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**The Social Capital Formation among  
the Bengali-speaking Muslims  
in three Indian border states**

Shahid, Rudabeh

*A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

School of Government and International Affairs (SGIA)

Durham University, United Kingdom

October, 2018

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Rudabeh Shahid

15<sup>th</sup> October, 2018

## **Dedication**

This thesis is dedicated to my maternal grandmother, Khojesta (Ahmed) Sayem, who told me stories about her wonderful childhood in Calcutta.

## **Acknowledgement**

I often take for granted how the birth of my country, Bangladesh, came to fruition—first with the departure of the British from the Indian sub-continent in 1947 and then our War of Independence from Pakistan in 1971. Nevertheless, I am reminded time and again about the sacrifices of millions of people who are responsible for making today's nation-states of South Asia a reality. My late maternal grandmother, Khojesta (Ahmed) Sayem, who was born and brought up in Calcutta (now Kolkata), used to talk fondly about her childhood during the city's heydays. She also mentioned how she experienced the gradual breakdown of communal relations, ultimately culminating in the Direct Action Day Riots of 1946. A few years later, following her marriage to my maternal grandfather who was from the eastern part of Bengal, my grandmother must have left her hometown with an extremely heavy heart. Since my grandmother was born in one of the Indian states that I have studied in this research, I would like to first and foremost dedicate this thesis to her.

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## **The Social Capital Formation among the Bengali-speaking Muslims in three Indian border states**

**Rudabeh Shahid**

**Abstract:** In this study, I examine the factors forming social capital among Bengali-speaking Muslims living in the three Indian border states—Assam, West Bengal and Tripura. Social capital theory has been used for understanding the lack of integration and development among ethnic minorities. However, the question of what creates social capital among ethnic minority groups in the first place is understudied, especially in the South Asian context. By applying the individual-level network theory of social capital formation in the South Asian context, this study makes a significant empirical contribution to both the literatures of social capital and Islam in South Asia. According to the network theorists, social capital are intangible resources embedded in an individual's social networks at a given point in time which can be accessed or mobilized through pre-existing ties in those networks. I argue that “network closure”, which increases the depth of ties in a given linguistic and/or religious network, leads to the formation of bonding social capital. On the other hand, filling “structural holes” across networks by transmitting the flow of information across linguistic and/or religious group network results in bridging social capital. My argument highlights individual-level personal characteristics and location-specific factors that are expected to affect the processes of network closure and filling of structural holes. I use a parallel mixed method study design, where both quantitative survey and qualitative interview data were collected concurrently. The quantitative component is the core component, while the qualitative part is supplemental. I find that factors leading to the formation of bonding social capital are state-specific, while the factors leading to the formation of bridging social capital are more common across states.

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## List of Abbreviations

AASU	All Assam Students Union
AFSPA	Armed Forces Special Powers Act
AGP	Asom Gana Parishad
AIUDF	All India United Democratic Front
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CPI (M)	Communist Party of India (Marxist)
EIC	East India Company
IMDT	Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunal
INC	Indian National Congress
IPFT	Indigenous People's Front of Tripura
JIH	Jamaat-e-Islami Hind
NRC	National Register of Citizens
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PCA	Principal Components Analysis
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SFI	Students' Federation of India
SP	Samajwadi Party
TMC	Trinamool Congress
ULFA	United Liberation Front of Assam

# 1


## Introduction

On 30<sup>th</sup> July 2018, the first draft of the National Register of Citizens (NRC), a record of citizenship, was published in the northeast Indian state of Assam (Mohan, 2018). The Supreme Court of India originally conceived the NRC as a mechanism to establish one's Indian nationality owing to the widespread fear of undocumented migration in Assam happening from neighbouring Bangladesh (Sen, 2018). The publication of this registry implies that in the long run, four million inhabitants in Assam may be declared as non-Indians or stateless in their own land (Mohan, 2018). The following day after the publication of the draft NRC, the Chief Minister of neighbouring West Bengal, Ms. Mamata Banerjee, stated that the NRC could lead to a situation of civil war in India as she viewed the step taken under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led central government and state government of Assam as a way of targeting people who are native Bengali-speakers, especially those who are Muslims (Ghosh, 2018). On the other hand, the BJP stated that such a process should also be conducted in other bordering states such as West Bengal since they deem such areas to be hosting many undocumented foreigners (Kundu, 2018). Representatives of many political parties also sided with Ms. Banerjee stating that the published NRC was discriminatory and was aimed at making a big segment of the state's population stateless based merely on their religious affiliation (TOI, 2018a). However, to a non-Indian observer, the vital question is why such a legal step to establish an individual's nationality is being viewed as a way to make a big chunk of India's Muslim population as stateless? A common answer suggested by many political analysts is that the NRC relates to the broader topic of religious demographic change happening in India, of which the issue of undocumented migration from Bangladesh to bordering regions in India happens to be a major aspect, and thus declaring a particular segment of Indian Muslims as non-citizens is a product of the fear of demographic change (Chanakya, 2018; Pathi, 2018). Many scholars of social capital would see this kind of a fear of a specific group of people as a consequence of social capital (Pinchotti & Verwimp, 2007; Ballet et al., 2008; McDoom, 2014). Nevertheless, I believe that this kind of fear actually affects the formation of social capital, which in turn results in a national registry process such as the NRC. Social capital theory has been studied for understanding the lack of

integration and development of ethnic minorities (Jacobs & Tillie, 2004; Lancee, 2012). Nevertheless, the question of what actually creates social capital among ethnic minority groups is understudied, particularly in the South Asian context. The objective of this study is to examine the factors which form social capital among the Bengali-speaking Muslims living in three border states of India—Assam, West Bengal and Tripura.

## 1.1 Location of the three states and socio-political background

**Fig. 1.1: Map showing North Eastern Indian States and West Bengal**



Note: Map created using shapefile data downloaded from <https://gadm.org>

This first section will give an overview of the location in which the study has been conducted. Although the Background Chapter (Chapter 2) will go into greater descriptions about the history behind the current respective socio-political settings in each state and Section 4.2 in Chapter 4 will describe the cultural context in the three Indian states, the summary of the location in this section is provided for ease of comprehending the roadmap of this research and justifying the choice of conducting my study in the three states.

It may come as a surprise to many people that Bengali-speaking Muslims form the second largest Muslim ethno-linguistic group in the world after Arab Muslims (Eaton, 2013, p. 53). They constitute the majority of Bangladesh's population and a sizeable portion of the populations of the eastern and northeastern regions of India bordering Bangladesh. The India-Bangladesh borderland, which is one of the largest bi-lateral borders in the world, is porous and inhabited by large Bengali-speaking Muslim populations with a sizeable informal cross-border movement of people and goods (Van Schendel, 2005; Afsar, 2008). Since the Partition of British India in 1947, undocumented migration from Bangladesh has changed the religious and linguistic balance in these three Border States, which in recent years has emerged as a major concern in Indian political debates (Hazarika, 2000; Gillan, 2002; Afsar, 2008).

In recent years, a plethora of studies on Bangladeshi identity (Eaton, 1993; Uddin, 2006; Guhathakurtha & Van Schendel, 2013) have focused on how the eastern part of the Indian sub-continent emerged as a dense Muslim majority region, but these studies have primarily concentrated on Bangladesh. West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura are three Indian border states which have sizeable Bengali-speaking Muslim populations and will be studied in this research. As can be seen in Fig.1.1 showing the map of the region, besides those three states, two other states in India's northeastern region, Meghalaya and Mizoram, border Bangladesh. However, they have been left out in this study because the percentages of Muslims and native Bengali-speakers in their populations are very small (Census of India, 2011).

The first state that this research considers is West Bengal, which lies west of the independent country of Bangladesh (Jamwal, 2004, p. 8), with which it shares a border of 2,217 km (Jamwal, 2004, p. 5). West Bengal and Bangladesh historically constitute the region of undivided Bengal. The second state in which I conducted my research is the northeastern Indian state of Assam. Assam lies north of Bangladesh (Jamwal, 2004, p. 8), with which it shares a border of 262 km (Jamwal, 2004, p. 5), comprising of two of the state's western districts and one of its eastern districts. The third state that this study considers is Tripura, another state in India's northeastern region. It lies to the east of Bangladesh (Jamwal, 2004, p. 8), with which it shares a border of 856 km (Jamwal, 2004, p. 5) on its northern, western and southern sides. These three states have been chosen because of the high percentages of Muslims and native Bengali-speakers in their total populations. The present breakdowns of the

populations of Muslims in each of these states as per the Indian national census of 2011 are roughly as follows: Assam (33%), West Bengal (30%) and Tripura (9%). The current breakdowns of the populations of native Bengali-speakers in each of these states as per the Indian national census of 2011 are approximately as follows: West Bengal (80%), Tripura (69%) and Assam (27%).

## **1.2 Research Question and Theoretical Argument**

The main research question in this study is the following: How is social capital formed among Bengali-speaking Muslims in three Indian border states? To answer this question, I formulate the following two sub-questions:

1. What individual personal characteristics and location-specific factors determine bonding social capital formation and through which mechanisms do they work?
2. What individual personal characteristics and location-specific factors determine bridging social capital formation and through which mechanisms do they work?

To answer the main research question, I am drawing on the individual-level network theory of social capital developed by Lin (1999; 2001), which has been adapted by Lancee (2010; 2012). Lin (1999; 2001) describes social capital as intangible resources embedded in one's social networks at a given point in time which can be accessed or mobilized through ties which are pre-existing in an individual's networks. The individual-level network theory of social capital has been applied in this study to avoid problems in the collective-level theory of social capital which confuses causes with effects, as the latter does not take into account the existence of embedded resources in one's network which actually creates social capital (Lin, 1999; 2001). I am also following Putnam's (2000, p. 22-24) classification of social capital into two types: "bonding" and "bridging", where bonding social capital indicates connections within a group and bridging social capital refers to connections between different groups.

Lin (1999; 2001) posits that the determination of the accessibility of an individual to the embedded resources in his/her network depends on two features which are "structural holes" and "network closures." According to Lancee (2010;

2012), bonding and bridging types of social capital are dependent on the theory of network closures and structural holes, which has both structural and cognitive components. Lancee (2010, p. 204) describes the structural components as the “wires” in the network showing the connections, while he refers to the cognitive component as the “nodes” in a network displayed through the attitudes and values exhibited in trust. Lancee (2010; 2012) says that ties which connect “structural holes” lead to the creation of bridging social capital, while factors which increase the degree of “network closure” lead to the creation of bonding social capital. While describing the cognitive components, Lancee (2010; 2012) posits that ties are distinguished by the degree of trust, where thin trust refers to loose ties with secondary contacts and bridging social capital, and thick trust is associated with solidarity with primary contacts and bonding social capital.

I argue that “network closure”, which increases the depth of ties in a given linguistic and/or religious network leads to bonding social capital, while the mechanisms of filling “structural holes” across networks by transmitting the flow of information across linguistic and/or religious group network lead to the formation of bridging social capital. Certain individual-level personal characteristics and location-specific factors based on cultural, socio-economic, historical and political settings in the three Indian border states affect the processes of network closure and network bridging and are described in Chapter 4 explaining the theoretical framework of this research.

### **1.3 The Contributions of this Research**

This study makes two empirical contributions to existing knowledge. The major contribution is the following: I am conducting an individual-level network theory of social capital formation in a new context. I am considering fundamental measurement components of bonding and bridging social capital, which was developed by Lancee (2010; 2012) and studying a minority ethnic group in the context of the greater Bengal region. To date, there are only a few studies (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009; Asadullah, 2017; Gupta et al., 2018) from the Bengal region in South Asia investigating social capital creation, and even these studies lack comprehensiveness as they only consider interpersonal trust or the cognitive dimension of social capital. Without considering the fundamental

measurement components of bonding and bridging social capital, the embedded resources which actually lead to social capital creation cannot be determined.

The minor contribution is empirical again. By investigating cross-state comparison on the formation of bonding and bridging social capital, I identify how different contexts affect the causal mechanisms pertaining to an individual's personal characteristics and location-specific factors. This helps identify which macro-level contextual factors have a mediating effect.

#### **1.4 The Methods followed in this research and the findings of this study**

This research follows a parallel mixed method study design, where both the quantitative and qualitative data were collected concurrently. The quantitative component is the core component and can stand alone in being the driver of the theory, while the qualitative component is called the supplemental component and is dependent on the core component (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 119). In Chapter 4, explaining the theoretical framework of this research, I hypothesise how ten factors lead to the creation of bridging social capital and five factors lead to the creation of bonding social capital. In Chapter 6, I built quantitative Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis models to test each of the fifteen independent factors. While the factors forming bridging social capital could be investigated simply by relying on the interpretations of OLS regression analysis models, the factors forming bonding social capital needed to have an additional qualitative component for providing robustness to the quantitative findings.

The outcome of the quantitative analytical component helped me decide what exactly to analyse in the qualitative analytical component in Chapter 6. The reason for the qualitative analytical component is laid out in the theoretical framework in Chapter 4 where I explain how two of the five independent factors affecting the formation of bonding social capital are being attributed largely to having political actors as stakeholders. These actors influence the formation of bonding social capital by provoking fear and at times utilizing kinship ties for reasons concerning the expansion of their vote-banks, financial motives, and for the functioning of their state's economy. Therefore in Chapter 8, I conduct a content analysis of information gathered from semi-structured interviews of political actors for developing more in-depth explanations of how two factors affect the formation of bonding social capital.

The study finds that the factors leading to the formation of bonding social capital are state specific. This is due to the historical existence of joint family structure in the region and the presence of political actors as stakeholders who have different ways of using kinship ties as well as applying divergent ways of exploiting the notions of fear prevalent among different populations. On the other hand, the study finds that the factors such as language and intermarriage leading to the formation of bridging social capital are more common across states. This is due to these factors having causal mechanisms that are less dependent on context and having more of a universal nature, as they are based primarily on prolonged interaction with another individual. Please note that since this study is cross-sectional and the data collected was not random, I am not claiming causality but putting forward descriptions concerning how factors form social capital in the three states under investigation.

### **1.5 Importance of the findings of this research**

The findings of this study which demonstrate the mechanisms of creating bonding and bridging social capital can have big implications for the development and integration of India's Muslim population, who are the largest religious minority in the country. The Sachar Commission report (2006) as well as the Misra Commission Report (2007) highlight how Muslims are the most disadvantaged religious group in India and are excluded from various aspects of civil life. The plight of Indian Muslims includes a wide range of issues such as worse access to health care and education, lower consumption levels, income inequality and poverty, and lower quality of transportation and road networks compared to the mainstream Indian population (Sachar et al., 2006; Dossani, 2011). Over the years, there has been a rapid growth in studies from across the world showing how the presence of social capital in a society leads to positive outcomes concerning a diverse range of subjects, including building effective developmental policies (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Cleaver, 2005; Savioli & Patuelli, 2016), life satisfaction (Putnam, 2000; Halpern, 2005; Elgar et al., 2011), and public health (Kawachi et al., 1999b; Bush & Baum, 2001; Eriksson, 2011). Constructive policies geared towards building social capital in the three states can also lead to positive social outcomes which can improve the conditions of the Muslim populations. Two of the states being studied, West Bengal

and Assam, have 30% and 33% population of Muslims respectively, which is higher than India's average of 15% (Census of India, 2011). Therefore, making policies leading to positive steps towards social capital formation among Muslim communities in India should lead to greater overall positive effects of social capital for a big segment of the populations in the three states, thereby improving the prospects of integration of Muslims with the mainstream Indian population.

## **1.6 Outline of Chapters**

Chapter 2 provides the background knowledge pertaining to history and socio-political context in these three Indian Border States. The chapter considers historical events for illustrating underlying reasons for the formation of linguistic and religious identities, and the presence of agricultural and rural communities. The chapter also considers events in post-Independence India where remnants of the British era are visible in modern day factors which create social capital such as socio-economic inequality and migration. Finally, the chapter describes the presence of some political actors in the three states who are influential and important stakeholders for some factors leading to social capital formation.

Chapter 3 lays out the literature review, showing how this research contributes to the literature on social capital theory and Islam in South Asia. This chapter points out that the literature on the Partition of India in 1947 dominate writings about Muslim communities in India as well as those pertaining to Bengal, while there appears to be a gap in the post-partition literature concerning Bengali-speaking Muslims in India. The chapter also points out how there are limited studies on social capital formation relating to ethnic groups of South Asia, while those that are based in the Bengal region primarily consider aspects of trust or cognitive dimensions of social capital, but do not consider the structural dimensions of social capital.

Chapter 4 lays out the theory of this research. A theoretical framework has been developed from the network theory of social capital as outlined by Lin (1999; 2001), adapted by Lancee (2010; 2012). Individual-level characteristics of people and certain location-specific factors which affect the theoretical mechanisms encompassing structural and cognitive dimensions of an individual's network, which in turn leads to the formation of bonding and bridging social capital are described

here. It will also state what kind of individuals should be expected to possess the highest amount of each type of social capital.

Chapter 5 describes the quantitative component of the mixed methods study design which is the core component of this research. The chapter will explain the process of collecting primary data by administering a close-ended survey questionnaire, the sampling framework, and the population characteristic. It will also describe the measurement units, including the creation of the indices of the dependent variables, the coding of the explanatory variables and control variables, and the regression model specifications.

Chapter 6 displays the quantitative analysis, which is the main analytical part of the research. In this chapter, OLS regression models are built using cross-sectional survey data that were collected from individuals in the three states. Separate sections have been created for the models based on bonding social capital and those models based on bridging social capital. Each section comprises of subsections pertaining to an individual's personal characteristics and location-specific factors of the respondents in the survey, on their effects on the two types of social capital. The chapter explains how far the models support my theoretical argument now that some of the hypotheses have shown significant results and some have been rejected. It will also discuss if the theory developed in this research generally finds one kind of social capital to be more state-specific than the other type.

Chapter 7 describes the qualitative component of the mixed methods study design which is the supplemental component of this research. This chapter signifies the value of a qualitative component for deeply understanding the process of bonding social capital formation in this study. It employs a stakeholder segmentation matrix and describes how in fact the political actors are highly influential and important compared to other actors, concerning the causal mechanisms for two independent factors (religion and support for cross-border movement) leading to the formation of bonding social capital. The chapter also describes the process of conducting semi-structured interviews of the political actors, the preparation of the interview transcripts, and the development of codes for classifying the quotes from the interviews.

Chapter 8 presents the qualitative analysis, which is the second part of this mixed methods research. I use pre-coded data and conduct a content analysis of information gathered from semi-structured interviews of political actors for

answering some questions about bonding social capital that arose from the state-specific OLS regression output of two factors (religion and support for cross-border movement) in Chapter 6. The questions will be followed by answers provided by political actors, and backed up or challenged by analysing the statements of other political actors, and reports from newspapers and secondary sources.

Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, summarizes this research and findings and points out the limitations of the study. It indicates the theoretical and policy implications of the findings. It evaluates whether these findings can be generalized for the broader literature on social capital or if these findings are merely specific to the region being studied. It considers avenues for future research, such as if a similar study design can be used to analyse social capital formation in a western border state of India such as in Gujarat which also has a minority Muslim population. Additionally, it considers if a second phase data collection can be carried out for the research in this thesis so that there is a possibility of conducting a time series analysis for establishing greater validity to the results.

## **Background of the Region**

This chapter provides the historical and socio-political context in these three Indian Border States which are essential in order to investigate the social capital formation of Bengali-speaking Muslims. This chapter has been divided into two sections: The first one describes historical events until the end of British rule and the second describes events in the post-British era. The aim of the first section through describing historical events is to illustrate underlying reasons for the existence of some factors which are visible at present for the creation of social capital. These include the formation of linguistic and religious identities, and the presence of agricultural and rural communities. The second section aims to describe events in post-independent India which affect factors that form social capital in these three states. The second section is focused mainly on explaining how remnants of the British era are visible in modern day factors which create social capital such as socio-economic inequality and migration. It will also describe the presence of some political actors in the three states who are influential and important for some factors leading to social capital formation.

### **2.1 Events until the end of British rule**

This section will describe the history of the region being studied from pre-historic times until the end of British rule, for tracing back the foundations of the contemporary socio-political settings which affect factors in today's time that lead to the formation of social capital. Due to this research being on Bengali-speaking Muslims, this section initially focuses on language and religion, showing how speakers of the Bengali language had in due course formed a distinct identity and about the interaction of the three regions with Islam and/or Islamic entities. The section also talks about how agricultural and rural communities are related to the formation of a Bengali-speaking Muslim identity, and the spread of Islam in the region. This section afterwards gives a description of the animosity between different religious, linguistic and tribal groups, which are attributed to the policies of British colonial rule in the region. The section will be divided into three sub-sections, first of

which will concentrate on the events in the Bengal region, the second will look at events in Assam, and the third will talk about events in Tripura. Although this research looks at three separate states of India, many of the historical events overlap since the states border each other. Additionally, their histories are also tied to those of the neighbouring regions and must be put into perspective for understanding the socio-political settings of the time.

### **2.1.1 History of the Bengal Region until the end of British rule**

The lands that comprise of yesteryear's Bengal, consisting of West Bengal and Bangladesh, have a shared history until the end of British rule in the region, and so shall be looked at holistically in this section. Although this region finds mention in Hindu epics such as the Mahabharata and the Ramayana (Sengupta, 2011, p. 27), the earliest roots of Bengali linguistic identity formation in this region can be traced to the era of the Pala Dynasty (750-1095), which ruled what are now Bangladesh and the Eastern part of India (Sengupta, 2011, p. 44). The Palas were patrons of Buddhism and promoters of scholarship (Huntington, 1984). During their rule a kind of proto-Bengali language formed, which is found in the *Charayapada*, a collection of Buddhist mystical poems (Chakrabarti & Chakrabarti, 2013, p. 125). Proto-Bengali which is believed to have arisen from a combination of Sanskrit (the literary language of the time) in addition to Prakrit and Pali, is also considered to be the sources of proto-Assamese (Sengupta, 2011, p. 101). Since Bengali and Assamese language speakers are the two main groups of respondents in my research, it is useful to know about the common origins of these two languages.

After the fall of the Pala Dynasty, the Sena Dynasty (1070-1230) rose to power (Banglapedia, 2015a). Similar to the Palas, the Senas were also patrons of literature, and there seems to have been a significant growth of Bengali language under their rule (Banglapedia, 2015a). The Senas tried to introduce a kind of Hindu caste system in the territories which they ruled, by bringing in Brahmin priests from northern India, with the lure of granting them land (Narasu, 1988, p. 63). However, throughout this period, the overwhelming population remained Buddhists or outside the fold of any kind of Hindu caste system (Sarkar, 1972, p. 164). The lack of ingraining of the Hindu caste system helped in the spread of Islam in the years to come (Eaton, 1993).

After the fall of the Senas, several Islamic dynasties ruled Bengal and this time period is known as the era of the Sultanates of Bengal (1342-1576) (Hasan, 2007). The period of the Bengal Sultans was followed by the rule of the mighty North Indian Islamic Mughal Empire in Bengal (1576-1757) (Eaton, 1993). During the era of the Bengal sultans and the Mughals, Islam spread in Bengal principally due to the works of sufis (Islamic mystics) (Eaton, 1993; Shahid, 2010). According to Eaton (1993), the political and Islamic frontier in Bengal coincided with an agrarian frontier, as the gradual eastward movement of the latter offered the tool for the process of Islamisation. Prior to the thirteenth century, the agrarian frontier of Bengal was mainly in the north-western and western sub-regions, which was more Hinduized/ Sanskritized (Eaton, 1993, p.10). This was not the case in the eastern delta, which remained relatively unexploited for cultivation. The process of Islamisation was mostly carried out by the sufis, who syncretised the indigenous beliefs with Islamic ones, as they tried to build new settlements (Eaton, 1993; Shahid, 2010). These sufis carried out a kind of missionary work in which they reclaimed jungles, cultivated land, built roads, and water reservoirs, thereby attracting the local population to their Islamic syncretic form of belief (Eaton, 1993). Through the works of sufis, the Muslim population grew in the region (Eaton, 1993). Since their work was focused on moving the agricultural frontiers eastwards, the concentrations of Muslims today in the eastern delta is primarily due to this reason (Eaton, 1993). Therefore, investigating factors concerning rural and agricultural communities are highly relevant in this research to understand the basis of social capital formation among Bengali-speaking Muslims, as Islam was spread in such settings and is linked to the spread of agricultural frontiers.

In the early 1700s, as the power of the Mughals started to decline, their regional governors began to exercise greater autonomy and set up their own semi-autonomous hereditary kingdoms, taking up the title of *Nawabs* (sovereign landlords) (Sen, 2006, p. 38). During this time, several European trading companies were given the rights to start trade in Bengal (Sen, 2006, p. 38). By the late eighteenth century, the British East India Company (EIC) emerged as a major military power, which in 1757 defeated the last Nawab of Bengal at the Battle of Plassey, thereby gaining administrative control over Bengal (Sen, 2006, p. 40). From then onwards the region slowly integrated into a province of the British Empire (Sen, 2006). With the takeover of Bengal by the British, the organic development of a

regional Muslim identity halted, leading to the polarization of an ethno-religious identity.

The development of a distinct Muslim identity consciousness, as opposed to the greater Hindu population, can be considered to be a product of British rule. Until the arrival of the British, Muslims in India were in no means a monolithic entity, having several regional differences, such as being mainly peasants in Bengal and landowners, yeoman farmers and tribesmen in the Punjab, Sind and the Northwest Frontier region (Robinson, 1997). Specifically in Bengal, five reasons can be taken into account for understanding the dynamics of the intensification of Hindu and Muslim fragmentation within the local population during British rule. The first two reasons can be considered similar to what was happening within the Muslim community in North India, while the latter three are Bengal-specific. The first reason can simply be attributed to the introduction of the printing press in India. Due to the print media, there was a rapid growth in pan-Islamic consciousness as Muslims in India learnt about the fate of their co-religionists in other parts of the world (Robinson, 1993, p. 243). The second reason involves the creation of a census. The enumeration of religious categories for the purpose of building a comprehensive census by the colonial government in order to know about the people living in their realms, led to a situation where religious consciousness started increasingly becoming prominent among Muslims as individuals started to identify themselves primarily based on their religious identity (Robinson, 1998, p. 274).

The third reason for the growth of religious identity can be attributed to the arrival of Christian missionaries, which led to reformations in the Hindu and Muslim communities, which included greater consciousness of their faith. Missionary efforts to convert local populations involved learning Indian languages and writing about the theological superiority of Christianity over Hinduism and Islam (Uddin, 2006, p. 114). This led to counter-reformist movements by the followers of those religions (Uddin, 2006, p. 114). For the Hindus, it meant acknowledging the language and authority of the British rulers and accepting English education (Uddin, 2006, p. 67). For the Bengali-speaking Hindus, this period is known as the “Bengal Renaissance”, as this time is seen as a kind of great classical awakening, where writers such as Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) and Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar (1820-1891), questioned what they deemed as corrupt practices within the Hindu community (Sengupta, 2011, pp. 232-236).

On the other hand, for the Muslim reformers, such as Haji Shariatullah (1781-1840) who founded the Faraizi movement, it meant wanting to do away with localized interpretations of Islam that they deemed as non-Islamic, thereby telling Muslims to adhere to a more “uniform” Islam, which they thought of as emulating the practices of Prophet Muhammad (570-632) (Uddin, 2006, pp. 53-54). These Muslim reformers also introduced a kind of Islamized Bengali packed with Arabic and Persian terms, for the literary consumption of their rural brethren (Uddin, 2006, p. 114).

The fourth reason for the growth of intensification of Hindu and Muslim identities is related to the animosity of the rural Muslim peasants against their Hindu rural landlords. In pre-partition Bengal, Muslims constituted a little more than half the population, who were located mostly in the rural areas of Bengal’s eastern districts (Heehs, 1997, p. 122). Few amongst them went to the cities to be educated or looked for employment in the government service (Heehs, 1997, p. 122). In a list of Calcutta University graduates from 1858 to 1881, only 38 names out of a total of 1720, were Muslims (Sarkar, 1972, p. 166). As these Muslim cultivators had to tolerate the oppression of the Hindu landlords and moneylenders, they developed their own sense of identity (Heehs, 1997). This frustration of the rural population was the motivation behind the Muslims of Bengal largely supporting the Partition of Bengal in 1905 (also known as the First Partition of Bengal), which according to the British authorities was carried out for administrative reasons (Heehs, 1997).

The fifth reason for the growth of intensification of Hindu and Muslim relates to the presence of the Urdu-speaking people in the urban areas of Bengal. A linguistic community that should be mentioned here is that of the Urdu-speaking people of Bengal. In the later years of Mughal rule, while Urdu became a cultural religious identity for the majority of Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, this was not the case in Bengal (Uddin, 2006, p. 60). In its grammatical form, Urdu is virtually the same as Hindi, and Hindi-Urdu is collectively known as “Hindustani,” which is the lingua franca of North India (Brass, 2005, p. 190). However, the scripts of the two languages are different: Urdu is written in the Persian-Arabic Nastaliq script, while Hindi is written in the Devanagari Script of Sanskrit (Brass, 2005, p. 129). Also in its literary form, Hindi uses more Sanskrit words, while Urdu uses more words of Persian and Arabic origin (Brass, 2005, p. 129). Due to this reason, the former was favoured by Hindu nationalists and the later by Muslim nationalists

(Brass, 2005, pp. 128-129). Interestingly in Bengal, only some Muslims living in urban areas tried to model themselves on the Urdu-speaking Muslim aristocracy of upper India as a status symbol, by claiming to be people of foreign origin (Sarkar, 1972, p. 170), while the majority of Muslims who lived in rural areas were native Bengali speakers (Uddin, 2006, p. 60). Under the British rule, the economic position and status of the Muslim upper class suffered a sudden and sharp decline (Sarkar, 1972, p. 165). These urban Muslims who were previously favoured by the Nawabs were hard hit by the new administrative order of the British (Sarkar, 1972, p. 165). When the medium of education was replaced by English, these urban Muslims developed a kind of distrust of what they deemed as an irreligious system of learning, thereby keeping themselves away from the new schools and colleges (Sarkar, 1972, p. 166). This did not apply to the Hindus as they eagerly made the switch-over from Persian to English education, and thereby established themselves by furthering their education and getting jobs as government officials (Sarkar, 1972, p. 166). Thus, the urban Urdu speaking Muslims of Bengal also developed a kind of animosity to the Hindus of the region. Some of the respondents in the survey belong to the Urdu-speaking community of West Bengal.

When the first Partition of Bengal took place in 1905, the Muslims of the province largely supported the move as they felt that their aspirations were being expressed through the creation of a Muslim-majority province in the east (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 136). The 1905 Partition resulted in the creation of a new province of East Bengal and Assam, which would have a majority of Muslims (Ray, 1977, p. 34). This move was not seen favourably by the Bengali-speaking Hindus, especially those who held land in the eastern areas of Bengal and felt that their land and economic power were being taken away (Ray, 1977, p. 39). Commentators such as Ray (1977, p. 39) and Palit (2004, p. 41) deem this move as a British policy of “divide and rule,” which is a tactic to create dissension within groups in a population by placating one group at the expense of the other. Even though Sir John Strachey denied such a policy in the 1880s, some British administrators possibly had this mindset (Robinson, 1998, p. 277). For example, during the years preceding the First Partition of Bengal, Sir Antony Macdonnell wrote in a letter to Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India in 1890s, that “we are far more interested in [encouraging] a Hindu predominance”...“than in [encouraging] a Mahomedan predominance, which, in the nature of things must be hostile to us” (quoted in Robinson, 1998, p. 277).

This partition which was reversed in 1911 by the British authorities due to anti-Partition protests staged by Hindus of the province, angered Bengal's Muslims (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 139). This anger, in turn, led to a new political party called the Muslim League gaining momentum by starting to politically mobilize the region's Muslim population (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 140). The Muslim League would in the following decades turn out to be the arch-enemy of the Hindu-dominated Indian National Congress (INC), the latter of which spearheaded India to Independence (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 140). Counter-reactions to the creation of the Muslim League were also seen within the Hindu nationalist establishment. One such example is the creation of the All India Hindu Mahasabha in 1915, which is said to have been a counter-reaction from the Hindu nationalists to the formation of the Muslim League and the decision of the British to grant separate electorates to India's Muslims (Gould, 2004, pp. 202-204).

The next few decades saw people of Bengal, as part of the British Indian Empire, fighting for the British forces in World Wars. After the end of World War II, the British decided to make a swift exit from India in 1947 and in doing so, created two sovereign nations, based on religious considerations—India and Pakistan. One decisive factor for the British authorities for coming to the conclusion that Hindus and Muslims cannot have a mutual coexistence was due to the Great Calcutta Killings in the 1946 Direct Action Day riots in Calcutta, where Hindus and Muslim mobs clashed, resulting in the death of over four thousand people (Wynbrandt, 2009, p. 155). Counter riots took place in Bengal's eastern districts such as in Noakhali, resulting in the deaths of more people (Guha, 2014). While the concept of a United Bengal was suggested by Muslim leaders such as Huseyn Suhrawardy (1892-1963) (Ahmed, 2004, p. 282), this time around the Hindu population mobilized by the Hindu Mahasabha demanded a separate homeland for themselves as part of the Indian union, and largely supported the Partition of Bengal (Ahmed, 2004, p. 289).

With this Second Partition of Bengal, the Hindu-majority districts remained as part of India, while Muslim-majority districts became the eastern wing of Pakistan (Sengupta, 2011, p. 484). The Partition of 1947 also led to the division of the north-western province of Punjab, with western Punjab being a part of Pakistan and eastern Punjab remaining with India (Jaffrelot, 2015, p. 2). The human tragedy of the 1947 Partition is reflected in the massacre of about a million people, which took place as Hindu and Muslim mobs clashed during the migration of ten million people

(Jaffrelot, 2015, p. 2). Following the Partition of 1947, a significant percentage of educated and wealthier segments amongst the Bengali-speaking Muslims of West Bengal migrated to East Pakistan (Sengupta, 2017, p. 452), and many fled due to fear of violence to rural areas or clustered in Muslim-majority areas of urban centres (Chatterji, 2007, p. 190). This exodus, loss of property and ghettoisation led to degradation of the social status and economic backwardness of Bengali-speaking Muslims who remained in India (Chatterji, 2007, p. 194; Sengupta, 2017, p. 448), which is still visible today.

### ***2.1.2 History of Assam until the end of British Rule***

Similar to pre-colonial Bengal, the mention of the pre-colonial history of Assam is also found in Hindu epics such as Mahabharata (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 14). What is important to take away from this time are the emergence of two different kinds of communities who still exist in today's Assam, who have been interviewed during the survey phase of my fieldwork: The first includes populations of numerous tribes who worship various deities and are marginally Hindu as they are outside the folds of Sanskritization or the spread of caste-based Hinduism (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 33).

The second community includes indigenous Assamese Muslims, who trace their settlement in the Brahmaputra Valley of Assam as far back as the early thirteenth century (Dev & Lahiri, 1985, p. 2; Prakash, 2007, p. 357). These early Muslim settlers appeared due to a series of invasions by Turks from Northern India (Prakash, 2007, p. 357). The indigenous Assamese Muslims refer back to such pre-British era heritage to differentiate themselves from their Muslim co-religionists who came much later from the Bengal region (TOI, 2012). These indigenous Muslims are until today distinguished in terms of their customs and socio-economic status from the Muslims of Bengal-origin who were brought in as peasants much later by the British administration (Prakash, 2007, pp. 357-358). This is obvious to this day, where it can be seen that indigenous Assamese Muslims have higher literacy and income levels than their co-religionists who came from rural Bengal (Saikia, 2006, p. 192).

Assam's regional identity is attributed to the Ahoms, a dynasty which ruled Assam in the pre-colonial era for nearly six hundred years between 1228 and 1826 (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 106). The Ahom era is known for the promotion of the

Assamese language and the introduction of a kind of caste-based Hinduism (Pathak & Pathak, 2014). Although the early Ahoms had their own ancestral cult, gradually by the sixteenth century, they adopted a Brahminized caste-based form of Hinduism (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 124). The Ahom rulers, being originally from South-east Asia, initially had their own written language which is found in records of their lineage in the Ahom *Buranji* (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 112). However, in due course, they adopted the Assamese language and patronized the translation of Sanskrit works of the Hindu epics into the Assamese language (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 124-125). During Ahom rule, several Muslim families settled in their territories, of whom many were granted land and imperial titles by the rulers, and some even served in the royal army (Saikia, 2012). The Ahom Dynasty is widely remembered for thwarting the advance of Muslim expansion to the region, particularly during the Battle of Saraighat in 1671, when they defeated the Mughal forces (Gait, 2008, pp. 160-161). The era of the Ahom rulers is invoked by the Assamese nationalists for the dynasty's role in developing a regional linguistic identity and by the Hindu nationalists due to the kingdom effectively stopping Muslims from entering the region (Kashyap, 2016a).

In the last few years of rule of the Ahom dynasty, three invasions by Burmese forces were launched between the periods 1817 and 1826 (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 221). The EIC who came to the Ahom ruler's assistance drove the Burmese back to their borders and gained control of Assam's plains (Gait, 2008, pp. 236-238). Slowly, the territories under the Ahom rulers became part of the Bengal Presidency (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 242). As with British rule in Bengal, the British rule in Assam would affect the organic development of regional identities which happened under the Ahom rule—although to a much larger extent as there were series of great migrations from neighbouring Bengal.

During the era of British rule in Assam, several waves of migration of various communities took place. Two of the types of respondents in the survey that the thesis is interested in from this time are the Bengali-speaking Hindus and the Bengali-speaking Muslims, and their equation with the other group of respondents, the Assamese Hindus. It is essential to consider the migration of native Bengali-speakers to North East India (including Assam) before 1947, as a direct result of British policies to administer the region (Weiner, 2015). The Bengali-speaking Hindus were brought to Assam as administrators, while the Bengali-speaking

Muslims were brought in to reclaim marshy land for growing food (Weiner, 2015, p. 108). In 1837, the Bengali language was made the official language in the Brahmaputra Valley, which pitted the Assamese against the Bengalis (Weiner, 2015, p. 93). This language policy was implemented because the Bengali-speaking Hindu middle-class was able to convince the British authorities that Assamese was merely a dialect of the Bengali language, thereby hurting the self-esteem of Assamese language speakers (Phanjoubam, 2015). Although Assamese was reintroduced in the Brahmaputra Valley in 1873, this step did not mitigate the anxiety of the Assamese (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 73). When Bengal was partitioned in 1905, Assam for a short period became part of East Bengal (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 243). Subsequently, with the reunification of Bengal in 1911, Assam was separated to create new provinces on linguistic grounds (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 243). This reorganization based on linguistic grounds in 1911 was a measure by the British to assuage the fear of the growing Assamese elites who saw the realignment of their region with East Bengal as a threat to Assamese identity and culture (Phanjoubam, 2015). The animosity between the Bengali-speaking Hindus and the Assamese Hindu elites is visible even today in Assam's civil society and politics, with the Bengali-speaking Hindus detaching themselves from the Assamese-language and a big segment of Assamese population advocating for a kind of regional identity based on Assamese linguistic nationalism (Sharma, 2012).

Similarly, the arrival of Bengali-speaking Muslims in the region also built the foundation for religious polarization in Assam. As the years of the Partition of India approached, the politics of Assam saw a degree of religious polarization mainly due to the colonial government's policy for increasing revenue collection through increasing agricultural productivity encouraging Muslim migration from Bengal (Ahmed, 2005). Under the Muslim League government of Syed Muhammad Saadulla (1885-1955), during the period from 1937 to 1945, the Muslim migration from East Bengal increased as part of the "grow more food" campaign of World War II (Ahmed, 2005, p. 1011). Many see this policy of the then Muslim League government of Assam as a mechanism to increase its Muslim vote-bank (Hazarika, 2000, p. 190). An important Bengali-speaking Muslim politician during the pre-Partition days was Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani (1880-1976), also known as Maulana Bhashani. He is mainly responsible for mobilizing the Muslims of East Bengal descent to support the Muslim League, particularly in the *char/sor* (temporary

riverine floating islands in the Brahmaputra Delta) region of Assam (Guha, 1974). *Char/sor* are ideal for agriculture because they are filled with rich sediments, and since Assam's Bengali-speaking Muslim population are mainly agriculturists, a big chunk of this population still lives on these islands (Hazarika, 2000, p. 36)—many of whom have been interviewed during the survey phase of the fieldwork.

As in other parts of India, the politics of the Muslim League was at odds with that of INC (Hazarika, 2000, p. 115). The leadership of INC under Gopinath Bardoloi (1890-1950) blocked the province's merger with Pakistan (Hazarika, 2000, p. 26). While the consequence of the 1947 Partition in Assam was not as bloody as Bengal, thousands of Bengali-speaking Hindu refugees from East Bengal streamed into the lands that presently constitute Assam (Hazarika, 2000, p. 275). Even after the creation of Pakistan, Bengali-speaking Muslim migration kept on happening due to poverty, famine and land pressure in the-then East Pakistan (Hazarika, 2000, p. 232). In the years to come, this would lead to anti-foreigner movements, of which the worst sufferers would be the Bengali-speaking Muslims. This religious polarization is visible today in Assam's politics with the appearance of various pro-migrant and anti-migrant political parties.

### ***2.1.3 History of Tripura until it acceded to the Union of India***

Similar to the history of Bengal and Assam, the mention of Tripura is also found in the early Hindu epic, Mahabharata (Sandys, 2008, pp. 2-3). The rulers of the kingdom of Tripura, also known as the Manikya kings, always remained an independent kingdom or at least semi-autonomous, even though it faced invasions by Islamic forces, particularly the Mughal forces to whom they used to pay a kind of subordination tax (Sandys, 2008, p. 22). By the time the EIC came to the scene in 1761, it can be said that the Manikya kings were left with only the prospect of exercising control in the hills of its territories, but not in the plain lands which it once ruled (Sandys, 2008, p. 27). Slowly, the Manikya Kingdom became a Princely State of British India, which was a form of semi-sovereign way of indirect rule practiced by the British administration over some Indian provinces, where the indigenous rulers were provided military protection in return for taxes collected from the population living in their territories (Ramusack, 2004, p. 85).

Before the arrival of the British, there appeared to be a degree of harmony between the local tribal population and the Bengali-speaking population. Although

Kokborok, the native language of the Tripuris, was the state language of the Kingdom of Tripura (585-1949) (Banglapedia, 2015b), since the days of King Ratana Manikya (1464-68), the Manikya rulers were patrons of the Bengali language (Ali, 2011). The best evidence of this was having the *Rajmala* (the chronicle of the Tripura rulers) being composed in Bengali (Ali, 2011). In the *Rajmala*, there are numerous instances of their rulers encouraging the immigration and settlement of Bengali-speakers to their kingdom (Ali, 2011; Rahaman, 2015, p. 47). The migration of the Bengali-speaking Hindus was encouraged in order to run the administration, while the welcoming of the Bengali-speaking Muslim cultivators was for reclaiming uncultivated lands, in order to increase imperial revenue (Ali, 2011). Especially in the seventeenth century, the Manikya rulers encouraged the immigration of Muslim cultivators in large numbers (Rahaman, 2015, p. 50).

The era of Princely State of British India was a time of polarization of Tripura's tribal identity because of the taxation and land giving policies favouring the Bengali-speaking migrants. The periods of the Manikya Kingdom under the protection of the British authorities led to times where the British officials forced the Manikya kings to increase the collection of taxes (Ali, 2011). This burden that the king passed on to his tribal subjects made the latter unable to pay taxes and therefore lose their land rights. This, in turn, led to several series of revolts from the tribals, which were brutally suppressed by the Manikya rulers (Ali, 2011). Furthermore, the situation was aggravated by the partisan attitude of the Bengali-speaking Hindu administrators towards the tribals (Ali, 2011). This control of Tripura's administration by Bengali-speaking Hindus is currently reflected in Tripura's civil society where indigenous organizations claim that Bengali-speakers have taken control of all institutions in their state and are disregarding the rights of the indigenous people (Esterbrook, 2003).

During the years preceding the independence of British India, a Muslim party called the Anjuman-e-Islamia, tried to mobilize support for the merger of Tripura with East Pakistan but could not achieve its goals as the ruler decided to accede to the Union of India (Bhaumik, 2002). The merger of the Manikya Kingdom with India led to an extended period of influx of Bengali-speaking Hindu refugees from neighbouring East Pakistan (Ali, 2011). This process commenced in 1950, and remained unabated until the Bangladesh War of independence in 1971, resulting in the demography of Tripura taking a drastic shift, and the tribals becoming minorities

in their own homeland (Ali, 2011). This demographic shift is currently visible in Tripura where the civil administration is not just in the control of Bengali-speakers, but all political parties have their leadership dominated by Bengali-speakers (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 138).

With the Partition of British India, many Muslims (all of them being Bengali-speakers) exited to East Pakistan, which led to a sharp fall in the census figures for Muslims from 24.09% in 1941 to 6.68% in 1971 (Rahaman, 2015, p. 52). As with West Bengal, mostly the wealthier and educated Bengali-speaking Muslims left, resulting in the socio-economic downturn of this community (Rahaman, 2015). However, the difference here seems to be that the fall of the Muslim population to single digit figures making them ineffective as a constituency for courting by political parties in the years to come.

## **2.2 The Post-British Era: The current political formations in the three states**

This section will aim to describe the ethno-religious and ethno-linguistic tensions that are present in the three states being studied via analysing events since the departure of the British and examining the agenda of some of the current political parties and organizations. It will also describe how remnants of the British era are visible in modern day factors which create social capital, such as socio-economic inequality and migration. Since West Bengal, Assam and Tripura are states within India, the central government's policies over the last seventy years, have shaped the socio-political settings in these three states. The first sub-section will focus on the general events that have occurred in India since the exit of the British, which will be followed by state-specific sub-sections on events that have shaped the socio-political settings of West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura.

### ***2.2.1 Events in the Union of India***

In August of 1947, as borders were drawn across the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, millions of people left their homes. The two new nations of India and Pakistan had to deal with not just setting up new administrations but also resettling of incoming refugee populations. As communities were cut, this led to the demonization of the other (Khan, 2017). For those who were unfortunate enough to

be left on the “wrong” side of the border, the chain of riots which took place over the subsequent years were geared towards them (Khan, 2017). From 1950 to 1971, there were a series of riots in which Hindu and Muslim minorities were targeted in both countries. The division of Punjab had led to the complete movement of religious minorities (Lahiri-Dutt & Samanta, 2012), with Muslims now predominantly based in the western part (in Pakistan) and the non-Muslims on the eastern part (in India). In Bengal, the population migration was carried out much slower (Lahiri-Dutt & Samanta, 2012). One possible reason that Lahiri-Dutt & Samanta (2012, p. 204) states for this slow process among the Hindu community is that most of the violence in the early post-Partition period in Bengal was geared towards the educated upper and middle class, while the rest of the population was relatively untouched.

In 1971 with the help of India, Pakistan’s eastern wing gained independence to become Bangladesh. The grievance of the Bengali-speakers of East Pakistan had reached its peak when the regional party, the Awami League, won a majority of votes by demanding full provincial autonomy for the eastern wing but was not allowed to form a government (Talbot, 1998, pp. 208-209). This was followed by a crackdown by the Pakistani military and ultimately nine months of war between the Pakistani military establishment and the guerrilla fighters of East Pakistan (Talbot, 1998, pp. 209-211). Initially, India had trained the guerrilla fighters of East Pakistan who kept up nine months of armed resistance against the Pakistan army (Jaffrelot, 2015, p. 122). After this, the Indian army finally intervened militarily by entering the territories of East Pakistan, which led to the surrender of the Pakistani armed forces (Jaffrelot, 2015, p. 122). India justified this military intervention on the grounds that the Pakistani army’s crackdown in its eastern wing had led to the flow of 10 million refugees into India (Jaffrelot, 2015, p. 122), particularly to the states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura (Alom, 2017).

Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, new issues emerged regarding matters concerning religious minorities. Regarding the issue of migration, cases of the continued persecution of Hindus in the new nation of Bangladesh led to them fleeing to India, while economic pressures in Bangladesh led to the impoverished Bengali-speaking Muslims to also migrate to India (Gillan, 2002). For Hindu right-wing groups, this undocumented migration of Bengali-speaking Muslims from Bangladesh to India is seen as a demographic threat, since India already has a sizeable Muslim population (Destradi, 2012), with the religious group

forming the largest religious minority, comprising roughly 175 million people or about 15 percent of India's total population (Nair & Daniel, 2014).

With large Bengali-speaking (both Hindu and Muslim) populations present in the surrounding areas of India bordering Bangladesh, there is also a form of special relationship in the ethno-linguistic spheres, with many people sharing pre-partition family ties (Datta & Srinivasan, 2015, p. 388). These issues not only pose a problem to India's central government but also to the leaders of political parties ruling the state governments, who have taken very different measures in dealing with their populations. According to Indian law, anyone entering India after 25<sup>th</sup> March 1971, would be deemed a foreigner (Hazarika, 2000, p. 297). Sub-section 2.2.3 on Assam discusses how this law came to fruition. In its 2014 election campaign, the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had the "Bangladeshi" issue at the top of its agenda (Das, 2015). Its leaders said that if they get elected, they will grant refugee status to Hindu migrants from Bangladesh while taking strict actions to deport the Bangladeshi Muslim "infiltrators" (Das, 2015).

As mentioned earlier, the issue of the migration of Bengali-speaking Muslims to India is related to the topic of growth of India's Muslim population (Destradi, 2012; Chanakya, 2018; Pathi, 2018). This, in turn, is related to the broader debate on Hindu-Muslim inter-communal tensions prevalent in contemporary Indian civil society, with such tensions having risen since the BJP took office in 2014 (Nair & Daniel, 2014). One movement of Hindu right-wing forces directly targeting religious minorities is *ghar wapsi* (literally means "coming back home"), a popular term for referring to mass religious conversions to Hinduism of poor Muslims, Christians and tribals (Kim & Singh, 2016, p. 62). The BJP espouses *Hindutva* (Hindu Nationalism), in which being "Hindu" pertains to territorial and cultural factors, and should not merely be seen as a matter of faith (Paranjape, 2009, p. 49). The BJP is strongly linked to the Hindu right-wing organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (Nair & Daniel, 2014), and the organization has grown in prominence since the Indian general election of 2014, with members appointed to important cabinet posts and senior leaders deputed to the BJP (Nair & Daniel, 2014). Besides the fact that the BJP is the ruling party at India's centre, in all the three states that I am studying, the RSS and BJP have a marked presence. The BJP is the current ruling political party in Assam. Through building educational institutions, the RSS has grown in its support in West Bengal as well (Das, 2017a). Until 2017, the BJP was

virtually absent in Tripura's landscape but won the elections in March 2018 (Bhaumik, 2018).

The marginalization of Muslims in India has been documented by the government-commissioned Sachar Committee Report (2006). Among the findings of this report, Muslims are identified as the most socio-economically backward religious community in India because of some of the following reasons: Firstly, the report says that socio-economic backwardness of the nation's Muslim community should be seen (albeit not entirely) through demographic factors such as low urbanization, low female ratio, high child mortality and high population growth (Dossani, 2011, p. 12). Secondly, there are cases of systematic discrimination towards them, such as when their religious identity comes in the way of admitting their children to good educational institutions (Dossani, 2011, p. 12). Thirdly, reasons pertaining to the fears of physical violence increasingly make Muslims resort to living in predominantly Muslim neighbourhoods, thereby leading to their ghettoisation and being cut off from the wider Indian society (Dossani, 2011, p. 16). Such dire socio-economic figures are also visible among the Muslim populations in the three states that I am studying, which I shall be pointing out in the state-specific subsections.

### ***2.2.2 Events in West Bengal since 1947***

With the Partition of India, Bengali-speaking Hindus from East Pakistan started flowing into West Bengal at different phases. This continuous resettlement of enormous numbers of refugees became a significant economic issue in West Bengal (Chatterjee, 2013). There were a series of post-Partition Riots, which led to the exit of Bengali-speaking Hindus from East Pakistan, and the departure of Bengali-speaking Muslims to East Pakistan (Chatterji, 2007). However, the major ones that deserve mention are the 1964 Riots, which led to a vast influx of Hindu refugees to West Bengal and the exodus of Muslims to East Pakistan (Chatterji, 2007, p. 167). This series of riots were sparked by the news of the disappearance of an Islamic holy relic from the Hazrat Bal Shrine in Kashmir (Chatterji, 2007, p. 111). As a result, anti-Hindu riots broke out in several East Pakistani cities resulting in the death of hundreds of people (Galonnier, 2013). This sparked retaliation against Muslims in

Calcutta and the rural areas of West Bengal, in which hundreds of people were killed (Galonnier, 2013).

The influx of refugees into West Bengal had a dire effect on its economy (Chatterjee, 2013, pp. 70-71). With the War of Independence in East Pakistan in 1971, further refugees started flowing in (Chatterjee, 2013, p. 71). With the bad condition of the economy of West Bengal, people were disillusioned with the policies of the ruling INC, and thus voted the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) to power in 1977 (Chatterjee, 2013, p. 77). The communists would rule the state for 34 years until their defeat in 2011 at the hands of the Trinamool Congress (TMC) (Bhaumik, 2011). Among the Muslim population in the West Bengal comprising of 30% of the population, there is a sizeable number, represented by the orthodox segment which votes for the ruling TMC party, while the secular Muslims tend to vote for a wider range of political parties (Bagchi, 2016b).

In recent years, there have been three factors that right-wing forces have tried to drum up for garnering the political support of the majority Hindu: The first involves the subject of the undocumented migration of poor Bengali-speaking Muslims from Bangladesh who have made West Bengal their prime entry point to the rest of India (Gillan, 2002). According to Tripathi (2016), although there are no reliable statistics on the precise number of undocumented migrants from Bangladesh in India, an examination of population growth and demographic statistics from both countries in the previous four censuses of 2011, 2001, 1991, and 1981, implies that the figure is roughly fifteen million. Most of these undocumented migrants have relatives across the border, and thus had access to ways of acquiring Indian identity cards (Afsar, 2008, p. 15). For security forces, the shared ethno-linguistic ties make undocumented Bengali-speaking Muslim migrants indistinguishable from their Indian counterparts (Afsar, 2008, p. 15). The second factor which right-wing forces have tried to drum up relates to cases of persecution and killings of Hindus in Bangladesh (Bhattacharya, 2016). In West Bengal's villages, Muslims see Bangladeshi Hindu migrants from Bangladesh as threats (Nandy, 2017). There have been tensions since the arrival of new Hindu migrants after escaping persecution in Bangladesh have made them harbour ill-feelings against Muslims (Nandy, 2017). The present political arena in West Bengal is marked by local Hindu right-wing organizations affiliated to the BJP trying to make inroads by instigating riots in the state's border regions (Bose, 2017). The third factor relates to the Hindu right-wing

forces accusing the ruling TMC of practising “appeasement politics” towards the Muslim population at the expense of the Hindus of the state (R. Bhattacharya, 2017a). Such accusations of practising “appeasement politics” include policies of the ruling TMC government giving state allowances to Muslim religious leaders and regularly attending events sponsored by Muslim groups for gaining publicity (Bagchi, 2016b). Furthermore, the TMC is supported by the influential Islamist organization of West Bengal, the Jamaat-i-Islami Hind (JIH) (Hossain, 2014). Some of its leaders of JIH have been courted by the senior TMC leadership, including the Chief Minister’s decision to nominate a prominent journalist affiliated with this organization to the upper house of the Parliament of India (Hossain, 2014).

The post-Partition period saw a decline in the socio-economic conditions of Muslims in West Bengal, as the educated and wealthy among this section had migrated to East Pakistan. The SNAP (2016) report shows that the Muslims of present-day West Bengal, who constitute 30 percent of the state’s population, lack in various socio-economic indicators (Das, 2016). The study also finds that almost 80% of West Bengal’s Muslim population living in rural areas live below the poverty line (Roy, 2016). Furthermore, the report states that while the state’s average literacy rate is 76.3 percent, the literacy rate of the state’s Muslim community is 69.5 percent (Bagchi, 2016a). It also reported that only one percent of households have salaried jobs in the private sector as their primary source of income (Roy, 2016). Thus, the dire figures documented in the SNAP (2016) report are comparable to the dismal socio-economic figures of Muslims across India found in the government-commissioned Sachar Committee Report (2006).

### ***2.2.3 Events in Assam since 1947***

Soon after the independence of India, Assam faced many tribal and linguistic conflicts. Various tribal groups, which can be classified to be belonging marginally to the Hindu caste-system, started asserting their identities (Hussain, 1987). This led to the carving out of three other distinct states from Assam along tribal lines, in order to fulfil the political aspirations of the hill tribes (Hussain, 1987). Furthermore, in the sixties, the linguistic divide grew between the Assamese and the Bengali speakers because of the adoption of the Assam Official Language Bill by the Government of Assam (Phanjoubam, 2015). This act which sought to have Assamese as the sole

official language of the state, led to the rise of the Bengali language movement in the state, as the Bengali speakers saw this move as a kind of linguistic imposition (Phanjoubam, 2015). From the Assamese viewpoint, this move was probably a result of the fear of a growing middle-class Bengali-speaking Hindu population, who were arriving from neighbouring East Pakistan (Phanjoubam, 2015). The ensuing linguistic conflict, which continued well into the seventies and eighties, reached its peak in the Bengali-speaking region of Barak Valley, with the killings of student protestors in May 1961, due to police excesses (Phanjoubam, 2015). This tragedy led to the Government of Assam reconsidering its official language policy act in the Barak Valley region, where it made Bengali the other official language (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 29). Bengali-speaking Hindus of the state still consider this event as a matter of their pride and keep on holding to their Bengali linguistics roots (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 29).

However, the greatest sufferers in the post-Partition conflicts in Assam have been the Bengali-speaking Muslims of the Brahmaputra Valley. As mentioned earlier, while the consequence of the 1947 Partition in Assam was not as violent as in Bengal, thousands of Bengali-speaking Hindus migrated to present-day Assam (Hazarika, 2000, p. 275). It is to be noted that even after the creation of Pakistan, Bengali-speaking Muslim migration kept on happening due to poverty and land pressure in East Pakistan, and later on from Bangladesh ((Hazarika, 2000, p. 232). This unblocked influx of foreigners to Assam led to the upsurge of Assamese nationalism, culminating in the Assam Movement in 1979 (Hazarika, 2000, p. 55). This movement which was geared towards the undocumented migrants from Bangladesh, mainly the Bengali-speaking Muslims, was spearheaded by the All Assam Students Union (AASU) (Hazarika, 2000, p. 64). The AASU alleged that the INC party of Assam had used this migrant population as a vote bank, and demanded that their names be removed immediately from the voter list, after which they should be deported (Hazarika, 2000, p. 55). Elections were still held under such circumstances, angering the Assamese nationalists (Hazarika, 2000, p. 67). This resulted in the massacre of 3,000 Bengali-speaking Muslims by the supporters of the AASU in Nellie in 1983 (Kimura, 2013, p. 69). The then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, later had agreed to hold talks with the AASU leaders, and decided to agree on a date for the labelling of foreigners as anyone who entered the state after March 25<sup>th</sup> 1971, after detection as per the IMDT (Illegal Migrants Determination by

Tribunal) Act (Hazarika, 2000. pp. 131-132). The concern to drive out undocumented migrants led to the creation of the National Register of Citizens (NRC) a type of citizenship register in Assam where people have to prove their ancestry in the state on or before March 24, 1971, one day before the Bangladesh War of Independence began (Mohan, 2018). With the end of this anti-migrant agitation, a new political party was formed in 1985 called the Ahom Gana Parishad (AGP) (Paranjape, 2009). The AGP which is at present part of the ruling coalition espouses Assamese regional identity (Kashyap, 2016a) and is against both Hindus and Muslims migrants from Bangladesh (Singh, 2018a).

With the anti-foreigner's agitation, many insurgent groups emerged, which demanded separatism from mainland India (Mahanta, 2013). With the Indian Army being launched to crush these insurgent groups and such killings going unpunished as per the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), the security situation of the region became even more fragile (Baruah, 1999, pp. 165-166). With such a long period of insurgency, one very prominent militant organization called the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was born (Mahanta, 2013). ULFA is an organization that was built on the concept of gaining a sovereign independent political status for Assam on the grounds of the region's socio-cultural distinctness and historical background (Mahanta, 2013, p. 123). It has anti-migrant origins and at the same time holds strong views against India's central government (Mahanta, 2013, p. 45-48). Its anti-migrant stand had softened as many of its senior leadership took refuge in Bangladesh during the nineties and early-2000s, but it started raising its voice against Bangladeshi migrants again as Bangladeshi security forces arrested many of its leaders and handed them over to India (Patowary, 2009).

For understanding the lives of my main survey respondents, Bengali-speaking Muslims, it is useful to acknowledge their dreadful living conditions, particularly those who live in the Brahmaputra Valley. This community is still the biggest sufferer in Assam's various conflicts. According to a government survey in 2003, it was found that in the *char/sor* region which is the home of a substantial population of Bengali-speaking Muslims has a literacy rate of 19 percent— which is appallingly low when compared with the state's average of 54 percent (Andre & Kumar, 2016). This statistic on the dismal level of education as well as high rate of poverty within this community (Khalid, 2018) maybe the barrier to their integration in the mainstream Assamese society, where members of the Bengali-speaking

Muslim community are routinely referred to using the derogatory term called “miya” (Andre & Kumar, 2016) and sometimes even branded as foreigners from neighbouring Bangladesh (Khalid, 2018).

Although the Bengali-speaking Muslim community has accepted Assamese as their native language, including implementing ways to popularize it among its community members and setting up Assamese-medium schools for its community—this step has been looked upon with suspicion by the mainstream Assamese society (Deka, 2016). In addition, this approach of accepting the Assamese language by the Bengali-speaking Muslims has further alienated them from the Bengali-speaking Hindus, who keep on holding to their Bengali roots and have Bengali-medium schools for their children (Sharma, 2012).

This form of religious polarization in Assamese politics has led to the birth of the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) in 2005, which is a political party largely representing the Bengali-speaking Muslim migrant population (Kashyap, 2016b). It was the main opposition party from 2011 to 2016. A party along similar lines is the Samajwadi Party (SP) of Assam. Although this is a political party based in North India, with small branches in other Indian states such as Assam, it too represents the religious minorities such as Muslims (Bhuyan, 2007, p. 22). Furthermore, this religious polarization has led to the rise of Hindu-right wing groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), whose mobilization of Hindu votes in the state election of 2016 led to the BJP’s victory in the 2016 Assam state election (Jaffrelot, 2016). With the beginning of BJP rule in Assam, there have been several cases of harassment of Bengali-speaking Muslims, one prime example being the eviction and destruction of the dwellings of Bengali-speaking Muslim settlers at Kaziranga National Park (Deka, 2016). Recently, on 30th July 2018, a draft NRC was published, where the names of almost four million individuals especially those belonging to the Bengali-speaking Muslim community of the state were missing (Gani, 2018). Although conducted under the guidelines stated by the Supreme Court, since the state government is under the control of the BJP and the government officials were in charge of administering it, the NRC has been deemed to have a discriminatory agenda (Gani, 2018; Mohan, 2018; Sen, 2018).

#### ***2.2.4 Events in Tripura since its merger with the Union of India in 1949***

After the merger of the Princely State of Tripura with India in 1949, there was an influx of Bengali-speaking Hindu refugees in 1950 that remained unabated until the Bangladesh War of independence in 1971 (Rahaman, 2015, pp. 48-49). This eventually led to the drastic change in the demography of Tripura from having a majority of tribals to one being primarily composed of Bengali-speaking Hindus (Rahaman, 2015). One major reason for this drastic change in demography was the ruling INC Party's support for Bengali-speaking Hindu refugees, by going out of the way to promote settlements in areas marked as tribal reserves (Bhaumik, 2002). During the years preceding the merger of the kingdom with the Indian Union, support of communism grew among the tribals as a backlash against the ruling Manikya rulers for having supported the migration of Bengali-speakers to Tripura and taxation of the tribal population (Ali, 2011).

Nevertheless after the CPI (M) came to power, they too neglected the tribals areas of the state for development purposes, particularly in the eastern regions where there is a tribal administrative council (Ali, 2011). This has led to the further disillusionment of the tribal community, with sections amongst them turning to militancy as part of a wider chain of violent insurgent groups in the North East Indian region (Ali, 2011). The renaming of Ujjayanta Palace to Tripura State Museum has angered the tribal population, as it was thought as a measure to undermine the state's former indigenous Manikya Dynasty (TOI, 2013a). Moreover, there have been demands by the tribals to promote the indigenous Kokborak language, which although is a co-official language in the state, is deemed by the native speakers (who form the majority of the state's tribal population) to have been neglected by the CPI (M) government (Ali, 2011). In 2016, this dissent among the tribals led to demands by a tribal political organization, Indigenous People's Front of Tripura (IPFT), to demand for separate statehood for the tribal population, thereby culminating in riots between the tribals and the Bengali-speaking population (Karmakar & Barman, 2016).

As in West Bengal, the BJP slowly tried to make inroads into the political arena of Tripura. In the case of Tripura, it has been successful as it won the state elections of March 2018, with a vote share of 43% compared to 1% in the state elections of 2013 (Bhaumik, 2018). The BJP tried to grow support within the tribal population through various measures. One such step was the central BJP

government's decision to rename Agartala Airport to Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya Airport, after the name of the last Manikya ruler (Datta, 2017) as a way of showing that it respects the state's tribal legacy, which the ruling CPI (M) had for the longest time undermined. One of the major reasons for the victory of the BJP in Tripura's state election of 2018 is due to the BJP securing a large chunk of tribal votes via its political alliance with the IPFT (Bhaumik, 2018).

As far as the condition of my main survey respondents is concerned, the socio-economic conditions of the Muslims (all being native Bengali-speakers) of Tripura, comprising of 8.96% of the state's population, exhibit dismal figures (Rahaman, 2015, p. 46). According to a Tripura government survey in 2014, it was found that the share of Muslims in government services is 2.69%, which is much lower than their percentage in Tripura's population (Rahaman, 2015, p. 60). In data collected from 22 colleges in 2014, it was found that the enrolment of Tripura's Muslims is very low in higher education, with 1.5% being female Muslims and 3.6 % being male Muslims (Rahaman, 2015, p. 55). These dire figures are similar to the SNAP (2016) report from West Bengal and the all India government-commissioned Sachar Committee Report (2006).

### **2.3 Conclusion**

This chapter narrates the historical and socio-political context in the three Indian Border States which are necessary for investigating the social capital formation of Bengali-speaking Muslims. There are two sections in this chapter: The first one describes historical events until the end of British rule. By describing historical events, the section illustrates underlying reasons for the existence of some factors which are visible at present for the formation of social capital. These include the creation of linguistic and religious identities, and the existence of agricultural and rural communities. The aim of the second section by describing events in the post-British era is to show how remnants of the British era are visible in modern day factors which create social capital such as socio-economic inequality and migration. This section also illustrates the origins and presence of some political actors in the three states who are influential and important for some factors leading to the formation of social capital.

It can be seen that in the pre-British era, group identities were more fluid identities, as in comparison to later times. This can be understood when considering the virtual absence of a caste system in the Bengal region, which made it easier for a kind of syncretic Islam to spread with the progress of agricultural frontiers. This kind of fluidity of identity can also be seen during the Ahom rule in Assam, where a foreign dynasty made the region their seat of rule for six hundred years and welcomed outsiders such as Muslims while defending its territory from invasion by their co-religionists. In the British era, it can be seen how the colonial government's policies, such as those relating to the creation of new provinces, taxation and land holding, the promotion of migration, led to the polarization of identities, whether it be based on criteria pertaining to religion, language and/or tribal affiliations.

Since the independence of India, events have been shaped by happenings in neighbouring East Pakistan, and then in Bangladesh. During the brief period of East Pakistan's existence, a series of religious riots had led to a further polarization of religious identities. With the independence of Bangladesh, undocumented migration of Bengali-speaking Muslims from Bangladesh to India for economic reasons have been a significant source of concern, which has been seen through suspicious eyes given the change in the general religious demography of India as well as the arrival of persecuted Bengali-speaking Hindus from Bangladesh. For considering the state-specific issues, the legacy of violence surrounding Bengal's Partition, Tripura's accession to India with the state becoming a host to a vast refugee population, and the growth of Assamese nationalism as a counter-reaction to migration, have also been talked about. Furthermore, the section also describes the evolution and interests of current political actors in the civil society and political scenario in each state, which affect the lives of Bengali-speaking Muslims living in each state. Finally, the section also provides current figures for the socio-economic conditions of Bengali-speaking Muslims as compared to the rest of the population living in each state.

Thus, all the details given in this background chapter concerning historical and contemporary events provide the ideal platform for understanding the literature review in Chapter 3 where I am stating how exactly I am contributing to the literature on social capital theory and Islam in South Asia. Also, the information in this chapter will also help for understanding the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4 for investigating the formation of social capital among Bengali-speaking Muslims in the three border states.

## Literature Review

This research contributes to the literature on social capital theory and Islam in South Asia. Fewer studies on social capital are geared towards understanding social capital formation as compared to the amount of studies pertaining to seeing the effects of social capital. Moreover, the limited studies on social capital formation relating to ethnic groups of South Asia primarily consider aspects of trust and collective action but in doing so do not accurately consider all dimensions of social capital. This study develops a framework for explaining bonding and bridging types of social capital formation among Bengali-speaking Muslims in India (i.e., an ethnic minority population living in South Asia) by drawing from the individual-level network theory of social capital, which considers structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital. This study also contributes to the literature on Islam in South Asia. Although the literature on the Partition of India in 1947 includes writings about Muslim communities in Bengal, there appears to be a gap in the post-partition literature pertaining to the lives of Bengali-speaking Muslims of India. By using primary data collected through fieldwork, the study examines the present day conditions of Bengali-speaking Muslims in three border states in India.

There are three sections in this chapter: The first section describes the literature of social capital theory, the second section describes the literature on Islam in South Asia, and the third section considers both genres of literature jointly and concludes by highlighting empirical contribution in this research.

### 3.1 Social Capital Theory

The theory of social capital has emerged as a distinct field of literature due to the seminal works of Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993; 2000). Interestingly, there are relatively few studies on the formation of social capital compared to the effects or outcomes of social capital. This section is divided into seven subsections: The first subsection talks about the origins of the concept of social capital. The second subsection describes how the theory became popularized and how collective level scholars visualize the concept. The sub-section also analyses the influential writings of Putnam (1993; 2000) and includes an

introduction to Putnam's (2000) conception of bonding and bridging types of social capital. The third subsection explains why collective level studies are fundamentally defective as problems of causality have been discovered in various studies which employed a collective level concept of social capital. The fourth section will state how network theorists of social capital provide the correct mechanism to understand the formation of social capital and how they have adopted Putnam's bonding/bridging dichotomy of social capital for studying ethnic groups. The fifth subsection explains how individual-level social capital theory has been applied to study ethnicities in developing countries. The sixth subsection talks about how network level analysis of social capital has been used to examine ethnic minorities in western countries, but such a method is generally lacking in the South Asian context. The last subsection will point out the contribution of this research to the study of social capital formation.

### ***3.1.1 Origins of Social Capital***

The use of the word "social capital" can be traced back to the writings of Lyda J. Hanifan (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000) who while discussing community participation in enhancing school performance described social capital as "tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit" (1916, p. 130 cited in Woolcock & Narayan, 2000, p. 228). According to Ostrom (2000), the occurrence of collective action happening in a given community is due to the presence of trust which gives rise to social capital—a particular form of capital which is distinct from physical or economic capital. Over the years, there has been a boom in the studies using social capital theory for explaining positive outcomes concerning a diverse range of topics, including public safety (Kawachi et al., 1999a; Carcach & Huntley, 2002; Drakulich, 2015), building effective developmental policies (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Cleaver, 2005; Savioli & Patuelli, 2016), life satisfaction (Putnam, 2000; Halpern, 2005; Elgar et al., 2011), and public health (Kawachi et al., 1999b; Bush & Baum, 2001; Eriksson, 2011).

### ***3.1.2 Popularization of the Term, the Collective Level Scholars of Social Capital and the Writings of Putnam***

The initial popularization of the term social capital is attributed primarily to the writings in the eighties by the sociologist Bourdieu (1986) and then the economist Coleman (1988). It is noticeable that the scholars of social capital can roughly be divided into two camps: ones who conceive of social capital at the collective level versus another camp whose focus is on the individual-level of analysis. Bourdieu (1986) had thought of the concept from the viewpoint of the individual by introducing the concept of social capital in relation to economic and cultural capital, where he argued that the fundamental causes of social stratification lie in the unequal acquisition and accumulation of capital between the dominated and dominating classes. Whereas Coleman (1988), while analysing reasons for dropping out from high school thought of the concept of social capital as something that not only an individual but also a society possesses.

In the nineties and early part of the twenty-first century, the theory of social capital garnered attention in the field of political science due to the writings of Putnam (1993; 2000). In his 1993 book, *Making Democracy work*, Putnam investigated the history of democracy in Italy and found that the presence of greater social capital in the northern region as compared to the southern one allowed community members in the former to easily overcome the dilemmas of collective action, leading to higher economic prosperity. In a later work in 2000, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Putnam investigated the decline in civic engagement in the United States since the fifties, which has led to a gradual decline in social capital in the nation. In both these works, Putnam saw the concept purely at a collective level, after which his writings lead to the growth of a group of scholars who considered social capital at the collective level.

As mentioned above, the camp of social capital theorists who look at social capital at the collective level can be traced back to the ideas of Coleman (1988). Coleman's primary examples are of obligation and trust between individuals in various settings, which he extrapolates to explain how collective action problems are solved by establishing reciprocal expectations and trustworthiness which lead to social cohesion. Yet Coleman's ideas remained vague and his level of analysis is not clear. The principal author from the collective level camp is Putnam (1993; 2000), whose work acknowledges Coleman's concept of social structure and group

cohesion. For Putnam, social capital includes norms and trust ingrained in civic engagement, which leads to collective action in a society. While explaining the declining civic engagement in the United States, Putnam (2000, p.19) explained this by pointing to the decline of social capital, which he defined as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.” Putnam (2000) equates social capital with the number of and level of membership in civic apolitical associations, such as in bowling and bird watching clubs. Putnam (1993; 2000) sees civic associations such as schools teaching citizens to trust each other, which in turn helps people learn to trust even non-members beyond the civic association.

Putnam’s (2000) work is also important because it introduces the distinction between two forms of social capital: bonding and bridging forms of social capital. In his work on explaining the decline of American democracy, Putnam (2000) describes bonding social capital ties as being exhibited by strong ties within a homogenous group which foster access to internal resources. In contrast, Putnam sees bridging social capital ties being exhibited by weak ties and which are observable though considering interactions between heterogeneous groups which increase access to external resources.

### ***3.1.3 Limitations of the Collectivist conception of Social Capital***

There are several flaws in the work of Putnam. Some flaws are specific to his work while other criticisms are generally of scholars who study social capital at the collective level. The first flaw stems from Putnam’s 1993 work on *Making Democracy work*, where he saw the mere creation of social capital as a positive factor. However, it has been pointed out by Fukuyama (1999) that even mafia groups and xenophobic organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan, also possess a high stock of social capital. Correspondingly, some scholars (Pinchotti & Verwimp, 2007; Ballet et al., 2008; McDoom, 2014) point out that genocide happens in societies with a high stock of social capital, where there exist very high ethnic solidarities. Secondly, Putnam’s belief in both his works in Italy (1993) and the United States (2000) that being active in organizations should automatically promote social capital might be inaccurate. This is because as pointed out by Stolle & Rochon (1998) that not all types of organizations will be equally effective in their relative capacity to generate social capital, and as Levi (1996) states some organizations might do exactly the

opposite, i.e., diminish social capital. The third flaw which Putnam's studies as well as all collective level studies of social capital have is that there remains a question of causality. Authors such as Portes (1998), Morrow (1999), Paxton (2002) and Quibria (2003) posit that Putnam's formulation is engaged in a causal reasoning which is entirely circular, where the sources of social capital are confused with showing their effects.

The following studies which have used data from Western countries for showing the correlation of a single independent variable affecting social capital, have inherent problems in causality due to them not explaining the causal mechanisms in the same way: Halman and Luijkx (2006) found that institutional trust is statistically significantly and positively influenced by education, while van Oorschot et al. (2006) found the effect to be negative. In investigating the correlation of social capital with gender, Halman and Luijkx (2006) found that women possess more social trust than men, while the Soroka et al. (2003) had earlier found exactly the opposite correlation. In investigating the correlation of social capital with being married, Bolin et al. (2003) found how couples have less social capital than unmarried individuals, but Christoforou (2005) found married individuals to have more social capital than unmarried individuals. Finally, for establishing the correlation between religiosity and social capital, Knack & Keefer (1997) and Halman & Luijkx (2006) found how religious people have higher social capital as it can be said that being practising forces its followers to act in the interests of something other than themselves, while Berggren & Bjørnskov (2009) found that religiosity has a negative effect on social capital as it may cause rift with followers of other religions.

#### ***3.1.4 Network theorist of social capital***

The issue of causality faced by collective level scholars of social capital is addressed by a particular group of individual-level scholars of social capital known as the network theorists, such as Lin (1999; 2001) and Burt (2001). This group posits that only through studying the embedded resources in an individual's social network it will be possible to understand the process of social capital formation. While both Coleman (1988) and Bourdieu (1986) refer to social networks in their discussions of social capital, neither developed the insights of network analysis as a theoretical tool.

Lin's (1999; 2001) conception of social capital has provided researchers with a clear conceptualization of networks creating social capital, where one views social capital as being present in embedded resources in an individual's social networks, which the individual must have the ability to access and mobilize, in order to gain economic, political and social return for themselves and for other individuals who are part of the same collective unit. Building on the concept of Burt's (2001) structural holes and Coleman's (1988) network closures, Lin (1999, 2001) explains how network's lead to the mobilization of embedded resources in a particular network as it determines the strength of ties or relationship in that network. For Lin (1999; 2001), networks which lead to the creation of social capital consist of not just a cognitive dimension reflecting reciprocity and trust, but it must also have a structural aspect comprising of the actual connections between people. These abstract concepts of social capital creation by network theorists are explained further in Chapter 4, outlining the theoretical framework of this research.

As mentioned in section 3.1.2, Putnam's (2000) work is significant because it introduces the distinction between bonding and bridging types of social capital, where bonding social capital ties are exhibited by strong ties within a homogenous group and bridging social capital ties are displayed by weak ties between heterogeneous groups. The origins of the concepts of bridging and bonding social capital among network theorists predate the use of the terminology by Putnam (2000). In 1973, Granovetter (1973) distinguished between the strength of ties among an individual's network by classifying them into those that are weak and those that are strong. Granovetter (1973) described weak ties as loose connections of an individual to another set of individuals who are of different backgrounds and are unlikely to know each other well, while he defined strong ties of an individual as close relationships with people with similar backgrounds such as those that exist within families.

Network theorists have implemented the bonding/ bridging dichotomy for studying ethnicity (Lancee, 2010; Beaudoin 2011; Lancee, 2012; Kim, 2017). According to Beaudoin (2011), it is possible to visualise ethnic networks being composed of bonding and bridging ties by considering the theory of homophily developed by Laumann (1973) and the contact hypothesis attributed to Allport (1979). According to Beaudoin (2011, p. 160), the theory of homophily says that people are drawn to others having similar characteristics due to the inbuilt perception

of knowing such people and having feelings of intimacy, whereas the contact hypothesis is about positivity or negativity of past interactions with members of another race determining causes for prejudice and stereotyping.

### ***3.1.5 Social Capital Studies of ethnic groups in the context of developing countries***

The notion of ethnic communities in developing countries as possessing social capital can be traced back to studies conducted in Africa which focuses on collective action, political trust, and participation. There appears to be a trend in such studies from Africa where it is seen that ethnic diversity is impacting collective action depending on how political actors view their political gains (Posner, 2004; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). Another set of studies from Africa investigate the effect of social capital on political trust (Kuenzi, 2008) and political participation (Bwalya & Sukumar, 2018) of citizens. However, there appear to be no studies from Africa about ethnic groups using a network level analysis using structural and cognitive dimensions of bridging and bonding social capital.

In studies conducted in the South Asian context, collective action and ethnic mobilization are seen in studies of Hindu-Muslim violence in India (Varshney, 2001; Dutta, 2014). Such studies show that in locations across India, civic interactions via involvement in organizations and everyday engagement lowers or increases the penchant of interethnic violence. However, the problems with these studies are that they are not talking about social capital formation but rather its effects. There are some studies which are based on the Bengal region on social capital in regards to ethnic relations, but they lack comprehensiveness. The first study is by Sengupta & Sarkar (2012) who examine four municipalities comprising of 440 households in West Bengal, investigating structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital between religious and caste groups. While the authors do consider structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital of ethnic groups, their measurement of ethnic diversity in villages does not explicitly talk about measurement of the formation of bonding and bridging social capital among ethnic groups. There is another set of studies from the Bangladesh and West Bengal region which has the limitation of only studying interpersonal trust or the cognitive dimension of social capital, but do not consider the structural dimension. The first one is by Johansson-Stenman et al. (2009) who conducted a study using trust survey questions and a trust game in rural

Bangladesh for investigating the effect of social distance (based on religious belonging) on both within and between Muslims and Hindus, finding a positive effect. The second study pertains to a recently published research conducted in Bangladesh by Asadullah (2017), who combines individual and community level independent variables from almost one hundred villages in Bangladesh for examining notions of social capital as the trust between different religious groups. His study is unique because it considers many independent factors about an individual's personal characteristics such as education, gender, income and marital status for determining if they create social capital. A third recently published study by Gupta et al. (2018) pertains to data collected from field experiments conducted in Bangladesh and West Bengal, where the researchers found that religious minority status being the driver of trust among different segments of the population rather than religiosity itself.

### ***3.1.6 Studies of ethnic groups using the cognitive and structural dimensions of Bridging and Bonding types of Social Capital***

There appear to be sparse studies which use both the structural and cognitive dimensions for studying bonding and bridging social capital. Only two studies based in Western countries, by Beaudoin (2011) in the United States on studying different racial groups and by Lancee (2010; 2012) in Europe on studying non-Western immigrants, use the structural and cognitive dimensions of bonding and bridging social capital. Lancee's studies examine the presence of bonding and bridging forms of social capital as independent variables affecting labour market outcomes for immigrant groups. On the other hand, Beaudoin's study considers bonding and bridging types of social capital as outcome variables for analysing how news media influence people to form ties with other individuals who are similar as well as hailing from different ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, Beaudoin seems to be one of the few authors who have considered social capital formation, by using the structural and cognitive dimensions of bonding and bridging types of social capital. As discussed in the previous sub-section, studies of social capital of ethnic minorities in developing countries do not generally consider both the structural and cognitive dimensions of social capital for measuring the formation of bonding and bridging forms of social capital.

### ***3.1.7 The Contribution***

In the previous subsections, I reviewed the literature relating to the seminal studies of social capital theory, the differences between the collectivist and the network theorist notions of social capital, and studies of social capital relating to ethnic minority communities. I believe that this research will fulfil the gap existing in the individual-level network theory analysis of social capital pertaining to ethnic minority communities living in South Asia. For doing so, this study will consider multiple factors which lead to the surfacing of fundamental components of bonding and bridging social capital among the Bengali-speaking Muslim communities living in the context of three Indian border states.

### **3.2 Islam in South Asia**

Since there are 480 million Muslims in the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (Ruffle, 2013, p. 193), the literature of Islam in the region has emerged as a distinct field of literature, encompassing the political, intellectual and spiritual developments happening among the region's Muslims. The writings on Islam in South Asia are primarily focused on the Partition of India in 1947, while those that pertain to the present-day context are mostly North-India centric studies. This research fills the gap in the literature of Islam in South Asia, specifically Bengali-speaking Muslims in three border states of India on whom there is limited research.

This section is divided into four subsections: The first subsection talks briefly about the studies relating to the Partition of 1947, for stating how the vast majority of writings about Muslims in India pertain to this genre of literature. The second subsection describes the studies of Muslim populations in post-Partition India, for showing how such studies have a North-India centric outlook. The third subsection describes that although there are regional studies of Muslim populations in India, studies concerning Bengali-speaking Muslims are primarily related to studies concerning the identity of Bangladesh. The fourth subsection talks about how studies of Bengali-speaking Muslims in the Indian context being inherently linked to the phenomenon of undocumented migration from Bangladesh, which entirely overlooks the current socio-economic condition and daily life of the region's Muslim

population. The fifth subsection will indicate my contribution to the literature on Islam in South Asia.

### ***3.2.1 Studies of Partition of India in 1947***

Even though there have been writings on pre-Partition India such as on the early Arab conquests (Elliot, 1867; Anjum, 2007), the rise of the Delhi sultanate (Majumdar & Munshi, 1990; Jackson, 2003), and the Mughal Empire (Richards, 1993; Schimmel, 2006), the vast majority of literature on Islam in South Asia pertains to the construction of a distinct Muslim identity during the colonial era and the partition of India with the subsequent creation of Pakistan in 1947 (Robinson, 1974; Jalal, 1994; Khan, 2007). While these studies describe significant events underlying the construction of distinct Muslim identity in India, the limits of these studies are that they are focused on history and are North India centric. This undermines the regional diversity of Muslims living in South Asia because it merely sees Muslims in South Asia as a monolithic community. A sub-genre in the literature concerning the Partition of India pertains to the events of partition which specifically occurred in Bengal (Heehs, 1997; Chatterji, 2007; Sengupta, 2017). However, the gap remains in the literature regarding documenting the contemporary lives of Muslims who remained in post-partition India. Thus, the major flaw with the vast majority of literature about Islam in South Asia is that it does not touch on the stories of Muslims in today's India, who make up approximately 160 million or 15 percent of India's total population (Ruffle, 2013).

### ***3.2.2 Studies of Post-Partition India***

Then there is the second genre of literature about the lives of Muslims in post-partition India. This genre can roughly be divided into three subsets. The first subset of this literature investigates the Hindu-Muslim religious riots in post-partition India that is largely responsible for the fractured nature of Indian society ever since its inception (Varshney, 2001; Brass, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004). However, the problem with this subset of literature is that the focus is on the violence concerning Hindu-Muslim relations rather than on other factors which might be present in civil society which maybe shaping the lives of the nation's Muslim minority. The second subset of literature about the lives of Muslims in post-partition India focuses on doubts

about the patriotic loyalty of the remaining Muslims in India, which has furthered the growth of Hindu Nationalism (Puri, 1993; Corbridge & Harriss, 2000; Jaffrelot, 2006). The problem with this set of writings which focuses on the rise of Hindu nationalism attributed to the presence of a religious minority population is that it again leaves out factors which are present in Indian civil society that shapes the lives of Muslims in post-partition India.

The third subset of this literature talks about the current conditions of Muslims in post-partition India, where there is a lack of integration or visible alienation of the nation's Muslim population. Such studies include those that document the apparent discrimination in Indian civil society (Sachar et al., 2006; Misra et al., 2007; Dossani, 2011). Trends visible in such genre of literature include reasons for the existence of inequality between the religious majority and minority, statistics on the bad socio-economic condition of Indian Muslims and explanations for the ghettoisation of the Muslim population of the country. One specific example of the visible trend of discrimination using numerical data is given in the report of Sachar et al. (2006), showing that in any state of India, the representation of Muslims in the government departments does not match their population share (Sachar et al., 2006, p. 94). This subset of literature showing lack of integration of the nation's Muslim population also includes literature pointing towards the induction of fear among the nation's Muslim population due to rise in Hindu nationalism (DeVotta, 2002; Kim & Singh, 2016). Examples given in such literature about fear generation among Indian Muslims by Hindu right-wing forces include actions by the latter directly targeted against the former, such as inciting mob violence for being "cow-eaters" (DeVotta, 2002, pp. 61-62) or conducting ceremonies to convert Muslims en-mass into Hinduism (Kim & Singh, 2016, p. 62). A recent addition to this subset of literature showing the lack of integration of Indian Muslims include the work of Hassan et al. (2018) who investigate the relationship between Muslim minority size and inequality using a new cross-sectional dataset of six hundred districts. The authors found that the well-being of Muslims reaches the lowest point when the minority community reaches approximately fifty percent of the population in a district. My research falls in this third subset of literature pertaining to the lives of Muslims in post-partition India. However, my research is not a country-wide or a North India-centric study but has a greater regional focus, considering the lives of Muslims in eastern and north-eastern India.

### ***3.2.3 Regional Studies of Muslims in India***

Moving on to the literature about the lives of Muslims in eastern and north-eastern India, there are also gaps which my study is fulfilling. Considering the region-specific studies describing the histories of Assam, West Bengal, and Tripura, there are mentions of the historical existence of Muslims in the region due to conquests and state policies of permitting migration (Pathak & Pathak, 2004; Sengupta, 2008; Sandys, 2008). While these writings talk about the existence of Muslim populations in the three states, they do not talk about the lives of modern-day Muslims in those states. Although there have been studies on the regional presence of Muslims in India such as in the southern states of Kerala (Chiriyankandath, 1996; Osella & Osella, 2008) and Tamil Nadu (Matthew, 1982; Rajakumar, 2015), the north-western regions of Gujarat (Ghassem-Fachandi, 2012; Susewind, 2013) and Mumbai city (Punwani, 2012; Gupta, 2015), these works do not relate to the eastern and north-eastern region of India where a significant portion of Muslims reside, such as in West Bengal which has a population comprising of 30% Muslims and Assam which has one consisting of 33% Muslims (Census of India, 2011).

Reflecting on those studies that exist on the Muslim populations of Bengal (Ahmed, 1981; Roy, 1983; Eaton, 1993; Khan, 2013) and Assam (Dev & Lahiri, 1985; Kar, 1997; Ahmed, 2005), it seems that they are mostly of a historical nature and do not document the current lives of Muslims living in the region. These studies merely focus on how Muslims in the region appeared during the era of the Bengal sultans, the eras of the mighty Mughal Empire and the Ahom Kingdom, and the British colonial rule in Bengal and surrounding regions. In this quest for finding contemporary studies of Bengali-speaking Muslims, one is guided to studies on the Bengali-speaking Muslim identity of Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2004; Uddin, 2006; Muhith, 2008). However, the main problem with these studies on Bangladesh is that they ignore the significant presence of a Bengali-speaking Muslim population currently living on the other side of the border in India.

### ***3.2.4 Studies of Bengali-speaking Muslims in India***

The studies of Bengali-speaking Muslims in India are inherently linked to the phenomenon of undocumented migration from Bangladesh. The first group of these studies concerns Indian foreign policy vis-à-vis Bangladesh (Destrandri, 2012; Datta,

2015), pointing out how the issue of undocumented migration is a source of contention between the two countries as Bangladesh denies the existence of its citizens migrating to India. A second group of studies links the problem of undocumented migration from Bangladesh to India with the overall militancy in the north-east Indian region (Baruah, 1999; Bhaumik, 2009; Lacina, 2017), where certain organizations which had formed to tackle the issue of undocumented migration became violent overtime due to disillusionment with the Indian central government's inability to deal with this problem. The third group of these studies looks at the existence of such forms of migration happening because of natural ties of kinship existing between Bengali-speaking populations living in the India-Bangladesh borderlands (Van Schendel, 2005; Afsar, 2008; Damodaran, 2017). The fourth group of studies focuses on how this form of migration happens because of the existence of a porous border between Bangladesh and India and the incentives of certain political parties to garner votes (Hazarika, 2000; Saikia, 2006). Some of these studies are purely focused on the anti-foreigner agitation in Assam which had culminated in the massacre of Bengali-speaking Muslims at Nellie in 1983 (Kimura, 2013; Weiner, 2015). The fifth group of studies pertaining to the undocumented migration of Bangladeshis to India looks at how political actors in the region visualize this issue of undocumented migration and utilize this subject for attaining tangible political goals (Gillan, 2002; Shamshad, 2017; Sethi & Shubhrastha, 2017). However, the glaring gap with all these studies focusing on the current day Bengali-speaking Muslims population in India being linked to undocumented migration from Bangladesh is that it entirely overlooks the current socio-economic condition and daily life of the region's Muslim population. At this point, there should be a special mention of Rahaman (2015) and the SNAP Report (2016), the first of which documented the bad socio-economic status of Muslims of present-day Tripura and the latter looks at the dire socio-economic situation of Muslims in West Bengal. However, the question remains as to what factors have led to the current situation of Bengali-speaking Muslims in these Indian states.

### ***3.2.5 The Contribution***

After reviewing the literature of Islam in South Asia, I believe that my study which looks at Bengali-speaking Muslims will be a useful addition to the region-specific

literature on Muslim communities living in specific states of contemporary India. The study describes the lives of Bengali-speaking Muslims in India, going beyond the historical accounts of events leading to the partition of 1947, the fractured nature of Hindu-Muslim relations in the civil society of contemporary India, the narratives relating to the formation of the national identity of Bangladesh, and studies relating to the undocumented migration of Bengali-speaking Muslims from Bangladesh to India. By analysing primary data collected through field surveys on the general population and in-depth interviews of political actors about their viewpoints concerning the Muslim population, this research contributes to the literature of Islam in South Asia by examining the decisive variables concerning an individual's personal characteristics and location-specific factors which lead to the creation of social capital among the Bengali-speaking Muslims, which in turn determine their condition in the present context. These specific factors are explained in sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the thesis.

### **3.3 Conclusion**

This chapter sketches out the existing literature pertaining to social capital theory and Islam in South Asia. There appears to be no study till date which considers the formation of social capital of an ethnic minority community living in South Asia based on the individual-level network theory analysis of social capital. I am empirically contributing to the individual-level network theory of social capital via considering both cognitive and structural dimensions of bonding and bridging social capital, in order to study an ethnic minority community in South Asia. In doing so, I am also contributing to the literature about Islam in South Asia. Writings on the Partition of India in 1947 dominate the literature of Islam in South Asia, while writings which relate to post-partition contexts are primarily North-India centric studies. Furthermore, writings on Bengali-speaking Muslims primarily pertain to identity studies of Bangladesh or undocumented migration from Bangladesh to India. This research fills the gap in the literature of Islam in South Asia by explicitly focusing on factors which affect the lives of Bengali-speaking Muslim populations in three border states of India.

The following chapter will develop a theoretical framework for examining how specific personal characteristics of an individual and some location-specific

factors effect the social capital formation among Bengali-speaking Muslim populations living in three border states of India. The theoretical framework will be developed from the network theory of social capital built by Lin (1999; 2001) consisting of structural and cognitive dimensions which have been adopted by Lancee (2010; 2012) for explaining labour market outcomes in the Netherlands and Germany. In the following chapter, I will also suggest what kind of individuals should be expected to possess the highest amounts of bonding and bridging forms of social capital.

## 4

### Theory

This chapter develops a theory for examining how social capital is formed in the context of three border states of India which have habitations of Bengali-speaking Muslims. The theory for this research is developed from the network theory of social capital outlined by Lin (1999; 2001) and adapted by Lancee (2010; 2012). The network theory of social capital believes that social capital consists of intangible resources embedded in ties existing in an individual's social networks at a given point in time (Lin, 1999; Lin, 2001).

For the purpose of this research, two forms of social capital, bonding and bridging, have been considered. I posit that "network closure" of a given linguistic and/or religious network leads to bonding social capital. Factors which induce causal mechanisms leading to "network closure" are rooted in the notion of fear, based on the idea of kinship derived from being part of a "joint family" structure, or having affinity with co-ethnics based on kinship ties. I also posit that mechanisms of filling "structural holes" for transmitting the flow of information across linguistic and/or religious group networks lead to the formation of bridging social capital. Factors which induce causal mechanisms leading to filling "structural holes" are mainly related to the prospects of prolonged interaction with another person.

Section 4.1 will describe the aspects of Lancee's (2010; 2012) works from which a theoretical framework has been built for this research. It will try to point out in abstract terms what processes occur within and between networks which lead to the formation of the two types of social capital, which are the dependent variables of this research. Section 4.2 will discuss the origins of the cultural context present in the three states which lead to specific sets of independent factors interacting within and between networks, thereby leading to the formation of bonding and bridging types of social capital. Section 4.3 will explain how bonding social capital is formed from a set of independent factors composed of an individual's personal characteristics and certain location-specific factors. Section 4.4 will describe how bridging social capital is created from another set of independent factors consisting of an individual's personal characteristics and certain location-specific factors. Section 4.5 will bring together the theoretical mechanisms which are happening for

the creation of bonding and bridging types of social capital in the three Indian states, and answer my research question. It will also state what kind of individuals should be expected to possess the highest amount of each type of social capital.

#### **4.1 What is actually Social Capital and what leads to the formation of Social Capital?**

This section explains in abstract terms what is actually social capital as far as this study is concerned and what leads to its formation. By the end of this section, it should be clear what in practical terms entails to be classified as components of bonding and bridging types of social capital for the purpose of this research. From the onset, I would like to state that although the goal of Lancee (2010; 2012) was to develop a model for explaining returns in the labour markets among non-western immigrant groups in the Netherlands and Germany, his model can be adjusted for examining the formation of social capital among Bengali-speaking Muslims because even though the Bengali-speaking Muslims are largely not migrants, they are similar to the non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands in two main ways. Firstly, they both are minorities in their respective locations. Secondly, as Lancee (2010; 2012) points out, immigrant groups are vulnerable as compared to the native population and so need sincere network support. In the case of the three border states, Bengali-speaking Muslims, are largely not migrants but in many cases are labelled as undocumented migrants (Reuters, 2015; Deka, 2016), thereby making them quite vulnerable in comparison to the majority population.

Lancee (2010; 2012) built the theoretical framework of his study on the concept of social capital as described by the network theory of social capital attributed to Lin (1999, 2001) and Burt (2001). Lancee (2010; 2012) also adopts some aspects of Van Der Gaag & Snijders' (2004) theoretical conception of social capital. In the following paragraphs, I shall explain how Lancee (2010; 2012) builds his concept of social capital by taking specific parameters from the works of other authors. After that, I shall state my theory of social capital as far as this research is concerned.

Lin (1999; 2001) describes social capital as intangible resources embedded in one's social networks at a given point in time which can be accessed or mobilized through ties which are pre-existing in those networks. According to Lin, these

embedded intangible resources can only be accessed and used by an individual for the purpose of gaining returns in instrumental actions or preserving gains in expressive actions. Lin (1999, 2001) describes these embedded resources as indicated by the wealth, status, and power of social ties. He explains that the greater the accessibility to these embedded resources, the more they can be mobilized.

Lin (1999; 2001) points out that the determination of accessibility of an individual to these resources depends on two factors which are “structural holes” and “network closures.” “Structural holes” as explained by Burt (2001) are gaps in networks that provide opportunities to transmit the flow of information between individuals in different networks and thereby mobilize resources for the individual whose relationships span the holes. On the other hand, “network closures”<sup>1</sup> as explained by Lin (1999; 2001) lead to mobilization of embedded resources in a particular network as it determines the strength of ties or relationship in that network.

To understand the abstract concepts outlined in the previous paragraph, it is also useful to consider the work of Van Der Gaag & Snijders (2004), who discuss social network as a form of social resource or capital. They explain that the collection of these networks is actually a type of resource or stock of capital which may become available to the individual, as a result of the history of the relationships the individual has with the members of his network. Van Der Gaag & Snijders (2004) also state that the value of these networks can be measured by seeing individual goals through the social production function theory (SPF), which proceeds from the source of rational choice theory, with measurement of social capital always being concentrated on actions and outcomes.

As stated in Chapter 3 containing the literature review, Putnam (2000) had divided the types of social capital into two kinds: bonding social capital and bridging social capital. However, Lin (1999; 2001) does not clearly demarcate the division of social capital into bonding and bridging types of social capital. According to Lancee (2010; 2012), bonding and bridging types of social capital are dependent on the theory of network closures and structural holes, which has both structural and cognitive components. Lancee (2010, p. 204) describes the structural components as the “wires” in the network showing the connections, while the cognitive component

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<sup>1</sup> The concept of “network closure” was originally conceived by Coleman (1988), where he stated that in a network which has closure, the members of the network have ties with all members. However, unlike in this study, Coleman considered social capital as being collectively produced.

refers to the “nodes” in a network shown by attitudes and values exhibited in trust. Describing his model of what constitutes as structural components of bonding and bridging types of social capital, Lancee (2010; 2012) says that ties which connect “structural holes” lead to the creation of bridging social capital, while factors which increase the degree of “network closure” lead to the creation of bonding social capital. While describing the cognitive components, Lancee (2010; 2012) posits that ties are distinguished by the degree of trust. Whereas thin trust refers to loose ties with secondary contacts and bridging social capital, thick trust is associated with solidarity with primary contacts and bonding social capital.

Lancee (2010, p. 206) says that for an individual, the thick ties within a given network that connect people and increase the degree of “network closure” lead to the creation of bonding social capital. Such “closure” or the strength of such ties are explained through emotional intensity, time spent, intimacy, reciprocity and acknowledged obligations. These ties are highest in groups sharing a similar social identity, which according to Lancee (2010) are highly present in a closed network such as ties with co-ethnics. In a later work, Lancee (2012, p. 23-24) elaborates how individuals belonging to an ethnic group as having greater solidarity and more ties and/or trust with each other, classifying immigrants in Netherlands and Germany as belonging to such distinct “ethnic” social network.

On the other hand, Lancee (2010, p. 208) describes bridging social capital as a collection of thin ties that form an individual’s wider social networks. If the chance to transmit the flow of information is created as a result of filling “structural holes” or gaps in networks, this will lead to the creation of bridging social capital. According to Lancee (2010; 2012), these “bridges” between networks made as a result of filling structural holes by increasing diversity of contacts can be viewed through considering immigrants in the Netherlands or Germany building connections with the native population.

In this research, the social capital formation among Bengali-speaking Muslim minority populations can be seen through visualizing the network theory of social capital developed by Lin (1999; 2001), which was later adopted by Lancee (2010; 2012). The network theory of social capital which this study follows views the creation of each type of social capital as something which is not created by collective level interactions but through individual-level interactions, which dictate how structural holes are bridged and how network closures happen. Lancee (2010; 2012)

had used bonding and bridging social capital as independent variables having structural and cognitive components in his study for measuring labour market outcomes in the Netherlands and Germany. In doing so, Lancee investigated the effects of social capital and not its formation. In this study, I am examining the individual-level factors which actually lead to the mobilization of the structural and cognitive components of social capital, which in turn are responsible for creating social capital.

For the purpose of my study, structural components of social capital are essentially what is really being considered for determining bonding and bridging types of social capital. Since this study is interested in examining the formation of social capital, the cognitive components are not as essential as the structural components, because the “wires” need to exist for the “nodes” to actually do its work. Therefore, as far as this study is concerned, for an individual, the network of ties that fills structural holes or bridge beyond his/her linguistic and religious group is what constitutes as bridging social capital. While those ties that increase the degree of closure of one’s own core network, in this case, one’s linguistic or religious group, is what constitutes as bonding social capital. One more point to note is that “Bengali-speaking Muslims” are being classified as an ethnic group since their common language and religion should make them share “thick ties.” The next section will state how certain cultural context present in the region being studied, lead to network closure and filling of structural holes, thereby forming bonding and bridging types of social capital.

#### **4.2 Origins of the cultural context present in the three states**

This section will give an overview of how sets of independent factors are applicable for the formation of bonding and bridging types of social capital as per the cultural settings which are specific to the three Indian border states being studied. First, this section will talk about the general social-economic context in India which is interrelated to the cultural context which affects the creation of social capital in the three states. Second, it will talk specifically about the contextual cultural issues in the three states which are essential for this study. Finally, this section will cluster different independent factors to show the commonality of certain causal mechanisms

which are leading to the formation of bonding and bridging types of social capital in the three states being studied.

India is a regional economic power in South Asia, comprising of eighty percent of South Asia's economic output (World Bank, 2014a). This is a significant chunk of the region's economy, considering the fact that the region is composed of seven other countries including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (World Bank, 2014a). India is rapidly urbanizing with 31.14% of its population living in its urban centres according to the 2011 census, which is a rise from 27.82% as per the 2001 census (Srinivasan, 2017). Yet India is a developing country with high income inequality (Economist, 2018). Even though there is a sizeable middle-class, the income inequality is visible in the fact that top ten percent of Indians have incomes at least comparable to Central European standards, while the bottom fifty percent has incomes similar to African standards (Economist, 2018). Moreover, economic inequality between Indian states is noticeable when considering states such as Assam, Tripura and West Bengal having per capita income much below the national average (Ahmed & Ghani, 2008). Furthermore, India also ranks high in corruption with a rank of 81 among the most corrupt nations according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index of 2017 (Hindu, 2018). Corruption in India is driven by a range of issues including income inequality, where underprivileged individuals seek political patronage, thereby reaching out to political connections for getting access to jobs, public services and other economic benefits (Sadanandan, 2012; Quartz, 2014).

While issues such as income inequality and corruption are common across most states in India, there are other matters which are specific to the three states being studied. As described in Chapter 2 outlining the historical and political background of the states being investigated, there is a considerable degree of religious and linguistic fractionalization, which although can be traced back to pre-colonial times, were consolidated mainly during British rule of the region. It was also explained in Chapter 2 how the three Indian states being studied are located in the region of greater Bengal which was divided in 1947, and where until now co-ethnic identities span international borders with populations sharing ties of kinship (Van Schendel, 2005; Afsar, 2008). Kinship ties in the Bengal region can be traced to ancient kinship structures of rural Bengal, where the foundation of people's loyalties was based on being part of a village network which cuts across multiple

generations and one's extended family (Aziz, 1979). Moreover, the extended family arrangement in such a setting is rooted in a structure called the "joint family" where several generations of people live under the same roof and have established gender roles (Sinha, 1993, p. 30).

Having explained the cultural settings in the three Indian states being studied, it can be deduced that the set of independent factors which affects the wires leading to the closure of linguistic and/or religious network of an individual, are those that lead to the creation of bonding social capital. The following are the five factors that I have identified: one's religion, one's income, being involved in agricultural profession, living in a rural setting, and supporting cross-border movement. These factors induce causal mechanisms leading to solidarity based on the notion of fear, reciprocity based on the idea of kinship derived from being part of a joint family structure, or having affinity with co-ethnics based on kinship ties. These causal mechanisms will be explained in Section 4.3.

On the other hand, those sets of factors which fill gaps or structural holes across networks by providing an opportunity to transmit the flow of information across linguistic and/or religious group network, are those that lead to the creation of bridging social capital. The following are the ten factors that I have identified: one's language, age group, educational level, gender, involvement in non-agricultural professions, marital status, living in an urban setting, the perception of governance institutions, the perception of the socio-economic environment and the proximity to the ruling political establishment. These factors induce causal mechanisms leading to the growth of connections outside one's core linguistic and/or religious network. The main cluster of factors for the creation of bridging social capital has the identical causal mechanism which relates to the prospects of prolonged interaction with another person. Further clusters of factors relating to the causal mechanism for the creation of bridging social capital that I have identified are related to the presence of corruption and economic inequality in Indian society. These causal mechanisms will be explained in Section 4.4.

The following two sections will describe the set of factors which lead to the creation of bonding and bridging types of social capital. They have been further divided into two subsections based on factors concerning an individual's personal characteristics and factors specific to the local settings of the region being studied.

### **4.3 Independent Factors which create Bonding Social Capital**

This section will answer the first sub-question which was mentioned in 1.2 while stating the main research question of the thesis: What individual personal characteristics and location-specific factors determine bonding social capital formation, and through which mechanisms do they work? Bonding social capital is formed due to a set of independent factors that induce causal mechanisms which affect the wires leading to the closure of linguistic and/or religious network of an individual. These causal mechanisms include solidarity based on the notion of fear, reciprocity based on the idea of kinship derived from being part of a joint family structure, and having affinity with co-ethnics based on kinship ties. Since the set of factors are quite long, this section is divided into two parts, the first of which covers factors that are related to an individual's personal characteristics, followed by those factors that are location-specific.

#### ***4.3.1 Aspects of an individual's personal characteristics that create bonding social capital***

I posit that three aspects of an individual's personal characteristics affect the formation of his/her bonding social capital. These characteristics include religion, household income and being engaged in agricultural profession.

***H<sub>1</sub>: An individual who is Muslim (as opposed to an individual who is Hindu) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.***

This hypothesis is based on the notion of fear being generated as a result of minority-majority relations. There are two parts to deducing this hypothesis: First, Muslims as India's biggest minority exhibit a defence mechanism due to the perceived fear of the elimination of their rights. The roots of this fear can be traced to India's history of partition in 1947 which marked a rupture of Hindu-Muslim relations, with both communities becoming prejudiced against each other (Puri, 1993; Ashraf, 2017). The reason which is attributed mainly for causing the Partition of India was the inherent fear in the minority Muslim community as being politically, economically and culturally suppressed in a future Hindu majority India (Puri, 1993; Ashraf, 2017). This fear is visible among Muslims in today's India where they perceive the

markers of their religious identity inviting frowns and sometimes even violence (Ashraf, 2017). So being placed in a situation as religious minorities living in fear, Muslims look into their own group for reciprocal support, thereby forming greater bonding social capital.

An additional important reason for Muslims forming greater bonding social capital in comparison to Hindus is due to the presence of political actors as stakeholders concerning religious communities. The rise in Muslim population in India, especially in the three border states being studied, due to internal birth rate and undocumented migration from Bangladesh has led to certain Hindu nationalist organizations such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and political parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) claiming that there is a plan to change religious demography by Muslims (DeVotta, 2002; Deogharia, 2015). This type of claim has led to a backlash observed in the rise in apprehension among the Muslims (DeVotta, 2002), who as minorities already are fearful. Furthermore, it is reported that particularly in the Indian border states such as Assam and West Bengal, there is the presence of certain political parties and organizations that reach out to religious sentiments within the minority Muslim population in order to solidify their vote banks (Roy, 2017; Tripathi et al., 2018). Such political parties include the Indian National Congress (INC), Trinamool Congress (TMC) and All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) (Roy, 2017; Tripathi et al., 2018). These political parties often refer to the politics of Hindu nationalism which the RSS and BJP promote (Hussain, 2016; Roy, 2017), additionally invoking fear among the Muslim population living in those states, which in turn leads to the formation of greater bonding social capital within Muslims. The dynamics concerning how these political stakeholders affect religion will be described further in Chapter 7 describing the qualitative methods of this study.

***H<sub>2</sub>: The lower the household income of an individual, the greater the level of his/her bonding social capital.***

This hypothesis is deduced from the idea of the joint family structure of rural India and Bengal. Sinha (1993, p. 30) in studying Hindu households of traditional villages in Bengal, comments that the family structure is comprised of households consisting of not just the core family, but also an extended family with several generations living together. Khanam (2013) in her study of Muslim communities in India also

talks about the presence of joint family structures. The joint family structure which has its roots in rural areas has now grown in urban areas of India by 29% over the last decade due to economic migration (Varma, 2017). Here the patriarch takes on the economic responsibility for family members and is responsible for the financial support and general welfare of the family (Sinha, 1993). His financial responsibility is not limited to his wife and children but also includes supporting the education of brothers and bearing the expenses of the weddings of his sisters (Sinha, 1993). Since individuals belonging to joint family households have to share their income with a greater number of people, they should have less income per capita than those who are not from such households. This kind of obligation based on providing one's kin with financial support and looking towards the general wellbeing of one's kin lead to a kind of co-dependence ties which in turn leads to the formation of greater bonding social capital.

***H<sub>3</sub>: An individual who is employed in an agricultural profession (as opposed to an individual who is not employed in an agricultural profession) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.***

This hypothesis is also derived from the notion of the joint family structure originating from rural Bengal. As described above, joint families are guided by kinship relations. According to Hopkins (1898), the ownership of land in agricultural communities gives rise to the concept of joint families. Tracing the origins of the joint family back to ancient Hindu texts, Hopkins (1898, p. 677) posits that in village-communities land holding was equated with agriculture, where the division of the family would mean the division of the land and agricultural capabilities. Thus, in fertile regions of eastern parts of India where Bengal is situated, joint families became the norm (Hopkins, 1898). In later studies (Freed & Freed, 1969; Dasgupta et al., 1993) it was found how agricultural land ownership was equated with family size. Through the concept of the joint family, a norm is built in the village-community, where the greater number of household members is equated with more sacrifices for one's community (Hopkins, 1898). Therefore, such a norm of obligation promoted by the joint family system leads to the formation of higher bonding social capital.

#### ***4.3.2 Aspects of a person's location-specific factors that create bonding social capital***

I posit that two aspects of a person's location-specific factors affect the formation of a person's bonding social capital. These factors are aspects beyond one's profile that influences the formation of social capital. These characteristics include living in a rural location and supporting the cross-border movement of people and goods.

***H<sub>4</sub>: An individual who lives in a rural location (as opposed to an individual who lives in an urban location) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.***

This hypothesis is deduced from the conception of kinship ties present in rural Bengal. A good source of understanding such ties can be understood from the works of Aziz (1979) and Amin (1998). Although their studies are based in Bangladesh, kinship concepts in the neighbouring regions in India should be comparable such as in terms of the family structure of joint families which dictates generational interaction and gender roles. Ties of kinship in rural Bengal as the foundation of people's loyalties which cut across multiple generations have evolved over centuries, tracing beyond pre-Islamic times in South Asia (Aziz, 1979). In a rural community of Bengal, one does not just feel like a part of their own household but also a part of a broader group of network beyond one's household, to which they can count on for support (Aziz, 1979). Amin (1998) bases his study in Bangladeshi villages and finds that even when a son or brother moves out from his parental household to form a separate household, his immediate family continue to share many facilities based on formal or informal agreements. Therefore, individuals living in rural location have a kind of cohesion where affinity is created due to the existence of greater kinship relations promoting norms of reciprocity, which in turn leads to the formation of higher bonding social capital.

***H<sub>5</sub>: The greater an individual's support for the cross-border movement of people and goods, the greater the level of his/her bonding social capital.***

This hypothesis is deduced from the notion of having solidarity with co-ethnics who live on the other side of the international border. There are two types of cross-border movement considered in this hypothesis: one relates to goods, and the other relates to people. In both cases, support for the cross-border movement is leading to the

formation of bonding social capital as a result of a pattern of reciprocity and obligations based on co-ethnic kinship ties. Furthermore, one's support for cross-border movement contributing to the creation of social capital is also driven by the existence of political actors as stakeholders.

For understanding the dynamics relating to the cross-border movement of goods between India and Bangladesh, one comparable paradigm relates to Chinese networks and their activeness in trade in Southeast Asia. Rauch & Trindade (2002) investigated trade dataset from the 1980s and 1990s and found that in Southeast Asia, the smallest estimated average increase in bilateral trade in differentiated products attributable to ethnic Chinese networks is nearly sixty percent. They conclude that ethnic social networks have a substantial impact on international trade by helping to connect buyers and sellers, based on a kind of enforcement of community sanctions that deter opportunistic behaviour. Similarly, while investigating the occurrence of informal trade in Indian bordering regions, such ties of co-ethnic kinship are also visible. Taneja (2005) found that co-ethnic kinship ties facilitate information flow about goods and quantities to be traded, minimizing risks to traders by ensuring proper delivery of goods and reducing transaction costs of informal trading. Furthermore, Taneja (2005) points out that in the border regions of India, due to the ineptness of formal banking mechanisms there is a greater emphasis on co-ethnic trust networks which provide a mechanism of informal banking, ensuring nonphysical transfer of currency by a process which is locally known as *hundi*.

For understanding the dynamics relating to the cross-border movement of people, let us consider two aspects, the first relates to tourism and the second pertains to migration. The first aspect, tourism, can be viewed as the non-permanent movement of people from Bangladesh to India, which comprises of the largest share of tourist inflow to India, totalling 16% of all tourist arrivals (Kamal & Chatterjee, 2017). India, especially West Bengal, is seen as a convenient option by Bangladeshi tourists because of its similarity in culture, food, and language (Modi, 2015; Kamal & Chatterjee, 2017). Thus, this form of attachment which is a driver of tourism can be viewed as a form of cohesion beyond national bonds.

The second type of cross-border movement of people relates to the controversial issue of migration. In order to comprehend migration patterns effected by ethnic networks, one approach would be to consider the dynamics of migrant

networks present among the Chinese population. A similarity can be seen between the floating migrant segments of the Chinese population and the Bangladeshi migrants who enter India. The floating migrant population in the Chinese migration networks are those that are more likely to reach out to their networks compared to permanent migrants because they are in greater need of information related to housing and employment opportunities (Liang et al., 2017). Migrants to India from Bangladesh are predominantly a floating underclass which has entered the neighbouring country in pursuit of decent income and living conditions (Van Schendel, 2005, p. 200). Such migrants, who have entered without documentation across the border to India for better economic livelihood, are likely doing it because of the emotional support provided by kinship (Afsar, 2008; Shamshad, 2017).

Moreover, a vital reason for the support for the cross-border movement of both goods and services forming greater bonding social capital is because of the presence of political actors as stakeholders. In terms of trade, this is particularly visible in the illegal sphere where smugglers say that they routinely bribe the security agencies and political actors so that they do not hamper their businesses (Rahman, 2013). Also, the issue of undocumented migration is fostered by politicians for aiding their vote-bank as illegal migrants are given Indian identity cards by certain political actors in return for voting for certain political parties (Hazarika, 2000). Even though the Hindu nationalist parties such as BJP see this as a major issue concerning the change in religious demography, the existence of kinship which is utilized by certain political actors for their vote-bank defeats this anti-migrant agenda (Gillan, 2002; Shamshad, 2017). Finally, political actors also realize the reason of historical ties of language and culture as a pre-existing condition for the sustenance and the development of tourism between India and Bangladesh, and in some instances take steps to promote tourism such as by inaugurating new land ports in recent years (BD News, 2016). This kind of utilization of kinship ties by political actors for reasons of their vote-bank, financial motives and consideration of broader development goals are further supporting co-ethnic affinity, thereby generating greater bonding social capital. The dynamics concerning how these political stakeholders affect the cross-border movement of goods and people will be described further in Chapter 7 describing the qualitative methods of this study.

#### **4.4 Independent Factors which create Bridging Social Capital**

This section will answer the second sub-question which was mentioned in 1.2 while stating the main research question of the thesis: What individual personal characteristics and location-specific factors determine bridging social capital formation, and through which mechanisms do they work? These set of independent factors induce causal mechanisms which affect the growth of connections outside one's core linguistic and/or religious network. These causal mechanisms include prospects of prolonged interaction with another person, and the presence of corruption and economic inequality in Indian society. Similar to the previous section, this section too has been divided into two parts, the first of which covers factors that are related to a person's personal traits, followed by those factors that are location-specific.

##### ***4.4.1 Aspects of an individual's personal characteristics that create bridging social capital***

I posit that six aspects of a person's profile affect the formation of a person's bridging social capital. These characteristics include one's linguistic group, age group, gender, educational level, profession, and marital status.

***H<sub>6</sub>: An individual who is a native Bengali-speaker (as opposed to a native speaker of a different language) forms a lower level of bridging social capital.***

This hypothesis is centred on the notion of individuals not having a platform to network outside his/her core ethnic group. To understand the causal mechanism of this hypothesis, it must be understood that there is a very high diversity of languages in India (Friedrich, 1962), particularly in Eastern and North-Eastern India (Prakash, 2007). However, in Eastern and North-Eastern India, Bengali-speaking people form the biggest group of language speakers (Census of India, 2011). In West Bengal and Tripura, where they are the linguistic majority, they comprise of 80% and 69% of the state's population respectively, and in Assam, they form the second biggest linguistic group at 27% (Census of India, 2011). In states such as West Bengal and Tripura, Bengali-speakers get less opportunity to network with individuals who are non-native speakers as they are in the majority. While in a state such as Assam, where native Bengali speakers are the second biggest linguistic group, their relationship

with the majority Assamese speakers should be considered. In Assam, there lies intrinsic bitterness of the native Assamese majority towards Bengali speakers because the earliest assertion of linguistic consciousness by the native Assamese was a movement against the cultural supremacy of the Bengali administrators who had convinced the British colonial administration to impose the Bengali language on the majority Assamese population (Hazarika, 2000, p. 28). Thus for a native Bengali-speaker, being in a majority Bengali-speaking state lowers networking opportunities beyond one's core group; while in a state such as Assam where they are the biggest minority, historical conflict based on language bars them from forming contacts with the majority Assamese population. In both cases, lower bridging social capital is formed based on one's linguistic feature of being a native Bengali-speaker.

***H<sub>7</sub>: The higher the age group of an individual, the lower the level of his/her bridging social capital.***

The causal mechanism determining this hypothesis are time and physical restraints caused by spirituality and mobility, respectively. Zimmer et al. (2016) find that as the global population is getting older, more individuals tend to be involved in spiritual endeavours. Conducting a cross-country study, Saleem & Khan (2015) find that for a highly spiritual country such as India, as people age, they tend to be more engaged in spiritual pursuits, making them withdraw from worldly duties. Furthermore with age, globally it is noticed that individuals have health-related mobility issues and impairments which in turn limit access to different public spheres (Webber et al., 2010). Therefore, it can be deduced that due to the withdrawal of older individuals from worldly duties because of becoming more spiritual and losing mobility as one gets older, individuals of an older age group form lower bridging social capital as opposed to individuals who are of a younger age group.

***H<sub>8</sub>: An individual who is female (as opposed to an individual who is male) forms a lower level of bridging social capital.***

This hypothesis is built on the basis of women having different gender roles in families and facing more seclusion in Indian society, leading to fewer prospects of meeting out-group members. Through investigating data from a nationally representative survey of over forty thousand households conducted in 2004–2005,

Desai & Temsah (2014) find that across religious groups, females have less decision-making power in households and face segregation from society due to their gender identity. From the dynamics of joint families in Indian society, it is expected of females to accept a position in a family where they have less decision-making power (Davis, 1976; Sinha, 1993). While both males and females are to accept responsibilities for meeting the needs of other family members, the focus for the women should exclusively be to put ahead the needs of others before her own ones (Vir & Mahajan, 1996). Thus while norms of reciprocity and obligation exist for both men and women, women tend to face pressures of family life much more than men as they are expected to focus predominantly on their family and immediate kin (Vir & Mahajan, 1996). Chandra (2010) talks about how due to higher expectations from women in family life as compared to men, the former face work-family conflict much more than the latter when they join the workforce. Furthermore, seclusion from public spheres is experienced by women in Indian society such as restricting them from venturing outside the home unless accompanied by someone else due to physical security concerns and facing barriers while participating in the labour force (World Bank, 2014b). Thus, the differing gender roles and facing of seclusion by women make them form lower bridging social capital compared to men as they have limited opportunity for prolonged interaction with individuals outside of their core family and kin group.

***H<sub>9</sub>: The higher the educational qualification of an individual, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.***

This hypothesis is built on the notion that higher educational qualifications provide individuals a platform for having more number of years of interaction with other individuals via schooling. While analysing data collected from educational institutions in Sylhet region of Bangladesh for understanding the relationship of education and social capital, Chowdhury et al. (2012) found that individuals with more years of schooling have a more diverse network of people such as along the lines of religion and gender. Given that the study is based in Bangladesh, which is a neighbouring country of India, there should be similarities. Tokas (2016) in trying to explain the relationship of education and social capital comments that being in educational institutions in India would lead to interaction with different kinds of people not just in the classroom but also through the engagement in extracurricular

activities such as sports including cricket, which help individuals to interact with different types of people. Thus, educational qualifications reflect a person's years of exposure in networking with people beyond one's background, which translates to the generation of higher bridging social capital.

***H<sub>10</sub>: An individual who is employed in a non-agricultural profession (as opposed to an individual who is employed in an agricultural profession) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.***

This hypothesis has been conceived from the notion of higher human capital, which is a term used to refer to the intangible intellectual assets of individuals that can be used to create economic value (OECD, 2007). Human capital is based on the idea of acquiring intellectual skills to get ahead to fulfilling one's individual goals (OECD, 2007). Basing their study in the UK, Lee & Tuselmann (2013) posit that as professionals and higher technical entrepreneurs aspire to get ahead in professional life by increasing their knowledge and skill sets, they try to gain access to resources and information via knowledge sharing. This assumption should also be applicable in a developing country such as India which has a sizeable middle-class employed in white-collar jobs, particularly in its urban centres (Kapur & Vaishnav, 2014). This interaction through networking with talented people for acquiring information leads to a situation of reaching out to individuals beyond one's core group, which in turn leads to a natural increase in one's contact network and more bridging social capital.

***H<sub>11</sub>: An individual who is married to a person of the same linguistic and religious group (as opposed to an individual who is unmarried) forms a lower level of bridging social capital. However, an individual who is married to someone of a different linguistic or religious group (as opposed to an individual who is unmarried) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.***

This hypothesis is built on the idea of types of marriages opening up greater networks. By analysing longitudinal data from the 2001 to 2009 conducted in the United States, Einolf & Philbrick (2014) find that individuals who are unmarried have more time for socialization because marriage involves a significant investment of time and energy towards one's spouse, leaving less time for engaging in other forms of relationships including volunteer work. In Indian society, most marriages are arranged since continued loyalty of the individual to the family and kin group is the basis of cohesive function as a mechanism for fulfilling the emotional needs of

its members (Gupta, 1976). From the very beginning, families are highly involved in the process of choosing a partner and in certain times determining life after marriage (Gupta, 1976; Dholakia, 2015). Marriage partners are selected by family and close kin keeping in mind practical consideration of not only the couple but also of the immediate and extended family (Gupta, 1976; Dholakia, 2015). Such involvement of individuals with his/her own kin group in post-marriage situations leaves people lesser amount of time to interact with people outside his/her own core group of family and kin once he/ she is married.

Moving on to the second part of the hypothesis for intermarriage, it is worthwhile to consider studies of migrant population where such patterns of marriage can be noticed. Lancee (2010) posits that migrants in the Netherlands when they intermarry with native Dutch individuals open up greater sources of contacts outside one's core group, such as by forming a more extensive friend and relative network. In the case of India, it is useful to keep in mind that arranged marriages are mainly the norm since pre-marital love is viewed as disrupting family traditions by upsetting the firmly established close ties in the family and a loss of allegiance towards one's family and kin group (Gupta, 1976). In such a societal setting, intermarriages are seen as even more disruptive to the natural order of things. Thorat & Coffey (2016) finds that it is essential to make a distinction between different kinds of inter-marriages. They interviewed individuals across socio-economic backgrounds in India and found that people are opposed to both inter-caste and inter-religious marriages, with the latter one being of more concern to parents and elders in society. For the purpose of this thesis, inter-linguistic marriages can be classified as inter-caste marriages, since the concept of the caste system is derived from ancient Indian societal divisions where belonging to another linguistic community automatically demarcates a person as belonging to another caste, albeit not of a different religion (Brass, 2005, p. 3). It is useful to note that couples in inter-linguistic or inter-religious relationships sometimes elope to escape the wrath of their own communities such as being targeted for honour killings (Singh, 2017). Thus, an individual who is married to someone of a different linguistic or religious group has a greater scope of interaction with non-group members, creating greater bridging social capital.

#### ***4.4.2 Aspects of an individual's location-specific factors that create bridging social capital***

I posit that four aspects of a person's location-specific factors, beyond an individual's personal characteristics, affect the formation of a person's bridging social capital. These characteristics include living in an urban location, an individual's perception of the governance institutions, an individual's perception of the socio-economic environment, and an individual's proximity to the ruling political establishment.

***H<sub>12</sub>: An individual who lives in an urban location (as opposed an individual who lives in a rural location) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.***

This hypothesis is based on two underlying factors present in urban settings which are namely proximity with other people and availability of time. Hook & Lee (2017) consider data from the United States and posit that diversity has increased by ninety-eight percent in all metropolitan areas, showing that urban areas are in general getting more diverse. Considering the diversity of a country like India and the density of population in urban areas of the nation as compared to rural ones (Shekhar & Padmaja, 2013), it can be deduced that proximity dictates people's economic interaction as one needs to buy food from the local market regardless of who the seller might be. Moreover, due to the presence of better modes of public transport and availability of electricity and power in urban centres of India as opposed to in rural parts of the country (Nath, 2007), people should have more time to interact with different groups of people even if they live in different parts of town. This increase in contact with non-group members due to proximity and availability of time leads to the formation of higher bridging social capital in urban settings as opposed to rural ones.

***H<sub>13</sub>: The better an individual's perception of his/her governance institutions, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.***

This hypothesis is built on the logic of having institutions of governance which are trustworthy determining the context of one's social interactions. Kuezi (2008) analysed survey datasets of Nigeria and Ghana and concluded that interpersonal trust depends on trust in one's political institutions as impartial and effective institutions act as a deterrent to engage in dishonest behaviour. The likelihood of wrong actions

being punished would make individuals more likely to follow the rules if they believe that other people are also willing to do so (Kuenzi, 2008). If the local context seems to support fair behaviour, people are more likely to feel comfortable engaging with their fellow citizens, especially those with whom they lack close ties (Kuenzi, 2008). This study applies to linguistically and religiously diverse areas of the three Indian states being studied, as Ghana and Nigeria share many similarities with this region including being developing countries, having similar colonial history and containing ethnic fractionalization. Thus, the greater an individual's perception of his/her local political institutions being impartial and effective, the greater would be his confidence in fellow citizens. This in turn would be reflected in his/her wider network of people spanning beyond his/her background, which sequentially would translate to a higher generation of bridging social capital.

***H<sub>14</sub>*: The better an individual's perception of his/her socio-economic environment, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

This hypothesis is based on the idea of economic inequality where respondents see their current economic situation in comparative terms. Hofmeyr & Govender (2016) investigate a sample of over two thousand respondents from South Africa for studying economic inequality and find that any attempt at national reconciliation will remain futile as long as those who were disadvantaged under apartheid remain poor. The legacy of the South African apartheid system has left a deeply unequal society in which extreme poverty and affluence co-exist in close proximity (Hofmeyr & Govender, 2016). Although South Africa's apartheid experience is unique, the high-income inequality between its racial groups is comparable to the Indian case of income inequality between religious groups, because both exist due to historical reasons. The income inequality in India between Hindus and Muslims can be traced back to the days of Partition of British India where a big segment of prosperous Muslims left for Pakistan (Rahaman, 2015; Sengupta, 2017). Furthermore, British colonial policies in Bengal had promoted the education and economic prosperity of Hindus at the expense of Muslims by creating dissension among groups as per their policy of "divide and rule" (Chatterji, 2007; Islam, 2017). This situation of income inequality between different groups of people translates to a perception of being disadvantaged, which in turn excludes an individual from connecting to a wider network of people beyond one's core group.

***H<sub>15</sub>*: The greater an individual's proximity to his/her political establishment, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

This hypothesis is based on the idea of clientelistic exchanges leading to greater inter-group trust. In sub-Saharan Africa, where state penetration of society is extraordinarily weak, societal orientations toward the state are primarily extractive, and strong expectations exist that office-holders will redistribute public resources to what they consider their own ethnic communities (Joseph, 1987; Bayart, 1993). However, considering public opinion data from urban Nigeria, LeBas (2017) finds that due to the inherent diversity in cities where cross-ethnic contacts are increasing, one's social position affects attitudes positively toward elected officials or the power establishment. This is because, in such settings where cross-ethnic contacts are growing, state-citizen linkages are still built on clientelistic exchanges, but one's own ethnic group is not prioritized as social ties happen across ethnic lines considering other profile markers such as class (LeBas, 2017). For the purpose of this hypothesis, the cases of Nigeria and India are comparable because both societies have ethnic fragmentation based on kinship networks, are located in developing countries, and have sizeable populations living in urban settings. Moreover, both countries have noticeable levels of corruption with 54% of Indians reporting in a Transparency International Survey of having paid a bribe in the last year, compared to 44% of Nigerians (Economist, 2014). Thus, for an individual in this study, his/her proximity to the power establishment means a kind of indirect access to clientelistic exchanges, which in turn leads to a greater number of ties outside of his/her core network, which in turn translates to the higher formation of bridging social capital.

**4.5 Conclusion: Theory for the Formation of Social Capital in Three Indian Border States**

This chapter has developed the theoretical framework for explaining how the formation of bonding and bridging types of social capital occurs among the Bengali-speaking Muslim populations living in three border states of India. Sets of factors from an individual's personal characteristic and location-specific features were considered with the intention of gauging the possibilities of social capital formation among them. This section will recap the theoretical mechanisms which are happening for the creation of the two types of social capital and will answer the main

research question: How is social capital formed among Bengali-speaking Muslims in Indian border states? This section will also declare what kinds of individuals should be expected to possess the highest amount of each type of social capital as per the theory developed in this chapter.

The “network closure” which increases the depth of ties in a given linguistic and/or religious network leads to bonding social capital, while the mechanisms of filling “structural holes” across networks by transmitting the flow of information across linguistic and/or religious group network via creating “bridges” lead to the formation of bridging social capital. For explaining the mechanics leading to the formation of bonding and bridging types of social capital, certain individual-level personal characteristics and location-specific factors have been considered in this chapter by keeping in mind the cultural, historical, socio-economic, and political settings in the three Indian border states as described in Chapter 2 and Section 4.2. I explained in this chapter how “network closure” happens due to five factors which induce causal mechanisms guided by the notion of fear, based on the idea of kinship derived from being part of a joint family structure, or having affinity with co-ethnics based on kinship ties. I also explained how the mechanisms of filling “structural holes” for transmitting the flow of information happens due to ten factors which induce causal mechanisms related mainly to the prospects of prolonged interaction with another person, but also the presence of corruption and inequality in the society in which one lives.

According to the theory developed in this chapter, those individuals who are Muslims, are part of a household with low income per capita, are involved in agricultural profession, live in a rural setting, and support the cross-border movement of people and goods, form the most bonding social capital. While those individuals who are not native speakers of the Bengali language, are of a younger age group, male, have a higher educational level, are involved in non-agricultural professions, have a spouse of a different linguistic and religious background, live in an urban setting, have a better perception of governance institutions, have a better perception of the socio-economic environment, is closer to the ruling political establishment, form the most bridging social capital.

The next chapter will outline the method of collecting individual-level survey data that I followed in order for testing the theoretical framework developed in this

chapter. It will also describe how this data will be analysed quantitatively by building and running multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models.

## Quantitative Methods

This chapter describes the quantitative component of the mixed methods study design, which is the core component of this research. This research follows a concurrent (parallel) mixed method study design, as both the quantitative and qualitative data have been collected concurrently. This quantitative analysis provides the “theoretical drive” for the research meaning that the theory was built to be tested through this quantitative component (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 112).

This study can be classified as a QUAN + qual study as a deductive-simultaneous design has been built, where the core component is quantitative, and the supplemental component is qualitative (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 119). Quantitative data has been collected by administering close-ended surveys. Data collected from the surveys have been coded to build multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models in order to assess the fifteen hypotheses in the theoretical framework relating to the individual-level characteristics of people and certain location-specific factors of the populations affecting the creation of social capital.

Starting off with a quantitative method helped in this particular study for the following reasons: Firstly, the data could be directly collected from several individuals thereby helping to learn about specific correlational patterns concerning the characteristic of the survey population. Secondly, the regression models could be run using control variables, thus controlling for alternative explanations, which strengthens the descriptive findings. Finally, a clear documentation is present due to the use of a survey instrument, allowing future researchers to replicate the approach and compare findings.

The chapter is divided into the following sections: The first section explains the process of collecting quantitative data by administering close-ended surveys. This includes the development of the questionnaire during the pre-test phase, choice of the actual fieldwork sites, the sampling framework, the training of the enumerators, and the population characteristic in comparison to the Indian national census. The second section describes my measurement units, including the creation of the indices of the dependent variables, the coding of the explanatory and control

variables, and the regression model specifications. In the third section, I state how I carried out the actual analysis, including presenting the equations of the OLS regression models that I will build and how I will calculate the size of the effect of the independent variable in the regression models in Chapter 6.

## **5.1 The Data Collection**

The collection of primary data is a central component of this research. The primary data for my quantitative analysis has been gathered by administering cross-sectional surveys in the three Border States. Although there are ethnographic studies on this region such as on Bengal's village life and family structure (Aziz, 1979, Sinha, 1993), historical writings on the Partition of 1947 (Chatterji, 2007, Islam, 2017), and on change in ethnic demography due to migration (Hazarika, 2000, Afsar, 2008), these studies do not provide the kind of individual-level data which are required for gauging the formation of social capital as per the network theory of social capital outlined by Lin (1999; 2001) and Lancee (2010; 2012). For building the OLS regression models to understand an individual's level of social capital, it was essential to collect individual-level data on personal characteristics, location-specific factors, the degree of affinity towards one's group, and connections beyond one's core group, via conducting cross-sectional surveys. By collecting original data through surveys, a gap in such lack of individual-level data from this region concerning the determinants of social capital formation is being fulfilled.

This section will focus on how I conducted my fieldwork for collecting the primary quantitative data for this research. This phase was carried out from October 2015 to February 2016, which included making contacts, pre-testing the survey questionnaire, delineating the exact areas to carry out the fieldwork, fixing travel dates within India, deciding on the sampling framework, training the enumerators in the field, and finally conducting the actual surveys. The steps are described below in the sub-sections of this section.

### ***5.1.1 Pre-Test of the Survey***

Before I started off administering the actual survey, I conducted a pre-test of my questionnaire during the second and third weeks of October 2015. In order for individuals to comprehend the real meaning of the questions, Assamese and Bengali

were used, as these are the official language of the states. The questionnaire had to be translated as the original questionnaire was in English. I translated the English questionnaire to the Bengali version myself. Since I am not fluent in Assamese, I took assistance from a professional translator for preparing the Assamese version of the questionnaire


Individuals in the three states were chosen because the purpose of this pre-test was to conduct it on individuals whose characteristics would be most similar to the respondents in the final survey and use their responses as feedback for creating the final version of the survey instrument. The total number of pre-test respondents was 40, among which 20 were from West Bengal, 10 were from Assam, and 10 were from Tripura. Besides me, four enumerators conducted the survey and were trained by me over Skype. All enumerators wrote down their observations regarding the local factors that the questionnaire had not taken into account and noted the questions that the pre-test respondents found hard to comprehend or got uncomfortable while answering.

After conducting the pre-test, I entered the data from the paper forms manually into MS Excel, for understanding where I needed to make changes and redesigned the final questionnaire. Changed questions included those that made individuals uncomfortable, and were too direct or vague. In addition, the Likert scale questions that showed limited variation in answers after generating histograms and exhibited clustering tendencies had their categories split into a broader range. Additional questions on religious and linguistic affiliation were added, and the open-ended responses were made closed-ended for ease in coding.

All changes were made in the English version, which were translated to Bengali for use in West Bengal and Tripura, and also to Assamese for use in Assam. As with the pre-tested version of the questionnaire, since I am not fluent in Assamese, a professional translator was hired for preparing the actual survey questionnaire as well. The original English version, as well as the Bengali and Assamese versions of the questionnaire instrument, can be found in Appendix 1. Appendix 1 also includes the consent form in all three languages.

### 5.1.2 Actual Fieldwork Sites

Fig. 5.1: Areas where the survey was conducted



Note: Map created using shapefile data downloaded from <https://gadm.org> and <http://www.mapcruzin.com/>

The survey locations as shown in Fig. 5.1 were selected keeping in mind the concentrations of Bengali-speaking Muslims. For each state, these were the capital city and the district/ sub-district with the biggest percentage of Bengali-speaking Muslims. Urban-rural differentiation was also kept in mind when choosing to survey in the capital city and district/ sub-district of a state. The starting points of the survey in the district/ sub-district with the biggest percentage of Bengali-speaking Muslims were rural areas, which in many cases spanned out to cities. Also in Assam, as the state is largely rural and Bengali-speaking Muslims are mostly a floating population, even when I started with individuals from cities, their main points of residences turned out to be rural areas.

The survey was administered in the three Indian states between November 2015 and January 2016. These fieldwork sites were chosen by locating areas with high concentrations of Bengali-speaking Muslims as per the 2001 census. As can be seen in Fig. 5.1, the survey areas comprise of the three capital cities (and their surroundings) and an overwhelmingly Muslim majority district (sub-division in the case of Tripura) bordering Bangladesh in each of the three states. The state capitals are the following: Agartala in Tripura, Guwahati/ Dispur in Assam, and Kolkata in West Bengal. The Muslim-majority sub-division/ districts are the following: Sonamura in Tripura, Dhubri in Assam, and Murshidabad in West Bengal.

The approximate distances from the capital cities to the other sub-division/ districts are the following: 55 km between Agartala to Sonamura, 270 km between Guwahati/ Dispur to Dhubri, and 220 km between Kolkata to Murshidabad. Fieldwork in Tripura was done in November 2015, in Assam it was done in December 2015, and in West Bengal it was carried out in January 2016. Two things to note about the locations: Although the state capital of Assam is officially Dispur, which is a part of the city of Guwahati, for the purpose of this research both Guwahati/ Dispur are considered as the capital city, due to ease in locating initial contacts who were Bengali-speaking Muslims. Secondly, although North 24 Parganas is a separate district in West Bengal, many of the suburbs of Kolkata are located there and as such a lot of people in my contact list generated through the purposive snowball approach were from this district.

### ***5.1.3 Sampling Framework***

Respondents were selected via snowball sampling since the application of a proper random or stratified sampling framework was not possible. There are several reasons for collecting survey data by following a purposive snowball sampling framework. The study follows a deductive theory testing model, and so the analysis is descriptive and correlational. Since the study is interested in looking for reasons as to how social capital formation occurs through the analysis of individual-level factors by building on the social network theory of social capital, it warrants that I follow a snowball sampling technique which is rooted in the use of an individual's social network for the collection of data (Cohen & Arieli, 2011). The method for choosing the snowball sampling in this research was a good mechanism to get direct access to the population being studied (i.e., Bengali-speaking Muslims) and their in-group and out-group networks. This purposive snowball sampling would provide “analytical generalisability” (Yin, 2010, p. 21) as it becomes possible to evaluate findings in relation to the theory of social capital developed for this research. Secondly, since the region being studied has a history of conflict, intergroup relations can be unstable due to an intrinsic lack of societal trust which makes the prospect of conducting research a daunting one (Cohen & Arieli, 2011). Here the snowball sampling technique provides a good mechanism to access the networks of hard to reach populations (Valdez & Kaplan, 1999), such as those of Bengali-speaking Muslims in the three states. Finally, due to financial and time constraints, a snowball sampling framework provided a good alternate way to find access to networks of my intended survey population.

I spent 3 weeks in each state and the target was to get at least a hundred individuals per state in order to run multivariate state-level regressions. Before arriving at the fieldwork sites, I made contacts with three individuals who were Bengali-speaking Muslims, through my connections in Bangladesh. These 3 individuals became my primary contacts. Then all 3 individuals were interviewed and asked to share their cell phone contact lists with me. From the phone lists provided by my 3 primary contact lists, I randomly selected 5 names using MS Excel, i.e., a total of 15, as my secondary contacts. I called these 15 secondary contacts and asked if they would like to participate in the survey and provide similar contact lists from their phone list as my primary contacts. Then enumerators were sent to them to conduct the interviews and bring back the contact lists so that I could

select my tertiary contacts. Among those who did provide a tertiary contact list, again 5 names were selected randomly from the secondary contacts (i.e., 15 individuals if all agreed) and called to ask if they wanted to be interviewed (in the best scenario, the tertiary contacts would be 75). Then enumerators were sent to them. This method generated 186 names per state (i.e. 3 primary +15 secondary +75 tertiary= 93 total in each site X 2 sites per state). In total, I was able to collect 355 surveys, of which 104 were from Assam (i.e., 56% response rate), 110 from Tripura (i.e., 59% response rate) and 141 from West Bengal (i.e., 76% response rate). The low response rate in Assam is due to the widespread fear of harassment by state authorities, which is particularly evident in areas inhabited by Bengali-speaking Muslims (Khalid, 2018). The low response rate in Tripura is probably due to the authoritarian nature of the communist regime (Taneja, 2018), where respondents perhaps felt some restrictions on speaking unreservedly.

Although there are obvious limitations in a snowball sampling framework as there is selection bias due to the researcher's dependence on the referrals of the respondents, in first getting access and second to make the respondents participate (Cohen & Arieli, 2011, p. 428). The use of parallel snowball networks by finding three initial respondents in each location and then asking for their phone lists from which 5 names were selected randomly decreased the possibility of respondents knowing each other too well. Given the population density in the region, the primary and secondary respondents had at least a hundred contacts in their cell phone list in most cases. Thus the limitation concerning most respondents knowing each other too well has been reduced due to two reasons: Firstly, the names of secondary and tertiary respondents would already be picked at random, and so the individual whom I got the contact from would not exactly know who I am interviewing. Secondly, even if the individual who I got the contact from realized who I am interviewing, he or she would not in most cases know them too well and there would not be a high possibility of respondents sharing questions in advance which might affect the responses of future respondents.

The low response rate should be expected given the sensitivity of the topic pertaining to issues surrounding the minority Muslim population in India. According to Cohen & Cohen (1983) and Tabachnick & Fidell (1996), there should be at least 40 observations to run a stable regression model in order for it to provide a good

estimate of the effect of an explanatory variable on a dependent one. Except in two cases, all the OLS regression models that I created had at least 70 observations.

#### ***5.1.4 The Enumerators***

Although I conducted several interviews myself, the majority were carried out by enumerators who I had employed. In every site, I employed local people as enumerators, whose ages ranged between 20 and 30 years. This was so that respondents felt at ease while being interviewed by individuals belonging to their own community, and when needed local dialects could be used for explaining the questions. I conducted enumerator training sessions on the first day at each site. During the enumerator training session, each enumerator was provided with a mini-guide, was told to listen to a mock interview and asked to fill in a questionnaire for practice, had every question explained to them, was instructed on approaches towards making respondents feel comfortable and give consent during interviews, and had the modes of payment explained. Documents used during the training process of the enumerators can be found in Appendix 2. These documents include the introductory message to the enumerator team, the training schedule, the mini-guide, and the agreement page.

In the following days, the enumerators were sent to the list of addresses to meet the respondents, which in most cases were at the latter's homes or workplaces. Additionally, some respondents chose to be interviewed over the phone. In order to monitor the enumerators and ensure the quality of data, enumerator team meetings happened each night, during which completed survey forms were handed back to me for checking. During this meeting, I also made phone calls to confirm with respondents whether the specific enumerator had actually interviewed them over the course of the day. Additionally, during these meetings, problems that were faced in the field were discussed, including cases in which respondents were absent, and the possibilities of rescheduling missed interviews.

#### ***5.1.5 Population Characteristics***

The snowball sampling framework which I employed led to observations with characteristics that were different from the actual demography in each state. I have calculated the percentages of certain characteristics of the population as stated in the Indian national census (if available), taking into account the districts where I actually

conducted my survey. Tables 5.1(a), 5.1(b), 5.1(c) and 5.1(d) below show this demographic breakdown of the survey populations in comparison to the Indian national census. It also shows the p-value and states if the sample proportion is representative of the census proportion. In very few cases, such as those factors relating to urban and rural locations, my samples match the census breakdown. However, for most demographic factors my samples do not match the census breakdown. Since I am only searching for descriptive and correlational interpretations, the survey samples not matching the actual demographic breakdown do not really matter. The aim of comparing proportions of demographic characteristics via application of a proportional t-test is for seeing if the averages are significantly different or not, in order to estimate to what extent my results from the findings of the OLS regression output in Chapter 6 for particular explanatory variables can be generalised. Detailed tables pertaining to the demographic factors from the Indian census showing the district wise breakdown and the total population can be found in Appendix 3. As much as possible, I have tried to use the figures from the 2011 census, but when it was unavailable, I compared them to the 2001 census.

**Table 5.1(a): Percentages of independent variables in the survey and the census in All States**

Variables	All 3 States			
	Census	Sample	p-value	Representative Proportion
Muslim	9%	43%	0.0000	No
Bengali-Speaker	65%	98%	0.0000	No
Female	49%	25%	0.0000	No
Urban	39%	40%	0.1548	Yes
Rural	61%	60%	0.1548	Yes
Married	51%	72%	0.0000	No
Age Range (18-29)	34%	32%	0.0028	No
Age Range (30-39)	23%	32%	0.0264	No
Age Range (40-49)	19%	23%	0.9691	Yes
Age Range (50+)	24%	13%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Below Secondary)	73%	18%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Secondary)	20%	23%	0.0420	No
Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree)	6%	24%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree)	1%	17%	0.0000	No

**Table 5.1(a) (continued)**

Variables	All 3 States			
	Census	Sample	p-value	Representative Proportion
Agricultural Profession	39%	15%	0.0000	No
Non-Agricultural Profession	61%	57%	0.0004	No

Note: Data from 2011 Indian National census has been used for all demographic factors, except for the data pertaining to language for which 2011 figures were unavailable, and 2001 figures were used instead.

**Table 5.1(b): Percentages of the independent variables in the survey and the census in Tripura**

Variables	Tripura			
	Census	Sample	p-value	Representative Proportion
Muslim	9%	43%	0.0000	No
Bengali-Speaker	65%	98%	0.0000	No
Female	49%	25%	0.0000	No
Urban	39%	40%	0.8297	Yes
Rural	61%	60%	0.8297	Yes
Married	51%	72%	0.0000	No
Age Range (18-29)	34%	32%	0.4938	Yes
Age Range (30-39)	23%	32%	0.0280	No
Age Range (40-49)	19%	23%	0.2152	Yes
Age Range (50+)	24%	13%	0.0109	No
Educational Level Category (Below Secondary)	73%	18%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Secondary)	20%	23%	0.4134	Yes
Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree)	6%	24%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree)	1%	17%	0.0000	No
Agricultural Profession	39%	15%	0.0000	No
Non-Agricultural Profession	61%	57%	0.3974	Yes

Note: Data from 2011 Indian National census has been used for all demographic factors, except for the data pertaining to language for which 2011 figures were unavailable, and 2001 figures were used instead.

**Table 5.1(c): Percentages of the independent variables in the survey and the census in Assam**

Variables	Assam			
	Census	Sample	p-value	Representative Proportion
Muslim	42%	70%	0.0000	No
Bengali-Speaker	27%	71%	0.0000	No
Female	49%	12%	0.0000	No

**Table 5.1(c) (continued)**

Variables	Assam			
	Census	Sample	p-value	Representative Proportion
Urban	18%	16%	0.6607	Yes
Rural	82%	84%	0.6607	Yes
Married	45%	49%	0.5282	Yes
Age Range (18-29)	36%	62%	0.0000	No
Age Range (30-39)	24%	20%	0.3632	Yes
Age Range (40-49)	18%	10%	0.0260	No
Age Range (50+)	22%	8%	0.0004	No
Educational Level Category (Below Secondary)	70%	22%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Secondary)	23%	39%	0.0006	No
Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree)	6%	12%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree)	1%	4%	0.0000	No
Agricultural Profession	46%	4%	0.0000	No
Non-Agricultural Profession	54%	84%	0.0000	No

Note: Data from 2011 Indian National census has been used for all demographic factors, except for the data pertaining to language for which 2011 figures were unavailable, and 2001 figures were used instead.

**Table 5.1(d): Percentages of the independent variables in the survey and the census in West Bengal**

VARIABLES	West Bengal			
	Census	Sample	p-value	Representative Proportion
Muslim	33%	79%	0.0000	No
Bengali-Speaker	85%	87%	0.6121	Yes
Female	49%	26%	0.0000	No
Urban	39%	33%	0.1677	Yes
Rural	61%	67%	0.1677	Yes
Married	52%	65%	0.0009	No
Age Range (18-29)	34%	35%	0.9431	Yes
Age Range (30-39)	22%	31%	0.0128	No
Age Range (40-49)	18%	20%	0.5379	Yes
Age Range (50+)	25%	14%	0.0063	No
Educational Level Category (Below Secondary)	71%	8%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Secondary)	19%	17%	0.4380	Yes
Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree)	9%	37%	0.0000	No
Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree)	1%	11%	0.0000	No

**Table 5.1(d)** (continued)

VARIABLES	West Bengal			
	Census	Sample	p-value	Representative Proportion
Agricultural Profession	36%	16%	0.0000	No
Non-Agricultural Profession	64%	70%	0.1734	Yes

Note: Data from 2011 Indian National census has been used for all demographic factors, except for the data pertaining to language for which 2011 figures were unavailable, and 2001 figures were used instead.

## 5.2 Measurement

This section will focus on how I built my measurement units for running the OLS regression models. It is divided into four subsections: The first subsection illustrates the creation of the indices of bonding and bridging social capital, which are the dependent variables in this research. The second subsection describes the coding of the explanatory variables concerning an individual's personal characteristics and location-specific factors. The third subsection explains the coding of the control variables. The fourth subsection illustrates the model specifications concerning the OLS models built for testing the fifteen hypotheses. It gives the justification for the inclusion of every control variable for testing each hypothesis.

### 5.2.1 Outcome Variables

The first set of variables is the outcome variables, i.e., bonding and bridging forms of social capital. For determining the exact combination of variables to measure each type of social capital, I considered Lancee's (2010; 2012) measurement because the theoretical concept of what constitutes as social capital for this research has been adapted mostly from his study. As mentioned in Chapter 4 while outlining the theoretical framework of this research, it was mentioned how for examining the formation of social capital in three Indian border states, the structural components are more necessary than the cognitive components. This is because the structural components need to be in place first for the cognitive components to actually do its work. This, however, does not mean that the cognitive components are completely undermined, but they are taken into consideration only where necessary.

Adapting the variables from Lancee's study for my project, I incorporated questions from my survey that aimed to capture different dimensions of each type of social capital. In addition, where required I added additional measures or dropped

some measures. Separate indices were constructed for bonding and bridging forms of social capital using a Principal Components Analysis (PCA). PCA is a multivariate statistical dimension-reduction tool that reduces the number of possibly correlated variables into ordered components for creating an index, in which the first component explains the largest possible amount of variation in the original data (Izenman, 2008, p. 196).

The development of the bonding and bridging social capital indices are described below in sub-sections 5.2.1.1 and 5.2.1.2, along with their relationship in sub-section 5.2.1.3.

### ***5.2.1.1 Bonding Social Capital***

For determining components leading to “network closure”, Lancee (2012; p. 80) created a scale for structural bonding consisting of six items to measure the strength of family (which for immigrant community includes close kin and extended family) ties by the frequency of giving or receiving help and/or advice from one’s parents or children, and the frequency of contact with one’s parents or children. He considered family as the core group and asked respondents about the following 6 items: Received help from parent/child in past 3 months, helped parent/child in past 3 months, got advice from parent/child in past 3 months, gave advice to parent/child in past 3 months, saw parent/child in past 2 months, and had contact with parent/child in past 12 months.

As mentioned in the theory chapter, for the purpose of this study, the core or ethnic group comprises of those individuals sharing similar native language and/or religion. I determined an individual’s affiliation to his/her religious or linguistic group by asking him/her first which identity (whether linguistic or religious) he/she identified more with. Then to measure the frequency of contact and receiving/giving help to one’s chosen religious or linguistic group, I included two items: do members of his/her group mostly help one another (frequency of help created using a scale of 1 to 5) and how does one personally help group members via volunteering one’s time, financially or giving advice (here frequency of contact is created using a scale of 0 to 3).

Lancee (2010, p. 206) states that the cognitive component of a core network is the “nodes” comprising of attitudes and values such as perceptions of support, reciprocity, and trust that contribute to the exchange of resources, showing “thick

trust.” For my model, I believe that because the ties concerning religion or language are intrinsically a part of an individual’s core ethnic group network, I feel it is imperative to accurately gauge the thickness that these ties embody. For the purpose of this research, to holistically gauge the components of this form of social capital, two cognitive aspects were considered. Lancee (2012; p. 80) had measured the cognitive aspect of bonding social capital through 6 items: trust family more than friends, discuss problems rather with family, family members should be there for each other, you can always count on your family, in case of worries family should help, and family members keep each other informed.

As described in Chapter 2 outlining the historical and political background of the states being studied, there is a considerable degree of religious and linguistic fractionalization, which was consolidated mainly during British rule of the region. Due to this history of ethnic fractionalization, I am measuring the thickness of such trust through knowing about how much one feels part of his/her ethnic group. There are two items for this: one relates to sanctions from his/her ethnic group if norms are violated, and the other relates to perceived support during times of crisis from his/her ethnic group.

In such ethnically fractured societies, network closures of groups occur due to the increased possibility of imposition of sanctions. A good way to understand this notion would be to consider studies conducted in ethnically fractured societies in Africa. In studying the distribution of public goods in Western Kenya, Miguel & Gugerty (2005) find that social sanctions are imposed more effectively within ethnic groups than between groups, and violations of norms are punished by community imposing social sanctions. Miguel & Gugerty (2005) find that ethnically homogenous regions have better public good distribution mechanisms than regions that are ethnically diverse. In this research, the measure for sanctions was built by asking respondents about how his/her group punish someone who breaks its trust (measures are on a scale of 1-5 showing the severity of punishment).

The idea of perceived support during times of crisis also needs a measure because this item shows how seriously an individual thinks of himself as part of his/her ethnic group. I included a measure of perceived protection which was by asking how much one would help group members from violence (measures are on a scale of 1-5 showing the likelihood of protection). This is an indirect measure for one’s trust in his/her group as questions relating to violence cannot be asked directly.

After determining the four items to create the bonding social capital variable, I constructed indicators that are available for the overall sample and combined them into a coherent index using a Principal Components Analysis (PCA). For the index I created, the reliability coefficient is 0.5211, and of the 4 components, the majority of the values were in the first factor that explained 42.13% of the variation of the data.


The summary statistics on Bonding Social Capital for all the respondents and individual states are as follows:

**Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Bonding Social Capital Index**

State	Observation	Standard Deviation	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
All States	325	0.69	0.47	-1.7	1.6
Tripura	104	0.74	0.54	-1.32	2.34
Assam	94	0.64	0.41	-2.30	1.06
West Bengal	127	0.52	0.26	-1.41	1.17

The histograms showing the overall and state-specific results for Bonding Social Capital are as follows:

**Fig. 5.2: Distribution of Bonding Social Capital Index**



By looking at the distribution in the histogram (Fig. 5.2) and summary statistics (Table 5.2), it can be said that overall, the bonding social capital index spreads the same distance, with maximum (1.6) being almost as the same distance as the minimum (-1.7). However, Tripura has an above average variance (0.54), and West Bengal has a variance (0.26) which is much below the overall variance of 0.47. Assam (0.41) has a variance which is closer to that of the overall sample. The high variance for Tripura means that for any individual of the state, having solidarity for one's linguistic or religious group can range from either very high or very low, compared to the average for the state. West Bengal's low variance means that the range of solidarity towards one's linguistic and religious group is neither too high nor too low compared to the average for the state.

Also, from the right skewness of the population in Tripura, there appears to be some people there who possess very high bonding social capital. Similarly, from the left skewness of the population in Assam, there appears to be some people who possess very low bonding social capital. However, all the curves overall do fall in a normal distribution curve, meaning that the OLS regression outputs can be interpreted with a fair degree of confidence when looking for correlational and descriptive findings.

#### ***5.2.1.2 Bridging Social Capital***

The bridging social capital index was developed similarly keeping in mind questions which were used by Lancee (2010; 2012) who quantitatively measured the structural component of bridging social capital as part of his analysis. These measures are those that span structural holes, which concerns knowing about and interacting with people of different groups. Lancee (2012; p. 81) had measured structural bridging based on six items that deal with inter-ethnic contacts: more contact with native Dutch than own group, has native Dutch friends or acquaintances, receives visits at home from native Dutch friends or neighbours, contact with native Dutch in private life, partner born in the Netherlands, member of an association that has little or almost no members who have the same ethnicity as the respondent. Analogous to the first four items on friend and contact diversity, I developed a variable on friendship diversity (where I included the native language and religion of the two closest friends of the respondent) and another on contact

diversity (where I included the native language and religion of the two most frequently contacted people other than family members of the respondent). I did not include measures on organizations as I felt that people could be part of an organization but not be as active. Also, many of my respondents did not have any organizational affiliations. I also left out the measure on a person’s country of birth, because I feel that this does not determine my respondent’s inter-ethnic contact.

For the cognitive components of bridging social capital, Lancee (2010; 2012) describes cognitive bridging social capital as characterized by “thin trust” associated with solidarity with secondary relations. Lancee (2010, p. 208) imagines such trust as stemming from one’s attitudes concerning modernization and outward orientation. For the purpose of this research, since it has already been established that any connection outside one’s ethnic group (i.e., religious or linguistic network) is secondary, those ties are not being included in this measure because unlike the thick ties which are intrinsic, these thin ties are not always available in networks. To access these thin ties, structural components need to be in place first for cognitive components to be even accessible.

By means of a PCA, an index was developed using these two measures on friendship and contact diversity, where the scale reliability coefficient was 0.6464 and of the 2 components, the majority of the values were in the first factor that explained 74.22% of the variation of the data.


The summary statistics on Bridging Social Capital for all the respondents and individual states are as follows:

**Table 5.3: Summary Statistics of Bridging Social Capital Index**

<b>State</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Variance</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>
All States	304	0.7	0.48	-0.56	1.85
Tripura	86	0.67	0.45	-0.57	1.42
Assam	85	0.46	0.21	-0.32	1.47
West Bengal	133	0.79	0.62	-0.69	1.65

The histograms showing the overall and state-specific results for Bridging Social Capital are as follows:

**Fig. 5.3: Distribution of Bridging Social Capital Index**




The histogram (Fig. 5.3) and summary statistics (Table 5.3) show that similar to the bonding social capital index, the bridging social capital index also has inter-state differences. The data shows that there is a tendency for individuals to have less linguistic and religious variation in their friend and contact circles. Thus, there should be a tendency for individuals to not build friendships and contacts outside one's own linguistic and religious groups. Unlike the bonding social capital index, the bridging social capital index for Tripura has a similar variance (0.45) as the overall bridging social capital index (0.48). West Bengal shows greater variance (0.62) than the overall index, while Assam shows much less variance (0.21) compared to the overall index. This means for West Bengal that the range for building friendships and contacts outside one's network can be much higher or lower than the average for the state, while for Assam the range will be closer towards the average.

Although all distributions of the bridging social capital index are rightly skewed and do not follow a normal distribution, they can still be utilized as a dependent variable for running OLS regression models. What really matters is to make sure that the “goodness of fit” conditions are not violated and that the residuals of the regression models are normally distributed. This can be investigated by viewing scatter plots of the residuals of each regression model. For all the OLS regression models that I created, the residuals generally fit a linear line on a scatterplot. The scatterplots for each OLS regression model can be found in Appendix 4.

### ***5.2.1.3 The Relationship between Bonding and Bridging Social Capital***

As per most studies which tried to quantify social capital, the two forms of social capital are not exact opposites, but actually measure delinked features of individuals and communities. Other than Geys & Murdoch (2010) and Satyanath, Voigtländer & Voth (2014) who measured organizations by classifying them into those that promote bonding and bridging social capital, most authors base their measurements on factors which are not precisely opposites—rather are quite disconnected. The statistical correlation is also negligible as the correlation coefficient is -0.098. The following scatter plot (Fig. 5.4) points out that the bonding social capital and bridging social capital indices for this research show minimal correlation and their effect on each other is negligible:

**Fig. 5.4: Scatter plot showing Bonding and Bridging Social Capital index measures**



The two types of social capital may exist separately from one another: one's solidarity with his/her religious or linguistic group is not related to one's choice of friends and contacts. Thus, the two dimensions are orthogonal to each other, meaning that the findings in one dimension do not predict the findings in the other dimension.

## **5.2.2 Explanatory Variables**

The second sets of variables used for the quantitative analysis OLS regression models are the explanatory variables pertaining to a respondent's personal characteristics and location-specific factors. Summary statistics for these variables, for my overall sample and state-specific samples, can be found in Appendix 5.

### **5.2.2.1 For Respondent's Personal Characteristics**

Data was collected directly via the survey relating to sets of variables pertaining to an individual's personal characteristics, as opposed to the outcome variables which involved creating indices.

For variables pertaining to an individual's personal characteristics, the following questions have been used from the survey: respondent's age, gender, ethnic identity (native language and religion), socio-economic status (household income, education, and the type of profession), and marital status. The next few paragraphs will outline the ways in which I categorized the responses for making them ready for my analysis. In the following paragraphs, the variables will be initially italicized so that it is easier to identify them.

In the questionnaire, *age* was categorized into seven subgroups. In the pre-test, it was found that most people could not exactly state their correct ages and so decadal ranges were asked for which there was a 100% response. When running the regression analysis, the subgroups were decreased into 4 categories (i.e., 18-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50+). Categories of 18-20 and 21-29 were combined to 18-29 as they were considered the youth. Also, the categories of people who were 50+ were combined as representative of the elderly population.

For *gender*, there were originally 3 categories: males, females, and others. As there were no individuals in the "other" category, that category was dropped. Thus, for the analysis two categories for gender were used: males and females.

For the ethnic identity variables, *native language* and *religion* were taken into account. For the category on native language, I originally had four categories based on the major languages spoken in the states being surveyed: Bengali, Assamese, Urdu, and Hindi. I also had an open-ended category called “other” in which respondents reported a total of six other languages. Since the hypothesis was based on whether the speaker was a speaker of Bengali or not, I re-categorized the language variable into Bengali or other.

The second identity category was religion. For this, I had four categories of religion based on the major followers of religions practised in the region: Muslim, Hindu, Christian or other. In my sample, there were no individuals in the other category. The categories were re-categorised into Muslim and Hindu, with responses for Christians being dropped. This was because the hypothesis was solely testing for Muslims versus Hindus. In addition, as only 4 Christians were reported in the overall sample, it did not make a difference in dropping those observations.

*Household Income* originally had ten categories which asked about the respondent’s approximate average household income (monthly in Indian Rupees), which were re-categorized into 4 income categories: 0 to 5,000, 5,000 to 10,000, 10,000 to 20,000, and above 20,000. This re-categorization was based on uniformly distributing the responses in my sample.

*Education* was kept in its original categories which capture the level of an individual’s highest educational attainment: Primary, Secondary, Higher Secondary, Bachelors degree, and Masters degree and above.

*Profession* was originally categorized as unemployed, agriculture, trading, manufacturing, service holder, other. In the “other” category there was an open-ended response. The responses stating “housewife” in the other category were considered, and a seventh variable was created for those responses. Profession was re-categorized into three variables: agricultural, non-agricultural (trading, manufacturing, service holder and other), unemployed (unemployed or housewife). For the variable capturing agricultural profession, only the variable for agriculture was considered. For the second variable on non-agricultural profession, the original categories on trading, manufacturing, service holder and other (after dropping housewives) were considered. The last category on unemployed included the responses for unemployed and housewives.

*Marital Status* was captured using two steps. The respondent was asked if he or she is married or unmarried. If so, the following questions were asked about his/her spouse: if the spouse was of the same linguistic and religious background, if the spouse was of a different linguistic background, if the spouse was of a different religious background, and if the spouse was of both a different linguistic and religious background. These answers were then re-categorised into the following five categories: unmarried, married with spouse of the same background, married with spouse of different linguistic background, married with spouse of different religious background, and married with spouse of both linguistic and religious backgrounds. The aim is to see if a person with different types of marriages has a greater level of bridging social capital than an individual who is unmarried.

#### ***5.2.2.2 For Respondent's Location-specific factors***

Another group of explanatory variables is those measuring location-specific factors. The variables are the following: residency location (urban/rural), support for cross-border movement, perception of governance institutions, perception of socio-economic environment, and proximity to political establishment. Besides the variable for residency location (urban/rural), the other four variables have been created as indices using multiple questions from the survey questionnaire, using Principal Components Analysis (PCA). In the following paragraphs, the variables will be initially italicized so that it is easier to identify them.

The two variables for *residency location* were kept in its original format as urban versus rural.

The third variable for location-specific factor, *support for cross-border movement*, has been created using a PCA by combining seven items. The scale reliability coefficient is 0.5566, and of the 7 components, the majority of the values were in the first factor that explained 32.17% of the variation of the data. The seven items which make up this variable are the following from the survey: if one supports changes in cross-border movement policy with Bangladesh, if one supports policies to decrease trade barriers, if one supports faster visa policy, if one supports no visa policy with Bangladesh, if one supports an increase in trade with Bangladesh, if one supports the flow of remittance from Bangladesh, and if an individual has family or friends in Bangladesh.

Except for the item capturing the support for the flow of remittance from Bangladesh, all the other questions were either yes/ no responses. For the item on “support for the flow of remittance from Bangladesh” the question was asked if the respondent or his household members can help friends or relatives financially who are living on the other side of the border. There were four response categories: yes (absolutely), yes (although that is unsafe), no (I don’t think it is possible), and no (absolutely not). These items were then recoded on a 0 to 3 scale in a reverse order, where “no (absolutely not)” was 0 and yes (absolutely) was 3.

The fourth variable for location-specific factor, *perception of governance institutions*, has been created using a PCA by combining four items. The scale reliability coefficient is 0.7819, and of the 4 components, the majority of the values were in the first factor that explained 60.24% of the variation of the data. The four items are the following: trust in local government officials, trust in state government officials, trust in central government officials, and the belief that the country is headed in the right direction.

The first three items “trust in local government officials,” “trust in state government officials” and “trust in central government officials” had the same original categories, which were then re-categorized. There were four response categories which were the following: no (absolutely not), probably not, maybe (depends on the official), certainly yes. These items were then recoded on a 1 to 3 scale in reverse order, with “no (absolutely not)” and “probably not” being combined into one category. The remaining item “belief that the country is headed in the right direction” had the same options (yes/no) retained as in the questionnaire.

The fifth variable for location-specific factor, *perception of socio-economic environment*, has been created using a PCA by combining four items. The scale reliability coefficient is 0.7025, and of the 4 components, the majority of the values were in the first factor that explained 51.97% variation of the data. The four items are the following: positive view of the economic situation of the country, belief that the economic situation of the country is improving, viewing one’s living condition as compared to other people in the state, and viewing one’s living condition as compared to other people in the country.

The first item “positive view of the economic situation of the country” had the same options (yes/no) retained as in the questionnaire. The second item “belief that the economic situation of the country is improving” originally had 3 categories

which are the following: has improved, stayed the same, got worse. These categories were re-coded with “has improved” being assigned a score of 1 and “stayed the same” and “got worse” being assigned a score of 0. The third item “viewing one’s living condition as opposed to other people in the state” and “viewing one’s living condition as compared to other people in the country” has an original 1 to 5 scale with 1 being the worst and 5 being the best. The first three categories were given a score of 0, and the last two were assigned a score of 1.

Finally, the sixth variable for location-specific factor, *proximity to the political establishment*, has been created using a PCA by combining three items. For this index, the scale reliability coefficient is 0.7468, and of the 3 components, the majority of the values were in the first factor that explained 67.56% variation of the data. The three items are the following: having a group member in the local government, having a group member in the state government, and having a group member in the central government. All the three items originally had “yes/ no,” and were re-coded with “yes” assigned a value of 1 and “no” assigned a value of 0.

### **5.2.3 Control Variables**

The last group of quantitative measurement variables includes the controls. Many of the explanatory factors were used as controls for different regression models. These include ethnic identity factors (native language and religion), socio-economic factors (household income, education, and profession) and residency location (urban/rural). Summary statistics for these variables, for my overall sample, can be found in Appendix 6.

Additionally, the names of other variables which have been used as controls in the OLS regression models are the following: household size, mobility, student diversity, practising, members in local government, members in state government, members in central government, trade with Bangladesh, and ostracized. The following paragraphs will list the ways in which I categorized the responses for making them ready for my analysis. As in the previous sub-section, the variables in the following paragraphs will be initially italicized so that it is easier to identify them.

Some of the control variables were kept in its original form, and this paragraph will describe those. The variable *household size* contains the number of

people living in a household (under a single roof in rural areas or in an apartment/house in urban areas). An individual was asked about roughly the number of people living in his/her household and divided into 4 categories: 1-2 people, 3-5 people, 6-8 people, and more than 8 people. For the variable *mobility*, the respondent was asked about how often they step out of their neighbourhood or village. There were 6 categories for the responses: 0 to 1 time yearly, 2 to 5 times yearly, 6 to 10 times yearly, monthly, weekly, and daily. The three control variables for gauging if one has a member in different levels of government (*members in local government*, *members in state government*, *members in central government*), had direct responses for the questions on “Are members of your group in the local/ state/ central government” used as it is. The control variable, *trade with Bangladesh* is to know if an individual is involved in trade with Bangladesh. This was a direct question where the respondents were asked if he/she is involved in such kinds of trade. These responses were kept in the original form as yes/no.

The variable *ostracized*, which was used for measuring if one is ostracised by one’s family, involved recoding. It was created by adding up two responses received from married people in which they were asked if they are in touch with their parents or in-laws after marriage. Three categories were created: 0 for being in touch with both one’s and spouses parents, 1 for being in touch with either one’s own or spouse’s parents, and 2 if one is in touch with both his and his spouse’s parents.

The variable, *student diversity* for measuring the diversity of student body, also involved recoding. This response was built from the question of whether children attending the educational institution hailed from different linguistic or religious backgrounds. There were originally four categories: linguistic mix, religious mix, both linguistic and religious mix, and neither religious nor linguistic mix. Then three categories were created: 0 for no linguistic or religious diversity, 1 for either linguistic or religious diversity (in which the first two categories were combined), and 2 for both linguistic and religious diversity. The last variable concerning schooling involved if a person attended an education institution within his or her neighbourhood or outside. It remained in its original form as 1 for yes and 0 for no.

The variable, *practising* is a measure for gauging religious devotion and spirituality. Question about ‘how disciplined one is about practising one’s religion’ was asked. The original four categories were: not disciplined, try, try very hard, do

everything properly. From these original four categories, two categories were created: ‘disciplined in religious practice’ where the last two categories for ‘try very hard’ and ‘do everything properly’ were combined, and “not disciplined in religious practice” were the original two responses ‘not disciplined’ and ‘try’ were combined.

#### **5.2.4 Model Specification**

The fifteen OLS regression models which have been built have the relationship between the independent and dependent variables explained in Chapter 4, showing the theoretical framework. This sub-section of the Quantitative Methods Chapter is stating the hypotheses of the OLS regression models once again, but focusing on describing the rationale for including the control variables of each model. These control variables are explained here to ascertain that the models are not a result of false observed relationships between two variables appearing due to variable(s) being left out and leading to omitted variable bias. For reasons of clarity, the control terms have been italicized in this discussion.

***H<sub>1</sub>: An individual who is Muslim (as opposed to an individual who is Hindu) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.***

The model for the first hypothesis is a test for the effect of being Muslim as opposed to being Hindu, where the notion of fear being generated as a result of minority-majority relations among Muslims lead to greater solidarity amongst Muslims, and thereby greater bonding social capital. Three control variables have been added: native Bengali speaker, being practising and the interaction term for practising Muslim. The first control variable for native *Bengali* speaker has been added based on the reasoning of the same kind of minority-majority fear leading to the formation of bonding social capital. It may be the case that minority-majority fear is also being generated between linguistic groups, where speakers of the non-majority language in a particular state can exhibit the solidarity amongst them, due to being a minority. As most Muslims in these three states are Bengali-speakers, this variable might actually be driving the effect. Secondly, the control for *practising* or greater practise of one’s own faith could be leading to this effect of bonding social capital as people who are more practising might be turning towards a more non-pluralistic orthodox notion of their faith and only seek in-group solidarity. Thirdly, a

control for the interaction term of *Practising Muslim* has been added to test if only this segment of the population might exhibit such orthodox notion of their faith leading to greater in-group solidarity as compared to the rest of the population. In South Asia, spirituality of Muslims was traditionally embodied by popular practice of Islam which combines local tradition and was of a more pluralistic form, but in recent years there has been a more reformist brand of Islam which is more non-pluralistic and tries to cleanse the religion of local cultural influences (Jaffrelot & Louer, 2017). Thus, the greater practise of Islam might be leading to a bigger following of a more non-pluralistic orthodox brand of Islam, which leads to greater bonding social capital.

***H<sub>2</sub>*: The lower the household income of an individual, the greater the level of his/her bonding social capital.**

The model for the second hypothesis related to household income is deduced from the idea of the joint family structure of rural India and Bengal, where lower household income shows the presence of a joint family household. Individuals belonging to such households have to share their income with a greater number of people and exhibit greater in-group solidarity. All three controls are related to being part of joint family structures. Thus, the first control for the number of people in a household or *household size* has been added as indicating towards the existence of big family size or presence of joint family. Secondly, a control for *rural* location has been added as the setting from which the concept of joint family is derived from rural areas, which in itself may be the driver of in-group solidarity. Thirdly, a control for being engaged in *agricultural profession* has been added since the idea of sharing agricultural land is what had led to the high presence of joint family structure in rural areas, thereby leading to solidarity and the formation of greater bonding social capital.

***H<sub>3</sub>*: An individual who is employed in an agricultural profession (as opposed to an individual who is not employed in an agricultural profession) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.**

The model for the third hypothesis is related to agricultural communities being guided by norms of kinship which is based on the idea of joint ownership of agricultural land, which thereby leads to the formation of bonding social capital. It is

essential to control for *Muslim* as this community is in many cases involved in agricultural profession, and maybe affecting in-group solidarity. Secondly, control for *rural* setting is required because agricultural profession is found in such locations, which in itself maybe the driver of in-group solidarity as such areas are having high ties of kinship loyalties. Thirdly, the control for *household income* reflects controlling for joint families because being part of such households lead to lower income due to reasons of sharing with one's extended family based on reasons of solidarity, which can be reflected in the formation of higher bonding social capital.

***H<sub>4</sub>: An individual who lives in a rural location (as opposed to an individual who lives in an urban location) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.***

The model for the fourth hypothesis relates to living in a rural location versus an urban one, in which the former location is based on the notion of greater in-group ties based on kinship loyalties. The controls for this model are household income and being engaged in agricultural profession. As described earlier, control for *household income* reflects controlling for joint families because being part of such households lead to lower income because of sharing with one's extended family based on reasons of solidarity. Secondly, a control for being engaged in *agricultural profession* has been added because the idea of sharing agricultural land is what had led to the high presence of joint family structure in rural areas which is the reason for solidarity in such areas.

***H<sub>5</sub>: The greater an individual's support for the cross-border movement of people and goods, the greater the level of his/her bonding social capital.***

The model for the fifth hypothesis relates to cross-border movement indicating having solidarity with co-ethnics who live on the other side of the international border. A control for *trade with Bangladesh* has been added because such individuals might be supporting cross-border movement due to personal gains through being involved in trade and not because of having co-ethnic ties per se. Two controls for being a native *Bengali* speaker and being *Muslim* have been added to control for which kind of ethnic group category, whether ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious, is leading to co-ethnic solidarity.

***H<sub>6</sub>*: An individual who is a native Bengali-speaker (as opposed to a native speaker of a different language) forms a lower level of bridging social capital.**

The model for the sixth hypothesis is based on native Bengali-speakers having lower bridging social capital due to individuals having limited opportunity to network outside his/her core ethnic group. *Muslim* has been controlled as a large portion of native Bengali-speakers are Muslims, and this ethnic identity might actually be driving the effect of networking outside his/her core group. The next three control variables are those which might give an individual opportunity to network outside his/her core group. A second variable, *education* has been controlled because years of schooling give people access to out-group network. A third variable, *urban* location is also controlled as such settings provide proximity to a diverse group of people and access to out-group network. A fourth variable, *non-agricultural profession* has been controlled because such professions give people incentive to build networks out of his/her group for reasons of knowledge sharing.

***H<sub>7</sub>*: The higher the age group of an individual, the lower the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

The model for the seventh hypothesis is based on the idea of limited time and physical restraints caused by being engaged in greater spiritual pursuits and limited mobility, as a result of aging, which lead to lower bridging social capital. Therefore, *mobility* and *practising* (representing spirituality) have been controlled in this model for showing whether age alone can lead to any effects on bridging social capital.

***H<sub>8</sub>*: An individual who is female (as opposed to an individual who is male) forms a lower level of bridging social capital.**

The model for the eighth hypothesis is built on the notion of females having different gender roles in families which makes them inherently secluded in Indian society. A joint family imposed females with greater restrictions regarding out-group interactions, and so *household income* and *household size* have been controlled to see if such an environment is actually having an effect on the bridging social capital levels of females. A third variable, *mobility* has been controlled to see if females actually are restricted inside their households. The fourth and fifth variables, being engaged in *non-agricultural profession* and living in an *urban* setting have been

controlled to check if females build out-group networks without having incentives for knowledge sharing or having proximity to a more diverse group of people.

***H<sub>9</sub>*: The higher the educational qualification of an individual, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

The model for the ninth hypothesis is based on the notion that higher educational qualifications provide individuals a platform for having more number of years of interaction with other individuals via schooling. A control for *school diversity* has been added to check if individuals have actually been to schools which have a diverse student body which allows such interaction. The second control in this model is for *non-agricultural profession* because higher education paves the path for such forms of employment, which in turn opens up opportunities for knowledge sharing, and thereby affecting bridging social capital.

***H<sub>10</sub>*: An individual who is employed in a non-agricultural profession (as opposed to an individual who is employed in an agricultural profession) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.**

The model for the tenth hypothesis is based on the notion of non-agricultural employment providing opportunities to network with a diverse group of people due to individuals trying to get access to resources and information via knowledge sharing with people outside his/her core network. The first control, *urban* location has been controlled because non-agricultural professions tend to be located in urban settings and those areas naturally tend to be more diverse and provide opportunities to form greater bridging social capital. The second control is for *education* because this variable which actually made an individual eligible for employment in non-agricultural sector maybe the driver of bridging social capital.

***H<sub>11</sub>*: An individual who is married to a person of the same linguistic and religious group (as opposed to an individual who is unmarried) forms a lower level of bridging social capital. However, an individual who is married to someone of a different linguistic or religious group (as opposed to an individual who is unmarried) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.**

The model for the eleventh hypothesis is based on the notion of marriage putting restrictions on time for out-group interactions, while inter-marriage opening up opportunities for people to build networks out of their core group. The single control variable is *ostracized* or being disowned by one's kin. This variable has been

controlled because arranged marriage is the norm in Indian society and individuals who engage in inter-marriage violate the traditions of arranged marriage even more, and in many cases risk being disowned by close kin (Thorat & Coffey, 2016). This act of disowning actually makes couples seek out-group networks for their survival.

***H<sub>12</sub>: An individual who lives in an urban location (as opposed an individual who lives in a rural location) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.***

The model for the twelfth hypothesis is based on proximity with other people. A control for this variable is mobility because the ability to step out of one's home actually provides opportunities for individuals to meet others, and not always the location itself. A second variable, *education* has been controlled because institutions of learning which are more diverse in urban areas may be what is actually providing scope for out-group interaction. Finally, *non-agricultural profession* which are mostly located in urban areas are what might be providing individuals with scope for networking with individuals outside his/her core group.

***H<sub>13</sub>: The better an individual's perception of his/her governance institutions, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.***

The model for the thirteenth hypothesis is based on greater perception of governance institutions leading to citizens feeling more comfortable engaging with others with whom they lack close ties. The first control for this model is for *Muslim* because as the biggest religious minority community they face various forms of institutional discrimination, such as when trying to file a charge sheet for a crime (Apoorvanand, 2018). They should exhibit such forms of trust more than the usual if they have belief in the governance institutions. Three additional controls, having a *member in the local, state and central governments*, are added as proxies for patronage network. This is because if someone belongs to such patronage networks, he/she should exhibit a better perception of governance institutions regardless of actual trust in the impartiality of such institutions.

***H<sub>14</sub>: The better an individual's perception of his/her socio-economic environment, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.***

The model for the fourteenth hypothesis is based on the perception of economic inequality leading to lesser trust of individuals toward out-group networks.

*Muslim* has been controlled in this model as this group is the one which has a greater perception of inequality towards their community based on historical reasons of discrimination (Chatterji, 2007; Islam, 2017). A second control, *household income* has been controlled because being poor or rich may be the factor which is driving one's perception of the socio-economic environment.

***H<sub>15</sub>*: The greater an individual's proximity to his/her political establishment, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

The model for the fifteenth hypothesis is based on the idea of proximity of political establishment leading to clientelistic exchanges, which in turn leads to greater inter-group trust. *Urban* setting has been controlled as this hypothesis has been derived from a study based in Nigeria which looks at the inter-group clientelistic network in diverse urban settings of the country (LeBas, 2017). Native *Bengali* speaker and *Muslim* have been controlled because individuals maybe having access to clientelistic networks based on their ethno-linguistic or ethno-religious affiliations.

### **5.3 Data Analysis**

After coming back from the field, I carried out the following steps to ensure that I was ready for the quantitative analysis stage. First, I made a codebook of each of the survey questions, marking the variables as single, dichotomous and various. Second, I designed a template of the survey questions in Stata format, in preparation for the actual entering of the data from the paper forms. Third, I entered the data manually in the template that I designed. Fourth, I checked the dataset with the information in the paper forms that had been entered. Fifth, I created primary two-by-two cross-tabs for the primary analysis. All the above steps took about six to seven weeks, ensuring that my dataset was ready for conducting regression analysis.

As seen earlier, for creating the Y variable indices, i.e. bonding or bridging social capital, factor analysis was used to reduce the complex interrelationship of multiple variables while compensating for random error and invalidity. The next step is the major analysis which involved building several regression models. These models were built for my overall dataset, as well as for individual states. As

described in the last section, various controls were used depending on the particular regression model.

The two equations below represent the regression models that I have developed. The first equation represents the model for the pooled cross-sectional dataset.

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + u_i \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_i$  represents the dependent variables (i.e., Bonding or Bridging Social Capital) for an individual  $i$ ,  $\beta_0$  is the intercept,  $\beta_1$  is the coefficient of the independent variable of interest,  $X_{1i}$  (i.e., Aspect of Individual's Personal characteristic/ Location-specific factor) is the independent variable,  $\beta_2$  is the coefficient vector of the control variable matrix  $X_{2i}$ , and  $u_i$  represents the idiosyncratic error term.

The second equation represents the state fixed effects model.

$$Y_i = \beta_1 X_{1i} + \beta_2 X_{2i} + \alpha_i + u_i \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_i$  represents the dependent variables (i.e., Bonding or Bridging Social Capital), all terms have identical meanings as in Equation (1), except for  $\alpha_i$ , which replaces the intercept and represents the state fixed effect.

Please note that in the regression models of Chapter 6, the size of the effect of the independent variable compared to the baseline is reported as an equivalent percentage change in the dependent variable's standard deviation:  $100 / \text{Standard Deviation of } Y * \text{Coefficient of } X$ . Any change between 10 to 20% is small to moderate, over 20% is substantively meaningful, and above 50% is absolutely large. The Standard Deviation of the dependent variable for each sample which has been used to build every OLS regression model (pooled data-set as well as the three states) can be found in Appendix 7. Please also note the results of each regression model are significant at one of the three levels of significance: 1% (very significant), 5% (significant) and 10% (marginally significant). Significant results represent how much a particular result is believable and has not occurred by random chance.

The results of the quantitative regression models discussing a change in "social capital" will use the term "capital" as a noun, where an individual can "possess" or "have" capital. Furthermore, he/she can have "more/higher/greater/increase in capital" or "less/lower/ decrease in capital"

compared to another individual. These ways of comparison have been used by scholars studying social capital at the individual level (Lancee, 2010; Beaudoin, 2011) and at the collective level (Putnam 1993; 2000).

#### **5.4 Conclusion**

This chapter describes the quantitative portion of the mixed methods study design which is the core component of this research. It starts off by providing details on the data collection, including pretesting of the survey questionnaire, selection of the sampling framework and actual survey sites, the training of the enumerators, and the population characteristics. Then the chapter gives details on the measurement techniques, including the building of the indices of the dependent variables, the coding of the explanatory and control variables, and the model specifications. The chapter finally provides explanations of the data entry, the mathematical equations of the OLS regression models and how I shall calculate the size of the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variables in the regression models in Chapter 6. Now that the mechanics of the research has been explained, the next chapters will display the quantitative analysis by illustrating the output of the OLS regression models.

## 6

### Quantitative Analysis

This chapter presents the results of the quantitative analysis, which is the principal analytical part of this research. Ordinary least square (OLS) regression models have been built from data from my survey dataset. Separate sections have been created for the models based on bonding social capital and those models based on bridging social capital, where I will answer my sub-research questions. Each section comprises of subsections pertaining to an individual's personal characteristics and location-specific factors of the respondents in the survey, on their effects on these two forms of social capital. The final section lays out the conclusion and discussion of my results, where I will answer my main research question and explain how far the models support my theoretical argument, now that some of the hypotheses have been found significant and some have been rejected. It will also compare the findings of this quantitative portion of the research with earlier studies. Additionally, it will discuss if the theory developed in this research generally finds one kind of social capital to be more state-specific than the other type.

#### **6.1 Analysis of the OLS Regression Models pertaining to the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

This section examines how certain personal characteristics and location-specific factors of a respondent affect the formation of bonding social capital. The first part of this section considers the aspects of a respondent's personal characteristic and the second part considers location-specific factors. Each hypothesis is followed by tables showing the output of the OLS regression of all respondents, which are then followed by state-specific regression models. As mentioned in section 5.4 of Chapter 5, the size of the effect of the independent variable compared to the baseline is reported as an equivalent percentage change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. The standard deviation of the bonding social capital index for each sample which has been used to build every OLS regression model (pooled data-set as well as the three states) can be found in Appendix 7. Please note that fixed effects models are added to the tables showing the OLS regression for all respondents, thus allowing for a separate intercept for each state, thereby erasing all

the inter-state differences and estimating the average intra-state effect. The results and key features of the OLS regression models for bonding social capital are then explained in detail at the end of this section.

### ***6.1.1 Aspects of an individual's personal characteristics that create bonding social capital***

There are three models in this section explaining how religion, household income, and engagement in agricultural profession effect the formation of bonding social capital of an individual.

**$H_1$ : An individual who is Muslim (as opposed to an individual who is Hindu) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.**

**Table 6.1: Impact of being Muslim on the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>					
Bengali				X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>					
Muslim	0.257*** (0.081)	0.224*** (0.078)	0.157 (0.125)	0.221* (0.122)	0.249** (0.112)
Practising		0.379*** (0.077)	0.308** (0.129)	0.241* (0.126)	0.043 (0.105)
Practising X Muslim			0.110 (0.160)	0.173 (0.156)	0.146 (0.135)
N	320	320	320	320	320
R-squared	0.031	0.100	0.102	0.159	0.358
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>					
Muslim	0.736*** (0.129)	0.747*** (0.130)	0.812*** (0.195)	-	-
Practising		-0.096 (0.130)	-0.045 (0.174)	-	-
Practising X Muslim			-0.118 (0.263)	-	-
N	101	101	101	-	-
R-squared	0.247	0.251	0.252	-	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>					
Muslim	-0.178 (0.147)	-0.144 (0.136)	-0.183 (0.468)	0.247 (0.502)	-
Practising		0.800*** (0.197)	0.766* (0.436)	0.874** (0.43)	-
Practising X Muslim			0.043 (0.489)	-0.094 (0.484)	-
N	93	93	93	93	-
R-squared	0.016	0.168	0.168	0.208	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>					
Muslim	0.207* (0.114)	0.197* (0.115)	-0.095 (0.153)	-0.088 (0.161)	-
Practising		0.081 (0.092)	-0.426** (0.201)	-0.418** (0.207)	-
Practising X Muslim			0.633*** (0.224)	0.625*** (0.230)	-
N	126	126	126	126	-
R-squared	0.026	0.032	0.091	0.091	-

Note: Baseline is Hindu; Standard Deviation of the Bonding Social Capital Scores: 0.690 (All States), 0.740 (Tripura), 0.638 (Assam), 0.517 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.1 presents the effects of religion. The first column only includes the indicator for being Muslim, the second column controls for practising (one’s religion), the third column adds the interaction term of the two, and the fourth

column includes a control for being a native Bengali-speaker. Column 4 which controls for being a native Bengali speaker cannot be estimated for Tripura, as this sample contains only native Bengali speakers.

It can be seen from the overall results (Panel A, Column 5) that being a non-practising Muslim leads to higher bonding social capital than a non-practising Hindu, where being a Muslim (with the inclusion of all controls) as opposed to being a Hindu leads to an equivalent 36% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. The size of the effect of the independent variable (non-practising Muslim) compared to the baseline (non-practising Hindu) is calculated as an equivalent percentage change in the dependent variable's (bonding social capital) standard deviation:  $100 / \text{Standard Deviation of Bonding Social Capital (0.690)} * \text{Coefficient of non-practising Muslim (0.249)}$  is equal to 36%. This is a substantial change. Similar calculations to show the size of the effect of the independent variable compared to the baseline is shown for the rest of the calculations in this chapter and henceforth only the percentage change in the bonding/ bridging social capital index will be reported. This result is significant at the 5% level. This significance level is higher than the output for a non-fixed effects model reported in Panel A, Column 4, showing a marginally significant result of 10%. By including fixed effects for the state in the fifth column, I am controlling for the average differences across states in any observable or unobservable predictors, which in this case is the difference in being a practiser of one's religion.

It is also seen in Panel A, Column 5, how the coefficient estimate for practising is no longer significant after the inclusion of the fixed effects, meaning that across all states on average being a practiser of religion does not have an affect on the creation of bonding social capital. There is a big variation when it comes to practising between states, e.g., In Tripura, only being a Muslim matters for the creation of bonding social capital while in Assam being a practiser of religion matters for its creation.

Moving on to the state-specific regression tables, it can be seen in Panel B, Column 3 that the result is highly significant in the case of Tripura, at the 1% level. Being Muslim compared to being Hindu leads to roughly 115% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation, which is an absolutely large change. This hypothesis on religion is based on the reasoning of minority-majority relations, where Muslims as India's biggest minority fear annihilation of their rights

and look into their own group for reciprocal support, thereby exhibiting greater bonding social capital. This seems to fit in the case of Tripura as the minority Muslim community being 9% would be generally fearful of the majority community.

The story gets more intricate when considering Assam. The effect of practising (religion) on the creation of bonding social capital was driven by the sample from Assam as seen in Panel C, Column 2. As described in Chapter 2 covering the historical and political background of the regions being studied, the conflict in Assam has both religious and linguistic roots. Being a practiser of any religion in Assam to not being one, leads to about 125% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation (Panel C, Column 2). In recent years, the society of Assam has seen a rise in religious polarization among both Hindus and Muslim communities of the state. The roots of this polarization can be traced back to events in the British colonial era and in recent times due to the presence of undocumented Muslim migration from Bangladesh. This polarization is viewed in the trend in the sample of practisers of religion having higher bonding social capital as compared to non-practisers of religion.

During the colonial era, the policy of the then Muslim League government of Assam to bring in peasants from neighbouring East Bengal was viewed by the majority Hindu population of Assam as a mechanism to increase its Muslim vote-bank (Hazarika, 2000, p. 190). The Muslim league also mobilized the Muslims of East Bengal descent to support the Muslim League, particularly in the *char/sor* region of Assam (Guha, 1974), where a big chunk of Bengali-speaking Muslim population resides (Hazarika, 2000, p. 36). Even after the creation of Pakistan, Bengali-speaking Muslim migration kept on happening due to poverty and land pressure in East Pakistan, and later on from Bangladesh (Hazarika, 2000, p. 232). This unblocked influx of foreigners to Assam led to the upsurge of Assamese nationalism, with the beginning of the Assam Movement in 1979, and resulting in the massacre of 3,000 Bengali-speaking Muslims in 1983 (Kimura, 2013, p. 69). This form of religious polarization in Assam's politics has led to the birth of the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) in 2005, which is a political party mainly representing the Bengali-speaking Muslim migrant population (Kashyap, 2016b). Additionally, this religious polarization has led to the rise of Hindu-right wing groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), whose mobilization of Hindu votes in the state election of 2016 led to the BJP's victory in the Assam state

election (Jaffrelot, 2016). Thus, being the practiser of any religion probably shows how such individuals are warier in general in Assam of social differences between Hindus and Muslims. For the Hindus, it is the demographic threat of being swamped by Muslims (Mohan, 2018). While for Muslims, it is the fear of being labelled as undocumented migrant and being made stateless (Mohan, 2018). The fears of both religious communities are used by political actors, and this is shown in higher bonding social capital among the practising populations of the state. These dynamics in Assam of practising populations, regardless of religious affiliation, forming higher bonding social capital will be explored further in Chapter 8 showing the qualitative analysis.

The story changes even more when considering West Bengal. In West Bengal, the significance of the interaction term in Panel D, Column 3 shows that practising Muslims have greater amount of bonding social capital<sup>2</sup>, as opposed to non-practising Hindus. This is, however, the reverse in Tripura (Panel B, Column 2) where non-practising Hindus have greater bonding social capital than practising Muslims (although the interaction term is not significant). As described in Chapter 4 outlining the theory, there are political actors who as stakeholders influence these dynamics of fear happening inside religious communities. There is a sizeable number of Muslims in West Bengal's population of Muslims, who are more orthodox (Bagchi, 2016b). In South Asia, a rise in spirituality of a Muslim was traditionally embodied by popular practice of a mystical brand of sufi Islam which was of a more pluralistic form as it combined Islamic practises with local tradition, but there is now a more reformist brand of Islam which is more non-pluralistic and tries to cleanse the religion of local cultural influences (Jaffrelot & Louer, 2017). It may be the case that the practising Muslims are turning towards this more orthodox strand of their faith, as opposed to following the more mystical sufi strands of their faith. Among the Muslim population in the West Bengal comprising of 30% of the population, there is a sizeable number, represented by the orthodox segment which votes for the ruling Trinamool Congress political party, while the secular Muslims as like the rest of the population tend to vote for a broader range of political parties (Bagchi, 2016b). These orthodox Muslims should be forming more bonding social capital as they are being the targets of fear-mongering by political actors. On the other hand, Tripura's

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<sup>2</sup> The calculation of the exact percentage of the interaction term value is not shown here as it is beyond the scope of the OLS regression interpretation followed in this research.

Muslim population is just nine percent of the state's overall population and so, there probably is not enough scope for the practising Muslims who are turning towards the orthodox strands of their faith to form bonding social capital amongst them owing to the fact that already the Muslim population is quite small and the political parties do not particularly reach out to this segment of the Muslim population. Rather it was seen in Panel B, Column 3, how the Muslims in Tripura, in general, have more bonding social capital than the Hindus of the state. The dynamics of the creation of bonding social capital between the practising Muslims in West Bengal versus the overall Muslim population in Tripura will be explored further in Chapter 8 showing the qualitative analysis, where I will investigate how political stakeholders have a state-specific role in utilizing certain segments of the Muslim community.

**$H_2$ : The lower the household income of an individual, the greater the level of his/her bonding social capital.**

**Table 6.2: Impact of Household Income on the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>					
Household Size		X	X	X	X
Rural			X	X	X
Agricultural Profession				X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
					FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>					
Income (Rupees 5,000-10,000)	0.173 (0.108)	0.099 (0.108)	0.137 (0.105)	0.144 (0.106)	0.015 (0.084)
Income (Rupees 10,000-20,000)	-0.092 (0.112)	-0.098 (0.110)	-0.005 (0.109)	0.002 (0.110)	-0.077 (0.085)
Income (Rupees 20,000+)	-0.036 (0.127)	-0.017 (0.125)	0.184 (0.130)	0.195 (0.132)	0.048 (0.097)
N	314	314	314	314	314
R-squared	0.026	0.067	0.124	0.125	0.353
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>					
Income (Rupees 5,000-10,000)	0.107 (0.184)	0.134 (0.174)	0.193 (0.172)	0.208 (0.171)	- -
Income (Rupees 10,000-20,000)	-0.509*** (0.191)	-0.533*** (0.180)	-0.416** (0.183)	-0.337* (0.188)	- -
Income (Rupees 20,000+)	-0.327 (0.249)	-0.282 (0.238)	-0.133 (0.241)	-0.068 (0.243)	- -
N	95	95	95	95	-
R-squared	0.131	0.259	0.301	0.321	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>					
Income (Rupees 5,000-10,000)	0.094 (0.226)	0.071 (0.226)	0.064 (0.225)	0.097 (0.236)	- -
Income (Rupees 10,000-20,000)	0.263 (0.242)	0.205 (0.243)	0.215 (0.242)	0.247 (0.252)	- -
Income (Rupees 20,000+)	0.245 (0.256)	0.258 (0.257)	0.359 (0.267)	0.376 (0.270)	- -
N	94	94	94	94	-
R-squared	0.022	0.065	0.085	0.088	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>					
Income (Rupees 5,000-10,000)	-0.184 (0.130)	-0.213 (0.133)	-0.206 (0.134)	-0.197 (0.134)	- -
Income (Rupees 10,000-20,000)	-0.322** (0.125)	-0.318** (0.125)	-0.292** (0.130)	-0.294** (0.130)	- -
Income (Rupees 20,000+)	-0.306** (0.139)	-0.286** (0.141)	-0.232 (0.159)	-0.212 (0.161)	- -
N	125	125	125	125	-
R-squared	0.061	0.084	0.088	0.094	-

Note: Baseline: Income (Rs. 0- 5,000); Standard Deviation of the Bonding Social Capital Scores: 0.688 (All States), 0.728 (Tripura), 0.639 (Assam), 0.518 (West Bengal); "FE" denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; "X" in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.2 shows the test relating to average household income and bonding social capital. The first column includes only average household income, the second column controls the number of members in one's household, the third column controls for living in a rural location, and the fourth one controls for being involved in agricultural profession.

The hypothesis is based on the concept of joint family households, where it is suggested that individuals who live in such households have to share their income with a greater number of people and thus have less income per capita than those who are not from such households. The kind of obligation formed in such joint family spaces leads to a kind of co-dependence ties towards one's kins which in turn leads to the formation of greater bonding social capital. From Panel A, Column 4 it can be seen that at none of the income levels compared to the baseline of Rs. 0-5,000, are there higher levels of bonding social capital, which goes counter to the hypothesis. A closer look at the state-specific differences shows another side of the story.

For the outputs from Tripura and West Bengal, some significant statistical patterns can be seen when comparing the income brackets Rupees 10,000-20,000 and Rupees 20,000+ with the baseline. In Panel B, Column 1 showing results for Tripura, individuals in income bracket Rupees 10,000-20,000 compared to the baseline income of Rupees 0- 5,000, have lower bonding social capital and exhibit 70% change in the bonding social capital's index's standard deviation. This value is an absolutely large change and is significant at 1% level of significance. However, when living in rural locations and agricultural professions are controlled there is an increase in the level of bonding social capital, meaning that location and profession have an important effect on the creation of bonding social capital. The effect of income on bonding social capital is related to the presence of joint families which is derived from strong kinship ties in rural areas and is also based on the sharing of agricultural land leading to solidarity. Overall the model for Tripura shows lower bonding social capital and exhibit 46% change in the bonding social capital's index's standard deviation for income bracket Rupees 5,000-10,000 (Panel B, Column 4) compared to the baseline. This change is substantively meaningful, but it is marginally significant at the 10% level of significance.

For the model for West Bengal (Panel D, Column 1), initially, both income brackets Rupees 10,000-20,000 and Rupees 20,000+, show lower levels of bonding social capital compared to the baseline income of Rupees 0- 5,000, or approximately

62% and 57% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. These results are significant at the 5% level, and the changes are absolutely large. However, with the inclusion of controls, only the results for income brackets Rupees 10,000-20,000 are significant at the 5% level of significance, and change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation rises from -62% to -57%. The inclusion of the control for rural makes the coefficient estimate for income no longer significant (although the result still remains negative) for income bracket Rupees 20,000+ compared with the baseline, showing that location is important for the creation of bonding social capital at the highest level of income for West Bengal. This result points towards the difference between metropolitan and rural settings in West Bengal, which is probably owing to the state having the presence of some major industrialized cities such as Kolkata. In the urban centres of India, the effect of urbanization is seen with the decrease in the proportion of joint families and the rise of nuclear families (Terentia Consultants, 2017), and thereby difference in location in the state is leading to the lower creation of bonding social capital in urban centres.

Although the results for Assam show a positive trend compared to the baseline, none of those results are statistically significant.

***H*<sub>3</sub>: An individual who is employed in an agricultural profession (as opposed to an individual who is not employed in an agricultural profession) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.**

**Table 6.3: Impact of Agricultural Profession on the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>					
Muslim		X	X	X	X
Rural			X	X	X
Household Income				X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>					
Agricultural Profession	0.138 (0.118)	0.048 (0.121)	0.004 (0.118)	0.038 (0.119)	0.222** (0.110)
N	311	311	311	311	311
R-squared	0.004	0.030	0.085	0.103	0.366
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>					
Agricultural Profession	0.731*** (0.198)	0.294 (0.196)	0.229 (0.196)	0.157 (0.197)	-
N	93	93	93	93	-
R-squared	0.131	0.321	0.349	0.395	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>					
Agricultural Profession	0.139 (0.328)	0.194 (0.329)	0.173 (0.330)	0.304 (0.358)	-
N	93	93	93	93	-
R-squared	0.002	0.020	0.030	0.055	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>					
Agricultural Profession	0.160 (0.124)	0.117 (0.126)	0.106 (0.127)	0.111 (0.127)	-
N	125	125	125	125	-
R-squared	0.014	0.032	0.040	0.080	-

Note: Baseline: Non-Agricultural Profession; Standard Deviation of the Bonding Social Capital Scores: 0.689 (All States), 0.727 (Tripura), 0.638 (Assam), 0.518 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.3 shows the test pertaining to being involved in an agricultural profession and bonding social capital. The first column includes only agricultural employment, the second one has a control for being Muslim, the third one adds a control for living in a rural location, the fourth one adds a control for household income. It can be seen that in Panel A, in the first four columns, the coefficients do not change much and none of them are significant.

When controlling for fixed effects for the states (Panel A, Column 5), it is seen that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level, pointing towards differences between the states. This highlights that being employed in the agricultural profession versus being employed in a non-agricultural profession lead to increase in bonding

social capital and over 32% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation if state-specific unobservable predictors are controlled. This is a substantively meaningful change. In the case of this hypothesis, the main reason for getting a significant result in Panel A but not in any other panels, even though the results point towards a positive trend has to do with statistical power. The greater number of observations leads to lower standard deviations and a higher t-score.

As with the earlier hypothesis, this hypothesis too is built on the concept of joint families derived from rural Bengal. Through the concept of the joint family, a norm is built in the village-community, where the greater number of household members is equated with more sacrifices for one's community, with such a norm of obligation leading to the formation of higher bonding social capital. When considering the state-specific regression models, the significant effect is only seen in the case of Tripura, where from Panel B, Column 1 it is seen that being engaged in the agricultural profession as opposed to not being in such a profession leads to higher bonding social capital and 101% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. This is an absolutely large change, and the result is highly significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient estimate for agricultural profession is no longer significant with the addition of Muslim as a control. This means that being Muslim as opposed to being Hindu is the factor which is leading to the creation of bonding social capital in the state. Historically, Muslims in the Tripura have been mostly involved in agricultural professions (Ali, 2011), and thus might be exhibiting solidarity based on religion. In the cases of Assam and West Bengal, the results are not significant, although the trend points positively. Thus, those results cannot be interpreted with certainty as they do not show any significant values.

### 6.1.2 Aspects of an individual's location-specific factors that create bonding social capital

There are two models in this section explaining how living in a rural location and support for the cross-border movement of people and goods affect the formation of bonding social capital of an individual.

**H<sub>4</sub>: An individual who lives in a rural location (as opposed to an individual who lives in an urban location) forms a greater level of bonding social capital.**

**Table 6.4: Impact of Rural location on the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>				
Household Income		X	X	X
Agricultural Profession			X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
				FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>				
Rural	0.415*** (0.083)	0.431*** (0.089)	0.425*** (0.090)	0.241*** (0.077)
N	314	314	314	314
R-squared	0.075	0.094	0.095	0.351
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>				
Rural	0.561*** (0.144)	0.493*** (0.147)	0.422*** (0.149)	-
N	95	95	95	-
R-squared	0.140	0.228	0.259	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>				
Rural	0.181 (0.180)	0.284 (0.197)	0.271 (0.199)	-
N	94	94	94	-
R-squared	0.011	0.044	0.047	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>				
Rural	0.173* (0.098)	0.088 (0.113)	0.078 (0.113)	-
N	125	125	125	-
R-squared	0.024	0.065	0.073	-

Note: Baseline: Urban; Standard Deviation of the Bonding Social Capital Scores: 0.688 (All States), 0.728 (Tripura), 0.639 (Assam), 0.518 (West Bengal); "FE" denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; "X" in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.4 shows the test pertaining to living in a rural location as compared to urban location. The reasoning for this hypothesis is that individuals living in rural location have a kind of cohesion where affinity is created due to the existence of greater kinship relations promoting norms of reciprocity, which in turn leads to the formation of higher bonding social capital. The first column only includes rural

location, the second column controls for household income, the third column adds another control for being involved in agricultural profession.

Overall, from Panel A, Column 4, living in a rural environment as opposed to an urban one leads to higher bonding social capital and roughly 35% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change, and the result is highly significant at the 1% level.

Analysing the state-specific regression outputs, with the addition of controls, the hypothesis holds true for Tripura, where living in a rural location versus an urban one leads to the formation of higher bonding social capital and roughly 58% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation (Panel B, Column 3). This is an absolutely large change, and the result is highly significant at the 1% level.

In the case of West Bengal (Panel D), only the first column is marginally significant at the 10% level, showing that living in a rural location as opposed to an urban one leads to the formation of higher bonding social capital and 33% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change. However, with the addition of household income as a control, the coefficient estimates is no longer significant meaning that kinship cohesion is actually a product of the sharing of income in joint families in West Bengal. This was noticeable in the model for West Bengal depicting the hypothesis for household income (earlier in Table 6.2, Panel D), where it was seen how bonding social capital in the state being negatively affected by the decrease in joint families as a product of urbanization. In the case of Assam, although the model shows a positive trend, the results cannot be said with certainty as none of the results are significant.

In Tripura, in comparison to the other two states, kinship ties generated as being part of a joint family structure are felt highly in rural as opposed to urban areas. This is because ties of joint families are stronger in Tripura than the other two states. In West Bengal, the rural areas are getting urbanized faster in an unplanned manner (Das, 2017b) and so the distinction of rural and urban are blurring. Only income is what actually gives rise to reciprocity and bonding social capital (as seen in Table 6.2, Panel D). In the case of Assam, since much of the state's population, particularly the Bengali-speaking Muslim population is a floating group of people who travel to cities for part of the year in search of employment (Chowdhury, 2018), the kinship factor generated as part of being in a rural settings may not be as strong.

It should be pointed out that the proportion of people in the survey sample is similar to the proportion of people in the census who are from rural locations. Thus, specifically for this independent variable, I can claim the results to be representative of the original population living in all states.

***H<sub>5</sub>: The greater an individual’s support for the cross-border movement of people and goods, the greater the level of his/her bonding social capital.***

**Table 6.5: Impact of Cross-Border Movement on the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>					
Trade with Bangladesh		X	X	X	X
Bengali			X	X	X
Muslim				X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>					
Cross-Border Movement	0.177*** (0.051)	0.177*** (0.051)	0.178*** (0.050)	0.151*** (0.049)	0.201*** (0.042)
N	290	290	290	290	290
R-squared	0.039	0.073	0.113	0.165	0.377
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>					
Cross-Border Movement	0.305*** (0.099)	0.272** (0.103)	0.284*** (0.103)	0.164 (0.104)	-
N	85	85	85	85	-
R-squared	0.102	0.116	0.144	0.242	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>					
Cross-Border Movement	0.332*** (0.064)	0.324*** (0.065)	0.308*** (0.065)	0.312*** (0.065)	-
N	89	89	89	89	-
R-squared	0.235	0.242	0.265	0.272	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>					
Cross-Border Movement	0.033 (0.053)	-0.003 (0.053)	-0.001 (0.054)	0.003 (0.053)	-
N	116	116	116	116	-
R-squared	0.003	0.066	0.069	0.107	-

Note: Standard Deviation of the Bonding Social Capital Scores: 0.695 (All States), 0.767 (Tripura), 0.644 (Assam), 0.517 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.5 shows the test regarding my fifth hypothesis. Here the independent variable support for cross-border movement is an index composed of seven variables including if one supports changes in cross-border movement policy with Bangladesh, if one supports policies to decrease trade barriers, if one supports faster visa policy,

if one supports no visa policy with Bangladesh, if one supports an increased trade with Bangladesh, if one supports the flow of remittances from Bangladesh, and if an individual has family or friends in Bangladesh. In addition, controls have been added: The first column in the table includes only the index for cross-border movement, the second one controls for whether a person is involved in trade with Bangladesh, the third one adds a control for whether a person is a native Bengali-speaking individual, and the fourth one adds a further control for being Muslim.

This hypothesis is deduced from the notion of having solidarity with co-ethnics who live on the other side of the international border, leading to one's support for the cross-border movement of people and goods. As can be seen from Table 6.5, the significant effect on cross-border movement is driven largely by the sample from Assam. From Panel A, Column 5, it can be seen that overall, for every unit increase in support for cross-border movement there is higher bonding social capital and over 29% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change, and the result is highly significant at the 1% level. From Panel C, Column 4, it can be seen that specifically for Assam, for every unit increase in support for cross-border movement there is higher bonding social capital and 48% change in the bonding social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change, and the result is highly significant at the 1% level. The legal cross-border movement of people and goods from Assam to Bangladesh is very low compared to West Bengal and Tripura (particularly in the Brahmaputra Valley where the survey respondents were from). Here, the subject of undocumented migration has been a burning issue. The mainstream Assamese population is jittery due to the changing demography, which they think is because of illegal migration from Bangladesh (Hazarika, 2000). Thus, the survey in Assam reflects the need for much more open and legal policies on cross-border movement, to address the issue of illegal movement of people and goods. The idea of issuing work permits is also recommended by Hazarika (2000; pp. 261-262) in his research where he documents how people go across the borders through the *char/sor* regions from Bangladesh to Assam in search of better livelihoods.

Although the results for Tripura in Panel C, Column 3 were highly statistically significant at the 1% level, showing for every unit increase in support for cross-border movement there is higher bonding social capital and 37% change in the

bonding social capital index's standard deviation, the coefficient estimates is no longer significant with the inclusion of Muslim as a control variable. This means that bonding in the state is driven by religious identification. This may be related to the Muslim minority community having greater solidarity due to the small size of this population, for which they have higher levels of bonding social capital than the rest of the population. Furthermore, most Muslims live in border areas of Tripura (Northeast Today 2017; News18 2018) and should naturally support greater cross-border movement as they would be the immediate beneficiaries.

In West Bengal and Tripura, which are Bengali-majority states, cross-border movement is seen as a part of daily life, and this is reflected in responses which favour a status quo on cross-border movement policies. This kind of cross-border movement is described by Afsar (2008) when talking about the link between illegal travel and undocumented migration between Bangladesh and West Bengal, where it is impossible to distinguish the Bengali-speaking migrants from locals. More recently, Damodaran (2017, pp. 315-316) talks about his journey in West Bengal's borderlands and describes how individuals possess properties in both countries, easily moving to and fro because of having both Indian and Bangladeshi ID card. However, this interpretation cannot be said with certainty because the results for the other two states are not significant. This support for cross-border movement of people and goods leading to greater bonding social capital in Assam, in comparison to West Bengal and Tripura, shall be investigated in chapter 8 showing the qualitative analysis in which I will investigate the role of political actors as stakeholders affecting the causal mechanism of this variable.

### 6.1.3 Summary Table and Discussion of Results

**Table 6.6: Results of the hypotheses relating to Bonding Social Capital**

Hypothesis Number	1	2	3	4	5
	Religion	Household Income	Agricultural Profession	Rural	Perception Cross-border Movement
All 3 States	*		*	*	*
Tripura	*			*	
Assam					*
West Bengal					

Table 6.6 summarises the OLS regression models for the personal characteristics and location-specific factors of respondents which lead to the formation of bonding social capital. The “\*” mark means that the results fit the hypothesis and are significant. It should be noted that for a continuous variable, the monotonic effect of the variable on bonding social capital has been considered for gauging whether the results are significant enough to be included in this summary table.

This subsection will answer the following sub-question: What individual personal characteristics and location-specific factors determine bonding social capital formation and through which mechanisms do they work? On the onset of this discussion, it should be said that there is not a single hypothesis that achieves support across all specifications and states. Overall 4 of the 5 models for bonding social capital fit the hypotheses and are significant. Except for the hypothesis for household income, all the independent variables in this section are shown to be leading to the formation of bonding social capital for my respondents. The results indicate that overall, being Muslim, being involved in agricultural profession, living in a rural location, and supporting cross-border movement determine the formation of greater bonding social capital. The results do show state-specific differences in factors leading to the formation of bonding social capital. It should be kept in mind that limited sample size per state may have led to some of the state-specific models not showing significant results, while showing significant results in the overall model. However, the significant results do have some degree of validity as most of

the observations have not been dropped, and the scatter plots of the residuals of the individual regression models fit a straight line very well. These scatter plots of the residuals can be found in Appendix 4.

Considering the state-specific results in table 6.6, the models fit best for Tripura, where two of them are significant. For Tripura, one's religious affiliation and living in a rural setting lead to bonding social capital. For Assam, only one variable is significant. For Assam, an individual's support for cross-border movement leads to bonding social capital. None of the results are significant in the case of West Bengal. Having considered Table 6.6, it is also imperative to take into account the earlier output in Table 6.1 on religion which includes interaction terms for practising (of one's own faith) in order to find out greater state-specific differences for the formation of bonding social capital. Considering the outputs in both Tables 6.1 and 6.6, I find that rural location and being Muslims lead to higher bonding social capital in Tripura, being a practiser of religion and supporting cross-border movement lead to greater formation of bonding social capital in Assam, and being a practising Muslim lead to higher bonding social capital in West Bengal.

Since the overall results are mostly significant but the state-specific results do not mostly show significant values (albeit showing a general fit for the hypotheses) for those same variables, it can be said that my models for presenting the factors that create bonding social capital exhibit state-specific differences. This is probably because even though the factors that lead to the formation of bonding social capital share similar causal mechanisms namely solidarity stemming from the notion of fear, reciprocity based on the idea of kinship derived from being part of a joint family structure, and having affinity with co-ethnics based on kinship ties, these factors may be leading to divergent mechanisms of bonding social capital formation between the three states, resulting to state-specific differences. Two of the factors which create bonding social capital have political actors as stakeholders, whose views shall be investigated in Chapter 8 for examining state-specific differences.

## **6.2 Analysis of the OLS Regression Models pertaining to the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

There are ten models in this section explaining how certain independent factors lead to the formation of bridging social capital. Similar to the previous section, each hypothesis is followed by tables showing the output of the OLS regression of all respondents and the fixed effects model, which are then followed by state-specific regression models. As mentioned in section 5.4 of Chapter 5, the size of the effect of the independent variable compared to the baseline is reported as an equivalent percentage change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. The standard deviation of the bridging social capital index for each sample which has been used to build every OLS regression model (pooled data-set as well as the three states) can be found in Appendix 7. This section too has been divided into sub-sections showing those factors pertaining to an individual's personal characteristic and then those that are location specific. The results and key features of the OLS regression models for bridging social capital are then explained in detail at the end of this section.

### ***6.2.1 Aspects of an individual's personal characteristics that create bridging social capital***

I posit that six aspects of a person's profile affect the formation of a person's bridging social capital. These characteristics include one's language, age group, gender, educational level, profession, and marital status.

**$H_6$ : An individual who is a native Bengali-speaker (as opposed to a native speaker of a different language) forms a lower level of bridging social capital.**

**Table 6.7: Impact of being a native Bengali-speaker on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>						
Muslim		X	X	X	X	X
Education			X	X	X	X
Urban				X	X	X
Non-Agri.					X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
						FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>						
Bengali	-0.554*** (0.113)	-0.550*** (0.120)	-0.548*** (0.120)	-0.539*** (0.122)	-0.537*** (0.123)	-0.706*** (0.133)
N	290	290	290	290	290	290
R-squared	0.077	0.077	0.088	0.09	0.092	0.166
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>						
Bengali	-0.597 (0.484)	-0.863* (0.451)	-0.859* (0.453)	-0.769* (0.456)	-0.780* (0.459)	-
N	84	84	84	84	84	-
R-squared	0.018	0.178	0.181	0.245	0.247	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>						
Bengali	-0.335*** (0.113)	-0.399** (0.164)	-0.366** (0.169)	-0.413** (0.169)	-0.424** (0.168)	-
N	74	74	74	74	74	-
R-squared	0.108	0.112	0.121	0.202	0.226	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>						
Bengali	-0.998*** (0.187)	-0.774*** (0.185)	-0.718*** (0.196)	-0.745*** (0.204)	-0.745*** (0.203)	-
N	132	132	132	132	132	-
R-squared	0.18	0.272	0.276	0.283	0.295	-

Note: Baseline: Not a native Bengali speaker; Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.705 (All States), 0.679 (Tripura), 0.475 (Assam), 0.791 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.7 shows the test regarding my sixth hypothesis. This hypothesis considers the effect of being a native Bengali-speaker on the formation of bridging social capital. The first column includes for only being a native Bengali-speaker, the second panel controls for being Muslim<sup>3</sup>, the third column controls for educational

<sup>3</sup> Please note that the control variable for religion for this regression model includes the Christians in the survey sample (just 4 individuals in total). In all other regression models, the individuals who were Christians were dropped because the effect was to measure for Hindus versus Muslims. However in this case, the individuals who are Christians have been kept so that the sample for Tripura can be measured, as these individuals are the only ones who are not native speakers of Bengali. Otherwise, as all the Muslims and Hindus in the sample from Tripura are native Bengali-speakers, the model for Tripura cannot be run.

levels, the fourth column controls for living in an urban location, and the last column adds a control for being engaged in non-agricultural profession.

This hypothesis is based on the notion of individuals not networking outside his/her core ethnic group if he/she is a native Bengali-speaker, because of being provided with limited opportunity to do so. It can be seen in Panel A, Column 6 that overall being a native Bengali-speaker as opposed to not being one, lowers bridging social capital and leads to 100% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. The change is absolutely large, and this result is highly significant at the 1% level. Considering the state-specific models, all the results show significance at varying levels, with the result of Tripura, Assam and West Bengal being significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.

Being a native Bengali-speaker in West Bengal as opposed to not being one, leads to lower bridging social capital and roughly 94% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. The change is absolutely large. Since the proportion of Bengali-speakers in the sample from West Bengal is similar to the proportion in the official census of India, the result for this particular model is representative of the population of West Bengal, where native Bengali-speakers should form less bridging social capital compared to the rest of the population. Being a native Bengali-speaker in Tripura, as opposed to not being one, leads to lower bridging social capital and 115% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. The change is absolutely large. However, the initial regression model for Tripura which did not include any control showed a negative, yet non-significant correlation. Controlling for Muslim made the results significant, showing the fact that Hindus form even lower bridging social capital in the state as they do not get the opportunity to form out-group connections due to living in an overwhelmingly Bengali-speaking Hindu state, comprising of 66% of the state's total population (TOI, 2018b). In Assam, being a native Bengali-speaker compared to not being one leads to lower bridging social capital or roughly 89% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. The change is absolutely large. Although Assam has a history of linguistic conflict which makes it harder for an individual to form networks out of his/her core group, the fact of being a minority exposes native Bengali-speaking individuals to individuals who are non-native Bengali-speakers, thereby leading to the formation of bridging social capital.

***H<sub>7</sub>*: The higher the age group of an individual, the lower the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

Table 8.1 in Appendix 8 shows the test relating to my seventh hypothesis. The first column includes only age, the second one controls for mobility, the third one adds a column for practising (of one's faith). As can be seen, the coefficients do not change much across age brackets, and none of them are statistically significant. Overall it seems that age has no impact on the bridging social capital that an individual may possess.

The hypothesis is built on the notion that older people tend to be constricted due to time and physical restraints caused by spirituality and mobility. However, neither the model of the pooled dataset nor the models pertaining to the state-specific statistical differences between age brackets are significant, and so this model cannot be interpreted to show the effect of age on bridging social capital.

**$H_8$ : An individual who is female (as opposed to an individual who is male) forms a lower level of bridging social capital.**

**Table 6.8: Impact of being Female on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>							
HH Income		X	X	X	X	X	X
HH Size			X	X	X	X	X
Mobility				X	X	X	X
Non-Agri.					X	X	X
Urban						X	X

<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>							
Female	0.152 (0.104)	0.102 (0.105)	0.099 (0.105)	0.119 (0.102)	0.153 (0.103)	0.138 (0.104)	0.107 (0.104)
N	295	295	295	295	295	295	295
R-squared	0.007	0.041	0.042	0.138	0.149	0.156	0.173
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>							
Female	-0.539*** (0.190)	-0.533*** (0.195)	-0.524** (0.207)	-0.486** (0.207)	-0.448** (0.209)	-0.449** (0.211)	-
N	83	83	83	83	83	83	-
R-squared	0.090	0.171	0.171	0.277	0.29	0.291	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>							
Female	0.039 (0.171)	0.075 (0.180)	0.080 (0.180)	0.046 (0.186)	0.173 (0.200)	0.171 (0.200)	-
N	84	84	84	84	84	84	-
R-squared	0.001	0.022	0.037	0.082	0.115	0.122	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>							
Female	0.359** (0.158)	0.215 (0.150)	0.215 (0.151)	0.289* (0.157)	0.306* (0.159)	0.285* (0.159)	-
N	128	128	128	128	128	128	-
R-squared	0.039	0.207	0.207	0.252	0.256	0.268	-

Note: Baseline: Male; Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.693 (All States), 0.677 (Tripura), 0.457 (Assam), 0.787 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.8 shows the test regarding my eighth hypothesis. The first column includes only gender, the second one controls for household income, the third one controls for the number of members in one’s household, the fourth one controls for mobility, the fifth one adds a control for being engaged in non-agricultural profession, and the sixth column further adds a control for living in an urban location.

This hypothesis is built on the notion of females in Indian society having different gender roles and facing seclusion in comparison to males, which in turn

leads to them getting limited opportunity for prolonged interaction with individuals outside of their core family and kin group, thereby making them form lower bridging social capital. In the overall model, although it is noticeable that females have more bridging social capital than men which is counter to the hypothesis, nothing can be predicted from that model as none of the results are significant.

Considering the state-specific models, different trends can be seen. In Panel C, the model for Assam shows a positive trend for females having greater social capital than males, but similar to the overall model, nothing can be predicted from that model as none of the results are significant. The results for the other two states show significant values. From Panel B, Column 6, it can be seen how in Tripura, males form greater bridging social as compared to females and lead to 66% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation, after controlling for all concerned factors. This is an absolutely large change, and this result is significant at the 5% level of significance.

In Panel D, Column 6, showing the results for West Bengal, a totally opposite story is noticeable. With the inclusion of all control variables, females as compared to males form higher bridging social capital and lead to 36% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change, and the result is marginally significant at the 10% level of significance. There are two possible reasons behind this result. The first one pertains to the proportion of females in the sample from West Bengal. As with most of the variables, the proportion of females in the sample is not representative of the proportion of females in the state. Only 26% of the people in the sample from West Bengal are females, while according to the Indian National Census of 2011, 49% of the state's population is female. Thus, something unique might be present in the sample of females from West Bengal which is leading to such unusual results. The second reason for the divergent result for the regression result for West Bengal pertains to better physical safety for women in the state. Kolkata, West Bengal's capital, happens to be one of the safest cities for women in India (S. Bhattacharya, 2017) and thus, it may be the case that females do not face any restrictions when stepping outside their households as physical safety is not a big concern for them. However, this value is only marginally significant at the 10% level of significance, and so can be disregarded.

**H<sub>9</sub>: The higher the educational qualification of an individual, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

**Table 6.9: Impact of Educational Level on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>				
Student Diversity		X	X	X
Non-Agri. Prof.			X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>				
Secondary	0.095 (0.139)	0.104 (0.140)	0.082 (0.143)	0.085 (0.123)
Higher Secondary	0.187 (0.137)	0.207 (0.140)	0.183 (0.143)	0.117 (0.133)
Bachelors	0.182 (0.134)	0.199 (0.138)	0.177 (0.141)	0.048 (0.139)
Masters & Above	0.081 (0.162)	0.087 (0.164)	0.055 (0.169)	-0.084 (0.165)
N	287	287	287	287
R-squared	0.009	0.011	0.014	0.073
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>				
Secondary	0.135 (0.232)	0.148 (0.235)	0.160 (0.241)	- -
Higher Secondary	0.213 (0.250)	0.213 (0.257)	0.237 (0.274)	- -
Bachelors	-0.149 (0.232)	-0.122 (0.239)	-0.111 (0.244)	- -
Masters & Above	-0.196 (0.250)	-0.154 (0.258)	-0.126 (0.282)	- -
N	82	82	82	-
R-squared	0.051	0.059	0.060	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>				
Secondary	-0.058 (0.148)	-0.050 (0.144)	-0.098 (0.148)	- -
Higher Secondary	-0.083 (0.161)	-0.041 (0.158)	-0.063 (0.158)	- -
Bachelors	0.236 (0.187)	0.351* (0.187)	0.345* (0.187)	- -
Masters & Above	0.363 (0.261)	0.478* (0.258)	0.432 (0.259)	- -
N	73	73	73	-
R-squared	0.078	0.159	0.179	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>				
Secondary	0.193 (0.304)	0.305 (0.292)	0.257 (0.297)	- -
Higher Secondary	0.206 (0.274)	0.304 (0.267)	0.251 (0.273)	- -
Bachelors	0.187 (0.268)	0.195 (0.259)	0.128 (0.269)	- -
Masters & Above	0.089 (0.314)	0.008 (0.300)	-0.057 (0.308)	- -
N	132	132	132	-
R-squared	0.006	0.144	0.149	-

Note: Baseline: Primary or no education; Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.707 (All States), 0.683 (Tripura), 0.476 (Assam), 0.791 (West Bengal); "FE" denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; "X" in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.9 shows the test regarding educational attainment. The first column includes only educational levels, the second one controls for student diversity, and the third one adds a control for non-agricultural employment.

The reasoning for this hypothesis was based on the theory that higher education means having spent more years in school with individuals who are different from oneself and thus developing a greater out-group network. However, the overall model shows that there happens to be no difference with the baseline of primary or no education, pointing towards great variation within the states. In the overall model, none of the coefficient estimates are significant.

Looking at the state-specific models, none of the results for Tripura and West Bengal are significant, while some results from Assam show marginal significance at the 10% level. These outputs are for individuals holding Bachelors, Masters and above educational qualifications. This means that having a Bachelors Degree or higher, a person would have a higher likelihood of forming greater bridging social capital compared to the base educational level in Assam. This probably has to do with proficiency in Assamese, which a person with lower education, if he/she is not a native Assamese speaker (similar to most individuals in my sample with 71% being a native Bengali speaker) would not possess. In addition, for the Bengali-speaking Muslims who comprise 85 percent of the population in the *char/sor* region (Andre & Kumar, 2016), attaining a university education might mean stepping out to a bigger city such as Guwahati where one has a higher likelihood of networking with the wider group of people from the mainstream Assamese community. From Panel C, Column 2, it can be seen that having attained a Bachelors Degree and a Masters Degree and above as compared to having a primary school education or below, leads to higher bridging social capital with roughly 74% and 100% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation respectively. Interestingly, for Masters Degree holders and above, controlling for non-agricultural profession (Panel C, Column 3) makes the coefficient estimates no longer significant meaning that the effect was driven by being involved in non-agricultural profession which leads to people having higher chances of networking outside one's core group due to reasons of knowledge sharing.

***H<sub>10</sub>*: An individual who is employed in a non-agricultural profession (as opposed to an individual who is employed in an agricultural profession) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.**

Table 8.2 in Appendix 8 shows the test pertaining to being engaged in non-agricultural employment. The first column includes only non-agricultural profession, the second one has a control for living in an urban location, and the third one also controls for educational level. It can be seen that in general although there is a positive trend, none of the results are significant.

This hypothesis is built on the notion that non-agricultural communities form networks with non-group members for getting hold of opportunities for resource and knowledge sharing. Considering the state-specific models, none of the values for Tripura and Assam are significant. Only in the case of West Bengal, without the addition of any variables, the result in the initial column was significant at the marginal 10% level, showing that being employed in a non-agricultural profession as opposed to being employed in an agricultural profession, lead to higher bridging social capital and almost 34% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change. However, with the addition of urban as a control variable, makes the coefficient estimates no longer significant showing that living in an urban location was actually driving this effect in West Bengal. This result was only marginally significant, and thus no interpretation can be derived from this model.

***H<sub>11</sub>*: An individual who is married to a person of the same linguistic and religious group (as opposed to an individual who is unmarried) forms a lower level of bridging social capital. However, an individual who is married to someone of a different linguistic or religious group (as opposed to an individual who is unmarried) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.**

**Table 6.10: Impact of types of Marriages on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Control</b>			
Ostracized		X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>			
Married (same language & religion)	-0.135 (0.084)	-0.155* (0.085)	-0.188** (0.091)
Married (different language)	0.148 (0.233)	0.121 (0.234)	0.172 (0.189)
Married (different religion)	0.765*** (0.246)	0.765*** (0.245)	0.629*** (0.230)
Married (different language & religion)	0.709*** (0.204)	0.661*** (0.206)	0.608** (0.259)
N	299	299	299
R-squared	0.095	0.102	0.137
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>			
Married (same language & religion)	-0.090 (0.168)	-	-
Married (different language)	0.813* (0.358)	-	-
N	86	-	-
R-squared	0.080	-	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>			
Married (same language & religion)	-0.141 (0.108)	-0.156 (0.105)	-
Married (different language)	-0.109 (0.244)	-0.109 (0.234)	-
Married (different language & religion)	-0.013 (0.279)	-0.348 (0.291)	-
N	81	81	-
R-squared	0.023	0.128	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>			
Married (same language & religion)	-0.195 (0.143)	-0.236 (0.146)	-
Married (different language)	-0.182 (0.754)	-0.382 (0.817)	-
Married (different religion)	0.594** (0.286)	0.594* (0.286)	-
Married (different language & religion)	0.800*** (0.272)	0.738*** (0.275)	-
N	132	132	-
R-squared	0.137	0.153	-

Note: Baseline: Unmarried; Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.699 (All States), 0.674 (Tripura), 0.461 (Assam), 0.790 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.10 shows the level of bridging social capital formed by married people in comparison to unmarried people. Married people have been divided into various categories depending on the linguistic and religious backgrounds of their spouses: married (spouse of the same linguistic and religious background), married (spouse of different linguistic background), married (spouse of different religious background), and married (spouse of both different linguistic and religious backgrounds). The first column included only variables for marriage and the second column controls for being ostracized by one's family. The baseline is being unmarried.

For the overall model (Panel A, Column 3), being married with a spouse of the same linguistic and religious background as compared to being unmarried, leads to lower formation of bridging social capital and 27% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change, and this result is significant at the 5% level. However, intermarriage shows a positive effect. Overall, being married with a spouse of the different religious background and being married with a spouse of both different linguistic and religious backgrounds as compared to being unmarried, have quite a big impact on bridging social capital, with significant levels of 1% and 5 % respectively. From Panel A, Column 3, it can be seen that being married with a spouse of different religious background as compared to being unmarried, leads to higher bridging social capital and roughly 90% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is an absolutely large change. Similarly in Panel A, Column 3, it can be seen that being married with a spouse of different linguistic and religious backgrounds as compared to being unmarried, leads to higher bridging social capital and roughly 87% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is an absolutely large change.

When considering each state individually, the results are varied. In the case of Assam, neither combination of different backgrounds of the spouse is significant.

In the case of Tripura, from Panel B, Column 1, it can be seen that being married with a spouse of different linguistic background as compared to being unmarried, leads to higher bridging social capital and roughly 121% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is an absolutely large change, but this result is marginally significant at the 10% level. In Tripura, the conflict between the tribals and the Bengali-speaking Hindus is of a linguistic nature, as described in the background chapter of the region in Chapter 2, and so intergroup

relations open up more if people from these two communities intermarry. The sample from Tripura does not report any case of religious inter-marriage.

In the case of West Bengal, having a spouse of a different religious background or having a spouse of both different religious and linguistic backgrounds as compared to being unmarried, lead to greater bridging social capital. From Panel D, Column 2, it can be seen that being married with a spouse of different religious background as compared to being unmarried, leads to higher bridging social capital and roughly 75% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is an absolutely large change, but this result is marginally significant at the 10% level. Similarly in Panel D, Column 2, it can be seen that being married with a spouse of different linguistic and religious backgrounds as compared to being unmarried, leads to higher bridging social capital and roughly 93% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is an absolutely large change, and this result is significant at the 1% level. As stated in Chapter 2 describing the history of the region, Bengal's history of Partition in 1947 has deepened the religious divide in West Bengal. Cases of Hindu-Muslim inter-faith marriages can have severe consequences with couples being targets of honour killings. The most famous case of honour killings, in recent years, is that of Rizwanur Rahman, a young Muslim man who had married the daughter of a prominent Hindu businessman (Ghose, 2016). With the threats of such sanctions looming such actions, couples in many cases run off and get disconnected from their own kin and put themselves in a situation to seek out social network outside of their core group. Thus, any kind of religious intermarriage should open up intergroup relations leading to networking with people beyond one's core ethnic group.

## 6.2.2 Aspects of an individual's location-specific factors that create bridging social capital

Four aspects of a person's location-specific factors, beyond one's personal characteristics, affect the formation of a person's bridging social capital. These characteristics include living in an urban location, an individual's perception of the governance institutions, an individual's perception of the socio-economic environment, and an individual's proximity to the ruling political establishment.

***H*<sub>12</sub>: An individual who lives in an urban location (as opposed an individual who lives in a rural location) forms a greater level of bridging social capital.**

**Table 6.11: Impact of living in an urban location on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>					
Mobility		X	X	X	X
Education			X	X	X
Non-Agri. Prof.				X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>					
Urban	0.210** (0.090)	0.240** (0.094)	0.225** (0.096)	0.212** (0.096)	0.200** (0.097)
N	287	287	287	287	287
R-squared	0.019	0.109	0.120	0.129	0.138
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>					
Urban	-0.274* (0.151)	-0.070 (0.162)	-0.111 (0.171)	-0.130 (0.171)	-
N	84	84	84	84	-
R-squared	0.038	0.178	0.258	0.276	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>					
Urban	-0.146 (0.137)	-0.038 (0.163)	-0.197 (0.172)	-0.234 (0.174)	-
N	74	74	74	74	-
R-squared	0.016	0.058	0.183	0.203	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>					
Urban	0.586*** (0.141)	0.539*** (0.158)	0.545*** (0.162)	0.532*** (0.162)	-
N	129	129	129	129	-
R-squared	0.120	0.135	0.140	0.156	-

Note: Baseline: Rural; Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.707 (All States), 0.679 (Tripura), 0.475 (Assam), 0.797 (West Bengal); "FE" denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; "X" in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.11 shows the test relating to living in an urban versus a rural location. This hypothesis is based on two underlying factors present in urban settings, compared to

rural settings, which are namely proximity with other people and the availability of time. The first column only includes location, and the second column controls for mobility, the third column adds a control for education, and the fourth column further adds a control for being engaged in non-agricultural profession.

According to the overall model (Panel A, Column 5), living in an urban environment as opposed to living in a rural setting has a positive impact on bridging social capital. This result is significant at the 5% level, where living in an urban location as opposed to a rural one leads to higher bridging social capital and over 28% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change. Considering the state-specific models, it turns out that results for Assam show a negative trend but none of them are significant, and so no interpretation can be deduced. In the case of Tripura, living in an urban location over a rural one shows a negative effect on bridging social capital, with the models without control (Panel B, Column 1) showing that living in an urban location as opposed to a rural one leads to lower bridging social capital and 40% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change, and this result is marginally significant at the 10% level. This is the case because the only major city, Agartala, is a city comprising largely of Bengali-speaking Hindus (Debbarma, 2017), and more diverse areas can be found in the countryside. With the addition of mobility as a control variable, there is minimal correlation and the coefficient estimate is no longer significant, reflecting that mobility is the factor which actually determines bridging social capital in Tripura. If people travel between villages, they should be connecting with a more diverse network of people, than if they just lived in Agartala.

However, the hypothesis fits in the case of West Bengal. From Panel D, Column 4, it can be seen that living in an urban environment as opposed to a rural one leads to higher bridging social capital and roughly 67% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is an absolutely large change, and this result is highly significant at the 1% level. Some of the big industrial centres of India, especially the city of Kolkata, are situated in West Bengal. Thus, the reasoning for living in close proximity to linguistically and religiously different people in such multi-cultural settings, which in turn leads to greater bridging social capital, holds particularly true here.

It should be noted that the proportion of individuals in the samples who are from urban areas is similar to the proportion of people living in urban areas according to the Census of India (2011). Thus for this independent variable, any significant results can also be representative of living in urban locations reflecting change in the formation of bridging social capital in the actual population.

***H<sub>13</sub>*: The better an individual's perception of his/her governance institutions, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

**Table 6.12: Impact of Perception of governance institutions on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>						
Muslim		X	X	X	X	X
Mem Local Gov			X	X	X	X
Mem State Gov				X	X	X
Mem Central Gov					X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>						
Perception	-0.050	-0.084*	-0.075	-0.059	-0.017	0.000
Gov Institution	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.052)
N	271	271	271	271	271	271
R-squared	0.004	0.047	0.057	0.083	0.120	0.145
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>						
Perception	-0.241**	-0.250**	-0.285***	-0.279***	-0.274***	-
Gov Institutions	(0.101)	(0.099)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)	-
N	63	63	63	63	63	-
R-squared	0.085	0.134	0.221	0.246	0.268	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>						
Perception	0.096*	0.076	0.045	0.044	0.081	-
Gov Institution	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.053)	-
N	80	80	80	80	80	-
R-squared	0.041	0.072	0.110	0.172	0.252	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>						
Perception	0.022	-0.073	-0.060	-0.034	-0.023	-
Gov Institution	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.075)	(0.075)	-
N	128	128	128	128	128	-
R-squared	0.001	0.162	0.201	0.224	0.247	-

Note: Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.707 (All States), 0.698 (Tripura), 0.449 (Assam), 0.790 (West Bengal); "FE" denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; "X" in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.12 shows the test regarding my thirteenth hypothesis. Here the independent variable, perception of governance institutions, is an index composed of four variables including trust in local government officials, trust in state government

officials, trust in central government officials, and the belief that the country is headed in the right direction. The first column includes only the index for perception of governance institutions. The second column controls for being Muslim, the third column adds a control for having a member in the local government, the fourth column includes a control for having a member in the state government, and the fifth column further adds a control for having a member in the central government.

This hypothesis is built on the logic of having institutions of governance which are trustworthy determining the context of one's social interactions, especially with engaging with their fellow citizens with whom one lack close ties (Kuenzi, 2008). From the first panel, showing results for all the respondents, it appears that the perception of institutions of governance has a slight negative effect on bridging social capital. This is however not significant, with the addition of all controls. In the first panel, when Muslim is added as a control variable, it turns out that the negative relationship of perception of governance institutions with bridging social capital increases. The result is marginal significant at the 10% level. While controlling for Muslim, a higher perception of governance institutions leads to less bridging social capital and 12% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation which is a small change. This means that Hindus have a greater perception of governance institutions. It may be the case that because an individual who is a Hindu happens to be from the majority community, if the local context seems to support fair behaviour, they are less likely to network with people especially fellow citizens with whom they lack close ties as there is no necessity for doing so.

Moving on to the state-specific effects, different results can be seen. In Tripura, the results are highly significant at the 1% level but show a negative effect where a one unit increase in the perception of governance institutions leads to lower level of bridging social capital and more than 39% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation (Panel B, Column 5). This is a substantively meaningful change. One explanation for this result can be that for Tripura, which is a state comprising mainly of Bengali-speaking Hindus, if the local context seems to support fair behaviour, individuals do not feel the necessity to reach out to their fellow citizens with whom they lack close ties, and this is reflected in his/her wider network being less diverse. The results for Tripura should be interpreted with caution as many respondents chose not to answer certain questions which were used to create

the independent variable. This is possibly because they felt anxious in talking about the governing establishment.

Without the addition of controls, Assam fits the hypothesis and the result is marginally significant at the 10% level. The first column for Assam without any controls (Panel C, Column 1) shows that for every unit increase in perception of governance institutions, there is a higher level of bridging social capital and 21% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change. However, with the addition of Muslim as a control variable, the coefficient estimate is no longer significant, and this probably means that particularly for Muslims in the state, belief in governance leads to higher network with people and thereby the greater formation of bridging social capital. This points out to the need to develop higher trust in governance institutions among the Muslim community in the state, as they are routinely harassed and discriminated by the wider Assamese society (Andre & Kumar, 2016; Khalid, 2018). However, the result for the model cannot be said with certainty as with the additions of all controls, the coefficient estimate is no longer significant. The results for West Bengal show minimal correlation, and none of the results are significant.

***H<sub>14</sub>*: The better an individual's perception of his/her socio-economic environment, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.**

**Table 6.13: Impact of perception of socio-economic environment on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>				
Muslim		X	X	X
Household Income			X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>				
Socio-economic Environment	0.02 (0.063)	-0.023 (0.065)	-0.049 (0.065)	-0.052 (0.067)
N	257	257	257	257
R-squared	0.000	0.022	0.047	0.113
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>				
Socio-economic Environment	0.032 (0.106)	0.054 (0.100)	0.105 (0.105)	- -
N	80	80	80	-
R-squared	0.001	0.133	0.168	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>				
Socio-economic Environment	-0.061 (0.062)	-0.106* (0.059)	-0.104 (0.063)	- -
N	53	53	53	-
R-squared	0.019	0.167	0.169	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>				
Socio-economic Environment	0.025 (0.097)	-0.176* (0.094)	-0.283*** (0.092)	- -
N	124	124	124	-
R-squared	0.001	0.208	0.323	-

Note: Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.700 (All States), 0.680 (Tripura), 0.400 (Assam), 0.740 (West Bengal); "FE" denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; "X" in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.13 shows the test regarding my fourteenth hypothesis. Here the independent variable, perception of socio-economic environment, is an index composed of four variables including positive view of the economic situation of the country, belief that the economic situation of the country is improving, viewing one's living condition as compared to other people in the state, and viewing one's living condition as compared to other people in the country. The first column includes only the index for the perception of socio-economic environment. The second column controls for being Muslim, and the third column adds a control for household income.

The hypothesis is based on the notion that socio-economic inequality between different groups of people translates to a perception of being disadvantaged, which in turn excludes individuals from connecting to a wider network of people beyond one's core group. In the first panel, when Muslim is added as a control variable, it turns out that the relationship of socio-economic environment with bridging social capital becomes negative. However, none of the results in the overall model is significant, and so anything regarding that cannot be said with certainty.

Moving on to the state-specific effects, none of the models fits the hypothesis, but different stories can be seen from their results. The results for Tripura, in Panel B, show a positive trend but nothing about the model from that state can be said with certainty as none of the results, with or without controls, are significant.

The result for West Bengal, in Panel D, Column 3, is highly significant at the 1% level, although the relationship between the variables is negative. Initially, without the addition of the control variables, the result was not significant but showed a positive correlation. When controlling for Muslims (Panel D, Column 2), the result showed that a one unit increase in perception of socio-economic environment led to decrease in bridging social capital and almost 24% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation, which is a substantively meaningful change. Although this result is marginally significant at the 10% level, it shows that without the proportions of Muslims in the sample, having a better perception of socio-economic environment leads to lower formation of bridging social capital. Furthermore, when controlling for household income, the relationship becomes even more negative and significant at the 1% level, meaning that one's financial situation affects his/her perception of the socio-economic environment, which in turn affects inter-group relations. The model for West Bengal (with the inclusion of all controls; Panel D, Column 3) shows that with every unit increase in one's perception of socio-economic condition, there is a decrease in the formation of bridging social capital and 38% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation, which is a substantively meaningful change. This means that one's positive perception of socio-economic environment leads to lower bridging social capital as one does not need to reach out to a wider network of people, especially if they belong to the majority religious community and have a moderate level of income.

This hypothesis was formed based on the idea of economic inequality where respondents see their current economic situation in comparative terms feeling disadvantaged, which in turn excludes an individual from connecting to a wider network of people beyond one's core group. The economic inequality in Bengal between Hindus and Muslims can be traced back to the days of British colonial policies favouring education and economic prosperity of Hindus at the expense of Muslims by creating dissension among groups as per a policy of "divide and rule" (Chatterji, 2007; Islam, 2017). Due to historical reasons of income inequality faced by the Muslims in West Bengal, there probably is an existent mind set among members of this community about inherent discrimination against them. This mind set of discrimination is also present among Muslims in other parts of India, where one feels they are constantly being discriminated by civil society such as for instance by not being allowed tenancy (Wajid, 2017). In West Bengal, there are cases where Muslims pose as Hindus for getting hold of employment, particularly for menial jobs in sectors where documentation is not required (Rahman, 2012). While a Hindu (Panel D, Column 2) who does not have this mind set of being discriminated, having a better perception of his/her socio-economic condition leads to less networking outside his/her core group as already he/she is satisfied with his/her economic situation. Furthermore, the control for household income in making the result even more negatively significant means that having a moderate income one will be satisfied economically and will not gauge his/her out-group interaction based on being relatively disadvantaged.

The results for Assam show a negative trend while the addition of Muslim as a control variable (Panel C, Column 2) show marginal 10% level of significance, with a one percent increase in perception of socio-economic environment leading to lower bridging social capital and roughly 27% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change. However, with the addition of household income as a control, the coefficient estimate is no longer significant, and the overall result cannot be interpreted with certainty. On the onset, it should be pointed out that the interpretation of this result should be done with caution as there are very few observations, because many individuals in Assam did not have any opinion about the economic situation in other parts of India due to limited outside exposure. In Assam, there is isolation between tribal communities who are deemed to be marginally affiliated to the Hindu faith and are not fully

integrated into the Hindu caste system (Pathak & Pathak, 2014, p. 33). So being satisfied with the socio-economic environment for the individuals in the sample from Assam might mean one does not have to consider out-group ties, especially if they are Hindus (as seen after the addition of controls for Muslims) because they are confined in their own communities and require no inter-ethnic networking for economic reasons.

***H<sub>15</sub>: The greater an individual’s proximity to his/her political establishment, the greater the level of his/her bridging social capital.***

**Table 6.14: Impact of proximity to political establishment on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>					
Urban		X	X	X	X
Bengali			X	X	X
Muslim				X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
					FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>					
Political Proximity	0.202*** (0.045)	0.191*** (0.045)	0.187*** (0.043)	0.193*** (0.044)	0.144*** (0.050)
N	293	293	293	293	293
R-squared	0.065	0.082	0.141	0.142	0.181
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>					
Political Proximity	0.212* (0.121)	0.218* (0.120)	0.218* (0.120)	0.129 (0.122)	-
N	78	78	78	78	-
R-squared	0.039	0.063	0.063	0.133	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>					
Political Proximity	0.142** (0.069)	0.179** (0.071)	0.138* (0.070)	0.137* (0.071)	-
N	84	84	84	84	-
R-squared	0.049	0.093	0.162	0.162	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>					
Political Proximity	0.194*** (0.072)	0.199*** (0.068)	0.196*** (0.064)	0.237*** (0.061)	-
N	131	131	131	131	-
R-squared	0.054	0.162	0.263	0.343	-

Note: Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.697 (All States), 0.682 (Tripura), 0.449 (Assam), 0.788 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

Table 6.14 shows the test regarding my fifteenth hypothesis. Here the independent variable, proximity to the ruling political establishment, is an index composed of three variables including having a group member in the local government, having a group member in the state government, having a group member in the central government. The first column includes only the index for the proximity to the ruling political establishment. The second column controls for living in an urban location, the third column controls for being a native Bengali speaker, the fourth column adds a control for being Muslim.

The overall model (Panel A, Column 5) is highly significant at the 1% level and shows that with a one unit rise in an individual's proximity to his/her political establishment, there is rise in his/her level of bridging social capital and over 21% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change. Moving on to the state-specific regression, the model for West Bengal (Panel D, Column 4) is also highly significant at the 1% level and shows that for one unit rise in proximity to the political establishment, there is rise in bridging social capital and roughly 30% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change.

The results for Tripura and Assam show a slightly different story. For Tripura, it can be seen that in the initial model without controls (Panel B, Column 1), one unit rise in proximity to the political establishment leads to higher bridging social capital and roughly 31% change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation. This is a substantively meaningful change. This result is marginally significant at the 10% level. With the addition of Muslim as a control variable, the coefficient estimate is no longer significant. The hypothesis for this test is based on the idea of clientelistic exchanges leading to greater inter-group ties. This means that since Muslims are only 9% of the Tripura's population, they have a greater need for clientelistic exchanges for getting access to more public goods and services, which is shown in them having a big effect on the formation of bridging social capital.

In the case of Assam, the addition of native Bengali speakers as a control variable (Panel C, Column 3) lowers the level of significance from 5% to 10%, and the bridging social capital score. The change in the bridging social capital index's standard deviation falls from 40% to 31%. Both cases are substantively meaningful changes. This means that native Bengali speakers being 27% of the state's population have a greater need for clientelistic exchanges through building inter-

group ties, in order to get more access to public goods and services. Overall the model for Assam is marginally significant at the 10% level and shows that for 1 unit increase in an individual’s proximity to the political establishment, his/her bridging capital rises with a change in the bridging social capital index’s standard deviation by 31%.

### 6.2.3 Summary Table and Discussion of Results

**Table 6.15: Results of the hypotheses relating to Bridging Social Capital**

Hypothesis Number	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
	Language	Age	Gender	Education	Non-Agricultural Profession	Inter-marriage	Urban	Perception Gov. Institution	Perception Socio-economic Environment	Political Proximity
All 3 States	*					*	*			*
Tripura	*		*			*				
Assam	*									*
West Bengal	*					*	*			*

Table 6.15 summarises the OLS regression models for the personal characteristics and location-specific factors of respondents which lead to the formation of bridging social capital. As in the summary of the last section, the “\*” mark means that the results fit the hypotheses and are significant. It should be noted that for a continuous variable, the monotonic effect of the variable on bridging social capital has been considered for gauging whether the results are significant enough to be included in this summary table.

Overall 4 of the 10 models for bridging social capital fit the hypothesis and are significant. Overall, not being a native Bengali speaker, living in an urban location, being married to a person of another linguistic and religious background, and having greater proximity to the political establishment greatly affect the bridging social capital that one possesses. Considering the state-specific models, the hypotheses fit the best for West Bengal for which 4 of the 10 models have fit the hypotheses and are significant. These factors happen to be exactly the same as for

the pooled-dataset. For the other two states, 3 models are significant for Tripura, and 2 models are significant for Assam. From Tripura, other than the factors for language and intermarriage, gender is also significant for the creation of bridging social capital. For Assam, the factors for language and political proximity are significant for the creation of bridging social capital. The factors for the formation of bridging social capital do show less state-specific differences than the factors that lead to the creation of bonding social capital.

The good side of a few of the significant models is that they can also be deemed representative of the whole population as the proportion in the survey is equal to the proportion in the Indian census. This includes all proportions for the independent factor, urban, in the pooled dataset and the state-specific models. This means that overall living in an urban area and specifically in West Bengal will lead to greater bridging social capital for the actual population. The survey and the census proportions are also representative for the language category for West Bengal, which means that being a non-Bengali speaker should lead to greater bridging social capital for the actual population in the state.

This sub-section will answer the sub-research question: What individual personal characteristics and location-specific factors determine bridging social capital formation and through which mechanisms do they work? The factors that form bridging social capital are more common between the states than the factors that lead to bonding social capital which are more state-specific. It can be said that since the factors that lead to the formation of bridging social capital are induced by similar underlying causal mechanisms leading to the growth of connections outside one's core linguistic and/or religious network, they seem to show less variation within the states. Such a tendency consists of prolonged interaction with another person, such as by living in an urban location, via intermarriage, or being a speaker of a language in a state whose majority speaks another language. The only factor which was found significant with having a different kind of causal mechanism is the factor for proximity with the political establishment, which is based on the presence of corruption in society. It should be noted that although the model for intermarriage showed significant results, it should be looked at with caution because in the overall sample only 9% of respondents intermarried.

The state-specific analysis is a bit less complex in explaining the models for bridging social capital as compared to the models for bonding social capital. Other

than the common factors between the states which lead to the creation of bridging social capital, being female in Tripura leads to lower bridging social capital as it appears that females have less time for outside interaction as they possibly face greater seclusion. Similarly, urbanization leads to bridging social capital in West Bengal because the city of Kolkata, one of the biggest industrial centres of India, is located in the state—thereby reflecting the urban and rural differences in terms of diversity of the population.

The models for the formation of bridging social capital should be viewed with slightly more caution than the models for the creation of bonding social capital. First of all, the distribution of the bridging social capital index was rightly skewed meaning that most of the respondents had limited bridging social capital to begin with and this might have affected the results. However, the scatter plots of the residuals of the individual regression models more or less fit straight lines, and so the normality assumptions are not completely violated, and thus the results for the models for bridging social capital do hold validity. These scatter plots of the residuals can be found in Appendix 4. Furthermore, unlike the models for bonding social capital, more observations have been dropped in the regression models for bridging social capital. Yet, except in two cases, the models for bridging social capital have been run with 70 observations, and so the results can be accepted with a fair degree of validity.

Caution should be placed when considering the results for the regression model pertaining to the perception of government institutions in Tripura, which was run with only 63 respondents. Similar caution should be placed when considering the results for the regression model pertaining to the perception of the socio-economic environment for Assam, which was run with only 53 respondents. These are mainly due to some of the questions of the items used to create the independent variables being too sensitive or respondents not having an opinion about them. In both cases, the relationship between the independent variable and bridging social capital is exactly reversed. Although in the case of Tripura, the result is also significant, this model should be considered with extreme caution.

### **6.3 Discussion and Conclusion**

The OLS regression analysis models generated in this quantitative analysis chapter try to answer the main research question in this study: How is social capital formed among Bengali-speaking Muslims in three Indian border states? It does this by investigating how well the theoretical framework that I built in Chapter 4 captures the formation of bonding and bridging social capital among Bengali-speaking Muslims in three border states of India.

At the onset of this discussion, it should be said that there is only a single hypothesis that achieves support across all specifications and states. The study finds that for the overall model, being Muslim, being involved in agricultural profession, living in a rural location, and supporting cross-border movement lead to the formation of greater bonding social capital; while not being a native speaker of Bengali, being married to someone of a different linguistic and religious background, living in an urban location, having greater proximity to the ruling establishment lead to the formation of greater bridging social capital. It should be kept in mind that limited sample size per state may have led to some of the state-specific models not showing significant results while showing significant results in the overall model.

It is found that the models for the formation of bridging social capital exhibit more commonality between the states, while the models for bonding social capital display more variation between the states. It was found that rural location and being Muslims lead to higher bonding social capital in Tripura, being a practiser of religion and supporting cross-border movement lead to the greater formation of bonding social capital in Assam, and being a practising Muslim lead to higher bonding social capital in West Bengal. On the other hand, considering the results for the models depicting the formation of bridging social capital, only one factor which was significant in the state-specific model was not significant in the overall model. This includes the model for gender in the case of Tripura.

Comparing the results with earlier studies, I do find that the outcome in this study which shows that Muslims possess more bonding social capital, concurs with the recent study by Gupta et al. (2018). The authors had based their studies in the Bangladesh and West Bengal region and found that religious minority status being the driver of trust among different segments of the population rather than religiosity itself. Although Gupta et al. (2018) had simply looked at interpersonal trust, their finding is comparable to my study in the sense that I also find Muslim minority

status as generating fear among the population and leading to greater bonding social capital.

Another result which was significant in my study pertains to the factor of language leading to the creation of greater bridging social capital. Van Tubergen et al. (2004) stated that speaking the host region's language helps in opening up employment networks and so being a speaker of the majority language leads to higher bridging social capital. I find that being a non-native speaker of a minority language actually leads to the formation of greater bridging social capital as one is given the opportunity to meet with people who speak a language different from himself/herself.

Regarding urban-rural differences, Sørensen (2016) found how urban areas had higher social capital than rural areas and vice versa. Sørensen (2016) found that people living in rural settings had greater bonding social capital because of the co-dependent nature of their communities, while he found that in urban areas individuals face the pressure of building greater economic relations and thus build a diverse network of contacts. Sørensen's understanding of rural settings being close-knit is actually similar to the idea of close kinship generated by joint family structures of rural Bengal. In terms of my reasoning regarding urban settings, my understanding was based simply on the greater opportunity to meet more people due to living in proximity to them which leads to bridging social capital, but not any kind of economic reasoning that Sørensen had suggested.

My study also finds a correlation between intermarriage and social capital as was found in earlier studies. For example, Alba and Nee's (2003) study in the United States found that intermarriage being a resultant of trust because it showed a true acceptance of other ethnic groups as equals, leading to gradual erosion of the ethnic uniqueness. However, my causal reasoning is different where I see intermarriage being generated due to having greater interaction with other kinds of people, which in turn leads to opening up of diverse contact networks and greater bridging social capital.

In terms of the significant result for support for cross-border movement leading to bonding social capital, it is comparable to several earlier studies on migration and trade. Studies on the Chinese diaspora (Rauch & Trindade, 2002; Liang et al., 2017) show how support for cross-border movement leads to the formation of trust as a result of a pattern of reciprocity and obligations based on co-

ethnic kinship ties. Such examples are visible in the floating migrant population among the Chinese migration networks getting information from their networks about housing and employment opportunities (Liang et al., 2017) and bilateral trade between countries being higher due to the presence of bigger ethnic Chinese networks in certain countries (Rauch & Trindade, 2002).

The last factor for which my study finds significant results is related to political proximity, where I stated that having greater proximity to the ruling establishment leads to greater bridging social capital. I developed this hypothesis from LeBas's (2017) study in a similar setting with high corruption, where it was found how inherent diversity in cities leading to increase in cross-ethnic contacts due to reasons of clientelistic exchanges, with one's social position affecting attitudes positively toward elected officials or the power establishment. I also found the same result where I saw more people trying to build connections outside his/her ethnic group due to reasons of trying to build linkages for clientelistic exchanges.

Two factors pertaining to one's personal characteristics, age and involvement in a non-agricultural profession, are not supported at all in this study and may be dropped from careful consideration while thinking of factors that lead to the formation of bridging social capital. It has been found in earlier studies (Yen et al., 2009; Li & Fung, 2013) how age is correlated with interpersonal trust. In regards to the result for age, this study finds no correlation may be because the focus in this study was on the structural or network dimension of social capital, rather than the cognitive or trust component which earlier studies had emphasized. The other factor which the study found no support for was the factor for being involved in non-agricultural profession. Lee & Tuselmann (2013) suggest how in pursuit of knowledge, individuals form greater non-group connections if they are involved in such jobs. However, Lee & Tuselmann's study did not conceive of an ethnic group as a group but rather their measurement of one's group was based on connections with close kin and family intra-group, while intra-group contact was based on one's business contacts or links with professional advisors.

Another set of factors which I did not find significant for affecting the formation of social capital, pertains to education and income. However, since my hypothesis was predicting a monotonic effect, I cannot say with confidence that these factors should be dropped in future studies. Earlier studies had found a correlation between those two factors and social capital. For example, Chowdhury et

al. (2012) in the context of Bangladesh found that individuals with more years of schooling have a more diverse network of people, while Lancee (2010; 2012) had found greater income actually being an effect of social capital.

The following two chapters, presenting the qualitative method in Chapter 7 and the qualitative analysis in Chapter 8, will lay out the qualitative component of this research. According to the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4, due to the presence of two factors forming bonding social capital having political actors as stakeholders, the intricate state-specific variations are perhaps a result of the presence of such actors. These include the hypotheses for religion and support for cross-border movement. Questions which arose from the OLS regression analysis results in this chapter will be investigated in greater detail in the next component of the thesis for exploring more nuanced explanations.

## Qualitative Methods

This chapter explains the method followed in the qualitative portion, which is the second component of the mixed method study design of this research. The chapter is divided into four sections: The first section gives the rationale and signifies the value of this qualitative component in this research which is following a parallel mixed methods study design. The second section establishes why the political actors are key stakeholders whose views deserve further analysis. Although the theory in Chapter 4 had pointed out why the political actors are major stakeholders, I will also use a stakeholder segmentation matrix for revealing how such actors have a central role in terms of their influence and importance for this study in comparison to other actors who might be present. The third section will describe the importance of collecting primary data and also explain the process of conducting semi-structured interviews of the political actors. The fourth section will outline the way of conducting a directed content analysis of these in-depth interviews. This includes the preparation of the interview transcripts, development of codes for classifying the quotes from the interviews, and the analysis of the questions which arose after the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression Analysis in Chapter 6.

### 7.1 Relevance of this supplemental qualitative component

The qualitative component is the second part in the parallel mixed methods study design of this research. As mentioned in Chapter 5 outlining the quantitative methods, this research follows a parallel mixed method study design, where both the quantitative and qualitative data were collected concurrently. The quantitative component is the core component and can stand alone and is the driver of the theory, while the qualitative component is called the supplemental component and is dependent on the core component (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 119). Specifically, this is a QUAN + qual study, where a deductive-simultaneous design has been built, in which the core component is quantitative, and the supplemental component is qualitative (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 119). In Chapter 4, explaining the theoretical framework of this research, it was described how five

factors lead to the creation of bonding social capital and ten factors lead to the creation of bridging social capital. While the factors forming bridging social capital could be investigated solely via relying on the interpretations of the quantitative OLS regression analysis models, the factors forming bonding social capital needed to have a second qualitative component for providing robustness to the quantitative findings of the regression analysis models. With the mixing of the second supplemental qualitative component as an extension of the quantitative part, I am still following a deductive approach, but bringing together a more comprehensive account and achieving “completeness” (Bryman, 2006, p. 106). In doing so, I am mutually corroborating the findings of the quantitative and qualitative components of the study, and thereby increasing the “validity” of the overall findings of the research (Bryman, 2006, pp. 105-106).

As described above, this is a “dependent research” as the outcome of the first quantitative analytical component helped me decide on what exactly to analyse in the second qualitative analytical component (Schoonenboom & Johnson, 2017, p. 114). The reason for this dependency was laid out in the theoretical framework where I explained how two of the five factors affecting the formation of bonding social capital are attributed largely to having political actors as stakeholders. It was theorized in hypotheses 1 and 5 of the theoretical framework in Chapter 4, how political actors influence the formation of bonding social capital by provoking fear and at times utilize kinship ties for reasons concerning the expansion of their vote-banks, financial motives, and for the functioning of their state’s economy. Therefore, the viewpoints of political actors as a second set of respondents need to be considered as the overall results of the OLS regression models of those two factors were found to be significant and having state-specific variations. In this qualitative component, I am searching for deeper explanations to the results of OLS regression models of two of these independent factors by developing certain questions and analysing them using information gathered from interviews of political actors.

## **7.2 Stakeholder Segmentation for establishing the relevance of Political Actors**

This section aims to show why the political actors are very important and influential actors for the formation of bonding social capital, and whose views deserve exploration. Through the use of the stakeholder segmentation matrix, I will

classify the potential stakeholders who are influential and important, vis-à-vis the independent variables religion and cross-border movement leading to the formation of bonding social capital. Through the segmentation of the stakeholders, it will emerge why the political actors are in fact the most vital stakeholders in comparison to other stakeholders who might be present but are not as influential or important.

### ***7.2.1 What is actually a stakeholder and how am I utilizing a stakeholder matrix to segment stakeholders?***


According to Smith (2000, p. 103), a stakeholder consists of individuals, groups, or organizations that have an interest in a project and can mobilize resources to affect the outcome of a project in some way. Businesses and international development organizations sometimes conduct a stakeholder analysis in the early steps of implementing a project in order to identify actors who would have an interest or level of influence that can impact a project, thereby classifying them as a stakeholder (Smith, 2000; Manchanda & Robakowski-Van Stralen, 2016). Since a stakeholder analysis is done in the primary stages of a project (Smith, 2000, p. 105), I also conducted a similar procedure in the initial stage of my research project before going off for fieldwork.

A stakeholder analysis starts off with a planning phase involving a brainstorming activity with appropriately selected experts who are knowledgeable about the project, such as country experts in the case of development projects (Manchanda & Robakowski-Van Stralen, 2016, p. 15). However, the World Bank (2010) states that in addition to country experts, the stakeholders themselves, as well as a review of background literature, can also provide details about potential stakeholders. In this phase, actors related to a project are listed and then narrowed down via classification of their interests and impact level on the project (Smith, 2000; Manchanda & Robakowski-Van Stralen, 2016). Due to the paucity of funds, for the identification of the actors, I did not reach out to such experts or stakeholders. Instead, I investigated secondary data sources, including books, journal articles, and newspaper reports. For a limited scale project such as mine, this alternate way of reviewing of background literature should not be considered a big limitation as I believe I was able to list most of the actors who should be classified as stakeholders.

After this initial planning stage, World Bank (2004) suggests the use of a 2X2 matrix (Fig.7.1) for mapping out the various actors who have influence and

importance in the outcome of a project. The stakeholders who stand to lose or gain significantly from the project are those who have high importance, while the stakeholders whose actions can affect the project’s ability to meet its objectives are those with high influence (World Bank, 2004). According to the World Bank (2004), for classifying the stakeholders into the importance and influence categories, a researcher should consider who is losing/ gaining and what exactly are they losing/gaining by the project’s outcome. As far as my research is concerned, the meaning of the term “project” has been adjusted to show the dynamics of two independent factors, i.e., religion and cross-border movement, leading to the “outcome” of the project, which in this case is the formation of bonding social capital. I posit that gaining/ losing for the political actors mean gathering public support in order to get votes and deriving tangible economic benefits such as through bribes. For other actors, gain/loss is subjective to their own goals.

**Fig. 7.1: Segmentation of stakeholders according to the Stakeholder Segmentation Matrix of the World Bank (2004)**



Note: Recreated from *Guidance Note: Stakeholder Analysis* (<http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/politicaleconomy/November3Seminar/Stakeholder%20Readings/CPHP%20Stakeholder%20Analysis%20Note.pdf>)

Fig. 7.1 shows the segmentation of different stakeholders in a project based on their influence and importance being presented in a 2X2 matrix. The four boxes in the matrix depict the following kinds of actors: Actors in Box A are the most

influential and important, actors in Box B have low importance but high influence, actors in Box C have high influence but low importance, and actors in Box D who have both low influence and low importance.

Some scholars (Reed et al., 2009; Manchanda & Robakowski-Van Stralen, 2016) conduct stakeholder analysis using the stakeholder segmentation matrix in conjunction with the net-map social networking tool. The net-map social networking tool produces computer-generated precise points for actors influencing and gaining from the project and displays them in the stakeholder segmentation matrix. However other scholars (Newcombe, 2003; Maj, 2015) have classified stakeholders by simply listing actors in the 2X2 matrices. I am following the technique of this second group of scholars because my aim of using the stakeholder segmentation matrix is simply to establish why the political actors are vital in order for their views to be more deeply investigated, but not to exactly demarcate their precise points in the setting being studied.

A major limitation of conducting a stakeholder analysis is that it provides a snapshot of what maybe a rapidly changing context, in which positions and influence of actors are subject to change with internal and external events (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000, p. 344). This is mostly the case in developing country settings where the political context especially can be very unstable, and any long-term study of stakeholders may become invalid very soon (Varvasovszky & Brugha, 2000, pp. 344-345). However, this study is cross-sectional, and so this limitation will not affect my research. Another limitation of a stakeholder analysis, particularly the use of a stakeholder matrix, is that it simplifies the actors by putting them into separate categories (Reed et al., 2009, p. 1947). This is, in fact, a good approach for this research where I am trying to determine how the political actors fit into the context being studied in relation to other actors.

### ***7.2.2 Stakeholder Segmentation in this Research***

The four figures (Figs. 7.2, 7.3(a), 7.3(b) and 7.3(c)) below show matrices of the formation of bonding social capital, for two independent factors of my research. Fig. 7.2 relates to religion as an independent factor, while Fig. 7.3(a) (migration), Fig. 7.3(b) (tourism) and Fig. 7.3(c) (trade) relate to the three aspects of cross-border movement which I had identified in Chapter 4 outlining the theoretical framework. In all cases, the local populations are deemed to gain or lose highly from the

outcome but have low influence on the ability of the factors in meeting its objective, and are placed in Box B. I deduce this from the fact that while an individual, who is part of the local population of any of the three states under study, follows a certain religion or may/ may not support cross-border movement, he/she virtually has no control over the causal mechanisms relating to fear or inherent ties of kinship, which lead to the formation of bonding social capital. Additionally, in all cases, Indians of other states should be in Box D, as this category of people may live in the country but they are located in a different state, and therefore do not gain or influence the formation of bonding social capital. It is also noticeable how political actors are either in Box A or Box C meaning that they always have high influence in the formation of bonding social capital, but what they gain or lose depends on the particular independent factor that they are influencing. Finally, while for each matrix depicting an independent factor or aspect there are several other influencers and gainers besides the political actors or local populations in each state, none of them overlap with another matrix depicting another independent factor or aspect. This means that while there are stakeholders who are influential and are important for a particular factor or aspect, they do not have control over other factors or aspects.

**Factor 1: Religion as a source for the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

**Fig. 7.2: Stakeholders concerning Religion’s role in the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

	<i>High Influence</i>	<i>Low Influence</i>
<i>High Importance</i>	Box A: Political Actors	Box B: Local Populations in the three states
<i>Low Importance</i>	Box C: Muslim Clergy; Indian Media	Box D: Indians of other states

Fig. 7.2 shows a matrix pertaining to the presence of stakeholders regarding the dynamics of religion forming bonding social capital. In Box A it can be seen that

political actors are presented as losing or gaining from the dynamics of religion influencing the creation of bonding social capital. As described in Chapter 4 outlining the theoretical framework, the rise in Muslim population in India especially in the three border states has led to certain Hindu nationalist political parties and organizations claiming that there is a plan to change religious demography by Muslims, which in turn has led to a backlash observed in the rise in apprehension among the already fearful Muslim minority community (DeVotta, 2002; Deogharia, 2015). Moreover, another group of political parties reaches out to the religious sentiments of the minority Muslim population in order to solidify their vote banks, via invoking further fear by pointing towards the presence of rising Hindu nationalism (Hussain, 2016; Roy, 2017; Tripathi et al., 2018).

The first group of these political actors consists of the Hindu nationalists such as the pan-India political party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). However, being state-specific, in Assam, there are the regional nationalists such as the AGP and ULFA, which emerged after the anti-immigrant movement of Assam in 1985, and whose main targets for scapegoating are the Bengali-speaking Muslims of the state (Mahanta, 2013; Kashyap, 2016a). In the second group, there is the pan-India political party Indian National Congress (INC), but at a regional level, there is the Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal, and the All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF) and Samajwadi Party in Assam. The Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI (M)) also falls in this block because for thirty-four years of their rule a large portion of their vote-base consisted of Muslims (Imam & Salim, 2017). In West Bengal, Jamaat-i-Islami Hind should also be considered to be part of this group due to its affiliation with the ruling TMC (Hossain, 2014).

Other actors include the Muslim clergy and the Indian media. In Box C, there is the Muslim clergy who are high influencers but not exactly gainers. One extreme example can be seen where an atheist writer deemed to have criticized Islam faced a death threat from Muslim mobs following a meeting of clerics from prominent mosques in West Bengal (Reuters, 2007). The Indian Media can also be classified in Box C because although they are financed by various political parties to religiously polarize different aspects in society such as relating to crime or sports (Coffey, 2013), they do not directly gain from doing so.

**Factor 2: Significance of Cross-border movement for the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

**Fig. 7.3(a): Stakeholders concerning Migration’s role in the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

	<i>High Influence</i>	<i>Low Influence</i>
<i>High Importance</i>	Box A: Political Actors, Migrants	Box B: Local Populations in the three states
<i>Low Importance</i>	Box C: NGOs focusing on Human rights	Box D: Indians of other states

**Fig. 7.3(b): Stakeholders concerning Tourism’s role in the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

	<i>High Influence</i>	<i>Low Influence</i>
<i>High Importance</i>	Box A: Bangladeshi Tourists	Box B: Local Populations in the three states; Tourism Operators
<i>Low Importance</i>	Box C: Political Actors; Ministry of Tourism of India	Box D: Indians of other states

**Fig. 7.3(c): Stakeholders concerning Trade’s role in the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

	<i>High Influence</i>	<i>Low Influence</i>
<i>High Importance</i>	Box A: Political Actors (for illegal forms); Traders- especially illegal form (e.g., smugglers) but also legal forms (e.g., Indian Chamber of Commerce)	Box B: Local Populations in the three states
<i>Low Importance</i>	Box C: Political Actors (for legal forms)	Box D: Indians of other states

Figures 7.3(a), 7.3(b) and 7.3(c) show three matrices on the presences of stakeholders influencing or gaining from the dynamics of cross-border movement forming bonding social capital. Cross-border movement has been classified as that pertaining to the permanent and undocumented movement of people (migration), temporary and documented movement of people (tourism), and the movement of goods (trade in both legal and illegal forms). As described in Chapter 4 outlining the theoretical framework, this hypothesis is deduced from the notion of having solidarity with co-ethnics who live on the other side of the international border, which political actors utilize for various reasons such as solidifying vote-banks, financial motives, or sustenance of their state’s economy. It can be seen in all figures that political actors are very influential in the creation of bonding social capital. However, their gain/loss depends on each individual factor. When it comes to migration (Fig. 7.3(a)) and illegal trade (Fig. 7.3(c)), they are potential losers/ gainers, while in terms of tourism (Fig. 7.3(b)) and legal trade (Fig. 7.3(c)) they do not directly gain/lose a lot.

First, let us consider migration. As described in Chapter 2 outlining the historical and contemporary political settings in the three states being studied, there happens to be the existence of migration in its undocumented form from Bangladesh to India. Political actors are a major stakeholder for this issue and can roughly be divided into three groups. The first group includes the right-wing BJP, which views Bengali-speaking Muslim migrants as infiltrators who are planning to change the religious demographic balance of India while viewing Hindu migrants as refugees

who have fled persecution in Bangladesh (Gillan, 2002; Shamshad, 2017). This first group is trying to solidify Hindu vote-banks (Gillan, 2002). The second group of political actors pertains to the regional parties and organizations such as AGP and ULFA in Assam (Mahanta, 2013; Shamshad, 2017) and the IPFT in Tripura (Bhaumik, 2018), which see both Bengali-speaking Muslims and Bengali-speaking Hindus as threats to the regional ethno-linguistic identities of their states. The third includes all the other political parties who see the undocumented migration of Muslims from Bangladesh as a way to increase their Muslim vote-banks (Hazarika, 2000; Daniyal, 2014).

In terms of trade, the scenario is a bit complex. Political actors are influential in the formation of bonding social capital when trade happens in both legal and illegal forms. For informal trade, they also monetarily benefit as they are routinely bribed for the continuation of such trade (Rahman, 2013). In terms of legal trade, political actors may not gain monetarily but are still influential since their encouragement of certain bi-lateral policies to decrease formal restrictions on the movement of goods, should lead to increase in legal forms of trade (Singh, 2018b). One example is the current Chief Minister of Tripura taking up the matter of implementation of a Motor Vehicle Agreement for movement of cargo vehicles from his state to ports in Bangladesh (Singh, 2018b).

In terms of tourism, political actors are influential but do not benefit directly. They realize the reason of historical ties of language and culture as a pre-existing condition for the sustenance and the development of tourism from Bangladesh to maintain their state's economy, and in some instances take steps to promote tourism such as by inaugurating new land ports in recent years (BD News, 2016).

Classification of different political actors when it comes to aspects such as trade and tourism should be among the ruling party and organizations affiliated to them, versus the rest. The ruling party should gain monetarily or be the most influential because they have maximum control of the patronage networks, while the other political actors should gain less and have limited influence.

Considering Figs. 7.3(a), 7.3(b) and 7.3(c), there are the presences of various actors, but they are present for only one aspect. In Fig. 7.3(a), showing the actors who are influential or gain from the presence of migration, it can be seen that migrants (Fig. 7.3(a), Box A) influence and gain/lose the most. While Hindu migrants escape persecution, Muslim migrants find better economic opportunities

(Gillan 2002). NGOs in India focusing on human rights (Fig. 7.3(a), Box C) are influential because they advocate for the rights of migrants (Ravishankar, 2015), but do not benefit directly from it.

In Fig. 7.3(b), showing the actors who are influential or gain from the presence of tourism, other than the political actors, the local populations in the three states and Indians living in other states, there is also the presence of tourists, tour operators and the Ministry of Tourism. With Bangladeshi tourists accounting for 16% of tourists in India, it is obvious that the tourists are the main beneficiaries of travel (Modi, 2015) and are placed in Box A. In addition, tour operators (in Box B) in both India and Bangladesh should benefit monetarily but do not have an influence on any policy. While the Ministry of Tourism of India (in Box C) can influence tourism thorough forming policies with their Bangladeshi counterpart (Prothom Alo, 2018) it does not gain monetarily or otherwise.

Finally, in Fig. 7.3(c), both legal and illegal traders are highly influential and gain/ lose a lot. Trade in the legal sphere according to 2013-14 data indicates that India's exports to Bangladesh stand at \$6.1 billion, while illegal trade is estimated to be much higher than its legal counterpart (Economic Times, 2014).

### **7.3 Data Collection**

As described above, since the political actors are a group of stakeholders who are the most influential and in many cases are the maximum gainers, their views deserve inspection. The following paragraphs will talk about who are the relevant political stakeholders in the three states being studied, what entailed the collection of primary data, how I pre-tested the semi-structured interview questionnaire, how I conducted the actual interviews, and provide a short description about the basic interview questionnaire instrument.

#### ***7.3.1 Who exactly are the relevant political stakeholders?***

In the previous section, in addition to situating the position of the political actors as important and influential stakeholders, I had also categorized them based on how they influence and/or gain from the dynamics concerning religion and cross-border movement. In all states, these include the ruling political party, the opposition political party, additional political parties and organizations which have significant

influence and/or gain from the dynamics of religion and cross-border movement in the states being studied. They are briefly described below. A more detailed account of the state-specific dynamics of these political parties and organizations can be found in Chapter 2 which describes the historical and socio-political background of each region in length.

When I conducted my fieldwork in 2015/2016, in Tripura, the ruling party was the CPI (M) and the opposition was the INC— representatives of those two parties have been interviewed. There has been a change in government since then but for understanding this cross-sectional research, the statements of the political parties and organizations of that time period will be considered. An important tribal political organization back then was the IPFT which was demanding separate statehood for the tribal population and whose alliance with the BJP in the 2018 elections was one of the reasons for the latter to come to power (Bhaumik, 2018). One of the representatives of the IPFT has been interviewed.

In West Bengal, there are three major political parties in the state, and their representatives have been interviewed: TMC which is the ruling political party, and the two main opposition parties—the CPI (M) and the INC. Other than the representatives of these three main political parties, a representative of the BJP, which has a small presence in the state, has also been interviewed. Furthermore, a representative of the influential Islamist organization of West Bengal, the JIH, has been interviewed.

In Assam, the representatives of the BJP and the INC have been interviewed, because the former is the ruling political party and the latter is the main opposition. Other than the representatives of those two political parties, the representatives of two other influential political parties, the AGP and the AIUDF, have also been interviewed. Additionally for such a conflicted state, the opinions of smaller political actors are also needed, and so I interviewed a representative of the SFI<sup>4</sup> (Students Federation of India) and the Samajwadi Party (SP). For a state such as Assam that has gone through a long period of insurgency, one very prominent organization is the ULFA, whose representative, an active campaigner from its heydays has been interviewed.

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<sup>4</sup>Student wing of the CPI (M)

### ***7.3.2 Importance of collecting Primary Data for the Qualitative component of this research***

Although some of the statements or the underlying reasons for the actions of the political actors are available in newspaper reports or have been written about in books, the authenticity of those reports are being backed up by primary interview data. Additionally, some of these political actors who I interviewed had never been interviewed previously, but simply second-person accounts on their views have been documented. An analysis of the interviews of political actors as influential and important stakeholders provides a method of increasing the validity of the existing data. This is because the original responses of the senior level leadership of parties and organizations who know the inner workings of their organizations are being compared to and analysed with prior documentation. This process provides a vital mechanism for corroborating or challenging earlier observations, thereby providing greater validity to the quantitative findings of Chapter 6. All of my respondents are senior officials who know the policies of their parties or organizations. For reasons of protecting my respondents from political harm, anonymity has been assured to them. While I listed their state, I did not include their exact positions in their parties or organizations. Although the accounts of the political actors maybe biased given the sensitive topics which I discussed with them, the differences within their narratives will help the reader to reconcile conflicting concepts, to counter contradiction, and cope with an alternative interpretation (Seale, 2004, p. 34). Also, in order to ensure reduction of biases, the accounts of the political actors will be backed up or challenged with secondary sources and newspaper reports in Chapter 8.

### ***7.3.3 Pre-test of Interviews***

During November 2015 and January 2016, I decided to pre-test the semi-structured interviews of the political actors. Two of the pre-test respondents were in Tripura, and one was in West Bengal. I had come to know the pre-test respondents through the connections that I made in those states during the survey interview phase of my fieldwork. During this pre-test phase, I wanted to make sure that the questions were desensitized enough so that the respondents do not feel offended or uncomfortable, given the sensitivity of my research. A verbal and written summary followed, and they were requested to give consent to record the interview. Questions

were asked in English so that the actual meanings of what I asked were not lost in translation. Although the English skills of the respondents were adequate in terms of comprehension, they felt at greater ease in answering in a mix of Bengali and English, which was then translated during the transcription stage. The following are the respondents of the three political parties or organizations whom I interviewed in this pre-test phase, along with the anonymous names that I shall use for referring to them in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 8:

1. Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI (M)), Tripura  
(Anonymous name: CPIM-T)
2. Indian National Congress (INC), Tripura (Anonymous name: INC-T)
3. Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH), West Bengal (Anonymous name: JIH-WB)

#### ***7.3.4 Actual Interviews of Political Actors***

For the actual interview phase, I needed to make further contacts with representatives of the political parties and organizations. These representatives needed to be senior officials who were able to explain the inner workings of their parties and organizations—it could not have been a new member or someone who was not as involved in the party or organization. For this reason, I had to think of potential gate-keepers who would facilitate access to such people (Littig, 2009, pp. 104-105). In this case, the people were individuals in Bangladeshi academic and business circles, who have links to political actors in those Indian states. These included faculty members who I know at the University of Dhaka and individuals who work at the Bangladesh-India Chamber of Commerce & Industry. After this step, I set up suitable meeting times with most of these individuals, particularly representatives of the ruling party and main opposition, and set off on a ten day trip to the state capitals of Assam and West Bengal in mid-March 2016. It was expected that during my time in those two states, I would be able to gain access to the representatives of the other parties and organizations via recommendations through the contacts that I made. I did not have to go to Tripura since the remaining respondent in that state wanted to answer my questions via Skype and reply to follow up questions via phone.

Most of the respondents wanted to meet me in their offices, although some preferred to meet me in other public places. Before starting the actual interview, I

gave them a verbal summary of the project and got their verbal consents in my recording device. As in the pre-test phase, I assured them that their political image would not be harmed as their anonymity would be maintained by not listing their names anywhere in my PhD thesis. As far as language issues were concerned, as with the pre-test phase, I asked the questions in English so that respondents understood the full meaning of what I was asking. Also as with the pre-test phase, most respondents knew Bengali and preferred to answer in a mix of English and Bengali. In a few instances, where the respondents did not know Bengali, they answered completely in English.

In addition to the three individuals who I had interviewed during the pre-test phase, there were twelve additional respondents who were senior officials from the other political parties or organizations. The political parties and organizations of these senior officials, along with the anonymous names that I shall use for referring to them in the qualitative analysis in Chapter 8 are the following:

1. All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF), Assam  
(Anonymous name: AIUDF-A)
2. Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), Assam (Anonymous name: AGP-A)
3. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Assam (Anonymous name: BJP-A)
4. Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), West Bengal (Anonymous name: BJP-WB)
5. Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI (M)), West Bengal  
(Anonymous name: CPIM-WB)
6. Indian National Congress (INC), Assam (Anonymous name: INC-A)
7. Indian National Congress (INC), West Bengal (Anonymous name: INC-WB)
8. Indigenous People's Front of Tripura (IPFT), Tripura  
(Anonymous name: IPFT -T)
9. Samajwadi Party (SP), Assam (Anonymous name: SP-A)
10. Students' Federation of India (SFI), Assam (Anonymous name: SFI-A)
11. Trinamool Congress (TMC), West Bengal (Anonymous name: TMC-WB)
12. United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), Assam  
(Anonymous name: ULFA-A)

### ***7.3.5 Data Collection Tool***

Even though I had a semi-structured questionnaire for conducting the interviews, the questionnaire was not followed literally, and some questions were

improvised so as to cover the major ideas more effectively. The basic questionnaire instrument can be found in Appendix 9.

Some of the questions regarding religion are the following:

- What are the factors that harm the harmony that is present among the people of your state?
- There are reports of religious communal disturbances within this state. Any comments on that?
- It is evident that several Bengali-speaking people are living in Assam. How do they show their solidarity with the native people of Assam?

Some of the questions used for investigating the support for cross border-movement are the following:

- In Indian social debates, there is the issue of migration from Bangladesh which appears to be changing the demography in your state. Any comments on that topic?
- There are reports of the presence of an informal trade sector between Bangladesh and your state. Do you think that future connectivity would benefit both the formal and informal trade sectors, compared to now? And why do you think so?

## **7.4 Data Analysis**

This last section of this qualitative methods chapter will lay out the process of data analysis. This includes the transcription of the data from the interviews, the employment of a directed content analysis to categorize and code the raw data, and the investigation of questions which arose from the OLS regression results in Chapter 6 using the interview data.

### ***7.4.1 Transcription of the Interviews***

It took me about three weeks to transcribe all the semi-structured interviews. After the transcription, the transcripts of the interviews were emailed to the respondents on the email addresses that they had provided to me during the interview meetings. After this, I made phone calls to the respondents, to ensure that they were satisfied with the transcripts. Gibbs (2018, pp. 132-133) states that this step is vital because a respondent might change their mind or misremember what they may have said, there could have been a misinterpretation in the transcription, there might have

been intervening events which warrants that respondents cannot say the same things in public at the present moment, and the respondents are embarrassed about what they might have said. My respondents were mostly satisfied with the details of the transcripts and asked me to make minimal changes to the transcribed interview document.

#### ***7.4.2 Directed Content Analysis***

A directed content analysis of the interview transcripts was conducted following Hsieh & Shannon's (2005) prescription for a deductive study such as in this research, whose goal is to validate or extend a theoretical framework conceptually. According to Hsieh & Shannon (2005, p. 1281), the theoretical framework of the research allows a structural mechanism which helps derive the initial coding scheme. All the data were collected through interviews via questions based on predetermined categories and coded immediately with predetermined codes (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281).

Gibbs (2018, p. 61) refers to this technique as a priori coding, where a collection of codes is developed without first using them to code the data, but these codes are used to identify chunks of text that exemplify the codes in this initial list. Gibbs (2018, p. 61) recognized that the researcher might need to amend the list of codes during analysis as better ways of categorizing are detected. I did not have to amend my list of codes but in some cases I had to recode additional texts from the transcripts. Hsieh & Shannon (2005, p. 1282) say that this is common practice in the directed content analysis technique where data from text that is not possible to be coded initially are later reconsidered. I have only two categories for my codes, which are the factors that I was going to analyse: religion and cross-border movement. For the category or factor of religion, the codes are the following: Assamese-Bengali conflict, Assamese xenophobia, Bangladesh communalism, Bengali hegemony, Bengali-tribal conflict, demography, discrimination, Hindu nationalism, Hindu-Muslim conflict, and Islamist viewpoint. For the category or factor of cross-border movement, the codes are the following: Assamese xenophobia, demography, Hindu nationalism, migration, tourism-cultural exchange, and trade. The reasons for choosing each code can be found in Appendix 10.

Hsieh & Shannon (2005, p. 1283) posit that one of the main biases which arise from the use of a directed content analysis technique is that the over-

dependence on the theoretical framework as the primary guide leads the researcher to be more likely to find evidences that are supportive of his/her theory rather than those evidences that are non-supportive of his/her theory. In this study, this kind of bias has been minimized already because this qualitative analysis is a supplementary component in my overall research design. Certain variables that might have affected the independent variables have already been controlled for earlier in the OLS regression analysis models in Chapter 6.

#### ***7.4.3 Investigation of state-specific OLS regression output***

In Chapter 8, the coded data have been used for answering some questions about bonding social capital that arose from the state-specific OLS regression output of two factors (religion and cross-border movement) in Chapter 6.

For the factor of religion, the following two questions arose from the OLS regression results:

*Q1: In the case of Assam, why does being a practiser of religion lead to higher bonding social capital?*

*Q2: In general, why does the Muslim population of Tripura have higher bonding social capital but in West Bengal higher social capital is specifically restricted to the practising Muslims?*

For the factor of cross-border movement, the following question arose from the OLS regression results:

*Q: Why does support for cross-border movement of people and goods lead to greater bonding social capital in Assam, in comparison to West Bengal and Tripura?*

#### ***7.4.4 Qualitative studies from India which have analysed controversial statements***

The analysis of factual material within the controversial claims made by political actors is similar to the content analysis carried out in a study based in India by Shamshad (2017). Shamshad (2017) interviewed key civil society and political parties' members in West Bengal for conceptualizing how the dimension of "Bengaliness" is used for forming opinions on Bangladeshi migrants in West Bengal. An example of a controversial quote that Shamshad (2017, p. 442) used for explaining concerns among a segment of West Bengal's society regarding the long-term Bangladeshi Muslim migration to West Bengal is the following: "Migration is not a big problem, but if migrants come with fundamentalist views, it will affect the

secular democratic fabric of India. Muslims will never be secular, so why would the Hindus? That is what people think here.”

Another study from India by Naujoks (2015) also looks for factual material by considering controversial statements made by political actors. Naujoks (2015) bases his analysis on fifty interviews with Indian policy-makers from different political parties who are active in India’s central government in order to comprehend the perception of dual citizenship. For explaining how security risks are there for conferring dual citizenship, Naujoks (2015, p. 30) provides a quote by the former Home Minister L. K. Advani who refers to Bangladeshi migrants in the following way: “millions of Bangladeshi infiltrators staying in India under the conniving eyes of the Congress-Communist regimes can be granted dual citizenship”?

## **7.5 Conclusion**

This chapter describes the qualitative portion of the mixed methods study design which is a supplemental component in this research. It starts off by explaining why this qualitative supplemental portion of this research is imperative for providing completeness and validity to this study. Then through the use of the stakeholder segmentation matrix, I mapped out the potential stakeholders who are influential and important, vis-à-vis the independent variables religion and cross-border movement leading to the formation of bonding social capital. Through this technique, I demonstrated how political actors are in fact the most vital stakeholders in comparison to other stakeholders who might be present but are not as influential or important. After this, the chapter gives details on the significance and procedure of collecting primary data via conducting semi-structured interviews of senior officials in political parties and organizations. Finally, the chapter describes the procedure of data analysis, including the coding of the primary data from the transcribed interviews and conducting a directed content analysis of the interview data in order to investigate some questions which arose from the OLS regression analysis results.

Chapter 8, the following chapter, will layout the qualitative analysis portion of this research. In that chapter, I will investigate the interviews of political actors for describing the state-specific variations found in the OLS regression models in Chapter 6.

## Qualitative Analysis

This chapter presents the qualitative analysis, the supplemental analytical part of this research. As described in Chapter 4 in the theoretical framework, political actors are the stakeholders for two independent factors, religion and support for the cross-border movement of goods and people, which lead to the formation of bonding social capital. In Chapter 6 showing the quantitative Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression output of the survey dataset, the results pertaining to these two independent factors which lead to the formation of bonding social capital were observed to have significant state-specific differences. In this chapter, I am conducting a directed content analysis of information gathered from semi-structured interviews of political actors to develop deeper explanations as to how these two factors affect the formation of bonding social capital. As mentioned in sub-section 7.4.2 of Chapter 7, specific questions which have been developed from the OLS regression analysis results will be followed by analysing answers provided by political actors, and backed up or challenged with secondary sources and newspaper reports. Please note that the anonymous names of the political actors which were listed in sub-section 7.3.3 of Chapter 7 will be used to refer to them in this analysis. Additionally, all the quotes from the interviews that have been used in the analysis, along with their corresponding codes, are displayed in Appendix 11.

### **8.1 Factor 1: Religion as a source of Bonding Social Capital**

This section answers two questions which had arisen from the result of running the OLS regression models in chapter 6, for analysing the effect of the independent factor of religion on the formation of bonding social capital.

#### ***8.1.1 Question 1: In the case of Assam, why does being a practiser of religion lead to higher bonding social capital?***

This sub-section answers the first of two questions related to the factor of religion which forms bonding social capital. It was found in the OLS regression analysis results in chapter 6 that being a practiser of any religion in Assam leads to significantly higher bonding social capital as opposed being a non-practiser of religion in the state. As stated in Chapter 6, this is because, in recent years, the

society of Assam has seen a rise in religious polarization among both Hindus and Muslim communities of the state. It was stated in that chapter how the vital reason for this religious polarization could be attributed to change in demography. However, considering the interviews of the political actors, there are two other reasons, one relating to the persecution of Hindus in neighboring Bangladesh and the second relating to historical linguistic tensions between the Assamese and the Bengali speakers of the state. All three reasons are evaluated in the following paragraphs.

The first reason for practisers of any religion having higher social capital as opposed to non-practisers relates to demographic change. This perhaps is historically rooted in the competition for land. The British administration had started the process of encouraging migration of Muslims from East Bengal to Assam because the former was densely populated while the latter provided fertile land for cultivation (Weiner, 2015, p. 100). The policy of the then Muslim League government in the province of Assam in British India, to bring in peasant from neighbouring East Bengal was viewed by the majority Hindu population of Assam as a mechanism to increase its Muslim vote-bank (Hazarika, 2000, p. 190). Even after the creation of Pakistan, Bengali-speaking Muslim migration kept on happening due to poverty and land pressure in East Pakistan, and later on from Bangladesh (Hazarika, 2000, p. 232). Slowly, these Muslim migrants from East Bengal started being viewed by the mainstream Assamese as “land-hungry peasants” (Weiner 2015, p. 109). ULFA-A (quote 1, Appendix 11) said that Bengali-speaking Muslims who came to Assam as cultivators were only interested in grabbing land. This notion of “land grabbing” being commonly associated with the Bengali-speaking Muslim population in Assam arose due to the fact that in many areas of lower Assam, Bengali-speaking Muslim peasants slowly became the majority and were thought of as taking control of land which was previously under the control of indigenous people (Kimura, 2013, p. 103). This kind of animosity led to the Nellie Massacre in 1983 when Assamese and Tiwa peasants attacked Bengali-speaking Muslim peasants due to having lost their land to them (Kimura, 2013, p. 1).

In the present day, this demographic change appears to the mainstream Assamese population as happening through sinister ways. ULFA-A (quote 2, Appendix 11) said that Bengali-speaking Muslim community has opened Assamese-medium schools in their areas of settlement, are learning the Assamese language, and

list their mother tongue as “Assamese” in the official census—even though they do not speak that language at home. ULFA-A went on to state: “So now the question is ‘who is an Assamese?’ ... So for us indigenous Assamese, it is very difficult for us to say who is an Assamese....” (quote 2, Appendix 11). ULFA-A’s statement points out that the effort of the Bengali-speaking Muslims to promote linguistic integration with the greater Assamese society is also looked upon with suspicion by the mainstream Assamese community.

The threat of demographic change in Assam is seen through the religious lens due to the rise in the Muslim population. Even AGP-A, the representative of a political party which espouses Assamese regional identity, said that if the Muslim demography keeps on changing at the current rate, it would be a problem for the Hindus in Assam (quote 3, Appendix 11):

Muslims will demand Assam as a Muslim state. It is because Hindu families are giving birth to 1 or 2 children, and according to Hindu law over here only one marriage is allowed. In Muslim communities, they can marry 9-10— as much as they want. Their birth rate is also much more than that of the Hindu community.

AGP-A’s opinion is probably based on the fact that the 2011 national census of India shows Assam having the highest increase in Muslim population among all states, from 30.9% in 2001 to 34.2% in a decade (Parashar, 2017), and incidences of polygamy among the Bengali-speaking Muslim community (Hassan, 2018). Although AGP-A did add that if the whole Bengali-speaking Hindu community from Bangladesh is allowed to stay in Assam, it will affect the “heritage of the Assamese people.... as it has happened in Tripura with the native Tripuri community”, the immediate concern for AGP-A seems to be the religious demographic change (quote 4, Appendix 11).

The second reason for higher bonding social capital among practising individuals is due to religious polarization in the state, attributed to events in neighbouring Bangladesh. This probably relates to the rise of *Hindutva* in the state, which has led to the gradual side-lining of the Assamese-Bengali linguistic conflict. It should be noted that the religious communal angle in Assam’s politics can be traced back to the pre-independence time under the Muslim league. The Muslim

League mobilized the Muslims of East Bengal descent to support them, particularly in the *char/sor* region of Assam (Guha, 1974), where a big chunk of Bengali-speaking Muslim population reside (Hazarika, 2000). Now, this communal factor has resurfaced due to two reasons: the first being the demographic change in Assam as described above and the second reason is due to the persecution of Hindus in neighbouring Bangladesh. Persecution of the Hindu community in Bangladesh has been a long highlighted subject of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) across India, particularly in the border states of Assam and West Bengal (Gillan, 2002; Destradi, 2012). The BJP refers to undocumented Hindu migrants from Bangladesh as “refugees” fleeing persecution in Bangladesh and uses the terminology of “infiltrator” for referring to undocumented Bangladeshi Muslim migrants (Gillan, 2002, p. 84). According to BJP-A, the political unrests in Bangladesh do not have a direct impact in Assam, unless they are related to the persecution of the Hindus who are living in the neighbouring country (quote 5, Appendix 11). This persecution, according to BJP-A, was evident from the movement of Hindus from Bangladesh to his state (quote 5, Appendix 11).

A third reason for bonding social capital among the practisers of religion as opposed to those who are not, is due to linguistic differences between the Assamese and the Bengali-speaking population, the first of which is predominantly Hindu and the latter is mostly Muslim. According to SP-A, which also has sizeable support from the Bengali-speaking Muslim community, the core Assamese nationalists are concerned with “the Assamese identity” and have “an inbuilt xenophobia” against all Bengali-speakers (quote 6, Appendix 11). SP-A said the causes are the following (quote 7, Appendix 11):

The native Assamese linked the rising population of Bengalis as a demographic threat, thinking that they would become a minority in their own land. Traditionally, the Assamese are lazy and comfort-loving people, and Bengalis are appreciated for their hard work and labour, so Bengalis are preferred in employment.

The interpretation based on linguistic differences affecting the Muslim community is also corroborated by statements of the AIUDF-A, who pointed towards the discrimination that Muslims of Bengal origin face when it comes to

finding employment in Assam. According to AIUDF-A, when it comes to finding government jobs, “native Assamese” are preferred, although Bengali-speakers comprise about twenty-seven percent of the state’s overall population (quote 8, Appendix 11). AIUDF-A went on to pointed out that if one goes to the Assam Secretariat, there are only sixty people among the six thousand employees, who happen to be Muslim (quote 8, Appendix 11). Furthermore, not a single one of them is of Bengal origin but rather are Muslims originating from upper Assam (quote 8, Appendix 11). So basically, AIUDF-A was pointing towards double discrimination: the first in terms of religion, and the second regarding language and descent. It should be pointed out here that AIUDF-A’s assessment of double discrimination is embedded in a historical linguistic conflict, between the Assamese and the Bengali speakers.

The sources of this view can be traced back to colonial times when there was a linguistic demographic change and preferential treatment of Bengali-speakers when it came to gaining employment in Assam (Misra, 1999, p. 1265). During the days of British rule, Bengali-speakers were encouraged to move to Assam as the native Assamese were thought of as being too lazy for employment (Saikia, 2004, p. 102). The Bengali-speaking Hindus came for serving in the colonial administration, and the Bengali-speaking Muslims came as agriculturalists to settle in unclaimed lands as cultivators (Lacina, 2017, p. 150). This explanation corroborates the statements of AIUDF-A and SP-A who talked about double discrimination, or Bengali-speaking Muslims being the prime targets of discrimination.

Therefore, from the analysis in this sub-section, it can be comprehended why being a practiser of religion in Assam has a large effect on Bonding Social Capital as compared to non-practiser of religion: the widespread perception of Bengali-speaking Muslims being land-grabbers who are changing the demography of the state, the rise of Hindu nationalism as a result of the perceived persecution of fellow Hindus in neighbouring Bangladesh, and the historical linguistic tensions created during British rule in the states which favoured migrant Bengali speakers over the local Assamese population.

***8.1.2 Question 2: In general, why does the Muslim population of Tripura have higher bonding social capital but in West Bengal higher bonding social capital is specifically restricted to the practicing Muslims?***

This is the second question that arose pertaining to the independent factor on religion after running the OLS regression models. It was found in the quantitative analysis chapter that Muslims in Tripura and West Bengal have differences in the relationship of bonding social capital regarding segments of their Muslim populations. While in West Bengal, practising Muslims (and not the overall Muslim community) have a greater amount of bonding social capital, the overall Muslim population in Tripura have a higher level of bonding social capital. This sub-section will illustrate how this phenomenon has materialized.

First, let us consider the reasons for practising Muslims of West Bengal having a higher level of bonding capital than the other non-practising Muslims and the Hindus of the state. As mentioned in chapter 6 while describing the OLS regression output concerning religion, there is a sizeable number of Muslims in West Bengal's population of Muslims, who are more orthodox (Bagchi, 2016b). In Chapter 6 it was also mentioned how in South Asia, a rise in spirituality of a Muslim was traditionally embodied by popular practice of a mystical brand of sufi Islam which was of a more pluralistic form as it combined Islamic practises with local tradition, but there is now a more reformist brand of Islam which is more non-pluralistic and tries to cleanse the religion of local cultural influences (Jaffrelot & Louer 2017). I posited that it might be the case that the practising Muslims are turning towards this more orthodox strand of their faith, as opposed to following the more mystical sufi strands of their faith. Among the Muslim population in the West Bengal comprising of 30% of the population, there is a sizeable number, represented by the orthodox segment which votes for the ruling TMC political party, while the secular Muslims tend to vote in a wider range of political parties (Bagchi, 2016b).

For consolidating this orthodox section of Muslims, the TMC has taken up pandering strategies such as giving state allowances to Muslim religious leaders and regularly attending events sponsored by Muslim groups for gaining publicity (Bagchi, 2016b). Over the last few years of the TMC being in power, Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee has graced stages at rallies of her political party with prominent members of the Muslim community who hold extreme views (R. Bhattacharya, 2017b). For example, Noor-ur-Rehman Barkati, the Shahi Imam of the Tipu Sultan

Mosque in Kolkata, who recently issued fatwas against the Prime Minister of India, is known to be a supporter of the TMC and the current Chief Minister (R. Bhattacharya, 2017b). The notion that the orthodox section of Muslims is getting more political backing is supported by the statement of JIH-WB, the representative of the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind (JIH) Islamist organization, who said that “the ruling party is on the side of the minorities” (quote 9, Appendix 11).

According to CPIM-WB, there is a section of politicians in West Bengal who fan religiously charged issues for their political benefits (quote 10, Appendix 11). CPIM-WB explained that both the Central and State governments “are eager to divide this population (i.e., the population of West Bengal) and bring about communal (i.e., religious) polarization” for their own political benefits (quote 10, Appendix 11). CPIM-WB added that while “triggers for large-scale communal riots” have not worked in West Bengal as most people “don’t really want that” (quote 11, Appendix 11), events such as beef-banning and *ghar wapsi* in other parts of India have had an impact in the state (quote 12, Appendix 11). Thus, it appears that the TMC’s pandering to the Muslims having right-wing views and the Central Government’s (i.e., BJP) support for right-wing Hindu fundamentalist causes have made orthodox sections of both Muslims and Hindus in West Bengal more vocal.

The second reason for the practising Muslim population having more bonding social capital as compared to the secular ones is due to the publicity surrounding religious discrimination targeting the Hindu community in neighbouring Bangladesh. Analysing BJP-WB (quotes 13 & 14, Appendix 11) and JIH-WB (quote 18, Appendix 11), it appears that the issue of religious intolerance in Bangladesh is used by both Hindu and Muslim right-wing organizations for gaining political clout. Statements of TMC-WB, INC-WB, and CPIM-WB also show that the persecution based on religious beliefs in Bangladesh causes societal problems in West Bengal (quotes 15, 16 & 17, Appendix 11). The BJP’s topmost political agenda in the border states of Assam and West Bengal has been to highlight the plight of the Hindus in Bangladesh (Gillan, 2002). According to BJP-WB, young students in Bangladesh, especially in Islamic religious schools, are taught to identify Hindus as “kafirs” or unbelievers (quote 13, Appendix 11). BJP-WB additionally stated: “...elements that controlled the administration there (i.e., in Bangladesh)...fostered some fanatic and religious elements—and the bottom line was anti-India and anti-Hindu feelings” (quote 14, Appendix 11).

Correspondingly, the Islamists also have their interpretation of this subject. According to JIH-WB, the current government in Bangladesh is responsible for hampering religious harmony in West Bengal (quote 18, Appendix 11). JIH-WB keenly stated that the pandering of the so-called leftist secular section of people in Bangladesh by the nation's government is the reason for religious tensions in West Bengal (quote 18, Appendix 11):

Those people come here and give speeches, and it affects harmony here. It creates pressure on the Muslim community. People such as Shahriar Kabir come here and give speeches on so-called human rights abuses inflicted on the religious minorities over there.... Now people want to keep a distance from us minorities over here. Those leftist secular people coming here, and giving speeches about the so-called persecution of religious minorities in Bangladesh, start problems here.... You see one section of the minorities here face suppression and do not have much choice.

Shahriar Kabir is a human rights activist who is known for raising awareness about the discrimination against the Hindu minorities in Bangladesh, particularly violence faced at the hands of the Islamist organizations (Economic Times, 2016). JIH-WB's statement about "one section of the minorities facing suppression" (quote 18, Appendix 11) reflects the exceptional concern of the Islamist organization about the orthodox section of Muslims in West Bengal.

The above statements of BJP-WB and JIH-WB point out that the issue of persecution of the Hindu population in neighbouring Bangladesh is drummed up in West Bengal, leading to alienation of individuals who appear to be visibly Muslim, which in this case, possibly means the orthodox section of the Muslim population. This supports the quantitative OLS regression results of Chapter 6 where it was found that in West Bengal, practising Muslims have a greater amount of bonding social capital compared to their non-practising counterparts due to a section of the practicing Muslims who are more of the orthodox bent having greater group affinity.

Moving on to the case of Tripura, as mentioned before, it appears that there is an occurrence of higher bonding social capital among the non-practising Hindus (although the results were not significant), as compared to the practising Muslims of that state. As mentioned in the quantitative analysis chapter, Tripura's Muslim

population is just nine percent of the state's overall population (Census of India, 2011). So there probably is not enough scope for the practising Muslims who are turning towards the orthodox strands of their faith to form bonding social capital amongst them because already the Muslim population is quite small and the political parties did not particularly reach out to this segment of the Muslim population. Most of Tripura's Muslim population have historically been engaged in agriculture (Ali, 2011), and agricultural communities in the Bengal region tend to have high ties of kinship derived from families having joint ownership of land (Hopkins, 1898). Thus, the resulting significantly greater bonding social capital among the overall Muslim population of Tripura may simply be a result of this fact—and not more religious affinity per se.

However, two other reasons should be considered concerning mobilization of the Muslim identity of Tripura by the political actors who are the stakeholders. The first is the fact that because the Muslim community is so small, it does not make particular sections of this community a good target for political mobilization as it is in West Bengal. It may be the case that promoting religious tolerance in the state might be beneficial. For example, the former Chief Minister of Tripura, Manik Sarkar, at an event attended predominantly by Muslims, not being able to spot anyone in full hijab, applauded all the attendees for having freed themselves from conservatism (TOI, 2013b). This discouragement of orthodoxy is also evident in the interviews of the representatives of the ruling party and the political opposition. According to CPIM-T, there were no issues of inter-religious disharmony between the Bengali-speaking Hindus and Muslims communities in his state (quote 19, Appendix 11). Similar sentiments were expressed by INC-T who said that all Bengali speaking people, whether Hindu or Muslim, celebrate each other's religious festivals in Tripura (quote 20, Appendix 11). This notion is corroborated by the Hindustan Times (2013) news report which states that Muslim residents of Tripura in Hindu-Muslim mixed villages, organize and financially contribute towards the celebration of major Hindu festivals such as during Durga Puja.

This leads to the second reason for non-mobilization of sections of the Muslim community in Tripura. The tribal population and the Bengali-speakers are embroiled in a linguistic and territorial conflict (Ghosh, 2003). Muslims, who are Bengali-speakers, maybe mobilized via the over-arching Bengali identity for political purposes, thus leaving no room for religious polarization or rift. This can be

inferred when analysing the statements of the representatives of the ruling CPI (M) (quote 21, Appendix 11), the opposition INC (quote 22, Appendix 11), and the tribal political organization IPFT (quote 23, Appendix 11). All three representatives stated that since the Bengali-speakers were the majority, they were the dominant group in Tripura.

According to CPIM-T, while there were no issues of inter-religious disharmony within the Bengali-speaking Hindu and Muslim communities in his state, there were frictions in his state among the Bengali-speaking people and the Kokborok speakers, the latter having had “sections involved in extremism and militancy” (quote 24, Appendix 11). Here CPIM-T is probably referring to the All Tripura Tiger Forces, a former, outlawed rebel organization which was responsible for the killings of Bengali settlers in the early part of the last decade, who they accused of exploiting Tripura’s rich resources and depriving its indigenous population of economic benefits (Esterbrook, 2003).

INC-T was more extreme in his views of Bengali dominance and stated directly that “our [i.e., Bengali] culture is not compatible with the culture of the tribal people” (quote 25, Appendix 11). This notion of cultural supremacy has been corroborated by the narrative of IPFT-T, where he states that Bengalis have taken control of the administration, snatched most means of generating income, and have even affected the linguistic heritage of the tribal people of Tripura (quote 26, Appendix 11):

These people are now in control of the business, the government jobs, the cultivation, and the agriculture in villages. Our indigenous people are not really adept at setting and running businesses, so these Bengali people came and started their businesses....Now we are facing an identity crisis of language, education...The Bengalis—the Bangladeshi—now abuse us in a casteist way. We are now suffering a crisis of our identity. We can’t explain our name, we can’t talk in our language—once we start talking in our language in the cities—they just slap and disgrace us.

Throughout the interview, IPFT-T used the term “Bengalis” and “Bangladeshis” interchangeably seeing both categories of people as illegal migrants to Tripura. As can be seen above, IPFT-T also uses the Indian Pidgin English term

“casteist” to refer to the discriminatory attitude of the whole Bengali-speaking population towards the tribal population. During the interview, IPFT-T did not make any distinction between the Hindus and the Muslim Bengali-speakers. Hence, it can be said that in this linguistic conflict in Tripura, the small Bengali-speaking Muslim population is not identified as a separate entity for political manipulation and have cordial relations with the overwhelming Bengali-speaking Hindu population of the state.

Hence, from the analysis in this sub-section, it can be comprehended that the association of bonding social capital when it comes to the practising Muslim populations in West Bengal and the overall Muslim population in Tripura, are because of the following reasons: In West Bengal, it is the current state government’s pandering strategies to reach out to the extreme sections of the Muslim population, combined with the propaganda of both Hindu and Islamist organizations surrounding religious persecution of the Hindu community in neighbouring Bangladesh, which has mobilized an orthodox segment of the Muslim population. In Tripura, the small size of the Muslim population makes it impractical for them to be divided for political purposes into smaller sections for vote-banks. Rather in the Bengali-tribal linguistic and territorial conflict, the Muslims of the state are mobilized under the general umbrella of Bengali-speakers.

## **8.2 Factor 2: Significance of Cross-border movement for the formation of Bonding Social Capital**

This section contains only one question which had surfaced as a result of running the OLS regression model on the effect of the support for cross-border movement on the formation of bonding social capital in Chapter 6. As in the previous section, the question will be followed by an analysis of answers provided by political actors.

### ***8.2.1 Question: Why does the support for cross-border movement of people and goods lead to greater bonding social capital in Assam, in comparison to West Bengal and Tripura?***

It was found in the quantitative analysis chapter that although Assam is not a majority Bengali-speaking state, support for cross-border movement of people and goods with Bangladesh, in comparison to Tripura and West Bengal, has the most affect on bonding social capital among the three Indian states. Earlier studies, as

pointed out in chapter 4 outlining the theoretical framework of this research, conducted on groups sharing a common ethnicity reflected higher cross-border movement, both in terms of trade of goods and the movement of people (vis-à-vis migration or tourism) (Rauch & Trindade, 2002; Liang et al., 2017). However, the results for Assam seem to contradict the foundation of this hypothesis, which is built on the notion that ethnic ties lead to more bonding social capital. Is it the case that something beyond ethno-linguistic factors is at play? In order to explain the rise in this phenomenon, this section will consider the various opinions that political actors have given in all the three states regarding issues of movement of goods and people.

First, let us consider the case of the movement of goods. In West Bengal and Tripura, the trade of goods, especially in its illegal form is a part of daily life (Van Schendel, 2005, p. 147). In West Bengal, all the representatives of the political parties recognized this fact as inevitable. One such example can be seen in the following statement made by INC-WB, the representative of one of the two main opposition parties of West Bengal, when questioned about whether initiatives that are being taken by India and Bangladesh at the highest administrative level for increasing regional connectivity would lead to a decrease in illegal trade (quote 27, Appendix 11):

Formal trade will increase, but informal trade shall stay the same. As you know, the border is so long and unfenced. Cattle are going to Bangladesh informally. Boys are playing football, and the village people are going to the border huts, without any restrictions at all.

In Tripura, the politicians completely avoided this question. This is probably because the state's whole economic setup is dependent on this form of trade with Bangladesh (Bhaumik, 2005). Trying to avoid this question on whether legal and illegal cross-border trade would increase equally if regional connectivity increases, CPIM-T made the following statement (quote 28, Appendix 11): "Well, this is true. I think this is a redundant question, can we move on to the next question please..."

Thus, it can be inferred that since there is already a sizeable trade setup in place in West Bengal and Tripura, and the current status quo with economic transactions happening regardless—whether in its legal or illegal forms—there is no real advantage in changing the structure.

On the other hand, in Assam, all the political actors said that trade with Bangladesh, in all its forms, is at its nascent stage. This is especially true in the Brahmaputra Valley, where I conducted my fieldwork. Most of my respondents expressed the dire need to make trade more legal and open. The presence of an unmanageable terrain in the Bangladesh and Assam borderland maybe the reason behind minimal trade. Out of the 272 km long Assam-Bangladesh border, 95 km is riverine, where during every monsoon season, new islands come up, and where even the border fences are washed away due to the change of course of the rivers (Mishra, 2017).

Even ULFA-A, an organization that has anti-migrant origins, said that the opening up of trade with Bangladesh is essential for the sake of Assam, which for the longest time has had its development paralyzed because of being virtually landlocked (quotes 29 & 30, Appendix 11):

It is a good thing to open up trade and commerce. Because most of the tea from the tea gardens in Assam went through the Chittagong Port, we used to send tea, timber and other products via that port. After the Partition and the departure of the British, Assam and the North East got bottle-necked. This was because the Chittagong Port went to East Pakistan, and even our access to the Calcutta Port got blocked—so water route was blocked. So we need this connectivity, but because of the huge influx of illegal Bangladeshis across the porous border, we want the border to be sealed.... So we have to balance it. On the one hand, we have to seal the India-Bangladesh border because of the influx of foreigners, especially to Assam, but on the other hand, we have to open it up for trade and commerce.

Opinions on legalizing trade were expressed by the spokespersons of the two main opposition parties in Assam. AIUDF-A said that if connectivity happens official trade will go up more, but unofficial would “increase less” as people would not take convoluted routes when there are straight ways of doing things because border security forces would not harass traders if things are made official (quotes 31 & 32, Appendix 11). AIUDF-A’s statement about the corruption of Indian BSF (Border Security Force) personnel vis-à-vis trade, especially via Assam, is well documented (Rahman, 2013; Mishra, 2017). The spokesperson of the main

opposition party INC, exclaimed the following: “...why trade has not been legalized is another mystery—both the Indian and the Bangladeshi governments have not legalized such trade...Trade centres in Karimganj and Mankachar have been opened, but those are not adequately staffed or have full facilities...” (quote 33, Appendix 11). Thus, while in West Bengal and Tripura, there is already a working setup for trade which does not necessitate the vital need to change anything, the support for more legal forms of trade is more of a regional necessity in the instance of Assam which supersedes ethno-linguistic ties.

Now, let us move on to the description of the cross-border movement of people, whether in legal forms of tourism observed through travel and cultural exchange, or in the undocumented form such as the kind of migration happening from Bangladesh to India. Again, in West Bengal and Tripura, as with trade, the cross-border movement of people is considered a part of daily life (Van Schendel, 2005; Afsar, 2008; Damodaran, 2017), and so there is not a widespread demand to change the status quo. From the interviews that I conducted in West Bengal, it can be inferred that politicians of the state generally consider the topic of migration as a non-issue or an issue to be overlooked. While TMC-WB refused to answer any questions on the topic of migration from Bangladesh (quote 34, Appendix 11), the representatives of the two main opposition parties, CPIM-WB (quote 36, Appendix 11) and INC-WB (quote 35, Appendix 11) viewed this as a topic that did not really require attention. According to CPIM-WB, Hindu right-winged forces in India, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), have made this topic into a major issue: “...this migration takes place throughout the ages. Does religion have a role to play? RSS has made this a major issue” (quote 36, Appendix 11).

Along similar lines, INC-WB commented on the change in religious demography happening in West Bengal, due to the migration from Bangladesh: “...I can tell you that after this Land Border Agreement, which took place in the North part of the State—of course there would be a natural demographic change. Other than that there are no issues really” (quote 35, Appendix 11).

Here INC-WB is referring to the Land Border Agreement of 2015, a deal according to which India and Bangladesh have agreed to swap some 200 tiny enclaves dotted around their 4,000 km border (Quadir, 2015). The 52,000 inhabitants of these enclaves, who have for decades been deprived of basic public services and lived without effective citizenship, were given options to stay where they are or

move to the other side of the border (Quadir, 2015). Given that the population density is very high in this region, the movement of just 52,000 people should not make a difference, and it only shows that INC-WB was simply trying to downplay the seriousness of the topic of undocumented migration.

Whereas in West Bengal, the topic of migration was an issue which politicians downplayed the seriousness of or did not like mentioning, conversely in Tripura, this topic was brought up with much pride and enthusiasm (quotes 37 & 38, Appendix 11). CPIM-T enthusiastically said the following (quote 37, Appendix 11):

Well, historically if I may say, Tripura has always had a very special relationship with Bangladesh. During 1971's Bangladesh's War of Independence, we hosted more refugees than what was then the population of Tripura. We hosted Bangladeshi refugees as our guests, and on several instances, the people of Tripura hosted them in their own homes....There are also cases where some even settled here and did not go back when Bangladesh won its independence. For eleven months, there was a huge flow of refugees and marriage relations even formed during those times.

This enthusiasm of the ruling establishment in Tripura to encourage migration from neighbouring Bangladesh is confirmed in the memoir of General Jacob (2011, p. 139). According to Jacob (2011, p. 139), during the days of INC rule in the state, the Chief Minister allegedly encouraged migration of Bengalis to counter tribal votes.

While the topic of cross-border movement of people from Bangladesh is seen as a normal phenomenon in West Bengal and Tripura, in Assam, on the other hand, it is completely a different situation. The topic of migration from Bangladesh is a burning issue in the state's politics because the mainstream Assamese population believes that the changing demography of the state is due to this reason (Hazarika, 2000). The answers to my questions on migration, cultural exchange, and tourism reflected this. According to BJP-A, cultural collaboration with Bangladesh is not an area that has been given attention because of the following reason (quote 39, Appendix 11):

One thing among the migrants from Bangladesh is that they profess the religion of Islam and they speak the Bengali language. So, the xenophobia is

attached to the Bengali-speaking Muslims of Assam, and because of that, there is hardly any collaboration.

Whereas BJP-A's sentiments reflected the right-wing political version, the liberal parties had other perspectives. Here it is useful to analyse the statements of the liberal parties of Assam on questions relating to migration and cultural exchanges. INC-A implied that cultural exchanges take place with the Bengal region of India, but this is, unfortunately, missing with Bangladesh (quote 40, Appendix 11):

In our state, Assam, there is the presence of Bengali people and of course, their culture. Many reputed artists from West Bengal come here to perform *baul* and *bhatiali* songs for the large Bengali population here. But when one says "Bangladesh," there is hesitation because for three and a half decades, there has been a movement to drive off so-called Bangladeshis...

Similarly, SFI-A said that there is a dire need for cultural exchange with Bangladesh (quote 41, Appendix 11). SFI-A said that some rudimentary initiatives that are being taken now for fostering Bangladesh-Assam cultural exchange and tourism should have been done long ago for the following reasons (quote 41, Appendix 11):

It is because the people are having cultural affinity....With the movement of people, the perception of Bangladeshis being poor and basically not understanding our neighbours shall be over. We, who are of East Bengal descent, try to show positives of Bangladesh in the media, such as showing where Bangladesh has reached in child mortality rates and where our state is at the moment. That is why we are labelled negatively as collaborators of Bangladesh. So this communication gap—when people will come and go—will definitely be diminished.

Nevertheless, the representatives of the liberal political parties stated that the claim of undocumented migration from Bangladesh has completely no basis (quotes 42 & 43, Appendix 11). The following quotes of the two main opposition political parties of Assam illustrate how the issue of migration is completely denied by them, claiming that demographic change is due to internal reasons present among the

Muslims of Assam, creation of new districts with the corresponding misrepresentation in the new census data in the media by simply highlighting the data for one of the divided districts and not stressing on the other, and also Bangladeshis finding it more convenient to go to other places than to come to Assam:

Totally false notion! Since the census of 1971 to the data of 2016, no established research could show that because of migration, the population of Assam is increasing. It is because of internal population growth rate—our economic condition and religion are also reasons...Early marriage, dowry systems, and illiteracy rate are reasons. No established data could prove the migration issue, and those studies that are out there are biased. For example, the data for Karimganj that shows this time that there is a population growth of 11%— is completely false. Why is this? If you divide a district and not show the population of the other district, then naturally you will see a rise or fall in the population in one of them. You must show the holistic picture, showing the population of both districts. This is also the case of Dhubri, which got divided from Goalpara. Then there is a rise in Dhubri's population, but where is Goalpara's population at the same time? (Statement by AIUDF-A, quote 42)

People used to come during the days of British India or early days of Pakistan, but now it is not possible at the rate which might change demography here. Firstly, the borders are more or less sealed—except in riverine areas. Secondly, if they do come here, where would they stay? Unlike before, there isn't an abundance of land here. Local Muslims here are challenged for their land rights—if new people come, how would they get land? Thirdly, there are other avenues now for Bangladeshis to go to for blue-collar jobs, such as to the Middle East. Those are much safer and easier venues to go, then to Assam. (Statement by INC-A, quote 43)

Therefore, after analysing the statements of the representative of the political parties and organizations in Assam, vis-à-vis cross-border movement, it can be concluded by saying that while there is a general feeling of a section of people in not

allowing anybody from Bangladesh to enter Assam even for cultural exchanges, as such actions are deemed as potential ways for migrant settlers entering Assam, there is another section which wants cultural exchange and denies the claim of any kind of undocumented migration.

Hence, from the analysis in this section, it can be comprehended that Assam's support for cross-border movement of people and goods with Bangladesh, in comparison to West Bengal and Tripura, affecting bonding social capital, is because of the following reasons: Firstly, everyone in Assam wants greater openness in trade, because its dearth has harmed the state's development. This is more of a reason related to bad location than any kind of ethnic ties. Secondly, in Assam, while some people do not want any movement of people from Bangladesh due to the issue of undocumented migration, there are others who deny the occurrence of undocumented migration and want people from Bangladesh to visit the state as tourists. This second group views the possibility of tourism changing the notion of Bengali-speaking Muslims coming to Assam from the neighboring country due to poverty. Finally, in West Bengal and Tripura, the arrangement regarding the cross-border trade and movement of people are already in place, and as such, policy makers in those states do not find any effective reason for bringing about change in the current situation.

### **8.3 Discussion and Conclusion**

The content analysis of information gathered from interviews of political actors tries to develop deeper explanations to how two factors affect the formation of bonding social capital. In doing so, it tries to answer the following sub-question of this research: What individual personal characteristics and location-specific factors determine bonding social capital formation and through which mechanisms do they work? By conducting a directed content analysis of the statements of political actors, who are major stakeholders concerning issues pertaining to religion and views on cross-border movement, deeper explanations are provided for the state-specific differences in regards to those two factors affecting the creation of bonding social capital.

In Chapter 6, displaying the OLS regression analysis of this research, it was found how for all my survey respondents from the three states, being Muslim, being

involved in agricultural profession, living in a rural location, and supporting the cross-border movement of people and goods lead to the formation of greater bonding social capital. It was found that rural location and being Muslim lead to higher bonding social capital in Tripura, being a practiser of religion and supporting cross-border movement lead to greater formation of bonding social capital in Assam, and being a practising Muslim lead to higher bonding social capital in West Bengal. According to the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4, while the significant result for rural location in Tripura can only be attributed to the strong presence of the joint family structure in the state, the other state-specific variations can be explored further due to the presence of political actors affecting them.

The content analysis technique employed in this section to look at the interviews of political actors has led to a number of explanations for the variations in results. In Tripura, the overall Muslim community comprises of just nine percent of the state's population and so political actors do not try to divide the population further into smaller vote-banks but rather try to mobilize them politically under the general umbrella of the Bengali-speaking identity in the state's linguistic conflict between the Bengali and Kokborak speakers.

In contrast in West Bengal, it was found that the segment of the population comprising of practising Muslims have greater bonding social capital as opposed to the non-practising Hindu population of the state. This chapter explains that practising Muslims in West Bengal have high bonding social capital because of two reasons: Firstly, it is the higher fear-mongering among Muslims in West Bengal by political actors where the present TMC government's strategies is to reach out to extreme sections of the Muslim population who are a considerable percentage of the state's vote-bank. Secondly, the propaganda of both Hindu and Islamist political organizations surrounding the religious persecution of the Hindu community in neighbouring Bangladesh has mobilized an orthodox segment of the Muslim population.

The OLS regression results for Assam had presented a story of an anomaly among the three states. It showed that a practiser of religion possessed more social capital than non-practisers. The analysis in this chapter finds that the threat of demographic change in recent years has led to religious polarization. It also finds historical linguistic tensions created due to policies promoted by the British colonial administration as an aspect in this polarization since the Assamese population is

mainly Hindu, and the Muslims in the state are mostly native Bengali-speakers. It also finds that the rise of Hindu nationalism in the state is fostered by events in neighbouring Bangladesh.

In regards to the OLS regression output for Assam highlighting the support for cross-border movement of goods with Bangladesh affecting the formation of bonding social capital, this chapter illustrates that this phenomenon perhaps depends on Assam's urgent need for openness in trade due to the sake of the state's development. In terms of the outcomes for the cross-border movement of people in Assam, it was found that while some people do not want any movement of people from Bangladesh because of concern over undocumented migration, there are others who completely deny the occurrence of undocumented migration and want people from Bangladesh to visit the state because it would change the negative image about Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam. This is in contrast to the two states, West Bengal and Tripura, where the study finds that the appropriate arrangements regarding the cross-border trade and movement of people exist already, and political actors as stakeholders do not find any effective reason for changing them.

Gupta et al. (2018) findings in Bangladesh and West Bengal were that religious minority status being the driver of trust among different segments of the population rather than religiosity itself. Their study supports the findings of this study in the case of Tripura where minority status determines social capital. Gupta et al. (2018) findings completely go against the findings of this study in regards to Assam and West Bengal where it is seen that religiosity or religiosity among a certain religious community affecting the formation of bonding social capital. Perhaps the difference in measurement of social capital as trust by Gupta et al. (2018) in contrast to this study's measurement of social capital as not just trust but also the frequency of contacts is something that has led to disparate results.

While it was mentioned in the discussion section in chapter 6 how this study generally supports the findings of previous research on the Chinese diaspora (Rauch & Trindade, 2002; Liang et al., 2007) showing how support for cross-border movement leads to the formation of trust as a result of a pattern of reciprocity and obligations based on co-ethnic kinship ties, the state-specific output shows a different narrative. It is seen in the analysis of this chapter how economic necessity and the need to change the negative image about Bengali-speaking Muslims in Assam being the driver of the formation of bonding social capital.

Chapter 9, the following chapter, present the conclusion of this research. It summarises the findings of this study and answers the main question of this research: How is social capital formed among Bengali-speaking Muslims in three Indian border states? It does so by combining the findings in this chapter, as well as the findings in Chapter 6. The concluding chapter also points out the limitations of this research, the policy implications of the findings, and the scope for future research.

## Conclusion

In this concluding chapter, I summarise the research on the social capital formation among the Bengali-speaking Muslim communities living in the three border states of India and state what I find. I then point to the limitations of this study and policy implications of the findings. Furthermore, I also consider avenues for future research using this study's theoretical framework and deem to what extent the findings of this study can be generalized beyond the context of the three Indian border states.

### 9.1 Summary of the Research and Findings

The objective of this study was to examine the factors which lead to social capital formation among the Bengali-speaking Muslims living in three border states of India—Assam, West Bengal and Tripura. In Chapter 3 outlining the literature review, I pointed out how there appear to be relatively few studies (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009; Asadullah, 2017; Gupta et al., 2018) from the Bengal region investigating social capital creation, and that even these studies lacked comprehensiveness as they only considered interpersonal trust or the cognitive dimension of social capital. I stated how my research is making a major empirical contribution by considering the fundamental measurement components of bonding and bridging types of social capital among an ethnic minority community in South Asia, thereby taking into account the embedded resources which actually lead to social capital creation. In Chapter 3, I also stated how I am making a contribution to the literature of Islam in South Asia by examining the decisive variables concerning an individual's personal characteristics and location-specific factors which lead to the creation of social capital among the Bengali-speaking Muslims, which in turn determine their condition in the present context. Up to this point in time, studies on Bengali-speaking Muslims in India have largely pertained to historical accounts of events leading to the partition of 1947.

In Chapter 4, I developed a theoretical framework for examining how social capital is formed in these three border states and hypothesized an answer to the following research question: How is social capital formed among Bengali-speaking Muslims in three Indian border states? For answering this question, I adjusted the

individual-level network theory of social capital comprising of structural and cognitive dimensions originally conceived of by Lin (1999; 2001), which Lancee (2010; 2012) had adapted for explaining bonding and bridging types of social capital in his study on explaining labour market outcomes among the non-Western migrant populations in the Netherlands and Germany. The network theory of social capital which this study follows views the creation of each type of social capital as something which is not created by collective level interactions but through individual-level interactions, which dictate how structural holes are bridged and how network closures happen. While Lancee (2010; 2012) had used the two forms of social capital as independent variables for explaining outcomes in the labour market, I used the two forms of social capital as dependent variables having structural and cognitive dimensions. In Chapter 4, I built a theoretical framework composed of an individual's personal characteristics and location-specific factors which affect the structural and cognitive components forming bonding and bridging types of social capital. My theoretical argument for answering the main research question is the following: The "network closure" which increases the depth of ties in a given linguistic and/or religious network leads to bonding social capital, while the mechanisms of filling "structural holes" across networks by transmitting the flow of information across linguistic and/or religious group network lead to the formation of bridging social capital.

The following are the five factors that I had conceptualised for leading to the formation of bonding social capital: one's religion, one's household income, being involved in agricultural profession, living in a rural setting, and supporting the cross-border movement of people and goods. The following are the ten factors that I had conceptualised for leading to the formation of bridging social capital: one's language, age group, educational level, gender, involvement in non-agricultural professions, marital status, living in an urban setting, perception of governance institutions, perception of the socio-economic environment and proximity to the ruling political establishment. Chapter 2 had earlier provided the historical and socio-political background of the region needed for understanding the formation of linguistic and religious identities, the presence of agricultural and rural communities, and socio-economic inequality and migration. Additionally, Section 4.2 in Chapter 4 explained additional issues which affect cultural settings in the three Indian states being studied such as pertaining to kinship relations in Bengal, the joint family

structure in rural Bengal, and the corruption prevalent in Indian society. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of Chapter 4, I also described how the exact causal mechanisms occur in relation to the fifteen independent factors and the creation of bonding and bridging social capital.

I then applied a parallel mixed-method study design, where I collected quantitative and qualitative data concurrently, for testing the theory developed in Chapter 4. As described in Chapter 5, the quantitative component is the core component and can stand alone in being the driver of the theory, while the qualitative component described in Chapter 7 is the supplemental component and is dependent on the core component. While the factors forming bridging social capital could be simply investigated in Chapter 6 by relying on the interpretations of the quantitative Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis models, the factors forming bonding social capital needed to have an additional qualitative component for providing robustness to the quantitative findings of the regression analysis models. This is because of the presence of two of the five independent factors affecting the formation of bonding social capital being largely attributed to having political actors as stakeholders. The outcome of the quantitative analytical component in Chapter 6 helped me decide on what exactly to analyse in the second qualitative analytical component in Chapter 8. In Chapter 8, I conducted a directed content analysis of the statements of political actors, who are major stakeholders concerning issues pertaining to religion and views on cross-border movement, and found deeper explanations to the state-specific differences in regards to those two factors affecting the creation of bonding social capital.

The findings from the analysis chapters (Chapter 6 and 8) in this research are that factors leading to the formation of bonding social capital are state-specific, while factors leading to the creation of bridging social capital are more common between the states. The four independent factors (language, urban, inter-marriage and political proximity) which were found significant in the OLS regression models depicting the creation of bridging social capital in Chapter 6 have similar causal mechanisms pertaining to engaging in prolonged interactions with individuals who are not of the same ethnic group and the presence of corruption in one's social setting. Chapter 6 also found how bonding social capital forms in the three states due to different causal mechanisms. They are better described in conjunction with findings in Chapter 8. The findings from Chapter 6 and 8 show that bonding social

capital occurs in Tripura due to the presence of the joint family structure as shown by the significant result of living in a rural setting and also due to being part of the minority Muslim population. In West Bengal, the basis for the creation of bonding social capital lies in the presence of religious orthodoxy among the minority Muslim population. Finally, in Assam, bonding social capital is formed due to the apprehension in mainstream Assamese society relating to demographic change by Bengali-speakers coming in from neighbouring Bangladesh and economic necessity present in the state due to being part of a landlocked region.

## **9.2 Limitations of the Findings of this study**

The limitations of the study stem from the employed quantitative and qualitative methods. As far as the quantitative core component of the study is concerned, the limited sample size per state may have influenced some of the results of the regression analyses, where some of the results seemed to show a positive trend but were not significant. However, I had ensured during the survey design phase that I must at least conduct interviews of a hundred respondents in each state, and thus the results do have some degree of validity. I had a reasonable number of observations for running OLS regression models as the vast majority of the observations were not dropped.

Another limitation of the quantitative portion of the study stems from the sampling framework of data collection. Respondents were selected via snowball sampling because the application of a proper random or stratified sampling framework was not possible. Although there are obvious limitations in a snowball sampling framework as there is selection bias due to the researcher's dependence on the referrals of the respondents, in first getting accessed and second to make the respondents to participate (Cohen & Arieli, 2011, p. 428), they were largely mitigated. The use of parallel snowball networks by finding three initial respondents in each location and then asking for their phone lists from which 5 names were selected randomly decreased the possibility of respondents knowing each other too well. Given the population density in the region, the primary and secondary respondents had at least a hundred contacts in their cell phone list in most cases. Thus the limitation concerning most respondents knowing each other too well has been reduced due to two reasons: Firstly, the names of secondary and tertiary

respondents would already be picked at random, and so the individual whom I got the contact from would not exactly know who I am interviewing. Secondly, even if the individual who I got the contact from realized who I am interviewing, he or she would not in most cases know them too well and there would not be a high possibility of respondents sharing questions in advance which might affect the responses of future respondents. Furthermore, since the study follows a deductive theory testing model, and the analysis is descriptive and correlational, a snowball sampling framework was not meant for testing causality but rather “analytical generalisability” (Yin, 2010, p. 21), and it was possible to evaluate findings in relation to the theory of social capital developed for this research.

Additional limitations of the quantitative portion of the study include the designing of the survey instrument as it did not include questions about whether individuals visit different religious sites, such as mosques or temples, Sufi shrines or other places of worship. It should have also directly asked individuals about places for getting access to religious education such as Islamic seminaries or Hindu organization run schools. Going to such places might affect the formation of an individual’s bonding or bridging social capital. Due to the inclusive nature of Islamic sufi shrines as places where people might network beyond their core religious group, one might actually form bridging social capital based on visiting such places. Additionally, visiting one’s own place of worship (temple/ mosque) or attending religious schools more might make an individual’s frequency of contact with core group higher, and the religious teachings in places of worship might make a person more willing to help each other, leading to the formation of greater bonding social capital.

Other limitations of the study come from the qualitative data collection. During the stakeholder detection phase for conducting a stakeholder analysis, when I was narrowing down on the influential and important actors who affect the causal mechanisms concerning religion and cross-border movement, I did not consult an expert. Normally companies and development organizations consult regional or topic-specific experts for big scale projects. Nevertheless, as the scale of my project was small, the alternate way of reviewing background literature for detecting stakeholders should not pose a big problem pertaining to leaving out any major stakeholder or for establishing the fact that political actors are indeed very influential

and important actors who affect the formation of bonding social capital in the region being studied.

### **9.3 Implications of this Research for the Development of Policies**

The findings of this study which demonstrate the mechanisms of creating bonding and bridging social capital can have big implications for the development and integration of India's Muslim population, who are the largest religious minority. The Sachar Commission report (2006) as well as the Misra Commission Report (2007) highlight how Muslims are the most disadvantaged religious group in India and are excluded from various aspects of civil life. The plight of Indian Muslims includes a wide range of issues such as worse access to health care and education, lower consumption levels, income inequality and poverty, and lower quality of transportation and road networks than the mainstream Indian population (Sachar et al., 2006; Dossani, 2011). Over the years, there have been a rapid growth in studies from across the world showing how the presence of social capital in a society leads to positive outcomes concerning a diverse range of subjects, including building effective developmental policies (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000; Cleaver, 2005; Savioli & Patuelli, 2016), life satisfaction (Putnam, 2000; Halpern, 2005; Elgar et al., 2011), and public health (Kawachi et al., 1999b; Bush & Baum, 2001; Eriksson, 2011). Constructive policies geared towards building social capital in the three states could also lead to positive social outcomes which can improve the conditions of the Muslim populations. Two of the states being studied, West Bengal and Assam, have 30% and 33% population of Muslims respectively, which is higher than India's average of 15% (Census of India, 2011). These two states also show appalling reports concerning their Muslim populations. As mentioned in Chapter 2 describing the historical and socio-political background of the region, in West Bengal, almost 80% of West Bengal's Muslim population living in rural areas live below the poverty line (Roy, 2016). It was also mentioned in Chapter 2 how recently, on 30th July 2018, a draft NRC (National Register of Citizens) was published in Assam, where the names of almost four million individuals especially those belonging to the Bengali-speaking Muslim community of the state were missing and essentially declared stateless (Gani, 2018). Therefore, making policies leading to positive steps towards social capital formation among Muslim communities in India should lead to

greater overall positive effects of social capital for a big segment of the populations in the states which were studied in this research, thereby improving their prospects of integration of Muslims with the mainstream Indian population.

#### **9.4 Implications of the Findings of this study for Future Research**

The findings of this research demonstrate that there is scope for the development of future research showing how region-specific social capital formation occurs. A similar comparative study can be conducted in a western border state of India such as in Gujarat which also has a substantial Muslim population having pre-Partition ties with neighbouring Pakistan (Khalidi, 1998, p. 347). However, since cross-border movement is hazardous due to tighter security in the India-Pakistan borderlands (Khalidi, 1998, p. 347) unlike in the India-Bangladesh Bengal region, bonding social capital may not be formed due to the factor concerning cross-border movement of people and goods. Nevertheless, political actors have used the notion of fear between the minority Muslim and majority Hindu communities for creating riots such as in 1969 and 2002 (Dhattiwala & Biggs, 2012). This should be a factor affecting the creation of bonding social capital in Gujarat, as was found in this research. On the other hand, since Gujarat has major cities such as Ahmedabad and Surat (Dhattiwala & Biggs, 2012, p. 505) which provide ample opportunities for interaction of Muslims with Hindus and there is the presence of corruption due to being part of India (Hindu, 2018), there is scope for bridging social capital formation because of similar causal mechanisms which were applicable in the three states of this study.

Beyond South Asia, such a study design can be used to examine the formation of social capital among Muslim populations in Africa such as in Nigeria where Muslim groups coexist alongside a big Christian population (Ilfiffe, 2007, p. 66). Individuals from the predominantly Muslim Hausa tribe living in such locations share ethno-linguistic and ethno-religious ties with neighbouring Hausa people living in Niger (Ilfiffe, 2007. p. 75), and historically there have been instances of cross-border trade and migration (Ilfiffe, 2007, p. 85). Thus, the findings in this study for factors affecting social capital creation may be applicable in that context as well.

In addition, there lies a possibility of conducting a longitudinal study: The analysis in this research was based on cross-sectional field data which was collected in 2015/2016. A second phase data collection such as in 2019/2020 will help in

conducting a time series analysis. Additionally, future research with altered study design aiming for random data collection can establish causality. Therefore, both types of changes in the research design involving a random data collection and time series analysis will help establish generalization of the findings of this research and provide an avenue for establishing greater validity of the description of social capital formation provided in this study.

Future work may also include a refined survey questionnaire when doing fieldwork which will consist of questions about visitation to religious sites such as Islamic sufi shrines and mosques/ temples or attendance in religious educational institutions to understand religion's effect on the formation of bonding and bridging social capital. This will help in providing more nuanced explanations of how religion leads to the development of social capital in different state settings.

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# Appendices

**Appendix 1:  
Survey Questionnaire and  
Consent Forms in Three Languages**

### Survey Questionnaire

Enumerator's ID:	Date of Interview:	Respondent's ID #:
Name of Indian State: _____	Name of District: _____	Name of City/ Village/ Zip Code:
Time Interview Started:	Time Interview Ended:	
<p><b>Introduction and Oral Summary to be read out by the Enumerator:</b></p> <p><i>"As part of a PhD research at England's Durham University, our team is conducting surveys on the trust network of Bengali Muslims living in your state and two other states of India bordering Bangladesh. The India-Bangladesh bordering areas have historically been a porous zone that is inhabited by large Bengali-speaking populations. In recent years, it has also been areas of debates concerning India-Bangladesh political relations. Through studying the trust network of Bengali Muslims, we want to understand how the topic of ethnic ties is connected to resource allocation, trade, labor market and migration. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and you are free to exit the survey at any time. If you are not comfortable answering any question, please let me know and I shall proceed to the next question. Your identity shall be kept confidential and your responses will only be used for academic purposes. Completing this survey takes about 45 minutes. Do you have any questions regarding the purpose of this survey?</i></p> <p><i>If you have no further questions please sign or put your thumb mark on the consent sheet so as to indicate that you have understood the nature of this survey and voluntarily agree to participate. This consent sheet shall be kept confidential. Thank you for your participation."</i></p>		

1. Approximately, how old are you? (not to interview <18, select next name in contact list if person <18 is selected)		18-20	21-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70+
2. Gender			1. Male	2. Female		3. Other		
3. Native Language	1. Bengali	2. Assamese	3. Urdu	4. Hindi		5. Other Language? _____		
4. Religion	1. Muslim	2. Hindu	3. Christian	4. Other? _____				
5. Geographic Location of your Home				1. Urban		2. Rural		
6. How often do you step out of your neighbourhood or village?	1. 0 to 1 time yearly	2. 2 to 5 times yearly	3. 6 to 10 times yearly	4. Monthly	5. Weekly	6. Daily		

**Your Network:**

7. Over the past two weeks, approximately how many people have you been in contact in the following ways:		1. Landline/ Cell Phone/ Skype (Both calls and texts): _____		2. Social Media (such as Facebook, Whatsapp, Viber): _____		3. Had Tea with or met up for a meal: _____	
8. Among them, how many have you talked to more than twice a week?							
<i>Please think of 3 people amongst them with whom you had been in contact with the most frequently (These may include friends, relatives or co-workers, but not household members):</i>							
9. What is person (i)'s native language and religion?							
10. What is person (ii)'s native language and religion?							
11. What is person (iii)'s native language and religion?							
12. How many close friends do you have, i.e. those people who you can talk to for private matters?							
<i>Now, please think of 3 friends amongst them with whom you are the closest:</i>							
13. What kind of characteristic do you share with Friend (i)? (tick as many as appropriate)	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Gender	7. Age Group
14. What kind of characteristic do you share with Friend (ii)? (tick as many as appropriate)	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Gender	7. Age Group

15. What kind of characteristic do you share with Friend (iii)? (tick as many as appropriate)	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Gender	7. Age Group

**Your Organizational Affiliations:**

16. How many non-governmental organizations do you and your household belong to? (These can include political organizations, religious organizations, trade union, cultural organizations, peasant organizations, social rights organizations, academic organizations (such as alumni group), professional organizations, charitable organizations, sports organizations):							
17. Which two of the above organizations are the most important for your household?			ORGANIZATION (A): _____		ORGANIZATION (B): _____		
<b>Organization (A):</b>							
18. How active are you in this Organization (A)?	1. Not Active (pay membership fee)	2. Somewhat Active (attend meetings)	3. Active (attend meetings and participate in its activities)	4. Very Active (recruit members for the organization)			
19. How does this Organization (A) go about adding members?	1. Completely Voluntarily		2. Because of Peer pressure	3. Because of Social Pressure			
20. What are the similarities amongst the members? (tick as many as appropriate)	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Gender	7. Age Group
21. What are the differences among the members? (tick as many as appropriate)	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Gender	7. Age Group
22. Does this Organization (A) collaborate with other organizations or take part in activities which are not specifically related to its work? (For example, an educational institution maybe working together with a cultural organization or manage cultural events).						1. Yes	2. No
23. If yes, how often does this collaboration or activities occur?	1. Never or very rarely (0 to 1 time yearly)	2. Rarely (2 to 3 times yearly)	3. Sometimes (4 to 5 times yearly)	4. Frequently (6 to 12 times yearly)	5. Very Frequently (more than 12 times yearly)	6. Always	

<b>Organization (B):</b>							
<b>24. How active are you in this Organization (B)?</b>	1. Not Active (pay membership fee)	2. Somewhat Active (attend meetings)	3. Active (attend meetings and participate in its activities)	4. Very Active (recruit members for the organization)			
<b>25. How does this Organization (B) go about adding members?</b>	1. Completely Voluntarily		2. Because of Peer pressure	3. Because of Social Pressure			
<b>26. What are the similarities amongst the members? (tick as many as appropriate)</b>	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Gender	7. Age Group
<b>27. What are the differences among the members? (tick as many as appropriate)</b>	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Gender	7. Age Group
<b>28. Does this Organization (B) collaborate with other organizations or take part in activities which are not specifically related to its work? (For example, an educational institution maybe working together with a cultural organization or manage cultural events).</b>						1. Yes	2. No
<b>29. If yes, how often does this collaboration or activities occur?</b>	1. Never or very rarely (0 to 1 time yearly)	2. Rarely (2 to 3 times yearly)	3. Sometimes (4 to 5 times yearly)	4. Frequently (6 to 12 times yearly)	5. Very Frequently (more than 12 times yearly)	6. Always	

**Your Neighborhood or Village:**

<b>30. Are the residents of your neighborhood or village different in the following ways (tick as many as appropriate):</b>	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Age Group	7. Wealth/Income	8. Other... what? _____ _____
<b>31. Please list the kind of differences among people living in your neighbourhood or village that cause tensions or conflict? (tick as many as appropriate)</b>	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Age Group	7. Wealth/Income	8. Other... what? _____ _____

<b>32. Which of these differences might escalate to violence? (tick as many as appropriate)</b>	1. Linguistic	2. Religious	3. Caste-related	4. Class	5. Professional	6. Age Group	7. Wealth/Income	8. Other... what? _____ _____
<b>33. Have you experienced such situations in your lifetime?</b>							1. Yes	2. No

**Only for Village Residents:**

<b>34. How do you go about fixing a community problem in your village without outside help (tick as many as appropriate)?</b>	1. Through discussions amongst ourselves			2. Through the panchayat village assembly		3. Other... what? _____	
<b>35. How effective is this resolution?</b>	1. Ineffective with supervision	2. Ineffective without supervision	3. Somewhat effective with supervision	4. Somewhat effective without supervision	5. Effective with supervision	6. Effective without supervision	
<b>36. How would you fix a community problem using help from outside your village (tick as many as appropriate)?</b>	1. With Legal Help		2. With help from an outside organization	3. With help from an outside influential individual	4. Other... what? _____		
<b>37. If you use outside help, how effective would that be?</b>	1. Ineffective with supervision	2. Ineffective without supervision	3. Somewhat effective with supervision	4. Somewhat effective without supervision	5. Effective with supervision	6. Effective without supervision	
<b>38. What do you consider as a community resource, something which only villagers are allowed to use (tick as many as appropriate)?</b>	1. Village Well	2. Playground	3. Pond	4. School	5. Other... what? _____ _____		
<b>39. How do you protect such limited resources of your community from outsiders?</b>	1. Surveillance Group		2. Through Regular Inspection	3. Through Random Inspection	4. Other... what? _____		
<b>40. How severely would you punish someone who dishonestly got access to these resources?</b>	1. Not Severely (force him out)	2. Somewhat Severely (force him out after scolding him)	3. Severely (force him out after scolding and shaming him)	4. Very Severely (publically shaming and physically assaulting him)			

**Trust in your Group:**

<b>41. Please rank the following groups by the order in which you trust them:</b>	1. Own Friend Circle:	2. Linguistic Group:	3. Religious Group:
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**Note:** Other than "Own Friend Circle", choose the one between "Linguistic" and "Religious" group, which has been ranked higher, for answering questions 42 to 48.

<b>42. Do members of this group mostly help one another?</b>	1. Not at All	2. Only under severe circumstances	3. Sometimes (for issues such as medical treatment or yearly school registration fee)	4. Frequently (for some kind of monthly need)	5. Very Frequently (anytime for any kind of necessity)
<b>43. How does this group punish someone who breaks its trust?</b>	1. Not at All	2. Give Warning	3. Ostracize	4. Banish	5. Physical Assault and/or Banish
<b>44. Do people in this group help non-group members?</b>	1. Not at All	2. Only under severe circumstances	3. Sometimes (for issues such as medical treatment or yearly school registration fee)	4. Frequently (for some kind of monthly need)	5. Very Frequently (anytime for any kind of necessity)
<b>45. How do you help your own group members? (tick as many as appropriate)</b>	1. Financially		2. Volunteering your time		3. Giving Advice
<b>46. If the choice "1. Financially" has been selected in the previous question, please selected to what degree you help your own group members financially?</b>	1. Only under severe circumstances	2. Sometimes (for issues such as medical treatment or yearly school registration fee)	3. Frequently (for some kind of monthly need)	4. Very Frequently (anytime for any kind of necessity)	
<b>47. How much would you protect your own group members from violence?</b>	1. I would remain passive	2. Would consider protecting	3. Will try to protect if possible	4. Will try very hard to protect	5. Will protect with my life if needed
<b>48. How much would you protect non-group members from such violence?</b>	1. I would remain passive	2. Would consider protecting	3. Will try to protect if possible	4. Will try very hard to protect	5. Will protect with my life if needed

**Civil Society:**

<b>49. How safe do you feel from crime and violence when you walk alone in your own neighbourhood or village?</b>	1. Unsafe during both daytime and night time	2. During daytime walk with a companion but during night time should not stay out	3. Safe to walk during the daytime but need a companion during night time	4. Safe during both daytime and night time	
<b>50. Have you or people in your household been attacked or had something stolen in your home or while walking in your own neighbourhood or village in the past year?</b>				1. Yes	2. No
<b>51. How safe do you feel from crime and violence when you walk alone outside your neighbourhood or village?</b>	1. Unsafe during both daytime and night time	2. During daytime walk with a companion but during night time should not stay out	3. Safe to walk during the daytime but need a companion during night time	4. Safe during both daytime and night time	

52. Have you or people in your household been attacked or had something stolen while walking outside your neighbourhood or village in the past year?	1. Yes	2. No
53. Have you seen policemen patrolling your neighbourhood or village in the past year?	1. Yes	2. No
54. Besides the police, have you seen any other security personnel patrolling your neighbourhood or village in the past year?	1. Yes	2. No
55. If yes, did they treat you and individuals of your household with the dignity expected to be conferred to a citizen?	1. Yes	2. No

56. Do you identify with any particular Political Ideology?				1. Yes	2. No
57. If yes, choose one of the following which fits best with your political ideological beliefs:	1. Liberal	2. Socialist	3. Conservative	4. Something Else? What? _____	
58. Would you vote for an individual belonging to another group who is running for a position in the local government?	1. Never (not possible)	2. Probably Not	3. Maybe (depending on the candidate)	4. Certainly (of course shall give)	
59. Would non-group members vote for you if you run for a position in the local government?	1. Never (not possible)	2. Probably Not	3. Maybe (depending on the situation)	4. Certainly (of course shall give)	
60. Do you think it is appropriate to vote for anyone if offered money or material gifts for voting?	1. Never (under no circumstances)	2. Probably Not	3. Maybe (depending on the situation)	4. Certainly (of course shall give)	
61. Are Local Government officials to be trusted?	1. No, Absolutely Not	2. Probably Not	3. Maybe (depends on the official)	4. Certainly Yes	
62. Are State Government officials to be trusted?	1. No, Absolutely Not	2. Probably Not	3. Maybe (depends on the official)	4. Certainly Yes	
63. Are Central Government officials to be trusted?	1. No, Absolutely Not	2. Probably Not	3. Maybe (depends on the official)	4. Certainly Yes	
64. In general, do you think that the Economic Situation of the country is good?	1. Yes			2. No	
65. Compared to last year at this time, has it improved, stayed about the same, or become worse?	1. Has improved	2. Stayed the same	3. Gotten worse		
66. Overall, considering not just economic issues but also other factors, do you feel that the country is going in the right direction?	1. Yes			2. No	

<b>67. How do you rate your living conditions compared to people in your State?</b>				1. Extremely Bad	2. Bad	3. Same	4. Better	5. Much Better
<b>68. Please select the issues which made you think so? (tick as many as appropriate):</b>								
1. Inflation related	2. Food related	3. Energy related (Water & Electricity)	4. Health Care related	5. Education related	6. Employment related	7. Bureaucracy related		
8. Transportation related	9. Infrastructure related	10. Culture related	11. Lifestyle related	12. Related to mutual respect between different communities		13. Other... what? _____ _____		
<b>69. How do you rate your living conditions compared to people living in other States of India?</b>				1. Extremely Bad	2. Bad	3. Same	4. Better	5. Much Better
<b>70. Over the past year, how often have you or anyone in your household been deprived of the following 9 essential items? (tick as many as appropriate)</b>				1. Food		2. Housing		3. Clothing
4. Education	5. Medicine and Health Care	6. Water and Electricity	7. Fuel for Cooking	8. Money		9. Transportation services		
<b>71. Are any members of your group in the Local Government?</b>							1. Yes	2. No
<b>72. Are any members of your group in the State Government?</b>							1. Yes	2. No
<b>73. Are any members of your group in the Central Government?</b>							1. Yes	2. No

<b>74. Are you interested in your local news?</b>					1. Yes	2. No	
<b>75. How often do you get local news from sources such as radio, TV or newspapers?</b>		1. Never	2. Less than once a month	3. Monthly	4. 2 to 3 times Weekly	5. 3 to 4 times Weekly	6. Daily
<b>76. Did you vote in the last national election of May 2014?</b>					1. Yes	2. No	
<b>77. How free are you to join any political organization (even if it is different from the ones followed by your family, friends and peers)?</b>	1. Would be ostracized by family and friends	2. Family and friends would see me with disgust	3. No one would say anything but everyone in society would look down on me	4. No one would think negatively	5. Because of social norms no one would think negatively or say anything		

<b>78. If someone says the word "government" which level of government would come to your mind?</b>			1. Local	2. State	3. Central
<b>79. Where would you talk about regarding how the government is doing? (tick as many as appropriate)</b>	1. Family/ Household	2. Workplace	3. Market-place (including teashops and restaurants)	4. Public Transport	4. Other...what? _____
<b>80. How free are you to express your opinions regarding government policies?</b>	1. Feel uncomfortable even to share my views with family and friends	2. Only feel comfortable to share my views with family	3. Feel comfortable to share with family and friends	4. Feel comfortable to share freely in society	5. Feel comfortable to share in the media and on any public platform
<b>81. How free are you to vote for your candidate of choice (even if different from the ones supported by your family, friends and peers)?</b>	1. My life, family and property would be at risk	2. My livelihood or job would be at risk	3. Could negatively affect my job or livelihood (such as stalling promotions, cutting or preventing salary increment, and transferring to a remote location)	4. No risk at present	5. No risk whatsoever now or in the future
<b>82. Do you have access to your community head such as your local mayor or village head?</b>				1. Yes	2. No
<b>83. If there is a problem, how often do your community members get together to petition to the local government for something?</b>	1. Do not petition even if there is a problem	2. Petition only for serious issues	3. Petition for any issues	4. Local community head comes or sends someone for scheduled inspection regularly	5. We are in regular contact with our community head
<b>84. How easy is it for you to access public services such as public schools or colleges, police station, post office or other government offices or services?</b>	1. Even with pursuance and payment, the work does not get done	2. With severe pursuance and payment, the work gets done	3. With pursuance and payment, the work gets done	4. With pursuance, the work gets done	5. Easily and timely, the work gets done

<b>85. Do you support the increase in trade with the neighboring country?</b>	1. Yes	2. No
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86. Are you involved in such trade?		1. Yes	2. No
87. If yes, do you have dues remaining in the market?		1. Yes	2. No
88. On what issues would it be appropriate for the government to reconsider the rules regarding the cross-border movement of people and goods? (tick as many as appropriate)	1. On no issues should there be changes	2. Trade restrictions should be relaxed	3. Visa requirements and waiting time should be reconsidered
			4. As long as there is some form of National ID, the visa system can be gotten rid off
89. If needed can you or anyone in your household help friends or relatives financially who are living on the other side of the border?	1. Yes, absolutely	2. Yes, although that is unsafe	3. No, I don't think it is possible
			4. No, I would not consider doing that
90. Would you vote for candidates favoring migration?	1. Yes, absolutely	2. Maybe, I am not sure	3. No, absolutely not

**Personal Characteristics:**

91. How many household members do you have, including family members and other individuals that you support who are living in your household?	1. 1-2 people	2. 3-5 people	3. 6-8 people	4. 8+ people
92. Are you married?				1. Yes 2. No
93. If yes, is your spouse of a different linguistic or religious background?	1. Yes, different linguistic background	2. Yes, different religious background	3. Yes, both linguistic and religious backgrounds are different	4. No, of the same linguistic and religious background
94. After marriage are you in touch with your parents? (if dead, while they were alive)				1. Yes 2. No
95. After marriage is your spouse in touch with his or her parents? (if dead, while they were alive)				1. Yes 2. No
96. Do you live in a rental property?				1. Yes 2. No
97. Approximate Average Household Income (monthly in Indian Rupees)	1. <2,500	2. 2,500-5,000	3. 5,000-7,500	4. 7,500-10,000
	5. 10,000-15,000	6. 15,000-20,000	7. 20,000-30,000	8. 30,000-50,000
			9. 50,000-75,000	10. 75,000+
98. Your Years of Schooling				
99. What is your highest educational attainment?	1. Primary	2. Secondary	3. Higher Secondary	4. Bachelors Degree
				5. Masters Degree & Above

<b>100. School Type</b>		1.Public	2.Private	3.Religious	4. Technical	
<b>101. Where did you go to school?</b>		1. This Village or Neighbourhood		2. Outside this Village or Neighbourhood		
<b>102. Were children attending the school belonging to different linguistic or religious backgrounds?</b>		1. Yes, there was a good linguistic mix of students	2. Yes, there was a good religious mix of students	3. Yes, both linguistic and religious mix was apparent in the student body	4. No, most students were of the same linguistic and religious background	
<b>103. Your Profession</b>	1. Unemployed	2. Agriculture	3.Trading	4. Manufacturing	5. Service Holder	6. Other _____
<b>104. How disciplined are you about practicing your religion?</b>		1. Not disciplined	2. Try	3. Try very hard	4. Do everything properly	
<b>105. How often do you say any morning prayer per week?</b>		1. Never	2. Once or Twice	3. More than twice	4. Daily	
<b>106. Do you have family living on the other side of the border? (can also include distant relatives or in-laws)</b>				1. Yes	2. No	
<b>107. Where were you born?</b>						
<b>108. Where were your parents born?</b>						
<b>109. Where were your grandparents born?</b>						
<b>110. Have you heard anything about the "Dandakaranya Project"?</b>				1. Yes	2. No	
<b>111. If no, have you heard of the place called "Basanti"?</b>				1. Yes	2. No	

**Consent Sheet**

I have understood from the enumerator about the details of the survey, and have received answers to any questions. I affirm that I am 18 years of age or older and agree to voluntarily take part in this survey.

Name:

Signature or Thumb Mark:

Date:

## সার্ভের প্রশ্নসমূহ

প্রশ্ন কর্তার আ,ডি,নং:	সাক্ষাতের তারিখ:	উত্তর দাতার সিরিয়াল নং:
রাজ্যের নাম:	জেলার নাম:	শহর / থামের নাম / পিন কোড নম্বর:
সাক্ষাতের শুরু সময়:	সাক্ষাতের শেষ হওয়ার সময়:	
<b>প্রশ্নকর্তা মৌখিকভাবে উত্তরদাতাকে পড়ে শোনাবে:-</b>		

ইংল্যান্ডের ডারহাম বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ের পিএইচডি গবেষণার অংশ হিসাবে, বাঙালী মুসলমানদের "আস্থার সম্পর্ক সমূহ" নির্ণয়ের জন্য আমাদের জরিপের দল আপনাদের রাজ্য এবং আরো দুটি ভারতীয় রাজ্য যেগুলো বাংলাদেশের সাথে সীমান্ত রয়েছে, সেখানে জরিপ করছে। ঐতিহাসিক ভাবে ভারত-বাংলাদেশের সীমান্ত এলাকা একটি খোলামেলা জায়গা যেখানে বাংলাভাষী জনসাধারণ অধিক পরিমাণে বসবাস করে। সাম্প্রতিক বছরগুলিতে, এইসব এলাকা নিয়ে ভারত-বাংলাদেশের রাজনৈতিক সম্পর্কে প্রায়ই বিতর্ক রয়েছে। বাঙালী মুসলমানদের "আস্থার সম্পর্ক সমূহ" গবেষণা করে আমরা জানতে চাই যে কিভাবে জাতিগত সম্পর্কের বিষয়গুলি সম্পদ, বাণিজ্য, শ্রমবাজার এবং অভিবাসনের সাথে জড়িত। এই জরিপে আপনার অংশগ্রহণ একটি স্বেচ্ছামূলক কার্যক্রম যা আপনি যে কোন সময়ে ত্যাগ করতে পারেন। যদি আপনি কোনো প্রশ্নের উত্তর দিতে স্বেচ্ছাবোধ না করেন তবে দয়া করে আমাকে তা জানালে আমি পরবর্তী প্রশ্নের এগিয়ে যাবো। আপনার পরিচয় গোপন রাখা হবে এবং আপনার উত্তরগুলি শুধুমাত্র গবেষণার উদ্দেশ্যেই ব্যবহৃত হবে। এই জরিপ সম্পূর্ণ করতে মাত্র ৪৫ মিনিট প্রয়োজন। এই জরিপের উদ্দেশ্য সম্পর্কে আপনার কোন প্রশ্ন আছে কি ?

যদি আপনার কোন প্রশ্ন না থাকে তবে অনুগ্রহ করে সম্মতিপত্রটিতে স্বাক্ষর দিন অথবা টিপসই দিন, যাতে আপনি এই জরিপের তথ্য সমূহ বুঝতে পেরেছেন এবং স্বেচ্ছায় অংশগ্রহণ করেছেন বলে প্রতীমান হয়। এই সম্মতিপত্রটিও গোপন রাখা হবে। এই জরিপে অংশগ্রহণ করার জন্য আপনাকে ধন্যবাদ।

১. আনুমানিক বয়স (বয়স ১৮ বছরের কম হলে ইন্টারভিউ নিবেন না):	১৮-২০	২১-২৯	৩০-৩৯	৪০-৪৯	৫০-৫৯	৬০-৬৯	৭০+
২. লিঙ্গ	১. পুরুষ		২. মহিলা		৩. অন্যান্য		
৩. মাতৃ ভাষা	১. বাংলা	২. আসামি	৩. উর্দু	৪. হিন্দি	৫. অন্যান্য .....কি?		
৪. ধর্ম	১. মুসলিম	২. হিন্দু	৩. খ্রীষ্টান	৪. অন্যান্য .....কি?			
৫. বসবাসের স্থান	১. শহর			২. গ্রাম			
৬. আপনি কত ঘন ঘন আপনার এলাকার বাইরে যান?	১. বছরে ০-১ বার	২. বছরে ২-৫ বার	৩. বছরে ৬-১০ বার	৪. প্রতি মাসে	৫. প্রতি সপ্তাহে	৬. প্রতিদিন	

**আপনার সামাজিক সম্পর্ক:-**

৭. গত ২ সপ্তাহে আপনি আনুমানিক কতজনের সাথে ফোনে কথা বলেছেন এবং চা খেয়েছেন?	১. ল্যান্ডলাইন / মোবাইল / ক্লাইপ (কথা এবং টেক্সট): _____	২. সোশাল মিডিয়ায় (যেমন ফেসবুক, হোয়াটসঅ্যাপ, ভাইবার): _____	৩. চা খেয়েছেন / নাস্তা, দুপুরের বা রাতের খাবার খেয়েছেন:				
৮. এদের মধ্যে আপনি কতজনের সাথে সপ্তাহে ২ বারের অধিক কথা বলেছেন?							
এদের মধ্যে যে তিনজনের সাথে আপনি সবচেয়ে বেশি যোগাযোগ করেছেন (পরিবারের সদস্য ছাড়া)?							
৯. প্রথম জনের মাতৃভাষা ও ধর্ম কি?							
১০. দ্বিতীয় ব্যক্তির মাতৃভাষা ও ধর্ম কি?							
১১. তৃতীয় ব্যক্তির মাতৃভাষা ও ধর্ম কি?							
১২. ব্যক্তিগত বিষয়ে কথা বলা যায় এরকম আপনার কয়জন ঘনিষ্ঠ বন্ধু আছেন?							
এখন, এদের মধ্যে আপনি ৩ জন সবচেয়ে ঘনিষ্ঠ বন্ধুদের কথা চিন্তা করেন:							
১৩. প্রথম বন্ধুর সাথে আপনার কি কি মিল আছে (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. ভাষাগত	২. ধর্মীয়	৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত	৪. শ্রেণীগত	৫. পেশাগত	৬. লিঙ্গ	৭. বয়সকাল
১৪. দ্বিতীয় বন্ধুর সাথে আপনার কি কি মিল আছে (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. ভাষাগত	২. ধর্মীয়	৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত	৪. শ্রেণীগত	৫. পেশাগত	৬. লিঙ্গ	৭. বয়সকাল
১৫. তৃতীয় বন্ধুর সাথে আপনার কি কি মিল আছে (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. ভাষাগত	২. ধর্মীয়	৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত	৪. শ্রেণীগত	৫. পেশাগত	৬. লিঙ্গ	৭. বয়সকাল

**আপনার সংগঠনীয় সংযুক্তি:-**

১৬. আপনি বা আপনার পরিবারে কেউ কয়টি বেসরকারী সংগঠনের সাথে জড়িত আছেন? (যেমন রাজনৈতিক, ধর্মীয়, অধিকার, সাংস্কৃতিক, কৃষি মূলক, শ্রম অধিকার, শিক্ষামূলক (অ্যালুমিনি সংগঠন সহ), পেশাদার, দাতব্য, ক্রীড়া সংগঠন):																
১৭. এদের মধ্যে কোন ২টি সংগঠন গুরুত্বপূর্ণ আপনার বা আপনার পরিবারের জন্য?			সংগঠন (ক):			সংগঠন (খ):										
<b>সংগঠন (ক):-</b>																
১৮. আপনি ব্যক্তিগতভাবে কতটা সক্রিয় এ সংগঠনের (ক) সাথে?			১. সক্রিয় নয় (চাঁদা দেন)		২. কিছুটা সক্রিয় (মিটিং-এ অংশগ্রহণ করেন)		৩. সক্রিয় (মিটিং-এ অংশগ্রহণ করেন এবং কার্যক্রমে অংশগ্রহণ করেন)		৪. খুবই সক্রিয় (সদস্য সংগ্রহণ করেন)							
১৯. এই সংগঠনটি (ক) কিভাবে সদস্য সংগ্রহ করে?			১. সম্পূর্ণ স্বইচ্ছায়			২. পারিপার্শ্বিকতার চাপ		৩. সামাজিক চাপ								
২০. সংগঠনের সদস্যদের মধ্যে সাদৃশ্য কি (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?			১. ভাষাগত		২. ধর্মীয়		৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত		৪. শ্রেণীগত		৫. পেশাগত		৬. লিঙ্গ		৭. বয়সকাল	
২১. এই সকল সংগঠনের সদস্যদের মধ্যে বৈসাদৃশ্য কি (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?			১. ভাষাগত		২. ধর্মীয়		৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত		৪. শ্রেণীগত		৫. পেশাগত		৬. লিঙ্গ		৭. বয়সকাল	
২২. এই সংগঠন (ক) কি অন্য কোন সংগঠনের সাথে মিলিত ভাবে কাজ করে অথবা অন্য কাজের সাথে জড়িত হয় যেটা নির্দিষ্ট ভাবে তার নিজের কাজের মত না? (যেমন একটি শিক্ষাগত সংগঠন সাংস্কৃতিক সংগঠনের সাথে জড়িত হতে পারে বা নিজে কোন সাংস্কৃতিক কর্মকান্ড পরিচালনা করতে পারে)											১. হ্যাঁ		২. না			
২৩. যদি "হ্যাঁ" হয়ে, তাহলে কত ঘনঘন এই সহযোগিতা হয়ে?			১. কদাচিৎ (০-১ বার বৎসরে)		২. কখনো কখনো (২-৩ বার বৎসরে)		৩. প্রায়ই (৪-৫ বার বৎসরে)		৪. ঘনঘন (৬-১২ বার বৎসরে)		৫. খুবই ঘনঘন (১২ বারের বেশী)		৬. সর্বদাই			
<b>সংগঠনটি (খ):-</b>																
২৪. আপনি ব্যক্তিগতভাবে কতটা সক্রিয় এ সংগঠনের (খ) সাথে?			১. সক্রিয় নয় (চাঁদা দেন)		২. কিছুটা সক্রিয় (মিটিং-এ অংশগ্রহণ করেন)		৩. সক্রিয় (মিটিং-এ অংশগ্রহণ করেন এবং কার্যক্রমে অংশগ্রহণ করেন)		৪. খুবই সক্রিয় (সদস্য সংগ্রহণ করেন)							
২৫. এই সংগঠনটি (খ) কিভাবে সদস্য সংগ্রহ করে?			১. সম্পূর্ণ স্বইচ্ছায়			২. পারিপার্শ্বিকতার চাপ		৩. সামাজিক চাপ								
২৬. সংগঠনের সদস্যদের মধ্যে সাদৃশ্য কি (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?			১. ভাষাগত		২. ধর্মীয়		৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত		৪. শ্রেণীগত		৫. পেশাগত		৬. লিঙ্গ		৭. বয়সকাল	

২৭. এই সকল সংগঠনের সদস্যদের মধ্যে বৈসাদৃশ্য কি (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. ভাষাগত	২. ধর্মীয়	৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত	৪. শ্রেণীগত	৫. পেশাগত	৬. লিঙ্গ	৭. বয়সকাল
২৮. এই সংগঠন (খ) কি অন্য কোন সংগঠনের সাথে মিলিত ভাবে কাজ করে অথবা অন্য কাজের সাথে জড়িত হয় যেটা নির্দিষ্ট ভাবে তার নিজের কাজের মত না? (যেমন একটি শিক্ষাগত সংগঠন সাংস্কৃতিক সংগঠনের সাথে জড়িত হতে পারে বা নিজে কোন সংস্কৃতিক কর্মকান্ড পরিচালনা করতে পারে)	১. হ্যাঁ						২. না
২৯. যদি "হ্যাঁ" হয়ে, তাহলে কত ঘনঘন এই সহযোগিতা হয়ে?	১. কদাচিৎ (০-১ বার বৎসরে)	২. কখনো কখনো (২-৩ বার বৎসরে)	৩. প্রায়ই (৪-৫ বার বৎসরে)	৪. ঘনঘন (৬-১২ বার বৎসরে)	৫. খুবই ঘনঘন (১২ বারের বেশী)	৬. সর্বদাই	

**আপনার এলাকা বা গ্রাম:-**

৩০. আপনার এলাকা বা গ্রামের মানুষের মধ্যে কি কি বৈসাদৃশ্য আছে (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. ভাষাগত	২. ধর্মীয়	৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত	৪. শ্রেণীগত	৫. পেশাগত	৬. বয়স সমষ্টির স্তর	৭. বসত সম্পদ / আয় রোজগার	৮. অন্যান্য ..... কি?
৩১. কি কি ধরনের বিষয় আপনাদের গ্রাম বা এলাকার মধ্যে উদ্ভেজনা বিভেদের সৃষ্টি করে (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. ভাষাগত	২. ধর্মীয়	৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত	৪. শ্রেণীগত	৫. পেশাগত	৬. বয়স সমষ্টির স্তর	৭. বসত সম্পদ / আয় রোজগার	৮. অন্যান্য ..... কি?
৩২. এগুলির মধ্যে কোন বিষয়ে মারামারীর পর্যায়ে যায় (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. ভাষাগত	২. ধর্মীয়	৩. বর্ণ সংক্রান্ত	৪. শ্রেণীগত	৫. পেশাগত	৬. বয়স সমষ্টির স্তর	৭. বসত সম্পদ / আয় রোজগার	৮. অন্যান্য ..... কি?
৩৩. আপনার জীবনদশায় এরকম অবস্থা দেখেছেন কি না?	১. হ্যাঁ						২. না	

**শুধুমাত্র গ্রামবাসীদের জন্য:-**

৩৪. বাহিরের কারো সাহায্যে ছাড়া কিভাবে আপনারা আপনাদের গ্রামের সামাজিক সমস্যার সমাধান করেন (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. নিজেদের মধ্যে আলাপ আলচনার মাধ্যমে		২. পঞ্চায়তে মাধ্যমে		৩. অন্যান্য ..... কি?		
৩৫. আপনাদের সমস্যা সমাধান কতখানি কার্যকর?	১. তদারকি সন্তোষ অকার্যকর	২. তদরকি ছাড়া অকার্যকর	৩. তদরকি সহ অল্পবিস্তর কার্যকর	৪. তদরকি ছাড়া অল্পবিস্তর কার্যকর	৫. তদরকি সহ কার্যকর	৬. তদরকি ছাড়া কার্যকর	

৩৬. প্রয়োজনে আপনাদের গ্রামের সামাজিক সমস্যা কিভাবে বাইরের সাহায্যে সমাধান করেন (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. আইনের সাহায্যে	২. বাইরের কোন সংগঠনের সাহায্যে	৩. বাইরের কোন প্রভাবশালী ব্যক্তির সাহায্যে	৪. অন্যান্য .....কি?		
৩৭. বাইরের সাহায্য নিলে তা কতটা কার্যকরী হয়?	১. তদরকি সন্তোষ অকার্যকর	২. তদরকি ছাড়া অকার্যকর	৩. তদরকি সহ অল্পবিস্তর কার্যকর	৪. তদরকি ছাড়া অল্পবিস্তর কার্যকর	৫. তদরকি সহ কার্যকর	৬. তদরকি ছাড়া কার্যকর
৩৮. আপনারা কোন্ কোন্ জিনিষকে আপনাদের সামাজিক সম্পদ, যেটা শুধুমাত্র গ্রামবাসী ব্যবহার করতে পারে, বলে মনে করেন (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. কুয়া / ইন্দিরা	২. খেলার মাঠ	৩. পুকুর	৪. স্কুল	৫. অন্যান্য .....কি?	
৩৯. আপনারা কিভাবে আপনাদের এইসব সীমিত সম্পদ বাইরের ব্যবহারকারীর হস্তক্ষেপ থেকে সংরক্ষন করেন?	১. নজরদারী দল	২. নিয়মিত পাহারা	৩. অনিয়মিত পাহারা	৪. অন্যান্য .....কি?		
৪০. বাইরের কেউ যদি এই সম্পদের অবৈধ ব্যবহার করে তাহলে তার সাজা বা প্রতিকার কিভাবে করবেন?	১. নমনীয়ভাবে (বের করে দিয়ে)	২. কিছুটা শক্তভাবে (বকা দিয়ে বের করে দিয়ে)	৩. শক্তভাবে (বকা ও অপমান করে বের করে দিয়ে)	৪. গুরুতর শক্তভাবে (প্রকাশ্যে অপমান এবং শারীরিক নির্যাতন করে)		

**আপনার গোষ্ঠির উপর আস্থা:-**

৪১. আস্থার গুরুত্ব অনুসারে ক্রমিক নাম্বার দিন:	১. বন্ধু-বান্ধব:	২. ভাষাভাষী গোষ্ঠি:	৩. ধর্মীয় গোষ্ঠি:		
বিঃ দ্রঃ বন্ধু-বান্ধব ছাড়া আপনার নির্বাচিত পরবর্তী গুরুত্বপূর্ণ গোষ্ঠির বিবেচনায় রেখে নিম্নের ৪২ থেকে ৪৮ নং প্রশ্নগুলির উত্তর দিন :					
৪২. এই গোষ্ঠির এক জন ব্যক্তি অন্য ব্যক্তিকে সাহায্য করে কিনা?	১. মোটেও না	২. গুরুতর প্রয়োজনে	৩. মাঝেমাঝে (চিকিৎসা বা শিক্ষা প্রতিষ্ঠানে ভর্তি সংক্রান্ত বিষয়ে)	৪. ঘনঘন (মাসিক কোন প্রয়োজনে)	৫. খুবই ঘনঘন (যে কোন প্রয়োজনে যখন তখন)
৪৩. যদি এই গোষ্ঠির কেউ আস্থা ভঙ্গ করেন তাহলে তাকে কি উপায়ে সাজা দেন?	১. কোন সাজা দেওয়া হয় না	২. সাবধান করে দেওয়া হয়	৩. একঘরে করে দেওয়া হয়	৪. বহিস্কৃত করা হয়	৫. শারীরিক নির্যাতন এবং/ অথবা বহিস্কৃত করা হয়
৪৪. সেই গোষ্ঠীর এক জন ব্যক্তি অন্য গোষ্ঠীর এক জন ব্যক্তিকে সাহায্য করে কি না?	১. মোটেও না	২. গুরুতর প্রয়োজনে	৩. মাঝেমাঝে (চিকিৎসা বা শিক্ষা প্রতিষ্ঠানে ভর্তি সংক্রান্ত বিষয়ে)	৪. ঘনঘন (মাসিক কোন প্রয়োজনে)	৫. খুবই ঘনঘন (যে কোন প্রয়োজনে যখন তখন)

৪৫. আপনি নিজের গোষ্ঠীর সদস্যদের কিভাবে সাহায্য করেন (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. আর্থিক ভাবে	২. নিজ সময় দিয়ে	৩. পরামর্শ দিয়ে		
৪৬. যদি আগের উত্তর “১. আর্থিক ভাবে” নির্বাচিত হয়ে থাকে, তাহলে আপনি বলুন যে আপনি আপনার নিজ গোষ্ঠীর লোকজনদের কতটা সাহায্য করেন?	১. গুরুতর প্রয়োজনে	২. মাঝেমাঝে (চিকিৎসা বা শিক্ষা প্রতিষ্ঠানে ভর্তি সংক্রান্ত বিষয়ে)	৩. ঘনঘন (মাসিক কোন প্রয়োজনে)	৪. খুবই ঘনঘন (যে কোন প্রয়োজনে যখন তখন)	
৪৭. প্রয়োজনে কতটা আপনি নিজের গোষ্ঠীর লোকজনদের মারামারীর সময় রক্ষা করবেন?	১. আমি নিষ্ক্রিয় থাকবো	২. রক্ষার বিবেচনা করবো	৩. সম্ভব হলে চেষ্টা করবো	৪. রক্ষা করার জন্য খুবই চেষ্টা করবো	৫. জীবন দিয়ে রক্ষা করবো
৪৮. আপনি কতটা অন্য গোষ্ঠীর লোকজনদের এমন মারামারীর সময় রক্ষা করবেন?	১. আমি নিষ্ক্রিয় থাকবো	২. রক্ষার বিবেচনা করবো	৩. সম্ভব হলে চেষ্টা করবো	৪. রক্ষা করার জন্য খুবই চেষ্টা করবো	৫. জীবন দিয়ে রক্ষা করবো

**সুশীল সমাজ:-**

৪৯. নিজের এলাকা বা গ্রামে একাকী হাঁটতে আপনি নিজেকে কতটা নিরাপদ মনে করেন?	১. দিনে-রাতে যে কোন সময়ে নিরাপত্তা বিঘ্নিত হতে পারে	২. দিনে সাথী থাকা উচিত কিন্তু রাতে বের হওয়াই ঠিক না	৩. দিনে একা চলাচল সম্ভব কিন্তু রাতে সাথী লাগে	৪. দিনে-রাতে নিরাপদ
৫০. আপনি বা আপনার পরিবারের কেউ গত এক বছরে নিজের বাড়ীতে বা নিজের এলাকায় আক্রান্ত হয়েছেন কিনা বা চুরির শিকার হয়েছিলেন কিনা?				১. হ্যাঁ ২. না
৫১. নিজের এলাকা বা গ্রামের বাইরে একাকী চলাচল করতে কতটা নিরাপদ মনে করেন?	১. দিনে-রাতে যে কোন সময়ে নিরাপত্তা বিঘ্নিত হতে পারে	২. দিনে সাথী থাকা উচিত কিন্তু রাতে বের হওয়াই ঠিক না	৩. দিনে একা চলাচল সম্ভব কিন্তু রাতে সাথী লাগে	৪. দিনে-রাতে নিরাপদ
৫২. আপনি বা পরিবারের কেউ গত এক বছরে এলাকা বা গ্রামের বাইরে আক্রান্ত অথবা ছিনতাইয়ের শিকার হয়েছিলেন কি?				১. হ্যাঁ ২. না
৫৩. আপনি আপনার এলাকা বা গ্রামে বিগত বছরে কোন পুলিশ টহল দেখেছেন কি না?				১. হ্যাঁ ২. না
৫৪. বিগত বছরে, আপনি কি আপনার এলাকা বা গ্রামে স্থানীয় পুলিশ ছাড়াও অন্য কোন নিরাপত্তা বাহিনীর টহল দেখেছেন?				১. হ্যাঁ ২. না
৫৫. যদি হ্যাঁ হয়, তারা কি আপনি বা আপনার পরিবারে সদস্যদের সাথে আপনাদের প্রাপ্য নাগরিক মর্যাদা রক্ষা করে ব্যবহার করেছিল কি না?				১. হ্যাঁ ২. না

৫৬. আপনি কি বিশেষ কোন রাজনৈতিক ভাবাদর্শে বিশ্বাসী?	১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
৫৭. যদি হ্যাঁ হয়, তাহলে পাশের রাজনৈতিক ভাবাদর্শের একটি পছন্দ করুন:	১. উদারপন্থী	২. সমাজতান্ত্রিক	৩. রক্ষণশীল	৪. অন্যান্য .....কি?

৫৮. আপনি কি অন্য গোষ্ঠীর কাউকে স্থানীয় সরকার নির্বাচনে ভোট দিবেন?	১. কখনই না (সম্ভব না)	২. হয়তো না	৩. হয়তো (প্রার্থীর উপর নির্ভরশীল)	৪. নিশ্চয়ই দিব (অবশ্যই)		
৫৯. আপনি স্থানীয় সরকারের প্রার্থী হলে অন্য গোষ্ঠীর কেউ কি আপনাকে ভোট দিবে?	১. কখনই না (সম্ভব না)	২. হয়তো না	৩. হয়তো (পরিস্থিতির উপর নির্ভরশীল)	৪. নিশ্চয়ই দিবে (করবেই)		
৬০. আপনি কি মনে করেন যে, এমন কাউকে ভোট দেওয়া যেতে পারে যে আর্থিক বা বস্তগত সাহায্য করতে চায়?	১. কখনই না (কোন পরিস্থিতিতে না)	২. হয়তো না	৩. হয়তো (পরিস্থিতির উপর নির্ভরশীল)	৪. নিশ্চয়ই দিব (অবশ্যই)		
৬১. স্থানীয় সরকারী কর্মকর্তারা আপনাদের আস্থাভাজন কি না?	১. না (কখনই না)	২. হয়তো না	৩. হয়তো (পরিস্থিতির উপর নির্ভরশীল)	৪. নিশ্চয়ই হ্যাঁ		
৬২. রাজ্য সরকারের কর্মকর্তারা আপনাদের আস্থাভাজন কি না?	১. না (কখনই না)	২. হয়তো না	৩. হয়তো (পরিস্থিতির উপর নির্ভরশীল)	৪. নিশ্চয়ই হ্যাঁ		
৬৩. কেন্দ্রীয় সরকারের কর্মকর্তারা আপনাদের আস্থাভাজন কি না?	১. না (কখনই না)	২. হয়তো না	৩. হয়তো (পরিস্থিতির উপর নির্ভরশীল)	৪. নিশ্চয়ই হ্যাঁ		
৬৪. সাধারণভাবে আপনি কি মনে করেন যে দেশের অর্থনৈতিক অবস্থা ভালো?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না	
৬৫. আপনি কি মনে করেন যে গত বছরের এই সময়ের চেয়ে এখনকার অবস্থা:-	১. ভালো হয়েছে		২. একই থেকেছে	৩. খারাপ হয়েছে		
৬৬. সার্বিক ভাবে (শুধুমাত্র অর্থনৈতিক ক্ষেত্রে নয়), আপনার কি মনে হয়ে যে দেশ সঠিক দিকে এগোচ্ছে?	১. হ্যাঁ		২. না			
৬৭. কিভাবে আপনি আপনার নিজের রাজ্যের মানুষের এবং আপনার নিজের জীবনযাপনের ভুলনা করবেন?	১. অত্যন্ত খারাপ	২. খারাপ	৩. একই	৪. ভালো	৫. অনেক ভালো	
৬৮. কোন কোন বিষয়ের জন্য আপনার এরকম মনে হয় সেটা বেছে নিন (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন):						
১. মূদ্রাস্ফীতি সংক্রান্ত	২. খাদ্য সরবরাহ সংক্রান্ত	৩. বিদ্যুৎ ও জল সংক্রান্ত	৪. স্বাস্থ্য সংক্রান্ত	৫. শিক্ষা সংক্রান্ত	৬. কর্ম সংক্রান্ত	৭. আমলাতন্ত্র সংক্রান্ত
৮. যানবাহন সংক্রান্ত	৯. পরিকাঠামো/ ভিত্তি সংক্রান্ত	১০. সংস্কৃতি সংক্রান্ত	১১. জীবন ধারা সংক্রান্ত	১২. বিভিন্ন সম্প্রদায়ের মধ্যে পারস্পরিক সম্মান সংক্রান্ত	১৩. অন্যান্য .....কি?	
৬৯. কিভাবে অন্য রাজ্যের মানুষের ভুলনায় আপনার নিজের জীবনযাপনের পরিমাপ করবেন?		১. অত্যন্ত খারাপ	২. খারাপ	৩. একই	৪. ভালো	৫. অনেক ভালো
৭০. বিগত বছরে আপনি বা পরিবারের কেউ কি নিম্নবর্ণিত ৯টি অপরিহার্য জিনিস থেকে বঞ্চিত হয়েছেন? (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)			১. খাদ্য	২. বাসস্থান	৩. বস্ত্র	
৪. শিক্ষা	৫. ঔষধ ও স্বাস্থ্য সেবা	৬. বিদ্যুৎ ও পানীয় জল	৭. রান্নার জ্বালানী	৮. টাকা পয়সা	৯. যানবাহন সুবিধা	

৭১. স্থানীয় সরকারে আপনার গৌষ্ঠীর কোন সদস্য আছে?	১. হ্যাঁ	২. না
৭২. রাজ্য সরকারে আপনার গৌষ্ঠীর কোন সদস্য আছে?	১. হ্যাঁ	২. না
৭৩. কেন্দ্রীয় সরকারে আপনার গৌষ্ঠীর কোন সদস্য আছে?	১. হ্যাঁ	২. না

৭৪. আপনি কি আপনার স্থানীয় সংবাদ জনতে অগ্রহী?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না	
৭৫. পত্রিকা, টিভি আর রেডিওর মাধ্যমে আপনি কত ঘন ঘন আপনার স্থানীয় সংবাদ পেয়ে থাকেন?	১. কখনই না	২. মাসে এক বারের চেয়ে কম	৩. মাসে একবার	৪. সপ্তাহে ২-৩ বার	৫. সপ্তাহে ৩-৪ বার	৬. প্রতিদিন
৭৬. আপনি কি মে, ২০১৪-তে অনুষ্ঠিত জাতীয় নির্বাচনে ভোট দিয়েছেন?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না	
৭৭. কতটা স্বাধীনভাবে আপনি যেকোন রাজনৈতিক সংগঠনের সদস্য হতে পারেন (যদিও আপনার পরিবার, বন্ধু-বান্ধব ও সমকক্ষীয়রা কোন ভিন্ন সংগঠনকে সমর্থন করেন)?	১. পরিবার ও বন্ধুদের দ্বারা তিরস্কৃত হবো	২. পরিবার ও বন্ধুরা ঘৃণা করবে	৩. কেউ কিছু বলবে না কিন্তু অল্প বিস্তারিত পরিবেশের শিকার হবো	৪. কেউ কিছু মনে করবে না	৫. সামাজিক প্রথার কারণে কেউ কিছু মনেও করবে না বলবেও না	
৭৮. যদি কেউ “সরকার” শব্দ ব্যবহার করে তাহলে কোন স্তরের সরকারের কথা চিন্তা করেন?			১. স্থানীয়	২. রাজ্য	৩. কেন্দ্রীয়	
৭৯. সরকারের কাজের ব্যাপারে কোথায় কোথায় আলোচনা করবেন (যতগুলি প্রয়োজ্য টিক দিন্য)?	১. পরিবারের মধ্যে	২. সহকর্মীদের সাথে	৩. হাটেবাজারে (চায়ের দোকান ও রেস্তোরাঁ সহ)	৪. সরকারী যানবাহন	৫. অন্যান্য .....কি?	
৮০. আপনি সরকারের নীতির উপর কতটা স্বাধীনভাবে অভিমত ব্যক্ত করতে পারেন?	১. পরিবার ও বন্ধুদের কাছেও ব্যক্ত করতে স্বাচ্ছন্দ বোধ করি না	২. শুধু পরিবারের সাথে ব্যক্ত করতে স্বাচ্ছন্দ বোধ করি	৩. পরিবার ও বন্ধুদের সাথে ব্যক্ত করতে স্বাচ্ছন্দ বোধ করি	৪. পরিবার ও বন্ধু ছাড়াও সমাজের সামনে ব্যক্ত করতে পারি	৫. জনসাধারণ, মিডিয়াতেও ব্যক্ত করতে পারি	
৮১. আপনি কতটা স্বাধীনভাবে আপনার পছন্দের ভোট প্রার্থীকে বেছে নিতে পারেন (যদিও আপনার পরিবার, বন্ধু-বান্ধব ও সমকক্ষীয়রা কোন ভিন্ন প্রার্থীকে সমর্থন করেন)?	১. জীবন, সম্পদ, পরিবার ঝুঁকিতে পড়বে	২. জীবিকা, চাকুরি ঝুঁকিতে পড়বে	৩. চাকুরিতে প্রতিক্রিয়া (যেমন পদোন্নতি না হওয়া, বেতন কাটা বা না বাড়ানো, অনুন্নত জায়গায় বদলী হওয়া) হতে পারে	৪. এখন কোন ঝুঁকি নেই	৫. কখনও ঝুঁকি ছিল না বা হবে না	
৮২. আপনি কি আপনার এলাকা পঞ্চায়েত প্রধান বা স্থানীয় সরকার প্রধানের কাছে যেতে পারেন?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না	

৮৩. এলকায় কোন সমস্যা হলে আপনার এলাকাবাসী কত ঘনঘন স্থানীয় সরকারের কাছে সেই সমস্যা সমাধানের জন্য আবেদন করে থাকেন?	১. সমস্যা হলেও যাওয়া হয় না	২. শুধুমাত্র গুরুতর সমস্যায় যাওয়া হয়	৩. যে কোন সমস্যায় যেতে পারি	৪. স্থানীয় সরকার প্রধান অথবা তার কর্মকর্তারা নিয়মিত পরিদর্শনে আসেন	৫. আমাদের সাথে স্থানীয় সরকার প্রধানের নিয়মিত যোগাযোগ হয়
৮৪. আপনার কত সহজে সরকারী স্কুল বা বিদ্যালয়, থানা, ডাকঘর বা অন্যান্য সরকারী অফিসের পরিষেবা পেতে পারেন?	১. পিছনে লেগে থাকলেও এবং টাকা দিলেও কাজ হয় না	২. খুব কষ্ট করে পিছনে লেগে থাকলে এবং টাকা দিলে কাজ হয়	৩. লেগে থাকলে এবং টাকা দিলে হয়ে যায়	৪. লেগে থাকলেই হয়ে যায়	৫. সহজেই এবং সময়মত হয়ে যায়

৮৫. আপনি কি এপার বাংলা ও ওপার বাংলার সাথে বাণিজ্য বাড়াতে চান?	১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
৮৬. আপনি কি নিজে এ ধরনের ব্যবসায় জড়িত?	১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
৮৭. যদি হ্যাঁ হয়, তাহলে আপনার কোন টাকা মার্কেটে পড়ে আছে কি?	১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
৮৮. নিম্নলিখিত কোন ক্ষেত্রে সরকারের পন্থা এবং মানুষের চলাচলের নিয়মাবলী পুনর্বিবেচনা করা সংগত (যতগুলি প্রযোজ্য টিক দিন)?	১. কোন ক্ষেত্রে না	২. বানিজ্যে বাধাগুলো কমিয়ে ফেলা উচিত	৩. ভিসার মধ্যে আবশ্যিকতা এবং অপেক্ষার সময় কমিয়ে ফেলা উচিত	৪. কোন ধরনের জাতীয় পরিচয় পত্র থাকলে ভিসা সিস্টেম বাদ দেওয়া যেতে পারে
৮৯. দরকার পড়লে আপনি অথবা আপনার পরিবারের কেউ কি সীমান্তের অপরপারের বসবাসকারী বন্ধু-বান্ধব বা আত্মীয়স্বজনদের আর্থিক সাহায্য করতে পারবেন?	১. হ্যাঁ, নিশ্চয়ই	২. হ্যাঁ, যদিও সেটা অনিরাপদ	৩. না, আমি এটা সম্ভব মনে করি না	৪. না, আমার এই কথা বিবেচনায়ই আসে নাই
৯০. আপনি কি অভিবাসন এর পক্ষের ভোট প্রার্থীকে ভোট দিবেন?	১. হ্যাঁ, নিশ্চয়ই	২. হয়তো, আমি সঠিক বলতে পারছি না	৩. না, কখনই না	

**ব্যক্তিগত বিবরণ:-**

৯১. আপনার পরিবারের সদস্য সংখ্যা কত (পোষ্য সহ)?	১. ১-২ জন	২. ৩-৫ জন	৩. ৬-৮ জন	৪. ৮+ জন
৯২. আপনি কি বিবাহিত?	১. হ্যাঁ			২. না
৯৩. আপনার স্ত্রী / স্বামী কি অন্য ভাষা বা কি অন্য ধর্মের (আগে হয়ত ছিল)?	১. হ্যাঁ, অন্য মাতৃভাষার	২. হ্যাঁ, অন্য ধর্মের ছিল বা আছে	৩. হ্যাঁ, মাতৃভাষা এবং ধর্ম আলাদা	৪. না, একই ধর্মের এবং মাতৃভাষার
৯৪. বিবাহের পরে আপনার বাবা মার সাথে আপনার যোগাযোগ আছে? (যদি মৃত হয়ে থাকে, তাহলে যখন তারা জীবিত ছিলেন)	১. হ্যাঁ			২. না

৯৫. বিবাহের পরে আপনার স্ত্রী/স্বামী কি তার বাবা-মার সাথে যোগাযোগ করেন কি না? (যদি মৃত হয়ে থাকে, তাহলে যখন তারা জীবিত ছিলেন)				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
৯৬. আপনি কি ভাড়া বাড়ীতে থাকেন?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
৯৭. ভারতীয় মুদ্রায় আপনার আনুমানিক মাসিক পারিবারিক আয়:		১. <২,৫০০	২. ২,৫০০ ৫,০০০	৩. ৫,০০০ ৭,৫০০	৪. ৭,৫০০ ১০,০০০		
৫. ১০,০০০ ১৫,০০০	৬. ১৫,০০০ ২০,০০০	৭. ২০,০০০ ৩০,০০০	৮. ৩০,০০০ ৫০,০০০	৯. ৫০,০০০ ৭৫,০০০	১০. ৭৫,০০০+		
৯৮. সবমিলে কত বছর আপনি স্কুলে/ মহাবিদ্যালয়ে/ বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ে পড়েছেন:							
৯৯. আপনার শিক্ষাগত যোগ্যতা কি?		১. প্রথমিক	২. মাধ্যমিক	৩. উচ্চ মাধ্যমিক	৪. স্নাতক	৫. স্নাতকগোত্র	
১০০. কি ধরনের স্কুলে আপনি পড়েছেন?		১. সরকারী	২. বেসরকারী	৩. ধর্মীয়	৪. পেশামূলক শিক্ষাসহ		
১০১. আপনি কোথায় স্কুলে পড়েছেন?		১. এই গ্রামে বা এলাকার মধ্যে		২. এই গ্রামে বা এলাকার বাইরে			
১০২. ঐ স্কুলে বিভিন্ন ধর্মীয়/ ভাষাভাষীর ছাত্রছাত্রী পড়তো কি না?		১. হ্যাঁ, বিভিন্ন ভাষাভাষীর ছাত্রছাত্রী পড়তো	২. হ্যাঁ, বিভিন্ন ধর্মের ছাত্রছাত্রী পড়তো	৩. হ্যাঁ, অধিকাংশ ছাত্রছাত্রীরা বিভিন্ন ধর্মীয় / ভাষাভাষীর ছিল	৪. না, অধিকাংশ ছাত্রছাত্রীরা একই ধর্মীয় / ভাষাভাষীর ছিল		
১০৩. উত্তরদাতার পেশা:		১. বর্তমানে বেকার	২. কৃষিকাজ	৩. ব্যবসায়	৪. উৎপাদন	৫. চাকুরিজীবী	৬. অন্যান্য .....কি?
১০৪. আপনি আপনার ধর্ম পালনে কতটা নিয়মনিষ্ঠ?		১. সেরকম না	২. চেষ্টা করি	৩. খুব চেষ্টা করি	৪. সব ঠিক মত করি		
১০৫. আপনি প্রতি সপ্তাহে সকালের প্রার্থনা কত ঘন ঘন করেন?		১. কখনও না	২. ২/১ বার	৩. দু'বারের বেশি	৪. প্রতিদিন		
১০৬. আপনার নিজের বা স্ত্রীর পরিবারের কেউ কি ওপারে আছেন?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
১০৭. আপনি কোথায় জন্মেছেন?							
১০৮. আপনার বাবা-মা কোথায় জন্মেছেন?							
১০৯. তাদের বাবা-মা কোথায় জন্মেছেন?							
১১০. আপনি কি "দল্ভকারন্য প্রজেক্ট" সম্পর্কে কিছু জানেন?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		
১১১. যদি না হয় তাহলে "বাসন্তী" নাম কি শুনেছেন?				১. হ্যাঁ	২. না		

### সম্মতি পত্র

আমি প্রশ্নকর্তা থেকে এই সার্ভের বিষয় বস্তু বুঝে নিয়েছি, এবং এই সার্ভের সম্পর্কিত যে কোন প্রশ্নের উত্তর পেয়েছি। আমার বয়স ১৮ বছর অথবা তার বেশি, এবং আমি এই সার্ভেতে স্বেচ্ছায় অংশগ্রহণ করছি।

স্বাক্ষর অথবা বৃদ্ধাঙ্গুলের ছাপ:

নাম:

তারিখ:

## চাৰ্ভেৰ প্ৰশ্নাৱলী

আই. ডি. নং: _____	সাক্ষাৎকাৰ তাৰিখ: _____	উত্তৰ দিওঁতা আই. ডি. নং: _____
ভাৰতীয় ৰাজ্যৰ নাম: _____	জিলাৰ নাম: _____	চহৰ/গাঁওৰ নাম/ পিন নম্বৰ: _____
সাক্ষাৎকাৰৰ আৰম্ভৰ সময়: _____	সাক্ষাৎকাৰৰ শেষ হোৱাৰ সময়: _____	

### পাতনিৰ গপ্তিকাৰকৰ দ্বাৰা সংক্ষেপ ৰূপে মৌখিক বিৱৰণ:-

“যুক্ত ৰাজ্যৰ ডাৰহাম বিশ্ববিদ্যালয়ৰ পি, এইছ, ডি, গবেষণা অংশ হিচাপে আমাৰ এই গৱেষণাৰ দল, এই ৰাজ্যত আৰু বাংলাদেশৰ লগত সিমাস্তৰতি অন্য দুটা ভাৰতীয় ৰাজ্যৰ অন্তৰ্গত সিমাবোৰৰ বাংলাভাষী মুছলমান জনগোষ্ঠীৰ আস্থাৰ সম্পৰ্ক নিৰ্ধাৰণ কৰিছে। বাংলাদেশ আৰু ভাৰতৰ ঐতিহাসিক ভাৱে সহযে যাতায়াতৰ সুবিধা আছে যত বাংলাভাষীৰ ঘন বসতি আছে। সাম্প্ৰতিক বছৰ বিলাকৰ ভিতৰত ভাৰত আৰু বাংলাভাষী সম্পৰ্কে বহুতো আলোচনা হৈছে। এই বাংলাভাষী মুছলমান সকলোৰ আস্থাৰ সম্পৰ্কৰ ওপৰত আমি জানিব বিছাৰো যে কেনেকৈ সিহঁতৰ ব্যৱসায়, বানিজ্য, শ্ৰম, কৰ্ম সংস্থান অবিভাষণ ইত্যাদি সিহঁতৰ জাতিগত সম্পৰ্কৰ ওপৰত প্ৰভাৱ বিছাৰ কৰে। এই ছাৰ্ভেত আপুনি আপোনাৰ সহিছাৰে অংশ গ্ৰহণ কৰিব পাৰে বা পৰিত্যাগ কৰিব পাৰে। যদি কোনোৱা প্ৰশ্নৰ উত্তৰ দিয়াৰ ইচ্ছা নাই তেতিয়া হলে আমি দ্বিতীয় প্ৰশ্নলৈ যাম। আপোনাৰ তথ্য আৰু পৰিচয় গোপনে ৰখা হয়। আৰু তথ্যবোৰ কেৱল গৱেষণাৰ কাৰণে হে ব্যৱহাৰ কৰা হব। এই ছাৰ্ভে মাত্ৰ ৪৫ মিনিট সময় লাগিব যদি এই ছাৰ্ভে সম্পৰ্কে কিবা প্ৰশ্ন সুধিব লগা থাকে সুবিধা পাৰে।

যদি আপোনালোকৰ কোনো ধৰণৰ প্ৰশ্ন নাই, আৰু কোনো ধৰণৰ আখোৱা নাই তেনেহলে এই পৃষ্ঠা তলত চহী কৰি দিব যাতে এয়া প্ৰমাণিত হয় যে আপোনালোকে এই ছাৰ্ভেত অংশ গ্ৰহণ কৰিছে। আপোনালোকৰ পৰিচয় গোপনীয় ৰখা হব। ধন্যবাদ।”

১. আপোনাৰ বয়স কিমান (১৮ বছৰতকৈ সৰু হ'লে সাক্ষাৎকাৰ লোৱা নহ'ব):	১৮-২০	২১-২৯	৩০-৩৯	৪০-৪৯	৫০-৫৯	৬০-৬৯	৭০+
২. লিংগ:	১. পুৰুষ		২. স্ত্ৰী		৩. অন্যান্য		
৩. মাতৃভাষা:	১. বাঙালী	২. অসমীয়া	৩. উৰ্দু	৪. হিন্দী	৫. অন্যান্য ..... কি?		
৪. ধৰ্ম:	১. মুছলমান	২. হিন্দু	৩. খ্ৰীষ্টান	৪. অন্যান্য ..... কি?			
৫. আপোনাৰ ঘৰৰ ভূগোলিক স্থান:	১. নগৰ			২. গাঁও			
৬. আপুনি আপোনাৰ গাঁও বা চুবুৰীৰ পৰা কিমান সঘনে ওলাই যায়?	১. বছৰত এবাৰ বা একেবাৰে নোলাই	২. বছৰত দুইবাৰ পৰা পাঁচবাৰ	৩. বছৰত ছয়বাৰ পৰা দহবাৰ	৪. মাহেক	৫. সপ্তাহেক	৬. সদায়	

**সামাজিক সম্পৰ্ক :-**

৭. যোৱা দুই সপ্তাহত আনুমানিক আপুনি কিমানজন মানুহক উল্লেখিত মাধ্যমেৰে সংযোগ কৰিছে?	১. দূৰভাষ/ মোবাইল/ স্মাইপ (কথা আৰু এছ.এম.এছ.):	২. ছেটিয়েল মিডিয়া (যেনে- ফেচবুক, ৱাটছআপ, ভাইবাৰ):	৩. কাৰোবাৰ লগত একেলগে বহি চাহ বা ভাত এসাজ খাইছিল নেকি:				
৮. সেই কেইজন ব্যক্তিৰ কিমান জনৰ লগত সপ্তাহত দুবাৰতকৈ বেছি কথা পাতে?							
অনুগ্রহ কৰি তিনিজন এনেকুৱা ব্যক্তিৰ বলিখক বিজনে আপোনাৰ লগত সঘনে কথা পাতে (সেয়া আপোনাৰ বন্ধু, সম্বন্ধীয় সহকাৰী নাইবা ঘৰৰ মানুহৰ হ'ব পাৰে):							
৯. (ক) তেখেতৰ ভাষা আৰু ধৰ্ম?							
১০. (খ) তেখেতৰ ভাষা আৰু ধৰ্ম?							
১১. (গ) তেখেতৰ ভাষা আৰু ধৰ্ম?							
১২. আপোনাৰ অন্তৰংগ বন্ধু যাৰ লগত আপুনি ব্যক্তিগত কথা বতৰা পাতে?							
এতিয়া সেইজনৰ মাজৰ পৰা আপুনি তিনিজন আটাইতকৈ বেছি অন্তৰংগ মানুহৰ নাম লিখক:							
১৩. প্ৰথম বন্ধু জনৰ লগত আপোনাৰ কি কি মিল আছে? (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়	২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়	৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. লিংগ	৭. বয়স সম্বন্ধীয়
১৪. দ্বিতীয় বন্ধু জনৰ লগত আপোনাৰ কি কি মিল আছে? (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়	২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়	৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. লিংগ	৭. বয়স সম্বন্ধীয়
১৫. তৃতীয় বন্ধু জনৰ লগত আপোনাৰ কি কি মিল আছে? (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়	২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়	৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. লিংগ	৭. বয়স সম্বন্ধীয়

**আপোনাৰ সাংগঠনিক অনুমতি :-**

<p>১৬. আপোনি বা আপোনাৰ পৰিয়ালৰ কিমানটা বেচৰকাৰী সংগঠনৰ লগত জড়িত? (তাৰ ভিতৰত ৰাজনৈতিক, ধৰ্মীয়, অধিকাৰ, সাংস্কৃতিক, কৃষকৰ সংগঠন, শ্ৰম অধিকাৰ, শিক্ষা সংগঠন, পেচাৰ সংগঠন, দাতব্য সংগঠন, খেলাধুলাৰ সংগঠন):</p>									
<p>১৭. উল্লেখিত কোন দুটা সংগঠন আপোনাৰ পৰিয়ালৰ বাবে বেছি দৰকাৰী:</p>			<p>সংগঠন (ক):</p>			<p>সংগঠন (খ):</p>			
<p><b>সংগঠন (ক):-</b></p>									
<p>১৮. আপুনি সংগঠনটোতে কিমান পৰিশ্ৰমী?</p>		<p>১. পৰিশ্ৰমী নহয় (মাত্ৰ মেকাৰৰ বানচ দিয়ে)</p>		<p>২. অলপ পৰিশ্ৰমী (সভাত উপস্থিত থাকে)</p>		<p>৩. পৰিশ্ৰমী (সভা আৰু আন কামবোৰত উৎসাহেৰে লাগি থাকে)</p>		<p>৪. খুব পৰিশ্ৰমী (সংগঠনটোৰ সদস্য যোগান ধৰে)</p>	
<p>১৯. সংগঠনবোৰত কেনেকৈ সদস্য যোগ কৰে?</p>			<p>১. সম্পূৰ্ণ ইচ্ছাকৃত ভাৱে</p>			<p>২. সমনীয়া জোৰত</p>		<p>৩. সামাজিক জোৰত</p>	
<p>২০. সদস্যবোৰৰ মাজত মিল কি (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?</p>		<p>১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৬. লিংগ</p>	<p>৭. বয়স সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	
<p>২১. সদস্যবোৰৰ মাজত অমিল কি (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?</p>		<p>১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৬. লিংগ</p>	<p>৭. বয়স সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	
<p>২২. এটা সংগঠন আন এটা সংগঠনৰ লগত লগ লাগি কাম কৰেনে যিবোৰৰ মাজত কোনো ধৰণৰ সম্বন্ধ নাথাকে (যেনে এটা শৈক্ষিক অনুষ্ঠানে এটা সাংস্কৃতিক অনুষ্ঠানৰ লগত বা সাংস্কৃতিক সন্ধিয়াত একেলগে কাম কৰা)?</p>							<p>১. হয়</p>	<p>২. নহয়</p>	
<p>২৩. যদি কৰে তেন্তে কেনেকৈ এই কামবোৰ একেলগে কৰে?</p>		<p>১. নকৰে বা একেবাৰে কমকৈ কৰে (০ ব পৰা ১ বছৰেকত)</p>	<p>২. একেবাৰে কম (২ ব পৰা ৩ বাৰ বছৰেকত)</p>	<p>৩. কেতিয়াবা কৰে (বছৰেকত ৪ ব পৰা ৫ বাৰ)</p>	<p>৪. ঘনে ঘনে (বছৰেকত ৬ ব পৰা ১২ বাৰ)</p>	<p>৫. খুব সমন্বাই (বছৰত ১২ বাৰতকৈ বেছি)</p>	<p>৬. সদায়</p>		
<p><b>সংগঠন (খ):-</b></p>									
<p>২৪. আপুনি সংগঠনটোতে কিমান পৰিশ্ৰমী?</p>		<p>১. পৰিশ্ৰমী নহয় (মাত্ৰ মেকাৰৰ বানচ দিয়ে)</p>		<p>২. অলপ পৰিশ্ৰমী (সভাত উপস্থিত থাকে)</p>		<p>৩. পৰিশ্ৰমী (সভা আৰু আন কামবোৰত উৎসাহেৰে লাগি থাকে)</p>		<p>৪. খুব পৰিশ্ৰমী (সংগঠনটোৰ সদস্য যোগান ধৰে)</p>	
<p>২৫. সংগঠনবোৰত কেনেকৈ সদস্য যোগ কৰে?</p>			<p>১. সম্পূৰ্ণ ইচ্ছাকৃত ভাৱে</p>			<p>২. সমনীয়া জোৰত</p>		<p>৩. সামাজিক জোৰত</p>	
<p>২৬. সদস্যবোৰৰ মাজত মিল কি (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?</p>		<p>১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	<p>৬. লিংগ</p>	<p>৭. বয়স সম্বন্ধীয়</p>	

২৭. সদস্যবোৰৰ মাজত অমিল কি (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়	২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়	৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. লিংগ	৭. বয়স সম্বন্ধীয়	
২৮. এটা সংগঠন আন এটা সংগঠনৰ লগত লগ লাগি কাম কৰেনে যিবোৰৰ মাজত কোনো ধৰণৰ সম্বন্ধ নাথাকে (যেনে এটা শৈক্ষিক অনুষ্ঠানে এটা সাংস্কৃতিক অনুষ্ঠানৰ লগত বা সাংস্কৃতিক সন্ধিয়াত একেলগে কাম কৰা)?							১. হয়	২. নহয়
২৯. যদি কৰে তেন্তে কেনেকৈ এই কামবোৰ একেলগে কৰো?	১. নকৰে বা একেবাৰে কমকৈ কৰে (০ ৰ পৰা ১ বছৰকত)	২. একেবাৰে কম (২ ৰ পৰা ৩ বাৰ বছৰকত)	৩. কেতিয়াবা কৰে (বছৰকত ৪ ৰ পৰা ৫ বাৰ)	৪. ঘনে ঘনে (বছৰকত ৬ ৰ পৰা ১২ বাৰ)	৫. খুব সঘনাই (বছৰকত ১২ বাৰতকৈ বেছি)	৬. সদায়		

আপোনাৰ গাঁও বা চুবুৰীয়া:-

৩০. আপোনাৰ গাঁও বা চুবুৰীয়া বাসিন্দাসকলৰ কিহত বেলেগ (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়	২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়	৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. বয়সৰ বিভাজন	৭. সম্পত্তি/ উপার্জন	৮. অন্যান্য .....কি?
৩১. আপোনাৰ গাঁও বা চুবুৰীয়াৰ কোনবোৰ মানুহে সমস্যা সৃষ্টি কৰে (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়	২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়	৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. বয়সৰ বিভাজন	৭. সম্পত্তি/ উপার্জন	৮. অন্যান্য .....কি?
৩২. এইবোৰৰ মাজৰ কিহে ধৰংসলৈ আগবঢ়ায় (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. ভাষা সম্বন্ধীয়	২. ধৰ্ম সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. বৰ্ণ সম্বন্ধীয়	৪. শ্ৰেণী সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. পেচা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. বয়সৰ বিভাজন	৭. সম্পত্তি/ উপার্জন	৮. অন্যান্য .....কি?
৩৩. আপুনি জীৱনত কেতিয়াবা এনেকুৱা পৰিস্থিতিৰ সন্মুখীন?							১. হয়	২. নহয়

একমাত্ৰ প্ৰামাণ্য অঞ্চলৰ বাবে:-

৩৪. বাহিৰৰ মানুহৰ সহায় নোহোৱাকৈ কেনেকৈ আপুনি এটা সমাজিক সমস্যা আপোনাৰ গাঁৱক সমাধান কৰিব (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. নজৰ মাজতে আলোচনা কৰি		২. গাঁও পঞ্চায়তৰ মিটিং মাতি		৩. অন্যান্য .....কি?	
৩৫. সমাধানটো কিমান কাৰ্যকৰি?	১. পৰিদৰ্শনেৰে নহয় সমাধান	২. পৰিদৰ্শন নকৰাকৈ নহয় সমাধান	৩. পৰিদৰ্শনেৰে অলপ সমাধান	৪. পৰিদৰ্শন নকৰাকৈ অলপ সমাধান	৫. পৰিদৰ্শনেৰে সমাধান	৬. পৰিদৰ্শন নকৰাকৈ সমাধান
৩৬. বাহিৰৰ মানুহৰ সহায় লৈ কেনেকৈ এটা সমাজিক সমস্যা আপোনাৰ গাঁৱত সমাধান কৰিব (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. আইনৰ সহায় লৈ	২. বাহিৰৰ সংগঠনৰ সহায় লয়	৩. কোনো বাহিৰৰ প্ৰভাৱশালী ব্যক্তিৰ সহায় লয়	৪. অন্যান্য .....কি?		

৩৭. যদি বাহিৰৰ সহায় আপুনি লয় সেইটো কেনেদৰে কাৰ্যকৰী হ'ব?	১. পৰিদৰ্শনেৰে নহয় সমাধান	২. পৰিদৰ্শন নকৰাকে নহয় সমাধান	৩. পৰিদৰ্শনেৰে অলপ সমাধান	৪. পৰিদৰ্শন নকৰাকে অলপ সমাধান	৫. পৰিদৰ্শনেৰে সমাধান	৬. পৰিদৰ্শন নকৰাকে সমাধান
৩৮. কাক আপুনি সমাজিক সম্পদ হিচাপে ধৰিব, যাক অকল গাঁওবাসীয়ে ব্যৱহাৰ কৰিব পাৰে (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. কোৱা	২. খেল পথৰা	৩. পুখুৰী	৪. পঢ়াশালী	৫. অন্যান্য	.....কি?
৩৯. আপোনাৰ সমাজিক সম্পদবোৰক কেনেকৈ আপুনি বাহিৰৰ মানুহৰ পৰা ৰক্ষা কৰিব?	১. তদাৰক দলেৰে	২. নিয়মীয়া পৰ্যবেক্ষণ দ্বাৰা	৩. কেতিয়াবা পৰিদৰ্শন কৰি	৪. অন্যান্য	.....কি?	
৪০. কোনোবাই আপোনাৰ সমাজিক সম্পদবোৰক দুৰ্য্যৱহাৰ কৰিলে আপুনি তাক কেনেকৈ শাস্তি দিব?	১. কাৰ্চিন শাস্তি নহয় (জোৰ কৰি গাঁৱৰ)	২. অলপ কাৰ্চিন তেওঁক গালি পাৰি গাঁৱৰ পৰা বাহিৰ কৰি দিয়া হ'ব	৩. কাৰ্চিন শাস্তি (লাজ দি গালি পাৰি জোৰ কৰি গাঁওৰ পৰা উলিয়াই দিয়া হ'ব)	৪. খুব কাৰ্চিন শাস্তি (ৰাজহুৱা ভাৱে লাজ দিয়া আৰু শাৰীৰিক ভাৱে মাৰধৰ কৰা হ'ব)		

**আপোনাৰ দলৰ ওপৰত বিশ্বাস:-**

৪১. অনুগ্রহ কৰি উল্লেখিত দলবোৰৰ ভিতৰত আপোনাৰ বিশ্বাসী দলটো বাচি উলিয়াওক:	১. নিজৰ বন্ধু বৰ্গৰ দল:	২. ভাষাৰ দল:	৩. ধৰ্মৰ দল:
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বি.স্ৰ : নিজৰ বন্ধুমহলক বাদ দি, ভাষা বা ধৰ্মৰ দলটো বাচনি কৰা, যেনে : আনটো দলক ওপৰত স্থান দিয়া হৈছে ৪২ ৰ ৪৮ নম্বৰলৈ প্ৰশ্নকেইটাৰ উত্তৰ দিয়া বাবে :

৪২. আপোনাৰ দলৰ মানুহে আপোনাৰ দলৰ মানুহক সহায় সহযোগ কৰে নে?	১. নকৰে কেতিয়াও	২. একমাত্ৰ তীব্ৰ পৰিস্থিতি	৩. মাজে মাজে (চিকিৎসালয়ৰ খৰচ বা বিদ্যালয়ৰ বছৰেকীয়া মাছুলৰ বাবে)	৪. ঘনকৈ (মাহিলি কিবা প্ৰয়োজনীয়তাৰ কাৰণে)	৫. বৰ ঘনকৈ (যিকোনো প্ৰয়োজনক যিকোনো সময়ত)
৪৩. এই প্ৰ-পৰোৰে বিশ্বাস ঘাতকতা মানুহক কেনেকৈ শাস্তি দিয়ে?	১. একেবাৰে নিদিয়	২. সৰ্বস্বীয় দি	৩. মঞ্চ মাতি বন্ধ কৰে	৪. বহিস্কাৰ কৰে	৫. শাৰীৰিকভাৱে শাস্তি দিয়ে আৰু/ বা বহিস্কাৰ কৰে
৪৪. দলৰ মানুহে বেলেগ দলৰ মানুহক সহযোগ কৰিবানে?	১. নকৰে কেতিয়াও	২. একমাত্ৰ তীব্ৰ পৰিস্থিতি	৩. মাজে মাজে (চিকিৎসালয়ৰ খৰচ বা বিদ্যালয়ৰ বছৰেকীয়া মাছুলৰ বাবে)	৩. ঘনকৈ (মাহিলি কিবা প্ৰয়োজনীয়তাৰ কাৰণে)	৫. বৰ ঘনকৈ (যিকোনো প্ৰয়োজনক যিকোনো সময়ত)
৪৫. নিজৰ দলৰ সদস্যসকলক কেনেকৈ সহায় কৰিবা (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. আৰ্থিক ভাৱে	২. নিজৰ সময় দিয়ে	৩. উপদেশ দি		
৪৬. যদি আগৰ প্ৰশ্নটোত তুমি '১. আৰ্থিক ভাৱে' বাচনি কৰা, তোমাৰ দলৰ সদস্যসকলক কেনেকৈ আৰ্থিক ভাৱে সহায় কৰিবা?	১. একমাত্ৰ তীব্ৰ পৰিস্থিতি	২. মাজে মাজে (চিকিৎসালয়ৰ খৰচ বা বিদ্যালয়ৰ বছৰেকীয়া মাছুলৰ বাবে)	৩. ঘনকৈ (মাহিলি কিবা প্ৰয়োজনীয়তাৰ কাৰণে)	৪. বৰ ঘনকৈ (যিকোনো প্ৰয়োজনক যিকোনো সময়ত)	

৪৭. ধবংসৰ পৰা তোমাৰ দলৰ সদস্যসকলক তুমি কেনেকৈ সহায় কৰিবা?	১. নিষ্ক্ৰিয় থাকিব	২. বক্ষা বিবেচনা কৰিম	৩. যদি সম্ভৱ হয় বক্ষা কৰিম	৪. বক্ষণ কৰিবলৈ কঠিন চেষ্টা কৰিম	৫. দৰকাৰ হ'লে জীৱনৰ দি হ'লেও বক্ষা কৰিম
৪৮. এনেকুৱা ধবংসৰ পৰা দলৰ বহিৰাগতক তুমি কেনেকৈ বক্ষা কৰিবা?	১. নিষ্ক্ৰিয় থাকিব	২. বক্ষা বিবেচনা কৰিম	৩. যদি সম্ভৱ হয় বক্ষা কৰিম	৪. বক্ষণ কৰিবলৈ কঠিন চেষ্টা কৰিম	৫. দৰকাৰ হ'লে জীৱনৰ দি হ'লেও বক্ষা কৰিম

**সুশীল সমাজ:-**

৪৯. তুমি নিজকে কিমান নিৰ্ভয় বুলি ভাবা যেতিয়া নিজৰ ওচৰ চুবুৰীয়াৰ গাঁৱৰ মাজেৰে গৈ থাকি?	১. দিন-ৰাতি ভয় লাগি থাকে	২. দিনত কাৰোবাৰ লগত যাও, ৰাতি বাহিৰত নাযাও	৩. দিনত নিৰ্ভয় কিন্তু ৰাতি যাবলৈ সংগী লাগে	৪. দিন-ৰাতি নিৰ্ভয়
৫০. যোৱা বছৰত তোমাৰ গাঁৱত ওলাই যাওতে কোনোবাই তোমাক আক্ৰমণ কৰিছে নেকি বা কিবা চুৰ কৰিছে নেকি?				১. হয় ২. নহয়
৫১. তুমি নিজকে কিমান নিৰ্ভয় বুলি ভাবা যেতিয়া নিজৰ ওচৰ প্ৰয়োজনক যিকোনো চুবুৰীয়াৰ গাঁৱৰ মাজেৰে গৈ থাকি?	১. দিন-ৰাতি ভয় লাগি থাকে	২. দিনত কাৰোবাৰ লগত যাও, ৰাতি বাহিৰত নাযাও	৩. দিনত নিৰ্ভয় কিন্তু ৰাতি যাবলৈ সংগী লাগে	৪. দিন-ৰাতি নিৰ্ভয়
৫২. যোৱা বছৰত তোমাৰ গাঁৱৰ বাহিৰত ওলাই যাওতে কোনোবাই তোমাক আক্ৰমণ কৰিছে নেকি বা কিবা চুৰ কৰিছে নেকি?				১. হয় ২. নহয়
৫৩. যোৱা বছৰটোত আপোনাৰ ওচৰ-চুবুৰীয়া বা গাঁৱত পুলিচ পহৰা দিয়া দেখিছেনে?				১. হয় ২. নহয়
৫৪. যোৱা বছৰটোত পুলিচ ওপৰিও কোনো বিশেষ ব্যক্তিৰ শাস্তিৰক্ষক বাহিনী আপোনাৰ ওচৰ-চুবুৰীয়া বা গাঁৱত দেখিছেনে?				১. হয় ২. নহয়
৫৫. যদি হয় তেন্তে এজন নাগৰিক হিচাপে আপোনাক বা আপোনাৰ পৰিয়ালৰ কোনো ব্যক্তিক তেখেতসকলে আশা কৰা ধৰণে সন্মান দিছেনে?				১. হয় ২. নহয়

৫৬. আপুনি যিকোনো ৰাজনীতি ভাবধাৰা চিনাক্ত কৰিব পাৰেনে?				১. হয় ২. নহয়
৫৭. যদি "হয়", তেন্তে উল্লেখিত সকল মাজৰ পৰা আপোনাৰ বিশ্বাসী ৰাজনীতি ভাবধাৰা পচন্দ কৰক:	১. উদাৰনৈতিক	২. সমাজতন্ত্রী	৩. বক্ষণশীল	৪. অন্যান্য .....কি?
৫৮. এজন বেলেগ দলৰ ব্যক্তিয়ে যদি স্থানীয় চৰকাৰী পদৰ বাবে আগবাঢ়ে আপুনি তেখেতক সন্মতি দিবনে?	১. নিদেয়ে (সম্ভৱ নহয়)	২. সম্ভৱ নিদেয়ে	৩. হ'ব পাৰে (দিব পাৰে ব্যক্তিৰ ওপৰত নিৰ্ভৰ কৰিব)	৪. নিশ্চয় (নিশ্চয় দিম)
৫৯. আপুনি যদি কোনো স্থানীয় চৰকাৰী পদৰ বাবে আগবাঢ়ে সেই ঠাইৰ নিৰ্দলীয় সদস্যবোৰে আপোনাক সন্মতি দিবনে?	১. নিদেয়ে (সম্ভৱ নহয়)	২. সম্ভৱ নিদেয়ে	৩. হ'ব পাৰে (দিব পাৰে পৰিৱেশৰ ওপৰত নিৰ্ভৰ কৰিব)	৪. নিশ্চয় (নিশ্চয় দিব)
৬০. আপুনি বাকু ভাবেনে যে যদি কোনোবাই টকা বা উপহাৰ বিনিময়ত সন্মতি দিয়ে সেইটো উপযুক্ত সন্মতি হ'ব?	১. নহয় (কোনো কাৰণতে নহয়)	২. সম্ভৱ নহয়	৩. হ'ব পাৰে (দিব পাৰে পৰিৱেশৰ ওপৰত নিৰ্ভৰ কৰিব)	৪. নিশ্চয় (নিশ্চয় দিম)

৬১. স্থানীয় চৰকাৰী বিষয়বোৰক বাক বিশ্বাসত ল'ব পাৰিনে ?	১. নোৱাৰ (কোনো কাৰণতে নোৱাৰি)	২. সম্ভৱ নোৱাৰি	৩. সম্ভৱ পাৰি (পৰিৱেশৰ ওপৰত নিৰ্ভৰ কৰিব)	৪. নিশ্চয় (নিশ্চয় পাৰি)		
৬২. ৰাজ্য চৰকাৰী বিষয়বোৰক বাক বিশ্বাসত ল'ব পাৰিনে ?	১. নোৱাৰ (কোনো কাৰণতে নোৱাৰি)	২. সম্ভৱ নোৱাৰি	৩. সম্ভৱ পাৰি (পৰিৱেশৰ ওপৰত নিৰ্ভৰ কৰিব)	৪. নিশ্চয় (নিশ্চয় পাৰি)		
৬৩. কেন্দ্ৰীয় চৰকাৰী বিষয়বোৰক বাক বিশ্বাসত ল'ব পাৰিনে ?	১. নোৱাৰ (কোনো কাৰণতে নোৱাৰি)	২. সম্ভৱ নোৱাৰি	৩. সম্ভৱ পাৰি (পৰিৱেশৰ ওপৰত নিৰ্ভৰ কৰিব)	৪. নিশ্চয় (নিশ্চয় পাৰি)		
৬৪. সাধাৰণতে আপুনি ভাবেনে যে দেশৰ অৰ্থনৈতিক পৰিৱেশ ঠিকে আছে?	১. হয়		২. নহয়			
৬৫. যোৱা বছৰ লগত তুলনা কৰিলে এতিয়া বেছি ভাল হৈছে, একে আছে নে বেছি বেয়াহে হৈছে?	১. উন্নত হৈছে	২. একে আছে	৩. অধোমতি হৈছে			
৬৬. অকল অৰ্থনৈতিক দিশতে নহয় চাৰিওফালৰ পৰা চাব গ'লে আন দিশবোৰতো দেশখন সঠিক পথেৰে গৈ আছেনে?	১. হয়		২. নহয়			
৬৭. আপুনি আপোনাৰ ৰাজ্যত থকাৰ অৱস্থাটো বেলেগৰ লগত কেনেকৈ গতি কৰিছে কেনেকৈ তুলনা কৰে?	১. খুবেই বেয়া	২. বেয়া	৩. একে নিশ্চয়	৪. ভাল	৫. বহুত ভাল	
৬৮. অনুগ্রহ কৰি প্ৰকৃত কাৰণটো বাচি উলিওৱা যিটোৱে আপোনাৰ তেনেকৈ ভাবিবলৈ বাধ্য কৰিছে (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক):						
১. মূল্যবৃদ্ধি সম্বন্ধীয়	২. খাদ্য সম্বন্ধীয়	৩. শক্তি সম্বন্ধীয় (পানী আৰু বিজুলী শক্তিৰ)	৪. স্বাস্থ্য সম্বন্ধীয়	৫. শিক্ষা সম্বন্ধীয়	৬. কাৰ্য সম্বন্ধীয়	৭. বিভাগীয় শাসন ব্যৱস্থা সম্বন্ধীয়
৮. যাতায়ত ব্যৱস্থা সম্বন্ধীয়	৯. ভেটি প্ৰমুখ সম্বন্ধীয়	১০. সাংস্কৃতি সম্বন্ধীয়	১১. জীৱন ধাৰণা সম্বন্ধীয়	১২. পৰম্পৰাৰ মাজত থকা চিন	১৩. অন্যান্য .....কি?	
৬৯. আপুনি আপোনাৰ জীৱন নিৰ্বাহৰ ভাৰতৰ আন ৰাজ্যৰ মানুহৰ জীৱন নিৰ্বাহৰ লগত কেনেকৈ তুলনা কৰে?	১. খুবেই বেয়া	২. বেয়া	৩. একেই	৪. ভাল	৫. বহুত ভাল	
৭০. যোৱা বছৰটোত কেনেকৈ আপুনি বা পৰিয়ালৰ কোনো সদস্যহ উল্লেখিত ৯টা দৰকাৰী উপাদানৰ পৰা বঞ্চিত হৈছে (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. খাদ্য			২. ঘৰ	৩. বস্ত্ৰ	
৪. শিক্ষা	৫. চিকিৎসা আৰু ঔষধ	৬. পানী আৰু বিজুলী	৭. বন্ধনগেছ	৮. টকা	৯. যাতায়ত ব্যৱস্থা	
৭১. আপোনাৰ দলৰ কোনো সদস্য স্থানীয় চৰকাৰৰ পৰা অহা নেকি?	১. হয়			২. নহয়		
৭২. আপোনাৰ দলৰ কোনো সদস্য ৰাজ্য চৰকাৰৰ পৰা অহা নেকি?	১. হয়			২. নহয়		
৭৩. আপোনাৰ দলৰ কোনো সদস্য কেন্দ্ৰীয় চৰকাৰৰ পৰা অহা নেকি?	১. হয়			২. নহয়		
৭৪. আপুনি আপোনাৰ স্থানীয় বাতৰিত আগ্ৰাহীনে?	১. হয়			২. নহয়		
৭৫. আপুনি স্থানীয় বাতৰি সঘনাই পায় যেনে - অনাতাৰ কেন্দ্ৰযোগে, দূৰদৰ্শন নে বাতৰি কাকতেৰে ?	১. নাপাও	২. মাহত এবাৰতকৈ ও কমকৈ	৩. মাহেকৈ	৪. সপ্তাহত দুবাৰ বা তিনিবাৰ	৫. সপ্তাহত ৩ বা ৪ বাৰ	৬. সদায়

৭৬. আপুনি ২০১৪ চনৰ শেষৰ জাতীয় নিৰ্বাচনত সন্মতি দিছিলনে ?				১. হয়	২. নহয়
৭৭. যিকোনো ৰাজনৈতিক দলত যোগদান কৰিবলৈ আপুনি কিমান স্বাধীন (যদি দলটো আপোনাৰ পৰিয়াল বা বন্ধু বৰ্গৰ বাচনিৰ পৰা বেলেগ হয়) ?	১. সমাজ আৰু বন্ধুবৰ্গই সমাজ চ্যুত কৰিব	২. সম্ভৱ নোহাবি পৰিয়াল আৰু বন্ধুবৰ্গই মোক লুকাই চাব	৩. সম্ভৱ পাবি সমাজত একো নকয় কিন্তু সকলোৰে চাহ থাকিব	৪. কোনেও নেতিচাবচক ভাৱে নাভাবে	৫. সমাজৰ নিয়ম বাবে কোনেও একো নকয় আৰু নাচায়
৭৮. যদি কোনোবাই "চৰকাৰ" বুলি কাক তুমি কেনেকুৱা ধৰণৰ চৰকাৰ কথা ভাবিবা ?		১. স্থানীয়	২. ৰাজ্যিক	৩. কেন্দ্ৰীয়	
৭৯. চৰকাৰে কি কৰিছে তুমি ক'ত আলোচনা কৰিবা (যিমান পাবি উপাযুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক) ?	১. পৰিয়াল গৃহস্থী	২. কাম কৰা ঠাইত	৩. বজাৰত (চাহ দোকান আৰু জলপনীয়া দোকানত)	৪. চৰকাৰী পৰিহন	৫. অন্যান্য .....কি?
৮০. চৰকাৰী শাসনৰ ওপৰত আপুনি কেনেকৈ মুক্ত হৈ মন্তব্য দিব পাৰে ?	১. মোৰ মন্তব্য আনকি মই পৰিয়াল আৰু বন্ধুবৰ্গৰ আগত দিবলৈ অস্বস্তি অনুভৱ কৰিম	২. অকাল পৰিয়ালৰ আগত হৈ মই মন্তব্য দি স্বস্তি অনুভৱ কৰিম	৩. পৰিয়াল আৰু বন্ধুবৰ্গৰ আগতে মন্তব্য দি স্বস্তি অনুভৱ কৰিম	৪. সমাজৰ আগত মন্তব্য দি স্বস্তি অনুভৱ কৰিম	৫. জনমাধ্যম আৰু ৰাজহুৱা স্থানত মন্তব্য দি স্বস্তি অনুভৱ কৰিম
৮১. আপোনাৰ পচন্দৰ ব্যক্তিক তোট দিবলৈ আপুনি কিমান মুক্ত (যদিওবা তেওঁক আপোনাৰ পৰিয়াল বন্ধুবৰ্গ আৰু সমন্বীয়া সমৰ্থন নকৰিও পাৰে) ?	১. মোৰ জীৱন, পৰিয়াল আৰু সম্পত্তি সমস্যাত পৰিব পাৰে	২. মোৰ জীৱিকা আৰু চাকৰিত সমস্যা হ'ব পাৰে	৩. নেতিবাচক ভাৱে মোৰ জীৱন আৰু জীৱিকাত প্ৰভাৱ পৰিব পাৰে যেনে (দৰমহা কাটি দিয়া, পদোন্নতিত বাধা দিয়া আৰু কোনো দাতি কাষৰীয়া অঞ্চলত বদলিকৰণ)	৪. বৰ্তমান সময়ত একো সমস্যা নহয়	৫. বৰ্তমান আৰু ভৱিষ্যতত কোনো কেতিয়াও কোনো ধৰণৰ সমস্যা নহয়
৮২. আপুনি আপোনাৰ স্থানীয় মেয়ৰ বা গাঁওবুঢ়াৰ লগত বাৰ্তালাপ কৰেনে ?				১. হয়	২. নহয়
৮৩. আপোনাৰ কোনো সমস্যা হ'লে আপুনি কেনেদৰে সমাজ সদস্যৰ লগত লগ লাগি স্থানীয় চৰকাৰক কিবা এটা কৰাৰ বাবে দৰ্খাস্ত দিব ?	১. কোনো দৰ্খাস্ত দিয়া নহ'ব যদিওবা তাত সমস্যাই দেখাই দিয়ে	২. কোনো গুৰুতৰ সমস্যা হ'লেহে দৰ্খাস্ত দিয়া হ'ব	৩. যিকোনো সদস্যতে দৰ্খাস্ত দিয়া হ'ব	৪. স্থানীয় প্ৰধান আহিব বা কোনো ব্যক্তিক পঠিয়াই সদায় পৰিদৰ্শন কৰিবলৈ নিয়ম বনাই দিব	৫. আমি সদায় স্থানীয় প্ৰধানৰ লগত সংযোগ বজাই ৰাখিব
৮৪. কোনো চৰকাৰী বিদ্যালয় বা মহাবিদ্যালয়, পলিচ থানা, ডাকঘৰ বা আন চৰকাৰী চাকৰি কৰিবলৈ আপোনাৰ বাবে কিমান সহজ ?	১. পৰিশোধ অনুসাৰে কামটো কৰা নহ'ব	২. যেনে যেনে পৰিশোধ অনুসাৰে কামটো কৰা হ'ব	৩. পৰিশোধ অনুসাৰে কামটো কৰা হ'ব.	৪. অনুসৰণৰ দ্বাৰা কামটো কৰা হ'ব	৫. সহজতে আৰু সময় মতে কামটো কৰা হ'ব

৮৫. আপুনি গুচৰ দেশৰ লগত বাণিজ্য বেপাৰ বেচি হোৱাটো সম্মতি দিয়েনে?	১. হয়	২. নহয়		
৮৬. আপুনি এনেকুৱা বাণিজ্যৰ লগত জড়িত নেকি?	১. হয়	২. নহয়		
৮৭. যদি হয় আপোনাৰ কিবা বাকী দিব লগা আছে নেকি?	১. হয়	২. নহয়		
৮৮. কি কাৰণত চৰকাৰে সীমান্তৰ মানুহ আৰু বস্তু লবচৰৰ ওপৰত পুনৰ বিবেচনা কৰিব লাগে (যিমান পাৰি উপায়ুক্তটোত চিন দিয়ক)?	১. কোনো কাৰণতে বদলি কৰিব নোৱাৰে	২. ব্যৱসায়িক বাধাবোৰক বেহাই দিব লাগে	৩. ভিছা দৰকাৰ আৰু সময়ৰ অপেক্ষাক বেহাই দিব লাগে	৪. জাতীয় প্ৰমাণ পত্ৰৰ বাবে, ভিছাৰ নিয়মবোৰ এৰি দিব লাগে
৮৯. যদি দৰকাৰ হয় তুমি বা তোমাৰ পৰিয়ালৰ কোনোবাহ সীমাৰ সীপাৰে ধকা কাৰোবাক আৰ্থিকভাৱে সহায় কৰিবা নে?	১. হয়, নিশ্চয়	২. হয়, যদিও এইটো বিপদজনক	৩. নহয় মই এইটো সম্ভৱ বুলি নাভাবো	৪. নহয়, মই এইটো নকৰো
৯০. প্ৰব্ৰজনকাৰী আবেদনকাৰীক তুমি তেতিয়া দিবানে?	১. হয়, নিশ্চয়	২. হ'ব পাৰে, মই নিশ্চয়তা দিব নোৱাৰো	৩. নহয়, নিশ্চয় নহয়	

**ব্যক্তিৰ লক্ষণ:-**

৯১. তোমাৰ ঘৰত কিমানজন সদস্য আছে?	১. ১-২ জন মানুহ	২. ৩-৫ জন মানুহ	৩. ৬-৮ জন মানুহ	৪. ৮+ জন মানুহ
৯২. তুমি বিবাহিত নে?	১. হয়			২. নহয়
৯৩. যদি হয়, তোমাৰ স্বামী বা স্ত্ৰী অন্য ভাষা বা ধৰ্মৰ হয়নে?	১. হয়, বেলেগ ভাষা	২. হয়, বেলেগ ধৰ্মৰ	৩. হয়, বেলেগ ধৰ্ম আৰু ভাষা	৪. নহয়, একে ভাষা আৰু ধৰ্মৰ
৯৪. বিবাহৰ পিছত তোমাৰ মা-দেউতাৰ লগত সম্পৰ্ক আছেনে? (যদি ঢুকাইছে, জীৱিত কালত আছিলনে?)	১. হয়			২. নহয়
৯৫. বয়সৰ পিছত তোমাৰ স্বামী বা পত্নীৰ মা-দেউতা লগত সম্পৰ্ক আছেনে? (যদি ঢুকাইছে, জীৱিত কালত আছিলনে?)	১. হয়			২. নহয়
৯৬. তুমি ভাৰা ঘৰত থাকানে?	১. হয়			২. নহয়
৯৭. আনুমানিক গড় মাহিলী আয় (ভাৰতীয় হিচাবত মাহে):	১. <২,৫০০	২. ২,৫০০-৫,০০০	৩. ৫,০০০-৭,৫০০	৪. ৭,৫০০-১০,০০০
৫. ১০,০০০-১৫,০০০	৬. ১৫,০০০-২০,০০০	৭. ২০,০০০-৩০,০০০	৮. ৩০,০০০-৫০,০০০	৯. ৫০,০০০-৭৫,০০০
১০. ৭৫,০০০+				

৯৮. তুমি কিমান বছৰ স্কুলত গৈছা?					
৯৯. তোমাৰ উচ্চতম শৈক্ষিক অৰ্হতা কি?	১. প্ৰাথমিক	২. মাধ্যমিক	৩. উচ্চতৰ মাধ্যমিক	৪. স্নাতক	৫. স্নাতকোত্তৰ
১০০. বিদ্যালয়ৰ ধৰণ অৰ্হতা কি?	১. চৰকাৰী	২. ব্যক্তিগত	৩. ধৰ্মীয়	৪. কাৰিকৰী	
১০১. তুমি বিদ্যালয়ৰ ক'ত গৈছিলি?	১. এই গাঁৱত বা কাষত			২. এই গাঁৱ বা গাঁওতকৈ দূৰত	
১০২. তুমি যিখন স্কুলত পৰিছিলি সেইখনত বেলেগ ধৰ্ম বা ভাষাৰ লোক আছিল নেকি?	১. হয়, বিভিন্ন ভাষাৰ ছাত্ৰ আছিল	২. হয়, বিভিন্ন ধৰ্মৰ ছাত্ৰ আছিল	৩. হয়, উভয়ে ভাষা আৰু ধৰ্মৰ লোক আছিল	৪. নহয়, বেছিভাগ ছাত্ৰই একে ভাষা আৰু ধৰ্মৰ আছিল	

১০৩. তোমাৰ পেচা:	১. বেকাৰ	২. খেতিয়ক	৩. ব্যৱসায়	৪. উৎপাদনকাৰী	৫. চাকুৰিজীৱী	৬. অন্যান্য .....
১০৪. তুমি তোমাৰ ধৰ্মৰ প্ৰতি কিমান সজাগ?	১. সজাগ নহয়	২. চেষ্টা কৰো	৩. খুবেই চেষ্টা কৰো	৪. সকলো ভালকৈ কৰো		
১০৫. তুমি প্ৰতি সপ্তাহত বাতিপূৰা প্ৰাৰ্থনা কেইবাৰ কৰা?	১. কেতিয়াও নকৰো	২. এবাৰ দুবাৰ	৩. দুবাৰতকৈ বেছি	৪. সদায়		
১০৬. তোমাৰ কোনোবা আলহি বা পৰিয়ালবৰ্গ বাংলাদেশত আছে নেকি?				১. হয়	২. নহয়	
১০৭. তোমাৰ জন্ম ক'ত হৈছিল?						
১০৮. তোমাৰ মা-দেউতাৰ জন্ম ক'ত হৈছিল?						
১০৯. তোমাৰ ককাদেউতাৰ জন্ম ক'ত হৈছিল?						
১১০. তুমি 'দস্তকৰণীয় প্ৰজেক্ট'ৰ বিষয়ে শুনিছা নেকি?				১. হয়	২. নহয়	
১১১. যদি নাই পোৱা, তেতিয়াহলে তুমি 'বসন্তী' নামৰ বস্তিটোৰ নাম শুনিছা নেকি?				১. হয়	২. নহয়	

অনুমতি পত্ৰ

মই প্ৰশ্নকৰ্তাৰ পৰা চাৰ্ভেটোৰ বিষয়ে সকলো বুজি পাইছো আৰু চাৰ্ভেট  
সকলো প্ৰশ্ন পাইছো। মই ১৮ বা ১৮ তকৈ ডাঙৰ আৰু মই এই চাৰ্ভেটত ভাগ  
ল'বলৈ নিজে আগবাঢ়ি আহিছো।

স্বাক্ষৰ বা আঙুলিৰ চাপ :

নাম :

তাৰিখ :

## **Appendix 2: Enumerator Training Documents**

## Enumerator Welcome Message

Welcome Team Member:

This is the first day of our work and I am here to train you on how to conduct surveys for my PhD research. As part of my PhD research at England's Durham University, I am building a survey team comprising of five individuals and you happen to be one of them.

The surveys are designed to capture indicators on the trust network of Bengali Muslims who are living in your state and two other states of India bordering Bangladesh. The India-Bangladesh bordering region has historically been a porous zone that is inhabited by large Bengali-speaking Muslim populations. In recent years, these populations have been the source of debates concerning India-Bangladesh political relations. Through studying the trust network of Bengali Muslims, I want to understand how the topic of ethnic ties is connected to resource allocation, trade, labor market and migration.

Your enumerator pack contains the following items:

1. This Training Schedule and Mini-Manual
2. Stamp Pad
3. 2 Survey Questionnaire Forms for you to practice with during Session III
4. List of Addresses and Cell Phone Numbers of survey respondents
5. Pack of 4 Survey Questionnaire Forms for the Field (You will fill only 3. The 1 extra is a reserve in case you make any mistakes and need a fresh one. **Make sure you return all 4 to me by the end of the day. During the process of conducting the surveys, make sure to keep all forms in your possession as they are confidential.**)
6. 4 consent forms for the respondents (Again, you will only need 3. The 1 extra is a reserve in case you make any mistakes and need a fresh one. **Please return all 4 to me. When in the field, always keep them in your possession as they are confidential.**)
7. 10% of your salary (you shall be paid 10% of your salary daily and 60% at the end)
8. An Agreement Page for you to sign.

Thank you for helping me with my research work.

Sincerely,

Rudabeh Shahid

## Enumerator Training Schedule

### Day 1

9:30am to 10:00 am **Session I:**

- Introduce Myself and my Research
- Describe my contract with you. *Please note that you need to sign an agreement with me in which you shall agree to be paid in cash in the following manner: 10% of your full salary per day and 60% after the successful completion of the project in this location.*

10:00 am to 10:30 am Tea Break

10:30 am to 11:45 am **Session II:** Introducing and Explaining my Survey Question-by-Question

11:45 am to 12:30 pm Practicalities

- How to talk to respondents
- Special discussion and explanations about questions that have rating

12:30 pm to 1:30 pm Lunch Break

1:30 pm to 4:00 pm **Session III:** Practice and Feedback

- Practice in groups of two: Conduct the Survey on each other and fill in one set of questionnaire form
- Hear a Mock Recording of a survey interview and complete a second set of questionnaire form
- Q& A Session

4:00 pm to 4:45 pm Further Issues

- Those enumerators who miscoded more than 10 responses during the mock interview will need to talk to me about where they went wrong.

### Day 2/ Day 3/ Day 4

*In each of these days, you are expected to conduct 3 surveys each. The team shall meet at 5 PM to monitor progress.*

8:00 am to 9:00 am Collect the fresh set of 4 Survey Questionnaire Forms and 4 Consent Sheets

9:00 am to 11:00 am Survey 1

11:00 am to 1:00 pm Survey 2

1:00 pm to 3:00 pm      Lunch Break

3:00 pm to 5:00 pm      Survey 3

5:00 pm to 7:00 pm      **Team Meetings:** During this time, you shall hand in all the questionnaires and consent sheets (including those that are unused). During this time, we shall discuss all issues that you and your fellow enumerators have encountered on that day. In addition, I shall make the confirmatory phone calls to each respondent in the team's presence. If you were unable to interview all 3 respondents that you were assigned for that day, you must tell us at this meeting, as to why it was not possible to interview (This information is important to me for deciding on how to reschedule interviews with those missed respondents).

**Day 5**

No particular respondent is assigned for this day. **This day is reserved for the team to revisit the missed respondents.**

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### **Enumerator's Mini-Guide**

- 1) Please collect the fresh set of Survey Questionnaire Forms and Consent Sheets.
- 2) Go to the Address of the Survey Respondent in the Respondent List provided to you. This must be done serially from the list as interview times have been set with each of them.
- 3) If the respondent is not available, please make a note of that because you or your team member shall revisit that site on the last day of the survey.
- 4) Introduce yourself to the respondent
- 5) Read out the Introduction and Oral Summary of my research that is found on page 1 of the survey questionnaire.
- 6) Read out the consent sheet to them and ask for the respondent's signature or thumb mark.
- 7) Start the interview and write down the responses directly in the space provided in the questionnaire.
- 8) For "Don't know/ No Response" to a particular question, please record DN or NR next to the question on the questionnaire.
- 9) For Mistakes you made while recording a response, simply cut out the response in the questionnaire, and write the correct answer next to it.
- 10) After you are done conducting a survey, please thank the respondent for his time and go to the next location listed in the respondent list. Make sure you send me a text message after the completion of the survey interview.
- 11) After you have completed surveying the respondents, please meet me and the team at our designated meeting spot. You are expected to hand over all the questionnaires and consent sheets (including those that have not been used).
- 12) During this time we shall have our team discussion, confirmatory call to each respondent, 10 % of your salary, and formalize the next day's schedule.

**Agreement Page**

I understand my duties as an enumerator and agree to conduct surveys for this research. I am aware that I shall be paid in cash in the following manner: 10% of my full salary per day and 60% after the successful completion of the project in this location.

Name in BLOCK LETTERS:

Signature:

Date:

**Appendix 3:**  
**District wise Census Breakdown**

**Table 3.1(a): Total numbers and percentages of Muslims in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011) by district wise breakdown**

<b>RELIGION- District (2011)</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>MUSLIM</b>
West Tripura	1725739	152791
<b>Total (Tripura)</b>	<b>1725739</b>	<b>152791</b>
<b>Percentage (Tripura)</b>		<b>8.85%</b>
Kokrajhar	887142	252271
Dhubri	1949258	1553023
Goalpara	1008183	579929
Barpeta	1693622	1198036
Nagaon	2823768	1563203
Dibrugarh	1326335	64526
Sivasagar	1151050	95553
Jorhat	1092256	54684
Kamrup	1517542	601784
Kamrup Metropolitan	1253938	151071
<b>Total (Assam)</b>	<b>14703094</b>	<b>6114080</b>
<b>Percentage (Assam)</b>		<b>41.58%</b>
Murshidabad	7103807	4707573
Nadia	5167600	1382682
North Twenty Four Parganas	10009781	2584684
Kolkata	4496694	926414
South Twenty Four Parganas	8161961	2903075
Purba Medinipur	5095875	743436
<b>Total (West Bengal)</b>	<b>40035718</b>	<b>13247864</b>
<b>Percentage (West Bengal)</b>		<b>33.09%</b>

Note: The districts of Sipahijala and Gomati (where some of the survey respondents are from) were both parts of West Tripura when the survey was conducted.

**Table 3.1(b): Total number and percentage of Muslims in all three states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

<b>RELIGION</b>	<b>Muslim (2011)</b>	<b>Total</b>
Total (Tripura)	152791	1725739
Total (Assam)	6114080	14703094
Total (West Bengal)	13247864	40035718
<b>Total (Total)</b>	<b>19514735</b>	<b>56464551</b>
<b>Total (Percentage)</b>	<b>34.56%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 3.2(a): Total numbers and percentages of Bengali-speakers in each state according to the Indian National Census (2001)**

LANGUAGE- State (2001)	Bengali	Total	Percentage of Bengali-speakers
<b>Tripura</b>	2083257	3199203	65.12%
<b>Assam</b>	7255880	26655528	27.22%
<b>West Bengal</b>	67766217	80176197	84.52%

**Note:** For the linguistic breakdown, 2001 census report was used. The 2001 census report does not show the district wise breakdown for language.

**Table 3.2(b): Total number and percentage of Bengali-speakers in all three states according to the Indian National Census (2001)**

LANGUAGE	Bengali-Speaker (2001)	Total
Total (Tripura)	2083257	3199203
Total (Assam)	7255880	26655528
Total (West Bengal)	67766217	80176197
<b>Total (Total)</b>	<b>77105354</b>	<b>110030928</b>
<b>Total (Percentage)</b>	<b>70.08%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 3.3(a): Sex ratio and percentages of females in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

GENDER- District (2011)	Sex Ratio (Per 1000 Male Births)
West Tripura	960
<b>Total (Tripura)</b>	<b>960</b>
<b>Percentage Female (Tripura)</b>	<b>48.98%</b>
Barpeta	953
Dhubri	953
Dibrugarh	961
Goalpara	964
Jorhat	962
Kamrup	949
Kamrup Metropolitan	936
Kokrajhar	959
Nagaon	962
Sivasagar	954
<b>Total (Assam)</b>	<b>955</b>
<b>Percentage Female (Assam)</b>	<b>48.85%</b>
Murshidabad	958
Nadia	947
Kolkata	908
North Twenty Four Parganas	955
South Twenty Four Parganas	956
Purba Medinipur	938
<b>Total (West Bengal)</b>	<b>944</b>
<b>Percentage Female (West Bengal)</b>	<b>48.56%</b>

**Table 3.3(b): Sex ratio and percentages of females all three states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

<b>GENDER</b>	<b>Sex Ratio (Per 1000 Male Births)</b>
Total (Tripura)	960
Total (Assam)	955
Total (West Bengal)	944
<b>Total (All States)</b>	<b>953</b>
<b>Total (Percentage)</b>	<b>48.83%</b>

**Table 3.4(a): Total numbers and percentages of Urban and Rural population living in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

<b>URBAN/RURAL- District (2011)</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>Urban</b>	<b>Rural</b>
West Tripura	1725739	677638	1048101
<b>Total (Tripura)</b>	<b>1725739</b>	<b>677638</b>	<b>1048101</b>
<b>Percentage (Tripura)</b>		<b>39.27%</b>	<b>60.73%</b>
Barpeta	1693622	147353	1546269
Dhubri	1949258	203701	1745557
Dibrugarh	1326335	243730	1082605
Goalpara	1008183	138062	870121
Jorhat	1092256	220534	871722
Kamrup	1517542	142394	1375148
Kamrup Metropolitan	1253938	1037011	216927
Kokrajhar	887142	54941	832201
Nagaon	2823768	369534	2454234
Sivasagar	1151050	110096	1040954
<b>Total (Assam)</b>	<b>14703094</b>	<b>2667356</b>	<b>12035738</b>
<b>Percentage (Assam)</b>		<b>18.14%</b>	<b>81.86%</b>
Murshidabad	7103807	1400692	5703115
Nadia	5167600	1438873	3728727
Kolkata	4496694	4496694	0
North Twenty Four Parganas	10009781	5732162	4277619
South Twenty Four Parganas	8161961	2087773	6074188
Purba Medinipur	5095875	592714	4503161
<b>Total (West Bengal)</b>	<b>40035718</b>	<b>15748908</b>	<b>24286810</b>
<b>Percentage (West Bengal)</b>		<b>39.34%</b>	<b>60.66%</b>

**Table 3.4(b): Total numbers and percentages of Urban and Rural population living in all three states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

URBAN/RURAL	Urban (2011)	Rural (2011)	Total
Total (Tripura)	677638	1048101	1725739
Total (Assam)	2667356	12035738	14703094
Total (West Bengal)	15748908	24286810	40035718
<b>Total (Total)</b>	<b>19093902</b>	<b>37370649</b>	<b>56464551</b>
<b>Total (Percentage)</b>	<b>33.82%</b>	<b>66.18%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 3.5(a): Total numbers and percentages of the married population in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

MARRIED- District (2011)	Total	Married
West Tripura	1725739	876810
<b>Total (Tripura)</b>	<b>1725739</b>	<b>876810</b>
<b>Percentage (Tripura)</b>		<b>50.81%</b>
Barpeta	1693622	750463
Dhubri	1949258	845530
Dibrugarh	1326335	613557
Goalpara	1008183	438883
Jorhat	1092256	517813
Kamrup	1517542	692142
Kamrup Metropolitan	1253938	626651
Kokrajhar	887142	398580
Nagaon	2823768	1215481
Sivasagar	1151050	538936
<b>Total (Assam)</b>	<b>14703094</b>	<b>6638036</b>
<b>Percentage (Assam)</b>		<b>45.15%</b>
Murshidabad	7103807	3427537
Nadia	5167600	2743938
Kolkata	4496694	2357203
North Twenty Four Parganas	10009781	5310449
South Twenty Four Parganas	8161961	4158524
Purba Medinipur	5095875	2695594
<b>Total (West Bengal)</b>	<b>40035718</b>	<b>20693245</b>
<b>Percentage (West Bengal)</b>		<b>51.69%</b>

**Table 3.5(b): Total numbers and percentages of the married population in all states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

MARRIED	Total	Married (2011)
Total (Tripura)	1725739	876810
Total (Assam)	14703094	6638036
Total (West Bengal)	40035718	20693245
<b>Total (Total)</b>	<b>56464551</b>	<b>28208091</b>
<b>Total (Percentage)</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>49.98%</b>

**Table 3.6(a): Total numbers and percentages per age category in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

<b>AGE CATEGORIES- District (2011)</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>Age Range (18-29) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	411340
<i>Total in Age Range (18-29)</i>	411340
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	34.40%
<b>Age Range (30-39) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	277330
<i>Total in Age Range (30-39)</i>	277330
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	23.19%
<b>Age Range (40-49) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	222389
<i>Total in Age Range (40-49)</i>	222389
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	18.60%
<b>Age Range (50+) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	284637
<i>Total in Age Range (50+)</i>	284637
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	23.81%
<b>Total for all Age Ranges (Tripura)</b>	<b>1195696</b>
<b>Age Range (18-29) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Kokrajhar	197170
Dhubri	421071
Goalpara	225931
Barpeta	362263
Nagaon	608326
Dibrugarh	311462
Sivasagar	260028
Jorhat	248866
Kamrup	348138
Kamrup Metropolitan	300805
<i>Total in Age Range (18-29)</i>	3284060
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	36.24%
<b>Age Range (30-39) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Kokrajhar	128475
Dhubri	255765
Goalpara	137224
Barpeta	233395
Nagaon	390531
Dibrugarh	210414
Sivasagar	184460
Jorhat	179506
Kamrup	233904
Kamrup Metropolitan	227409

**Table 3.6(a) (Continued)**

<i>Total in Age Range (30-39)</i>	2181083
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	24.07%
<b><i>Age Range (40-49) (breakdown per district)</i></b>	
Kokrajhar	96240
Dhubri	183610
Goalpara	102607
Barpeta	171651
Nagaon	287503
Dibrugarh	161450
Sivasagar	146487
Jorhat	136044
Kamrup	174328
Kamrup Metropolitan	174091
<i>Total in Age Range (40-49)</i>	1634011
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	18.03%
<b><i>Age Range (50+) (breakdown per district)</i></b>	
Kokrajhar	108956
Dhubri	221745
Goalpara	117427
Barpeta	215355
Nagaon	366112
Dibrugarh	186774
Sivasagar	171710
Jorhat	171062
Kamrup	212740
Kamrup Metropolitan	190908
<i>Total in Age Range (50+)</i>	1962789
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	21.66%
<b>Total for all Age Ranges (Assam)</b>	<b>9061943</b>
<b><i>Age Range (18-29) (breakdown per district)</i></b>	
Murshidabad	1603519
Nadia	1176994
North Twenty Four Parganas	2267741
Kolkata	967807
South Twenty Four Parganas	1933653
Purba Medinipur	1198461
<i>Total in Age Range (18-29)</i>	9148175
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	33.60%

**Table 3.6(a) (Continued)**

<b>Age Range (30-39) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Murshidabad	948306
Nadia	795692
North Twenty Four Parganas	1604438
Kolkata	765810
South Twenty Four Parganas	1217404
Purba Medinipur	776437
<i>Total in Age Range (30-39)</i>	6108087
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	22.43%
<b>Age Range (40-49) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Murshidabad	769288
Nadia	689294
North Twenty Four Parganas	1364558
Kolkata	667504
South Twenty Four Parganas	934070
Purba Medinipur	607805
<i>Total in Age Range (40-49)</i>	5032519
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	18.48%
<b>Age Range (50+) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Murshidabad	991413
Nadia	934417
North Twenty Four Parganas	1921143
Kolkata	1014769
South Twenty Four Parganas	1235558
Purba Medinipur	842025
<i>Total in Age Range (50+)</i>	6939325
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	25.49%
<b>Total for all Age Ranges (West Bengal)</b>	<b>27228106</b>

**Table 3.6(b): Total numbers and percentages per age category in all three states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

<b>AGE CATEGORIES- All States (2011)</b>	<b>(18-29)</b>	<b>(30-39)</b>	<b>(40-49)</b>	<b>(50+)</b>	<b>Total</b>
Tripura	411340	277330	222389	284637	1195696
Assam	3284060	2181083	1634011	1962789	9061943
West Bengal	9148175	6108087	5032519	6939325	27228106
<b>Total (All States)</b>	<b>12843575</b>	<b>8566500</b>	<b>6888919</b>	<b>9186751</b>	<b>37485745</b>
<b>Percentage (All States)</b>	<b>34.26%</b>	<b>22.85%</b>	<b>18.38%</b>	<b>24.51%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 3.7(a): Total numbers and percentages per educational category in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

<b>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL CATEGORIES- District (2011)</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>Educational Level Category (Below Secondary) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	939628
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Below Secondary)</i>	939628
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	72.73%
<b>Educational Level Category (Secondary) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	261421
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Secondary)</i>	261421
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	20.23%
<b>Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	77409
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree)</i>	77409
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	5.99%
<b>Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree) (breakdown per district)</b>	
West Tripura	9415
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree)</i>	9415
<i>Percentage of Tripura Total</i>	0.73%
<b>Total for all Educational Level Categories (Tripura)</b>	<b>1291934</b>
<b>Assam</b>	
<b>Educational Level Category (Below Secondary) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Kokrajhar	339509
Dhubri	703004
Goalpara	428683
Barpeta	642117
Nagaon	1304756
Dibrugarh	570291
Sivasagar	503296
Jorhat	461373
Kamrup	645233
Kamrup Metropolitan	451138
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Below Secondary)</i>	6049400
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	70.06%
<b>Educational Level Category (Secondary) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Kokrajhar	96734
Dhubri	143050
Goalpara	90199
Barpeta	177621
Nagaon	256736
Dibrugarh	214523
Sivasagar	220111
Jorhat	213538
Kamrup	249690
Kamrup Metropolitan	304492

**Table 3.7(a) (Continued)**

<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Secondary)</i>	1966694
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	22.78%
<b>Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Kokrajhar	14861
Dhubri	32376
Goalpara	16263
Barpeta	41446
Nagaon	61606
Dibrugarh	55213
Sivasagar	45429
Jorhat	56511
Kamrup	48002
Kamrup Metropolitan	174167
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree)</i>	545874
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	6.32%
<b>Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Kokrajhar	1184
Dhubri	1910
Goalpara	1129
Barpeta	2413
Nagaon	4162
Dibrugarh	5407
Sivasagar	2876
Jorhat	4955
Kamrup	2499
Kamrup Metropolitan	23815
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree)</i>	50350
<i>Percentage of Assam Total</i>	0.58%
<b>Total for all Educational Level Categories (Assam)</b>	<b>8634885</b>
<b>Educational Level Category (Below Secondary) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Murshidabad	3171796
Nadia	2578040
North Twenty Four Parganas	4782581
Kolkata	1609614
South Twenty Four Parganas	4171133
Purba Medinipur	3014809
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Below Secondary)</i>	19327973
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	71.04%

**Table 3.7(a) (Continued)**

<b>Educational Level Category (Secondary) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Murshidabad	594739
Nadia	595354
North Twenty Four Parganas	1586058
Kolkata	942378
South Twenty Four Parganas	819762
Purba Medinipur	636182
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Secondary)</i>	5174473
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	19.02%
<b>Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Murshidabad	147713
Nadia	194759
North Twenty Four Parganas	866297
Kolkata	741018
South Twenty Four Parganas	296450
Purba Medinipur	169933
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Bachelors Degree)</i>	2416170
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	8.88%
<b>Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree) (breakdown per district)</b>	
Murshidabad	9590
Nadia	11755
North Twenty Four Parganas	79066
Kolkata	77458
South Twenty Four Parganas	18776
Purba Medinipur	17691
<i>Total in Educational Level Category (Post-Graduate Degree)</i>	214336
<i>Percentage of West Bengal Total</i>	0.79%
<b>Total for all Educational Level Categories (West Bengal)</b>	<b>27206877</b>

**Table 3.7(b): Total numbers and percentages per educational category in all three states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

<b>EDUCATIONAL LEVEL CATEGORIES- All States (2011)</b>	<b>Below Secondary</b>	<b>Secondary</b>	<b>Bachelors</b>	<b>Post-Grad Degree</b>	<b>Total</b>
Tripura	939628	261421	77409	9415	1291934
Assam	6049400	1966694	545874	50350	8634885
West Bengal	19327973	5174473	2416170	214336	27206877
<b>Total (All States)</b>	<b>26317001</b>	<b>7402588</b>	<b>3039453</b>	<b>274101</b>	<b>37133696</b>
<b>Percentage (All States)</b>	<b>70.87%</b>	<b>19.93%</b>	<b>8.19%</b>	<b>0.74%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 3.8(a): Total numbers and percentages of the population engaged in agricultural profession in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

AGRICULTURAL PROFESSION-District (2011)	Total Workers	Agricultural Profession		
		Cultivators	Labourers	Total Engaged in Agriculture
West Tripura	698178	115175	156108	271283
<b>Total (Tripura)</b>	<b>698178</b>	<b>115175</b>	<b>156108</b>	<b>271283</b>
<b>Percentage (Tripura)</b>		<b>16.50%</b>	<b>22.36%</b>	<b>38.86%</b>
Barpeta	561824	205259	98946	304205
Dhubri	669819	205305	171116	376421
Dibrugarh	560557	135194	61209	196403
Goalpara	362573	126549	75828	202377
Jorhat	498618	145885	53153	199038
Kamrup	628954	185803	99522	285325
Kamrup Metropolitan	490932	25250	16995	42245
Kokrajhar	341131	156753	56330	213083
Nagaon	979998	346123	196174	542297
Sivasagar	485717	138100	48468	186568
<b>Total (Assam)</b>	<b>5580123</b>	<b>1670221</b>	<b>877741</b>	<b>2547962</b>
<b>Percentage (Assam)</b>		<b>29.93%</b>	<b>15.73%</b>	<b>45.66%</b>
Murshidabad	2589907	381076	842294	1223370
Nadia	1842607	308742	556134	864876
Kolkata	1795740	16039	12388	28427
North Twenty Four Parganas	3571624	288058	599039	887097
South Twenty Four Parganas	2964494	355350	806562	1161912
Purba Medinipur	1910320	345215	702304	1047519
<b>Total (West Bengal)</b>	<b>14674692</b>	<b>1694480</b>	<b>3518721</b>	<b>5213201</b>
<b>Percentage (West Bengal)</b>		<b>11.55%</b>	<b>23.98%</b>	<b>35.53%</b>

**Table 3.8(b): Total numbers and percentages of the population engaged in agricultural profession in all three states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**

AGRICULTURAL PROFESSION-All States (2011)	Cultivators	Labourers	Total engaged in Agriculture	Total Workers
Tripura	115175	156108	271283	698178
Assam	1670221	877741	2547962	5580123
West Bengal	1694480	3518721	5213201	14674692
<b>Total (All States)</b>	<b>3479876</b>	<b>4552570</b>	<b>8032446</b>	<b>20952993</b>
<b>Percentage (All States)</b>	<b>16.61%</b>	<b>21.73%</b>	<b>38.34%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 3.9(a): Total numbers and percentages of the population engaged in non-agricultural in each state according to the Indian National Census (2011)**


NON-AGRICULTURAL PROFESSION- District (2011)	Total Workers	Non-Agricultural Profession		
		Household Industry	Other Workers	Total engaged in Non-Agricultural Profession
West Tripura	698178	25163	401732	426895
<b>Total (Tripura)</b>	<b>698178</b>	<b>25163</b>	<b>401732</b>	<b>426895</b>
<b>Percentage (Tripura)</b>		<b>3.60%</b>	<b>57.54%</b>	<b>61.14%</b>
Barpeta	561824	30342	227277	257619
Dhubri	669819	27822	265576	293398
Dibrugarh	560557	14362	349792	364154
Goalpara	362573	14346	145850	160196
Jorhat	498618	31543	268037	299580
Kamrup	628954	69106	274523	343629
Kamrup Metropolitan	490932	12463	436224	448687
Kokrajhar	341131	12423	115625	128048
Nagaon	979998	38122	399579	437701
Sivasagar	485717	14532	284617	299149
<b>Total (Assam)</b>	<b>5580123</b>	<b>265061</b>	<b>2767100</b>	<b>3032161</b>
<b>Percentage (Assam)</b>		<b>4.75%</b>	<b>49.59%</b>	<b>54.34%</b>
Murshidabad	2589907	466007	900530	1366537
Nadia	1842607	308742	556134	864876
Kolkata	1795740	68438	1698875	1767313
North Twenty Four Parganas	3571624	155762	2528765	2684527
South Twenty Four Parganas	2964494	240976	1561606	1802582
Purba Medinipur	1910320	118816	743985	862801
<b>Total (West Bengal)</b>	<b>14674692</b>	<b>1358741</b>	<b>7989895</b>	<b>9348636</b>
<b>Percentage (West Bengal)</b>		<b>9.26%</b>	<b>54.45%</b>	<b>63.71%</b>

**Table 3.9(b): Total numbers and percentages of the population engaged in non-agricultural in all three states according to the Indian National Census (2011)**


NON-AGRICULTURAL PROFESSION- All States (2011)	Household Industry	Other Workers	Total engaged in Non-Agricultural Profession	Total Workers
Tripura	25163	401732	426895	698178
Assam	265061	2767100	3032161	5580123
West Bengal	1358741	7989895	9348636	14674692
<b>Total (All States)</b>	<b>1648965</b>	<b>11158727</b>	<b>12807692</b>	<b>20952993</b>
<b>Percentage (All States)</b>	<b>7.87%</b>	<b>53.26%</b>	<b>61.13%</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Appendix 4:  
Residual Plots for  
the OLS Regression Models**


**Fig. 4.1: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of being Muslim on Bonding Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.2: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of Household Income on Bonding Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.3: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of being engaged in Agricultural Profession on Bonding Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.4: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of living in a Rural Location on Bonding Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.5: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of the Support for Cross-border Movement on Bonding Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.6: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of being a native Bengali-speaker on Bridging Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.7: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of Age on Bridging Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.8: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of being Female on Bridging Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.9: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of Education on Bridging Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.10: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of being engaged in Non-Agricultural Profession on Bridging Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.11: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of Marital Status on Bridging Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.12: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of living in an Urban Location on Bridging Social Capital**




**Fig. 4.13: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of the Perception of Governance Institutions on Bridging Social Capital**



**Fig. 4.14: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of the Perception of Socio-economic Environment on Bridging Social Capital**



**Fig. 4.15: Residual Plots for OLS Regression Models showing the impact of Political Proximity on Bridging Social Capital**



**Appendix 5:  
Summary Statistics of  
the Independent Variables**

**Table 5.1(a): Summary statistics of the Survey Respondents' Personal Characteristics for the pooled-dataset**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Total</b>	355	100%	0.41
	<b>Female</b>	76	21%	
	<b>Male</b>	279	79%	
<b>Language</b>	<b>Total</b>	355	100%	0.35
	<b>Bengali-speaking</b>	304	86%	
	<b>Other Language</b>	51	14%	
<b>Religion</b>	<b>Total</b>	351	100%	0.48
	<b>Muslim</b>	228	65%	
	<b>Hindu</b>	123	35%	
<b>Profession</b>	<b>Total</b>	348	100%	
	<b>Agricultural Profession</b>	42	12%	0.33
	<b>Non-Agricultural Profession (Service/Trading/ Manufacturing/ Other)</b>	245	70%	0.46
	<b>Unemployed</b>	61	18%	0.38
<b>Age</b>	<b>Total</b>	350	100%	
	<b>Age (18-29)</b>	146	42%	0.49
	<b>Age (30-39)</b>	99	28%	0.45
	<b>Age (40-49)</b>	63	18%	0.38
	<b>Age (50+)</b>	42	12%	0.33
<b>Educational Level</b>	<b>Total</b>	336	100%	
	<b>Primary</b>	50	15%	0.36
	<b>Secondary</b>	82	24%	0.43
	<b>Higher Secondary</b>	80	24%	0.43
	<b>Bachelors Degree</b>	87	26%	0.44
	<b>Masters Degree and Above</b>	37	11%	0.31
<b>Household Income Range</b>	<b>Total</b>	340	100%	
	<b>Below Rupees 5,000</b>	66	19%	0.40
	<b>Rupees 5,000-10,000</b>	115	34%	0.47
	<b>Rupees 10,000-20,000</b>	99	29%	0.45
	<b>Rupees 20,000+</b>	60	18%	0.38

**Table 5.1(a) (Continued)**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Total</b>	351	100%	
	<b>Unmarried</b>	132	38%	0.49
	<b>Married (no intermarriage)</b>	189	54%	0.50
	<b>Married (linguistic intermarriage)</b>	9	3%	0.16
	<b>Married (religious intermarriage)</b>	8	2%	0.15
	<b>Married (Both linguistic and religious intermarriage)</b>	13	4%	0.19

**Table 5.1(b): Summary statistics of the Survey Respondents' Personal Characteristics for Tripura**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Total</b>	110	100%	0.44
	<b>Female</b>	28	25%	
	<b>Male</b>	82	75%	
<b>Language</b>	<b>Total</b>	110	100%	0.13
	<b>Bengali-speaking</b>	108	98%	
	<b>Other Language</b>	2	2%	
<b>Religion</b>	<b>Total</b>	108	100%	0.50
	<b>Muslim</b>	46	43%	
	<b>Hindu</b>	62	57%	
<b>Profession</b>	<b>Total</b>	105	100%	
	<b>Agricultural Profession</b>	16	15%	0.36
	<b>Non-Agricultural Profession (Service/Trading/ Manufacturing/ Other)</b>	60	57%	0.50
	<b>Unemployed</b>	29	28%	0.45
<b>Age</b>	<b>Total</b>	108	100%	
	<b>Age (18-29)</b>	34	32%	0.47
	<b>Age (30-39)</b>	35	32%	0.47
	<b>Age (40-49)</b>	25	23%	0.42
	<b>Age (50+)</b>	14	13%	0.34

**Table 5.1(b) (Continued)**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Educational Level</b>	<b>Total</b>	106	100%	
	<b>Primary</b>	19	18%	0.39
	<b>Secondary</b>	24	23%	0.42
	<b>Higher Secondary</b>	20	19%	0.39
	<b>Bachelors Degree</b>	25	24%	0.43
	<b>Masters Degree and Above</b>	18	17%	0.38
<b>Household Income Range</b>	<b>Total</b>	99	100%	
	<b>Below Rupees 5,000</b>	26	26%	0.44
	<b>Rupees 5,000-10,000</b>	33	33%	0.47
	<b>Rupees 10,000-20,000</b>	30	30%	0.46
	<b>Rupees 20,000+</b>	10	10%	0.30
<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Total</b>	108		
	<b>Unmarried</b>	31	29%	0.45
	<b>Married (no intermarriage)</b>	73	68%	0.47
	<b>Married (linguistic intermarriage)</b>	4	4%	0.19
	<b>Married (religious intermarriage)</b>	0	0%	0.00
	<b>Married (Both linguistic and religious intermarriage)</b>	0	0%	0.00

**Table 5.1(c): Summary statistics of the Survey Respondents' Personal Characteristics for Assam**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Total</b>	104	100%	0.32
	<b>Female</b>	12	12%	
	<b>Male</b>	92	88%	
<b>Language</b>	<b>Total</b>	104	100%	0.46
	<b>Bengali-speaking</b>	74	71%	
	<b>Other Language</b>	30	29%	
<b>Religion</b>	<b>Total</b>	103	100%	0.46
	<b>Muslim</b>	72	70%	
	<b>Hindu</b>	31	30%	

**Table 5.1(c) (Continued)**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Profession</b>	<b>Total</b>	103	100%	
	<b>Agricultural Profession</b>	4	4%	0.19
	<b>Non-Agricultural Profession (Service/Trading/ Manufacturing/ Other)</b>	87	84%	0.36
	<b>Unemployed</b>	12	12%	0.32
<b>Age</b>	<b>Total</b>	103	100%	
	<b>Age (18-29)</b>	64	62%	0.49
	<b>Age (30-39)</b>	21	20%	0.40
	<b>Age (40-49)</b>	10	10%	0.30
	<b>Age (50+)</b>	8	8%	0.27
<b>Educational Level</b>	<b>Total</b>	91	100%	
	<b>Primary</b>	20	22%	0.42
	<b>Secondary</b>	35	39%	0.49
	<b>Higher Secondary</b>	21	23%	0.42
	<b>Bachelors Degree</b>	11	12%	0.33
	<b>Masters Degree and Above</b>	4	4%	0.21
<b>Household Income Range</b>	<b>Total</b>	103	100%	
	<b>Below Rupees 5,000</b>	10	10%	0.30
	<b>Rupees 5,000-10,000</b>	48	47%	0.50
	<b>Rupees 10,000-20,000</b>	24	23%	0.42
	<b>Rupees 20,000+</b>	21	20%	0.40
<b>Marital Status</b>	<b>Total</b>	103	100%	
	<b>Unmarried</b>	53	51%	0.50
	<b>Married (no intermarriage)</b>	42	41%	0.49
	<b>Married (linguistic intermarriage)</b>	4	4%	0.19
	<b>Married (religious intermarriage)</b>	0	0%	0.00
	<b>Married (Both linguistic and religious intermarriage)</b>	4	4%	0.19

**Table 5.1(d): Summary statistics of the Survey Respondents' Personal Characteristics for West Bengal**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>Total</b>	141	100%	0.44
	<b>Female</b>	36	26%	
	<b>Male</b>	105	74%	
<b>Language</b>				
<b>Language</b>	<b>Total</b>	141	100%	0.34
	<b>Bengali-speaking</b>	122	87%	
	<b>Other Language</b>	19	13%	
<b>Religion</b>				
<b>Religion</b>	<b>Total</b>	140	100%	0.41
	<b>Muslim</b>	110	79%	
	<b>Hindu</b>	30	21%	
<b>Profession</b>				
<b>Profession</b>	<b>Total</b>	140	100%	
	<b>Agricultural Profession</b>	22	16%	0.37
	<b>Non-Agricultural Profession (Service/Trading/ Manufacturing/ Other)</b>	98	70%	0.46
	<b>Unemployed</b>	20	14%	0.35
<b>Age</b>				
<b>Age</b>	<b>Total</b>	139	100%	
	<b>Age (18-29)</b>	48	35%	0.48
	<b>Age (30-39)</b>	43	31%	0.46
	<b>Age (40-49)</b>	28	20%	0.40
	<b>Age (50+)</b>	20	14%	0.35
<b>Educational Level</b>				
<b>Educational Level</b>	<b>Total</b>	139	100%	
	<b>Primary</b>	11	8%	0.27
	<b>Secondary</b>	23	17%	0.37
	<b>Higher Secondary</b>	39	28%	0.45
	<b>Bachelors Degree</b>	51	37%	0.48
	<b>Masters Degree and Above</b>	15	11%	0.31
<b>Household Income Range</b>				
<b>Household Income Range</b>	<b>Total</b>	138	100%	
	<b>Below Rupees 5,000</b>	30	22%	0.41
	<b>Rupees 5,000-10,000</b>	34	25%	0.43
	<b>Rupees 10,000-20,000</b>	45	33%	0.47
	<b>Rupees 20,000+</b>	29	21%	0.41

**Table 5.1(d) (Continued)**

Variable	Categories	Observation	Percentage	Standard Deviation
Marital Status	Total	140	100%	
	Unmarried	48	34%	0.48
	Married (no intermarriage)	74	53%	0.50
	Married (linguistic intermarriage)	1	0%	0.08
	Married (religious intermarriage)	8	6%	0.23
	Married (Both linguistic and religious intermarriage)	9	6%	0.25

**Table 5.2.1(a): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the categorical variables on Location-Specific Factor (pooled-dataset)**

Variable	Categories	Observation	Percentage	Standard Deviation
Urban-Rural	Total	351	100%	0.46
	Urban	105	30%	
	Rural	246	70%	

**Table 5.2.1(b): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the categorical variables on Location-Specific Factor (Tripura)**

Variable	Categories	Observation	Percentage	Standard Deviation
Urban-Rural	Total	108	100%	0.49
	Urban	43	40%	
	Rural	65	60%	

**Table 5.2.1(c): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the categorical variables on Location-Specific Factor (Assam)**

Variable	Categories	Observation	Percentage	Standard Deviation
Urban-Rural	Total	103	100%	0.36
	Urban	87	16%	
	Rural	16	84%	

**Table 5.2.1(d): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the categorical variables on Location-Specific Factor (West Bengal)**

Variable	Categories	Observation	Percentage	Standard Deviation
Urban-Rural	Total	140	100%	0.47
	Urban	46	33%	
	Rural	94	67%	

**Table 5.2.2(a): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the continuous variables on Location-Specific Factor (pooled-dataset)**

Variable	Observation	Standard Deviation	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
<b>Cross-border Movement</b>	316	0.79	0.62	-1.17	1.15
<b>Governance Institutions</b>	319	0.90	0.81	-1.32	1.24
<b>Socio-Economic Environment</b>	312	0.70	0.49	-0.70	1.09
<b>Political Proximity</b>	339	0.85	0.72	-0.62	1.67

**Table 5.2.2(b): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the continuous variables on Location-Specific Factor (Tripura)**

Variable	Observation	Standard Deviation	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
<b>Cross-border Movement</b>	89	0.80	0.65	-1.30	1.04
<b>Governance Institutions</b>	84	0.84	0.71	-1.57	0.89
<b>Socio-Economic Environment</b>	106	0.72	0.52	-0.85	0.92
<b>Political Proximity</b>	95	0.65	0.42	-0.52	1.33

**Table 5.2.2(c): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the continuous variables on Location-Specific Factor (Assam)**

Variable	Observation	Standard Deviation	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
<b>Cross-border Movement</b>	99	0.94	0.89	-1.23	1.00
<b>Governance Institutions</b>	99	0.92	0.85	-1.67	1.08
<b>Socio-Economic Environment</b>	72	0.91	0.83	-0.71	1.58
<b>Political Proximity</b>	104	0.66	0.44	-0.31	2.95

**Table 5.2.2(d): Summary statistics of the survey responses for the continuous variables on Location-Specific Factor (West Bengal)**

Variable	Observation	Standard Deviation	Variance	Minimum	Maximum
<b>Cross-border Movement</b>	128	0.89	0.80	-1.12	0.95
<b>Governance Institutions</b>	136	0.90	0.81	-1.01	1.71
<b>Socio-Economic Environment</b>	134	0.74	0.55	-0.68	1.38
<b>Political Proximity</b>	140	0.94	0.88	-0.86	1.18

**Appendix 6:  
Summary Statistics of  
the Control Variables**

**Table 6.1: Summary statistics of the Control Variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Categories</b>	<b>Observation</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>
<b>Practising</b>	Total	353	100%	0.48
	Disciplined in religious practice	221	63%	
	Not Disciplined in religious practice	132	37%	
<b>Household Size</b>	Total	353	100%	
	Members (1-2 people)	13	4%	0.19
	Members (3-5 people)	211	60%	0.49
	Members (6-8 people)	101	29%	0.45
	Members (8+ people)	28	8%	0.27
<b>Mobility</b>	Total	352	100%	
	0-1 time yearly	36	10%	0.30
	2-5 times yearly	55	16%	0.36
	6-10 times yearly	36	10%	0.30
	Monthly	69	20%	0.40
	Weekly	62	18%	0.38
	Daily	94	27%	0.44
<b>Student Diversity</b>	Total	344	100%	
	Not Diverse	38	11%	0.31
	Moderately Diverse (Either Linguistic or Religious Mix)	140	41%	0.49
	Very Diverse (Both Linguistic and Religious Mix)	166	48%	0.50
<b>Ostracised</b>	Total	349	100%	
	No contact with parents	6	2%	0.13
	Contact with one's own or spouse's parents	10	3%	0.17
	Contact with one's own and spouse's parents	333	95%	0.21

**Table 6.1 (Continued)**

<b>Involved in Trade with Bangladesh</b>	Total	352	100%	0.35
	Yes	49	86%	
	No	303	14%	
<b>Members in Local Government</b>				
<b>Members in Local Government</b>	Total	341	100%	0.49
	Yes	129	38%	
	No	212	62%	
<b>Members in State Government</b>				
<b>Members in State Government</b>	Total	340	100%	0.46
	Yes	103	30%	
	No	237	70%	
<b>Members in Central Government</b>				
<b>Members in Central Government</b>	Total	341	100%	0.39
	Yes	64	19%	
	No	277	81%	

**Appendix 7:  
Standard Deviation of the Dependent Variable  
for each sample used in  
the OLS Regression Models**

**Table 7.1 Standard Deviation of the dependent variable of each sample used in the OLS Regression Models**

<b>Model</b>	<b>All States</b>	<b>Tripura</b>	<b>Assam</b>	<b>West Bengal</b>
Muslim	0.690	0.740	0.638	0.517
Household Income	0.688	0.728	0.639	0.518
Agricultural Prof.	0.689	0.727	0.638	0.518
Rural	0.688	0.728	0.639	0.518
Cross-Border Mov.	0.695	0.767	0.644	0.517
Bengali	0.705	0.679	0.475	0.791
Age	0.700	0.675	0.455	0.800
Female	0.693	0.677	0.457	0.787
Education	0.707	0.683	0.476	0.791
Non-Agricultural Prof.	0.705	0.679	0.475	0.791
Intermarriage	0.699	0.674	0.461	0.790
Urban	0.707	0.679	0.475	0.797
Percep. Gov. Inst.	0.707	0.698	0.449	0.790
Percep.Socio-econ Env.	0.700	0.680	0.400	0.740
Political Proximity	0.697	0.682	0.449	0.788

**Appendix 8:**  
**Tables showing Regression Output**  
**of the Non-significant Models**

**Table 8.1: Impact of Age on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

<b>Controls</b>				
Mobility		X	X	X
Practising			X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
				FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>				
Age (30-39)	-0.082 (0.099)	-0.045 (0.096)	-0.049 (0.096)	-0.091 (0.098)
Age (40-49)	0.124 (0.114)	0.115 (0.114)	0.147 (0.111)	0.064 (0.113)
Age (50+)	0.012 (0.132)	0.025 (0.132)	0.043 (0.127)	-0.055 (0.136)
N	298	298	298	298
R-squared	0.010	0.091	0.095	0.113
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>				
Age (30-39)	-0.268 (0.179)	-0.162 (0.172)	-0.163 (0.173)	- -
Age (40-49)	0.110 (0.196)	0.277 (0.190)	0.281 (0.192)	- -
Age (50+)	0.216 (0.235)	0.267 (0.273)	0.257 (0.277)	- -
N	85	85	85	-
R-squared	0.066	0.237	0.238	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>				
Age (30-39)	-0.142 (0.123)	-0.128 (0.126)	-0.129 (0.128)	- -
Age (40-49)	-0.213 (0.184)	-0.190 (0.189)	-0.189 (0.192)	- -
Age (50+)	-0.090 (0.174)	-0.072 (0.180)	-0.074 (0.183)	- -
N	85	85	85	-
R-squared	0.028	0.063	0.063	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>				
Age (30-39)	-0.024 (0.177)	0.026 (0.178)	0.029 (0.179)	- -
Age (40-49)	0.106 (0.196)	0.088 (0.198)	0.099 (0.200)	- -
Age (50+)	-0.124 (0.230)	-0.106 (0.229)	-0.101 (0.230)	- -
N	128	128	128	-
R-squared	0.007	0.057	0.059	-

Note: Baseline: Age (18-29); Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.700 (All States), 0.675 (Tripura), 0.455 (Assam), 0.800 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

**Table 8.2: Impact of Non-Agricultural Profession on the formation of Bridging Social Capital**

Urban Education		X	X	X
			X	X
<b>Model</b>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) FE
<b>Panel A: All States</b>				
Non-Agricultural Profession	0.104 (0.090)	0.073 (0.091)	0.071 (0.094)	0.119 (0.092)
N	290	290	290	290
R-squared	0.005	0.021	0.027	0.064
<b>Panel B: Tripura</b>				
Non-Agricultural Profession	-0.063 (0.150)	0.039 (0.159)	0.024 (0.169)	- -
N	84	84	84	-
R-squared	0.002	0.039	0.087	-
<b>Panel C: Assam</b>				
Non-Agricultural Profession	0.093 (0.156)	0.134 (0.159)	0.188 (0.160)	- -
N	74	74	74	-
R-squared	0.005	0.025	0.147	-
<b>Panel D: West Bengal</b>				
Non-Agricultural Profession	0.266* (0.149)	0.225 (0.141)	0.234 (0.148)	- -
N	132	132	132	-
R-squared	0.024	0.133	0.140	-

Note: Baseline: Agricultural Profession; Standard Deviation of the Bridging Social Capital Scores: 0.705 (All States), 0.679 (Tripura), 0.475 (Assam), 0.791 (West Bengal); “FE” denotes the Fixed Effects model; Standard errors are in parentheses; p-values: \*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01; “X” in the row presenting the control variables demarcates which particular model includes that control

**Appendix 9:  
Interview Questionnaire  
for the Political Actors**

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## Interview Questionnaire for Political Actors

### *Common Questions:*

1. As you know, there are ongoing efforts to increase connectivity between Bangladesh and the states of India that border it. Due to the development of connectivity between Bangladesh and Assam/ Tripura/ West Bengal, how much increase in trade do you foresee?
2. Do you think that the present form of trade interaction is a win-win situation for both the sides? Why so?
3. Would the situation change with increase in connectivity and help in Assam/ Tripura/ West Bengal's economic prosperity?
4. There are reports of the presence of an informal trade sector between Bangladesh and Assam/ Tripura/ West Bengal. Do you think that future connectivity would benefit both the formal and informal trade sectors, compared to now? And why do you think so?
5. Do you think that the approach of the current government in Bangladesh is towards the enhancement of friendship?
6. Overall, do you think that the relationship between Bangladesh and Assam/ Tripura/ West Bengal has enhanced many folds since 1971?
7. When did you face difficulties in building good relations? And at the moment, do you believe that there any hindrances in building good relations and can you tell us ways in which they can be overcome?
8. In Indian social debates, there is the issue of migration from Bangladesh, which appears to be changing the demography in your state. Any comments on that topic?
9. Now let us think at the national level. In both India and Bangladesh, when the political scenario changes, does that affect the people-to people relation between the two countries?
10. In your view, since 1971, how vital a role has India as a friendly-nation played in the gradual development of Bangladesh?

*Specifically for Assam:*

- 1) As you know, the newly inaugurated bus service that connects Dhaka with Guwahati, via Shillong, is being seen as a positive chapter by political analysts. Any remarks on that?
- 2) Do you think any ups and downs in Bangladesh have had any reflections in your State? Can you give me some examples? In addition to strikes & agitations in Bangladesh, a few months back there was the killing of a Japanese agricultural scientist in neighbouring Rangpur which appeared in the Assam Press...
- 3) Let us discuss about the Partition of 1947, because at one time both Assam and Bangladesh used to be part of the same political entity. As you know, a portion of present-day Bangladesh was a part of undivided Assam. What effects has the Partition had on families that were divided?
- 4) Since Assamese and Bengali languages have shared linguistic roots, I shall ask some questions specifically about this aspect. Apart from Assam-Bangladesh collaborations in the area of energy, are there future plans to promote collaborative research in the fields of culture and wider history of this region?
- 5) It is evident that several Bengali-speaking people are living in Assam. How do they show their solidarity with the native people of Assam?
- 6) In your judgement, what are the factors that hinder the friendship between the Assamese speaking community and the Bengali speaking community?
- 7) For the future of Assam's economy, how can the state efficiently use its marginal blue-collar labour force for its development?
- 8) Besides Assamese and Bengali speakers, Assam has linguistic communities such as the Bodos and many others. Do you think that there is harmonious coexistence at the moment?

*Specifically for Tripura:*

- 1) Do you think any ups and downs in Bangladesh have had any reflections in your State? Can you give me some examples? Such as when Bangladesh has a non-civilian martial law caretaker government or when there are a series of political strikes in that country.
- 2) Now let us discuss about the Partition of 1947 because at one time both Tripura and Bangladesh used to be part of the same political entity. What effects has the Partition had on families which were divided?

- 3) Now, since this is a Bengali speaking region, I shall ask some questions specifically about this aspect. In your view, how influential are Bengali-speaking people in the State of Tripura?
- 4) In your judgement, what are the factors that play a binding role among the Bengali-speaking people of Tripura? For example, there are great philosophies of writers such as the Bengali Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore.
- 5) What are the factors that harm the harmony that is present among the Bengali-speaking people of Tripura? Well, for example I have not heard of any religious communal disturbances here...
- 6) Besides Bengali-speaking people, Tripura has aboriginals. Do you think that there is harmonious coexistence?

*Specifically for West Bengal:*

- 1) Do you think any ups and downs in Bangladesh have had any reflections in your State? Can you give me some examples? Such as when Bangladesh has a non-civilian martial law caretaker government or when there are a series of political strikes in that country.
- 2) Now let us discuss about the Partition of 1947 because at one time both West Bengal and Bangladesh used to be part of the same political entity. What effects has the Partition had on families which were divided?
- 3) Now, since this is a Bengali speaking region, I shall ask some questions specifically about this aspect. In your view, how influential are Bengali-speaking people in the State of West Bengal?
- 4) In your judgement, what are the factors that play a binding role among the Bengali-speaking people of West Bengal? For example, there are great philosophies of writers such as the Bengali Nobel Laureate Rabindranath Tagore.
- 5) What are the factors that harm the harmony that is present among the Bengali-speaking people of West Bengal? Well, for example there are reports of religious communal disturbances within this State...
- 6) Besides Bengali-speakers, West Bengal is the home of several people whose mother-tongue is not Bengali. Do you think that there is harmonious coexistence?

**Appendix 10:**  
**Code-list for Categories/Factors**

**Table 10.1(a): Code-list for the category/factor of “Religion”**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Reason for the code</b>
Assamese-Bengali conflict	Religious conflict in Assam is also linked to language as the Muslim migrants from Bengal are not native speakers of Assamese and are deemed to be non-native.
Assamese xenophobia	Assamese nationalists view both Bengali-speaking Hindus and Bengali-speaking Muslims as threats to the cultural identity of their state, and this gives the religious conflict in the state a linguistic dimension as well.
Bangladesh communalism	Attacks on Hindu minorities in neighboring Bangladesh maybe causing religious tensions in neighboring states of India.
Bengali hegemony	Native Bengali-speakers in Tripura may have sidelined the religious conflict due to their sense of cultural superiority from the tribals, making the conflict in the state more linguistic/tribal.
Bengali-tribal conflict	Maybe religious identity gets sidetracked when the conflict in a region such as Tripura becomes more about tribal or linguistic identity.
Demography	Demographic change with Muslims becoming a higher percentage of the population has resulted in Hindu nationalists provoking further fear among Muslims.
Discrimination	One maybe discriminated due to his/her religious identity and that aggravates religious tensions.
Hindu nationalism	The growth of Hindu nationalism may itself have strengthened religious identity.
Hindu-Muslim conflict	The conflict between these two communities can be traced back to colonial times and plays out specifically in this region which was partitioned on a religious basis.
Islamist viewpoint	Islamists would provide another angle to the religious conflict by stating how Muslim orthodox communities are singled out for discrimination.

**Table 10.1(b): Code-list for the category/factor of “Cross-Border Movement”**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Reason for the code</b>
Assamese xenophobia	Cross-border movement of both people and goods should raise fear of undocumented migration.
Demography	Demographic change is related to migration or the cross-border movement of people in undocumented form.
Hindu nationalism	Hindu nationalists see migration or the cross-border movement of people in the undocumented form as a threat.
Migration	One aspect of cross-border movement is the cross-border movement of people in the undocumented form.
Tourism-cultural exchange	One aspect of cross-border movement is the cross-border movement of people in the documented form.
Trade	One aspect for cross-border movement is the cross-border movement of goods both in the legal and illegal forms.

## **Appendix 11: Quotes from Interviews**

**Table 11.1(a): Quotes from Interviews**

Factor (Category)	Codes	Quotes of Original Text
<b>I. Religion</b>	Demography/ Assamese xenophobia	1. <i>“Now, the Bengali Muslims who came here as cultivators—they simply grabbed land... There used to be much forest and grazing land here, tribal belts which they grabbed...” (ULFA-A)</i>
	Demography/ Assamese xenophobia	2. <i>“Another complexity is that in many places where the Bengali Muslims settled, they opened Assamese-medium schools, even in the char areas, and are learning Assamese. So now the question is “who is an Assamese?” Even more interestingly, they don’t speak Assamese at home as their mother tongue, but in the official census, they report their native language as Assamese. During the language agitation, the Bengali Muslims supported Assamese, unlike the Bengali Hindus of Cachar who opposed it... Bengali Hindus don’t learn Assamese, unlike Bengali Muslims...So for us indigenous Assamese, it is very difficult for us to say who is an Assamese...” (ULFA-A)</i>
	Demography/ Hindu nationalism/ Hindu-Muslim conflict	3. <i>“If the demography changes at the rate at which it is changing, in the next ten years, Muslims will demand Assam as a Muslim state. It is because Hindu families are giving birth to 1 or 2 children, and according to Hindu law over here only one marriage is allowed. In Muslim communities, they can marry 9-10—as much as they want. So their birth rate is also much more than the Hindu community. Thus, if the Indian Government doesn’t take any serious steps, this will change the full demography of the state.” (AGP-A)</i>
	Demography/ Assamese- Bengali conflict/ Assamese xenophobia	4. <i>“So if the whole Bengali Hindu community from Bangladesh are allowed to stay in Assam, definitely that will also affect the heritage of the Assamese people. For example, in Tripura, there is the Tripuri community, who have become a minority in their own land. In Assam as well, in the Barak Valley, there are 90% Bengalis.” (AGP-A)</i>
	Hindu nationalism/ Hindu-Muslim conflict/ Bangladesh communalism	5. <i>“Any political unrest in Bangladesh doesn’t have an effect in Assam. Except when it turns a little bit against the Hindus who are living there—so obviously some organizations in India do take up their causes. There is also a movement of non-Muslims from Bangladesh to here. Other than that there is no effect on the northeastern states.” (BJP-A)</i>

(Continued)

Factor (Category)	Codes	Quotes of Original Text
<b>I. Religion</b>	Assamese-Bengali conflict/ Hindu-Muslim conflict	6. <i>“...religious communal feelings are the main reasons which fuel the conflict between the two communities, as most Muslims in Assam are native Bengali speakers and are of East Bengal-Bangladesh descent. Other than that, the core Assamese nationalists are concerned with the Assamese identity issue, and have an inbuilt xenophobia about Bengalis in all aspects.”</i> (SP-A)
	Demography/ Assamese-Bengali conflict	7. <i>“Native Assamese linked the rising population of Bengalis as a demographic threat, thinking that they would become a minority in their own land. Traditionally, the Assamese are lazy and comfort-loving people, and Bengalis are appreciated for their hard work and labour, so Bengalis are preferred in employment.”</i> (SP-A)
	Discrimination	8. <i>“...in government jobs, native “Assamese” are preferred, although Bengalis are 27% in this state. If you go to the secretariat, out of the 6000 people who are working, only 60 people are from the Muslim community. Among these Muslims, these are upper Assam indigenous Muslims, not those whose roots are in Bengal.</i> (AIUDF-A)
	Islamist viewpoint/ Hindu-Muslim conflict	9. <i>“Especially, the ruling party is on the side of the minorities. You see one section of the minorities here face suppression and do not have much choice.”</i> (JIH-WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict	10. <i>“The people of Bengal do not want to fight on communal lines, but a section of politicians and fanatics or fundamentalists—they are out there to fan such issues. Even the Central governments and State government for their own political benefits are eager to divide this population and bring about communal polarization.”</i> (CPIM- WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict	11. <i>“So what I am saying, that a series of events that have happened in this part of Bengal, which was sought to trigger large-scale communal riots, those haven’t happened, simply because the people don’t really want that.”</i> (CPIM- WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict	12. <i>“However, what has happened, in this country over the last two years, do impact here. Such as the ghar wapasi or beef-banning issue, and then the Malda event, which you mentioned.”</i> (CPIM- WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict/ Bangladesh communalism	13. <i>“You see, a proper coexistence of both the Bengali-speaking people of both the countries will not be possible, until and unless you stop teaching young-minds—young students in your country, especially in religious schools—in madrassas, that the kafir identifies with Hindus.”</i> (BJP-WB)

(Continued)

Factor (Category)	Codes	Quotes of Original Text
<b>I. Religion</b>	Hindu-Muslim conflict/ Bangladesh communalism	14. <i>“But after that, there were elements that controlled the administration there, which didn’t go by those guidelines and they fostered some fanatic and religious elements—and the bottom line was anti-India and anti-Hindu feelings.”</i> (BJP-WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict/ Bangladesh communalism	15. <i>“Especially some communal feelings. We don’t want any communal feelings in this part of the country. In the Bengal region, people are very sensitive and progressive. If any situation takes place in Bangladesh, pertaining to the minorities, it immediately affects Kolkata and West Bengal.”</i> (INC-WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict/ Bangladesh communalism	16. <i>“Although there are both Hindu and Muslim Fundamentalists here, there is a counter criticism and democratic forces against that. In Bangladesh, there are also counter-forces. I don’t know how strong those are, but I feel those are suppressed.”</i> (TMC-WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict/ Hindu nationalism	17. <i>“Then you shall look through a religion prism. You will see Bangladesh as a Muslim country and India as a Hindu country. However, if all is secular, you will look at it through the lens of national interest or regional interest. Religion itself isn’t a destroying force but utilizing it for political needs is, of course, a destructive force.”</i> (CPIM- WB)
	Islamist viewpoint/ Hindu-Muslim conflict/ Bangladesh communalism	18. <i>“The current government in Bangladesh is not working in a cooperative manner, and in fact, it is hampering religious harmony in West Bengal as well. It is because there are many so-called leftist secular people in Bangladesh. Those people come here and give speeches, and it affects harmony here. It creates pressure on the Muslim community. People such as Shahriar Kabir come here and give speeches on so-called human rights abuses inflicted on the religious minorities over there. We know that there are no religious communal issues in Bangladesh but such people giving speeches flame religious tensions here. Now people want to keep a distance from us minorities over here. Those leftist secular people coming here, and giving speeches about the so-called persecution of religious minorities in Bangladesh, start problems here.”</i> (JIH-WB)
	Hindu-Muslim conflict	19. <i>“No, within the state of Tripura, we have no such issues within the Bengali-speaking community.... Other than that, the kind of Hindu-Muslim-Christian religious intolerance situation or the beef controversy that is now present in the country (India), does not really affect us over here.”</i> (CPIM-T)

(Continued)

Factor (Category)	Codes	Quotes of Original Text
<b>I. Religion</b>	Hindu-Muslim conflict	20. <i>“All Bengali speaking people celebrate festivals together over here in Tripura. For example, during Durga Puja, Muslims join the majority Hindus for celebrations. During Eid festivals, we Hindus also celebrate with the minority Muslim community.”</i> (INC-T)
	Demography/ Bengali hegemony	21. <i>“Of course, by sheer numbers, Bengali-speakers are a numerical majority.”</i> (CPIM-T)
	Demography/ Bengali hegemony	22. <i>“We are the majority, being seventy percent of the population. So no doubt we are the most influential here.”</i> (INC-T)
	Demography/ Bengali-tribal conflict	23. <i>“Earlier, as per the earlier census, as per my knowledge, we indigenous people were only 35%. Even the indigenous population has grown. How come in the last 10- 20 years, they became 71% and we became 29%?”</i> (IPFT-T)
	Demography/ Bengali-tribal conflict	24. <i>“But what happens here is that between the Kokborok and the Bengali speakers there is friction. I am not talking about Kokborok speakers as a whole community, but about a section within this tribal community that has been involved in extremism and militancy. At one time, there was a conspiracy to spoil relations between Bengali people and Kokborok speakers. We have faced that problem.”</i> (CPIM-T)
	Bengali hegemony/ Bengali-tribal conflict	25. <i>“No, not at all. Our culture is not compatible with the culture of the tribal people.”</i> (INC-T)
	Bengali hegemony/ Bengali-tribal conflict	26. <i>“These people (Bengalis) are now in control of the business, the government jobs, the cultivation, and the agriculture in villages. Our indigenous people are not really adept at setting and running businesses, so these Bengali people came and started their businesses. These are the issue. Now we are facing an Identity Crisis of Language, Education, of our caste. The Bengalis...the Bangladeshis now abuse us in a Casteist way. We are now suffering a Crisis of our Identity. We can’t explain our name, we can’t talk in our language—once we start talking in our language in the cities—they just slap and disgrace us.”</i> (IPFT-T)

(Continued)

Factor Category)	Codes	Quotes of Original Text
<b>II. Cross-Border Movement</b>	Trade	27. <i>“Formal trade will increase, but informal trade shall stay the same. As you know, the border is so long and unfenced. Cattle are going to Bangladesh informally. Boys are playing football, and the village people are going to the border huts, without any restrictions at all.”</i> (INC-WB)
	Trade	28. <i>“Well, this is true. I think this is a redundant question, can we move on to the next question please...”</i> (CPIM-T)
	Trade/ Demography	29. <i>“It is a good thing to open up trade and commerce. Because most of the tea from the tea gardens in Assam were through Chittagong Port. We used to send tea, timber and other products via that port. After the Partition and the departure of the British, Assam and the North East got bottle-necked. This was because Chittagong Port went to East Pakistan, and even our access to Calcutta Port got blocked—so water route was blocked. So we need this connectivity, but because of the huge influx of illegal Bangladeshis across the porous border, we want the border to be sealed. However, legally—businesses and tourism should open up. Even Bangladeshi people can come for work here with a work permit, but what is happening is that they are coming and occupying government land, tribal belts, forest reserves, grazing land—all they have captured. And by now, they have citizenship as well. Before it was land conflict and now it is political...”</i> (ULFA-A)
	Trade/ Demography	30. <i>“So we have to balance it. On one hand, we have to seal the India-Bangladesh border because of the influx of foreigners, especially to Assam, but on the other, we have to open it up for trade and commerce.”</i> (ULFA-A)
	Trade	31. <i>“If connectivity goes up, the informal trade will go up less, the formal trade will rise more... If people can get access to things easily, they will not have to look at alternate paths... When you know that you can’t convince officials easily, even after bribing, then only you will look at such paths”.</i> (AIUDF-A)
	Trade	32. <i>“...the BSF of India are not business friendly people...They are the guards, and their mental approach is to stop everything—that needs to be changed... So first for all this, mutual friendship with the government needs to be developed and behave as a businessman by accepting them as our partners— so businesses have trust in the first place”.</i> (AIUDF-A)

(Continued)

Factor (Category)	Codes	Quotes of Original Text
<b>II. Cross-Border Movement</b>	Trade	33. <i>“Why such trade has not been legalized is another mystery—both the Indian and the Bangladeshi governments have not legalized such trade... Trade centers in Karimganj and Mankachar have been opened, but those are not adequately staffed and have full facilities...”</i> (INC-A)
	Migration	34. <i>“I don’t want to comment on that.”</i> (TMC-WB)
	Migration	35. <i>“No, I can tell you that after this land border agreement, which took place in the North part of the State, of course there would be a natural demographic change. Other than that there are no issues really.”</i> (INC-WB)
	Migration/ Hindu nationalism	36. <i>“This migration takes place throughout the ages. America and Europe too have migration debates.... Of course, they have the duty to protect their border, but because they are Christians migrating, they are not seen as demographic changes.... Does religion have a role to play? RSS has made this a major issue.”</i> (CPIM-WB)
	Migration	37. <i>“Well, historically if I may say, Tripura has always had a very special relationship with Bangladesh. During 1971’s Bangladesh’s War of Independence, we hosted more refugees than what was then the population of Tripura. We hosted Bangladeshi refugees as our guests, and in several instances, the people of Tripura hosted them in their own homes. In many cases, those who came were not even related to us, but they became our relatives and life-long friends. There are also cases where some even settled here and did not go back when Bangladesh won its independence. For eleven months, there was a huge flow of refugees and marriage relations even formed during those times.”</i> (CPIM-T)
	Migration	38. <i>“...as you know, in India, we have a census every five to ten years. We can see from the census that the population here in Tripura is increasing. This is due to migration from Bangladesh.”</i> (INC-T)
	Migration/ Assamese xenophobia/ Hindu nationalism/ Tourism-cultural exchange	39. <i>“One thing among the migrants from Bangladesh is that they profess the religion of Islam and they speak the Bengali language. So, the xenophobia is attached to the Bengali-speaking Muslims of Assam, and because of that there is hardly any collaboration.”</i> (BJP-A)

(Continued)

Factor (Category)	Codes	Quotes of Original Text
<b>II. Cross-Border Movement</b>	Tourism-cultural exchange/ Assamese xenophobia	40. <i>“In our state, Assam, there is the presence of Bengali people and of course, their culture. Many reputed artists from West Bengal come here to perform baul and bhatiali songs for the large Bengali population here. But when one says “Bangladesh,” there is hesitation because for three and a half decades, there has been a movement to drive off so-called Bangladeshis...”</i> (INC-A)
	Tourism-cultural exchange	41. <i>“It is because the people are having cultural affinity....With the movement of people, the perception of Bangladeshis being poor and basically not understanding our neighbours shall be over. We, who are of East Bengal descent, try to show positives of Bangladesh in the media, such as showing where Bangladesh has reached in child mortality rates and where our state is at the moment. That is why we are labelled negatively as collaborators of Bangladesh. So this communication gap—when people will come and go—will definitely be diminished.”</i> (SFI-A)
	Migration	42. <i>“Totally false notion! Since the census of 1971 to the data of 2016, no established research could show that because of migration, the population of Assam is increasing. It is because of internal population growth rate—our economic condition and religion are also reasons...Early marriage, dowry systems, and illiteracy rate are reasons. No established data could prove the migration issue, and those studies that are out there are biased. For example, the data for Karimganj that shows this time that there is a population growth of 11%—is completely false. Why is this? If you divide a district and not show the population of the other district, then naturally you will see a rise or fall in the population in one of them. You must show the holistic picture, showing the population of both districts. This is also the case of Dhubri, which got divided from Goalpara. Then there is a rise in Dhubri’s population, but where is Goalpara’s population at the same time?”</i> (AIUDF-A)

(Continued)

<b>Factor (Category)</b>	<b>Codes</b>	<b>Quotes of Original Text</b>
<b>II. Cross-Border Movement</b>	Migration	43. <i>“People used to come during the days of British India or early days of Pakistan, but now it is not possible at the rate which might change demography here. Firstly, the borders are more or less sealed—except in riverine areas. Secondly, if they do come here, where would they stay? Unlike before, there isn’t an abundance of land here. Local Muslims here are challenged for their land rights—if new people come, how would they get land? Thirdly, there are other avenues now for Bangladeshis to go to for a blue-collar job, such as to the Middle East. Those are much safer and easier venues to go, then to Assam.” (INC-A)</i>

## Glossary of Terms

*Buranji* = The official records of the Ahom rulers (1228-1826) of Assam. It was initially written in a South-east Asian language, but afterwards it was written in the Assamese language.

Casteist= Indian Pidgin English term used to refer to discriminatory attitude.

*Char/ sor*= Temporary riverine floating islands in the Brahmaputra Delta.

*Charayapada* = A collection of Buddhist mystical poems composed during the rule of the Pala Empire (750-1095) in Bengal. It was composed in a kind of proto-Bengali language.

*Ghar wapsi*= Literally means “coming back home” in the Hindi language. A popular term for referring to mass religious conversions to Hinduism of poor Muslims, Christians, and tribals.

*Hindutva*= Hindu Nationalism

*Hundi*= A mechanism of informal banking in the Bengal region, ensuring non-physical transfer of currency.

Joint family= A kind of family structure prevalent in rural Bengal comprising of households consisting of not just the core family, but also an extended family with several generations living together under the same roof.

*Miya*= Literally means “mister” in the Bengali/Hindi/Urdu languages. A derogatory term used to refer to individuals from the Bengali-speaking Muslim community in Assam.

*Nawab*= Sovereign landlords who were originally regional governors of the Mughal rulers. By the early 1700s, as the power of the Mughals started to decline, they began

to exercise greater autonomy and set up their own semi-autonomous hereditary kingdoms.

Princely State= A form of semi-sovereign way of indirect rule practiced by the British administration over some Indian provinces, where the indigenous rulers were provided military protection in return for taxes collected from the population living in their territories.

*Rajmala*= The chronicle of the Manikya rulers (1463- 1949) of Tripura. It was written in the Bengali language.

Sufi= Islamic mystic