0.02	2.95	9.59	-0.83	0.68	2.75	-2.77		4	10	4	6	2		1		1		2		3		1
21	OF	0.02	2.87	13.37	-1.98	3.99	5.32	-4.77		6	38	33	5	2	4	6		21				1	3	1
22	IN	0.02	2.74	12.03	-2.06	4.52	4.25	-4.30		7	25	14	11	4	4	2		4				5	2	4
23	AL	0.01	2.53	9.93	-2.02	4.62	2.98	-3.56		3	13	5	8	1	1	3				2	1	3	1	1

Figure 10: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of ‘Qatar’, based on MI score

Based on MI scores, the verb ‘supported’ is the strongest collocate of ‘Qatar’. A KWIC examination of ‘supported’ in the R1 position to Qatar shows the following instances: ‘Qatar supported groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood’, ‘Qatar supported Muslim Brotherhood cells’, ‘Qatar supported Muslim Brotherhood figures in Saudi Arabia’ and ‘Qatar supported the change in the Arab world and stood against its former allies’. The concordance lines also show ‘supported’ in relation to ‘Qatar’ but in the R2 position: ‘Qatar has supported hostile media’, ‘Qatar has supported the Muslim Brotherhood’ and ‘Qatar has supported the parties that threaten the security and the stability of the Gulf States’.

Moreover, the BBCM-M’s special focus on the Muslim Brotherhood, which Qatar is said to ‘support’ against the interests of Saudi Arabia, is clear when the concordance lines of the word type ‘Muslim’ are examined. Fully, 105 of the 128 occurrences of ‘Muslim’ in the SC are actually related to the Brotherhood rather than to a person who adheres to Islam.

Finally, the collocation analysis of ‘Saudi’ has already revealed the BBCM-M’s depictions of Saudi Arabia through a political frame. They also reveal the focus of the BBCM-M on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry; the concordance lines of the two common

patterns of the strongest collocation of ‘Saudi’, that is to say ‘Arabia’s’, either show the Kingdom’s stance against Iran or the consequences of that stance, which comes in the form of Saudi Arabia’s refusal to allow members of Hizbullah to be appointed to the government of Lebanon or in its support of the Syrian opposition against the Iranian-backed Syrian regime. This special focus on the Shiʿa-Sunna conflict and proxy wars and conflicts related to the Saudi-Iranian rivalry colours the BBCM-M’s image of Saudi Arabia with conflict and hostility.

6.3.2.2 Saudi Arabian Reliance on the US

The interpretation of the wordlist and the keyword list also highlighted the indispensable American role in shaping the future of Saudi Arabia and on the Arab-Israeli file. However, ‘American’ (-35.30) and ‘America’ (-63.91) appear with negative keyness values on the keyword list; that is to say unusually infrequent in the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia compared to the 4UKBS. Nonetheless, a KWIC analysis of the word type ‘relations’ (no. 99, freq. 145) shows that the adjectives that precede it are of the following natures: aligned (with), aligned (uncertain), unaligned and finally relating to countries, as Table 26 shows.

Relations	Adjectives
aligned (with)	bilateral (freq. 10), brotherly (freq. 1), deep (freq. 1), friendly (freq. 1), good (freq. 6) and strong (freq. 3)
aligned (uncertain)	complicated (freq. 1), difficult (freq. 1), hazy (freq. 1), weak (freq. 1), secret (freq. 1), tense (freq. 2) and troubled (freq. 1)
unaligned	diplomatic (freq. 1), economic (freq. 2), foreign (freq. 1), future (freq. 1), international (freq. 1), public relations (freq. 2) and strategic (freq. 1)
relating to countries	Saudi-Iranian (freq. 5), US-Iranian (freq. 1), Iraqi-Iranian (freq. 1), Saudi-Iraqi (freq. 1), Arab-Israeli (freq. 1), Saudi-Qatari (freq. 5), Qatari (freq. 1), Iranian-Turkish (freq. 1), Qatari-Saudi (freq. 1), Jordanian-Saudi (freq. 1), Iraqi-Saudi (freq. 4), US-Saudi (freq. 2), the Saudi-US (freq. 6) and Saudi (freq. 3)

Table 26: Analysis of the concordance lines of the word type relations

As Table 26 shows, the adjectives related to countries refer mainly to the US, Iran and Qatar, which is an indication of the special focus on these countries in the SC. The

analysis so far has already identified the reasons behind the salience of Iran and Qatar, which is fundamentally the BBCM-M's particular focus on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. However, it is interesting to find of the adjectives relating to countries, 'the Saudi-US' has the highest frequency at six occurrences, which calls into question the relationship it has with Saudi Arabia in the SC. This is explained by interpreting the theme of action and status, which shows that the US has a significant role in both the future of Saudi Arabia and in the Arab-Israeli conflict despite the unusual infrequency of 'American' and 'America' in the BBCM-M's coverage when compared to the 4UKBS.

6.3.2.2.1 Linking the US to the Future of Saudi Arabia

The description in the previous chapter showed that the status theme discursively constructs the subthemes of the past, present and future statuses of Saudi Arabia. The interpretation showed that the past status is mainly constructed in relation to a) ideology and thought and b) relationships with Arab countries. The present constructed status is related to a) power, b) economy and c) ideology and policies, while the future status is constructed as both assertion and possibility. The certain future identified in the corpus lies in the three-word cluster 'Saudi Arabia will', which comes second in terms of frequency after 'will not be'. An examination of the cluster 'Saudi Arabia will' shows that Saudi Arabia's national, regional and international future depends on foreign policies, its current internal actions and one country: the US.

Saudi Arabia's national future depends on its foreign policy; for example, it will be free from funders of the terrorist group Hizbullah because it 'will deport anyone that supports Hizballah financially'. On a regional level, the future status of Saudi Arabia is also dependent on its current internal actions, as Saudi Arabia will not be able 'to reposition itself as a regional power that has political and economic weight and will remain hostage to old' notions if it does not undertake 'internal reforms'. Interestingly, the future regional status of Saudi Arabia is shown to depend on a country well outside the area – the US – as in 'The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will then agree to what the United States is doing and will be ready to shake hands with Iran'. Similarly, the future international status of Saudi Arabia depends on current internal actions, as in 'Saudi Arabia will lose a lot for adopting a policy consistent with the Israeli stance' and again related to the US, as in 'the United States and Saudi Arabia will continue to be the close and important friends and allies that we have been'.

6.3.2.2.2 Focusing on the US Role in the Arab-Israeli Conflict

When the keywords of the subthemes denoting the overarching theme of action were examined, it became clear that the most salient action in the category of physical actions is ‘visit’. A KWIC examination of ‘visit’ shows that the most common salient pattern is ‘visit to’. The concordance lines of this pattern show that 24 of the 48 instances are related to Saudi Arabia. The rest of the concordance lines are related to Egypt (three instances), China (one), Israel (five), Russia (three), India (one), the region (two), the Gulf (one), the US, namely New York (one), Middle East (one), Palestine, namely Gaza (one), France, namely Paris (one) and Iran (four, two of which are related to Tehran and two to the country itself).

When examining ‘visits to Saudi Arabia’, it emerges that 14 of the 24 ‘visits to Saudi Arabia’ were by American officials: 9 by President Obama, 4 by Secretary of State John Kerry and a single trip by Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. The remaining instances of ‘visit to Saudi Arabia’ refer to the visits of the following people: Hasan Rouhani, Iran’s president (two instances), former Yemeni president Ali Abdallah Salih (one), Iraqi Prime Mister Nuri al-Malki (one), Lebanese Prime Minister Tammam Salam (two), al-Azhar Shaykh Ahmad al-Tayyib (one), Iraqi President Fu’ad Ma’sum (two) and Iranian Foreign minister Javad Zarif (one).

A collocate list analysis of ‘visit’ also emphasises this, as the strongest collocations of ‘visit’, based on MI scores, are ‘Obama’s’ and ‘Obama’, as Figure 11 shows.



	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_L	T	Log_R	Set	Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	VISIT	1.04	9.84	24.03	11...9	1...4	11.95	0.00		12	143	3	3		3				137				3	
2	OBAMA'S	0.18	8.82	16.64	25.48	94.80	3.86	2.24		5	15	15	0				2	13						
3	OBAMA	0.11	7.15	14.07	11.60	39.81	3.29	1.01		7	11	5	6	1	2		2					1	1	4
4	DURING	0.09	6.83	13.47	9.72	31.78	3.13	0.83		7	10	7	3			1	6			1		1	1	
5	PRESIDENT	0.10	6.44	14.26	10.11	39.98	3.83	-0.14		6	15	7	8	1	1	2	3					3	4	1
6	RIYADH	0.08	5.96	12.88	6.94	22.56	3.26	-0.18		7	11	2	9		1	1				1	7			1
7	HIS	0.07	5.51	13.33	6.46	22.94	3.79	-1.07		8	15	14	1		2		4	6						1
8	US	0.07	5.43	13.25	6.19	21.64	3.78	-1.15		6	15	5	10	1	1	2	1				2	3	1	4
9	TO	0.06	4.75	17.95	10.30	75.72	9.48	-4.52		12	97	22	75	8	2	4		8		49	4	7	9	6
10	WILL	0.04	4.36	11.28	2.45	4.78	3.16	-1.77		7	11	6	5		2	2		2		4			1	
11	BY	0.04	4.33	12.82	3.10	7.77	4.14	-2.60		4	19	1	18				1			10	6		2	
12	ARABIA	0.03	4.09	11.90	2.08	3.77	3.65	-2.50		6	15	1	14			1					2	12		
13	SAUDI	0.03	4.03	14.29	2.94	7.67	5.55	-3.78		7	35	12	23	3	4	3		2		2	14	1	1	5
14	A	0.03	3.89	13.61	2.15	4.31	5.02	-3.64		10	29	16	13		1	1	4	10			4	1	5	3
15	FOR	0.02	3.47	10.12	0.33	0.13	2.88	-2.52		4	10	7	3	2	1	2	2						1	2
16	THAT	0.02	3.44	12.95	0.44	0.25	4.72	-3.99		6	27	20	7		1	4	13	2		2		2	1	2
17	ON	0.02	3.35	10.52	0.07	0.01	3.12	-2.91		5	12	10	2	3	1	3	3					1		1
18	THE	0.02	3.31	16.90	-0.12	0.00	9.47	-6.16		9	111	68	43	8	16	2	5	37		1	16	8	6	12
19	THIS	0.02	3.24	9.89	-0.16	0.02	2.83	-2.76		4	10	10	0		1		1	6						
20	#	0.02	3.17	11.81	-0.49	0.20	3.97	-3.83		6	20	8	12	6		2				1		4	3	4
21	IS	0.02	2.90	10.30	-1.08	1.19	3.12	-3.48		5	13	3	10		2	1				5		2	2	1
22	OF	0.02	2.89	13.15	-1.80	3.32	5.12	-4.91		8	35	18	17	1	2	1	14			5		1	6	5
23	AND	0.01	2.18	10.67	-3.62	15.97	3.39	-4.75		8	19	8	11	1	3	1	3			4	2	3	1	1
24	IN	0.01	1.70	8.62	-3.99	21.15	2.29	-4.44		9	11	4	7	1	3						2	2	2	1

Figure 11: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of 'visit', based on MI score

The most frequent collocational pattern of 'Obama's' is 'Obama's visit', and it often occupies the L1 position. Indeed, a KWIC examination of 'visit' has shown that the BBCM-M is concerned with visits to Saudi Arabia by American officials, mainly President Obama, when reporting on Saudi Arabia. The pattern 'Obama's visit' shows that the visits referred to are mainly to the Middle East: Saudi Arabia (seven instances), Israel (three) and the 'Gulf' (one). This pattern strongly suggests that the US has a pivotal role in Saudi Arabia for it is the most salient acting agent in the unusually frequent physical action of 'visit'.

The salience of 'Saudi Arabia' and 'Israel' in the concordance lines of the visits by Obama could be argued to refer to the mediating role that the US plays in Arab-Israeli relations and in the American role in Saudi Arabia in general. Indeed, the US has tried to balance between the interests of its strategic ally, Israel, and its broader interests in the Middle East (Marshall, 2002). Some of the US efforts date back decades; in 1951, it sought an agreement with King Abdallah I of Jordan, 'with whom some sort of settlement seemed possible', and 1953's Johnston Plan aimed 'for neighbouring countries to share water' (Marshall, 2002, p.215). This shows how the second representation of Saudi Arabia in the BBCM-M's coverage was identified as in relation to its rivalry with Iran and its reliance on the US.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter represents the second level in the corpus analysis, the interpretation of the wordlist generated and the keyword list. It has presented, first, the political nature of the BBCM-M's portrayals of Saudi Arabia using Arabic news output from March 2013 to March 2015. Second, it has presented two of the four main representations of Saudi Arabia in that coverage: Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women and Saudi Arabia in relation to its rivalry with Iran and its reliance on the US. It has also shown the mechanisms through which the linguistic constructions of Saudi Arabia were achieved and identified. These representations of Saudi Arabia significantly colour the image of the Kingdom with masculinity and authority and conflict and hostility. Chapter 7 presents the two remaining identified representations of Saudi Arabia in the SC, supported by the mechanisms that are used to linguistically construct them.

Chapter 7: Corpus Inquiry of themes and Representations at the Second Level (Part 2)

7.1 Introduction

Chapter 6 showed the political nature of the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia and presented two of the four identified representations of Saudi Arabia in that coverage with linguistic evidence derived from the second level of corpus-driven analysis, interpretation. This chapter presents two more identified representations of Saudi Arabia in the SC, supported by evidence from the corpus-driven analysis: Saudi Arabia and terrorism and Saudi Arabia's image in relation to power, policies and developments. These two representations are complex, as the representation of Saudi Arabia in relation to terrorism has three dimensions. Similarly, the Saudi Arabian representation in relation to power, policies and development has paradoxical features.

7.2 The Third and Fourth Main Representations of Saudi Arabia

7.2.1 Saudi Arabia and Terrorism: A Three-Dimensional Image

The interpretation showed that there is a clear concentration on terrorism in the BBCM-M's use of Arabic news items to cover Saudi Arabia in the 2013–2015 period. Not only do names of terrorist groups stand out as unusually frequent word types in the corpus – such as 'Qa'idah', as spelled y the BBCM-M, with a high positive keyness value of 808.52 – but a KWIC examination of keywords such as 'organisation' and 'organisations' also shows that they are mainly related to terrorist and militant groups.

The concordance lines show that 'organisation' is primarily used in the SC to refer to terrorist and militant groups mentioned above. Some of the concordance lines refer to the following: al-Qaʿida organisation, the MB organisation, the international organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIL, MB in Saudi society, the organisation of the Islamic State, and al-Qaʿida terrorist organisation in Yemen, with a few instances referring to other groups such as quality organisation, Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL) and political organisation. Similarly, the plural 'organisations', based on its concordance lines, refers to terrorists and militants such as 'DAI'SH and other organizations, extremist Sunni organizations, terrorist organization in Syria, ISIL and

its sister organizations and al-Qaʿida or other organizations' with only a few exceptions such as 'civil society organizations and intellectual organizations'.

The examination of the 'Qa'idah' word type shows that the BBCM-M's reporting on Saudi Arabia discursively constructs an image of Saudi Arabia in relation to that specific terrorist group, because 'Qa'idah' is the most frequent word type in the corporate identity subtheme, after 'corporation'. That term was discarded from the analysis because it only appears in the following disclaimer: '(c) 2014 The British Broadcasting Corporation. All Rights Reserved. No material may be reproduced except with the express permission of The British Broadcasting Corporation'.

An examination of the concordance lines of 'Qa'ida' shows that many verbs occupy the L2 position relative to that term: 'vanquishing' (1 instance), 'supporting' (1), 'supported' (1), 'says' (6), 'returning' (1), 'prevents' (1), notes' (2), 'joining' (3), 'joined' (7), 'help' (1), 'fighting' (1), 'facing' (1), 'enabled' (1), 'discusses' (2), 'deserted' (1), 'counter' (1) and 'assess' (1).

Out of these verbs, the lemma 'join' is the most salient; it occurs 10 times as either 'joining' (3 instances) or 'joined' (7 instances). An examination of these instances shows that, when reporting on Saudi Arabia in relation to al-Qaʿida, the BBCM-M creates three different dimensions of an image of Saudi Arabia as it relates to terrorism: 1) Saudi nationals joining or having joined al-Qaʿida, 2) Saudi Arabian youths being used by or attracted to al-Qaʿida and 3) Saudi Arabian authorities as fighting terrorism. The underlined segments in the following examples demonstrate those dimensions:

1) Saudis nationals joining terrorists' groups:
    - 'the story of another Saudi citizen named Salih al-Qar'awi…, a leading figure in the organization',
    - 'Asiri has been the number one on the wanted list of 85 men announced by the Saudi Interior Ministry at the beginning of 2009,
    - Asiri joined al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia,',
    - 'for the first time, we have seen some in Saudi Arabia…, joined al-Qaʿida',
    - 'in Saudi Arabia… joy over their sons joining al-Qaʿida',
    - 'Pan Arab TV show views Saudis joining al-Qaʿida in Syria, Iraq',

- and ‘Al-Shaddukhi… then joining al-Qaʿida’

2) Saudi Arabian youth being used by or attracted to al-Qaʿida:
   - ‘the number of Saudi youths who joined al-Qaʿida in Iraq exceeds 5,000, many of whom were killed’,
   - ‘fewer than 700 Saudi youths joined al-Qaʿida there. Many of them were killed in battles or suicide operations’.

3) Saudi Arabian authorities having to deal with Saudis joining terrorist groups:
   - ‘Saudi Arabia has collected samples of the DNA from the families of those who fled to the areas of fighting, or joined al-Qaʿida Organization’,
   - ‘returned to Saudi Arabia and stood trial’.

7.2.1.1 Saudi Jihadists as the Other Saudis

The first dimension in the image of Saudi Arabia in relation to terrorism is clear in the BBCM-M’s focus on al-Qaʿida, which ‘Saudi jihadists’ join and serve in high ranks, as reported in the SC. A collocation analysis of the most unusually frequent word type of terrorist groups in the SC that has the highest positive keyness value (808.52), ‘Qa’idah’, was carried out (see Figure 12).



N	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_l	T	Log_ll	Set	Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3
1	QA'IDAH	1.02	9.38	24.43	11...5	1...3	13.69	0.00		10	188	2	2	1		1			184			1
2	ORGANIZATION	0.21	7.89	17.50	24.67	13...7	5.27	1.26		8	28	3	25			3				22	1	1
3	AL	0.20	6.18	21.35	33.00	48...4	13.91	-3.28		10	199	189	10	2	3			184		2	3	1
4	YEMEN	0.08	5.77	13.17	6.89	24.05	3.54	0.25		4	13	1	12			1						5
5	BEEN	0.06	5.05	12.22	4.40	12.59	3.36	-0.36		4	12	5	7	4	1						4	2
6	HAS	0.05	4.30	12.79	3.00	7.45	4.14	-1.78		5	19	1	18	1						12	3	2
7	OR	0.04	4.20	11.12	2.06	3.62	3.14	-1.08		6	11	2	9		1	1				4	2	
8	BY	0.04	4.11	13.03	2.60	5.95	4.42	-2.17		5	22	21	1	2	1	3	15					1
9	WHICH	0.03	3.90	11.31	1.46	2.03	3.36	-1.62		3	13	7	6	4			3			2	3	
10	AS	0.03	3.67	10.84	0.84	0.74	3.19	-1.74		3	12	3	9		2		1					2
11	ARE	0.03	3.60	10.77	0.66	0.48	3.18	-1.81		3	12	6	6		4	2				4	1	
12	NOT	0.03	3.57	10.97	0.62	0.44	3.30	-1.95		3	13	2	11		2						9	
13	IN	0.03	3.46	14.74	0.66	0.57	6.43	-4.01		8	50	8	42	5		2	1			14	11	4
14	IT	0.03	3.43	11.04	0.27	0.11	3.39	-2.20		6	14	3	11	1	2						1	4
15	OF	0.03	3.43	15.60	0.59	0.51	7.48	-4.49		8	68	57	11	12	1	6	38					1
16	ARABIA	0.03	3.34	10.51	0.04	0.01	3.12	-2.07		2	12	1	11		1							7
17	SAUDI	0.03	3.28	12.89	-0.17	0.01	4.75	-3.35		3	28	12	16	5	2	1	4				6	6
18	THAT	0.03	3.22	13.13	-0.41	0.11	4.97	-3.56		5	31	19	12	5	4	2	8			2	4	
19	TO	0.03	3.12	13.90	-0.93	0.73	5.74	-4.10		4	42	20	22	7	3	2	8			4	9	
20	AND	0.02	3.09	14.26	-1.16	1.17	6.11	-4.32		9	48	10	38	1	3	1	5			20	6	4
21	FOR	0.02	3.05	9.69	-0.61	0.33	2.78	-2.10		4	10	6	4	2			4					
22	WITH	0.02	2.96	10.13	-0.88	0.74	3.02	-2.45		4	12	9	3	1			8					
23	A	0.02	2.86	11.35	-1.43	2.07	3.76	-3.22		3	19	5	14	1	3	1					3	2
24	#	0.02	2.81	11.60	-1.65	2.79	3.93	-3.40		4	21	10	11	1	4	3	2				2	1
25	IS	0.02	2.77	10.77	-1.56	2.53	3.41	-3.06		5	16	3	13	1			2			6	1	3
26	THE	0.02	2.63	15.71	-4.91	26.09	8.08	-5.74		9	93	55	38	10	25	3	17			1	12	9

Figure 12: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of 'Qa'idah', based on MI score

The collocations of 'Qa'idah' are mainly conjunctions like 'or' and 'and', determiners like 'which', 'that' and 'not', prepositions like 'of' and 'by', numbers like '#', auxiliary verbs like 'is', 'has' and 'are' and the Arabic definite article 'Al', which is commonly used as a prefix in al-Qaʿida. However, it is interesting to find that Yemen and Saudi Arabia are the only countries that collocate with 'Qa'idah'. Thus, a larger context examination of these specific countries as collocates of 'Qa'idah' was carried out using KWIC analysis with a special focus on the position they occupied most often in the collocates list: 'Yemen' in the R3 position, 'Saudi' in the R2 position and 'Arabia' in the R3 position, all relative to 'Qa'idah'.

The examination of 'Yemen' in R3 shows an association between Saudi Arabia, Yemen and al-Qaʿida. This association is the involvement of Saudi Arabian nationals in the 'Al-Qaʿida affiliate in Yemen'. What is interesting is that those Saudis referred to hold high ranks in al-Qaʿida; examples include the Saudi al-Qaʿida leader in Yemen, Ibrahim al-Rubaysh, and Muhammad al-Awfi, a former al-Qaʿida leader in Yemen. Indeed, the analysis of 'Saudi' in R2 and 'Arabia' in R3 relative to 'Qa'idah' confirms

the nature of the association of Saudi Arabia and Yemen through al-Qaʿida, as the following concordance lines show:

- ‘Al-Milfi says: ‘I believe that the charge that has been admitted by al-Rubaysh about the prisoners of al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia is not the first. The first admittance took place in the telephone conversation between Mish'al al-Shudukhi, a representative of al-Qaʿida, and his excellency the Saudi ambassador to Yemen. That proved that those held in Saudi prisons are from al-Qaʿida, and perhaps from very high levels in the al-Qaʿida organization’,
- ‘Ibrahim Asiri had… dropped out from his studies in his third year, and decided to join the extremists among the ranks of al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia’,
- ‘Asiri joined al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia, and infiltrated into Yemen in 2006 accompanied by his brother Abdallah’,
- ‘this episode discusses al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Sharayir begins the programme by saying: “Despite the end of the organization of al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia, the organization in Yemen is still trying to revive its presence in Saudi cities”’,
- ‘Al-Arabiyah TV programme discusses al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia, Yemen’.

Remarkably, an examination of the othering pronouns ‘them’ and ‘their’ clearly shows that ‘Saudi jihadists’ are othered in the corpus, as these pronouns chiefly refer to ‘Saudi jihadists’ (see Tables 27 and 28).

N	Refers to	Context-based identity	Frequency
1	Saudis who went to Syria to fight	Saudi jihadists	2
2	media	N/A	1
3	Saudis who joined al-Nusrah front	Saudi Jihadists	1
4	spies who were arrested in Saudi Arabia	spies who work for Iran	1
5	MB [Muslim Brotherhood] members	members of a designated terrorist group	1
6	Princes of the Saudi ruling family	Saudi royalties	1

Table 27: The othering pronoun ‘them’ analysis

N	Refers to	Context-based identity	Frequency
1	Saudi who went to fight in the ranks of al-Qaʿida	Saudi jihadists	1
2	Saudi youth attracted to conflict zones then return to their countries	Saudi youth jihadists	1
3	Saudis who fled to Syria	Saudi jihadists	1
4	misled Saudi nationals who joined Islamic groups to fight in Syria	Saudi jihadists	1
5	Saudi nationals who fought alongside al-Nusrah front in the Syrian al-Qalamun area	Saudi jihadists	1
6	Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar	N/A	7
7	Saudis return to their countries from Syria	Saudi jihadists	1
8	mujahidin after their return from Syria	Saudi jihadists	1
9	mujahidin who fled to Syria	Saudi jihadists	2

Table 28: The othering pronoun ‘their’ analysis

This shows that, in the BBCM-M’s linguistic construction of Saudi Arabia with respect to terrorism, ‘Saudi jihadists’ are clearly depicted as the ‘other Saudi’, which is the first dimension in the image of Saudi Arabia in relation to terrorism.

7.2.1.2 Saudi Youths Attracted to Terrorist Groups

Although most of the concordance lines above refer to the same identified association between Saudi Arabia and Yemen through Saudi al-Qaʿida leaders, one concordance line shows a significance behind the high ranks enjoyed by al-Qaʿida fighters of Saudi nationality. This is al-Qaʿida’s aim to use Saudi youths ‘as fuel for its bloody agenda, which has created a predicament for the Saudi authorities’. Indeed, a KWIC examination of ‘Saudi youth’ and ‘Saudi youths’ shows that the pattern of those youth being attracted, used as dupes and driven to their deaths by al-Qaʿida is salient, as the following examples show:

- ‘attracting Saudi youths to the zones of combat’,
- ‘using them of deceiving Saudi youths’,
- ‘are accused of driving Saudi youths to their death’,
- ‘who incite Saudi youths to jihad over State-own’,
- ‘after the fall of many Saudi youths in the fighting arenas’,
- ‘of strong influence on Saudi youths as millions read’,
- ‘particularly Saudi youths, to wage jihad in Syria’,
- ‘recent attempts to reach Saudi youths’,
- ‘how where the Saudi youths duped?’ [sic]
- and ‘Al-Qaʿida uses Saudi youths as fuel for its bloody’.

This shows that the second dimension in the Saudi image in relation to terrorism in the BBCM-M coverage from Arabic news output in 2013–2015, is Saudi youth being manipulated and used by al-Qaʿida.

7.2.1.3 Saudi Arabian Government Fighting Terrorism

The third dimension of Saudi Arabia in relation to terrorism appears mainly in the form of Saudi authorities having to deal with the issue of their nationals and youth who were manipulated to join al-Qaʿida. It shows the Saudi authorities as fighting terrorism in various ways, including 1) intolerance of ‘radicalisation’ by censoring material and of jihad by penalising it, 2) taking responsibility for those Saudis already involved in the act of jihad outside its territory by facilitating their return to the Kingdom to surrender and 3) by not funding terrorist groups, overtly or covertly.

7.2.1.3.1 Intolerance of ‘Jihad’ and ‘Radicalisation’

An examination of the keywords related to religion in the cultural identity subtheme shows that the keyword ‘Mujahidin’, Islamic fighters, is commonly used to refer to Saudi nationals involved in the act of jihad in Syria. The noun jihad in Arabic, from which the term was borrowed into English, ‘means to strive, to exert or to struggle. The object of exerting one’s utmost effort is often categorized as against a visible enemy, the devil, and/or aspects of one’s own self’ (Martinez, 2003, p.2). Thus, it is not inherently violent, as the utmost effort exerted upon oneself can be a form of disciplining oneself. Nonetheless, a KWIC examination shows that the term is mainly used in the sense of ‘fighting’, with the common pattern being ‘Mujahidin in Syria’. The

concordance lines of this pattern show that most instances are related to Saudi Arabia, as the following lines demonstrate:

- ‘Saudi royal decisions were suddenly issued to Saudi (mujahidin) in Syria to return to the (Kingdom) of Saudi Arabia’,
- ‘the royal Saudi decisions, the sharia fatwa, the temptations to facilitate the return of these (mujahidin) to Saudi Arabia, and… that might be targeted by (the mujahidin) in Syria after their return to the land of (Kufr) [unbeliever]’,
- ‘we do not believe that we shall see sheikhs like Muhammad al-Urayfi… on Twitter to support the mujahidin in Syria… and the latest decree by the Saudi Monarch forbidding ‘incitement’ to jihad’.

This reveals the underlying reason behind the unusual frequency of ‘Mujahidin’ in the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia as paying special attention to Saudi fighters who have become involved in the act of jihad in Syria. However, all instances of ‘Mujahidin in Syria’ that are related to Saudi Arabia actually highlight the efforts of the Saudi government to *stop* Saudi nationals from fighting ‘in Syria’, either through penalising the act itself or facilitating the return of those who wish to quit jihad, which is discussed below.

The Saudi authorities’ effort to stop terrorism are also revealed in the SC, where the most unusually frequent word related to the geographical identity subtheme, the ‘Kingdom’ (236.29), was examined. The examination showed that it has 27 collocates, 25 of which are shown in Figure 13.



N	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_L	T	Log_R	Set	Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	KINGDOM	1.00	9.10	24.62	10...5	1...4	14.70	0.00		14	217	0	0						217					
2	OUTSIDE	0.09	7.44	14.61	13.60	50.19	3.44	2.52		4	12	12	0				12							
3	ARABIA	0.14	5.64	17.90	14.96	12...6	8.20	-1.83		11	70	2	68		2							68		
4	SAUDI	0.08	4.53	17.14	7.71	46.33	8.50	-3.11		11	79	9	70	5	2			2			68	1	1	
5	SAID	0.04	4.40	11.04	2.41	4.71	3.01	-0.26		4	10	6	4			4	2			1	1	1	1	
6	FROM	0.05	4.22	12.56	2.68	6.16	4.01	-1.29		7	18	15	3	3	2	3	7			1			1	1
7	OF	0.06	4.18	18.36	7.15	44.75	11.02	-4.24		14	136	47	89	12	5	1	29			73	1	7	4	4
8	THE	0.06	4.14	20.20	10.57	10...4	16.71	-5.49		15	314	258	56	21	26		3	208		2	13	8	12	21
9	THEY	0.04	4.10	11.02	1.82	2.95	3.12	-0.69		5	11	4	7	3		1				1	1	1		4
10	HAS	0.04	3.97	12.31	1.93	3.48	3.97	-1.53		9	18	2	16		1	1				5	1	1	6	3
11	IN	0.05	3.89	16.53	3.57	12.37	8.34	-3.77		10	80	55	25	6	7		42			10	2	5	6	2
12	WILL	0.03	3.82	10.99	1.20	1.43	3.22	-1.10		5	12	4	8	3	1					3			4	1
13	THAT	0.04	3.51	14.50	0.88	0.97	6.12	-3.32		11	45	31	14	9	2	1	19			4	2	2	2	4
14	#	0.04	3.42	13.92	0.43	0.29	5.59	-3.16		7	38	16	21	7	2	6		1	1	2	2	8	2	7
15	WHICH	0.03	3.42	10.34	0.22	0.08	3.01	-1.38		5	11	4	7	1	2		1			5	1		1	
16	ARE	0.03	3.35	10.52	0.07	0.02	3.12	-1.57		7	12	5	7	1	3	1				1	2		4	
17	ITS	0.03	3.31	9.95	-0.03	0.00	2.84	-1.35		4	10	4	6	2	2						2	2		2
18	HE	0.03	3.30	10.22	-0.05	0.00	2.98	-1.49		6	11	9	2	2	2	5				1				1
19	AND	0.03	3.24	15.19	-0.50	0.13	7.09	-4.08		11	63	17	46	5	8	2	2			19	2	5	15	5
20	NOT	0.03	3.21	10.38	-0.27	0.05	3.09	-1.71		6	12	3	9		1	2				1	4		1	3
21	TO	0.03	3.18	14.58	-0.72	0.36	6.42	-3.85		11	52	34	18	3	4	4	21	2		5	4	2	2	5
22	IS	0.03	3.17	12.46	-0.54	0.21	4.44	-2.81		7	25	11	14	7	2	2				4	2	1	6	1
23	WITH	0.02	3.04	10.85	-0.77	0.53	3.40	-2.20		8	15	8	7	2	1		5			2	1		1	3
24	FOR	0.02	2.94	9.86	-0.89	0.75	2.89	-1.85		7	11	7	4	2	2		2	1		1		1		2
25	A	0.02	2.89	11.93	-1.47	2.12	4.15	-2.97		9	23	10	13	7	3						3	2	3	5

Figure 13: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of ‘Kingdom’, based on MI score

The screenshot in Figure 13 also shows that ‘Arabia’, ‘Saudi’, ‘Said’, ‘from’, ‘of’, ‘the’, ‘they’, ‘has’, ‘in’ and ‘will’ are the 10 strongest collocates of ‘Kingdom’ based on MI scores. However, the majority of these may not reveal any significance, as Saudi Arabia is commonly referred to as ‘the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’. Thus, the position ‘the’ enjoys, along with its tendency to precede ‘kingdom’ does not necessarily highlight either an ideological or a thematic significance. Similarly, the central position ‘Kingdom’ has and the frequent L1 position of ‘of’ do not indicate a significance in terms of ideology.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the strongest collocate of ‘Kingdom’ is ‘outside’ in the L2 position, as in ‘outside X kingdom’. ‘In’ is, interestingly, also a strong collocate of the keyword ‘Kingdom’, which generally refers to Saudi Arabia, as a KWIC examination showed. ‘In’ tends to have an L2 position relative to ‘Kingdom’, which means that the pattern ‘in X kingdom’ is frequent in the corpus at hand. This raises the question of what the patterns ‘in X kingdom’ and ‘outside X kingdom’ reveal about the

representation of Saudi Arabia in BBCM-M's coverage using Arabic news sources between 2013 and 2015.

A KWIC examination of the first identified pattern, 'outside X kingdom', shows that the events frequently referred to that take place outside Saudi Arabia are related to the following: Saudi nationals fighting or involved in jihad (six instances) and allegations that Saudi Arabia censors TV channels (four; see Appendix 5A). The frequent events that take place within Saudi Arabia, as the KWIC examination of the second pattern 'in X kingdom' showed, are as follows: human rights status (two instances), Syrian refugee affairs (four), TV channels and censorship (three), Saudi nationals who fighting or involved jihad (two), Sudanese expatriates (three) and pilgrimage (three; see Appendix 5B).

Examining the frequent events that take place within and outside the 'Kingdom' shows that there are similarities in the events that the BBCM-M focuses on, regardless of location: the involvement of Saudi nationals in fighting or jihad and the censorship of channels. When the jihad-related concordance lines were examined, it became clear that the BBCM-M represents Saudi Arabian authorities as an agent that is intolerant of 'jihad', as all instances of 'outside the kingdom' that are related to jihad report on the late Saudi monarch who 'issued laws criminalizing 'jihad' outside the kingdom and penalizing any Saudi that fights in Syria or Iraq or anywhere else with a prison sentence of up to 20 years'. The concordance lines related to 'jihad' in the 'in the kingdom' KWIC examination show that the BBCM-M coverage is of the same group of Saudi nationals who were involved in fighting or jihad outside the kingdom, but this time the issue is their status after returning to Saudi Arabia. This means that when the BBCM-M reported on Saudi nationals in relation to jihad between 2013 and 2015, it only referred to those who fought outside Saudi Arabia while representing the Saudi authorities as taking actions to curb terror, including issuing tighter laws to prevent it.

The second frequent event that takes place both inside and outside Saudi Arabia also highlights the Saudi authorities' efforts to fight radicalisation, which serves the welfare of both its own territories and other countries. Regardless of the truthfulness of the allegations that Saudi Arabia censors TV channels, the concordance lines show a Saudi Arabian official defending the country against the allegations that Saudi Arabia censors TV channels with offices located outside the country. Defending the

allegations of imposing ‘more censorship, Riyad Najm, chairman of the Audio-Video Media Commission in Saudi Arabia, said “that is not true…” Najm stated that the commission will supervise the religious channels that are accused of radicalism, as well as their bureaus and the material they broadcast from Saudi Arabia. He continued by saying, “as for their headquarters, they are located outside the kingdom and the commission does not have any authority over what is broadcasted from outside the kingdom’”.

The notion of Saudi Arabian authorities as ‘fighting terrorism’ is further proven when dividing actions are examined, as the concordance lines of the most salient dividing action – ‘terrorism’ (87.72) – show that Saudi Arabia has been at ‘war with terrorism’ and suffered greatly from it, as the following excerpts show: ‘renounce terrorism’ (one instance), ‘war on terrorism’ (four), ‘in the face of terrorism’ (one), ‘criminalizing all form of terrorism’ (one), ‘combating all forms of terrorism’ (one), ‘campaign against those who incite terrorism’ (one), ‘fighting global terrorism’ (one), ‘activating the law against funding terrorism’ (one), ‘Saudi Arabia suffered from terrorism’ (four), ‘Saudi Arabia fought terrorism and dried up its sources’ (one), ‘fighting terrorism’ (four), ‘fight terrorism’ (four), ‘eradicate terrorism’ (one), ‘counter-terrorism’ (three), ‘combating terrorism’ (four), active determination to and efforts made by the kingdom to ‘combat terrorism’ (two), ‘Saudi Arabia is the country hit hardest by terrorism’ (one), ‘anti-terrorism (forty-two), ‘reject violence and terrorism’ (one), and ‘against terrorism’ (one). This shows that the third dimension in the image of Saudi Arabia in relation to terror, Saudi Arabian authorities as fighting terrorism, is linguistically constructed first by showing the Saudi authorities as intolerant of ‘jihad’ and ‘radicalisation’.

7.2.1.3.2 Taking Responsibility for ‘Saudi Jihadists’

The Saudi authorities are also shown as taking responsibility for those Saudis who are already involved in acts of jihad outside the Kingdom. In the concordance lines of ‘Saudi authorities’, the following pattern is common: ‘Saudi authorities + verb’. A closer examination of this pattern shows that Saudi authorities take the subject position in the sentences in which the pattern is located. The entities that follow the verbs of the subject ‘Saudi authorities’ show that those authorities are mainly related to Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia, Saudi fighters in Syria who wish to return to Saudi Arabia, al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia, spy cells in Saudi Arabia, diseases in Saudi Arabia and

sectarian violence. Of these, the most salient sub-patterns are 1) ‘Saudi Arabia’ + verb + Saudi nationals involved in fighting abroad, 2) ‘Saudi authorities’+ verb + terrorist groups and 3) ‘Saudi authorities’ + verb + sectarian violence. The first salient sub-pattern generally shows Saudi authorities as trying to facilitate the return of Saudi nationals who fought in Syria or elsewhere, as the following examples show:

- ‘Saudi authorities will be responsible for them [the Saudis who fought in Syria]’,
- ‘Saudi authorities are working with the Islamic and non-Islamic organizations… to secure the return of any Saudi fighters’,
- ‘the Saudi authorities gave an amnesty period to any Saudi national who fought in Syria’,
- ‘the period ended in the middle of March, but it appears that the Saudi authorities extended the amnesty period’,
- ‘the Saudi authorities hope that hundreds of Saudi citizens will return’,
- and ‘the Saudi authorities issued instructions… to provide all possible facilities for any Saudi national who wants to abandon the armed organizations in Syria’.

The second salient sub-pattern shows Saudi Arabia as fearing the return of al-Qaʿida fighters and countering the expansion of terrorist organisations, as the following shows: ‘Saudi authorities “fear” returning al-Qaʿida fighters’ and ‘the Saudi authorities believe that their main priority is to fight the expansion of DA'ISH and other organizations, such as al-Nusrah Front’. It also shows that ‘Al-Qaʿida’ no longer exists inside the Kingdom and that Saudi Arabia ‘fears the return of al-Qaʿida’. However, the Saudi authorities ‘released over 1,000 persons accused of affiliation or sympathy with al-Qaʿida’, which could undermine the alleged efforts expended by Saudi authorities to ‘fight’ terrorism. It is evident from the context that ‘the release was in response to the demands of al-Qaʿida’, which could be a special case of negotiations between the Saudi authorities and al-Qaʿida, as an excerpt above shows that ‘Saudi authorities are working with the Islamic and non-Islamic organizations… to secure the return of any Saudi fighters’. Thus, the image of Saudi Arabian authorities represented as distinct from terrorists and as fighting terrorism is maintained in the corpus.

7.2.1.3.3 Not Funding Terrorists

The second salient word type of physical actions is ‘financing’ (51.31); it has the second highest keyness value among physical actions, after ‘visit’ (217.19). The KWIC

analysis of ‘financing’ reveals that the pattern of Saudi Arabia’s denial of the allegations concerning funding terrorism is salient. This denial is based on the argument that the Saudi government plays no part in the financing of terrorist groups, because it is mainly conducted by ‘personal donations’, which the Saudi government is ‘controlling’ in its ‘fight’ against terrorism.

Examining the concordance lines of ‘financing’ shows two salient patterns that can be simplified as ‘doing Y to the financing of X’ and ‘financing of/for/from X’; the X is in all instances related to terror as the following excerpts show: ‘financing terrorism’, ‘financing of terrorist’, ‘financing of terrorism’, ‘financing from sympathizers with terrorist’, ‘financing of terrorism and terrorist’, ‘financing for terrorist cells’, ‘sources of terrorism financing’, ‘eliminating the sources of terrorist financing’, ‘the fight against terrorism and its financing’, ‘dealing loosely with terrorism and its financing’, ‘controlling the financing’ and ‘stopping financing groups’.

A close examination of the concordance lines shows one instance where Saudi Arabia was allegedly financing terrorism, which is located in remarks by Congressman Chris Van Hollen, a member of the Democrat leadership in the US House of Representatives, who states that ‘Saudi Arabia should start with stopping financing groups associated with al-Qaʿida in Syria’ before it tries to make the US intervene in Syria militarily. However, the remaining concordance lines show the government of Saudi Arabia as an agent in ‘fighting’, ‘uncovering sources’, ‘controlling’, ‘eliminating’ and ‘imposing control’ over ‘terrorist financing’, mainly through two people: Abd-al-Aziz bin-Saqr, director of the Gulf Research Centre, and Dr Nasir al-Shahrani, a member of Saudi Shura Council. They narrate the ‘successful’ actions of Saudi Arabia in its ‘fight against terrorism’, which is evident in the capture of a large terror cell of 60 members and the seizure of 900,000SR (nearly £180,287).

This shows that the image of Saudi Arabia in the BBCM-M’s coverage is linked to terrorism. However, there are clear distinctions that the BBCM-M is drawing in this portrayal as it linguistically constructs a three-dimensional image, one element of which relates to Saudi nationals who have joined terrorists groups, notably al-Qaʿida. The other two are related to the Saudi youth who are manipulated by terrorist groups and to the Saudi authorities, who are in a war with those terrorist groups.

7.2.2 Saudi Arabia's Paradoxical Image: Power, Policies and Developments

The fourth main representation of Saudi Arabia identified through the interpretation of the wordlist and the keyword list is marked by an obvious paradox: first, in relation to power, second to policies and third to developments.

7.2.2.1 Power Struggle: Regional and International

The first paradox detected in the portrayals of Saudi Arabia in the BBCM-M's coverage is related to power struggles at the regional and international levels, especially as they relate to the West. Saudi Arabia is shown as both strong, vital and leading and as isolated, suffering and regionally threatened. Similarly, it is shown as having a strong economy due to 'oil', which enables it to have a 'grip on the West' and as losing its grip on the West because the West no longer needs 'oil'.

The Arab-related keywords in the geographical identity subtheme were categorised into a) Arab countries and cities of conflict, b) Arab countries and cities of agreement and c) Saudi-related cities. An examination of keywords of the second set shows that even when the BBCM-M reports on Saudi Arabia in relation to countries of agreement, it is in reference to the agreements Saudi Arabia makes with other countries in the face of the Iranian threat in the region, in which Saudi Arabia is Iran's most powerful rival. This not only emphasises the identified focus on the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the SC but also shows the heavy influence that Saudi Arabia wields regionally.

This is evident from the special attention that the BBCM-M pays to the GCC states; both 'GCC' (274.05) and 'Gulf' (155.20), which refers mainly to the GCC, have high positive keyness values. A collocation examination of 'Gulf' shows that it has 30 collocates in the SC, with 'states', 'cooperation', 'council', 'countries', 'other', 'region', 'security, 'Arab', 'Iran' and 'have' as the 10 strongest collocates, based on MI scores. The majority of these collocates are to be expected, given the positions they occupy in the collocation list relative to 'Gulf'.

For example, 'states' occupies the L1 position as in 'Gulf states', as does 'cooperation' with 'Gulf cooperation'. 'Council' occupies the L2 position as in 'the Gulf X council', which usually refers to the Gulf Cooperation Council, 'countries' occupies L1 position, as in 'the Gulf countries', and 'Arab' occupies the R1 position, as in 'the Arab Gulf'. Thus, the 10 top collocates of 'Gulf' do not reveal any ideological significance; they

merely refer to the name of the GCC, except for ‘other’, ‘security’ and ‘Iran’. There is potential ideological significance in the position those three collocations occupy in relation to ‘Gulf’: ‘other’ in the L1 position, as in ‘other Gulf’, ‘security’ in the R1 position, as in ‘Gulf security’, and ‘Iran’ in the R5 position, as in ‘Gulf X X X X Iran’.

To determine what those mean, a KWIC examination was conducted. The concordance lines of ‘other’ in the L1 position it occupies relative to ‘Gulf’ shows that Saudi Arabia is the heavyweight in the region; it is the main force in the GCC and takes the lead at the council while the remaining states are referred to as the ‘other GCC states’. The leading role of Saudi Arabia is related to the welfare of those ‘other GCC States’. This is evident in the salience of the pattern ‘Saudi Arabia/Saudis and other GCC countries/states. Indeed, a KWIC examination of the second unusual top collocate of Gulf, ‘security’, shows that Saudi Arabia’s decisions to ‘withdraw its ambassador from Qatar’ and place sanctions on ‘Hizballah’ is in fact due to ‘the threat’ they pose to ‘Gulf states security’. This depicts Saudi Arabia as a dynamic force that acts for the ‘security’ of the Gulf states against two threatening bodies (one main, one peripheral). The main threatening body is ‘Iran’, which ‘poses a threat to the Gulf security’, and the periphery is ‘Qatar’, which is ‘undermining Gulf security’ and ‘exposing Gulf security to danger’ through its relationship with the main threatening body, Iran. This highlights both the regional and international power of Saudi Arabia as it acts against ‘Iran’ and ‘Qatar’ for the sake of the GCC states.

The analysis of the most unusually frequent word type in the keywords of the relations theme ‘stance’ also highlights the regional power of Saudi Arabia. A KWIC examination of ‘stance’ shows that the L1 position is occupied by the following: ‘US’, ‘this’, ‘the’, ‘similar’, ‘scholars’’, ‘Saudi’, ‘Riyadh’s’, ‘anti-Qatar’, ‘political’, ‘of’, ‘my’, ‘memorable’, ‘latest’, ‘Jordan’s’, ‘its’, ‘Israeli’, ‘Iraqi’, ‘Iran’s’, ‘historic’, ‘Gaza’, ‘firm’, ‘Arab’ and ‘a’. Out of these word types, ‘Saudi’ is the most frequent in the L1 position relative to ‘stance’ (as in ‘Saudi stance’). A contextual examination shows that that the main Saudi stances that the BBCM-M reports on are as follows:

1) Saudi Arabia’s stance against the MB,
2) Saudi Arabia’s stance against Qatar,
3) Saudi Arabia’s stance towards the Egyptian crisis,
4) Saudi Arabia’s stance against revolution in the Arab world.

The first Saudi stance has been described as ‘firm’; it ‘pressured’ other Arab countries, especially Jordan. By using ‘its financial and political weight’, Saudi Arabia might be ‘exerting pressure on Jordan’. This stance is directly linked to the second stance, which is Saudi Arabia’s anti-Qatari stance in which Saudi Arabia is also said to pressure Jordan to adopt a similar stance: the Kingdom is ‘pushing [Jordan] towards complete turning against the Muslim Brotherhood Group’. However, Jordan is resisting, which signals a decrease in the power Saudi Arabia has in the region, thus creating a paradoxical image of Saudi Arabia’s power on a regional level.

This paradoxical image is further emphasised in the third identified stance above, which is related to the Egyptian crisis. On the one hand, the Egyptian uprising is said to be ‘historic’ and to have ‘saved not only Egypt but the entire Arab world’. On the other, in the fourth stance, it is said that Saudi Arabia has always been against change and revolutions in the region, which led Saudi Arabia to suppress ‘these revolutions either through a military intervention or by equivocating and supporting the anti-revolution forces’. Due to this, ‘the kingdom has failed in evaluating the critical phase of moving from failed regimes to new…. As a result, Saudi Arabia's name has become linked to the concept of counter-revolution.… This made the kingdom lose its reputation in the region and diminished the evaluation of the Saudi stance, which, in turn, reflected positively on the regional power competing against the Saudi role in the Arab world’.

The paradoxical image of Saudi Arabia in power relations is also evident in the analysis of the present-status word types; on one hand, it shows that Saudi Arabia’s regional role of is strong, vital and in a leading position:

- ‘the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the gateway to ties with regional countries’,
- ‘Saudi Arabia is a country of heavy weight in the region’,
- ‘Saudi Arabia is considered the primary sponsor of the GCC initiative’,
- ‘Saudi Arabia is the only country that stands honestly with the Syrian people’,

On the other hand, however, the current status of Saudi Arabia is also identified in the corpus as isolated, suffering and not taking a leading role on regional and even national levels. For example, ‘Saudi Arabia is the country hit hardest by terrorism’, ‘Saudi Arabia is now paying out of its own asset in the entire region’. It is also shown as struggling in terms of the situations in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon; ‘Saudi Arabia is

gradually losing its influence in Yemen as Iran's influence grows through the Ansar Allah armed group (Al-Huthi's group)', 'Saudi Arabia is quickly losing its influence on its border strip', it 'is competing with Syria which had controlled the presidential elections in 1989 and 1998 by imposing the election of President Ilyas al-Hirawi', 'the assassination of al-Hariri which led to the withdrawal of the Syrian Army on 26 April 2005 brought back the kingdom's presence to Lebanon… because Saudi Arabia is angry' and 'Saudi Arabia is trying to find a way around its inability to prevent a presidency vacuum in Lebanon'.

Similarly, on an international level, the Kingdom is shown as a strong ally of the US; it is 'the strongest strategic ally in the region' and 'the coordination between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is durable and ongoing'. However, it is also shown as 'worried about the signs of an initial reconciliation between Washington and Tehran' for it is 'isolated' from the US-Iranian talks; it is watching 'with suspicion and caution the speedy dialogues' between Iran and the West. It is also shown as suffering in the Iranian media: 'the media affiliated to Iran say that Saudi Arabia is the side that supports the various groups of the al-Qaʿida Organization'. This also clearly portrays Saudi Arabia in relation to power in a paradoxical fashion at both the regional and international levels.

Also related to the international level is Saudi Arabia's oil-based economy, which is on one hand shown as a source of wealth and power and on the other hand as no longer needed. The second portrayal is signalled by the BBCM-M's negligence of the 'oil' in its coverage of Saudi Arabia, demonstrated by unusually infrequent reporting on 'oil' from Arabic news sources. This is empirically obvious, as 'oil' holds the highest negative keyness value (-330.10) of all the keywords in the geographical identity subtheme related to power and the natural resources of specific geographical areas; 'gas' is at -48.57 and 'energy' at -96.96. This neglect could be an indication of the decreasing value of oil to the West.

However, a KWIC analysis of the pattern 'oil and', because 'and' strongly collocates with 'oil' in R1 position, shows the first portrayal of 'oil' as representing wealth and power to GCC countries whose markets are located 'outside' the region as in 'Gulf States have wealth in the form of oil, and our markets are outside'. The concordance lines also show that Saudi Arabia is the wealthiest and thus the most powerful of the

GCC countries, with power over those buyers located ‘outside’ the region, as in ‘Saudi Arabia is the first producer of oil and it possesses one-fourth of the world's known oil reserves’.

When the countries related to ‘oil’ in Saudi Arabia were examined, it became clear that those buyers are mainly the US and, potentially, Russia, because an agreement is planned between Saudi intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan and Russian President Vladimir Putin. The KWIC analysis of the pattern ‘oil and’ also shows that ‘oil’ is associated with ‘military’, which emphasises the power that oil means for its sellers. It also unveils the nature of oil trade between Saudi Arabia and the West, which is largely oil for arms. For example, ‘Bandar stressed the importance of enhancing relations between the two countries, saying that the language of interests can reveal large areas of cooperation, giving numerous examples in the economic, investment, oil and military arenas’. However, the KWIC analysis also shows a contradictory representation of oil as a source of power; it shows that the need for oil is no longer quite as urgent and that other countries are no longer obliged to the Saudi status.

This is evident in **‘**Saudi Arabia thought that the US Administration would continue to be ready to fight the Saudi wars by proxy under the pressure of the need for oil …, but the reality proved the contrary of this’, and ‘it seems that Riyadh has not realized the significance and gravity of Obama's policy of transferring the US strategic focusing from the Middle East to the Pacific Ocean’. This will have consequences for ‘the oil and gas maps, the financial crisis, and the balances in Europe’. This paradox shows that the regional and international power of Saudi Arabia are shown in the BBCM-M’s coverage as coloured with struggle and instability.

7.2.2.2 Policies Concerning the Syrian Civil War and the Huthi Conflict

The second paradoxical representation of Saudi Arabia is related to its foreign policies, as Saudi Arabia is shown both as supporting the ‘armed’ Syrian opposition while ‘fighting Jihad’ in that same country. It is also shown both as ‘an ally’ to the ‘Huthi’ and ‘a foe’ to that same group.

7.2.2.2.1 ‘Banning Jihad in Syria’ while ‘Supporting Armed Syrian Opposition’

The previous analysis showed that Saudi Arabian authorities are fighting terrorism. In doing so, the Kingdom has banned jihad in Syria and elsewhere in the world. However,

it is also shown in the SC as aiding and supporting the ‘armed Syrian opposition’, which highlights a paradox in Saudi Arabian foreign policies in relation to the Syrian file.

This is evident in the collocation analysis of the second most unusually frequent word type (after ‘Saudi’ [1360.89]) related to the cultural identity of countries and nationalities: ‘Syrian’, with 38 collocates. Based on the strength of collocations as measure by MI scores, the following are its ten strongest collocations: ‘refugees’, ‘opposition’, ‘crisis’, ‘file’, ‘army’, ‘regime’, ‘people’, ‘issue’, ‘weapons’ and ‘president’, as Figure 14 shows.



Figure 14: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of ‘Syrian’, based on MI score

It is not surprising to find that most the collocations of ‘Syrian’ are related to the Syrian civil war, which was raging during the data collection timeframe of 2013–2015 and remains very much an issue as this chapter is being written. It should be noted, however, that although civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, it escalated in 2013, after the first chemical attack by the Syrian regime in December 2012; seven people were announced to have been killed by ‘poisonous gas in Homs’ (Armscontrol.org, 2018).

Thus, the BBCM-M's focus on the Syrian civil war from 2013 to 2015 could be due to the urgency of events in Syria.

However, when 'refugees' and 'opposition', the two strongest collocations of 'Syrian', are examined through KWIC examination, one pattern appeared common: Saudi Arabia's 'support' of 'Syrian refugees' and the 'Syrian opposition', which is 'armed'. The forms that this 'support' takes, in the SC, are all of the following: 'aid and tents', 'US$ 10 million', 'donations' and 'military and security assistance'. See the following concordance lines:

- 'the Saudi grant estimated at US$ 10 million that has been provided in the form of in-kind aid and tents for Syrian refugees',
- 'Ayman Muflih stressed that KSA donations continue to support Syrian refugees present in the kingdom through the same commission',
- 'Dara'a is the crossing point of Saudi military and security assistance to the armed Syrian opposition'
- 'Al-Humud stressed the role of the KSA in supporting Jordan to be able to perform its humanitarian role in the Syrian file through the provision of continuous support to the Syrian refugees in the kingdom'.

The cultural identity-related keywords analysis shows that the BBCM-M represents Saudi Arabia with an image that is marked by paradox; at the same time that Saudi Arabia is shown as banning 'jihad' in Syria, it is shown as being involved in the Syrian civil war by taking a side and giving support to the 'armed Syrian opposition'.

Another paradoxical image related to Syria is found in the SC by examining the keywords with positive values connected to relations. Based on the keyness value and the larger co-context[33], 'especially' is the most unusually frequent keyword of relations,

[33] 'Except' is the keyword of relation that has the highest keyness value (351.02) of all keywords of relation. However, an examination of the concordance lines showed that 102 of its 113 occurrences are stated in the header of translated news articles in the phrase 'no material may be reproduced except with the express permission of The British Broadcasting Corporation.' This means that it does not have significance in terms of relations; it is thus eliminated, and the examination is directed towards the next most unusual word type in the BBCM-M's reporting of Saudi Arabia's relations: 'especially'.

with a 118.80 keyness value. The concordance lines of ‘especially’ show that ‘especially in’ (19 instances) is the most frequent pattern in comparison to the other patterns identified as taking the R1 position with ‘especially’: ‘especially after’ (8), ‘especially since’ (11) and ‘especially the’ (9). Indeed, a collocation analysis shows that ‘in’ is the second strongest collocation, based on MI score, of ‘especially’ (after ‘#’) and that it generally takes the R1 position, as Figure 15 shows.

Collocate List (unsaved)

File Edit View Compute Settings Windows Help

N	Word	Dice	MI	MI3	Z	Log_L	T	Log_R	Set	Texts	Total	Total Left	Total Right	L5	L4	L3	L2	L1	Centre	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5
1	ESPECIALLY	0.73	9.94	21.99	79.19	53...0	8.05	0.00		7	65	0	0						65					
2	#	0.03	4.22	13.73	3.32	9.09	4.92	-4.45		5	27	15	12	1	5	3	5	1			1	1	5	5
3	IN	0.02	3.77	13.58	1.71	2.79	5.07	-5.06		6	30	11	19	4	3	2	2			17			2	
4	THE	0.02	3.40	15.94	0.51	0.32	7.95	-6.79		7	77	32	45	6	8	10	8			6	22	2	9	6
5	SAUDI	0.01	3.10	10.27	-0.53	0.27	3.06	-4.40		4	12	7	5	2	2	2	1			2	3			
6	AND	0.01	3.07	12.12	-0.84	0.69	4.23	-5.37		5	23	16	7	1	3	7	5					3	1	3
7	OF	0.01	2.78	11.56	-1.77	3.40	3.91	-5.54		6	21	9	12	3	1	4	1				1	4	6	1
8	TO	0.01	2.48	9.88	-2.18	5.51	2.96	-5.15		6	13	8	5	4	2	2					1	1		3

Figure 15: Screenshot of collocation relationship display of ‘especially’, based on MI score

To understand the significance of this pattern, a KWIC analysis was conducted of ‘especially in’; it showed that 14 of the 19 instances refer to countries and places. Table 29 displays the names of the countries and places that followed the ‘especially in’ pattern and how many times a country or a place is identified in the same pattern. It should be noted, however, that these countries are identified from the larger context rather than the R2 position that follows ‘in’ from ‘especially in’; in many instances, the R2 position is occupied by a list of countries, such as ‘especially in Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and other countries, including Saudi Arabia itself.’ Thus, all the countries that follow ‘in’ are taken into consideration in Table 29, rather than solely the country that occupies the R2 position.

Name of country or place	Number of occurrences
the eastern region	1
the north	1
Arab arena	1
Kuwait	1
other countries	2
the gulf	1
Palestine	2
Yemen	2
Iran	1
Bahrain	2
Syria	4
Lebanon	2
USA	1
Britain	1
Saudi Arabia	2
Iraq	3
Egypt	2

Table 29: Analysis of the ‘especially in’ pattern related to countries

Table 29 above shows that the most common country to follow the ‘especially in’ pattern is ‘Syria’, with four instances. Thus, when the BBCM-M reported on Saudi Arabia during the study timeframe, an X ‘especially in Syria’ that is worthy of unusual frequent coverage. The nature of this X can be further identified by closely examining the KWIC of the pattern ‘especially in Syria’. That examination shows that Saudi Arabia’s support of developments in Egyptian policies of reconciliation with the Syrian regime and making deals with Russia (an ally to Iran, Saudi Arabia’s longstanding rival) weakens its position in the area, especially in Syria. This is because it contradicts its support to the Syrian revolution, which highlights a paradoxical stance adopted by Saudi Arabia on the Syrian file.

7.2.2.2.2 Saudi Arabia and the ‘Huthi’: a ‘Foe’ and an Occasional ‘Ally’

In a similar vein to Saudi Arabia’s paradoxical foreign policy on the Syrian file, the concordance lines of the second most salient militant group, the Huthi, shows Saudi

Arabia as both an ally and a foe to the 'Huthi'. Examining the concordance lines of the keyword 'Huthists' shows potential significance in the L2 position, as the Saudi stance towards this group, whether involuntary or not, is an 'alliance', as items 2, 5 and 6 in Table 30 shows.

N	Word occupying L2 position to 'Huthists'	Related to	Context
1	against	the al-Ahmar family leaders and the leaders of the Hashid tribes who have engaged in wars along with their Salafist allies	'against the Huthists in the governorates of al-Jawf and Amran'
2	with	Saudi Arabia	'Saudi Arabia reportedly forms alliance with Huthists to 'punish' Yemen'
3	attacked	the Reform Party, the government, the Salafis, and the tribes of Kutaf and Ahim	'those who attacked the Huthists in Yemen over'
4	with	Qatar	'on Qatar's role, … during the tensions with the Huthists and managed to hold truces over the past years, …'
5	with	Saudi Arabia	'Tamih went on to stress that 'Saudi Arabia was forced to enter into an alliance with the Huthists as a strategic ally …'
6	with	Saudi Arabia	'to pressure him [Hadi] with the Huthists stick.'
7	support	Qatar	'there are cells in the UAE and Saudi Arabia that have ties with Qatar, and you support the Huthists, who pose a threat to Saudi security…'

N	Word occupying L2 position to 'Huthists'	Related to	Context
8	empower	Iran	'deal 'to empower the Huthists to control the political decision making in the country.'
9	towards	the former Yemeni president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi	'exploding the situations on more than one front to weaken Hadi's grip which will make negotiations with him to wrest concessions towards the Huthists and Saudis easier.'

Table 30: Analysis of the 'XX Huthists' pattern from concordance lines

The concordance lines of the 'XX Huthists' pattern above reveals an interesting feature in the Saudi-Huthi conflict; Saudi Arabia serves as an occasional ally to its foe, the Huthis. This indicates that Saudi Arabia was struggling to prioritise its aims in Yemen, which governs its policy when dealing with the Huthi conflict. Saudi Arabia's Yemen strategy, as shown in the SC, ranges from allowing the Huthis to achieve victory against its old Salafi ally, the al-Islah party (commonly translated as 'reform party') for the purpose of vanquishing the MB group and its affiliates to forming an alliance with the Huthi group to force Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the late Yemeni president, to sign border agreement.

This paradox in Saudi Arabia's policies in relation to the Syrian civil war and the Huthi serves to colour the image of Saudi Arabia with confusion; on one hand, Saudi Arabia bans jihad in Syria, but on the other hand it 'supports armed opposition' with which the 'Saudi jihadists' fight. This confusion is also related to its policies on the Huthi, with which Saudi Arabia is both in conflict and an occasional ally.

7.2.2.3 Developing While Failing to Develop

The third paradoxical image of Saudi Arabia is in relation to development; on one hand, Saudi Arabia is shown as developing, but on the other, it is 'failing to develop', especially in relation to its penal and societal laws.

The analysis of the status keyword 'development' (43.91) was carried out using KWIC, and the paradox in Saudi Arabia's development was revealed, because it became

clear that only a few instances of the concordance lines of ‘developments’ refer to Saudi Arabia. These instances a) show developments in the Saudi-Iranian relationship, b) are actions related to the Saudi stance on the Syrian crisis, c) refer to certain Arab countries that Saudi Arabia is supporting financially, such as Lebanon and Jordan, and d) discuss the fields of science and technology in Saudi Arabia:

- ‘the US secretary of state, speaking in Washington, welcomed the visit invitation extended to the Iranian foreign minister by Riyadh… this development’,
- ‘explaining the development in the stand of Saudi Arabia on the Syrian crisis since Dar'a's first incident all the way to what is happening today’,
- ‘at the end of last year, the KSA was quick to sign a Saudi grant to Jordan for a development projects agreement at a value of US$ 787 million’,
- ‘al-Hariri, the father, assured Saudi Arabia of its role and money in Lebanon through the Saudi Development Fund and all the sources of construction and development financing’,
- and ‘the Crown Prince to sign an agreement with the Chinese National Space Administration… Such an agreement will contribute to the development of the department of space research, communications, and satellites’.

Although most of these developments are of a political nature, they do show that a development is taking place in Saudi Arabia. In contrast, the concordance lines of ‘development’ also show that Saudi Arabia is failing to develop socially (especially in relation to ‘fatwas’) and in relation to its judiciary system, as the following concordance lines show:

- ‘the Saudi news in the international press today are no more than jokes… not to speak about the flaws in the development… particularly the political ones’,
- ‘while Saudi Arabia benefited from the economic and industrial developments it achieved, it rejects any development of its penal code’,
- ‘Saudi Arabia.... Now it seems to be alone in the role of a monitor who is apprehensive of the development of events in the region’,
- ‘the media pick up Saudi fatwas as an example of everything that is odd, underdeveloped and reactionary’,
- ‘the Arab world also wants this Saudi ‘other’ to be a mirror that does not reflect the extent of its own development’,

- ‘today, we find that the Western media search for this different ‘other’ that is outside the context of time to measure the extent of its difference, development’.

The paradoxical representation of Saudi Arabia’s developing versus its failure to develop is also evident in the negative value of the keyword ‘growth’ (-31.78). This negative value reflects the unusual infrequency of ‘growth’ compared to the RC, offering statistical evidence of the BBCM-M’s decision to avoid that word type. This avoidance corresponds to the BBCM-M’s representation of Saudi Arabia as failing to develop. Through the positive keyness value of ‘duality’ (48.34), another image of Saudi Arabia that is marked by paradox is detected in the BBCM-M’s coverage. An examination of the concordance lines of ‘duality’ resembles the idea conveyed in the analysis of ‘development’, as it describes the paradoxical status of Saudi authorities: a reformist king, Abdallah bin Abdulaziz, and reactionary scholars who ‘cling to the past’ in their ‘fatwas’ that gain national and international attention.

This shows that the image of Saudi Arabia’s status represented by the BBCM-M is, like its representation of Saudi Arabia’s power struggle and policies, marked by a paradox that colours its image with disorder and even chaos.

7.3 Conclusion of the Corpus Analytical Unit

With the aid of corpus tools, this analytical unit began with the aim of exposing the knowledge that the BBCM-M has constructed about Saudi Arabia and eventually transmitted to the English reader by addressing the first and second research questions (see chapter 1). The analysis took place at two levels: categorisation and description (chapter 5) and interpretation (chapters 6 and 7). Through a semantic fields-based categorisation and description of the wordlist and the keyword list, three main overarching themes in the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output between March 2013 and March 2015 were identified. In order of salience in the SC, these are identity, action and status and relations.

The second level of analysis, interpretation, led to two main findings. First, when the BBCM-M reports on Saudi Arabia’s identity, action and status and relations from Arabic news in the 2013–2015 period, the nature of the BBCM-M’s coverage of Saudi Arabia is largely political. Second, in that same coverage, the BBCM-M constructs an

image of Saudi Arabia with four main representations: as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women, in a rivalry with Iran and reliant on the US, as having a three-dimensional image in relation to terrorism and a paradoxical image relating to power, policies and developments.

All four identified representations colour the images constructed of Saudi Arabia with suppression and submissiveness of women, masculinity and authority, conflict and hostility, terrorism, and disorder and chaos. These, in Moscovici's terms (2000), are the social representations through which Saudi Arabia's four main representations in the BBCM-M's coverage for the English reader are made familiar. These social representations indicate a selectively stereotypical knowledge construction of Saudi Arabia as they resonate with the existing system of representations of Arabs and Muslims in Western literature and media (Said, 1978).

Chapters 8, 9, and 10 are dedicated to the CDA, in which the forms of rewriting chosen by BBCM-M's professionals, its transeditors, and the power negotiation between the source and target language and culture through transediting are discovered, explained and analysed.

Chapter 8: Critical Discourse Analysis Investigating Forms of Rewriting and Power Dynamics

8.1 Introduction

This chapter and chapters 9 and 10 are the second analytical unit in this thesis: CDA. They are concerned with the power play between the source and target languages and cultures through transediting. Thus, the two parts of research question 3) will be addressed:

> What are the forms of rewriting chosen by the BBCM-M's transeditors when reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic-language news items from 2013 to 2015? What are the dynamics of power between the source language (Arabic) and the target language (English)?

In order to answer these questions, a qualitative analysis with a special focus on the first identified representation of Saudi Arabia, as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women, is conducted following a developed model of the DHA that is structured as follows:

1. Contextual triangulation
    - 1.1 The history and archaeology of texts (ST) and organisations (ST-TET)
    - 1.2 The institutional frames of the specific context of a situation (ST-TET).
    - 1.3 The intertextual and interdiscursive relationships (ST-TET)
2. Linguistic triangulation
    - 2.1 The specific contents or topics of a specific discourse (ST-TET)
    - 2.2 Investigation of discursive strategies (nomination and predication ST-TET)
    - 2.3 Linguistic Means and the Specific Context-Dependent Linguistic Realizations (intensification and mitigation ST-TET)

As the acronyms ST-TET suggest, this model is an adapted model of the DHA that was encouraged by the fact that the data under examination is transedited rather than raw (untranslated). Therefore, a comparative analysis is embedded in the analytical framework in both the contextual and linguistic triangulations. The contextual triangulation in the adapted model aims to reveal the potential forms of rewriting at a macro level, whereas the adapted linguistic triangulation examines it at a micro level.

8.2 Three Case Studies

After identifying the most commonly selected Arabic news source by the BBCM-M when representing Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women (known as source X for the time being), three case studies compromising three levels of CDA are conducted. 1) with a special focus on source X, an in-depth analysis of a news item that is, according to the criteria explained below, deemed emblematic of Saudi Arabia's representation in question is carried out. 2) Then, the consistency of the findings of the first case study are tested by conducting an analysis of three news items selected from the same news source (source X). 3) An investigation of the consistency of the findings beyond that most frequent news source (source X) is carried out; four more news items that include the same linguistic construction of Saudi Arabia but come from different news sources are examined. The first case study is presented in this chapter, and the remaining two are presented in chapters 9 and 10.

8.3 News Item Selection for the Case Studies and Design

In order to identify source X, the frequency of the news items that linguistically construct Saudi Arabia with the representation in question had to be calculated, but it is important first to outline how a news item is deemed linguistically emblematic of the representation of Saudi Arabia in question.

A news item, in this thesis, is deemed representative of Saudi Arabia's depiction as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women if it frequently, or strongly in the case of collocations, includes the linguistic mechanisms identified in the interpretation of the wordlist and the keyword list as linguistically constructing the first representation of Saudi Arabia (see chapter 6). These are: 1) unusually infrequent reporting on women; 2) linguistically constructing women as acted upon while men of authority are acting; 3) the othering of Saudi women and selfing of Saudi men of authority; and 4) mainly reporting on proper nouns and the titles and careers of men.

An Arabic news source is deemed the most frequently selected news source by the BBCM-M when it has the highest number of news items that linguistically construct the image of Saudi Arabia with the linguistic mechanisms mentioned above. Thus, news items were retrieved using WordSmith 7 tools by looking up the most frequent word

types, the keywords with the highest keyness values (whether negative or positive) and the strongest collocates that revealed the first representation of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women. This identified 59 news items that linguistically construct the image of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from acting women (see Appendix 6). Moreover, it shows that these 59 items come from 16 news sources, with al-Quds al-Arabi being the most frequent news source (14 articles); see Table 31.

N	News source	Located	Published	Number of news articles
1	Akhbar al-Khalij website	Manama	Daily	1
2	Al-Arabiyah TV	Dubai	24-hour news channel	7
3	Al-Ayyam	Khartoum	Daily	1
4	Al-Hayat website,	London	Daily	6
5	Al-Quds al-Arabi website	London	Daily	14
6	Al-Jazeera TV, Doha	Doha	24-hour news channel	5
7	Al-Jazeera .net website	Doha	Daily	1
8	Al-Safir website,	Beirut	Daily	1
9	Al-Sharq al-Awsat website,	London	Daily	6
10	As listed	N/A	N/A	1
11	Elaph website	London	Daily	5
12	Raʾy al-Yawm,	London	Daily	5
13	Al-Dustur website,	Amman	Daily	2
14	Tishrin website,	Damascus	Daily	1
15	Syrian TV satellite service,	Damascus	24-hour news channel	2
16	Middle East Arabic press review from BBC Monitoring in Arabic	UK, Reading	Daily	1
Total				59

Table 31: The news sources from which the first representation of Saudi Arabia was constructed by the BBCM-M

As Table 31 shows, 12 of the 16 news sources from which the BBCM-M linguistically constructed the image of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women are dailies, with one 'As listed' and the remainder TV news channels. Now that the most selected news source, previously source X, used by the BBCM-M to linguistically construct the image of Saudi Arabia with the representation in question has been identified as al-Quds al-Arabi, this analytical unit investigates that daily in case studies 1 and 2 and then investigate the two TV news channels in case study 3, aiming at going beyond al-Quds al-Arabi daily.

Looking at the dates of the BBCM-M's publications that come from al-Quds al-Arabi and construct the image of Saudi Arabia with the representation in question (see Appendix 6) reveals the BBCM-M's particular focus on the months of April and October; thus, the selected news items for case studies 1 and 2 appeared during one of these two months.

8.4 An In-Depth Analysis of a Transedited Text from al-Quds al-Arabi (Case Study 1)

For case study 1, the selected news item was published on 9 April 2013 and entitled 'Saudi prince TV interview on local, Arab issues triggers "wide debate"' (see Appendix 7.1 for the full article).

8.4.1 The Contextual Triangulation: Macro-Analysis

8.4.1.1 The History and Archaeology of Texts and Organisations

The title of the TET shows that the history and archaeology of the ST indicate that the ST has gone through a change in its journalistic genre prior to transediting. The TET has two titles: A) an English title written by the BBCM-M professional and B) a transedited title of the original title, also by the BBCM-M professional.

A: 'Saudi prince TV interview on local, Arab issues triggers "wide debate"'

B: [Report by Ahmad al-Masri: 'Al-Walid Bin-Talal attacks Brotherhood and supports election of Shura Council; He considers Arab Spring to be ruin and says that al-Jazeera is channel for the street while al-Arabiyah is for leaders']

Although news reports and interviews are both types of journalistic writing that can be described as informative, the latter differs in the sense that it is more dialogic. Both

titles provide information on the history and archaeology of the ST and show that it has a trajectory through which the text migrated from one form of communication, a broadcast interview, into another, a written ST that has been selected and transedited into English. The text's trajectory can further be identified as migrating from an interview with 'principals' (Richardson, 2010, p.110) to a written report by professional 1. This is because the interviewee is the Saudi prince 'Al-Walid', who is the son of Ṭalāl bin ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Al Saʿud and the richest Muslim in the world in 2015, the richest Middle Easterner, an investor, a businessperson and the founder and CEO and owner of Kingdom Holdings Co (Salihovic, 2015, p.61).

In order to identify the organisations that were involved in the production of the TET, the original interview on which the report was written was traced online. The first organisation identified is Rūtānā Khalījiyyah, which literally translates into 'The Gulf Rotana' and refers to the Arabian Gulf. Rūtānā Khalījiyyah is a satellite TV channel owned by Prince Al-Walid bin Talal himself.

This organisation conducted and broadcasted the interview on 2 April 2013 in context 1, which is the Rūtānā Khalījiyyah TV channel itself and any online device (such as a tablet or smart phone) that can access the Rūtānā Khalījiyyah YouTube channel (YouTube, 2018b). The clip of the interview is two and one-half hours long and the medium used to conduct the interview is Arabic.

This interview was, as title B above shows, then selected and reported on by Ahmad al-Masri, professional 1 and published by of al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper, the first patron. However, as the interview took place in the studio of Rūtānā Khalījiyyah and broadcasted by that outlet, this means that the first patron, al-Quds al-Arabi, is actually the second organisation that was involved in the production of the text in question, on 4 April 2013 in Arabic to a target readership in context 2. It is at this stage that the text has travelled from context 1 to context 2, migrating from the interview genre into the report genre.

The BBCM-M then selected the article, transedited it into English and finally published the TET on 9 April 2013 into context 3. This shows that there are three main organisations in three different contexts in two different languages that were involved in the process producing the text under examination.

However, an initial comparative ST-TET analysis shows that the BBCM-M not only transedited the identified ST by al-Masri but also merged it with parts of another Arabic report that was written by AFP[34] and published on 6 April 2013. This means that the professional 1, al-Masri, is now a sub-professional, as another text written by another professional at another news source and controlled by another patron (AFP) was merged with the first ST.

The first ST is al-Masri's ST and has the following headline and subheadings:

طالب بتشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي بالسعودية يرأسه شخص من خارج الاسرة الحاكمة

الوليد بن طلال يهاجم «الاخوان» ويؤيد انتخاب مجلس الشورى

اعتبر «الربيع العربي» «دمارا».. وقال ان «الجزيرة» قناة للشارع و« العربية» للزعماء

Literally translated into English as:
Called for the formation of a service-cabinet of ministers in Saudi Arabia with a person from outside the ruling family to chair it
Al-Walid bin Talal attacks the "Brotherhood" and supports the election of the Shura Council
Considered "the Arab Spring" "destruction". He said that "Al-Jazeera" is a channel for the street and "Al-Arabiyah" is for the leaders.

The second ST, by contrast was written and published by the AFP with the following Arabic headline:

الوليد بن طلال يؤيد انتخاب أعضاء مجلس الشورى في السعودية وتعزيز صلاحياتهم

Literally translated into English as:
Al-Walid bin Talal supports the election of members of the Shura Council in Saudi Arabia and strengthening their powers.

This shows that the role of the BBCM-M professional involved selectively merging two texts to create a ST (see Appendices 7.2 and 7.3 for the two separate STs, 7.4 for the merged ST by the BBCM-M and 7.1 for the BBCM-M TET) prior to the transediting

[34] AFP is an international news agency. It was founded in 1944 and covers 151 countries (AFP.com, 2018).

process. In contrast to the news items that the BBCM-M accumulated from different news sources, transedited and published with ‘As listed’ for the source (see chapter 4), this selective merging is a form of rewriting prior to transediting, because the news source from which the ST was composed was misleadingly referred to as only al-Quds al-Arabi, concealing the selective merging that was carried out by the BBCM-M prior to transediting. This selective merging assigns the ST a lesser degree than the TET and thus suggests an unequal power relation between the source language and culture, Arabic, and the target one, English.

8.4.1.2 The Institutional Frames of the Specific Context of a Situation

The first identified context above, context 1, is a Rūtānā Khalījiyyah studio in which five presenters took part in asking the Prince specific questions, as identified from the video clip on YouTube: ʿAli al-ʿUlayyaniy (a male Saudi TV presenter), Jamāl Khāshuqjy (a male Saudi TV journalist), Maysāʾ al-ʿAmūdiy (a female Saudi journalist), ʿAbd Allah al-Mudayfir (a male Saudi TV presenter and journalist) and Thāmir Amīn (a male Egyptian journalist). This organisation, as stated above, is owned by Prince Al-Walīd bin Ṭalāl. It is part of the pan-Arab entertainment Rotana group, which includes TV and radio stations, production and recording companies and a magazine. The headquarters of Rūtānā are located in Dubai in the UAE. The TV channel’s website indicates that the targeted audience are the ‘Gulf audience and in particular, Saudi viewers’ (Sat.tv, 2018). However, it broadcasts to many Arabian countries.

In covering the contextual background (chapter 4), it was shown that al-Quds al-Arabi attracted the BBCM-M’s attention during the study period, as news articles from this source outnumber any other source in the data set. The significance of this news source lies in its alleged orientation to critically frame Saudi Arabia in general and the Saudi regime and policies in particular (see chapters 4 and 6). Coupled with the findings of the history and archaeology of the text and the organisation analysis, it is clear that the BBCM-M not only frequently selects news items from a source with a critical view of Saudi Arabia but also creates a ST for the process of transediting by selecting two separate STs and misleadingly dating them as one. Therefore, the first identified form of rewriting is at a macro level and precedes transediting, as the contextual triangulation showed: the selective merging of more than one ST to create a new ST.

8.4.1.3 The Intertextual and Interdiscursive Relationships

8.4.1.3.1 The Intertextual Analysis

The DHA offers a strategy of identifying the possible reproduced ideologies and power imbalance that might have been transferred between texts and genres of discourse by examining intertextual and interdiscursive relationships. The following texts and voices are identified in the text under examination as reproduced and invoked:

1. the interview of the Prince in the form of quotations of the Prince's answers,
2. the reception of the interview in Saudi circles on social media; 'wide debate',
3. the statements the Prince occasionally makes on reforms in the Kingdom,
4. the widespread advertising of the interview,
5. studies on al-Jazeera versus al-Arabiyah news channels,
6. King Abdulla's decision to include women in the Shura Council,
7. the teachings of Islam and women's progress,
8. the most recently announced Saudi Arabian budget,
9. *Forbes* estimation of al-Walid's wealth at US$20 billion,
10. other estimates of al-Walid's wealth at US$29 billion,
11. the issue of women's driving was prohibited religiously
12. and the issue of women's driving is now social

An examination of both of the identified STs (al-Masri's and AFP's) makes it clear that the texts and voices invoked in items 1–6 are from al-Masri's ST, while the remainder are actually from AFP's ST. Thus, despite the fact that the evolution from the interview genre to the report genre was carried out by al-Masri, it could be argued that it was the BBCM-M professional who truly governed the intertextuality of the text prior to transediting through the merger of specific voices and texts from the AFP's ST with those already in al-Masri's ST. This empirically shows the impact of the first identified form of rewriting on the intertextual relationships.

8.4.1.3.2 The Interdiscursive Analysis

Just as the intertextuality analysis revealed that the various texts and voices in two separate STs were weaved together by a BBCM-M professional, an interdiscursivity analysis can also reveal the various discourses that are linked though topics or sub-topics of both al-Masri's ST and AFP's ST. Figure 16 shows the main identified discourses and topics in the text, especially how and where these discourses are

linked through topics – the interdiscursivity relationship – and whether the topics actually exist in al-Masri's ST or were imported from the AFP item to fabricate a certain link between discourses.



Figure 16: Interdiscursive relationships analysis

Figure 16 shows the five main discourses in the text under examination, each presented in a grey rectangle: religious discourse, discourse on reforms in Saudi Arabia, discourse on journalism, political discourse and, finally, discourse on the economy. In addition, there are fifteen main topics in the text; they are presented in the figure in oval white shapes, eight of which link discourses together. These are, presented above in the oval white shapes with solid outer lines for easier identification. In the figure, the topics that are noted as from both STs are the topics that exist in both al-Masri's ST and AFP's ST, while the topics marked as (AFP's only) or (al-Masri's only) are those that exist in only one or the other; they are present in the BBCM-M's transedited version because the professional has decided to move them from separate STs to produce a made-up ST version.

Interestingly, six of the fifteen topics are related to women, with one, 'allowing Saudi women to drive cars', linking four of the five identified discourses. This ties the discourse on reforms in the Kingdom to the political discourse, which is allowing women to drive. It also links these discourses to two further discourses: 1) the discourse on the economy (for the potential benefit of women not having to pay salaries to their drivers); 2) the discourse on religion (in the form of women not being in the presence of their male drivers who are regarded as strangers in Islam with whom women should not be alone). The second topic on women is 'progress of women within the teaching of Islam', which comes from both STs.

The second and third women-related topics that link discourses are 'progress of women within the teaching of Islam' and 'women do not have to be with strangers'. They both link the discourse on reform to that on religion, and both are woven by the BBCM-M professional into the created ST, as they originally appear only in the AFP ST. The fourth women-related topic is 'women work as pilots', which links the discourse on reforms to that on politics, because allowing women to work as pilots is perceived in the texts as an advance in policies related to women's status in Saudi Arabia. The fifth women-related topic is 'introducing women to the Shura Council', which exists in both STs and links the discourses on reforms and politics. The sixth topic related to women is 'women's relief from economic burden' of paying drivers if they were allowed to drive. It was brought to the created version from the AFP and does not appear in al-Masri's ST and links three discourses: economy, politics and reforms. However, as the text was selected as a representative text of the

representation of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men and distant from (acting) women, the salience of women-related topics in this text is to be expected. Still, it is striking to find empirical proof that some of the topics were actually imported into the text by the BBCM-M professional who chose elements of al-Masri's ST and of the AFP ST to create a new ST on which the transediting process was carried out. These are the second, third and sixth topics above, namely, 'progress of women within the teaching of Islam'; 'women do not have to be with strangers'; and 'women's relief from economic burden' if they were allowed to drive their own cars.

As to the remaining five linking topics, we first note that the topic of 'high ceiling of freedom', which is taken from al-Masri's ST, links the discourse of reform to the discourse on journalism. Second, the topic of the Prince's willingness to repeat interviews as long as they serve the country links the discourses on journalism and politics by supporting the argument made by the Prince that he is 'at the service of the homeland'. Third, and also from al-Masri's ST, the topic of the two rival news channels links the political discourse and the discourse on journalism; it implies the Prince's contempt for Qatari-owned al-Jazeera and his praise of Saudi-owned al-Arabiyah. Fourth, from al-Masri's ST, the topic of MB links the political discourse to the economic, for the Prince denies funding of or support for this group; 'there is some confusion', and he is 'watching closely the cell captured in the UAE to overthrow the system of the government'. Fifth and sixth, both of which are in both STs, are the topics of the Prince's demand for 'greater power to Shura Council' and 'creating a service-oriented mini-cabinet chaired by non-royal person', which link the discourse on reforms and the discourse on politics.

This shows that women-related topics are central to the text in question. The interdiscursive analysis empirically demonstrates that the links between the identified discourses is artificial and has been created by BBCM-M's transeditor, who opted to create a ST by merging two STs. Thus, this can be seen as the contextual outcome of the identified form of rewriting carried out by the BBCM-M at a macro-level, which empirically shows the inferior position assigned to the Arabic ST by the BBCM-M professional and arguably permitted by the power delegated from the patron, the BBCM-M's editor, to that professional.

8.4.2 The Linguistic Triangulation: Micro-Analysis

The following analysis examines the forms of rewriting carried out by the BBCM-M when transediting at the micro level. Following the linguistic triangulation approach suggested by Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p.93) and taking into consideration the nature of the text under examination, a TET of two merged STs, the following steps were taken: (1) having identified the specific contents or topics of a specific discourse, (2) discursive strategies were investigated. Then (3), linguistic means (as types) and the specific, context-dependent linguistic realizations (as tokens) were examined (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001).

8.4.2.1 The Specific Content or Topics of a Specific Discourse

The following content can be identified in the BBCM-M's TET (see Appendix 7.1):

- a heading and subheadings given by the BBC (heading1),
- the word count of the TET,
- dateline1: the publishing date of the TET's by the BBC,
- by-line1: the publisher (BBCM-M),
- the language of the publication (English),
- the BBC's copyright statement,
- a brief description of the STs, including type of news article, dateline2, place-line2 and by-line2 ('report by London-based independent newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi website on 4th April'),
- heading 2: a TET of the by-line: name of author (Ahmad al-Masri) and a TET of the heading and subheading of al-Masri's ST ('Al-Walid Bin-Talal attacks Brotherhood and supports election of Shura Council; He considers Arab Spring to be ruin and says that al-Jazeera is channel for the street while al-Arabiyah is for leaders'),
- below the final paragraph, a repetition of by-line2, place-line2 and dateline2, along with the language of the ST (Arabic), 'Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 GMT 4 Apr 13',
- and document ID in the BBC's archives.

Although the analysis above showed that the text is a TET of a created text that was produced by selectively merging al-Masri's STs and the AFP ST, the contents above

clearly neglect any reference to the AFP. Therefore, al-Masri's ST can be regarded as the ST to which the merged parts from the AFP's ST were added.

Focusing on the discourses on reforms, religion, politics and economy that include topics that are related to men of authority and women (see figure 16), 'Prince al-Walid' and Saudi 'women' are the two prominent social actors. They are discussed in the following topics:

1) women work as pilots (both STs),
2) introducing women into the Shura Council (both STs),
3) allowing women to drive (both STs),
4) he is willing to repeat interviews as long as they serve the country (al-Masri only),
5) high ceiling of freedom in his channels (al-Masri only),
6) women's relief from economic burden (AFP only),
7) Al-Walid's wealth (AFP only),
8) women do not have to be with strangers (AFP only),
9) and progress for women (AFP's only).

Notably, out of the topics identified as related to men and women, topics 1, 2 and 3 exist in both STs, while topics 4 and 5 exist only in the al-Masri article and 7, 8 and 9 only in the AFP article. The added topics revolve around Prince al-Walid's wealth, religion, women and reforms in relation to women. This review demonstrates the second outcome of the form of rewriting, carried out at a macro level: the selective merging of the STs. This outcome occurred at a linguistic level, which empirically shows how a macro-level form of rewriting can affect the micro-level linguistic structure of the text that is being rewritten.

8.4.2.2 Discursive Strategies (Nomination and Predication)

It is suggested in the DHA approach to investigate five discursive strategies: nomination, predication, argumentation, perspectivation, and mitigation and intensification, which together help investigate possible power imbalance in discourses at the micro level. The following analysis shall focus on nomination, predication, and mitigation and intensification, which is presented in (8.4.2.3) below.

The first discursive strategy to be investigated is nomination, which is identified in this analysis by answering the question of how people, objects, phenomena, events, processes and actions related to gender and authority named and referred to linguistically in the text (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p.33). The second discursive strategy is predication, which can be identified by determining which characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to the social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes in the text.

In the TET, there are dominant social actors related to gender and authority: mainly 'Prince al-Walid', the 'Shura Council members' and 'Saudi women'. In addition, there are other social actors who are mentioned peripherally in the text but have an enormous impact on the issues discussed. These are the late 'King Abdallah bin-Abd-al-Aziz', 'family' and 'drivers' (see Table 32).

Gender			Authority		
anthroponyms	deictic expressions	membership categorisation devices (words of gender)	membership categorisation devices (words of authority)	deictic expressions	anthroponyms
Prince Al-Walid bin Talal and King Abdallah bin Abd-al-Aziz	she, he, we, his, him, himself, I and them	Saudi Women, driver/s[35], Saudi woman employee, Saudi woman and families[36]	members of the Shura council, the prince and the King	he, himself, his, we, him and them	Prince Al-Walid bin Talal and King Abdallah bin Abd-al-Aziz

Table 32: The linguistic devices used to refer to the social actors in relation to gender and authority

[35] Based on the TT's immediate context (co-context), 'drivers' is deemed a gendered word, because it refers to the male drivers who, at the time of the interview, were permitted to drive women in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

[36] Based on the TT's immediate context (co-context), 'families' is deemed a gendered word, because for it refers only to the males in families who had the legal right, at the time of the interview, to allow or forbid women to undertake certain actions in Saudi society, such as driving, working and studying.

However, it should be noted that the analysis of the discursive strategies is focused on two main social actors: Saudi 'women/woman' and 'Prince al-Walid', the interviewee, because they are the two social actors identified above, in the specific topics of the various discourses, as the main social actors. Moreover, they are representative of the Saudi Arabia's representation in question: as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women.

There are three main methods identified in the text that attribute qualities to the social actors of focus. However, to avoid confusion, it is important to draw a distinction here between Reisigl and Wodak's nomination as broadly used in their CDA model to refer to the first of five discursive strategies, which looks at possible ways of referring to social actors by name or other linguistic means and the same term, nomination, in Machin and Mayr's taxonomy (2012, pp.81-82), which refers specifically to citing social actors using their names and contrasts with functionalisation, which refers to avoiding the citation of social actors using their names.

With this in mind, when the first method of attributing qualities to the social actors of focus is examined, Saudi 'Prince al-Walid' is nominated as he and 'King Abdulaziz' are the only two actors referred by name in the text, as Table 32 shows. On the other hand, Saudi 'women' and 'woman' are functionalised in the TET; they are referred to by their roles, 'pilot' and 'employee'. This is especially striking here because the interdiscursive analysis above has empirically shown that women-related topics are at the core of the text in question, but not a single woman's name is used in the text.

Following the notion of 'suppression or lexical absence' described by Machin and Mayr (2012, pp.85-86), which can simply be identified in any text by asking the following question: 'What lexical items are missing that we might expect to be included?' A name of a woman would be expected to be mentioned in the text in question, especially when the Prince was talking about his achievements in the area of women's progress. Therefore, Saudi women are linguistically backgrounded in the text. This led linguistically to the usage of specific lexical items that reflect the same effect of backgrounding, using third-person pronouns to refer to women: 'they' as in 'they are without power' and 'she' as in 'she flew a plane'. This shows that unlike men of authority, women are talked about in the text but not to. They are thus not heard,

which shows how the first representation of Saudi Arabia is achieved linguistically at a micro level.

Moreover, deictic expressions (I, he, him, himself, his and we) are used to refer to the social actors. Although in Arabic the pronoun 'we' نحن is normally used by royals to refer to themselves (the 'royal we'), it is striking to see that the Prince uses the first person plural 'we' in three main positions, none of which is restricted to authority. 'We' is used by the Prince twice when addressing women-related topics – the issues of 'women driving' and 'the progress of women' – and once when discussing the economy of Saudi Arabia.

Based on the co-context of the two usages of 'we' in relation to 'women', one possible interpretation of 'we' in the text is that it includes Saudi men more than Saudi women. 'We' in 'we publicly demand that Saudi women be allowed to drive' can be argued to echo the voices of Saudi men rather than Saudi women. This is because the sentence that follows this one و أهلها موافقون على ذلك, which is literally transedited by the BBCM-M professional into 'families agree to that', can mean the women's male legal guardians approve this.

To clarify, the Arabic أهلها can be literally translated into 'her family' including mother, father and siblings. However, there is a cultural and legal reality that alters this, which is the fact that women in Saudi Arabia have what is known as 'male guardians': a father, a husband or even a son. The male-guardianship issue in Saudi Arabia obliges adult Saudi women to ask their male guardians for permission to travel abroad, marry, be released from prison, be educated in schools, work, have a bank account, buy property or be transported to hospital by an ambulance. Saudi activists have long sought for male guardianship to be eliminated, and Saudi Arabia promised in both 2009 and 2013 at the United Nations Human Rights Council to decrease the level of control over Saudi women exercised through male guardianship (Human Rights Watch, 2016). However, no action has been taken by the kingdom, at the time of writing this thesis, since this promise was made (Human Rights Watch, 2016). This legal guardian can be the intended أهل in the ST, as the co-context refers to those persons who legally have the right to allow or prevent women from driving and other activities.

Thus, the Prince uses the collective ‘we’, in ‘we publicly demand that Saudi women be allowed to drive’ to speak on behalf of Saudi men in Saudi society more than the women. Similarly, in the second usage related to women, ‘we want the progress of women within the teaching of Islam’, ‘we’ may exclude Saudi women while including Saudi men, as the Prince uses the inclusive ‘we’ to reflect on the concerns of Saudi Arabian men in relation to women-related issues rather than echoing the voices of Saudi women themselves.

The comparative ST-TET analysis of women-related segments shows that, although the transeditor transfers the existing qualities in the ST to the TET in hand, these qualities are domesticated to the target audience’s supposed knowledge and expectations through an oblique translation strategy that largely involves the application of a modulation technique. For example, the singular امرأة ‘woman’ is in all instances in the text transedited into the plural ‘women’. There is a possible cultural reason for this, by which the transeditor is ‘anchoring’ the ‘unfamiliar’ to the ‘familiar’ or ‘a well-known sphere of earlier social representations so that we may compare and interpret it’ (Höijer, 2011). The cultural reason is that, in English-speaking societies, when referring to women’s causes, such as empowering women and women’s driving, the plural form ‘women’ is most likely to be used rather than the singular, as in ‘empowering woman’.

In Catford’s (1965) terms, this is known as a category shift in which an intra-system shift occurs. Although both English and Arabic have systems of singular versus plural nouns, what is frequently referred to in Arabic with singular word ‘woman’ in this context is transedited into the English plural ‘women’. This intra-system shift has adapted the ST into the target language, culture and expectations for ‘women’s causes’, which is commonly known and used in the target language much more often more than ‘woman’s causes’.

The second method identified to qualify Saudi ‘women/woman’ and ‘the Prince’ involves the use of adjectives and adjectival phrases, that are directly translated from the ST, specifically in relation to his nationality (‘The Saudi Prince’), age (‘the young Prince’), wealth (‘Saudi billionaire’ and ‘the richest non-ruling Arab’), authority (‘the Prince’), and investments (‘who owns a media and investment empire’). By contrast, the second social actor of focus, ‘Saudi women/woman’, is qualified via the noun

‘woman’, which reflects on gender and the adjective that denote their nationality ‘Saudi’. These qualities are directly translated from the ST rather than being domesticated and highlight the elevated status of the Prince in comparison to ‘women/woman’.

The third identified method of attributing qualities to the social actors of focus is presenting them in relation to certain actions, events, phenomena and processes in which there are segments related to each social actor, ‘the Prince’ and ‘women’. The attributed qualities actually remain the same in all segments: the Prince has a free will to express his opinions, to demand and to justify. On the contrary, ‘Saudi women’ are mainly shown as acted upon and lacking that free will, except in the one instance described below. The majority of these actions, events, phenomena and processes are transferred from the ST and were not created by the BBCM-M professional, but they are transedited using a domestication strategy in which they are made linguistically or culturally familiar to the target English readers.

- First are instances related only to ‘Prince al-Walid’:

TET1: ‘he also called for forming a service-oriented mini-cabinet’.

ST1: كما دعا الى تشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي مصغر

The Prince here is the acting agent who ‘called for X’. In this example, an obligatory level shift in which the male singular third person in the past tense in دعا is transedited into the lexis ‘he called’. Moreover, the adjectives خدماتي مصغر literally meaning ‘mini service’ of the noun مجلس (‘council’) have been transedited into compound adjectives. This approach may have been chosen to avoid a possible reduction in meaning if each adjective were simply translated into its English equivalent.

Although the ST can simply be translated into ‘he called for forming a mini service council/cabinet’, the transeditor decided not to follow that course, as the adjective ‘mini’ in this TET could be inferred by readers as ‘he called for forming a cabinet with mini services’. However, in the ST both the adjectives ‘mini’ and ‘service’ modify ‘cabinet’. Thus, compound adjectives can be argued to be a plausible decision here; they are used in cases where two or more adjectives refer to the same noun. This use of the compound adjective again highlights the transeditor’s conscious decision to produce a domesticated TET that meets the linguistic expectations of the target

readers while keeping the ST's meaning. Interestingly, however, the word وزراء 'ministers' is omitted, which *does* affect the ST's meaning.

TET2: 'others said that it is consistent with the statements he makes every now and then on reforms in the kingdom'.

ST2: رأي اخـرون انها تدخل ضمن تصريحاته التي يطلقها بين الحين والاخر حول الاصلاحات في المملكة

This example shows Prince Al-Walid making statements from time to time about reforms in the kingdom. These statements are understood to be 'bold' or 'strong' in the ST from the verb يطلقها literally meaning 'launch', which imbues the statements he makes every now and then with a certain degree of intensity. However, this intensity, is removed by transediting decisions, because the transeditor opted to domesticate the more intensive turn into the everyday verb 'makes'. This decision to domesticate is based on collocations, because 'makes' collocates with 'statements', while 'launch' does not. Thus, the professional opted to domesticate the TET at the expense of the intended illocutionary force present in the Arabic ST.

Moreover, the verb رأى, which literally means 'view' but can have either a physical meaning related to 'seeing' or an intellectual one related to 'having an opinion', but based on the context in which it appears, it means the second. Via the modulation technique of transediting, the professional opted to replace the abstract meaning carried in رأى with a more concrete one by transediting it into 'said'. This is because 'saying' involves articulation, which 'having an opinion' necessirly does not. Some might regard this as a minor change in meaning caused by the transeditor's lexical choice. Nonetheless, it has affected the ST in terms of the verb's abstraction, which gives the TET a more physical sense than the original ST.

In the same phenomenon, the transeditor not only applies oblique translation, which gives a translator more freedom, in instances where it is linguistically obligatory but also where it is not. See, for example, the level shift in which the transeditor expressed the singular masculine pronoun expressed in the ST in grammar using lexis as follows. Changing تصريحاته into 'his statements' is obligatory, but the transposition technique used to transedit the verb in تدخل ضمن literally 'enter within' is transedited into the predicative 'consistent with', which is an optional shift that could have been accurately expressed in the TET with the same part of the speech: verb for verb. For example, تدخل ضمن تصريحاته could have been transedited into 'is in line with his statements' or

‘matches his statements’. This analysis emphasises the transeditor’s preference for domestication and shifts in transediting, even in cases where it is not linguistically necessary.

- Second, instances related to ‘women’ only:

TET: ‘women started flying planes a while ago’

ST: قيادة المرأة للطائرة تم منذ فترة

This event, as it appears in the TET, shows women as full-fledged agents, as is evident in the syntax of the sentence, which uses the active rather than the passive voice: S + V + O + prepositional phrase. However, in comparing the ST to its TET, two changes can be detected: a lexical choice and the sentence structure. The lexical choice shows that the transeditor has decided to use the verb ‘fly’ instead to قيادة literally ‘to drive’, which is from a collocational perspective a plausible decision; ‘planes’ are ‘flown’ rather than ‘driven’ in English, and this change domesticates the TET according to the linguistic expectations of the target audience. Another domestication manoeuvre is evident in the sentence structure change, the category shift; here, a class shift is used to translate a noun قيادة that literally means ‘driving’ into the verb form ‘flying’, thus changing the passive voice into the active voice. Moreover, ‘women’ are placed in the subject position. This change interrupts the identified linguistic construction of ‘women’ to this point as acted upon rather than acting; here, a transediting decision has given ‘women’ more agency and will than they have in the original ST. This emphasises the transeditor’s preference for domestication, even at the expense of the ST’s intended meaning.

- Third, related to both ‘women’ and ‘Prince al-Walid’

TET1: ‘Al-Walid described the decision of King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz to include women in the Shura Council for the first time as “very important”. However, he said that “for it to be historic, there is a need for two things. First, elections, even if it is partial, and, more importantly, powers”’.

ST1: وصف الوليد قرار الملك عبدالله بن عبدالعزيز بادخال المرأة للمرة الأولى إلى مجلس الشورى بإنه <<مهم جدا>> إلا أنه قال انه <<حتى يكون تاريخياً لابد من بندين، أولاً الانتخابات ولو جزئية والأهم الصلاحيات>>

In this instance, both social actors are manifested: first is the Prince, who is active and expresses his opinion by ‘describing’ the event of ‘including women in the Shura Council for the first time’ as ‘important’ but not ‘historic’ for they should be given ‘greater powers’. On the contrary, ‘women’, the object of the sentence, are depicted as inactive and acted upon through being ‘included’.

In the transediting of this event, the transeditor decided to foreground the prepositional phrase (an adverbial of place) ‘in the Shura council’ and move the other prepositional phrase (an adverbial of time) ‘for the first time’ after it. This category shift is known as a structural shift; the structure of the ST is changed into another structure in the TET. However, this shift is not obligatory as, with or without it, the TET is grammatically correct. If the structural shift were not present, the TET would be something like ‘the decision of King Abdallah bin Abd-al-Aziz to include women for the first time in the Shura Council’, which is grammatically correct. The TET, however, changes the ST’s meaning by placing the emphasis on the adverbial of place by foregrounding it. It also downplays the adverbial of time by delaying it; here, we see both a translation loss and a translation gain.

> TET2: ‘we want progress for Saudi women within the teachings of Islam, and not a commodity over which the liberal and conservative trends fight’.
>
> ST2: نريد النهضة للمراة السعودية ضمن تعاليم الاسلام وليس سلعة يتصارعها النطاق الليبرالي والمحافظ

In this action, the Prince is active through the verb ‘want’, while ‘women’ is inactive; it is the Prince who wants ‘progress’ for them rather than them wanting that progress for themselves. In terms of transediting decisions, domestication again prevails, as the comparative ST-TET analysis demonstrates. Firstly, the singular ‘woman’ امرأة is transedited into the plural via an intra-system shift of category shifts. Another shift can also be identified in this action, a level shift in which what is expressed by grammar in Arabic is expressed by lexis in English: the first person plural in نريد is transedited into ‘we want’. Secondly, domestication is evident in the transediting of نطاق, literally meaning ‘range’, into ‘trends’. Thirdly, the lexical choice of ‘trends’ over the literal ‘range’ may have been inspired by seeking to produce a TET that sounds natural and idiomatic, for ‘a commodity over which the liberal and conservative ranges fight’ does not collocate or sound natural.

Fourthly, the Prince is arguing for the former's نهضة, a noun that has the following four main meanings in Arabic, according to Almaany Arabic/English dictionary (Almaany.com, 2019): اِزْدِهار 'advancement', 'boom', 'growth', 'progress', 'rise' or 'upswing'; اِنْبِعاث 'awakening', 'reawakening', 'rebirth', 'renaissance', 'resurgence' or 'revival'; قَوْمَة 'rise' or 'rising'; and نَهْضَة 'regeneration', 'renascence' or 'reviviscence'.

Based on the co-context of this text, it can be argued that the ST's intended meaning is related to 'starting' the نَهْضَة or 'the early stages' of the نَهْضَة, because the Prince is 'arguing for the نَهْضَة that is yet to happen'. Thus, plausible choices could have been one of the equivalents of اِنْبِعاث, 'awakening', or قَوْمَة, 'rise'. However, as the example above shows, the BBCM-M professional opted for 'progress' in 'we want progress for women'. As the Oxford English-English dictionary defines it, 'progress' is related to 'development towards an improved or more advanced condition', meaning a condition that already exists.

Moreover, the notion of 'progress' when related to 'women' is commonly used to suggest 'the empowerment of women', 'women's rights', 'gender equality' and the like, all of which are rooted in Western feminist rhetoric and discourse. The feminist movement, or simply 'feminism', started in in the West in the nineteenth century and has gone through three major different phases in which women's rights were publicly demanded, ranging from the right to vote, going through sexuality to the call for equal pay for women and men (Fitzpatrick, et al., 2006, p.465). However, feminism in the West (regardless of its various definitions based on the perspectives through which it is seen or its aims, achievements and history) differs from that in the East and the Arab Islamic world in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular for several reasons, one of which is that religion in Saudi Arabia is still an integral part of the culture. Thus, even though the concept of 'women's progress' does exist in both the source and target cultures, they differ in their origins, standards, aims and current status.

Thus, this foreign concept of 'awakening or rising of women' as perceived and governed by the historical, religious and societal context of Saudi Arabia is domesticated into a concept familiar to the English reader – 'progress for women', which could trigger a specific cognitive understanding that is limited to that familiar concept, leading the reader to perceive and judge the foreign concept according to the standards of its more familiar counterpart.

Therefore, and inspired by the definition of false cognate words (or simply ‘false cognates’) that have similar pronunciations and meanings but differ in their origins (Shreve and Angelone, 2010, pp.323-24), the suggestion is made here to call concepts that exist in both the source and target cultures but differ as to origins and contexts, ‘false cognate concepts’.

> TET3: ‘the question of women driving has become a social issue after it was religiously prohibited and then forbidden. I think that driving is a foregone conclusion. It will inevitably happen.’
>
> ST3: موضوع قيادة المراة للسيارة اصبح اجتماعيا بعد ان كان محرما ثم ممنوعا، اعتقد القيادة تحصيل حاصل ات لا محالة’.

The BBCM-M professional here has chiefly applied oblique translation in which he or she replaced موضوع ‘the topic’ with ‘the question’ and ات ‘coming’ with ‘happen’. The latter substitution may have been encouraged by the desire to produce a fluent and natural-sounding TET, as the direct translation strategy would produce something like ‘it will inevitably come’, which is not idiomatic in English when referring to something taking place inevitably; ‘happen’ would be more idiomatic. The former substitution, however, could not have been driven by that same purpose, because transediting the first directly as ‘on the topic of’ would produce a natural-sounding and idiomatic TET. This confirms that domestication is the transeditor’s default strategy, even when it is not needed.

Moreover, ‘issue’ and ‘religiously’ are added in ‘a social issue’ and ‘religiously prohibited’. The addition technique here serves to make the meaning more explicit. Thus, in Vinay and Darbelnet’s (1958) terms, the technique applied here is ‘explicitation’; the Arabic ST اجتماعياً does not explicitly indicate that it is a social ‘issue’. The second case of addition, however, is محرما in the ST, which is clearly understood in Arabic as ‘religiously prohibited’; it uses a religious Islamic term – محرم from ḥarām or ‘haram’ – meaning ‘prohibited’. However, this jargon may not be widely understood in English, so the transeditor chose to explicitly indicate that it was ‘religiously prohibited’. Even though the meaning of the ST is arguably delivered in the TET, a translation loss in the cultural meaning carried in محرم which refers to a prohibition based on Islamic law, is removed when it is domesticated into ‘religiously prohibited’.

The analysis of the discursive strategies of nomination and predication in the TET showed how the two main social actors in the text in question are referred to and qualified. Importantly, it showed how Saudi women are linguistically backgrounded while the Saudi Prince Al-walid bin Talal, who is representative of Saudi men that enjoy authority, is forwarded in the text. Moreover, the analysis highlights the first form of rewriting carried out during transediting, at a micro level: domestication at the expense of the ST's meaning, which affects the cultural features carried in the ST. This pattern of domestication positions the Arabic ST, and by extension the Arabic language and Arab culture, in a lower position than the TET, and by extension English language and culture. As examples 2 and 3 above show, the familiarising of the Arabic ST for the English reader was carried out at the expense of its intended meaning, which stripped the texts from its cultural and positioned it into the target culture, that is to say English.

8.4.2.3 Linguistic Means and the Specific Context-Dependent Linguistic Realizations (Mitigation and Intensification)

The question to be asked to analyse the mitigation and intensification discursive construction, as Wodak suggest, is: 'Are the respective utterances related to 'Saudi women' and 'Prince al-Walid' articulated explicitly, are they intensified or are they mitigated?'

The intertextuality and interdiscursivity analysis have all shown that Saudi women-related topics are at the core of the TET in hand. However, both the headings of the TET, A and B below (the transedited and the headings given by the BBCM-M professional) do not even mention women while presenting other marginal topics in the headings:

A: 'Saudi prince TV interview on local, Arab issues triggers "wide debate"'
B: [Report by Ahmad al-Masri: 'Al-Walid Bin-Talal attacks Brotherhood and supports election of Shura Council; He considers Arab Spring to be ruin and says that al-Jazeera is channel for the street while al-Arabiyah is for leaders']

The comparative ST-TET analysis shows that the BBCM-M professional has transferred these mitigations of importance of 'Saudi women/woman' from the ST; they were not imported by the BCCM-M. The heading of the al-Quds al-Arabi professional's news item does not refer to women in any way:

طالب بتشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي بالسعودية يرأسه شخص من خارج الاسرة الحاكمة:ST

الوليد بن طلال يهاجم «الاخوان» ويؤيد انتخاب مجلس الشورى

اعتبر «الربيع العربي» «دمارا».. وقال ان «الجزيرة» قناة للشارع و« العربية» للزعماء

Literal translation into English: 'Called for the formation of a cabinet of ministers in Saudi Arabia headed by a person from outside the ruling family'.

'Al-Walid bin Talal attacks the 'Brotherhood' and supports the election of the Shura Council'.

'He considered "The Arab Spring" a "ruin"… and said that "Al-Jazeera" is a channel for the street and "Al-Arabiyah" is for the leaders.

Notably, this suppression of Saudi women in al-Masri's heading is maintained in the heading written by the BBCM-M professional (A above), as they are still not present in the heading despite their centrality in the relevant TET.

Moving on to the body of the TET, the first location of an utterance related to 'Saudi women/woman' is in the sixth paragraph, whereas utterances related to 'the Prince' can be found in third paragraph. Interestingly, the utterance related to 'Saudi women' comes after discussions regarding the weight of the actual interview in Saudi society, political matters like the MB and Arab Spring, and authority, such as the demand for more powers to be given to the public. This placement assigns a lesser significance to topics related to Saudi women than to those related to the Prince.

Moreover, when the utterances related to women in the TET are examined in terms of speech reporting verbs, it becomes clear that neutral structuring verbs are used to report on the Prince's perspective on women's issues, such as 'described' in the first utterance (paragraph 6), 'said' twice in the second utterance (paragraph 8) and 'pointed out' in the third utterance (paragraph 9). By contrast, assertive speech-reporting verb such as 'confirmed' and directive speech-reporting verbs such as 'called for' are used to report on the Prince's utterances that are not related to 'Saudi women/woman'. For example, 'the Prince confirmed that he supports the election of the Shura Council members in the Kingdom, even if this is partial', and 'He also called for forming a service-oriented mini-cabinet that'.

These verbs have added a force to the reported speech that is interpreted from the interview itself. Indeed, the latter utterance is brought up twice in the TET, but the second time using direct quotation in the seventh paragraph of the body of the TET with the same directive speech reporting verb ‘called for’, which intensifies it even more. Furthermore, there are direct quotations of women-related utterances by the Prince that are presented without reporting verbs, and thus neither intensified nor mitigated.

This means that women, in addition to not presenting Saudi women/woman in both the headings of the TET, are also marginalized by delaying the topics related to them in the body of the TET. Moreover, when their topics are presented, they are reported with direct quotations and neutral reporting verbs, in the case of reported speech, which does not compensate for the mitigations that have been executed.

Examining the STs that were written by al-Quds al-Arabi’s and the AFP’s professionals reveals a similar delay in discussing women-related topics. To clarify, Saudi women/woman are referred to in al-Masri’s ST in paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 (out of 8 paragraphs) and in the AFP’s ST in paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 (out of 11 paragraphs). Hence, the mitigation of importance is transferred rather than caused by the BBCM-M professional. Similarly, examining these segments makes it that clear the selected neutral-structured reporting verbs are indeed by the al-Quds’ al-Arabi and AFP professionals rather than the BBCM-M professional; they exist in the STs and were transedited by the BBCM-M professional using a direct rather than an oblique translation strategy. For example, وصف is transedited into its dictionary equivalent ‘described’ and قال into ‘said’. Similarly, the adjectives and relative clauses in the ST segments related to ‘Saudi women/woman’ are transedited with the same intensity; they are neither mitigated nor intensified.

On the other hand, intensification is detectable in the utterances of the Prince, as identified above, and namely relating to two actions ‘calling for’ and ‘confirmed’. Importantly, a comparative ST-TET analysis shows that these are transferred via transediting rather than caused, as the following example shows:

ST1: و أكد الامير.... انه يؤيد انتخاب اعضاء مجلس الشورى في المملكة ولو جزئيا، مع منحهم صلاحيات حقيقية، كما دعا الى تشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي مصغر يمكن ان يرأسه شخص من خارج اسرة آل سعود الحاكمة

TET1 ‘the Prince confirmed that he supports the election of the Shura Council members in the Kingdom, even if this is partial, while giving them genuine powers. He also called for forming a service-oriented mini-cabinet that could be chaired by a person from outside the ruling family of Al Sa'ud’.

This shows that the fourth identified outcome of the second identified form of rewriting carried out by the BBCM-M professional at a micro-level, during transediting, is transferring the marginalization of Saudi ‘women/women’ from the ST (headline B above and the utterances related to Saudi woman in the body of the TET) while intensifying other periphery utterances via bringing them up to the headline (headline A above). Conversely, keeping the intensified utterances of men of authority, Prince Al-Walid in this case, the same (in both headings A and B above and in the body of the TET).

8.5 Conclusion

Firstly, the application of the adapted DHA model has helped demystifying the ways in which Saudi Arabia is represented by the BBCM-M, as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women, both at macro-, i.e. contextual, and at micro-, i.e. linguistic, levels. At the contextual level, the BBCM-M mainly constructed the representation of Saudi Arabia in question from a single news source that is arguably critical: al-Quds al-Arabi. In the selected news items from that source, men of authority, such as the male Saudi Prince ‘Al-Walid bin Talal’, get to discuss topics in which Saudi women are salient while Saudi women do not. At the linguistic level, this representation of Saudi Arabia is constructed by the ways in which Saudi men and Saudi women are referred to and qualified, which ascribed men will and agency and deprived women of them. Moreover, distancing women from the reader via functionalising them while personalising Saudi men who enjoy authority, who argue for Saudi women-related issues. Furthermore, it became clear that this linguistic construction of Saudi Arabia was achieved via linguistically marginalising Saudi women while placing emphasis on those men of authority.

Secondly, it has also shown the forms of rewriting applied by the BBCM-M professional, which are identified both prior to and during transediting process. These are selectively merging two separate STs and domestication even if not required, which can affect the ST’s meaning. Importantly, the outcomes of these forms of

rewriting, empirically showed, firstly, the extent to which the BBCM-M professional contributes to discursive construction, both at linguistic and contextual levels, of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women. Secondly, the clear inferior position ascribed to the Arabic ST in comparison to the TET by the BBCM-M professional, which enabled such great changes to the Arabic ST. This identified power imbalance that positions the Arabic STs in a lower position compared to the English TET is explored further in Chapter 9, within al-Quds al-Arabi, and beyond in Chapter 10.

Chapter 9: Investigating the Consistency of the Findings in Transedited Texts from al-Quds al-Arabi (Case study 2)

9.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the consistency of the findings of the previous case study within the limits of the most commonly selected news source by the BBCM-M when representing Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women. As chapter 8 has shown, the BBCM-M paid special attention to the months of April and October when selecting news from al-Quds al-Arabi that represented Saudi Arabia with the image in question. Thus, the three selected news items were published during those months: 'Article slams Saudi authorities duality of reformist king, reactionary scholars' (Appendix 8.1), 'Pan Arab daily highlights Amnesty International's report on Saudi rights abuses' (Appendix 9.1) and 'Saudi fighters in Syria reportedly surrender to authorities in Lebanon' (Appendix 10.1). In the analysis that follows, they are referred to as text 1, text 2 and text 3 (see Appendices 8.2, 9.2 and 10.2 for their Arabic STs).

The investigation first aims to determine whether the BBCM-M professionals who transedited the texts in question assign Arabic STs a lower position than the English TETs by the BBCM-M based on the chosen forms of rewriting. The second question to answer is whether the forms of rewriting chosen by the BCM-M's professionals contribute to the Saudi Arabian representation in question.

9.2 Prior to Transediting: Source Text Selection

Contextual triangulation, namely the history and archaeology of texts and organisations and the history and institutional frames of the specific context of the situation of the three texts in question, shows that the BBCM-M professionals selected the STs from al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper rather than writing them from scratch. Therefore, it is important to investigate the selected STs in order to uncover the main reasons behind the BBCM-M professionals' decision to select these STs instead of creating them, as identified in case study 1.

9.2.1 Voices: Intertextuality Analysis

Examining the intertextuality relationships within the three texts makes it clear that, in a manner similar to the findings of case study 1, all three Arabic STs show that Saudi

women's voices are not evoked or reproduced in the texts, while male-dominant texts and voices do appear. Surprisingly, the voices of men are depicted as discussing crucial women-related topics in texts 1 and 2, as detailed below.

Starting with text 1, it becomes clear that despite Saudi women-related topics having a pivotal role in linking different discourses through discourse topics (interdiscursivity relationship analysis), the evoked texts and voices are related to Saudi men of religious and governmental authority and, notably, to 'international feminism' rather than to the voices of Saudi women. Moreover, these evoked voices negotiate Saudi women-related topics.

The texts in the article are the singular فتوى fatwā, meaning 'a religious law or ruling' and موضوع المرأة meaning 'women's issues'. A fatwā is issued by a religious scholar, Shaykh. This Shaykh, is known as a muftī, meaning 'the issuer of the fatwā', who is referred to in the ST as الفقيه 'scholar or expert'. However, the muftī referred to in the ST is a male muftī, which is evident in the masculine nouns and pronouns in Arabic الفقيه. The second text regularly employed in the text is related to 'women's issues', which are mainly negotiated in the text by men of religious and governmental authority and 'international feminism', as the following shows:

ST1: كلما خرجت فتوى مثيرة او رأي من عالم سعودي ينشغل الاعلام العالمي والعربي بنشرها والتعليق عليها... تجاه قضايا عالقة من اهمها موضوع المرأة

TET1: 'every time an inflammatory fatwa [religious ruling] or opinion is published by a Saudi [religious] scholar… regarding unresolved issues, most notably women's issues'.

ST2: خاصة وان الفقيه اعترض على الموضوع من ...فجاءت افكار عالم سعودي حول قضية قيادة المرأة للسيارة باب علمي هذه المرة حيث ربط القيادة بصحة الحوض النسوي والمبايض

TET2: 'the ideas of a Saudi cleric on the issue of women driving cars…, particularly since the cleric objected… this time when he linked driving to the health of a woman's pelvis and ovaries'.

ST3: فكما يخاف الفقيه السعودي على مبايض المرأة من سياقة السيارة نجد النسوية العالمية تركز ايضا على هذه المبايض وتريدها ان تبقى للمرأة وحدها وتحررها من قبضة الرجل

TET3: 'as the Saudi scholar fears for the women's ovaries due to driving, we find that international feminism also focuses on these ovaries and wants them for women alone and wants to liberate them from the grip of man'.

ST4: فخرجت الحركة النسوية المعولمة من محيطها المحلي لتصب اهتمامها على العوالم... همها تخليص المرأة الاخرى المسلمة من قبضة الرجل المسلم خاصة فتاويه الغريبة.

TET4: 'the women's globalized movement has, therefore, left its local environment to focus its attention on the worlds… concerned with salvaging the Muslim 'other' woman from the grip of the Muslim man, particularly his odd fatwas'.

ST5: وتوفر لها فتاوى علماء السعودية مادة حية ..فالنسوية اليوم هي صناعة معولمة لها مؤسسات دولية وعالمية تعتبرها حجر عثرة في طريق المساواة بين المرأة والرجل ومثالا حيا لتخلف ذلك الآخر الغريب.

TET5: 'today, feminism is a global industry …Saudi scholars' fatwas provide it with live [ammunition] that it considers a stumbling block on the road to equality between men and women and a living example of the backwardness of that foreign "other"'.

ST6: ويبدو فيها الملك الاصلاحي متقدما على مجتمعه ناهضا به رغم مواقف الفقيه الرجعي ومن يتبعه. فكل خطوة اصلاحية يتم الاعتراض عليها من موضوع تعليم النساء في فترة الستينيات الى تعيين المرأة كعضو في مجلس الشورى السعودي او السماح لها بالمشاركة في الانتخابات المحدودة على مستوى البلديات او الغرف التجارية.

TET6: '[this image] shows the reformist king ahead of his society, pushing it forward despite the positions of reactionary scholars and their followers. Each reformist step is rejected starting from the issue of women's education in the 1960s, to the appointment of women as members of the Shura Council, and allowing women to participate in limited elections at the municipal and chambers of commerce level'.

This shows how the voices of men of authority are reproduced and cited in the text in question as discussing essential women-related issues such as driving, education and participating in elections, while Saudi women are silenced; not a single voice of

a woman is reproduced in the text. This is even more striking because the comparative ST-TET analysis of these evoked texts and voices shows that they *do* exist in the ST.

Similarly, in the second text under examination, there are various voices that have been evoked in the text; all exist in the ST and so were not created by the BBCM-M. However, none of these voices is the voice of a woman, as the following identified texts and voices in the text via the intertextuality relationship analysis below show:

1. the submission of Amnesty International,
2. the 'dire' record of human rights in Saudi Arabia,
3. the promises made four years ago by Saudi Arabia to address human rights abuses,
4. Saudi report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva,
5. Khalid al-Faysal's claim that Saudi Arabia is not one of the world's richest nation,
6. the economic decisions made in 2012,
7. other decisions made later against non-Saudi residents,
8. local reports on an increasing demand for piloting licenses
9. and claim that 'a considerable proportion of the Saudi population, estimated by some economic reports at 50 per cent, live under poverty line'.

In a similar manner, the intertextuality analysis of the third text under examination shows that all texts and voices evoked in that text are of men, with the majority being those in authority – religious, governmental or royal – as not a single woman's voice is traceable in the ST. Importantly, it also shows that when these texts and voices were compared, they all exist in the ST. The following shows both the ST and TET of those men of authority as they appeared in the texts:

ST1: السفير السعودي لدى لبنان علي عسيري

TET1: 'Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Asiri'

ST2: السفير السعودي لدى الأردن الدكتور سامي الصالح

TET2: 'the Saudi ambassador to Jordan, Dr Sami al-Salih',

ST3: رجال دين سعوديين مثل الشيخ محمد العريفي

TET3: ‘Saudi clergymen, such as Sheikh Muhammad al-Urayfi’,

ST4: العاهل السعودي الملك عبدالله بن عبد العزيز

TET4: ‘the Saudi monarch, King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz’.

These excerpts show that the first discursive strategy through which Saudi men of authority were situated in the image constructed of Saudi Arabia in contrast to pushing away Saudi women is by silencing the voices of the latter while calling upon those of the former in all three texts. This silencing of Saudi women while allowing Saudi men of authority to speak clearly exists in the selected STs; it was not created by the BBCM-M.

9.2.2 Agency: Passivation versus Activation

The linguistic triangulation analysis of text 1 shows that women are acted upon rather than acting; they are passive and lack will. In contrast, men of religious, royal and governmental authority act in those same texts. When comparing the active role of men of authority and the passive depiction of women in the TET to the ST, it became clear that the BBC’s transeditor has transferred this rather than created it, as the following excerpts show.

- Saudi men of authority in text 1:

ST1: كلما خرجت فتوى مثيرة او رأي من عالم سعودي

TET1: ‘every time an inflammatory fatwa [religious ruling] or opinion is published by a Saudi [religious] scholar’,

ST2: حيث ربط القيادة بصحة الحوض النسوي

TET2: ‘when he linked driving to the health of a woman's pelvis’

ST3: فكما يخاف الفقيه السعودي على مبايض المرأة

TET3: ‘as the Saudi scholar fears for the women's ovaries’,

ST4: يكون الفقيه السعودي قد وفر مادة استشراقية

TET4: ‘the Saudi scholar has provided Orientalist material’,

ST5: ومنذ تولي الملك عبد الله السلطة نجد ان الثنائية الاسطورية هذه قد ترسخت كصورة ثابتة تروجها وسائل الاعلام المحلية ويبدو فيها الملك الاصلاحي متقدما على مجتمعه ناهضا به...

TET5: 'since King Abdallah assumed power. [This image] shows the reformist king ahead of his society, pushing it forward',

ST6: فلا الملك الاصلاحي يقبل بالطرح الاصلاحي السياسي ولا الفقيه يرضى به

TET6: 'neither the reformist king accepts the political reformist presentation, nor do the scholars accept it'.

- Saudi women in text 1:

ST1: افكار عالم سعودي حول قضية قيادة المرأة للسيارة

TET1: 'the ideas of a Saudi cleric on the issue of women driving cars',

ST2: معضلة المرأة

TET2: 'the dilemma of women',

ST3:تخليص المرأة الاخرى المسلمة من قبضة الرجل المسلم

TET3: 'salvaging the Muslim 'other' woman from the grip of the Muslim man',

ST4: يخاف الفقيه السعودي على مبايض المرأة

TET4: 'Saudi scholar fears for the women's ovaries',

ST5: تعيين المرأة كعضو في مجلس الشورى السعودي او السماح لها بالمشاركة في الانتخابات

TET5: 'the appointment of women as members of the Shura Council, and allowing women to participate in limited elections'.

In text 2, women are generally shown as acted upon by being discriminated against in Saudi Arabia. The act perpetrated on Saudi women in the text in question is 'segregation against women in law and practice', which exists in the ST as التمييز ضد المرأة في القانون والممارسة. However, in the same ST, Saudi women are shown to be active in two instances related to the right of 'driving', as the following excerpts show:

ST1: استعدادات المرأة السعودية لخرق قانون منعها من قيادة السيارة،

TET1: 'preparations by Saudi women to break the law that bans women from driving',

ST2: المرأة في السعودية المحرومة من رخصة قيادة السيارة تقبل بشكل لافت على حيازة رخصة طائرات

TET2: 'women in Saudi Arabia, who are banned from having driving license, have

recently demonstrated a remarkable interest in having licenses for piloting Gliders',

The third text in question is male-dominant, as it mainly discusses topics related to male Saudi nationals, male Saudi government agents and a male Saudi royal figure. All these males are active. This emphasis on the active nature of men of authority exists in the STs and was not created by BBC's transeditors, as the comparative analysis below shows:

ST1: وصرح السفير السعودي لدى الأردن الدكتور سامي الصالح

TET1: 'the Saudi ambassador to Jordan, Dr Sami al-Salih, said',

ST2: وأشار في تصريح صحافي

TET2: 'he added in a press statement',

ST3: أكد السفير السعودي لدى لبنان علي عسيري

TET3: 'Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Asiri affirmed',

ST4: وأوضح لصحيفة 'مكة'

TET4: 'speaking to the Makkah Newspaper, he said',

ST5: ونفى السفير السعودي أن يكون لدى سلطات بلاده

TET5: 'the Saudi ambassador denied that his country's authorities have',

ST6: وأصدر العاهل السعودي الملك عبدالله بن عبد العزيز

TET6: 'the Saudi monarch, King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, issued a royal order'.

These snippets show that Saudi women in the texts in question are generally acted upon, except in two instances when connected to 'driving' and their right to drive, while men of authority are always acting in the texts selected from al-Quds al-Arabi.

9.2.3 Distance: Functionalisation versus Nomination

A closer examination of the instances in which Saudi women were active shows that they are referred to with functionalisation rather than nomination, by using the gendered 'women' or 'woman' instead of proper nouns. In fact, in texts 1 and 2, Saudi

women are *always* functionalised. Functionalisation, as defined above, is a referential linguistic strategy through which the subject referred to is distanced from the reader by taking away the subject's personal aspect; nomination is the opposite strategy and emphasises the individual's distinctive personhood. The personal aspect is present in proper names, whereas it is lacking when referring to subjects by their gender, role or occupation (Machin and Mayr, 2012, pp.81-82).

In a similar vein to the two discursive strategies identified as presenting the image of Saudi Arabia as distanced from Saudi women, silencing voices of women and depriving them of agency, this discursive strategy can be found in the STs. In this case, the BBCM-M professionals did not functionalise a nominated woman in the texts in question, as the following examples from texts 1 and 2 show:

ST1: كمخلص للمرأة من براثن

TET1: 'saviour of women from the claws',

ST2: مبايض المرأة

TET2: 'for the women's ovaries',

ST3: وتريدها ان تبقى للمرأة وحدها

TET3: 'wants them for women alone',

ST4:تعيين المرأة كعضو في مجلس

TET4: 'the appointment of women as members of the Shura Council',

ST5: التمييز ضد المرأة في القانون والممارسة

TET5: 'segregation against women in law and practice',

ST6: استعدادات المرأة السعودية لخرق قانون....

TET6: 'preparations by Saudi women to break the law',

ST7: ومن المثير للسخرية ان المرأة في السعودية

TET7: 'ironically, women in Saudi Arabia'.

Therefore, Saudi women, who are already identified as acted upon rather than acting and silenced in the relevant texts, are shown as a faceless collective entity that is distanced from the reader by removing their individual characteristics. Conversely, Saudi men of authority are brought closer to the reader by typically being nominated in all three texts. Saudi men of authority were functionalised in a few instances, such as 'the Saudi religious scholar', but most other men of authority were indeed nominated, such as King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Ali Asiri, Dr Sami al-Salih and Sheikh Muhammad al-Urayfi. As with the other phenomena reported immediately above, these instances of nomination and the few functionalisations are transferred from the STs, not created by the BBCM-M.

This shows that the three texts discursively construct the image of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women: first, by silencing Saudi women while presenting the voices of men of authority; second, by largely depriving Saudi women of agency with the exception of a few instances in relation to human rights, while providing it to men of authority without exceptions; and thirdly, by distancing the reader from Saudi women while bringing Saudi men of authority to the forefront for the reader. These discursive strategies are similar to those identified in case study one (chapter 8), which the BBCM-M professional caused by the form of rewriting identified as a selective merging of STs.

In other words, as these discursive strategies exist in the STs, the BBCM-M's role in representing Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women is, in case study two, selecting news items that discursively achieve those goals even before the transediting process begins.

9.3 During Transediting: Domestication

The linguistic triangulation of the three texts in question, as developed in the adapted DHA model, shows that there are numerous domestications that have been conducted by the BBCM-M professional at the expense of the STs' meaning or accuracy, leading to translation loss and gain, as detailed in this section.

9.3.1 Translation Loss

Translation loss as defined Hervey and Higgins (1992, p.21) is 'the incomplete replication of the ST in the TT'. This lack of completeness can be caused at many linguistic levels, including morphology, syntax and semantics. The examples below are taken from the three texts to show the translation loss caused by the BBCM-M's application of rewriting through domestication at the expense of the ST's meaning.

9.3.1.1 Inaccurate Source Text Meanings

In the following excerpts, the BBCM-M professional rewrites the Arabic texts through domestication, which caused mistakes in grammar, spelling and more seriously the intended meaning of the ST:

ST1:

فلا الملك الاصلاحي يقبل ... ولا الفقيه يرضى به ... من هنا يتعاون هؤلاء على تقليص مساحات عمل المهتم بالشأن العام

Literal meaning: 'the reformist king does not accept… nor does the scholar accept it ... Thus, those cooperate to reduce the areas of work of that who is interested in public affairs'.

TET1: 'neither the reformist king accepts…, nor do the scholars accept it... Consequently [those activists] cooperate to reduce the work areas of those interested in public affairs'.

The transeditor here uses an addition technique to add information within square brackets to elaborate on هؤلاء 'those' and make clear that it refers to 'those activists'. However, the intended هؤلاء, based on the ST's context, are the 'reformist king' and 'the scholar', thus, the plural determiner 'those' would have been more accurate without that addition, which caused a translation loss in the ST's intended meaning.

ST2:

مؤسسو جمعية الحقوق المدنية والسياسية ...والذين اعتقلوا ، ومن بين هؤلاء عبد الله الحامد ومحمد القحطاني اللذان حكما بالسجن عشرة اعوام للحامد و11 للقحطان اضافة لمنعهما من السفر بعد الافراج عنهما.

Literal meaning: ‘the founders of the Association of Civil and Political Rights,…who were sentenced to ten years in prison for al-Hamed and 11 for al-Qahtan in addition to preventing them from travelling after their release’.

TET2: ‘the founders of The Society of Civil and Political Rights … were arrested…These include Abdallah al-Hamid, who was sentenced for 10 years in prison, and Muhammad al-Qahtani, who was sentenced to 11 years in prison. Both were later released but have been banned from travel abroad’.

Two main observations can be made on TET2. First, the BBCM-M professional opted to discount the Arabic name of the association referred to in the ST, as the ST-TET analysis shows. Rather, he or she has decided to transedit the name of the association as ‘the Society of Civil and Political Rights’. This may be misleading for the English reader because, even in English, the association is commonly known and referred to as the ‘Association of Civil and Political Rights’ (Acpra.org, 2019).

Second, the final sentence in the TET refers to an action that has already happened: ‘Both were later released but have been banned from travel abroad’. However, the ST refers to the court sentence issued in 2013 to both imprison the founders and ban them travelling, which will be enforced after they are released. Six years after the date of the news item’s publication and the publication of the BBCM-M’s TET, at the time of writing this chapter, both founders are still in prison (The Right Livelihood Award, 2019). This means that they were not ‘later released’ and are yet to ‘have been banned from travel abroad’ and shows the inferior position assigned to the Arabic ST by the BBCM-M professional; he or she simply ignores the meaning it contains.

ST3:

قد اعتبر الكثيرون ان القرارات الاقتصادية الصادرة عام 2012 حبوب تسكين للالم اكثر من علاج له،

Literal meaning: ‘many have considered the economic decisions that were issued in 2012 to be pain-relieving pills more than a cure’,

TET3: ‘many people see the economic decisions made in 2012 as sedatives of the pain, not a cure’

The BBCM-M professional opted to transedit حبوب تسكين للألم into ‘sedatives of the pain’. This is a move from the specific ST ‘pills’ to the generic TET ‘sedatives’, as sedatives come in various forms including pills, lotions and injections. Thus, the meaning of the ST is less clear and more implicit. The use of this implicitation technique results in a translation loss; ‘sedatives’ loses its specific form of pills. Importantly, the comparative meaning intended in اكثر من علاج له، ‘more than a cure’ is altered when the BBCM-M professional transedits it into ‘not a cure’, which is another translation loss. Moreover, the BBCM-M professional commits a grammatical mistake by using ‘of’ instead of ‘for’ in ‘sedatives of the pain’. All these examples indicate the inferior position of the Arabic ST assigned by the BBCM-M professional, which caused several instances of translation loss in the ST’s meaning.

ST4:

معظمهم انضم الى ‘جبهة النصرة’ وبعضهم يقاتل مع ‘داعش’ الأكثر تطرفا

Literal meaning: ‘most of them joined al-Nusra Front and some are fighting with ISIS, which is more extreme’.

TET4: most of these Saudis joined al-Nusrah Front and some of them are fighting alongside DA'ISH, which is most extreme’.

The Arabic ST refers to two terrorist organisations – the al-Nusra Front and ISIS –that Saudi nationals are alleged to join and fight for in the SC. It also includes a comparison between these two organisations in terms of their تطرف ‘extremism’. Comparison in Arabic involves using the (أفعل) form as in س أكبر من ص, ‘X is bigger than Y’. However, the (أفعل) form is inapplicable with longer adjectives, so أكثر plus the verbal noun derived from the adjective and (من) are used in comparing two objects, as in س أكثر أهميةً من ص ‘X is more important than Y’. In the ST, however, this is not clear as الأكثر تطرفا, literally meaning ‘the most extremist’, is used. Nonetheless, the context specifically refers to two organisations, and thus could have been rendered ‘more extreme’.

This would also be adequate in the English TET; in accordance with the English grammar, it should have been rendered into ‘which is more extreme’, for it is a comparison between two entities, and the superlative requires at least three entities.

However, the transeditor opted to use ‘most extreme’, which is the superlative form of ‘more’, thus not only losing the comparative between the two entities in the ST but also inserting a superlative sense, which overstates the phrasing in the original.

9.3.1.2 Limited/Partial Source Text Meanings

Producing a TET that delivers a limited or partial meaning of the ST’s meaning can also be caused by rewriting as domestication at the expense of the ST’s meaning, as in the following example:

ST1:

التمييز ضد المرأة في القانون والممارسة، والتمييز ضد الاقليات

Literal meaning: ‘discrimination against women in law and practice, and discrimination against minorities’.

TET1: ‘segregation against women in law and practice, segregation against minorities’.

Before discussing the limited ST meaning conveyed in the TET by virtue of the latter’s lexical choices, it is important to point out the grammatical mistake committed by the transeditor; he or she uses ‘against’ in ‘segregation against women in law and practice’ while the linguistic context requires ‘of’ instead of ‘against’.

Notably, the professional here decides to twice transedit التمييز ‘discrimination’ into ‘segregation’. This is done through an oblique translation strategy in which explication through modulation (generic-specific) or whole-part is identified, as the transeditor chose to translate التمييز ‘discrimination’ as ‘segregation’. Although both ‘discrimination’ and ‘segregation’ are familiar to the English reader, the decision to use the latter to refer to the former is a domestication based on the specific context under discussion, Saudi Arabia.

As this chapter is being written, Saudi Arabia is recognised as a country where men and women are segregated during events and in locations like places of worship (mosques), the workplace, schools and universities. This is not only the law in Saudi Arabia; it is also a cultural practice rooted in the religious commitment to avoid *al-khalwa* ‘seclusion’. Thus, family gatherings are also segregated (Alhazmi and Nyland, 2013).

By using the modulation technique (generic-specific) or, in Vinay and Darbelnet's terms, whole-part, 'segregation' is chosen as the equivalent of التمييز 'discrimination'. However, segregation of women and men can, from a certain perspective, be one of several forms of discrimination against women under Western standards that consider gender-based segregation at events, universities or the workplace as an 'unlawful' discriminatory practice (Equalityhumanrights.com, 2016). Thus, the BBCM-M professional fails to convey the full meaning of the ST; 'discrimination' in this context goes beyond the concept of gender segregation to cover a wide range of other issues such as women not being allowed to drive, which is mentioned in the text itself and was the law in Saudi Arabia until June 2018.

This also applies to والتمييز ضد الاقليات, which is transedited into 'segregation against minorities' rather than 'discrimination against minorities', for 'segregation' is only one of several possible forms of التمييز 'discrimination' against minorities. Thus, in this context, selecting 'segregation' limits the meaning of the ST and signals a stereotypically motivated attempt to shed light on a specific form of discrimination against women and minorities in Saudi Arabia: segregation. This move again emphasises the inferior position of the Arabic ST compared to the stereotypically motivated domestication in the TET, which comes at the expense of the ST's meaning.

ST2:

ومنها الاعدام بالسيف بالساحات العامة والجلد وقطع الاطراف

Literal meaning: 'including sword execution in public areas, flogging and amputation of limbs',

TET2: 'including execution by the sword in public squares, flogging, and amputation of hands'.

In this example, although the transediting decision to transedit قطع الاطراف 'amputation of limbs' into 'amputation of hands' somewhat tones-down the gruesome meaning carried in the ST that can involve the amputation of both hands and feet, it indeed highlights a stereotypically motivated domestication at the expense of the ST's meaning. To clarify, the Islamic penalty for theft is 'amputation of limbs', which starts

with the right hand and, in the event of repeated thefts, can go beyond to the amputation of the thief's foot. According to al-Shariʿa, the Islamic law based on al-Qurʾan wa-l-sunna (Campo, 2009, p.620), the punishment for theft is not limited to hands; it can be gradually applied to both hands and feet in case of repeat offenses (Sunnah.com, 2019).

However, a translation loss is thus evident here by constricting the ST's meaning ('limbs') for the English reader, reproducing a reductionist view on the Islamic laws regarding theft that is based on a common stereotype, that is to say cutting off hands, instead of the ST's meaning or knowledge of the ST's culture. This confirms the lower position of the Arabic ST, and culture, assigned by the BBCM-M professional who neglected the ST's clear meaning and domesticated it into 'hands'.

ST3:

إلا أن مصادر سعودية تقدر عددهم بأنه يتراوح بين 1500 و2000 سعودي معظمهم ...

Literal meaning: 'however, Saudi sources estimate that between 1500 and 2,000 Saudis, most of them',

TET3: Saudi sources estimate their number at 1500–2000. Most of these Saudis',

In accordance with the routine domestication opted by the BBCM-M professional, this somewhat lengthy Arabic sentence is split into two in the English TET. However, this produced a vague TET, because 'their', in the first sentence, does not refer to a specific subject mentioned earlier in the same sentence or in a previous one. سعودي 'Saudi' in سعودي 2000 و1500 is omitted; it is only in the second sentence that 'their' can be identified as referring to 'Saudis' because it begins with 'most of these Saudis'. This shows how the BBCM-M's preference for domestication affected the ST's meaning by making it vaguer, merely for the sake of producing an English TET with shorter sentences to the English reader.

9.3.1.3 Unnatural/Unidiomatic TETs

The following examples show the outcome of the BBCM-M professional's constant clarifications of the meaning of the ST through additions or the usage of words that

are thought to be common in English, which led to an unidiomatic and unnatural TET for English readers:

ST1:

شعور السعودية بان هناك تراجعا بدورها ووزنها الاقليميين وخشيتها من تسوية بين الغرب وايران،

Literal meaning: 'the feeling of Saudi Arabia that there is a decline in its regional role and weight and its fear of a settlement between the West and Iran'.

TET1: Saudi Arabia feels… and that it fears a settlement between the Western nations and Iran.

The transeditor here decided to add 'nations' to the 'West', which has changed the meaning of the ST for, based on the linguistic context, the West refers to governments rather than nations. This government is the one in a state of disagreement with Iran and might forge a 'settlement', rather than the 'nation'. Thus, this manoeuvre has produced a TET that may be unnatural to an English reader.

ST2:

تتجاهل اطيافا متنوعة ومختلفة على الساحة السعودية ربما لا يجد رأيها او موقفها مساحة في الاعلام حيث هي غير مثيرة او مسلية و

Literal meaning: 'it ignores various and different spectra (meaning voices) in the Saudi arena whose opinion or position may not find a space in the media for it is not exciting nor entertaining'.

TET2: 'it ignores various and different spectrums in the Saudi arena whose opinions or stands might not find any space in the media as they are not sexy or entertaining'.

The ST's meaning refers to an 'opinion' of various voices in the Kingdom that do not meet the norm and are thus unexciting for the Saudi media. However, the transeditor opted to use the term 'sexy', which does not collocate with 'opinion' in this context and thus not only fails to duplicate the ST's meaning but also producing a TET that is unnatural for the English reader.

ST3:

وتأتي المبايض كأولوية بعد الحجاب

Literal meaning: ‘the ovaries come as a priority after the hijab.

TET3: ‘ovaries become a priority after the headdress’.

Similarly, the transeditor tries to produce a familiar TET by domesticating the term hijab into ‘headdress’. This not only removes the profound cultural significance of hijab but also produces an unnatural TET. Hijab is a commonly used term in English in contexts similar to the ST’s context, referring to the Islamic garment that Muslim women wear on their heads to cover the hair, and ‘headdress’ is not typically used in English to refer to that item. Rather, it is generic, used for any head garment worn by any woman – Muslim, Christian, Jewish and so on – and indeed by men in many cultures. A query of the iWeb corpus, a 14 billion-word corpus released in May 2018 and 140 times larger than the BNC (English-corpora.org, 2019), shows that ‘headdress’, for women, is mainly used in contexts that refer to ‘bridal headdress’ rather than the actual meaning of hijab in the ST.

9.3.1.4 Spelling, Syntactic and Grammatical Errors within TETs

In addition to the grammatical mistakes identified above, there are other errors in spelling and grammar, as the following examples show:

ST1:

الجايروكوبتر’ و’البروموتر وميترولايت’ الشراعية

Literal meaning: ‘gyrocopter, paramotor and microlight’.

TET1: ‘Gyrokwitters, Promoters, and Metrolite’.

The ST above talks about three types of gliders, الجايروكوبتر والبروموتر وميترولايت الشراعية. These are words that have been borrowed from English into Arabic, and their Arabic pronunciations and spellings differ from the original English words (and the literal translations presented above). For example, the ‘c’ in ‘microlight’ becomes ‘ت’, which is ‘t’ in the Arabic borrowed word ميترولايت, and the ‘a’ in ‘paramotor’ becomes ‘و’, which is ‘o’ in the Arabic البروموتر.

However, as the professional's default strategy is to domesticate of the foreign, he or she neglects the fact that these words are actually borrowed from the English 'gyrocopter, paramotor and microlight' and domesticates them as if they were genuinely foreign words. This led to producing a TET with unacceptable misspellings: 'Gyrokwitters, Promoters, and Metrolite'.

ST2:

كل من شارك في أعمال قتالية خارج المملكة أو الانتماء للتيارات أو الجماعات الدينية والفكرية المتطرفة.

Literal meaning: 'any person who participated in fighting activities outside the Kingdom or belonging to extremist intellectual and religious movements or groups'.

TET2: 'every person who participated in fighting outside the kingdom or belong to religious and extremist intellectual trends or groups'.

An observation is notable with this example. There is a mistake in the meaning of the ST, in which the transeditor decides to transedit للتيارات أو الجماعات الدينية والفكرية المتطرفة into 'religious and extremist intellectual trends or groups'. The adjective 'extremist', as the ST shows, refers to both 'religious and intellectual movements and groups', but the TET restricts it to 'the intellectual movements/trends or groups'. Based on the TET, the punishment is for 'religious trends and groups' and 'extremist intellectual trends or groups', which is not what the ST actually conveyed.

ST3:

السعودية تتذرع باستنادها الى الشريعة الاسلامية

Literal meaning: 'Saudi Arabia claims its reliance on Islamic Shariah'.

TET3: 'Saudi Arabia gives the excuse that it upholds the Islamic shar'ah'.

Before discussing the transeditor's failure to replicate the ST's meaning, it is important to point out a mistake in the TET. The transeditor misspells 'Shariah or Sharia' and does not capitalise it as 'shar'ah'. He or she then decides to transedit الشريعة الاسلامية, which is commonly phrased 'Islamic law' or 'Shariah or Sharia law' in English, into

‘Islamic shar'ah’. This, however, qualifies ‘Shariah’ as ‘Islamic’, which is embedded as ‘Shariah’ is restricted to ‘Islam’; there is no ‘Christian Shariah’ or ‘Buddhist Shariah’. The TET thus not only has spelling mistakes but also unnatural and redundant English in ‘Islamic Shariah’.

ST4:

المرأة في السعودية المحرومة من رخصة قيادة السيارة تقبل بشكل لافت على حيازة رخصة طائرات...

Literal meaning: ‘women in Saudi Arabia who are denied a driving licence are remarkably turning to acquiring aircrafts’ licence’.

TET4: ‘there is an increasing demand for piloting licenses’.

In British English, ‘licence’ is a noun, and ‘license’ is a verb. In American English both verb and noun are spelled ‘license’. Based on the linguistic co-context and the larger context of the BBCM-M as a British news organisation, using ‘licenses’ to refer to the noun ‘licences’ is a grammatical mistake; the sentence demands a noun, not a verb.

This shows that during transediting, the BBCM-M professionals who transedited the three texts in question carried out an act of rewriting as domestication at the expense of the ST. This placed the Arabic STs in an inferior position to the English TETs for the sake of familiarising what they assumed to be foreign for the English reader. What is foreign, as the analysis above showed, is the Arabic style of writing, such as shortening sentences and using words instead of numerals for large numbers, the Islamic law for theft, the status of human rights (Saudi activists, Saudi women and minorities) and the Muslim women’s garment hijab. This form of rewriting has led to translation loss in accuracy, meaning, idiom, spelling and grammar, leading to inaccurate, partial, unnatural and misspelled TETs.

9.3.2 Translation Gain

A translation gain describes the TT’s acquisition, through translation, of elements that were not there, at least with the same force or clarity, in the ST. Translation gain, from the ST’s perspective, is nothing but a translation loss, for making an element more obvious than it is in the ST is equally a failure to replicate its original meaning (Hervey and Higgins, 1992, p.22). However, these instances are called ‘translation gains’

below to highlight the intensification caused by transediting decisions. Translation gain is the sole identified effect in all examples in the paragraphs that follow.

9.3.2.1 Using an Equivalence with Stronger Illocutionary Force

ST1:

الاوضاع السيئة لحقوق الانسان في السعودية

Literal meaning: 'the bad conditions for (meaning 'of') human rights in Saudi Arabia'
TET1: 'the dire record of human rights in Saudi Arabia'.

The translation gain here is in the illocutionary force carried in the lexical choice 'dire' for السيئة 'bad'. Both 'bad' and 'dire' have negative meanings, but 'dire' carries an extreme degree of that negativity (English-English Oxford Dictionary, 2019). Thus, rather than faithfully transferring the meaning of 'bad', the meaning of 'very bad' (or even worse) is delivered in the TET, thus intensifying the ST's meaning.

ST2:

لمنع المجتمع الدولي من انتقاد سجلها السيىء بحقوق الانسان

Literal meaning: 'to prevent the international community from criticizing its poor/bad record of human rights'.

TET2: 'from criticizing its dire record on human rights'.

The transeditor systematically opts for 'dire' to again transedit السيىء, which literally means 'bad' or 'poor', and intensifies the ST's meaning into something like 'extremely poor' or 'very bad'.

9.3.2.2 Explicitation of Source Text Meaning and Addition to Source Text Meaning

The following examples show the intensification of the ST's meaning through two translation techniques: addition (example 1) and explicitation (2 and 3).

ST1:

رغم غنى السعودية

Literal meaning: 'despite Saudi Arabia's wealth'.

TET1: ‘despite its enormous wealth’.

The BBCM-M professional opts to qualify the ‘wealth’ of Saudi Arabia with the addition of the qualifier ‘enormous’, thus intensifying the ST’s meaning. This intensification of ‘Saudi Arabia’s wealth’ may well be stereotypically motivated given that the ST does not qualify ‘wealth’ in any way.

ST2:

وأعطت السلطات السعودية فترة عفو لمن قاتل في سوريا

Literal meaning: ‘Saudi authorities have granted an amnesty period for any of those who fought in Syria’.

TET2: ‘Saudi authorities gave an amnesty period to any Saudi national who fought in Syria’.

The BBCM-M professional intensifies the meaning of the ST by explicitly transediting لمن قاتل, meaning ‘to any of those who fought’, into ‘to any Saudi national who fought’, which clearly states the nationality of those to whom the text refers.

ST3:

السلطات السعودية ... التنظيمات الإسلامية وغير الاسلامية التي تدعمها ماليا وعسكريا

Literal meaning: ‘the Saudi authorities are… Islamic and non-Islamic organizations that they support financially and militarily’.
TET3: ‘the Saudi authorities are… the Islamic and non-Islamic organizations that Saudi Arabia supports both financially and militarily’.

Similarly, the TET explicitly states the subject ‘Saudi Arabia’, even though the pronoun ‘they’, referring to ‘the Saudi authorities’, would have been more lexically accurate and grammatically correct.

ST4:

بل على العكس من ذلك صعّدت المملكة من القمع خلال هذه الفترة.

Literal meaning: ‘on the contrary, the Kingdom stepped up the repression during this period’.
TET4: ‘on the contrary, Saudi Arabia has stepped up its repressive measures since then’.

Using modulation technique by which a whole, ‘the repression’, is changed into a more explicit part, ‘repressive measures’, the BBCM-M professional has added an emphasis to the ‘measures’ that was not present in the ST.

9.3.2.3 Materialising the Abstract in the Source Text

ST1:

رغم غنى السعودية فهناك نسبة كبيرة من سكانها، تقدرها بعض الارقام الاقتصادية بـ50 بالمئة، هم تحت خط الفقر، وهذا الأمر محل قلق

Literal meaning: ‘despite Saudi Arabia's wealth, a large percentage of its population, estimated by some economic figures at 50 percent, is below the poverty line and this issue/matter is a source of concern’.
TET1: ‘despite its enormous wealth, a considerable proportion of the Saudi population, estimated by some economic reports at 50 per cent, live under poverty line. This reality is a source of concern’.

The lexical choice in the example above intensifies the ST’s meaning by turning an abstract meaning of the ST, ‘some economic figures’, into a more factual one, ‘some economic reports’. A report is commonly a more involved and in-depth process that entails more than simply relaying ‘figures’.

A similar intensification is evident in the transediting of هذ الأمر محل قلق و احتجاج, in which the transeditor opted to use ‘reality’ for الأمر, meaning ‘issue’ or ‘matter’, again making the ST’s meaning appear more factual than it is and increasing the reliability of the claim made in the ST.

9.3.2.4 Pluralising/Normalising a Lone Case and Generalising the Part

The following examples are intensifications created by transediting through generalisations of the ST’s meaning in a variety of ways, including universalising the limited meaning of a certain entity, as in the first example, to portraying a single case as the norm, as in the third example:

ST1:

الاتهامات للسلطات السعودية تتضمن ...

Literal meaning: ‘the accusations against Saudi authorities include’.

TET1: ‘the charges against Saudi Arabia include’.

In this example, the BBCM-M professional applied a modulation technique in which a part (‘Saudi authorities’) is changed into a whole (‘Saudi Arabia’). This has generalised the meaning of the accusation to cover all of Saudi Arabia instead only ‘Saudi authorities’, potentially intensifying the meaning.

ST2:

فيستحضر هذا الاعلام صورة الفقيه الرجعي المنغمس بفكره

Literal meaning: ‘this media brings to mind the image of the reactionary scholar, who is immersed in his thought’.

TET2: ‘this media recall the reactionary scholars immersed in his ideology’.

In this example, the BBCM-M professional pluralises the second singular noun الفقيه ‘the scholar’ into ‘scholars’. This decision serves to generalise the case of a single Saudi religious scholar who justified the ban imposed on women’s driving in Saudi Arabia on the basis of concern over harming women’s pelvises and ovaries. The change renders this dubious claim of a single scholar as a shared ideology among Saudi religious scholars as a group. However, none of the various cultural, societal or religious reasons used by any number of Saudi religious scholars, over the years, to support the ban on women’s driving in Saudi Arabia stems from the logic of this specific scholar. Thus, this notion of harming women’s pelvis and ovaries is thus far from a consensus amongst Saudi religious scholars. For example, the fatāwā of al-shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn ʿAbd Allah ibn Bāz and al-shaykh ibn ʿUthaymīn that prohibit women from driving were made on the basis that driving might lead to unlawful consequences, such as taking off hijab, *al-khalwa* or potentially *ḥarām* (‘unlawful’) meetings between men and women (Abdul-Rahman, 2003, pp.5-12).

Interestingly, this generalisation is systematically achieved in the TET, except for a few instances, as the following list of examples shows:

ST3:

رغم مواقف الفقيه الرجعي ومن يتبعه.

Literal meaning: ‘despite the positions of reactionary scholar and his followers.

TET3: ‘despite the positions of reactionary scholars and their followers.

ST4:

نجدهم محاصرين ملاحقين من قبل السلطات والفقيه معا

Literal meaning: ‘we find them besieged and pursued by both the authorities and the religious scholar’.

TET4: ‘we find that they are besieged and pursued by the authorities and the scholars’.

ST5:

ولا الفقيه يرضى به كبديل لآرائه الموغلة في أزليتها

Literal meaning: ‘nor does the religious scholar accept it as an alternative to his views that are soaked in their oldness’.

TET5: ‘nor do the scholars accept it as an alternative to their opinions so deeply entrenched due to their oldness’.

ST6:

ان نلجم الفقيه ونمنعه من الترويج لارائه الغريبة ليس من حقنا

Literal meaning: ‘it is not our right to strap the religious scholar and prevent him from promoting his strange views’.

TET6: ‘to rein in the scholars and stop them from promoting their odd opinions’.

ST7:

حماية ليس فقط المرأة في السعودية بل العالم من شطحات الفقيه الرجعي

Literal meaning: ‘the protection not only of women in Saudi Arabia but of the world from the slips of the reactionary religious scholar’.

TET7: ‘to protect not only women in Saudi Arabia but the world against the slips of reactionary scholars’.

ST8:

حصن المرأة ضد تخلف الفقيه

Literal meaning: ‘women’s fort against the backwardness of the religious scholar’.

TET8: ‘bastion of women against the lagging scholars’.

Ironically, the ST under examination does raise the potential harm caused by this kind of scholar, which is that the Western media will take his views and disseminate them as being ‘representative of Islam and a speaker in its name, expressing its secrets and positions regarding unresolved issues, most notably women's issues’. This is applied by the BBCM-M, as the professional who transedited this ST has publicised this illogical ‘scientific’ explanation for prohibiting women from driving in Saudi Arabia as the consensus of many ‘scholars’ rather than the dubious opinion of ‘a scholar’, who is in fact ridiculed in the ST.

9.3.2.5 Adding a Comparative Element or a Near-Synonym

Another technique that is used by the BBCM-M professional to intensify the ST’s meaning is the addition of a comparative element not present in the ST and repeating the ST’s meaning through the addition of a near-synonym, as the following excerpts show:

ST1:

وتتضمن الانتهاكات التمييز ضد المرأة في القانون والممارسة، والتمييز ضد الاقليات واساءة معاملة الوافدين،

Literal meaning: ‘the violations include discrimination against women in law and practice, discrimination against minorities and abuse of migrants’.

TET1: ‘these violations also include, among others, segregation against women in law and practice, segregation against minorities, and ill-treatment of foreign workers’.

In the example above, the transeditor opted to add, through transediting, ‘among others’, which amplifies the ST’s meaning because the implication in the produced TET is that there are more violations than the ones actually listed in the ST.

ST2:

والاعتقال التعسفي للناشطين ومطالبي الاصلاحات، ومن ضمنهم مؤسسو جمعية الحقوق المدنية والسياسية...

Literal meaning: ‘and arbitrary detention of activists and reformers, including the founders of the Civil and Political Rights Association’.

TET2: ‘and arbitrary arrest of activists and of those who call for reforms and even the founders of The Society of Civil and Political Rights’.

In this case, the transeditor opted to substitute من ضمنهم ‘including’ with ‘and even the founders’. This substitution brings about a certain degree of emphasis that was not present in the ST; the adverb ‘even’ is used for comparison in the English version to create emphasis. This adverb does not appear in the Arabic ST.

ST3:

ولا يبدو ان تقرير المملكة يخاطب القضية الاساسية وهي الانتهاكات ضد المواطنين،

Literal meaning: ‘the Kingdom's report does not appear to address the fundamental issue of violations against citizens’.

TET3: ‘the report, however, does not mention or address the basic issue, namely violations against citizens’.

This example reveals the decision of the transeditor to translate يخاطب, meaning ‘address’, into two words ‘mention or address’ through the addition of a near-synonym, thus adding a degree of emphasis to the ST’s meaning.

Thus, in addition to causing translation loss, another outcome of domestication at the expense of the ST, which is the form of rewriting chosen, has been identified. This is translation gain, which re-emphasised the ST’s meanings through a variety of devices. These examples clearly show the inferior position ascribed to the Arabic ST and the extent to which the BBCM-M professional has contributed to the discursive construction of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women at the micro level.

9.4 Conclusion

In this case study, three news items from al-Quds al-Arabi that were selected and transedited into English by the BBCM-M were investigated by applying an adapted model of the DHA to CDA. The investigation has shown that the BBCM-M professionals’ role in the construction of the image of Saudi Arabia as dominated by

men of authority and distant from (acting) women, prior to transediting, was selecting news items that discursively construct that image of Saudi Arabia. This was identified at both the contextual (related to silencing the voices of women while prioritising those of men who enjoy authority) and linguistic levels (related to lesser agency for women and more distance from the reader than men of authority enjoy).

It became clear that, during transediting, the BBCM-M professionals systematically ascribed the Arabic STs an inferior position to the English TETs, which enabled domestication at the expense of one or more of the STs' morphology, syntax and semantics, thus, placing the Arabic ST at a lower position compared to the English TET. A closer look at this form of rewriting shows that it caused stereotypically motivated translation loss and gain, which contributed to Saudi Arabia's construction as dominated by men of authority and as distant from (acting) women.

These findings confirm the consistency of the BBCM-M professionals' role in contributing to the image of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women both prior and during transediting process when dealing with news items from al-Quds al-Arabi. They also confirm the inferior position of Arabic STs and cultural aspects embedded in the texts compared to familiarising the texts for the English reader. Chapter 10 investigates the consistency of these findings beyond the news source most frequently selected by the BBCM-M, al-Quds al-Arabi.

Chapter 10: Investigating the Consistency of Findings beyond Transedited Texts from al-Quds al-Arabi (Case Study 3)

10.1 Introduction

This chapter tests the consistency of the power imbalance identified in the previous two chapters as taking place against Arabic language and culture via transediting. It also investigates the identified BBCM-M professionals' contribution to the representation of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women. In doing so, it goes beyond the most frequently selected daily by the BBCM-M when constructing the image of Saudi Arabia, al-Quds al-Arabi, to analyse four news items from other news sources. The news items for this case study are from al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyah news TV channels, the most frequently employed TV channels when depicting Saudi Arabia with the representation in question.

The following four news items were selected: 'Pan Arab TV show views Saudis joining al-Qaʿida in Syria, Iraq' (see Appendix 12.1), 'Saudi cleric views use of social media to counter al-Qaʿida ideology' (see Appendix 12.2), 'Talk show discusses Gulf states' alleged "concern" over Iran-West nuclear deal' (see Appendix 12.3) and 'Al-Jazeera discusses Qatar's tense relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain' (see Appendix 12.4).

The transediting of all four news items involves discourse transfer from one form of communication (audio-visual) into another (written). Interestingly, the contextual triangulation shows that al-Jazeera's two audio-visual clips were published along with their full transcriptions on the official al-Jazeera website (see Appendix 11.2 for the Arabic transcriptions and Appendices 12.3 and 11.4 for the TETs), while al-Arabiyah's audio-visual clips are published on its official website without transcriptions (see Appendices 12.1 and 12.2 for the TETs). Thus, for the purpose of this research, al-Jazeera's transcriptions were used as STs for the comparative analysis, and al-Arabiyah's two audio-visuals were transcribed prior to the analysis (see Appendix 11.1).

The contextual triangulation also shows that both al-Jazeera and al-Arabiyah are prestigious news networks in the Middle East and the Arab world more generally. In relation to the focus of this research, Saudi Arabia, al-Arabiyah is a Dubai-based and

Saudi-owned network that is thus commonly identified as ‘pro-Saudi’. Al-Jazeera, by contrast, is a source of discomfort for many Arab regimes – the Jordanian, Egyptian, Bahraini, Emirati and, most importantly, Saudi regimes. One reason is the long-standing conflict between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the owner of al-Jazeera, over foreign policies and borders over the past 20 years, which has recently escalated into the current Saudi-Qatari diplomatic crisis; shutting down the al-Jazeera organisation appears in a leaked list of 13 demands by Saudi Arabia given to the Qatari regime in 2017 to end the Saudi-led economic and diplomatic embargo on Qatar (Lynch, 2016, p.14). The Saudi Arabian government’s distress over al-Jazeera arises from the alleged anti-Saudi propaganda that al-Jazeera regularly airs (Hearst, 2014). Thus, in this context, al-Jazeera is an anti-Saudi news source.

Both of the audio-visuals taken from al-Arabiyah are from the same talk show صناعة الموت ‘Death industry’, during the same month and year (November 2013; the first was broadcast on 15 November and the second on 30 November 2013) and discuss similar topics: the tweets of Dr Muhammad al-Sai’di, a Saudi Arabian religious preacher, about al-Qaʿida. The earlier audio-visual analysed here is an interview conducted by the Saudi journalist Muhammad al-Tumayhi of another Saudi journalist, Faris bin Hizam, about the controversial tweets by Dr Muhammad al-Sa’idi, who is discussing al-Qaʿida’s Ideology and the decreasing number of Saudis joining al-Qaʿida. The second audio-visual is an interview by al-Tumayhi with Dr al-Sa’idi himself about his tweets, which were discussed in the earlier episode with Bin-Hizam.

Moving on to al-Jazeera’s audio-visuals, the first was taken from a 27-minute talk show on the al-Jazeera TV channel known as ماوراء الخبر, or ‘What is Behind the News’. In the studio, the news presenter Layla al-Shaykhali is mainly talking about the Western-Iranian nuclear deal and conducts several interviews: Dr As'ad al-Shamlan, a Saudi academic and researcher in international relations, via satellite from Riyadh; Dr Amir al-Musawi, an expert on Iranian affairs, via satellite from Tehran; and Dr Khalil Jahshan, an expert on US Middle East policy, via satellite from Washington. The BBC reported on the clip on 24 November 2013. The second audio-visual is a 50-minute episode of the TV talk show في العمق ‘In Depth’ that aired on 10 March 2014. The presenter Ali al-Zufayri hosts in the Doha studios, while Jabir al-Harami, chief editor of the Qatari newspaper al-Sharq and Husayn Shubukshi, a Saudi writer and political

analyst appear via satellite from Jedda to discuss the withdrawal of the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini ambassadors from Qatar.

10.2 Discursive Distancing of Saudi Women

It is not surprising to find that Saudi women are scarcely noticeable in all four audio-visuals, whether in the STs or the TETs. Saudi men of authority are mentioned in the texts far more often than Saudi women. This insight was obtained because this case study goes beyond the most reported news source from which the discursive construction of Saudi Arabia's image as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women was created: al-Quds al-Arabi. Moreover, as the few instances of reporting on Saudi women were observed to be mainly from that source, the neglect of Saudi women in the four audio-visuals selected from other news sources is hardly unexpected. That being said, the only instance in which a Saudi woman is referred to in the texts in question is in al-Arabiyah's first audio-visual, as the following excerpt shows:

> 'Bin-Hizam says "for the first time, we have seen some in Saudi Arabia expressing joy over their sons joining **al-Qaʿida** in Syria, such as a lady in the city of al-Qasim who has sent her son, 15, to Syria and announced through Twitter that he had reached Syria, joined al-Qaʿida, and would return to Saudi Arabia to conquer the tyrants of the Arabian Peninsula." Wondering what that child can do in Syria, he says "hundreds of Saudis are used as tools to carry out car bombing operations". He also says "the said woman has long complained that she and her husband have been accused of maintaining links with al-Qaʿida".

As the excerpt shows, the Saudi woman is acting rather than being acted upon as she 'sent her son, 15, to Syria and announced through Twitter'. However, her actions can be described as inhumane; not only does she send her minor son to join an internationally recognised terrorist group, al-Qaʿida, but she also takes enough pride in it to 'announce' it on Twitter. This shows that the linguistic distancing of Saudi women from the promoted image of Saudi Arabia continues beyond the most reported news source, as they are overlooked elsewhere. Notably, when reporting on Saudi

women, it is those whose actions are alien that garner the attention of the BBCM-M, such as the proud mother who sent her 15-year old son to join al-Qaʿida in Syria. Arguably, the BBCM-M is stripping Saudi women of human qualities in its rare instances of reporting on them.

10.3 Forms of Rewriting prior to Transediting

Comparing the TETs to their STs shows three forms of rewriting that took place prior to transediting. These are 1) reframing older events to emphasise meanings, 2) partial transcription that involves large-scale omissions (both consequential and inconsequential) and 3) subjectively reporting speeches. All three highlight the lower position of the Arabic STs, the audio-visuals, compared to the English TETs and are thus key factors in such aggressive forms of rewriting.

10.3.1 Reframing Older Events to Emphasise Meanings

Comparing the broadcast dates of the audio-visuals as reported by the BBC with those taken from the official websites shows that the BBC falsely reported a year-old al-Arabiyah TV show as current. The BBCM-M professional transedited the first al-Arabiyah audio-visual four days after its original broadcast and the second nearly a year after it aired. It is striking that the second one was incorrectly described as being published four days earlier by al-Arabiyah, while al-Jazeera's audio-visuals are correctly dated, as Table 33 makes clear.

	News source	Original broadcasting date (from their official webpages)	Original broadcasting date (as stated by the BBCM-M)	BBCM-M's publishing date
1	al-Arabiyah's first news item	15-11-2013	15-11-2013	19-11-2013
2	al-Arabiyah's second news item	30-11-2013	18-7-2014	22-7-2014
3	al-Jazeera's first news item	24-11-2013	24-11-2013	25-11-2013
4	al-Jazeera's second news item	10-3-2014	10-3-2014	12-3-2014

Table 33: Analysis of the audio-visuals' publication dates

This manoeuvre is the first identified form of rewriting prior to transediting and results in an emphasis on the topic of Dr Muhammad al-Sai'di's tweets about al-Qaʿida, which had been discussed in 2013, a full year later by digging the topic up and publishing it as a recent discussion on the original source, al-Arabiyah. Indeed, a brief scan of the other TETs that the BBCM-M produced based on al-Arabiyah's coverage of Saudi Arabia from 2013 to 2015 shows that the same event was reported two other times by the BBCM-M on two more dates – 19 November 2013 and 1 December 2013– Under different headings: 'Pan Arab TV show views Saudis joining al-Qaʿida in Syria, Iraq' and 'Pan-Arab TV interviews Saudi cleric on anti-Al-Qaʿida tweets', respectively. This repetition shows the deliberate emphasis of the BBCM-M on the topic of the Saudi religious cleric courting al-Qaʿida through Twitter.

10.3.2 Partial Transcription: Large-Scale Omissions

A comparative ST-TET analysis shows that the second form of rewriting prior to transediting is partial transcription, because all four audio-visuals were partially transcribed prior to transediting, which meant numerous large-scale omissions. It is important to distinguish these large-scale omissions from the minor omissions that might take place via transediting, in which omission is part of a translation technique. Thus, to avoid confusion, the large-scale omissions that were caused through partial transcription are discussed before we turn to the transediting stage. These large-scale omissions were caused by the BBCM-M professionals who transedited the four audio-visuals. However, these omissions are of two natures: inconsequential and consequential in terms of taking out, amplifying or mitigating the ideological meaning of the original audio-visuals, as the paragraphs below make clear.

10.3.2.1 Inconsequential Large-Scale Omissions

As the news items by the BBCM-M are expected to have specified word counts, the omission of less important content is expected, even on a large scale like two or more sentences. These omissions function as signposting, signal turn-taking, effect introductions and address the audience. They are thus referred to here as inconsequential large-scale omissions in terms of the ideological meaning of the ST. They can be found in all of the audio-visuals under examination. It is important to note, however, that the following examples are entirely omitted from the TETs in question; thus, only a literal translation is provided for the purpose of comprehension.

- Examples from al-Arabiyah's audio-visuals:

1. اسمحوا لي في بداية هذه الحلقة أن أرحب بضيفي هنا في الاستوديو الصحفي السعودي فارس بن حزام، فارس أهلاً بك لهذه الحلقة من صناعة الموت، كما قلنا قبل قليل

1. Literal translation: 'allow me at the beginning of this episode to welcome my guest here at the studio, the Saudi journalist Faris Bin Hizam. Faris, welcome to this episode of Death Industry, as we said before'.

2. طيب، أستاذ فارس سنتوقف مع فاصل قصير نتابع بعده قصة السعودي أحمد الشايع

2. Literal translation: 'ok, Mr. Faris. We will stop with a short break after which we shall follow the story of Saudi Ahmad Alshaya'.

3. أهلًا بكم مجددًا، أرحب بضيفي في الاستديو الأستاذ فارس بن حزام، الصحفي السعودي. أستاذ فارس. أهلًا بك مجددًا

3. Literal translation: 'welcome again; I welcome my guest at the studio Mr. Faris Bin Hizam, the Saudi journalist. Mr. Faris, welcome again'.

4. حلقة جديدة من صناعة الموت، أهلاً بكم.

[موسيقى]

4. Literal translation: 'a new episode of Death Industry; welcome'.

[Music]

5. [موسيقى]

المحاور: أرحب بضيفي من جدة الدكتور محمد السعيدي، الداعية الإسلامي، أهلاً بك دكتور محمد.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: أهلاً بك أستاذ محمد وأهلاً بجميع المشاهدين.

5. Literal translation: [Music]

Interviewer: 'I welcome my guest from Jeddah, Dr. Muhammad al-Sai'di, the Islamic preacher; welcome Dr. Muhammad'.

Dr. Muhammad al-Sai'di: Welcome Mr. Muhammad and welcome to all of the viewers.

- Examples from al-Jazeera's audio-visuals:

1. أسعد الشملان :مساء الخير أولا.
ليلى الشيخلي :مساء النور.

1. Literal translation:

As'ad al-Shamlan: 'firstly, good evening'.

Layla al-Shaykhali: 'good evening'.

2. أسعد الشملان :أنا أنا شخصيا أتكلم هنا بصفتي الشخصية أنا أتحفظ كثيرا على مثل هذه الصياغات، أنا أعتقد أن فيها

2. Literal translation:

As'ad al-Shamlan: 'I personally speak here in my personal capacity. I am very reserved for such formulations; I believe that they'.

3. ليلى الشيخلي :دكتور، دكتور سؤالي واضح يعني لو سمحت لي بس يعني حتى نسير باتجاه إلى الأمام في هذا الحوار، أسألك سؤال محدد وواضح

3. Literal translation: 'doctor, doctor, my question is clear, if you allow me, but I mean, so we move forward in this dialogue, I am asking you a specific and clear question'.

4. علي الظفيري :أهلاً بكم مشاهدينا الكرام طابت أوقاتكم بكل خير في العمق يبحث الليلة

4. Literal translation: Ali al-Zufayri: Welcome, dear viewers, greetings, In Depth tonight is investigating'.

5. حسين شبكشي :أخوي علي أنا لا بس أخوي علي لا أنا ما إني ماغي فرح هنا عشان أسال أسئلة فيها تنبؤات وفلكية أنا اللي أعرفه أنا أن

5. Literal translation: Husayn Shubukshi: 'brother Ali, I am not, brother but I am not; I am Maggie Farah here so that you ask me questions with predictions and astrology. All what I know is that'.

10.3.2.2 Consequential Large-Scale Omissions

In addition to the inconsequential cases presented above, there are other omissions, also on a large scale, that involve segments that do carry ideological significance. Thus, they are referred to as consequential large-scale omissions. Once al-Arabiyah's two TETs had been compared with their originals (STs or Arabic transcriptions), it became clear that there were specific themes that were omitted on a large scale. Interestingly, as the intertextual and interdiscursive relationships' analyses show,

these themes are not omitted in their entirety. Rather, specific voices and texts revolving around these themes were left out, while other voices and texts are cited, so certain aspects of the STs' meaning are emphasised, and others are weakened.

The examination of al-Arabiyah's first audio-visual shows that there are aspects in Saudi Arabia's relation to al-Qaʿida, namely Islamic daʿwah and Saudi society, that were taken out while others were not, thus placing emphasis on the latter. Similarly, the analysis of the second al-Arabiyah's audio-visual shows that the supporting evidence presented on Iran's 'infiltration' of al-Qaʿida was consistently omitted, thus weakening that argument. These decisions remove the STs' ideological meaning in these areas.

10.3.2.2.1 Resisting change in Saudi Arabia's relation to al-Qaʿida concerning daʿwah and society

As the analysis is still focusing on large-scale omissions, it is important to note that the examples below were omitted in their entirety by the BBCM-M and that the underlined segments are for the purpose of highlighting the exact words from which the findings are drawn. In al-Arabiyah's first audio-visual, the omitted voices and texts related to the theme of Saudi Arabia and al-Qaʿida are of the following nature:

a) there is an 'evolution' in daʿwah, 'Islamic preaching', in Saudi Arabia and in Saudi society, and there is a decrease in the number of Saudis joining al-Qaʿida:

ST1:

تطور في الجانب الدعوي والمجتمعي في هذا الإطار بالذات نتوقف مع هذه التغريدات للداعية السعودي الدكتور محمد السعيدي، والتي أثارت جدلا واسعا في مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، أيضا في تلك المواقع التابعة او الموالية لتنظيم القاعدة.

Literal translation 1: 'evolution in the daʿwah (advocacy) and societal aspects. In this particular context, we stop with these tweets by the Saudi preacher Dr Muhammad al-Sai'di, which have sparked controversy on social networking sites, and in those sites affiliated with or loyal to al-Qaʿida'.

ST2:

طيب، أستاذ فارس كما أشرت في بداية الحلقة إلى أن هناك تراجع في عدد السعوديين المنضمين إلى صفوف القاعدة

Literal translation 2: ‘ok, Mr. Faris as you pointed out at the beginning of the episode that there is a decline in the number of Saudis joining the ranks of al-Qaʿida’.

The BBCM-M professional who transedited this ST transcribes the theme of Saudi Arabia in relation to al-Qaʿida. However, that omits and thus suppresses in the first example the voice that clearly states that there is an evolution in Islamic daʿwah in Saudi Arabia, which is frequently associated with Islamic extremist intellectual and political movements and organizations like al-Qaʿida. It also, in the same example, ignores by suppressing the evolution that is happening in Saudi society. In the second example, the emphasis placed in the ST on the decrease of the number of Saudis joining al-Qaʿida is omitted; there is a resistance to certain changes in Saudi Arabia related to its ‘societal’ and ‘religious’ aspects, even though they are fundamentally related to the theme being discussed: Saudi Arabia and al-Qaʿida.

b) Saudi Arabian society’s normal reaction towards terrorism:

ST1:

أعتقد أن الرأي العام سيُصدم اليوم أنه كيف بعد هذه التجربة يعود الإنسان إلى مجموعة

Literal translation 1: ‘I think that public opinion will be shocked today that a person who went through this experience goes back to a group’.

ST2:

أعتقد أن هذه القصة شوي مؤلمة بالدرجة الأولى للمجتمع

Literal translation 2: ‘I think this story is painful primarily to society’.

ST3:

أيضًا مؤلمة لأسرته التي عانت الأمرين منذ ظهور والده متحدثًا عبر وسائل الإعلام في 2004 يعني شاكيًا من الذين ورطوا ابنه في 2004 وأرسلوه إلى العراق. لا أعلم ماذا سيقول اليوم؟ ماذا ستقول أسرة أحمد اليوم

Literal translation 3: ‘it is also painful to his family, which has suffered since his father appeared in the media in 2004, complaining of those who tricked his son in 2004 and sent him to Iraq. I do not know what he will say today. What will Ahmad's family say today?’

ST4:

يعني أصعب قصة أخرى، حتى التي لم تظهر إلى وسائل الإعلام حتى الآن، هي قصة شخص عرفه الناس كاسم الأول، المطلوب الأول في قائمة الخمسة والثمانين التي صدرت في 2009،

Literal translation 4: 'the most difficult (painful) story, even the one that has not appeared to the media so far, is the story of a person known by people as the most name, the most wanted on the list of eighty-five issued in 2009'.

ST5:

يعني لا أفهم أي منطق اللي ممكن لإنسانة ترسل هذا الطفل،

Literal translation 5: 'I mean, I do not understand any possible logic for this woman to send this child'.

These examples show the BBCM-M's suppression of Saudi Arabian society's 'shock', 'sadness', 'pain' and 'incomprehension' regarding terrorists, which means having taken out the common-sense – indeed, the supremely human – reaction, or voice, that a society would have towards terrorists. This omission of that voice in turn portrays Saudi society as unresponsive when it comes to terrorism, thus contradicting the ST's discussion of Saudi Arabian society's evolution in relation to terrorism.

c) al-Qaʿida manipulates Saudi nationals for ideological gain and that Saudi Arabian youth learnt lessons from joining terrorist groups, 'learnt' and 'regret':

ST1:

هو يقول إنها (القاعدة) بالفعل كادت أن تقتله وخدعته

Literal translation 1: 'he says that it (al-Qaʿida) indeed almost killed him and tricked him'.

ST2:

الشيء الثالث من هم المصنفون كرجال دين، لا يصدرون فتاوى في أي حدث إلا إذا اطمأنوا من هم الأشخاص الذين يقاتلون هناك، عندما يرون السعوديون ويسألون عنهم يطمأنون،

Literal translation 2: ‘the third thing is that those classified as clerics do not issue fatawa in any event unless they are assured about who are the people whom are fighting there, when they see the Saudis and ask about them, they are ressured’.

ST3:

احمد الشايع: قالولي توصل الشاحنة وتطلع للمكان هذا اللى ورينالك قبل وتطلع قبل وتطلع يمين ويجوك اصحابنا وتوقف يجون ياخدون التنكر منك انا أول ما وقفت انفجر التنكر بي.

Literal translation 3: Ahmad Alshaya: ‘They told me: take the truck to the place we showed you earlier then go straight then turn to the right, then, our fellows will come to take explosive from you. Once I stopped, it exploded with me still in’.

ST4:

أخشى كل ما أخشاه أن يتحول هذا مثل مئات من السعوديين الذين ذهبوا-- ساعات يتحولون إلى فيوزات هي للحرق، مجرد أداة انتحارية يركب في السيارة ويفخها ويُرسل إلى أي مكان ويفجر به.

Literal translation 4: ‘I'm afraid, all that I'm afraid of is that he will turn, just like the hundreds of Saudis who went and within hours were turned into fuses for burning, just a suicidal tool that gets in the car, booby-traps it, sent to any place and gets blown up’.

ST5:

وتحول الى أيقونة يتعلم منها جيله وجيلا بعده

Literal translation 5: ‘and he turned into an icon (a lesson) from which his generation and a generation after it will learn’.

ST6:

وأحمد الذي ظهر كثيرًا على وسائل الإعلام يتحدث عن مرارة التجربة ويحمد الله على أن عاد إلى الحياة بعد أن شارف على الموت، احترق جسمه كليًا،

Literal translation 6: ‘Ahmad, who appeared a lot on the media talking about the bitterness of the experience and thank God that he came back to life after he was close to death, his body burned completely’.

These six examples show the suppression of the voices and texts that are related to Saudi Arabia and al-Qaʿida and show specifically how Saudis who joined al-Qaʿida are manipulated and taken advantage of in various ways, such as having only one job ('suicide bombing') and being put in the forefront for specific reasons like attracting 'fatwas' from Saudi Arabian Islamic clerics. There is also a suppression of the voices of Saudi youth who learn about reality and regret joining such terrorist groups. These suppressions portray the image of Saudi Arabian youth as knowingly and remorselessly joining al-Qaʿida to hold high ranks and thus affect the ST's intended meaning.

Conversely, the voices evoked related to Saudi Arabia and terrorism in the first audio-visual show that Saudi Arabians are still sending their sons to join al-Qaʿida and that Saudi society displays an abnormal reaction to terrorism – 'joy' and 'pride' – as the following instances were fully transcribed and transedited by the BBCM-M professional:

ST1:

يفتخرون بذلك، يعني أحدث قصة عندنا اليوم، أنا لأول مرة نعيش في السعودية، الإنسان يفرح بإرسال ابنه إلى القاعدة في سوريا، مثل السيدة موجودة في القصيم، والناس تعرف قصتها، لا أريد أن أذكر اسمها تمامًا، ولكن أرسلت ابنها، وابنها في السن الخمسة عشر سنة، أرسلته إلى العراق عفوًا إلى سوريا، وكتبت على تويتر أنه وصل إلى سوريا، والتحق بالقاعدة، وسيعود مجددًا إلى السعودية لقهر طواغيت الجزيرة،

TET1 by the BBCM-M:

'bin-Hizam says "for the first time, we have seen some in Saudi Arabia expressing joy over their sons joining **al-Qaʿida** in Syria, such as a lady in the city of al-Qasim who has sent her son, 15, to Syria and announced through Twitter that he had reached Syria, joined al-Qaʿida, and would return to Saudi Arabia to conquer the tyrants of the Arabian Peninsula"'.'

ST2:

لكن مازال بعض الأشخاص يدفعون بأبنائهم للقتال في صفوف القاعدة

TET2 by the BBCM-M:

'al-Tumayhi says some still send their sons to fight along with al-Qaʿida'.

This form of rewriting, in which certain voices and texts on a certain theme are silenced through large-scale omissions, while others are evoked through transcription has led to challenging the change both in the Saudi Arabian society and daʿwah in Saudi Arabia. On one hand, the aspects that show Saudi society as being 'shocked', 'saddened' and 'in pain' over their youth joining al-Qaʿida and how they 'cannot comprehend' how those young people continue to do so while being 'manipulated' to becoming 'suicide bombers' are removed from the text. On the other hand, the evoked voices and texts that are related to the same topic show Saudi society as abnormal that 'continues' to join terrorist groups and expresses 'joy' and 'pride' over their teenage sons' joining terrorist groups.

This shows that partial transcription, the second identified form of rewriting has the potential to suppress certain voices while evoking others in the final transediting product, the TET, which proved to have consequences on the original ST's meaning.

10.3.2.2.2 Weakening the argument on Iran's 'infiltration' of al-Qaʿida

In the second audio-visual from al-Arabiyah, a similar technique appears to be applied to the theme of Iran's relationship with al-Qaʿida; the argument made by Dr al-Sai'idi about Iran's 'infiltration' of al-Qaʿida is partially 'transcribed'. The argument itself is conveyed, but the supporting arguments that follow and were made by Dr al-Sai'di are omitted, a move which has weakened that argument, as the following examples show:

ST1:

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: نعم، أعتقد أن من الأمور التي تدلنا على هذا الاختراق، هو تعزيز الفكر التكفيري، ووجود تنظيم إعلامي كبير جداً.

Literal translation 1: Dr. Muhammad al-Sai'di: 'Yes, I think that one of the signs of this infiltration is the promotion of Takfiri ideology and the existence of a very large media organisation'.

ST2:

ذكرت في الجزء الأول علاقة ما، ربما تربط القاعدة بإيران، وأيضا في إحدى التغريدات أشرت بأن القاعدة تتواجد في سوريا، في العراق، في الجزيرة العربية، وأيضاً في المغرب الإسلامي، وحتى في سيناء في مصر، ولكنها لا تتواجد في إيران، فلم نسمع قبلاً تنظيم إيران الإسلامية، أو القاعدة في بلاد فارس أو ما إلى ذلك.

Literal translation 2: ‘you mentioned in the first part that there is a relationship, perhaps linking al-Qaʿida to Iran. You also pointed out, in one of the tweets, that al-Qaʿida is located in Syria, Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, the Islamic Maghreb, and even the Sinai in Egypt, but it does not exist in Iran as we never heard of the Islamic Iran organisation nor al-Qaʿida in Persia or so on’.

ST3:

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: نعم، هذه حقيقة واقعية وحقيقة تاريخية، فالتاريخ يشهد بأن إيران لم يكون في داخلها تنظيم للقاعدة، فهو--... وجدت تنظيم القاعدة في تلك المناطق النائية ولكنه لم يوجد في إيران

Literal translation 3: ‘this is a real fact and a historical fact. History shows that Iran did not have an al-Qaʿida organization within it.… al-Qaʿida has been found in those remote areas, but has not been found in Iran’.

This shows that even though the argument made in the ST by Dr al-Sai’idi on Iran’s ‘infiltration’ of al-Qaʿida is transferred to the TET, the supporting evidence excerpted above – that al-Qaʿida exists in numerous places near but not in Iran and the dissemination of the Takfiri ideology at the core of al-Qaʿida’s beliefs – is taken out through omission, thus weakening the argument.

10.3.2.2.3 De-legitimising Saudi Arabia’s fear of Iran

Examining al-Jazeera’s first audio-visual shows that the segments that have been omitted on a large scale have Iran in common. Interestingly, the omitted Iran-related segments appear to remove the legitimate reasons for Saudi concern about the Iranian-Western nuclear deal:

1) Saudi Arabia’s accusation against Iran as planning to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to Washington,

ST1:

واتهمت الرياض في وقت سابق إيران بمحاولة اغتيال السفير السعودي في واشنطن،

Literal translation: Riyadh earlier accused Iran of attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington,

2) the fact that this deal proved to have a positive impact on Iran so far,

ST2:

ويزيد من التوجس انعكاس الاتفاق ايجابيا على الاقتصاد الإيراني بسبب الرفع الجزئي للعقوبات عنها وأثر ذلك المباشر في نفوذها السياسي، وقد ارتفع بالفعل سعر صرف الريال الإيراني بنسبة 2% مقابل الدولار الأميركي بمجرد إعلان الاتفاق

Literal translation: the apprehension is increased due to the positive impact that the agreement has on the Iranian economy because of the partial lifting of sanctions and its direct impact on its political influence. The Iranian rial has already risen by 2% against the US dollar once the agreement is announced

3) the West is indifferent to Islamic countries in the deals they make with Iran,

ST3:

ليلى الشيخلي :دكتور أمير حتى لا نغرق في مثل هذا الكلام، لأنه أنت أول من يدرك أن
لا شيء يمكن أن يقدم هكذا ببلاش ومن أجل عيون الأمة الإسلامية، لا شك أن هناك
شيء حدث وهذا ما نريد أن نبحث فيه، ما وراء هذه الصفقة ما الذي يمكن..

Literal translation:
Layla al-Shaykhali: Dr. Amir, to avoid dwelling on such topic, because you are the first to realize that nothing can be offered for free and for the sake of the Islamic *umma*. There is no doubt that something happened and that's what we want to look at. What is beyond this deal? What can be..

4) the fact that, since 2011, two years prior to the date of this news item, there were secret meetings between Iran and the US while the first meeting that took place in Oman was only eight months ago, as the date of the publication is 24/11/2013, raises many questions,

ST4:

ربما الموضوع عندما تثير اسوشيتد برس الحديث عن اجتماعات سرية بدأت في الواقع من 2011أو التمهيد لها وأول اجتماع كان في عُمان في مارس من هذا العام، كل هذا يخلق علامات استفهام كثيرة، ما الذي تريد الولايات المتحدة أن تقوله تحديدا لحلفائها الخليجيين؟

Literal translation: Perhaps when *Associated Press* talks about secret meetings that actually started, or were prepared for, in 2011, as the first meeting took place in Oman during March of this year, this calls for many questions. What does exactly the United States want to say to its Gulf allies?

5) the probable US divorce from its Gulf allies due to this deal with Iran,

ST5:

اسمح لي أذهب إلى لب الموضوع هنا، يعني الموضوع يقال الآن ما يقال الآن أنه بسبب بلورة الولايات المتحدة للغاز الصخري في النهاية فعليا ما تقوله الولايات المتحدة للحلفاء للخليجيين Bye, Bye :لا نحتاجكم بعد الآن؛ أمورنا الآن مصالحنا تغيرت الآن نحن باتجاه طهران وهم الحليف الأقوى الآن لنا.

Literal translation: Allow me to move to the core of the topic here, which is what is being said now about the United States' ability to crystallize shale gas. It is being said that what the United States is eventually saying to the Gulf allies is "Bye, Bye, we do not need you anymore. Our interests have changed now. We are looking toward Tehran and it is our strongest ally".

6) and the possibility of a rational reason behind the change in reaction as the Saudis come out of their silence.

ST6:

ربما يعني في النهاية هناك ما يدعو إلى وتيرة ولهجة الرد الخليجي لتكون مختلفة بعض الشيء دولة مثل السعودية تخرج عن صمتها الدبلوماسي ويبقى هناك خيارات أمام دول الخليج العربي في التعامل مع تنامي هذا النفوذ الإيراني

Literal translation: Perhaps in the end, there is a reason for the pace and tone of the Gulf response to be somewhat different: a country like Saudi Arabia breaks its diplomatic silence while there remains options for the Gulf States to deal with this growing Iranian influence

This shows that Saudi Arabia's fear about this nuclear deal is actually de-legitimised by omitting perfectly plausible reasons for this fear.

10.3.2.2.4 Toning-down Qatar's disturbing side

In al-Jazeera's second audio-visual, although partial transcription is not surprising given its 50-minute length, it is notable to find that the omissions mainly involve Qatar. There are many large-scale omissions in this audio-visual, ranging from topics on disagreements among European countries, Saudi Arabia's withdrawing its media personnel from Qatar, the Omani and Kuwaiti stance on the Saudi, Bahraini and Emirati withdrawal of their ambassadors to Qatar and the use of media in the Qatari-

Saudi conflict. However, the majority are related to Qatar and have one of three key characteristics.

The first involves elaborations on Qatar's political involvement in countries where controversial groups exist, namely Yemen in relation to the 'Huthis' and Egypt in relation to the 'MB', as the following examples show:

1. أمير قطر سمو الأمير الوالد الشيخ حمد قام بزيارة إلى مصر بعد الثورة بثلاثة أشهر في 3 مايو 2011 وكان آنذاك...

Literal translation 1:

1. 'Emir of Qatar His Highness the Father Sheikh Hamad visited Egypt three months after the revolution on 3 May 2011 and was then',

2. علي الظفيري :طيب الحوثيين مسألة مصيرية بالنسبة للسعودية .جابر الحرمي :جميل، الحوثيين تدخلت قطر في فترة من الفترات

Literal translation 2:

Ali al-Zufayri: 'Okay, the Houthis is a crucial issue for Saudi Arabia.' Jabir al-Harami: 'Well, with regards to the Houthis, Qatar intervened at a time',

The second is related to the alleged evidence that the UAE has about Qatar's support of the MB and potential reasons for Qatar to do so in the GCC states:

1. يعني الإمارات الدعم الذي حصل للتوجه الإخواني فيها من قطر كما اتضحت وبالأدلة إذا أحب الأستاذ جابر أن يطلع عليها والحصول عليها..

علي الظفيري :أعطيني الأدلة إذا تكرمت؟

حسين شبكشي :عند الجهات الأمنية في الإمارات يمكن الحصول عليها نعم هذا الذي ذُكر في المحاكم في علاقة بين دعم قطري للخلايا الإخوانية التي وجدت في الإمارات

Literal translation 1:

'this means that the support that the Brotherhood has received in the UAE is from Qatar, as proved by the evidence if Mr. Jabir would love to see and get it',

Ali al-Zufayri: 'Give me the evidence, please?'

Hussein Shobokshi: ‘It is with the security agencies in the UAE and it is obtainable. Indeed, this is what was mentioned in courts, that there is a link between Qatari support for Brotherhood cells found in the UAE’,

2. علي الظفيري :لكن أستاذ جابر دعم النكايات، الأنظمة بينها كل واحد يعني تعرف ممكن يكره الإخوان هنا بس يحبهم عشان عاملين مشكلة للنظام الثاني والسعودية والإمارات نفس الطريقة يعني ممكن تكره الطرف لكن تدعمه نكاية فيه فممكن قطر تعمل هذا الشيء

Literal translation 2:

Ali al-Zufayri: ‘But Mr. Jabir supports out of spite, among regimes, a regime -you know – may hate the Brotherhood here, but loves them because they cause a problem for the other regime. As the case with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This means that they can hate a party, but support it out of spite, so, Qatar can do this thing’,

Third, the immediate danger and marked spitefulness towards Saudi Arabia inherent in Qatar’s actions:

1. وأدت إلى انعدام الثقة والريبة والشك من تصرفات قطر فيما يخص السعودية تحديداً
2. طيب الحوثيين مسألة مصيرية بالنسبة للسعودية.
3. أنه قطر تلعب دوراً سلبياً فيما يتعلق بأمن المملكة العربية السعودية داخل السعودية،

Literal translation:

1. ‘it has led to a lack of confidence, suspicion and doubt of Qatar's actions specifically regarding Saudi Arabia’,

2. ‘okay, the Houthis are a crucial issue for Saudi Arabia’,

3. ‘Qatar plays a negative role with respect to the security of Saudi Arabia within Saudi Arabia’,

These omissions can be argued to have toned down Qatar’s political involvement in Yemen with the Huthis and in Egypt, where the MB is based, once they are no longer in the TET. Moreover, they remove the existence of alleged evidence of Qatar’s support of the MB on Emirati soil, along with the potential Qatari reason to do so in all

the other GCC countries, which, as stated in the ST, was out of spitefulness to other GCC states. Overall, these omissions tone down the alleged support of Qatar for the MB, which is one of the main reasons behind the current Saudi-Qatari conflict.

10.3.3 Subjectively Reporting Speeches

In addition to the identified forms of rewriting prior to transediting, the BBCM-M professionals selectively quoted from the audio-visuals. Both direct quotation and indirect citation of speech are used. Thus, speech representation is examined below for the selection of one specific style of reporting over another, direct versus indirect reporting; in addition, selecting a specific reporting verb over another can be very revealing of certain positions taken by the teller, reporter, author or, in this case, the transeditor(s). That selection is not merely stylistic but also ideological (Floyd, 2000).

In any reported speech, there is a speaker and the primary discourse uttered by that speaker, a teller who reports the primary discourse, an author (if the utterance is written as in the case of news reports), a secondary discourse that includes the teller's discourse and any meaning, interpretations, ideological stances or 'illocutionary force' brought to the discourse by the author's decision of what to report and how (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994; Fairclough, 1995a). The segments that the author decides to report on, the style of reporting, direct versus indirect speech and the reporting verbs ('say' versus 'claim') selected can all bring about a new meaning, change the intensity of the meaning or remove the original meaning of the primary discourse uttered by the speaker. Thus, the analysis below focuses on both the style of reporting and the reporting verbs.

Table 34 shows the reporting verbs selected by the BBCM-M professionals in all four audio-visuals, their frequencies, their types (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994) and the percentages that each reporting verb represents of the total number of reporting verbs (see Appendices 13.1-13.4 for a full account).

Reporting verb	Frequency	Type of speech reporting verb	Percentage of the total reporting verbs[37]
say*[38]	91	neutral structuring verb	50.83%
note*	15	metapropositional verbs: assertive	8.37%
ask*	20	neutral structuring verb	11.17%
add*	26	transcript verbs: relation to other parts of speech	14.52%
praise*	2	metapropositional verbs: assertive	1.11%
interrupts	1	discourse signalling: discourse progress	0.55%
repeats	2	transcript verbs: relation to other parts of speech	1.11%
relates	1	transcript verbs: relation to other parts of speech	0.55%
defends	1	metapropositional verbs: expressive	0.55%
disagrees	1	metapropositional verbs: expressive	0.55%
hosts	2	metalinguistic verbs: descriptive	1.11%
reads	2	metalinguistic verbs: descriptive	1.11%
gives an example	1	metalinguistic verbs: descriptive	0.55%

[37] The equation used to produce the percentages is the total frequency of each reporting verb, such as 'say*', divided by the total frequencies of all reporting verbs, 179, multiplied by 100, as follows: 91 ÷ 179 X 100 = 50.83%.

[38] The asterisk is used to denote other forms of the verb, e.g. 'say*' means 'says', 'saying' and 'said'.

Reporting verb	Frequency	Type of speech reporting verb	Percentage of the total reporting verbs
airs	1	metalinguistic verbs: descriptive	0.55%
welcomes	1	metalinguistic verbs: descriptive	0.55%
wonder	2	metapropositional verbs: expressive	1.11%
arguing	1	metapropositional verbs: assertive	0.55%
nominal (no verbs)	3	n/a	1.67%
tell*	6	neutral structuring verb	3.35%
Total	179		

Table 34: The identified reporting verbs in the four audio-visuals, their frequencies and their percentages

Following Caldas-Coulthard's 1994 taxonomy and definitions of speech reporting verbs, Table 34 shows that the majority of reporting verbs selected by the BBCM-M professionals in the four audio-visuals are neutral; they do not carry 'an explicit evaluation' but simply 'introduce' what has been said in more or less neutral terms. In fact, 65.35% of the selected reporting verbs are neutral structuring verbs: 'say*', 'tell*' and 'ask*'.

The remaining verbs are transcript verbs that highlight a relation to other parts of speech (16.18%), metapropositional verbs of an assertive nature (10.03%), metalinguistic verbs of a descriptive nature (3.32%), metapropositional verbs of an expressive nature (2.21%) and, finally, discourse-signalling verbs to highlight discourse progress (0.55%).

Of these reporting verbs, only four explicitly hold ideological meaning: 'praise' (which represents a percentage of 1.11% of the total reporting verbs selected by the BBCM-M professionals), 'disagrees' (0.55%), 'defends' (0.55%) and 'arguing' (0.55%). The individual percentages of the total reporting verbs makes it clear that they were not commonly selected by the BBCM-M professionals. Thus, it could be argued that the

BBCM-M's position, based on its coverage from the audio-visuals, is indeed what Caldas-Coulthard 1994 refers to as only 'apparently' neutral. Apparent neutrality is crucial because it signals a 'lack of mediation', which 'results in a more actualised and therefore more vivid text. The reader, then, must infer more from the bare account of external (reported) behaviour and from the quotes themselves'. The quotes from which the reader needs to infer are also subjective quotes that 'are manifestations of paratactic interclausal relations', so 'the narrator is also always in control, even when the presentation of quotes is neutral' (Caldas-Coulthard, 1994, pp.303-4). Another reason to argue for the potential bias behind using quotes lies in the fact that the author chooses what to report on.

Leech and Short (1981, pp.318-51) present categories of reported speech in the novel that highlight the 'control' the author (or 'narrator' in their terms) has over reported speech, based on the style of reporting used. Regardless of the degree of control they assign to each type of speech reporting, the suggested categories do shed light on the potential control an author has over the narrative report of speech act, indirect speech, free indirect speech and direct speech alike.

Indeed, when the speech reporting verbs used by the BBCM-M professionals were examined while taking into consideration the style of reporting, an implicit subjectivity was revealed. Eight linguistic formulae of speech reporting were identified, all of which involve a certain degree of control by the BBCM-M professionals.

These are 1) reporting with neutral structuring verbs while selectively quoting to report using direct speech; 2) adding a qualifier to a neutral reporting verb, which is followed by a selective direct speech; 3) selecting neutral structuring reporting verbs to be followed by an indirect speech reporting style, which allows the author to rephrase, select or even omit, without the readers knowledge, for the reader has no access to the primary discourse; 4) illocutionary verbs followed by selective direct reporting; 5) illocutionary verbs followed by selective direct reporting, which is then followed by indirect reporting that the author can reformulate without presenting the primary discourse to the reader; 6) illocutionary verbs followed by indirect reporting, which is then followed by selective direct reporting; 7) illocutionary verbs followed by indirect reporting; and 8) using a nominal phrase to gloss over the indirect reporting Leech and Short (1981, pp.318-51).

The following are examples of the eight identified formulae (with STs when required):

1) neutral + direct (partial and selective)

- Al-Jazeera's audio-visual 1:

ST:

أنا شخصيا أتكلم هنا بصفتي الشخصية أنا أتحفظ كثيرا على مثل هذه الصياغات، أنا أعتقد أن فيها مبالغات شديدة يجب أن نتذكر شيء أنه إيران لا تذهب باتجاه التسليح النووي هو مطلب خليجي ويمثل مصلحة خليجية عليا، أن إيران جاءت إلى طاولة المفاوضات في جنيف بفعل ما قاسته من العقوبات الاقتصادية الشديدة التي فرضت في الآونة الأخيرة..

TET:

'he says this is "much exaggerated", adding that the Gulf states do not want Iran to go for nuclear armament and this is in the supreme interest of these states, noting that 'Iran went to the table of negotiations in Geneva as a result of its suffering from the strong economic sanctions imposed on it'.

2) adding a qualifier to a neutral reporting verb + direct speech

- al-Arabiyah's audio-visual 1:

ST:

تقوم دولة داعش بالتحرش بتركيا، حتى تضطر الأخيرة لمضايقة المجاهدين، والتضييق على طرق امداداتهم.

TET:

'he says, accusing it of "trying to provoke Turkey and turn it against the mujahidin in order to cut off their supply lines"'.

- Al-Jazeera's audio-visual 1:

ST1

السعودية أمامها خيارين فقط إما التصعيد والاستمرار بالتصعيد كما كانت تفعل خلال خمس ثلاثين سنة ضد :إيران...

TET1:

'concluding, he says: "Saudi Arabia has only two options. It either continues its escalation against Iran as it has been doing over the past 35 years but to no avail"'.

ST2:

إيران انتصرت بقوة في هذه الإتفاقية لأنه لا ننسى عشر سنوات يريدون تعطيل البرنامج النووي الإيراني السلمي بالكامل حتى في المختبرات الجامعية

TET2:

‘al-Musawi finally says: “Iran has strongly won in this agreement because they [in the West] have tried to completely disrupt the Iranian peaceful nuclear programme for 10 years even in university laboratories”’.

- Al-Jazeera’s audio-visual 2:

ST:

علي الظفيري: كأن هذا الأمر أستاذ حسين هذه نقطة، اسمح لي بس مضطر على الفاصل، بس أعلق تعليق لما سأطرحه معك بعد الفاصل ...، يعني بإمكانك أن تقول كل شيء لكن ليس بإمكانك أن تجعل الناس يصدقوا أي شيء يمكن أن يقال إلا إذا كان هناك وثيقة ودلائل وقرائن تؤكد ما تقول،

TET:

‘Al-Zufayri interrupts him here to say “you can say anything, but you cannot make people believe anything said unless there is documented evidence proving it”’.

3) neutral verbs+ indirect speech

- al-Arabiyah’s audio-visual 1:

ST1:

حيث أصبح للتوانسة والليبيين عدد أكبر مقابل انخفاض ملحوظ في نسبة السعوديين والخليجيين بشكل عام،

TET1:

‘al-Tumayhi says the number of Saudis and other Gulf citizens fighting for those organizations has dropped in favour of other nationalities’.

ST2:

كما قلنا قبل قليل هناك انخفاض ملحوظ في نسبة السعوديين الذين تم استدراجهم لتنظيم القاعدة للقتال في سوريا

مقارنة ببقية المقاتلين من البلدان العربية والإسلامية، كيف ذلك؟

TET2:

‘asked how he views the drop in the number of Saudis mobilized by al-Qaʿida Organization to fight in Syria’.

- al-Arabiyah’s audio-visual 2:

ST1:

المحاور: إذن أنت ترى بأنها حركة منظمة وليست مجرد أهواء. طيب فلنبدأ معك يا دكتور محمد بواحدة من أبرز التغريدات التي ذكرتها على موقع تويتر وقلت فيها: ‘منذ ثلاثة وعشرين عامًا أبحث عن عمل واحد قامت به القاعدة وأدى إلى خير المسلمين والإسلام فلم أجد.’ كيف ذلك؟

TET1:

‘al-Tumayhi then reads one of al-Sa'idi's tweets which says, “Over the past 23 years… but I could not find”. He then asks him to explain this’.

- Al-Jazeera’s audio-visual 1:

ST2:

ليلى الشيخلي :بغض النظر عن ماذا كان يمكن لإيران أن تحصل عليه، هناك قلق خليجي، ولنكن أكثر تحديدا هناك كاتب في يديعوت أحرنوت اليوم كتب أن الاتفاق هذا سيطير النوم من عيون السعوديين تحديدا نريد أن نفهم، يعني هذا الكلام عن القلق ما مصدره؟

TET2:

‘when told that an Israeli newspaper said the new agreement will rob the Saudis of their sleep’.

- Al-Jazeera’s audio-visual 2:

ST:

والسعودية بالتالي رأت ما يحدث حولها وارتأت أن تأخذ الخط ألاستباقي لضمانة أمنها وسلامتها لأنها رأت هذه النتائج في أكثر من دولة ولها نتائج مخيفة.

TET:

‘therefore, he says, Saudi Arabia has decided to take a preemptive measure to maintain its security’.

4) illocutionary verbs + direct

- Al-Jazeera’s audio-visual 1:

ST:

أسعد الشملان :بأنه قد يقيد قدرتنا يعني الولايات المتحدة الآن حددت مصلحتها مع إيران في موضوع هذه الصفقة، وبالتالي هذا قد يقيد دول الخليج من مجابهة إيران في مناطق أخرى مثل سوريا، قد يقيد الحركة حركة دول الخليج في مجابهة المطامع الإيرانية فيها لكن في المحصلة النهائية هذا الاتفاق ينم عن ضعف إيراني وليس تفوق إيراني.

TET:

'arguing that "this agreement denotes Iranian weakness rather than superiority"'.

5) illocutionary verb + direct + indirect

Al-Jazeera's audio-visual 1:

ST:

أمير الموسوي :أنا أعتقد هذه نقطة، النقطة الثانية ما يدور من كلام حول سلطنة عُمان أنا أعتقد نثمن جهود سلطان عُمان على ما قام به من جهود طيبة دبلوماسية وكذلك دولة الكويت وكذلك فترة من الفترات دولة قطر

TET:

'he then praises the "diplomatic" efforts made by Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar'.

6) illocutionary verb + indirect + direct

ST:

فارس بن حزام: يعني أصعب قصة أخرى، حتى التي لم تظهر إلى وسائل الإعلام حتى الآن، هي قصة شخص عرفه الناس كاسم الأول، المطلوب الأول في قائمة الخمسة والثمانين التي صدرت في 2009، والناس تعرفه باسم النجم، أو تعرفه باسمه الطبيعي صالح القرعاوي، شاب من منطقة القصيم

TET:

'relates the story of another Saudi citizen named Salih al-Qar'awi, "who was among a list of 85 wanted people"'.

7) illocutionary + indirect

- Al-Jazeera's audio-visual 2:

ST1:

نتمنى أنها الأمور لا يكون فيها نوع من التصعيد لأنه التصعيد بصراحة سيضر الخليج العربي

TET1:

'he hopes there will be no escalation as this will harm all Gulf states'.

ST2:

أنا أيضاً أعجبت بردة الفعل القطرية وهي لم تتعامل بمبدأ المعاملة بالمثل لم تسحب سفراءها من الدول الثلاثة ،هذه أيضاً خطوة تحسب لأخوانا في دولة قطر

TET2:

'he then praises Qatar for not responding to the withdrawal decision in kind'.

ST3:

جابر الحرمي :هذا حقهم مشروع ولا نتدخل ولا أعتقد أنه يحق لأحد أن يتحدث عن مثل هذا الأمر ولها كامل السيادة التامة فيمن يتعاملون، لكن عندما تقول قطر تدعم الإخوان أو تدعم حماس طبيعي جداً إن هناك مظلومين في غزة قصفوا بقنابل

TET3:

'he then defends the Qatari decision to support the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 2008 war'.

8) reporting with nominal phrase rather than reporting verbs

- al-Arabiyah's audio-visual 1:

'answering a question'.

- al-Jazeera's audio-visual 1:

'al-Musawi next responds to a question on what Iran can do to ease Gulf concerns after the deal'.

- al-Jazeera's audio-visual 2:

'responding to a question on the reported mediation of Oman in talks between Iran and the United States'.

'Shubukshi next responds to a question on why the Muslim Brotherhood is not wanted to establish relations with Iran at a time when the Gulf states have ties with it'.

This shows that the BBCM-M professionals' apparent neutrality actually conceals an implicit subjectivity in quoting from the audio-visuals, which is the third identified form of rewriting prior to the transediting stage. The reader thus needs to interpret from the 'bare account of external (reported) behaviour and from the quotes themselves' and to infer the 'implicit illocutionary act' in the case of selecting neutral speech reporting

verbs followed by direct speech reporting (Caldas-Coulthard, 1992, pp.77-79). On the other hand, the reader is faced with an explicit illocutionary act selected by the author, who has ‘complete control of the character's supposed talk, since a speech act verb generally introduces reported utterances that are averred by the author’ and since ‘there is 'integration' of the secondary discourse into the discourse of the narrator’ (1992, pp.77-79).

10.4 Forms of Rewriting during Transediting

A comparative ST-TET analysis of the transcription of the included parts of the audio-visuals shows that there are many oblique translation techniques used by the BBCM-M professionals. The translation techniques applied in descending order of frequency are as follows: omission, modulation, addition and explicitation and economy, the last two of which were used to an equal extent (see Table 35).

N	Translation technique	Frequency of application	Percentage of application
1	modulation	16	12%
2	explicitation	8	6%
3	addition	11	8.25%
4	omission	19	14.25%
5	economy	8	6%
6	generalisation	7	5.25%
7	one part of speech with the same part of speech yet a different lexis (verb for a different verb, adjective for a different adjective and noun for a different noun)	7	5.25%
8	pluralising the singular	1	.75%
9	adaptation	2	1.5%

Table 35: The identified oblique translation techniques in the four audio-visuals, their frequencies and their percentages

Taking into consideration that large-scale omissions have been made prior to transediting, it is interesting to find that omission, based on its overall application in the four audio-visuals, is still the most frequently applied technique during the actual

transediting stage. When an examination of instances in which translation by omission is carried out, it becomes clear that most omissions are domestications at the expense of the STs' meanings. Remarkably, these small-scale omissions are in line with the large-scale omissions that took place prior to transediting in terms of resisting a change in representing Saudi Arabia's perspective on terrorism and toning-down Qatar's concerning position, as detailed paragraphs below show.

10.4.1 Small-Scale Omissions: Resisting the Change in Saudi Arabia's Relation to Terrorism

The small-scale omissions during transediting of al-Arabiyah's two audio-visuals accord with the identified impacts of the large-scale omissions discussed in the treatment of the partial transcriptions of al-Arabiyah's audio-visuals. The small-scale omissions also resist the change in the representation of Saudi Arabia in relation to terrorism, as the following examples show:

ST1:

يعني بلغة الأرقام، وإن لم تكن-- دقيقة، ولكن حسب ما يتم رصده، وما يتم متابعته، نستطيع أن نقارن ما جرى في سوريا

Literal translation 1: 'in the language of figures, even if not accurate, but according to what is being monitored, and what is being observed, we can compare what happened in Syria'.

TET1: 'in the language of figures, though not accurate, we can make a comparison between what has happened in Syria over'.

The omission of a synonym or near synonym to produce a more economic TET in which لكن حسب ما يتم رصده، وما يتم متابعته are both removed causes the reliability of the claim that the number of Saudis joining terrorist groups has decreased 'according to what is being monitored, and what is being observed' to be removed.

ST2:

المؤسسات التي تدعم الدعوة والعمل الخيري في العالم حوصرت، والسبب الأول القاعدة، التي تذرع العالم بها لإيقاف الخير الذي كان يتدفق من هنا

Literal translation 2: The institutions that support *al-daʿwa* (advocacy) and charity work in the world have been trapped, and the first reason is al-Qaʿida, which the world has invoked to stop the good that was flowing from here.

TET2: 'Institutions promoting charity work throughout the world have been besieged, thanks to al-Qaʿida's behaviour that has harmed that activity, according to the world community."

The meaning of the 'good' that was flowing from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the world in the form of '*al-daʿwa'* and 'charity work' is removed via the small-scale omissions via transediting decisions by the BBCM-M's transeditors. Moreover, through those omissions, the role of Saudi institutions as described in the ST is limited to only doing charity work as *al-daʿwa* is simply suppressed via omission.

ST3:

كيف تمكن هؤلاء وان كنت أشرت الى انهم تقريبا وصلوا الى الربع مقارنة بدول أخرى، كيف تمكن هؤلاء من الوصول الى الأراضي السورية وبينهم مطلوبين على لوائح الارهاب السعودية؟

Literal translation 3: 'how did they manage and if I pointed out that they almost reached a quarter compared to other countries, how did they manage to reach the Syrian territories and among them wanted on the Saudi terror lists?'

TET3: 'asked how Saudi citizens have reached Syria, even though some of them are wanted by Saudi Arabia for involvement in acts of terrorism'.

Via this omission, the precise decrease in the number of Saudis joining jihad to a 'quarter [of] what it was' is eliminated.

ST4:

السعوديين الذين توجهوا إلى سوريا في مجملهم نحو 600 شخص،

Literal translation 4: 'the Saudis who went to Syria in total about 600 people'.

TET4: 'he says that around 600 Saudis have gone to Syria'.

Omitting 'in total' removes the crucial fact that the *entire* number of Saudis who joined jihad in Syria is 600. Coupled with keeping 'around', this makes the statement less certain than it is in the ST.

All these omissions echo the omissions that were carried out on a large scale through the partial transcription of al-Arabiyah's audio-visuals; they all resist – and some even suppress – the change in Saudi Arabia's representation in relation to terrorism.

10.4.2 Small-Scale Omissions: Toning-Down Qatar's Disturbing Side

There are similar omissions in the transediting of al-Jazeera's second audio-visual that resonate with the partial transcription of that source by the BBCM-M professional in relation to Qatar; they soften its suspicious behaviour, as the following examples show:

ST1:

وتسبب إزعاجاً وصداعاً مستمراً منذ عقدين في ملفات كثيرة

Literal translation1: 'causing irritation and headache that has been going on for two decades'.

TET1: 'cause others continuous concern'.

The emphasis on Qatar's being a source of 'irritation and headache' and the duration of this 'concern' as 'for two decades' are both taken out when repetition of the near synonyms وصداعاً إزعاجاً were transedited into 'concern' and منذ عقدين was removed to produce a more economical TET. Indeed, there is a systematic omission of the duration of Qatar's adoption of policies independent of the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, which is the same duration of the difficulties between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as examples 2 and 3 below show:

ST2:

أعتقد إنه الثقة وصلت لمراحل متدنية جداً إذ أستطيع أن أقول انعدمت بين البلدين في أكثر من حقبة وأكثر من موقف معروف

TET2: 'I think that confidence between the two countries has reached a very low level in more than one area'.

ST3:

باستقلالية السياسة القطرية التي تميزت بها طوال يعني العقدين الماضيين،

Literal translation 3: 'the independence of the Qatari policy that has distinguished it for the past two decades'.

TET3: ‘Qatar adopts an independent policy that is different from’.

Referring to Qatar’s controversial foreign policy of supporting the Huthis in Yemen, the ‘very disturbing agenda’ of the Huthis, which is emphasised in the ST by appearing twice is suppressed by a simple act of omission.

ST4:

هناك فصائل تدعم من قطر والفصائل هذه لها خطوط مثل الحوثيين تحديدا لها خطوط ومطامع سياسية مقلقة جدا

Literal translation 4: ‘there are factions supported by Qatar and these factions have lines (agenda) such as the Houthis in particular. They have very disturbing political lines and ambitions’.

TET4: ‘the Huthists specifically, are supported by Qatar and these have very disturbing political ambitions’.

This shows that the BBCM-M professional who transedited this news item systematically tones-down the disturbing elements with which Qatar is coloured in the ST, first by filtering out the instances that refer to it on a large scale, then by omitting on a small scale any references to it in parts of the ST. Similarly, the resistance to the change with which Saudi Arabia is represented in relation to terrorism is systematically achieved, on both the large and small scales, in both of al-Arabiyah’s audio-visuals.

10.5 Conclusion of the Critical Discourse Analysis Unit

By adopting a developed model of the DHA, the CDA unit has addressed the third research question, which is concerned with the forms of rewriting and the power dynamics between the ST and the TET (see chapter 1). The CDA has unveiled two main findings: first, the Arabic ST is assigned an inferior position compared to the English TET by the BBCM-M both prior to and during the transediting process in all three case studies. Second, this allowed the BBCM-M professionals to take an active role in contributing to the identified neglect of Saudi women and focus instead on Saudi men of authority. Through this, the discursive construction of the image of Saudi Arabia as being dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women was achieved both within al-Quds al-Arabi and beyond it.

In case study one, the form of rewriting chosen by the BBCM-M professionals prior to transediting involved selectively merging two STs from two different news sources,

AFP and al-Quds al-Arabi, to compose a single ST that had never actually been published in Arabic. Similarly, in case study three, all four examined audio-visuals were partially transcribed (and thus partially ignored) prior to transediting. Through this, the BBCM-M professional(s) contributed to the discursive neglect of Saudi women and the focus on Saudi men of authority by systematically suppressing certain voices while foregrounding others. This manipulation prior to transediting clearly indicates an inferior position ascribed to the Arabic STs compared to their English TETs. However, in case study two, the extent to which the BBCM-M professionals contributed to the discursive construction of Saudi Arabia as being dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) woman is less noticeable than that in case studies one and three, because their role was limited to selecting news items in which that representation of Saudi Arabia was already linguistically constructed. Nonetheless, the contribution is there, through the selection of the STs for transediting.

During the transediting process, power imbalance that positions Arabic, the source language, in a lower position compared to the English TET. In case study one, the domestication strategy seems to be the BBCM-M's preference, even when domestication is not necessary. This affected the ST's meaning and the soundness of its arguments. A similar pattern appears in case study two, where rewriting during transediting led to various translation losses and gains that manipulated the ST's meaning, including its accuracy and force. In case study three, various omissions on a small scale at the expense of the ST were caused through domestication, in an apparent attempt to familiarise the ST to the English reader. Notably, these omissions are in line with the large-scale omissions that were carried out prior to transediting; they all lead to resist acknowledging a change in Saudi Arabia's relation to terrorism and to tone down Qatar's disturbing side, which shows the BBCM-M making deliberate omissions.

To conclude, there is power imbalance against Arabic both prior to and during transediting that enabled the BBCM-M professionals to actively contribute to the discursive construction of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women through the use of stereotypically motivated forms of rewriting. This phenomenon, which can hardly be accidental, is consistent across news sources and during the two-year study period.

Chapter 11: Discussion and Conclusion

11.1 Introduction

In acknowledging the powerful influence of media in shaping people's opinions and the undervalued pivotal role of translation in news-making in today's world, this thesis has analysed the main themes that characterise the BBC Monitoring Middle East Service (BBCM-M) coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output between March 2013 and March 2015 in relation to other British news sources reporting in English. It has also examined the main representations of Saudi Arabia when those themes were selected for coverage during that timeframe. Finally, it has investigated the power relations in transediting (Stetting, 1989), that is to say translation and editing, Arabic news items on Saudi Arabia into English by the BBCM-M professionals.

This resulted in the identification of three main overarching themes and four main representations of Saudi Arabia in the BBCM-M's coverage. The three identified themes are, in order of salience: identity, action and status and relations, which demonstrate the general notion behind the BBCM-M's 'selection principles' (Bielsa and Bassnett, 2009) as revolving mainly around Saudi Arabia's identity, its relations, the actions that take place in and around it and, finally, its status. These selection principles were further identified when the specific representations of Saudi Arabia within these commonly selected themes were recognised.

Through the developed model of the Discourse-Historical approach to CDA (DHA), the CDA analysis began with a special focus on the first identified representation of Saudi Arabia as dominated by men and distant from (acting) women. This was carried out with the aim of revealing the forms of rewriting (Lefevere, 1992) perpetrated by the BBCM-M professionals both prior to and during transediting and, accordingly, the nature of power relations between the Arabic source text (ST) and the English target text (TT) and, by extension, cultures.

The CDA analysis has revealed the forms of rewriting that were chosen by the BBCM-M professionals, leading to two main findings. Firstly, a clear power imbalance exists in the transediting exercise by the BBCM-M transeditor(s), both prior to and during the transediting process when applying a strategy of domestication. Secondly, through that power imbalance that positions the Arabic ST in a lower position compared to the English transedited text (TET), the BBCM-M contributes to the promotion of a

stereotypical image of Saudi Arabia as a place dominated by men of authority and women at this place are pushed away via distancing them at both a linguistic and contextual level. Below is a discussion of the main findings of those analytical units, a presentation of the main limitations and contributions of the thesis and suggestions for further research.

11.2 Discussion

11.2.1 News Translation: Power Imbalance and Anglo-American Hegemony

News agencies observe, translate and disseminate news on/from nations to target readerships that may not speak the languages of those nations. However, as the survey of the literature in this thesis has shown, translation in newsrooms transcends the classical sense of producing a target text (TT) that is merely based on the source text (ST) as the translator's interpretations, segments of other news items or even editorial comments can be infused into the final product of transediting (Stetting, 1989). Such practice can ascribe the translator a degree of power that is greater than what the classical translator has over the ST especially that the target reader does not necessarily have an access to that original ST due to various possible reasons, such as not being able to read the language in which the ST was written. Since the transeditor operates in an institutional environment, it is more likely that the agency involved in the transediting activity is not limited to the individual transeditor as the institution will have a certain degree of influence on the several stages, or at least one, of the transediting process, such as the selection of news sources, texts, strategies and techniques of translation and finally the form in which the TET is published.

Indeed, transeditors who work for news organisations are commonly provided by a translation guide that specifies how certain words should be transedited, for example transliterated or translated, as well as other stylistic and form preferences. These preferences set by the institution, the patron, are the poetics that the literature, the STs, needs to be brought to by the professionals, the transeditors, via a power delegated to them by that patron to rewrite the literature (Lefevere, 1992).

Venuti (1995) argues that in translating into English, editors and publishers tend to prefer fluency over accuracy. Thus, he argues that there is an Anglo-American hegemony or what he calls 'ethnocentric violence' in the practice of translation into

English. He argues that this is enabled by means of domestication, which strips the source culture from the ST and positions it in that of the TT. In other words, this violence is possible due to the power that the transeditors enjoy over the ST, and by extension culture. He also argues that in the act of translation, choosing a certain strategy over another sheds light on the preference of the editor, publisher or the translator. Importantly, it shows the attitude or ethics held towards the source texts, and by extension language and culture (Venuti, 1998).

In this research, the analysis of the forms of rewriting (Lefevere, 1992) that the BBCM-M's transeditors opted for when reporting on Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output shows that there is a power imbalance between the Arabic ST and the English transedited text (TET) both prior to and during transediting. Importantly, this power imbalance positions the Arabic ST and culture in an inferior position compared to the English TET and its culture. For example, the contextual triangulation in case studies 1 and 3 of the CDA analytical unit showed that the source texts (STs) were not simply selected from the Arabic news output on Saudi Arabia for transediting. Rather, the STs were created by selectively merging two STs in case study 1 and by partially transcribing audio-visuals in case study 3 (see chapters 8 and 10). When further investigated, it became clear that the STs, in both case studies, that the BBCM-M purported do not exist; those texts were created and then transedited and published as if they were genuine TETs, that is to say based on STs (see chapter 10).

Importantly, such forms of rewriting, selectively merging STs and partially transcribing audio-visuals, highlight the extent of the power delegated by the patron to the professionals. Moreover, this power did not only allow the professionals to make up STs, but also falsely reproduce a year-old event as a current one, with a false date of original publication written on the TET (see chapter 10). The date change could not have been an error given the BBCM-M's previous focus on this event; the BBCM-M had reported on it on additional two separate occasions under two different headings (see chapter 10).

This freedom to falsely date a news item and selectively merge others prior to the actual transediting process highlights the invisible position of the translators in newsrooms that Van Doorslaer (2010a, pp.180-84) and Davier (2014) refer to in their investigation of the issue of authorship and news translation. It also clearly indicates

the power imbalance between the Arabic ST and the English TET and its journalistic purposes. This inferior position assigned to the Arabic ST in comparison to the English TET by the BBCM-M transeditors is confirmed by the linguistic triangulation analysis, namely the comparative ST-TET analysis, which showed that the default strategy to transedit Arabic STs in the 2013–2015 timeframe appears to be domestication. In numerous instances, it was clear that the Arabic ST had been rewritten, at some cost, through domestication as the ST's culture, meaning, logic or even accuracy were all vulnerable for the sake of familiarising the TET for the English reader, hegemonizing English over the Arabic ST, and by extension, culture.

For example, domesticating the well-known term of 'hijab' that refers to the Islamic garment that Muslim women wear on their heads to cover the hair into 'headdress', which is more generic and can refer to women of any other religion as well as men (see chapter 9). This did not only unnecessarily domesticate the term and remove the cultural feature carried in 'hijab', but also produced an unnatural TET, which is 'headdress' that does not fit well in the intended context as it commonly collocate with 'bridal' as in 'bridal headdress instead of referring to Muslim women's garment (English-corpora.org, 2019).

Another example of this Anglo-American hegemony in the BBCM-M's transediting practice is the domestication of the foreign term نهضة 'awakening' in the Saudi Prince's argument for the awakening of Saudi women 'within the teaching of Islam'. The transeditor opted to use the more familiar term 'progress' to refer to the status of Saudi women as in 'women's progress'. However, 'progress' to the English reader is a concept, in this context, that is established in Western feminist rhetoric and discourse and has specific aims and standards that cannot be limited within the 'teaching of Islam' or any other religion for that matter (see chapter 8). Thus, presenting the TET on Saudi women's status in the light of Western standards. This shows that the power imbalance identified both prior to and during transediting ascribes the English TET a higher value than the Arabic ST, and by extension culture, highlighting the Anglo-American hegemony in Arabic news transediting by the BBCM-M for the English reader. This power imbalance did not only cause an Anglo-American hegemony over the Arabic ST, but also enabled the BBCM-M' transeditors to actively contribute to the recycling of stereotypical imagery of Muslims, Arabs and Middle Eastern in general and Saudis in particular, as the following sections shall explain.

11.2.2 Covering the East: Recycling Stereotypical Representations

Existing literature shows that Islam, Arabs and the Middle East in general have been represented in Western media, namely English, in a highly selective, reductionist, stereotypical and oppositional – to the West – manner (Shaheen, 2003; Ridouani, 2011; Baker, et al., 2012; Said, 1997). One way to achieve this as, Said (1997) argues, is that Muslims and Arabs are only 'newsworthy' when the topics are related to certain themes, such as 'oil' and 'terrorism'. As a result, Ridouani (2011) argues that Arabs and Muslims have been alienated as 'the other' or 'the enemy', which continues, as he argues, since the Crusades. Similarly, Baker, et al., (2012) shows that in a corpus of 143 million words of news articles from British newspapers, Muslims are depicted in a reductionist manner as they are shown as a 'homogeneous group that is distinctly separate from non-Muslims' and are 'in conflict with non-Muslims' (Baker, et al., 2012, p.255).

In a similar vein, the scant available literature on the representations of Saudi Arabia, an Eastern, Arab and Muslim country, in translated British media, namely the BBC, shows that the common depictions of the Saudis to be selective and reductionist, mainly revolving around the narratives of Muslim women as being "submissive" and "oppressed" (al-Hejin, 2012: 311). This can be fed by the stereotypical discourse that Saudi Arabia is 'caught between tradition and modernity', 'where religion plays an important role and in which women have fewer rights than in the USA' and has 'restrictive gender roles' that Mendelson and Darling-Wolf (2009, pp.806-7) concluded to be prevalent in American readers. Interestingly, the survey of the current Anglo-American media depictions of Saudi Arabia, in chapter 4, shows Saudi Arabia is both depicted in Western media as the enemy of the West and an ally of Western governments. Importantly, these depictions have a critical tone as the Kingdom is mainly portrayed as a threat to the West by being linked to terrorism or a threat to 'Western values' of democracy, freedom and human rights.

In this research, the corpus analysis has shown that the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from 2013 to 2015 recycle stereotypical imagery of Saudi Arabia as all four main identified representations echo the stereotypical narrative of Saudi Arabia in relation to gender, conflict and hostility, terrorism and disorder. To clarify, the first representation shows the Saudi Arabian identity to be masculine and authoritative,

excluding and suppressing women. The second identified representation of Saudi Arabia shows it to be related mainly to conflict and hostility by focusing on Saudi-Iranian rivalry and its by-products. The third representation, although clearly showing the Saudi authorities as fighting terrorism and Saudi youth as being manipulated to join terrorist groups, it shows the continuation of Saudi nationals to join terrorist groups. The fourth representation shows Saudi Arabia as disorderly and unpredictable especially in relation to its power, policies and development.

Moreover, the CDA analysis, namely the linguistic triangulation, has shown that the BBCM-M's transediting practice recycles those stereotypical images of Saudi Arabia. Importantly, the BBCM-M's transeditors play an active role in such practice in which they amplify certain images, mitigate or even create them via transediting choices. For example, in case study 2 of the CDA analytical unit, the BBCM-M systematically pluralised the lone case of the Saudi religious scholar who was ridiculed – internationally and even nationally – for arguing against 'women's driving' for fear of 'harming' their ovaries is a clear case of stereotypical depiction via transediting choices. The BBCM-M professional uses the plural 'the scholars' to transedit the singular الفقيه 'the scholar' and keeps to that decision, save for a few instances, by using the plural pronoun 'they' instead of 'he' and projecting this lone case as a sort of consensus or norm in Saudi Arabia's social reality and contributing, at the micro level, to the construction of a stereotypical knowledge of Saudi religious scholars in which they appear to be fundamentalists, behind the times, misogynistic and irrational, to say the least.

Also in case study 2, the transeditor systematically used an equivalence with a stronger illocutionary force, which intensified the ST's meaning from 'bad records of human rights' in Saudi Arabia into 'dire records of human rights'; although it is a synonym of 'bad', it has a vastly more powerful illocutionary force. As this emphasis is systematic, it appears to be for the purpose of amplifying the 'bad' conditions of human rights into 'dire' conditions. Similarly, the transeditor decided to amplify the wealth of Saudi Arabia, as stated in the ST, through the addition of the qualifier 'enormous' to غنى 'wealth' in case study 2, which indeed recycles the stereotype of the enormous wealth of Saudi Arabia. This intensifications via transediting choices do not only recycle the image of Saudi Arabian authorities as being fundamentalists and unable to modernise, but also projects an image of Saudi Arabia that is enormously wealthy

and oppositional to the so-called ‘Western values’ of democracy, freedom and human rights (see chapter 9), thus, a powerful and dangerous country.

This danger, as case study 3 shows, is also in the alleged link of Saudi Arabia to terrorism in which the BBCM-M professionals play an active role in constructing stereotypical depiction of Saudi Arabian society in relation to terror. Through the omissions carried out on a small scale, the BBCM-M’s transeditors removed the precise decrease in the number of Saudis joining jihad: a ‘quarter of what it was’ was eliminated. Thus, resisting the change in Saudi Arabia’s relation to terrorism that was present in the ST.

All these transediting decisions do not only serve to reinforce the inferior position of Arabic relative to English, but also empirically show that the BBCM-M professionals as playing an active role in constructing stereotypical knowledge of Saudi Arabia through transediting, which then they transmit to the English domain. This is in relation to gender, Saudi men of authority versus submissive and oppressed Saudi women, Saudi religious scholars as fundamentalists, behind the times, misogynistic and irrational, Saudi Arabian authorities as abusers of human rights and Saudi Arabian wealth as enormous. Lastly, these changes by the BBCM-M led to a resistance to acknowledging the evolution in Saudi Arabia’s relationship with terrorism in favour of recycling stereotypical imagery of Saudi Arabia in that regard.

11.2.3 Stereotypical Knowledge and Source Selection as Epistemological Colonisation in Translation

News-making in general and news translation in particular can be a fertile environment for stereotypical portrayals as due to the potential limited access of readers to the nations on which the news items are written. Fujioka (1999, pp.52-75) shows how media can be a powerful apparatus for stereotypes creation especially if it is the main source of information available to the public. Venuti (1998, p.48) attributes this to the Anglo-American political and cultural hegemony that encourages publishers and editors to select literature that is easily assimilated into the culture of the target readerships whom he describes as ‘aggressively monolingual’. In Said’s words ‘the reporter takes hold of what is nearest at hand, usually a cliché or some bit of journalistic wisdom that the readers at home are unlikely to challenge’ (1997, pp.ii-iii), thus, producing a partial knowledge.

Orientalism is based on inferior and superior relations between the East and the West in general. It functions to legitimise colonisation and justifies it (Said, 1978). One of the forms that orientalism takes to achieve its goals is the constant production and reproduction of certain images that create and sustain partial knowledge on nations in order to justify their colonisation. According to Quijano (2000), 'coloniality of power' is the heritage of the colonial project that still lives to this day. It is linked to the concept of modernity and is operated on the basis of an inferior-superior relationship. It has various forms, one of which is the epistemological colonisation through which the construction of knowledge on a certain group as inferiors is achieved, which is more or less what Said refers to in the partial and selective knowledge constructed on the orient.

In the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output, a body of knowledge on Saudi Arabia has been created via selection, transediting and then publishing. In order for this knowledge to be communicated successfully, Moscovici argues that a shared set of beliefs, values and practices needs to be shared between those taking part in the communicative act, the English reader on one hand and the patron and the professionals (the transeditors) on the other. There are two strategies that can be used to familiarise and thus communicate an unfamiliar concept: 'anchoring and objectification' (Moscovici, 2000). In translation, such familiarising can be in either in the form of selecting what is 'easily assimilated' for translation or in the form of selecting translation strategies that produce a familiarised TET, such as domestication (Venuti, 1995).

With regards to news source selection, the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output during the timeframe of focus (March 2013 to March 2015) uses 20 news sources, 17 of which are dailies. Of these dailies, six are located in the UK, three in Saudi Arabia and the remaining are elsewhere in the Arab world. Three of the UK-based newspapers are banned in Saudi Arabia: Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, Ra'y Al-Yawm* and *Elaph.* They are barred for either being critical of Saudi Arabia's government and policies or distributing a certain stream of thought (see chapter 4).

Out of the 20 new sources, the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia comes largely from al-Quds al-Arabi, a newspaper that is London-based and critical of Saudi Arabia; 31 of the total of 101 news items in the collected SC were taken from that newspaper.

Accordingly, the knowledge of Saudi Arabia constructed by the BBCM-M and eventually communicated to the English reader during the timeframe of focus, in relation to the identified themes of identity, action and status, and relations is, firstly, selective as the locations of the news sources show. Secondly, this knowledge is arguably oriented towards criticising the Saudi government and policies as it relied heavily on al-Quds al-Arabi; further evidence emerged in the corpus analysis. Hence, constructing a body of knowledge that fits within the existing literature on Saudi Arabia's portrayals in Western media. Thus, the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia is not 'through its media', as the BBCM-M slogan claims (see chapter 1). Rather, it is shaped by the selected sources from which this coverage comes.

In addition to shaping the constructed knowledge through news sources selection as a way of familiarising that knowledge to the English reader, the BBCM-M's constructed knowledge of Saudi Arabia's social reality that is stereotypical, and thus, epistemologically colonised. This is due to the fact that all four identified representations of Saudi Arabia are 'anchored' to 'social representations' (Moscovici, 2000) that recycle the reductionist and stereotypical images of Arabs and Muslims as marked by anti-democracy, belatedness, conflict, hostility, chaos and, finally, as a potential threat (Said, 1978).

Importantly, the analysis focused on the first identified representation of Saudi Arabia, which is related to men and women, has revealed the forms of rewriting that were chosen by the BBCM-M professionals to deal with the Arabic STs. This led to the unveiling the BBCM-M's professionals role in contributing to the promotion of an image of Saudi Arabia as a place being dominated by men of authority and missing acting women at both a linguistic and contextual level. Therefore, the communication between the English reader, and the patron and the professional, which functions to enable the reader to take a stance on the social reality communicated to him or her (Moscovici's, 2000) is more or less controlled, or at the very least influenced, by that epistemologically colonised knowledge.

11.3 Limitations of the Research

Firstly, in relation to corpus analysis, although this analysis was corpus-driven, which means that it began with no pre-analytical expectations (Tognini-Bonelli, 2001), switching to a corpus-based analysis approach as further questions emerged during

the process of analysis and interpretation. Therefore, the application of corpus tools shows that an integrated approach to corpus enquiry (corpus-driven and corpus-based) is an adequate method of exposing discursive constructions found in linguistic data.

Moreover, although patterns were identified in the corpus analysis; however, it must be acknowledged that the small size of the data set can be a limitation to this study. As a larger SC would have highlighted the identified patterns clearly or even shown other patterns in the data set. Also related to the data set, the fact that this study only examines those news items selected by the BBCM-M, overlooks those that are not. This can be deemed a limitation to this study as the area of those de-selected news items can be a fertile zone for exploration that was not touched upon in this study.

Furthermore, despite the researcher's every attempt to control subjectivity in the CDA through the incorporation of the semi-automated corpus-driven inquiry, subjectivity still exists at both levels of corpus analysis: categorisation and description, and interpretation. The categorisation of the wordlist and the keyword list was based on the semantic fields of the word types, according to which the subthemes and the overarching themes were identified. However, Fairclough (1989, pp.92-93) warns us that MRs (analysts' beliefs that will unavoidably influence their interpretations) will differ from one individual to another. Therefore, it is possible that another researcher or a non-researcher might categorise the word types differently and thus reach different subthemes and overarching themes. However, this practice is widely accepted and did in fact lead to the exposure of linguistic patterns in the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output during the timeframe of focus, March 2013–March 2015.

As to the CDA investigation, this research was designed to overcome the issue of selectivity in CDA approaches. Thus, complete news items were examined: one in the first case study, three in the second case study and four in the third case study. However, as the data in hand consists of TETs, an investigation of the STs alongside the TETs was called for, so a total of sixteen complete news items were actually examined in the CDA unit. The analysis of complete texts, in the case of TETs, requires double the time and effort needed for texts that did not go through a translation process.

Moreover, it is understandable in this time-limited PhD thesis to focus on one of the identified four representations of Saudi Arabia, that is to say Saudi Arabia as dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women, in the CDA analysis. However, this does indeed limit the investigation, as a full analysis of all of the four identified representations would have been more enlightening.

11.4 Main Contributions and Suggestions for Future Research

This research has contributed to the existing literature on Western media representations of Arabs and Muslims as the four representations of Saudi Arabia fit into the system of representations of Arabs and Muslims that has been created and maintained in the Anglo-American literature and media for centuries (Said, 1978). This research also bolstered the literature on depictions of Saudi Arabia in Western media, which has largely been limited to American media.

It also contributes to the literature on translation as rewriting in the service of power as the findings do suggest a power imbalance between the Arabic ST and the English TET that serves to 'familiarise' the ST for the English reader. In doing so, this study also contributes to the literature on the concept of Coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000) and expands the applicability of this concept to nations that are not former colonies, such as Saudi Arabia. Moreover, this study contributes to the scant literature that examines the pivotal role of translation in news-making using CDA approaches as the majority of studies of this nature overlook translation in newsrooms. It has also contributed to the literature of CDA inquiry and news, for this research area has been primarily monolingual to date.

The methodological framework of this thesis was used to examine texts that have migrated from one form of communication into another, first through news reporting and then through translation. Thus, can inform other studies that wish to trace texts' trajectories and the multiple re-contextualisation processes that can take place in their evolution, contributing to the literature on texts' trajectories and CDA. Also related to the methodology of this thesis, incorporating CDA approaches and corpus tools that was guided by previous studies (see Baker, 2006) to examine translated texts (TTs) is of an innovative nature that aimed for mitigating major drawbacks of both CDA and corpora, such as subjectivity and selectivity of segments of texts.

Moreover, in this study, the researcher has designed and built a specialised corpus on the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output that can be examined and used to answer any number of research questions at the intersection of TS and news-making. Similarly, the RC created for this study, the 4UKBS, can be used for a variety of research purposes as either a RC or a SC.

A final point on the methodology that is worthwhile to mention here is the fact that the researcher looked as both keywords with negative and positive values in the corpus analysis of keywords. This is rarely conducted and can indeed be a novel practice in corpus analyses that proved fruitful. It showed what the BBCM-M overlooks when reporting on Saudi Arabia in relation to other British media, which is indeed equally important to what the BBCM-M focuses on.

In terms of the debates that this research engages in, firstly, the Anglo-American hegemony in translation practice that Venuti (1995) claims to exist while other scholars dismiss (Pym, 1996). This is because this research shows that the majority of domestications identified in the analysis are conducted for 'familiarising' the ST for the English reader, removing the cultural features of the Arabic ST. Also related to the debates to which this research contributes, is the revelation that in a cross-cultural situation like news translation, ethnocentric violence is not only restricted to the domestication strategy, as Venuti (1995) argues. Rather, it can be exercised even prior to the act of transediting either via news source selection or by source texts selection, for example, selectively merging two STs, as in case study 1 shows. Thus, this study stretches the concept of domestication to practices that take place prior to transediting activity itself.

Therefore, there is a pressing need to revisit Venuti's argument on ethnocentric violence via translation. Future research could investigate the potential ethnocentric violence with special focus on the practices that can commence prior to, or even post, the transediting activity. Moreover, the comparatively innocuous term 'domestication' does not fully capture the potential for power imbalance, or even abuse as Venuti (1995) argues, between the source and target languages and by extension cultures; thus, future studies could propose a more suitable term and support it with examples.

One potential alternative to domestication that this study can suggest is 'domination', due to the fact that this practice would inevitably lead the translator, in

Schleiermacher's terms, to 'leav[e] the reader in peace, as much as possible, and mov[e] the author towards him' (Lefevere 1977, p.74). As the direction of movement is towards the reader, who is left in peace, it is the ST that is being moved; the reader's language and culture thus 'dominate' those of the ST. Conversely, and focusing on the target reader, foreignization could be called 'compliance', as the target reader's language and culture are forced to comply with the source language and culture. Unlike domestication and foreignization, 'domination' and 'compliance' do suggest the potential for ethnocentric violence through power imbalance in transediting.

It is important to note, however, that by operating as domestication, domination does not necessarily distort the ST's message; it can even contribute to achieving its goal or *skopos* (Vermeer, 1989). For example, in translating for purposes of marketing, the domination of the reader's or receiver's culture can achieve the intended goal of the translation by causing the marketed item to be sold more successfully and produce financial benefits.

Although the issue of 'authorship' and the 'declining status of the ST' in translation has been discussed in previous studies, such as Van Doorslaer (2010a), Davier (2014) and Van Doorslaer (2010b), they have all stopped short of acknowledging transeditors as contributing to a project that goes beyond the limits of the institution at which they work, such as coloniality. Therefore, future studies can examine the effects of institutional translation practice beyond the limits of the institution.

Moreover, Moscovici argues that social representations govern the 'stimuli and the response', as 'the response is not a reaction to the stimulus, but, up to a point, constitutes the origin of the stimulus' (1973, p.xii). Therefore, future studies could examine the audience's reception to such epistemologically colonised knowledge on Saudi Arabia by seeking ethnographic evidence for the assumed control over the response through the social representations to which the knowledge constructed about Saudi Arabia is anchored to the English reader.

As this chapter was being written and after the current Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Salman, came to power in 2017, a number of changes took place in Saudi Arabia. Examples include lifting the ban on women's driving and an anti-corruption campaign that, for the first time in Saudi history, investigated and punished members of the royal family. In light of these changes, future research may be able to collect fresh and highly

revealing data on the BBCM-M's coverage of Saudi Arabia from Arabic news output to examine whether these indisputable changes in the social reality of Saudi Arabia call for (or lead to) a change in the BBCM-M's construction and communication of knowledge about Saudi Arabia for the English domain.

Finally, future research could conduct interviews and observations in order to understand more about who does what in the process of transediting as practised in the BBCM-M by the professionals. For example, if the transediting takes place at various stages, conducted by several transeditors or even if the transediting is computer-aided. Moreover, if the final product is checked and groomed by a non-Arabic speaker, that is to say has no access to the ST, which can explain the translation losses and gains identified in this study. All this can help understand the role of ideology more in the BBCM-M transediting.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Wordlist from WordSmith 7 tool (showing word types in frequency order from 1-115)

N	Word	Freq.	%	Texts	%
1	THE	9818	8.18	20	100.00
2	OF	4128	3.44	20	100.00
3	AND	3683	3.07	19	95.00
4	TO	3152	2.63	19	95.00
5	IN	2971	2.48	20	100.00
6	THAT	2172	1.81	20	100.00
7	#	1949	1.62	20	100.00
8	SAUDI	1881	1.57	20	100.00
9	AL	1787	1.49	19	95.00
10	A	1711	1.43	20	100.00
11	IS	1530	1.27	19	95.00
12	ON	1029	0.86	20	100.00
13	WITH	1005	0.84	20	100.00
14	THIS	925	0.77	18	90.00
15	IT	848	0.71	18	90.00
16	BY	830	0.69	17	85.00
17	FOR	788	0.66	19	95.00
18	ARABIA	773	0.64	17	85.00
19	NOT	713	0.59	18	90.00
20	ARE	647	0.54	19	95.00
21	HAS	631	0.53	19	95.00
22	AS	614	0.51	19	95.00
23	HE	613	0.51	17	85.00
24	WHICH	566	0.47	18	90.00
25	BE	558	0.46	20	100.00
26	ITS	555	0.46	17	85.00
27	FROM	532	0.44	18	90.00
28	HAVE	481	0.40	17	85.00
29	ALL	479	0.40	20	100.00
30	WILL	468	0.39	16	80.00
31	WAS	442	0.37	18	90.00
32	OR	389	0.32	14	70.00
33	AN	373	0.31	18	90.00
34	WHO	363	0.30	17	85.00
35	THEY	352	0.29	16	80.00
36	THEIR	344	0.29	16	80.00
37	WE	335	0.28	15	75.00
38	SAYS	314	0.26	13	65.00
39	SYRIA	314	0.26	15	75.00
40	SYRIAN	314	0.26	14	70.00
41	AT	312	0.26	18	90.00
42	US	304	0.25	17	85.00
43	HIS	288	0.24	18	90.00

44	IRAN	286	0.24	12	60.00
45	ARAB	282	0.23	17	85.00
46	THERE	282	0.23	16	80.00
47	RIGHTS	272	0.23	20	100.00
48	SECURITY	270	0.22	14	70.00
49	COUNTRIES	263	0.22	16	80.00
50	BETWEEN	261	0.22	16	80.00
51	SAID	261	0.22	16	80.00
52	NO	257	0.21	20	100.00
53	STATES	255	0.21	15	75.00
54	ABOUT	246	0.20	15	75.00
55	THESE	245	0.20	17	85.00
56	POLITICAL	244	0.20	15	75.00
57	I	240	0.20	12	60.00
58	BEEN	236	0.20	15	75.00
59	THEM	234	0.19	13	65.00
60	RESERVED	228	0.19	20	100.00
61	AGAINST	227	0.19	17	85.00
62	GULF	226	0.19	14	70.00
63	WHAT	224	0.19	14	70.00
64	KINGDOM	218	0.18	15	75.00
65	REPORT	216	0.18	18	90.00
66	BIN	213	0.18	15	75.00
67	BUT	208	0.17	16	80.00
68	BRITISH	207	0.17	20	100.00
69	STATE	205	0.17	15	75.00
70	TWO	204	0.17	17	85.00
71	BROADCASTING	202	0.17	20	100.00
72	CORPORATION	202	0.17	20	100.00
73	ONE	190	0.16	17	85.00
74	ALSO	185	0.15	17	85.00
75	QA'IDAH	184	0.15	10	50.00
76	IRANIAN	178	0.15	11	55.00
77	MAY	174	0.14	20	100.00
78	REGION	174	0.14	12	60.00
79	OTHER	173	0.14	16	80.00
80	PEOPLE	171	0.14	14	70.00
81	THOSE	170	0.14	11	55.00
82	ANY	168	0.14	14	70.00
83	WORDS	168	0.14	20	100.00
84	ARABIC	164	0.14	20	100.00
85	UNITED	164	0.14	14	70.00
86	SOURCE	162	0.13	20	100.00
87	FOREIGN	160	0.13	13	65.00
88	OVER	160	0.13	15	75.00
89	AFTER	157	0.13	14	70.00
90	WERE	157	0.13	13	65.00
91	NEW	156	0.13	16	80.00
92	RIYADH	155	0.13	16	80.00
93	YEMEN	155	0.13	11	55.00
94	COUNTRY	154	0.13	13	65.00
95	MINISTER	153	0.13	12	60.00

96	PRESIDENT	151	0.13	15	75.00
97	QATAR	151	0.13	10	50.00
98	SOME	150	0.12	15	75.00
99	RELATIONS	145	0.12	14	70.00
100	PRINCE	144	0.12	9	45.00
101	IF	141	0.12	14	70.00
102	SUPPORT	141	0.12	16	80.00
103	WEBSITE	141	0.12	13	65.00
104	POLICY	137	0.11	11	55.00
105	VISIT	137	0.11	12	60.00
106	GOVERNMENT	136	0.11	15	75.00
107	MIDDLE	135	0.11	20	100.00
108	BECAUSE	133	0.11	15	75.00
109	EAST	131	0.11	20	100.00
110	DO	130	0.11	16	80.00
111	LONDON	130	0.11	5	25.00
112	WHEN	130	0.11	12	60.00
113	THROUGH	129	0.11	14	70.00
114	ABD	128	0.11	15	75.00
115	MUSLIM	128	0.11	12	60.00

Appendix 2

Initial manual categorisation of the top 115 word types on the wordlist

Word type/s	Word Class	Theme
‘people’	noun	personal identity (specific group of people)
‘abd’	noun	personal identity (specific proper name)
‘bin’	patronymic indicator	personal identity (specific proper name)
‘Muslim’	noun/ adjective[39]	cultural identity (specific religion)
‘minister’, ‘president’, ‘prince’	nouns	personal identity (specific political persons)
‘rights’, ‘security’	nouns	political
‘government’	noun	corporate identity (specific political organisation)
‘corporation’	noun	corporate identity (specific organisation)
‘Qa'idah’	noun	corporate identity (specific terrorist organisation)
‘policy’, ‘website’, ‘source’	nouns	corporate identity (characteristics of specific organisations)
‘Qatar’, ‘Arabia’, ‘Syria’, ‘Iran’, ‘Arab’, ‘gulf’, ‘Kingdom’, ‘state’, ‘region’, ‘Riyadh’, ‘Yemen’, ‘country’, ‘London’, ‘countries’, ‘states’	nouns	geographical identity
‘middle’	noun/ adjective/ verb	geographical identity
‘east’	noun/ adjective/ adverb	geographical identity
Word type/s	Word Class	Theme

[39] Due to a lack of contextual information in the wordlist, some word types are initially classified as having more than one word class. This is addressed with greater specificity in chapter 6.

‘united’	adjective	specifically relating to country ‘United States’, thus, geographical
‘Arabic’	noun	cultural identity (specific language)
‘al’	article	referring to the article ‘al-‘ in Arabic, thus, cultural identity (specific language)
‘words’	noun	cultural identity (particularity of a language)
‘visit’	noun/ verb	action
‘broadcasting’	noun/ verb	action
‘relations’	noun	relation
‘we’, ‘us’, ‘I’	pronouns	personal identity
‘he’, ‘they’, ‘them’	pronouns	personal identity
‘its’, ‘their’, ‘his’	possessive determiners	personal identity
‘other’	pronoun/ adjective	reference to additional people/things
‘a’, ‘an’	determiners	indefinite
‘no’	determiner	relation (negation)
‘the’	determiner	definite
‘which’	interrogative pronoun and determiner/ relative pronoun and determiner	asking for information/giving further information
‘who’	pronoun	asking for information/ giving further information (actor)
‘what’	pronoun/ determiner/ interrogative adverb	asking for information/giving information
‘any’	determiner/ pronoun	quantifiers of count words/ any quantity
‘some’	determiner/ pronoun/ adverb	quantifiers of count words/ some of the quantity
‘all’	pronoun/ determiner/ predeterminer	quantifiers of count words/ all of the quantity
Word type/s	Word Class	Theme

‘Saudi’, ‘Syrian’, ‘British’, ‘Iranian’	adjectives	cultural identity (nationalities)
‘political’	adjective	politics
‘new’	adjective	status
‘with’, ‘against’, ‘between’, ‘by’, ‘from’, ‘about’, ‘after’, ‘for’	prepositions	functional words that might be lexical as well (relations)
‘in’, ‘of’, ‘on’, ‘at’, ‘over’	prepositions	functional words
‘may’	verb	possibility of future (action or status)
‘were’, ‘was’	verbs	past status
‘said’, ‘reserved’	verbs	past action
‘been’	verb (past participle of be)	perfect action
‘will’	verb	certainty of future (action or status)
‘says’, ‘do’	verbs	present action
‘is’, ‘are’, ‘be’, ‘has’, ‘have’	verbs	present status
‘support’	noun/ verb	action
‘one’, ‘two’, ‘#’[40]	numerical words	statistics
‘because’, ‘but’, ‘if’, ‘and’, ‘or’	conjunctions	relations
‘as’	adverb/ conjunction/ preposition	comparison
‘also’	adverb	addition
‘when’	interrogative adverb/ relative adverb/ conjunction	asking for information/giving information (time)
‘not’	adverb	negation
‘through’	preposition/ adverb	relations
‘these’, ‘those’, ‘there’	pronoun/ adverb	reference
‘that’, ‘this’	determiner	reference
Word type/s	Word Class	Theme

[40] It should be noted that WordSmith 7 tools automatically omit numerical figures such as 1, 2 and 3 and lemmatise, or join, them all under the symbol ‘#’. However, if the focal point of an analysis is on numerical figures, the concordance lines of the ‘#’ symbol can be generated for a detailed examination.

‘to’	preposition/ adverb/ infinitive marker	functional word that can be lexical (location)
‘report’	noun/verb	giving information
‘it’	dummy pronoun/pronoun	reference

Appendix 3

Keywords list sorted in a descending order according to the keyness value, namely log-likelihood:

N	Key word	Freq.	%	Texts	RC. Freq.	RC. %	Log_L	Log_R	P
1	AL	1787	1.49	19	2422	0.25	2684.17	2.56	0.00
2	SAUDI	1881	1.57	20	5025	0.52	1360.89	1.58	0.00
3	BROADCASTING	202	0.17	20	9		815.34	7.49	0.00
4	QA'IDAH	184	0.15	10	0		808.52	139.65	0.00
5	CORPORATION	202	0.17	20	23		744.56	6.13	0.00
6	INC	126	0.10	17	0		553.66	139.10	0.00
7	ARABIC	164	0.14	20	64		465.02	4.36	0.00
8	FACTIVA	123	0.10	17	13		457.78	6.24	0.00
9	REPRODUCED	101	0.08	20	0		443.80	138.79	0.00
10	BBCMEP	100	0.08	20	0		439.41	138.77	0.00
11	ABDALLAH	95	0.08	14	2		398.43	8.57	0.00
12	ARABI	97	0.08	3	4		393.50	7.60	0.00
13	ABD	128	0.11	15	41		384.83	4.64	0.00
14	MONITORING	104	0.09	20	20		352.13	5.38	0.00
15	EXCEPT	113	0.09	20	32		351.02	4.82	0.00
16	WEBSITE	141	0.12	13	81		347.32	3.80	0.00
17	C	100	0.08	20	20		335.99	5.32	0.00
18	EXPRESS	109	0.09	20	34		330.10	4.68	0.00
19	QUDS	95	0.08	3	16		329.65	5.57	0.00
20	SYRIAN	314	0.26	14	659	0.07	311.18	1.93	0.00
21	PERMISSION	101	0.08	20	32		304.57	4.66	0.00
22	SOURCE	162	0.13	20	160	0.02	303.17	3.02	0.00
23	ORGANIZATION	77	0.06	10	5		301.86	6.94	0.00
24	MATERIAL	113	0.09	20	54		299.05	4.07	0.00
25	REPORT	216	0.18	18	324	0.03	298.61	2.41	0.00
26	GCC	101	0.08	7	45		274.05	4.17	0.00
27	SAYS	314	0.26	13	770	0.08	256.35	1.71	0.00
28	MB	58	0.05	7	1		244.96	8.86	0.00
29	AZIZ	88	0.07	11	39		239.22	4.17	0.00
30	KINGDOM	218	0.18	15	422	0.04	236.29	2.05	0.00
31	ZU'BI	53	0.04	1	0		232.89	137.86	0.00
32	ADDS	89	0.07	8	45		230.63	3.98	0.00
33	ASAD	52	0.04	11	0		228.49	137.83	0.00
34	TEXT	71	0.06	13	18		226.60	4.98	0.00

35	SHI'I	51	0.04	7	0		224.10	137.80	0.00
36	ORGANIZATIONS	52	0.04	7	1		218.81	8.70	0.00
37	VISIT	137	0.11	12	173	0.02	217.19	2.66	0.00
38	RELATIONS	145	0.12	14	201	0.02	213.95	2.53	0.00
39	BIN	213	0.18	15	443	0.05	213.29	1.94	0.00
40	DR	89	0.07	10	64		198.15	3.48	0.00
41	SHARQ	46	0.04	4	1		192.69	8.52	0.00
42	SECURITY	270	0.22	14	728	0.08	192.68	1.57	0.00
43	POLITICAL	244	0.20	15	614	0.06	192.30	1.67	0.00
44	STATES	255	0.21	15	676	0.07	186.59	1.59	0.00
45	SCHOLARS	65	0.05	7	25		185.16	4.38	0.00
46	YEMENI	120	0.10	8	168	0.02	175.66	2.51	0.00
47	AWSAT	44	0.04	3	3		171.73	6.87	0.00
48	GMT	76	0.06	8	53		171.73	3.52	0.00
49	ISSUE	127	0.11	13	202	0.02	166.80	2.33	0.00
50	BBC	101	0.08	20	122	0.01	165.39	2.73	0.00
51	JORDANIAN	84	0.07	7	81		159.51	3.05	0.00
52	GULF	226	0.19	14	625	0.07	155.20	1.53	0.00
53	QATARI	69	0.06	6	49		154.56	3.49	0.00
54	FAYSAL	34	0.03	9	0		149.40	137.21	0.00
55	PAGE	125	0.10	17	221	0.02	148.66	2.18	0.00
56	IRANIAN	178	0.15	11	450	0.05	139.38	1.66	0.00
57	NEWSPAPER	75	0.06	14	80		133.69	2.91	0.00
58	YOUTHS	37	0.03	6	5		133.10	5.89	0.00
59	FILE	44	0.04	9	15		129.98	4.55	0.00
60	ANCHOR	35	0.03	3	4		128.94	6.13	0.00
61	ISSUES	89	0.07	14	128	0.01	127.46	2.48	0.00
62	SAYING	105	0.09	12	188	0.02	123.33	2.16	0.00
63	SA'UD	28	0.02	9	0		123.04	136.93	0.00
64	HUTHISTS	28	0.02	5	0		123.04	136.93	0.00
65	ESPECIALLY	89	0.07	13	139	0.01	118.80	2.36	0.00
66	QATAR	151	0.13	10	383	0.04	117.70	1.66	0.00
67	HIZBALLAH	26	0.02	9	0		114.25	136.83	0.00
68	RESPONDING	37	0.03	5	11		113.50	4.75	0.00
69	ASKED	100	0.08	9	187	0.02	112.40	2.10	0.00
70	LEBANESE	73	0.06	12	96	0.01	112.24	2.60	0.00
71	SATELLITE	39	0.03	7	15		111.09	4.38	0.00
72	SALIH	27	0.02	5	1		110.25	7.75	0.00
73	HASAN	33	0.03	8	7		109.56	5.24	0.00
74	RAPPROCHEMENT	53	0.04	6	47		105.69	3.17	0.00
75	RUHANI	24	0.02	3	0		105.46	136.71	0.00
76	HUTHIST	24	0.02	4	0		105.46	136.71	0.00
77	DIFFERENCES	49	0.04	9	38		105.05	3.37	0.00
78	SOURCES	80	0.07	8	132	0.01	101.62	2.28	0.00
79	AWDAH	23	0.02	3	0		101.06	136.65	0.00
80	AMMAN	38	0.03	4	18		100.89	4.08	0.00
81	BANDAR	59	0.05	8	68		99.85	2.79	0.00
82	PAN	37	0.03	10	17		99.31	4.12	0.00
83	INTERESTS	92	0.08	11	180	0.02	98.58	2.03	0.00
84	SHI'IS	22	0.02	5	0		96.67	136.59	0.00
85	SA'IDI	22	0.02	1	0		96.67	136.59	0.00
86	HAYAT	27	0.02	2	4		95.74	5.75	0.00

87	POLICY	137	0.11	11	375	0.04	95.57	1.55	0.00
88	SITUATION	86	0.07	11	163	0.02	95.32	2.08	0.00
89	STATEMENTS	44	0.04	11	35		93.10	3.33	0.00
90	SHAYKH	23	0.02	6	1		92.99	7.52	0.00
91	HARAMI	21	0.02	1	0		92.28	136.52	0.00
92	JAZEERA	41	0.03	5	31		89.04	3.40	0.00
93	AMBASSADORS	33	0.03	6	15		88.92	4.14	0.00
94	MUHAMMAD	62	0.05	12	90		88.11	2.46	0.00
95	SUNNAH	20	0.02	2	0		87.88	136.45	0.00
96	TERRORISM	99	0.08	13	228	0.02	87.72	1.80	0.00
97	ROLE	116	0.10	13	307	0.03	85.09	1.60	0.00
98	COOPERATION	53	0.04	12	66		84.89	2.68	0.00
99	AHMAD	35	0.03	7	21		84.65	3.74	0.00
100	THEREFORE	51	0.04	12	61		84.10	2.74	0.00
101	JAMA'AH	19	0.02	2	0		83.49	136.38	0.00
102	REGARD	40	0.03	10	34		81.68	3.23	0.00
103	QARADAWI	28	0.02	4	10		81.59	4.49	0.00
104	ALAWI	24	0.02	1	5		79.97	5.26	0.00
105	REGARDING	31	0.03	12	16		79.70	3.95	0.00
106	DOHA	44	0.04	7	46		79.46	2.94	0.00
107	WA	18	0.01	1	0		79.09	136.30	0.00
108	QA'IDAH'S	18	0.01	4	0		79.09	136.30	0.00
109	ARABIYAH	18	0.01	4	0		79.09	136.30	0.00
110	INTERVIEW	58	0.05	10	91		77.11	2.35	0.00
111	NUSRAH	19	0.02	7	1		75.78	7.25	0.00
112	DA'ISH	19	0.02	4	1		75.78	7.25	0.00
113	AGREEMENT	105	0.09	9	281	0.03	75.77	1.58	0.00
114	ELAPH	22	0.02	1	4		75.29	5.46	0.00
115	JEDDA	20	0.02	6	2		74.95	6.32	0.00
116	REALIZED	17	0.01	5	0		74.70	136.21	0.00
117	DAWSARI	17	0.01	1	0		74.70	136.21	0.00
118	STRESSED	32	0.03	11	21		74.39	3.61	0.00
119	REGIONAL	106	0.09	13	294	0.03	72.47	1.53	0.00
120	QUESTION	71	0.06	10	146	0.02	72.02	1.96	0.00
121	CHANNEL	45	0.04	8	57		71.18	2.66	0.00
122	SAQR	16	0.01	3	0		70.31	136.13	0.00
123	INFORMATION	70	0.06	11	147	0.02	69.32	1.93	0.00
124	PARTIES	53	0.04	10	85		69.09	2.32	0.00
125	ARENA	22	0.02	2	6		68.99	4.87	0.00
126	AFFAIRS	61	0.05	12	114	0.01	68.60	2.10	0.00
127	RING	24	0.02	3	10		66.62	4.26	0.00
128	TUMAYHI	15	0.01	1	0		65.91	136.03	0.00
129	ILAF	15	0.01	2	0		65.91	136.03	0.00
130	DHIYABI	15	0.01	3	0		65.91	136.03	0.00
131	MINISTRY	61	0.05	10	119	0.01	65.57	2.04	0.00
132	AUTHORITIES	79	0.07	10	193	0.02	64.82	1.71	0.00
133	SUPPORTS	30	0.02	7	24		63.29	3.32	0.00
134	MUJAHIDIN	16	0.01	4	1		62.93	7.00	0.00
135	LEBANON	82	0.07	10	214	0.02	61.38	1.62	0.00
136	EGYPTIAN	66	0.05	11	147	0.02	60.96	1.84	0.00
137	COORDINATION	23	0.02	7	12		58.89	3.94	0.00
138	SANAA	35	0.03	4	41		58.57	2.77	0.00

139	PERSONS	19	0.02	7	6		57.35	4.66	0.00
140	RAʾY	13	0.01	2	0		57.12	135.83	0.00
141	PARTICULARLY	62	0.05	11	139	0.01	56.80	1.83	0.00
142	TIES	47	0.04	10	83		55.96	2.18	0.00
143	CONSIDERED	45	0.04	9	76		55.93	2.24	0.00
144	STANCE	33	0.03	10	38		55.88	2.80	0.00
145	EMBASSY	58	0.05	7	125	0.01	55.73	1.89	0.00
146	DIALOGUE	37	0.03	9	50		55.70	2.57	0.00
147	NAMELY	20	0.02	8	9		54.08	4.15	0.00
148	CHANNELS	24	0.02	6	17		53.83	3.50	0.00
149	LEADERSHIP	59	0.05	12	133	0.01	53.69	1.83	0.00
150	JORDAN	79	0.07	8	222	0.02	52.92	1.51	0.00
151	SHADDUKHI	12		1	0		52.73	135.71	0.00
152	NAJM	12		1	0		52.73	135.71	0.00
153	DUSTUR	12		2	0		52.73	135.71	0.00
154	DAR'A	12		2	0		52.73	135.71	0.00
155	NASIR	17	0.01	7	5		52.30	4.77	0.00
156	AZHAR	17	0.01	1	5		52.30	4.77	0.00
157	FINANCING	27	0.02	5	26		51.31	3.05	0.00
158	ADDITION	33	0.03	9	43		51.10	2.62	0.00
159	AHL	18	0.01	1	7		51.10	4.36	0.00
160	BILATERAL	23	0.02	7	17		50.52	3.44	0.00
161	TWEETS	21	0.02	5	13		50.11	3.69	0.00
162	RUSSIAN	70	0.06	8	191	0.02	49.07	1.55	0.00
163	DECREE	18	0.01	3	8		48.88	4.17	0.00
164	INDICATES	16	0.01	7	5		48.43	4.68	0.00
165	ZUFAYRI	11		1	0		48.34	135.59	0.00
166	UNATTRIBUTED	11		6	0		48.34	135.59	0.00
167	SHUBUKSHI	11		2	0		48.34	135.59	0.00
168	MAMDUH	11		1	0		48.34	135.59	0.00
169	DUALITY	11		1	0		48.34	135.59	0.00
170	AFFIRMED	11		5	0		48.34	135.59	0.00
171	INTERFERENCE	23	0.02	6	19		47.70	3.28	0.00
172	CUSTODIAN	17	0.01	8	7		47.37	4.28	0.00
173	CELL	24	0.02	6	22		46.96	3.13	0.00
174	NOV	18	0.01	8	9		46.84	4.00	0.00
175	HENCE	20	0.02	6	13		46.69	3.62	0.00
176	MANSUR	14	0.01	5	3		46.38	5.22	0.00
177	DISCUSSES	14	0.01	6	3		46.38	5.22	0.00
178	EMPHASIZED	12		4	1		45.91	6.58	0.00
179	DISTURBANCES	12		5	1		45.91	6.58	0.00
180	CONFRONTATION	31	0.03	8	43		45.72	2.53	0.00
181	ARTICLE	42	0.03	8	81		45.70	2.05	0.00
182	ESPIONAGE	15	0.01	3	5		44.60	4.58	0.00
183	SHAYI	10		1	0		43.94	135.45	0.00
184	SA'D	10		2	0		43.94	135.45	0.00
185	ISHQI	10		2	0		43.94	135.45	0.00
186	HIZAM	10		1	0		43.94	135.45	0.00
187	ASAL	10		1	0		43.94	135.45	0.00
188	ASAD'S	10		4	0		43.94	135.45	0.00
189	DEVELOPMENTS	30	0.02	9	42		43.91	2.51	0.00
190	SHURA	19	0.02	5	13		43.32	3.55	0.00

191	YAWM	13	0.01	2	3		42.39	5.12	0.00
192	COMMENTING	13	0.01	5	3		42.39	5.12	0.00
193	PRETEXT	15	0.01	6	6		42.20	4.32	0.00
194	POLICIES	44	0.04	11	95		42.19	1.89	0.00
195	POSITION	61	0.05	9	168	0.02	42.16	1.54	0.00
196	TENSION	29	0.02	8	41		42.12	2.50	0.00
197	NOTING	19	0.02	9	14		41.80	3.44	0.00
198	HUTHI	12		3	2		41.72	5.58	0.00
199	STANDS	31	0.03	8	48		41.70	2.37	0.00
200	JAWF	11		2	1		41.69	6.46	0.00
201	HUSAYN	11		6	1		41.69	6.46	0.00
202	UNDERSTANDING	39	0.03	9	78		40.80	2.00	0.00
203	INITIATIVE	25	0.02	7	31		40.17	2.69	0.00
204	KUWAITI	18	0.01	7	13		39.99	3.47	0.00
205	THUS	32	0.03	11	54		39.80	2.24	0.00
206	II	20	0.02	9	18		39.55	3.15	0.00
207	SAQQAF	9		1	0		39.55	135.30	0.00
208	SA'DUN	9		2	0		39.55	135.30	0.00
209	NUSUR	9		2	0		39.55	135.30	0.00
210	NAYIF	9		4	0		39.55	135.30	0.00
211	NAHAR	9		2	0		39.55	135.30	0.00
212	BU	9		3	0		39.55	135.30	0.00
213	DISAGREEMENT	15	0.01	8	8		38.08	3.91	0.00
214	INTERIOR	42	0.03	9	95		38.06	1.82	0.00
215	STANCES	11		4	2		37.64	5.46	0.00
216	SABAH	11		4	2		37.64	5.46	0.00
217	GOVERNORATES	11		4	2		37.64	5.46	0.00
218	OWNED	33	0.03	9	61		37.53	2.11	0.00
219	ORGANS	10		3	1		37.47	6.32	0.00
220	INFILTRATION	10		4	1		37.47	6.32	0.00
221	CELLS	19	0.02	6	18		36.46	3.08	0.00
222	WALID	16	0.01	4	11		36.40	3.54	0.00
223	WRITER	29	0.02	9	49		36.03	2.24	0.00
224	TALK	46	0.04	10	117	0.01	35.72	1.65	0.00
225	MEASURES	35	0.03	10	72		35.49	1.96	0.00
226	SHAMSAN	8		1	0		35.15	135.13	0.00
227	PERTAINING	8		2	0		35.15	135.13	0.00
228	AS'AD	8		3	0		35.15	135.13	0.00
229	AFTERWARD	8		4	0		35.15	135.13	0.00
230	CONCERNING	18	0.01	5	17		34.61	3.08	0.00
231	YUSUF	14	0.01	6	8		34.56	3.81	0.00
232	REGARDLESS	19	0.02	10	20		34.16	2.93	0.00
233	TRENDS	16	0.01	6	13		33.48	3.30	0.00
234	STAND	44	0.04	10	114	0.01	33.28	1.63	0.00
235	UMMAH	9		3	1		33.28	6.17	0.00
236	NOTEWORTHY	9		3	1		33.28	6.17	0.00
237	MODERATOR	9		2	1		33.28	6.17	0.00
238	HUTHIS	9		4	1		33.28	6.17	0.00
239	INSTITUTIONS	31	0.03	6	61		33.01	2.02	0.00
240	VARIOUS	26	0.02	8	43		32.96	2.27	0.00
241	SUPPORTING	42	0.03	11	107	0.01	32.54	1.65	0.00
242	SIDES	46	0.04	9	125	0.01	32.44	1.56	0.00

243	SPY	24	0.02	6	37		32.40	2.38	0.00
244	CARRIES	23	0.02	7	34		32.19	2.44	0.00
245	ASKS	19	0.02	5	22		32.05	2.79	0.00
246	ALLIANCE	44	0.04	10	117	0.01	32.05	1.59	0.00
247	BROTHERS	27	0.02	8	48		31.94	2.17	0.00
248	SEDITION	11		5	4		31.88	4.46	0.00
249	SULTAN	32	0.03	10	67		31.80	1.93	0.00
250	TURKI	24	0.02	5	38		31.65	2.34	0.00
251	EMIR	24	0.02	5	38		31.65	2.34	0.00
252	FATWAS	15	0.01	3	12		31.64	3.32	0.00
253	CONTEXT	26	0.02	7	45		31.57	2.21	0.00
254	PEOPLES	13	0.01	5	8		31.10	3.70	0.00
255	MEDIATION	13	0.01	5	8		31.10	3.70	0.00
256	NOTES	21	0.02	5	29		31.08	2.53	0.00
257	ZAYID	7		3	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
258	UWAYS	7		1	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
259	SPECIALIZED	7		4	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
260	SISTERLY	7		4	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
261	RUBAY'AH	7		2	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
262	ORGANIZED	7		4	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
263	MILFI	7		1	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
264	MA'SUM	7		1	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
265	KHUJAH	7		3	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
266	KHASHUQJI	7		1	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
267	CORONA	7		1	0		30.76	134.93	0.00
268	VIS	10		4	3		30.60	4.74	0.00
269	GOVERNORATE	10		4	3		30.60	4.74	0.00
270	GENEVA	42	0.03	7	112	0.01	30.47	1.58	0.00
271	REPERCUSSIONS	15	0.01	6	13		30.30	3.21	0.00
272	DEPTH	14	0.01	5	11		29.81	3.35	0.00
273	TERRITORIES	16	0.01	6	16		29.71	3.00	0.00
274	HOMELAND	21	0.02	7	31		29.43	2.44	0.00
275	DIRECTIONS	12		5	7		29.37	3.78	0.00
276	STAGE	34	0.03	11	80		29.31	1.77	0.00
277	UNDERSTANDINGS	8		3	1		29.11	6.00	0.00
278	ELABORATING	8		2	1		29.11	6.00	0.00
279	CRITICIZED	8		4	1		29.11	6.00	0.00
280	BANNA	8		3	1		29.11	6.00	0.00
281	CONSIDERS	15	0.01	4	14		29.04	3.10	0.00
282	POINTED	24	0.02	8	42		28.83	2.19	0.00
283	HAPPENED	39	0.03	12	104	0.01	28.29	1.58	0.00
284	SAFIR	10		3	4		28.13	4.32	0.00
285	CONSPIRACIES	10		3	4		28.13	4.32	0.00
286	CREED	11		2	6		27.67	3.87	0.00
287	MEETINGS	28	0.02	9	59		27.62	1.92	0.00
288	OBSERVERS	18	0.01	8	24		27.38	2.58	0.00
289	CHANGES	32	0.03	9	77		26.79	1.73	0.00
290	VIEWER	9		1	3		26.76	4.58	0.00
291	RECONCILIATION	15	0.01	6	16		26.74	2.91	0.00
292	DILEMMA	15	0.01	3	16		26.74	2.91	0.00
293	KHALID	19	0.02	7	28		26.66	2.44	0.00
294	INFORMED	19	0.02	7	28		26.66	2.44	0.00

295	CITIZEN	19	0.02	6	28		26.66	2.44	0.00
296	BAHRAINI	13	0.01	4	11		26.61	3.24	0.00
297	USAYRI	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
298	URAYFI	6		3	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
299	SHAHRANI	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
300	RUBAYSH	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
301	QARI	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
302	MOBILIZATION	6		4	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
303	MANIFESTATIONS	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
304	MAHMUD	6		3	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
305	KHALIFAH	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
306	JHCC	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
307	JARRADI	6		1	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
308	INTERFERING	6		3	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
309	CONSULTATIONS	6		4	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
310	ARENAS	6		5	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
311	AFOREMENTIONED	6		3	0		26.36	134.71	0.00
312	PRESENCE	31	0.03	7	74		26.23	1.74	0.00
313	RASHID	12		4	9		26.17	3.41	0.00
314	SONS	22	0.02	7	39		26.10	2.17	0.00
315	TELEPHONE	14	0.01	8	14		26.00	3.00	0.00
316	WONDERS	11		2	7		25.93	3.65	0.00
317	MEMBERSHIP	11		4	7		25.93	3.65	0.00
318	ADOPTING	11		7	7		25.93	3.65	0.00
319	NURI	8		5	2		25.62	5.00	0.00
320	CONSTITUTES	8		3	2		25.62	5.00	0.00
321	CONTACTS	16	0.01	7	20		25.56	2.68	0.00
322	GOD	35	0.03	6	93		25.52	1.59	0.00
323	REPRESENTED	20	0.02	7	33		25.41	2.28	0.00
324	WITHDRAWAL	23	0.02	5	44		25.24	2.06	0.00
325	WEIGHT	19	0.02	6	30		25.12	2.34	0.00
326	STRESSES	7		4	1		24.97	5.81	0.00
327	QUALITATIVE	7		3	1		24.97	5.81	0.00
328	DEVIANT	7		2	1		24.97	5.81	0.00
329	FILES	14	0.01	6	15		24.88	2.90	0.00
330	NETWORKING	12		5	10		24.77	3.26	0.00
331	SALAFI	15	0.01	3	18		24.68	2.74	0.00
332	EPISODE	15	0.01	3	18		24.68	2.74	0.00
333	DONATIONS	15	0.01	4	18		24.68	2.74	0.00
334	CHARITABLE	10		3	6		24.18	3.74	0.00
335	IMPLEMENTATION	13	0.01	7	13		24.14	3.00	0.00
336	CIRCLES	13	0.01	5	13		24.14	3.00	0.00
337	OUT	116	0.10	14	1450	0.15	-24.34	-0.64	0.00
338	BOMB	4		2	195	0.02	-24.34	-2.61	0.00
339	DOCUMENT	103	0.09	20	1322	0.14	-24.50	-0.68	0.00
340	MY	38	0.03	8	638	0.07	-24.70	-1.07	0.00
341	EUROPE	9		5	279	0.03	-25.18	-1.95	0.00
342	SEEN	18	0.01	8	402	0.04	-25.20	-1.48	0.00
343	NIGHT	6		4	233	0.02	-25.20	-2.28	0.00
344	SIX	9		6	282	0.03	-25.70	-1.97	0.00
345	THAN	121	0.10	12	1519	0.16	-25.92	-0.65	0.00
346	LARGEST	7		4	254	0.03	-26.13	-2.18	0.00

347	LIKELY	10		6	301	0.03	-26.44	-1.91	0.00
348	SET	12		6	330	0.03	-26.51	-1.78	0.00
349	WAR	73	0.06	12	1037	0.11	-26.64	-0.83	0.00
350	COMPANIES	12		5	331	0.03	-26.67	-1.79	0.00
351	AIRCRAFT	3		2	189	0.02	-26.81	-2.98	0.00
352	WEST	29	0.02	6	550	0.06	-26.84	-1.25	0.00
353	ECONOMY	9		3	290	0.03	-27.09	-2.01	0.00
354	HIS	288	0.24	18	3137	0.33	-27.42	-0.45	0.00
355	OFTEN	3		3	195	0.02	-28.03	-3.02	0.00
356	LESS	10		8	312	0.03	-28.33	-1.96	0.00
357	SHARE	6		2	251	0.03	-28.56	-2.39	0.00
358	WHITE	3		2	198	0.02	-28.65	-3.04	0.00
359	REMAINS	5		1	235	0.02	-28.73	-2.55	0.00
360	TOP	3		2	199	0.02	-28.86	-3.05	0.00
361	COST	4		3	218	0.02	-28.88	-2.77	0.00
362	OWN	27	0.02	9	545	0.06	-29.46	-1.34	0.00
363	MONTH	18	0.01	9	440	0.05	-30.96	-1.61	0.00
364	THOUGH	9		6	312	0.03	-30.98	-2.12	0.00
365	SOUTH	5		3	247	0.03	-31.07	-2.63	0.00
366	WESTERN	34	0.03	6	642	0.07	-31.09	-1.24	0.00
367	RISK	3		1	211	0.02	-31.33	-3.14	0.00
368	GROWTH	6		2	268	0.03	-31.78	-2.48	0.00
369	BANK	4		3	234	0.02	-32.09	-2.87	0.00
370	ENGLISH	102	0.08	20	1416	0.15	-34.00	-0.80	0.00
371	AMERICAN	21	0.02	8	508	0.05	-35.30	-1.60	0.00
372	COURT	7		4	308	0.03	-36.19	-2.46	0.00
373	HIGH	14	0.01	8	417	0.04	-36.27	-1.90	0.00
374	FAMILY	22	0.02	6	528	0.06	-36.33	-1.59	0.00
375	EVER	3		2	237	0.02	-36.77	-3.30	0.00
376	HUMAN	22	0.02	6	531	0.06	-36.80	-1.59	0.00
377	OFFICE	5		4	278	0.03	-37.20	-2.80	0.00
378	SO	90	0.07	13	1322	0.14	-37.28	-0.88	0.00
379	MILLION	14	0.01	8	427	0.04	-37.97	-1.93	0.00
380	WOMAN	4		2	265	0.03	-38.41	-3.05	0.00
381	MARKETS	5		4	285	0.03	-38.60	-2.83	0.00
382	LOW	5		2	286	0.03	-38.80	-2.84	0.00
383	HOUSE	10		6	373	0.04	-39.18	-2.22	0.00
384	WOMEN	37	0.03	6	739	0.08	-39.29	-1.32	0.00
385	ISLAMIST	4		3	271	0.03	-39.64	-3.08	0.00
386	WORLD	109	0.09	11	1550	0.16	-39.94	-0.83	0.00
387	HALF	5		3	295	0.03	-40.62	-2.88	0.00
388	SUPPLY	4		3	277	0.03	-40.88	-3.11	0.00
389	LIFE	8		4	350	0.04	-40.98	-2.45	0.00
390	WERE	157	0.13	13	2063	0.21	-41.52	-0.72	0.00
391	STRIKES	7		4	336	0.04	-41.58	-2.59	0.00
392	MUCH	31	0.03	10	687	0.07	-42.60	-1.47	0.00
393	YET	9		3	378	0.04	-43.12	-2.39	0.00
394	YESTERDAY	27	0.02	11	640	0.07	-43.36	-1.57	0.00
395	BIGGEST	5		2	309	0.03	-43.45	-2.95	0.00
396	BEEN	236	0.20	15	2875	0.30	-43.53	-0.61	0.00
397	POLICE	5		4	310	0.03	-43.66	-2.95	0.00
398	ALMOST	7		4	347	0.04	-43.73	-2.63	0.00

399	CITY	11		6	415	0.04	-43.96	-2.24	0.00
400	CUT	4		4	297	0.03	-45.04	-3.21	0.00
401	PER	21	0.02	7	570	0.06	-45.16	-1.76	0.00
402	INTO	83	0.07	12	1320	0.14	-45.35	-0.99	0.00
403	AS	614	0.51	19	6471	0.67	-46.06	-0.40	0.00
404	ACROSS	10		4	415	0.04	-46.97	-2.38	0.00
405	TOO	11		8	436	0.05	-47.83	-2.31	0.00
406	DAY	22	0.02	10	604	0.06	-48.43	-1.78	0.00
407	GAS	5		3	334	0.03	-48.57	-3.06	0.00
408	FOR	788	0.66	19	8113	0.85	-49.08	-0.36	0.00
409	LIKE	36	0.03	8	811	0.08	-51.43	-1.49	0.00
410	DAVID	3		3	306	0.03	-51.50	-3.67	0.00
411	WHERE	44	0.04	10	925	0.10	-53.21	-1.39	0.00
412	PAKISTAN	3		2	324	0.03	-55.40	-3.76	0.00
413	BACK	29	0.02	9	750	0.08	-56.37	-1.69	0.00
414	COULD	69	0.06	13	1259	0.13	-57.36	-1.19	0.00
415	JUST	29	0.02	9	761	0.08	-58.13	-1.71	0.00
416	NORTH	7		5	420	0.04	-58.28	-2.91	0.00
417	DOWN	24	0.02	9	695	0.07	-58.83	-1.86	0.00
418	AROUND	12		6	513	0.05	-59.19	-2.42	0.00
419	ALREADY	7		6	426	0.04	-59.49	-2.93	0.00
420	AIR	14	0.01	7	567	0.06	-63.13	-2.34	0.00
421	AMERICA	3		2	363	0.04	-63.91	-3.92	0.00
422	NOW	67	0.06	10	1291	0.13	-64.72	-1.27	0.00
423	REBELS	7		2	475	0.05	-69.53	-3.08	0.00
424	WORLD'S	3		2	398	0.04	-71.60	-4.05	0.00
425	WEEK	18	0.01	6	682	0.07	-72.46	-2.24	0.00
426	MARKET	13	0.01	5	600	0.06	-72.58	-2.53	0.00
427	OFF	6		6	473	0.05	-73.32	-3.30	0.00
428	PAGES	3		3	428	0.04	-78.24	-4.16	0.00
429	WOULD	126	0.10	15	2098	0.22	-79.81	-1.06	0.00
430	AT	312	0.26	18	4153	0.43	-87.30	-0.73	0.00
431	PRODUCTION	3		3	483	0.05	-90.47	-4.33	0.00
432	GLOBAL	8		4	612	0.06	-93.84	-3.26	0.00
433	DAILY	27	0.02	10	944	0.10	-94.36	-2.13	0.00
434	OBSERVER	3		2	502	0.05	-94.72	-4.39	0.00
435	HOME	5		3	555	0.06	-95.59	-3.79	0.00
436	WAS	442	0.37	18	5565	0.58	-96.03	-0.65	0.00
437	GROUP	65	0.05	11	1487	0.15	-96.25	-1.52	0.00
438	SAID	261	0.22	16	3724	0.39	-96.90	-0.84	0.00
439	ENERGY	3		3	512	0.05	-96.96	-4.42	0.00
440	COM	3		2	515	0.05	-97.63	-4.42	0.00
441	BRITAIN	11		6	698	0.07	-99.31	-2.99	0.00
442	MORE	123	0.10	13	2265	0.24	-104.93	-1.20	0.00
443	BUSINESS	4		1	617	0.06	-114.61	-4.27	0.00
444	PRICE	13	0.01	4	838	0.09	-120.05	-3.01	0.00
445	LAST	53	0.04	10	1501	0.16	-124.27	-1.82	0.00
446	NEWSPAPERS	12		5	921	0.10	-141.40	-3.26	0.00
447	UP	62	0.05	13	1736	0.18	-142.07	-1.81	0.00
448	HAD	105	0.09	14	2326	0.24	-144.17	-1.47	0.00
449	NEWS	30	0.02	9	1285	0.13	-148.45	-2.42	0.00
450	TIMES	10		4	1063	0.11	-180.97	-3.73	0.00

451	BUT	208	0.17	16	3915	0.41	-188.55	-1.23	0.00
452	YEAR	28	0.02	12	1506	0.16	-198.18	-2.75	0.00
453	SHE	12		8	1209	0.13	-202.76	-3.65	0.00
454	PRICES	4		4	1050	0.11	-212.39	-5.04	0.00
455	LIMITED	8		5	1235	0.13	-229.45	-4.27	0.00
456	HER	6		3	1257	0.13	-246.36	-4.71	0.00
457	UK	6		2	1265	0.13	-248.17	-4.72	0.00
458	MR	4		2	1207	0.13	-248.27	-5.24	0.00
459	A	1711	1.43	20	20994	2.19	-327.39	-0.62	0.00
460	OIL	47	0.04	7	2515	0.26	-330.10	-2.74	0.00
461	#	1949	1.62	20	23727	2.47	-358.26	-0.61	0.00

Appendix 4

Proper Nouns: keywords analysis

Proper noun	Refers to	Gender
‘Usayri’ (26.36),	Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Awwad al-Usayri	male
‘Urayfi’ (26.36),	Saudi Arabian Islamic preacher Shaykh Muhammad al-Urayfi	male
‘Shahrani’ (26.36),	Dr Nasir bin-Rajah al-Shahrani, member of the Saudi council	male
‘Uways’ (30.76),	Ghadah Uways presenter an Doha studios	female
‘Rubaysh’ (26.36),	Al-Qaeda leader in Yemen Ibrahim al-Rubaysh	male
‘Qari’ (26.36),	Dr Fu’ad Bu-Qari, member of the joint committee of the joint Saudi-Chinese business council	male
‘Zayid’ (30.76),	Shaykh Muhammad Bin Zayid, Shaykh Abdullah Bin Zayid, reporter Zayid al-Sari from Riyadh	males
‘Rubay'ah’ (30.76),	Saudi health minister Abdallah al-Rubay’ah, Saudi minister of trade and industry Tawfiq al-Ruay’ah	males
‘Milfi’ (30.76),	Saudi journalist specialised in security affairs, Muhammad al-Milfi	male
‘Ma'sum’ (30.76),	New Iraqi president Fu’ad Ma’sum	male
‘Khujah’ (30.76),	Khalid Khujah, elected chief of national coalition for Syrian	male

	revolutionary and opposition forces	
‘Khashuqji’ (30.76),	Jamal Khashuqji, Saudi analyst and president of al-Arab channel	male
‘Jarradi’ (26.36),	Ali al-Jarradi, publisher and chief editor of the Yemeni newspaper al-Ahli	male
‘Awdah’,	Shaykh Salman al-Awdah, Saudi Islamic preacher	male
‘Zu'bi’ (232.89),	Syrian Information Minister Umran al-Zu’bi	male
‘Asad’ (228.49),	Syrian president Bashar al-Asad, Syrian former president Hafiz al-Asad	males
‘Bin’ (213.29),	Saudi Royals e.g. King Abdullah bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Muqrin bin-Abd-al-Aziz, King Fahd bin-Abd-al-Aziz, prince Muhammad bin Nayif bin- Abd-al-Aziz, prince Khalid bin Bandar, Al-Walid bin-Talal, Saudi major general Prince Fahd bin Turki bin Abdulaziz, Imam Faysal bin-Turki of the second Saudi State …, Omani foreign minister Yusuf bin-Alawi, deputy chairman of the Omani Shura council Salim bin-Ali- al-Ka’bi, al-Husayn bin-Ali, the third Shi’I Imam, the Qatari Emir’s secretary for political affairs Ali bin Fahd al-Hajri, Qatar’s Emir Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad, Sunni Islamic scholar Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, Saudi journalist Faris bin-Hizam, Saudi convict Yasir bin Husayn al-Hamzah, politican and tribe leader in Yemen Sahykh Abdullah bin-Husayn al-Ahmar, Saudi convict Amr bin-Yahya bin-Ibrahim al-Barakati, Bahrain King Hamad bin Isa al –Khalifah, reporter Zayd bin-Kami, the Head of the royal Qatari court Shaykh Khalid bin-Khalifa Al	males

	Thani, the Qatari prime minister and interior minister Shaykh Abdullah bin Nasir Bin-Khalifah, former al-Qaedah leader Usamah bin-Laden, head of the Saudi Middle East Centre for strategic and Legal Studies Dr Anwar bin-Majid Ishqi, Minister of State and member of the council of ministers Dr Musa'id bin Muhammad al-Ayban, the Bahraini foreign minister and the king media adviser Shaykh Kalid bin Muhammad al-Khalifah, Saudi ambassador in Sanaa Ali bin-Muhammad al-Hamdan, Qatari foreign minister Dr Khalid bin Muhammad al-Atiyyah, Saudi interior minister Muhammad bin-Nayif, Dr Nasir bin-Rajah al-Shahrani, member of the Saudi council, the UAE vice president, prime minister and the ruler of Dubai Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktum, the secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council Dr Abd-al-Latif bin Rashid al-Zayani, the Bahraini royal court minister Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmad bin Salman al-Khalifah, director of the Gulf research centre Dr Abd-al-Aziz bin-Saqr, UN envoy on Yemen Jamal bin-Umar and the Bahraini king's media adviser, Nabil bin Ya'cub al-Hamar	
'Bin' (213.29),	Presenter Khadijah bin-Qinnah at the Doha studios	female
'Ruhani' (105.46),	Iranian president Hasan Rouhani	male
'Sa'idi' (96.67),	Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi, a Saudi Islamic preacher	male

‘Harami’ (92.28),	Jabir al-Harami, chief editor of the Qatari newspaper al-Sahrq	male
‘Qaradawi’ (81.59),	Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Sunni Islamic cleric head of the international union for Muslim scholars	male
‘Alawi’ (79.97),	Omani foreign minister Yusuf bin-Alawi	male
‘Dawsari’ (74.70),	Salman al-Dawsari chief editor of the al-eqtisadiyah newspaper	male
‘Saqr’ (70.31),	director of the Gulf research centre Dr Abd-al-Aziz bin-Saqr, Dr Turki Saqr, journalist of the Syrian government-owned newspaper Tishrin	males
‘Tumayhi’ (65.91),	Dubai al-Arabiyah television presenter Muhammad al-Tumayhi	male
‘Shaddukhi’ (52.73),	Official negotiator for al-Qaedah Saudi national Mish’al al-Shaddukhi	male
‘Zufayri’ (48.34),	Al-Jazeera television presenter of the weekly talk show ‘in Depth’, Ali al-Zufayri	male
‘Shubukshi’ (48.34),	Husayn Shubukshi, Saudi writer and political analyst	male
‘Shamsan’ (35.15),	Abd-al-Baqi Shamsan, a professor of political sociology at Sanaa University	male
‘Saqqaf’ (39.55),	Faris al-Saqqaf, an adviser to the Yemeni president	male
‘As'ad’ (35.15)	Riyadh al-As’ad the Free Syria Army (FSA) commander	male
‘Banna’ (29.11),	Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB)	male
‘Bu’ (39.55),	Dr Fu’ad Bu-Qari, member of the joint committee of the joint Saudi-Chinese business council	male
‘Bu’ (39.55),	Rosanna bu-munsif, a journalist in al-Nahar Lebanese newspaper	female
‘Dhiyabi’ (65.91),	Jamil al-Dhiyagbi, political analyst and editor-in-chief of the Saudi edition of al-Hayat newspaper, journalist Fahd al-Dhiyabi from Riyadh	males

‘Asad's’ (43.94),	Syrian president Bashar al-Asad’s	male
‘Shayi’ (43.94),	Ahmed al-Shayi, Saudi national who fought in Iraq	male
‘Ishqi’ (43.94),	Dr Anwar bin Majid Ishqi, head of the Saudi Middle East Centre for strategic and legal studies	male
‘Nusur’ (39.55),	Jordanian prime minister Abdullah al-Nusur	male
‘Najm’ (52.73),	Riyad Najm, chairman of the audio-video media commissioner in Saudi Arabia	male
‘Sa'dun’ (39.55)	Dr Sa’dun al-Sa’dun, chairman of the communications and information committee of the Saudi Shura council, Dr Abdallah al-Sa’dun founding member of the Arab-Turkish Dialogue forum	males
‘Hizam’ (43.94),	Saudi journalist Faris Bin-Hizam	male
‘Abdallah’ (Log-L, 398.43),	Saudi King Abdallah (58 times), President Ali Abdallah Salih, Abdallah al-Hamid, His Majesty King Abdallah II, Sheikh Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-Ahmar, Prime Minister Abdallah al-Nusur, Dr Abdallah al-Shammari, Dr Abdallah al-Askar, Dr Abdallah al-Subay'i, Abdallah Al Haydah journalist, Muhammad Bin-Abdallah, Dr Abdallah al-Marzuq, Health Minister Abdallah al-Rubay'ah, al-Qaʿida’s member Asiri’s brother Abdallah, Dr Abdallah al-Mu'ayli, Saudi diplomat	males

	Abdallah al-Khalidi, Abdallah al-Shihri, Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf Bin-Alawi Bin Abdallah by Jamil al-Dhiyabi, Abdallah al-Mu'allimi journalist, Prince Mut'ab Bin Abdallah Bin Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Abd-al-Aziz Bin Abdallah Bin Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Turki Bin Abdallah Bin Abd-al-Aziz, Sheikh Khalid al-Abdallah Al Sabah, Sheikh Abdallah Bin Zayid Al Nahyan, Sheikh Abdallah Bin Nasir Bin Khalifah, Sheikh Salman Bin Abdallah Bin Hamad Al Khalifah, Sheikh Rashid Bin Abdallah Al Khalifah	
‘Nuri’ (25.62),	Iraqi Prime minister Nuri al-Maliki	male
‘Turki’ (31.65),	Saudi prince Turki al-Faysal, Saudi prince Turki bin Abdullah, Saudi major general Mansur al-Turki, Saudi prince and Major general Fahd bin Turki, Imam Faysal bin Turki of the second Saudi state,	males
‘Sultan’ (31.80),	Saudi prince Salman bin-Sultan, Saudi prince Sultanbin-Abd-Aziz, Saudi prince Bandar bin-Sultan	males
‘Walid’ (63.40),	Saudi prince Al-Walid bin-Talal, Walid abd-al-Rahman a journalist for al-Sharq al-Awsat Saudi-owned newspaper, Walid Jumblatt, a	males

	Lebanese politician, Walid Shuqayr interviewer of the Saudi-owned London-based al-Hayat newspaper	
‘Sa'd’ (43.94),	Lebanese prime minister Sa’d al-Hariri, Sa’d Ilyas journalist for al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper, Dr Sa’d Mariq, chairman of the finance committee of the Saudi Shura council	males
‘Nayif’ (39.55),	Saudi prince Nayif bin-abd-al-Aziz, Prince Muhammad bin nayif	male
‘Yusuf’ (34.56),	Yusuf al-Shihri Saudi national who was killed by Saudi forces as he crossed Saudi-Yemeni borders to join al-Qaeda, Sunni Islamic cleric Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Omani foreign minister Yusuf bin-Alawi, Yusuf al-Kuwaylit, journalist in the Saudi daily al-Riyadh	male
‘Mansur’ (46.38),	Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi Yemeni president, Moderate MB official Hamzah Mansur, Ahmed mansur a journalist in al-Jazeera newspaper, Major general Mansur al-Turki the Saudi official spokesman of the interior ministry	male
‘Mamduh’ (48.34),	Saudi prince Mamduh bin-Abd-al-Aziz	male
‘Sabah’ (37.64),	Sahykh Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad al Sabah the deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Kuwait, Shaykh Khalid al-Abdallah al Sabah, the head of Kuwaiti royal protocol, Kuwait’s Emir Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al Sabah	

‘Nasir’ (52.30),	Nasir al-Haqbani journalist of al-Hayat newspaper, Abdullah bin Nasir bin Khalifah Qatari prime minister, Jamal abd-al-Nasir late Egyptian president, Nasir Shararah journalist at al-Akhbar Lebanese newspaper, Dr Nasir bin-Rajah al-Shahrani, member of the Saudi council, Nasir al-Sirami journalist in Saudi newspaper al-Jazirah, Nasir al-Umar Saudi Islamic preacher, Nasir al-Wuhayshi Yemeni leader of al-Qaeda	males
‘Ahmad’ (84.65),	Ahmad Ubaydat prime minister of Jordan, Syrian Prime minister Ahmad Tu’mah, Ahmad Ramadan MB member, presenter in Syrian television channel Ja’far Ahmed, Ahmed mansur a journalist in al-Jazeera newspaper, Ahmad ma'adh al-khatib the newly minted leader of Syria's main opposition group, Kuwaiti Emir Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Director of the Office of the Kuwaiti Ruler, Ahmad Fahd al-Fahd, Sunni Islamic scholar Imam Ahmad Bin-Hanbal, Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Bin Salman Al Khalifah, the Royal Court Minister of Bahrain, the Bahraini Interior Minister; Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Bin Muhammad Al Khalifah, Syrian television presenter of the ‘Today's Dialogue’ talk show Ja'far Ahmad, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh the eldest	male

	son of former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, Ahmad al-Shayi, a name known well to the Saudi public opinion for his involved in fighting in Iraq, al-Jazeera reporter Ahmad al-Shalafi, Dr Ahmad al-Farraj, a Saudi writer and academic, al-Quds al-Arabi journalist Ahmad al-Misri, Saudi writer Ahmad al-Arfaj, Ahmad al-Masri of al-Quds al-Arabi, al-Azhar Shaykh Dr Ahmad al-Tayyib, Dubai al-Arabia television interviewer Ahmad al-Tuwayyan and Saudi journalist Ahmad Adnan	
'Bandar' (99.85),	Saudi Prince Bandar Bin-Sultan, head of the Saudi Intelligence, journalist Bandar al-Sharidah from Riyadh, the chief of General Intelligence, Prince Khalid Bin Bandar,	male
'Hasan' (109.56),	Hasan al-Banna the founder of the MB, Hasan Nasrallah hird and current Secretary General of the Lebanese political and paramilitary party Hezbollah, Ali Hasan al-Ahmadi (chairman of the Yemeni National Security Bureau), presenter of al-Jazeera, presenter Hasan Jammul, journalist at the Saudi-owned Elaph Hasan Hamidaway, Dr Hasan al-Shafi'i, adviser to the grand Shaykh of al-Azhar, Hasan Rouhani/Rowhani the seventh President of Iran, Saudi national Ibrahim Hasan Asiri al-Qaeda's bomb maker	male

‘Salih’ (110.25),	Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Salih, Saudi-owned al-Hayat newspaper journalist Salih al-Hajjaj, Saudi citizen Salih al-Qar'awi who joined al-Qaeda, Saudi Ambassador to Jordan Dr Sami al-Salih, Huthist leader Salih Habrah, Editor-in-Chief of iberal Sudanese newspaper al-Ayyam Mahjub Muhammad Salih,	male
‘Salih’(110.25),	Huda al-Salih from Riyadh Saudi-owned leading pan-Arab al-Sharq al-Awsat	female
‘Sa'ud’ (123.04),	Prince Bandar Bin-Sultan Al Sa'ud, head of the Saudi Intelligence Directorate, the Saudi Monarch Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz Al Sa'ud, Saudi prince Sa'ud al-Faysal,	male
‘Sa’ud’ (123.04),	Al-Saud family/dynasty/house of, King Sa'ud University in Riyadh	males
‘Faysal’ (149.40),	Prince Turki al-Faysal, Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, Khalid al-Faysal, Syrian diplomat Faysal al-Miqdad, Imam Faysal Bin-Turki, the man of the second Saudi state, King Faysal	male
‘Mahmud’ (26.36),	Qatari writer Abd-al-Aziz Al Mahmud, Mahmud Abbas, the President of the State of Palestine and Iranian former President Mahmud Ahmadinezhad	male
‘Khalifah’ (26.36),	the Interior Minister; Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Bin Muhammad Al Khalifah, Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Bin Salman Al Khalifah, the Royal	male

	Court Minister, Sheikh Salman Bin Abdallah Bin Hamad Al Khalifah crown prince, Staff General Sheikh Rashid Bin Abdallah Al Khalifah, the Interior Minister, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifah Al Thani, the head of the Royal Court, Sheikh Abdallah Bin Nasir Bin Khalifah, the Prime Minister and Interior Minister	
‘Khalid’ (26.66),	Saudi writer Khalid al-Dakhil in the Saudi-owned al-Hayat newspaper, Khalid Batarfi, a Saudi academic and writer in Jedda, Khalid al-Attiyah, the head of the bureau of the minister of state for foreign affairs, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifah Al Thani, the head of the Royal Court, Sheikh Khalid al-Abdallah Al Sabah, the head of Royal Protocol, the Interior Minister; Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Bin Muhammad Al Khalifah, Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Bin Salman Al Khalifah, Prince Khalid Bin Bandar Bin Abd-al-Aziz, the head of the General Intelligence Service, the elected Khalid Khujah as the chief of National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, HAMAS leader Khalid Mish'al, Foreign Minister Dr Khalid Bin Muhammad al-Atiyyah, al-Quds al-Arabi journalist Khalid al-Hammadi in Sanaa, Saudi prince Khalid al-Faysal, the Ruler of Kuwait included Sheikh Sabah al-Khalid al-	male

	Hamad Al Sabah, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Khalid Kalalidah	
‘Rashid’ (26.36),	Al-Arabiyah correspondent Rashid al-Id, Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, Sheikh Muhammad Bin Rashid Al Maktum, the UAE Vice President, Staff General Sheikh Rashid Bin Abdallah Al Khalifah, Dr Abd-al-Latif Bin Rashid al-Zayani, the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council,	male
‘Rashid’ (26.36),	Dr Madawi al-Rashid (6 times)	female
‘Husayn’ (41.69),	Al-Husayn Bin-Ali, the third Shi'i imam, Saudi political analyst Husayn Shubakshi, Saudi Yasir Bin-Husayn Al Hamzah who was convicted of the crime of drug trafficking, Sheikh Abdallah Bin-Husayn al-Ahmar Yemeni politician and tribe leader, Husayn al-Uwayni who in 1947 became the trade representative and protector of the kingdom's interests in Lebanon, Saudi-owned Elaph Husayn Hamidwi, from Riyadh.	male
‘Muhammad’ (88.11),	Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi, a Saudi Islamic preacher, television presenter of weekly talk show ‘death industry’ Muhammad al-Tumayhi, Muhammad al-Awfi, a former al-Qaʿida leader in Yemen, Muhammad al-Milfi, a Saudi journalist specialized in security affairs, a man named Muhammad, Editor-in-Chief	male

	Mahjub Muhammad Salih of the liberal Sudanese newspaper al-Ayyam Muhammad al-Balawi, media official at the Saudi Embassy in Amman, Major-General Muhammad al-Ghamidi, the official spokesman of the General Directorate for the Saudi Border Guards, Prince Muhammad Bin Nayif, Muhammad al-Kabir al-Kutubi, Kuwaiti journalist Muhammad al-Wushayhi, Egypt deposed President Muhammad Mursi, Shaykh Muhammad Bin-Zayid the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Muhammad Bin-Nayif, Jordanian Minister of Communications Muhammad Mumini, Sheikh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, Saudi Ambassador in Sanaa Ali Bin-Muhammad al-Hamdan, Saudi activist Muhammad al-Qahtani, who was sentenced to 11 years in prison, Saudi clergyman Sheikh Muhammad al-Urayfi, Abu-Muhammad al-Maqdisi, prominent theorist of the Jordanian Salafi jihadist trend, Muhammad Khalaf al-Hadid, political activist who is a good follower of the Syrian file, Muhammad Ballut journalist in Lebanese leftist, pro-Syrian newspaper al-Safir, Staff General	

	Muhammad Sa'id al-Ghamdi, Muhammad Bin Abd-al-Rahman al-Tubayshi, the Royal Protocol Chief, Dr Anwar Muhammad Qarqash, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, he Interior Minister; Sheikh Khalid Bin Ahmad Bin Muhammad Al Khalifah, Foreign Minister Dr Khalid Bin Muhammad al-Atiyyah, Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince, Muhammad Mubarak al-Mazru'yi, Sheikh Muhammad Bin Zayid, Abu Dhabi's Crown Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktum, the Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Dubai's Ruler, researcher Muhammad al-Mulfi, Dr Musa'id Bin Muhammad al-Ayban, Minister of State and member of the Council of Ministers, Basil Muhammad journalist in Kuwaiti newspaper al-Siyasah website, Muhammad Ataiyah, member of the Revolutionary Forces Bloc, Prophet Muhammad Bin-Abdallah, may prayer and blessings be upon him, late President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, Minister of Interior Muhammad Salim, Dr Muhammad al-Salimi, the Saudi researcher specialized in Iranian affairs, the deputy Muhammad Tayfur of president of the Syrian	

	Muslim Brotherhood Movement, Imam Muhammad bin-Abd-al-Wahhab Sunni Islamic scholar,	
‘Abd’ (384.83),	King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Jamal Abd-al-Nasir, Dr Abd al-Aziz Bin-Saqr, General Abd-al-Fattah al-Sisi, Dr Sabir Abd-al-Da'im, dean of the Faculty of Arabic Language at the University of al-Azhar, journalist Abd-al-Wahhab Badrakhan, Abd-al-Bari Atwan founder and chief-in-editor of London-based Arabic e-newspaper Raʾy al-Yawm, King Abd-al-Aziz city, Yemeni President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, Abd-al-Aziz Tarabzuni, Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, ate Saudi Crown Prince Sultan Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Salman Bin-Sultan Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Saudi deputy defence minister, Abd-al-Baqi Shamsan, a professor of political sociology at Sanaa University, Abd-al-Aziz Bin-Saqr, head of the Gulf Research Centre, Qatari writer Abd-al-Aziz Al Mahmud, bd-al-Askar, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the Saudi Shura Council, Dr Abd-al-Ilah al-Sa'dun, founding member of the Arab-Turkish Dialogue Forum, elected Shaykh Abd-al-Latif Darban as a new mufti in Lebanon, Prince Nayif Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, the former crown prince and	

	interior minister, Prince Muqrin Bin Abd-al Aziz, the Crown Prince to the Crown Prince, Imam Muhammad bin-Abd-al-Wahhab, Muhammad Bin Abd-al-Rahman al-Tubayshi, the Royal Protocol Chief, Prince Mamduh Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, the youngest brother of the Saudi monarch, Isam Abd-al-Shafi from the Open Arab University in Denmark, Saudi Information Minister Abd-al-Aziz Khujah, group's leader Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi, GCC Secretary General Dr Abd-al-Latif al-Zayani, Fahd Bin-Abd-al-Muhsin al-Zayd, Saudi Arabia ambassador in Amman, late King Fahd Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Chairman of the al-Sakinah Campaign Sheikh Abd-al-Mun'im al-Mushawwah, Dr Abd-al-Latif Bin Rashid al-Zayani, the Secretary General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Walid Abd-al-Rahman in Cairo journalist in Saudi-owned leading pan-Arab daily al-Sharq al-Awsat website, Prince Khalid Bin Bandar Bin Abd-al-Aziz, the head of the General Intelligence Service,	
‘Aziz’ (239.22)	Qatari writer Abd-al-Aziz Al Mahmud, Dr Abd-al-Aziz Bin-Saqr, King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz (34 times), Prince Badr Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, King Abd-al-Aziz, Salman Bin-Abd-	males

	al-Aziz, the King Abd-al-Aziz City for Science and Technology, Abd-al-Aziz Tarabzuni, Crown Prince Sultan Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Saudi Information Minister Abd-al-Aziz Khujah, Crown Prince Miqrin Bin Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Salman Bin-Sultan Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Mamduh Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Nayif Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Abd-al-Aziz Bin-Saqr head of the Gulf Research Centre, Prince Muhammad Bin-Nayif Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, King Fahd Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Khalid Bin Bandar Bin Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Abd-al-Aziz Bin Abdallah Bin Abd-al-Aziz, Prince Turki Bin Abdallah Bin Abd-al-Aziz.	

Appendix 5

A) “Outside X Kingdom” Analysis

Outside X kingdom	Identified pattern	Concordance lines
‘Outside the kingdom’	Saudi monarch criminalises Jihad/fight outside the kingdom 6	The enactment of strict laws to criminalize the Saudis who go to "jihad" in Syria and elsewhere outside the Kingdom and putting them on trial in the event that they return alive. They would face sentences of between five to 20 years'

		imprisonment.
	Saudi censorship of channels	Najm promised that the commission will employ all of its capabilities to support and facilitate the tasks of these channels. He added that he realizes the difficulty of the return of major channels that transmit from outside the kingdom due to the huge investment they made.
	Saudi prince receives medical treatment outside the Kingdom,	Perhaps the disappearance of Prince Bandar Bin Sultan from the Syrian scene and the extended vacation he took for medical treatment outside the Kingdom, as confirmed in many news reports, is one of the indications in this connection.
	Saudi censorship of channels	He continued by saying: As for their headquarters, they are located outside the kingdom and the commission does not have any authority over what is broadcasted from outside the kingdom."
	Saudi monarch criminalises Jihad/fight outside the kingdom	Saudi King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz has issued a royal decree that punishes with imprisonment citizens involved in fighting outside the kingdom and those who support them financially or morally.
	Corona virus ad its impact on performing pilgrimage	he Corona Virus is contagious and is transmitted in crowded places. Although no information is available on several cases that have appeared so far among those performing the lesser pilgrimage from inside or outside the kingdom, there are fears that this virus may

		spread during the next lesser pilgrimage season, especially during the month of Ramadan.
	Saudi monarch criminalises Jihad/fight outside the kingdom	Dubai-based al-Arabiyah Television Channel in Arabic at 2011 GMT on 3 February carries a report, followed by an interview, on the Saudi royal decree that punishes citizens who fight in conflicts outside the kingdom.
	Saudi monarch criminalises Jihad/fight outside the kingdom	He issued laws criminalizing "jihad" outside the kingdom and penalizing any Saudi that fights in Syria or Iraq or anywhere else with a prison sentence of up to 20 years.
	Saudi monarch criminalises Jihad/fight outside the kingdom	About a week ago, the Saudi monarch, King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, issued a royal order under which every person who participated in fighting outside the kingdom or belong to religious and extremist intellectual trends or groups will be punished by imprisonment for a period ranging from 3 to 20 years as maximum.
	Saudi censorship of channels	Najm went on to say that some 40 per cent of owners of Saudi channels outside the kingdom said that they are waiting for the chance to operate in Saudi Arabia.
	Saudi monarch criminalises Jihad/fight outside the kingdom	A Royal announcement was made of punishment ranging from three to 20 years [in prison] to Saudi nationals who participate in combat outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - are they required to participate in fighting in the Kingdom?

	Saudi censorship of channels	He continued by saying: As for their headquarters, they are located outside the kingdom and the commission does not have any authority over what is broadcasted from outside the kingdom."

B) “In X Kingdom” Analysis

In X kingdom	Identified pattern	Concordance lines
‘In the kingdom’	Syrian MP about the Saudi’s alleged negligence of the Syrian crisis	I simply ask myself the following question: Where are the people in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? Where are the Turkish people? Where are the Lebanese people? Where are the Jordanian people? How do they feel about what is happening in Syria?
	offices of the Islamic al-Wisal channel	Saudi Information Minister Abd-al-Aziz Khujah issued a decision closing the offices of the Islamic al-Wisal channel; in the kingdom because it attacks the Shias. In a statement, he said that his ministry "will not remain silent over any print or electronic or televised or digital media outlet that tries to harm the unity, security, and stability of the homeland."
	offices in the kingdom	Dr Khujah said that this station is not Saudi. This is an unconvincing fallacy because all its programmes are transmitted from its offices in the kingdom and it is funded by the state treasury. Its "stars" live in the kingdom and they have become the source of strong influence on Saudi youths as millions read and follow their pages and accounts on the social media outlets.

	Its "stars" live in	This is an unconvincing fallacy because all its programmes are transmitted from its offices in the kingdom and it is funded by the state treasury.
	sources of income in the Kingdom.	Al-Walid Bin-Talal called for establishing a sovereign fund to invest public wealth and lead to diversifying sources of income in the Kingdom.
	ruling in the kingdom.	However, observers say that the huge advertisement campaign that preceded the interview and the prince's conversation about various affairs is meant to pave the way for him to nominate himself for ruling in the kingdom.
	the election of the Shura Council members in the Kingdom	During the interview, broadcast by more than 23 channels, the prince confirmed that he supports the election of the Shura Council members in the Kingdom, even if this is partial, while giving them genuine powers.
	fighting in the Kingdom	A Royal announcement was made of punishment ranging from three to 20 years [in prison] to Saudi nationals who participate in combat outside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia - are they required to participate in fighting in the Kingdom?
	those who had been sent for (jihad	Can this problem be addressed by merely facilitating the return of those who had been sent for (jihad)? Would it be possible to accommodate them easily in society, or would they turn into (ferment) promoting violence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
	drivers in the Kingdom	He pointed out that "Saudi women driving cars will lead to the departure of around 500,000 to 1 million drivers in the Kingdom, not only because the driver is a stranger, but also because he is an economic burden on women as well."

In this kingdom	diplomatic issue in this kingdom	Therefore, and perhaps due to his lack of experience and wisdom and due to the way he handled the diplomatic issue in this kingdom, he has always led the Saudi policy to failure and a dead end.
In the kingdom	candidate in the kingdom,	A TV interview broadcast by several satellite channels with the Saudi billionaire Prince Al-Walid Bin-Talal on Tuesday evening [2 April] has triggered a wide debate in Saudi circles on social media. While some viewed it as an introduction for the debut of the young prince into the power struggle and a platform of a presidential candidate in the kingdom,
	reforms in the kingdom	Continued— others said that it is consistent with the statements he makes every now and then on reforms in the kingdom.
	scholars in the Kingdom	cholars and Shaykhs from al-Azhar in Egypt have hailed the role of scholars in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in confronting what they described as "the deviant Shi'i tide" and defending the Ahl al-Sunnah wa-al-Jama'ah. T
	the issue of low liberties and rights in the kingdom itself,	he reports attributes the decrease in the number of those positively supporting the Saudi role to the issue of low liberties and rights in the kingdom itself, which clearly reflected negatively on the evaluation of the Saudi role in the region and the world
	telecommunications companies in the Kingdom	The sources said that most of the ring members, who are falling at present, work in a number of the telecommunications companies in the Kingdom, and their main task had been to supply foreign and internal parties with information about security

		commanders and influential figures in the Saudi society.
	Regarding the meeting between the Saudi foreign minister and Lebanese figures in the kingdom	Regarding the meeting between the Saudi foreign minister and Lebanese figures in the kingdom, al-Asiri said: "The majority of Lebanese leaders are closely and historically related to the kingdom
	a number of Saudis and residents in the Kingdom in acts of espionage for another country	Major General Mansur al-Turki, security spokesman for the Interior Ministry, said that "based on the information made available to the General Intelligence about the involvement of a number of Saudis and residents in the Kingdom in acts of espionage for another country by collecting information about vital installations and sites and communicating with intelligence agencies in that country concerning this information, the persons involved were arrested in coordinated and simultaneous security operations in four regions of the Kingdom (Mecca, Medina, Riyadh, and the Eastern Region).
	punishments in the Kingdom are co	hese punishments include defamation, fines, and other punishments included in the law. In addition to this, the Chinese side will apply its own law, while the punishments in the Kingdom are considered effective in reducing fraud."
	deputy defence minister in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	There is no substantial proof of the existence of a strong and integrated link between the recent recurrent stays in the Jordanian capital, Amman, by the young Saudi Prince Salman Bin-Sultan and his appointment a few days ago of a deputy defence minister in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
	about to establish a media academy in	Najm concluded by saying that the commission is about to

		establish a media academy in the kingdom that offers training and works on developing the skills of the Saudi youth in various media specialties.
	to preserve the national security in the Kingdom.	The sources said that the Saudi Intelligence service has restored its strength after the internal changes in its organizational and field structure in addition to the great effort to consolidate its influence amid extraordinary regional circumstances, adding that the Intelligence is strongly operating through the Saudi embassies in most of the countries in direct coordination with the Foreign Ministry to preserve the national security in the Kingdom.
	Prince Bandar heads the hawks in the Kingdom.	Perhaps the disappearance of Prince Bandar Bin Sultan from the Syrian scene and the extended vacation he took for medical treatment outside the Kingdom, as confirmed in many news reports, is one of the indications in this connection. This is a disappearance that might last longer than expected in confirmation of that turnaround. Prince Bandar heads the hawks in the Kingdom.
	Never differentiated among the Lebanese in the kingdom	He pointed out that "the kingdom has never differentiated among the Lebanese in the kingdom".
	famous in the kingdom	The supporters of al-Awdah's speech have created a group called hashtag #[word in Arabic] on the Twitter site. These supporters include the names of clerics and people who are famous in the kingdom
	the seizure of human rights in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	The speech in which famous Saudi preacher Salman al-Awdah condemned the seizure of human rights in the Kingdom

		of Saudi Arabia has sparked a debate on Twitter
	tension in the kingdom, which follows a conservative, political, and religious tradition	In an "open speech" on 15 March, al-Awdah, who is from the [Islamic] awakening trend, which is close in ideology to the Muslim Brotherhood, condemned the seizure of rights, calling for reform and warning, at the same time, that there is tension in the kingdom, which follows a conservative, political, and religious tradition.
	Syrian refugees in the kingdom.	l-Humud stressed the role of the KSA in supporting Jordan to be able to perform its humanitarian role in the Syrian file through the provision of continuous support to the Syrian refugees in the kingdom.
	pilgrims that will begin arriving in the kingdom in the coming few months to perform the Umrah and Hajj	Fears are rising in Saudi Arabia about an outbreak of the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Corona Virus [MERS-CoV] as the anxiety of the Saudi authorities grows that this virus may spread among the pilgrims that will begin arriving in the kingdom in the coming few months to perform the Umrah and Hajj [lesser and greater pilgrimages].
	During the years of terrorism in the Kingdom Saudi arabia in an era of post-terrorsim	this episode discusses al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Sharayir begins the programme by saying: "Despite the end of the organization of al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia, the organization in Yemen is still trying to revive its presence in Saudi cities. During the years of terrorism in the Kingdom, the militants ended up either killed or imprisoned.
	the health conditions in the kingdom	The Saudi authorities do not wish to announce a suspension of the lesser pilgrimage in order to avoid panic in the country and arouse the suspicions of the

		world about the health conditions in the kingdom
	in the kingdom from performing the lesser pilgrimage and to suspend granting lesser pilgrimage visas	Such an outbreak threatens to drive the Saudi authorities to stop citizens and residents in the kingdom from performing the lesser pilgrimage and to suspend granting lesser pilgrimage visas temporarily for those wishing to perform it from outside the country in order "to avert risks”
	he United States is interested in US national security, and we in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are interested in Arab national security.	"The issue of Iran is different from that of Syria. The United States is interested in US national security, and we in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are interested in Arab national security.
	that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has allocated $75 billion to spread the Salafi way through charitable activities which were carried out by many institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	The Salafi way, however, has annoyed the old colonialist states." He notes: "Al-Qaʿida was used as a pretext to besiege charitable activity, most of which comes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. some US reports said that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has allocated $75 billion to spread the Salafi way through charitable activities which were carried out by many institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
	Alqaedaa It thus began to draw up a new scheme to return to society via the platform that brought together more than four million users in the kingdom	Al-Qaʿida knows that it lost a lot more after it repelled the people than from the strikes of the Saudi Interior Ministry since it lost its presence on the ground. It thus began to draw up a new scheme to return to society via the platform that brought together more than four million users in the kingdom.
	the situation of refugees in the kingdom.	n-kind assistance to them is being secured by the JHCC, officially charged with following up the situation of refugees in the kingdom.

	Syrian refugees present in the kingdom	On his part, the secretary general of the Jordanian Hashimite Charity Commission [JHCC] Ayman Muflih stressed that KSA donations continue to support Syrian refugees present in the kingdom through the same commission, clarifying that the distribution mechanism of these donations is implemented though the employees and warehouses of the JHCC directly and not via any other way.
	Thousands of Sudanese expatriates in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Thousands of Sudanese expatriates in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will face a major crisis within a few weeks but authorities here do not show any concern despite the large numbers of Sudanese expatriates who will lose their work in Saudi Arabia and perhaps their rights and assets as well because they live and work in the Kingdom in an illegal manner or through forged employment documents.
	media delegation experienced consecutive sessions of political nourishment under the heading of Moderation and Stable Conditions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.	Al-Quds al-Arabi learned that the media delegation experienced consecutive sessions of political nourishment under the heading of Moderation and Stable Conditions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
	housands of Sudanese expatriates in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will face a major crisis within a few weeks but authorities here do not show any concern despite the large numbers of Sudanese	housands of Sudanese expatriates in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will face a major crisis within a few weeks but authorities here do not show any concern despite the large numbers of Sudanese expatriates who will lose their work in Saudi Arabia and perhaps their rights and assets as well because they live and work in the Kingdom in an illegal

	expatriates who will lose their work in Saudi Arabia and perhaps their rights and assets as well because they live and work in the Kingdom in an illegal manner or through forged employment documents	manner or through forged employment documents
	the Syrian refugee affairs in the kingdom	Meanwhile, the media spokesman for the Syrian refugee affairs in the kingdom, Inmar al-Humud, said that the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan continued to increase as of last evening when the concerned authorities registered 2,879 new refugees who have been transferred to the al-Za'tari Camp in al-Mafraq Governorate.
	thousands of Sudanese who have settled for years in the Kingdom and	this Kingdom's legitimate right. Over the coming few weeks, this is going to affect about half a million foreigners including thousands of Sudanese who have settled for years in the Kingdom and many of whom have entered by illegal means by staying behind after performing the Haj or Umra [annual pilgrimage rites to Mecca]

Appendix 6

59 news items linguistically construct the image of Saudi Arabia as being dominated by men of authority and distant from (acting) women

N	News articles' headings (as given by the BBCM-M)	Source and date of original publication
1	Scholars laud late Saudi king's achievements, expect "no change" in policies	Source: Akhbar al-Khalij website, Manama, in Arabic 26 Jan 15

2	Sunni cleric al-Qaradawi says he is not against all Shi'is, lauds Saudi scholars	Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1605 gmt 9 Jun 13
3	Pan Arab TV show discusses Kerry's visit to Saudi Arabia, Saudi-US ties	Dubai al-Arabiyah Satellite Channel Television in Arabic, an influential pan-Arab news channel espousing pro-Saudi Government views, social reform, and liberal values, at 1935 GMT on 4 November 13
4	Pan-Arab TV report discusses royal decree to punish Saudis fighting abroad	Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 2011 gmt 3 Feb 14
5	Sudan column reviews plight of workers facing deportation from Saudi Arabia	Source: al-Ayyam Khartoum, in Arabic 20 Apr 13
6	Yemeni source says al-Qaʿida's Mish'al al-Shaddukhi killed in Hadramwat	Source: al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 14 Dec 13
7	Saudi fighters in Syria reportedly surrender to authorities in Lebanon	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 18 Apr 14
8	Talk show discusses Gulf states' alleged "concern" over Iran-West nuclear deal	Source: al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1830 gmt 24 Nov 13
9	Al-Jazeera TV debates US Defence Secretary's visit to Saudi Arabia	Source: al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1830 gmt 14 May 14

10	Saudi intelligence chief expected to visit Russia soon - newspaper	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 15 Nov 13
11	Saudi Arabia worried about possible outbreak of respiratory syndrome – website	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 30 Apr 14
12	Jordan said resisting Saudi pressure to adopt anti-Qatar stance - website	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 16 Mar 14
13	Yemen, Saudi Arabia said in "simmering crisis" over expulsion of workers	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 4 Apr 13
14	Lebanese newspaper reports on meeting between Saudi spy chief, Russia's Putin	Source: al-Safir website, Beirut, in Arabic 21 Aug 13
15	Saudi commentator rejects anti-Shi'i rhetoric after arrest of Iranian spy ring	Source: al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 2 Apr 13
16	Highlights from UK Arabic press 18 Mar 13	Sources: As listed
17	Saudi prince reportedly criticizes Muslim Brotherhood	Source: Elaph website, London, in Arabic 18 Apr 13
18	Saudi analysts see Iraqi president's visit to Riyadh as "turning point" in ties	Source: Elaph website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 13 Nov 14

19	Saudi Arabia likely finance Russian-Egyptian arms deal - website	Source: Elaph website, London, in Arabic 12 Nov 13
20	Pan-Arab daily expects tough Saudi measures against Qatar over Gaza stance	Source: Raʾy al-Yawm, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 28 Jul 14
21	Saudi cleric views use of social media to counter al-Qaʿida ideology	Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1833 gmt 18 Jul 14
22	Pan-Arab TV interviews Saudi cleric on anti-Al-Qaʿida tweets	Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1830 gmt 29 Nov 13
23	Saudi information minister denies economic pressure on Jordan	Source: al-Dustur website, Amman, in Arabic 27 Feb 13
24	Saudi citizen said fighting in Syria surrenders to embassy in Jordan	Source: al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 6 Jul 14
25	Commentary says Saudi Arabia's foreign policy facing "impending collapse"	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 2 Dec 13
26	Security experts say terrorist cells in Saudi Arabia rely on personal donations	Source: al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 9 May 14
27	Saudi Arabia announces officially Iran linked to spy ring	Source: al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London, in Arabic 27 Mar 13

28	Saudi minister, Chinese officials sign agreement on counterfeit goods	Source: al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London, in Arabic 15 Mar 14
29	[Article by Dr Turki Saqr: "Iran, Saudi Arabia... Will Matters Change?"]	Source: Tishrin website, Damascus, in Arabic 22 Sep 13
30	Writer on Obama's expected visit to Saudi Arabia, slams US policy on Saudis	Source: al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 18 Feb 14
31	Al-Jazeera talk show discusses regional, international intervention in Yemen	Source: al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1905 gmt 25 Nov 13
32	Pan-Arab TV interviews Saudi intellectuals on Obama's visit to Saudi Arabia	Source: al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1439 gmt 28 Mar 14
33	Saudi prince TV interview on local, Arab issues triggers "wide debate"	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 4 Apr 13
34	Saudi legal experts laud royal order punishing nationals fighting abroad	Source: al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 4 Feb 14
35	Al-Azhar clerics hail Saudi scholars' stance against Hezbollah, Shi'i "tide"	Source: al-Sharq al-Awsat website, London, in Arabic 9 Jun 13
36	Pan Arab TV show views Saudis joining al-Qaʿida in Syria, Iraq	Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1830 gmt 15 Nov 13

37	Omani minister views Arab unity, US-Iran mediation, Gulf issues - part II	Source: al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 21 Apr 14
38	Paper comments on Kerry's visit to Saudi Arabia, statements on Egypt, Syria	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 6 Nov 13
39	Writer discusses reasons behind Saudi "isolation" from US-Iranian talks	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 21 Oct 13
40	Pan-Arab newspaper on Saudi royals' remarks on US ties, reactions in Washington	Source: Elaph website, London, in Arabic 23 Oct 13
41	Saudi Arabia threatens to deport any person who supports Hezbollah	Source: Elaph website, London, in Arabic 19 Jun 13
42	Commentary says Iranian-Saudi understanding only way to end Syrian conflict	Source: Raʾy al-Yawm, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 4 Feb 14
43	Editorial analyses Saudi position on jihadists in Syria, campaign against terror	Source: Raʾy al-Yawm, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 30 Jan 14
44	Raging flames in Syria, Iraq to reach Saudi cloak" – writer	Source: Raʾy al-Yawm, London, in Arabic 5 Nov 14

45	Syrian foreign minister in interview discusses Khan al-Asal "massacre"	Source: Syrian TV satellite service, Damascus, in Arabic 1859 gmt 27 Jul 13
46	Syrian TV interviews minister on US official's statement on Geneva II talks	Source: Syrian TV satellite service, Damascus, in Arabic 1853 gmt 4 Nov 13
47	Article slams Saudi authorities duality of reformist king, reactionary scholars	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 7 Oct 13
48	Pan-Arab daily highlights Amnesty International's report on Saudi rights abuses	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 22 Oct 13
49	Kuwait emir's visit to Iran shows failure of Saudi regional policy of arrogance	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 2 Jun 14
50	Al-Jazeera websites al-Jazeera websites retracts report on Saudi king's letter to Egypt's al-Sisi	Source: Aljazeera.net website, Doha, in Arabic 6 Jun 14
51	Al-Arabiyah TV programme discusses al-Qaʿida in Saudi Arabia, Yemen	Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1830 gmt 8 Mar 13
52	Saudi envoy denies reports on applying economic pressures on Jordan	Source: al-Dustur website, Amman, in Arabic 2 Mar 13
53	Lebanese premier views election of new president, Syrian refugees	Source: al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 18 May 14

54	Writer says Saudi rejects UN Security Council seat due to disputes with Obama	Source: al-Hayat website, London, in Arabic 20 Oct 13
55	Al-Jazeera discusses Qatar's tense relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain	Source: al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1905 gmt 10 Mar 14
56	UK-based Arabic daily says Saudi policy in Yemen shows grave miscalculation	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 25 Sep 14
57	Saudi ambassador says return to Beirut not linked to Lebanese elections	Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 3 May 141
58	Mideast Arabic press highlights attack on Saudi-Iraqi border	Source: Middle East Arabic press review from BBC Monitoring in Arabic 06 Jan 15
59	Commentary says Iranian Saudi understanding only way to end Syrian conflict	Source: Raʾy al-Yawm, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 4 Feb 14

Appendix 7 (CDA Case Study 1)

7.1 The BBCM-M's TET

Saudi prince TV interview on local, Arab issues triggers "wide debate"

1,133 words

9 April 2013 15:48

BBC Monitoring Middle East BBCMEP

English

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Text of report by London-based independent newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi website on 4 April

[Report by Ahmad al-Masri: "Al-Walid Bin-Talal attacks Brotherhood and supports election of Shura Council; He considers Arab Spring to be ruin and says that al-Jazeera is channel for the street while al-Arabiyah is for leaders"]

A TV interview broadcast by several satellite channels with the Saudi billionaire Prince Al-Walid Bin-Talal on Tuesday evening [2 April] has triggered a wide debate in Saudi circles on social media. While some viewed it as an introduction for the debut of the young prince into the power struggle and a platform of a presidential candidate in the kingdom, others said that it is consistent with the statements he makes every now and then on reforms in the kingdom. However, observers say that the huge advertisement campaign that preceded the interview and the prince's conversation about various affairs is meant to pave the way for him to nominate himself for ruling in the kingdom.

The prince described the revolutions of the "Arab Spring" as "Arab ruin". He attacked the Muslim Brotherhood, saying: "There is Muslim Brotherhood scent in Saudi Arabia. I say I seek refuge in God from the support of the Brotherhood."

During the interview, broadcast by more than 23 channels, the prince confirmed that he supports the election of the Shura Council members in the Kingdom, even if this is partial, while giving them genuine powers. He also called for forming a service-oriented mini-cabinet that could be chaired by a person from outside the ruling family of Al Sa'ud. Prince Al-Walid Bin-Talal said that he does not interfere at all in the management of Rotana Khalijia [satellite TV channel] and that his ceiling of freedom is high and without limits. He indicated that the news channel "Al-Arab", which will be launched, will be different and will be by the end of 2013. The channel came to fill the gap in the content offered by the group of Rotana channels. He said: "Many studies

showed that the al-Jazeera TV is the channel of the Arab street, while al-Arabiyah is the channel of leaders and governments. Therefore, the al-Arab news channel will be in the middle and will compete strongly with them." He said that going to war with the open media is a losing case because it is a means for the victory of freedom of opinion and expression. Asked if he wished to be the "Murdoch of the Arabs," he said: I take pride in my Arabism. I am a servant of the Arab and Islamic nation.

Prince Al-Walid Bin-Talal said that he is at the service of the homeland, whether in the government or outside it and that his interview is a step towards supporting the press and media and that he is willing to repeat interviews as long as they serve the country. On the rule of the Brotherhood in Egypt, Al-Walid said: "It is hard to judge the performance of the Muslim Brotherhood group. There is some confusion." He said: "I am watching closely the case of the cell captured in the UAE to overthrow the system of government. Certainly, there are Brotherhood scents in Saudi Arabia." On his support for the Brotherhood, Al-Walid Bin-Talal said: "I seek refuge in God."

Al-Walid, who owns a media and investment empire and is the richest non-ruling Arab, said that the appointed Shura Council should be given "greater powers to be active," and that "civil society organizations should be given a greater role" and the press the possibility of "intervening in reforms in a stronger manner."

Al-Walid described the decision of King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz to include women in the Shura Council for the first time as "very important." However, he said that "for it to be historic, there is a need for two things. First, elections, even if it is partial, and, more importantly, powers." In this context, he said that "as long as they are without powers, they will remain without significant strength. I think that, with King Abdallah, the question of powers is inevitably coming."

On another issue, Prince al-Walid, who is known for his reform trends and support for women causes, called for "establishing a mini-cabinet specialized in services and living affairs of citizens to be headed by a person from the royal family or from outside it." The king in Saudi Arabia is the prime minister. This position is occupied by members of the ruling families in all GCC states.

On the question of women driving cars, which causes controversy in Saudi Arabia, the only country in the world that prevents women from driving, the Saudi prince said: "I have female Saudi employees in all fields. Women started flying planes a while ago. We publicly demand that Saudi women be allowed to drive. Families agree to that. Of course, she flew a plane before driving a car, and this is regrettable." Al-Walid employed a Saudi woman as a pilot of his jet a while back. He said: "We want progress for Saudi women within the teachings of Islam, and not a commodity over which the liberal and conservative trends fight. The question of women driving has become a social issue after it was religiously prohibited and then forbidden. I think that driving is a foregone conclusion. It will inevitably happen."

He pointed out that "Saudi women driving cars will lead to the departure of around 500,000 to 1 million drivers in the Kingdom, not only because the driver is a stranger, but also because he is an economic burden on women as well."

Al-Walid Bin-Talal called for establishing a sovereign fund to invest public wealth and lead to diversifying sources of income in the Kingdom. In this context, he said that "the last budget announced dependence on oil by 92 per cent. It is risky for our income to depend on oil. There is a ready solution to diversify sources of income. We have 700bn US dollars in surplus, but regrettably their return is almost 1 per cent or 1.5 per cent."

Forbes estimates al-Walid's wealth at 20bn US dollars. However, he rejected this estimation and severed ties with the magazine last March because it refused to calculate the value of the shares of his holding group according to the price of its shares in the Saudi stock market. Al-Walid's wealth could amount to 29bn US dollars, according to other estimates.

Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 4 Apr 13

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Document BBCMEP0020130409e949003h1

7.2 The First Merged ST (Published on the 4th of April 2013)

السنة الرابعة والعشرون ـ العدد 0047 الخميس 4 نيسان)ابريل(3102 - 32 جمادى الاولى 4341هـ

طالب بتشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي بالسعودية يرأسه شخص من خارج الاسرة الحاكمة

الوليد بن طلال يهاجم «الاخوان» ويؤيد انتخاب مجلس الشورى

اعتبر «الربيع العربي» «دمارا».. وقال ان «الجزيرة» قناة للشارع و« العربية» للزعماء

جدة ـ ا ف ب ـ لندن ـ «القدس العربي»

من احمد المصري:

اثارت مقابلة تلفزيونية بثتها عدة قنوات فضائية للامير المليادير السعودي الوليد بن طلال مساء الثلاثاء جدلا واسعا في الاوساط السعودية، على مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، وفيما رأى البعض انها تمهيد لدخول الامير الشاب على خط الصراع على الحكم، وانها عرض برنامج انتخابي لمرشح رئاسة في المملكة، رأى اخرون انها تدخل ضمن تصريحاته التي يطلقها بين الحين والاخر حول الاصلاحات في المملكة، الا ان مراقبون يرون ان هذه الحملة الاعلانية الضخمة قبل المقابلة وحديث الامير في شتى الشؤون يدخل ضمن التمهيد له لترشيح نفسه للحكم في المملكة. ووصف الامير ثورات »الربيع العربي« بـ«الدمار العربي«، وهاجم الاخوان المسلمين، وقال، »هنالك روائح اخوانية في السعودية وانا اقول اعوذ بالله من دعم الاخوان«.

واكد الامير السعودي خلال المقابلة التي بثتها اكثر من 32 قناة، انه يؤيد انتخاب اعضاء مجلس الشورى في المملكة ولو جزئيا، مع منحهم صلاحيات حقيقية، كما دعا الى تشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي مصغر يمكن ان يرأسه شخص من خارج اسرة آل سعود الحاكمة. وأكد الأمير الوليد بن طلال، إنه لا يتدخل نهائيا في إدارة »روتانا خليجية«، وسقفه في الحرية عال ومرتفع وبلا حدود، مشيرا إلى أن قناة »العرب« الإخبارية التى سيتم إطلاقها ستكون مختلفة، وستكون في نهاية عام 3102، وجاءت لسد الفراغ في المحتوى المقدم على مجموعة قنوات »روتانا«، وقال »إن العديد من الدراسات أثبتت أن قناة)الجزيرة(قناة الشارع العربي، بينما)العربية(قناة الزعماء والحكومات، وبالتالي تأتي قناة)العرب(الإخبارية، لكي تكون في الوسط بينهما وستنافس بقوة معهما«، موضحا أن الدخول في حرب مع الإعلام المفتوح، هي قضية خاسرة، لأنها وسيلة لانتصار حرية الرأي والتعبير، وحول السؤال عن رغبته في أن يكون »مردوخ العرب«، قال: أفخر بعروبتي، وأنا خادم للأمة العربية والإسلامية.

وقال الأمير الوليد بن طلال، إنه في خدمة الوطن سواء في الحكومة أو خارج الحكومة، وان حواره هو خطوة نحو دعم الصحافة والإعلام، ومستعد لتكرار الحوارات طالما كانت في سبيل الوطن. وعن حكم الإخوان في مصر، قال الوليد، »إنه من الصعب الحكم على أداء جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، »هناك بعض من التخبط«، وقال »أتابع بدقة قضية

الخليجية التي تم القبض عليها في الإمارات لقلب نظام الحكم، ومن المؤكد أن هناك روائح إخوانية في السعودية«، وعن دعمه للإخوان قال الوليد بن طلال »أعوذ بالله«.

وقال الوليد الذي يملك امبراطورية اعلامية واستثمارية، ويعد اغنى عربي من غير الحكام، انه يجب اعطاء مجلس الشورى المعين »صلاحيات اكثر حتى يفعل«، فضلا عن منح »مؤسسات المجتمع المدني دورا اكبر«، والصحافة امكانية »التدخل في الاصلاحات بشكل اقوى«.

ووصف الوليد قرار الملك عبد الله بن عبدالعزيز بادخال المرأة للمرة الاولى الى مجلس الشورى بانه »مهم جدا«، الا انه قال انه »حتى يكون تاريخيا لا بد من بندين، اولا الانتخابات ولو جزئية والاهم الصلاحيات«. وقال في هذا السياق »طالما)هم من دون(صلاحيات سيبقون من دون قوة مهمة)...(واعتقد مع الملك عبدالله ان موضوع الصلاحيات آت لا محالة«.

في جانب آخر، دعا الامير الوليد المعروف بميوله الاصلاحية ودعمه لقضايا المرأة، الى »تأسيس مجلس وزراء مصغر يختص بالشؤون الخدماتية والمعيشية للمواطنين يكون له رئيس من العائلة المالكة او من خارجها«.

والملك في السعودية هو رئيس مجلس الوزراء، كما يشغل هذا المنصب اعضاء من الاسر الحاكمة في جميع دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي.

وفي موضوع قيادة المرأة للسيارة المثير للجدل في المملكة، التي تعتبر البلد الوحيد في العالم الذي يمنع النساء من قيادة السيارات، قال الامير السعودي »بالنسبة لي لدي موظفات سعوديات في شتى وسائل العمل، قيادة المرأة للطائرة تم منذ فترة ونحن نجاهر ونطالب بقيادة المرأة السعودية للسيارة واهلها موافقون، طبعا قادت الطائرة قبل ان تقود السيارة للاسف .»

7.3 The Second Merged ST (Published on the 6th of April 2013)

القدس العربي

الوليد بن طلال يؤيد انتخاب أعضاء مجلس الشورى في السعودية وتعزيز صلاحياتهم
Apr 06, 2013

جدة- (ا ف ب): اكد الأمير والملياردير السعودي الوليد بن طلال انه يؤيد انتخاب اعضاء مجلس الشورى في المملكة ولو جزئيا مع منحهم صلاحيات حقيقة، كما دعا الى تشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي مصغر يمكن ان يرأسه شخص من خارج اسرة ال سعود الحاكمة، وذلك في برنامج بثته 23 قناة تلفزيونية مساء الثلاثاء. وقال الوليد الذي يملك امبراطورية اعلامية واستثمارية ويعد اغنى عربي من غير الحكام، انه يجب اعطاء مجلس الشورى المعين "صلاحيات اكثر حتى يفعل"، فضلا عن منح "مؤسسات المجتمع المدني دورا اكبر"، والصحافة امكانية "التدخل في الاصلاحات بشكل اقوى".

وتقدر مجلة فوربس ثروة الوليد بعشرين مليار دولار. الا انه رفض هذا التقدير وقطع علاقته مع المجلة في اذار/ مارس الماضي لرفضها اعتماد قيمة اسهم مجموعته القابضة بحسب سعر سهمها في سوق المال السعودي. وقد تصل ثروة الوليد الى 29 مليار دولار بحسب تقديرات اخرى.
ووصف الوليد قرار الملك عبد الله بن عبدالعزيز بادخال المراة للمرة الاولى الى مجلس الشورى بانه "هام جدا"، الا انه قال انه "حتى يكون تاريخيا لا بد من بندين، اولا الانتخابات ولو جزئية والاهم الصلاحيات". وقال في هذا السياق "طالما (هم من دون) صلاحيات سيبقون دون قوة هامة (...) واعتقد مع الملك عبدالله ان موضوع الصلاحيات ات لا محالة".

في جانب آخر، دعا الامير الوليد المعروف بميوله الاصلاحية ودعمه لقضايا المرأة، الى "تاسيس مجلس وزراء مصغر يختص بالشؤون الخدماتية والمعيشية للمواطنين يكون رله رئيس شخص من العائلة المالكة او من خارجها".

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وفي موضوع قيادة المراة للسيارة المثير للجدل في المملكة التي تعتبر البلد الوحيد في العالم الذي يمنع النساء من قيادة السيارات، قال الامير السعودي "بالنسبة لي لدي موظفات سعوديات في شتى وسائل العمل، قيادة المراة للطائرة تم منذ فترة ونحن نجاهر ونطالب بالمراة السعودية واهلها موافقون، طبعا قادت الطائرة قبل ان تقود السيارة للاسف".

وكان الوليد بادر قبل فترة الى توظيف سعودية كقائدة لطائرته.

وقال "نريد النهضة للمراة السعودية ضمن تعاليم الاسلام وليس سلعة يتصارعها النطاق الليبرالي والمحافظ. موضوع قيادة المراة للسيارة اصبح اجتماعيا بعد ان كان محرما ثم ممنوعا، اعتقد القيادة تحصيل حاصل ات لا محالة".

كما اشار إلى ان "قيادة المراة السعودية للسيارة سوف تؤدي إلى مغادرة نحو 500 إلى مليون سائق المملكة، ليس فقط لانه دخيل (السائق) بل لانه عبء اقتصادي عليهن ايضا".

وطالب الوليد بن طلال بانشاء صندوق سيادي يستثمر الثروة العامة ويؤدي الى تنويع مصادر الدخل في المملكة.

وقال في هذا السياق ان "الميزانية الاخيرة اعلنت الاعتماد على البترول بنسبة 92 في المئة، من الخطورة ان دخلنا معتمد على البترول. هناك حل جاهز لتنويع مصادر الدخل. لدينا 700 مليار دولار من الفوائض، للاسف عائدها تقريبا 1 أو 1,5 بالمئة".

7.4 The Merged Version by the BBCM-M: the Composed ST

طالب بتشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي بالسعودية يرأسه شخص من خارج الاسرة الحاكمة

الوليد بن طلال يهاجم «الاخوان» ويؤيد انتخاب مجلس الشورى

اعتبر «الربيع العربي» «دمارا».. وقال ان «الجزيرة» قناة للشارع و« العربية» للزعماء

جدة ـ ا ف ب ـ لندن ـ «القدس العربي»

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واكد الامير السعودي خلال المقابلة التي بثتها اكثر من 32 قناة، انه يؤيد انتخاب اعضاء مجلس الشورى في المملكة ولو جزئيا، مع منحهم صلاحيات حقيقية، كما دعا الى تشكيل مجلس وزراء خدماتي مصغر يمكن ان يرأسه شخص من خارج اسرة آل سعود الحاكمة. وأكد الأمير الوليد بن طلال، إنه لا يتدخل نهائيا في إدارة »روتانا خليجية«، وسقفه في الحرية عال ومرتفع وبلا حدود، مشيرا إلى أن قناة »العرب« الإخبارية التى سيتم إطلاقها ستكون مختلفة، وستكون في نهاية عام 3102، وجاءت لسد الفراغ في المحتوى المقدم على مجموعة قنوات »روتانا«، وقال »إن العديد من الدراسات أثبتت أن قناة)الجزيرة(قناة الشارع العربي، بينما)العربية(قناة الزعماء والحكومات، وبالتالي تأتي قناة)العرب(الإخبارية، لكي تكون في الوسط بينهما وستنافس بقوة معهما«، موضحا أن الدخول في حرب مع الإعلام المفتوح، هي قضية خاسرة، لأنها وسيلة لانتصار حرية الرأي والتعبير، وحول السؤال عن رغبته في أن يكون »مردوخ العرب«، قال: أفخر بعروبتي، وأنا خادم للأمة العربية والإسلامية.

وقال الأمير الوليد بن طلال، إنه في خدمة الوطن سواء في الحكومة أو خارج الحكومة، وان حواره هو خطوة نحو دعم الصحافة والإعلام، ومستعد لتكرار الحوارات طالما كانت في سبيل الوطن. وعن حكم الإخوان في مصر، قال الوليد، »إنه من الصعب الحكم على أداء جماعة الإخوان المسلمين، »هناك بعض من التخبط«، وقال »أتابع بدقة قضية الخلية التي تم القبض عليها في الإمارات لقلب نظام الحكم، ومن المؤكد أن هناك روائح إخوانية في السعودية«، وعن دعمه للإخوان قال الوليد بن طلال »أعوذ بالله«.

وقال الوليد الذي يملك امبراطورية اعلامية واستثمارية، ويعد اغنى عربي من غير الحكام، انه يجب اعطاء مجلس الشورى المعين »صلاحيات اكثر حتى يفعل«، فضلا عن منح »مؤسسات المجتمع المدني دورا اكبر«، والصحافة امكانية »التدخل في الاصلاحات بشكل اقوى«.

ووصف الوليد قرار الملك عبد الله بن عبدالعزيز بادخال المرأة للمرة الاولى الى مجلس الشورى بانه »مهم جدا«، الا انه قال انه »حتى يكون تاريخيا لا بد من بندين، اولا الانتخابات ولو جزئية والاهم الصلاحيات«. وقال في هذا السياق »طالما)هم من دون(صلاحيات سيبقون من دون قوة مهمة)...(واعتقد مع الملك عبدالله ان موضوع الصلاحيات آت لا محالة«.

في جانب آخر، دعا الامير الوليد المعروف بميوله الاصلاحية ودعمه لقضايا المرأة، الى »تأسيس مجلس وزراء مصغر يختص بالشؤون الخدماتية والمعيشية للمواطنين يكون له رئيس من العائلة المالكة او من خارجها«.

والملك في السعودية هو رئيس مجلس الوزراء، كما يشغل هذا المنصب اعضاء من الاسر الحاكمة في جميع دول مجلس التعاون الخليجي.

وفي موضوع قيادة المرأة للسيارة المثير للجدل في المملكة، التي تعتبر البلد الوحيد في العالم الذي يمنع النساء من قيادة السيارات، قال الامير السعودي »بالنسبة لي لدي موظفات سعوديات في شتى وسائل العمل، قيادة المرأة للطائرة تم منذ فترة ونحن نجاهر ونطالب بقيادة المرأة السعودية للسيارة واهلها موافقون، طبعا قادت الطائرة قبل ان تقود السيارة للاسف[41] .»

وفي[42] موضوع قيادة المراة للسيارة المثير للجدل في المملكة التي تعتبر البلد الوحيد في العالم الذي يمنع النساء من قيادة السيارات، قال الامير السعودي "بالنسبة لي لدي موظفات سعوديات في شتى وسائل العمل، قيادة المراة للطائرة تم منذ فترة ونحن نجاهر ونطالب بالمراة السعودية واهلها موافقون، طبعا قادت الطائرة قبل ان تقود السيارة للاسف".

وكان الوليد بادر قبل فترة الى توظيف سعودية كقائدة لطائرته.

وقال "نريد النهضة للمراة السعودية ضمن تعاليم الاسلام وليس سلعة يتصارعها النطاق الليبرالي والمحافظ. موضوع قيادة المراة للسيارة اصبح اجتماعيا بعد ان كان محرما ثم ممنوعا، اعتقد القيادة تحصيل حاصل ات لا محالة".

كما اشار إلى ان "قيادة المراة السعودية للسيارة سوف تؤدي إلى مغادرة نحو 500 إلى مليون سائق المملكة، ليس فقط لانه دخيل (السائق) بل لانه عبء اقتصادي عليهن ايضا".

وطالب الوليد بن طلال بانشاء صندوق سيادي يستثمر الثروة العامة ويؤدي الى تنويع مصادر الدخل في المملكة.

[41] This is where the first ST ends.

[42] This is where the addition of segments from the second ST starts.

وقال في هذا السياق ان "الميزانية الاخيرة اعلنت الاعتماد على البترول بنسبة 92 في المئة، من الخطورة ان دخلنا معتمد على البترول. هناك حل جاهز لتنويع مصادر الدخل. لدينا 700 مليار دولار من الفوائض، للاسف عائدها تقريبا 1 أو 1,5 بالمئة".

وتقدر مجلة فوربس ثروة الوليد بعشرين مليار دولار. الا انه رفض هذا التقدير وقطع علاقته مع المجلة في اذار/ مارس الماضي لرفضها اعتماد قيمة اسهم مجموعته القابضة بحسب سعر سهمها في سوق المال السعودي. وقد تصل ثروة الوليد الى 29 مليار دولار بحسب تقديرات اخرى.

Appendix 8 (CDA Case Study 2)

8.1 TET of the First Examined News Item

Article slams Saudi authorities duality of reformist king, reactionary scholars

1,739 words
10 October
2013 09:58

BBC Monitoring Middle
East BBCMEP
English

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Text of report by London-based independent newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi website on 7 October

[Article by Dr Madawi al-Rashid: "Rich Orientalist Material from Saudi Arabia"]

Every time an inflammatory fatwa [religious ruling] or opinion is published by a Saudi [religious] scholar, the Arab and international media become preoccupied with publishing it and commenting on it. This media recall the reactionary scholars immersed in his ideology that does not stand examination and scrutiny. They become a representative of Islam and a speaker in its name, expressing its secrets and

positions regarding unresolved issues, most notably women's issues.

The ideas of a Saudi cleric on the issue of women driving cars and the current campaign to take place on 26 October have been full of excitement and entertainment, particularly since the cleric objected to the issue through a scientific window this time when he linked driving to the health of a woman's pelvis and ovaries. A few minutes after the publication of this opinion, media outlets reported this amusing and sad news item to be transformed into articles published by the international media on their pages with Arab media reporting it and commenting on its absurdity.

We cannot attribute this passion and interest in this odd fatwa except to an orientalist view immersed in searching for this odd "other." Today, we find that the Western media search for this different "other" that is outside the context of time to measure the extent of its difference, development, and its passage over the dilemma of women, which has become a standard for people and the extent of their progress. Today, the West needs this Muslim "other" and his fatwas to define itself as the alternative to darkness and reactionism, which it believes continue to be abundant in the Islamic world, chiefly Saudi Arabia.

This interest in the Muslim "other" is synchronized with the advancement of the women's [liberation] movement in the West itself where some issues have melted away and the movement itself has disintegrated losing its past sparkle and, at this moment, could only move on to globalization to find a place that could bring back its past standing.

The women's globalized movement has, therefore, left its local environment to focus its attention on the worlds of the "other." It established organizations that are also globalized and concerned with salvaging the Muslim "other" woman from the grip of the Muslim man, particularly his odd fatwas. Today, feminism is a global industry that has international and global institutions and huge budgets with concerns that go beyond their own borders to reach the borders of that "other." Saudi scholars' fatwas provide it with live [ammunition] that it considers a stumbling block on the road to equality between men and women and a living example of the backwardness of that foreign "other." International feminism designs itself as a saviour of women from the

claws of inequality and partiality against them.

As the Saudi scholar fears for the women's ovaries due to driving, we find that international feminism also focuses on these ovaries and wants them for women alone and wants to liberate them from the grip of man. It is not strange that the scholar and international media have focused on these important organs of the female body since it remains the area of the decisive battle. Ovaries become a priority after the headdress and the arguments it has caused in the West. Since the 1970s, garments have become rich material for scientific research and media [commentaries]. They have even become part of governmental policies due to their links to identity, which remains ambiguous until it is manifested in a strong symbol that everyone can see.

The orientalist view does not stop at the borders of international media. It is also the preoccupation of the new Arab media based on their current orientations. The media pick up Saudi fatwas as an example of everything that is odd, underdeveloped and reactionary that gives no attention to the weight of the world or the cause or its value in the field of science and fatwas. The Arab world also wants this Saudi "other" to be a mirror that does not reflect the extent of its own development. It wants to widen the gap between the achievement of its states and societies and the Saudi "other" fearing that it might slip into its debate. The Arab believes that he has gone beyond [the issue of] fatwas on pelvises and ovaries and risen above them although not in a sufficient manner as he is far and at the same time close to it, contrary to the Western world, which is very far away.

Therefore, the Saudi scholar has provided orientalist material that is rich regionally and internationally. As for the local Saudi level, this world might have served the duality of the Saudi authority the best way possible as this duality depends on the legend of the reformist king and the reactionary scholar.

This legendary duality has been ingrained as a fixed image promoted by the local media since King Abdallah assumed power. [This image] shows the reformist king ahead of his society, pushing it forward despite the positions of reactionary scholars and their followers. Each reformist step is rejected starting from the issue of women's education in the 1960s, to the appointment of women as members of the Shura

Council, and allowing women to participate in limited elections at the municipal and chambers of commerce level. Authority seems to be above society as a source of civility and progress against the backdrop of the reactionary society and its clinging to the past and its chains.

The duality legend depends on two important pillars. The first pillar is the precedence of the wise leadership and its progress over its society. This is a revolutionary leadership regarding the subject of empowering women against the backdrop of the ferocious opposition represented by an opinion of a scholar or a fatwa of another. The second is that the scholar represents a symbol of the exacerbated reactionism within society and that had it not been for the leadership's wisdom, his ideas would have dominated and would have been transformed into resolutions obligatory to everyone. Therefore, the leadership appears to be the safety valve that protects society against slipping into reactionism and backwardness. Society should be restricted and guided so that Saudi Arabia does not roll back towards more backwardness and bygone days.

Hence, comes the increasing attention to the provocative opinions of the scholars as they become transformed, like all opinions, into a measure of the degree of prevalent ignorance at some social strata. Here, we do not need statistics that define the extent of the popularity of the fatwas on pelvises and ovaries and the extent of their acceptance by society. One example is sufficient for the observer to reach a radical conclusion that such opinions represent a large societal stratum consolidating more and more the Saudi duality necessary for instilling a new legitimacy for the leadership based on the principle of its precedence in the course of progress and development.

If this indicates anything, it shows the transformation that has occurred in Saudi legitimacy that has moved from the legend of protecting religion and commitment to its laws to a new legitimacy based on the illusion of reform and social awakening. To strengthen this transformation, the symbolism of odd fatwas remains important to remind the public of the pivotal leadership without which the country would slip backward leading to the tumbling of progress and backwardness of the awakening.

This duality instilled in the official media will not stand as it ignores various and

different spectrums in the Saudi arena whose opinions or stands might not find any space in the media as they are not sexy or entertaining and do not reprove the duality of the reformist leadership and the reactionary scholar to guarantee immunity against oppression or imprisonment. How many activists have gone to jail for no reason other than imagining real political and social awakening or having signed statements demanding civil rights for both women and men together? Those are the ones who wreck Saudi duality as they tear down its contradictory and distant pillars and corners because they are not convinced of the legend of the reformist leadership on the one hand, and the reactionary scholar on the other. Therefore, we find that they are besieged and pursued by the authorities and the scholars at the same time as both consider them to be a risk to the Saudi system in its current form. Neither the reformist king accepts the political reformist presentation, nor do the scholars accept it as an alternative to their opinions so deeply entrenched due to their oldness. Consequently, [those activists] cooperate to reduce the work areas of those interested in public affairs

Emanating from a real reformist political awakening platform that oversteps driving a car and its effects on the body of a woman.

We do not have the right to rein in the scholars and stop them from promoting their odd opinions. However, it is our right to push forward with our analysis beyond the Saudi duality to understand its meanings and consequences on the course of political reform without which the hopes of many to exit from the deadlock will not be realized.

The deadlock remains for one reason: The lack of Saudi leadership response to any political reform demands and the replacement of this file with simple social reforms it promotes as if it is a qualitative leap imposed regardless of the will of reactionary scholars. This view is sponsored by the international media, which still believe that the Saudi leadership is the one and only bastion to protect not only women in Saudi Arabia but the world against the slips of reactionary scholars. This media link social strictness and the sensitive subject related to terrorism in particular. As the leadership is the bastion of women against the lagging scholars; it is also the world's bastion against a society that produces the odd and the dangerous.

Until this duality is shattered, Saudi Arabia will continue to be a source of excitement,

particularly the fatwas of its scholars that provide the world with rich orientalist [material].

Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 7 Oct 13

Document BBCMEP0020131010e9aa000rz

8.2 ST of the First Examined News Item

مادة استشراقية دسمة من السعودية

د. مضاوي الرشيد

OCTOBER 6, 2013

كلما خرجت فتوى مثيرة او رأي من عالم سعودي ينشغل الاعلام العالمي والعربي بنشرها والتعليق عليها فيستحضر هذا الاعلام صورة الفقيه الرجعي المنغمس بفكره الذي لا يصمد امام التدقيق والتمحيص فيصبح ممثلا للاسلام ناطقا باسمه معبرا عن خفاياه ومواقفه تجاه قضايا عالقة من اهمها موضوع المرأة. فجاءت افكار عالم سعودي حول قضية قيادة المرأة للسيارة والحملة الحالية من اجل القيادة المقرر تنفيذها يوم 26 اكتوبر محملة بالاثارة والتسلية خاصة وان الفقيه اعترض على الموضوع من باب علمي هذه المرة حيث ربط القيادة بصحة الحوض النسوي والمبايض وبعد دقائق من نشر هذا الرأي تناقلت وسائل الاعلام الخبر المضحك المبكي ليتحول الى مقالات تنشرها وسائل الاعلام عالمية على صفحاتها تتناقلها الصحف العربية معلقة على تفاهتها.

ولا يمكن ان نعزي هذا الشغف بالفتوى الغريبة والاهتمام بها الا الى نظرة استشراقية منغمسة بالبحث عن هذا الآخر الغريب. من جهة الاعلام الغربي نجده اليوم يبحث عن هذا الآخر المختلف الخارج عن سياق الزمن ليقيس مدى اختلافه هو وتطوره وتجاوزه لمعضلة المرأة التي اصبحت مقياسا للشعوب ودرجة تقدمها. فالغرب اليوم يحتاج الى هذا الآخر المسلم وفتاويه ليعرف عن نفسه كبديل للظلامية والرجعية التي يعتقد انها لا تزال مستشرية في العالم الاسلامي وعلى رأسه السعودية.

ويتزامن هذا الاهتمام بالآخر المسلم مع تطور الحركة النسوية في الغرب ذاته حيث ذابت بعض القضايا وتشتتت الحركة ذاتها ففقدت بريقها السابق ولم تجد هذه اللحظة الا ان تنتقل بنفسها الى العولمة لتجد مكانا يستطيع ان يعيد اليها مكانتها السابقة. فخرجت الحركة النسوية المعولمة من محيطها المحلي لتصب اهتمامها على العوالم الاخرى واسست منظمات هي ايضا معولمة همها تخليص المرأة الاخرى المسلمة من قبضة الرجل المسلم خاصة فتاويه الغريبة. فالنسوية اليوم هي صناعة معولمة لها مؤسسات دولية وعالمية وميزانيات كبيرة همها يتجاوز حدود بلادها الى حدود ذلك الآخر. وتوفر لها فتاوى علماء السعودية مادة حية تعتبرها حجر عثرة في طريق المساواة بين المرأة والرجل ومثالا حيا لتخلف ذلك الآخر الغريب. فتتذر النسوية العالمية نفسها كمخلص للمرأة من براثن عدم المساواة والتحيز ضدها. فكما يخاف الفقيه السعودي على مبايض المرأة من سياقة السيارة نجد النسوية العالمية تركز ايضا على هذه المبايض وتريدها ان تبقى للمرأة وحدها

وتحررها من قبضة الرجل. وليس مستغربا ان الفقيه والاعلام العالمي قد ركزا على هذه الاعضاء المهمة في جسد المرأة حيث يبقى الجسد مساحة المعركة الحاسمة وتأتي المبايض كأولوية بعد الحجاب والجدل الذي يسببه في الغرب حيث منذ السبعينات تحول اللباس الى مادة دسمة للابحاث العلمية والاراء الاعلامية بل اصبح جزءا من سياسة الحكومات لارتباطه بالهوية التي تظل مبهمة حتى تظهر برمز قوي يراه الجميع.

ولا تتوقف النظرة الاستشراقية عند حدود الاعلام العالمي بل هي ايضا من شغل الاعلام العربي الجديد حسب اتجاهاته الحالية. فيلتقط الفتاوى السعودية كمثال لكل ما هو غريب متخلف ورجعي غير مهتم بوزن العالم او القضية وموقعه من الاعراب في ساحات العلم والفتاوى. فالعالم العربي هو ايضا يريد من هذا الآخر السعودي ان يكون مرآة لا تعكس مدى تطوره ويريد ان يعمق الفجوة بين انجاز دوله ومجتمعاته وبين الآخر السعودي خوفا من ان ينزلق الى جدله فيعتقد العربي انه تجاوز فتاوى الحوض والمبايض وارتفع عنها ولو لم يمكن بالدرجة الكافية فهو البعيد القريب عكس العالم الغربي البعيد جدا. ومن هنا يكون الفقيه السعودي قد وفر مادة استشراقية دسمة اقليميا وعالميا. اما محليا على مستوى السعودية فالعالم هذا يكون قد خدم ثنائية السلطة السعودية على اكبر وجه حيث تعتمد هذه الثنائية على اسطورة الملك الاصلاحي والفقيه الرجعي. ومنذ تولي الملك عبد الله السلطة نجد ان الثنائية الاسطورية هذه قد ترسخت كصورة ثابتة تروجها وسائل الاعلام المحلية ويبدو فيها الملك الاصلاحي متقدما على مجتمعه ناهضا به رغم مواقف الفقيه الرجعي ومن يتبعه. فكل خطوة اصلاحية يتم الاعتراض عليها من موضوع تعليم النساء في فترة الستينيات الى تعيين المرأة كعضو في مجلس الشورى السعودي او السماح لها بالمشاركة في الانتخابات المحدودة على مستوى البلديات او الغرف التجارية. وتبدو السلطة فوق المجتمع كمصدر للمدنية والتقدم على خلفية رجعية المجتمع وتشبثه بالماضي وقيوده. تعتمد الثنائية الاسطورة على ركيزة مهمة اولها اسبقية القيادة الحكيمة وتقدمها على مجتمعها فهي ثورية في موضوع تمكين المرأة على خلفية المعارضة الشرسة التي يمثلها رأي الفقيه او فتوى لآخر. ثانيا: يمثل الفقيه رمزا للرجعية المستشرية في المجتمع والتي لولا حكمة القيادة لطغت افكاره وتحولت الى قرارات ملزمة للجميع عندها تبدو القيادة كصمام أمان يحمي المجتمع من الانزلاق الى الرجعية والتخلف الذي يجب ان يقيد ويرشد حتى لا تتدحرج السعودية باتجاه المزيد من التخلف والماضوية. من هنا الاهتمام المتزايد بآراء الفقهاء المثيرة حيث تتحول مثل هذه الاراء الى مقياس لدرجة الجهل المستشري عند بعض فئات المجتمع. ولا نحتاج هنا الى احصائيات تحدد مدى شعبية فتاوى الحوض والمبايض ومدى تقبل المجتمع لها حيث ان مثالا واحدا يكفي لان يصل المتابع الى استنتاج عميق مفاده ان مثل هذه الاراء تمثل شريحة كبيرة من المجتمع فتترسخ اكثر واكثر الثنائية السعودية الضرورية لتثبيت شرعية جديدة للقيادة تقوم على مبدأ اسبقيتها في مسيرة التقدم والتطور.

وان دل هذا على شيء فهو يدل على تحول طرأ على الشرعية السعودية التي انتقلت من اسطورة حماية الدين والالتزام بشرعه الى شرعية جديدة تقوم على وهم الاصلاح والنهضة الاجتماعية ومن اجل تدعيم هذا التحول تبقى رمزية الفتوى الغريبة مهمة وضرورية لتذكر الجمهور بمحورية القيادة والتي بدونها تنزلق البلاد الى الخلف فيتدهور التقدم وتتخلف النهضة.

لن تصمد هذه الثنائية المترسخة في الاعلام الرسمي حيث انها تتجاهل اطيافا متنوعة ومختلفة على الساحة السعودية ربما لا يجد رأيها او موقفها مساحة في الاعلام حيث هي غير مثيرة او مسلية ولا تعيد اثبات ثنائية القيادة المصلحة والفقيه الرجعي من هنا يبقى صوتها غير مسموع ورأيها غير مهم وان هي برزت على الساحة الاعلامية نجدها مضطرة ان تعيد انتاج الثنائية لتضمن حصانة ضد القمع او السجن فكم من ناشط حقوقي دخل السجن ليس بسبب سوى انه تخيل نهضة سياسية واجتماعية حقيقية او وقع بيانا يطالب بحقوق مدنية وسياسية للمرأة والرجل معا. هؤلاء هم من يحطمون الثنائية السعودية حيث انهم يهدمون دعائمها وزواياها المتناقضة والمتباعدة فلا تقنعهم اسطورة القيادة الاصلاحية من جهة والفقيه

الرجعي من جهة اخرى لذلك نجدهم محاصرين ملاحقين من قبل السلطات والفقيه معا حيث كلاهما يعتبرهما خطرا على المنظومة السعودية بشكلها الحالي. فلا الملك الاصلاحي يقبل بالطرح الاصلاحي السياسي ولا الفقيه يرضى به كبديل لآرائه الموغلة في أزليتها من هنا يتعاون هؤلاء على تقليص مساحات عمل المهتم بالشأن العام من منطلق نهضة اصلاحية سياسية حقيقية تتجاوز قيادة السيارة وتبعياتها على جسد المرأة. ليس من حقنا ان نلجم الفقيه ونمنعه من الترويج لارائه الغريبة لكن من حقنا ان نذهب بتحليلنا الى ابعد من الثنائية السعودية لنستشرف مغزاها وتبعياتها على مسيرة الاصلاح السياسي والذي بدونه لن تتحقق آمال الكثيرين في الخروج من الطريق المسدود.
ويبقى الطريق مسدودا لسبب واحد هو عدم استجابة القيادة السعودية لاي مطلب اصلاحي سياسي والاستعاضة عن هذا الملف باصلاحات اجتماعية بسيطة يروج لها وكأنها قفزة نوعية تأتي رغم أنف الفقيه الرجعي ويتبنى هذه النظرة الاعلام العالمي الذي لا يزال يعتقد ان القيادة السعودية هي الحصن الاول والاخير في حماية ليس فقط المرأة في السعودية بل العالم من شطحات الفقيه الرجعي. ويربط هذا الاعلام بين التزمت الاجتماعي والموضوع الحساس المتعلق بالارهاب خاصة، فكما القيادة هي حصن المرأة ضد تخلف الفقيه كذلك هي حصن العالم ضد مجتمع يفرز الغريب والخطير. والى ان تتحطم الثنائية ستظل السعودية مصدر اثارة خاصة فتاوى علمائها التي تمد العالم بمادة استشراقية دسمة.
‘ كاتبة واكاديمية من الجزيرة العربية

Appendix 9 (CDA Case Study 2)

9.1 TET of the Second Examined News Item

Pan-Arab daily highlights Amnesty International's report on Saudi rights abuses
887 words
24 October
2013 16:41

BBC Monitoring Middle
East BBCMEP
English

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Text of report by London-based independent newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi website on 22 October

[Editorial: "Saudi Arabia's Influence and Human Rights Violations"]

Amnesty International has released a statement denouncing the dire record of human rights in Saudi Arabia and accusing it of failing to carry out the promises it made four years ago to address human rights violations. During a meeting of the Human Rights Council in Geneva in 2009, Saudi diplomats stated their acceptance of a series of recommendations to improve human rights conditions in their country. Amnesty International accuses Riyadh of failing to make good on those promises and, on the contrary, Saudi Arabia has stepped up its repressive measures since then.

The charges against Saudi Arabia include details of violations of human rights, such as torture, ill-treatment, and arbitrary arrest of activists and of those who call for reforms and even the founders of The Society of Civil and Political Rights established in 2009. The founders were arrested for their peaceful exercise of the right of free expression. These include Abdallah al-Hamid, who was sentenced for 10 years in prison, and Muhammad al-Qahtani, who was sentenced to 11 years in prison. Both were later released but have been banned from travel abroad.

The list of violations in Saudi Arabia is long, including executions based on hasty trials and confessions taken under torture. These violations also include, among others, segregation against women in law and practice, segregation against minorities, and ill-treatment of foreign workers. Most of these violations are spread in the Gulf States but at a lower degree than in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia relies on its political, economic, and media clout to deter the international community from criticizing its dire record on human rights.

In defence of its record on human rights, Saudi Arabia sets forth its achievements (as is contained in the report it submitted to the U.N Human Rights Council in Geneva yesterday). The report mentions the prominent role it plays within the Group of 20 as an advocate of the developing countries' rights, writing off more than $6 billion of the debts due from developing nations as well as a donation of $500,000 to the World Food Programme. According to this report, Saudi Arabia offered more than $100 billion in aid and loans over the past three decades, benefitting 95 developing nations. The report, however, does not mention or address the basic issue, namely violations

against citizens and lack of social justice.

Despite its enormous wealth, a considerable proportion of the Saudi population, estimated by some economic reports at 50 per cent, live under poverty line. This reality is a source of concern and protest, not only to Saudi citizens, but also to some princes of the ruling royal family, such as Khalid al-Faysal, who called on Saudi citizens not to believe the discourse that Saudi Arabia is one of the world's richest nations.

If we add to this the youth population, which represents approximately 60 of Saudi Arabia's population, this could be a recipe for a major domestic dilemma and a critical balance. If developments affect the economic or political equation in the region (such as major military or political disorder in the Gulf region, or a sharp fall in oil prices, this could cause major tribulations, or the emergence of uncontrollable trends in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has not seen serious attempt to solve its social justice problems. Many people see the economic decisions made in 2012 as sedatives of the pain, not a cure. Other decisions made later against non-Saudi residents gave the idea that Saudi Arabia sought to replace Arab and foreign workers with Saudi citizens in all economic sectors as a desired solution.

Saudi Arabia gives the excuse that it upholds the Islamic shar'ah in enacting some of its laws, including execution by the sword in public squares, flogging, and amputation of hands, procedures that existed as punishments approximately 14 centuries ago. While Saudi Arabia benefited from the economic and industrial developments it achieved, it rejects any development of its penal code.

The Amnesty International's report came on the eve of preparations by Saudi women to break the law that bans women from driving. Activists set this Saturday to defy the ban. Ironically, women in Saudi Arabia, who are banned from having driving license, have recently demonstrated a remarkable interest in having licenses for piloting Gliders, such as Gyrokwitters, Promoters, and Metrolite. Local reports said there is an increasing demand for piloting licenses although the fees for one course total approximately $35,000.

The Amnesty International's report coincides with Saudi Arabia's refusal of a seat in the UN Security Council, highlighting confusion in the decision-making process in Saudi Arabia. This also raised a question about the reasons that prompted Saudi Arabia to apply for the seat only to reject it later. All these developments indicate that Saudi Arabia feels that there is a decline in its regional role and weight, and that it fears a settlement between the Western nations and Iran at its expense and at the expense of Arabs in general.

Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 22 Oct 13

Document BBCMEP0020131024e9ao004h6

9.2 ST of the Second Examined News Item

نفوذ السعودية وانتهاكات حقوق الانسان

رأي القدس

OCTOBER 21, 2013

اصدرت منظمة العفو الدولية (امنستي انترناشيونال) بيانا نددت فيه بالاوضاع السيئة لحقوق الانسان في السعودية، واتهمتها بالتقاعس عن الوفاء بوعود قدمتها قبل اربعة اعوام لمعالجة هذه الانتهاكات.
وكان دبلوماسيون سعوديون اعلنوا اثناء لقاء للجنة حقوق الانسان في جنيف عام 2009 قبولهم سلسلة توصيات لتحسين اوضاع حقوق الانسان، وتتهم المنظمة الرياض بعدم الايفاء بأي من تلك الوعود، بل على العكس من ذلك صعّدت المملكة من القمع خلال هذه الفترة.
الاتهامات للسلطات السعودية تتضمن تفاصيل لانتهاكات حقوق الانسان، من ضمنها التعذيب وصنوف المعاملة السيئة والاعتقال التعسفي للناشطين ومطالبي الاصلاحات، ومن ضمنهم مؤسسو جمعية الحقوق المدنية والسياسية التي انشئت عام 2009، والذين اعتقلوا لممارستهم السلمية لحقوقهم بحرية التعبير، ومن بين هؤلاء عبد الله الحامد ومحمد القحطاني اللذان حكما بالسجن عشرة اعوام للحامد و11 للقحطان اضافة لمنعهما من السفر بعد الافراج عنهما.
قائمة الانتهاكات في المملكة طويلة، منها الاعدامات المبنية على محاكمات عاجلة واعترافات منتزعة تحت التعذيب، وتتضمن الانتهاكات التمييز ضد المرأة في القانون والممارسة، والتمييز ضد الاقليات واساءة معاملة الوافدين، ومعظم هذه الانتهاكات منتشرة في دول الخليج، وان كانت بدرجة أقل، لكن السعودية تعتمد على نفوذها السياسي والاقتصادي والاعلامي لمنع المجتمع الدولي من انتقاد سجلها السيىء بحقوق الانسان.
ففي دفاعها عن سجلها في حقوق الانسان تستعرض انجازاتها (حسب تقريرها الذي قدمته لمجلس الامم المتحدة لحقوق الانسان في جنيف أمس) من خلال دورها البارز داخل مجموعة العشرين كمدافع عن حقوق الدول النامية، حيث تنازلت عما يزيد عن ستة مليارات دولار من ديونها المستحقة على دول نامية، اضافة لتبرعها بمبلغ نصف مليار دولار لبرنامج الغذاء العالمي، وبحسب التقرير فان ما قدمته السعودية من مساعدات وقروض خلال العقود الثلاثة الاخيرة يزيد عن مئة مليار دولار استفادت منها 95 دولة نامية، ولا يبدو

ان تقرير المملكة يخاطب القضية الاساسية وهي الانتهاكات ضد المواطنين، وعدم العدالة الاجتماعية.
رغم غنى السعودية فهناك نسبة كبيرة من سكانها، تقدرها بعض الارقام الاقتصادية بـ50 بالمئة، هم تحت خط الفقر، وهذا الأمر محل قلق واحتجاج ليس فقط من المواطنين السعوديين بل حتى من بعض امراء العائلة الحاكمة مثل خالد الفيصل الذي طالب السعوديين ان لا يصدقوا مقولة ان السعودية 'دولة من اغنى دول العالم'.
واذا عطفنا ذلك على نسبة الشباب التي تقارب 60 بالمئة من عدد السكان فاننا نشهد عملياً وصفة لمعضلة داخلية كبيرة ولتوازن حرج يمكن، نتيجة تطورات مؤثرة على المعادلة الاقتصادية او السياسية في المنطقة (مثل حصول خلل عسكري وسياسي كبير في منطقة الخليج او هبوط أسعار النفط بشكل حاد)، أن يدفعا بالمملكة الى خضات كبيرة او اتجاهات لا يمكنها السيطرة عليها.
لم تشهد المملكة محاولات جدية لحل مشاكل العدالة الاجتماعية فيها، وقد اعتبر الكثيرون ان القرارات الاقتصادية الصادرة عام 2012 حبوب تسكين للالم اكثر من علاج له، فيما توجهت قرارات اخرى لاحقا ضد المقيمين غير السعوديين بحيث قدمت فكرة احلال مواطني المملكة الأصليين محل أقرانهم من العرب والاجانب في القطاعات الاقتصادية كافة على أنها الحلّ المنشود.
السعودية تتذرع باستنادها الى الشريعة الاسلامية في بعض قوانينها، ومنها الاعدام بالسيف بالساحات العامة والجلد وقطع الاطراف، وهي الاجراءات التي كانت موجودة كعقوبات قبل نحو اربعة عشر قرنا، وفي حين استفادت المملكة من التطورات الاقتصادية والصناعية التي تمت خلال هذه الفترة، الا انها ترفض اي تطوير لقانون العقوبات.
تقرير منظمة العفو الدولية يأتي عشية استعدادات المرأة السعودية لخرق قانون منعها من قيادة السيارة، حيث حدد الناشطون يوم السبت المقبل لتحدي الحظر.
ومن المثير للسخرية ان المرأة في السعودية المحرومة من رخصة قيادة السيارة تقبل بشكل لافت على حيازة رخصة طائرات 'الجايروكوبتر' و'البروموتر وميترولايت' الشراعية، حيث ذكرت تقارير محلية ان هذه الظاهرة تجد اقبالا كبيرا في الاونة الاخيرة على الرغم من ان اسعار دورتها حوالي 35 الف دولار.
يتزامن تقرير منظمة العفو الدولية مع قرار السعودية عدم قبول مقعد مجلس الامن في الامم المتحدة، مما سلط الاضواء على بلبلة في عملية اتخاذ القرارات في المملكة، وايضا حول الاسباب التي دفعتها الى الترشح ثم الى الانسحاب، وكلها تشير الى شعور السعودية بان هناك تراجعا بدورها ووزنها الاقليميين وخشيتها من تسوية بين الغرب وايران، تكون على حسابها وحساب العرب عموما.

Appendix 10 (CDA Case Study 2)

10.1 TET of the Third Examined News Item

Saudi fighters in Syria reportedly surrender to authorities in Lebanon

830 words
21 April 2014
10:05

BBC Monitoring Middle East BBCMEP
English

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Text of report by London-based independent newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi website on 18 April

[Unattributed report from London: "Saudi Nationals Fleeing al-Qalamun Give Themselves up to Their Country's Embassy in Beirut"]

Al-Quds al-Arabi has learned that tens of Saudi nationals - who fought alongside al-Nusrah Front in the Syrian al-Qalamun area and fled to Lebanon after the Syrian regime's forces, supported by Hezbollah men, controlled the area - gave themselves up to the Saudi Embassy in Beirut, which secured their return to their country.

Sources said that the Saudi embassy in Beirut asked the Lebanese authorities to facilitate the entry of any Saudi national who flees Syria and abandons armed Islamic groups in Syria. The embassy also asked the Lebanese authorities to hold any one of them who enters Lebanon in safe locations away from supporters of the Syrian regime and extremist Islamic groups.

Members of the Saudi embassy staff, through influential parties, communicate with misled Saudi nationals who joined Islamic groups to fight in Syria, in order to persuade them to return to their country.

Last month, Saudi Arabia passed a law criminalizing any Saudi national who joins any terrorist group fighting abroad. Under this law, any Saudi national who joins such groups will be imprisoned for up to 20 years. The law considers the al-Qaʿida Organization, DA'ISH [Arabic acronym for ISIL, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], and al-Nusrah Front that are fighting in Syria terrorist movements. The Saudi authorities gave an amnesty period to any Saudi national who fought in Syria. The period ended in the middle of March, but it appears that the Saudi authorities extended the amnesty period for some special cases.

The Saudi embassies in Amman, Beirut, and Ankara received many Saudi nationals

who fled Syria and secured their return to their country. The Saudi authorities issued instructions to their embassies in Amman and Beirut and their consulate in Istanbul to provide all possible facilities for any Saudi national who wants to abandon the armed organizations in Syria.

The Saudi ambassador to Jordan, Dr Sami al-Salih, said: "In implementation of directives, all the embassy's resources have been used to receive any misled Saudi national who fought in Syria and wishes to go back to his country."

He added in a press statement: "The Saudi embassy is ready to receive any Saudi national who returns from Syria. The embassy will secure accommodation for him until official documents and travel tickets have been issued and measures to ensure his safe return to the kingdom have been completed."

For his part, Saudi Ambassador to Lebanon Ali Asiri affirmed that his country's embassy received the same directives and that it is making efforts to help any Saudi family that seeks to bring back from Syria any of its sons.

Speaking to the Makkah Newspaper, he said: "Other measures that will be taken after they (the Saudi returnees) arrive are not part of our job. The Saudi authorities will be responsible for them."

The Saudi ambassador denied that his country's authorities have accurate figures about the number of "the misled Saudis who are fighting in Syria."

It was learned that the Saudi authorities are working with the Islamic and non-Islamic organizations that Saudi Arabia supports both financially and militarily in order to secure the return of any Saudi fighters who are fighting on the side of these organizations. The Saudi authorities also urge these organizations to hand over any Saudi national captured in fighting alongside DA'ISH.

However, Saudi sources estimate their number at 1500–2000. Most of these Saudis joined al-Nusrah Front and some of them are fighting alongside DA'ISH, which is most extreme.

The Saudi authorities hope that hundreds of Saudi citizens will return. They are fighting in Syria in response to fatawa [Islamic religious rulings] issued by Saudi clergymen, such as Sheikh Muhammad al-Urayfi, and non-Saudi clergymen, such as Sheikh Adnan al-Ar'ur. The Saudi media launched an attack on them, accusing them of deceiving Saudi youths.

About a week ago, the Saudi monarch, King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz, issued a royal order under which every person who participated in fighting outside the kingdom or belong to religious and extremist intellectual trends or groups will be punished by imprisonment for a period ranging from 3 to 20 years as maximum.

The royal order punishes every person who belongs to religious or extremist intellectual trends or groups or groups classified as terrorist organizations domestically, regionally, or internationally, supports or adopts their thought or policy in any form, explicitly shows sympathy with them through any means, extends any form of material or moral support to them, or incites to, encourages, or promotes such actions verbally or in writing in any way.

Source: al-Quds al-Arabi website, London, in Arabic 0000 gmt 18 Apr 14

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10.2 ST of the Third Examined News Item

سعوديون هاربون من القلمون يسلمون أنفسهم لسفارة بلادهم في بيروت

APRIL 18, 2014

لندن ـ ‘القدس العربي’: علمت ‘القدس العربي’ أن عشرات السعوديين الذين كانوا يقاتلون مع ‘جبهة النصرة’ في منطقة القلمون السورية، وهربوا الى لبنان بعد سيطرة قوات النظام السوري المدعومة بعناصر حزب الله على المنطقة ،سلموا أنفسهم للسفارة السعودية في بيروت التي أمنت عودتهم الى بلادهم.
وقالت المصادر إن السفارة السعودية طلبت من السلطات اللبنانية تسهيل دخول أي سعودي يهرب من سوريا ويتخلى عن انضمامه للجماعات الإسلامية المسلحة في سوريا واحتجازه في أماكن آمنة بعيدا عن أعين أعوان النظام السوري وأعوان الجماعات الإسلامية المتطرفة

وتقوم جهات في السفارة السعودية عبر جهات نافذة بالإتصال مع السعوديين الذين غرر بهم ' والتحقوا مع الجماعات الإسلامية للقتال في سوريا لإقناعهم بالعودة الى بلادهم .

وكانت السعودية قد أصدرت الشهر الماضي قانونا يجرم أي سعودي يلتحق بأي جماعة إرهابية تقاتل في الخارج وبسجنه الى مدة تصل الى 20 عاما واعتبر القانون تنظيم القاعدة وحركتي 'داعش'، و'جبهة النصرة 'التي تقاتل في سوريا حركات إرهابية، وأعطت السلطات السعودية فترة عفو لمن قاتل في سوريا انتهت في منصف شهر اذار/مارس الماضي، ولكن يبدو أن السلطات السعودية مددت فترة العفو لبعض الحالات الخاصة.

واستقبلت سفارات السعودية في عمان وبيروت وأنقرة العديد من السعوديين الذين هربوا من سوريا وأمنت عودتهم لبلادهم وأعطت السلطات السعودية تعليماتها لسفارتيها في عمان وبيروت وقنصليتها في اسطنبول، لتقديم كل التسهيلات الممكنة لأي سعودي يرغب بترك التنظيمات المسلحة في سوريا، وصرح السفير السعودي لدى الأردن الدكتور سامي الصالح 'أنه تنفيذا للتوجيهات فإن جميع إمكانات السفارة معدة لاستقبال أي سعودي مغرر به ويقاتل في سوريا ويريد العودة الى بلده'.

وأشار في تصريح صحافي 'إن السفارة السعودية مستعدة لاستقبال أي سعودي يعود من سوريا وتؤمن له الاقامة الى حين استصدار الوثائق الرسمية له وتذاكر السفر وإنهاء إجراءات سفره وتأمين عودته سالما للمملكة'.

كما أكد السفير السعودي لدى لبنان علي عسيري أن سفارة بلاده تلقت التوجيهات نفسها، وأنها تبذل جهودها لمساعدة أي عائلة سعودية تريد استعادة أي من أبنائها من سوريا، وأوضح لصحيفة 'مكة' أن 'الإجراءات الأخرى بعد وصولهم ـ السعوديين العائدين ـ ليست من مهامنا بل هي من اختصاص السلطات السعودية'، ونفى السفير السعودي أن يكون لدى سلطات بلاده أعدادا دقيقة حول عدد السعوديين 'المغرر بهم ويقاتلون في سوريا'.

وعلم أن السلطات السعودية تسعى لدى التنظيمات الإسلامية وغير الاسلامية التي تدعمها ماليا وعسكريا من أجل إعادة أي مقاتلين سعوديين يحاربون الى جانبها، كما تحثها على تسليم أي سعودي يتم أسره خلال القتال مع تنظيم 'داعش'.

إلا أن مصادر سعودية تقدر عددهم بأنه يتراوح بين 1500 و2000 سعودي معظمهم انضم الى 'جبهة النصرة' وبعضهم يقاتل مع 'داعش' الأكثر تطرفا.وتأمل السلطات السعودية أن يعود المئات من مواطنيها الذين يقاتلون في سوريا استجابة لفتاوى رجال دين سعوديين مثل الشيخ محمد العريفي، وغير سعوديين مثل الشيخ عدنان العرعور، وشن الإعلام السعودي هجوما على هؤلاء متهما إياهم بالتغرير بالشباب السعودي، وأصدر العاهل السعودي الملك عبدالله بن عبد العزيز قبل نحو أسبوع أمرا ملكيا يعاقب بموجبه بالسجن مدة تبدأ من 3 سنوات ولا تزيد على عشرين عاما كل من شارك في أعمال قتالية خارج المملكة أو الانتماء للتيارات أو الجماعات الدينية والفكرية المتطرفة.

وبوجب الأمر الملكي يعاقب كل من ينتمي للتيارات أو الجماعات ـ وما في حكمها ـ الدينية أو الفكرية المتطرفة أو المصنفة كمنظمات إرهابية داخلياً أو إقليمياً أو دولياً، تأييدها أو تبني فكرها أو منهجها بأي صورة كانت، أو الإفصاح عن التعاطف معها بأي وسيلة كانت، أو تقديم أي من أشكال الدعم المادي أو المعنوي لها، أو التحـــريض على شيء من ذلك أو التشجيع عليه أو التــرويـج له بالقول أو الكتابة بأي طريقة.

Appendix 11 (CDA Case Study 3)

11.1 Transcription of al-Arabiyah's Audio-Visuals

11.1.1 Audio-Visual 1 Transcribed (ST 1)

600 سعودي انضموا إلى صفوف "القاعدة" في سوريا

حلقة "صناعة الموت" تكشف مصير أخطر مطلوب سعودي

[موسيقى مقدمة البرنامج]

المحاور: حشد المقاتلين والانتحاريين من البلدان العربية والإسلامية، هذه استراتيجية ثابتة تطبقها القاعدة كلما أرادت أن تصنع الموت والفوضى في جبهة جديدة، حدث هذا من قبل في أفغانستان والعراق ويحدث الآن بصورة أخرى في سوريا، مع فارق جوهري يرصده المحللون، وهو تغير جنسيات المقاتلين الذين يتم حشدهم.

حيث أصبح للتوانسة والليبيين عدد أكبر مقابل انخفاض ملحوظ في نسبة السعوديين والخليجيين بشكل عام، ما سر هذا الاختلاف في روافد التطرف، وما دلالة ذلك بالنسبة للتغيرات التي تحدث في بُنية تنظيم القاعدة في السنوات الأخيرة. حلقة جديدة من صناعة الموت، أهلاً بكم.

[موسيقى]

المحاور: اسمحوا لي في بداية هذه الحلقة أن أرحب بضيفي هنا في الاستوديو الصحفي السعودي فارس بن حزام، فارس أهلاً بك لهذه الحلقة من صناعة الموت، كما قلنا قبل قليل هناك انخفاض ملحوظ في نسبة السعوديين الذين تم استدراجهم لتنظيم القاعدة للقتال في سوريا، مقارنة ببقية المقاتلين من البلدان العربية والإسلامية، كيف ذلك؟

فارس بن حزام: يعني بلغة الأرقام، وإن لم تكن-- دقيقة، ولكن حسب ما يتم رصده، وما يتم متابعته، نستطيع أن نقارن ما جرى في سوريا اليوم إلى 3 سنوات نتحدث يعني منذ بداية 2011 والآن احنا على مشارف2014 ، يعني بيصير كم ثلاث سنوات-- إذا قارنا هذي الثلاث سنوات، مع أول ثلاث سنوات في مرحلة العراق، بين 2003 إلى 2006 وقارناها بتجارب أخرى، البوسنة والهرسك، كوسوفو، أفغانستان، باكستان، اليمن، نجد الفارق كبير-- في إعداد السعوديين الذين توجهوا لسوريا اليوم بين الذين توجهوا هناك.

الرقم التقديري اليوم يُحكى تقديرياً أن السعوديين الذين توجهوا إلى سوريا في مجملهم نحو 600 شخص، يزيد، ينقص قليلاً بينما في مثل هذه الفترة كانت في العراق على مدى ثلاث سنوات، في أول ثلاث سنوات كان الرقم أكبر بكثير، رقم تجاوز ال 3000سعودي دخلوا إلى العراق، أكيد طبعاً منهم قُتل مثل ما هو الحال في سوريا اليوم، فهذه هي المقارنة في وضع السعوديين اليوم-- كأقرب مثال عندنا العراق، وأيضاً إذا قارناها بأمثلة هي أصغر طبعاً،الي هي تجربة اليمن إذا لم تأخذ هذه المساحة الكبيرة مثل سوريا اليوم.

المحاور: طيب، نحن نتحدث عن تقريباً 600 مقاتل، هل هم جميعاً مع تنظيم القاعدة، أم مع جهات، ميليشيات أو عناصر أو تنظيمات أخرى في ال-- في سوريا؟

فارس بن حزام: تركيبة الكتايب المسلحة والمجموعات المسلحة في العراق لا تسمح بدخول الـ-- لأجانب كثر-- إلا في التنظيمات التي لها طابع خارجي، ولا يظهر لنا في الساحة اليوم إلا تنظيم جبهة النَصرة الذي هو تبع لاحقاً تنظيم القاعدة، وأيضاً تنظيم القاعدة المسمى اليوم داعش، فغالبية العرب، السعوديين وغيرهم لا يتوجهون لهذين التنظيمين، وطبعاً السواد الأعظم يتجه إلى تنظيم القاعدة، بينما كان في البداية يتجه إلى جبهة النُصرة، لكن الآن السواد الأعظم يتجه إلى تنظيم القاعدة المسمى الدولة الاسلامية بالعراق الشام، أو ما يختصر إليها باسم داعش.

المحاور: طيب، هذا الانخفاض جاء لصالح جنسيات أخرى، لماذا؟

فارس بن حزام: الصدارة، الواضح ولأول مرة يعني تشهد-- نشهد هذا التباين أن اليوم جنسيتين من الدرجة الأولى، تونس وليبيا-- هما في المركز الأول والمركز الثاني في أعداد الجنسيات اذا وزعنا في التركيبة الديموغرافية لتنظيم القاعدة لجبهة النُصرة في سوريا، هما الأول والثاني، تونس وليبيا، والسعودية تأتي خامساً وقبلها طبعاً هناك مبدئياً العراق ونستطيع أن نقول نوعاً ما الأردن.--

هذا التقدم الملحوظ عند تونس وليبيا والتراجع الملحوظ عند السعودية لابد انه ينظر الى ظروف هذه البلدان، لابد من مقارنة الوضع الذي في السعودية اليوم مع الوضع الذي فيه تونس وليبيا، تونس المنظومة الأمنية به ليست متكاملة، بعد ثورته يعيش قلاقل أمنيه وأيضاً ال-- ال-- التجربة في ليبيا يعني المنظومة الأمنية نستطيع أن نقول إنها مختفية تماماً، بعكس القوة الأمنية الموجودة في السعودية، في هذا الجانب.

العنصر الثاني غير الأمني هو العنصر التوعوي، لم تكن هناك في تونس أو في ليبيا اي تجارب عنيفة في الفترة الماضية في تجربة الارهاب والقاعدة، ليحذر منها المجتمع، وليبذل المجتمع جهد في مكافحتها، يعني تعتبر قصة حديثة بالنسبة لهم، عكس السعودية التي عاشت سنوات طويلة، ربع قرن، في موضوع الارهاب، ولذا هناك جهد مجتمعي هائل يوازيه مجتمع جهد حكومي، واذا نظرنا بالتقسيمات الأخرى ان كان هناك دور لمؤسسات الدولة، دور لمؤسسات الاعلام، دور للمؤسسات او لطبيعة الناس في تحذير وتوعية الشباب من الذهاب الى ساحات القتال التي في الأصل لا تحتاج اليهم، سواء كانت في سوريا اليوم او في العراق، لأن اذا كان هناك الهدف هو دعم لهذا البلد ضد ظالم، مثل ما هو حاصل في سوريا اليوم، فالسوريون أولى في الدفاع عن بلدهم، وهم ليسوا بأقلية في الشباب السوري، العدد السوريون هو عدد هائل، ويستطيعوا يدافعوا عن انفسهم، كما نرى اليوم في الجيش السوري الحر عشرات الآلاف من المقاتلين، فبالتالي لا حاجة لذهاب مقاتلين سعوديين مثلما لم تكن هناك حاجة في الثمانينيات عندما ذهب السعوديون وغيرهم العرب الى أفغانستان بينما كان هناك عشرات الالاف من المقاتلين الأفغان الذين لا يحتاجون الى العنصر السعودي او العنصر المصري.

المحاور: طب أشرت انت الى تطور في الجانب الدعوي والمجتمعي في هذا الإطار بالذات نتوقف مع هذه التغريدات للداعية السعودي الدكتور محمد السعيدي، والتي أثارت جدلا واسعا في مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي، أيضا في تلك المواقع التابعة او الموالية لتنظيم القاعدة.

]موسيقى خلفية[

تسجيل صوتي: الدكتور محمد السعيدي رجل دين بارز في المشهد السعودي، أطل عبر تويتر بآراء عن القاعدة، كان منها:

"منذ ثلاثة وعشرين عاما أبحث عن مثال واحد لعمل قامت به القاعدة، وجاءت عواقبه خيرا للإسلام والمسلمين فلم أجد".

"دخلت القاعدة في قرار طالبان، فاحتلت أمريكا افغانستان، وأعادت جذوة الحرب الأهلية وأقامت حكومتها الحالية، ولا يزال الوضع هناك في منتهى السوء".

"كل تلك المؤسسات التي تدعم الدعوة والعمل الخيري في العالم حوصرت، والسبب الأول القاعدة التي تذرع العالم بها لإيقاف الخير الذي كان يتدفق من هنا".

"على منوال دولة العراق، التي كانت اداة لضرب المجاهدين في العراق، قامت دولة داعش، لتضرب المجاهدين في الشام".

"تقوم دولة داعش بالتحرش بتركيا، حتى تضطر الأخيرة لمضايقة المجاهدين، والتضييق على طرق امداداتهم".

"الملاحظ في القاعدة منذ نشأتها انها لا تتعرض لإيران ابدا، فاذا كانت الدول السنية التي تتعرض لهجمات القاعدة كافرة وعميلة، فلماذا نجت إيران؟"

"الذين قاتلوا الحوثيين في اليمن مدى السنوات الماضية هم حزب الاصلاح والحكومة والسلفيون وتجمع القبائل كتاف وعاهم، ولا ذكر للقاعدة في موقف هناك".

]موسيقى خلفية[

المحاور: طبعا بعد مشاهدتنا لهذه التغريدات للدكتور محمد السعيدي، كيف يمكن ان نعلق عليها؟ هناك اشخاص كانوا صامتين فيما يتعلق بتنظيم القاعدة، هناك أشخاص اخرون او اخرين كانوا موالين للقاعدة، كيف يمكن رصد هذه التغريدات؟

فارس بن حزام: طبعا حديث الدكتور محمد السعيدي حديث مباشر، واستخدم لغة مباشرة لانه استخدم موقع تويتر، فبالتالي الكلمات لازم تكون دقيقة مباشرة وليست خطابية أو دعوية، استعرض في أكثر من عشر تغريدات نقاط اساسية على مدى ربع قرن في تجربة القاعدة في الوطن العربي والاسلامي، وفصلها بنقاط قصيرة توصل الى المتلقي في تويتر العادي ليتعرف ماذا فعلت القاعدة، ليصل الى نتيجة نهائية ان القاعدة لم تقدم شيء للعالم الاسلامي، وكل ما قدمته هو الضرر الاسلامي، ووضع في الأخير تساؤلاته الأخيرة هل القاعدة هي، ما يشير اليه، هل هي مخترقة سياسيا من دول اخرى عندما يقول لا تستهدف ايران، لا تستهدف حلفاء ايران، ان كانوا حزب الله في مثلا، في لبنان، او الحوثيين في اليمن، فمثل هذه الاشارات يعني تبصر الجمهور أن القاعدة وان كانت هي تنظيم سني سلفي، لكن قد يكون مخترق او متحالف مع تنظيم أخر مع جماعة اخرى مختلفة عنها عقائديا ولكن لأهداف سياسية لاحقة، لان اذا كان هذان الطرفان إيران والقاعدة، اليوم لديهم خصم واحد و أساسي مثلا هو الدول العربية أو بالدرجة الأولى السعودية، فلا مانع من الاتحاد بينهم وهذا ليس غريبا على تنظيم القاعدة وليس غريبا على ايران، لأن في الأخير القاعدة تمارس عمل سيأسى للوصول لهدف وايران ايضا تمارس هدف سيأسى للوصول لهدف حتى لو كانت هي مؤسسة أو تحت غطاء ديني.

المحاور: طيب، مع الأخذ في الاعتبار موقف المملكة من النظام في دمشق، كيف تمكن هؤلاء وان كنت أشرت الى انهم تقريبا وصلوا الى الربع مقارنة بدول أخرى، كيف تمكن هؤلاء من الوصول الى الأراضي السورية وبينهم مطلوبين على لوائح الارهاب السعودية؟

فارس بن حزام: و بينهم خارجين حديثا من السجن في القضايا القاعدة، عندنا الأن ثلاثة نماذج للسعوديين الذين ذهبوا للعراق، هناك النموذج الأول الذى لا شبهة جنائية عليه، ولا شبهة ممكن ان تكون يفكر ان أفكار متطرفة أو يلتحق بتنظيم القاعدة و كذه، هذا لا تستطيع منعه من السفر هو مواطن طبيعي يستطيع أن يسافر، فهؤلاء--هذه المجموعة من هذه الفئة الذى ينتمى اليها يذهبوا مباشرة مثلا الى اسطنبول أو بيروت، تمام؟، لا أحد يستطيع يمنعهم في السعودية من السفر لأن هو مواطن طبيعي يحق له السفر و من بيروت أو من اسطنبول هناك وسطاء ينقلونهم الى داخل سوريا. الفئة

الثانية التي تعل—هي تعلم في داخلها انها مسموح لها السفر ولكن تخشى أن الأمن سيلاحقها وسينتبه اليها فبالتالي لا تأخذ الطريق المباشر الى اسطنبول أو غيره، تأخذ عدة محطات قبل الوصول لبيروت واسطنبول، اما السفر لدبي أو الدوحة أو البحرين أو القاهرة، يعنى تاخد لفة طويلة للوصول لإسطنبول ومن ثم الوسطاء ينقلونه لسوريا. أما الفئة الثالثة التي هي للتو أفرج عنها بعد أن تعهدت أمام الأجهزة الأمنية أنها تابت عن مشروع القاعدة وتراجعت وبدأت تصحح أفكارها، ولا هؤلاء لا يملكون جوازات سفر ولا وثائق، فهؤلاء يتسللون الى اليمن وهناك من هو في اليمن يسهل لهم الحصول على جوازات سفر مزورة تمكنهم من الانتقال من صنعاء الى اسطنبول او من صنعاء الى بيروت، ومن ثم والوصول لهذا الوسيط الذي ينقلهم تاليا الى داخل سوريا. فها هو لدينا ثلاث نماذج، لا يوجد نموذج رابع حسب ال 600 شخص السعودي اللي على الاقل—اللي انتقل لسوريا خلال ثلاث سنوات.

المحاور: طيب، أستاذ فارس سنتوقف مع فاصل قصير نتابع بعده قصة السعودي أحمد الشايع الذي أحرقته القاعدة في بغداد قبل عقد، أين هو اليوم؟

تسجيل صوتي: أحمد الشايع أكثر أسم عرفه الرأي العام السعودي في قضية المتورطين في العراق، شاب جعلته القاعدة وسيلة لاستهداف السفارة الأردنية في بغداد، ديسمبر 2004، حدث الانفجار مخلفا الضحايا وأحدهم أحمد الذي تلظى بنيران قاعدته ليعتقل وكله حروق. تحدث الى الاعلام العراقي عن كل ما جرى.

أحمد الشايع: سافرت من السعودية.

المحاور2: الى وين؟

أحمد الشايع: الى سوريا من نهاية رمضان.

المحاور2: من أي منطقة او نقطة دخلت العراق من سوريا؟

من البو كمال الى القائم أحمد الشايع:

المحاور2: من هو اللي اتكلف بيك—اتكلف بيك ودخلك العراق؟

أحمد الشايع: هو مهرب أسمه أبو محمد.

المحاور2: قديش بقيت بالرمادي؟

أحمد الشايع: بالرمادي بقيت تقريبا حوالي شهر وعشر أيام.

المحاور2: وين سلموك الشاحنة -- مال الغاز؟

أحمد الشايع: سلموني الشاحنة عند الاستدارة

المحاور2: أي استدارة أي مكان؟

أحمد الشايع: قريب من برج صدام.

المحاور: شنو توجيهاتهم للشاحنة، شو قالو لك شو فهموك؟ وين توصل الشاحنة شلون صارت الحادثة؟

احمد الشايع: قالولى توصل الشاحنة وتطلع للمكان هذا اللى ورينالك قبل وتطلع قبل وتطلع يمين ويجوك اصحابنا وتوقف يجون ياخدون التنكر منك انا أول ما وقفت انفجر التنكر بي.

تسجيل صوتي: أقام فترة في السجن وبذلت السعودية جهدا لاستعادته، عاد أحمد الشايع الى الرياض بعد أشهرا ليبدأ علاجا طويلا لحروق الجسد وجروح الفكر، وتحول الى أيقونة يتعلم منها جيله وجيلا بعده والنهايات غير السعيدة. بعد رحلة علاج طويلة في السعودية استعاد أحمد الشايع عافيته وعاد لممارسة حياته الطبيعية قبل أن يختفي فجأة ليعود مقاتلًا في صفوف القاعدة في سوريا التي أحرقته قبل عقد.

]موسيقى خلفية[

المحاور: أهلًا بكم مجددًا، أرحب بضيفي في الاستديو الأستاذ فارس بن حزام، الصحفي السعودي. أستاذ فارس. أهلًا بك مجددًا. كما تابعنا في التقرير السابق عن أحمد الشايع، إنسان يتعرض لهذه التجربة المريرة ثم يعود مرةً أخرى حسب التسريبات ليقاتل في صفوف التنظيم الذي تسبب في مأساته في الأساس. كيف؟

فارس بن حزام: والله الواقع فعلًا أنه اتجه إلى سوريا قبل أشهر، بصمت من دون أن يعلم أحد، حتى خبر لم يظهر على المواقع أو على وسائل الإعلام، أعتقد أن المتلقي اليوم إذا سمع أن أحمد الشايع الذي تعرف على قصته خلال العشر سنوات الماضية، وأحمد الذي ظهر كثيرًا على وسائل الإعلام يتحدث عن مرارة التجربة ويحمد الله على أن عاد إلى الحياة بعد أن شارف على الموت، احترق جسمه كليًا، أعتقد أن الرأي العام سيُصدم اليوم أنه كيف بعد هذه التجربة يعود الإنسان إلى مجموعة هو يقول إنها بالفعل كادت أن تقتله وخدعته. أعتقد أن هذه القصة شوي مؤلمة بالدرجة الأولى للمجتمع وأيضًا مؤلمة لأسرته التي عانت الأمرين منذ ظهور والدها متحدثًا عبر وسائل الإعلام في 2004 يعني شاكيًا من الذين ورطوا ابنه في 2004 وأرسلوه إلى العراق. لا أعلم ماذا سيقول اليوم؟ ماذا ستقول أسرة أحمد اليوم؟ من الذي أرسل أحمد مـ مجددًا إلى سوريا؟ ماذا يملك أحمد اليوم؟ هو صحيح متعافي ولكن فاقد أطراف من اصابعه ولا زال مرهقًا ولا زالت الجروح والحروق لا زالت بادية عليه. لا أعلم ماذا سيفعل، ماذا سيفعل أحمد في سوريا؟

المحاور: وهذا يطرح...

فارس بن حزام: هل سيتحول الى شخصية انتحارية جديدة.

المحاور: هذا يطرح المزيد من التساؤلات

المحاور: هذا يطرح المزيد من التساؤلات، ولكن أيضًا هناك مآسي وتجارب مريرة، مع القاعدة عاشها السعوديون.

فارس بن حزام: يعني أصعب قصة أخرى، حتى التي لم تظهر إلى وسائل الإعلام حتى الآن، هي قصة شخص عرفه الناس كاسم الأول، المطلوب الأول في قائمة الخمسة والثمانين التي صدرت في 2009، والناس تعرفه باسم النجم، أو تعرفه باسمه الطبيعي صالح القرعاوي، شاب من منطقة القصيم، ذهب إلى القاعدة، كان أحد المسؤولين عن المجموعات السعودية التي تتنقل داخل إيران، وباكستان، وأفغانستان، هو صاحب صلة وصل مع عدة أطراف وصولًا إلى لبنان، هذا

الشخص الذي كان يصنف كقيادي وهو واجهه لم يكن قياديًا فعليًا، أصيب إصابة بالغة -- فقد أطرافه، فقد عينيه، كاد أن يموت، تركته مجموعته ملقى على الأرض، حتى تم التوصل إليه عن طريق السلطات بالخارج، ونقل للسعودية ليعالج، وهو لليوم يعالج في السعودية، من يعني هول ما شفته، عندما رأيت صورة صالح القرعاوي يعني الإنسان يقول: الحمد لله على كل حال. يعني لا يتخيل شاب في هذا في هذا في مقتبل العمر، وبهذا الـ الذي كان منظره أنيق، وورط حاله في هذه النهايات، ووجد النهاية التي يعني لا نقول الحمد لله على كل حال، الرجل موجود اليوم بالسعودية يتعالج، وبكل تأكيد موقوف لأنه متورط في أحداث داخل السعودية، لكن لا أريد أن أربطه بشكل أحمد الشايع الذي بعد أن تمت معالجته وبعد سنوات اتجه إلى سوريا ليقتل، لا أعلم مصير صانع القرار لاحقًا يعني.

المحاور: طيب طبعًا نعتذر للسادة المشاهدين على هذه اللقطات الشنيعة التي تمثل مأساة حقيقة، ولكن على الرغم من هذه المأساة مازال.

فارس بن حزام: شخص عرفه الناس.

المحاور: نعم.

فارس بن حزام: كواجهه وكقيادي.

المحاور: لكن مازال بعض الأشخاص يدفعون بأبنائهم للقتال في صفوف القاعدة.

فارس بن حزام: ويفتخرون بذلك، يعني أحدث قصة عندنا اليوم، أنا لأول مرة نعيش في السعودية، الإنسان يفرح بإرسال ابنه إلى القاعدة في سوريا، مثل السيدة موجودة في القصيم، والناس تعرف قصتها، لا أريد أن أذكر اسمها تمامًا، ولكن أرسلت ابنها، وابنها في السن الخمسة عشر سنة، أرسلته إلى العراق عفوًا إلى سوريا، وكتبت على تويتر أنه وصل إلى سوريا، والتحق بالقاعدة، وسيعود مجددًا إلى السعودية لقهر طواغيت الجزيرة، يعني لا أفهم أي منطق اللي ممكن لإنسانة ترسل هذا الطفل، وتضع صوره وهو محمل بالسلاح بين مجموعة لا أعلم في سن ا الخمسة عشر ماذا يمكن ان يفعل في داخل سوريا هل يستطيع أن يقاتل، أشك، هل يستطيع أن يفعل أي شيء في هذه المعركة الطويلة، شك، أخشى كل ما أخشاه أن يتحول هذا مثل مئات من السعوديين الذين ذهبوا-- ساعات يتحولون إلى فيوزات هي للحرق، مجرد أداة انتحارية يركب في السيارة ويفخها ويُرسل إلى أي مكان ويفجر به.

هذا الولد الصغير ذو الـ 15 سنة يعني أعتقد هو صدمة للناس طالما إن أسرته لا تهتم به، وهذه القصة يعني أكثر ما هو مزعج فيها أن هذه السيدة لا أستطيع أن أقول عنها أكثر من أنها كانت طوال الفترة الماضية تنادي عن الظلم الذي لحق بها، وأنها مظلومة هي وزوجها بتهمة العلاقة مع القاعدة وبمباركة تنظيم القاعدة من خلال نشاط زوجها، واليوم هي تُرسل ابنها لسوريا، ونستطيع أن نقول اليوم هل فعلاً هي مرتبطة بتنظيم القاعدة أم لا؟ هل زوجها الموقوف اليوم هو بريء من العلاقة بالقاعدة أم لا، يعني الصورة بالنسبة لي ضبابية.

المحاور: امم.

فارس بن حزام: ولكن نحتاج لإعادة النظر تجاه ما يقال عن قصة المعتقلين الموقوفين في السعودية بعلاقة القاعدة، هل هم أبرياء أم جناة، هذا متروك للقضاء، ولكن قصة سيدة تُرسل ابنها بهذا السن تجعلنا نعيد النظر ونتمهل قليلاً تجاه الموقوفين داخل السجون.

المحاور: طيب، أستاذ فارس كما أشرت في بداية الحلقة إلى أن هناك تراجع في عدد السعوديين المنضمين إلى صفوف القاعدة ولكن على الرغم من ذلك، نشاهد أنه أي إصدار للقاعدة لابد أن يكون الشخصية الرئيسية أو البطل لذلك الإصدار هو من السعوديين.

فارس بن حزام: يعني شيء من المؤسف يعني أنه يصدر تسجيل فيه أربع خمس أشخاص يتحدثون نكتشف بأن الأربع خمس أشخاص ثلاثة سعوديين وواحد غير سعودي وكأنها تعكس الواقع على الأرض أنه معظم المقاتلين على الأرض السورية هم السعوديين، في الحقيقة المعظم هم من جنسيات غير سعودية.

ليس الهدف هو تبرئة السعوديين من القصة، ولكن لتبيان هدف وجود السعودي على الشاشة، القاعدة تهدف إلى إبراز السعودي على شاشاتها وإنتاجها لثلاثة أشياء، هذه الأشياء الثلاثة لا يحققها أي مقاتل عربي آخر، الشيء الأول إذا وضعت السعودي في الواجهة فبالتالي أنت ضمنت تمويلاً سعودياً من الداخل من خلال الذي يقول نفسه أنهم متبرعين أو داعمين أو فاعلين خير لا يستطيعون يرسلوا إرسال أموالهم إلى القاعدة طالما لا يعرفون من هو الطرف الآخر.عندما يرون أولادهم السعوديين في الواجهة يطمأنون فيرسلون الأموال.

ثانياً المقاتلين السعوديين لا يطمأنون للذهاب إلى القتال ظهر القاعدة طالما لا يوجد سعوديين، فبالتالي عندما يرى السعودي فيذهب.

الشيء الثالث من هم المصنفون كرجال دين، لا يصدرون فتاوى في أي حدث إلا إذا اطمأنوا من هم الأشخاص الذين يقاتلون هناك، عندما يرون السعوديون ويسألون عنهم يطمأنون، فترسل أساساً، مع أنها فتوى ومال ومقاتلين هم العناصر الثلاثة الأساسية التي يجلبها الوجه السعودي عندما يضع في المنتج الإعلامي للقاعدة لا أكثر من ذلك، وهذه التجربة وجدناها في اليمن، وجدناها في أفغانستان، ووجدناها على مدى عشرين سنة.

المحاور: طيب، أنت تتحدث عن واجهة، ولكن هل يقتصر فعلاً دور السعوديين في تنظيم القاعدة على أنهم فقط واجهة؟

فارس بن حزام: اليوم يوجد داعش، ويوجد جبهة النصرة في سوريا، لا يوجد قائد سعودي واحد في هذه المجموعات، إذا قلنا أهم 10 أشخاص في داعش في سوريا، وأهم 10 أشخاص في جبهة النصرة في سوريا، لا يوجد بينهم سعودي واحد، فعلياً، ولكن هناك أشخاص سوريين يوضعون في الواجهة لهذه الأهداف الثلاثة، مثل ما هو الحال في اليمن وغيرها.

المحاور: ولكن عندما نسمع بأن هناك انتحاري سعودي فجر نفسه، مازلنا نتحدث عن واجهة؟

فارس بن حزام: هو وظيفته إنه يفجر، لا أكثر ولا أقل، لا توجد أي وظيفة أخرى، يقاتل بعدد بسيط، يعني الأهداف القتالية محدودة، لكن هدفه الأساسي الانتحارين، تنظيم القاعدة في سوريا يحتاج خلال 2014 الفترة القادمة إلى 300 انتحاري، من هم الانتحاريين، هم السعوديين الجاهزين الجدد، أمثال الولد الصغير ابو 15 سنة، الله يستر عليه ويرجعه لأهله، لبلده، وأمثال الآخرين.

المحاور: في نهاية هذه الحلقة من صناعة الموت، فارس بن حزام، وصحفي سعودي، شكراً جزيلاً لك.

فارس بن حزام: أهلاً وسهلاً.

المحاور: وشكراً لكم أنتم أيها السادة المشاهدين على متابعة هذه الحلقة من صناعة الموت، شكراً لمتابعتكم، وإلى اللقاء.

[موسيقى نهاية الحلقة]

11.1.2 Audio-Visual 2 Transcribed (ST 2)

صناعة الموت: الرد الشرعي على المتطرفين

[موسيقى مقدمة البرنامج]

المحاور: ما الدور الذي يلعبه رجال الدين في الرد على فتاوى القاعدة ومتطرفي الفكر، كيف يقومون بتفنيد الادعاءات التي يحاول منظرو القاعدة النفاذ منها لعقول البسطاء والشباب المتحمس لدينه، ويدفعونه بواسطتها نحو طريق العنف والموت.

نحاول الإجابة على بعض هذه التساؤلات من خلال حلقة اليوم التي نستضيف فيها الدكتور محمد السعيدي الداعية الإسلامي السعودي، الذي أثار موجة من الجدل مؤخراً بعد قيامه بنشر سلسلة من التغريدات على موقع تويتر يهاجم فيها فكر القاعدة وفتاويها، ومنظريها.

حلقة جديدة من صناعة الموت، أهلاً بكم.

[موسيقى]

تعليق صوتي: الدكتور محمد السعيدي رجل دين بارز في المشهد السعودي، أطل عبر تويتر بآراء عن القاعدة كان منها:

"منذ 23 عاماً أبحث عن مثال واحد لعمل قامت به القاعدة، وجاءت عواقبه خيراً للإسلام وللمسلمين، فلم أجد"

" دخلت القاعدة في قرار طالبان فاحتلت أميركا أفغانستان، وأعادت جذوة الحرب الأهلية، وأقامت حكومتها الحالية ولا يزال الوضع هناك في منتهى السوء".

"كل تلك المؤسسات التي تدعم الدعوة والعمل الخيري في العالم حوصرت، والسبب الأول القاعدة، التي تذرع العالم بها لإيقاف الخير الذي كان يتدفق من هنا."

" على منوال دولة العراق التي كانت أداة لضرب المجاهدين في العراق قامت دولة داعش لتضرب المجاهدين في الشام."

"تقوم دولة داعش بالتحرش بتركيا حتى تضطر الأخيرة لمضايقة المجاهدين والتضييق على طرق إمداداتهم."

" الملاحظ في القاعدة منذ نشأتها أنها لا تتعرض لإيران أبداً، فإذا كانت الدول السنية التي تتعرض لهجمات القاعدة كافرة وعميلة، فلماذا نجت إيران؟"

" الذين قاتلو الحوثيين في اليمن مدى السنوات الماضية هم حزب الإصلاح، والحكومة، والسلفيون، وتجمع القبائل، كتاف وعاهم، ولا ذكر للقاعدة في موقف هناك."

[موسيقى]

المحاور: أرحب بضيفي من جدة الدكتور محمد السعيدي، الداعية الإسلامي، أهلاً بك دكتور محمد.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: أهلاً بك أستاذ محمد وأهلاً بجميع المشاهدين.

المحاور: دكتور، قبل التعليق على هذه التغريدات أو المواقف، لماذا اختار الدكتورمحمد السعيدي موقع تويتر للتصريح بها؟

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: الحقيقة أنا لم أختر موقع تويتر وحسب، فقد تحدثت عن آرائي هذه من قبل أكثر من 12 عاماً وأنا أتحدث في جميع الوسائل المتاحة، تحدثت في الإذاعة عبر عدة برامج كنت أقدمها وأشارك فيها، تحدثت كذلك في التلفزيون السعودي عبر برنامج كنت أعده وأقدمه واسمه في رحاب الإسلام، تحدثت عبر المواقع الإلكترونية.

ثم بعد ذلك لما استحدثت وسائل التواصل الاجتماعية السريعة، كتويتر والفيس بوك، تحدثت في تويتر لوجود كم كبير من الشباب هناك الذين يحتاجون إلى توعية في تقديري، لاسيما وأن كثيرا منهم لم يعاصروا من الأحداث ما عاصرناه في قضية تكوين القاعدة والتاريخ الذي نلم به من واقع معاصرتنا له، ولا يلمون به هم.

المحاور: إضافة إلى ما ذكرت حول إقبال العديد من الشباب على تلك المواقع للتواصل، أيضاً تختلف تلك المواقع عن الإذاعة والتلفزيون فيما يتعلق بردود الفعل والتجاوب من قبل الجمهور.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: لا شك أن تويتر والفيس بوك يعطي تجاوباً سريعاً ومباشراً، كما أن الكثافة العددية التي يهيئها تويتر والفيس بوك لا تتهيأ في أي وسيلة أخرى، فبمجرد تغريدة واحدة يطلقها الإنسان، تصل هذه التغريدة مباشرة إلى ملايين الأشخاص عبر متابعيه المباشرين، أو عبر إعادة التدوير، فالتغريدة الواحدة تصل إلى أكثر مما لا-- تصل إليه القنوات في تقديري، لاسيما وأن القنوات تحتاج إلى وقت طويل لمشاهدتها ومتابعتها بينما تغريدات تويتر هي 140 حرفًا يستطيع الكل قراءتها في ثوانٍ.

المحاور: ولكن تدرك أيضًا يا دكتور بأن-

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: فكانت شعبية-

المحاور: بأن تويتر لا توجد به فلترة وأن هناك من يرد عليك ويتجاوز وهناك ااا جيوش مجيشة من اللـ المستخدمين الذين ينتمون لهذا الفكر المتطرف والذين تعدوا عليك شخصيًا ولفظيًا أيضًا.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: اا في تقديري أن ااا الإنسان عندما يكون في الموقع الوسط يتعرض للقذف من كل اتجاه. فإذا أردت أن تعرف هل أنت وسطيًا أم لا، فانظر هل أنت تتعرض للقذائف من كل اتجاه أم تتعرض لها من اتجاه واحد. بالنسبة لي يبدو لي أنني أتعرض لـ القذائف من ااا مختلف الاتجاهات فأتعرض لـلقذائف من التكفيريين المتشددين وأتعرض أيضًا للقذائف من اا الأهوائيين الغارقين في الأهوائية وأتعرض لـ القذائف في.. من الـ المخالفين أيضًا الـ الشاطحين في التوجهات السياسية وهكذا. فالمتوسط دائمًا يتعرض لـ القذائف من كل اتجاه. لا أخفيك أن هناك تنظيم في تويتر، هناك ااا فئات منظمة في جميع الاتجاهات، لا سيما الاتجاه التي الاتجاهات التي تخدم ميولًا استخباراتية عالمية،

كل الاتجاهات، سواء أكانت اتجاهًا أهوائيًا أو اتجاهًا تكفيريًا. إذا كانت تخدم ميولًا استخباراتية عالمية، فإنها. فإنك تجد أن هناك تنظيم دقيق وربما تجد أن هناك حشد على أناس معينين. فعندما يظهر معتدل أو مناهض لأي اتجاه من هذه الاتجاهات، تجد أن هناك حشدًا لا يمكن أن يكون لولا أنه كان منظمًا، خاصةً وأننا نجد أن أكثر الأسماء التي ترد إلينا من تلك الحشود هي أسماء مستعارة وربما كثير منها يعبر عن فكرة واحدة وفي وقت واحد وتتوجه لشخص واحد مما يعطينا انطباع بأن كثير من هذه الأسماء المستعارة يديرها شخص واحد، فتجد ربما شخص واحد يدير 50 معرفًا. وكل هذه المعرفات تهاجم شخصية واحدة إذا كانت تنحو منحًا وسطيًا سواء أكان ذلك المنح الوسطي في توجهه ضد التكفير أو ضد الأهواء، أي توجه ضد ميول أو ااا يخالف ميول تخدم جهات استخباراتية خارجية، فأجد أنه يلاقي مثل هذا الـهجوم المنظم. بينما عندما نغرد بتغريدات ربما تخالف أو يختلف معها الكثير ولكنها ليست مخالفة لـلميول الاستخباراتية فإننا نجد أنفسنا لا نواجه إلا بـالعقلاء أو بالأسماء الـمنفتحة والأسماء الواضحة وليس الأسماء المستعارة ولا-

المحاور: إذن-

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: ولا نواجه أيضًا

المحاور: طيب.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: بالسباب المقذعة التي تعمد إلى إخفات الصوت المعتدل وقهره.

المحاور: إذن أنت ترى بأنها حركة منظمة وليست مجرد أهواء. طيب فلنبدأ معك يا دكتور محمد بواحدة من أبرز التغريدات التي ذكرتها على موقع تويتر وقلت فيها: "منذ ثلاثة وعشرين عامًا أبحث عن عمل واحد قامت به القاعدة وأدى إلى خير المسلمين والإسلام فلم أجد." كيف ذلك؟

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: نعم. طرحت أنا هذا التساؤل وحتى الآن لم يجبني أحد من أنصار القاعدة بأن هناك عملًا قامت به القاعدة وأدى إلى خير الإسلام والمسلمين. كل الأعمال التي قامت بها القاعدة أدت إلى عكس ما يتمناه أفراد القاعدة. أعتقد أنني استخدمت في تغريداتي عبارة دقيقة، وهي عبارة الاختراق ولم اختر.. استخدم عبارة العمالة أو عبارة الخيانة، لأنني أعتقد أن كثير من المنضوين أو المتعاطفين مع تنظيم القاعدة هم صادقون ولكن هذا الاختراق هو الذي يجعل أهداف القاعدة لا تحقق ااا أو يجعل أعمال القاعدة لا تحقق الأهداف التي بعضها نبيل أو معظمها نبيل كنصرة وعز الإسلام والمسلمين مثلًا-

المحاور: امم.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: بل تحقق العكس، لأنها ااا تؤدي أو لأنها تنشأ من نفس المخترقين الذين ااا خططوا لهذا العمل الذي قامت به القاعدة. نلاحظ عندما ااا في الآونة الأخيرة مثلًا أضرب لك مثالًا..

المحاور: امم.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: تفجير السفارة الإيرانية. تفجير السفارة الإيرانية تبنته القاعدة واا اعتبره الكثير ردًا على تغريداتي عندما قلت إن إيران لا تواجه وأن القاعدة لا تواجه إيران بأي شكل من الأشكال. الذي استفاد من هذا التفجير هو إيران نفسها، ولم يستفد منه الإسلام والمسلمين، ولم يستفد منه النضال في سوريا أبداً.

المحاور: طيب، التغريدة التي أشرت إليها هي التي قلت فيها" الملاحظ على القاعدة منذ نشأتها بأنها لا تتعرض لإيران، فإذا كانت الدول السُنية التي تتعرض لهجمات القاعدة، كافرة وعميلة، فلماذا نجت إيران؟"

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: نعم، دائماً القاعدة عندما تهاجم الدول السُنية تتهمها بالكفر، وتدعي مشروعية قتال هذه الدولة باعتبارها دولة مرتدة، وتعتقد أن القيام بالأعمال التخريبية والأعمال الإرهابية في داخل تلك الدول على أساس أنها مرتدة، والقاعدة تزعُم أنها سُنية، فإذا كانت سُنية وهذه الدول السُنية التي هي أقرب إليها تقوم بالتفجير في داخلها، فلماذا لا تمارس نفس العمل في إيران.

طبعاً أنا بقولي هذا لا أدعوا القاعدة أن تقوم بنفس الأعمال في إيران، أو في أي مكان آخر، ولكنني أراجع التاريخ وأجد أن-- هذه-- أو هذا الأمر مؤشر كبير جداً على صحة ما أدليت به من وجود الاختراق للقاعدة.

المحاور: طيب، هناك نقطة مهمة يا دكتور، وأنت ذكرت بأن القاعدة مخترقة، ولكن لا ننكر بأن-

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: نعم.

المحاور: من ينفذ تلك العمليات هم شباب مسلمون، الدماء التي أريقت في العراق، في سوريا، وحتى في السعودية، أريقت بدماء شباب يعلنون انتمائهم صراحة للقاعدة.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: نعم، أعتقد أن من الأمور التي تدلنا على هذا الاختراق، هو تعزيز الفكر التكفيري، ووجود تنظيم إعلامي كبير جداً، مؤسسات إعلامية كبيرة جداً ونشطة ومتحركة بشكل غير طبيعي ل-- لبث الفكر التكفيري بين الشباب، سواء كانوا في المملكة العربية السعودية، أو في العراق، أو في سوريا أو في أي مكان، هذا العمل لإشعال الفكر... جذوة الفكر التكفيري واستخدام الشبهات واستخدام بعض الفتاوى التي قيلت في عصور ماضية، لإعادة بثها في هذا الوقت الحاضر وتنزيلها على العصر الحاضر.

في تقديري هو عمل لا يمكن أن يكون عملاً تطوعياً فردياً، بقدر ما هو عمل مدعوم من جهات مخابراتية، نعم، الشباب جنحوا نحو فكر التكفير، ولكن يبدو لي أن هناك تغذية لهذا الفكر عبر وسائط إعلامية وأعتقد أن هناك أخطاء في الدول الإسلامية تقتات عليها القاعدة حينما تبث فكرها التكفيري.

لأننا نحن نعلم جميعاً، أن كل باطل أو كل فكرة خاطئة إذا أردنا نشرها لابد أن نجعلها تتوكأ على معلومة صحيحة، فالمعلومات الخاطئة أو الأفكار الخاطئة جميعاً تتوكأ على معلومات صحيحة.

للأسف هناك حق موجود في الفكر الذي تقوله القاعدة حينما تبث دعايتها بين الشباب، ولكنها تستخدم هذا الحق لنسج الكثير من الباطل حوله، لذلك نجحت الحقيقة في تجنيد الشباب، إضافة إلى أنه لم يوجد وسائل إعلامية في العالم العربي وفي العالم الإسلامي تستطيع مقاومة هذا الفكر.

بل للأسف وسائل الإعلام العربي والإسلامية، ربما أوجدت مبررات كثيرة ل-- للفكر القاعدي لأن يتسلل إلى قلوب وعقول الشباب.

[موسيقى]

المحاور: أرحب مجدداً بضيفي من جدة الدكتور محمد السعيدي، الداعية الإسلامية، دكتور محمد أهلاً بك.

ذكرت في الجزء الأول علاقة ما، ربما تربط القاعدة بإيران، وأيضا في إحدى التغريدات أشرت بأن القاعدة تتواجد في سوريا، في العراق، في الجزيرة العربية، وأيضاً في المغرب الإسلامي، وحتى في سيناء في مصر، ولكنها لا تتواجد في إيران، فلم نسمع قبلاً تنظيم إيران الإسلامية، أو القاعدة في بلاد فارس أو ما إلى ذلك.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: نعم، هذه حقيقة واقعية وحقيقة تاريخية، فالتاريخ يشهد بأن إيران لم يكون في داخلها تنظيم للقاعدة، فهو-- فيما أنه كون تنظيم للقاعدة في مناطق بعيدة ونائية عن منطقة الصراع في الشرق الأوسط، الصراع بين الصهاينة وبين المسلمين التي دائما تتغنى القاعدة وتتغنى إيران بعداوتهم ومع ذلك لم، وجدت تنظيم القاعدة في تلك المناطق النائية ولكنه لم يوجد في إيران. في تقديري ان هذا مؤشر صحيح ينبغي ان يعتمده الشعب حينما يقيم تنظيم القاعدة، اعتقد اننا ينبغي حينما نريد من الشاب مراجعة نفسه نعلمه او نخبره بهذه النقاط التاريخية التي تحتاج منه الى اجابة، والاجابة الصحيحة لا يمكن ان تكون الا بفكر متجرد عن الهوى وفكر متجرد عن مجرد العاطفة، العاطفة حقا هي مطلوبة لتكوين الافكار لكنها لا يمكن او لا ينبغي ان تكون اساسا لتكوين الافكار.

الشباب حينما يجعلون عاطفتهم فقط هي الوسيلة الوحيدة لتقويم او تقييم مثل هذه المؤسسات ومثل هذه المنظمات فلا شك انهم سوف يغرقون، حتى لو انحلت القاعدة وتغير منهج القاعدة اعتقد انه ربما يقوم تنظيمات اخر تخاطب الشباب بما يتعاطفون معه سواء كانوا يتعاطفون مع نشر الاسلام ونشر القضية الاسلامية ونشر التدين، ام الشباب الذين يتعاطفون مع قضايا اخرى تستقطبهم ربما بعض المنظمات. نحن نجد ان المنظمات الشيوعية سابقا استقطبت كثير من الشباب في العالم الاسلامي وذلك ليس بالعقل وانما بإشعال عاطفة او اشعال كراهية الفقراء التي ربما تكون في بعض الاحيان طبيعية لمن يدعون او يتصورون انه يسلبهم غناهم ويسلبهم قوتهم.

فالشيوعية عندما وجدت في الاربعينات والثلاثينات من القرن الماضي في العالم الاسلامي لم توجد لأنها تخاطب العقل ولم توجد لان معها ادلة صحيحة، وانما وجدت لان هناك شباب اندفعوا اليها بعاطفتهم. فانا امل ان لا يجعل الشباب سواء كانوا منتمين الى الفكر والتوجه الديني او منتمين الى اي توجه اخر، لا ينبغي ان يجعلوا العاطفة هي ميزانهم في تقييم الاحداث وتقييم التنظيمات وتقييم الامور.

المحاور: طيب ايضا قلت "ان كل المؤسسات التي تدعم الاسلام والعمل الخيري حوصرت بسبب تنظيم القاعدة".

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: طبعا هي حوصرت، تنظيم القاعدة اتخذ ذريعة لحصار هذه المنظمات، منظمات العمل الخيري. وفي تقديري ان الغرب بأكمله ضج من انتشار المنهج السلفي في العالم، نحن نجد ان المنهج السلفي انتشر حتى بين المسلمين الجدد في الولايات المتحدة الامريكية، بين المسلمين الجدد في اوروبا، بين اخذ، يأخذ او أصبح يأخذ مواقع التوجهات الدينية الاخرى في المغرب العربي، في افريقيا، في اقاصي اسيا واتهمت المملكة العربية السعودية بانها وراء نشر التوجه السلفي، وفي الحقيقة هي ليست تهمة هي ينبغي ان تكون شرفا.

لكن التوجه السلفي كان مضايقا بشكل كبير جدا للدول الاستعمارية القديمة التي كانت استعمارية، خاصة وان الدول الاستعمارية الذي اخرجها من الاستعمار هو التوجه السلفي. نحن نعلم ان الجزائر التي قامت فيها الثورة وقدمت الجهاد مليون شهيد الذي اذكى جذوة الثورة فيها هو التوجه السلفي الذي قاده ابن باديس رحمه الله

وجمعية علماء المسلمين، وعندما نضرب مثالا لجميع الثورات في بلاد المسلمين على الاستعمار نجد ان التوجه السلفي كان وراءها.

فالغرب لم يكن يحبذ اعادة نشر التوجه السلفي بل كان يرمي الى تشويهه، لذلك حوصرت او كانت القاعدة ذريعة لحصار العمل الخيري المنبعث اكثره من المملكة العربية السعودية فقد قالت بعض التقارير الامريكية ان المملكة العربية السعودية قدمت لنشر التوجه السلفي 75 مليار دولار عبر الاعمال الخيرية التي كانت تقوم بها العديد من المؤسسات في المملكة العربية السعودية، طبعا حل محل التوجه المؤسسات الخيرية السعودية في كل دولة كانت تعمل بها المؤسسات الخيرية السعودية حلت إيران.

وقد ضربت في التغريدات مثالا بجزر القمر، لأنها مثال واضح فقد كانت الدعم او العمل الاغاثي والخيري من المملكة العربية السعودية يشكل 50% من الدخل الذي يسمونه الدخل القومي في جزر القمر. عندما انسحب العمل الخيري في ال-السعودي حل محله مباشرة دون اعتراض من اي جهة غربية، دون اعتراض من امريكا، دون اعتراض من اي-اه

المحاور: طيب.

الدكتور محمد السعيدي: حتى المنظمات التبشيرية، التي كانت تعترض على العمل السعودي لم تعترض علي العمل الايراني، الذي كان يحل دائما محل المملكة العربية السعودية.

المحاور: طيب هذا حديث بالغ الاهمية، ولكن للأسف انتهي وقت حلقتنا، لهذه الليلة، شكرا لك دكتور محمد، وشكرا لكم ايها السادة المشاهدين، على هذه المتابعة، إلى اللقاء.

[موسيقى نهاية البرنامج]

11.2 Transcription of al-Jazeerah's Audio-Visuals

11.2.1 Audio-visual 1 Transcribed (ST3)

تفاعلات الاتفاق النووي الإيراني عربيا

ليلى الشيخلي :حيّاكم الله، أثار الاتفاق النووي الإيراني الغربي ردود فعل دولية وإقليمية مختلفة اتسّم بعضها بالحذر بينما اعتبره آخرون خطوة مفيدة لتحقيق السلام والاستقرار في منطقة الشرق الأوسط.

نتوقف مع هذا الخبر لنناقشه في محورين :انعكاسات هذا الاتفاق على علاقات إيران مع دول الخليج في ظل الهواجس والخلافات بين الجانبين؟ ما هي خيارات دول الخليج في مواجهة تنامي نفوذ إيران وتقاربها المحتمل مع الولايات المتحدة بعد هذا الاتفاق؟

لم يُخفِ مراقبون خليجيون قلقهم من تنامي نفوذ إيران الإقليمي بعد اتفاقها النووي مع الغرب، أما معظم حكومات دول الخليج العربية فقد فضّلت التريث في إبداء مواقفها، كانت الإمارات العربية المتحدة وحدها المبادرة إلى الإعراب عن أملها في أن يكون خطوة تجاه اتفاق دائم يحفظ استقرار المنطقة ويقيها التوتر، وكان وزير الخارجية الأميركي جون كيري قد صرح بأنه قدم خلال زيارته للسعودية والإمارات مؤخرا تطمينات إزاء المحادثات مع إيران، هذا وكشف تقرير لوكالة أسوشيتد برس أن سلطنة عُمان قامت بدور في التوسط لعقد محادثات إيرانية أميركية سرية ومباشرة على مدار العام الماضي.

[تقرير مسجل]

محمد الكبير الكتبي: اتفاق إيران ومجموعة (1+5)بشأن ملفها النووي قد يُرسى في رأي الكثيرين أساس مرحلة جديدة في مسار العلاقات المتوترة بين طهران ودول المجموعة وبينها الولايات المتحدة التي تقاطع إيران منذ قيام ثورتها عام 1979 ، لكن الاتفاق جددّ من ناحية أخرى توجس دول الخليج من أجندة إيران بالمنطقة وهي ترقبُ بحذر تمددها في بعض البلدان العربية وطالما أثارت قلقها احتمالات تقارب طهران والغرب رغم محاولة الغربيين طمأنة دول الخليج في هذا الصدد، هناك من يعتقد أن الملف النووي لا يمثل الخطر الأكبر على الخليج بقدر ما يشكله الخطر السياسي المتنامي لإيران وما يوصف بسعيها للتغلغل في المنطقة عبر زوايا مختلفة دلائلها واضحة، وتتنازع الدول الخليجية مع إيران في تبعية جزر طنب الكبرى وجزر طنب الصغرى وأبو موسى، كما تتهم طهران بدعم شيعة البحرين والسعودية وتحدثت الكويت أخيرا عن كشفها شبكة تجسس إيرانية واتهمت الرياض في وقت سابق إيران بمحاولة اغتيال السفير السعودي في واشنطن، ويزيد من التوجس انعكاس الاتفاقِ ايجابيا على الاقتصاد الإيراني بسبب الرفع الجزئي للعقوبات عنها وأثر ذلك المباشر في نفوذها السياسي، وقد ارتفع بالفعل سعر صرف الريال الإيراني بنسبة 2% مقابل الدولار الأميركي بمجرد إعلان الاتفاق، لكن ذلك لا يمنع تفاؤل كثيرين به قالت روسيا أنه ينعش الآمال بإمكانية إسهام إيران بحكم قربها من النظام في سوريا في دفع جهود حل النزاع هناك من خلال إنجاح مساعي عقد مؤتمر جنيف4 ، بل هناك من يرى في التقارب الغربي الإيراني الذي يتبلور الآن مصلحة خليجية ولو في المستقبل لاندراجه

تحت عنوان الحفاظ على الوضع السلم العالمي والسلم الخليجي جزء من ذلك، وانطلاقا من هذه الزاوية جاء ترحيب بعض الخليجيّين الحذر بالاتفاق.
[نهاية التقرير]

ليلى الشيخلي :لمناقشة هذا الموضوع ينضم إلينا من الرياض الدكتور أسعد الشملان

الأكاديمي والباحث في العلاقات الدولية، من طهران معنا الدكتور أمير موسوي الخبير في الشؤون الإيرانية ومن واشنطن الدكتور خليل جهشان الخبير في السياسة الأميركية إزاء الشرق الأوسط أهلا بكم جميعا ، أبدأ معك دكتور أسعد شملان؛ عندما يقول عبد الله العسكر رئيس لجنة الشؤون الخارجية إن النوم سيجافي المنطقة بعد الاتفاق النووي الغربي الإيراني ما هي النقطة الأكثر إثارة للقلق هنا؟
أسعد الشملان :مساء الخير أولا.
ليلى الشيخلي :مساء النور.
أسعد الشملان :أنا أعتقد أنه حتى نستطيع أن نحكم على هذا الاتفاق ومدى أهميته سواء سلبا أو إيجابا لدول الخليج يجب أن ننظر إلى الاتفاق بحد ذاته، يعني باختصار شديد الاتفاق هو في التحليل النهائي هو تسليم إيراني بمطالب موجودة على الأقل منذ أكثر من ثمان سنوات، يعني ما قامت به إيران في جنيف هي سلمت بمطالب كانت طرحت على الطاولة في مفاوضات سابقة تمتد إلى ثماني سنوات ماضية، وفي حقيقة الأمر لو وضعنا الأمر في سياق تاريخي نجد أنه إيران كان بإمكانها قبل ثماني سنوات أن تحصل بالمقابل أكثر بكثير مما حصلت عليه في هذا الاتفاق، يعني في هذا الاتفاق هي لم تحصل إلا على رفع جزئي لعقوبات تم فرضها بعد أن رفضت العروض المغرية ما يسمى بحزمة الحوافز..
ليلى الشيخلي :بغض النظر عن ماذا كان يمكن لإيران أن تحصل عليه، هناك قلق خليجي، ولنكن أكثر تحديدا هناك كاتب في يديعوت أحرنوت اليوم كتب أن الاتفاق هذا سيطير النوم من عيون السعوديين تحديدا نريد أن نفهم، يعني هذا الكلام عن القلق ما مصدره؟
أسعد الشملان :أنا شخصيا أتكلم هنا بصفتي الشخصية أنا أتحفظ كثيرا على مثل هذه الصياغات، أنا أعتقد أن فيها مبالغات شديدة يجب أن نتذكر شيء أنه إيران لا تذهب باتجاه التسليح النووي هو مطلب خليجي ويمثل مصلحة خليجية عليا، أن إيران جاءت إلى طاولة المفاوضات في جنيف بفعل ما قاسته من العقوبات الاقتصادية الشديدة التي فرضت في الآونة الأخيرة..
ليلى الشيخلي :دكتور، دكتور سؤالي واضح يعني لو سمحت لي بس يعني حتى نسير

باتجاه إلى الأمام في هذا الحوار، أسألك سؤال محدد وواضح، ما الذي يخيف الخليجيين

والسعوديين تحديدا في هذا الاتفاق؟
أسعد الشملان :من هذا الاتفاق أم نتكلم..
ليلى الشيخلي :هذا الاتفاق.
أسعد الشملان :يا أخت ليلى يجب أن نكون محددين..
ليلى الشيخلي :هذا الاتفاق.
أسعد الشملان :هذا الاتفاق تريدين بأن أجيب بما أعتقد أم أجيب بما يجعل هناك إثارة في الموضوع؟
ليلى الشيخلي :بما تعتقد طبعا..
أسعد الشملان :أريد أن أجيب، أريد أن أتكلم بصفتي الشخصية، الاتفاق بحد ذاته إذا كان سيؤدي إلى منع إيران من الوصول إلى درجة التسليح النووي فهذا الشيء يمثل مصلحة خليجية ومطلب خليجي، هناك جانب آخر يمكن هذا ما تشيرين إليه، على جانب هذا الاتفاق هو أنه في هناك قضايا أخرى تهم دول الخليج وليست ضمن إطار اهتمام الدول الموقعة على هذا الاتفاق يعني الولايات المتحدة..
ليلى الشيخلي :على رأسها فقط بسرعة لو تكرمت على رأس هذه القضايا التي جعلت العسكر يقول أن النوم سيجافي المنطقة؟
أسعد الشملان :والله أنا اعتقد أنه يجب نأخذ الكلام في سياقه وأنا أعتقد أنه كونه تعبير، أنا شخصيا أراه أنه مبالغ به لكن في جانب معين يهم دول الخليج، بس دعيني أشرح هذه..
ليلى الشيخلي :بسرعة لو تكرمت.
أسعد الشملان :بأنه قد يقيد قدرتنا يعني الولايات المتحدة الآن حددت مصلحتها مع إيران في موضوع هذه الصفقة، وبالتالي هذا قد يقيد دول الخليج من مجابهة إيران في مناطق أخرى مثل سوريا، قد يقيد الحركة حركة دول الخليج في مجابهة المطامع الإيرانية فيها لكن في المحصلة النهائية هذا الاتفاق ينم عن ضعف إيراني وليس تفوق إيراني.

ليلى الشيخلي :ضعف إيراني رغم أنه كثير من الجهات ترى يعني إذا كانت ستحدد من المنتصر والمنهزم، كثيرون ذهبوا إلى أن إيران في الواقع خرجت يعني إلى جانب الولايات المتحدة وروسيا منتصرة في هذا الاتفاق، الطرف الآخر إذا لم نرد أن نسميه مهزما ولكنه قلق على الأقل دكتور أمير الموسوي، ماذا تفعل إيران من أجل تبديد هذا وهل يهمها أصلا أن الطرف الآخر قلق؟
أمير الموسوي :نعم ، بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، أنا اعتقد أن المنتصر هي الشعوب الإسلامية والدول الإسلامية بامتياز، لسبب بسيط منذ نهاية الحروب العالمية الأولى والثانية ما رأينا دولة إسلامية مستقلة ذات سيادة واستقلال واضح ومناهضة للاستكبار العالمي من خلال منطقها الدبلوماسي أن تفرض رؤيتها على الدول الكبرى وبقناعة

وبهدوء، وهذا أعتقد انتصار لكل الدول الإسلامية أنا اعتقد أن..
ليلى الشيخلي :دكتور أمير حتى لا نغرق في مثل هذا الكلام، لأنه أنت أول من يدرك أن لا شيء يمكن أن يقدم هكذا ببلاش ومن أجل عيون الأمة الإسلامية، لا شك أن هناك شيء حدث وهذا ما نريد أن نبحث فيه، ما وراء هذه الصفقة ما الذي يمكن..
أمير الموسوي :أنا أردت أن أقول ذلك..
ليلى الشيخلي :نعود إلى قضية الخليج، الخليج الآن قلق.
أمير الموسوي :نعم أنا أردت أن أشير إلى هذه النقطة، نعم ليس مجانا هذا الامتياز الذي حصلت عليه إيران بقوة مقاومة الشعب الإيراني بسبب الوحدة الوطنية والالتفاف بين الشعب والقيادة، هذه كلها عوامل وإيران قاومت أنواع العقوبات منذ عام 1191 إلى الآن 25 عاما أنواع العقوبات مارستها الدول الغربية ضد إيران والمشاكسات الأمنية والعسكرية والدبلوماسية والسياسية، لكن ما يثير القلق في بعض الدول المجاورة أنا اعتقد أنه في غير محله، لأنه في الحقيقة هذا الاتفاق نجا شعوب المنطقة ودول المنطقة من حرب ربما كانت حتمية بسبب التهديدات الغربية والصهيونية ومن جانب الصمود والإصرار الإيراني على امتلاك هذا الحق النووي السلمي، فلذا هذا الإصرار من الطرفين ربما كانت تؤدي إلى حرب ومواجهه خطيرة تدمر المنطقة كلها.
ليلى الشيخلي :كيف ترد على أن الخليج ربما، يعني يخشى من إيران ذات نفوذ في

المنطقة أكثر مما يخشى من إيران نوويا ، يعني هذه النقطة هي التي تثار الآن..
أمير الموسوي :أرجو أن تحددي، أرجو أن تحددي ليس هناك خوف في منطقة الخليج الفارسي إلا في السعودية والبحرين، أنا أعتقد أن السعودية كذلك فيها شقين فيها شق تصعيدي ضد إيران يتمثل ببندر بن سلطان وسعود الفيصل وفي شق متلائم ويرغب بعلاقات طيبة مع إيران حتى السعودية منقسمة إلى قسمين والخط الثاني يمثله العاهل السعودي الملك عبد الله بن عبد العزيز أولاده وحاشيته وخطه الموجود في السعودية، خليني أكون واضح معك هذا الخط الآن المتشدد ضد إيران الذي يمثله بندر بن سلطان وسعود الفيصل ذاهب إلى الزوال، وسينتهي قريبا وسترين وسيرى المشاهدون هذا الأمر، لأن هذا الخط خط تصعيدي خط مشاغب خط..
ليلى الشيخلي :قد نتكلم عن هذا على الرغم من أننا شهدنا لقاء ثلاثي بالأمس فقط جمع قطر وجمع السعودية والكويت يعني هذه نقطة أريد أن أبلورها أكثر في هذه الحلقة إن شاء الله ولكن دعني أذهب إلى الدكتور خليل جهشان يعني في النهاية دكتور ربما الموضوع عندما تثير اسوشيتد برس الحديث عن اجتماعات سرية بدأت في الواقع من 2011 أو التمهيد لها وأول اجتماع كان في عُمان في مارس من هذا العام، كل هذا يخلق علامات استفهام كثيرة، ما الذي تريد الولايات المتحدة أن تقوله تحديدا لحلفائها الخليجيين؟
خليل جهشان :طبعا الرسالة ليست فقط موجهة إلى حلفاء الولايات المتحدة الخليجيين

عندما تنظر إلى سياسة من هذا النوع وهذا طبعا يعتبر تحول في السياسة الأميركية في الخليج لأن العلاقات كانت علاقات سيئة مع إيران لفترة طويلة وهذه الإدارة منذ وصول أوباما إلى البيت الأبيض حاول أن يغير من هذه السياسة وأعلن للملأ بأنه يفضل أن يكون هناك تبادل دبلوماسي لحل هذه المطبات التي مرت بها هذه العلاقات والإشكاليات التي تواجهها يعني هذا لم يكن مفاجئا وفي الواقع يعني الاتصال الأول تم تغطيته في بعض وسائل للإعلام الأميركية آنذاك بالنسبة قبل أكثر من سنة لاتصالات بين مسؤولين في البيت الأبيض مع مسؤولين إيرانيين ولكن المفاجئ أن هذه المحادثات السرية كانت على مستوى عالٍ وكانت في الوقع تركز على موضوع البرنامج النووي الإيراني مما ساهم في الواقع..

ليلى الشيخلي :اسمح لي أذهب إلى لب الموضوع هنا، يعني الموضوع يقال الآن ما

يقال الآن أنه بسبب بلورة الولايات المتحدة للغاز الصخري في النهاية فعليا ما تقوله الولايات المتحدة للخلفاء للخليجيين Bye, Bye :لا نحتاجكم بعد الآن؛ أمورنا الآن مصالحنا تغيرت الآن نحن باتجاه طهران وهم الحليف الأقوى الآن لنا.

خليل جهشان :ليلى مع كل احترامي لهذا التحليل أنا لا أعتقد أنه في الواقع مقنع أو حتى مرتبط بأي شيء للولايات المتحدة، الولايات المتحدة لم تحول أنظارها عن منطقة الشرق الأوسط وبالرغم من الاكتشافات الجديدة وربما التحول في احتياجات الولايات المتحدة النفطية للاعتماد على النفط أكثر خلال السنوات العشرة الماضية الولايات المتحدة لا تستطيع حتى لو أرادت أن تحول أنظارها عن المنطقة وأن تغير أو تعيد تعريف مصالحها في المنطقة وتبتعد عن حلفائها العرب فهي لا تريد أن تقول لا Bye, Bye ولا مع السلامة ولا أي شيء من هذا النوع لأنها تعرف أن الغرب ربما ليس

الولايات المتحدة وربما لفترة محدودة ولكن الغرب سيبقى يعتمد بشكل كبير على النفط من هذه المنطقة في العالم، والولايات المتحدة لأسباب إستراتيجية أخرى غير النفط لن تغير من سياستها في المنطقة فهذا يعني الكلام طبعا يعني له مبرراته وهناك بعض المحللين المقتنعين فيه..

ليلى الشيخلي :ربما يعني في النهاية هناك ما يدعو إلى وتيرة ولهجة الرد الخليجي لتكون مختلفة بعض الشيء دولة مثل السعودية تخرج عن صمتها الدبلوماسي ويبقى هناك خيارات أمام دول الخليج العربي في التعامل مع تنامي هذا النفوذ الإيراني وتقاربها المحتمل مع الولايات المتحدة هذا ما سنناقشه بعد الفاصل أرجو أن تبقوا معنا.

[فاصل إعلاني]

ليلى الشيخلي :أهلا بكم من جديد إلى هذه الحلقة التي نناقش فيها تفاعلات الاتفاق النووي الإيراني الغربي على الصعيد العربي وخاصة دول الخليج، أعود إليك دكتور أسعد الشملان في عبارة قلتها أن هذا الاتفاق دليل على ضعف إيران وليس قوتها يعني نريد أن نفهم هذه العبارة خصوصا أننا نرى نفوذا متصاعدا لإيران في مختلف دول

المنطقة وخصوصا يعني نبرة مختلفة وإحساس بهذا من الجانب الآخر بدليل الحديث عن احتلال إيراني وأشياء لم نكن نسمعها من دولة كالسعودية في السابق؟

أسعد الشملان :نعم يعني الدليل؛ أتسمعني أختي؟
ليلى الشيخلي :أسمعك تماما واضحا.
أسعد الشملان :نعم الدليل بسيط يعني أهم ما في هذا الاتفاق هو قبول إيران بأن لا تزيد نسبة التخصيب عن 5% وهذه النسبة إلي تحتاجها إيران لإنتاج الطاقة الكهربائية وهذه نسبة تضمنها أصلا معاهدة عدم انتشار الأسلحة النووية وهذا المطلب الآن اللي إيران حصلت عليه هو كان معروضا عليها منذ عشر سنوات وهي رفضته ودفعت في سبيل ذلك أثمانا باهظة فالسؤال هو أنه هي لم تحصل على شيء كانت تريده في السابق والطرف الآخر جاء ليسلمها ما كانت تريد، والعكس هو الذي ما حصل وأعتقد أنه أي عاقل اليوم في إيران يجب أن يسأل نفسه طيب لما كل هذه التكاليف وهذه الجعجعة إلى آخره إذا كنا سنقبل اليوم شيء رفضناه قبل ثمان سنوات وبشروط..
ليلى الشيخلي :لكن ظروف اليوم غير ظروف الأمس لا تنسَ ما مرت به إيران نفسها
أسعد الشملان :نعم.
ليلى الشيخلي :ولا تنسَ ما تمر به دول المنطقة.
أسعد الشملان :أنا أفهم هذا.
ليلى الشيخلي :طيب يا ريت..
أسعد الشملان :طبعا هي لم تقبله اسمحي لي هي لم تقبله طواعية هو كان هناك نوع من الدبلوماسية..
ليلى الشيخلي :إنها ربما نقطة لا أريد أن أفوتها هنا يعني بصراحة إذا كانت هناك نقطة يجب أن نتوقف عندها الموضوع العُماني يعني هذه الوساطة العمانية إلى أي حد يعني في النهاية يفترض أن دول الخليج ككتلة واحدة في حين كنا نسمع أصوات تنادي بتشديد العقوبات على إيران من أطراف خارجية، ها هي دولة خليجية تتوسط من أجل رأب الصدع بين واشنطن وطهران، ما تعليقك على هذا؟
أسعد الشملان :والله أولا دعينا نؤكد على شيء أساسي لا يوجد عداء مبدئي كما تظن- دول الخليج بين إيران ودول الخليج العربي هذا أساسي، ما وتر العلاقات هو تصرفات- إيران وسلوكها وعندما تقوم أي دولة خليجية حتى لو كان جهد وساطة ونقل رسائل طالما أن النتيجة في النهاية تصب ضمن إطار تحقيق المصالح العليا لدول مجلس التعاون ككل فهذا أمر مفهوم ومقبول.

الوساطة العُمانية بين واشنطن وطهران

ليلى الشيخلي :طيب أريد أن أذهب إلى الدكتور خليل جهشان فيما يتعلق بالوساطة العمانية تحديدا هل ترى أن هناك ربما واقع جديد فرضته هذه الصفقة فيما يتعلق

بالعلاقة بين دول الخليج ربما تفسر غياب بعض الدول عن اجتماع مهم مثلما حصل بالأمس؟

خليل جهشان :أولا يعني دخول أو لعب عُمان لهذا الدور ليس بجديد، عُمان معروفة لكل خبير في منطقة الشرق الأوسط عامة والخليج خاصة بأن لها علاقة مميزة ومقربة من طهران ربما أكثر من سائر دول المنطقة، فقد لعبت يعني هذا الدور في الماضي وأوصلت رسائل وتوصيات من أطراف معينة في الغرب إلى طهران عندما كانت العلاقات مؤزمة ولم تسمح في الماضي بتوصيل هذه الرسائل مباشرة فهذا ليس مفاجئا ولكن يعني في نفس الوقت أنه بدون أي شك أن التغييرات في المنطقة أدت إلى تغيير في مواقف دول خليجية وربما إلى بعض الخلافات التي بدأت تطفو إلى السطح خصوصا بالنسبة لما يتعلق بالنزاع في سوريا، بالنسبة لما يتعلق في العلاقات مع إيران وأيضا بالنسبة..

ليلى الشيخلي :نعم ولكن حمل رسائل في الماضي شيء وما حصل اليوم في جنيف شيء آخر يعني الآن هناك مصلحة على المحك هناك يعني إستراتيجيات الآن تتغير في المنطقة وهذا الدور الذي لعبته عُمان هل يجب أن نتوقف عنده هل سيؤثر بأي شكل من الأشكال على وحدة الصف الخليجي هل سنرى نتيجة لهذه الصفقة أو هذا الاتفاق أي نوع من التغيير؟

خليل جهشان :أنا شخصيا لا أعتقد ذلك بصراحة لأنه أتفق مع الدكتور أسعد بأنه ما دام الهدف ما زال كما هو وهو منع إمكانية تطوير إيران لسلاح نووي من قبل الدول الخليجية التي تعارض ذلك وتريد أن تحافظ على منطقة الخليج كمنطقة خالية من هذا السلاح لا أعتقد أنه سيكون هناك خلافات ولكن إذا ما فشل هذا الاتفاق قد يؤدي.

ليلى الشيخلي :طيب وصلت الفكرة يعني ربما تركت أمير موسوي فترة طويلة أريد أن أعود إليك في نقطة هذه الإتفاقات والإجتماعات السرية التي واضح أنها بدأت في عهد

أحمدي نجاد والسؤال هل يعني كان ربما على إطلاع أم أن الملف كان بيد المرشد وكان هناك أمور تتم يعني تقسيم لأدوار؟

أمير الموسوي :أولا أشكرك لأنك تذكرتِني في نهاية الدقيقة الأخيرة يعني شكرا جزيلا لك على هذا الكرم الكبير من جانبكم يعني أولا أنا أقول شيء يعني طرحت نقاط مهمة إيران انتصرت بقوة في هذه الإتفاقية لأنه لا ننسى عشر سنوات يريدون تعطيل البرنامج النووي الإيراني السلمي بالكامل حتى في المختبرات الجامعية وكانوا يرفضون أي نوع من التخصيب وكانوا يطالبون بتعطيل فردو وأراك وكذلك نطنز وكانوا يريدون تفتيش مواقع عسكرية كل هذه رفضت في هذه الإتفاقية انتصار كبير بامتياز، إيران لم تسعَ في الماضي لتخصيب اليورانيوم بدرجة % 41 وإنما أجبرت بسبب أن فرنسا تنصلت عن التزامها في الاتفاقيات السابقة حتى قبل الثورة الإسلامية على أن تزود إيران بيورانيوم مخصب بدرجة % 41 تنصلت عن التزاماتها إيران أجبرت وخصبت اليورانيوم بدرجة

41%وأمنّت احتياجاتها لعشر سنوات قادمة، هذا انتصار كبير الآن ليست هناك حاجة لتخصيب اليورانيوم بدرجة % 41 لكن إيران تراجعت عن هذا الأمر بامتياز كبير أخذته من الإدارة الأميركية والدول الغربية..

ليلى الشيخلي :طيب والآن نريد..

أمير الموسوي :أنا أعتقد هذه نقطة، النقطة الثانية ما يدور من كلام حول سلطنة عُمان أنا أعتقد نثمن جهود سلطان عُمان على ما قام به من جهود طيبة دبلوماسية وكذلك دولة الكويت وكذلك فترة من الفترات دولة قطر، أنا لا أنس هذا الأمر فلذا أنا أعتقد أن السعودية منزوية في منطقة الخليج الفارسي لوحدها وخاصة بعد مرض العاهل السعودي الآن شخصيتين ثلاثة يلعبون بالقرار السعودي، فلذا أنا أعتقد ليس هناك مشكلة، السعودية أمامها خيارين فقط إما التصعيد والاستمرار بالتصعيد كما كانت تفعل خلال خمس ثلاثين سنة ضد إيران وفشلت أو تغيير سياساتها ومراجعة سياساتها والتفاهم مع الوضع الجديد في إيران والوضع الإقليمي والدولي، هذه فرصة ذهبية أمام المملكة العربية السعودية، جربت كل الأوراق وفشلت أمام إيران وأمام قوة المقاومة في المنطقة والصمود والتصدي لدى الشعب الإيراني والشعوب الأخرى في المنطقة فلذا أنا أعتقد أن هذا التشبث بسياسات بطالة وقديمة ليس فيها فائدة..

ليلى الشيخلي :طيب.

أمير الموسوي :على السعودية أن تراجع وأن تستفيد من هذه الفرصة إذا إيران مدت يدها وتمد يدها وترغب بالتفاهم مع الرياض.

ليلى الشيخلي :شكرا لك.

أمير الموسوي :لكن نأمل أن يكون الطرف المقابل كذلك.

ليلى الشيخلي :شكرا جزيلا لك دكتور أمير موسوي الخبير في الشؤون الإيرانية، شكرا جزيلا للدكتور خليل جهشان الخبير في السياسة الأميركية إزاء الشرق الأوسط، وشكرا للدكتور أسعد الشملان الأكاديمي والباحث في العلاقات الدولية من الرياض، وشكرا لكم مشاهدينا الكرام على متابعة هذه الحلقة من برنامج ما وراء الخبر، في أمان الله___.

11.2.2 Audio-Visual 2 Transcribed (ST4)

أزمة العلاقات الخليجية إثر سحب السفراء

علي الظفيري :أهلاً بكم مشاهدينا الكرام طابت أوقاتكم بكل خير في العمق يبحث الليلة في أزمة العلاقات الخليجية الخليجية إثر قرار كل من المملكة العربية السعودية، دولة الإمارات، ومملكة البحرين، سحب سفرائها بخطوة جماعية من قطر بعد خلافات كثيرة واجتماعات كثيرة وقضايا كثيرة سنناقش هذا الموضوع مع ضيفي في الأستوديو الأستاذ جابر الحرمي رئيس تحرير صحيفة الشرق القطرية، مرحباً أستاذ جابر وضيفنا أيضاً

من جدة عبر الأقمار الصناعية الأستاذ حسين شبكشي الكاتب والمحلل السياسي مرحبا أستاذ حسين.

حسين شبكشي :مرحباً بكم سيدي.

علي الظفيري :قبل النقاش هذا التقرير مشاهدينا الكرام يعود بنا إلى جذور وامتدادات هذا الخلاف الذي نشهده اليوم بين قطر من جهة والسعودية طبعاً والإمارات والبحرين من جهة أخرى.

[تقرير مسجّل]

تعليق صوتي :في خطوة غير مسبوقة سحبت كل من السعودية والإمارات والبحرين سفراءها من قطر، في بيان مشترك نص فيما نص عليه على :عدم التزام الدوحة بمبادئ مجلس التعاون الخليجي وعدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية لأي من دول المجلس بشكل مباشر أو غير مباشر وعدم دعم كل من يعمل على تهديد أمن واستقرار دول المجلس من منظمات أو أفراد سواء عن طريق العمل الأمني المباشر أو عن طريق محاولة التأثير السياسي وعدم دعم الإعلام المعادي.

وجاء الرد القطري موضحاً أن تلك الخطوة التي أقدمت عليها الدول الثلاث لا علاقة لها بمصالح الشعوب الخليجية وأمنها واستقرارها بل لها صلة باختلاف في المواقف بشأن قضايا خارج دول مجلس التعاون.

تاريخ الخلافات بين قطر والسعودية بدأ مع منتصف التسعينيات وتولي الأمير السابق مقاليد الحكم في قطر أخذت سياسة كل بلد تسير في اتجاه مختلف عن الآخر، تبنت السياسة القطرية دعم المقاومة اللبنانية والفلسطينية فيما تصدرت السعودية محور الاعتدال العربي المقابل والذي يضم مصر والأردن وبعض دول الخليج وكان لهذا المحور موقف مغاير في القضية الفلسطينية وفي المواجهة مع إسرائيل وتجلى الانقسام في أوضح صوره في حربي إسرائيل على لبنان وغزة في العامين 4112 ، و 4112 ، في الأولى رأت السعودية ما حدث على أنه مغامرة قام بها حزب الله وفي الحرب على غزة قاطعت قمة الدوحة التي خصصت لدعم صمود الشعب الفلسطيني في مواجهة العدوان الإسرائيلي، هبّت رياح التغيير في العالم العربي في نهاية عام 4101 وشهد أكثر من بلد عربي ثورة شعبية اقتلعت نظام الحكم فيه وكانت السعودية وقطر على موعد جديد من الاختلاف والتباين في السياسات الخارجية، ساندت قطر التغيير الحاصل في العالم العربي ووقفت ضد حلفائها السابقين في دمشق وطهران والضاحية الجنوبية فيما توجست السعودية من هذه الانتفاضات الشعبية ووقفت موقف المناهض لها أو المتحفظ

في بعض الأحيان، وجاءت الثورة السورية لتشكل نقطة التقاء بين البلدين فالدوحة والرياض هما من يدعم الثورة في وجه النظام السوري وحلفائه في المنطقة لكن ذلك لم يكن كافياً لتقريب وجهات النظر بين البلدين رغم تأكيد الدوحة في العهد الجديد على أنها تقف على مسافة واحدة من جميع الأطراف وأنها تدعم الدول والحكومات لا الأحزاب

والجماعات.

[شريط مسجل]

الشيخ تميم بن حمد آل ثاني/أمير قطر :نحن دولة وشعب ومجتمع متماسك ولسنا حزباً سياسياً ولهذا فنحن نسعى للحفاظ على علاقات مع الحكومات والدول كافة، كما أننا نحترم جميع تيارات السياسة المخلصة المؤثرة والفاعلة في المنطقة ولكننا لا نحسب على تيار ضد آخر.

تعليق صوتي :جاء انقلاب الثالث من يوليو في مصر ليعيد الانقسام على أشده بين البلدين أيدت السعودية ودول الخليج إقصاء الرئيس محمد مرسي ودعمت الحكم الجديد في البلاد فيما وقفت قطر موقفاً مختلفاً عن بقية دول المجلس، هنأت الرئيس المؤقت الذي عينه الجيش المصري والتزمت بالمساعدات التي أقرتها سابقاً لمصر لكنها قدمت رؤية مغايرة للخروج من الأزمة التي تسبب فيها الانقلاب وكان هذا الأمر سبباً في التباعد والاختلاف مع الرياض وأبو ظبي تبينت نتائجه في سحب السفراء من الدوحة ودخول منظومة مجلس التعاون الخليجي في دوامة خلاف جديدة لا يعرف أين وكيف ستنتهي.

[نهاية التقرير]

علي الظفيري :أهلاً بكم من جديد مشاهدينا الكرام في العمق يبحث الليلة كما قلنا أزمة العلاقات الخليجية الخليحية إثر قرار سحب السفراء، القرار الثلاثي السعودي الإماراتي البحريني من قطر وضيفي هما جابر الحرمي هنا في الأستوديو، حسين شبكشي من جدة في المملكة العربية السعودية، أستاذ حسين الآن مضت 2 أيام أو 5 أيام على هذا القرار الذي تضمن سحب السفراء نستطيع اليوم وفي هذه الحلقة أن نقرأ وبشكل موضوعي ويعني عميق المسألة وأن نبحث في أسبابها برأيك ما هي الأسباب الأساسية التي دفعت لاتخاذ مثل هذا الإجراء؟

حسين شبكشي :الاعتماد على إنه المسألة بدأت منذ 2 أيام فيه قراءة قاصرة للمسألة، قبل سحب السفراء كان هناك مسألة سحب الثقة أعتقد إنه الثقة وصلت لمراحل متدنية جداً إذ أستطيع أن أقول انعدمت بين البلدين في أكثر من حقبة وأكثر من موقف معروف طبعاً في أزمات سياسية طاحنة جداً وأدت إلى انعدام الثقة والريبة والشك من تصرفات قطر فيما يخص السعودية تحديداً أنا بتكلم الآن، وبالتالي أصبح هناك محاولة فهم محاولة رأب الصدع لكن لم تفلح وبعد موضوع الربيع العربي انطلقت الشكوك أكثر وأصبح هناك طبعاً توجهات واضحة جداً وخلافات شديدة بين البلدين يعني موضوع مصر ما هو إلا القشة التي قصمت ظهر البعير لكن هناك تباين في كثير من المواقف في مسألة اليمن في مسألة سوريا حتى في مسألة سوريا مع احترامي للتقرير الاتفاق على إسقاط الأسد شيء ولكن دعم الأطراف المتصارعة داخل سوريا شيء آخر، هناك تباين في الكثير من المواقف في العلاقة مع إيران في العلاقة مع البحرين في الملف الليبي وطبعاً

أولا وأخرا ودائماً الملف المصري، العلاقات السعودية القطرية مرت بمراحل متأزمة للغاية واستخدمت فيها وسائل شديدة النعومة مثل الإعلام والمال وحتى السلاح والتسليح لأطراف مريبة ومقلقة منها على الحدود السعودية فيما يخص القضية اليمنية على سبيل المثال فسحب الثقة عندي أهم بكثير من سحب السفراء.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ حسين ذكرت الملف المصري بشكل رئيسي اليمن وأيضاً في سوريا رغم إنه كان في نوع من التعاون لكن أنت تراه كان موضوعاً خلافياً، الملف الليبي العلاقة مع إيران لكن البيان الذي ظهر وتحدث عن سحب السفراء تحدث عن الأمن السعودي بمعنى الإشارة إلى أنه قطر تلعب دوراً سلبياً فيما يتعلق بأمن المملكة العربية السعودية داخل السعودية، البيان القطري تحدث عن قضايا خارج دول مجلس التعاون.

حسين شبكشي :السعودية ترى موقف قطر من جماعة الإخوان المسلمين موقف يهدد الأمن الوطني السعودي بصريح العبارة وأنا في برنامجك الذي أحترمه وأحترم فيه احترامك للمشاهد من الواضح جداً إنه قطر اتخذت خطاً معيناً في دعم جماعة الإخوان المسلمين في علاقاتها الخارجية وأصبح ذلك ركن أساسي من ركن الخارجية القطرية، وذكر التقرير أن السعودية تخلت عن الحضور في مؤتمر غزة هذا لم يكن مؤتمر غزة السعودية لا تعترف بغزة تعترف بشيء اسمه فلسطين هذا كان مؤتمر لدعم حماس، وهناك فرق كبير في العلاقة السعودية الفلسطينية اللي هي علاقة مؤسسات ومع ممثل يعترف به من قبل الشعب الفلسطيني كما يعرفه العالم وبين الاتكال على فصيل واحد

يمثل جغرافية واحدة داخل منطقة واحدة في فلسطين تؤيدها قطر هذا هو التباين بعينه، السعودية..

علي الظفيري :إذا تسمح لي أستاذ حسين أنا لاحظت، طبعاً قضية الإخوان المسلمين ودعم قطر للإخوان المسلمين وأستغرب حقيقة حينما يبدأ الحديث عن إنه محاولة التبرؤ من هذه المسألة خليني أتحدث الآن بفرضية دعم الإخوان المسلمين قطر تدعم الإخوان المسلمين كيف يمكن أن يشكل هذا الأمر تهديداً لأمن السعودية؟

حسين شبكشي :جميل، أنا كنت سأصل لهذه النقطة هناك طبعاً معروف جداً إنه في الخليج في تواجد للإخوان المسلمين وفي تواجد حراكي معروف ومنظم معروف بعض رموزه طبعاً أجهزة الداخلية في كل بلد في الخليج العربي تعرفهم منهم ما حوكم ومنهم ما وصل للبرلمان ومنهم من يزال تحت الأرض يعني في بعض الدول لكنهم موجودين ولا يمكن إنكار ذلك يتلقون دعماً ويتلقون منابر ويتلقون تشجيعاً من قطر ومن دعمها لهذا الخط الإخواني والإخوان لديهم مطامع سياسية، مطامع يعني تشكل خطراً على الأمن الوطني السعودي بعلاقة الإخوان مع إيران تعلمون جيداً جداً مدى ريبة السعودية من المشروع الإيراني برمته وإدراكهم تماماً إن إيران تستخدم الكثير من العناصر علاقاتها بين بعض الدول العربية والجماعات العاملة في بعض الدول منها حماس

والإخوان المسلمين وحزب الله وغيره التي تسببت فعلاً في أكثر من موقع مختلف للقلاقل والأحداث العنيفة والدموية في أكثر من بلد عربي، والسعودية بالتالي رأت ما يحدث حولها وارتأت أن تأخذ الخط ألاستباقي لضمانة أمنها وسلامتها لأنها رأت هذه النتائج في أكثر من دولة ولها نتائج مخيفة.

علي الظفيري :قضايا كثيرة أستاذ حسين ومهمة وفي نقاط حقيقة يعني تستحق وهذا أصلاً موضوعنا الليلة للنقاش في هذه التفاصيل، أسأل الأستاذ جابر الحرمي الآن لماذا تشكل قطر قلقاً وتهديداً لأمن دول مجلس التعاون الأخرى بانتهاجها سياسات تختلف عن هذه السياسات التي تنتهجها المملكة العربية السعودية وتسبب إزعاجاً وصداعاً مستمراً منذ عقدين في ملفات كثيرة كما أشار الأستاذ حسين ولماذا قطر تريد أن تكون مختلفة عن السعودية خاصة أن منظومة مجلس التعاون يفترض أن توحد السياسات وتوحد المواقف؟

جابر الحرمي :أولاً دعني أشكر بداية أستاذ حسين على ما طرح وإن كنت أختلف معه في كثير من القضايا التي طرحها لكن حقيقة هو تحدث عن غالبية ما طرح قضايا خارج

نطاق الإقليم الخليجي بينما البيان الذي تحدث بسحب السفراء ركز على تدخل قطر في شؤون دول مجلس التعاون كل المحللين الذين يدافعون عن القرار يتحدثون عن قضايا خارجية الإخوان، اليمن..

علي الظفيري :اليمن مسألة أمنية سعودية تتعلق بأمن المملكة العربية السعودية هذا واضح.

جابر الحرمي :لكن البيان الذي تحدث عنه وتسبب بسحب السفراء خلا تماماً عن أي شيء يقول أن هذه الأزمة من أجل قضايا خارج نطاق الخليج، البيان القطري حدد بالضبط ما هي القضية الأساسية المرتكزة على سحب السفراء تحديداً إذن حددنا نحن أن هناك قضايا أخرى أدت إلى أن ندفع بسحب السفراء يفترض أننا في منظومة خليجية متكاملة ليس عيباً أن نختلف اتجاه هذه القضايا هناك اختلافات في كل دول العالم، الإتحاد الأوروبي فيه خلافات في الملفات الخارجية بين الدول الأعضاء لكن لم يحدث أن قامت هذه الدول بسحب سفرائها أو استدعاء إعلامييها كما حدث مؤخراً..

علي الظفيري :كيف استدعاء إعلاميين؟

جابر الحرمي :بالأمس يعني هناك جميع الإعلاميين المتعاونين إن كانوا الإخوة الأشقاء من المملكة العربية السعودية بالدوحة تم استدعائهم وأمرهم بترك الوسائل الإعلامية حتى الذين كتاب المقالات طلب منهم أن يعودوا وعدم الكتابة في الصحافة القطرية ونفس الأمر فيما يتعلق بالأشقاء في دولة الإمارات هذا أمر آخر.

علي الظفيري :إذا كنت تعتبر إن أنت سياستك تشكل خطر على أمني بالتأكيد سأوقف التعاون معك.

جابر الحرمي :جميل جداً ما هي السياسة أو ما هي التدخلات التي تزعج أشقاءنا في

دول الخليج وأدت إلى مثل هذه الخطوة الغير مألوفة والتي تحدث لأول مرة أن يتم سحب جماعي لسفراء من دولة خليجية يتحدثون عن موضوع كما أشار موضوع إيران على سبيل المثال وأن قطر لديها يعني تدعم..

علي الظفيري :تدعم الإخوان مع إيران..

جابر الحرمي :إيه نعم الجهتين تشكلان نحن نعرف من هي الدولة التي تتبادل تجارياً مع إيران كصادرات وواردات..

علي الظفيري :من هي؟

جابر الحرمي :الأشقاء في دولة الإمارات العربية المتحدة وهذا أعتقد أرقام معروفة وليست..

علي الظفيري :مش عيب التبادل التجاري.

جابر الحرمي :هذا حقهم مشروع ولا نتدخل ولا أعتقد أنه يحق لأحد أن يتحدث عن مثل هذا الأمر ولها كامل السيادة التامة فيمن يتعاملون، لكن عندما تقول قطر تدعم الإخوان أو تدعم حماس طبيعي جداً إن هناك مظلومين في غزة قصفوا بقنابل في 4112 وكان الموقف القطري أن استنجاداً ويعني نهضة لهؤلاء المحصورين في هذه البقعة تم الدعوة لمؤتمر عربي من أجل قمة غزة وأعتقد إن هذا أمر طبيعي لكن الموضوع موضوع الإخوان المسلمين الذي أشار إليه أن قطر تدعم الإخوان المسلمين قطر نقف مع جميع الأطياف على مسافة واحدة الإخوان المسلمين شأنهم شأن جميع الأطياف التيارات الفكرية..

علي الظفيري :خليني أسأل بشكل واضح أنتم قريبين من الإخوان المسلمين ولا لا بقطر؟

جابر الحرمي :نحن ندعم جميع التيارات، الإخوان المسلمين متواجدين بالساحة كما هو الحال بالنسبة للتيارات الأخرى لكن قل لي ما هو نوع الدعم الذي قدم لهؤلاء حتى استطاعوا أن يتمكنوا في بلد، في مصر ليست قطر هي التي اختارتهم الشعب المصري هو الذي أوصلهم إلى سدة الحكم ثم أن تواجد قطر في الساحة المصرية سبقت مشهد الإخوان المسلمين على سبيل المثال أقول لك بالتواريخ أمير قطر سمو الأمير الوالد الشيخ حمد قام بزيارة إلى مصر بعد الثورة بثلاثة أشهر في 3 مايو 4100 وكان آنذاك المجلس العسكري هو الحاكم، المشير طنطاوي والتقى مع الشيخ تميم قام بزيارة مماثلة في شهر يونيو إلى مصر في 4100 ولم يكن في المشهد لا إخوان مسلمين ولا مرسي وما إلى ذلك، حتى الاتفاقيات بالمناسبة التي وقعت سبقت أن وقعت مع عصام شرف مع أطراف أخرى وبالتالي لم توقع من أجل عيون الإخوان المسلمين إنما قدم دعما للشعب المصري الشقيق الذي نحن نؤمن بضرورة أن نقف معه وضرورة أيضا أن تعمل دول مجلس التعاون من أجل أن يخرج من هذا المأزق ومن أجل أن يخرج من هذا الوضع

الذي يعيش فيه ونحن نتفق مع أشقائنا في دول الخليج على ضرورة إيجاد حل للوضع في مصر.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ حسين في المسألة في قضية علاقة الإخوان المسلمين في إيران هناك مسألتان تطرحان في هذه القضية، المسألة الأولى إنه من حق الإخوان المسلمين كتيار سياسي في مصر لما تولوا الحكم الرئاسة أو غيرها أن يقيموا علاقات مع إيران خاصة أن الدول الخليجية السعودية والإمارات وقطر والجميع يقيم علاقات مع إيران وبالتالي لا يرون أنه ليس لديهم الحق في هذا الأمر، الأمر الثاني لما قامت الثورة السورية وقفت حماس حركة حماس وهي في دمشق ومحتضنة من النظام السوري وكان يدعمها لمدة سنوات وقفت موقف مخالف للنظام وابتعدت عنه وخرجت من دمشق وخرجت أيضا من العباءة الإيرانية ولما خرجت لم تجد من يستوعبها، يعني تعيّر حماس بالعلاقة مع إيران كتيار قريب من الإخوان ولما توقفت عن العلاقة مع إيران لم تجد من يحتضنها بل عاد الأمر الآن لحصارها من جديد ولمواجهتها في هاتين النقطتين ما المشكلة في إقامة علاقة مع إيران؟ ولماذا لا يتم استيعاب هؤلاء وإبعادهم عن إيران؟

حسين شبكشي :جميل، بس عندي نقطة بسيطة أنت إعلامي نفتخر به خليجي وسعودي وتعمل الآن في الدوحة ولم يتم استدعاءك وأتشرف باللقاء معك بس أحببت أن أوضح هذه النقطة، الموضوع الآخر العلاقة مع إيران طبعا من حق كل الدول أن تقيم علاقة مع إيران ولكن إذا كانت هذه العلاقة علاقة تؤدي إلى تقوية دولة لها مطامع واضحة ومعلنة وغير غامضة تحتل جزر الإمارات تهدد سوية أمن البحرين وتطالب البحرين وتهدد بدعم فصائل هنا وهناك في سائر الدول الخليجية الأخرى، من حق هذه الدول أن تعتبر هذا التقارب يهدد أمنا.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ حسين اسمح لي أرجوك.

حسين شبكشي :أما فيما يخص اليمن.

علي الظفيري :بس قبل ذلك، إذا كانت تحتل الجزر الثلاث وتهدد أمن البحرين وتطالب بها وهناك إيرانيون يتحدثون عن البحرين تبعية إيرانية ونحن نعرف هذا الموضوع وكيف تديره إيران وهذا تهديد لأمن الخليج، ليش ما سحبنا السفراء من إيران الأولى من قطر على الأقل؟

حسين شبكشي :جميل هذا سؤال طبعا قد يكون استراتيجي ونحن نعلم أن العلاقات السعودية القطرية اليوم في ظل حتى سحب السفراء لا تزال أفضل من العلاقات السعودية الإيرانية، فالشكل الذي تقوم عليه العلاقة الآن هو عتب أكثر منه تجميد العلاقة، العلاقات السعودية القطرية علاقة تاريخية.

علي الظفيري :نحن جميعا متضررين من هذا الأمر، هل يتصعد بتقديرك؟

حسين شبكشي :أنا مصر على أنه عتب لكنه عتب، نعم حط الأمر في نصابها، إلى اليوم في تجارة بينية هائلة جدا بين السعودية وقطر بين الإمارات وقطر وبين البحرين وقطر وستظل في علاقة نسب وعلاقة مشاركات تجارية وإلى آخره، لكن في مسألة

سياسية خطيرة جدا أنا بس أحببت أوضح هذا الموضوع إنه الجانب الذي طرح جوانب خارجية فقط ولكن في جوانب أيضا محلية، الخلايا التي تم القبض عليها منها ما حوكم مثل الذي حدث في الإمارات العربية المتحدة ومنها ما يحقق معهم الآن في السعودية ويمكن البحرين أيضا، في روابط تم التعرف إليها وأعلنت في جلسات خاصة مع الداخلية القطرية والوزراء القطريين المعنيين بهذه المسألة أن هناك روابط تم الكشف عنها تدين بعض الشخصيات القطرية بالدعم وإلى آخره.

علي الظفيري :مسألة مهمة يعني قطر دعمت من بالضبط في الإمارات؟

حسين شبكشي :أعلنت هذه موجودة، تم تعريف الجانب القطري أن هناك مسائل مقلقة أمنيا من قبل السعودية والبحرين والإمارات أن هناك دعم بشكل غير مباشر من الجماعات المحسوبة على تيارات الإخوان المسلمين، أما بالنسبة لليمن والموضوع هذا أيضا خطير إنه هو الحدود الجنوبية للمملكة العربية السعودية هناك فصائل تدعم من قطر والفصائل هذه لها خطوط مثل الحوثيين تحديدا لها خطوط ومطامع سياسية مقلقة جدا يعني أطلقوا خرائط الآن تطالب ببعض الأراضي السعودية يعني فصيل يدعم بين هلالين من جهات محسوبة.

علي الظفيري :نمررها بس للأستاذ جابر الحرمي، ذكر نقاط مهمة إنه في الإمارات خلايا بالسعودية خلايا واتضحت صلات مع قطر أنتم تدعمون الحوثيين والحوثيون يشكلون خطرا على أمن السعودية.

جابر الحرمي :جميل، نقطة النقطة ما يتحدث عن هذه الخلايا التي تدعمها قطر نتمنى أن يتم تقديم أدلة أن قطر ساندت الخلية الفلانية، ما يتم الاستشهاد فيه اليوم عكس ذلك،

أشقاؤنا في مملكة البحرين في 4100 أقروا وتقدموا بالشكر الجزيل على أن قطر قامت باكتشاف خلية كانت تستهدف منشآت..

علي الظفيري :أظن جسر الملك فهد.

جابر الحرمي :جسر الملك فهد وسفارة المملكة العربية السعودية الشقيقة في المنامة وشخصيات ورموز، خرجت هذه الخلية البحرينية من مملكة البحرين ودخلت السعودية وخرجت من السعودية ولم يتم اكتشافها، عندما أتت إلى الحدود البرية القطرية تم اكتشافها وتم التعامل معها وتم إبلاغ أشقائنا في البحرين في نوفمبر 4100 ، على ماذا يدل هذا؟ ألا يدل على مدى التكامل وحرص قطر على أمن واستقرار دول مجلس التعاون، أليست هذه شهادة، هل هو..

علي الظفيري :هل تدعمون الإخوان في السعودية؟

جابر الحرمي :أبدا.

علي الظفيري :هل هناك دعم قطري للإخوان في السعودية لرموز إخوانية لشخصيات إخوانية؟

جابر الحرمي :أبدا، هل هناك إخوان في المملكة العربية السعودية؟

علي الظفيري :بالتأكيد في إخوان.
جابر الحرمي :هل هناك دليل واضح أن قطر قدمت دعما أيا كان هذا الدعم لأي شخصية كما يتم الادعاء قدمت لهم قطر أو أوصلت لهم دعما أو مساندة، إلى الآن ما يتم الحديث عليه للأسف ما هي إلا قصاصات صحفية وأخبار نشرت في صحف هي معادية وأشقاؤنا يعرفون أين نشرت ومن كتبها وفي أي جهة وكان يفترض وكان أملنا دائما في أشقائنا ونحن نثق فيهم أن يتم الدفاع حتى عن قطر عندما يتم الإساءة إليها في هذه الصحف التي يتم الاستناد فيها على أنها حقائق، هناك صحف كثيرة سواء كان صحف مصرية مدعومة للأسف بعضها من أشقائنا في دول الخليج ويتم الاستناد إليها على أن هذه حقائق وأنها هذه إثبات.
علي الظفيري :طيب الحوثيين مسألة مصيرية بالنسبة للسعودية.
جابر الحرمي :جميل، الحوثيين تدخلت قطر في فترة من الفترات عندما كان الرئيس السابق علي عبد الله صالح موجود بطلب منه والرئيس علي عبد الله صالح موجود وموجود بالمملكة العربية السعودية حاليا ويمكن الاستشهاد به تدخلت قطر بوساطة وهذا عهد قطري لم تتدخل فقط بطلب عندما طلبت منها اليمن بالتدخل كان لها موقف في لبنان كان لها موقف في دارفور عندما يتم الطلب من قطر بالتدخل من أجل حل أزمة ومن أجل نزع فتيل أزمة في وطن عربي بالتأكيد قطر لن تتأخر وسوف تبذل جهد.
علي الظفيري :ما جاوبت على سؤالي، دعمتم الحوثيين أم لا؟
جابر الحرمي :كانت وساطة قطرية من أجل أن تحل مشكلة قائمة بين الحكومة اليمنية.
علي الظفيري :هذا زمان.
جابر الحرمي :وتوقفت الوساطة بين الحوثيين واليمنيين آنذاك بوساطة قطرية توقفت تماما، اليوم بالعكس نحن في نوفمبر الماضي يعني قبل 3 أو 2 أشهر وزير الخارجية القطري كان موجود في اليمن وقدم دعما للحكومة اليمنية الحالية قدر ب 351 مليون دولار دعما للمشاريع التنموية للحكومة اليمنية، مشاريع التنمية توجه اليوم من أجل تنمية الأشقاء في اليمن بالعكس من ذلك الحوثيون أنفسهم وهذه الأخبار نشرت في صحف خليجية عندما اتهمت قطر بأن هناك مستقبل مظلما ينتظر قطر لأنها قد تدعم تيارات إسلامية أخرى، كان يمكن أن يقال أن قطر والله تدعم السلفيين تدعم جهات أخرى لكن أن تدعم الحوثيين ففيه غرابة هي تقف مع الجانب الحكومي وقدمت له، هي تدعم المبادرة الخليجية في اليمن، كيف لها أن تدعم الحكومة اليمنية وآنذاك تدعم، إلا إذا كانت قطر تتاجر بالسلاح أو لديها مصانع أسلحة حتى تبيع لهؤلاء، إذن الموضوع هو مجرد ادعاءات وهي تهم تلقى جزافا دون أن يكون هناك مستند حقيقي يقدم وما قدم حتى للحكومة القطرية كان مجرد قصاصات صحفية ردت عليها الحكومة القطرية في..
علي الظفيري :عفوا أستاذ جابر، الدليل الذي قدم لكم خبر جريدة؟
جابر الحرمي :أخبار جريدة في اللقاءات التي حدثت مع وزراء الخارجية ومع المسؤولين في دول مجلس التعاون قدمت أوراق وقصاصات صحفية ومن صحف

صفراء.

علي الظفيري :نمرر هذا الأمر للأستاذ حسين، أستاذ حسين اتهام قطر بهذا الأمر يعني أنا هنا في قطر وأتابع الرأي العام، هناك قلق كبير وهناك انزعاج من هذه التهمة والقول بأنه يا أخي إذا كانت اتهامات بمثل هذا المستوى الإخلال بأمن دول الخليج يفترض أن يقدم دليلا للرأي العام حتى يقنع الرأي العام بالحجة التي أدت إلى سحب السفراء، لم يقدم حتى الآن الأستاذ جابر يقول أخبار صحفية من جرائد مصرية تقدم على أنها دليل؟

حسين شبكشي :يعني الأستاذ جابر طبعا يتذاكى علينا الليلة فأنا سأمرر له وأنتقل للنقطة اللي بعدها إنه أعطيك مثال واحد كيف أولبرمان كان مذيع في محطة الإم إس إن بي سي المعروفة جدا وطلب منه أن يترك عمله لأنه تبرع لمنظمة محسوبة على أحد المرشحين للحزب الديمقراطي الذي ينتمي إليه، طبعا طلب منه أن يترك عمله فورا، أحمد منصور الذي يعمل في الجزيرة وهي محطة محسوبة على قطر يدرب المعتصمين في رابعة على كيفية الاعتراض على الجيش المصري، يوسف القرضاوي الذي يعمل ويتقاضى راتبا من محطة الجزيرة ومن الحكومة القطرية قال ما فيه الكفاية بحق الإمارات وبحق السعودية، هذا تأييد صريح وتقليب ضد الحكم في السعودية وفي الإمارات برعاية قطرية برعاية واضحة جدا أنا سأختصر الطريق عشان ما نضيع الوقت للمشاهدين وندخل في صلب الموضوع، هذه أمور تعتبر تهديدا للأمن الوطني السعودي والإماراتي وهذه برعاية قطرية، أنا ما أقدر أعتبر إنه هذه منابر إعلامية مستقلة لأنه الإعلام في الغرب يسمى السلطة الرابعة عندما تكون هناك سلطة أولى تنفيذية سلطة ثانية تشريعية وسلطة ثالثة قضائية ثم يكون هناك مجال لسلطة رابعة يكون لها قيمة في المجتمع وهذا الشيء غير متوفر في الدول العربية عموما وحتى قطر فلا يمكن أن أعتبرها سلطة إعلامية مستقلة وبريئة هي موجهة لأغراض سياسية تهدد امن الأشقاء في مجلس التعاون الخليجي ومن ضمنهم السعودية.

علي الظفيري :كأن هذا الأمر أستاذ حسين هذه نقطة، اسمح لي بس مضطر على الفاصل، بس أعلق تعليق لما سأطرحه معك بعد الفاصل والأستاذ جابر لديه تعليق، واشنطن تايمز كتبت التالي، السعودية فاجأت قطر بتوسيع قائمة المحظورات والدوحة رفضت الإذعان، تحدثت عن إغلاق مراكز أبحاث تحدثت عن مطالبة بسياسة خارجية أكثر ترويضا تحدثت أيضا يعني ديفد هيرست مثلا تحدث عن إغلاق مراكز أبحاث وعن غلق الجزيرة وكذلك أظن في هذه النقطتين وقطع علاقتها مع الإخوان المسلمين، طيب خلينا بعد الفاصل أعود لك بهذه النقاط وأسمع تعليق الأستاذ جابر الحرمي هنا حول ما ذكرتم مع تثبيت مسألة أنت ذكرت زملاء لنا في الجزيرة أنا أعتقد أن هذه المعلومات تقال هكذا وبالتالي من الواجب علينا، يعني بإمكانك أن تقول كل شيء لكن ليس بإمكانك أن تجعل الناس يصدقوا أي شيء يمكن أن يقال إلا إذا كان هناك وثيقة ودلائل وقرائن تؤكد ما تقول، بعد الفاصل نلتقي مع الزميلين حسين شبكشي وجابر الحرمي.

[فاصل إعلاني]
علي الظفيري :أهلا بكم من جديد مشاهدينا الكرام، في العمق يبحث الليلة الخلافات الخليجية الخليجية وقضية سحب السفراء الثلاثة السعودي والبحريني والإماراتي من-الدوحة نظرا لما تراه هذه الدول من أخطاء قامت بها أو تدخلات في الأمن في هذه الدول قامت بها قطر، ضيفي هما جابر الحرمي هنا في الدوحة وحسين شبكشي في جدة في المملكة العربية السعودية، أستاذ جابر تحدث الأستاذ حسين عن قضية الدكتور يوسف القرضاوي وإساءته لدول أخرى وهو يستخدم منابر يعني صحيح هي إما منابر مسجد وحتى منابر إعلامية لكن الدولة تستطيع السيطرة عليها، بالتالي أيضا منبر إعلامي كالجزيرة وغيرها كما يقول أستاذ حسين وغيره أيضا أنها تستخدم ضد هذه الدول للإساءة لهذه الدول وتوتير الأمور معها بالتالي أنت واحد من الأمرين بالتالي يعني يا مع يا ضد فخليك يعني واضح شوي.
جابر الحرمي :أنا أعتقد إذا نحن يعني فتحنا هذا الجانب فإن الطرف الآخر يتحمل أعباء أكبر بكثير.
علي الظفيري :كيف؟
جابر الحرمي :موضوع أنا دعني خطوة خطوة موضوع القرضاوي الذي يتحدث عنه، إذا نحن نعم صدرت من القرضاوي في خطبة جمعة على الهواء مباشرة منقولة لا يستطيع يعني على الهواء يمكن قفل النقل دون أن يكون ..وهو شخصية كبيرة في السن ولا يعبر عن السياسة القطرية ويعني وزير الخارجية القطري أكد أن السياسة القطرية تأخذ من المصادر الرئيسية الرسمية وليس من المنابر..

علي الظفيري :لكن في الإمارات قالوا في الإمارات قالوا أن القرضاوي لا يمكن أن يتحدث مثل هذا الحديث إلا بموافقة.
جابر الحرمي :جميل عندما نتحدث هناك الدكتور أحمد الكبيسي أو الشيخ أحمد الكبيسي الذي متواجد إلى اليوم في الشقيقة الإمارات وخطيب طالما هاجم قطر وأساء إلى رموز قطرية وأساء إلى أمير قطر شخصيا سمو الشيخ حمد بن خليفة، هل أقدمت قطر على سحب أو استدعاء أو حتى إرسال مذكرة؟ والأشقاء في الإمارات العربية المتحدة يعرفون ذلك لكن دعني فهذه شخصيات دينية ليس لديها منصب رسمي، لكن أنا أسال أخي وزميلي العزيز الأستاذ حسين ماذا سيكون موقفك إذا ما صدر هجوم من قائد شرطة قطر مثلا يهاجم الشقيقة المملكة العربية السعودية أو خادم الحرمين الشريفين ماذا سيكون موقفك؟ اليوم هناك شخصيات رسمية تتولى إلى هذه اللحظة..
علي الظفيري :تقصد ضاحي خلفان.
جابر الحرمي :أقصد ضاحي خلفان.
علي الظفيري :أساء لقطر؟
جابر الحرمي :أساء لقطر وهو بمنصبه وهو قائد شرطة أساء لقطر، هناك أيضا

شخصيات سياسية هناك أنور قرقاش وهناك شخصيات أخرى يعني مستشارين لإمارات معينة أساءوا لقطر لكن قطر رفضت أن تتعامل مع هذه الإساءات أو أنها تسحب أو حتى ترسل مذكرات إلى أشقائنا في الدول الخليجية على اعتبار أن ما يربط دول مجلس التعاون قيادة وشعوبا أكبر من هذه الأمور التي قد تمر أو قد تحدث في خطبة جمعة أو في وسيلة إعلام أو إلى ما ذلك من حوادث لأن ما يربطنا وما يربط الشقيقة السعودية أكبر بكثير، فالسعودية عمقنا ولا يمكن يوما من الأيام أن نطعن أو أن نتآمر مع أي كان أن نطعن الشقيقة السعودية، كيف يمكن لشخص أن يطعن نفسه وأنا على ثقة تامة أنه إذا ما حدث اليوم أي اعتداء لا قدر الله على قطر فإن أول من سيقف معنا المملكة العربية السعودية قيادة وشعبا ونفس الأمر إذا لا قدر الله تعرضت المملكة العربية السعودية لأي سوء فإن القطريين والخليجيين كلهم سوف يقفون داعمين المملكة العربية السعودية وسوف يضحون بمالهم وأنفسهم من أجل الدفاع عن المملكة العربية السعودية، وهذا أمر طبيعي جدا حجم التداخل الأسري و الاجتماعي المتجذر لا يمكن أن يفصل بقرار ولا يمكن أن يعني يحسب بسفير ولا يمكن أن يتم التعامل معه بتصريح، نحن أكبر من هذه الأمور وما يربطنا أعتقد طوال السنوات أثبتت أن كل الأزمات سوف يتم تجاوزها لأن هناك حقيقة تاريخية متجذرة أن علاقتنا مصيرية.

علي الظفيري :طيب أستاذ حسين أنا أسمع في قطر هنا هذا الأمر الذي قاله الأستاذ جابر أن كثيرين أساءوا لنا في قطر مسؤولين رسميين في الإمارات و في أكثر من مكان ولم نتحدث عن مسألة التصعيد بهذه الدرجة سحب سفراء وما إلى ذلك.

حسين شبكشي :البادي أظلم، هناك إجماع شبه عربي في أكثر من دولة عربية أن هناك أذى لحقها بسبب منابر أتيحت لمعارضين ولبرامج ليست بالضرورة أن تنشر الحقيقة ولا حتى المعلومات الدقيقة ولكنها تقدم رؤية مظللة في بعض الأحيان عن بلادهم، وكانت هذه دائما عبر مؤتمرات عبر برامج عبر ملتقيات في قطر مع شديد الأسف وبالتالي وجهت هذه الاتهامات إلى هذه الدول وبدأت تتوجس وتخاف، وأنا لا أوافق على هذا الرد الذي حدث من أي مسؤول بحق قطر لأنه لا ينبغي أن نصل في علاقات شقيقة إلى هذا المستوى من الأخذ والرد، لكن نعود إلى أصل المشكلة لماذا بدأت هذه الأمور تتخذ هذا المنحى الخطير جدا في العلاقات وعبر المنابر والطرق والتدخلات يعني الإمارات الدعم الذي حصل للتوجه الإخواني فيها من قطر كما اتضحت وبالأدلة إذا أحب الأستاذ جابر أن يطلع عليها والحصول عليها..

علي الظفيري :أعطيني الأدلة إذا تكرمت؟

حسين شبكشي :عند الجهات الأمنية في الإمارات يمكن الحصول عليها نعم هذا الذي ذُكر في المحاكم في علاقة بين دعم قطري للخلايا الإخوانية التي وجدت في الإمارات هذا ما تم نشره وهذا هو سبب الغضبة الإماراتية من قطر، فالإمارات اختارت يعني هل لازم يكون في نهج بين محمد مرسي أو محمد بن راشد اختاروا محمد بن راشد أو محمد بن زايد أو الشيخ خليفة هذا اللي اختاروه فلا يجب أن يفرض عليهم نظام آخر بدعمه

بتهيئة المناخ له، وفي السعودية الدولة تحكم بالشريعة وتحكم بالكتاب والسنة..

علي الظفيري :يعني بس أنا بالله عندي سؤال إذا تكرمت إذا حكموا الإخوان المسلمين في الإمارات حكموا في السعودية يعني رح يظل آل ثاني سيحكمون قطر ولا ممكن الإخوان المسلمين سيتمددون يعني ما يشمل قطر والإمارات والسعودية واحد أسر حاكمة أنظمة شمولية.

حسين شبكشي :أخوي علي أنا لا بس أخوي علي لا أنا ما إني ماغي فرح هنا عشان أسال أسئلة فيها تنبؤات وفلكية أنا اللي أعرفه أنا أن الحجة التي تطرح فيها الإخوان المسلمين أنهم مسلمين أكثر من غيرهم يعني هذه المسألة سياسية وليست دينية لأن بلد تحكم بالكتاب والسنة اسمها السعودية تزايد عليها دينيا يعني أعتقد فيها نوع من المغالطة فيها خلل وفيها مشاكل وفيها إصلاح مطلوب وفيها وفيها وفيها لكن موضوع الدين أعتقد في المملكة العربية السعودية صعب بيع السالفة هذه يعني ما هي مقنعة فيها.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ حسين القضية أن تضع فرضان.

حسين شبكشي :لا لا بس نقطة أخيرة.

علي الظفيري :تفضل، تفضل.

حسين شبكشي :اسمح لي نقطة أخيرة، أردوغان الذي يمجد فيه أنصار الإخوان المسلمين ويغنون يعني بإنجازاته وهي مهمة جدا سواء على المستوى الديمقراطي أو الاقتصادي لم يكن أن يستطيع أن يصبح ما كان عليه كأردوغان ناجح لولا مروره بالتجربة الأتاتوركية هي العلمانية، العلمانية جزء من نجاح أردوغان فلما تبيع الديمقراطية بالمنظومة الإخوانية بيعها كلها بالعلمانية أو بالديمقراطية.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ حسين أنا معك بهذه النقطة، أقصد نقاش القضية، نقاش المسألة الفكرية عند الإخوان شيء، أنت تضع فرضيا أن قطر تدعم الإخوان في السعودية فهنا المقصد أن الفرضية نفسها فيها إشكالية الآن الإخوان كيف اتجاههم ولا السعودية..

حسين شبكشي :أنا قاعد أضع فرضية..

علي الظفيري :طيب خلينا نسمع تعليق جابر.

جابر الحرمي :أنا عفوا عندما يتحدثون عن دعم قطر للإخوان المسلمين وأنها تغيير الأنظمة أنا أبي أسال ما هو نظام الحكم في قطر؟ أليس هو مشابه للمملكة العربية السعودية للإمارات الكويت؟ أليس هو وراثي يعني كيف يمكن؟ وبأي منطق هذا؟

علي الظفيري :صفقة مثلا؟

جابر الحرمي :أي صفقة يمكن أن يتم لإسقاط النظام هو مشابه لمن أسقط نظاما جارا له سوف يأتي إليه طبيعي، هو ما ينطبق في الأشقاء في الإمارات أن النظام وراثي كما هو الحال سوف يتمدد وسوف يأتي فكيف به بقطر أن تأتي بمن يقول أن تدعمهم من أجل تغيير أنظمة خليجية وهي سوف تكون بمنأى عن هذا.

علي الظفيري :لكن أستاذ جابر دعم النكايات، الأنظمة بينها كل واحد يعني تعرف ممكن

يكره الإخوان هنا بس يحبهم عشان عاملين مشكلة للنظام الثاني والسعودية والإمارات نفس الطريقة يعني ممكن تكره الطرف لكن تدعمه نكاية فيه فممكن قطر تعمل هذا الشيء.

جابر الحرمي :في أمور إستراتيجية أستاذ علي لا يمكن التضحية فيها أمن الخليج والاستقرار وأنظمة الحكم وما تم التعاقد عليه بين شعوب وأنظمة حكم لا يمكن، لا يمكن أن يكون..

علي الظفيري :اسمح لي آخذ هذه المداخلة السريعة للأستاذ سالم بن علي الكعبي نائب رئيس مجلس الشورى العماني يوضح لنا موقف سلطنة عمان من الخلاف بين الدول الخليجية.

[شريط مسجل]

سالم بن علي الكعبي/نائب رئيس مجلس الشورى :نحن سمعنا البيان من الدول الثلاث نتمنى من الدول الثلاث ونناشدها أنها تتحلى بالصبر تتحلى بالحكمة، ودولة قطر دولة شقيقة ويجب حتى لو لا قدر الله بدّر خطأ من إخوانا في دولة قطر الشقيقة نتحمل هذا الخطأ وأن نعالجه بالحكمة وبالطريقة التي تتناسب ولا نثير شعوبنا في إجراءات يمكن لا قدر الله تحقق نتائج سلبية، نتمنى أنها الأمور لا يكون فيها نوع من التصعيد لأنه التصعيد بصراحة سيضر الخليج العربي بالعموم ليس فقط الدول المعنية في القضية الحالية، إحنا كل متكامل أي ضرر يلحق بأحدنا يلحق بالجميع، أتمنى من الحكماء أتمنى من العقلاء أن يقف هذا الموضوع عند هذا الإجراء، أنا أيضاً أعجبت بردة الفعل القطرية وهي لم تتعامل بمبدأ المعاملة بالمثل لم تسحب سفراءها من الدول الثلاثة هذه أيضاً خطوة تحسب لأخوانا في دولة قطر، إحنا في السلطنة من المبادئ الأساسية للسياسة العُمانية عدم تدخل في شؤون الآخرين وفي المقابل أيضاً لا نقبل للآخرين أن يتدخلوا في شؤوننا، بس إحنا في المقابل وهذا أيضاً اللي انتهجه حاكم البلد جلالة السلطان المعظم حفظه الله ورعاه من خلال أيضاً يعني فتح باب الإصلاح بين الإخوان وأيضاً لا أحد ينكر دور السياسة العمُانية ودور صاحب الجلالة في حل الكثير من الإشكاليات التي طافت على السطح، ممكن بعض الأمور إحنا عرفنا عنها وأنا أعتقد أن الكثير من الأمور حتى المواطن الخليجي لا يعرف عنها.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ حسين هذا موقف عُمان وموقف الكويت، طيب عندي سؤال لماذا لم تكن الأدلة التي عُرضت في الاجتماعات الخليجية كاملة مقنعة للكويت وعُمان حتى تتخذان الخطوة ذاتها بسحب السفراء من قطر ويكون هنا العقاب يعني مجدي جماعياً وبالتالي يؤثر في السياسة أو في الموقف القطري؟

حسين شبكشي :يعني ليس بجديد بأن لا يتفق كافة أعضاء مجلس دول التعاون الخليجي على نفس المسألة لم يتفقوا على إتحاد المصارف الخليجية ولا على العملة الموحدة ولا على مسائل ولا على إتحاد نفسه فبالتالي ليس مستغربا أن يكون هناك

اختيار لبعض هذه الدول أن تلعب أدواراً مختلفة قد يكون الخيار لعُمان أن تلعب الدور الهادئ الصامت حتى ترى ماذا يحدث وقد يكون الاختيار للكويت أن ترى أنها بإمكانها أن تكون فاعلة أكثر إذا حافظت على دور الوسيط هذه خيارات ولكن لا يعني أنهم مقتنعين وغير مقتنعين بالأدلة.

علي الظفيري :إيش رأيك أستاذ جابر بالموقف الكويتي والعُماني؟

جابر الحرمي :أنا أعتقد الآن أولاً نحن يعني نشكر سمو الشيخ صباح الأحمد على جهده ودوره الكبير اللي قامت به دولة الكويت الشقيقة وأشقائنا في سلطنة عمان أيضا لكن لو كانت هناك أدلة حقيقية وأدلة يعني تثبت إدانة تامة على قطر لا أعتقد أن

أشقاءنا في دولة الكويت أو في سلطنة عُمان سوف يعني يكون لهم موقف محايد لكن بذلت جهود من أجل إدخال سلطنة عمان ودولة الكويت لكن هذه الأدلة التي قدمت لم تكن مقنعة أبداً وأدى ذلك إلى أن يتصدر للأمر كل من الأشقاء في الإمارات والمملكة العربية السعودية وطبعاً بالضرورة أشقائنا في مملكة البحرين.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ حسين فقط للإجمال يعني هناك من يتحدث عن أنه القضية تتعلق باستقلالية السياسة القطرية التي تميزت بها طوال يعني العقدين الماضيين، استقلالية يعني ليس بالضرورة أن تكون إيجابية أو سلبية المهم أنها مختلفة عن السياسة السعودية، الفايننشال تايمز تتحدث عن هذا الأمر قالت أنه أمير قطر وافق بالاجتماع اللي حدث في الرياض على الالتزام بعدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية لدول المجلس وفي اجتماع وزراء الخارجية بعد ذلك زاد الضغط تحدثوا عن آليات للتطبيق تحدثوا عن نقاط للمطالبة بسياسة خارجية قطرية أكثر ترويضاً وهذا ما اعترضت عليه قطر

أن لا تقبل الإملاء أو التبعية المطلقة في قضية السياسة الخارجية، يعني المشكلة كلها أن أنت مختلف عني في سياستك الخارجية.

حسين شبكشي :ولكن الاختلاف اللي أنت مختلف عني فيه يسبب مشاكل، هناك وساطات قطرية مغربية وساطات قطري بحرينية وساطات قطرية أردنية وساطات قطرية سعودية وساطات قطرية مصرية وساطات قطرية يمنية، قطر لديها خلافات كبيرة مع أكثر من دولة عربية هذه السياسات أصبحت تسبب قلقا على الأمن الوطني لأكثر من دولة عربية، وهذا القلق والخطورة والتهديد على الأمن الوطني يعني سيصيب الجميع هي شظية هي قنبلة زمنية لو انفجرت ستصيب شظاياها كافة الأقطار العربية، الخلاف القطري البيني بين دولة وأخرى أصبح خلاف عام مع أكثر من دولة عربية هنا الخطورة.

علي الظفيري :أستاذ جابر أنتم يعني عندكم مشاكل مع دول عربية كثيرة كما يقول أستاذ حسين وسؤالي ما هو القادم، ماذا ستفعل قطر هل نتيجة هذه الخطورة وهذا الضغط ستغير سياستها ستلين ستتشدد ماذا ستفعل؟

جابر الحرمي :أبداً قطر واضحة في سياساتها الخارجية ولن تساوم ولن تفاوض على

سياستها التي تنطلق من مبادئ وقيم ليست هي وليدة اليوم إنما هي إرث تاريخي، لكن السؤال إنه هناك خلافات مع الدول الأخرى نريد أن نتحدث بصراحة على مدى هذه الخلافات، اليوم الخلافات هي بالدول الثلاث التي قامت بسحب السفراء من أجل ما يحدث في مصر تحديداً يراد لقطر أن تؤيد تماماً كما هو الأشقاء في السعودية والإمارات يؤيدون الحكومة المصرية الحالية، قطر حقيقةً تقف مع الشعب المصري وتسعى جاهدة أن يخرج الشعب المصري من الأزمة ومن الأوضاع التي هو فيه، اليوم الخلاف ليس على خلاف قضية محلية إنما على أزمة خارج مجلس التعاون، ولماذا لا يكون هناك اختلاف في وجهات النظر؟ لماذا يراد ..والآن تحدث الأخ حسين أن الكويت وعُمان كان لهم وجهة نظر أخرى، عُمان كان لها في الإتحاد الخليجي رأي آخر أيضاً أشقائنا في الإمارات في..

علي الظفيري :طيب أنتم السنة الماضية في قطر كنتم موافقين على الإتحاد الخليجي مع السعودية وكان في كلام حتى عن إتحاد سعودي قطري بحريني شو اللي حصل في سنة؟

جابر الحرمي :كان هناك سياسة متفقة وماضية في هذا الصعيد لكن الذي حدث اليوم الأزمة المصرية هي التي خلقت هذا الخلاف وهي التي دفعت إلى توتير هذه العلاقة بين مجلس التعاون هي للأسف هي التي أثرت ولم يعني دول مجلس التعاون أن تصاب بهذا الوجع اليوم طوال مسيرة مجلس التعاون بخلاف داخلي خليجي خليجي حتى في حالة..

علي الظفيري :جابر الحرمي رئيس تحرير صحيفة الشرق القطرية شكراً جزيلاً لك انتهى الوقت أنا آسف والشكر موصول لحسين شبكشي الكاتب والمحلل السياسي ضيفنا من جدة في المملكة العربية السعودية، نتمنى إن شاء الله الخلافات تنتهي وأن تتصافى القلوب هذه أمنية بالتأكيد عند المواطنين الخليجيين والعرب المعنيين بالقضية أو ما يجري في الخليج اليوم، الشكر موصول لكم مشاهدينا الكرام على طيب المتابعة، صفحاتنا في مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي وقبل ذلك والأهم في موقع الجزيرة نت صفحة البرنامج في العمق ومواقع التواصل في تويتر وفيسبوك تحيات الزملاء داود سليمان وعبد العزيز الحيص ومنصور الطلافيح مخرج البرنامج نلقاكم إن شاء الله الأسبوع المقبل دمتم بخير وفي أمان الله___.

Appendix 12 (CDA Case Study 3)

The Audio-Visuals as “Transedited” by the BBCM-M (TETs):

12.1 al-Arabiyah (TET1)

Pan Arab TV show views Saudis joining al-Qaʿida in Syria, Iraq

1,526 words
19 November
2013 07:26
BBC Monitoring Middle
East BBCMEP
English
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Al-Arabiyah Televisionat 1830 GMT on 15 November carries live a new episode of its weekly "The Death Industry" talk show programme. Anchorman Muhammad al-Tumayhi conducts an interview with Saudi journalist Faris Bin-Hizam in the studio.

At the outset, al-Tumayhi says: "Mobilizing fighters and suicide bombers from Arab and Islamic countries is a strategy, which al-Qaʿida applies whenever it wants to spread death and chaos to a new front. This was done in Afghanistan and Iraq and is now being done in Syria but with an essential difference in the nationalities of the fighters being mobilized, as analysts put it. He also says the number of Tunisian and Libyan fighters has risen, compared to Saudis and other Gulf nationals."

Asked how he views the drop in the number of Saudis mobilized by al-Qaʿida Organization to fight in Syria, Bin-Hizam says "in the language of figures, though not accurate, we can make a comparison between what has happened in Syria over the past three years from 2011 to 2013 on the one hand and the situation in Iraq from 2003 to 2006 and the state of affairs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen on the other hand." He says that "around 600 Saudis have gone

to Syria, but more than 3,000 Saudis went to Iraq from 2003 to 2006."

Asked whether the said 600 Saudis in Syria are affiliated to al-Qaʿida or other organizations, Bin-Hizam says "due to the nature of their structures, the armed brigades in Iraq do not allow large numbers of foreigners into Iraq," adding that "the majority of the Arab fighters in Syria, including Saudis, join neither al-Nusrah Front which has been recently annexed to al-Qaʿida nor the ISIL [The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]

Al-Tumayhi says the number of Saudis and other Gulf citizens fighting for those organizations has dropped in favour of other nationalities.

In response, Bin-Hazim says "Tunisians and Libyans form the majority of the al-Qaʿida and al-Nusrah Front fighters in Syria," adding that "Iraqi, Jordanian, and Saudi fighters come third, fourth, and fifth in number respectively." In order to understand this issue, he says, "we should explore the security situation in Tunisia and Libya, which are still facing unrest as a result of their revolutions." He also says "neither Tunisia nor Libya has previously experienced any terrorist operations by al-Qaʿida, compared to Saudi Arabia that has suffered from terrorism over the past 25 years." Syrians "do not need any Arab or foreign fighters, simply because they can defend themselves," he says, adding that "the Free Syrian Army is made up of dozens of thousands of Syrian fighters."

A TV correspondent says "Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi, a religious figure in the Saudi scene, has revealed his stand on al-Qaʿida through Twitter, saying that he has not seen any action by al-Qaʿida in favour of Islam and Muslims over the past 23 years." He says "Al-Qaʿida intervened in Taleban's decision making, prompting the United States to occupy Afghanistan, reignited the civil war, and install the current government," adding that "the situation there is still extremely bad." Institutions "promoting charity work throughout the world has been besieged, thanks to al-Qaʿida's behaviour that has harmed that activity, according to the world community." The ISIL has been established "to strike mujahidin in Syria," he says, accusing it of "trying to provoke Turkey and turn it against the mujahidin in order to cut off their supply lines." He also says "since it was establish, al-Qaʿida has never targeted Iran."

Asked to comment, Bin-Hizam says "Al-Sa'idi reviewed the basic points in al-Qaʿida's experience in the Arab and Islamic world over the past 25 years, saying the organization has not offered any service to the Islamic world." He says "Al-Qaʿida does not target Iran, Hizballah, or Yemen's Huthis, and although it is a Salafi Sunni organization, it sometimes makes an alliance with other organizations or groups with different ideologies in order to achieve certain political goals." He also says "since they have a joint enemy - the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia - Iran and al-Qaʿida may close their ranks," adding that "this is not abnormal simply because the two sides work to achieve their political goals."

Asked how Saudi citizens have reached Syria, even though some of them are wanted by Saudi Arabia for involvement in acts of terrorism, Bin-Hizam says "some travel to Istanbul or Beirut as ordinary Saudi citizens and are transported to Syria by mediators; some others are so cautious that they first go to Dubai, Doha, Bahrain, or Egypt and then travel to Istanbul to be transported to Syria by mediators; and the others, who were released from prison after confirming that they had deserted al-Qaʿida, infiltrate into Yemen without passports or other documents, obtain faked passports, and then travel to Istanbul or Beirut to be taken to Syria by mediators." He also says "this is how the 600 Saudi citizens have travelled to Syria over the past three years."

A TV correspondent says "Ahmad al-Shayi, a name known well to the Saudi public opinion for his involved in fighting in Iraq, was used to target the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in December 2004," adding that "the bombing killed or wounded a number of people, including al-Shayi who suffered burns all over his body."

Asked by a correspondent how he entered Iraq from Syria, al-Shayi, speaking from poor reception, says "I entered Iraq via the Albu Kamal crossing."

Asked who helped him enter Iraq, al-Shayi says "a man named Muhammad [words indistinct]"

The correspondent also says "Al-Shayi was held in prison for a period of time, and Saudi Arabia worked hard to have him back," adding that "Al-Shayi returned to Riyadh several months later to undergo a long medical treatment." al-Shayi then recovered and resumed his normal life before disappearing suddenly once again and returning to Syria as a fighter in the ranks of al-Qaʿida."

Asked how he views al-Shayi returning to Syria once again to fight in the ranks of al-Qaʿida despite the tragic situation he had faced, Bin-Hizam says "Al-Shayi' left silently for Syria several months ago," adding that "the Saudi public opinion has been shocked by his return to al-Qaʿida despite his bitter experience." He also says "Al-Shayi has recovered but is still tired and suffers from burns."

Al-Tumayhi says many Saudis have faced bitter experiences because of al-Qaʿida.

Bin-Hizam relates the story of another Saudi citizen named Salih al-Qar'awi, "who was among a list of 85 wanted people." al-Qar'awi, he says, "joined al-Qaʿida and was in charge of Saudi groups operating in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and worked as a connecting link with several parties in Lebanon." He also says "Al-Qar'awi, a leading figure in the organization, was wounded severely, lost his limbs and eyes, and was about to die," adding that "after his group deserted him while he was lying on the ground, he was brought back to Saudi Arabia where he is now being treated."

Al-Tumayhi says some still send their sons to fight along with al-Qaʿida.

Bin-Hizam says "for the first time, we have seen some in Saudi Arabia expressing joy over their sons joining al-Qaʿida in Syria, such as a lady in the city of al-Qasim who has sent her son, 15, to Syria and announced through Twitter that he had reached Syria, joined al-Qaʿida, and would return to Saudi Arabia to conquer the tyrants of the Arabian Peninsula." Wondering what that child can do in Syria, he says "hundreds of Saudis are used as tools to carry out car bombing operations." He also says "the said woman has long complained that she and her husband have been accused of maintaining links with al-Qaʿida."

Al-Tumayhi says many Saudis still occupy outstanding positions in al-Qaʿida.

Bin-Hizam says "regrettably, each four or five people speaking for al-Qaʿida include three Saudis, as if most of the fighters in Syria had been Saudis," adding that "Al-Qaʿida projects its Saudi members to guarantee Saudi donations and encourage more Saudis to join the organization." He says "there is no leading Saudi figure in the ISIL or al-Nusrah Front in Syria."

Al-Tumayhi says we often hear that Saudi members of al-Qaʿida carry out suicide bombings.

Bin-Hizam says "their only duty is to carry out bombings," adding that "Al-Qaʿida Organization in Syria will be in need of 300 suicide bombers in 2014, including Saudis like the 15-year-old Saudi child."

Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1830 gmt 15 Nov 13

Document BBCMEP0020131119e9bj000ul

12.2 al-Arabiyah (TET2)

Saudi cleric views use of social media to counter al-Qaʿida ideology
1,379 words
22 July 2014
11:07
BBC Monitoring Middle
East BBCMEP
English

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Dubai al-Arabiyah Television in Arabic at 1833 gmt on 18 July carries a new 25-minute

episode of its weekly "Death Industry" talk show, presented by Muhammad al-Tumayhi.

At the outset of this episode, al-Tumayhi says: "What is the role which men of religion play in replying to the fatwas [formal religious rulings] of al-Qaʿida and those who embrace extremist ideologies? How they refute the claims through which the ideologues of al-Qaʿida try to infiltrate the brains of the simple people and youth who are enthusiastic about their religion and through which they push them towards the path of violence and death? We will try to answer some of these questions in today's episode in which we host Dr Muhammad al-Sa'idi, a Saudi Islamic preacher, who has recently created a wave of controversy after posting a series of tweets on Twitter, in which he attacked the ideology of al-Qaʿida, its fatwas, and ideologues."

Al-Tumayhi then welcomes al-Sa'idi via satellite from Jedda.

Asked why he chose Twitter to announce these positions, al-Sa'idi says: "I did not choose Twitter only, for I have expressed these opinions about more than 12 years ago. I used all available means. I spoke on the radio station, through several programmes which I used to present or in which I participated. I also spoke on the Saudi Television through a programme which I used to prepare and present." he adds that he also used other websites. He notes: "I spoke on Twitter because there is a large number of youth there, who need to be educated, as I believe, taking into consideration that many of them did not see many of the events which we have seen regarding the establishment of al-Qaʿida and the history which we know and which they do not know."

Asked that responses of social networking sites differ from those on the radio or television, al-Sa'idi says: "There is no doubt that responses on Twitter and Facebook are faster and more direct. The large number of people on Twitter and Facebook is also not available in any other means."

Al-Tumayhi says that since there is no filtering on Twitter, some people "who embrace this extremist ideology have attacked you."

Commenting, al-Sa'idi says: "I believe that when one holds moderate views, he will be attacked from all directions. If you want to know whether you are a centrist or not, you should look to see whether you are attacked from all directions or from one direction. It seems to me that I am attacked from all directions. I am attacked by the extremist takfiris [those who hold other Muslims to be infidels]. I am also attacked by whimsical people and those who disagree with me on political issues." He notes: "I do not divulge a secret if I say that there is an organization on Twitter. There are organized groups from various trends, particularly the trends that serve international intelligence sides."

Al-Tumayhi then reads one of al-Sa'idi's tweets which says; "Over the past 23 years, I have been searching for one action which al-Qaʿida carried out and served the interests of Muslims and Islam, but I could not find." He then asks him to explain this.

Commenting, al-Sa'idi says: "I have asked this question, but no one of the supporters of al-Qaʿida has thus far answered me to say that al-Qaʿida has carried out an action that served Islam and Muslims. All the actions which al-Qaʿida carried out have led to results that were against the wishes of the elements of al-Qaʿida. In my tweets, I have used an accurate phrase, which is infiltration, but I did not use the words collaboration or treason. This is because I believe that many of those who support or those who are affiliated with al-Qaʿida Organization are truthful, but this infiltration prevents al-Qaʿida from achieving its goals, some of which or most of which are noble, such as supporting Islam and Muslims." He gives as an example the bombing of the Iranian embassy in Beirut. He notes: "Al-Qaʿida has claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Iranian embassy and many people believed that this was a reply to my tweets in which I said that al-Qaʿida does not confront Iran in any way. The side that benefited from this bombing was Iran itself, but neither Islam and Muslims nor struggle in Syria benefited from it."

Al-Tumayhi then reads another tweet in which al-Sa'idi said: "Is is noticed that since it was established, al-Qaʿida has not attacked Iran. If the Sunni states that are exposed to attacks by al-Qaʿida are infidels and agents, then why Iran escaped this."

Commenting, al-Sa'idi says: "When it attacks Sunni states, al-Qaʿida always accuses them of infidelity and claims that fighting such states is legitimate because they are

renegade states. Therefore, it believes that subversive and terrorist acts should be carried out in these states because they are renegade states. Al-Qaʿida claims that it is Sunni. Since it is Sunni and carries out bombings in these states which are closer to it, why it does not carry out similar acts in Iran? By saying this, I am not calling on al-Qaʿida to carry out similar acts in Iran or in any other place, but when I review history, I find out that this issue is a very big sign of the soundness of what I said; namely, that al-Qaʿida is infiltrated."

Answering a question, al-Sa'idi says: "The communist organizations have previously attracted many youth in the Islamic world, not based on reason, but by kindling the poor people's hatred, which is perhaps sometime natural, of those who they claim or imagine that they deprive them of their food. Therefore, when Communism was founded in the Islamic world in the 1930s and 1940s, it did not address the mind and was not founded because it had sound proofs, but it was founded because the youth have joined it emotionally. Therefore, I hope that the youth, whether they have religious affiliations or any other affiliation, will not make emotions their standard in assessing events, organizations, and issues."

Al-Tumayhi says: "You have also said that all institutions that support Islam and charitable organizations were besieged because of al-Qaʿida Organization."

Commenting, al-Sa'idi says: "Al-Qaʿida Organization was used as a pretext to besiege these charitable organizations. I believe that the entire West was disturbed by the spread of the Salafi way in the world. We can see that the Salafi way has spread even among new Muslims in the United States and Europe." He notes: "The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was accused of being behind the spread of the Salafi way. The truth is that this is not an accusation, but it should be an honour. The Salafi way, however, has annoyed the old colonialist states." He notes: "Al-Qaʿida was used as a pretext to besiege charitable activity, most of which comes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. some US reports said that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has allocated $75 billion to spread the Salafi way through charitable activities which were carried out by many institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia." He says that "Iran has replaced the Saudi charitable organizations in every state they used to work." He adds that the Saudi charitable and relief aid activities in the Comoro Islands used to

account for 50 per cent of the national income. He says: "When the Saudi charitable activity stopped there, it was directly replaced by Iran. The United States and even the missionary organizations which used to object to the Saudi activity, however, did not object to the Iranian activity which has always replaced that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

Source: al-Arabiyah TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1833 gmt 18 Jul 14

Document BBCMEP0020140722ea7m002uu

12.3 al-Jazeera (TET3)

Talk show discusses Gulf states' alleged "concern" over Iran-West nuclear deal
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25 November
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BBC Monitoring Middle
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English

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Doha-based al-Jazeera Satellite Channel Television in Arabic at 1830 Gmt on 24 November carries a new 27-minute episode of its "Behind the News" programme on the nuclear deal Ira STruck with the United States and five other world powers in Geneva. Anchor Layla al-Shaykhali begins by saying: "The Iranian nuclear deal with the West drew all sorts of regional and international reactions, some of which were marked by caution while others considered it a useful step towards peace and stability in the Middle East region. We will discuss this issue from two angles: The way this deal will reflect on Iran's relations with the Gulf states in view of the apprehensions and differences existing between the two sides, and the options the Gulf states have to confront the growing influence of Iran and its possible rapprochement with the

United States after this agreement.

Gulf observers did not conceal their concern over Iran's growing influence in the region after this nuclear agreement with the West, but most Gulf states' governments preferred to wait before expressing their opinion. Only the UAE expressed hope that the deal would be a step towards a permanent agreement that preserves regional stability and avoids tension in the region. US Secretary John
Kerry said he had recently given Saudi Arabia and the UAE assurances about talks with Iran. An AP report said the Sultanate of Oman had played a role in mediating secret and direct Iranian-US talks throughout the past year."

The above introduction is followed by a two-minute report over video by Muhammad al-Kabir al-Kutubi, who says: "The agreement has renewed apprehensions in the Gulf states about possible changes in the region while cautiously watching Iran's expansion in some Arab countries. These states have always been annoyed by any possible rapprochement between Tehran and the West in spite of the Westerners' attempts to reassure the Gulf states about this issue. There are some who say the Iranian nuclear programme does not pose so much threat to the Gulf states as the growing Iranian political threat and the so-called Iranian attempt to penetrate the region." He then says the Gulf states are in conflict with Iran over three islands and they accuse Tehran of supporting Shi'is in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, adding that Kuwait has recently said it discovered an Iranian spy network. Video shows part of the Geneva meetings, Kerry meeting with the Saudi monarch, and Lavrov addressing an audience.

To discuss this issue, al-Shaykhali hosts Dr As'ad al-Shamlan, a Saudi academic and researcher in international relations, via satellite from Riyadh; Dr Amir al-Musawi, an expert on Iranian affairs, via satellite from Tehran; and Dr Khalil Jahshan, an expert on US Middle East policy, via satellite from Washington.

Asked about Gulf concern about the nuclear deal between Iran and the big powers, As'ad al-Shamlan says: "The agreement shows that Iran has accepted demands made more than eight years ago. What Iran did in Geneva was accepting demands made during previous negotiations over the past eight years. Looking at the issue from a historic perspective, we will find that eight years ago Iran could have gotten

much more than what it got in this agreement. Now it got only a partial lifting of the sanctions that were imposed on it after its rejection of attractive offers."

When told that an Israeli newspaper said the new agreement will rob the Saudis of their sleep, he says this is "much exaggerated," adding that the Gulf states do not want Iran to go for nuclear armament and this is in the supreme interest of these states, noting that "Iran went to the table of negotiations in Geneva as a result of its suffering from the strong economic sanctions imposed on it."

Asked why the Gulf states, mainly Saudi Arabia, are "apprehensive" about this agreement, he says: "If the agreement is going to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear armament, this will be in the interest of the Gulf states because it is a Gulf demand." He adds that the deal "may restrict the Gulf states' ability to confront Iran in other areas like Syria," arguing that "this agreement denotes Iranian weakness rather than superiority."

Al-Musawi next responds to a question on what Iran can do to ease Gulf concerns after the deal. He says: "I think that concern by some neighbouring countries is out of place because this agreement has rescued the peoples and countries of the region from an almost inevitable war as a result of the Western and Zionist threats." He adds: "There is no fear in the Persian Gulf region except by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. There are two groups in Saudi Arabia. One seeks escalation against Iran and this groups is represented by Bandar Bin-Sultan and Sa'ud al-Faysal, and another seeks good relations with Iran and this is represented by Saudi King Abdallah Bin-Abd-al-Aziz and his sons and aides. Clearly, the hard-line trend against Iran, represented by Bandar Bin-Sultan and Sa'ud al-Faysal, will come to an end shortly."

Asked what the United States wants to tell its Gulf allies, Jahshan says "the message is not addressed only to the Gulf allies of the United States," noting that "this is considered a change in the United States' Gulf policy because relations have long been bad with Iran" and President Obama "tried to change this policy" and seek a political solution to the problem with Iran. He says Iranian-US "secret talks" started more than a year ago on a high level and concentrated on the Iranian nuclear programme, something which "helped reach this agreement." He notes that the United

States will continue to maintain ties with its Arab allies for strategic reasons.

Responding to a question on the reported mediation of Oman in talks between Iran and the United States, As'ad al-Shamlan says: "In principle, there is no enmity between Iran and the Arabian Gulf states. What strained relations were Iran's behaviour and actions. When any Gulf state undertakes mediation efforts or conveys a message, this will be understandable and acceptable as long as the final result falls within the framework of achieving the supreme interests of the GCC states."

Al-Musawi finally says: "Iran has strongly won in this agreement because they [in the West] have tried to completely disrupt the Iranian peaceful nuclear programme for 10 years even in university laboratories. They used to reject any type of enrichment and to call for shutting down the Furdo, Arak, and Natanz facilities. They wanted to search military centres. All these have been rejected in this agreement. This is a big victory. Iran did not want to enrich uranium to the 20-per cent degree but was forced to do so because France failed to fulfil its commitment - as noted in previous agreements even before the Islamic revolution - to provide Iran with uranium enriched to the 20-per cent degree." He adds that Iran has secured its needs of enriched uranium for 10 years and it no longer needs to enrich it to this degree now. He then praises the "diplomatic" efforts made by Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar, noting that he believes "Saudi Arabia is isolated in the Persian Gulf region, especially after the illness of the Saudi monarch," noting that "two or three persons are now playing with the Saudi decision." Concluding, he says: " Saudi Arabia has only two options. It either continues its escalation against Iran as it has been doing over the past 35 years but to no avail, or changes its policies and comes to terms with the new situation in Iran as well as the regional and international situation. This is a golden opportunity for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It played all cards but failed in front of Iran and the strength of resistance in the region as well as the steadfastness and confrontation of the Iranian people and other peoples in the region. Therefore, I think this insistence on old and futile policies will not be useful. Saudi Arabia has to reconsider things and benefit from this opportunity if Iran extends a hand to it. Iran does extend a hand wishing to reach an understanding with Riyadh, but we hope the other side is willing to reciprocate."

Source: al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1830 gmt 24 Nov 13

Document BBCMEP0020131125e9bp003pd

12.4 al-Jazeera (TET4)

Al-Jazeera discusses Qatar's tense relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain

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2014 17:21
BBC Monitoring Middle
East BBCMEP
English

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Doha al-Jazeera Satellite Channel Television in Arabic at 1905 GMT on 10 March carries live a new 50-minute episode of its "In Depth" talk show on "the crisis of relations among the Gulf states following a collective decision by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain to withdraw their ambassadors from Qatar."

The talk show begins with a report over video on the "roots" of differences between Qatar and the three other Gulf states. The report says: "In an unprecedented step, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. In a joint statement, they said Doha did not comply with the GCC principles that ensure non-interference in the internal affairs of any of the GCC states, either directly or indirectly, and that call for refrain from supporting any party that threatens the security and stability of the GCC states whether organizations or individuals, either through direct security work or by political influence, and refrain from supporting the hostile media. The Qatari response said the step taken by the three countries had nothing to do with the Gulf peoples' interests, security, or stability, but is linked to differences in opinion about issues unrelated to the GCC countries. The history of differences between

Qatar and Saudi Arabia began in the mid-nineties when the former emir assumed power in Qatar. The policy of each country then took a
different direction. The Qatari policy supported the Lebanese and Palestinian resistance, while Saudi Arabia headed the axis of Arab moderation, which included Egypt, Jordan, and some Gulf states. This axis adopted a different position on the Palestinian issue and the confrontation with Israel. The differences were starkly clear in Israel's war on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008 respectively. Saudi Arabia viewed the first war as an adventure by Hizballah. During the war on Gaza, it boycotted the Doha summit, which was dedicated to supporting the Palestinian people's steadfastness against the Israeli aggression. The winds of change in the Arab world began to blow at the end of 2010. More than one Arab country witnessed a popular revolution dislodging the ruling regimes. This led to new differences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over foreign policy. Qatar supported the change that took place in the Arab world and stood against its former allies in Damascus, Tehran, and the southern suburb [of Beirut; namely, Hizballah]. Saudi Arabia was apprehensive about these popular uprisings and it either stood against them or expressed reservations about them. The Syrian revolution came to represent a point of convergence between the two countries. Doha and Riyadh supported the revolution against the Syrian regime and its allies in the region, but that was not enough to bring the two countries' views closer in spite of Doha's assertion during the new Qatari ruling regime that it maintains an equal distance from all parties and that it supports countries and governments and not parties and groups." Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani is then shown saying: "We are a cohesive state and united people and society, and not a political party. Therefore, we seek to maintain relations with all governments and countries. We also respect all sincere, influential, and active political parties in the region, but we do not support one party against another."

The report adds: "The 3 July coup in Egypt revived sharp differences between the two countries. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states supported the ouster of President Muhammad Mursi and supported the new Egyptian regime, while Qatar adopted a different position. Qatar congratulated the interim president that was appointed by the Egyptian Army and committed itself to the aid it had earlier decided to extend to Egypt, but it presented a different view of the way to overcome the crisis that was caused by the coup. That was a reason for alienation and differences with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi

as manifested in the withdrawal of ambassadors from Doha. The GCC has thus entered a new whirlpool of differences no one knows when and how it is going to end."

To discuss this issue, anchor Ali al-Zufayri hosts in the Doha studios Jabir al-Harami, chief editor of the Qatari newspaper al-Sharq, and Husayn Shubukshi, a Saudi writer and political analyst, via satellite from Jedda.

Asked about the main reasons for the Saudi withdrawal of its ambassador from Qatar, Husayn Shubukshi says: "I think that confidence between the two countries has reached a very low level in more than one area. It is well known that severe political crises have led to lack of confidence and to scepticism about the Qatari actions." He adds that attempts were made to "heal the rift but to no avail," noting that "suspicions increased after the Arab Spring" and "strong differences emerged between the two countries." He says there are differences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Libya, and over relations with Iran and Bahrain.

When told that the Qatari statement talked about issues unrelated to the GCC countries, Shubukshi says "Saudi Arabia believes that Qatar's position on the Muslim Brotherhood group threatens the national security of Saudi Arabia." He adds: "It is clear that Qatar has adopted a certain foreign policy in support of the Muslim Brotherhood and this has become a basic pillar in the Qatari foreign policy. Your report said Saudi Arabia failed to attend the Gaza conference. Saudi Arabia does not recognize Gaza; it recognizes something called Palestine. That was a conference to support HAMAS, and there is a big difference between the Saudi-Palestinian relationship, which is a relationship of institutions with a representative that is recognized by the Palestinian people and the world, and reliance on one faction representing one geography in one area in Palestine - a faction that is supported by Qatar."

Asked how Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood can pose a threat to the security of Saudi Arabia, Shubukshi says there is an "organized" Muslim Brotherhood presence in the Gulf states and the Muslim Brothers receive "support" and "encouragement" from Qatar, noting that "the Muslim Brothers have political ambitions that pose a threat to Saudi national security through the Muslim

Brotherhood's relationship with Iran." He then says Iran supports HAMAS, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hizballah, which he says "caused disturbances and violent and bloody events in more than one Arab country." Therefore, he says, Saudi Arabia has decided to take a preemptive measure to maintain its security.

Al-Zafiri next asks Jabir al-Harami "why Qatar poses a threat to the security of the other GCC countries by adopting policies that are different from those of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and that cause others continuous concern," and "why Qatar wants to be different from Saudi Arabia, especially since the GCC states are supposed to unify their policies and positions." Responding, al-Harami says the statement issued on the withdrawal of ambassadors focused on "Qatar's interference in the GCC states' affairs while all analysts defending the decision speak about foreign issues like the Muslim Brotherhood and Yemen." When told that "Yemen is a Saudi security issue," he repeats that the statement did not talk about foreign issues. He adds that differences over foreign issues should not lead to withdrawal of ambassadors between countries. He then defends the Qatari decision to support the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 2008 war. Asked if Qatar does not maintain a close relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Harami says: "We support all movements. The Muslim Brotherhood is present just like other movements."

Shubukshi next responds to a question on why the Muslim Brotherhood is not wanted to establish relations with Iran at a time when the Gulf states have ties with it. He says all countries have the right to establish ties with Iran, but "if these relations lead to strengthening a country that has clear, declared, and unambiguous ambitions and a country that occupies UAE islands, threatens the security of Bahrain, and supports factions here and there in the other Gulf states, these states will then have the right to consider this rapprochement a threat to their security." Asked why ambassadors are not withdrawn from Iran if the latter poses a threat to Gulf security instead of withdrawing them from Qatar, he says: "Saudi-Qatari relations today are better than Saudi-Iranian relations even after the withdrawal of ambassadors. There is censure rather than freezing of relations. Saudi-Qatari relations are historical." He says Qatar was informed by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and UAE that interrogation of some apprehended "cells" pointed to links with and support from some Qatari personalities and figures supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. He adds that "some factions on the

southern borders of Saudi Arabia, like the Huthists specifically, are supported by Qatar and these have very disturbing political ambitions." He says these have drawn maps claiming ownership of part of the Saudi land.

Al-Zufayri next tells al-Harami: "Shubukshi mentioned important points. He said there are cells in the UAE and Saudi Arabia that have ties with Qatar, and you support the Huthists, who pose a threat to Saudi security." Responding, al-Harami says "I wish the ones talking about cells supported by Qatar could present evidence to prove that there is support for a certain cell." He denies claims that Qatar supported Muslim Brotherhood figures in Saudi Arabia, noting that such things are reported by "hostile newspapers," adding that some Egyptian newspapers, supported by Gulf states, attack Qatar and publish baseless reports about it and these are used as evidence against Qatar.

Al-Zufayri then says that the people in Qatar are much annoyed by the accusation that Qatar is undermining Gulf security, especially since no evidence has been provided to convince them of the reason for withdrawing the ambassadors. Responding, Shubukshi says: "Ahmad Mansur, who works in al-Jazeera, which is a station linked to Qatar, trained protesters in Rabi'ah Square on the way to oppose the Egyptian Army. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who works with and gets a salary from al-Jazeera and the Qatari Government, said much against the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This is an open incitement against the government in Saudi Arabia and the UAE under a very clear Qatari sponsorship." He adds: "These things pose a threat to Saudi and UAE national security and they are under Qatari sponsorship. I do not consider them independent media outlets." He says "they are geared for political purposes threatening the security of brothers in the GCC." al-Zufayri interrupts him here to say "you can say anything, but you cannot make people believe anything said unless there is documented evidence proving it."

After a brief commercial break, al-Zufayri tells al-Harami: "Husayn spoke about Dr Yusuf al-Qaradawi and how he offends other countries, using mosque or media platforms although the state can control these. Husayn also says media platforms like al-Jazeera and others are used against these countries and this strains relations with them." Responding, al-Harami says al-Qaradawi was delivering a Friday sermon on

the air when he said things, and the relay could not be stopped. He adds that al-Qaradawi is an old man who does not express the Qatari policy. He notes that a mosque preacher in the UAE continues to criticize Qatar and the emir but no Qatari action was taken in protest. He then says Dubai police chief Dahi Khalfan and UAE politicians spoke ill of Qatar but Qatar remained silent.

Responding to him, Shubukshi says many Arab countries complain that they are harmed by opposition figures speaking through Qatari media or at conferences and seminars held in Qatar. He, however, disagrees with the decision to withdraw ambassadors. He repeats that Qatar supported "Muslim Brotherhood cells in the UAE," and this caused anger there.

When told that Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have "ruling families" and "totalitarian regimes," Shubukshi says the Muslim Brothers "say they are more Muslim than others" although the issue is political rather than religious, noting that Saudi Arabia is governed according to the Koran and Sunnah. Al-Zufayri here tells him that he is only assuming that Qatar supports the Muslim Brotherhood in Saudi Arabia and this is controversial. Al-Harami responds to him by saying the ruling regime in Qatar is hereditary like the regime in other Gulf states. Therefore, he wonders why it should try to topple another similar regime.

At this point in the talk show, al-Zufayri airs an excerpt from a recorded interview with Salim Bin-Ali al-Ka'bi, deputy chairman of the Omani Shura Council, who says: "We appeal to the three Gulf states to demonstrate patience and wisdom. The State of Qatar is a sisterly country. If a mistake is made, God forbid, by our brothers in the sisterly State of Qatar, we must put up with it and deal with it wisely." He hopes there will be no escalation as this will harm all Gulf states. He then praises Qatar for not responding to the withdrawal decision in kind.

When told that Qatar adopts an independent policy that is different from that of the other Gulf states, Shubukshi says the difference in policies is causing problems to many Arab countries, noting that "Qatar has big differences with more than one Arab country and its policies are causing concern in more than one Arab country about national security."

Finally asked if Qatar is going to change its policy under this pressure, al-Harami says: "No not at all. Qatar is clear in its foreign policy. It will not bargain over its policy, which stems from principles and values." He adds that the three Gulf states withdrew their ambassadors from Doha because of what is happening in Egypt and because they want Qatar to support the current Egyptian regime.

Source: al-Jazeera TV, Doha, in Arabic 1905 gmt 10 Mar 14

Document BBCMEP0020140312ea3c00565

Appendix 13

The speech reporting verbs selected by the BBC's "transeditor" to report the speakers' primary discourses as well as the style of reporting:

13.1 Speech reporting analysis from al-Arabiyah's audio-visual 1

N	Al-Tumayhi (interviewer)	Bin-Hizam (interviewee)	TV correspondent (three different Tv correspondents)	Dr al-Sai'di (mentioned in the video report)	Al-Shayi (shown in the video report)
1	Says (direct)	Says (direct)	First tv correspondent: Says (direct)	Says (indirect)	Says (direct)
2	Also Says (direct?)	Says (direct)	Second tv correspondent: Says (direct)	Says (direct)	Says (direct)
3	Asked (indirect)	Says(direct)	Adding that (direct)	Adding that (direct)	-
4	Asked (indirect)	Adding that (direct)	Says (direct)	Says, accusing (direct)	-
5	Says (indirect)	Says (direct)	Adding that (direct)	Also says (direct)	-

6	Asked (indirect)	Adding that (direct)	Third tv correspondent: asked (indirect)	-	-
7	Asked (indirect)	Says (direct)	Asked (indirect)		-
9	Asked (indirect)	Also says (direct)	-	-	-
10	Says (indirect)	Says, adding that (direct)	-	-	-
11	Says (indirect)	Says (direct)	-	-	-
12	Says (indirect)	Says (direct)	-	-	-
13	-	Also says (direct)	-	-	-
14	-	Adding that (direct)	-	-	-
15	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-
16	-	Also says (direct)	-	-	-
17	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-
18	-	Adding that (direct)	-	-	-
19	-	Also says (direct)	-	-	-
20	-	Relates (indirect)… (direct)	-	-	-
21	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-
22	-	Also says (direct)	-	-	-
23	-	Adding that (direct)	-	-	-
24	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-
25	-	Wondering… says (direct)	-	-	-
26	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-
27	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-

28	-	Adding that (direct)	-	-	-
29	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-
30	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-
31	-	Adding that (direct)	-	-	-

13.2 Speech reporting analysis from al-Arabiyah's audio-visual 2

N	Al-Tumayhi (interviewer)	Dr al-Sa'idi (interviewee)
1	Says (direct)	Says (direct)
2	Welcomes (indirect)	Notes (direct)
3	Asked (indirect)	Says (direct)
4	Asked (indirect)	Commenting,… says (direct)
5	Says (indirect)… (direct)	Notes (direct)
6	Then reads (indirect)	Says (direct)
7	Then asks (indirect)	Gives an example (indirect)
8	Then reads (indirect)	Says (direct)
9	Says (direct)	Notes (direct)
10	-	Said (direct)
11		Commenting,… Says (direct)
12	-	Answering a question,… says (direct)
13	-	Commenting, says (direct)
14	-	Notes (direct)
15	-	Notes (direct)
16	-	Says (direct)
17	-	Adds (indirect)
18		Says (direct)

13.3 Speech reporting analysis from al-Jazeera's audio-visual 1

N	Presenter Layla al-Shaykhali	As'ad al-Shamlan	Video report by al-Kutubi	Amir al-Musawi	DDr Khalil Jahshan
1	Begins by saying (direct)	Says (direct)	Says (direct)	Responds to a question, says (direct)	Asked… says
2	Hosts (indirect)	Says partial (direct)	Then Says (indirect)	Adds (direct)	Says (direct)
3	Asked (indirect)	Adding that (indirect)	Adding that (indirect)	Finally says (direct)	Noting that (direct) + (indirect)
4	Told (indirect)	Noting that (direct)	-	Adds that (indirect)	Says (direct) + (indirect)
5	Asked (indirect) + (direct)	Says (direct)	-	He then praises (direct)+ (indirect)	Notes (indirect)
6	A question on (indirect) no verb	Adds (indiect) + (direct)	-	Noting that he believes (direct)	-
7	Asked (indirect)	Arguing (direct)	-	Noting that (direct)	-
8	A question (indirect) no verb	Responding… says (direct)	-	Concluding he says (direct)	-

13.4 Speech reporting analysis from al-Jazeera's audio-visual 2

	Presenter	The talk show	Husayn Shubukshi	Qatari Emir	Video report	Al-Harami	Salim al-Ka'bi in report
1	Hosts (indirect)	Begins with (direct) + (indirect)	Says (direct)	Then shown ...saying (direct)	Says (direct)	Responding... says (direct)+ (indirect)	Says (direct)
2	Asked (indirect)	-	Adds (direct)+ (indirect)	-	Adds (direct)	Repeats (indirect)	Hopes (indirect)
3	Told (indirect)	-	Noting that (direct)+ (indirect)	-	-	Adds (indirect)	Praises (indirect)
4	Asked (indirect)	-	Says (indirect)	-	-	Defends (indirect)	-
5	Nexts, asks (direct)	-	Says (direct)	-	-	Says (direct)	-
6	Told (direct)	-	Adds (direct)	-	-	Responding... says (direct)	-
7	Asked (indirect)	-	Says (direct)+ (indirect)	-	-	Denies claims (indirect)	-
8	A question (indirect) no verb	-	Then says (indirect)	-	-	Noting that (direct) + (indirect)	-
9	Asked (indirect)	-	Which he says (direct)	-	-	Adding that (indirect)	-
10	Nexts, tells (direct)	-	Therefore he says (indirect)	-	-	Responding, says (indirect)	-

11	Then says (indirect)	-	Next responds to…. Says (direct) + (indirect)	-	-	Adds (indirect)	-
12	Interrupts him here to say (direct)	-	Says (direct)	-	-	Notes (indirect)	-
13	Tells (direct)	-	Says (direct)+ (indirect)	-	-	Says (indirect)	-
14	Tells him (indirect)	-	Adds (direct)	-	-	Responds (indirect)	-
15	Airs (indirect)	-	Says (indirect)	-	-	Wonders (indirect)	-
16	Finally asked (indirect)	-	Respondin g, says (direct)	-	-	Says (direct)	-
17	-	-	Adds (direct)	-	-	Adds (indirect)	-
18	-	-	Says (direct)	-	-	-	-
19	-	-	Respondin g, says (indirect)	-	-	-	-
20	-	-	However, disagrees (indirect)	-	-	-	-
21	-	-	Repeats (direct)+ (indirect)	-	-	-	-
22	-	-	Says (direct)+ (indirect)	-	-	-	-

23	-	-	Noting that (indirect)	-	-	-	-
24	-	-	Says (indirect)	-	-	-	-
25	-	-	Noting that (direct)	-	-	-	-