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MARC RUFUS BREALEY

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Abstract

This thesis explores depictions of the human body in German Expressionist art and the ways in which they might be interpreted through Arthur Schopenhauer's philosophy. It is inspired by Franz Marc's claim that, in Schopenhauer's terms, the world as will took precedence over the world as representation in his own day.

Discussion begins with an assessment of Vasily Kandinsky's development of abstract art in relation to Schopenhauer's philosophy of the world as representation. Here attention is given to Kandinsky's personal reading of Schopenhauer's doctrine of vision and colour. Chapter 2 explores depictions of dance in Expressionism, where the body is considered to be an objectification of the will. Discussion is negotiated through a case study of the work of Emil Nolde. In addition to the body in movement, the theme of the naked body was also central to Expressionist ideology and practice. Hence, Chapter 3 engages in an interpretation of Expressionist depictions of the naked body according to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Platonic ideas and the world as representation.

The outbreak of war in 1914 presented the Expressionist generation with new challenges. Chapter 4, therefore, examines the military experiences of selected Expressionist artists in order to assess their affirmation or denial of the will to war. The final chapters of the thesis reflect upon the relationship between Expressionism and the emergent Nazi regime in the 1930s. Chapter 5 takes as its theme an exploration of 'degenerate art' and 'degenerate' bodies in relation to the artist Otto Mueller and his depiction of gypsies, according to Schopenhauer's moral philosophy. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates Emil Nolde's association with Nazism and offers a new interpretation of these associations according to Schopenhauer's doctrine of free will. In conclusion, the thesis demonstrates that Marc's claims were broadly valid throughout this period but not without exception.

‘The Triumph of the Will’: The German Expressionist Body c. 1905-1945 and the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer.

Volume 1 of 2.

By Marc Brealey PhD Candidate.

Supervised by Dr. Anthony Parton and Dr. Hazel Donkin.

School of Education University of Durham.

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Abbreviations

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BAB: Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde (German Federal Archives, Berlin).

BMB: Brücke-Museum, Berlin.

DKA: Deutsches Kunstarchiv, Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nuremberg (German Art Archive, German National Museum).

DHM: Deutsche Historisches Museum, Berlin.

GNM: Deutsches Kunstarchiv im Germanischen Nationalmuseum Nürnberg (Max Pechstein papers).

GRI: Getty Research Institute Los Angeles, California.

LAB: Landesarchiv Berlin.

LMO: Landesmuseum für Kunst und Kulturgeschichte Oldenburg, Nachlass Gerherd Wielek.

MMT: Munchmuseet Tegning (Munch Museum - Drawing).

NS, inv.no: National Socialist Inventory Number.

PrAdK: Preussische Akademie der Künste.

SUB: Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Carl von Ossietzky, Hamburg.

NGS: Nachlass Gustav Schiefler (Gustav Schiefler papers).

SMB-ZA: Staatlichen Museen Berlin-Zentralarchiv (Central Archives of the Berlin State Museums).

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The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

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Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my mother and my father who is now afflicted by Alzheimer's disease. Without his financial help, and the memory of my mother's love, this thesis would not have been possible.

‘The Triumph of the Will’: The German Expressionist Body c.1905-1945 and the Philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer

Introduction

This thesis is concerned with Expressionist visual art from c.1905-1945 and explores two claims made by the *Blaue Reiter* artist Franz Marc. In an essay written for the journal *Pan* in 1912, Marc claimed that, “in Schopenhauer’s terms, the world as will today takes precedence over the world as representation”[1] (‘Mit Schopenhauer geredet, bekommt heute die Welt als Wille vor der Welt als Vorstellung Geltung’) [C1]. Similarly, in an essay written for the same journal just two weeks prior to the above, he claimed that “Today we seek under the veil of appearances things hidden in nature that seem to us more important than the discoveries of the Impressionists…”[2] (‘Wir suchen heute unter dem Schleier des Scheines verborgene Dinge in der Natur, die uns wichtiger scheinen als die Entdeckungen der Impressionisten') [C2]. The notations C1 and C2 (literally, claim 1 and Claim 2) are my own, and throughout this thesis Marc’s claims shall be referred to by using these notations. Due to the chronology of this thesis, the validity of C1 shall be prioritised over C2. One reason for this is that Marc specifically refers to Schopenhauer in the former passage, whilst another is that by limiting the scope of our investigations chronologically we might be able to explore C1 in particular depth and gain new insights. That is to say, how specific Expressionists interacted with Schopenhauer’s thinking and

[1]Marc, F., "Die Konstruktiven Ideen der Neuen Malerei " in: *Pan* Vol. 2, no. 18., 21.03.1912, pp.527-531. Marc’s claims are not a remark on anything specific or identifiable about artistic practice, nor are they about the specific nature of Expressionism (as can be deduced from the context of the full article). That said, it appears to be a general observation which covers all of these things and one which, as we shall prove in this thesis, has picked up the *Zeitgeist* of his times. In addition, Marc did not elaborate on these claims in an explicit manner in his writing.

[2] Marc, F. "Die Neue Malerei " in: *Pan* Vol. 2, no. 16., (07.03.1912), pp.468-471.. The term ‘appearance’, when used by Marc, Schopenhauer and this thesis, is an alternative description to that of representation (*Vorstellung*) – that is to say, ‘appearances’ relate to sensory experiences or perceptions. The world of appearance however, is not causally determined by the will (or what Schopenhauer relatedly refers to as the ‘thing in itself’). Whilst sensory experiences are coordinated by *a priori* forms of time, space and causality, by contrast the will is not so determined. As we shall see later on in this theis, the will is groundless and uncreated being free from the dictates of time, space and causality. That said, definitions of the terms ‘will’ and ‘representation’ shall be given later on in this introduction.

how we might interpret Expressionism, its socio-political context and cultural history through this philosopher.

In his essay of 07.03.1912, as an Expressionist artist, Marc looked back at the 1890s as a period of significant development within modern art. He noted how French Impressionism had "consumed itself in its own fire" and how "phoenix-like [*phönixgleich*], a new swarm of ideas arose, birds with brightly coloured feathers and mystical beaks [*mystischen Schnäbeln*]**.**"[3] He also asked, **"**who believes himself to be closer to the heart of nature, the Impressionists or the modern artists of today?"[4] His belief was that there was no pre-existing standard by which this question could be addressed - despite feeling that contemporary German artists were just as close to the 'heart of nature' and its 'inner secrets' as Manet had been.

Marc's metaphysical convictions were reiterated and substantiated within other areas of his thought as we note in the following statement in which he argues that:

> Art is metaphysical ... it will free itself from man's purposes and desires. We will no longer paint the forest or the horse as they please us or appear to us, but as they really are, as the forest or the horse feel themselves - their absolute being which lives behind the appearance which we see.[5]

In addition, he argued that he was beginning to see through the world of objects as they appeared to him and able to see what lay behind them. That which lay behind them was concealed by external appearances - "hoodwinking man with a facade which is quite different from what it actually covers."[6] Whilst seeking the inner well-spring of nature under a 'veil of appearances' his belief was that the new movement in art was not an exclusively Parisian enterprise but was rather a pan-European one. In other words, the

[3] Ibid.
[4] Long, R.-C. W. et al., *German Expressionism : Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the Rise of National Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
[5] The original German sources appear in: Marc, F. Briefe, Aufzeichnungen und Aphorismen (Berlin, 1920), vol. I, p. 121 and Aufzeichnungen auf Bogen in Folio ohne Titel: Thesen über die ›abstrakte‹ Kunst und über ›Grenzen der Kunst‹ (1912 1913), Fragment; Blatt 3**.**
[6] Long et al.

metaphysical yearning he sensed in contemporary artistic developments (and which would inform Expressionism) had now become international.

Given its international roots, Jason Gaiger points out that "the term Expressionism has a complex and troublesome history. It characterises neither a specific style nor a unified artistic movement and remains highly diffuse in its application."[7] Part of this 'troublesome history' stems from the fact that Expressionism possesses an international aetiology. In fact, the term was perhaps first used by the French amateur painter Julien-Auguste Hervé when he exhibited a number of paintings at the Salon des Indépendants from 1901-1914. However, it is also the case that during May 1910, the German journal *Kunst und Künstler* employed the word 'expressionistisch' as a contrastive word to 'impressionistisch'. To complicate matter further, one year later in the January 1911 edition of London's *The Burlington Magazine,* the term 'Expressionism' was also used by Arthur Clutton-Brock in order to re-name the Post-Impressionists as 'Expressionists'.

This international aetiology of the term Expressionism was readily accepted by the German art historian Max Deri in his essay 'Cubists and Expressionism' written for *Pan* in 1912. In it he confidently argued that German Expressionism had evolved from Italian Futurism and Cubism. Yet, by contrast Ernst Ludwig Kirchner's 1913 essay 'Chronik der Brücke', disavowed the influence of Cubism, Fauvism or Futurism – which was a viewpoint unsupported by other *Brücke* artists. As a consequence, Kirchner's **'**Chronik der Brücke' underwrote a "paradoxical myth developed during the war that Expressionism was primarily Germanic in origin rather than part of an international modernism."[8]

[7] Gaiger, J. 'Expressionism and the Crisis of Subjectivity' in: Edwards, S. and Wood, P., *Art of the Avant-Gardes* (New Haven, Conn.; London: Yale University Press in association with the Open University, 2004).
[8] Long, R. C. W., Rigby, I. K., and Barron, S., *German Expressionism: Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the Rise of National Socialism* (University of California Press, 1995). p.22.

This raises the question as to how Expressionism as a visual phenomenon can be defined. In Gaiger's opinion it can be broadly suggested that:

> Many of the artists now classified as Expressionist rejected the imitation of nature as art's primary goal, employing brilliant colour and visual distortions in order to communicate their responses to the world around them. A pronounced anti-naturalistic tendency was thus combined with technical radicalism and a stress on authenticity of feeling and expression."[9]

Alongside its 'technical radicalism', German Expressionism absorbed an eclectic array of philosophical and spiritual influences ranging from the Kabbalah, Theosophy and the occult. Moreover, the German Expressionsts were conversant with the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Schopenhauer.

Schopenhauer's philosophy was influenced by, and synthesises, the doctrines of Plato, Kant and Indian thought with a leaning towards Buddhism.[10] Indeed, Schopenhauer understood Buddhism as a confirmation of his own philosophy and was aware of Tibetan (Mahayana) sources and possibly Therevada scripts. Yet, he read the compilations of Buddhism selectively, being interested in its philosophy and ethics but not in Buddhism as practiced in South and Central Asia.[11] His major work of philosophy appears in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (The World as Will and Representation) of 1818, and a second revised edition of 1844 which contained supplementary materials to the first edition. This major work was grounded upon his doctoral thesis *Uber die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichende Grunde* (On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason) of 1813. Schopenhauer persuades his readers that they must read his doctoral thesis first in order to understand his major work. Two years later, in 1815, Schopenhauer

[9] Gaiger, J. 'Expressionism and the Crisis of Subjectivity 'in: Edwards and Wood. p.13.
[10] Cross, S., Society for, A., and Comparative, P., *Schopenhauer's encounter with Indian thought : representation and will and their Indian parallels* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2013).
[11] See Baumann, M., "Global Buddhism: Developmental Periods, Regional Histories, and a New Analytical Perspective," in: *Journal of Global Buddhism* Vol. 2 (2015). I am grateful to Martin Baumann for his advice on this issue.

produced his book *Über das Sehn und die Farben* (On Vision and Colours) which as we shall see in chapters 1 and 3 was studied by Kandinsky and Kirchner.[12]

Every work which Schopenhauer produced was a corroboration and not refutation of his major work. Works produced thereafter were *Über den Willen in der Natur* **(**On the Will in nature) of 1836, and 'On the Foundation of Morality' in *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* (The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics) of 1841, both of which will underpin our explorations of C1 and C2 in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis.[13] In Schopenhauer's ouvre there also followed a compendium of his essays in two volumes called *Parerga and Paralipomena* of 1851, which as we shall note shortly, gained him some popularity after almost a lifetime of neglect by his contemporaries.

His philosophy is founded upon Kant's demarcation between the thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*) (or what Schopenhauer often refers to as the will) and the world of appearance.[14] The will (*Wille*) is one, not in the sense that a concept or object is one, and exists in all things without division. It is groundless, uncreated, aimless and ever striving. Furthermore, it is the ultimate cause of all suffering, devoid of knowledge, expressing itself in the forces of nature such as gravity. The will successively manifests itself in ever more sophisticated grades within the world of phenomena attaining its highest pinnacle in the human being.[15] The will as the underlying essence of the world and as its true being offers us no escape, aside from aesthetic experience which in the end only proves to be transient, or by renunciation of the will to life which can prove to be permanent.

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[12] Schopenhauer, A., *Farbenlehre: 1. Ueber das sehn und die farben. 2. Theoria colorum physiologica* (Leipzig: P. Reclam, 1854).

[13]As David Cartwright says: "There has not been a translation of Schopenhauer's *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik* under a single cover." For this quotation and further information see Cartwright, D. E., *Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer's Philosophy* (Scarecrow Press, 2005).p.200.

[14] There is some contention over E.J.F. Paynes' translation of Schopenhauer's term (*Erscheinun*g) into the English word 'phenomenon'. See Cartwright. Ibid.p.126.

[15] Dale Jacquette,'Idealism. Schopenhauer, Schiller, and Schelling' in: Gaut, B. and Lopes, D., *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics* (Taylor & Francis, 2013). p.68. For a history of the Great Chain of Being, see: .Lovejoy, A., *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Taylor & Francis, 2017).

The other side of the world we live in is the world of representation (*Vorstellung*) or appearance (*Erscheinung*) and it is governed by what Schopenhauer calls the principle of sufficient reason (*Satz vom Zureichenden Grund*). This means that "every possible object is subordinate to it, that is to say, stands in a necessary relation to other objects, on the one hand as determined, on the other as determining."[16] In section 5 of his doctoral thesis, Schopenhauer defines the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' as being a "common expression of several kinds of knowledge given *a priori*."[17] He chose to lay down this Principle in a formula - which most scholars have mistakenly attributed directly to Schopenhauer. Rather, the reality is that he uses Christian Wolff's formula "as the most general" which states that, "*nihil est sine ratione cur potius sit quam non sit* (nothing is without a ground or reason why it is)."[18]

According to Schopenhauer, the root of the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason' is actually divisible into four classes by which everything can become for us a representation and therefore explicable. As such, it is a Principle which he regards as being indubitable and in need of no defence. Thus, he says:

> …every ground or reason must be valid within one of those four possible classes of objects of our representation faculty; consequently, the use of this ground or reason assumes as given one of those possible classes together with that faculty, that is, with the whole world, and it keeps within these limits. But such a ground or reason cannot be valid outside its possible class, or even outside of all objects.[19]

In brief, the four-fold root of this 'Principle' consists of i) the physical, ii) the logical, iii) the mathematical and iv) the moral. This means that the physical root explains all changes which occur in the physical world, while the logical root explains the ground of all truths *a priori*. Although the mathematical class explains geometrical theorems, and is

[16] Schopenhauer, A. and Payne, E. F. J., *The World as Will and Representation* (New York: Dover Publications, 1969). Vol.1., p.6-7.
[17] *On The Fourfold Root of The Principle of Sufficient Reason* (La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1974).,p.6.
[18] Ibid.,p.6.
[19] Ibid.,p.235.

quite self-evident, by contrast the class belonging to moral explanations pertains not, as we might assume, to morality *per se* but instead to an explanation of human or animal behaviours according to their motives. As consequence, this latter class will apply to our explorations of C1 in chapter 6 of this thesis where we discuss the problem of free will in relation to Nolde and that which may or may not have motivated him to behave in certain ways as opposed to others whilst living under Nazi rule.

Of central importance, there is no causal link between the will and the world of representation. The world as will, according to Schopenhauer is the only true reality which generates and manifests the world as representation. Whilst the will is the thing in itself, it diverges from the world of appearances since it is the essence, the inner kernel, or the 'reality' behind the 'illusion' of all appearances so to speak.[20] For Schopenhauer, the thing-in-itself is accessible to us as human beings in contrast to Kant who did not believe that this was possible. By contrast, he says that it is accessible to us through our individual will as an object of experience, and that the will is identical with our body. Therefore, one of the central tenets which underpins Schopenhauer's philosophy (and this thesis) is that the experience of our embodied will also offers us a key to the inner nature of the will as the thing in itself.

Apart from his great respect for Kant, Schopenhauer also studied Plato whilst at the University of Göttingen in 1810 and eventually reconciled Kant's thing-in-itself with Plato's Ideas. Indeed, as Cartwright shows, Schopenhauer reconciled their two most paradoxical doctrines, "Plato's theory of Ideas and Kant's thing in itself, by claiming that both philosophers recognized that the world revealed by the senses is merely a world of

[20] Cartwright., p.171-72. Schopenhauer defines the thing in itself (and his place for it in the history of philosophy) as follows: "Thing-in-itself expresses that which exists independently of perception through any of our senses, and so that which really and truly is. For Democritus this was formed matter; at bottom, it was still the same for Locke; for Kant it was an x; for me it is will."Schopenhauer, A. and Payne, E. F. J., *Parerga and Paralipomena. Short Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974). Vol.2,p.90.

appearances and not true reality."[21] As we shall see in chapter 3 of this thesis, when we explore C1 and C2 in relation to Kirchner's art, Plato's Ideas (or Forms) are eternal archetypes which act as paradigmatic patterns for every particular object in the phenomenal world - which in turn (theoretically) bridge the world as will and the world as representation.

According to such a theory, every particular object retains something of the universal Idea within it. In fact, as we shall note in chapter 3, aesthetic contemplation enables us to perceive a universal in a particular. Furthermore, as Andy Hamilton shows in his book *Aesthetics and Music*, "Schopenhauer radically re-interprets Kant's account of aesthetic judgment as disinterested, seeing it as transcending ordinary forms of perception, and therefore possessing special value."[22] Thus, through aesthetic contemplation of a beautiful object we forget ourselves for a brief time and experience a will-less sense of peace. Therefore, by losing ourselves in aesthetic contemplation we obtain a temporary respite from the striving of the will which causes the suffering of the whole world.

This is of relevance to chapter 4 of this thesis when we come to investigate C1 in relation to a group of selected artists who fought in the First World War. It is of relevance because Schopenhauer states that "the basis of all willing…is need, lack, and hence pain, and by its very nature and origin it is therefore destined to pain."[23] Indeed, in a succinct reminder of this notion, Thomas A. Mautner shows that "Schopenhauer's thoroughgoing pessimism was neatly condensed in his turning *Welt* (world) into an acronym: *Weh* (woe), *Elend* (misery), *Leid* (suffering), *Tod* (death)."[24]

Despite his acknowledged pessimism, Schopenhauer had a remarkable influence upon later thinkers such as Thomas Mann, Richard Wagner, Sigmund Freud, and Friedrich

[21] Cartwright.p.153.
[22] Hamilton, A., *Aesthetics and Music*, Continuum aesthetics (London: Continuum Press, 2007). p.76.
[23] Schopenhauer, A., *The world as will and representation* (New York: Dover Publications, 1969).Vol.1., p.312
[24] Mautner, T., *The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy* (London: Penguin, 2000).p.510.

Nietzsche.[25] However, his reception into the canon of philosophy was seriously delayed, in part due to the greater successes of his contemporary G.W.F.Hegel, (and then the Young Hegelians who became his disciples), but also in part due to the later popularitry of Nietzsche's writings.[26] Yet, this is not all that there is to the matter, since Schopenhauer appears to have been a poor decision maker and difficult to associate with. For instance, we know that in the Summer of 1820, whilst at the University of Berlin, Schopenhauer planned a cycle of lectures which he no doubt hoped would be more popular than those of his rival Hegel. However, this plan failed since only a small number of students attended his first lecture, subsequently leading Schopenhauer (in a fit of pique) to abandon an academic career forever and to nurture a life-long grudge towards Hegel.[27]

For nigh on 35 years after the publication of his major work in 1818, Schopenhauer was almost completely ignored by the intellectual world, and as Bryan Magee has shown, he first gained recognition in England around 1853 when the *Westminster Review*, (edited by Georg Eliot), published an unattributed article on Schopenhauer called 'Iconoclasm in German Philosophy'. It was later republished in German in the *Vossische Zeitung* and read more so there than in England. Three years later in 1854, Soren Kierkegaard would write

[25] For Mann on Schopenhauer see: Mann, Thomas, 'Schopenhauer', *Essays of Three Decades*, trans. H. T. Lowe- Porter (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1947). For Wagner's comments on Schopenhauer, and his correspondence with him, see: pp. 614-17,632,637,646,659,699,731,749,784,786 in: Wagner, R., *My Life* (London: Constable and Co., 1911). Freud claims that he read Schopenhauer late in life. See: Freud, S., *An Autobiographical Study Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety: The Question of Lay Analysis and Other Works: 1925-1926* (London: The Hogarth Press: The Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1986). p.59-60. However, his claims have been successfully refuted by several scholars who have proven that Freud not only read Schopenhauer much earlier than claimed, but also borrowed heavily from him. For further information, see: Askay, R., and J. Farquhar. *Apprehending the Inaccessible: Freudian Psychoanalysis and Existential Phenomenology*. Northwestern University Press, 2006.p.390 and Sulloway, F.J. *Freud, Biologist of the Mind: Beyond the Psychoanalytic Legend*. Harvard University Press, 1992, p.253. Nietzsche was initially infatuated with Schopenhauer's philosophy, as is evidenced by his early work *The Birth of Tragedy* of 1872. Nietzsche subsequently renounced his infatuation with both Schopenhauer and Wagner, maintaining a lasting antipathy towards both men, despite his intellectual debts to them.

[26] The Young Hegelian movement, consisting of Bruno Bauer, Ludwig Andreas von Feuerbach**,** Max Stirner, and Carl Nauwerck among others, had a significant and impact upon Karl Marx's thinking at one stage. However, despite Marx's approval of the Young Hegelians' tactic of confronting Christianity so as to challenge the Prussian authorities, he eventually broke away from the group and censured their opinions in *Die deutsche Ideologie* (The German Ideology). Marx, K. et al., *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1932). See also: McLellan, D., *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* ([S.l.]: Praeger, 1969).

[27] For a detailed account of Schopenhauer's animosity towards Hegel see: Cartwright, D. E., *Schopenhauer: A Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).,p.366. His undoubted envy of Hegel led him to draw in his notebook a caricature of Hegel which made the philosopher look like a pig.

in his diary that "all the literary gossips, journalists and authorlings have begun to busy themselves with S' ."[28]

In the aftermath of failed revolutions during 1848, a wave of pessimism overtook Europe and from that point on Schopenhauer began to find fertile ground for the reception of his work. Nevertheless, throughout most of the 1840s, Schopenhauer remained largely unknown, despite attracting the attention of philosopher cum judge Friedrich Ludwig Andreas Dorguth, whom Schopenhauer described as his 'evangelist'. In a letter to Adam von Doss, dated 10.01.1855, Schopenhauer would lament that: "The primary evangelist [*Urevangelist*] Dorguth has died, aged 77, from cholera: he had received the 'Will in Nature' two days previously and had started reading and enjoying it, so his daughter tells me."[29] That said, the only professional philosopher to take a serious interest in Schopenhauer was Julius Frauenstädt who he made the legal heir to his writings in 1859.

One of the few individuals who was able to maintain cordial relations with Schopenhauer consistently from July 1844, was a lawyer from Alzey called Johann August Becker. Schopenhauer would classify him as an 'apostle', and as Magee has noted::

> He [Schopenhauer] distinguished, only half-jokingly, between his 'evangelists' and his 'apostles', the evangelists being those who propagated the gospel, the apostles those who embraced it but did not spread it. Becker remained always an apostle. According to Schopenhauer the arch-apostle was Doss, the arch-evangelist Frauenstädt.[30]

Ten years before his death in 1860, Schopenhauer attempted to persuade Brockhaus, Germany's leading publisher, to publish *Parerga and Paralipomena* – which was summarily rejected. On the whole therefore, we can say that Schopenhauer remained

[28] Magee, B., *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer*, Rev. and enl. ed. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997)., P.26.
[29] Letter from Schopenhauer to Friedrich Ludwig Andreas Dorguth, dated 10.01.1855, in: Schopenhauer, A. and Hübscher, A., *Gesammelte Briefe* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1987).
[30] Magee.,p.420.

outside the canon of University philosophy, often securing greater success in the public domain through independent readers. Yet, by the 1870s, Magee has argued that Schopenhauer "came to be seen by academic philosophers generally as one of the outstanding philosophers of recent times, but his established reputation with them never overtook that of Hegel."[31] Then by 1890, William Wallace, Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, had published a biography of Schopenhauer, and then, in the same decade, we find that American philosophers Josiah Royce and George Santayana began to engage with his work more closely.[32]

A few years earlier, German philosopher Eduard von Hartmann, author of *Philosophy of the Unconscious: Speculative results according to the Inductive Method of Physical Science*,[33] came to acknowledge Schopenhauer's work, as did the Indologist Paul Deussen, professor of philosophy at Kiel, who in 1911 created the Schopenhauer Society (*Schopenhauer-Gesellschaft*) which still exists today.[34] In fact, we find that one year later in 1912 Deussen, as a former friend of Nietzsche, had begun to edit a journal known as the *Schopenhauer Yearbook* (*Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch*). We also find, among a handful of interested German scholars one Hans Vaihinger, author of *The Philosophy of As If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind*, coming under the influence of Schopenhauer.[35]

[31] Ibid.,p.427.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Hartmann, E. v. and Coupland, W. C., *Philosophy of the Unconscious: Speculative results according to the inductive method of physical science* (London; New York: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.; Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931). Cf. Hartmann, E. v., *Philosophie des Unbewussten: Versuch einer Weltanschauung* (Berlin: Carl Duncker's Verlag (C. Heymons), 1869).
[34] For a detailed analysis of Schopehauer's reception in Germany see; Weiner, T., *Die Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers und ihre Rezeption* (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 2000). Also see: Sorg, B., *Zur literarischen Schopenhauer-Rezeption im 19. Jahrhundert* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1975).
[35] Vaihinger, H., "The Philosophy of As If: A System of the Theoretical, Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind," in: (2014).

The French reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy was often complex and fraught with Germanophobia from the 1850s onwards. Following the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, for many in France even the music of Wagner symbolised Germany's domination of their culture. Indeed, Léon Daudet's book, *Hors du joug allemande: mesures d'après guerre* of 1915 reflects a widely held opinion that their culture had been overrun by Germany. In it Daudet claimed that, "the devotion to Wagner is costly because he denationalizes the French in the manner of a Kant or a Hegel or a Schopenhauer."[36] However, an exception to this opinion is held by Foucher de Careil who, in his book *Hegel et Schopenhauer: Études sur la philosophie allemande moderne depuis Kant jusqu'à nos jours* (1862), offers us a rare and affirmative account of Schopenhauer's philosophy from a French perspective - although it should be treated with caution.[37]

One note of caution stems from David Asher, a German-Jewish scholar who began his correspondence with Schopenhauer by letter from 16.06.1855 until the philosopher's death in 1860. Asher warned his readers of a certain discrepancy in de Careil's account in his book, *Arthur Schopenhauer New Material by Him and about Him by Dr David Asher* (1871), where he points out that de Careil had implied how a face-to-face meeting had taken place between Schopenhauer and himself. De Careil had claimed that, "I have seen how he (Schopenhauer) was excited by the thought that the philosophical commentary on his doctrine of the will is found in the rightly proclaimed book of Bichat about life and death."[38]

Asher was convinced that the above account was fictitious, arguing that much of the supposed meeting between Schopenhauer and de Careil could be found verbatim in

[36] Daudet, L., *Hord du Joug Allemand* (1915).p.85
[37] The mutual suspicion between France and Germany would continue into the advent of the Expressionist era as will be discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis.
[38] Asher, D. and Farrelly, D. J., *Arthur Schopenhauer: New Material by Him and about Him* (2015).p.81

the philosopher's own writing. Indeed, Asher states that, "this fictional dressing up of a quoted passage in the shape of a conversation seems customary in France and belongs to the excusable untruths with which this unfortunate nation lets itself be beguiled during wartime."[39] Ultimately, Asher felt that de Careil, while rendering the philosophers work honestly enough, drew the inaccurate conclusion that Schopenhauer had few disciples. Asher refuted this conclusion by stating that "…there is no city in Germany where Schopenhauer does not have followers who quietly contribute to the dissemination of his philosophy..."[40]

The major portion of Schopenhauer's philosophy was destined for *The World as Will and Representation,* which appears in two volumes and has a basic pattern in terms of format. In each volume there are four subtitled 'books' which alternate between the world as representation and the world as will. Book 1 explores the world as representation; Book 2 the world as will; Book 3 the world as representation; Book 4 the world as will. During the first four chapters of this thesis I mirror that alternating pattern, oscillating between the world as representation and the world as will. However, the final two chapters of this thesis interpret the Expressionist body through two of Schopenhauer's ethical works, these being his essay *On the Basis of Morality* (*Über die Grundlage der Moral*) (1839) and his essay *On the Freedom of the Human Will,* (*Über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens*) (1839) - which are mutually reinforcing.[41] Both essays were originally contained in *The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*[42] (1841), and deal with morality in a more concentrated sense. Consequently, these latter two essays ought to be

[39] Ibid.p.82
[40] Ibid.p.83
[41] Schopenhauer, A., Payne, E. F. J., and Cartwright, D. E., *On the Basis of Morality* (Berghahn Books, 1995); Schopenhauer, A., *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften. I. Über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens ... II. Über das Fundament der Moral, etc* (Frankfurt am Main: Hermannsche Buchhandlung, 1841).
[41] Zöller, G. n., *Arthur Schopenhauer: Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1999).
[42] Schopenhauer, *Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik, behandelt in zwei akademischen Preisschriften. I. Über die Freiheit des menschlichen Willens ... II. Über das Fundament der Moral, etc*.

regarded as sequels to the ethical side of his philosophy, as found in book 4 of his major work. They can therefore be regarded as appropriate tools with which to explore the final two chapters of this thesis.

To put Schopenhauer's major work into greater detail, the four-part pattern in Volume 1 of Schopenhauer's opens with the subtitle, 'First Book The World as Representation First Aspect: The Representation subject to the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Object of Experience and of Science'.[43] It is followed by the 'Second Book: The World as Will First Aspect: The Objectification of the Will',[44] then the 'Third Book: The World as Representation Second Aspect: The Representation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art'.[45] Finally, we have the 'Fourth Book: The World as Will Second Aspect: With the Attainment of Self-Knowledge, Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-Live'.[46] The 1818 edition of *The World as Will and Representation,* known in this thesis as Volume 1, was followed by a second edition in 1844, referred to in this thesis as *The World as Will and Representation*[47] Volume 2, and contains supplements to Volume 1.

In terms of methodology, Chapter 1 of this thesis adopts the 'First Book: The World as Representation First Aspect'. According to my adoption of Schopenhauer's philosophy, I introduce Kandinsky's approach to the world as representation, which means that chapter 1 is called 'Vasily Kandinsky and the World as Representation'.[48] The chapter also defines Schopenhauer's use of the term representation (*Vorstellung*), and my

[43] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.1-91.
[44] Ibid., p.93-165.
[45] Ibid., p.167-267.
[46] Ibid., p.269-412.
[47] *The World as Will and Representation* (Indian Hills (Col.): Falcon's Wing Press, 1958). Vol.2.
[48] For a detailed discussion of Schopenhauer's methodology see: Guyer, Paul. 'Schopenhauer, Kant, and the Methods of Philosophy in: Janaway, C. and Online Cambridge Collections, *The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). Also: Bart Vandenabeeles' 'Background: Schopenhauer's Methodological Presuppositions' in: Vandenabeele, B., *A Companion to Schopenhauer* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).

adoption of it, in relation to the world of objects in Expressionist art. More importantly, this chapter tests Marc's claims, particularly C2, in relation to Kandinsky's move away from the world of objects as intuitive representations and towards abstraction. It thus paves the way for the German Expressionist body *per se* as a locus for disinterring that which is the content of our representations. Ultimately, Chapter 1 concludes that Marc's claims were appropriate generalisations when applied to the visual arts, but they do not necessarily apply to the critical language of the age.

While we are investigating Marc's claims on Schopenhauer's terms, we shall consider intuitive representations of perception through a method which he refers to as dianoiology.[49] In order to understand this we need to accept that for Schopenhauer, philosophy has for its object experience in general and must therefore find secure empirical foundations. As a result, that which ought to be the topic of philosophy he says "should be the medium wherein *experience in general* presents itself, together with the form and nature of that medium. This is the representation, the mental picture, knowledge, and thus the intellect."[50] On this basis, he argues that philosophy is compelled to begin by investigating - and validating the boundaries of - the faculty of knowledge, together with its laws and forms. This division of philosophy he defines as a '*philosophia prima'* which in turn is subdivided as follows:

> …into a consideration of primary representations, i.e. representations of intuitive perception, and this part may be called *dianoiology* or theory of the understanding; and into a consideration of secondary representations, i.e. abstract representations, together with the order of their manipulation, and thus *logic* or the theory of reason [*Vernunft*].[51]

[49] Dianoiology refers to theories of understanding. Consequently, by engaging with Schopenhauer's methodology, Chapter 1 investigates the limits of the faculty of knowledge in relation to both Marc's claims and Kandinsky's understanding of art.
[50] Schopenhauer and Payne. Vol.2, p.18.
[51] Ibid.

However, as he explains in chapter 17, volume 2 of his major work, such a philosophical method can never arise out of pure abstract concepts. This methodological approach is important, not only for our investigations of C1 and C2, on Schopenhauer's terms in general, but more narrowly for our own investigations into Kandinsky's artistic practice and thinking in chapter 1. That is to say, by adopting Schopenhauer's methodology our investigations will pursue C1 and C2 as *metaphysical* claims in a more specific sense by, on the one hand acquainting us with the empirical world of nature, and on the other by conceiving of it as did Schopenhauer, "as a phenomenon which is given but somehow conditioned and in which an essence or entity manifests itself, such entity being different from the phenomenon itself and accordingly would be the thing-in-itself."[52]

As we have just noted, by 'the thing-in-itself' (alternately described by him as the will), Schopenhauer means the ultimate reality which lies behind the veil of appearances. And it is this reality which Marc and Kandinsky claimed to have been searching for through their art. As we shall find in chapter 1, both Kandinsky and Schopenhauer attempted to unite inner and outer experience in order to obtain insights into the whole phenomenon of nature. Thus, according to Schopenhauer, a thinker can uncover the whole phenomenon of nature in such a way that it renders "its meaning and connection-comparable to the reading of hitherto mysterious characters of an unknown writing."[53] Consequently, we shall attempt to advance, (as perhaps did Marc and Kandinsky), "from the phenomenal appearance to *that which appears*, to that which is hidden behind the phenomenon"[54] in pursuit of C1 and C2. As shall be noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, according to Schopenhauer, his recommended procedure reveals to us that that 'which is hidden behind the phenomenon' is our *will.*

[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid.

Consequently, we shall apply this procedure to Marc's claims. However, because Schopenhauer regarded himself as Kant's successor, one of the limitations to the methodology of this chapter, and the thesis overall, is the absence of comparisons made between Schopenhauer's philosophical method and Kant's. This is justifiable on the grounds that this thesis is primarily orientated towards an art historical readership. I have therefore chosen to neglect much of the Kantian in favour of the Nietzschean. The reason for this is that Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy was known by the Expressionists, and that for Nietzsche, Schopenhauer was of fundamental importance.

One of the most important questions for philosophers such as Schopenhauer, and artists such as Kandinsky, was to ask what it is that lies behind the world of appearances. In other words, is the world as representation all that there is to life, or is there a metaphysical reality which underpins this world? Indeed, Kandinsky's book, *On the Spiritual in Art* (*Über das Geistige in der Kunst*) of 1912, addresses such issues and it can be found translated in Kenneth C. Lindsay and Peter Vergo's *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art* (1994).[55] In this latter work, the artist's essays are presented chronologically allowing the reader to navigate the complex evolution of Kandinsky's ideas. This is significant beacause it brings to light his theories on abstract art and his conviction that abstraction could reveal the metaphysical substrate of representation.

In line with this, Kenneth Berry's article, 'The Paradox of Kandinsky's Abstract Representation'[56] (2005) examines aspects of the artist's journey into abstraction. The conceptual definitions of 'abstract' and 'concrete', are explored in relation to the phrase 'abstract representation'. This is important since turn of the century artists began to question the value of the object as a means to expression. David Morgan's article 'The

[55] Kandinsky, W., Lindsay, K. C., and Vergo, P., *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*, New ed. ed. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1994). p.114-221.
[56] Berry, K., "The Paradox of Kandinsky's Abstract Representation," in: *Journal of Aesthetic Education* Vol. 39, no. 1 (2005).

Idea of Abstraction in German Theories of the Ornament from Kant to Kandinsky'[57] (1992), also goes some way towards addressing this, as does Peg Weiss' article 'Kandinsky and the Symbolist Heritage'. [58]

Although Chapter 1 must count as a significant contribution towards Expressionist scholarship, there are certain limitations to its scope. Two immediately spring to mind. The first is that Kandinsky's case could be regarded as an exception, since the majority of Expressionist artists were happy to depict the world of objects and were not driven towards abstraction as strongly as he was. However, I felt it necessary to engage Kandinsky's art in this way since his art leans progressively upon conceptual representations with such force that it puts Marc's claims to the test in a more vivid manner. This way provides a methodological platform upon which to set the significance of the human body as an object according to Schopenhauer's philosophy. The second is a limitation of the time frame to around 1905 to 1918. I felt it necessary to focus upon this time frame in order to concentrate upon the newly arising tensions between an emergent abstract art and the body as an object.

In terms of methodology, Chapter 2 engages Schopenhauer's 'Second Book: The World as Will First Aspect', and is titled 'Expressionist Art, Dance and the Embodied Will'. As with Schopenhauer, rather than pursue scientific methodologies in order to penetrate into the substance of Marc's claims, this chapter apprehends the inner reality of the world of appearances through the phenomenology of the human body.[59] Through the

[57] Morgan, D., "The Idea of Abstraction in German Theories of the Ornament from Kant to Kandinsky," in: *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol. 50, no. 3 (1992).
[58] Weiss, P., "Kandinsky and the Symbolist Heritage," in: *Art Journal* Vol. 45, no. 2 (1985).
[59] The body could be considered as a narrow gateway through which we might grasp the inner nature of appearances and other beings. However, as Daniel Came suggests, there is a weakness to this notion since it may be counter-argued that Schopenhauer's phenomenological approach "can never be evidence of anything beyond itself." Daniel Came, 'Schopenhauer on the Metaphysics of Art and Philosophy' in: Vandenabeele. (2012) p.239. Even so, it does not exsanguinate Schopenhauer's philosophy of its interpretative or historical value by which we can examine Marc's claims. If we do not accept this then it is possible that ,"in the end one may be in the ridiculous position of deploring a necessary truth." Ayer, A. J., *Philosophical Essays* (London: Macmillan, 1954). p.195.

medium of the human body we shall discover that the content of our representations is, according to Schopenhauer, the will. We may argue therefore, that depictions of dance in Expressionist art both generate and illustrate Schopenhauer's argument that the body is a manifestation of the will. On the basis of Schopenhauer's definition of the term will, C1 is subsequently tested through Expressionist images of dance as produced by *Die Brücke* and *Der Blaue Reiter* artists.

Despite Kandinsky's early move towards abstraction, the human body as an object of art remained a focal point for artists such as Emil Nolde. For this artist, the human body in dance captivated his artistic imagination, as we learn from his autobiography *Mein Leben* (1979).[60] This captivation is also explored in the book *Emil Nolde in Berlin: Dance, Theatre, Cabaret* (2007)[61] and *Two Dancers within the Blaue Reiter Circle* (2002).[62] The latter looks at the relationship between Russian dancer Alexander Sakharov and his wife Clotilde Derp, along with their links to the *Blaue Reiter* group. In addition, any interest in the human body dancing as a manifestation of the will, should pursue the complexities of movement as found in Rudolf von Laban's book *The Mastery of Movement on the Stage* (1960).[63]

Although this chapter on the human body dancing appears wide ranging, there are shortcomings to it, especially since its compass is restricted to the outbreak of the First World War. Furthermore, it is arguably less complete for not incorporating a discussion of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner's life-long interest in dance - most conspicuous during the Weimar era. Yet, this approach was deemed necessary in order to act as a counter balance to the first chapter which concentrates on the representation as an object of experience.

[60] Nolde, E., *Mein Leben*, Neuaufl. ed. (Köln: DuMont, 1979).
[61] Reuther, M. et al., *Nolde in Berlin: Tanz, Theater, Cabaret (Dance, Theatre, Cabaret)* (Köln, Seebüll: DuMont, 2007).
[62] Peter, F.-M. and Stamm, R., *Die Sacharoffs: zwei Tänzer aus dem Umkreis des Blauen Reiters (Two Dancers within the Blaue Reiter Circle)* (Köln: Wienand, 2002). This is a bilingual book.
[63] Laban, R. v. and Ullmann, L., *The Mastery of Movement on the Stage*, Second ed. Revised and enlarged by Lisa Ullmann. ed. (London1960).

Through this approach, it becomes possible to demonstrate that whilst Kandinsky began to establish the abstract representation as an object for experience, other artists pursued the concrete reality of the human body in their art, which we may interpret as an objectification of the will.

In terms of methodology, Chapter 3 'Kirchner, the Expressionist Nude and the Platonic Idea', recruits Schopenhauer's 'Third Book: The World as Representation Second Aspect'. It adopts Schopenhauer's epistemological methodology, as in the law of homogeneity (*das Gesetz der Homogeneitat*) and the law of specification (*das Gesetz der Specifikation*). As David E. Cartwright shows in the *Historical Dictionary of Schopenhauer's Philosophy* (2005), "the law of specification seeks to distinguish for each other the species subsumed under a wider genus, and to distinguish from each other the things falling within a species."[64] By contrast, the law of homogoneity "…instructs us to unite kinds of things into species, then into wider genera, and lastly into the highest unity that covers everything. Consequently, this law always seeks unity in diversity, or the one in the many."[65] Although Schopenhauer did not elaborate on this latter law, it continued to be an unbroken attempt on his part to secure all-inclusive accounts of human experience. In this chapter, we more often engage Schopenhauer's law of homogeneity as one which pertains to the Platonic Idea of the human body.

In order to explore what the body is in itself, and to test Marc's belief that the world as will dominated the world as representation, Chapter 3 introduces Schopenhauer's theory of the Platonic Ideas. Following a definition of Schopenhauer's use of the Platonic Ideas (*Platonische Ideen*) this chapter is placed within the historical context of *Nacktkultur*. As Karl Eric Toepfer points out, German *Nacktkultur* (literally 'nudist

[64] Cartwright. p.160.
[65] Ibid. p.54.

culture') "refers to a network of private clubs that promoted nudism as a way of linking the modern body more closely to nature, giving it a freer presence in the great outdoors."[66] *Nacktkultur,* as we note in chapter 3 of this thesis, was a practice whereby the general public and artists sought a way of reconnecting with nature. Rendering oneself naked became a social and aesthetic statement designed to re-assert the individual practitioner's will in opposition to the wearing of clothing which was considered ugly.[67] In addition, Toepfer has found that:

> *Nackkultur* was a constellation of subcultures, each of them pursuing values that were not always or even usually common to the constellation as a whole. Indeed, one might even say that, for each subculture, the naked body functioned as a sign of ideological difference rather than as a universal identifier in relation to the alienating pressures of modernity.[68]

With this subculture in mind, chapter 3 shows how knowledge of the Ideas might be gained through Schopenhauer's doctrine of aesthetic contemplation of nudes in nature. Through that doctrine, this chapter shall argue that some spectators of Kirchner's nudes may experience deliverance from their servitude to the will. Yet, several objections to the Platonic Ideas, and their applicability to Kirchner's art, shall be raised together with a criticism of their use by Schopenhauer within his own philosophy. On that basis, this chapter shall conclude that neither Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Ideas *per se*, nor their application to Kirchner's nudes, make for a convincing possibility despite the necessity of the discussion. In addition, it will be suggested that C1 can be refuted through Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Ideas at one level, just as C2 can be equally supported at another.

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[66] Toepfer, K. E., *Empire of Ecstasy: Nudity and Movement in German Body Culture, 1910-1935* (Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press, 1997). p.30.
[67]Schönemann, Friedrich 1906 'Zurück zur Natur!' in: "Kraft und Schönheit : Zeitschr. für vernünft. Leibeszucht," in: *Kraft und Schönheit : Zeitschr. für vernünft. Leibeszucht* (1901). v.6 p.307
[68] ; ibid.,p.31

Although we are utilising Schopenhauer's philosophy, most commonly the relationship between Expressionist visual art and philosophy has been made through Nietzsche. Students of Nietzsche understand that Schopenhauer features heavily in many of his works such as *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), both as his philosophical mentor and later in life as his *bête noire*.[69] Although Nietzsche vilified Plato, it appears that Kirchner appreciated the Greek philosopher, since the artist owned a copy of Plato's essay *The Symposium* (2001), which as a work of philosophy, offers us a valuable insight into the origins of the Platonic Ideas as representation. [70] With respect to these two philosophers Mark Anderson's *Plato and Nietzsche: Their Philosophical Art* (2014), is an apposite guide to both Nietzsche and Schopenhauer's approaches to art.[71]

Of critical importance, this chapter engages with Kirchner's letters as documentary evidence, which enable us to interpret his self-defined contribution to the history of art. However, this self-definition has been exposed as contradictory, for example in Donald E. Gordon's *catalogue raisonné* which, despite its datedness, remains indispensable to any understanding of Kirchner's art.[72] These contradictions have been examined further by Christian Weikop in 'Ernst Ludwig Kirchner as His Own Critic: The Artist's Statements as Stratagems of Self-Promotion'[73] (2012). Yet, what comes across in Weikop's essay is a jaundiced view of Kirchner's failings, and a negative view of Kirchner as a "spin doctor," which tends to overshadow what might have been a more objective enquiry.[74]

[69] Nietzsche, F., Geuss, R., and Speirs, R., *Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings* (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[70] Plato and Lamb, W. R. M., *Plato. 3. 3* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press [u.a.], 2001).
[71] Anderson, M., *Plato and Nietzsche: Their Philosophical Art* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).
[72] For the dating of Kirchner's letters and some biographical data I am indebted to: Kirchner, E. L., Delfs, H., and Kornfeld, E. W., *Der gesamte Briefwechsel: die absolute Wahrheit, so wie ich sie fühle* (Zürich: Scheidegger und Spiess, 2010).
[73] Weikop, C., "Ernst Ludwig Kirchner as His Own Critic: The Artist's Statements as Stratagems of Self-Promotion," in: *Forum for Modern Language Studies* Vol. 48, no. 4 (2012).
[74] Ibid., p.406.

In Chapter 4 we depart from Kirchner and the world of ideal beauty by concentrating upon the First World War. In terms of methodology, this chapter recruits Schopenhauer's 'Fourth Book: The World as Will Second Aspect', and is called 'The Expressionist at War: Affirmation or Denial of the Will?' Contrary to Kant's excessively abstract methodology, Schopenhauer's own was nearer to British empiricists such as John Locke, George Berkeley and David Hume. Thus, in the spirit of Schopenhauer's empirical methodology, we shall explore the texts and images of Beckmann, Marc and August Macke by using two methods that might help us interpret their attitudes towards the war. Firstly, through their personal readings of Schopenhauer and secondly, through contemporary military practices. In essence, their attitudes towards the war shall be probed so as to examine the extent to which they affirmed or denied the will to war.[75]

For all those involved with the war, including Expressionist artists, there was an opportunity to renounce the will to live in order to obtain a salvific release from servitude to the will. However, the evidence gained from research shows that neither they nor any other Expressionist artist followed Schopenhauer's advice, which was to renounce the will to live and follow an ascetic path through the human life-cycle. Given this evidence, C1 can be fully vindicated and Schopenhauer's doctrine of the affirmation of the will made historically relevant. However, the conclusions of this research could be regarded as frail. This is because an empirical analysis of just a few artists compares unfavourably to an all-embracing survey of what every artist experienced during the war. Whilst this is true, we possess the strength of concision and specificity, appropriate to C1 and C2, through an analysis of that which Marc, Beckmann and Macke felt about the war through their reading

[75] As defined by their texts and art, this chapter is also about the effects of war service upon the artists as phenomena of the embodied will.

of Schopenhauer. Therefore, what this chapter lacks in empirical breadth it makes up for in focus.

In terms of documentary evidence, an analysis of Beckmann's letters from the Western Front, in *Briefe Im Kriege*[76](1955), reveal the thoughts of an artist at war. The same can be said of Marc's letters to his wife in *August Macke, Franz Marc: Briefwechsel*[77] (1964). However, analysis is tempered by the fact that both artists were corresponding to their female partners, and one wonders whether there is not at times a 'deceitful' air of bravado woven into the fabric of his narrative. Moreover, when we come to a work such as Suzannah Biernoff's *Portraits of Violence: War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement*[78] (2017), we also wonder how an artist of Marc's alleged sensitivities could have affirmed the will to war in the face of great bodily disfigurements engendered by war. Although Biernoff's book is concerned with Allied casualties and disfigured bodies, the philosophical and medical approach she takes is illuminating and undoubtedly contributes to a validation of C1.

In spite of the illuminating interplay between the Expressionist body and war, as filtered through Marc's claims and Schopenhauer's philosophy, there are methodological imperfections to this thesis. One such imperfection might be attributed to an historical hiatus between the first four chapters and the latter two chapters which omits the Weimar era altogether. Certainly, the Weimar era was of great significance, and I could have argued that the phenomenon of *Lustmord*,[79] prevalent during this era, bridged that hiatus and vindicated C1. Indeed, at that time, distressing imagery of sexual murder stood out as

[76] Beckmann, M., *Briefe im Kriege* (München: A. Langen : G. Müller, 1955).
[77] Macke, A., *August Macke, Franz Marc, Briefwechsel : August Macke - Franz Marc, Lisbeth Macke - Maria Marc 1910 bis 1914 ; Franz Marc - Lisbeth Macke 3.8.1914 bis 5.2.1916 ; Lisbeth Macke - Maria Marc 6.8.1914 bis 14.3.1916* (Köln: DuMont Schauberg, 1964).
[78] Biernoff, S., *Portraits of Violence: War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement* (University of Michigan Press, 2017).
[79] *Lustmord* was a form of sexual homicide prevalent during the Weimar era. Often motivated by sadistic pleasure and a warped sense of public notoriety.

a compelling indicator of moral dissolution and social decay. As Wayne Anderson argues in his book *German Artists and Hitler's Mind: Avant-Garde Art in a Turbulent Era* (2007), some scholars such as himself, "think of *Lustmord* as an extreme type of Expressionism, a fanatical way of expressing something about one's private self."[80] Therefore, the aesthetic theme of my research could have considered the combined topic of *Lustmord*, Schopenhauer's moral philosophy, and his metaphysics of sexual love. However, the potential justification for such a strategy proved inadequate in view of two major considerations. From a methodological point of view, I had to make a crucial choice in terms of both historical procedure and philosophical theory. In the first instance, I felt that the common consensus between scholars that German Expressionism had 'died' at the end of the First World War was largely correct. Yet, German Expressionism was forcibly 'resurrected' through the political momentum of National Socialism, and I therefore argue that the most significant impact upon the human body came about not only as a result of war, but also as a result of National Socialism. In the second instance, the fate of the German Expressionist body, and the greater significance of National Socialism compared to Weimarism, could be more effectively examined by employing Schopenhauer's doctrines on morality and free will within this particular time-frame.

Immediately after the war, once-supportive critics of Expressionism who had believed in its revolutionary potential to transform society, perceived that it had not fulfilled its potential at all, rather they now believed that it had lapsed into a mere style of art. By 1919-20, as we learn from an October 1920 speech given by Worringer to the Goethe Society in Munich, he too had begun to feel that Expressionism had not realised its promise of metaphysical renewal in society. One year later, in 1921 Iwan Goll's article

[80] Andersen, W., *German Artists and Hitler's Mind: Avant-garde Art in a Turbulent Era* (Editions Fabriart, 2007). p.27.

'Expressionism Is Dying' (written for the periodical *Zenit*), expressed disillusionment not only with the politics of his time, but also with the demise of Expressionism.[81] However, as we shall learn in chapter 6 of this thesis, during the 1930s Expressionism became a talking point once more when Marxist scholars debated the renewed import of Expressionism. As Washton Long et al. argue:

> The controversy over Expressionism has been interpreted as the left's debate on the nature of modernism as it attempted to form a 'popular front' against fascism. Expressionism - understood as Germany's modern movement - came under attack from those convinced by Soviet ideology that a revolutionary art should be linked to realism and classicism.[82]

Yet, as will become clear in chapter 6 of this thesis, not every fascist was necessarily an anti-modernist, which for a time led to the 'resurrection' of Expressionism.' Indeed, as Jonathan George Petropoulos has revealed, amongst the Nazis, *Reichsführer-SS* Himmler "was not always a resolute anti-modernist. "[83] In addition, SS leader Count Klaus Baudissin, the director of the Folkwang Museum in Essen "was not a straightforward figure and at times expressed admiration for certain kinds of German Expressionism."[84] Moreover, as we shall see in chapter 6 of this thesis, the forcible resurrection of Expressionism for Nazi purposes was initially lauded by none other than Joseph Goebbels. In the first instance, he supported Berlin's NSD-Studentenbund which actively opposed the Nazi *volkisch* program.[85] In another instance, as Petropoulos has found:

> The propaganda minister also endorsed other pro-modernist groups during the period stretching to the autumn of 1935. An exhibition society called *Der Norden*, which frequently organized shows at the Ferdinand Möller Gallery in Berlin, and the art journal *Kunst der Nation*, which openly advocated Expressionism, were two such groups. Even the RkdbK published a monthly journal called *Die Kunstkammer*, which included illustrations of abstract works.[86]

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[81] Goll, I. 'Der Expressionismus stirbt' in: Micic, L., "Zenit: internacionalna revija za umetnosti-kulturu," in: *Zenit : internacionalna revija za umetnosti-kulturu.* (1921). 1, no. 8 (October,1921): 8-9.
[82] Long et al. p.312.
[83] Petropoulos, J., *Artists under Hitler: Collaboration and Survival in Nazi Germany* (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2014). p.162.
[84] Ibid.,p.165.
[85] NSD stands for the *Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (National Socialist German Students' League).
[86] Petropoulos, J. G., *Art as Politics in the Third Reich* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). p.24.

If we take the above context into account, not just as a political issue but also as a moral issue, then Chapter 5 ‘Degenerate Art, Degenerate Bodies - Otto Mueller and the Gypsies’, will interpret its findings according to Schopenhauer’s essay *On the Basis of Morality.* Along with Schopenhauer, I shall proceed with the belief that the bedrock of ethics is discernible through empiricism. Thus, Chapter 5 begins by stating some empirical facts, these being that following the war Germany faced many upheavals through revolution, war reparations, and economic depression. Following the collapse of the Weimar Republic, such upheavals formed the basis by which the Nazi dictatorship exploited the human body for political purposes in both art and society. Consequently, this chapter approaches the problem of the German Expressionist body as a political palimpsest under National Socialism. It therefore takes the work of Mueller for a case study in relation to his paintings of the gypsy people.

Initially, Chapter 5 explores what the concept ‘degenerate’ means through its intellectual origins. Following this, we explore Nazi concepts of race in relation to what they described and displayed as ‘degenerate’ art in the Munich *Entartete Kunst* exhibition of 1937. In this exhibition, the public were ‘educated’ by the Nazis as to what ‘degenerate’ bodies and ‘degenerate’ art looked like; amongst the many works on display were those of gypsies produced by Mueller. Although there is no extant evidence that Mueller read Schopenhauer, this chapter interprets and concludes its findings according to Schopenhauer’s moral philosophy.

The conclusion of Chapter 5 is that C1, when extended into Germany’s future and beyond Marc’s death stands for a paradox. Indeed, research shows that C1 appears to be both supportable and refutable according to the political trajectory of nascent Nazism. Therefore, through Schopenhauer’s philosophy, it will be shown on the one hand that the

embodied individual, as mere phenomenal appearance of the will, exists only in our representations. Whilst on the other hand, it will be shown that the plurality of embodied individuals, once described by Nazi ideology as a 'science of racial types' (*Rassenkunde*), could only find their true meaning in the will *per se* - through which we all share our most real being. As a result, Chapter 5 will conclude that if 'individuation is mere phenomenon or appearance', then C1 may be vindicated metaphysically but not aesthetically.

Many Expressionist artists were caught up in the vilification of an art at variance with such an ideology. This is explored in Stephanie Barron's tome, *Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany* (1991).[87] Similarly, Olaf Peters *et al*. have contributed to the debates surrounding art under Nazism in their book *Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany 1937* (2014).[88] However, the latter book lacks the rigorous attention to detail as found in the former, which offers a room by room inventory of works shown in the infamous *Entartete Kunst* exhibition, where much of Germany's modernist art was displayed with moralising censure. This moralising censure is contextualised by Guenter Lewy's article, who offers us an insight into Heinrich Himmler's strategy for dealing with the gypsy people in 'Himmler and the Racially Pure Gypsies'[89] (1999). This he does by revealing how the freedom of the travelling gypsy was undermined.

Although Chapter 5 helps us interpret notions of racial difference according to Schopenhauer's moral and 'evolutionary' theories, at first sight it appears weak in terms of an overt relationship to the world as will and the world as representation. Yet, if an application of Schopenhauer's moral theory appears unconvincing in this regard, let us

[87] Barron, S. and Guenther, P. W., *Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany* (Los Angeles, Calif. New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art. Harry N. Abrams, 1991).
[88] Peters, O. et al., *Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany, 1937* (Munich: Prestel, 2014).
[89] Lewy, G., "Himmler and the 'Racially Pure Gypsies'," in: *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 34, no. 2 (1999); Barron and Guenther.

remember that moral choices formed by totalitarian states always influence the ontology of its constituent peoples. As a result, only the most robust *frondeur* can disenthrall their will and representations from the powers of totalitarianism.

The issue of freedom under totalitarianism leads us to Chapter 6, 'Nolde, Nazism and the Fable of Free Will', which is grounded upon Schopenhauer's essay *On the Freedom of the Human Will.* By adopting Schopenhauer's philosophy of determinism, it becomes possible to explore some phenomenological aspects of Nolde's life under Nazism. In doing so, this chapter re-investigates Nolde's life under Nazism in a new light. This re-investigation begins by asserting that the work of historians such as Bernhard Fulda, Aya Soika, and Peter Vergo disregards free will in relation to Nolde as a moral and ontological problem. Of crucial importance to this problem, we shall question to what extent Nolde or any human being, could be described as free and responsible for their actions. We shall also question and expose the incongruity behind Schopenhauer's account of moral responsibility and how it can be applied to human beings.

We can learn something about the impact of Nazism upon Nolde's free will through documentary evidence such Hans Fehr's book *Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der Freundschaft* (1957).[90] We also have Nolde's written work, known collectively as *Mein Leben*, which is the title given to four volumes of his autobiographies. The first volume *Das eigene Leben* (1974)[91] was first published in 1931, and the second volume, *Jahre der Kämpfe*[92] was first published in 1934. Yet, there is a perceived drawback to these autobiographies, since as Fulda rightly shows after the war, "…the stewards of Nolde's legacy set out to sanitize his public image. Among the first actions of the Foundation was

[90] Fehr, H. and Smargiassi, G., *Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der Freundschaft* (Köln1957). Fehr was a close friend and confidante of Nolde's.
[91] Nolde, E. and Seebull, A., *Das eigene Leben: die Zeit der Jugend 1867-1902*, 4 ed. (Köln: DuMont Schauberg, 1974).
[92] Nolde, E., *Jahre der Kämpfe* (Berlin: Rembrandt-Verlag, 1934).

the publication of a new edition of Nolde's *Jahre der Kämpfe* in 1957, cleansed of its worst anti-Semitic passages."[93]

Although we are not obliged to trust self-promotion or the bias of friendship in the above memoires, equally we are not obliged to trust the accounts of scholars such as Fulda and Soika either. Despite producing essays such as 'Emil Nolde and the National Socialist Dictatorship' (2104),[94] which are often well written in terms of dates and biography, neither author is ever concerned with the problems of free will for Nolde. It therefore remains to be seen whether in 2018, Fulda's planned publication of a work titled *Emil Nolde and National Socialism: The Construction of Artistic* '*Genius*' *in the Twentieth Century*[95] addresses these inadequacies.

Chapter 6 in this thesis perhaps reveals a comparatively minor engagement with Nolde's art. Weighted towards the theoretical at the expense of the practical, the chapter may appear to be an operose existential analysis more than anything else, pervaded by an air of, as the French would say, *chacun à son gout*. Yet, this operose chapter questions the very possibility of freedom for Nolde through Schopenhauer's philosophy - a topic neglected by previous scholars. As a result, this analysis touches not only upon one of the most pressing concerns for an individual living under Nazism, but by an unspoken inference it foreshadows the fate of our own generation. Its theoretical bias therefore, is arguably a compelling vindication of C1 through Schopenhauer's philosophy and historical circumstance.

[93] Rüger, J. and Wachsmann, N., *Rewriting German History: New Perspectives on Modern Germany* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). p.185.
[94] Krämer, F., Nolde, E., and Städtische Galerie im Städelschen Kunstinstitut Frankfurt am Main, *Emil Nolde: Retrospective* (Munich Humlebæk [Denmark]: Prestel; Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, 2014).
[95] Fulda aims to build upon his work done on the mass media, politics and public opinion. Given his previous endeavours, one is doubly surprised that no mention of mass indoctrination found its way into his first essays on Nolde.

To date, little sustained research has been applied to links between Expressionist visual art and Schopenhauer's philosophy. Of what little there is we have Mark A. Cheetham's *The Rhetoric of Purity: Essentialist Theory and the Advent of Abstract Painting* (1994) [96] - one of the few books that explores direct links between Schopenhauer and artists such as Piet Mondrian, Paul Klee and Vasily Kandinsky. We also have Barbara Buenger's book, *Max Beckmann: Self-Portrait in Words: Collected Writings and Statements, 1903-1950* (1997)[97]; Marsha Morton's essay 'Painted sounds: Music in the Art of Max Beckmann'(2009)[98], and Robert Zimmer's *Zeitfahrt, Leidensfahrt, Erlösungsfahrt. Max Beckmanns Abfahrt als metaphysische Meditation im Geiste Schopenhauers* (*Journey through Time, Journey through Suffering, Journey through Redemption. Max Beckmann's Departure as a Metaphysical Spiritual Meditation*) (2005).[99] As a result, a scholarly lacuna exists between German Expressionist visual art and Schopenhauer's philosophy. Therefore, by establishing such links, this thesis offers new insights and new interpretations for the benefit of art history and philosophy alike.

This thesis reflects the "unfolding of a single thought"[100] which permeated Schopenhauer's major work *The World as Will and Representation* (1818).[101] Although he does not make explicit what that 'single thought' is, for Rudolf Malter it implies that "the world is the self-knowledge of the will."[102] Similarly, John Atwell believes that the

[96] Cheetham, M. A., *The Rhetoric of Purity: Essentialist Theory and the Advent of Abstract Painting* (Cambridge University Press, 1994).
[97] Beckmann, M. and Buenger, B. C., *Max Beckmann: Self-Portrait in Words: Collected Writings and Statements, 1903-1950.* (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
[98] Marsha Morton 'Painted sounds': Music in the Art of Max Beckmann' in: Morton, M., *Of Truths Impossible To Put In Words: Max Beckmann Contextualized* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009).
[99] See: Zimmer Robert, 'Zeitfahrt, Leidensfahrt, Erlösungsfahrt. Max Beckmanns Abfahrt als metaphysische Meditation im Geiste Schopenhauers' in: Baum, G. n. and Birnbacher, D., *Schopenhauer und die Künste* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2005). pp. 141-154. Whilst the editors have touched on the 'arts' in relation to Schopenhauer, they have also included an essay by Thomas Röske about the Symbolist painter Max Klinger which is called 'Der Zeichner als verneinender Künstler. Max Klinger und Arthur Schopenhauer'. See pp.118-136.
[100] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.286. See also ibid., Vol. 1.p.xiii.
[101] Ibid., This work was published in December 1818 but also bears a publication date for 1819
[102] Malter, R., *Der eine Gedanke: Hinführung zur Philosophie Arthur Schopenhauers* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988); Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. Translated by Janaway from Malter, p.4.

'single thought' reflects how "the double-sided world is the striving of the will to become fully conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, self-divisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self-affirmation, and then reach salvation."[103] By contrast, my interpretation of this 'single thought' parallels that of Marc, who claimed that in his day the world as will took precedence over the world as representation.[104] Consequently, the unifying thought behind this thesis explores the extent to which the will is almighty (*allmächtig*) and predominant in the life and art of Expressionism.[105] This exploration is therefore divided into six chapters for the purpose of communicating an organic whole. Each chapter of this organic whole supports the other and presupposes its neighbour, and as a system of thought, attempts to mirror the architectonic structure of Schopenhauer's major work.

It is important to note that the first five words in the title of this thesis have been borrowed from Leni Riefenstahl's 1934 film *Triumph des Willens*.[106] In referencing this now historic and controversial film, the intention is *not* to imply the spirit of National Socialism but instead how the concept of 'the will' attained the status of what Foucault might call a 'metanarrative' under different guises during the early twentieth century. In National Socialist thinking it adopted a kind of 'monolithic' and 'mythic status' in bolstering the political legitimacy of the regime, and yet, in the field of the visual arts it

[103] Atwell, J. E., *Schopenhauer on the Character of the World: The Metaphysics of Will* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). p.31. Atwell adds that: "In several places Schopenhauer does use *der einzige Gedanke* (the single thought), *der eine Gedanke* (the one thought), and *mein Hauptgedanke* (my main thought), and he frequently states what may be considered the single thought; but he never puts the two together in an explicit fashion, that is, he never says, 'See, here is the single thought, and it goes thus and so' " ibid., p.188. fn,1. See also: Taylor, T. G., "Platonic Ideas, Aesthetic Experience, and the Resolution of Schopenhauer's Great Contradiction," in: *International Studies in Philosophy* Vol. 19, no. 3 (1987). p.43-53.

[104] Schopenhauer says that "the master is the will, the servant the intellect, for in the last instance the will is always in command, and therefore constitutes the real core, the being-in-itself, of man." Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.208. See also p.136. For more information on this topic see: Hannan, B., *The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer's Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 2009). p.13. Also: Janaway, C., *Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsche's Educator* (Clarendon Press, 1998). p.60.

[105] There are many instances where Schopenhauer takes the view that the will is *allmächtig* as in: Schopenhauer, A. and Hübscher, A., *Manuscript Remains in Four Volumes.* (Oxford: Berg, 1988). Vol.3.

[106] Riefenstahl gave to Hitler the collected works of philosopher J.G .Fichte which consisted of eight volumes bound in vellum and gold leafed paper edges. She signed the inner cover of volume 1 with the words to "my dear Führer." See: Ryback, T. W., *Hitler's Private Library: The Books that Shaped his Life* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008). p.100.

can be understood and employed in a much more nuanced way. As a result, our understanding of how German Expressionist painters in the early 20th century found themselves conflicted by the forces of modernity, might be empowered by Schopenhauer's concept of 'the will', through which we can reinterpret the nature of German modernism. For our purposes today, nearly a hundred years on, Schopenhauer's concept may reignite our thinking about German Expressionism by exploring the ways in which 'the will', *as defined by Schopenhauer*, could have literally 'triumphed' through some of the most radical and exciting forms of creative expression to have emerged during the 20th century.

That said, 'the triumph of the will' in a strictly philosophical sense - and in a sense which offsets any misconstrual that the title of this thesis implies a 'triumph' of Hitlerism - can be understood through its polar opposite – a denial of the will. Therefore, let us hear Schopenhauer who says that:

> The doctrine of original sin (affirmation of the will) and of salvation (denial of the will) is really the great truth which constitutes the kernel of Christianity…Accordingly, we should interpret Jesus Christ always in the universal, as the symbol or personification of the denial of the will-to-live, but not in the individual, whether according to his mythical history in the Gospels, or according to the probably true history lying at the root thereof.[107]

Yet, it may always be problematic for some to come to terms with Schopenhauer's use of the concept 'will' – one which can all too easily be conflated with Riefenstahl's film and Nazism. Therefore, with regards to this concept, perhaps a full explanation from Schopenhauer might help when he argues that:

> …no word could exist to describe the concept of this genus. I therefore name the genus after its most important species, the direct knowledge of which lies nearest to us, and leads to the indirect knowledge of all the others. But anyone who is incapable of carrying out the required extension of the concept will remain involved in a permanent misunderstanding. For by the word *will*, he will always understand only that species of it hitherto exclusively described by the term, that is to say, the will guided by knowledge, strictly according to motives, indeed only

[107] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.,p.405.

> to abstract motives, thus manifesting itself under the guidance of the faculty of reason.[108]

In this thesis, we too shall also distinguish between the innermost essence of the phenomenon of the world as representation and then by analogy transfer it to every other 'weaker' less distinct phenomena pertaining to the same essence. By doing so, we extend the concept of will beyond the common interpretation of 'the will as being guided by knowledge' and one strictly according to motives.

[108] Ibid.,p.111.

Note on Russian Translated Names

A number of artists referred to and discussed in this text were of Russian origin. Consequently, their names were originally transliterated according to the German system. Whilst this system still pertains in German academic literature, French and Anglo-American literature has employed different approaches. For the purposes of this thesis therefore the Library of Congress system has been adopted. The adjectival suffix 'ии' is transliterated 'y', as in Kandinsky (as opposed to 'ii'). The syllable 'кс' is rendered as 'x', as in Alexei (as opposed to 'ks'). The Cyrillic 'в' is rendered 'v' as in Verevkina (as opposed to the German 'w' or the archaic tendency of using of 'ff'); The Cyrillic 'x' is rendered 'kh' as in Sakharov (as opposed to the German 'ch'); The Cyrillic 'ч' is rendered 'ch' (as opposed to the Germanic 'tsch'); and the Cyrillic 'я' is rendered 'ya' as in Yavlensky (as opposed to the Germanic 'ja'). In relation to Russian the nomenclature 'von' which is sometimes used in the German tradition in relation to Russian names is not employed. This brings the spelling of proper nouns into line with more standard spellings in the current Anglo-American literature.

Chapter 1: Vasily Kandinsky and the World as Representation

Introduction

> The world is my representation: this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective abstract consciousness. If he really does so, philosophical discernment has dawned on him. It then becomes clear and certain to him that he does not know a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth; that the world around him is there only as representation, in other words, only in reference to another thing, namely that which represents, and this is himself.[109]

For Schopenhauer, everything that is knowable, the entire world, is an object in relation to the human subject, the perception of a perceiver, a representation.[110] On that basis, we shall consider Kandinsky's art only in so far as it can be considered in terms of the world as representation - that is to say we shall proceed with the understanding that a representation is a mental picture in the mind. We shall consider his art up until the year 1914 and inform our discussion through Schopenhauer's 'First Book: The World as Representation First Aspect'. As shall become clear by the second chapter of this thesis, by using this methodology it means that what we are abstracting from in this chapter is the will. The will alone is entirely one side of our bifurcated world, just as the other side of our world is entirely representation, but "a reality that is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which also Kant's thing-in-itself has unfortunately degenerated in his hands), is the phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an *ignis fatuus* in philosophy."[111]

In this chapter we shall begin by defining what a representation is according to Schopenhauer's philosophy. In doing so, we will explore the difference between intuitive representations and abstract representations as they relate to Kandinsky's art - on Schopenhauer's terms. Following this, we shall investigate Kandinsky's reading of

[109] Ibid.Vol.1, p.3. Cf. *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol,2.p.3.
[110] *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.3.
[111] Ibid., p.4.

Schopenhauer's work *On Vision and Colours* – particularly in relation to Kandinsky's use of the colour white in a manner which may uphold C2. We shall then proceed by examining the attitudes of Kandinsky towards human anatomy and his reasons for them. These attitudes suggest that Kandinsky was more attracted to the metaphysical rather than the physical, both as an artist and thinker. This possibility arguably undermines C1 since he was led away from the embodiedness of willing towards ever greater abstraction.

Our discussion is then led on to a study of Kandinsky's imputed theosophical leanings and what might be described as a metaphysics of abstract representation. On that basis, this chapter looks again at the suggested origins of Kandinsky's first abstract pictures and his interest in science. In the final instance, we explore possible parallels between Kandinsky's reading of Schopenhauer and their respective thoughts on the development of children's visual faculties.

Overall, we can assert that it is probably the case that Kandinsky was influenced by Schopenhauer to some degree and that his work can be interpreted through the latter's philosophy.

1.1 Representation, Intuitive Perception (*Anschauung*), and Abstract Representation[112]

The problem of representation which we are exploring was of major importance to Kandinsky and his generation. By the time Kandinsky had moved to Munich in 1896, the *Jugendstil* movement was establishing itself under the influence of Hermann Obrist. Whilst it did so, Obrist's creative partner August Endell saw that there was a conjunction between *Jugendstil* decoration and the development of non-representational art. As Peg Weiss states, shortly after Kandinsky's move to Munich, Endell predicted that there would

[112] Intuition (*Anschauung*), refers to immediate experience which grounds the formation of abstract concepts through the faculty of reason. Most often it refers to our grasp of empirical objects, and as such intuition here is to be regarded as intellectual and therefore an operation of the faculty of understanding. In terms of translation, as Cartwright has shown, "E. F. J. Payne generally translated the term '*Anschauung*' as perception or as 'intuitive perception'." Cartwright., p.88.

in future be "…an art with forms that mean nothing and represent nothing and remind one of nothing, yet that will be able to move our souls so deeply, so strongly, as before only music has been able to do with tones."[113] In addition, Weiss also reveals how Adolf Hölzel at the time was making what he termed abstract ornaments.[114] Therefore, we may infer that Kandinsky reflected upon the future of abstraction and 'conventional' representations within this aesthetic milieu.

Along with Kandinsky, Marc recognised that 'conventional' representations (*Vorstellungen*) in art showed no sign of disappearing, even though such representations were rapidly becoming ciphers of the past.[115] In Marc's opinion, old ideas and creations lived on in a world of appearances (*Scheinleben*), whilst the avant-garde were faced with a Herculean task of driving them away. Furthermore, Marc avouched that:

> Schopenhauer extolled the victory of the will over representation (*Vorstellung*). In our hands this has been transformed into the victory of knowledge over representation. The good European created this precise way of thinking that stands this side of representation, material and custom, a familiarity with the absolute…[116]

Since the concept of 'representation' is of significance to our evaluation of C1 and C2, let us define what a representation is according to Schopenhauer. From the second edition of *The World as Will and Representation*, we receive a concise enough definition, a representation is "a very complicated physiological occurrence in an animal's brain, whose result is the consciousness of a picture at that very spot."[117] Furthermore, the whole form of our body is made known to us only through knowledge and representation - not through mere feeling - and only in our brain do our bodies become known to us as an

[113] Weiss, P., "Kandinsky and the 'Jugendstil' Arts and Crafts Movement," in: The Burlington Magazine Vol. 117, no. 866 (1975). p.270. See also: Roessler, A., "Das Abstrakte Ornament mit gleichzeitiger Verwendung simultaner Farbenkontraste," in: Wiener Abendpost (1863). Supplement to Nr. 228, 6th October 1903, n.p.
[114] Weiss, "Kandinsky and the 'Jugendstil' Arts and Crafts Movement." p.270.
[115] Marc, F. and Lankheit, K., *Schriften* (Köln: DuMont, 1978). p.144.
[116] Ibid., Aphorism 40, p.197.
[117] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.191.

extended living thing.[118] Therefore, if Kandinsky as an artist had a representational picture in his mind, then this representation was not a figment of his imagination, since perceptual objects as intuitive representations existed outside of his head. This means that for all individuals, objects exist in the outer world and are not mere figments of the imagination. Nor are they results of changes in our sensory apparatus or even sensory representations that are non-mediated. Neither are sensations perceptual objects, even though sensations give rise to perceptual objects through the faculty of understanding (*der Verstand*).

The understanding is one of three cognitive faculties, (sensibility and reason being the others), and is "the immediate, non-reflective and non-conceptual cognition of the relation of cause to effect."[119] Schopenhauer suggested that our cognisance of the outer world, consisting of intuitive representations, is the construction of an unconscious and instantaneous application of the law of causality to our sensations. Therefore, the understanding assigns a cause to our sensations so that every cause is attributed to a spatial location. Through the understanding, Schopenhauer says that the human subject 'knows' but is known by none and is the conditional supporter of the world and all that appears in it.[120] On that basis, we could innocently interpret this notion to mean that every experience requires "an experiencer."[121] In other words, there can be no object without a correlative subject. Schopenhauer's belief is that whatever exists, exists for the subject, and because of this the body is an object for the subject and therefore a representation. The body is also an object amidst other objects and subservient to the laws of nature which

[118] *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.20.
[119] Cartwright., p.175. See also: Hilgers, T., *Aesthetic Disinterestedness: Art, Experience, and the Self* (Taylor & Francis, 2016). p.40.
[120] When the word 'subject' is being used in this thesis it refers to the human individual, not as in art history which refers to a topic or theme of a picture. When the word 'object' is used in this thesis, it refers to any object external to the individual and of an empirical nature.
[121] Janaway, C., *Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). p.118. Cf.Atwell.,p.36.

pertain to all objects. Therefore, as an object, the body sits inside the forms of knowledge which co-ordinate time, space and plurality.[122]

The world as representation consists of two indivisible components, that of subject and object. If one of these components disappeared then the world as representation would disappear, since subject and object have a reciprocal relationship to each other. These two components create an essential totality, and this totality constitutes the world as representation.[123] If this is taken away, then all that is left is the purely metaphysical thing-in-itself - which in the second chapter we shall argue is the will.[124]

The fundamental difference among our representations is between those of intuitive and abstract representations. The latter consist of concepts and belong only to human beings, while intuitive representations embrace all that is visible, all of external experience, and every condition for the world's existence.[125] All intuitive perception (*Anschauung*) is independent of experience, which entails that "the properties of space and time, as they are known in *a priori* perception or intuition, are valid for all possible experience as laws."[126] Since Schopenhauer argues that experience necessarily accords with these laws, we shall consider Kandinsky's abstract and intuitive representations on these terms.

In this chapter, the phrase 'abstract representation' is being used in Schopenhauer's sense, which refers to conceptual constructs in the brain, whilst the phrase 'intuitive perception' is being used in his sense of apprehending external objects. When we apply Schopenhauer's thinking to Kandinsky's perception of the world, we find that it

[122] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.5. Cf. On The Fourfold Root of The Principle of Sufficient Reason. p.121.
[123] The World as Will and Representation.Vol.2, p.18.
[124] Ibid., p.18.
[125] *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.16.
[126] Ibid., p.7.

must have been subject to the laws of causality and the conditions of matter – and in chapter 6 of this thesis such laws shall figure in our explorations of Nolde's free will. Therefore, no individual can acquire a perception unless an effect is received through their body. As a result, every change undergone by an individual's body is known instantly as a feeling, and because such feelings are often traceable to a cause the perception of an object is made intelligible to the individual through this process.[127]

The above description is not, Schopenhauer argues, the conclusion of abstract thought, but is immediate, absolutely necessary and certain. The above process of perception he calls the cognitive method used by the pure understanding, which is necessary for perception to occur. This occurs through the faculty of understanding (the brain) which converts sensation into perception immediately, so that what the hand or eye experiences *per se* is merely raw sensory data. In the process, therefore the understanding passes from effects to their causes by uniting "space and time in the representation of matter. This world as representation exists only through the understanding, and only for the understanding."[128]

1.2 Kandinsky, Colour and his reading of Schopenhauer

Schopenhauer explains how the understanding creates perception in the first chapter of his essay *On Vision and Colours*,[129] and also in section §21of his essay *On the Principle of Sufficient Reason.*[130] Kandinsky owned a copy of *On Vision and Colours*[131] and in this copy he has pencil-marked the text with perpendicular strokes or question marks in the margins. These 'glosses' reveal that Kandinsky appears to have

[127] Ibid., p.11-12.
[128] Ibid., p.12.
[129] Schopenhauer, A., Runge, P. O., and Stahl, G., *On Vision and Colors; Color Sphere* (Princeton Architectural Press, 2012).
[130] See also: Schopenhauer and Payne. Section §21.
[131] Kandinsky read this essay in Schopenhauer's *Sämmtliche Werke* (collected Works) of 1854. Kirchner too had an interest in 'On Vision and Colours' as explained in Chapter 3.

been thinking about the physiology of representation and colour. It also perhaps reveals a greater interest in the world as representation, as opposed to that of the will - which at this stage of our investigations might suggest that, through Kandinsky at least, C1 could be refuted. Furthermore, it could indicate that Kandinsky was probing the formation of brain generated appearances through his reading of Schopenhauer, and thus validating C2.

What these 'glosses' may reveal is that Kandinsky was probably interested in the activity of the retina, intuitive perception and children's visual development. From the second chapter of *On Vision and Colours*, Kandinsky has paid special attention to the philosopher's disquisition on light and the colour white.[132] He has placed a question mark against a specific area of Schopenhauer's text where he suggests that white could be regarded as diffused light, and the passage which says, "…if we want to express the effect through the cause, then Goethe's explanation of white appearing in the physical way, as perfect turbidity, is appropriate and correct. Bodies that do not react on the eye at all under the influence of light are black."[133] We can relate this 'explanation of white' to Kandinsky's art, as in *The White Sound* of 1908 (fig. 1) which was exhibited in the Berlin Secession, and Hagen in 1909. The image, which has a woodcut made from it, is quite abstract, with at least three human figures, two of which appear to have white halos.

[132] In a letter to Ernst Otto Lindner of 01.05.1852, Schopenhauer said that the treatise on vision and colours was not essential reading yet good to read alongside his other works. As Janaway argues, although Schopenhauer was ambivalent towards *On Vision and Colours*, the work is important from the standpoint of idealism and his philosophical progress. Janaway highlights too that the work introduces "Schopenhauer's use of the term 'urphenomenon', a concept that would play a vital role in his ethics and in his statement of philosophical methodology." Schopenhauer, A., Cartwright, D. E., and Janaway, C., *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* (Cambridge [u.a.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).p.xliii, fn.52. Cartwright and Janaway suggest that Schopenhauer may have developed the concept of *urphänomen* from Goethe's *On the Theory of Colours* of 1810 since Goethe contended that light and dark were *urphänomene* for colours. However, Cartwright and Janaway add that "Schopenhauer found the phenomena of lightness and darkness not to be urphenomena, because they could be accounted for by states or modifications of the eye, and thus, by physical phenomena." In section 21 of *On the Basis of Morals*, Schopenhauer does ascribe compassion to the concept of 'urphenomenon', as something which is irreducible to other phenomenon. See also: Cartwright. p.247. (We shall investigate Schopenhauer's moral philosophy in Chapter 5).

[133] Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl.p.60. Cf. Schopenhauer, A., *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6*, *6* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1854). p.37.

However, the halos, and a large area of off-white created in an undefinable shape, are ironically the only whites in an otherwise red, pink, yellow, green and blue composition.

We also have *St.George I* of 1911 (fig. 2), where Will Grohmann has indicated that Kandinsky "escapes the problem of space by use of a great amount of white, which is at once mystical and so transparent that it seems to be trying to let us glimpse the finiteness of unlimited space."[134] Grohmann adds that, with *Picture with White Form* (fig. 3) of 1913 and *Composition VII* (fig. 4) of 1913, "it is hard to find where these pictures begin or end. They are excisions from the whole of the world, from the creative process which has no beginning or end…events do not happen, they are there, and Kandinsky comes across them."[135]

Kandinsky 'discovered' the use of white during the hot summer of 1911, when nature literally appeared to him white. He recalled that "suddenly, all nature seemed to me white; white (great silence - full of possibilities) displayed itself everywhere and expanded visibly."[136] Later, he would recall this feeling after observing how white had played a vital part in his pictures. Since that time, he had found that there were immeasurable possibilities for the use of white as a primordial colour. Previously, he had regarded the presence of white in large masses as requisite for mere linear emphasis, whilst being troubled by the wild properties of its inner strength. The discovery of which he said, "was of enormous importance for me."[137]

The importance of white can be seen in Kandinsky's early woodcuts and the painting *White Sound*, which in their imagery and technique parallel Stefan George's early

[134] Grohmann, W., *Wassily Kandinsky: Life and Work* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959). p.151.
[135] Ibid., p.151.
[136] Kandinsky,V. Cologne Lecture 'Kandinsky über seine Entwicklung.' Johannes Eichner, Kandinsky und Gabriele Münter, von Ursprüngen Moderner Kunst' (Munich), 1957 in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo. p.397-98.
[137] Kandinsky, V. Cologne Lecture 'Kandinsky über seine Entwicklung.' Johannes Eichner, 'Kandinsky und Gabriele Münter, von Ursprüngen Moderner Kunst' (Munich), 1957 in: ibid., p.397-98.

poems, especially *White Song*.[138] Indeed, Weiss suggests that the woodcuts and painting "…represent both a thematic and a stylistic convergence of the 'lyric,' the 'graphic,' and the 'painterly'- and a major step in the transformation from Symbolism to abstraction."[139] By contrast, Kandinsky asserts that the colour black, as the opposite of white, "has an inner sound of nothingness bereft of possibilities, a dead nothingness as if the sun had become extinct, an eternal silence without future, without hope."[140] This reinforces the fact that the colour white was of importance to Kandinsky's creativity, as does his argument that the colour white, when isolated, evokes an emotion, an 'inner sound'.[141]

Kandinsky's concept of 'inner sound' stands for the intrinsic meaning of objects, words, colours and movements.[142] However, we should not be misled into suspecting that there is some sort of correspondence between Kandinsky's concept of an 'inner sound' and Schopenhauer's reference to the content of the world as representation - which the latter describes as relating to its "innermost being, its kernel, the thing-in-itself."[143] Indeed, according to Schopenhauer, the 'inner' kernel of all genuine knowledge arises only from perception, or the fruit of perception, and every genuine thought takes place through pictures or images.[144]

Despite an apparent similarity, Kandinsky's 'inner sound' cannot stand for the 'innermost being' of representation since sound pertains to phenomena and not essence. The only way in which it might stand for the 'innermost essence', as far as Schopenhauer's philosophy is concerned, would be in the case of musical sound where he states that music is a direct objectification and reproduction of the will. Therefore, music is not a mere copy

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[138] See: Weiss, P. and Kandinsky, W., *Kandinsky in Munich: The Formative Jugendstil Years* (Princeton; Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1979). pp. 93, 180, 198, and *passim.*
[139] Weiss, "Kandinsky and the Symbolist Heritage." p.139.
[140] On the Spiritual in Art [*Über das Geistige in der Kunst: Insbesondere in der Malerei*] 2d ed., (Munich), 1912 in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo. p.185.
[141] Reflections on Abstract Art ["Reflexions sur l'art abstrait"] Cahiers d'Art (Paris), 1, nos. 7-8 (1935) in: ibid., p.767.
[142] Cardullo, R. J., "Wassily Kandinsky's The Yellow Sound as a Total Work of Art," in: *Neohelicon* (2017). No page number given.
[143] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.30-31.
[144] *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.72.

of the Platonic Ideas, (we shall examine the latter in chapter 3), as we find in other arts, but it is "a copy of the will itself."[145] By comparison, Kandinsky's concept of 'inner sound' is too broad and too sensual, missing out on Schopenhauer's distinct belief that music "surpasses even that of the world of perception itself."[146]

For his description of the world of perception Schopenhauer employs an artistic simile for the process. When an artist (or any human being) has sensory experiences, intuitive perceptions are the work of the faculty of understanding (the brain). The perceptions of the senses provide materials for the brain to work with which means that "the understanding is the artist forming the work, whereas the senses are merely the assistants who hand up the materials."[147] This material explanation is 'mundane', tangible and entirely of this world, yet by comparison Kandinsky held 'extra-mundane' beliefs which are antithetical to Schopenhauer's, who denies that there is an independent 'extra-mundane' world of the spirit. He also denies that the mind causes the external world of objects to appear, as with idealism, since causality only applies between objects. He argues that philosophies of materialism and idealism, which ground themselves upon the notion of causality, are incorrect. As a result:

> The whole world of objects is and remains representation,and is for this reason wholly and forever conditioned by the subject; in other words, it has transcendental ideality. But it is not on that account falsehood or illusion; it presents itself as what it is, as representation, and indeed as a series of representations, whose common bond is the principle of sufficient reason.[148]

Having stated this, Schopenhauer asks two fundamental questions which have a bearing upon our investigations. He asks, "What is this world of perception besides being my

[145] *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.257.
[146] Ibid., p.256.
[147] On The Fourfold Root of The Principle of Sufficient Reason. p.114.
[148] The World as Will and Representation.Vol.1, p.15. Transcendental Idealism, (*Transzendentaler Idealismus*), can be defined as follows by Cartwright who states that: "This is Immanuel Kant's theory that we only experience or have knowledge of the appearances of things and not things in themselves. Schopenhauer ascribed to Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves, and he agreed with Kant, but for different reasons. Our experiences of empirical reality are conditioned by the a priori forms of space, time, and causality, but he maintained that the essence expressed in all appearances, the thing in itself, is will." See: Cartwright.,p.174.

representation? Is that of which I am conscious only as representation just the same as my own body, of which I am doubly conscious, on the one hand as *representation*, on the other as *will*?"[149] This is important, because for Schopenhauer the body is the starting-point for our perception of the world. It is also important to us, because we are going to consider the body as an object, as something knowable throughout this thesis since it is both will and representation.

According to Schopenhauer, contrary to reductive philosophies such as Cartesian dualism, the body is a single thing revealed to us in a double way. Since this is the case, we may claim that Kandinsky, as an embodied being, experienced himself as an object in space and time, thus standing in an *a priori* causal relationship with other objects in the world. Like everyone else, Kandinsky had an intuitive perception of his body just as he did of other objects in the world. In the same way that he received sensory data concerning other external objects in the world, so he received sensory data about his own body. Therefore, Kandinsky's body was for him an object of representation. However, in contrast to other objects in the world, Kandinsky possessed a particular knowledge of his body, as one experienced from within. He experienced his body from within as a phenomenal object for self-consciousness, which at the same time was a manifestation of the will. Indeed, Schopenhauer argues that this is the double manner in which we understand our bodies as *both* will and as objects of representation - from without *and* from within. Therefore, let us propose that the double manner in which we understand our bodies as human beings permits us to enter into the metaphysical substrate of the Expressionist body.[150]

[149] Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation., p.18.
[150] We shall explore this 'double manner' in greater depth in Chapter 2.

1.3 Kandinsky, Schopenhauer and the Body

The body was an aesthetic problem for Kandinsky from early on in his career. His aesthetic problems with the body began in 1897 after he became an art student at the school of Slovenian painter Anton Ažbe. Kandinsky recollected that the discipline of life drawing classes under Ažbe imposed a constraint upon his freedom which turned him into a temporary 'slave' by "studying from the model."[151] Although Ažbe's life classes were well attended, Kandinsky could not help but notice how students were "trying to represent exactly the anatomy, structure, and character of these people who were of no concern to them."[152] In their careful attention to detail, Kandinsky believed that they spent very little time thinking about art.[153] On the one hand, he found the play of lines in the nude models interesting, while on the other sometimes repulsive. In addition, through many of the models' postures, he claimed that he had to force himself to reproduce them. As a result, he was in almost continual conflict with himself, and it was only when he had left the life classes that he felt free again to paint or draw as he wished.[154]

In spite of all of this, he did follow two anatomy courses conscientiously, in the second of which he reluctantly "breathed the corpse-ridden air."[155] He was disinclined to study anatomy after hearing of a direct relationship between anatomy and art, saying that, "It even offended me - in the same way that I had taken offense at being taught that a tree trunk must always be depicted as joined to the ground."[156] Although he felt creatively isolated due to these issues, he found that a human head, even a very ugly one, could be

[151] Wassily Kandinsky, 'Reminiscences/Three Pictures ["Rückblicke"; "Komposition 4"; "Komposition 6"; "Bild mit weissem Rand"] *Kandinsky, 1901-1913* (Berlin), 1913 in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo. p.373.
[152] Ibid., p.374.
[153] Ibid., p.374.
[154] Ibid., p.374.
[155] Ibid., p.374-75.
[156] Ibid., p.375.

beautiful.[157] Consequently, he could stand in front of 'ugly' models and admire them, comparing them with the ingenuity of the natural world.[158]

Some years later, in a letter of 1910, Kandinsky described the influence of Hugo von Habermann and Franz von Lenbach as those "who doggedly pursued the asymmetrical structure of anatomy."[159] Although he acknowledged Professor Siegfried Mollier's lectures on anatomy which were most popular, it comes as no surprise that in a lecture of 1914 (delivered by proxy in Cologne) Kandinsky referred to the human body as an object which often displeased him.[160] He recalled that:

> I saw with displeasure in other people's pictures elongations that contradicted the structure of the body, or anatomical distortions, and knew well that this would not and could not be for me the solution to the question of representation. Thus, objects began gradually to dissolve more and more in my pictures. This can be seen in nearly all the pictures of 1910. [161]

In his notes for this Cologne lecture, Kandinsky describes his slow emancipation from artistic prejudices. Through *Sketch for Composition II* of 1910 (fig. 5), he points to the liberated use of colour without concern for perspective. Yet, in the context of this painting, and the human body as a representation, he said that he always found it unpleasant, even distasteful "to allow the figures to remain within the bounds of physiological laws and at the same time indulge in compositional distortions."[162] It therefore appeared to him, that if one physical area was destroyed out of pictorial necessity, then other physical areas could receive the same treatment also.

Although Kandinsky claimed that he always found it unpleasant to allow 'figures to remain within the bounds of physiological laws', there is evidence to contradict this.

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[157] Ibid., p.375.
[158] Ibid., p.375.
[159] Wassily Kandinsky, 'Letters from Munich' ["Pis'mo iz Miunkhena"] *Apollon* (St. Petersburg), 1909-1910, in: ibid., p.70.
[160] The lecture was designed to mark an exhibition of his work at the Deutsches Theater in Cologne.
[161] Kandinsky, W., Lindsay, K. C., and Vergo, P., *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art* (London: Faber and Faber, 1982). p.396.
[162] *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.395.

For instance, *Kochel - Lady standing by the Forest's Edge* of 1902 (fig. 6), an oil on canvasboard, is a competent representation of the female form. Executed in an Impressionist style, and painted with bold brushstrokes, the figure looks out at the viewer from a background of dense forest. Similarly, his *Portrait of Gabriele Münter* of 1905 (fig. 7) is an oil on canvas painted in Dresden, showing Münter's pale face set against a deep blue background. He captures her expression with great competence, her eyes and mouth expressing a petulant personality. Neither of these works have been created by one who was defeated, or truly displeased by a representation of the human body, nor is the latter painting a '*Saumalerei*' (mess), as he claimed in a letter to Münter of 1905.[163] However, if we accept that the body is a manifestation of the will, then it may be that Kandinsky's distaste for the body refutes C1 since he moves away from it in favour of abstraction or near abstraction. Indeed, we may also consider the fact that in comparison to *Die Brücke* artists, he and many of the *Der Blaue Reiter* group preferred to contemplate the world of 'spirit' rather than that of the body.[164] That said, in chapter 3 of this thesis, we explore Kirchner 's depiction of the nude and how contemplation of a nude may (in theory) lead us to metaphysical knowledge.

From Schopenhauer's point of view, the manifestation of the body assumes the world of representation, in as much as the body as object is in the world. Yet the representation equally assumes the body, since it results from "the function of an organ of the body" [165] - the brain. This organ has arisen from the will, and through it the will is able to recognise itself in an individual's self-consciousness.[166] On this basis, Schopenhauer

[163] Letter from Kandinsky to Münter dated 18.09.1905. See: Roethel, H. K., Benjamin, J. K., and Kandinsky, W., *Kandinsky: Catalogue Raisonné of the Oil Paintings. Vol. 1, 1900-1915* (London: Sotheby, 1982). p.152.
[164] This comparison offers fertile ground for future research into the validity of C1 and C2 in relation to the amount of emphasis *Die Brücke* and *Der Blaue Reiter* could be said to have placed upon metaphysics versus the empirical respectively.
[165] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.276
[166] Ibid., p.300.

asserts that, as the truly metaphysical, the will "is not like the intellect, a function of the body, but the body is its function; therefore, *ordine rerum* it is prior to that body, as it is the metaphysical substratum of that body, the in-itself of that body's phenomenal appearance."[167]

Even though the body displeased Kandinsky, when faced with criticism he could use a metaphysics of the body as a metaphor for artistic resilience. He recalled how he and his fellow Expressionists at one point "…stood with both feet implanted in the spirit of the awakening art, and lived in this spirit with soul and body."[168] Indeed, as Betsy F. Moeller-Sally points out, scholars have virtually neglected the more physical aspects of Kandinsky's art, preferring to discuss his abstract representations instead.[169] She alerts readers to Philippe Sers's extensive study of Kandinsky's philosophy of the abstract which, "contains an entry for 'hear', but not for 'body, 'love' or sexuality'."[170] However, she perhaps overstates her case, since Rose-Carol Washton Long and Valery Turchin do attend to earthly themes such as the erotic, particularly in the context of Kandinsky's cultural environment - Turchin studying eroticism in relation to Kandinsky's depictions of women. These two scholars conclude that it would be erroneous to assume that a lack of conspicuous eroticism in Kandinsky's art meant that there was none at all.[171]

Washton Long and Moeller-Sally's arguments are not certainties, but there is some empirical evidence which might support their physical views of Kandinsly's art as in the painting *Nude* of 1911 (fig. 8), a watercolour on thin cardboard, which was exhibited in the Moderner Bund in Zurich, during July 1912. As one might expect from his comments, Kandinsky did not paint nudes often, but he did create a larger oil painting of the same

[167] Ibid., p.214.
[168] Schopenhauer and Payne. *Parerga and Paralipomena* Vol.2, p.2.
[169] Moeller-Sally, B. F., "Inner Simmering: Unveiling the Erotic in Kandinsky," in: *The Russian Review* Vol. 61, no. 1 (2002). p.5.
[170] Ibid., p.53.
[171] Ibid., p.53.

title on 11.03.1911. In this image, we can see that the female body is still recognisable as an object derived from intuitive perception, but only through the simple delineation of form by line and colour, indicating that the tendency towards abstraction has begun. In spite of the nakedness of the body in question, it does not really equate to eroticism. Indeed, although an erotic and earthy reading of Kandinsky's art is often at variance with the evidence, Moeller-Sally remains convinced that Kandinsky did employ the erotic. Her conviction was that Kandinsky was "representing the making of art in terms of making love" and that his art was veiled by "...processes he sometimes described as 'clothing' (*Einkleidung*) and 'fitting a gown' (*Zurichtung eines Gewandes*)."[172]

This still sounds far-fetched, yet there is another slender piece of evidence which might suggest that Kandinsky was obliquely interested in the erotic nature of the body. For this we return to the works of Schopenhauer owned by Kandinsky, which included a chronological overview of the philosopher's life. In the overview Kandinsky has marked off with pencil the year for 1860, which contains a translation by Maillard entitled 'Metaphysique de l'amour' (Metaphysics of Sexual Love). This appeared in the January issue of *Revue Germanique* and was taken from the German text of Schopenhauer's major work.[173] However, since this evidence verges upon the ephemeral, perhaps Kandinsky's sketchbooks may offer us better insights into his studies of the body.

The critical response to these sketches has been less than enthusiastic, with his drawings being described as diligent but not above the average. Indeed, Grohmann sees Kandinsky's female bodies as "stylized female figures, which in their exaggeration have the effect of parodies on the line drawings of the Munich *Jugend*."[174] That said, we might

[172] Ibid., p.54.
[173] For the English translation of Schopenhauer's 'The Metaphysics of Sexual Love' see Chapter xliv in: Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2. p.531. For the footnote relating to Maillard's, 'Metaphysique de l'amour' translation see: Reclam. p.212. We shall contrast issues of sex with Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Platonic Ideas and C1 in chapter 3 of this thesis.
[174] Grohmann. p. 35-6.

point to Kandinsky's *Child and Dog* of 1904 (fig. 9), which is an obvious intuitive representation, and contrary to Grohmann's estimation of Kandinsky's abilities, comparatively well executed. The composition uses loose brush strokes after the manner of Impressionism, whilst drawing upon empirical perception. There is though, a discrepancy of relations between the stature of the dog, and stature of the child, which destabilises and unsettles the composition. This might lead us to assume that Kandinsky held relational anatomy in disdain, as something merely mechanical, because in a diary entry of c.1908, Münter recalled how Kandinsky had been asked why he did not exhibit nudes such as these. He is said to have replied, "That would be as if I were successful as a circus cyclist – however, I am not a juggler (*Kunstradler*), but a painter."[175]

The role of the human body in Kandinsky's art appears conservative, in comparison to his abstractions, but it did play a significant role in his *St.George* figures. The significance lies in the fact that Kandinsky thought of himself as a Christian Knight.[176] This can be seen in the 1912 *Blaue Reiter* almanac cover (fig. 10) which is largely derived from German and Russian folk images. Based on his glass painting of *St. George II* of 1911 (fig. 11), and influenced by Bavarian versions of the saint, it is arguably a reversed mirror image of Hans von Marées' *St. George* of 1881 (fig. 12).[177] Given the spiritual associations of the saint, Kandinsky's projection of the 'Christian Knight' onto his own art was one way in which he used both intuitive and semi-abstract representations, as a result of what he called an 'inner necessity'. Consequently, Kandinsky could use associated ideas from the abstract and the 'real' whatever the given demands of a specific work were.[178]

[175] Roethel, Benjamin, and Kandinsky. Vol,1, p.132
[176] Long, R. C. W., "Kandinsky's Abstract Style: The Veiling of Apocalyptic Folk Imagery," in: *Art Journal* Vol. 34, no. 3 (1975). p.220.
[177] Von Marées had painted his rider in blue, and it appears as if Kandinsky followed suit.
[178] Olin, M., "Validation by Touch in Kandinsky's Early Abstract Art," in: *Critical Inquiry* Vol. 16, no. 1 (1989). p.165.

Another depiction which uses both 'real' and abstract representations is *Lady in Moscow* of early 1912 (fig. 13), a watercolour executed in gouache and pencil.[179] The intuitive representation of the female body is clear here, and not abstracted from perception, she stands in the centre of the image looking out at the viewer and is set against a background of distorted perspective. Indeed, Margaret Olin has found both intuitive and abstract representations which means that:

> Each object in the picture exists for itself, a sign of direct perception as pure in its own way as are the splotches that represent thought forms. The pink flower in the lady's hand tells the same message in 'reality' as the pink splotch tells in abstraction. The two forms equate the two styles.[180]

1.4 Kandinsky, Theosophy and the Metaphysics of Abstract Representations

The image mentioned by Olin above has been linked to Kandinsky's theosophical interests and Annie Besant's theosophy.[181] This is an important topic since Kandinsky, as a man of his times, would have been aware of the vogue for occult theory and practice in Germany. Indeed, as Corina Treitel points out, Berlin alone had around six hundred mediums practising in 1900 and "contained ten thousand spiritualists, four hundred mediums, and between fifteen and twenty spiritualist clubs."[182] In addition, by 1923 Munich had become a centre for occultism and an official for the Catholic Church would note with concern how "more than ten thousand families had reportedly held séances."[183] And so it was in this cultural context that Kandinsky nurtured his sense of mysticism and a short lived fascination with Theosophy. In fact, in his essay 'Whither the New Art?' of

[179] Endicott Burnett, V., *Kandinsky: Watercolours: Catalogue Raisonné* (London; Milano: Sotheby Publications; Electa, 1992). p.260.
[180] Interview with Karl Nierendorf ["Interview Nierendorf-Kandinsky"] M. Bill, ed., *Kandinsky, Essays über Kunst und Künstler'* (Bern-Bumpliz), 1963 in: Olin. p.165.
[181] Endicott Burnett., p.285.
[182] Treitel, C., *A science for the soul : occultism and the genesis of the German modern* (Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).p.57
[183] Ibid.p.57

1911, Kandinsky presents an argument for a correspondence between abstraction and Theosophy. In this essay he states that:

> A general interest in abstraction is being reborn, both in the superficial form of the movement towards the spiritual, and in the forms of occultism, spiritualism, monism, the 'new' Christianity, Theosophy, and religion in its broadest sense. Circles, societies, journals, lectures, symposia dedicated to the problems of the abstract are growing up like mushrooms.[184]

Out of this occult milieu Besant and fellow Theosophist C. W. Leadbeater co-authored a book called *Thought- Forms*[185] and Kandinsky may well have known this work. It is said that this book, together with Leadbeater's *Man Visible and Invisible*[186] of 1902, led to Rudolf Steiner's occult colour theory. Moreover, as Sixten Ringbom reveals, these writers refer to the human body in an occult manner. They refer to "the seven bodies of man" in the physical, the astral, the mental, and "the four highest bodies of a spiritual character."[187] Earlier, Steiner had become the editor for the complete works of Schopenhauer on behalf of the publisher Ludwig Leistner. The first three volumes appeared in 1894, with Steiner contributing both an introduction and a biographical sketch of Schopenhauer.[188] Subsequently, links have been made between Steiner's philosophy and Schopenhauer's - it being observed that:

> Rudolf Steiner built on Schopenhauer's thought by contrasting the idea of a dualistic, active, egoistic individual will with the non-dualistic but receptive rather than passive will, thereby beginning his long quest of advocating the cultivation of spiritual, intuitive, artistic meditation, and creativity, which were to balance the destructive effects of the egoistic will.[189]

Steiner's work was read by Kandinsky and other Expressionist artists, such as Marc and

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[184] Kandinsky, V. 'Whither the 'New' Art?' ["Kuda idet 'novoe' iskusstvo"?] *Odesskie novosti* (Odessa), 1911 translated in:Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.101.
[185] Besant, A. and Leadbeater, C. W., *Thought-Forms* (London: Theosophical Pub. House, 1901).
[186] Leadbeater, C. W., *Man Visible and Invisible: Examples of Different Types of Men as Seen by Means of Trained Clairvoyance: With Twenty-Two Coloured Illustrations* (London: Theosophical Publishing Society, 1902).
[187] Ringbom, S., "Art in 'The Epoch of the Great Spiritual': Occult Elements in the Early Theory of Abstract Painting," in: *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* Vol. 29 (1966). p.397.
[188] See: Steiner, Rudolf. *Arthur Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke in zwölf Bänden. Mit Einleitung von Dr. Rudolf Steiner*, Stuttgart: Verlag der J.G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, o.J. (1894–96)" (in German).
[189] Ashperger, C., *The Rhythm of Space and the Sound of Time: Michael Chekhov's Acting Technique in the 21st Century* (Rodopi, 2008). p.26.

Alexei Javlensky, who valued its cultivation of spiritual, intuitive, and artistic values.[190] We know that Kandinsky owned a copy of Steiner's *Theosophie* and copies of his *Lucifer-Gnosis*[191] in which there are several annotations by the artist in the margins. We also know that Kandinsky first heard Steiner's lectures in 1908 whilst in Berlin.[192] However, Vergo and Lindsay are cautious about the Steiner connection and suggest that, "although Kandinsky appreciated Steiner's methodology and the ways in which occult experimentation coincided with his own interests in dematerialization, he maintained a sceptical distance: he was a painter, not a theurgist."[193] More cautious still, Nina Kandinsky dismissed her husband's links to Steiner and the burgeoning Anthroposophical Society.[194] Nevertheless, Kandinsky at a metaphysical level, certainly believed that:

> …as long as the soul remains joined to the body, it can as a rule only receive vibrations *via* the medium of the senses, which form a bridge from the immaterial to the material (in the case of the artist) and from the material to the immaterial (in the case of the spectator).[195]

Ringbom suggests that Kandinsky's liberation of form and colour from intuitive representations parallel Steiner's conceptions of free-floating tones and colours.[196] That is because Steiner's astral realm of the spirit signified the possible "representation of such realities."[197] In addition, the colour illustrations used in Steiner's theosophical books might be considered as the very first abstract representations, created nearly ten years prior to Kandinsky's alleged first abstract watercolour of 1910. Ringbom thinks that this coincides

[190] Bassie, A., *Expressionism* (Parkstone International, 2014). p.96.
[191] Ringbom. p. 417. Cf. Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p. 876, fn.28.
[192] See: Sixten Ringbom, 'Art in the Epoch of the Great Spiritual: Occult Elements in the Early Theory of Abstract Painting', Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 29 (1966): p.386-418. Kandinsky's theosophical literature can be traced in Kandinsky's library, see: Ringbom's Appendix to, 'Art in the Epoch of the Great Spiritual'.
[193] Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.23.
[194] Ibid., p.874.
[195] Kandinsky, V, 'Kandinsky über seine Entwicklung'. Johannes Eichner, Kandinsky und Gabriele Münter, von Ursprüngen Moderner Kunst (Munich), 1957 in: Kandinsky Content and Form ["Soderzhanie i forma"] Salon 2.(Odessa), 1910-1911, ibid., p.87.
[196] Ringbom. p.403. In chapter 6 of this thesis, we shall question the very possibility of aesthetic liberation in relation to the problem of free will as it relates to Nolde during the Nazi era. In doing this, we shall scrutinise the extent to which C1 may or may not be a valid claim beyond Marc's death in the First World War.
[197] Ibid., p.404.

with Kandinsky's belief that artists should neglect the corporeal appearance of matter in preference to the extra-sensory reality of the spirit.[198] This belief was important to Kandinsky who felt that art had the capacity to engender spiritual redemption. As a consequence, his attempt to journey beyond phenomenal appearances into the realm of the metaphysical validates C2. Yet, as a form of redemption, his beliefs and practices as an artist invalidate C1, since he tended to disregard the appearance of matter in favour of spiritualised / dematerialised representations.

For such redemption to occur, Kandinsky believed that the metaphysical relationship between emotion, sensation, and art was of vital importance.[199] In his opinion, the vibrations of an artist's soul must attain a material form of expression accessible to spectators. This form stands for the external component of an art work inseparable from its content.[200] But, contrary to Kandinsky and Theosophists, Schopenhauer's philosophy does not endorse a spiritual world existing independently of all objects. Nor does it endorse such a world from which objects might be derived, or which might be manifested through an artist's vibrating soul. Unlike Theosophy, his doctrine starts with the simple division of object and subject as the first comprehensive and fundamental form of the world as representation.[201]

Schopenhauer's doctrine does not make him a materialist, although we can infer through him that Kandinsky was correct to eschew materialism. By this Schopenhauer means that:

> …the fundamental absurdity of materialism consists in the fact that it starts from the objective; it takes an objective something as the ultimate ground of explanation, whether this be matter in the abstract simply as it is thought, or after it has entered into the form and is empirically given, and hence substance….[202]

[198] Ibid., p.404.
[199] We shall examine the possibility of 'redemption' as it relates to Expressionist artists in Chapter 4.
[200] Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.87.
[201] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.25
[202] Ibid., p.27.

Moreover, according to Schopenhauer, materialism (in science especially) at no time targets the innermost nature of the world or proceeds past the world as representation. Consequently, it never informs us of anything beyond the fact that one representation is related to another.[203] In addition, whilst materialists argue that the human subject 'emerges' from the world of objective matter, conversely idealists argue that the object-world 'emerges' from the human subject. To prove his point, Schopenhauer cites Johann Gottlieb Fichte, as a leading exponent of idealism, who "overlooked the fact that with the subject (let him give it whatever title he likes) he posited the object, since no subject is thinkable without object."[204]

In contrast to both materialism and idealism, Schopenhauer's procedure is quite different, since it does not begin with either the object or the subject "but from the representation, as the first fact of consciousness."[205] Therefore, since we are exploring C1 and C2 on Schopenhauer's terms, and due to the relativity of the world as representation, we must seek out the inner nature of the world elsewhere, on another path than that of representation.[206] However, Kandinsky, in his art at least, stayed on the path of representation by seeking out *abstract* representations (concepts), hoping that this would communicate the metaphysical substrate of the world.

The story behind the development of his abstract representations begins with a recollection of 'an unexpected spectacle' that confronted him at dusk in his studio. He reports that he:

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[203] Ibid., p.28.
[204] Ibid., p.25. For an in-depth discussion on this issue see Janaway who concludes that: "it must be said that while for much of the time Schopenhauer understands the notion of the dependence of objects on the subject in terms of the ('undeniable') proposition that any content of experience is so for some subject, he also wants to claim that the whole world of material objects depends for its existence on being experienced by some object. It is far from obvious that this proposition is undeniable without contradiction. A convincing case for idealism cannot be built solely on what is contained in the slogan 'No object without subject'. If that slogan can be expanded to mean something obviously true, it does not give any argument for idealism; if it is read as a statement of idealism, it is highly contentious." Janaway.,p.139.
[205] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.34.
[206] Ibid., p.34.

> …suddenly saw an indescribably beautiful picture, pervaded by an inner glow. At first, I stopped short and then quickly approached this mysterious picture, on which I could discern only forms and colors and whose content was incomprehensible. At once, I discovered the key to the puzzle: it was a picture I had painted, standing on its side against the wall.[207]

The following day he attempted to re-create the crepuscular impression by daylight. Half succeeding he recognized objects, yet the element of dusk was missing. From that point on he said that:

> Now I could see clearly that objects harmed my pictures. A terrifying abyss of all kinds of questions, a wealth of responsibilities stretched before me. And most important of all: What is to replace the missing object? The danger of ornament revealed itself clearly to me; the dead semblance of stylized forms I found merely repugnant.[208]

It was only after years of patient study that he found the answers through pure abstraction. Feeling that ornament in art was a danger, that creativity could not be arrived at by rational logic but instead by inner feeling, he maintained that every form which he used arrived spontaneously of itself, fully fledged before his eyes so that he merely had to replicate it.[209] As a result, his capacity for engrossing himself in the inner life of his art and his soul, increased to such an extent that he often neglected external events.[210]

This story is rivalled by another which he told, to the art dealer Karl Nierendorf in a 1937 interview, who asked how he had arrived at the idea of abstract painting. In this story, he told Nierendorf that at twenty years of age he was sent by Moscow University to Vologda in north eastern Russia for ethnographic research. There he said, "I saw farmhouses completely covered with painting – nonrepresentational - inside."[211] Following this he observed Russian icon painting with fresh eyes, acquiring an eye for the abstract element of painting.[212] Later in 1906, he saw Henri Matisse's early paintings for

[207] Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.369.
[208] Ibid., p.370.
[209] Ibid., p.370.
[210] Ibid., p.371.
[211] Ibid., p.806.
[212] Ibid., p.806. On his fascination with ethnography, Weiss argues that around 1911 Kandinsky's visits to the museum of anthropology in Munich meant that "his borrowings from the iconography of Lapp and Siberian shamanism began in earnest. During this period, his paintings were becoming increasingly 'pictographic', more 'abstract'. It is also the time

the first time, and asked himself whether he could not just simplify or distort given objects but omit them completely. From that point on he converted to abstract art *via* Expressionism, experimentation, doubt, hope, and discovery.[213]

Four years later, Kandinsky would remark upon an exhibition held at the Moderne Galerie Thannhauser, which had displayed a few works by Matisse. In his opinion, only Matisse was bold enough to venture beyond the 'accidental forms of nature' by eliminating inessentials and substituting them with his own forms.[214] As part of Kandinsky's move towards abstract representations, it was important therefore "for the artist to free himself from dependence on nature and the representation of visual objects."[215] In addition, as Kenneth Berry suggests, Kandinsky was inspired by Gauguin's belief that drawing was a process of abstracting from nature by memory. In turn, Gauguin had been inspired by the abridged delineations and flattened configurations of Puvis de Chavannes.[216] Furthermore, both Kandinsky and Marc had arguably pursued aesthetic liberation from intuitive representations under the inspiration of Neo-Idealist and Romantic art.[217]

The pursuit of aesthetic liberation from intuitive representations and a tendency towards abstraction arguably made Kandinsky's work uncertain to viewers. That is to say, Kandinsky's abstract intentions were often not retrievable by spectators. Indeed, by

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when his self-identification as St. George/leader/shaman resulted in the dominance of St. George and a new leadership role for the artist." Weiss, P., *Kandinsky and Old Russia: The Artist as Ethnographer and Shaman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). p.87. This perspective relates to aspects of 'primitivism' in Kandinsky's work. Take for example David Pan, who argues that: "Because the primitive art Kandinsky emulated was always embedded in a specific tradition, abstract forms did not exist for themselves but were always implicitly augmented with associations from the cultural context in which they were produced." See: Pan, D., *Primitive Renaissance: Rethinking German Expressionism* (University of Nebraska Press, 2001). p.113.

[213] Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.806.

[214] Wassily Kandinsky, letters from Munich ["Pis'mo iz Miunkhena"] *Apollon* (St. Petersburg), 1909-1910 in: ibid., p.68. As Lindsay and Vergo comment, "For the first year of the magazine's existence, Kandinsky acted as Munich correspondent, submitting five 'Letters', which appeared in the "Chronicle" section of *Apollon* between October 1909 and October-November 1910." Ibid., p.54. Although Matisse supressed figuration in his cut-outs, he might not be described as an abstract artist.

[215] Gordon, I., "Kandinsky Watercolors," in: *Members Newsletter (Museum of Modern Art)*, no. 4 (1969). p.12.

[216] Berry. p.100.

[217] Clarke, J. A., "Neo-Idealism, Expressionism, and the Writing of Art History," in: *Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies* Vol. 28, no. 1 (2002). p.35.

1919, in an article called 'Art of this Moment', and written for the journal *Der neue Merkur*, German art critic Wilhelm Hausenstein would describe abstract art as an "esoteric formalism too related to decoration, incomprehensible, with no collective impact."[218] If this is the case, then Schopenhauer by contrast assures us that objects of perception arising from the external world offer us a greater guarantee of certainty and impact. That which has arisen from perception and remains true to it is he says, "like the genuine work of art, can never be false, nor can it be refuted through any passing of time for it gives us not opinion, but the thing itself."[219] However, when it comes to using abstract knowledge, arising through the faculty of reason (*Vernunft*), then doubt and error can appear. As a result, even if the representation of perception does generate illusions, the error of an abstract representation can hold sway for thousands of years.[220]

To support his belief, Schopenhauer likens abstract representations that borrow from perception to the borrowed light of the moon from the sun. This borrowed light involves the faculty of reason whose formation of concepts is its only glory – a loaned glory. Therefore, because abstract concepts are derived from perception, they are less reliable than immediate perceptions which can be tested. Yet, trustworthy abstract knowledge can expand the range of our capabilities, and it is this "abstract reflex of everything intuitive in the non-perceptive conception of reason"[221] which differentiates man from animal.

The great adventure of Kandinsky was his journey into the 'abstract reflex of everything intuitive'. However, his journey was sometimes accompanied by vocal

[218] Wilhelm Hausenstein, "Die Kunst in diesem Augenblick," *Der neue Merkur* 3, *Sonderheft* no.2 - "Werden" (1919-1920), 117, 119-22, 123, 125-26. Translated in: Long, Rigby, and Barron. p.280.
[219] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.35.
[220] Ibid., p.35.
[221] Ibid., p.38.

travelling companions – some of them being the most notable critics of his era. Among the critics who had reacted against the new art of the avant-garde was Carl Vinnen, who in 1911 edited a polemic called, *Ein Protest deutscher Künstler* (*A Protest of German Artists*), which argued that the excessive introduction of foreign art had led to the devaluation of German art. To Vinnen, it was clear that, in view of the 'invasion of French art' in particular, "a people is only driven to great heights by artists of its own flesh and blood."[222]

One riposte to this objection came from Wilhelm Worringer, an early apologist for Expressionism. He replied to Vinnen in his essay 'The Historical Development of Modern Art', which was taken from an anthology titled, *The Struggle for Art: The Answer to the Protest of German Artists* of 1911.[223] He understood that Vinnen's protest was not about guarding against the influences of classical impressionism, as in Édouard Manet, Claude Monet and Pierre-Auguste Renoir, but rather against the younger Parisians who took after Paul Cézanne, Vincent van Gogh and Matisse. Around this time, Worringer's 1908 doctoral thesis, *Abstraction and Empathy*,[224] became a beacon for the Expressionists and a factor in bridging the gap between abstract and representational art. Jay A. Clarke proposes that Expressionists employed Worringer's work to vindicate their penchant for abstraction and mysticism, so as to rationalise them as particularly German.[225] But not every Expressionist used Worringer's argument in this way, and as David Morgan has argued, by 1912 Kandinsky showed no interest "in restricting the artist's pictorial vocabulary to the rigid geometrical patterns of ancient ornament, in which Worringer

[222] Vinnen, C., "Quousque Tandem," in *Ein Protest deutscher Künstler [in German]*. (Jena: Eugen Diederichs, 1911). p.12.
[223] Wilhelm Worringer, 'Entwicklungsgeschichtliches zur modernsten Kunst', *Im Kampf um die Kunst: Die Antwort auf den "Protest deutscher Kunstler* (Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1911), 92-99; reprinted in *Der Sturm* 2, no.75 (August 1911): 597-98. R. Piper & Co. Verlag, Munchen 1911. This anthology gathered together various refutations against Vinnen's argument.
[224] See: Worringer, W. and Bullock, M., *Abstraction and Empathy: A Contribution to The Psychology of Style; translated by Michael Bullock* (London: Routledge & Paul, 1963).
[225] Clarke. p.34-35.

discerned an abstract 'urge to form.'"[226] Therefore, when Kandinsky published *On the Spiritual in Art* in 1912, he "followed Roessler in insisting on a careful distinction between ornament in the past and the place for a new visual form which owed nothing to visual appearances."[227]

If abstraction involved a departure from 'visual appearances', then as Berry has argued, "creative analogical thinking as evinced in Kandinsky's art, often involves breaking free of a clichéd representation."[228] Should this be the case then, since we are exploring the validity of C1 and C2, we might need to become aware of a possible tension between 'weak' and 'strong' forms of abstract art - especially when using phrases such as 'abstract representation'.[229] That is to say, there is a tension between Kandinsky's early abstraction, where figuration and recognisable objects are retained ('weak') and his later geometric abstraction which removes the object and figuration almost entirely ('strong'). Although, both 'weak' and 'strong' forms are abstract, Kandinsky's move towards 'strong' abstract representation was undoubtedly an attempt to avoid 'mere design'. If this is so, then as Hamilton has argued, the following may apply where three components can be discerned in a work of art:

> (1) The two-dimensional array of coloured marks on the surface of the canvas (2) The representation of abstract volumes, spatially related to each other (the pictorial form) (3) The subject-matter of these volumes. Where (2) is present, the painting is only weakly abstract. It is (3), and not (2), that formalists such as Bell declare irrelevant to aesthetic or artistic value.[230]

[226] Morgan. p.238.
[227] Ibid. p.238.
[228] Berry. p.100.
[229] Ibid., p.99.
[230] Hamilton, A. 'Abstraction and Depiction: Paintings as Pictures and as Mere Design' appears as an Italian translation in: G. Tomasi ed., Sulla Rappresentazione Pittorica, Palermo: Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, 2010. p.4. (I am grateful to Andy Hamilton for sharing his views with me on this topic).

Yet, it becomes quite a different matter to extend this and suggest that Kandinsky's abstract representations, by breaking free of 'clichéd representations', subsequently led to greater aesthetic expression or the "aesthetic enrichment of society."[231]

Despite this caveat, as Thomas M. Messer has argued, the pivotal role which Kandinsky's art has taken on in our appreciation of modern art has arisen from the fact that he "brought to bear on his art an instinctive awareness of what constituted the central aesthetic issues of his era."[232] For Berry, Kandinsky's abstract representations mirror cultural change, and the capacity to transform society by acquiring pictorial counterparts for an expressive language.[233] This view resonates with Jerome Ashmore, who agrees that Kandinsky construed early twentieth century art as a quest for an internal determination which pledged an approaching spiritual revival without guaranteeing it.[234] The apprehension of this spiritual revival entails that Kandinsky's paintings are to be understood as symbolic images which permit a free association of ideas and a Kantian delight in the free use of an aesthetic imagination. However, this claim is contestable as we shall see.

The first point to note is how Berry has claimed that since Kandinsky's paintings are images in their own right, "their self-referential visual imagery and meta-symbolic language point…to their being autonomous, or *autotelic* works of art: having their aim or object inherent in itself."[235] The second point to note is how Berry has claimed that the pictorial effect of Kandinsky's mature abstract art depends upon the fact that such works are self-contained creations - possessing their own intrinsic organisation and qualities -

[231] Berry., p.99.
[232] Messer, T. M., *Masters of Art: Kandinsky* (Harry N. Abrams, 1997). p.8.
[233] Berry., p.100.
[234] Ashmore, J., "Sound in Kandinsky's Painting," in: *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol. 35, no. 3 (1977). p.329.
[235] Berry. p.101.

"without need of associative references of any kind."[236] This may be so, yet we might contest his belief that "in the Kantian sense, Kandinsky's pictures allow for a free play of poetic associations."[237]

On the one hand, we may agree with Berry's assertion that "for Kant, aesthetic pleasure or aesthetic 'delight' relates to the free play of the imagination - on some object, including the 'aesthetic object' of the work of art."[238] Indeed, we may also agree with Berry's other assertion that "Immanuel Kant felt that 'artistic beauty is a *beautiful representation* of a thing,' and that it is the special task of genius to make beautiful representations…"[239] Yet, on the other hand for Berry to argue that, post-1910, "Kandinsky gave visible expression to this idea of Kant - in his 'abstract representations'"[240] is open to dispute. This is because Berry appears to be suggesting firstly that Kandinsky's abstractions are beautiful representations 'of a thing'- an object - which clearly they are not. Secondly, apart from his subjective assumption that Kandinsky was a 'genius', Berry's supposition that 'Kandinsky's pictures allow for a free play of poetic associations' implies that they permit the spectator freedom to choose their mode of attention as in the case with natural beauty. However, it could be argued that, because Kandinsky's abstract art is 'fabricated' by the artist, this entails that such 'fabrication' pre-determines the ground of the artwork's reception. If this is the case, then there is no freedom in the Kantian sense as referred to by Berry.

In contrast to Berry's position, Hamilton offers us a more convincing argument when stating that "artworks imply a clear, unambiguous focus of attention, and are intended to be experienced from a certain point or points in order to obtain their full effect."[241] He

[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Hamilton, A., "Indeterminacy and Reciprocity: Contrasts and Connections between Natural and Artistic Beauty," in: *Journal of Visual Art Practice* Vol. 5, no. 3 (2006). p.188.

rightly goes on to suggest that, "in nature, unlike art, there is no determinate aesthetic object; appreciators of nature have the freedom to decide on the frame or focus of attention."[242] Although this opinion is as he says often disputed, it does convey a more persuasive account of how spectators might be free to choose what they focus their attention upon. By comparison, Kandinsky's abstract works, I suggest, do not offer the same freedom, despite their lack of depicted objects.

This suggestion might be supported by Hamilton's belief that in an artwork, and I would argue any abstract artwork, "viewers have freedom to focus on different parts of the artwork, but they cannot construct its boundaries or its primary focus."[243] As a result, this position can be contrasted with the 'indeterminacy' of nature where "the boundary between the object of appreciation and its environment is decided by the viewer."[244] In essence, such an aesthetic experience would therefore be unavailable to viewers of Kandinsky's work as a whole whether abstract or not.[245]

With the above in mind, we are led to consider the possibility that an aesthetic experience of Kandinsky's abstract representations may sometimes require the empirical for it to make any sense - and as a consequence a certain tension resides within his work. Indeed, as Berry implies, Kandinsky's paintings of the 1910s rely on the intuition of form and empirical representation, which suggests that it "is this reciprocal tension between abstract and concrete, universal and particular, that gives unique definition to Kandinsky's 'abstract representation'."[246] However, Kandinsky wished to liberate himself from the concrete object as an intuitive representation in order to achieve pure expression through

[242] Ibid., p.184.
[243] Ibid., p.188
[244] Ibid.
[245] This would apply to all artworks not just Kandinsky's.
[246] Berry., p.103.

pictorial means alone.[247] Indeed, in his essay for *The Blaue Reiter Almanac* of 1912, Kandinsky stated that:

> The combination of the abstract with the representational, the choice between the infinite number of abstract forms and those forms built out of representational material - i.e., the choice between the individual means within each sphere - is and remains entirely according to the inner wishes of the artist.[248]

Kandinsky was convinced that the abstract would surface when the spirit of the age was ripe. He argued that the goal of *The Blaue Reiter Almanac* was to arouse a capacity for experiencing spirituality, in both material and abstract phenomena, which would be essential to the future of art.[249] By spirituality, Kandinsky implied not only aesthetics but an inner feeling of religious foreboding. As Rose-Carol Washton Long argues, Kandinsky's essay *On the Spiritual in Art*, and his magnetic attraction towards abstraction, was in part due to a messianic vision. That is to say, while "… he equated representationalism with the materialistic values that he felt dominated his age, abstraction seemed to offer a way to express anti-materialistic or spiritual values."[250]

When we interpret Kandinsky's anti-materialistic (or spiritual abstractions) according to Schopenhauer then it is has a feminine quality. This is because "reason is feminine in nature; it can give only after it has received. Of itself alone, it has nothing but the empty forms of its operation."[251] According to Schopenhauer, to know something through reason is to possess the power of forming judgements grounded upon that which arrives from outside of them, and by necessity they must be demonstrably true. However, this is something which we cannot vouch for in Kandinsky's art, because much of it relies

[247] Wassily Kandinsky, "The Value of a Concrete Work," *XX Siècle V /VI* (1939), in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.820.
[248] *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.254.
[249] *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.381.
[250] Long. p.217.
[251] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.50. He adds that the feminine nature of reason is "receptive, retentive, and not self-creative." Ibid.

upon idiosyncratic concepts which are often demonstrably not true or universally applicable. But, we can legitimately assert that some abstract knowledge, which is based upon direct perception, is demonstrably true and that "rational knowledge (*Wissen*) is therefore abstract consciousness, fixing in concepts of reason what is known generally in another way." [252]

Schopenhauer's proposal that 'reason is feminine in nature' might be interpreted (or misinterpreted) in two ways. On the one hand, his proposal that reason 'has nothing but the empty forms of its operation' could be viewed as misogynistic, as a pejorative jibe aimed at 'empty headed' women. However, this is not the case since he ascribes some of the most powerful capacities to reason – as in "metalogical truth, the principles of identity, of contradiction, of the excluded middle, and of sufficient reason of knowledge."[253] Perhaps a better interpretation might entail that Schopenhauer's 'feminisation' of reason is a sexual metaphor, whereby the faculty of reason is akin to the womb, and the fertilisation of it pertains to the masculine principle of planting the seeds of sensory experience within it in order that abstract concepts may be born. From this union therefore, we obtain not only empirical evidence but abstract concepts.

That said, this is not the only possible way to think about Kandinsky's, abstraction and Schopenhauer's 'feminisation' of reason. Without referring to Schopenhauer, scholars such as Bibiana K. Obler have argued that the rise of abstract art during the early twentieth century is "generally described as an apotheosis of masculinity, made possible by the repression of the decorative (read femininity)" and how Kandinsky "infamously described painting as a conquest of virgin canvas with 'imperious brush'..."[254] Viewed in this way,

[252] Ibid., p.51.
[253] Ibid.,p.50.
[254] Obler, B. K., *Intimate Collaborations: Kandinsky & Münter, Arp & Taeuber* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2014).p.1.

Schopenhauer's 'feminisation' of reason becomes inverted, rendering it masculine rather than feminine.

In a similar vein, feminist art historians such as Obler believe that Kandinsky concealed a debt to the applied arts - the alleged realm of the feminine - and sustained a gender inflected dynamic vis-à-vis abstraction.[255] Yet, as Obler points out, this inflection was ameliorated in 1913, when Kandinsky reacted with irritation to art critics who had derided successful female artists such as Münter for being 'masculine'.[256] By contrast, Kandinsky denied an association between artistic quality and masculinity by vouching for Münter's natural ability. It is therefore in this sense that by "championing her femininity, Kandinsky's intent was avowedly feminist."[257]

Femininity has often been associated with feeling and masculinity with rationality, yet for Schopenhauer abstraction really belongs to the faculty of reason whilst the opposite of it is feeling (*Gefühl*) - which we may argue Kandinsky aspired to through his spiritual values.[258] According to Schopenhauer, the concept of feeling possesses only a negative content allowing us to stipulate that there is something in consciousness which does not contain abstractions.[259] The problem with the concept of feeling is that it is wide ranging, containing incongruous elements from religious feeling, sensual pleasure, moral feeling, bodily feeling, feeling for colours, musical sounds and harmonies, etc.[260] All that these have in common therefore is that they are not abstract concepts belonging to reason and belong to both sexes. Nevertheless, if we can hypothesise that Kandinsky reconciled a

[255] Ibid.p1.
[256] It should be remembered that Kandinsky and Münter had a professional and personal relationship. On 01.10.1908, they moved in to 36 Ainmillerstrasse in Munich close to Paul Klee's apartment.
[257] Obler.,p.12.
[258] Although this proposition would be an inversion of the above feminist model - and could ignite further discussion of gender inflected relations vis-à-vis abstraction - we shall not be detained in this way but continue with our explorations into C1 and C2 on Schopenhauer's terms as planned at the outset.
[259] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.51.
[260] Ibid., p.51.

gender inflected dialectic vis-à-vis abstraction, then perhaps feminist historians such as Obler have a point when claiming that:

> His ambition was to show that women are different from *while also equal to* men. In the context of a backlash against feminism (and against the elimination of distinctions between the fine and applied arts), both Kandinsky and Simmel sought an alternative to re-establishing hierarchies between the sexes (and the arts) even as they maintained that differences existed[261]

The opposite of rational knowledge is feeling (*Gefühl*), which Kandinsky was aspiring to - given his anti-materialistic and spiritual values. Yet, the concept of feeling, according to Schopenhauer, possesses only a negative content, allowing us to stipulate that consciousness does not contain abstractions.[262] The problem with the concept of feeling is that it is wide ranging, containing incongruous elements from religious feeling, sensual pleasure, moral feeling, bodily feeling, feeling for colours, musical sounds and harmonies, etc. [263] All that these concepts have in common therefore is that they are not abstract concepts belonging to reason.

Kandinsky's goal of delivering abstract feeling through art became problematic after he realised that it could alienate his public. He understood that if he wished art to express a spirituality with fewer intuitive representations, then it had to be accessible to the wider public.[264] One method was to communicate his thoughts through colour, but colour and line alone proved inadequate for abstract purposes. What was needed in a composition was a balance between the intuitive and the abstract in order to gain clarity of meaning.[265]

Washton Long believes that we can see this by comparing a preparatory oil study for *Composition VII* of 1913 (already mentioned) with Peter Behrens' abstract *Sketch for*

[261] Obler.,p.12.
[262] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.51.
[263] Ibid., p.51.
[264] Long. p.217.
[265] Ibid., p.217.

a Tapestry appearing in the journal *Dekorative Kunst. III* of 1900 (fig. 14). Because the latter image was executed in the manner of *Jugendstil* she thinks it becomes clear why Kandinsky tried to avoid abstract representations based solely upon 'mere design' or decorative ornamentation. He himself had argued that:

> If, even today, we were to begin to dissolve completely the tie that binds us to nature, to direct our energies toward forcible emancipation and content ourselves exclusively with the combination of pure color and independent form, we would create works having the appearance of geometrical ornament, which would-to put it crudely-be like a tie or a carpet.[266]

That said, Washton Long's argument is that Behrens' work is two-dimensional and "contains no ready key to a mood."[267] Her view concurs with that of Magdalena Dabrowski, who argues that around the 1910s neither Kandinsky nor the spectators of his work were adequately prepared for abstraction based only upon colour and form. Therefore, his compositions relied upon abstractions drawn from covert motifs, the dissolution of colour and eventual devaluation of figuration.

This can be seen in *Compositions V* of 1911 (fig. 15) and *Composition VI* of 1913 (fig. 16).[268] The former is an oil on canvas, which was shown in the *Sturm* Album of 1913 and exhibited widely, most notably in the Modern Galerie Tannhauser Munich. There is a discernible figure which appears to be walking symbolically out of the painting at the bottom right, as if to declare the evacuation of the human body and the intuitively perceived object. *Composition VI* is an oil on canvas completed on 05.03.1913 and is based upon an earlier glass-painting *Deluge* (*for Composition VI*) of 1911 (fig. 17).[269] *Composition VI* featured in *Der Sturm's* first German autumn salon of 1913 in Berlin and

[266] Kandinsky, V. 'On the Spiritual in Art' in:Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.197.
[267] Long., p.217.
[268] Dabrowski, M., "Kandinsky Compositions: The Music of the Spheres," in: *MoMA*, no. 19 (1995). p.12.
[269] *Deluge* (*for Composition VI*) of 1911 was shown in the Sturm Album, 1913, p. xxxv. It was also exhibited in Berlin, Der Sturm, *Der Blaue Reiter*, 1912, no.41, and Berlin, Der Sturm, *Die Futuristen*, April 1912, no.56.

bears no resemblance to intuitive perception being completely abstract and devoid of the human body.

Kandinsky differed from many other avant-garde artists by using preparatory sketches in order to derive abstractions from covert motifs. He differed too from later Conceptual artists of the 1960s whose preparatory work was often a miniature of the final production. By comparison, Kandinsky's works are at their most abstract in their final production, being progressively abstracted from perceptual reality during the process of creation. Indeed, viewers might recognise some intuitively perceived objects, from which the abstraction was originally taken by studying his preparatory works.[270]

Preparatory watercolour sketches for the *Improvisations* series of paintings of 1911-1913, show that he moved away from the intuitively perceivable by suppressing objects so that only an allusion to them remains. The *Improvisations* have been abstracted from perception to such an extent that identifying them is challenging.[271] For the Viennese art historian Hans Tietze such art signified how "the new style dematerializes the conception of the world."[272] The dematerialisation of the world of objects led Kandinsky to remark that the philosophy of the future would study the *spirit* of phenomena with special attention.[273] He believed that in the future, mankind would feel the spirit of things, albeit unconsciously, "just as people in general today still experience the external aspect of phenomena unconsciously, which explains the public's delight in representational art."[274] He felt convinced that initially at least, mankind would need to receive the spirit

[270] Galenson, D. W., "Two Paths to Abstract Art: Kandinsky and Malevich," in: *Russian History* Vol. 35, no. 1/2 (2008). p.241.
[271] Ibid., p.241.
[272] Green, R. C., "Bloch, Beethoven and Der Blaue Reiter," in: *Music in Art* Vol. 37, no. 1/2 (2012).p.279. Hans Tietze, and Max Dvořák the Czech-born Austrian art historian, both championed the new art of the Expressionists. See: Tietze, H., "Der Blaue Reiter," in: *Kunst für Alle* Vol. XXVII (1911-12), 543ff.
[273] Wassilly Kandinsky, 'Reminiscences/Three Pictures ["Rückblicke"]; "Komposition 4"; "Komposition 6"; "Bild mit weissem Rand"] *Kandinsky, 1901-1913* (Berlin) 1913, in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.380.
[274] Ibid., p.380.

within material phenomena before receiving the spirit within the abstract.[275] Through this incremental process humanity would come to enjoy abstract art conceptualised under the signature of the 'spirit.[276]

Kandinsky was not alone in yearning for the signs and wonders of the spirit in art. As Mary Dezember argues, we find Kandinsky was in similar company with Charles Baudelaire, Guillaume Apollinaire, and Rainer Maria Rilke, who depended upon powerful aesthetic imagery to set the soul 'vibrating'.[277] The concept of 'vibrating' souls tallied with Kandinsky's interest in musical harmony as a means of reviving the spirit within visual art.[278] Musical harmony underwent a radical transformation almost in synchrony with Kandinsky's exploration of abstract representations, and in 1907 a concert was given by Arnold Schoenberg who had begun to abandon the tonal system in favour of atonality. This was as much of a paradigm shift as was Kandinsky's move away from depicting intuitively perceived objects. On 01.01.1911, Kandinsky and Marc attended a Schoenberg concert which was noted by Marc in a letter to August Macke:

> Can you imagine a kind of music in which tonality (and therefore the observance of any key) is completely removed? While listening to this music I had to keep thinking about Kandinsky's great composition which also allows no trace of key […] and also of Kandinsky's 'leaping spots', which each stand for a note that is struck (a kind of *white screen* between the spots of colour!).[279]

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[275] Ibid., p.381.
[276] Ibid., p.380.
[277] Dezember, M., "Poets as Modern Art Critics: Stating the "Redemptive Power" of the Abstracted Image," in: *Rocky Mountain Review of Language and Literature* Vol. 58, no. 1 (2004). p.23.
[278] It is said that, on the basis of Wagner's theory of the total work of art (*Gesamtkunstwerk*), that Kandinsky made associations between music and vision in his essay *On the Spiritual in Art.* However, the usual definition of *Gesamtkunstwerk*, as a mixture of different artistic media, is incorrect. Wagner's Zurich essays define the term primarily in relation to drama - where music and the other arts provide a contextual role for drama itself. Indeed, Kandinsky may have had little insight into Wagner other than that which he obtained through Diaghilev and Mir Iskusstva. For this information I am indebted to: 'The Blue Rider Centenary Symposium Audio Recordings' of 25.11.2011, See: Tate Modern, http://www.tate.org.uk/context-comment/audio/blue-rider-centenary-symposium-audio-recordings See also: Vergo, Peter 'Music, Kandinsky and the Idea of the Gesamtkunstwerk' in: Kandinsky, W. and Lloyd, J., *Vasily Kandinsky from Blaue Reiter to the Bauhaus, 1910-1925* (Ostfildern; New York: Hatje Cantz; Neue Galerie, 2013).
[279] Letter from Marc to August Macke, dated 14.08.1911 in: Marc, M., *Briefwechsel August Macke-Franz Marc, Lisbeth Macke-Maria Marc 1910-1914, etc. [With portraits and a facsimile.]*. p.40. The last movement of Schoenberg's Second String Quartet, which was played at the concert, had words set to it by Stefan George which must have resonated with Kandinsky.

Vergo has proposed that Schoenberg's musical theory captured Kandinsky's imagination to a greater extent than did his music - most notably in a brief article written by the musician for the above concert program. As Vergo has shown, Schoenberg's polemic against the 'prohibition' of parallel octaves and fifths by academic music teachers mirrored Kandinsky's own beliefs concerning academic 'rules' taught in art schools. Schoenberg's comments on dissonance impressed the painter leading him to suggest that dissonances "differ from consonances only in degree; they are nothing other than more distant consonances, whose analysis presents the ear with greater difficulties, because of their remoteness but which, once analysis has brought them nearer, have just as much chance of becoming consonances as the more immediate overtones."[280]

As a consequence of the above, Kandinsky could validate his dissonant pictorial compositions by referring to theories such as Schoenberg's. Indeed, Vergo argues that there is a correspondence between abstraction and atonality because "Kandinsky evidently regarded this argument as a model worthy of emulation in his own attempts to formulate a theoretical justification for the abandonment of representation in painting."[281] Therefore, (in theory) the dissolution of tonality in Schoenberg's atonal music was comparable to Kandinsky's dissolution of the object in his pictorial compositions.[282]

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[280] Vergo ,P. 'Footnotes to Schoenberg's 'On Parallel Octaves and Fifths' ["Paralleli v oktavakh i kvintakh"] Salon 2, (Odessa), 1910-1911, in:Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.92.

[281] Ibid., p.92-93.

[282] In Robert L.Wicks' opinion: "Schopenhauer's theory of music and metaphysics unlocks the expressive qualities of the tortured soul that found their proper form of artistic expression in the twentieth-century atonal music that Wagner inspired, a full century after *The World as Will and Representation* was originally published in 1818." Wicks, R. L., *Schopenhauer's 'The World as Will and Representation': A Reader's Guide* (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011). p.149. This raises the question as to how much Schoenberg, the progenitor of atonality, knew of Schopenhauer's philosophy. On this topic Pamela White reveals that, "…evidence exists for dating Schoenberg's interest in Schopenhauer, beginning as early as 1911, when Schoenberg made reference to Schopenhauer's *Parerga und Paralipomena* in the first edition of the *Harmonielehre.* The following year, Schoenberg also referred to Schopenhauer in the following two essays: 'Gustav Mahler', and 'The Relationship to the Text'." See: White, C. P., "Schoenberg and Schopenhauer' " in: *Journal of the Arnold Schoenberg Institute.* (1976). vol. 8, (1) June 1984, pp.39-57. As White has discovered, by 1913, Schoenberg possessed most of Schopenhauer's works, owning the *Sämtliche Werke* and the complete six volume set of the 1891 Reclam edition edited by Eduard Grisebach – all of which were entered into the musicians personal library catalogue on 23.01.1913. It appears that one of the most annotated books in Schoenberg's library was *Parerga und Paralipomena: Kleine Philosophische Schriften,* vol. 2, from the Reclam *Werke*. White also suggests that the book did not get listed in Schoenberg's personal catalogue but may have been integrated into the collection after 1918.

For musicians such as Paul Bekker, a violinist with the Berlin Philharmonic, Schoenberg's atonal music indicated that:

> The music of the nineteenth century, as it developed from the classical art, was shaped by the urge towards representation, a corporealization of the process of feeling. But here lies the chasm. Schönberg's music does not illustrate, it does not represent. It lives in a strange, unknown dimension of feeling, in which the corporeal, the firm outline of the artistic object, no longer exists.[283]

However, Alan Lessem takes a contrary position and argues that the idea of a chasm disconnecting Schoenberg from the nineteenth century is an overstatement, since for the 19th century "representation was already an intellectual problem."[284]

The intellectual problem for Kandinsky and Schoenberg was that abstract concepts form a specific class of their own, having their life only in the human mind, and differ from the representations of perception as so far discussed. They cannot be demonstrated in experience or "brought before the eyes or the imagination like objects of perception. They can only be conceived, not perceived, and only the effects that man produces through them are objects of experience proper."[285] At their best, Schopenhauer argues, abstract concepts are brought about by the process of cognitive reflection which repeats the original world of perception creating a singular copy out of an heterogeneous material. Concepts he therefore suggests, can be termed "representations of representations."[286] They are *conceivable* but not *perceivable*, being inclusive of both representations from perception and abstract representations.[287] This is so because the concept is a representation of a representation, or in other words a copy of a copy, whose complete nature exists only in relation to another representation.[288] The essential value of abstract concepts lies in their communicability, their retention, and their fixed state. However,

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[283] Lessem, A., "Schoenberg and the Crisis of Expressionism," in: *Music & Letters* Vol. 55, no. 4 (1974). p.434. See also: Bekker, P., *Kritische Zeitbilder*, 1. bis 3. tausend. ed. (Berlin: Schuster & Loeffler, 1921). p.170.
[284] Lessem. p.434.
[285] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.39.
[286] Ibid., p.40.
[287] Ibid., p.40.
[288] Ibid., p.40.

Schopenhauer concludes that "for art the concept always remains unproductive; in art it can guide only technique; its province is science."[289]

1.5 The Origins of the 'First' Abstract Paintings and the Critical Language of the Age

The above discussion brings us on to some critical concepts surrounding Kandinsky's technique in art and attributions of dates to his first abstract works. Hans K. Roethel and Jean K. Benjamin have made it known that Vasily Dmitrievich Bobrov possessed some photographs of Kandinsky's work.[290] On the back of one of these photographs is an inscription which reads thus: "Picture with a Circle/first non-objective/1911/Collection Kandinsky." [291]

Although Kandinsky's signature is evidently at the lower left-hand side of this photograph, Roethel and Benjamin offer what they believe to be additional provenance in the form of a letter to J. B. Neumann dated to 1935. In it Kandinsky thanked him for sending photographs of his paintings left behind in Moscow when he left in 1921, but noted that his "first abstract painting" (*Painting with a Circle*) was not amongst them. He asked Neuman to try to locate a photograph of this work, stating "it really is the very first abstract painting in the world because in those days there was no other artist who painted abstract pictures. Therefore, it is an 'historic painting'."[292]

Roethel and Benjamin are persuaded that Kandinsky painted the said image in 1911 whilst living in Munich, taking it to Russia in 1912, then subsequently leaving it in Moscow, and not seeing it again until the latter part of 1914 when he relocated to Russia at the beginning of the First World War. They inform us that *Picture with a Circle* (fig.

[289] Ibid., p.57.
[290] Kandinsky's pupil, secretary and assistant from 1915 to 1921.
[291] Roethel, H. K. and Benjamin, J. K., "A New Light on Kandinsky's First Abstract Painting," in: *The Burlington Magazine* Vol. 119, no. 896 (1977). p.772.
[292] Ibid., p.772.

18) was shown in a Moscow exhibition called 'The Year 1915' during April of that year and suggest that this painting may be derived from a picture called *Murnau - The Garden II* of 1910 (fig. 19). [293] On this basis, Roethel and Benjamin attempt to persuade us that the later painting of 1911 ought to be called abstract since it did not require an object.[294]

Peter Vergo by contrast, argues that the origins of abstraction in Kandinsky's pre-1914 works are more problematic than Roethel and Benjamin suggest. Although Kandinsky employed the term *bez-predmetnyi* (literally 'without objects') to describe Edouard Manet's pioneering abstractions, in his criticism of Roethel and Benjamin Vergo argues that:

> … to suggest that a picture should be termed 'non-objective' because it derives not from nature, but from another picture that might be termed 'abstract' reveals a complete misunderstanding of the distinction Kandinsky drew between the two terms in his famous response to Hilla Rebay (letter of 16 December 1936; translated and discussed in Rudenstine, 1976, pp. 274ff.).[295]

In this letter to Rebay, Kandinsky responded to how the terms 'abstract' and 'non-objective' had been defined by her in the introductory essay for a 1936 catalogue titled *Solomon R. Guggenheim Collection of Non-Objective Paintings*.[296] The difference between the two terms, as Kandinsky understood it, was that " 'abstract' means an abstraction from the object, while 'non-objectivity' describes an art which requires no object and therefore uses none."[297] He added that his first 'abstract' painting was in Moscow, and that this work could be described as 'non-objective' because its content had nothing to do with objects. At the time of its production he was unable to proceed along these lines any further since he was a pioneer without a precedent to follow. Thereafter,

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[293] Ibid., p.772.
[294] *Picture with a Circle* is indeed abstract and relies heavily on colour and nebulous expression to convey Kandinsky's conceptualised aesthetic.
[295] *Reminiscences/Three Pictures* Editor's Notes in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*.p.887.fn.6. The Russian language used by Kandinsky in part reads, '*pervaia bezpredmetnaia*' [first non-objective].
[296] Museum, S. R. G. and Rudenstine, A. Z., *The Guggenheim Museum Collection: Paintings, 1880-1945* (Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, 1976).
[297] Ibid.p.274.

in the following years he reverted to the depiction of objects, so that in some of his paintings suggestions of objects remained observable.[298]

In another letter to her dated to 16.01.1937, Kandinsky reiterated the above but in a slightly different manner – and one which is congruent with Schopenhauer's philosophy. Again, working with Rebay's distinctions, Kandinsky said that her definition of 'abstract' referred to an art which 'abstracted' its content in some way from an empirical object. By contrast he said, 'non-objective' art produces its own content without this being drawn from the world of empirical perception. Since this was the case, he was at a loss as to how Rebay could describe his paintings in the Guggenheim collection as 'abstract' because there were several of his paintings, even those pre-dating the war, which did not 'abstract' from the world of objects.[299] He argued that his first non-objective painting was executed in 1911and held at that time by the People's Museum in Moscow. For Rudenstine, at the time of her writing in 1976, the assertion was problematic since this painting had never been found, which made Kandinsky's testimony impracticable to work with.

Whilst quibbles and ambiguities over dating Kandinsky's work may be valuable, some critics have struggled to find any worth to his abstract representations. For example, as Berry argues, Clement Greenberg was quite critical about Kandinsky's abstract works - Greenberg regarding it as an error for Kandinsky to have made a radical break with art history. This was so, Berry suggests, because "Greenberg wanted modernist abstraction, in spite of its innovations, to maintain a classical continuity with the art of the past."[300] However, Kandinsky did not view his career in this way and explained that such an implied break had never been his intention.[301] Instead, Kandinsky perceived his art to be

[298] Ibid.
[299] Ibid.,p.275.
[300] Berry, K., "A Personal View on Greenberg and Kandinsky," in: *Journal of Aesthetic Education* Vol. 29, no. 4 (1995). p.97.
[301] Ibid., p.97.

organically contiguous with earlier phases in art history, and that abstraction was a necessary emancipation from irrelevances attached to the object.

In contrast, A.F. Page considers Kandinsky's earliest abstractions to be convincing, genuine and unselfconsciously expressive, compared to the later works which were indicative of intellectualism rather than spontaneous creative impulse.[302] Yet, as convinced as Page might be with regards to Kandinsky's abstractions, Schopenhauer suggests that "although abstract rational knowledge is the reflex of the representation from perception, and is founded thereon, it is by no means so congruent with it that it could everywhere take its place; on the contrary, it never corresponds wholly to this representation."[303] Therefore, given Schopenhauer's assertion, we may argue that Kandinsky's abstraction is subjective and could never be congruent with intuitive representations grounded upon objective perception.

Unlike Kandinsky, Schopenhauer was convinced that perception and not abstraction ought to be the bed rock for all evidence. This is because the immediate (or mediate reference) of perception equates to absolute truth which can yield the most valuable insights. To put this into context, Schopenhauer says that a fundamental difference between Kant's method and his is that the latter begins from indirect, reflected knowledge (concepts), whilst Schopenhauer begins from direct intuitive knowledge (perception). In order to highlight his point, Schopenhauer uses a simile which states that Kant "is comparable to a person who measures the height of a tower from its shadow; but I am like one who applies the measuring rod directly to the tower itself."[304] Thus, for Kant philosophy is a science *of* concepts, but for Schopenhauer it is a science *in* concepts, arising from knowledge of perception, "the only source of all evidence, and set down and

[302] Page, A. F., "An Early Kandinsky," in: *Bulletin of the Detroit Institute of Arts* Vol. 38, no. 2 (1958). p.28.
[303] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.69.
[304] Ibid. Vol.1,p.452.

fixed in universal concepts."[305] By contrast, Schopenhauer argues that Kant therefore "skips over this whole world of perception which surrounds us, and which is so multifarious and rich in significance, and he sticks to the forms of abstract thinking."[306] The shortest and least convoluted route to this truth, Schopenhauer believes, is through perception. This is so he says, because it is the safest route to truth since every facilitation through abstraction renders us vulnerable to deception.[307]

Indeed, Kandinsky was not so unselfcritical or naïve as to believe that he could escape charges of being an abstract deceiver, and in all probability, he has marked a passage in Schopenhauer's book with this spectre in mind. This passage concerns a letter from Schopenhauer to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe of 1815 which refers to the act of self-criticism. It says that:

> Every work has its origin in one single happy insight, and this grants the delight of conception; the birth, however, the execution, is for me at least not without pain: for then I stand before my own spirit: as a merciless judge before a prisoner who lies on the rack, and requires him to answer, until there is nothing more left to ask.[308]

Apart from being his own judge, Kandinsky had to face public criticism. As Riccardo Marchi tells us, many early Berlin critics such as Oskar Bie could not accept Kandinsky's abstract art. When writing for the *Berliner Börsencourier*, Bie responded with aggression towards Kandinsky's theoretical writing, construing this to be symptomatic of an unwarranted intellectualism and the miscarriage of his art.[309]

In reaction to this problem, Herwarth Walden's solution was to publish Bie's

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[305] Ibid.,p.453.
[306] Ibid.
[307] Ibid. Although Schopenhauer makes perception the standard bearer of evidence it is open to dispute. F.C. White argues that perception is relative, as when we encounter the problems of hallucinations, illusions, dreams, and interaction between perceiver and perceived. See: F. C. White, 'The Fourfold Root' in: Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. p.74-75, fn.22.
[308] Arthur Schopenhauer to J.W. von Goethe on 11.11.1815, in: Schopenhauer, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6*. p.223.
[309] Marchi, R., "October 1912: Understanding Kandinsky's Art "Indirectly" at Der Sturm," in: *Getty Research Journal*, no. 1 (2009). p.60. Bie was an art historian and editor of the literary journal Neue Rundschau from 1894-1922.

review in *Der Sturm* as an exemplar of an unimaginative mind. Walden argued that "these art critics look going from picture to picture instead of moving from their experience (*Erlebnis*) to the work of art."[310] From his perspective, too many critics were rooted in representational seeing – approving works drawn from intuitive perception only, and disapproving of works such as *Picture with Black Arch* of 1912 (fig. 20). This has no overt resemblance to intuitive perception or the human body. However, not everyone has agreed with Kandinsky's early critics since W. Januszczak's experience is that this abstract painting, with three distinct colours, does retain a vestige of intuitive representation "by an inflected line that recalls the *douga*, the characteristic yoke of the Russian troika."[311]

In order to deconstruct a predilection for representational seeing, Walden suggested that most contemporary viewers were too proud of their eyes and that they had not yet learned how to see properly. They demanded that the artwork reproduce their own optical impressions which were not even their own. [312] To be proud of one's eyes was to adhere to the art of former times - which by implication was to be backward and imitative. Arguing against such 'conservative' viewing habits, Walden declared that, "every conventional form … is a scaffold for a collapsing building or a corset for a sagging body. Art is presentation, and not representation. To enjoy a precious fruit the skin has to be sacrificed."[313] Therefore, the skin of representation had to be sacrificed in order to reveal what the artist, with his "innermost senses, the expression of his being,"[314] had achieved. The affective life of the will had to be the artist's instrument where every external impression became an expression of their inner life. The artist was to be a conduit for

[310] Ibid., p.60.
[311] Januszczak, W., *Techniques of the World's Great Painters* (Smithfield N.S.W.: Gary Allen, 2004).p.140-41.
[312] Herwarth Walden, "Vorrede," *Erster Deutscher Herbstsalon* (Berlin: Der Sturm, 1913), 5-8; see also the letter from August Macke, Walden estate, *Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz*, Berlin.Walden, H., *Der Sturm* (Berlin-Hallensee: Der Sturm, 1910).p.5, quoted in Long, R.C.W., I.K. Rigby, and S. Barron. *German Expressionism: Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the Rise of National Socialism*. University of California Press, 1995. p.57.
[313] Ibid., p.57.
[314] Walden quoted and translated in: Long et al. p.57-58.

visions and "inner apparitions."[315] As a result, what Walden was attempting to promote was a paradigm shift that would destabilise contemporary viewing habits and the world as representation. In doing so his critical language is full of paradox, since on the one hand he was affirming the affectivity of the will, and thus C1, whilst simultaneously foregrounding what he wanted less of – the world as intuitive representation, and thereby undermining C1.

A notable contributor to these complex debates over representation was Paul Fechter who, after receiving his doctorate in 1906, worked as an editor for the newspaper *Dresden Neuesten Nachrichten.* By 1911, he could be found working for the *Vossische Zeitung* and making his acquaintance with *Die Brücke* members in Berlin. Three years later, his book *Der Expressionismus*[316] was an early and significant exploration of both Expressionism and Impressionism. In this book, Fechter describes the turn away from the world as representation through contemporary views on Impressionism, Post-Impressionism and Expressionism. In Fechter's opinion, the reaction against Impressionist naturalism was correct insofar as the latter was aimed at the unremitting use of nature. By contrast, the abandonment of nature was the clarion call of the Expressionists which was fully justified. But its combination with the call 'back to the picture' (*Zurück zum Bild*) was contaminated to the core, and thus inevitably led to the ills of decorative painting. The turning away from the representation of external appearances became truly meaningful only when the life changes it implied had been fully realized down to the last consequences.[317]

Following an undue emphasis on representation and the pictorial, the abandonment of nature could only lead back to genuine art "after it responded to the directive back to

[315] Ibid., p.58.
[316] Fechter, P., *Der Expressionismus ... Mit 50 Abbildungen. Dritte Auflage* (München1919).
[317] See: Paul Fechter, from Chapter 3, "Die späten Gegenbewegungen," part 1 "Der Expressionismus," *Der Expressionismus* (Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag 1914): 21-29.R. Piper & Co. Verlag, Munchen 1914.Quoted and translated in: Long, Rigby, and Barron. p.81-82.

emotion!"[318] Through an emphasis on emotive feelings Expressionists ironically gave rise to those feelings' most intensively concentrated representations. Consequently, for Fechter the new German art became "a matter in essence of solving a visual task of understanding, expressed in Schopenhauerian terms."[319] Since Expressionism was allegedly more about achieving feeling, it was no longer sufficient to know the world as representation but instead to experience (and develop) the will so that it became a living factor in the "destiny of the soul"[320] – thus validating C1. Not content with demanding the dissolution of colour into representational objects, as had been the case with Impressionism, Expressionism Fechter argued laid claim instead to the world as representational appearance - not just as appearance or as symbolic value - but as an expressive medium of the will – thus validating C1. Therefore, Fechter's critical language - as had Walden's - paradoxically affirmed and denies C1. On the one hand, Fechter's call 'back to emotion' affirmed C1, whilst on the other the pursuit of 'feelings' most concentrated representations' indicates a contradictory, perhaps inescapable need for representation, as did his comment that Expressionism had 'laid claim to the world as representational appearance'.

As did Fechter, Hermann Bahr in his 1916 essay *Expressionismus* was convinced that whoever saw a painting by leading Expressionists or Futurists, would have to agree that in spite of sectarian strife amongst these groups, they were all united in turning away from Impressionism.[321] While Impressionism always wanted to attain a simulacrum of representational reality, in Bahr's opinion Expressionists violated reality, appearances and

[318] Ibid., p.82.
[319] Fechter. p.23.
[320] Ibid.,p.23.
[321] Bahr recalled a gathering in Munich for Whitsun when he was asked if he stood by the philosophy of Schopenhauer. Bahr replied, "that no-one can swear by the truth of another; everyone must look for his own truth…How could that possibly be, for everyone admittedly sees the same world, but everyone sees with their own eyes?" See: Verhältnis zu Schopenhauer, "Jahrbuch der Schopenhauer - Gesellschaft," (Kiel: Schmidt & Klaunig, 1915). Vol.4,1915. p.3, Vol.4, 1915. p.3.

the empire of the senses.[322] This violation of representation caused 'general indignation' because all that had gone before in terms of aesthetic value was being denied in the process of trying new things. Therefore, the world as representation, the world of seeing, was being violated through the Expressionists' experimentation upon the visual.

Contemporary viewers, for the main part, could not accept anything other than the authentication and imitation of the natural world as representation. As a result of Expressionist art resisting the natural world of representation, Bahr reported how contemporary viewers felt that this:

> …could never be art, while the Expressionist claims exactly this to be art, to be his art. And when the viewer heatedly retorts that the painter should paint only what we see, the Expressionist assures him: we too paint only what we see! But they are unable to agree. They are unable to agree on seeing. When they speak about seeing, they each mean something different. What is seeing?[323]

Bahr's comment implies that Expressionist art was not just about the affective world, the world as will, but by necessity and just as often, about the world as representation, as one of 'seeing', thus undermining the credibility of C1. However, Bahr had 'form' which was not forgotten by one wry observer who brought this 'form' to light for his readers in a 1917 edition of *Kunst und Künstler*. That observer was Karl Scheffler, who sardonically asked:

> And yet did Bahr once, by his own admission, battle for Impressionism 'as if fighting for his own life'? He therefore fought for thoughtlessness, soullessness and empty imitation? How should the reader now take it seriously, when he fights for Expressionism![324]

Scheffler felt that there was never a real struggle in Bahr or a deep belief in what he was saying about art at all. He went further and argued that Bahr never truly experienced the

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[322] Bahr, H., *Expressionismus* (München: Delphin-Verlag, 1916). Quoted in Long, R.C.W., I.K. Rigby, and S. Barron. *German Expressionism: Documents from the End of the Wilhelmine Empire to the Rise of National Socialism*. University of California Press, 1995. p.89.
[323] Ibid., p.89.
[324] Scheffler, K., "Max Pechstein," in: *Kunst und Künstler / Illustrierte Monatsschrift für bildende Kunst und Kunstgewerbe* Vol. 16, no. 1. 1918. p.26.

pictures of the great Impressionists or learned the art of seeing. For that reason, although Bahr had the capacity to dazzle readers, his book could not convince on a lasting basis.[325] Indeed, it is true that Bahr frequently referred to the 'eye' and 'seeing' as he attempted to 'dazzle' his readers about the processes of the creative act through the language of vision as opposed to feeling. Thus, we may say that Bahr's visual language betrayed Expressionism's indebtedness to the world as visual representation, not just to the affectivity of the world as will.

This concern with visual representation, and the dialectical play between classical modes of 'outer seeing' versus the Expressionist's art of 'inner seeing', ran into conflict with an art-going public who were used to seeing things very differently.[326] On this Bahr was confident that:

> Someone who has never become conscious of his own seeing is in any case inclined to think of the eye as a window into which the world looks. Add to that our being educated in classical art, an art always looking out sucking in the world. Impressionism is only the last word of classical art; it completes and fulfils it in its entirety by intensifying the outer seeing to the utmost and thereby excluding the inner seeing as much as possible.[327]

Although Bahr derided 'classical art' as a conservative mode of 'outer seeing', one of mere corporeal perception, let us recall that for Schopenhauer perception is the primary source of all evidence.[328] However, for him empirical perception does not have the last word on human experience, since even scientific explanations must stop at an unknown occult quality – which in turn seems to mirror the 'spirit' of C2. Scientific knowledge always leaves the inner nature of inorganic matter unexplained just as it does with that of

[325] Neue Bücher (New Books) by Karl Scheffler. Reviews of 'Expressionismus' by H Bahr and 'Das Ende des Impressionismus' by M Picard. p.146.
[326] With regard to 'outer seeing' Schopenhauer tells us that the world as representation is formed in our brain in such a way that it only gives us the 'outer shell' not the inner kernel of the true order of things. He also informs us that this is not a condemnation of the faculty of the intellect, (the brain) especially since the "intellect finds the remedy for this 'error' in itself. Thus, it arrives at the distinction between phenomenon and the being-in-itself of things." Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation* [in English; German (translation)]. Indian Hills (Col.): Falcon's Wing Press, 1958. Vol.2, p.176.
[327] Hermann Bahr, *Expressionismus* (Munich: Delphin-Verlag, 1916), Quoted in: Long, Rigby, and Barron.p.90.
[328] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.80.

human beings.[329] Consequently, it is through this inadequacy that art and philosophy take up their true calling and venture into those areas where science cannot go. Therefore, the task of philosophy, and we may argue art, is to explain the material world on metaphysical terms.

1.6 Kandinsky, Science and Philosophy

Whilst British and French empiricists have by definition displayed an antipathy towards a spiritualised metaphysic - and thus refuted the above calling - French phenomenologists have embraced it. In relation to Kandinsky's art, French phenomenologists Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion perceive that he reconciles the metaphysical gap between the invisible and the visible. Contrary to hard-line empiricists, some phenomenologists hold that external life is illusory compared to that of interior life which is deemed to be more 'real'. For them our true reality is invisible, and our subjectivity is the reality which constitutes the content of art – an art which seeks to express that abstract content. [330]

According to Crétien van Campen there is a common ground between the phenomenology of abstract art and psychology. He has remarked upon how a number of scholars have found strong parallels between early abstract art and the illustrations used by experimental Gestalt psychologists during the early 20th century.[331] In addition, he has found common ground between Kandinsky's attempts to extract aesthetic laws from visual experiments and Theodor Lipps' *Raumästhetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen* (1897) (*Space Aesthetics and Geometrical-Optical Illusions*). As a result, Van Campen

[329] Ibid., p.81.
[330] Gschwandtner, C. M., "Revealing the Invisible: Henry and Marion on Aesthetic Experience," in: *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* Vol. 28, no. 3 (2014). p.306.
[331] Campen, C. V., "Early Abstract Art and Experimental Gestalt Psychology," in: *Leonardo.* Vol. 30, no. 2 (1997). p.133.

argues that "Kandinsky and Lipps considered aesthetic experiences to be the product of 'visual balances' that arise from energy fields in the human mind."[332]

Van Campen also surmises that Kandinsky's philosophy was coterminous with the emergent Gestalt theories of Max Wertheimer, going so far as to suggest that from around 1911-12 onwards Kandinsky could be viewed as a pioneer of Gestalt methods for understanding perception.[333] Van Campen is not alone, since Nicoletta Misler also argues that for Kandinsky, psychology was the foremost science involved concurrently with the "science of the soul (or of the spirit - cf. the Russian *dusha/dukh*) and with the science of perception, a conviction that guided his study of how the work of art influenced human perception."[334]

We also know that Kandinsky read Wilhelm Wundt's psycho-physiology. This was a matter of importance at the time and discussed by Russian psychologist Georgy Ivanovich Chelpanov.[335] Furthermore, Misler argues that Kandinsky's fascination with psychology might be the reason why he founded one of the most significant and early divisions within the RAKhN - the Physico-Psychological Department in 1921.[336] Indeed, Misler adds that for a time Kandinsky pondered the biological sciences as a model for

[332] Ibid., p.135.
[333] Ibid., p.135.
[334] Misler, N., "Vasilii Kandinsky and the Russian Academy of Artistic Sciences," in: *Experiment* Vol. 8, no. 1 (2002).p.178.
[335] Chelpanov used Schopenhauer's philosophy in his polemics against materialism. See: Haber, E. C., Mikhail Bulgakov: The Early Years (Harvard University Press, 1998). p.15.
[336] Misler. p.174. The RAKhN stands for The Russian Academy of Artistic Sciences - (Rossiyskaia Akademiia Khudozhestvennykh Nauk). Misler argues that Kandinsky and his co-workers at the RAKhN held a mutual fascination for synaesthesia. This led them to become interested in the ideas of composer-pianist Aleksandr Skriabin, to attend Vladimir Baranov-Rossine's 1923 lecture on the optophone and to examine the correspondences between colour, sound, and movement. Misler also suggests that musicologist Leonid Sabaneev, "a member of the Music Section and a close friend of Kandinsky, elaborated a 'plan of experimental investigation into color hearing' for the Commission on Musical Psychology." Ibid.,p.175. Given Kandinsky's passion for music, Richard C. Green has argued that Kandinsky experienced synaesthesia seeing "yellow when he heard the note c; orange for d, and so on through the spectra of color and sound. Vibrating solely with line, colors, and shapes unimpeded by representation, painting was now being given the exalted expectation of expressing pure spirit." Green.p.279. In addition, Joshua M. Hall's argues that Kandinsky invoked the 'language' of synaesthesia in order to analyse Composition VI. See: Hall, J. M., "Kandinsky's Composition VI: Heideggerian Poetry in Noah's Ark," in: The Journal of Aesthetic Education Vol. 46, no. 2 (2012). For an in-depth discussion of synaesthesia in relation Kandinsky's work see: Campen, C. v., "Artistic and Psychological Experiments with Synesthesia," in: Leonardo Vol. 32, no. 1 (1999). Also see: Union internationale des beaux-arts, d. l. d. s. e. d. l. i. and Union internationale des beaux-art et des, l., "Les Tendances nouvelles," in: Les Tendances nouvelles. (1904).

aesthetic creativity. This was reinforced in 1921 by Nikolai Uspensky's lecture on the 'Role of the Positive Sciences in the Study of the General Paths of Artistic Creativity'.[337]

Whether or not we agree with such psychological attributions to Kandinsky, the model for aesthetic creativity behind the *Compositions* series was his internal response to external events. This method contained perceptions which resulted from Kandinsky's internal world *and* impressions which he gathered from the external world of appearances. Since the internal factor was one of metaphysical 'vibrations' he hoped that this would literally strike a chord within the spectator of his works, rather than any manifest intuitive representation *per se*. [338]

In order to attain this, as already noted, Kandinsky repudiated ornamental art which may have been inspired by Alois Riegl's principle of *Kunstwollen.*[339] In what may be construed as a validation of C2, Kandinsky reframed this principle into one of 'inner necessity' which impelled the production of an artwork without concern for external appearances, concerning itself instead with inner meaning and concepts.[340] As his generation moved into the 20th century, Kandinsky sensed that the previous century was one which had become more and more remote from this type of inner meaning. He concluded that the *fin de siècle* was to be one of the major turning points in spiritual history, where the irreconcilable was to be reconciled. He felt that the dialectical poles of analysis and synthesis, when reconciled would lead to what he called 'the Great Synthesis'. It was in this way that the new art of the twentieth century would come into existence. He believed that 'the Great Synthesis' of the *fin de siècle* was born from inner

[337] Misler., p.178.
[338] Dabrowski. p.11.
[339] *Kunstwollen* may be considered as analogous to the Hegelian 'world spirit', Nietzsche's 'will to-power' or Schopenhauer's 'willing'. The latter sense may be applied to historian Alois Riegl. As Diana Reynolds Cordileone points out, although aesthetic idealism was a factor in Riegl's *Kunstwollen*, "he also incorporated some element more closely related to Schopenhauer, particularly in the interchangeability of the words 'drive' (*Trieb*) and 'will' (*Wille, Wollen*)." Cordileone, D. R., *Alois Riegl in Vienna 1875–1905: An Institutional Biography* (Ashgate, 2014).p.100. Note how cordileone supplies evidence for Riegls' avid interest in Schopenhauer's work.
[340] Morgan. p.239.

necessity and the beginning of the 'Great Spiritual'.[341] As a result, he felt that it was the 19th century's emphasis on material appearances which caused the deterioration of mankind's inner creative powers - and those powers' near disappearance.[342]

Kandinsky was probably motivated to think this way through the developments of material science. Although art and science have engaged spirituality with their own tensions and antagonisms, caution is needed if we attempt to confer the same tensions upon his experimental art. This view may be supported by David W. Galenson, who observes that "the empirical and visual source of Kandinsky's belief in the validity of abstract art points to his experimental nature as an artist."[343]

1.7 Kandinsky and Schopenhauer on Children's Visual Development

Despite Kandinsky basing much of his later art on the premises of abstract experimentation, he did not lose sight of the empirical altogether. Intuitive perception was still of interest to him, as we can see from his 'glosses' in Schopenhauer's essay *On Vision and Colours*. In chapter 2, simply called 'On Vision', Kandinsky has paid attention to the nature of intuitive perception in relation to the development of children's visual faculties. Here Schopenhauer explains that the faculty of vision can register delicate and diverse external impressions but on its own can only produce sensations. These initially become intuitive perceptions through the operation of the understanding. Thus, if an individual were to stand before a beautiful landscape and they were for an instant deprived of the faculty of understanding, "then nothing of that vista would remain but the sensation of a manifold stimulation of his retina similar to the many color blobs on the palette of a painter

[341] Foreword to the Catalogue of the First International Art Exhibition, Dusseldorf "Vorwort", [Katalog der Ersten Internationalen Kunstausstellung im Hause Leonhard Tietz, A.G.,] (Dusseldorf), 1922 in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.479.
[342] Fingesten, P., "Spirituality, Mysticism and Non-Objective Art," in: *Art Journal* Vol. 21, no. 1 (1961). p.2.
[343] Galenson. p.238.

- which is, so to speak, the raw material from which, just a moment ago, his understanding created that intuitive perception."[344]

Kandinsky has then marked a section of Schopenhauer's text which runs as follows: "During the first weeks of its life, a child can use all its senses, but it does not perceive intuitively; it does not understand, therefore it stares curiously at the world."[345] In addition, Kandinsky has read Schopenhauer's work on perception, which describes how every object impacts upon the sensory organs differently. The effects of this impact can always be traced back to an object as its cause:

> Therefore, a child learning intuitive perception compares the different kinds of impressions it receives from the same object. It touches what it sees, it examines what it touches, follows the sound to the source from which it originates, brings to its aid smell and taste, and finally takes distance and illumination into account for the eye.[346]

This is significant because we can relate Kandinsky's reading of Schopenhauer to his thoughts on children's art.[347] Firstly, let us compare Schopenhauer's statement above with Kandinsky's statement below and note the similarities:

> A child, for whom every object is new, experiences the world in this way: it sees light, is attracted by it, wants to grasp it, burns its finger in the process, and thus learns fear and respect for the flame. And then it learns that light has not only an unfriendly, but also a friendly side: banishing darkness and prolonging the day, warming and cooking, delighting the eye.[348]

There are remarkable similarities between the texts, especially those concerning a child's approach to objects, their acquisition of perception, and their experimental attitude. Through the language of form and colour the intuitive perceptions of children took on a

[344] Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl.p.50. Cf. Schopenhauer, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6*. p.23-24.
[345] Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl.p.50.Cf. Schopenhauer, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6*. p.24.
[346] Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl. p.50.
[347] Indeed, as we shall see in chapter 3 of this thesis, Kandinsky's 'purer' thoughts on the role of children in art might at this juncture be contrasted with those of Kirchner and Heckel's, who allegedly entertained less than pure thoughts about their child models. Although we shall not be making such comparisons in that chapter, we may consider the fact that, through their alleged improper treatment of their child models, C1 can be validated in as much as their purported behaviours act as an affirmation of the will.
[348] 'On the Spiritual in Art and Painting.' in: p.157.

metaphysical importance for Kandinsky, who believed that an artist's internal necessity possessed three 'mystical sources' or 'three mystical necessities'. The second of these 'necessities' was that every artist, as a child of their time, had to express what is peculiar to their own time in terms of style and inner value.[349] As a consequence, his belief was that children's drawing in particular had a salutary effect upon unbiased spectators.[350]

Of the child's intuitive perception he was convinced that "the practical-purposive element is foreign to the child, since it regards every object with unaccustomed eyes and still possesses an undimmed capacity for taking in the object itself."[351] The 'practical-purposive' is made familiar to the child through trial and error so that through "every child's drawing without exception is revealed the inner sound of the object itself."[352] Adults, usually teachers, attempt to compel the child towards the 'practical-purposive', and through this unenlightened viewpoint they undermine a child's drawing.[353] Instead of this, Kandinsky wished to emphasise the positive aspect of children's art in terms of their compositional characteristics.[354] Therefore, a vast unconscious potential in children's art exists which can express itself over and above an adult's art.[355]

Since the artist resembles the child he can manifest the 'inner sound' of things as perhaps in Schoenberg's *Self-Portrait* of 1911 (fig. 21).[356] For Kandinsky, paintings such as this arose from that which he termed the 'great realism', in art attainable by depicting the shell of an object with completeness and directness, thereby separating the object from any practical meanings in order to reveal its 'inner sounds'. In line with this, Kandinsky

[349] 'On the Spiritual in Art and Painting ' in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*., p.173.
[350] Wassily Kandinsky,' On the Question of Form' in: Kandinsky, W., Marc, F., and Lankheit, K., *The Documents of 20th Century Art: The 'Blaue Reiter' Almanac*, New documentary ed. (London: Thames and Hudson, 1974). p.174.
[351] Vasily Kandinsky, '*The Blaue Reiter Almanac [Der Blaue Reiter]* (Munich), 1912,' in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.250.
[352] Ibid., p.251.
[353] Ibid., p.251.
[354] Kandinsky, Marc, and Lankheit.p.175.
[355] Ibid., p.176.
[356] Ibid., p.176.

opted for what he called the 'great realism', as experienced in children's drawings. He believed that both 'the great abstraction' and 'the great realism' have always been present in art and characterised by a continuous balancing act. This balancing act aimed at achieving an ideal through a complete equilibrium.[357] During his day, it appeared as if the ideal no longer mattered, thus creating an imbalance between the two poles of abstraction and realism. As a result, he argued that "art has apparently put an end to the welcome complementation of the abstract by means of the objective and vice versa."[358] The 'great realism' he also thought, had scarcely manifested itself as the impetus to objectify the content of a picture through a simple 'inartistic' depiction of objects.[359]

While the 'great realism' should be simple, child-like and direct, by contrast the 'great abstraction' consists of "the apparent wish to exclude completely the objective (real) element and to embody the content of the work of art in 'non-material' forms."[360] This reduces the life of the object within a picture to a bare minimum, so as to reveal the 'inner sound' of the picture in question.[361] Therefore, while realism intensifies the 'inner sound' of the picture by excluding the abstract, abstraction by antithesis intensifies the 'inner sound' by exclusion of the real.

The above sounds like a game of aesthetic dialectics and Berry has pointed to the 'games' which Kandinsky played with spectators in terms of representation. This may be seen in horse rider images such as *Lyrical* of 1911 (fig. 22) which is partially influenced by children's drawings where detail is denuded in favour of the essential. Subsequently, "for a while, Kandinsky indulged in a kind of game with the spectator, where, by a kind of 'fuzzy logic', actual objects are suggested by a more or less vague process of

[357] Vasily Kandinsky. 'On the Question of Form', *The Blaue Reiter Almanac[Der Blaue Reiter]* (Munich), 1912, in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*. p.242.
[358] Ibid., p.242.
[359] Ibid., p.243.
[360] Ibid., p.244.
[361] Ibid., p.244.

representation."[362] However, Kandinsky's logic, when referring to notions of 'realism', was not meant in the sense of social realism, or fidelity to intuitive representation, rather what was intended was the depiction of a subject with naïve distinctness. In the *Almanac*, children's drawings were published as "…realists because they represent the object without regard for practical necessities, art, and other extraneous considerations."[363]

Kandinsky's recognition of the innate spontaneity of children's art is evident during the years of 1908-09, particularly under the influence of fellow Russian artists. As Vergo comments, "…in Kandinsky's 'fairy-tale' paintings, the affinity with the children's book illustrations of his compatriot Ivan Bilibin (who, like Kandinsky, studied in Munich) is unmistakable - for example, in a work such as *Buntes Leben* …remarkable because of its comparatively late date (1907)."[364] *Buntes Leben*, otherwise known as *Motley Life* (fig. 23), is a tempera and gouache on canvas, which was exhibited at the Salon d'Automne in Paris 1907 and at Angers in the same year. In what is a very dark setting, a throng of people, clearly identifiable as people not as abstractions, are set against the Kremlin which rests on a hill. The building is painted in lighter tones as if to contrast a more enlightened viewpoint in comparison to the earthly gathering below it. These images, Vergo feels, therefore provide us with insights into the abstract works of 1910-16 "in which the artist disguises, principally by his use of colour, certain of the motifs from his earlier paintings (churches with onion domes, crinolined figures, walled city on hill, etc.)."[365]

Kandinsky's respect for the perceptual capacities of children also resonates with another passage he has marked in his copy of Schopenhauer's work. This passage relates

[362] Berry, "The Paradox of Kandinsky's Abstract Representation." p.101.
[363] Olin. p.156. Kandinsky praised Henri Rousseau's images as the champions of naïve 'realism' since they mirrored the clarity and spontaneity of children's art.
[364] Vergo, P., "Kandinsky - Munich, Haus der Kunst," in: *The Burlington Magazine* Vol. 119, no. 887 (1977). p.141. Bilibin was an illustrator and set designer involved with *Mir Iskusstva*. He studied with Anton Ažbe, as did Kandinsky, from 1898, and with Ilya Repin in St. Petersburg.
[365] Ibid.,p.141.

to the philosopher's theory of empirical observation which describes how things can go wrong when sensory data is received by the brain. About this Schopenhauer asserts that:

> Long after intuitive perception has been mastered, a very remarkable situation can occur which furnishes, as it were, proof of all that has been said. Even after we have practiced the processing and arranging of sense data in accordance with the laws of understanding learned in childhood for many years, these data can be disarranged through a change in the position of our sense organs.[366]

There are two cases when this occurs, as in looking cross-eyed or when we cross the middle and index fingers. In these cases, we see and feel one object as double. As a result, the understanding (the brain) behaves appropriately enough yet acquires nothing but false information. Consequently, "the rays of light traveling from the same point to the eye no longer impinge on both retinas at mutually corresponding spots, and the outer sides of both fingers touch the opposite surfaces of the same ball, which could never be with the natural position of the fingers."[367] Therefore, what we experience is double vision and double touch as an illusory appearance which cannot be taken away because the brain assumes the normal position of the sensory organs.

Schopenhauer's argument concerning touch and vision is not unique. Nor should it be assumed that Schopenhauer's argument had a unique influence upon Kandinsky's 'childlike' development of abstract art as with *Improvisation No. 30* (*Canons*) of 1913 (fig. 24), and *Improvisation No. 19* of 1911 (fig. 25). Indeed, Kandinsky was as much a child of his time as was Schopenhauer and as Olin points out, "True to the perceptual theory of his time, he does not try to argue that colors are things. To make reference to touch through line is to make reference to the real without necessarily making reference to any specific 'real' object."[368] This can be found in *Improvisation No.19*, an oil on canvas, which tends towards incorporeality and abstraction through a black outline. There

[366] Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl.p.53. Cf. Schopenhauer, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6*. p.28.
[367] Schopenhauer, Runge, and Stahl. p.53. Cf.Schopenhauer, *Arthur Schopenhauers Sämmtliche Werke 6, 6*. p.28.
[368] Olin. p.167.

is a child-like vivacity to the luscious swathes of blue which contrast with the oranges and yellows of the figures on the left.[369]

Although he demonstrated a tendency towards incorporeality and abstraction, the intuitive perception of objects was still of importance to Kandinsky. This notion may be supported by his response to a questionnaire set by the avant-garde review *Gaceta de Arte*. In it Kandinsky proposed that the move away from the object does not mean a flight from nature in general.[370] This means that art need not depend upon nature since it is a constituent of nature. Thus, "it can dispense with the mediation of nature provided it can put itself directly in relation with nature's totality. So-called abstract art is subject to the same laws."[371]

The more abstract the form of a painting became, the more purity he felt that it gained. Therefore, a picture's corporeal component could be discarded in favour of pure abstract forms, or corporeal forms could be distilled into abstractions.[372] Yet, ever prudent, Kandinsky erred on the side of caution, and argued that the label 'abstract' was harmful, and misleading if taken too literally.[373] Indeed, he would remark upon how Parisian abstract painters and sculptors had attempted to create an alternative concept to that of 'abstract', as in *'art-nonfiguratif'*, an equivalent to the German term '*gegenstandslose Kunst*'. However, he felt convinced that the negative parts of such words, as in *non* and *los,* were regrettable since they negated the sense of an 'object' and therefore "put nothing

[369] It was not exhibited until the 1950s.
[370] Wassily Kandinsky ' Reply to Gaceta de Arte *Gaceta de Arte, Revista internacional de cultura* (Tenerife), 1936 in: Kandinsky, Lindsay, and Vergo, *Kandinsky: Complete Writings on Art*.
Iibid., p.791.
[371] Wassily Kandinsky,' Reply to Gaceta de Arte *Gaceta de Arte, Revista internacional de cultura* (Tenerife), 1936, in: ibid.,
Ibid., p.791.
[372] Ibid.
[373] Reflections on Abstract Art ["Reflexions sur l'art abstrait"] Cahiers d'Art (Paris), 1, nos. 7-8 (1931) in: ibid., p.757.

else in its place."[374] And so it was, at the time of writing, he arrived at the following conclusion:

> For a long time now, people have been trying (as I, too, did before the war) to replace 'abstract' with 'absolute'. In fact, scarcely an improvement. In my view, the best name would be 'real art', because this kind of art puts a new artistic world, spiritual in nature, alongside the external world. A world that can be brought about only through art. A real world. The old term 'abstract art' has, however, by now become firmly entrenched.[375]

Conclusion

Having stated the above let us conclude our discussion concerning the 'sacrosanct phenomena' of Kandinsky's art. Let us argue that if we are to interpret Kandinsky's abstract art according to Schopenhauer's philosophy, then it is impossible to understand the real inner nature of things as Kandinsky had hoped to do by staying on the path of representational knowledge.[376] Schopenhauer argues that this is so because such "knowledge always comes to things *from without,* and must therefore remain eternally *outside* them."[377] If this is the case, then our exploration of C1 entails that we must ask a key question. That question being what is the world of perception besides being representation - whether abstract or otherwise? This we cannot discern through mere abstractions – something more concrete than these must anchor our investigations.

Let us therefore anchor our investigations on Schopenhauer's terms by asking once more, "is that of which I am conscious only as representation just the same as my own body, of which I am doubly conscious, on the one hand as *representation,* on the other as *will*?"[378] Since we are following Schopenhauer's thinking, and exploring C1 and C2 in detail, we, like Schopenhauer, "want to know the significance of those representations;

[374] Ibid.,p. 785.
[375] Ibid.
[376] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.12.
[377] Ibid.,p.12.
[378] *The World as Will and Representation*., p.18.

we ask whether this world is nothing more than representation."[379] In order to explore this we need to investigate the other side of the world - which is that of the will. If we follow Schopenhauer, then the approach which Kandinsky took may be regarded as inappropriate for approaching claims such as C2. Indeed, we may say that, Kandinsky's theory and practice as an artist undermines C1, due to its predominant focus upon representations, no matter how otherworldly his intentions were. This view is supported by the fact that the critical language and impetus of the age as we have noted, although articulating a need to express more emotion, paradoxically referred more often to that which critics and artists wanted *less* of, which was the world as intuitive representation. Therefore, this critical irony demands that C1 cannot be vindicated in full.

In spite of this, Schopenhauer's line of questioning sometimes parallels Kandinsky's metaphysical enquires. Kandinsky too wanted to know if there was something more to human experience than phenomenal appearance and what that 'something more' was. However, Schopenhauer makes it clear that this 'something more' must be entirely different from the world as representation, abstract or otherwise, and from the principle of sufficient reason. This means that Kandinsky, and like-minded Expressionist artists, could not reach this 'something more' through the forms of the principle of sufficient reason or abstract representation.

This 'something more' has to be foreign to the world and its laws of representation. It cannot be found by any external route because this route only delivers 'images and names', nor can it be found on the route of abstractions since they are open to innumerable deceptions. As a result, Schopenhauer can state that, "we are like a man who goes round a castle, looking in vain for an entrance, and sometimes sketching the facades. Yet, this

[379] Ibid., p.98.

is the path that all philosophers before me have followed."[380] Consequently, we need to find that knowledge which takes us on the path to the inner nature of the world, to find what Schopenhauer called the will and the thing-in-itself which differs entirely from representation.[381]

Schopenhauer uses an apt analogy to describe his theory of the 'thing-in-itself' and how it differs from the world as representation as follows:

> Just as a magic lantern shows many different pictures, but it is only one and the same flame that makes them all visible, so in all the many different phenomena which together fill the world or supplant one another as successive events, it is only the one will that appears, and everything is its visibility, its objectivity; it remains unmoved in the midst of this change. It alone is the thing-in-itself; every object is phenomenon, to speak Kant's language, or appearance.[382]

Whilst being himself rooted in the world of appearance, we should also conclude that Kandinsky was an artist who expressed a spiritualised vision of the world as representation. Yet, the knowledge he had was still "given entirely through the medium of a body, and the affections of this body are, as we have shown, the starting-point for the understanding in its perception of this world."[383] Indeed, as the next chapter explains, the body is tangible willing, objectivity of will, an object like other objects, and manifests itself through the principle of sufficient reason in "the knowing consciousness."[384]

Thus, the 'medium of the body', as depicted in Expressionist art, must lead us into the world as will in the next chapter. "Therefore, what becomes known, what becomes representation, is the will; and this representation is what we call the body."[385]

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[380] Ibid., p.99.
[381] Ibid., p.31.
[382] Ibid., p.153
[383] Ibid., p.99.
[384] Ibid., p.175.
[385] *The World as Will and Representation*., Vol.2, p.259.

Chapter 2: Expressionist Art, Dance and the Embodied Will

Introduction

In relation to Expressionist art, the previous chapter examined features of the world as representation according to its general form through facets of Schopenhauer's 'First Book: The World as Representation First Aspect'. Among other matters, the previous chapter showed that abstract representations, as mere concepts, have meaning and content only in relation to perception. Subsequently, in this chapter we shall examine Expressionist art, according to elements of Schopenhauer's 'Second Book: The World as Will First Aspect: The Objectification of the Will'. This is being done in order to test C1 and C2 and to obtain a knowledge of the content of perception through a specific aspect of Expressionist art - the human body dancing. Consequently, this chapter counterbalances the previous one by suggesting that the human body is an objectification of the will - not just a representation.

Our objective in this chapter is to get to know the embodied will intimately, as the most real of things, through the Expressionist body. We can achieve this by thinking about what goes on within our own bodies when it performs an action and then comparing this activity with another person's body - whether a dancer or not - and come to understand something of another body's inner nature through such a comparison. In addition, by comparing what goes on in our bodies to the material world as a whole, we can gain insights into the inner nature of that world. On this topic, Schopenhauer says that if we compare that which goes on within our own bodies when it performs activities born of motives, along with inner changes governed by external factors, then we can acquire an

insight into the manner by which inanimate bodies change through causal influences and therefore understand their inner nature.[386]

Although this analogical inference might help us explore the validity of C1 and C2 it is a vulnerable inference as we shall note later on in this chapter. However, if as Schopenhauer says, the medium of the body is a manifestation of the will, then let us question this assumption. In the first instance let us ask, how is the relationship between the body and the will to be interpreted through Expressionist depictions of dance?[387] Secondly, why should we trust Schopenhauer's analogical argument which moves from the body to the will? Thirdly, how could it really be said that we come to know the *meaning* of our bodies as representation and that this means we 'know' the body as will?

This chapter begins with the work of Emil Nolde and refers also to the work of *Die Brücke* artists Erich Heckel, Kirchner and Max Pechstein. Not only does this chapter show that Nolde had a strong interest in dance but that his imagery of dance perhaps 'speaks to us directly' about that which lies behind the veil of appearances.[388] However, before proceeding any further, let us define what is meant by the term will (*Wille*). David Cartwright provides a detailed definition as follows:

> … the world is ultimately the will, since Schopenhauer viewed the will as the essence of the world, the ultimate substrate, the agent in unconscious functions of organisms, the common stuff of all being, and as that which is known empirically or *a posteriori.* The will is, he said, a true *ens realissimum,* the most real being.[389]

The world as representation mirrors the will, and the will is one, not in the sense of a concept or object being one, but as something whole and undifferentiated. The will is 'devoid of knowledge' and strives aimlessly and blindly within every human being and

[386] *The World as Will and Representation*., p.125.
[387] This chapter interprets Expressionist dance up until the year 1914.
[388] The German art historian and publisher of *Das Kunstblatt* Paul Westheim was aware of this dichotomy between reality and appearance. He argued that in Matisse's painting *The Dance* (1909-10), the artist had looked into the reality of dance and not the sparkling appearance of it: "That is the outer, unimportant world; as an artist he can't be satisfied with that. For him the task is to provide the world with a representation [*Vorstellung*] of the meaning and essence of the dance." Westheim, P., *Die Welt als Vorstellung: ein Weg zur Kunstanschauung. [With plates.]* (Potsdam,1918). p.30.
[389] Cartwright. p.181.

every force of nature. When manifesting itself as *phenomenon* the will has 'many grades' from the most basic forces of nature such as gravity, to the highest in the form of human beings.[390] Furthermore, the will is not subjugated by the principle of sufficient reason, since this applies only to the world as representation. Therefore, the will is not subordinate to any laws of necessity as are its phenomena and as a result is completely free.

This form of freedom is called transcendental, which means that "the will has aseity ... an independence from anything else, and the will is as it expresses itself."[391] For theologians aseity means that:

> …in a straightforward sense, God is not dependent on anyone or anything for his existence. According to stronger interpretations of aseity, God is completely independent of everything else, including his properties. This view supports a doctrine of divine simplicity according to which God is not distinct from his properties.[392]

By contrast, since Schopenhauer was an atheist, aseity meant for him an underived or independent existence where no deity was involved. It was his belief that humans do not possess aseity at any level, since they are not completely independent of an infinite series of causes and effects which brings them into being. He therefore applied the term aseity to the ontological status of the will alone. To this will Schopenhauer attributes responsibility for the trials and tribulations of the whole world. He says that the will is something so terrible that if redemption is to be obtained from our existence as humans,

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[390] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.149 and p.111.

[391] Cartwright.p.182. In Chapter 6, we shall explore the problem of free will in relation to Nolde's life and work during the Nazi era.

[392] Audi, R., "The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy," in: (1999). p.240. Aseity can also be related to the concept of an *ens a se* (Latin, 'a being from itself') as follows: "a being that is completely independent and self-sufficient. Since every creature depends at least upon God for its existence, only God could be *ens a se.* In fact, only God is, and he must be. For if God depended on any other being, he would be dependent and hence not self-sufficient. To the extent that the ontological argument is plausible, it depends on conceiving of God as *ens a se.* In other words, God as *ens a se* is the greatest conceivable being. The idea of *ens a se* is very important in the *Monologion* and *Proslogion* of Anselm, in various works of Duns Scotus, and later Scholastic thought. *Ens a se* should be distinguished from *ens ex se,* according to Anselm in *Monologion. Ens a se* is from itself and not "out of itself. In other words, *ens a se* does not depend upon itself for its own existence, because it is supposed to be dependent on absolutely nothing. Further, if *ens a se* depended upon itself, it would cause itself to exist, and that is impossible, according to medieval and Scholastic philosophers, who took causality to be irreflexive. (It is also transitive and asymmetric). Hence, the medieval idea of *ens a se* should not be confused with Spinoza's idea of *causa sui.*" Ibid., p.266.

then the will to live and the *will to life* must be denied.[393] As we shall see, these two definitions are important since they help frame the rest of this chapter and much of the remaining thesis. However, it must be made clear that it is not the case that the artists whom we discuss in this chapter were necessarily influenced by Schopenhauer. That said, it must also be made clear that Schopenhauer's philosophy does provide a ground for artistic analysis regardless of whether the artists in question were influenced by or acquainted with his philosophy or not.

2.1 Nolde and the Embodied Will in Dance

With the above assertions in mind, and as we begin to discuss the medium of the body in relation to the will, it must be noted that the starting point of philosophical perception for Schopenhauer "is the action or effect on animal bodies."[394] His formative insights into 'the action or effect on animal bodies' may have developed during his time as a medical student at the University of Göttingen from 1809 where dancing was on the curriculum. In addition, his insight into bodily movement may have arisen later on in life through his girlfriend Caroline Richter (later Medon), who arrived in Berlin at the age of seventeen to work at the Berlin Opera as a dancer and chorus girl.

Nolde also took an interest in dance from early in life. He recalled that, once every year an Italian hurdy-gurdy man visited his district who danced while turning a barrel-organ which had a picture of a reclining lady on it, semi-naked, only half-covered by a blue robe. As children they stood in front of it, and the more the hurdy-gurdy man played, the more beautiful the picture became to him. From then on Nolde believed, "that's what art should look like…!"[395] Then, in 1888, while a student in Karlsruhe at the

[393] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.405.
[394] Ibid., p.11.This includes human beings.
[395] Nolde, *Mein Leben.* p.19.

*Kunstgewerbeschul*e, Nolde was given dancing 'lessons' by his landlady's daughter.[396] Several years later in July 1894, Nolde found himself teaching drawing at the Industrie und Gewerbemuseum in St Gallen, Switzerland. Once again, the motion of the body in dance captured his imagination, especially a dance in the Swiss Loetschen Valley he had attended during his holidays. He recalled that in the evening, young people danced to the melody of a mouth organ played by a young man, while the dairywomen wore no corsets, "so one's hand held softly the full form of the dancer, and the lovely feel to the fingertips was unhindered. We danced merrily on, while our happiness increased."[397]

If one considers this comment from Schopenhauer's perspective, then Nolde was ultimately experiencing the will to life manifesting itself through the dancing body. Yet, it is vital to note that E.F.J. Payne has perhaps mistranslated Schopenhauer's German phrase *Wille zum Lebe*n to mean the 'will to live'. As Christopher Janaway shows, the translation is misleading because it omits the reproductive drive to life through sexual behaviours, which is prominent in Schopenhauer's philosophy. It is misleading, because it encourages an incorrect presupposition that Schopenhauer means "a conscious *desire* to live, whereas *Wille zum Leben* primarily operates to originate and shape the organism prior to any question of its having desires."[398]

At another level, Nietzsche too found Schopenhauer's concept of the will misleading, arguing that the concept was:

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[396] Ibid., p.35.
[397] Ibid., p.57.
[398] Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. p.8-9. Grammatically, both 'will to live' *and* 'will to life' are correct translations (it depends whether you construe Leben as an infinitive verb or a noun, both of which it can perfectly well be). The main argument for 'will to life' is that the phrase does not designate just a conscious desire to go on living, as with the 'will to live'. It is also a drive to reproduce life, manifest in the body's reproductive organs and in the sex drive that permeates human psychology in Schopenhauer's view. In addition, all living things exhibit the will to life, even though they may have no conscious desires or mind. A tree is an expression of a drive to life, growth, flourishing and reproduction. That is the same will to life that is manifest in humans. In the ordinary sense of the phrase, it would seem odd to attribute a 'will to live' to the tree. It's also just a rather clichéd phrase, which tends to mask the fact that Schopenhauer is using *Wille zum Leben* in a rather odd and unexpected way. (I am grateful to Christopher Janaway for these ideas which I have adapted from an email conversation with him. However, although Janaway has a valid point, I shall retain Payne's interpretation of *Wille zum Leben* when appropriate, particulary in Chapter 4 of this thesis, since it conveys a sense of surivival. Yet, when appropriate I will also employ Janaway's interpretation since I believe that the two defintions are two sides of the same coin).

> …an unjustified generalization, that this will *does not exist at all.* That instead of grasping the idea of the development of one definite will into many forms, one has eliminated the character of the will by subtracting from it its content, its 'whither?' - this is in the highest degree the case with *Schopenhauer:* what he calls 'will' is a mere empty word.[399]

Nietzsche expands on this objection by saying that "it is even less a question of a 'will to live'; for life is merely a special case of the will to power; - it is quite arbitrary to assert that everything strives to enter into *this* form of the will to power."[400]

Although Nolde probably never read Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, he certainly possessed knowledge of the will to life through the dancing body since he took pleasure in dance as an expression of art and life.[401] If we interpret this will to life on Schopenhauer's terms, then we can infer that Nolde's knowledge of dance 'given entirely through the medium of a body', was the starting-point for his perception of the world. [402] Schopenhauer argues that this is so for each individual because, for each individual as the knowing subject, the body is a representation just like any other representation and an object among objects.[403] Consequently, the body's movements and actions are known to every individual in the same manner as the changes seen in other objects for perception. As a result, "they would be equally strange and incomprehensible to him, if their meaning were not unravelled for him in an entirely different way."[404]

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[399] Nietzsche, F. W., Kaufmann, W. A., and Hollingdale, R. J., *The Will to Power* (New York: Random House, 1967). p.369.
[400] Ibid., p.369
[401] Nolde, *Mein Leben*. p.177.
[402] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.99.
[403] Atwell defines the concept 'knowing subject' as follows: "The world as representation has two components: the knowing subject and the known object. Being mutually implicatory, there is no object without a subject and no subject without an object, that is, no representation without a representer and no representer without a representation. Schopenhauer therefore denies that objects exist apart from being known (by the subject) and he denies that the subject exists apart from knowing (objects). He contends that normal perceptual objects have only a relative or conditioned existence, for they are relative to or conditioned by the knowing subject. They have, as objects, no existence absolutely or unconditionally, that is, in themselves. Normal perceptual objects are objects only relative to the knowing subject, and they are qualified in three ways - temporally, spatially, and causally in virtue of the knowing subject's modes of knowing objects." Atwell. p.11. See also in Schopenhauer. *The World as Will and Representation* Vol.1 p.28, 30-1, 99, 103, 150, 162, 169, 257, 331, 462 and Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2. p.4-5, 15, 177, 194-5, 245, 275, 500.
[404] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.99.

If this were not so, then we would see our behaviours follow upon motives as if they were foreign objects under the sway of natural law. Schopenhauer argues that even though we could describe the manifestations of their body as forces, qualities, or character we would be none the wiser. Yet this is not so, he argues, because "the answer to the riddle is given to the subject of knowledge appearing as individual, and this answer is given in the word *will.*"[405] As we shall see, in complete contrast to Kandinsky's often abstract representations, it is only through the 'concrete' medium of the body that the Expressionist artist could find the key to his (or her) own phenomenon. Only through this medium could they discover the significance of their inner being, their actions, and movements.[406]

When we interpret these matters according to Schopenhauer, then in theory Nolde had begun to explore the inner mechanism of his own being, his actions, his movements, and those movements of the dancers which he observed – which in a sense would support C2 since he may have been 'tuning' in to that which lies behind the world of appearance.[407] As early as 1908, he had already spent many nights sitting in the communal dance hall of Weissig near Dresden, painting and drawing assiduously, although in later times it was more the individual dance which he particularly enjoyed depicting. His first experience of this type of dance may have been with that of Australian-born Saharet, whom he remembered for "her wild and whirling turns" where " her black tuft of hair worked loose as she became a fantastical primitive being."[408] He also remembered a trip to La Scala in Milan where "a horde of grotesque dancing girls whirled around wildly, dripping with

[405] Ibid., p.100.
[406] Ibid., p.100. This is because the body is both will and representation simultaneously. Because of this, Schopenhauer infers that through the inner knowledge of that specific representation (the body), this is the only route we have into knowledge of the inner mechanism of the will which itself is the content and substratum of the world as representation.
[407] All human beings do this as an aspect of everyday self-consciousness. However, no claim is being made here that Nolde applied any rigorous philosophical analysis to the 'inner mechanism' of his bodily movements.
[408] Nolde, *Mein Leben.* p.177. Her birth name appears to have been either Clarissa Campbell or Clarice Campbell.

sweat,"[409] and to Paris where he saw Loie Fuller give her shimmering serpentine dances, in green and silver, wearing a broadly pleated robe in phosphorescent colours.[410]

Fuller was an American dancer and choreographer with no formal training. She first came to prominence in February 1892 when she performed her Serpentine Dance in New York. Shortly afterwards she left New York for Paris, where she became the house *artiste* at the Folies-Bergère. Here she became famous for highly innovative and expressive 'trademark' dances such as the *Danse du feu*, captured in the famous poster designs by Jules Chéret (fig. 26). These dances were characterised by the use of a long, diaphanous veil that she twirled around her head and body as she danced. Occasionally, her veils were dyed with phosphorescent salts so that they refracted the light as she danced, creating shimmering rainbow effects to give form to routines such as *The Butterfly* (1892), *Clouds* (1893), and *Fire Dance* (1895).

The visual spectacle of Fuller's dance routines attracted the attention of many French avant-garde artists and designers of the time such as Toulouse Lautrec, Émile Gallé, Raoul Francois Larche, and Francois Rupert Carabin. At the same time her routines captivated German artists such as Bernhardt Hoetger and Karl Theodor Eichler. In early 1910, perhaps under the inspiration of Fuller's dances, Nolde made five small woodcuts for a catalogue of his graphic works, among which he probably depicted Fuller as the dancer, as in the images *Fire Dancer* of 1910 (fig. 27) and a *Dancing Girl with Wafting Cap-Sleeves.*

When we interpret Nolde's dancing bodies through Schopenhauer's philosophy, then the artist and dancer are creating an identity between the will and the world as representation, through the embodied movements of the dancer – a topic which shall

[409] Reuther et al. p.102.
[410] Ibid., p.107.

preoccupy us when we discuss the case of Sakharov later in this chapter. For Schopenhauer this identity entails that, "to the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only through his identity with the body, this body is given in two entirely different ways."[411] Firstly, it is given as representation for perception like any other object under the laws of the principle of sufficient reason. Secondly, it is given as immediate knowledge 'and is denoted by the word *will.*' Therefore, "every true act of his will is also at once and inevitably a movement of his body; he cannot actually will the act without at the same time being aware that it appears as a movement of the body."[412] As a result, acts of will and acts of the body are identical but are not linked by processes of cause and effect.

Since acts of will and acts of the body are identical, we can read out of Nolde's dancing bodies the possibility that the actions of the body denote the act of the will objectified.[413] If the 'action of the body' in dance is the objectification of the will as depicted by artists, then:

> …we shall see that this applies to every movement of the body, not merely to movement following on motives, but also to involuntary movement following on mere stimuli; indeed, that the whole body is nothing but the objectified will, i.e., will that has become representation.[414]

Therefore, Nolde not only observed and depicted dancers in his art, but he would by necessity have become aware of his own bodily movements during the creative act. Indeed, Nolde described his creative interaction with dancers to his friend Hans Fehr in the following way. He said that "I draw the movement in such a way that I capture a

[411] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.100.
[412] Ibid., p.100.
[413] Ibid., p.100.
[414] Ibid., p.100.

moment and then don't look again at the object. If I look again, it has long since taken up a different attitude."[415]

When we interpret this practice through Schopenhauer, Nolde was capturing the dancer's bodily movements as objectified willing. If this is the case, then the objectified will in bodily movement can be considered as *both* voluntary and involuntary. On this John Atwell proposes that:

> When the body moves by way of a physical cause or stimulus, it moves in a passive sense: *It is moved* (by something else), and its movement is said to be involuntary (*unwillkürlich*). But when the body moves by way of a motive, it moves in the active sense: *It moves*, and its movement is then said to be voluntary (*willkürlich*).[416]

During the historical period we are exploring, voluntary and involuntary bodily movements were implicated in Germany's *Willenskultur* (literally a 'culture of the will'). In the early 20th century, there was a growing concern that modernity and modernisation were causing a loss of personal will-power (*abulia*) through the effects of urbanisation and industrialisation. These concerns were mirrored by contemporary physicians who believed that the everyday folk of modern Germany were becoming suggestible and weak through an overstimulated nervous system. Therefore, a strong will (*ein starker Wille*) became such an imperative for the modern German that Martin Fassbender, in his essay *Wollen, eine königliche Kunst* (*Willing, a Kingly Art*) would write that "the goal of will cultivation (*Willensbildung*) is, through conscious and thorough discipline and regulation of all external actions and inner sensations, to provide a counterweight to the involuntary influences exerted by the environment and the body upon the mind." [417]

[415] Reuther et al. p.105.
[416] Atwell. p.93.
[417] Martin Fassbender, *Wollen, eine konigliche Kunst: Alte und neue Anschauungen uber Ziele und Methoden der Willensbildung.* Berlin: Walther, 1911, p.190. Quoted in: Cowan, M. J., *Cult of the Will: Nervousness and German Modernity* (University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2008). p.86.

Nolde's watercolour *Girl Dancing* (fig. 28) of 1910, may illustrate this relationship between *Willensbildung*, the body and art. In this watercolour the body of the dancer is clearly captured in motion with strong contour lines registering the dynamic interplay between the dancer's clothing and her moving limbs. Her movement is decisively voluntary and as such reflects the embodied will in action. Her bodily movements were also caused by whatever personal motives she had to dance in this particular way. However, we must note that Schopenhauer deliberately opposes the orthodox notion that volitions (acts of will) cause bodily movements.[418] Furthermore, as Atwell reminds us, only in thought are willing and acting dissimilar, since in point of fact they are identical.[419] Therefore, according to Schopenhauer's philosophy we can infer that there is no bodily relationship between Nolde's decision to paint, or a dancer to dance, as in one of cause and effect, since willing and acting should be regarded as one thing.

In Schopenhauer's opinion, the unity of willing and acting means that "… the will is knowledge *a priori* of the body, and that the body is knowledge *a posteriori* of the will."[420] Both Nolde and Ada acquired some of this knowledge through attending masked balls. He personally retained a fond memory of a masked ball they went to in Karlsruhe just before his marriage. He recalled that for Ada, a costume was quickly improvised, and an individual masked as a police dog became her enthusiastic courtier and dancer. Thereafter, the masked ball became a small episode in his art.[421] Yet, whilst Nolde felt that masked balls and dances originated out of an archaic need he also felt that they had degenerated into urbanised versions full of social hypocrisy.

[418] Atwell. p.87.
[419] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.100-101.
[420] Ibid., p.100.
[421] Nolde, *Mein Leben.* p.165.

During 1910-11, his sensitivity to that social hypocrisy was reinforced after experiencing Berlin's night life. Despite his cynicism, the German dance scene and its seedy night life did offer itself up as an urban 'dispensary' for his creative imagination. An example of this occurred in mid-November 1911 when French dancer Adorée Villany appeared on the dance scene giving a number of performances at Munich's Comic Theatre. Her routine involved dancing scantily clad or completely naked. On 18 November she was arrested by the police and charged under Paragraph 183 of the German Criminal Code which could impose a two year prison sentence for being a public nuisance through indecent behaviour.[422] As Andrew Dickinson points out, both she and her manager were subsequently charged under Paragraph 33 of the Industrial Code for proffering, without police approval, a public dance performance that had no redeeming aesthetic value.[423] Similar accusations were aimed at the dancer Mata Hari (Margarete van Zelle) when "…the public seemed to regard her style of dancing, with its emphasis on 'exotic', Oriental effects, as the product of a courtesan personality whose chief objective was to bewitch wealthy, influential male spectators."[424]

Given such risqué dancing on the German dance scene, Karl Toeffer has argued that at the time there was a tense relationship between innocence and modernity - one filled with complexity and ambiguity. He finds that the context for this was:

> …German tendencies to link innocence with conditions of maturity and evolution rather than to a 'lost', childlike state of perception. This ambition to present modernity as a condition of innocence depended on the situating of the body within elaborate philosophical frameworks, a persuasive metaphysical rhetoric.[425]

[422] Dickinson, E. R., "Must we dance naked?: Art, Beauty, and Law in Munich and Paris, 1911-1913," in: *Journal of the History of Sexuality* Vol. 20, no. 1 (2011). p.95-6.
[423] Ibid., p.96.
[424] Toepfer. p.25.
[425] Ibid., p.4.

Arguably ‘a persuasive metaphysical rhetoric’ surrounds Nolde’s *The Dance Round the Golden Calf* of 1910 (fig. 29), in which the impulses of an archaic reality are endowed with a living sensuality through rapid brushwork.[426] Here colour and form are no longer limited to a purely obedient description of the artist’s representation, but rather each (arguably) manifests the inner will to life of both artist and dancer. Arguably, this image is overtly wilful due to the latter’s lax handling of paint. Indeed, Andrew Graham Dixon argues that “at his sloppiest and most calculatingly ‘primitive’, for example in the pictures he painted of African masks in Berlin’s ethnographic museum in 1911, Nolde can be quite spectacularly dreadful.”[427]

Nolde’s ‘calculatingly ‘primitive’ interest in dance meant that he and Ada in 1911 would visit Émile Jaques-Dalcroze’s Educational Institute for Music and Rhythm (*Bildungsanstalt für Musik und Rhythmus*) in Hellerau near Dresden several times.[428] Whilst in Hellarau he and Ada saw Expressionist dancer Mary Wigman as an upcoming dancer. They followed her until she became the great creative force of ‘New Dance’ (*Neuer Tanz*), which repudiated classical ballet and dancing *en pointe*. Wigman’s friendship towards the Nolde’s was maintained in the following decade despite their infrequent meetings, with Nolde commenting that the friendship:

> …was increased when she danced on the stage and I in excitement drew her with my colours. Her gifted pupil, the little Palucca, struck the gong and I painted her like that, until later she also performed her jumps while dancing, almost released from gravity. The dancers gave inspiration to my pictures, and in return they probably gave inspiration to the dancers.[429]

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[426] Donald E. Gordon has interpreted this painting as typifying “Nietzschean ambivalence in meaning, a typically Expressionist contradiction in content.” See this cited, and more on the topic of Nietzschean ambivalence and contradiction, in: Gordon, D, “Content by Contradiction,” Art in America (December, 1982), Mather, F. J., Sherman, F. F., and Publishing, E., "Art in America," (Westport, Conn: F.F. Sherman, 1939). p.81.

[427] Dixon, A. G., "Degenerate and Proud," *The Independent*, 19/12/1995. The concept of the ‘primitive’ will be explored in relation to Kirchner’s art in the following chapter of this thesis.

[428] Jacques Dalcroze is remembered as a teacher and theoretician of Eurhythmics, a system of rhythmical body movements expressing the same time values as the accompanying music. His work came to broader attention following the publication of *Der Rhythmus: Ein Jahrbuch* in Jena in 1911. At around this time many avant-garde artists and dancers became interested in his methods and during 1913. Nijinsky studied with him in preparation for designing the choreography for Diaghilev’s production of the ballet *Sacre du printemps*.

[429] Nolde, *Mein Leben.* p.208.

As Michael Cowan suggests, Jaques-Dalcroze's experimentation with rhythmic calisthenics and the 'Méthode Jaques-Dalcroze' was "intended not to train musicians or dancers but rather to educate the will through dance."[430] Arguing from the perspective of *Willenskultur*, and in a comment which validates C1, Cowan believes that Jaques-Dalcroze's dance 'pieces' were supposed "…to act as *tableaux vivants*, spurring visitors to overcome their passive, intellectual relation to the spectacle before them and experience the will building power of performative rituals in their own bodies."[431]

Cowan is careful though and argues that it would be wrong to suggest that every aspect of Germany's dance reformation was inspired by the need to 're-educate the will'. As an example, he cites the later Weimar dance schools under the influence of philosopher Ludwig Klages, who attempted to "revitalize the vital forces of the body against the hegemony of what they saw as an all too rationalist power of will and spirit (*Geist*)."[432] Cowan also argues that the re-imagination of the will through dance involved a paradox. That paradox arose through the "…project of using bodily performance to solidify the rein of spirit - what the expressionist poet and dance critic Ernst Blass would aptly describe as an effort to 'surpass the body with the body' (*mit dem Leib den Leib überschreiten*)."[433]

There is evidence to suggest that Nolde inspired Wigman to 'surpass the body with the body' and to seek out Rudolf von Laban the eminent dance teacher of the period. Concerning this Wigman recollected that:

> … we had a visit from the painter Emil Nolde and his wife, in front of whom I had occasionally improvised, and one day Nolde, who was otherwise a very taciturn man, suddenly said: 'You know, I met a man in Munich who moves exactly like you. His name is Rudolf von Laban'. I became a pupil of Laban's and worked with him for seven years both as a pupil and as his assistant.[434]

[430] Cowan. p.18-19.
[431] Ibid., p.205
[432] Ibid., p.173.
[433] Ibid., p.17.
[434] Reuther et al. p.109.

Often Laban's philosophy is reminiscent of Schopenhauer's own, especially since he was convinced that "the motions of bodies and sounds seen and heard on the stage stir the imagination, and awaken the will to look with open eyes into that vaguely discernible world, the world of human values."[435] From Laban's perspective both dancing and painting were permeated by movement as all creative endeavours are. As a result, it was his belief that rather than relying exclusively upon conscious rationalisations, "the actor or dancer, using movement as a means of expression, will rely more on the feel of the movement than on a conscious analysis of it."[436]

During the long winter months of 1910-11, Nolde continued to use 'movement as a means of expression' by immersing himself in Berlin's dance halls, cabarets and theatres. By sitting on the front row of Max Reinhardt's Deutsches Theater (fig. 30) he found inspiration for such expression, producing hundreds of drawings and watercolours. He recalled that often in the near darkness of the theatre he was constantly drawing the performers on the stage, "their movements, their passion, their colours."[437]

He expressed movement and passion in *Dancing Girl* (*Light Blue*) of 1911 (fig. 31), where the purity of the means expressed by the light blue suggests an ethereal connection to reality. The dancer wears a trance-like expression implying an abandonment to the dictates of the will which in turn illustrates how the body can be agitated through excessive movements of the will. Thus, we might note how Schopenhauer states that:

> The identity of the body and the will further shows itself, among other things, in the fact that every vehement and excessive movement of the will, in other words, every emotion, agitates the body and its inner workings directly and immediately, and disturbs the course of its vital functions.[438]

[435] Laban and Ullmann. p.105.
[436] Ibid., p.101.
[437] Nolde, *Mein Leben.* p.222.
[438] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.101.-

Not only can the motion of dance agitate 'the body and its inner workings' but the creative act of painting can do so too. In an agitated state is not unusual for painters to rework, crop, paint over or even destroy some of their canvases - and Nolde was no exception here. In fact, through the vehement urges of his will, *Dance II* of 1911(fig. 32), has suffered from severe cropping. Such a literal destruction necessitates movements of the body and resolutions of the will to be carried out through time in a performed deed. Indeed, Nolde recognised these vehement urges towards his pictures, and in a statement which upholds C1, confessed that, "I had a dangerous, rash urge to destroy them … I cut up a large dance picture, they danced no longer...."[439]

Although aggression is not commonly associated with Expressionism, discussion of it does appear in the literature as with Ludwig Meidner's 1914 article, 'An Introduction to Painting the Metropolis' written for *Kunst und Künstler*. On the theme of applied aggression in painting he instructs aspiring artists as follows: "In the focal point area use a small brush and paint short, violent lines. They must all hit the mark!"[440] A similar spirit of aggression can also be found in Hermann Bahr's 1916 essay *Expressionismus*, where he argued that, in the new generation of Expressionists, "the spirit vehemently proclaims itself again" [*in der heraufkommenden Jugend mit Heftigkeit der Geist wieder meldet*].[441] He also remarked that what "Expressionism gives us is the symbol of the unknown in us, in which we trust to save us, the symbol of the imprisoned spirit which wants to break out of its dungeon [*aus dem Kerker brechen*], the symbol of alarm of all frightened souls.[442] In addition, Wayne Andersen contributes to those who believe that the spirit of

[439] Nolde, Mein Leben. p.208. Nolde also said that: "Being an artist is a compulsive struggle with God and Nature, it is a battle in desire and passion with matter, with people and with one's self, to make sure that one doesn't lose oneself or be burnt alive, for it seethes deeply inside one [tiefst in ihm brodelt es] like the heat at the centre of our Earth."ibid.,p.100.
[440] Meidner, Ludwig, 'Anleitung zum Malen von Grosstadtbildern', from 'Das Neue Programm', Kunst und Künstler 12, no. 5 (1914): 312-14; English translation by Victor H. Meisel in: Miesel, V. H., Voices of German Expressionism (Prentice-Hall, 1970)., p.113.
[441] Bahr, H., *Expressionismus* (München: Delphin-Verlag, 1920)..p.93.
[442] Ibid.,p.116.

Expressionism vehemently announced itself in claiming that "Expressionism swarms with aggressive and often erotic emotion…"[443] and that *Die Brücke* "drew upon elemental passions of fear, love, and hatred, with color, line, and shapes exploited for aggressive expressiveness."[444] This he contrasts with Impressionist tendencies which lacked a vehement will for "passionate love, fear, and hatred"[445] preferring instead to depict the pleasures of the leisured classes.

Whether in its 'vehement and excessive movement' or not, Schopenhauer says that the will is something which we have in common with the whole of nature where everything overflows with it.[446] However, Nietzsche took issue with Schopenhauer's concept of an undifferentiated will flowing through all of nature. In *Beyond Good and Evil* Nietzsche argued that:

> ...Schopenhauer would have us believe that the will is the only thing that is really familiar, familiar through and through, familiar without pluses or minuses. But I have always thought that, here too, Schopenhauer was only doing what philosophers always tend to do: adopting and exaggerating a popular prejudice.[447]

In contrast to this popular prejudice, Nietzsche conceived of willing as "something *complicated*, something unified only in a word."[448] This 'single word' he felt contained the uncritical prejudice which renders naïve many an incautious philosopher and artist. Instead, Nietzsche proposed that "in every act of willing there is, to begin with, a plurality of feelings."[449] They are he says:

> …accompanied by a feeling of the muscles that comes into play through a sort of habit as soon as we 'will', even without our putting 'arms and legs' into motion.

[443] Andersen.p.23.
[444] Ibid.,p.155.
[445] Ibid.
[446] Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.1, p.599.
[447] Nietzsche, F., Horstmann, R. P., and Norman, J., *Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future* (Cambridge University Press, 2002). p.18.
[448] Ibid., p.18.
[449] Ibid., p.18. On the will and affective movements see: Pethick, S, *Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and Nietzsche: Making Knowledge the Most Powerful Affect*. Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. p.78. Also for the phenomenological aspects of willing and bodily movement see Gemes, K., and S. May, *Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy*. OUP Oxford, 2009. p.249.

> Just as feeling – and indeed many feelings – must be recognized as ingredients of the will, thought must be as well.[450]

Nolde took an opportunity to embrace a 'plurality of feelings' when he left Germany in the spring of 1913 by joining the Kulz-Leber anthropological expedition which made for the Colonies of the South Sea Islands.[451] He committed himself to producing art works throughout his sojourn and in his watercolour *South Sea Dancer* of 1915 (fig. 33) he captured the pulse of a 'native' dancing with a sumptuous instinct for colour based on emotion. Through colour we may perhaps experience the radiating energies of the 'native's' embodied will, if we take a Schopenhauerian view, depicted in vibrant shades of purple, magenta and orange juxtaposed against the dark brown of the dancer's face.

Nolde's memoires record a specific 'native' dance of 1914 which he witnessed in Mandalay, Burma. He recalled that one night, under the palm trees, a dancer performed grotesque whirling dances in a wild and fiery way until she collapsed into a barely visible heap. The female dancer had tied her feet tightly together with stiff silk so that only her upper body and arms could move in the dance – all of which he found fascinating.[452]

The wild and wonderful movements witnessed by Nolde suggest a symbiotic relationship between the body and the will as one which is unified. About this unity Schopenhauer argues that:

> My body and my will are one; or, what as representation of perception, I call my body, I call my will in so far as I am conscious of it in an entirely different way comparable with no other; or, my body is the *objectivity* of my will; or, apart from the fact that my body is my representation, it is still my will, and so on.[453]

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[450] Ibid., p.18.

[451] As will be discussed later on in this thesis, after six months in the South Sea Islands war was declared in Europe entailing the return of the expedition to Germany, passing through Burma and Java as it did so. Early twentieth century Europeans often referred to the culture and peoples of undeveloped nations as being 'primitive'. In chapter 3 of this thesis aspects of the 'primitive' will be discussed in relation to Kirchner's work. Similarly, in chapters 5 and 6 we shall examine the fate of Expressionist artworks which had embraced the 'primitive' and subsequently came to be described by the Nazis as 'degenerate'. In each case, the discussion of the 'primitive' in Expressionism will form a part of our broader explorations of C1and C2.

[452] Nolde, *Mein Leben.* p.290.

[453] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.103.

2.2 The Dancing Body, Knowledge and Schopenhauer's Analogical Inference

As shall be explained shortly in this chapter, it was Schopenhauer's conviction that we can know the inner nature of all appearances by comparing the inner life of our bodies (as manifestations of the will) with the rest of nature – and in theory validating C2. However, it might be pointed out that in the previous chapter of this thesis, it could be said that the German Expressionist body, was merely another representation of the knowing subject, just like any other object pertaining to the world of perception.[454] Yet, Schopenhauer believes that an individual's consciousness is able to discern the representation of their own body from others which may be similar to it, and that the body manifests itself to consciousness in a different way which can be signified by the word *will*.[455] Therefore, it is this bifurcated knowledge of our body which informs us about the body, its actions, its movements ensuing upon motivations and sufferings *via* external impressions. That is to say, "about what it is, not as representation, but as something over and above this, and hence what it is *in itself*."[456]

Schopenhauer argues that while we know the 'in itself' of our bodies as objects, by contrast we do not possess the same immediate knowledge of other objects. He therefore proposes that as knowing subjects we are individuated by this unique relationship to our bodies, which were it not so, then our body as object would be for us a representation just like any other representation[457] - in that case we could not probe C1 or C2 any further since we would be obliged to stop our enquiries at the world as representation so far as our bodies are concerned. He also thinks that an individual is not

[454] Ibid., p.103.
[455] Ibid., p.103.
[456] Ibid., p.103.
[457] Since this is one of Schopenhauer's most profound insights, John Atwell states that: "It would not be an exaggeration to dub Schopenhauer *the* philosopher of the body. To a greater extent than anyone before his time, and even since then, he makes the body-that is, one's own body *(der eigene Leib*)-the primary focus and indispensable condition of all philosophical inquiry."Atwell. p.81.

only conscious of their body as a particular representation but at the same time as the will albeit in a different way. Consequently, Schopenhauer says that "…if he abstracts from that special relation, from that twofold and completely heterogeneous knowledge of one and the same thing, then that one thing, the body, is a representation like all others."[458] -

In order to understand this, Schopenhauer argues that when an individual considers their body, they have to assume that they obtain knowledge of it as both will and representation simultaneously, "…not by a difference of this object from all others, but only by a difference between the relation of his knowledge to this one object and its relation to all others."[459] However, some individuals could assume that only their body as an object is real and that all other objects are mere phantoms. Should this be the case then such an individual presumes that their body is the only real thing in the world. As a result, if that individual denies a reality to all external phenomena, then their standpoint belongs to theoretical egoism which interprets every phenomenon outside of their own will as fictitious. That being the case "a man regards and treats only his own person as a real person, and all others as mere phantoms.[460]

Although many Expressionist artists possessed an overweening self-regard, (this topic of egoism being of great importance to chapters 4 and 5), none could be strictly labelled as theoretical egoists.[461] Yet, their sense of self-regard and showmanship often matched that of dancers and cabaret performers around Germany. We know that from 1908, Kirchner, Erich Heckel and Max Pechstein increased their visits to dance venues and circus acts in Hamburg, Dresden and Berlin. Heckel's drawing *The Rehearsal* of 1910 (fig. 34), shows a dancer rehearsing in his own studio, although it is not known if the

[458] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.103.
[459] Ibid., p.104.
[460] Ibid., p.104.
[461] Concerning the term 'theoretical egoism', Schopenhauer argues that: "…the perceived object must be something *in itself*, and not merely *something for others;* for otherwise it would be positively only representation, and we should have an absolute idealism that in the end would become theoretical egoism, in which all reality disappears, and the world becomes a mere subjective phantasm." *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.193.

performer was Sidi Riha his girlfriend, or not.[462] However, it is possible that Riha was the model for his woodcut *The Dance* of 1905, (fig. 35), which depicts a nude dancer in an early form of *Nackttanz* (Naked Dance).[463]

Almost nothing is known about Sidi Riha and her dancing, although there is a woodcut programme cover for *Pantomime by W.S. Guttmann* of 1912 (fig. 36), in which she dances. This has been attributed to Heckel, along with a poster woodcut for *The Merry Puck Sidi Riha*, also dated to 1912 (fig. 37). The letters between the couple of that time are now lost, yet there is a postcard addressed to her from Kirchner dated 19.06.1911.[464] It seems that (on the whole) she probably did not perform very often, despite performing with Valeska Gert early in 1916 as a dance student.[465] Whilst a dance student Riha would have encountered a degree of Eastern exoticism in cabaret replete with snake charmers, jugglers and acrobats that also reinforced a sense of 'primitivism' in *Die Brücke*'*s* work. Indeed, Jill Lloyd has suggested that, "this mixed style recurs in contemporary cabaret subjects by Heckel such as *Dancers*, where the repeated movements are inspired by the dance routine in part, but the frieze-like effect is reminiscent of the Palau carvings and, in this case, Egyptian stone reliefs."[466]

Amongst these 'exotic' influences, we find that in 1909 the *Dresdener Illustrierte Neueste* published an illustration and brief account of the popular dance form known as the Apache dance.[467] The Apache dance was originally a Parisian phenomenon, where the

[462] For more information on Riha see: Jiminez, J. B., *Dictionary of Artists' Models* (Taylor & Francis, 2013). p.273.
[463] Toepffer argues that *Nackttanz* registered the "modern relations between dancer, the body, and the gaze" and that "nudity symbolically equated modernity with the assertion of a more naked identity." See: Toepfer. p.22.
[464] The postcard is addressed as follows: "Fräulein Sidi Riha / Danseuse / Berlin-Charlottenburg / Leibnizstr. 41. See: Annemarie Dube-Heynig, *E.L.Kirchner, Postkarten und Briefe an Erich Heckel*, Köln 1984, Nr.69, S.182.
[465] See Valeska Gert's memoires. For comprehensive information on Gert and the contemporary dance scene in Germany see: Peter, F.-M. and Schlöndorff, V., *Valeska Gert Tänzerin, Schauspielerin, Kabarettistin, eine dokumentarische Biographie* (Berlin: Frölich & Kaufmann, 1985).
[466] Lloyd, J., *German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity* (New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 1991). p.95. The carved and painted house beams, taken from the South Pacific island of Palau and displayed at the Dresden Ethnographic Museum from 1907, were a source of aesthetic inspiration for *Die Brücke* artists. Ibid., p.29.
[467] Ibid., p.90.

'society' of the underworld of the capital city were known as 'Apaches'. The Apache dance was the dance of the Apache with his lover which brought to life the earthy feelings of the underworld gangster, achieved through "its rhythmical movement of every limb."[468] Another Parisian phenomenon was the *demi-monde* Stasia Napierkowska, who as an 'exotic' dancer performed at the Berlin Wintergarten in January 1912 - a venue frequented by Heckel and Kirchner. One year later, Napierkowska (fig. 38) was arrested in New York for dancing in a lewd and indecent manner. Following her arrest, she concluded: "What a narrow-minded people they are - how utterly impervious to any beautiful impression."[469]

By contrast, Kirchner was far from being 'narrow minded' towards dance maintaining an interest which endured beyond the Great War. He painted *The Russian Dancer Mela* in 1911 (fig. 39), capturing his performer in mid-flight. She stares assertively at the viewer fixing our gaze upon her own. Her right arm is bent into a V shape while her right-hand points upwards. Her left arm is extended outward as if to keep her balance while she moves across the dance floor. Her green dress swirls around in an anti-clockwise direction capturing the movement of her body, while her left leg suggests that she is *en pointe*. As she does this, her right leg mirrors her right arm with her inwardly turned knee suggesting contrapuntal motion.

With images such as this in mind, we need a key to unlock the inner nature of the human body as a representation in order to test C1 and C2. Armed with 'the double knowledge' of our bodies as mentioned above, Schopenhauer is confident that we may extend the application of this knowledge, since it offers us a "key to the inner being of every phenomenon in nature."[470] Therefore, we could in theory establish an analogical inference between our own bodies and all other objects in the world. In addition, we could

[468] Nietzsche, Geuss, and Speirs. p.21.
[469] "Paris Dancer Dislikes US. Napierkowska, Soured by Her Arrest, Makes Some Warm Remarks". *New York Times* (*Paris*). *April 27, 1913*. Retrieved 2008-12-12.
[470] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.105.

theoretically *assume* that these objects are representations and consistent with our own bodies as representations.

In an observation which perhaps helps us interpret the nature of C2, Schopenhauer says that, if we put aside the existence of all other objects as the subject's representation, then "what still remains over must be, according to its inner nature, the same as what in ourselves we call *will.*"[471] However, Schopenhauer's analogical argument may be considered weak, since we are being asked by him to extrapolate from only one item (our bodies) to innumerable other items. Indeed, it is not necessarily an irrecusable or irrefrangible argument as Robert L. Wicks shows when he states that:

> A strong argument from analogy would run in the other direction: since after having experienced, say, 20,000 examples of some item, each of which has 15 salient qualities, if we were to encounter another item that has 14 of those qualities, we could infer by analogy that the 15th quality is likely to be present as well.[472]

Yet, if the quality of analogical reasoning was really vulnerable, then the whole edifice of empirical psychology ought to be fatally weak and built upon sand. However, it may be argued that the success of manipulative strategies, as used in the advertising business and politics which has been based upon studying human behaviours, ought to suggest that reasoning by analogy often proves successful. Even so, this does not prove that on Schopenhauer's terms, other objects as representations for us possess an identical inner nature to our own. Thus, as Wicks points out:

> Schopenhauer might be understood to be assuming, rather unconvincingly, that we cannot imagine any other kind of inner nature than what we experience in ourselves as "will," and so whatever the inner nature of the other representations happens to be, since all representations qua representation are the same, it has to be roughly the same as our own.[473]

[471] Ibid., p.105. According to Schopenhauer, when we examine the reality of our bodies and its behaviours, then besides it being our representation, we discover nought else in it but the will and so thus its reality exhausted.
[472] Wicks.,p.63.
[473] Ibid.,p.64.

In addition, a major problem with Schopenhauer's argument by analogy is that he cannot find any object beyond the human body for which an enquirer might say that they possess the same double knowledge of it as we do of our own bodies. If this is so, then as Dale Jacquette argues, the analogical inference offers us at best "doubtful grounds for his transcendental metaphysics of thing-in-itself as will."[474]

If Schopenhauer's argument still fails to convince then perhaps his inference could support the traditional solution to the problem of other minds – with relevance to individuals who appear to us as objects of representation? The solution to this problem being that if other human beings are similar to us, share similar experiences to us and behave in similar ways to us under similar circumstances, then some of us might assume that these beings must be similar to us in some sort of way. Indeed, A.J. Ayer for example goes so far as to argue that even if we could not literally share the experiences of another person then "it by no means follows that I cannot have good reasons to believe in their existence."[475] Therefore, using 'ordinary language' it is the case that some individuals might assert that other human beings possess an interior life that is similar to their own. Yet by contrast, objectors such as Gilbert Ryle state that "even if a person did enjoy a privileged illumination in the ascription of mental-conduct concepts to his own performances, his supposed analogical argument to the mental processes of others would be completely fallacious."[476] Furthermore, he asserts that "the observed appearances and actions of people differ very markedly, so the imputation to them of inner processes closely matching one another would be actually contrary to the evidence."[477]

Given the above contentions, there are many good reasons why we could continue an exploration of Schopenhauer's tendentious inference, but let us conclude that unless a

[474] Jacquette, D., "Schopenhauer's Proof that Thing-in-ltself is Will," in: *Kantian rev. Kantian Review* Vol. 12, no. 02 (2007). p.93.
[475] Ayer. p.199.
[476] Ryle, G., *The Concept of Mind* (Taylor & Francis, 2009).p.41
[477] Ibid.p.41

committed position is taken then perhaps by endlessly "parodying the soaring of a mind," (in our case Schopenhauer's analogical mind), we might lose our "direction in the mazes of metaphysical conjecture."[478] As a result, let us suspend our incredulity and suggest that Schopenhauer's analogical inference is worth pursuing - if only to examine Marc's claims on the former's terms - otherwise these claims run the risk of falling "into anti-climax as the dead Bird of Paradise falls to the ground."[479] In this respect, Alexander Sakharov makes for an interesting case study.

2.3 Alexander Sakharov and Der Blaue Reiter

Sakharov (fig. 40) began his career by studying painting at the Académie des Beaux-Arts in Paris under William Adolphe-Bouguereau. He also studied in a private art school created by Rodolphe Julian known as the Académie Julian.[480] There André Derain, Matisse, Paul Gauguin, Paula Modersohn-Becker, and Käthe Kollwitz also studied. Throughout this period of c.1903-4, Sakharov reflected his art school training in numerous choreographic sketches made on paper. He made frequent visits to the Louvre and was permanently inspired by its Classical sources, but parted company with the Académie Julian in 1905 in order to relocate in Munich. When in Munich he began studying at a private art school organised by the Slovenian painter Ažbe, which Kandinsky also attended.

The milieu of Munich in which Sakharov, Kandinsky and many other artists lived needs to be briefly contextualised. During the 1880s it was noted for its academy and for being the most significant city of the arts. It was a city which was graced by the presence of creative luminaries such as the Symbolist poet Stefan George, and Rainer Maria Rilke.

[478] Williams, K., *Jonathan Swift and The Age of Compromise* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1958).p.135.
[479] Ibid.p.135.
[480] Nothing of Sakharov's work survives except for a few drawings such as *Self-Portrait* of 1908; see fig. 40.

In fact, Thomas Mann's novella *Gladius Dei* opens with a glowing reference to Munich as an intellectual paradise. The city quickly became known as the 'Athens on the Isar' and the 'Florence of the North', by drawing in a large number of intellectuals and artists from around Europe. At the time of Kandinsky's arrival in 1896, Munich's Golden Age had brought forth the first secession of 1892 and had seen the emergence of the *Jugendstil* movement.[481] Munich was also the location of Germany's first efficacious challenge to Willhelime culture and the city's annual salon. As Joan Weinstein has pointed out, in contrast to their Berlin counterparts," the Munich secession very quickly achieved parity with the official Art Association (*Kunstgenossenschaft*), receiving state and royal patronage, honors and influence."[482] However, Munich began to lose its pre-eminence to Berlin at the turn of the twentieth century and by 1901 public discussion was focused on Munich's demise as an artistic centre, having witnessed the migration of key figures such as Lovis Corinth and Max Slevogt to Berlin.[483]

During the course of time Munich became the intellectual home of many philosophers. In 1894, Theodor Lipps, a psychologist now remembered for his theory of aesthetics and *Einfühlung* (empathy), had arrived at the University of Munich and by 1895 had created the *Akademischer Verein für Psychologie* (Academic Society for Psychology).[484] Characterised by exchanges of vigorous thinking, the club inspired Alexander Pfänder's doctoral thesis *Phänomenologie des Wollens: eine psychologische Analyse*[485] (Phenomenology of Willing) of 1900. Indeed, many members eventually took

[481] By 1898, the city had hosted the *Kraft und Arbeitsmaschinen-Ausstellung*. Among other significant events, in 1902 *the Anthropologisch-Prähistorisches Sammlung des Staates* was formed and by 1903 the *Deutsches Museum von Meisterwerken der Naturwissenschaft und Technik* had been founded. One year later, in 1904 Heinrich Thannhauser's art gallery opened.
[482] Weinstein, J. and Chicago, U. o., *The End of Expressionism: Art and the November Revolution in Germany, 1918-1919* (University of Chicago Press, 1990). p.13.
[483] Ibid.,p.14.
[484]Lipps' account of psychology can be found in: Lipps, T., *Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens* (Bonn: M. Cohen, 1883). He also developed a theory of optical illusions as in: *Raumäesthetik und geometrisch-optische Täuschungen* (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1897).
[485] Pfänder, A., *Phänomenologie des Wollens : eine psychologische Analyse* (Leipzig: J.A. Barth, 1900).

inspiration from Edmund Husserl's book *Logische Untersuchungen* (Logical Investigations).[486] Volume 1 of the latter was the result of work done between 1900-1901, whilst volume 2 encapsulated his thoughts of 1913 -1921. This work was critical of Lipps' own and as a result members moved away from their 'discipleship' towards the latter philosopher and towards the work of Husserl. .[487] The Munich Society developed a new way of doing philosophy which became known as phenomenology and a new school of philosophy which is now called the Munich Circle of phenomenologists.

In the same year as Kandinsky's arrival, the city's intellectual life was enriched through the foundation of the satirical journal *Simplicissimus* and the magazine *Jugend Münchner illustrierte Wochenschrift für Kunst und Leben.*[488] Three years after his arrival Munich saw the birth of *Die Insel,* an art magazine which was edited by Rudolf Alexander Schröder, Otto Julius Bierbaum, and Alfred Walter Heymel. By 1901, Kandinsky had challenged both the Academy and the Munich Secession by founding the artists' group Phalanx, becoming its president in 1902. The first exhibition was held in August 1901, for which he designed a poster - (*Plakat für die erste Ausstellung der 'Phalanx*') after the manner of *Jugendstil* - which depicted Greek soldiers advancing from right to left of the picture with thrusting spears in a phalanx. The militant title of the Munich group was a deliberate choice, one born out of a bellicose spirit which aimed to circumvent private galleries and in order to set up their own exhibition spaces. The group, which displayed work by French Post-Impressionists and Neo-Impressionists, was liquidated in 1904 due to poor public support.

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[486] Husserl, E. and Holenstein, E., *Logische Untersuchungen* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Husserl, E. and Moran, D., *Logical Investigations*, [2nd ed.]. ed. (London: Routledge, 2001).For a discussion as to how Pfänder's phenomenology diverged from Husserl's see: Natanson, M., *Essays in Phenomenology* (Springer Netherlands, 2013). p.138.

[487] Hopkins, B. and Crowell, S., *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* (Taylor & Francis, 2015).,p.76.

[488] The name *Simplicissimus* was taken from a leading character who appears in Hans Jakob Christoffel von Grimmelshausen's 1668 novel *Der Abenteuerliche Simplicissimus Teutsch. Jugend Münchner illustrierte Wochenschrift für Kunst und Leben* promoted the art of *Jugendstil* and was founded by art historian Julius Meier-Graefe.

By 1904, the conservative art and literary magazine *Süddeutsche Monatshefte* had also begun publishing and actively criticised the avant-garde. In the same year, as we have already noted in this chapter in the case of Villany, prior to the First World War Munich's cultural spectrum was fertile enough for it to foster an 'exotic' dance scene. In 1904, the same year as the creation of *Süddeutsche Monatshefte*, a dancer by the name of 'Madaleine' would perform under hypnosis, and as Karl Toepfer has shown, "although she had no dance training at all, she moved as if 'a magical command had released her body from earthly laws, gravitational powers' and created an apparition 'without will' yet strangely compelling…"[489] Then in 1907, a city-based opera group intended to make Richard Strauss's Salome execute the 'Dance of the Seven Veils' whilst naked – all part of Munich's erotic dance culture.[490] In addition, an equivalent subversive culture was reflected in the satirical cabaret of Frank Wedekind's '*Elf Scharfrichter*' (The Elf Executioner) which deployed a Nietzschean style critique of bourgeois society.[491]

In 1909 Kandinsky became president of Munich's *Neue Künstlervereinigung München* (NKV) (New Artists' Union), which exhibited both Expressionist and Impressionist art together with that of artists from Matisse's circle. Kandinsky resigned from the NKV 1911 after the NKV declined to show one of his abstract works - *Composition V*, which he hoped to show at their third exhibition in December of that year. This resignation acted as a catalyst for the formation of *Der Blaue Reiter* with Marc who had recently joined the NKV.

Whilst in Munich, Sakharov developed friendships with Kandinsky, Marianne Verevkina, Alexei von Yavlensky, Vladimir Bekhteev, and Alexander Mogilevsky.[492] In

[489] Toepfer.p.64.
[490] Ibid.,p.75, The police prohibited this intention
[491] Lloyd.p.96.
[492] Verevkina had read Schopenhauer's *Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit* in 1893 and Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* in 1900, which as we know quotes Schopenhauer at length. Evidence for her thoughts on Schopenhauer can be found in her intimate diary from which some parts were published in German by Clemens Weiler (*Briefe an einen Unbekannten*)

1909, four years after his arrival, Sakharov also became a member of the NKV out of which sprang the Blaue Reiter group.[493] Many years later in 1937, Sakharov's great friend Yavlensky recalled that, "In those days we were always together, and he visited us almost every day. We discussed his entire training together. I always watched how he danced. He also knew and understood my art very well."[494] Clotilde von Derp,[495] Sakharov's wife, also recalled that "Yavlensky enjoyed putting make-up on me. He painted a red circle on my forehead and a heavy brown line down the length of my nose. I resembled one of his famous heads."[496] Indeed, Yavlensky often painted Sakharov throughout 1909, as in *White Feather* (fig. 41), and *Portrait Study Sakharov* (fig. 42). However, Marianna Verevkina depicted Sakharov with much greater frequency. If we interpret such depictions through Schopenhauer's philosophy then, as we shall see later on in this chapter, she perhaps captured what turns out to be the embodiment of an androgynous phenomenon of the will.

Like Verevkina and Yavlensky, the other artists whom Sakharov befriended were fascinated by the way he moved his body, and the fact that his choreographic routines synthesised classical Greek motifs with *Jugendstil*, which can be seen in numerous photographs of 1910 (fig. 43). On his debut at the Royal Odeon on 02.06.1910, Sakharov performed his Greek style dance routine accompanied by the music of Thomas

and in French by Gabrielle Dufour-Kowalska (*Lettres à un inconnu. Aux sources de l'expressionisme*). The whole manuscript of her diaries can be consulted in the Museum's archive in Ascona.

[493] Sakharov was not a member of the Blaue Reiter.

[494] Pieroni-Jawlensky, L., Jawlensky, A., and Aleksej von Jawlensky Archive, *Alexej von Jawlensky: Catalogue Raisonné of the Oil Paintings: Volume 1: 1890-1914* (Sotheby's Publications, 1991). p.30.

[495] Derp married Sakharov in September 1919 and the ceremonial witness was the artist Verevkina. Whilst Derp was schooled in both painting and music it is said that: "She was one of the typical representatives of the early form of German *Ausdruckstanz*—predating Laban and Wigman. To her contemporaries, it seemed as if her soul became visible in her young body." See: Peter, Frank-Manuel, Rainer Stamm, Paula Modersohn-Becker Museum, Deutsches Tanzarchiv Köln , and Museum Villa Stuck. Peter and Stamm.p.75. In addition, Marc, Kandinsky and Munter planned to the first performance of Sakharov and Clotilde von Derp dancing together on 24.05.1913 in Munich.

[496] Ibid., p.9.

Alexandrovich de Hartmann and from then on Sakharov became known as a reformer of dance.[497] It was said at the time that:

> The reformers want to free dance of the constraints forced upon it by a dressage mentality, they want to return it to its original purpose: to teach people to express what moves them, their suffering and joy, their passion and pain, in their movement and facial expressions.[498]

If one looks at Verevkina's drawings of Sakharov the reformer from a Schopenhauerian perspective, then arguably they express the external manifestation of the will as an embodied action. Her graphic line insinuates the structure of his body and its movements through time as an example of embodied willing. In the image, this is achieved through the transference of his weight from one foot to the other which is mirrored by his hand gestures. Each gesture, and each part of the body, manifests an aspect of Sakharov's inner life, or in other words his will to action. As manifestations of the will, both Verevkina as an artist, and Sakharov as a dancer, necessarily engaged in voluntary and involuntary bodily movements through a chain of causal necessity prompted by sensory impressions. Such sensory impressions also involved a nexus of *memorised* impressions in order to create their aesthetic end-products.

As a dance theorist, Laban believed that bodily action was a result of an inner excitement of the nervous system. It was his opinion that "this excitement results in the voluntary or involuntary inner effort or impulse to move."[499] He also argued that any freedom of choice in bodily movement is not always consciously or voluntarily executed - these choices being often automatic "without any contribution of conscious willing."[500] By contrast, Schopenhauer's opinion is that the 'being-in-itself of our own body', as what

[497] Javlensky produced a portrait of von Hartmann's wife in 1909.
[498] Rainer Stamm 'Alexander Sacharoff- Dance and the Fine Arts' in: Peter and Stamm. p.29.
[499] Laban and Ullmann. p.22.
[500] Ibid., p.23.

it is besides an object of perception for representation, i.e. the will, manifests itself initially in voluntary movements of the body, as individual but perceptible acts of the will. Such movements emerge directly and concurrently with these acts of will, being identical with them, and are differentiated from them "only by the form of perceptibility into which they have passed, that is to say, in which they have become representation."[501] In addition, Schopenhauer states that "the act of will itself is in self-consciousness," which means that "the business of self-consciousness is the act of will alone, together with its absolute mastery over the limbs of the body."[502] This, through the lens of Schopenhauer's philosophy, is evident in the self-conscious poses made by the dancer in Yavlensky's *Alexander Sakharov Dancing* of 1912 (fig. 44).

Whether we consider self-conscious poses or not, acts of the will are always grounded in motives outside of them. Such motives only condition that which is willed in specific moments of time.[503] Consequently, the inner nature of our willing cannot be interpreted from motives alone since they "are merely the occasion on which my will shows itself."[504] The will *per se* lies outside the dominion of motivational laws which means that only the will's phenomena in time is subordinated to such laws. Therefore, Schopenhauer concludes that:

> Only on the presupposition of my empirical character is the motive a sufficient ground of explanation of my conduct. But if I abstract from my character, and then ask why in general I will this and not that, no answer is possible, because only the *appearance* or *phenomenon* of the will is subject to the principle of sufficient reason, not the will itself, which in this respect may be called *groundless.*[505]

[501] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.105.
[502] Schopenhauer, A. and Kolenda, K., *Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2005). p.14.
[503] However, it is important to note that this has nothing to do with our capacity to will or our character of willing.
[504] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.106.
[505] Ibid., p.106. Character (*Der Charakter*). As we shall note in chapter 6 of this thesis, Schopenhauer argued that our intelligible character (*der intelligible Charakter*) lies beyond the domain of the principle of sufficient reason and causal necessity. Since it is our essence, the intelligible character is free and undetermined by causality. Again, as we shall note in chapter 6, somewhat unconvincingly Schopenhauer proposed that, while our behaviours are governed by necessity, our essential character remains free. As did Kant, he discriminated between the intelligible and empirical character (*der empirische Charakter*), the latter of which is the manifestation of our essential intelligible character. By contrast, the empirical character is dominated by the principle of sufficient reason and is determined by causality. Through self-

It therefore follows, he says, that if every act of our bodies is an appearance of the will in action, whereby the whole of our will and character expresses itself through motives, then we must assume that the appearance of the will must be the essential condition of our actions. This is so because the will in appearance is conditional upon that which exists directly through it, otherwise the will's appearance would be accidental. This condition is 'the whole body itself', and since this is the case Schopenhauer suggests that:

> … this body itself must be phenomenon of the will, and must be related to my will as a whole, that is to say, to my intelligible character, the phenomenon of which in time is my empirical character, in the same way as the particular action of the body is to the particular act of the will.[506]

As such the entire will becomes visible as a representation and object of perception, which in turn might vindicate the possibility that C2 might (on Schopenhauer's terms) be a search for that will.[507] On this basis, it may be possible to perceive something of Sakharov's embodied empirical character in Verevkina's and Yavlensky's art. Verevkina's *The Dancer Sakharov* of 1909 (fig. 45), showing the dancer in action, does capture something of his effeminate movements and his androgynous empirical character'.[508] This androgynous character, in various poses offers us a glimpse into Sakharov's state of mind through Verevkina's rhythmic lines, which capture the outward features of the dancer's inner self.[509] Every captured movement of his body could be interpreted as a particular act of the will in its empirical form and an object of movement in the world as representation. Notions such as these were therefore important to a dance teacher like Laban, who considered bodily action to mean that "character, an atmosphere, a state of mind, or a

knowledge of our empirical character we can develop what Schopenhauer calls an 'acquired character' (*der erworbene Charakter*). See also:Cartwright.p.25-26.

[506]Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.

[507] *The World as Will and Representation*.,Vol.1, p.107.

[508] That is to say his observable character.

[509] On Sakharov, Friedrich Markus Huebner wrote that: "From all the pores of this hermaphrodite figure there flashes the expression of a happy, desired, elevated release from the confines of the individual self." See: Friedrich Markus Huebner: 'Alexander Sakharov' in: "Phöbus Monatsschrift für Aesthetik und Kritik des Theaters," in: (1914). Phöbus Vol. 1, 1914 part 3, pp.101-104.

situation cannot be effectively shown on the stage without movement, and its inherent expressiveness."[510]

Verevkina and Yavlensky were not the only people who observed Sakharov's 'inherent expressiveness' in action. The art historian Karl With and Russian-Jewish sculptor Moissey Kogan for example, both watched Sakharov perform in Hagen along with other cultural elites. At that time in terms of physiology, Sakharov was remembered as "…just standing there for a while in spellbound immobile repose, until his body, as if slowly awakening, would begin to move, to stir and turn and his arms would lift and unfold in gestures of dance-like trance."[511] However, physiological explanations such as these for Schopenhauer would not detract from the fact that at a metaphysical level, the existence of the body and its functionality is merely "the *objectivity of the will.*"[512]

By establishing the body as 'the *objectivity of the will*' Schopenhauer foreshadowed Darwin evolutionary theory, whereby teeth, throat and intestines are the objectification of hunger.[513] The same applies to the genitals which objectify sexual instincts, just as the whole human organism in its overall form objectifies the general human will. The individually tailored will, as in the individual's character, reflects the individual's somatic form which is in every way characteristic of them and "full of expression."[514] We can pick up on some of these characteristic objectifications in relation to Expressionist art and Sakharov as a dancer. Firstly, let us take Schopenhauer's point that the genitals are objectified sexual instinct. This is important, because many critics

[510] Laban and Ullmann. p.2.
[511] Rainer Stamm 'Alexander Sacharoff- Dance and the Fine Arts' in: Peter and Stamm. p.34.
[512] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.108.
[513] For a near contemporary account of Schopenhauer in relation to Darwinism see: Asher, D., "Schopenhauer and Darwinism," in: *The Journal of Anthropology* Vol. 1, no. 3 (1871). pp. 312-332.
[514] Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. p.108.

were unsettled by Sakharov's effeminate movements, his cross-dressing and Jewish homosexuality. One contemporary declared that:

> If dancing artists like Sakharov become the rule, then we will come to a phase of disgusting dancing men and to a male dance cult of the kind that came to play a role in the Roman Empire as a degenerate development. [...] hence, this Slav, Sacharoff, precipitates, despite his extraordinary technique, a feeling of virtual discomfort, even a feeling of aversion.[515]

The contemporary journal *Simplicissimus* also published a satirical cartoon which lampooned Sakharov's 'degenerate' effeminacy and his use of Greek motifs as in Olaf Gulbransson's cartoon *An Object Lesson* of 1910 (fig. 46).[516] The main problem for Sakharov's critics being that neither his physiology nor costume allowed for a congruent sexual identification which in turn increased an aura of sexual ambiguity.[517] This sense of sexual incongruity was depicted by Yavlensky in his 1909 *Portrait of Dancer Sakharov* (fig. 47), where the dancer, dressed in vivid red, leers demonically with coal black eyes at the spectator. The face is powdered white, which contrasts dramatically with the sitter's jet-black hair, and the effect is so startling, that if anything could unsettle the will, or representational equilibrium of the spectator, then Yavlensky's brilliant handling of his subject expedited that.

A sexually incongruous and 'degenerate nature' of Sakharov's type earned the scorn of many *Körperkultur* enthusiasts who promoted the ideals of a manly body and a Germanic will of steel. In the contemporary journal *Die Schönheit* an article titled

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[515] Frank Manuel-Peter 'The 'neue Münchener Derpsichore. Clotilde von Derp –The originator of *Ausducktanz*?' in: Peter and Stamm. p.121.

[516] Gerhard Amundsen compared Sakharov's art of dancing to the Greeks', arguing that in his dancing the spiritual and physical were indivisible. Amundsen knew that Sakharov was originally planning to become a painter and sculptor, and suggested that, in the same way that he used to employ colours and lines or forms in stone to achieve an effect, he used his body and its movement. Sakharov combined everyday movements, such as running and carrying, with expressive movements which in in turn conveyed spirituality through gesture. This included the resting positions of the body which denoted petrified movement which were of especial value for his dances. See: Amundsen, Gerhard: 'Alexander Sacharoff und sein Tanz' in: Koch, A. and Verlagsanstalt Alexander Koch, "Deutsche Kunst und Dekoration," (Darmstadt: A. Koch, 1897).

[517] The sex drive will be of significance to the next chapter of this thesis where we interpret an element of *Die Brücke's* artistic practice through Schopenhauer's metaphysics of sexual love.

'Körperschönheit' (Bodily Beauty) of 1909 put it that, "just as the soul of a violin player is expressed in his music, one can recognize a swift gait as the expression of a resolute character, while a slothful gait reveals weakness of the will (*Willensschwäche*)."[518] What was required at the turn of the century was a strong willed, resolute, heterosexual population which would promote the well-being of the *Volk.* Four years earlier in 1905, an article titled 'Willensschwäche-Lebensglück' (Weakness of the Will-Happiness in Life), argued that "the secret of all success lies in the ability to concentrate our thoughts into an unshakable will. [. . .] The present times, - and to an even greater extent the future, demand a strong-willed generation capable of decisive action."[519] As a consequence, those with 'unnatural affections' and an effeminate will had to be somehow exorcised from the body of the *Volk*. If this was the case, then the pursuit of 'an unshakable will' would therefore justify C1.

Examples of the effeminate will can be seen in the ink drawings by the artist Dora Brandenburg-Polster showing Sakharov dancing the Pavane Royale from *The Baroque Bacchus* (fig. 48, a-d) - a suite of dances staged for the Munich Press Ball in January 1913. The effeminate will can also be seen in Verevkina's 1909 *Portrait of Alexander Sakharov* where his Jewish features are emphasised, in which Shulamith Behr argues that Verevkina "gives reign to the flexibility of the 'female gaze' in embodying the eroticism of gendered and racial difference."[520] Moreover, Behr adds that Verevkina's personal encounter with the dancer possibly matched the artist's own longings for the emancipation of the body from controlling norms on gender identity.[521] It is therefore possible to infer that both Sakharov and Vervekina exploited modernity's self-reflexivity of the body in pursuit of

[518] Cowan. p.150.
[519] Ibid., p.116.
[520] Behr, Shulamith. 'Veiling Venus: Gender and Painterly Abstraction in early German Modernism' in : Scott, K. and Arscott, C., *Manifestations of Venus: Art and Sexuality* (Manchester University Press, 2000). p.208.
[521] Ibid., p.208.

a liberation from such norms.[522] Indeed, this example of early modern exploitation might resonate with Anthony Giddens' belief that the body, during late modernity, becomes progressively invested with the reflexive organisation of social life.[523]

The self-reflexivity of the body, or conversely 'reflexive embodiment' as Nick Crossley terms it, is one which "refers to the capacity and tendency to perceive, emote about, reflect and act upon one's own body; to practices of body modification and maintenance; and to 'body image'."[524] Similarly, Michael Pagis argues that embodied self-reflexivity is "a process based predominantly on feeling the body, in which the relation with oneself unfolds through a corporeal medium by way of practices that increase awareness of sensations, such as meditation, yoga, and dance."[525] In each case, when a dancer looks in the mirror at themselves during rehearsal for example, they are both the subject who sees and the object which is seen. Since this is the case they can modify their performance and self-image on these terms.

Arguably, this form of self-reflexivity may be applicable to the early phases of German modernism since it encouraged Sakharov, and other artists across the media, to reframe the expression of their modernity through the re-imagination of the body. Such a re-imagination meant that:

> …the dancer's representational body not only moulds social space but is also, in turn, moulded by it. The theatre artist lives only within the world; he is continually forced to carry out adjustments between his will and what he imagines the public's

[522] This position might be interpreted through Anthony Giddens' work on modernity and self-identity as follows: "The reflexivity of the self, in conjunction with the influence of abstract systems, pervasively affects the body as well as psychic processes. The body is less and less an extrinsic 'given', functioning outside the internally referential systems of modernity, but becomes itself reflexively mobilized. What might appear as a wholesale movement towards the narcissistic cultivation of bodily appearance is in fact an expression of a concern lying much deeper actively to 'construct' and control the body. Here there is an integral connection between bodily development and lifestyle - manifest, for example, in the pursuit of specific bodily regimes." See: Giddens, Anthony.Giddens, A., *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Blackwell, 1991). p.7. Although Giddens is most often referring to late-modernity in his work, it can be argued that such a self-reflexivity of the body had its grounding in earlier phases of modernity. It simply did not appear ex nihilo.
[523] Ibid. p.98.
[524] Crossley, N., *Reflexive Embodiment In Contemporary Society : The Body in Late Modern Society* (Buckingham, UNITED STATES: McGraw-Hill Education, 2004)., p.1.
[525] Pagis, M., "Embodied Self-reflexivity," in: *Social Psychology Quarterly* Vol. 72, no. 3 (2009). p.266.

level of acceptance to be.[526]

Whilst Sakharov's theatrical transvestitism and representational body threw off traditional norms, for some critics he perhaps lacked 'sincerity'. As Patrizia Veroli argues, Sakharov's "concept of representation and of self-representation was not distant from the 'insincerity' of Dorian Gray, the main character of Oscar Wilde's celebrated story, as a desire to show a multiple personality and to make identity coincide with artifice."[527]

The desire to make 'identity coincide with artifice' could be interpreted as an abstract deliberation, and Schopenhauer thinks that from abstract deliberations we can obtain an insight into what we all know in the concrete - which is the experience of having feelings. According to Schopenhauer, this knowledge shows us that the inner nature of our own phenomenon, manifesting itself to us as representation through our actions and the permanent foundation of them in our body, is our will. Therefore, this insight will furnish a person with a key to discovering the innermost being of nature. This is so because we can transfer this insight to every phenomenon given to us, not as with our own phenomenon, which is simultaneously given as direct and indirect knowledge, but through the indirect route of *representation* alone.[528]

Conclusion

In this chapter we examined depictions of dance in Expressionist art through Schopenhauer's 'Second Book: The World as Will First Aspect: The Objectification of the Will'. The methodology of the chapter was designed to test C1 and C2 and to acquire knowledge about the content of our representations. Through this methodology, we may

[526] Patrizia Veroli 'The Mirror and the Hieroglyph. Alexander Sacharoff and Dance Modernism' in: Peter and Stamm. p.170.
[527] Ibid., p.170.
[528] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.109.

now assert that the starting point of perception for all of us is the action or effect on the body. We can also assert that Nolde was capturing an objectification of the will in a dancer's bodily movement. Since this was so, we argued that "the action of the body is nothing but the act of will objectified, i.e., translated into perception."[529] As a result, it was suggested that through a comparison with what goes on within our own bodies, as it performs an action, we can obtain an insight into the changes which other bodies undergo and their 'inner nature'.[530] This inference is possible Schopenhauer says, because the body is the only object which we know intimately as both representation and will.

However, it was concluded that Schopenhauer's analogical inference was a weak argument and could only be useable for the sake of methodological coherence. This compromise weakened our interpretations of C2, since we cannot be utterly certain that Schopenhauer's analogy is justifiable. Although we argued that Schopenhauer's analogical inference was vulnerable, it was deemed worth pursuing for the sake of philosophical coherence. This was so, despite his assertion that "I must recognize the inscrutable forces that manifest themselves in all the bodies of nature as identical in kind with what in me is the will, and as differing from it only in degree."[531]

By exploring the relationship between the dancing body and the will, it was argued that C1 was a legitimate claim when set against works such as Nolde's *The Dance Round the Golden Calf* of 1910 (fig. 29), since in theory it appears to manifest the will to life of both artist and dancer. We also found that the contemporary goal of will cultivation (*Willensbildung*) was designed to offset the debilitating effects of abulia and contributed towards a validation of C1. On this basis, the practice of will cultivation, as objectified by

[529] Ibid., p100.
[530] Ibid., p.125.
[531] Ibid., p126. According to Schopenhauer, when we examine the reality of our bodies and its behaviours, then besides it being our representation, we discover nought else in it but the will and so thus its reality exhausted.

the example of Jaques-Dalcroze's rhythmic calisthenics in Hellerau, illustrated the role of dance in expressing the human will. Whilst visiting Jaques-Dalcroze's Educational Institute for Music and Rhythm, Nolde and his wife became acquainted with Wigman as an upcoming dancer whose career they closely followed. In addition to the above, we discovered another example which served to validate C1 through the vehement urges of Nolde's 'creative' will that almost destroyed *Dance II* of 1911 (fig. 32) by severe cropping. Although such aggression is not commonly associated with Expressionism, in this chapter we briefly outlined the opinions of those who have thought in this way.

The findings of the above seem to resonate with Maxine Sheets-Johnstone's phenomenological approach which states that "the dancer is not moving through a form; a form is moving through him. The dancer is not doing movement; movement is doing him,"[532] which appears to uphold the notion that something other than that which is represented manifests itself through the dancer, which Schopenhauer would describe as the will. The findings of this chapter also appear to resonate with Susanne K. Langer's observation, who without referring to Schopenhauer, suggests that in a dancer, "the conscious will that seems to motivate or animate him may be imagined to lie beyond his person, which figures as a mere receptacle or even momentary concentration of it…"[533]

Our observations differ from Roger Copeland's who, as Kristin Boyce shows, argued how "dance has suffered the effects of a deeply entrenched Cartesian dualism: because its medium is the human *body*, dance has been conceived (and often conceived itself) as 'mired' in the body, feeling and subjectivity - more suited to serve as a therapeutic antidote to the 'abstractions and deceptions' of reason than as a medium of

[532] Sheets-Johnstone, M., "On Movement and Objects in Motion: The Phenomenology of the Visible in Dance," in: *Journal of Aesthetic Education* Vol. 13, no. 2 (1979). p.43.
[533] Langer, S. K., *Feeling and form: A Theory of Art developed from Philosophy in a New Key* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953).p.183.

thought."[534] In contrast to Copeland and Boye's cognitive approach, our explorations of the will as a manifestation of the body as it related to C1 and C2, led us to discuss the case of Sakharov who lived his life, not as *Körperkultur* enthusiasts would have him live by cultivating a heterosexual body and Germanic will of steel, but with 'unnatural affections' and an effeminate will which had to be somehow exorcised from the body of the *Volk*. If this was the case, then the pursuit of an unshakable Teutonic will of steel would therefore justify C1.

However, perhaps few of the above findings are likely to secure a consensus of opinion amongst scholars, especially where Schopenhauer's analogical inference has been applied to C2. A consensus theory of truth entails that we may assign a predicate to an object, such as 'the body is a manifestation of the will', if and only if everyone who enters into a discourse with us would assign an identical predicate to the same object.[535] For Jürgen Habermas, a consensus theory of truth relies upon a community of discourse, where an attainment of "mutual understanding [*Verständigung*] is a normative concept."[536] Therefore, the veracity of the conclusions which this chapter has drawn from C1 and C2 as propositions must be contingent upon the assent of such a community. Although this is arguably a truism, the problem will always remain that "there are always only a few persons against whose assent I can check my assertion's claim to validity."[537]

[534] Boyce. K. 'The thinking body: Dance, Philosophy and Modernism' in:Bunker, J., Pakes, A., and Rowell, B., *Thinking through Dance: The Philosophy of Dance through Performance and Practices* (Binsted: Dance Books, 2013). p.258.
[535] Habermas , J. 'The Christian Gauss Lectures' in: Habermas, J. r. and Fultner, B., *On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action* (Cambridge: Polity, 2001).p.89.
[536] Ibid.,p.93.
[537] Ibid.

Chapter 3: The Expressionist Nude and the Platonic Idea

Introduction

In this chapter we begin with a discussion on the traditional reliance upon Nietzsche's philosophy as a means for interpreting *Die Brücke*'s work. It will be suggested that it is time a new strategy was adopted through Schopenhauer's philosophy. Having stated this, we then briefly explore Schopenhauer's reception of Plato and Kirchner's interest in philosophy on the basis of the latter's personal library. However, it is not being argued that Kirchner was necessarily influenced by Schopenhauer, although it is probably the case that the artist may well have read the philosopher's work *On Vision and Colours*. That said, what is being argued is that the latter's philosophy provides a basis for artistic interpretation, irrespective of whether Kirchner was influenced by or acquainted with that philosophy.

As was pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, we are working upon the assumption that a Platonic Idea stands for an eternal archetype of a particular thing and that this concept might help us interpret the status of C1. If this is so, then we may be able to explore Kirchner's depictions of the nude as putative Ideas which are independent of time, space and causality. Although the Ideas are abstract, we shall anchor our discussion of Kirchner's nudes in terms of art history, by showing how he was influenced by Matisse and Munch – in spite of Kirchner's denial of such influences. What cannot be denied, it will be argued, is the fact that Kirchner wrote about his ability to engage in aesthetic contemplation and his appreciation of beautiful bodies. His aesthetic appreciation embraced Indian art and an imaginative engagement with the Orient, and as we will note in this chapter, for Schopenhauer the imagination was a co-traveller with 'genius'. The concept of 'genius', it will be argued, is problematic as is the Platonic Idea in Schopenhauer's philosophical system. Yet, what may be even more problematic is the

allegation that Kirchner engaged in sexual activity with his child models. This accusation in turn leads us on to expose the latent contradictions between disinterested aesthetic contemplation and sexual desire, for an artist such as Kirchner.

3.1Kirchner, *Die Brücke* and the reliance upon Nietzsche.

Kirchner was one of the most prolific of *Die Brücke* artists in the years before the First World War. Although he is chiefly noted for his Berlin 'street scenes' (a reflection on the theme of the corruptive forces of modern life), a large proportion of his work was taken up with studies of the naked body, either in the studio or in nature. Traditionally, social historians of art have explored the significance of these works through the lens of Nietzsche's philosophy, seeing them as a means for critically reflecting upon modernity as Kirchner experienced it.[538] According to this account, the Berlin 'street scenes' may be interpreted as a critique of the sham and 'artificiality' of modern urban life vested in those processes of 'commodification' which had first been identified by Baudelaire in his essay 'The Painter of Modern Life' of 1863. This was symbolised for him at the time, and for the artistic avant-garde in the years thereafter, by the figure of the prostitute.[539]

By contrast, those related but sometimes divergent fields of art-historical scholarship, conventionally called 'the social histories of art' which proceed from a historical materialist point of view, explains the many representations of naked figures in Kirchner's art as a celebration of the 'authenticity', 'honesty' and moral integrity to be found in nature; hence these works are explained as a celebration of forces which stood as a binary opposite, a corrective and solution, to the corruption and artificiality of urban

[538] See: Simmons, S. (2000), "Ernst Kirchner's Streetwalkers: Art, Luxury, and Immorality in Berlin, 1913-16, *The Art Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (March,2000), pp. 117-148.
[539] Baudelaire, C. 'Le peintre de la vie moderne', serialised in *Le Figaro*, 26 November and 29 November, also 13. December 1863.

culture. In nature, one could act spontaneously and assert one's individuality, whilst the urban context was seen to induce a terminal conformity to 'the herd'. Lloyd and Gill Perry exemplify this reading of Kirchner's work particularly well. They see Kirchner as a participant in a contemporary 'cult of Nietzsche', and hence as an artist whose nudes may be seen as expressing an 'authenticity' that could be deployed as a counter-sign to the 'artificial' culture of the urban bourgeoisie.[540]

At first sight, we might agree with these historians, since Kirchner possessed several of Nietzsche's works in his library and evidently read them. We know that Kirchner owned *Thus Spake Zarathustra, The Will to Power*, *Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, Dionysian Dithyrambs,* and *Nietzsche Letters,* the latter being edited by Alfred Baeumler.[541] In 1923, Kirchner would recall how years earlier, in 1904, Heckel's eyes shone when he came to him for the first time to draw nudes and how he declaimed aloud from *Zarathustra*.[542] Indeed, the *Zarathustra* connection was applied by Botho Graef to Kirchner's work, who recalled how Nietzsche had boasted that he would show readers the meaning of the world. It was these words, Graef believed, which might equally be applied to Kirchner.[543] Similarly, Vergo's conviction is that, just as Schopenhauer's thought is ubiquitous in Kandinsky's writing, so is Nietzsche's in Kirchner's.[544] However, in reality Kirchner only mentions Nietzsche, or his works three times in his letters, but there is one letter to Hans Gewecke of 1913 where Kirchner does refer to *Zarathustra*, then *Ecce*

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[540] See: Lloyd, J (1991), *German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity*, New Haven: Yale University Press. Also: Lloyd, J. & Moeller, M. (Eds.) (2003), *Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: The Dresden and Berlin Years*, London: Royal Academy of Arts and Perry, G. (1993), "Primitivism and the 'Modern'", in: Harrison, C., Frascina, F. & Perry, G. (1993), *Primitivism, Cubism, Abstraction: The Early Twentieth Century*, London: Yale University Press, 1993, pp. 3-85.

[541] Nietzsche-Briefe. Baeumler, Alfred. Nietzsche in seinen Briefen. Illustriert. Leinwand, Ausgabe Kröner. For an account of Baeumler's relationship to Nietzsche's work see: Whyte, M., "The Uses and Abuses of Nietzsche in the Third Reich: Alfred Baeumler's 'Heroic Realism'," in: *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol. 43, no. 2 (2008).

[542] Kirchner diary entry, 06 .03.1923. Published in: Kirchner, E. L. and Grisebach, L., *E. L. Kirchners Davoser Tagebuch: eine Darstellung des Malers und eine Sammlung seiner Schriften* ([Köln]: M. DuMont Schauberg, 1968). p.78.

543 Original document appears in: The Museum of Modern Art Archives, Curt Valentin Papers. Carbon copy of a typewritten document, 4 pages, not dated consisting of a free translation of no. 3324, prepared by Alyse Gregory

544 Vergo, P., "Ernst Ludwig Kirchner by Donald E. Gordon " review of Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Donald E. Gordonin: The Burlington Magazine Vol. 113, no. 823 (1971). p.616.

Homo specifically, and also the will to power, the will to create.[545] Finally, in a letter to Helene Spengler of 1917, Kirchner asserts that the *Zarathustra* should belong to the stock of every library. [546]

If he really did read *Zarathustra*, then he must have recalled the passage where the prophet announces, "What is great about human beings is that they are a bridge and not a purpose: what is lovable about human beings is that they are a crossing over and a going under."[547] This passage, according to Georg Reinhart, inspired a 1905 woodcut by Kirchner, the central motif of which was a bridge (fig. 49).[548] Moreover, Lloyd too perceives the inspirational influence of *Zarathustra* on Kirchner through this quote:

> …and one morning he rose with the dawn, stepped before the sun, and spoke to it thus: Great Star! What would your happiness be, if you had not those for whom you shine! You have come up here to my cave for ten years: you would have grown weary of your light and of this journey, without me, my eagle and my serpent.[549]

She suggests that this passage represents a major convergence between *Die Brücke* and the nudist movement.[550] Yet, as Christopher Short argues, her assertion is unjustified because the passage Lloyd has quoted from in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* has no connection to sun worship specifically, or a cult of the body in general.[551] Instead, Short perceives

[545] Kirchner to Hans Gewecke, 24.09.1913. Original in Sketchbook No. 35 in the Kirchner Museum Davos. Written by Erna, presumably dictated, it breaks off in the middle. It is known that Kirchner sometimes wrote letters in his sketchbook and tore out the pages and sent them. However, there are also drafts of letters in the sketchbooks which were not sent. It is not known if Gewecke received this letter. Published in: Kirchner, E. L. and Presler, G., *Ernst Ludwig Kirchner : die Skizzenbücher : "Ekstase des ersten Sehens" : Monographie und Werkverzeichnis* (Karlsruhe: Engelhardt & Bauer, 1996). Hans Gewecke (1906-1991), was an artist and pupil of Kirchner at the MUIM-Institut which was founded in Berlin 1911 by Kirchner and Pechstein. Gewecke was the NSDAP Reichstag Deputy involved in persecution of Jews. See also: Spielmann, H. and Schleswig-Holsteinisches Landesmuseum, *Ernst Ludwig Kirchner auf Fehmarn* (Schleswig: Schleswig-Holsteinisches Landesmuseum, Schloß Gottorf, 1997).

[546] Kirchner to Helene Spengler, 14.10.1917. Original in private collection. Letter written in a strange hand but signed by Kirchner. Extracts published in: Grisebach, L., *Maler des Expressionismus im Briefwechsel mit Eberhard Grisebach. (Herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort versehen von Lothar Grisebach.) [With reproductions, including portraits.]* (Hamburg1962). p.72.See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 199-200. Helene Spengler was the wife of Dr. Lucius Spengler (1858 -1923), director of the Schatzalp Sanatorium in Davos, and Kirchner's doctor.

[547] Nietzsche, F. W., Caro, A. d., and Pippin, R., *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). p.7. Nietzsche uses the word 'bridge' as a metaphor regularly in this book as on: p.8, p.25, p.77, p.109, p.110, p.150, p.158, p.162, p.175.

[548] Reinhardt, G., *Die frühe "Brücke": Beiträge zur Geschichte und zum Werk der Dresdner Künstlergruppe "Brücke" der Jahre 1905 bis 1908* (Berlin: Brüder Hartmann, 1978). See also: Lloyd. p.246. n.32. Reinhart was a merchant, an art collector and patron of art in Winterthur.

[549] See equivalent translation in: Nietzsche, Caro, and Pippin. p.3.

[550] Lloyd.p.246. n.32.

[551] Christopher Short, *Friedrich Nietzsche and German Expressionist Art*, PhD Thesis, Volume I: Text. Department of Art History and Theory University of Essex 1993, p.2.

Nietzsche to be speaking in a purely philosophical manner that "articulates in concise form Kant's 'Copernican revolution', in which the perceiving subject becomes the centre of the universe; and Nietzsche speaks this to the 'subject' of Copernicus universe, the sun."[552]

Lloyd is not alone in emphasising the dependence of *Die Brücke* artists such as Kirchner upon the writings of Nietzsche. Twohig, for example, suggests that "many of their (i.e. *Die Brücke's*) vitalistic celebrations of nudes playing and dancing together in interiors and in the open air were made while listening to each other reading from Nietzschean texts."[553] Short, however, whilst agreeing with Twohig about the dramatised readings of Nietzsche's works, points out that the execution of their art works under the conditions of hearing Nietzsche, is an unfounded one because, although Twohig refers to Reinhardt's *Die frühe Brücke*[554] for evidence, this source does little to affirm her claims. As a result, Twohig misrepresents matters in order to express more convincingly the 'impact' of Nietzsche.[555]

In this chapter, during our investigations into C1 in particular, we will also seek to qualify this traditional reliance upon Nietzsche as a means of understanding Kirchner's works - and specifically those representing the naked body from c.1904-1918. Whilst agreeing that Nietzschean sources were clearly important to the artists of *Die Brücke*, we Schopenhauer's views in particular.

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[552] Ibid., p.2. Schopenhauer considered that *Kant's* ultimate achievement was to make distinct the phenomenon of appearance from the thing-in-itself (*Ding an sich*). Therefore, as Sebastian Gardener has said, "…the Copernican revolution consists in explaining the objects of cognition idealistically, in terms of our mode of cognition…" See: Sebastian Gardner, 'Schopenhauer, Will, and the Unconscious' in: Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. p. 389. For Schopenhauer Kant's distinction was *"*based on the proof that between things and us there always stands the *intellect,* and that on this account they cannot be known according to what they may be in themselves." See: Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.417-418. Jacquette adds that: "Kant's slogan that reason without intuition (sense experience) is empty, and intuition without concepts (innate forms of intuition or categories of pure understanding) is blind, summarizes the (Copernican) revolutionary synthesis of rationalism and empiricism." See: Jacquette, D. 'Schopenhauer's metaphysics of appearance and Will in the philosophy of art' in; Jacquette, D., *Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts*, [Reprint with corrections] ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). End note, 3, p.33.

[553] Sarah O'Brien Twohig, 'Dix and Nietzsche' in:Dix, O. et al., *Otto Dix: 1891-1969* (London: Tate Gallery, 1992). p.42

[554],Reinhardt, G., *Die frühe 'Brücke': Beiträge Zur Geschichte und Zum Werk der Dresdner Künstlergruppe 'Brücke' der Jahre 1905 bis 1908* (Berlin: Brücke-Museum, 1977).

[555] Short, *Friedrich Nietzsche and German Expressionist Art*. p.4.

3.2 Kirchner, Schopenhauer and the Platonic Idea

We are referring Kirchner's nudes to Schopenhauer's philosophy so as to explore the ways in which we might interpret Kirchner's depictions as an expression of the Platonic Ideas through a specific application of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Evidence for Kirchner's interest in philosophy may be ascertained through the contents of his personal library.[556] Out of his own library, Kirchner would have become acquainted with Schopenhauer through the numerous quotations and references made about the philosopher in Nietzsche's work, a number of which have been identified above.[557] Although many of Nietzsche's references to Schopenhauer take a negative or disparaging tone, Nietzsche once confessed that his essay, *Schopenhauer als Erzieher* (*Schopenhauer as Educator*) of 1874 "bears my innermost history, my *becoming* inscribed within it."[558]

Kirchner's own introduction to Schopenhauer's philosophy might stem from a visit to the 8th Munich Phalanx exhibition in 1904, to which he often referred. As Christoph Krekel and Heide Skowranek remark, this experience probably influenced the stylistic development of the artist and signals his first engagement with colour theory.[559] They argue that there are many references to theoretical works in Kirchner's writings, and that he appears to have studied Goethe, Michel Eugène Chevreul, Paul Victor Jules Signac, and Friedrich Wilhelm Ostwald among others.[560] This is corroborated by a letter

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[556] Gordon, D. E. and Kirchner, E. L., *Ernst Ludwig Kirchner* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968). p.18. For the complete holdings in Kirchner's library, including Nietzsche, see Kirchner, E. L. et al., *E.L. Kirchner Dokumente: Fotos, Schriften, Briefe* (Das Museum, 1980). p.353-62.

[557] It could be the case that Kirchner was a man given to display and that his personal library was an unread ornament to his ego. On the issue of Kirchner and self-promotion see: Weikop.

[558] Nietzsche, F. W. and Large, D., *Ecce Homo: How To Become What You Are* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). p.53. Schopenhauer's essay On Schopenhauer as Educator can be found in the English translation of Nietzsche, F., Breazeale, D., and Hollingdale, R. J., *Nietzsche: Untimely Meditations* (Cambridge University Press, 1997). p.125-195.

[559] Kirchner first began to study art theory after being admitted to the Davos Sanatorium around 1918. Only from the 1920s onwards, after creating the pseudonym of Louis de Marsalle, did he promote his personal theories and criticisms in magazines such as *Genius* and *Der Cicerone*. See: L. de Marsalle. "Uber Kirchners Graphik," *Genius* 3 (1921): 215-63, and L. de Marsalle, "Uber die plastischen Arbeiten von E. L. Kirchner," *Der Cicerone* 17, no. 14 (1925): 695-701. Although Krekel et al. suggest that Kirchner became acquainted with Schopenhauer's colour theory through the 8th Phalanx Exhibition of 1904, we must regard this supposition with some scepticism.

[560] Kirchner, E. L. et al., *'No One Else Has These Colors: Kirchner's Painting'* (Ostfildern, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 2012).p.84.

sent from Kirchner to Curt Valentin of 1937, where he wrote about an exhibition of French neo-Impressionists which he had visited.[561] He commented that he found their drawing weak, and after studying the colour theory which was based on optics, he came to the opposite conclusion, namely not to use complementary colours but rather to allow the eye to produce the complement, in accordance with Goethe's theory.[562]

Kirchner's interest in optics promised to take a new turn following his provisional discharge from military service in November 1915. Later, after being admitted on 15 September 1917 to the Bellevue Sanatorium of Kreuzlingen in Switzerland, Kirchner was alerted to Schopenhauer's early work *On Vision and Colours*. In a letter to Eberhard Griesbach from 1919 he states that:

> I recently read by chance that Schopenhauer wrote a theory of colors; do you know it? I would now like to read it. It is perhaps not good to occupy oneself with such theoretical matters, but it fills the idle period and yet vanishes into thin air while working.[563]

Schopenhauer's text mentioned by Kirchner pays homage to Goethe's work *Theory of Colours*[564] of 1810 after discussing his own ideas with Goethe between 1813 and 1814. Although Schopenhauer's work had since become outdated, we can assume, along with Krekel and Skowranek, that Kirchner's interest in this work was an academic one regarding the history of colour.[565] Indeed, judging from the above letter Kirchner perhaps leaned more towards the practical than the theoretical. One particular leaning was towards

[561] Kirchner to Curt Valentin, 17.04.1937. Original in The Museum of Modern Art Archives, Curt Valentin Papers, manuscript letter, 12 sides. Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.3, p. 1986-1988. Valentin was an art dealer, an employee of the Galerie Buchholz in Berlin, and in 1937 emigrated to New York, as founder of the Buchholz Gallery.
[562] Original in The Museum of Modern Art Archives, Curt Valentin Papers, manuscript letter, 12 sides.
[563] Kirchner to Eberhard Griesbach, 01.01.1919. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 4 sides. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p. 325-326. One wonders just how seriously Kirchner might have taken Schopenhauer's theoretical work since he says that such as work merely 'fills the idle period and yet vanishes into thin air while working'. This could imply that theoretical works meant little or nothing to him whilst working or just as likely that he prioritised practice over theory.
[564] Goethe, J. W. v. and Eastlake, C. L. S., *Goethe's Theory of Colours*, [1st ed.], new impression with index. ed. (London: Cass, 1967).
[565] Kirchner et al. p.89.

that of depicting the naked body, and Schopenhauer's philosophy of will and representation offers a new way of interpreting these depictions.

To begin with, let us note how Schopenhauer says that the act of every individual has a purposive aim but willing as such has no purposive aim. Every embodied individual, every natural phenomenon is determined by a cause with regard to its appearance in space and time, yet "the force manifesting itself in this phenomenon has in general no cause, for such a force is a stage of appearance of the thing-in-itself, of the groundless will."[566] He goes on to add that, "the sole self-knowledge of the will as a whole is the representation as a whole, the whole world of perception. It is the objectivity, the revelation, the mirror of the will."[567] In this chapter, we shall explore 'the mirror of the will' by studying Kirchner's images of the naked body executed in the period c. 1905-1914.[568] In order to achieve this, and to test C1 in particular, it is necessary to introduce Schopenhauer's theory of the Platonic Ideas due to their significance within his work.

Their significance is due to the fact that Schopenhauer stratified the world of art upon the kind of Idea each art communicates. Just as the will objectifies itself throughout nature, from the lowest forms of natural forces such as gravity to its highest form in man, the 'lower' arts communicate Ideas which concern the natural forces of nature, whilst the 'higher' arts express Ideas of humanity at the highest objectification of the will.[569] Thus, his stratification of the arts entails that the 'lowest' art in his hierarchy is architecture since it conveys the Ideas of natural forces such as gravity and rigidity. Next, in ascending order

[566] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.165.
[567] Ibid.,Vol.1, p.165.
[568] I lean quite heavily on Donald E. Gordon's catalogue raisonné in this chapter since it remains the most comprehensive source of information on Kirchner's work at this time.
[569] Schopenhauer states that: "…man is more beautiful than all other objects, and the revelation of his inner nature is the highest aim of art. Human form and human expression are the most important objects of plastic art, just as human conduct is the most important object of poetry." Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.210.

we find horticulture, historical painting and sculpture, nudes and rhetorical art, allegorical art, poetry, tragedy, and at the summit of his hierarchy, music.

The relationship expressed between the body as it is 'in itself', and the theory of the Platonic Ideas, is one which refers to various grades of the will's objectification, a theme discussed in the third book of Schopenhauer's major work. This third book is subtitled 'The World as Representation Second Aspect: The Representation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art'.[570] Schopenhauer's frontispiece to this third book employs a quotation from Plato's *Timaeus* which asks, "What is that which eternally is, which has no origin? And what is that which arises and passes away, but in truth never is?"[571] Whilst Schopenhauer had his own reasons for quoting Plato, let us endeavour to answer these questions in relation to Kirchner's depictions of the nude and attempt to interpret them as manifestations of a Platonic Idea.

Schopenhauer had a high regard for "Plato the divine" who "aims throughout at unity and at ascertaining the depth of things; for him all things are only letters in which he reads the divine Ideas.[572] Yet, Schopenhauer does not agree with Plato's assertion in the *Republic* and *Parmenides* that a table and chair express the Ideas of a table and a chair. On the contrary, Schopenhauer argues that "they express the Ideas already expressed in their mere material as such."[573] In addition, whilst he enlarges on the Platonic Idea as a perceptible reality discoverable by the mind through aesthetic experience he has to admit that a conflict exists between his own interpretation of the Ideas and Plato's. He says that:

> [Plato] teaches (Republic, X [601], p. 288) that the object which art aims at expressing, the prototype of painting and poetry, is not the Idea, but the individual thing. The whole of our discussion so far maintains the very opposite, and Plato's

[570] Ibid. p.168.
[571] Ibid., p.167.
[572] Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p.12.
[573] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.

> opinion is the less likely to lead us astray, as it is the source of one of the greatest and best-known errors of that great man, namely of his disdain and rejection of art, especially of poetry.[574]

We shall follow Schopenhauer's discussion in this chapter, and by applying his philosophy examine individuated nude bodies in Kirchner's art insofar as they relate to their eternal prototypes as Platonic Ideas.

3.3 The Nude as Idea Independent of Time, Space and Causality

Regardless of whether Kirchner's nudes relate to their eternal prototypes or not, his earliest attempts at depicting nudes may have been a communal one. This is because *Die Brücke* artists were dissatisfied with academic approaches to life drawing in their Technical High School. As a result, they decided to organise their own life classes, allowing only a quarter-hour for each pose, thereby prompting the artist to capture it quickly. Evidence for this comes from a letter to Dr. Eberhard Grisebach, where Kirchner recalled that early on in their *Brücke* careers, several times a week members of the group came to his studio to paint nudes.[575] However, there is evidence of another kind in a letter to Graef of 21.09.1916, where Kirchner reveals that he had difficulties in depicting the human body and how "through the medium of a friend I futilely drew anatomy and many nudes in my own studio and in the evening at evening school."[576]

Among his early works Kirchner produced *Nude on Patterned Bed Cover* in 1904 (fig. 50), which was probably based upon Félix Edouard Vallotton's woodcut *Laziness* of

[574] Ibid.Vol.1, p.212. See also: Janaway, 'Knowledge and tranquillity: Schopenhauer on the value of art' in: Jacquette, *Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts*. p.43.
[575] Dated to 08.01.1918. Original document in a private collection. Manuscript letter in another hand, 4 pages. Fragment without an ending or signature. Kirchner was writing about the history of Die Brücke - he does not give clear dates for the events he writes about. See also: Selz, Peter. "E. L. Kirchner's "Chronik der Brücke." College Art Journal 10, no. 1 (1950): 50-54. Grisebach was an art historian, philosopher, and head of the Jena Art Society. He acted as a patron and supporter of Kirchner.
[576] Kirchner to Botho Graef 21.09.1916. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: Grisebach. p.53. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p.144-145. Graef was an archaeologist, art historian, friend of Kirchner, and belonged to the George circle.

1896 (fig. 51). Of this nude, Gordon observes that "the sinuous rhythms used by Kirchner in outlining the figure create that same *fin de siècle* air of sensuous self-indulgence that is expressed in this Valotton."[577] Indeed, during the Autumn and Winter of 1905-1906, Kirchner's approach to the nude was influenced by two exhibitions in Dresden, firstly the November 1905 exhibition of Vincent van Gogh's works and secondly, the February 1906 exhibition of Edvard Munch's work held at the *Sächsischer Kunstverein* (Saxon Art Association.).[578] Although Gordon points out that during 1906 Kirchner's style continued to be influenced by post-Impressionist sources in part, he adds that throughout 1909 and 1910 Kirchner's whole graphic style was "as pervasively and subtly conditioned by Matisse's prints as it was earlier by Munch's."[579]

Whilst Kirchner's 1906 woodcut *Nude among Sunflowers* (fig. 52) may have been conditioned by Munch's symbolism there is an element of Art Nouveau influence in the nude's curvilinear line.[580] In addition, as Gordon has argued, "Matisse's 1906 lithograph *Half Length Nude, Eyes Cast Down* (fig. 53) is alone the most probable progenitor for a long series of Kirchner lithographs of female nudes in the course of the year 1909, executed almost wholly in line."[581] Indeed, Kirchner's *Girl Washing Her Breasts* of 1909 (fig.54), expresses something of Matisse's 'vitalism' whose sinuous economy of line would become the signature style of *Die Brücke's* Dresden period lithography.

[577] Gordon, D. E., "Kirchner in Dresden," in: *The Art Bulletin* Vol. 48, no. 3/4 (1966). p.338. See also: Meier-Graefe, J., *Felix Vallotor biographie de cet artiste avec la partie la plus importante de son oeuvre* (Berlin ; Paris: J.A. Stargardt-E. Lagot, 1898). p.83.
[578] The Munch exhibition was reviewed by Richard Stiller in: "Sächsischen Kunstverein," *Dresdener Anzeiger*, 53 (February 24, 1906), 4; Similarly, note Paul Fechter in: "Im Sächsischen Kunstverein" *Dresdener neueste Nachrichten*, 51 (23.2. 1906). There are two books by Schopenhauer in Munch's library, as in *Parerga und Paralipomena. Kleine philosophische Schriften*, Leipzig, Reclam Verlag, 1895 and *Sämmtliche Werke III*, Leipzig, Reclams Universal Bibliothek, Nr 2801-2805, [s.n]
[579] Gordon. p.349.
[580] Ibid., p.340.
[581] Ibid., p.349.

If a Matissian 'vitalism' could be attributed to *Girl Washing Her Breasts*, then it might be interpreted through Schopenhauer's vitalist philosophy.[582] However, as Leslie White points out, 'vitalism' is an imprecise term with each theoretician of it developing their own methodology. Schopenhauer's 'vitalism' for instance arose from the striving will, while Thomas Carlyle's arose from the dynamism of a changing world, and Bergson's version of it highlighted the concept of *élan vital*. More importantly, White argues that:

> Broadly put, when a rational orientation to the world ceased to be adequate, when rationalism devolved into a falsification of reality's authentic energy, major vitalists came into existence and posited as the true reality a primitive, universal force of which everything in that reality is an objectification.[583]

In line with this, Axel Pérez Trujillo believes that the search for a 'primitive, universal force' accelerated from the early 1800s onwards, thereby undermining a mechanised model of the world. By that he means to tell us that "philosophies of the 'machine of life' characteristic of the age of Descartes gave way to the more dynamic idea of 'vital properties' or vitalism".[584] However, the shift away from the concept of 'machine life' may have begun earlier through the work of the French physician Xavier Bichat (1771-1802) and subsequently pursued by Schopenhauer who discerned a metaphysical solution

[582] There is no evidence that Matisse ever read Schopenhauer, no trace of the philosopher in the list of books in Matisse Atelier (Nice) made in 1943 (see Archives at Paul Getty Center, Special Collections, 850855A, Folder 10). Nor is there evidence for that matter in his personal papers, correspondence or agendas about what he was reading. Although there exists, in the library of Georges Duthuit (the husband of his daughter), Schopenhauer's *Le Fondement de la morale* and *Le Monde comme volonté et comme representation,* it would be mere speculation to propose that Matisse could have borrowed these books from him. That said, if there is any plausible link to be found it would be early in the 20th century when Matisse, along with Prichard and Duthuit, attended a series of Bergson's conferences. But again, this does not allow any speculation about Matisse reading Schopenhauer. However, we do know that Matisse, when discussing the nature of fleeting impressions and delicate sensations as found in Monet and Sisley, uses the Bergsonian term *durée* in his *Notes d'un peinture.* (I am grateful to Wanda de Guébriant at the Archives Matisse for her kind assistance in these matters).

[583] White, L., ""Uproar in the Echo": Browning's Vitalist Beginnings," in: *Browning Institute Studies* Vol. 15 (1987).p..91.

[584] The Strange Case of 19th Century Vitalism, El extraño caso del vitalismo del siglo XIX, Axel Pérez Trujillo, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Recibido: 15/09/2011, Aprobado: 20/12/2011. p.65.

to the problems of anatomy and thereby created "a provocative hybrid of the medical and philosophical perspectives."[585]

Although 'vitalism' has often been associated with a philosophy of science, Richard A. Lofthouse has argued that references to a vital unifying force as one which sustains the Universe played a significant part in early twentieth century art and culture. Through his study of Otto Dix and Max Beckmann, Stanley Spencer and Jacob Epstein, Lofthouse argues that from c.1900 onwards, the artists of this period faced a far more inchoate world in which positivism and secularisation were challenged.

On the basis of 'vitalism', Schopenhauer was able to introduce a unitary concept of nature which was congruent at a Platonic level.[586] If nature is commensurable with a Platonic model then how does Schopenhauer define a Platonic Idea? His definition is that:

> …by Idea I understand every definite and fixed grade of the will's objectification, in so far as it is thing-in-itself and is therefore foreign to plurality. These grades are certainly related to individual things as their eternal forms, or as their prototypes.[587]

While Plato proposed that an eternal Form or Idea could be an archetypal Man or Woman, through which all individual men or women are particularised types which they imitate, Schopenhauer by contrast refers the archetypal Man or Woman to particular grades of the will's objectification. His doctrine of the Ideas also explains natural forces, natural species and those aspects of the world left unexplained by science. Additionally, we must note that although the Ideas are manifestations of the will, contrary to Plato they are not constitutive of fundamental reality since they are only objectifications of the will. Ideas are objects of thought and are situated within the most elementary form of representation, as between subject and object. The Ideas are not the thing-in-itself *per se*, nor are they

[585]Ibid., p.69.
[586] Schopenhauer, A. et al., *The World as Will and Representation.* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).p. xxvi.
[587] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.130.

plural.[588]

As the most elementary form of representations, the Ideas in Kirchner's work would not vindicate C1, even though they are the most adequate objectivity of the will since they are not the will *per se*. However, we may regard a Kirchner nude as an example of the Idea of a human being, whereby the individual phenomenon of a *particula*r human has no 'real' existence but only a relative one compared to the *Idea* of the human being - which alone possesses true being. Consequently, in order to know what the nude is *in itself*, independent of time, space and causality, a different type of knowledge from sensory knowledge would be needed.[589] Therefore, we must establish what this different type of knowledge is.

Schopenhauer agrees with Kant that the forms of knowledge in time, space and causality are merely the 'arrangement of our intellect', by which the truly existing unity of the Idea manifests itself to us as plurality. When we apprehend paintings such as *Three Nudes under Trees* of 1913 (fig. 55) through this 'arrangement', then this form of knowledge is called *immanent* in contrast to knowledge of things as they truly are, which is called *transcendental* knowledge.[590] By taking his cue from Kant, Schopenhauer observes that we acquire this knowledge in the abstract, but that it may also appear intuitively in atypical cases.[591] However, the Idea and thing-in-itself for Schopenhauer are *not* the same, since Schopenhauer states that:

> …on the contrary, for us the Idea is only the immediate, and therefore adequate, objectivity of the thing-in-itself, which itself, however, is the will - the will insofar as it is not yet objectified, has not yet become representation.[592]

[588] Cartwright. p.134.
[589] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.173.
[590] The concepts of immanent and transcendental knowledge were also broached in relation to Kandinsky's art in Chapter 1. As did Kant, Schopenhauer asserts that his philosophy remains within the realm of experience, hence the term immanent.
[591]Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.173.
[592] Ibid., p.174.

For Kant, the thing-in-itself was free from all forms of knowledge *per se*, yet according to Schopenhauer, Kant's error was to avoid the concept of 'being object for a subject' since this is the most universal form of all representations. By contrast, Plato's Idea is a known object, a representation, and therefore distinguishes it from the thing-in-itself.

From Schopenhauer's position, the Idea has been divested of the subordinate forms of phenomenon pertaining to the principle of sufficient reason while retaining the most universal form of representation by 'being object for a subject'. It is the principle of sufficient reason which multiplies the universal Ideas into particular things and gives us the appearance of diversity. We might perceive this scenario in Kirchner's *Bathers Throwing Reeds* of 1909 (fig. 56) which portrays naked bodies as particular things. Therefore, we may conceive of how "… the principle of sufficient reason is again the form into which the Idea enters, since the Idea comes into the knowledge of the subject as individual."[593]

3.4 Kirchner, Nudity and Historical Context

That the Ideas depicted by Kirchner, entered the principle of sufficient reason must imply that his painted images belong to art history somehow. Rather than being disembodied images deracinated from other creative styles his nudes were developed and located within an historical context. For example, the Fauvist influence on Kirchner's development was enhanced in September 1908 when he visited the Emil Richter Salon in Dresden. There the work of French Fauve artists Albert Marquet, Maurice de Vlaminck, Pierre-Narcisse Guérin, Achille-Émile Othon Friesz, Cornelis van Dongen, and Jean Puy was on display. As a consequence, it is likely that Kirchner's late 1908 *Nude in Tub Seen from Above* [594] (fig. 57) was derived from Marquet's drawing *Nude* (not dated) (fig. 58),

[593] Ibid., p.175.
[594] Now lost.

thus demonstrating an assimilation of Fauvist practices. In particular, Marquet and Van Dongen's work acted as the immediate grounds for the greatest transformation of style up to that point in Kirchner's development.[595] From this it can also be inferred that Van Dongen's work, as exhibited at Richter's exhibition, inspired Kirchner's *Dancer with Bent Back*, of 1910 (fig. 59).[596]

Although Kirchner received formal training in draughtsmanship at Chemnitz and Munich, he "learned that exact representation could not be achieved through objective faithfulness to nature."[597] In fact Kirchner wrote, "I was astonished; there was after all a form which could exactly represent something, a man, a movement etc, and yet which differed from the objective natural form."[598] This led him to examine the drawings of the old masters, and to question whether it was possible to create an art which would be comprehensible to all, without producing an 'ideal' likeness to nature, by using a symbolic language of forms.

The woodcut *Seated Nude seen from the Back* of 1906 (fig. 60), reveals how he began to evolve his idiosyncratic representations of form between 1906-1909; Gordon suggesting that this nude "is a most successful graphic embodiment of a late Impressionist concern for the optical effects of light and shadow."[599] However, it was not until Kirchner painted *Three Nudes in the Forest* in 1908 that he achieved a more distinctive form of expression, and as Gordon concludes, through its strident colours the painting may be regarded as the first Fauvist painting produced in Germany, and as such is a prelude to Kirchner's Moritzburg nudes which would appear in later years.[600] Two years later in

[595] Gordon. p.347.
[596] Ibid., p.347.
[597] Gordon and Kirchner. p.19.
[598] Original in Max Beckmann Archive. Manuscript document, 12 sides. Fragments of an autobiography. Published in: Hagemann, C. et al., *Kirchner, Schmidt-Rottluff, Nolde, Nay - : Briefe an den Sammler und Mäzen Carl Hagemann 1906-1940 : Briefe von Hermann Blumenthal ... [et al.]* (Ostfildern: H. Cantz, 2004). No page number given.
[599] Gordon and Kirchner. p.19
[600] Ibid., p.53

1910, Kirchner agreed with Heckel and Pechstein that they would work together at the lakes around Moritzburg near Dresden, one of the aesthetic playgrounds for *Die Brücke* throughout the summers of 1909 to 1911. This is confirmed in a letter of 1910, sent to Gustave Schiefler, in which Kirchner states that there was nothing more charming than nudes in the open air.[601] Subsequently, this attraction for contemplating nudes in the open air lasted throughout his life, especially with 'ideal' models Nina Hard and Lotte Rohner-Kraft.[602]

This contemplation of the ideal body for Kirchner, and many others at the time, took place within the context of Germany's *Nacktkultur* movement. *Nacktkultur* mirrored the self-reflexivity of the modern individual as its practitioners sought a way of reconnecting with nature in the open air.[603] To render oneself naked could be seen as a social statement designed to re-assert the individual's will in opposition to the norm for wearing clothes, which was deemed artificial.[604] The concept of *Nacktkultur* was reputedly invented by Heinrich Pudor in 1903, although it could also be said that *Nacktkultur* materialised earlier during the 1870s as one of a number of social reform movements, including vegetarianism and alternative therapies.[605] The hope in each case was to initiate

[601] Kirchner to Gustave Schiefler, dated 19.07.1910. Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 2 sides. Published in: Kirchner, E. L., Schiefler, G., and Henze, W., *Briefwechsel, 1910-1935/1938: mit Briefen von und an Luise Schiefler und Erna Kirchner sowie weiteren Dokumenten aus Schieflers-Korrespondenz-Ablage* (Stuttgart: Belser, 1990). See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p.44. Schiefler, was the District Court Director in Hamburg, an art collector, author of essays on art history and catalogues of graphic works by Illies, Liebermann, Munch, Nolde, and Kirchner.

[602] Nina Hard and Lotte Kraft-Rohner posed naked for Kirchner at different times. There are several photographs, drawings etc. in the collection of E. W. Kornfeld. One may find the photographs in the catalogue by Roland Scotti / Kirchner Museum Davos (2005): *Das fotografische Werk*. See for example: Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, photographs of Lotte Kraft-Rohner, unknown woman, Erna Kirchner, 1929, cat. 336q, p. 208; cat. 336s, p. 213; cat. 3360, p. 212. The catalogue contains a series of photographs from the same day. Nina Hard visited Kirchner and Erna Schilling in the summer of 1921 in Davos and stayed with them for several months. Hard was a dancer and actress. Rohner-Kraft was a violinist, friend of Erna Kirchner, and wife of the painter Hans Rohner (1898-1972).

[603] Self-reflexivity should be understood as a self-conscious re-negotiation of the individual's body with modern society. As Ross Chad argues, Germans were persuaded by the nudist movements to "lose their feelings of bodily shame." See: Ross, C., *Naked Germany: Health, Race and the Nation* (Berg, 2005). p.127.

[604]Schönemann, F., "Zurück zur Natur!," in: *Kraft und Schönheit* Vol. 6 (1901).

[605] Pudor pioneered nudism in Germany, was a nationalist and held some anti-Semitic views. Something of a polymath he studied art history and philosophy when at the University of Leipzig from 1886-87. Whilst at the University of Heidelberg he completed a dissertation on Schopenhauer's philosophy of music in 1889. See: Messing, S. *Schubert in the European Imagination*. University of Rochester Press, 2006. p.124.

a therapeutic intervention against the perils of modernity and stimulate a regeneration of the body.[606]

The vision for a comprehensive regeneration of the body was reflected in Pudor's chapter 'The Will to Life' as featured in his work *Nacktkultur*. Here, Pudor shows that he had read Schopenhauer's 'theory of the will', although for the purposes of *Nacktkultur* he found the philosopher too pessimistic. Even so, Pudor believed that the strength of the individual's will could prolong their life and he remarked that:

> …are not all the sages of the world of all times united in saying that not only belief, but also the will, can move mountains? I remember Kant's essay 'The power of feeling', also Schopenhauer's 'The world as will and representation'. What a shame, that Schopenhauer was a pessimist and that he didn't use his theory of the will to prolong human life.[607]

The desire to employ the will to affirm and prolong life took place through regional networks which were privately run for both sexes.[608] These networks gained in popularity during the Weimar period, being a diverse phenomenon often reflecting internal and political rivalries. Far from being anti-intellectual, it spawned a considerable philosophical discourse that ascribed deep metaphysical significance to the human body.[609] Indeed, Karl Toepfer suggests that "*Nacktkultur* consistently presented itself as a sign of modernity and an aspect of modernism rather than as a reaction against both."[610] Therefore, within this context, Kirchner and his fellow *Die Brücke* artists expressed not only an aspect of German modernity but their own brand of modernism through depictions of the naked body.

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[606] Wahr, K., "Nacktheit und Sittlichkeit," in: *Deutsch-Hellas erste ill. Reform-Zeitschr. zur Gesundung d. gesamten nationalen Lebens; zugl. Organ d. Buttenstedt'schen Empfingunsphilosophie* Vol. 2 (1907), no. 6. Vol.2, p.6.
[607] Pudor, Heinrich : Die Probleme des Lebens und der Zeugungi n: Pudor, H., *Nackt-Kultur Bdchen. 3* (Berlin-Steglitz: Pudor, 1907). Die Nackt-Kultur v. 3, p.13.
[608] "Membership in the more than two hundred German nudist clubs seems to have appealed equally to men and women. The documentation and imagery of *Freikörperkultur* nudity was prodigious, perhaps because human nudity had such a complicated impact on perception that it was impossible to have enough documentation or 'explanation' of it." Toepfer. p.30.
[609] Ibid., p.31.
[610] Ibid., p.31.

The individual models, who posed naked for Kirchner and his fellow artists, may be regarded as indirect objectifications of the will, or the thing-in-itself. Therefore, standing between particular things such as nudes and the will:

> …the Idea still stands as the only direct objectivity of the will, since it has not assumed any other form peculiar to knowledge as such, except that of the representation in general, i.e., that of being object for a subject. Therefore, it alone is the most adequate objectivity possible of the will or of the thing-in-itself; indeed, it is even the whole thing-in-itself, only under the form of the representation.[611]

If particular nudes in Kirchner's art can be theorised as Ideas, then they were 'the most adequate objectivity possible of the will'. In addition, since these Ideas were a form of representational knowledge, and 'the whole thing-in-itself only under the form of the representation', as Ideas they refute C1 given their overt absence of will. Thus, when we interpret this possibility through Schopenhauer's theory, that which Kirchner theoretically apprehended in a particular naked body was an attempt by nature to aspire to a perfection of the universal Idea 'as the only direct objectivity of the will'. Yet, for knowledge of a universal Idea to occur through contemplation of the naked body, it is necessary that a change takes place in the viewing subject (the viewer of the nude, whether artist or others).

3.5 Aesthetic Contemplation of the Nude

With regards to the above assertion, and according to Schopenhauer, "such a change is analogous and corresponds to that great change of the whole nature of the object, and by virtue of it the subject, in so far as it knows an Idea, is no longer individual."[612] Since knowledge is ordinarily in the service of the will, and all knowledge governed by the principle of sufficient reason remains locked in servitude to the will, an artist must apprehend the Idea of the nude according to a different kind of knowledge. The issue

[611] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.175.
[612] Ibid., p.176.

becomes problematic when considering what value Kirchner's nude images, or any other art, would possess if it only served as knowledge for the will of the artist or viewer.

If we apply this problem to Kirchner's *Two Nudes in a Landscape* of c.1908-10 (fig. 61), then how viewers gaze at the nudes involved may be limited to distracting thoughts ranging from the sexual to the facture of the work. Therefore, a viewer's quality of mind is measured by how they look at the external world, how deeply or superficially. Indeed, this belief led Schopenhauer to adduce that "the ordinary European's gaze is often almost like the animal's, and he would never suspect the invisible in the visible, if he were not told about it by others." [613]

When looking at paintings such as Kirchner's *Nude before Green Sofa* of 1908 (fig. 62), then how can we make the appropriate transitional change and begin to 'suspect the invisible in the visible'? Schopenhauer's answer is that:

> …the transition that is possible but to be regarded only as an exception, from the common knowledge of particular things to knowledge of the Idea takes place suddenly since knowledge tears itself free from the service of the will precisely by the subject's ceasing to be merely individual and being now a pure will-less subject of knowledge.

In theory, such a transition made by the subject of knowledge (*Subjekt des Erkennens*) [614] could begin with aesthetic contemplation of a nude. During contemplation, the subject (the artist or viewer) ceases to follow relationships according to the principle of sufficient

[613] Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.1, p.4.

[614] Janaway notes that: "Payne renders *Subjekt des Erkennens* as 'subject of knowledge'. Schopenhauer also calls the subject of cognition 'the representing I' (*das vorstellende Ich*); Payne translates this phrase as 'the ego that represents' (*FR* 208/H. 1, 141), marking a contrast to the represented I or the I as object. In general, Schopenhauer restricts the use of the term 'I' to the intellectualist function of self." See: Janaway and Online Cambridge Collections. p.41. Schopenhauer himself states that: "From what has been said, the subject of knowing can never be known or become object or representation." See: Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* [in English; German (translation)]. La Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1974. p.210. On Schopenhauer's declaration that 'The world is my representation', Janaway argues that "it is nothing but the totality of representations that appear to the subject. But the 'subject of knowledge' to which the world as representation appears is merely an 'indivisible point'. It cannot be encountered in experience, just as the eye 'sees everything except itself'. Nevertheless, it is a 'centre of all existence' and determines the limits of the world. For the world is my representation, and the Idea of a world without a representing subject is a contradiction in terms." See: *The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer*. p.445.

reason and instead becomes fully absorbed with the contemplated object.[615] By ceasing to follow the forms of the principle of sufficient reason, which are in servitude to the will, the artist or viewers of a painted nude, or any other beautiful object in nature, theoretically do not let abstract thoughts distract them from the contemplated object. In doing so they become completely absorbed in perception, filling their consciousness with calm contemplation of the object. Thus, theoretically, the viewing subjects lose themselves in the contemplated object forgetting their individuality and the demands of their will. As a result, they:

> …continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object, so that it is as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one, since the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by a single image of perception.[616]

Therefore, the nude in Kirchner's above-mentioned work as an object has stepped out of all relation to that which is external to it, and the viewing subject in turn has stepped out of relations to their will. The effect upon the artist and viewer in theory repudiates C1, since the viewer and artist, by engaging in aesthetic contemplation cease to be purely individual. This means that, having lost themselves in aesthetic contemplation they become a "*pure* will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge."[617] Through this form of contemplation, particular naked bodies as objects have as a consequence become the Idea of their species, just as the perceiving individual in turn develops into the *pure subject of knowing.*[618]

What this means is that individuals, not engaging in aesthetic contemplation, know only particular things, whereas the pure subject of knowledge, through aesthetic

[615] Schopenhauer states that "…as regards the *objective* element of such aesthetic intuitive perception, the (Platonic) *Idea*, this may be described as that which we should have before us if time, this formal and subjective condition of our knowledge, were withdrawn, like the glass from the kaleidoscope." Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.420.
[616] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.178.
[617] Ibid., p.179.
[618] Ibid.

contemplation, rises into knowledge of the eternal Ideas. The individual as a phenomenon of the will is bound to the principle of sufficient reason, "therefore all knowledge which relates itself to this, also follows the principle of sufficient reason, and no other knowledge than this is fit to be of any use to the will; it always has relations to the object."[619]

If all this is possible, then in order to make such an epistemic transition to the Platonic Ideas, through contemplating *Two Reclining Nudes* of 1909 (fig. 63) for example, the specific process required of Kirchner and his viewers of it would be as follows:

> First of all, a knowing individual raises himself in the manner described to the pure subject of knowing, and at the same time raises the contemplated object to the Idea; the *world as representation* then stands out whole and pure, and the complete objectification of the will takes place, for only the Idea is the *adequate objectivity* of the will.[620]

The viewer can only obtain true knowledge of the world as representation when subject and object penetrate each other completely. That is to say, when the Idea becomes 'visible' neither the subject nor the object can be discerned in it, since the Idea as the most adequate objectification of the will, the actual world as representation, emerges only when "subject and object reciprocally fill and penetrate each other completely."[621]

If Kirchner wished to portray and experience a nude in a state of objective aesthetic contemplation, then we may ask what the purpose of this state might be according to Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's answer is that the purpose behind aesthetic contemplation is to silence the will and, for a while at least, to enter into a better consciousness.[622] An individual would want this silence because all willing implies deficiency (*Bedürfnis*) or

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[619] Ibid.

[620] Ibid. Since the 'world as representation stands out whole and pure', unadulterated by the will, this process appears to refute C1.

[621] Ibid., p.180.

[622] Janaway illustrates this as follows: "What is the 'better consciousness' better than? It is better than empirical, spatio-temporal consciousness, to which it is fundamentally opposed. The world of empirical consciousness is associated with 'a wrong direction from which virtue and asceticism are the return journey,' which is why Plato 'calls the entire life of the sage a long dying, i.e. a breaking away from such a world.' This better consciousness is a super-sensuous and extra-temporal consciousness (pp. 43-44), which has moral or religious significance, but it is also aroused when something affects us aesthetically, and in art it expresses itself as genius. Art, whether in a still life painting or in a tragedy, enables the better consciousness, and does so by revealing some "Platonic Idea" (p. 43). The better consciousness is connected 'indissolubly' with Ideas (p. 83)." See: Janaway *Knowledge and Tranquility: Schopenhauer on the Value of Art*, in: Jacquette, *Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts*. p.40-41. See also: Vandenabeele, Bart. *A Companion to Schopenhauer* [in English]. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. p.72.

lack, which is only brought to an end by satisfactions which are temporary. Therefore, an achieved object of willing cannot satisfy for long, since it merely postpones distress until another day.[623]

If an external or internal cause takes an individual out of this vicious circle of willing then it "snatches knowledge from the thraldom of the will."[624] Thus, when freed from the subjection to the will we are able to perceive objects such as nudes with a degree of objectivity - as pure representations. This process runs contrary to treating things as interesting objects which engage us with a greater degree of subjectivity. Consequently, according to Schopenhauer, through this process we find peace and "we celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still."[625] As a result, this process in theory leads to knowledge of the Idea when individuals are able to forget themselves and their will. In which case the experience of the Ideas effectively undermines C1, since the world as representation stands out clearly and alone.

This experience occurs via a thorough absorption with a beautiful object of contemplation whilst in a state of perception which purportedly stands outside of spatio-temporal relations. However, this experience pertains only to those whose 'inward disposition' has a greater degree of knowing compared to willing.[626] That Kirchner possessed such a disposition may be gathered from a letter to Grisebach of 1918, in which he comments how "as a boy I lived in aesthetic contemplation (*Anschauung*) and drew what was visible…"[627] He continued to develop an ability for aesthetic contemplation throughout his career, assimilating creative influences along the way as in *Nude Group II* of 1907 (fig. 64), which was displayed in the September 1908 *Brücke* exhibition.[26] This

[623] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.196.
[624] Ibid.
[625] Ibid.
[626] Ibid., p.197.
[627] Kirchner to Dr. Eberhard Grisebach, 28.01.918. Original document in a private collection. Manuscript letter in another hand, 4 pages. Fragment without an ending or signature. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p.240-242.

was his first representation of multiple figures to issue from the imagination as opposed to perceptual reality.[628] By early 1909, his assimilation of Fauvism had developed further through his visits to other exhibitions. The influence of these would last for many years, the most lasting arising from the January Matisse exhibition at Paul Cassirer's Berlin Gallery with its "fine drawings of nudes."[629]

3.6 The Influences of Matisse, Munch and the Beautiful

Among the exhibits in Berlin were Matisse's *Reclining Nude I (Aurora)* a bronze sculpture of 1907 (fig. 65), and his painting *Blue Nude* of 1907 (fig. 66). However, in a letter to Frédéric Bauer of 1934, Kirchner denied any such influence on the grounds that, "as Matisse was completely unknown in Germany in 1904-06, there can be no thought of his influence, just as little as with Munch."[630] Furthermore, in a 1919 letter to Helene Spengler from Frauenkirch, Kirchner objected to being described as a 'pupil' of Matisse.[631] Kirchner added that he would have liked to hang his early work next to some of Matisse's, just to see how people reached this odd conclusion.[632] Yet, Gordon argues that:

> Matisse's Fauve style was requisite to Kirchner's, in sum, but from its first maturity in early 1909 Kirchner's Fauve style was clearly the more radical in distortion. Kirchner's fascination with Matisse's anatomical distortions of the female figure was to endure for a considerable period after his original contact with the French sources.[633]

[628] Gordon and Kirchner. p.53.
[629] Anonymous, "Von Ausstellungen-Berlin," *Die Kunst für Alle*, 11 (published February 11), 1909, 272. The Matisse exhibition was apparently installed before Christmas, 1908; cf. Barr, 1951, os108.
[630] Kirchner to Frédéric Bauer, dated 23.02.1934. Original in Kirchner Museum, Davos. Manuscript letter, 4 pages. Published in: Kirchner, E. L., Bauer, F., and Delfs, H., *Kirchner und Dr. Bauer: Briefe von Ernst Ludwig Kirchner an Dr. Frédéric Bauer; mit einer Dokumentation der Sammlung Bauer* (Davos2004). Kirchner, EL, Briefe an Dr. Frédéric Bauer, Magazin V, 2004, no. 78. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.3, p. 1770-1771.
[631] It is not known which criticism he is referring to.
[632] Kirchner to Helene Spengler, 04.03.1919. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 2 sides. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol 1, p. 353-354.
[633] Gordon. p.348.

Kirchner's denial of Matisse's influence on his own work appears ten years later in a letter to Spengler of 1919 when he wrote that, "Today I received some Matisse reproductions. What they are supposed to have in common with my works is quite unclear to me."[634] Despite Kirchner's protestations of 1919, Gordon does not take the artist at his word and has related the upper body as found in Kirchner's woodcut *Nude Girl Reclining* of 1910, to the Matisse sculpture *Reclining Nude I*, and suggests that similar features have been appropriated from Matisse's painting *Blue Nude* and then translated into Kirchner's woodcut *Recumbent Nude Woman* of 1910 (fig. 67). Gordon feels convinced that "the crossed legs, spread buttocks and strongly arched spinal column of the *Recumbent Nude Woman* may be seen to derive ultimately from another Matisse source, the *Seated Nude* woodcut of early 1906."[635] He also suggests that *Girl under Japanese Umbrell*a of 1909 (fig. 68) parallels Matisse's *Woman with Hat* and *Portrait of a Woman with a Green Stripe* of late 1905 (fig.69 & fig. 70) seen by Kirchner in the January,1909 exhibition at Cassirer's.[636]

Despite Gordon's reading, in a letter to Schiefler of 1919 Kirchner protested against Paul Ferdinand Schmidt's criticism of his works when shown in Frankfurt's Gallery Ludwig Schames.[637] He wrote, "My works are once again suffering strong hostility, and I am charged with early imitation of Nolde, Matisse, Munch etc, when I didn't even know their names at that time."[638] Although Kirchner denied Munch's

[634] Kirchner to Helene Spengler 16.03.1919. Original in private collection, manuscript letter, 3 sides. See also; Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p. 356-357. The influence of Matisse on Kirchner's Dresden works is verifiable, as Gordon suggests, but Kirchner's discussion with Spengler was ended by the criticism of the Frankfurt exhibition, which contained primarily works from Berlin, Fehmarn, Jena and Konigstein, in which the connection with Matisse is hard to prove.
[635] Gordon. p.348.
[636] Ibid., p.349.
[637] Kirchner had four exhibitions at the Gallery Ludwig Schames: October 1916, February-March 1919 (graphic works), January-February 1920 (paintings), 22 January-28 February 1922 (paintings and works on paper).
[638] Kirchner to Gustav Schiefler, 31.03.1919. Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 2 sides. Published in: Kirchner, Schiefler, and Henze; ibid. Stuttgart 1990, no.106. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol.1, p. 362 for how Kirchner kept abreast of contemporary art criticism, and had was always well-informed about the artistic currents of his time. In a postcard to Max Pechstein and Erich Heckel, dated 12.01.1909, the content proves that he had seen works by Matisse early in 1909 at Cassirer's Gallery in Berlin See: Original postcard in

northern influence and that of Matisse, his *Four Bathers* of 1909 (fig. 71), certainly imitated the *plein-air* practice of the Impressionists during his first summer trip to the lakes of Moritzburg. On this occasion, he was accompanied by Heckel, plus selected female models including the child models Fränzi and Marzella.[639] When the females went about naked, Kirchner painted the beauty of his models with extempore rapidity, as is the case with *Girls Bathing, Lake Moritzburg* of 1909 and *Reclining Blue Nude with Straw Hat* (figs. 72 and 73) of the same year. [640] However, this raises a problem, since how are we to know that certain naked human forms and not others are standard bearers of the beautiful and fit for aesthetic contemplation – at least according to Schopenhauer?

Schopenhauer's solution is that "human beauty is an objective expression that denotes the will's most complete objectification at the highest grade at which this is knowable, namely the Idea of man in general, completely and fully expressed in the perceived form."[641] In art, Schopenhauer says, this is not to be obtained simply by imitating nature because nature has never produced anything completely beautiful. Nor is it achieved by gathering together individual aspects of the beautiful from several different human beings and creating an idealised whole from them. In fact, knowledge of beauty is not gained *a posteriori* but *a priori* in such a way as to demarcate it from the principle of sufficient reason. The kind of *a priori* knowledge which presents to us the beautiful is, he says, the *what* of appearances as opposed to the *how* of appearance because the *how* of appearance can only be explained by the principle of sufficient reason. [642]

On being presented with the beautiful, Schopenhauer believes that we are all able to recognise it when we see it because we are all manifestations of the same will. However,

Altonauer Museum in Hamburg. Published in: Dube-Heynig, Annemarie, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Postkarten an Erich Heckel, Cologne 1984, No. 1. Postmarked Berlin 12.01.09. Sketch of Soldier and Coquette, pencil and coloured chalks.
[639] Lina Franziska Fehrmann (1900-1950) and Albertine Olga Sprentzel (1895-1977).
[640] Gordon and Kirchner. p.64.
[641] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.221.
[642] Ibid., p.222.

it is the artist (particularly the genius) who is especially suited to anticipate nature and therefore recognise the Idea of beauty within individual things. This is because the artist more than most people, "understands nature's half-spoken words. He expresses clearly what she namely stammers"[643] and is able to complete for nature what she was unable to fulfil herself.

Historically speaking Schopenhauer says, it was the Greek artistic genius who anticipated and discovered the ideal human form, thereby establishing it as the "canon for the school of sculpture."[644] Consequently, the anticipation of the Greek artist, like the modern artist, refers to an Ideal. This means that: "The possibility of such anticipation of the beautiful *a priori* in the artist, as well as of its recognition *a posteriori* by the connoisseur, is to be found in the fact that artist and connoisseur are themselves the 'in-itself' of nature, the will objectifying itself."[645] For Schopenhauer, such anticipation presupposes a particular inner disposition within an artist which can absorb the Idea and then 'reproduce' it in art. Therefore, his opinion was that much is attained through the inner force of an artist's disposition and objects of natural beauty which inspire contemplation.[646]

When Schopenhauer refers to this inner force of artistic disposition he is referring to an objective state of mind, a will-less calm. According to him, objects of beauty should deliver us from every arousal of the will into a state of pure knowledge. At that point, shorn of the will, having offered ourselves up to pure will-free knowing, we step into a new world where all that compels our will and all that forcefully troubles us ceases to exist.[647] And so it is that, in theory at least, a state of pure will-free knowing attained

[643] Ibid. As a typical German *savant* of his time Schopenhauer is not inclined to mention female painters or use the feminine in relation to artists as a whole.
[644] Ibid.
[645] Ibid.
[646] Ibid., p.197.
[647] Ibid., p.197.

through a Kirchner nude, or any other beautiful object, could eliminate C1 through will-lessness and the predominance of representation.

In spite of this, Schopenhauer's promotion of 'pure will-less knowing' has been described as one devoid of a love for beauty.[648] As Philip Nicholas Pothen argues:

> There is little love of beauty, nor indeed, longing for life in Schopenhauer's metaphysic…By making the artwork a mere vehicle for Platonic Ideas it becomes divested of its materiality, of a particularity that might ground our appreciation of it in a joy more closely associable with other joys of a more everyday kind.[649]

Should Pothen also be correct in assuming that Schopenhauer's contemplation of the beautiful is one of "disembodied joy,"[650] then, as we shall note later on, it raises the possibility that unlike Kirchner, Schopenhauer was a despiser of the body. Indeed, in his address to such 'despisers of the body' Nietzsche states that:

> The creative self-created respect and disrespect for itself, it created pleasure and pain for itself. The creative body created spirit for itself as the hand of its will. Even in your folly and your contempt, you despisers of the body, you serve your self. I say to you: your self itself wants to die and turns away from life.[651]

Nietzsche clearly repudiated the exaltation of abstractions through aesthetic contemplation at the expense of the body beautiful.[652] In *The Genealogy of Morals* his belief was that "…contemplation first appeared in the world in disguise, with an ambiguous appearance, an evil heart and often with an anxiety-filled head."[653] For him, art should seduce us through the contemplation of *pleasure* itself so as to empower

[648] Pothen's opinion perhaps misses the point and has allowed Schopenhauer's pessimistic world-view to colour his thinking, since Schopenhauer did appreciate beauty on many different levels. In fact, Schopenhauer's mother Johanna, would write to her son convinced that, "…I have a feeling for beauty, and I am pleased that you perhaps inherited this from me…" (The original text of the letter from Johanna to Arthur of 4.08.1803, is taken from Schopenhauer, A. et al., *Die Schopenhauers : der Familienbriefwechsel von Adele, Arthur, Heinrich Floris und Johanna Schopenhauer* (Zürich: Haffmans, 1991)., p. 57. It is translated in: Cartwright.,p.51). Johanna also remarked upon Arthur's ability to overcome his aversion to boarding school in London by contemplating beautiful things. We also know that Schopenhauer appreciated the beauty of Berlin and Dresden's architecture. Indeed, we must acknowledge too his deep appreciation of music, his playing of the flute and the fact that a substantial feature of his major work reflects his 'love' of aesthetics as a whole.
[649] Pothen, P., *Nietzsche and the Fate of Art* (Ashgate, 2002). p.159.
[650] Ibid., p.159.
[651] Nietzsche, Caro, and Pippin. p.24.
[652] Nietzsche, F., Clark, M., and Leiter, B., *Nietzsche: Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality* (Cambridge University Press, 1997). p.43.
[653] Nietzsche, F. W. and Samuel, H. B., *The Genealogy of Morals* (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2003). p.139-40.

procreation, thus perpetuating our existence both as individuals and as a species. This entails an embodied process of reciprocity between artist and viewer, an act of *Kunsttrieb*[654] which stands in opposition to the morality of self-abnegation and disinterested contemplation. Consequently, for Nietzsche it typified "the seductive guise under which the castration of art is presently trying to create a good conscience for itself."[655]

The notion of art 'trying to create a good conscience for itself' is present in Kirchner's development of the nude and in his self-assessment as an artist. In a letter to Spengler of 1919, in an attempt to clear his conscience, Kirchner said: "I forgot to show you the photos of the Matisses today. Here they are with some pictures of mine. It is unclear to me what they are supposed to have in common. I have never painted in such a sweet and soft way."[656] Yet, *Bathing Nudes in a Room* of 1909 (fig. 74) has been praised by Gordon as being situated alongside the most accomplished formal compositions of 20th century German art, showing how his progress during 1909 matched Matisse's own progress during the years 1905-1907.[657]

In another letter to Will Grohmann of 1925, he mentions that he had laid out some coloured prints of his red nudes next to some by Pablo Picasso, Georges Braque, and Matisse in order to demonstrate the distinctiveness and strength of German modernism in relation to that of the French.[658] Kirchner argued that their prints appeared weak when set

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[654] *Kunsttrieb* in Nietzsche takes on various meanings such as artistic drive. For a detailed explanation see: Brown, K. and Golden, K. B., *Nietzsche and Embodiment: Discerning Bodies and Non-dualism* (State University of New York Press, 2006).p.100. Also Moore, G., *Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).p.94-5. The term is used by Schopenhauer in chapter 27 of the World as Will and Representation '*Vom Instinkt und Kunsttrieb'* ('On Instinct and Mechanical Tendency'). See: Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.342.

[655] Nietzsche, F. W., Norman, J., and Horstmann, R.-P., *Nietzsche, Norman, and Horstmann, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). p.33.

[656] Kirchner to Spengler, 19.03.1919. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 2 pages. Extracts published in: Grisebach.p.104. Kirchner enclosed four photographs of Matisse's works and four photos of his works. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol 1, p. 357.

[657] Gordon and Kirchner. p.65.

[658] Ibid., p.65. Grohmann was an art historian, and writer, his works included monographs on Max Ackermann, Willi Baumeister, Wassily Kandinsky, Kirchner, Paul Klee, and Henry Moore.

against his and that it was the first opportunity he had found for years to compare them. He was firmly convinced that he was not vain enough to deceive himself. His work, he thought, was something new and powerful, while the artists he had compared himself with appeared academic and quite unoriginal.[659]

Although Kirchner's visual language from 1909 to 1911 was Fauvist, Gordon argues that, of his works shown in Dresden during September 1910, the *Marzella* in Stockholm (fig. 75) seems to be derived from Munch's image *Puberty* (fig. 76). His argument is that "what is surprising in the Kirchner painting is the marriage of the Munch subject matter with the colorful and two-dimensional forms of the Fauve painting style."[660] Yet Kirchner's work can be contrasted with Munch's in the final analysis since the naturally folded limbs of the former's imagery "bespeak a cheerful casualness utterly distant from the Norwegian's symbolic conception."[661]

Kirchner was at pains to deny any links to Munch, as is seen in a letter to Grohmann of 1924. In it Kirchner expresses his gratitude for Grohmann's criticism of the October 1924 Munch exhibition held at the Galerie Arnold. Although Kirchner felt that the criticism was valuable, he said that "… I always remained opposed to such a hysterical weakling as Munch, I was always very cool and without sympathy." He added that:

> … I recently saw (the monograph on Pechstein in the Biermann series), in which the fellow dishes up the greatest lies about my time in Dresden. That is where the mistake about Munch comes from, as it was not I, but he, who admired him - I still didn't know Munch at all at that point…I have many enemies who denigrate the power of my work and only a few true friends.[662]

[659] Will Grohmann to Kirchner 02.07.1925. Original in Grohmann Archive of the Staatsgalerie Stuttgart. Manuscript letter, 3 pages.See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld.
[660] Gordon. p.353.
[661] Ibid., p.353.
[662] Kirchner to Grohmann, 28.11.1924. Original in Grohmann Archive in Staatsgalerie Stuttgart. Manuscript letter, 7 pages. By the Biermann series, Kirchner refers to the 'Serie über junge Kunst im Verlag Biermann und Klinkhardt' which is unknown. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 2, p. 810-813.

It was only Schiefler, the Munch collector who had collected his work since 1907-08, Kirchner believed, who had said that Kirchner's work was something different and new.

3.7 The 'Primitive', the Artist as 'Genius', and problems with the Platonic Idea

Whether we believe Kirchner's petitions concerning himself and Munch or not, we do know that by the latter part of 1911 Kirchner's proclivity towards Fauvism had been transformed when he and other members of *Die Brücke* encountered the 'primitive' art on display at the Dresden Ethnographical Museum. Although *Die Brücke* artists as a whole denied that 'primitive' artefacts had influenced their work, Gordon discerns an unmediated effect of 'primitive' sources on Kirchner's style.[663] Indeed, Kirchner himself acknowledges his encounter with the 'primitive' in a letter of 1910, commenting on a day trip to the Ethnographical Museum, where he saw artefacts from the Pueblos in Mexico and some Negro sculptures.[664]

In fact, Kirchner made an ink drawing which reproduced the bulbous abstractions of a Cameroon sculptured nude (fig. 77) and a drawing called *Bather in Studio* of 1910 (fig. 78), which Gordon describes as "…all but transformed into an African sculpture in a drawing whose taut angular and geometric shapes characterize Kirchner's drawing style in 1910 and early 1911."[665] That there was an African influence on his depictions of nudes Kirchner did not deny, as we hear in a letter to Graef of 1916. In it Kirchner explicitly mentions his visit to Dresden where he saw works by the Palau people, Negro sculptures, and ornamented feather coats which he believed paralleled his own works.[666]

[663] Gordon and Kirchner. p.21.
[664] Kirchner to Heckel 31.03.1910. Original in Altanauer Museum in Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 4 sides. Published in: *Kirchner, E. L. et al., Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, Postkarten und Briefe an Erich Heckel im Altonaer Museum in Hamburg (Köln: DuMont, 1984).* Postcard to Erich Heckel, Cologne 1984, nr. 30.
[665] Gordon and Kirchner. p.21. *
[666] Kirchner to Botho Graef, 21.07.1916. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: Grisebach. p.53. Kirchner may have been answering a request from Graef for his biography. Kirchner was planning a book to contain essays on him by Graef and Schiefler.

What can be read out of Kirchner's interest in southern peoples and distant lands is perhaps "a critique of northern rationality" as contrasted with "southern imagery, which provokes the collapse of the rational self."[667] That is to say, "this collapse of self engenders more primal modes of feeling and perception" leading "to a reconstruction of an aesthetic perspective, also expressed through the projection of southern exotic imagery."[668] As Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei argues, from a philosophical position both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche impacted upon modernist artists "in their search for alternatives to the fragmentation, aesthetic impoverishment, and alienation of modern culture."[669] On this basis, we may suggest that *Die Brücke*'s turn towards the inner life of the individual did not necessarily offer peace via aesthetic contemplation of beautiful 'primitivised' bodies, but rather the means to approach more profound origins of vitality restrained by modern European culture.[670] As Gosetti-Ferencei reveals:

> Schopenhauer insisted on the essential animality of the human self: self-consciousness is conditioned '*durch das Gehirn und seine Funktion*' ('through the brain and its function'); and he proposed, against Kant, a zoological account of the intellect as arising '*aus dem Organismus*' ('from the organism').[671]

This 'zoological account' of the human organism implies a more primal, more organic root to human self-consciousness, the consideration of which was being overridden by Europe's rapid industrialisation. Therefore, Kirchner's nudes may indicate a modernist yearning to reconnect with a pre-industrialised state of being. This suggests that he, as a European, could not look to his familiar modern environment for a more primordial experience, compared to that which might be aroused by "imagining other, exotic realms within the psychic interior, which take on more significance in the fragmentation of the

[667] Gosetti-Ferencei, J. A., *Exotic Spaces in German Modernism* (OUP Oxford, 2011). p.181.
[668] Ibid., p.181.
[669] Ibid., p.168.
[670] Ibid.
[671] Ibid.

rational self."[672] That is to say, through nudes such as his *African Sculpture* ink drawing of 1910 (fig. 79), Kirchner maps onto this 'primitive' body what he imagines to be the psychic landscape of those more in tune with the natural world. This nude and arguably his nudes in general, becomes a cipher, a passport into a 'pre-rational', comparatively inchoate world of 'original experience' unmediated by Western technology.[673] Indeed, Lloyd has posited a link between the 'primitive' and the 'more original' experience of childhood through the iconography of child models Marzella and Fränzi. This notion may be seen in Kirchner's *Fränzi at Breakfast* of 1910 (fig. 80), which juxtaposes her naked body against a sculptured tribal image.

At a philosophical level, the concept of a 'more original' experience may be associated with Schopenhauer's treatment of the artistic genius, who is able to unify and repeat their original experience through art. In fact, Schopenhauer states that it is only the artistic 'genius' who is able to apprehend the Platonic Ideas. A 'genius' is able to remain in pure perception by forgetting himself and removing knowledge from servitude to the will, thus becoming "a pure knowing subject, the clear eye of the world."[674] Through an overabundance of knowledge, the 'genius' repeats that which he has apprehended during creative activity - having been purified of the clamouring will. It is the 'genius' therefore, who is able to repeat "the inner nature of the world"[675] in his art, and who would be able to negate C1 through will-less contemplation.

Kirchner too had something to say on the nature of genius. In 1929, he wrote to Elfriede and Hansgeorg Knoblauch and suggested that in 1912, it was said that the genius could be a swine as a person and yet a great artist. By contrast, in 1929 it was commonly

[672] Ibid., p.171.
[673] The notion of journeying into exotic psychic landscapes, (as in Gosetti-Ferencei's concept of 'psychic topgraphies'), through art could of course be viewed as a form of existential tourism to the 'other side'; a form of aesthetic escapism from modernity and a narcotic for the soul.
[674] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.186.
[675] Ibid.

held, or so he believed, that only a pure person could be a true artist, that is to say artistic development was closely linked to personal development as a human being. He said that "I have been fighting since 1900 for this viewpoint (*Auffassung*) and for that reason almost fell out with my friend Gräf. In place of '*mens sana in corpore sano*' we have the saying today: true person, true art."[676]

For Schopenhauer, a 'genius' is not necessarily a morally 'true person' but merely one who is able to transcend their will.[677] His concept of 'genius' concerns an individual who apprehends the Idea which is absolutely perceptible, representing a myriad of individual things and is quite definite. Unknown to ordinary individuals, and only known to those, who in their 'genius', have raised themselves above their individuality and willing to become a pure subject of knowing. Only attainable by the 'genius' the Idea is communicated with conditions, since the Idea received and reiterated in the artwork attracts people according to their intellectual worth.[678] In contrast to the Idea, a concept appeals because it is pragmatic, serviceable in daily life and easily accessible. The Idea is the true cradle of all genuine art. Through its commanding originality the Idea is extracted from life and the natural world. It is extracted only by an authentic 'genius' or he who fleetingly accesses true genius under inspiration.[679]

The 'genius' apprehends the Platonic Idea by freeing knowledge from the service to the will, not through learning which merely develops concepts, but through intuitive

[676] Kirchner to Elfriede and Hansgeorg Knoblauch, 30.07.1929. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 7 sides. Published in Kirchner, E. L., Dümmler, E., and Knoblauch, H., *Ernst Ludwig Kirchner: Briefwechsel mit einem jungen Ehepaar, 1927-1937, Elfriede Dümmler und Hansgeorg Knoblauch* (Bern: Verlag Kornfeld, 1989). p.87. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 2, p. 1345-1346. Gräf was an art collector in Wiesbaden. Elfriede Knoblauch was a friend and correspondent of Kirchner as was her architect husband Hansgeorg.
[677] The relationship between 'genius' and morality is complex and shall not detain us here. However, Arati Barua is right to point out that what the aesthetic 'genius' and the saint share in common is a vanishing sense of individuality. Yet for the aesthetic 'genius,' the loss of that sense is temporary, whereas for the saint the resignation from individuality and egotism is lasting. See: Barua, A., *Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue Between India and Germany* (Northern Book Centre, 2008). p.142. See also Lucian Krukowski 'Schopenhauer and the aesthetics of creativity' in:Jacquette, *Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts*. p.79, fn.7.
[678] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.234.
[679] Ibid., p.235.

power.[680] Because the 'genius' possesses greater knowledge than is needed for meeting the everyday demands of the will, what remains after servicing their will allows them to perceive the world in a purified way. Therefore, not only does this purified perception negate C1, but it also reveals how the Ideas were obtained in which an aesthetic pleasure consists. This is due not only to the artwork portraying things with greater clarity through accentuating the most essential compared to the least essential, but just as equally to the "fact that the absolute silence of the will, required for the purely objective apprehension of the true nature of things, is attained with the greatest certainty."[681]

Among his works, perhaps Kirchner's *Bathers on the Stones* (*Fehmarn*) of 1912 (fig. 81) does emphasise the essential by eliminating the inessential through the confident singularity of his draughtsmanship which favours a simple curvilinear line. The same economy of line is achieved in *Man and Woman* (*Sitting in a Meadow*) of 1909 (fig. 82), which is illuminated by contrasting yellows and blues. Interpreted through Schopenhauer, we may argue that both of these images stand for the 'objective apprehension of the true nature of things' and have been attained with the greatest certainty.

Assuming there is a 'true nature of things' Gordon claims that, "though completely committed to self-expression, Kirchner would never completely reject either the world of nature or the possibility that his art might communicate from self to other."[682] However, if Kirchner's art leads an individual to obtain pleasure through will-less contemplation of a nude, then there is a tension to note, since such a communication does not necessarily produce knowledge of the Platonic Ideas. In fact, it may be argued that will-less contemplative peace does not necessarily equate to knowledge of any type, let alone Platonic knowledge. That said, if will-less knowledge of a Platonic Idea can

[680] Ibid., p.321. Upon the condition of freeing knowledge from the service of the will, the genius is able to contradict C1.
[681] *The World as Will and Representation*. p.370.
[682] Gordon and Kirchner. p.78.

be achieved by the 'genius' and repeated in art, then it would be sufficient to nullify the assertion of C1, despite the epistemic hollowness of aesthetic contemplation.[683]

Should we hypothesise that Kirchner was a 'genius', and humour Schopenhauer that will-less peace leaves the genius as a pure subject of knowing, then we learn that not only has the will vanished from consciousness through a silencing of the will, but that individuality vanishes along with its concomitant pains. Thus, Schopenhauer describes the 'genius', the pure subject of knowing, as "the eternal world-eye."[684] If the 'eternal world eye' is the creator of purely objective representations, then Schopenhauer says that:

> …only in the consciousness of this does the objective world have its existence. As such he is *all things,* in so far as he perceives them, and in him their existence is without burden and hardship. Thus, it is *his* existence in so far as it exists in *his* representation; but then it is without will. On the other hand, in so far as it is will, it is not in him.[685]

Schopenhauer attaches the label of genius to every genuine work of art and philosophy which represent the Platonic Ideas through pure perception. Because the Ideas are not abstractions, the proper nature of a 'genius' has to exist in the fullness of knowledge arising from perception.[686] Such fullness of knowledge from perception may be read out from Kirchner's *Bather with Hat* of 1913 (fig. 83). Here vigorous strokes of the crayon perhaps capture the universal Idea of the human body, while schematic colouring suggests an immediacy of perception. As a result, colouring has been simplified and applied briskly in a brief space of time.

According to Schopenhauer, the universal Ideas are of no interest to the vulgar and uncultured who, "have no thought or desire for universal truths, whereas the genius

[683] Although Schopenhauer suggests that an Idea yields the 'true essence' of an object, contemplation of an Idea does not yield the variegated knowledge which we can acquire through intuitively perceived objects born from the principle of sufficient reason and individuation. Therefore, as Jacquette argues an Idea remains "thin in terms of the knowledge it embodies" See: Jacquette, D., *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer* (Taylor & Francis, 2015). p.105.
[684] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.371.
[685] Ibid.
[686] Ibid., p.376.

overlooks and ignores what is individual."[687] On the other hand, Schopenhauer says 'genius' pertains to a universal objectivity of the mind, whereby the *world as representation* has achieved a greater degree of clarity through a concentrated grasp of the whole. [688] Therefore in theory, since the *world as representation* rather than the will has attained greater clarity through the creative genius, C1 can be refuted. Nevertheless, whilst the 'ordinary' individual and the 'genius' both see the naked body as an object *per se*, Schopenhauer observes a difference between the two, whereby the intuitive perceptions of real objects differ in the mind of a 'genius' compared to that of the 'ordinary' individual. In the latter case, they lack the same will-lessness of the 'genius', whereas in the 'genius' will and representation are more effectively separated, and consequently the representation becomes purer and more liberated from references to the will."[689]

If we accept that Kirchner was a 'genius' in Schopenhauer's understanding of the term, then we may assume that this 'genius' apprehended the universal Idea of the nude through disinterested contemplation. From one point of view, disinterestedness does not mean that the will is 'denied' in aesthetic contemplation – in which case C1 is not necessarily refutable. Phenomenologically, 'will-less' basically refers to a form of self-transcendence, which has nothing mystical about it. It means that our self-centred focus changes into a focus upon the object for its own sake.[690]

Another point of view might be to argue that Schopenhauer clearly distinguishes between the aesthetic contemplation of Ideas, which is strictly will-less, and the production of an artwork in terms of physical matter, where willing and embodiment are given. In *Parerga* he argues that:

[687] Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.4.
[688] Ibid., p.76.
[689] Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.3, p.24.
[690] I am grateful for Professor Bart Vandenabeeles' discussion and input on this area.

> …the original artistic cognizance is one that is entirely separate from, and independent of, the will, a will-free, will-less cognizance … On the other hand, with the *execution* of the work, where the purpose is to communicate and present what is known, the *will* can, indeed must, again be active, just because there exists a *purpose*. Accordingly, the principle of sufficient reason here rules once more…[691]

Unfortunately, he does not explain the transition between both states; how the Idea keeps its extraordinary significance while becoming an object like others. There must be a coincidence of will-lessness and will-fullness in Kirchner the artist which is inexplicable, and this is a reason why Schopenhauer's aesthetics as such is problematic contrary to his metaphysics which fits much better.[692]

It is also problematic to explain how the Ideas, born from will-less contemplation, can be practically linked to their artistic portrayals. It is both a problem and a paradox for us to understand how the artistic portrayal of a nude figure, as in Kirchner's *Reclining Nudes in a Meadow* of 1909-20 (fig. 84), could be interpreted in such a way as to ignore everyday perception. Indeed, it is not entirely clear how the Ideas are linked to everyday things, whether to nudes or not. As Patrick L. Gardiner states, "if there is no other, independent, method of pointing them out, the question of making a comparison between them and their artistic portrayals can hardly be said to arise."[693] Gardiner's instinct is that:

> …the uncomfortable feeling persists that his metaphysical conception of art as consisting in the apprehension of eternal unchanging Ideas is liable to lead in its turn to distortion, and that it may in the end be exposed to objections similar to those which can be brought against crude imitationist theories of the sort he attacks.[694]

Gardiner has a valid point here since Schopenhauer's notion of unchanging Ideas presupposes an 'Ideal form' which is 'fixed and unalterable'. Consequently, if we argue that Kirchner depicted the Ideas, which are 'fixed and unalterable' in his nudes, then this

[691] Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.418-19.
[692] I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Matthias Kossler for his assistance on this question.
[693] Gardiner, P., *Schopenhauer* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963). p.207.
[694] Ibid., p.210.

ironically presupposes that Kirchner was a mere *imitator* of that which is 'fixed and unalterable.' Therefore, the problem with Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Ideas *per se* is that they do not do justice to our modern day sensibilities of what counts for originality or expressive innovation. Gardiner corroborates this view and asks whether by "regarding the products of art as essentially renderings of fundamental forms or Ideas, he [Schopenhauer] himself over-emphasizes the purely reproductive side of artistic work, to the neglect of its complementary inventive aspect?"[695] However, it might be equally justifiable to conclude that Schopenhauer did allow for artists as special individuals, who could make that which is familiar seem new to our eyes through their creative originality.

Original creative imagination is not only an antidote to 'the purely reproductive side of artistic work' but it might also act as a bridge between will-lessness and will-fullness. Indeed, Kirchner comments upon creative imagination in a letter to Schiefler of 1923, where he described how he had learned to see the wonderful and the 'secretive', not in external phenomena, but in the simple appearance of everyday life, so that the objects on his sheets of paper were symbols of that 'secret'[696] He claimed that he felt strong enough to both find and communicate this 'secret' in the representation [*Vorstellung*] of form itself. He said that, "I have also given form to a great number and variety of naked people and [sketches] from imagination."[697] Here Kirchner was thinking of the woodcut cycles *Absalom* (fig. 85), Petrarch's *Triumph of Love* both of 1918 (fig. 86), *The Dance of the Man* of 1919 and *A Thousand and One Nights* of 1922 (fig.87).

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[695] Ibid., p.211.

[696] Kirchner to Gustav Schiefler on 06.12.1923. Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 19 pages. Published in: *Kirchner, Schiefler, and Henze.* No.229. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 654. Kirchner is referring to his hand-drawn sketches, especially his print works for Gustav Schiefler's catalogue raisonnée. He uses the term 'hieroglyph' in this letter which relates to the more simple form of visual language found to be found in his sketches and graphic art. The whole letter is in fact about the catalogue raisonnée of print works by Kirchner that Gustav Schiefler was currently working on. It was published in two volumes. See: *Die Graphik Ernst Ludwig Kirchners bis 1924 1, 1,* (Berlin-Charlottenburg: Euphorion Verl., 1926); Schiefler, G., *Die Graphik Ernst Ludwig Kirchners* (Berlin-Charlottenburg: Euphorion Verlag, 1931).

[697]Letter from Kirchner to Gustav Schiefler, Davos, 06.12.1923. Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 19 pages. Published in*:* Kirchner, Schiefler, and Henze.No.229..

Schopenhauer's philosophy of creative imagination extends the artist's horizon beyond their personal experience so as to perceive things in nature not as "actually formed, but what she endeavoured to form, yet did not bring about, because of the conflict of her forms with one another…"[698] As a result, imagination may be regarded as the 'companion' and 'condition' of genius, an organically alive faculty, and possibly a bridge between will-lessness and will-fullness. Yet, evidence for a strong imagination would not be evidence of 'genius' in Kirchner.

3.8 Kirchner's Imaginative Appropriation of Ajanta Cave Paintings and the Oriental

Although imagination can be used with pure objectivity for apprehending the Platonic Ideas, it can also be misused to build sand castles in the air through the work of self-indulgence or madness. Indeed, Kirchner's imagination was stimulated not only by the African nude, but also by Buddhist wall paintings of nudes (and clothed figures) as found in the Ajanta cave-temples of India dating to the 6th century A.D. These paintings are situated in the region of Aurangabad, Maharashtra in India and are inspired by the Hinayãna and Mahãyâna doctrines of Buddhism. They depict numerous jãtaka stories from one of the births of the Buddha[699] with a limited spectrum of colour. [700] These visualised stories were discovered by Kirchner during the autumn of 1910, when he visited the Central Art Library of the Dresden Museums and found an illustrated two-volume work by John Griffiths on the cave-temples.[701] Several years later in a letter to Nele van der Velde of 1919, he remarked how strong and fresh the originals were and that:

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[698] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.186.
[699] Pradhan, S., "Ajanta to Amaravati: A Comparative Study of Art," in: *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute* Vol. 68/69 (2008). p.417.
[700] Pradhan, S. A., "Painted Decorative Motifs in The Ajanta Caves," in: ibid. Vol. 56/57 (1996).p.134. On the rise of global modernism through Indian art see: Somathilake, M., "Analysis on Fresco and Tempera: An Analysis of the Technique of Murals in South Asia," in: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Sri Lanka* Vol. 53 (2007).
[701] Griffiths, J., *The Paintings in the Buddhist Cave-Temples of Ajanta, Khandesh, India* (London: W. Griggs, 1896).See also Yazdani, G., *Guide to Ajanta Frescoes* (Hyderabad, Deccan: H.E.H. the Nizam's Govt., Archaeological Dept., 1935).

> These works made me almost helpless with delight. This unheard-of unity of representation, this monumental tranquillity of form, I thought I never would achieve. All my endeavours seemed hollow and restless to me. I copied a lot from the pictures, only to gain my own style.[702]

Eleanor Moseman observes something of the impact of the Ajanta paintings in Kirchner's *Five Bathers at the Lake* of 1911 (fig. 88), in which he "translated the sensuous curvilinear forms of the fleshy Gupta figures by using bold blue to accentuate the rounded contour of the women's breasts, hips, and bellies."[703] In addition, Gordon believes that "Kirchner's references to 'unity of representation' and 'monumental tranquillity of form' are alone sufficient to indicate the meaning Ajanta held for the artist."[704] Indeed, Kirchner made numerous copies of the Ajanta illustrations from Griffiths' book, and in Gordon's opinion, *Five Bathers at the Lake* is a peroration to the sequence of copies taken from the Buddhist scene.[705] As a consequence, this work approaches the 'unheard-of unity of representation,' and that 'tranquillity of form' which he appreciated in Ajanta art.

Given that the Ajanta site was discovered in 1819, it is highly probable that, as a self-confessed Buddhist, Schopenhauer knew about it. Being something of an Indologist he was an avid reader of the *Asiatic Researches* to which he often refers in his work.[706] The *Asiatic Researches* was a journal published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal which changed its name to the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* around 1838 – and the latter remained an important journal for archaeological matters throughout the 19th century. Following Ajanta's discovery, it was regularly featured in reports and discussions of India's monuments, especially from the 1840s when the cave temples were championed

[702] Kirchner to Nele van der Velde,12.05.1919. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 5 sides. Published in: Kirchner, E. L., Velde, N. v. d., and Velde, H. v. d., *Briefe an Nele und Henry van de Velde* (Munchen: R. Piper, 1961). See also: E. L. Kirchner, "Die Arbeit E. L. Kirchners," in (catalogue) Bern, 1954-55, and Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 372.

[703] Moseman, E., "At the Intersection: Kirchner, Kubišta, and 'Modern Morality', 1911-14," in: *The Art Bulletin* Vol. 93, no. 1

[704] Gordon, D. E., "Kirchner in Dresden," in: ibid. Vol. 48, no. 3/4 (1966).,p.357.

[705] Ibid., p.359.

[706] See: Cross, S., *Schopenhauer's Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and Will and their Indian Parallels* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 2014). Also: App, "Schopenhauer, Begegnung mit Buddhismus" in: Verhältnis zu Schopenhauer. Jahrbuch, Vol. 79, (1998), pp.35-56, Vol. 79.

by James Fergusson.[707] His involvement led to the establishment of the Caves Commission in the 1840s and the appointment of the artist, and later photographer, Robert Gill to document the caves through the late 1840s and '50s.[708] Ajanta paintings clearly influenced Kirchner's representations of the naked body; Gordon stating that:

> His increasing departure from fauve like full intensity harmonies, first noted in *Standing Nude with a Hat* from late 1910, and leading in the *Five Bathers* to nudes of pale tonality and a stress on unusual shades of nonprimary hues, may be attributed to his experience of Indian color composition sometime after the Gauguin exhibition of September 1910.[709]

Five Bathers was exhibited at the November 1911 Neue Sezession in Berlin, and the Cologne Sonderbund International exhibition of May 1912.[710] The Ajanta drawings in general, *Harem Scene* of 1910-11 (fig. 89) and *Nude with Kerchief I* of 1910-1911 (fig. 90) in particular, are derived from the Ajanta figure group and belie their European origins.[711] However, although Kirchner was greatly influenced by such figure groups he arguably remained true to his modern European origins – especially when working on the German island of Fehmarn. We can see this in *Four Bathers among the Rocks by the Sea* (fig. 91), and *Bathers at the Shore* (fig. 92), both of 1913. His modern mind-set entailed that, unlike the 'primitive' artists which he attempted to emulate, not all of his work can be described as spontaneous 'plein-air' executions because some were produced from a combination of memory and photographs, as in *Brown Nude at the Window* of 1912 (fig. 93). In contrast to the apparent extemporaneity of non-European 'primitive' art, his use of photographs perhaps undermines the perceived spontaneity of his earlier nudes.[712]

That form of spontaneity in the nude can be seen in the lithograph *Girl in Bathtub*

[707] Scottish Indologist and antiquarian.
[708] Gill was commissioned by the Indian government to make copies of the cave paintings between 1844-1863. In an attempt to copy the painting from Cave 1 at the Ajanta site, Gill produced an oil painting of it between 1850-1854.
[709] Gordon and Kirchner. p.76.
[710] Ibid., p.76.
[711] Gordon. p.358.
[712] Lloyd. p.125.

of 1908 (fig. 94), which reveals how her body has been reduced to one continuous line under the influence of Matisse's work.[713] However, as Frances Carey and Antony Griffiths argue, Kirchner has surpassed Matisse "in swiftness of line and directness of response."[714] Similarly, *Bathers by Stones* a dry-point of 1912-1913 (fig. 95), shows how Kirchner has distilled the upper body in the left-hand figure into a cylindrical shape. Here Carey and Griffiths suggest that this practice was probably derived from Cameroon wood carvings, since a Cameroon figure can be found in the painting *Seated Woman with Wood Sculpture* of 1912 (fig. 96), which probably was owned by Kirchner.[715]

Cameroon and Ajanta art were not the only 'exotic' influences upon Kirchner's depictions of the nude. During 1911, he derived pictorial ideas from Gauguin, as seen in the lithograph *Reclining Nude Seen from the Back*, which refers to Gauguin's *Spirit of the Dead Watches* of 1892 (fig. 97).[716] Furthermore, Gauguin's *Ta Matete; The Marke*t of 1892 (fig. 98), with its Egyptian profiles and thoracic frontalities, may have influenced Kirchner's lithograph *Bathing Bohemians* of 1911 (fig. 99).[717] Thus, if it is true as Gordon says, that Kirchner's response to Gauguin was the most inventive of the *Die Brücke* group, then it is worthwhile noting how Kirchner's *Two Nudes with Sculpture* of 1911 (fig. 100) replicates the central figure in Gauguin's *Tahitian Women Bathing* of 1891-2 which was on display in September 1910 (fig. 101).[718] In addition, along with Gordon, we may be convinced that in bodily terms, Kirchner's *Three Standing Nudes* of 1910 (fig. 102)

[713] The model is probably his 'friend' Doris 'Dodo' Grosse.
[714] Carey, F. et al., *The Print in Germany 1880-1933: The Age of Expressionism: Prints from the Department of Prints and Drawings in The British Museum: With a section of illustrated books from The British Library* (London: British Museum Publications, 1984). p.109.
[715] Ibid., p.111.
[716] This work was viewed by Kirchner in the Arnold exhibition.
[717] Four years later after *Bathing Bohemians*, Kirchner wrote to Fritz Meyer-Schönbrunn, on 16.09.1915 telling him that, "I got to see the magnificent Coptics in the Kaiser Friedrich Museum. It would be a terrific work for me to master the proportions of a three metre figure." See: Original in the Archive of the Karl Ernst Osthaus Museum, Hagen, manuscript letter, 2 pages. Published in:Hesse-Frielinghaus, H. et al., *Ernst-Ludwig Kirchner und das Folkwang-Museum Hagen : Briefe von an und über Kirchner, zusammengesellt aus den Beständen des Osthaus-Archivs Hagen ... aus Anlaß des 100. Geburtstags von Karl Ernst Osthaus und der Eröffnung des Um- und Erweiterungsbaus des Karl-Ernst-Osthaus-Museums Hagen* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1974). p.20. See also:Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 110-111.
[718] Gordon.p.464, fn.77.

appropriates "the typically 'Gauguinesque' alternation of curve and straight line in the stylization of the hip and in the elongated elbow."[719]

In 1919, Kirchner would acknowledge Gauguin in a letter to Henry van de Velde. Here Kirchner commented upon how Gauguin's letters were very beautiful and that he had read them all in one night and would read them often again.[720] In another letter to van de Velde of 1920, Kirchner thanked him for the Gauguin woodcuts, which interested him very much. He described the woodcut *A Horse and Birds* of 1899 which had appeared on the title page for *Le Sourire*, and how Gauguin had grasped the Orientalised Persian miniatures, the Indian Batiks, and the Chinese because they were somehow in his blood. Yet, Kirchner felt that in the final analysis although his art looked very good, Gauguin could not excite people any longer. He believed that "we need a more direct route from life to a representation of form. We will achieve that by constant drawing of all that we see."[721]

The Orientalising representation of the naked form manifests itself from the summer period of 1910 when Kirchner's art might be epitomised by three of his Moritzburg paintings , *Three Nudes in Front of Trees* (fig. 103), *Nudes Playing under Tree* (fig. 104) and in *Naked Couple in the Sun* (fig. 105) of 1911.[722] In these pictures human anatomy becomes angular, distorted, and geometrical in an attempt to appropriate 'primitive' sculpture as an "animist vehicle of expression."[723] Indeed, a geometric line informs the composition of *Standing Nude with a Hat* of 1910-1920 (fig. 106) which was

[719] Gordon and Kirchner.p.464, n.77.
[720] Kirchner to Henry van de Velde, 22.11.1919. Original in Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: Kirchner, Velde, and Velde.p.101. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 416. In addition, see: Gauguin, P. et al., *Lettres de Gauguin à Daniel de Monfreid* (Paris: Falaize, 1950).
[721] Kirchner to Henry van de Velde, 29.11. 1920. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 7 sides. Extracts published in Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 7 sides. Extracts published in: Kirchner, Velde, and Velde.p.30. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 1, p. 471.
[722] Gordon and Kirchner.p.40. Arguably, this can be more clearly accounted for in Kirchner's Moritzburg subjects from the late summer of 1911.
[723] Ibid., p.40. 1

inspired by a reproduction of Lucas Cranach the Elder's *Venus* of 1532 (fig. 107) he saw in Otto Mueller's Berlin studio.[724] Of *Standing Nude with a Hat* he would write that, "into this picture has come the first deep love of a woman's body, which only happens once... Today I might leave out the hat and the shoes, but at that time they belonged to the conception, in spite of the fact that this woman had stirringly beautiful feet and hands so fine."[725]

This Cranach picture was significant to Kirchner because he refers to it several times in his correspondence. In a letter to Erna Schilling of 1925, he says that "I saw the wonderful *Venus* today in the original, delicate pink against black."[726] Later in 1930, he wrote to Carl Hagemann that it had made him happy when he saw the large photograph of the Cranach *Venus* in Mueller's studio, the original of which was hanging in Frankfurt's Städel.[727] Kirchner confirmed the significance of this when he wrote that:

> This picture was for me at that time the Ideal female nude. My picture of a naked woman with a black hat of 1907 shows that well. We also had in common a sensual reverence of women and an admiration of elegance. Only, in human relations with women he clung more to the bourgeois forms, while I preferred a free camaraderie.[728]

In another letter to Hagemann of 1933, Kircher would write and ask him if he liked the two pictures sent by him, feeling that *Standing Nude with Hat* must look beautiful in his house. Kirchner said that it was his best picture from Dresden and that in Frankfurt Hagemann would have the opportunity to compare it with the Cranach which had given

[724] Ibid., p.70.
[725] Ibid., translation from Gordon, p.70.
[726] Kirchner to Erna Schilling, 22.12.1925. Original in: Kirchner Archiv E.W. Kornfeld, Bern-Davos. Manuscript letter, 5 sides. Postcard enclosed: Lucas Cranach the Elder, Venus, Städelsches Kunstinstitut. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 2, p. 979-980.
[727] Lucas Cranach, *Venus*, Friedländer-Rosenberg no. 246. Hagemann was a Chemist, art collector and long-time friend of Kirchner.
[728] Original in possession of Max Beckmann Archive. Manuscript letter, 7 pages. Published in: Hagemann et al. Ostfildern 2004, no.353. The woman with the black hat in the painting is Dodo. For the painting see Gordon 136.

him inspiration.[729] Gordon adds to this by suggesting that *Standing Nude with Hat* shows how:

> The fashionable hat and the canon of figure proportion, with shortened torso and swelling hips, do derive from the Venus-type of Cranach; but the full breasts enframed by the arms and the widespread placement of legs and feet reveal an utterly natural sexuality in this woman, far removed from the self-conscious posturing of her Renaissance source.[730]

3.9 The Nude as Idea and Issues of Sex

The portrait model for Kirchner's painting mentioned above, was Dodo who posed in the nude for him from 1909-1911. Whilst her anatomy typifies 'Kirchner's proportional canon' of 1910, Gordon suggests that she does not "display the mannered attenuation of proportions to be found in much sixteenth-century art."[731] Rather, it is the attenuated narrowness of the format which adds expressivity to the picture. In fact, by 1911 Kirchner had returned to a Fauvist economy of line and purity of colour as in *Half-Length Nude with Hat* (fig. 108), introducing for the first time a depiction of semi-nudity in fashionable women. On this image, Gordon states that:

> The picture is erotic in a way no French fauve work is erotic; yet Dodo transcends pornography precisely because of her conception in primitive terms. Like some ancient fertility goddess from prehistoric Europe, Mesopotamia, or India, she bares her breasts and holds her pose without self-consciousness…the content of the painting is, once again, iconic in its universality.[732]

If Kirchner really did transcend the pornographic and ascend to the universal Idea of his nudes, then theoretically he should have been less interested in his female models from a sexual-physical angle.

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[729] Kirchner to Carl Hagemann, 20.06.1933. Original in possession of Max Beckmann Archive. Manuscript letter, 4 pages. Published in*:* ibid., Ostfildern 2004, no.509. See Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol. 3, p. 1739-1740. Kirchner mentions the Cranach a final time to Hagemann, from Davos on 22.07.1935. Ostfildern 2004, no.623. See; ibid., Vol. 3, p. 1867-1868.

[730] Kirchner to Carl Hagemann, 22.07.1935. See also: Gordon and Kirchner.p.70. The Cranach was a significant point of reference for Kirchner, as we hear in 1919 when he wrote to his common-law-wife Erna Schilling. He told her that, "… you gave me the strength to speak about your beauty in the purest picture of a woman, compared to which the Cranach *Venus* is an old c**t." Kirchner and Grisebach. See: Kirchner to Erna Schilling, 05.07.1919. Ibid., p.43.

[731] Gordon and Kirchner. p.70.

[732] Ibid., p.40.

This may be indicated by a letter Kirchner wrote to Graef in 1916 in which he described his experimental creativity. His personal observation was that, with his insight into human empathy and the potential for osmosis between people, came a dissolution of his psyche into the 'other' - all of which benefited more intensive representations. He claimed that "the less I was physically interested myself, which occurred very early due to the nature of my constitution, the more freely and better I could penetrate into another and portray them."[733]

Kirchner's claim, that the less physically interested he was in his naked models the more freely he could portray them, does suggest an objective apprehension of the Idea. However, we should treat this claim with caution because in a letter written to Heckel in 1910, Kirchner defined his attraction to the child model Marzella:

> We have become quite at ease with each other, we lie on the carpet and play. There is a great charm in such a pure female, hints which could drive you crazy. Better than in the older girl. More free, without losing the mature woman. Perhaps there is something in her more mature than in the riper girl, which withers away again. The richness is surely greater now. Today she brought her 12 year-old friend who has a sister of 15.[734]

In his letter Kirchner drew a picture of Marzella holding a Japanese Samisen.[735] Sherwin Simmons argues that the Samisen may have acted as a sexual message between Kirchner and Heckel, given that Geisha girls were often depicted playing such an instrument. [736] It is from this letter that charges of paedophilia have been made against Kirchner, although no firm evidence of sexual relations between child model and artist has yet been

[733] Kirchner to Graef, 21.07.1916. Original in private collection. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: Grisebach. p.53.
[734] Kirchner to Heckel, c. April 1910. Original in Altonauer Museum Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 4 pages. Published in: Kirchner et al. Cologne 1984, nr. 31. As Delfs and Kornfeld show, Dube dates the letter between 30.03.1910 and 02.04.1910, since during this time a dancer named in the text was staying in Dresden. See: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. ibid., Vol.1, p.38.
[735] See first page of a four-page letter from Ernst Ludwig Kirchner in Dresden to Erich Heckel in Berlin, late March /early April,1910.
[736] Simmons, S., "A Suggestiveness That Can Make One Crazy: Ernst Ludwig Kirchner's Images of Marzella," in: *Modernism/Modernity* Vol. 22, no. 3 (2015). p.526-27.

discovered. However, Simmons suggests that for Kirchner "deep seated feelings of infantile reprimand and loss could be compensated for by grandiose feelings of artistic and sexual power, as well as provoke some identification with a girl model whose subjectivity was both diminished and emboldened by his fascination."[737]

Given Kirchner's fascination for the child model Marzella, it appears questionable that the metaphysical purity of her nakedness could have exceeded her sexual value. Viewed in this way, one must question how often sexual feelings insinuated themselves into the 'non-aesthetic' glances between Kirchner, his child models and his mature models, which overrode considerations of metaphysical worth.[738] If this was so, then it leads us to suspect that C1 may be supportable after all, since it would be an example of the world as will dominating the world as representation through sexual attraction.

On the topic of sexual attraction through initial furtive glances, Schopenhauer regards it as a Platonic Idea 'in the making' which needs the procreative act to become 'objectified'. Thus, between an organically mature couple and their furtive glances, there is the possibility for a birth of a particular Idea through the birth of a particular body. Moreover, Schopenhauer suggests that:

> To a certain extent this new individual is a new (Platonic) Idea; and, just as all the Ideas strive to enter into the phenomenon with the greatest vehemence, avidly seizing for this purpose the matter which the law of causality divides among them all, so does this particular Idea of a human individuality strive with the greatest eagerness and vehemence for its realization in the phenomenon. This eagerness and vehemence is precisely the two future parents' passion for each other.[739]

Matter, it must be noted for Schopenhauer, is a condition of perceptual experience, the mere objectification of causality. Thus, while in principle each Idea or grade of the will's objectification could have an infinite number of copies or representations, in actuality

[737] Ibid., p.554.

[739] Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation. Vol.2, p.536-7.

there is only a finite amount of matter. As with every grade of the will's objectification, the Ideas fight with each other in order to gain entrance into time and space through matter.[740]

This sense of the Ideas in conflict meant that for Heckel, and possibly Kirchner too on one occasion, the 'eagerness and vehemence' of their sexual impulses (*Geschlechtstrieb*) overrode any sense of metaphysical purity that they had for their other child model Fränzi.[741] The Idea, in waiting so to speak, attempted to seize the naked matter before it through the body of ten-year old Fränzi.[742] That is to say, through the illicit assertion of the artist's will, child-sex abuse took place. Contrary to Wolf-Dieter Dube, Bernhard Fulda argues that there is evidence to suggest that Heckel and maybe Kirchner had sexual intercourse with their 10-year-old child model Fränzi. If they had been caught by the police of Moritzburg then they would have found themselves in prison for paedophilia.[743]

On the one hand, this example of the artist's decadent and vehement willing (*Wollen*) would be at odds with the chaste morality of *Nacktkultur* devotees such as those of the painter/sculptor Sascha Schneider. His belief was that devotees wished to portray

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[740] *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.147.

[741] The vehemence and eagerness of the will, as a source of conflict, shall be explored from another angle in Chapter 4, where we investigate Marc's claims as they pertain to war.

[742] On the topic of sexuality, modernity and the child see: Egan, R. and Hawkes, G., *Theorizing the Sexual Child in Modernity* (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2010).See also the work by Sarah D. Goode on the sexual theorist Baron von Krafft-Ebing (1840-1902) in Goode, S.D. *Understanding and Addressing Adult Sexual Attraction to Children: A Study of Paedophiles in Contemporary Society*. Taylor & Francis, 2009.

[743] Fulda, B. and Soika, A., *Max Pechstein: The Rise and Fall of Expressionism* (De Gruyter, 2013). p.99. As Fulda points out in note 233 on p.99, few scholars have broached this difficult topic. However, Tanja Hommen observes that on the penalty for paedophilia at the time: "In Paragraph 182 of the RStGB [Reichstrafgesetzbuch is the German penal code] it states: 'Whoever seduces a girl of good character, who has not yet completed her 16th year, will be punished by up to a year in prison. The prosecution will only proceed on the application of the parents or guardian of the seduced girl.' " See: Hommen, Tanja. 'Sittlichkeitsverbrechen: Sexuelle Gewalt Im Kaiserreich' [in German]. Frankfurt/Main: Campus, 1999, p.57. On the other hand, it may be possible to interpret the Expressionists' use of child models as an engagement with the 'cult of the child'. The cult of childhood' is a term employed by art historians such as Anthony Parton (2010) to identify a widespread interest in childhood manifested by the expressionist generation in the first years of the early 20th century. The term takes in not only a newly discovered appreciation of children's art on the part of the avant-garde but also a love of 'childhood', which, they believed, possessed the 'authenticity', purity and innocence of vision that they as adults had lost. This led some artists to collect children's art and to emulate its features in an attempt to revitalise their own practice whilst other artists wished to become intimate with children as a means of engaging directly with the perceived 'authenticity' of the childhood condition and as a means of releasing the expressive and creative potential of 'the child within'. For further information see: Parton, A., Goncharova, N., and Antique Collectors, C., *Goncharova: The Art and Design of Natalia Goncharova* (Woodbridge: Antique Collectors' Club, 2010).

no afflictions, nothing old, nothing decadent, not the street or the brothel, but rather the merry playgrounds of healthy youth.[744] On the other hand, it is possible that the impetus to produce images of Fränzi naked may have been inspired, initially at least, by a genuine intention to apprehend the Idea of the body.[745] If there was any such genuine intention, then it matched the intellectual vision of gynaecologist Carl Heinrich Stratz. He believed that through art and nature people should aspire to an uninhibited understanding of the human body which was usually the province of doctors.[746]

Kirchner did possess an uninhibited understanding of the naked body, but Carol Duncan argues that through the depictions of his nudes the emancipation of the artist entailed the subordination of the female. The depictions, she argues, *imply* opposition to the status quo of society, yet "the drastic reduction of women to objects of specialized male interest - embodies on a sexual level the basic class relationships of capitalist society."[747] This notion of reducing the Idea of women to 'objects of specialized male interests' is echoed by Martin S. Weinberg and Colin J. Williams who refer to the notion of the "looking glass body."[748] By this they infer that a woman's sense of 'self' is sometimes formed in response to what she imagines men think of her, experiencing herself as highly gendered and sexually objectified.[749] From a feminist point of view then, Kirchner may be seen to engage in a degree of misogyny - charges also levelled against Schopenhauer himself.

[744] Schneider, S., *Mein Gestalten und Bilden* (Leipzig: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1916). p.8.
[745] Real name Lina Franziska Fehrman, (b.1900-?). While the Fränzi affair could be seen as an exploitation of the child model as being cheap to employ it could be also be interpreted as an example of the 'authentic' and 'innocent purity' which is attached to a 'cult of the child'. However, this argument is surely untenable if the desecration of Fränzi's body could be proven.
[746] Foreword by and from Stratz, C. H., *Die Darstellung des menschlichen Körpers in der Kunst* (Berlin: Springer, 1914).
[747] Duncan, C., *The Aesthetics of Power: Essays in Critical Art History* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). p.105.
[748] Weinberg, M. S. and Williams, C. J., "Bare Bodies: Nudity, Gender, and the Looking Glass Body," in: *Sociological Forum* Vol. 25, no. 1 (2010). p.47.
[749] Ibid., p.48.

Although Schopenhauer's misogyny has gone relatively unchallenged in recent years, Tom Grimwood and Angelika Hübscher agree that to perceive Schopenhauer as an 'irrational hater of women' would be erroneous.[750] It would also be erroneous to omit the fact that his philosophy inspired a 'school' of female followers such as Helen Zimmern, Olga Plümacher, the radical feminist Helene von Druskowitz and the Viennese cultural philosopher, artist and feminist Rosa Mayreder.[751] Despite his alleged misogyny, Schopenhauer would agree that the female body can be a beautiful manifestation of the will at its highest grade. Yet, Nietzsche felt that Schopenhauer's contemplation of the Platonic Idea counteracted a frustrated *sexual* interest in women.[752] This meant that "he never tired of singing the praises of this escape from the 'will' as the great advantage and use of the aesthetic condition."[753] Thus, Nietzsche concluded that Schopenhauer's redemption from the will "treated sexuality as a personal enemy (including its tool, woman, that '*instrumentum diaboli'*)."[754] As a result, Nietzsche doubted whether Schopenhauer's approach could offer any insights into the nature of beauty.

Although Schopenhauer ascribed a calming of the will to some objects of beauty, Nietzsche denied that this could occur regularly. As an alternative, Nietzsche compared Schopenhauer's sense of beauty with that of Stendhal's, for whom the effect of it promised an *excitement of the will*. On that basis, Nietzsche asked, "what does it *mean* if a philosopher pays homage to ascetic Ideals? We get our first hint: he wants *to free himself*

[750] Grimwood, T., *Irony, Misogyny and Interpretation: Ambiguous Authority in Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche* (Cambridge Scholars Publisher, 2012).p.37. See also: Angelika Hübscher, *'Schopenhauer und die Weiber'* in: "Schopenhauer Jahrbuch," (Würzburg). p. 187-203.
[751] Mayreder, R., *Mein Pantheon: Lebenserinnerungen* (Dornach: Philosophisch-Anthroposophischer Verlag am Goetheanum, R. Geering, 1988).
[752] During a conversation with Carl Georg Bähr, dated to 12.04 1856, Schopenhauer confessed that, "…as far as women are concerned, I was very well-disposed towards them – if only they had wanted me."Schopenhauer, A., *Schopenhauer-Bibliothek. Originalhandschriften Schopenhauers, 166 Bände aus seiner Privatbibliothek, seine Schriften, Briefe und Gespräche, Literatur über ihn. [A catalogue.]* (Frankfurt am Main: Baer, 1905). p.239.
[753] Nietzsche, F. W., Ansell-Pearson, K., and Diethe, C., *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Revised student edition. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). p.75.
[754] Ibid., p.76.

from torture."[755] Therefore, it is in this sense that Schopenhauer might be regarded as a 'despiser of the body'. Indeed, Wicks has persuasively argued that despite natural beauty possessing significant value for Schopenhauer, its value in his philosophy is less than that of ascetic or moral experience gained through intense suffering. It is of lesser value because it lacks the permanence gained through such experience.[756] Consequently, when contemplating beauty, it is not a question of permanent deliverance from the will but one of "a brief hour of rest."[757]

If the above is true, then reading between the lines of Schopenhauer's philosophy, we might conclude with Wicks that the 'brief hour of rest' achieved through contemplating a beautiful body might be a misleading one. His hypothesis appears tenable, since Schopenhauer apparently undermines our reception of natural beauty and any long-term optimism born from contemplating it. We can say this because Schopenhauer felt that "human life, like all inferior goods, is covered on the outside with a false glitter; what suffers always conceals itself."[758] Therefore, if like Kirchner, we are distracted by the 'false glitter' of contemplating beautiful bodies, then the hypothesis is that we might be in danger of becoming distracted by morally superficial representations. That is to say, we could claim that the pleasure and optimism which they afford may distract us from the fact that "at bottom every individuality is really only a special error, a false step, something that it would be better should not be, in fact something from which it is the real purpose of life to bring us back."[759] As a result, we may reasonably infer that any release from willing effected by contemplating beautiful Ideas, is a transient and insecure refutation of C1. Therefore, as we shall note in the following chapter of this thesis, and according to

[755] Ibid., p.75-76.
[756] Wicks, R., "Natural Beauty and Optimism in Schopenhauer's Aesthetics," in: *European Journal of Philosophy* Vol. 16, no. 2 (2008).p.273.
[757] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.363.
[758] *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.325.
[759] *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.491-92.

Schopenhauer, the most secure refutation of C1 would be a resignation from the will to life through great suffering.

During 1914, Kirchner did experience great suffering brought about by his conscription into the army from which he was provisionally discharged in November 1915 on the grounds of ill-health. In December of that year he would inform Schiefler that the demands upon him were too much and that he had disintegrated mentally and physically.[760] Four years later, in a letter to Georg Reinhart of 1919, Kirchner wrote about the long months of his convalescence in Kreuzlingen's Sanitorium and how the images of the woodcut *The Triumph of Love* of 1911 had taken form.[761] He referred to the Neo-Platonist and poet Francesco Petrarch, observing how the poet had expressed the effects of love between the sexes in both sensual and spiritual terms. As a result, it was after reading Petrarch some years previously that Kirchner had begun to develop the material for his nude in *The Triumph of Love* series of woodcuts.[762]

The Triumph of Love is a series of eight woodcut prints (plus one cover page), and is related to Petrarch's literary work of the same name - *The Triumph of Love*. Kirchner must have wanted to work on these prints for a couple of years, since he mentions them in a letter of 1912 to Marc, although the series was not completed until 1918. Indeed, according to Delfs et al., Marc had arranged for the Reinhard Piper Company to publish Petrarch's *Triumph of Love* with woodcuts by Kirchner.[763] In the 1912 letter, Kirchner

[760] Kirchner to Gustav Schiefler, 15.12.1915.Original in the Universitäts- und Staatsbibliothek Hamburg. Manuscript letter, 3 sides. Published in: Kirchner, Schiefler, and Henze. Stuttgart 1990, no.50. See Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld.
[761] Kirchner to Georg Reinhart, 14.03.1919. Original in the Winterthur public library. Transcript. The original letter was not kept and only a partial transcript by Reinhart remains. Published in: *Kirchner, E. L., Reinhart, G., and Joelson-Strohbach, H., Das ungewohnte Neue: Briefwechsel Ernst Ludwig Kirchner und Georg Reinhart (Winterthur, Zürich: Kunstmuseum, Scheidegger & Spiess, 2002).* Nr.20. See also: Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld. Vol..1, p. 355. On 15.09.1917, Kirchner was admitted to the Bellevue Sanatorium in Kreuzlingen under the supervision of Dr Ludwig and Dr Binswanger.
[762] See: Gercken 936 / Dube H. 342 / Schiefler H. 315.
[763] See Kirchner, Delfs, and Kornfeld., Vol.1, p.73. and a letter from Kirchner to Reinhard Piper, 12.12.1912, published in: Piper, R., Buergel-Goodwin, U., and Göbel, W., *Briefwechsel mit Autoren und Künstlern, 1903-1953* (München: Piper, 1979).

would discuss his hopes for *The Triumph of Love* series and thanked Marc for all of his efforts. Kirchner hoped that, "this time we will be successful. *The Triumph of Love* in the German translation and abridgement takes 32 pages. Every nine lines are arranged in three verses which form one page, and a woodcut always faces every page of text."[764]

Kirchner suggested that the setting and the woodblock would have to be of equal size, and that he would probably cut a vignette in wood for every setting. The title and cover he said, might also be woodcuts and that there would then be 33 pages with 33 woodcuts with the same number of vignettes. For this he argued that he would need an advance of 300 Marks, and asked Marc if he thought that too much. Although Kirchner did not feel that the cost was prohibitive, he believed that he could cut the whole text in wood, but in order to achieve that he would need 600 Marks since it would take at least a quarter of a year to execute. Despite this, it was his opinion that the woodcut series would be magnificent, and he expressed a longing to carry out such a work.

The ideal cycle in *The Triumph of Love* would be a 'script' of pictures, similar in format to Egyptian papyrus rolls with hieroglyphs full of narrative symbolic imagining. In what appears to be a tentative apprehension of the Platonic Ideas, he argued that "from the ecstatic vision, and nothing more, arises a representation [*Vorstellung*] with few lines and surfaces, which… can deal with conditions of the soul."[765] In addition, he told Reinhart that the pictures should arouse the imagination of the viewer and through their feelings lend them another meaning. He added that, "You can imagine that for me this is a very interesting attempt to see how far the human capacity for perception [*Auffassung*] extends through pictures."[766] Ironically, just as Kirchner found comfort through the

[764] Kirchner to Franz Marc, 06.11.1912. Original letter in the Germanisches Nationalmuseum Nuremberg, German Art Archive, Marc Estate, I, C, manuscript letter, 5 pages (with envelope).
[765] Kirchner, Reinhart, and Joelson-Strohbach. nr. 20.
[766] Ibid.

imagination of Petrarch so too did Schopenhauer who, in the preface of *The World as Will and Representation*, wrote that he had found consolation for his long neglect as a philosopher through Petrarch's comment in *De Vera Sapienta*, that "if anyone who wanders all day arrives towards evening, it is enough."[767]

Conclusion

In order to investigate C1 and follow Schopenhauer's methodology, this chapter introduced his theory of the Platonic Ideas. Our finding here was that, as the most elementary form of representations, the Ideas in Kirchner's work undermined C1 despite the theoretical notion that they stand for the most adequate objectivity of the will. This was so, since the Ideas which are manifestations of such an objectivity are not the will *per se*. Yet, according to Schopenhauer's thinking, we were supposed to find that, *particular* nudes in Kirchner's art can be theorised as universal Ideas. However, as Janaway argues:

> From a picture's portraying an individual in accurate detail we can make no inference to its revealing the essence common to everything of a certain species. On the contrary, the two features seem in danger of excluding one another at least sometimes, since many of a thing's peculiarities will precisely be peculiar to it alone. The leap from individual to Idea here is enormous and perverse.[768]

Although Janaway may be right, we need to add that the Ideas of nudes were a form of representational knowledge (and the thing-in-itself under the form of the representation), which entails that as Ideas they refute C1 due to their absence of will. Yet, upon reflection this too might be considered an 'enormous and perverse' inference since, as we noted earlier in the chapter, we asserted that there must be a coincidence of will-lessness *and* will-fullness in Kirchner the artist which is inexplicable. However, according to

[767] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1. p. xxviii. For mentions of Petrarch in *World as Will and Representation,* see: Vol. I, p. xxvi, xxviii, 377, 396; II, 126, 432, 551, 556-7, 576.
[768] Janway, C. ''Knowledge and Tranquility: Schopenhauer on the Value of Art' in: Jacquette, *Schopenhauer, Philosophy, and the Arts*. p.52.

Schopenhauer's philosophy, Kirchner's work as an object steps out of all relation to that which was external to it, and the viewing subject in turn steps out of relations to their will – which would lead to an abatement of suffering. On that theoretical basis, we found that the effect upon the artist and viewer undermined C1, because the viewer and artist, cease to be purely individual through the practice of aesthetic contemplation. It was argued that this is only possible when individuals lose themselves in aesthetic contemplation and become a "*pure* will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge."[769] Through the exercise of aesthetic contemplation, particular naked bodies as objects allegedly become the Idea of their species, while the perceiving individual becomes the *pure subject of knowing.*[770] Therefore, according to Schopenhauer's philosophy, we attain respite from the will and "…celebrate the Sabbath of the penal servitude of willing; the wheel of Ixion stands still."[771] In theory then, a state of will-lessness and the predominance of representation invalidates C1.

It was also mooted through Schopenhauer in this chapter, that it is the 'genius' who is most capable of repeating "the inner nature of the world,"[772] through aesthetic contemplation and with their art negate C1 by allowing the world as representation to dominate the world as will. We noted that whilst a layman and a 'genius' would perceive a naked body as an object, Schopenhauer informs us of a difference between them. In the layman's case, they cannot attain to the same level of will-lessness as the 'genius', who is able to separate will and representation with greater efficiency, so that representations become purer and liberated from references to the will.[773] Thus, if some consider Kirchner to be a 'genius', then arguably he was capable of apprehending the universal Idea of a nude through disinterested contemplation. Yet, we found that disinterested contemplation

[769] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.179.
[770] Ibid., p.179.
[771] Ibid., p.196.
[772] Ibid., p.186.
[773] Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.3, p.24.

does not entail that the will is completely 'denied' through aesthetic contemplation, which means that C1 is not ineludibly refuted.

Having discussed Schopenhauer's theory of disinterested contemplation, we went on to examine the possibility that sexual desire insinuated itself into Kirchner's contact with his child models and mature models. We found that this may well have been the case, although concrete evidence beyond Kirchner's letters is still in need to convict him of paedophilia, However, what evidence we do have appears compelling and allows us to say that C1 may be uphold in this sense, because it would be an example of the world as will dominating the world as representation through sexual desire.

As we noted in this chapter, Schopenhauer suggests that the consolation which art gives, the pleasure of contemplating a beautiful nude when freed from the pain of willing, permits the contemplated object as an Idea to express the *world as representation* 'whole and pure'. However, as we have shown this is a highly contingent emancipation from the will and as such offers only a temporary repudiation of C1. Yet, Schopenhauer asserts that "this purely knowable side of the world and its repetition in any art is the element of the artist. He is captivated by a consideration of the spectacle of the will's objectification."[774]

Although Kirchner arguably never tired of contemplating the will's objectification, or repeating it in his art, there was a price to pay, since he was the striving will which objectifies itself in all of nature, entailing that he remained in constant suffering. Thus, for Kirchner and all artists, Schopenhauer would say of their endeavours that:

> …it does not become for him a quieter of the will, as we shall see in the following book in the case of the saint who has attained resignation; it does not deliver him from life for ever, but only for a few moments. For him it is not the way out of life, but only an occasional consolation in it, until his power, enhanced by this contemplation, finally becomes tired of the spectacle, and seizes the serious side of things.[775]

[774] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.267.
[775] Ibid., p.267.

Since the ‘occasional consolation’ of beauty, as and when afforded by ‘enhanced’ contemplation, could not invalidate C1 due to the transient nature of such a practice, we must seize ‘the serious side of things’ in the following chapter in order to ascertain how an artist, or any individual, might affirm or deny the will. By pursuing this policy, we shall enquire more deeply into the legitimacy of C1.

Chapter 4: The Expressionist at War: Affirmation or Denial of the Will?

Introduction

We begin this chapter by defining what is meant by affirmation and denial of the will in terms of Schopenhauer's philosophy. After this, we briefly discuss Beckmann and Marc's military affiliations and then move on to consider Beckmann's war time experience in relation to C1 as an example of his will to life. Following this, we examine Beckmann's knowledge of Schopenhauer and his interactions with the philosopher's text. Then, after interpreting Marc's affirmation of the will to war in the context of C1, we shall think about Marc and Beckmann's attitudes towards the war according to their conceptions of fate. This is significant, because Schopenhauer had much to say on the question of fate, and as will be noted, Beckmann in particular interacted with the philosopher's texts which discuss this issue.

For some active servicemen fate and morality possessed a close relationship to each other. Since this was the case, this chapter necessitates not only a close scrutiny of Marc's attitudes towards fate, but also an evaluation of his moral stance towards the war. From this discussion, it may surprise some of us that Marc, (more often than not), affirmed the will to war, yet it may not surprise others that many servicemen such as Beckman displayed a high degree of self-interest and a resolute will to live. By contrast for Marc, self-interest had to be sacrificed to the natural justice of war – an 'unfailing atonement' as he put it. However, for arguably less robust servicemen such as Beckmann, no sense of self-sacrifice could offset his existential pain, his encounters with bodily disfigurement and subsequent nervous breakdown. In addition, it shall be noted that not only did human beings suffer disfiguring injury and pain during the First World War but that animals also suffered on an enormous scale.

As a consequence of the above, the war might appropriately be described on Schopenhauer's terms as the will at war with itself - thus making C1 fully justifiable. Yet as we shall demonstrate, what seems unjust to some of us is that artists such as Marc and Macke lost their lives through combat and the fact that we shall never know what the fruits of their aesthetic labours might have been - had they survived. In fact, although Macke appreciated Schopenhauer's interpretation of the striving restless nature of the will, his letters to his wife show that he was deeply anxious about the mortal danger he was in – compared to Marc whose only fear (it seems) was that he might never complete his aesthetic labours.

In this chapter, it could be argued that overly concrete conclusions are drawn from tenuous premises, such as when a phrase in a letter is used to make claims about something as complex as an individual's experience of war. Indeed, there is some truth to this which requires methodological reflection. Therefore, on the one hand it may be correct to say that, by imposing my own intellectual prejudices upon such tenuous premises throughout this chapter that an interpretative sin has been committed. Yet, on the other hand for Hans Gadamer, the activity of understanding cannot occur without prejudices at all, or without an apriority of personal anticipations, which provide the "initial directedness of our whole ability to experience."[101] Thus, it may be argued, that the prejudices of my findings in this chapter could have been continually remodelled, as and when they encountered the past, in order to attain a certain hermeneutical 'rectitude'. However, as Gadamer argues, the interpretive act itself must remain insurmountable since the hermeneutic circle cannot be destroyed as "it is the fundamental precondition of understanding."[776]

[776] Boucher, D., *Texts in Context: Revisionist Methods for Studying the History of Ideas* (Dordrecht ; Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985).,p.226.

That said, one plausible method for interpreting the letters and experiences of the artists in this chapter would have been to 'reconstruct' all of the possible conditions in which they had experienced the war, and in this way gained some sort of interpretative 'rectitude'. Yet, as Gadamer suggests, that which is reconstructed and retrieved from the past is not the original work, since its perpetuation in an alienated condition merely gives it "a derivative, cultural existence."[777] Consequently, in order to think historically then our ideas of the past must inevitably undergo a transposition when we attempt to think through them, which in turn entails that "to think historically always involves mediating between those ideas and one's own thinking. To try to escape from one's own concepts in interpretation is not only impossible but manifestly absurd."[778]

In spite of the above, it may still be the case that the interpretations of this chapter become "dissolved into the subjective or the occasional."[779] If this is the case, then it could in theory be tolerable since there is no 'canonized first performance' for this chapter, and any striven for 'correctness' of interpretation (especially when we apply Schopenhauer's philosophy) might inflict an injustice on the artists in question. Should this be conceivable, then Gadamer for one is convinced that "in view of the finitude of our historical existence, it would seem that there is something absurd about the whole idea of a unique, correct interpretation."[780]

What is not a unique interpretation, but nevertheless indubitably correct, is the fact that before the outbreak of war, Marc and Beckmann engaged in a conflict of their own. Marc had published 'Die neue Malerei' in the journal *Pan*, in March 1912 and Beckmann had subsequently responded to it in the following issue of 14.03.1912 with

[777] Gadamer, H.-G., *Truth and Method* (New York, UNITED STATES: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2004). p.159.
[778] Ibid.,p.415.
[779] Ibid.
[780] Ibid.,p.123.

his article 'Gedanken über zeitgemässe und unzeitgemässe Kunst' ('Thoughts on Modern and Non-Modern Art'). As Dietrich Schubert has demonstrated, Beckmann established a fundamentally opposite position to Marc on art, whereby the former perceived that his own art – in contrast to the 'modern' Marc's – was not modern. By contrast, he postulated instead, through an art of inwardness, that his art led to the representation of a visible contemporary reality, a powerful depiction of the world of sensory perception, which referenced among others Goya, Géricault, Delacroix and Vincent van Gogh.[781] Marc responded with a short 'anti-Beckmann' statement which did not contain anything new but emphasised the impossibility of any reconciliation between the viewpoints. Thus, Schubert goes on to suggest that:

> …the fundamental questions of the relationship of subjectivity and objectivity, of objectivity and the inner life, of art to 'Nature' (visible reality and the invisible), of depiction to life (in the Nietzschean sense), ultimately, with regard to content and 'réalisation', raise questions of turning to life or a mystical turning away from life.[782]

Schubert understands this to mean that the controversy between the artists possessed a significance, not only for the times, but with respect to two basic positions: artistic shaping, (thus realisation) of reality perceptible to the senses, and the shaping of a purely subjective imagination (fiction).[783]

For many Expressionists the start of the First World War as a field of conflict exemplified a turning-point in German history. While some artists volunteered for military service others were conscripted into it, but for most of them their affirmation of the will to war (*die Bejahung des Willens zum Krieg*) quickly changed into one of despair and a complete denial of the will to war (*die Verneinung des Willens zum Krieg*).[784] This chapter

[781] Hüppauf, B.-R. and Goethe, I., *Expressionismus und Kulturkrise* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1983). p.208
[782] Ibid.,p.208.
[783] Ibid.
[784] Although the expression 'will to war' is my own invention, and reflects the spirit of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will, it should not be conflated with the more precise use I make of Schopenhauer's affirmation or denial of the will to *life* or will to *live.*

is primarily, but not exclusively, about the artists Beckmann and Marc who served their country, either willingly or unwillingly, during the First World War. It is about the effect of war service upon them as examples of embodied willing, as reported by their own texts and their own images. These texts and images will be interpreted through Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will and it shall be asked to what extent these artists affirmed or denied the will to war. This interpretative process makes it possible to test and expand upon the core research area of this thesis as stimulated by C1. Consequently, research methodology is grounded upon aspects of Schopenhauer's 'Fourth Book the World as Will, Second Aspect: With the Attainment of Self-Knowledge, Affirmation and Denial of the Will-to-Live' from Volume 1 of his major work. It shall be construed therefore, that the self-affirmation of the human body through war extended this affirmation to such a degree that it led to the denial of the same will (which we all share in) appearing in other bodies.[785]

4.1 Defining Affirmation and Denial of the Will

Although Schopenhauer does not use the phrases 'will to war' or 'denial of the will to war' they are congruent with his overall philosophy. For example, Schopenhauer points out how the "will manifests that *self-affirmation* of one's own body" is so common, yet "by virtue of the egoism peculiar to all, it very easily goes beyond this affirmation to the *denial* of the same will appearing in another individual."[786] By denying the embodied will appearing in an 'other', whether through war or otherwise, this selfish affirmation of the usurping will of the 'other' is underwritten by Schopenhauer's concept of wrong (*Unrecht*). Therefore, "the sufferer of the wrong feels the transgression into his own body's sphere of affirmation through the denial of this by another individual, as an

[785] Schopenhauer believed that the most vehement affirmation of the will is a sexual one. This may have been true for him, but let us argue that since his lifetime modern warfare has evidently proven far more vehement.
[786] Schopenhauer and Payne, The World as Will and Representation., Vol.1, p.334. The concept of egoism will be examined in Chapter 5, where we discuss Mueller's work as it relates to the plight of the gypsy under National Socialism.

immediate and mental pain."[787] Inevitably, every artist in question during their military 'career' suffered from both physical and mental pain, whether through military discipline or combat. If that is so, then how can we begin to interpret this suffering through Schopenhauer's philosophy? One answer to this question is that true loss was as unlikely as true gain for every artist who suffered during the war. This is because in the world of phenomena, "The will alone is; it is the thing-in-itself, the source of all those phenomena. Its self-knowledge and its affirmation or denial that is then decided on, is the only event in-itself."[788]

Schopenhauer defines the affirmation of the will (*die Bejahung des Willens*) as the persistence of willing itself, unperturbed by knowledge, indwelling the life of man as a whole. The body of an individual is the objectivity of the will appearing at this grade in this individual. An individual's willing which develops through time is, Schopenhauer says, "the paraphrase of the body, the elucidation of the meaning of the whole and of its parts. It is another way of exhibiting the same thing-in-itself of which the body is already the phenomenon. Therefore, instead of affirmation of the will, we can also say affirmation of the body."[789] In addition, every individual pursues their own willing and does not generally pursue any other knowledge.[790] As a result, it is possible that the will of an individual can become aroused to such a pitch that it exceeds the reasonable affirmation of their body. This pitch manifests itself in vehement emotion by which the individual not only affirms their own will but denies and supresses that of other individuals who oppose them.[791]

[787] Ibid., p.335.
[788] Ibid., p.184.
[789] Ibid., p.326-7.
[790] Ibid., p.327.
[791] Ibid., p.328.

This pitch encapsulates the violence of war by which an individual affirms his own existence, denying and seeking 'to suppress that of others when it stands in his way'. If this is so, could it be said that Beckmann and Marc affirmed their own existence and suppressed that of others when it stood in their way? As will be shown, Beckmann did affirm the will to war for a time although he could not be said to be a man who, when faced with the embodied will of others, denied and suppressed that of others when it opposed him. By contrast, the same could not be said of Marc as we shall see in this chapter.

Before proceeding with the above, it is important to offer a working definition of what denial of the will (*die Verneinung des Willens*) means. It means a quieting of the will, often through extreme suffering, leading to a metaphysical form of salvation and deliverance from pain. As Cartwright states, "The denial of the will connotes the ultimate triumph of the intellect or cognition over the will."[792] When denial of the will takes place it does not occur as a result of causality or personal contrivance. Instead, true denial of the will arrives all of a sudden as if from an external source with a semblance of spiritual revelation. In a metaphysical sense the denial of the will then leads to an almost holy renunciation of the world, a turning away from all willing in general and a state of abject resignation. As a consequence, the state achieved is a relative nihilism without knowledge, incommunicable and devoid of subject object/relations, closely allied to the Buddhist state of *nirvana* and Indian asceticism. However, whilst we might acknowledge this definition, it must be stated that no artist ever attained Schopenhauer's ascetic denial of the will to life or the will to live. Indeed, as we shall note later on in this chapter, Beckmann for example could never adopt an ascetic philosophy.[793]

[792] Cartwright. p.183.
[793] Cf. Beckmann and Buenger. End note 6, p.400. In general, we might interpret Schopenhauer's doctrine as one which prioritises knowing over willing and one which advocates a subjugation of bodily appetites. In fact, future research

Whilst many artists denied the will to war, in doing so they merely affirmed the will to life and the will to live as an act of self-preservation. For example, Karl Schmidt-Rottluff did not deny his will to such an extent that he sought 'voluntary poverty' or asceticism, but he did maintain a moral denial of the will to war. On 28.06.1917, he expressed a will to end the war when observing how, "the troops, whom I have got to know in the past 21 months, now only want peace, and for a long time have not cared under what conditions."[794] In August of that year, he again repudiated the will to war when, referring to historian and collector Wilhelm Niemeyer's support for the conquest of Riga, he judged it to be a "pre-meditated crime."[795]

Although Heckel did not go so far as to completely deny every need of his will, his denial of the will to war began to emerge slowly from around mid-1916. This can be seen in a letter which was written by him to art historian Walter Kaesbach in August 1916 from Ostende in which he states that:

> Today I received a letter from Kestenberg. He would like to have something for an expanded issue (of the *Bildermann*) which will be 'directed' against the horrors of war. No word, the line of the National Committee [i.e., the committee of the Reichstag advocating peace negotiations]. I don't know. They are both right and wrong. When I walked through the casualty transport train at Ghent, yes. When I

might benefit by exploring research on asceticism. Expressionist figuration, for example, may be illuminated by the work of John M. Dillon, who, who discusses the contribution of Platonism to the European tradition of asceticism. (Dillon, M. J. 'Rejecting the Body, Refining the Body: Some Remarks on the Development of Platonist Asceticism' in: Wimbush, V. L., Valantasis, R., and Union Theological, S., *Asceticism* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)., p.81). He argues that each of two major traditions in Europe have arisen from Platonism and have evolved into distinct historical accounts. The first tradition rejects the body as an impediment to the health of the soul, while the second disciplines and refines the body by making it a suitable habitation for the soul. He argues that both aspects necessitate ascetic practices and that the most significant demonstration of Plato's rejection of the human body can be found in the *Phaedo.* And so it is that, contrary to humanity's lust for war and bodily training for it, we might invoke Socrates who stated that we should do well "if we consort with the body as little as possible, and do not commune with it, except in so far as we must, and do not infect ourselves with its nature, but remain pure from it, until God himself shall release us." (Gallop, D., *Phaedo* (Clarendon Press, 1975).,(67a), p.12). This is what Dillon refers to as "the world-negating tradition of asceticism." (Wimbush, Valantasis, and Union Theological.,p.81). Indeed, in line with this tradition, Socrates concludes that "we men are in some sort of prison." (Gallop.,(62b), p.6). By contrast, the second tradition has no dispute with our bodies or our world, but rather perceives "the ensouled body as an organism that gains greatly by being finely tuned. Soul should dominate body, and rational soul should dominate irrational soul, and the whole organism should dominate - or, rather, transcend as far as possible - its environment." (Wimbush, Valantasis, and Union Theological.,p.82). In this respect, we could in future argue that artists such as Kandinsky aspired to knowing over willing and that this would negate C1.

[794] Soika, A., Moeller, M. M., and Brücke Museum, *Weltenbruch: die Künstler der Brücke im Ersten Weltkrieg. 1914-1918* (München ; London: Prestel, 2014).p.209. Cf. Letter from Schmidt-Rottluff to Niemeyer 28.06.1917, and LMO-GW 3.

[795] Letter from Schmidt-Rottluff to Niemeyer 12.08.1917, and LMO-GW 3.

> see the daredevils of sailors, healthy predators, wonderfully filled with strength - then one sees the good side (of the issue). [796]

Early on in the war Otto Mueller wrote to his wife Maschka that, "life is interesting to be sure, but in the long term unbearable."[797] By the end of 1916 he would write "my life is terrible, you've no idea what I have to suffer and endure. Everything disgusts me here, the people, the food and running around the whole day with guns. No peace and quiet … madness."[798] Although Mueller never arrived at an ascetic denial of the will to life he at least denied the will to war when he told Mashka that "I hope that the war will come to an end and we will soon be together."[799] However, if he, or indeed the whole human race, at any time achieved an utter denial of the will to life or the will to live, then the world would automatically vanish into nothing according to Schopenhauer.[800] Consequently, there would be no triumph of the will at all since if this became the rule then the human race would become extinct and along with it the animal kingdom. Therefore, with the total eradication of knowledge everything would vanish into oblivion "for there can be no object without a subject."[801]

4.2 Beckmann and Marc's Military Affiliations

At the outbreak of the First World War, Beckmann was far from oblivion, being on holiday close to Danzig where Schopenhauer was born.[802] When war preparations began Beckmann subsequently returned to Berlin, and as Barbara Buenger indicates,

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[796] See: Werckmeister, O. 'Heckel and the First World War' in: Rumold, R. and Werckmeister, O. K., *The Ideological Crisis of Expressionism: The Literary and Artistic German War Colony in Belgium 1914-1918* (Columbia, S.C.: Camden House, 1990). p.223.
[797] Letter from Mueller to Maschka, 21.1.1917, from "Briefe von Otto Mueller", no. 11. In: Lüttichau, M.-A. v., Pirsig, T., and Mueller, O., *Otto Mueller CD-ROM*, München, 2003).
[798] Mueller quoted in: Buchheim, L. G. n., *Otto Mueller: Leben und Werke* (Feldafing: Buchheim, 1963). p.168.
[799] Ibid., p.181.
[800] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.380.
[801] Ibid.Vol.1, p.380.
[802] The Schopenhauer family fled Danzig in March 1793 to escape Prussian annexation.

Minna Beckmann-Tube was asked by Scheffler to choose samples of Beckmann's war letters to her for publication shortly after his posting to East Prussia.[803] We know that the letters were written between 14.09.1914 and 12.06.1915 being published in *Kunst und Künstler* from December 1914 to July 1915. By 1916, these military letters were made public through the publisher and gallery owner Bruno Cassirer as a book with the title *Briefe im Krie*ge.[804]

Buenger has suggested that there is no record of Beckmann's military unit, although she has believed that he was attached to a division of the Eighth Army.[805] There is however a record of his military assignment made by the artist himself which Buenger overlooks. This record can be found in one of Beckmann's sketchbooks that he kept during the war. There, on page 91 verso, can be found his exact military affiliation written down as "M. Beckmann volunteer nurse at the Military Hospital Department of the Active Guard Corps Stage Inspection of the IV. Army." We know, therefore, that he was in the 4th Army and not the assumed 8th Army."[806]

By contrast, Marc's military service began on 01.10.1899, as a 1-year volunteer in the *Königlicher Bayerischer 1. Feldartillerie-Regiment 'Prinzregent Luitpold'* (Royal Bavarian 1st Field Artillery Regiment 'Prince Regent Luitpold') where he was made a private in April 1900, then discharged to the Reserve in September 1900. When the First World War broke out, Marc moved from his hometown of Ried on 06.08.1914 to join his active service regiment. On 30.08.1914, after a transfer to the *Leichte Munitionskolonne* (Light Munitions Column), he returned to the field as a new non-commissioned officer.

[803] Beckmann and Buenger. p.133. He agreed to their publication with reluctance. However, the letters are not to be taken as unmediated 'truth', just because they are personal disclosures to Minna. It may well be the case that Beckmann shaped his letters carefully since he knew that they would be published.
[804] Ibid., p.133.
[805] Ibid., p.134.
[806] "M. Beckmann freiwilliger Krankenpfleger der Kriegslazarettabteilung des aktiven Gardecorps Etappeninspection der IV. Arme(e)." in: Max Beckmann. *Die Skizzenbücher*. Ostfildern 2010. See: sketchbook no. 9, page 330.

He was appointed to the rank of *Vizefeldwebel und Offizier-Aspirant* (Staff Sergeant and Officer Candidate), awarded the Iron Cross 2nd Class, promoted to *Offizierstellvertreter* (Acting Officer), and finally on 13.10.1915 promoted again to Lieutenant of the Field Artillery.

Overall, Marc strongly affirmed the will to war and was profoundly grateful for it, often writing and commenting about his experiences as Beckmann did. As early as mid-October 1914, Marc had written an article called 'In War's Purifying Fire' for the December 15th edition of the *Vossische Zeitung* in which he aired this affirmation. In affirming the will to war Marc kept company with writer Thomas Mann, author of the pro-war book *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen* (*Observations of a Non-Political Man*). On 04.10.1914, the 'Manifest der 93' (Manifesto of the Ninety-Three) was signed by 93 of Germany's intellectual elites in support of the war, among them being the painter Max Liebermann, art historian Wilhelm von Bode, philosopher Rudolf Christoph Eucken, and historian Karl Gotthard Lamprecht who discussed the concept of *Reizbarkeit* (excitability) in German society.[807]

Beckmann's own excitability about the war can be sensed in a letter to Minna written on 11.10.1914 in which he claimed that he went out, through hordes of wounded and shattered soldiers who were coming from the battlefield, and listened to the tremendous 'music' of war.[808] From the safety of his position Beckmann seemed to be affirming the will to war after reporting how he longed to paint the sound of war with it's "beautiful depths!"[809] In this context Beckmann managed to produce a lithographic image

[807] See Lamprecht's 1902 work titled: *Zur jungsten deutschen Vergangenheit* (On the Most Recent German History) discussed in: Cowan.p.13. Also in Cowan note the connections between Lamprecht and 'nervous art' on p.17. See too: Jürgen von Ungern-Sternberg and Wolfgang von Ungern-Sternberg, *Der Aufruf 'An die Kulturwelt!': das Manifest der 93 und die Anfänge der Kriegspropaganda im Ersten Weltkrieg*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1996.
[808] Beckmann. p.18. Buenger suggests that this was probably Gumbinnen (Gusev), which was a focal point for a campaign against the Russians at the Battle of Tannenberg. See: Ibid., p.370.
[809] Ibid. p.18.

of exhausted combatants called *Fallen Soldiers* in 1914 (fig. 109), highlighting the devastating effects of war upon the body. Here Beckmann depicts the sight of three figures in a state of mortal collapse, with the only upright figure carrying a drawn dagger marking out the declination of the seated figure before him. This sight of wounded or dead soldiers subsequently became an everyday occurrence for Beckmann and medical orderlies.

On 10.03.1915, whilst working at the *Kriegslazarett-Museum*, Beckmann's role was to attend to patients who were not serious casualties.[810] His duties were to clean the operating theatres, to collect wounded soldiers transferred from the trenches and to care for their wounds. However, his work in this respect did not deter his will from creative action since on 16.03.1915 he enthused that on his day off, instead of making an excursion, he threw himself into his drawing like a wild man and drew a self-portrait for seven hours.[811] We can see that creative will in an oil painting titled *Self-Portrait as a Nurse* of 1915 (fig. 110), where Beckmann looks out as if in surprise whilst holding a paint brush. As he does so, he almost casts before the viewer an image of detached self-aggrandisement. The Red Cross on his lapel, which signifies his military affiliation, picks up the pinkish skin tones of his face perhaps expressing a powerful will to life.

4.3 Beckmann, the Will to Life and Hedonism

Beckmann's will to life at times verged on hedonism during the war. In fact, when reading his war writings what comes across is the image of a man participating in both hedonism and tragedy.[812] There are several letters which substantiate this claim, but

[810] Buenger states: "The Kriegslazarett-Museum (Field hospital museum) was a collecting place for the sick and wounded close to the Courtrai railway station." His work was carried out under the supervision of a chief medical officer who knew his paintings. See: Beckmann and Buenger. p.371.
[811] Beckmann. p.27. Buenger identifies Beckmann's location as "Thorn (Torun), an old fortified town on the Vistula, is 238 miles from Berlin and was of great importance in the history of both Poland and Prussia. Thorn was a main place of transfer, about sixty miles from Mlawa". See: Beckmann and Buenger., p.369.
[812] Schopenhauer suggests "that the measure of an individual's possible happiness is determined beforehand by his individuality. In particular, the limits of his mental powers have fixed once for all his capacity for pleasures of a higher

two in particular are worth mentioning. The first was written from Ostende on 16.03.1915 while others were dying on the front line or struggling with their wounded bodies. The letter to Minna shows that Beckmann was 'spirited away' from danger through the instigation of a certain Captain Ludwig Thormaehlen.[813] Beckmann subsequently reported that, "Here I am sitting in an elegant hotel room, I have lit a cigarette and a bottle of red wine stands before me. It amuses me to gaze at the smoke from my cigarette and to think about the drunken sailor with whom I have just driven back or about the grotesque variations in my life."[814] This image of a man taking his leisure in an 'elegant hotel room' whilst others were on the brink of nothingness is hedonistic. It is reminiscent of a charge which was made against Schopenhauer by Georg Lukács in *The Destruction of Reason*, when he described how "Schopenhauer's system, well laid out and architecturally ingenious in form, rises up like a modern luxury hotel on the brink of the abyss, nothingness and futility. And the daily sight of the abyss, between the leisurely enjoyment of meals or works of art, can only enhance one's pleasure in this elegant comfort."[815]

The second letter to Minna was written on 27.03.1915, when Beckmann was in Wervicq, seven miles from Ypres. Once more a parallel might be drawn between Beckmann and Lukacs' perception of Schopenhauer, especially when Beckmann confided that whilst eating an orange he could peacefully observe the most exquisite shooting at planes, and how "at night I have wonderful fireworks" (*wundervolles Feuerwerk*) arising

order. If those powers are small, all the efforts from without, everything done for him by mankind or good fortune, will not enable him to rise above the ordinary half-animal human happiness and comfort. He is left to depend on the pleasures of the senses, on a cosy and cheerful family life, on low company and vulgar pastimes." See: Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Eric Francis Jules Payne. *Parerga and Paralipomena. Short Philosophical Essays* Vol.1, p.317-318. Cf. *World as Will and Representation*, Vol.2, chap. vii.

[813] "Ludwig Thormaehlen (1889-1956), a sculptor, had become director of the Charlottenburg Kunstgewerbeschule at the war's beginning. The same year he also began a career at the Berlin Nationalgalerie that eventually led to his appointment as curator in the department of prints and drawings." See: Beckmann and Buenger. p.372.

[814] Beckmann. p.28.

[815] Lukács, G., *The Destruction of Reason* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981). p.243.

from flares in the trenches.[816] Subsequently, he acted as if he were a connoisseur of war, remarking upon how his ear was learning to differentiate machine gun fire from infantry fire along with the gratifying power to recognise French and German cannons.

Beckmann's motivation to pursue gratifications of this type during unprecedented human slaughter might come as a surprise to us. Yet, it would come as no surprise to Schopenhauer, who acknowledges that motives of this kind can "in this way obtain power over the will, and bring about acts of will of the most various kinds."[817] In addition, he says that the will is only made visible in motives and that a motive declares itself as a candidate for quenching the thirst of the will.[818] However, even if these motives satisfy the will it quickly creates new demands for new satisfactions. Therefore, if every individual succumbs to such hedonic egoism then Beckmann is no exception here, since he exemplifies how the individual often pursues their own willing at the expense of other knowledge.[819]

4.4 Beckmann's Knowledge of Schopenhauer

Despite the fact that Beckmann often pursued his own willing and did not possess knowledge born from a University education, he did read the works of Schopenhauer avidly. He owned a copy of the 1902 edition *The World as Will and Representation*, along with Volumes 1 and 2 of *Parerga and Paralipomena* in their 1891-93 editions. He also had a 1921 edition of the *Sämtliche Werke* (Collected Works).[820] Of these books, Beckmann's copy of *The World as Will and Representation* is particularly interesting since it contains annotations made by the artist himself.[821] The annotations to volume 1

[816] Beckmann. p.32.
[817] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.327.
[818] Ibid., p.327.
[819] Ibid.,p.327.
[820] Schopenhauer, A. and Frischeisen-Köhler, M., *Arthur Schopenhauer* (Berlin: Weichert, 1921). The *Parerga* itself was given to him by his first wife Minna-Tube in 1906 but we do not know about the origins of the other volumes.
[821] The comments which Beckmann made in his copies of Schopenhauer have been published in: Beckmann In the preface to his book, Uwe M. Schneede tells us that the vast majority of Beckmann's notes are in Schopenhauer's and

are undated and appear in an older version of the work, whilst many of those in volume 2 are date-lined to the 1940s and it is these that will be used here. Whilst it is not conclusive to relate annotations made in the 1940s to Beckmann's thinking and practice of his earlier years, the annotations do provide a basis on which we can begin to assess his understanding of Schopenhauer. This is supported by the fact that, although the extant copy of Beckmann's volume 2 was published in 1921, we know that Beckmann had sourced older versions of volume 2 and read them before the war.

Given the evidence available to us, Beckmann continued to read Schopenhauer after the war as part of his ongoing autodidacticism. As Buenger has shown, Beckmann's early decision to study philosophy also bought him into contact with Hegel's *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences) and Nietzsche's *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (Beyond Good and Evil).[822] In addition, she argues that Beckmann's "strong reaction to the 'logarithmic' reasoning of Immanuel Kant, for instance, was undoubtedly reinforced by reading critiques of Kant in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche."[823] Moreover, at the time of his death, Beckmann owned a 1908 copy of Kant's *Kritik der reinen Vemunft* (Critique of Pure Reason) of 1781, so it is therefore possible that Beckmann had read Kant for himself as early as 1903.[824] We can argue for this given the following diary entry where the artist says that:

> Yes, he's certainly a first-rate thinking machine, this Kant; but what's it for, this lifetime spent investigating human intelligence. Is it really worth it? Haven't the

Madame de Blavatasky's works. By contrast, there are no marks in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* or *Theorie der Reinmoralischen Religion* - although Beckmann recommended the former, and the works of Schopenhauer, to Schneede in a letter of 1936 as necessary reading. In Schneede's opinion, Beckmann's notes on Schopenhauer and Blavatsky read like conversations with personal friends, displaying both strong criticism and insight. Indeed, Schneede elaborates on this by saying that "… he conversed with the authors now and again, as if they had been sitting intimately opposite him for a long time, […] 'Schoppi, Nitsche und old Auntie BLV'. With all three […] he could find individual parts charming and excellent and very pretty, but he could equally denounce them as pointless rubbish (Blavatsky) academic (Schopenhauer) or *Jugendstil* rubbish (Nietzsche). Nowhere is he an unbounded admirer, but also nowhere […] is he purely a harsh critic." Ibid., p.7-8.

[822] Hegel, G. W. F., *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999). Nietzsche, F., Nikol Verlagsgesellschaft mb, H., and Co, K. G., *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (2017).

[823] Beckmann and Buenger.

[824] Ibid. End note 48, p.332. See: Kant, I. and Schmidt, H., *Kritik der reinen Vernunft, herausg. von H. Schmidt. Volksausg* (Leipz1908).

> most beautiful deeds sprung directly from unconscious action, and isn't that always by far the most beautiful. What has this tedious logarithmic table achieved? Something he can be proud of. Be comically proud of something.[825]

Although Beckmann rarely referred to Kant, Buenger is persuaded that the artist's wide philosophical reading during the 1920s may also have been informed by Paul Deussen's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*.[826]

Despite the caveat that Beckmann's readings of Schopenhauer straddled the First World War, it is important to deploy his annotations nonetheless, since they clearly demonstrate that Schopenhauer was important to Beckmann.[827] Even though such evidence cannot be relied upon to prove *categorically* that 'x' or 'y' was of significance to Beckmann at specific points of artistic creation (or even philosophically), it could nonetheless be regarded as a strong indicator that this was *likely* to be the case. Therefore, although Beckmann may have made fewer references to Schopenhauer during the war years, subsequently however, we do have strong evidence for him reading Schopenhauer's work which suggests the possibility of an earlier interest that develops after the conclusion of the war. As a result, we may employ the evidence as an indicator with a warning that it cannot be used in any conclusive way.[828]

In his copy of the *World as Will and Representation* Volume One for example, Beckmann has marked out for attention pages 314-315 in their entirety without dating them.[829] Certain sections have been underlined by Beckmann such as:

> What might otherwise be called the finest part of life, its purest joy, just because it lifts us out of real existence, and transforms us into disinterested

[825] Beckmann's diary entry for 30.08.1903, translated in: Beckmann and Buenger., p.20.
[826] Deussen, P., *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Religionen*, 3rd Aufl. ed. (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1920). Cf. Beckmann and Buenger. End note 12, p.393.
[827] It may be of interest to note that when in Frankfurt Schopenhauer lived at Schöne Aussicht 16-17 in 'rooms' and that Beckmann lived near there briefly after the First World War at Untermainkai 3.
[828] When using such evidence, the English translated versions of Schopenhauer will be cited in-text along with the German language Beckmann/Schaffer collection reference in the corresponding footnotes. Bear in mind that Beckmann actually read Schopenhauer in the following: Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Max Frischeisen-Köhler. *Arthur Schopenhauer* [in In Fraktur]. Berlin: Weichert, 1921 and earlier 1902 versions.
[829] As paginated in the English translation which we are using throughout this thesis, not his German edition.

> spectators of it, is pure knowledge which remains foreign to all willing, pleasure in the beautiful, genuine delight in art.[830]

Here Beckmann has underlined the phrase 'pure knowledge which remains foreign to all willing'. Although Beckmann may have read this passage before the war, and in relation to a purely artistic experience, it does lead us to suspect that, if Beckmann could peacefully observe whilst eating an orange 'the most exquisite shooting at planes', then he *may* have been engaging in 'pure knowledge which remains foreign to all willing' and sublimating his observations into an aesthetic experience. On the other hand, he has also attended to a passage on page 314 which says, "But this need for exciting the will shows itself particularly in the invention and maintenance of card-playing, which is in the truest sense an expression of the wretched side of humanity."[831] There, Beckmann has marked the whole passage with four strokes in the margin. If Beckmann's reading offers us a clue as to his personal character, let us ask if he was a disinterested spectator or a mere hedonist entertaining the basic instincts of his will? Furthermore, could it be inferred that Beckmann looked to Schopenhauer for practical insights to help transform his character?[832]

The answer to the first question must be yes, since he was at least a moderate hedonist, while the answer to the second was probably no. Supportive evidence to the effect can be found in a diary entry of 07.02.1904 where he writes that:

> Once again, the Closerie des Lilas (which incidentally means the Lilac Nurseries, as I recently discovered), once again red wine, not quite so good as on the previous pages. I have read through the whole meaningless muddle of moods once again and I am very content that I still have half a bottle of red wine left. That is all. Schopenhauer lies in front of me. A matter of duty. And in spite of him I have no

[830] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.314. See: Beckmann, P. and Schaffer, J., *Die Bibliothek Max Beckmanns: Unterstreichungen, Kommentare, Notizen und Skizzen in seinen Büchern* (Worms am Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992). p.85-6.
[831] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.p.314. Beckmann and Schaffer. p.86.
[832] Practical and philosophical insights into the nature of human character will be examined in Chapter 6 of this thesis, through Schopenhauer's philosophy of free will.

> desire left to penetrate these tedious idiotic mysteries of a man who seems to be dried up in his living body. I will live I swear it a thousand times. I will.[833]

4.5 Marc, Will-Power and Fate

As with Beckmann, in a manner which perhaps upholds C1, Marc too shared in a certain excitement for the will to war and the will to life, however he was never to be found in an 'elegant hotel room' but more often suffering bodily fatigue through combat duties. We can hear this in a letter to Kandinsky of 24.10.1914 where Marc had stated that, "I am *living in this* war. Indeed, I see in it the healing, if dreadful, gateway to our goals; it won't set back the people, but it will clean Europe and make it 'ready'."[834] Yet, by 16.11.1914 Marc would inform Kandinsky that he was suffering from bodily fatigue and wrote that:

> Unfortunately, my body isn't as capable of resistance as I thought in the beginning, but must endure all the same; my heart isn't angry with the war, but is grateful from the depths; there was no other gateway to the time of the spirit, the Augean stables and the old Europe could only thus be cleaned, or is there a single person who would wish this war hadn't happened?[835]

His commanding officer Lieutenant Öhler considered his health to be in danger and offered Marc the post of supervisor and billeting officer which he accepted.[836]

Several months later, undeterred by bodily fatigue, Marc wrote an article called 'The Secret Europe,'[837] published in the March 1915 edition of *Das Forum,* affirming the will to war. Other artistic journals and newspapers of the day, such as *Kunst und Künstler* and *Kriegzeit* also affirmed the will to war at first. They found support from aesthetic luminaries such as Fechter, whose article 'Confirmation of the War' not only affirmed war but suggested that a renewal of German art would result from it. In addition, Adolf

[833] Beckmann, M., Beckmann-Tube, M., and Schmidt, D., *Frühe Tagebücher, 1903/04 und 1912/13: mit Erinnerungen von Minna Beckmann-Tube* (München: Piper, 1985). p.85. Despite his acerbic comments Beckmann was to study Schopenhauer more than any other philosopher.
[834] Marc, F. and Meißner, G., *Briefe, Schriften und Aufzeichnungen* (2. Aufl. Leipzig: Kiepenheuer, 1989). p.204.
[835] Ibid., p.206.
[836] Ibid., p.119.
[837] Marc, F., "Das geheime Europa," in: *Das Forum*. (March 1915), pp.632-638.

Behne's 1915 article 'Organisation, Germanness, and Art,'[838] used the significant phrase 'willpower' in his discussion of the war. This is significant because the nurturing of 'willpower' through 'will-training' was an essential aspect of the war effort.

Although Marc's 'willpower' did not require reinforcement through military training, many soldiers would never accommodate such training. The objective behind military 'will-training' in the First World War involved harnessing the natural aggression of the human will in pursuit of its war aims – and as such validates C1. As Cowan points out, 'will-training' was deployed in order to prepare combatants for the enormous stresses of industrialised warfare and unprecedented human slaughter. As an example, he cites a 1914 pamphlet, *Der Wille zum Sieg* (*The Will to Victory*) by Colonel Friedrich Immanuel, who realised that mass technological warfare required unparalleled self-control. Immanuel contended that military training was not just about acquiring the skill-sets of a soldier but "to a much greater extent, soldiers must train their wills, their capacity for self-mastery."[839]

For many soldiers, this would have made no difference since their characters were such that they could never affirm the will to war anyway, and their resolution to escape military action was unlikely to be shaken by military 'will-training'. Nevertheless, as Cowan shows, military theoreticians such as Immanuel boldly asserted the will to war. Even though Immanuel acknowledged that wars were conducted under different circumstances than in the past, and that the enemy might be equipped with all manner of technological wonders, he emphasised that:

> …all such thoughts must recede before the singular idea that we are at least as formidable as our enemy and that we possess the unbreakable *will* to achieve victory in battle, however great the sacrifices. Weakness, hesitation, and doubt are

[838] Behne, Adolf, 'Organization, Germanness, and Art' in: Haas-Keye, O., *Zeit-Echo* (München: Graphik-Verlag, 1914). 1, nos. 25-24, (1915): p. 561-65.
[839] Friedrich Immanuel, *Der Wille zum Sieg* (Leipzig: Heinrich Finck, 1914), 66. Quoted and translated in: Cowan. p.256.

> unknown concepts in our army, no matter what terrifying and fantastic scenarios laymen might dream up to describe the horrors of future wars.[840]

Within this culture of willpower, and what appears to be an aggressive confirmation of C1, on 29.01.1915 Marc went so far as to write to Macke's widow that, "I love today all people who tremble with us in our life and with the 'will of fate' of this war. Strangely enough, there are many others who anxiously avoid everything which could draw their soul into the war, the 'Neutrals' in this country!"[841] Here, Marc alludes to the pacifist voices who aroused suspicion amongst those who were affirming the will to war. Such pacifist voices found their way into anti-war magazines which were subsequently prohibited from publication, or severely censored, forcing some to relocate in neutral Switzerland in order to continue publishing.[842] As Deborah Lewer reveals, Swiss-based magazines and newspapers such as *Der Revoluzzer* (Zurich), *Zeit-Echo*, *Die Freie Zeitung*, *Die Weissen* (Bern), and *Demain* (Geneva) regularly aroused suspicion, their editors and contributors - often inaccurately - branded anarchists or 'Bolsheviks. "[843]

Marc was aware that the war as a 'will of fate', not only had a political dimension but was the tool of a deeper will.[844] This is corroborated by a letter he wrote to his wife Maria Marc only a month earlier on 23.12.1914. In it he argued that the bloody-mindedness of the French politically speaking was becoming ever more puzzling to him.

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[840] Ibid., p.256.
[841] Marc. p.205.
[842] See: Raabe, Paul, 'Das literarische Leben im Expressionism. Eine historische Skizze'. in: Raabe, Paul *Die Zeitschriften und Sammlungen des literarischen Expressionismu*s. Stuttgart. J.B Metzler 1964, p.15 and footnote below.
[843] Lewer, Debborah. 'The Avant-Garde in Swiss Exile 1914-20' in: Brooker, P., *The Oxford Critical and Cultural History of Modernist Magazines* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). p.1033.
[844] Schopenhauer's view was that the necessity of that which happens 'is not blind'. The belief in the connectedness of every event in our lives as systematic and necessary is he states: "…a fatalism of a higher order which cannot, like simple fatalism, be demonstrated, but happens possibly to everyone sooner or later and firmly holds him either temporarily or permanently according to his way of thinking. We can call this transcendent fatalism, as distinct from that which is ordinary and demonstrable. It does not come, like the latter, from a really theoretical knowledge or from the investigation necessary for this, for which few would be qualified; but it gradually reveals itself from the experiences in the course of a man's own life." See: Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Eric Francis Jules Payne. *Parerga and Paralipomena.* p.204. These systematic and necessary events are certainly conspicuous to historians concerned with Macke and Marc's deaths, since they belong to these artists with "the stamp of a moral or inner necessity, yet, on the other, they carry the clear impression of an external and wholly accidental nature." Ibid., p.204, which we may argue makes them so chilling. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, § 35.

He observed that it was uncanny to see how the politics of national interests, which was the tool of a deeper will, necessarily turns against itself when this deeper will demands it (*wenn dieser tiefere Wille es will*). That was the 'mistake' of politics he believed. He concluded that he would be patient and not hope for a premature ending to the war even if German 'interests' required it.[845]

Undoubtedly, Marc's fated affirmation of the will to war was shared for the most part by the German nation, especially the ruling classes who for some time had felt undermined by incipient Socialism. When the German nation affirmed the will to war a *Burgfrieden* ended the internal political dissension "behind the banner of a fully justified war of self-defence."[846] As David Welch points out, "In August 1914 therefore, it seemed that the war had created a new sense of solidarity in which class antagonisms were transcended by some entirely fictitious national community (*Volksgemeinschaft*)."[847] In a letter to Maria, Marc extended this transcendence to include the whole continent by suggesting that the war was a self-willed act undertaken by Europe to 'purify' itself.[848] He therefore believed that the "war was a natural *consequence* and hence a just, unfailing atonement."[849] As we shall see, this belief was ironically to become an unfailing prophecy for his own tragic fate and an affirmation of C1, since an overpowering affirmation of C1 took his life in an 'unfailing' manner. Indeed, his statement, perhaps unwittingly, reflected Schopenhauer's view that "the true sense of the tragedy is the deeper insight that what the hero atones for is not his own particular sins, but original sin, in other words, the guilt of existence itself."[850] Consequently, Marc readily affirmed the will to war, harbouring no

[845] Marc and Meißner. p.123.
[846] A *Burgfrieden* is a form of political truce and was a critical factor in war propaganda. See: Welch, D., *Germany and Propaganda in World War I : Pacifism, Mobilization and Total War* (2014); ibid., p.14.
[847] Ibid., p.14.
[848] Letter to Maria, 22.02.1916 in: Marc, F., Lankheit, K., and Steffen, U., *Letters from the War* (New York: P. Lang, 1992).p.138. Cf. Original letter to Maria, 22.2.1916 in: Marc, F., *Briefe aus dem Feld: mit 32 Bildern des Verfassers* (Berlin: Rembrandt-Verlag, 1940). p138.
[849] Quotation and translation from Werckmeister, O. K., *The Making of Paul Klee's Career, 1914-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). p.62.
[850] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.254.

regret at enlisting, feeling lucky that it was his fate to be playing his own part in it despite its tragic costs.

4.6 Beckmann, Schopenhauer and the Question of Fate

Beckmann also shared Marc's perception that the war was a question of fate. On 24.05.1915, he wrote that he was not participating in the war as some kind of historian, instead he was immersing himself in the war as if it were a manifestation of life, as in sickness, love or ecstasy. Since he pursued fear, sickness and ecstasy to their utmost limits, he felt that he could do the same with the war. He was persuaded that "everything is life, wonderfully changeable and rich in ideas. Everywhere I find deep lines of beauty in the suffering and bearing of this terrible fate."[851]

One key to interpreting Beckmann's perception of history and fate is to be found in Schopenhauer's essay 'Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual' in *Parerga and Paralipomena* Volume One. Indeed, Beckmann spent a great deal of time annotating, underlining and thinking about the nature of fate and history as found in *Parerga*. Within that thinking process, Beckmann has attended to a passage where Schopenhauer proposes that world history does not have a plan or blueprint, as the academic philosophy of his time suggested. Whilst nations have their existence in the abstract, individuals alone are real for Schopenhauer which means that "world history is without direct metaphysical significance; it is really only an accidental configuration."[852] In his copy, Beckmann has underlined the phrase "individuals are what is real"[853] and appended his own comment to it with the words, "a confidence trick" (*Hochstapelei*). What Beckmann meant is open to speculation, but given the trend of

[851] Beckmann. p.67. In chapter 6, of this thesis, it shall be recounted how Nolde struugled with what he described as a fateful pressure placed upon him by the Gestapo.
[852] Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.1, p.204. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation.* Vol.1, § 35.
[853] Beckmann and Schaffer. p.75.

Beckmann's comments it is most likely a repudiation of Schopenhauer's notion that 'individuals are what is real'.

The greatest proportion of Beckmann's commentary in *Parerga* is given over to the nature of fate. In this regard Schopenhauer warns his readers that they cannot expect to receive definite answers on the nature of fate. Yet, he does suggest that the belief in a supernatural providence is universally known amongst his readers. When we encounter bad luck, he says, many of us reassure ourselves with maxims such as 'it could have been worse', or 'this was a blessing in disguise', both of which arise from the notion that chance is the prince of this world and error its vice-regent. Since we are buffeted by both chance and its vice-regent, "we shun the blows of one world-tyrant and rush to the other in that we turn from chance and appeal to error."[854]

After reading this passage in later years, on 17.06.1940, Beckmann has underlined the words 'although chance rules the world,'[855] and then a few paragraphs later the phrase 'with strict necessity'. This is taken from Schopenhauer's observation that, "without exception everything that happens takes place with *strict necessity…*"[856] Further on, Beckmann has marked in the margin of his copy the whole section which speaks of an apparent occult power which guides external events.[857] This section says that "in truth, however, that occult power that guides even external influences can ultimately have its root only in our own mysterious inner being; for indeed in the last resort the alpha and omega of all existence lie within us."[858]

There are many more instances in *Parerga* where Beckmann has either underlined passages on the nature of fate or added his personal comments. One final example implicates the concept of the will in relation to fate. This is where Schopenhauer asserts

[854] Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.1, p.204.
[855] Beckmann and Schaffer. p.75.
[856] Ibid., p.75.
[857] Ibid., p.76.
[858] Schopenhauer and Payne. p.212.

that sometimes we adopt plans unsuitable to our welfare but "while we are eagerly pursuing it we experience against it a conspiracy of fate, which sets in motion all its machinery to defeat it. In this way, fate finally thrust us back, against our will, on to the path that is truly suited to us."[859] From this, Beckmann has underlined the words beginning with 'while we are eagerly pursuing it', right through until 'a path that is truly suited to us', underlining the phrase 'conspiracy of fate which sets in motion all its machinery to defeat us'.[860]

It is clear that Beckmann was interested in Schopenhauer's thoughts about fate, and ironically 'a conspiracy of fate' did thrust Beckmann away from the military and back to the world of art – onto a path which truly suited him. This machinery of fate meant that by the end of the summer in 1915 Beckmann found himself at the 15th Corps' headquarters in Strasburg on medical leave following a nervous breakdown; then by October, his will to war broken and his health in jeopardy, a doctor he had known in Belgium finally arranged for his transfer to Frankfurt. A broken will and nervous breakdown as a result of war trauma was not uncommon as history has shown. Indeed, Cowan argues that:

> Given their experiences with shell-shocked soldiers, military doctors were some of the most vocal critics of the model of hysteria as a female disease. Schleich, for one, insisted that hysteria was gender-blind: 'Thus hysteria knows no sex, and it is high time to free women from the curse of being the only bearers of hysteria - an idea probably invented by men to make themselves believe that they are more reasonable than women.'"[861]

Although there is no evidence that Beckmann exhibited symptoms of 'hysteria', he was discharged from military duty in November 1915, and was not alone among artists in feeling the effects of war service. As the war began to intensify there is some evidence to suggest that the experience of combat had undermined Marc's will to war. Indeed, a

[859] Ibid., p.218.
[860] Beckmann and Schaffer. p.76.
[861] Carl Ludwig Schleich, *Vom Schaltwerk der Gedanken* (Berlin: Fischer, 1925), 137f. Quoted and translated in: Cowan. p.313.

fluctuation in Marc's affirmation of the will to war did manifest itself on occasions, for example when he was on leave on 05.10.1915. On that occasion, Macke's widowed wife was to hear from Marc that he was "full of hate against the war," but at the same time enjoying the unchallenged reputation of being an "excellent" soldier – an incongruity which he described as grotesque (*das Groteske*).[862]

4.7 Marc and the Morality of War

The above incongruity leads us to point out that, although Marc was proud of his military prowess and the sensation of becoming a better soldier, scholarship to date has neglected the moral implications of his actions as a trained killer.[863] If we are to make any judgement about these implications then Schopenhauer concludes that right and wrong are moral determinations, being valid to human conduct "in reference to the inner significance of this conduct in itself."[864] Therefore, according to Schopenhauer's moral philosophy, there are three fundamental incentives which motivate human conduct. These are egoism, malice, and compassion.[865]

Because Marc's military duty compelled him to kill other human beings, beyond this mandate it would be objectively impossible to discern whether his killing included egoism, malice or compassion. Yet, when a sensitive human being injures another they often find that the act presents itself to their consciousness as a wrongdoing shadowed by an inner pain. This pain is the perpetrator's consciousness of an internal affirmation of their will which has denied the will of their victims. Consequently, some perpetrators are aware that even though they are different from their victim as phenomena, they are in

[862] Marc. p.216.
[863] Schopenhauer claims how "… the man who denies that his own conduct has any other than empirical significance, will never make the statement without feeling an inner conflict therewith and exercising self-restraint." Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Eric Francis Jules Payne. *Parerga and Paralipomena.*Vol.2, p.266. See also: Schopenhauer, A., E.F.J. Payne, and D.E. Cartwright. *On the Basis of Morality*. § 21.
[864] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.341.
[865] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.145. Moral determinations are studied in depth in the following chapter of this thesis

themselves somehow identical with that victim.[866]

On the other hand, Schopenhauer argues that the recipient of the wrong is achingly conscious of the denial of their will as it is disclosed in their body. At the same time, they are conscious that without doing wrong, they could fend off that denial by all means, unless they lacked the power.[867] In fact, in what amounts to another validation of C1, Marc must have regarded the killing of another human being as the warding off of a potential denial of his own embodied will. In a letter to Maria dated 02.02.1916, his sense of warding off harm comes across when he likened the process of war to a man who does not die of a cancerous growth but of the deadly kernel of it which cannot be overcome.[868]

His will to life and his will to live, is also evident a month earlier in a New Year's Day letter to Maria (which provides us with further evidence of the validity of C1 due to an overriding emphasis on the will) where he stated that, "I do not enter this year reluctantly – my optimism is indestructible; lack of optimism is a lack of the power of desire and a lack of will."[869] However, Schopenhauer would never share Marc's optimism believing instead that:

> At bottom, optimism is the unwarranted self-praise of the real author of the world, namely of the will to live which complacently mirrors itself in its work. Accordingly, optimism is not only a false but also a pernicious doctrine, for it presents life as a desirable state and man's happiness as its aim and object.[870]

Even so, Marc clearly remained optimistic about the war because in his letter to Maria on 02.02.1916, he would tell her that he was struggling against the thoughtlessness (*Gedankenlosigkeit*) of hating the war. He said that he resisted such thoughtlessness feeling that he must direct his thoughts not against the war, but against himself. He

[866] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.341.
[867] Ibid., p.341.
[868] Marc and Meißner. p.190.
[869] Ibid., p.183.
[870] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.584.

reasserted that "nothing is more comprehensible, or more just than this war. Nobody sees that - or at least, nobody wants to see it in themselves."[871]

Marc's opinion that nothing was more just than the war is significant. If Marc was affirming the will to life *and* the will to live, then he was living proof of C1. Yet, according to Schopenhauer, "if we consider the will to live as a whole and objectively, we have to think of it, according to what has been said, as involved in a delusion."[872] To renounce this will to live *and* will to life is what the religionists term self-denial, since our real self is both the will to live *and* the will to life.[873] However, moral virtue, justice and philanthropy stem from the will to life seeing through the delusions of the principle of individuation and seeing itself in all phenomena. The principle of individuation (*Principium Individuationis*), entails that space and time are the conditions for multiplicity and diversity – in fact both space and time stand for this principle. Furthermore, because space and time are *a priori* forms of our sensibility, they operate as necessary characteristics for the cognisance of the world as representation. For all those who see themselves in others and all phenomena – and 'see through' (*durchschauen*) the principle of individuation - it is a sign that the will which appears in them is not held in the grip of that delusion: "Thus, it might be said figuratively that the will already flaps its wings, in order to fly away from it."[874]

By contrast, Schopenhauer argues that injustice, wickedness, and cruelty are symptomatic of a profound involvement with that delusion.[875] If Marc considered the will to war as an example of justice, then moral virtue should have been instrumental in promoting a denial of the will to war, not the denial of the phenomena appearing in

[871] Marc and Meißner. p.189-190.
[872] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.606.
[873] Ibid., p.606.
[874] Ibid., p.606. See also Cartwright. p137.
[875] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.606.

another's body through war. If such a denial had occurred, then C1 would have been discredited since the will would have been nullified. For many, a complete renunciation of the will is difficult to achieve, since genuine righteousness and justice as the foremost cardinal virtues, can be onerous. Therefore, the individual who practices such virtues must undertake self-sacrifices which often deprive life of its pleasure. Consequently, these painful virtues necessitate an utter commitment to self-abjuration and an ongoing denial of the will to life.[876]

4.8 Beckmann and Schopenhauer's *Eigennutz*

Of course, Beckmann was no self-abjuring ascetic and not about to "deprive life of the sweetness required to make it enjoyable."[877] When he was in Roeselare, a Belgian city of West Flanders, on 01.04.1915 he affirmed the will to life in no uncertain terms. That afternoon he had been out for a walk, when he saw an aeroplane being fired at above his head, leading him to take cover under a tree. The experience forced him to conclude that, "It's funny how from this really quite rotten thing, by that I mean life, not the war, there is still so much enjoyment to be gained […] Enjoyment of the self. Naturally in its highest form. A feeling of existence."[878]

If we are to believe Beckmann, then his actions might be explained according to Schopenhauer's concept of *Eigennutz* (self-interest), which denotes egoism as an attitude guided by the reflective processes of reason. The latter faculty in turn assists egoism to pursue its intentions "*systematically.*"[879] For both man and animal, egoism is coexistent with their innermost essence and identical with that essence.[880] On this basis, we could

[876] Ibid., p.606.
[877] Ibid., p.606.
[878] Beckmann. p.39.
[879] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.131.it is
[880] Ibid., p.131.

plausibly interpret some of Beckmann's testimonials as indicative of a man egoistically driven. This in turn may allow us to evaluate his innermost essence as a human being and thus escort our interpretations of C1 and C2. Should this be the case, then we could infer that his actions sprang from an everyday egoism which Schopenhauer says is boundless. Indeed, Beckmann, along with most individuals, had the inclination to safeguard his life, to ensure that it was free from suffering and privation. Therefore, as one who affirmed the will, he was inclined to possess the optimum levels of comfort and well-being whilst fostering within himself new abilities for enjoying life.[881]

Beckmann's war-time appetite for the greatest possible amount of well-being extended into his affirmation of both life and art. For example, on 26.04.1915 he nursed a large number of wounded soldiers and reaffirmed his will to life in a letter. He said:

> I am often amused by my own so idiotically tenacious will to life and to art. I care for myself like a loving mother, spit, choke, shove, jostle, I must live and I want to live. I have never bowed down to God or anything like that in order to achieve success, but I would push myself through all the sewers of the world, through all the humiliations and defilements, in order to paint. I have to do this.[882]

Many years later at the age of 65 on 12.02.1949, Beckmann reflected upon the will to life once more. In his copy of the *World as Will and Representation* Volume Two, he annotated an aspect of Schopenhauer's 'epiphilosophy'. Here Schopenhauer asks, from where does the great discord arise which pervades the world?[883] Beckmann has singled out the passage which reads:

> Further, it may be asked how deeply in the being-in-itself of the world do the roots of individuality go. In any case, the answer to this might be that they go as deeply as the affirmation of the will to [life]; where the denial of the will occurs, they cease, for with the affirmation they sprang into existence. We might even put the

[881] Ibid., p.131.
[882] Beckmann. p.46.
[883] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.641.

> question: 'What would I be, if I were not the will to-[life]?' and more of the same kind.[884]

Beckmann has underlined the phrase, 'What would I be, if I were not the will to life?' to which he has then written, "Eh bien, after effortful denial, would a new affirmation be the next class possible of denial of individuality by simple willing? - One can anaesthetise it as if with ether or chloroform - kill off? Who believes such nonsense. (*Unsinn*) ..."[885] The word 'nonsense' has been underlined by Beckmann showing that he has probably misunderstood Schopenhauer as saying that the denial of the will is itself another affirmation, that is to say an effort. What Schopenhauer calls the "self-suppression of the will"[886] stems from knowledge, even though all knowledge and insight are separate from free choice. However, a denial of the will which leads us into true freedom cannot be contrived, rather it arises from "the innermost relation of knowing and willing in man; hence it comes suddenly, as if flying in from without."[887]

The will to life compelled Beckmann to create art during the First World War. On 26.04.1915 he looked through over seventy of his works remarking that:

> Looked at all together, they please one better than when seen individually. One sees the will that goes through them, which I am not conscious of in the individual drawing, for when I draw I only feel and don't think…Since, as I told you, my fresco is progressing too, I have today once again a certain feeling of satisfaction that the time has not been completely wasted. Grit your teeth and hold on, through the war and through life, which isn't such a very different thing.[888]

However, Beckmann's will soon began to show signs of weakening leading to an eventual denial of the will to war. For instance, on 04.05.1915 he confessed that for the first time he had had enough. Whilst at the dressing station nearest to the outermost trenches, in the

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[884] Ibid., p.641. NB. I have taken the liberty of re-translating Payne's version here as 'will to [life]' in the belief that it is more appropriate.
[885] Beckmann and Schaffer. p.62.
[886] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.404.
[887] Ibid.,Vol.1, p.404. See also: Vandenabeele, Bart. *A Companion to Schopenhauer* [in English]. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, p.246.
[888] Beckmann. p.47-48.
[888] ibid., p.47-18. Beckmann was commissioned to paint a 'fresco' (*Resurrection*) in a military bathing unit. The fresco was completed in Wervicq on 01.05.1915.

midst of a major bombardment at Ypres, he found the onslaught too much for him. Subsequently he had to concede that, "I must tell you frankly that I had some not inconsiderable feelings of the most extreme concern for my worthy self."[889]

4.9 Marc, Klee and War as Natural Justice

By comparison, Marc did not share in the same 'extreme concern' for his 'worthy self', being fully prepared to die and shoulder his "burden of the evil imposed on human life."[890] Yet, this did not lead to an unconditional 'resignation' from an affirmation of the will to life, the will to live, or a renunciation of his will to war. Even though his sacrifice for Germany was arguably a noble sacrifice, Schopenhauer would not uphold the will to war as a just action.[891] Instead, the real essence of justice lies in the righteous individual's *not* imposing upon others hardships and sufferings accidental to life - as is the case with the unrighteous individual. Thus, "Justice thereby becomes a means for advancing the denial of the will to live since want and suffering, those actual conditions of human life are its consequence; but these lead to resignation."[892]

Rather than advancing a denial of the will to live or the will to life in an ascetic sense of the term, Marc firmly believed that the war was natural, and that it was not tenable to place the war beyond the normal course of human events as Maria always did. He was therefore complicit in furthering a devastating war which cost many lives, thereby acting out C1 through an unjust affirmation of the will. However, in a letter to Maria written on 22.02.1916, he would confide that "my glance has long since turned away from the war"

[889] Ibid., p.53.
[890] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.606.
[891] Ibid.,606.
[892] Ibid., p.606.

with the caveat that "my nature, however, does not seek to gain the indifference of Klee and Campendonk…"[893]

As a friend of Marc's, the Swiss born Klee initially appeared to affirm the will to war, feeling that patriotism might inject a new passion into German art.[894] However, Klee recoiled at the prospect of being drafted into military service – an event which eventually happened on 11.03.1916. His denial of the will to war was to harden from January to April 1915, especially when he found sympathetic listeners in Maria and the composer Heinrich Kaminski. They all concurred in denying the will to war, with the exception of Marc who alone maintained the most overt affirmation of the will to war.

As a consequence of their discussions on the war, Maria was to write to Marc that for Klee, "the war does not touch him inside at all…All the more odd since his artistic sensitivity is so completely assured and very rich."[895] This suggests that either Maria misread Klee's denial of the will to war and interpreted him as one who was simply indifferent, or that Klee really was disinterested in the war. Indeed, as Otto Karl Werckmeister shows, by 26.04.1915 Maria would conclude that "Klee does not strive, does not torment himself, does not suffer."[896] This is significant, because the concept of striving resonates with Schopenhauer's notion concerning the essential character of the will, in which "willing and striving are its whole essence, and can be fully compared to an unquenchable thirst. The basis of all willing, however, is need, lack, and hence pain, and by its very nature and origin it is therefore destined to pain."[897] Furthermore, Schopenhauer adds that, in all its guises the will "always strives, because striving is its

[893] Marc and Meißner. p.197.
[894] For the relationship between the First World War and the German art market see: Werckmeister, O.K., 'The Incipient Recovery of the German Art Market' in: Werckmeister. In point of fact, because Klee's father was a German he was obliged by law to receive the same nationality as his father independently of his birthplace. As a result, Klee could not escape his military draft.
[895] Quotation and translation in:ibid. p.38.
[896] Ibid., p.38.
[897] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.311.

sole nature, to which no attained goal can put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction; it can be checked only by hindrance, but in itself it goes on for ever."[898] Therefore, unless Klee was genuinely detached from all aspects of life, it would be inappropriate for us to believe that Klee did not 'strive' if all things in nature strive. The exception to this condition applies only to those who cease willing through aesthetic contemplation – which is temporary; or to those who deny the will to life *and* the will to live through severe asceticism – which is permanent.

4.10 Beckmann, Existential Pain and Disfigurement

For those artists suffering in mind and body during the war, their struggle for survival, their 'need, lack, and hence pain', could have led to a permanent renunciation of the will to live but it did not. A sense of existential pain was certainly present in Beckmann's 04.05.1915 confession that he had 'had enough', yet, such pain could not be classified as the onset of a renunciation of the will to live or the will to life. Such existential pain is inevitable so that "in every individual the measure of the pain essential to him has been determined once for all by his nature, a measure that could not remain empty or be filled to excess, however much the form of the suffering might change."[899] Therefore, in Schopenhauer's terms, Beckmann's suffering was preordained by his character and fluctuated according to circumstance - but the fruits of it did not lead to self-abjuration.

These facts are of great importance, since Beckmann paid much attention to the areas of Schopenhauer's philosophy which deals with 'the inevitability of pain'. As we can see from his annotations on p.316 of *The World as Will and Representation*, Beckmann has concentrated on the phrase, "Conversely, experience also teaches us that, after the appearance of a long-desired happiness, we do not feel ourselves on the whole

[898] Ibid. p.308.
[899] Ibid.Vol.1, p.316.

and permanently much better off or more comfortable than before."[900] This is significant because Schopenhauer observes that if a great concern has been lifted from us by good fortune then another immediately replaces it. The material for this new concern already existed in potential but could not enter consciousness due to its preoccupation with a previous concern. However, as soon as there is room the new concern "at once comes forward and occupies the throne of the reigning care of the day."[901]

Beckmann has underlined another passage on page 318 on the topic of pain which runs as follows:

> Every immoderate joy *(exultatio, insolens laetitia)* always rests on the delusion that we have found something in life that is not to be met with at all, namely permanent satisfaction of the tormenting desires or cares that constantly breed new ones. From each particular delusion of this kind we must inevitably later be brought back; and then, when it vanishes, we must pay for it with pains just as bitter as the joy caused by its entry was keen.[902]

From the above Beckmann has marked the phrase 'pay for it with pains just as bitter as the joy caused by its entry was keen'.[903] He has also paid attention to Schopenhauer's belief in the relatedness of art to pain.[904] On this, Schopenhauer states that in art the true reflection of the real character of life is that all joy is negative, not positive, and cannot provide lasting gratification. This means that we are always delivered from one pain to a newer one sooner or later. Consequently, every artistic hero finds that their shimmering goals, through which they hoped to obtain happiness were but a mockery, leading them to suspect that they were no better off than before. Therefore, Schopenhauer concludes that, "since a genuine, lasting happiness is not possible, it cannot be a subject of art…"[905]

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[900] Ibid., p.316. Beckmann has underlined this phrase.
[901] Ibid. Vol.1, p.317.
[902] Ibid., p.318.
[903] Beckmann and Schaffer. p.87.
[904] The relatedness of art to pain shall be dealt with in depth when we explore Nolde's life and work under Nazism.
[905] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.320. In Beckmann's copy, he has underlined the concluding phrase 'cannot be a subject of art', and written in the margin 'that's a bit better now'. What this annotation signifies is open to speculation.

It is likely that Beckmann's 1914 portrait *In Memory of a Friend Killed in Action* (fig. 111) was not 'a subject of lasting happiness'. The depicted image of a bandaged head reminds us that death was not always outright and sudden but often followed injury or severe disfigurement. As Suzannah Biernof shows, visions of mutilated faces led to 'a crisis of representation'. Thus, it followed that:

> Facial casualties presented a medical challenge, to be sure, but the public spectacle of the mutilated face also provoked a crisis of representation; a 'symbolic collapse', to use Julia Kristeva's term: a crisis that threatened to undermine the very concept of human nature in the context of social and economic upheaval and mass slaughter.[906]

Biernhof rightly stresses that disfigurement through war often undermined a man's sense of self and the social proof which validated his identity.[907] Sights of disfigurement and the smell of death were occupational hazards for Beckmann, who as a medical orderly often came face to face with it. For example, on 16.09.1914 he wrote of how he assisted with the dissection of a man who had died that night, and despite the emotional pain of the event, he had sufficient presence of mind to observe that the profile of the dead man looked similar to his model for Christ.[908]

Another occupational hazard entailed that Beckmann had to visit the morgue, and his drawing *The Morgue* of 1915 (fig. 112) illustrates the interior of one. Here, two men are helping each other place a heavily bandaged cadaver into a wooden coffin, whilst a third living figure is heaving a coffin into an upright position in the background. In the foreground are two naked cadavers in open coffins. The image is matter of fact and a chilling reminder of the tragic cost to the human body through the effects of war. Indeed, Beckmann one day remembered how two of the morning's dead were left lying in the

[906] Biernoff. p.60.
[907] Ibid., p.71.
[908] Beckmann. p.7.

open for burial. He lifted the cloths from their faces and saw that one was totally sallow, brownish white and with a remarkable otherworldly expression on his face, while the other had a brutal face, totally covered with blood, showing a huge gaping wound in his lower face and upon his neck - a deep, bloody abyss. They lay there silently he said, whilst nearby their comrades dug the shallow grave.[909]

His work as a medical orderly also meant that he witnessed terrible wounds as depicted in the dry point on paper called *The Operation* of 1914 (fig. 113). In this image, two naked bodies are laid upon stretchers which are juxtaposed in contrapuntal motion to one another. The scene is one of emergency and chaos with health professionals crowding the picture space. It is a scene which Beckmann knew well and which touched his senses in a vivid manner. As a result, he once reported how that everywhere, in spite of good ventilation and bright rooms, there was a sharp smell of decomposition.[910]

Neither Beckmann nor Marc were alone amongst artists who came face to face with such disfigurements or mass slaughter. George Grosz's well-known work *Remember Uncle August, The Unhappy Inventor* of 1919 (fig. 114) addresses this very question; evoking the physical disfigurement of soldiers by the artistic dislocation of the face and the use of early prostheses by use of collage elements of machine forms. There was also Max Slevogt who was involved with Paul Cassirer's new pacifist periodical, *Der Bildermann: Steinzeichnungen fürs deutsche Volk* (*The Picture Man: Lithographs for the German People*). In January 1917, his war pictures appeared in a book entitled *Kriegstagebuch* with the euphemistic text being written by an unnamed contributor. Slevogt himself wrote only the foreword which was a repudiation of war's deathly

[909] Letter of 04.05.915. Ibid., p.56.
[910] Ibid., p.7.

'heroics'.[911] In the foreword he wrote that whilst in the magic spell (*im Banne*) of devastation, he experienced the mutilation of houses and trees as atmospheric, charming and portrayable, but not so the mutilated person, the corpse. The humanity in him was deeply affected by the world turned on its head, and the portrayer, the artist in him was repelled.[912] As a result, all that remained for him was a final and decisive memory - a world which appeared desecrated by blind destruction.

The problem of bodily destruction and the mutilated person expressed an underlying anxiety which affected both military personnel and the civilian population alike. It was a well-founded anxiety born from the brutalisation of the human body which was without precedent. Indeed, every combatant must have feared terrible disfigurement, and as Biernhof suggests:

> Disfigurement was a loss – a sacrifice – that could never be commemorated in a culture that, as Gabriel Koureas has shown, institutionalized the 'sanitised and aestheticised body of the 'picturesque soldier' while banishing – at least in the public sphere – the private memories of pain and mutilation.[913]

Such 'memories of pain and mutilation' must have reminded Marc and Beckmann that death was not always outright but a prolonged and disfiguring agony. This reminder must have induced Beckmann to affirm the will to live as opposed to denying it through heroic self-sacrifice. By comparison, Marc was prepared for heroic self-sacrifice, although there is some evidence to suggest that 'a cessation of willing' in his relation to the war effort began to appear. In fact, we can sense a degree of cognitive dissonance beginning to emerge between his will to live and his will to war. Take for instance therefore, a letter

[911] Bartholomeyczik, G. and Slevogt, M., *Im Banne der Verwüstung: Max Slevogt und der Erste Weltkrieg; Begleitheft zur Ausstellung Schloss Villa Ludwigshöhe, Edenkoben 13.04.-13.07.2014* (Mainz: Generaldirektion Kulturelles Erbe Rheinland-Pfalz [u.a.], 2014). p.10.
[912] Slevogt quoted in: ibid., p.10.
[913] S. Biernoff, *Portraits of Violence: War and the Aesthetics of Disfigurement* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2017), p.64.

written to Maria on 29.02.1916 where he suggested that, "this deeply shameful, humiliating war (*beschämende schmachvolle Krieg*) must surely soon come to an end."[914]

4.11 Animals and the Will at War with Itself.

Marc's experience of war, and his suggestion that 'this deeply shameful, humiliating war' should come to an end, might be contrasted with a pre-war yearning for an apocalyptic catharsis of European culture. Indeed prior to, and often during the First World War, thoughts of world destruction, apocalyptic horsemen and messianism flooded the European consciousness. Many in the Expressionist avant-garde in fact embraced such apocalyptic thinking as they bestrode the growing gulf between modernity and tradition. Since that time a wealth of literature has appeared which often concerns itself with "mapping a plenitude of modern German apocalyptic visions, political programs, and philosophical motifs onto the 'canonical' Christian apocalypse."[915]

If this is the case, then we could argue that Schopenhauer's vision of the will at war with itself, where nature devours itself at every grade of the will's manifestation, is a philosophical motif which resonates with turn of the century visions of apocalyptic doom and mirrors the perspicacity of C1. In line with this, later philosophers such as Walter Benjamin came to view history as a natural cycle of 'coming to be' and 'passing away' interspersed with cycles of catastrophic ruin.[916] This is a viewpoint which informs his discussion of Klee's *Angelus Novus*, (an oil transfer drawing with watercolour) of 1920, describing the depicted angel as the 'angel of history' - one who presides over an apocalyptic storm of progress through catastrophe.[917] In the ninth thesis of his 'Theses on the Philosophy of History'(*Über den Begriff der Geschichte*) Benjamin states that:

[914] Marc and Meißner. p.199.
[915] Rabinbach, A, '*Apocalypse and Its Shadows*' in: Rabinbach, A., *In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). p.6.
[916] Wolin, R., *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption* (University of California Press, 1994).,p.61.
[917] In 1921, Klee purchased this image and hung it in his apartment.

> The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise*;* it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.[918]

In what we may regard as a storm blowing from Paradise, prior to the war in 1914, Marc had painted *Fighting Forms* (fig. 115), which may be interpreted as an abstract conceptualisation of the will at war with itself and as a premonition of war *per se*.[919] It may also be interpreted as a dialectical protagonist within modernism's aesthetic shift towards abstraction and away from figuration. As a metaphorical protagonist within modernism's overall 'evolution', *Fighting Forms* may consequently be understood as a protagonist within the dual nature of the world as will and representation.

In *Fighting Forms*, one becomes aware of the striving nature of pure form as a bearer of the will. This is especially so where swirling masses of pure form suggest flux, indeterminacy and the ever striving violence of the will. The violently swirling masses of warm colours on the left of the painting appear to cause the cooler colours to the right of the painting to retreat, almost as if the heat of the will in its fury attempts to overpower the cooler world as representation. This reminds us therefore how Marc asserted that "one no longer seeks a picture of nature, but destroys it, in order to show the mighty rules which prevail behind the beautiful appearance."[920]

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[918] Benjamin, W., *On the Concept of History* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2016)., p.258-59. Also see 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in: Benjamin, W. and Arendt, H., *Illuminations. Edited and With an Introd. by Hannah Arendt. Translated by Harry Zohn* (New York, Schocken1969).

[919] In another moment of perspicacity Marc had written a foreword for the planned second volume of the *Blaue Reiter* in February 1914. There he prophesied that: "The world is giving birth to a new time; there is only one question: has the time now come to separate ourselves from the old world? Are we ready for the *vita nuova?* This is the terrifying question of our age. It is the question that will dominate this book. Everything in this volume is related to this question and to nothing else. By it alone should we measure its form and its value." See: Kandinsky, Wassily, Franz Marc, and Klaus Lankheit. *The 'Blaue Reiter' Almanac*. p.260. It was a new world which he was never to see and the time would come when he would have to separate himself from the 'old world' through his death.

[920] Marc and Lankheit. p.108. The concept that 'one no longer seeks a picture of nature, but destroys it' perhaps echoes Nietzsche who felt that, "For a *Dionysian* task the hardness of the hammer, the *pleasure even in destroying* are crucial preconditions. The imperative 'Become hard!' the deepest conviction *that all creators are hard*, is the true badge of a Dionysian nature." Nietzsche and Large. p.76.

During the war Marc's attempt (as in C2) to reveal '… the mighty rules which prevail behind the beautiful appearance' was most often focused upon the animal body.[921] He neglected the human form in favour of the animal body since he believed that the animal body was a purer expression than that of the human. In a letter to Maria dated 12.04.1915, he described the instinct which had led him away from a feeling for people towards a feeling for the purity of the animal. The 'impious people' (*Der unfromme Mensch*) who surrounded him, above all the masculine, did not arouse his true feelings whereas the unspoiled feeling for animal life released all that was good in him. As a result, the unspoiled feeling for animals generated an instinct within him for the abstract which then led to even greater excitement.[922] This excitement stimulated a spiritual 'second sight' which he believed was quite Indian, timeless and purifying. However, there is a degree of incongruity to be aware of in his thinking as we note in the following disclosure where he states that:

> I felt very early that people were 'ugly' [*hässlich*], the animal seemed to me much more beautiful and pure; but I found in the animal also much that was repugnant and ugly; so that my portrayals instinctively (from an inner compulsion) became ever more schematic and abstract.[923]

Marc may have had Schopenhauer in mind since the philosopher believed that there was something beautiful about every animal, although in certain animals, such as apes, this was not so obvious.[924] By antithesis, that which Schopenhauer found most ugly in mankind was a lack of individuality.[925] As far as he was concerned what humans 'will' and think is etched upon their faces as if they were common herd animals, making them

921 These works were later published under the title Franz Marc: Skizzenbuch aus dem Felde in 1920 by Paul Cassirer in Berlin.
922 Marc, F., *Briefe, Schriften und Aufzeichnungen* (Leipzig: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1989).
923 Marc and Meißner. p.140-155.
924 Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.424. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation.*Vol.1, § 41.
925 Schopenhauer appears to contradict himself when he argues that human portraits should be Idealised individuals with a balance between beauty and character. This presupposes that beauty does exist in humankind. He also states that: "Beauty cannot be abolished by character, or character by beauty. For the abolition of the character of the species by that of the individual would give us caricature, and the abolition of the character of the individual by that of the species would result in meaninglessness." Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.225

superficial, trite and vulgar. Consequently, their behaviours are predictable since they are 'mass produced' and have no uniqueness.[926]

Marc also asked himself this: "Does there exist a more mysterious idea for artists than the representation of itself which nature mirrors in the eye of an animal? How does a horse see the world, or an eagle, a deer or a dog?"[927] This puzzling question could be answered by means of a drawing in his war-time sketch book *Four Horses* (fig.116). This pencil sketch is a highly symmetrical and balanced depiction where one horse feeds with a rounded neck at the bottom right of the sketch, whilst the shape of this is mirrored by the rounded neck of another horse at the top right of the drawing. At the same time, the only horse to look directly at the viewer is complimented by the opposing gaze of its immediate neighbour which looks away from us and to our right. Undoubtedly, Marc conceived the horse *per se* to be a pure affirmation of the will to life and worthy of compassion – all the more remarkable since he was involved in a conflict which would involve the denial of the will to life for millions of animals. As an affirmation of life therefore, these near abstract animal sketches suggest a certain timelessness connatural with organic existence.

Schopenhauer linked timelessness to the animal when arguing that "the life of every animal species throughout the thousands of years of its existence is to a certain extent like a single moment; for it is mere consciousness of the *present* without that of the past and of the future, and consequently without that of death."[928] When contemplating the animal species in his art during the war, Marc's attention, we may infer was attracted to "a steady and enduring moment, a *nunc stans"*[929] which is reflected in the animal

[926] Schopenhauer and Payne.,Vol.2, p.598. Cf. 'Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, 'Freedom of the Will', Pt III (2) and Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, § 55.
[927] Marc and Lankheit. p.99.
[928] Ibid., p.571.
[929] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.571.

species. The animal species, as with every general 'form of life', as a "phenomenon of the will with consciousness" [930] is in effect one continuous *present.* By contrast, the past and future are conceptual additions peculiar to the human being known only in the abstract and are possibly exemplified by representations of the imagination.[931]

4.12 Macke's and Marc's Death - Thoughts from Schopenhauer

As a friend of Marc's, Macke shared his fascination with animals as well as Schopenhauer's philosophy. In a letter written from Kandern on 27.08.1905, Macke discussed Schopenhauer's philosophy with his future wife Lisbeth.[932] He recalled from his reading that the world is will, a great striving will, and that this great will meets various obstacles. He explained to her that he did not read Schopenhauer to go through hell and high water for some philosophical ideas, but instead to improve his thinking. In this letter, he quoted directly from Schopenhauer on the differences between man and animal. He understood Schopenhauer as one who argued that man surpasses animals in suffering, and how animals live in the present, whereas man can roam through the past, present and future with the aid of abstract reflection. He conveyed to her Schopenhauer's belief that if the sufferings of mankind are justified (as an atonement for the guilt of existence) then this cannot be extended to animals "whose sufferings are considerable, brought on for the most part through man, but often also without his agency."[933]

If Schopenhauer's woeful vision is true, then we need to ask what is "the purpose of this troubled and tormented will in its thousands of different forms without the freedom

[930] Ibid.Vol.1, p.571-2.
[931] Ibid., p.572.
[932] Elisabeth Erdmann-Macke née Elisabeth Gerhardt (1888-1978).
[933] Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.322. Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation.*Vol.2, Chapter 28.

to salvation which is conditioned by reflectiveness?" [934] Schopenhauer's answer is that the sufferings of animals are justifiable from the fact that, "the will to live must *devour its own flesh* because in the phenomenal world absolutely nothing exists besides it, and it is a hungry will."[935] Therefore, each grade of this hungry will lives at the expense of another grade. As a result, Schopenhauer argues that the will to live (or the will to life), as the expression of the innermost being of nature, has passed through the entire sequence of animals in ceaseless striving for its complete objectification - eventually achieving "*reflection* in the being endowed with the faculty of reason, namely man."[936]

Being 'endowed with the faculty of reason', the situation becomes critical for mankind in general, and in particular for a philosophical artist such as Marc. From Schopenhauer's perspective, certain questions force themselves upon the philosophical mind such as, "whence is all this and for what purpose, and principally whether the trouble and misery of his life and effort are really repaid by the profit."[937] Or as he puts it, "Is the game worth the candle?"[938] For Macke and Marc 'the game' was apparently worth the candle and worth enduring with optimism. Indeed, Macke approached the possibility of his own tragic death with the hope that he could return home one day. On 21.09.1914, he wrote from Somme-Pie that the day before he had received with joy the Iron Cross from his Colonel. He said that he was sending it to Lisbeth in his letter, and that if he ever saw it again "it will remind me of the most terrible thing that a person can experience."[939] Unfortunately, Macke never saw the Iron Cross or Lisbeth again since he was killed in action on 26.09.1914, at Perthes-les-Hurlus – he was just 27 years of age.

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[934] Ibid., Vol.2, p.322.
[935] Ibid., p.322-3. In sections §153 and §154 of *Parerga* Volume 2, Schopenhauer argues that "the capacity for suffering is in the animal very much less than in man. Now what might be added beyond this would prove to be hypothetical or even mythical and may, therefore, be left to the reader's own speculation." Ibid., p.323.
[936] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.572.
[937] Ibid., p.572.
[938] Ibid., p.572.
[939] Macke, A., Frese, W., and Güse, E.-G., *Briefe an Elisabeth und die Freunde* (München: Bruckmann, 1987). p.334. Macke was killed in action on 26.09.1914 at Perthes-les-Hurlus in Champagne, France.

From here on in, Marc's attitude to the war was forced into greater philosophical profundity. As Werckmeister suggests, "For the first time, Marc conceived the avant-garde's characteristic 'spiritual' alternative to physical life as a longing for death itself… By actually facing death at the front, Marc had given his stance a compelling authenticity."[940] That 'longing for death' eventually achieved its 'compelling authenticity' through his demise which occurred on 04.03.1916. Marc's death arose from a reconnaissance mission around 4pm when he was fatally wounded by two grenade splinters to the head near the woods of Herméville-en-Woëvre at Braquis.

There is a chilling irony to Marc's death, since only a few weeks earlier on 17.02.1916 he had written to his mother on the topic of death. He shared her calm conviction that death was not to be feared and said that:

> Today I would greet death in a very melancholy and bitter way, not from fear or agitation – nothing is more calming than the prospect of the *peace of death* – but because I have half-finished work, which my whole mind is focused on completing. My unpainted pictures contain my whole will to live.[941]

Ultimately, both Marc and Macke's deaths represented a turning point in the history of German art since for many critics Expressionism had become synonymous with German patriotism. As Werckmeister argues:

> Marc's death in action on March 5, 1916, was a turning point in the nationalist revalidation of expressionism. Although his wife launched a press campaign in order to establish him as the leading painter of expressionism on nationalist terms, Walden and Hausenstein, Marc's most influential advocates, in their publications left no doubt that Marc's patriotic assent to war was no longer perceived as the platform for his success.[942]

Werckmeister rightly shows that whenever a *Sturm* 'contributor' was killed in action[943]

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[940] Werckmeister. p.46.
[941] Marc and Meißner. p.195. Marc does not mean a single half-finished work but his incomplete career as an artist.
[942] Werckmeister. p.64.
[943] Marc was to write a self-fulfilling prophecy in an aphorism of how: "I followed things, like a man who walked around after his funeral. He was happy that the heavy burden of his life had been carried away from him and he felt free and light, the Schopenhauerian man. I reined in my senses, so that they couldn't hear or see or taste any more. Only my spirit communed with things, which revealed all their joyful secrets to it, the good new European" See: Marc, Franz, and Klaus Lankheit. *Schriften* [in German]. Köln: DuMont, 1978. p.206.

then Walden denigrated what war had done to the modern art world - Walden's argument being that war neither validated nor affirmed any particular art.[944] To the German art world it appeared to be an unjust blow that they had lost two of their leading artists. For observers both then and now, it is often difficult to reconcile such tragic losses, yet as Schopenhauer writes:

> …we are like lambs playing in the field, while the butcher eyes them and selects first one and then another; for in our good days we do not know what calamity fate at this very moment has in store for us, sickness, persecution, impoverishment, mutilation, loss of sight, madness, death, and so on.[945]

Conclusion

With this in mind let us conclude that if the will to live and the will to life is one which "*devours its own flesh,*"[946] then Marc's claim C1 has been fully confirmed in the context of war. It can also be confirmed that, if war was an overabundant expression of the will, manifesting the *self-affirmation* of individuals, then out of human egoism it went beyond this affirmation to the *denial* of the same will appearing in other individuals.[947] Therefore, we may see the war as an overabundant expression of egoism. This entailed that combatants suffered a transgression of their "body's sphere of affirmation"[948] through the denial of it by other combatants. Consequently, they experienced this as "immediate and mental pain."[949] We have also learned that Beckmann, Marc and other artists during their military 'careers' experienced the denial of their bodily sphere by other individuals. For Marc and Macke that denial led to their deaths, while for Beckmann, Kirchner and many others it sometimes led to 'immediate and mental pain'.

[944] In the following chapter of this thesis, Walden's assertion shall be proven wrong when we explore the influence of Nazism on art.
[945] Schopenhauer and Payne. p.292.
[946] Ibid.,Vol.2, p.322-23.
[947] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.334.
[948] Ibid. Vol.1, p.335.
[949] Ibid., p.335.

The world of pain in which they fought meant that what these artists saw was the most terrible suffering induced by catastrophic circumstances - which could and did claim their own lives. As a result, it is the purpose of tragedy, in both art and life, to induce a sudden moment of shocking recognition in us – that is to say a form of mimetic shuddering (*Schauder*) bought about through the most horrifying examples of 'the antagonism of the will with itself'. As Schopenhauer asserts, when we recognise what tragedy means, whether in art or life, as did Beckmann and Marc, "then, shuddering, we feel ourselves already in the midst of hell (*dann fühlen wir schaudernd uns schon mitten in der Hölle*)."[950] Indeed, Schopenhauer goes so far as to argue that tragedy reveals the "terrible side of life (*der schrecklichen Seite des Lebens*)."[951] As it does so he argues that "…the wailing and lamentation of mankind, the dominance of chance and error, the fall of the righteous, the triumph of the wicked" bring before our eyes an aspect of the world "which directly opposes our will."[952] When this happens he says, "at this sight we feel ourselves urged to turn away from life, to give up willing and loving life."[953]

Thus, at the sight of tragedy, Beckmann, Marc, Macke and all those affected by war, were given the opportunity to 'give up willing and loving life' - which they did not do. Even so, as Schopenhauer states, "at the moment of the tragic catastrophe, we become more convinced more clearly than ever that life is a bad dream from which we have to awake."[954] As we shall see in the next chapter, Schopenhauer's opinion that 'life is a bad dream from which we have to awake' possesses a tragic resonance for the plight of the gypsy community in Nazi Germany.

[950] Ibid., p.255.
[951] *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.433.
[952] Ibid., p.433.
[953] Ibid., p.433.
[954] Ibid., p.433.

Chapter 5: Degenerate Art, Degenerate Bodies - Otto Mueller and the Gypsies

Introduction

In this penultimate chapter, we shall begin with a brief discussion about the fate of Expressionism and the German economy following the First World War. We shall also briefly outline the institutionalisation of anti-gypsy politics under the Third Reich. After this we shall define what 'degeneracy' means and how it emerged historically. This discussion will then lead us to explore links between race, art and intelligence as they were understood by Nazi anthropologists. In addition, we shall look at Mueller's relationship to the gypsies in both his art and personal life. In fact, much of this chapter can be interpreted through Schopenhauer's 'racial theory' which lends us an intellectual paradigm by which we may understand Mueller's 'degenerate' art.[955]

On the one hand, this will necessitate an investigation as to how miscegenation, 'degeneration' and the exoticism of the gypsy were construed by the Nazis, while on the other it will allow us to reinterpret the so called 'gypsy nuisance', as the Nazis termed it, through Schopenhauer's philosophy. We shall then undertake a Schopenhauerian evaluation of human morality as it pertains to German citizenship, the will and the fate of art under Nazism. That said, no claim is being made that Mueller had read Schopenhauer. Instead, the claim is that his work, and the socio-political context of that work, can be usefully assessed through Schopenhauer's philosophy.

Before we go any further, it is important to point out that this chapter in no way argues that Marc prefigured National Socialism - or that C1 and C2 stand for a corresponding leitmotif. Indeed, as Christian von Holst and Karin von Maur point out, in their exhibition catalogue 'Franz Marc, Horses', held at the Staatsgalerie Museum in Stuttgart from 27.05.2000 to 10.09.2000, his work does not uphold Beat Wyss's

[955] As we will note, in the following chapter of this thesis, charges of 'degeneracy' were also levelled at Nolde.

interpretation of it as "*die explosive Gaerverbindung*"[956] (an explosive ferment of intellectual fascism) – or one mirroring the *Betonung des Willensprinzips*"[957] (emphasis on the principle of the Will) as discovered in the literature of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.[958] Yet it is true to say, as does Isgard Kracht, that in 1935 the Nazi Director of the Hamburger Kunsthalle, Harald Busch, defended Marc's work as 'German Nordic art'.[959] Kracht also points to a contemporary press article by an anonymous author with the title 'Der Maler der Blauen Pferde: zur Ausstellung in Hannover' which described Marc's work as one born of 'Nordic faith and Germanic spirit'.[960] It is also true that, as a proselytizer of the 'Nordic faith and Germanic spirit', Baldur von Schirach and his wife Henriette, brought up the topic of Marc's art with Hitler when they visited him at the Berghof. Henriette presented to the Führer samples of the artist's work from his early period with hopes of them being accepted. After seeing them, the Führer reluctantly recognised the excellence of Marc's work but remained intractable saying that "…if he could draw properly, why didn't he?"[961]

In 1937, Ernst Holzinger would write to Eberhard Hanfstaengl, the director of Berlin's Nationalgalerie, and refer to anecdotal evidence which suggested that in 1934, Goebbels had allegedly said that "[Franz] Marc would probably have been the leading German artist if he had not fallen in war."[962] Whilst many of the gallery staff were unsure of this evidence, Petropoulos believes that it may, if true, uphold the fact that Goebbels had supported German modernism before changing his mind. Apart from Hitler's undoubted influence on Goebbels' change of mind, Expressionism has sometimes been

[956] Wyss, B., *Der Wille zur Kunst: zur ästhetischen Mentalitat der Moderne* (Köln: DuMont, 1996).p.191.
[957] Staatsgalerie, S., *Franz Marc: Pferde*.p.206.
[958] Marc, F. et al., *Franz Marc, Horses* (Hatje Cantz, 2000).p.206
[959] Kracht, Isgard. 'Angriff auf die Avant-Garde. Kunst und Kunstpolitik im Nationalsozialismus' in: Fleckner, U. and Fleckner, U., *Angriff auf die Avantgarde: Kunst und Kunstpolitik im Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007). p.315.
[960] Ibid.,p.330-31. See: Anonymous: 'Der Maler der Blauen Pferde: zur Ausstellung in Hannover' in:. "Berliner Morgenpost," in: *Berliner Morgenpost.* (1898). 07.03.1936 (no page number given).
[961] Petropoulos.,p.181.
[962] Ibid.p.20.

associated with anti-Semitism via its anti-Impressionist tendencies. As Petropoulos has shown, Impressionism had been finagled upon the German public by Jewish suppliers, and the elite of the Weimar Republic, which Otto Andreas Schreiber called the 'Jewish Republic'. This 'Republic' had allegedly conspired to introduce Impressionism into Germany, thereby betraying Expressionists such as Marc, Ernst Barlach, Nolde, Heckel, Rohlfs, and Schmidt-Rottluff.[963]

On the one hand this is true, because Impressionism had been repudiated for its numerous Jewish art dealers.[964] In fact, Schreiber, a member of the NSDAP from 1932, would assert, at the *Jugend kampft für deutsche Kunst* (Youth fights for German art) rally of 29.06.1933, that the Expressionists mentioned above " [had led] the war of destruction against Impressionism."[965] Indeed, Petropoulos shows how Schreiber once argued that these artists had repulsed the 'Jewish Republic', and how "…we reject [the Impressionist] forms'."[966] In Schreiber's opinion, then, the resurrection of Expressionism entailed that the artists of this 'movement' were the practitioners of a *genuine völkisch* culture.[967] As a consequence, for a brief time, alongside Barlach, Marc was treated more leniently than other artists due to his death in battle.[968]

Despite this, Isgard Kracht refers to what Robert Scholz, the art editor of the *Völkischer Beobachter*, described as "the so-called 'Franz Marc problem'."[969] This relates to the fact that, even before the Nazis seized power, Marc had received respect from the wider public for which the other Expressionists still had to strive.[970] Marc's unusual

[963] Ibid.,p.35.
[964] Several Jewish art dealers to note are: Alfred Flechtheim, Paul Cassirer, Johanna Ey, Hans Goltz, Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler, Curt Valentin and Heinrich Thannhauser of the same dynasty which owned the Tahannhauser Galleries.
[965] Petropoulos.,p.40. *Jugend kampft fur deutsche Kunst* was planned by the *National sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (National Socialist league of German students) and held at Friedrich -Wilhelm University in Berlin on 30.06.1931 The *Studentenbund* was a unifying force for adversaries of Nazi policies in the arts and canvassed for 'Nordic' Expressionism Schreiber was one of the organisers of the *Studentenbund*. See: Barron and Guenther.p.86.
[966] Petropoulos.,p.40.
[967] Ibid.,p.40.
[968] Ibid.,p.145.
[969] Fleckner and Fleckner.,p.333.
[970] Ibid.,p.333.

popularity with the public was in part due to the accessible motifs of his animal pictures, and in part due to the widespread admiration, even glorification, of his character. His *Letters, Sketches and Aphorisms* of 1920, was well received by the public, who needed to recover from their great losses in the First World War and who needed to rediscover their national identity. As a result, Marc embodied a virtuous and courageous model from which a new national self-consciousness could be created. Consequently, he was no longer viewed merely as an artist, but above all as a role model, and 'culture carrier' [*Kulturträger*].[971]

Marc was widely regarded as a man of integrity who had made his contribution to the welfare of society, quite apart from his artistic creations. In fact, Kracht proposes that, "as a self-sacrificing war hero he supported the myth of the Führer, but as an intellectual he undermined it. He was simultaneously an enemy and friend to the dictatorship and presented an incalculable potential of danger to a totalitarian system."[972] For the Nazis then, this stood for 'the problem of Franz Marc'. He was a brave war hero and standard bearer for the German people; even so the Nazis asked whether he was nothing more than a dangerous, society-threatening 'cultural bolshevist'? As Kracht puts it, "he who strives for a spiritual revolution and preaches 'opposite thinking' will always be anything but acceptable to the regime."[973]

5.1 The Fate of Expressionism, Germany and the Gypsy.

Among the many organisations which dealt with a perceived opposition to the regime, we find that in 1936 the *Rassenhygienische und Bevölkerungsbiologische Forschungsstelle* (Racial Hygiene and Demographic Biology Research Unit) (RHF) had

[971] Ibid.,p.357.
[972] Ibid.,p.358.
[973] Ibid.,p.358.

been established under the directorship of Robert Ritter.[974] As we shall see later on in this chapter, this unit was created for the planned destruction of Europe's gypsies. It acted as an organisational link "between science and the National Security Headquarters and its precursors."[975] This was not the first time that the gypsies had suffered organised persecution. As far back as March 1889, an information service on gypsies had been created by the security police for Munich's Imperial Palace Headquarters. Then in 1905, the same year as *Die Brücke* was formed, a Munich policeman called Alfred Dillmann published a book which 'leaked', (in a manner contrary to the law), compromising personal data belonging to 3,500 gypsies.[976] That said, it is not the purpose of this chapter to provide a history of the gypsy peoples under National Socialism, rather the purpose is to explore in depth a link between the artist Otto Mueller, his paintings of the gypsies, and the concept of 'degeneracy' as it was understood by the Nazi regime. It is also the purpose of this chapter to explore these links in a unique manner through Schopenhauer's moral philosophy.

Arguably, the general paranoia with which the Nazis persecuted the gypsies (and denigrated Mueller's depictions of them) was exacerbated by Germany's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Allies in the First World War. Indeed, following the war in November 1918, Germany was convulsed by revolution, Kaiser Wilhelm's abdication and the eventual inception of the German Republic. In December of that same year a group of artists and architects known as the *Novembergruppe* was formed in reaction to the revolution. This group aimed to popularise art, assist social revolt and republican organisations in order to accelerate artistic emancipation. Indeed, many Expressionist artists appear to have trusted that their endeavours were in harmony with the working

[974] This was department L3 of the National Health Office and part of the Ministry of the Interior.
[975] Fings, K. et al., *From "Race Science" to the Camps: The Gypsies during the Second World War* (1997). p.30.
[976] Ibid.. p.23.

classes who had accomplished political transformation through revolution. Over forty artists and architects contributed to the *Novembergruppe* exhibitions in 1918, often recruited by the Expressionist painter Georg Tappert, who in 1918 circulated his letter 'Expressionists, Cubists, and Futurists' in *Die Schöne Rarität.* [977]

The *Novembergrupp*e created its directives in January 1919, paralleling many of the aims of the socialist group of artists known as *Arbeitsrat für Kunst* (Working Council for Art). As Weinstein has argued, the nebulous revolutionary declarations of both the *Arbeitsrat für Kunst* and the *Novembergrupp*e, had secured an almost instant ratification amongst Expressionist art journals such as *Das Kunstblatt*, which in turn had smoothed the path towards revolution.[978] Yet, there was a contrast between the *Novembergrupp*e's obdurate conviction in the radical character of Expressionism, regardless of any political consequences, and the *Arbeitsrat für Kunst*'s incessant attempts to embrace innovative policies when confronted by political reversals thereby "opposing first imperial and then SPD art policies."[979] However, the *Novembergruppes's* political impetus was brief and ultimately collapsed when the working classes rejected the Expressionists' proclivity for abstraction. Furthermore, the Expressionists' vacillation over urban life, industrialisation and modernisation contradicted the day to day realities of the working classes whom they had hoped to inspire but had instead affronted.[980] As a result, forms of Expressionist practice that had been popular amongst the avant-garde in the years before the war were increasingly seen as irrelevant to the pressing demands of the moment.

[977] Several rejoinders to the letter were published in Helga Kliemann's *Novembergruppe* manifesto, circular letter and guidelines, reprinted in Grohmann, W. *Zehn Jahre Novembergruppe', Kunst der Zeit, Zeitschrift fur Kunst und Literatur*, Sonderheft, 3:1-3 (1928), 11-12, 16.
[978] Weinstein and Chicago.p.30.
[979] Ibid.,p.105.
[980] Rigby, I. K., "German Expressionist Political Posters 1918-1919: Art and Politics, a Failed Alliance," in: *Art Journal* Vol. 44, no. 1 (1984). p.39.

By June 1919, this irrelevance became the topic of vocal criticism as Weinstein has shown. One such critic was Willi Wolfradt, who had promptly announced the end of Expressionism in the journal *Die Neue Rundschau*. Wolfradt's contention was that Expressionism had been ineluctably wedded to the November Revolution, but that this 'marriage' had miscarried in the following manner:

> The revolutionary forms itself in art (sic). If art is submerged in the actuality of the revolution - that is, politicizes itself in such a way that it remains tied to an actual goal to be realized - then, as soon as this goal begins to emerge from the utopian phase, art dies. One used to think that in a perfect world there would be no art. This is correct and only expresses the deep relationship between art and dissatisfaction, the revolutionary character not only of today's, but of all and every art.[981]

Since Expressionism had lost its revolutionary credibility its successes were perceived as increasingly finagle. Indeed, as Weinstein has shown, the architect Bruno Taut now proclaimed that Expressionism had become "absorbed into literariness and vaudeville."[982] Thereafter, many of Expressionism's most fervid devotees had to confess that, as a style, it had lapsed into unoriginality and modishness. As a result, for many avant-garde critics, because Expressionism had attained the status of an 'official' style it's subsequent institutionalisation portended its historical internment.

Three other contemporary essays also demonstrate the new mood that began to surface amongst the post-War avant-garde. In an essay, 'Art of this Moment' of 1919, Wilhelm Hausenstein argued for the bankruptcy of Expressionism, whilst Worringer in 'Current Questions on Art' of 1921 laid a post-mortem at the door of Expressionist spiritual revolution.[983] Similarly, Iwan Goll's 'Expressionism is Dying' of 1921 expressed a sense of aesthetic demoralisation and anti-climax following Germany's defeat in the

[981] Weinstein and Chicago.,p.229. In Weinstein's opinion Wolfradt's position subpoenaed the concept of the end of art as imagined by Hegel. See Ibid., p.230.
[982] Ibid. p.227.
[983] 1919 Wilhelm Hausenstein; "Die Kunst in diesem Augenblick," *Der neue Merkur* 3, *Sonderheft* no 2 "Werden" (1919-1920), 117, 119-22, 123, 125-26. Wilhelm Worringer, *Künstlerische Zeitfragen* (Munich: Hugo Bruchmann, 1921), 7-8, 9-10, 15, 19-20, 27, 28-29, 31-32. p .849.

war.[984] It was in this context that G.F. Hartlaub, in the preface to the catalogue of the 1925 *Neue Sachlichkeit* exhibition held in Mannheim, appealed for a new social realism and a return to the object in art. Additional reactions to the unfulfilled promises of 'Utopian' Expressionism, such as those made by the late Franz Marc, also signalled a return to objectivity. Consequently, Franz Roh for example, proclaimed the arrival of what he called 'post-Expressionism' or 'Magic Realism' which signalled the return to objectivity.[985]

Objectivity of another kind confronts many historians who agree that without Germany's defeat at war and Versailles there would have been no Hitler. The reparation payments enforced upon Germany by article 231 were onerous, and from 1925-1930 "the German economy was deprived of between one and 2.2 billion Reichsmark (RM) annually, which amounted in the late 1920s to nearly 2.5 per cent of Germany's GDP."[986] Despite the increasing economic impact of War Reparations, Germany entered a period of relative stability in the mid-1920s. In 1923, Chancellor Gustav Stresemann formed a centre coalition which controlled inflation, and in 1924 the worst effects of Reparations were off-set by American intervention in the form of the Dawes Plan. In 1929, however, Stresemann died and the Wall Street Crash meant that American loans to German industry and business were called in. The German economy 'crashed' and unemployment soared.

[984] Iwan Goll, "Der Expressionismus stirbt," *Zenit* (Zagreb), 1, no. 8 (October 1921): 8-9. See also his post-war poem *Requiem for the Dead of Europe.*

[985] See: Roh, F., *Nach-Expressionismus; Magischer Realismus, Probleme der Neuesten Europäischen Malerei* (Leipzig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1925).

[986] Hantke, M. A. X. and Spoerer, M., "The Imposed Gift of Versailles: The Fiscal Effects of Restricting the size of Germany's Armed Forces, 1924-9," in: *The Economic History Review* Vol. 63, no. 4 (2010).p.849. Part vii, Reparation Section I, General Provisions, Article 231, reads as follows: "The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." See: Allied and Associated, P., *Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, and other Treaty Engagements signed at Versailles, June 28th, 1919: Together with the Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace* (London: H.M.S.O, 1920). p.137-38.

The collapse of the last Weimar coalition just one year later paved the way for Nazism and the appointment of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933.

After the Nazis gained power they placed a renewed importance to the human body in life and art. We shall investigate this renewed importance and explore the question of the German Expressionist body through the lens of National Socialism. In particular, this chapter takes the work of Otto Mueller as its case study in relation to his paintings of the gypsy people. This is done with special reference to the later treatment of the gypsy peoples by the Nazis after his death in 1930.

5.2 Conceptualising 'Degeneracy' and Hitler's reading of Schopenhauer

Before we discuss Mueller's work, let us begin with an exploration of the concept 'degeneracy' and of its origins. First of all, let us establish a working definition of this term and then refer this to the meanings ascribed to it by Nazi racial ideology. Our attention will then turn to Mueller's paintings of gypsies and to their reception in the 1930s. This will be set in the context of a widespread criminalisation of the gypsy people by the Nazi regime, and of the *Entartete Kunst* (Degenerate Art) exhibition held in Munich 1937. This exhibition represented a virulent attack on German modernist art.[987] Within the context of this exhibition and beyond, the response to Mueller's paintings of gypsies reveals much about Nazi attitudes towards sexuality and race. From the National Socialists' point of view, Mueller's paintings were evidence of 'degeneracy', however an exploration of these paintings through Schopenhauer's metaphysics of sexuality and race opens up new perspectives. One specific implication of this exploration suggests that C1 possessed a prophetic quality undreamed of by Marc.

[987] As we shall see in the next chapter of this thesis, this exhibition and the rise of Nazism would have a crippling effect on artistic expression. It will therefore lead us to examine the problem of free will for Nolde who attempted to live and work under the duress of Nazism.

Concepts of 'degeneracy' may be said to originate in the work of the physiologist Johann Blumenbach, and the work of the French psychiatrist Bénédict Morel. Blumenbach on the one hand used the female skull to epitomise Caucasians, which he considered to be "the most beautiful and primitive race from which all others have degenerated."[988] Morel on the other hand harnessed the concept of 'degeneracy' to classify mental illnesses, arguing that environment and life style caused 'degeneracy'. He also argued that 'degeneracy' was hereditary and ultimately fatal. [989] Then, towards the latter part of the nineteenth century the Italian scholar Cesare Lombroso's work on anthropological criminology furthered investigations into 'degeneracy', perhaps foreshadowing the Nazi belief that criminal behaviours were hereditary qualities.[990] Subsequently, the Jewish physician Max Simon Nordau, an ardent Zionist and supporter of Theodor Herzl, built upon the above authors' concepts of 'degeneracy'. [991]As a result, Nordau's conceptual development of the sociological, medical and aesthetic problems of 'degeneracy' led him to state that the 'degenerate' was "a morbid deviation from an original type."[992] His opinion was that each individual had the capacity to transmit 'degeneracy' from one generation to another:

> Degeneracy betrays itself among men in certain physical characteristics which are denominated stigmata, or brand marks, an unfortunate term derived from a false idea, as if degeneracy were necessarily the consequence of a fault, and the indication of it a punishment.[993]

[988] Schiebinger, L., "The Anatomy of Difference: Race and Sex in Eighteenth-Century Science," in: *Eighteenth-Century Studies* Vol. 23, no. 4 (1990). p.396. See also: Blumenbach, J. F., *Joh. Friedr. Blumenbach's Geschichte und Beschreibung der Knochen des menschlichen Körpers* (Göttingen: Dieterich, 1807).
[989] Andreas, H. and Kluge, U., "Anthropological and Evolutionary Concepts of Mental Disorders," in: *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* Vol. 24, no. 3 (2010).p.294. See also: Morel, B.-A., "Traité des dégénérescences physiques, intellectuelles et morales de l'espèce humaine et des causes qui produisent ces variétés maladives," (Paris: J.-B. Baillière, 1857).
[990] See: Lombroso, C., *Genio e degenerazione. Nuovi studi e nuove battaglie* (Palermo: Sandron, 1897).
[991] Theodor Herzl was a leading Zionist. In August1897 he became the World Zionist Organization's first president.
[992] Nordau, M. S. and Mosse, G. L., *Degeneration*, 2nd ed. (Lincoln ; London: University of Nebraska Press, 1993). p.16.
[993] Ibid., p.17.

He felt that ‘degeneracy’ could be distinguished from the phylogenetic development of a new species, since the morbid variety of the degenerate body could not renew itself through procreation but would eventually terminate through reproductive sterility.[994] He was certain that ‘degeneracy’ could be reflected in art and argued for a medical examination of artists who were thought to be ‘degenerate’. This therefore would entail an examination of their biological ancestry and an analysis of their family character traits. Consequently, Nordau was convinced that if this was undertaken it could be possible to trace those family ancestors who were responsible for transmitting the seeds of degeneracy to a ‘degenerate’ artist.

Alongside artists, Nordau also found philosophers such as Schopenhauer to be ‘degenerate’. In his 1892 work *Entartung* (*Degeneration*), Nordau begins an amusing mockery of Schopenhauer who had cited Benedict de Spinoza in order to illustrate an argument about causality. Schopenhauer referred to Spinoza’s suggestion that, “If a stone flung by a human hand could think, it would certainly imagine that it flew because it wished to fly.”[995] Furthermore, Nordau ridiculed Schopenhauer’s attachment to Buddhism, Quietism and aesthetic contemplation. As a result, Nordau argued that the ‘degenerate’ (Schopenhauer) despised action born of ‘free determination’ and justified himself with:

> …a philosophy of renunciation and of contempt for the world and men, asserts that he has convinced himself of the excellence of Quietism, calls himself with consummate self-consciousness a Buddhist, and praises Nirvana in poetically eloquent phrases as the highest and worthiest ideal of the human mind. The degenerate and insane are the predestined disciples of Schopenhauer and Hartmann and need only to acquire a knowledge of Buddhism to become converts to it.[996]

[994] Phylogenesis: “The evolutionary development of a species or other group of organisms through a succession of forms. Also: the evolutionary development of a particular (esp. anatomical) feature of an organism. Also in extended use. Cf. ontogenesis n., phylogenesis” Quotation from Oxford English Dictionary. *"Phylogenesis, N."* [in English]. Oxford University Press. For further information see Gould, Stephen Jay. *Ontogeny and Phylogeny* [in English]. Cambridge, Mass; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977, p.1.

[995] Nordau and Mosse. p.20.

[996] Ibid., p.20-21. Quietism is a complex issue and scholars often disagree over its definition. As a general rule, it has been defined as a religious attitude of passivity belonging to forms of European mysticism. It is commonly seen as a practice of detachment from worldly affairs. Glenn Alexander Magee has argued that Quietism runs throughout

Moreover, the 'degenerate' person, like Schopenhauer, when sunk in an 'inane reverie' of contemplation "is tormented by doubts, seeks for the basis of all phenomena, especially those whose first causes are completely inaccessible to us, and is unhappy when his inquiries and ruminations lead, as is natural, to no result."[997]

Aside from art and philosophy Nordau, together with Georg Simmel, argued that the aetiology of 'degeneration' and bodily regression could be traced to the destructive influences of 19th century urbanisation.[998] Furthermore Nordau suggested that:

> Parallel with the growth of large towns is the increase in the number of the degenerate of all kinds of criminals, lunatics, and the higher degenerates of Magnan; and it is natural that these last should play an ever more prominent part in endeavouring to introduce an ever greater element of insanity into art and literature.[999]

While Nordau argued in this way, and Simmel argued that regression was a result of modern man experiencing an overwhelming *Steigerung des Nervenlebens,* by contrast Hitler was to argue that it was in fact racial interbreeding which led to 'degeneration'.[1000] Moreover Hitler, who had his own concepts of 'degeneracy' as we shall note, accused the 'degenerate' Jews in particular of betraying Germany at the end of the Great War. This he believed had effectively rendered Germany defenceless and powerless. Therefore, after the Great War, Hitler was convinced that the will power of the *Volk* was just as necessary

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Germany's intellectual history and that "Hegel comes nearly as close as Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein do to embracing quietism in the fullest sense." See: Magee, G. A., "Quietism in German Mysticism and Philosophy," in: *Common Knowledge* Vol. 16, no. 3 (2010). p.486.

997 Nordau and Mosse. p.21.

998 Ibid., p.36. Simmel argued that: "The deepest problems of modern life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces, of historical heritage, of external culture, and of the technique of life. The fight with nature which primitive man has to wage for his bodily existence attains in this modern form its latest transformation." Simmel, G. and Wolff, K. H., *The Sociology of Georg Simmel* (Free Press, 1950). p.409. For a useful commentary on this see Brigitta Nedelamnn in: 'On the Concept of Erleben' in: Kaern, M., Phillips, B. S., and Cohen, R. S., *Georg Simmel and Contemporary Sociology* (Springer Netherlands, 2012). p.231.

999 Nordau and Mosse.p.36. Valentin Magnan (1835-1916), was a French psychiatrist who classified mental illnesses and was connected to the Hôpital Sainte-Anne in Paris.

1000 '*Steigerung des Nervenlebens*' stands for intensified nervous stimulation induced by rapid urbanisation and modernity. However, Nedelmann suggests that what Simmel actually means by this phrase is 'intensified strain' upon the nerves of the mind and body. She also states that the phrase as translated does not refer to "an intensification of emotional life." Kaern, Phillips, and Cohen. p.231 and p.240, fn.2.

to Germany's 'resurrection' as was the repossession of its 'outward power'. Thus, Germany's future 'resurrection' presupposed 'the forces of the will' and this involved a violent attempt to curb the effects of 'degeneracy' in both Germany's art and racial life. Through these attempts, Hitler felt that he was not only reasserting the will of the German *Volk* over 'degeneracy', but that he was also asserting the will of the 'Almighty', in which case Marc's claim C1 might prevail.

This apparent conflation between Hitler's assertion and C1 might be illuminated in the following way. On 4.10.1936, at the end of the *Nationalsozialistischer Rechtswahrerbund* (National Socialist Jurist's Organization) - a conference for university lecturers - Carl Schmitt delivered a speech known as *Die deutsche Rechts-wissenschaft im Kampfgegen den judischen Geist* (German Jurisprudence and the Struggle against the Jewish Spirit). In this speech, (and worth quoting at length), he made the following connections between the Jews, the world of art and Hitler's self-appointed 'spiritual work'. In that speech he stated that:

> …the speed with which Jewish art dealers or intellectual merchants hurl themselves at German artists, poets, and scholars in order to get their hands on a pension are no merits and no qualities that allow us to turn our gaze from the fundamental here. The Jew concerns us not for his own sake. That for which we are searching and that for which we are fighting is our own unadulterated kind, the undamaged purity of our German *volk*. "By fending the Jew away from me," says our Führer's, Adolf Hitler, "I fight for the work of the Lord."[1001]

Hitler's 'fight', and self-induced conviction that he was undertaking the will of the 'Lord', should not be conflated with C1 *per se* - as if the latter could somehow be interpreted as supportive of Nazism – no such thing is being implied. However, at a purely metaphysical and technical level, if all things are a manifestation of the will according to Schopenhauer, then Hitler's assertion was unexceptional in Schopenhauer's technical sense of the term

[1001] Carl Schmitt, 'Die deutsche Rechts-wissenschaft im Kampf gegen den judischen Geist', first published in *Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung* 41, no. 20, (15.10.1936), pp.1193-99. Translated by Timothy Nunan in: Rabinbach, A. and Gilman, S. L., *The Third Reich Sourcebook* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2013). p.218.

will. The latter's understanding of the term would not deny that such a will is cruel, blind, destructive and worthy of being abolished. What he would deny is that his use of the concept will is identical with, interchangeable with, indebted to or underwritten by, a Christian theology or divinity - or for that matter a deliberate anti-Christian dogma.

In contrast to Schopenhauer's atheism, Hitler's political strategies attempted to co-opt and manipulate a Christian mythology which would involve a concerted purge of the nation's Jewish and gypsy population. Without this purge he believed that the triumph of the Jewish people would "be the funeral wreath of humanity…"[1002] Therefore, Hitler argued that by defending himself against the Jewish people, he was fighting for the Lord - a theme that is expressed in several of his portraits e.g. Hubert Lanzinger's *The Standard Bearer* of c.1935-6 (fig. 117), which depicts Hitler as a Medieval crusader knight.

Hitler's metaphysical beliefs lead us on to consider that, amongst many the apocryphal stories which have abounded with regards to his literary and philosophical tastes, Ernst Hanfstaengl (who we shall encounter again in chapter 6 of this thesis) once claimed that Hitler had read Schopenhauer, Karl Marx and Nietzsche whilst at Landsberg prison.[1003] Whilst there is no firm evidence to support this account, another is that:

> Hitler's confidant Hans Frank claimed that Hitler told him he carried Schopenhauer's central work, *The World as Will and Representation*, with him during the First World War...the claim becomes even less credible when one observes that Hitler…did not even know how to spell the philosopher's name.[1004]

Whether such stories are true or not, it is a fact that Hitler borrowed books by Schopenhauer from Krohn's Library at the National Socialist Institute between 1919 and 1921.[1005] In fact, there is no doubt either that Hitler owned books by Schopenhauer, although in his personal library only one book by the philosopher survives to this day.

[1002] Hitler, A. and Manheim, R., *Mein Kampf*, [New ed.]. ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1974).
[1003] Ryback.p.68. Hanfstaengl was Hitler's confidant. He lost that friendship, and through a dramatic turn of events, he then defected to the United States where he became involved with Franklin D. Roosevelt's 'S-Project'. In that project he revealed important details on Nazi leaders including Hitler.
[1004] Ibid.,p.104.
[1005] Ibid.,p.104.

This is a 1931 reprint of the *Hand Oracle and the Art of Worldly Wisdom*, a translation from the work of Baltasar Gracián.[1006]

Among other evidence for Hitler's 'appreciation' of Schopenhauer, we know that on the evening of 25.10.1941, among the Führer's special dinner guests were SS-*Reichsführer* Himmler and SS-*Obergruppenührer* General Reinhard Heydrich. At this dinner Hitler is reported to have stated that:

> In our parts of the world, the Jews would have immediately eliminated Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Kant. If the Bolsheviks had dominion over us for two hundred years, what works of our past would be handed on to posterity? Our great men would fall into oblivion, or else they'd be presented to future generations as criminals and bandits [1007]

Three years later on 16.05.1944, in a Berlin restaurant, Hitler is said to have declaimed on the history of philosophy, and it is a declamation worth quoting at length. He told his guests that:

> In the Great Hall of the Linz Library are the busts of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the greatest of our thinkers, in comparison with whom the British, the French and the Americans have nothing to offer. His complete refutation of the teachings which were a heritage from the Middle Ages, and of the dogmatic philosophy of the Church, is the greatest of the services which Kant has rendered to us. It is on the foundation of Kant's theory of knowledge that Schopenhauer built the edifice of his philosophy, and it is Schopenhauer who annihilated the pragmatism of Hegel. I carried Schopenhauer's works with me throughout the whole of the first World War. From him I learned a great deal. Schopenhauer's pessimism, which springs partly, I think, from his own line of philosophical thought and partly from subjective feeling and the experiences of his own personal life, has been far surpassed by Nietzsche.[1008]

[1006] The Spaniard Gracián was a Jesuit scholar and philosopher. His *Criticón,* appeared in 1651, 1653, and 1657 *Oráculo Manual y Arte de Prudencia* (literally *Manual Oracle and Art of Discretion.* It is also a fact that Hitler's 'appreciation' of Schopenhauer motivated him to place a sculpted bust of the philosopher on his desk.

[1007] Hitler, A. et al., *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941-1944: His Private Conversations*, 3rd ed. (New York City: Enigma Books, 2000)., p. 89. (Hitler's dinner conversations were recorded by Martin Bormann). In another infamous comment, Hitler co-opted Schopenhauer for rhetorical support when stating that: "The Jew's life as a parasite in the body of other nations and states explains a characteristic which once caused Schopenhauer, as has already been mentioned, to call him the 'great master in lying'. Existence impels the Jew to lie, and to lie perpetually, just as it compels the inhabitants of the northern countries to wear warm clothing." See: Hitler and Manheim., p.277. However, as Cartwright has shown, Hitler also conveniently forgets that Schopenhauer's comment was written in a context where Schopenhauer denounced cruelty, as with "Christians against Hindus, Mohammedans, American natives, Negroes, Jews, heretics and others.'" See: Vol. 2, p. 358/ibid, Vol. 6, p. 379. For an extensive coverage of the Hitler/Schopenhauer connection see: Wolfgang Weimer, 'Der Philosoph und der Diktator': Arthur Schopenhauer und Adolf Hitler' in: *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch,* Vol. 84 (2003), pp. 157-67. Cf. Cartwright., p.543.

[1008] Hitler et al., p.720. Moreover, in this conversation when it came to discussing the purity of the German language, he is said to have commented that, "Only writers of genius can have the right to modify the language. In the past

Although Hitler appears to be conversant with philosophy, Hans Sluga has argued that "Hitler's knowledge of Nietzsche's philosophy seems, indeed, to have been negligible; while he referred occasionally to the titles of Nietzsche's books, there is no evidence that he ever read any of them."[1009] In addition, Sluga points out that Schopenhauer could never become the Nazis' 'official' philosopher simply because he was no nationalist. Moreover, despite Schopenhauer's metaphysics appealing to the Nazis, Hitler and Rosenberg could never condone his moral philosophy of compassion which would uphold C1 due to the Nazis' affirmation of the will.[1010] This was so because on the one hand, Schopenhauer promoted a denial of the will and a withdrawal from the world of public affairs which was antithetical to Nazism, just as on the other hand the Nazis disavowed his pessimism and his conviction that salvation entailed a complete denial of the will. As a consequence, the Nazis adopted Nietzsche instead, "particularly a Nietzsche interpreted as the heir of Schopenhauer's metaphysical system, as the one who had turned Schopenhauer's pessimism into an affirmative."[1011] It also appears that Hitler in particular, had not embraced all of Schopenhauer's philosophy – especially what might be termed his idiosyncratic 'theory of race'.

generation, I can think of practically nobody but Schopenhauer who would have dared do such a thing." See: Sherratt, Y., *Hitler's Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).,p.23.

[1009] Sluga, H. D., *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany* (Harvard University Press, 1995).

[1010] Ibid.,p.180. Yvonne Sheerratt has said that: "… Hitler would eventually become irritated by the contemplative side of philosophers and complaining about his 'fatherly friend' Dietrich Eckart he stated that: `Schopenhauer has done Eckart no good. He has made him a doubting Thomas, who only looks forward to a Nirvana. Where would I get if I listened to all his [Schopenhauer's] transcendental talk? A nice ultimate wisdom that: To reduce on[e]self to a minimum of desire and will. Once will is gone all is gone. This life is War." See: Sherratt., p.24. Eckart was convinced that Fichte, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were the 'philosophical triumvirate of national Socialism'. Ibid., 24.

[1011] Sluga.,p. 181. In a similar way, Sherratt has written that: "Hitler's businessman friend Hanfstaengl heard him remark: 'Now it is the heroic *Weltanschauung* which will illuminate the ideals of Germany's future.' 'What was this?' Hanfstaengl questioned. 'This was not Schopenhauer, who had been Hitler's philosophical god in the old ... days. No, this was new. It was Nietzsche: SS Hitler had moved his allegiance elsewhere." See: Sherratt., p.24.

5.3 Race, Art and Intellect

Even though Hitler had not embraced all of Schopenhauer's philosophy, by contrast the Nazi's own idiosyncratic doctrine of the will was welcomed in certain academic quarters. For instance, as part of his personal and professional vow of allegiance to Hitler, Professor Wilhelm Pinder claimed that the resurrection of Germany would lead to the same freedom of artistic expression as had been the case in the Middle Ages.[1012] Furthermore, on a specifically racial note, philosopher Ernst Krieck suggested in his 1934 essay, 'Das rassisch- völkisch-politische Geschichtsbild' (The Racial-Folkish - Political Conception of History) that; "race manifests itself in the will, the outlook, and the worldview in accordance with the racial hierarchy of values."[1013] This will ensured that the Germanic value system led to a hardened human body with a hardened will committed to a 'völkisch totality', which in turn would reinvigorate native German culture and so act against 'degeneracy'. Therefore, given a political hardening of the will, C1 may be regarded as possessing continued relevance for the 1930s.

Anthropological interest in the '*völkisch* totality' of the human body and German culture pre-dated the Nazi era. As Andrew D. Evans points out, an anthropology of the human body began in Germany around the 1870s in conjunction with 'ethnology and prehistory'. It was subsequently in the Weimar era that anthropologists of the body

[1012] Rabinbach and Gilman. p.277. Wilhelm Pinder (1878-1947) was an art historian and nationalist whose close attention to German art appealed to the Nazis. As a professor at the University of Berlin, Pinder acted as an adviser to the Nazis on the confiscation of art for the Party. Along with Martin Heidegger, Pinder and other lecturers in Higher Education took a voluntary vow to the Nazi Party in 1933. This grandiose vow was published in: *Bekenntnis der Professoren an den deutschen Universitäten und Hochschulen and Hochschulen zu Adolf Hitler and dem NS Staat* **(**Vow of Allegiance of the Professors of German Universities and Institutions of Higher Learning to Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist State). Cf. Ibid. p.271-78.

[1013] Ibid., p.120 First published as "Das rassisch- völkisch-politische Geschichtsbild," in: *Wissenschaf t, Weltanschauung, Hochschulreform* (Leipzig: Armanen Verlag, 1934), 6-8, 36-39. In 1933 Ernst Krieck was rector at the University of Frankfurt and by 1934 had become rector to the University Heidelberg. Krieck joined the Nazi Party in 1932 and found himself at the vanguard of Nazi academic philosophy. His belief in the totalising effects of *völkisch* philosophy stressed a pedagogy of political values. However, he was not convinced by the politics of racial hygiene. He died in 1947 as a prisoner whilst in American custody. For more on Krieck see: Sluga, H.D. *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany*. Harvard University Press, 1995. pp.7,131, 174-5, 215, 241. Also, on Krieck and other philosophers under Hitler, note the tabloid sensationalism of: Sherratt.

renamed their science as *Rassenkunde*, (racial science). From then on, by "using new approaches from the burgeoning field of genetics, adherents of *Rassenkunde* set out to determine the links between race, intellect, and culture."[1014] For the Nazi Party 'the links between race, intellect, and culture' raised the spectre of both racial and artistic 'degeneration'.

In 1937 the links between race, intellect, and art reached a crisis point when the National Socialists staged the *Entartete Kunst* (Degenerate Art) exhibition, described by Stephanie Barron as "the most virulent attack on modern art" [1015]. Among the 650 'degenerate art' works on display were those of Expressionist artists who had taken a particular interest in the human body. These works had been systematically confiscated from museums around Germany. In retrospect, the exhibition may be regarded as a manifestation of the National Socialists' will taking precedence over the world as representation and thus contributing towards a vindication of C1.

The political will of the National Socialists was to undermine not only the work of Cubists, Constructivists and Dadaists, but also the 'wilfulness' of the Expressionists. The art works displayed were regarded as exemplars of moral and racial 'degeneracy'.[1016] By way of contrast, the National Socialists organised the *Grosse Deutsche Kunstaustellung* (Great German Art Exhibition), which exhibited the fruits of a racially 'purified' art. This exhibition was shown in the premises of the *Haus der Deutschen Kunst* (German House of Art) at the same time as the Degenerate Art exhibition and within walking distance of it. Before these exhibitions Goebbels had initially thought it politically expedient to publicise Expressionism's *völkisch* aspects in order to further the Nazi cause, but was

[1014] Evans, A. D., "Race Made Visible: The Transformation of Museum Exhibits in Early-Twentieth-Century German Anthropology," in: *German Studies Review* Vol. 31, no. 1 (2008). p.88.
[1015] Barron and Guenther. p.9.
[1016] Edwards and Wood.

eventually overruled by Hitler at the Nuremberg party rally in 1934.[1017] There Hitler gave his speech 'Kunst verpflichtet zur Wahrhaftigkeit' (Art and Its Commitment to Truth). In it Hitler expressed his belief that the 'sovereign spirit' of a true German artist "reaches deep into the sum total of related cultural achievements of his species throughout millennia and still manages to resolutely lend expression to his own artistic will and intent."[1018] The sovereign German 'artistic will and intent' was set in opposition to those whom Hitler described as the "destroyers of art (*Kunstverderber*)" whose motto was "innovation at any price."[1019] In addition, under the National Socialists, he believed that, "The nobility of the human body has cast off the bane of rape and deformity. A whole new world of beauty is emerging."[1020]

Later, when giving his speech for the opening of the Great German Art Exhibition on 18.07.1937, he alluded to the German Expressionist body as one of, "Deformed cripples and cretins, women whose image can but elicit disgust, men who look more like animals than humans, children who would be considered a curse from God if they were to actually live the way you portray them!"[1021] In theory, the 'curse from God' upon art could be avoided if the forces of racial purity were obeyed. As a result, Hitler reasoned that the racial power at the hub of Germany's development in history continued to form his nation through the Aryan peoples, who in the past, present and

[1017] In 1931, Goebbels's empirical will expressed itself in a leading article written for the Nazi periodical *Wille und Weg* (first edition). The periodicals title 'Will and Way' was later renamed as *Unser Wille und Weg* ('Our Will and Way'). In this article, Goebbels stated that "The will of the National Socialist movement is laid out in its program." See translation by Randall Bytwerk in: Calvin College, *German Propaganda Archive*. Cf. Goebbels, Josef 'Wille und Weg' in: Goebbels, Joseph, Nsdap Zentralverlag der, and N.S.D.A P. Reichspropagandaleitung der. Unser Wille Und Weg (in German). Muñchen: Zentralverlag der N.S.D.A.P. 1 (1931) p.2-5. Goebbels also stressed that: "Political methods always presume a political goal. Only when the goal is crystal clear and unchangeable is it possible to determine the foundations of practical work. The means one uses to reach the goal is political will." Ibid., Bytwerk. Note how Goebbels disengenously claims that the *Volk* would retain their free will. His assurance being that, "We will gain power only with the people, not against them. They will join us when it feels as we do, when it is persuaded that what we want is correct." See: Ibid., Bytwerk. For similar ideas see: Stoltzfus, N., *Hitler's Compromises: Coercion and Consensus in Nazi Germany* (Yale University Press, 2016). p.41.
[1018] Rabinbach and Gilman. p.490.
[1019] Ibid., p.490.
[1020] Ibid., p.491.
[1021] Ibid., p.498.

future had objectified themselves as standard bearers of culture. His vatical oratory concluded that "…degenerate peoples such as the gypsies and Jews could never become standard bearers for unsullied representations of the Aryan body in art or everyday life."[1022]

Hitler's vatic oratory is the subject of Hermann Otto Hoyer's painting *In the Beginning Was the Word* of 1937 (fig. 118). The Nazi intention here was to reinstate the world as representation according to the 'word' of Hitler. The title and depiction of the painting depicts Hitler's sermonising gestures in a parody of the opening line from the Gospel of John in the New Testament which describes Christ as the word of God being made flesh. In doing so Nazism reinstated the 'conventional' aesthetic of representation through the 'word' and 'will' of its Messianic figure - Hitler. Since the reinstatement of 'conventional' representation was typical of Nazi policy, we are faced with a paradox, because on the one hand it invalidates C1 by reinstating 'conventional' representations in art. On the other hand, it also reveals the dominance of Nazi will, presiding over and dictating to the world as representation, which paradoxically validates C1.

As did Hitler, Alfred Rosenberg inscribed racial values into German art. As far as he was concerned, philosophers had neglected notions of racial beauty when writing about art. Consequently, it became necessary that the aesthetic conditions of art should be linked to an ideal physical appearance according to an ideal racial typology and value system. For this reason Rosenberg in his book *The Myth of The Twentieth Century: An Evaluation of the Spiritual-Intellectual Confrontations of Our Age* that, "In this respect, it is evident that if the nature of art is to be discussed, then the pure physical representation, for example, of a Greek, must have a different effect upon us than, for instance, the portrait

[1022] Ibid., p.496.

of a Chinese emperor."[1023] All art he believed, was produced through "different race souls," by artists who embodied spiritual values and manifested "certain racial peculiarities."[1024] He was convinced that the Nordic racial form expressed 'true' art, just as the will of a great leader conducted the masses toward that art. Physiologically therefore:

> …in art forms, the head alone is drawn into prominent position. This representation symbolically shows what is significant, what is essential, for Germanic man. The forehead, nose, eyes, teeth and chin all become bearers of the will, of the direction of ideas. The movement from the static to the dynamic is discernible here. At this point, Nordic western art separates from the Greek ideal.[1025]

Having said this, Rosenberg felt that aesthetic philosophy had neglected the representation of racial ideals pertaining to beauty, with the exception of H.F.K. Gunther's *Rassenkunde* of 1922, and Schultze Naumburg's *Kunst und Rasse* of 1928. Therefore, Rosenberg inferred that in the world as representation, laypeople, artists, and art historians passed through art galleries without truly seeing anything at all.[1026] In addition, Rosenberg's belief that "race is the outward image of a definite soul"[1027] was a safeguard against all that was unfamiliar or 'un-German' in the world as representation. In essence, we may argue that although Rosenberg was asserting his will, his conception stands for a rebuttal of C1, since Rosenberg wished to restore 'conventional' forms of representation. Indeed, as Eric Michaud points out, Nazi politics aimed at "transfiguring bodies so as to render them *Heimlich*, familiar."[1028]

[1023] Rosenberg, A., *The Myth of The Twentieth Century: An Evaluation of the Spiritual-Intellectual Confrontations of Our Age* (Sussex: Historical Review Press, 2004). p.176.
[1024] Ibid., p.177.
[1025] Ibid., p.185.
[1026] Ibid., p.185.
[1027] Ibid., p.345.
[1028] Michaud, E. and Lloyd, J., *The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004). p.24

However, the gypsy body was far from being *Heimlich,* instead being that which stood for the "anti-people or anti-race (*Gegenvolk*, *Gegenrasse*)."[1029]

5.4 Mueller and the Gypsies

If the gypsy body was *ungewohnt* (unfamiliar), then it had to be dealt with according to Nazi racial legislation. This obviously raises several moral questions, not simply with respect to the gypsies, but also with respect to the philosophy and practice of art.[1030] Firstly, let us note how Schopenhauer proposes that, "In morality the good will is everything, but in art it is nothing; for, as the word art (*Kunst*) already indicates, ability (*Können*) alone is of any consequence."[1031] Yet, as far as Hitler was concerned, there was an absence of both 'good will' and ability in the cultural decay of the old Reich. This he believed resulted from pernicious foreign influences inimical to German art. Thus, "a spiritual degeneration that had reached the point of destroying the spirit"[1032] became visible via the effects of 'Art Bolshevism'. Therefore:

> Anyone to whom this seems strange need only subject the art of the happily Bolshevized states to an examination, and, to his horror, he will be confronted by the morbid excrescences of insane and degenerate men, with which, since the turn of the century, we have become familiar under the collective concepts of cubism and Dadaism, as the official and recognized art of those states.[1033]

When the Nazi official Adolf Ziegler gave his opening speech for the Degenerate Art exhibition on 19.07.1937 in Room 3 of the exhibition hall, he was flanked on his left-hand side by four of Mueller's 'degenerate' paintings.[1034] These paintings were all of the gypsy

[1029] Ibid., p.80.
[1030] We will apply more of Schopenhauer's moral philosophy to Nolde's situation under Nazism in the following chapter of this thesis.
[1031] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.384.
[1032] Hitler and Manheim.p.234-5.
[1033] Ibid.,p.235.
[1034] Adolf Ziegler was president of the *Reichskammer der Bildenden Künste*. Following Goebbel's decree of 30.06.1937, Ziegler, along with five others, was commissioned to confiscate 'degenerate' art from any German Museum. Such art was to be shown in Munich's 'Degenerate Art' exhibition. In addition, a second commission organised by Goebbels enabled Ziegler to sell off the confiscated works. His was assisted by Hans Schweitzer and Robert Scholz, together with Franz Hofmann, Cari Meder, Karl Haberstock, and Max Taeuber. For an in-depth discussion of this see the essays by:

people and in this same room the exhibition organisers had placed captions on the walls in an attempt to thematise the artworks on display. Accordingly, along with Paul Kleinschmidt, Kirchner, and Karl Hofer, Mueller's work was damned with the captions 'An insult to German womanhood' and 'The ideal-cretin and whore'. Another caption which overshadowed the works of Mueller, Pechstein, and Nolde read "The Jewish longing for the wilderness reveals itself - in Germany the Negro becomes the racial ideal of a degenerate art."[1035] The racial ideal of the National Socialist Party meant eradicating or marginalising all 'alien blood' from the *Volk*, leaving no room for images of the gypsy body in German art. However, for Mueller, the gypsy had been a major preoccupation for many years and now it was inevitable that his paintings of the gypsy body would find themselves on display.[1036]

As a child Mueller had developed a lasting affinity for the gypsy people to such an extent that this affinity has led many to claim that he had gypsy blood in his veins. Yet Lothar Günther Buchheim states that:

> That is not true: Otto Mueller's mother, Marie Maywald, was admittedly just as dark-haired and dark-eyed as his father, but she was no gypsy, but rather a Bohemian. In any case one can say that Otto Mueller's genealogical line soon disappears into oblivion on his mother's side, as the father of his mother is not known. Her mother was born to an unmarried Bohemian maid, and brought up in the house of the only sister of Robert Hauptmann, the father of Carl and Gerhart Hauptmann. This aunt of Gerhart Hauptmann married the estate owner Julius Göhler. The Göhlers took in Marie Maywald as their own child. [1037]

Andreas Huneke and Stephanie Barron in: Barron, Stephanie, *Degenerate Art: The Fate of the Avant-Garde in Nazi Germany* [in English]. Los Angeles, Calif New York: Los Angeles County Museum of Art Harry N. Abrams, 1991.
In 1940 Kurt Pinthus observed that, "Never before has Germany given so many literary awards or arranged for so many festivals, official art exhibitions and meetings of authors." From: Pinthus, K., "Culture Inside Nazi Germany," in: *The American Scholar* Vol. 9, no. 4 (1940). p.484.

[1035] Barron and Guenther., p.308. No paintings depicted African Negroes in this room. For the Nazis, the African Negro more often appeared in the context of 'primitivism' and Jazz. Therefore, this wall caption was more relevant to the 1938 *Entartete Musik* exhibition held in Düsseldorf.

[1036] This chapter uses the National Socialist's inventory numbers for those works shown in the 1937 Munich '*Entartete Kunst*' exhibition as reconstructed by Mario-Andreas von Luttichau. This chapter follows those inventory numbers by using the abbreviations 'NS inv.no' followed by the inventory number itself. For further details on all inventory numbered paintings in this exhibition see: ibid., p.20.

[1037] Buchheim. p.33.

The aunt of Hauptmann, having married the wealthy landowner Göhler, 'adopted' Marie Maywald. Subsequently it is easy to understand how the conjunction of being 'dark haired and dark eyed', together with the presence in Bohemia of gypsies, and an unknown father led to the romantic perception of Mueller being a gypsy. This romantic perception was addressed by his sister Emmy who said that:

> "Our mother", wrote Emmy, "who became almost deaf at 12 years old, brought great joy to the Göhlers, and they adopted her before her marriage to Lieutenant Julian Mueller. Today it is claimed that our mother was a gypsy. This is very unlikely for the following reasons: when I visited the Göhlers in my youth, I once saw my grandmother there. I came across her in the hallway, and I still today have a firm recollection of her as a maid who was dressed like our Bohemian maids and who had nothing gypsy-like about her."[1038]

Although Mueller never disputed rumours that he had gypsy blood in his veins, it was not uncommon for modernist artists to foster 'romantic' myths about their 'primitive' origins. Gauguin, for example, claimed that he had Peruvian blood in his veins, and the Russian artist Natalia Sergeevna Goncharova claimed that she was from gypsy stock, though there is no proof for either. However, when any orthodox Nazi official looked at Mueller's *Gypsy Woman* of 1926 (fig. 119), it would have become clear to them that the natural stylisation of gypsy racial features, and the mysterious allure of this strange race with their dark skin, was the embodiment of an alien 'barbarism'.

Apart from the gypsy being the embodiment of an alien 'barbarism', one of the major problems for Nazism was the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the gypsies within Germany. As we shall see, this is a theme often referenced in paintings by Mueller and was also likely to have proven problematic in the reception of his work by the authorities in the 1930s. Indeed, the semi-nomadic lifestyle of the gypsies was one factor that led to their demise. As Guenter Lewy points out concerning Himmler's decree titled 'Combating

[1038] Lewy. p.201.

the Gypsy Plague' of 12.12.1938 "It had become clear…that *Zigeunermischlinge* were responsible for most of the criminal offences committed by gypsies. It therefore was necessary that racially pure gypsies and Mischlinge be treated differently."[1039]

One of the grounds upon which gypsies were 'treated differently' was their dark skin, whilst another was the history of their perceived anti-social behaviours. However, as Lewy argues, more compelling grounds for being treated differently stemmed from the threat of gypsies 'polluting' the gene pool of the *völkisch* body. Ironically, Himmler's 1938 decree was founded upon the earlier Nuremberg Laws of 1935 and did not refer to gypsies *per se*.[1040] Yet, one decree issued by Minister of the Interior Wilhelm Frick on 26 November "noted that, besides Jews, there were others who polluted the German blood - gypsies, Negroes and their bastards."[1041] Furthermore, an authoritative commentary on the new racial legislation published in 1936, stipulated that persons of 'alien blood' could not become German citizens. As a rule therefore, Jews and gypsies were classified as being of alien blood in Europe.[1042]

Subsequent to this, Mueller's paintings of gypsies found themselves implicated within a complex racial argument based on a specific theory. This theory was that Aryan tribes had once invaded India and driven out the native Dravidians, leading to an

[1039] Ibid., p.201.
[1040] On the 15.07.1935 at the Nuremberg rally, the Nazi Party announced a series of laws which largely implicated the Jews. Two particular laws which covered this were the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour, which aimed to curb the problem of racial 'degeneracy' by prohibiting relationships between German natives and Jews and the Reich Citizenship Law which excluded all who were not native Germans (or related to them) from being described as Reich citizens. The remainder were effectively dispossessed of civil rights whilst remaining subject to the state. Two months later on 26 November, the Nuremberg laws were extended to gypsies and African Negroes. Wilhelm Stuckart and Hans Globke, in their 1936 commentary, *Globke Kommentare zur deutschen Rassengesetzgebung* (Civil Rights and the Natural Inequality of Man) observed that, "The community of the Volk, sustained by a common will and consciousness of honor of the racially homogeneous German Volk, constitutes political unity. This community is not only spiritual; it is real. The real bond is the common blood. This community of blood is what forms the völkisch-political unity of purpose in our confrontation with the surrounding world." Quotation from: Rabinbach, Anson, and Sander L. Gilman. *The Third Reich Sourcebook* [in English]. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2013. p.212.
[1041] Lewy. p.201. Wilhelm Frick was a member of the NSDAP, and Hitler's Reich Minister of the Interior from 1933 to 1943.
[1042] Ibid., p.202.

intermarriage between the two peoples.[1043] Dr. Robert Ritter, as head of the Berlin *Rassenhygienische und Bevölkerungbiologische Forschungsstelle* (RHF), disagreed with those who suggested that gypsies could trace their racial origins to India, or that the Sanskrit language might entitle them to be called 'Aryan'.[1044] Himmler, by contrast was particularly fascinated by the gypsies and in 1942 issued orders for new research into their way of life.[1045]

5.5 Schopenhauer's 'Racial Theory'

Although it may surprise us that Himmler took an interest in the gypsies, it may also surprise some of us that Mueller's fascination with gypsies, and their Indian provenance, resonates with Schopenhauer who had what might loosely be described as his own racial theory. He often referred to the Indian Vedas and Upanishads while maintaining a belief that these texts (and Sanskrit literature in general) would permeate Germany in a similar manner to the way that Ancient Greek literature had in the fifteenth century.[1046] He believed that, "The *Vedas* and *Puranas* know no better simile for the whole knowledge of the actual world, called by them the web of Maya, than the dream, and they use none more frequently."[1047] The Hindu belief surrounding the veil of Maya suggests that the world is an illusion inherent to human perception. Because the veil of Maya which consists of multiplicity and plurality, it is only a virtuous character who is able to see through this illusion. They can achieve this out of high levels of compassion and empathy which

[1043] The Aryan Invasion theory has been discredited. There is no archaeological evidence of large-scale warfare, or even substantial demographic changes at the presumed time of the 'invasion' (late second millennium BCE) in the north-western region of the subcontinent. It is impossible to prove that Dravidian-speaking peoples were at any time inhabiting those areas in the prehistoric age. More likely, there was a migration over centuries of small groups hailing from the Iranian plateau (ancient Iranic languages and Sanskrit being cognate), some of whom settled in what is today Panjab, then interbred with the pre-existing population and created the Vedic culture that is at the origin of most later developments. I am grateful to Dr. Vincenzo Vergiani for his assistance on these issues.
[1044] The word 'Aryan' itself is derived from a Sanskrit adjective – ārya –with meanings akin to 'noble, righteous', without ethnic connotations.
[1045] Lewy. p.203.
[1046] Schopenhauer makes his claims about Sanskrit literature in: Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1,p.xv.
[1047] Ibid., p.17.

enables them to identify with others as if no distinction exists between themselves and the 'other'. As a result, Schopenhauer considers that this disposition "reveals the identity of the will in all appearances and the illusory status of individuation."[1048] This means that for such a disposition "the veil of Maya has become transparent and he or she recognizes his or her self in all things."[1049]

Schopenhauer's philosophy also nurtured a high regard for the Hindu religion as one of compassion for all living creatures. From his earliest manuscripts, we know that he had a profound interest in aspects of Indian philosophy. He related this to his own, especially in terms of affirmation and denial of the will.[1050] His acquaintance with Indian texts was made whilst living in Weimar through Friedrich Majer, which then led to a lifelong interest in Buddhism. Later, Schopenhauer would conclude that, "if I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I should have to concede to Buddhism pre-eminence over the others."[1051]

Schopenhauer's views on racial issues (possibly under the influence of Indian philosophy) finds extensive coverage in the second volume of his work *Parerga and Paralipomena*. If Hitler had truly engaged with all of Schopenhauer's works and encountered the philosopher's 'racial theories' here, then perhaps his admiration would have quickly turned to disgust. By contrast, Schopenhauer's 'racial theories' help us to interpret Mueller's paintings in a new way, which runs counter to the aesthetic and political ambitions of Hitler's regime.

Schopenhauer begins his *Parerga* essay on 'racial evolution' by noting that in different regions of the world similar organisms come into being under similar physical

[1048] Cartwright., p.109. Schopenhauer's use of the Sanskrit term '*Tat Tvam Asi'* (तत्त्वमसि) means 'Thou art that'. See: Cartwright, p.169. This term can be found in the Chandogya Upanishad 6.8.7.
[1049] Cartwright. p.109.
[1050] Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.1, p.515.
[1051] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.p.169. Friedrich Majer was a little-known Orientalist and student of Johann Gottfried Herder.

conditions. This means that numerous species share common characteristics without being identical. He argues that the variety of the human race cannot have been derived from each other, despite the species remaining the same. He also argues that consonance of species does not equal a single origin from a single pair: "Who will believe that all oaks are descended from a single first oak, all mice from a first pair, or all wolves from the first wolf?"[1052] Thus, Schopenhauer seems to conflate convergent evolution (where similar evolutionary effects are found in different places) with phylogenetic closeness (where species within genera are closely related).

Schopenhauer's 'evolution theory' entailed that the first human beings from the torrid zones were black in skin colour, or at any rate dark-brown - just as the gypsy paintings by Mueller are. Of such skin colour he states that:

> This, then, is the true, natural, and characteristic colour of the human species, regardless of race, and there has never been a naturally white race. In fact, to talk of such and childishly to divide people into white, yellow, and black, as is still done in all books, is evidence of great prejudice and a lack of thought.[1053]

Schopenhauer was also convinced that, "a white man has never sprung originally from the womb of nature. Only in the tropics is man at home, and here he is always black or dark brown." [1054] In addition, Schopenhauer was evidently convinced that it was only after mankind had multiplied in the tropics and then extended into colder regions of the world that it became white. Therefore, it was only due to the consequences of a temperate climate and colder regions that the European stock became white.[1055]

In many ways, Schopenhauer's 'evolutionary theory' is correct. This 'theory' might be visualised through Mueller's 'degenerate' gypsies who, being of Hindu origins, migrated into Europe so that their "colour is roughly midway between that of the Hindu

[1052] Schopenhauer and Payne. p.155.
[1053] Ibid., p.156. Schopenhauer spends some time on this topic in 'The Metaphysics of Sexual Love'. See: Volume 2, *The World as Will and Representation*. Chapter XLIV.
[1054] Ibid., p.156-157.
[1055] Ibid., p.157.

and ours."[1056] Furthermore, Schopenhauer suggests that Negro slaves had become fairer in skin colour, "despite the fact that in this respect they are checked through their interbreeding with fresh ebony-coloured immigrants, a renewal that does not happen to the gypsies."[1057] Consequently, Mueller's 'degenerate' tempera on canvas, *Gypsy Child with Donkey* of 1927 (fig. 120), leads us to believe that Schopenhauer was correct due to the child's dark skin tones. In this image, a naked child has her back turned to the spectator whilst wrapping her arms around a tree trunk. Her skin tonality is dark-brown which harmonises with the saturnine tonalities of the whole composition. As a result, the dark tonalities of the gypsy body imply an exoticism at variance with the Nordic world as representation.

5.6 The Problem of the Gypsy and Mueller's 'Degenerate' Works

For the Nazis, the gypsy was a serious problem, and the latter's apparently feculent exoticism threatened to 'infect' the German people. An anonymous author writing in *Das Schwarze Korps* on 15.07.1937 commented that, "The German people must find a way of solving the gypsy problem, for we cannot tolerate a foreign body amongst us which would be an eternal danger of infection, an eternal source of criminality, an eternal parasite on the wealth of the people." [1058] Perceived in this way, Mueller's gypsy paintings were redolent with a 'danger of infection' for the German people. However, from a political standpoint it became increasingly problematic for the Nazi authorities to calibrate exactly how a gypsy body should be defined. To calibrate a Jewish body was relatively straightforward - it depended upon religious faith and the ancestry of the family. By comparison, no similar calibration was available for the definition of a gypsy body,

[1056] Ibid., p.157.
[1057] Ibid., p.157.
[1058] Anonymous, "Verlogene Romantik " in: *Das Schwarze Korps*.,15.07.1937, p.12.

especially for those who had already interbred with the 'Aryan' race. Consequently, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, in 1936 the Ministry of the Interior had created the RHF institute whose purpose was to gather intelligence on Germany's 'nomadic' gypsy population and its resultant *Zigeunermischlinge.*[1059] This intelligence was subsequently handled by the Kripo in order to deal with the gypsy menace.[1060]

The problem of the gypsy menace was subsequently mapped onto those artists who portrayed them. In fact, simply to have a dark skin aroused suspicion in the minds of the Nazi authorities. However, there were other works of Mueller's that did not have gypsy orientated titles but still portrayed suspiciously dark-skinned females. One such example, shown at the Munich *Entartete Kunst* exhibition, was his *Two Nude Girls* of c.1919 (fig. 121). Here, if we look at the two darkly hued girls through Nazi eyes, then they possess a nakedness suggestive of their 'contaminated' racial sexuality.[1061] The prevailing context for this antipathy was a concern that the *Volk* would become contaminated through interbreeding with the gypsies. As a result, in 1937 Robert Krämer, the author of 'Racial Examinations on the 'Gypsy' Colonies Lause and Altenburg bei Berleburg (Westf)', would report that, *"*… almost parallel to the skin, hair and eye-colour studies, a lower level of talent was connected with the increase in gypsy blood ratios."[1062] Therefore, if there was a 'lower level of talent' concomitant with an 'increase in gypsy blood ratios',

[1059] *Zigeunermischlinge* means to be of mixed race but predominantly of Aryan stock. About 90% of gypsies living in Germany were categorised as *Mischlinge* (mixed blood). This information was from Niewyk, D.L., and F.R. Nicosia, *The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust*. Columbia University Press, 2012. In addition, "Germans of mixed blood **(**Mischlinge**)** were further defined as first degree Mischlinge and second-degree Mischlinge according to the number of Jewish grandparents**."** This quotation was taken from Atkins, S.E. *Holocaust Denial as an International Movement*. Praeger, 2009, p.35.

[1060] Lewy. p.202. The Kripo, or the *Kriminalpolizei* ('Criminal Police'), became the Criminal Police Department for Nazi Germany from 1936.

[1061] Notions of ideological 'contaimination' are discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis as they might relate to Nazism, Nolde and the problem of and free will.

[1062] Krämer, R., "Rassische Untersuchungen an den 'Zigeuner'-Kolonien Lause und Altenburg bei Berleburg (Westf)," in: *Archiv für Rassen und Gesellschaftsbiologie* Vol. 31, no. 1 (1937). p.46.

then Mueller's gypsy females manifested the potential seductive power of a 'degenerate' race over the German male.[1063]

From a Nazi perspective, another of Mueller's 'degenerate' works illustrated the consequences of racial interbreeding. This work of c.1920 was entitled *Lovers* (fig. 122) and executed in tempera on canvas shows a fair skinned (probably Aryan) female who, while seated in the nude, is being watched by a dark-skinned male (probably a gypsy) in the shadows behind her. It was all too easy for the Nazi authorities to read out of this image the presence of a sexually 'parasitic' gypsy leering over an Aryan female. For the National Socialists, images of this nature were examples of racial treason and exemplified the threat of interbreeding. Therefore, after observing the two gypsy colonies in Lause and Altenberg bei Berleburg, Krämer argued that it could be shown how "their blood inheritance, furthered by a decades-long negative selection process, still determines today their parasitic form of life."[1064] The problem facing the Nazis then was to 'triumph' over the will of the *Volk* in such a way that it was compelled to reproduce itself from Aryan stock alone. The compulsion to do so, as an act of political will, lends weight to Marc's claim C1. Thus, the sexual denial of 'foreign individuals' as with gypsies, was a convincing mandate for every racial hygienist who wished to enforce that will.[1065]

As a consequence of the above, the defamation of Mueller's gypsy paintings became embroiled in policies for Aryan self-preservation. Gustav Adolf Küppers spoke of the gypsies as a foreign body amongst the Aryan peoples. This necessitated that Aryans

[1063] A certain Curt Thomella commented on the Nuremberg race laws of 1935 so that party officials could be sure of certain 'facts'. He explained the difference between '*Reichsbürger*' (Reich citizens) and '*Staatsangehörige*' (nationals), arguing that the concept 'German blood' had to be explained. He asserted that, "members of foreign races, so for example gypsies, Negroes and Jews, are not related to German blood. It must be pointed out once and for all, although it probably seems superfluous and self-evident to do so, that it is not the body fluid 'blood' which is meant by this explanation, but rather the concept 'blood' is symbolic of the sum total of the inherited physical, mental and spiritual qualities of man." See: Curt Thomalla: ‚Der Schutz des deutschen Blutes und der Ehre' in: ‚Unser Wille und Weg' 1937, p.308.

[1064] Krämer. p.50.

[1065] Rosenberg's belief was that the Jew and Negro were symbolic of a disintegrating world-view since they were given an undue importance in Germany. He said that: "The race and soul of the Negroes is regarded - along with the good Jews - as being more important than the nation to which one has the honour to belong." Rosenberg. p.124.

had to take "clear and unambiguous precautions."[1066] One way to protect the *Volk* was to prevent any art such as Mueller's from appearing at all. Indeed, the only state-approved appearance for Mueller's work was in the context of a heavy propaganda programme designed to undermine other races.[1067] Hitler began this programme by asserting that the *Volk's* need for self-preservation was itself an act of will. He claimed that:

> What is ultimately decisive in the life of a Folk is the will to self-preservation, and the living forces that are at its disposal for this purpose. Weapons can rust, forms can be outdated; the will itself can always renew both and move a Folk into the form required by the need of the moment.[1068]

Hitler's racial propaganda meant that Mueller's work, which was shown in the *Entartete Kunst* exhibition, went on a national tour between 1938 and 1941. For this purpose, a communiqué was sent from Berlin's *Reichspropagandaleitung* (Reich Propaganda Directorate) on 23.11.1937 to party organisers in each German province. Having taken over the *Entartete Kunst* exhibition, the *Reichspropagandaleitung* of the NSDAP allowed at the most four-week stays for the travelling exhibition in each location.[1069] However, for the sake of 'financial support', Mueller's *Three Women* of c.1922 (fig. 123) was sent back to Berlin in the hope of its being sold on to support Party funding.

Of the remaining exhibits pertaining to the original Munich exhibition, works by Mueller such as *Boy Standing in front of Two Standing Girls and One Sitting Girl* of c.1918-19 (fig. 124) would have still have been interpreted as morally and racially inappropriate. Although it is not certain whether the bodies shown in this painting are full-blooded gypsies, what is certain is that the accurate depictions of an alien body type by

[1066] Küppers, Gustav Adolf: 'Begegnung mit Balkanzigeunern' in: *Volk und Rasse illustrierte Monatsschrift für deutsche Volkstum, Rassenkunde, Rassenpflege; Zeitschrift. des Reichsausschusses für Volksgesundheitsdienst und der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene* Vol. 17, no. 3 (1942). p.193.
[1067] The influence of propaganda was felt not only by ethnic minorities but also by native Germans as we shall see in the next chapter.
[1068] Hitler, A., Attanasio, S., and Taylor, T., *Hitler's Secret Book* (New York: Grove Press, 1961). p.25.
[1069] Barron and Guenther. p.90.

Mueller closely parallel the observations of racial commentators such as Sophie Ehrhardt.[1070] In her 1942 essay, 'Gypsies and Gypsy half-breeds in East Prussia', she observed that the gypsies were of slim build and had a well-developed musculature. The bone structure in them she found not to be coarse, but rarely fine, although the gypsy head was often broadly projecting.[1071]

This corporeal analysis matches Mueller's depiction of the gypsy skull in *Half Nude Girl in Profile* (*in Front of a Picture*) of 1922 (fig. 125), where the mandible and parietal areas of the skull are quite 'projecting'.[1072] The fact that these areas of the skull are 'broadly projecting' would have confirmed Bertil Lundman's findings.[1073] These findings were that many, if not most, of the predominantly Nordic people of 'feeble' constitution (surveyed in Dalarna, Sweden), had acquired their weakness through their gypsy ancestry.[1074] Yet, despite the Nazis' use of such visual and ethnographic generalisations, the gypsy works of Mueller were hemmed in by a virulent racial ideology so that little of an aesthetically positive nature could be read out of them at the time. By contrast, what was required was an ideal Aryan skull type. For a point of aesthetic and moral reference, 'The Great German Art Exhibition' exhibited three sculptured busts of Schopenhauer. Hitler himself purchased a marble portrait bust of him by Rudolf Schmid for 4000 RM which was exhibited in 1942.[1075] The second the *Schopenhauer-Büste* by Munich based sculptor Fritz Müller-Kamphausen shown in 1939. The third was a bronze

[1070] Dr. Sophie Ehrhardt was involved with gypsy research and a member of the anthropology faculty at the University of Tübingen from 1942. For her research, at the Racial Hygiene and Population Research Office, she managed to avoid prosecution after the war. See: Stewart, M. and Rovid, M., *Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies* (Central European University Press, 2011); Lemarchand, R., *Forgotten Genocides: Oblivion, Denial, and Memory* (University of Pennsylvania Press, Incorporated, 2011); ibid.p.143. Stewart, M., M. Rovid, and M.R.R. VID. *Multi-Disciplinary Approaches to Romany Studies*. Central European University Press, 2011.p.180.

[1071]. Ehrhardt, Sophie, 'Zigeuner und Zigeunermischlinge in Ostpreussen' in: *Volk und Rasse illustrierte Monatsschrift für deutsche Volkstum, Rassenkunde, Rassenpflege* 1942, Vol. 17, no. 3, p.56.

[1072] "*Landscapes,* architectural works, flower pieces, still life and so on show me *my knowing,* but *historical paintings* and heads show me my *willing* or my *being,* which are one and the same." Schopenhauer and Hübscher. Vol.1, p.335.

[1073] Lundman, B. and Swan, D. A., *The Races and Peoples of Europe* (IAAEE, 1977).

[1074] Ibid., p.304.

[1075] Although he does not say who the sculptor was, Timothy W. Ryback argues that: "The most solid piece of evidence for the centrality of Schopenhauer in Hitler's life is the bust of the wild-haired philosopher that Hitler displayed on a table in his Berghof study." See: Ryback. p.105.

head of Schopenhauer (fig. 126) by Willhelm Neuhäuser, shown in 1941 and bought by a private collector for 500 RM.

5.7 Miscegenation, 'Degeneration' and the 'Exotic' Gypsy

Despite the virulent racial ideology which framed his art, not all of Mueller's 'degenerate' works were of gypsies or Asiatic body types. Those seen in *Six Nudes in a Landscape* of 1924 (fig. 127), in tempera on canvas, are evidently Nordic bodies. Although the prevailing Nazi fear was that miscegenation would adulterate the Nordic body type, many racial theorists pointed out that the gypsy blood line could also 'degenerate' through inter breeding. This was turned to Nazi advantage in 1938 when Küppers wrote: "It is not hard to recognise that gypsies have acquired large mixtures of blood from the affected host people. (This is a) sign of the degeneration of the gypsy race."[1076] However, the 'degeneration' of the gypsy was of no concern to the Nazis. Instead, their concern was to deny any blurring of the Aryan archetype through the predatory sexual impulses of the gypsy. The sexual impulse is for Schopenhauer, as already noted, the strongest affirmation of life. Therefore, self-preservation and self-care are mankind's primary goals. Once these are secured then procreation becomes the *only* goal. As a phenomenon of nature mankind cannot aspire to more.[1077]

On this basis, we can interpret Mueller's 'degenerate' works as the expression of the will as sexual impulse. For example, *Lovers* of 1919, executed in distemper on hessian, shows two dark-skinned lovers in an embrace. In this image, the female has her shirt open which exposes her breasts to the viewer, whilst a swarthy looking male kisses her with his head turned away from us. Simultaneously, the female leans her hips towards the male

[1076] Küppers, Gustav Adolf: 'Begegnung mit Balkanzigeunern' in: *Volk und Rasse illustrierte Monatsschrift für deutsche Volkstum, Rassenkunde, Rassenpflege; Zeitschrift. des Reichsausschusses für Volksgesundheitsdienst und der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene* 1938, Vol. 13, no. 6, p.184.
[1077] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.329.

whose body language anticipates the sexual impulse. The sexual impulse as the objectified will to life is set against a verdant background suggestive of fertility. A similar conjunction between nature and the sexual impulse can be traced in the lithograph *Seated Couple I* (*Squatting Couple*) of c.1908 (fig. 128), where there is little artificial covering over the genital areas. This too suggests a certain 'naturalness' and 'pagan naivety' on behalf of the sitters.

In the latter of these paintings, the genitalia of the female are intimated suggesting that the sexual impulse may not have been lacking in the artist during the work in question. Mueller's graphic intimation of the female genitalia reveal the subjection of the sexual organs to the will as the ultimate 'force' and inner kernel of nature. Since the inner kernel of nature is the will to life, it is she (nature) who compels man and animal to 'propagate'. Consequently, "after this she has attained her end with the individual, and is quite indifferent to its destruction; for, as the will to live, she is concerned only with the preservation of the species; the individual is nothing to her."[1078]

What Mueller's work might confirm is Schopenhauer's view that, compared to other parts of the body, the genitals are subordinate to the will and none whatsoever to knowledge. In the case of the genitals the will manifests itself almost autonomously of knowledge, as in the case with mere vegetative life which responds to mere stimuli and reproduces itself blindly as does all of nature-without-knowledge.[1079] Thus, one might interpret Mueller's work as having depicted the sexual apparatus of the body as the essential objectification of the will to life. Through the medium of Mueller's painting we see the means for reproduction which entails that, "the genitals are the real focus of the will, and are therefore the opposite pole to the brain, the representative of knowledge, i.e.,

[1078] Ibid., Vol.1, p.330. This is an example where *Willle zum Leben* ought to have been translated by Payne as the 'will to life' instead of the 'will to live'. In the above context, it should be taken to mean the former.
[1079] Ibid., p.330.

to the other side of the world, the world as representation."[1080] Therefore, the genitals guarantee unending life through time and symbolise how the author of this world (the will) affirms itself.[1081]

Mueller's depiction of "the life-preserving principle"[1082] and symbolic affirmation of the will was interpreted by the Nazis, not according to Schopenhauer's philosophy, but rather as an act of sexual treason and moral transgression against their racialised values. Indeed, Mueller did transgress the social order of his day but in a very different manner. By turning towards the gypsies he was trying to express – probably unconsciously – his own aversion to the accepted order of society which derogated gypsies. Yet, as Buchheim concludes, Mueller was not making social accusations, nor was there any hidden agenda in his gypsy art as some of his interpreters have assumed.[1083]

By comparison, the Nazi agenda did not take gypsy sexuality and social behaviour as lightly as Mueller had done in *Gypsies in front of a Tent*, c.1925 (fig. 129). Here there is a definite feeling of transience and a nomadic gypsy lifestyle laid before the viewer. As opposed to the bourgeois predictability of bricks and mortar the image depicts a crudely fashioned tent in front of which sit two gypsies. In the background, there is a black horse over which stand three yellow sunflowers. To the far left of the scene a gypsy sports an ochre-coloured headscarf and zebra striped costume. The whole scene appears exotically Indian and not at all sympathetic to a steel-cool Aryanism. However, as Buchheim argues, "only by living closely with the gypsies was it possible for him to see their world not as picturesque exoticism, but as a way to bring mystery and magical demonism into his pictures by experiencing it with evocative intensity."[1084]

[1080] Ibid., Vol.1, p.330.
[1081] Ibid., p.330.
[1082] Ibid., p.330.
[1083] Buchheim. p.130.
[1084] Ibid.

Mueller may well have been attracted to the gypsies through a shared interest in mysticism.[1085] This extended to an alleged wearing of pentagram amulets and use of snakes as an artistic signature. In addition, he purportedly depicted images of the gypsy Madonna with magic symbols.[1086] Yet, the magical exoticism of the 'degenerate' gypsy body, which fascinated Mueller, does not parallel that which the South Sea Islanders held for Gauguin. By comparison, Gauguin's art experienced a clear transformation in the South Seas, whereas Mueller's choice of the gypsy theme, from around 1912-13, did not stimulate any significant change in artistic form or expression. However, such a transformation had been the case for both Kirchner and Schmidt-Rottluff, whose encounters with 'degenerate' 'alien blood' from 'exotic' places led to new artistic expression and the development of new stylistic devices.

Following the First World War, the 'degenerate' Mueller had hoped for another type of transformation - a political transformation - by joining the left wing *Arbeitsrat fur Kunst* (Workers' Council for Art), even though his art was arguably apolitical. However, it is true that he sent prints to left wing periodicals such as *Die rote Erde* (The Red Earth) and *Der Anbruch* (The Beginning) as well as becoming a member of the anti-conservative *Novembergruppe*.[1087] To the Nazi authorities all artists who had contact with Communism were a danger to the German nation. Furthermore, throughout the period of 1930-33, almost all gypsies were *presumed* to be Communists whose chief activists usually belonged to the *Antifaschistische Aktion* (Antifa German Communist Party).

This situation escalated when Antifa activists reputedly threatened the Berleburg National Socialists with death and arson. As a consequence, racial theorists such as

[1085] Ibid., p.131. Cf. Just as Jean-François Millet, Camille Pissarro, van Gogh and Gauguin had done before him, Mueller arguably idealised and 'romanticised' the gypsy. His works, for example, do not reflect anything of the sometimes repellent realities of gypsy life.
[1086] Ibid.
[1087] Barron and Guenther. p.308.

Krämer could argue that, "During this time of state and cultural demoralisation they showed the true face of their Asiatic bestiality, which they understand how to hide in times of discipline and order, and which they are trying to hide again today."[1088] Therefore, not only did Mueller's depictions of the 'degenerate' gypsy body signify 'genetic pollution' but they also signified the political corruption of the Nordic race. This inference was made despite the admission that many, if not the majority of gypsies in Germany, seemed to carry out their jobs reasonably well.

With this admission in mind it is significant to note that of those considered to be of 'alien blood' at that time, the gypsies represented a tiny minority of c.26,000 compared to c.525,000 Jews. This small figure was a comparatively minor issue compared to the principal problem for the Nazis which was the Jewish Question.[1089] However, the gypsy was to pose a specific threat at the outbreak of World War Two leading to an escalating confrontation with the 'gypsy nuisance'. As Lewy shows, the rise in anti-gypsy policies at the start of the war originated with fears that the gypsies were involved in espionage, alongside pandemic governmental and social pressures which aspired "to get rid of the 'gypsy nuisance'."[1090]

5.8 Reinterpreting the 'Gypsy Nuisance' through Schopenhauer

The 'gypsy nuisance' can be reinterpreted through Schopenhauer, who could well have perceived Mueller's gypsy paintings as being congruent with his 'racial philosophy'had he seen them. However, for racial theorists such as Rosenberg, this would be problematic. Rosenberg would air this problem in an article called 'Revolution in der bildenden Kunst?' in *Völkischer Beobachter,* of 07.07.1933.[1091] Although he criticized

[1088] Krämer. p.52.
[1089] We shall touch upon elements of anti-Semitism in the following chapter of this thesis as it relates to Nolde.
[1090] Lewy. p.202.
[1091] Rosenberg, Alfred, 'Revolution in the Visual Arts?' First published as "Revolution in der bildenden Kunst?" in: *Völkischer Beobachter,* 07.07.1933. Quoted and translated in: Rabinbach and Gilman. p.48.

Nolde and Ernst Barlach in particular, he associated Negritude with a lack of piety, rawness, and vacuity of true "inner strength of form."[1092] By contrast, Schopenhauer takes a very different view to 'non-Aryan' peoples, which makes it possible to understand Mueller's gypsy paintings in a new way. Thus, Schopenhauer adduced that "the Adam of our race must in any case be conceived as black and it is ludicrous for painters to depict this first human being as white, a colour that has originated from the skin's turning pale."[1093] Moreover, Schopenhauer observed that since God created man in his own image he ought to be shown as dark skinned in art: "Here, however, he can be given the conventional white beard, as the thin beard is not associated with a dark colour, but merely with the Ethiopian race."[1094] He was also of the opinion that in older artistic depictions of the Madonna and child, as seen in 'the Levant' and Italy, the complexions are usually dark.

Rosenberg and Hitler were either ignorant of or deliberately side-stepped, Schopenhauer's 'racial philosophy'. They certainly failed to notice Schopenhauer's comments about the 'chosen people' where he suggested that:

> In fact, the whole of God's chosen people was black or dark brown, and is even now darker than we who are descended from pagan tribes that immigrated earlier. Present-day Syria, however, was populated by half-breeds descended partly from northern Asia (like the Turcomans, for example).[1095]

Whilst Schopenhauer took an enlightened view about dark-skinned bodies, other artists apart from Mueller relished depictions of dark skinned 'degenerate' bodies. To take but a single example from many, Pechstein's *Married Couple on Palau* of 1917 (fig. 130) was regarded by the National Socialists as clear evidence of the 'degeneracy' of both the Palau people and of the artist himself. In the painting, a couple of Palau natives with Negroid features stand on a canoe in a river

[1092] Ibid., p.48.
[1093] Schopenhauer and Payne. p.157-8.
[1094] Ibid., p.158.
[1095] Ibid., p.158.

which flows into the distance. While the whole scene is set in a tropical context, a semi-naked female, who is being embraced by the male, cradles a naked infant in her left arm and appears to be listening intently to her male partner. He carries in his right hand what appears to be a punt for the canoe. He stands on the canoe in a gesture of authority over both the canoe and what we may assume to be his family. This image seems harmless enough to us, but such images were a problem for Rosenberg since they stood for physical ugliness and animalistic traits.[1096] His opinion was that "the avenging Furies were depicted by the Etruscans as "utterly loathsome, with animalistic or Negroid features, pointed ears, matted hair, fangs, and so forth."[1097] His conclusion was that the biological and aesthetic ideal for the German nation was to be "by physical appearance, Nordic."[1098]

This leads us on to look briefly at how Rosenberg received Schopenhauer's metaphysics and how he responded to the philosopher in terms of his own aesthetic ideals. He acknowledged that whilst the German public honoured Schiller, Kant and Schopenhauer these philosophers had certain 'limitations'. With these 'limitations' in mind he declared that, "we are cautious of these not because we fail to find the profoundest thoughts in their works, but because we can no longer use them in their entirety for the study of art."[1099] One specific 'limitation' he found was that they looked only to Greek art – or so he believed. Yet, he seems to have deleted from his memory the fact that Schopenhauer had a lasting appreciation of Salomon van Ruysdael, the Dutch Golden Age painter, and that he had a lasting appreciation of the Italian composer Gioachino Antonio Rossini. Even so, Rosenberg found another 'limitation' of a more general nature with these

[1096] As Schopenhauer states: "… the *purely objective contemplation of any object* (but not of the ugly or disgusting) results in this stirring of the better consciousness, but in particular this results from a contemplation of vegetable and inorganic nature (landscape), of the beautiful human form and of architecture." See: Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p.50. However, there is an exception to the use of ugliness in painting since: "*Ugliness* is perhaps inadmissible in sculpture, but admissible in painting, because, unlike sculpture, painting has as its subject not only the beauty of the human form, but is also the expression of character, temper and disposition. This expression can be so prevalent in the painting that beauty or ugliness of form here becomes a matter of secondary importance; and this itself again becomes fraught with meaning." Ibid., p.356.
[1097] Rosenberg. p.32.
[1098] Ibid., p.387.
[1099] Ibid., p.175-76.

philosophers in the form of their universalising aesthetics. Rosenberg's 'corrective' to this universalising principle is worth quoting at length since it encapsulates much of his aesthetic values. His solution reads as follows:

> If they would accept the fact of racial differences in art, then on their theoretical thought - the thought which we describe as the philosophy of the 18th century - we would have an acceptable base on which to build. Their thought could seize the art products of their own peoples. This contradiction between philosophical theory and concrete practice is present in Goethe, Schiller and Schopenhauer. The great fault of all 19th century aesthetics was that it was not likened to the works of the artists; it merely dissected works of art.[1100]

Rosenberg also proposed that the Greeks' inner life partook in 'an act of will' when their art was born. In doing so, he said that the Greek manifested a 'universalising aesthetic will' which was transferred into their mythology. He contrasted this 'aesthetic will' with Schopenhauer and Kant's philosophy of disinterested aesthetic contemplation, whose teaching he believed had 'condemned' German aesthetics to one of infertility. By antithesis, Rosenberg asserted that 'an active force' was at work in genuine artistic production entailing that "a shaping will lies at the bottom of every art creation. It is concentrated in the work and it necessitates a powerful action of the soul. Without such a will, all our other efforts are in vain."[1101] Since this was his belief, then we must conclude such a conviction validates C1.

There are more beliefs of a similar tenor throughout the second chapter of his book, which is titled 'Will and Instinct'. In this chapter he makes it clear how Schopenhauer's philosophy can be used "only to emphasise those points which might be helpful for a judgement of the laws of life as they are expressed in ideology, science and art."[1102] On that basis, he argued for a Schopenhauerian philosophy of the will as one of central

[1100] Ibid., p.176.
[1101] Ibid., p.201.
[1102] Ibid., p.210.

importance – which again appears to privilege C1 over C2. Even so, Rosenberg stated that Schopenhauer's philosophy was "the tragic dream of a despairing seeker," and that it had "failed because his intellect lacked the will."[1103] For Rosenberg, this was the most tragic aspect of Schopenhauer's life and work, being persuaded that, "as the example of an heroic - in its powerful, truly European - struggle for the essence of this world, he gambled everything on one card and failed."[1104]

In brief, Rosenberg inverted Schopenhauer's recommendation for a negation of the will through aesthetic contemplation and denial of the will to life, by arguing for a predominance of willing over knowing.[1105] This, may be substantiated by a statement which arguably supports C1 where Rosenberg argued that:

> If I speak of a view of art which does not reject the will, then I do not wish to maintain the impossible assertion that art must have effect upon impulse, instinct upon Schopenhauer's 'will', but that works of art, and especially a definite group of them, do not turn toward the subject of perception immersed in contemplative mood, but aim particularly at the awakening of a spiritual activity of a will.[1106]

Rosenberg's prescription for 'the awakening of a spiritual activity of a will' and his racialised aesthetics of human biology can be contextualised through comments such as those made by SS-Untersturmführer Professor Karl August Eckhardt. His article, 'Widernatürliche Unzucht ist todeswürdig' (Sexually Indecent Abominations against Nature are Punishable by Death), written for the 22.05.1935 edition of the SS periodical *Das Schwarze Korps*, addressed the growing problems of racial 'degeneration'. Eckhardt took as his context Karl von Amira's discussion of how a particular use of the death penalty had been used in ancient Germany. This particular use was reserved

[1103] Ibid., p.217.
[1104] Ibid., p.217.
[1105] We have discussed these values in detail throughout chapter 3 and 4 of this thesis
[1106] Rosenberg., p.218.

for those miscreants who through interbreeding had deviated "from the norms of the species"[1107] Consequently, Eckhardt suggested that:

> The instinctual impulse within the *Volk* to maintain the purity of the race is congruent with the divine mandate to maintain the original God-given purity of the race. The degenerates, then, are *offered as sacrifices* so as not to provoke the anger of the gods in response to racial treason.[1108]

The very thought, therefore, of permitting the appearance of Mueller's 'degenerate' gypsy bodies or Pechstein's *Composition with Three Palauan Nudes, from: The Creators* of 1918 (fig. 131) was literally 'racial treason'. As a result, these conditions made it possible for Eckhardt to argue "that the power of racial thought should also be preserved in its purest form in the Germanic states and, for example, bastardizing the race with the blood of Negroes is considered an act of racial treason for the Germans."[1109] In conclusion, he also suggested that:

> Now that we have found our way back to our ancient Germanic perspectives on the question of mixed marriages with members of races that are alien to the species [*artfremde Rassen*], we must do the same for our assessments of the scourge of racial annihilation presented by the degenerate profile of the homosexual and return to the Nordic guiding principle of extirpating the degenerates. Germany's rise and fall rest on her ability to maintain the purity of the race.[1110]

By contrast, according to Schopenhauer's philosophy, we might reinterpret Mueller's gypsy paintings not as a falling away from an archetypal purity of humanity, from light skin to dark skin, but rather the reverse. Therefore, we may invert Eckhardt's edict and argue that the Caucasian race is in itself a 'degenerate race'. In that case, aside from their modernist style, Schopenhauer would perhaps not judge Mueller's paintings of gypsies as 'degenerate' at all. Taking an alternative view to Nazism, we might argue through

[1107] SS-Untersturmführer Professor Eckhardt, 'Sexually Indecent Abominations against Nature are Punishable by Death'. First published as 'Widernatürliche Unzucht ist todeswürdig', in *Das Schwarze Korps*, 22.05.1935, 13. Quotation and translation in: Rabinbach and Gilman. p.377.
[1108] Ibid., p.377.
[1109] Ibid., p.380.
[1110] Ibid., p.380.

Schopenhauer that: "… the white face is a degeneration and unnatural is shown by the aversion and repugnance that are excited among some tribes of the interior of Africa when they first see such a face; to them it looks like a sickly and unhealthy pining away."[1111] Furthermore, such a reinterpretation made through Schopenhauer's philosophy indicates that Mueller's depiction of skin colour is not the essential point to consider. It is not the essential point because differences in skin colour originates solely with a greater or lesser distance travelled by indigenous human beings away from the 'torrid zones'.[1112]

Nevertheless, for Nazi theorists such as Johann Fahlbusch, skin-colour and racial integrity were essential things. In his February 1935 article, 'Farbiges Blut im Rheinland' (Colored Blood in the Rhineland), he voiced his concern that the Aryan birth rate had been falling for some time. This concern was underscored by a perceived threat to the purity of the Aryan bloodline through interbreeding with foreign races. In this article, Fahlbusch rhetorically asked who the mothers "of these bastards"[1113] were. It was the lascivious Aryan female who was responsible – it was she who was leading the nation into a hereditary disaster. Therefore, he claimed that through "…the children of German mothers, these Negro bastards are in possession of German citizenship."[1114]

5.9 Moral interpretations of German Citizenship, the Will and Art

German citizenship, the will and art can be interpreted according to Schopenhauer's moral doctrine. Somewhat disconcertingly, as we have noted earlier, he states that, "In morality the good will is everything, but in art it is nothing; for, as the word art (*Kunst*) already indicates, ability (*Können*) alone is of any consequence."[1115] He adds

[1111] Schopenhauer and Payne.Vol.2, p.158.
[1112] Ibid., p.158.
[1113] Johann Fahlbusch, 'Colored Blood in the Rhineland'. First published as ‚Farbiges Blut im Rheinland,' in *Volk and Welt: Das deutsche Monatssbuch*, February 1935, 8. Quoted and translated in: Rabinbach and Gilman. p.168.
[1114] Ibid., p.169.
[1115] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.384.

that art and philosophy should aim towards solving the problems of existence by those artists freed from the aims of willing.[1116] However, this raises a problem for us if, as David S. Luft maintains, "Schopenhauer encouraged an art that transcended the merely wilful life of the ego and responded to the deepest sources of ethical motivation."[1117] This would entail that some artists, some of the time, necessarily created some art with an ethical 'good will'. Despite Schopenhauer's pessimism that the body and its impulses are egregious and deluded, the 'good will' of some artists entails that we are motivated to comprehend life in a different manner. Thus:

> Through art, and especially tragic art, we comprehend these facts in a general way. The experience of spectatorship, which already, in its cognitive structure, exemplifies detachment from will, gives us, through this comprehension, new motives to reject and blame life as both evil and false.[1118]

If a 'good will' stimulates these motives through some art, and if they are sometimes good to act upon, then sometimes that is where an artist's "seriousness is to be found."[1119] For the National Socialists this 'seriousness' meant solving the problems of 'degenerate' art and the problems of miscegenation. As far as Nazi philosophy was concerned, only the 'aristocracy of nature' through Aryanism could solve the problems of 'degeneration'.[1120] As we have seen, prior to Nazism the concepts of 'degeneracy' had already been addressed by Blumenbach, Morel, Lombroso, and Nordau at length. While their doctrines were appropriate enough for lecture halls, they could never inspire anyone to act in a morally upright fashion. By antithesis, Schopenhauer argued that morality requires something

[1116] Ibid., p.406 Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation* Vol.1, Section § 49.
[1117] Luft, D. S., "Schopenhauer, Austria, and the Generation of 1905," in: *Central European History* Vol. 16, no. 1 (1983).p.73.
[1118] Nussbaum, M. C., "The Transfigurations of Intoxication: Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Dionysus," in: *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics* Vol. 1, no. 2 (1991).p.92.
[1119] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*., p.384.
[1120] Rabinbach and Gilman. p.300.

independent of the intellect which "speaks to every man, even the coarsest and crudest."[1121]

Hitler's reaction to the problem of 'degenerate' art and his moral solutions to it appealed to 'even the coarsest and crudest' when he declared that:

> If some self-styled artist submits trash for the Munich exhibition, then he is either a swindler, in which case he should be put in prison; or he is a madman, in which case he should be in an asylum; or he is a degenerate, in which case he must be sent to a concentration camp to be 're-educated' and taught the dignity of honest labour.[1122]

The problem of 're-educating' the artist entailed that Nazi civil law enforce its sense of justice. This it did through misguided concepts of philanthropy and beneficence on behalf of the German people. However, from Schopenhauer's perspective, no amount of philanthropy or beneficence could generate just and lawful acts anyway, "since here everyone would like to be the passive part and no one active."[1123] Therefore, it would have been naïve of the Nazis, and anyone for that matter, to believe that just and lawful acts possess a moral origin: "On the contrary, the relation between justice as practised by men and genuine honesty of heart is analogous to that between the expressions of politeness and the genuine love for one's neighbour."[1124]

In reality, Schopenhauer says, only two external necessities bring about acts of justice and good behaviour. They are firstly, the protection of one's civil rights through the law, and secondly, through the possession of civil honour or a good name. Both entail that our behaviours are validated by public opinion.[1125] The Nazis harnessed these two external necessities in order to undermine Mueller's name. By manipulating public opinion against artists such as him, it could lead to "an indelible stain on the guilty man

[1121] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.120.
[1122] Hitler et al. p.694.
[1123] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.121.
[1124] Ibid., p.122.
[1125] Ibid., p.122.

for the rest of his life."[1126] As a result, the Nazis played upon the public's expectation that a man's behaviours are a product of their inborn character and that he would inevitably repeat his 'errors' in similar circumstances.[1127]

For good or ill, Schopenhauer says, such external necessities are the moral "guardians that watch over public honesty, and without which we should be in a bad way."[1128] Consequently, the Nazis associated Mueller, the bad 'degenerate' artist, with that of "forever being expelled from the great masonic lodge of honourable men who observe the law of uprightness."[1129] However, this association is problematic. If Mueller, and the Nazis, shared an indivisible will, and were manifestations of that will, then the Nazis could have seen themselves in Mueller's depictions of the gypsy. At the very least, the Nazis possessed a body and sexual desires just as the gypsy did. If there is an indivisible will, then might we assume an indivisible manifestation of that will in terms of moral value?

At first this seems to be a reasonable assumption. Yet, as Cartwright points out, for Schopenhauer to sustain the notion that the moral value of an individual's character has a metaphysical basis, and that the moral value of that individual's character flows from an indivisible will is perplexing. In addition, Cartwright argues that, for Schopenhauer to hold that "there are morally good and bad characters, he must also hold that the unitary metaphysical will bears a diversity of moral values."[1130] Indeed, Schopenhauer was conscious of this problem and referred to it as "the most difficult of all problems."[1131] He therefore asked: "In spite of the identity and metaphysical unity of the will as thing-in-

[1126] Ibid., p.122.
[1127] Ibid., p.122.
[1128] Ibid., p.123.
[1129] Ibid., p.125.
[1130] See: Cartwright's Introduction in: ibid., p. xxx.
[1131] Schopenhauer and Hübscher. Vol.4, p.221.

itself, whence the enormous difference of characters? - the malicious, diabolical wickedness of the one and the goodness of the other in such conspicuous contrast…"[1132]

His answer to this is less than convincing, especially when he proposes that we could modify the problem so that the difference is merely a matter of degree. However, this is not particularly helpful - although we may concede that the problem of *intellectual* diversity might be less problematic if it rested upon degrees of neurological development. Even if we did, the problem of *moral* diversity in general and for art in particular, has not gone away. It remains as an unresolved contradiction, since diversity appears to emanate immediately from the will which is supposed to be 'one', outside of time and eternal. Problematically Mueller's moral character, and every Nazi's character, was therefore based upon the principle of individuation and diversification, whilst simultaneously being rooted in the thing-in itself.[1133] It is from that eternal aspect, the thing-in-itself, that the human character supposedly arises and which resists immanent explanation.[1134] Yet, the fundamental problem of moral diversity remains unsettled. In the end, Schopenhauer himself could only hope that "perhaps someone after me will shed some light on this abyss."[1135]

Conclusion

While we may not be able to shed light on this particular 'abyss', it may be possible to shed some light on some of the moral issues at stake within the parameters of this chapter. If moralists were to asservate that the Nazis' sense of justice and honesty was simply 'conventional' and founded upon egoism, then we should not be surprised for there

[1132] Ibid., p.221.
[1133] Schopenhauer and Payne. Vol.2, p.227 See also: Mander, W. J., *Idealist Ethics*, First edition. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).p.205
[1134] Schopenhauer and Hübscher., p.222.
[1135] Ibid.p.222 Cf. Schopenhauer, Arthur, and E. F. J. Payne. *The World as Will and Representation* Vol.2, p.598.

is some truth in this. [1136] Goebbels' egoism took on a moral tone in a speech called 'Unsterbliche deutsche Kultur' (Immortal German Culture) for the 7th German Art Exhibition on 26.06.1943. He argued that the Axis powers were engaged in a fight to preserve the aesthetic values which had suffused European culture for the last thousand years. He suggested that since Germany was a primary source of those values, their roots at that moment were being threatened byAllied bombing campaigns. In essence, every nation which had made the greatest contribution to Western art, such as Germany, was "fighting for their material and spiritual existence."[1137] As a result., Goebbels would state that "it is almost a miracle that in the midst of this gigantic battle, art is able to exist, almost untouched by the storms of our people's gigantic and fateful struggle."[1138] For him this was moral proof that National Socialism sustained the world of art. With this proof Goebbels placed German artists under a moral obligation, announcing that this:

> …does not mean that artists can ignore what is going on around them. There may be an artist here or there who believes that since his art does not concern the war, the elementary laws of war have no application to him. He must be reminded of his duty, perhaps rather firmly. His work, even if not related to the war, is not an end in itself. He is still working for his people, which is enduring the heaviest burdens and deepest sorrows.[1139]

The moral obligation of the artist was to mitigate these 'burdens and deepest sorrows' during a decisive moment for the *Volk* - an urgent need for self-preservation. Indeed, Goebbels' speech registered a certain element of desperation. [1140] By appealing to what Schopenhauer calls the 'anti-moral incentive' of egoism, Goebbels' plea to artists reveals

[1136] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.125.
[1137] Josef Goebbels: "Unsterbliche deutsche Kultur. Rede zur Eröffnung der 7. Großen Deutschen Kunstausstellung," *Der steile Aufstieg* (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP., 1944), pp. 339-346. Sourced from: The German Propaganda Archive. Calvin College. Trans. by Randall Bytwerk.
[1138] Ibid.
[1139] Ibid.
[1140] 1943 was a significant year for Nazi Germany. Among many other problems, in May of that year German U-boats accrued high losses. In July, on the Eastern Front, the Battle of Kursk saw the Red Army repulse an intense German attack causing the retreat of the German army. That repulse was a contributory factor leading up to the eventual capitulation of Germany in 1945. Consequently, the spectre of the East bearing down on Germany loomed large in the Nazi consciousness from 1943 onwards.

that egoism is the well-spring of all actions.[1141] On that basis, the motto for the individual, and the collective Nazi State, would be "everything for me and nothing for the others."[1142] When egoism pursues its course, politically or individually, without being audited by an external force, as in a sound moral incentive or fear of the divine, then it goes on unchecked. Left unchecked, the result would be anarchy, therefore as Schopenhauer states, "reflecting reason very soon invented the machinery of the State which, springing from the mutual fear of mutual violence, obviates the disastrous consequences of universal egoism, as far as this can be done in the negative way."[1143] Thus, Nazi reflective reasoning harnessed the machinery of the State, not only to defame Mueller's gypsy paintings, but also to obviate what they perceived to be 'the disastrous consequences of universal egoism' working *against* Aryan self-preservation.[1144]

The maxim of extreme egoism culminated in the concentration camp and the eugenic clinic where the Nazis sought to contain those they considered 'degenerate'. As Rabinbach and Gilman argue:

> The prevailing notion was that one could not alter the nature of the degenerate but could stop his or her degenerate acts. While the 'concentration camps' were not extermination camps (such as Auschwitz), the extremely high death rate through mistreatment and disease made them the pattern for the later sites of death.[1145]

Schopenhauer's views are relevant here, since he observes that if 'malicious joy' aroused by inhumane treatment of others is 'theoretical cruelty', then cruelty is malicious joy in practice appearing as cruelty whenever the opportunity arises. Derivations of spiteful mistreatment are "envy, disaffection, ill will, malice, malicious joy at another's

[1141] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.131.
[1142] Ibid., p.132.
[1143] Ibid., p.133.
[1144] Schopenhauer states that: "the maxim of extreme egoism is *Neminem juva, imo omnes, si forte conducit* (hence still always conditioned) *laede.*" Trans. in Schopenhauer as: 'Help no one; on the contrary, injure all people if it brings you any". In addition, "the maxim of malice *is Omnes, quantum poles, laede*." Trans. in Schopenhauer as: 'Injure all people as much as you can'. Ibid., p.136.
[1145] Rabinbach and Gilman. p.207.

misfortune, prying curiosity, slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, perfidy, thirst for revenge, cruelty, and so on"[1146] - all of which are 'anti-moral' forces arising from extreme egoism.

Schopenhauer's views on the 'anti-moral forces' are particularly relevant *if* they give us a purchase on the moral classification of human characters. If they do, then what could make his views doubly relevant here is that we become aware of just how problematic it is to secure a motive which could inspire a nation to assume moral behaviours which oppose the most vicious tendencies of their 'ingrained' nature – and thus preculde C1.That is to say, "if such a line of conduct were given in experience, of finding a motive that would give an adequate, simple, and natural account of it."[1147]

Given the spiteful actions at work during the policing of 'degenerate art', what motive could have induced an individual to oppose the deeply ingrained instincts of his or her natural tendency towards extreme egoism? For Schopenhauer, no such motive resides in morality or sentiments of disposition since all actions arising from such are rooted in egoism. Paradoxically therefore, along with the Nazis, "we are sometimes just as much in error over the true motives of our own actions as we are over those of others."[1148] Despite this apparent paradox, Schopenhauer believed that the only actions which contain genuine moral worth are those executed under certain conditions. That is to say, acts containing genuine moral worth are those performed (or not performed) to the benefit of another.[1149] Thus, the weal and woe of the 'other' is contingent upon identifying with the 'other', so that the difference between self and 'other' is eradicated or appropriately modified.[1150]

[1146] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.136.
[1147] Ibid., p.137. The problem is so complex that, for its solution he argues, it was necessary for the greater mass of humanity to resort to "the machinery from another world." Ibid. On this basis, the will of the gods was invoked in order to inspire appropriate moral conduct through rewards and punishments fit for this world and the next.
[1148] Ibid., p.137.
[1149] Ibid., p.143. Schopenhauer offers nine hypotheses which can be treated as maxims to this effect. See: ibid., p.141-42.
[1150] Ibid., p.143-44.

The only knowledge which can eliminate the difference between self and 'other' is through the representation of them in our minds. By identifying with the 'other' through the knowledge of representation we should obtain compassion and participate in the sufferings of the'other'. Therefore, "It is simply and solely this compassion that is the real basis of all voluntary justice and genuine loving-kindness."[1151] In theory, the virtue of justice, born of compassion, prevents individuals from mistreating the 'other' and helping them as much as possible.[1152] Consequently, "justice is, therefore, the first and fundamentally essential cardinal virtue."[1153]

Through this 'essential and cardinal virtue', we must conclude that whilst every individual gypsy and Expressionist artist was unique, possessing their own spiritual ideals, to feel that everyone else was alien and less real was at the core of Nazi egoism, which resulted in hatred, injustice and malice.[1154] Yet, on Schopenhauer's terms, it has been suggested that individuation pertains only to phenomenal appearance in time.[1155] Even though we all exist merely in another's representation, Schopenhauer argues that "my true inner being exists in every living thing as directly as it makes itself known in my self-consciousness only to me."[1156] In order to support his belief he cites the Sanskrit formula "*tat tvam asi* (this art thou)"[1157] for the expression of this knowledge. As a result of this, the following chapter builds upon the expression of this knowledge, and the premise that 'individuation is mere phenomenon or appearance'. We shall pursue this premise in relation to the problem of free will for Nolde living and working under National Socialism.

[1151] Ibid., p.144.
[1152] Ibid., p.148.
[1153] Ibid., p.162.
[1154] Ibid. p.210.
[1155] If 'individuation is mere phenomenon or appearance', then C1 has been fully vindicated in this chapter.
[1156] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright., p.210.
[1157] Ibid., p.210.

Chapter 6: Nolde, Nazism and the Fable of Free Will

Introduction

Vigorous individualism appears to identify modernism with the autonomy of the modern artist. Being able to create freely by using voluntary rhythms of the body is a fundamental expression of individuality and human experience. This being so, the painter's craft necessitates specialised vocabularies of action through the free selection of specific acts relevant to that craft. Impinge upon that selection and the painter's craft is compromised. That is to say, once the artist has been dispossessed of the synchronised coordination between their creative brain and the rhythmic movements of their musculature, then free artistic creation becomes redundant. If the disruption is severe enough, then the disconnection of the free voyage from brain to nervous system means that the artist becomes severed from the fundamental right to express their individuality. During Nazism, this disruption was severe enough, so much so that artists were subjected to close scrutiny and the fear of punishment.

The fear of punishment and unwanted close scrutiny, which many artists must have experienced during the Nazi era, was not always exercised by authorities 'above' them. A less commonly discussed aspect in relation to this (and one which, we may speculate, could have been at the back of Nolde's mind) was the fear of being denounced from 'below' by one's fellow citizens as a traitor to the Nazi regime. Whilst the participation in free elections was prohibited under the Nazi regime, and politics divested of genuine meaning beyond the totalitarian, Robert Gellately argues that, although participation in democratic politics was negated during the Nazi era, citizens could "articulate their

interests, and seek to satisfy them" through other means.[1158] One of those means was to become an informer and denounce your fellow citizens. As Gellately states:

> In contrast to Imperial Germany and especially the Weimar Republic's rule of law, citizens in Nazi Germany, had more direct access to the coercive apparatus of the state. Judicial procedures were 'simplified' and citizens could take advantage of unmediated access to the system. Germans could not fail to become aware, that the Nazi regime needed more information than the Weimar democracy it had replaced, and they learned that this great hunger for certain kinds of information could be capitalized upon for purposes of their own. Many citizens took advantage of the system and even sought to manipulate it 'from below'.[1159]

Despite the important contextual information which Gellately's comments affords for our exploration of Nolde's free will under Nazism, this chapter does not pursue an analysis of privately made denunciations or how citizens 'took advantage of the system'. Instead it investigates the disruption to free artistic expression, the validity of C1 and the extent to which Nolde possessed free will whilst living under National Socialism.

Using Schopenhauer's doctrine of free will, it shall be shown that the moral, physical and intellectual problems regarding this issue involve far wider implications than scholars have thus far imagined. The discussion which follows does not condone Nazi politics, or what is now known as 'The Holocaust' but is rather a philosophical investigation as to whether Nolde possessed free will (or not) under National Socialism. No case is being argued for Nolde being influenced by Schopenhauer in this chapter. Instead, a sustained case is put forward that a debate about this artist's life and work under Nazism can be informed by Schopenhauer's philosophy. The chapter is therefore founded upon Schopenhauer's essay *On the Freedom of the Human Will*. As a consequence, in the first instance we begin our explorations by outlining the structure of this essay and offering a brief outline of Nolde's historical reception. Following this, we explore the

[1158] Gellately, R., "Denunciations and Nazi Germany: New Insights and Methodological Problems," in: *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* Vol. 22, no. 3/4 (83) (1997). p.238.
[1159] Ibid.,p.238.

extent to which Nolde possessed freedom of the will in the physical sense of the term‘free‘, by introducing arguments for and against freedom of the will such as those of determinism and indeterminism.

This chapter will also ask whether Nolde could be charged with escapism during his aesthetic exile in Seebüll, whilst living in the district of Nordfriesland. Despite the fact that his exile was a consequence of his falling out of favour with the Nazi party, he had been a member of this party. Since this was the case, we shall apply Schopenhauer's doctrine to this issue and question the nature of moral freedom *per se*. In doing so, we raise the spectre of indoctrination, anti-Semitism and the extent of Nolde's moral responsibility according to Schopenhauer's doctrine of free will. In the final instance, we discuss the problem of Schopenhauer's conceptualisation of transcendental freedom and what this means for an account of moral responsibility in human behaviour.

This chapter is important because the contemporary fashion amongst some scholars is to criticise Nolde for his links to National Socialism and his anti-Semitic remarks. Much has already been written about the links between Nolde and anti-Semitism and it is not the purpose of this chapter to explore them in any detail.[1160] The purpose of this chapter however is to explore C1 in relation to Nolde's life and work under Nazism. If we are to achieve that on Schopenhauer's terms, then we must ask whether Nolde was free to choose what he chose. This appears to be a very simple question, yet as we shall see it is one of the most complex questions facing any human being and has a crucial bearing upon creative freedom.

[1160] Among several other authors on the issue of Nolde and anti-Semitism see: Boa, E. and Palfreyman, R., *Heimat - A German Dream: Regional Loyalties and National Identity in German Culture 1890-1990* (OUP Oxford, 2000). p.157. Wistrich, R. S., *Who's Who in Nazi Germany* (Taylor & Francis, 2013). p.181-82. For an in depth account of Max Liebermann's links to Nolde see: Deshmukh, M. F., *Max Liebermann: Modern Art and Modern Germany* (Taylor & Francis, 2017).

Despite this, Fulda and Aya Soika, in a joint article, feel that it is too easy to depict Nolde as a victim of the Nazis.[1161] They suggest that "…to portray Nolde simply as a victim of Nazi repression does scant justice to his own efforts to serve the new regime" and that "in 1933, Nolde welcomed the regime change in no uncertain terms..."[1162] Similarly, Peter Vergo argues that Nolde "seems almost wilfully to have laid himself open to at least some of these accusations."[1163] This argument can be instantiated by a letter to Goebbels of 1938, in which Nolde requested the return of his confiscated pictures from the Nazis, and asked that the defamation of him as a 'degenerate' artist would stop. He said that after the cession of North Schleswig it would have been easy for him to have become a world-famous artist for political reasons, had he not placed his loyalty to Germany ahead of all other things and every opportunity at home and abroad to fight for party and country. He added that "in spite of my defamation, or because of it so much more, I could testify to the world historical significance of National Socialism."[1164]

Nolde's post-war reception in West Germany was initially more laudatory. In 1949 Paul Ortwin Rave argued that, during the Nazi era, so-called 'degenerate' artists such as Nolde had behaved as "carriers of the internal and unbroken resistance, to which we Germans are certainly allowed to allude."[1165] Likewise, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD, Social Democrats) said that since he was 16, Nolde together with Barlach, had been for him the greatest German artist. However, Nolde's inclusion in the Nazi exhibition of so-

[1161] Fulda, Bernhard and Soika, Aya "Emil Nolde and the National Socialist Dictatorship" in: Peters et al.p.186. Fulda is one of the leading researchers into Nolde's relationship with National Socialism. His planned publication on this subject entitled, *Emil Nolde and National Socialism: The Construction of Artistic 'Genius' in the Twentieth Century* has been delayed publication as a result of the forthcoming Nolde exhibition in 2019 (in conversation with the author).
[1162] Ibid., p.186.
[1163] Vergo, P. et al., *Emil Nolde* (London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1995). p.38.
[1164] Letter to Dr Joseph Goebbels, Berlin, 02.02.1938 reprinted in: Schmidt, D., *In letzter Stunde, 1933-1945: Schriften deutscher Künstler des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 1964). p.152-153.
[1165] Rave, P. O. and Schneede, U. M., *Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich* (Berlin: Argon, 1987).p.133. Cf. Bernhard Fulda 'Myth-making in Hitler's Shadow: The Transfiguration of Emil Nolde after 1945' in: Rüger and Wachsmann. p.184.

called ‘degenerate’ art when Schmidt was 17 years old became the reason for his personal break with National Socialism.[1166]

Christian Saehrendt also shows how “the case of Nolde provides a typical example of the West German phenomenon of *Verdrängung* (displacement), of the reluctance to remember individual involvement with The Third Reich.”[1167] Thus, the Nolde case, when discussed by German scholars such as Soika, might be conceived of as vicarious self-exoneration. That is to say, they are perhaps making a ‘scapegoat’ of Nolde and sending him away from themselves as Germans into the wilderness of political vilification. If this transference is conceivable, then it is not unreasonable to suspect that a political agenda is at work in Fulda’s criticism of Nolde. We must consider therefore the possibility that Fulda has a political agenda which is not impartial. On the other hand, it is also true to say that Nolde’s supporters have also had a political agenda. For example, Fulda is quick to point out that the hero of Siegfried Lenz’s novel *Deutschstunde*[1168] (*German Lesson*), Max Ludwig Nansen, was modelled on Werner Haftmann’s characterisation of Nolde in his biography.[1169] Fulda points out that Joachim von Lepel “had previously implored Haftmann to leave out any mention of Nolde’s party membership in his book; a request to which Haftmann eventually acceded.”[1170] However, before we explore the complexities of Nolde’s critical reception any further, let us note how Schopenhauer deals with the complexities of free will in his 1839 essay *On The Freedom of the Will* (*Über die Freiheit des Menschlichen Willens*).

[1166] Helmut Schmidt to Siegfried Fenz, 12.12.1968, in: Archiv Helmut Schmidt (Hamburg), HS Privat Politisch - 1968 - A-Z, lfd. Nr. 47.
[1167] Weikop, C., *New Perspectives on Brücke Expressionism: Bridging History* (Ashgate, 2011). p.223
[1168] Lenz, S., Kaiser, E., and Wilkins, E., *The German lesson : [a novel]* (London: Macdonald, 1971).
[1169] Haftmann, W. and Ada und Emil Nolde Stiftung Seebüll, *Emil Nolde* (Köln: M. DuMont, Schauberg, 1958). During 1935 Haftmann produced articles for the journal *Kunst der Nation* which published volume 1 in November 1933, and volume 3 in February 1935. In 1935 the Nazis prohibited the journal from appearing so only 3 volumes were published.
[1170] Rüger and Wachsmann.p.186. Joachim von Lepel (1913-1962) was the Director of the Emil Nolde Foundation and so it was in his interests to defend Nolde’s reputation.

6.1 Schopenhauer's Prize Essay the Freedom of the Will

Schopenhauer entered this essay for a competition generated by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in 1837. The question set for the competition was, "Can the freedom of the human will be demonstrated from self-consciousness?"[1171] Schopenhauer replied according to his metaphysics of the will from his major work *The World as Will and Representation*. In this competition essay, he never deviates from his belief that all human actions, every event, every state of affairs are 'determined' by "antecedent events and states of affairs."[1172] Nevertheless, there are numerous counter-arguments which oppose Schopenhauer's doctrine, such as those of indeterminism - the belief that some events are not necessarily determined by antecedent causes.[1173] It is probably from an indeterminist's position that Vergo, Fulda, Soika and others interpret Nolde's early sympathy towards Nazism.

The structure of the Prize Essay is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the central concepts pertaining to the Society's competition question. Section 2 of the essay states that it is not possible to answer this question in the affirmative. That is to say that it is not possible to establish that we have free will through self-consciousness. Section 3 of the essay broadens out the argument by resorting to an alternative foundation for free will through the consciousness of other objects. However, Schopenhauer says that free will cannot be proven through the consciousness of other objects either. In section 4 he discusses his intellectual predecessors in theology and philosophy who argued that we do not have freedom of the will and finally in section 5, in what appears to be a studied *volte-face*, Schopenhauer suggests that we must turn to the problem of moral responsibility in

[1171] Zöller. p.3.
[1172] Mautner.p.154.
[1173] Ibid., p.300.

order to prove that we possess freedom of the will.[1174] Yet, as we shall see in this chapter, during our continued explorations of C1, in doing so Schopenhauer presents an unconvincing account whereby he argues that we have free will as something which arises from our 'intelligible character'.[1175]

Schopenhauer emphasises that the concept of freedom is 'negative' - since by freedom we understand it to mean the absence of physical hindrances. Physical freedom is usually applied to sentient beings, where the "characteristic of animals is that their movements proceed from their will, are voluntary, and consequently are called free when no material obstacle makes this impossible."[1176] If this is the case, then for Nolde to be described as 'free' under National Socialism, it would have to be proven that no material obstacle made this impossible. This is important, since German Expressionists imagined themselves to be free thinkers and "understood themselves as attempting to free art from the alienation of representation."[1177]

In contrast to 'free thinkers' of his own era, Schopenhauer adopted a determinist's view, which argues that everything which happens does so according to laws of absolute necessity - that is to say, the "necessary is that which follows from a given sufficient ground."[1178] By antithesis, indeterminists take the view that "if we accept freedom as a fact, we are bound to consider whether at least a certain measure of physical indeterminism may not also be a fact."[1179] However, Schopenhauer opposes physical indeterminism by counterarguing that "the two lowest senses, smell and taste, are not free from a direct stimulation of the *will;* thus they are-- always agreeably or disagreeably affected, and so

[1174] For an overview of Schopenhauer's essay, and which I am indebted to here, see: Zöller.
[1175] Zöller rightly points out this means that "the freedom of the will can be maintained although not explained or understood." Ibid., p.xii.
[1176] Ibid. p.3.
[1177] Nirenberg, D., *Aesthetic Theology and Its Enemies: Judaism in Christian Painting, Poetry, and Politics* (Brandeis University Press, 2015). p.76.
[1178] Zöller. p.6.
[1179] Lillie, R. S., "Physical Indeterminism and Vital Action," in: *Science* Vol. 66, no. 1702 (1927). p.140.

are more subjective than objective."[1180] He therefore rejected contemporary exponents of indeterminism.[1181] From his position, hindrances to physical freedom always obstruct the will. Thus, we may infer that prior to the Nazi era, Nolde possessed sufficient physical freedom to paint images such as *Nudes and Eunuch* of 1912 (fig. 132), or indeed any image he chose. Yet as we shall see later on in this chapter, following the Munich 'Degenerate Art' exhibition of 1937, Nolde lacked the same physical freedom of will.

Freedom of bodily movement in artistic production implicates metaphysical and socio-political dynamics relevant to the human will. If creative ideas and feelings are normally expressed by the free flow of bodily movements, then they are rendered visible through aesthetic gestures. Since the art of the painter is a dynamic one, it loses that dynamism when subjected to the inspection of tyranny. The free use of the artist's body as a manifestation of free will therefore reveals several things. It reveals the striving after an effect or a state of mind, just as the shapes and rhythms objectified in their work permit the artist to manifest certain attitudes, moods and their own character. None of these factors can be attained to in a work of art without freedom of will and bodily movement. Therefore, free will - and free bodily movements ensuing from it - are indispensable to the presentation of genuine art.

To bring this into sharper focus Schopenhauer states that: with the "…physical meaning of the concept of freedom, animals and human beings are called free when neither chains, dungeon, nor paralysis, and thus generally no physical, material obstacle impedes their actions, but these occur in accordance with their will."[1182] Such a physical meaning is the most 'original' 'immediate' and frequent use of the concept. Similarly, from a political perspective, a people is termed free when governed by self-instituted laws and

[1180] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.2, p.27.
[1181] Schopenhauer, A. and Kolenda, K., *Essay on the Freedom of the Will* (Dover Publications, 2012). p.xii.
[1182] Zöller. p.4.

"obeys only its own will."[1183] As a result, political freedom comes under the category of physical freedom.

6.2 Physical Freedom, Determinism and Nolde's Artistic Practice

Nolde's political and physical freedom certainly came under pressure from 1933 onwards when he was asked to 'voluntarily' resign from the Akademie der Künste by the Nazis - which he refused to do.[1184] Through the sheer force of Nazi will, and arguably an instance of C1, the Akademie der Künste faced mounting pressure from the Ministry of Education to comply with its demands that 'unacceptable' artists be removed from office. Three members of the Akademie did comply with the Ministry's call for their resignation – notably Paul Mebes, Otto Dix and Schmidt-Rottluff. However, the majority stood their ground and refused to comply - thus temporarily maintaining their physical freedom.

A little later in 1936, Nolde's exhibition at the Galerie Ferdinand Moeller in Berlin was shut down, then re-opened again, simply because Nolde was far from willing to compromise in affairs of art or change his style.[1185] In the same year, came the news that his autobiography *Welt und Heimat* was forbidden publication– yet another blow to his freedom of expression.[1186] Perhaps the only expressive acts of Nolde's which could have aroused the Nazis' displeasure were the figurative oil paintings of 1936, *Woman with Auburn Hair* (fig. 133) and *L. and I. The Sisters* (fig. 134). In the same year, Goebbels

[1183] Ibid., p.4.
[1184] Urban, M., Nolde, E., and Parsons, G., *Emil Nolde: Catalogue Raisonné of the Oil-Paintings: Volume Two, 1915-1951* (London: Philip Wilson for Sotheby's Publications, 1990). p.25.
[1185] Brenner, H., *Die Kunstpolitik des Nationalsozialismus* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1963). p.70. Nolde, E., Osterwold, T., and Knubben, T., *Emil Nolde: Unpainted Pictures: Watercolours 1938 - 1945 from the collection of the Nolde-Stiftung Seebüll* (Ostfildern-Ruit: Hatje Cantz, 2000). p.8.
[1186] Urban, Nolde, and Parsons. p.26.

had issued his 'Ban on Art Criticism', which significantly eroded the freedom of Germany's modernist movement.[1187]

With the gradual erosion of Nolde's physical freedom it may be wondered if he was constrained from acting freely by motives such as threats from his political situation, or hopes and fears.[1188] To this Schopenhauer would reply that a physical obstacle might exceed the powers of a human being, but a motive is never irresistible *per se*, nor does it possess complete power since it might be overthrown by a more powerful counter motive, if it existed and the individual's situation was determined by it.[1189]

In terms of motivating events, 'hard determinism' would argue that all events in Nolde's life were pre-determined because they followed specific antecedents, or an accumulation of antecedent causes. If an indeterminist would argue that no events in Nolde's life were pre-determined, then a determinist would find this untenable since "it would involve the denial of any regular sequence whatsoever..."[1190] However, an indeterminist might respond that Nolde's art signified humanity's free will through its very (at times) uncertain pictorial construction. Indeed, when writing for *Der Sturm* in 1912, Paul Ferdinand Schmidt suggested that what Pechstein, Jean Puy, Maurice de Vlaminck and Auguste Herbin had in common with Nolde was a manifestation of uncertainty.[1191] Moreover Worringer had argued, for those who knew their heritage, how Germans had an "inborn sensual instinctive uncertainty."[1192] Yet on the other hand, more

[1187] In the first instance published as "Anordnung des Reichsministers für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda über Kunstkritik vom 27. II. 1936," for *Völkischer Beobachter*, 28.11.1936. Cf. Wulf, J., *Die bildenden Künste im Dritten Reich : eine Dokumentation* (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1983). p. 119-20.
[1188] Zöller. p.34.
[1189] Ibid., p.35.
[1190] Dotterer, R. H., "Indeterminisms," in: *Philosophy of Science* Vol. 5, no. 1 (1938). p.62.
[1191] Paul Ferdinand Schmidt, "Die Expressionisten," in: Walden. *Der Sturm* 2, no. 92, January 1912, p.735.
[1192] Wilhelm Worringer, "Entwicklungsgeschichtliches zur modernsten Kunst," Im Kampf um die Kunst: Die Antwort auf den "Protest deutscher Kunstler" in: ibid., Der Sturm 2, no.75, (August 1911), p.598.

recent critics such as Andrew Graham Dixon propose that sometimes Nolde used a "determined, wilful application of a Fauve palette to Turnerian subject matter."[1193]

This tension between determinism and indeterminism is significant, because by 1927 Werner Karl Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty Principle' had begun to undermine the "predetermined future of strict causality," [1194] thus leading scientists to relinquish their moral opposition to the possibility of free-will.[1195] As Joshua C. Gregory points out, by 1931 scientists such as Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington came to believe that it was a "gratuitous complication to presume determinism in the mental when there is indeterminism in the physical."[1196] Consequently, by 1935 Eddington would claim that science had opened the "door of human freedom by expelling determinism from physics, but only slightly."[1197] However, if an indeterminist would continue to argue that Nolde possessed free will, then we should do well to heed Gregory who suggests that:

> A capricious indeterminism involves neither the freedom we want nor the free will we think we have. Free will may be only a name for 'unconscious determinism' - a determination which seems to be freedom because it is not felt.[1198]

Whether one believes in an 'unconscious determinism' or not, we can resolve in a more abstract way the problem as to whether or not Nolde's will *per se* was free. This might be achieved by conceptualising freedom as the absence of necessity, where the concept

[1193] Dixon.
[1194] Gregory, J. C., "Indeterminism and the Wish," in: *Science Progress* Vol. 36, no. 144 (1948). p.606.
[1195] The relevance of Heisenberg may on the one hand be due to the possibility that many people are interested in whether indeterminism is required for free will - and that that is a question the answer to which does not depend upon whether the world is actually deterministic or not. But on the other hand, the 'Uncertainty Principle' does not tell us anything about how macro-systems like human brains work. Plenty of macro systems would seem to be deterministic, or at least close enough to deterministic as to make the absolutely miniscule chances of something else happening irrelevant. Thus, one could detonate a bomb on an aircraft and everybody would definitely die – and in that sense perhaps, human decisions are more like that than like the behaviour of small numbers of subatomic particles. However, the success of quantum mechanics - and therefore Heisenberg's 'Uncertainty Principle' - has made a big difference to the debate. That is to say, prior to Quantum Mechanics, philosophers basically either thought (a) the universe was deterministic (and so either free will is compatible with determinism, or else there is no free will), or (b) since free will obviously exists, then it must be that somehow the will lies outside the domain of physical description since such physical description will always be deterministic. (I am very grateful to Professor Helen Beebee for her guidance in this matter).
[1196] Gregory., p.606.
[1197] Ibid., p.606.
[1198] Ibid., p.607.

of freedom keeps its negative sense as mentioned above.[1199] If we use the concept of necessity as that which ensues from a given sufficient ground, then there was always a sufficient ground for any event in Nolde's life. Yet, if an indeterminist were to press for an absence of necessity in Nolde's decision making (and in the use of his body), then this would be illogical. According to Schopenhauer it would be illogical because:

> A free will would therefore be one that was not determined by grounds; and since everything determining something else must be a ground – a real ground, i.e., a cause, in the case of real things – a free will would be one that was determined by nothing at all.[1200]

If this was possible, then there would be no determinable grounds for explaining Nolde's acts of will, or as Schopenhauer puts it, all human beings would be left without "even a terminus technicus for this concept; it is *liberum arbitrium indifferentiae.*"[1201] Therefore, from this standpoint, Nolde did not possess freedom of will to use his body without hindrance, especially during the reign of National Socialism.

As mentioned above, Nolde experienced more hindrance to his bodily freedom following the 'Degenerate Art' exhibition of 1937 since "no one occupied the officials more."[1202] In fact, by 1940 the State Security Police went so far as to request that Berlin's Academy of Arts provide details about his biological ancestry.[1203] Throughout that year Nolde produced twenty-one oil paintings, the majority of which were of flowers and buildings. However, in his depictions of the human body he does appear to have manifested a certain will to resist. This might be seen in *Veterans* of 1940 (fig. 135) which depicts two male figures clothed in what appears to be medieval costume. This could easily have been perceived (if the

[1199] See also: Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.287.
[1200] Zöller., p.8.
[1201] Ibid., p.8. The Latin phrase '*liberum arbitrium indifferentiae*' means 'free choice of indifference' which is a possible concept for an absolutely unconditioned will.
[1202] Vergo et al. p.57.
[1203] Ibid., p.57.

authorities wished) as undermining Germany's veterans of the Great War given their 'rustic' and unflattering appearance.

A work like *Veterans* ran the risk of flouting Nazi art regulations, the defining parameters of which were impactful. Fehr gives details of the law regarding 'inferior' works of art by referring to Section 2, Paragraph 1, of the 'Order Regarding the Distribution of Inferior Art Products'.[1204] This section stated that: "Acceptance into a Chamber can be denied, or a member can be excluded, in the event that there is evidence that the person in question does not possess the necessary reliability and suitability to practice their activity."[1205] Therefore, paintings such as *Joy of Dancing* of 1940 (fig. 136) flouted the restrictions imposed by the Nazi system. The most likely reason in this case being that Nolde had 'freely chosen' to paint figures which appear as dwarf-like and unnatural.

Within the defining parameters laid down by the Nazi Party, more threats to Nolde's physical freedom occurred in 1940, when he was compelled to give all of his work for that year to the Reich Chamber for the Visual Arts. As Petropoulos has shown, of around forty-eight works submitted to the Reich many were never seen again. Additionally, Nolde's freedom was threatened by a surveillance report of 25.08.1941, issued from the offices of Security Services Director Reinhard Heydrich. Heydrich was prompted by this report to declare that "the notorious art Bolshevist and leader of degenerate art, Emil Nolde, submitted a tax declaration for 1940 for the sum of RM 80,000 ($32,000)."[1206] Thus, it is undeniable that Nolde must have felt the effects of this upon his freedom of will. Petropoulos recognises this and how "the direct involvement of the head of the Reich Security Main Office signalled the decision to ratchet up the pressure on the artist."[1207] The effect of this pressure resulted

[1204] See: *Völkischer Beobachter* nr. 288, p.9, Vol. 9. 0 9.10.1940.
[1205] , *Reichsgesetzblatt. Teil 1*, Berlin, 1933).Part 1, p.797.
[1206] Petropoulos. p.168. Although this was a significant figure under the circumstances of war Petropoulos urges caution with regards to this figure.
[1207] Ibid., p.168.

in over 1,000 of Nolde's works being confiscated from various sources. Indeed, we have noted in the previous chapter that this was a similar fate which awaited Mueller's works and many others.

A little while later on 23.08.1941 Ziegler, as president of the Reichskunstkammer, wrote to Nolde informing him that he was forbidden to practice in the visual arts due to his lack of 'reliability', formally ending his creative free will.[1208] However, as Saehrendt and James van Dyke show, the prohibition on Nolde's artistic practice by the Reichskammer der Bildenden Künste (Reich Chamber for Visual Arts) was only actioned after Heydrich, as leader of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD),[1209] had heard about Nolde's tax returns.[1210] Furthermore, as van Dyke argues, despite the NSDAP[1211] radicals being able to impose their will on Germany's public institutions of culture, and "to define the terms of debate and description between 1930 and 1938,"[1212] the acts of private collectors were not easy to supress.

The Führer's aesthetic will defined the terms of debate in the arts so as to promote a culture of responsibility towards *Volk* and State.[1213] Fehr believes that these terms must have been well-known to Nolde because they were set out in the Führer's speech at the opening of the 'Great German Art Exhibition' in Munich.[1214] However, as Petropoulos has stated, Ziegler's letter "…was indeed more extreme than the ban on exhibitions (*Ausstellungsverbot*) or professional activity (*Berufsverbot*), and effectively served as a ban on painting."[1215] Nolde's reaction was to ask Fehr if this should mean the end of artistic

[1208] Interestingly, Nolde never mentions the 'ban' in his letters.
[1209] Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers-SS (Security Service of the Reichsführer-SS).
[1210] van Dyke, J., "Something New on Nolde, National Socialism, and the SS," in: *Kunstchronik: Monatsschrift für Kunstwissenschaft Museumswesen und Denkmalplege* Vol. 65. 2012, p.267.
[1211] NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (National Socialist German Workers' Party) (abbreviated to the 'Nazi Party').
[1212] van Dyke. p.267.
[1213] The problem of what moral responsibility entails in Schopenhauer's terms will be discussed in detail towards the latter part of this chapter.
[1214] Fehr and Smargiassi. p.126.
[1215] Petropoulos. p.168.

life, perhaps revealing that not only was his physical and moral freedom of will threatened, but also his intellectual freedom.[1216] He would write to Fehr on 04.04.1942 in deep depression saying that from free artistic people they had been reduced to beggars, begging for a little favour and some understanding. He stressed that he was not 'unreliable', decadent or 'degenerate', being an artist who had striven for his art and for everything beautiful and noble which he could give to the German people, whilst he had also striven against external controls and being told what to think.[1217]

Despite Nolde's protestations, Ziegler prevented him from selling his pictures and practising as an artist; a ban which was also applied to Schmidt-Rottluff. At the time of the ban, Nolde said that he was "right in the middle of the most wonderful productive painting. The brushes slipped out of my hand."[1218] The tension of not knowing what he could or could not do led him to comment that "with a sword hanging over my head, I was deprived of mobility and liberty."[1219] During that year of 1941 he only managed to produce three oil paintings of flowers, *Gladioli* of 1941 (fig. 137), *Gladioli and Coleus* of 1941 (fig. 138) and *Sunflowers and White Dahlias* of 1941 (fig. 139), which signifies the effects of the political situation upon his artistic free will.[1220] One year later, in the latter part of December 1942, a draft letter from Ada Nolde to Otto von Kursell reported the effect upon Nolde's freedom.[1221] She said that, "for one and a half years my husband has been banned from parting with his paintings, from exhibiting, and from painting new ones."[1222] These

[1216] Fehr and Smargiassi. p.127.
[1217] Ibid., p.130.
[1218] Nolde, E., *Reisen Ächtung Befreiung: 1919 - 1946* (Köln: DuMont, 1978). p.125.
[1219] Ibid.
[1220] This Schopenhauerian interpretation might be contrasted with Max Sauerlandt's 1921 monograph on Nolde. It would appear, since Sauerlandt wrote "that his development . . . has been achieved completely independent of the external events of his life, existing at first in a subterranean state, in the subconscious, until the inhibiting barrier falls away and the mysterious accumulated energy breaks through to the surface in a full, broad stream of creativity." See: Bradley, W. S., *Emil Nolde and German Expressionism: A Prophet In His Own Land* (Ann Arbor, Mich: UMI Research Press, 1986). p.113.
[1221] Otto von Kursell was director of the State University of Fine Arts in Berlin-Charlottenburg and Senator of the Prussian Academy of Arts . He was also a member of the NSDAP from 1922.
[1222] Undated letter from Ada Nolde to Peter Thomas (late December 1942), in ANS.

effects would continue into 1944, when Ada drafted a letter to von Kursell, claiming that her husband was "sitting with bound hands and dishonoured in his beloved Germany."[1223]

In spite of his ban, Nolde managed to paint using watercolours creating what have become known as his 'unpainted pictures'. He used watercolours in an effort to avoid the olfactory traces which oil paints leave behind in order to avoid detection by the Gestapo. After the war, Nolde referred to the ordeal of being policed by the Gestapo saying that he:

> …lived under the surveillance of the Gestapo. I do not know how extensive this surveillance of mine was, but as an artist I was struggling constantly under this fateful pressure and they came repeatedly to control me.[1224]

Regardless of the pressure, Nolde produced more than 1,300 of these watercolours on small pieces of rice paper in a semi-secret room at his home in Seebüll.[1225] In van Dyke's opinion they could be read "as documents of persecution and resistance."[1226] This may or may not be so, yet we must qualify this statement through Schopenhauer and assert that this heroic act of resistance was subject to the determining laws of causality. Indeed, the same laws of causality must apply to Rave's heroising statement that 'degenerate' artists were always at risk where the police were concerned while they remained faithful to their artistic calling during aesthetic exile.[1227]

6.3 Imaginary Representations: Expressionism as Pseudo-Profundity and Escapism

In an attempt to escape these controls of the police, it seems as if Nolde retreated into a world of dreamlike reverie. In early December 1941, whilst in aesthetic exile, Nolde wrote that during the nights he wandered through magnificent landscapes of the

[1223] Draft letter from Ada Nolde to Otto von Kursell, 10.02.1944, annotated by Emil Nolde, in ANS.
[1224] Letter Nolde to Feldenkirchen, 08.09.1945, in ANS.
[1225] Vergo et al. p.169.
[1226] James A. van Dyke 'Something New on Nolde, National Socialism, and the SS', in: van Dyke. p.266.
[1227] Rave, P. O., *Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich* (Hamburg: Mann, 1949). p.133.

imagination, full of wonders and splendours.[1228] As a result, the imaginative use of his homeland acted as a determining ground for a personal attempt to find aesthetic freedoms of any sort whilst under duress.[1229] Two years later, on 08.08.1943, Nolde recorded how his excursions into dreamlike fantasy stood outside of detached knowledge, feeling that these regions stood for a "profound and carefree spiritual experience."[1230]

About this, Manfred Reuther suggests that Nolde's intimate visions were matched by the artist's selection of small palm sized paper often roughly trimmed.[1231] This intimacy of vision is registered in most of the watercolours dating from 1938-1945, as in *Blue Couple* (*in profile*) *in Sidelight*, (fig. 140) and *Red-Bearded Treeman* (fig. 141). The former image has an ethereal dream-like quality taken from the world of imaginary representations. The purples and blues have been applied with a full brush saturating the paper to give an hallucinatory depth. The latter image shares in the dream-like quality of imaginary representations often used to illustrate a children's folk tales.

Thinking about and filtering these works through Marc's claims may at first sight appear problematic. On the one hand, they appear to be testimonials of Nolde's representational power, and arguably possess something detached from the will, tempting us to refute C1. On the other hand, the realisation that the images were the compelling effects of external motives acting upon his will arguably resolves the problem. That is to say, even though his imaginary representations could be regarded as the product of his stubborn will to create, and as such validate C1, they were still determined by external motives and were not indifferently free acts. Therefore, it may be possible to reconcile C1 and his use of imaginary representations in this way.

[1228] Nolde, E. et al., Emil Nolde: Mein Wunderland von Meer zu Meer (Emil Nolde: My Wonderland from Sea to Sea) (Köln
Seebüll: DuMont Nolde Stiftung, 2008). p.12.
[1229] Ibid., p.12-13.
[1230] Nolde quoted and translated by Reuther in: Nolde, Osterwold, and Knubben; ibid., p.10.
[1231] Ibid., p.10.

This is important because Nolde's retreat into the world of the imagination was promoted by aesthetic solitude and perhaps deluded him into believing that he retained some vestiges of freedom from Nazi tyranny. On the power of imagination Schopenhauer says that the faculty of imagination possesses greater activity when fewer external perceptions are introduced through the sensory organs. Thus, lengthy intervals of solitary confinement in jail, overriding quiet, crepuscular light or calignosity assist its activity, and so without invitation it begins to perform.[1232]

If the faculty of imagination is to be useful, it needs materials from the external world from which to draw inspiration. Schopenhauer makes a parallel between "the nourishment of the imagination as with that of the body… to which the body is indebted for all the power which it afterwards manifests at the proper time."[1233] Since Nolde was forced to retreat into the world of imaginary representations, we may suggest through Schopenhauer, that the faculty of imagination extended the artist's horizons beyond the realities of his own personal experience. A powerful imagination is both a condition and co-traveller of genius, although a powerful imagination in itself "is not evidence of genius; on the contrary, even men with little or no touch of genius may have much imagination."[1234] Whether one believes that Nolde was a 'genius' or not is open to personal judgement, yet he thought that his desire for artistic progress and its representational potential extended into the uttermost primeval areas, whether in reality or fantasy.[1235]

Nolde's attempt to find freedom may be interpreted as an over- identification with the world of fantasy and the representational stuff of dreams - or even as a form of

[1232] Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.3, p.137.
[1233] Ibid., Vol.3, p.138.
[1234] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. p.187.
[1235] Nolde et al. p.13.

escapism. Indeed, Schopenhauer suggests that human experience has a kinship to the world of dreams and may be classified along with them.[1236] However, Bart Vandenabeele finds this a wearisome kinship because Schopenhauer "regularly identifies the world as representation with a dream, which seems to lead him to precisely the kind of (Fichtean) idealism he absolutely wanted to avoid."[1237] This is a reasonable objection since Schopenhauer does state that life and dreams can be considered as leaves from one and the same book. [1238]Yet, Schopenhauer's statement is also reasonable since there can be no logical refutation of any presupposition that all of life is but a dream.[1239] In order to support such a view Bertrand Russell observed how "there is no logical impossibility in the supposition that the whole of life is a dream, in which we ourselves create all the objects that come before us."[1240]

Although a powerful imagination is no guarantor for genius, Nolde could ponder an object either objectively, as would a 'genius', by apprehending the Idea of the object, or via the commonest way through the principle of sufficient reason and its relations to his own will.[1241] Similarly, Nolde could have perceived an imaginary object in the following two ways. In the first instance it would have been an instrument to knowledge of the Idea, the message of which belongs to the work of art. In the second instance Schopenhauer says that:

> …the imaginary object is used to build castles in the air, congenial to selfishness and to one's own whim, which for the moment delude and delight…The man who indulges in this game is a dreamer; he will easily mingle with reality the pictures that delight his solitude, and will thus become unfit for real life.[1242]

[1236] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.4.
[1237] Vandenabeele, B., "Schopenhauer on Sense Perception and Aesthetic Cognition," in: *The Journal of Aesthetic Education* Vol. 45, no. 1 (2011). p.40.
[1238] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.18.
[1239] Vandenabeele, "Schopenhauer on Sense Perception and Aesthetic Cognition." p.55.
[1240] Russell, B., *The Problems of Philosophy : Bertrand Russell* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).10.
[1241] Nolde could also perceive imaginary objects in these antithetical ways.
[1242] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.187.

The notion of building 'castles in the air' possesses overtones of escapism, not only for Nolde but also for Expressionism. In the 1930s, the philosopher Ernst Bloch pointed out how Lukács had drawn attention to the escapist ideology of Expressionism. He also pointed out how in the essay 'Realism in the Balance', Lukács was persuaded that the Expressionists lacked an aesthetic grip on reality.[1243] In addition, Lukács argued that the Expressionists conferred "a pseudo-profundity and pseudo-perfection on immediate experience."[1244]

Through such pseudo-profundity, Lukács suggested that Expressionism had developed into a "mystical irrationalism."[1245] Indeed, critics who had pinned a 'pseudo-profundity' onto Expressionism may have remembered Conrad Felixmüller's comment of 1918, that artists of his day could not gauge to what extent their new art was romantic escapism.[1246] It is possible then that Nolde withdrew into a world of 'mystical irrationalism' in a vain attempt to exercise his perceived free will. In fact, Erich Bronner argues that, when it came to a "mystical irrationalism, the reliance on instinct, the attempt to merge with the dynamic force that supposedly sways nature and man - Nolde still believed it all."[1247]

[1243] Ernst Bloch 'Discussing Expressionism' in: Bloch, E., *Aesthetics and Politics* (London: NLB, 1977). p.19. Bloch was familiar with Schopenhauer's work, yet one may not find any specific interest in the concept of the 'will' in his work. He is interested in the epistemological treatment concept of hope and, as a Marxist, was sensitive to the influence of economic, social, and political influences on the development of human consciousness. By the time he came to write *The Principle of Hope* (1938-47, revised 1953 & 1959) he had consigned Schopenhauer to the origins of reactionary philosophy which had fed into National Socialism; as he put it in this work: "Feuerbach lies ... on the salvation-line which leads from Hegel to Marx, just as the German disaster-line leads from Schopenhauer to Nietzsche and the consequences." See: Bloch, Ernst. The Principle of Hope (in Translation of: Das Prinzip Hoffnung.). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996 3 vols. p. 274). His work on Expressionism can be found in: Bloch, Ernst. *Heritage of Our Times* [in English]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991, is useful as is his work on display and the body in *The Principle of Hope*. (I am grateful to Dr. Vincent Geoghegan for his advice on the above).
[1244] Georg Lukács 'Realism in the Balance' in: ibid., p.51.
[1245] Lukács, G., Livingstone, R., and Fernbach, D., *Essays on Realism*, [English-language ed.] ed. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980). p.81.
[1246] Conrad Felixmüller,"Zur Kunst" in: Felixmüller, C., "Zur Kunst " in: *Die Schöne Rarität* (1917).
[1247] Bronner, S. E., *Modernism at the Barricades: Aesthetics, Politics, Utopia* (Columbia University Press, 2012). p.90.

Extending this notion still further, Robert Ellis considers that the 'irrationalism' of Nolde and Expressionism was at home on the far Right of politics.[1248] This line of argument mirrors the oft cited debate between Lukács and Bloch over Expressionism's political integrity. During the mid-1930s, Lukács had argued that "Expressionism is grounded in an irrationalist mythology. Its creative style tends towards that of an emotive, rhetorical, vacuous manifesto, a declamatory pseudo-activism…"[1249] If this was so, then in terms of political free will, should we agree with Lukács that Expressionists were not only unable to exercise that free will, but were pressed into serving the visual language of Fascism? Indeed, on the topic of Expressionism's intellectual freedom Lukács stated that:

> … since they were unable to free themselves intellectually from an imperialist parasitism, and since they colluded in the ideological decay of the imperialist bourgeoisie without offering either criticism or resistance…their creative method could without distortion be pressed into the service of that synthesis of decadence and atavism which is the demagogy of Fascism.[1250]

On the one hand, given Fascism's aversion to Expressionism and its curtailment of Nolde's freedom for the sake of *völkisch* thought, we must disagree with Lukács' generalisations. In fact, Bloch criticized Lukács for tarring Expressionism and Fascism with the same philosophical brush, pointing out that Lukács never mentioned any Expressionist painters such as Nolde in his essay.[1251] On the other hand, William S. Bradley argues that the most perspicacious of Nolde's supporters did not comprehend the indebtedness of

[1248] Ellis, R., *Ernst Toller and German Society: Intellectuals as Leaders and Critics, 1914–1939* (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2013). p.78.
[1249] Bloch. p.17.
[1250] Ibid., p.17.
[1251] In fact, as Richard Sheppard argues, before late 1911 Lukács "had no contact with, let alone knowledge of the embryonic *avant-garde* circles in Berlin." See: Sheppard, R., *Georg Lukács, Wilhelm Worringer and German Expressionism* (Chalfont St Giles: Alpha Academic, 1995). p.246. Nor did Lukács have knowledge of *Der Sturm*, *Die Aktion* and the *Neue Club* which produced four *Neopathetische Cabarets* whilst he was in Berlin. Sheppard's research concludes that Lukács' *Heidelberger Asthetik* (Heidelberg Aesthetics) written between 1916-18, "clinches the argument about Lukács relationship to Expressionism. Throughout its 220 pages, he never once mentions an Expressionist writer, painter or aesthetician…" Ibid., p.246. Therefore, we are not obliged to regard Lukács relationship to Expressionist art as an authoritative one.

his art to *völkisch* thinking.[1252] Yet, he also concludes that Nolde's bid to reconcile his art with the Nazis' cultural politics cannot be entirely excused.

6.4 Nolde, Free Will and Membership of the Nazi Party

With the above in mind, we need to approach the problem of Nolde's freedom of will *per se* by exploring: i) Nolde's relationship to National Socialism according to Schopenhauer's doctrine of free will, ii) the extent to which the will in itself is free, and iii) the freedom of willing *per se*. Perhaps Nolde's early political remarks offer us a clue as to what motivated his will towards National Socialism in the first place. For example, it is known that in 1919 he was unhappy with border disputes between Germany and Denmark. He had written to Fehr in February of how "the newspapers bring rather disturbing news from Schleswig. It hurts me so that the land where I was born, my Heimat, should be torn through the middle."[1253]

Nolde was born close to the village of Nolde within the Prussian Duchy of Schleswig with the birth name of Emil Hansen, converting it to Emil Nolde in 1902. Following a referendum on 10.02.1920, the village became part of Burkal in Southern Jutland in Denmark. He was living in Utenwarf at that time so he officially became a Dane.[1254] He was to claim that "we did not like the exaggerated political and petty-minded border matter ... We loved our land just the way it was."[1255] Subsequently, it seems as if Nolde could never accept these border disputes and the necessary shifts in national identity.[1256]

[1252] Bradley, W. S., *Emil Nolde and German Expressionism: A Prophet in his own Land* (Ann Arbor, Mich: UMI Research Press, 1981). p.116.
[1253] Petropoulos. p.158.
[1254] Nolde et al.
[1255] Nolde. p.36
[1256] On this see: "Politics and Paint," *Financial Times*, 16/12/1995.

Petropoulos argues that the threat to Nolde's *Heimat* motivated him to join the Danish branch of the Nazi Party in 1920, which has since been proven to be an incorrect date.[1257] The same incorrect date is also given by Barron and Peter Selz.[1258] However, Vergo questions whether Nolde sympathised or communicated with the Nazi Party in the 1920s, especially since the artist's political motives were ambivalent. This can be attested to by the fact that in 1919, Nolde was prepared to sign the left-wing *Arbeitsrat für Kunst* (Workers' Council for Art) manifesto. Consequently, Vergo surmises that although Nolde was a Danish citizen, it was unlikely that he would have been motivated to join the Danish Nazi Party

Further questions have been raised regarding Nolde's membership of the Nazi Party. Monika Hecker lists two incorrect 'facts' which are often cited against Nolde. She says these are often based on a misreporting of the regional politics and history of North Schleswig.[1259] This misreporting of Nolde's association with the Nazi Party arises from two sources. Firstly, in 1949 Rave, the Director of the Berlin National Gallery, published a book called *Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich*[1260] (Art Dictatorship in the Third Reich). There, Rave said that Nolde had become a Danish citizen in 1920, and that he became a party member of the NSDAP when he joined the NSDAP-N in North Schleswig at its foundation. However, he did not make clear to the reader what the NSDAP-N was and that it was not founded until 1935.[1261] Secondly, an East German publication by Dieter Schmidt of 1964, misinterpreted Nolde's letter to Goebbels of 02.07.1938, as meaning

[1257] Petropoulos.,p.158. *Heimat* means 'homeland' or 'roots', signifying a special identification between an individual and their regional home.
[1258] Barron and Guenther. p.315 and Selz, P., *German Expressionist Painting* (University of California Press, 1974). p.124.
[1259] Hecker, M., "Ein Leben an der Grenze. Emil Noide und die NSDAP," in: *Nordfriesland: Zeitschr. für Kultur, Politik, Wirtschaft*, no. 110. pp.9-15. It is often misreported that Nolde joined the NSDAP (Nazi Party) in 1920 at the same time as Hitler. This false 'fact' was popularised in Siegfried Lenz's novel *Deutschstunde* (German lesson) of 1968.
[1260] Rave. *Kunstdiktatur im Dritten Reich*, Hamburg, 1949.
[1261] NSDAP-N = *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei Nordschleswig* (National Socialist German Workers' Party of North Schleswig). The NSDAP-N was founded in 1935, and shortly after it was confirmed as a satellite of the NSDAP. All of the minor nationalist parties in North Schleswig were integrated into the NSDAP-N from 1935-1938 (including the NSAN).

that he joined the NSDAP in 1920.[1262] For political reasons, this misinterpretation was deliberately used by East German scholars to draw divisions between bourgeois (Western) artists, art critics and anti-fascist (East European) ones.[1263]

After Denmark was occupied, Nolde's membership of the NSDAP-N was investigated. On 07.04.1941, the Berlin Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda made inquiries of the German Embassy in Copenhagen. Nolde claimed that he had joined the "NSAN-NSDAP"[1264] 'Group of Germans in North Schleswig' on 15.09.1934, with membership number 4060 or 3460. They were requested to check the correctness of this claim as soon as possible. It turned out that Nolde had joined the NSAN[1265] on 15.07.1934 but had the membership number 1722.[1266] In the summer of 1935, rival National Socialist groups, including the NSAN, were brought into line and the NSDAP-N was founded. Therefore, Nolde was a party member of the NSDAP-N at the same time as the NSDAP was persecuting him in Germany as a 'degenerate' artist.[1267] As Hecker points out, the membership list of the NSAN and NSDAP-N are presumed destroyed, as are the documents of the Regional Court in Hamburg. However, Hecker concludes that the documents of the Supreme Party Court of the NSDAP and the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda leave much unclear.[1268]

Regardless of the above ambiguities, it is clear that on 09.11.1933, Nolde and Ada were invited by Reichsführer-SS Himmler to attend the commemoration of the 1923 Beer Hall Putsch in Munich. Yet, as van Dyke suggests:

[1262] Schmidt.
[1263] Hecker. p.11.
[1264] This acronym is from Nolde's letter which he uses – however this acronym cannot be found anywhere else. Hecker puts the phrase in quotation marks. Nolde's own use of this acronym must be an error. He must have meant the NSAN because he did join them on 15.09.1934.
[1265] NSAN=*Nationalsozialistische Arbeitsgemeinschaft Nordschleswigs* (National Socialist Workers' Association of North Schleswig).
[1266] See Bundesarchiv Potsdam, Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, R55/409.
[1267] Hecker. p.13-14.
[1268] Ibid., p.14.

> …it is important to remember that Himmler and the SS were not then what they would later become. The letter does not put Nolde in the vicinity of Auschwitz, but rather at the other end of the 'twisted road' that led there.[1269]

Along with Himmler, Nolde and his wife saw the Führer for the first time in the Munich Löwenbräukeller. Nolde's attendance implicated him with the Hanfstaengl family who had protected Hitler following the Beer Hall Putsch. It may have been Erna Hanfstaengl who had approached Himmler's wife to prompt the Reichsführer-SS to invite the Noldes to this event, although van Dyke suggests that this may not have been the result of her efforts alone.[1270] After the event, in a letter dated 10.11.1933, Nolde observed that they were "all united in hopes and wishes for our beloved Germany, though otherwise very divided through the growing gulf between military and art interests ..."[1271]

Whilst Nolde mingled with the Nazi elites, it is plausible that a combination of artistic ambition and economic motives were at the back of his mind. As William Brustein argues, many individuals who joined the Nazi Party did so from economic interests, calculating "that the benefits of joining would exceed the costs."[1272] Yet, he acknowledges that many people were drawn to the Nazi Party for reasons other than economy, recommending that no single factor can adequately explain why 1.4 million Germans joined the Nazi Party between 1925 and 1932.[1273] Feeling convinced that it is an error to assume that the Nazi Party's successes can be attributed to anti-Semitism, he suggests that before 1933, Nazi Party anti-Semitism was unoriginal, sharing similar attitudes with various other Weimar political groups. In his view, "what was highly unoriginal in pre-

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[1269] van Dyke. p.269.

[1270] Petropoulos.p.162-63. Cf. James A. van Dyke 'Something new on Nolde, National Socialism and the SS' van Dyke. p.270. Erna Hanfstaengl's brother, Ernst ("Putzi") Hanfstaengl (1887-1975), a member of Hitler's elite inner circle, had watercolours by Nolde in his flat which were seen by Hitler. See Soika, A & Fulda, Bernhard: 'Deutscher bis ins tiefste Geheimnis seines Geblüts': Emil Nolde und die nationalsozialistische Diktatur in: Krämer, F. and Städelsches Kunstinstitut und Städtische Galerie, *Emil Nolde: Retrospektive; [... anlässlich der Ausstellung "Emil Nolde. Retrospektive", Städel Museum, Frankfurt am Main, 5. März - 15. Juni 2014; Louisiana Museum of Modern Art, Humlebaek, 4. Juli - 19. Oktober 2014]* (München [u.a.]: Prestel, 2014). p.190. Cf. Petropoulos. p.163.

[1271] James A van Dyke , 'Something New on Nolde, National Socialism, and the SS'. Letter to Hans Fehr reproduced by van Dyke in: van Dyke. p. 268-269.

[1272] Brustein, W., *The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1996). p.22.

[1273] "Who Joined the Nazis and Why," in: *American Journal of Sociology* Vol. 103, no. 1 (1997)., p.217.

1933 Nazi Party programs was its anti-Semitism."[1274] By antithesis, Helmut K. Anheier questions whether economic interests were sufficient and believes that they were not.[1275] He argues that a combination of economic and ideological motives "including anti-Semitism, accounted for the Nazi Party position in the early 1930s - a nationalistic position that combined modern and antimodern, pro-capitalist and anti-capitalist, as well as pro-socialist and antisocialist elements, among others."[1276]

Although Nolde had a comparative freedom to make decisions on these issues, his capacity as a human being for deliberation gave rise to a conflict of political motives. According to Schopenhauer, motives born from conflict can be painful to the will - especially when uncertainty arises. This is because an individual permits motives to continually impinge upon their will, one motive conflicting with another. The individual's will is then akin to a body which is buffeted between opposing forces, until the strongest motive prevails and determines the action of the will.[1277] Thus, Robert A. Pois has found that the loss of the First World War, Nolde's lost *Heimat* and the enforcement of Danish citizenship were among those conflict-motivating factors which pushed Nolde towards the political far-right.[1278]

Vergo by comparison, appears uncertain about which was the strongest motive for Nolde to join the Nazis, being inclined to believe that he was motivated partly by expediency.[1279] If we interpret this scenario through Schopenhauer, then whatever motives Nolde had for making his political decisions, they could never be irresistible, whether

[1274] Ibid., p.220.
[1275] Ibid., p.209.
[1276] Ibid., p.209. The possibility that a combination of economic and ideological motives may 'contaminate' an individuals' mental capacity to form decisions is a topic which shall be examined shortly in this chapter. Indeed, it may revivivify the previous debate we had in the previous chapter of this thesis on Mueller's *Two Nude Girls* of c.1919 (fig. 121), which through Nazi eyes, were perceived to possess a nakedness suggestive of a 'contaminated' racial sexuality. The context for this was a concern that the *Volk* would be 'contaminated' through interbreeding with the gypsy people.
[1277] Schopenhauer and Kolenda. p.32.
[1278] Pois, R. A., *Emil Nolde* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). p.186.
[1279] Vergo et al. p.54.

performed out of expediency or not. Thus, Schopenhauer argues that even the strongest motive for self-preservation can be overcome by other motives such as suicide, the laying down of one's life for others, and competing interests. If this is the case, then we may question the extent to which the human will is free at all. On this issue, Janaway argues that:

> Though it seems a relatively straightforward matter to ask whether I can (in certain circumstances) do what I will, it is clearly a different matter to ask whether my will itself is free, that is, whether when I will to do *a*, anything prevented me from willing to do *b*, which seemed a possible choice but was not my actual choice.[1280]

This observation now begs the question as to whether Nolde's 'will itself' was free, since according to such a concept freedom of this kind means acting in conformity with our own will.[1281] Corresponding to an empirical conception of freedom, most individuals feel themselves to be free to do whatever they want within reason. Yet, we are enquiring about the freedom of willing *per se* and asking if it is possible for individuals such as Nolde to will what they will.[1282] If we assume an affirmative answer, then this assumption is grounded upon a presupposition that willing is dependent on another form of willing. As a result, Schopenhauer asks "can you also will what you will to will?"[1283] This problematic question therefore necessitates that we investigate whether it was possible for Nolde to have made choices that were both free *and* causally determined.

On the problem of choice in relation to free will, Brand Blanshard believes that, "The real issue, so far as the will is concerned, is not whether we can do what we choose to do, but whether we can choose our own choice, whether the choice itself issues in

[1280] Janaway. p.232.
[1281] Zöller. p.5.
[1282] Ibid., p.6.
[1283] Ibid., p.6.

accordance with law from some antecedent."[1284] Thus, the indeterminist might attack the determinist's position (on the issue of choosing that which is chosen) and would attribute responsibility to Nolde. However, the indeterminist could only do so if Nolde's actions were provably *not* determined by antecedents.[1285] As A.C. Ewing shows, indeterminists cannot evade the fact that causality is an intrinsic feature of human existence and that human actions are at least 'partially determined'. If they attempt to refute this then, "Without at least some causal influence, if not complete determination, any of the reliable predictions we are constantly making or assuming about human action would be impossible."[1286] From Schopenhauer's position this type of polemic is liable to ricochet into an infinite regression until we accept that willing *per se* is groundless and dependent upon nothing. Consequently, to argue that Nolde had freedom of the will (at least according to the popular concept of freedom) soon becomes inadequate and appears to sustain C1. It becomes particularly inadequate when we question Nolde's moral freedom of the will and his relationship to Nazism.

6.5 Moral Freedom, Self-Consciousness and the Consciousness of other Objects

Before engaging with this, let us presuppose that Nolde was self-consciously defining his own actions according to the world around him. This issue of self-consciousness and free will is of significance to our discussion for the following reason. *Self-consciousness* resides in the contrast between one's own self and the consciousness of other objects or other selves. The *consciousness* of other objects or other selves belongs to the faculty of cognition which organises space, time, and causality. Therefore, Nolde's *consciousness* was always driven towards the *external* world, whereas his *self-*

[1284] New York University Institute of Philosophy and Hook, S., *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science* (New York: Collier Books). p.21.
[1285] Ewing, A. C., "Indeterminism," in: *The Review of Metaphysics* Vol. 5, no. 2 (1951). p.200.
[1286] Ibid., p.199.

consciousness was driven *inwards* towards his personal willing as *internal* experiences of pain and pleasure. As a result, through Schopenhauer it can be argued that "by far the greatest part of all our consciousness in general is not *self-consciousness* but the *consciousness of other things* (*Bewusstsein anderer Dinge*) or the faculty of cognition."[1287]

The immediate objects of Nolde's self-consciousness were occasioned by both the consciousness of other things and acts of his will. His willing was only a reaction to external cognitions, and according to Schopenhauer, those cognitions which move the will are motives. If this is so, then was a *specific* act of Nolde's will caused by a motive, or could some *other* act have occurred instead? That is a question which human self-consciousness is unable to answer. Indeed, Schopenhauer argues that "the business of self-consciousness is the act of will alone, together with its absolute mastery over the limbs of the body."[1288] Consequently, this is what people mean by the expression "what I will."[1289]

Whenever Nolde merely pondered an act of will it was only a form of *wishing* until a final decision objectified that pondering into an actual deed. Thus, we face the common illusion that in a particular circumstance, Nolde (or any individual), had diametrically opposed acts of will available to him. It is from this illusion that there arises the confusion between *wishing* and willing. Indeed, Nolde could have *wished* for diametrically opposed things but he could only *will* one thing, whether under the duress of Nazism or not. In the end Schopenhauer reduces this assumption to its bare essentials as follows: "I can will, and when I will an action, the movable limbs of my body will at once and inevitably carry it out the moment I will it. In short, this is equivalent to saying that 'I can do what I will'."[1290]

[1287] Zöller. p.9.
[1288] Ibid., p.14.
[1289] Ibid., p.14.
[1290] Ibid., p.14.

Most individuals are more conscious of the active side of their acts of will and the effects produced by this as opposed to their passive side - of their dependence.[1291] If we ask an individual about the origin of their acts of will, as to whether they are given by rules or none at all, then Schopenhauer believes that their self-consciousness cannot answer the question. This is because the will of the individual is their real self, the true kernel of their being; it therefore constitutes the ground of their consciousness, given absolutely and existing beyond which they cannot go.[1292] As Schopenhauer says: "For he himself is as he wills, and he wills as he is. Therefore, to ask him whether he could will otherwise than he does is tantamount to asking him whether he could be different from what he himself is; and this he does not know."[1293] Therefore, Nolde could do what he willed, but he could only will one specific thing - and absolutely nothing else but that one thing.

Thus far, we have considered Nolde's will subjectively according to Schopenhauer's understanding of self-consciousness. Now we must consider his will objectively, and move our investigation on from his will as the immediate object of his self-consciousness, to his will as the mediated object of the consciousness of external objects (including people). The consciousness of external objects gives rise to motives which are not always taken directly from perception, but are often worked up into abstract concepts. If this is so, then were Nolde's acts of will by *necessity* brought into being by given motives, or could his will have retained complete freedom to will or *not to will* when a motive entered his consciousness? As Schopenhauer puts it: "Here, then, we have the concept of freedom in the abstract sense…as the mere negation of necessity, and consequently our problem is posed. "[1294]

[1291] Ibid., p.16.
[1292] Ibid., p.18.
[1293] Ibid., p.18.
[1294] Ibid., p.12.

Arguably, some acts of Nolde's will were brought into being through the influence of Nazi propaganda which attempted to train the will of the masses through motives. However, the effectiveness of the Nazi motivational industry on Nolde's will escapes many critics' notice. One far-reaching propaganda effect arose from a speech given by Goebbels to the media on 15.03.1933 (and many more like it afterwards), where he discussed the new Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda's mission. There he declaimed that: "I see in the newly established Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda a link between government and people, the living contact between the national government as the expression of the popular will and the *Volk* itself."[1295]

The new Ministry was actively involved in motivating the German people, conspiring to win over the will of the people by *addicting* them to the Ministry's own will - thus abrogating the freedom of the masses.[1296] When Goebbels asserted the following statement it might be interpreted as a validation of C1 due to its headstrong insistency. He declared that:

> It is not enough to reconcile people more or less to our regime, to move them towards a position of neutrality towards us; we want, rather, to work on people until they are addicted to us, until they realize, in the ideological sense as well, that what is happening now in Germany not only can be permitted, but must be permitted.[1297]

Not long after the inception of this Ministry, Goebbels asked Nolde if he would become Director of Berlin's *Vereinigte Staatliche Kunstschule* (United State Art School).

[1295] First published as: "Rede vor der Presse uber die Errichtung des Reichspropagandaministeriums," in: Goebbels-Reden, vol. I, 1931-1939, edited by Helmut Heiber (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1971), S. 90, 94, 95, 106-7. Published in English in: Welch, David, *The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda* (London: Routledge, 1933), 136-45 by Rabinbach and Gilman. As William S. Bradley says: "In his own deeply felt longing for a regeneration of the German spirit and the birth of a new German art, Nolde recognized the similarities between his own ideas and their transformed reappearance in the Nazi rhetoric, but he was no doubt guilty of being blind at least initially to the great and terrible difference between his motivations and those of the Nazis." See: Bradley, *Emil Nolde and German Expressionism: A Prophet in his own Land* , p.116.

[1296] It is noteworthy how the will (*Wille*) became a media phenomenon throughout the Weimar and Nazi era. See: Appendix A, 'Period Media Titles', which contains a list of periodicals indicating the prevalence of will orientated publications.

[1297] Rabinbach and Gilman. p.456.

Although Nolde did not secure the position, Fulda argues how "Nolde made clear that he would have been willing to help the new regime in a letter written to Hans Fehr."[1298] Given these circumstances, it can surely be no coincidence that Goebbels' pledge 'to work on people until they are addicted to us' acted as an external motive upon Nolde's will which in turn made him susceptible and 'willing to help the new regime'. On Goebbels' offer Nolde confided that the possibility of being appointed to the position of Director was unsettling due to his artistic style, although he would have accepted it out of duty and done it gladly.[1299]

Fulda builds on this and continues to question Nolde's character and motives as follows. He proposes that:

> Nolde had not only been very willing to contribute to the re-ordering of the German art world, but had even used his meeting with the Propaganda Ministry official to disqualify a possible alternative candidate for the position, Max Pechstein, his former colleague in the artists' association Brücke (Bridge), by claiming that Pechstein was a Jew.[1300]

The word 'willing' is significant here and ought to be contextualised within Goebbels' campaign to *addict* the will of the people to the Nazi system and a resultant confirmation of C1. The campaign to *addict* the will of the people to the Nazi system is often overlooked with regard to Nolde. Certainly, Fulda shows little awareness of the possibility that 'mental contamination', through Nazi mass 'will-training', exerted any number of unwanted influences on Nolde's judgments and motivations.[1301] As Timothy D. Wilson and Nancy Brekke show, mental contamination is "… the process whereby a person has an unwanted response because of mental processing that is unconscious or uncontrollable."[1302] This means that:

[1298] Bernhard Fulda and Aya Soika 'Emil Nolde and the National Socialist Dictatorship' in: Peters et al.
[1299] Ibid., p.187.
[1300] Bernhard Fulda and Aya Soika "Emil Nolde and The National Socialist Dictatorship" in ibid., p.194. See also: Fulda, B., and A. Soika. *Max Pechstein: The Rise and Fall of Expressionism*. De Gruyter, 2013. p. 301-302.
[1301] Wilson, T. D. and Brekke, N., "Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations," in: *Psychological Bulletin* Vol. 116, no. 1 (1994). p.117.
[1302] Ibid., p.117.

> Mental contamination is difficult to avoid because it results from both fundamental properties of human cognition (e.g., a lack of awareness of mental processes) and faulty lay beliefs about the mind (e.g., incorrect theories about mental biases).[1303]

6.6 Mental Contamination and Anti-Semitism

With the above comment in mind, it is therefore tenable that the effects of Nazi anti-Semitism, as 'mental contamination', led Nolde to inform Goebbels that Pechstein was a Jew. Even so, Pechstein was both motivated and angry enough to issue a complaint to the Prussian Academy of Arts about Nolde's conduct. After the Deputy President of the Academy notified Nolde in a letter that Pechstein was of Aryan descent Pechstein dropped any charges against Nolde.[1304] However, Nolde's reputation was significantly damaged thereafter. Thus, from Petropoulos's point of view, "to denounce a former colleague as a Jew, whether accurately or, in the case of Pechstein, mistakenly, showed how he tried to establish his Nazi bona fides and offers an on-the-ground example of anti-Semitism."[1305] This was and is a moral issue. Therefore, in order to penetrate this issue, it is necessary to look into the relationship between Nolde's character, his motives and free will.

On this issue of personal character and free will, Janaway reminds us that Schopenhauer asked two important questions: "(1) How does the *character* of that upon which motives exert their influence contribute to an explanation of what is willed? and (2) Is there after all any justified basis for our sense of responsibility for our actions?"[1306] The answer to these questions may be explored in relation to Nolde's reputation as a Nazi sympathiser and anti-Semitic comments. This will involve an examination of his moral responsibility and character from the point of view of Schopenhauer's doctrine of free will.

[1303] Ibid., p.117.
[1304] Krämer, Nolde, and Städtische Galerie im Städelschen Kunstinstitut Frankfurt am Main. p.48.
[1305] Petropoulos. p.160.
[1306] Janaway. p.239.

Nolde's anti-Semitism appears to originate with his 1910 contretemps with the Berlin Secession, whose jury had rejected his painting *Pentecost* (fig. 142). This caused Nolde to write a furious letter to Karl Scheffler, the editor of *Kunst und Künstler* (Art and Artists) criticising the Jewish chairman of the Secession, Max Liebermann. The letter itself was subsequently published along with a criticism of Nolde and the announcement of his expulsion from the Secession.[1307] Afterwards, Nolde wrote about his expulsion and said that he stood alone, hunted for life by oppositional powers.[1308] He said he felt as if he had been picked up by life, carried along for a short while, then cast out. This was the reason, he said, for his bold revolt against the Jewish power prevailing in all the arts: "What did I, a clumsy lad from the country, with my belief in right and humanity, want with this smooth, slippery place?"[1309]

Selz associates the Secession affair with Nolde's distaste for the Jewish members of its committee, believing that his anti-Semitism was aimed at Liebermann and Cassirer. Selz also claims that this led Nolde to becoming one of the founder members of the Nazi party for North Schleswig in 1920, which as shown above is incorrect.[1310] However, Selz arguably lends us a biased opinion, since being of Jewish parentage, he and his family had fled Nazi Germany for America in 1936. By contrast, Lloyd has argued that Nolde's letter of 1910 to *Kunst und Künstler* revealed nothing like radical nationalism at this point in time. Instead, Nolde indicted Liebermann with a deterioration in artistic qualities and an incapacity to welcome new advancements.[1311]

Lloyd does qualify this statement though, when observing that by the time of Nolde's 1934 autobiography, *Die Jahre der Kämpfe* (*Years of Struggle*), he would

[1307] Selz. p.123.
[1308] Nolde, *Jahre der Kämpfe*. p.149.
[1309] Ibid., p.149.
[1310] Selz; ibid., p.124.
[1311] Lloyd. p.164.

describe the Secession affair as one cast in nationalistic terms.[1312] Yet, arguably by 1934 Nazi propaganda had begun to influence Nolde's will and his political motivations. Indeed, Vergo maintains that few authors have stopped to ponder whether the statements made by Nolde in his autobiographies stand for his real beliefs or whether they were tailored to accommodate the political influences of the 1930s. He adds that, Nolde did not exploit the anti-Semitic feelings of the time and that to brand Nolde "…as a dyed-in-the wool chauvinist or an inveterate nationalist ignores the fact that his vehement personal crusade was in reality part and parcel of a much wider and long-running debate over the question of German cultural identity."[1313]

German identity and 'the Germanness of German art' were amongst the major concerns of Nolde who admitted that he would have liked it if a clean separation could have ensued between Jewish and German art, and also between a German-French mixture and pure German art.[1314] Nolde also suggested that if the identity of German art was to be equal to that of French art, or more meaningful, then it had to become completely German, even if that was not particularly wanted.[1315] Furthermore, he did not wish for his identity to become confused with a Jewish one or to be promoted by Jews. He was motivated to complain how journalists had, "cast me in with the greatest enemies of my life, the thoroughly evil Jew Kerr, the two Cassirers, Katzenellenbogen and all the others, as if I belonged with them […]."[1316] He felt that the injustices against him were greater than a responsible person could bear in silence. Eventually on 06.12.1938, Nolde importuned Otto Dietrich, Press Chief for the NSDAP, and argued that he had not been promoted by Jews.

[1312] Ibid., p.164.
[1313] Vergo et al. p.47.
[1314] Letter from Emil Nolde to Max Sauerlandt, 08.04.1933, ANS.
[1315] Letter from Emil Nolde to Gustav Schiefler, 14.09.1911 Quoted in Nolde: *Briefe aus den Jahren 1894-1926* (Berlin 1927) p.78.
[1316] Six-page typed manuscript without an addressee, and with corrections in Nolde's handwriting and dated by him 06.12.1938 in the Hans Fehr Estate, ANS.

The problems regarding human identity, and moral responsibility for it, were addressed by Schopenhauer who believed that the essence of human identity was not the organic matter of the body, which changes over time, nor the form of the body which also changes over time. Instead, an 'eternal' aspect underpins bodily identity even though in terms of personal individuality "nothing is more necessarily determined."[1317] That many individuals feel as young as ever, despite old age, proves that there remains in us something 'untouched' by time which is 'our inner nature'. If our 'inner nature' shapes our beliefs and behaviours, then a sense of moral responsibility is often attributed to our character. On this basis, many art historians are motivated to attribute moral responsibility to Nolde's character.[1318]

The need for moral responsibility has been applied not only to Nolde's remarks but to some of his 'theological' paintings of the Jewish body. Some of Nolde's work stood out for the Nazis as a profane, willful slur on the 'divine,' as in *The Twelve-Year--Old Christ with the Doctors* of 1911 (fig. 143). Here, the Christ figure is depicted reading in the Temple surrounded by four male figures, each of which is distorted into caricature, which detracts from the mythical solemnity of the occasion. Rather than depict the event in the classical manner, the event is rendered schematically - all of which angered Nazi purists.

The same schematic qualities apply to paintings such as the *Three Magi* (fig. 144) and *Discussion* of 1913 (fig. 145). The latter has the signs of a Talmudic dispute between two Jews who are standing facing each other, and does not necessarily imply an anti-Semitic message. We can see that the right-hand figure, who sports a dark rabbinic beard, gesticulates with upraised arms to another man who mirrors this gesture with his own. The

[1317] Schopenhauer and Hübscher.Vol.4, p.14.
[1318] Vergo believes that, as a friend of Nolde's, Fehr is probably the best commentator on Noldes' character. Yet, if Vergo cannot trust Nolde's personal testimony then we should have some reservations about Fehr's possible bias towards his friend. See Nolde in: Nolde, Emil. *Jahre der Kämpfe* [in German]. Berlin: Rembrandt-Verlag, 1934. p.145.

whole tonality is imbued with a yellow hue, perhaps, but not certainly, suggestive of the Oriental religious Jew.

Around 1915, Nolde was perplexed that his pictures were being criticised by both Evangelicals and Catholics.[1319] In his opinion, rather than producing an anti-Semitic message, he had followed his own instinct in depicting Christ and the Apostles as simple Jewish country folk. He was motivated to say that "I painted them as strong Jewish types, for it certainly wasn't weaklings who professed the revolutionary new teaching of Christ."[1320] As did Schopenhauer, Nolde believed that Renaissance representations of the Apostles and Christ as Italian or German body-types were an artistic deception. He eventually asked, "Where does that lead? If we want to see biblical characters painted as Aryans, should it not also be possible for Chinese Christians to see them depicted as Chinese, Negroes or blacks?"[1321]

6.7 Moral Responsibility or Determinism?

Given the biblical overtones just mentioned, how would Schopenhauer respond to ecclesiastical doctrine that Nolde, as a created being, had free will and was morally responsible for his 'bad' actions? Schopenhauer's reply is simple: "what should we say of the watchmaker who was angry with his watch because it was off?"[1322] Given this answer, theologians cannot realistically charge Nolde's intrinsic character with being the result of his own 'bad' work'. As Schopenhauer states, if an action arises from the inherent nature of an individual, then the culpability rests with the creator of that nature, "which is why

[1319] The general public and academic painters of the time also felt uncomfortable with his picture: See: Harries, R., *The Image of Christ in Modern Art* (Taylor & Francis, 2016). p.10-11.
[1320] Nolde, *Jahre der Kämpfe*. p.140.
[1321] Ibid., p.140.
[1322] Zöller.p.65. Schopenhauer put this another way in his letter to Johann August Becker of 23.08.1844, when discussing religious doctrine and the 'original freedom of the will': He said that "consequently, where the being is from, there also comes the doing." See: Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p. 213-216.

free will was invented."[1323] Therefore he concludes that "it is absolutely impossible to see from what that bad action is supposed to spring, since free will is at bottom a merely *negative* quality and simply states that nothing compels the human being to act in such-and-such a way or prevents him from so acting."[1324]

Considered in this way, it is not certain from where Nolde's actions arose, since if his actions arose from a created nature then the creator of it must be held responsible, or if his actions arose from purely natural non-divine causes, then responsibility could arguably be given over to chance.[1325] Yet, if we argue from determinism, then Nolde cannot be held responsible for expressing Nazi sympathies out of an unconditionally free will. Thus, for Schopenhauer:

> The natural image of a free will is an empty set of scales. It hangs there at rest and will never lose its equilibrium unless something is laid on one of the pans. Free will can no more produce an action out of itself than the scale can produce a movement of itself, since nothing comes from nothing.[1326]

As when scales go down on one side when a weight is laid on them, human actions must be determined by something which is positive and stands for more than *negative* freedom.[1327] This only occurs through motives in and of themselves, that is by external circumstances, in which case no human being is responsible for their actions, since all human beings in similar circumstances must act in the same way. Or, it arises from the individual's susceptibility to specific motives and from their inborn character, i.e., from inherently original tendencies belonging to them.[1328]

[1323] Zöller. p.65.
[1324] Ibid., p.66.
[1325] As the German painter Alfred Otto Wolfgang Schulze once said, "Chance, seeing that is not chance, is a great master; chance only exists in our eyes, it is an agent for the 'master' of the universe." See: Wols, Peter Inch, and Annie Fatet. *Aphorisms and Pictures* [in English]. Gillingham (11, Byron Rd, Gillingham Kent): Arc Publications, 1971. Quoted and translated in: Harrison, C. and Wood, P., *Art in Theory, 1900-2000: An Anthology of Changing Ideas*, New edition, [i.e. second edition]. ed. (Malden, Mass. ; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2003). p.595.
[1326] Zöller. p.66.
[1327] Ibid., p.66.
[1328] Ibid., p.66.

Nolde's 'susceptibility' to motives, as interpreted through Schopenhauer's doctrine, means that he, and all individuals, possess an essential character known as their 'intelligible character'.[1329] While he the individual was mere phenomenon, the *thing-in-itself* which was inherent to him as the individual, lay beyond space and time being free from "succession and plurality of acts."[1330] Therefore, "it is one and unchangeable. Its constitution *in itself* is the *intelligible character*, which is equally present in all the actions of the individual and is stamped on every one of them, like the signet on a thousand seals."[1331] By contrast, 'the *empirical character*' of the individual, as a phenomenon called Nolde, was manifested through time in successive acts and was 'determined by the intelligible' so that he, like every individual, was compelled to act in accordance with his intelligible character.[1332] Thus, on the one hand an external cause revealed his *empirical character*, while on the other it revealed its original inner ground being one not accessible to experience as his *intelligible character.*[1333] Ultimately, mankind is no exception within nature, since "he too has his fixed disposition and unalterable character, which, however, is entirely individual and different in each case."[1334]

If this is so, then we need to explain the necessity of applying moral responsibility to Nolde. Through Schopenhauer, we answer this question by displacing the notion of responsibility away from his personal acts on to his character. However, Vergo for one does not trust Nolde's self-observations about his own character, stating that to do so "brings a variety of other unfortunate consequences in its train."[1335] By contrast, Fehr seems to do so and refers to Nolde's "goodness, which seems to me the chief characteristic

[1329] "Our being or essence…is our intelligible character or the will as thing in itself, and this essence is expressed by our empirical character, which is the seat of our deeds." See: Cartwright. p.149.
[1330] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.110.
[1331] Ibid., p.110.
[1332] Regarding his own character Nolde confessed to Fehr that, "I would like to be simple and sophisticated at the same time" See: Fehr, Hans, and Gabriele Smargiassi. *Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der Freundschaft.* p.52.
[1333] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.111-12.
[1334] Ibid., p.111-12.
[1335] Vergo et al. p.41.

of his being…"[1336] Yet for Vergo, Nolde's *self-defined* character matches the myth of a heroic artist who pits themselves against the world, isolated, devoted to their art and acknowledging only the inner compulsion to create.[1337]

Vergo's account lacks objective insight into the metaphysics of the human character, the difficult questions of free will, and the subtleties of moral responsibility. An insight into the metaphysics of the human character is vital if we wish to form an objective interpretation of Nolde's moral responsibilities. Schopenhauer states that:

> ...character is just as necessary a factor in every action as the motive; so in this way we can explain the feeling that our deeds proceed from ourselves, or the 'I will' that accompanies all our actions, and by virtue of which each person must recognize them as *his* deeds, for which he consequently feels himself responsible.[1338]

If we adopt a Schopenhauerian view, then the only actions which could have emanated from Nolde during Nazism, or any other time, emanated from his *character*. Indeed, despite his determinism, Schopenhauer also concludes that most people feel themselves to be somehow responsible for their *character*, for being who they are. However, Janaway argues that Schopenhauer's conclusion appears to be bizarre and unwarranted.[1339] Janaway has a point, because if Nolde's character was pre-set at birth, then it is indeed bizarre to suggest that his character was his own work.[1340]

[1336] *Festschrift für Emil Nolde anlässlich seines 60. Geburtstages*, (Dresden: Neue Kunst Fides, 1927). p.16.
[1337] Lunn, F., McKeever, I., and Whitechapel Art Gallery, *Emil Nolde [Whitechapel Art Gallery, London 8 December 1995 - 25 February 1996, Museum of Modern Art, Copenhagen 15 March - 10 May 1996]* (London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1996). p.41
[1338] Janaway. p.242.
[1339] Ibid. p.242.
[1340] On Nolde's character Walter Jens said: "Some criticised what at the same time others praised – only slowly did the Janus face of the great painter emerge, and only gradually did spectators begin to perceive the interplay of naivety and sophistication which Nolde's style of painting developed, corresponding to his own early wish." See: Jens, W., *Von deutscher Rede* (München: Piper, 1969). p.105. On Nolde's character Vergo notes that: "Moreover, despite his repeated references to the duality supposedly characteristic of himself and of his art, he writes so much more about the emotive, instinctual side of his nature, and so little about his intellectual concerns that most commentators have obligingly followed suit, overlooking a wealth of evidence that might have been used to flesh out other aspects of his personality and accepting virtually without question the image of a self-absorbed, unworldly figure, at best naive, at worst verging on the simple-minded." See: Vergo, Peter, Nolde Emil. p.41.
[1340] Janaway. p.243.

If Schopenhauer pursues the notion that any individual's character contributes towards the behaviours of that individual, then Schopenhauer attempts to uphold the notion of moral responsibility in the same way. As a consequence, Janaway states that:

> The result is scarcely coherent. Nothing has yet succeeded in explaining how we come by the 'feeling of responsibility'. It is possible, for all that Schopenhauer has said, that there is no more to responsibility than a mere subjective feeling, a product of an ignorance of the causal ancestry of our actions forced upon us by our self-conscious viewpoint.[1341]

6.8 The Problem of Transcendental Freedom and Responsibility

This observation is important, since it raises a problem for us with regards to freedom of will and our feelings of responsibility. On this topic, Janaway argues that an individual's 'feeling of responsibility', at first glance, indicates not only an empirical version of free will, but also a *transcendental* freedom of the will. Although, Schopenhauer's interpretation of the *transcendental* freedom of the will was influenced by Kant, by contrast he makes no *causal* links between a person's intelligible character and the empirical world in which they live.[1342] On this basis, we must infer that Nolde's *empirical character* was mere appearance which manifested his *intelligible character*, or in other words, his will as t*hing-in-itself.*[1343] If this is so, was Nolde's *intelligible character* really something which existed beyond the world as appearance and free from causality?[1344]

[1341] .Ibid., p.243.

[1342] Ibid., p.243. In a letter to Julius Frauenstädt of 6.08.1852, Schopenhauer argued that: "Intelligible freedom of will is exactly that, intelligible and not intuitive; for it is based on the fact that 1) freedom is a negative concept, whose substance is merely the absence of any necessity; 2) that all necessity simply indicates 'the consequence of a given ground'; and 3) that the grounds of reason, in its four forms, is simply the form of appearance, pre-formed in cerebro, not owing to the thing-in-itself; ergo such a thing is free as such. That the individual and his character is the work of the intelligible will results only from the fact that while deeds from necessity arise from motives and the given character, which they affect, nevertheless we have the clearest consciousness of responsibility for those things as the authors of our deeds. But we cannot make all these conditions possible to grasp intuitively ourselves; they are simply intelligible." Schopenhauer and Hübscher. p.287-290.

[1343] Janaway. p.243.

[1344] Fehr described Nolde's character as being reticent yet during their time together in St.Gallen Fehr recalled that: "We whispered and talked and talked and whispered about everything in the world. Our thoughts flew like buzzing bees

According to Schopenhauer, freedom from causality stands for *transcendental freedom*, which means that the will is free, but only in itself and beyond the realm of appearances.[1345] Thus, we would have to infer that Nolde's freedom of will should not be sought for in his actions but rather in his total being and essence. His character could then be considered as his free act, manifesting itself only for his faculty of knowledge, constrained as it is by time, space, causality and a plurality of acts.[1346]

Should we interpret Nolde's freedom of will in this sense, then we meet a stumbling block, since Schopenhauer's account of free will, as does Kant's, falters "over the problem that an intelligible object cannot act."[1347] However, if it could be said that Nolde possessed an essential 'being' beyond the world of appearance, then it might be said that his essence was his own act. But Schopenhauer is not very clear on issues of this type, because he also argues that every act takes place within the constraints of the principle of sufficient reason. Thus, if we follow Schopenhauer through, and link Nolde's character to the *thing-in-itself*, then it must have been free from the modalities of space, time, and causality. However this, as Janaway argues, illustrates Schopenhauer's difficulty since:

> …freedom, he comments, has not been entirely 'removed' (*aufgehoben*) by his account, but merely 'pushed out' (*hinausgerückt*), 'namely out of the area of individual actions up into a region higher, but not so easily accessible to our knowledge'.[1348]

Undeterred, Schopenhauer hopes to attach a sense of responsibility to human actions, despite the fact that no one is likely to feel responsible for their intelligible character. If we apply this hope to Nolde, then his intelligible character could be blamed for his

backwards and forwards, and the reserved man opened up his deep, rich heart more and more." Fehr, Hans, and Smargiassi, Gabriele. *Emil Nolde. Ein Buch der Freundschaft.* p.15.

[1345] Janaway. p.243.
[1346] Ibid., p.244.
[1347] Ibid., p.244.
[1348] Ibid., p.244

behaviours.[1349] This is so despite the fact that "it is not coherent to say of an intelligible character that it acts, that it is an act, or that we feel ourselves responsible for it, nothing like the relevant kind of freedom can have been preserved by Schopenhauer's account, even should it make clear sense."[1350] Consequently, any congruent sense of free will, attributable to Nolde through a Schopenhauerian interpretation, has been conveniently banished into an obscure region 'not so easily accessible to our knowledge'. As Janaway concludes:

> With Schopenhauer the free will seems to have reached its absurd limit: explicitly banished to a realm outside the objective world, and without even the possibility - which Kant tried so hard to salvage - of any interaction with the objective world. Nietzsche's 'fable of intelligible freedom' in *Human, all too Human* seems to hit the nail on the head.[1351]

Nietzsche certainly believed that no human being was accountable for his deeds - or for his nature. He argued that to judge another is the same as being unjust, even when an individual judges themselves.[1352] He asserted that the "proposition is as clear as daylight, and yet here everyone prefers to retreat back into the shadows and untruth: from fear of the consequences."[1353] As a result Janaway contends that Schopenhauer enters the fable and resists this conclusion, whereas "Nietzsche concludes that responsibility is an illusion, revealed as such by Schopenhauer's fantasy version."[1354] In the end Janaway rightly adduces that "Schopenhauer has no reply to this pungent attack."[1355] And so it is that we

[1349] On Nolde's conservative character in relation to his art, Jill Lloyd argues that: "Central to the inner contradictions of Nolde's early work was his engagement with modernity on the one hand, and his deep-seated conservatism on the other, reflected in the fluctuations of his career." See: Lloyd, Jill. *German Expressionism: Primitivism and Modernity.* p.162.
[1350] Janaway. p.244.
[1351] Ibid., p.245.
[1352] Nietzsche, F. W. and Hollingdale, R. J., *Human, All Too Human*, [Rev.] ed. (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). p.35.
[1353] Ibid., p.35.
[1354] Janaway.,p.245.
[1355] Ibid. p.245.

must not neglect this 'pungent attack' either, which is 'as clear as daylight', preferring instead 'to retreat back into the shadows and untruth: from fear of the consequences'.

Conclusion

This chapter has contributed to our existing knowledge of Nolde's life and work under Nazism through a sustained engagement with Schopenhauer's philosophy of free will. It has also contributed to a specific philosophical issue which has not been addressed to any great extent by scholars – the problem of free will during the reign of Nazism. As far as can be ascertained, little research has been undertaken which directly approaches this problem. In part this may reflect the uneasiness with which many German scholars retrieve their understanding of the past. Consequently, such a hiatus in current research makes this thesis significant in two ways. Firstly, it opens the debate on the problem of free will under Nazism and secondly, if contrary to Schopenhauer's determinism, we might agree with Robert Kane that, in order to guarantee freedom of will at all, it would be necessary to take an incompatibilist or non-determinist's position. This in turn would give us the following:

> (1) genuine creativity, (2) autonomy or self-legislation, (3) true desert for achievements, (4) moral responsibility in an ultimate sense, (5) being suitable objects of reactive attitudes such as admiration, gratitude, resentment and indignation, (6) dignity or self-worth, (7) a true sense of individuality or uniqueness as persons, (8) (freely given) love and friendship, and others.[1356]

However, in this chapter we found that from a determinist's point of view, none of the above could apply to Nolde's case, excepting possibly Schopenhauer's relevant account of (4) which we showed was a *reductio ad absurdum*. Therefore, whether we take a determinist's view or not, all of the above criteria were unarguably compromised by Nazism, entailing that C1 prevailed through the Nazi's empirical will. Indeed, should we

[1356] Kane, R., *The Significance of Free Will* (Oxford University Press, 1998).p.80.

be obliged to concede that Schopenhauer's philosophy only remains coherent at the level of determinism (as I have argued), then, as Karl Popper has proposed, physical determinism is a nightmare which renders us mere 'sub-automata' – that is to say, "it thus destroys, in particular, the idea of creativity."[1357]

As a result of the above, an additional contribution to knowledge might arise if we could take Nolde scholarship beyond the confines of determinism (which threatens creativity) in order to explore the nature of human 'selves' which attempt to function independently of totalitarianism. In this sense, as Kane has put it, we might consider the possibility that "the power to be 'self' creating in this way is free will."[1358] Since this did not apply to Nolde we must conclude that, not only has C1 been vindicated in this chapter, but that 'the power to be 'self' creating in this way' was denied not only to Nolde, but every artist affected by Nazism. This issue could therefore become a topic for a future philosophy of aesthetics.

In addition to the above, we found that Nolde's physical freedom was heavily compromised from 1933, after being asked to resign from the Akademie der Künste by the Nazis - which he declined to do. Because the Akademie der Künste met with escalating pressures from the Reich Ministry of Education to submit to its commands, we may conclude that C1 was endorsable through the force of the Nazis political will. Yet by contrast, whilst Nolde was in aesthetic exile it was argued that his secretly produced watercolours possessed a dreamlike quality which seemed to stand for a detachment from the will, inviting us to renounce C1. However, the paintings could be regarded as the effects of an obdurate will to create in the face of personal hardship and therefore uphold C1. However, his paintings were compelled by external motives operating upon his will,

[1357] Ibid.p.80.
[1358] Ibid.,p.96.

and because they were determined by external motives they were not indifferently free acts. It was concluded relatively early on in the chapter that, according to a popular concept of freedom (usually a sense of physical freedom), C1 can be vindicated in Nolde's case.

We also mentioned the fact that the new Reich Ministry conspired to *addict* the masses to their own will, and how a speech uttered by Goebbels confirmed C1 when suggesting that it was not enough to reconcile the people to Nazism, but that they must become "addicted to us."[1359] It was established therefore, that the will of the German people was misguided into an escalating confirmation of C1 and as such this remains an historical context often unheeded by Nolde scholars.

It can also be concluded that the rhetoric of praise and blame presiding over Nolde's life under Nazism is significant and shows no sign of abating. This rhetoric continued after 1945 when he, along with many other Germans, needed to explain his views on National Socialism.[1360] On the one hand, in 1945, Ada portrayed themselves as liberated prisoners, suggesting that Nolde's paintings had been freed from captivity, just like Nolde the artist.[1361] On the other, Fulda argues that, communications of this sort were rehearsals "of defiant victimhood that held great appeal in the post-war period - and journalists were quick to discover its potential."[1362] Even so, whether one believes Ada's version of events or Fulda's, according to a Schopenhauerian interpretation, their motives were always conditioned by the determining grounds of causality. Thus, whether one praises or blames Nolde for his life under Nazism, it has proven all too easy for many 'to retreat back into the shadows' when it comes to the unsettling complexities of free will.

[1359] Rabinbach and Gilman. p.456.
[1360] Fulda in: Rüger and Wachsmann. p.180.
[1361] Ada Nolde to Bernhard Sprengel, 16.07.1945, in Niedersachsisches Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover, Dep 105, Acc 2 / 80, 98.
[1362] Rüger and Wachsmann. p.181.

In spite of this neglect, several difficult questions surrounding Nolde's freedom of will have been explored in this chapter. According to the above exploration, Nolde's freedom of the will must be separated from his freedom of action. For Nolde, as with every individual, there was freedom of will only if he could experience willing in the absence of *necessity*. An objective exploration of Nolde's acts of will showed that they were grounded in causes which pre-determined their manifestation, despite counter arguments from indeterminism. As a result for Nolde, as with every individual, there was no freedom of the will in this sense – particularly under the duress of Nazism - which leads us to suspect that C1 continued to bear down on Germany.

This fact still cannot eradicate the feeling that Fulda, Soika and others have, that Nolde was responsible for his actions, or Schopenhauer's belief that human actions must be explained from a higher standpoint. As we have seen, Schopenhauer promotes this higher standpoint, by postulating an 'intelligible character' from which freedom of the will can be imputed. However, as demonstrated above, Schopenhauer's argument lapses into absurdity and can only remain coherent by retaining determinism. Yet, despite this flaw in his doctrine, Schopenhauer enables us to re-interpret and reconsider Nolde's life under Nazism in a new light.

This new light helps us realize, that as a phenomenon, Nolde's existence arose only from the will *per se* which alone "is free; it is almighty."[1363] Consequently, the problems surrounding Nolde and Nazism are a mirror of that will, where "…all finiteness, all suffering, all miseries that it contains, belong to the expression of what the will wills."[1364] Therefore, life was as it was, and will be as it will be, "…because the will so wills."[1365] In this sense, Nolde did not possess aseity; his character was not his own work.

[1363] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.351.
[1364] Ibid., p.351.
[1365] Ibid., p.351.

Thus, he cannot be *blamed without reservation* for his political sympathies, nor can he be *praised without reservation* for any perceived resistance to Nazism, or indeed any other reason. On Schopenhauer's terms then, that which should be blamed is the will, for the will is the criminal author of this world, and as author of this world - in the past, present and future - it triumphs over the world as representation thus propelling C1 into our own future.

Thesis Conclusion

This thesis may well be caught up in what Joel C. Weinsheimer refers to as "the dichotomy of knaves and fools."[1366] While the 'fool' perceives everything as clear-cut, the 'knave' perceives everything as full of mystery and, as Weinsheimer contends, "These corollary deficiencies result from the 'converting imagination' which the two share and exercise in common, though in opposite directions, 'converting' toward either the literal or the figural."[1367] Thus, it might be assumed that the interpretative strategy for this thesis ought to have been one which did not convert at all, and took the literal as literal and the figural as figural. However, as Weinsheimer argues, this is the solution of the 'fool', since it presupposes that the difference between literal and figural is itself clear-cut and in no need of interpretation.

Weinsheimer also argues that the dichotomy between 'knave' and 'fool' is not depleted by surface/depth distinctions - that would be 'knavish' because curiosity would assume it.[1368] "Foolish hermeneutics is therefore monistic; knavish is dualistic or pluralistic, in that it posits two or more levels of understanding, and its very activity consists in discriminating between them."[1369] The 'fool' finds it easy to identify what a misinterpretation is, whereas the 'knave' finds it problematic since it is the essence of interpretation that meanings shall differ. If this is so, then how is this thesis to be situated in terms of 'knavish' curiosity or 'foolish' monism? The answer is that it probably stands for both. That is to say, along with many Expressionist artists (and Schopenhauer), I may be charged with suspecting the invisible in the visible when there is no such thing, or making that which is not open to common understanding appear plain.

[1366] Weinsheimer, J., *Eighteenth Century Hermeneutics: Philosophy of Interpretation in England from Locke to Burke* (New Haven, Conn. u.a.: Yale Univ. Press, 1993). p.1.
[1367] Ibid., p.2.
[1368] Ibid., p.2.
[1369] Ibid., p.2.

Whether or not this thesis is judged to be 'knavish', 'foolish' or both, I have attempted to explore the validity of Marc's claims on Schopenhauer's terms (who is both 'foolish' and 'knavish)'.[1370] These claims originated from two essays written for the journal *Pan* in 1912, where Marc claimed that "in Schopenhauer's terms, the world as will today takes precedence over the world as representation"[1371] [C1] and in another essay written just two weeks earlier where he claimed that, "Today we seek under the veil of appearances things hidden in nature that seem to us more important than the discoveries of the Impressionists…"[1372] [C2}

At the close of research into the above, I found approximately 40 validations of C1 and 18 refutations of C1, 12 validations of C2 and 3 refutations of C2. These results are significant, since C1 and C2 can be described as being *generally* true, yet because the results are not *completely* true some scholars might issue a warrant on behalf of a coherence theory of truth.[1373] Thus, they may rightly point out that we used Schopenhauer's analogical inference for the sake of a coherent methodological analysis and that the conclusions drawn from chapter 2 are seriously underdeveloped. In essence, the results could be criticised for being too hazy to provide "a sound normative theory of evidence and proof."[1374] Certainly, if I were to argue for a holistic approach to the proofs provided in this thesis as a whole, then theorists of coherence would find this an insecure process since I may be accused by them of "unduly disregarding contradictory evidence

[1370] This should not be misinterpreted as a frivolous indictment of Schopenhauer, rather it should be interpreted within the above context. Indeed, perhaps this caveat is both 'knavish' and 'foolish'.
[1371]Marc, "Die Konstruktiven Ideen der Neuen Malerei "., 21.03.1912, pp.527-531. Marc did not elaborate on these claims in an explicit manner in his writing.
[1372] Marc, F. "Die Neue Malerei "., (07.03.1912), pp.468-471..
[1373] A coherence theory of truth can be defined as **"**the view that either the nature of truth or the sole criterion for determining truth is constituted by a relation of coherence between the belief (or judgment) being assessed and other beliefs (or judgments)… the coherence theory holds that it is true provided it stands in a suitably strong relation of coherence to other beliefs, so that the believer's total system of beliefs forms a highly or perhaps perfectly coherent system." See: Audi.,p.154.
[1374] Amaya, A., *The Tapestry of Reason: An inquiry into the nature of coherence and its role in legal argument* (Oxford: Hart, 2015).p.124.

so as to enhance coherence."[1375] In addition, critics could suggest that I have augmented the force of my argument in order to discredit and ignore alternative explanations surrounding C1 and C2.

Critics who are uncertain about the primary findings arising from C1 and C2, might also highlight the problem of circularity (as a facet of coherence-based theories) which "posit a reciprocal relationship between the evidence of the case and the hypotheses about the case."[1376] In response it could be argued that neither theory nor evidence was pre-eminent during research, but instead both theory and evidence were co-dependent. Even so, this thesis might demonstrate a circularity in terms of its internal relations in as much as detailed work is related in sometimes convoluted ways back to Schopenhauer.

It could also be the case that, despite the narrative around C1 and C2 being coherent enough, the research can be criticised for omitting links to certain factual events which ought to have been mentioned – especially cultural studies of Imperial Germany and post-war Expressionism. On that basis, the coherence of the narrative it may be argued, becomes a foundation for judgements which encourages one to accept as justified factual conclusions which are in fact unresponsive to the evidence. As a result, critics may suggest that readers will form their decisions about the primary findings of this thesis - (should it appear to be coherent and reasonable to them) - based upon a narrative unsupportable by consistent evidence. Indeed, some incompatible, yet coherent narratives, could have shown that the coherence of my narrative fails to deliver a sufficient reason to believe it to be true.

That said, it is possible that the conclusions drawn from investigating C1 and C2, are acceptable and justifiable according to Schopenhauer's philosophy, but still false. However, perhaps no philosophical theory can succeed in eradicating every uncertainty

[1375] Ibid.,p.126.
[1376] Ibid.,p.128.

characteristic of a study of historical facts. On the other hand, it is equally possible that the investigation of C1 and C2 has been based upon a philosophical theory which provides us with cogent enough reasons to be accepted as justified in accordance with this theory - and *in general* likely to be true. Thus, Charles S Peirce offers us a plausible reconciliation to the above abjections when he declared that: "Philosophy is the attempt - for as the word itself implies it is and must be imperfect - is the attempt to form a general informed conception of the *All.* All men philosophize; and as Aristotle says we must do so if only to prove the futility of philosophy."[1377]

Whilst all of the above may be true to an extent, as an art-historical study into German Expressionism (based upon a philosophy of aesthetics), it has attempted 'to form a general informed conception of the *All*'. The above claims of C1 and C2, as researched on Schopenhauer's terms, have been fundamental to a single thought (*der einzige Gedanke*) running throughout this thesis, which is that the world as will takes precedence over the world as representation.[1378] Since this became my main thought (*mein Hauptgedanke*), I have shown that Kandinsky's attempt to explore that which lies beyond the world of representational appearance [C2] was misguided - even though he had read his Schopenhauer.[1379] This was so because the inner nature of the world cannot be discovered whilst we are on the path of mere representation whether abstract or otherwise.

The methodological approach behind Chapter 1 of this thesis adopted the 'First Book: The World as Representation First Aspect' and introduced Kandinsky's approach to the world as representation. The chapter defined Schopenhauer's understanding of the concept representation and my adoption of it and how this related to the world of objects

[1377] Peirce, C. S. et al., *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Electronic edition. Volume 7 : Science and Philosophy* (Charlottesville, Va: InteLex Corporation, 1994).p. 347.
[1378] For information on *der einzige Gedanke* see this thesis p.19.
[1379] Schopenhauer uses the phrase *mein Hauptgedanke* interchangeably for *der einzige Gedanke.* I have co-opted Schopenhauer's German language so as to mirror the spirit of his methodology.

in Expressionism. In addition, this chapter explored C1 and C2 in connection with Kandinsky's departure from the world of recognisable objects as intuitive representations, and towards abstract representations in his art. This method allowed us to introduce the German Expressionist body *per se* as a site for discovering the content of our representations. By investigating C1 and C2 on Schopenhauer's terms, we considered intuitive representations of perception through his use of dianoiology which refers to theories of understanding.

This methodology was important to our research into C1 and C2, since Schopenhauer argued that in Plato's *Phaedo* Chapter 10 the Greek philosopher has put forward a "false dianoiology" that contained "a secret metaphysical intention" in order to fulfil a rational psychology and "a doctrine of immortality attaching thereto."[1380] This 'secret metaphysical intention' can be defined in the following way. In essence, that which knows within us is supposedly an immaterial substance, essentially dissimilar to the body and described by philosophers such as Plato and Descartes as the soul. By contrast the body with its impure sensory apparatus is an impediment to true knowledge - and according to our research appears to mirror Kandinsky's belief system as well. Therefore, according to this doctrine, all knowledge arising from the senses is deceptive, whereas the only trustworthy and certain knowledge "is that which is free and removed from all sensibility (thus from all intuitive perception), consequently *pure thought*, i.e. an operation exclusively with abstract concepts."[1381] *Pure thought* in turn arises entirely through its own means, functioning best after death when the soul has departed from the body.

[1380] Schopenhauer and Payne. Vol.1., p.43. This methodology could be equally applied to chapter 3 of this thesis. However, since Kandinsky eschewed the body in favour of the spirit it was felt that dianoiology was more suitable to his case. Indeed, we may conclude that Kandinsky's quasi theological leanings and his interest in the occult which were discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis, testify to similar beliefs and reflected in his book *On the Spiritual in Art*.
[1381] Ibid.

As a result of the above, Schopenhauer concludes that "dianoiology here plays into the hands of rational psychology for the purpose of a doctrine of immortality."[1382] Yet, for Schopenhauer as an atheist there is no soul, no life after death where the individual retains any sense of self. In other words, "There is no rational psychology or doctrine of the soul since, as Kant has proved, the soul is a transcendent hypostasis, undemonstrated and unwarranted as such."[1383] In Schopenhauer's opinion then, we ought to accept his own doctrine as a corrective to that of a rational psychology of the soul. In sum, and in concise terms, his doctrine states that only "intuitive knowledge, that is kept clear of all connection with the *will,* reaches the highest objectivity and hence perfection."[1384] Therefore, Kandinsky's belief in a 'soul', as an avatar within the body, could not lead us to understand C2 on Schopenhauer's terms, since for the latter there is 'no rational psychology of the soul'.

It was also demonstrated, on Schopenhauer's terms, how Kandinsky's theory and practice repudiated C1, due to its emphasis upon representation. This conclusion was reinforced by the critical language of the age, which ironically referred more often to the world of representation than the world as will or emotion. Naturally, this is not the only way to interpret Kandinsky's work.[1385] Yet, my interpretation however may complement Lisa Florman's *Concerning the Spiritual - and the Concrete - in Kandinsky's Art*[1386] (2014), which links the artist to the philosopher G.W.F. Hegel. Although, there is no direct evidence for this linkage, she argues that Kandinsky wrote in German "to use the same language - in many passages, even precisely the same phrasing

[1382] Ibid.
[1383] Ibid., Vol.2., p.19.
[1384] Ibid., p.46.
[1385] In 1918 Westheim reflected not only the critical language of the age, but unconsciously the dichotomy between 'knave' and 'fool' when he questioned who was the person detaching themselves most from Nature: "Is it he who relies purely on the evidence of his eyes, or he who instinctively feels his way towards a greater truth, which is hidden in the depths?" See: Westheim.p.32.
[1386] Florman, L., *Concerning the Spiritual and the Concrete in Kandinsky's Art* (Stanford University Press, 2014).

- that Hegel himself had employed."[1387] Her evidence is taken primarily from conversations which Kandinsky had with his nephew Alexandre Kojève. That said, my work differs from Florman's speculative work, and is perhaps more significant, in that we do have direct evidence for a correlation between Kandinsky and Schopenhauer.

Despite such direct evidence, it may be argued that my solution to Marc's claims is as 'knavish' as Kandinsky's, since "for knavish curiosity, the real is hidden. This means that the object of interpretation is conceived as situated below a covering surface, behind some opaque but enticing hieroglyph, waiting to be deciphered."[1388] However, I argued that because abstract representations are open to error, our discussion had to be anchored in something tangible – the human body.[1389] This was not the position of an hermeneutic 'fool' who finds that there is "nothing 'mere' about the outside, since there is no inside with which to contrast it - which is merely to say that things are what they seem."[1390] Instead, on Schopenhauer's terms it was argued, perhaps 'knavishly', that the entire body is the will manifesting itself in the perception of our brain. This entails that the will is ubiquitously present in the entire body, which means that the identity of the body is therefore identical with that of the will.[1391]

This identity was explored in Chapter 2, where it was argued that Expressionist artists translated into aesthetic perception the dancing body - as objectified movements of the will. By analogical inference, it was maintained that we might in theory know the inner nature of other bodies or objects by comparing the changes occurring within our own bodies to that of other bodies or objects.[1392] Schopenhauer asserts that this is possible

[1387] Ibid., p.1.
[1388] Weinsheimer. p.2.
[1389] As mentioned in the main text of this thesis, Schopenhauer argues that all primary evidence is from *intuitive perception*, which is trustworthy compared to derivative concepts which are akin to the moon borrowing light from the sun. See: p.58-59.
[1390] Weinsheimer., p.3-4.
[1391] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.2, p.250.
[1392] Peters, M., *Schopenhauer and Adorno on Bodily Suffering: A Comparative Analysis* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). p.125.

because we know the body as *both* will and representation, and as an object it is like other objects - a representation. In essence therefore, it was this possibility which allowed us to answer C1 and C2 in detail throughout this thesis. The methodological approach behind chapter 2 was, in contrast to chapter 1, more 'edaphic' when it engaged with Schopenhauer's 'Second Book: The World as Will First Aspect'. Therefore, via the medium of the human body we attempted to apprehend the verity of C1 and C2 through a phenomenology of the body. As a result, we argued that the content of our representations was the will according to Schopenhauer's philosophy. The artistic focus of the chapter contended that portrayals of dance generated and illustrated Schopenhauer's opinion that the body is a manifestation of the will.

Through the theme of the body in dance, a relationship of power between the will and the intellect was exposed - one where "…the intellect strikes up the tune, and the will must dance to it."[1393] This happens even though the will is devoid of knowledge, and the intellect is devoid of will. The will can act as if it were a body controlled by the intellect, but 'the primacy of the will' reasserts itself by:

> …prohibiting the intellect from having certain representations, by absolutely preventing certain trains of thought from arising, because it knows, or in other words experiences from the self-same intellect, that they would arouse in it any one of the emotions previously described. It then curbs and restrains the intellect, and forces it to turn to other things.[1394]

As soon as the will becomes serious about this it offers resistance to any representation it dislikes - thus confirming C1. If a representation interests the will, all is 'well', yet if abstract knowledge informs the will that a representation may give it pain, then the will compels the intellect to submit to its demands – again confirming C1. As Schopenhauer discloses, "this is called 'being master of oneself'; where the master is the will, the servant the intellect, for in the last instance the will is always in command and therefore constitutes

[1393] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol. 2, p.208.
[1394] Ibid., p.208.

the real core, the being-in-itself, of man."[1395] As a consequence, the *intellect* is a mere footman to its master, the will.

The consequences of Chapter 2 may be applied to other branches of knowledge such as dance history. At one level, they might illuminate the work of Barbara Reiner, and Katharina Knauth's *Ausdrucksgymnastik und Ausdruckstanz: Tanzen bildet die Sinne*[1396] (2013). These authors have enlarged upon elements of Wigman's expressionist dance as an aid to psychotherapy. Through the authors' knowledge of Expressionist dance, patients are enabled to communicate their feelings through movement. This playful form of self-knowledge therefore, could perhaps benefit from my investigations into the nature of the body as objectified will.

As we have seen, the form of the Expressionist body is not given to us through feeling alone, but solely through knowledge in representation. Since this is so, the body is a metaphysical key to understanding how we perceive the world. For example, every movement of our body is an act of objectified will which Expressionist artists translated into aesthetic perception. This implies that knowledge of the will in Expressionist art is inseparable from knowledge of the body and vice versa. The import of this being that, through our knowledge of the Expressionist body and the aspects of it we have explored, we have gained knowledge *a posteriori* of the will. To parody Schopenhauer, if the will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content of the Expressionists' world, then the world of the Expressionists was also the phenomenon, the mirror of that will. Therefore, the world of the Expressionists accompanied that will as inextricably as their body was accompanied by a shadow.

[1395] Ibid., p.208.
[1396] Reiners, B. and Knauth, K., *Ausdrucksgymnastik und Ausdruckstanz: Tanzen bildet die Sinne* (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013).

Through the medium of the body, Chapter 3 explored C1 and C2 in relation to the most adequate objectivity of the will - the Platonic Idea. This objectivity was related to Kirchner's depictions of the naked body during the period c. 1905-1914. Although social historians have tended to associate Kirchner's art with Nietzsche's philosophy, by contrast our approach to this chapter was to employ facets from Schopenhauer's third book, 'The World as Representation Second Aspect: The Representation Independent of the Principle of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object of Art..'[1397] In this chapter we used an epistemological methodology as in the law of homogeneity and the law of specification and primarily appointed the former law as that which pertains to the Platonic Idea of the human body. The importance of this approach was that it showed how we might come to know the Ideas in Kirchner's work. Yet, despite this knowledge, it could be argued that anything other than a plain and literal interpretation of Kirchner's nudes would be pointless, or even worse, since it runs the risk of unnecessary misinterpretation. Certainly, as Weinsheimer might argue, that would be "the fool's hermeneutic, and of course it is not entirely foolish or wholly anti-interpretive."[1398] However, to say that Kircher's nudes speak for themselves I would argue forestalls interpretation - but "only interpretation as knavishly conceived."[1399]

Although Kirchner's nudes were set in this new context, my findings reaffirmed what many scholars have found to be the inadequacy of Schopenhauer's doctrine of the Ideas. As Gardiner points out, it is not entirely clear how the Ideas relate to real things in the world, nor is it clear how such inflexible archetypes allow for any unique expressivity by artists. *Furthermore, because Schopenhauer has argued that the will is pernicious and ought to be abolished, who would wish to contemplate its most adequate objectivity?* A

[1397] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.168.
[1398] Weinsheimer. p.9.
[1399] Ibid., p.9.

'knavish' response may be that this is possible "because the pure subject of knowledge has become completely detached from the will and from its purposes, because the will-less contemplation is unaffected by the unhappy character of the objectivations of the will."[1400] Even so, we are left with the uncomfortable feeling that the 'knave' has side stepped the issue and that, "the fool is right that anything beyond what is plain and apparent must be invented."[1401]

Whether we agree with the fool or the knave, Kirchner's appreciation of the nude in Ajanta cave art is evident, as is Schopenhauer's affinity with the Vedas, Upanishads and Buddhism. That means that this chapter may complement works such as Arati Barua's book, *Schopenhauer and Indian Philosophy: A Dialogue Between India and Germany*[1402] (2008), as well as Stephen Cross's *Schopenhauer's Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and Will and Their Indian Parallels*[1403] (2013). Consequently, future scholars might pursue Kirchner's interest in Ajanta art through Schopenhauer's teaching and its coincidence with Indian idealism.

Since the Platonic Ideas expressed in Kirchner's nudes were held to be the most adequate objectivity of the will, aesthetic contemplation of them was shown to offer but a temporary liberation from - and refutation of - C1. Yet, that is not the end of the story, because as Wicks suggests, Schopenhauer's philosophy "indicates the gradual emergence within his aesthetics, of what can be called the art of suffering."[1404] This suggestion entails that a comprehensive rebuttal of C1 necessitates a resignation from the will to live and the will to life through suffering.

[1400] Hübscher, A., *The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in Its Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide* (E. Mellen Press, 1989). p.386.
[1401] Weinsheimer. p.11.
[1402] Barua.
[1403] Cross, S., *Schopenhauer's Encounter with Indian Thought: Representation and Will and Their Indian Parallels* (University of Hawai'i Press, 2013).
[1404] Wicks. p.281-82.

In chapter 4 of this thesis, an analysis of artists suffering through the First World War enabled us to proceed along these lines. The viability of interpreting Beckmann, Marc, and Macke's attitudes to war and suffering was reframed through a new and original methodology. Therefore, our approach to chapter 4 and the research into Marc's claims involved a recruitment of Schopenhauer's 'Fourth Book: The World as Will Second Aspect', and an empirical methodology, where we studied the texts and images of Beckmann, Marc and August Macke. Two methods helped us interpret their feelings towards the First World War, firstly through their understanding of Schopenhauer's philosophy and secondly via contemporary military practices. The primary goal was to uncover their attitudes towards the war through the utterances expressed in their letters, and the extent to which they affirmed or denied the will to war.

This goal might raise several objections since we cannot be certain, unless the matter is literal and plain, precisely what the intentions of the artists were in relation to their utterances. Due to that uncertainty, this chapter as was pointed out earlier on in the thesis, may justly be charged with forming concrete conclusions which have been drawn from tenuous premises - as when a phrase in a letter was used to make claims about an individual's experience of war. Indeed, because some of the primary findings surrounding C1 and C2 were derived from such letters, some final methodological reflection may be necessary here. In the first instance, we might reflect upon Quentin Skinner's argument that the:

> …special authority of an agent over his intentions does not exclude, of course, the possibility that an observer might be in a position to give a fuller or more convincing account of the agent's behavior than he could give himself. (Psychoanalysis is indeed founded on this possibility).[1405]

[1405] Skinner, Q., "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," in: *History and Theory* Vol. 8, no. 1 (1969).,p.28.

Therefore, the vital point in our effort to understand such utterances (as expressed by the artists in their letters, and in connection with C1 for example) might have been one of retrieving the intentions of these artists. In that case, Skinner would suggest that we should have outlined the entire range of possible communications which usually operated at the time of the artists utterances.

Following this, we ought then to have followed the links between the artists utterances and the broader verbal context in which they appeared - "as a means of decoding the actual intention of the given writer."[1406] Therefore, if we were to view the Expressionists letters as a special linguistic study, concerned only with a retrieval of authorial intentions, then a contextual study of the facts in question may have assumed their rightful place. Yet, as Skinner himself confesses, it often happens that "the 'context' mistakenly gets treated as the determinant of what is said. It needs rather to be treated as an ultimate framework for helping to decide what conventionally recognizable meanings, in a society of that kind, it might in principle have been possible for someone to have intended to communicate."[1407] If this is true, then we may have avoided such a problem in this thesis.

That said, if some critics feel that this chapter has presumed too much upon tenuous evidence for its primary findings, and has argued for authorial intentions which are specious, then as David Boucher rightly points out, there are numerous cases where an utterance *can* manifest a force which was unintended by the author. Thus, at a simple level, it is possible that in some instances convention and not intention "determines the force an utterance will carry,"[1408] and that "what the utterer means and what the utterance

[1406] Ibid.,p.49.
[1407] Ibid.,p.49.
[1408] Boucher.p.223.

means can be two distinct entities."[1409] Consequently, to enforce a philosophy of meaning which discounts features of a text, "such as the assumptions, presuppositions and implications, of which the author may not have been aware,"[1410] would do violence to the truth of many possible meanings. Even so, for scholars such as John Dunn, it is the elusiveness of meanings, and the problem of consigning to them a distinct theoretical standing, which threatens the "coherence of our *a priori* presumptions."[1411]Therefore, it remains open to debate whether this thesis has given due scope to such 'presuppositions and implications', or whether the *a priori* assumptions and attributed meanings which I have given to the Expressionists utterances have contaminated their original intentions.

In spite of any potential misinterpretations, through Schopenhauer's philosophy, some remarkable differences in the characters of Beckmann, Marc and Macke were revealed. Although these artists featured in a dedicated chapter, the new horizons which such a study has opened up means that scholars in future could advance upon my work. For instance, scholars could explore the entire life and work of Beckmann through his reading of Schopenhauer, including both his visual and literary art. Although I have gone some way towards addressing such deficits, future scholarship could take matters further by specialising in these areas through stand-alone theses. Despite the limited scope of this chapter, my work is at least significant for adding to Buenger's thoughts on Beckmann during the war.[1412]

Whilst acknowledging the limited scope of this chapter and the thesis as a whole, there is an additional significance to note, since whether the Expressionists were at war or not, their work can now be set against Germany's *Willenskultur*. As we saw, this term

[1409] Ibid.,p.221.
[1410] Ibid.,p.2223.
[1411] Dunn, J., *Political Obligation in Its Historical Context: Essays in Political Theory* (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
[1412] Beckmann and Buenger.

refers to a culture of the will, that is to say a culture of empirically willed human actions in opposition to those of passive acquiescence. Indeed, *Willenskultur* was not simply a minor Germanic phenomenon. The idea of 'exercising the will' was quite widespread and transmitted through popular self-help books. This does not mean that everyone followed it (this is unlikely), yet most people knew about it, much in the same way that we all know about alternative medicine. However, 'will training' was by and large an ideal for an aspiring bourgeoisie with reformist overtones, albeit less so for the working classes.[1413] Nevertheless, both *Willenskultur* and body culture impacted upon the consciousness of those involved in art and philosophy. As a result, I argued that one of the greatest impacts upon the human body was bought about by the Nazi dictatorship which contrived to give it a new significance for art and life. Consequently in Chapter 5, we turned our attention the work of Otto Mueller in relation to his paintings of the gypsy people.

Our approach to Chapter 5 entailed an interpretation of its findings through Schopenhauer's essay *On the Basis of Morality.* We proceeded with the conviction that the foundation of ethics is made apparent through empiricism. Therefore, we began by discussing specific empirical facts, such as Germany's 'November' revolution, the abdication of the Kaiser, the subsequent institution of the Weimar Republic war reparations, and economic depression. This chapter then approached the notion of the German Expressionist body through the work of Mueller in relation to his depictions in art of the gypsy people. Although no evidence exists that Mueller studied Schopenhauer's philosophy, the chapter interpreted and resolved its findings through the latter's moral philosophy.

[1413] I am grateful to Michael Cowan for sharing his thoughts with me on this through an email conversation of 07.11.2015.

By following this procedure, the treatment of the gypsy people was juxtaposed in relation to Muller's depictions of them. This treatment was set within the context of the *Entartete Kunst* exhibition of 1937 and an examination of the concept of 'degeneracy'. This chapter was valuable since it showed how C1 possessed a strongly prophetic quality, testified to by the impact of the Nazis' political will. Out of this impact arose a renewed significance for Expressionist art in relation to moral theory, where as we saw, for Nazi officials such as Rosenberg, justice arose through Nordic art due to its manufacture by 'different race souls', the most virtuous race souls being the Nordic peoples who allegedly revealed the most salient moral values for art. Yet, I argued that this was at the core of an egoism, which resulted in hatred, injustice and malice.[1414] Through Schopenhauer, I therefore showed that acts of genuine moral worth are those which benefit others as if they were acts of kindness towards oneself.[1415]

Through the knowledge that we are all born of the same will, it was proposed that compassion is "the real basis of all voluntary justice and genuine loving-kindness."[1416] This is of import because to date no scholarship has approached the problems of the 'Degenerate Art' exhibition through a specific moral doctrine as executed in this thesis. This approach implies that both the monism of the 'fool' and the dualist interpretations of the 'knave' can be satisfied, since it is plain that the gypsy people suffered and Mueller's depictions of them remind us of this fact. Consequently, by reaching below the surface of these facts it was argued that compassion ought to be the foundation for moral judgement.

If we are prepared to apply Schopenhauer's moral judgements, then there are further possibilities for interpreting Expressionist art through them. One possibility is the

[1414] Schopenhauer, Payne, and Cartwright. p.210.
[1415] Ibid., p.143.
[1416] Ibid., p.144.

link between portraiture and Schopenhauer's work on physiognomy, which feeds into the harsh reality that if an individual's face, quite literally, did not 'fit' during Nazism, then that individual would often find themselves in a world of pain. In fact, well before the advent of Nazism, it is probable that Expressionist artists were aware of physiognomic theories, although physiognomy is perhaps more prominent in the photography of the period, as in August Sander's project for cataloguing the physiognomies of different classes of people.[1417] Such links ought to resonate therefore with Richard T. Gray's book *About Face: German Physiognomic Thought from Lavater to Auschwitz.*[1418]

The problem of Expressionist physiognomy, as a cultural sign for belonging or not belonging under Nazism, relates to my work on Nolde in Chapter 6. The methodological approach behind Chapter 6 arguably placed an emphasis upon the theoretical as opposed to the practical order to question the possibility of free will for Nolde according to an application of Schopenhauer's philosophy. Despite any potential controversy which this chapter may have raised, the problem of free will for German citizens of whatever creed or ethnic origin, has never been raised by previous scholars. Its 'pioneering' theoretical emphasis was therefore a major contribution towards a dearth of scholarship on this issue and we might conclude therefore became a compelling vindication of C1.

In spite of the above, it may be the case that this chapter falls into a trap, and by "'fixing tropes and allegories to the letter' is what makes credulity foolish, just as 'refining what is literal into figure and mystery' […] makes for hermeneutic knavery."[1419] As a result, as Weisheimer argues, on this basis "the fool understands everything as plain, the

[1417] Photography is also important for Cesare Lombroso's theories and runs deep into criminology of the period and in Expressionist film as well. I am grateful to Richard T. Gray for his input on the above through an email conversation dated 15.04.2016.
[1418] Gray, R. T., *About Face: German Physiognomic Thought from Lavater to Auschwitz* (Wayne State University Press, 2004).
[1419] Weinsheimer.,p.2-3.

knave as dark and deep."[1420] Yet, if the chapter of this thesis is adjudged to have 'fixed tropes to the letter' or refined 'what is literal into figure and mystery' with regards to Nolde's case, then at least this chapter has taken a new look at the artist in relation to the problems of free will.

That new look investigated the extent to which Nolde possessed free will whilst living under National Socialism, by using Schopenhauer's doctrine on freedom of the will. This doctrine was applied to Nolde's membership of the Nazi Party, his later victimisation by them, and the problem of certain anti-Semitic remarks made by him. This was felt to be important since most Nolde scholarship, particularly that of Fulda and Soika, simply engages in epideictic oratory over his anti-Semitic remarks and his membership of the Nazi Party. By contrast, I argue that this is an hermeneutic of the 'fool', for whom "truth is open to common understanding, as well as common sense, because what is most certainly true is that which is patent, obvious to everyone."[1421] My argument, conceivably knavish, problematised this belief, advocating that human behaviour is more complex, more ambiguous and more perplexing than such historians would have us believe. Even so, some may object that my approach to Nolde's situation means that "not the surface, then, but the very attempt to penetrate and interpret it constitutes the deception: in a monistic world, it is the knave who is the fool."[1422]

The possibility that my approach to Nolde's free will is one of self-deception, of a 'knave who is the fool', is noteworthy because John Berger once said that "to look is an act of choice."[1423] But this is surely an hermeneutical folly because there is a sense in which all art, and viewings of it by the public and art establishment, is made according to

[1420] Ibid.,p.3.
[1421] Ibid. p.4-5.
[1422] Ibid., p.4.
[1423] Berger, J., *Ways of Seeing* (London: Penguin Books, 2008). p.8.

strict laws of causality. I therefore argue, that Nolde's freedom of will must be disentangled from his freedom of action – that is to say the capacity to perform a particular deed if he willed to perform that particular deed. Thus, according to Schopenhauer's philosophy, Nolde possessed freedom of will only if he enjoyed the absence of causal necessity. This postulation entailed a consideration of Nolde's physical freedom under Nazism from the standpoint of Schopenhauer's determinism. This led us to conclude that he lacked freedom of the will in a physical sense, and it was therefore anticipated that political freedom was to be classed under physical freedom.

During the entire consideration of Nolde's freedom I applied a research question originally set by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences in 1837, one which had formed the basis of Schopenhauer's essay on free will. This question asked, "Can the freedom of the human will be demonstrated from self-consciousness?"[1424] Schopenhauer's answer to the Society's question was then adapted and applied to a study of Nolde's life under Nazism. Subsequently, it was stated that Nolde's self-consciousness could not provide an answer to the Society's question - as to whether his acts of will were necessitated by grounds which determined them. I also compared the doctrine of determinism with that of indeterminism and explained the difference between the two as it applied to Nolde. In doing so, it was argued that any objective account of Nolde's acts of will, whether under the duress of Nazism or not, had to be grounded in a nexus of causes which necessitated them. Therefore, according to my application of Schopenhauer's philosophy, it was concluded that there could have been no freedom of will for Nolde in this sense. That was so because no acts of his will could have been without a ground which necessitated them.

[1424] Zöller. p.3

Yet, I appear to contradict myself, since I have implied that determinism is all there is to the matter. Thus, it seems as if I have practiced the wisdom of the 'fool' who feels in" his knowledge that in a world without mystery or mystification, without 'secret wheels' and 'hidden springs', hermeneutic exposé actually covers the truth it pretends to discover."[1425] As a result, I could have conceded that either there was no problem of free will for Nolde, or that there was a genuine mystery to the problem of free will for him - as there is with every individual. However, perhaps that would be a 'fool's' interpretation, since it would suggest that the distinction between these two choices was obvious. Nevertheless, this did not preclude the feeling that most of us have that Nolde must have been somehow plainly responsible for his actions.

Through Schopenhauer's doctrine this problem was tackled by displacing the notion of his responsibility away from his personal acts on to his character. Thus, by applying Schopenhauer's doctrine to Nolde, it was found that his empirical character was said to be a mere appearance which manifested "his *intelligible character*, i.e. his will as thing in itself."[1426] Since Schopenhauer pursues the determinist path we subsequently found that he was attempting to uphold the notion of moral responsibility in the same way. By agreeing with Janaway, it was suggested that any sense of free will which we might have attributed to Nolde meant that Schopenhauer's sense of free will reaches an absurd limit, as one removed from the objective world without the possibility of interacting with it.[1427] However, despite these limitations it was found that Schopenhauer's philosophy helped us interpret Nolde's life under Nazism and his anti-Semitic remarks in a new light. Ultimately, since we have thought about Marc's claims on Schopenhauer's terms, we must

[1425] Weinsheimer. p.6-7.
[1426] Janaway. p.243.
[1427] Ibid., p.245.

conclude that on those terms the will alone "is free; it is almighty,"[1428] which in turn confirms C1.

We can also confirm that one of the primary findings of the thesis was that specific Expressionist artists studied Schopenhauer's work - sometimes in considerable depth. It was therefore, argued that the latter's philosophy provides a basis for artistic interpretation and that in some cases, as with Marc, Kandinsky, Beckmann and Macke, that they may have been influenced by Schopenhauer. It was also an important finding that we could sustain a rigorous investigation of C1 and C2 through Schopenhauer's philosophy, since it provided us with a basis for artistic interpretation - irrespective of whether the artist in question was influenced by or acquainted with that philosophy. However, as part of our concluding remarks, we must briefly reflect upon the idea of influence *per se* which may have run the risk of forming questionable conclusions.

The spectre of questionable conclusions based upon theories of influence has been addressed by Philip P. Weiner, who acknowledges that the problem of 'influences' in the history of ideas is a perennial one. He states that: "It will not do to say 'X influenced Y because what is true of X is true of Y, and X preceded Y'. The fallacy of *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* and the possibility that X and Y have a common source in Z or derive from a common tradition must not be forgotten."[1429] In that case, the intellectual historian is perhaps better equipped to assess a thinker's influence upon subsequent periods in history compared to that thinkers autobiographical declarations – as Wiener says, "*Ipse dixit* is not an indubitable criterion of truth in intellectual autobiography."[1430]

Since we have explored C1 and C2 in great detail in this thesis, and secured some important findings in the process, it comes as a surprise to learn that Schopenhauer placed

[1428] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.351
[1429] Wiener, P. P., "Some Problems and Methods in the History of Ideas," in: *Journal of the History of Ideas* Vol. 22, no. 4 (1961).p.537. Cf. Boucher..p195-96.
[1430] Wiener.,p.539.

great faith in autobiographical testimonies – doubly surprising given his renowned pessimism and his stringent demand that scholars should think for themselves. He proposes that we can get to know an author as an individual "most easily" from their books, and how "in an autobiography it is so difficult to dissimulate, that there is perhaps not a single one that is not on the whole truer than any history ever written."[1431] For Schopenhauer, the author who writes an autobiographical work sits at the confessional, of their own free will, where "… the spirit of lying does not seize him so readily, for there is to be found in every man an inclination to truth which has first to be overcome in the case."[1432]

Had we therefore assessed C1 and C2, and any findings arising from this with Schopenhauer's unguarded *naïveté,* then they may have possessed less credibility. On the other hand, a safer methodological option might have been to dispense with any notion of Schopenhauer's influence upon Expressionist artists altogether and dismissed such ideas from our research vocabulary altogether. There might have been a point to this, and one which Skinner could agree with, since historians may erroneously assume that it was the intention of a later writer or artist to refer to an earlier writer or artist, and thereby speciously cite the influence of that earlier individual's work.

That said, if the concept of influence, has been applied at all in a direct manner in this thesis, at least as an 'explanatory' instrument, then it was perhaps not entirely a vacuous exercise - despite its oft times highly tenuous grip. Yet, as Skinner remarks, the danger of the influence model is "that it is so easy to use the concept in an apparently explanatory way without any consideration of whether the conditions sufficient, or at least necessary, for the proper application of the concept have been met."[1433] If this is so, then

[1431] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*. Vol.1, p.248.
[1432] Ibid. Vol.1, p.248.
[1433] Skinner, Q. and ProQuest, *Regarding Method* (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).p.75.

arguably, when I have found parallels between Kandinsky's study of Schopenhauer, or highlighted the fact that Macke used the latter's philosophy in order to learn how to think, then my correlations may signal a form of parochialism, whereby I have misused my "vantage-point" when describing "the apparent *reference* of some statement in a classic text,"[1434] such as Schopenhauer's or an Expressionist's. As a consequence, by speciously brooding upon my presumption, this thesis may at times have given the impression that it was the intention of Kandinsky for example, to 'insinuate' Schopenhauer into his own creative thinking.

That said, the intention of this thesis was to echo the "unfolding of a single thought"[1435]which pervades Schopenhauer's major work *The World as Will and Representation,* however neither Schopenhauer nor myself have been able to render explicit what this 'single thought' is. Even so, it might be interpreted as being how "the double-sided world is the striving of the will to become fully conscious of itself so that, recoiling in horror at its inner, self-divisive nature, it may annul itself and thereby its self-affirmation, and then reach salvation."[1436] In essence, the unifying thought behind this thesis explored the extent to which the will is almighty (*allmächtig*) and predominant in the life and art of Expressionism.[1437]

Despite this conclusion, for 'knave' and 'fool' alike, C1 may be viewed as either a mere platitude or one pregnant with significance. Indeed for 'knave' and 'fool', the Expressionist Body, in conjunction with the philosophy of Schopenhauer, might only be remembered as a clever snare which is "like coins in the devil's purse: when you open it

[1434] Ibid.
[1435] Schopenhauer and Payne, *The World as Will and Representation*.Vol.1, p.286. See also ibid., Vol. 1.p.xiii.
[1436] Atwell. p.31. Atwell adds that: "In several places Schopenhauer does use *der einzige Gedanke* (the single thought), *der eine Gedanke* (the one thought), and *mein Hauptgedanke* (my main thought), and he frequently states what may be considered the single thought; but he never puts the two together in an explicit fashion, that is, he never says, 'See, here is the single thought, and it goes thus and so' " ibid., p.188. fn,1. See also: Taylor. p.43-53.
[1437] There are many instances where Schopenhauer takes the view that the will is *allmächtig* as in: Schopenhauer and Hübscher. Vol.3.

you find only dead leaves."[1438] Moreover, the flaws of this thesis inevitably reveal that, I as an interpreter, along with every man, "takes the limits of his own field of vision for the limits of the world."[1439] Given this hermeneutical confession, a 'knavish' interpretation of Marc's claims has perhaps put me at a disadvantage, since some metaphysical explanations can never achieve the status of apodictic certainty. On the other hand, where the 'fool's' interpretation of Marc's claims appear evident in this thesis, then this has the advantage of apparent clarity and plainness. However, a lack of hermeneutical consensus is perhaps a virtue of this thesis, since I did not aspire to "the advent of a hermeneutic dictator powerful or persuasive enough to 'reduce the notions of all mankind exactly to the same length and breadth and height of his own'."[1440]

Not wishing to reduce the notions of mankind to the same length and breadth as my own, let us conclude our explorations and assert that Marc's claims were astute, prophetic and expressive of his generation's *Weltgefühl*.[1441] Despite their partial validity, these claims had their gaze directed towards eternity and foreshadowed developments across Europe which will continue to haunt us in the future. Therefore, if the 'triumph of the will' is real, and takes precedence over the world as representation, then for the life cycle of the individual and mankind alike, it must be the case that:

> In early youth, as we contemplate our coming life, we are like children in a theatre before the curtain is raised, sitting there in high spirits and eagerly waiting for the play to begin. It is a blessing that we do not know what is really going to happen. Could we foresee it, there are times when children might seem like innocent prisoners, condemned, not to death, but to life, and as yet all unconscious of what their sentence means.[1442]

[1438] Sartre, J.-P. and Alexander, L., *Nausea* ([New York]: New Directions Pub. Corp, 1969). p.52.
[1439] Schopenhauer, A. and Saunders, T. B., *Studies in Pessimism: A Series of Essays* (S. Sonnenschein, 1891). p.69.
[1440] Weinsheimer. p.11.
[1441] Trans. 'World-feeling'.
[1442] Schopenhauer, A., *Collected Essays of Arthur Schopenhauer* (Start Publishing LLC, 2012).

Appendix A: Period Media Titles

Der dramatische Wille, (The Dramatic Will), 1919-23.

Deutscher Wille, (German Will), 1921-1935.

Deutscher Wille / *Jugendbuch*, (German Will/Youth Magazine), 1935-41.

Deutscher Wille: *Schriften für die deutsche Jugend*, (German Will: Writings for German Youth), 1933.

Entscheidung: proletarischer Wille und soziale Zukunft, (Decision: Proletarian Will and Social Future), 1929-33.

Hitler Jugend marschiert: *Wille und Tat*, (Hitler Youth on the March: Will and Deed), 1938-39.

Der jüdische Wille: Zeitschrift der Kartells jüdischer Verbindungen, (Jewish Will: Newspaper for the Cartel of Jewish Connections), 1918-1937.

Junger Wille, (Young Will), 1933-42.

Nationaler Wille, (National Will), 1929-33.

Tat und Wille: *Blätter der Gegenwart*, (Deed and Will: Magazine of the Present) 1927.

Unser Wille und Weg, (Our Will and Way), 1931-1941.

Werk und Wille: Zeitschrift zur Bücherei und Kulturarbeit, (Work and Will: Magazine for Libraries and Cultural Work), 1934-38.

Der Wille: Blätter für das deutsche Volk, (The Will: Magazine for the German People), 1932.

Wille und Macht: *Führerorgan der nationalsozialistischen Jugend*, (Will and Power: The Führer's Magazine for Nazi Youth), 1933-44.

Wille und Werk (*Deutscher Jugendbewegung*), (Will and Work), 1918-1933.

Appendix B: **Walden, *Der Sturm* and Schopenhauer**

If German Expressionism could ever be accused of entertaining its own mythology, then it might be seen through the growth of specialist art journals. From the turn of the century until the outbreak of the First World War over fifty were in circulation. The journal *Der Sturm*, founded by Herwarth Walden in 1910, was a major promoter of German Expressionist art becoming the first to proselytise works by both *Der Blaue Reiter* and *Die Brücke.*

By 1912, *Der Sturm* had established its own art gallery bringing in works of art from the Italian Futurists and French Fauves, amongst others. As Irene Chytraeus-Auerbach has shown, the editorial staff of the Italian magazine *La Voce* maintained mutual relations with Walden and *Der Sturm* from late 1912 and early 1913. Whilst, some of Walden's associates in Florence disapproved of *Der Sturm's* artistic evolution, others such as the painter Ardengo Soffici exhibited his French Cubist style works in *Der Sturm's* Berlin gallery from 30.01.913, alongside the work of Robert Delaunay and Julie Baum.[1443] Four years later in 1917, *Der Sturm* founded an independent art school with Walden himself acting as agent for Lyonel Feininger, Marc Chagall, Fernand Léger, and Hans Arp. Together with many other activities, *Der Sturm* was an influential publishing house which organised travelling exhibitions to in an attempt to promote international modernism throughout Germany.

Schopenhauer's name rarely appears in *Der Sturm,* yet there is one direct link between Walden and the philosopher in an article by Max Steiner, called 'Schopenhauer

[1443] See: Irene Chytraeus-Auerbach 'German Expressionism in Italy: Herwarth Walden's Der Sturm, the Berlin Novembergruppe, and the Modernist Circles of Florence, Turin, and Rome' in: Wünsche, Isabel (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Expressionism in a Transnational Context, London/New York: Routledge, 2018 (forthcoming). Cf. *Der Sturm*. Wochenschrift für Kultur und die Künste, ed., *Zwölfte Ausstellung: Robert Delaunay, Julie Baum, Gedächtnisausstellung, Ardengo Soffici* [Twelfth exhibition: Robert Delaunay, Julie Baum, commemorative exhibition, Ardengo Soffici], (Berlin: Der Sturm, 1913; exh. cat.).

und die Politik'. In this 1911 article for *Der Sturm*, Sterner argued that Schopenhauer did not simply view the world from his study window. Instead, he used the experience of life as the basis of all his doctrines. Furthermore, Sterner suggested that no-one criticised democracy more sharply than did Schopenhauer. The philosopher it is true had lived through the 1848 revolutions and gave a description of them in a letter which reduced the glorious heroes, as the democrats saw themselves, to 'the pack behind the barricades'. In fact, Sterner told his *Der Sturm* readers how Schopenhauer had considered the republican system to be an unnatural one. Whilst acknowledging the sovereignty of the people in some respects, he (Schopenhauer) also believed that the people could easily become the plaything of demagogues. The philosopher's low opinion of the people's political understanding also made him an opponent of press freedom. Indeed, Schopenhauer did not wish to replicate the British parliamentary system in Germany, and Sterner understood Schopenhauer to be a staunch monarchist whose greatest wish was for German unity. Consequently, Sterner argued that for Schopenhauer an Emperor who would preserve the nation's peace internally and represent the unity of the empire externally.[1444]

Another rare instance where the philosopher's name occurs is in a 1920 edition, in the form of an article written by Otto Nebel and titled 'Was Schopenhauer von Servaes Weiss'.[1445] The article is difficult to translate, since it is written in a satirical idiolect where only one mention of Schopenhauer is made. In fact, the rest of the text is given over to criticising a journalist by the name of Franz Servaes. In the only mention of the philosopher, Nebel tells his *Der Sturm* audience that Schopenhauer considered journalists

[1444] Steiner, M. 'Schopenhauer und die Politik' in: Walden., Jg. II, Nr. 82, October 1911, p.652-653.
[1445] Nebel, O. 'Was Schopenhauer von Servaes Weiss' in: ibid., Jg.11, Heft 2, May 1920, p.22. In addition, there are some short references to Schopenhauer in the following literature on Walden and *Der Sturm*: Maurice Godé: "Poetik und Politik im literarischen Expressionismus," in: Bermbach, Udo / Vaget, Hans Rudolf (Hg.) Getauf auf Musik. Festschrift fuer Dieter Borchmeyer, Wuerzburg: Koenigshausen & Neumann, p.86. Hodonyi, Robert: Herwarth Waldens 'Sturm' und die Architektur, eine Analyse zur Konvergenz der Kuenste in der Berliner Moderne, Bielefeld: Aisthesis. 2010, p.116, 262, 268, 355.

to be untalented personalities who have vulgar mouths. Servaes by contrast is given priority over Schopenhauer, and *Der Sturm* readers learned that Servaes attended the Gymnasium in Cologne and studied art and German at the universities of Leipzig, Strasbourg, and Bonn from 1881. After receiving his doctorate in 1887, he lived in Berlin publishing his first essays and art reviews there. The first performance of his drama "Zu Haus," which had remained unpublished up until then, took place on 7.04.1895 whih received negative reviews from the press. Then a short time later, another drama entitled "Stickluft" appeared, and by 1899 Servaes had published in various weekly and monthly magazines. He also worked temporarily as the theatre critic for the "Vossische Zeitung." In the same year, he worked as a cultural correspondent and feuilletonist for the *Neue freie Presse* in Vienna, and by 1904 he had taken over as editor succeeding Theodor Herzl upon the latter's death.

Until now, no book length study of *Der Sturm* has appeared, and it is only recently that has such an endeavour has come to fruition in the form of Jenny Anger's *Four Metaphors of Modernism: From Der Sturm to the Société Anonyme.*[1446] In her study, Anger begins by arguing that Walden implies that genuine art is directly accessible to the senses as in his statement: "He who has eyes to hear, feels." She explores her claims by exploring links between *Der Sturm* and the *Société Anonyme* through four metaphorical chapters called' Piano, Water, Glass and Home'. The *Société Anonyme* (arguably the first museum of modern art) was founded in 1920, by Man Ray, Marcel Duchamp and Katherine Dreier.[1447] Functioning in a similar to *Der Sturm*, and perhaps inspired by Dada, the *Société Anonyme* exhibited art at the International Exhibition of Modern Art at the Brooklyn Museum, New York during the 1920s.

[1446] Anger, J., *Four Metaphors of Modernism: From Der Sturm to the Société Anonyme* (2018).
[1447] anonyme, S., *Société Anonyme (the First Museum of Modern Art, 1920-1944): Monographs* (Arno Press, 1972).

Appendix C: Sample annotations from Max Beckmann's signed copy of Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation. Volume 1*

Cotta'sche Handbibliothek

Die Welt

als

Wille und Vorstellung

von

Arthur Schopenhauer

Zweiter Band

Inhalt: 3. und 4. Buch

Stuttgart und Berlin
J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger
G. m. b. H.

Max Brückmann

In these samples, Beckmann uses a 1902 edition of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*.[1] He also had a 1921 edition of the *Sämtliche Werke,* but the annotations we see below are all from the 1902 edition. All English translations of Schopenhauer's German text as seen in the below can be found in: Arthur, and Payne, E. F. J. *The World as Will and Representation*. New York: Dover Publications, (1969).[2] I have reproduced the German text verbatim in this Appendix as it is found in: Beckmann, Peter, and Schaffer, Joachim. *Die Bibliothek Max Beckmanns: Unterstreichungen, Kommentare, Notizen und Skizzen in seinen Büchern* Worms am Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, (1992). It is in this book that Beckmann's annotations of Schopenhauer have been collated in the first instance.

When reading this Appendix, there are two important orientation devices to be aware of. Firstly, as will become apparent, one set of footnotes corresponds to Payne's English translation of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, whilst another set displays a *conferatur* (Cf.) page number which relates to Beckmann's annotations of Schopenhauer's German text as it appears in Schaffer's collation.

[1] Schopenhauer, A. and Köhler, M., *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Bd 1 Bd 1* (Berlin: A. Wrichert, 1902).
[2] Schopenhauer, A. and Payne, E. F. J., *The World as Will and Representation* (New York: Dover Publications, 1969). Vol.1.

Sample i)

What might otherwise be called the finest part of life, its purest joy, just because it lifts us out of real existence, and transforms us into disinterested spectators of it, is pure knowledge which remains foreign to all willing, pleasure in the beautiful, genuine delight in art. But because this requires rare talents, it is granted only to extremely few, and even to those only as a fleeting dream.[3]

1 Beckmann has underlined the text segment beginning from: "…is pure knowledge which remains foreign to all willing…"[4]

Sample ii)

Moreover, it makes them feel lonely among beings that are noticeably different from them, and in this way also matters are made even. But purely intellectual pleasures are not accessible to the vast majority of men. They are almost wholly incapable of the pleasure to be found in pure knowledge; they are entirely given over to willing. Therefore, if anything is to win their sympathy, to be *interesting* to them, it must (and this is to be found already in the meaning of the word) in some way excite their *will,* even if it be only through a remote relation to it which is merely within the bounds of possibility. The will must never be left entirely out of question, since their existence lies far more in willing than in knowing; action and reaction are their only element. The naïve expressions of this quality can be seen in trifles and everyday phenomena; thus, for example, they write their names up at places worth seeing which they visit, in order

[3] Ibid. Vol.1. p.314.
[4] Cf. Beckmann, P. and Schaffer, J., *Die Bibliothek Max Beckmanns: Unterstreichungen, Kommentare, Notizen und Skizzen in seinen Büchern* (Worms am Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992).p.85.

thus to react on, to affect the place, since it does not affect them. Further, they cannot easily just contemplate a rare and strange animal, but must excite it, tease it, play with it, just to experience action and reaction. But this need for exciting the will shows itself particularly in the invention and maintenance of card-playing, which is in the truest sense an expression of the wretched side of humanity. But whatever nature and good fortune may have done, whoever a person may be and whatever he may possess, the pain essential to life cannot be thrown off.[5]



1 Beckmann has marked the following text segment in the margin from: "…noticeably different from them …" until the phrase beginning with "… lies far more in willing than in knowing; action and…."[6]

2 Beckmann has marked the following text segment in the margin with four strokes the text segment starting from: "…exciting the will shows itself particularly…" until the end of the sentence "… wretched side of humanity."[7]

Sample iii)

If, which is very difficult, we have succeeded in removing pain in this form, it at once appears on the scene in a thousand others, varying according to age and circumstances, such as sexual impulse, passionate love, jealousy, envy, hatred, anxiety, ambition, avarice, sickness, and so on. Finally, if it cannot find entry in any other shape, it comes in the sad, grey garment of weariness, satiety, and boredom, against which many different attempts are made. Even if we ultimately succeed in driving these away, it will hardly be done without letting pain in again in one of the previous forms, and thus starting the dance once more at the beginning; for every

[5] Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.314.
[6] Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.,p.86.
[7] Ibid.,p.86.

human life is tossed backwards and forwards between pain and boredom. Depressing as this discussion is, I will, however, draw attention in passing to one aspect of it from which a consolation can be derived, and perhaps even a stoical indifference to our own present ills may be attained. For our impatience at these arises for the most part from the fact that we recognize them as accidental, as brought about by a chain of causes that might easily be different. We are not usually distressed at evils that are inescapably necessary and quite universal, for example, the necessity of old age and death, and of many daily inconveniences. It is rather a consideration of the accidental nature of the circumstances that have brought suffering precisely on us which gives this suffering its sting. Now we have recognized that pain as such is inevitable and essential to life; that nothing but the mere form in which it manifests itself depends on chance; that therefore our present suffering fills a place which without it would be at once occupied by some other suffering which the one now present excludes; and that, accordingly, fate can affect us little in what is essential. If such a reflection were to become a living conviction, it might produce a considerable degree of stoical equanimity, and greatly reduce our anxious concern about our own welfare. But such a powerful control of the faculty of reason over directly felt suffering is seldom or never found in fact.[8]

1 Beckmann has underlined the following text segment from: "…which is very difficult…", then from "…it comes in the sad, grey garment of weariness …" until the close of the sentence "… many different attempts are made."[9]

2 Beckmann has marked in the margin with an exclamation mark the following text segment from: "…it manifests itself depends on chance … a living conviction, it might produce…".[10]

[8] Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.315.
[9] Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.,p.86.
[10] Ibid.,p.86.

Sample iv)

Conversely, experience also teaches us that after the appearance of a long-desired happiness, we do not feel ourselves on the whole and permanently much better off or more comfortable than before. Only the moment of appearance of these changes moves us with unusual strength, as deep distress or shouts of joy; but both of these soon disappear, because they rested on illusion. For they do not spring from the immediately present pleasure or pain, but only from the opening up of a new future that is anticipated in them. Only by pain or pleasure borrowing from the future could they be heightened so abnormally, and consequently not for any length of time. The following remarks may be put in evidence in support of the hypothesis we advanced, by which, in knowing as well as in feeling suffering or well-being, a very large part would be subjective and determined *a priori.* Human cheerfulness or dejection is obviously not determined by external circumstances, by wealth or position, for we come across at least as many cheerful faces among the poor as among the rich. Further, the motives that induce suicide are so very different, that we cannot mention any misfortune which would be great enough to bring it about in any character with a high degree of probability, and few that would be so small that those like them would not at some time have caused it.[11]

1 Beckmann has underlined the following text segment from: "…after the appearance of a long-desired happiness" until the end of the sentence "… much better off or more comfortable than before," breaking off and then underlining the sentence segment "…strength as deep distress or shouts of joy." [12]

[11] Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.316.
[12] Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.p.86.

2 Beckmann has marked in margin with exclamation mark the text segment from: "…the following remarks may be put …" until the new sentence commencing with "Further, the motives…"[13]

Sample v)

In keeping with this is also the observation that, if a great and pressing care is finally lifted from our breast by a fortunate issue, another immediately takes its place. The whole material of this already existed previously, yet it could not enter consciousness as care, because the consciousness had no capacity left for it. This material for care, therefore, remained merely as a dark and unobserved misty form on the extreme horizon of consciousness. But now, as there is room, this ready material at once comes forward and occupies the throne of the reigning care of the day [Greek text here in Schopenhauer- my words]. If so far as its matter is concerned it is very much lighter than the material of the care that has vanished, it knows how to blow itself out, so that it apparently equals it in size, and thus, as the chief care of the day, completely fills the throne.[14]

1 Beckmann has marked in margin the text segment from: "…pressing care is lifted …" until the phrase "… comes forward and occupies the throne."[15]

[13]Cf. Ibid.,p.86.
[14] Schopenhauer and Payne.p.317.
[15] Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.p.86.

Sample vi)

From each particular delusion of this kind we must inevitably later be brought back; and then, when it vanishes, we must pay for it with pains just as bitter as the joy caused by its entry was keen.[16]

1 Beckmann has underlined the following text segment from "…must pay for it with pains" until "entry was keen."[17]

Sample vii)

Thus, it goes on either *ad infinitum,* or, what is rarer and already presupposes a certain strength of character, till we come to a wish that is not fulfilled, and yet cannot be given up. We then have, so to speak, what we were looking for, namely something that we can denounce at any moment, instead of our own inner nature, as the source of our sufferings. Thus, although at variance with our fate, we become reconciled to our existence in return for this, since the knowledge that suffering is essential to this existence itself and that true satisfaction is impossible, is again withdrawn from us. The consequence of this last kind of development is a somewhat melancholy disposition, the constant bearing of a single, great pain, and the resultant disdain for all lesser joys and sorrows. This is in consequence a worthier phenomenon than the constant hunting for ever different deceptive forms which is much more usual.[18]

[16] Schopenhauer and Payne.p.318.
[17] Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.,p.87.
[18] Schopenhauer and Payne.,p.319.

1 Beckmann has marked in the margin the text segment from: “....is rarer and already…” until the end of the whole section which ends in “... in deceptive forms which is much more usual."[19]

Beckmann, Peter, and Schaffer, Joachim. *Die Bibliothek Max Beckmanns: Unterstreichungen, Kommentare, Notizen und Skizzen in seinen Büchern* [in German]. Worms am Rhein: Wernersche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1992.

Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Köhler, Max. *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Bd 1 Bd 1* [in German]. Berlin: A. Wrichert, 1902.

Schopenhauer, Arthur, and Payne, E. F. J. *The World as Will and Representation* [in English ; German (translation)]. New York: Dover Publications, 1969.

[19]Cf. Beckmann and Schaffer.,p.87.

<S.118/S.119> Ich hätte noch manches hinzuzufügen über die Art, wie Musik percipiert wird, nämlich einzig und allein in und durch die Zeit, mit gänzlicher Ausschließung des Raumes, auch ohne Einfluß der Erkenntnis der Kausalität, also des Verstandes: denn die Töne machen schon als Wirkung und ohne daß wir auf ihre Ursache, wie bei der Anschauung, zurückgingen, den ästhetischen Eindruck. - Ich will indessen diese Betrachtungen nicht noch mehr verlängern, da ich vielleicht schon so in diesem dritten Buche manchem zu ausführlich gewesen bin, oder mich zu sehr auf das Einzelne eingelassen habe. Mein Zweck machte es jedoch nötig, und man wird es um so weniger mißbilligen, wenn man die selten genug- </> sam erkannte Wichtigkeit und den hohen Wert der Kunst sich vergegenwärtigt, erwägend, daß, wenn, nach unserer Ansicht, die gesamte sichtbare Welt nur die Objektivation, der Spiegel des Willens ist, zu seiner Selbsterkenntnis, ja, wie wir bald sehen werden, zur Möglichkeit seiner Erlösung, ihn begleitend; und zugleich, daß die Welt als Vorstellung, wenn man sie abgesondert betrachtet, indem man vom Wollen losgerissen, nur sie allein das Bewußtsein einnehmen läßt, die erfreulichste und die allein unschuldige Seite des Lebens ist; - wir die Kunst als die höhere Steigerung, die vollkommenere Entwickelung von allen diesem anzusehen haben, da sie wesentlich eben dasselbe, nur konzentrierter, vollendeter, mit Absicht und Besonnenheit, leistet, was die sichtbare Welt selbst, und sie daher, im vollen Sinne des Wortes, die Blüte des Lebens genannt werden mag. Ist die ganze Welt als Vorstellung nur die Sichtbarkeit des Willens, so ist die Kunst die Verdeutlichung dieser Sichtbarkeit, die Camera obscura, welche die Gegenstände reiner zeigt und besser übersehen und zusammenfassen läßt, das Schauspiel im Schauspiel, die Bühne auf der Bühne im »Hamlet«.

Der Genuß alles Schönen, der Trost, den die Kunst gewährt, der Enthusiasmus des Künstlers, welcher ihn die Mühen des Lebens vergessen läßt, dieser eine Vorzug des Genius vor den anderen, der ihn für das mit der Klarheit des Bewußtseins in gleichem Maße gesteigerte Leiden und für die öde Einsamkeit unter einem heterogenen Geschlechte allein entschädigt, - dieses alles beruht darauf, daß, wie sich uns weiterhin zeigen wird, das Ansich des Lebens, der Wille, das Dasein selbst, ein stetes Leiden und teils jämmerlich, teils schrecklich ist; dasselbe hingegen als Vorstellung allein, rein angeschaut, oder durch die Kunst wiederholt, frei von Qual, ein bedeutsames Schauspiel gewährt. Diese rein erkennbare Seite der Welt und die Wiederholung derselben in irgend einer Kunst ist das Element des Künstlers.

<S.119/S.120> Jene reine, wahre und tiefe Erkenntnis des Wesens der Welt wird ihm nun Zweck an sich: er bleibt bei ihr stehen. Daher wird sie ihm nicht, </> wie wir es im folgenden Buche bei dem zur Resignation gelangten Heiligen sehen werden, Quietiv des Willens, erlöst ihn nicht auf immer, sondern nur auf Augenblicke vom Leben, und ist ihm so noch nicht der Weg aus demselben, sondern nur einstweilen ein Trost in demselben; bis seine dadurch gesteigerte Kraft, endlich des Spieles müde, den Ernst ergreift. Als Sinnbild dieses Ueberganges kann man die heilige Cäcilie von Raffael betrachten. Zum Ernst also wollen nun auch wir uns im folgenden Buche wenden.

Viertes Buch.
Der Welt als Wille zweite Betrachtung: Bei erreichter Selbsterkenntnis Bejahung und Verneinung des Willens zum Leben. <S.121-S.285>
§ 55. <S.140-S.165>

<S.159> Hieraus eben erklärt sich die Befriedigung, oder die Seelenangst, mit der wir auf den zurückgelegten Lebensweg zurücksehen: beide kommen nicht daher, daß jene vergangenen Thaten noch ein Dasein hätten: sie sind vergangen, gewesen und jetzt nichts mehr; aber ihre große Wichtigkeit für uns kommt aus ihrer Bedeutung, kommt daher, daß diese Thaten der Ausdruck des Charakters, der Spiegel des Willens sind, in welchen schauend wir unser innerstes Selbst, den Kern unseres Willens erkennen. Weil wir dies also nicht vorher, sondern erst nachher erfahren, kommt es uns zu, in der Zeit zu streben und zu kämpfen, eben damit das Bild, welches wir durch unsere Thaten wirken, so ausfalle, daß sein Anblick uns möglichst beruhige, nicht beängstige. Die Bedeutung aber solcher Beruhigung, oder Seelenangst, wird, wie gesagt, weiter unten untersucht werden.

§ 57. <S.168-S.178>

<S.171> Die Langeweile aber ist nichts weniger, als ein gering zu achtendes Uebel: sie malt zuletzt wahre Verzweiflung auf das Gesicht. Sie macht, das Wesen, welche einander so wenig lieben, wie die Menschen, doch so sehr einander suchen, und wird dadurch die Quelle der Geselligkeit.

<S.172/S.173> Denn das, was man sonst den schönsten Teil, die reinsten Freuden des Lebens nennen möchte, eben auch nur, weil es uns aus dem realen Dasein heraushebt und uns in anteilslose Zuschauer desselben verwandelt, also das reine Erkennen, dem alles Wollen fremd bleibt, der Genuß des Schönen, die echte Freude an der Kunst, dies ist, weil es schon seltene Anlagen erfordert, nur höchst wenigen und auch diesen nur als ein vorübergehender Traum vergönnt: und dann macht eben diese wenigen die höhere intellektuelle Kraft für viel größere Leiden empfänglich, als die Stumpferen je empfinden können, und stellt sie

2-3 Ausschließung des Raumes, unterstrichen: Bleistift. Daneben arR Fragezeichen: Bleistift.
11-12 wir ... Erlösung, unterstrichen: Bleistift. Daneben alR Ausrufezeichen: Bleistift.
17-19 mit ... so alR Randstrich: Bleistift.
23-28 Der ... jämmer-lich, alR Randstrich: Bleistift.
34-40 wie ... wenden. alR doppelter Randstrich: Bleistift.
45-52 Hieraus ... kämpfen, arR Randstrich: Tinte. Daneben Fragezeichen: Tinte. Darunter ***das wäre doch nur ein Scheinkampf.*** :Tinte.
57-58 welche ... lieben, unterstrichen: Bleistift.
62 also ... Wollen unterstrichen: Bleistift.

überdies einsam unter merklich von ihnen verschiedene Wesen: wodurch sich denn auch dieses ausgleicht. Dem bei weitem größten Teile der Menschen aber sind die rein intellektuellen Genüsse nicht zugänglich; der Freude, die im reinen Erkennen liegt, sind sie fast ganz unfähig: sie sind gänzlich auf das Wollen verwiesen. Wenn daher irgend etwas ihnen Anteil abgewinnen, ihnen interessant sein soll, so muß es (dies liegt auch schon in der Wortbedeutung) irgendwie ihren Willen anregen, sei es auch nur durch eine ferne und nur in der Möglichkeit liegende Beziehung auf ihn; er darf aber nie ganz aus dem Spiele bleiben, weil ihr Dasein bei weitem mehr im Wollen als im Erkennen liegt: Aktion und Reaktion ist ihr einziges Element. Die naiven Aeußerungen </> dieser Beschaffenheit kann man aus Kleinigkeiten und alltäglichen Erscheinungen abnehmen: so z.B. schreiben sie an sehenswerten Orten, die sie besuchen, ihre Namen hin, um so zu reagieren, um auf den Ort zu wirken, da er nicht auf sie wirkte: ferner können sie nicht leicht ein fremdes, seltenes Tier bloß betrachten, sondern müssen es reizen, necken, mit ihm spielen, um nur Aktion und Reaktion zu empfinden; ganz besonders aber zeigt jenes Bedürfnis der Willensanregung sich an der Erfindung und Erhaltung des Kartenspieles, welches recht eigentlich der Ausdruck der kläglichen Seite der Menschheit ist. <...>
Die unaufhörlichen Bemühungen, das Leiden zu verbannen, leisten nichts weiter, als daß es seine Gestalt verändert. Diese ist ursprünglich Mangel, Not, Sorge um die Erhaltung des Lebens. Ist es, was sehr schwer hält, geglückt, den Schmerz in dieser Gestalt zu verdrängen, so stellt er sogleich sich in tausend anderen ein, abwechselnd nach Alter und Umständen, als Geschlechtstrieb, leidenschaftliche Liebe, Eifersucht, Neid, Haß, Angst, Ehrgeiz, Geldgeiz, Krankheit u.s.w. u.s.w. Kann er endlich in keiner andern Gestalt Eingang finden, so kommt er im traurigen, grauen Gewand des Ueberdrusses und der Langeweile, gegen welche dann mancherlei versucht wird. Gelingt es endlich diese zu verscheuchen, so wird es schwerlich geschehen, ohne dabei den Schmerz in einer der vorigen Gestalten wieder einzulassen und so den Tanz von vorne zu beginnen; denn zwischen Schmerz und Langerweile wird jedes Menschenleben hin und her geworfen.

<S.174> Wenn wir nun aber erkannt haben, daß der Schmerz als solcher dem Leben wesentlich und unausweichbar ist, und nichts weiter als seine bloße Gestalt, die Form unter der er sich darstellt, vom Zufall abhängt, daß also unser gegenwärtiges Leiden eine Stelle ausfüllt, in welche, ohne dasselbe, sogleich ein anderes träte, das jetzt von jenem ausgeschlossen wird, daß demnach, im wesentlichen, das Schicksal uns wenig anhaben kann; so könnte eine solche Reflexion, wenn sie zur lebendigen Ueberzeugung würde, einen bedeutenden Grad stoischen Gleichmuts herbeiführen und die ängstliche Besorgnis um das eigene Wohl sehr vermindern.

<S.175> Für diese Hypothese spricht nicht nur die bekannte Erfahrung, daß große Leiden alle kleineren gänzlich unfühlbar machen, und umgekehrt, bei Abwesenheit großer Leiden, selbst die kleinsten Unannehmlichkeiten uns quälen und verstimmen; sondern die Erfahrung lehrt auch, daß, wenn ein großes Unglück, bei dessen bloßen Gedanken wir schauderten, nun wirklich eingetreten ist, dennoch unsere Stimmung, sobald wir den ersten Schmerz überstanden haben, im ganzen ziemlich unverändert dasteht; und auch umgekehrt, daß nach dem Eintritt eines langersehnten Glückes, wir uns im ganzen und anhaltend nicht merklich wohler und behaglicher fühlen als vorher. Bloß der Augenblick des Eintritts jener Veränderungen bewegt uns ungewöhnlich stark als tiefer Jammer, oder lauter Jubel; aber beide verschwinden bald, weil sie auf Täuschung beruhten. <...> - Für die aufgestellte Hypothese, der zufolge, wie im Erkennen, so auch im Gefühl des Leidens oder Wohlseins ein sehr großer Teil subjektiv und a priori bestimmt wäre, können noch als Belege die Bemerkungen angeführt werden, daß der menschliche Frohsinn, oder Trübsinn, augenscheinlich nicht durch äußere Umstände, durch Reichtum oder Stand, bestimmt wird; da wir wenigstens ebensoviele frohe Gesichter unter den Armen, als unter den Reichen antreffen: ferner, daß die Motive, auf welche der Selbstmord erfolgt, so höchst verschieden sind; indem wir kein Unglück angeben können, das groß genug wäre, um ihn nur mit vieler Wahrscheinlichkeit, bei jedem Charakter, herbeizuführen, und wenige, die so klein wären, daß nicht ihnen gleichwiegende ihn schon veranlaßt hätten.

<S.176> Diesem entspricht auch die Beobachtung, daß, wenn eine große, uns beklemmende Besorgnis endlich, durch den glücklichen Ausgang, uns von der Brust gehoben wird, alsbald an ihre Stelle eine andere tritt, deren ganzer Stoff schon vorher da war, jedoch nicht als Sorge ins Bewußtsein kommen konnte, weil dieses keine Kapazität dafür übrig hatte, weshalb dieser Sorgestoff bloß als dunkle unbemerkte Nebelgestalt an dessen Horizonts äußerstem Ende stehen blieb. Jetzt aber, da Platz geworden, tritt sogleich dieser fertige Stoff heran und nimmt den Thron der herrschenden (πρυτανευουσα) Besorgnis des Tages ein: wenn er nun auch, der Materie nach, sehr viel leichter ist, als der Stoff jener verschwundenen Besorgnis; so weiß er doch sich so aufzublähen, daß er ihr an scheinbarer Größe gleichkommt und so als Hauptbesorgnis des Tages den Thron vollkommen ausfüllt.

<S.177> Jeder unmäßige Jubel (exultatio, isolens laetitia) beruht immer auf dem Wahn, etwas im Leben gefunden zu haben, was gar nicht darin anzutreffen ist, nämlich dauernde Befriedigung der quälenden, sich stets neu gebärenden Wünsche, oder Sorgen. Von jedem

1-8 ver-]schiedene ... und alR Randstrich: Bleistift.
14-16 Willens-]anregung ... ist. alR vier Randstriche: Bleistift.
19 was ... hält, unterstrichen: Bleistift. Daneben arR Randstrich: Bleistift.
23-24 er ... Langeweile,/dann ... wird. unterstrichen: Bleistift.
30-33 darstellt, ... zur arR Randstrich: Bleistift. Daneben zwei Ausrufezeichen: Bleistift.
42-43 dem ... Glückes,/nicht ... fühlen unterstrichen: Bleistift.
44 stark ... Jubel; unterstrichen: Bleistift.
47-51 die ... Motive, arR Randstrich: Bleistift. Daneben Ausrufezeichen: Bleistift.
55-61 beklem-]mende ... nimmt alR Randstrich: Bleistift.
61-64 den ... ausfüllt. daneben alR ***großartig*** unterstrichen: Bleistift.

einzelnen Wahn dieser Art muß man später unausbleiblich zurückgebracht werden und ihn dann, wann er verschwindet, mit ebenso bittern Schmerzen bezahlen, als sein Eintritt Freude verursachte.

<S.178> So geht es denn entweder ins Unendliche, oder, was seltener ist und schon eine gewisse Kraft des Charakters voraussetzt, bis wir auf einen Wunsch treffen, der nicht erfüllt und doch nicht aufgegeben werden kann: dann haben wir gleichsam was wir suchten, nämlich etwas, das wir jeden Augenblick, statt unseres eigenen Wesens, als die Quelle unserer Leiden anklagen können, und wodurch wir nun mit unserm Schicksal entzweit, dafür aber mit unserer Existenz versöhnt werden, indem die Erkenntnis sich wieder entfernt, daß dieser Existenz selbst das Leiden wesentlich und wahre Befriedigung unmöglich sei. Die Folge dieser letzten Entwickelungsart ist eine etwas melancholische Stimmung, das beständige Tragen eines einzigen, großen Schmerzes und daraus entstehende Geringschätzung aller kleineren Leiden oder Freuden; folglich eine schon würdigere Erscheinung, als das stete Haschen nach immer anderen Truggestalten, welches viel gewöhnlicher ist.

§ 58. <S.178-S.183>

<S.179> Daher kommt es, daß wir der Güter und Vorteile, die wir wirklich besitzen, gar nicht recht inne werden, noch sie schätzen, sondern nicht anders meinen, als eben es müsse so sein: denn sie beglücken immer nur negativ, Leiden abhaltend. Erst nachdem wir sie verloren haben, wird uns ihr Wert fühlbar: denn der Mangel, das Entbehren, das Leiden ist das Positive, sich unmittelbar Ankündigende. Daher auch freut uns die Erinnerung überstandener Not, Krankheit, Mangel u. dgl., weil solche das einzige Mittel die gegenwärtigen Güter zu genießen ist.

<S.179/S.180> Jede epische, oder dramatische Dichtung nämlich kann immer nur ein Ringen, Streben und Kämpfen um Glück, nie aber das bleibende und vollendete Glück selbst darstellen. Sie führt ihren Helden durch tausend Schwierigkeiten und Gefahren bis zum Ziel: sobald es er- </> reicht ist, läßt sie schnell den Vorhang fallen. Denn es bliebe ihr jetzt nichts übrig, als zu zeigen, daß das glänzende Ziel, in welchem der Held das Glück zu finden wähnte, auch ihn nur geneckt hatte, und er nach dessen Erreichung nicht besser daran war, als zuvor. Weil ein echtes, bleibendes Glück nicht möglich ist, kann es kein Gegenstand der Kunst sein.

<S.181> Es ist wirklich unglaublich, wie nichtssagend und bedeutungsleer, von außen gesehen, und wie dumpf und besinnungslos, von innen empfunden, das Leben der allermeisten Menschen dahinfließt. Es ist ein mattes Sehnen und Quälen, ein träumerisches Taumeln durch die vier Lebensalter hindurch zum Tode, unter Begleitung einer Reihe trivialer Gedanken. Sie gleichen Uhrwerken, welche aufgezogen werden und gehen, ohne zu wissen warum; und jedesmal, daß ein Mensch gezeugt und geboren worden, ist die Uhr des Menschenlebens aufs neue aufgezogen, um jetzt ihr schon zahllose Male abgespieltes Leierstück abermals zu wiederholen, Satz vor Satz und Takt vor Takt, mit unbedeutenden Variationen. -

<S.182/S.183> Dämonen, Götter und Heilige schafft sich der Mensch nach seinem eigenen Bilde; diesen müssen dann unablässig Opfer, Gebete, Tempelverzierungen, Gelübde und deren Lösung, Wallfahrten, Begrüßungen, Schmückung der Bilder u.s.w. </> dargebracht werden. Ihr Dienst verwebt sich überall mit der Wirklichkeit, ja verdunkelt diese: jedes Ereignis des Lebens wird dann als Gegenwirkung jener Wesen aufgenommen: der Umgang mit ihnen füllt die halbe Zeit des Lebens aus, unterhält beständig die Hoffnung und wird, durch den Reiz der Täuschung, oft interessanter, als der mit wirklichen Wesen. Er ist der Ausdruck und das Symptom der doppelten Bedürftigkeit des Menschen, teils nach Hilfe und Beistand, und teils nach Beschäftigung und Kurzweil: und wenn er auch dem erstern Bedürfnis oft gerade entgegenarbeitet, indem, bei vorkommenden Unfällen und Gefahren, kostbare Zeit und Kräfte, statt auf deren Abwendung, auf Gebete und Opfer unnütz verwendet werden; so dient er dem zweiten Bedürfnis dafür desto besser, durch jene phantastische Unterhaltung mit einer erträumten Geisterwelt: und dies ist der gar nicht zu verachtende Gewinn aller Superstitionen.

§ 59. <S.183-S.186>

<S.184> Jeder, welcher aus den ersten Jugendträumen erwacht ist, eigene und fremde Erfahrung beachtet, sich im Leben, in der Geschichte der Vergangenheit und des eigenen Zeitalters, endlich in den Werken der großen Dichter umgesehen hat, wird, wenn nicht irgend ein unauslöschlich eingeprägtes Vorurteil seine Urteilskraft lähmt, wohl das Resultat erkennen, daß diese Menschenwelt das Reich des Zufalls und des Irrtums ist, die unbarmherzig darin schalten, im großen, wie im kleinen, neben welchen aber noch Thorheit und Bosheit die Geißel schwingen: daher es kommt, daß jedes Bessere nur mühsam sich durchdrängt, das Edle und Weise sehr selten zur Erscheinung gelangt und Wirksamkeit

2-3 ebenso bittern/sein ... verursachte. unterstrichen: Bleistift.
4-15 ist ... ist. alR Randstrich: Bleistift.
19-22 nur ... über-[standener arR Randstrich: Bleistift.
27-31 er-]reicht ... Kunst alR Randstrich: Bleistift. Darüber aoR ***das ist ein bischen besser geworden*** : Bleistift.
33-37 und wie ... geboren arR Randstrich: Bleistift.
54 Ausgangzeile, darunter ***du kannst auch nicht wissen, ob diese Götterwelt wahr ist oder nicht*** - . :Bleistift. ***auch*** unterstrichen: Bleistift.

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