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GOD THE LIFE-GIVER

4 MACCABEES, *4 EZRA*, AND PAUL'S LETTER TO THE GALATIANS IN CONVERSATION ON THE GIFT OF LIFE

BY

LOWELL ROBERT GRIGGS

SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract

This thesis reads 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* in dialogue with Galatians on the topic of God as life-giver and life as divine gift. Scholars have occasionally noted parallels between the vocabulary and themes of these texts—especially, Gal 3 – 4 and *4 Ezra* 3 – 10 and Gal 5 – 6 and 4 Macc—but their conceptions of divine life-giving benefaction have not been analysed. This thesis aims to fill this scholarly lacuna and, by placing these texts in conversation, to expose and compare the theological logics of Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and *4 Ezra*.

Part one provides separate readings of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* 3 – 10 on divine life-giving benefaction. Chapter one argues that 4 Maccabees' apologetic blending of Hellenistic virtue ethics with Jewish theology depends on a conception of God's gift of the Torah to order the mind at creation as inviolable, while God's life-giving and death-dealing activity in history and at the eschaton grounds and vindicates this order. Chapter two argues that, because *4 Ezra* considers irrevocable the divine donation of life as Torah-ordered freedom at creation, its apocalyptic, two-ages theodicy explains the fall of Zion and occlusion of historical justice as a function of the epistemological (not moral) estrangement of the inhabitants of the fallen, 'dying' cosmos.

Part two reads Galatians from the perspective of the concerns of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. Chapter three considers how the presentations of Eleazar and Ezra as exemplary recipients of Torah-ordered created life raise questions about Paul's understanding of the divine donation of creation and the Torah, given his presentation of himself as an unworthy recipient of life in the Christ-gift (Gal 1 – 2). Chapter four hosts a debate with *4 Ezra* over Paul's reading of scripture and salvation-history (Gal 3 – 4), arguing that Paul considers the law to be fitted to humanity's 'dead' estate in view of the eschatological life created and ordered in the Christ-gift by the Spirit. Chapter five argues, through debate with 4 Maccabees, that Paul's conception of the gift of 'life' to the unworthy 'dead' reaches its climax in an inchoate theory of moral agency and account of moral order (Gal 5 – 6).

In this way, this study unites streams of scholarship on grace and 'life' texts both to further understanding of the theological relation between Paul and his

Jewish contemporaries and to propose a new account of the theological logic of Galatians.

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Declaration

This work has been submitted to Durham University in accordance with the regulations for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It is my own work, and no part of it has been previously submitted to the Durham University or in any other university for a degree.

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Abbreviations

All abbreviations of ancient literature, academic journals, and monograph series follow the forms indicated in the *SBL Handbook of Style: For Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Early Christian Studies* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2006).

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am continually unworthy, and, yet, you remain, turning my eyes to the source of life. Thank you for being my companion and for bearing the daily burdens of this thesis, this life, with me. I love you.

Introduction

'Odd that a thing is most itself when likened…'—Richard Wilbur, 'Lying'

1. Aim of the Study

This study reads Paul's letter to the Galatians in dialogue with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* on the theme of God as life-giver and life as divine gift. Though there are comparative studies of these texts, they differ in focus, scope, and length from the present study. Moreover, this work furthers research on Paul's relation to his Jewish contemporaries by inquiring into the theological and hermeneutical grounds for the differing accounts of both God's life-giving activity and the kind of life he gives in Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and *4 Ezra*. In so doing, the study contributes to the longstanding debate on the character of Paul's theological logic in Galatians by demonstrating that it is his particular construal of God's life-giving activity that distinguishes him both from texts like 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* and from his Jewish-Christian interlocutors in Galatia. Thus, it is in asking and answering why Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and *4 Ezra* affirm God as life-giver but construe both his activity and gift differently that both the task and contribution of this thesis lies.

To get a clear sense of the aims of the present comparison, it is necessary first to situate the analysis within the wider debate about Paul's position within Judaism, on the one hand, and the ongoing reconsideration of Paul's theological logic in Galatians, on the other. Then, we will be in a position to survey the literature related to our theme and texts, in order to define the gap in scholarship this work aims to fill. Finally, because our comparison focuses on a theme that is apt for significant and diverse metaphorical expression, it is necessary to make a few brief methodological remarks on the nature of this comparison and our approach to metaphor before closing with an overview of the thesis. The first two sections of this introduction will contend that while recent work challenging both the paradigms prior to and after E.P. Sanders' *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* is persuasive, there is a need both to extend the analysis to additional texts and to further clarify the theological and hermeneutical differences between Paul and his Jewish-*Christian* opponents and thus his theological logic in Galatians. In the selective history of

research we argue that, despite the paucity of comparisons of our chosen texts on the particular theme of divine life-giving benefaction and the gift of life, a careful exegetical theological comparison of these texts on this theme holds promise in uniting two streams of recent scholarship on divine benefaction and ancient Jewish and Pauline appropriation of biblical 'life' texts.

2. Paul and Judaism, 'Grace' in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*

The twentieth century reconsideration of ancient Jewish soteriology that culminated in E.P. Sanders' *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* is well known and documented.[1] Though Sanders' influence is unquestioned, the precise character of his achievement is in a state of reevaluation.[2] Thus, rather than rehearsing in detail the history of scholarship, we will limit ourselves to select examples that demonstrate the need for this reevaluation, focusing, where possible, on interpretations of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*.[3]

Frustrated by the relative impotence of previous attempts, Sanders aimed to 'destroy' the regnant construal of the relation between Rabbinic and ancient Judaism and Christianity in the New Testament guild, wherein Judaism was considered a religion of legalistic works-righteousness in antithesis to the religion of grace of Pauline Christianity.[4] If Sanders has been successful, it is because he had a point.

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[1] E.P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1977). See e.g. S. Westerholm, 'The "New Perspective" at Twenty-Five', in *Justification and Variegated Nomism: Vol.2, The Paradoxes of Paul* (ed. D.A. Carson, P.T. O'Brien, and M.A. Seifrid; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 1 – 38; J.D.G. Dunn, *The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays* (WUNT II 185; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 1 – 98; and J.M.G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 151 – 165.

[2] For earlier criticism of Sanders' interpretation, see e.g. M.A. Seifrid, *Justification by Faith: The Origin and Development of a Central Pauline Theme* (NovTSup 68; Leiden: Brill, 1992); F. Avemarie, *Tora und Leben: Untersuchungen zur Heilsbedeutung der Tora in der frühen rabbinischen Literatur* (TSAJ 55; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996); D.A. Carson, P.T. O'Brien, and M.A. Seifrid, eds., *Justification and Variegated Nomism: The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001); and S.J. Gathercole, *Where is Boasting?: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul's Response in Romans 1 – 5* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). For recent criticism, see e.g. J.A. Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul's Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation* (NovTSup 152; Leiden: Brill, 2013); O. McFarland, *God and Grace in Philo and Paul* (NovTSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2015); and Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*.

[3] As will become clear, this introduction shares a number of concerns and questions with Linebaugh, McFarland, and Barclay, op. cit.

[4] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, xii. cf. G.F. Moore, 'Christian Writers on Judaism', *HTR* 14 (1921): 197 – 254; W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology* (London: SPCK, 1948).

Beginning with the work on rabbinical theology of Ferdinand Weber,[5] in German scholarship there was, as Sanders claims, a tendency to '[retroject] the Protestant-Catholic debate into ancient history'.[6] In his influential and controversial *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, Wilhelm Bousset, for example, praises Weber's work and reflects its categories.[7] Thus, in a discussion of 'die individuelle Gerichtsgedanke' among 'der führenden Geister im Pharisaïsmus', Bousset concludes: 'Das ewige Leben ist der Lohn der guten Werke der Frommen'.[8] Likewise, elsewhere he portrays this system as a 'Rechenexempel' in which '[d]as Leben… der Fromme bei Gott' has the character of 'einem fortwährenden Ziehen der Bilance'. Thus, acts of charity (Wohltätigkeit) and mercy (Barmherzigkeit) are treated under a heading in the table of contents entitled 'Der Gedanke der verdienstlichen Leistungen'[9] and are identified in the treatment as '*opera supererogationis*' that produce 'einen besondern Lohn'.[10] The problem with this system in which God always calculates and responds to human 'Leistungen' in the form of 'Lohn', according to Bousset, is that the Jewish faith in the 'gütigen und barmherzigen Gott' always stands in 'einer unausgeglichenen Spannung' to the 'gerechten und erbarmungslos strengen Gott', such that one's self-assessment is always one of uncertainty (Unsicherheit).[11] Appealing to *4 Ezra* 7:117 – 119, *1 Enoch* 103, and Wisdom of Solomon 3, Bousset summarises: 'In dieser Welt…steht der Fromme

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[5] Franz Delitzsch and Georg Schnedermann edited two posthumous editions of Weber's work, the first entitled, F.W. Weber, *System der altsynagogalen palästinischen Theologie: aus Targum, Midrasch und Talmud* (Leipzig: Dörffling & Franke, 1880) and the second, more influential, idem, *Jüdische Theologie auf Grund des Talmud und verwandter Schriften: gemeinfasslich dargestellt* (Leipzig: Dörffling & Franke, 1897).

[6] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 57. For other critiques, see e.g. S. Schechter, *Some Aspects of Rabbinic Theology* (New York: Macmillan, 1909); C.G. Montefiore, *Judaism and St. Paul: Two Essays* (New York: Dutton, 1915); H.J. Schoeps, *Paulus: die Theologie des Apostels im Lichte der jüdischen Religionsgeschichte* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1959).

[7] Bousset calls Weber's *Jüdische Theologie*, 'Ein treffliches Hülfsmittel zur Kenntnis der zeitgenössischen pharisäischen Theologie'; W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1903), 52. For immediate criticism of Bousset on philological and historical grounds, see F. Perles, *Bousset's Religion des Judentums: im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter kritisch untersucht* (Berlin: W. Peiser, 1903). For an overview of the reception of and controversy surrounding Bousset's work, see C. Wiese, *Wissenschaft des Judentums und protestantische Theologie im wilhelminischen Deutschland: Ein Schrei ins Leere?* (SR 61; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 140–72.

[8] Bousset, *Die Religion*, 262–63.

[9] Ibid., xiii.

[10] Ibid., 395.

[11] Ibid., 363.

verlassen und greift so wenig von der Gnade seines Gottes'.[12] It is not difficult to discern Lutheran concerns in this analysis. *4 Ezra* does not know *true* grace because it construes divine saving action not according to undeserved mercy but as a corresponding response to human 'Leistungen' in the form of 'Lohn' at the final judgment.

4 Ezra was not only interpreted in this fashion but also played a key role in the story that Bousset and others told about the development of Jewish soteriology. Justus Köberle argues, for example, that *4 Ezra* represents the negative logical culmination of a long line of Jewish thinking on the relationship between God's mercy and the future judgment of individuals. Thus, framed in the context of 'der Kampf um die Heilsgewissheit' in 'spätere Judentum', *4 Ezra* 8:33 – 36 approaches a proper understanding of grace as 'das Vertrauen auf Gottes vergebende Gnade'[13] in opposition to 'das Bemühen durch Treue gegen das Gesetz das jenseitige Erbe zu erlangen'[14] but retreats to 'das alte Lied': 'Die Gerechten' expect 'den Lohn ihrer Arbeit', while 'die Sünder' receive 'keine Gnade' but await rather 'das Gericht'.[15] Bousset and Köberle evaluate Jewish soteriology according to their Protestant terms, which set mercy and justice, grace and reward, and faith and works in antithesis without considering whether such antitheses are appropriate to *4 Ezra*. The same antithetical paradigm is assumed in contemporaneous interpretation of 4 Maccabees. Thus, while Bousset asserts '[d]as Centrum der Frömmigkeit ist der Glaube' in 4 Maccabees, this assertion occurs within the context of a criticism of 'jüdische Gesetzesfrömmigkeit', which 'verhindert… den Durchbruch der Erkenntnis der fundamentalen Bedeutung des Glaubens'.[16] This 'fundamental meaning' is revealed in the opposition 'Werke oder Glaube'.[17] Similarly, R.B. Townshend, holding that 4 Maccabees antedates Christianity, writes that its author 'has naturally no inspired

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[12] Ibid., 352.

[13] J. Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade im religiösen Leben des Volkes Israel bis auf Christum: eine Geschichte des vorchristlichen Heilsbewusstseins* (München: C.H. Beck, 1905), 658.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid. For the same paradigm in Anglophone scholarship on *4 Ezra*, see e.g. G.H. Box, '4 Ezra', in *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (ed. R. H. Charles; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:555. G.H. Box, *The Ezra-Apocalypse: Being Chapters 3 - 14 of the Book Commonly Known as 4 Ezra (or II Esdras)* (London: Sir Isaac Pitman, 1912), xlviii. H.M. Hughes, *The Ethics of Jewish Apocryphal Literature* (London: Charles H. Kelly, 1910), 144, 240–41.

[16] Bousset, *Die Religion*, 176–77.

[17] Ibid., 177.

anticipation of the Christian doctrine of God's grace whereby sinners may be led into the way of truth…'[18] He is 'a Jew to the core, and his conclusion is preemptory; for him the Law is the last word'.[19] Thus, as with *4 Ezra*, so with 4 Maccabees: a number of scholars assume a univocal definition of grace *apart from works*.

Given Sanders' express aims in *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, we might expect a thorough debunking of these 'Pauline' theological impositions. On *4 Ezra,* Sanders, however, agrees: 'in IV Ezra one sees how Judaism works when it actually does become a religion of individual self-righteousness.'[20] This is so, for Sanders, because, Palestinian Judaism exhibits the pattern of 'covenantal nomism',[21] while *4 Ezra* breaks this pattern: 'obedience maintains one's position in the covenant, but it does not earn God's grace as such', but in *4 Ezra*, 'God has no concern for sinners but will save only the righteous, who are perfect like Ezra.'[22] Thus, Sanders agrees with Bousset and Köberle on *4 Ezra*: 'God's character as compassionate, gracious, forgiving and the like is effectively denied'.[23] The basic problem with this view is the assumption that grace must be defined with reference to God's merciful character either apart from or despite human activity.[24] Thus, at the point where Sanders *agrees* with those whom he criticises, his Protestant assumptions emerge most clearly. As we will argue, however, *4 Ezra* emphatically prioritises divine action as *grace* while insisting that *this* grace is in harmony with salvation *via* judgment according to obedience to the law. There is no ultimate tension between the two in *4 Ezra*.

Though Sanders gave no attention to 4 Maccabees, his influence may be seen in an important article on νόμος in 4 Maccabees. For Paul Redditt asserts that '*Nomos* is not conceived [in 4 Maccabees] in a narrowly legalistic fashion',[25] explaining that it is not 'fear of eternal punishment' but 'positive expectation of reward' that serves as

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[18] R.B. Townshend, 'The Fourth Book of Maccabees', in *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (ed. R.H. Charles; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:653. Cf. Hughes, *Ethics*, 233.

[19] Townshend, 'Fourth Maccabees', 2:664.

[20] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 409.

[21] Ibid., 422.

[22] Ibid., 412–13.

[23] Ibid., 415.

[24] For a critique of 'grace' as a dispoition and his alternate conception of 'Die χάρις als Geschehen', see R. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (7th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1977), 287 – 92.

[25] P.L. Redditt, 'The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees', *CBQ* 45 (1983): 253.

the motivation for the martyrs' self-offering.[26] In support, Redditt cites 'the view that *nomos* would not condemn [the martyrs] and God would pardon them for acts committed in fear (8:22)'.[27] That is, God would, as Antiochus asserts, 'be merciful to [those] who act contrary to the law because of compulsion' (8:14). Though Sanders' influence is not explicit, it is enough to notice that the same view separates Sanders from other interpreters of Palestinian Jewish texts and Redditt from other interpreters of 4 Maccabees. Whereas Redditt sees mercy *apart from obedience* in 4 Maccabees, Townshend does not. As we will argue in chapter one, the brothers' resistance to Antiochus' line of argument belies Redditt's claim. In agreeing, however, that mercy *should not* be conditioned on law-observance, neither Redditt nor Townshend consider the possibility that grace or mercy can be defined differently.

A number of interpretations of Judaism around the turn of the twentieth century assumed or constructed a linear evolutionary trajectory that reached its 'proper' climax in (their respective versions of) Christianity. These schemes projected a legalistic works-righteousness soteriology onto these texts as a theological foil to a 'Pauline' religion of antithetical 'grace'. The irony, however, is that *Sanders* has assumed that grace is 'groundless', 'free', 'not earned', and 'unmerited', and thus imposed a univocal theological definition onto the Jewish texts he interprets.[28] This study will argue that Galatians, *4 Ezra*, and 4 Maccabees each represent divine gifts as both constitutive of human action and the criterion by which such action is evaluated. Yet, the specific differences in these accounts of 'grace' disclose their unique and ultimately opposed theological accounts. Thus, by attending to the specific differences in their respective accounts of divine benefaction and divine gifts, this thesis will aim to contribute to the ongoing reevaluation of the writings of Paul and his Jewish contemporaries on 'grace' and to reframe and resolve a number of specific issues of interpretation. In this regard, our primary contribution will be a reevaluation of the theological logic of Galatians, a topic on which Sanders and those who followed him have been quite influential.

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 394 – 96. Rightly, Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 6; McFarland, *God and Grace*, 7.

3. Paul's Logic in Galatians

As a natural corollary to his interpretation of Palestinian Judaism, Sanders aimed to 'argue for a certain understanding of Paul'.[29] Put simply: if grace is univocal in these texts (except *4 Ezra*), how and why does Paul differ from his Jewish contemporaries? Whereas, for example, Bultmann interpreted Paul's logic as grounded in the justification of the sinner as conceived from the perspective of faith,[30] Sanders construed it as the experience of participation in Christ.[31] As we will see, Sanders' construal of Paul's logic proved both controversial and fecund, especially regarding Galatians. Yet, for our purposes, William Horbury made the most prescient early criticism, remarking that Sanders' Paul and his Jewish contemporaries 'pass like ships in the night'.[32] This perceived lack of contact was the impetus for the family of explanations known as the 'New Perspective on Paul'.[33] Though the New Perspective family of views is diverse, their likeness includes both the conviction that Sanders' critique of the 'traditional' paradigm of Judaism is correct and that an alternative to Sanders' dogmatic interpretation is necessary. Paul is neither opposing individualistic legalism, nor promoting Christological dogmatism, but rather fighting Jewish ethnocentrism or nationalism.[34] In other words, Paul's arguments are covenantal and missionary in character—having to do with the broadened basis for the inclusion of the Gentiles among the people of God *post Christum*.[35]

As we consider further in chapters four and five, these two construals have come to dominate discussion of Paul's theological logic in Galatians. With regard to the account of Paul's target as 'national righteousness' or 'ethnocentrism', this study will analyse the argumentative function of the Jewish food laws and circumcision in Galatians and 4 Maccabees.[36] That is, we will ask why both texts regard these

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[29] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, xii.

[30] Bultmann, *Theologie*, 315–20.

[31] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 447–53.

[32] W. Horbury, 'Paul and Judaism', *ExpTim* 90 (1979): 116.

[33] J.D.G. Dunn, 'The New Perspective on Paul', *BJRL* 65 (1983): 95 – 122.

[34] N.T. Wright, 'The Paul of History and the Apostle of Faith', *TynB* 29 (1978): 61 – 88; J.D.G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998).

[35] D.B. Garlington, *The Obedience of Faith: A Pauline Phrase in Historical Context* (WUNT II 38; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 265: Paul's arguments are over 'a more ethnically inclusive vision of God and his love over against one which was more nationally restrictive.'

[36] For a recent re-examination of the lexical issues with an overview of the literature on the works of the law, see L. Doering, '4QMMT and the Letters of Paul: Selected Aspects of Mutual Illumination', in *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Pauline Literature* (ed. J.S. Rey; STDJ 102; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 69 – 87.

practices as the fulcrum on which their respective arguments pivot—i.e., not as matters of relative cultural accommodation but categorical theological repudiation.[37] Why would accepting the practice of circumcision render the benefit of Christ null and void (Gal 5:2);[38] why would eating pork entail the very destruction of the ancestral law (4 Macc 5:33)? For Paul's opponents thought the Gentiles *could* be included in Torah-terms,[39] and 4 Maccabees could hardly be more Hellenising but draws the *theological* line at circumcision and food laws. As we will see in chapter one, 4 Maccabees resists interpretation in the terms of a distinction between individual and national righteousness, as the Torah orders both the self and society as a matter of the created design of the cosmos. This raises the possibility that Paul's relativising of Jewish practices has not simply a national but also an anthropological significance.

Along with the problem of contact raised by Horbury, the 'dogmatic' account of Paul's logic in Galatians has a more fundamental difficulty. That is, Paul, at least in Galatians, is not arguing with Jews but Jewish Christians and the Gentiles they seek to influence.[40] Consequently, if Paul is appealing to his experience of participation in Christ or the powerful work of the Spirit *per se*, then such an appeal is question-begging. What is at issue in Galatia is not the experience of salvation in Christ or the Spirit but *the meaning of these* and, specifically, their implications for observance of the law in the church.[41] Though Paul could be begging the question, we will pursue the possibility that his argument is valid—that he has a different *understanding* of the Christ-event.

This logical problem is illustrated by Sanders' interpretation of Gal 3:21, a text which will also serve as an introduction to the particular theme of this study—divine life-giving benefaction and the gift of life. After a brief exposition of Galatians in support of his argument that, for Paul, solution precedes plight, Sanders concludes:

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[37] For example, fulfilment of the covenant with 'the advent of Christ' (Dunn, 'New Perspective', 114) excludes Torah practices *only if* we consider these merely cultural and not creational.

[38] J.M.G. Barclay, 'Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of Galatians', *ABR* 58 (2010): 37.

[39] Already in Dunn, 'The New Perspective', 112 – 13.

[40] Rightly noted by Dunn; ibid., 111.

[41] Barclay, 'Battle', 44.

> Throughout [Galatians], the argument is *dogmatic*; there is *no* analysis of the human situation which results in the conclusion that doing the law leads to boasting and estrangement from God. Gal. 2.21 and 3.21 seem to be substantially the same and to give the main thrust of Paul's thought: if one could be righteous by the law Christ need not have died; if the law could make alive, one could be righteous by the law. The inference which the reader must draw from the last passage is that no law was given which could make alive and that righteousness must come another way. He has already said how it comes: by the death of Christ and by faith.[42]

In support, Sanders appeals to the Galatians' receipt of the Spirit (Gal 3:1 – 5): 'the Spirit is the guarantee of salvation; the Spirit came by faith; therefore it cannot come any other way'.[43] This appeal, again, does not consider that the receipt of the Spirit was a shared experience of the Galatians and Paul's Jewish Christian interlocutors, but they fail to draw the same inference from this experience. Is Paul talking past them, or is there a deeper hermeneutical and theological difference?

Sanders' dogmatic reading of this text has been influential. Richard Hays appeals to Sanders for support in his account of the 'narrative logic' of Galatians.[44] Likewise, though his retention of the notion of human inability is opposed to the interpretations of Sanders and Krister Stendahl[45], Barry Matlock concedes that 'Sanders rightly notes' that Gal 3:21 pertains to 'Paul's present view of what God's plan was all along'. And, though they disagree on human inability, Matlock's general explanation of Paul's logic is identical to Sanders: '[I]t is not necessary to reconstruct either a legalistic or perfectionistic strand within Judaism against which Paul can be seen more cogently to be arguing. Paul's perspective on the law at this point, as at many others, is Christological and retrospective.'[46] Thus, among both proponents and some opponents of Sanders' reading of Paul's theological logic in Galatians, there is fundamental agreement on the 'dogmatic' character of Paul's argument. It is 'Christological and retrospective', but, again, why do Paul's opponents disagree with him on the *implications of Christology* for observance of the

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[42] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 484.

[43] Ibid.

[44] See e.g. R.B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1 – 4:11* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 113, n. 89; 178 – 179; Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, 154.

[45] K. Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles – and Other Essays* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 80–81; Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 443, nn. 4, 479, 23.

[46] R.B. Matlock, 'Helping Paul's Argument Work? The Curse of Galatians 3.10 – 14', in *Torah in the New Testament* (ed. M. Tait and P. Oakes; LNTS 401; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 177 – 78.

law in the church? In this connection, our argument depends on recognising another cluster of questions left largely unasked and unanswered by Sanders and others—viz. what does Paul mean in Gal 3:21 by implying that the law is given to the 'dead', to people in need of being 'made alive' (ζῳοποιέω)? As we will argue, though they construe God's life-giving benefactions differently, a recognition that Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and *4 Ezra* consider God as the giver of life-giving gifts provides an angle of vision that illumines the theological logic of each text.

4. History of Research: Grace and Life, Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and *4 Ezra*

Because our topic draws together two themes—grace and life—that have received no attention together and little focused attention separately in the literature on our texts, it will be necessary to trace the history of research so that both the gap this study seeks to fill is outlined and the manner in which we seek to fill it is justified. Thus, we must selectively survey three groups of literature: 1) studies that situate grace in Pauline and Jewish texts within the context of gift-giving in antiquity; 2) works that address 'life' and life texts; and 3) comparisons of Galatians and 4 Maccabees or *4 Ezra*.

'Grace' as Gift in Pauline and Jewish Texts

Several studies that examine the Pauline and Jewish literature in the context of ancient systems of benefaction are germane to our review and illustrative of our purpose.[47] Though he gives no sustained attention to the motif in Galatians, *4 Ezra*, or 4 Maccabees, James Harrison provides an extensive survey and analysis of the word χάρις in ancient inscriptions, papyri, first-century Jewish literature and inscriptions, Greco-Roman philosophical literature, and the literature of Paul

[47] For the seminal study of 'le système des dons éxchangés' (197) see, M. Mauss, 'Essai sur le don: forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques', in *Sociologie et Anthropologie* (Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1950), 145 – 279; M. Mauss, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (trans. W.D. Halls; New York: W.W. Norton, 2000). For an overview of the anthropology of 'gift' and its use within the humanities, see now Barclay, *Gift*, 11–65. For additional works on 'gift' relevant to biblical studies, see S. Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul's Collection* (WUNT II 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000); Z.A Crook, *Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, and Conversion in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean* (BZNW 130; Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2004); and the essential epigraphic study F.W. Danker, *Benefactor: Epigraphic Study of a Graeco-Roman and New Testament Semantic Field* (St. Louis: Clayton Pub. House, 1982).

(focused on Romans). Though Harrison demonstrates his thesis that 'the Graeco-Roman [*sic*] benefaction context of χάρις is the backdrop for Paul's understanding of divine and human grace', his particular account of that context and the relation of Paul and other Jewish writers to it is problematic.[48] Two interrelated problems have to do with Harrison's imposition of 'merit' or 'contractual' categories and the understanding of reciprocity in gift-exchange. Thus, at the end of his survey of χάρις in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Harrison suggests that 'a merit theology regarding almsgiving' in some of these texts subverts the post-Sanders consensus in which 'a unilateral and covenantal understanding of grace dominated first-century Judaism'.[49] The fundamental problem here is Harrison's assumption that divine-human gift-exchange that produces reciprocity necessarily entails an economic or contractual relation, which thus leads him to a preference, with Sanders, for 'unilateral and covenantal' grace. Thus, Harrison specifies the conceptual target of 'Paul's emphasis on the unilateral nature of grace' as 'the idea that God was compelled by acts of human piety to reciprocate beneficently'.[50] Relatedly, Harrison sometimes operates with an anachronistic concept of χάρις itself: for Paul's very use, he thinks, risks misunderstanding 'God's unilateral grace as some kind of reciprocal contract'.[51] On the contrary, the giving and receiving of gifts produces not economic or contractual but personal obligations in Paul's context. *Because* the obligation to reciprocate is interpersonal and voluntary, God could choose *not* to reciprocate (and that for a variety of reasons)—ending the relationship.

The monograph of Seth Schwartz is relevant here, as he situates Jewish conceptions of benefaction in their Mediterranean context, while insisting on a significant divergence on the matter of reciprocity.[52] Schwartz finds evidence of the rejection of reciprocity at the exact point where Harrison detects a merit theology—viz., in Jewish almsgiving or, as Schwartz prefers, 'charitable donation'.[53] According to Schwartz, the Torah envisions and later Jewish literature reflects, at least ideally, a

[48] J.R. Harrison, *Paul's Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context* (WUNT II 172; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 1.

[49] Ibid., 113.

[50] Ibid., 18.

[51] Ibid., 35.

[52] S. Schwartz, *Were the Jews a Mediterranean Society?: Reciprocity and Solidarity in Ancient Judaism* (Princeton: PUP, 2010).

[53] Ibid., 18–19.

rejection of the sort of institutional interpersonal dependence entailed by Greco-Roman schemes of 'friendship' and 'patronage' in favour of 'pure, unreciprocated gift'.[54] Though it is not necessary, with Harrison, to construe divine return as merited, it is necessary, *contra* Schwartz, to recognise divine return as the ground and driving impetus for almsgiving in some of these texts. That is, it is not that the beneficent do not expect a return in giving to the poor, but rather that they expect a return from *God*.[55] Moreover, unlike Schwartz, we are not concerned with 'ideal types' but rather how schemes of benefaction were used in figuring God as life-giver in particular texts.[56] Thus, as we will argue, it is the recognition of God as Benefactor in 4 Maccabees that enables the martyrs to reject Antiochus Epiphanes' offer of friendship, in expectation that their lives, when *fittingly* offered back to God, would be *fittingly* returned by him. Though it is possible that divine reciprocity is rejected in our texts, it is more likely, if our texts differ, that they differ on the interpersonal logic of reciprocity. In the terms of our study, if created life is given differently by God in our texts, does this configure the human return of life differently, and, in turn, does the divine receipt and further return of that life also differ?

The studies of Jonathan Linebaugh and Orrey McFarland are relevant at this point, as they, unlike Harrison and Schwartz, are more successful in mitigating the risk of imposition. To mitigate this risk, both Linebaugh and McFarland produce full and close exegetical readings of their Jewish texts (Wisdom of Solomon and Philo, respectively) first, in order to allow the respective conceptions of grace in these texts to emerge fully, with their theological and hermeneutical bases exposed. In this way, the conceptions of divine benefaction (and human in McFarland) of the Jewish texts set the agenda for a robust conversation with Pauline texts. The general result is that Wisdom, Philo, and Paul each thematise grace emphatically, though each defines grace differently. Thus, Linebaugh summarises the difference between Wisdom and Romans this way:

> For *Wisdom*, the one God's particular and discriminate acts of saving grace are a necessary instantiation of divine justice. For Paul, by contrast, it is because the saving event of divine righteousness and grace that Paul calls 'the

[54] Ibid., 134.
[55] Barclay, *Gift*, 44, n. 121.
[56] Schwartz, *Jews a Mediterranean Society?*, 15–16.

> redemption that is in Christ Jesus' (Rom 3.24) is unconditioned by any criterion of human worth, including worth defined in terms of Jewish ethnicity or law-observance, that the Christ-gift is given to Jew and Gentile, male and female, slave and free.[57]

Linebaugh further explicates the basic theological grounding of these differences in Wisdom's 'protology' and Paul's event-focused Christology, such that the anthropological differences between the two texts are rooted in Wisdom's 'symmetrical structuring of the cosmos fashioned and ordered by σοφία' and, by contrast, Romans' conception of 'the unconditioned and centrifugally significant divine act that is the history and proclamation of Jesus Christ'.[58] McFarland comes to similar general conclusions, when he contrasts Philo's conception of 'divine generosity' as '*cosmological* and *causative*' with Paul's 'understanding of grace' as '*Christological* and *creative*' (ital. orig.).[59] It would not be fair to reduce the results of these nuanced and significant studies to these similar conclusions, but, for the purposes of this introduction, we must focus on the convergence of the conclusions on what Linebaugh dubs 'the Christological fault-line'.[60] For, in both studies, the differing construals of definitive divine gift-giving are traced exegetically to cosmological conceptions, for Wisdom and Philo, and Christological conceptions, in Romans and Paul, generally. Moreover, McFarland's argument for Paul's 'creative' understanding of grace, specifically in terms of 'a saving event which effects new creation and new life for its recipients', vis-à-vis the recognition of cosmological accounts of grace in Wisdom and Philo raises but does not resolve the very questions this study seeks to address.[61] That is, *why* and in *what respects* are 'new creation' and 'new life' not only effected by the Christ-gift in Galatians but *needed*? Moreover, does the cosmological/Christological fault-line hold for our comparative texts? And, if so, how might an examination of the conceptions of grace in Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and *4 Ezra* with a focus on their respective conceptions of God as life-giver and life as a divine gift further analysis not only of the respective theological logics of these texts but also the particular argumentative force of Paul's Christology in Galatians?

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[57] Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 236.
[58] Ibid., 224, 226.
[59] McFarland, *God and Grace*, 186–87.
[60] Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 177–79, 227.
[61] McFarland, *God and Grace*, 227.

'Life' in Pauline and Jewish Texts

In the wake of Sanders' dogmatic account, there has been a reevaluation and subsequent debate over the interpretation of 'life' texts (e.g., Lev 18:5; Dt 30:15 – 20) and what Paul and his Jewish contemporaries mean by 'life'. Consistent with Sanders' contention that 'nomism' is about 'staying in', several studies limit the meaning of these texts and Paul's interpretation to their social function.[62] Thus, Dunn argues that, in Gal 3:11 – 12 for Paul, Hab 2:4 provides the ground for righteousness, while Lev 18:5 specifies the manner in which that righteousness is to be lived out in covenant community.[63] The problem Paul has with his Jewish Christian interlocutors is not soteriological but social: 'his fellow Jews have put too much emphasis on that secondary [regulatory] stage.'[64] N.T. Wright similarly interprets over-emphasis on life within the Torah boundaries in racial terms.[65] Though these approaches rightly highlight the social dimensions of Paul's context and arguments, they are deficient on both theological and exegetical grounds. Again, it is not clear why, theologically, Gentiles could not be included within the church in Torah terms. Exegetically, Dunn's reading of Lev 18:5 fails within both its canonical OT context and Galatians 3. Israel's manner of life is not associated with regulation for regulation's sake in Lev 18 but with avoiding the fate of expulsion from the land that awaits those whom Israel is displacing (Lev 18:24, 28),[66] and such a 'results-oriented' context is apparent, for Paul, from the explicit appeal to the curses of Dt 27:26 and 21:23 in Gal 3:10 and 3:13, respectively. Nonetheless, this regulatory reading does raise an important issue for our study, for, if Paul does deny that life within the law leads to soteriological life, then this raises the question, as Wakefield

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[62] This interpretation of Lev 18:5 was first introduced in G. Howard, 'Christ the End of the Law: the Meaning of Rom 10:4ff', *JBL* 88 (1969): 331 – 37.

[63] J.D.G. Dunn, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1993), 174–75. Cf. Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, 152–53.

[64] Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, 153.

[65] N.T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 149. For Dunn's use of racial categories, see Dunn, 'The New Perspective', 105, 108, 114, 115.

[66] Rightly noted by Gathercole with respect to Dunn's reading of Ezekiel 20; S.J. Gathercole, 'Torah, Life, and Salvation', in *From Prophecy to Testament: the Function of the Old Testament in the New* (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 127 – 28. Wright recognises this *telos* of the regulations, but does not consider how it might relate to Paul's reading in an eschatological register; Wright, *Climax*, 150. For the 'regulative' reading of Lev 18:5 in Rom 10, see Dunn, *Theology of Paul*, 152–53.

recognises, of the proper regulation of life that corresponds to 'faith' and is characteristic of the church.[67] As we will argue in chapter 5, 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* would pose this sort of question, and Paul's answer to it is vital to his argument in Galatians.

In contrast to this regulatory view, we should survey the essay of Shannon Burkes on 'life' in *4 Ezra* and the studies of Simon Gathercole and Preston Sprinkle on 'life' in readings of Lev 18:5. Though Burkes is not interested in pushing below the similarities and differences between *4 Ezra* and other texts to their ultimate theological differences, her essay illumines how *4 Ezra* modulates traditional arguments for the relation of the Torah and Wisdom in an eschatological key.[68] Thus, Burkes provides a clear argument for *4 Ezra*'s reading of the promise of life in Dt 30 in eschatological terms, which she attributes to the belief (arising from the Destruction in 70 C.E.) that 'the creation itself is already becoming old and dying' and, thus, 'the present world no longer holds out the possibility for life in a meaningful sense of the word'.[69] Consequently, Burkes' essay supports the contention of Gathercole, who surveys a number of readings of Lev 18:5 in Christian and Jewish literature of the Second Temple Period and concludes that the Judaism Paul is arguing with thought 'in terms of obedience, final judgment, and eternal life' and not 'sin-repentance-forgiveness or sin-exile-restoration'.[70] Sprinkle expands on this analysis by not only examining more texts but also by considering the question of Paul's theological logic. He argues that Paul's reading of Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:12 'exhibits an antithesis between divine and human agency' that is grounded on his conception of a humanity that is 'in bondage to the present evil age'.[71]

Though we will find reason to agree with the position of Gathercole and Sprinkle that soteriological life is in view in Gal 3:12, there are remaining issues. As we will argue in chapter five, this position still raises the question, even for eschatologically-oriented Jewish readers, of the regulatory framework appropriate to

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[67] A.H. Wakefield, *Where to Live: the Hermeneutical Significance of Paul's Citations from Scripture in Galatians 3:1 – 14* (AcBib 14; Atlanta: SBL, 2003).

[68] S. Burkes, '"Life" Redefined: Wisdom and Law in Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch', *CBQ* 63 (2001): 55 – 71.

[69] Ibid., 61.

[70] Gathercole, 'Torah, Life, and Salvation', 144.

[71] P.M. Sprinkle, *Law and Life: The Interpretation of Leviticus 18:5 in Early Judaism and in Paul* (WUNT II 241; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 152.

'faith'. Likewise, as we will argue in chapter four, from the perspective of texts like *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees, Sprinkle's Paul does not explain why divine prior action in *creation* was not sufficient to establish human agency. In this connection, Sprinkle's appeal to the motif of slavery to cosmic powers as the ground for the divine-human agency antithesis leaves unanswered the most basic questions: *why* is humanity enslaved, *what* does the Torah have to do with this estate, and *why*, of necessity, should the expression of the liberty won or life created by Christ *not be Torah-ordered*? That is, *why* is the Torah *necessarily* classed as 'a merely human way of appropriating eschatological life', or, put differently, *why* and *in what sense* must 'eschatological life' be 'created by divine action, the revelation of Christ in Paul' and, thereby, *not Torah-ordered*?[72] Gathercole and Sprinkle have established the eschatological register of Paul's argument, but Sprinkle's analysis of Paul's theological logic is limited both by his generalised account of divine and human agency and his focus on Paul's citation of Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:12 in the context of Gal 3. In this regard, by pursuing a dialogue with *4 Ezra* on divine life-giving benefaction and the gift of life across the textual territory of Gal 3 – 4, we aim to clarify the development of Paul's theological logic and thus set the stage for a debate between 4 Maccabees and Paul on Gal 5 – 6 on the status of created human life under the law. We will argue that it is there, in the last two chapters of Galatians that the material ground of Paul's theological logic is exposed.

Finally, a work by John Yates should be mentioned, because, though there are only two brief excurses on Galatians, it develops an argument about Paul's conception of the Spirit as life-giver that is essential for our purposes.[73] After treating the Spirit and creation in the Hebrew Bible, LXX, Dead Sea scrolls, other Second Temple works, the Targums and the Rabbis and then providing a focused analysis of the same motif in the *Hodayot*, Yates argues that Paul deploys the language and metaphors of Gen 2 and Ezek 36 – 37 in 1 Cor 15, 2 Cor 3 – 5, and Rom 5 – 8 to portray the Spirit, not as the agent of ethical empowerment but as the divine agent who brings about new creation within history. Thus, in his reading of the crucifixion of the flesh and life in the Spirit in Gal 5:24, 25, he concludes that, given the

[72] Ibid., 155–56.
[73] J.W. Yates, *The Spirit and Creation in Paul* (WUNT II 251; Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 120 – 21, 170 – 72.

traditions he has traced, 'this [reference to life] must be considered in some way to be resurrection life. The spirit has not simply indwelt in order to empower. The spirit has indwelt so as to give new life'.[74] The key point for the present study is that, though the reduction of life in the Spirit to ethical enabling begs the question of *why* ethical enabling cannot take the shape of Torah-observance, an account of the Spirit as giving *new* eschatological life opens up the possibility of thinking of created life and eschatological life, though related, as categorically distinct.[75] In other words, if what the Spirit creates is a *new* life altogether, a life which is *necessarily* not coincident with the Torah, is there some sense in which the Torah is *integral* to the 'old creation' but not the 'new'? In the context of a dialogue with texts like 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, this question is foregrounded for Paul. For, as we will argue, these texts conceive of both creation and eschatological reality as Torah-ordered. Nonetheless, Yates' work, though brief and not turned toward the question of the theological logic of Galatians, forces us to inquire after the entailments of Paul's deployment of traditional 'life' motifs, a task that is central to the present work and which will be discussed in more detail in our discussion of metaphor below.

Comparisons of Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra

Though not on our particular topic, two studies by Francis Watson offer brief but significant comparisons of our texts, and John Barclay's *Paul and the Gift* addresses divine benefaction in *4 Ezra* and Galatians. In an essay comparing 4 Maccabees, *4QMMT*, and Galatians, Watson argues that the Pauline antithesis between faith and works depends on Paul's conception of the priority of divine over human agency in soteriology, a conception that is revealed in comparison to be a hermeneutical *construction*.[76] That is, whether Paul's view of Lev 18:5 'corresponds to the realities of Second Temple Judaism' is 'a matter of perspective'.[77] This is an

[74] Ibid., 172.

[75] We take up, for example, in chapter five Yates' suggestion that an account of 'life-giving spirit language for Paul' as creative not simply empowering 'challenges part of Todd Wilson's thesis' (171). Cf. T.A. Wilson, *The Curse of the Law and the Crisis in Galatia: Reassessing the Purpose of Galatians* (WUNT II 225; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 117–38.

[76] F. Watson, 'Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and Other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and Human Agency', in *Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment* (ed. S.J. Gathercole and J.M.G. Barclay; LNTS 335; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 99 – 116.

[77] Ibid., 116.

essential point for our purposes, for, though Watson treats the various sources of these texts' differing interpretations of the law's soteriology briefly, there is a clear recognition here that these differences depend on the more basic theological systems of each text and their respective differences. Moreover, as we suggested regarding Sprinkle and as we shall see, given the accounts of the *creational* institution of human agency in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, we may have reason to doubt that 'the great antithesis between divine and human agency' is sufficient to explain Paul's basic theological differences with his interlocutors.[78] Specifically, though a comparison of our texts may corroborate Watson's contention that the Pauline faith and works antithesis is indeed a theological and hermeneutical construction, we will explore the possibility that it is in their particular and differing conceptions of divine life-giving action, not a general and only Pauline conception, that generate their differing perspectives on divine and human agency and the Torah's relation to these.

In *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith*, Watson lays out in fuller detail his analysis of Paul and his fellow Jews as those who 'read the same texts, yet read them differently'.[79] Most striking for our purposes, his treatment of *4 Ezra* takes pride of place as the climactic conversation before the conclusion to the book. Moreover, though mostly in comparison with Romans, Watson identifies three significant similarities between Ezra and Paul. Like Paul, Ezra initially resists the soteriology of the, as Watson rightly recognises, conceptually 'interchangeable' texts of Dt 30:19 and Lev 18:5,[80] he is the recipient of an apocalypse (Gal 1:16; 3:23),[81] and he too radicalises the Deuteronomic curse (cf. Gal 3:10), such that Ezra's view is 'very similar' to Paul's perspective that 'the pervasive reality of death' rules out 'the law's conditional offer of life' and does so 'from the very outset'.[82] These points of contact, in light of Watson's further contention that Gal 3 is Paul's *reading* of the Pentateuch 'co-ordinated with Paul's christological proclamation', suggest the potential fruitfulness of a fuller close reading of Galatians with *4 Ezra*.[83] For, though Watson's analysis identifies a number of the similarities and differences between Paul and

[78] Ibid.
[79] F. Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith* (2nd ed.; London: T&T Clark, 2015), xi.
[80] Ibid., 465.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid., 469.
[83] Ibid., 474.

Ezra's 'engagement with Moses' final address', his analysis of the theological basis of their differences is focused on his reading of Rom 5:12 – 21 and restricted to the observation that, for Paul, the fact that 'the law is enclosed and limited by the Genesis promise…and its fulfillment in Christ' renders 'Ezra's despair at the human predicament…without foundation'.[84]

This brief analysis of theological difference, though suggestive, leaves open the question of *why* Ezra (and *4 Ezra*) reads similar sacred texts and the same salvation-history so differently from Paul in Gal 3 – 4. Moreover, though a debated matter, Watson's contention that Ezra does not, ultimately, accept Uriel's view but maintains his 'solidarity with sinners' is not only open to question but possibly an occlusion of *4 Ezra's* ultimate position on the relationship between divine mercy and eschatological justice.[85] That is, Watson's contention that a reading of episode four as Ezra's conversion precludes '[c]orrelations between Paul's understanding of grace and Ezra's appeal to divine mercy' depends on his view that such a conversion amounts to an '[abandonment of Ezra's] former belief in the covenant with Israel and in the saving power of the divine mercy'.[86] Yet, this position assumes that Uriel's argument itself does not amount to a *redefinition* of the covenantal relationship between divine mercy and eschatological justice, such that this justice is itself an expression of mercy for *the righteous*. In other words, Watson seems to assume that grace/mercy is antithetical to justice, but is this the case, ultimately, for *4 Ezra*? For example, when Ezra argues that, in considering God's 'limit/death' for her son just, the pious Mother Zion will receive him back from the dead (*4 Ezra* 10:15 – 16, 24), is this not justice-shaped mercy (cf. 14:34)? Likewise, when Paul argues that the death of Jesus is an act of curse-bearing (Gal 3:13), is this not mercy-shaped justice? If these construals are correct, then the natural question is *why*, ultimately, justice and mercy in these texts are correlated differently.

John Barclay's recent book is the nearest in intention and design to our study, as it is the only work offering close exegetical and theological treatment of *4 Ezra* and Galatians on divine benefaction. Deploying the analytical tool of 'perfections' of grace, Barclay reads *4 Ezra* as a debate over Ezra's appeal to *incongruous*

[84] Ibid., 472.
[85] Ibid., 466.
[86] Ibid., 464, n. 45.

grace/mercy and Uriel's argument for *congruous* grace/mercy.[87] And, unlike Watson, he concludes that Ezra ultimately adopts Uriel's bi-focal hermeneutic, in which the principle of equity holds despite the apparent paucity of worthy recipients of divine mercy.[88] Barclay argues that, in contrast to *4 Ezra*, in Galatians Paul's notion of the Christ-gift as an incongruous and unconditioned divine gift has the effect of subordinating and, in certain respects, subverting pre-existing criteria of worth.[89] Thus, for Barclay, Paul's particular Christological focus remaps reality without reference either to creation or Torah.[90] The corresponding new taxonomies of reality thereby created, in turn, fund Paul's radical missionary praxis.[91]

This cogent reading of grace in *4 Ezra* and Galatians represents a considerable advance in scholarship, because Barclay uses the constituent features of systems of gift-exchange identified both by anthropologists and scholars of antiquity to illumine the respective and *differing* conceptions of divine beneficence. Moreover, this work avoids the formal arbitrariness of various post-Sanders 'dogmatic' readings by grounding Paul's missionary praxis in the theological conviction that the Christ-gift is given without regard to worth. *Paul and the Gift* is a convincing reevaluation of Paul and select Jewish authors on 'grace'. Yet, there are two areas where further work is necessary. Generally, though Barclay brings *4 Ezra* in for comparison at several points in his reading of Galatians, he does not place the two texts into sustained conversation.[92] Moreover, though Barclay has recognised the significance of the theme of 'life' in Galatians more than most, he does not give sustained attention to life as divine gift in Galatians or *4 Ezra*.[93] In this respect, his explanations of the theological logic of Galatians tend to leave the Pauline conception of life arising from death un- or underexplored. Thus, though he recognises that 'for those whose lives are reconstituted in Christ, the supreme

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[87] Barclay, *Gift*, 66–78, 280–308.
[88] Ibid., 282–83, nn. 8, 300–303.
[89] Ibid., 351–422.
[90] Ibid., 421, 426.
[91] Ibid., 423–46.
[92] Though, cf. J.M.G. Barclay, 'Constructing a Dialogue: 4 Ezra and Paul on the Mercy of God', in *Anthropologie und Ethik im Frühjudentum und im Neuen Testament* (ed. M. Konradt and E. Schläpfer; WUNT I 322; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2014), 3 – 22.
[93] Barclay, *Gift*, 407. Cf., though, Gathercole's perceptive comment on Rom 4:3 (*Boasting?*, 243), 'God's declaration of Abraham as righteous was not a descriptive word (*pace* 1 Maccabees) but the creative word of the God who calls "nonentities" into being as "entities".'

definition of worth is not the Torah but the truth of the good news'[94], this is to restate rather than resolve the problem of Paul's theological logic in Galatians.

In fairness, Barclay notes that an account of this logic requires the drawing out of Paul's 'submerged assumption' in Gal 3:21 – 22, concluding: 'What is clear (and all that is necessary for Galatians) is that the Torah was incapable of producing the necessary solution: it could neither liberate people from the dominance of sin, nor give life to the dead'.[95] But, again, this does not move materially beyond Sanders' 'dogmatic' account, because there is still the question: *why not*? Likewise, though Barclay is correct to insist that 'the Christ-event has subverted every other regime of value' *as* 'incongruous gift', this still does not *explain* what either in the nature of the Christ-gift or the Torah precludes the 'repackag[ing]' of the former in the 'taxonomies' of the latter.[96] In other words, why does 'every other regime of value' *need subverting*, and why is the Torah included within these '(socially constructed) value systems' and not, as in *4 Ezra*, the divine eschatological and ultimate value system?[97] If, as Paul assumes, the Torah is incapable of liberating from sin or making alive, why is the Torah, thus, *necessarily* inadequate as the eschatological order of life in the church? These criticisms of Barclay's work are posed to suggest the possibility that, in line with his own suggestion that 'Paul's logic…may overlap with [*4 Ezra*]',[98] further analysis of the conceptions of life-giving benefaction in these texts is needed. This is especially so given Barclay's insistence that Paul's 'interpretation of this [divine] gift is *Christological* in focus…centered…on an *event*—the death and resurrection of Christ—that has effected a transformation of reality'.[99] For, presumably Paul's Jewish Christian interlocutors had a similarly *Christological* focus, but they construed reality in a decidedly different fashion from Paul. *Why?*—we will read Galatians in dialogue with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* in an effort to answer this question.

[94] Barclay, *Gift*, 444.
[95] Ibid., 407.
[96] Ibid., 444.
[97] Ibid.
[98] Ibid., 405.
[99] Ibid., 445–46.

5. Comparative Method and Key Terms

In this section we begin by explaining the value of comparative projects in general, addressing briefly both the benefits and risks of the comparative method. Then we will be in a position to give a brief justification of the texts and motif we have chosen for comparison, before turning to a survey and explanation of the key terms that undergird and inform the thesis.

Comparative Method

The line from the poet Richard Wilbur that opened this chapter captures the basic methodological insight of comparisons: 'Odd that a thing is most itself when likened….' This thesis joins other comparative studies that use the metaphor of a conversation between texts in the conviction that our texts will be most themselves 'when likened'.[100] The value of such a dialogue is that it provides an opportunity to gain a fresh and clearer hearing of familiar (Galatians and *4 Ezra*) and somewhat muted (4 Maccabees) textual voices. For, in seeking to give the perspectives of the texts rather than those of scholars the hermeneutical and discursive priority in the exegesis, we aim to observe those places where 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Galatians might raise otherwise unnoticed questions. That is, by reading texts in dialogue, we gain a sense of the rhetorical and theological force of their language and argument that cannot be had reading in isolation. For reading Galatians in monologue risks obscuring both what Paul shares and where he differs with his fellow Jews and Jewish Christian interlocutors, and thus his *particular* theological logic. By contrast, a good comparison, in disclosing deep shared assumptions, makes the distinctive emphases and thus particular theological profiles of each text stand out. This is neither a substitute for exegesis of the texts on their own terms, nor a depreciation of the value of the various exegetical debates surrounding the texts. Rather, it is a recognition that in attempts to read ancient texts on their own terms (esp., texts as contested as Galatians or *4 Ezra*) we are never really reading them in isolation but rather through the interpreted mediation of their *Wirkungsgeschichte* and from our

[100] In addition to Watson, Linebaugh, McFarland, and Barclay, op.cit., see C.A. Newsom, *The Self as Symbolic Space: Constructing Identity and Community at Qumran* (STDJ 52; Leiden: Brill, 2004). For a perceptive introduction, C.A. Newsom, 'Bakhtin, the Bible, and Dialogic Truth', *JR* 76 (1996): 290 – 306.

own social location. Dialogical comparison, then, is useful because, in so far as the particular questions of the comparative texts framed in their own language succeeds in both exposing tacit interpretive frameworks of the reader and making the distinctive voices of the texts clearer, the dialogical exegesis functions as a distinct and illuminating mode of 'likening'. This thesis is not, of course, *divorced* from scholarly debates on grace or the appropriation of biblical 'life' texts in Paul and Judaism. Yet, the focal task is to allow these specific texts to speak to, query, and clarify each other—on their own terms and in their own language—and, in so doing, to allow the texts to be not less but more *themselves*.

Comparisons are no panacea; they have well-known risks of their own. In the context of comparisons of Paul and Judaism, E.P. Sanders famously identified two—imbalance and imposition.[101] With the term imbalance, Sanders highlighted the problems of comparing the entire corpus of Jewish literature with the work of Paul. The chief pressure is to distil the former to some essence that would prove useful in understanding the latter, thereby potentially obscuring the particular features of the rhetoric and theological logic of the Jewish texts and distorting one's understanding of Paul in relation to them. Our control for this risk has to do with the scope of our inquiry: by examining only three texts, we provide space for close readings in which the conceptions of divine life-giving benefaction can be explored adequately within their particular rhetorical contexts and theological logics.

With the term 'imposition', Sanders underlined the problem of comparative anachronism. In the specific context of comparisons of Paul and Judaism, the theologies of other Jewish texts have been unwittingly forced into and judged according to a supposed Pauline mold. The result is the imposition of an 'artificial pattern' on the theologies of these other Jewish texts.[102] In the context of the present thesis, the risk of imposition has to do with allowing the frameworks or overriding concerns of any of our comparative texts to *dictate* and thereby arbitrarily determine the contours of the conversation. Our control for this risk has to do with the structure and development of the thesis, and it has two aspects. First, in order to avoid imposing foreign assumptions on our comparative texts, in part one, we will

[101] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 19 – 20.
[102] Ibid., 20

pursue, as far as necessary and possible, a *full* and *sequential* reading of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* on divine life-giving benefaction without reference to each other or to Galatians.[103] In this way, 4 Maccabees' and *4 Ezra's* respective conceptions of God as giver of life and life as gift will emerge in the context of the development of their own rhetorical concerns and theological conceptions. Thus, we aim to fill a scholarly lacuna by offering an analysis of an unstudied, but significant, motif in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* and, in so doing, to prepare for a conversation on this topic in Galatians.

Second, in part two, with 4 Maccabees' and *4 Ezra's* particular conceptions and terms in mind, we host a conversation between these texts and Galatians, focusing on Paul's conception of God as life-giver and life as divine gift. Again, we will pursue a *full* and *sequential* reading of Galatians to avoid both prejudging which texts are relevant and ignoring the development of Paul's argument. Here, though, to mitigate the risk of imposition, 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* will ask the questions and advance the conversation. In summary, by reading Galatians *in conversation* with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra,* we aim both to gain hermeneutical distance from our own assumptions and those inherited in Pauline scholarship and thereby to hear Paul's own voice more clearly. By asking first what questions 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* might bring to Paul's argument *as it progresses* in Galatians, we aim to illumine both the rhetorical and theological force of the letter and, thereby, cast both Paul's text and the particular exegetical and theological debates that have arisen from it in a new light.

Finally, if comparisons risk imbalance and imposition, in general, dialogical comparisons carry their own risk—muting debate. That is, one drawback of the 'comparison is conversation' methodological metaphor, is that, in framing a social discourse as open-ended and free-flowing, one can obscure conflict.[104] For example, conversations directed toward matters of identity or ultimate concern often become debates. And, in debates, while convention establishes the contours of discussion, counter-proposals often emerge not as wholesale rejections but strategic

[103] While we will cover the entirety of 4 Maccabees, we will read only the first four episodes of for *4 Ezra* (3:1 – 10:59), as there is a scholarly consensus that the *theology* of the work does not develop in episodes five and six (11:1 – 14:48).

[104] Newsom, *Self*, 4–6, 18–19.

modifications.[105] The risk of anachronism in these cases lies primarily, then, with the historian's reconstruction of the discourse(s) that constitutes convention. Thus, Sanders' account of 'common Judaism' under the rubric of 'covenantal nomism' has, despite his articulation of the dangers, obscured the *debate* about grace in Jewish texts. Likewise, we explore the possibility that a Christological definition of grace like that of Barclay, Linebaugh, and McFarland might mute a debate about the significance of the Christ-event as gift *between* Paul and Jewish Christians in Galatia. The basic challenge here is no different than that of historical inquiry in general: what is most important for understanding is typically *assumed*—both in the case of the historian and the text.[106] The task is to discover not simply what *texts say* but rather the *force* of what they say—and in such a way that our own problematic assumptions about the topic of conversation are exposed and not imposed.

In this connection, a comment by Aristotle about the paradoxical utility of metaphor expresses the methodological approach of this study well: 'Since foreign tongues are unknown, and known [things] are already "kings", the metaphor teaches most of all'.[107] For those ways of reasoning in which 'the thought' (ἡ διάνοια) does not come immediately but a little later, with this phenomenon emerges 'instruction, so to speak' (οἷον μάθησις).[108] This insight guides both the general ('conversation') and particular methodological orientation (metaphor) of this study. We pay attention to metaphorical constructions and puzzles *arising from the texts in conversation* in an attempt to identify possible strategic modifications or subversions. Are there places where our authors use the same metaphorical language but differently, and are these uses significant? If so, what 'instruction, so to speak' follows? Utilising the theory of Lakoff and Johnson, who define 'conceptual metaphors' as broad human modes of 'understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another',[109] we will use their concepts of 'metaphorical coherence' and the related concepts of 'metaphorical entailments' and 'basic conceptual

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[105] Ibid., 18.

[106] For an instructive application of this insight, see J. Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays* (trans. D. O'Connor; London: Faber and Faber, 1957).

[107] *Rhet.* 3.10.2.

[108] *Rhet.* 3.10.4.

[109] G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: UCP, 1980), 6.

metaphors'.[110] Metaphorical entailments concern the implications of metaphors, and basic conceptual metaphors are metaphors that are 'broad' enough to contain other metaphors. For example, 'life-as-existence' is more basic than (on a Greco-Roman notion of gift) 'life-as-gift'—for the latter implies a purpose and therefore a *structure* to life, while the former does not. That is, if life is a gift, in this sense, then it is given for a *relationship* and thus in expectation of the *return* of that life in some form. To be clear, this is neither a study of metaphor, nor a study of metaphor in our comparative texts, but rather a study that foregrounds sensitivity to metaphorical entailments as a methodological disposition. Illustrated in question form: if Paul configures the recipients of the law as 'dead' in Gal 3:21, do the authors of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* consider such recipients 'living', and, if so, are these differences *theologically* significant?

The Value of Comparison between Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra

As we have seen, the value of a comparison of texts is the ability to see each in sharper profile, as the comparison serves to illumine both the shared assumptions and distinctive emphases of each. To read Paul in isolation risks muting both what he shares with others and what is peculiar to him. Reading Galatians in isolation, as we shall see, risks obscuring the particular logic by which Paul's theology operates. This comparison will, of course, be most beneficial if the texts to be compared are sufficiently close in theme and milieu to make comparison worthwhile. In this connection, we offer here a general justification of the value of comparing our texts, while we analyse the specific evidence for the relevance of our focal theme of divine life-giving benefaction in the analysis of key terms in the next section.

4 Maccabees has been studied relatively little in its own right and only in a few notable cases in relation to Paul.[111] Moreover, the limited comparative attention

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[110] Ibid., 87–105. On metaphor as a phenomenon of thought, see I.A. Richards, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (New York: OUP, 1936), 94.

[111] The best recent work on 4 Maccabees is J.W. van Henten, *The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees* (JSJSup 57; Leiden: Brill, 1997). For an earlier recognition of verbal correspondences between Paul and 4 Maccabees in the context of speculations about Christian origins, see P. Staples, 'The Unused Lever?: A Study on the Possible Literary Influence of the Greek Maccabean Literature in the New Testament', *MC* 9 (1966): 218 – 24. For a recent (more responsible) tradition-historical and rhetorical study of the relation between 4 Maccabees and Galatians 1 – 2, see S.A. Cummins, *Paul and the Crucified Christ in Antioch: Maccabean Martyrdom and*

has been given primarily to Romans.[112] There are good reasons, however, for comparing this text with Galatians. In addition to being written by a Diaspora Jew who was a rough contemporary of Paul, 4 Maccabees shares a number of general thematic concerns and specific argumentative strategies with Galatians. Both texts are concerned with overcoming 'the passions of the flesh' (4 Macc 7:18; Gal 5:13 – 26),[113] they each use the language of faith/faithfulness with respect to God in the context of compulsion or duress (cf., e.g., the uses of ἀναγκάζω in 4 Macc 4:26; 5:2, 27; 8:2, 9; 11:25; 18:5 and Gal 2:3, 14; 6:12 and cognates in 4 Macc 4:7; 5:25; 7:9, 15, 19, 21; 8:7; 15:24; 16:22; 17:2; 18:17 and Gal 1:23; 2:7, 16, 20; 3:2, 5–9, 11–12, 14, 22–26; 5:5–6, 22; 6:10), and they each view eternal life as the ultimate context in which the aforementioned struggles takes place (4 Macc 17:12; Gal 6:8). Likewise, each text argues both by way of exemplar (Eleazar; Paul) and through appeal to biblical 'life' texts (e.g., Dt 32:39, 47 and 30:20 in 4 Macc 18:18 – 19; Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:11, 12). Finally and perhaps most generally, both 4 Maccabees and Galatians deal in different ways with the question of whether there are conditions under which one might justifiably violate the Jewish laws concerning food and circumcision (cf., e.g., 4 Macc 4:25; 5:14 – 21; Gal 2:11 – 14; 5:3), and strikingly, in this regard, both texts share the rare term Ἰουδαϊσμός (4 Macc 4:26; Gal 1:13, 14). Thus, in terms of generally shared social world, thematic concerns, and vocabulary, these texts are good candidates for comparison.

As we have seen, whether as the problem to which Pauline Christianity is the solution or the exception that proved Palestinian Judaism's rule of covenantal nomism, the relevance of *4 Ezra* to Paul's writings is not disputed. As with 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra* has, however, been compared most regularly with Romans. Yet, *4 Ezra* is a good conversation partner for Galatians in several respects. Like 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra* shares both a number of thematic concerns and argumentative

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Galatians 1 and 2 (SNTSMS 114; Cambridge: CUP, 2001) , a work which touches on the topic of the theological logic of Galatians without fully addressing it and will thus be engaged in chapter three.

[112] On 4 Maccabees and Romans, see, for example, S.K. Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event: The Background and Origin of a Concept* (HTRDS 2; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975); J. W. van Henten, 'The Tradition-Historical Background of Romans 3.25: A Search for Pagan and Jewish Parallels', in *From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology, in Honour of Marinus de Jonge* (ed. M.C. de Boer; JSNTSS 84; Sheffield: JSOT, 1993), 101 – 28; D.P. Bailey, *Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul's Use of Hilasterion in Romans 3:25* (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1999); Cummins, *Crucified Christ*, 86 – 90.

[113] D.A. deSilva, *4 Maccabees* (GAP; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998), 145.

strategies with Galatians. Thus, though of likely Palestinian provenance, *4 Ezra* was written not long after Galatians, arguing, like Paul, not only 'a theological position shaped by…reflection on the texts of scripture'[114] but one in which readings of biblical 'life' texts play a primary role in arguments about salvation history (Dt 30:19 in *4 Ezra* 7:129; Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 in Gal 3:11, 12). Moreover, as with Paul in Galatians and Eleazar in 4 Maccabees, Ezra serves as the exemplary embodiment of *4 Ezra's* argument and theology, in the end representing the one who will be saved 'by faith or by works' at the judgment (9:7) despite suffering due to the travail of the cosmos and Zion. In addition to these argumentative strategies, *4 Ezra* shares, in general, the themes and language of faith/faithfulness (Gal 1:23; 2:7, 16, 20; 3:2, 5–9, 11–12, 14, 22–26; 5:5–6, 22; 6:10; *4 Ezra* 5:1; 6:5, 28; 7:34; 9:7; 13:23) and works (Gal 2:16; 3:2, 5, 10; 5:19; 6:4, 10; *4 Ezra* 7:24, 77; 8:32, 33, 36; 9:7; 13:23), accounts of revelatory disclosure by 'heavenly' figures (Gal 1:12, 16; *4 Ezra*, *passim*), concerns over the identification and status of eschatological heirs (Gal 3:18 – 4:31; *4 Ezra* episode three, esp. the framing in 6:55 – 7:18), and readings of salvation history in which the relation between earthly and heavenly Zion is at issue (Gal 4:21 – 31; *4 Ezra* 9:38 – 10:59). These shared themes and arguments along with Paul's life in and familiarity with near-contemporary Palestinian theological circles render Galatians and *4 Ezra* good conversation partners.

In summary, 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Galatians each argue within a generally shared social milieu from shared scriptures concerning a number of shared themes and theological concerns. Moreover, as we will survey below, these texts view God's life-giving activity as fundamental for understanding divine identity, the cosmos, human life, and the eschaton, regularly employ gift-terminology to figure God as a life-giver and life as divine gift. They are good candidates for comparison.

As we saw in the previous three sections, a number of scholars have assumed that 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* are either in simple opposition to or identical with Paul on grace. This thesis will further recent work that inquires about the definition of grace in these texts through an analysis of their respective theologies. Such an analysis is needed not only for 4 Maccabees, which has not been studied in any depth in this connection, but also for *4 Ezra* and Galatians. For, as we have seen, the

[114] Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 464.

recent work of McFarland and Barclay on Galatians argues that Paul defines grace Christologically and, thus, differently from a number of his Jewish contemporaries. Such a definition, however, raises afresh Horbury's concern about Paul's contact with his fellow Jews (a problem not addressed in Barclay's treatment of *4 Ezra* or Galatians). That is, if, for these approaches, the ultimate difference between Paul and some of his fellow Jews is, for Paul, Christological, which generates his different understanding of grace, then Horbury's description of Sanders' picture still applies. Paul and his Jewish contemporaries 'pass like ships in the night'—not in there understanding of grace, where they are in controversy, but in there deeper theology. This raises the possibility, however, that if Paul is appealing to the Christ-event *simpliciter*, then he is begging the question in debate with his Jewish Christian interlocutors in Galatia. For Paul's opponents are believers in Christ and have themselves experienced the Spirit. Does Paul merely appeal to the Christ-event and the Galatians' experience of the Spirit and thereby assume and not argue about the significance of these events, or does he present an argument for a different understanding of Christology, one that would make contact at the level of *theology* with Jewish and Jewish Christian interlocutors alike? In focusing the conversation on *life* as divine gift, we are exploring the possibility that Paul makes contact with Jewish interlocutors at the theological level by construing the Christ-gift as life-giving and that this construal represents not an appeal *to* but a different construal *of* Christology. Such a focus on divine life-giving benefaction does not seek to overturn either the work recent work on grace by Linbaugh, McFarland, and Barclay or the analyses of Jewish and Pauline use of 'life' texts in Gathercole and Sprinkle. Rather, by analysing the concept of life as divine gift in these texts on their own terms, we aim to deepen the conversation in both areas of scholarship.

Method and Key Terms

This thesis is not a study of the words χάρις or ζωή, their respective cognates, or their translation equivalencies, but of the concepts of God as giver of life and life as divine gift in 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Galatians. Nonetheless, there are several points of clarification necessary for the key terms of this study—both those of the ancient texts and my own analytic vocabulary—that should be explored here. Before

surveying the Greek and Latin terminology and giving an account of our own analytical terms, it will be necessary to make a few brief methodological points. First, we assume that the meaning of our key terms can differ in different contexts. The primary risk of this thesis, from a lexical semantic point of view, has to do with assuming that the same or cognate terms and their translation equivalents have the same senses in our comparative texts. To mitigate this risk, we seek to analyse the usage of these terms in each text independently of each other—i.e., with respect to their own specific social domains, particular syntactical relations, and distinct argumentative functions. Only if we analyse each text's gift and life terminology in its own context will we be able to formulate a text's particular *conception* of God as life-giver and life as divine gift, and only then will we be in a position to pursue an adequate comparison of these texts' conceptions.

The relative variety and lack of overlap in gift terminology in our texts invites a related point: without assuming *identity*, our analysis depends on the recognition that these texts participate in a shared gift discourse rooted in the social practices of, in Danker's words, the social 'system of reciprocity' that was ubiquitous in Greco-Roman antiquity.[115] That is, though our texts may reflect significant differences in the practices, terminology, and conceptions of gift-giving culturally, geographically, and across time, we are justified in comparing our texts' gift-concepts—even given their varied terminology—because of the shared social phenomena of and discourse about gift-giving in antiquity.[116] As with the key terms, we do not assume that the social domains related to their use in our texts are *identical*, but, we argue, neither are they *alien*. Rather, a comparison of 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Galatians is interesting, in part, because of the *particularities* of their respective uses of gift language and conceptions in construing God as life-giver and life as divine gift.

Second and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, we assume that authors can use various words to refer to the same, similar, or related concepts. In

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[115] F.W. Danker, 'Paul's Debt to the *De Corona* of Demosthenes: A Study of Rhetorical Techniques in Second Corinthians,' in *Persuasive Artistry: Studies in New Testament Rhetoric in Honor of George A. Kennedy* (ed. D.F. Watson, JSNTSup 50; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 278, n. 1: 'It is unfortunate that the narrow term "patron-client relationship" should have entered the discussion rather than the more comprehensive term "reciprocity system" of which "patron-client" more accurately describes an ancient Roman subset.'

[116] For a clear overview of these differences, see Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor*, 22 – 69.

other words, conceptual analyses that focus *only* on shared or conventional gift terminology risk missing other relevant terms or muting the discourse-specific use of terms relevant to conceptual analysis. This point is significant because, as we will enumerate below, though each of our texts use Greco-Roman terminology for gift-giving with respect to life often, the terms used, their frequencies, and their discourse-specific senses vary in 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Galatians. Our general controls against imbalance and imposition help to mitigate these particular risks of arbitrary selection of data and conceptual anachronism, as we will offer full and sequential readings of only three texts. This will allow the necessary scope for close reading that recognizes references to gift-giving in non-conventional terminology and that considers how the particular discourse aims of our texts affect their respective conceptions.

Finally, a brief account of what we take to be the characteristic features of this shared 'system of reciprocity' in Greco-Roman antiquity is in order. Joubert's warning about the character of our evidence is apposite: 'the historical sources do not present us with pure, ideal types…'[117] Nonetheless, even if branches spread out in a number of different directions, it is possible to identify a family gift-exchange tree. Barclay's recent definition of 'gift' represents a succinct expression of the three basic features of Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity: they are 1) concerned with 'voluntary, personal relations'; 2) 'characterized by goodwill in the giving of benefit or favour'; 3) 'and eliciting some form of reciprocal return that is both voluntary and necessary for the continuation of the relationship.'[118] Thus, in the survey of key

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[117] Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor*, 24.

[118] Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 575. Though Barclay explicitly produces this general definition with respect to the anthropology of gift, such a definition is not necessarily anachronistic when applied to Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity. Rather, the seminal studies of 'gift' among classicists and New Testament scholars bear out the heuristic utility of broad anthropological definitions in recognising and analysing at a structural level gift-exchange in the literary and epigraphic remains of antiquity. On the heuristic value of 'gift', in this sense, for classicsts, see M.L. Satlow, 'Introduction' in *The Gift in Antiquity* (ed. M.L. Satlow; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013): 1 – 6. For seminal works in Classics and New Testament studies that recognise the heuristic value of anthropological definitions of 'gift' indebted to Mauss, see, e.g.: M. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (London: Harmondsworth, 1978 [1954]), 145; S. von Reden, *Exchange in Ancient Greece* (London: Duckworth, 2003), vii – ix, 6; P. Veyne, *Bread and Circuses* (ed. O. Murray; trans. B. Pearce; London: Penguin Books, 1990), xv.; R.P. Saller, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire* (Cambridge: CUP, 1982), 72; Danker, *Benefactor*, 26 – 29; ibid., 'Paul's Debt', 263; Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor*, 18 – 22; Harrison, *Paul's Language of Grace*, 17 – 22. For an overview of recent debates in anthropology and a critique of Mauss' idealised account of tribal gift-exchange vis-à-vis Western practices of property exchange, see B. Wagner-Hasel, *Der Stoff der Gaben:*

ancient terms here, we restrict ourselves primarily to a consideration of those instances of terms that denote 'gift', 'giving', 'receiving' or that designate specific types of gift relationships in Greco-Roman antiquity—whether patron-client, civic benefactor, or personal benefactor relationships.[119] Where other locutions imply the giving of divine benefits, even without gift-terminology, we will widen our net accordingly, and will justify this procedure exegetically at relevant points in analysing our texts in the relevant chapters below. Here, after an overview of the Greek gift terms of Galatians and 4 Maccabees and the Latin terminology of *4 Ezra*, we will turn to a consideration of some of our own key analytical terms.

'Gift' and 'Life-giving' terms in Galatians

Although Paul uses a variety of words to refer to divine and human gift-giving in Galatians, we treat his use of χάρις first because it provides a ready way into key features of his gift terminology. As we shall see, in Galatians, Paul uses χάρις for the gift itself: for example, it is ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ, through their receipt of the Christ-gift in Paul's preaching, that the Galatians were called (Gal 1:6),[120] while it is his refusal to reject τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ that, in his view, distinguishes Paul from his opponents (Gal 2:21). In this last connection, as we shall see, Paul's particular identification of Jesus' self-offering as a divine gift (Gal 2:20; cf. 1:4) implicates a range of terms and concepts in his account of divine and human reciprocity. For example, because James, Peter, and John recognize 'the gift [of apostleship] given to [him]' (τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι), they return (ἔδωκαν) 'the right hand of fellowship' to him and Barnabas (Gal 2:9). Consequently, though χάρις is the only word that might mean 'gift' in Galatians,[121] there are many instances of nouns, like κοινωνία, that figure as gifts.

Kultur und Politik des Schenkens und Tauschens im archäishen Griechenland (Frankfurt: Campus, 2000): 27 – 76.

[119] For this broad taxonomy, see Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor*, 22 – 69.

[120] It is difficult to tell whether Paul means by ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ 'through Christ's favour' or 'through Christ's gift'. Though we will argue for the latter below, in either case the event of Jesus' self-offering is evoked.

[121] The cognate adverb δωρεάν ('freely' or 'to no effect'; Gal 2:21) is the only instance of a term in Galatians related to the nouns formed in relation to δίδωμι.

These nouns are recognizable, in part, from their syntactical relations to the verbs Paul uses for actions related to gift-giving. In addition to four instances of δίδωμι (Gal 1:4; 2:9; 3:21–22; 4:15), Paul uses χαρίζομαι with reference to the divine donation of the Abrahamic κληρονομία by a promise (3:18) and a perfect passive form of πιστεύω for God's act of endowing him with the εὐαγγέλιον (2:7). For the action of receiving a gift, Paul can use λαμβάνω (2:6; 3:2, 14), ἀπολαμβάνω (4:5), and παραλαμβάνω (1:9, 12), though his particular association of πίστις with the *manner* of receipt of both the good news of the Christ-gift and the Spirit (3:1, 2; cf. 3:22b!) raises the possibility that some instances of πίστις and πιστεύω function as gift-receipt terminology. With the possible exception of the aforementioned use of δίδωμι in Gal 2:9, there are few explicit uses of gift-return terms in Galatians. As we will argue, however, the use of δόξα (1:5) and δοξάζω (1:24) indicate returns, and Paul's particular understanding of the Christ-gift and its receipt indicates that his use of ἀγάπη (Gal 5:6, 13, 22; cf. the use of ἀγαπάω, 2:20; 5:14) specifies the disposition that leads to a variety of appropriate return-actions. In this way, we will argue, Paul's command that the Galatians 'enslave themselves to one another' διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης (Gal 5:13) is one of his discourse-specific identifications of the appropriate return of the Christ-gift. Similarly, Paul's metaphor about 'walking in line with the truth of the gospel' (2:14) and his query about what is keeping the Galatians from 'obeying the truth' (5:7) represent Pauline examples of obliged return gifts characteristic of Greco-Roman reciprocity systems.

In addition to the frequency of gift terminology in Galatians, Paul's use of this terminology in argument in relation to life language underlines the importance of divine life-giving benefaction for understanding Galatians. The key point is that this conjunction of life and gift language occurs at critical moments throughout Galatians. Firstly, Paul's somewhat vague opening reference to Jesus' self-offering for sins to rescue from the present evil age (Gal 1:4) finds its climactic expansion in Paul's paradigmatic autobiography in Gal 2:20, where he contrasts himself both with Peter at Antioch and his opponents in Galatia. Rather than rejecting the gift of God by seeking righteousness in the law (2:21), 'the life [Paul] now lives' (ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ) is Christ's own life (ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός). His current 'life in the flesh' is,

thus, itself ordered 'by faith in the Son of God who loved [him] and gave himself for [him]' (ὃ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκί, ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, 2:20). Likewise, Paul's rather compressed argument relating the 'life' texts Hab 2:4 and Lev 18:5 to each other in Gal 3:11, 12 finds its conclusion in the hypothetical counterfactual of Gal 3:21, in which Paul envisions a law that 'was *given*' (ἐδόθη) and capable of making-alive (ζῳοποιέω) such that righteousness would be ἐκ νόμου. This raises a crucial assumption of the letter: that life *needs to be granted* to humanity but has not and cannot be granted in the law, but rather, as we will argue in exegesis of Gal 3:22, only in the Christ-event. Relatedly, in the context of the Galatians' apparently impending return to slavery to τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in the form of Jewish calendrical practices (4:1 – 11), Paul expresses his wish that Christ be formed in '[his] little children' (4:19), and figures the receipt of the Spirit in the Christ-gift as birth by the Spirit from a barren mother (4:21 – 31; cf. Isa 54:1). This not only evokes the theme of life in connection with the donation of the Spirit, but it provides a hermeneutic by which the promise to Abraham, the addition of the law, and the Christ-event might be seen in relation to a singular divine life-giving and salvific intention. Finally, as we will see, in contrast to a 'dead' existence enslaved to the Flesh, Paul conceives of the Spirit as the gift and agent by whom believers have crucified the Flesh (5:24) and in whom they live and order their lives. That is, the proper response to their existence in the Spirit is to order their lives according to the Spirit (Εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν, 5:25). In summary, Paul regularly joins his gift and life language throughout Galatians, and the *prima facie* argumentative significance of these combinations invites a substantive analysis of divine life-giving benefaction in this letter.

'Gift' and 'Life-Giving' terms in 4 Maccabees

Though the use of gift terminology in 4 Maccabees is not as frequent as that in Galatians or *4 Ezra*, gift terms and conceptions arise at key points and play a vital role in the argument. Like Galatians, 4 Maccabees can use χάρις to refer to gifts themselves: Antiochus Epiphanes rebukes Eleazar for rejecting τὰς τῆς φύσεως χάριτας (i.e., here pork; 4 Macc 5:9), and the fifth brother mocks Antiochus for unwittingly

'[giving them] gifts' (χάριτας ἡμῖν χαρίζῃ) in the form of opportunities to remain faithful to the Torah despite torture (11:12). Relatedly, in response to their summary rejection of his offer of φιλία (8:5; cf. the use of εὐεργετέω, 8:6) and εὐεργεσία (8:17), Antiochus is enraged by the brothers' apparent 'ingratitude' (ἀχάριστος, 9:10). Given the relative infrequency of gift terms in 4 Maccabees, uncertainty about the provenance of the work, and the lack of a clear picture among ancient historians of the reception of Roman conceptions of patron-client relationships in the eastern Mediterranean in the early empire,[122] it is difficult to be certain about the precise use of these terms. Nonetheless, the terms used and the asymmetrical relationship between Antiochus and the Jewish martyrs may indicate that these terms figure this relationship in political and, perhaps, patron-client terms. Antiochus is neither proposing to become a civic εὐεργέτης to the Jewish nation, nor is he offering to enter into a personal relationship of reciprocity. Rather, Antiochus' understanding of his offer of φιλία as directly tied to the brothers' receipt of leading positions with respect to 'the affairs of the kingdom' (τῆς βασιλείας…πραγμάτων, 12:5), suggests a relationship of public political subordination on a par with that of Jason, who agreed 'to give' (δώσειν) annual tribute in exchange for the priesthood (4:17). The language of friendship, as is often the case in such situations in antiquity, is likely used to allow the brothers to save face in an otherwise humiliating act of political subservience. Though a precise account of the particular social practices that inform the use of these terms is difficult, as we shall see, the general relations between the divine donation of individual and political life are clear enough for the purposes of our comparison.

Turning from these nouns (and the adjective) to a consideration of the verbs related to beneficent action, we gain a fuller picture of the basis of the martyrs' refusals of the benefactions of nature and Antiochus. For 4 Maccabees' first use of δίδωμι signals the key contention, as the author holds both that '[God] gave the law [to the mind at creation]' (τούτῳ νόμον ἔδωκεν) and that 'if one becomes a citizen to

[122] On the question of the adoption or modification of Roman patron-client relations in the Greek East, Harrison (*Paul's Language of Grace*, 16 – 17) remarks, 'The interaction of the Greek and Roman benefaction systems, at the level of local *poleis* and more generally throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, still awaits the detailed regional study of ancient historians, especially as regards the ethos of reciprocity.'

this law, he will rule a kingdom' (καθ' ὃν πολιτευόμενος βασιλεύσει βασιλείαν) characterised by the cardinal virtues (2:23). Consequently, Eleazar contends that 'the creator of the cosmos' has given a law (νομοθετέω) that is κατὰ φύσιν (5:25), and so he refuses Antiochus' account of Nature as benefactor with its attendant obligations to eat pork. Likewise, the brothers say to each other 'let us consecrate ourselves to God from a whole heart, to the one who gave (τῷ δόντι) [our] souls' (13:13), and so they reject Antiochus himself as a political benefactor.

The verbs 4 Maccabees uses for receiving gifts further reflect these choices between benefactors and their respective fitting outcomes. The brothers reject Antiochus' promise that '[they] will receive' (λήμψεσθε) leading government positions (8:7), are tortured and killed, and, subsequently, the youngest brother reminds Antiochus that such behaviour is shameful for 'one who has received good things and a kingdom from God' (παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὼν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, 12:11). In other words, like the brothers themselves, Antiochus is a recipient of divine benefactions and should have considered how best to return them. In this connection, though the logic of reciprocal obligation is often assumed in 4 Maccabees, the author uses ἀποδίδωμι for the youngest brother's climactic return of his life (presumably to God, 12:19) and ἀπολαμβάνω for God's return of the martyrs souls, pure and immortal (18:23). Likewise, on the related question of the adequacy of return gifts, Eleazar is specifically said to receive 'glory' (δόξα, 7:9) for his exemplary death and the martyrs are deemed 'worthy' (ἄξιος, 18:3) of an eternal inheritance.

In summary, not only is gift terminology (perhaps, specifically patron-client language) used in 4 Maccabees, the terms and the conceptions they convey play a vital role in signalling the opposing logics at work in conceptions of God, nature, and Antiochus as benefactors. More specifically for our purposes, 4 Maccabees repeatedly figures life—whether created life or eschatological life—as a divine gift. As we have seen, the divine gift of the law to the mind at creation serves as the guide both to personal and political flourishing (4 Macc 2:23). To live in recognition of this is to live a 'wise life' (σοφίας βίος, 1:15). In other words, the primary undergirding of 4 Maccabees' peculiar contention that only the Jews exhibit

Hellenistic virtue given in the account of his philosophical 'starting-point' (ὑπόθεσις, 1:12) is this notion that the gift of the Torah properly orders the mind, and thus human and social life. As such, this notion is the foundation of the argument of the entire work. Thus, as we shall see, in a time of divine chastisement, such a wise life is returned in the form of an offering, as Eleazar bids God to 'receive [his] life in exchange [for that of God's people]' (ἀντίψυχον αὐτῶν λαβὲ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν, 6:29). Moreover, those who make such a return can expect, like the patriarchs, 'that they do not die to God…but live to God' (ὅτι θεῷ οὐκ ἀποθνήσκουσιν…ἀλλὰ ζῶσιν τῷ θεῷ, 7:19; cf. 16:25). This is so because, for 4 Maccabees, God is the one who says: 'I will kill and I will make alive; this is your life and length of days' (Εγὼ ἀποκτενῶ καὶ ζῆν ποιήσω· αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡ μακρότης τῶν ἡμερῶν, 18:19; cf. Dt 32:39, 47 and Dt 30:20). This figuring of God as life-giver stands in stark contrast to Antiochus, who in offering friendship to the martyrs as a path to life while threatening torture and death for ingratitude ironically exposes where true life is found. As the mother counsels in 4 Macc 15:2, the choice Antiochus offers is really between 'temporal salvation' (πρόσκαιρος σωτηρία) and 'eternal life' (αἰώνιος ζωή). Thus, in light of these and other texts, our analysis will seek to discern how the author's conception of God as life-giver and life as divine gift exposes his hermeneutical stance and his basic theological logic.

'Gift' and 'Life-giving' terms in 4 Ezra

Any account of gift terminology in *4 Ezra* must reckon with the fact that, in using a critical Latin text, we are working two steps removed from the language of the original text.[123] The primary issue in this connection has to do with the potential for anachronism in our Latin version, as the Latin terms may (falsely) suggest or obscure particular senses or connotations of gift terminology in the original work. Fortunately, this risk is negligible in our specific case, for, as we shall see, the verbs related to gift-giving in *4 Ezra* clearly map on to the general system of reciprocity common in Greco-Roman antiquity. Moreover, the senses of the nouns that might

[123] For the best overview of the scholarly consensus in favor of a Hebrew original text, see M.E. Stone, 'Some Remarks on the Textual Criticism of 4 Ezra', *HTR* 60 (1967): 107 – 15. For the evidence of the text's early translation into Greek and a Greek translation as the ultimate source of most extant manuscripts, see Stone, *4 Ezra*, 1 – 2.

indicate more specific types of gift-exchange are both clear in their respective contexts and far outnumbered by verbal references to the actions of gift-giving. Thus, the nine instances of *gratia* are all used in accordance with the biblical idiom 'to find favour in the eyes of/before' (*4 Ezra* 4:44; 5:55; 6:11; 7:75, 102, 104; 8:42; 12:7; 14:22; cf. Gen 6:8; Ex 33:12; Num 11:11; Prov 3:4; etc.), while the sole use of *beneficium*, as we will argue fully in chapter two, given the context, refers both to the life human beings have received from God and the law which provides its proper order of return (*4 Ezra* 9:10, 11). In contrast to nouns for 'gift', verbs related to gift-giving are frequent. Verbs related to beneficent action occur more than seventy times in *4 Ezra*, with those related to giving most often indicated with a form of *do*,[124] though *dono* (*4 Ezra* 5:27; 7:135, 138; 14:32) and *praesto* (7:134; 8:8; 12:4) are used for God's granting of the law or bringing about a state of affairs, respectively. Relatedly, the overlapping verbs *accipio* (7:9, 16, 72, 109; 8:43, 56; 9:32–34, 36; 14:30, 40), *recipio* (6:26; 7:14, 96, 98, 128; 8:33; 10:16; 14:9), and *suscipio* (7:91; 8:59; 9:35–36; 13:14) can be used to refer to the action of receiving a gift, and *consequor* (4:24; 7:72; 9:10; 14:34) can be used more specifically for obtaining a gift. In addition to those places where *do* is used for the action of returning a gift (3:5; 5:46; 7:116; 8:2; 10:14), the general obligation to return can be indicated with forms of *debeo* (3:31; 5:30; 10:9, 11), the obligation to return in a fitting fashion with *reddo* (4:42; 7:32, 75; 8:9), and the specific obligation to give glory or honour with *glorifico* (8:49; 9:31; 13:57) or *honorifico* (9:45). In this last connection, the adjective *dignus* sometimes signals a concern about the worth of the recipient of a gift (4:24; 12:9, 36; 13:14; 14:45; cf. *indignus* 14:45), while the noun *merces* (3:33; 4:35; 7:35, 83, 98; 8:33, 39; 13:56) is used to refer to a gift for the worthy.

In addition to the high frequency of conventional gift terminology in *4 Ezra*, the potential significance of a study of divine life-giving benefaction is indicated by the way that these terms are regularly combined with 'life' language and metaphors and at key points of the argument. For example, the resolution of Ezra's initial complaint that God has not made his way of justice known (3:31) depends on whether 'God will grant to [him] to live' (*tibi dederit Altissimus vivere*; 5:4) to see the

[124] It is striking that, apart from those uses of *do* that indicate a return to God (3:5; 5:46; 7:116; 8:2; 10:14), God is the explicit or implied giver in every other use of *do* in *4 Ezra* (3:15, 19; 4:19, 21–23; 5:4–5, 7, 48, 50; 6:51–52; 7:9, 78, 94, 100; 8:5–6; 9:45; 13:41; 14:31, 42).

eschatological judgment. Likewise, Ezra's debate with Uriel/God in episode three reaches its climax in the assertion that humanity 'lives having received [God's] benefactions' (*viventes beneficia consecuti*, 9:10) and is thus responsible for adhering to Moses' command to 'choose life for yourself that you might live' (*elige tibi vitam ut vivas*, 7:129; cf. Dt 30:19). Our analysis will seek to explain the significance of such statements and others both in relation to the overall conception of God as life-giver and with respect to the theological logic of *4 Ezra*.

Key Analytic Terms

Because the various theological connotations of the word 'grace' can be misleading when applied to ancient uses of χάρις that refer to a gift or benefit, we regularly use the terms 'gift' or 'benefaction'. Thus, unless otherwise specified, we use 'gift' and 'benefaction' interchangeably to refer to benefits as they functioned in Greco-Roman systems of voluntary and reciprocal exchange. In this connection, we follow Danker, who uses the terms 'benefactor' and 'benefaction' with reference to the broader Hellenic system of gift-exchange, while we avoid the anachronistic general social-scientific use of 'patron' and 'client', as those terms should be reserved for specifically Roman practices and relations modeled on them. The primary benefit of using these terms, then, is that they are general enough to refer to gifts within a variety of Greco-Roman systems of reciprocity, while avoiding sometimes assumed theological definitions of 'grace.' 'Gift' and 'benefaction' do not, of course, function as appropriate equivalents for all of the senses of χάρις, *gratia*, or *beneficium*, and they may carry unwanted connotations of their own. The only remedy is a precise, clear, and well-supported use of language in every relevant case.

We use the terms 'shape', 'order', and 'disorder' in two related ways. First, we use these terms to refer to the way that particular gifts and the manner of their donation informs their return gifts. This language seeks to convey something of Joubert's notion of 'balanced reciprocity', wherein a gift obligates 'returning the same kind of gifts, or gifts of equal value for those received.'[125] Though such a notion may initially seem impossible to apply to *divine* gifts—how can one return gifts *of equivalent value to God*?—two of our texts apparently already negotiate this difficulty

[125] Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor*, 22.

by ascribing *eternal* glory to God (and in identical language; cf. Gal 1:5; 4 Macc 18:24). Likewise, as we will see, the return of human life, though not equivalent, is a gift of the same *kind*—i.e., life. Second and relatedly, we use this language more generally to highlight how our authors conceive of divine action as constraining human obligation in normative or moral terms. For example, as we will argue, 4 Maccabees' identification of the law as a divine gift given to the mind at creation entails a conception of human beings as *Torah-shaped*, such that the appropriate *moral* return of a human life to God is *Torah-ordered*. This is, to adapt Senecca's phrase, 4 Maccabees' account of the *lex vitae* (*Ben.* I.4.2)—the order of human conduct. Relatedly, we use 'order' or 'shape' with reference to both history and eschatology, as, e.g., 4 Maccabees' contends that God's saving and judging actions uphold this order of human conduct. Again, the primary benefit of such terms is that they bring to the surface general assumptions implicit in the use of gift language without being overly specific, which allows for recognition of similarities at a basic level and differences in particulars. The risk here is, again, the importation of unwanted connotations, requiring clarity and precision in the application of these analytic terms.

Finally, we regularly use the term 'life' in tandem with 'death' without assuming a fixed meaning for either term. We adopt this practice because our texts regularly place their terms for life and death in syntagmatic or syntactical relation and because the paradigmatic relation between the two in a given text makes them reciprocally defining. For example, a conception in which death is properly a *part* of life implies a markedly different definition of the term 'life' than one in which death is properly *excluded* from life. In the former, 'life' is the cycle of life and death, while in the latter 'life' is the absence of this cycle. Again, in order to avoid anachronism, we must be careful not to assume that *our* use of these terms is identical to that of our texts, but rather must clarify usage on a case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, as each of our texts argue from biblical texts that use 'life' (and 'death') language with divine benefaction terms, our use of these terms has the benefit of drawing attention to similarities and differences in the conceptions of our texts. Additionally, the language of life and death is susceptible to diverse metaphorical usages, some of which are important for the argument of this thesis. Two examples from Philo

illustrate the kinds of metaphorical extensions these words can represent. In *Fug.* 58 Philo assumes that the binaries 'life and death, good and evil' (Dt 30:15) entail a conception of life *as morally ordered*. So, he translates them into virtue terms—'good and virtue' and 'evil and wickedness'. He further specifies this order *ontologically*, interpreting the identification of the love of God with 'life and length of days' (Dt 30:20) *as* desire for and friendship with God unencumbered by disordered desires and bodies. Elsewhere, Philo remarks that 'right-thinking people' regard the reversal of fortune suffered by Flaccus—from 'lord of life' to subject of mockery—to be 'worse than death' (*Flacc.* 147). Even limited to two examples, Philo's life language exhibits sophisticated conceptual metaphors, here from more to less basic: 1) life-as-existence; 2) life-as-ordered-existence; 3) properly-ordered-life-as-true-life; 4) disordered-life-as-death. Moreover, a number of 'life' texts in the Hebrew Bible operate with respect to conceptual metaphors like these—e.g. disordered life as a kind of death.[126] Thus, as Philo does, our authors may both utilise and modulate these *scriptural* terms in their own systems of thought. Consequently, it is necessary to allow our authors to define their own terms *and* to ask if those definitions are implicated in a more comprehensive theological structure.

6. Overview of the Study

This study has two primary aims. In part one, we examine God as life-giver and life as gift in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* without reference to each other or Galatians. Thus, we seek both to offer the first full account of divine benefaction in 4 Maccabees and to extend research on divine gift-giving in *4 Ezra* by focusing on life as gift, while avoiding importing assumptions about Paul or from Galatians into the analysis. In part two, we place 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* in conversation with Galatians, allowing them to raise questions for Paul's account of the life-giving Christ-gift. In conversation with 4 Maccabees, chapter three will consider the implications of Paul's presentation of himself as a paradigmatic recipient of life in the Christ-gift in Gal 1 –

[126] As Jon Levenson writes, 'death and life in the Hebrew Bible are often best seen as relational events and are for the selfsame reason inseparable from the personal circumstances of those described as living or dead. To be alive in this frequent biblical sense of the word inevitably entailed more than merely existing in a certain physical state'; J.D. Levenson, *Resurrection and the Restoration of Israel: The Ultimate Victory of the God of Life* (New Haven: YUP, 2006), 154.

2 both for his accounts of the social implications of the gospel in Jerusalem and Antioch (and, by implication, Galatia) and for his presentation of himself as a reconstituted agent. Here we enter into the debate over whether Paul's autobiography is primarily apologetic or paradigmatic in character, arguing that his presentation of himself as a paradoxically Torah-observant yet paradigmatically unworthy recipient of life invites a deeper analysis of the theological rationale for the incongruous Christ-gift. How is it that 4 Maccabees can insist that to die *for* the law is to live to God, while Paul contends that he had to die *to* the law in order to live to God? Chapter four will then moderate a debate with *4 Ezra* over Paul's argument in Gal 3 – 4 about the place of the law in salvation history. In this chapter we contend that the major approaches to the question of Paul's theological logic are unsatisfactory because they all fail to account either for his assumption that recipients of the law are 'dead' or for his argument that the law itself is fitted and thus confined to the 'dying' and 'barren' cosmos. These points emerge in light of the recognition that, in *4 Ezra*, human beings are 'living'—capable and responsible agents—and that the Torah is identified not with the fallen created order but with the eschatological order. Chapter five turns to a debate with 4 Maccabees over the purpose and character of Paul's ethics in Gal 5 – 6. This chapter offers a new argument for the place of Paul's ethics in Galatians, arguing that Paul presents an inchoate theory of the self in Gal 5:13 – 26 that undergirds is assumption of a 'dead' humanity in Gal 1 – 4, while Gal 6 offers an account of how the Christ-gift properly orders the church that is (at least in the view of an author like 4 Maccabees) necessary for theological completeness.

This thesis then provides a new account of the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians by highlighting the *particular* significance of construing life as a divine gift given in the Christ-gift in the context of Jewish debates about a range of theological topics, most notably the relation between anthropology, cosmology, salvation-history, and divine saving action. Thus, in allowing 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* to pose their theological questions, this study intends not only to clarify how each author conceived of God as life-giver and life as divine gift but also to solve a primary puzzle in Pauline theology. In short, why and in what respect, if Christ, then not Torah?

Part 1
God as Life-Giver and Life as Gift in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*

Part 1: Introduction

Part one examines God as life-giver and life as gift in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. In chapter one, we explore how 4 Maccabees' conception of God as life-giver informs the argument that only the Hebrews exemplify Hellenistic virtue. In 4 Maccabees, the pursuit of a σοφίας βίος amounts to ἡ τοῦ νόμου παιδεία (1:15 – 17), because the Torah is God's gift to the mind from creation (2:22, 23). How, though, does this creational and anthropological understanding of the divine gift of Torah-ordered life relate to the development of 4 Maccabees' 'narrative demonstration' (3:19)—both his account of the events that incite the divine justice (3:20 – 4:26) and of the climactic *Rededuell* between Eleazar and Antiochus (5:1 – 6:30)? Our answer will attend both to 4 Maccabees' historical hermeneutic and the sacrificial logic exemplified in Eleazar's self-offering. In the remainder of 4 Maccabees, it becomes clear that Eleazar's teaching and death introduces a paradoxical pedagogy for the martyrs. What, though, is the relation between the earlier account of creational life as a divine gift, Eleazar's return of this life in self-offering, and 4 Maccabees' account of the martyrs as both the recipients of eschatological life and the means of national renewal? Our analysis here explores how 4 Maccabees' cosmology and eschatology fund an argument for the rationality of his Torah-ordered ethic—specifically, in relation to the notion that God gives life to the worthy individual and nation.

In chapter two, we explore how *4 Ezra's* particular definition of life and his understanding of it as divine gift informs the two-ages eschatological theodicy. For *4 Ezra*, the problem is not that God's gift of human life as Torah-ordered at creation is ineffectual as Ezra's opening salvo contends (3:1 – 36) but that, because Ezra is subject to death and decay, he cannot understand incorruptible life and God's limitless way (4:11, 12). Thus, in our analysis of episodes one and two we attend to *4 Ezra's* move toward theodicy—i.e., Uriel's reframing of Ezra's complaint about moral incapacity into an analysis of cosmological and epistemological incapacity. How, though, does this reframing relate to the subsequent debate about the basis for divine judgment and salvation as divine gift in episode three and the revelation of heavenly Zion in episode four? In our analysis of episodes three and four we focus on how the definition of created life as divine Torah-ordered gift informs the reading of scripture and the logic of Uriel's argument for the Torah as the discriminating

factor in the judgment. What is the logical relation between *4 Ezra's* definition of created and eschatological life and the debate in episode three over whether God is, ultimately, a discriminate or indiscriminate giver? In the latter half of chapter two, then, we analyse not only *4 Ezra's* hermeneutics, ethics, and soteriology but also Ezra's status as exemplar of a mortal and yet worthy witness to the eschatological restoration of Zion.

In part two, we turn to a reading of Galatians, allowing 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* to raise questions of Paul. The analysis of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* in part one prepares for our reading of Galatians by mapping a range of concerns that these different accounts of God as life-giver and life as gift raise and, in their own ways, resolve. With this map in mind as we read Galatians, we are prepared to recognise not only those places where Paul, as it were, enters into shared theological territory but also to get a sense of the *particular* significance of his chosen path through it. To revert to the conversation metaphor, in considering how 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* might respond to Paul's argument, we hope to clarify the rhetorical and theological force of his language and concepts. How would Paul have been *heard* by a near-contemporary Jewish author on this topic? What might such an author notice in the *manner* of his expression? What might Paul's particular choices of language and progression of argument have indicated about the range of theological views he might accept or reject *by implication*? The aim is not, of course, to suggest that Paul's meaning is *determined* by how he would have been heard by our conversation partners. Rather, we use these responses to raise issues that require further exegetical analysis from Paul's text. Thus, in chapter three with our analyses of Eleazar and Ezra as exemplary recipients of life in mind, we re-read Paul's paradigmatic autobiography in Gal 1 – 2. If the presentation of Eleazar and Ezra as worthy recipients of eschatological life depends on a prior account of human life as created and Torah-ordered gift, what might Paul's account of his receipt of life in the Christ-gift without regard to the Torah entail for his theology?

Likewise, in chapter four with *4 Ezra's* reading of sacred text and salvation-history in mind, we re-read Paul's scriptural argument about the place of the law in salvation-history. Specifically, if *4 Ezra's* theodicy employs a Torah-ordered hermeneutic because, as Uriel argues, humans live in receipt of the divine gifts of

created life and its Torah order, then what hermeneutic and theological logic undergirds Paul's portrayal of the law as an addition to the divinely given promise, his hypothetical portrayal of the law as a gift to the 'dead', his identification of the law with the 'dead' and 'enslaving' cosmic elements, and his conception of heirs as 'born' by the Spirit? We will thus study both how Paul's account of the Christ-event as life-giving addresses an account of created and eschatological life in Torah-terms (as in *4 Ezra*) and why specifically, in Paul's view, the theology of his opponents is faulty. That is, we will show how Paul's reading constitutes not a question-begging appeal to a shared Christology but an argument for an alternate Christology in life-giving terms.

Finally, in chapter five with 4 Maccabees' account of the Torah-ordered self and society in mind, we will explore the function of Paul's Spirit/Flesh antithesis and ethical guidance in Gal 5 – 6 in his overall argument. If in 4 Maccabees overcoming the passions of the flesh is a matter of being trained by the Torah to exercise one's created reason both on a personal and social level, then what does Paul's insistence on the necessity of the Spirit for properly-ordered individual and communal life imply about his anthropology and ethics? Here we offer a new reading of the argumentative function of Gal 5 – 6, contending that these chapters are required not only for rhetorical persuasion or social need but also for grounding Paul's theological logic and for theological completeness. In other words, an author like 4 Maccabees would want to know *why* human beings are 'dead' apart from the Christ-gift and *how*, if not by Torah, the Christ-gift provides the norm for social life. It is issues like these, we argue, that Paul addresses in Gal 5:13 – 26 and Gal 6:1 – 10, respectively.

Chapter 1
Redefining Right Reason: The Logic of Divine Life-Giving Benefaction in 4 Maccabees

Seeing Jewish Tragedy as Greek (and Jewish) Triumph

Written in Asia Minor near the end of the first century CE, 4 Maccabees is perhaps the boldest Jewish appropriation of Hellenistic philosophical tradition of antiquity.[1] For in 4 Maccabees Jewish piety *alone* is the fulfilment of the Hellenistic ethical vision.[2] In this connection, the death of the priest Eleazar after severe torture provides the exemplary proof of the author of 4 Maccabees' (hereafter, 4 Maccabees) peculiar claim, as it is his particular understanding of and commitment to the Torah that enables him to defeat the πάθη, proving the superiority of Torah-philosophy (i.e., the philosophy of '*pious* reason' [ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός]; 4 Macc 1:1) in the arena of Greek virtue discourse.[3] Because Eleazar's death is framed in apparently sacrificial terms (6:26 – 30), theological analyses have revolved around 4 Maccabees' conception of atonement, and the debate has centered on the questions of the logic of the efficacy of the martyrs'[4] deaths as saving events and to a lesser extent the meaning of the

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[1] The clearest indication of provenance is the 'Asianic' rhetorical style; see E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa, vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance* (5th ed.; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1958), 1:419 – 20. While Jan Willem van Henten prefers a date 'around 100 C.E. or a short time later', David deSilva follows Elias Bickerman's suggestion that the anachronistic reference to 'Syria, Phoenicia, and Cilicia'(4 Macc 4:2) could date the work to the time this region was an administrative district (i.e., between 19 – 72 C.E.); see J.W. van Henten, *The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees* (JSJSup 57; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 77 – 82; D.A. deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Introduction and Commentary on the Greek text in Codex Sinaiticus* (SCS; Leiden: Brill, 2006), xvi – xvii; and E.J. Bickerman, 'The Date of Fourth Maccabees', in *Studies in Jewish and Christian History* (AGJU 9; Leiden: Brill, 1976), 1:275 – 81. Given the tenuous nature of the evidence, we slightly favour a date soon after the destruction of the Temple, since the political implications of the author's argument work best if the Temple service is suspended but hope of its restoration is not abandoned. None of the positions I take in this chapter, however, depend on this date.

[2] E. Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (175 B.C. - A.D. 135): Vol. III.i* (ed. F. Millar, G. Vermes, and M. Goodman; rev. ed.; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1986), 590: 'Of all the known Jewish philosophers [of that time], he is remarkable for his uncompromising assertion that distinctively Jewish religious practices could, and should, be considered by the Greeks as wisdom'.

[3] For the text of 4 Maccabees I am using A. Rahlfs and R. Hanhart, eds., *Septuaginta: Id est Vetus Testamentum graece iuxta LXX interpretes, Editio altera* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

[4] On the application of the term 'martyr' to the heroes of 4 Maccabees, see e.g. T. Rajak, 'Dying for the Law: The Martyr's Portrait in Jewish-Greek Literature', in *The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in Cultural and Social Interaction* (AGJU 48; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 100. and J. W. van Henten, 'Noble Death and Martyrdom in Antiquity', in *Martyriumsvorstellungen in Antike und Mittelalter: Leben oder Sterben für Gott?* (ed. S. Fuhrmann and R. Grundmann; AGJU 80; Leiden: Brill, 2012), 92 – 94. For an account of the literary features of martyr texts, see van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs*, 7–13.

word ἱλαστήριον (4 Macc 17:22), with both the tradition-historical and comparative implications for Paul's atonement conception and language in Rom 3:25 often lurking in the background.[5] Yet, the martyrs' deaths are situated in the context of a philosophical argument that proceeds by way of narrative demonstration from Jewish history—with both Hellenistic philosophical concepts and Jewish scriptural theological frameworks and argumentation used throughout—for the purpose of commending a particular vision and justification of Jewish life in the Diaspora.

Thus, 4 Maccabees' bold *apologia* presents both an interpretive problem and an opportunity for further theological analysis. For though it may be an overstatement that, in Tessa Rajak's words, 'there is no question of disentangling the Greek influences from Jewish in this text,'[6] the particularly tight fit between influences invites a careful analysis of the author's practice of conceptual weaving, while, to switch metaphors, examinations of the particular places where 4 Maccabees modulates Jewish texts and concepts in a Hellenistic key (or vice versa) will, in those places where the sound is just a bit 'off,' provide some access to the author's basic theological melody. For it is those dissonances that are, as it were, ignored that signal the primary theological concerns of the author and elucidate the hermeneutic by which those concerns are both heard and projected.[7] In this connection, the thesis of this chapter is that 4 Maccabees' *apologia* for Judaism is also a theodicy, in which the belief in God's inviolable donation of life as Torah-ordered from creation governs the reading of sacred text and salvation-history. Put differently, the claim of this chapter is that 4 Maccabees provides a comprehensive account of God's ordering of the world from creation in the shape of the Torah, both in justly dealing death on the

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[5] For arguments that obedience (Williams) or the mimetic effect of obedience (Seeley) rather than the deaths of the martyrs *per se* account for the atoning efficacy of their deaths, see e.g. Williams, *Jesus' Death*, 169–96; D. Seeley, *The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Paul's Concept of Salvation* (JSNTSup 28; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 84–98. For accounts of the martyrs' deaths as atoning sacrifices, see, e.g., H. Anderson, "4 Maccabees," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (ed. J.H. Charlesworth; vol. 2; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985), 531–64; van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs*, 150 – 53; M. de Jonge, 'Jesus' Death for Others and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs', in *Text and Testimony: Essays on New Testament and Apocryphal Literature in Honour of A.F.J. Klijn* (ed. T. Baarda; Kampen: Kok, 1988), 142–51. For an argument against a conceptual parallel between the uses of ἱλαστήριον in Rom 3:25 and 4 Macc 17:22, see D.P. Bailey, *Jesus as the Mercy Seat: The Semantics and Theology of Paul's use of Hilasterion in Romans 3:25 with an Analysis of 4 Maccabees 17:22 and Patristic Interpretation* (Ph.D. thesis: Cambridge University, 1999).

[6] Rajak, 'Dying ', 111.

[7] For the relation between hermeneutical 'effect' and theological 'cause,' see Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 26.

wicked and in giving life or salvation as reward to the righteous both in this life and beyond history. As we shall see, the problem with examining particular theological motifs in isolation in this text (e.g., 4 Maccabees' atonement theology) is that it contains an integrated argument about the relation between the self, society, and the cosmos as given and ordered by God the benefactor.[8] Consequently, in addition to offering the first full analysis of God as a benefactor in 4 Maccabees, this chapter will contribute to the debate over this text's atonement theology by showing how it is implicated in a more fundamental theological position on and hermeneutical perspective about the character of human life as divine gift.

The argument will proceed in three parts. Section one argues that the author's account of God's gift of the Torah to the mind at creation subordinates Stoic ethics to Jewish theology, while the story of David's thirst illustrates how pious, cult-shaped reason restrains the passions of leaders to enable personal and societal flourishing. Section two argues that the historical build-up to the martyr stories employs a cult-focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic sourced from Lev 17 and Dt 30/32 to explain the integral relation between the virtue of leaders and the plight of societies, while Eleazar's account of God (not Nature) as the one who gives and orders the self and society according to the Torah establishes the paradoxically rational piety necessary to vindicate Jewish law and life and elicit God's just mercy. Section three argues that the account of the brothers grounds their commitment to Eleazar's paradoxical piety in their expectation of God's fitting temporal and eschatological judgement and salvation. Moreover, this paradoxical piety is further grounded in the mother's instruction to her sons and the audience, in which she expounds the hermeneutic and theology of divine life-giving benefaction that undergirds the martyrs' commitment. In short, only the Hebrews are invincible for virtue—and, thus, rational in Stoic terms (9:18)—because only they receive God's gift of Torah-ordered life and expect that, if they exercise their inviolable created freedom (7:18; 12:13), they will receive immutable eternal life (7:19; 16:25; 18:23) and national renewal (6:28, 29; 9:24; 12:17; 17:10) from God.

[8] The problem of studying motifs in isolation in this text is well understood in H.J. Klauck, 'Brotherly Love in Plutarch and in 4 Maccabees', in *Greeks, Romans, and Christians: Essays in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe* (ed. D.L. Balch, E. Ferguson, and W.A. Meeks; Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 144 – 56.

1.1 God the Benefactor of the Torah-Ordered Self and Society (4 Macc 1:1 – 3:18)

Even a cursory reading of 4 Maccabees suggests some relation to Greek philosophical tradition. The author's first words announce a 'most philosophical subject' (φιλοσοφώτατον λόγον), viz. 'whether pious reason is sovereign master over the passions' (εἰ αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός, 1:1). Yet, as 4 Maccabees sketches the definitions, taxonomies, and examples that serve as the premises (ὑπόθεσις, 1:12)[9] on which his 'narrative demonstration' depend (ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῆς ἱστορίας, 3:19), he retrofits his eclectic yet essentially Stoic terms with Jewish concepts in preparation for his subsequent *apologia*—most clearly stated in the *Rededuell* with Antiochus Epiphanes IV (5:1 – 38). As we shall argue, 4 Maccabees, generally, accepts a Greek definition of σοφία, *only if* the 'divine' and 'human' matters of which it speaks are qualified in a Jewish way (1:17), while the particular, material qualification he introduces construes God as the Creator of the self and Benefactor of the Torah to the mind (2:21 – 23). Moreover, by connecting this notion of the properly ordered self to the Stoic notion of the supremacy of self-rule in the context of David's ideal rule of Israel (2:24 – 3:18), 4 Maccabees presents both self and society as inviolable and inviolably Torah-ordered, from creation. In this way, by presenting God as the giver of life as Torah-ordered and David as an exemplary rational King in recognizing this order, a necessary feature of 4 Maccabees' theological logic is established. Not only can one resist the passions and obey God's law, but one should do so as an appropriate return of created life.

1.1.1 The Exordium: The Good Life and Noble Death Framework (1:1 – 12)

The topic of the πάθη is a familiar one in Hellenistic ethics, as it has a prominent place both in the first systematic subdivision of the subject in antiquity

[9] Because 4 Maccabees concerns a general question not a particular course of action, ὑπόθεσις does not signal the genre of the work; *pace* U. Breitenstein, *Beobachtungen zu Sprache, Stil und Gedankengut des Vierten Makkabäerbuchs* (2nd ed.; Basel: Schwabe, 1978), 119, n. 1. Cf. D.M. Schenkeveld, 'Philosophical Prose', in *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C.-A.D. 400* (ed. S.E. Porter; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 248. The words 'thesis' (NETS) or 'main principle' (NRSV) are unattested, and ὑπόθεσις refers here to matters that are preliminary to demonstration (ἀπόδειξις, 3:19) and, thus, the usage in philosophical texts is most likely. Thus, '*supposition*', '*presupposition*', '*premise*', '*starting-point*' ('ὑπόθεσις', *LSJ* 1881 – 82).

and in the Stoic account of action.[10] In Hellenistic philosophical ethics the views of Socrates provide the starting-point for discussion and are, for most who follow, axiomatic.[11] In Malcolm Schofield's terms, the 'true self' was the supreme good and, thus, only the 'conditions of the self' (virtue or vice) can be 'intrinsically good and bad.'[12] In other words, Hellenistic ethics is concerned with the 'good life' defined principally in personal, rational, and ethical terms.[13] The author of 4 Maccabees explicitly locates his work within this philosophical tradition by defending a Stoic elaboration of it in relation to the more general context of discussions of virtue.[14] As Barclay observes, 'It is important to this author that Judaism is a "philosophy."'[15] Thus, his thesis is 'essential to the path to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) for everyone,' important for the exaltation of the chief virtue 'prudence' (φρόνησις), and necessary for restraining the vices that hinder the remaining cardinal virtues of δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and σωφροσύνη (1:2 – 4). As in Hellenistic ethics generally and Stoicism particularly the good life is defined in 4 Maccabees in a qualitative sense. Furthermore, if the good life is primarily a matter of 'the conditions of the self' or personal moral flourishing and the chief threat to this life is not external circumstances or the body (with Socrates) but the internal passions that arise from these (with the Stoics), then reason must be demonstrated to be capable of governing the passions. Otherwise, the good life—human virtue—is impossible.

Yet, in order to prove that reason does rule the passions, 4 Maccabees appeals to the exploits of Jewish martyrs. In the *exordium,* the martyrs are presented as dying not 'for religion' (6:22) but 'for the sake of virtue' (1:8) or 'for the sake of nobility of character' (καλοκἀγαθία), and for such death they receive honours (τιμαί, 1:10). The

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[10] A.A. Long, 'Arius Didymus and the Exposition of Stoic Ethics', in *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 119 – 23; M. Schofield, 'Stoic Ethics', in *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics* (ed. B. Inwood; Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 236 – 39.

[11] A.A. Long, 'Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy', in *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996): 1 – 34.

[12] Schofield, 'Stoic Ethics', 234.

[13] Ibid.: '[I]t is historically plausible that the crucial differences between [Socrates, the Stoic Zeno, and the Cynic Diogenes] are to be found not in what they believed, but in how they sought to convert others to acceptance – practical as well as intellectual – of what they were united in seeing as the key to the good life.'

[14] On the eclectic, though predominantly Stoic, philosophical character of 4 Maccabees, see R. Renehan, 'The Greek Philosophic Background of Fourth Maccabees', *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 115 (1972): 223 – 38; R. Weber, 'Eusebeia und Logismos : zum philosophischen Hintergrund von 4 Makkabäer', *JSJ* 22 (1991): 212 – 34.

[15] J.M.G. Barclay, *Jews in the Mediterranean Diaspora: From Alexander to Trajan (323 BCE – 117 CE)* (Berkeley: UCP, 1996), 371.

description is reminiscent of Hellenistic noble death traditions, in which heroes were celebrated for defending their cities with their lives.[16] By setting noble death and good life traditions in relation to each other, the author frames the entire work in the form of a paradoxical proof. It is not the deaths of the martyrs *simpliciter* that proves that 'reason has full control over the passions' (1:9), but rather it is *how they die.* Their bravery (ἀνδραγαθία, 1:8) in the face of suffering and death proves the thesis. As we will see more clearly below, the author defends reason's power (and, thereby, the possibility of the good life) by presenting cases in which the increasingly extreme assaults of the passions are defeated not by being removed but by being endured. The paradox is that it is precisely in the extreme degradation of the body and loss of physical life that reason is most perfectly shown to be impervious to the passions. This spectacle elicits wonder (θαυμάζω,1:11; cf. 6:9; 9:26; 17:16, 17; 18:3) from everyone, even from the torturers, and the brave deaths of the martyrs secure the overthrow of the tyrant (1:11) and the purification of the land (1:12). This focus on the maintenance of reason despite a perfect assault of the passions suggests that 4 Maccabees is, at least in one respect, very close to Stoic conceptions of flourishing. The good life is the rational and virtuous life, one that, in its ideal form, is impervious to tragedy.

Despite the dominance of the Hellenistic good life and noble death framework of the *exordium*, the distinctively Jewish features are not entirely absent. The addition of the modifier εὐσεβής to λογισμός in the statement of the thesis (1:1) would have seemed strange to anyone well-versed in Hellenistic philosophy.[17] The appeal to the story of *Jewish* martyrs as proof of a *Greek* thesis is novel, as is the reference to the 'purification' (καθαρίζω) of the homeland and the 'all-wise God' (πάνσοφος θεός, 1:11, 12). The integration of these words and phrases in the *exordium* allows the Hellenistic traditions to dominate the surface, while suggesting the

[16] D.A. deSilva, 'The Noble Contest: Honor, Shame, and the Rhetorical Strategy of 4 Maccabees', *JSP* 13 (1995): 31–57; van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs*, 187 – 269.

[17] *Pace* deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 70. Though εὐσέβεια is a common topic in philosophical discourse, the phrase εὐσεβὴς λογισμός is not attested in Greek literature prior to 4 Maccabees and, therefore, to qualify reason in this way would have been verbally odd. Rightly, D.C. Aune, 'Mastery of the Passions: Philo, 4 Maccabees and Earliest Christianity', in *Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World* (ed. W.E. Helleman; Lanham: UPA, 1994), 135. That it is conceptually novel too becomes clear in what follows. So, S. Lauer, 'Eusebes Logismos in IV Macc.', *JJS* 6 (1955): 170; Breitenstein, *Beobachtungen*, 133.

important Jewish qualifications and elaborations of this basic picture of the good life that are to come.[18]

1.1.2 'Wise Life': The Verbal and Conceptual Fit between the Good Life and the Jewish Law (1:13 – 19)

It is one thing to have the capacity to reason, another to be reasonable, and yet another to give an account of how a person comes to be reasonable. In its emphasis on reason's capacity and its definition of reason and wisdom, 4 Maccabees stands squarely within the good life discourse of Hellenistic ethics. In this connection, prior to engaging his argument in earnest, 4 Maccabees considers it necessary to set out his 'starting-point' (1:12). He begins with two important definitions:

> λογισμὸς μὲν δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν νοῦς μετὰ ὀρθοῦ λόγου προτιμῶν τὸν σοφίας βίον. σοφία δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν γνῶσις θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτιῶν. (4 Macc 1:15 – 16)

Though the definitions of both λογισμός[19] and σοφία[20] reflect standard philosophical coinage, the phrase 'life of wisdom' (ὁ σοφίας βίος) is unattested in Greek literature prior to 4 Maccabees. The inclusion of the term βίος could simply represent the characteristic concern in Hellenistic philosophical ethics with the relationship between wisdom, reason, and life. For example, after a discussion of the power of the mind via reason and argument to arrive at wisdom, Cicero attacks the Academics for denying this power such that 'they overthrow the whole of life' (*totam vitam evertunt*, *Acad.* 2.508). In doubting the mind's cognitive powers, skeptics do

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[18] These Jewish qualifications highlight the need to pay careful attention to 4 Maccabees' use of noble death discourse, as there is a danger of missing its distinctive appropriation if too close an assimilation to Hellenistic models is assumed. As van Henten notes ('Noble Death', 91), 'Martyrdom…is a specific type of noble death: it is part of the broader category of noble death in antiquity, which includes several ways of self-sacrifice and self-killings, but it differs from other types of noble death because of its specific motifs and the fact that it is transmitted in a corpus of specific Jewish and Christian writings, which can be called "martyr texts."'

[19] Reason is a matter not only of the νοῦς but also of ὀρθὸς λόγος of the νοῦς, all of which is oriented towards σοφία. The ὀρθὸς λόγος was an important concept in Stoic discussions of the πάθη; cf. A.A. Long, 'The Harmonics of Stoic Virtue', in *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 202 – 23.

[20] For the commonplace Socratic definition of φρόνησις as the chief virtue, see e.g. Plato, *Euthyd.* 414. Seneca also gives the definition of the good man as the 'wise man', with Socrates as the exemplar (*Const.* 7.2 – 3). For definitions quite close to 4 Maccabees here, see e.g. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* 4.392: *sapientiam esse rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit*; and Philo, *Congr.* 79, σοφία δὲ ἐπιστήμη θείων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ τῶν τούτων αἰτίων. For the general, not specifically Stoic, character of this definition, see Renehan, 'Philosophic Background', 228.

more than score epistemological points—they remove the foundations of life. In this connection, when the author of 4 Maccabees defines λογισμός in terms of νοῦς and ὀρθὸς λόγος and the 'wise life' he is reflecting a tradition in which being human is conceived in cognitive, rational, and ethical terms. Given the author's later distinctions, however, between different forms of βίοι, it seems that the phrase introduces the word βίος as a key term by which these relations may be clarified. Paradigmatically, to live in 4 Maccabees is to live *well* in *Jewish* terms.[21]

It is one thing to offer a definition of the good life, another to actually *live* a good life, and the author is interested in proving reason's rule of the passions not defining philosophical concepts *in abstracto*. Consequently, he clarifies how σοφία is to be acquired: '[Wisdom previously defined in Hellenistic terms, v. 16], thus, *is* the instruction of the law…' (αὕτη δὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ νόμου παιδεία, 1:17). This is an audacious equation, identifying with Greek wisdom a life ordered by Jewish social and cultic practices that were regular sources of controversy and conflict in antiquity.[22] The fact that the terms σοφία and νόμος are often related in the biblical wisdom literature does suggest that the author is making traditional verbal associations, [23] though the repetition of the adjectives θεῖος and ἀνθρώπινος in v. 17 explicitly recalls the philosophical definition, while the adverbs σεμνῶς and συμφερόντως qualify it. Also, the 'forms' (ἰδέαι) of σοφία are the cardinal virtues and, again, φρόνησις is the chief virtue (1:18). The introduction of this audacious equivalency, consequently, is not meant to overthrow the carefully articulated Hellenistic framework. Rather, it turns wisdom toward the ends of 'reverence' and

[21] The noun is used fourteen times (4 Mac 1:15; 4:1; 5:36; 6:18; 7:7, 15; 8:8, 23; 10:15; 12:18; 13:24; 16:18; 17:14; 18:9), the verb βιόω twice (4 Mac 5:22; 17:18). For the way βίος is used in differentiations of βίοι, compare, for example, φιλόσοφος θείου βίος (7:7), βίος νομίμος (7:15) and Ἑλληνικὸς βίος (8:8).

[22] Barclay, *Diaspora*, 428–44.

[23] Wisdom is associated with the doing of the law or obedience to the commandments regularly in Ben Sira (Sir 1:26; 15:1; 19:20). Piety and wisdom are correlated in an important passage at the very beginning of the book of Proverbs (Prov 1:7), and there is an interesting variation from the MT in the LXX of Proverbs 9:10 equating knowing the law with a good mind (διάνοια). The result, Prov 9:11, is 'a long life' and the addition of 'years to life,' both of which are notably absent from 4 Maccabees. On this topic in Second Temple Judaism and Paul, see E.J. Schnabel, *Law and Wisdom from Ben Sira to Paul: A Tradition Historical Enquiry into the Relation of Law, Wisdom, and Ethics* (WUNT II 16; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985).

'profitability', a move our author shares with Philo[24] and which suggests that he accepts a Greek definition of σοφία, *only so long as* the 'divine' and 'human' matters of which it speaks are qualified in a Jewish way. As such, these definitions represent a harmony of Greek ethical categories and Jewish theology, though, admittedly, one in which Jewish theology decisively shapes the practice of ethics and conception of anthropology and cosmology.[25] The result, for our author, is that the good life is truly embodied only in Judaism.[26] Furthermore, the theology that grounds 4 Maccabees is not amenable to Stoic conceptions of divinity. Zeno's 'good flow of life' (εὔροια βίου) or 'living well' (εὖ ζῆν)[27] arising from Stoic belief in the divinity of nature and its rational and providential ordering, is foreign to the author's way of thinking.

1.1.3 Torah-Shaped Σοφία and the Capacity of Reason (1:20 – 2:23)

If the author of 4 Maccabees is eager to present life as life *lived well*, he is equally keen on demonstrating the role of the law in reason's restraint of the passions. Given the identification of wisdom with instruction in the law (1:16 – 17), it is not surprising that, after a general taxonomy of the πάθη in terms of pleasure and pain along with the various forms these take for the body and soul (1:20 – 30), 4 Maccabees turns to exemplars of restraint from Israel's history and general legal examples of restraint of the πάθη (1:31 – 2:20).[28] Relying on 4 Macc 2:10 – 23, Redditt establishes that one of the primary functions of νόμος is that it 'educates the intellect

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[24] Philo, *Congr.* 80: ταῦτα λέγεται μὲν εἶναι δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετά, σεμνότερα δὲ φαίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ θεοῦ τιμῆς καὶ ἀρεσκείας ἕνεκα ἐπιτηδεύοιτο.

[25] Scholars who emphasise the dominance of Jewish over Hellenistic thought in 4 Maccabees are correct at this point (e.g., 'Das jüdische Element überdeckt das echt griechische'; Breitenstein, *Beobachtungen*, 132). Our author does not deny that nature is rational or that one should live κατὰ φύσιν in order to live the good life, but he *insists* that reverence for the *Jewish God* and, with it, instruction in the law of *this* God are necessary conditions for the good life. They are not sufficient, because they require the courageous exercise of human reason, but they are necessary. On the relationship between Stoic theology and ethics see, A. A. Long, 'The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics', in *Stoic Studies* (University of California Press, 1996), 134 – 155.

[26] Barclay, *Diaspora*, 372: 'Even in the opening chapters it is clear that the author views the philosophical virtues as not simply illustrated in the law but dependent for their realization on its practice.'

[27] Attributed by Arius Didymus to Zeno; cf. *SVF* 1.184, 3.16. For further discussion, see A.A. Long, 'Stoic Eudaimonism', in *Stoic Studies* (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 179 – 201.

[28] P.L. Redditt, 'The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees', *CBQ* 45 (1983): 249 – 70 argues convincingly that νόμος typically refers to the Pentateuch and serves five major functions in 4 Maccabees—'teaching, enabling rational living, encouraging, condemning/not condemning and commanding/prohibiting' (251).

to enable rational behavior', [29] but he does not specify *how*. As we shall see, in this section of 4 Maccabees, νόμος is necessary for the good life (i.e., it enables rational behaviour) because it provides the *shape of virtuous behaviour* (Reddit's fifth category) to which reason responds, and it *introduces a logic* (Redditt's fourth category) by which the law might form reasonable people.

The law enables rational living by providing the shape of virtue. In the starting-point the law 'enables' reason only in a formal sense—i.e., by defining the standard to which reason conforms.[30] The idea of limits or proportion is inherent to discussion of the πάθη, because the emotions are problematic for the Stoics precisely in inciting disproportionate, excessive, or boundary-breaking behaviour.[31] More precisely, then, in 4 Maccabees, the νόμος defines the shape of σοφία, which λογισμός maintains by ὀρθὸς λόγος. The emphasis throughout the 'philosophical section' is on the empirical fact of obedience to the νόμος as proof of reason's capacity to resist the passions. The first general legal example is typical: the law forbids certain foods and reason makes it possible (δύναμαι) to forgo the pleasure (ἡδονή) of eating such foods (1:33, 34). The author does not here explain *why* it is reasonable to forgo these foods and their pleasures, only that restraint demonstrates the capacity of reason. In other words, the rationality of the law *per se* is assumed, not defended. Each of the biblical exemplars demonstrate reason's capacity to restrain the passions: Joseph uses his mind (διανοίᾳ, 2:2) and reason (τῷ λογισμῷ, 2:3) to defeat lust and resist Potipher's wife's advances; Moses restrained his anger against Dathan and Abiron by reason (λογισμῷ, 2:17); and Jacob's reproof of Simeon and Levi for their genocide of the Shechemites (an act which was μὴ λογισμῷ, 2:19) demonstrates the power (δυνατός) of 'the self-controlled mind' (ὁ σώφρων νοῦς, 2:18). The ability to obey the law, in general, and the restraint of the biblical exemplars, in particular, specify virtue's shape and

[29] Ibid., 252.

[30] F. Watson, 'Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and Other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and Human Agency', in *Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment* (ed. S.J. Gathercole and J.M.G. Barclay; LNTS 335; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 112.

[31] A.A. Long, 'Harmonics of Stoic Virtue', 209: '[ὀρθὸς λόγος] functions as the craftsman of impulse by moderating their excess and by making them commensurate with correct estimates of value.'

demonstrate reason's capacity to maintain that shape despite the assaults of the passions.[32]

For 4 Maccabees, this relationship between reason and the law as the shape of virtue is materially and inviolably constitutive of human nature, rooted as it is in God's creative benefaction. The ground of reason's capacity for ruling (2:20)—e.g. anger—is God's creation and ordering of the self: 'For when God formed mankind (ὁπηνίκα γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατεσκεύασεν), God implanted (περιφυτεύω; cf. Gn 2:8) in mankind passions and habits (2:21), and 'when he enthroned the mind as sacred ruler through the senses' (τὸν ἱερὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐνεθρόνισεν, 2:22), 'then to the mind he gave the law' (καὶ τούτῳ νόμον ἔδωκεν, 2:23). As we shall see, the divine gift of the law to the mind at creation as an inviolable moral agency is the theological ground of 4 Maccabees. For our present purposes, we should note here that the conception of created life as Torah-ordered gift informs 4 Maccabees' account of life in normative terms. That is, the receipt of the Torah by the human mind at creation entails the exercise of created reason according to Torah-norms. As we shall see, it is precisely this entailment that informs 4 Maccabees account of *why* they martyrs reject both Nature and Antiochus as Benefactor (5:25) and political 'friend' (13:13), respectively.

4 Maccabees' treatment of Joseph illustrates this Torah-ordered anthropology. In 4 Macc 2:2 – 4, the desire of 'self-controlled Joseph' (ὁ σώφρων Ιωσηφ) is introduced as a species of the genus ἐπιθυμία (2:1), which leads to the mention of the prohibition against forbidden desiring in the law (ἐπιθυμέω for 'to covet'; cf. Ex 20:17; Dt 5:21). It is then argued, through appeal to an abbreviated form of the tenth commandment, that reason rules 'all desire' (πᾶσα ἐπιθυμία, 2:4). The implication is that Joseph is following the tenth commandment *before* it is given at Sinai, though, unlike *1 Maccabees*, this is not explicitly stated.[33] Be that as it may, it is God's creation of the

[32] Watson, 'Antithesis ', 113: 'The reason that is sovereign over the passions is the human capacity presupposed and constituted by the law's address. It is the law's anthropological correlate, just as the law is reason's theological correlate.'

[33] 1 Macc 2:53: 'Joseph, in the time of his distress, kept the commandment and became lord of Egypt.' Erich Gruen (E.S. Gruen, *Heritage and Hellenism: the Reinvention of Jewish Tradition* (HCS 30; Berkeley: UCP, 1998), 79 – 80) attributes this to a belief 4 Maccabees shares with *1 Maccabees* and Wisdom of Solomon that '[d]ivine inspiration gave Joseph insight into the morality of abstinence.'

self and gift of the Torah that establishes the created integrity of the self and, thus, the possibility of virtue and flourishing.

1.1.4 Disciplining David: How the Law Forms Virtuous and Wise Leaders (2:24 – 3:18)

The author's rhetorical skill and conceptual coherence are nicely illustrated in the transition from this account of God's creative benefaction to his narrative demonstration: for his assertion that 'the one who becomes a citizen [to the divine gift of the law] will rule a kingdom' (καθ' ὃν πολιτευόμενος βασιλεύσει βασιλείαν) characterised by the cardinal virtues (2:23), in alluding to the Stoic paradox that '[n]ur der Weise ist König',[34] prepares for an objection (2:24 – 3:5) and an exemplary case that, in featuring King David, both proves his theory (2:24 – 3:5) and prepares for its political application in the narrative demonstration (3:19 – 4:26). In short, his account of the ordering of the self and society are here *integrally related* in David's example of rational kingship. Thus, David proves that 'reason is not the destroyer of the passions, but their antagonist' (οὐ…ἐκριζωτὴς τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνταγωνιστής, 3:5) by mastering his 'irrational desire' (ἀλόγιστος ἐπιθυμία, 3:11) and refusing to drink the water his mighty men have procured at risk of their lives (3:12 – 16; cf. 2 Sam 23:13 - 17).[35] In an amplification of the LXX version (cf. 2 Sam 23:17),[36] the author lays the accent on David's cultic reasoning: 'he thought to himself (ἐλογίσατο) "a drink reckoned (λογισθὲν) equivalent to blood is a danger to the soul" (3:15),' and, thus, 'pitting reason against desire (ἀντιθεὶς τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τὸν λογισμόν), he poured the drink out to God' (3:16).[37] Thus, David is an exemplar of the leader who, in ruling himself, properly orders a flourishing society—one that is σώφρων, δίκαιος, ἀγαθός and ἀνδρεῖος (2:23). Likewise, this presentation makes an implicit claim about the rationality of the law itself, which serves both to frame the narrative demonstration and set up Eleazar's explicit defence of the rationality of the law in

[34] H.J. Klauck, *4. Makkabäerbuch* (JSHRZ 3.6; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1989), 699, n. 23.

[35] On the shift from a conception of extirpation to one of control of the passions in later Stoic ethics, see M.C. Nussbaum, 'The Stoics on the Extirpation of the Passions', in *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: PUP, 1994), 359 – 401.

[36] For a full account of the narrative shaping, see deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 104–10.

[37] The background for this reasoning is Lev 17:10 – 16; rightly, Klauck, *4. Makkabäerbuch*, 702. *Pace* deSilva, (*4 Maccabees: Commentary,* 108) because the logic works by analogy, the fact that this seems to be a drink offering is irrelevant; moreover, Lev 17:13 requires the blood of non-sacrificial animals to be poured out.

the *Rededuell* (5:1 – 38). In other words, if the law produces virtuous societies it is, by implication, *rational*.

Thus, 4 Maccabees' 'starting-point' (1:1 – 3:18) is a generally Stoic account of the good life, but this account is decisively qualified by Jewish theology. God is both Creator and Benefactor, ordering the self by donating the law to the mind from creation and ordering society by forming leaders in the wisdom characteristic of the cardinal virtues, though Torah-defined. With our analysis of divine life-giving benefaction in the 'starting-point' in place, a necessary component of 4 Maccabees' theological logic is clarified: the *particular* character of the life God gives at creation—a created self with an enduring rational capacity and Torah order—grounds not only the divine maintenance of the created order in the history 4 Maccabees tells (3:19 – 4:26) but also Eleazar's exemplary exercise of reason in a time of divine chastisement (5:1 – 7:23). Consequently, as we shall argue presently, any account of 4 Maccabees' atonement theology must recognize its place in the more fundamental conception of God as life-giver and life as gift in this text. Neither a mere recognition of the martyrs' deaths as atoning nor an account of this atonement in merely exemplary terms is sufficient to convey the text's theological logic.

1.2 Paradoxical Piety: the Good Life Perfected in Noble and Sacrificial Death (4 Macc 3:19 – 7:23)

In the 'narrative demonstration' each of the martyr stories serve as both exemplary proofs of the author's thesis and sequential advances in his *apologia* for Judaism. In this section we argue that the historical build-up (3:19 – 4:26) to the martyrs' stories introduces a hermeneutic sourced from Deuteronomy 30 and 32 to frame Eleazar's *Rededuell* with Antiochus (5:1 – 6:30) as a debate over and test of the author's conception of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction, while the *encomium* to Eleazar (6:31 – 7:23) stresses the rational character of his sacrifice and its temporal and eschatological results. More specifically, whereas Jason's Hellenising program invites the divine wrath by dismissing the Temple, the order of life it represents, and, ultimately, the God who gave both, Eleazar deploys an argument for the rationality of this order in modified Stoic terms, proves this argument by mastering himself despite tortures and death, and, thereby, is established both as the

exemplary defender of the 'faith' of the patriarchs and a fitting recipient of eternal life. In this way, Eleazar instructs the martyrs in a paradoxical political and eschatological piety, wherein, in a time of divine chastisement, the good life takes the form of mutilated bodies, and a noble death for the law is the only path to eschatological life and national renewal. Our argument here helps clarify 4 Maccabees' theological logic and resolve the debate over its atonement theology, because it shows how Eleazar's sacrifice is both effective and exemplary for the brothers. Eleazar's sacrifice and thus 4 Maccabees' atonement theology is neither simply effective nor merely exemplary. Rather, by returning his created life in self-offering, Eleazar both invites God's eschatological return of his life as gift and shows the brothers the path to their own vindication and the restoration of the nation.

1.2.1 Cultic Commitment as Civic Virtue and Hermeneutical Key to Historical Order (3:20 – 4:26)

4 Maccabees' build-up to the fateful contest between Antiochus and the Maccabean martyrs, as in 2 Maccabees 3 – 6, includes two accounts of revolution, one thwarted and the other successful, but the narrative here is selected, compressed, and shaped to serve different purposes.[38] For 4 Maccabees, personal and political virtue is identified with the cultic commitment of the nation's leaders, while history provides an accurate index of this virtue in the form of God's blessing and cursing activity. The good (ἀγαθός, 4:1; cf. 2:23) indigenous leadership of Onias and the beneficent rule of Seleucus[39] are replaced by the Hellenising (ἐκπολιτεύω, 4:19) Jason and the 'arrogant' (ὑπερήφανος) and 'terrible' (δεινός) Antiochus Epiphanes

[38] Direct dependence is the simplest explanation, as 4 Maccabees gives little evidence of independent material and ample evidence of dependence and expansion; so, G.W.E. Nickelsburg, *Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early Christianity* (exp. edit.; HTS 56; Cambridge: HUP, 2006), 138. Freudenthal attributes the differences between 4 Maccabees and 2 Maccabees to a partial restoration of the original perspective found in Jason of Cyrene (2 Macc 2:23) (J. Freudenthal, *Die Flavius Josephus beigelegte Schrift Ueber die Herrschaft der Vernunft (IV Makkabäerbuch): eine Predigt aus dem ersten nachchristlichen Jahrhundert* (Breslau: Schletter, 1869), 72–90. Dupont-Sommer's droll question is apt, 'S'il prend de telles libertés avec un texte incontestablement canonique [i.e., 2 Sam 23], faudra-t-il s'attendre de sa part à plus de fidélité à l'égard d'une source profane?'; A. Dupont-Sommer, *Le Quatrième livre des Machabées: introduction, traduction et notes* (Paris: Champion, 1939), 30.

[39] The Seleucus in view here is not further specified in 2 Macc 3:3, and the author of 4 Maccabees erroneously supplies 'Nicanor' as the epithet, one of several historical errors in this section. (It was Seleucus IV Philopator.) For explanations of the mistake, see van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs*, 80; deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 112.

(4:15). The result is that the time of peace (εἰρήνη) and harmony (ὁμόνοια, 3:21) experienced as a result of law observance (διὰ τὴν εὐνομίαν, 3:20) is replaced by a state of utter lawlessness (ἐπὶ πᾶσαν παρανομίαν, 4:19) and a multitude of calamities (3:21). Jason's Hellenising of the Jewish πολιτεία (3:21) presented in these terms is ironic, with the references to εἰρήνη, ὁμόνοια, and εὐνομία portraying the Jewish nation as a flourishing Greek city-state before his Hellenising program.[40] Furthermore, the repetition of πολιτεύομαι and cognates echoes the theme of personal and civic virtue just presented in the 'starting-point' (2:23), so that an evaluation of leaders' rationality reverberates throughout the build-up. This framing ironically implies that it is the social order of life of the *Jews* that leads to flourishing that the Greeks would and should recognise as a fruit of civic virtue.

As in 2 Maccabees, it is the Hellenising program's disregard for the Temple that brings disaster, but in 4 Maccabees a more explicitly theological interpretation focused on the leadership is given.[41] The attack of Apollonius, invited by the subterfuge of Simon the ἀντιπολιτευόμενος of Onias (4:1), and the Hellenising of Jason incite ἡ θεία δίκη, (4:13, 21). DeSilva suggests that portions of Deuteronomy 30 and 32 provide the framework for 4 Maccabees' theology of history, though he does not establish dependence or analyse its hermeneutical significance.[42] The only citations of Deuteronomy in 4 Maccabees occur at 18:18 -19, where portions of Dt 32:39, 47 and 30:20 are combined, and at 17:18 – 19 (Dt 33:3). In the former, the father of the martyred boys taught them 'the song that Moses taught, which says': Εγὼ ἀποκτενῶ καὶ ζῆν ποιήσω· αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡ μακρότης τῶν ἡμερῶν. We will examine this use more fully below, but we should note the configuration of the two citations: it is the God, who kills and makes alive, who *is* their life and length of days. This theological conviction produces a hermeneutic that sees in historical events God's fitting allocation of salvation and judgement. Thus, in the case of Apollonius, his disregard

[40] deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 112.

[41] On the influence of Dt 32 on 2 Maccabees, see e.g. D.R. Schwartz, 'On Something Biblical About 2 Maccabees', in *Biblical Perspectives: Early Use and Interpretation of the Bible in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls: Proceedings of the First International Symposium of the Orion Center for the Study of the Dead Sea Scrolls and Associated Literature, 12 - 14 May, 1996* (ed. M.E. Stone and E.G. Chazon; STDJ 28; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 223 – 32 and D. Lincicum, *Paul and the Early Jewish Encounter with Deuteronomy* (WUNT II 284; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 89.

[42] deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 180, 264–65.

for the Temple and its God, leads to divine δίκη, as angels leave him 'half-dead' (ἡμιθανής, 4:11). He is saved (διασώζω) only after expressing regard for the Temple and its God, confessing his sin as worthy of death (ἄξιος ἀποθνήσκειν), and receiving intercessory prayer from Onias (4:12, 13). Though this fits the basic structure of Deuteronomy 30:15 – 20, where regard for God leads to life and disregard death, there are clear signs of the influence of the Song of Moses on the language. In 2 Maccabees, the divine warriors are not called ἄγγελοι, their weapons do not 'shine like lightning' (περιαστράπτω) and their activity is not characterised as δίκη, while all these words are used in 4 Maccabees. The only place in the LXX where these three words or cognates of them appear together is Deuteronomy 32:41 – 43. There the Lord provokes his sword like 'lightning' (ἀστραπή) in order to dispense δίκη to the enemies (Dt 32:41), and it is the ἄγγελοι θεοῦ who are strengthened to pay back δίκη (Dt 32:43). As the word δίκη itself is rare in the LXX and it occurs only twice in 2 Maccabees (2 Macc 8:11, 13; both of which can be coordinated to a theology of history derived from Deuteronomy),[43] it seems likely that the author of 4 Maccabees reads the angelic defense of the temple through a lens fashioned from the quotations from Dt 30 and 32—specifically, God's death-dealing δίκη. If so, then Antiochus, whom the divine δίκη caused to war against Jerusalem (αὐτοῖς τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐπολέμωσεν, 4:21), would represent the 'no nation' (οὐκ ἔθνος, Dt 32:21) and the 'enemies' (ἐχθροί, Dt 32:41 – 43) sent to chastise the people. These will be overthrown, however, so that they might not say 'Our hand is proud, and it was not the Lord who did these things' (Dt. 32:27). This parallel would account for the recognition that the healing of Apollonius is necessary so that the divine δίκη will be recognised by Seleucus (3:13; cf. 2 Macc 3:32 – 33). Moreover, it introduces a theme that is repeated, in both historical and eschatological keys, by the brothers, who warn Antiochus constantly that he should expect the divine δίκη after death for his tortures (4 Macc 9:9, 15, 32; 11:3; 12:12).

This combined account of rational civic virtue and its Deuteronomic

[43] Of the 37 occurrences in the LXX, only 4 are in the Pentateuch: Ex 21:20; Lev 26:25; Dt 32:41, 43. In 2 Macc 8:11 - 13, Judas Maccabeus is the form of God the Almighty's δίκη in response to 'lawless violence against the holy place', 'the torture which mocked the city' and 'destruction of the ancestral polity' (2 Macc 8:17).

maintenance renders the actions of Simon, Jason, and Antiochus as revolutions against the earthly and divine order, actions that reveal them to be irrational, vice-ridden, and ignorant of the operations of divine justice. These leaders are the antithesis of rational King David—impious, power-hungry, greedy, and brutal. Moreover, in the case of Jason, we have a leader who is willing to give tribute to a foreign political ruler in exchange for the priesthood (4 Macc 4:17). Though, like 2 Maccabees, 4 Maccabees produces its theology of history through an appropriation of Deuteronomy, they differ in one important respect. Unlike 2 Maccabees, the blame for the ascent of Antiochus lies solely on Jason and not also the priests and people (cf. 2 Macc 4:12, 13), and there is no suggestion that the people, in general, participate in his Hellenising program.[44] In both Deuteronomy and 2 Maccabees, the nation as a whole is implicated in idolatry and disobedience, while here the blame falls squarely on Jason, with the people swept along in the judgement. Furthermore, without the Temple, there is no mechanism by which the people can be delivered from Antiochus's paradoxical edict that those who adhere to the law will die (4:23).[45] The result is the monstrous dissonance of fatal law-obedience, as women and newly-circumcised babies are flung to their deaths (4:25; cf 2 Macc 6:10).[46]

1.2.2 Who Gives and Orders Life?: The Rededuell[47] between Antiochus and Eleazar on the Rationality of Jewish Life (5:1 – 7:23)

In 4 Maccabees, to live is to live well in Torah-terms. Yet, in a time of divine chastisement, a commitment to the law may lead to death. In both his reasoned defense and his exemplary fidelity, Eleazar articulates and embodies the author's vision of the Jewish fulfilment of the good life in a time of tyranny. Specifically, Eleazar argues that, because it produces individual and civic virtue, the law is equivalent to the order of nature and God alone is Benefactor. Thus, he grounds this *apologia* in an alternate account of theological cosmology and establishes the logic by which the martyrs' deaths can be seen as effective. In this way, he explains how a

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[44] Watson, 'Antithesis ', 109.

[45] van Henten notes a similar recognition for the need for 'an alternative offering' in Dan 3:39, 40; J.W. van Henten, 'The Tradition-Historical Background of Romans 3.25: a Search for Pagan and Jewish Parallels', in *From Jesus to John: Essays on Jesus and New Testament Christology, in Honour of Marinus de Jonge* (ed. M.C. de Boer; JSNTSup 84; Sheffield: JSOT, 1993), 112.

[46] Watson, 'Antithesis ', 109.

[47] For this term, see Klauck, *4. Makkabäerbuch*, 652.

death that might be viewed as a tragedy is really personal and national triumph. For Eleazar establishes a martyrological pedagogy for the nation—one that is rational because it motivates them to resist the passions in the expectation that God will vindicate the nation through their deaths and give them eschatological life in return.

The portrayal of Antiochus and his verbal sparring with the martyrs is a fictional expansion of 2 Maccabees 6.18 – 7:42, which, like the build-up, is shaped to serve the author's purpose. The basic question assumed by the first *Rededuell* is: is it reasonable to be tortured and die in fidelity to the Jewish food laws? In Antiochus's offer of a chance for the elderly priest and scribe Eleazar to save (σῴζω) himself by eating pork (5:6), we can, therefore, detect both a practical and theological testing of limits. How far must one go in fidelity to the law, and are there matters on which one might justifiably break the law? Similarly, and more foundationally, is adherence to the law reasonable *per se*? These questions further highlight the connection between the accounts of Eleazar and David—with David representing the foundational exemplar of how the law inculcates personal and political wisdom via cultic reasoning, Eleazar the exemplar of the test of this reasoning in a time of divine chastisement. Though Eleazar will soon give an explicit answer to these questions, the use of echoes from the historical build-up portray Antiochus as ironically ignorant of the workings of divine δίκη and σωτηρία. The last thing Eleazar should expect, for example, is that he can save himself (cf. 4:12, 14) by disregarding God or his laws, as the story of Apollonius proves. This highlights the fundamental question of the whole debate: who gives and orders life—Nature, Antiochus, or God?

Antiochus' argument oscillates between principled appeal to the natural order and pragmatic political justification. To argue the irrationality (ἀνόητος) of Jewish abstinence from pork, Antiochus appeals, on the one hand, to a conception of Nature as Benefactor (5:8, 9) and, on the other, to the folly of Jewish abstinence given the grave and terrible consequences (5:10). In the first criticism Nature is a Benefactor (φύσις) who gives (χαρίζομαι) pork as one of 'her' most excellent gifts.[48]

[48] As deSilva points out (*4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 129), καλλίστην is not in the attributive position in the phrase τῆς φύσεως κεχαρισμένης καλλίστην τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ ζῴου σαρκοφαγίαν and makes better sense taken as a substantive, with the emphasis lying on the excellence of the gift not its meat.

This frames Eleazar and the Jews as refusing the patronage and friendship of Nature, and since there is nothing obviously shameful (ὄνειδος) about pork, it is unjust (ἄδικος) to refuse τὰς τῆς φύσεως χάριτας (5:9). This reference to Natures' 'gifts' in the context of a debate over reason recalls 4 Maccabees' conception of the Torah as a divine gift to the mind from creation. Thus, if one accepts Antiochus' theological cosmology, the criticism makes sense, but the word ἄδικος reminds the reader, again, of an alternate account of δίκη, subtly undermining the point.[49] If forgoing such delicacies rejects and violates Nature's benefactions, 'holding a vain opinion' (κενοδοξῶν) about the truth is even worse, as torture and death await such incorrigible disobedience to the king's rule (5:10). Eleazar's philosophy is mere gossip (φλύαρος) and his reason nonsense (λῆρος), because he is not 'philosophising according to the truth of what is profitable' (φιλοσοφήσεις τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀλήθειαν, 5:11). The rhetoric attributed to Antiochus plays on Eleazar's supposed pretensions to philosophy and his old age, suggesting that if he really wanted to adopt a philosophy fitting (ἄξιος) for his age (5:11), he would abandon this nonsense. Nevertheless, granting the dubious proposition that there is some 'power' (δύναμις) governing the Jewish religion, Antiochus asserts that it will 'pardon' (συγγνωμονέω) those who break the law under duress (5:13, cf. uses of διασώζω and δύναμις in 2 Macc 3:38).[50] As the echoes of σώζω and δίκη imply, however, this assertion, like everything else uttered by Antiochus, should be viewed with skepticism, an implication confirmed by Eleazar's response.

The threat of violence combined with the assumption of God's pardon elicits a rebuttal from Eleazar that is principled and pragmatic. Though Eleazar begins by attacking the suggestion that adherence to Jewish food laws is a trivial matter, he soon broadens Antiochus' scope, moving beyond the question of his own individual rationality and personal virtue to a broader philosophical and political perspective.

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[49] Thus, *pace* deSilva (D.A. deSilva, 'Using the Master's Tools to Shore Up Another's House: A Postcolonial Analysis of 4 Maccabees', *JBL* 126 (2007) 108): the 'arrogant logic of tyranny' exemplified by Antiochus is not that he does not 'take sufficient trouble to understand the inner logic and "reasonableness"' of Jewish life, but rather that he has an alternate account of nature and reasonableness that allows him to do as he pleases, all in defiance of divine order. In other words, his arrogance and irrationality consists in his *godlessness*. Cf. deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 133.

[50] Moses Hadas argues that the repetition and rejection of this idea of pardon and unconditioned mercy (cf. 8:14, 25; 9:4) suggests that it was a tempting one for 4 Maccabees' audience; M. Hadas, *The Third and Fourth Books of Maccabees* (New York: Harper, 1953), 171.

The religious practices derided as 'irrational' (ἀνόητος) and 'vain opinion' (κενοδοξία, 5:10; 8:19, 24), are ones the Jews cannot neglect, because, 'having been persuaded to become citizens to divine law' (θείῳ πεπεισμένοι νόμῳ πολιτεύεσθαι), they consider nothing more compelling than 'ready obedience' (εὐπείθεια) to the law (5:16). Antiochus' charge of 'vain-opinion' notwithstanding (5:10), the Jewish philosophy is not merely a matter of tribal 'opinion' (δόξα, 5:18; cf. 6:18; 7:9), one that they might jettison in favour of a more suitable one.[51] The consumption of forbidden food is, rather, an issue of grave importance, because the law does not admit of degrees of fidelity, as disobedience in any matter demonstrates contempt for the law *in toto* (5:17, 20, 21).[52] In other words, because the law is divine it is to be obeyed *in every detail*, and, thus, abstinence from forbidden foods is part of the inviolable tapestry of divine order.

Eleazar argues that Antiochus ought to recognise the truth of this order. Though Antiochus thinks the Jews are without 'good reason' in 'living according to [their philosophy]' (οὐ μετὰ εὐλογιστίας ἐν αὐτῇ βιούντων, 5:22), the Jewish philosophy teaches the cardinal virtues that restrain vice (5:23, 24; cf. 2:23). This replays the provocative theme that Jewish life fulfils the ethical conditions necessary for the good life with an implied argument in *modus ponens* form*:* if, as Eleazar argues, the law produces virtuous citizens, then the law is rational. In other words, in recognising the virtue of the Jews, Antiochus ought to recognise the rationality of Judaism *per se* and *on his own terms*, which were considered *universal*.[53] Whether this sort of *a posteriori* argument is convincing, it is, nonetheless, how the author of 4 Maccabees translates his tradition.[54] His characteristic turn of wisdom toward God (cf. 1:17) is indicated, though, by the variation he introduces to the theme of the cardinal virtues, with εὐσέβεια here presented as the final and, therefore, chief virtue.[55] Likewise, Eleazar's contention that they worship 'the only existing God' (τὸν

[51] Though δόξα could mean 'reputation' here (so, NRSV, NETS), 'opinion' is more likely since the debate in this context concerns the truth of the Jewish position, not the martyrs' fidelity to it.

[52] For this principle in Stoic debate, see Renehan, 'Philosophic Background', 229 – 32. Cf. Gal 5:3.

[53] van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs*, 277; deSilva, 'Master's Tools', 115 – 16.

[54] For the ethical and rational contrast between Antiochus and the martyrs, see S.D. Moore and J.C. Anderson, 'Taking It Like a Man: Masculinity in 4 Maccabees', *JBL* 117 (1998): 252 – 265.

[55] van Henten, *Maccabean Martyrs*, 282.

ὄντα θεόν, 5:24)[56] is further evidence of the Jewish philosophical register of the response (5:24). The God the Jews worship is the only existing God, and those who live according to his laws exhibit universal virtues. These virtues are crowned with εὐσέβεια, which teaches the Jews how to worship the only existing God properly (5:24). This last point subtly counters Antiochus' previous charge of ingratitude and injustice to Nature. The Jews do not worship Nature as Benefactor. They worship the only existing God, and piety teaches them how to respond appropriately to his beneficence, offering worship that is a fitting match to his greatness.

These convictions that the law is divine and that it trains the people in virtue form the basis (διό, 5:25) for Jewish abstinence from pork. In vv. 25 – 26, 4 Maccabees grounds the creational anthropology developed in the 'philosophical' section (cf. 2:21 – 23) and its Torah-defined ethical content in a broader theological cosmology inflected in Stoic terms. Eleazar claims that 'the Creator of the cosmos has sympathy [on human beings] by giving a law to us that accords with nature' (κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖν συμπαθεῖ νομοθετῶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου κτίστης, 5:25). The use of Stoic technical terms κατὰ φύσιν and the verb οἰκειόω (5:26) recall the previously defined concepts of rationality, though, as with the earlier definitions of wisdom, the Jewish view of God as Creator and Lawgiver implies a significant modification of Stoic conceptions of φύσις.[57] Nature is neither divine, nor the Benefactor—God is. Though Eleazar has presented a clear alternative to Antiochus' appeal to Nature as Benefactor, arguing that Jewish virtue implies the truth of Jewish piety and theology, this argument is not extended to encompass the rest of humanity. As in the example of Joseph (2:1 – 5), it is not clear how the law given to the mind at creation (2:23) can be understood apart from its mediated instruction in history. In this connection, 4 Maccabees' focus on the volitional and civic adoption of the Torah by the Jews (cf. πολιτεύομαι in 2:8, 23; 4:23; 5:16) occludes an account of its general accessibility. On what grounds and when did they gain this citizenship, and how is it gained by other nations? The civic language

[56] Though God is rarely called the 'only God' in the LXX (2 Kgs 19:15, 19; Isa 37:16; Dan 3:14), he is never called the 'only existing God.' For a similar phrase in Philo, see *Spec.* 1:332; 2:255. On 'only God' in antiquity, see D. Staudt, *Der eine und einzige Gott: Monotheistische Formeln im Urchristentum und ihre Vorgeschichte bei Griechen und Juden* (NTOA/SUNT 80; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012).

[57] Cf. H. Koester, '*Nomos Physeōs*: The Concept of Natural Law in Greek Thought', in *Religions in Antiquity: Essays in Memory of E.R. Goodenough* (ed. J. Neusner; SHR 14; Leiden: Brill, 1968), 521 – 41.

and philosophical argument could imply an ironic critique of the pretensions of Hellenistic *tradition* to universality, or it could simply underline the primarily *apologetic* interests of 4 Maccabees. In either case, there is no account of the general accessibility of the Torah to humanity, despite the identification of it as the order of nature, society, and the self. Rather, the reasoning is generally abductive and, specifically, *a posteriori*. For our purposes, this absence in an otherwise carefully crafted debate highlights how 4 Maccabees conception of God's life-giving and life-ordering activity governs his reading of the world and Israel's salvation-history. What matters is upholding the Torah-shaped account of the created self and its proper social order, not providing an exhaustive account of these with respect to humanity generally.

Thus, after giving principled reasons for doubting Anitochus' basic charges of irrationality and commitment to vain-opinion, Eleazar attacks his motives. Antiochus' arguments seek to justify an attempt 'to tyrannically compel' (τυραννικὸν…ἀναγκάζειν) the Jews to break the law in a fashion that would be repulsive to them but amusing to him (5:27). Not only will Eleazar give Antiochus no such satisfaction, but he provides a summary of both personal and civic reasons for resisting. This further wedding of civic virtue and Jewish commitment, suggested already with the use of the word πολιτεύομαι (5:16), precludes reading the martyrs' stories in individualising or spiritualising terms.[58] Eleazar's assertion of the vigour of his 'youthful reason' is for the purposes of defending 'piety' (5:31), which is not purely an individual matter.[59] Rather, personifying and addressing his philosophical and political guiding principles in vv. 34 – 35, he will neither deny his 'friend self-control' (φίλη ἐγκράτεια) or 'philosophical discourse' (φιλόσοφε λόγε) nor his 'instructor the law' (παιδευτὰ νόμε) or 'honourable priesthood and knowledge the law gives' (ἱερωσύνη τιμία καὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπιστήμη). The rationale Eleazar provides for this unswerving commitment is simultaneously civic and eschatological. Eleazar refuses to preserve his dignity by avoiding torture and death, 'so that through

[58] *Pace* van Henten, 'Background', 122: 'The martyrology in 4 Maccabees has become completely concentrated on the ideal way of life. Neither a struggle for liberation nor the institutions of a Jewish nation matter to the author. The martyrs defeat the tyrant in a moral and spiritual sense by their perseverance (ὑπομονή) until death…'

[59] *Pace* Moore and Anderson ('Taking It', 257), 'the tyrant's brutal physical coercion' is not simply 'the graphic externalization of the internal coercion that every true 'man' must resist.'

[himself] the ancestral law is destroyed' (ὥστε δι' ἐμαυτοῦ τὸν πάτριον καταλῦσαι νόμον, 5:33). This is no mere Stoic acceptance of fate, however, because Eleazar is confident that in facing death despite tortures he will be received as pure (ἁγνός) by the fathers (οἱ πατέρες, 5:37). It is this dual ground—civic and eschatological—that amounts to 'pious reason' for Eleazar and by which he assures Antiochus he will be mastered neither by words nor deeds (5:38). In other words, Eleazar must resist tyranny not only for the sake of his own virtue and life but also because the very life, flourishing, and honour of the nation is at stake. Given the Deuteronomic hermeneutic of the build-up, to disregard the law, as a leader of the nation, is to incite the divine δίκη and risk the dissolution of the nation. Consequently, even after the initial gruesome tortures (6:1 – 15), he will not reverse course and become a model (παράδειγμα) of impiety by eating the pork (6:19), but rather exhorts the 'children of Abraham to come to their end nobly for the sake of piety' (6:22). Because God creates life and the Torah is the divine gift that matches the created order of both self and society, only commitment to *this* order is rational. Likewise, only this commitment proves that reason rules the passions, because, as we shall see, it provides the confidence that a noble death will be met with the fitting gift of eschatological life and national renewal.

This recognition of Eleazar's alternative account of divine benefaction along with the Temple-focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic of the build-up suggest a way of resolving the longstanding debate over the force of his request in 4 Macc 6:28, 29. For the logic of Eleazar's decision to die in tortures 'for the law' (διὰ τὸν νόμον, 6:27) is not fully explicable without recognising how the appeal of 6:28, 29 utilises the hermeneutic and theological logic thus far developed. Thus, the general request that God 'be merciful to [his] people' depends on his 'being satisfied with my punishment on their behalf' (ἀρκεσθεὶς τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν δίκῃ, 6:28), with the word δίκῃ evoking the earlier Deuteronomic historical logic. Likewise, the explanatory request that God 'make my blood their cleansing and receive my life as an exchange for theirs' (καθάρσιον αὐτῶν ποίησον τὸ ἐμὸν αἷμα καὶ ἀντίψυχον αὐτῶν λαβὲ τὴν ἐμὴν ψυχήν, 6:29) echoes David's cultic reasoning regarding his men's blood (3:15), introduces

the neologism ἀντίψυχος derived from Lev 17,[60] and, indicated by the verb λαμβάνω, deploys the logic of sacrificial gift-giving to present Eleazar's death as a substitution.[61] Consequently, though as Tessa Rajak rightly contends we should be wary of the potential of 'a seriously distorting effect' of 'Christian readings' of Jewish martyrdom texts like 4 Maccabees,[62] there are good reasons to see a doctrine of *redemptio vicaria* in 4 Maccabees. In this connection, Rajak's methodological question—'how this "doctrine" figure[s] in the work'[63]—and her summary answer are representative of other views and illustrative of the force of our interpretation. After observing that Eleazar's ἀντίψυχος doctrine is confined to his prayer (6:29) and the closing homily (17:22) and that the use of ὥσπερ in 17:21 renders ἀντίψυχος metaphorical and probably original to the author, Rajak concludes that, 'The basic idea in these utterances is simply that the martyrs were instrumental in breaking the old sin and punishment cycle by the outstanding piety manifested in their deaths.'[64] On this view, the sacrificial metaphors are *mere metaphors*, added to the primary historical framework to bolster the idea of the effectiveness of the martyrs' sacrifice. Sam Williams' interpretation is similar, as he concludes that the sacrificial metaphors 'cannot be separated radically from the objective historical effect of the martyrs' endurance unto death (17.20)' and, thus, do not represent 'an independent affirmation' but a 'supplement [to the] central assertion that the deaths were effective and beneficial for the nation in that Antiochus departed.'[65] David Seeley's position modifies this account by arguing that the effectiveness of the deaths of the martyrs consists specifically in the mimetic process initiated by their exemplary obedience.[66] Thus, though Williams, Seeley, and Rajak all recognise the connection between cultic and historical logic in 4 Maccabees, they see the former as an unnecessary appendage to the latter.

The fundamental problem with these views is methodological. Rajak rightly asks how cultic 'doctrine' works in 4 Maccabees but wrongly assumes that the cultic

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[60] Cf. Lev 17:11: τὸ γὰρ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἀντὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξιλάσεται.

[61] The word καθάρσιος likely indicates expiation (cf. 4 Macc 1:11; 17:21), while δίκη may imply propitiation, given the later warning that Antiochus will receive τὰς τῆς θείας ὀργῆς δίκας (9:32).

[62] Rajak, 'Dying ', 108 – 109.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid., 110.

[65] Williams, *Jesus' Death*, 178.

[66] Seeley, *Noble Death*, 84–98.

logic is confined to texts that feature the word ἀντίψυχος (6:26 – 29; 17:17 – 24), as do Williams and Seeley. What is missed is that the cultic logic is introduced in the account of David's thirst, assumed in the attack and displacement of the Temple in the build-up, and explicitly wedded to the historical logic with the word δίκη in Eleazar's prayer. One cannot understand how the ἀντίψυχος '"doctrine" figures in the work' without recognising this development, as we will see below. The second problem has to do with the relegation of the cultic language in 4 Maccabees to the status of *mere* metaphor. As we have seen, David's metaphorical reasoning is indicative of wisdom: he reasons analogically, via Lev 17, sees the drink as akin to life's blood, and, thus, pours it out to God. Moreover, a careful reading of Lev 17 suggests that the metaphorical use of cultic language is inherent to the presentation of cultic sacrifice itself. The equivalency made in Leviticus is between blood and life, not blood and atonement. God *regards* blood as atoning. It is because the life of an animal or person is in the blood that God *gives* (emphatic use of δίδωμι, Lev 17:11) the blood for the purposes of atoning sacrifice. Thus, God regards the blood of the animal as a fitting exchange—a visual metaphor for the life it represents. The metaphorical nature of the cultic logic of 4 Maccabees, therefore, indicates nothing about its significance, because all cultic logic is irreducibly metaphorical, relying on a 'this-is-that' way of seeing. When Eleazar, therefore, commands God to 'make [his] blood a purification for the nation and take [his] soul/life in exchange for theirs' (6:29), he is merely extending by analogy the metaphorical logic of sacrifice. The question, then, is not whether 4 Maccabees' presentation of cultic logic is metaphorical but whether it is incidental or integral to the historical logic presented.

This leads to the third problem: the subordination of cultic to historical logic. If by 'not worked out' Rajak means that the cultic logic is merely stated and not integrated with the historical framework in 4 Maccabees, as Williams and Seeley similarly argue, then this is simply not the case. As we saw in the exemplary rationality of David, the cultic vision of the divine order of value is at the heart of personal and political virtue and, because it constitutes the climax of 4 Maccabees' 'starting-point', is, therefore, constitutive of the logic of the remaining argument. In the build-up it is precisely the disregard for the cult that demonstrates the viciousness and irrationality of the leaders and incites the divine δίκη. Consequently,

without a recognition of the divine order of value represented in the cult, the theology of history represented in the build-up makes no sense. In other words, the cultic logic reveals the divine order of value, while the historical logic explains what happens both when this order is upheld and when it is violated. This observation illumines how the particular use of Lev 17 and Dt 30 and 32 represents an amplification of the complementarity between cult and history already present in the canonical texts themselves. For the particular problem is the lack of a cultic mechanism for atonement, as there is no method for turning away δίκη. In such a paradoxical situation, for 4 Maccabees, only an equally fitting 'sacrifice' will do. Eleazar is presented as this paradoxical and perfectly fitting offering, in that he embodies the sort of unblemished life that God regards and, in not saving himself despite tortures unto death, becomes an exemplary substitute for the people. Whether a similar cultic conception underlies the presentation of 2 Maccabees is another matter,[67] but one of the clearest differences between 2 Maccabees and 4 Maccabees is precisely in the latter's 'working out' in sacrificial terms *how* and *why* the deaths of the martyrs were effective in history, not simply *that* they were.[68] Looking through Lev 17 and Dt 30 and 32, Eleazar's torture and death is not a gruesome tragedy but a fitting and, thus, effective gift offered to God.

In his encomium to Eleazar, our author employs numerous rhetorical devices, praising him from multiple perspectives, in order to describe the fitting nature of his sacrifice. The means of Eleazar's triumph was 'pious reason' (7:1, 4, 12, 14). He is acclaimed, 'O man, harmonious with the law and philosopher of divine life [θείου βίου, 7:7]'. Eleazar's death serves as a fitting end to his life, exemplifying proper administration (δημιουργέω) of the law under threat, confirming Jewish loyalty to the law (εὐνομία; cf. 3:20; 4:24), proving the 'divine philosophy' of the Jews, and receiving proper acclaim (δόξα, 7:8, 9).[69] Moreover, it is Eleazar's unchanging reason that, like

[67] See e.g. L.E. Frizzell, 'Education by Example: A Motif in Josephus and Maccabee Literature of the Second Temple Period', in *Of Scholars, Savants, and their Texts: Studies in Philosophy and Religious Thought in Honor of Arthur Hyman* (ed. R. Link-Salinger; New York: P. Lang, 1989), 108; van Henten, 'Background ', 116 – 121.

[68] deSilva, *4 Maccabees*, 140.

[69] Eleazar's perseverance in correct 'opinion' (δόξα, 5:18; 6:18), despite Antiochus' charge of 'holding a vain-opinion' (κενοδοξέω, 5:10), secures 'public repute' (δόξα, 7:9). On δόξα and honour in 7:9, see Hadas, *Fourth Maccabees*, 185; H. Anderson, '4 Maccabees', in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (ed. J.H. Charlesworth; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985), 2:552.

Aaron after Korah's rebellion (Num 16:46), Eleazar turned away God's wrath (4 Macc 7:11 – 12), and διὰ τοῦ λογισμοῦ that he, like Isaac who offered himself, nullifies the rack (7:13 – 14). Eleazar is both priest and sacrifice, facing and extinguishing the fire. His 'law observant life' (βίος νόμιμος) is made complete (τελειόω) by the 'faithful seal of death' (πιστὴ θανάτου σφραγίς, 7:15).

Though the stress lies on the temporal results of Eleazar's sacrifice, eternal results play a subtle but key role in the encomium. The end of his voyage is 'the harbour of immortal victory' (ὁ λιμὴν τῆς ἀθανάτου νίκης, 7:3), and through his deeds he made believable (πιστοποιέω) the words of his 'divine philosophy' (7:9). In other words, Eleazar's noble death is—in addition to being rational and honour-preserving—the path to eternal life. Earlier, Eleazar expressed confidence that the fathers would receive him as pure as a result of his endurance of torture unto death for the law (5:37). At the end of his encomium, the author answers a potential objection to his thesis with an elaboration and explicit appeal to such confidence: 'What about those who cannot master the passions because they do not have prudent reason' (φρόνιμος λογισμός, 7:17)? By responding that only those who attend to εὐσέβεια 'from a whole heart' (ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας) can master 'the passions of the flesh' (τῶν τῆς σαρκὸς παθῶν, 7:18), 4 Maccabees makes it clear that reason's rule of the passions of the body (3:1) is a *moral* not a constitutional issue—a matter of 'weak' (ἀσθενής, 7:20), flabby reason. The reason adduced for this is significant: πιστεύοντες ὅτι θεῷ οὐκ ἀποθνήσκουσιν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἱ πατριάρχαι ἡμῶν Αβρααμ καὶ Ισαακ καὶ Ιακωβ, ἀλλὰ ζῶσιν τῷ θεῷ (7:19).[70] In other words, the result of a proper, whole-hearted attention to εὐσέβεια is a belief that, like the patriarchs, life not death is the final word τῷ θεῷ. In 4 Maccabees, obedience to the Jewish law in its entirety is grounded in God's life-giving benefaction at creation, the exercise of created freedom in dependence on it, and the expectation of eternal life as a fitting return gift from God. Thus, far from

[70] The argument that the doublet formed by this statement with 4 Macc 16:25 and its eschatological content suggest a later Christian interpolation is belied by the repeated emphasis on eschatological rewards and punishments throughout the account of the brothers (4 Macc 8:1 – 12:19). *Contra* C.L.W. Grimm, 'Viertes Buch der Maccabäer', in *Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen des Alten Testaments* (ed. O.F Fritzsche and C.L.W. Grimm; Leipzig: Weidmann, 1857), 4:332; likewise, on 16:25, Freudenthal, *IV Makkabäerbuch*, 117–20. *Pace* Shepkaru, the eschatological content is so prominent throughout 4 Maccabees that there is no reason to think that, originally, the author expected 'only the nation to benefit from an individual's voluntary death'; S. Shepkaru, 'From After Death to Afterlife: Martyrdom and its Recompense', *AJSR* 24 (1999): 17.

being an unnecessary or underdeveloped appendage to 4 Maccabees' historical narrative as Rajak, Williams, and Seeley contend, Eleazar's self-offering as return *gift* is integral to this text's theological logic. For Eleazar's fitting self-offering both elicits a divine return gift of eschatological life and provides the paradoxical pedagogy for the martyrs, through which the nation itself is restored. Without an account of divine life-giving benefaction, the deep coherence of 4 Maccabees' atonement theology remains opaque.

1.3 God the Guarantor of Life for the Nation and Martyrs and of Punishment for Tyrants (4 Macc 8:1 – 18:24)

The hermeneutic and theological logic illustrated in the build-up, articulated by Eleazar, and exemplified in his voluntary death is further tested and elaborated in the accounts of the martyrdom of the brothers and their mother. The stories of the brothers test 4 Maccabees' conception of fitting divine life-giving benefaction against the question of theodicy in the form of Antiochus' offer of temporal friendship and his characterisation of the youths' commitment to piety as futile (8:1 – 14:10). The account of the mother stresses how her commitment to and instruction of her sons in such a paradoxical eschatological piety enables her, though a 'weak' woman, to withstand a perfect storm of motherly passions (14:11 – 16:23). In other words, Antiochus offers temporal friendship and suggests that God will show unconditioned mercy to those who give in (8:10, 14, 22; 9:4; 12:6), while the martyrs articulate and exemplify a belief in God's justice-shaped temporal and eschatological mercy. Thus, like Eleazar, the brothers offer themselves calling on God's just mercy (12:17), expecting that God will give them eternal life and vindicate Israel. It is this conviction in God's inviolable Torah order of created life that amounts to 'pious reason;' for to 'know piety' (16:23) just is to believe that, as with Isaac and Daniel, God delivers the righteous (16:20, 21) and, thus, that 'those who die for the law' will live eschatologically like the patriarchs (16:25). The rational exercise of this conviction, thus, proves the integrity of the self and, as fitting representative gift, serves as the instrumental means of God's renewal of the nation and the condition of the martyrs' receipt of the gift of eschatological life. Chapters 17 and 18 both summarise these themes in praise of the martyrs and apply them to 4 Maccabees'

audience, respectively.

In light of the exegesis that supports the above points, in this final section of the chapter several important results for our thesis and the argument of this chapter emerge. Most generally, our analysis of the *Rededuell* between Antiochus and the brothers demonstrates that the assumption of Sanders and others that grace is by definition 'groundless' does not hold for 4 Maccabees. God's indiscriminate donation of Torah-ordered life in creation *is the basis* of moral agency, and thus the precondition for the *discriminating* return of life as a gift to the worthy, whether temporally or eternally. With respect to the theological logic of 4 Maccabees, specifically, this section clarifies how complete fidelity to the Torah is grounded in the expectation of personal immortality for the martyrs and national renewal for the nation—both of which depend on the conviction that God gives life to the worthy. This conviction is further supported, finally, by the development of a hermeneutic in the teaching of the mother by which a consistent pattern of divine saving action might be recognised in scripture and salvation history. Thus, in the end, 4 Maccabees' atonement theology is seen to function only with reference to a deeper commitment to divine life-giving benefaction, wherein God gives Torah-ordered life at creation and governs this life both in and beyond history.

1.3.1 What Comes After Life?: The Rededuell Between Antiochus and the Brothers on the Futility of Jewish Life (8:1 – 12:19)

In the *Rededuell* between Antiochus and the brothers, the focal question is not the rationality of Jewish commitment *per se*, but rather the rationality of the commitment (cf. μανία, 8:5) given the temporal consequences for the young men. Thus, Antiochus, not Nature, plays the role of benefactor, offering friendship (φιλία) to the obedient and punishment to the disobedient (8:6). The benefits will be 'leading positions', if only they trust him (πιστεύω) and 'deny the ancestral rule of their polity' (8:7). Two options lie before them: to change their lifestyle in exchange for a 'Greek life' (Ἑλληνικὸς βίος) and 'carouse in their youth' (8:8) or be tortured to death by Antiochus (8:9). As with the use of σώζω and δίκη in Antiochus' *Rededuell* with Eleazar, echoes of key words illumine the nature of the challenge and the implicitly negative perspective from which the reader should view Antiochus' speech.

Whereas Eleazar believed in the divine origin of the law (5:25) and that those who live to God do not die but live as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob do (7:19) and the author states that those who believe in God with a whole heart can master the passions (7:21), Antiochus asks the boys to trust him (8:7), to have mercy (κατελεέω, 8:10) on themselves, and consider (διαλογίζομαι) that nothing awaits them but death through torture if they disobey (8:11). After showing the boys the grisly implements reserved for them, Antiochus makes one last pragmatic concession: surely the δίκη they worship will be 'merciful' (ἵλεως) to them if they act contrary to the law (παρανομέω) because of necessity (ἀνάγκη, 8:14). This, of course, echoes the earlier concession to Eleazar (5:13), but it also represents a direct contradiction of the historical logic presented in the build-up. It is precisely Jason's Hellenising activity that leads to παρανομία then disaster, a disaster attributed to divine δίκη. The implication is that the boys should not 'trust' Antiochus, and they should not expect mercy from the divine δίκη if they break the law under torture.

As a prelude to his account of how the brothers 'philosophised against' (ἀντιφιλοσοφέω) Antiochus and defeated him through 'good reason' (εὐλογιστία, 8:15), 4 Maccabees entertains a hypothetical situation in which the brothers are 'fearful-souls' (δειλόψυχοι) and 'unmanly' (ἄνανδροι, 8:16), in order to frame and clarify their unified response. Again, just as with Eleazar, the brothers are asked to entrust themselves (εἰ πεισθείημεν αὐτῷ) to another benefactor—in this case, Antiochus who offers them εὐεργεσία (8:17). The key imaginary concession is that their obedience to God is 'vain' (κενός, 8:18), representing a mere 'vain opinion' (κενοδοξία, 8:19). The assumption, of course, is that there is no God to insure any results beyond their deaths, though, even if there is, they mimic Antiochus' consolation by assuming that 'the Divine justice' (ἡ θεία δίκη) will 'forgive' (συγγινώσκω; 8:22; cf. 5:13), and that the law itself would not condemn them to death for fearing the tortures (8:25). The echo of δίκη, of course, belies the claim. Yet, in an effort to bolster his assurance that the law 'is not conceived here in a narrowly legalistic fashion', Redditt affirms 'the positive expectation of reward' of the martyrs, while denying that they 'face martyrdom out of fear of eternal punishment.'[92] Besides the contradiction of this

[92] Redditt, 'Nomos ', 253.

statement in 4 Macc 13:14, 15[93] and the fact that the particular transgression in view here is apostasy,[94] Redditt's analysis misses both the ironic echoes of authorial dissent running throughout Antiochus' speeches and the logic of benefaction at work in 4 Maccabees. In this connection, it is critical to recall Eleazar's contention that the law's divine origin both renders it *inviolable* in every detail and reveals it as *the guide* to the good life, the life according to nature (5:16 – 25). The implication drawn from this is that, because God has made mankind rational and formed mankind's reason through the law, there is no excuse (7:17 – 23). The irony of Redditt's position is that, by apparently assuming that saving mercy is by definition unconditioned (cf. ἢν σέβεσθε δίκην ἵλεως ὑμῖν ἔσται δι᾽ ἀνάγκην παρανομήσασιν, 4 Macc 8:14), he sides with Antiochus.[95] Yet, for 4 Maccabees, the possibility of the exemplary fidelity of Eleazar, the boys, and the mother demonstrates its necessity. In other words, God's mercy in 4 Maccabees is conditioned and congruous—justice-shaped, as we will see next.

The unified nature of the brothers' response is foreshadowed in Antiochus' observation that they looked like a 'chorus' (χορός, 8:4) surrounding their mother, but their song is an anthem of unified defiance (8:29): Antiochus' 'mercy on the basis of our lawless salvation' (τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ παρανόμῳ σωτηρίᾳ ἡμῶν ἔλεον, 9:4) is worse than death, because through (διά + gen.) their endurance and suffering for God they will receive the 'reward' (ἆθλον) of virtue and will be with God (9:8), while Antiochus should expect 'eternal tortures through fire' from the divine δίκη for his actions (9:9). This justification for choosing to suffer like Eleazar, their 'teacher' (παιδευτής, 9:6), applies and expands on his account of eschatological destinies by answering the particular problem they faced. That is, by governing their passions in anticipation of

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[93] 4 Macc 13:14, 15: 'Let us not fear the one who thinks [himself] to be killing [us]. For great is the contest of the soul and the danger of eternal torture for those who transgress the commandment of God.'

[94] J.M.G. Barclay, 'Who Was Considered an Apostate in the Jewish Diaspora? ', in *Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity* (ed. G.N. Stanton and G.G. Stroumsa; Cambridge: CUP, 1998), 88 – 89.

[95] Rightly, Watson, 'Antithesis ', 109. Cf. G.F. Moore, 'The Rise of Normative Judaism: I. To the Reorganization at Jamnia', *HTR* 17 (1924): 324. For this assumption that grace/mercy is missing in 4 Maccabees because it is by definition unconditioned, see e.g. W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1903), 177; R.B. Townshend, 'The Fourth Book of Maccabees', in *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (ed. R.H. Charles; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:653; Hughes, *Ethics*, 112, 233.

eternal life, the question of theodicy contained in the charge of 'vain-opinion' (8:18 - 19, 24) and Antiochus' taunt that 'nothing is stored away with your disobedience except to die with tortures' (οὐδὲν ὑμῖν ἀπειθήσασιν πλὴν τοῦ μετὰ στρεβλῶν ἀποθανεῖν ἀπόκειται, 8:11) is answered.

Again, it is the martyrs' particular understanding of God's donation of rational, Torah-ordered life that informs their logic of fitting judgement and salvation. Their defiance earns the brothers diverse and gruesome tortures, as Antiochus flies into a rage at their 'ingratitude' (ἀχάριστος, 9:10). This word evokes the choice between Antiochus and God as benefactor, a theme which gets replayed in the seventh and final brother's contention that Antiochus himself is an ungrateful client of God and, thus, forms an *inclusio* around the whole section (9:10 – 12:19). Thus, 4 Maccabees begins by summarising Eleazar's teaching in the words of the first brother (9:15 – 24), providing the material ground for the seventh brother's clear statement about the fitting destinies of God's clients (12:11 – 18). The eldest brother gives perhaps the clearest expression of 4 Maccabees' peculiar claim: far from being able 'to strangle [his] reason,' the tortures prove that 'only the children of the Hebrews are invincible where virtue is concerned' (9:18). Moreover, like Eleazar, he appeals to the brothers to join the fight for piety, in hopes that 'the just and ancestral Providence' (ἡ δικαία καὶ πάτριος πρόνοια) will show mercy on the nation and punish Antiochus (9:24). The youngest brother concludes by stating the temporal and eschatological logic of 4 Maccabees' account of divine life-giving benefaction: Antiochus, though a 'man,' has acted as a 'savage' (θηριώδης, 12:13) by killing and torturing God's servants despite 'receiving from God good things and a kingdom ' (παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὼν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, 12:11). Thus, his ingratitude will receive both temporal and eternal recompense (12:18), while the brothers request just mercy on their nation (12:18) and anticipate eternal rewards. In short, in 4 Maccabees God's mercy is justice-shaped—conditioned on following the divine order of life and given as a congruous gift to the worthy.

Consequently, with Eleazar's logic and themes as support, several of the brothers give statements about the fitting temporal and eschatological destinies awaiting them and Antiochus. While the second brother experiences 'the joys accorded to virtue' (9:31) in self-mastery unto eternal life even as he dies, Antiochus'

'arrogant reason' (ὑπερήφανος λογισμός, 9:30) receives the fitting temporal recompense of seeing it defeated in the brothers' resistance as he is tortured by 'the threats of the impious ' (9:32). Likewise, the fourth brother cites 'the everlasting destruction of the tyrant and the eternal life of the pious' as the ground of his continued commitment (10:15), while assuring Antiochus that 'God will pursue [him] quickly' for his tortures (10:21). In sum, while the brothers experience their tortures and death as a transition to 'immortality' (9:22), Antiochus is assured of 'tortures that will never leave' (12:12) and 'punishment in the present life and death' (12:18). Consequently, while the references to God's δίκη scattered throughout this section (8:14, 22; 9:9, 15, 32; 11:3; 12:12) highlight the application of the Deuteronomic hermeneutic, the opening and closing appeals to just mercy restate its temporal representative logic, and the repeated expectation of eternal life highlights the author's eschatological answer to the question of theodicy. In short, God is the Benefactor who both gives inviolable, and inviolably Torah-ordered, life to humans from creation and, in his temporal and eschatological activity, ensures the fitting judgement and salvation of individuals and nations.

It is perhaps advisable here to consider the particular character of 4 Maccabees' benefaction language at this point. Given the relative infrequency of gift terms in 4 Maccabees, uncertainty about the provenance of the work, and the lack of a clear picture among ancient historians of the reception of Roman conceptions of patron-client relationships in the eastern Mediterranean in the early empire,[96] it is difficult to be certain about the precise social domain of 4 Maccabees' benefaction terminology. Nonetheless, to this point in our analysis, Antiochus Epiphanes has rebuked Eleazar for rejecting τὰς τῆς φύσεως χάριτας (i.e., here pork; 4 Macc 5:9), and the fifth brother has mocked Antiochus for unwittingly '[giving them] gifts' (χάριτας ἡμῖν χαρίζῃ) in the form of opportunities to remain faithful to the Torah despite torture (11:12). Relatedly, in response to their summary rejection of his offer of φιλία (8:5; cf. the use of εὐεργετέω, 8:6) and εὐεργεσία (8:17), Antiochus is enraged by the

[96] On the question of the adoption or modification of Roman patron-client relations in the Greek East, Harrison (*Paul's Language of Grace*, 16 – 17) remarks, 'The interaction of the Greek and Roman benefaction systems, at the level of local *poleis* and more generally throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, still awaits the detailed regional study of ancient historians, especially as regards the ethos of reciprocity.'

brothers' apparent 'ingratitude' (ἀχάριστος, 9:10). Thus, the specific terms used and the asymmetrical relationship between Antiochus and the Jewish martyrs may indicate that the language figures this relationship in political and, perhaps, patron-client terms. Antiochus is neither proposing to become a civic εὐεργέτης to the Jewish nation, nor is he offering to enter into a solely personal relationship of reciprocity. Rather, Antiochus' understanding of his offer of φιλία as directly tied to the brothers' receipt of leading positions with respect to 'the affairs of the kingdom' (τῆς βασιλείας…πραγμάτων, 12:5), suggests a relationship of public political subordination on a par with that of Jason, who agreed 'to give' (δώσειν) annual tribute in exchange for the priesthood (4:17). Thus, though a precise account of the particular social practices that inform the use of these terms is difficult, the asymmetry in relations and the expectation of mutual obligations is enough to show that 4 Maccabees is operating with some form of Greco-Roman gift exchange in mind. The key point for our purposes has to do with the logic and contrasting construals of life-giving benefaction: just as Eleazar contends that 'the creator of the cosmos' has given a law (νομοθετέω) that is κατὰ φύσιν (5:25) and thus refuses Antiochus' account of Nature as benefactor with its attendant obligations to eat pork, so the brothers say to each other 'let us consecrate ourselves to God from a whole heart, to the one who gave (τῷ δόντι) [our] souls' (13:13) and thus reject Antiochus himself as a political benefactor. In this connection, the brothers reject Antiochus' promise that '[they] will receive' (λήμψεσθε) leading government positions (8:7), are tortured and killed, and, subsequently, the youngest brother reminds Antiochus that such behaviour is shameful for 'one who has received good things and a kingdom from God' (παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὼν τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὴν βασιλείαν, 12:11). In other words, like the brothers themselves, Antiochus is a recipient of divine benefactions and should have considered how best to return them. In this connection, though the logic of reciprocal obligation is often assumed in 4 Maccabees, the author uses ἀποδίδωμι for the youngest brother's climactic return of his life (presumably to God, 12:19) and, as we shall see, ἀπολαμβάνω for God's return of the martyrs souls, pure and immortal (18:23).

The preceding exegesis represents two vital results for our study. First, it

furthers the recent reevaluation of grace in Judaism around the time of the Second Temple period by demonstrating that the assumption of earlier scholars and Sanders that grace is *by definition* 'groundless', 'free', 'not earned', and 'unmerited'[97] is false—at least, in 4 Maccabees. The brothers give their lives as a *fitting* response to God's prior donation of Torah-ordered life in creation, and thus they expect to receive their lives back as a *fitting gift* of immortal life from God. Thus, God's gift of salvation in 4 Maccabees, while voluntary, is nonetheless not 'groundless' but conditioned on the obedience of the martyrs and congruent with their prior self-offering. Second, with the conclusion of this *Rededuell* between Antiochus and the brothers, another feature of 4 Maccabees' theological logic is fully exposed. The brothers' commitment to the Torah unto death is not vain (8:18), for it recognises that there is an existence beyond temporal life in which God the Benefactor exercises fitting recompense. Consequently, at this point in the argument, 4 Maccabees' theological justification of complete fidelity to the Torah receives one of its grounds in an account of the relation between individual temporal and eternal life. In the remainder of 4 Maccabees, as we shall see, this theological justification is further and more clearly grounded in the prospect of national renewal and it is further supported by the development of a hermeneutic by which a consistent pattern of divine saving action may be observed in scripture and salvation-history.

1.3.2 The Chorus of Piety: Brotherly Love Perfected in Torah-Commitment (13:1 – 14:10)

The author's praise of the boys magnifies 4 Maccabees' account of God's inviolable gift of rational, Torah-ordered life by showing how their exercise of properly-ordered agency overcomes the extreme passions of their perfect brotherly love.[98] Forming a 'holy chorus of piety' (13:8), they encourage each other to emulate exemplary young men like those who withstood the fiery furnace (13:9), and like Isaac, to offer themselves for slaughter 'for the sake of piety' (13:12). Moreover, the brothers' chorus characterises and grounds their exemplary piety in God's creative

[97] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 394 – 96.

[98] R.D. Young, 'The "Woman with the Soul of Abraham": Traditions About the Mother of the Maccabean Martyrs', in '*Women like This': New Perspectives on Jewish Women in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. A.J. Levine; SBLEJL 1; Atlanta: Scholars, 1991), 75.

and eschatological grace: they properly exercise their created agency, committing themselves 'from a whole heart to give their lives and use their bodies as a guard for the law' (13:13).

This self-donation and its Torah-ordered expression is grounded both negatively in 'the contest of the soul and the peril of everlasting torture' for those who break God's command (13:14) and, positively, in the conviction that, if they employ 'the mastery of passion of divine reason' (τὴν τοῦ θείου λογισμοῦ παθοκράτειαν, 13:16), then an eschatological reception and the honours of the patriarchs await (13:17). In this way, the passions which attended their ideal 'nobility of character' (καλοκἀγαθία, 13:25) and 'brotherly love' (φιλαδελφία, 13:26)[99] underline the surpassing fidelity of the brothers to the law, which is itself a demonstration of reason's mastery of even the passions produced by brotherly love under torture.[100] Moreover, just as Eleazar is the appropriate counterpart of rational King David and the good Onias, and the foil of Jason, so the brothers represent the nation. For the application of the term ὁμόνοια (13:25; cf. 3:21) both to the Jewish polity and to the brothers suggests that, in Klauck's terms, 'the harmony (v. 25) produced by brotherly love is simultaneously the ideal state of the whole Jewish people (3:21)'. The implication is that, 'All children of Israel should practice it toward one another not as an unattached moral ideal but on the basis and within the framework of the Torah.'[101] Thus, by emphasising the unified and rational commitment of the brothers to the Torah-order of divine life-giving benefaction, the author provides further proof of his peculiar thesis and establishes the theological ground by which the eschatological resolution of the martyrs' deaths is logically related to the temporal renewal of the nation.

In this connection, 4 Maccabees' characterization of the brothers as a chorus provides the penultimate component of his particular theological logic. The obedience of Eleazar and the brothers is the appropriate exercise of the divine gift of created life, a sacrificial obedience that is rational both because it aligns with the

[99] Klauck, 'Brotherly Love', 154: 'Until 4 Macc 13:27 – 14:1, one could get the impression that the author is concerned with eulogizing the seven brothers as an example of perfect brotherly love in order to demonstrate the superiority of Hellenistic, Diaspora Judaism in comparison with the ethical standards of the surrounding non-Jewish world.'

[100] Ibid., 155.

[101] Ibid.

created order and because it can expect its subsequent return in eschatological life. Yet, this obedience, since it is a sort of perfect expression of social and communal order, is also representative. And thus it invites not only an eternal return for individuals but temporal restoration of the nation—both given by God as fitting return gifts. *That* is why Eleazar's earlier disobedience would have meant the very dissolution of the nation (5:33): it would have subverted the very logic—the logic of divine life-giving benefaction grounded in the gift of Torah—by which the nation exists. With this representative aspect of his theology in place, 4 Maccabees can move on to an articulation of its ultimate source in his account of the mother's hermeneutical teaching about God the life-giver.

1.3.3 The 'Adamantine' Woman: Proof of Pious Reason, Daughter of Abraham, Mother of the Nation (14:11 – 16:25)

4 Maccabees' assumption that women have weak minds and serve as instructors of youth provides an opportunity for 4 Maccabees to bring his argument and his hermeneutic to their climactic expression. Demonstrating 'manliness' greater than any man (15:30), the victory of pious reason shines forth most clearly in *this* Jewish mother. Moreover, it is because she is ὁμόψυχος with Abraham who offered Isaac (14:20), looking beyond the apparently vain deaths of her sons to the just life-giving God who stands behind and beyond them, that she is 'mother of the nation' (16:20) in instructing them to die for the law. In other words, the mother's particular piety, her belief in God's just life-giving benefaction and its corresponding cult-focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic, is the ground of her exemplary control over motherly passions, the source of Israel's eschatological instruction, and, thereby, the instrumental cause of national renewal and the eschatological life of the martyrs.

Though the mother does not engage in a *Rededuell* with Antiochus or undergo the tortures of Eleazar and the brothers, the author dramatises her unique, motherly battle against the passions in a vivid and extended way. The control of reason the boys displayed in their tortures would be reason enough to be amazed if it were not for the fact that 'even a woman's mind' was able to disdain manifold sufferings

(14:11).[102] The proof of this (γάρ) is that this mother endured the 'rack' of each of her children (14:12). In order to emphasise the enormity of the victory of this mother's reason over her passions, 4 Maccabees skillfully juxtaposes the depth of her natural and maternal feelings for her children with what she saw as they were tortured. If birds and bees show sympathy for their young by defending them from attack, how much more must this woman have felt sympathy for her children (14:13 – 20)? Assuming that women are more sympathetic than men and that mothers who have more children love their children more, the author emphasises the enormity of this mother's maternal feelings (15:4 – 8).[103] It is this woman, full of love and sympathy for her children, who watches the pile of her children's charred flesh, severed hands, and scalped heads grow (15:20). Despite the enormity of her feelings for her boys and the gruesome nature of their deaths, she remains unmoved (14:20) with her reason secure (15:11). From the author's point of view (and that of his audience), given the combination of the mother's 'weakness' with the 'power' of the emotions released by the spectre of her brutalised children, one would expect a complete breakdown. The mother's restraint, a restraint so great that she did not even weep for her tortured sons (15:19, 20), demonstrates reason's capacity to master the passions peculiar to mothers. She has an 'adamantine mind' (16:12), so hard that it is impenetrable even to the greatest emotional attack.

As in Eleazar and her sons, the mother's reason is inviolable because it is pious reason, shaped by a belief in God's gift of life as Torah-ordered in creation, history, and the eschaton. Yet, in 4 Macc 15:2, the author uses the mother's particular case to make clear the formal distinction that has been operating all along. Thus, the mother distinguishes between the 'temporal salvation' (πρόσκαιρος σωτηρία) offered on Antiochus' terms and the 'eternal life' (αἰώνιος ζωή) promised by God to the pious. Antiochus presents a choice between temporal life and death, while the mother's reason posits an integral relationship between the immanent and transcendent planes. In other words, to disregard piety is not, as the tyrant would have it, a matter of choosing life over death. It is rather a choice between two temporal forms of life,

[102] On the *topos* of the weak and yet 'manly' woman in 4 Maccabees and antiquity, see Moore and Anderson, 'Taking It', 266 – 269.

[103] Young, 'Soul', 76.

one entailing eternal death and the other eternal life. Again, this does not negate the author's commitment to the Hellenistic definition of the good life or the noble death entailed by such a life in a time of tyranny. On the contrary, the καλοκἀγαθία of the brothers—here equated with the fact that each is δίκαιος, σώφρων, ἀνδρεῖος, μεγαλόψυχος and φιλάδελφος —displayed in their death for the law deepened her love for them (15:9, 10). Yet, as in the case of the brothers, the mother's love is properly ordered precisely in so far as that love is ordered toward not temporal but eternal ends. It is this understanding of the relationship between temporal and eternal loves that clarifies the otherwise opaque comparison of the mother with Abraham, as we shall see.

Abraham and Isaac feature in 4 Maccabees in a number of ways. Eleazar twice refers to the Jews as 'the children of Abraham' (6:17, 22). The boys remind each other of Isaac's self-offering as a spur to their own self-offering (13:12). Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are the ground of hope for life with God for both Eleazar and the boys, as they live and die for God (7:19, 13:17, 16:25). Rajak notes 'that the prominent national dimension to the martyrdom' is a clue to the meaning of these references, while conceding that references connecting Abraham with the brothers and their mother are 'extraordinary and still puzzling.'[104] Near the beginning of the account of the mother, she is called ὁμόψυχος with Abraham (14:20). Rajak's comment regarding the 'national' character of the references to the patriarchs is more sharply focused when compared with an apt observation of Young, who writes, 'Her status as ὁμόψυχος with Abraham may be seen as an echo of 13:12, and it emphasizes her high religious status through her bonds with the patriarch; just as her sons, nourished together physically and morally are 'ὁμόνοια' with each other, she is ὁμόψυχος with Abraham.'[105] It is striking that the next reference to Abraham, after a lengthy discussion of the tension between the mother's motherly passions and her pious reason, again introduces the distinction between temporal and eternal deliverance as the key to her resolve. In making this distinction, she is 'Abraham's daughter', remembering his 'God-fearing perseverance' (16:20). In the very next verse, she is acclaimed 'mother of the nation.' Similar to the earlier observations of Klauck

[104] Rajak, 'Dying', 115 – 16.
[105] Young, 'Soul', 76.

regarding the representative character of the brother's love for each other, it would seem that the mother is 'one-soul' with Abraham, according to the author of 4 Maccabees, precisely in offering her sons to God as Abraham offered Isaac, trusting that she would, as it were, receive them back from the dead.

This view is confirmed by two other features of the account. First, as with the boys, the author imagines how the mother might have spoken to herself if she were 'cowardly-souled' (δειλόψυχος, 16:5), and, again, the key theme is vanity (μάταιος,16:7; μάτην,16:8), though the choice of word here stresses the result of her mothering. It was to no purpose or result. Second, this theme of vanity is directly contradicted by the author's account of the speech the mother gave the boys: 'Remember that it is because of the God of the cosmos that you have come to share in and enjoy life and on account of this you are obligated to endure all pain because of God' (16:18). In other words, the mother uses the logic of benefaction to describe the boys' fitting response to God's gift of life—viz., they should offer their lives back to God. That the endurance of the boys is understood precisely as an offering in which the life given would be returned is confirmed by the two examples she adduces in support of this statement. Abraham hastened to offer Isaac, and Isaac did not cower when he saw the knife coming down (16:19). Daniel went to the lions, and Hananiah, Azaariah, and Mishael went to the furnace for the sake of God (16:22). Crucially, the mother says that it is precisely because they have the same faith in God (τὴν αὐτὴν πίστιν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν) that the boys should endure (16:22). In the next verse she says something similar: because (γάρ) they know piety (εὐσέβεια), it would be irrational (ἀλόγιστος) not to resist pain (16:23). These parallel verses help us see how πίστις can serve as a synecdoche for εὐσέβεια in 4 Maccabees, with the latter as the more comprehensive category.[106] To *know* piety entails a faith like that of Abraham and Isaac, and Daniel, Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael.[107] That is, it is to have faith in the God of life, the

[106] *Contra* van Henten, 'Background ', 125 –126. The πίστις of the mother (15:24) and the πίστις she recognises in the biblical exemplars and commends to the boys (16:22) is not a matter of obedience ('faithfulness') but *knowledge* and, thus, 'trust.' The verses in 4 Macc 16:22, 23 are parallel, with the first clause as the cognitive ground of the action in the second clause: 'Since then you have the same faith in God (πρὸς τὸν θεόν), do not be afraid. For it is unreasonable for those who know piety (ἀλόγιστον γὰρ εἰδότας εὐσέβειαν) not to resist pains.'

[107] Deissmann and Townshend observe that the grammatical anomaly of the nominative plural εἰδότες in 16:25 (cf. ἕνα ἕκαστον τῶν υἱῶν, 16:24) is a case of anacolouthon; A. Deissmann, 'Das vierte

God who delivers the pious who endure from death. That this life is conceived as a life beyond death is confirmed by 16:25: 'Those who die for God live to God just as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and all the patriarchs.'

1.3.4 Closing Epitaph and Theological Instruction (4 Macc 17 – 18)

In 4 Macc 17 – 18 the author concludes with a closing epitaph and final instructions in pious reason for his audience. Chapter 17 provides a fitting summary and conclusion of the author's *apologia*. The mother's trust in God that led to the endurance of her boys was effective both temporally and eternally, as she, with them, both defeated the tyrant and, for her immovable commitment, has received from God an immovable existence (17:1 – 7). For, like Abraham (17:6), she has received through a divine miracle her sons back and stands with them in God's presence, fixed and immutable like the stars in the sky (17: 5). While the reminder of what the mother and boys endured causes shuddering (17:7), properly remembered, it causes amazement and, so, the author imagines a memorial epitaph. While the martyrs died because Antiochus wanted to 'destroy the polity of the Hebrews,' 'they avenged (ἐξεδίκησαν) their people, looking to God and enduring tortures even unto death' (17:8 – 10). This epitaph naturally invites the question of *how* the deaths of the martyrs 'avenged' Israel, a question the author answers by reintroducing the contest metaphor, with an account of its temporal and eternal honours. In their contest, personified virtue 'was offering rewards through testing perseverance,' but, because this endurance race is divine, the prizes are 'immortal victory in everlasting life' (τὸ νῖκος ἀφθαρσία ἐν ζωῇ πολυχρονίῳ, 17:12). As the whole world watches (17:14), 'godliness wins, crowning its own athletes' (17:15) leaving everyone amazed by 'the athletes of the divine law' (17:16). Temporal honours are added to eternal ones, however, as 'because of them' (δι' αὐτούς) Israel avoided subjugation (17:20), the tyrant was punished, and the homeland purified (17:21). Again, the logic is cultic and substitutionary, as the martyrs are considered an 'exchange' (ἀντίψυχος) for the sin of the nation and their blood and propitiatory deaths (τοῦ ἱλαστηρίου τοῦ θανάτου

Makkabäerbuch', in *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des alten Testaments in Verbindung* (ed. E. Kautzsch; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1900), 2:173; Townshend, 'Fourth Maccabees', in *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (ed. Charles), 2:682. There is no reason, then, to excise v. 25 as an interpolation based on this anomaly; *contra* Freudenthal, *IV Makkabäerbuch*, 123–24.

αὐτῶν), though not effective *per se*, are the means by which 'the Divine Providence' saved Israel 'who had been previously mistreated' (17:22).[108] In other words, it is *God* who is the material cause of this salvation, his providence that makes the martyrs' 'gift' of their lives liberating, propitiatory, and expiatory.

Turning from his praise for the martyrs and summary of his theology to exhortation of his readers in 4 Macc 18, the author addresses them as 'Abrahamite offspring' (Αβραμιαῖος) and 'Israelite children' (παῖδες), and commands them to 'trust in this law and act piously in every way' (18:1). The appeal to their knowledge that *pious* reason rules the passions establishes their capacity to trust in the law and live piously (18:2), while the brief recounting of the temporal and eternal results for the martyrs, Antiochus, and the nation grounds this life in its expected results (18:3 – 5). Moreover, in both exemplars and scriptural quotations taught by their father, the mother reminds the boys (the nation) of the inevitability of suffering and the life-giving power of God: Cain and Abel, the sacrifice of Isaac, Joseph in prison, Phineas, Hananiah, Azariah, and Mishael in the fire, and Daniel in the lion's den were all delivered, while the scriptural quotations, which taken together figuratively affirm God's deliverance of the afflicted righteous from harm, take on new significance in light of the martyrs' actual tortures. They have passed through fire from which God promises deliverance (Isa 43:2), suffered the many afflictions of the righteous (Ps 34:19), done God's will in hope of the tree of life (Prov 3:18), and been a positive answer to the question of whether dry bones can live (Ez 37:3). The author's conflation of Dt 32:39, 47 and Dt 30:20 in 18:19 is the climax: Εγὼ ἀποκτενῶ καὶ ζῆν ποιήσω· αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡ μακρότης τῶν ἡμερῶν.[109] The peculiar configuration of these verses serves as a fitting summary of the author's theological vision. It is the fact that God kills and makes alive, that he is death-dealer and life-giver that *is*, in the author's view, the very basis of temporal and eternal life. Thus, echoing the language that began his closing exhortation, he concludes that it is the 'Abrahamite children' (οἱ Αβραμιαῖοι παῖδες), the ones who trusted that God has the power to bring life to the *worthy* dead, who along with their mother are added to the 'chorus of the

[108] deSilva (*4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 250) rightly notes that the reference to the martyrs' blood and divine providence implies a sacrificial frame.

[109] deSilva, *4 Maccabees: Commentary*, 265.

fathers' (πατέρων χορός), 'having received pure and immortal souls from God' (ψυχὰς ἁγνὰς καὶ ἀθανάτους ἀπειληφότες παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, 18:23).

The same mother who urged her sons to endure suffering in expectation of God's deliverance (16:16 – 23) taught her boys as children that God, the life-giver is their life and length of days (18:19). Thus, with the mother's teaching in place 4 Maccabees' theological argument is complete. Eleazar grounds complete obedience to the Torah in an account of the divine *donation* of created life, seeing his suffering and death through a cult-focused Deuteronomic hermeneutic and thus appealing to God to receive his life as a substitutionary gift for the nation. In complementary fashion, the mother grounds complete obedience to the Torah in the anticipation of the divine *return* of national and eschatological life, seeing salvation history and scripture through a hermeneutic that configures divine saving action as God's gift of life to worthy sufferers.

Conclusion: God of the Good Life, Torah-Defined

The boldness of 4 Maccabees' peculiar *apologia* is matched by the subtle melding of Stoic ethics and Jewish theology that undergirds it. The deaths of the martyrs prove that only the Hebrews are invincible for virtue (9:18). For if even an old man, some boys, and a mother are able to defeat the passions of torture and death, then God must have given the law to the mind from creation as the proper order of the self. Yet, in 4 Maccabees, the good life, the Torah-shaped life, always leads to flourishing, either temporally or eternally, because God is just. Thus, though the author starts with Stoic conceptions of the good life, he will not accept the mere pyrrhic victories of Stoicism but must instead explain how justice did and will prevail. Here again the Jewish theology of divine benefaction modifies and expands the Stoic anthropology and ethics. In the account of the brothers, 4 Maccabees both answers the question of theodicy and provides the representative ground for national renewal, as their united commitment to the teaching of Eleazar and their mother renders them worthy of God's justice-shaped mercy in eternity and is the means by which the sin of the nation is removed. Throughout, the creational teaching of Eleazar and the eschatological instruction of the mother undergird the theological logic and provide the hermeneutic by which the martyrs see tragedy as triumph, death as life. For

God—not Nature or Antiochus—is the Benefactor, who has given inviolable individual and social life as inviolably Torah-ordered, and who sustains this order via his cult-focused and Deuteronomic life-giving and death-dealing activity in and beyond history.

Consequently, this chapter produces two important results for this thesis. First, it demonstrates that the assumption that divine grace is by definition 'groundless' or should be conceived without respect to human activity or worth axiomatically is misleading. This result is significant because it supports recent reevaluations of grace in Jewish texts of Greco-Roman antiquity that analyse differing *definitions* of gift in these texts.[110] In 4 Maccabees, the indiscriminate divine donation of Torah-ordered created life provides the basis for God's fitting return of life in history and the eschaton to the worthy. This is neither 'legalistic works righteousness'[111], nor grace that is by definition apart from obedience.[112] Second, though analyses of the theology of 4 Maccabees have focused on its atonement theology, such a focus is insufficient for understanding this text's theological logic. For the self-offering of Eleazar and the martyrs has logical and theological force only within 4 Maccabees' deeper account of the circle of the divine gift of life initiated at creation and maintained by God's life-giving and death-dealing activity in history and in the eschaton.

[110] Cf. Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*; McFarland, *God and Grace*; Barclay, *Gift*.

[111] Cf. W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter* (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1903), 176 – 77; and R.B. Townshend, 'The Fourth Book of Maccabees', in *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (ed. R.H. Charles; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), 2:653; 2:664.

[112] Redditt, 'The Concept of Nomos', 253.

Chapter 2
Seeing (from) the End: Ezra, Exemplary Witness of Life in *4 Ezra*

'I can with one eye squinted take it all as a blessing'. Flannery O'Connor[1]

Introduction

Despite the profundity and depth of its interrogation of the plight of humanity and Israel, *4 Ezra* occupies an ironic position in current scholarship.[2] Pauline scholars working in the shadow of E.P. Sanders' *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* are prepared to find in this apocalypse an anomaly—an ancient Jewish text in which God's 'grace' *is* absent and a theology of legalistic works-righteousness dominates[3]—while specialists are still in search of a consensus on how *4 Ezra* works theologically.[4] Though the vision of episode four (*4 Ezra* 9:26 – 10:59) is recognised as the climax of the work,[5] there is no consensus on the *character* of this climax, and it is still unclear how or whether the powerful debate over God's mercy in episode three (6:35 – 9:25) between Ezra and his *angelus interpres*, Uriel leads up to it. This chapter argues that an examination of divine life-giving benefaction in *4 Ezra* exposes episode three as a debate over the created integrity (i.e., freedom) of the self. Thereby, the *theological* function of the vision of episode four is a confirmation of Ezra as an exemplar of this created integrity and, in this way, a fitting recipient of the revelation of restoration of Zion at the eschaton. Despite the cognitive limitations of life in a world dominated

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[1] F. O'Connor, *The Habit of Being: Letters of Flannery O'Connor* (New York: FSG, 1988), 57.

[2] *4 Ezra* is dated after the destruction of the Temple in 70 C.E., near the end of the first century due to the apparent reference to the Flavian emperors in the 'three heads' of the eagle in the vision of episode five (cf. 11:19 – 35; 12:22 – 28); see J.M. Myers, *I and II Esdras* (AB 42; Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), 129–31, 299–302; M.E. Stone, *Fourth Ezra* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 9–10, 363–65. On the unity of the text, see M.E. Stone, 'On Reading an Apocalypse', in *Mysteries and Revelations* (ed. J.J. Collins and J.H. Charlesworth; JSJSup 9; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 65–78.

[3] E.P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 409 – 18. Sanders views his analysis as confirmation of Köberle, *Sünde und Gnade*, 651–57. Cf. B.W. Longenecker, *Eschatology and the Covenant: a Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1 - 11* (JSNTSup 57; Sheffield: JSOT, 1991), 151 – 53. Though note Longenecker's shift from covenantal 'abrogation' to 'redefinition'; idem, *2 Esdras* (GAP; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1995), 98 – 100.

[4] See K.M. Hogan, *Theologies in Conflict in 4 Ezra: Wisdom Debate and Apocalyptic Solution* (JSJSup 130; Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2008), 15 – 35.

[5] See e.g. E. Breech, 'These Fragments I Have Shored Against My Ruins: the Form and Function of 4 Ezra', *JBL* 92 (1973): 267–74; M.E. Stone, 'Reactions to Destructions of the Second Temple: Theology, Perception and Conversion', *JSJ* 12 (1981): 195 – 204.

by the experience of sin, futility, and death, human beings remain free to live according to the divine gift of Torah-ordered life—a freedom paradoxically expressed in Ezra's full venting yet ultimate subordination of his grief to God's just mercy.

Consequently, this chapter will further research on divine grace in *4 Ezra* by demonstrating how the debate over God's generosity in this text is grounded ultimately in a particular account of the relationship between God's life-giving activity in creation and his life-giving activity in the eschaton. If the life God gave at creation is properly ordered by Torah, it is not only just but necessary that the righteous (as defined by Torah) enter the fulfillment of life that is given in the eschaton. With this reading, we will build on the recent work of Barclay, by showing how the angel Uriel's case for God's discriminating distribution of eschatological life depends on his logically prior account of the efficacy of God's indiscriminate donation of created life as Torah-ordered. Moreover, over the course of this analysis, we will contribute to the debate over the theological logic in *4 Ezra* by showing how the author's definition of life informs his theodicy and its climax in Ezra's vision of heavenly Zion. That is, by attending to how *4 Ezra* defines life as divine gift in creation and at the eschaton, we will demonstrate how the vision of episode four provides the (theo)logical climax of the debate over the character of divine mercy/grace in episode three. Specifically, we will show that neither does episode three end in an *aporia* (intentional or unintentional), as Hogan and Brandenburger contend, nor is the change of Ezra in episode four reducible to 'visionary experience' (i.e., non-rational or irrational; cf. Gunkel and Stone), but rather, by recognising the connection to and development of the seed metaphor from episode three to episode four, we come to see the organic logic connecting the gift of created life and its eschatological return.

The argument is tri-partite: section one contends that, in episode one, Uriel reframes Ezra's accusations of 1) God's unwillingness to use his life-giving power to remove his people's moral incapacity (*infirmitas*, 3:20 – 22)[6] and 2) God's unjust favouring of his enemies (3:28 – 36) by diagnosing Ezra's fallen condition as

[6] For the text of *4 Ezra*, I am using A.F.J. Klijn, ed., *Der lateinische Text der Apokalypse des Esra* (TUGAL 131; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1983). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted.

epistemic not moral (4:11) and Israel's plight as a function of the world's corrupted and limited estate not God's capriciousness (4:26 – 32), respectively; in episode two, Uriel reframes Ezra's complaint about Gentile humiliation of Israel by identifying the nation's decline with the inevitable decline of the cosmos *via* his world-as-womb metaphor (5:45 – 55); section two argues that the debate over mercy in episode three exposes two differing accounts of God's life-giving benefaction—one modeled on God's unconditioned and incongruous sustenance of the fallen world and one on God's conditioned and fitting governance of inviolable created life and its Torah-order—accounts that find quintessential expression in strong readings of Ex 34:6 – 7 (7:132 – 8:14) and Dt 30:15 – 20 (7:19 – 22; 7:127 – 131) by Ezra and Uriel, respectively; in section three, we argue that Ezra adopts Uriel's account of the created freedom of the self and the two-ages framework that insures its just maintenance, which both renders him epistemically ready and morally fit for receiving a vision of Zion's eschatological restoration. The thesis of this chapter is that the author's reading (hereafter, *4 Ezra*) of sacred text, salvation-history, and empirical reality is governed by a theological vision in which Israel's experience of the world's futile *Sein-zum-Tode* is seen as the ontological and epistemological consequence of God's judgement of creation, while God's inviolable donation of human life as free and Torah-ordered from creation provides the moral basis and criterion for God's fitting resurrection of the righteous and punishment of the wicked at the eschaton.[7]

2.1 Learning to See Life God's Way: The Revelatory Reframing of Ezra's Understanding (*4 Ezra* 3:1 – 6:34)

Piqued by a comparison of the 'desolation' of Zion and the 'abundance' of Babylon (3:1 – 3), Ezra's case against God begins with an overview of salvation-history (3:4 – 27), emphasising the futility of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction at both creation (3:4 - 6) and Sinai (3:17 – 19). This overview prepares for the accusation that God favours his enemies over Israel (3:28 – 36)—despite Babylon's manifest wickedness (3:29, 33, 35) and Israel's commitment to God (3:32, 35). While the image

[7] On Ezra and Uriel as both, in certain respects, representative of the author's voice, see L. DiTommaso,'Who is the "I" of 4 Ezra?', in *Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch: Reconstruction After the Fall* (ed. M. Henze; JSJSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 129 – 30. Cf. J.A. Moo, *Creation, Nature and Hope in 4 Ezra* (FRLANT 237; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 27–34.

of God in the dock, harangued by his prophet is striking, we analyse how Ezra's organic framing places God in a double bind. For, as we will argue, Ezra's conception of the *cor malignum* and the *infirmitas* it produces implies God's negligence in not removing the moral incapacity of his people, while his charge that Israel's labour has borne no 'fruit' (*fructus*) questions God's just governance of history (his *via*, 3:31). Either way, God is at fault.

Uriel distills Ezra's accusations to the issues of God's way and the evil heart (4:4), but rather than answering directly, his defence begins with a test of knowledge Ezra is bound to fail (4:5, 6). This test introduces the angel's alternate diagnosis of the human condition not as morally incapacitated but mortal, finite, and, thus, epistemologically estranged from God's *heavenly* way (4:7 – 21). Ezra's attempt to redirect Uriel from heavenly to historical concerns (4:22 – 25) prepares for the angel's introduction of the two-ages framework (4:26 – 32) and the elaboration of this alternate diagnosis of moral *responsibility* (4:28, 30) amidst *cosmic* corruption and limitation (4:27; cf. 4:29, 31 – 32). In short, Ezra's problem is not God but the occlusion of God and his justice that results from being a 'corrupt [human] in the corrupt world' (4:11). With these clarifications in place, Ezra asks about the timing of (4:33, 44 – 46) and likelihood that he will see the 'end' Uriel announces (4:51 – 52), while the angel deems Ezra worthy of further instruction about the fixed timing of the end (4:34 – 43), Ezra's position in the eschatological time-table (i.e., late; 4:47 – 50), and the character of the last days (5:1 – 15).

For the purposes of the argument of this chapter, the analysis of this section establishes two points. First, with regard to the study of grace in *4 Ezra*, our exegesis contributes to our overall contention that the outcome of the debate in episode three over the character of God's eschatological grace—whether congruous or incongruous—depends logically on the account of God's gift of created life as Torah-ordered in the first two episodes. Whereas Ezra seeks to deny the efficacy of God's creation gifts of moral agency and the Torah, Uriel reframes this incapacity in ontological and epistemological (not moral) terms. As we shall see, this particular understanding of the implications of the incapacity of the world and humanity introduces Uriel's explanation of the inevitable decline of Israel in episode two. In summary, the problem is not that Ezra and Israel *cannot* live according to the Torah

but that they and the world they inhabit *qua* fallen and finite are not capable of understanding or receiving the divine gift of *true* eschatological life—life devoid of sin, sickness, and death. Yet, all is not lost, because, despite these epistemological and ontological limitations, both Ezra's given moral capacity and access to the Torah-order of creation remain. Second, with respect to the theological logic of *4 Ezra*, the organic metaphors here introduced by Ezra and subverted by Uriel provide the conceptual structure that links the two ages. For, as we shall see, the debate over the character of God's grace in episode three occurs *through* differing uses of these organic metaphors of life. Likewise, in episode four, it is God's *creative* return of life as eschatological gift to the worthy that insures that the Torah given at creation bears fruit—thus providing the *logical* link between episode three and Ezra's vision.

2.1.1 God in the Dock: Debating the Futility of Life (3:1 – 5:20)

Ezra begins by presenting Israel's history as a vicious life-sin-death cycle (3:4 – 27), a reading that stresses the paradoxical pattern of God's dealings. Retelling the *magnalia Dei*, from the creation of Adam to the destruction of Zion, Ezra presents God's life-giving creative and elective activity as negated by sin and judgement. The background for this recital is the 'covenant lawsuit', whereby the narration of the mighty works of God introduces an indictment of the people.[8] Yet, *4 Ezra* subverts the traditional form to '[call God] to account before the bar of his own justice'.[9] Ezra's prosecutorial strategy is clever: he implicates God in the life-sin-death cycle by juxtaposing his life-giving power with his apparent unwillingness to use that power to change the hearts of his people, preferring rather to punish them through his enemies. Moreover, this narration of Israel's *Unheilsgeschichte*[10] sets up a bold charge (3:28 – 36): despite their wickedness, God favours Israel's enemies, while Israel's own fidelity is futile. The framing of Ezra's charges places God in a classic double bind: either he is indifferent to the plight of his people or he is unjust in his

[8] See M.E. Stone, 'The Way of the Most High and the Injustice of God in 4 Ezra', in *Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman World* (ed. R. van den Broek, T. Baarda, and J. Mansfeld; EPRO 112; Leiden: Brill, 1988), 133 – 34; idem, *Fourth Ezra*, 61 – 63. Ezra asserts God's justice in his dealings with Israel (3:7 – 10, 25 – 27), questioning God's justice only in 3:28 – 36; rightly, Barclay, *Gift*, 284, n. 12.

[9] Stone, 'Way', 134.

[10] For this term, see Barclay, *Gift*, 285.

treatment of them. Ezra's account of God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction and his use of organic metaphors play a key role in framing the charges.

Ezra lingers at two places in his overview of salvation-history, to give fuller accounts of God's life-giving and life-ordering activity. At God's verbal command alone (3:4) the dust 'gave' (*dedit*) Adam, a 'dead body' (*corpus mortuum*), while God's direct life-giving activity receives emphasis in a threefold description. Adam is the 'product' (*figmentum*) of God's hands, the one in whom God breathed the 'spirit of life' (*spiritum vitae*), and the one who was 'made alive' (*factus est vivens*, 3:5). As we shall see more fully in our analysis of episode three, the use of *do* with God as subject, esp. with reference to life and the law as gifts, is consistent with the broad system of exchange in Greco-Roman reciprocity, with the giving of divine gifts establishing a relationship and expecting a suitable return. Thus, at Sinai, the cosmological upset of God's glory descending from heaven to earth is emphasised fourfold (3:18), while this upset is necessary: *ut dares semini Iacob legem et generationi Israhel diligentiam* (3:19). In both descriptions God's care and power are underlined and he is presented as the donor (*mando*, 3:7; *do*, 3:19) of a singular law (cf. *diligentiam unam*, 3:7).[11] These careful descriptions are given, however, to question their utility and purpose in light of God's death-dealing judgement: for Adam transgressed God's command on receiving it and God immediately (*statim*) 'appointed death for him' (3:7). Moreover, this Adamic heritage of transgression and death extends to 'the nations born from him…that are without number' (3:7), as 'each nation walked according to its own will' (*ambulavit unaquaque gens in voluntate sua*, 3:8). This is Israel's heritage too: though God raised up his servant David, the residents of Zion transgressed *in omnibus facientes sicut fecit Adam*, and, thus, God handed the city over to his enemies (3:26 – 27). Despite God's life-giving and life-ordering care at creation and Sinai, the cycle of life-sin-death he governs extends from creation to exile.

Ezra develops the diagnosis of the plight of humanity and Israel by extending the organic terminology of the creation account to created anthropology. God's gift of an ordered life is futile both from creation and in Israel because he did not remove

[11] There is no evidence that this conflation is understood, as in some rabbinical literature, as a consequence of the rejection of the law by the nations (*contra* Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 132). As Hogan argues, the view likely arises from an identification of personified Wisdom with the Torah (see e.g. Sir 24:23; 15:14 – 15; 7:7 – 11; cf. Dt 4:6); K.M. Hogan, 'The Meanings of tôrâ in 4 Ezra', *JSJ* 38 (2007): 537 – 39.

the *cor malignum* (3:20).[12] Though Ezra does not say that God gave Adam an evil heart, the plight of Israel is the plight of humanity, as Ezra grounds the situation logically (*enim*) in Adam's state of 'being burdened' (*baiolans*) with the *cor malignum* (3:21). If Israel is to be judged for transgression, God is to blame: for he did not remove the evil heart 'that it might produce fruit *(fructum*) in them' (3:20b).[13] Israel, like Adam and the rest of humanity, 'having transgressed, was overcome' (*transgressus et victus est*, 3:21). Ezra explains that Adam's fall perpetuated 'an enduring sickness' (*permanens infirmitas*), and, viewing the heart as a garden, pictures this sickness as a situation in which 'the law and the evil root [were] with the heart of people' (*lex cum corde populi cum malignitate radicis*, but 'the good (*bonum*) has departed and the evil (*malignum*) remained' (3:22). Scholars have noted the importance of the angel Uriel's appeals to nature and his explicit use of nature metaphors.[14] Yet, it is *Ezra's* organic language that provides the logical framework for his debate with Uriel over the nature of the Adamic heritage. For *Ezra* uses organic language to posit both a necessary relationship between the heart and its resulting behaviour (*fructus*, 3:20) and, given the departure of the law and the remaining 'evil root', the inability of the heart to produce *good* fruit (3:22).[15] As Barclay comments, 'Ezra here identifies a problem deeper and broader than the horrors of the exile: the whole of humanity is infected with a "sickness"… which appears to doom all human history to the futility of suffering and death'.[16] Ezra's understanding of the Adamic heritage and its transmission is not developed, but the organic metaphors do configure God's gift of the Torah at Sinai as ineffectual.[17]

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[12] Barclay, *Gift*, 284, n. 12: '[T]he two statements of God's non-action (*non prohibuisti*, 3.8; *non abstulisti*, 3.20) imply that God could have intervened but did not'.

[13] Rightly recognised in J.A. Moo, 'The Few Who Obtain Mercy: Soteriology in 4 Ezra', in *This World and the World to Come: Soteriology in Early Judaism* (ed. D.M. Gurtner; T&T Clark, 2011), 101, 104.

[14] See e.g. M.E. Stone, 'The Parabolic use of Natural Order in Judaism of the Second Temple Age', in *Gilgul: Essays on Transformation, Revolution, and Permanence in the History of Religions, Dedicated to R.J. Zwi Werblowsky* (ed. S. Shaked, D. Shulman, and G.G. Stroumsa; SHR 50; Leiden: Brill, 1987), 298–308; K.M. Hogan, 'Mother Earth as a Conceptual Metaphor in 4 Ezra', *CBQ* 73 (2011): 72 – 91.

[15] *Contra* W.O.E. Oesterly, who imports here a 'Pauline' notion of the law leading to death (from Rom 5:2), a view which begs one question under debate; W.O.E. Oesterley, *II Esdras (the Ezra Apocalypse)* (Westminster Commentaries; London: Methuen, 1933), 26.

[16] Barclay, *Gift*, 284.

[17] For the view that it is Adam's sinfulness that is inherited, see W. Harnisch, *Verhängnis und Verheissung der Geschichte: Untersuchungen zum Zeit- und Geschichtsverständnis im 4.Buch Esra und in der syr. Baruchapokalypse* (FRLANT 97; Göttingen: Vandehoeck & Rupprecht, 1969), 54–56; Egon Brandenburger, *Fleisch und Geist: Paulus und die dualistische Weisheit* (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und Neuen Testament 29. Bd; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des

Moreover, with this framing, as we shall see, a debate over the character of the Adamic heritage is initiated.

Ezra's self-talk in 3:28 marks a shift in prosecutorial strategy ('And then I said in my heart…'), as a consideration of Zion's status relative to Babylon implies not inaction in removing evil but God's perverse tolerance of it. Ezra has seen (*video*) 'innumerable impieties' and 'many sins' during his time in Babylon (3:29; cf. 3:12), and, yet, he has not seen (*video*) judgement but 'the manner in which [God] endures sinners, spares those who live impiously, destroys [his] people and preserves [his] enemies' (3:30). This incongruity leads to the overarching complaint: 'and you have shown nothing to anyone about how this way ought to be understood'.[18] Again, an organic metaphor provides the logic for Ezra's indictment. While Jacob waits in vain for his work (*labor*) to bear fruit (*fructifico*), Ezra sees (*video*) the Gentiles flourishing despite not remembering God's commandments (3:33). This use of *fructifico* extends the organic logic of the relation between heart and actions to their *results* (*merces*, 3:33), which underlines Ezra's changed strategy, as he now expects that Israel's 'labor' *should* have received something from God. For, in comparison, only Israel has known God, trusted his covenants, and obeyed his commandments (3:32 – 35). Thus, Ezra implies that God's way is not just unknown but unjust (3:34).

The basic defensive strategy of the *angelus interpres* is to deny Ezra's capacity to understand the information he seeks, but in such a way that the prophet becomes pupil in apocalyptic instruction.[19] The key aspect of the resulting dialogue, for our purposes, is how Uriel utilises Ezra's organic metaphors and logic to reframe the sage's opening complaint: the problem is neither the *cor malignum* nor the injustice of God's way but that *Ezra* is 'corrupted', both epistemologically estranged and constitutionally incapable of understanding God's *heavenly* way, and the *world* is

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Erziehungsvereins, 1968), 35–36. For criticism of this view and the alternate suggestion that it is the evil inclination and death, not sinfulness, that is inherited from Adam, see Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 63–66. If as Hogan contends ('tôrâ', 538) Ezra's conflation of creation order with the law stands in the tradition of Sirach, there is a striking dissonance between Ezra's picture of the evil heart in the first episode and Sirach's insistence that freedom of choice is an inviolable created capacity (cf. Sir 15:14 – 15).

[18] The Latin text of 3:31 reads: *et non significasti nihil nemini quomodo debeat derelinqui via haec*, though most scholars follow the Syr., which in place of an equivalent of *derelinquo* ('forsake, leave') reads 'comprehend'. Given the use of *comprehendo* with respect to the *via* of God in 4:2, the Syr. text is to be preferred at 3:31; so, Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 59.

[19] Thus, every interaction is revelatory and authoritative; DiTommaso, 'The "I"', 127. Cf. M.E. Stone, 'Apocalyptic—Vision or Hallucination? ', *Milla wa-Milla* 14 (1974): 47 – 56.

'corrupted', subject to an *infirmitas* that renders it unfit for and incapable of hosting the revelation of God's justice in full.

Uriel's first lesson concerns Ezra's incapacity as a finite and mortal human. Utilising a play on the word *via* (3:31), Uriel's opening gambit offers Ezra a fool's errand. He cannot solve the three 'ways/riddles' (4:5) and secure the angel's promise to 'show' him the 'way' and to teach him why the heart is evil (4:4). For knowledge of the weight of fire, the force of wind, or how to turn back time is beyond him (4:5). Ezra's response hints at the problem: for the question 'who of those born is able so to do?' (4:6) implies a contrast with the angels who are not born[20] and ties into uses of *nascor* concerning the Adamic legacy of sin and death (cf. 7:46, 57, 63, 65, 68, 127; 9:22; 10:10). The angel's response accepts the point and capitalises on it: he has *not* asked Ezra about things with which he is unfamiliar (e.g., the exits of Hades or the entrances of paradise, 4:7)[21] but matters that he experiences but does not understand. This introduces a clear denial of Ezra's epistemological capacity for understanding God's *heavenly* way, and in organic and spatial terms: if he cannot understand these experiences, how can his 'vessel' (*vas*) receive (*capio*) the way of the Most High, and how can 'one who is corrupt in the corrupt world' understand 'the way of the incorruptible' (4:11).[22] In addition to this distinction between mortality and immortality, the contrast between limited body and limitless 'way' contained in other manuscripts is likely original, for all versions except the Latin read the following statement after 4:11a: 'For the way of the Most High is created immeasurable'.[23] With these distinctions between mortal/immortal and limited/limitless, Uriel asserts a qualitative difference between Ezra and the knowledge he seeks, one that configures him as epistemologically because cosmologically estranged from God. In A.P. Hayman's terms, 'the chaos without

[20] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 84.

[21] On the implicit denial of esoteric heavenly knowledge here, see Moo, *Creation*, 50. Cf. Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 84; idem, 'Paradise in 4 Ezra iv:8 and vii:36, viii:52', *JJS* 17 (1966): 85 – 86; idem, *Features of the Eschatology of IV Ezra* (HSS 35; Atlanta: Scholars, 1989), 198 – 199, 203.

[22] The phrase 'corrupt in the corrupt world' is a reading found in all of the witnesses except one Arab. version and the Lat. The difficulty of making sense of the Latin text as it stands along with the relative unanimity of the other witnesses suggests a corruption of the Latin text. For the issues and our translation, see Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 78, 85–86.

[23] Ibid., 78.

mirrors the chaos within—in the human heart'.[24] Moreover, this diagnosis raises the question, if the prophet's instruction is to continue, of how Ezra's epistemological incapacity is to be transcended.[25] Uriel's next lesson provides the clue.

Ezra objects to Uriel's spatial dualism, insisting on information not of 'the ways above' but the outrages experienced by Israel (4:22 – 25). Ezra's reiteration of this incongruity is neither 'specious' nor a failure to pose 'questions [that] clearly pertain to "the way of the Most High"'[26] but rather a transition to the question whether the knowledge of God's heavenly way is necessary for a proper understanding of God's earthly ways. In Barclay's terms, the difference is 'between the *unifocal perspective* of "this age" and a *bifocal view* in which the present sad age is seen alongside, and with the added perspective of, the world to come (4.26 – 32)'.[27] Consequently, Uriel is not concerned in his answer with 'eschatological events and the world to come'[28] but rather with the *relationship* between the two ages, especially with respect to how knowledge of the world to come provides a proper perspective on *this age*. The problem introduced by Uriel's insistence on Ezra's epistemic incapacity is *how* to gain this eschatological perspective.[29] For Ezra's part, he is struck by the extreme brevity of the life of God's people and by the apparent fact that '[they are] unworthy to obtain mercy' (*nec digni sumus misericordiam consequi*, 4:24). The challenge, then, is for Ezra to gain a perspective from which he can see how the worthy do receive mercy from God.

One way, Uriel hints, is to be alive when this *saeculum* comes to an end; for then the evil sown will be 'harvested' (4:28) and a new field where good has been sown will emerge (4:29). Again, Uriel extends Ezra's organic terms to answer the challenge about the absence of justice, though with a significant modification: it is

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[24] A.P. Hayman, 'The "Man from the Sea" in 4 Ezra 13', *JJS* 49 (1998): 15.
[25] DiTommaso, 'The "I"', 126.
[26] Hogan, *Theologies*, 122.
[27] Barclay, *Gift*, 285.
[28] Hogan, *Theologies*, 122.
[29] *Contra* Hogan's contention (Ibid., 9) that 'the author made a conscious choice to move beyond a rational, sapiential approach to the questions raised by the Destruction and to embrace a non-rational, apocalyptic solution'. The author relies, rather, on an eschatological projection of the 'rational, sapiential approach' to uphold God's mercy and justice, the knowledge of which is apocalyptically delivered and rational because it conforms to the divine eschatological order. For further argumentation regarding the significance of sense perception for the *rational*, theological, and experiential theodicy of *4 Ezra*, see R. Griggs, 'Apocalyptic Experience in the Theodicy of 4 Ezra', in *Evil in Second Temple Judaism and Early Christianity* (ed. C. Keith and L.T. Stuckenbruck; WUNT II 417; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 282 – 98.

not Israel *per se* who awaits the fruit of her labor (3:33) but the *righteous* (*iusti*, 4:27) who await the things God promised in this emergence of a new field.[30] This distinction between two fields introduces Uriel's two-ages framework, but the explanation of it furthers his alternate diagnosis of the plight of humanity and Israel. For our purposes, the key point is that the issue with the *cor* according to Uriel is cosmological not moral, a function of the *world's Sein-zum-Tode* vis-à-vis the fullness of life to come.[31] Just as Ezra cannot *receive* God's heavenly way due to his corrupted and limited state (4:11), so this *saeculum* is not able to receive (*capio*) the fulfillment of God's promises because it is 'full of sadness…and sicknesses' (*infirmitatibus*, 4:27). Thus, both Ezra and Uriel use the term *infirmitas* to refer to *the structural incapacity* to bear 'fruit'; the question is over the proper applicability of this term, whether to the heart (3:22) or the world. Uriel's use of *infirmitas* grounds[32] Ezra's epistemic (not moral) incapacity in the subjection of the present *saeculum* to evil, limitation, and death. The key point for our argument is Uriel's expansion of Ezra's previous metaphorical use of the life-cycle to both reaffirm the link between heart, behaviour, and results, *and* to justify the present incongruity. God's gift of life and its order at creation and Sinai is not ineffectual, and his maintenance of it is not unjust; rather, a dying and constricted world is unfit both for the judgement of *all of humanity* with *all of humanity's deeds* and the disclosure of immutable and limitless life. Moreover, the heart is not *totally* evil: the *righteous will* receive the things promised (4:27), while the evil sown in Adam's heart and the innumerable amount of impieties (4:30, 32) it has produced *will* be 'harvested' on a 'great threshing-floor' (*magnam aream*).[33] What is needed is a setting sufficient for so great a judgement and a new 'field' for the eschatological 'good' (4:29).[34]

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[30] Barclay, *Gift*, 285.

[31] For the implications of *4 Ezra's* 'two-age' theory for its pessimism regarding the possibility of salvation within the fallen creation, see Harnisch, *Verhängnis*, 89–178.

[32] *Contra* Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 64.

[33] Uriel's reference in 4:30 to the *granum seminis mali* sown in Adam's heart does not confirm Ezra's earlier picture of the *cor malignum* (*pace* Barclay, *Gift*, 284; Hogan, *Theologies*, 115); for Ezra's conception of *infirmitas* pictured the *complete* evacuation of the law and good from the heart. Uriel states later that the righteous are capable of resisting the 'evil thought' and avoiding being led from life to death (7:92). Harnisch (*Verhängnis*, 48 – 50) recognises that the phrases 'evil seed' and 'evil root' differ from Ezra's 'evil heart', as the latter denies the possibility of doing good.

[34] Stone notes (*Fourth Ezra*, 95) that the words 'place' and 'field' refer to both the 'world' and the 'heart' (4:29), a fact which Moo argues (*Creation*, 89 – 90, 109) is due to the integral relationship between anthropology and cosmology, 'human sin' and 'cosmic evil'.

Bolstered by the prospect of seeing the resolution of his grief, the rest of the episode concerns Ezra's queries about the duration (4:33 – 37) and reason for the delay (4:38 – 39), his position in the timeline of salvation-history (4:44 – 46), and whether he will see the end (4:51). The basic principle is that time is providentially ordered by God for the sake of the righteous—'[God] has weighed the age (*saeculum*) in a balance and precisely measured the times and exactly numbered the times and he will not move or arouse until the decreed measure [of the righteous] is filled' (4:36 – 37; cf. Wis 11:20). This weighing of time displaces Ezra's suggestion that God weigh iniquities (3:34), while Uriel's underworld-as-womb metaphor (4:38 – 43) continues the organic historical logic by specifying that God himself has determined when Hades will 'pay back' (*reddo*) those in its care (4:42). This reference to equitable distribution at the end elicits a surprising confirmation of Ezra's worth.[35] For, after asking if he has found favour (*gratia*) and is fit (*idoneus,* 4:44), to be shown where he stands in this ordered history, Uriel grants the vision of the flaming furnace and rain, which both confirms Ezra's worth and situates him late in salvation-history (4:47 – 50).

These disclosures provoke an overreach, as Ezra's question whether he will live to see all this forces Uriel to admit that such knowledge is beyond his remit (4:51 – 52). Nonetheless, 'if the Most High has given to [Ezra] to live' (*si autem tibi dederit Altissimus vivere*, 5:4), then he will see the terrors of the last days, where reason, wisdom, and righteousness are nowhere to be found (5:9, 11), 'unrighteousness and incontinence' have multiplied over the earth (5:10, 11), the signs of the covenant curses found in Leviticus 26 and Deuteronomy 27 – 30 and 32 are on terrifying display,[36] and the messianic woes have emerged.[37] These references to God's fitting return to those in Hades (*reddo*, 4:42), Ezra's inquiry about God's favour and his fittingness (*gratia* and *idoneus*, 4:44), and the possibility that he will be granted a

[35] Whereas Ezra complains that Jacob's 'reward has not been seen and [his] labour has not born fruit' (*merces non conparuit neque labor fructificavit,* 3:33), Uriel holds that 'the fruit of the threshing floor of reward' (*fructus areae mercedis*) will come for the 'souls of the righteous' (*animae iustorum*, 4:35), the corollary of his earlier insistence that the *fructus impietatis* will be harvested (4:31 – 32).

[36] For 'panic', see Lev 26:16; 26:36; Dt 28:20; *4 Ezra* 5:1; for the roaming beasts, see Lev 26:22; *4 Ezra* 5:8; on the vanity of labour in *4 Ezra* 5:12; cf. Lev 26:20; 26:26; Dt 28:29 – 31.

[37] For the relationship between *4 Ezra's* account of 'the breakdown of social and cosmic order' (110) associated with the Messianic age and other traditions, see the passages in Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 110, n. 15.

vision of the end (*do*, 5:4) bring together our two themes of divine benefaction and divine life-giving together explicitly and in an important way. For, though they await further explication, we have three components that are foundational for *4 Ezra's* theological logic: 1) that the way of God's justice Ezra seeks (3:31) depends both on 2) his fittingness to live eschatologically and 3) on the fact that God's gifts are assumed to be equitably distributed. Moreover, though *4 Ezra's* terms for 'gift' or 'favour' are limited to only a few uses of *gratia* (*4 Ezra* 4:44; 5:55; 6:11; 7:75, 102, 104; 8:42; 12:7; 14:22; cf. Gen 6:8; Ex 33:12; Num 11:11; Prov 3:4; etc.) and one use of *beneficium* (9:10, 11), the use of the verb *do* for God's gift-giving activity here with respect to the fitting recipients of his benefactions is significant. For it is striking that, apart from those uses of *do* that indicate a return to God (3:5; 5:46; 7:116; 8:2; 10:14), God is the explicit or implied giver in every other use of *do* in *4 Ezra* (3:15, 19; 4:19, 21–23; 5:4–5, 7, 48, 50; 6:51–52; 7:9, 78, 94, 100; 8:5–6; 9:45; 13:41; 14:31, 42). And, as we shall see, it is the character of God's gift-giving and specifically his life-giving activity that is debated throughout the first four episodes of this text.

In any case, after hearing that if he continues in his grief he will learn 'greater things' (5:13), Ezra awakens in physical and epistemic distress, while Uriel brings life-sustaining support. His 'body shuddered greatly' and his 'soul laboured so as to faint', requiring Uriel to 'comfort' him and 'stand him on his feet' (5:14, 15). Thus, at the close of the episode Ezra and Uriel embody its content: though worthy of apocalyptic instruction, Ezra requires both the tutelage and support of the angel to transcend his epistemic and physical incapacity for receiving God's heavenly way.

2.1.2 The World-as-Womb: The Gestation of Judgement and Life (5:21 – 6:34)

4 Ezra uses the same structure of complaint, dialogue, and revelatory experience in episode two, producing a similar movement in the flow of the argument.[38] There are, however, hints that Ezra is coming to see things Uriel's way. As Stone argues, Ezra 'does not question the basic axiom of divine righteousness' in

[38] Earl Breech ('Fragments') identified this 'triptych' structure, though he wrongly implied that it applied, without qualification, to the first three episodes (episode three is considerably expanded; rightly, Hogan, *Theologies*, 23). The expansion of dialogue section, as Barclay rightly notes (*Gift*, 288), suggests that the author's primary concerns are to be found there.

that 'God is not charged [in episode 2], he is simply not understood…'[39] Consequently, Ezra's complaint narrows the scope and shifts the focus: he is concerned now with the manner of Israel's judgement, as the indignity of suffering at Gentile hands suggests that God hates his own people (5:21 – 30).[40] Moreover, despite further proof of Ezra's epistemic incapacity (5:31 – 40), Uriel's promise that he will 'hear greater things' (5:13) is fulfilled, as Ezra is taught the logic of God's providential order (5:41 – 55), learns of its basis in God's agency before and at the end of creation (5:56 – 6:10), and receives instruction on and experiences a foretaste of the planned judgement and redemption (6:11 – 6:28). Two features of this episode are vital for our purposes: first, organic metaphors continue to clarify the theological logic, as Uriel extends the womb metaphor to order and explain the inevitable decline of Israel, while the description of salvation envisions the epistemic change of heart/mind concurrent with complete cosmic renewal; second, Uriel's focus on the worthy recipients of salvation and esoteric revelation is both continued and further specified. Now that Ezra's corrupted epistemic condition has been established, the author moves on to elaborate on the implications of the creation's corrupted condition for Israel. God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction, modulated by the distinction between corruptibility and incorruptibility, explains Israel's inevitable decline despite the existence of those like Ezra who have maintained uprightness (*directio*) and chastity (*pudicitia*, 6:32) from youth. Whereas the world (and Israel) is like a womb and, thus, headed toward death, humans are physically and epistemologically but not morally incapacitated.

Ezra's poetic recitation of God's preference for his 'one people' over the 'multitudes' (5:27) climaxes with God's gift of the Torah, providing a sharp contrast to Ezra's analysis of the current situation. If it is 'to this people whom God desired that [he] gave (*donasti*) the law which is approved by all' (5:27), why has God 'handed the one over to the many' so that 'those who opposed [his] promises' have trod all over 'those who believed [his] covenants' (5:28, 29)? Ezra concludes: 'if you utterly hate your people, you should discipline them with your own hand' (5:30). This contrast between Israel's receipt of the law and subsequent plight echoes that of

[39] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 135.
[40] K. Koch, 'Esras erste Vision: Weltzeiten und Weg des Höchsten', *BZ* 22 (1978): 70 – 72.

episode one but *without* Ezra's diagnosis of the *infirmitas* of the *cor malignum* (3:20 – 22). Likewise, Uriel elicits Ezra's confession that he does not love Israel more than God but is speaking out of grief (5:34). Whereas before Ezra stressed the incongruity between the debasement of Zion and the flourishing of Babylon, given their respective moral worth, now Ezra questions the propriety of God 'handing over' Israel to be punished rather than doing it himself. In other words, Ezra no longer questions God's justice *per se* but the mode of that justice, a shift that seems explicable only in light of Ezra's previous experience of the signs of the 'end'. [41]

As in episode one, Uriel's denial of Ezra's cognitive capacity leads to a test. Yet, now both the terms of the dialogue and the character of the diagnostic are coloured by Uriel's previous 'heavenly' instruction. Ezra takes up Uriel's womb metaphor, stating that he would rather his mother's womb had been his grave than to live to see 'the toil of Jacob and the exhaustion of the descendants of Israel' (5:35). The test Uriel proposes in response, though focusing on earthly matters, is a test of power—'revive for me [Uriel] the withered flowers' (5:36). Whereas before Ezra attributed his lack of knowledge to his being 'among those born' (4:6), here he states that only 'the one who does not have a dwelling with mankind' is able to know (*scio*) these things (5:39). Thus, Ezra's shift from the earthly to heavenly frame mirrors Uriel's eschatological epistemology from episode one, while Uriel's shift to the issue of creative power anticipates the subsequent focus on God's singular and creative agency in salvation. Though Uriel has managed to extract two significant concessions from Ezra, Uriel's conclusion that Ezra can 'find' neither God's 'justice' nor the 'end [*finem*] of the love [he] promised [his] people' (5:40)[42] is not the end of but an invitation to Ezra's further instruction.[43] In the dialogue that follows, Uriel

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[41] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 127: 'Ezra seems to have moved from his doubt about the justice of God's conduct of the world to bewilderment at his actions.'

[42] For analyses of the variegated but consistent use of 'end' terminology, see M.E. Stone, 'Coherence and Inconsistency in the Apocalypses: the Case of "the End" in 4 Ezra',*JBL* 102 (1983): 229 – 43; Stone, *Features*, 83 – 97; Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 103 – 4. If one recognises that the advent of the Messiah is associated with the eschatological end as its prelude, then Schäfer's argument for a tripartite schema is consistent with Stone's view; cf. P. Schäfer, 'Die Lehre von den zwei Welten im 4. Buch Esra und in der tannaitischen Literatur', in *Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie des rabbinischen Judentums* (AGJU 15; Leiden: Brill, 1978), 244 – 91.

[43] Uriel's affirmation of God's continued love for Israel (5:33) and eschatological purpose for his people (5:40) undermines Hogan's contention that Uriel's arguments in the dialogues are strictly universal and individual and, thus, her thesis that the visions of episodes four, five, and six represent a third theology; Hogan, *Theologies*, 35–40. Moreover, as we shall argue, the key problem lies in her

extends the earlier metaphor of the womb to explain the necessary decline of Israel, providing an alternative logic to Ezra's earlier diagnosis of the Adamic heritage as the cause.

Given Ezra's incapacity, the dialogue shifts necessarily to an interrogation of the angel concerning the nature and timing of God's judgement. Exploiting Uriel's eschatological role and knowledge, Ezra questions the angel about the status of everyone at the 'end'—past, present and future (5:41). Scholars often note that the question seems to be motivated by fear that being alive at the end is necessary for participating in the age to come,[44] a view which could be consistent with Uriel's assurance to Ezra in 4:26 ('If you are alive, you will see…'). Yet, Uriel responds by comparing divine judgement to a 'crown'.[45] Barclay rightly insists 'the point is not that a circle has no beginning or end, but that every point on a circle is equidistant from its center (here, its central point of significance)'.[46] Ezra recognises the implication and, eager to see this judgement, wonders why God could not have created all of humanity at once to avoid delay (5:43). Uriel's rejection of this suggestion is twofold, focusing on the theme of incapacity: 'the creation cannot hasten more quickly than the Creator, nor can the world endure those created in it at once' (5:44). Ezra reads this statement as contradictory, because, on the one hand, God's justice is equidistant to everyone, suggesting to Ezra a general resurrection where everyone will be alive at the same time to experience judgement, while, on the other, Uriel insists that it is not possible for the world to hold the totality of humanity. How can there be a general resurrection if the creation is not able to sustain the totality of humanity?

Though Uriel responds to the charge of contradiction by expanding on the world-as-womb metaphor, there has been debate on how to understand the point(s)

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reading (with E. Brandenburger, *Die Verborgenheit Gottes im Weltgeschehen: Das literarische und theologische Problem des 4. Esrabuches* (ATANT 68; Zürich: Theologischer, 1981), 63 – 68) of Ezra's seed metaphor in 9:26 – 37 as ironic; cf. Hogan, *Theologies*, 153–57.

[44] Cf. G.H. Box, *The Ezra-Apocalypse: Being Chapters 3 - 14 of the Book Commonly Known as 4 Ezra (or II Esdras)* (London: Sir Isaac Pitman, 1912), 59; Myers, *II Esdras*, 195, 200; Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 148 – 149. As Moo highlights, the relationship between the messianic kingdom and the ultimate 'end' in this passage is unclear. He notes, however, that, though the opening question may be motivated by concerns about inclusion in the messianic kingdom, Ezra's questions throughout assume a general resurrection, suggesting a concern for ultimate justice; Moo, *Creation*, 115–16.

[45] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 141. Moo, *Creation*, 115, n. 39.

[46] Barclay, *Gift*, 286, n. 17. *Pace* Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 151; Moo, *Creation*, 115.

of the expansion. Uriel's point is that the fallen *saeculum* has a fixed, iterative, and, in our view, entropic historical order that is determined by God. In episode one the point of comparison is gestation: just as there is a fixed gestation for an unborn child, so there is a fixed gestation for God's judgement. This gestation, though known only to God, is for the sake of the righteous (4:36, 37). Here the point of comparison is the capacity and life-cycle of the womb itself. Consequently, in addition to the fixity of the womb's cycle of gestation, Uriel emphasises its *iterative* character and *entropic* nature. A women's womb has a finite capacity that cannot be exceeded (Uriel chooses ten as the limit), requiring each child to be born, as Ezra admits, 'in its own time' (5:47). Likewise, God's ordering of history is fixed and iterative, just like the birth cycle (5:48). Though Stone recognises the shift in focus that occurs at 5:49, he thinks the point of the shift is obscure, concluding that it 'serves to strengthen the observation' about the fixed 'order and organisation' of the world.[47] Yet, Uriel gives a partial reason (*enim*) for this order: just as neither infants nor old women bear children, likewise God's ordering (*dispono*) of his 'created world' (*creatum saeculum*, 5:49). In other words, Uriel explains the *iterative* character of historical events by appealing to the life-cycle of the womb itself. They both have a beginning and an end, and the beginning always leads to the end, which is death. The point is not just to support the previous focus on the fixity of the historical order.[48] The world is neither 'simply… organized' in an iterative fashion, nor 'almost mechanistic [as a] result of how the creator has designed it'.[49] It is not just that a mother's womb cannot 'give ten at once' (*det decem in unum*, 5:46). Rather the point is to add to the notion of fixity the idea that the historical order is *entropic*, teleologically constrained and ordered like the organic cycle of birth, life, maturity, decline, and death.[50] Whereas the use of the world-as-womb metaphor in episode one is positive, explaining the timing of and characterising the nature of the vindication of the righteous, this use of

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[47] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 146. The source of Stone's confusion seems to be the view of Box (*Ezra-Apocalypse*, 61) that Uriel should be taken literally, meaning that there were no human beings at the beginning of history and there will be none at the end. This keeps Stone from recognising the deeper connection between 5:49 and what follows—just as the womb itself is subject to the life-cycle, so is the world. Cf. Harnisch (*Verhängnis*, 300), who likewise considers 5:49 a repetition of the womb metaphor of episode one.

[48] *Pace* Stone, 'Parabolic', 305; idem, *Fourth Ezra*, 146.

[49] *Contra* Moo, *Creation*, 116.

[50] Thus, there is no 'apparent contradiction in arguments based on nature' with the theme that 'human life is a fleeting thing' in *4 Ezra*; *contra* Stone, 'Parabolic', 306.

the metaphor is negative, explaining the timing of and characterising the nature of the judgement as the death of the present age. God both sets limits to what the womb might produce and he orders the womb toward death. In this way, the character of God's gift of created life orders the character of its return. What Ezra seeks depends on the transcendence of these limits.

In this connection, Uriel provides an alternate rationale to the *cor malignum* for Israel's inevitable decline by arguing for an integral relation between Israel's history and that of the cosmos. The small stature of Ezra and his contemporaries suggests not only that the womb of the world is past maturity and in decline (5:55) but that Israel is approaching hospice care.[51] Likewise, the justice of the cycle of life-sin-death is not now in question, for Ezra, but rather *why* God neither breaks this cycle for Israel nor consistently applies it to his enemies *in history*. The world-as-womb metaphor answers these questions simultaneously: the cycle will itself cease and justice will be done at the 'end', because God has 'made the same rule for the world that [he] created' (5:49). In conjunction with Uriel's description of the character of the reversal of entropic conditions of the present *saeculum*, this resolves Ezra's charge of contradiction by implying the necessity of a liminal state—a time when the corruptible and incorruptible *overlap*—for the possibility of a general resurrection unto judgement prior to cosmological renewal.[52]

Uriel's reference to the decline of Israel leads Ezra to envisage the end of the creation (*creatura,* vv. 55, 56), which he associates with final judgement. Echoing his earlier complaint that God should do his own dirty work (5:30), Ezra's question about the agent of this judgement marks the beginning of the author's transition toward Ezra's next apocalyptic experience. The focus until the end of the episode is God's plan and the power that is his alone to execute it. Thus, God himself (or Uriel speaking as God) responds to Ezra, who learns through a series of poetical references to the features of God's creation that *Endzeit* was planned before *Urzeit* (*antequam* thirteen times, 6:1 – 6). Though obscure, the Jacob (coming age) and Esau (present age) typology offered by God/Uriel precludes both a more precise eschatological clock *and* a separation of the ages (6:8 – 10), the latter point stressing

[51] Recognised by Stone (*Fourth Ezra*, 146), but he misses the integral relation to the entropic cosmos in the reference to infants and old women in 5:49.

[52] *Pace* Moo, *Creation*, 116.

both the relationship between the ages (they are like brothers) and their radical difference.[53] It also concludes the debate on the timing of the end by giving an alternate frame of reference: the precise timing is not as important as the fact that it is God himself who has planned the end from before the beginning and it is God himself who will bring it about.[54] Consequently, though paradox prevails now and Israel's history seems a meaningless *Unheilsgeschichte*, there is and has always been an 'end' toward which history moves.

The delay of this 'end' has to do with its cosmological *character,* and Ezra's revelatory experience of it concludes the initial phase of instruction. In this connection, the whole account is bracketed by Uriel's warning about the earth-shaking effects of the voice he will hear (6:13) and Ezra's experience of these effects (6:29). Uriel's explanation of this cosmological tumult--'for [*enim*] [the earth] knows that its end [*finem*] must be changed' (6:16)—marks the revelation as a preview of the divine re-creative word that will refashion the world. Within this cosmological frame, God gives Ezra a verbal preview of the final judgement and salvation. Ezra's concern for justice for Zion is affirmed by God, who will judge his enemies for their iniquity (6:18 – 19), while signs that signal the final universal judgement (6:20 – 24) are thematically linked by an abrupt end to the life-cycle (e.g., infants and unborn children are suddenly matured, 6:21). While all will see God's judgement in the end (v. 20), it is only those who survive the end who will see his salvation (v. 25).

The organic metaphors reach their conceptual climax and decisively reframe Ezra's opening complaints here, as the cessation of the life-cycle at the judgement provides the necessary prelude to both the removal of death and the epistemic transformation of humanity. Those saved will see that 'it is those who have not tasted death from birth who have been received [by God]'(*qui recepti sunt homines qui mortem non gustaverunt a nativitate sua*), while the heart (*cor*) of the people of the earth (those who survive the judgement) will be changed 'into another mind' (6:26). Though the metaphor of 'tasting death' may refer to those like Enoch and Elijah (and Ezra; cf. 14:9) who are translated without dying, it is probably a figurative way of

[53] Ibid., 118.
[54] Ibid., 117.

referring to moral rebellion,[55] given the explanatory (*enim*, v. 27) function of moral renewal in vv. 27 – 28 and Ezra's reference, in episode three, to the evil heart 'having lead us into corruption and the ways of death' (*deduxit nos in corruptionem et itinera mortis*, 7:48). As will become clear in episode three, the description of the epistemic transformation of humanity entails a rejection of Ezra's initial configuration of the *cor malignum* in moral terms. The transformation of the *cor* of those who survive the judgement is not their *moral* transformation but the removal of the evil, deceit, and corruption that hinder faithfulness and prevent the full disclosure of the truth (6:27 – 28).

In this way, the questions posed by Uriel's reframing of *infirmitas* in epistemic and cosmological terms are partially answered. Ezra's epistemological incapacity has been partially transcended through God's *verbal* instruction, but the justice he wants to understand depends on *seeing* the healing of the incapacity of creation itself. In other words, though as Barclay writes, 'Ezra is capable of a deeper appreciation of this truth because he is himself the kind of righteous person who will be vindicated (6.31-33; cf. 6.5)',[56] he is not yet capable of experiencing the truth of the end *in full*. To experience the yet 'greater things' to be revealed (6:32), he must humble himself (6:31), replace fear with belief, and stop being so quick to think 'vain thoughts' about the 'former times' so that he will not jump to vain conclusions about 'the last times' (6:34). It is in episode three that Ezra's vain thinking about 'the last times' is definitively transformed, rendering him ready to *see* the end.

Our analysis of life as gift in episodes one and two provides two important points for our argument. First, it shows how *4 Ezra's* two-ages theodicy depends on a particular account of the relation between created and eschatological life as gifts. Though neither Ezra nor Israel, as corrupted inhabitants of a world subjected to death, can understand or receive the gift of *true* life from God, the enduring gift of created moral agency and its divinely-given Torah-order make it possible for the righteous Ezra to receive apocalyptic instruction. Thus, Barclay's recent account of Uriel's argument in episode three for God's character as a discriminating eschatological giver is deepened and supported by our account of the argument over

[55] *Contra* Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 172.
[56] Barclay, *Gift*, 287.

its relation to God's indiscriminate donation of the Torah and created life in episodes one and two. Second, the development of organic metaphors in these first two episodes provides the framework in which both the apparent futility of Israel's history within fallen existence and Uriel's ultimate account of the efficacy of created life and the Torah make sense. For, as we shall see presently, the debate over whether God is a discriminate or indiscriminate giver of eschatological life occurs *through* these organic metaphors and turns in Uriel's favor because of his particular account of the organic relation between created life as indiscriminate gift and eschatological life as discriminate gift. Likewise, in episode four, though Zion and Mother Earth are subject to barrenness, God will *give* life to Zion *qua* the righteous. That is, the law *will* bear eschatological fruit, despite the conditions of cosmic death, but *only* as divine miraculous gift for the worthy.

2.2 Debating God's Life-Giving Benefaction and the Definition of Mercy (*4 Ezra* 6:35 – 9:25)[57]

Ezra's complaint in episode three pivots from a discussion of God's work in creation (6:35 – 54) to the question of the delay of Israel's receipt of the world as an inheritance (6:55 – 59), which sets up Uriel's attribution of this delay to the corruption of the present world (7:11), the necessity of traveling through its consequent futility toward immortality (7:1 – 16), and a subsequent debate over the law as the criterion of discrimination between eschatological heirs and pretenders (7:17 – 44). Though Uriel's description of the Messianic prelude to the judgement is the most obvious addition to Ezra's knowledge (7:26 – 44), our focus is on how the opening complaint, response, and further debate elaborate the themes of God's life-giving and life-ordering activity: for, as we will argue, Uriel's insistence on humanity's abiding cognitive capacity (7:22 – 24; 7:70 – 74) in the context of Ezra's focus on God's personal, creative, and ordering agency grounds the divine condemnation of the nations for rejecting the law (7:37), while Ezra's concern for the

[57] For the structure of this episode, see W. Harnisch, 'Der Prophet als Widerpart und Zeuge der Offenbarung: Erwägungen zur Interdependenz von Form und Sache im IV Buch Esra', in *Apocalypticism in the Mediterranean World and the Near East: Proceedings of the International Colloquium Apocalypticism, Uppsala, August 12 – 17, 1979* (ed. D. Hellholm; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1983), 461 – 93; Barclay, *Gift*, 288, n. 19.

many sinners invites both Uriel's principle of fitting judgement *(vacua vacuis et plena plenis*, 7:25) and its application to the few worthy of salvation (7:61).

With God's equitable judgement in Torah-terms grounded in his inviolable life-giving and life-ordering activity, the episode applies this both to the question of the intermediate state (7:75 – 101) and to debating the question of the possibility of unconditioned and incongruous mercy at the judgement (7:102 – 8:62)—whether as a result of the intercession of the righteous (7:102 – 115; 8:15 – 36) or arising from God's mercy on the unworthy (throughout 7:116 – 8:62). As we will see, while Ezra repeatedly appeals to God's unconditioned activity in the creation and sustenance of *fallen* human life to fund an argument for unconditioned and incongruous mercy at the judgement, Uriel flips these appeals to argue that it is God's inviolable creation of the self that *requires* his maintenance of Torah-order for the sake of justice, with the two ages framework ensuring the equitable distribution of salvation and judgement. In this connection, both the debates over competing scriptural material (Uriel's reading of Dt 30:19 [7:19 – 22; 7:127 – 131] vs. Ezra's reading of Ex 34:6 – 7 [7:132 – 8:14]) and alternate accounts of the application of the harvest metaphor to the question of inheritance underline the contrasting hermeneutics that arise from alternate accounts of God's life-giving benefaction. Whereas Ezra reads such activity from the perspective of God's unconditioned creation of the world, election of his people, and sustenance of the unworthy, Uriel insists that such principles apply only to the present age. The choice between life and death presented by Moses (Dt 30:19) is the quintessential expression of the stakes of life after Adam's fall. Thus, God will redeem the few on the basis of their lives ordered according to God's covenant (9:7, 8), while this same life-giving and life-ordering benefaction of inviolable *libertas* (8:56; 9:11) will render God's enemies culpable for 'having disdained [God's] law' (9:11) despite 'living in receipt of [his] benefactions' (9:10).[58] In short, because, for *4 Ezra*, life is inviolably given and given as Torah-ordered from creation, the self is both capable and responsible for living according to the Torah—an order that is vindicated at the judgement.

[58] For a complementary argument that recognises the fitting character of mercy and the motif of agency in *4 Ezra* but does not analyse its basis in God's benefaction at creation, see K.B. Wells, *Grace and Agency in Paul and Second Temple Judaism: Interpreting the Transformation of the Heart* (NovTSup 157; Leiden: Brill, 2014), 173–86.

For the purposes of the argument of this chapter, the exegesis of this section will provide two important results. First, as we shall see, the debate between Ezra and Uriel over whether God is a discriminating or indiscriminate giver in the eschaton turns on their respective understandings of the enduring efficacy of the gifts of created agency and the Torah. Thus, though Barclay's recent work has helpfully raised the issue of the differing *definitions* of God's grace in episode three, a focus on the relation between created and eschatological life as gift is necessary for an adequate account of the *logic* by which Uriel's account prevails. Second, our analysis of Ezra and Uriel's competing uses of the seed metaphor shows how the organic metaphors of the first three episodes constitute both the shared ground of theological debate and the means by which episodes three and four are logically coherent. Consequently, this analysis prepares for a new interpretation of episode four that seeks to resolve the problem of the logical coherence of the first four episodes without either appealing to Ezra's experience *simpliciter* as the deciding factor or concluding that episode three ends without a theological resolution—be it an *aporia* or stalemate.

2.2.1 Israel's Inheritance, the Judged Creation, and the Plight of Humanity (6:35 – 7:16)

Arising from his foretaste of the world's coming change (6:13 – 16, 29), Ezra's complaint combines the emphasis on God's sovereign life-giving word from episode one (6:38, 43, 44; cf. 3:4 – 6) with that on Israel's election in episode two (6:56 – 58; cf. 5:21 – 30), though without the earlier accusations, in order to pose the question of Israel's delayed receipt of her inheritance. God's life-giving word is effective in providing a flourishing and variegated habitat that is all for Adam (6:46, 54), whom God appoints as ruler (*dux*), while, because Israel both descends from Adam and is chosen by God (6:54), the world was in reality made for them. Yet, those whom God considers 'nothing', 'spittle', a mere 'drop in the bucket' (6:57) are dominating his people, who are his 'first born', 'only begotten', 'zealous for [God]', and 'most dear' (6:58).[59] The juxtaposition of God's sovereignty in creation and filial election and

[59] For the typological correspondence between Adam-Israel and the animals-Gentiles, see Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 450.

Israel's current status 'increases the dissonance' of Ezra's complaint.[60] If the world was created for Israel by the God who speaks things into existence, why does she not have her inheritance (*hereditas*, 6:59)?

Because Ezra does not accuse but only seeks information, Uriel reframes the complaint not with a humiliating test but with two metaphors that explain the significance of the fallen creation's incapacity for Israel's inheritance. The metaphor of the narrow river and the broad sea continues Uriel's emphasis on the spatial limitations of the present *saeculum*, while the metaphor of Israel's inheritance as a city reached through a perilous journey configures the plight of heirs as a quest through these 'vain things' (*vana*, 7:14). The delay of Israel's inheritance is a result of God's judgement of creation: 'For [he] made the world for their sake, and when Adam transgressed his statutes, what had been made was judged' (7:11), which rendered the path through this *saeculum* a necessary journey through 'narrow and vain things' (7:14) to a city in which the 'fruit of immortality' awaits the heirs (7:13). In other words, God's gift of the inheritance through a quest for an 'immortal' city renders it a conditioned gift, the receipt of which depends on successfully passing through the 'appointed danger' (7:9); the reference to *fructus* (7:13) implies that the conditions are moral; and the cosmologically and ontologically inflected context of the journey explain why it is difficult yet not impossible—and worthwhile. That Uriel does indeed configure the inheritance as a gift is clear from his language: that which 'will be given' (*dabitur*) is 'a gifted…city' (*data…civitas*, 7:9). This inheritance is a conditioned gift because its receipt depends on 'having passed through the appointed danger' (*antepositum periculum pertransierit*, 7:9). Thus, the 'sadness and infirmities' that render this world incapable of delivering 'the things promised' (4:27) are not due to the experiences of evil in this world but more fundamentally to God's judicial response to evil. This judicial response subjects the entire cosmos to death, with all of the constricting experiences of vanity that entails, in view of the reversal of futility unto immutable life for worthy heirs in a renewed world. Again, the logic of gift to the worthy is invoked: the 'living' must endure 'narrow and vain' things in order to 'receive' (*recipere*) what has been reserved for them (7:14). In this connection, the fact that Ezra is 'corruptible' and 'mortal', Uriel insists, should lead

[60] Moo, *Creation*, 67.

him to focus not on what is now but on what is to come (7:15 – 16). In other words, Ezra knows that he will die, but should he not consider his experiences from the perspective of their coming reversal? That is, Ezra should receive the gift of knowledge being offered by Uriel: 'why receive not in [his] heart what will be, but instead what is at hand?' (*quare non accepisti in corde tuo quod futurum sed quod in praesenti,* 7:16).

2.2.2 The Inviolable Law and the Plight of Fallen Humanity (7:17 – 74)

In the three exchanges that follow this opening (7:17 – 74), Ezra accepts both Uriel's two-world framework and his advice to consider what is to come, though he advocates for the wicked. Adopting an aggressive tone, he responds: 'Behold, you have ordained by your law that while the righteous ones [*iusti*] will inherit these things, the ungodly ones [*impii*], however, will perish' (7:17).[61] Thus, the righteous can take Uriel's advice and bear their current 'narrow things' (*angusta*) while hoping for the 'broad things' (*spatiosa*), but the impious suffer and do not see the 'broad things' (*spatiosa*) (7:18). These comments make it clear that Ezra recognises the moral and cosmological frame implicit in Uriel's preceding response (cf. *fructus inmortalitatis*, 7:13) and understands that the law defines this moral order; he simply objects to the implications for the *impii*. Uriel's programmatic response establishes the inviolability of the law, initiating a debate about the implications of this arrangement that runs until 7:75. Most generally, Ezra is not God's superior as judge or in wisdom (7:19), and, thus, (*enim*) it would be better that the many living at that time (*multi praesentes*) perish than 'the law of God that has been placed before them be disregarded' (7:20). The ground (*enim*) of this shocking statement is that God has commanded everyone (not just Israel)[62] 'what must be done that they might live and must be observed that they might not be punished' (*quid facientes viverent et quid observantes non punirentur*, 7:21). This is apparently a paraphrase of Dt 30:19, as the

[61] Watson (*Hermeneutics*, 454) notes that the verbs κληρονομῆσαι and ἀπολεῖσθε must 'underlie the translator's Latin rendering here'—*hereditabunt* and *peribunt*—thereby, confirming an echo of Dt 30:16 – 18.

[62] Moo rightly argues (*Creation*, 75; cf. 76 – 79) that Elliott's attempt to limit the scope of Uriel's statement to Israel founders on an unwarranted reading of *saeculum* in 7:11, 12 as a reference to the 'land'; M.A. Elliott, *The Survivors of Israel: A Reconsideration of the Theology of Pre-Christian Judaism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 99–107, 343–44.

use of the verb *antepono* (v. 20) echoes Moses' words (MT: נָתַתִּי לְפָנֶיךָ; LXX: δέδωκα πρὸ προσώπου ὑμῶν), the references to being 'made alive' and 'not being punished' map onto Moses' life-death binary, and, of the five uses of the subjunctive of *vivo* in *4 Ezra*, four are associated with law observance, and each of them, if not an echo of, are conceptually consistent with the explicit appeal to Dt 30:19 in *4 Ezra* 7:129 (cf. 7:21, 82, 109, 129; 14:22). Obedience to God's law is here, however, the path not to life in the land (Dt 30:20) but eschatological life.[63] That is, the moral dualism that provides the basis for a Deuteronomic historical order is affirmed, but, because the present age is subject to death and vanity, this dualism is maintained by projecting it into the eschaton.[64]

One of the key points for our purposes is that Uriel's earlier specification of the inheritance as a 'gifted city' holds (7:9), though now the conditions attendant to this gift are now further specified with respect to God's personal donation of the law at creation. Thus, Uriel's subsequent description of the human response to God's gift of the law emphasises the integral relation between the 'vain thoughts' of humanity and their complete rejection of his ways (7:23, 24). This rejection forms the basis for Uriel's principle of fitting judgement—[*p]ropter hoc, Ezra, vacua vacuis et plena plenis* (7:25)—but it also illumines the personal terms in which judgement is recompensed. For after introducing the concept of a Messianic Kingdom as prelude to God's singular judgement (7:26 – 30), Uriel presents God's verbal sentence on the nations as the climax of the judgement (7:31 – 38). Those who have spoken against God (*contradico,* 7:22) are told to 'see and understand whom you have denied, whom you have not served, whose commands you have rejected' (7:37). Uriel's diagnosis of the integral relation between 'vain thoughts' (even atheism; cf. 7:23) and rejection of God's law, framed in the context of God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction, illumines the theological logic of *4 Ezra* and, thus, the subsequent debate. For, as here, so in the remainder of *4 Ezra*: *to reject God's gift of the law is to reject him, and to reject him is to forfeit immutable life.* In this connection, Uriel's description of the day of judgement here clarifies the cause of the suspension of the life-cycle we saw in the

[63] For an overview of this interplay of life and 'eschatological life', see S. Burkes, '"Life"Redefined: Wisdom and Law in Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch', *CBQ* 63 (2001): 55 – 71.

[64] For the implicit concept of natural law in this context, see Moo, *Creation*, 79–82.

previous episode (6:21 – 24): for that day is illumined only by 'the brilliance of the glory of the Most High' (*splendorem claritatis Altissimi*, v. 42), bringing evening and morning, summer and spring to an end (7:39 – 42). Thus, it is not simply the need for time to cease in order for all the facts to be reviewed (7:33), but the personal presence of the immortal and incorruptible God himself that inexorably includes the end and judgement of time in the arrival of eternity. When God arrives 'what is corrupt will die' (*morietur corruptum*) – *whether physical or moral* – giving way to the next world (7:31).

Ezra's next two speeches lament the plight of humanity from the perspective of Uriel's full rationale for and rehearsal of divine judgement. Though Ezra now affirms that the obedient are indeed blessed, he is concerned that the world to come (*futurum saeculum*) will mean torments for many (7:47). Ezra's explanation adopts Uriel's metaphor of the path, his focus on the relation between cognition and morality, and the organic language that unites these cosmologically, but he applies them to the damned: for (*enim*) the *cor malum* has 'separated' humans from the good things that are to come by leading them into 'corruption' and 'the way of death' (*itinera mortis*), which is 'to us the path of perdition' (*nobis semitas perditionis*, 7:48). The result is that '[the *cor malum*] has made us far off from life' (*longe fecit nos a vita*) …'almost all who have been created' (*paene omnes qui creati sunt*, 7:48). At this point, Ezra again requires instruction, which comes in the form of Uriel's explanation of the significance of the two-ages framework through the metaphor of Earth's rare and common materials: just as some materials are of greater worth (gold) than others (clay; 7:49 – 58), so some human beings are of greater moral worth than others, and God will rejoice over the rare righteous and show no concern over the many wicked who perish (7:59 – 61).

This response produces Ezra's longest speech of this cycle. The key point, for our purposes, is that Ezra's lament over humanity's cognitive capacity (*sensus*, 7:64) and his suggestion that the animals are better off because they do not look forward to the judgement (7:65 - 68) extends the focus on human mental capacity and provides the basis for Uriel's rejoinder. In line with his earlier presentation of God as gift-giver, Uriel indicts humanity for 'possessing understanding yet committing iniquity' (*sensum habentes iniquitatem fecerunt*), which amounts to failing to observe

the '*received* commandments' (*mandata accipientes*) and being unfaithful to the law 'they have *received*' (*acceperunt*, 7:72).[65] In other words, it is the human capacity to *understand* the consequences of rejecting God's *gift* of Torah-order that renders them liable to judgement and without excuse (7:73). According to Uriel, all of humanity stands in receipt of the gift of God's law, and all humanity knows this. Thus, there is no excuse.

2.2.3 The Perfectly Just Intermediate State (7:75 – 101)

Ezra does not directly challenge Uriel, but rather exploits his reference to God's patience (7:74; cf. 7:33) to test whether it extends to the intermediate state. It does not: while the souls of those who have rejected God wander about in seven 'ways', the faithful rest in seven 'orders'. As with the giving and receiving of the law, here the Most High is viewed as Benefactor, though here the giver of breath and life. Consequently, Ezra and Uriel figure created life as a gift that will be returned at death: 'each one will return back [his] life' (*reddemus unusquisque animam*, 7:75), and when the predetermined time comes from the Most High, a person's breath leaves his body (*corpus*) and returns to God who gave (*do*) it (7:78). The criterion distinguishing the 'wanderers' from those who 'rest' is their respective responses to God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction: the wicked reject God's law and find themselves without the opportunity to repent 'that they might live' (*vivant*, 7:82), while the righteous 'struggle with great effort to overcome the evil thought formed within them that they might not be led astray from life to death' (7:92), thereby 'completely keeping the law of the Lawgiver' despite 'enduring danger at every hour' (7:89).[66]

In this connection, Uriel insists that, despite Ezra's inclusion of himself among those awaiting torment (7:76), he has a 'treasury of works' (*thesaurus operum*, 7:77) on deposit with the Most High. Likewise, those who have believed in the divine

[65] This is not 'the closest *4 Ezra* comes to affirming a more legalistic notion', but an alternate view of divine benefaction as conditioned and congruous; *pace* Moo, 'The Few', 111.

[66] The explicit reference to repentance here precludes a 'legalistic' or 'perfectionistic' reading; so e.g. R. Bauckham, 'Apocalypses', in *Justification and Variegated Nomism: The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism* (ed. D.A. Carson, P.T. O'Brien, and M.A. Seifrid; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 171 – 72; Moo, *Creation*, 80; Moo, 'The Few', 113; Barclay, *Gift*, 282, n. 7. *Contra* Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 416, 418.

covenants 'will see the reserved reward' (*vident repositam mercedem*, 7:83). After learning that the departed souls will have either terrifying or comforting previews of the Most High (7:87, 98), Ezra inquires about the duration of these experiences prior to being gathered into their 'habitations' (7:101) to await the judgement. It seems that the seven-day timeframe and the fact that Uriel has responded only with respect to the righteous, suggests an opportunity for Ezra to spend some of his heavenly capital. For he immediately asks whether the righteous will have an opportunity to intercede for the ungodly at the judgement (7:102).

2.2.4 The Contest of Eternal Life and the Definition of Mercy (7:102 – 9:25)

The transition from debate over the plight of wicked humanity to the questions of intercession and mercy is a natural one. Uriel's insistence on the inviolability of the Torah and, thus, the standard of God's justice leaves intercession and incongruous mercy as the only possible means by which the wicked might avoid perdition. The significance of these questions for *4 Ezra* is seen by the length and character of their treatment. For, over the course of five exchanges, Ezra and Uriel debate the relation between the character of God and the shape of his mercy: the significance of Israel's exemplary intercessors (7:102 – 115), the proper response to the human plight (7:116 – 131; cf. Dt 30:15 – 20), the implications of Ex 34:6 – 7 for understanding God's gracious character (7:132 – 8:3), the propriety of prayer and direct appeal to him for mercy for God's people (8:4 – 41), and God's culpability as Creator of humanity and Israel in light of the impending judgement (8:42 – 62). With the introduction of biblical exemplars and scriptural warrant for Ezra's appeals to mercy, the hermeneutical significance and scriptural grounding of *4 Ezra's* cosmologically and eschatologically inflected conception of God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction comes to the fore, as the Deuteronomic choice between life and death provides the formal order through which both reality and scripture is to be read. In the end, Uriel's insistence on humanity's inviolably given *libertas* is the material ground for the divine application of this order in judgement and salvation. Thus, as we shall see, in the final summary account of the signs of the end (8:63 – 9:13), it is the differing cognitive and moral responses to God's life-giving and life-ordering benefactions—whether faithfulness/works (9:7, 8) or disregard of God and

scorn for his law (9:9 – 12)—that account for God's fitting gift of salvation and punitive judgement.

2.2.4.1 The Immutable, Immortal, and Perfectly Just Future Age (7:102 – 115)

Ezra's question about the possibility of intercession on the day of judgement receives a clear denial from Uriel. God's judgement is 'decisive [*audax*] demonstrating to all the seal of truth' (7:104). In line with the two previous uses of the word *veritas* in the context of judgement (cf. 6:28; 7:34), the sense here is of correct evaluation, while the reference to the *signaculum* recalls the sealing (*supersigno*) of the age in 6:20 (cf. 6:5; 8:53) and makes this correct judgement definitive and irreversible. This is so, because the quality of one's life—whether healthy or ill—is inextricably one's own. A parent cannot be healed *for* a sick child (7:104).[67] As the references to being ill and receiving healing suggest, this way of putting the point is consistent with the earlier metaphorical construction of the organic relationship between behaviour and results. Thus, when Uriel concludes that 'everyone will bear their own righteousness and unrighteousness' (7:105) he means they will bear the necessary *consequences* of their deeds.[68] Ezra appeals to a long list of exemplary intercessions, beginning with Abraham and ending with Hezekiah, as counter-examples. The mention of Elijah's raising of the dead child (7:109; cf. 1 Kgs 17:17 – 24) underscores the effectiveness of these appeals. If even the dead can come to life, that is, and now the righteous pray for the ungodly, why will there be no prayer for reversal in the coming age (7:111)? Uriel's answer appeals to the moral and cosmological implications of the two-age framework, asserting that the judgement marks the end of the old, less than fully glorious world, and the beginning of the 'immortal age' (7:113) in which 'corruption', 'intemperance', and 'unbelief' have faded and 'righteousness' and 'truth' have emerged in full (cf. 6:27, 28). The result (*ergo*) is that it will be neither possible to have mercy on one 'who will have been conquered (*victus*) by judgement, nor to sink (*demergere*) one who will

[67] The Latin reads *intellegat* for the first verb in the sequence here, which Stone (*Fourth Ezra*, 247; following Bensly, who suggests ἵνα νοσῇ as the Greek phrase; R.L. Bensly, *The Missing Fragment of the Latin Translation of the Fourth Fook of Ezra* [Cambridge: CUP, 1875], 72) judges is due to a misreading of the Greek verb as νοέω rather than νοσέω.

[68] For this principle in the Hebrew Bible, see Dt 24:16; Jer 31:28 – 29; and Ezek 18:20.

have conquered (*vicerit*)' (7:115). The parallel use of forms of *vinco* anticipates the metaphor of life as a 'contest' (*certamen*, 7:127), but, notably here, the final result of this contest is immortal life. In other words, according to Uriel, because God's judgement of the evil of the former age brings it to an end and ushers in fullness of life in its place, this judgement is immutable.

2.2.4.2 The Law's Life and Death Contest: An Eschatological Reading of Deuteronomy 30 (7:116 – 131)

Uriel's insistence on the immutability of the judgement elicits from Ezra a hypothetical, then a lament. Again, emphatically identifying himself with the fate of wicked humanity (*nobis* three times in 7:119, 120; *nos* five times in 7:119 – 124), Ezra reasons that humanity would have been better off either never having existed or having been prevented from falling—'For what good is it that all at present live in sadness and after death expect punishment' (7:117)? Repeating six of the seven 'ways' and 'orders' of the post-mortem liminal state revealed earlier (cf. 7:76 – 99; omitting the vision of God), Ezra asks 'what use' (*quid prodest*, 7:117, 119) is any of this coming reality if 'we' will not experience the good but only the bad that will come with it. 'For while we lived and did iniquity we did not consider what we might suffer after death' (7:126). Uriel's response is not sympathetic but rather compares life to a contest. Citing Moses's words in Deuteronomy 30:19, Uriel presents the choice: 'Choose life for your self that you may live' (*elige tibi vitam ut vivas*, 7:129). Yet, because Israel did not believe Moses or the prophets or Uriel himself, it is their own fault that they are destroyed (7:130). There will be no grief for them, only 'joy over the life of those who did believe' (7:131).[69]

This reading of Deuteronomy 30:19 is consistent with the earlier eschatological projection of life and death in 7:21, though a specific citation here grounds Uriel's response to Ezra in scripture. Although it may seem rather obvious, it is important to note that this eschatological reading denies the thrust of the original passage, which is to explain how national flourishing (or renewal) might be possible *in history*. This reading is necessary because of the author's radical understanding of both human flourishing and cosmic decay. From the point of view

[69] For this translation, see Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 253.

of the author of *4 Ezra*, the presence of evil within and God's judgement of the cosmos render it subject to a structural vanity such that sustained and complete human flourishing is impossible. Why the author has come to this conclusion is not obvious. The radical failure of Israel as a nation to live for God, as indicated in the *Unheilsgeschichte* and subsequent destruction, could have suggested the intractability of the problem of sin and evil in 'this age'. Yet, if it is possible, in principle, for someone to follow Moses's command, then it is possible, in principle, for the nation to remain faithful. Uriel's earlier appeal to the entropic nature of the cosmos and history provides a sort of answer to this problem, but it is one that sits awkwardly with the focus on created capacity for obedience. Be that as it may, it is clear that this eschatological reading of Deuteronomy 30:19 plays a vital role in grounding the theological logic of *4 Ezra* in scripture. For it ties the basic choice and destiny facing all of humanity specifically to obedience to the divine law.[70]

2.2.4.3 Living in Receipt of God's Gifts: why Eschatological Life is Given to the Worthy (7:132 – 9:25)

Ezra's response introduces a series of three last ditch appeals to God's character as merciful toward the unworthy, bringing the debate to its (theo)logical conclusion in the context of alternate construals of God's life-giving benefaction. Ezra's final basic move is to present an alternative eschatological hermeneutic *via* a reading of Ex 34:6 – 7 grounded in God's unconditioned creation and incongruous sustenance of fallen humanity. God is called merciful (*misericors*)[71] 'because' (*quod*) he has mercy on the unborn (7:132); one who has mercy (*miserator*)[72] because he has mercy on those who repent and return to the law (7:133); patient (*longanimis*)[73] because he is patient with sinners 'as his works' (*quasi suis operibus*, 7:134); and bountiful (*munificus*)[74] because he prefers to give (*donare*) rather than drive away (7:135). Ezra's key interpretive move, for our purposes, occurs in the pivot toward an eschatological frame that begins in v. 136: for the appellation 'great in mercy' (*multae*

[70] On this reading of Dt 30 as a theodicy in the form of a 'free will defence', see Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 457–58. See also Moo, 'The Few', 108 – 113; Wells, *Grace and Agency*, 182 – 86.

[71] Ex 34:6; MT: רַחוּם ; LXX: οἰκτίρμων.

[72] Ex 34:6, חַנּוּן/ἐλεήμων.

[73] Ex 34:6, אֶרֶךְ אַפַּיִם/μακρόθυμος.

[74] Ex 34:6, רַב־חֶסֶד/πολυέλεος.

misericordiae)[75] is grounded both in God's great provision of mercies that fund the existence of those who exist, have existed, and will exist (7:136) *and* (*enim*) in the fact that, without these mercies, the coming *saeculum* and its inhabitants 'will not be made alive' (*non vivificabitur*, 7:137). This shift, its appeal to mercy as God's unconditioned creation and incongruous sustenance of fallen humanity, and its counter-factual logic, grounds a partial eschatological reading of the remainder of Ex 34:7. For, taking the assurance that God 'keeps steadfast love for thousands' as a promise, Ezra reasons that the appellation of God as *Donator* depends on his unconditioned and incongruous donation of eschatological life; for if God 'does not give out of his goodness and raise up those who have sinned from their sin, then not a ten-thousandth part of humanity will be able to be made alive' (*si non donaverit de bonitate sua ut adleventur hii qui iniquitates fecerunt de suis iniquitatibus non poterit decies millesima pars hominum vivificari*, 7:138). In this connection, God is *Iudex only* as the one who 'forgives those who he created by his word and blots out the multitude of their sins', lest his promise be broken—'lest a very few' (*nisi pauci valde*) 'will be left' (*derelinquentur,* 7:139) at the judgement.

As in Uriel's reading of Dt 30, Ezra's reading runs against an important feature of the text of Ex 34, because it omits the statements about God's justice—viz., his refusal to clear the guilty and his 'visiting' of the sins of parents on subsequent generations (Ex 34:7). Moreover, this omission, combined with Ezra's appeal to unconditioned and incongruous life-giving mercy, undermines Uriel's repeated emphasis on human responsibility. Thus, Uriel's expected response is terse and clear (8:1 – 4): this appeal to God as Creator is invalid, because God made not one world but two—the former for 'the many', the latter for 'the few'; the former for the worthless 'clay', the latter for the valuable 'gold'. Thus, Uriel concludes: *multi quidem creati sunt pauci autem salvabuntur* (8:3).

The last two exchanges revolve around the contrasting conceptions of the integrity of the self these incompatible accounts of divine life-giving benefaction produce. Thus, in the penultimate exchange Ezra returns first to the initial theme of his opening complaint (3:4 – 36)—the apparent futility and meaninglessness of God's life-giving action, given his death-dealing judgement. Ezra requests 'seed for the

[75] Ex 34:6, רַב־חֶסֶד/πολυέλεος.

heart' and 'cultivation for the understanding' for the production of 'fruit' unto eternal life (8:6), a request grounded scripturally in v. 7 in God's own self-ascription as *solus es* (Dt 4:35; 6:4; Isa 43:7, 11; 44:6; cf. Dt 32:39) and the fact that humanity is 'one of the works of [God's] hands' (cf. Job 10:3 – 9; Ps 138:8; Isa 64:8). Ezra's emphasis on God's creative activity (*vivifico*) and sustenance from conception to maturity (8:8 – 12) only serves to underline the brutal fact that 'it is as God's own creature that he will kill [a human being] and as his own work that he will make [one] alive' (*mortificabis eum ut tuam creaturam et vivificabis eum ut tuum opus*, 8:13). Thus, just as God's sovereign care in giving life is contrasted with the immediacy of his judgement in episode one, so here, though the earlier implication is now stated: 'If, therefore, you will destroy by means of a simple command what with so much effort was made by you, for what was it made' (8:14)?

After this question, Ezra shifts, as in episode one, from a focus on the Adamic heritage to God's dealings with his elect people, but now, because '[he] has heard of the swiftness of the judgement that is future' (8:19), Ezra intercedes for Israel. The petitions of vv. 26 – 20 are summed-up in the request that God not 'look on the sins of the people but those who served [him] in truth' (v. 26), while vv. 27 – 28 contrast their respective deeds, and the reference in v. 28b to 'those who have voluntarily acknowledged that you are to be feared' (*qui ex voluntate tuum timorem cognoverunt*) provides the bridge to their differing *attitudes*. God should overlook those who live like cattle (8:28) and think like wild beasts (8:29), regarding instead those who gloriously taught God's law (8:28) and those who have always trusted in God's glory (8:29). The reason given for this request is again an appeal to God's mercy, but as Barclay rightly emphasises, mercy is conceived differently here: 'Ezra has pressed the claims for another view of 'mercy' and 'benefaction' (for the mixture of terminology, see 7.132 – 38)–one where mercy is perfected as *incongruous*.'[76] Redeploying terminology from his earlier interpretation of Ex 34:6 – 7, according to Ezra, God is called merciful for his treatment of those without 'works of righteousness' (8:32), and his goodness will be proclaimed when he is merciful to

[76] Barclay, *Gift*, 299.

those without a 'store of good works' (8:36).[77] This construal of incongruous mercy would introduce an asymmetry in God's treatment of sinners and the righteous, as the latter will 'receive the reward from their own works' (*ex propriis operibus recipient mercedem*, 8:33) and the former will not (8:32), despite the fact that they (Israel and her ancestors) have lived 'in a mortal manner' (*mortalibus moribus*, 8:31). The logic for this appeal is representative in character, because God is asked to consider the righteous and not the sinners when looking at his people (8:26 - 29). In other words, Ezra asks for God to break the organic relationship between sin and death for the sinners of Israel on the basis of the righteous, while maintaining this organic relationship for those who live righteously.

Uriel's response, though predictable, moves our debate toward its climax in an illuminating way. For Ezra's request that God provide a 'seed for the heart' and 'cultivation for the understanding' (8:6) and his prayer that God overlook those who live like cattle and think like wild beasts (8:28, 29) both prepare for Uriel's metaphor of God as farmer and his justification of this metaphor in the paradoxical exemplarity of Ezra himself. Uriel's penultimate response collapses Ezra's two-fold emphasis on creation and election into one issue: God will show no concern for the life, sin, death, and destruction of sinners (8:38), while he will rejoice over the creation, pilgrimage, salvation, and reward of the righteous (8:39). Thus, modifying Ezra's request for 'seed', Uriel compares God's creative activity and its result in salvation and judgement to the farmer's scattering of seed—only some takes root and produces a crop; only some of those born will be saved (8:41). This subversion of Ezra's seed metaphor elicits from him both a charge of anachronism and a final, direct appeal to incongruous mercy: seeds die as a result either of neglect by the farmer or due to the unsuitability of the conditions (8:43), but, because human

[77] Given Ezra's role as prosecuting attorney in episode one and intercessor here, the problem of the apparent contradiction between the assumption that some are righteous in 8:26 – 30 and the claim that all have sinned in 8:35 is lessened; for Ezra is pleading for unconditioned and incongruous mercy on multiple grounds, returning throughout 8:4 – 62 to a variety of arguments already advanced (e.g., the request for a 'seed' in 8:6 returns to the assumption of the *cor malignum* and its *infirmitas* in 3:20 – 21). Thus, though Stone is correct to warn against 'oversystematization', this does not entail that the *author's* conception of the self is ultimately contradictory; *pace* Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 272. Cf. R. Bauckham, 'The Conflict of Justice and Mercy: Attitudes to the Damned in Apocalyptic Literature', in *The Fate of the Dead: Studies on Jewish and Christian Apocalypses* (NovTSup 93; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 138; S.J. Gathercole, *Where is Boasting?: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul's Response in Romans 1–5* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 138.

beings are made by God's own hands after his own image, surely they are not like the farmer's seed and God will have mercy (8:44, 45). Ezra's final, desperate appeal receives a familiar response: Ezra must observe which matters belong to the present age and which to the future (8:46), while remembering that he cannot love creation more than God (8:47). Moreover, though Uriel insists that Ezra's identification with the unrighteous must stop (8:47), his humble refusal to consider himself among the righteous renders him worthy of 'the greatest glory' (8:49), a stark contrast to those who, 'though in receipt of freedom', have rejected God, his law, and his ways (8:56). Thus, implicit in Uriel's use of the seed metaphor is the earlier connection between behaviour and results, but now with clarification that humans have received both an inviolable created self and the inviolable order of creation in the law. Uriel's insistence on the created *libertas* of the unrighteous underscores the key issue and grounds it in his particular account of God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. The problem is not, as Ezra implies, that God created humans to destroy them (8:59) but that, despite their inviolable created freedom, human beings 'have become ungrateful ones (*ingrati*) to the one who has prepared life for them now' (8:60). Thus, as Uriel turns to a final synopsis of the judgement, salvation is conditioned on one's response to God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction: the righteous will be saved *per opera* or *per fidem in qua credidit*[78] (9:7), while the judged are those 'who have not known [God] despite living in receipt of [divine] benefactions (*viventes beneficia consecuti*)' (9:10), 'those who have rejected [God's] law despite having freedom (*erant habentes libertatem*)', and 'those who did not understand but rejected [this freedom] while a place of repentance (*paenitentiae locus*) was still open to them' (9:12). It is this *locus*, this inviolable space of created *libertas*, that is the moral and material ground of the return gift of salvation for the 'one grape' and the 'one plant' (9:21, 22). In this connection, Uriel's closing reference to 'those living in receipt of [divine] benefactions' underlines the theological logic of the entirety of episode three. As Uriel insisted, the law as been given by God to all

[78] The conjunction *vel* rules out a soteriology of faith and works (*contra* Myers, *II Esdras*, 248). Longenecker's translation (*2 Esdras*, 49) 'through the faithfulness in which they put their trust' is unlikely, given the consistent use of *credo* with regard to divine covenants in the rest of *4 Ezra* (3:32; 5:29; 7:83, 130) and the variable use of *fides* (5:1; 6:5, 28; 7:24, 34, 94, 98, 103–104; 9:7; 13:23), which suggests 'through the faith by which they believed' or 'through the faith in which they believed'. Given the focus on cognition in the immediate context, we prefer the former.

(7:20), and all know what they must do in response in order to live (7:21). Likewise, Israel is obligated to heed Moses' words and choose life (7:129; cf. Dt 30:19). Thus, Ezra's appeals to God as the indiscriminate giver of life to the unworthy (7:138) or the one called merciful because he has mercy on those who have no works (8:32) is, for Uriel, mistaken because it disregards the enduring state of *libertas* (8:56; 9:11) granted in God's benefactions to the living (9:10).

Thus, two critical results for the argument of this chapter arise from the exegesis of the previous section. First, the logical grounding of the debate over the character of God's eschatological gift-giving in episode three—whether for the worthy or unworthy—is shown to rest in a prior commitment to a conception of the enduring efficacy and relevance of the divine gifts of life (specifically, human agency) and the Torah. Thus, a *particular* account of divine-human gift exchange at creation, in the fallen *saeculum*, and at the eschaton governs the theological logic: humans who return the gift of created freedom in observance of the Torah, receive eschatological life as a return gift to the worthy. The axiomatic nature of this account of divine-human gift-exchange in creation and the eschaton is further illustrated in the contrast between Uriel and Ezra's respective hermeneutics. Whereas Ezra interprets Ex 34 as an expression of God's character as one who gives to the unworthy, Uriel confines this reading to the present, fallen *saeculum,* subordinating it to the Mosaic choice between eschatological life and death in Dt 30. With the above argument, we have gone beyond Barclay's recent analysis of gift in *4 Ezra*, by showing precisely *why* Uriel's account of gift differs from that of Ezra. And, in so doing, we have shown that an analysis of life as divine gift and God as life-giver is necessary for doing so. Second, the closing debate over the proper interpretation of the seed metaphor both extends the organic logic of the first two episodes and prepares for Ezra's vision, in which he comes to understand how the law bears eschatological fruit not just for individuals but also for *Zion*. Thus, our analysis of this metaphor prepares for a new interpretation of the logical relation between episodes three and four —as opposed to merely experiential resolution (as most prominently argued by Stone) or an intentional *aporia* (as recently argued by Hogan).

2.3 Ezra's Vision as Fitting Gift (*4 Ezra* 9:26 – 10:59)

Though there has been considerable debate over the significance of episode four, there are good reasons to think that Ezra's theology has changed.[79] It is unnecessary either to construe this change psychologically or religiously rather than intellectually or theologically,[80] or to interpret the debates of episode three as a stalemate leading to an intentional aporia.[81] On the contrary, as we shall argue, Ezra's further development of the seed metaphor indicates full *theological* acceptance of Uriel's account of the creational freedom of the self.[82] Likewise, the particular nature of the counsel he gives to Mother Zion demonstrates that Ezra has adopted in full Uriel's two-ages account of divine life-giving benefaction, a change that proves him both ready for and worthy of the climactic vision of the eschatological Zion. Thus, Ezra receives the vision *because* he is a paradoxically exemplary leader, one whose grief has been tested and proven to arise *ex toto corde* (10:50) but who, in order to lead Israel, needs to experience the healing of Israel's grief in a vision of the end and reversal of grief itself.

Consequently, in this closing section we will see how our focus on *life* as divine gift and our analysis of *4 Ezra's* organic metaphors exposes the logical relation between episodes three and four and, thus, the theological logic of the apocalypse. Specifically, Ezra's puzzle over the apparent death of historical Israel in light of his conviction about the eschatological fecundity of the law is not an absurdity, but rather represents the remaining paradox this episode answers. Likewise, the fact that

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[79] Barclay, *Gift*, 297, n. 38: 'if it is a mistake to identify a single point of total change, it is also mistaken to conclude form some elements of continuity at this point that nothing is changing at all'.

[80] Herman Gunkel was the first to suggest that the debates reflect the author of *4 Ezra's* inner struggle; H. Gunkel, 'Das vierte Buch Esra', in *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments* (ed. E. Kautzsch; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1900), 2:343. Cf. Breech, 'Fragments', 274; Stone, 'Reactions to Destructions', 202 – 04; Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 32 – 33, 36; J.J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature* (2nd ed.; BRS; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 210 – 11; Hogan, *Theologies*, 38 – 40. For criticism of this line of interpretation, see Brandenburger, *Verborgenheit*, 37 – 52; P. Esler, 'The Social Function of 4 Ezra', *JSNT* 53 (1994): 110 – 13.

[81] Hogan, *Theologies*, 38, 153–57.

[82] Though some have read Ezra's restatement of his complaint of the tiny number saved (a drop in a wave, 9:15, 16) as indicating his recalcitrance because Ezra's grief has not been removed, it does not follow that Ezra does not accept Uriel's position. For it was the testing, not the removal, of Ezra's grief that was Uriel's object prior to the climactic vision (10:50). *Contra* M.A. Knibb, 'Commentary on 2 Esdras', in *The First and Second Books of Esdras* (The Cambridge Bible Commentary; Cambridge: CUP, 1979), 216; Esler, '4 Ezra', 110 – 13; Hogan, *Theologies*, 42; 234 – 35; Moo, *Creation*, 72; Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 458 – 59, 461 – 62.

the vision of the grieving Mother Zion twice interrupts Ezra's puzzlement signals not that the theological question is being set aside but rather that it is being answered in the vision. In summary, Ezra's puzzled extension of the seed metaphor implies the survival of Israel, his assurance that Mother Zion will receive her son back as a fitting gift explains the logic of this implication, and the vision of 'resurrected' Zion itself shows how that logic is true.

2.3.1 The Remaining Paradox: The Survival of Israel (9:26 – 37)

Though the new location, change in diet, and Ezra's satisfaction signal that some change has occurred (9:26), this episode begins, as all of the others, with Ezra's heart being troubled over a paradox (9:27). Ezra returns to the problem that initiated the opening complaint of episode one, but here the focus is narrower: he considers only Israel's apparently vain receipt of the law, *not* her relatively unjust treatment by God vis-à-vis the nations.[83] Recalling the giving of the law after the Exodus, Ezra summarizes God's words in this way: 'Hear me, O Israel, and pay attention to my words, O seed of Jacob. For behold I sow my law in you, and it will make fruit in you, and you will be glorified through it through the age' (9:30, 31). The change in Ezra's seed metaphor is the interpretive key: this is neither a restatement of his position in 3:20 – 27,[84] nor an ironic withdrawal of the assent given at the end of episode three[85] but rather it represents both a reversal of the position in episode one and a response to Ezra's own request for seed in 8:6. For Ezra's use of the metaphor here both recognises the divine gift of the law *and* attributes the historical 'death' of Israel not to God or to the moral incapacity of the *cor malignum* but emphatically to the failure of those who received the gift of the law *to keep it* (9:32, 33).[86]

Moreover, Ezra does not turn, as he has repeatedly done, to the question of the relative righteousness of Israel vis-à-vis the nations but maintains his narrow focus on the survival of Israel. This narrowing and the terms in which it is expressed

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[83] Longenecker, *2 Esdras*, 64.

[84] *Pace* Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 308; L.T. Stuckenbruck, 'Ezra's Vision of the Lady: The Form and Function of a Turning Point', in *Fourth Ezra and Second Baruch: Reconstruction After the Fall* (ed. M. Henze and G. Boccaccini; JSJSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 141.

[85] *Contra* Brandenburger, *Verborgenheit*, 63–68; Hogan, *Theologies*, 155.

[86] Consequently, it is both formally and materially true that, in Harnisch's words, '[s]tets ist es Uriel, der das letzte Wort behält'; Harnisch, 'Prophet', 463.

imply that Ezra has adopted not only Uriel's explanation of the structural incapacity of the present *saeculum* for God's definitive judgement and salvation but also his insistence on God's equitable—congruous and conditioned—judgement. Despite the fact that those who received the law have perished, the law's fruit *will* last because the imperishable God guarantees its imperishability (9:32)—*factum est fructum legis non periens; nec enim poterat, quoniam tuus erat*. This is neither a *misuse* of the metaphor that unintentionally proves the intractability of the debate,[87] nor an intentionally absurd muddle[88] but an extension of the metaphor's logic toward the only remaining paradox. That is, Hogan's rhetorical question *is* the point, 'If the Torah was given only to Israel and the members of Israel are all going to perish because they have sinned, in what meaningful sense can the Torah be said to "survive in its glory" (9:37)?'[89] The question Hogan finds absurd *is* the question being posed in all seriousness by Ezra. The eschatological inflection of the metaphor leads Ezra to a paradox: how can both the law (9:37) and its fruit (9:34) endure if that which holds them, historical Israel, perishes? The problem is that, though Ezra has learned to think of the self and the law, and, thus, the righteous and their 'fruit' in terms of the two-ages, he is still thinking of Israel from the perspective of her apparently vain and futile history.[90] What he cannot understand is how *Israel* might survive. That Ezra has the conceptual apparatus, provided by Uriel, necessary to resolve his own puzzlement is clear from his consolation of the grieving mother, as I will demonstrate.[91]

2.3.2 The Mother Zion: The Reversal of Temporal Grief in the Just Return of Eternal Joy (9:38 – 10:59)

Both Uriel's absence and the fact that the vision of the grieving mother twice interrupts Ezra's cogitations (9:39; 10:4, 5) suggest that the vision itself provides the answer to Ezra's puzzlement. After having his thoughts of the imperishable law interrupted by the mother's grieving (9:38 – 40), Ezra hears how, though 'the Mighty

[87] Brandenburger, *Verborgenheit*, 63–67.
[88] Hogan, *Theologies*, 154–56.
[89] Ibid., 156.
[90] Barclay, *Gift*, 301.
[91] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 319: 'Ezra comforts the woman…by stressing to her exactly those ideas and concepts which he himself has struggled to accept since the beginning of the book'.

One' gave (*do*) her a son (9:45) after thirty years of prayers and barrenness (9:44, 45), he died on his wedding night (10:1). So, the woman came to the place to fast and die (10:2 – 4). In turning to comfort her, as the parallels with his own laments suggest, Ezra is both assuming the role of Uriel[92] and consoling those like himself—the representative righteous Israelite.[93] Ezra's first attempt at consolation reframes the mother's grief in the context of Zion (10:6 – 8) and Mother Earth (10:9 – 11). Though there is certainly irony in Ezra's inability to identify the mother *as* Zion, his consolation is not mistaken. For his appeal to Zion's grief affirms that it is *appropriate* for the righteous Israelite to grieve, while the reference to Mother Earth tempers grief and prohibits despair. That is, Zion is bereaved *now,* but, given the condition of Mother Earth, God has been habitually bereaved from the beginning (10:13, 14).[94] And, as with the Earth, so will it be with Mother Zion. So, she should 'bravely' (*fortiter*) forebear: 'For if you consider righteous (*iustificaveris*) the limit (*terminum*) of God, then you will receive your son back in time (*in tempore*) and will be praised among women' (10:16; cf. 7:78). This promise of the reversal of the mother's futility in the return of her son is both an affirmation of God's justice and a sign of the reversal of earthly futility itself. For, if death is reversed, then the sorrow of all mothers, even Mother Earth, is turned to joy. In other words, Ezra's words here already imply an answer to his conundrum, as Uriel's subsequent explanation of the vision of heavenly Zion makes clear. Moreover, this answer upholds Uriel's insistence on equity in the judgement, as the Mother both *receives* her son as a fitting gift for her long-suffering piety (9:44, 45) *and receives him back* as a fitting gift for considering God righteous in the midst of her grief. In other words, just as the gift of her son was due to a fitting reversal of an unjust state, so is his return from the dead.

Ezra's first consolation, like the first two episodes, does not resolve the woman's grief, and so he continues. After giving a long litany of the ways that Zion has suffered humiliation (10:1 – 23), Ezra admonishes the woman to 'lay aside' her

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[92] W. Harnisch, 'Die Ironie der Offenbarung: Exegetische Erwägungen zur Zionsvision im 4. Buch Esra', in *SBL Seminar Papers, 1981* (ed. K.H. Richards; Chico: Scholars, 1981), 79–104; Stuckenbruck, 'Ezra's Vision', 144.

[93] *Contra* W.J. Harrelson, 'Ezra among the Wicked in 2 Esdras 3 – 10', in *Divine Helmsman, Studies on God's Control of Human Events, Presented to Lou H. Silberman* (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1980), 36: though ironic, this is not 'an answer that Ezra cannot accept for himself'.

[94] Ezra's reference to national and cosmic grief does not indicate his emotional recalcitrance but rather relativises the grief in light of its reversal; *pace* Stuckenbruck, 'Ezra's Vision', 145.

troubles so 'that the Mighty One might be merciful again and give [her] rest, the Most High a rest from her labours' (*ut tibi repropitietur Fortis et requiem faciat tibi Altissimus requietionem laborum*, 10:24). The reference to God as *Fortis* echoes both the woman's earlier reference to the honor she gave to the Mighty One (*Fortis*) who had given her a son despite her barrenness (9:45), and it also recalls Ezra's admonition that she bear her circumstances 'bravely' (*fortiter*, 10:15). This further specifies what Ezra means by God being 'merciful again' and giving 'rest': the woman is to receive this mercy *as* reversal, life. There is a congruity between her grief-bearing and God's response, a fact that further emphasises God's role as the Benefactor who gives fittingly (God sees [*pervideo*] and gives [*do*] in 9:45). That Ezra expects reversal to be the form that the mother's 'rest' will take is confirmed by her transformation before his eyes and while he speaks.

The numerous indications that Ezra progressively adopts Uriel's two-world eschatological framework and his subsequent interpretation of the necessary congruity and definitive nature of God's judgement reach their climax in Ezra's consolation of the mother. As with Ezra's speech, the transformation of the woman interrupts him, and the nature of the interruption *as a vision of heavenly Zion*, the very reality Uriel has been urging him to contemplate, highlights the importance of his words. Ezra's appeals to both God's justice and mercy *as the reversal of personal, national, and earthly futility* provide the answer to his own puzzlement. Whatever the law vivifies now, though it die, God will return to perfect life in the age to come. This is so because God 's mercy is justice-shaped—fitting. In commending this point of view to the woman, Ezra opens up the possibility of seeing its reality himself.[95]

The most peculiar feature of this whole episode is that Ezra's inability to comprehend what he sees nearly kills him. Fear seizes him, he cries out for Uriel, certain that he is about to die ('my end is made into corruption', 10:28). Uriel finds him lying 'as though dead' (*ut mortuus,* 10:31), raises him up and strengthens him. Ezra's begs: '…do not leave me so that I will not die in vain, since I have seen what I do not know and I hear what I do not know' (10:35). The references to God's *seeing* Ezra bracketing Uriel's interpretation of Zion's history are striking—'he has seen your upright way since without ceasing you have been sad for your people and

[95] Barclay, *Gift*, 302.

mourned for Zion' (10:39) and 'now the Most High, seeing that you are sad in mind and suffer from a whole heart for [Zion], he has shown you the brightness of her glory and the beauty of her grace' (10:50). This produces another paradoxical evaluation of Ezra's moral worth. Just as his inclusion of himself among the damned is the pinnacle of humility and leads to the highest divine praise, his *faithful grief* renders him worthy to see divine reality and 'to be with the Most High as few have' (10:57) despite his corrupt state and relative inability to take in with his ears and eyes the divine building (10:55, 56). In this way, Ezra's journey is a hopeful one for humanity and the people he represents. Despite the corrupted and blinkered human condition, there is a paradoxical path to perfect knowledge and communion with the Most High for the righteous.[96]

Conclusion: Ezra as Exemplary Human and Fitting Witness of Life

In *4 Ezra* the profound grief of the destruction is consecrated in a sophisticated and finely-crafted theological debate over its significance. Ezra's initial reading of text, salvation-history, and world presents an anti-theodicy in the form of a prosecutorial double bind: either God is culpable for the *Unheilsgeschicte* of Israel because he created Adam with a *cor malignum* and refused to take it away (3:1 – 27), or, in favouring his enemies over his people, he is capricious in exercising justice in history (3:28 – 36). Either way, God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction at creation and Sinai is rendered futile by his own death-dealing judgement. Utilising tests of knowledge (4:1 – 6) and power (5:36 – 40) to humble him, the angel Uriel enrolls Ezra on a course of apocalyptic instruction, reframing and, thereby, refuting his denials of the efficacy of God's benefactions. Ezra's first problem is not God but the occlusion of God's *heavenly* way: human incapacity is not moral (*infirmitas*, 3:22) but epistemological, a function of 'one who is corrupt in the corrupt world' trying to understand the 'incorruptible' and God's 'immeasurable way' (4:11). Ezra's second problem is not God's capriciousness but the *infirmitas* of the present *saeculum* (4:27)—a world that is incapable of hosting either God's judgement of the manifold

[96] The visions of episodes five and six do not materially alter the theology developed in the first four episodes, a point confirmed by Ezra's recapitulation of Uriel's two-ages account in the *Abschiedsrede* (14:28 – 36) of episode seven (cf. Brandenburger, *Verborgenheit*, 32, 148 – 53; Harnisch, 'Prophet ', 461 – 64). Thus, our analysis covers only the first four episodes.

fructus impietatis (4:31) or the 'good things' (*bonum*, 4:29) that have been promised to the 'righteous' (*iusti,* 4:27). Likewise, the decline of Israel is due to the fixed, iterative, and entropic history of the judged cosmos, which is headed toward death like a woman's womb, *yet* destined for transformation and renewal because of God's life-giving power (5:20 – 6:34).

Spurred on by Ezra's advocacy for the unworthy, the debate reaches its climax in two alternate accounts of God's life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. Whereas Ezra defines mercy as incongruous and unconditioned, reading Ex 34:6 – 7 from the perspective of God's creation and sustenance of the unworthy (7:132 – 8:14), Uriel reads Moses' command to 'choose life that you may live' (7:129; Dt 30:19) from a theological vision committed to the inviolable *libertas* (8:56; 9:11) of the created self and, thus, entailing God's equitable distribution of judgement and salvation. Ezra's account of the seed metaphor (9:26 – 37) and his consolation of Mother Zion regarding God's just mercy (10:16, 24) show that he has adopted Uriel's account in full. Thus, after commending God's justice-shaped mercy, Ezra sees its revelatory confirmation in the vision of heavenly Zion (10:25 – 28). Paradoxically, it is the grieving yet ultimately faithful sage who proves the possibility of human commitment to God *ex toto corde* (10:50) in the midst of a world dominated by sin and death.

Consequently, though Barclay's analysis of *4 Ezra* establishes the fact that Ezra and Uriel operate with differing definitions of God as gift-giver, a focus on the relation between created and eschatological life is needed to ascertain the deep theological logic of this apocalypse. For Uriel's account of God as a discriminating giver at the eschaton is materially grounded in his earlier insistence on the efficacy of the gift of moral agency and its Torah order at creation. Likewise, this focus on divine life-giving benefaction raised the crucial issue of the development of organic metaphors in *4 Ezra*. In this connection, we demonstrated that, given a careful analysis of the development of the seed metaphor from episode three to episode four, it is not necessary either to construe Ezra's vision as an appeal to mere experience or as an alternative, non-rational solution to a supposed *aporia* in episode three. Rather, the organic metaphor establishes the connection between dying historical Zion and resurrected eschatological Zion, while the account of God as a

one who gives life to dead Zion *qua* the righteous supplies the logic by which the connection holds. Put differently, *4 Ezra's* organic life metaphors posit a necessary relation between the life one lives in history and the results of that life beyond history, while the logic of divine life-giving benefaction provides the theological ground of this relation. For those who order their lives according to the gift of created, Torah-ordered life, they will receive back resurrection life, despite death and decay, as divine gift to the worthy. Thus, for *4 Ezra*, God's good gifts of created life and its Torah-order are not wasted—either individually or nationally—as Ezra argues in episode one. For Ezra himself, a righteous man, has seen through grief to the fruit of the law—a life he has not known, a city he has not visited, and a joy he cannot describe.

Part 2
Galatians in Conversation with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* on God as Life-Giver and Life as Gift

Chapter 3
Living to God: Exemplary Recipients of the Gift of Life in 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Galatians 1 and 2

Part two of this thesis will place Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and *4 Ezra* in conversation on the topic of God as life-giver and life as divine gift. This chapter will query Paul's presentation of himself as a paradigmatic recipient of life in Galatians 1 and 2 from the perspective of the presentations of Eleazar (4 Maccabees) and Ezra (*4 Ezra*) as exemplary recipients of divine life-giving benefaction. In this conversation a formal anthropological divergence is exposed: whereas Paul identifies the singular Christ-gift as the sole source and order of human life, 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* consider as inviolable God's singular gift of the created and Torah-ordered self (and society). Chapter four will moderate a debate between Paul and *4 Ezra* over their readings of scripture and Israel's history, with the dispute over Gal 3 - 4 clarifying the formal differences between their conceptions of divine life-giving activity and grounding these differences in their divergent hermeneutics and theodicies. Chapter five will argue through debate primarily with 4 Maccabees over Gal 5 – 6 that the differing conceptions of divine life-giving and life-ordering in these texts find their material ground in divergent conceptions of the (re)constitution of human agency, which exposes the material and hermeneutical basis of Paul's theological disagreement with his Jewish-Christian opponents and provides the formal shape of his ethics.

The Resurrection, Paul as Paradigm, and the Theology of Galatians

Of the many controversies about Galatians, the centrality of the cross is not one. Paul's focus on the cross became problematic in the wake of Ernst Käsemann's identification of apocalyptic as the origin of Christian theology, with its corresponding focus on the cosmological and eschatological framework of Pauline Theology.[1] Thus, for J. Christian Beker, 'the virtual absence of the resurrection of Christ' is a theological problem in Galatians and for the apocalyptic interpretation of Pauline Theology, because here, in a core Pauline text, a key apocalyptic theme of

[1] E. Käsemann, 'Die Anfänge christlicher Theologie', *ZTK* 57 (1960): 162 – 85; E. Käsemann, 'Zum Thema der urchristlichen Apokalyptik', *ZTK* 59 (1962): 257 – 84.

the gospel is muted.[2] In a seminal essay, J. Louis Martyn granted Beker's assumption that the paucity of references to the resurrection (Gal 1:1) entailed the lack of significance of the resurrection for the theology of the letter, but Martyn transformed this liability into a virtue.[3] Rather than seeing Paul's apparently myopic cruciform vision in Galatians as a problem, Martyn reads Jesus' death on the cross as *the* apocalyptic event. The cross *is* the revelation of the divine invasion of the old cosmos *and* the emergence of the new—thus, the inauguration of the age of humanity's rescue. What is crucial for our purposes is that, despite considerable diversity in interpreting Paul's theology in Galatians, most scholars either assume with Beker and Martyn that Paul's focus on the cross excludes the resurrection and parousia as significant factors or they fail to integrate Paul's explicit resurrection reference and subsequent 'life' language in their accounts of the theology of the letter.[4]

The work of John Barclay is an anomaly in this connection. For him, Paul's paradigmatic autobiography reaches its climax in the account of the reconstitution and reordering of Paul's self in the Christ-gift.[5] Thus, while Martyn and others place the theological accent on the cross,[6] Barclay sees Jesus' resurrection 'presupposed throughout [Galatians] as the source of the "life" (cf. 2:19-20; 3:21; 5:25; 6:8) or "new creation" (6:15) generated by the Christ-event'.[7] Thus, for Barclay, the impact of the

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[2] J.C. Beker, *Paul the Apostle: the Triumph of God in Life and Thought* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989), 58.

[3] J.L. Martyn, 'Apocalyptic Antinomies in Paul's Letter to the Galatians', *NTS* 31 (1985): 410 – 24.

[4] See e.g. B.R. Gaventa, 'The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians', in *Pauline Theology, Vol. 1* (ed. J.M. Bassler; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 157, n. 28: 'Paul's reference to the cross or crucifixion or death of Christ are multivalent …but that multivalence does not mean that cross for Paul includes resurrection.' Cf. M.C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 29; J.D.G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul's Letter to the Galatians* (Cambridge: CUP, 1993), 43.

[5] A spate of studies over the last forty years have displaced the old consensus that reads Galatians 1 and 2 as Paul's apology for his gospel and apostleship arguing rather that Paul tells his story in paradigmatic terms, presenting himself as an example of, in Gaventa's terms, 'the working of the gospel'; B.R. Gaventa, 'Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm', *NovT* 28 (1986): 313; cf. G. Lyons, *Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1985); B. Dodd, *Paul's Paradigmatic 'I': Personal Example as Literary Strategy* (JSNTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999); J.M.G. Barclay, 'Paul's Story: Theology as Testimony', in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment* (ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 133–56. For a defense of Galatians 1 – 2 as *apologia*, see H.D. Betz, 'The Literary Composition and Function of Paul's Letter to the Galatians', *NTS* 21 (1975): 353 – 79; idem, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 14 – 15.

[6] Cf. Barclay's own earlier description of the cross as the locus of 'recreative divine life'; Barclay, 'Paul's Story', 143, n. 28. See now, slightly differently, his contention that the emphasis in Galatians 'signals the disjunction created by the Christ-event'; Barclay, *Gift*, 352–53, 7; cf. 378.

[7] Barclay, *Gift*, 352–53, n. 7.

Christ-event is death *and* resurrection shaped—effecting 'a radical disjunction' from the authority of the Torah in Paul's co-crucifixion with Christ, 'a change of vision and value', and 'a change of "self"' through Christ's resurrection life.[8] Yet, while Barclay insists on the integral relation of Jesus' death and resurrection in Paul's paradigmatic climax, for him, Paul's theological logic is explicable in terms of its character as incongruous gift: 'Because [the Christ-gift] is incongruous, this gift bypasses and subverts preexisting norms; it does not fit any pre-constituted system of value'.[9]

Paul's framing of this death to life movement, however, invites a reconsideration of both its theological logic and the story he tells in Gal 1 – 2 leading up to it. For the new life Paul lives to God is preceded *necessarily* by his death to the law—ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον, ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω (Gal 2:19). It is not that Paul, unlike his opponents knows the proper answer to the question 'What time is it?' or 'In what cosmos do I live?'[10] It is not simply that the Christ-gift has a singular character somehow by definition.[11] It is not even that 'the Torah *no longer* defines what [a life to God] entails' (italics added) *because* the Christ-gift is given without regard to Torah parameters.[12] Paul's opponents, presumably, recognised both the redemptive-historical change and its effects in divine incongruous gift-giving; they just disagreed about the implications of these *for the Torah*. Rather, however one takes διὰ νόμου, Paul's death and life configuration indicates categorically that one cannot live *to the law* and *to God*. The rhetorical punch of Paul's paradoxical statement in Gal 2:19—a faithful Jew is *not* living to God, somehow, *by definition*—and Paul's 'crucifixion' and 'resurrection' shaped explanation of it in Gal 2:20 invite a different analysis of the theological logic at work in Galatians 1 – 2, a reading alert both to the particulars of Paul's narration of the Christ-gift and the logical entailments conveyed in that story as the paradoxical receipt of life from the dead through, in some sense, crucifixion *and* resurrection.

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[8] Ibid., 386.
[9] Ibid., 387.
[10] J.L. Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 23.
[11] Gaventa, 'The Singularity of the Gospel'.
[12] Barclay, *Gift*, 386.

With the recognition of Paul's climactic presentation of himself as the recipient of a life-giving gift, then, our argument will proceed by way of a conversation with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* over the textual terrain of Galatians 1 – 2, focusing on the question of the life-giving significance of the Christ-gift. Given their respective presentations of Eleazar and Ezra as, like Paul, recipients of divine life-giving gifts, a conversation with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* will serve to illumine both the rhetorical force and theological significance of Paul's particular narration of the Christ-gift. We will argue that Paul's bestowal of the blessing of the singular Christ-gift (not the Torah) (Gal 1:1 – 5), his pronouncement of anathemas as an ironic witness to truth (Gal 1:6 – 10), his identification with the Galatians as a recipient of the Christ-gift (1:11 – 24),[13] his account of the recognition under threat of the new social order implied by this gift in Jerusalem (2:1 – 10), and his response to the threat posed to the order of the gift in Antioch/Galatia (2:11 – 21) all lead up to a reading of Gal 2:18 – 20 in which Paul rhetorically and theologically subverts an account of the inviolable integrity of the Torah-ordered self (and society) by presenting the Christ-gift as the singular life-giving and life-ordering gift. Such a gift is necessary, Paul implies, because the created self, and even the Torah-ordered, created self, is not free. Rather, the Christ-gift *alone* effects the 'resurrection' of such a 'dead' self and reordering of 'dead' agents. Thus, Paul does not appeal to but begins to *explain* the unconditioned and incongruous character of the Christ-gift and, thereby, subverts an alternate account of God's life-giving benefaction. By presenting humans—Jew and Gentile alike—as recipients of properly-ordered life only in the Christ-gift, Paul subverts an account of self and society, like those in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, as inviolably Torah-ordered from creation. To be clear, we shall argue that this subversion is formal in Gal 1 – 2, receiving its material grounding in Paul's arguments in the remainder of the letter. Thus, whereas the debates in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* serve to establish both the worth of Ezra and Eleazar as recipients of

[13] Though differing on matters of exegetical detail, the present argument coheres with Barclay and McFarland on the character of the Christ-gift. What is unique is the argument that, in Gal 2:17 – 21, Paul begins an account of the necessarily incongruous and unconditioned character of the Christ-gift in the context of a debate over divine life-giving action, in general, and human agency, in particular. See Barclay, *Gift*, 351 – 87; O. McFarland, '"The One Who Calls in Grace": Paul's Rhetorical and Theological Identification with the Galatians', *HBT* 35 (2013): 151 – 65; idem, *God and Grace in Philo and Paul* (NovTSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2015), 104 – 12.

salvation *and* the Torah-ordered created integrity of the self as the necessary precondition of this worth, Paul presents himself as an unworthy recipient of the death-dealing and self-reordering Christ-gift in order to begin to call into question both the created integrity of the self and the Torah-order of self and society.

Consequently, in this chapter we contribute to research that contends, in Gaventa's terms, that Paul presents himself as a paradigm of 'the working of the gospel', by beginning to clarify the precise senses in which this is the case. Paul's autobiography in Gal 1 – 2 reaches its formal climax in his presentation of himself as the recipient of a new and newly-ordered agency for a new community. Likewise, we begin to go beyond Barclay's research by showing not simply *that* Paul conceives of divine benefaction in the Christ-gift as unconditioned and incongruous but, by focusing on the life-giving and life-ordering aspect of this gift in conversation with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, *how* this conception is implicated in deeper questions about created and eschatological life in relation to the Torah. Specifically, we show that the particular character of Paul's autobiography implies a rejection both of accounts of the enduring efficacy of created agency and of identifications of the Torah with the created order, like those used to present Eleazar and Ezra as exemplary worthy recipients of eschatological grace. In the next two chapters, we argue that this implied rejection of an alternate scheme of divine life-giving benefaction is made explicit in Paul's argument about the shape of salvation-history (Gal 3 – 4), the existence and proper ordering of the self in Christ and the Spirit (Gal 5), and the proper ordering of the church (Gal 6).

3.1 Singular Divine Gifts and Exemplary Recipients (Gal 1:1 – 24)

Paul begins by contrasting the benefits of the Christ-gift with the dire consequences of defecting from it. On the one hand, the event of Jesus' death and resurrection is the source and catalyst of a new dynamic (1:1 – 5): Paul's receipt of apostleship initiates a cycle of divine-human gift exchange that effects blessing in Galatia and elicits praise to God.[14] On the other hand, the Galatians are on the verge of 'deserting the one who called [them] in grace', a rupture in relationship precipitated by their

[14] Debates over the referent of Γαλατία (1:1) are inconclusive but inconsequential for our argument. For a recent review of the issues and evidence, see D.J. Moo, *Galatians* (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), 3–8.

consideration of a different version of the 'good news' (1:6 – 10).[15] Thus, in sharp contrast to his pronouncement of blessing on the Galatians as a group, Paul delivers a double-anathema on anyone, either on earth or in heaven, who preaches 'another gospel'.[16] This startling juxtaposition of 'grace and peace' and double-'anathema' establishes a basic rhetorical and theological tension that runs throughout the rest of the letter, concluding in Paul's pronouncement of grace in 6:18.[17] For our conversation partners, however, it is not the tension itself but its source that raises troubling questions. For in identifying with the Galatians as a recipient of the Christ-gift and narrating the effect of this gift not as a confirmation but a subversion of his commitment to Torah, Paul implies the displacement of the Torah as the singular life-ordering gift.

In this connection, the dialogical exegesis of Gal 1 here serves the overall argument of this chapter by showing how Paul's presentation of Jesus's self-offering as a divine gift for sins, his characterization of this gift as singular, and his characterization of himself as a fellow, unworthy recipient with the Galatians of this gift all raise deep questions in the minds of authors like 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. Specifically, Paul's presentation raises questions about God's gift of created life and the Torah as its divinely given norm, the answers to which themselves have a range of logically related theological implications. It could be, of course, that our conversation partners (or we) are mishearing Paul. So, in the exegesis that follows we will need to determine whether and, if so, how Paul *explicitly* addresses the questions that arise in the dialogical exegesis of this opening section.

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[15] Because Paul gives carefully selected and framed information, it is not possible to determine the precise issues involved in the Galatian crisis. For the consensus reconstruction, arguing that Paul's opponents in Galatia were advocating circumcision (Gal 5:2 – 12; 6:12 – 13) and observance of the Torah (Gal 4:21; 5:3; cf. 4:10; 6:13a), see J.M.G. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 37 – 74.

[16] On the Pauline anathemas in light of the curses on false prophecy in Deuteronomy 13 (LXX), see K.O. Sandnes, *Paul - One of the Prophets?: A Contribution to the Apostle's Self-Understanding* (WUNT II 43; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991), 70 – 73.

[17] The initial ἄνθρωπος/θεός antithesis and his subsequent development of it suggests that Paul's status as a Jewish apostle to Gentiles does not constitute the particular tension of the letter; *contra* Dunn, *Galatians*, 5. For the letter as an explication of the tension between 'amen' (1:5) and 'anathema' (1:8, 9), see Martyn, *Galatians*, 92, 106.

3.1.1 The Christ-Gift and the Cycle of Divine-Human Gift Exchange (1:1 – 5) [18]

From the outset Paul places himself on the divine side of a fundamental divine-human polarity—Παῦλος ἀπόστολος οὐκ ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων οὐδὲ δι᾽ ἀνθρώπου ἀλλὰ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ θεοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ ἐγείραντος αὐτὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν. Thus, with the second word ἀπόστολος and his subsequent specification of Jesus and God as both source and means of this role, Paul presents himself as God's 'authorized envoy',[19] commissioned for a specific work.[20] The initial message Paul and his companions are to deliver is one of blessing[21]—'grace and peace'[22] that flows from not only from the risen Christ but 'from God our Father and the Lord Jesus Christ who gave himself for our sins' (1:3, 4). By reversing the temporal sequence of the Christ-event here, Paul presents this blessing in phenomenological terms: he and his message come from the risen Christ and God, but the precondition of this reality is 'the will of our God and Father' and the resulting self-giving of 'the Lord Jesus Christ'. This careful definition of himself in relation to God and God, in turn, in relation to Jesus (and vice versa) has the effect of locating Paul within the dynamic created by the Christ-event, a dynamic which, as de Boer concludes, is 'integral to the identity and activity of God'.[23] Moreover, the focus of this divine activity, for Paul, is Jesus' self-giving 'for our sins to rescue us from the present evil age' (1:4), a gift that is the precondition for Paul's apostolic announcement of 'grace and peace', the impetus for his solemn ascription of eternal glory to God (1:5), and, as Bryant notes, a 'remarkable amplification' of the typical greeting that 'decidedly shifts the customary salutation's focus *away* from both sender and recipient' onto Christ.[24] Though Paul can use δίδωμι in the more general sense 'to convey' (cf. Gal 4:15), Gal 1:4 is his first use with respect to Jesus' death, an event which he configures as the

[18] For Paul's prescript as polemical preparation for the rebuke of 1:6 – 10 and the themes of the letter, see R. E. Van Voorst, 'Why Is There No Thanksgiving Period in Galatians? An Assessment of an Exegetical Commonplace', *JBL* 129 (2010): 153 – 72.

[19] de Boer, *Galatians*, 21.

[20] The letter is, thus, not merely a personal letter but an 'Auftragsarbeit'; so, L. Doering, *Ancient Jewish Letters and the Beginnings of Christian Epistolography* (WUNT I 298; Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 398.

[21] On the literary form and meaning of this blessing, see J. Lieu, '"Grace to You and Peace": the Apostolic Greeting', *BJRL* 68 (1985): 161 – 78.

[22] Doering, *Letters*, 414: χάρις 'references God's gift' and εἰρήνη 'designates the state constituted by grace, that is, life in wholesome communion'.

[23] de Boer, *Galatians*, 28. On the 'dynamic' character of this gift, see Barclay, *Gift*, 352. Cf. Martyn, *Galatians*, 90.

[24] R.A. Bryant, *The Risen Crucified Christ in Galatians* (SBLDS 185; Atlanta: SBL, 2001), 118.

'gift of God' (2:21). Thus, Paul is the conduit of the Christ-gift, a gift that initiates an ongoing cycle of blessing and praise, for which he praises God and invites the Galatians, if they can, to share in the communal 'Amen'.[25]

Of the numerous places where the authors of *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees might engage, three related points require attention. First, Paul's designation of Jesus as the risen Christ (i.e., a Messiah resurrected within and not at the end of history) and his further identification of him as Lord would be curious to *4 Ezra*. For, in *4 Ezra*, only God is 'Lord', the general resurrection occurs not within but at the end of history, and it would thus be odd for anyone to be an 'apostle…through [a somehow risen] Lord Jesus Christ and God'. Second, though 4 Maccabees' conception of immortality might suggest a different cosmology from Paul's, he would, however, understand this resurrection as following from Jesus' self-giving for sins 'according to the divine will.' For the martyrs themselves receive the lives they offer to God back, perfected as a fitting divine return gift of immortality. Yet, for *4 Ezra*, this focus on Jesus' self-giving for sins as a rescue from the present evil age would suggest two potentially troubling lines of inquiry. This self-giving might fall afoul of Uriel's prohibition on eschatological intercession (*4 Ezra* 7:102 – 115), and the 'us' for whom Jesus gives himself is here undifferentiated, while intercession in *4 Ezra* is of the strong for the weak, the righteous for the unrighteous. We could imagine *4 Ezra* asking, 'What, Paul, does this imply about both Jesus, the self-giver, and the recipients, 'us'—i.e., what is this gift and who precisely *are* we as recipients of it?' Likewise, in asking the latter question, it would likely occur to *4 Ezra* that Paul says nothing here of the law or of its status as the singular divine gift of a 'narrow' way through this evil age (*4 Ezra* 7:6 – 9, 19 – 21) but rather he presents Jesus *alone* as deliverer in his self-gift. Though recognising the faithful death and subsequent vindication pattern, 4 Maccabees would be similarly troubled by Paul's failure to specify Jesus' self-giving as obedience to the 'divine law' (4 Macc 5:16). Thus, the third and final concern: this gift—without mention of the law—coincides with the divine will and, for Paul, elicits eternal praise to God. From the perspective of both *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees, a fundamental worry arises from the outset: does the Christ-gift represent, in some

[25] Van Voorst, 'No Thanksgiving? ', 171: 'His implied meaning can be paraphrased: "Can you bless God with me for providing the death of Jesus Christ as the act that rescues us from the present evil age?"'

respect, an instance of God's singular Torah-ordered gift of created life, are these gifts somehow in competition, or is Paul trying to subordinate Torah-ordered life to the Christ-gift?

3.1.2 The Irony of Paul's Singular Gospel (1:6 – 10)

This worry is not eased but intensified with Paul's about face from 'grace and peace' to double 'anathema' in Gal 1:6 – 10.[26] To be sure, Uriel makes definitive negative statements that, like Paul's, both amount to curses and occur in the context of an appeal to revelation from God.[27] Likewise, Ezra's journey of illumination assumes a similar spatial configuration of his relationship to God to that in Paul's presentation of the Galatians' impending apostasy[28] in v. 6: the Galatians are 'turning [themselves]' (μετατίθεσθε) from God, while, in *4 Ezra*, God shows mercy to the those who 'effect a turn' (*conversionem faciunt*) to his law (7:133), and Ezra himself 'turned' (*conversus sum*) from his puzzlement to Mother Zion (9:39).[29] Yet, Paul's references to 'the one who called you in the grace of Christ' (τοῦ καλέσαντος ὑμᾶς ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ)[30] and his opponents' misrepresentation of 'the good news of Christ' (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ Χριστοῦ) makes no mention of the law,[31] and thus, intensifies, for *4*

[26] Despite the ongoing uncertainty about the flow of Paul's argument, it is generally recognised that v. 10 is transitional, and, since vv. 11 – 13 are each linked by a postpositive γάρ, we treat 1:1 – 10 and 1:11 – 24 as distinct units; cf. Betz, *Galatians*, 44–46; de Boer, *Galatians*, 63–65, 76.

[27] Thus, *4 Ezra* 7:20: 'Let the many at present in fact perish rather than the law of God that is set before them be neglected.' On the cursing function of Paul's anathemas, see K.A. Morland, *The Rhetoric of Curse in Galatians: Paul Confronts Another Gospel* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1995), 63–67, 151–54.

[28] J.H. Schütz, *Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority* (SNTSMS 26; London: CUP, 1975), 117 – 118: 'The defection is not from Paul who preaches, but God who calls.'

[29] See *4 Ezra* 6:26, for the eschatological revelation of those 'human beings who have not tasted death from birth' (*homines qui mortem non gustaverunt a nativitate sua*) and, thus, whose 'heart will be turned into another mind' (*cor…convertetur in sensum alium*). Likewise, in 4 Macc 2:18 the 'wise mind' is capable of 'turning' (δυνατὸς...μεταθεῖναι) the passions. For the steadfast refusal to 'change' one's mind, 4 Maccabees prefers μεταβάλλω (6:18; 6:24; 5:14), while to indicate the refusal to 'change' the regulatory framework of one's life (from Jewish to Greek), he coins μεταδιαιτάω (8:8).

[30] Even if strong external evidence (e.g., 𝔓51, א, A, B, Ψ, 33, 81) does not entirely remove doubt cast on the originality of Χριστοῦ due to its absence from several important manuscripts (𝔓46vid, G, Hvid, ar, b), as de Boer remarks (*Galatians*, 38), 'the immediate context makes it plain that the grace at issue pertains to Christ ('the gospel of Christ' in v. 7)'.

[31] Given the challenges of mirror-reading (see J.M.G. Barclay, 'Mirror-Reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case', *JSNT* 31 (1987): 73 – 93) and the limited and obscure nature of the evidence, it is difficult to say much about the background of 'the ones troubling' the Galatians, beyond the fact that Paul's accusation that they are 'desiring to distort' the good news (1:7) in order to avoid persecution (6:12) indicates that they are Jewish Christians; rightly Barclay, *Gift*, 335, n. 12. *Contra* M.D. Nanos, *The Irony of Galatians: Paul's Letter in First-Century Context* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002), 52–59, 285–316.

Ezra, the issues raised by the prescript. For Paul equates this 'calling…in the grace of Christ' with the good news the Galatians heard about Christ: his anathema is against those who preach 'contrary to what [the Galatians] received' (παρ' ὃ παρελάβετε). The parallel Paul draws suggests that by ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ Paul means not 'in Christ's favour' but 'in Christ's gift'—i.e., the event of their reception of this gift in his preaching.[32] In other words, just as the conent of his message is about a gift, so the message itself is a gift *to be received* (cf., the language of Paul being 'entrusted' with the gospel, Gal 2:7). Even if, however, ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ should be rendered 'through Christ's favour', the expression of that goodwill is his self-offering. Thus, for *4 Ezra*, we have not just another troubling reference to the event of Jesus' self-offering but Jesus is in Gal 1:6 - 10 *the* gift from which one may not turn without becoming accursed. For our conversation partners, Paul's insistence on the singular good news ironically places the Christ-gift in potential competition with their own singular conception of divine life-ordering benefaction in God's gift of Torah. Moreover, the intensity of Paul's argument and our conversation rises in v. 10, as Paul, in framing the story of his own call, brazenly claims the debating high ground.[33] Paul, like Eleazar, insists that *he* is implacably committed to God, but: whereas Eleazar represents the Jews who '[have] been persuaded to become citizens to the divine law' (θείῳ πεπεισμένοι νόμῳ πολιτεύεσθαι, 4 Macc 5:16), Paul, as a 'slave of Christ', recognises not the Torah but a superior divine norm.[34] For our conversation partners, the full effect of Paul's claim that, with these warnings, he is aiming to 'persuade' and 'please' God and not human beings will be felt as his story in vv. 11 – 24 unfolds. For with the word ἔτι, Paul indicates that his people-pleasing days are past, consigned to the time when he, like his opponents, was a champion of the law.[35] With this appeal to the ideological and moral high ground, Paul frames a

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[32] For the classic and still convincing argument for χάρις as event, see Bultmann, *Theologie*, 289–92.

[33] Paul may be anticipating or responding to an accusation here (so, E.D. Burton, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* [ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1921], 30 – 34; P. Esler, *Galatians* [London: Routledge, 1998], 67; de Boer, *Galatians*, 64), but, if so, he flips the accusation on its head both rhetorically and theologically.

[34] Though, as we will see, there are a number of conceptual and verbal parallels with Maccabean texts, our argument about the rhetorical and theological force of Paul's argument in Gal 1:6 – 2:21 does not require dependence on Maccabean tradition. For a cumulative and somewhat uneven case for Pauline dependence on Maccabean tradition in Gal 1 – 2, see Cummins, *Crucified Christ*.

[35] de Boer, *Galatians*, 64.

narrative illustration of the receipt of the good news that begins with an account of himself as an exemplary recipient of the Christ-gift. Thus, our conversation shifts to debate, as Paul's story formally contradicts those of Eleazar and Ezra, his fellow exemplars of the receipt and service of divine revelation. Paul presents himself as a sincere witness to the truth not to buttress the superiority of the Torah as God's ultimate life-ordering norm, as Eleazar and Ezra do, but to set up his qualification of it.

3.1.3 Paul, Eleazar, and Ezra as Exemplars of the Gift: but which One? (1:11 – 24)

Along with his presentation of the Christ-gift, Paul's identification of himself as ἀπόστολος (1:1) suggests another discussion topic for *4 Ezra*. For the idea of being sent from the risen Christ and God (1:1) in itself sounds like an appeal to revelatory experience, a suspicion which Paul confirms in Gal 1:12. Likewise, the apostolic blessing pronounced by Paul (1:3) and the subsequent framing of his calling in prophetic terms (1:3; 1:15) are sufficiently similar to both the message and function of Ezra to suggest overlapping revelatory purposes and roles.[36] Thus, Paul's implied epistemological point in v. 1 is made explicit for *4 Ezra* here in v. 11: the good news has a heavenly and divine not an earthly and human source, and, as such, this good news is definitive. For in denying that he received or was taught the good news παρὰ ἀνθρώπου but rather δι' ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:11, 12; cf. the denial of consultation with 'flesh and blood', 1:17), Paul is depending on a distinction that bears a striking resemblance to that of Uriel in episode one (*4 Ezra* 4:1 – 12). As Ezra's corrupted and limited mind needs angelic instruction and divine revelation to transcend its limitations, Paul needed good news not sourced from ordinary human modes of transmission (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, Gal 1:11)[37] but δι' ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (1:12).[38] Though the revelatory scheme does not require an appeal to special

[36] Ezra is the only one who remains alive 'among the prophets' (*prophetis*, *4 Ezra* 12:42), and he assures the people that 'the Most High' remembers them (12:47).

[37] For this qualitative reading of the phrase, see B.C. Lategan, 'Is Paul Defending his Apostleship in Galatians?: the Function of Galatians 1:11 – 12 and 2:19 – 20 in the Development of Paul's Argument', *NTS* 34 (1988): 419 – 21.

[38] It is not clear whether Paul's denial that he received or was taught the good news by human beings implies that he both received *and* was taught it by the risen Christ. Given Uriel's vital instructional role and Paul's anathema on any opposing ἄγγελος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ in v. 8, *4 Ezra,* at least, would assume as much. What is clear is that Paul is discounting both human (and angelic!) sources

revelation (angelic interference *confirms* the deliverances of pious reason; 4 Macc 4:1 – 14), Eleazar too is presented as a faithful recipient and custodian of the gift of divine wisdom, acclaimed 'O man in harmony with the law and philosopher of divine life!' precisely as the ideal type of one who 'administers the law' (τοιούτους δεῖ εἶναι τοὺς δημιουργοῦντας τὸν νόμον, 4 Macc 7:7, 8). Yet, in his characterization of the immediate effect, the circumstances surrounding its receipt, and the character of his 'calling through the gift', Paul presents himself as an exemplary recipient and custodian of a gift that does not confirm but overturns his commitment to the Torah. Thus, Paul's story raises questions not only about the Torah-order of life but about his understanding of the created integrity of self and society. For, as we have seen in both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, God's gift of the Torah at creation is the means by which individuals and communities resist 'the evil thought' (*4 Ezra* 7:88 – 92) or 'the passions of flesh' (4 Macc 7:18) in order to return the gift of created life to God. If, though, Paul's *commitment* to the Torah leads him to oppose God, this could raise doubts about the status of the Torah as created gift, the sufficiency of the created self (or society) for obedience, or both.

The irony of Paul's insistence that *he* (and not his opponents) is an exemplary 'slave of Christ' emerges most clearly for our debate partners in the immediate and paradoxical effect of the Christ-gift. What stands out, however, is not the paradoxical character of Paul's story *per se*—that 'his former life in Judaism' (ἀναστροφήν ποτε ἐν τῷ Ἰουδαϊσμῷ) had negative consequences—but that this negative experience did not confirm but rather subverted his ultimate commitment to the Torah.[39] 'Judaism', for

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and modes of instruction, not *per se* but in relation to the divine source, which is ultimate and ultimately the risen Jesus Christ; cf. Barclay, *Gift*, 355–56.

[39] Despite recent arguments that Ιουδαῖος and Ἰουδαϊσμός are essentially ethnic and geographic terms and should, thus, be translated 'Judean' and 'Judeanism', respectively (see e.g., S. Mason, *Josephus, Judea, and Christian Origins: Methods and Categories* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2008), 141 – 84; though, cf. D.R. Schwartz, '"Judean" or "Jew"? How Should We Translate ioudaios in Josephus? ', in *Jewish Identity in the Greco-Roman World* (ed. J. Frey, D.R. Schwartz, and S. Gripentrog; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 3 – 28), we retain the translation 'Judaism' here for Ἰουδαϊσμός for three reasons: 1) uses of this rare term in the Maccabean literature (2 Macc 2:21; 8:1; 14:38; 4 Macc 4:26) all relate to the *religious* challenge and disaster attending the adoption by the High Priest Jason of customs delimited with the term Ἑλληνικός (2 Macc 4:10, 15; 6:9; 11:24; 13:2; 4 Macc 8:8), a phenomenon termed Ἑλληνισμός (2 Macc 4:13); 2) Paul's phrase αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις bears clear similarities to phrases deploying the adjective πάτριος that refer to the practice of the Torah as such (see below; cf. 2 Macc 6:1); 3) Paul's self-presentation as one intent only on 'persuading' God (1:10) and subsequent stance *against* the adoption of Jewish norms in the church indicate here that he is dealing with religious norms in general. Relatedly, Matthew Novenson's restriction of Ἰουδαϊσμός to 'political activism' (37) and 'not the

Paul, is both given *and* pursued, and whatever else the term ζηλωτής indicates,[40] it at least implies that a half-hearted pursuit risks a negation of what is given.[41] Ezra and Eleazar agree, but the paradox they experience is different, as commitment to the law is perfected only *in extremis*—in either grief and near insanity-producing puzzlement (Ezra) or brutal torture and untimely death (Eleazar). Yet, for Paul, his existence as someone zealous for Jewish ancestral traditions (περισσοτέρως ζηλωτὴς ὑπάρχων τῶν πατρικῶν παραδόσεων, 1:14) leads him to seek the destruction of the ἐκκλησία θεοῦ (Gal 1:13) and, thus, paradoxically through the revelation of Jesus Christ to a decentering of these norms and a new form of life. By contrast, 4 Maccabees is committed to the view that Eleazar's refusal to 'destroy the ancestral law through [himself]' (δι' ἐμαυτοῦ τὸν πάτριον καταλῦσαι νόμον, 4 Macc 5:33) [42] is *confirmed* both in his receipt of eternal life and in the reversal of the nation's fortunes as fitting return gifts from God (18:3 – 5, 23). Likewise, *4 Ezra* portrays Ezra's receipt of the gift of divine revelation as paradoxical *confirmation* of his commitment—despite the enormity of his grief and puzzlement—to God's Torah-ordered way (*4*

[practice of the] ancestral religion itself' (34) in the Maccabean literature and Galatians is belied both by a reading of 2 Maccabees that does not assume a dichotomy between religious observance and political action, and by 4 Macc 4:26, in which Antiochus tries to compel not a select few radicals but 'each one of the people to renounce Judaism in the tasting of polluted food' (ἕνα ἕκαστον τοῦ ἔθνους ἠνάγκαζεν μιαρῶν ἀπογευομένους τροφῶν ἐξόμνυσθαι τὸν Ιουδαϊσμόν). Nonetheless, see his excellent overview of the debate in M.V. Novenson, 'Paul's Former Occupation in *Ioudaismos*', in *Galatians and Christian Theology: Justification, the Gospel, and Ethics in Paul's Letter* (ed. M.W. Elliott et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 24 – 39. Likewise, though his distinction between two 'political' and 'religious' senses of Ἰουδαϊσμός is anachronistic, Shaye Cohen does argue that 2 Maccabees contains the first 'religious' uses of the terms Ιουδαῖος (6:6; 9:17) and Ἰουδαϊσμός (2:21; 8:1; 14:38); S.J.D. Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties* (HCS 31; Berkeley: UCP, 1999), 90–93, 105–6, 109–10.

[40] Dunn's characterisation of the form of Paul's Jewish life as 'fiercely nationalistic' is speculative; see J.D.G. Dunn, *Jesus Remembered: Vol. 1 of Christianity in the Making* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 262; idem, *New Testament Theology: An Introduction* (Nashville: Abingdon, 2009), 102.

[41] For a recent review of the literature and a similar argument, see D.C. Ortlund, *Zeal Without Knowledge: The Concept of Zeal in Romans 10, Galatians 1, and Philippians 3* (LNTS 472; London: T&T Clark, 2012), 137 – 150.

[42] Paul's language of αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις in Galatians is significantly similar to 'the ancestral custom' in 4 Maccabees (τὸ πατρῖον ἔθος, 4 Macc 18:5). In this regard, *contra* Ortlund, Josephus does not associate αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις with the Pharisees at 'numerous points', but only twice—*Antiquities* 13.297 and 13.408; ibid., 141. Paul is not referring to Pharasaic *'halakoth*', as he makes no such distinction, and the related theme of the 'ancestral custom' in 4 Maccabees demonstrates that Hellenistic Jews could and did identify Torah-observance *per se* with 'ancestral custom'; rightly, Barclay, *Gift*, 358, n. 21. *Contra* Ortlund, *Zeal Without Knowledge*, 143; Dunn, *Galatians*, 60; R.N. Longenecker, *Galatians* (WBC 41; Dallas: Word Books, 1990), 30; R. Schäfer, *Paulus bis zum Apostelkonzil: ein Beitrag zur Einleitung in den Galaterbrief, zur Geschichte der Jesusbewegung und zur Pauluschronologie* (WUNT II 179; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2004), 86 – 87.

Ezra 4:23; 10:50). Though neither *4 Ezra* nor 4 Maccabees would necessarily approve of the violent expression of Paul's zeal (though, cf. *4 Ezra* 12:33 and 4 Macc 4:10), they would not abide the notion that a divine revelation would warrant a setting-aside of the Torah's normative force, even for Gentiles. For, as we argued in the previous chapters, in both texts the Torah is the divinely given norm not just for the life of Israel but for creation as a whole. In this connection, our conversation partners would want to know how αἱ πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις for which Paul was zealous are not simply traditions but also 'the divine law' (*4 Ezra* 7:20; 4 Macc 5:16) and how and why the Christ-gift could warrant setting aside the divine order of life it represents.

Paul's answers to these questions begin to emerge for debate when we recognise the relation between this ironic and paradoxical reversal he narrates and the circumstances surrounding his receipt of the revelation that produces it. God is, in relation to Paul, 'the one who separated me from my mother's womb and called me through his gift' (ὁ ἀφορίσας με ἐκ κοιλίας μητρός μου καὶ καλέσας διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ, 1:15). It is well known that Paul shapes this presentation of the origin of his apostleship here by echoing prophetic call narratives (Jer 1:4 -5; Isa 49:1 – 6), a move which applies Israel's eschatological hopes to Paul's specific ministry.[43] As the story of Ezra shows, however, this framing does not preclude a significant, even revelatory change in Paul's theology and life, a change which might adequately be called a 'conversion'.[44] Yet, unlike either Ezra or Eleazar, Paul's worth as an exemplary steward of revelation is not accounted in Torah-terms. His commitment to Torah neither renders him, like Ezra, 'worthy' (*dignus*, *4 Ezra* 12:9, 36; 13:14) of eschatological revelation nor produces, like Eleazar, acclaim as the ideal administrator of the Torah, one acclaimed 'worthy of the priesthood' (ὦ ἄξιε τῆς ἱερωσύνης, 4 Macc 7:6). Rather, Paul receives revelation as a gift destined for delivery

[43] Sandnes, *Prophets?*, 59–70. Cf. M.S. Harmon, *She Must and Shall Go Free: Paul's Isaianic Gospel in Galatians* (BZNW 168; Göttingen: De Gruyter, 2010), 76–86.

[44] S.J. Chester, *Conversion at Corinth: Perspectives on Conversion in Paul's Theology and the Corinthian Church* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2003), 77: though the Septuagint is the source of Paul's calling language, 'this does not mean that Paul uses the concept in an identical way.' *Contra* Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews*, 10.

from birth—a gift that is unconditioned (taking no account of Paul's zeal) and incongruous (given despite his persecution of the church).[45]

Paul's status as the recipient of such an unconditioned and incongruous gift would confirm for our debate partners that he considers Jesus' self-offering as in some sense either a substitution, analogous to that given by the martyrs for the sin of the nation (4 Macc 6:26 – 30; 17:21), or, in *4 Ezra*'s terms, an intercession for the unrighteous (*4 Ezra* 7:102 – 115). In other words, both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* have categories for divine gifts that go to the unworthy, and would have no trouble recognizing the Christ-gift as such a gift. They would expect further clarification of the precise character and need for such a gift, a topic we will address in the next chapter in relation to the relevant material of Gal 3:10 – 14.

What they would not understand is *how* Paul can present himself as an enemy of God and his church *precisely* in his Torah-zeal for God or *why* God might give a gift, much less a revelation and apostleship, to such a person. For with this presentation of himself as, in their view, a chimera—a 'faithful' enemy of God—and the recipient of a divine gift, Paul implies the irrelevance or unreliability of Torah-reckoned distinctions of worth—whether between the weak/righteous and strong/wicked (*4 Ezra*) or pious/virtuous and impious/vicious (4 Maccabees). In this way he formally contradicts the Torah-criterion of worth defended by our debate partners. Consequently, *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees would raise two significant questions, questions which are foundational for all subsequent debate: 'How, Paul, could your commitment to the Torah lead to an *unworthy* status, and how is it possible that God would give the gift of eschatological revelation to such an unworthy person?'

These questions are interrelated for *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees, grounded in the theological axioms that God gave life at creation as Torah-ordered and, thus, justly judges human beings and nations based on their obedience to this order. Thus, Paul *cannot* be zealous for the Torah and *unworthy*, much less a recipient of divine gifts—that is, unless Torah is not identical to the divine created order and God gives gifts to the unworthy. In this connection, Paul's 'calling' language points in precisely this

[45] Barclay, *Gift*, 357: 'By combining these statements, Paul indicates that it was not "Judaism" that qualified him for the divine call; it was his conduct "in Judaism" that set him directly *against*, not for, God.'

direction in two respects. First, in applying the language of 'calling' and 'gift' to himself and the Galatians, Paul makes explicit what was implicit in the undifferentiated 'us' of Gal 1:4: he includes himself among the sinners who have been delivered by Jesus' self-gift.[46] Paul is called 'through the gift' (διὰ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ, 1:15), while the Galatians are called 'in the grace of Christ' (ἐν χάριτι Χριστοῦ, 1:6), a phrase that mirrors the revelation of God's Son ἐν ἐμοί (1:16).[47] If, as we argued above, Paul is thinking in concrete terms in Gal 1:6, such that God's calling of the Galatians in the gift of Christ occurred *in* Paul's preaching of the good news, then his selection of differing prepositions for these parallel phrase implies a similarly concrete force for his autobiography. The Galatian calling 'in grace' is a calling through Paul's preaching (cf. 3:1 – 5), while his own call is given 'through God's gift', which is to say *personally* in the revelation of Christ, the Gift, himself. Thus, Paul's story, unlike those of both Eleazar and Ezra, is not that of an ideal to be imitated but of a divine action and human response that is repeated.[48] It is the divine bestowal and human receipt of a life-giving gift.

Second and relatedly, Paul's use of the verb καλέω here may evoke the connotation of God's *creative* voice. In other words, God's 'calling' of Paul and the Galatians is a calling into existence.[49] Despite the likelihood that the ultimate *Vorlage* of *4 Ezra* was written in Hebrew, such an understanding might be indicated in Ezra's statement that God has 'called [Israel] first-begotten [and] only-begotten' (*quem vocasti primogenitum unigenitum*, *4 Ezra* 6:58), especially given the concept of God's creative voice in *4 Ezra* 3:4. Though it is impossible to say whether *4 Ezra* would hear the connotation at this point in Paul's argument, we will argue below that both of

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[46] For the integral relation between Paul's paradigmatic conversion and his call, see McFarland, 'One Who Calls'. For the link between Gal 1:6 and 1:15, see Schütz, *Apostolic Authority*, 134; Barclay, 'Paul's Story', 137.

[47] Given his use of καλέω elsewhere in Galatians (5:8, 13; cf. Rom 4:17; 9:7, 12, 24 – 26), in both cases, God is the subject who 'calls'.

[48] *Contra* Lyons, *Pauline Autobiography*, 136. Rightly, Schütz, *Apostolic Authority*, 114–58.

[49] McFarland, 'One Who Calls'. McFarland's argument, building on Chester, *Conversion*, depends on the recognition of Paul's death-and-resurrection-shaped paradigmatic 'I' in Gal 2:18 – 20, and is, thus, retrospective. For a convincing argument for this connotation of the verb in Romans 9, see B.R. Gaventa, 'On the Calling-into-Being of Israel: Romans 9:6 – 29', in *Between Gospel and Election: Explorations in the Interpretation of Romans 9 – 11* (ed. F. Wilk and J.R. Wagner; WUNT I 257; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 255–69. Cf. S.J. Gathercole, *Where is Boasting?: Early Jewish Soteriology and Paul's Response in Romans 1 – 5* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 243: on Rom 4:3, 'God's declaration of Abraham as righteous was not a descriptive word (*pace* 1 Maccabees) but the creative word of the God who calls "nonentities" into being as "entities".'

our debate partners would raise the issue of the meaning of Paul's life and death language at Gal 2:19 – 21 in creative terms. And, if we should hear a creative connotation in Paul's use of καλέω, then the life-giving character of the Christ-gift contains a basic theological challenge.[50] For this construal of the Christ-event as creative gift provides a significant point of contact and debate as a rival account of God's definitive *creative* activity. For, in both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, individual and social life is inviolably given at the creation of humanity as Torah-ordered. Moreover, this commitment is axiomatic, securing the integrity of human agency for the proper ordering of self and society in view of the consistent operations of divine justice. Thus, if Paul is construing the Christ-gift not just in life-giving and life-ordering terms but in specifically *creative* terms, we should be open to the possibility that the integrity of the self and society emerge as topics of debate over the course of Galatians. In other words, Paul's formal collapse here of the operative anthropological distinctions of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* inevitably raises deeper questions for them about human agency, community order, and eschatological order. That is, Paul's story of the exemplary reversal of a Torah-ordered and unworthy life challenges at multiple theological levels the sort of ultimate commitment to Torah demonstrated in the stories of the martyrs and Ezra's revelatory journey.[51]

If Paul's understanding of his story as initiated by the receipt of the unconditioned, incongruous, and creative Christ-gift raises the possibility of a number of significant theological departures from 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, it also separates him from his Jewish-Christian opponents in Galatia. This is evident from Paul's emphasis on what he did not do upon receiving the Christ-gift— he 'neither

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[50] Paul's story is not about a change in direction but a transition from one status to another. Rightly, Schütz, *Apostolic Authority*, 134.

[51] In so far as the Christ-gift represents an alternative life-ordering norm to that of the Torah, as in *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees, the subordination of the latter to the former is, on *their* terms, a repudiation of Judaism *per se* and, thus, either an apostasy or conversion. Rightly, A.F. Segal, *Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee* (New Haven: YUP, 1990); D. Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley: UCP, 1994); *contra* Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews*, 7–23; Dunn, *Galatians*, 3. One cannot assume that Paul's identity as a Jew precludes the end of his commitment to the Torah as definitive norm; rightly Barclay, *Gift*, 359 – 60, n. 26; *contra* e.g. C.E. Johnson Hodge, *If Sons, then Heirs: a Study of Kinship and Ethnicity in the Letters of Paul* (New York: OUP, 2007); P. Eisenbaum, *Paul Was Not a Christian: The Original Message of a Misunderstood Apostle* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009); M.D. Nanos, 'Paul and Judaism: Why not Paul's Judaism? ', in *Paul Unbound: Other Perspectives on the Apostle* (ed. M.D. Given; Hendrickson Publishers, 2010), 117 – 60.

immediately consulted with flesh and blood, nor did [he] go into Jerusalem to those who were apostles before [him]'. Rather, he went into Arabia and then on to Damascus, visiting Peter and James only three years later (1:17 – 19). In other words, Paul's gospel is not κατὰ ἄνθρωπον in that it was not subjected to the immediate scrutiny or oversight of those in Jerusalem after he received it. It seems that Paul assumes that he is being attacked at this point by his opponents, as he has to deny before God that he is lying (1:20). In any case, he stresses the immediate result of this reversal: the Judean churches who did not know him in person (τῷ προσώπῳ) hear that he is 'preaching the faith he once tried to destroy' and end up praising God 'in him'. Thus, like the Christ-gift itself, Paul's apostleship becomes an opportunity for returning praise to God (1:24).

In summary, the dialogical exegesis of Gal 1 has raised a number of theological questions, some of which Paul is beginning to resolve. As we have seen, by characterizing both the Galatians and himself as objects of God's call and recipients of his benefaction in Christ, Paul presents himself as a zealous Jew who, nonetheless, *needs* Jesus' self-offering. Unlike Ezra, his identification with sinners is not for the sake of intercession, but is rather in earnest—as one who needs the intercessory or substitutionary gift of another. If, however, Paul is not a paradoxical exemplar of the worthy like Ezra but rather paradoxically zealous *and* unworthy, this raises the question, for 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, of the enduring efficacy of the divine donation of life and its Torah order at creation. It may be that Paul's very use of καλέω betrays an awareness of this implication, with him viewing God's calling as a calling into existence. Be that as it may, for the purposes of the present chapter, the preceding dialogical exegesis shows how Paul's characterization of the Christ-gift and its recipients might go beyond a mere recognition of either the gift's singularity or its unconditioned and incongruous character to an analysis of *why*, paradoxically, Paul himself is an exemplar of one who *needs* such a gift despite living in receipt of the Torah. As we shall see in the next section, the remainder of Paul's autobiography raises similarly deep theological questions in the realms of social order and moral agency, questions which both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* answer ultimately with conceptions of life as divine, Torah-ordered gift from creation.

3.2 Recognising the Christ-Gift, Debating Divine Life-Giving Benefaction (Gal 2:1 – 21)

After the second mention of glorifying God (1:24; cf. 1:5) and another claim to receiving a revelation (2:2), Paul jumps forward in his story to his second visit to Jerusalem (2:1 – 10).[52] Within Paul's story running from 1:11 – 2:21, we can clearly distinguish between his account of the Jerusalem agreement (2:1 – 10) and the Antioch incident (2:11 – 14), but it is notoriously difficult to determine just where Paul shifts from rebuking Peter to addressing the Galatians (2:15 – 21). This ambiguity invites us to read Paul's account of the Antioch incident and his apparent summary response to the Galatian crisis together.[53] Yet, there are also good reasons to read the Antioch incident itself in light of Paul's account of the Jerusalem agreement. In addition to the repetition of the phrase 'the truth of the gospel' (2:5, 14), Paul uses the verb ὁράω (2:7, 14) to establish the connection between perception, evaluation, and action in relation to the gift (2:9, 21) in both Jerusalem and Antioch.[54] By narrating the proper recognition and reception of the gift in Jerusalem, Paul provides a strong contrast to the situation in Antioch and thus Galatia.[55]

For 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, Paul's characterization of events in Jerusalem confirms their suspicions: this man is witness of a world turned upside down, a world where a Greek man, without being circumcised and thus committed to the law, can be deemed free and worthy of intimate friendship by *Jews* in God's

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[52] Paul goes to Jerusalem for the second time in Galatians, that is; given that the issue is circumcision, Paul most likely refers here to the Jerusalem Council (cf. Acts 15:1 – 29); see J.B. Lightfoot, *Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians* (10th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1890), 123–28; M. Silva, *Interpreting Galatians: Explorations in Exegetical Method* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 132–36; de Boer, *Galatians*, 107. It is unlikely that Paul has reversed the chronological sequence of events (*pace* G. Lüdemann, *Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 75 – 77), as the intensity of Paul's rebuke at Antioch makes better sense if the Jerusalem agreement is already in place; so, J. Murphy-O'Connor, *Paul: A Critical Life* (Oxford: OUP, 1996), 132.

[53] Dunn, *Theology of Galatians*, 73: 'Galatians is what [Paul] should have said to Peter at Antioch had time and sufficient reflection allowed it.'

[54] F. Vouga, *An die Galater* (HNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck), 48.

[55] Whatever the political realities in Jerusalem, Paul does not present the events there as a bilateral agreement but a mutual recognition of God's gift-giving activity, which forms the basis of unconditioned fellowship. That is, it is clear that the treatment of Titus and the fellowship extended to his team is crucial for Paul (rightly, S.J. Gathercole, 'The Petrine and Pauline *Sola Fide* in Galatians 2', in *Lutherische und neue Paulusperspektive: Beiträge zu einem Schlüsselproblem der gegenwärtigen exegetischen Diskussion* (ed. M. Bachmann; WUNT I 182; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 314 – 15), but not because it is entailed by the agreement but by the gift (*pace* R. Bauckham, 'James, Peter and the Gentiles', in *The Missions of James, Peter, and Paul: Tensions in Early Christianity* (ed. B. Chilton and C.A. Evans; NovTSup 115; Brill, 2005), 122).

assembly.[56] Thus, the actions of Peter and his fellow Jewish Christians in Antioch look like a return to sanity: by insisting on Jewish norms of commensality in their meals with Gentiles, Peter and his fellow Jews are apparently repenting of their brazen disregard of the divine Torah-order of social relations.[57] Paul, of course, takes the opposite view. Moreover, by narrating the recognition (Jerusalem) and denial (Antioch) of the Christ-gift in the social sphere in rhetorically charged terms, Paul both completes the setup of his argument for and launches our debate about its life-giving and life-ordering significance. For by asserting that the proper social recognition of the Christ-gift precludes the Torah as the proper order of the church, Paul makes it clear that receipt of the Christ-gift outside of Torah conditions entails the ordering of social life unrestrained by those conditions. Thus, the Torah neither orders the exemplary self nor the ideal social order, for Paul—a position which demands, for 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra,* both explanation and justification.

Consequently, this section will produce two important results for the argument of this chapter. First, it shows how Paul's application of the rhetoric of tyranny, slavery, and compulsion to the observance of Torah in Jerusalem and Antioch entails a structural theological problem with Torah-ordered social life. Second, it shows how Paul's paradigmatic refusal to submit to Torah norms in the church is grounded, formally, in a deeper conception of the structural disorder of his life in the Torah and the reconstitution and reordering of his self in the Christ-gift. Thus, with respect to research both on Paul's paradigmatic autobiography and grace in Galatians, we show how a consideration of the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering accounts for the deep theological connection between the social implications and individual significance of Paul's gospel in Gal 1 – 2. It is neither

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[56] Though it is not the case that every Jew considered Gentile conversion via circumcision possible (on eighth day circumcision, see M. Thiessen, *Contesting Conversion: Genealogy, Circumcision, and Identity in Ancient Judaism and Christianity* [Oxford: OUP, 2011]), Paul did. Thiessen's reading of οἱ περιτεμνόμενοι αὐτοί in Gal 6:13 as a 'reflexive middle' and thus referring to Judaising Gentiles depends, as we will argue in a subsequent chapter, on a misunderstanding of the force of Gal 5:2 – 12 and an unwarranted distancing of this phrase from ἡ περιτομή and οἱ ἐκ τῆς περιτομῆς in Gal 2:7 – 9, 12. The participial phrase in 6:13, with most commentators, should be taken as passive and thus referring to Jewish Christians; *contra* M. Thiessen, *Paul and the Gentile Problem* (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 95 – 96; cf. G. Howard, *Paul: Crisis in Galatia: A Study in Early Christian Theology* (2nd ed.; SNTSMS 35; Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 17 – 19.

[57] Bauckham ('James, Peter and the Gentiles') argues that the concern was moral impurity arising from intimate association. On this relation between ritual and moral impurity, see *Jub.* 22:16; *Let. Aris.* 142; Acts 10:28.

simply that the Christ-gift is singular, admitting no additions by definition, nor is it the mere fact of the unconditioned and incongruous manner of the donation of the Christ-gift that accounts for Paul's formal theological logic. Rather, Paul considers himself an exemplar of the working of the gospel as one who *needs* and has received a comprehensively new life—a new and newly-ordered agency for a new and newly-ordered community. With this result, we also prepare for an account in the next two chapters of how Paul's formal picture of himself as an unworthy recipient of divine life-giving benefaction in the Christ-gift is grounded in his material argument from salvation-history (Gal 3 – 4) and his inchoate theory of the self (Gal 5 – 6).

3.2.1 The Community Ordering Gift: Circulated in Jerusalem, Disrupted in Antioch (2:1 – 14)

With a clear structural break occurring only at Gal 3:1, Paul frames, in effect, both his accounts of Jerusalem and Antioch in Gal 2:2: though by a miracle (ἀποκάλυψις)[58] Paul's nightmare (the possibility of his work coming to nothing) was averted in Jerusalem, it became a reality in Antioch (and is materialising in Galatia).[59] In both stories Paul is troubled by the potential imposition of Jewish social norms on Gentile converts and, thus, the church as a whole: whereas his Greek companion Titus was not circumcised in Jerusalem (2:3), Peter did withdraw from eating with Gentiles in Antioch (2:12).[60] Paul is not concerned in either case with

[58] That Paul connects his trip to Jerusalem κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν and the subsequent activity there (ἀνεθέμην αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ κηρύσσω ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν) with καί and not ἵνα, suggests that he means not 'for the purpose of a revelation' but 'as the result of a revelation', *contra* de Boer, *Galatians*, 108–9. So, NRSV and NIV: 'in response to a revelation'.

[59] Barclay, *Gift*, 366: 'The Antioch dispute is important for Paul not merely as a historical datum, but because it allows him to explicate the 'good news' in precisely these terms [i.e., the terms of Gal 2:14 – 21].'

[60] de Boer (*Galatians*, 138) rightly recognises that the theme of compulsion creates parallels between Paul's opponents in Jerusalem, Antioch, and Galatia, though his argument that this necessitates circumcision as the goal of the separation in Antioch is unpersuasive. Though it was not customary for Jews to refrain from all social contact with Gentiles (see M. Bockmuehl, *Jewish Law in Gentile Churches: Halakhah and the Beginning of Christian Public Ethics* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 57 – 61), it is clear that Paul considered Peter's previous table fellowship to be 'living not like a Jew' (οὐχὶ Ἰουδαϊκῶς ζῇς, 2:14), and the imperfect active συνήσθιεν suggests that eating with Gentiles in a fashion that contravened Jewish norms was Peter's regular activity; cf. Martyn, *Galatians*, 232; *contra* J.D.G. Dunn, 'The New Perspective on Paul', *BJRL* 65 (1983): 121 – 22.

Jewish 'national imperialism'[61] or the supposed category mistake inherent in the idea that a Gentile *could* become a Jew through circumcision,[62] much less in Antioch, with the precise table-fellowship arrangements before Peter's withdrawal, [63] the status of Gentiles at these shared meals,[64] or the observance of an emergency measure that allows Jewish 'teachers' to associate intimately with Gentiles.[65] He is focused on the proper recognition and thus social circulation of the Christ-gift. This concern is signaled by the circular movement of 'gift' Paul traces in Jerusalem: the recognition of 'the divine gift given to [Paul]' (τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι) by God[66] elicits from the pillars a fitting return (again, δίδωμι) of κοινωνία (2:9) *and* a request for ongoing relationship in the form of poverty relief in Jerusalem (2:10). Thus, whereas those in Jerusalem resisted Jewish social pressure (2:3, 4), recognised the divine 'gift' of Paul's apostleship (2:7, 9),[67] and initiated a reciprocal relationship with Paul and his team (2:9, 10), Paul observed the disruption of fellowship in Peter's imposition of Jewish table-norms in Antioch and rebuked him for the failure to live according to the good news (2:11 – 14). If we take these two stories with Paul's own testimony of reversal, the implication is clear: Paul's (and the Galatians') exemplary receipt of the Christ-gift as an unconditioned and incongruous gift entails the ordering of the social group created by that gift on the same terms. In other words, Paul's metaphor about 'walking in line with the truth of the gospel' (2:14) is a context-appropriate way of spelling-out the sort of social return to which the Christ-gift obligates

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[61] Dunn's term (*Galatians*, 267) for the problem identified in Gal 5:2 – 6, but equally applicable here.

[62] Thiessen, *Gentile Problem*, 78–82.

[63] For debates over reconstructions of the precise arrangements of table fellowship in Antioch, see J.D.G. Dunn, *Jesus, Paul, and the Law: Studies in Mark and Galatians* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1990), 156, 158, 179; M.D. Nanos, 'What Was at Stake in Peter's "Eating with Gentiles" at Antioch?', in *The Galatians Debate: Contemporary Issues in Rhetorical and Historical Interpretation* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2002), 282–318; M. Zetterholm, *The Formation of Christianity in Antioch: A Social-Scientific Approach to the Separation between Judaism and Christianity* (London: Routledge, 2003), 129 – 166.

[64] Nanos, 'What Was at Stake? ', 300 – 11.

[65] Johnson Hodge, *If Sons, Heirs*, 58, 123–25.

[66] That is, his apostleship: they saw that '[Paul] had been entrusted with the gospel of the foreskin' (πεπίστευμαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας , 2:7).

[67] On the syntax of Gal 2:7 – 9a and originality of 2:7b – 8, see de Boer, *Galatians*, 119–21. The aside of 2:7b – 8 manages both to acknowledge Peter's mission to 'the circumcised' and, essential for Paul's purposes, subordinate that mission to 'the One working' (ὁ ἐνεργήσας) in both missions. That 'the good news of the foreskin' (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας) could be and was recognised by 'the pillars' precisely as divine gift (2:9) is, for Paul, a rather shocking subversion of his opponents' position. Barclay (*Gift*, 363, n. 32) deems it 'the Galatian equivalent to "the justification of the ungodly" (Rom 4:5)'.

recipients. And, the return gift of κοινωνία to Paul in Jerusalem *outside*—indeed, despite pressure to observe—Torah-confines, for Paul, proves that those in Jerusalem *know this*.

4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* would expect this integral relation between exemplary reception of the Christ-gift and the social order it entails: both Eleazar and Ezra are, as exemplary individuals, microcosms of the ideal social order. What is odd is not the relation between the ordered self and the ordered social group but that the Christ-gift *necessarily* requires indifference to Torah norms in both spheres: a proper recognition of the gift requires that the fellowship extended must flow without insistence on circumcision for Paul's Greek team-member, Titus, while Peter, in imposing Jewish food norms, must be rebuked for not walking according to the truth of the gospel. What 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* would not have expected is that the incongruous and unconditioned Christ-gift would produce a necessary indifference to Torah-norms rather than repentance and conformity to them.

For our conversation partners, the rhetoric Paul deploys to characterise himself, his opponents, and the imposition of Jewish social norms suggests a reason for the Christ-gift's necessarily unconditioned social circulation. For in deploying the language of tyranny, slavery, and freedom, Paul implies a structural problem with Torah-ordered social life. It is not simply that Torah norms are a matter of indifference, but insistence on them amounts to tyrannical enslavement. The 'false brothers' in Jerusalem seek to 'compel' (ἠναγκάσθη, 2:3) Titus to be circumcised, Peter's withdrawal from table-fellowship amounts to '[his] compelling' (ἀναγκάζεις) the Gentiles to act like Jews (ἰουδαΐζειν, 2:14).[68] Though Barnabas and his fellow Jewish Christians are 'carried away' (συναπήχθη, 2:13) by Peter's example in Antioch, earlier Paul and Titus (and, by implication, Barnabas) did not 'withdraw in submission [to the false brothers] even for an hour' (οἷς οὐδὲ πρὸς ὥραν εἴξαμεν τῇ ὑποταγῇ, 2:5). To do so would have meant that the plans of the false brothers to observe 'the freedom *we* have in Christ Jesus, in order to enslave us' (τὴν ἐλευθερίαν

[68] Again, irrespective of Paul's rhetorical intentions, theologically speaking, Cummins' comments are apposite (*Crucified Christ*, 94 – 95): 'In essence, Paul is recasting his former self and his current Jewish-(Christian) detractors as akin to those Jewish apostates who aligned themselves with Antiochus IV Epiphanes and his cause', and thus, in essence 'the Galatian scenario may be seen as a remarkable inversion of the Maccabean crisis'.

ἡμῶν ἣν ἔχομεν ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἵνα ἡμᾶς καταδουλώσουσιν, 2:4) would have succeeded. Moreover, this inclusive 'we', along with Paul's biography of reversal, suggests that circumcision represents a state of enslavement from which the Christ-event frees the Jews *themselves* and, thus, into which Gentiles need not enter.[69]

This rhetoric would be theologically provocative for our conversation partners. For, in *4 Ezra*, the zone of *libertas* established by God for humans at creation is precisely *for* obedience to the law (*4 Ezra* 9:11) and, in 4 Maccabees, the inviolable commitment of the martyrs to Jewish food laws proves that only the Jews are really free (4 Macc 9:18). Paul's characterisation of Jewish norms as somehow structurally enslaving would, thus, raise the question of the created integrity of the Torah-ordered self. Moreover, Paul's identification of circumcision with slavery and the observation of Jewish food laws as tyrannical oppression is, likewise, a complete inversion of the witness of the martyrs, who resist tyranny and fear and shun hypocrisy out of fidelity to Torah (specifically food laws): Eleazar says the Jews recognise no 'compulsion' (ἀνάγκη) greater than immediate obedience to 'the divine law' and, therefore, '[they] do not consider it worthy to transgress the law in any manner' (κατ᾽ οὐδένα τρόπον παρανομεῖν ἀξιοῦμεν, 4 Macc 5:16, 17). Paul's portrait of Peter in this connection is, however, like a grotesque image of Eleazar seen in a fun house mirror: whereas Eleazar is tempted by fear 'to play a hypocritical part' (δρᾶμα ὑποκρίνασθαι, 4 Macc 5:17) in eating pork and thereby 'become an example of impiety for the young' (γενοίμεθα τοῖς νέοις ἀσεβείας τύπος, 4 Macc 6:19) in pretending to eat the pork, Paul accuses Peter of *actually* being an exemplar of hypocrisy *by* removing himself from the table-fellowship of Gentiles as a result of 'certain men from James' (τινας ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου) arriving and thereby placing him in a state of 'fear of those of the circumcision' (φοβούμενος τοὺς ἐκ περιτομῆς, Gal 2:12).[70]

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[69] de Boer, *Galatians*, 114.

[70] Given Paul's characteristic use of ἐκ to define a group or class (N. Turner, *Syntax,* [vol. *3* of *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*; ed. J.H. Moulton; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1963], 260) and the fact that περιτομή refers to the act of circumcision, ἐκ περιτομῆς should be translated 'those of the circumcision'; rightly, Burton, *Galatians*, 108; F. Watson, *Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: Beyond the New Perspective* (rev. and exp. ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 106 – 07. It is unclear whether those 'from James' and those 'of the circumcision' are the same group.

Paul takes no account of 'those who seem to be pillars' (οἱ δοκοῦντες στῦλοι εἶναι, 2:9),[71] and, in fact, he rebukes one 'to his face' (κατὰ πρόσωπον αὐτῷ, 2:11), because 'God does not regard the face of a human being' (πρόσωπον θεὸς ἀνθρώπου οὐ λαμβάνει, 2:6).[72] What matters in Paul's view is not *who* someone is but *how* he aligns with who God is and what he is doing.[73] Moreover, in his autobiography of reversal and accounts of events in Jerusalem and Antioch, Paul has made it clear that his exemplary reception of the unconditioned and incongruous Christ-gift entails a social order that is necessarily indifferent to the Torah's social norms. Thus, for our conversation partners, Paul has formally denied the Torah as the divine order of the created self and society. The question now is how he can and why he must do this.

3.2.2 Constructing an Antithesis, Debating Divine Order and Evaluation (2:15, 16)

The question Paul poses to Peter in Galatians 2:14 represents the rhetorical climax of the story he has been telling since 1:11: how can a Jew who has played fast and loose with the Jewish norms of commensality *now* compel the Gentiles to live like Jews?[74] This rhetorical climax, however, invites a series of deeper theological questions. Paul begins his explicitly theological gambit by playing on a commonly held Jewish belief that he shares with Peter: 'We are Jews by birth and not from among the Gentile sinners.'[75] It was precisely Ezra's thirty years lived among 'many

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[71] On the breakdown in syntax at 2:6 as Paul interrupting himself to 'relativize the pillar apostles', see de Boer, *Galatians*, 117. Cf. Burton, *Galatians*, 87.

[72] Paul is not concerned with being personally 'acknowledged by Jerusalem' but rather that the divine action and evaluation in extending the Christ-gift to and through him be acknowledged; *contra* B. Holmberg, *Paul and Power: The Structure of Authority in the Primitive Church as Reflected in the Pauline Epistles* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 15. Neither is Paul 'ready to acknowledge the authority of the Jerusalem leadership to pronounce on issues related to the gospel and its proclamation among Gentiles'; *contra* Dunn, *Galatians*, 4.

[73] Schütz, *Apostolic Authority*, 142: 'For him…their position depends on their submission to the truth of the gospel and nothing else.'

[74] There can be no question of two distinct churches—Jew and Gentile—for either side; rightly, de Boer, *Galatians*, 136. This does not, however, entail that Peter is actively putting pressure on Gentiles to convert (cf. Josephus *Ant.* 13.257 – 58 and 1 Macc 2:46), requiring a conative force for ἀναγκάζεις (*contra* Dunn, *Galatians*, 129). For Paul's language of hypocrisy suggests *inconsistency* in thought and practice. It is Peter's status and behaviour itself that does the compelling; so F. Mussner, *Der Galaterbrief* (2nd ed.; HTKNT 9; Freiburg: Herder, 1974), 145.

[75] Though the punctuation of vv. 15 – 16 is uncertain, depending on whether δέ should be read at the beginning of v. 16, the meaning in either case is the same, as the verses share the same subject. The point is that *even* the Jews seek justification in Christ. Though, since the 'polemical setting' does tell against the idea that Paul here refers to 'ready-to-hand agreement' (R.B. Matlock, 'The Rhetoric of Pistis in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 3.22, Romans 3.22, and Philippians 3.9', *JSNT* 30 (2007): 199, n. 26), we

sinners' (*delinquentes multos*) and 'impious deeds without number' (*impietates quorum non est numerus*) of the Gentiles that led to his failure of heart, doubts about God's justice, and indictment of God (*4 Ezra* 3:29, 30). Likewise, for 4 Maccabees, Gentiles are by definition vicious because wisdom just is instruction in the law (4 Macc 1:15, 6; cf. Onias' scruples in interceding for the would-be temple robber Apollonius, 4:13). So, when Paul asks whether 'Christ is a servant of sin' (ἆρα Χριστὸς ἁμαρτίας διάκονος) if those 'seeking justification in Christ are also found to be sinners' by fraternising with Gentiles (ζητοῦντες δικαιωθῆναι ἐν Χριστῷ εὑρέθημεν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἁμαρτωλοί, 2:17) both Ezra and Eleazar would answer with an emphatic 'yes'. For Paul this equally emphatically (μὴ γένοιτο) cannot be the case, but why?[76]

The answer is implicit in something else that Paul and his fellow Jewish Christians know—viz., 'that no human being is justified by the works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ' (ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, 2:16a).[77] In other words, at one level, as Paul illustrated in his conversion and the reception he and Titus received in Jerusalem, his fellow Jewish Christians recognised the divine evaluation in the divine act. Those who receive the Christ-gift offered in the good news, whether Jew or Gentile, are considered righteous by God and thus worthy of fellowship without Torah-constraints. Consistent with what we have argued above, both the context of Paul's story extending from 1:11 through to 2:14 – 16 and the comparison with 4 Maccabees suggest that ἔργα νόμου refers here not simply to the boundary-marking function of Torah norms but rather to their status as constitutive expressions of the order of Jewish life.[78] Thus, the phrase ἔργα νόμου only further specifies the Torah as the norm

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are inclined to see a shift toward Paul's own framing of the Galatian crisis in v. 15. In either case, Scott is correct: Paul 'lays the situation in Antioch alongside the situation in Galatia, to see the crises as parallel and the true solution as the same in both cases'; I.W. Scott, *Implicit Epistemology in the Letters of Paul: Story, Experience and the Spirit* (WUNT II 205; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 180.

[76] The Pauline μὴ γένοιτο indicates that v. 17 is a question, and thus ἆρα not ἄρα is the original reading; so de Boer, *Galatians*, 141.

[77] For a convincing argument that an adversative sense of ἐὰν μή is possible in Greek literature in antiquity and required in Galatians 2:16, see D. Hunn, 'Ἐὰν μή in Galatians 2:16: A Look at Greek Literature', *NovT* 49 (2007): 281 – 90. Likewise, Matlock, 'Rhetoric ', 197 – 8, n. 25. *Contra* Dunn, *Jesus, Paul, and the Law*, 195 – 98; M.C. de Boer, 'Paul's Use and Interpretation of a Justification Tradition in Galatians 2.15 – 21', *JSNT* 28 (2005): 189 – 216; A.A. Das, 'Another Look at ἐὰν μή in Galatians 2:16', *JBL* 119 (2000): 529 – 39.

[78] On ἔργα νόμου as boundary markers, see, e.g., J.D.G. Dunn, 'Works of the Law and the Curse of the Law (Galatians 3:10 – 14) ', *NTS* 31 (1985): 523 – 42; idem, 'Yet Once More—"the Works of the

of the life Paul both renders indifferent in his biography of reversal and presents as subordinated to the life normed by 'the truth of the gospel' in his accounts of Jerusalem and Antioch.[79] Like Eleazar, Paul considers these ἔργα νόμου a package deal: circumcision entails obedience to the entirety of the law (Gal 5:3), and Eleazar considers the food laws to be inviolable (4 Macc 5:17). The difference is that Paul subordinates the 'works of the law' to a life characterised by 'faith in Christ' (see below) as the sort of life God considers 'righteous', and so he considers Peter's imposition of Jewish norms in Antioch to put him in a 'condemned state' before God (2:11).[80]

Though neither 4 Maccabees nor *4 Ezra* would recognise initially the norm by which Paul could make such a judgement, the theological force of the judgement itself would be clear. Like Paul, our debate partners see divine evaluations in divine acts: in 4 Maccabees it is the operations of 'the Divine Justice' (ἡ θεία δίκη, 4 Macc 4:13, 21; 8:22; 9:8–9, 32; 18:22) that vindicate the Torah-order in acts of judgement, while, in *4 Ezra*, Ezra's apocalyptic instruction is aimed precisely at enabling him to see through the contradictions of history to the perfect revelation of Torah-shaped justice beyond history—specifically, in the salvation of those who are 'righteous' (*justi*, *4 Ezra* 8:33; 9:13) in Torah-terms. Thus, given Paul's terminology for 'sin' and 'righteousness' in the context (2:15, 17, 21) and his ongoing focus on recognising the

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Law": a Response," *JSNT* 46 (1992): 99 – 117; idem, 'Noch einmal "Works of the Law": the Dialogue Continues', in *Fair Play: Diversity and Conflicts in Early Christianity. FS H. Räisänen* (ed. I. Dunderberg et al; Leiden: Brill, 2002), 273 – 90. For critique of Dunn's view, see F. Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith* (2nd ed.; London: T&T Clark, 2015), 307 – 08, n. 40; R.B. Matlock, 'Sins of the Flesh and Suspicious Minds: Dunn's New Theology of Paul', *JSNT* 72 (1998): 67 – 90. For a full bibliography generally related to the New Perspective on this issue, see M. Bachmann, 'Keil oder Mikroskop? Zur jüngeren Diskussion um den Ausdruck "Werke des Gesetzes"', in *Von Paulus Zur Apokalypse - und Weiter: exegetische und rezeptionsgeschichtliche Studien zum Neuen Testament* (NTOA/SUNT 91; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 100 – 101, n. 5.

[79] Noting the different purposes of the parallel phrase in 4QMMT and Galatians, Lutz Doering concludes: 'MMT is about *disagreement in halakhic opinion*, whereas Paul addresses the question *whether Gentiles are*, in the first place, *obliged to observe halakhah or not*. If the argument about the formative role of ἐκ πίστεως holds, Paul must be seen as having *creatively* adapted the previous phrase to fit a new discourse, inspired by his reading of Scripture'; Lutz Doering, '4QMMT and the Letters of Paul: Selected Aspects of Mutual Illumination', in *The Dead Sea Scrolls and Pauline Literature* (ed. J.S. Rey; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 79. Thus, we have in Galatians an antithesis between two forms of life; rightly, M. Bachmann, *Anti-Judaism in Galatians?: Exegetical Studies on a Polemical Letter and on Paul's Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 1–18. For the argument regarding the role of ἐκ πίστεως in Paul's phrase ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, see F. Watson, 'By Faith (of Christ): An Exegetical Dilemma and its Scriptural Solution', in *The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies* (ed. M.F. Bird and P. Sprinkle; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 147 – 63.

[80] R.B. Hays, *The Letter to the Galatians* (NIB XI; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 233.

divine evaluation in the divine action, it seems virtually certain that our debate partners would take δικαιοῦται in Gal 2:16 as a divine passive referring to God's verdict.[81] This evaluative sense fits both the standard usage of the verb[82] and its particular application in the present context of the debate in Antioch about the standard of divine evaluation.[83] Moreover, the debate between Eleazar, the martyrs, and Antiochus is over the divine standard of eschatological evaluation: 'the Justice they revere' (ἣν σέβεσθε δίκην) *will not*, as Antiochus claims, 'be merciful to [the brothers] on account of their violating the law under compulsion' (ἵλεως ὑμῖν ἔσται δι' ἀνάγκην παρανομήσασιν, 4 Macc 8:14). Likewise, despite Ezra's persistence, '[the Lord's] righteousness and goodness' (*iustitia tua et bonitas tua Domine) will not* be acclaimed 'when [he] shows mercy on those who have no substance of good works' (*cum misertus fueris eis qui non habent substantiam operum bonorum*, *4 Ezra* 8:36). It is not clear at this point in Galatians that Paul intends a reference to the future judgement with the phrase ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ, though references to 'the hope of righteousness' (5:5) and the warning 'that those who practice ['the works of the flesh' (τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός, 5:19)] will not inherit the kingdom of God' (ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες βασιλείαν θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομήσουσιν, 5:21) make this likely, as we will argue in chapter five.[84]

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[81] Barclay (*Gift*, 375, n. 65 and 375) rightly appeals to the two other passive instances of the verb in v. 16 and the related phrase δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ in Gal 3:11.

[82] See the overview of Paul and select literature in S. Westerholm, *Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The "Lutheran" Paul and His Critics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 261 – 84 (276) , who concludes: 'In its "ordinary usage"—in Paul as elsewhere—the *dikaio*-terminology may be said to take its cue from the noun δικαιοσύνη, "what one out to do," or "what the one who does what one ought thereby possesses." The dikaios (δίκαιος) is the one who does δικαιοσύνη, and to dikaiosify (δίκαιοῦν) is "to treat as one ought to treat the dikaios," "to declare innocent," "to acquit" (though the object of the verb may well be one who ought *not* to be given such treatment).' To identify justification with the effect of the Christ-gift, as Gorman does in claiming that 'co-crucifixion is what Paul means by justification', given Paul's forensic use of δικαιόω, is to confuse the divine verdict with its evidential basis; M.J. Gorman, *Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul's Narrative Soteriology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 67.

[83] To reduce justification to social terms, defined as 'to be reckoned by God a true member of his family' (N. T. Wright, *Justification: God's Plan & Paul's Vision* (Downers Grove: IVP, 2009), 96 – 101), is to confuse the divine norm that orders and evaluates the community with the community itself, and, for both Paul and our conversation partners, to occlude the integral relation between that order and the properly ordered self. For a recent evaluation of this construal of righteousness in covenantal terms, see C.L. Irons, *The Righteousness of God: A Lexical Examination of the Covenant-Faithfulness Interpretation* (WUNT II 386; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015).

[84] Cf. the parallel in Rom 3:19 – 20, specifically, the eschatological reference in v. 19b: ἵνα πᾶν στόμα φραγῇ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ.

Such a reference to future judgement would, however, make sense to our debate partners formally if not materially. For, like Paul, they argue for a certain evidential standard by which God deems a person or group of people righteous now and, thus, by which he will render post-mortem judgement. They merely disagree with Paul about the evidential standard. Paul denies that 'a human being [even a Jew][85] is considered righteous on the basis of the works of law' or that 'all flesh' will be so considered by God (2:16).[86] Both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* affirm this standard. For Eleazar's 'law-observant life, the faithful seal of death perfected' (βίου νομίμου, ὃν πιστὴ θανάτου σφραγὶς ἐτελείωσεν, 4 Macc 7:15). Likewise, Uriel convinces Ezra that those 'who will be made safe and who will be able to escape [judgement]' (*qui salvus factus fuerit et qui poterit effugere*) will do so 'on account of his works or the faith by which he has believed' (*per opera sua vel per fidem in qua crediditis*, *4 Ezra* 9:7). Thus, with Paul's denial that 'all flesh will be considered righteous on the basis of the works of the law', theological hostilities commence.[87]

Yet, from the point of view of our debate partners, the contest does not necessarily come to an end here. For Paul's antithesis between 'works of the law' and 'faith in Jesus Christ' invites several related angles of approach. First, it is clear from his identification of his opponents' position as 'another good news' (1:6) that Paul is

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[85] There is no lexical evidence for taking ἄνθρωπος to refer only to Gentiles; *contra* L. Gaston, *Paul and the Torah* (2nd ed.; Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987), 66; J.G. Gager, *The Origins of Anti-Semitism: Attitudes Toward Judaism in Pagan and Christian Antiquity* (Oxford: OUP, 1983), 233.

[86] Thus, Matlock ('Rhetoric ', 199): 'here the Jewish Christian experience of the gospel is placed within a common human narrative' as Paul and his fellow Jews are situated between ἄνθρωπος and σάρξ.

[87] It is unclear whether Paul's switch of σάρξ for the substantive participle ζῶν in his allusion to LXX Ps 142:2 is simply a conflation from memory of the related phrase in the Psalter (πᾶσα σάρξ, LXX Ps 64:3; 135:23 – 25; 144:21), a substitution of the more for less common word (M. Silva, 'Galatians ', in *Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament* [ed. G.K. Beale and D.A. Carson; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007], 790 – 91; for the data, see R.E. Ciampa, *The Presence and Function of Scripture in Galatians 1 and 2* [WUNT II 102; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998], 183, n. 94), a veiled allusion to circumcision (Dunn, *Galatians*, 140), or an attempt to avoid ζῆν/ζωή, which he uses 'im theologisch gefüllten Sinn zur Bezeichnung des neuen Lebens der Glaubenden' (H.J. Eckstein, *Verheissung und Gesetz: eine exegetische Untersuchung zu Galater 2,15 – 4,7* (WUNT I 86; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 28). Given the status of σάρξ as a key term and Paul's earlier reference to 'flesh and blood' (1:16) in contrast to God, Paul may be hinting at his particular understanding of the reason for the truth of the phrase ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιωθήσεται πᾶσα σάρξ—viz., the 'die Hinfälligkeit, die Ohnmacht, und Sterblichkeit des Menschen' (ibid. on σάρξ in Gal 2:20; cf. *1 Enoch* 81:5). On the parallels between the antithetical structure of thought in LXX Ps 143 and Gal 2:16, see H. Hübner, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments: Die Theologie des Paulus und ihre neutestamentliche Wirkungsgeschichte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 65 – 66.

not simply interested in the works of the law as Jewish practices but as a part of an alternative message to be rejected. Likewise, Paul's subordination, by implication, of these Jewish practices to walking straight (ὀρθοποδέω) 'according to the truth of the gospel' (πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, 2:14) is purely negative in his story; these practices do not provide the chief social norm in the church; but, Paul has not addressed, positively, what this 'walking straight' amounts to (cf. πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν, 5:25; ὅσοι τῷ κανόνι τούτῳ [i.e., καινὴ κτίσις] στοιχήσουσιν, 6:16). Finally, as a fellow Jew, Paul must give an account of the law's relation to this normative divine Christ-gift.

The key point, for our purposes, is that Paul's application of the language of gift to Jesus' self-offering and, at this stage in the argument, the introduction of the phrase 'faith in Christ' in antithesis to 'works of the law' as the standard of divine evaluation raises not the general questions of the relation between belief and action or even the priority of divine action over human action but the particular question of God as life-giving Benefactor—specifically, the nature, rationale, and effects of his life-giving activity.[88] Though we will have more to say on the πίστις Χριστοῦ debate in the next chapter, the present discussion of divine benefaction will proceed with the primary theological objections to the objective genitive reading in view, in order to illustrate both why they are unfounded and how reading Paul's 'faith' language in the context of a debate over divine benefaction supports the semantic case for the objective genitive reading.[89]

In the context of our debate, the objective genitive reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ is parallel, in one respect, to the language of 'faith' and 'works' in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. That is, in our debate partners, Ezra, Eleazar, and the martyrs are materially dependent on God's causal creative and saving action: they exercise created freedom according to the divine, Torah order of created life (faith), in order to meet the condition (obedience) necessary to receive the divine reconstitution of life as a fitting

[88] The concrete context of divine gift-giving helps explain why it is difficult, on the one hand, for Moo (*Galatians*, 146) to claim that 'Paul does think that the truth of the gospel is at stake', while asserting on the other that 'the difference is not fundamentally over theology' but 'the implications for a specific form of conduct'. Such a divorce of theology and ethics is not conceivable if God's gift-giving and, specifically, life-giving and life-ordering activity is determinative *qua* theology and ethics, as we will argue below.

[89] For a complementary treatment of this issue in Romans, see Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 154–60.

return gift. In *4 Ezra,* it is the zone of created *libertas* that enables both the few fit to receive salvation *per opera* or *per fidem* (9:7) and the many liable to judgement because they 'did not acknowledge [God] despite living as a result of receiving [his] benefits' (*non cognoverunt me viventes beneficia consecuti*, 9:10) and 'scorned [God's] law when they still had freedom' (*fastidierunt legem meam cum adhuc erant habentes libertatem*, 9:11). In 4 Maccabees, the martyrs prove the efficacy of the Torah-ordered mind to rule the self *because* they exercise 'the same faith in God' (τὴν αὐτὴν πίστιν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν, 16:22) as the patriarchs *because* they know 'that those who die for God live to God' (ὅτι οἱ διὰ τὸν θεὸν ἀποθνήσκοντες ζῶσιν τῷ θεῷ, 16:25; cf. 7:19). Thus, in denying the works of the law as the condition of justification, Paul, in effect, calls into question our conversation partners' systems of belief in which God's life-giving and Torah-ordering activity in creation and the eschaton is the causal ground of salvation.

In this connection, when Paul opposes 'faith in Christ' and the 'works of the law', our debate partners would wonder not about faith as the condition or cause of divine saving action but about the *object* of faith—specifically, the Christ-gift's relation to divine creative and saving action. That is, as in Paul, in *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees faith is instrumental, and, thus, concerns that the objective genitive reading makes faith a condition of salvation in Paul are misguided.[90] Moreover, the Pauline opposition of 'faith in Christ' to 'works of the law', in the context of a discussion of divine life-giving benefaction, potentially calls into question our conversation partners' commitment to the inviolable Torah-ordered donation of the created self. In this respect, the construal of the objective genitive reading as an anthropocentric as opposed to Christological account of justification misses the mark also.[91] For, rather than presuming an anthropocentric construal of justification, 'faith in Christ' invites the question of the anthropological significance of Paul's

[90] Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 156, n. 106: 'This fear [that the objective genitive interpretation renders faith a material condition for divine action] is based on an historical misreading. Calvin for example, while never referring to faith as a *causa materialis*, speaks of faith as the *causa instrumentalis* only in connection with the word that invokes it (Rom 10.17): "*verbum cum fide instrumentum*."' Cf. J. Calvin, 'Acts 14 – 28 and Romans 1 – 6', in *Calvin's Commentaries, Volume XIX* (trans. J. Owen; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 138, n.2. For the concern, see, e.g., D.A. Campbell, *The Deliverance of God: An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 77 – 78; P.M. Sprinkle, 'Pistis Christou as an Eschatological Event', in *The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies* (ed. M.F. Bird and P.M. Sprinkle; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 166.

[91] See, e.g., R.B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1 – 4:11* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), xxix; J.L. Martyn, 'The Apocalyptic Gospel in Galatians', *Int* 54 (2000): 250.

Christology—and specifically in terms of his conception of the inviolability of created human agency—and *then* the question of what it means for Christ to be the ground of justification.[92] Despite the challenges of the passions and corruptions/limitations of human existence, respectively, Eleazar and Ezra are living proof of the instrumental exercise of the created freedom of the Torah-ordered self and, in this way, the fitting recipients of the divine gift of salvation. Consequently, when Paul states that it is 'faith in Christ' and not 'works of the law' that constitutes the evidential basis for God's verdict, he invites a debate about *God's* life-giving activity in creation and salvation.[93] As we will see, Paul enters directly into this debate in his paradigmatic account of the reconstitution of the self in Gal 2:17 – 21.

3.2.3 Paul as Paradigm of the Crucified and Resurrected Self (2:17 – 21)

If the ironic distance between the phrases φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι and ἐξ ἐθνῶν ἁμαρτωλοί in Gal 2:15 adds rhetorical weight to Paul's emphatic theological point that it is *Jewish* Christians themselves who seek God's approval by faith in Christ, then the repetition of the word ἁμαρτωλοί in 2:17 redirects this force against the *Jewish* evaluative framework itself.[94] Thus, in v. 17, Paul's emphatic rejection of the possibility that Christ is a 'servant of sin' (διάκονος ἁμαρτίας) renders the judgement that 'those seeking justification in Christ' could be classified (εὑρίσκω) as 'sinners' suspect. The conditional of v. 18 supports this judgement by stating what *would* be the case were Paul to follow Peter's path, recognise the moniker 'sinner', and change his behaviour.[95] That Paul's target here is not the exposure of Jews and Gentiles alike as 'sinners' but the Torah-reckoning of sinner *qua* Gentile is clear from his terminology in v. 18: 'these things [plural!] which [Paul] destroyed' (ἃ κατέλυσα

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[92] That is, why *must* it be that in Watson's terms ('By Faith [of Christ]', 159) 'faith constitutes the righteousness of the generic individual only insofar as it is oriented towards and grounded in Christ and the saving divine action enacted in him'?

[93] From a semantic perspective, the chief points in favour of the objective genitive reading of πίστις Χριστοῦ are: 1) the fact that Paul never uses the verb πιστεύω with Jesus as the subject; and 2) Paul tends to pair the noun πίστις with scriptural citations that use the verb πιστεύω (e.g. three times ἐκ πίστεως follows Paul's quotation of Gen 15:6, ἐπίστευσεν τῷ θεῷ; see Matlock, 'Rhetoric'). Both of these suggest that in Gal 2:16 Paul's use of the verb πιστεύω disambiguates the phrase πίστις Χριστοῦ.

[94] Barclay, *Obeying*, 78–80.

[95] Moo rightly notes (*Galatians*, 166) that Paul has Peter and his fellow Jews in mind. Barclay's gloss (*Obeying*, 80) catches the sense of the relation indicated by the γάρ connecting vv. 17 and 18: 'by no means, in fact, the case stands just the opposite'.

ταῦτα) and is now being pressured to 'again rebuild' (πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ) most likely refer to the Jewish practices indicated by ἔργα νόμου, which in turn suggests that by παραβάτης he means not the violation of the norms of the Christ-gift but of the Torah (cf. 3:19). Likewise, given the reference to these practices and the fact that, from the context, Peter and his fellow Jewish Christians have been, as of late, successfully following them in Antioch, it is unlikely that this violation has to do with the impracticability of the Torah and thus its role as 'revealer' or 'provoker' of sin.[96] Paul is exposing a category mistake here, not the status of Jew and Gentile alike as sinners,[97] though the former *is* the ground of the latter, as we will argue (cf. 3:10 – 12; 3:22). One is *not* 'found to be a sinner' by seeking justification in Christ with 'sinners' outside of Torah confines, because Christ is *not* a servant of sin. On the contrary, having enjoyed commensality with Gentiles, to return to Torah confines is the problematic move, because to do so is to 'prove' oneself to be a 'transgressor'.[98] That is, it is to admit that, in this respect, one was wrong to associate with Gentiles without regard to the norms of Torah. And *that* Paul will not do.

We can easily imagine our conversation partners interjecting, 'You should do it!' For they will see in Peter's behaviour not hypocrisy but repentance, and thus in Paul's case a proper realignment with the Torah order is preferable to the folly of misguided consistency.[99] In other words, Paul's way of framing the issue is prejudicial. Neither his opponents in Galatia nor our debate partners would concede his assertion that seeking justification in Christ necessitates living like a Gentile and,

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[96] Rightly, Burton, *Galatians*, 124–30; Dunn, *Galatians*, 141–42; Martyn, *Galatians*, 254–56. *Contra* Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 116 – 17; J. Lambrecht, 'The Line of Thought in Gal. 2.14 b – 21', *NTS* 24 (1978): 484–95; J. Lambrecht, 'Once Again Gal 2,17 – 18 and 3,21', *ETL* 63 (1987): 148 – 53; J. Lambrecht, 'Paul's Reasoning in Galatians 2:11 – 21', in *Paul and the Mosaic Law: The Third Durham-Tübingen Research Symposium on Earliest Christianity and Judaism, Durham, September, 1994* (ed. J.D.G. Dunn; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 53 – 74.

[97] *Pace* Eckstein, *Verheissung und Gesetz*, 30–41.

[98] *Contra* T. G. Gombis, 'The "Transgressor" and the "Curse of the Law": The Logic of Paul's Argument in Galatians 2 – 3', *NTS* 53 (2007): 89: Paul's language of 'transgression' here is hypothetical, not actual. It was *obedience* to the Torah that led to his 'death' to it as a norm in his life, as this obedience drove him toward the revelation of the truth of the gospel in the revelation of Christ. As Lightfoot recognised (*Galatians*, 119), there is a shift in the metaphorical references to death from Galatians 2:19, 'freedom from past obligation', to 2:20, 'annihilation of old sins'.

[99] Ironically, by deploying the language of hypocrisy, Paul leaves open the possibility of a realignment with the good news—a repentance, if you will. Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 113: 'The idea at the root of ὑπόκρισις is not a false motive entertained, but a false impression produced'. On Paul's attempt to recover Peter, see B. Holmberg, 'Jewish Versus Christian Identity in the Early Church? ', *RB* 105 (1998): 397 – 425.

thus, taking on the moniker 'sinner'.[100] For thus far Paul has appealed to the divine action in the Christ-gift *against* the authority of those norms. But his opponents do not see the entailment, and the response of our conversation partners might indicate why: for they recognise the propriety of intercession and/or substitution for the unworthy (even Gentiles!, 4 Macc 4:13 ; cf. *4 Ezra* 7:102 – 112) that leads *to* not *against* repentance and reordering according to Torah norms.[101] Paul can paint himself as the principled witness with Peter and his opposition as hypocrites and tyrants all he likes, but our debate partners would demand an argument for this paradox: 'How exactly, Paul, is Peter a tyrant for *obeying* and encouraging others to obey the Torah, the created order of human and social life?' The shift from plural (2:15 – 17) to singular verbs (2:18 – 21) marks the beginning of Paul's personal and paradigmatic summary answer.

Paul will neither accept the label 'sinner' nor prove himself a 'transgressor': 'for through the law to the law I died, in order that to God I might live'[102] (2:19). It is clear from the immediate context and his subsequent references to life 'under Torah', that by 'death to the law' Paul means at a minimum the end of the Torah as the definitive moral norm in his life. Thus, in terms of the debate over divine life-giving benefaction Paul invites in Gal 2:15, 16, he would reject the identification of the Torah with the created order that is axiomatic for our conversation partners.[103] It is a mistake, however, to end our analysis of the metaphor here, because the significance of this 'end' of the Torah's authority depends on the nature of the authority ended. For to assert as Paul does that the end of the Torah's authority over his life came διὰ νόμου is potentially to imply much more than a recalibration or even negation of so-

[100] Though Paul is 'making explicit what he takes to be implicit in the practice of the gospel', it is doubtful (*pace* Matlock, 'Rhetoric', 199, n. 26) that this amounts not to 'a matter…of formal logic, but of belonging to a common life'. For the very practice of such a common life, for a Jew like Paul, requires a judgement regarding its legitimacy. The argument this thesis develops is that Paul presents this argument *in nuce* in Gal 2:17 – 21, and develops it in Gal 3:1 – 5:26.

[101] *4 Ezra* 7:133: '[God is called] gracious in that he is gracious to those who make a turn to his law' (*miserator in eo quod miseretur illis qui conversionem faciunt in lege eius*).

[102] Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 178: 'Das Ich des V 18 visiert noch einmal Petrus an, das betonte ἐγώ des v 19 dagegen Paulus; beide aber sind dabei exemplarische Repräsentanten oder Typen eines bestimmten Tuns bzw.'

[103] *Pace* Gombis ('"Transgressor"', 86), the problem is not that a 'universal gospel' is contrary to a 'particular gospel'. This is question-begging, as is clear from the fact that some Jews (like those represented by 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Jubilees) could conceive of Israel and its Torah as the particular expression of God's universal design for human life and flourishing. Rather, there are competing conceptions of divine, universal order here.

called 'cultural' norms. That is the reason why there are multiple parallels *within Paul's own writings* that might fill out the logic here. If we allow the immediate context to govern interpretation, we note that Paul mentions nothing of the law's cursing function in his autobiography[104] and, if his experience among the Gentiles played a role in the Torah's subversion, he gives no indication.[105] Rather, Paul's entire story has been generated and framed by the juxtaposition of his zealous life for the Torah and his calling through the unconditioned and incongruous gift that made this life irrelevant.[106] Moreover, as we will argue presently, given the rhetorical and theological force of Paul's death and life language in Gal 2:19, 20, it seems that by διὰ νόμου Paul means the Torah's role in leading him to Christ and, therein, to the realization that his former agency in Torah was disordered.

In close dialogue with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, the likelihood that Paul has human agency in mind in these verses becomes almost certain. Both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* resist the subversion of the Torah as a norm not simply because of questions of Jewish identity or as even as the order of created life. Rather, the law is also constitutive of the created self—being 'with the heart of the people' (*lex cum corde populi*, *4 Ezra* 3:22) and 'given to [the mind by God]' (τούτῳ [τὸν ἱερὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν, v. 22] νόμον ἔδωκεν, 4 Macc 2:23) at the constitution of human beings at creation. This interpretation in terms of human agency illumines Paul's careful language in vv. 19 – 20.[107] The obscurity our interpretation will clarify has to do with the interpretation of Paul's life and death metaphors. For, in conversation with the presentations of exemplary figures in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, we see not only the sense of what Paul means by saying that he has died and now lives in Christ but also *why* this necessarily has implications for his life as a Torah-observant Jew. For, as we will argue, Paul's insistence that, in order to live to God a death to the law was

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[104] Martyn, *Galatians*, 257. A related option is the role of the law in provoking and disclosing sin (cf. Rom 7:7 – 25).

[105] It is not clear how Paul would ever have experienced the challenge of his Jewish norms in Gentile company if he did not recognise the validity of participating in such unconditioned social groups from the outset; *pace* Barclay, *Gift*, 361, 385.

[106] Similarly, de Boer, *Galatians*, 160.

[107] For treatments of divine and human agency in this passage in the context of the 'reconstituted' and 'converted' self, respectively, see J.M.G. Barclay, '"By the Grace of God I Am What I Am": Grace and Agency in Philo and Paul', in *Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment* (ed. S.J. Gathercole and J.M.G. Barclay; LNTS 335; London: T. & T. Clark, 2006), 140 – 57; T. Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 157 – 61.

necessary (2:19), esp. followed by language of a new existence in Christ (2:20), represents a clear denial of an account of the Torah as the order of the created self. Without these recognitions, we run the risk of simply repeating Paul's metaphors or possibly inappropriately filling in the logic from elsewhere in his letters.

Generally speaking, the most striking feature in these verses is the clear parallel between Jesus' own death and resurrection and Paul's application of death and life language to himself. Though Paul reserves the vocabulary of resurrection for either the bodily resurrection of Christ or the bodily general resurrection at the eschaton, the transition from one existence here ('I myself no longer live…') through death ('I have been crucified with Christ.') to new life ('Christ lives in me. The life which I now live…') is deliberately resurrection shaped. It is not certain that Paul is evoking the discourse of Maccabean martyrdom in Gal 1:10 – 2:21, but this shaping is both rhetorically provocative and theologically puzzling for authors like 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, nonetheless.[108] For example, rhetorically speaking, there is a vital difference between Eleazar and Paul, in so far as, unlike the martyrs, Paul has presented himself neither as worthy of this gift of life nor as willingly dying to secure it. That is, the perfect passive verb in the phrase Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι matches perfectly Paul's passive role in being called by God through the gift (1:15). His zeal for Torah did not intend his crucifixion with Christ but *its opposite*. Nevertheless, God's call turned him around—or better, 'raised' him from the 'dead'—without regard either to his intentions or his previous actions.

Theologically, this passive framing indicates not only the new norms of life in the Christ-gift but the *need* for such a new and newly-ordered life. Paul clarifies this need by specifying just what he means by the general transition from life in the law, through death to the law, and to life to God (v. 19a – b): it is the death of one subject (vv. 19c, 20a) and the life of another subject who is the risen Christ (v. 20b), with the result now being that *both* Christ and Paul, somehow, live in this subject (v. 20c). The most obvious force of this metaphorical configuration in our context is, again, ethical—viz., what has ended is the order of Paul's old life. But there are two other intriguing and, in our view, likely additional entailments. The first is evident from

[108] If Paul is evoking Maccabean martyrdom, we have here the provocative 'resurrection' of the *unworthy* self in the Christ-gift.

the recognition of the theological impossibility, from the perspective of 4 Maccabees, of Paul's metaphorical configuration here. It is *precisely* the Torah-zealous Paul, the subject prior to co-crucifixion with Christ, who is most like Eleazar—the exemplar of the inviolable integrity and proper order of the created self. Such a properly ordered self does not *need* to be 'crucified' and 'raised'. Unless, that is, on Paul's view, such a self does not retain its created freedom and/or is not properly ordered by Torah. In other words, Paul's movement from one agency, through a divinely wrought end of that agency in 'crucifixion', to active agency in 'resurrection' looks not only like the re-ordering but the reconstitution of the self.[109] As we shall see in the next two chapters, this implication of the formal statement here is materially defended by Paul both with respect to his reading of salvation-history and his understanding of the condition of human life apart from the Spirit.

Such a metaphorical construction does not amount to a denial of agency in Paul's former 'life'. Rather it is a denial of *properly-ordered* agency. Paul *used* to live—just not *to God*. Moreover, given the active subject (ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός) between the 'crucifixion' of his old life and the new life he lives 'by faith', Paul seems to be denying the *possibility* of properly-ordered agency apart from this life in Christ. For, given the parallel with v. 19, it is *in Christ's living* that one lives to God. Thus, again, in terms of the questions Paul invites in discussion of divine life-giving benefaction, Paul's rejection of the supremacy of the Torah-order would seem to be grounded in a rejection of the created integrity of the Torah-ordered self—and that rather perversely. Paul's Torah-ordered self, far from coinciding with a properly-ordered life to God, is rather the very context in which his disordered self exists.

This appeal to Christ's active agency invites its own set of puzzles surrounding how to account for the apparent realism of Paul's language, a topic that has dominated the interpretation of these verses virtually since they were penned.[110] For our purposes, however, the effect of Christ's life in Paul raises the question of the singularity and singular worth of the Christ-gift in specifically creative terms. For

[109] Barclay, 'Paul's Story', 142 – 46.

[110] For a survey of the history of interpretation, see J. Riches, *Galatians Through the Centuries* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 137 – 43; on the possible 'relational ontology' undergirding this realism, see E.L. Rehfeld, *Relationale Ontologie bei Paulus: die ontische Wirksamkeit der Christusbezogenheit im Denken des Heidenapostels* (WUNT II 326; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).

rather than 'rebuild' his Torah life (v. 17), Paul will not 'reject the gift of God' (2:21), but rather expresses a new and newly-ordered agency in living 'by faith'[111] in Jesus, the self-giver who loved him (2:20).[112] (Given the reference to the event of Jesus' self-offering in Gal 2:20 and his subsequent consideration of that death as, on his opponents' view, 'to no effect' [δωρεάν], it is most likely that Paul refers not to divine favour but to divine gift with τὴν χάριν τοῦ θεοῦ in Gal 2:21). This juxtaposition places Jesus' self-offering not just in the position of the divine gift of supreme worth but of the singular divine life-giving gift. Moreover, given Paul's earlier anathemas on 'another good news' (1:6 – 9) and insistence on receipt of his good news via divine revelation of it in the person of Jesus Christ (1:11 – 17), this asymmetrical juxtaposition—disordered life to the law/new and newly-ordered life in Christ—invites a rather pointed query from *4 Ezra*. For Uriel's instruction of Ezra in bifocal eschatological hermeneutics is aimed at defending as supreme divine gift precisely what Paul denies here—Torah-ordered life. It is 'the law of life' (*4 Ezra* 14:30), given by God as the path through life (7:10 - 25) and thus the standard by which all human belief and activity will be judged (9:7 – 13). Moreover, because it is *God's* gift it shares in his eternal attributes: its 'fruit' does not and is not capable of perishing 'because it is [God's]' (*fructum legis non periens nec enim poterat quoniam tuus erat*, 9:32) and the law itself, likewise, 'does not perish but remains in its glory' (*lex non perit sed permanet in suo honore*, 9:37). It is toward this reality Uriel bids him look, from this reality that Ezra serves as prophet in Israel. Thus, Paul's earlier troubling reference to Jesus' self-giving for sinners as a 'rescue from the present evil age' emerges clearly, for *4 Ezra*, in Gal 2:20, 21 as the rival to the Torah as God's singular and singularly valuable *divine* life-giving gift. What Ezra experiences as a visionary experience of future reality and looks forward to in hope, Paul claims to have seen both in the risen flesh of Jesus Christ and the effect the preaching of this gift has

[111] On Luther's account of the anthropological negation and Christological confession of Christ as the ground of justification inherent in the Pauline *sola fide*, see J.A. Linebaugh, 'The Christo-Centrism of Faith in Christ: Martin Luther's Reading of Galatians 2.16, 19 – 20', *NTS* 59 (2013): 535 – 44.

[112] Paul's paradigmatic account of himself as a crucified and resurrected agent increases the likelihood that the locative phrase ἐν σαρκί is theologically pregnant, referring to 'human susceptibility to the sway of evil', though, as we will argue in chapter five, it is not necessary to interpret such evil with reference to 'cosmological powers', as in M.C. de Boer, *The Defeat of Death: Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5* (JSNTSup 22; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1989), 131–32.

among Jew and Gentile alike. Like Eleazar and Ezra, Paul refuses to reject the *gift*; he simply differs on *what that gift is and does*.

And, like Eleazar and Ezra, Paul's refusal to reject divine life-giving benevolence is grounded in the recognition that the divine gift of life is ordered, and as such necessarily related to 'righteousness'. What Paul means by 'righteousness' in this context and how the Christ-gift relates to it vis-à-vis the law is not entirely clear. At a minimum, the divine approbation of those who live 'by faith' in Jesus entails an alternate standard of righteousness to that of the Torah,[113] but, given the multiple entailments created by Paul's metaphorical life language in this context, δικαιοσύνη could also refer to a new source and quality of life exhibited by believers.[114] For, if it is only in the crucifixion and resurrection of the self in the Christ-event that one exists as a properly-ordered agent, then actually being called in or through the gift and subsequently living by faith entails a new and qualitatively-new life. Whether Paul uses δικαιοσύνη in this sense depends essentially on the anthropology and cosmology in which this term operates. For in the context of 4 Maccabees' fundamentally optimistic anthropology there is no observable 'gap', in principle, between ideal human obedience and its eschatological goal: the perfectly ordered self is fixed in this perfection in immortality. In *4 Ezra*, the apparent opacity of divine judgement in history combined with the constitutional fragility of humanity's *Sein-zum-Tode* and limited understanding, renders the full measure of human δικαιοσύνη recognisable only in light of the divine disclosure of its *telos*—when in the 'immortal age' inaugurated by divine judgement (7:113) 'unbelief is brought to an end while righteousness has increased and truth has appeared' (7:114). Paul may have such an eschatological and, in his case, inaugurated sense of δικαιοσύνη in view here, but clarity on this point awaits our exegesis of Gal 3:21 – 22 and 5:2 – 6.

Conclusion—Debating Divine Life-Giving Benefaction

Though we cannot discern the full material significance of Paul's concluding statement in v. 21 without his development of it in subsequent chapters, the formal logic is clear. Paul will not reject *the* gift, because to revert to Torah norms is to deny

[113] Barclay, *Gift*, 387.
[114] For an account of such 'extraordinary righteousness', see Westerholm, *Perspectives*, 273–84.

that Jew and Gentile alike—even he himself and the Galatian Gentiles—have received Jesus' self-giving without regard to antecedent conditions and despite previous sins. It is to reject the divine verdict on Jew and Gentile in the divine act of recognising them as righteous on the basis of receipt of the Christ-gift. Paul will not reject the gift, because unlike the situations in Antioch and Galatia, this gift was properly received and circulated in Jerusalem, as Jewish missionary teams acknowledged God's action in the Gentile mission and accepted the Gentiles into fellowship in social terms unconditioned by Torah norms. To insist on Torah norms, as Peter and his fellow Jewish Christians in Antioch hypocritically did, would have been to reject those whom God had accepted in the gift, and thus to reject the divine standard implicit in this divine verdict. Not only that, but such a reversion to the authority of Torah norms proves one to be a transgressor of those norms and implies that, by promoting fellowship among Jews and Gentiles alike, Jesus himself promotes sin. Paul will do neither, because it is precisely in Jesus' self-giving and not the authority of the Torah that he and all believers are reconstituted and reordered as new and newly-ordered agents within a new community. With these three moves—the recognition of calling in the gift apart from Torah norms, the subsequent subordination of Torah norms to this unconditioned gift, and the grounding of both in the reconstitution and reordering of a new self for a new society in the Christ-gift—Paul, at least formally, calls into question the accounts of divine life-giving benefaction in texts like 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. For if the Christ-gift is the singular and singularly supreme life-giving and life-ordering gift, then life cannot be inviolably donated as Torah-ordered at creation.

Consequently, our dialogical exegesis of Gal 1 – 2 has contributed to research on the force and meaning of Paul's paradigmatic autobiography and extended recent studies of divine gift. Paul neither appeals to the singularity of the gospel (Gaventa) nor to the unconditioned donation of the Christ-gift (Barclay), but rather he begins to make *arguments* for his particular conception of both. These arguments reach their formal presentation in Gal 2:18 – 21, as Paul presents himself as the recipient of a new and newly-ordered individual and social life. Such a presentation is in formal opposition to the theology of divine life-giving benefaction that undergirds the

presentation of exemplary figures like Eleazar and Ezra in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, respectively.

Yet, this formal opposition does not bring our conversation to an end but rather initiates further debate. For there are a number of remaining questions Paul must address for our conversation partners, chief among them: what relation the 'divine law' has to this Christ-gift; why, given the divine donation of the law attested in Scripture, this Christ-gift was necessary; and, given answers to these two, how, specifically, this Christ-gift positively orders the self and society. In our next chapter, we turn to these first two questions in debate with *4 Ezra*, arguing that Paul answers the first question materially and the second only formally. The material answer to both the second and third questions, awaits our debate with 4 Maccabees in the final chapter.

Chapter 4
What Makes Alive?: The Gift of Life and the Order of History in Galatians 3 – 4 and *4 Ezra* 3 – 10

'Who ain't a slave? Tell me that.'—Ishmael, *Moby Dick*

'Reading' Texts and Experiences Differently

In our texts, Paul, Ezra, and Eleazar are exemplary recipients of the divine gift of life, yet this divine life-giving benefaction is construed differently. Chapter three argued that Paul's presentation of himself as an exemplary yet unworthy recipient of divine life in the Christ-gift contrasts with the accounts of the divine donation of life in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. For in presenting his Torah-observant life as structurally disordered, Paul both displaces the Torah as the order of life and raises questions about the freedom of the created self. This introduces, however, another point for debate: if the Torah does not order self and society, what is its status as 'divine law' and gift as attested in scripture (*4 Ezra* 7:20; 4 Macc 5:16), and what is its relation to the Christ-gift? Thus, as Paul turns to his own reading of sacred text and salvation-history, we turn to consider a key hermeneutical question: not only why do these authors construe divine grace differently but also *why* do they read the same scriptural texts and salvation-history differently?[1]

This chapter reintroduces the Deutoronomic theodicy of *4 Ezra* to answer this hermeneutical question, but also to serve a larger aim. By staging a debate between *4 Ezra* 3 – 10 and Galatians 3 – 4 over their respective readings of sacred text, salvation-history, and world, we aim to further disclose the submerged Pauline assumptions and clarify the theological logic of Galatians. For Paul is not only engaged in a debate over a 'single intertextual field',[2] he is also providing an argument about the meaning of early Christian experience. Consequently, when Richard Hays asserts the 'hermeneutical priority of Spirit-experience', for Paul, over 'the normative constraints laid down by the text' this does not resolve but magnifies

[1] For this methodological question, see Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 22, 177–78.
[2] Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 3.

the hermeneutical questions.[3] For both these scriptural texts and experiences are held in common in Galatia: Paul and his opponents read the same scriptures differently, and they interpret the receipt of the Christ-gift and the experience of the Spirit differently. Thus, what is needed is an account of the interrelation between Paul's textual and his Christological and pneumatological hermeneutic.[4]

This chapter argues two interrelated theses, in this regard: 1) as with the paradigmatic differences between Eleazar, Ezra, and Paul, the hermeneutical differences are attributable to Paul's conception of the Christ-event in life-giving and life-ordering terms; 2) Paul's teleological Christ-ordered reading of text and redemptive-history depends on a Christ-shaped understanding of reality. Whereas *4 Ezra* reads text, salvation-history, and world(s) as Torah-shaped because the Torah represents the divine order of created *and* eschatological life within history (9:7 - 13), Paul's reading is Christ-shaped because he sees life created and ordered in the Christ-gift by the Spirit in the midst of the 'dead' cosmic conditions to which the Torah confines humanity and is itself confined. Thus, it is Paul's creative, christomorphic, and pneumatological hermeneutic that excludes the Torah as the order of self and society; for the Torah serves the promises (3:6 -9) and their eschatological order by confining and confirming humanity in its cursed (3:10) and dead estate in view of the life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift (3:11 – 13; 3:21, 22). Likewise, to answer our other hermeneutical question, Paul differs from his opponents because, for him, God's raising of Jesus from the dead is not simply the event of salvation, to which Torah-ordered life may be appended, but the *creative* pattern of salvation and salvation-history (Gal 4:21 – 31). Thus, his reading of sacred text, salvation-history, and world is Christ-shaped—figured by Jesus' death and resurrection—because both text and world are inevitably oriented to Christ.

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[3] R.B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: YUP, 1989), 108. Dunn, reduces the hermeneutical function of the Spirit to its 'existential power'; Dunn, *Theology of Galatians*, 95. Cf. J.M.G Barclay, 'Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of Galatians', *ABR* 58 (2010): 44: '[i]t is the connection Paul draws between the Galatians' experience and the Christ-event (3:1 – 5; 4:4 – 6) that needs explaining.'

[4] E.P. Sanders 'dogmatic' account of Paul's argument is also question-begging, assuming a univocal understanding of the Christ-event when this is under dispute in Paul's scriptural argumentation; E.P. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1977), 484.

The argument of this chapter produces two important results for our thesis. First, it contributes to debates over the theological logic of Paul's reading of scripture and salvation-history in Gal 3 – 4 (and thus Galatians, in general) by showing why the current range of interpretive options do not adequately convey the *logic* of Paul's argument. Specifically, in debate with *4 Ezra*, we show that the current interpretations do not account both for: 1) how Paul can announce a necessary and inevitable curse on those who are 'of the works of the law' when the scriptural curse he appeals to in Dt 27:26 is contingent; and 2) why the law itself cannot itself provide the proper order for the life of the church. Second, in this connection, we go beyond Barclay's analysis of gift in Gal 3 – 4 by showing how, in debate with *4 Ezra*, a consideration of the Christ-gift as life-giving exposes, in his words, the 'submerged assumption' in Gal 3:21 – 22.[5] Specifically, we show both how the Torah confines humanity to a 'dead' existence in view of the divine donation of life in Christ and the Spirit and why the law itself is confined to 'dead' cosmic conditions.

Yet, as we noted in the previous chapter, further debate between our conversation partners and thus further clarification of Paul's argument in Galatians is possible still. For Paul's assumption that the recipients of the law are 'dead' (Gal 3:21) does not indicate why this is the case or what, specifically, he means by it. Moreover, if the Torah itself does not order the community of God, 4 Maccabees would want to know what *does* and how this relates to Paul's account of the life-giving Christ-gift. Thus, our account of the formal structure of Paul's theological logic in this chapter prepares for an argument about its material grounding in Gal 5 – 6, which, in turn, serves as a new argument for the thematic coherence of the letter.

4.1 Debating the Broken Middle: The Gift of Life at the Beginning or in the Midst of History? (Gal 3:1 – 22)

'It is quite true what philosophy says, that life must be understood backward. But then one forgets the principal proposition, that it must be *lived forward*.'[6] Kierkegaard's statement leads to a paradox: understanding life is impossible,

[5] J.M.G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 407.

[6] S. Kierkegaard, *Kierkegaard's Journals and Notebooks* (ed. B.H. Kirmmse et al.; Princeton: PUP, 2007), 179.

because there is never a stable point from which to look back.[7] In Galatians 3 and 4, Paul assumes a rupture in the flow of life, a definitive vantage-point from which both to evaluate the past and to live forward. This place is the Christ-event. Why, though, has the history of Israel and the cosmos inevitably converged on this point?

By the time Galatians and *4 Ezra* were written, Jewish thinkers had developed an array of strategies for dealing with the tensions between past revelation and present experience.[8] In diverse texts like *1 Enoch*, *Jubilees*, 2 *Maccabees*, *1 QS*, the *Wisdom of Solomon*, and *De Bello Judaico*, authors employed varied exegetical practices to discern in shared authoritative writings the patterns of divine dealings with human beings and nations, to explain the application of those patterns to current affairs and future prospects, and to seek after fresh and sometimes hidden revelatory insight into God's ways.[9] Galatians 3 – 4 and *4 Ezra* 3 – 10 are instances of this common discourse, and they exhibit not only extensive overlap in the texts they use, themes they develop, and cognate vocabulary they employ but they also share a similar overriding problem and, at a deep level, a similar logically structured way of solving it. Most generally, Galatians and *4 Ezra* deal explicitly with or assume the problems and solutions of revelatory theodicy[10]—how is the suffering experienced by God's people to be explained given his specific commitments, power, goodness, and fidelity? In this connection, the constraint of antecedent divine revelation introduces an additional problem: how does the new, definitive revelation relate to

[7] Ibid.: 'Which principle, the more one thinks it through, ends exactly with temporal life never being able to be properly understood, precisely because I can at no instant find complete rest to adopt the position: backward.'

[8] Cf. M.E. Stone, 'Reactions to Destructions of the Second Temple: Theology, Perception and Conversion', *JSJ* 12 (1981): 195 – 204.

[9] See the careful analysis in M. Bockmuehl, *Revelation and Mystery in Ancient Judaism and Pauline Christianity* (WUNT II 36; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1990).

[10] Given Paul's use of the noun ἀποκάλυψις twice (1:11; 2:1) and the verb ἀποκαλύπτω twice (1:16; 3:23) and, if we do not view 'apocalyptic eschatology' monolithically, it is fair to describe Galatians as exhibiting 'an apocalyptic construction of reality', in which the transcendence of cosmic, temporal, and spatial dualisms through revelation plays a key role in the argument. Cf. G.W.E. Nickelsburg, 'The Apocalyptic Construction of Reality in 1 Enoch', in *Mysteries and Revelations: Apocalyptic Studies since the Uppsala Colloquium* (ed. J.H. Charlesworth and J.J. Collins; JSP 9; Sheffield: JSOT, 1991), 51 – 64. For the state of the question on 'apocalyptic' and *4 Ezra*, see J.A. Moo, *Creation, Nature and Hope in 4 Ezra* (FRLANT 237; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011), 9 – 21; on Paul, J.P. Davies, *Paul Among the Apocalypses?: An Evaluation of the "Apocalyptic Paul" in the Context of Jewish and Christian Apocalyptic Literature* (LNTS 562; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2016), 1 – 38.

its antecedents, and why is it necessary at all?[11] Both texts resolve these problems by identifying a pattern of divine saving action that is common to both 'proto-' and 'meta-revelation'.[12] That is, God's previous revelatory commitments *only seem* to be contradicted by present experience. They have a deeper and fuller meaning, the fulfilment of which will resolve and explain the apparent conflict and reveal God's intention present *in nuce* all along.

In this section, we begin to trace the correspondence Paul identifies between 'proto-' and 'meta-revelation', arguing that he denies exegetically and theologically an identification of the Torah as the created and eschatological order of life. This becomes clear in debate with *4 Ezra* in four moves in Gal 3:1 – 22—presenting the gospel as pre-preached and pre-figured in Abraham (Gal 3:1 – 9); tracing exegetically the necessary movement from blessing, through inevitable curse on the Torah's practitioners, to the terminus of promised blessing and curse in Jesus' life-giving curse-bearing (Gal 3:10 – 14); limiting the Torah's horizon to history and denying its status as direct divine gift (Gal 3:15 – 20); and construing the Torah's cursing word as cosmic in scope and, thereby, integral to securing a 'dead' humanity in anticipation of the singular life-giving Christ-event (3:21, 22). Thus, whereas *4 Ezra* reads sacred text, salvation-history, and the cosmos in light of his conception of the divine gift of life as Torah-ordered and, thus, as the path through the present dying cosmos to its reversal in a coming *saeculum*, Paul identifies the Torah's function with confining humanity within the fallen, 'dead' cosmos and, thus, views it as integral but not identical to the divine life and its order prefigured in Abraham and given within history in the Christ-event. In this way, Paul argues exegetically *against* a creational and eschatological identification of the Torah as the order of life and invites questions about the hermeneutic by which he identifies the stable pattern of divine action within history, questions which he answers in Gal 3:23 – 4:31.

Consequently, the dialogical exegesis of this section produces two important general results for the argument of this chapter. Most importantly, it shows why

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[11] N.A. Dahl, 'Contradictions in Scripture', in *Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian Mission* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1977), 175.

[12] Bockmuehl, *Revelation and Mystery*, 126: 'New and old stand in a reciprocal relationship: new revelation is always meta-revelation, given shape and texture by a charismatic reading of the old; yet once accepted and accorded its rightful status, this new disclosure becomes in turn instrumental for the understanding of the old, the "proto-revelation"'; see further ibid., 29, 41, 110, 122, 229.

current construals of Paul's argument do not capture the logic of his argument. Sanders' contention that Paul argues dogmatically (and, as we shall see, the materially identical arguments of Martyn and de Boer) only exacerbates the problem of Paul's logic. For a mere appeal to divine saving action in the Christ-event only intensifies the problem of the cursing function of the law: *why* did things, given God's providence, have to be *this* way? Likewise, readings that appeal to the mere fact of Israel's failure as a nation to obey the law (Hays and Barclay), to the experience of the Spirit *simpliciter* (Hays and Dunn), or to Paul's pessimistic reading of salvation-history arising from Deuteronomy (Watson) do not explain why the curse was *inevitable*. In this connection, the initial contribution of this chapter has to do with clarifying what is required for a valid construal of Paul's theological logic. What needs explaining, in other words, is the logic that deems as necessary and inevitable the *particular pattern* of salvation-history in which the Abrahamic promise, the Deuteronomic curse, and the Christ-event are integrally related. As we shall see, such a pattern raises, for an author like *4 Ezra*, the question of the moral inability of the recipients of the law and divine culpability in not removing it—an issue that, we argue, Paul clearly addresses in assuming that recipients of the Torah are 'dead' (Gal 3:21). Second and in this connection, through exegetical dialogue with *4 Ezra*, this section shows how attention not just to the definition of gift in Galatians but a focus on the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering lays bare Paul's theological logic. For, we argue, Paul does not simply appeal to the unconditioned and incongruous character of the Christ-gift in Gal 3 – 4. Rather, by contending that the law *by divine design* confines its recipients to a 'dead' humanity in view of both the promise to Abraham and its fulfillment in the life-giving Christ-gift, Paul provides an argument for the *necessary* pattern of salvation-history. That is, Paul gives an argument for *why the Christ-gift is necessarily a gift for the unworthy*

Yet, this result does not signal a return without qualification to the various 'traditional' approaches to Paul's logic. For one must account for the reason, once inability is removed, that the law *cannot* provide the proper order of church life. In the next section, we argue that, by contending that the law itself is fitted for and confined to the 'dead' cosmic conditions of the fallen creation, Paul avoids begging the question of why the Christ-gift *necessarily* excludes the Torah as the proper order

of the church community. Likewise, by inviting *4 Ezra* to interrogate Paul's reading of the Pentateuch from the perspective of the Hagar and Sarah story, we present the hermeneutic by which Paul sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in history. In this last connection, we begin an account of the theological purpose of Gal 4:21 – 31, which prepares for our reading of this section in Chapter five as a thematic bridge to Gal 5 – 6. That argument is important because, in modifying Engberg-Pedersen's reading of the thematic coherence of the letter,[13] it is necessary both for our new account of that coherence and of the letter's theological logic.

4.1.1 Abraham: Righteous Recipient of Revelation or Prototype of the Good News? (3:1 – 9)

Galatians 3:1 marks the end of Paul's paradigmatic and indirect approach to the problems in Galatia: turning to address the Galatians directly, Paul states what was left unstated in 1:6 – 13. The one who called them in the gift (Gal 1:6) did so in the presentation of the good news of Christ crucified (Gal 3:1), and their receipt of the Spirit was conditioned not on observing the works of the Torah but through 'hearing in faith' (Gal 3:2, 5).[14] As in Jerusalem, so in Galatia: the Galatians should recognise the divine evaluation in the divine act and live accordingly. In Gal 3:1 – 5, however, Paul clarifies how this divine evaluation is recognised: it is the receipt (λαμβάνω, 3:2) of the Spirit (3:2) and observation of the Spirit's powers (δύναμις, 3:5) that signals the divine approbation. (That Paul configures the Spirit here as a gift is clear from his use of forms of λαμβάνω for the receipt of the good news [παραλαμβάνω, 1:9, 12] and the receipt of benefit's arising from the Christ-gift [λαμβάνω, 3:14; ἀπολαμβάνω, 4:5]. In other words, Paul uses receipt verbs for the good news about and the benefits that flow from the Christ-gift, and, for him, the Spirit *is* the gift promised to Abraham and received by faith in the Christ-gift [3:14].) Yet, as we argued in the previous chapter, the logical force of Paul's antithesis and, thus, the

[13] T. Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 133 – 34.

[14] Given both Paul's other uses of ἀκοή (1 Thess 2:13; Rom 10:16 – 17) and the explicit parallel here with Abraham's receipt of a promise from God and the public placarding of Christ crucified (3:1), ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως in Galatians 3:2, 5 should be translated 'the message received by faith' or 'the message that elicits faith' not 'the hearing of [i.e., that Christians call] faith'; *pace* S.K. Williams, 'The Hearing of Faith: ΑΚΟΗ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ in Galatians 3', *NTS* 35 (1989): 90. For the numerous ways of translating and interpreting the phrase, see H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* (14th ed.; KEK 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 121–22.

rhetorical question in Gal 3:3 are not entirely clear: why should the Galatians not view the works of the Torah as the shape of repentance, but rather as a refusal to continue in the Spirit in favour of 'being completed by the flesh' (σαρκὶ ἐπιτελεῖσθε)? It could be that Paul's answer is implicit in the very terms—πνεῦμα and σάρξ—he employs.

Be that as it may, he embarks on an exegetical argument in Gal 3:6 – 9 that begins with an identification between the Galatians and Abraham: just as Abraham believed God and it was counted to him as righteousness, so the Galatians hear the gospel in a trusting manner and receive the divine approbation. Thus, they are 'sons of Abraham' (3:7), the man to whom the good news was pre-preached—'in you shall all the nations be blessed' (3:8).[15] Likewise, Abraham is the one in whom the good news was prefigured—'those who are of faith are blessed with Abraham, the believing man' (3:9).[16] In the context of our debate with *4 Ezra*, this renders Abraham not a prototypical ideal to be imitated—a fitting recipient of divine revelation regarding the future, eschatological saving action like righteous Ezra—but, similar to Paul's exemplary calling (1:11 – 17), a prototypical recipient of and respondent to the unconditioned divine saving message as gift. Thus, whereas in *4 Ezra* Abraham's descendants are the 'righteous' in Torah-terms, for Paul, Abraham's descendants are those who depend on the divine promise and receive its fulfilment announced in the good news of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ.[17] As we observed in the previous chapter, however, Paul's antithetical argument—faith in Christ/works of the Torah—is a prejudicial construction. 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* each define the 'righteous' in terms of faith. They simply define that faith differently—i.e., as faith in God's Torah-ordered, life-giving benefaction in creation and salvation. So, Paul still

[15] On promise as pre-preaching, see e.g. S.K. Williams, 'The "Righteousness of God" in Romans', *JBL* 99 (1980): 264; J.R. Wisdom, *Blessing for the Nations and the Curse of the Law: Paul's Citation of Genesis and Deuteronomy in Gal 3.8 – 10* (WUNT II 133; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 142 – 43.

[16] On pre-preaching and pre-figurement, see G. Howard, *Paul: Crisis in Galatia: A Study in Early Christian Theology* (2nd ed.; SNTSMS 35; Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 54–56.

[17] O. Wischmeyer, 'Wie kommt Abraham in den Galaterbrief? Überlegungen zu Gal 3,6 – 29', in *Umstrittener Galaterbrief: Studien zur Situierung und Theologie des Paulus-Schreibens* (ed. M. Bachmann and B. Kollmann; BThST 106; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2010), 161: 'Abraham ist nach der Septuaginta der Stammvater Israels, und Israels Geschichte wird hier nicht aufgehoben, sondern im Gegenteil als Teil der Geschichte Gottes mit der Menschheit interpretiert. Abraham ist der Vater Israels *und* der „Vater vieler Völker."'

owes an account of why this antithesis is necessary, the logic of which begins to emerge in exegetical and theological argument in Gal 3:10 – 14.

4.1.2 The Formal Shape of Salvation-History: From Promise, through Inevitable Curse, to the Christ-Gift (3:10 – 14)

Interpreters have long struggled to make sense of the flow of Galatians 3:10 – 14, but, as we will see, this difficult section of Paul's argument raises key issues for an eschatological reader of salvation-history like *4 Ezra*, issues which Paul is addressing formally *seriatim*. In tracing the logic of these developments, I aim to expose the implied connections and assumptions of Paul's argument until we arrive at, as I will argue, the core disagreement over the manner of divine life-giving benefaction and its implications for humanity, society, and the cosmos.[18] This disagreement concerns Paul's conception of Jesus' death, not the Torah-ordered creation, as God's definitive life-giving and life-ordering gift. In vv. 10 – 14, Paul's configuration of those ἐξ ἔργων νόμου as inevitably cursed raises the question of moral inability for *4 Ezra*, while in Gal 3:19 – 22 Paul's restriction of the law's function to transgressions (*not* the criterion for discriminating righteous from unrighteous) and his assumption that the recipients of the law are 'dead' implies an affirmative answer to this question.

In Galatians 3:10, the language of curse naturally follows that of blessing (cf. Gen 12:3, Dt 30:19), but Paul uses this curse language as a logical support (γάρ) to his previous argument in Galatians 3:6 – 9. Thus, Abraham's blessing rests on those who are ἐκ πίστεως, because those who are ἐξ ἔργων νόμου are under a curse (3:10). Likewise, as a number of scholars recognise, this curse language is only one aspect of what might be called the Deuteronomically inflected language of the argument in 3:10 – 14, as the initial motifs of blessings/cursing are combined in vv. 11 and 12 with the life/death[19] pair they share only in Dt 30:19.[20] The rhetorical force of this

[18] R.B. Matlock, 'Helping Paul's Argument Work? The Curse of Galatians 3.10 – 14', in *Torah in the New Testament* (ed. M. Tait and P. Oakes; LNTS 401; London: T&T Clark, 2009), 176: '*Any* reading of these verses will have to contend with gaps in Paul's argument, however it is construed.'

[19] Though Wakefield is correct to point out that the intertextual 'ungrammaticality' in vv. 11 – 12 is not self-interpreting (149, 172 – 74), the absence of the 'death' term (142 – 43) does not necessarily support his conclusion that we have here a choice not between 'death and life' but between 'life and life' (173)—viz., an emphasis on the order of life (ethics) rather than the gaining of life (soteriology). As we observed with eschatologically inflected texts like 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, the pragmatics of

inflection matches a theological purpose, for, not only are the promises (3:6, 8) now filtered through a Deuteronomic frame, but the curse now lies between the promise(s) and fulfilment in the Chirst-event (3:10 'blocks' vv. 13 – 14). Finally, we should note that Paul's activation of this Deuteronomic curse motif[21] is very carefully constructed, involving at least the citations in 3:10 – 13 in a chiastic pattern with the language of 'life' at the center.[22] These three features of the structure of Paul's argument—the overlap of Abrahamic blessing and Deuteronomic curse as an extension of the antithetical relation between those ἐκ πίστεως and those ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, the transposition of the Abrahamic language into a Deuteronomic key with the language of life/death, and the chiasm with the keyword ζήσεται at the center—produce not only a relation between Abrahamic promise and Deuteronomic curse (3:9, 10) but a corresponding relation between these two and the Christ-event. In other words, in Paul's way of constructing his argument and his citations, there is a carefully choreographed movement—from the combination of the divine crediting

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these syntagms entails that one term in these binaries implies its opposite. Thus, the alternatives life and life are significant because of their respective eschatological ends—either salvation (life) or condemnation (death). Wakefield struggles with this issue when he concedes that 'where one lives' has soteriological implications (144, n. 44; 173, n. 128; 174; 176 – 77, n. 141), but he never spells these out and continues to strongly separate soteriology from moral order in numerous places (e.g, 144 – 45, 167, 170, 176, 177, 184). If, however, we place Paul's argument in the context of various construals of divine life-giving benefaction, then the *integral* relation between life as existence and life as order becomes clear. 'Where one lives' is a function of where and how one receives life, for Paul and the authors of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. On 'ungrammaticality', see A.H. Wakefield, *Where to Live: The Hermeneutical Significance of Paul's Citations from Scripture in Galatians 3:1 – 14* (AcBib 14; Atlanta: SBL, 2003), 122 – 30; for his account of Gal 3:10 – 14, see ibid., 131 – 88.

[20] On the pairs 'life/death', 'good/evil', and 'blessing/curse' in Dt 30:15, 19 (LXX), see Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 466–67. On the Deuteronomic inflection of language in 3:10 – 14, see, e.g., J.M. Scott, 'Paul's Use of Deuteronomic Tradition', *JBL* 112 (1993): 657 – 59; idem, '"For as Many as Are of Works of the Law are Under a Curse" (Galatians 3:10) ', in *Paul and the Scriptures of Israel* (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; JSNTSup 83; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993), 195; A. Gignac, 'Citation de Lévitique 18,5 en Romains 10,5 et Galates 3,12: Deux lectures différentes des rapports Christ-Torah? ', *EgT* 25 (1994): 384 – 85.

[21] For the argument that Paul cites Dt 27:26 here in the context of a Deuteronomic interpretation of Israel's history, see Scott, 'For as Many', 194 – 195; N.T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 137 – 156. Watson's analysis (*Hermeneutics*, 394 – 96) of Paul's adapted citation demonstrates that Paul's phrase ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου adapts phraseology from Dt 28:58, 61; 29:20; and 30:10 in such a way that, with Deuteronomy, Paul affirms that 'the law's curse represents the destiny of the entire people, and not just of individual law-breakers'. On Paul's modifications in this citation, see also C.D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature* (SNTSMS 74; Cambridge: CUP, 1992), 238–43; D.A. Koch, *Die Schrift als Zeuge des Evangeliums: Untersuchungen zur Verwendung und zum Verständnis der Schrift bei Paulus* (BHT 69; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1986), 164–65.

[22] On the chiasm, see e.g. Gignac, 'Citation de Lévitique', 381; Koch, *Die Schrift als Zeuge*, 120; Stanley, *Paul and Language*, 239.

of Abraham's righteous status based on faith (3:6) and the pre-preaching of the gospel to Abraham (3:8) through the Deuteronomic curse (3:10) to the 'resolution' of both blessing and curse in the Christ-event (3:13, 14).

One significant result of Paul's movement from blessing to cursing in vv. 9 and 10 is that it produces two mutually exclusive general classes of people. This is so because the blessing on those who are ἐκ πίστεως and the curse on those who are ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, though assigned to general classes and not specific people or groups here, are themselves realised[23] and categorical[24] in character—Ὅσοι γὰρ ἐξ ἔργων νόμου εἰσίν, ὑπὸ κατάραν εἰσίν. The parallels between Paul's biblical citations and the current states they produce combine to create this actual and categorical textual logic. Just as the Abrahamic blessing will *be* for πάντα τὰ ἔθνη (3:8), so it *is* οἱ ἐκ πίστεως who *are* blessed (3:9). Likewise, though with an inversion of the order of statement and citation, 'as many as are' ἐξ ἔργων νόμου *are* under a curse, because Dt 27:26 proclaims 'accursed [are] all who do not remain in all the words in the book of the law to do them' (ἐπικατάρατος πᾶς ὃς οὐκ ἐμμένει πᾶσιν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐν τῷ βιβλίῳ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ποιῆσαι αὐτά, 3:10). Yet, while the promise and fulfilment structure in v. 8 that leads to the blessed status of οἱ ἐκ πίστεως in v.9 depends on the activity of God—'the Scripture' pre-preached the gospel in the promise because it foresaw (προοράω) *God's justification* of the gentiles by faith—the cursed status of ἐξ ἔργων νόμου depends not on a divine promise but on the contingent curse of Dt 27:26.

This leads us to the second major feature emerging from Paul's construction of statement and citation in 3:10 – 14. Both blessing for those ἐκ πίστεως and curse for

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[23] This is not the threat of a curse. *Contra* C.D. Stanley, '"Under a Curse": a Fresh Reading of Galatians 3:10 – 14', *NTS* 36 (1990): 481 – 511. As Avemarie observes, ὑπὸ κατάραν is an 'inversion' of the LXX phrase κατάρα ἐπί (τινα) (cf. Gn 27:12f; Dt. 28:15, 45; Jdg 9:57; Mal 2:2; Dn 9:11)—the latter referring to actual cursing, the former to the actual state of being cursed; F. Avemarie, 'Paul and the Claim of the Law According to the Scripture: Leviticus 18:5 in Galatians 3:12 and Romans 10:5', in *The Beginnings of Christianity: a Collection of Articles* (ed. J. Pastor and M. Mor; Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 2005), 139, n. 48. Moreover, however one construes the saving significance of Jesus' death in 3:13, that death resolves an actual curse 'for us', and, thus, as Watson observes (*Hermeneutics*, 392, n. 29), 'show[s] the curse to be a reality that had to be removed in order for the blessing to be realized'. Wakefield and Hays follow Stanley on this issue to the detriment of their readings; Wakefield, *Where to Live*, 179–80; Hays, *Galatians*, 258.

[24] Since, as we argued in the previous chapter, Dunn's reduction of 'works of the law' to boundary markers is not convincing, we should not make relative that which Paul has deemed categorical. For critique of Dunn's interpretation of 3:10 – 14, see Matlock, 'Helping? ', 162 – 66.

those ἐξ ἔργων νόμου are *inevitable*.[25] Because the story Paul is telling is universally encompassing—including not only all humans, but *all things* (3:22)—if it is true, it is necessarily true. In this respect, because both the Abrahamic promise and the Deuteronomic curse reach their *telos* in the Christ-event (3:13, 14), and Christ's 'resolution' of the curse in his death is necessary for the distribution of the blessing, then, not only is the curse inevitable, but it is *necessarily so.* That this is Paul's perspective is clear from the fact that he includes in his reading of salvation-history the blessing promised through Abraham for the gentiles as a matter of *divine unconditioned* promise and saving intention.[26] Moreover, since Paul has aligned the oppositions ἐκ πίστεως and ἐξ ἔργων νόμου to the categorical oppositions of blessing and curse, respectively, and since blessing is inevitable for the former, curse must likewise be inevitable for the latter. Yet, this raises a question: how is it that Dt 27:26 functions, for Paul, like his mixed citation of Gen 12:3 and 18:18, in the realm of necessity when the former curse is contingent (based on human obedience) and the latter blessing is necessary (based on divine action)? That is, what is needed in order to understand Paul's logic is an account of *why* the contingent curse of Dt 27:26 on those who *do not observe the law* is *inevitably* realized for those who are ἐξ ἔργων νόμου. This logical gap between Gal 3:10a and 10b requires explaining not only for modern interpreters but also for would-be ancient Jewish debating partners like *4 Ezra*.

On the logical relation between Galatians 3:10a and 10b, Luther famously remarked, '*Sunt ergo omnino duae pugnantes sententiae Pauli et Mosi*.'[27] Paul places those who do the works of the law under a curse, while Moses curses those who do not do the law.[28] To provide a comprehensive overview of the various ways of handling this 'conflict' is neither possible nor necessary here. There are several excellent accounts of the options,[29] and, for our purposes, we are concerned only

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[25] Rightly, Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 395.

[26] Matlock, 'Helping? ', 171: '*Whether* the 'blessing' would reach the Gentiles was never in doubt or jeopardy—unless the divine promise (v. 8) is to be doubted.'

[27] *W.A.* 40.I. Band, 2, 396.

[28] Given the assumption of the integral relation between identity and practice we have seen thus far in Galatians and the clear emphasis on *observing the law's* commandments in the two citations Paul uses to support his argument (Dt 27:26; Lev 18:5), Hays' (*Galatians*, 258) reduction of the curse to 'those whose identity is derived from the works of the law' *to the exclusion* of the law's practices is unconvincing.

[29] On 3:10 – 14, as a whole, see Stanley, 'Under a Curse', 481 – 86; Wakefield, *Where to Live*, 11 – 56; Matlock, 'Helping? ', 154 – 176. On 3:12, see Sprinkle, *Law and Life*, 142–52.

with surveying how various interpretations construe the logic of necessity at work in Paul's argument in order to show how comparison with *4 Ezra* illumines Paul's logic. Since Luther, the dominant interpretation of these verses has posited an unstated premise[30] between 10a and 10b regarding the impossibility of the fulfilment of Dt 27:26 due to a pessimistic view of human nature, either in a 'quantitative' sense (no one can do *all* that the law requires), a 'qualitative' sense (no one does the law *properly*), or both.[31]

This view still has defenders,[32] but has been displaced since the work of Krister Stendahl and E.P. Sanders. Not only did the law itself not require sinless perfection (cultic atonement!),[33] but Paul, given Philippians 3:6, seems to think that he was quite capable of meeting the law's requirements.[34] Sanders himself interpreted Gal 3:10 – 14 in line with his broader assessment that Paul's arguments about the law were 'dogmatic' in character,[35] arguing that the citation of Dt. 27:26 serves as a proof-text by which Paul buttresses his main argument that righteousness and life are by faith in Christ.[36] J. Louis Martyn and Martinus de Boer have recently argued along similarly dogmatic lines: on the assumption that Dt 27:26 is likely a threat from the Teachers, for Martyn, Paul here 'removes the distinction' between those who obey and those who do not and construes the law's function as only to curse.[37] For de Boer, the citation of the curse of the law, given its universal

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[30] Burton, *Galatians*, 164.

[31] For the language of 'quantitative' and 'qualitative' fulfilment, see H. Hübner, *Law in Paul's Thought* (trans. by J.C.G. Greg; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), 18 – 24, 37 – 41, 82, 105, 122. Reading Gal 3:10 in light of 5:19ff., Hübner concludes: '*Quantitative fulfillment is not possible because the Torah contains stipulations which must be 'qualitatively' fulfilled*' (41, ital. orig.). Bultmann combined both, though the latter was the anthropological basis for the former. R. Bultmann, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (7th ed.; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1977), 1.264 – 5: 'kein Mensch kann seine 'Gerechtigkeit' durch Gesetzeswerke erlangen—nämlich eben weil er diese nicht vorweisen kann' and 'weil das Bemühen des Menschen, durch Erfüllung des Gesetzes sein Heil zu gewinnen, ihn nur in die Sünde hineinfürht, ja im Grunde selber schon die Sünde ist'.

[32] R.H. Gundry, 'Grace, Works, and Staying Saved in Paul', *Bib* 66 (1985): 1 – 38; T.R. Schreiner, 'Paul and Perfect Obedience to the Law: An Evaluation of the View of E.P. Sanders', *WTJ* 47 (1985): 245 – 78; G.P. Waters, *The End of Deuteronomy in the Epistles of Paul* (WUNT II 221; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 93 – 100.

[33] E.P. Sanders, *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 28: 'It would…be extraordinarily un-Pharisaic and even un-Jewish of Paul to insist that obedience of the law, once undertaken, must be perfect. Such a position would directly imply that the means of atonement specified in Scripture itself were of no avail.'

[34] Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews*, 7–23.

[35] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 483, nn. 37, 484.

[36] Sanders, *Paul, the Law*, 21–27.

[37] J.L Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 311.

jurisdiction, suggests that Paul's opponents themselves are under the law's curse![38] Unlike Sanders, for Martyn and de Boer, Paul is *reverse* proof-texting here—gliding over the contingent nature of the curse in his use of his opponents' citation—in order to buttress his previous and real argument. As de Boer states it, 'The curse falls on observers as well as nonobserver [*sic*] (or imperfect observer) of the law…thus on everyone who is not "in Christ Jesus" (v. 14a), and '[t]his either/or has been created by the coming of Christ and his Spirit…'[39]

James Scott and N.T. Wright have advocated another cluster of approaches that accepts the critique of Stendhal and Sanders yet still seeks to explain the logical gap in Gal 3:10 by what might be termed a 'Deuteronomic' or 'Redemptive-Historical' approach to the presumed plight in which Paul sees in the present reality of Israel the historical realization of the curse of exile in Deuteronomy.[40] Thus, those who are 'of the works of the law' are cursed, as Hays remarks, 'not because obedience is theoretically impossible, but because Israel historically has failed and has in fact incurred the judgement of which Deuteronomy solemnly warns.'[41] On this reading, the inevitability of incurring a curse for those who are 'of the works of the law' is a function of Israel's present cursed state—in Hays's problematic terms of 'joining a losing team.'[42] Francis Watson made a significant advance on this

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[38] M.C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 200 – 01.

[39] Ibid., 201–2. This way of reading Galatians 3:10 in the context of vv. 1 – 14 is, formally, quite similar to that of Sanders (*Paul, the Law*, 22), who concludes that v. 10 'announces the negative proof of the positive statement of 3.8'.

[40] See e.g. Scott, 'For as Many'; Wright, *Climax*, 137 – 56. For Scott's development of this typological understanding elsewhere in Paul, see J.M. Scott, *Adoption as Sons of God: An Exegetical Investigation into the Background of υἱοθεσία in the Pauline Corpus* (WUNT II 48; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992); Scott, 'Paul's Use of Deuteronomic Tradition'. Two significant forerunners of this family of approaches are M. Noth, 'For All Who Rely On Works of the Law Are Under a Curse', in *The Laws in the Pentateuch and Other Studies* (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1966), 118 – 31; O.H. Steck, *Israel und das gewaltsame Geschick der Propheten: Untersuchungen zur Überlieferung des deuteronomistischen Geschichtsbildes im Alten Testament, Spätjudentum und Urchristentum* (WMANT 23; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1967).

[41] Hays, *Galatians*, 258–59.

[42] Ibid., 259. Though the argument for a wide acceptance of the view has been rightly criticised, it is the case that a number of Jewish groups in antiquity considered Israel to be still, in some sense, under God's 'curse' or in 'exile'. For example, Philo, at the end of *De praemiis et poenis* (164 – 72), uses Deuteronomic exile-restoration categories to envision a time of the diaspora's return from exile both in terms of the flourishing of virtue and the restoration of flourishing in the land. On the significance of exile and restoration as categories of thought in Paul, see Wright, *Climax*, 137 – 156; Scott, 'Paul's Use of Deuteronomic Tradition'. For a recent critical elaboration, see R.J. Morales, *The Spirit and the Restoration of Israel: New Exodus and New Creation Motifs in Galatians* (WUNT II 282; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 78–114.

approach by arguing that Paul's interpretation of the curse as universal, necessary, and inevitable arises both from his reading of the present state of the Jewish people *and* from his reading of Deuteronomy itself, which, Watson argues, already envisions the inevitable spread of the curse on individuals to the nation as a whole.[43] Paul is not the only, or even the first, pessimist!

How might our debate with *4 Ezra* help us understand the logic of Galatians 3:10? In most general terms, Paul's announcement of a necessary and inevitable curse on those who are of the works of the law is quite similar to Ezra's opening construal of Israel's plight. *4 Ezra* rarely uses the language of blessing, never the language of curse. But the reality of curse is evident and debated throughout.[44] Moreover, as we saw in the chapter two, Ezra's opening salvo articulates an indiscriminate and inevitable *infirmitas*, but, unlike Gal 3:10, *4 Ezra* seeks to explain its inevitability in explicitly anthropological and theological terms. It is the *moral* inability of human beings arising from their Adamic heritage combined with God's refusal to remove the *cor malignum* that leads inevitably to a cycle of life-sin-judgement in Israel's history (3:8 – 27). This does not, of course, prove that Paul is implying moral inability here, but it does highlight that, in a reading of sacred text and salvation-history that seeks to identify a stable pattern, it is not enough simply to identify the pattern. The author of *4 Ezra*, feels the need to explain *why* things had to happen *this* way, and Ezra's anthropological pessimism provides the opening explanation that is simultaneously a chief catalyst for the intricate debate that follows. Moreover, as we have demonstrated, the angel Uriel establishes two key points in his initial reframing of Ezra's opening charge: the first is anthropological--the deficiencies of the human condition are mortality and epistemological incapacity, not moral inability (4:10, 11; cf. 7:72, 73, 92; 9:11); the second is national and cosmological—the decline of Israel is a function of the present fallen cosmos (4:26 - 32), which, like an ageing mother whose womb is beginning to die, is likewise producing weaker and feebler children (5:51 – 55). Thus, *4 Ezra* would be very likely to hear Gal 3:10 in anthropological, national, and cosmological terms, and Uriel

[43] Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 394–96.

[44] As Uriel summarises: 'when Adam transgressed my [God's] ordinances, what was made was judged' (*quando transgressus est Adam constitutiones meas iudicatum est quod factum est*, *4 Ezra* 7:11).

would be keen to force Paul not only to clarify the relations between these three, but would also require an account of the *necessity* of these relations.

The resolution of these matters, if it is possible, depends on a convincing reading of the remainder of Paul's argument, but there are a few preliminary observations that can be made about the interpretive options outlined above. The apocalyptic or 'dogmatic' reading would only compound the problems of *4 Ezra*, for an appeal to divine sovereignty only *exacerbates* the problem of the law's cursing function. We might imagine, Ezra asking, '*Why* did things have to happen this way, O God?' As we will argue below, the attempt to evade the force of this question by separating the law from God is not convincing. The Deuteronomic reading, especially the pessimistically inflected version of Watson, might suggest sin as the cause, but again, this would invite the question of necessity. Even granting an extension of Dt 27:26's curse on individuals to the nation itself,[45] this Deuteronomic hermeneutic (even if given an inherently pessimistic pattern) does not explain why the *nation* itself was *inevitably* cursed. (This logical problem was obvious to the author of *4 Ezra,* who introduces the world-as-womb metaphor to explain the decline of Israel in the terms of the declining cosmos). As John Barclay remarks of Paul, we could have here 'simply a sense that Israel's history proved her collective and persistent incapacity to be obedient.'[46] But this is where Ezra *begins*, and, for him, it invites the further explanations of moral incapacity and divine negligence in removing it. In other words, it seems that Paul is not only applying the Deuteronomic pattern to interpret the present realities of Israel vis-à-vis the Christ-event or even that he is making the prophetic connections, but rather he is arguing for the necessity and inevitability of the *particular pattern* in which the Abrahamic promise, the Deuteronomic curse, and the Christ-event are integrally related. An appeal to historical fact or even prophetic pessimism is not sufficient for producing an *inevitable* redemptive-historical pattern. For we must ask: why did Israel inevitably end up in this position, and why is repentance and restoration *within* the terms of the Torah not possible? Thus, *4 Ezra* would very likely assume that Paul, as in the 'traditional' interpretations, is implying moral inability in Gal 3:10, for that is

[45] Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 396.
[46] Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 405 – 06, n. 39.

where *Ezra* begins. And, as we will see, (definitively in the next chapter), there are good reasons to think that this assumption is correct, though not for the reasons typically given by the family of 'traditional' explanations. For it is not just that the recipients of the law are 'dead' (3:21) but that the law itself is fitted to and '*expects*' this estate, being *for transgressions* (3:19), for cursing (3:22), and confined to, in certain respects, the 'weak and worthless elements' (4:9).[47]

From the perspective of *4 Ezra*, Paul's antithetical expansion on v. 10 in vv. 11 and 12 and the scriptural support he adduces for it only adds to *4 Ezra's* previous suspicion that Paul is assuming moral inability. In Gal 3:11 Paul makes the eschatological result of the inevitable curse explicit, but it is the alternative that is 'clear' (δῆλος) for him that is his main point: 'Because by the law no one will be justified by God, it is clear that the one who is righteous by faith will live (ὅτι δὲ ἐν νόμῳ οὐδεὶς δικαιοῦται παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, δῆλον ὅτι *ὁ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται*).[48] Given the inevitable curse, Paul's statement that justification will not be 'by law' would not surprise the author of *4 Ezra*, though he would resist it. The implication Paul identifies, however, in Hab 2:4 would be more than a little puzzling, and this puzzlement would turn quickly into bewilderment upon hearing Gal 3:12. For there Paul places those characterised by faith in antithesis not only to those by law, but he proves this with a quotation of Lev 18:5: 'the law is not of faith' (ὁ δὲ νόμος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ πίστεως, 12a) 'but the one who does these things will live by them' (ἀλλ' *ὁ ποιήσας αὐτὰ ζήσεται ἐν αὐτοῖς*, 12b). As we have seen, for *4 Ezra*, a person is *justus/* δίκαιος precisely *per fidem* or *per opera* as a matter of trust in and obedience to God's gift of Torah-ordered life (*4 Ezra* 9:7 – 13). Thus for interpreters and for *4 Ezra*, one of the key

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[47] Thus, though he recognises the significance of Paul's death and life language and places the law with the old, weak age, Morales interpretation of Gal 3 – 6 (*Spirit and Restoration*, 78 - 163) does not account for the *logic* of Paul's argument.

[48] This translation follows the growing list of interpreters who place the comma before rather than after δῆλον, primarily due to the long gap between the first ὅτι and the tendency of δῆλος to precede and modify the nearest ὅτι; cf. R.B. Hays, *The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1 – 4:11* (2nd ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 207; F. Thielman, *From Plight to Solution: A Jewish Framework for Understanding Paul's View of the Law in Galatians and Romans* (NTSup 61; Leiden: Brill, 1989), 127 – 28; Wakefield, *Where to Live*, 162 – 67; 207 – 14; S. Westerholm, *Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The 'Lutheran' Paul and His Critics* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 303, n. 15. For the argument that ἐκ πίστεως derives solely from Paul's citation of Hab 2:4 and cannot, therefore, be interpreted messianically, see F. Watson, 'By Faith (of Christ): An Exegetical Dilemma and its Scriptural Solution', in *The Faith of Jesus Christ: Exegetical, Biblical, and Theological Studies* (ed. M.F. Bird and P. Sprinkle; Peabody: Hendrickson, 2009), 147 – 63. *Contra* Hays, *Faith*, 137–38, 177–81.

questions in the interpretation of these verses concerns the inferential logic of verse 12: why is 'the doing of the law' not 'of faith'?

The answer, as we argued in the previous chapter, depends on the fact that 'faith', in Paul, is typically 'faith in Christ'.[49] What a debate with *4 Ezra* illumines is the *particular logical* force of Paul's christocentric definition of faith. In other words, it helps us see why Hab 2:4 is the natural alternative, for Paul, to the recognition that justification is not by the law.[50] In episode three of *4 Ezra*, the debate centers on two alternate conceptions of God's eschatological benefactions: Ezra appeals to God's care for the unworthy after the fall to argue for the unconditioned gift of eschatological life, while Uriel insists on strict equity at the judgment according to the law and thus the gift of eschatological life only for the Torah-worthy. With respect to the former, Ezra alternates between sheer appeals to undeserved mercy and appeals for mercy on the unworthy on the basis of the substitution or intercession of the righteous. Thus, *4 Ezra's* conception of God's donation of eschatological gifts has a logically binary structure. In this connection, in the context of Gal 3:11, 12, Paul's appeal to Hab 2:4 is an appeal to a text that does not predicate righteousness on the condition of observance of the Torah, which allows him to read Hab 2:4 as an *unconditioned* ascription of righteousness. This ascription is, for Paul, on the basis of the intercession or substitution of the Christ-gift received by faith. Thus, what the debate in *4 Ezra* shows us is that Paul's Christocentric definition of faith is simultaneously a denial of the possibility of Torah-reckoned conceptions of worth for an eschatological interpreter of 'life' texts. That is, for Paul to place unconditioned righteousness by faith in Christ in opposition to works of the law necessarily precludes the possibility of the sort of Torah-righteousness an eschatological reader of 'life' texts like *4 Ezra* depends on to argue for strict equity at the eschaton. For this reason the author of *4 Ezra* would resist Paul's definition of faith *to the exclusion* of doing the law because of what he believes both about the

[49] Eckstein, *Verheissung und Gesetz*, 138.

[50] Avemarie's contention that Paul does not make anything of an eschatological and soteriological reading of Lev. 18:5 at this point in his argument is well taken, but his own recognition that Paul explicitly denies this interpretation in 3:21 belies Avemarie's assertion ('Claim of the Law', 140 – 1) that Paul '*consciously ignored*' [ita. orig.] this soteriological perspective. Rather, Paul presents an argument against this view *throughout* Gal 3:15 – 4:7, the formal structure of which is summarised in Gal 3:6 – 14.

enduring efficacy of God's gift and ordering of creational life and the just return of that life at the eschaton for the worthy. If Paul is arguing against such an eschatological reader of Lev 18:5, as we shall argue in the remainder of this chapter, this means that Paul's logic in Galatians is not reducible to a general antithesis between divine and human agency.[51] *4 Ezra* is as emphatic as Galatians on the priority of divine saving action; they differ in their identification of *which* divine act constitutes the donation of life (creation or Christ-event) and, thus, how recipients of that life are configured. The force of Paul's Christocentric definition of faith for the author of *4 Ezra* is that, in construing the divine donation of eschatological life as an act of unconditioned *mercy*, Paul configures human recipients, even those who have the law, as *unworthy*. In this way, he makes a Torah-righteous exemplar like Ezra impossible *by definition*.

The force of Gal 3:11, 12 is further clarified when we analyse how 'faith' and the 'doing the law' function in the logic of the divine gift of life at work in *4 Ezra*. As we have argued, in *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees, to believe is to recognise the divine order of created and eschatological life in the covenantal relationship *and* to act according to it. Conversely, as Uriel's apparent gloss on Deuteronomy 30:19 in 7:21 suggests, failure to do what has been commanded is akin to neglect of the 'law of God' (*Dei lex*) set before all humanity (7:20). Thus, when Paul articulates a strong antithesis between faith and doing the law, he both destabilises *4 Ezra's* account of created and covenantal life and invites the deeper question of how he understands the divine donation and ordering of life.[52] If Paul is correct, however, and all who are of the works of the law are under an inevitable curse, then, as we saw in Paul's paradigmatic story in Gal 1:11 – 2:21, either the law is not the standard of

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[51] *Pace* Sprinkle, *Law and Life*, 133–64.

[52] This question exposes the chief problem for most redemptive-historical readings of Galatians 3 – 4, including those that adopt an Exile-Restoration schema. For the receipt of the eschatological Spirit is not self-interpreting (3:1 – 5), appeal to the receipt of the Spirit by faith does not explain why the Torah itself does not represent the proper order of pneumatological life (3:6 – 9), and appeal to the Christ-gift as the removal of the curse and the inauguration of eschatological salvation does not explain how the Torah is related to this or why Torah-order is excluded from it (3:10 – 14). See, e.g., J. Willitts, 'Context Matters: Paul's Use of Leviticus 18:5 in Galatians 3:12', *TynBul* 54 (2003): 105 – 22. Scott Hafemann seeks to integrate the anthropological and cosmological realities that make the historical pattern necessary, but with mixed results, as he regularly mentions the 'dawn' of the new age without explaining why the law was an integral factor in the problems of the old age; S.J. Hafemann, 'Paul and the Exile of Israel in Galatians 3 – 4', in *Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian Conceptions* (ed. J.M. Scott; JSJSup 56; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 329 – 71.

eschatological order, or no one meets this standard, or both. From *4 Ezra's* point of view, if the curse remains on those who received the law, then we are back with Ezra in episode one, viewing salvation-history as an inevitable cycle of divinely ordered and governed perdition. Moreover, it is possible that a critique of an eschatological reading of Lev 18:5 (or Dt 30:15 – 20) in terms very similar to those of *4 Ezra* is implicit in Paul's argument, thus far. For it is Uriel's argument for the created freedom of the self and the two-ages framework that leads Ezra to recognise that the problem was Israel's failure to 'keep' (*servo*, *4 Ezra* 9:32) the law that had been given to and *sown* in them (*semino*, 9:33); Ezra's recognition that the law, nevertheless, produces enduring fruit (for those who keep it) prepares for the vision of righteous (9:32), vindicated Zion. So, in announcing an inevitable curse (3:10) in relation to keeping the law (3:12) and in the context of a denial that justification is on the basis of the law (3:11), Paul, at least implicitly, denies the creational and eschatological framework Uriel struggled to get Ezra to adopt. As we shall see, this denial becomes explicit in Paul's rejection of the hypothetical possibility that a life-giving law had been given in Gal 3:21, 22.

In any case, by the end of v. 12, *4 Ezra* would be insisting that, if faith is not trust in and obedience to the Torah-ordered created life that leads to eschatological life as a return gift from God, then what is the object of faith and how is this related to the divine donation of life? [53] Paul's answer to this fundamental question is found *in nuce* in Galatians 3:13, 14, and a comparison with *4 Ezra* helps us see how. For Paul, the Christ-gift removes the curse and releases the eschatological blessing, and, thus, *it is this gift that reveals the order of covenantal history and eschatological destiny*. For it is only in and through Jesus' curse-bearing death that the Abrahamic blessing 'might come' (γένηται) to the gentiles *and* that 'we might receive' (λάβωμεν, 3:14) the promised Spirit through faith. Given the fact that the removal of the curse is 'for us' (3:13),[54] it is very likely that Paul considers the law's curse universally applicable

[53] Dahl ('Contradictions ', 171), notes that the contradiction in 3:11, 12 would not have been problematic for most Jews in antiquity. The contradiction is created, for Paul, because 'faith' means 'faith in the crucified Messiah'.

[54] *Contra* T.L. Donaldson, 'The "Curse of the Law" and the Inclusion of the Gentiles: Galatians 3:13-14', *NTS* 32 (1986): 94 – 100; Wright, *Climax*, 143, Paul does not have Jewish Christians in view, but Jewish and Gentile believers. As we will argue below, the key conceptual linkage between Jewish experience of life ὑπὸ νόμον and Gentile life is that they have a fallen existence in common, a life that,

and, thus, inevitable. Likewise, Paul's configuration of the receipt of the Spirit as the focal benefit of the receipt of the Christ-gift in fulfillment of the Abrahamic promise raises the issue of how exactly Paul understands the universal and inevitable curse. As we shall, argue that issue is resolved by Paul, formally, in his hypothetical consideration of the law as a life-giving gift in Gal 3:21.

With Paul's identification of the Christ-gift as the divine saving action in history, the scope and complexity of our debate with *4 Ezra* widens considerably. But at just this point the debate also clarifies several fundamental features of Gal 3:10 – 14. For the author of *4 Ezra's* first objection to Paul here would concern the representative and substitutionary character of the Christ-gift. In response to Ezra's query about the possibility of the righteous interceding for the ungodly on the day of judgement (7:102 – 103), Uriel appeals to the biblical prohibition[55] against vicarious blessing and punishment to argue that, on the day of judgement, even intercession will cease (7:105 – 115). This principle both raises the stakes of the Mosaic choice between life and death and forms the basis of Uriel's denial of divine mercy on the unworthy in episode three, but, in a debate over Gal 3:13, it would provide the primary thrust against Paul's construal of the pattern of salvation-history: how can one person die in the place of another? Moreover, why is this *necessary* for Jew and Gentile alike?

As we saw in our discussion of 4 Maccabees, one way of construing the logic of divine saving action in history, specifically when mercy for the unworthy is required, is by seeing it through a cultic lens. The Maccabean martyrs, following the exemplar Eleazar, died noble deaths not only for the sake of piety (6:20) but also, appealing to the divine mercy (ἵλεως, 6:28), as an exchange of life (ἀντίψυχος). The martyrs received the divine punishment the people deserved (6:28), while the people received the 'life' (ψυχή) the martyrs deserved (6:29). The vital point for our purposes, and as a hypothetical Pauline response to *4 Ezra*, is that these representative and substitutionary deaths are *self-offerings* and that they, thus, extend

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apart from the Christ-event, is conducive only to sin, futility, and death. For a related argument without this specific support, see Westerholm, *Perspectives*, 414–17.

[55] Cf. Dt 24:16; Jer 31:30; and esp. Ezek 18:1 – 32. If we note that words ἀδικία and ἀνομία are synonymous in the context, the language of the last two clauses of *4 Ezra* 7:105 seems inspired by the end of Ezek 18:20: δικαιοσύνη δικαίου ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔσται, καὶ ἀνομία ἀνόμου ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν ἔσται.

by analogy the divinely ordained gift economy of sacrificial mercy. In other words, Paul might rebut the author of *4 Ezra's* objection by noting that the prohibitions against vicarious blessing and judgement serve the normal course of divine justice by protecting against its *perversion* (the innocent should not be *forced* to die for the wicked), but Jesus gave *himself* 'for our sins' (Gal 1:4), 'for [Paul]' (2:20), and 'for us '(3:13) *precisely* in accord with his own will[56] and that of God the Father (1:4). In short, just as in Lev 17, it is a matter of the divine prerogative to have mercy on sinners, so in the Christ-gift the same divine prerogative is at work. Yet, this is still just. It is just that sacrificial justice is representative and substitutionary and, thus, *mercy-shaped justice*.

As we pointed out in our preliminary observations on Gal 3:10 – 14, Paul traces a movement from Abrahamic promise, through Deuteronomic curse, to the Christ-event in such a way that both blessing and curse reach their *telos* in the Christ-gift. Moreover, Gal 3:11, 12 represents a textual 'moment' within this movement that requires explanation, especially regarding the use of the term ζήσεται. In the interpretation of Gal 3:10 – 12, a scholarly debate has arisen over whether the word ζήσεται is soteriological or, for lack of better terms, social—gaining life or living it.[57] These dichotomies would have been confusing if not nonsensical to the authors of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. As we have seen, one of the particular challenges of interpreting ancient Jewish life discourse is that there is an inseparable connection between life as existence and life as order. Life is never *merely* given by God, but, because it is given *by God*, it is always simultaneously ordered. Moreover, as we noted in the introduction, this intrinsic relation between the donation of the gift, the circumstances of its donation, and the ordering of its return reflects what Joubert calls a concern for 'balanced reciprocity'.[58] Gifts expect either an equivalent return or a return of the same sort. In short, as in gift-giving in general, so with the divine

[56] S.J. Gathercole, *Defending Substitution: An Essay on Atonement in Paul* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2015), 25.

[57] For an overview of the options extending back to the Patristic period, see Avemarie, 'Claim of the Law', 130 – 37; he concludes: 'The problem with the vast divergence of interpretations is not the narrow-mindedness of the exegetes; it is rather the Pauline text itself' (137). For recent 'social' accounts, see e.g. J.D.G. Dunn, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 152 – 54; 374 – 75; idem, *The New Perspective on Paul: Collected Essays* (WUNT II 185; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 65 – 67; Wakefield, *Where to Live*.

[58] S. Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul's Collection* (WUNT II 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 22.

donation of life in particular: where and how life is divinely given, there it is divinely ordered…and evaluated. In *4 Ezra*, eschatological life is given as a return gift to the Torah-worthy because human beings receive divine benefactions of life that are ordered according to the Torah and they are, thus, capable and responsible for living according to this order. In Galatians 3:10 – 14, by contrast, life is given in the Spirit through the Christ-gift received by faith by the unworthy—Jews and Gentiles alike. This way of reading Gal 3:10 – 14 and its context suggests that Paul reads Hab 2:4 in a soteriological, christocentric, and pneumatological fashion: the 'one who is righteous by faith' is the one who receives the righteous life of Christ offered in his self-giving and, thereby, 'by faith lives' in the receipt of the eschatological Spirit.[59]

Yet, because this eschatological life is received and ordered through the Spirit *within history*, we should resist the temptation to dichotomise and read this life *solely* soteriologically, as eschatological existence but not order. The one who begins with the Spirit continues in the Spirit (3:3), for where eschatological life is given, there it is ordered. In this connection, though there is compelling evidence that Lev 18:5 was frequently read in eschatological and soteriological terms (as we have seen, a sister text, Dt 30:19 clearly plays a key role in *4 Ezra's* eschatological scheme and is possibly conflated with Lev 18:5 at *4 Ezra* 7:21),[60] it is unlikely that Paul is citing the text as a real eschatological alternative to Hab 2:4 here. He is arguing for a necessary pattern of redemptive-history in which this text plays a key role, but Paul considers that role to be consistent only with Dt 27:26 and, thus, the 'life' described in Lev 18:5 (3:12) is synonymous with the cursed existence from which Christ delivers (3:13).[61] That is, the problem with doing the law is not the problem of human doing *per se*

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[59] I follow Martyn in taking ἐκ πίστεως as both an adverb modifying ζήσεται and an adjective modifying ὁ δίκαιος (Martyn, *Galatians*, 314), because, as we argued in the previous chapter, πίστις Χριστοῦ is both the mark of the one who receives the divine approbation (2:16) and the mode by which one lives (ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀγαπήσαντός με καὶ παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ, 2:20). For an overview of the options and literature, see Sprinkle, *Law and Life*, 139.

[60] S.J. Gathercole, 'Torah, Life, and Salvation', in *From Prophecy to Testament: The Function of the Old Testament in the New* (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 131–50; Sprinkle, *Law and Life*, 25 – 130.

[61] Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 18: 'The Torah has Christ indirectly in view when it finally announces that its own conditional offer of life to the one who observes its prescriptions (Lev. 18:5) issues only in the universality of the curse (Deut. 27:26) – thereby creating space for the very different soteriological logic of "faith" (Hab. 2:4; cf. Gal. 3:10 – 12).'

but, as we will see below in our discussion of Gal 3:19 – 22, the problem of human transgressions and sin—that the law itself does not, ultimately, expect its recipients to do what it requires and, thus both the Torah and its practitioners are, in this respect, like all other humans, 'dead'. What is striking about our debate between Galatians and *4 Ezra*, in this connection, is that both texts emphasize divine priority and sovereignty in God's saving action. They simply configure this action differently—*4 Ezra* as a return gift of impervious resurrection life to those who properly order their created lives according to Torah-norms; Galatians as the divine gift of life out of the conditions of curse in the Christ-gift, received by faith, and ordered by the Spirit. It is crucial to recognise that Gal 3:10 – 14, in explicitly denying Torah-ordered life, calls into question *created* life as Torah-ordered for our conversation partners. This invites us to ask whether Paul thinks of the divine donation of life in the Christ-gift not just in soteriological and ethical but also in creative terms.

4.1.3 The Inheritance of Life: The Promise Fulfiled as Resurrection Beyond or 'Resurrection' Within History? (3:15 – 22)

In Galatians 3:15 Paul returns to Abraham in order to begin a more expansive explication of salvation-history running to 3:22,[62] and in so doing, he begins to produce the material theological logic that further fills out and supports the formal accounts of Gal 2:15 – 21 and Gal 3:6 – 14. In Galatians 3:15 – 18, the analogy Paul deploys from the realm of human covenantal relations clarifies the relation of the Torah to the Christ-gift by locating the Torah not as the order of but *within* salvation-history. Though the precise analogue of Paul's argument κατὰ ἄνθρωπον remains unclear, the fundamental point of the analogy is certain: it is axiomatic, for Paul, that the initial terms of the Abrahamic covenant cannot be altered. In this connection, Paul's reading of scripture underlines two points that are critical for his argument. Though it is difficult to determine precisely which promise Paul has in view, his repetition of the word ἐπαγγελία (six times in Gal 3:14 – 22; eleven total in 3:14 – 4:28) underlines his insistence on the promissory character of the covenant, while the

[62] Paul's consideration of the relation between the law and the promise as divine gifts marks out 3:15 – 22 as a coherent unit, *contra* those who see a break at v. 19, as e.g. Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 244–45; Martyn, *Galatians*, 294–95.

clarification of the singular 'seed' as the recipient with Abraham of the promises and that seed's identity as Χριστός underlines the salvation-historical horizon of significance of those promises. For Paul, since the covenant was promissory in character and made to the Christ, the Torah that came along many years later cannot alter those initial terms or provide the conditions by which the inheritance is determined, for: τῷ Ἀβραὰμ δι' ἐπαγγελίας κεχάρισται ὁ θεός. (Given Paul's earlier specification of Jesus' self-offering as God's gift [χάρις, Gal 2:21] and connection of the promise to Abraham with Christ, it is clear that he uses χαρίζομαι to refer to the act of divine gift-giving.) In other words, what is vital for Paul is not simply that the inheritance is a gift, though it is, but rather that the manner of the divine donation of the inheritance was *promissory*.

A comparison with *4 Ezra* illumines the rhetorical and theological force of this reading. Rhetorically, Paul's silence about Abraham's obedience is deafening; theologically, Paul's understanding of Abraham and the Messiah without regard to the Torah and his location of the Torah within history subverts *4 Ezra's* account of the Torah as coincident with the created order. For, in *4 Ezra*, Abraham is the *righteous* recipient of esoteric revelation regarding the eschatological judgement and salvation (*4 Ezra* 3:13, 14);[63] the Messiah's judgement of the ungodly and wicked provides the historical preamble to the definitive eschatological *judgement* at the end of history (12:31 – 33). Because *4 Ezra* could and did conceive of the Messiah in Torah-terms, we see that the key here for Paul is the figural correspondence not between the promise and the Christ, in general, but the covenant *as* promise and the Christ-*gift* as its fulfilment, in particular. In other words, in *4 Ezra* the righteous Abraham receives a preview of the eschatological judgment, which the Messiah will inaugurate in Torah-terms—the correspondence between preview and event being the *Torah-righteousness of both the recipient of the promise and the agent of its fulfilment*. In Paul's reading, the *particular* gift God gave to Abraham *as promise* requires an unconditioned and incongruous gift as its fulfilment—one received by faith in the

[63] Abraham is an implied *figura* of the righteous one who receives eschatological salvation in *4 Ezra*, as Ezra emphasises that God chose Abraham 'from among [the many peoples and nations]' (*ex his*) 'while they were committing iniquity in his sight' (*factum est cum iniquitatem facerent coram te*, 3:13), and, in Uriel's view, God only chooses the *worthy*—'one grape from a cluster' (9:21).

Christ-event.[64] Thus, Paul's understanding of the differing phenomenologies of promise as gift and Torah as gift are vital to the logic here; for both promissory and substitutionary gifts configure recipients as unconditioned recipients. Paul's view is not reducible to a general antithesis between divine and human agency, for both *4 Ezra* and Paul are emphatic in subordinating human to divine agency. The issue is the *particular* account of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. For Paul, there is a necessary inner-connection between God's *gift* of the inheritance to Abraham based on a *promise* and God's fulfilment of this promise in the divine gift of Jesus' self-offering and resurrection, one in which, as we will argue below, the receipt of life out of conditions of barrenness and death provides the theological and figural connection.[65] Whereas *4 Ezra* configures Abraham as prefiguring the Torah-righteous who trusts in God's created Torah-order, lives according to it, and receives eschatological life as a fitting divine gift, Paul considers Abraham the prototype of the one who receives an unconditioned and incongruous divine gift of inheritance in the Christ-event.[66] Moreover, this means that, with respect both to the receipt of the promise and its fulfillment in the Chist-event, Paul uses πίστις and πιστεύω as gift-receipt terminology. In this connection, Paul's careful limitation of gift terminology to the promise and its fulfilment in the Christ-event[67] and the inheritance raises the

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[64] Paul's historical argument here demonstrates that his use of citations in 3:6 – 13 is not merely *textual* but a figural and, thus, logical correlation of *divine actions*. The emphasis in figural reading is 'performative' not 'semiotic'—about what God will and is doing, not the 'allegorical meaning' of the words being used. For these distinctions in the context of a critique of Daniel Boyarin's semiotic reading of Paul's construction of Jewish identity in Gal 4:21 – 31, see J.D. Dawson, *Christian Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Identity* (Berkeley: UCP, 2002), 24–27.

[65] Ibid., 85: '"Figuralness" denotes the status of things as significant—not in themselves and not in their meanings—but insofar as they are, in all of their concrete reality, the enacted intention of God…Discerning that intention in oddly congruent literary narratives, the figural reader makes explicit the similarities by which otherwise separate events are related to one another as moments in a single, divine utterance. The similarity discerned in otherwise incongruent historical events bears witness to the singularity of the divine identity and purpose that permeates them.'

[66] Paul's continued focus on the particular divine gift-giving activity as it configures human reception belies Donaldson's argument that 'the contrast is between Christ and law, not faith and works' or that the antithesis is between 'two objective means of righteousness—Christ or Torah' and not 'two subjective human attitudes'; T.L. Donaldson, *Paul and the Gentiles: Remapping the Apostle's Convictional World* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 116. Yet, Westerholm is too general in his criticism that 'a command is scarcely a fit object for belief' (Westerholm, *Perspectives*, 279, n. 43). For, in *4 Ezra* and a number of cosmologically and eschatologically inflected texts of the period (e.g., Wis 2:17, 18; 3:9 – 11), the command represents a choice between eschatological life and death and to choose life and obey is to believe, according to their interpretation, that what God says about the law (e.g. in Dt 30:15 – 20) is *eschatologically* true.

[67] Barclay, *Gift*, 403.

question not only of the Torah's status as divine gift but also the character of the Christ-gift itself. For in denying the Torah-conditioned character of the Abrahamic covenant and its fulfilment, Paul configures Abraham as the prototype of one who is in *need* of a life-giving and life-ordering gift, and he invites the question, likewise, of the relation of the Torah itself to such a gift.

Having established that the promissory terms of the Abrahamic covenant entail fulfilment in the unconditioned and incongruous Christ-gift, Paul spends the remainder of Galatians 3 and 4 specifying the integral place of the Torah in salvation-history and the cosmos. Relatedly, Paul continues to use gift language with care: unlike the promise, the law was not given by God but 'added' (προσετέθη), being 'arranged' (διαταγείς) through angels by the mediator Moses;[68] unlike the promise (v. 20), the law was not *given* as the basis of the receipt of the inheritance but 'for the sake of transgressions' (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν, v. 19).[69] Moreover, in Gal 3:21 Paul considers a counter-factual that would frame the Torah not just as a divine gift but as a divine life-giving gift. We will argue presently that the compressed and enigmatic passage in Gal 3:19, 20 prepares for this counter-factual and its negation in vv. 21 – 22 by both limiting the function of the Torah to transgressions and by gesturing toward a salvation-historical and ontological subordination of the Torah to the unitary divine purpose disclosed in the Christ-gift.

After Paul's refusal to identify the Torah with either Abrahamic or creational order and the careful dissociation of it from divine gift, the question he posses in Gal 3:19 is the question the author of *4 Ezra* would ask: 'Why therefore the law?' (Τί οὖν ὁ νόμος). This is so because in *4 Ezra* the Torah is given either to lock Israel into a national cycle of life-sin-death, as in episode one, or to provide the path through the present sick and dying cosmos to the eternal city, as in episode three. Thus, by locating the Torah within history and denying its place as the condition of the receipt of eschatological inheritance, Paul seems to invite a reading of salvation-

[68] Stefan Nordgaard's assertion that 'Paul emphasizes the mutual exclusivity of the law and promise' and his conclusion that, since God clearly gave the promise, he could not have 'added' the law, is question-begging. For the question of the relation between law and promise depends here on supplying an *argument* to identify who 'added' (προσετέθη) the law; S. Nordgaard, 'Paul and the Provenance of the Law: The Case of Galatians 3,19 – 20', *ZNW* 105 (2014): 68.

[69] For early Jewish and Christian sources on angelic participation in the giving of the law, see Dt 33:2, LXX; Jub 1:27 – 2:1; Philo, *Somn.* 1.141 – 143; Josephus, *Ant.* 15.136; Heb 2:2; Acts 7:38, 53.

history like that of Ezra in episode one or an account of salvation from some other means. In either case, the question of the divine intention for the law arises naturally. If the law is not the condition for the receipt of the eschatological inheritance, why was it given? Paul's response is Christological: '[the law] was added for transgressions' until the rightful recipient of the promise should come (Gal 3:19). A lack of clarity about what it might mean that the Torah 'was added for the sake of transgressions' (τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη) has produced two basic interpretations of the preposition χάριν: Paul is either referring here to the positive function of the Torah as it addresses 'transgressions' already in progress (a causal χάριν, 'because'),[70] or more negatively to the 'transgressions' the Torah discloses under its watch (a telic χάριν, 'for the purpose').[71] Given Paul's association of the noun παράβασις with the Torah (Rom 2:24; 4:15; 5:13, 14) and his location of the Torah within history, the latter option is more likely. In this connection and in the context of our debate with *4 Ezra*, a preliminary observation is clarifying. The law is not given for transgressions in the way that *4 Ezra* would read this—i.e., as identical with the creation order and thus the means of discriminating between the eschatologically righteous heirs and the unrighteous in and beyond history. Paul has blocked such an interpretation both implicitly (Gal 3:10 – 14) and explicitly (3:15 – 18). From the perspective of *4 Ezra*, then, this leaves Paul with only one other way of configuring divine saving action—as mercy for the unworthy. Yet, if the Torah is limited to the historical situation of its recipients and serves only to render them transgressors, then, on *4 Ezra's* terms, Paul needs to explain how the Christ-gift relates to the gift of created life and what order vis-à-vis the Torah it provides.

Paul begins to address issues like these with the counterfactual of Galatians 3:21. Yet, in vv. 19 – 20, by introducing a distinction between the divine and direct giving of the promise and the divine but indirect addition of the Torah, Paul gestures towards an ontological rationale for the Torah's relation to the Christ-gift. One alternative and extreme way of reading the force of v. 20 is to see in it a

[70] Dunn, *Galatians*, 189; F. Vouga, *An die Galater* (HNT 10; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 82.
[71] Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 246; Martyn, *Galatians*, 354; de Boer, *Galatians*, 230.

dislocation of the purposes of the angels and Moses from those of God.[72] The view taken here is that the force of the distinction in verse 20—ὁ δὲ μεσίτης ἑνὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν—is not to dislocate the Torah from the divine purpose but to indicate why the law must have both an integral negative function and an ultimately positive subordination to the promise.[73] The point is neither that Moses or the law have been co-opted by 'anti-God powers' nor that God was somehow absent from Sinai,[74] much less that the angels were 'tampering with God's promises'.[75] Rather, just as neither Moses nor the angels are *God*, so the Torah *God* added[76] and, through them, arranged and mediated is not the ultimate expression of the divine purpose but serves it. In short, the ontological subordination of ὁ μεσίτης indicates the salvation-historical and eschatological subordination of the Torah to the Christ-event. Paul exploits the contrasting manner of direct receipt of the promise from God and mediated delivery of the Torah to gesture toward the eschatological and ontological horizons of the promise's fulfilment.[77]

Stephen Nordegaard and John Barclay have drawn attention to important parallel ontological reflections in Philo's argument that, in creating human beings, God used assistants to distance himself from human sin (cf. *Opif.* 69 – 75; *Conf.* 168 – 183; *Fug.* 68 – 72; *Mut.* 30 – 32).[78] And, as we have seen, sensitivity to the relation between moral and ontological issues is evident in our debate partner *4 Ezra*, arising

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[72] See, e.g., A. Schweitzer, *The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle* (London: A&C Black, 1931), 70–75; Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 245–50; Martyn, *Galatians*, 352–72; de Boer, *Galatians*, 225–36.

[73] Rightly noted by Hays (*Faith*, 199 – 200), but wrongly attributed only to 'the shape and sequence of the gospel story'.

[74] For the language of 'anti-God powers', see J.L. Martyn, 'God's Way of Making Things Right', in *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2005), 152; on God's absence from Sinai, Martyn, *Galatians*, 370.

[75] de Boer, *Galatians*, 228–31.

[76] Burton, *Galatians*, 188: 'προσετέθη marks the law as supplementary, and hence subordinate to the covenant.' Cf. F.J. Matera, *Galatians* (SP 9; Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1992), 128; Dunn, *Galatians*, 189. *Contra* Martyn, *Galatians*, 364–70; de Boer, *Galatians*, 228–29. As we will argue below, the rejection of προσετέθη as a divine passive depends on a misreading of v. 20 and ignores the careful modulation between passive and active voice, with the former clearly applying to God, in the immediate context of vv. 21 – 22.

[77] The ecclesiological ramifications of this configuration of salvation-history are not in view here; *pace* Wright, *Climax*, 157–74.

[78] Barclay, *Gift*, 403 – 404; Nordgaard, 'Provenance '. The present argument, though similar to Barclay, differs in seeing the Torah as not just 'less immediate and less direct' (404) but subordinated and integral (*pace* Barclay, 404) to the fulfilment of the promise. Unlike Nordgaard, we do not read Paul as suggesting that God is, via the angels and Moses, avoiding responsibility for the Torah. The Torah is a concession to the fallen order, not an abdication of it.

from the question of *why* the promises have not been fulfiled *within* history. In this connection, Ezra's ideal moral exemplarity has ontological ramifications. Not only does Uriel's divine instruction enable him to transcend his epistemological and ontological limitations and experience the heavenly Zion, it also leads to Ezra's transcendence of death itself. Paul's limitation of the purpose of the Torah to *transgressions* calls all of this into question, because it precludes the possibility that Ezra is *eschatologically* righteous in Torah-terms. In other words, though the law may in fact limit or even atone for transgressions in history,[79] for Paul, neither *eliminates* transgressions. The cultic system itself (if one wants to appeal to it) rather supports this point: it is not in place *in case* transgression should occur but *because* it will.[80] This renders the law both subordinate *and* integral to the fulfilment of the promise in its *negative* function: it presumes and discloses transgressions, and, thus, from an eschatological point of view, there is need for a gift not only for transgressions (or sins, Gal 1:4) but also for eschatological life to the transgressor.[81] Paul identifies the mechanism by which the Torah serves this integral negative function in Galatians 3:22.

On the above reading, it is Paul's limitation of the Torah to transgressions in v. 19 not the digression of v. 20 that invites the question of v. 21.[82] Because, for an eschatological reader of Lev 18:5 or Dt 30:15 – 20 as in *4 Ezra*, Paul's careful refusal to apply the language of gift to the Torah combined with his specification of it as being 'for the sake of transgressions' invites a reading of the Torah as *ultimately* negative. That is, Paul assumes that his interlocutors will hear him saying that the purpose of the law is not to distinguish between the righteous and the unrighteous, as in *4 Ezra*, but for transgressions *simpliciter*. *This way of hearing*, in Paul's view, in which the Torah either orders the created self or discloses *Unheilsgeschichte*, would introduce a cleavage between the angels and Moses on the one hand and God on the other, a cleavage that would suggest a bifurcation in the very deity (v. 20). For Paul and our

[79] Rightly, Matlock, 'Helping? ', 177.

[80] Bultmann, *Theologie*, 1.265: 'der Mensch immer schon Sünder ist…' Cf. Longenecker, *Galatians*, 138.

[81] This is its 'Offenbarungsfunktion'; Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 246.

[82] *Contra* Nordgaard, 'Provenance ', 69, it is difficult to see how the appeal to divine oneness in v. 20 could give rise to the question and emphatic rebuttal of v. 21. It is better to take the οὖν of v. 21 as referring to 19a *and* 19b, the clauses where the law and promise are explicitly related, and to take 19c as the beginning of a digression that ends in v. 20.

debate partners this cannot be the case, for: ὁ θεὸς εἷς ἐστιν. Consequently, Paul's way of answering the question of the possible antithetical relation between the Torah and the promise is to call into question the assumptions of his opponents. On Paul's terms, it is his opponents who, reading texts like Lev 18:5 and Dt 30:15 – 20 in life-giving and life-ordering terms *eschatologically*, have a problem of scriptural contradiction.[83] This is not, however, a 'dogmatic' assertion. For Paul does not simply deny that the Torah 'makes alive' (v. 21), but rather he argues that the Torah confirms its recipients as 'dead' in view of the life-giving Christ-gift (v. 22). In short, the problem with post-Sanders 'dogmatic' readings of Gal 3:21 is their failure to ask *what Paul might mean by implying that the recipients of both the Torah and the Christ-gift are 'dead'* and to find the answer in Gal 3:22.[84]

In addition to the above reading of vv. 19 – 20, three additional exegetical observations support this reading of vv. 21 – 22 in terms of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. The Pauline order of argumentation is crucial: rather than proceeding directly to his negative but integral reading of the purpose of the Torah in vv. 21 – 22, Paul begins with a counter-factual in which the Torah is considered a divine life-giving gift. The Torah would, *contrary to fact*, be against the promises if the law *given* were 'able to make-alive'; 'righteousness' in Torah-terms would, then, follow as a logical result (εἰ γὰρ ἐδόθη νόμος ὁ δυνάμενος ζῳοποιῆσαι, ὄντως ἐκ νόμου ἂν ἦν ἡ δικαιοσύνη, 3:21a). As in Gal 2:21, the counterfactual of Gal 3:21 takes away the assumption that produces the false inference: by reversing the order—life leading to righteousness—Paul takes away the assumption, of *4 Ezra* for example, that the recipient of the law is 'living/free' and thus capable of following the Torah-order

[83] Matlock, 'Helping? ', 171: for *Paul*, '[the Law] enforces the original terms of the promise…'

[84] Sanders's reading of 3:21 (*Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 495) in relation to his 'dogmatic' reading of the Christ-event vis-à-vis the law (and his assertion in particular, that ζῳοποιέω and δικαιοσύνη are equivalent in meaning (i.e., both mean 'life') in Gal 3:21) has been influential in the secondary literature. Cf. Sanders, *Paul, the Law*, 26–27. For example, Hays (*Faith*, 178 – 79) follows Sanders explicitly, though with his own messianic reading of 3:11. Even his critics, like Westerholm grant the 'parallel' between ζῳοποιέω and δικαιοσύνη (see also, Sprinkle, *Law and Life*, 139, n. 27), though he (*Perspectives*, 294) tries to explain it by glossing δικαιοσύνη as 'an acquittal *from* sin [that] brings life', but the hypothetical here, given the legal framework, suggests, in Westerholm's terms, 'ordinary' positive righteousness not 'extraordinary' acquittal. Likewise, Matlock ('Helping? ', 177) concedes Sanders's 'dogmatic' attribution of 3:21 to Paul's 'present view' of the law, assigning the differences between 3:12 and 3:21 to 'different moments of Paul's argument' without arguing for how these moments are related. What is needed, by contrast, is an explanation of why and in what respect Paul considers the recipients of the law 'dead' and, relatedly, in what respect their being 'made-alive' might lead to 'righteousness'.

and worthy of receiving 'life' as a gift soteriologically. Thus, as in Gal 2:17 – 21, a reversion to Torah norms is a rejection of the gift because it is a failure to recognise where life is given and ordered—the Christ-gift, not the Torah. That is, for Paul, the law would be contrary to the promises if in fact the law itself led to righteousness and eschatological life, because, in Paul's way of reading salvation-history, God gave life (inheritance) *on the basis of a promise* and credited righteousness as trust in that promise. There cannot be two mutually exclusive paths to righteousness—one via the law, the other via the promise. The singularity of the gospel is not self-interpreting for Paul. Rather, the law is a paradoxical path to righteousness, only in so far as it serves the promise and its fulfillment in the Christ-event (3:22).

This reading in terms of divine life-giving benefaction is further supported by the shifts in vocabulary and verbs from vv. 21 to 22. The strong adversative ἀλλά introduces what Paul thinks is in fact the case: 'but the scripture imprisoned all things under sin' (συνέκλεισεν ἡ γραφὴ τὰ πάντα ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν, 3:22). Crucially, Paul's change from passive to active then back to passive voice in vv. 21 – 22 marks the distinction between God's *hypothetical* giving of the law, the law's *actual* cursing function, and God's *actual* giving of the promise's fulfillment in the Christ-gift. Unlike his counterfactual in v. 21 where Paul uses the divine passive and breaks his custom by applying gift terminology to the law and imagining that God *gave* the law, in v. 22 he specifies that what 'the Scripture' actually does is imprison. Thus, Paul's personification of ἡ γραφή allows him to distinguish amongst and among the functions of various divine speech-acts.[85] Just as, in 3:8, the Scripture *pre-preaches* (aorist of προευαγγελίζομαι), so the Scripture also *imprisons* (aorist of συγκλείω). The particular ἡ γραφή of 3:22, however, imprisons, '*in order* that the promise…might be given' *by God* (ἵνα ἡ ἐπαγγελία…δοθῇ, 3:22). Paul does not specify 'the Scripture' he has in mind here, but the parallel with Gal 3:8 suggests that he has the curse of Dt 27:26 in view in 3:22.[86] For, just as in Gal 3:8—where the curse and its biblical anchor

[85] J R. Dodson, 'The Voices of Scripture: Citations and Personifications in Paul', *BBR* 20 (2010): 430: '[T]o say that Paul could have just substituted the word "God" for the personification misses the point: the significance lies in the fact that Paul does use personification, γραφή, rather than the divine Person, θεός.' The significance is not, however, that 'the original speaker (that is, God) is not highlighted' (431), but rather, for Paul, that what 'Scripture' has spoken and speaks both pre-figures and serves what God *is doing now;* similarly, Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 40.

[86] Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 475.

support the primacy of the promise and its particular modes of delivery and reception—in 3:22 'the Scripture' places all things ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν in service of the fulfillment of the promise. Likewise, in both Galatians 3:8 and 4:30 'the Scripture' which speaks is a *particular text* associated with a *particular event*.[87] The Torah is not a life-giving and ordering gift (v. 21) but, by divine dispensation, a death-dealing jailor (v. 22).[88]

Relatedly, we must consider the entailments of two critical shifts in vocabulary from vv. 21 to 22. First, with the shift from the implied object of ζωοποιέω to the explicit object of συγκλείω, Paul marks a shift from a human to a cosmic frame of reference—from the 'living dead' to τὰ πάντα. Second, combined with the shift in moral terminology from δικαιοσύνη to ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν, this shift in frame not only implies some logical relation between human and cosmic order but it also emphasises the cosmic scope and devastating effect of the Torah's curse. Far from leading to δικαιοσύνη for human beings, ἡ γραφή places *τὰ πάντα* ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν.[89] Thus, the *inevitability* of the curse resting on those who are ἐκ νόμου is grounded in the reality that they, along with τὰ πάντα, are 'under Sin'. Moreover, the logic of 3:21 indicates that, had this not been the case, then those who are 'of the Torah' would not be 'under Sin'. In Paul's view, however, the curse the Scripture voices has placed not just those 'of the law' under a curse. But, in contrast with *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees, it has placed them in the same 'occupied' space as all things—the space 'under Sin'.

Finally, in this connection, Paul's association of 'death' in v. 21 with being 'under Sin' in v. 22 entails a corollary relation between the receipt of the 'life' in the Christ-event and 'righteousness' conceived in *creative* terms. In vv. 21 and 22 there is a functional equivalence, for Paul, between Sin and death. God did not give a law that could make alive, but rather he added one that, not only did the opposite, but confined *all things* under Sin and, thus, 'death'. In other words, the assumption of

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[87] Ibid., 257: 'At each point, Paul is dependent on quite specific scriptural sources.'

[88] B. Byrne, *Sons of God, Seed of Abraham: A Study of the idea of the Sonship of God of all Christians in Paul against the Jewish Background* (AnBib 83; Rome: Biblical Institute, 1979): 'In Paul's theology God did not simply substitute a new way of salvation in place of the Law. There is an intrinsic connection between the failure of the Law way and the death of Christ.' We would change the word 'failure' to 'success.'

[89] Barrett notes that the choice of neuter τὰ πάντα stresses the universality and comprehensiveness of the reality in view; C.K. Barrett, *Freedom and Obligation: A Study of the Epistle to the Galatians* (London: SPCK, 1985), 34.

3:21 is a 'dead' humanity in an eschatological sense (the living whose end is death), in a moral sense (the living whose existence is qualitatively 'death-like'), or, likely, both. The relation between the counterfactual of v. 21 and the reality of v. 22 makes this 'dead' humanity, however conceived, equivalent to life 'under Sin'. Moreover, the same logic works on the 'life' side of this binary. As elsewhere in his writings, Paul deploys the verb ζωοποιέω exclusively with reference to the effect of the Christ-event (Rom 4:17; 8:11; 1 Cor 15:22, 36, 45) and often with reference to the Spirit's role in that event both within and beyond history (Rom 8:11; 2 Cor 3:6), and here he has the life-giving activity of the Spirit in view, as the 'promised Spirit' received 'through faith' (3:14) is equivalent to 'the promise' (i.e., the promise's content, inheritance, 3:18) given to believers 'by faith in Jesus Christ' (3:22). For our purposes, the key point is that Paul's historical argument about the Torah configures its recipients as 'dead' in *history*, which suggests, as in the reconstitution of his self in Gal 2:19 – 20, that the sort of life-giving activity Paul has in view here pertains not merely to the receipt of eternal life at the eschaton but to the Spirit's creative and life-ordering work for eschatological righteousness *within* history.[90]

Thus, our focus on divine life-giving benefaction furthers research on the theological logic of Galatians, in particular, and on gift in Paul, in general. First, it shows why construals of the 'dogmatic' character of Paul's argument, his pessimistic Deuteronomic reading of salvation-history, the experience of the Spirit in the Christ-event, the assumption of human ability, or even the recognition of the Christ-gift as incongruous and unconditioned—none of these is sufficient for conveying the *logic* of Paul's argument. In Gal 3:15 – 22, Paul argues that the logical twin of the promised inheritance is a singular 'dead' humanity. *This* the law delivers. Thus, *contra* Sprinkle the law is not excluded from the eschatological order of life either because it is a 'merely human way of appropriating eschatological life' or simply

[90] For Paul, δικαιοσύνη here is an eschatologically 'perfected' term, having to do with the *absence* of sin and the fullness of divine life as in *4 Ezra*. To modify Westerholm's categories slightly (*Perspectives*, 261 – 96), the term δικαιοσύνη, given the mention of the Torah in v. 21, refers to 'ordinary righteousness' but defined by the eschatological norm disclosed in the Christ-gift, while the 'emergency measure' (284) of righteousness as divine acquittal in the Christ-event was, for Paul, the point all along. Consequently, though I would add that eschatological order is implied in this positive use of δικαιοσύνη, I agree with Käsemann who places Paul's use of the term, generally, in the context of the indivisibility of divine power and gift; E. Käsemann, 'Gottesgerechtigkeit bei Paulus', in *Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen* (dritte Aufl.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 187.

because that life must be 'created by divine action, the revelation of Christ in Paul', but rather because, *by divine design*, the law itself confines (and, as we will argue below, is itself conformed and confined) to the morally 'dead' estate of humanity.[91] Yet, this does not, as it would in *4 Ezra*, lead to an irremediable *Unheilsgeschichte*; for the Christ-gift 'resurrects' and reorders humanity in the Spirit unto eschatological righteousness for all who receive this divine gift by faith. Thus, the Christ-gift is necessarily a gift for the unworthy because the Torah encloses all things under a 'dead' existence *by divine design*. Second and in this connection, we show why one must go beyond a recognition of the definition of divine gift as incongruous and unconditioned in Galatians. For, as we have seen, Paul's account of sacred text and salvation-history does not beg the question of the redemptive-historical significance of the Christ-gift. It is not simply *that* the Christ-gift was given without regard to worth that its receipt entails indifference to Torah norms in the church. Rather, it is because the law itself is *integral* to producing the negative conditions in which the Christ-gift is given that it cannot provide the proper order of church life. In Paul's view, the law *itself* requires an account of the Christ-gift in life-giving terms.

Yet, this recognition of the law's integral function in confirming humans in sin is not a simple return to 'traditional' readings of Gal 3 – 4. For, as we shall see presently, Paul argues that the Torah's confining function is a sign of its own confined status. In other words, the law cannot provide the proper order of the church *even after* its salvation-historical function has ended and humans are 'made-alive' in the Christ-gift because the law itself is conformed and confined to the 'dead' existence of the fallen creation. Thus, in the next section, by inviting *4 Ezra* to interrogate Paul's development of a variety of metaphors to configure the role of Torah in salvation-history (Gal 3:23 – 4:11) and his reading of the Pentateuch from the perspective of the story of Hagar and Sarah (Gal 4:21 – 31), we show why he considers the Torah to be fitted and confined to the fallen creation and we clarify the hermeneutic by which he sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in history.

[91] Sprinkle, *Law and Life*, 155 – 56.

4.2 Two Tales of Two Cities: Debating Christotelic History, Disclosing Christomorphic Reality (Gal 3:23 – 4:31)

In this section we will continue our debate with *4 Ezra* by tracing Paul's further metaphorical specification of the place of Torah within salvation-history (3:23 – 29; 4:1 – 11) to its conclusion in his figural summary of the voice of the νόμος in his interpretation of the story of Sarah and Hagar in Genesis 16 – 21 (4:21 – 31). We will argue that whereas Paul's metaphorical statements about the law in Gal 3:23 – 4:7 reveal the Christotelic shape of salvation- and cosmic history, his Christomorphic figural reading of the Pentateuch discloses the hermeneutic by which he sees why salvation and cosmic history *necessarily* takes this pattern. Thus, our debate with *4 Ezra* leads us directly to the hermeneutical problem Paul faced in the Galatian crisis—viz., how to see the implications for the Torah of their common receipt of the Christ-gift and common experience of the Spirit. The key is Paul's Christomorphic eschatological hermeneutic: the Torah is itself a part of the order of death of the fallen creation from which the Christ-gift redeems dead humanity, but this redemption is nothing less than a 'birth' to eschatological life within the 'barren' conditions of fallen history. Thus, from Abraham to the Galatians, the heirs of God *are born* according to the Spirit, whether in the form of children born of barren wombs or the equally miraculous 'birth' of heirs of the living God born among slaves to sin and death.

Consequently, this reading of Paul's metaphors and the Hagar and Sarah allegory shows how Paul's reading of the *logic* of salvation-history is grounded in his conception of the Torah as confining and *confined* to 'dead' fallen existence, while his understanding of God's saving activity as *creative* provides the hermeneutic by which he sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in promise and fulfillment. Thus, we contribute to research on the theological logic of Galatians by demonstrating that Paul does not beg the question of the relationship between Torah-order and the Christ-event by appealing to the Christ-gift *simpliciter*. Rather, he *argues* that the Christ-gift is life-giving *and* life-ordering, while the Torah itself is fitted and confined to the 'dead' existence from which this gift delivers.

4.2.1 Life as Slaves: Under the Law, Under the 'Child-Minder', Under Administrators and Managers, Under the Cosmic Elements (3:23 – 4:11)

In Gal 3:23 – 25, Paul continues to specify the relation of the Torah to the Christ-event in historical terms, while the reintroduction of the language of 'justification by faith' (3:24) indicates that the same fundamental issue about divine evaluation is being addressed. The difference here is that Paul's redemptive-historical and forensic framework is being turned to the question of the proper identification of 'sons' (3:26) and 'heirs' (v. 29). Though Paul's general intentions are clear, the logical and theological mechanisms that secure these ends are rather opaque. In this connection, two longstanding debates have occupied interpreters—the precise force of Paul's παιδαγωγός metaphor in relation to the Torah's function as the norm of self and society[92] and the implied subjects of his first person plural verbs (ἐφρουρούμεθα, 3:23; ἐσμεν, 3:25) and their corresponding personal pronoun.[93] The latter debate is of little ultimate consequence, for, as we have seen, the law's curse encompasses 'all things' (τὰ πάντα, v. 22) and, as we will see, life within the law's domain is theologically equivalent to subjection to the cosmic conditions that obtain ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου (4:3, 9). Even if the Torah custody Paul has in view pertains only to Israel, Israel is, for him, in no ultimately privileged position with respect to the rest of humanity; for the Torah's curse insures that she, given her 'dead' condition, is, like all else, under sin.[94] The terms in which Paul's παιδαγωγός metaphor have been discussed—whether negative or positive—are overly general and, thus, in certain respects question-begging;[95] for evaluations of this metaphor

[92] The best overview of the role and issues in Galatians is N. H. Young, '*Paidagogos*: The Social Setting of a Pauline Metaphor', *NovT* 29 (1987): 150 – 76. For a recent confirmation of his understanding from the inscriptional evidence, see C. Laes, 'Pedagogues in Greek Inscriptions in Hellenistic and Roman Antiquity', *ZPE* 171 (2009): 113 – 22.

[93] For the argument that Paul refers to humans in general, see, e.g., Martyn, *Galatians*, 362; de Boer, *Galatians*, 238; for reasons to restrict the referent to Jews, see, e.g., Matera, *Galatians*, 143–44; Dunn, *Galatians*, 198.

[94] de Boer (*Galatians*, 238): 'Paul may perhaps have Jews particularly in view…but if so he uses their situation "under the Law" to be representative of the situation of all humankind (cf. 3:10 – 4; 4:5)'.

[95] For assessments that stress the negative associations with the παιδαγωγός, see e.g. H.D. Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 177 – 78; Martyn, *Galatians*, 363. For positive interpretations of the παιδαγωγός as 'tutor', see, e.g., Burton, *Galatians*, 200; Dunn, *Galatians*, 198–99.

depend on identifying Paul's point of comparison, which in turn depends on a construal of the theological framework in which the metaphor operates.

In this connection, the key exegetical observation is that Paul carries over the terminology and framing of vv. 21 – 22: the explanatory passive participle συγκλειόμενοι borrows the main verb of v. 22a, thereby signaling that the phrase it explains—'we were held prisoner under the law' (ὑπὸ νόμον ἐφρουρούμεθα) is Paul's shorthand for the reality described in v. 22a. Consequently, if, as we have argued, Gal 3:21 – 22 discloses Paul's polemical target as those who read Torah as the eschatological order of divine life-giving benefaction, then Paul's παιδαγωγός metaphor introduces a filial focus that is quite provocative and illuminating. For *4 Ezra's* discussion of heirs and the nature of their inheritance occurs in a similarly cosmological and eschatological context. Yet, whereas Uriel's world-as-womb metaphor structures salvation-history toward national decay and cosmic death and its reversal for the righteous at the eschaton, Paul's reading of the Torah's inevitable curse structures salvation-history toward its curse-bearer, Christ, and the eschatological blessing that results for those who receive this gift by faith within history.[96] Thus, when Paul portrays the Torah as a παιδαγωγός and identifies sons and heirs with reference to faith in the Christ-gift, he closes off the path Uriel charts through futility and death toward the city where 'the fruit of immortality' (*4 Ezra* 7:13) awaits and he subverts Ezra's description of those who will inherit the world as 'your people [i.e., Israel] whom you have called first-begotten, only-begotten, zealous, beloved' (*populus tuus quem vocasti primogenitum unigenitum aemulatorem carissimum*, 6:58). For he configures sons and heirs not as identified in history and disclosed at the eschaton in Torah-terms, as Uriel does throughout episodes three and four, but as *constituted* within history among Jews and Gentiles who receive the Christ-gift by faith.[97] Moreover, given the context of divine life-giving and life-

[96] Though Paul's εἰς + acc. phrases may pick up a temporal nuance here, they are likely consistent with the majority of Paul's uses, which are telic in character—'unto the coming faith to be revealed' (εἰς τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι, 3:23); 'unto Christ' (εἰς Χριστόν, 3:24, 27); rightly, Moo, *Galatians*, 242–44.

[97] Since Paul's use of πιστεύω disambiguates the phrase ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ in v. 22 (R. B. Matlock, 'The Rhetoric of Pistis in Paul: Galatians 2.16, 3.22, Romans 3.22, and Philippians 3.9', *JSNT* 30 (2007): 192), his anaphorous phrase 'this coming faith' (τὴν μέλλουσαν πίστιν, 3:23) refers not to the faithfulness disclosed by Christ (*contra* Hays, *Galatians*, 269 – 70) but to the particular character of

ordering benefaction of both accounts, Paul's παιδαγωγός metaphor begins to clarify the logic by which he views the receipt of the Christ-gift as the necessary end of the Torah's custody; for it suggests that Paul identifies the Torah not as *4 Ezra* does with glory and imperishability (*lex non perit sed permanet in suo honore*, 9:37) as the heavenly and eschatological order of God 'the Lawgiver' (*legislator*, 7:89) but with the order of the fallen creation. Likewise, impervious commitment to Torah-norms despite the experience of futility and death is not the height of wisdom and maturity (Ezra's suffering *ex toto corde*, 10:50), but, given Paul's παιδαγωγός metaphor, a state of immaturity to be left behind.

In Gal 4:1 – 11 Paul continues his discussion of the proper identification of heirs, introducing two additional metaphors to explain and support his account of Christotelic redemptive-history and his Christological identification of heirs. The point of comparison is established by the experience of a minor heir, who 'though lord of all is no different than a slave' (οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου κύριος πάντων ὤν, 4:1). Such heirs are 'under administrators and managers' (ὑπὸ ἐπιτρόπους καὶ οἰκονόμους, 4:2) just as (οὕτως) 'we also, when we were children, were enslaved under the elements of the cosmos' (καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτε ἦμεν νήπιοι, ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἤμεθα δεδουλωμένοι, 4:3).[98] The use of the noun δοῦλος and the verb δουλόω in combination with these ὑπό + acc. phrases makes it clear that his earlier phrases—ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν, ὑπὸ νόμον—indicate enslaving realities.

In this connection and in the context of our debate with *4 Ezra*, a point of contention arises not with the use of slavery language *per se*: Ezra, like Paul (Gal 1:10), describes himself as a 'servant/slave' of God without any hint of irony (*4 Ezra*

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faith once its proper object in the Christ-gift is disclosed. On πίστις as the typical term for receipt of the gospel message, see Bultmann, *Theologie*, 1.91-94.

[98] For a compelling recent defense of the traditional Greco-Roman source domain of this metaphor, see J.K. Goodrich, 'Guardians, Not Taskmasters: The Cultural Resonances of Paul's Metaphor in Galatians 4.1 – 2', *JSNT* 32 (2010): 251 – 84. For the critique of the traditional source domain in favour of a Deuteronomic paradigm, see Scott, *Adoption as Sons*. In this debate, the concession of Hafemann ('Exile', 367), who is an enthusiastic proponent of the exile-restoration paradigm, is telling: 'The first thing to be said concerning the topic at hand is that Paul never mentions the exilic judgment of Israel directly. Indeed, the Septuagintal vocabulary for exile never occurs within the Pauline corpus in reference to the exile'.

5:45, 56; 6:12; 7:75, 102; 8:6, 24; 9:43, 45; 10:37; 12:8; 13:14), a self-description that is not uncommon in either the Hebrew Bible or ancient Judaism.[99]

Rather, for Paul 'the heir is no different than a slave', while, for *4 Ezra*, the heir *is* different. Though Uriel praises Ezra's humility in excluding himself from the company of the righteous (8:49), he is the exemplary heir in the exercise of his created freedom. Thus, despite his grief, he has sought to understand God's heavenly way, while the wicked 'despite receiving freedom, have rejected the Most High and despised his law and forsaken his ways' (*4 Ezra* 8:56). Consequently, though *4 Ezra* recognises the four constituent elements (*4 Ezra* 3:19; cf. 7:7, 8), envisions their transformation at the eschatological judgement (6:13 – 16), and even conceives of the limitations of the corruptible and estranged cosmos as something from which the righteous are set free (7:96), he could not concede that minor heirs are *no different* than slaves. Moreover, he could not allow the implication of Paul's metaphorical configuration of life ὑπὸ νόμον as equivalent to life ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου and, thus, as an estate *from which* the Christ-gift *redeems* in τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου. For, by specifying Jesus' redemption as an adoption, Paul envisions not a disclosure of the Torah-righteous as heirs but a change in status of those under Torah *from slaves to heirs*. Likewise, Paul here *identifies* existence under the law with the conditions of the fallen cosmos rather than construing it as the path *through* that cosmos.

In light of our cosmologically and eschatologically inflected debate with *4 Ezra* over the identification of heirs, Paul's identification of life ὑπὸ νόμον with life ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου illumines theological differences underlying his otherwise shocking characterisation of the Galatian adoption of Jewish worship as akin to a return to paganism in Gal 4:8 – 11. Recent research seems to have settled the long debate over the phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in favour of the translation 'the

[99] For the sometimes relatively positive connotations of slavery in Rabbinic contexts, cf. Betz, *Galatians*, 176, n. 126. Likewise, Marcus draws attention both to Josephus's positive use of the phrase 'to live under…the laws ' (ὑπὸ τοὺς νόμους ζῆν) in *C. Ap.* 2.210 and to the paradoxical rabbinical assertion that slavery 'under the yoke of the Torah' is the path to freedom; J. Marcus, '"Under the Law": The Background of a Pauline Expression', *CBQ* 63 (2001): 73 – 75. Thiessen's reduction of Paul's ὑπὸ νόμον phrase to Gentile Judaising, dependent on this parallel with Josephus, is unconvincing because it does not recognise that Paul's phrase is shorthand for the universal and cosmic curse rendering 'all things' ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν in 3:22; Thiessen, *Gentile Problem*, 97.

elements of the cosmos'—viz., earth, water, air, and fire, the four constitutive elements of ancient cosmology.[100] And, as de Boer notes, the sole point of contact in Paul's analogy is the formal similarity of Jewish and pagan calendrical practices.[101] Yet, rather than asking how Paul's theology might allow for this rather scandalous identification, de Boer considers it merely rhetorical.[102] In light of our debate with *4 Ezra*, we contend that Paul's analogy is not merely rhetorical but depends on the cosmological and theological linkage between a view of the present cosmos as subject to the ongoing cycle of life and death and a view of calendrical practices as ordering human life according to this 'dead' order. That is, whereas, as we saw in chapter, *4 Ezra* conceives of the law and its fruit as imperishable and thus as the path through the present, dying *saeculum*, Paul identifies the calendrical practices of the law *with* the 'weak' cosmos and thus confines the law itself to the present evil age. Unlike *4 Ezra,* the law does not encapsulate 'the way of the Most High' (cf. *4 Ezra* 4:11 – 13; 7:79; 7:129) but is itself enslaved and, as we shall see, thus producing children for slavery. There are three exegetical observations in support of this interpretation.

First, Paul's use of the adjectives 'weak' (ἀσθενής) and 'poor' (πτωχός, 4:9) to describe the elements along with his expression of fear that his work among the Galatians might be in 'vain' (εἰκῇ, 4:11) invite the question: in what respect? The immediate context suggests that the 'vanity' Paul has in view is with respect to the Galatians' relationship to God, who has come to know them through Paul's work (4:9).[103] Though he uses a different word in Gal 2:2 (κενός), there Paul both expresses

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[100] For arguments and evidence in support of this meaning, see J. Blinzler, 'Lexikalisches zu dem Terminus τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου bei Paulus', in *Studiorum Paulinorum Congressus Internationalis Catholicus 1961* (AnBib 17 – 18; Rome: Pontificium Institutum Biblicum, 1963), 2.429 – 43; E. Schweizer, 'Slaves of the Elements and Worshipers of Angels: Gal 4:3, 9 and Col 2:8, 18, 20', *JBL* 107 (1988): 455 – 68; D. Rusam, 'Neue Belege zu den stoicheia tou kosmou (Gal 4,3.9; Kol 2,8.20)', *ZNW* 83 (1992): 119 – 25; M.C. de Boer, 'The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians', *NTS* 53 (2007): 204 – 24. For an alternative approach, see C.E. Arnold, 'Returning to the Domain of the Powers: "Stoicheia" as Evil Spirits in Galatians 4:3,9', *NovT* 38 (1996): 55 – 76. For a thorough overview of the literature, see T. Witulski, *Die Adressaten des Galaterbriefes: Untersuchungen zur Gemeinde von Antiochia ad Pisidiam* (FRLANT 193; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 83 – 152.

[101] de Boer, 'Meaning', 222 – 24.

[102] *Pace* ibid., 224, Paul's rhetoric is grounded in his theology at this point.

[103] Though there is irony in these verses, the references to knowledge of God and vanity preclude the view that he is engaging here in nothing more than 'a bit of satire and mock[ery]'; *contra* Nordgaard, 'Provenance', 78.

a similar fear about the possible vanity of his labour among the Gentiles and employs the slavery metaphor to describe the state of those Gentiles who adopt circumcision. Likewise, in Gal 3:4, Paul wonders if the sufferings of the Galatians were 'in vain' (εἰκῇ).

Second, in light of this thematic parallel of fear of vanity with Gal 3:1 – 5, Paul's rhetorical question in verse 3:5 stands out as a potent contrast to Gal 4:9 – 10. For it was not the 'works of the law' (ἐξ ἔργων νόμου) but 'the message received by faith' (ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως) that was the means through which God supplies (ἐπιχορηγέω) the Spirit who 'works powers' (ἐνεργῶν δυνάμεις) among the Galatians. That is, in the context of Gal 4:9 – 10, the weakness, poverty, and vanity of observance of the Jewish calendar suggests that, as one aspect of the works of the law, not only do these practices not lead to the receipt of the Spirit or the miracles that accompany it, but they are of a different, *entropic* order altogether.

Third, this way of reading Paul's conception of the weak and impoverished life of the Jewish (and pagan) calendar as cosmically weak *in comparison* with the experience of the Spirit is supported by the immediately preceding context. In Gal 4:4 – 6, it is the receipt of the Spirit in the hearts of believers and the resulting cry of adoption that proves that believers are no longer enslaved to the cosmic elements (4:3). This reading suggests a rationale for Paul's necessary antithesis between the works of the law and faith in Christ. Though Paul and his opponents share the experience of the Spirit, only Paul sees in the experience the creation of eschatological human life. This suggests that, for Paul, to be a recipient of the Spirit is to be separated from the enslaving entropic order through the receipt of eschatological life and to be included within the eschatological order this life represents. That is, if, as we have argued, Paul is arguing against a conception of the law as a life-giving gift, similar to the one held by *4 Ezra*, then, by highlighting the shared cycle of life and death at the heart of the calendars of the law and pagan religion, Paul confines the law *theologically* to the 'weak' and enslaved cosmos. In short, he denies that the law is life-giving and attempts to show why the law is also *necessarily* not life-ordering. We noted above Paul's frequent identification of the Spirit as the means of divine life-giving (the Spirit as 'life-giver' *per se*, 2 Cor 3:6; cf. Rom 4:17; 8:11; 1 Cor 15:22, 45), and below we will see that it is this recognition of

the Spirit as life-giving agent that provides the hermeneutical frame for Paul's argument in Galatians 4:21 - 31.

4.2.2 Two Tales of Two Cities: Disclosing Christomorphic Reality in Pneumatological Birth (4:21 – 31)

Paul and *4 Ezra* read sacred text and salvation-history differently because they construe God's life-giving benefaction differently: whereas *4 Ezra* considers the created donation of Torah-ordered life as the inviolable life-ordering gift, Paul identifies the Torah with the 'dead' order of fallen existence from which eschatological life emerges and to which the order of life of the Christ-gift is necessarily indifferent. These theologies and their hermeneutics arise from differing accounts of revelation—for *4 Ezra*, the observation of reversal at the eschaton for the Torah-worthy, for Paul, the revelation of the risen Christ and the donation of the Spirit within history for the unworthy. Yet, this leads us to a crucial issue in the interpretation of Galatians; for it is one thing to recognise the competing appeals to revelatory experience of Paul and Ezra, but the Galatians and their Jewish Christian mentors share both Paul's commitment to the risen Messiah and his experience of the Spirit. Yet, they differ over the Torah. What is needed, then, is not an appeal to Paul's revelatory experience but insight into the hermeneutical framework in which he finds it to have the precise intelligibility articulated in Galatians. In this connection, in Galatians 4:21 – 31 Paul articulates the *creative* pneumatological hermeneutic that differentiates his reading of the Torah from his opponents and enables him to see the stable pattern of divine saving action.

Scholars have puzzled not only over the content and form of Paul's summary message in Galatians 4:21 – 31 but also, more basically, over the reason he felt compelled to offer it at all. It could be the case, as C.K. Barrett argued, that Paul is offering his own counter-reading of Genesis 16 – 21 in response to his opponents.[104] Nonetheless, if, as we have argued, Paul's account of the Torah as death-dealing in character in light of the life-giving and ordering Christ-gift refutes an eschatological reading of Leviticus 18:5 in benefactory terms, then his reading of the Sarah and

[104] C.K. Barrett, 'The Allegory of Abraham, Sarah, and Hagar in the Argument of Galatians', in *Rechtfertigung: Festschrift für Ernst Käsemann zum 70. Geburtstag* (ed. J. Friedrich, W. Pöhlmann, and P. Stuhlmacher; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1976), 1 – 16.

Hagar story provides an essential piece to his reading of salvation- and cosmic history. For he has sought to refute a scriptural hermeneutic by which one might see the consistency of divine saving action despite the experience of futility in a corrupted cosmos, but he has not offered his own. Paul's reading of the Pentateuch via an interpretation of Genesis 16 – 21 is, thus, neither an 'afterthought'[105] nor an occasion for 'offensive and heretical' statements that amount to 'hermeneutical jujitsu',[106] but the display of the lens through which one might see the donation of the promise, the addition of the Torah, and the Christ-event as expressing one singular saving purpose. That lens is *creative* and *Christomorphic*, as Paul sees prefigured in the births of Isaac and Ishmael two manners of birth—one according to 'natural' human means (κατὰ σάρκα) and, thus, confined to slavery and death, and one by the miraculous power of the Spirit and thus eschatologically free (κατὰ πνεῦμα, 4:29).

The first indication of Paul's creative and christomorphic hermeneutic is the shift from personal to impersonal address at the start of his reading in Gal 4:21 – 31. In Gal 4:19, Paul's concern is for his 'little children', his experience is akin to the anguish of birth pangs, and the reason for both is that Christ is not yet 'formed among [them]', while, in v. 21, the problem is that 'those who want to be under the law' do not listen to what the *Pentateuch* says.[107] The implication is that they should listen to their 'mother' Paul in this connection, who playing off of the more restrictive (Sinai law) and the expanded senses (Pentateuch) of νόμος, personifies the Pentateuch and places a message in its mouth for this class who is considering entering life ὑπὸ νόμον.[108] It is crucial to recognise that what the Pentateuch 'says' is not a particular text, as in all of Paul's other personifications of ἡ γραφή (3:8; 22; 4:30),

[105] Dunn, *Theology of Galatians*, 124.

[106] Hays, *Echoes*, 112, 115.

[107] For the connection between Paul's role as 'mother' and his interpretation of the children of Gal 16 – 21, see B.R. Gaventa, 'The Maternity of Paul: an Exegetical Study of Galatians 4:19', in *The Conversation Continues: Studies in Paul & John in Honor of J. Louis Martyn* (ed. R.T. Fortna and B.R. Gaventa; Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 189 – 201; idem, *Our Mother Saint Paul* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2007), 29 – 39; S.G. Eastman, *Recovering Paul's Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 89 – 126.

[108] We should resist the temptation to gloss Paul's use of νόμος here as 'Scripture', because Paul reserves the personification of ἡ γραφή for particular passages (Gen 12:3 in Gal 3:8; Dt 27:26 in Gal 3:22; Gen 21:10 in Gal 4:30); *pace* de Boer, *Galatians*, 291. That this is Paul's and not his opponents' summary message in 4:22, 23 (*pace Barrett*, 'Allegory', 10) seems clear from the tight fit between the opposition slave-free and flesh-promise and the larger argumentative frame Paul constructs.

but rather Paul's summary of the story of Abraham's two sons. Moreover, everything they need to hear is implied in two features of this story— the contrasting statuses of the sons' mothers (slave or free, 4:22) and the differing manners of the sons' births (κατὰ σάρκα and δι' ἐπαγγελίας, 4:23).[109]

Though, as we have seen, Paul's reading of salvation-history has depended on figural logic throughout, he makes the procedure explicit by claiming that 'these things' (ἅτινα; i.e., the status of the mothers and the manners of birth of the sons) are 'figuratively spoken' (ἀλληγορούμενα) as representing two covenants. As a reading of the contemporary message of the Pentateuch, this is not an arbitrary imposition on the Abraham story but an argument about its deep eschatological and saving logic. Thus, Paul begins with the mother/covenant that corresponds to his initial class of addressees—those who want to be under the law—and draws a line from Hagar, to Mt. Sinai, and ending with the present Jerusalem.[110] Though Mt. Sinai is in Arabia, it probably 'is placed in the column with the present Jerusalem' (συστοιχεῖ δὲ τῇ νῦν Ἰερουσαλήμ, 3:25) because Paul is expressing a shorthand geographical teleology not unlike that of *4 Ezra*. Just as, in episode four of *4 Ezra,* the law received in the wilderness (9:21 – 31) had Zion as its goal (10:44 – 46), so, in Paul's reading, the trajectory of the covenant that originated at Sinai (ἀπὸ ὄρους Σινᾶ) is toward Jerusalem. What is striking in this comparison is that, for Paul, the theological momentum of this Sinai covenant begins with Hagar and ends at the *present* Jerusalem. This contradicts not only the bi-focal hermeneutic finally adopted by Ezra but also the vision that confirms it: for, whereas for *4 Ezra*, the earthly Mother Jerusalem will be, *qua* the Torah-righteous, transformed into the heavenly Zion, for Paul the Sinai covenant and her earthly city are Hagar, enslaved to the dying cosmos and excluded from the eschatological inheritance.

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[109] For the adverbial rather than adjectival rendering of these phrases, see J.L. Martyn, *Theological Issues in the Letters of Paul* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 201, n. 225; Martyn, *Galatians*, 453–54, n. 175.

[110] The textual fluidity surrounding the word Ἁγάρ is probably best explained by its presence originally and subsequent removal because of the difficulty of understanding the identification, though either reading has claim to the *lectio difficilior*; cf. Betz, *Galatians*, 244; Schlier, *Galater*, 220; F.F. Bruce, *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 219. For an argument against inclusion, see esp. Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 323–24.

Paul's abrupt shift from general (v.21) to specific addressees (μήτηρ ἡμῶν) in v. 26 corresponds to a shift from this entropic to an eschatological point of view.[111] Additionally, the identification of the free Jerusalem above as 'our Mother' is the first of three such identifications from this perspective (4:28; 31), underlining Paul's emphatic concern that the Galatians see themselves as he sees them, as free children born from and headed toward the heavenly Jerusalem. The fact that Paul begins to interpret the 'Sarah' side of the column from the end of its teleology, far from betraying a disinterest in the Abrahamic covenant, rather provides a sharp and telling contrast with the 'present Jerusalem' and its covenant. In short, whereas the theological momentum of the Sinaitic covenant begins with Hagar and ends at the present Jerusalem, the theological momentum of the Abrahamic promise begins and ends in the Jerusalem above—its heavenly *source* and *goal*. Put differently, seen through Paul's conception of a cosmos and humanity enslaved to sin (3:21, 22), not only is the message of the whole Pentateuch found *in nuce* in Genesis 16 – 21, but the pattern of divine saving action established there *already* envisages the law's integral participation in and confinement to this 'dead' existence of humanity under Sin in view of the life-giving and liberating Christ-gift.[112] In this connection, Paul's quotation of Isaiah 54:1 provides material support for his conception of the particular shape of divine saving action. It is commonly recognised that the motif of barrenness provides the thematic connection between Paul's actualising reading of the Pentateuch via Genesis 16 – 21 and his citation of Isaiah 54:1 as support for v. 26.[113] What is missed is how Paul's citation of this verse occurs within a discourse about the emergence of eschatological life within a 'barren' cosmos: the point of

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[111] Hays, *Echoes*, 118: 'Theologically, this image suggests that the hope of Israel rests in God's transcendent grace rather than in the results of a human historical process.'

[112] Paul is *not* reading Gen 16 – 21 in an arbitrary or even typological fashion here, but rather he is reading the Pentateuch as a whole *from* this story producing a *figural* correspondence; *pace* Martyn, *Galatians*, 448 n. 166.

[113] For a full analysis of this motif and the connection, see K.H. Jobes, 'Jerusalem, Our Mother: Metalepsis and Intertextuality in Galatians 4:21 – 31', *WTJ* 55 (1993): 299 – 320. Cf. Betz, *Galatians*, 249; C. H. Cosgrove, 'The Law has Given Sarah No Children (Gal. 4:21 – 30)', *NovT* 29 (1987): 231; S. Di Mattei, 'Paul's Allegory of the Two Covenants (Gal 4.21 – 31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics', *NTS* 52 (2006): 115, 118; M.C. de Boer, 'Paul's Quotation of Isaiah 54.1 in Galatians 4.27', *NTS* 50 (2004): 377 – 79; Dieter Sänger, 'Sara, die Freie - unsere Mutter. Namenallegorese als Interpretament christlicher Identitätsbildung in Gal 4,21 – 31', in *Neues Testament und hellenistisch-jüdische Alltagskultur: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen* (ed. R. Deines, J. Herzer, and K.-W. Niebuhr; WUNT II 274; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 236 – 37.

Paul's citation of Isaiah 54:1 is not simply the identification of the 'birth' of Paul and the Galatians ('our Mother', 4:26) as a reversal of barrenness, but rather the manner of this birth (ὑμεῖς δέ, ἀδελφοί, κατὰ Ἰσαὰκ ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα ἐστέ, 4:28). For in this reversal of 'barrenness'—specifically, its origin and the manner and potency of its begetting—Paul's sees the stable pattern of divine saving action in salvation-history. God gives 'life' to the barren on the basis of a promise, so that, those who receive this promise depend on the miraculous work of God alone. To be born 'through promise' (δι' ἐπαγγελίας, 4:23) is analogically identical to being 'promised children' (ἐπαγγελίας τέκνα, 4:28): the source and manner of Isaac's physical birth is the archetype of which the 'birth' of the Galatians is the eschatological type. Moreover, in both cases the manner of begetting is κατὰ πνεῦμα, which is to say by means of God's *creative* power.[114]

Conclusion—Differing Life-Giving and Life-Ordering Gifts, Differing Hermeneutics

The formal parallels between the treatments of the earthly and heavenly cities in Galatians and *4 Ezra* make the material theological differences all the more striking: both metaphors operate in a cosmologically and eschatologically framed discussion of the proper identification of heirs. Yet, in *4 Ezra* the relationship between the present and heavenly Jerusalem is read through a creational and Torah-shaped hermeneutic: the present Jerusalem, though subject to the futility of historical existence, is worthy and in so far as she gives birth to children who order their lives in Torah-terms, receives her righteous children back resurrected at the eschaton. By contrast, in Galatians the relationship between the present and heavenly Jerusalem is read through a pneumatologically creative and Christ-shaped hermeneutic: the present Jerusalem gives birth only to morally enslaved and eschatologically dead children in history unless they, like the Gentiles, are 'born' by the Spirit through receipt of the Christ-gift in history. For the law is confined to the fallen creation (Gal

[114] Though Thiessen recognises this 'birth' motif, his attempt at a *Sonderweg* interpretation of Paul's account of descent and inheritance is unconvincing, because it fails to deal adequately with those points where the Torah itself and those who practise it are confined to 'the present evil age'; cf. Thiessen, *Gentile Problem*, 105–60.

4:3, 9)—given to, fitted for, and cursing a 'dead' humanity, in anticipation of Jesus' life-giving death received by faith (Gal 3:21, 22).

Thus we arrive at the conclusion of our comparison and the answer to both of our hermeneutical questions: Paul reads scripture, salvation-history, and the world differently than *4 Ezra* and his opponents in Galatia because, whereas they see the Torah as the inviolable order of the divine gift of created life, Paul considers the Torah a part of the 'barren' created order from which the Christ-event gives birth to and orders eschatological life in the Spirit. In this way, our exegetical dialogue with *4 Ezra* has furthered research on Galatians in two respects. First, we have shown that current accounts of Paul's theological logic in Gal 3 – 4 have not accounted for how Paul's reading of salvation-history both takes on a necessary shape despite the contingent curse he appeals to in Dt 27:26 (Gal 3:10) and why, after the removal of inability, the law *cannot* provide the order of life of the church. As we have argued, an understanding of Paul's answer depends on seeing how the law is negatively but integrally related to the Christ-gift: the law confines all things to a 'dead' existence and is itself fitted for and confined to that reality *by divine design* in light of the coming of the promised life-giving and life-ordering Christ gift. Second and in this connection, we have gone beyond recent research on gift in Paul, by showing that a mere recognition of the unconditioned and incongruous donation of the Christ-gift is not sufficient for capturing Paul's deep logic. For Paul does not beg the question of the significance of the Christ-gift for the law in the church, but rather argues for its *necessary* confinement to the present evil age. A focus on divine life-giving benefaction in our comparative texts has, thus, brought Paul's 'submerged assumption' to the surface.[115] Yet, given Paul's rather schematic reading, our debate partners may still fairly ask: *why* is the self 'dead', and, if not the Torah, how does the Christ-gift order both self and society? We turn to these questions in conversation with 4 Maccabees in our final chapter.

[115] Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 407.

Chapter 5
Life that Counts: The Reconstitution of the Self and Communal Flourishing in Galatians 5 – 6 in Debate with 4 Maccabees

'Who hindered you from obeying the truth?' (Gal 5:7b). This question both encapsulates the debate outlined in the previous chapter and suggests key issues that debate raises. In our texts the truth is not simply believed but obeyed because it concerns the donation and ordering of life by God. In other words, our texts assume the convention of 'balanced reciprocity' characteristic of Greco-Roman systems of gift-exchange, wherein a gift obligates 'returning the same kind of gifts, or gifts of equal value for those received.'[1] *4 Ezra* presents the Mosaic choice between life and death as the hermeneutic for seeing beyond the futility of history to the gift of resurrection life for the Torah-righteous. Paul, by contrast, reads sacred text and salvation-history Christomorphically, arguing that the law's curse recognises a singular 'dead' humanity, enslaved to the entropic elements of the cosmos and in need of the singular life-giving Christ-gift.

Both *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees consider life to be irrevocably given and ordered by the Torah at creation and, thus, Paul cannot simply *assert* that human beings are 'dead' and that the law is implicated in this entropic order. He must explain why this is the case. More specifically, Paul, in apparently denying the *libertas* of *4 Ezra* or 4 Maccabees' argument about the sufficiency of εὐσεβὴς λογισμός to rule the self, invites the questions of why he considers humanity 'dead', how this is to be understood, and what order of society, if not the Torah, the Christ-event entails. In Gal 5:13 – 6:10, we see how Paul would answer.

Thus, one burden of this chapter is to demonstrate how the anthropological and social questions that would be pressed by *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees illumine the debate about the relation of Gal 5 – 6 to the rest of the letter. Firstly, we aim to further research on the coherence of Galatians by showing that Gal 5:13 – 26 represents the material ground and explication of Paul's assumption that human beings are 'dead' in Gal 3:21. In this connection, we develop Troels Engberg-Pedersen's insight that Gal 4:21 – 31 provides a 'bridge' from Paul's theological

[1] S. Joubert, *Paul as Benefactor: Reciprocity, Strategy and Theological Reflection in Paul's Collection* (WUNT II 124; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 22.

reading of salvation-history to his parenesis in Gal 5, demonstrating that the assumptions of both sections are defended theologically and grounded anthropologically in Gal 5:13 – 26.[2] In the context of accounts of the theology and coherence of Galatians, this argument is significant because it shows how, ultimately, Paul's account of the Flesh/Spirit antithesis in Gal 5:13 – 26 is the theological ground for his autobiography (Gal 1 – 2), his reading of salvation-history (Gal 3 – 4), and his ethical material (Gal 6). In this connection, recent scholarship has rightly abandoned two options that view Paul's 'ethical' material as only loosely related to Gal 1 – 4: Paul is neither shifting here to a generalised collection of *sententiae*, nor fighting a two-front war against 'legalism' and 'libertinism', but rather, as most now argue, Gal 5 – 6 represents an integral piece,[3] for some, the climax of Paul's argument for the singular gospel.[4]

This chapter will modify this consensus, reintroducing 4 Maccabees' philosophically inflected argument for the superiority of the Torah-ordered self and society. The aim is to clarify why Paul gives this *particular* account of the self in the context of the antithesis between the Flesh and the Spirit and how this account necessarily finds its proper expression in a Christ-shaped self and social order. In this connection, we will resolve the debate between Engberg-Pedersen and J. Louis Martyn over the character and function of Paul's virtue ethics, showing both that Paul is concerned with individual virtue (*contra* Martyn) and that his account of the self is not structurally identical to but would decisively modify a Stoic account of anthropology (*contra* Engberg-Pederson).[5] Specifically, we show, through exegetical dialogue, that Paul is operating with an inchoate theory of new and newly-ordered agency. Moreover, by attending to the formal structure of Paul's argument in

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[2] T. Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 133 – 34: 'the two triads of law, flesh and slavery versus Christ, faith, spirit and freedom will be developed *with regard to their internal, logical connection* in the 'paranetic' section. In addition to providing exhortation of the Galatians, which it does do, that section also spells out *exactly how* it makes sense to connect the three items in either triad.'

[3] F.J. Matera, "The Culmination of Paul's Argument to the Galatians: Gal. 5.1-6.17," *JSNT* 32 (1988): 79–91; S. Schewe, *Die Galater zurückgewinnen: paulinische Strategien in Galater 5 und 6* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005); T.A. Wilson, *The Curse of the Law and the Crisis in Galatia: Reassessing the Purpose of Galatians* (WUNT II 225; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).

[4] See Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 136; M. Konradt, 'Die Christonomie der Freiheit: Zu Paulus' Enfaltung seines ethischen Ansatzes in Gal 5,13 – 6,10', *EC* 1 (2010): 60 – 81.

[5] Cf. J.L Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997); idem, 'De-apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay Focused on Paul and the Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen" *JSNT* 86 (2002); Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*; idem, "Response to Martyn," *JSNT* 86 (2002): 103–14.

conversation with 4 Maccabees, we will establish the apologetic character and clarify the logical form of the argument in Gal 5. In this way, way we take up the argument of Barclay, neglected by scholars, that Paul is involved in an apologetic 'bridge-building' exercise.[6] Though we will range across 4 Maccabees, one point will provoke particularly illuminating dialogue—the 'philosophical' section (4 Macc 1 – 3), where the Torah-order defines the virtuous self and community (esp., 2:21 – 23).

In sketching a debate with 4 Maccabees through Gal 5 – 6, I will argue two theses: 1) whereas 4 Maccabees presents a Torah-ordered self that maintains its divinely given created integrity and, thus, freedom, Paul's inchoate theory of action presents a self that, unless re-created and governed by the Spirit, is not free but in bondage to the evil passions and desires common to humanity, to the 'Flesh' (Gal 5:13 – 26); 2) in both Galatians and 4 Maccabees, however, life is ordered where it is given, and, thus, while the proper expression of Torah-ordered existence is obedience to the Torah unto death in 4 Maccabees, in Galatians, by contrast, Spirit-normed lives take the christomorphic shape of burden-bearing (6:1 – 5) and, thus, life-giving (6:6 – 10) communities. With regard to the latter thesis, we contribute to the debate over the relationship between Paul's ethics and Christology vis-à-vis the Torah by clarifying the theological significance of the phrase ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ in Gal 6:2. By showing how the phrase encapsulates Paul's apologetic bridge-building activity from the Christ-gift back to the Torah, we further paradigmatic readings of this phrase and show why the ethical material of Gal 6:1 – 10 serves a vital theological function in Paul's argument.

In summary, it is in Paul's Christological and pneumatological account of the creation and ordering of the self and community that the difference of his theological logic with that of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* comes to its clearest expression. For Gal 5 – 6 provides the material basis and deep coherence of Paul's previous argument by explaining the significance of and need for the new existence through the Christ-gift—created, sustained, and ordered by the Spirit. Thus, through our exegetical dialogue with 4 Maccabees, this chapter produces two vital results for our thesis. First, by demonstrating how Gal 5:13 – 26 functions as the material theological

[6] J.M.G. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 124 – 25.

ground for Paul's argument in Gal 1 – 4 and why the ethical instruction of Gal 6 is necessary for theological completeness, this chapter concludes our new account of the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians.

This result is significant because it shows how Paul's conception of the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering provides thematic coherence between Gal 1 – 4 and Gal 5 – 6, while specifying the integral relation and separate *theological* function of Gal 5:13 – 26 and Gal 6:1 – 10. Whereas previous approaches assume, as Susanne Schewe rightly argues, a '*Themaverschiebung*' that renders Gal 5:13 – 6:10 a '*Fremdkörper*' in the letter, the present chapter demonstrates how this section is thematically coherent with the rest of the letter *because* of its theological function.[7] Paul presents himself as an exemplary unworthy recipient of the life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift (Gal 1 – 2), bringing his autobiography to its climax with an account of himself as a 'resurrected' agent in the Christ-gift (Gal 2:18 – 21); he provides exegetical arguments for a reading of salvation and cosmic history designed to demonstrate how the law confines all things and is itself confined to a 'dead' existence in light of this life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift (Gal 3 – 4; esp. 3:21, 22); and, as we shall argue, he concludes (Gal 5 – 6) by showing why the Christ-gift, not the Torah, is needed to effect the creation of new agents in the Spirit, and how these new agents are, in turn, properly ordered by the Spirit within a new community. Thus, at each stage in his argument, Paul's conception of the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering provides deep thematic coherence, while in Gal 5:13 –

[7] Schewe identifies three approaches used by scholars to construe the thematic unity and function of Gal 5:13 – 6:10 within the letter: 1) dogmatic models, which argue that the section arises as a necessary consequence of Paul's previously articulated theology in the letter (*Galater*, 16 – 26); 2) rhetorical models, which construe the letter as deliberative rhetoric and this section as Paul's final appeal to live differently (ibid., 26 – 48); 3) historical models, which depend on reconstructions of the situation in Galatia to interpret the particularities of this section (ibid., 49 – 59). On the argument about an assumed *Themaverschiebung* in these models, which thus renders Gal 5:13 – 6:10 a *Fremdkörper* in the letter, see Schewe, *Galater*, 9, 10, 40. Though similar to dogmatic accounts, the argument of this chapter differs from them because it sees Gal 5:13 – 6:10 arising not as a consequence of the theology developed in Gal 1 – 4 but as the climactic expression of the logical ground and necessary ethical order of that theology. In addition to Schewe's monograph, for studies that limit Paul's intention here to rhetorical persuasion, see the seminal work of G.A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1984), 144–52 and the more recent text-based study of D.F. Tolmie, *Persuading the Galatians: A Text-centred Rhetorical Analysis of a Pauline Letter* (WUNT II 190; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 189–203. Barclay's earlier monograph is the preeminent 'historical' approach to these issues; J.M.G. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988). For two recent and significant theological construals, see Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics*, 131 – 77 and Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 423 – 41.

26 he grounds this theme theologically in an account of human bondage to evil passions and desires out of which the Christ-gift creates and orders new agents for a new community.

Second and consequently, we go beyond recent accounts of gift in Paul by showing why attention to the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering is necessary for capturing the deep theological logic of Galatians. As we have seen in chapter four, Paul does not assume that the unconditioned character of the Christ-gift precludes Torah norms in the church, but rather he argues that order of the church is *necessarily* indifferent to the Torah because the law confines and is confined to a 'dead' existence under sin. Thus, the Torah's function is *integral* to the Christ-gift, producing the entropic conditions out of which life is created and ordered by the Spirit. Likewise, as we shall argue, though it is the case that the Christ-gift is realised in 'non-competitive communities, ordered by a new calibration of worth'[8], this does not address the question *why* the Torah itself cannot produce such communities or represent the divine standard of worth. In other words, what is needed is an account of the inferential logic of Gal 5:18: εἰ δὲ πνεύματι ἄγεσθε, οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον. In this connection, we argue that, in Gal 5:13 – 26, that ὑπὸ νόμον is Paul's shorthand for the law's participation and role in humanity's bondage to the Flesh (i.e., the disordering evil passions and desires common to humanity), while it is in the Christ-gift that new agents are created and ordered by the Spirit. Thus, it is the life-giving and life-ordering aspect of the Christ-event as divine gift that structures Paul's theological logic. Likewise, as we shall argue, it is not simply that the Christ-gift establishes its own communal norms as unconditioned gift, for Paul, but rather that it does so in deeper fulfillment of the aims of the Torah itself. That is, the Christ-gift does not simply set aside Torah norms; it produces, as we shall argue, a Christ-piety that fulfills the Torah-virtue of love.

5.1 Vice and Virtue in Galatia: Paul's Apologetic Argument for Torah-Virtue without Torah-Piety in Gal 5

In light of the scholarly confusion over the logic undergirding Gal 5:2, John Barclay poses the key question: 'Why is it inconceivable to Paul that believing Gentiles might

[8] Barclay, *Gift*, 425.

express their faith in Christ, and conduct their life of love in the Spirit, by getting circumcised and observing the Torah?'[9] We pursued a related question in the previous chapter: why, for Paul, does the law pronounce an indiscriminate and inevitable curse on those who follow it? Put simply, given Gal 3:21, 22, the law curses indiscriminately because it finds within humanity nothing by which to discriminate. In positive terms, the law is given to 'dead' humanity and, thus, its cursing word places all things under Sin as a *preparatio evangelii*. As we argued, it is not Paul's appeal to the Christ-event in general but his conception of the Christ-gift as life-giving and, thus, his *creative* hermeneutic in particular that sets his reading of text and world apart from that of his opponents. In this section we will examine how Paul's particular death-life framing of the slavery and freedom motif is vital for discerning both the logic of necessity in his extremely compressed summary in Gal 5:1 – 6 and the apologetic character of his argument in Gal 5:13 – 26. For, we will argue, to render circumcision and Torah-observance a matter of indifference with respect to the demands of love (Gal 5:6), is both to call into question 4 Maccabees' definition of love and to introduce an argument for Torah-virtue, although not Torah-piety.[10]

Consequently, by attending to the relation between the content and form of Paul's argument, we contribute to the overall aim of this chapter in two ways. First, we begin to show *why*, for Paul, the law both provides the moral criteria the Christ-gift fulfilles and yet the law itself *cannot* secure. Second, by showing how Paul's notion of freedom carries his account of the Christ-gift in life-ordering and life-giving terms, we begin to offer an explanation of the thematic coherence and argumentative function of Gal 5 – 6, while also underlining the importance of Paul's construal of divine benefaction in life-givign and life-ordering terms for the argument.2

[9] J.M.G Barclay, 'Paul, the Gift and the Battle over Gentile Circumcision: Revisiting the Logic of Galatians', *ABR* 58 (2010): 37.

[10] By 'Torah-virtue', I mean love, the disposition Paul argues fulfils the law (Gal 5:13; cf. Lev 19:18) and is the product of the Spirit in various forms (5:22, 23); by 'Torah-piety', I mean the practices of the Torah that Paul has been persuading the Galatians not to adopt (e.g., circumcision).

5.1.1 Life that Counts: Freedom as the Expression of New Existence in Love

The bridge Paul constructs in Gal 5:1 from 4:21 – 31 to 5:2 – 6 carries his particular notion of 'freedom' as eschatological existence directly into the crisis over circumcision in Galatia.[11] As argued in the previous chapter, by freedom, Paul means the status of the Galatians as heirs *born* κατὰ πνεῦμα (4:28) and, thus, no longer subject to the 'dead' existence of 'all things under Sin' (3:21 -22), whether in the form of pagan or Jewish subservience to the order of life under the cosmic elements (4:1 - 11). Thus, against both the majority view that the state of ἐλευθερία[12] in Gal 5:1 has to do with freedom from the law *per se*[13] and a relatively recent minority report that identifies the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου of Gal 4:3, 9 as the primary referent,[14] the present approach locates the meaning in the relation between the two. That is, when, on the basis of the state of new life the Galatians have, Paul implores in v. 1b, 'stand firm, therefore, and do not be burdened again by a yoke of slavery' (στήκετε οὖν καὶ μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε), what he means by 'yoke of slavery' is subjection to the

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[11] Three features underline the transitional function of this verse: the reintroduction of Χριστός, framing 4:21 – 31 between 4:19, its asyndetic character, and the clear relation of the command μὴ πάλιν ζυγῷ δουλείας ἐνέχεσθε to the discussion of circumcision in vv. 2 – 4. As Williams concludes, 'Although 5:1 is connected thematically with what precedes and follows and indeed functions as a bridge passage between the allegory and the parenetic material of chapters 5 and 6, syntactically this verse stands in grand isolation. No particle or conjunction binds it to what precedes, and no conjunction or particle in 5:2 connects verse 1 to what follows'; S.K. Williams, *Galatians* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997), 132. For the best structural analysis of this section in the context of Paul's total argument, see Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 132–36.

[12] Since Deissmann's discovery of the use of this phrase in sacral manumission rites, most scholars take this phrase as a dative of goal or purpose, and thus in parallel with ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ in 5:13; A. Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World* (trans. L.R.M. Strachan; New York: Harper, 1927), 324 – 34. See, e.g., H. Schlier, *Der Brief an die Galater* (14th ed.; KEK 7; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), 229; M.C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 309, n. 433. For an account of the textual variants likely created by confusion over this dative phrase and a compelling argument for Τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν as the original reading, see Burton, *Galatians*, 270–71.

[13] de Boer, *Galatians*, 311.

[14] *Contra* Coppins, Paul does not use στοιχεῖα and ζυγὸς δουλείας as 'catch-all terms that are applicable to the past and present situations of both Jews and Gentiles,' but rather, because of the law's cosmic role in 3:21, the latter refers to the Torah in such a way that its integral relation to the former is presupposed; W. Coppins, *Interpretation of Freedom in the Letters of Paul: With Special Reference to the German Tradition* (WUNT II 261; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 114–15. Cf. Jones, who argues that the δουλεία in v. 1b cannot be limited to the requirements of the Torah, a position that must explain away the obvious limiting function of the word ζυγός; F.S. Jones, "*Freiheit" in den Briefen des Apostels Paulus: eine historische, exegetische und religionsgeschichtliche Studie* (GTA 34; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1987), 100.

entropic existence of the present age i*n the form* of commitment to the Torah.[15] Rather than burdening themselves with *this* yoke, Paul's desire is that the Galatians be 'Christ-shaped' (4:19), but before he can articulate this state of freedom positively (beginning in vv. 5 – 6), he must first warn of the negative implications (vv. 2 – 4) of refusing to continue standing firm.

Because Gal 5:2 – 6 represents the first direct application of Paul's previous argument to the situation in Galatia,[16] the logic is assumed. Consequently, if we ask why accepting the practice of circumcision in Galatia would necessarily mean that 'Christ will benefit [them] nothing' (Χριστὸς ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ὠφελήσει, 5:2),[17] then we must infer the meaning of Christ's 'benefit' from the previous argument to determine why circumcision necessarily cancels it. Also, as de Boer observes, the play on the related words ὠφελήσει and ὀφειλέτης (v. 3) 'indicates that the point of v. 3 (obligation to observe the whole law) complements the point of v. 2 (Christ will be of no benefit).'[18] With this complementary relation and the necessity of inference in view, then, Paul's solemn declaration to 'every human being who has himself circumcised that he is obliged to do the whole law' (παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ περιτεμνομένῳ ὅτι ὀφειλέτης ἐστὶν ὅλον τὸν νόμον ποιῆσαι, 5:3) sounds similar to his appeal to the inevitable curse of Dt 27:26 (n.b. ποιῆσαι in 3:10, 12), and the implied benefit would seem to be Christ's curse-bearing death (3:13). Thus, the problem with taking on the obligation entailed by the law would be that it brings the inevitable curse that the Christ-gift bears.

As we have seen, Paul's salvation-historical argument is eschatologically and cosmologically inflected. Thus, the obligation to do the whole law is *necessarily* problematic because the Torah's curse (3:10; 21) confirms (3:22) and conforms in

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[15] In Coppins's terms (*Freedom*, 114 – 115), 'the freedom in view is "freedom from the elements of the world", of which "the (Jewish) law" is a subset or instantiation', but it does not follow that the law plays no constitutive role in the fundamental cosmic enslavement of the στοιχεῖα, as he suggests when limiting the target of 4:8 to Gentile 'idolatry' and not subjection to Torah. Rather, Paul's argument by analogy works in these verses only if the latter is akin to the former, and that works, as we have argued, only if Jewish and pagan calendrical practices reinforce the same 'dead' cycle of life and death. Vollenweider is near the mark, 'Die Tiefendimension paulinischer Reflexion ist freilich erst dann ausgelotet, wenn das Gesetz als seine universale anthroplogische – und möglicherweise gar kosmologische – Grösse und nicht nur als jüdisches Spezifikum…in den Blick gerät'; S. Vollenweider, *Freiheit als neue Schopfung: Eine Untersuchung zur Eleutheria bei Paulus und in seiner Umwelt* (FRLANT 147; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 309. *Contra* de Boer (*Galatians*, 35, 161, 167), it is not necessary to conclude, however, that the law *itself* is 'an enslaving power'.

[16] J.L. Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 469.

[17] Barclay, 'Battle', 36 – 7.

[18] de Boer, *Galatians*, 312. Cf. Dunn, *Galatians*, 265.

certain respects (e.g., in calendrical practices, 4:1 – 11) to the 'dead' condition of 'all things under Sin' (3:22). Hence, Jesus' curse-bearing death (3:13) is inseparable from its life-giving application in the work of the Spirit in 'birthing' heirs from a dead humanity (4:21 – 31). In other words, the reason why the acceptance of circumcision in Galatia necessarily entails a loss of Christ's benefit is that Jesus' life-giving death is given not only without regard to Torah-observance but because such observance does not produce righteousness (3:21).[19] It is not simply that the Torah is a 'whole way of life'[20] or a 'total package [to be] accepted or rejected as such'.[21] This begs the question Paul is debating with his Jewish-Christian interlocutors: *why not* include the Gentiles on Jewish terms, especially if, as authors like *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees argue, the law represents *the* social expression of created order?[22] In Paul's view, the problem is that the Torah oversees a 'whole way of life' that is inevitably cursed by God and, by *divine design* (cf. Paul's emphasis on the *historical location* of the Torah in 3:15 -18 vis-à-vis our reading of 3:19 – 22 and 4:1 -11 in the previous chapter), integrally related to the fallen created order.[23] Thus, the acceptance of the practice of circumcision in Galatia,[24] because it is, in effect, the acceptance of a *cosmic* curse only the Christ-gift bears, is necessarily a refusal of the life-giving benefit Jesus' death bestows.

Verse 4 assumes the same logic, but the language of relationship, gift, and forensic evaluation is foregrounded. Paul describes 'whoever is seeking to justify [himself] through the law' (οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε) as 'cut off from Christ' (κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ) and having 'fallen from the gift' (τῆς χάριτος ἐξεπέσατε). Thus, Paul brackets his forensic construal of those accepting circumcision with

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[19] In this respect, we are in complete agreement with Barclay ('Battle'; idem, *Paul and the Gift*: the Christ-gift is unconditioned; what we are trying to explain is *why* for Paul it is also *necessarily* incongruous.

[20] Dunn, *Galatians*, 266 – 67; followed by R.B. Hays, *The Letter to the Galatians* (NIB XI; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 312 and de Boer, *Galatians*, 314.

[21] de Boer, *Galatians*, 314.

[22] For appeals to experience and the apparent misfit between nationalistic construals of Jewish identity and unconditional grace, see Dunn, *Galatians*, 262, 265, 271.

[23] As argued in chapter four, Stanley's argument that the curse of Gal 3:10 is not actualised or inevitable is mistaken; C.D. Stanley, '"Under a Curse": A Fresh Reading of Galatians 3:10 – 14', *NTS* 36 (1990): 481 – 511. Thus, Wilson's thesis, because it depends on the view that the curse is a threat, is unpersuasive; Wilson, *Curse*.

[24] I take the verb περιτέμνησθε in v. 2 as middle because of the durative force of the present tense, thus specifying the acceptance of circumcision as a *community practice*; so, de Boer, *Galatians*, 311.

relational and gift language because 'the Gift' *is* a life-giving relationship with Christ for those who are 'dead'—incapable of securing justification through the law. Seeking justification (present tense) through the law, then, just is a falling away (aorist) from the gift of Jesus' death and resurrection life, a cleavage (aorist) from Christ himself *in the sense that* the implied forensic verdict for such a person is the very state of death that the Christ-gift was given to reverse. If you have a 'living' subject then righteousness (and the eschatological justification that attends it) can be had through the law (cf. *4 Ezra,* 4 Maccabees, and Gal 3:21), but, for Paul, the law confines 'dead' subjects to *cosmic* and *moral* death in view of the divine gift of life donated in the Christ-event (Gal 3:22).

One could object that Paul does not himself *use* this death and life terminology in Galatians 5:1 – 6. But this overlooks the summary character of these verses (Paul uses only anarthrous nouns in vv. 5 – 6) and that Paul's 'sloganeering'[25] places the rhetorical emphasis on the new, concrete contrast between the would-be practice of circumcision in Galatia and the alternative way of life Paul calls 'faith working through love'. As in Gal 3 – 4, however, a proper view of this contrast depends on seeing it within an eschatological, cosmological, and moral frame. Thus, Paul anchors his warning against οἵτινες ἐν νόμῳ δικαιοῦσθε logically (γάρ, vv. 5, 6)[26] in the contrasting eschatological reality that 'we' (emphatic ἡμεῖς) experience and anticipate: '*We* by the Spirit from faith eagerly await the hope of righteousness; for in Christ Jesus neither circumcision counts for anything nor uncircumcision but faith working through love.' The slogan πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως reintroduces two significant points of Paul's previous argument (and anticipates another, cf. 5:25a: Εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι): the Spirit is received by or through faith in the good news of Christ (Gal 3:2, 5, 14), and a beginning 'by the Spirit' (3:3) is a birth 'according to the Spirit'

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[25] H.D. Betz, *Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979), 261 – 62; cf. B.C. Lategan, 'Formulas in the Language of Paul: A Study of Prepositional Phrases in Galatians', *Neot* 25 (1991): 75 – 87. For an analysis of the phenomena in the Corinthian correspondence, see M.M. Mitchell, 'Rhetorical Shorthand in Pauline Argumentation: The Function of "the Gospel" in the Corinthian Correspondence', in *Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker* (ed. L.A. Jervis and P. Richardson; JSNTSup 108; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 63 – 88.

[26] *Contra* Longenecker, *Galatians*, 228. For Paul's use of a logical but contrasting γάρ elsewhere in Galatians, see, on 2:17 and 3:10, Betz, *Galatians*, 121, 137. Engberg-Pedersen rightly identifies the same force in 5:5; T. Engberg-Pedersen, *Cosmology and Self in the Apostle Paul: The Material Spirit* (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 244 – 45, n. 41.

(4:29). The point is that it is those who have received eschatological existence by the Spirit through faith who actually look forward to the coming eschatological deliverance of the *righteous*—ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης ἀπεκδεχόμεθα.[27] This is so (γάρ) because the Christ-event has disclosed the ultimate standard of eschatological worth, which, though found formally in the law (5:14), is not dependent on the Torah's division of humanity into the 'circumcision' and 'uncircumsion' (v. 6). What counts (τι ἰσχύει)[28] in Christ Jesus is not *this kind of life*, where taxonomies of the present evil age produce competing evaluations of worth, but life sourced from this faith and expressed through this love. In short, the life that counts eschatologically is that which matches its source, the Christ-gift (2:20)—the life of love. *That righteousness*, for Paul, is what proceeds from the Christ-gift (2:21) and, thus, counts in Christ Jesus, and it is only supplied in the form of new existence πνεύματι ἐκ πίστεως.[29]

It is illuminating to bring *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees into our analysis here, for they, like Paul, assume that human love should be patterned after and sourced by divine love, though they construe both source and pattern differently. More specifically, Paul's identification of the Christ-gift as both the definitive source and pattern of divine love raises questions for our conversation partners about created life—i.e., human agency and its proper social order—as divine gift. It is these types of concerns, we will argue, that account for the character and arrangement of Paul's argument in Gal 5:13 – 6:10. In other words, what *4 Ezra* and 4 Maccabees help us to

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[27] Given the clear eschatological horizon indicated by Paul's characteristic use of ἀπεκδέχομαι (cf. Rom 8:19, 23, 25; 1 Cor 1:7; Phil 3:20) and the difficulty of teasing a concept of 'double justification' out of these brief verses (cf. Betz, *Galatians,* 262 n. 87; Cosgrove, *Cross*, 150), some scholars translate this phrase as an epexegetical genitive—'the hope that is righteousness'—and thus as a reference to God's 'justification/rectification' on the last day; so, e.g. Dunn, *Galatians*, 269; Martyn, *Galatians*, 472; Hays, *Galatians*, 313. This interpretation is problematic because the contrast between vv. 4 and 6 has to do with alternative sources and evaluations of human righteousness—law observance or a love-producing faith—and each of Paul's previous uses of δικαιοσύνη seem to refer not to the divine verdict but to human status (2:21; 3:6; 3:21). Thus, in our view it is preferable to take this phrase as a subjective genitive, translating it as 'the hope which belongs to righteousness', because it retains both the divine evaluation (the object of ἐλπίς *is* divine justification/rectification) and the human way of life that reflects it being evaluated in Paul's other uses of δικαιοσύνη (that ἐλπίς is for the 'righteous').

[28] For this sense, see 'ἰσχύω', *BDAG* 484. For the significance for Paul's construal of the Christ-gift as establishing its own criterion of worth, see Barclay, *Gift*, 392 – 93, 393, n. 9.

[29] J.W. Yates, *The Spirit and Creation in Paul* (WUNT II 251; Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 165: 'Somewhat confusingly, it is correct to say that eschatological life in the spirit is both the product of, and precursor to, righteousness.' This is so because Jesus' death is life-giving to the 'dead' (3:21) as the expression of eschatological righteousness (cf. Gal 2:20; 5:6) and as the possibility of its enactment in new, living agents (Gal 5:14, 24, 25).

see here is how Gal 5 – 6 is neither seeking merely rhetorically persuasive aims, nor is it merely responding to the circumstances in Galatia. Rather, it is laying bare the ground of Paul's theological logic (Gal 5) and providing, in general terms and for the sake of theological completeness, his positive account of how the Christ-gift properly orders the self and society in fulfillment of the Torah's own aims (Gal 6).

With respect to the shared theme of love, it is striking that *4 Ezra* (5:40), like Paul, identifies eschatological existence as the goal of the divine love promised to God's people. Yet, as we have argued, whereas *4 Ezra* identifies the revelation of eschatological existence as the expression of divine love beyond history in the resurrection for the Torah-righteous, Paul sees it in the 'resurrection' of 'dead' humanity within history in the Christ-event. Both emphatically identify new eschatological existence as the goal and gift of the divine love, but they construe this reality differently. The author of 4 Maccabees, by contrast, is less concerned with the apparent empirical negation of divine love for God's people in history. He is more concerned with the proper ordering of human love according to the divine will. For, to him, it is obvious both that the disordered desires of Jason (and those like him) and subsequent neglect of the law are to blame for the divine chastisement that has befallen the Jewish nation (4 Macc 4:15 – 26) and that the martyrs prove that such personal and social disorder can be avoided. Pious, Torah-ordered reason is capable of ruling the passions, thus empowering the martyrs to live through the paradoxical contest of torture and death for the law in the certainty of receiving immortality as a return gift (17:11 – 16). Thus, the author of 4 Maccabees would likely press Paul at two significant points, asking 'Is your configuration of the recipients of the law as "dead" (3:21) and enslaved (5:1) a denial that Torah-ordered reason is capable of ruling the passions, and, if so, what then is the status of the law?' and 'what, if not commitment to circumcision and the whole law, exactly do you *mean* by love?' It is to the first of these interrelated questions that we now turn in debate with 4 Maccabees.

5.1.2 Vice, Virtue, and Communal Flourishing in 4 Maccabees and Galatians

We will examine Gal 5:7 – 12 with Gal 6:11 – 18 in our final section on communal order and Pauline polemics. Here we enter the scholarly conversation

about the function and force of Gal 5 – 6. Martyn's approach is instructive; for in asking what would be missing *if* we removed Galatians 5:2 – 6:10 from the letter he highlights a *prima facie* case for the necessity of the section.[30] It seems obvious, for example, that the removal of Paul's account of the antithesis between the flesh and the Spirit would excise something vital. Yet, for the author of 4 Maccabees, an immediate concern arises in Paul's argument in Gal 5:1 – 12; for after bringing his argument against circumcision to a climax with an exasperated wish that his opponents would castrate themselves (v. 12), Paul turns in the next two verses to speak of the fulfilment (πληρόω) of 'the whole law in the one sentence' of Lev 19:18. Paul's positive use of the Torah in Gal 5:14 has surprised many interpreters, but it would not have confused the author of 4 Maccabees.[31] For this is Paul's version of an apologetic argument that is formally identical to that implied in 4 Maccabees 9:18: 'only the children of the Hebrews are invincible where virtue is concerned'.[32] Moreover, Paul's movement from the assertion of the fulfilment of the law ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ to a more general discussion of vices and virtues plays a vital role in this argument. In this connection, we enter another scholarly debate: is it a 'serious mistake' to read Galatians 5:13 – 26 as 'a form of moral discourse' concerned with 'vices and virtues attributable to individuals'[33]? Are these verses an example of '(ancient philosophical) *virtue ethics* in its starkest form'[34] (italics original), or are these false choices?

In what follows, we will argue that Paul does engage in virtue ethics as a 'debating device'[35] but one that is necessary not for rhetorical persuasion but for logical completeness: just as the author of 4 Maccabees needed to provide a 'narrative demonstration' that proved that Torah-piety is rational in Hellenistic terms while the Hellenistic way of life is not, so Paul's apology must demonstrate

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[30] Martyn (*Galatians*, 481) cites four gaps were we to excise this section: a) no 'warning predictions of 5:2 – 12'; b) no retort to the charge that Paul does not give 'guidance in everyday life'; c) no detailed portrait of what 'God's rectifying deed looks like in the daily life of the church'; d) no call to living 'in a world marked by the polarity between the Spirit and the Flesh'.

[31] Recently, de Boer, *Galatians*, 325: 'What makes v. 14 extraordinary is its surprisingly positive appeal to "the law."'

[32] The apologetic nature of Paul's argument was recognised already by Barclay (*Obeying the Truth: a Study of Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 124 – 25), but his observation has not been pursued in the subsequent literature.

[33] Martyn, *Galatians*, 484.

[34] Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 165.

[35] E.P. Sanders, *Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 97; followed by Barclay, *Obeying*, 141.

why a commitment to Torah-piety necessarily falls short of Torah-virtue (love) while life in the Spirit does not.[36] In other words, through exegetical dialogue with 4 Maccabees, we clarify the logical form of Paul's argument. In this way, we begin to show how both Paul's negative and positive statements about the law in Gal 5:13 – 26 are grounded in his theological anthropology and why these statements are necessary for his argument. The case will proceed in two movements—first, in analysing Paul's assertions that the works of the flesh are clear (5:19) and that there is no law against the fruit of the Spirit (5:23) in comparison with the Jewish modification of Stoic virtue ethics in 4 Maccabees; second, in light of this analysis, in arguing that Paul's construal of life in the Spirit as the fulfilment of the Torah's aim (5:14) produces a paradoxical and apologetic modification of Torah-virtue (*not* Torah-piety) that is formally identical to 4 Maccabees' modification of Hellenistic virtue

Since the content of Paul's ethics is not strikingly different from that of other Jewish writers of antiquity, it is not surprising to find considerable overlap with 4 Maccabees.[37] When, in Gal 5:19 Paul claims that the works of the Flesh are 'evident' or 'manifest' (φανερά), given the list of fifteen 'vices' he produces, the author of 4 Maccabees would likely agree.[38] In several cases they use the same words/cognates with the same meanings in the same context of a discussion of the role of the emotions in human action—e.g., 'anger/rage' (θυμός, Gal 5:20; 4 Macc 2:16 – 20), 'enmity' (ἔχθρα, Gal 5:20; 4 Macc 2:14), and 'drink/drunkard' (μέθη /μέθυσος, Gal 5:21; 4 Macc 2:7). Moreover, if we include synonyms and conceptual overlap, several patches of common ground emerge. For example, both sexual deviance and competitive rivalry are shared concerns: for the former, consider, 'sexual immorality', 'lewdness', 'lasciviousness' (πορνεία, ἀκαθαρσία, ἀσέλγεια, Gal 5:19) and Joseph's resistance of 'sweet passion' and the brothers' refusal to 'carouse in [their]

[36] What follows is my attempt to take up Engberg-Pedersen's challenge (*Stoics*, 133 – 34) to read 4:21 – 31 as a 'Pauline bridge' (329, n. 9) not only to 5:1 – 6 but also to vv. 13ff., specifically with reference to the '*internal, logical connection* in the "parenetic" section' (italics original) of 'the two triads of law, flesh and slavery versus Christ faith, spirit and freedom'.

[37] For the view that Paul does not abandon but reconfigures the Torah in light of his Christology and with reference to the love command, see e.g. V.P. Furnish, *Theology and Ethics in Paul* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968), 28 – 34; W. Schrage, *Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese: ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Ethik* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1961), 228–38.

[38] For the classification of Paul's vices into four distinct groups—sexual immorality, idolatry, communal strife, and partying—see Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 210.

youth' (ἡδυπάθεια, 4 Macc 2:2 – 4; ἐντρυφήσατε ταῖς νεότησιν ὑμῶν, 8:8);[39] on the latter, see Paul's block of eight vices 'enmities, strife, jealousy, rages, rivalries, divisions, factions, envyings'(ἔχθραι, ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθεῖαι, διχοστασίαι, αἱρέσεις, φθόνοι, Gal 5:19, 20) and, in 4 Maccabees, the 'malevolent disposition' (κακοήθης διάθεσις) that finds expression in the soul in the form of 'boastfulness', 'love of money', 'love of glory', 'love of argument', and 'envy' (ἀλαζονεία, φιλαργυρία, φιλοδοξία, φιλονεικία, βασκανία, 4 Macc 1:25 – 26).

A number of scholars view the central position of the vices associated with competitive rivalry and the fact that they account for over half of Paul's vices as evidence that they represent his chief concern.[40] Given the direct warnings of Gal 5:15 and 5:26 and the content of Paul's polemical statements in Gal 5:7 – 11 and 6:11 – 17, this is almost certain.[41] Though a full treatment awaits the final section below, here we should note that 4 Maccabees also views competitive rivalry as a critical problem. This is clear both from the position of the 'malevolent disposition' and its vices in 4 Macc 1:26 at the head of 4 Maccabees' 'philosophical section' and the application of these vices (and virtues) to the characters in the 'narrative demonstration'. For example, in the build-up to Antiochus Epiphanes' showdown with the martyrs, the vices of love of money, love of glory, and envy are on full display, as Simon incites Seleucus to temple robbery in an attempt to depose Onias (4:1 – 14), Jason receives the high priesthood for a bribe from Antiochus Epiphanes (4:15 – 18), and Antiochus plunders the Temple in a rage over a perceived slight to his honour (4:22, 23). Thus, Paul and 4 Maccabees agree about vices, generally, and competition, particularly.

When Paul turns from his warning about the eschatological vanity of a life lived in the flesh (Gal 5:22) to his list of virtues in the fruit of the Spirit, our

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[39] On immorality as a *locus communis* in Jewish ethics of the Second Temple Period and Paul, see A.F. Segal, *Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee* (New Haven: YUP, 1990), 187 – 223. For the traditional character of much of Paul's vice list, see S. Wibbing, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament und ihre Traditionsgeschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Qumran-Texte* (BZNW 25; Berlin: Töpelmann, 1959), 86–88.

[40] A. Vögtle, *Die Tugend- und Lasterkataloge im Neuen Testament: exegetisch, religions- und formgeschichtlich Untersucht* (NTAbh; Münster: Aschendorff, 1936), 30; B.S. Easton, 'New Testament Ethical Lists', *JBL* 51 (1932): 5 – 6; Wibbing, *Lasterkataloge*, 91, 95 – 7; F.F. Bruce, *The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text* (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 250; Barclay, *Obeying*, 152 – 55.

[41] Barclay, *Obeying*, 154.

comparison with 4 Maccabees moves to more alien territory. Yet, there are significant terminological and conceptual similarities. Paul's virtues of love (ἀγάπη), endurance (μακροθυμία), and self-control (ἐγκράτεια) are matched in 4 Maccabees by the motifs of love of various types/things (e.g., φιλότεκνος, *4 Macc* 15:4; cf. 1:26; 2:13; 5:34; 8:26; 14:13; 15:4 – 14, 12, 25; 16:3), endurance of suffering (ὑπομονή, 1:11; 7:9; 9:8, 30; 15:30; 17:4, 12, 17, 23), and self-control/temperance/'the wise' (ἐγκράτεια, 5:34; σωφροσύνη, 1:3, 6, 18, 30–31; 5:23; and σώφρων, 1:35; 2:2, 16, 18, 23; 3:17, 19; 15:10). More significantly, these similarities exist in a formally identical hierarchical and teleological structure concerned with moral formation for the sake of communal and eschatological flourishing. In 4 Maccabees εὐσέβεια is the chief virtue in which all of the other virtues consist implicitly, and, thus, εὐσέβεια defeats competitive rivalry in the community by forming the cardinal virtues that produce harmony in the nation and harmony eschatologically. Likewise, in Galatians ἀγάπη is the chief 'virtue' in moral formation that produces communal and eschatological flourishing: it is the disposition that produces action that counts eschatologically (Gal 5:6); in contrast to 'the flesh', it is the characteristic disposition that produces mutual service (5:13) rather than mutual destruction (5:16) in Christian community; it is the fulfilment of the law (5:14); and, in contrast to the 'works of the flesh' that preclude entry into the Kingdom (5:19 – 21), it is the first of Paul's singular fruit of the Spirit (Gal 5:22).

We will have occasion to agree with Martyn that, in one respect, it is a 'serious mistake' to interpret Paul's Flesh and Spirit discourse as simply an example of Greco-Roman vice and virtue discourse.[42] But, given what we have just observed, this is not because Paul is interested in the effects of apocalyptic powers only on community and not individual moral agency.[43] For both Galatians and 4 Maccabees are concerned with moral formation of individuals within both the communal horizon *and* the eschatological horizon. This does not mean, however, that we are in

[42] Martyn, *Galatians*, 484.

[43] Martyn, *Galatians*, 485, n. 46: 'In Gal 5:18 – 24 Paul speaks consistently and exclusively of the community of those who belong to Christ, those who have received the Spirit of Christ.' Note, however, that Martyn (531) excludes Galatians 5:17d from this communal focus, restricting Paul's statement there to the experience of those who are 'attempting the impossible, that is to follow both Christ and the Sinaitic Law'. Rather than specifying this impossible attempt in anthropological terms, Martyn is content to attribute it to the fact the community is '[s]omehow permeable both to the Flesh and the Spirit'. It is this 'somehow' that needs explaining, and in anthropological terms, as we will see below.

complete agreement with Engberg-Pedersen that we have in Galatians an example of ancient philosophical virtue ethics 'in its starkest form'.[44] For we will argue that, despite formal structure, Paul's account of moral formation itself is materially opposed to that of a Stoically inflected Jewish account like 4 Maccabees. Before turning, however, to these material differences, we need to broaden our account of the formal structures and force of these arguments, because both Galatians and 4 Maccabees utilise identical formal structures as a part of a matching larger apologetic argument. Once our analysis of the formal structures of these arguments is in place, we will be in position to see how Gal 5:13 – 26 represents the theological ground of Paul's theological logic, and thereby offer a new account both of the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians. For, by attending to the shared formal structure of the arguments of Galatians and 4 Maccabees, the recognition that they each construe life with respect to human agency enables us to see the material differences in their understandings of where *this* life is given and ordered by God. That is, whereas 4 Maccabees argues for the superiority of Torah-piety in inculcating Hellenistic virtue on the basis of a conception of human agency given and ordered by the Torah from creation, Paul argues for the superiority of Christ-piety in inculcating Torah virtue on the basis of a conception of human agency reconstituted and ordered in the Christ-gift by the Spirit. Thus, Paul's account of new and newly-ordered agents vis-à-vis a 'dead' existence ὑπὸ νόμον (Gal 5:18) provides the *theological* grounding for his antithesis between the Christ-gift and the works of Torah.

5.1.3 All You Need is Love (As I Define It): Paul's Apologetic Argument for the Fulfilment of the Torah in the Church

As we saw in chapter two, the peculiar force of 4 Maccabees' apology for Judaism depends on a creative melding of Torah-piety and Hellenistic virtue ethics. Though the explicitly philosophical register of 4 Maccabees is slightly atypical, this text shares in the same 'bridge-building' mission of a number of Hellenistic Jewish

[44] Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 165.

writings of the period.[45] 4 Maccabees' test of the Stoic thesis that reason rules the passions ups the ante, however, as it also argues that *only* the Jews lead a way of life that proves this thesis and fulfils the ideals of virtue. Consequently, Eleazar's programmatic response to Antiochus trumpets the *Jewish* achievement of *Hellenistic* virtue as a way of bolstering Jewish identity and commitment: despite Antiochus's judgement that Jewish philosophy is irrational, the Jews will not give it up, because it teaches them the cardinal virtues of σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη by which they restrain both the passions of pleasure and pain and learn to act justly (5:22 – 24). It is unclear whether the author of 4 Maccabees was aware of Plato's exclusion of εὐσέβεια from the list of virtues,[46] but, for this Hellenistic Jew, the virtue of φρόνησις is inculcated only through training in Torah-*piety* (1:15 – 17). In Eleazar's climactic assertion that the Jewish philosophy 'teaches piety so that we worship the only existing God majestically' (εὐσέβειαν ἐκδιδάσκει ὥστε μόνον τὸν ὄντα θεὸν σέβειν μεγαλοπρεπῶς, 5:24) we have a particular instance of 4 Maccabees' peculiar claim: φρόνησις, properly speaking, is a matter of training in *Jewish* εὐσέβεια. The refusal of the martyrs to eat the pork provides the test case for this claim, and the argument progresses from an *a posteriori* to an *a fortiori* one. Because the martyrs' instruction in the Torah as a whole produces the cardinal virtues of self-control, courage, and justice, the general claim that wisdom is a matter of Torah-piety and the particular claim that it is wise to practise circumcision (4:25) and abstain from pork are simultaneously vindicated. In other words, Eleazar's two-fold rationale for abstinence—that the law is a seamless whole (5:20, 21) and that the law is a divine gift given for the good of human beings (5:25, 26)—is considered *rational* because circumcision and food laws are a part of the way of life that inculcates *Hellenistic* virtue.

What is vital for our purposes is that Paul's appeal to ἀγάπη functions in an identical fashion to 4 Maccabees' paradoxical appeal to the cardinal virtues but with the opposite effect. 4 Maccabees builds a bridge from Hellenistic virtue toward

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[45] Barclay, *Obeying*, 124–25. Note, for example, how in Wis 8:5 – 7 it is the personified Jewish Wisdom 'from whom all things are made' (τῆς τὰ πάντα ἐργαζομένης) who teaches those who love righteousness the *virtues* (ἀρεταί) of σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, and ἀνδρεία, of which 'there is nothing more profitable in the life for human beings' (ὧν χρησιμώτερον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν βίῳ ἀνθρώποις).

[46] *Resp.*, Book IV, 427b – c.

Torah-piety, while Paul builds back from a shared recognition of vice and virtue toward Torah-virtue.[47] This produces a Pauline paradox that is formally identical to that of 4 Maccabees. Just as in 4 Maccabees the Hellenistic way of life does not provide the conditions sufficient for attaining Hellenistic virtue *but the Torah does*, so does the Torah way of life in Galatians prove insufficient for its own goal of love *but life in the Spirit does*. This reading depends on a particular understanding of πληρόω in Gal 5:14, a recognition of the framing of the vices in v. 19, the assertion of the Torah's positive relation to the fruit of the Spirit in v. 23, and the fact that Paul considers the Spirit's chief fruit of love to be a *virtue*.

Debates over the interpretation of Gal 5:14 are longstanding and extensive. For the purposes of the present argument, we must limit ourselves to briefly stating the reasons for our interpretation and rebutting one prominent recent group of counterarguments. With regard to de Boer's isolation of the three main interpretive issues in this verse,[48] we take ὁ πᾶς νόμος to refer to the entirety of the Mosaic legislation (cf. ὅλον τὸν νόμον, 5:3),[49] the verb πεπλήρωται to refer to the 'fulfilment' of this legislation in the sense that the moral goal of the Torah is completed *only* by the ἀδελφοί in mutual service through love (5:13), and, thus, ἐν ἑνὶ λόγῳ… ἐν τῷ· ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν refers to the 'one sentence' in which the overarching aim of the Torah is stated. Despite de Boer's recent argument, there is no good reason to think that Paul is using νόμος in v. 14 to refer, as in 4:21b, to the Pentateuch or (without precedent in Galatians) the scriptures in general.[50] For it is not the case that a positive reference to the law would be 'undermining his whole argument to this point.'[51] As we have seen, Paul is not operating with a negative view of the Mosaic

[47] Barclay, *Obeying*, 125: 'If Diaspora Jews used virtue-lists to commend the law as compatible with a highly moral way of life, Paul uses such a list to commend the morality of life in the Spirit as compatible with the law.'

[48] de Boer, *Galatians*, 343: 'There are…three main issues in the interpretation of v. 14: (1) the precise reference of the phrase "the entire law," (2) the import of the verb "to fulfil," and (3) Paul's use and interpretation of Lev 19:18."

[49] Since Hübner's largely failed attempt to establish a distinction between the noun phrases in 5:3 and 5:14, the majority of scholars have seen a reference to the Torah in Paul's use of νόμος; H. Hübner, 'Das ganze und das eine Gesetz, zum Problem Paulus und die Stoa', *KuD* 21 (1975): 239 – 56; idem, *Law in Paul's Thought* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984), 36 – 41. So, e.g., Barclay, *Obeying*, 136–37; Martyn, *Galatians*, 486. For early criticisms of Hübner's case, see Sanders, *Paul, the Law*, 96 – 7; H. Räisänen, *Paul and the Law* (2nd ed.; WUNT 29; Mohr Siebeck, 1987), 27, n. 72.

[50] de Boer, *Galatians*, 342–45.

[51] Ibid., 344.

legislation *simpliciter*.[52] Rather, the Torah is ultimately *positive* precisely in its negative function, for it is by no means *contrary* to (κατά) the promises (3:21). Here Paul views the Torah as negative in its *positive* function, in that it voices the moral aim by which all human practices, even those of the Torah, are to be judged.[53] In other words, as in 5:1 – 6, Paul is suggesting that the practice of circumcision is, if considered a part of the seamless whole of moral order, paradoxically, inimical to the life of love that counts (5:6), a life to which the Torah itself points (and is, thus, not *against;* cf. κατά, 5:23) but only the Christ-event produces. Thus, *contra* de Boer, the parallel of 5:3 is decisive, and Paul's use of νόμος here refers to the Mosaic legislation.[54]

Relatedly, a number of scholars recognise the significance of Paul's shift to the language of 'fulfiling' rather than 'doing' the Torah in v. 14.[55] Though de Boer is correct that Paul is not commanding the Galatians directly to *observe* Lev 19:18, it does not follow that the force of this citation is reducible to a reading of that verse in purely promissory terms (i.e., 'you *will* love your neighbour as yourself').[56] For the inferential γάρ of v. 14 indicates that v. 13 is Paul's interpretation of the force of Lev. 19:18,[57] and in v. 13 Paul *commands* the Galatians not to misuse their freedom but to enslave themselves to one another διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης. De Boer observes that Gal 6:2 precludes Martyn's suggestion that πεπλήρωται should be taken as a divine passive, which Martyn argues refers to the work of Christ in bringing the law to its

[52] This is not to suggest that, with Martyn (*Galatians*, 505 – 8), we should distinguish between 'the enslaving voice of the Sinaitic Law' and the promising voice of 'the Abrahamic Law'. For, as we saw in Paul's reading of the Pentateuch via the story of Sarah and Hagar, both the promise and the Mosaic legislation are, for him, envisaged *in nuce* in Genesis 16 – 21, with both culminating in the Christ-event. There is, to switch the metaphor, therefore, one divine voice, with, as it were, the minor Torah-tune inevitably enfolded and resolved in the major and eternal theme of the good news of the Christ-event.

[53] Thus, the love command provides an 'echo of the gospel' in the Torah precisely by pointing beyond its own moral horizon to the newly created and eschatologically ordered humanity and community called into existence in the Christ-event; for this language of 'echoes of the gospel in the Scriptures of Israel', see Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*, 170, n. 21; Barclay, *Gift*, 359, 418, 431.

[54] de Boer, *Galatians*, 344–45.

[55] See e.g. Betz, *Galatians*, 275; S. Westerholm, *Israel's Law and the Church's Faith: Paul and his Recent Interpreters* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 201–5; Barclay, *Obeying*, 138–41; Longenecker, *Galatians*, 242; de Boer, *Galatians*, 345. For an opposing position, see Dunn, *Galatians*, 289–90.

[56] de Boer, *Galatians*, 343–50.

[57] Martyn, *Galatians*, 486.

'completion' in a salvation-historical fashion.[58] But he does not account then for the *logical* relation, as Martyn does, between vv. 13 and 14.[59] Consequently, de Boer conflates the disposition of love with Paul's command of mutual service, does not account for the imperatives in v. 13 (and v. 15), and, thus, misses the particular force of vv. 13 – 14.[60] That is, the logical relation between vv. 13 and 14 indicates that Paul specifies and commands the *behaviour* that fulfils the moral aim of the Torah, quintessentially expressed in the command of Lev 19:18, the aim of love.[61] Put more sharply, Paul is manifestly *not* merely 'describing…' and 'not prescribing',[62] but rather he is commanding the behaviour that *as* the fulfilment of the Torah's aim, in his view, corresponds to the liberated state created by the Christ-event. Thus, with most commentators, we should take the force of the perfect πεπλήρωται to be gnomic in character but with a particular sense: it is not simply that the state of liberty won by the Christ-event *inevitably* fulfils the law in the sense that the promise or prophecy of Lev 19:18 is fulfiled in Christian community,[63] but rather that this state fulfils the law when it is expressed not in 'fleshly' behaviour but in mutual service.[64] In Barclay's terms, Paul is in fact claiming here that the life of mutual service in the church amounts to a 'total realization and accomplishment of the law's demand'.[65] He does this not by commanding love in the terms of Torah-piety, as his opponents might do, but by commanding mutual service as the fulfilment of Torah-virtue (love).

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[58] Cf. David Horrell, who correctly notes that the parallel in Rom 13:8 – 10 confirms that Paul views Lev. 19:18 as 'epitomizing a Christian's obligation'; D.G. Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics* (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 226.

[59] de Boer, *Galatians*, 345–46; Martyn, *Galatians*, 489. Because Martyn's argument for the grammatical passive is integrally related to his view that the law is fulfiled in Christ's taking 'the Law in hand' (490), Martyn's overall reading is, likewise, undermined by de Boer's appeal to Gal 6:2.

[60] Cf. de Boer's language (*Galatians*, 346): 'Whenever mutual love happens, those loving (will) "have fulfiled the law"'. But Paul does not merely promise love in Galatians 5 – 6 but he *commands* mutual slavery (5:13) and mutual burden bearing (6:2) as the fulfilment of the Torah's aim and the law of Christ, respectively.

[61] *Pace* de Boer (*Galatians*, 346), it is not 'the promise heard by Paul in Lev 19:18' that is 'fulfilled' in '[the] actual love [of the Galatians] for one another', but rather the fulfilment of this command is specified as fulfiled in the particular behaviour of mutual service Paul is commanding in Galatia.

[62] *Pace* Westerholm, *Israel's Law*, 201; followed by de Boer, *Galatians*, 346; similarly in Betz's distinction between 'prospective' and 'retrospective' fulfilment; Betz, *Galatians*, 275.

[63] *Contra* de Boer, *Galatians*, 346–48.

[64] Westerholm, *Israel's Law*, 235: 'For Paul it is important to say that Christians "fulfil" the whole law, and thus to claim that their conduct (and theirs alone) fully satisfies the "real" purport of the law in its entirety, while allowing the ambiguity of the term to blunt the force of the objection that certain individual requirements…have not been "done".'

[65] Barclay, *Obeying*, 139.

This reading is supported from the vantage-point of our debate with 4 Maccabees. For 4 Maccabees operates with a similar distinction between dispositions and actions precisely in order to argue for the superiority of Torah practices in exemplifying Hellenistic dispositions/virtues. If, as we saw in the previous subsection, Paul and the author of 4 Maccabees are agreed that divine judgement is concerned with these types of vices *and* that the law does not *prohibit* the virtues associated with the fruit of the Spirit, then Paul is in a position to make an *a posteriori* argument formally identical yet materially opposed to that of 4 Maccabees. By calling τὰ ἔργα τῆς σαρκός 'evident' (φανερά) in v. 19 Paul implies that these 'works' are universally acknowledged as condemnable, and, likewise, by asserting that the Torah is not 'against' (κατά) the fruit of the Spirit in v. 23, he implies that these virtues are commendable according to everyone, even his opponents.[66] Thus, if the ultimate goal of the law is love of neighbour (Torah-virtue), and those who are made alive by and live according to the Spirit (5:24, 25) produce this love *apart from complete subordination to the law's particular way of life*, then, *a fortiori*, observance of the law's particular works (Torah-piety) is not necessary for the fulfilment of its own purpose (Torah-virtue).[67] It is perhaps not too farfetched to imagine that an author as ingenious at synthesising Stoic virtue ethics and Jewish piety as 4 Maccabees would admire Paul's achievement. He has deployed the very apologetic move used by

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[66] Barclay rightly argues that taking κατά as 'concerning' is both 'very unusual in the New Testament' and an apparent contradiction of v. 14; ibid., 123. We would add that the other parallel in which both κατά and νόμος occur, Gal 3:21, supports the translation 'against', with 3:21 – 22 providing the overarching theological correspondence between Torah and Promise and 5:23 the specific ethical correspondence between Torah and the Christ-event. Since the interpretation of τῶν τοιούτων as masculine both arises from uncertainty about the reason for Paul's remark and is not easily reconciled with Paul's focus on qualities of people and not people *per se* in 5:22 – 23, the neuter is to be preferred. For an overview of the interpretive issues and a conclusion with which we are in general agreement, see ibid., 119 – 25. It does not follow, as Engberg-Pedersen contends (*Stoics*, 164, 330, n. 13, 343, n. 17) in a recent revival of the alternate translation of κατά (cf. G.M. Styler, 'The Basis of Obligation in Paul's Christology and Ethics', in *Christ and Spirit in the New Testament: Studies in Honour of C.F.D. Moule* [ed. B. Lindars and S.S. Smalley; Cambridge: CUP, 1973], 179, n. 11), that a recognition of the fact that the law is dealing in 'act-types' or 'commands' while Paul is concerned with 'attitudes' supports the translation of κατά as 'about' or 'concerning'. For this misses the logical connection between the commands of v. 13 and love as the overall aim of the law in v. 14, a connection which is vital for Paul's *apologetic* argument. What the Torah *aims at*, the ἀδελφοί fulfil by doing what Paul commands in v. 13.

[67] *Pace* Wilson (*Curse*, 112), the problem Paul is addressing here is not 'the threat of a curse…looming large in the background' but the actual cursed state of humanity that the law's curse confirms (3:21, 22), and thus the fulfilment of Torah-virtue is achieved not as an avoidance but as a reversal of this state.

Hellenistic Jews to argue *for* Torah-piety against that piety. Yet, debate is inevitable for 4 Maccabees, as nothing less than the reconstitution of Israel and the eternal beatitude of her martyrs is at stake in this inversion.

With this analysis of the overlapping content and shared logical form of the arguments of Galatians and 4 Maccabees in place, we are now in a position to consider the theological ground of their material differences. In so doing, we turn to a significant contribution of this chapter, arguing that in Gal 5:13 – 26 Paul grounds his theological logic ultimately in a conception of new and newly-ordered selves given in the Christ-gift and expressed in relationship with the Spirit.

5.2 *Veni Creator Spiritus*: Freedom as New and Newly Ordered Selves in a New Community

Though Paul utilises an apologetic argument like 4 Maccabees', he inverts the conclusion. Despite an obvious disagreement over which 'virtue' is chief (εὐσέβεια or ἀγάπη), 4 Maccabees would have a more basic concern; for he would want to know why Jewish piety is insufficient. For in denying the sufficiency of Jewish piety, is Paul denying the sufficiency of Torah-ordered reason to rule the passions, 4 Maccabees' overarching claim? In 4 Maccabees Torah-piety is only insufficient if left unpractised, whereas Paul has argued that the very practice is problematic (Gal 2:15 – 4:31; 5:1 – 6). *Why*?

This fundamental question arose at several places in the debate with *4 Ezra* in the previous chapter—why are those 'of the works of the law' inevitably cursed (3:10)?; the recipients of the law 'dead' (3:21)?; those who follow the Jewish calendar enslaved to 'the elements of the cosmos' (4:8 - 11)? These questions are all answered generally by recognising that Paul is operating with a conception of the fallen cosmos that is similar to that of *4 Ezra*, with one vital exception: whereas *4 Ezra* explicitly configures the recipient of the law as occupying an anthropological reserve, a space of *libertas*, Paul configures the recipient of the Torah as enslaved to sin and transgression. Yet, Paul has not made an explicit argument for his anthropological pessimism. We will argue that he does this in Galatians 5:13 – 26.

Thus, we aim to contribute to the longstanding debate about the function of Galatians 5 – 6 in the argument of the letter. Galatians 5:13 – 26 is necessary for

Paul's argument because it provides the material grounds and climactic elaboration of his fundamental claim: eschatological life is given and ordered *only* in the Christ-event by the Spirit, not in or according to the Torah. Specifically, Paul argues in these verses that the human agent is free only in so far as she is both recreated by the Spirit and continually dependent on the Spirit in the exercise of that freedom.[68] Our argument will proceed in two phases: we will compare the opposition between σάρξ and the πνεῦμα in Galatians with that between the πάθη and εὐσεβὴς λογισμός in 4 Maccabees with regard to their respective configurations of the relationship between passions, desires, and actions, arguing that Paul's personifications are aimed not at presenting the effects of warring apocalyptic powers on the church *per se* but with the formation of virtue and the threat of vice within the church in light of the eschaton; and we will contend based on this analysis that Paul's argument depends on an inchoate theory of human agency that is concerned with the origin, ongoing source, and order of the newly created human existence. This theory configures new human agents as those who are brought from 'death' as slavery to evil desires and actions to 'life' as the expression of a new relationship with God secured by the Christ-gift, created and ordered by the Spirit. Thus, for Paul, the recipients of the law are 'dead' to God (Gal 3:21; cf. Gal 2:19) precisely because they are willingly enslaved to evil desires and actions, an anthropology that is diametrically opposed to that of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*.

Consequently, this section establishes two significant results for this chapter and the thesis. First, it provides a new account of the theological logic of Galatians by showing that Paul's antithetical logic is grounded ultimately in Gal 5:13 – 26—i.e., in his account of reconstituted and reordered agency vis-à-vis life ὑπὸ νόμον. Thus, Galatians 5 – 6 is not simply Paul's climactic rhetorical appeal to desist from seeking circumcision; it is not simply a response to the circumstances of the crisis in Galatia; it is not even Paul's presentation of 'a genuinely Christ-believing form of life'[69] or 'a

[68] We are extending and specifying Yates' key insight about Gal 5:25 (*Spirit*, 172): 'Based on the traditions employed elsewhere by Paul when he speaks of the spirit in this way, this must be considered in some way to be resurrection life. The spirit has not simply indwelt in order to empower. The spirit has indwelt so as to give new life.'

[69] Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 131.

consequence of his own theological presentation' (ital. added).[70] Rather, it is the climax and ultimate ground of his *theological argument*. The law cannot provide the proper order of either the self or the church, for Paul, because it is confined to humanity's 'dead' existence—the enslavement to the evil passions and desires of the Flesh out of which the Christ-gift creates and reorders human life. Second and in connection with Barclay's recent theological construal of the function of Gal 5 – 6, this section shows that it is not the Christ-gift as unconditioned and incongruous gift *per se*, but rather it is Paul's particular conception of the Christ-gift as the definitive life-giving and life-ordering divine gift that establishes his antithetical logic. Paul does not assume that the divine donation of life apart from Torah norms requires a new norm; he argues that Torah norms (existence ὑπὸ νόμον) participate in and are confined to life dominated by the Flesh *by divine design* in view of the new existence created and ordered by the Christ-event.

5.2.1 Flesh and Spirit, Passions and Reason: Vice and Virtue in Gal 5:13 – 26 and 4 Maccabees

An anthropological comparison of Paul's vice and virtue discourse in Gal 5:13 – 26 with that of 4 Maccabees must consider two difficulties at the outset. Though Paul is making an apologetic argument similar to those found in Hellenistic Jewish texts, he neither commands virtue, nor does he use all of the standard terminology of ancient moral psychology (e.g., the language of reason is missing). Rather, Paul situates his discourse in an apparently cosmic frame, pitting the personified 'Flesh' against the 'Spirit'. Based on these differences some scholars contend that any comparison of Galatians to texts like 4 Maccabees is misleading.[71] Yet, Paul builds a bridge from the fruit of the Spirit to the Torah by insisting that ἀγάπη is the chief aim of both. This identification of a principal 'virtue' in the context of an apologetic argument, Paul's dependence on virtue and vice lists to make this argument (even if modified), and his use of terminology related to ancient moral psychology (i.e., ἐπιθυμία/ἐπιθυμέω, 5:16, 17, 24; πάθημα, 5:24) suggest the *prima facie* viability of a

[70] B.W. Longenecker, *The Triumph of Abraham's God: The Transformation of Identity in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 80, n. 13.

[71] Martyn, *Galatians*, 484: 'It is…a serious mistake to read Paul's descriptions of the activities of the Flesh and the Spirit in Gal 5:19 – 23 as an example of nomistic, moral discourse focused on "vices" and "virtues."'

comparison with 4 Maccabees. Thus, we use the frame provided by ancient virtue ethics discourse in a heuristic fashion, arguing that the exegetical results justify the comparison.

Paul's personification of σάρξ and πνεῦμα in Galatians 5:16 is the third instance of this opposition in the letter, combining with that at 3:3 to frame Paul's argument about the law.[72] The second and third instances show a marked development: Paul has moved from a discussion of the impending Galatian pursuit of the 'works of the law' in general as a fleshly endeavour (3:3) to the particular and similar activities of persecution (4:29) and community rivalry (5:20, 21) as the products of the flesh. Thus far, Paul's use of the word σάρξ, then, seems to imply a correlation between Jewish piety and the vices he considers condemnable.[73] If so, Paul's argument would be diametrically opposed to that of 4 Maccabees. Jewish piety actually tends not toward freedom in *virtue* but toward slavery to *vice*. We will address this potential negative proof of Paul's argument in the next section with regard to Paul's polemics. In order to see how, why, and in what respect Paul might be correlating Torah-piety with vice, however, we must deepen our debate, beginning by examining several intriguing similarities between Paul's personifications in Galatians 5:16 – 18 and 4 Maccabees' theory of the self.

Though the personifications of σάρξ and πνεῦμα would be initially obscure to the author of 4 Maccabees, given Paul's elaboration of this antithetical pair in the remainder of vv. 16 - 26, the force of his opening statements would not. For in Gal 5:16 Paul expresses confidence that the Galatians are capable of mastering the 'desire of the flesh': Λέγω δέ, πνεύματι περιπατεῖτε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν σαρκὸς οὐ μὴ τελέσητε. The phrase Λέγω δέ connects this verse with the warning in v. 15 to 'Look!' (βλέπετε), lest their beastly behaviour lead to mutual annihilation. Verse 16 tempers this warning by making it clear that communal disintegration is generally avoidable. Using οὐ μή plus the aorist subjunctive τελέσητε to express the strongest possible future negation,[74] Paul assures the Galatians that they will 'by no means complete the

[72] Barclay, *Gift*, 426.

[73] Morales, *Spirit and Restoration,* 143.

[74] E.D. Burton, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (T&T Clark, 1894), § 172: 'The Aorist Subjunctive is used with οὐ μή in the sense of an emphatic Future Indicative.'

desires of the Flesh' if they heed his command to 'walk by the Spirit'.[75] Likewise, 4 Maccabees' entire discourse is aimed at proving that 'pious reason is Sovereign over the passions' (αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστιν τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός, 4 Macc 1:1). Thus, 4 Maccabees makes similar pronouncements to Gal 5:16 in a number of places, personifying λογισμός as δεσπότης (2:24; 18:2; cf. 6:34, 35) and arguing throughout that reason 'rules' (cf. the use of the verbs κρατέω/ἐπικρατέω in 1:3, 5–6, 14, 19, 32–33; 2:4, 6, 9–11, 14–15, 20, 24–3:1; 5:23; 6:32, 34–35; 7:18; 8:1; 13:4; 14:1; 15:26; 16:2; 17:20). Intriguingly, 4 Maccabees even deploys the word σάρξ in this connection—'as many as apply themselves to piety from a whole heart, only these are able to subdue the passions of the flesh' (ὅσοι τῆς εὐσεβείας προνοοῦσιν ἐξ ὅλης καρδίας, οὗτοι μόνοι δύνανται κρατεῖν τῶν τῆς σαρκὸς παθῶν, 7:18).

Consequently, Gal 5:16 would suggest to the author of 4 Maccabees an affirmation of the self's ability to master its desires that is formally similar to his own. Likewise, the antithetical relationship between the Flesh and the Spirit would be familiar. For 4 Maccabees answers a potential objection to his thesis by introducing a distinction *and*, like Paul, an antithetical relationship—'for reason is not the destroyer of the passions, but [their] opponent' (οὐ γὰρ ἐκριζωτὴς τῶν παθῶν ὁ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ἀνταγωνιστής, 3:5). In this respect, λογισμός is the means by which the self avoids the state of 'being enslaved to desire' (δουλωθῆναι τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ). Thus, reason does not destroy but controls passions like 'anger' (θυμός, 3:3; cf. Gal 5:20) and 'malice' (κακοήθεια, 3:4; cf. Rom 1:29). Consequently, when Paul enlists in v. 17 the antithetical relationship between the Flesh and the Spirit in support (γάρ) of his assurance that walking by the latter will stifle the desires of the former, the author of 4 Maccabees would see in this an anthropological statement about the asymmetry of power between the superior Spirit and the inferior Flesh, taking ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε to refer to the resulting state of the Spirit's frustration of the Flesh's desires.

It does not follow that *this* is what Paul meant in v. 17d, but there are good exegetical grounds for preferring this option. Of the possible interpretations, Barclay is correct that the emphatic assurance of v. 16 and the 'crucifixion' of the Flesh in v.

[75] Barclay, *Obeying*, 111; Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 341, n. 12.

24 preclude two of them: one cannot take ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε as either a situation in which the Flesh blocks the self's good, Spirit-created wishes or a stalemate of opposing forces that frustrate each other.[76] Barclay's proposal focuses on the phrase ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε, arguing that this should be translated 'whatever you want'.[77] On this reading, Paul is assuring the Galatians that the refusal to be circumcised and obey the Torah does not leave them without an order for life. The Spirit is sufficient. Though this view fits the context well, it depends on taking the phrase ἃ ἐάν as 'whatever' rather than 'what', a translation which is possible but perhaps not likely given the parallel construction (ὃ γὰρ ἐὰν σπείρῃ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει) in Gal 6:7.[78] In that context, the relative pronoun ὅ seems to refer not to the problem of an unstructured life but rather to two definite and contrasting sources and modes of existence (Spirit/Flesh) and their respective outcomes (corruption/eternal life). Likewise, in the context of Gal 5:17, it seems that Paul's warnings both to 'Look!' to the communal ramifications (5:13, 15) and to remember the eschatological implications of 'fleshly' behaviour (5:21) imply that his focus here is not the problem of a lack of structure but of two contrasting structures, one disordered (Flesh) and the other properly ordered (Spirit).[79] As we argued above, Paul's apologetic argument depends on basic agreement about moral order (5:19, 23). Though it is far from certain, it is probably best, then, to take ἵνα μὴ ἃ ἐὰν θέλητε ταῦτα ποιῆτε as the resulting state of the opposition between Flesh and Spirit in which

[76] Barclay, *Obeying*, 112–14. Lambrecht's attempt to side-step the force of this objection against the 'Spirit-Inspired Wishes' view by interpreting v. 17d as referring to a hypothetical situation is unpersuasive; J. Lambrecht, 'The Right Things You Want to Do: A Note on Galatians 5,17d', *Bib* 79 (1998): 522 – 23. For it depends on the dubious assumption that Paul would mean 'that what the Galatian Christians want is always evil and wrong' (519). The point is not that the Galatian Christians 'always' have only evil desires but that they must always contend with them. Paul assumes that the Galatians have some ongoing relation to the desires of the Flesh in 5:16, even if that relation is one of having 'crucified' its passions and desires (5:24), as demonstrated both by his communal and eschatological warnings (5:15, 21).

[77] Barclay, *Obeying*, 110–16; Barclay, *Gift*, 428, n. 18.

[78] Lambrecht notes ('Right ', 521 – 22) the difference and the parallels at Gal 6:7 and 1 Cor 6:7 but does not present a compelling argument for his preference, asserting rather that Rom 7:15c provides the decisive parallel.

[79] Barclay, *Obeying*, 115: 'The warfare imagery is invoked…to show the Galatians that they are already committed to some forms of activity (the Spirit) and *against* others (the flesh)'. Yet, the question is not just the Spirit's sufficieny to provide 'direction' (116), but why this direction precludes circumcision and Torah-piety as the expression of its order.

the Spirit successfully resists the evil desires of the Flesh with which the Galatians have to contend.[80]

Consequently, both the author of 4 Maccabees and Paul are confident that the evil desires, though ineradicable,[81] are nonetheless capable of being held in check by a more powerful force. When, however, Paul further specifies in 5:18 his instruction in v. 16, three material differences begin to emerge for debate. These all depend on recognising a crucial development in the argument. The switch from the present active verb περιπατεῖτε to the present passive ἄγεσθε reflects Paul's development of the theme of contrasting desires, though with a significant twist: whereas in v. 16 Paul assures the Galatians of the efficacy of walking by the Spirit vis-à-vis the desire of the Flesh, here he makes a similar assurance but grounded specifically in an assertion of freedom from the desire of the Flesh. That is, in v. 16 the theme of agency is implicit, while in vv. 17–18 it is explicit: you will not complete the desire of the Flesh *if* you walk by the Spirit, because you are not enslaved to the Flesh if you are led (in your desires) by the Spirit. This leads, however, to the consideration of our first material divergence; for the author of 4 Maccabees would receive a shock in the apodosis of v. 18. He is expecting Paul to write οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ σάρκα, not οὐκ ἐστὲ ὑπὸ νόμον![82] For to be ὑπὸ νόμον for 4 Maccabees is to be *free* from the tyranny of the desires and passions. It is 'under the rule of the *Torah* through reason' (ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κρατεῖται διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν) that the 'stingy' (φειδωλός, 4 Macc 2:9; cf. 2:6) person acts

[80] A version of this view originated with John Chrysostom, who concludes, '[Paul] calls Flesh here reasoning that is earthly, indifferent, and negligent" (Σάρκα ἐνταῦθα τὸν λογισμὸν καλεῖ τὸν γεώδη, τὸν ῥᾳθυμον καὶ ἠμελημένον; *In epistolam ad Galatas commentarius* [PG 61:671 – 72]). Chrysostom wrongly reduces the Flesh and Spirit opposition to contrasting modes of reasoning not contrasting agents. For recent supporters of the general view, see e.g. R. Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of Their Use in Conflict Settings* (AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971), 106–7; G.D. Fee, *God's Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul* (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1994), 436; de Boer, *Galatians*, 354–55. Lambrecht's protest ('Right', 519) that the verb ἐπιθυμέω should be supplied in v. 17b with the Spirit as the subject (following Dunn, *Galatians*, 297; *contra* Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 210) and, thus, the 'meaning' (connotation?) of ἐπιθυμέω is 'most proabably neutral' with the Flesh as the subject in 17a, is unpersuasive. The desiring of the Flesh is evil, as is clear from the works it produces—vice versa for the Spirit. Likewise, Moo's objection that Paul pays 'precisely equal attention' to the Flesh and the Spirit 'earlier in the verse' and, thus, that the Spirit's desiring is probably not in view in v. 17d is misguided; Moo, *Galatians*, 356. Paul's symmetrical expression of mutual opposition does not preclude a hierarchical ordering, and if we take ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ἀντίκειται as parenthetical (cf. de Boer, *Galatians*, 355), then the reference to the Spirit's desiring in v. 17b precedes the reference to the subject's willing in v. 17d, suggesting the Spirit as an *aid* in 17d.

[81] *Contra* the emphasis on 'sinlessness' in Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 167, 172–73.

[82] Ibid, 162: 'Paul here almost explicitly connects the law with—the flesh: if the Galatians are led by the *pneuma*, they are not under the law; and here is a list of the "works" (*erga*)—of the flesh…!'

justly and allows the fields and vineyards to be gleaned by the poor. If Paul is correct, then, and the Galatians are not ὑπὸ νόμον, then by 4 Maccabees' lights they are *enslaved* to the desires of the Flesh.

5.2.2 Created or Newly Created Selves?: Contrasting Theories of Agency in Galatians and 4 Maccabees

The question for 4 Maccabees, then, is how Paul uses the phrase ὑπὸ νόμον to convey not freedom but slavery. An answer to this question, however, depends on recognising another formal similarity between the discourses of Galatians and 4 Maccabees. For Paul, the Spirit serves the same *anthropological* function as εὐσεβὴς λογισμός in 4 Maccabees. Thus, as in 4 Maccabees where εὐσεβὴς λογισμός (shorthand for ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου κρατεῖται διὰ τὸν λογισμὸν, 2:9) rules the passions such that vice is hindered and virtue is produced, so in Galatians walking by the Spirit nullifies the desires of the Flesh (5:16) such that vicious acts are avoided (5:19 – 21) and virtuous dispositions are produced (5:22 – 23). Moreover, the horizons of penultimate and ultimate significance of these anthropologies are the same: socially, the ruler whose mind is Torah-ordered rules a kingdom characterised by the cardinal virtues (4 Macc 2:23), while those who keep in step with the Spirit (Gal 5:25) avoid the reciprocal provocation (and destruction!, 5:15) that arises from vain-opinion, conceit, and envy (Gal 5:26); eschatologically, though he alludes to judgement negatively as the loss of inheritance of the Kingdom (Gal 5:21) rather than positively as eternal torture (4 Macc 9:9) and he waits until Gal 6:7, 8 to contrast the organic result of vice ('corruption', φθορά) with that of virtue ('eternal life', ζωή αἰώνιος), Paul is explicit, like 4 Maccabees, that vice will receive its ultimate eschatological condemnation and virtue, conversely, its eschatological commendation. Thus, *contra* Martyn, Engberg-Pedersen is correct that Paul is concerned with the formation of virtue and the vices of individual Galatians, while, with Martyn and Engberg-Pedersen, we must recognise that impending communal flourishing or dissolution is Paul's proximate concern in Gal 5:13 – 6:10.[83] Paul's ultimate concern, the eschatological horizon, foregrounds the seriousness of personal and communal disorder at 5:21, 6:5, and 6:7,

[83] Ibid., 340, n. 9: 'It is not enough just to say: a new creation.' This criticism of Martyn is valid, but Engberg-Pedersen's own reduction (ibid., 155) of Paul's language of life and death to self-understanding is equally problematic as an interpretation of Paul's vice and virtue discourse.

8. In other words, as in 4 Maccabees, Paul argues here for the integral relation between the ordering of the self and the ordering of community—whether toward flourishing or dissolution—while not losing sight of the eschatological horizon. Paul just has a different conception of the constitution and ordering of self and society.

In this connection, a closer examination of this shared anthropological function betrays materially divergent anthropologies (and cosmologies). For 4 Maccabees configures εὐσεβὴς λογισμός as a human ruling capacity, while in Galatians Paul conceives of Πνεῦμα not as an anthropological reality but as a new ordering relationship arising from the Christ-gift. 4 Maccabees configures the properly ordered self as the result of the exercise of an inviolable and created ruling capacity (λογισμός) according to the Torah-norm given to the self at creation (4 Macc 2:20 – 23a)—at the same time (ὁπηνίκα) that God created the mind as ruler of the self (2:22) 'he gave to [the mind] the law' (καὶ τούτῳ νόμον ἔδωκεν, v. 23a). Thus, the question is not, ultimately, of created capacity or even moral order in 4 Maccabees but of moral *agency*. 'Only the Hebrews are invincible were virtue is concerned' (9:18): will one recognise this and live accordingly or not? In the terms of *4 Ezra* 8:56 and 9:11, the self enjoys a state of created *libertas* from which either to accept or reject the divine benefaction of Torah-ordered creation. For Paul, however, the question of moral *agency* is not reducible to the exercise of created ruling capacity. For the receipt of the Christ-gift is logically antecedent to any expression of properly ordered moral *agency*—it is those who are τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ who have *actively* crucified the Flesh with its passions and desires (Gal 5:24).[84] Thus, we arrive at a material anthropological difference: whereas 4 Maccabees configures the created human as inviolably capable and responsible for her own proper ordering according to the created Torah-order, Paul configures the human capable *only* in receipt of an ongoing relationship with the Spirit. It is those who walk by the Spirit who do not complete the desires of the Flesh (5:16), precisely because they are led (in their desires) by the Spirit (5:18). In short, for the Flesh to be resisted *a new liberating relationship to God*, established in the Christ-gift, is required. We will argue below

[84] Barclay, *Gift*, 429.

that this is the force of Paul's language of living πνεύματι in Gal 5:25 and new creation in 6:15.

Yet, we must first turn to a potentially misleading but illuminating question. If the capacity for self-governance is not a created and inviolable human capacity, does Paul, then, deny human agency *ante Christum*? Not exactly. Paul does not employ 'the rhetoric of the flesh' as 'passive and mechanical' in contrast to 'the rhetoric of the spirit', which is 'active and purposeful'.[85] Paul, rather, contrasts two types of active agents—one led by the Spirit, the other by the Flesh. This is the implication not only of Paul's personification of the Flesh and Spirit in Gal 5:17 generally but, if our reading of 5:17d and 5:18 is correct, then also of Paul's particular reading of the salvation-historical, anthropological, and cosmological significance of the Christ-event. For if what is required to resist the desires of the Flesh is the advent of the Spirit, then what is absent *ante Christum* is not human agency *per se* but properly ordered human agency. That is, for Paul the Flesh does not simply assault the self *ante Christum*, as the passions do in 4 Maccabees, or tempt the self, as the *cogitamentum malum* does for Uriel (*4 Ezra* 7:92), *but rather the Flesh rules the self*—the selves of Jews and Gentiles alike. In other words, Paul's picture of the human condition *ante Christum* is much like that of Ezra in the opening complaint of *4 Ezra*. As with the *cor malignum* so with the Flesh: 'the disease became permanent…what was good departed [from the hearts of the people] and the evil remained' (*facta est permanens infirmitas… discessit quod bonum est et mansit malignum*, *4 Ezra* 3:22). Though we should be careful not to import conceptually developed accounts of the will into the discussion,[86] we must recognise that neither Ezra's opening account of the *cor malignum* nor Paul's conception of the Flesh preclude moral responsibility, as both assume that the evil actions these produce rightly incur the divine judgement. Both the *cor malignum* and the σάρξ are the agent's own; it is just that their selves are inevitably turned toward evil. Thus, we have another material anthropological difference: whereas the self always retains its created integrity because of the

[85] *Contra* O. O'Donovan, 'Flesh and Spirit', in *Galatians and Christian Theology: Justification, the Gospel, and Ethics in Paul's Letter* (ed. M.W. Elliott et al.; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 277.

[86] For the defence of the position that Augustine was the first to produce a conception of the will, see A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley: UCP, 1982). Cf. the recent counter-proposal, arguing that Epictetus was the first to form a concept of the will in M. Frede, *A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought* (Berkeley: UCP, 2011).

governing faculty of λογισμός in 4 Maccabees, Paul configures the self apart from the Spirit as irrevocably disordered because ruled by the evil desires of the Flesh. It is inadvisable to try to establish this point based on either this parallel with *4 Ezra* or the contested interpretation of Gal 5:17d alone. There are, however, several exegetical observations that support our contention that Paul is operating with an inchoate theory of new and newly-ordered agency.

The first observation depends on recognising the categorical difference between Paul's vice and virtue lists. In Engberg-Pedersen's terms, the former is concerned with 'act-types', while the latter is concerned with 'mental states' or dispositions.[87] Engberg-Pedersen's interpretation of this difference occurs in relation to his account of the force of Gal 5:23b: the law is not against the fruit of the Spirit in the sense that it is not *concerned* with mental states but act-types. As we have seen, however, Paul's point is not about the irrelevance but the paradox of the Torah, as his identification of the key 'mental state' of love as expressing the Torah's aim is one of the twin pillars on which his argument stands. The problem is not that law is indifferent to virtue but that, though not against it, it does not produce virtue. We propose here, then, a different reading of the distinction: viz., the 'act-types' allow for no 'space' between desire and action, while 'mental states' do. In other words, without the Spirit, the self just is disordered—the 'Flesh's desire' and the 'passions' that arise from human experience lead inevitably to the Flesh's characteristic 'works'. It is only in relation to the Spirit that a 'space' is, as it were, opened up such that one is in a position to resist the desires of the Flesh by being led by the Spirit.[88] If Paul is modifying a particular view of ancient moral psychology in its relation to virtue ethics, as he seems to be, then this is an implication of his placing of the Spirit in the place of reason as the governing faculty. Only the human agent led by the

[87] Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 164. On Paul's vice list as types of actions, see D. Lührmann, *Galatians: A Continental Commentary* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 111.

[88] Although the force of Engberg-Pedersen's account of the opposition in 'mythical' terms is obscure, in so far as we are construing situation as a 'space' where deliberation is possible for the Galatians, the result of his account is similar to our own. Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 163: 'The general account is designed to leave it *up to those individuals* whom Paul is addressing whether *they* will let 'the other force' have its way or not'. The problem with Engberg-Pedersen's account is that he does not recognise that this 'whether' is *itself* only possible for Spirit-created agents, for Paul. In contrast to his reductive communal focus, cf. Martyn's criticism of Engberg-Pedersen: 'Paul presupposes a history of the relation between the Spirit and the Galatians, a history that began with God's inceptive act of sending the Spirit into their hearts'; J.L. Martyn, 'De-apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay Focused on Paul and the Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen', *JSNT* 86 (2002): 91.

Spirit, rather than tending toward the dissolution of the self, is a properly ordered human agent. How, though, does this space for the properly ordered self emerge?

Two further related exegetical observations regarding the flow of thought of Gal 5:22 – 26 and the metaphorical entailments of the juxtaposition of 'crucifixion' and 'life' in vv. 24 and 25 are in order in this regard. First, in vv. 23 – 26 Paul alternates between positive and negative statements, bringing his moral discourse to a close with a general admonition in v. 25 and a specific application of this admonition to the Galatian situation in v. 26. Thus, v. 24 provides the logically antecedent reality that undergirds the Spirit's production of fruit in vv. 22 and 23: because Christians have crucified the passions and desires of the Flesh (v. 24), the fruit the Spirit produces should be evident in their lives (vv. 22, 23). They have 'died' to one set of dispositions in order to 'live' to another. Precision and clarity are essential here: the force of this metaphor is neither reducible to a mere 'normative self-identification',[89] nor is it about 'baptism as a *corporate* victory over a cosmic power' as opposed to 'an individual's killing his bodily desire'.[90] The former fails to take into account that such a self-identification, because it consists in a renewed life-giving and life-ordering relationship, is dependent on the antecedent 'creation' by the Spirit and ongoing relation of the self to the Spirit. The latter confuses the communal and cosmological horizon of Paul's discourse with its argumentative thrust, which is anthropological. To be sure, Paul's metaphorical personification of the Flesh in antithesis with the Spirit evokes a phenomenon that is cosmic in scope, but the very word σάρξ, 'flesh' suggests an anthropological reality.[91] This is confirmed both by the proliferation and centrality of the language of moral psychology in vv. 16 – 26 and by Paul's careful wording in Galatians 6:8: the Flesh to which one might sow is τὴν σάρκα ἑαυτοῦ, 'his *own* flesh'. Thus, our position on the force of Paul's metaphorical crucifixion language is similar to Engberg-Pedersen but with an important Martynian twist: it is new agents in particular and not the new community in general, created by the Spirit and ordered according to the Spirit's

[89] Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 152.
[90] Martyn, *Galatians*, 501, n. 88.
[91] For a critique of Martyn's cosmic martial metaphors as an over-interpretation of the possible military connotations of a few key terms, see Morales, *Spirit and Restoration*, 152–53.

desires, who have made a definitive break and 'crucified' the passions and desires of the Flesh.

This leads to another observation about the metaphorical entailments of the death and life language of vv. 24 – 25. For v. 25a relates to v. 24 as v. 24 relates to v. 23—viz. with the antecedent verses being supported logically by what follows. This point arises if we ask what Paul means by the metaphorical phrase Εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι in v. 25a. It is unlikely that Paul is referring to life by the Spirit in the sense of order, because that would make the clause in v. 25b redundant—'if we live according to the Spirit, let us order ourselves according to the Spirit'.[92] Rather, the dative in the protasis is likely instrumental and, thus, 'existence' is the likely referent of ζῶμεν—'if we exist by means of the Spirit…' But now we are faced with the same question we encountered in Galatians 3:21: in what respect, apart from the Spirit's agency, were the Galatians 'dead'? Verse 24 suggests that it was in the dominance of the Flesh's passions and desires, for v. 25b provides the positive corollary of v. 24—new agents have 'crucified' the Flesh and, thus, they should 'order themselves according to the Spirit' (πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν), with respect to their passions and desires. It is the middle term—Εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι—that enables both. In other words, being 'resurrected' by the Spirit is, for Paul, being freed from the 'dead' existence of the dominance of the evil passions and desires characteristic of fallen human nature, such that the new agent *can* make a decisive break with them, in order to live according to the dispositions produced in relationship with the Spirit.[93] Thus, Paul provides here the material ground for his contention in Gal 3:21 that the Torah could not make alive so that righteousness would result, for the Spirit not the Torah is the

[92] Barclay, *Gift*, 429, n. 20.

[93] For accounts of the Spirit as effecting a substance-ontological change, see, e.g., P. Stuhlmacher, 'Erwägungen zum ontologischen Charakter der καινὴ κτίσις bei Paulus', *EvT* 27 (1967): 1 – 35; F.W. Horn, *Das Angeld des Geistes: Studien zur palinischen Pneumatologie* (FRLANT 154; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992); idem, 'Wandel im Geist: zur pneumatologischen Begründung der Ethik bei Paulus', *KD* 38 (1992): 149 – 70. Though the work of Volker Rabens amounts, in our view, to a decisive criticism of this approach and his proposal of a relational model is broadly correct, the language of 'empowerment' potentially occludes the metaphorical and thus theological significance of life as *new* existence (Gal 5:25a) and, given the focus of his thesis, he pays no attention to the question of Paul's antithetical theological logic in Galatians; V.Rabens, *The Holy Spirit and Ethics in Paul* (WUNT II 283; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010).

creator of new agents and the source of the dispositions and desires to which the Torah points but does not directly lead.

We now have a clear answer to the puzzle of Paul's use of ὑπὸ νόμον. For Paul ὑπὸ νόμον is theological shorthand for the law's decisive role in the anthropological plight of humanity *ante Christum*. In the present evil age the Torah's role is to enclose 'all things under Sin' in the sense that, rather than freeing human agents, the law's curse confirms human agents in their 'dead' condition of being bound to evil passions and desires. The law is concerned with the transgressions these produce (3:19). Thus, if the Galatians are led in their *desires* by the Spirit, they are not 'under Torah' in the sense that they are free from the evil desires and actions the law's curse governs but does not change. It is in this sense that 'Hagar is in slavery with her children' (4:25), while Paul and the Galatians are children of the free 'Jerusalem above' (4:26). The latter have experienced the eschatological reversal of barrenness foretold by Isaiah in the 'resurrection' of their very selves from a 'dead' existence (Gal 4:27, 28; cf. Isa 54:1).

This freedom is not inviolable, as in 4 Maccabees or *4 Ezra*. Paul's conditional sentence in Galatians 5:18, the imperatives in 5:13, 16, 25, and 26, and the possibility of temptation assumed in 6:1 make this clear. Moreover, Barclay is correct that the key to understanding the indicative-imperative paradox lies in how Paul's death and life language relates to, in our terms, his theory of new human agents.[94] Still, we would add a further point to Barclay's insistence that the Spirit-generated life 'can hardly be said to be real without [its human] expression'.[95] For the absence of the human expression of Spirit-generated life not only lacks reality, it inevitably expresses its alternate. The absence of the reality of Spirit-generated life is, for Paul, always the presence of Flesh-generating death.

In this connection, when Paul turns from his consideration of the community order in Galatians 6:1ff to the eschatological horizon in Galatians 6:7, 8, the language of death and life is constitutive of the alternatives facing newly created agents—'what one sows, that will he reap' (ὃ γὰρ ἐὰν σπείρῃ ἄνθρωπος, τοῦτο καὶ θερίσει). The

[94] Ibid., 429 – 30: 'The indicative of "life" is not a statement of *status*, imaginable in abstraction from practice, but of *existence*, whose truth is evidenced in practice, and necessarily so.'

[95] Ibid., 430.

appeal to the motif of divine impartiality—Μὴ πλανᾶσθε, θεὸς οὐ μυκτηρίζεται—makes the forensic context of Paul's eschatological appeals, implicit at 5:21, explicit here.[96] Yet, it is the manner in which Paul presents the death and life dilemma of the Galatians that is critical for our purposes. As we have seen throughout this study, organic metaphors are valuable argumentative tools in moral discourse because they clarify the potentially opaque horizon of significance of moral action. These organic metaphors cut through the haze by positing a necessary connection between the life one lives now and the results of that life in the future. It is this function that Paul exploits in Gal 6:7, 8 to stress the ultimate significance of the personal and communal lives of the Galatians: 'the one who sows to his own flesh will from the flesh reap corruption' (ὁ σπείρων εἰς τὴν σάρκα ἑαυτοῦ ἐκ τῆς σαρκὸς θερίσει φθοράν) and 'the one who sows to the Spirit will reap eternal life' (ὁ δὲ σπείρων εἰς τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος θερίσει ζωὴν αἰώνιον). Paul's use of the word φθορά and the phrase ζωὴ αἰώνιος in this context are pregnant with significance, for they indicate how Paul's eschatology, cosmology, ecclesiology, and anthropology are all integrally interrelated. The advent of the creator Spirit gives life to the Galatians in receipt of Jesus' life-giving death, and, thus, the 'corruption' of the present evil age in its personal and communal expressions of disorder is no longer a given. Rather, those who sow to the Spirit (i.e., live according to the Spirit's desires) order their lives in relationship with the Spirit, and, thus, both do good (καλός, 6:9; cf. 4:17) to others and expect the divine outworking of their actions unto eternal life. Thus, Paul's organic death and life language is his fundamentally integrating language. Those who sow to the evil desires and passions of the flesh will experience the φθορά characteristic of the present evil age—the dissolution of the self, the destruction of community, and the eschatological disapprobation of God. Likewise, new agents who sow to the good desires of the Spirit will experience the ζωὴ αἰώνιος characteristic of the age to come—the integrity of the self, the flourishing of community, and the eschatological approbation of God.

[96] It is, therefore, doubtful, as de Boer argues, 'that by the end of the epistle the forensic apocalyptic eschatology of the Teachers has been decisively overtaken and neutralized by Paul's cosmological apocalyptic eschatology'; M.C. de Boer, 'Paul and Jewish Apocalyptic Eschatology', in *Apocalyptic and the New Testament: Essays in Honor of J. Louis Martyn* (ed. J. Marcus and M.L. Soards; JSNTSup 24; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1989), 185.

4 Maccabees argues that God gave the Torah to the mind at creation, such that human beings are inviolably endowed with the ability to rule the passions that threaten to disorder both the self and society. Thus, '[one] rules [oneself] under the law through reason' (4 Macc 2:9). Paul, by contrast, takes life ὑπὸ νόμον to be synonymous with slavery to the evil passions and desires of the Flesh. Moreover, for Paul, freedom from this state of disorder depends not on the exercise of created freedom according to the law but on the receipt of life in a new and newly-ordered existence in the Christ-gift through the Spirit. This conception of new and newly-ordered agents vis-à-vis an existence ὑπὸ νόμον, enslaved to evil desires and passions, is the theological ground of Gal 1 – 4: it explains why in Gal 1 – 2 that, though a committed Jew, Paul considered himself in *need* of the reconstitution and reordering of his agency in the Christ-event; and it explains why in Gal 3 – 4 Paul assumed that those in receipt of the law are 'dead' and imprisoned along with the rest of the cosmos ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν (Gal 3:22). This result is significant because it shows that Paul's theological logic depends on his account of theological anthropology in Gal 5:13 – 26. Moreover, this grounding in Paul's conception of life arising and being properly ordered from 'death' in the Christ-gift exhibits the deep thematic coherence of Galatians. Likewise, the demonstration of this thematic coherence shows why a recognition of the character of the Christ-gift as unconditioned and incongruous *simpliciter* is not sufficient for accounting for Paul's theological logic. For what is needed, if Paul is to avoid begging the question, is an argument for why the new life received in the Christ-gift *cannot* find proper expression in the practice of the Torah. Paul's answer is that life ὑπὸ νόμον is life enslaved to the evil desires and actions that the law's curse governs but does not change. The law confines humanity and is itself confined to this 'dead' existence, such that an embrace of Torah-piety is *of necessity* a life at once incapable of fully expressing the Torah-virtue of love and subject to evil desires and passions that produce the works of the Flesh. Thus, the Christ-gift finds personal and communal expression apart from Torah-piety *of necessity*.

5.3 Communal Order and Pauline Polemics in Gal 5 – 6

As in the preceding chapter, our debate has arrived at a stalemate over differing construals of divine life-giving benefaction and, thus, revelation: whereas 4

Maccabees and *4 Ezra* consider the Torah the revelation of the inviolable order given by God at creation, Paul sees in the Christ-event the gift of a new and newly ordered life. Nonetheless, there remains another matter the author of 4 Maccabees might wish to pursue. For whereas 4 Maccabees' apologetic works by addition and, thus, the practices of circumcision and abstinence from forbidden foods are *rational* (and necessary) by implication, the apology of Galatians works by subtraction, as life in the Spirit produces love and its fruit and, thus, renders the works of the law *unnecessary* by implication. Thus, even if the author of 4 Maccabees granted Paul's argument to this point, he would still want to know how love is to be expressed. If Torah-piety is not the necessary shape of love in community, what is? This is the sort of question Paul answers in Gal 6:1 – 10.

In this connection, this closing section concludes our new account of the function of Gal 5 – 6 by arguing that Gal 6:1 – 10 is necessary not simply for reasons of rhetorical persuasion or the circumstantial needs of the Galatian churches but rather to provide theological completeness. That is, Paul's apologetic argument for the Christ-gift as the fulfillment of Torah-virtue *but not* Torah-piety invites the question of the proper order of social life as a *theological* matter. If Torah-piety does not provide the proper order of communal life, what order does the Christ-gift produce? How is this order to be understood with reference to the Torah-virtue of love? Paul answers questions like these, we argue, by showing how Christ's self-giving functions as the positive, paradigmatic expression of the order of the newly-created self and society.

5.3.1 Pauline Polemics

One of the most surprising results of a debate between 4 Maccabees and Galatians is just how bad Paul appears in light of it. For Paul, like Antiochus, denies the identification of Torah with divine order (pork is one of αἱ τῆς φύσεως χάριτες, 4 Macc 5:9) and renders adherence to circumcision and Jewish food laws indifferent in the church. When Paul warns against becoming κενόδοξος in Gal 5:26, is he, like Anitochus (Eleazar is accused of κενοδοξῶν περὶ τὸ ἀληθές, 4 Macc 5:10), suggesting that his opponents' commitment to circumcision and the food laws is a species of 'vain-

opinion', κενοδοξία?[97] If so, then Paul's polemics serve a similar function to 4 Maccabees' characterization of Anitochus Epiphanes—viz., the attitudes and actions of his opponents constitute a sort of negative proof that life ὑπὸ νόμον reveals its 'fleshly' character.

There are several good reasons for thinking that Paul classes his opponents' views as 'vain-opinion' (κενοδοξία). First, he attributes their thinking to an alien source, denying that the leavening 'persuasion' (ἡ πεισμονή) at work among the Galatians arises 'from the one who calls [them]' (ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος ὑμᾶς, 5:8, 9). In fact, this persuasion is blocking the Galatians from 'obeying the truth' (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μὴ πείθεσθαι, 5:7b). Though Paul is confident 'in the Lord' regarding the Galatians (5:10), this depends on their 'not thinking otherwise [than he does]' (οὐδὲν ἄλλο φρονήσετε), which in turn means that they must walk (5:16) and be led by the Spirit (5:18). Thus, Paul's characterisation of his opponents in Gal 5:7 – 12 fits his apologetic argument about the relationship between dispositions, desires, and actions that follows in 5:13 – 26, so that the attitudes and activities of Paul's opponents by implication bear an inevitably 'fleshly' character. Consequently, when Paul concludes his argument in Galatians 5:26 with a warning against becoming κενόδοξος, it it is not simply 'conceit' or 'pride'[98] in general but the specific 'delusion' of his opponents[99] sourced from a *false* account of the 'truth of the gospel' that is in view (5:7; cf. 1:6 – 9; 2:14; 4:16).[100]

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[97] The three key words in v. 26—κενόδοξος, προκαλέω, and φθονέω—are exceedingly rare in the NT and LXX (προκαλέω, 2 Macc 8:11; φθονέω, Tobit 4:7, 16), and, thus, de Boer's judgement is apt (*Galatians*, 373): 'Paul's choice of words thus represents an attempt to make contact with the culture and knowledge of the Greek-speaking Gentile believers in Galatia'. See, likewise, Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 214; Burton, *Galatians*, 324–25; Betz, *Galatians*, 295; Vouga, *Galater*, 145.

[98] *Pace* Barclay, *Obeying*, 160; de Boer, *Galatians*, 373.

[99] The thematic links between thoughts, dispositions, and actions along with the focus on community rivalry suggest that the divisions in Galatia, though not the specific object of Paul's general reflections in 6:1 – 10, are nonetheless a catalyst and key background for them. *Contra* de Boer, *Galatians*, 351, 368; cf. 373. On the evidence for discord in Galatia, see Barclay, *Obeying*, 153.

[100] The adjective κενόδοξος in BDAG is unjustifiably limited to 'having exaggerated self-conceptions, *conceited, boastful*'. For several of the parallels listed demonstrate that the word frequently occurs in the context of debate about adherence to *truth* not improper self-estimation. Thus, Philo describes, in *Dreams* 2:105 – 106, the one who 'changes his mind that he might no longer dream the worthless fantasies of the vain-opinionated' (μεταβάλῃ καὶ μηκέτ' ἐνυπνιάζηται μηδὲ ταῖς κεναῖς τῶν κενοδόξων φαντασίαις) as the one who 'has been raised to clarity above indistinctness and from a false notion to truth' (ἐγρηγορώς, ἐνάργειαν δὲ πρὸ ἀσαφείας καὶ πρὸ ψευδοῦς ὑπολήψεως ἀλήθειαν). For similar uses of the adjective in the same context, see both Epictetus 3:24.40 and *Aristeas* 8. See also the relationship between κενοδοξία, idolatry, and sexual immorality in Wis 14:12 – 14.

Paul's reading of the motives of his opponents in Galatians 5:7 – 12 and 6:11 – 18 supports this reading of κενόδοξος. The exact circumstance that leads Paul to the implicit denial of 5:11 that he is not 'still preaching circumcision' (περιτομὴν ἔτι κηρύσσω) is unclear, but his logic is not. Since Paul is still being persecuted, he obviously is *not* still preaching circumcision[101]. Paul's understanding of the σκάνδαλον of the cross, in this connection, has been interpreted in two basic ways: it is either the offence of a crucified messiah[102], or it is the offence of the devaluation of the Temple and the Torah among 'Hellenists' in the early church (cf. Acts 6:1; 8:1).[103] The interpretation offered here, however, supports the recent contention of Michael Wolter, who argues that the σκάνδαλον relates to 'der Heiligkeit Israels' in so far as the Christ-event '*den Unterschied zwischen Israel und den Völkern letztlich aufhebt*' (ital. orig.).[104] That is, the cross is a σκάνδαλον in the context of the sort of claim that 4 Maccabees makes for the supremacy of *Jewish*-piety, as represented in commitment to circumcision and the food laws. The cross negates this claim by exposing the anthropological impotency of the εὐσέβεια on which it rests. Thus, unlike Paul, his opponents do not advocate circumcision for noble ends, but only to avoid persecution τῷ σταυρῷ τοῦ Χριστοῦ (6:12). That is why Paul can both chastise the Galatians for not *obeying* the truth (the gospel entails a personal and communal order, 5:7) and warn them against the inevitably vicious effects of becoming 'deluded' (κενόδοξος) on their dispositions and attitudes. Another accursed gospel is really a false and impotent gospel (cf. 1:6 – 9). In this connection, it is important to recognise the relationship between Paul's death-life pattern elsewhere in Galatians (2:19 – 21; 5:24 – 25) and his language of crucifixion and new creation in 6:14, 15: it is the introduction of competitive rivalry characteristic of the works of the flesh (5:20) into the Galatian community in the form of advocacy for and vain-boasting in circumcision *in contrast* to Paul's boast in the cross and new creation that reveals his

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[101] For analysis of the grammar of these verses and in support this view, see J. Lambrecht, 'Is Gal 5:11b a Parenthesis? A Response to T. Baarda', *NovT* 38 (1996): 239.

[102] U. Schnelle, *Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), 86., which depends solely on Justin, *Dial.* 90.1. For analysis of a broader textual basis that would provide qualified support to this position, see D.W. Chapman, *Ancient Jewish and Christian Perceptions of Crucifixion* (WUNT II 244; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008).

[103] K.-W. Niebuhr, *Heidenapostel aus Israel: die jüdische Identität des Paulus nach ihrer Darstellung in seinen Briefen* (WUNT I 62; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 62 – 65.

[104] M. Wolter, *Paulus: Ein Grundriss seiner Theologie* (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2011), 23.

opponents' thoughts, dispositions, and actions as a species of κενοδοξία. This means that it is not just the new existence that Paul boasts in when boasting in the cross, but it is the new order that existence entails. New creation (6:15), faith working through love (5:6), even, in the specifically Pauline sense of practicing Torah-virtue, 'keeping the law' (the implication of Paul's charge, οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ περιτεμνόμενοι αὐτοὶ νόμον φυλάσσουσιν, 6:13; cf. 1 Cor 7:19). That is what counts. That is the κανών (6:16) by which the 'peace and mercy of God' is experienced and on which Paul's hopes for Israel depend.[105] We could easily imagine the author of 4 Maccabees responding in disgust both to this rhetoric and the theology that undergirds it. Yet, at least for the purposes of this chapter, we must entertain the possibility that he would push Paul further.

5.3.2 Christological Social Order

For the author of 4 Maccabees, Torah defines what is 'good' (4 Macc 2:22, 23), but Paul has already qualified this identification. Thus, to avoid the charge of arbitrariness from an opponent like 4 Maccabees, Paul offers a construal of moral order that exhibits some deeper coherence with the divine purpose, developing in Gal 6:1 – 10 a Christ-piety that shows how the divine eschatological benefaction produces its own coherent moral order. With this reading we aim to make a modest contribution to the interpretation of Gal 6:2. By supporting and modifying the reading ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ as referring to Christ's self-giving as a 'metanorm',[106] we will clarify how and why Paul positively relates this metanorm to the Torah.

An exhaustive evaluation of the various interpretations of Gal 6:2 is unnecessary. For the cognate evidence for the key phrase τὸν νόμον τοῦ Χριστοῦ is so sparse (cf. ἔννομος Χριστοῦ, 1 Cor 9:21) that any interpretation will depend on how one takes the argument as a whole.[107] In this regard, our interpretation of Gal 5:14 in the context of Paul's apologetic argument in Gal 5:13 – 26 suggests the exclusion of

[105] S.G. Eastman, 'Israel and the Mercy of God: A Re-reading of Galatians 6.16 and Romans 9 – 11', *NTS* 56 (2010): 367 – 95.

[106] Horrell (*Solidarity*, 99, n. 2) defines a metanorm as 'one which determines the moral framework within which other norms, values and customs can be articulated and practiced'. For the concept of a 'metanorm', see S. Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 45.

[107] Horrell, *Solidarity*, 222.

certain options from the outset. It would not be compelling or necessary to take Paul's reference to 'the law of Christ' without reference to the Mosaic law in either a promissory sense[108] or as an 'ironic rhetorical formulation' referring only to a new norm of Christ's self-giving.[109] Either interpretation would gut Paul's apologetic argument, which depends on a *real* not merely rhetorical connection to and construal of the Torah. In this regard, Martyn's argument that ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ has the sense of 'the law as taken in hand by Christ' and thus fulfiled redemptive-historically exemplifies the sort of real connection between Christ and the law that is needed, but it founders on his interpretation of analogous genitive phrases including νόμος in Romans (Rom 3:27; 7:23, 25; 8:2).[110] Likewise, despite the pedigree of the view,[111] there is no evidence that Paul refers to Christ's own teaching either in opposition to (as New Torah of the Messiah)[112] or as the definitive expression of the Torah's meaning.[113] Thus, we agree with Horrell that there is no necessary contradiction between a real reference to the Torah here and an appeal, in Hays's terms, to the 'paradigmatic self-giving of Christ'.[114] Consequently, we propose a modification of Hays' 'paradigmatic' account along the lines of our reading of Paul's argument in Galatians 5:13 – 26: the phrase ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ represents the ethical climax of Paul's bridge-building activity in that he weds the Torah-virtue of love with the particular expression of Christ's love as self-giving (cf. 1:4; 2:20). This marriage of Torah-virtue and Christ-shaped disposition and action configures normative communal dispositions and actions as expressions of loving and thus Torah-fulfiling self-giving (6:1 – 5). More precisely, mutual burden-bearing fulfils 'the law of Christ'

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[108] *Contra* de Boer, *Galatians*, 378. It is hard to see how a notion of prophetic or promissory fulfilment in 6:2 serves as the Galatians' obedience to Paul's *commands* in 6:1, 2, and 4.

[109] R.B. Hays, 'Christology and Ethics in Galatians: the Law of Christ', *CBQ* 49 (1987): 275.

[110] See Horrell, *Solidarity*, 228. Cf. Martyn, *Galatians*, 549, 556–57.

[111] For an overview of the history of interpretation, see G.N. Stanton, 'What is the Law of Christ? ', *ExAud* 17 (2001): 47 – 59.

[112] *Contra* W.D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology* (London: SPCK, 1948), 142 – 44; C.H. Dodd, 'ENNOMOS CHRISTOU', in *More New Testament Studies* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1968), 134 – 48. On the idea that the Rabbis expected a 'new torah', see the analysis and negative verdict of P. Schäfer, 'Die Torah der messianischen Zeit', *ZNW* 65 (1974): 27 – 42.

[113] See, e.g. Dunn, *Galatians*, 322; Moo, *Galatians*, 378. Horrell observes (*Solidarity*, 225) that the absence in Paul of any reference to Jesus' *Doppelgebot* is not evidence of absence of influence and, thus, influence remains a possibility. For overviews, see Barclay, *Obeying*, 135–36; Martyn, *Galatians*, 515–18.

[114] Horrell, *Solidarity*, 230. Cf. Hays, 'Christology ', 275.

in the sense that it fulfils the Torah's aim of love in the cultivation of Christ-shaped dispositions and actions.[115]

Like Paul's bridge in 5:1 – 6, the logic of 6:1 – 10 is assumed. Thus, a careful analysis of Paul's word choice in v. 1 is vital, as it provides the first glimpses of Paul's pneumatological and Christological shaping. The phrase ἐὰν καί ('if however') connects 6:1 to the warning against 'deluded' beliefs and their characteristic dispositions (envy) and actions (provocation) in 5:26, rendering 6:1 a point-by-point reframing of the type of situation faced in Galatia.[116] The Galatians may face a 'trespass' (παράπτωμα) in the community—not a 'transgression'(παράβασις, cf. 3:19).[117] And in that case, those led by the Spirit (οἱ πνευματικοί)[118] should employ a Spirit-generated disposition of 'gentleness' (ἐν πνεύματι πραΰτητος) not envy (5:26), in order to practise 'mending' (καταρτίζετε) of those who trespass (τὸν τοιοῦτον) rather than provocation (5:26). Paul's appended warning—σκοπῶν σεαυτὸν μὴ καὶ σὺ πειρασθῇς—both underlines the risk to individuals (singular, σεαυτόν!) involved in this activity and provides a stark contrast to the disposition of his opponents. The 'deluded' do not recognise the real risk of temptation, an oversight οἱ πνευματικοί cannot afford.

This reading discloses the tight fit between Paul's theory of moral agency and his ethical guidance in Gal 6:1. As we have argued, Paul does not hold either that moral agency is an inviolable created capacity (4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*) or that it is an inviolable feature of new created agency but rather that it depends on one's ongoing relation to the Spirit. Thus, though the phrase ἐν πνεύματι πραΰτητος likely refers to a *human* disposition, there is no assumed competition between divine and human agency—it is οἱ πνευματικοί who exhibit this disposition.[119] Consequently, v. 1

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[115] In this regard, we aim to clarify in what respect this phrase means, as Barclay puts it (*Obeying*, 134), 'the law as redefined and fulfiled by Christ in love'.

[116] Schlier, *Galater*, 270: 'Paulus formuliert wiederum nicht so grundsätzlich, sondern bringt ein konkretes Beispiel'.

[117] de Boer, *Galatians*, 374 – 75.

[118] Some scholars take οἱ πνευματικοί as an ironic subversion of Paul's opponents' self-designation—e.g., Schlier, *Galater*, 270; Martyn, *Galatians*, 546. But a parallel such as 1 Cor 3:1 both militates against such a view and gives a clue to the meaning: there, to be πνευματικοί is to be mature, not νηπίοι ἐν Χριστῷ or 'fleshly' (σάρκινος). Here, as there, Paul considers all the Galatians recipients of the Spirit, but to be πνευματικοί is to be walking according to the Spirit regularly (5:25).

[119] de Boer, *Galatians*, 373: 'Paul here appears to use the term "spirit" (*pneuma*) in a nontheological sense to refer to an attitude or posture. But there may be a play on words since Paul also regards humility as a fruit of the Spirit. The Spirit of humility is, as it were, the humility of the Spirit'.

reframes the issue of a breakdown in community using Paul's moral agency framework: rather than the mutual rivalry and envy that flows from vain opinion, the Galatians are to be led by the Spirit in a gentle disposition for the purpose of restorative action. That is to say, we need look no further than the communal discord in Galatia and Paul's diagnosis of it in our search for the *relevance* of Gal 6:1 – 10. This ethical guidance begins with that situation as a catalyst but moves beyond it to address the more generally applicable situation of community rupture.

As suggested above, this is the sort of concrete example an author like 4 Maccabees would expect. The crucial point for our purposes, then, is that both Paul's polemics and his apologetic argument for new moral agents frame and inform his ethical guidance in Gal 6:1 – 10. Any interpretation of 6:2 must account for its function within this larger argument. The hypothesis pursued here is that this verse provides the formal shape of the 'Christ-piety' that, in Paul's view, fits both the Torah-virtue of love and the revelation of its particular eschatological shape in the Christ-event. In other words, 'sacrificial' burden-bearing is the mutual responsibility of all who are being guided by the Spirit (5:13; 6:1). This is so because, given the cosmological and anthropological conditions of the present evil age, Jesus' death for sinners and the life-giving donation of the Spirit discloses the fulfilment of the law of love *as* mutual burden-bearing (5:14; 6:2). The coherence, then, of Paul's ethics is rooted in his Christology, because Jesus' life-giving death discloses the shape of eschatological love in the present evil age. This makes sense not only given the theological logic and new theory of moral agency we have seen through our debate, but also in the exegesis of Paul's ethical guidance in Galatians 6:1 – 10. Specifically, this view makes sense of Paul's assumed standard of judgement and his continued focus on the relation between dispositions and actions in their communal and eschatological contexts in 6:3 – 10. In other words, for Paul, the disposition of love received in relation to the Spirit finds its appropriate expression in the community—its fitting return—in lives of mutual burden-bearing in the church. Thus, Paul's command that the Galatians 'enslave themselves to one another' διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης (Gal 5:13) is one of his discourse-specific identifications of the appropriate return of the Christ-gift—an obligation he glosses with the phrase 'the law of Christ' (Gal 6:2).

5.3.3 Recognising the Eschatological Order in Thought and Deed

Against earlier interpreters who saw Gal 6:1 – 10 as a loose collection of *sententiae* strung together by Stichwörter, John Barclay has drawn attention to Paul's dialectic movement between individual accountability and communal responsibility.[120] We may further specify this dialectic as an aspect of a broader theme in Gal 5 – 6, as Paul consistently treats individual dispositions and actions in the context of their communal effects and the eschatological verdict these actions will receive.[121] Relatedly, Gal 6:3 – 5 represents not just a focus on individual accountability but a continuation of Paul's examination of the communal and eschatological significance of the dispositions and action of new agents. Again, Paul's focus on distinguishing vain-opinion from the truth of the gospel plays a vital role in his analysis. An exegetical difficulty illustrates the point: how does v. 3 follow from v. 2; how is a diagnosis of self-deception a *logical* explanation of the mutual burden-bearing command or 'the law of Christ'? Some interpreters ignore this difficulty by taking v. 3 to refer either to Paul's appeal against becoming κενόδοξοι in 5:26[122] or his warning about temptation in 6:1,[123] seeing in Paul's diagnosis of self-deception in 6:3 a veiled warning against vanity in general.[124] Yet, if we take the γάρ of v. 3 to be governing vv. 3 – 4 together and we consider that Paul's discourse on κενοδοξία is not relative (an overestimation of one's worth) but categorical (a false estimation arising from a false standard), we can account for the connection to 6:2. For if the answer to self-deception (v. 3) is testing (v. 4), then the assumption is that the self-deceived *are not* reflecting on the proper evaluation of their dispositions and actions. The one who 'thinks he is something when he is nothing' (δοκεῖ τις εἶναί τι μηδὲν ὤν) is self-deceived *because* he does not test (δοκιμάζω) 'his own work' (τὸ…ἔργον ἑαυτοῦ δοκιμαζέτω). He *assumes* a standard instead of using the appropriate

[120] Barclay, *Obeying*, 149–66.

[121] Though we see coherence in vv. 1 – 10 too, we agree with D.W. Kuck, '"Each Will Bear His Own Burden": Paul's Creative Use of an Apocalyptic Motif', *NTS* 40 (1994): 289 – 97: '[against those who view this as a loose collection, Kuck contends that] Paul in 6.1 – 5 is building a single argument, that this argument concerns proper individual self-perception as the ground for life in the community, and that this argument has a specifically Christian point of view, which is set forth principally in the climactic reference to the final judgement of God in 6.5.'

[122] Mussner, *Galaterbrief*, 400; Barclay, *Obeying*, 160; de Boer, *Galatians*, 381.

[123] Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 216; Betz, *Galatians*, 301.

[124] Longenecker's interpretation (*Galatians*, 276) of v. 3 as a conceited attitude that blocks the mutual burden-bearing commanded in v. 2 is a notable though unpersuasive exception.

standard—'the law of Christ'. Paul's positive estimation of proper 'work' in v. 4[125] and his allusion to the forensic apocalyptic motif of burden-bearing at the eschaton in v. 5 cement the point.[126] What matters is not one's assumed perception but God's estimation, which is impartial (cf. Gal 2:6)[127]—ἕκαστος γὰρ τὸ ἴδιον φορτίον βαστάσει. Thus, Paul is not puncturing self-inflated pride here but urging the application of the appropriate standard of eschatological worth. This standard is Christological, as a brief look back from 6:2 to Gal 5:13 – 14 and 5:5 – 6 and a look forward to 6:6 – 8 shows.

5.3.4 The Christological Shape of Self and Society

As we argued above, in Gal 5:5 – 6 Paul defines the eschatological standard of worth with reference to the Christ-event. The hope to which the Galatians look forward by the Spirit's power depends on the righteousness revealed ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Moreover, in Gal 5:13 – 14 Paul applies this standard to the situation in Galatia in support of his apologetic argument for Torah-virtue: the mutual slavery Paul commands 'through love' (διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης) fulfils the entirety of the Torah's ethical aim, summarised in the 'one sentence' of Lev 19:18. Thus, when we arrive at Gal 6:2 we are prepared in advance for Paul's theological shorthand for the divine eschatological norm. The life that counts is the life characterised by a disposition of love towards others, as echoed in Torah-virtue and revealed in its Christological shape in mutual burden-bearing. The self-deceived person does not apply this vertical eschatological standard to himself, employing instead assumed horizontal standards that are 'vain-opinion' and tend toward envy and mutual provocation (6:3; cf. 5:26). The one who tests her own actions has no cause to boast *to another* (6:4),[128] however, for she recognises that the divine verdict is the one that counts

[125] Barclay, *Obeying*, 161–62.

[126] The majority of scholars think v. 5 refers to the eschatological judgement. For the most compelling argument, see Kuck, 'Burden'. See also, Hays, *Galatians*, 335; de Boer, *Galatians*, 385. For the contrary view that the future verb is gnomic, see Betz, *Galatians*, 304.

[127] Barclay, *Gift*, 437.

[128] It seems better to take the force of εἰς to be 'to' rather than 'in' and τὸ καύχημα to mean 'the activity of boasting' rather than 'ground for boasting'—'and then he will boast to himself alone and not to the neighbour' (καὶ τότε εἰς ἑαυτὸν μόνον τὸ καύχημα ἕξει καὶ οὐκ εἰς τὸν ἕτερον). Thus, Barclay, *Obeying*, 160 – 61; Dunn, *Galatians*, 325; Kuck, 'Burden', 294; Martyn, *Galatians*, 550; Schewe, *Galater*, 164. This is so for two reasons. First, it is not clear how a boast in one's neighbour at the eschaton fits the context: how might an eschatological boast *in another* (v. 4) be a corollary of a false perception of

(6:5).[129] The striking parallel with *4 Ezra* 7:105 makes the same point—*enim portabunt unusquisque tunc iniustitias suas aut iustitias*—but, as we have seen, there the Torah, not 'the law of Christ', is the standard. Thus, in contrast to the Torah-piety of 4 Maccabees (and *4 Ezra*) Paul presents a Christ-piety in which love expressed as mutual burden-bearing is the sort of life that expresses the ultimate divine standard of righteousness.

Conclusion—Self and Society Created and Ordered in the Christ-Gift

Why is it that those 'who would be justified by the law' have *necessarily* 'fallen away from the gift' (Gal 5:4)? Ironically, it is the very life 4 Maccabees presents as the quintessential expression of the properly ordered self—i.e., life 'under the rule of the Torah by reason' (4 Macc 2:9)—that is synonymous, for Paul, with a life that is enslaved to the evil desires and passions characteristic of fallen humanity, to the 'Flesh.' The ironic portrayal of life ὑπὸ νόμον is not mere rhetoric, however, but is derived from Paul's understanding of God's life-giving benefaction. Unlike 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, for Paul, life is not inviolably given by God as Torah-ordered at creation, but rather life is given and ordered in Jesus' death as created anew and continually reproduced by the Spirit in those who receive this life by faith. By isolating and arguing against the key anthropological assumption of texts life 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, Paul provides an alternate account of both moral agency and moral order. Unlike *4 Ezra*, there is for Paul no anthropological reservation, no zone of *libertas* from which to either accept or reject the divine gift of Torah-ordered life. On the contrary, one is either dominated by the desires of the Flesh or led by the desires of the Spirit.

Paradoxically, it is the very experience of individual and social futility of life ὑπὸ νόμον that the Christ-event discloses in full, for Paul. In their very commitment to Torah-piety, his opponents actually subvert the Torah-virtue of love by introducing

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one's own eschatological 'worth' (v. 3)? Second, only a few verses later, in 6:14, Paul categorically denies any boast other than that which is in the cross of Christ, a quintessential boast *in another*. These considerations, along with the clear interplay between the communal and eschatological horizons and the parallels in 2 Cor 8:24 and Rom 4:2, support the interpretation offered here. *Contra* Lightfoot, *Galatians*, 217; de Boer, *Galatians*, 382–84.

[129] Kuck, 'Burden ', 296: 'Each individual is to watch out for himself or herself, examine the self rather than judge others, and look to God's future judgement as the final arbiter of status.'

community rivalry. Thus, a double irony is disclosed in Paul's rhetoric and theology: not only does commitment to Torah-piety as the ultimate divine norm leave the self disordered, but it inevitably produces a competitive and disordered community. This is so, according to Paul, because the divine intention for the Torah was to confirm human beings in and confine them to their evil desires and actions (3:22; cf. 5:18), in order to reconstitute and order them as new agents in the Christ-event. Only those who are of Christ are capable of crucifying the desires and passions of the Flesh because only they exist as newly created agents, capable of properly exercising moral agency by the Spirit; only they fulfil the Torah by living lives of mutual slavery through the Spirit-sourced disposition of love; and only they experience the eschatological integrity of the self by living according to the new creation order—i.e., 'the law of Christ'. Thus, we arrive at the point of ultimate difference between Paul's theology in Galatians and that of 4 Maccabees (and *4 Ezra*): because Jesus' life-giving death is *the* divine gift of life in this evil age, the proper expression of that life cannot be Torah-shaped but must instead be Christ-shaped. Torah-piety is not contrary to this life-giving Gift (for it confines all things to 'death' as *preparatio evangelii*), but neither does it express the order this gift creates (for Torah-piety itself is confined to the 'dead' existence of the present evil age). Rather, it is, for Paul, a 'Christ-piety' expressed in lives of mutual burden-bearing sourced from divine love that counts before God. For, whereas 4 Maccabees produces an apology for the superiority of the Jewish way of life by identifying Stoic virtue paradigmatically in the Torah-piety of the martyrs, Paul, by contrast, produces an apology for the normativity of Christ-shaped (not Torah-shaped) lives and communities by seeing in the self-giving of Christ the Torah-virtue of love quintessentially revealed.

With the above reading of Gal 5 – 6, we have reached the primary contribution of the present chapter, which also constitutes a significant result for this thesis. Through exegetical dialogue primarily with 4 Maccabees, we have offered a new account both of the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians, in general, and thereby a new account of the function of Gal 5 – 6, in particular. That is, we have shown that Paul's theological logic depends on his articulation in Gal 5:13 – 26 of an inchoate theory of new and newly-ordered selves. More specifically, we have shown that Paul considers Torah-piety necessarily antithetical to life that

fulfills the Torah-virtue of love, because he see the works of the law as confining and confined *by divine design* to a 'dead' existence, subject to the evil passions and desires of the Flesh. It is because Torah-piety is *by divine design* confined, along with humanity, to this 'dead' existence in view of the life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift that the works of the law cannot be the proper order of the church. Thus, in the context of accounts of the function of Gal 5 – 6, Paul's presentation of the Flesh/Spirit antithesis functions neither as merely persuasive rhetoric nor as only a contingent response to the circumstances in Galatia but rather as the theological ground of Paul's entire argument.

We have also shown that, in service to his apologetic argument, Paul provides in Gal 6:1 – 10 a Christ-piety that posits a deep connection to the Torah-virtue of love. For, as we argued in debate with 4 Maccabees, Paul presents Christ's self-offering as a metanorm for personal and social order not simply to address community rivalry in Galatia (cf. Gal 6:1) but for the sake of theological completeness. In short, if Torah-piety does not order self and society as the order of created life, how does the life-giving Christ-gift so order human existence? Paul answers a question like this by positing Jesus' self-offering as the revelation of the eschatological shape of love in the present evil age (Gal 6:2)—and thus as both the eschatological standard by which individuals will be judged (6:3 – 8) and the norm for social action (6:9, 10). With this reading, we have offered a new account of the function of Gal 6:1 – 10 in Galatians in *theological* terms.

Finally, by attending to the way Paul argues from his understanding of the life-giving and life-ordering character of the Christ-gift, we have gone beyond recent reconsiderations of grace in Galatians. That is, we have shown that Paul's recognition of the unconditioned and incongruous character of the Christ-gift *per se* does not resolve the problem of the theological logic or thematic coherence of Galatians. For Paul's opponents shared his experiences of Christ and the Spirit but failed to draw the same inference for personal and social order. What is needed, then, are answers to a series of *why* questions: *why* does Paul consider his life in Judaism as needing to be reconstituted and reordered (Gal 1 – 2); *why* does Paul assume that the recipients of the law are 'dead' and *thus* that the law cannot be the eschatological standard of righteousness (Gal 3:21, 22)? The answers lie not in the

recognition that the unconditioned character of the Christ-gift implies its own norms. Rather, they lie in an analysis of the logic of Paul's Christological and pneumatological understanding of the divine donation and thus ordering of eschatological life in the Christ-gift. In short, Paul's life in Judaism needed reordering and the law itself could not provide the shape of that reordering, because *by divine design* Torah-piety confines and is confined to the life of the Flesh. And, as we have argued, it is Paul's conception of the Christ-gift in life-giving and life-ordering terms in contrast to the Torah as a death-dealing reality that grounds the antithetical theological logic of his argument. It is this conception and the 'resurrection' hermeneutic that it produces that is conveyed in the life and death language that arises at critical junctures in Paul's argument (Gal 2:18 – 21; 3:10 – 14, 21 – 22; 4:21 – 31; 5:24, 25; 6:8, 14, 15). It is *this particular* conception of divine benefaction as life-giving and life-ordering and the logic and hermeneutic that conception produces that undergirds the theology and thematic coherence of Galatians.

Conclusion

1. Debating Life as Divine Gift and God as Life-Giver

This thesis has placed 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and Galatians in conversation on the topic of divine life-giving benefaction and life as divine gift, in order both to observe those places where they differ and to explain why they do. We have argued that, though each author considers God to be the one who gives and orders life, they conceive of these gifts of life and their respective orders differently. For Paul, life is ultimately given and ordered only in the Christ-event, while for 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* life is inviolably given at creation as Torah-ordered. This conclusion, however, invites but does not answer the question of the theological logic of Galatians. Because Paul and his opponents have the Christ-event in common, we must ask *why* they view the implications of this event differently. Thus, by comparing three particular texts on divine benefaction, this work both seeks to contribute to the reevaluation of Paul's theological relation to Judaism and, by focusing on divine life-giving benefaction, to propose an alternative account of Paul's theological logic in Galatians. This conclusion, then, will summarise the argument of each chapter, in order to introduce a summary of the contribution of the whole.

2. Thesis Summary

Part one of this thesis analysed the accounts of divine life-giving benefaction and life as divine gift in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, which, though exhibiting differing cosmologies, are both creational and Torah-ordered. Chapter one argued that 4 Maccabees grounds God's life-giving and death-dealing activity in history and at the eschaton in his inviolable donation of Torah-ordered life at creation. In 4 Maccabees, wisdom just is 'the instruction of the law' (1:16, 17), because God gave '[the law] to the mind' at creation to restrain the passions, a gift which irrevocably endowed humanity with the necessary and sufficient moral agency and the moral order for individual and societal virtue and, thus, flourishing (2:23). Because this divine donation of Torah-ordered life is inviolable, moral agents and nations are capable of and responsible for living according to it. This Torah-ordered creational design and

its just divine maintenance is paradigmatically proven, for 4 Maccabees, in the vindication of the martyrs and punishment of the tyrant Antiochus Epiphanes. The exemplary priest Eleazar elucidates and embodies a paradoxical pedagogy in which torture is transformed into triumph and death is turned into life. He defends the sanctity and rationality of the Torah-order (5:14 – 38; 6:16 – 23), demonstrates the efficacy of pious reason (i.e., Torah-ordered reason) in resisting the passions of torture in commitment to that order (6:1 – 11, 24 – 26), and commends the cultic vision of life as the basis for the good life and the ground of the reconstitution of the nation through 'sacrificial' self-offering (5:24; 6:26 – 30). Eleazar's commitment to God (not Nature) as Benefactor of the created Torah-order of self and society is grounded in his belief that the fathers will receive him (5:37), a belief more fully explicated in the mother's eschatological hermeneutic that envisions the return gift of immutable immortality for the martyrs' inviolable Torah-commitment (16:16 – 23; cf. 7:18 – 20). Thus, as 'the instructor' of the martyrs (9:8), Eleazar laid the groundwork for their atoning resistance to the tyrant (17:21, 22), thereby guaranteeing his defeat at the hands of 'the Divine Providence [who] saved Israel' (17:22) and, as the mother taught, ensuring the martyrs' receipt of 'the victory prize in life everlasting' (17:12) and 'the divine justice which is eternal torture through fire' (9:9; cf. 10:15; 12:12) for Antiochus.

Paradoxically, then, for 4 Maccabees, the perfect expression of the good life in a time of divine chastisement is a noble death—an affirmation of the divine order of life that God gave, receives back, and transforms into eternal life and national renewal. 4 Maccabees is thus both a theodicy and an apology: God's inviolable constitution of moral agency and societal life as Torah-ordered and cult-centered is rational (*contra* Antiochus Epiphanes) because it produces virtue, and it is vindicated because God rewards that virtue in and beyond history. '[O]nly the children of the Hebrews are invincible for virtue' (9:18) because only they listen to the God who says 'I kill and I make alive; this is your life and length of days' (18:19)—that is, only they recognise the inviolable created Torah-order by which God judges individuals, leaders, and nations. It is this conviction about the irrevocable and effectual divine donation of life as Torah-ordered for individuals and societies that shapes the entirety of 4 Maccabees' theology—providing the anthropological basis for moral

agency and national life, the soteriological criterion through which virtue and vice receive their fitting divine return, and the Deuteronomic hermeneutical pattern through which scripture, history, and experience are seen as consistent with fitting divine justice.

In chapter two, we argued that it is theologically axiomatic for *4 Ezra* that the absence of God's perfect judgment in the present world is explicable only in light of the world's moral and ontological renewal unto fullness of life at the eschaton. Yet, it is precisely the need for ontological transformation that prevents the ultimate exercise of divine justice in history and occludes the operations of ultimate heavenly justice. Thus, in *4 Ezra*, Ezra is the exemplar of the wise man who receives an apocalyptic education in which his epistemic (not moral) estrangement from God's 'way' is overcome. Ezra sees in the resurrection of Zion *qua* the righteous the demonstration of the sanctity of the divine gift of Torah-ordered life and, in that revelation, confirmation of the justice-shaped mercy of God. Though 'when Adam transgressed [God's] ordinances, what had been made was judged' (7:11), rendering Ezra and all humans both cognitively limited and 'corrupted' and thus unable to 'understand the incorruptible' (4:10 – 11), and though the cosmos itself is incapable, without judgment and ontological transformation, of serving as the venue of divine salvation because it is 'full of sadness and infirmities' (4:27), and though 'a grain of evil seed was sown in Adam's heart from the beginning' (4:30)—despite all this, at the final judgment there will be no intercession or vicarious substitution, for 'all shall bear their own righteousness and unrighteousness' (7:105). This is so because all humanity has been inviolably endowed with moral agency—a space of *libertas* from which either to accept or reject the divine gift of life as Torah-ordered (8:56; 9:10 – 12)—and, thus, every 'human being born over the earth' (7:127) will be judged by the words of Moses who said, 'Choose life for yourself, that you may live!' (7:129). Likewise, though Israel is, like the cosmos, an ageing mother whose womb is dying, and thus the number and stature of her righteous inhabitants is lessening to the point of extinction (5:44 – 55), there will be a just and merciful eschatological reversal of this national 'death'. Thus, when Ezra finally adopts Uriel's bi-focal view of Zion's plight, encouraging the grieving Mother Zion that God's way is ultimately just (10:16; cf. 4:24) and that the labours of his people do not come to nothing (10:24; cf.

3:33), he demonstrates that he is worthy to see and experience her eschatological transformation *qua* the righteous (10:29 - 59). Thus, he is worthy and ready to lead the post-exilic community toward that reality.

Consequently, *4 Ezra's* theological vision, like that of 4 Maccabees, is paradoxical, though its precise character differs: it is only the one who fully and faithfully laments the *futility* of historical existence, enquiring after God's justice in it, who is worthy to be taught and shown the eschatological fecundity of God's law (9:31 – 37) for the righteous Israelite in 'resurrected' Zion. This way of accounting for the occlusion of divine justice in history makes *4 Ezra's* theodicy a cosmologically pessimistic and, thus, deeply qualified one. One cannot expect fitting justice within history, because the righteous live within both a nation and world that is fundamentally entropic, characterised by the experience of and headed towards cosmic death. Fitting divine justice and salvation will be commensurate with divine infinite and incorruptible being, which means that these await the event of the removal of sin, sickness, and death and the emergence of immutable life (7:113). Thus, though humanity retains an inviolably endowed moral agency and Torah-order, the entirety of human existence can be characterised as a series of passages that are 'evil, full of great dangers, and upheld only by great labors' (7:12). It is this dual conviction about the entropic cosmos and nation and the free moral agent that is the controlling centre of *4 Ezra's* theology—producing a relatively pessimistic anthropology (resisting the 'evil thought' requires 'great labour', 7:92) that is still essentially optimistic (a few do it), an account of cosmological and national life *prior to the eschaton* that is fundamentally pessimistic, a soteriological criterion that limits the righteous to a miniscule few (a 'drop of water' in an ocean of humanity, 9:16), and thus a bi-focal hermeneutical lens from which one might ignore the vanities of history and instead celebrate the 'gold dust' (8:2) for whom paradise and life is prepared (8:52).

In part two, we turned to analyse Paul's account of divine life-giving benefaction, which is Christological and *morally* creative. Chapter three argued that the theological significance of Paul's paradigmatic autobiography lies fundamentally in the shape of the anthropology it discloses. By comparing Paul's self-portrayal in Gal 1 – 2 with the exemplary figures Eleazar (4 Maccabees) and Ezra (*4 Ezra*), we

disclosed differing conceptions of the constitution and integrity of the self: whereas both Eleazar and Ezra represent God's gift of inviolable and inviolably Torah-ordered existence at creation, maintaining that created integrity through obedience to the Torah, Paul presents himself as the paradigm of the reconstitution, reordering, and eschatological integrity of humanity in the Christ-gift. Thus, Paul's presentation of himself as an unworthy recipient of divine life, from the perspective of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* where worth is Torah-reckoned, raises grave theological questions not only about social and cosmological order, and thus soteriology, but more fundamentally about the consistency, justice, and thus identity of God. If human life is not given by God as Torah-ordered but is rather 'resurrected' in the Christ-gift, *why* is this necessarily the case, *what* role then does the Torah play in this divine life-giving donation, and *how* exactly does the Christ-gift order self and society?

In chapter four, through a running debate with *4 Ezra* on these questions, we argued that the theological and hermeneutical profile of Paul's reading of sacred text and salvation history in Gal 3 – 4 is disclosed as a Christologically and pneumatologically grounded theodicy. Both Paul and *4 Ezra* argue against a reading of sacred and human history as an *Unheilsgeschichte*, but whereas *4 Ezra's* bi-focal lens discloses the resurrection of the body and Zion *qua* the righteous beyond history, Paul's sees in the Christ-event the 'birth' of the self for the unworthy believer within history. This produces a reading of the Torah not as the path through entropic existence, as in *4 Ezra*, but as the divine cursing verdict confining 'all things'—Jews and Gentiles alike—under Sin and death. God's identity as death-dealer and life-giver is thus, for Paul, fully disclosed in the Christ-gift, not the Torah. For he reads salvation-history as the history of the divine creation of life out of barrenness, a dead estate that the law does not change but, as divine curse, confirms precisely as a *preparatio evangelii*. Thus, Paul's reading of sacred text and salvation history is controlled by a 'death' and 'resurrection' hermeneutic, which is to say a Christological and pneumatological hermeneutic. Unlike his opponents, Paul sees in the Galatians' receipt of the Christ-gift and the subsequent expression of the power of the Spirit the life-giving activity of God. Likewise, his reading of the Pentateuch from the perspective of Gen 16 – 21 is death and resurrection shaped: the Torah, far

from being either the expression of the creation order or identical with the eschatological order, is implicated in the fleshly and, thus, ultimately enslaved manner of life of the present Jerusalem, while the promise and its fulfilment in the Christ-gift bears children from and destined for the Jerusalem above. Thus, if Paul were asked, by *4 Ezra*, *why* those who are under the law are necessarily cursed, his response would be that they, along with the cosmos, are dead. Yet, this raises further questions: *why* and in *what respect* are they dead, and if the Torah is implicated in the order of death of the present evil age, what positively is the order of life disclosed in the Christ-event and how are these related?

In chapter 5 we took up these questions in the context of the perennial problem of the purpose of Paul's ethics in Gal 5 – 6, arguing through debate with 4 Maccabees that these chapters most clearly disclose the material Christological and pneumatological theological basis for Paul's argument, which in turn determines the formal contours of his fundamentally interpersonal and communal ethic. In Gal 5:13 – 6:10 Paul answers two questions that an author like 4 Maccabees (and Paul's opponents in Galatia) would have: *why* is it that those 'who would be justified by the law' have *necessarily* 'fallen away from the gift' (Gal 5:4), and, if Torah-piety does not provide the order of eschatological life but the Christ-event does, how is this order to be expressed by individuals and communities? In short, by isolating and arguing against the key anthropological assumption of texts like 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, Paul produces an alternative account of moral agency and moral order. Life is not inviolably given at creation as Torah-ordered moral agency, but rather life is given and ordered in Jesus' life-giving death as created anew and continually reproduced by the Spirit in those who receive this life by faith. There is no zone of *libertas;* those ὑπὸ νόμον are dominated by the evil passions and desires of the Flesh. It is the Spirit who reconstitutes moral agents, and these agents exhibit the Spirit-produced Torah-virtue of love by resisting the practices of the flesh and living lives of mutual burden-bearing (Gal 6:2).

Thus, we arrive at the ultimate theological difference between Paul and 4 Maccabees, *4 Ezra*, and his opponents in Galatia, which is at once anthropological, social, cosmological, and eschatological. As in moral agency, so in moral order: because Jesus' life-giving death is *the* divine gift of life in this evil age, it is only in

relation to the life of Jesus created and sourced by the Spirit that properly ordered moral agency is possible. And thus the proper expression of that life cannot be Torah-shaped but must instead by Christ-shaped. Where life is given, there it is ordered, and thus, because God gives life to dead agents in the Christ-gift, the expression of that life will necessarily conform to Jesus' own life-giving death. It is in this 'Christ-piety' expressed in lives of mutual burden-bearing sourced from divine love that the Torah-virtue of love is fulfilled and divine righteousness practised. It is, according to Paul, not Torah-piety but receipt and exercise of the ongoing life according to the Christ-gift—that is, the bearing of one another's burdens—that counts before God. It is life sourced from and lived according to this new creation that fulfils Torah-virtue in the law of Christ.

3. Summary of Results

By attending to the language and thus conceptions of God as life-giver and life as divine gift in our comparative texts we have both analysed and demonstrated the importance of an unstudied theme and made a range of contributions to the study of each text, in particular, and to research on the relation between Pauline and Jewish conceptions of grace, in general. We will conclude by summarising the contributions this study has made to research on the coherence and theological logic of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, on grace in Jewish texts of antiquity, on the coherence and theological logic of Galatians, and on the relation between Pauline and Jewish texts of antiquity regarding divine benefaction.

4 Maccabees and its Atonement Theology

Though our focus was specifically on God as life-giver and life as divine gift, in chapter one we contributed to research on 4 Maccabees by offering the first full appraisal of divine benefaction in this text. This analysis produced important results for understanding the theological logic of 4 Maccabees (specifically, by resolving the debate surrounding its atonement theology), in particular, and for the recent reconsideration of grace in the Pauline and Jewish texts of Greco-Roman antiquity, in general. With respect to the two dominant models of 4 Maccabees' atonement theology and theological logic, neither a mere recognition of the martyrs' deaths as

atoning[1] nor an account of this atonement in merely exemplary terms[2] is sufficient to convey the text's theological logic. For, as we demonstrated, the self-offering of Eleazar and the martyrs has logical and theological force only within 4 Maccabees' deeper account of the circle of the divine gift of life initiated at creation and maintained by God's life-giving and death-dealing activity in history and at the eschaton. Put more specifically: God's indiscriminate donation of Torah-ordered life in creation is *the* basis of inviolable moral agency, and thus the precondition for the *discriminating* return of life as a gift to the worthy—whether temporally or eternally, nationally or individually. Thus, without an account of divine life-giving benefaction, 4 Maccabees' atonement theology and the theological logic remain opaque.

The Theological Logic and Coherence of 4 Ezra

Regarding debates over the coherence and theology of *4 Ezra*, we showed in chapter two how the vision of episode four relates to episode three (and the previous episodes) theologically. And, in so doing, we gave a new account of the coherence and theological logic of *4 Ezra*. Despite the recent minority report of Hogan that Ezra's vision represents a non-rational *qua* apocalyptic alternative to reasoned theological debate[3] and the majority view championed by Stone that *4 Ezra* avoids the theological questions of episode one in favour of a merely psychological explanation of Ezra's 'conversion',[4] we argued that the framing of the vision posits that Ezra's experience of the 'resurrection' of Zion itself is the answer to his theological questions. In this connection, we both confirmed Barclay's analysis of the

[1] See, e.g., H. Anderson, "4 Maccabees," in *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (ed. J.H. Charlesworth; vol. 2; Garden City: Doubleday, 1985), 531–64; M. de Jonge, "Jesus' Death for Others and the Death of the Maccabean Martyrs," in *Text and Testimony: Essays on New Testament and Apocryphal Literature in Honour of A.F.J. Klijn* (ed. T. Baarda; Kampen: Kok, 1988: 142 – 51; J.W. van Henten, *The Maccabean Martyrs as Saviours of the Jewish People: A Study of 2 and 4 Maccabees* (JSJSup 57; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 150–53.

[2] See, e.g., S.K. Williams, *Jesus' Death as Saving Event: the Background and Origin of a Concept* (HTRDS 2; Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975); D. Seeley, *The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Paul's Concept of Salvation* (JSNTSup 28; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990); T. Rajak, "Dying for the Law: The Martyr's Portrait in Jewish-Greek Literature," in *The Jewish Dialogue with Greece and Rome: Studies in Cultural and Social Interaction* (AGJU 48; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 99–133.

[3] K.M. Hogan, *Theologies in Conflict in 4 Ezra: Wisdom Debate and Apocalyptic Solution* (JSJSup 130; Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2008).

[4] M.E. Stone, *Fourth Ezra* (Hermeneia; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990).

competing definitions of gift in episode three[5] and went beyond that analysis by showing how a focus on the relation between eschatological life *and* created life as gift is needed to grasp *4 Ezra's* theological logic. Specifically, by tracing the development of organic metaphors throughout the first four episodes of *4 Ezra*, we showed how the seed metaphor of episodes three and four establishes the connection between dying historical Zion and resurrected eschatological Zion, while the account of God as one who gives life to dead Zion *qua* the righteous supplies the logic by which the connection holds. In other words, we showed that, in order to understand *why* Ezra adopts Uriel's account of God as a discriminate giver and *how* that account resolves his quest for seeing the survival of Zion, one must attend to the organic language through which the debate over the efficacy of the gift of moral agency and its Torah order is persued. In so doing, we argued, the long-standing scholarly debate over the coherence and theological logic of *4 Ezra* is resolved.[6]

In addition to solving a number of exegetical problems and resolving debates over the theological logic of these texts, our readings of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* in part one have contributed to the recent reconsideration of grace in Pauline and Jewish texts of Greco-Roman antiquity in two important respects.[7] First, we have shown that 4 Maccabees' understanding of grace neither fits within the dominant pre-Sanders framework of 'legalistic works righteousness', nor does it confirm the assumption of earlier scholars and Sanders that grace is *by definition* 'groundless', 'free', 'not earned', and 'unmerited'.[8] Rather, 4 Maccabees construes national restoration and eternal life as the discriminate divine gift of life to the Torah-worthy, grounded in an account of the indiscriminate donation and ordering of life as Torah-ordered at creation. Thus, 4 Maccabees argues both that God gives life in history and eschatologically to the worthy, grounding these gifts in a particular construal of divine benefaction at creation. In that respect, there is no tension between God's

[5] J.M.G. Barclay, *Paul and the Gift* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015), 288 – 300.

[6] This debate stretches back to the dawn of the twentieth century, specifically the seminal work of Gunkel in H. Gunkel, 'Das vierte Buch Esra', in *Die Apokryphen und Pseudepigraphen des Alten Testaments* (ed. E. Kautzsch; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1900): 2:331 - 402. For the most recent comprehenseive overview, see Hogan, *Theologies,* 15 – 35.

[7] In addition to Barclay, see J.A. Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness in Wisdom of Solomon and Paul's Letter to the Romans: Texts in Conversation* (NovTSup 152; Leiden: Brill, 2013); O. McFarland, *God and Grace in Philo and Paul* (NovTSup 164; Leiden: Brill, 2015).

[8] Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 394 – 96.

indiscriminate and prior creative action and his subsequent and saving eschatological action. Consequently, the tendency to downplay the fittingness of divine salvation as gift, as, e.g., in Paul Redditt's important article on the law in 4 Maccabees, is misguided.[9] Second, we both confirmed Barclay's analysis regarding the differing definitions of grace in episode three of *4 Ezra* and went beyond that analysis, showing that the differing definitions of grace depend, theologically, on *4 Ezra's* conception of the relation between created and eschatological life as divine gift. That is, we showed that, without a careful tracing of the debate over life and Torah as created gifts prosecuted through *4 Ezra's* organic metaphors, an account of *4 Ezra's* theological logic is not possible. For it is Uriel's *particular* account of created life as life-giving and life-ordering that establishes the connection between fallen and eschatological reality, and it is in adopting *this* account that Ezra's worth is proven and his initial request to see God's way resolved in revelatory vision.

In summary, neither the assumption that grace is 'groundless' (as in previous studies on both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*) nor the recognition that divine gifts can go to the worthy (as in Barclay on *4 Ezra*) are sufficient for understanding the theological logic of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*. For, though they differ on the status of the Jewish nation and the cosmos, both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* consider divine *return* gifts to be discriminate because they *assume* the inviolability of the divine indiscriminate donation of created life in the form of human agency and Torah-order. In short, to understand the theological logic of these texts one must give an account of their conceptions of divine life-giving and life-ordering benefaction. Thus, with respect to the recent reconsideration of grace in Pauline and Jewish texts, our research confirmed the analyses of Linebaugh, McFarland, and Barclay on the importance of attending to how grace is defined, while also extending and deepening that research in the analysis of our specific comparative texts.

The Theological Logic of Galatians

In addition to giving an account of divine life-giving benefaction in Galatians, the exegetical dialogue we hosted on this theme with 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* produced a number of results. Here we will itemise those results with respect to the

[9] P.L. Redditt, 'The Concept of Nomos in Fourth Maccabees', *CBQ* 45 (1983): 249–70.

debate over theological logic of Galatians. This will prepare for a summary of the implications of the particular findings in parts one and two of this thesis for the study of theological relations between Pauline and Jewish texts of antiquity, in general, and their conceptions of grace, in particular.

In chapter three we contributed to research that contends that Paul presents himself as a paradigm of 'the working of the gospel'[10], by placing his exemplary account in conversation with those of Eleazar (4 Maccabees) and Ezra (4 Ezra). This conversation produced one significant result for scholarship on Galatians, in general, and our thesis, in particular.

1. The Function of Paul's Paradigmatic Autobiography (Gal 1 – 2)
   Our analysis enabled us to see how Paul's autobiography represents not an *appeal* to the singularity of the gospel,[11] not merely an appeal to the change in redemptive-historical time or the creation of a new cosmos,[12] and not even an appeal to the unconditioned character of the Christ-gift *per se*,[13] but rather Paul's autobiography is the beginnings of an *argument*, climaxing in the formal presentation of Gal 2:18 – 21, for his particular construal of the singularity of the Christ-gift as gift to the unworthy vis-à-vis the law. In this way, we demonstrated that Paul's autobiography in Gal 1 – 2 reaches its formal climax in his presentation of himself as the recipient of a new and newly-ordered agency for a new community in the Christ-gift. Thus, we began to go beyond Barclay's research by showing not simply *that* Paul conceives of divine benefaction in the Christ-gift as unconditioned and incongruous but, by focusing on the life-giving and life-ordering aspect of this gift in conversation with 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, *how* this conception is implicated in deeper questions about created and eschatological life in relation to the Torah. Because Paul's opponents shared his experience of the

[10] B.R. Gaventa, 'Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm', *NovT* 28 (1986): 313; cf. G. Lyons, *Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding* (Atlanta: Scholars, 1985); B. Dodd, *Paul's Paradigmatic 'I': Personal Example as Literary Strategy* (JSNTSup 177; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1999); J.M.G. Barclay, 'Paul's Story: Theology as Testimony', in *Narrative Dynamics in Paul: A Critical Assessment* (ed. B.W. Longenecker; Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 133–56.

[11] B.R. Gaventa, 'The Singularity of the Gospel: A Reading of Galatians', in *Pauline Theology, Vol. 1* (ed. J.M. Bassler; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 147 – 59.

[12] Cf. Martyn's two questions: 'What time is it?' and 'In what cosmos do I live?'; J.L. Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 23.

[13] Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 386.

redemptive-historical change inaugurated by the Christ-event and its consequent effects in divine incongruous gift-giving but disagreed about the implications of these for the Torah, what is needed, in order to understand how Paul avoids begging the question, is not an appeal to the Christ-gift but an account of his inferential logic with respect to it. In this connection, we showed that the particular character of Paul's autobiography implies a rejection both of accounts of the enduring efficacy of created agency and of identifications of the Torah with the created order—i.e., accounts like those used to present Eleazar and Ezra as exemplary worthy recipients of eschatological grace. With this finding, we offered a new account of the function of Gal 1 – 2 as the introduction of Paul's primary theme—life as new human agency and order from 'dead' conditions—in a formal autobiographical *argument*. Moreover, this result initiated the subsequent clarification of the material development of Paul's argument for the life-giving and life-ordering character of the Christ-gift in the next two chapters of this thesis.

In chapter four we furthered research on Paul's theological logic in Gal 3 – 4 by demonstrating, through exegetical dialogue with 4 Ezra, how Paul avoids begging the question in argument with his opponents.

2. Clarifying the Question of Paul's Theological Logic

   Our initial contribution of chapter four had to do with clarifying what an account of Paul's theological logic would entail. Through dialogical exegesis with *4 Ezra* over Gal 3:1 – 14, we showed that what needs explaining is the logic that deems as necessary and inevitable the particular pattern of salvation-history in which the Abrahamic promise, the Deuteronomic curse, and the Christ-event are integrally related.[14] This result was significant for

[14] Thus, we refuted both Stanley's reading of the curse as a threat and not a reality and Wilsons' account of Paul's theological logic, as the latter depends materially on the former; C.D. Stanley, "'Under a Curse': A Fresh Reading of Galatians 3:10-14," *NTS* 36 (1990): 481–511; T.A. Wilson, *The Curse of the Law and the Crisis in Galatia: Reassessing the Purpose of Galatians* (WUNT II 225; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).

our argument, because it enabled us to evaluate available models of Paul's theological logic.

3. Evaluating Available Models of Paul's Theological Logic
   Next, we showed how various models of Paul's theological logic failed as accounts of Paul's logic. Whereas the family of 'dogmatic' approaches of Sanders, Martyn, and de Boer exacerbate the problem of Paul's logic by not explaining why the pattern is *necessary*,[15] appeals to the redemptive-historical failure of Israel (Scott, Wright, Hays, and Barclay),[16] the experience of the Spirit *simpliciter* (Hays and Dunn),[17] or Paul's pessimistic reading of salvation-history from Deuteronomy (Watson)[18] do not explain why the curse at the centre of Paul's pattern is *inevitable* or why the law *cannot* order the eschatological community once the curse is removed. In this last connection, we argued that the family of traditional accounts of Paul's logic,[19] likewise fail, because they do not explain why the law cannot provide the order of the church *once* inability is removed in the Christ-event.

4. The Logic of the Life-giving and Life-ordering Christ-Gift
   Finally, we went beyond available models and Barclay's recent account of gift, showing how Paul's conception of the Christ-gift in life-giving and life-ordering terms constituted not an *appeal* to but an *argument* for its necessary status as a gift to the unworthy. Specifically, we showed that Paul considers

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[15] For the argument justifying grouping these authors together under the 'dogmatic' label, see chapter four, 196. Cf. Sanders, *Paul and Palestinian Judaism*, 483, n. 37, 484; ibid., *Paul, the Law*, 21 – 7; J.L Martyn, *Galatians* (AB 33a; New Haven: YUP, 1997), 311; and M.C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 200 – 01.

[16] See J.M. Scott, 'Paul's Use of Deuteronomic Tradition', *JBL* 112 (1993): 657 – 59; idem, '"For as Many as Are of Works of the Law are Under a Curse" (Galatians 3:10) ', in *Paul and the Scriptures of Israel* (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; JSNTSup 83; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993), 195; N.T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 137 – 56; R.B. Hays, *The Letter to the Galatians* (NIB XI; Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 258–59; Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 405 – 06, n. 39.

[17] R.B. Hays, *Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul* (New Haven: YUP, 1989), 108; Dunn, *Theology of Galatians*, 95.

[18] F. Watson, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith* (2nd ed.; London: T&T Clark, 2015),394 – 96

[19] See, e.g., R.H. Gundry, 'Grace, Works, and Staying Saved in Paul', *Bib* 66 (1985): 1 – 38; T.R. Schreiner, 'Paul and Perfect Obedience to the Law: An Evaluation of the View of E.P. Sanders', *WTJ* 47 (1985): 245 – 78; G.P. Waters, *The End of Deuteronomy in the Epistles of Paul* (WUNT II 221; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006), 93 – 100.

the law confining and confined to a 'dead' existence by divine design in view of the life-giving and life-ordering Christ-gift. Moreover, we showed that the hermeneutic by which Paul sees the stability of divine saving action in history is 'death' and 'resurrection' shaped: just as God brings forth children from the barren Sarah, so does the Jerusalem above bring forth heirs from the barren conditions of the present evil age in the Christ-gift by the Spirit. In the context of our debate with *4 Ezra,* this result showed why one cannot assume that justice and mercy are in a necessarily antithetical opposition in either Galatians or *4 Ezra*, but rather the question is one of construal: Paul construes justice as mercy-shaped, gift to the unworthy within history, while *4 Ezra* construes mercy as justice-shaped, gift to the worthy beyond history.[20] Moreover, we showed that it is their differing accounts of divine life-giving benefaction that explain these differences.

5. The Theological Function of Gal 3 – 4

   Thus, the result of our overall reading was a clarification of the theological function of Paul's argument in Gal 3:1 – 22—viz., he shows why the Christ-gift and *necessarily* not the law is life-giving. In this way, we demonstrated a key point from our introduction: since Sanders 'dogmatic' reading of Paul's antithetical theological logic, scholars have generally failed to ask what Paul might mean in Gal 3:21 by implying that the law is given to the 'dead', to people in need of being 'made alive' (ζῳοποιέω). In this connection, we showed that, though the arguments of Gathercole and Sprinkle regarding the soteriological thrust of Paul's reading of 'life' texts are persuasive, generally, they are of limited utility as accounts of Paul's theological logic.[21] Specifically, Sprinkle's account of that logic in terms of a general antithesis between divine and human agency fails because it does not take into account or explain why

[20] Thus, *pace* Watson, one cannot conclude that Ezra's change of view amounts to a repudiation of his 'former belief in the covenant with Israel and in the saving power of the divine mercy'; Watson, *Hermeneutics*, 464, n. 45.

[21] S.J. Gathercole, 'Torah, Life, and Salvation', in *From Prophecy to Testament: The Function of the Old Testament in the New* (ed. C.A. Evans and J.A. Sanders; Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), 131–50; P.M. Sprinkle, *Law and Life: the Interpretation of Leviticus 18:5 in Early Judaism and in Paul* (WUNT II 241; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).

Paul should prefer divine creative agency in the Christ-event and *not* at creation (as in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*).[22] Relatedly, we showed how Gal 3:23 – 4:31 serves not a merely rhetorical but a theological function[23]—viz., it shows why the law cannot order the life of the eschatological community. Thus, *contra* Sprinkle the law is not excluded from the eschatological order of life either because it is a 'merely human way of appropriating eschatological life' or simply because that life must be 'created by divine action, the revelation of Christ in Paul', but rather because, *by divine design*, the law itself confines and is *itself* confined to the morally 'dead' estate of humanity.[24] Relatedly, though Paul's reading of 'life' texts in Gal 3 – 4 does have a soteriological and, specifically, creative thrust, the 'social' or 'regulative' readings of Wright, Dunn, and Wakefield are not altogether misguided.[25] Paul is concerned to address how the Christ-gift orders the self and social life, just not *at this point in the argument*: in Gal 3 – 4 he is producing an argument for why *the law cannot* provide that order. Finally, we showed that Paul's reading of the Pentateuch via an interpretation of Genesis 16 – 21 is neither an 'afterthought'[26] nor an occasion for 'offensive and heretical' statements that amount to 'hermeneutical jujitsu',[27] but the display of the lens through which one might see the donation of the promise, the addition of the Torah, and the Christ-event as expressing one singular saving purpose. That lens is *creative* and *Christomorphic*, as Paul sees prefigured in the births of Isaac and Ishmael two manners of birth—one according to 'natural' human means (κατὰ σάρκα)

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[22] The same is true of the explanation of Watson, on whom Sprinkle is dependent; F. Watson, 'Constructing an Antithesis: Pauline and Other Jewish Perspectives on Divine and Human Agency', in *Divine and Human Agency in Paul and his Cultural Environment* (ed. S.J. Gathercole and J.M.G. Barclay; LNTS 335; London: T&T Clark, 2006), 116.

[23] Cf. the interpretation of Paul's identification of Jewish with pagan calendrical practices as merely rhetorical in M.C. de Boer, 'The Meaning of the Phrase τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου in Galatians', *NTS* 53 (2007): 222 – 24.

[24] Sprinkle, *Law and Life,* 155 – 56.

[25] A 'social' or 'regulative' interpretation of Paul's reading of of Lev 18:5 was first introduced in G. Howard, 'Christ the End of the Law: the Meaning of Rom 10:4ff', *JBL* 88 (1969): 331 – 37. See, e.g., J.D.G. Dunn, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians* (BNTC; London: A&C Black, 1993), 174 – 75; idem, *Theology of Paul*, 152 – 53; Wright, *Climax*, 149; and A.H. Wakefield, *Where to Live: The Hermeneutical Significance of Paul's Citations from Scripture in Galatians 3:1 – 14* (AcBib 14; Atlanta: SBL, 2003), 131 – 88.

[26] Dunn, *Theology of Galatians*, 124.

[27] Hays, *Echoes*, 112, 115.

and, thus, confined to slavery and death, and one by the miraculous power of the Spirit and thus eschatologically free (κατὰ πνεῦμα, 4:29).

In summary, with these results, we clarified Paul's theological logic in Galatians by showing how his reading of sacred text and salvation-history represents not an appeal to the Christ-event, Spirit experience, sacred text, or even the character of the Christ-gift as gift to the unworthy, as the models we surveyed assume, but an argument for the necessarily integral yet antithetical relation between the Christ-gift and the law. Moreover, this result initiated our final chapter, in which we addressed: 1) why, ultimately, and it what sense Paul considers humanity 'dead'; and 2) how the Christ-gift orders the self and community in positive terms.

In chapter five, through exegetical dialogue primarily with 4 Maccabees, we brought our study of divine life-giving benefaction to a close in the context of scholarly debates over the thematic coherence and theological logic of Galatians.[28]

6. Clarifying the Thematic Relation between Gal 4 and 5

   Our initial argument of chapter five showed that, whereas interpreters take Paul's term ἐλευθερία in Gal 5:1 to mean freedom either from the Torah per se[29] or freedom from the στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου (Gal 4:3, 9),[30] it is the relation between the Torah and the cosmic elements that informs Paul's usage. By ἐλευθερία he means freedom from entropic existence in the form of commitment to the Torah, a concept which serves as the thematic bridge from Gal 4:21 – 31 to Gal 5. Thus, we began our own development of Engberg-Pedersen's insight about the logical and thematic relation between Gal 4 and 5.[31]

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[28] Cf. the overview of dogmatic, rhetorical, and historical models in S. Schewe, *Die Galater zurückgewinnen: paulinische Strategien in Galater 5 und 6* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 16 – 59. Though focused on explaining the rationale for Paul's references to the law in Gal 5:13 – 6:10, see also the overview of approaches in Wilson, *Curse of the Law*, 1–4.

[29] M.C. de Boer, *Galatians: A Commentary* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2011), 311.

[30] Coppins, *Freedom*, 114–15.

[31] T. Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2000), 133 – 34: 'the two triads of law, flesh and slavery [Gal 4:21 – 31] versus Christ, faith, spirit and freedom [Gal 5:13 – 26] will be developed *with regard to their internal, logical connection* in the 'paranetic' section. In

7. Explicating the Apologetic Character and Logical Form of Gal 5

   Next, by attending to the formal structure of Paul's argument in conversation with 4 Maccabees, we demonstrated the apologetic character and clarified the logical form of the argument in Gal 5. In this way, way we developed the argument of Barclay, neglected by scholars, that Paul is involved in an apologetic 'bridge-building' exercise.[32] Both authors make arguments that progress from *a posteriori* to *a fortiori*: but, whereas 4 Maccabees argues that only Torah-piety inculcates Hellenistic virtue, Paul argues that only Christ-piety fulfils Torah-virtue. This result invited an analysis of the material ground of 4 Maccabees' and Galatians' formal differences, which led to one of the most significnant contributions of the chapter and the thesis.

8. Gal 5:13 – 26 as Material Ground of Paul's Theological Logic

   Ultimately, we showed, then, that Gal 5:13 – 26 represents not merely persuasive rhetoric,[33] not a contingent address to Galatian circumstances *simpliciter*,[34] and not even an elaboration of Paul's theology,[35] but rather the ground of his theological logic. That is, Paul presents there his inchoate theory of new and newly-ordered human agents vis-à-vis an existence ὑπὸ νόμον (Gal 5:18) that is enslaved to the evil passions and desires characteristic of fallen humanity. With this result, we resolved the debate between Engberg-Pedersen and Martyn over the character of Paul's virtue ethics, showing that Paul is indeed engaged in virtue-ethics (with Engberg-Pedersen) and that he decisively modifies anthropological conceptions of the Stoic kind employed in 4 Maccabees (with Martyn).[36] Moreover, we showed that this conception of

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addition to providing exhortation of the Galatians, which it does do, that section also spells out *exactly how* it makes sense to connect the three items in either triad.'

[32] J.M.G. Barclay, *Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul's Ethics in Galatians* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 124 – 25.

[33] See, e.g., G.A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation Through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1984), 144–52; Tolmie, *Persuading the Galatians*, 189–203.

[34] See, e.g., Barclay, *Obeying the Truth.*

[35] See, e.g., Engberg-Pedersen, *Paul and the Stoics*, 131 – 77 and Barclay, *Paul and the Gift*, 423 – 41.

[36] Cf. Martyn, *Galatians*; idem, 'De-apocalypticizing Paul: An Essay Focused on Paul and the Stoics by Troels Engberg-Pedersen" *JSNT* 86 (2002); Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*; idem, "Response to Martyn," *JSNT* 86 (2002): 103–14.

new and newly-ordered agents vis-à-vis an existence ὑπὸ νόμον is the theological ground of Gal 1 – 4, because it explains why in Gal 1 – 2 that, though a committed Jew, Paul considered himself *in need* of the reconstitution and reordering of his agency in the Christ-event; and it explains why in Gal 3 – 4 Paul *assumed* that those in receipt of the law are 'dead' and imprisoned along with the rest of the cosmos (including the law) ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν (Gal 3:22).

9. The Theological Logic and Thematic Coherence of Galatians

The preceding results, and especially those of chapter five, are significant both because they show that Paul's theological logic throughout the letter is grounded in his theological anthropology and because they expose the deep thematic coherence of Galatians—both longstanding puzzles in the study of this letter.[37] It is Paul's conception of the Christ-gift in life-giving and life-ordering terms vis-à-vis the Torah as a death-dealing reality that grounds the antithetical theological logic of his argument. It is this conception and the 'resurrection' hermeneutic that it produces that is conveyed in the life and death language that arises at critical junctures in Paul's argument (Gal 2:18 – 21; 3:10 – 14, 21 – 22; 4:21 – 31; 5:24, 25; 6:8, 14, 15) and provides the thematic coherence of the letter.

10. The Function of Paul's 'Ethics' (Gal 5 – 6) in Galatians

Finally, we demonstrated that the function of Gal 6:1 – 10, given Paul's argument against Torah-piety, is necessary for the theological completeness of his apologetic argument. In other words, though his instruction is fitted to the situation in Galatia rhetorically and historically, it moves beyond these to a general, positive account of Christ-piety. Thus, we supported and nuanced the 'paradigmatic' interpretations of Gal 6:2 of Hays and Horrell, by showing

[37] As we observed in chapter four, attention to the problem of Paul's theological logic goes at least as far back as Luther's commentary on Gal 3:10. For an overview of the problem of thematic coherence in relation to Gal 5:13 – 6:10, which became of a focus of scholarly concern in the early twentieth century, see Barclay, *Obeying*, 9 – 26.

how and why Paul positively relates Christ to the Torah.[38] In this connection, we showed specifically that Paul's appeal to Christ as paradigm through the phrase ὁ νόμος τοῦ Χριστοῦ in Gal 6:2 encapsulates his apologetic bridge-building activity from the Christ-gift back to the Torah, while Gal 6:3 – 10 presents the positive significance of this for the self and community. In other words, we showed not simply *that*, in Horrell's terms, the Christ-gift is a metanorm but *why* Paul was compelled to offer *this* metanorm for the sake of his argument. It serves an apologetic *and* theological purpose. Thus, with this interpretation of Gal 5 – 6, we supplied a longstanding *desideratum* by showing precisely how Paul's 'ethical' section is related to and, recognised more recently,[39] serves as the climax of the letter. Though fitted to the historical situation of the Galatians and rhetorically shaped, Gal 6:1 – 10 is necessary because it provides Paul's positive account of how the Christ-gift orders the self and the church in deep continuity with the aim of the Torah (i.e., love), while Gal 5:13 – 26 shows why this ordering is *necessary*.

In summary, with the above results, we both confirmed and went beyond Barclay's recent reconsideration of gift in Galatians, while resolving a number of exegetical and interpretive puzzles. In Galatians, the Christ-gift is unconditioned and incongruous, but Paul is not appealing to this reality but arguing for its necessity and its necessary indifference to Torah-piety as the norm of church life. Moreover, with respect to the studies of Linebaugh and McFarland, our thesis shows how their tracing of the differing construals of definitive divine gift-giving exegetically to cosmological conceptions, for Wisdom and Philo, and Christological conceptions, in Romans and Paul, generally, might suggest not simply incommensurable theological conceptions but common ground for debate.[40] For, with respect to Galatians, we showed that Paul's account of the Christ-gift in life-giving and life-ordering terms amounts to a denial of a cosmological and Torah-

[38] R.B. Hays, "Christology and Ethics in Galatians: the Law of Christ," *CBQ* 49 (1987): 268–90; D.G. Horrell, *Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul's Ethics* (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 221 – 31.

[39] See, e.g., F.J. Matera, "The Culmination of Paul's Argument to the Galatians: Gal. 5.1-6.17," *JSNT* 32 (1988): 79–91; Engberg-Pedersen, *Stoics*, 136; M. Konradt, 'Die Christonomie der Freiheit: Zu Paulus' Enfaltung seines ethischen Ansatzes in Gal 5,13 – 6,10', *EC* 1 (2010): 60 – 81.

[40] Linebaugh, *God, Grace, and Righteousness*; O. McFarland, *God and Grace in Philo and Paul*.

ordered created anthropology for 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra. Further, we showed that, in order to give an adequate account of the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians, it is not enough to recognise the unconditioned or incongruous character of the Christ-gift. For Paul's opponents recognised this particular aspect of divine beneficence themselves but did not make the same inference as Paul with respect to the Torah. Thus, by attending to Paul's conception of the Christ-gift as life-giving and life-ordering, we have answered a series of why questions that disclose the inferential logic of necessity in Paul's antithesis between the Torah and the order of life in the church. Put concisely, if Christ, then not Torah, because the works of the Torah confine humanity and are confined to a 'dead' existence, out of which the Christ-gift creates and orders new selves for a newly-ordered community by the Spirit in fufilment of the Torah's deep aim of love.

Results for Paul and Judaism

By comparing Galatians, 4 Maccabees, and 4 Ezra on God as life-giver and life as divine gift, this thesis has contributed both to the ongoing reevaluation of Paul's theological relation to Jewish authors of antiquity and to the debate over the theological logic and thematic coherence of Galatians. Though they differ on the status and prospects of the Jewish nation and the cosmos, 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra both consider God's fundamental gift to be the irrevocable donation of Torah-ordered life to humanity at creation, while, by contrast, Paul sees Jesus' death and resurrection as the divine gift of the reconstitution and reordering of human life within history by the Spirit. Consequently, two features of post-Sanders scholarship are modified such that a new consideration of Paul's antithetical theological logic in Galatians is possible. Firstly, though neither 4 Maccabees nor even *4 Ezra* fit within the dominant pre-Sanders framework of 'legalistic works righteousness', neither text's view of divine grace is identical to Paul's. In fact, Paul's Christological and pneumatological conception of God's life-giving activity is not only at odds with the creational and Torah-ordered conceptions of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra but, in light of them, raises grave theological questions regarding creation, salvation-history, the Torah, and, ultimately, the identity of God.

Through identifying and analysing these questions, a second problem of post-Sanders scholarship has been addressed in this study. As we saw in the introduction, Sanders' comparison of Paul to Judaism as religions of univocal grace necessitated a search for a new understanding of the quarrel between Paul and his opponents over the law. Moreover, it was the perceived inadequacy of Sanders' own 'dogmatic' account that gave rise to the regnant view of those associated with the 'New Perspective' that Paul was not opposing Judaism per se but a form of Judaism dominated by nationalism. As this thesis has demonstrated, neither view gets at the logic of necessity by which Paul's argument operates and which 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* would want explained. This is so in part because both views pay insufficient attention (from the perspective of our texts) to the integral relation between anthropology and community, self and society, and thus occlude important features of these texts. Thus, even though *4 Ezra* redefines Zion qua the righteous and envisions her true flourishing only at the eschaton, an argument for the necessary decline of the historical nation must be proffered (i.e., the world-as-womb metaphor) in order to explain the misfit between the possibility of individual Torah-righteousness and the inevitability of national (and cosmic) decline and death. Yet, in both 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* the irrevocable donation of Torah-ordered human agency is the very precondition of national reconstitution within history (4 Maccabees) and national resurrection beyond history (*4 Ezra*).

For these authors, then, a Pauline attack on Jewish 'nationalism' is simultaneously an attack on Torah-ordered creational anthropology. Though advocates of the New Perspective rightly insist on the radically inclusive nature of Paul's gospel and social practice, they wrongly neglect analysing the Pauline theological anthropology that insists that both Jew and Gentile are *dead*—subject to the Torah's curse that encloses *all things* under Sin. Likewise, Sanders' 'dogmatic' construal (and other views that are materially similar to it) is unsatisfying because it begs the key question. What is at issue in Galatia is not the antithesis between the Christ-event and the Torah *but why the antithesis is necessary*. It will not do simply to appeal to the Christ-event itself (even its character as gift to the unworthy), the experience of the Spirit, Israel's historic failure to obey the law, or Paul's reading of Deuteronomy to explain the antithesis, for Paul and his opponents were readers of

scripture, recipients of the Christ-gift, and had experienced the Spirit. That is, since Sanders' influential interpretation of Gal 3:21, most scholars fail to ask and answer the vital questions: even if the law is not intended to make-alive, on Paul's view, what does it mean that the recipients of the Torah are *'dead'*?; and why once 'made-alive', is the Torah *necessarily* inadequate for providing the order of church life? As we argued in section two of this thesis, Paul's account of divine benefaction is at odds with those of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, but their theological grammars are not utterly alien. They each view God as life-giver and death-dealer (cf. Dt 32:39). Paul simply denies the core theological axiom of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra: life is not irrevocably given as Torah-ordered and inviolably free at creation. Rather, for Paul, the Torah-piety is both itself the instrument by which God confirms and encloses humanity in its enslavement to evil desires and passions and, thereby, itself confined to that 'dead' existence. Yet, God deploys the Torah's cursing word precisely in preparation for the divine bestowal of eschatological life in Jesus' death and resurrection. The law serves the singular gospel, for Paul, by confirming a singular 'dead' humanity from which eschatological life is created and ordered in Christ by the Spirit for those who believe. Moreover, this new and newly-ordered humanity in the Christ-gift is in deep harmony with the aim of the Torah—viz., as the source and quintessential expression of love disclosed in 'the law of Christ' (Gal 6:2).

Instead of beginning with the general issue of Paul's relation to Judaism, this thesis has asked how the particular conceptions of God's divine life-giving benefaction in 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra* might expose the buried assumptions of Paul's theology in Galatians. As we have seen, the needed clarifications revolved around Paul's assumption that the recipients of the law are 'dead' and that the law itself is confined to this estate. In this connection, despite the important cosmological and sociological differences between 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra, these texts shared an axiomatic theological commitment to the belief that God endowed human life as inviolably free and irrevocably Torah-ordered from creation. Thus, in opposing their Torah-reckoned conceptions of human and social worth, Paul would not be opposing their commitment to divine grace *per se* but rather their particular construal of it as creational, Torah-ordered, and endowing human agents with freedom. Likewise, the authors of 4 Maccabees and *4 Ezra*, in opposing Paul's

conception of new and newly-ordered agents and community in the Christ-gift, would not be opposing the idea that human worth depends ultimately on a divine creative and ordering act, but rather they would deny Paul's radically pessimistic anthropology and his concomitant reading of the donation of the Torah as confined to and integral to *fallen* created order.

Paul and the authors of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra not only believed that God is a giver, but they believed that God gives life and deals death. An analysis that stops, however, only at this most general level risks not only a fundamental misunderstanding of what grace means in these texts, but also occluding the radical nature of Paul's antithetical argument in Galatians. Because Paul sees in the Christ-gift the creation of new agents for a new community, the practices of the Torah cannot be identified with the created or eschatological order but are by divine design integral to the moral slavery of humanity in the present evil age. Given such an inversion of their carefully articulated and fully argued views of the Torah-ordered creation, self, and society, there is no doubt that the authors of 4 Maccabees and 4 Ezra would respond with force and precision. It is the argumentative, theological, and hermeneutical force of Paul's conception of the Christ-gift and the Spirit that this study has sought to understand in imagining those responses.

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