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Hizbullah's Struggle for Symbolic Power:

Creating and Reproducing the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon

Caelum Robert Maguire Moffatt

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

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Abstract

This thesis presents an alternative conceptual framework with which to examine the emergence and evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. The proliferation of Islamist movements in the Middle East has stimulated scholarly inquiry that seeks to identify and explain episodes of collective action in Muslim societies. Addressing the phenomenon of mobilisation from the respective perspectives of Islamic studies, Area studies or social movement theory (SMT), pre-existing literature remains predominantly characterised by intra-disciplinary dualisms and limited inter-disciplinary engagement. In this context, not only is there a deficiency of consistency concerning the relative influence of agency/structure and culture/ideology in collective action, but Hizbullah, arguably the most effective manifestation of movement mobilisation in the Middle East, is also conceptually under-explored. This research aims to transform these prevailing dichotomies into permanent dialectics by adopting the epistemological and methodological insights developed in Pierre Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice' as conceptual interlocutors to problematise conventional assumptions in traditional Islamic studies and SMT, to propose a revised Bourdieu-SMT approach for illustrating collective action and to prioritise the application of this holistic lens for assessing the multi-faceted dimensions of Hizbullah's advancement in Lebanon. Equipped with these analytical tools, this thesis intends to initiate and contribute to an inter-disciplinary discussion on collective action by arguing that a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation can assist in explaining the mutually constituted process by which Hizbullah strategically inculcates dispositions and perceptions amongst agents within the parameters of specific fields in Lebanon while concurrently propagating cohesive discourses and practices with the objective of managing the harmonisation of its relational positions across fields that are inherently constituted by differentiated logics. Embedded within a system that internally mitigates against the exclusive exercise of symbolic power, Hizbullah is entrenched in a tautological struggle for opportunities that enable it to balance and enhance the legitimate status of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.

Cover page contains a graphic commemorating the 2013 anniversary of Hizbullah's 'Three Leading Martyrs'. The image shows Imad Mugniyeh (d. 2008), Shaykh Abbas Moussawi (d. 1992) and Shaykh Ragheb Harb (d. 1984) with the phrase 'On the Road to Palestine' symbolically sprawled in blood at the bottom (picture obtained from Hizbullah's *Al-Moqawama* website).

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Declaration

I hereby declare that the research and subsequent content of this thesis were conducted, compiled and composed solely by the author, Caelum Moffatt. The material contained within this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree at Durham University or any other institution. All information or contributions have been clearly referenced.

Statement of Copyright

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without the author's prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged.

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This thesis has been a challenging project spanning two years of full-time study and almost three years of part-time study. If there are any inaccuracies or inconsistencies, I would implore the reader to ignore what follows below and attribute blame for these unintentional foibles emphatically in the author's direction. Otherwise, over this five year period, the completion of this work would not have been possible without the invaluable insights, guidance and support of a number of people.

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Note on Transliteration

While acknowledging other transliterations, such as Hezbollah, Hizballah, Hizb ‘Allah, Hizbollah and Hizbu’llah, this thesis has applied the spelling Hizbullah as outlined in the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies’ Word List. Accordingly, existing and accepted English translations are adopted for Arabic individuals, locations and terms. In specific instances, transliterations included in the text reflect their original usage in work attributed to the cited or referenced author.

List of Key Abbreviations

AMAL	Afwaj al-Moqawama al-Lubnaniyya or the Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance
AUB	American University Beirut
CAF	Collective Action Frames
CCSD	Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
FIP	Field of International Politics
FPM	Free Patriotic Movement
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSD	General Security Directorate
HISC	High Islamic Shi'i Council
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IJO	Islamic Jihad Organisation
ISF	Internal Security Forces
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria
JTDI	Jam'iyyat al-ta'lim al-dini al-Islami or the Islamic Religious Education Association
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LCP	Lebanese Communist Party
LF	Lebanese Forces
LNM	Lebanese National Movement
LNR	Lebanese National Resistance
LRB	Lebanese Resistance Brigades
MER	Middle East Reporter
MSF	Military-Security Field
NSM	New Social Movements
OCAL	Organisation of Communist Action in Lebanon
OF	Organisational Field
PF	Political Field
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
POS	Political Opportunity Structures
PPM	Political Process Model
PPT	Political Process Theory
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party
RMT	Resource Mobilisation Theory
SAA	Syrian Arab Army
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SLA	South Lebanon Army
SMF	Social Mobilisational Field
SMI	Social Movement Industry
SMO	Social Movement Organisation
SMS	Social Movement Sector
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SSNP	Syrian National Socialist Party
STL	Special Tribunal for Lebanon
SVIED	Suicide Vest Improvised Explosive Device
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
VBIED	Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

Glossary of Selected Bourdieusian Terms

Allodoxia	The misjudgement, misinterpretation or misperception of an agent(s) practice by falsely construing its (their) position within the structured parameters of legitimate action.
Collusio	A group of agents converging towards collective dispositions and perceptions based on position and practice.
Cultural Capital	A *field* resource for accumulation and deployment derived from intellectual and educational qualifications as well as encompassing recognised knowledge, experience and charisma.
Doxa	The inherent law(s) historically enshrined and institutionalised within the construction, constitution and logic of a *field*.
Economic Capital	A *field* resource for accumulation and deployment derived from quantifiable, material and tangible commodities of exchange.
Field	The dynamic, semi-autonomous network or configuration of objective relations between positions that provides the structured rules, principles and characteristics for legitimate practice.
Field Homology	The relational correlation of characteristics, compositions and commonalities that enable the 'horizontal' conversion and transference of *capital* from one *field* to another.
Habitus	An inscribed system of durable dispositions and perceptions that functions as a symbolic template in generating or regulating the practical activities of social agents within a *field*.
Heterodoxy	The predilection and purpose of an agent(s) to enhance their position from the dominated sectors of the *field*, revise the underlying principles of *doxa* and promote alternative interpretations of legitimate practice.
Hysteresis	A disruptive event that causes a structural lag or rupture whereby the perceptions and dispositions of agents become separated from the underlying structured rules and dynamics of the *field*.
Illusio	A prerequisite investment by each agent that encompasses a fundamental and inherent belief in the interest, value and stakes of participating in a *field*.
Orthodoxy	The predilection and purpose of an agent(s) to preserve or enhance their position within the dominant sector of the *field* by propagating legitimate practice within the parameters of the prevailing *doxa*.

Social Capital	A *field* resource for accumulation and deployment representing an agent's or group's access to formal or informal social relationships, networks, institutions, organisations, associations or partnerships.
Symbolic Capital	A *field* resource for accumulation and deployment whereby an agent's or group's pre-existing currencies of economic, cultural and social *capital* are intangibly recognised as legitimate in exercising influence and authority over practice.
Symbolic Power	A status in which an agent's or a group's values of *capital* are elevated to the extent of exerting and commanding exclusive, unilateral and unequivocal control over legitimate discourses and practices within a *field*.

'…And we, Hizbullah…grew up in the Resistance project. We were small boys and youth. On this path we matured and grew up and we were nurtured and developed on the confrontation with the Israeli enemy and the defence of this ummah, the defence of Palestine, Jerusalem and its sanctities, and the defence of Lebanon and its people, its dignity and sovereignty. It is an issue which became mixed with our flesh, blood and veins, and we inherited it from our fathers and grandfathers, and we passed it down to our children and our grandchildren, and on this path we offered thousands of martyrs, and the finest of martyrs, from Sayyid Abbas [Moussawi], to Shaykh Ragheb [Harb], to Hajj Imad [Mugniyeh]. We offered our dear ones as martyrs, and for this reason, I conclude on Quds Day by telling the whole world: We, Hizbullah, will also hold our responsibilities to the extent that we have responsibilities, and we, Hizbullah, the Islamic, Shi'i, Imamate, Twelver Party, we will never abandon Palestine, we will never abandon Jerusalem, we will never abandon the Palestinian people, we will never abandon the sanctities of this ummah. May God have mercy on our Imam Khomeini, may God grant you all victory, and peace be upon you and His mercy and blessings…

- Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary General of Hizbullah, on Al-Quds Day in Beirut, 2 August 2013.

Introduction

Hizbullah in Lebanon

'If I were Iran – a crazed fanatic, I'd say let's get a little fissile material to Hezbollah, have them carry it to Chicago, and then if anything goes wrong, or America starts acting up, we'll just say, "Guess what? Unless you stand down, why, we're going to let off a dirty bomb"'.

- *Mitt Romney, former Republican Presidential nominee, September 2012.*

In Evelyn Waugh's *Decline and Fall* (1973: 208-209), Otto Silenus presumes to have solved the meaning of life. Explaining his epiphany by juxtaposing himself to Paul Pennyfeather, the novel's protagonist, Silenus compares life to a rapidly rotating wheel. Akin to the heart of a tornado, tranquillity from the chaos of the storm awaits those who reach its core. Once aspiring actors have propelled themselves onto the wheel, the objective is to conjure and expend the energy required to reach the centre. However, not everyone has the capability to embark upon this exercise. Depending on one's inscribed dispositions, 'some just enjoy scrambling on and off; others cling on by dear life' while a fraction decide not to participate at all. Revealingly, 'people get hold of ideas about life, and that makes them think they've got to join in the game, even if they don't enjoy it'. In sum, Silenus concludes that the real distinction in life is the stratification between people who are static and those who are dynamic.

This thesis aims to conceptualise the complexity of this evolutionary transition through the lens of social movements. By examining the relational practices behind the inception and mobilisation of prospective change, the objective is to assess how organised eruptions of collective action manage the consistency of their narrative and position while concurrently adapting to mitigate against endogenous and exogenous threats. In this context, where the dynamic fervour of innovative heterodoxy is subsumed by the static allure of generative orthodoxy, the ultimate question becomes whether progress has been achieved. As George Orwell remarked: 'to exchange one orthodoxy for another is not necessarily an advance. The enemy is the gramophone mind, whether or not one agrees with the record that is being played at the moment' (Davison, 2001: 313).

In order to investigate these theoretical questions, this thesis will examine the sustained ascension of arguably the most influential exemplar of collective action in the Middle East. Hizbullah, or the 'Party of God', initially emerged in 1982 on the

peripheries of the Lebanese civil war as the progeny of the Iranian Revolution, conceived to conduct the 'Islamic Resistance' against Israeli occupation. By its own admission, Hizbullah's meteoric rise has become reminiscent of 'the volcano that exploded' (Jorisch, 2004: 75, 83). From a U.S. perspective, this 'volcano' was responsible for the targeting of Western citizens and military targets during the Lebanese civil war. Therefore, Hizbullah is categorised as a 'terrorist organisation', a proxy of Iran intent on the destruction of Israel and committed to undermining U.S. interests. As exemplified by Mitt Romney's statement, and citing Hizbullah's military involvement in the Syrian uprising, its ostensible links to drug trafficking in South America, its purported illegal fundraising schemes in North America and the alleged role of its Islamic Resistance in the assassination of Jewish citizens and Israeli officials from Bulgaria to Thailand, this linear, and largely decontextualised correlation of causation continues to portray Hizbullah in international public discourse as an Iranian strategic asset rather than a legitimate Lebanese actor.

Consequently, employing an Aristotelian logic of analysis, the origin, form, matter and purpose of Hizbullah becomes reduced to the simplicity of immutability. Meanwhile, although the majority of states within the European Union justify their indirect diplomatic engagement with Hizbullah by differentiating between its political representatives within Lebanese state institutions and the Islamic Resistance, this separation misconstrues the relational homology of Hizbullah's mutually constituted parts. As frequently reiterated by Hizbullah's *al-majlis al-shura* ('advisory council'), there is no distinction between the elements of its Resistance. Previously, while claiming responsibility for suicide bombings, kidnappings and military operations against Israeli soldiers in the vicinity of Lebanon, Hizbullah has adamantly denied participating in international 'terrorist' activities. Either the leadership is disingenuous by clandestinely managing an international organ within the Islamic Resistance that risks destabilising its interests in Lebanon or the leadership is authentic in its declarations, a position that challenges the myth of Hizbullah's monolithic dominance by insinuating the existence of another intricate dimension to the already multi-layered relationship between the Shi'i in Iran and Lebanon. While this thesis will not delve into speculation by attempting to reconcile Hizbullah's domestic and international practices, this preliminary discussion, which serves to emphasise idiosyncrasies in the predominant perception of Hizbullah in the West, provides an insight into the complexity of the Party that reverts the epistemological priority of explaining the Resistance back to its roots in Lebanon.

Hizbullah did not emerge or evolve in a vacuum but it has been cultivated and consolidated within the dynamics of Lebanon. As an organisation, Hizbullah is involved in a diverse multitude of simultaneous activities. Hizbullah not only presides over a sophisticated network of social services specialising in construction, education and healthcare, but it also offers welfare programmes investing in career development initiatives that empower the Shi'i community. Next to the state, Hizbullah is the biggest employer in Lebanon, supporting an estimated 35,000 families with salaries, a statistic that has earned it the reputation of attempting to establish a 'state within a state' (Sharara, 2006). Furthermore, Hizbullah has a growing portfolio in private ventures, such as urban planning, real estate, local commerce as well as the leisure and entertainment sectors.

Concurrently, through the Jihad Council of the *majlis al-shura*, Hizbullah commands the Islamic Resistance, a military unit that has become a source of pride within and beyond the Shi'i community in Lebanon. Due to its successful military campaigns against Israel, a reputation that has only been enhanced through its support of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, even Israeli Brigadier General Guy Zur recognised that Hizbullah is 'the greatest guerrilla group in the world' (Hirst, 2010: 350). As a result of this social and military Resistance, Hizbullah's Loyalty to Resistance Bloc figures as one of the largest political forces in the 128-member, democratically elected Lebanese parliament while the Party of God is also the figurehead of the Shi'i/Christian 8 March Alliance. These representatives, donning suits as opposed to traditional Shi'i attire, are mostly educated and conversant in Western languages and philosophy.

Principally, in Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah boasts a charismatic leader venerated by his supporters and respected by his adversaries. For the people who listen abidingly to his speeches and pledge unwavering allegiance to 'Al-Sayyid', Nasrallah is the embodiment of inspiration whose integrity and fortitude evoke the virtues of the Twelve infallible Shi'i Imams. Rather than relying on the limitations of a unified frame, Hizbullah deploys a myriad of positions, the cohesion of which is delicately welded together through a holistic combination of Shi'i activism, Lebanese particularism, Arab Nationalism, Islamic universalism, anti-Zionism and anti-Imperialism. *Al-Manar* ('the Lighthouse'), Hizbullah's primary media organ for disseminating its Resistance narrative, is not only one of the most watched news channels in the Arab World, but the broadcaster also sponsors *Al-'Ahd*, a Beirut-based football team.

These encompassing practices have exceeded conventional mobilisation classifications. As a result of its existence in a variety of operational spheres and the diversification of its discursive frames, Hizbullah symbolises a community-based activist association, an Islamist group, a social movement, a non-governmental organisation, a humanitarian provider, a non-state actor, a political party, a Shi'i militia, a national Resistance Army and a regional 'axis' alliance member. The combination of Hizbullah's multi-dimensional approach, as well as its highly disciplined disposition, has contributed to contradictory conclusions regarding its domestic and regional strategies. This seemingly ambiguous posturing, which is intentionally propagated by Hizbullah, allows the organisation to occupy a flexible space from which it can pre-emptively position itself to conceal, contain or confront perceived threats. While Hizbullah may harbour aspirations for symbolic *power*, a status in which its practices and discourses are unilaterally and unequivocally recognised as legitimate, the historical composition of Lebanon's convoluted and competitive structures prohibits the pursuit of this agenda. Therefore, Hizbullah must interpret power through the lens of preserving its authoritative placement and presence within the Shi'i community.

The exponential proliferation of literature in English on Hizbullah has accelerated in direct correlation to the movement's enhanced public profile in Lebanon. Initially, considering the relatively secretive inception and mobilisation of Hizbullah on the peripheries of a protracted civil war, as well as the scant resources available for accessing information on the subject, attempts to describe or explain the Hizbullah phenomenon amongst the Shi'i community in the 1980s were limited to scholarly articles that sought to place Hizbullah within the context of Lebanon. As epitomised by Shapira (1988), Deeb (1988), Piscatori (1989) and As'ad (1991), these preliminary explorations into Hizbullah briefly examined the root causes of the movement's manifestation in Lebanon, the ideological precepts guiding the underlying tenets of the Islamic Resistance, the internal composition, structure and dynamics of the movement, the influence of regional interests on its conception and nascent examples of the endeavours by Hizbullah to reconcile the principles of the Islamic Resistance with its practice in Lebanon.

Following the end of a 15-year civil war, Lebanon experienced a period of diminished attention as the tumultuous epoch of prolonged conflict transformed into a phase of consensus politics and state rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the politicisation of

Hizbullah in 1992 created three separate yet inter-related trends in the development of the canon on the Islamic Resistance. Firstly, academics such as Hamzeh (1993), Norton (1998; 1999) and Ranstorp (1998) steered their analysis away from Hizbullah's alleged activities during the civil war to concentrate on contemporary issues in producing journal articles assessing the motivations and challenges confronted by the movement in managing the 'Lebanonisation' process, namely the balanced transition between ideological dispositions and political pragmatism. Secondly, as demonstrated by the work of Harik (1994; 1996), researchers also strived to discover the scale, scope and substance of Hizbullah's popular support within the Shi'i community through the lens of its extensive and expansive provision of social services. Thirdly, scholars including Picard (1993), Kramer (1993), Wege (1994) and Hamzeh (1997) utilised the opportunity presented by Hizbullah's post-civil war sustainability and survival in Lebanon to revisit and expose the ideological origins, organisational structure and violent practices of the Shi'i movement throughout the 1980s.

In the context of the latter, the first comprehensive books dealing specifically with Hizbullah were released that embodied the divergent interpretations of the Islamic Resistance, particularly in relation to the asymmetric use of violence and the hostage crisis. Whereas Ranstorp (1997: 108) depicted Hizbullah as 'undisputably responsible' for attacks on Western targets in Lebanon on account of its purportedly centralised and sophisticated command structure, its converging ideological and political interests with Iran as well as its overlapping networks with the Islamic Jihad Organisation, Jaber (1997) argued that Hizbullah, while susceptible to the overtures of its regional patrons, represented an embryonic coterie of groups devoid of the cogent cohesion or professionalism required to systematically orchestrate the meticulously planned and coordinated operations perpetrated by an Islamic Jihad Organisation functioning independently and diffusely in the space between Iran and Hizbullah.

The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, widely attributed to the successful military operations of the Islamic Resistance, and the predominant global discourse on terrorism after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., ushered in a new phase of detailed literature aiming to augment understandings regarding the internal dynamics and external objectives of Hizbullah. Approaching Hizbullah from a position of retrospective hindsight, while benefiting from increased access to sources and information on the movement after almost a decade of politicised activity, a sequence

of studies constructed alternative perspectives and holistic frameworks for explaining the relative juxtaposition, balance and influence of Hizbullah's ideological principles in relation to its political practice. Deprived of Israeli occupation as the justification for the Islamic Resistance, the purpose of this work was to ascertain whether the movement was stringently adhering to and prioritising its foundational mantra or undergoing a process of negotiated transition and substantive transformation.

Deviating from conventional narratives that addressed Hizbullah's evolution either by propagating its fixed ideological rigidity or attesting to its instrumentalised ideological compromises amidst political developments, Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) provided a dialectical model. Delving into the roots causes of the movement's emergence in Lebanon, Saad-Ghorayeb replaced a chronological analysis of Hizbullah's evolution with a thematic examination seeking to investigate the application of the movement's core ideological principles in practice, especially the obedience to an Islamic State, the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* and Resistance against Israel, to conclude that Hizbullah's actions were determined by simultaneously maintaining a balance of interests whereby the movement confined 'its adaptation, and at times, embrace of reality to the political realm, whilst limiting its strategic goals to the intellectual realm' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 187). Although positing that Hizbullah's ideology remained consistent, by reducing its expression as the calculated result emanating between the intellectual and political spheres, Saad-Ghorayeb not only interpreted these fields as distinctly exclusive, but also endowed the organisation with the ability to independently direct its ideological discourse and practice.

Grappling with the same causal links between ideology and politics, Hamzeh (2004: 2) concurred with the consistent application of Hizbullah's principles by postulating that the choice of behaviour depended on contextual circumstances which did not contradict the Party's ideology. Designing a complex framework in which seizing power and establishing an Islamic order were the ultimate end goals, the means, contingent upon favourable or unfavourable operational opportunities subjectively derived and defined from crisis conditions, elicited commensurate responses from Hizbullah towards either militancy or pragmatism (Hamzeh, 2004: 80). In this convoluted schematic, not only were militancy and pragmatism interpreted as the only modes of action available to Hizbullah, but by assuming that the Party's rigid command structure was both bureaucratically organised and beholden to Iranian interests, Hamzeh similarly portrayed the movement as a coherent decision-maker

with the strategic foresight to independently and cohesively identify opportunities and mitigate risks within its situational environment.

Offering an insider's account to Hizbullah, Shaykh Naim Qassem (2005), the Party's Deputy Secretary General, authored a book for the purpose of broadcasting the movement's ideological principles, internal organisation, community outreach and political priorities to the broader public. Acknowledging Hizbullah's unwavering adherence to an Islamic State, *jihad* against Israel and *wilayat al-faqih*, Shaykh Qassem asserted that despite vigorous internal debate during the evolutionary process, Hizbullah's stance had not altered as its ideological and political interests represented mutually compatible and convergent pillars as opposed to contradictory ones. Emphasising the complementarity of Hizbullah's Resistance in terms of military, political and social activities that operated independently from Iran, Shaykh Qassam (2005: 262) outlined the sustainability of Hizbullah's approach by stating that 'if continuity is a function of a well-designed theoretical framework and programme, while the practical course is linked to popular outreach, then the existence of both of these assets to the Party should provide it with foundations for steadfast continuance'.

While the development of literature on Hizbullah focused on assessing the prospect of transition through the negotiated balancing of the Party's ideological and political interests rather than the movement's transformation, Alagha (2006) chronologically examined the historical phases of Hizbullah's integration into the Lebanese system to argue that the Party had gradually shifted the direction of its ideology. Dividing Hizbullah's evolution from the primacy of its religious ideology (1978-1984/5) to the priority of its political ideology (1985-1990) before privileging its political programme (1991-2005), Alagha presented a linear narrative in contradistinction to his contemporaries. Perceiving Hizbullah's Resistance identity as a strategic choice as opposed to a strategic obligation, Alagha (2006: 214-217) analysed that the politicisation of Hizbullah through the 'Lebanonisation' process had created instrumental ideological changes in the movement that diverged from its original principles.

As these scholars concentrated on reviewing Hizbullah's practices through the prism of reconciling its ideological and political interests, a sequence of post-2000 literature also contributed to this debate by exploring how the Party utilised its social and public services as a conduit for disseminating and inculcating its ideological as well

as its political interests. For Danawi (2002), Hizbullah capitalised on the marginalisation and socio-economic deprivation of the Shi'i community to inaugurate welfare institutions, especially the Shahid Foundation and Jihad al-Bina, which instrumentally acted as a means of structuring, organising and mobilising political support for the movement as it embarked upon a process of transition. Moreover, in the context of 9/11 and the global discourse on terrorism, Jorisch (2004) postulated that *Al-Manar*, Hizbullah's official television mouthpiece, was strategically devised and deployed to justify, legitimise and reproduce the discourses and practices of the Islamic Resistance.

Continuing on these themes, Harik (2005) elaborated on her previous work dealing with Hizbullah's social services and the origins of the movement's popular support within the Shi'i community in order to broaden the discussion beyond the rigid interplay between the Party's religious doctrine and its political development. Framing Hizbullah's dilemma as a conflated struggle between its Islamic Resistance against Israel and the U.S. fight against terrorism, Harik (2005) posited that Hizbullah cultivated and consolidated a comprehensive strategy that would complement and supplement its military position by investing in grassroots social initiatives aimed at sustaining popular support and transforming the Party away from negative designations pertaining to its radical ideology. Conversely, for Sharara (2006), the provision of Hizbullah's social and public institutions were not to facilitate the movement's transition or initiate change but to ensure the Party entrenched 'a state within a state', a parallel model for governance and organisation that would concurrently and consistently compromise the functionality of state structures in Lebanon.

If the canon on the Islamic Resistance before 2006 was characterised by a small cadre of academics documenting and specialising on the intricacies of the movement's ideological, political and social evolution in Lebanon, the eruption of the 2006 July War and Hizbullah's takeover of Beirut in May 2008 propelled the Islamic Resistance further onto the arena of global media, leading to the introduction and induction of new commentators, in addition to pre-existing experts, attempting to provide alternative perspectives and insights on the Hizbullah phenomenon in Lebanon. Using 2006 and 2008 as empirically observable episodes in which Hizbullah's employment of military force intended to exact political concessions, these contributors each endeavoured to explain Hizbullah's discourses and practices

from a variety of dimensions. Consequently, the field for studying Hizbullah broadened and diversified to encompass four discernible categories.

Firstly, academics continued to address Hizbullah's political/ideological nexus in a post-2006 environment. Testament to the growing status of the Islamic Resistance in global politics, Norton (2007a; 2007b) elaborated on the line of analysis developed in his previous work to publish a book briefly introducing and outlining the history of Hizbullah. Reiterating his assumption that Hizbullah's activities were driven and determined primarily by practical interests, Norton (2007a: 35) stated that 'political constraints and opportunities are the desiderata of political behaviour and ideology takes a back seat' with the movement exemplifying 'a sophisticated understanding of Lebanese politics'. Similarly, in order to appeal to a wider scholarly audience in the context of Hizbullah's enhanced profile, Alagha (2011) released another book predicated on assessing the movement's identity construction through the lens of a conceptual approach combining Resource Mobilisation Theory and Bourdieu's notion of capital as interpreted by Manuel Castells. By chronologically evaluating Hizbullah's efforts at identity formation, convergence and projection, Alagha (2011: 17, 178, 185) reasserted that the movement changed as circumstances changed while manipulating and transforming its religious ideology and resistance identity as its political position developed. Ultimately, Norton and Alagha viewed contemporary events as vindicating their former arguments regarding the Islamic Resistance.

Meanwhile, a number of scholars also joined the discussion on analysing the role of Hizbullah in Lebanon. For Gunning (2007b: 183), the ideologically mutable constitution of Hizbullah demonstrated by the logic of political participation enabled the state to integrate and thereby potentially transform the organisation through institutional processes. Additionally, symptomatic of the academic requirement to conceptualise Hizbullah, Karagiannis (2009) applied a framing approach derived from Social Movement Theory (SMT) to explain how the movement strategically constructed, cultivated and consolidated a multitude of flexible and simultaneous narratives to resonate with its diverse target audiences. Delving deeper into the relational dynamics of framing on a micro-level, Malthaner (2011) developed a model to accentuate the importance of utilitarian social exchange, personal networks, communal solidarity and political mobilisation in shaping Hizbullah's strategic discourses and practices. Conversely, although citing SMT models to illustrate collective action in Muslim societies, Azani (2011: 257) deviated from its conceptual precepts to devise and privilege a chronological, five-stage model of evolution in

which Hizbullah deliberately and disingenuously projected a politically pragmatic façade while harbouring aspirations informed by fixed ideological dispositions. Lastly, while not offering any innovative conceptual or contextual analysis, the chronological, three-phased assessment of Hizbullah conducted by Avon and Khatchadourian (2012) to elucidate the movement's perpetual struggle between ideological principles and political interests epitomised the increasing academic intrigue surrounding the Islamic Resistance phenomenon in Lebanon.

Secondly, alongside assessments focusing disproportionately on Hizbullah's broader political and military strategies, a collection of scholars shifted the locus of enquiry exclusively towards the community-based activities of the Party within Shi'i constituencies. Augmenting research conducted on the importance of Hizbullah's customised networks of aid and assistance in addressing deprivation and galvanising support, Harik (2006), Le Thomas (2010) and Bortolazzi (2011) continued to empirically examine the extensive scale and expansive scope of Hizbullah's professional welfare institutions or 'socialisation agencies' in performing an Islamic obligation, empowering the Shi'i community, instilling harmonised identities and constructing compliance mechanisms of systemic support. Moreover, particularly following the destruction caused by the 2006 War between Hizbullah and Israel, a group of academics developed the analysis beyond Hizbullah's organisation of social services to adopt a nuanced methodological approach that investigated the Party's role in directly controlling religiosity and spatiality for the purpose of producing and reproducing beliefs and practices that enshrined a homogenous Resistance society within a delicately designed and delineated Islamic milieu amongst the Shi'i in Lebanon.

Initially, and in response to prevalent Western assumptions, Deeb (2006a) wrote that Shi'i communities in Lebanon were undergoing 'an enchanted modern'. This period of material and spiritual progress, in which pious Muslims were constantly engaged in an authenticating process of 'defining, reinforcing, and prioritising certain religious discourses and practices', sought to inscribe dispositions and perceptions towards collective and normative understandings of action (2006a: 128, 228). Consequently, applying this approach explicitly to Hizbullah's efforts in privately and publicly instilling, inculcating and institutionalising its holistic Resistance narrative within Shi'i communities, Deeb (2006b; 2008) not only deconstructed the dynamics of *dahiyeh*, Hizbullah's stronghold in southern Beirut, but also demonstrated how the movement

used cultural production, including the media, commemorative sites and ritual events, to reconstitute Lebanese history and implant a Resistance identity in memory.

Elaborating on these observations, Deeb and Harb (2007; 2011; 2012) collaborated to assess how Hizbullah adapted to the growing expectations of an increasingly conscious youth demographic by investing in religiously-sanctioned leisure and entertainment sectors, how Hizbullah created physical and symbolic spaces, such as Khiam and Mleeta, to maintain and sustain the cultural legitimacy of the Resistance society amongst the Islamic milieu and how Hizbullah struggled to manage and mitigate against fissures emerging within its Resistance communities on account of political developments. A sub-theme of this literature also specifically examined Hizbullah's influence in reconstructing, reshaping and rebranding areas under its jurisdiction, especially capitalising on the opportunities presented by the damage inflicted during the 2006 Israeli offensive on south Beirut. Exemplified by Hizbullah's post-2006 remodelling of *dahiyeh* and Bint Jubayl, Al-Harithy (2010), Alamuddin (2010), Harb and Fawaz (2010) and Harb (2011) asserted that the movement's architectural logic of organising territory aimed to embed religious symbolisations and territorial markings into the fabric of space thereby enabling the transformation of material assets into symbolic meanings and ensuring the dialectic reproduction of a collective Shi'i consciousness, identity and practice.

Thirdly, as Hizbullah became progressively more established at navigating around the obstacles of Lebanese politics, more sophisticated in executing military campaigns against Israel, more consolidated within the Shi'i community and more integrated as a pivotal actor in the regional Resistance Axis, prominent U.S. think-tanks and risk consultants specialising on global terrorism and national security entered the Hizbullah oeuvre of literature by providing policy research, analysis and recommendations for government decision-makers in addressing the threat of the Islamic Resistance. Composing their work to inform and influence foreign policy in the realm of political interests, these commentators formulated their assessments by disproportionately invoking Hizbullah's regional and global activities.

As demonstrated by the book edited by Carusso (2011), the overall objective of the contributors was to brief the U.S. Congress on Hizbullah's military capacities and capabilities, its sources of revenue and financial assets, the nature of its relationship with Iran, Syria and Hamas as well as examples of alleged operations conducted by the Islamic Resistance abroad. Similarly, the comparative study of Hamas and

Hizbullah published by Gleis and Berti (2012) purported to present a nuanced analysis beyond 'terrorist' reductionism for the purpose of enhancing military and policy responses to these groups. However, this book, riddled with contextual errors, portrayed a Hizbullah, predominantly governed by its security apparatus, that seemingly de-prioritised its role in Lebanon to pursue a global, Iranian-led and anti-imperialist Resistance agenda involving illegal fundraising and violent operations. More recently, Levitt (2013; 2014) has become the main mouthpiece of a trend within U.S. think-tanks in which Hizbullah and the Islamic Resistance are decontextualised in Lebanon but globally conflated as part of a clandestine, coherent and cohesive transnational network tasked with targeting Israeli, Jewish and U.S. interests abroad.

In response to the dominant perspective of U.S. and Israeli think-tanks, a number of commentators rebutted this approach by countering the disproportionate discourse on national security and global terrorism with a revised analysis that explored the philosophy and ideology behind Hizbullah's internal decision-making processes in Lebanon. In an attempt to explain the causes and consequences of Hizbullah's involvement in the 2006 War with Israel, Saad-Ghorayeb (2006a; 2006b; 2007) not only questioned assumptions either insisting on Hizbullah's execution of a rationally calculated opportunity, Hizbullah's subservience to Iranian and/or Syrian directives in conflict or Western-centric definitions of power and victory, but she also illustrated the logic determining the movement's interpretation of UN Resolution 1701 as well as its role in withdrawing from the political process and the mobilisation of organised protests against prevailing government practices in Lebanon following the 2006 War. Similarly, Crooke and Perry (2006) produced a three-part piece intricately examining how Hizbullah's holistic strategic framework, operationalised by its complementary functions, defeated Israel in terms of its intelligence apparatus, its military tactics and its political nous. Moreover, Crooke (2009: 177-191) posited that by observing and obscuring Hizbullah solely through Western political thought as the antithesis of Israel and the U.S., policymakers failed to comprehend how the movement entrenched an encompassing and empowered 'culture of resistance'.

Fourthly, considering the elevated global status of an introverted and insulated movement such as the Islamic Resistance, investigative journalists also sought to uncover information on Hizbullah. Prior to 2006, Hizbullah featured frequently as the lead subject in lengthy articles of Western press outlets, in particular the pieces by Goldberg (2002) and Shatz (2004). However, not only did these accounts superficially address the movement's strategies and activities, but they also

reductively interpreted Hizbullah primarily through the prism of a post-9/11 discourse on global terrorism. Following Hizbullah's 2006 War with Israel and the movement's subsequent political rise in Lebanon, journalists endeavoured to provide the public with an explanation into the motivations, structure and interests of the Islamic Resistance. While some seasoned journalists, such as Blanford (2006), Hirst (2010) and Young (2010), preferred to afford Hizbullah a supporting role of secondary attention in their books on Lebanon, others claimed to concentrate solely on the Party of God. Nevertheless, these studies vary significantly in the definition of their focus, the structure of their work, the quality of their research and the vigour of their analysis.

Testament to the strength of the Hizbullah brand in global media, MacFarquhar (2009) as well as Dekker and Medearis (2010) ironically used the movement's name in the title of their respective books. Despite this labelling, the former only included a brief commentary on Hizbullah in the context of a chapter on Lebanon while the latter conducted a few largely apolitical interviews with prominent Shi'i figures in Lebanon. Additionally, established U.S. reporters, including Cambanis (2010) and Totten (2011), also contributed publications dealing specifically with Hizbullah. Based on informant interviews and anecdotal evidence, Cambanis (2010: 15-16) provided a commendable analysis detailing the internal contradictions and drivers behind the public endorsement of a movement that is 'not quite a state, but much more than a political party; not quite an army, but much more than a terrorist network; not yet a full-fledged transnational movement, but much more than a Lebanese faction'. Alternatively, Totten (2011), who intended to assess the rise of Hizbullah, produced a subjective, loosely structured account of the movement possessing preconceived generalisations devoid of robust examination. The two most informative journalistic works on Hizbullah were released by three writers with considerable experience covering the Islamic Resistance. While Harel and Issacharoff (2008), two veteran Israeli journalists, compiled a comprehensive book on the causes, contexts and consequences of the 2006 Hizbullah-Israel War, Blanford (2011) amalgamated two decades of expertise on Hizbullah to author an insightful investigation into the political, social and military activities as well as aims of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon spanning over thirty years.

Primarily, rather than employ theoretical models without problematising their application, this research seeks to review and question whether mainstream SMT is able to effectively assess the complex, multi-dimensional and sustained mobilisation

of Hizbullah in Lebanon. By extension, the conceptual contribution of this thesis to the field of social movement studies is the proposition of an alternative framework with which to examine and explain collective action. More specifically, in order to test the assumptions of this revised lens, the empirical contribution of this research is to utilise these analytical tools to provide an amended insight and interpretation into how Hizbullah concurrently struggles to create, manage and reproduce the mobilisation of its Resistance in Lebanon. Consequently, there are three inter-related objectives to assist in achieving these complementary aims.

Firstly, this thesis intends to offer a conceptual framework for explaining Hizbullah's inception and evolution. In the field of sociology, SMT has developed to become one of the most theoretically structured and analytically rigorous methods for assessing collective action. While a number of scholars have applied SMT to Islamist movements, only a small cadre of academics has attempted to incorporate SMT into their studies of Hizbullah[1]. Saad-Ghorayeb (2003) references social movement studies but not only does she fail to utilise it to inform her research, she also fails to explore the mainstream manifestation of the sub-discipline, namely the Political Process Theory (PPT). Similarly, whereas Karagiannis (2009) cites Collective Action Frames (CAF) in examining Hizbullah's discursive practices, he omits the other two essential components of the model, Political Opportunity Structures and Mobilising Structures. Lastly, Alagha (2011) and Azani (2011) both present interesting introductions to SMT for understanding Hizbullah. For the former, the importance lies in cross-fertilising Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and a rebranded version of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of *capital* while the latter provides an extensive literature review of SMT. However, neither implements these conceptual frameworks into their empirical investigations. Subsequently, Hizbullah, arguably the most successful example of Islamist mobilisation in the Middle East, remains under-explored by SMT.

Secondly, subscribing to a Popperian interpretation of social science, the purpose of theory is not to verify but to falsify. By this logic, there is limited utility in simply transposing the parameters of SMT onto Hizbullah without any critical problematising. The prevalent model of SMT privileges structural forces and rational behaviour, epistemological preferences that have divided the field into almost

[1] Those who have integrated SMT models into their work include: Kurzman (1996); Munson (2001); Wickham (2002); Hafez (2003); Bennani-Chraibi and Fillieule (2003); Clark (2004); Singerman (2004); Wiktorowicz (2004); Bayat (2005); Meijer (2005); Gunning (2007a); Tugal (2009); Olesen (2009) and Eligur (2010). Aside from Islamist movements, the Political Process Model has also been applied to other episodes of collective action in the Middle East: the Kurdish Nationalist Movement (Romano, 2006), the First Palestinian Intifada (Alimi, 2007) and the Second Palestinian Intifada (Araj & Brym, 2010). Lastly, attempts to read Islamic movements as versions of 'new social movements' include Simsek (2004) as well as Sutton and Vertigans (2006).

incompatible dualisms. Consequently, theories of social movement, propagating opposite sides of the spectrum, are mired in tautological debates concerning agency and structure, rationality and ideology, reason and emotion as well as culture and religion. As one of the most influential sociologists of the 20th Century with a background in Middle East research, detections of Pierre Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice' are evident in recent endeavours to revitalise conceptual thinking in both Islamic studies and SMT. However, the premise underlying Bourdieu's oeuvre is the construction of a holistic set of analytical tools that transform mutually exclusive dichotomies into mutually inclusive dialectics. Rather than deductively select aspects of Bourdieu instrumentally, the revised objective should be to inductively inject SMT with the innovative dynamism of *habitus* (dispositions), *capital* (resources) and *field* (context), three relationally constituted concepts that inform and are informed by practice. This interdependence between theoretical and practical logics also resonates with the principles of Shi'i political thought. According to interviews with representatives of Hizbullah and other Shi'i figures, *'ijtihad* is the enduring practice that strives to maintain a compatible reconciliation between the theoretical logic of religion (*sharia*) and the practical logic of interests (*masaleh*). For this reason, a Bourdieusian reconceptualisation of SMT, which is equipped to address relational complexity, can enable a more accurate account of the motivations and challenges guiding Hizbullah's evolution.

Thirdly, by embracing the Bourdieusian principle of relationality, the empirical contribution of this thesis is to locate and trace Hizbullah's engagement with the structures of Lebanon's conditional context. Pre-existing literature on Hizbullah remains disproportionately focused on Hizbullah's internal perceptions and practices, an introverted insularity that has the tendency to simplify how Hizbullah inducts, inculcates and institutionalises its Resistance within and between multiple *fields* of practice, each constituted by differentiated logics and structures that pre-date the Islamic Resistance. Historically, the entrenched confessionalism and subsequent suspicion that characterises the *orthodoxy* of modern Lebanon has emanated from a reciprocally reinforcing combination of endogenous and exogenous factors. Lebanon, which currently has a population of just over four million people, contains 18 confessional groups within an area famously proclaimed by former President Bashir Gemayel to be 10,452 square kilometres, an estimate that places the country between Qatar and Cyprus in terms of size[2]. This geographically vulnerable and

[2] This population statistic does not include the influx of refugees following the Syrian uprising. Since demographics are sensitive in Lebanon, in that confessional population figures correspond to political representation, accurate statistics are difficult to ascertain. The

socially eclectic mosaic of confessional cleavages was exploited by Imperial powers to imbue a neutralising and debilitating system of rival political elites that privileged equality in accordance to sect over citizenship. Whether this identity is perceived as a reconstructed class struggle (Mahdi 'Amil), a defensive 'armour and emblem' for practical purposes (Samir Khalaf, 2003) or a symbolic reflection of religious piety, confessional mobilisation and elite sectarian politics remain the predominant discourses and practices in Lebanon[3]. In 1982, Hizbullah did not enter into an unrestricted environment; it launched itself into a game it neither designed nor was familiar with. Therefore, in analysing Hizbullah's development, it is necessary to assess how Hizbullah has devised strategies that comply with pre-existing hierarchies within and across operational *fields* to enhance its legitimacy while paradoxically challenging the formulation of that process.

For the purpose of effectively pursuing these three objectives, this thesis subscribes to a Bourdieusian perspective that conceives theory and practice as synergised in mutually constituted relationality. The etymological root of the word 'theory' is derived from the Classical Greek for *theoria*, a philosophical term pertaining to the act of 'contemplation' or 'spectating' (Nightingale, 2004). In Fourth Century BC Athens, although Aristotle maintained that this process of *theoria* was devoid of any discernible utilitarian exchange with *praxis* ('practice') since reflection embodied an end in itself, Plato sought to reconcile the traditional principles of *theoria* with the *praxis* of its political and social context (Nightingale, 2004). By this reasoning, a *theoros* (pl. *theoroi*) represented an official 'witness' that attended public or private events as an emissary beyond the familiarity of their environment, such as the Pan-Hellenic Games in Olympia or the Oracle in Delphi, in order to observe rituals, interpret their meaning and produce knowledge regarding these practices. Therefore, *theoria* is perceived as simultaneously informed by and informing of social phenomena across time and space.

Expanding on this classical theme, the dialectic between theory and practice is a labour of Sisyphean proportions. The purpose of theoretical exploration is to devise a practical route with which to push the boulder of scientific inquiry to the summit of explanation within the parameters of pre-existing comprehension and extant context. However, through academic examination and falsification, the boulder is perennially

last census was conducted in 1932. Bashir Gemayel (d. 1982), the founder of the Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia during the civil war, declared that he sought to exert his authority over all of Lebanon, an area he claimed to be 10,452 square kilometres.

[3] Mahdi 'Amil (1936-1987), a Lebanese Marxist assassinated in 1987, wrote that the existence of confession as an ethnic grouping is an illusion: 'it is not an entity. It is not essence. It is nothing. It is a political relationship determined by a certain historical form of the class struggle which is controlled by the bourgeoisie in the political absence of its class alternative' (Firro, 2003: 65).

destined to return to the bottom of the mountain. Under these circumstances, the aim is to continually alter the structured dispositions of the mind and acclimatise the conditioning of the body in adjusting practices that align with the prevailing environment. Consequently, not only is the preparation and implementation of the task performed more effectively, but the planned target entails a reconstitution of assumptions that redirect the end, symbolised by the elusive apex of the mountain, to the methods through which theory and practice become synchronised in mutual relationality to produce knowledge of and on observable processes. Located between Islamic studies and sociology, this thesis presents a reconceptualisation of SMT via the analytical tools provided by Pierre Bourdieu with the intention of contributing to and initiating an inter-disciplinary discussion on the emergence and evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. In order to sketch and explain a schematic that plots a trajectory for examining the compatibility of theory and practice in collective action, this thesis is divided into two commensurate parts.

In the first section, the opening three chapters outline the conceptual framework adopted to approach the conception and consolidation of Hizbullah in Lebanon. In Chapter One, the thesis begins by presenting a literature review of the existing canon on the study of collective action in Islamic studies and SMT. By referencing the prevalent intra-disciplinary debates and discourses within these academic fields, the intention is to place the theoretical assumptions and precepts of this research in direct relation to its target audience. After surveying the contours of these discussions, this chapter emphasises that the 'pluralist' branch of Islamic studies and the 'critical' school of SMT converge on the requirement to examine movement mobilisation through the relative balance between structure and agency while interpreting cultural and ideational factors within their relational context.

Based on the conceptual compatibility between these perspectives, Chapter Two proposes an inter-disciplinary syncretism for collective action via the integration of analytical tools developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Following the identification and categorisation of four consistent areas of contestation within the study of collective action, namely the agency/structure nexus, the conceptualisation of culture and ideology, the prospect of concurrent and multi-faceted mobilisation as well as the problematic of mobilisation in producing change or reproducing *orthodoxy*, this chapter provides a brief synopsis of Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice' before sequentially addressing these issues by offering an alternative lens through the application of *habitus*, *field* and *capital*.

Invoking Bourdieu's (1982: 50) assertion that 'the specific object of research counts less indeed, than the method which was applied to it and which could be applied to an infinity of different objects', Chapter Three deals with the methodological implementation of a combined Bourdieu-SMT lens for research on and in Lebanon. Following a discussion on the methodological concepts of relationality and self-reflexivity inherent within Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice', in which the tools of analysis are reflected back onto the researcher, this chapter then proposes a reconceptualised Bourdieu-SMT framework for assessing Hizbullah's mobilisation in Lebanon that is predicated on the epistemological designation of five inter-related *fields* of practice, including the Social Mobilisational Field (*SMF*), the Political Field (*PF*), the Military-Security Field (*MSF*), the Organisational Field (*OF*) and the Field of International Politics (*FIP*). Equipped with these conceptual instruments, the chapter concludes by demonstrating the rationale the researcher employed in accumulating relevant primary and secondary sources over the course of fieldwork to illustrate and supplement a Bourdieu-SMT approach.

In the second section, this holistic conceptualisation is utilised to explain the inception and induction of Hizbullah in Lebanon through four empirical chapters. Since Hizbullah did not materialise in a vacuum, the objective of Chapter Four is to locate a Shi'i *habitus* within the historically constructed *fields* of Lebanon by investigating episodes of collective Shi'i mobilisation under the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire (1516-1919), under the French Mandate and the embryonic stages of Independence (1920-1958) as well as during the period of a proliferating Shi'i political consciousness under Musa Al-Sadr (1959-1978). By evaluating these three phases of evolution, Shi'i movement can be relationally recorded within the structured and structuring structures of Lebanon's institutionalised political and social systems. As recounted by Georges Naqqash (1887-1978), 'this Lebanon, which they have made for us, is a country consisting of two fifth columns…A state is not the sum of two non-powers – and two negations will never make a nation' (Ziadeh, 2006: 122). In this context, Albert Hourani opined that Muslims and Christians are perpetually locked in a mutually reinforcing practice of sectarianism where 'to leave one's sect was to leave one's world, and to live without loyalties, the protection of a community, the consciousness of solidarity and the comfort of loyalty' (Ziadeh, 2006: 171).

In Chapter Five, a Bourdieu-SMT approach is employed to address the factors precipitating the inception of Hizbullah in Lebanon (1982-1991). By analysing the salience of five key events, including the revolutionary Shi'i activism espoused by Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Israel's Operation Litani in South Lebanon in 1978, the return of hundreds of Shi'i clerics from Iraq, the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, this framework explains the process by which the amalgamation of disparate radical Shi'i *habiti* in the Social Mobilisational Field (*SMF*) transformed into manifestations of collective dispositions and perceptions (*collusio*) within the Shi'i community in Lebanon. Additionally, in the context of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, this chapter examines how Hizbullah translated these expressions of Shi'i *collusio* into a constructed and structured Organisational Field (*OF*) of harmonised discourse and practice before applying a Bourdieu-SMT perspective to explain the differentiated purposes and positions between Islamic Jihad and the Islamic Resistance in the Military-Security Field (*MSF*) during the Lebanese civil war.

In Chapter Six, a Bourdieu-SMT lens seeks to problematise and contextualise predominant assumptions regarding Hizbullah's process of 'Lebanonisation' (1992-2000). Adopting the explanatory tools of *field* analysis, this chapter demonstrates the multi-dimensional complexity confronted by Hizbullah's *OF* in internally adapting to the perceived opportunities of political participation. Primarily, since the tacit induction of Hizbullah into the unfamiliar and entrenched dynamics of Lebanese politics seemingly contradicted the guiding principles of the Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah's *OF* expended significant resources in constructing and implementing diversified tactics that ensured the realignment of harmonised Resistance practice, thereby retaining its balance and coherence within and across its corresponding *fields*. Furthermore, by detailing the sophisticated development of the Islamic Resistance, especially during its campaigns against Israel in 1993 and 1996, a Bourdieu-SMT perspective conceptually illustrates how Hizbullah strictly adhered to the pre-existing rules of the Military-Security Field (*MSF*) in order to acquire deployable forms of symbolic *capital*. However, this approach also reveals that despite Hizbullah's *OF* accumulating valuable currencies of symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community, the institutionalised logic of Lebanon's Political Field (*PF*) continued to debilitate and restrict the viability and sustainability of Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance.

Chapter Seven assesses the position of Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance in relation to the respective withdrawals of Israel (2000), its perpetually distinct adversary, and Syria (2005), its political patron in Lebanon. By documenting the encroaching permeation of the Field of International Politics (*FIP*) into Lebanese affairs after 2001, a Bourdieu-SMT approach explains why and how Hizbullah altered its practice to maintain the cohesion of its placement in Lebanon before the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005. Devoid of protection from Syria and possessing limited *capital* in the Political Field (*PF*), this chapter also examines the events of 2006 and 2008 to exemplify efforts by Hizbullah in transferring and transposing its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to the logic of the *PF* for the purpose of preserving its status in Lebanon. In this context, this chapter additionally explores how Hizbullah has reacted to the independent diversification of dispositions and perceptions within the Shi'i community in the *SMF* by adapting, customising and modernising its mobilisation repertoires to reflect and legitimise its revised standing following the withdrawals of Israel and Syria from Lebanon. Lastly, this chapter is followed by a conclusion in which eight observations are proposed that not only highlight the contribution of a robust Bourdieu-SMT framework in enhancing the conceptual strength of collective action, but also augment the understanding of Hizbullah's mobilisation in its reproductive struggle for symbolic *power* in Lebanon.

Chapter One

Islamist Movements in the Academic Field(s)

'So far as fear of God is concerned, the control of the appetites, prudence and sobriety in conduct of life, decency and moderation in all circumstances…I declare that if the West has added one single iota to the accumulated wisdom of the East, my powers of perception have been strangely in abeyance'.

- *Simon Ockley (1678-1720), Chair of Arabic at Cambridge (Irwin, 2006: 119)*

'There is no Homo Islamicus. The history of the Muslim world is specific, it has its own style and colour, it is an incomparable part of human diversity. But it is not exceptional. Men everywhere have faced similar problems, to be resolved by analogous means'.

- *Maxime Rodinson (1979: 161)*

'We find ourselves in an Orientalist predicament. On the one hand, considering the postmodern reappraisal of the colonial past, generally it is politically incorrect to make derogatory remarks about the scholarly works of Arab historians…On the other hand, in the age of ongoing globalization the Western scientific approach carries the day. If science stands for a special kind of communication…by scholars who dominate this discourse…everyone who wants to be part of the game has to follow its rules'.

- *Stephan Conermann (2000: 259)*

Edmund Burke III (1988: 18) postulated whether knowledge should be informed by viewing the objects of enquiry as 'Islamic political movements' or as 'social movements in Islamic societies'. The former position appears to follow the essentialist precepts of the Orientalist tradition by subscribing to the primacy of Islam while the latter approach, propagated by historians influenced by the social sciences, places religion in context, thereby promoting a conceptualisation that allows for a comparative study of movements across time and space. As reinforced by Zubaida (2011: 65), are Islamic movements variants on a single model of Muslim society or do they represent a variety of religio-political movements with similar range and diversity to those in any other part of the world? This question occupies a parallel discourse on the periphery of a wider discussion, the core of which lies in the traditional differences of approach between social science and area studies.

The consolidation of the U.S. as a global superpower after the Second World War signified a corresponding shift in academia. Reflecting the initial bias in the U.S. towards scientific universalism, Teti (2007: 123) explained that an 'institutionalized hierarchy' was established in which '"Disciplines" as producers of universal knowledge" were considered superior to the 'epistemologically subservient fact-collecting "Areas"'. As Middle East studies became inaugurated as an educational

field, its epistemic remit was debated between social scientific and humanistic approaches and between 'approaches which accepted the region's socio-political unity and exceptionalism and those who questioned it' (Teti, 2007: 131). Echoing Leonard Binder's (1976) critical appraisal of area studies, Richard Martin (1985: 15) posed whether Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies should be considered a specialist field or informed by more general disciplines? Therefore, in order to effectively examine Burke's insights into the study of Islamist movements, it is necessary to identify the deeper roots of dichotomisation both within and between the Western institutions of academic practice.

The first part of this chapter will outline how the academic study of Islam has evolved, from its nascent beginnings in Orientalism and Islamic studies to the emergence of its critics and apologists in the 20th Century. While acknowledging Edward Said's thesis that the scholarly practice of Western Orientalists contributed to the construction of an academic discipline that institutionalised an 'essentialist' orthodoxy, the field gradually developed and became exposed to the influences of the European Enlightenment. As traditional Orientalists and their 'modernist' contemporaries competed for the predominant narrative in the context of U.S. hegemony following the Second World War, the emergence of Islamism in the late 1970s divided the field into four parts. While 'neo-Orientalists' continue to designate Islam as the innate antithesis to the West, 'new-Orientalists' propagate this dichotomy by focusing on the existence of an intrinsically Islamic path to modernity. Furthermore, whereas 'modernists' interpret manifestations of Islam as inherently inseparable from the political, social and economic developments of Western modernity, 'pluralists' endeavour to propose methodological frameworks that problematise and reconcile these dichotomies.

The second part of this chapter will examine the development of the sociological sub-field of social movement theory (SMT) for the purpose of exploring whether literature on collective action can provide any insights into the conceptualisation of Islamist mobilisation. By documenting and detailing the evolution of the specialist sub-discipline, including 'structural strain', Resource Mobilisation Theory, New Social Movements, Political Process Model, Collective Action Frames and Political Process Theory, the objective is to identify a 'critical' trend within SMT that prioritises concepts of agency, strategy and culture over the structural and rational preoccupations of its predecessors. By way of a conclusion, this chapter will introduce a revised approach for conceptualising Islamist movements that bridges

the prevalent dualisms within Islamic studies and SMT by adopting a theoretical framework devised to transform seemingly incommensurate dichotomies into mutually constitutive dialectics.

1.1 Field Formation and Fragmentation

St John of Damascus, the seventh century theologian, is considered the vanguard of the Orientalist tradition (Hourani, 1980a: 8; Sardar, 1999). Derived from philological methods developed for examining classical texts, this early interaction with Arabic was motivated less by a fascination with Islam and more by an interest to enhance the study of Christianity (Binder, 1976: 9; Adams, 1976: 41). However, the Council of Vienna (1311-1312) and the subsequent establishment of positions for Oriental languages represented the initial institutionalisation of the academic discipline of Orientalism in Europe (Toll, 1988: 14)[4]. Although early Orientalists recorded notable achievements in philology[5], the field was mostly comprised of voyeuristic amateurs, aristocrats and clergymen who exclusively explored the Oriental East to vindicate European supremacy over Islam (Irwin, 2006: 147; Lockman, 2010: 37). Consequently, before Silvestre de Sacy (1758-1838) constructed a cohesive programme for the study of Orientalism, this introverted cadre of scholars remained largely marginalised from mainstream academia.

For Edward Said (1979: 130; 1980: 71), the work of Ernest Renan (1823-1892), which depicted Islam as 'inherently and eternally antirational and antiscientific', exemplified the 'philologist as judge', a predisposition of European scholars to propagate a 'plague' that expounded the ontological distinctiveness and intrinsic fanaticism of the Orient (Lockman, 2010: 79-80)[6]. While Renan's approach was not innovative, his assessment coincided with the encroachment of post-Enlightenment rationalism and secularism on the formerly reclusive field of Orientalism. Influenced by events in Europe, such as the 1848 revolutions and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71), in addition to developments abroad, particularly the growing intervention of European powers within the Ottoman Empire, Orientalists became exposed to sociological debates concerning religion and modernity as well as colonial discourses of power.

[4] Chairs were created in Greek, Hebrew, Aramaic and Arabic at Avignon, Paris, Oxford, Bologna and Salamanca.
[5] Including Guillaume Postel (1510-1581), Edward Pococke (1604-1691), Thomas Erpenius (1584-1624) and Barthelemy d'Herbelot (1625-1695).
[6] For Said (1980: 60, 72), while Renan is a 'philologist as judge', Louis Massignon (1883-1962) is a 'philologist as guest', overly sympathetic to the point of misrepresentation. Despite the contrast, neither is suitable for evaluating Islam due to their respective perceptions of difference.

The expanding hegemony of Europe, which was instrumental in structuring the parameters of the global public sphere, was equally important in demarcating the boundaries of an emerging field of Islamic studies. By combining the Habermasian concept of a 'life world', a societal space of communicative interaction, with the Bourdieusian notion of *habitus*, 'a system of historically and socially constructed generative principles grating a frame in which individuality unfolds', Dietrich Jung (2011: 90, 115, 156) argued that each scholar, constituted by their respective socialised discourses on religion and modernity, coalesced to produce an internalised 'generative grammar' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 33) that structured the conceptual underpinnings of Islamic studies.

As demonstrated by the first congress of Orientalists in 1873, an integrated network of scholars led by Ignaz Goldziher and Christiaan Hurgronje instigated a trend that substituted a strict adherence to the immutable religious orthodoxy of Islam, enshrined in philological exegesis, with a critical methodology that encompassed a more dynamic scientific framework (Irwin, 2006: 191-196; Jung, 2011: 161-169)[7]. An integral component of this emerging field of Islamic studies was the inseparable fusion of Western and Muslim thinkers in constructing 'modern knowledge on Islam within the coordinates of a wider global public sphere' (Jung, 2011: 263). Of particular note was the integration of Jamal al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh, two pioneers of a modernist *salafiyya* movement, who sought to bridge the chasm between religious traditionalists and secular modernists for the purpose of establishing pan-Islamism and Muslim nationalism as prerequisites for political and cultural independence from colonial hegemony (Azmeh, 1993: 44; Esposito, 2011: 156)[8]. However, since the field of Islamic studies was constituted in accordance to a Eurocentric logic, agents who were structured by its discourses and disposed to reproduce its orthodoxy remained the drivers of the field's practice. Consequently, Muslim thinkers were reduced to heterodox positions, compelled to adjust their *habitus* to legitimated conventional norms in accessing and contributing to the field.

[7] Goldziher, a Hungarian Jew, was one of the pioneers and masters of modern Islamic studies (Irwin, 2006: 191-196). Christiaan Hurgronje, a Dutch Muslim, was one of the first scholars to contest the assumption that Islam was anti-modern (Jung, 2011: 182, 192). Other notable figures in this trend were Heinrich Fleischer, Theodor Noldeke and Julius Wellhausen.

[8] *Salafiyya* literally means the return to the traditional practices of Islam. Although they differed in approach with Afghani promoting pan-Islamism and Abduh focusing on reform in Egypt, they were both versed in European social science, conducted discussions with European peers and published together. Other notable Muslim thinkers in this trend include Muhammad Iqbal, Ahmad Khan, Namik Kemal, Rifaat Tahtawi, Lufti al-Sayyid, Mustafa Abd al-Raziq and Taha Husayn. Rashid Rida, formerly a follower of Abduh, shifted to the vision of an Islamic state. He published his thoughts in the influential *al-Manar* ('the lighthouse') journal from 1898 until his death in 1935. He was also an inspirational figure for Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 (Zubaida, 2011: 135-144; Jung, 2011: 239-242).

By invoking Gramsci's notion of hegemony and Foucault's concept on the diffuse nature of power, Edward Said (1979) described Orientalism as a European discourse that exercises cultural dominance through its creation and reproduction of knowledge. Nevertheless, Said failed to clarify whether Orientalists within the field of Islamic studies were intentional or inadvertent agents in propagating this practice (Irwin, 2006: 289-290). In adopting a Bourdieusian perspective, which seeks to reconcile the dialectic between the 'colonial habitus' and the field of Islamic studies, one can examine the construction of a predominant practice that essentialised Islam amidst the discourse of modernity (Jung, 2011: 212).

As the essentialist orthodoxy of the field of Islamic studies became reinforced by its homology with European interests in the Ottoman Empire via the active participation of its agents[9], a revisionist trend emerged that characterised Orientalism as 'beset by subjective projections, displacements of affect, ideological distortion, romantic mystification, and religious bias' (Binder, 1976: 16-18)[10]. However, the main fracture occurred after the Second World War as the international balance of power shifted from European powers to U.S. hegemony[11]. Following the proliferation of area studies departments in the U.S., the field of Islamic studies was threatened by an influx of historians, anthropologists and sociologists advocating the application of social science methods to the Middle East, including the Weberian-inspired modernisation theory (Lerner, 1958)[12].

In addition to external appraisals, criticism also continued to emanate from within the field of Islamic studies. Roger Owen (1973) urged scholars to replace the philological assumptions of Orientalists pertaining to the immutable nature of Islam with scientific models that explored the permutation of Islam within complex and diversified contexts (Lockman, 2010: 165). Similarly, Maxime Rodinson (1979) endeavoured to debunk preconceptions by presenting dynamic syntheses between Islam, socialism and capitalism. Marshall Hodgson (1974) extolled the fluidity of Islam by developing the concepts of *Islamdom*, *Islamicate* and *Oikumene*[13]. For Charles Adams (1976:

[9] Martin Hartmann and Carl Heinrich Becker overstated the Islamic concept of *jihad* to justify German involvement in the First World War (Jung, 2011: 194-195). Massignon (1883-1962) was part of the Anglo-French Committee that drafted the Sykes-Picot agreement in 1916 dividing up the Middle East between Britain and France (Irwin, 2006: 222).
[10] Other scholars included Said (1979) and Adams (1976).
[11] During the Second World War, Orientalists remained involved in the war effort: Charles Bekingham worked at Bletchley Park, Freddie Beeston at British military intelligence; Bernard Lewis for the Foreign Service in Istanbul; Hamilton Gibb at BBC Arabic (Irwin, 2006: 237-238).
[12] U.S. Orientalists had always operated on the peripheries of Islamic studies. In 1841, Edward Salisbury (1814-1901) became occupied the first Orientalist teaching position in the U.S. (Irwin, 2006: 213-214). Traditional Orientalists also departed for the U.S. (Hamilton Gibb – Harvard; Bernard Lewis – Princeton; Joseph Schacht – Columbia).
[13] *Islamdom* refers to Muslim territory, *Islamicate* to the culture contained in that territory and *Oikumene* represents the settled world of high culture that spread over Europe, Asia and Africa (Irwin, 2006: 251)

41-49), philologists continued to reductively materialise Islam as an objective reality that superseded the explanatory weight of politics and economics.

The debate for the predominant discourse and practice in acquiring knowledge on the Middle East was embodied by two conferences in 1979 and 1980[14]. During the Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference, the participants acknowledged that the epistemological and methodological foundations of Orientalism were untenable, and while open to the influence of social science, they expressed reticence to privilege a revision that risked relegating the importance of Islam[15]. Ultimately, an accurate explanation of Islam in society required techniques that fused material and ideational factors symbiotically (Hourani, 1980b: 13-14; Lapidus, 1980: 90-92). Meanwhile, the International Symposium on Islam and the History of Religions encouraged interdisciplinary contributions in transcending the dichotomy between 'fideistic subjectivism' and 'scientific objectivism' (Martin, 1985: 1-2; 11). Devoid of mutual cooperation between Orientalist and social science methodologies, the former 'remain myopic, resulting in dangerous generalisations' while the latter 'become abstract, in fact, chimerical' (Rahman, 1985: 202).

While these conferences intended to reconcile the inter-disciplinary divide, in which Orientalists viewed social scientists as 'under-educated dabblers overly inclined to grandiose theories' while social scientists derided Orientalists as 'ivory-tower scholars preoccupied with moldering texts', each was matched by their intra-disciplinary congruence. Whereas Orientalism pitted Islam against the West, social science polarised tradition with modernity (Lockman, 2010: 140). Furthermore, Sadik al-Azm (1981: 24) argued that Said's 'Orientalism' implied the self-fulfilling existence of 'Occidentalism' whereby Islam was 'a monolithic unique Oriental totality ineradicably distinct in its essential nature from Europe, the West and the rest of humanity'.

Following the Second World War, the Islamic discourse in the Middle East remained eclipsed by the *nahda* ('renaissance') of socialist-inspired Arab nationalisms[16]. Nevertheless, the victory of Israel over the Arabs in 1967 was perceived as a defeat that accentuated the 'Arab malaise' (Kassir, 2006: 4) or *takhalluf* ('backwardness'), a

[14] The Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference was held in California in 1979 with the papers published in *Islamic Studies: A Tradition and its Problems* (1980). In 1980, the *International Symposium on Islam and the History of Religions* took place in Arizona with the papers published in Approaches to Islam in Religious Studies (1985).
[15] Hourani (1980b: 9); Said (1980: 60); Burke (1980: 77); Lapidus (1980: 90); Rahman (1980: 133).
[16] Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt (1956); Abd al-Karim Qassam in Iraq (1958); the Arab Ba'ath in Syria (1963); Houari Boumediene in Algeria (1965); National Liberation Front in Yemen (1967) and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya (1969).

reinforced cultural/socio-psychological disposition that confirmed the inability of the region to transition into modernity (Sing, 2012)[17]. Rather than revert to Eurocentric concepts of secular nationalism or revolutionary communism, national salvation rested in 'popular political Islam' (Azm, 1981: 22; Achcar, 2008: 21). Inspired by the thinking of Rashid Rida, Hassan al-Banna, Abul Ala Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ali Shariati, the proposed antidote to Western modernity became referred to as Islamism, or *islamiyya*, 'the ideology advocating the creation of a society and state based on Islamic principles' (Gunning, 2000: 2)[18]. As demonstrated by the Iranian Revolution and the establishment of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic in 1979, the siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by *salafi* activists the same year or the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat by *tanzim al-jihad* in 1981, the influence of 'Islamism' began permeating from theory into praxis[19].

In response to this religious resurgence, the already polarised academic field became characterised further by dichotomy and divergence. For Achcar (2008: 26), Azm's 'Orientalism in reverse' thesis, combined with contextual developments, had both consolidated traditional Orientalism to initiate 'neo-Orientalism' while simultaneously producing 'new Orientalism'. Firstly, epitomised by the work of Bernard Lewis (1976, 1982, 1990, 2003, 2010), 'neo-Orientalism' resuscitated the essence of the 'Muslim mind' and emphasised Islam's monolithic entity as an immutable set of core characteristics antithetical to modernity (Lockman, 2010: 111). Traces of this essentialist interpretation of Islam have been reflected in the writings of Francis Fukuyama (1989, 1992), Samuel Huntington (2002) and Martin Kramer (1996, 2001)[20]. Furthermore, this position is also detected amongst the liberal intelligentsia in the highly politicised arena of U.S. academia[21]. According to Paul Berman (2003, 2010), liberals are naïve if they fail to see that Islamist movements, regardless of their position, are 'stars in a single constellation' (Ruthven, 2010)[22].

[17] Authors who contributed to *takhalluf* literature include Sadik al-Azm, Yasin al-Hafiz, Nawal Saadawi and Mustafa al-Hijazi.
[18] There are no etymological origins of this word in Arabic either in the *Qur'an*, *hadith* or *sunnah*. According to Martin and Barzegar (2010:10), this modern term 'has been adapted to this usage by contemporary Muslim writers and intellectuals when writing about political Islam'. 'Islamism' isn't universally applied due to its negative connotations (Abdul Rauf, 2010; Varisco, 2010).
[19] Other 'Islamist' developments at this time include: the Palestinian Islamic Jihad was formed in 1979 against Israeli occupation; Hizbullah, the Shi'i movement inspired by the Iranian Revolution, was founded in Lebanon by 1982; the Arab *al-mujahideen* ('Muslim Warriors') was formed in the 1980s to resist the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (notable figures included Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin-Laden); Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine was established before the *intifada* of 1987.
[20] Fukuyama argued that History, perceived as a perennial struggle over ideas, had finished with the victory of liberal democracy. Huntington, adopting Lewis' 'clash of civilizations', posited that the victory of democracy was not yet guaranteed due to other cultures and civilisations that oppose liberal values. Kramer (1996: 16) stated that the Middle East seems 'impervious to the worldwide triumph of liberal democracy…and it remains susceptible to ideological excess in an age of pragmatism'.
[21] In 1995, Dick Cheyney's wife, Lynne and Senator Joseph Lieberman established the National Alumni Forum to monitor radicals on university campuses. Daniel Pipes founded Campus Watch in 2002, which pressures academics that deviate from a neo-conservative agenda. Martin Kramer, Robert Satloff and Bernard Lewis support this initiative.
[22] In particular, Berman targets Tariq Ramadan, a Professor of Islamic studies at the University of Oxford. While Ramadan's books focus on ways to integrate and immerse European Muslims by using classical texts and teachings (Ruthven, 2007b). Berman accuses Ramadan of manipulating the West with his pragmatism as a ruse to disguise his anti-liberal, Islamofascist opinions. Prominent

Secondly, proponents of 'new Orientalism' not only posit that 'Islam and modernity are compatible, but in fact Islam is the only and necessary path to modernity in the Muslim world' (Achcar, 2008: 26). This trend is echoed in the work of Olivier Roy (1990, 2004, 2007, 2009) and Francis Burgat (1997, 2002), both of whom consider Islam as an integral component of modernisation as it provides 'the essential language and culture of Muslim peoples' (Achcar, 2008: 24)[23]. Moreover, the alternative modernity of 'Muslim society' (Gellner, 1981), the redesign of a 'fifth circle' towards an autonomous Islamic path to modernity (Salvatore, 1997) and the assembling of an exclusive Islamic narrative in contradistinction to the West (Crooke, 2009) all contain aspects of this thesis[24]. However, by focusing on the epistemological priority of an explicitly Islamist response to modernity, 'new Orientalism' aligns with its 'neo-Orientalism' counterparts in 'the essentialist view according to which religiosity is a permanent and essential phenomenon for Muslim peoples' (Achcar, 2008: 26).

Thirdly, 'Modernists' symbolise another category of scholarship emanating from a post-1979 discourse of Islamism. Exemplified by Fred Halliday (1993, 1996, 2002, 2008) and Sami Zubaida (1993, 2011), 'modernists' replace the 'pseudo-sociology' and 'essential homogeneity' (Azmeh, 1993: 22) of Orientalists with a perspective that interprets Western modernity as the undisputed normative condition in which culture and ideology are shaped, negotiated and contested. Preferring to avoid 'regional narcissism', in which 'primordialists' perceive the Middle East as 'some age-old, atavistic, historically continuous, influence of holy texts and unshifting identities', 'modernists' claim that 'the past explains the present only if its continuation can also be explained' (Halliday, 2002: 193-205; 2008: 18-19). Contrary to Orientalists, and in reference to Islamist revanchism, 'the modernism of this proposed state is the fundamental feature of this supposedly pre-modern creature of postmodernism' (Azmeh, 1993: 31; Affendi, 2003: 17). Rather than evaluate the revival of Islamist discourse and practice literally as a 'fixed menu' of pre-prescribed formulas,

commentators Martin Amis, Melanie Philips and Christopher Hitchens represent a similar liberalism that is 'more intolerant of religious identity politics than the xenophobic right' (Affendi, 2012: 17-28).

[23] For Roy (2007), however, Islam was an intrinsically flawed project that will lead to post-Islamism, a condition that substitutes modernisation for neo-fundamentalism in which the overpoliticisation and privitisation of Islam creates Islamo-nationalists.

[24] Salvatore's (1997) Seven Interpretative Circles: a) Conflation of late-classical Orientalism; b) the deconflationist Middle Eastern Studies inspired by modernisation theory; c) Reconflation of Islamic Revival and Islamism; d) deconflation through appealing to inevitable modernity of Islam's politicisation; e) the 'trajectory of political discourse of modernity in the Arab World which can be expressed in terms that are not imitative of the Western experience' (xxv); f) Conflation of the Islamist *din wa dawla* (religion and state); g) deconflation of Islamist *din wa dawla*.

'modernists' highlight the 'a la carte' manipulation of the religious lexicon to construct and justify policies for the modern present (Halliday, 1993: 153-154, 2002: 199)[25].

Fourthly, whether espousing 'new social history' or incorporating analytical tools from other disciplines, the conceptual lens adopted by 'pluralists' attempts to problematise essentialist and modernist assumptions from both ends of the dichotomy (Gunning, 2000: 15-25). In the first instance, Ira Lapidus (1980, 2002) and John Esposito (2010, 2011) emphasised that the relationship between religion and politics in Islamic societies has always been ambiguous and diverse. Therefore, in a postmodernist construction of the secular nation state, identity is neither imposed nor contradictory to Islam but has continuously existed in tandem with religious symbols creating complex systems of meaning (Lapidus, 2002: 870). Similarly, Asef Bayat (2005, 2007, 2010, 2011), believed post-Islamism represents a change from the universal monopolisation of religious truth towards 'ambiguity, multiplicity, inclusion and compromise in the movement's principles and practice', a development which represents a shift from the immanence of Islam to Muslim agents 'who come to define and redefine their religion' (Bayat, 2007: 13, 2010: 231).

Complementing and supplementing this 'new social history' is research aiming to construct a framework that 'includes the study of foundational texts but that insists upon connecting them to the questions and debates of contemporary scholarship across disciplines and regions' (Ernst & Martin, 2010: 8). By applying methodological techniques developed by Michel Foucault, Talal Asad and Pierre Bourdieu, three figures relatively under-explored by the field, the discursive Enlightenment tradition that influenced Islamic scholarship by defining conceptualisations of both religion and secularism can be analytically contextualised and problematised to produce a reconstituted dialectic. For Lawrence (2010: 304-305), this 'cosmopolitanism' recaptures Islam's diversity and dynamism[26].

In conclusion, the field of Islamic studies, formed and institutionalised from the beginning of the 20th Century, was not parochial in its initial assessment of Islam. Nevertheless, the emergence of the U.S. as a global superpower, as well as

[25] Expanding on this point, Zubaida (2011: 4) calls this exercise 'spray on Islam', in which the adjective is implanted onto modern concepts – 'Islamic' state, 'Islamic' finance, 'Islamic' art, 'Islamic' science etc. – in order to manufacture a false difference and ensure the relevance of Islam in a modern context.

[26] This conclusion questions whether Salvatore's (1997: xiii, 249) construction of a 'fifth circle' represents 'new-Orientalism' or pluralism. Salvatore comments that 'de-essentializing Islam' does not necessarily imply the 're-essentializing of modernity'. The 'fifth circle' offers an alternative to the constraints of a Western hermeneutic straightjacket by developing a hybrid methodology based on an Islamic canon of modernity that reconstructs *turath* ('cultural heritage') to interpret Islam as a 'coherent, albeit plural, cultural system fostering an original tradition of knowledge'. However, due to the onus of the 'fifth circle' being reliant and dependent on reconstructing an autonomous Islamic trajectory, this thesis places Salvatore in the category of 'new Orientalism'.

corresponding developments in the Islamic world, provided new opportunities for scholars equipped with new methods to challenge the dispositions and positions of traditional Orientalists. Ultimately, in this revised configuration of intra/inter-disciplinary competition, Islam became 'essentially contested' (Gallie, 1956) between 'neo-Orientalists', 'new Orientalists', 'modernists' and 'pluralists'. While the predominant orthodoxy of the field may privilege conventional intra-field debates between Orientalists and modernists, the disposition of 'pluralists' to explore and construct inter-field conceptual frameworks represents an emerging trend.

Rather than propagate decontextualised and dichotomous grand narratives, Islam can be neither separated from a historical tradition in which endogenously-constituted ideas of religion were conceived nor detached from the exogenously-determined political, social and economic conditions that precipitated its (re)emergence. Whereas structural approaches risk creating 'homogenous and coherent social units which are to be identified by the discourse of their ideologies' (Bayat, 2005: 891), prioritising an agential perspective that examines the diversification of relational interactions threatens to reduce structures of practice (Turam, 2011: 144-146). Consequently, the objective of a 'pluralist' approach is to problematise prevailing assumptions by constructing contextualised frameworks that reconcile the mutually constitutive dialectic between agency and structure (Hroub, 2010: 9-19; Schwedler, 2011: 135-137).

Recalling the nexus posed in the introduction between 'Islamic political movements' or 'social movements in Islamic societies', Burke (1988: 33) concluded that the more relevant discovery would be incorporating methodological advances that enhanced the enrichment of both perspectives. However, while a 'pluralist' perspective offers insights into bridging this chasm through a sociological lens that identifies Islamist movements as heterogeneous and situational, it lacks a cohesive framework with which to harmonise its epistemological and methodological assumptions for the purpose of accessing and enabling discussions within the academic field. In order to further explore the sociological aspect of Islamist movements, the next part of this chapter will examine the development of social movement theory, a subfield of sociology that provides conceptual frameworks for investigating collective action within and across a range of contexts.

1.2 Introducing Social Movement Theory

Whether framed via the collective consciousness of the proletariat from the dominant control of the bourgeoisie (Marx), the solidarity of active participation caused by the *anomie* of societal breakdown (Durkheim) or the instrumental rationality of agents responding to the inequality of resources (Weber), this triumvirate of pioneers who contributed to defining the field of Sociology all conceptualised the phenomenon of collective action (Ruggiero & Montagna, 2008: 9). However, the inception of the 'classical period' of social movements was marked by an interest in the seemingly irrational behaviour of individuals following the Second World War.

Influenced by the Chicago School and the Frankfurt Institute of Psychoanalysis, collective action theorists examined the effects of 'structural strain' on marginalised segments of society, a process precipitated by industrialisation, urbanisation, unemployment and War (Blumer, 1951; Park, 1967; Turner & Killian, 1957). According to Neil Smelser (1962), the maelstrom of grievances resulting from the relative deprivation and social alienation of 'structural strain' evoked an anxious response by affected individuals who embarked upon incoherent and anarchic collective action against the inability of institutions to manage the change or restore cohesion (Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 4). For these 'breakdown theorists', rather than concentrate on the ideology of mass society, beliefs were constituted by an individual's innate attitude and psychological propensity (Garner, 1997: 11). Reinforcing this social-psychological dimension, Ted Gurr's (1970: 319) 'frustration-aggression' thesis stated that collective action 'is a diffuse disposition towards aggressive action determinate on relative deprivation' and the 'perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations and their value capabilities'.

Deviating from observations that investigated the psychologically predisposed and primordial responses of individuals to structural strain, Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) viewed social movements as rational and organisational. For RMT, structural strain was not the cause of collective action but an objective and ubiquitous reality. Rather than an instant reaction to specific structural conditions, social movement was a dynamic interaction between organised contenders and the shifting politico-economic context (McAdam, 1982: 7-17). RMT also contended that participants of collective action were not as estranged as 'breakdown theorists' had assumed (Oberschall, 1973). Furthermore, not only were social movements collective by definition, but by privileging psychological explanations, 'breakdown theorists' would

be unable to effectively account for the historical role of social movements in facilitating political change.

Inspired by Mancur Olson (1965), RMT offered an alternative conceptualisation focusing on a meso-level, 'neoutilitarian logic' (Cohen, 1985: 674) in which social movement organisations (SMOs) operated as the 'orienting, focal unit of analysis' (Snow et al, 2004). Navigating within the social movement sector (SMS) and the social movement industry (SMI), SMOs managed collective action by instrumentally accumulating and distributing resources through cost-benefit analyses for the purpose of utilising and creating solidary networks as well as achieving external consensus in effectively pursuing strategically and politically calculated interests (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 1979; Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 8)[27]. By instilling collective action with a Weberian-infused framework of instrumental rationality and institutional bureaucracy, RMT had reconceptualised social movement theory in two ways. Firstly, by emphasising the rationality and agency of organised actors in decision-making, not only had RMT de-essentialised the reductionist trend of prioritising 'structural strain', but it had also disproved the psychological motivations determining collective action and replaced them with the dynamic aspirations of emancipation (McAdam, 1982: 17; Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 15-16; Garner, 1997: 22; Cohen, 1985: 688). Secondly, as organised 'New Left' movements emerged, RMT had recaptured the study of social movements from other strands of sociology by constructing a robust conceptual framework with which to address this new trend.

1.3 New Social Movements

While concurring with an RMT approach that involved rational, networked and organised participants, European 'new social movement' (NSM) theorists diverged from their U.S. counterparts in their omission of three determinant factors of collective action, namely social structures, culture and identity (Cohen, 1985: 673). Although hailing from traditional Marxism, these scholars shifted the locus of discontentment and conflict from the proletariat struggle over production and distribution to a new space where an eclectic class, crossing traditional boundaries, harboured post-material values that target the quality of life in civil society (Cohen, 1985: 667; Offe, 1985: 293; Melucci, 1985: 789; Habermas, 1987: 392). In a 'post-industrial' or 'programmed' society, the social system, symbolised by money and

[27] While the shared beliefs of a social movements advocating action are contained within the SMS, the SMO acts as the formal body that identifies with and represents the interests of the social movement within an SMI comprised of other social movements vying to facilitate social change (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, 1979).

power, threatened to create and reproduce truths by encroaching onto the 'life world' – the repository of shared meaning which enable human beings to communicate, negotiate, socialise and legitimate (Touraine, 1981; Habermas, 1987: 393-394; Beckford, 1986: 146). Responding to this infraction, social movements mobilised to create an alternative public space and, in a Gramscian sense, contest over 'social control of the main cultural pattern' (Touraine, 1985: 754).

NSM theorists also countered an RMT approach that directed collective action towards political institutions. Contrary to the 'old paradigm' of an unchallenged welfare state establishing a civic culture of universalised interests, compartmentalised spheres and de-emphasised political participation, the 'new paradigm', in which the private/public distinction disappeared as the gap between state and civil society expanded, NSMs sought to challenge 'the social construction of the very boundaries between public, private, and political domains of action (Cohen, 1985: 694; Offe, 1985: 824). Confronted by inept and incapable representatives, NSMs deviated from conventional political structures to an autonomous 'sub-system' of latent forms of subinstitutional and extraparliamentary protest (Melucci, 1985: 798; Wolff, 1998: 58-59).

Consequently, the 'new' nature of social movements was the creation of this physical space between the state and civil society. NSMs were neither 'post modern', in espousing new values that were not universally shared amongst civil society, nor 'premodern', in adhering to 'a romanticized prerational past' (Offe, 1985: 849). In a 'post-industrial' epoch of globalised and interconnected information networks, NSMs strived to occupy this 'new space' with the collective identities of those suffering from 'withdrawal symptoms in a culturally impoverished and unilaterally rationalized praxis of everyday life' (Habermas, 1981: 36). By challenging prevailing norms of practice, NSMs endeavoured to politicise institutions of civil society without the constraints of political institutions for the purpose of reconstituting a culture of collective action that was 'no longer dependent upon ever more regulation, control, and intervention' (Offe, 1985: 820).

For NSM theorists, a utilitarian approach was insufficient because collective action was not confined to political institutions and strategic calculations as 'new' conflicts affected the system's cultural production (Cohen, 1985: 690; Melucci, 1985: 798). Therefore, it was not what movements *do* (RMT) but what they *are* (NSMs), mobilisations emerging in the cleavage between state and society that substitute

aspirations for political integration with the preservation of their collective identity. The objective was to facilitate change through modernising institutions, creating new elites, affecting political decision-making and renewing cultural meaning (Melucci, 1985: 807-815). The formation of the movement represented the ends, not the means. Furthermore, while RMT could understand *how* collective action occurred, by epistemologically privileging the instrumental rationality of actors over the structural forces that constituted cultural norms and collective identities, RMT could not explain *why* or *where* collective action was directed due to its continuous tautological *modus operandi* that omitted evolution, contingency or change (Melucci, 1985: 797; Wolff, 1998: 54-57; Della Porta & Diani, 1999: 9; Foweraker, 1995: 17). Conversely, in order to assess opportunities for collective action, NSM scholars focused on identity formation and cultural positioning within social contexts (Wolff, 1998: 54-57).

1.4 Political Process Model

In the context of the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S., McAdam (1982: 40) concluded that 'breakdown' theorists and RMT were equally ill-equipped to explain that social movements 'develop in response to an ongoing process of interaction between movement groups and the larger socio-economic environment they seek to change'. While agreeing with NSM scholars on the existence of structural opportunities, McAdam invoked the importance of 'political process' (Tilly, 1978), a position that converged with RMT regarding instrumental rationality and SMO management in organising resources for political ends. By invoking Peter Eisinger's (1973: 11) 'structure of opportunities', defined as 'a set of constraints or opportunities presented by the political environment that enable collective action', McAdam (1982: 40-50) devised a tripartite model for political process that combined this concept with RMT and Marxist notions on 'cognitive liberation'[28].

Firstly, collective action should be viewed as a political struggle between protesters and the state in which the opportunities for defiance afforded to the former are structured by the institutional modalities and access extended by the latter (Piven & Cloward, 1977: 23). Consequently, protesters are vulnerable to the symbolic and tangible concessions or incentives offered by a system of elites. Therefore, political impact is limited by a structure of opportunities whereby 'protesters win, if they win at all, what historical circumstances has already made ready to be conceded' (Piven &

[28] Eisinger (1973: 28) confirmed the existence and importance of a 'structure of political opportunities' by explaining that the very appearance of protest 'signifies changes not only among previously quiescent or conventionally oriented groups but also in the political system itself'.

Cloward, 1977: 36). Expanding on these insights, McAdam (1982: 41-43) suggested that although structural instability is the default position in capitalist societies, political opportunities vary over time. The possibilities emanating from these structural shifts enable challengers to reduce the power imbalance and improve their bargaining position, which encourages collective action by raising the costs of repression and diminishing the risks of participation.

Secondly, as rational actors, social movements seek to transform opportunities to enhance the resources, organisation and durability of collective action. Addressing the deficiencies of RMT, McAdam attempted to qualify the definition of a 'resource', formerly referred to as 'legitimacy, money, facilities, and labor' (McCarthy & Zald, 1977: 1220) while resolving the 'free-rider' problem in which rational individuals choose to benefit from movement mobilisation as opposed to contributing resources to its cause (Olson, 1965). Rather than vaguely describe resources as anything ranging from material to non-material assets (Oberschall, 1973: 28), McAdam (1982: 41-44) prioritised resources pertaining to the recruitment of members, the establishment of solidary incentives, the improvement of communication networks and the centralisation of leadership. Moreover, citing the work of Aldon Morris (1981: 766), McAdam (1982: 41-44) posited that utilising and transferring the motives of established pre-existing network structures and internal social organisations would provide a solution to the 'free-rider' obstacle.

Thirdly, McAdam (1982: 48) observed that 'mediating between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations'. By treating grievances as peripheral, not only had RMT ignored the variation of collective perception to structural conditions over time, but it had also failed to explain how movements, presented with identical political opportunities, pursued different strategies and paths (McAdam, 1982: 35; Szymanski, 2003: 7). Consequently, prospective participants must recognise that the system has lost legitimacy, demand rights for change and realise the potential opportunities in affecting change. Invoking the Marxist term of 'cognitive liberation', a self-reflective process of defiance by which a change in consciousness regarding the environment precipitates a shift in behaviour (Piven & Cloward, 1977: 1-4), McAdam (1982: 48-49) provided a relational link between the structure of political opportunities and the subjective perceptions of social movements.

Inexorably linked with 'cognitive liberation' was the role of institutional elites in shaping social movements. Deviating from conventional understanding, in which institutionalised elites prevent movements from organising and accessing the establishment in order to preserve their position (Gamson, 1968: 20), McAdam (1982: 32) argued that this perspective underestimated the ability of social movements to independently influence elites. McAdam (1982: 57-58) concluded that the success of a movement relies on a choice between institutional (reformist) and noninstitutional (revolutionary) tactics. Paradoxically, while the former represents a more acceptable and attainable objective for collective action, this direction risks diminishing its impact by endowing movements with the same powerlessness that initially led them to adopt noninstitutional avenues (Eisinger, 1973: 26).

1.5 Collective Action Frames

During the nascent discourse on SMT, a recurring trend was the attempt to conceptualise the schism between the existence of objective structural conditions that present opportunities for collective action and the subjective perceptions of this environment by social movement agents. Referencing the tendency of traditional models to 'abstract the participant/respondent from the context and networks in which the rationales are developed', a group of sociologists posited that these approaches were unable to adequately comprehend dynamic interpretive processes due to the uniform application of grievances (Snow et al, 1986: 465). Invoking the concept of 'framing', which acted to 'locate, perceive, identify, and label' events in relation to life spaces (Goffman, 1974: 21), Snow (et al, 1986: 464) coined the term 'frame alignment', a process that linked individual and SMO interpretive orientations as congruent and complementary. While framing viewed movements as the 'carriers of extant ideas and meanings', agents 'actively engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning' (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 613). Therefore, the impetus for collective action required three core framing tasks: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 615-617).

The implementation of these objectives is achieved through three concurrent practices (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 623-626). Firstly, in the 'discursive field', a movement will focus on Frame Amplification, which involves articulating and accentuating a frame with emphasis on the 'clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that bears on a particular issue' (Snow et al, 1986: 469). Subsequently, Frame Alignment enables the SMO, and its interpretation, to be

perceived as synonymous with the issue. Secondly, the 'strategic field' encompasses the utilitarian characteristics of SMO aspirations. To optimise mobilisation, an SMO engages in Frame Bridging, which conjoins ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames to appeal to individuals with common grievances and orientations but lacking organisation or direction (Snow et al, 1986: 467). Additionally, SMOs utilise Frame Extension, which endeavours to portray their interests as inclusive of broader issues, as well as Frame Transformation, which seeks to readjust or reformulate pre-existing frames (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 625). Thirdly, in the 'contested field', since SMOs are unable to unilaterally impose interpretations of reality, they may confront counterframing, a situation whereby the construction of frames becomes debated and negotiated both internally and externally as to the most effective method for collective action (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 625).

Ultimately, the strategic aim of framing within these three fields is to align personal and collective identities between protagonists and constituents (Snow & McAdam, 2000: 43-45). In doing so, SMOs are engaged in identity convergence and identity construction. While the latter attracts support from pre-existing solidary networks and identities, the former produces a new collective identity in which individuals regard movement activity as 'consistent with their self-conception and interests' (Snow & McAdam, 2000: 47-61). Nevertheless, framing does not operate in a vacuum but remains a relationally dynamic process in which participation and identity are subject to 'reassessment and renegotiation' within the contextual constraints of politics, culture and society (Snow et al, 1986: 467; Snow & Benford, 2000a: 628-630). As agents are both consumers and producers of meaning, frames are equally susceptible to changes in perceived political opportunities or cultural patterns (Tarrow, 1992: 189). Moreover, while a 'master frame' broadens appeal at the expense of detail, exclusive frames risk alienating prospective participants (Snow & Benford, 1992: 133-155). In order to mitigate against these threats, frames rely on credibility, in appearing empirically viable and consistent, as well as salience, in terms of centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity (Snow & Benford, 2000a: 619; Snow & Benford, 1988). Regardless, an SMO must frequently adapt and evolve depending on its situational context.

The conceptual framework provided by Collective Action Frames offers five general contributions to social movement theory. Firstly, frames flourish in contexts of interpretative ambiguity and contested meaning. Secondly, deviating from McAdam,

frames are not cognitive structures located in individuals but properties of organisations. Thirdly, master frames that are the product of these interpretative processes are central to understanding the course and character a movement. Fourthly, frames can be studied both as dependent and independent variables. Lastly, ideology, collective action frames and opportunity structures are 'different words not for the same thing but for different aspects and dimensions of the complex of symbolic, ideational and intersubjective factors associated with movement mobilization and dynamics' that are intrinsically interconnected via discursive framing processes (Snow, 2004: 405).

1.6 Towards a Synthesis

Intending to assimilate and harmonise prevailing trends within the discipline, Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (1996) proposed a synthesised conceptualisation of SMT. This project was influenced by two interrelated developments in the 1990s. Firstly, while U.S. scholarship had focused on using political process to link institutional politics to social movements in a national context, European NSM scholars had begun applying political opportunity structures to a cross-national context. Secondly, the advent 'cultural turn' in a post-Cold War epoch encouraged scholars to rethink their structural and rational bias in exchange for considering the cultural and ideational factors determining mobilisation (Jasper, 2007: 59; Platt & Williams, 2002: 328; McAdam, 1994: 36-37; Morris, 1992: 351).

Firstly, for NSM scholars, McAdam's Political Process Model (PPM) was constrained by two factors. Primarily, PPM failed to account for how movements perceive the availability of opportunities and why, given similar circumstances, movements adopted different strategies to pursue these opportunities. Additionally, PPM could not explain why a movement sometimes succeeds in seizing its opportunities while other movements might fail (Syzmanski, 2003: 12). In response, and building upon the work of Herbert Kitschelt (1986), Hanspeter Kriesi (et al, 1995: xii, 244) suggested a reconceptualisation that connected external political constraints with movements' choices at the meso-level of enquiry.

Rather than view institutional restraints as inferred, Kitschelt (1986: 58) initially aimed to emphasise movement variations in mobilisation and impact by listing institutional factors that influenced the choices and inhibited the activities of movement actors. Through a cross-national study of anti-nuclear movements in France, Sweden, the

U.S. and West Germany, Kitschelt (1986: 61-67) discovered that a movement's impact was directly correlated to the relative open or closed nature of the prevailing political system within each country. Expanding on these findings, Kriesi (et al, 1995: xiii) argued that political opportunities were defined by national cleavage structures, institutional structures, prevailing strategies and alliance structures. Furthermore, as opposed to the general conceptualisation of movement interests in PPM, the instrumental, subcultural and countercultural characteristics of a movement, and its relational experiences with the political system, were pivotal in explaining mobilisation strategies and impact (Kriesi et al, 1995: 236-237).

Secondly, since the social constructionist perspective of Collective Action Frames (CAF) had provided a conceptual link between the duality of structures and agency in collective action, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) adopted this approach as a means of integrating the 'cultural turn' into SMT. Adapting Max Weber's analogy that man 'is suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun', Clifford Geertz (1973: 5) postulated that culture represented those very webs of significance. Therefore, interpreting culture is a semiotic exercise of meaning in an 'interworked system of construable signs' (Geertz, 1973: 14). However, culture was not just systemic but also performative (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995: 5-8). For Ann Swidler (1995: 27), if culture influenced collective action, it was not by supplying the ends but providing 'the vocabulary of meanings, the expressive symbols, and the emotional repertoire with which they can seek anything at all'. By extension, culture offers a 'tool-kit' of components that are used to construct 'strategies of action' (Swidler, 1986: 273).

In an unprecedented time for the confrontation of human cultures (Melucci, 1995: 41), CAF could not only highlight the role of culture in recruitment resources and pre-existing networks, but it could also present a resonant view of the world that legitimises and motivates protest activity by mediating between structurally-determined opportunities and the 'processes by which the meaning and attributed significance of shifting political conditions is assessed' (McAdam, 1994: 37-43)[29]. However, while a conceptualisation of culture through the lens of CAF could enhance understandings of movement emergence and impact, cultural variables could not be assessed independently in isolation but in coordination with developments in RMT

[29] Invoking Melucci's (1995: 50-55) assertion that collective identities are complex processes involving semantics of meaning, CAF were also proposed to assist in the 'conceptually muddy' topic of collective identity to 'reconstitute the individual self around a new and valued identity' between the social psychological (dispositional) or post-material changes in industrial society (structural). (Hunt et al, 1994: 192; Freidman & McAdam, 1992: 169; Snow & McAdam, 2000: 62; Klandermans, 1992; Gamson, 1992).

and PPM to explain how culture acts as an opportunity and constraint, how framing constructs meaning and how social movement produces culture (Johnston & Klandermans, 1994: 21; McAdam, 1994: 45).

Reflecting these discussions, Political Process Theory (PPT) consisted of three conceptual components (McAdam et al, 1996: 3-10). Firstly, the authors redefined political opportunity as encompassed by the relative openness or closure of the political system, the stability of elite alignments underpinning a polity, the presence of elites and the state's capacity and history of repression. Secondly, 'cultural framing' was included as the link mediating between opportunity and action involving the 'conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action' (McAdam et al, 1996: 6). Thirdly, maintaining the contributions of RMT, 'mobilising structures' remained unchanged as 'those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage' (McAdam et al, 1996: 3). By combining the dominant strands of SMT, PPT intended to encourage theorists to broaden their research programme to include cross-national studies beyond the confines of democratic Western polities (McAdam et al, 1996: xii-xiii).

1.7 Misinterpreting Culture

The most vehement criticism of PPT came from Jeff Goodwin and James Jasper (2004). Referring to the model as an untested 'hegemonic' paradigm, the authors, proponents of 'cultural constructivism', emphasised PPT's conceptual deficiencies in relegating notions of strategy, agency and culture within immutable structures thereby failing to ascertain how structured opportunities and constraints are perceived in the inter-subjective understandings of different social movements (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 88, 90-91). Firstly, political opportunity structure, the reconceptualised and underlying tenet of PPT, was not only overly 'political' in nature but it engendered 'virtually anything that…helped a movement mobilise or attain its goals' (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 11). Similarly, although PPT claimed to increase the utility of the RMT-inspired concept of 'mobilising structures' by clarifying its definition of 'resources', the model had simply created another 'sponge' to soak up a wealth of potential opportunities (Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 275; Meyer, 2004).

Secondly, by separating 'cultural framing' from opportunities (McAdam, 1994: 39), not only had PPT omitted the influence of culture in shaping political and mobilising

structures, but the model had also failed to understand that cultural factors define and create opportunities presented as structural (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 9, 24, 28). Rather than attempt to construct SMT based upon the microfoundations of agency, strategy and culture, an approach that places 'human agency at the centre of movement analysis, for it operates at the centre of collective action' (Morris, 2004: 246), PPT was accused of propagating invariant models of structure that privilege conceptual hyperinflation and discard individuals from the equation (Goodwin & Jasper, 2004: 76, 90, 92).

In effect, by offering a conceptualisation that fused CAF with culture and incorporated these elements into PPM, PPT was guilty of employing 'cultural framing' as a corrective to remedy the discrepancies of PPM and ensure its survival in the face of new academic realities (Jasper, 2010: 965). In compartmentalising culture to a component of CAF for the purpose of connecting structural opportunities and SMOs, the ability of the latter to rationally and selectively deploy CAF as a resource in PPT not only underestimates the ubiquitous influence of culture, but it also structuralises agency by denying CAF its original remit of illustrating the dynamic interaction between society, the movement and individuals in which meaning is continuously contested and constructed (Tarrow, 1992: 197; Klandermans, 1992: 100; Williams, 2004: 100-101; Whittier, 2002: 291). As the 'elusive and ill-defined pseudoentity' (Geertz, 1973: 29), culture is not simply determined *a priori*, deployed instrumentally as an identifiable and enabling 'tool-kit' or the exclusive preserve of an SMO, but it also represents a potentially debilitating force that is contained within semiotic codes, social practices and institutionalised structures (Williams, 2002: 329, 2004: 99; Swidler, 1995: 28-30).

Independent of its association with culture, CAF were useful in conceptualising the activities of movement activists but overemphasised their cognitive elements (Williams, 2004: 93, 2002: 250-251). Although CAF implied the emergence of a symbolic congruence of consciousness and identity between the organisation and its members, the approach failed to recognise that 'activists are multivocal rather than mono-ideological, consensual and passive' (Platt & Williams, 2002: 356; Gamson, 1995: 105-106). Therefore, in order to explain identity, solidarity and consciousness in collective action, one must migrate from a theory of SMOs to explore the mutually constitutive link between the individual (agency) and socio-cultural (structural) levels

in facilitating and constraining mobilisation (Gamson, 1992: 74; Whittier, 2002: 292-295; Platt & Williams, 2002: 353)[30].

Reacting to these responses, McAdam (2004: 224-225) admitted that the 'existing theoretical consensus is inadequate to account for the origins of the very movement that animated the perspective in the first place'. Citing his work on 'contentious politics', a relational model that aims to utilise insights from rational, cultural and structural approaches to 'produce a program of inquiry centred on the detection of robust mechanisms and processes in contentious episodes' (McAdam et al, 2001: 304), McAdam (2004: 230) concluded that unless these perspectives are combined, 'we cannot hope to develop anything close to a complete understanding of the origins of social movements'.

For Jasper (2010: 966, 2004: 3), these mechanisms remain structuralist and static by dismissing movement dynamism and eliminating the process of choice at the micro-level. Ultimately, Jasper (2004: 12) believes that sociologists need to develop a social model that compensates for the 'weaknesses of game theory's individualistic and economic models…and structural sociology's blindness to agency and action'. By way of an alternative, Jasper (2010: 965, 2004) proposed a 'theory of action', an approach to collective action that shifts the focus of inquiry to agency, strategy and culture. In this perspective, choices, which are explained by metaphors of meaning, rhetoric, emotions, morality, leadership and psychology, can only be assessed by considering culture as all action, including the perception of opportunities, the definition of resources, network mobilisation and participant motivation, which is filtered through cultural understandings. Consequently, these cultural meanings are also used to persuade audiences that they share interests, solidarity, identity and direction (Jasper, 2010: 967; 2007: 60, 93; 2004: 4).

[30] A range of SMT literature has attempted to provide new insights on CAF. Steinberg (2002: 209, 224) suggests that CAF lacks the sufficient tools to conceptualise culture as dynamic and relational so a dialogic analysis of ongoing social action must view 'culture as a set of practices that occurs between power holders and challengers, sympathizers, authorities and other groups. Della Porta and Diani (1999: 78, 80-82) criticise framing for not considering the multiplicity of cultural models and recommend a link between symbolic production and political context, the result of which would entail an analysis of anti-system frames, realignment frames, inclusion frames and revitalisation frames. Hank Johnston (1995: 218, 241-242) proposes a microframe approach that would assess the dialogue between frame structures and the textual material on which they are based so that cultural and social influences are viewed through the lens of the individual.

1.8 Ideology and Religion in SMT

The rising prevalence of 'cultural framing' invariably caused attention to the role of ideology in collective action. Whereas Geertz (1973) viewed ideology as an aspect of the cultural system that created meaning, Williams and Platt (2002: 335) have provided a more substantial definition in which ideology is an assemblage of ideas, expressed in a discourse constructing and mobilising activities that are oriented through moral, cognitive and emotive processes responding to failures or absences of cultural doctrine and structural circumstances in order to achieve interests in establishing or re-establishing idealised conceptions of past, present and future social conditions.

Although receiving a brief mention in early forms of SMT (Turner & Killian, 1957), ideology has been traditionally neglected in favour of structural and rational alternatives. Following SMT's response to the 'cultural turn', ideology was subsumed within the remit and responsibility of CAF. According to Oliver and Johnston (2000a: 1), this placement failed to sufficiently address the relationship between CAF and the political concept of ideology. Rather than interpreting ideology as a complex interpretative schema that does not operate in a vacuum, the SMT promoted by PPT treated CAF as 'fully formed cognitive structures that constitute part of the cultural tool kit of everyday life' (Oliver & Johnston, 2000a: 3-5). By dismissing the notion of deliberation, differentiation and development of agents within social movements, CAF became a descriptive process and subsequently unable to explain how ideologies adopt, adapt and create content (Oliver & Johnston, 2000a: 7-14).

This complexity and confusion is also evident in attempts to incorporate religion within SMT. In the 19th Century canon of sociology, religion was either perceived instrumentally, as facilitating the integration of societies and mediating between the individual and the state (Beckford, 1990: 2), or in the Durkheimian sense of providing an invaluable blueprint for the construction of a moral community. Regardless, during the Enlightenment period, an age characterised political ideology, scientific discovery and technological enquiry, the 'secularisation credo' (Gunning, 2007a: 11) diagnosed religion as antithetical to modern progression. Inheriting the predominant orthodoxy of their disciplinary predecessors, 'breakdown' theorists researched collective action in the context of fascism and communism, two ideologies that reduced religion as 'epiphenomenal, a declining force in a fully secularised world' (Hannigan, 1991: 314). Although new episodes of collective action in the 1960s and 1970s inspired a

renaissance in SMT through RMT, NSM and PPM, these discussions further exacerbated the 'insulation and isolation of the sociology of religion' (Beckford, 1985; 1986: 162). Consequently, invoking religion to understand social activity was 'underexplored – arguably ignored – in the academic literature on social movements' (Smith, 1996: 2).

Attempting to initiate a discussion with NSM, Beckford (1990: 9) emphasised that in a post-industrial age of 'spirituality' and 'global ethic', religious symbolism was becoming 'increasingly cooptable by social activists trying to combat social problems'. Subsequently, elements innate to religion, such as ideological legitimation and universalistic values are conducive to the agendas of NSM. For Smith (1996: 6, 10), religion also provided assets for collective action through motivation, resources and identity. Moreover, John Hannigan (1991: 316) proposed a 'theoretical synthesis' with NSM by breaking the 'community closure' of the sociology of religion (Beckford, 1986: 16). Influenced by the work of Rodney Stark (1987) and John Lofland (1965, 1993, 1995), 'new religious movements' (NRM) argued that religion was not simply an 'epiphenomenal cloak for essentially material or political interests' (Smith, 1996: 8-9), but an invaluable method for observing and explaining 'how and why people think and act religiously' (Swatos, 1989: 153). Therefore, in an effort to prevent religion from the conceptual monopoly of other sociologists (Zald, 1982: 322; Robertson, 1985: 358), Hannigan (1991: 325-327) offered a synergy between NSM and NRM in which both represented 'collective attempts to articulate new grievances, construct new identities, and innovate new forms of association'.

Following these discussions, not only has Williams (1996: 377; 2002: 251-253) highlighted the dearth of conceptual tools with which to explain the role of religion in constructing legitimate 'cognitive rationales' that justify and motivate social change, but McAdam (et al, 1996; et al, 2001; 2004) and Jasper (2004) have also articulated the requirement of SMT to expand its remit beyond Western liberal democracies. Regardless, religion and social movements remained on 'parallel discourses rather than enriching dialogues' (Kniss & Burns, 2004). Examining 105 essays published in major sociological journals since Mayer Zald's 1982 call to fuse the sociology of religion with social movements, only eight had addressed religion explicitly (Kniss & Burns, 2004). Nevertheless, the adoption and application of aspects of PPT by scholars analysing collective action in the Middle East, initially pioneered by Charles Kurzman (1996), have contributed valuable insights into the role of religion, especially Islam, through the SMT lens of political opportunities, mobilising structures

and cultural framing[31]. According to Charles Kurzman (2004: 295-298), the study of Islamist movements can provide SMT with an empirically testable subject that explores the challenging methodological questions encountered by Western academic engagement with collective action.

In Egypt, not only did academics critique cultural framing in its inability to comprehend the movement activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in translating ideas and ideology, derived from Islam, into organisational practices, but in the absence of political opportunity structures, the Muslim Brotherhood deployed religion as a way of perceiving opportunities, generating mobilisational resources and motivating behaviour despite the constraints imposed by a repressive and closed institutional state framework (Munson, 2001: 497-506; Wickham, 2002: 4-18). Similarly, in his work on Hamas in Gaza, Jeroen Gunning (2007a) appraised SMT assumptions by assessing how the organisation manages and balances the complex and multi-faceted relationship between religion, democracy and violence in framing ideas and motivating behaviour. Furthermore, while evaluating the mobilisation of political Islam in Turkey, Banu Eligur (2010) reiterated that SMT's omission of religion failed to examine how movements frame Islam to enhance their appeal and called for a more dynamic interaction between political opportunity structure and movement entrepreneurs. For Bayat (2005, 2007), SMT's Western-centric elevation of the state over civil society produced a parochial perspective of homogenous and coherent social units, a position that failed to recognise the differentiated and diverse composition of movements that have the capacity to change their environments without access to political power.

Conclusion

Garner (1997: 1) summarised that 'more than any other field of sociology, the study of social movements is volatile because the phenomena under consideration change so rapidly'. This brief synopsis demonstrates a fundamental chasm between conceptual frameworks within SMT. The complexity of constructing and implementing an effective conceptual framework for collective action has split the field along dichotomous epistemological perspectives and dualistic methodological approaches. As scholars debate the relative prevalence of structure versus agency or material versus ideational factors in explaining the causal mechanisms motivating

[31] Kurzman (1996); Munson (2001); Wickham (2002); Hafez (2003); Wiktorowicz (2004); Bayat (2005); Gunning (2007a); Eligur (2010). The Political Process Model has also been applied to the Kurdish Nationalist Movement (Romano, 2006), the First Palestinian Intifada (Alimi, 2007) and the Second Palestinian Intifada (Araj and Brym, 2010).

collective action, it is no longer accurate to speak of a definitive 'social movement theory' with clear parameters, but to refer to a sub-discipline of sociology invigorated, yet fragmented, by 'theories of social movement'.

The trends and themes of this tautological intra-disciplinary debate recall the earlier discussions within field of Islamic studies. In both instances, each field is beset with conceptual questions that have produced polarisation, encouraged the pursuit of divergent practices and reproduced the logic as well as the characteristics of a divided discourse. Subsequently, enhancing the conceptualisation of social movements, particularly in the Middle East, remains a highly contested, debated and fractured exercise. However, this literature review has identified convergent commonalities between the 'pluralist' position within Islamic studies and the 'critical' branch of SMT. Specifically, rather than conform to an orthodoxy that prioritises structural and rational explanations of collective action, these proponents of revisionism seek to replace reductionist theories with new methods that reposition the epistemological focus to a sociological interpretivism responsible for conceptualising mobilisation through the lens of agency, strategy, culture and religion.

While scholars have endeavoured to contextualise and subsequently problematise collective action by applying mainstream SMT to Islamist movements in the Middle East, these embryonic experiments misinterpret the objectives of theoretical examination by exhibiting a tendency 'largely to "borrow" from rather than critically and productively engage with an thus contribute to, social movement theories' (Bayat, 2010: 4). Commenting on the increasing irrelevance of traditional grand theories, Jasper (2010: 965) affirmed that 'the passing of these giants from the intellectual stage has left a silence'. Therefore, in order to construct a viable and effective path to explain movement mobilisation in the Middle East, a more representational and rigorous conceptual framework of analytical tools must be devised that synthesises the respective contributions of the 'pluralist' and 'critical' schools of thought.

The next chapter will attempt to address this challenge by exploring the work of Pierre Bourdieu as a potential intermediary and interlocutor between 'pluralist' Islamic studies and 'critical' SMT. Interestingly, both Jasper (2004, 2010) and McAdam (2011, 2012), scholars positioned on polarised ends of the SMT spectrum,

have invoked Bourdieu for enhancing their conceptualisations of collective action[32]. However, not only do they neglect to adequately credit Bourdieu with providing the methods behind their observations, but they also reference Bourdieu's work selectively rather than acknowledge that his theoretical concepts are relationally inclusive and interdependent. Conversely, by transforming mutually exclusive dichotomies into mutually constituting dialectics, the adoption and application of Bourdieu's sophisticated analytical tools can facilitate a conceptual process that bridges the chasm between Islamic studies and SMT to produce a more accurate understanding of Islamist movements.

[32] Jasper's 'Theory of Action' (2004: 5, 2010), which is reminiscent of Bourdieu (1998), places actors in 'strategic fields', arenas governed by resources and rules in which actors judge 'what new arenas their opponents can force them into, and what resources and skills they and other players control fro maneuvering in those arenas'. Fligstein and McAdam (2011, 2012) suggest a theory of 'Strategic Action Fields', a 'meso level of social order where actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of a field, the relationships and the rules'.

Chapter Two

Introducing *Metanoia* into Social Movement Theory

'Social research is something much too serious and too difficult for us to allow ourselves to mistake scientific *rigidity*, which is the nemesis of intelligence and invention, for scientific *rigor*, and thus to deprive ourselves of this or that resource available in the full panoply of intellectual traditions of our discipline and of the sister disciplines of anthropology, economics, history, etc'.

- *Pierre Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 227)*

'A theoretical problem that is converted into a *machine for research* is set in motion, it becomes in a sense self-propelling, it is driven as much by difficulties it brings up as by the solutions it provides'.

- *Pierre Bourdieu (1993a: 29)*

'There is no denying that there exist dispositions to resist; and one of the tasks of sociology is precisely to examine under what conditions these dispositions are socially constituted, effectively triggered, and rendered politically efficient'.

- *Pierre Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 81)*

In the previous chapter, a synopsis of collective action was provided in which seemingly incompatible dichotomies were identified within and between the fields of Islamic studies and SMT. In the case of the former, traditional disputes tend to oscillate around the importance of the 'Islam' adjective in accounting for the manifestation, motivation and movement of collective action in Muslim societies, leading to a perennial ontological and epistemological chasm between Orientalists, modernists and pluralists. Similarly, incommensurate sociological dualisms in SMT have ensured that scholars fundamentally disagree on the integral causes and components of collective action[33]. The lack of a cohesive explanatory model has added complexity and confusion in applying these approaches to empirical cases. Consequently, the conclusion indicated that the 'pluralist' branch of Islamic studies and the 'critical' school of SMT were manoeuvring away from the primacy of reductive conceptualisations that privilege the universal rationality of actors operating in their objectively structured environment to converge on the importance of agency, ideology and culture. While 'pluralists' are experimenting with the contextualisation of Islam within variable social conditions by adopting methodological techniques from other disciplines, 'critical' SMT seeks to revitalise the discipline by alluding to the differentiated, dynamic and diverse characteristics of movement mobilisation.

[33] These include reconciling the relative importance of agency/structure, subjectivism/objectivism, universalism/particularism, individual/social, materialist/ideationist and qualitative/quantitative perspectives.

As SMT provides an analytical framework that focuses on collective action across time and space without essentialising specifically geographical or religious factors, it is preferable to work within the remit of its pre-existing theoretical assumptions and incorporate the perspectives of 'pluralist' Islamic studies rather than attempt to construct and elaborate upon the latter emerging school of thought, which represents more of an ad hoc corrective than an alternative revision within the discipline. Nevertheless, traditional SMT is not without its challenges. In particular, there are four areas of academic incongruity that should be addressed in order to prevent SMT practitioners from engaging in tautological debates regarding the theoretical primacy of their respective epistemological priorities.

Firstly, SMT remains restricted by its inability to effectively assess the weighted importance of the agency/structure dialectic. In the prevalent model proposed by Political Process Theory, mobilised actors are depicted as subservient to exogenous structures. In this respect, not only are agents rendered reactive to opportunities for collective action presented by the predominance of events beyond their control, but since the social movement organisation is responsible for translating these objective developments into the subjective perceptions of its supporters, agents are also characterised as passive receptacles bereft of the capacities to interpret opportunities independently. Furthermore, the mobilisation strategies devised by a social movement organisation are governed and determined by a structured definition of instrumental rationality that omits a nuanced approach that privileges the dynamism of situational contexts. Although the agency/structure dualism is perhaps the most enduring and contentious question across academic disciplines, effectively explaining the strategic motivations of movement mobilisation requires a conceptual framework that reconciles this complex distinction.

Secondly, there is an inclination for mainstream SMT to promote a linear and uniform application of culture and ideology that simplifies the emergence and manifestation of collective action. While Political Opportunity Structures, Mobilising Structures and Collective Action Frames each draw upon the relevance of cultural and ideational factors in pre-existing repertoires of movement mobilisation, the identification, comprehension and appropriation of these structuralised forces are interpreted as attainable and deployable resources rather than contested as well as constantly structuring concepts. By extension, since social movement organisations are presumed to comprise of rational actors with instrumental interests, the struggle for ideas is not perceived as an enabling and disabling feature of collective action but as

a product to be acquired and utilised. In both instances, the multi-faceted complexity of culture and ideas in movement mobilisation is underexplored. Consequently, in order to induce SMT with a more nuanced conceptualisation of collective action, a relational approach is required in which culture and ideas are construed as entrenched elements within the immanent structures of the social world that generate and regulate practice while simultaneously providing actors with a set of parameters of possibilities for framing interests, accruing resources and motivating action.

Thirdly, the prevailing Political Process Theory disproportionately channels the direction and purpose of mobilisation towards the end of political recognition and representation. Contrarily, episodes of collective action in the Middle East are not necessarily conceived or predicated on political aspirations. For example, Islamist Resistance movements propagate a holistic approach that positions them within concurrent spheres of activity. While engaging with the political institutions of the state may be a desired goal, Islamist Resistance movements expend a significant amount of effort in implementing other related objectives, such as sustaining their presence in military arenas as well as cultivating networks of social services in their communities. By constitution and composition, the structures that determine the logics and rules of these spheres are different. As a result, rather than construct an encompassing strategy, social movement actors must design customised mobilisation tactics that are applicable to and compatible with the legitimate practice of the sphere in question. Therefore, the most pertinent level of analysis is not only the exclusive pursuit of the political process but also the ability of a social movement to develop varying mobilisational strategies while relationally sustaining its positions within and between multiple spheres of activity.

Lastly, traditional SMT has not sufficiently invested in conceptually explaining the relative change instigated by social movements within a prevailing political system. While SMT scholars may refer to ‘episodes’ or ‘lifecycles’ of collective action in determining the reasons behind the eruption and durability of social movements, PPT is unable to conceptually account for the trajectory or transition of movement mobilisation. Moreover, by focusing on the political dimension, the PPT subscribes to a Western-centric definition of change. Conforming to the precepts of New Social Movement Theory, some movements may consider the creation and preservation of a space within the social system as preferable to politicisation; for others, limited access to the political system may be construed as the optimal method for harmonising its positions across operational arenas without disproportionately

succumbing to the structured logic of a unipolar approach. Ultimately, in order to gauge effective indicators or indices of change, a redefinition of SMT is required to emphasise that movement practice evolves in mutual constitution to the structures of its situational context, a relationship that results in a range of strategies and directions for development.

These four limitations, which this chapter will deal with in sequence, have contributed to SMT being perceived as a disjointed field of irreconcilable theories of social movement as opposed to a coherent dialogue of SMT frameworks. This intra-disciplinary dissonance has been transposed beyond the field's borders. Consequently, non-SMT scholars seeking to apply its framework(s) to empirical studies do so selectively with only a modicum of conceptual engagement. For example, academics from outside the discipline insist on implementing PPT as a general set of parameters for examining collective action, whereas within SMT, the traditional model that was devised in 1982 and revised in 1996 has become contested. Even its chief architect, Doug McAdam (2001, 2011, 2012), has defected from its initial assumptions. Nevertheless, the disparate voices within SMT compel others to extrapolate its most elementary and digestible forms to illustrate their arguments.

In order to traverse inter/intra-disciplinary dichotomies, not only should a cross-disciplinary syncretism be constructed, which combines elements of 'pluralist' Islamic studies and 'critical' SMT, but their respective perspectives should be placed within a refined analytical framework to propose a viable conceptual alternative to the inherent deficiencies of mainstream SMT. Consequently, this thesis posits that the analytical tools enshrined in Pierre Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice' can offer a useful intermediary between divergent positions by providing the methods with which to transform dichotomies into dialectics and enhance the conceptual strength of SMT in informing a framework that elevates and prioritises the notion of mutually constituted relationality for explaining the dynamic interaction between structure and agency, the multi-faceted role of culture and ideas, the multi-dimensional characteristics of differentiated social fields and the importance of a shifting situational context in determining perceived prospects for continuous mobilisation and movement evolution.

For researchers interested in appraising the underlying tenets of their respective fields, Bourdieu represents the epitome of *kritikos*, the Ancient Greek term for

judgement that endeavours to critically challenge conventional wisdom (Grenfell, 2010: 87-88). Moreover, the ISI Web of Science lists Bourdieu as the most cited sociologist in the world since 1990 (Santoro, 2011: 3-5). Despite this recognition, while Bourdieu's epistemological and methodological insights are nominally referred to in 'pluralist' Islamic studies and 'critical' SMT, there has been no concerted effort to construct a cohesive framework of collective action by utilising his approach[34]. One reason for invocation over implementation could be the complex content and style of his writing in which 'Bourdieu's work in *globo* is still widely misunderstood, and its overall economy and internal logic remain elusive' (Garnham & Williams, 1980: 209). Therefore, the application of selected parts of Bourdieu to explain different problems leads to a misreading of his overall theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 4). However, since the underlying tenet of Bourdieu's framework is the mutually constituting and reinforcing relationality between concepts, picking aspects of his approach independent of their encompassing counterparts creates a methodological fallacy that distorts and devalues the potential of his analytical tools.

Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice', developed over 30 books and 400 articles, deplores 'theoretical theory' or 'theoreticist theories', the recurring Lakatosian tradition of theoretical explorations inclined towards analytical research that is abstract, parsimonious and formulates connections between comparable objects of enquiry, thereby constructing synthetic systems of independently conceptualised phenomena devoid of empirical investigation (Swartz, 1997: 5; Calhoun, 1993: 9). For Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 31-36, 161), research is simultaneously empirical, in confronting the world of observable phenomena, and theoretical, by engaging hypotheses regarding the underlying structure of relations through which observations are designed to capture with scientific theory emerging as 'a programme of perception and of action – a scientific *habitus* – which is disclosed in the empirical work that actualises it'. Consequently, Bourdieu sought to instil *metanoia*, a 'new gaze' that encouraged an epistemological rupture precipitating 'a mental revolution, a transformation of one's whole vision of the social world' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 251).

Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical employment of 'tool kits', Bourdieu created his own 'analytical tools', such as *habitus*, *field*, *capital*, *doxa*, *orthodoxy*,

[34] In Islamic studies, aspects of Bourdieu have been applied in Martin & Barzegar (2010) and Jung (2011). In SMT, although not adequately cited, Bourdieu is undoubtedly the inspiration behind Jasper's (2004, 2010) 'Theory of Action' as well as Fligstein and McAdam's 'Strategic Action Fields' (2011, 2012).

heterodoxy, *illusio*, *hysteresis* and *collusio*, to transcend perpetual dualisms, including theory and research, structure and agency, micro and macro, objectivism and subjectivism as well as the individual and society (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 178). Since sociological language is politically and academically loaded with partisan preconceptions, Bourdieu's artificial language acts as a precautionary measure to protect it from 'naïve projections of common sense' and to ensure that it is 'inserted, locked into a network of relationships that impose their logical constraints' (Bourdieu, 1993a: 21). Therefore, these concepts mitigate against the futility of a corrupt sociological lexicon of systemic definitions while guaranteeing that their integrity is preserved with definitions applicable 'only within the theoretical system they constitute, not in isolation' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 96).

2.1 A Manual in Basic Bourdieuese[35]

[(habitus) (capital)] + field = practice (Bourdieu, 2010: 101).

Bourdieu (1987: 147) classified himself as a proponent of constructivist structuralism or structuralist constructivism. Subscribing to the main precept of structuralism, Bourdieu posited that objective structures are capable of orienting practices independently of agent consciousness. Concurrently, supporting a constructivist viewpoint, he maintained that 'there is a social genesis to both schemes of perception, thought and action on one hand, and social structures on the other' (Jackson, 2008: 164). Placing himself between the two traditionally divided pillars in social science, namely the objective physics of structural materialism and the subjective tenet of social phenomenology, Bourdieu believed that practice was directed by the mutually inclusive and dialectical constitution of these two poles. Inspired by notable phenomenologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), Bourdieu (1988b: 773-787) challenged the 'academic temple' of structural-functionalism by arguing that agents were actively engaged in a struggle against their conditions and the context in which meaning and experience was transmitted (Fowler, 1997: 93, 99).

In order to understand social life, one must conceive it as the 'mutually constituting interaction of structures, dispositions and actions' (Calhoun, 1993: 4). An individual's activity is not only informed and orientated by its engagement with the social

[35] Term used by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: ix).

structure, but it also re-establishes and reproduces this social structure through practice. Therefore, Bourdieu's objective was to design a 'theory of structure as both *structured* (*opus operatum*, and thus open to objectification) and *structuring* (*modus operandi*, and thus generative of thought and action)' (Grenfell, 2008: 45; 2010: 88). Reworking the previously insurmountable equation between the subjective and objective, Bourdieu's *field* becomes a designated arena of objective, historical relations between positions that are allocated, related and consolidated by *capital* or the 'distribution of material resources and means of appropriation of socially scarce goods and values' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 15-16). Completing the conceptual tripartite is the *habitus*, which represents a set of historical relations in the form of 'mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action' that 'function as symbolic templates for the practical activities of social agents' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 15-16).

Bourdieu's concept of *habitus* is arguably his most innovative and incisive legacy. More generative in composition than simply a repetitive 'habit', the *habitus* has been acquired through a historical process and durably incorporated into the transposable perceptions and dispositions of an agent (Bourdieu, 1993a: 86-87). While the notion of *habitus*, which seeks to account for agency and practice within structural conditions, has a philosophical precedent in pre-Bourdieusian parlance, Bourdieu's sophisticated cultivation of this analytical tool, whether in explaining the responses of the Kabyle in Algeria to the advent of imposed economic structures (1979), the differing dispositions of academics within the French academic system (1988a) or illustrating the permutations of the distinction of taste (2010), has become a unique and definitive component within the explanatory framework of the 'Theory of Practice'[36].

Initially, Bourdieu (1979: vii) described the *habitus* as a 'system of durable, transposable dispositions which function as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices'. In other words, agents are partly structured by objective conditions but they are not viscerally predisposed to passively react to external constraints because agents also participate actively in structuring and reproducing these conditions. Whereas rational choice theory assumes a *homo oeconomicus* of utilitarian individualism and positivist materialism in which agents act freely,

[36] Whereas *habitus* resembles Aristotle's *hexis* and Hegel's *ethos*, Bourdieu seems to have been influenced by the work of Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) who used the term *habitus* to argue that 'the human body is not regarded simply as a passive recipient of imposed, cultural imprints but as a self-developable means by which subjects achieve a range of human objects' (Asad, 2003: 251-252). Additionally, while Edmund Husserl wrote about the concept of *habituality* in phenomenology, the idea of memes and mimetics in Richard Dawkins' (1976) theory of human social evolution also mimics Bourdieu's *habitus* (Coker, 2008: 904-905).

consciously and instrumentally to maximise interests within the parameters of cost/benefit analyses, the *habitus* of agents does not fully determine autonomous action but responds with 'regulated improvisation' that is contingent upon the pre-existing, mutually constituted relationship between structuring dispositions and structured dynamics (Bourdieu, 1977: 65; 2000: 138-139). By introducing the *habitus*, Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 19) is proposing another definition of agency in which rationality is 'immanent in a historical system of social relations'. Consequently, practice is dictated by a combination of a system of durable dispositions of perception, identification and recognition that have been internalised, unconsciously through the existing social environment and consciously through formal learning (Jackson, 2008: 164). Therefore, agents are creative and inventive in being able to 'generate appropriate and endlessly renewed strategies, but within the limits of structural constraints of which they are the product and which define them' (Bourdieu, 2000: 138).

This interpretation is not to suggest that the *habitus* is fixed, static and destined to move in a predictable or pre-meditated manner. Rather, Bourdieu explains that the *habitus* resembles a self-correcting programme that constantly evolves in a state of permanent motion and revision thereby enabling it to adapt, assimilate and adjust to changing conditions, even to the point of transformation (Bourdieu, 2000: 139; 1993a: 87). In this respect, the *habitus* is a 'generative principle of regulated improvisations' with practice characterised as 'a repertoire but not a melody' (Bigo, 2011: 242). Therefore, it is 'informed by a kind of objective finality without being consciously organised in relations to an explicitly constituted end; intelligible and coherent without springing from an intention of coherence and a deliberate decision; adjusted to the future without being a product of a project or plan' (Bourdieu, 2010: 50-51).

Moreover, since the *habitus* of agents provides the 'grammar' for practices but never constitutes the text of those practices, agents are also afforded opportunities for improvisation beyond the structuring of the *habitus* as they are concurrently engaged in mutually dialectic relationship with a contextual environment that supplies the text for practice. Seen through this prism, social movement scholars working largely outside the confines of SMT have adopted Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* to recapture the dynamism of agency within collective action (Husu, 2013; Crossley 2003, 2008; Haluza-Delay, 2008). However, while the concept of *habitus* acknowledges agency, improvisation and transformation, Bourdieu (1993a: 87) contends that the extent of

this process is inexorably linked to the structure of objective conditions in which agents are produced, positioned, perceive and practice.

Therefore, in order to apply a Bourdieusian analysis, one cannot solely examine the composition or characteristics of the *habitus* independent of its constituent parts. Consequently, the *habitus* only exists and operates in accordance with, and in response to, objective structures that generate and regulate action. In this context, action obeys a 'practical logic' as the *habitus* selects responses that are reasonable in considering what is deemed appropriate and acceptable (Schatzki, 1997: 287-288). To neglect the rules governing perception and practice risks committing a methodological fallacy by disregarding that the conceptual cohabitation between *habitus* and *field* involves an interconnected interaction of 'ontological complicity' representing 'two sides of the same coin' (Grenfell, 2010: 89). Rather than choose between the *field*, which ascribes meaning and value, and the *habitus*, which activates these properties, it is only 'by reference to the space in the game which defines them and which they seek to maintain or redefine, can one understand the strategies, individual or collective, spontaneous or organized, which are aimed at conserving, transforming or transforming so as to conserve' (Bourdieu, 2010: 153).

The *field* is the 'epistemological priority' as 'dispositions constituting the cultivated *habitus* are only formed, only function and are only valid in a *field*' (Bourdieu, 2010: 87). The *field* is a dynamic, semi-autonomous 'network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions', a structure of rules and principles that provides and limits the scope of practice (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 97). Since the allocation and distribution of *capital* is unequal, the *field* represents a theatre of competition and struggle in which strategic agents shape and reshape the *field* through constant negotiation and contestation. For these reasons, the relational dynamics and components within a *field* are often illustrated by referring to the characteristics of a game. To be inducted into its zonal sphere of influence, players must subscribe to a shared belief, an instinctive 'feel' for the game, a recognition of its operational parameters and inherent meaning, thereby becoming participant stakeholders that are invested in performing its purpose.

For Bourdieu (2000: 96), the fundamental law (*nomos*) of the game, 'irreducible and incommensurable with any other law or related to any other field', is represented as *doxa*. Similar to norms in international relations, *doxa* encompasses everything 'which goes without saying', the set of fundamental beliefs, latently pre-reflexive and

semi-conscious but shaped by intuitive dispositions and practical experience, which supply the game with its inter-subjective, tacit and unwitting allegiance (Bourdieu, 2000: 16; 1993a: 73-74; Jackson, 2008: 167-168; Deer, 2008: 120). Those who actively seek to reinforce the prevalent *doxa* within the *field* propagate positions of *orthodoxy* whereas those seeking to revise the underlying principles of *doxa* promote *heterodoxy*. Nevertheless, since agents are not masters of knowledge, capable of commanding or controlling the contextual conditions of their practice, 'misrecognition' or *allodoxia* results from misconstrued or misguided action in which agents falsely perceive themselves as interpreting or representing legitimate forms of practice (Bourdieu, 2000: 185).

Possessing and nurturing a belief in the legitimacy of the game while recognising its boundaries and contributing to the reproduction of its logic compels each player to become an investor in the value of stakes on offer. By extension, interest is an integral part of the game by the default of participation. Although Bourdieu avoided the universalistic terminology of Weber's instrumental rationality or Adam Smith's *homo capitalisticus*, both of which defined interest as a calculable, visible and tangible value, he was captivated by the multi-dimensional facets of interest in which the particular logic of a *field* exudes and sanctions its own motivations 'for each *field* fills the empty bottle of interest with a different wine' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 25-26). Therefore, *illusio*, the *field*-centric 'fundamental belief in the interest of the game and the value of stakes inherent to membership', replaces conventional conceptualisations of interest (Bourdieu, 2000: 11). Relationally constructed as opposed to instrumentally pre-determined, *illusio* is a prerequisite investment by all participants of the field, whether proponents of *orthodoxy* or *heterodoxy*. Furthermore, *illusio* infers a deeper involvement that is not limited to economic or material interest (Bourdieu, 2010: 79). Principally, it is an 'affective investment', which is generated in the link between the *field* (a game offering the stakes) and the *habitus* (a system of dispositions synchronised to the game), a belief that produces 'the feel of the game and the stakes, which implies both the inclination and the capacity to play the game, to take an interest in the game, to be taken up, taken in by the game' (Bourdieu, 1993a: 18).

The last element of Bourdieu's conceptual formula is *capital*, the resource that classifies stratification and explains how agents devise strategies to enable their manoeuvrability in a designated *field*. Ultimately, *capital* acts as a 'medium of communication' between *habitus* and *field* (Grenfell, 2010: 89). Rather than reduced

to material resources, various types of *capital* can be detected depending on the specific currencies available within a given *field*. Nevertheless, Bourdieu indicates that there are four types of identifiable *capital* – cultural, economic, social and symbolic - ubiquitous in all fields and which agents can possess, acquire and deploy for the purpose of maintaining or enhancing their positions. Moreover, since the allocation, distribution and accumulation of *capital* is weighted differently as assigned and ascribed meanings and values vary depending on the logic of the *field* in question, the same practice performed in two *fields* may elicit different responses.

As culture is interpreted as an omnipresent feature of each *field*, inseparable from its inherent *illusio*, Bourdieu was concerned with assessing how cultural resources, processes and institutions hold individuals in competitive and self-perpetuating hierarchies of domination (Swartz, 1997: 6). Without culture, 'there is no race, no competition' but it is produced 'by the very race and competition which it produces' (Bourdieu, 2010: 247). Therefore, culture is not simply an exogenously structured factor that contributes to the constitution of a *field*, but it is also a dynamic form of *capital*, an attainable and appropriational resource for collection and consumption. Although empirical intra-*field* analysis is required to decipher the specific meaning, characteristics and value of cultural *capital*, on an abstract level, it consists of intellectual and educational qualifications (Fowler, 1997: 31). Cognisant of the diversification of this category, Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 119) emphasised that the skills and aptitude expressed by cultural *capital* exist in three forms: embodied, objectified or institutionalised. Exceeding the confines of the academic arena, cultural *capital* also implies specialised knowledge or experience in comprehending and conveying the origin, composition or purpose of practice that is subsequently perceived as recognised and legitimate by agents within the structures of a specific *field*.

The second form of currency noticeable in each *field* is objectively quantifiable values of economic *capital*. Either inherited or acquired, and depending on its relative signification within a particular *field*, the deployment of these tangible material resources as mutually accepted commodities of exchange can alter or negotiate one's position as well as persuade, co-opt or incentivise others to adopt dispositions or perceptions that subscribe to a specific practice. Conversely, the unequal distribution of economic *capital* can equally limit or prevent an agent's capacity to advance their relational position. Thirdly, social *capital* refers to the sum of resources, either 'actual or virtual', that are endowed on an agent or group by 'virtue

of possessing a durable network of institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 119). Akin to the concept of Mobilising Structures in mainstream SMT, these organic or strategic associations, affiliations and partnerships of formal or informal constitution, formulated either out of conviction or convenience, enable or disable agents from enhancing their positions in their respective *fields* of operation.

Unlike its *field* counterparts, symbolic *capital* is more challenging to quantify. Similar to the philosophical pursuit of *kleos* ('glory') or *arete* ('excellence') in Ancient Athens, symbolic *capital* resembles the quest for honour and prestige. Inherently recognisable but intangible, symbolic *capital* signifies the charismatic metamorphosis of cultural, social and economic *capital* into reverence and authority. For Bourdieu (2000: 242), this resource is 'what every kind of *capital* becomes when it is misrecognized as *capital*, that is, as force, a power or capacity for (actual or potential) exploitation, and therefore recognized as legitimate'. In other words, symbolic *capital* occurs when a *habitus*, suffering from a deficiency of self-esteem, devoid of meaning or cognitively paralysed, is predisposed to grant acceptance and justification on *capital* thereby converting and elevating it to symbolically normative proportions.

Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 98-99; 1993a: 34-35) frequently invoked the analogy of a card game to illuminate the strategic interplay between *capitals* and their uses. Akin to the value of cards in a deck, the hierarchy of *capital* (economic, social, cultural and symbolic) varies depending on the game (*field*) and its immanent laws (*doxa*). For example, two players with the same overall *capital* can differ in position as well as strategy based on the relative impact of their attributes. Each player (*habitus*) shares a belief in the stakes of playing the game (*illusio*) and starts with their specific allocation of tokens divided by volume and category (*capital*). Subsequently, a player's move is informed by three factors: firstly, by the cumulative and proportional weight of the tokens held; secondly, by the player's perceptions and dispositions derived from previous experience of the game; and thirdly, by the player's ability to assess the presumed position and predisposed tactics of their opponents. Equipped with these options, players either subscribe to the expected laws of the game by diligently protecting and enhancing their *capital* or strive to negotiate and revise the relative value of their *capital* by altering the exchange rate, a process that discredits conventional strategies as irrelevant and redundant.

2.2 Addressing Culture and Ideology

Bourdieu's formula of *habitus*, *field* and *capital* formula also provides an alternative to pre-existing discourses on culture and ideology. Traditionally, '"culture" stood for what humans can do; "nature" for what humans must obey' (Bauman, 1999: x). Nevertheless, this seemingly distinct definition became problematic as reproductive human activity caused academics to consider whether culture should be perceived as a restraining structural force reminiscent of the rigidity of nature. The resulting ambiguity centred on the negotiated balance between culture as an objectively immanent force or a subjectively attainable commodity[37]. Most notably, the Weberian-inspired Geertz (1973: 89) attempted to traverse the dualist schism by referring to culture as man-made 'webs of significance': 'an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitude toward life'.

Bourdieu presents interpretations of culture as a dichotomy between structuralists and functionalists. Following from Geertz, the former elevated culture to a structured structure in which a set of signs and symbols comprise systems of communication and knowledge that restrict human activity (Grenfell, 2010: 88; 2008: 45). Subsequently, culture is reduced to a '*corpus* of intergenerationally transmissible knowledge', separated from 'the ways in which it is put to use in practical contexts of perception and action' (Ingold in Lizardo, 2011: 31). Elaborating on this point, Asad (1983: 252) argued that a thick description of culture accepts a 'hiatus' between '(external) symbols and (internal) dispositions, which parallels the hiatus between "cultural system" and "social reality"'. Therefore, by neglecting the relational link between objective semiotics and subjective 'life', this perspective omitted relations of power that are an integral ingredient of culture (Asad, 1983: 238-239).

Alternatively, functionalists, such as Marx and Durkheim, propagated a subjectivist line interpreting culture as a product of social infrastructure, a structuring structure that reified ideology as an imposition of the dominant class in the critical tradition while maintaining social control and moral authority in the positivist tradition (Grenfell, 2010: 88: 2008: 45). Therefore, in order to question how culture works 'in the production of knowledgeable actors and in the reproduction and transformation of

[37] Since the coining of the term 'culture' at the end of the 18th Century, most notable sociologists have grappled with its meaning, including Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Talcott Parsons, Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck.

systems of power and inequality', Bourdieu intended to bridge the structuralist/functionalist divide by reconciling the two conflicting positions in a relational approach that examined structures as symbolic systems to uncover the logic of practice which gives them their structuring power (Lizardo, 2011: 30). In other words, Bourdieu studied structure dialectically and simultaneously as both structured and structuring (Grenfell, 2008: 45).

Adopting a Bourdieusian lens, culture is afforded two inter-related roles. Firstly, since all *fields* are structured arenas beset by power struggles, they are irrevocably connected to culture. Subsequently, culture embodies the fundamental basis of the game, the stakes (*illusio*) that agents not only recognise but compete over. Within these struggles, Bourdieu (2010: 248) insisted that 'the value of culture is generated, or…belief in the value of culture, interest in culture and the interest of culture – which are not self-evident…to induce belief in the innateness of the desire to play and the pleasure of playing'. Therefore, culture, which encompasses history, religion, language and mores, is the structured product of power relations that is inherited and imprinted as the interest generating/regulating an agent's dispositions to practice. Since the *habitus* is also a structuring agent, the manifestation, meaning and mutability of culture within a given *field* is commensurably reliant upon the mutually constituted acceptance, adoption and application of the stakes by agents engaged in competitive *fields* of struggle.

Secondly, Bourdieu 'de-culturalised' culture by conceptualising it as an acquistional form of *capital* at the disposal of strategically disposed agents. By extension, culture ceases to operate in the transcendental realms of immanence and becomes anthropomorphic, a qualifiable resource used by agents as a tool in power relations. By identifying culture relationally as one of four currencies of *capital*, Bourdieu bisected the assumptions of two 'radically opposing' intellectual traditions: Marxism, which holds that culture is a power resource standing in its own right; and humanism, which elevates culture as a structured value (Swartz, 1997: 288). Ultimately, from a Bourdieusian perspective, cultural *capital*, contextualised within a systemic structure of power, provides an opportunity for agents responsible for accumulating and disseminating culture to pursue pragmatic interests in enhancing their position within their respective *fields* of practice.

In terms of ideology, Bourdieu (2010: 67) generally derided a hegemonically monopolised and colonised concept that represents merely an 'illusion consistent

with interest'[38]. While 'ideology' may symbolise a 'well-grounded illusion', its conceptualisation would be a considerable methodological error as '"ideology"…does not appear as such, to us and to itself, and it is this misrecognition that gives it its symbolic efficacy' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 250). Although sharing an inter-subjective appreciation for the 'belief' and 'purpose' of the game (*illusio*), each *field* represents a polarised struggle between dominant and dominated agents that is managed by a system of rules (*doxa*). Subsequently, agents acquire and deploy different types of *capital* depending on whether they promote *orthodoxy* or propagate *heterodoxy*. In this gerrymandering for position, predominantly dominant actors endeavour to achieve symbolic *capital*, which enables them to dictate legitimate meaning and knowledge, or what Bourdieu labels as the exertion of symbolic *power* and symbolic *violence*. Since Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 13) defined 'symbolic systems' in a similar fashion to Marxist 'ideologies' or Weberian 'theodicies' as instruments of knowledge and domination that delineate the boundaries of the social world in the context of interests, the term *orthodoxy* could be interpreted as aligning with the notion of a 'dominant ideology'. While this is an erroneous correlation, invoking Louis Althusser's insights on 'ideology' demonstrates that Bourdieu should not be relegated to the periphery of debates on the concept.

Firstly, Althusser's (2008: 39) thesis on ideology stated that 'what is represented in ideology is therefore not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live'[39]. This rendering resonates with Bourdieu's dismissal of ideology as illusory and meaningless. Secondly, Althusser (2008: 40) maintained that ideology 'always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material'. The recognition of these inscribed rituals that govern action may provide the subject consciousness and demonstrate how ideology 'is realized and realizes itself' until it becomes the ruling ideology but 'in no sense does it give us the (scientific) *knowledge* of the mechanism of this recognition' (Althusser, 2008: 59; 41-47). Again, Bourdieu would concur with the analysis of Althusser's argument. In particular, the constituting relationship between the ideological apparatus and the subject's practices reflects the inextricable link between *habitus* and *field* with the ruling ideology of the dominant over the dominated comparable to the reinforcement of *orthodoxy* over *heterodoxy* in Bourdieuese. However, whether expressed through

[38] Bourdieu (1993a: 70) stated that 'I have never once used here the expression "dominant ideology"…my whole effort is aimed at destroying verbal and mental automatisms like the linkage between dominant class/dominant ideology'.
[39] Althusser (2008: 32-33) notes that ideology was a term invented by Pierre Cabanis (1757-1808) and Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) while positing that it has no history as it 'is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e. as nothingness'.

dominant 'ideology' or conveyed through symbolic *power*, both are synthetic forces of power, which the dominated are disposed to misconstrue and misattribute as legitimate within their structured environment. For these reasons, Bourdieu illustrated his theory by creating unloaded language that avoided contributing to the perpetuation of 'ideology' as an epistemological priority.

> 'If I have little by little come to shun the use of the word "ideology"…It is above all because, by evoking the order of ideas, and of action by ideas and on ideas, it inclines one to forget the most powerful mechanisms of the maintenance of the symbolic order, the *two-fold naturalization* which results from the inscription of the social in things and in bodies…with the resulting effects of symbolic violence' (Bourdieu, 2000: 181).

Since Bourdieu was concerned with examining social phenomena from the enduring struggle for power over culture, religion becomes an inferred discussion within his broader conceptual framework with Bourdieu (1993a: 147) remarking that 'the sociology of culture is the sociology of religion of our time'. However, it is important to briefly incorporate Bourdieu's insights into religion as it is an undeniable source and driver for Islamist mobilisation. Firstly, while Islam is inseparable from culture, the power of culture evokes a diversity of dimensions. For neo/new Orientalists, Islamic culture is static and immutable; for modernists, Western culture is a unipolar force that precipitates reactionary responses in Islam; and for pluralists, culture is periodically contested, negotiated and revised as a dialectic between agents and their situational environment. In this context, religion, like culture, cannot be treated as a monolithically transcendental or ethereal force impervious to the effects of history. Critiquing Geertz's structurally semiotic conceptualisation of religion, Asad (1993: 53; 1983: 251) argued that reaching a universal definition of religion is futile because:

> 'religious symbols…cannot be understood independently of their historical relations with nonreligious symbols or of their articulation in and of social life, in which work and power are always crucial…It is that different kinds of practice and discourse are intrinsic to the field which religious representations (like any representation) acquire their identity and truthfulness'.

Asad's observation, in which religion is inspected through the prism of power and practice, complements Bourdieu's conceptualisation. In cultural terms, Islam becomes part of the 'purpose' and 'belief' (*illusio*) that ties the *habitus* towards a particular *field*. Therefore, the task is not to discover the theoretical essence of religion but to contextualise the perception of Islam and its interaction within the existing social (power) structures of the *field*. The *habitus* is disposed to have an inscribed understanding of Islam in an institutionalised setting but how the meaning of Islam is (re)produced depends on the continual practice of agents in accordance and coordination with the rules of intra-*field* dynamics.

Secondly, and by the logic that all *fields* are *fields* of culture, there are two reasons why Bourdieu would interpret Islam as an independent sub-*field* of analysis, such as in the pedagogic scholarship of academia or in localised Muslim communities of religious exchange, rather than essentialising its influence as a core *field* of overarching inquiry. Primarily, 'the connexion between religious theory and practice is fundamentally a matter of power – of disciplines creating religion, interpreting true meanings, forbidding certain utterances and practice and authorising others' (Asad, 1983: 246). Subsequently, since Islam is reliant on the social reality of perception, practice and power within relational contexts, the permutation and manifestation of its epistemological relevance lies within intra-*field* dynamics as opposed to exclusively providing the intrinsic laws with which to investigate the generative and regulative practice within a core *field* of social interaction. Furthermore, since all *fields* are struggles over culture by definition, the reification of Islam to the epistemological primacy of its own independent core *field* not only dismisses other cultural forces that have contributed to shaping the religion, but it also undermines the ubiquitous role of Islam in determining dispositions and perceptions for motivating practice within a multiplicity of *fields*.

Thirdly, Islam is not only a structured and structuring aspect in the *illusio* of a *field*, but it is also a strategically as well as instrumentally acquired and deployed resource in the pursuit of advancing one's interests and position. In particular, and depending on the intrinsic value bestowed on its recognition and legitimacy within a specific *field*, Islam is a form of cultural *capital*, in which religious qualifications and experienced knowledge become commodities for accumulation and appropriation. However, over an extensive historical period of socialised practice, religions have exceeded their confinement to cultural *capital* to develop their utility in mobilising other forms of strategic *field* movement. For example, it is incumbent on every practising Muslim to

pay *zakat*, a compulsory tax levied on one's annual income. If this revenue is collected by a religious leader or institution, the receiving agent is able to acquire legitimate currencies of economic *capital* with which to enhance their position. Moreover, routinised practice in Muslim societies, such as mosque attendance, commemorative rituals or organisational membership, create informal and formal networks that provide an agent with considerable values of social *capital*. The transferability and conversion of religion from cultural to economic and social *capital* does not preclude other avenues for accruing *capital*. However, contrary to the limiting assumptions of religious *capital*, the cross-*capital* applicability of religion renders it a diversified source for intra-*field* movement[40].

Fourthly, and by extension, in fields where Muslim practice is a contributing factor to field *orthodoxy*, for instance in Muslim-majority societies, agents will endeavour to perpetuate or propel their legitimate *capital* towards symbolic proportions thereby ensuring that *heterodox* positions, either occupied by other Muslims or non-Muslims, remain suppressed and neutralised. As Asad (1986: 16), explained, 'wherever Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust *correct* practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace *incorrect* ones, there is the domain of orthodoxy'. However, while the predominant *orthodoxy* may expend *capital* to discredit, devalue or diminish *heterodox* practices, agents subsumed by *orthodoxy* can still translate cultural, economic and social *capital* into symbolic *capital* as long as other agents are disposed to perceive its meaning as credible in relation to intra-*field* dynamics. Thus, it is the embedded position of religion within power structures, and not its conceptual substance, that determines practice.

Therefore, the religious does not explain the social; the social conceptualises the religious. Adopting a Bourdieusian lens, Muslim societies can be explained by preparing and applying a two-pronged approach. Firstly, historical conditions and power structures should be explored to ascertain how Islam manifests in its situational context within a designated *field* of cultural struggle. Secondly, this structured environment requires examination to deduce how it enables the *habitus* to instigate opportunities for strategic movement and to facilitate 'the production and maintenance of specific discursive traditions, or their transformation – and the efforts of practitioners to achieve coherence' (Asad, 1986: 11, 17).

[40] Similar to the debate regarding religion as its own core *field*, religion cannot be reduced to religious *capital*. Firstly, due to its differentiated character, religion has no objective or ontological meaning without its contextualisation in existing social structures. Secondly, creating religious *capital* as a separate category would underplay religion's role in acquiring other forms of *capital*.

2.3 Collective Action and Transferability

By their construction and constitution, *fields* are systemic and hierarchical structures of recurring power relations between agents and structures. Each agent (*habitus*), subscribing to the purpose and interest of participating in the stakes on offer (*illusio*), is subject to, and deeply embedded in the laws (*doxa*) of the *field*, employing recognised values of *capital* to either maintain or enhance their position. As *fields* represent competitive arenas of divergent and differentiated dispositions divided by widening chasms caused by the unequal distribution of *capital*, a polarisation between *orthodox* and *heterodox* practice emerges. While agents may act as individualised subjects, equipped with their respective practices, this does not preclude the intra- and inter-*field* possibility of related *habiti* lodged in similar positions and coalescing organically or strategically through solidaristic interests[41].

Consequently, agents in similar positions within or between fields may experience disposition alignment or congruent actions resulting in the mobilisation and collaboration of *habiti* in practices of mutual perception and purpose. While Bourdieu did not explicitly address collective action in extensive detail, his analytical tools implicitly provide the means with which to examine social movement (Swartz, 1997: 186). In particular, Bourdieu (2000: 145) referred to *collusio*, a situation in which there is an 'implicit collusion among all the agents who are products of similar conditions and conditionings'. In this mutually reinforcing relationship, each agent discovers 'in the conduct of all his peers the ratification and legitimation ('the done thing') of his own conduct, which, in return, ratifies and, if need be, rectifies the conduct of others' (Bourdieu, 2000: 145). These socialised solidarities (*collusio*), rooted in the dialectic of shared perceptions and experiences (*habitus*) to the social environment (*field*) and their share of *capital*, produce collective dispositions of practice.

Equipped with the concept of *collusio*, Bourdieu offers a solution to the commonly contested 'free rider' challenge in SMT. Since the homogeneity of conditions facilitates the objective homogenising of *habiti* and allows practices to be homogenised, the bond between *habiti* is not superficial or transient, inferring a consciously non-committal or fickle stance, but constitutes an intrinsic bond through 'conductorless orchestration' (Bourdieu, 1990: 58; Swartz, 1997: 105). These joint

[41] Bourdieu uses the term *habituses* but this thesis will refer to the plural of *habitus* as *habiti*.

dispositions of interest and position also lead agents to display the same social *conatus*, a practice which 'inclines agents to strive to reproduce at a constant or an increasing rate the properties constituting their social identity, without even needing to do this deliberately or consciously' (Bourdieu, 1988: 176). This process of *collusio* is further accelerated by the inherently competitive logic of the *field*, which organises and categorises agents into distinct classes that become 'the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilization and demobilization' (Bourdieu, 2010: 481). In effect, the construction of these stratifications exemplifies and exacerbates the exercise of symbolic *power*, the 'simultaneous act of making conceptual and social discriminations' (Swartz, 1997: 87). While SMT disproportionately relies on CAF for conceptualising the practice of solidarity instilled amongst agents by social movement organisations, the concept of *collusio* both within and between *fields* provides a robust explanation for the prospect of convergence in collective action.

Firstly, by virtue of their structured dispositions of practice, the dominant continue to reinforce their distinctive positions through the deployment of their superior values of *capital*. The symbolic *capital* accrued from the validation and legitimation of this reproductive action justifies their role as the recognised defenders of the *field*'s *doxa*. This collective practice, whether the product of a subconscious adherence to an innate blueprint of behaviour or the strategic execution of a visceral sense of intuition, maintains *orthodoxy*, which, in turn, sustains the prevailing interpretation of *doxa* within the *field* and suppresses *heterodoxy*. By extension, the structured construction of *illusio*, the inter-subjective perception of 'belief' dictating the barriers for entry and the value of stock required to be inducted and progress, remains as agents continue to structure the conventional constitution of the *field*.

Secondly, in a similar vein, *collusio* implies the formation of homogenous, solidarised groups comprising the subservient subjects of a *field*. Either coalescing around dispositions inclined to cooperate or strategically acting to collaborate, the *heterodox* practice of agents with equal levels and perceptions of *capital* form a collective front to advance their positions. This distinction is the predominant struggle in each *field* as *orthodox* practice seeks to acquire and deploy *capital* to preserve the status quo whereas *heterodox* practice attempts to seize on perceived opportunities to accumulate legitimacy for advocating revisionist approaches. Additionally, aside from this intra-*field* fragmentation between *orthodoxy* and *heterodoxy*, there is a third example of *collusio* that occurs within the two classifications. Not only are there

prospects in *field* dynamics for intra-*orthodoxy* and intra-*heterodoxy collusio* to emerge over legitimate modes of practice, but in some instances, sub-branches of *orthodoxy* and *heterodoxy* may converge to achieve mutual interests. In either case, the arrangement of *collusio* is ultimately dependent on the harmonisation of strategies directed by dispositional and positional considerations regarding the alignment of *habitus*, *field* and *capital* towards a particular practice and purpose.

An essential component of identifying classifications in a designated *field* and contributing to the endurance of cleavages depends on the ability of the group 'to get itself recognized, to get itself noticed and admitted, and so to win a place in the social order' (Bourdieu, 2010: 483). Correlating to and augmenting the SMT concept of CAF, a group is 'defined as much by its *being-perceived* as by its *being*' and must therefore distinguish itself from others by appropriating practices, adopting stigmata that delineate boundaries and instilling social identity (Bourdieu, 2010: 484-485; Swartz, 1997: 186). By doing so, a mutual process of reinforced classification is conceived in which those who associate with them thereby stratifying themselves 'in the eyes of other classifying subjects' (Bourdieu, 2010: 484).

In this way, language invariably becomes an indispensable component in executing classification strategies as groups devise a name and mobilise around the 'unifying power of a word' to legitimate and consolidate its existence (Bourdieu, 2010: 483). On this topic, Bourdieu (1991: 8) dedicates significant attention to the power of linguistics, an aspect he believes is absent in the discipline. For Bourdieu (1991: 7-9), purveyors of language are afforded recognition and legitimacy not simply because of their ability to deploy pithy, attractive and resonant prose, but their entitlement derives from their 'capacity to produce expressions which are appropriate for particular situations'. Applying Bourdieu's formula, prospective speakers, similar to Weber's charismatic leader, are governed by a linguistic *habitus* and therefore unable to improvise from a *carte blanche* of terms. Instead, language is concocted in a relational context as the rhetorician operates within the confines of what their dispositions deem appropriate considering the inter-subjective comprehension of language within a designated *field*. Moreover, complementing observations evident in aspects of SMT (Johnston, 2008), in order to achieve symbolic status, an aspiring orator must also cater their techniques to appeal to agents from varying positions (Bourdieu, 1991: 27-28).

In this context, *field* rules that govern individualised *habiti* while creating opportunities for manoeuvrability can also be applied to collective *habiti* (*collusio*). Although *fields* are 'profoundly hierarchized, with dominant social agents and institutions having considerable power to determine what happens within it', denying agents the ability to mobilise would undermine the principles of Bourdieu's framework (Thomson, 2008: 73). Bourdieu (1988: 177) revealed that the solidarity of homologous positions can feasibly augment 'the probability of constituting a mobilized and socially active group'. Therefore, the game may be 'rigged' in favour of the dominant players but the 'dominated, in any social universe, can always exert a certain forces, inasmuch as belonging to a *field* means by definition that one is capable of producing effects in it' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 80). The *habitus* may be regulating, in that it operates within a range of possibilities informed by its structured dispositions, but it is not fixed. Conversely, the *habitus* is equipped with a strategically generative capacity that is directly determined by its relationship to the situational context of the *field*. Consequently, the *habitus* is constantly improving its standing by capitalising on perceived opportunities presented by the *field* to accumulate *capital* and instigate practice. In this way, while the *habitus* may devise and instruct the decision, *capital* acts as the 'energy of social physics', providing the vehicle with which to enhance an agent's position through practice (Bertrand Russell in Swartz, 1997: 78).

Bourdieu (2010: 126) referred to this type of strategic manoeuvring as 'vertical movements'. However, these 'vertical movements' are not universally applied but rely on whether the agent's motives are to conserve their position, vie for succession or subvert the system (Swartz, 1997: 124). In the first instance, players may share the purpose and stakes underpinning the *field* but may remove themselves from actively competing, preferring to adopt a risk-averse attitude that guarantees the maintenance of their position. To achieve this, the *collusio* of conservationists is formed around complementary dispositions and perceptions with *orthodox* or *heterodox* agents to ensure that *capital* is organised for stability to prevail. Secondly, successionists intend to establish a *collusio* with the objective of acquiring legitimate *capital* to ascend the hierarchy of the *field* by either challenging the interpretation of *orthodoxy* from an *orthodox* position or striving to achieve *orthodoxy* from a *heterodox* position. Thirdly, the *collusio* of subversionists refuses to submit to the dominance of *orthodoxy*, challenges the precepts of its control and promotes the reconstitution of the *field*'s *doxa* from a position of revisionist *heterodoxy*. While these attempts may cause the counter-mobilisation of *capital* by *orthodox* actors to expel

this threat, they may also lead to an alignment of interests between disgruntled *orthodox* actors and disenchanted *heterodox* practice.

However, *collusio*, in any of its forms, is not restricted to intra-*field* dynamics. Bourdieu's concept of *field* homology provides another dimension in assessing multi-*field* collective action. Although Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 109) was hesitant to offer a definitive explanation for the role of external actors in precipitating corresponding effects in designated *fields* without recourse to evidence supplied by empirical examples, through 'horizontal' or 'transverse' movements, Bourdieu (1993a: 33; 2010: 126) admitted that *capital* can be conceptually (re)converted and transferred from one *field* to another. While the unequivocal characteristic of a *field* is its foundation in fundamental laws 'irreducible and incommensurable with any other law or related to any other *field*', conceptual connectors for inter-*field* dynamics are identifiable and observable since *fields* are semi-autonomous by design and constitution (Bourdieu, 2000: 96). Their borders, which surround the social space in which agents move, are neither fixed nor porous but characterised by a semi-permeability comparable to the process of osmosis. In other words, *fields* represent an open and fluid space, a 'game devoid of an inventor,' and therefore lacking in strictly defined boundaries (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 103).

By invoking the term *field* homology, Bourdieu explained that while each *field* possesses 'its own determinate agents…its own accumulation of history, its own logic of action, and its own forms of *capital*', 'the patterned, regular and predictable practise within each *field* bear striking similarities, as do the kinds of social agents who are dominant in each social *field*' (Calhoun et al, 1993: 5-6; Thomson, 2008: 70). Therefore, while not identical, *field* homology proposes that *fields* can share enough of the same characteristics and therefore be interdependently intertwined so that struggles present in one *field* can have homologous effects on another with the underlying premise being that collective *habiti* (*collusio*), originating both inside and outside their respective *fields*, could relate to each other through their positions and converge on dispositions for action (Swartz, 1997: 130). For example, 'weak' *fields* are particularly vulnerable and susceptible to 'piracy' from external forces due to similar values of *capital* and their potential transferability (Bigo, 2011: 240).

For the dominant of each *field*, homology acts as an additional tool to enforce the reproduction of the hierarchical order across multiple *fields*. If internal struggles oscillate around the quest for symbolic *capital*, and by extension, the exertion of

symbolic *power*, the cognitive and discursive authority to impose legitimate knowledge, its meaning and its direction, *field* homology aims to transfer the image of this projection to other arenas (Bourdieu, 2000: 185). Consequently, in *fields* which share analogous dynamics and laws, therefore displaying similar values of *capital* in terms of currency exchange, the dominant of each *field* instigates an inter-*field collusio* with corresponding agents to instil and reproduce *orthodoxy* within their respective *fields* through the deployment of horizontal *capital*. Conversely, by the same logic, those subversive elements that challenge *doxa* across *fields* are disposed by practice and position to exercise the transference of horizontal *capital* in order to further their cause as proponents of *heterodoxy*.

2.4 Reproduction and Change

Invoking Bourdieu's analytical tools, it would appear that power relations in a given *field* would be repeated in a tautological cycle of reproduction. Even if individual or collective agents manage to strategically acquire more relevant forms of *capital* with which to advance their position, the institutionalised structure of *doxa* and its *orthodoxy* acts to limit the extent of their innovation, movement and progression while reinforcing the legitimacy of its practice. Bourdieu (2000: 116) explained that the reason was that actions in a *field* are (re)produced by the very logic of the *field* in that 'the structure of the space of positions which results from the whole history of the *field*...appears to them [agents] as a space of possibles capable of orienting their expectations and their projects by its demands and even of determining them…so favouring actions that tend to contribute to the development of a more complex structure'.

This passage seems to imply that opportunities for accumulating sufficient *capital* to promote *heterodoxy* and depose the prevailing *doxa* are futile given the overwhelming structural dominance of *orthodox* parties. This realisation would ostensibly vindicate Bourdieu's interest in constructing a theory of reproduction over change since his primary objective was not only to explain how cultural resources, practices and institutions function to maintain unequal social relations, but also to examine how these stratified social systems of hierarchy 'persist and reproduce intergenerationally without powerful resistance and without the conscious recognition of their members' and thereby render 'explicit the forms of misrecognised symbolic power that underpin the implicit logic of practice, expectations and relations of those operating in these *fields*' (Swartz, 1997: 285; Deer, 2008: 122). Nevertheless, it

would be inaccurate to assume that Bourdieu succumbed to the immutability of the system. On the contrary, the *habitus* of the agent is not innately obedient but an agent of permanent resistance, albeit within the remit of the possibilities provided by its dispositions and practice (Bigo, 2011: 243). Consequently, Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 14) wrote if one follows the logic that symbolic systems contribute to the making of the world, but are also constituted in social relations, 'then one can, within limits, transform the world by transforming its representation'.

Michel Foucault (1990: 95) penned that 'where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power'. While Bourdieu's writings concur with this statement, the debate is the degree to which resistance can be effective within the structures of power relations. By extension, how can a resistance incited by the dominated escape the antinomy of domination when one's assimilation into a designated *field* insinuates one's co-option by its institutions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 82)? Conversely, this enduring dialectical struggle appears only capable of dissipating when the former achieves a total monopolisation of power. By transforming a *field* of activity into an *apparatus*, 'the dominant, in all fields, see their domination as the end of history – the "end" in the sense of both conclusion and goal – which has no "beyond" and therefore becomes eternal' (Bourdieu, 1993a: 112-113). However, while Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 102) insists that an *apparatus* emerges when the dominant 'annul' the other participants, a Fukuyama-inspired 'end of history' never fully occurs.

In the absence of an *apparatus* in praxis, a Bourdieusian analysis suggests two inter-related loci for resistance and change: *field* revision led by endogenous forces or *field* reconfiguration fuelled by exogenous factors. Firstly, change can be facilitated through the medium of 'vertical movements'. For conservationist or successionist agents, individual or collectivised, dominant or dominated, searching for recognised and legitimate *capital* allows them either to maintain or enhance their positions in adherence to the extant conditions of *doxa*. This movement may initiate slight revisions to the order of positions but changes to the *field*'s immanent laws or the inter-subjective nature of the stakes the game offers will be of appearance as opposed to substance.

Since subversionists, the *collusio* of collective *habiti* for aspiring change, reside in the *heterodox* shadow of the dominant, they encounter significant obstacles in stimulating change for three reasons. In the first instance, while it is the *field* that

renders value to different forms of *capital*, promoting *heterodoxy* may entail collecting or focusing on types of *capital* in areas that are deemed less 'legitimate' as its agenda contravenes the conventional practice of *orthodoxy*. Therefore, if *heterodoxy* has any chance of succeeding, it must adopt modes of action that are sanctioned by the rules of a system initially structured to preserve the interests of the dominant. Secondly, *heterodox* mobilisation may stiffen the resolve of the dominant *orthodoxy* and elicit a counter-mobilising response that attempts to use superior *capital* to negate, co-opt or coerce any challenge to the hierarchy. In the words of Bourdieu (1993a: 73), 'if this *heterodoxy* (heresy) were to manifest, its emergence brings the dominant agents out of their silence and forces them to produce the defensive discourse of *orthodoxy*, the right-thinking, right-wing thought that is aimed at restoring the equivalent silent assent to *doxa*'. Thirdly, *capital* investment and deployment may assist in elevating one's position in a *field* but this may not necessarily reap direct implications on the immanent laws (*doxa*) of the *field* as there is an inherent paradox involved in juxtaposing *heterodoxy* with its relational context since those advocating a *heterodox* agenda are invariably stakeholders in the purpose of the game which they are playing (*illusio*) and intending to change. Consequently, Bourdieu was sceptical that *doxa* could be overturned by commenting that 'any common-sense reflection on established rules is necessarily mediated – and therefore restricted…by the lack of means to express and therefore question what is implicit and taken for granted' (Deer, 2008: 123).

Due to the extant exertion and exaction of symbolic systems of power, both individual (*habitus*) and collective (*collusio*) agents for change are discouraged and debilitated from pursuing *heterodoxy*. As the dominant are the custodians of *orthodoxy*, a status that is stable so long as *field* laws enshrine their *capital* as legitimate, *heterodox* positions advocated by the dominated either persevere with actions that are not rewarded or submit to the prevalence of their marginalised role in the rule of *orthodoxy*. *Collusio* may act to solidify solidarity between the *habiti* of subservient subjects in a *field*, but either informed subconsciously by their structuring *habitus* or emanating consciously from their agential assessment of the structured conditions of the *field*, the inclination of the dominated to misrecognise and misattribute symbolic *capital* as legitimate ensures that agents remain pacified by accepting practice as generated/regulated in conformity to immanent laws (*doxa*).

Despite being subject to the reproductive hierarchies of the dominant, this coercion is governed by practical consent and collaboration because the perceived legitimacy of

this constructed yet classified distinction is deeply inscribed in the *habiti* of the dominated (Bourdieu, 2000: 170)[42]. By reproducing this stratified system of division, the symbolic makes its own 'contribution to the maintenance of that order only because it has the specifically symbolic power to make people see and believe which is given by the imposition of mental structures' (Bourdieu, 2010: 482). Thus, such a habitual and unchallenged process of pre-meditated, self-perpetuating and self-disciplined practice serves to (re)produce a repetitive function and 'veil the conditions of their subordination' (Calhoun et al, 1993: 6). In effect, even the 'partial revolutions' instigated by subversive elements within *fields* do not depose the beliefs on which the game is based but claim 'to be returning to the sources, the origin, the spirit, the authentic essence of the game, in opposition to the banalization and degradation which it has suffered' (Bourdieu, 1993a: 74).

Concerning intra-*field* dynamics, the analysis provided paints a pessimistic portrait of the conceptual and practical challenges involved in revising a structured system comprised of the mutually reinforcing relationship between *habitus* and *field*. A considerable proportion of the issues encountered stem from the *heterodox* agent being embedded within the very system targeted for proposed change. Social life becomes one of 'structural permutations rather than of structural transformation; one of market competition, not collective organization; and one of reproduction not revolution' (Swartz, 1997: 188). However, akin to Bourdieu's concept of relationality, no structure or system operates in a vacuum but is contingent on relational forces of constitution. Therefore, similar to the dialectic between *habitus* and *field*, there is a level of transferability between *habiti* and *capital* across related *fields* as well as between *fields* themselves. For Bourdieu (1993a: 142), 'specific revolutions, which overthrow the power relations within a field, are only possible in so far as those who import new dispositions and want to impose new positions find, for example, support outside the field, in the new audiences whose demands they both express and produce'.

The inter-relatedness inferred in *field* homology and the horizontal transference of *capital* present the impetus for opportunities in facilitating exogenously-determined change. As expected from socialised dispositions, the *habitus* has different levels of integration. While *collusio* represents *habiti* in their collective, solidaristic form, there are instances when the *habitus* can become detached or estranged from its social

[42] Unlike Marx's 'false consciousness', the dominated in a Bourdieusian sense are not necessary compliant collaborators practising 'voluntary servitude' but their complicity is the result of power relations that are entrenched in the dispositions and perceptions of agents (Bourdieu, 2000: 171).

environment. During incidents of *hysteresis*, external events in a related *field* dismantle the social structure in which the *habitus* is invested and causes a crisis of inertia in the underlying rules and positions within the *field*. Similar to Durkheim's concept of *anomie*, in which the individual becomes detached from society, this spontaneous rupture, or the 'critical moment', which disrupts the *doxa* of a *field* and the value of *capital*, generates a structural lag between opportunities, perceptions and dispositions. Therefore, *hysteresis* creates a high-risk environment because 'for a time at least, field struggles take place in the context of an unknown future' (Hardy, 2008: 148). As *habiti* have been constituted by prior structures, *hysteresis* can initiate the Don Quixote effect, in which practice becomes separated and redundant as they are attuned to previous objective conditions (Bourdieu, 2010: 104, 2000: 160-162). Confused and alienated, agents act inopportunely in a void of meaning and subsequently compromise their position (Bourdieu, 2010: 130, Hardy, 2008: 148). In this context, and in an interpretation that assists SMT in more effectively identifying and understanding the diverse permutations of political opportunity structures, there are those less risk-averse agents who viscerally sense opportunities to accumulate previously inaccessible *capital* to enhance their position before they realign with a revised or reconstituted *field* of balanced equilibrium.

Ultimately, the level of influence and permeability an event occurring in a related *field* has on another is dependent on *field* proximity and homology with regards to corresponding or analogous laws (*doxa*) and stakes (*illusio*), which, by extension, insinuates a similar constituting relationship with agents and thereby a comparable value of currency exchange bestowed upon cultural, economic, social and symbolic *capital* that increases prospects for the inter-*field* transferability of horizontal *capital*. If *field* synthesis or relationality is evident, *hysteresis* in one *field* can act as a catalyst for structural change in another. With the *habitus* forcibly detaching from the *field*, the link between objective structures and subjective expectations is broken allowing for 'the opportunity for critical reflection and debate upon previously unquestioned assumptions' (Crossley, 2003: 5). This exposes 'individual dispositions to change differentially to achieve a match between *field* and *habitus* and to establish a new *doxa*' (Hardy, 2008: 147).

Despite conceptually accounting for *field* fractures and fissures, Bourdieu's default assertion was that while resistance and radical activity can be expressed, they serve as 'the exception to the rule and to his theory' (Crossley, 2003: 3). Therefore, any *field* fragmentation, whether superficial or substantial, is inevitably constrained by

illusio in mounting a credible challenge to *doxa* and subsequently repudiated with the order restructured in its own image as 'permanence can be ensured by change and the structure perpetuated by movement' (Bourdieu, 2010: 161). In the context of this thesis, Bourdieu's apparent apathy regarding seismic revolutionary shifts in *field* dynamics belies the explanation for potentially substantive transformation provided by his conceptual framework. By his own admission, 'the field is the locus of force – and not only of meaning – and of struggles aimed at transforming it, and therefore of endless change' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 102). Consequently, by conceptually identifying opportunities, modalities and inhibitors for change through the intra- and inter-relationality of structuring *habiti* strategically navigating within structured *fields* under conditions of perennial struggle, Bourdieu's framework can complement and supplement the insights of SMT into collective action. In particular, citing the concept of *hysteresis*, Crossley (2003: 3-9) argued that radical reflexivity emerging from episodes of *field* fragmentation can lead to the formation of a 'radical *habitus*', a structured and structuring disposition of practice where assumptions of *doxa* become incessantly appraised and countered by innovative and critical forms of praxis through collective social movement.

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to introduce and explain the main tenets of Pierre Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice' as a prospective conduit for addressing the conceptual deficiencies of traditional SMT by proposing a complementary analytical framework with which to effectively assess the perception, practice and purpose of collective action in Muslim societies. In the realm of Islamic studies, Bourdieu's methods have been invoked as a corrective to methodological practice as well as to examine the emergence of the academic field (Martin & Barzegar, 2010; Jung, 2011). Additionally, sociologists have endeavoured to improve the conceptualisation of social movement studies by incorporating elements of Bourdieu's canon (Crossley, 2003, 2008; Haluza-Delay, 2008; Husu, 2013). Moreover, social movement theorists have underplayed and under-explored the influence of Bourdieu's perspective in their conceptual revisions of the sub-discipline through developing *A Theory of Action* (Jasper, 2004; 2010) or *A Theory of Fields* (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; 2012).

While this cadre of scholars have integrated aspects of Bourdieu's approach in their work, these studies neither capitalise on utilising his insights by embracing the inter-connected relationality of his holistic concepts nor are they engaged in a dialogue of

cross-fertilisation concerning social movements across their disciplines. Furthermore, there have been no comprehensive attempts to apply the range of Bourdieu's tools to the proliferating phenomena of Islamist mobilisation in the Middle East. By suggesting the assimilation of Bourdieusian principles into SMT, the objective is not to replace one hegemonic theory with another. In this respect, Bourdieu's model should not be viewed as 'a king of theoretical *deus ex machina* by means of which Bourdieu relates objective structure and individual activity' (Di Maggio, 1979: 1464). Conversely, SMT provides the basis for a conceptually established, empirically tested and methodologically diverse reference for collective action. Nevertheless, subscribing to the adapting, customising and modernising mandate of theoretical examination, a Bourdieusian lens can assist in reformulating SMT assumptions with the intention of complementing and supplementing its analytical relevance in investigating episodes of movement mobilisation across time and space. In order to advance this aim, this chapter has emphasised the advantages of adopting Bourdieusian concepts in offering alternative solutions to four persistent challenges confronted by SMT.

Firstly, in terms of the agency/structure dualism, Bourdieu's tripartite formula of practice enshrined in *habitus*, *capital* and *field* plans to transform dichotomous assumptions into dialectical discourses. E.H. Carr (1964: 29) wrote that man 'is not totally involved in his environment and unconditionally subject to it…he is never totally independent of it and its unconditional master'. Devoid of situational context, the individual is 'both speechless and mindless' as 'the development of society and the development of the individual go hand in hand, and condition each other' (Carr, 1964: 31-32). Similarly, for Bourdieu, practice is predicated on the mutually constituted relationship between individual agents and their immediate surroundings. Rather than privilege epistemological primacy to one over the other, this inclusive and interdependent equation determines the generative or regulative characteristics of movement. Consequently, the dispositions and perceptions of the *habitus* are structuring structures that strategically and continuously vie for opportunities to improve their positions in accordance to the rules and parameters represented within the structured structure of *field* dynamics. Therefore, whether agents are channelled through the *habitus* or independently of it, improvised practice occurs in direct correlation with the *field*.

Secondly, Bourdieu's formula can also assist SMT in conceptually accounting for the historical context and role of culture and ideology in collective action (Steinmetz,

2011: 51). All *fields* are *fields* of culture in which history, language, religion, politics and mores are negotiated and contested. Through the dynamic interaction between *habitus* and *field*, the perception, position and purpose of agents is produced and reproduced within the historically structured logic and constitution of cultural discourses and practice. Although discarding the conceptualisation of ideology as a methodological fallacy, Bourdieu posited that all *fields* are also *fields* of struggle by definition. With each *field* containing an inherent *doxa* (law), agents are classified either by their propagation of *orthodoxy*, which intends to preserve their dominant interpretation of legitimate practice, or by their promotion of *heterodoxy*, which aims to reverse symbolic domination by challenging the prevailing construction of legitimate practice. In each case, the induction and participation of agents into any *field* requires the tacit recognition of *illusio*, a 'belief' or 'interest' whereby the stakes on offer within the relational dynamics of the *field* render mobilisation meaningful and worthwhile.

Thirdly, exemplified by the scientific idea that 'the real is the relational' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 97), Bourdieu's formula injects an encompassing concept that enables SMT to consider concurrent yet diversified modes of collective action within related spheres of practice. In intra-*field* dynamics, this not only refers to the intrinsic inter-related symbiosis between *habitus* and *field*, but with the accumulation and deployment of inter-subjectively recognised currencies of exchange, such cultural, economic, social and symbolic *capital*, relationality also entails the prospect of *collusio*, a convergence whereby agents are conjoined in perception, position and practice. In inter-*field* dynamics, although *fields* are differentiated in terms of logic and constitution, *fields* are also semi-autonomous spheres of competition that are susceptible to permeability from related *fields*. Therefore, depending on the identification of common or corresponding characteristics, Bourdieu's concept of *field* homology also allows for the possibility of shared perceptions and dispositions across *fields* as well as transferability of *capital* horizontally between *fields*. Consequently, while movement manifestation and mobilisation modalities may conform to the specific structures of intra-*field* relationality, they can simultaneously exhibit harmonised practice by virtue of inter-*field* relationality.

Lastly, Bourdieu's framework equips SMT with the conceptual reasoning to observe the relative extent of change instigated through collective action by inspecting multi-dimensional processes of movement inception, transition and evolution. By primarily focusing on the enduring prevalence of symbolic systems and social structures,

Bourdieu's conceptual framework may appear to privilege reproduction over transformation. Commenting on the Kabyle in Algeria, Bourdieu (1979: 94) postulated that 'revolt against the present situation cannot be orientated towards rational, explicit ends…until the prevailing order contains the potentiality of its own disappearance and so produces agents capable of making its disappearance their project'. Regardless, Bourdieu's approach should not be deemed insufficient 'to explore and account for factors of innovation and change' (Santoro, 2011: 12). Since Bourdieu (2000: 207) emphasised the centrality of perpetual struggles over *orthodoxy* as the default condition in *field* dynamics, not only are agents able to strategically acquire and deploy *capital* to vertically enhance their position, but the concept of *field* homology and the advent of *hysteresis* both facilitate opportunities for horizontal *capital* transference that potentially catalyse change.

Overall, Bourdieu (2010: 486) believed that 'the individual and collective struggles aimed at transforming the categories of perception and appreciation of the social world and the social world itself' had been largely neglected. Despite not committing attention to examining this phenomenon, Bourdieu frequently insisted that a politics of collective mobilisation was required (Swartz, 1997: 136). By applying Bourdieu's conceptual framework to act as an interlocutor between 'pluralist' Islamic studies and 'critical' SMT, the overarching objective is to induce inter-disciplinary syncretism for the purpose of producing a more accurate understanding and explanation of collective action in Muslim societies and more specifically, the emergence and evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. The next chapter will explore the advantages of adopting Bourdieu's insights in reconciling theoretical and practical logics in order to devise and implement viable methodologies for conducting field research in Lebanon.

Chapter Three

Studying (in) Lebanon

'Research without theory is blind and theory without research is empty'

- *Immanuel Kant (1996, A 51)*

'No Scholar, historian or anyone else is…ethically excused from their own circumstances. We are also participants in our own time and place and cannot retreat from it'.

- *Tony Judt (2012: 285-286)*

'Our cause is a secret within a secret, a secret that only another secret can explain; it is a secret about a secret that is veiled by a secret'.

- *Ja'far al-Sadiq, Sixth Shi'i Imam (Eco, 2001: 581)*

'They won't talk to you. It's not because you are British or a spy or something. They don't speak to anyone because they don't trust anyone. They've had a lot of bad experiences with this… Someone could write a whole PhD about the problems of researching in Lebanon'.

- *Interview with Moussa Bishara (Beirut, 11 April, 2012)*

Illustrating the methodological problems of their discipline via the analogy of a forest, Timothy Snyder and Tony Judt suggested that trees are the allegorical equivalent of episodes in history where the forest represents a particular account depending on the path one follows. Devoid of a path, 'you stare at the ground, you search for footing, you can't appreciate the trees'. Offering a step-by-step methodological blueprint, they recommended that one should learn about trees before understanding that many trees together constitute a forest, explaining that one way to think about a forest is as a place containing paths and proposing what they believe to be the best path available. Only then is one free to '"theorize" about paths: whether they are human creations, whether they distort the "natural" shape of the forest and so forth'. The ultimate challenge is 'that more and more of our young colleagues, bored by mere tree description, derive greatest satisfaction from teaching the etiology of paths' (Judt & Snyder, 2012: 272-273).

This metaphor demonstrates the methodological importance of reconciling theory and praxis. In Lebanon, where the constituent elements of its histories are as scattered as the Cedar trees that meander through the country, there exist a plethora of paths offering viable routes through the Lebanese forest. Depending on the motivations and aptitude of the wanderer, these paved avenues vary in length (brief strolls or extensive hikes), focus (observing tree patterns or specific clusters) and

direction (following or deviating). When studying the evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon, the available tours venture along prosaic paths constructed in a formulaic fashion. Whereas SMT has surveyed opportunities for developing an alternative path, by obediently relying on a track of pre-conceived design, it remains beset by operational obstacles. Conversely, a more effective approach entails abandoning a damaged and over trodden path for the purpose of devising a route forged through a dialectical process that returns the epistemological primacy to the tree while re-routing the path according to empirical enquiry.

In parallel to this methodological theory/praxis nexus is the acknowledgement of the insider/outsider dualism. E.H. Carr (1964: 29) emphasised that the researcher must navigate between 'the Scylla of an untenable theory of history as an objective compilation of facts…and the Charybdis of an equally untenable theory of history as the subjective product of the mind of the historian'. Consequently, this complex question consists of more than simply presenting a self-critical balance sheet containing an objective assessment of the individual researcher's (sub)conscious practice, priorities, proclivities, prejudices or politics and then mitigating against the risk of these subjective perspectives by recognising one's awareness of their presence. Rather, this is an inescapably conceptual process of negotiation of a subject's embedded position within objective structures of pre-existing practice.

For Bourdieu, the *habitus* of an agent is intrinsically immersed in social structures of perception and practice. Since 'habits of expression' constrain and corrupt a researcher's practice, the internalisation of these habits can 'denature, neutralize, and finally kill' the prospect of an 'independent, autonomous intellectual' (Said, 1994: 27, 67-68, 94, 101). Invoking the forest analogy, the question is not simply whether the paving of a path differs depending on the origin of its labourers, but also how their institutionally socialised knowledge of trees impacts their perception and practice in either following or deviating from an existing delineated route. The balance of this Cartesian dualism, in which the researcher recognises a meta-cognitive function in analysing themselves as both a thinking subject and an observable object, may have been deconstructed but accurately performing a thorough evaluation requires a more formally structured approach.

In mainstream SMT, while the researcher is equipped with the epistemological tools with which to identify and examine phenomena, the approach is less rigorous on the application of commensurate methodological techniques. Alternatively, the analytical

tools outlined within Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice' in the previous chapter concurrently serve to provide an in-built and interdependent methodological guide. Consequently, this framework features two principles of methodological practice, namely self-reflexivity and relationality, which not only endeavour to diagnose the recurring roots of research dilemmas, such as the theory/praxis or insider/outsider dualisms, but also present a formula with which to reduce the inherent debilitating deficiencies and impact of conventional methodological processes.

Firstly, in applying self-reflexivity, each researcher should subscribe to 'participant objectivation' (Bourdieu, 2003). This concept, which is also linked to relationality, requires the researcher to 'turn the tools of analysis back on the researchers themselves through a kind of "auto-analysis" of their own research field' (Grenfell, 2010: 96). In particular, throughout methodological practice, there are three biases that blur a researcher's perspective: social origins (class, gender, ethnicity); academic position (participating in a politicised field governed by rules, structures and interests); and intellectualist partisanship propagating a 'scholastic fallacy' of confusing 'the things of logic with the logic of things', a practice that ultimately projects the epistemological assumptions of theoretical practices on ordinary activities (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 40; Grenfell, 2010: 97; Swartz, 1997: 274). While self-reflexivity is more of a preferred *field* strategy than an achievable objective, neglecting 'to objectify the very intention of objectifying' or extract oneself from the ideological assumptions, operational logics and political dynamics of one's own academic *field* fails to produce a 'politically effective practice of science' (Bourdieu, 1987: 43-44; Swartz, 1997: 249, 277)[43].

Secondly, through the coining and application of conceptual notions such as *habitus*, *field* and *capital*, Bourdieu advocated the practice of relationality to ascertain their mutually constituted and inclusive co-habitation as opposed to their objectively observable or independent ontological nature. Consequently, 'it is the link between individuals (*habitus*), *field* structures, and the positionings both within and between fields, that form a conceptual framework for research' (Grenfell, 2008: 223). Translated into methodological practice, relationality can be divided into four phases: firstly, identifying *fields* and evaluating their intrinsic generative/regulative logics; secondly, mapping the structured relations between the inscribed dispositions, perceptions and positions of social agents while weighting the relative definition,

[43] Bourdieu (1990; 1988b) believed that the paradox of self-reflexivity is that one can never truly separate oneself objectively from the interests enshrined in their respective field (Swartz, 1997: 282).

value and legitimacy of *capital*; thirdly, accounting for the mutually reinforcing dialectic of relation between *field* structures and agent practice; and fourthly, plotting *field* boundaries, porosity and homology to determine the susceptibility and permeability of *fields* to *capital* deployment and transference. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is not to discard the path of collective action constructed by SMT, but to more effectively redirect its course in convergent methodological compatibility with the Bourdieusian principles of self-reflexivity and relationality for the purpose of addressing and assessing the emergence of Hizbullah in Lebanon.

The first objective of this chapter is to implement the methodological prerequisite of self-reflexivity by not only examining the researcher's placement within the academic *field*, from where he generates theoretical knowledge and dispositions, but also as an inducted observer within the empirical *fields* of Lebanon, from where he generates practical knowledge and perceptions, while considering the implications that these juxtaposed experiences of position and process have on the accumulation and interpretation of information. Additionally, since Bourdieu has been frequently criticised for his lack of clarity on the specifics of *field* labelling, categorisation, borders and inter-connection, the second objective of this chapter is to apply methodological relationality by explaining the selection and identification of *fields* in Lebanon, their constitution, composition and relation as well as their relevance for plotting the trajectory of Hizbullah[44]. This practice also presents an opportunity to complement and supplement Bourdieu's 'useful sensitizing concepts, empirically-testable hypotheses and suggestions for research' with SMT findings on movement mobilisation (Lizardo in Santoro, 2011: 15-16). Lastly, this chapter argues that by omitting theoretical issues pertaining to self-reflexivity and relationality, previous literature on Hizbullah, which is already inhibited by its conceptual paucity, continues to lack methodological credibility and reliability.

3.1 The Struggle for *Capital* in the Academic *Field*

As demonstrated in the first chapter with the palpable friction both within and between Islamic studies and sociology over the legitimate epistemological foundations of collective action in the Middle East, the Academic *field* is not exempt from competitive struggles. For Bourdieu, these spheres of institutionalised practice contain their own relational dynamics with each agent sharing the 'belief' and

[44] These accusations have been noted by Bigo (2011: 80), Thomson (2008: 79), Calhoun (1993: 70) and Lipuma (1993: 26)

'purpose' of participating in academia and subscribing to the intersubjective understanding of the 'stakes' or 'interests' on offer (*illusio*). Consequently, agents propagate *orthodoxy* (status quo) or *heterodoxy* (revisionist) towards the prevailing laws (*doxa*) and produce practice based upon their dispositions and perceptions (*habitus*) as well as their allocation and acquisition of *capital*. In *Homo Academicus*, Bourdieu (1988a: 48) described how the university system was organised according to 'social' and 'cultural' hierarchy, the first representing inherited *capital* while the second referred to 'scientific authority or intellectual renown'. Although the social sciences were relegated in importance compared to the natural sciences, the overall objective was to accumulate *capital* to convert into symbolic *capital*, a status from which one gains student respect, peer legitimacy and enhanced opportunities for further progression (funding, publications and promotions)[45]. Whether intentionally or inadvertently pursued, this practice not only curtailed peer advancement, but also dictated the parameters of disciplinary debates.

Therefore, there is an entrenched *modus operandi* in the Academic *field*, or an *obsequium* of 'unconditional respect for the fundamental principles of the established order' that preserves hierarchical succession and prevents those who seek to 'cut corners' (Bourdieu, 1988a: 87). Under the normative structures of this arrangement, one is forced into a position of becoming 'an expert, that is, an intellectual at the service of the dominant' or 'an independent petty producer in the old mode, symbolized by the professor lecturing in his ivory tower' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 58). In this paradox, while the pursuit of the latter is commendable for the integrity of science, the former is more successful in the realms of practice. Generally, those who concentrate on acquiring economic and social *capital* in order to translate it into symbolic *capital* manage to ensure a tautological circle of perennial dominance whereas those who focus disproportionately on cultural *capital* encounter difficulty in converting their *capital* into influence due to its relative value and transferable disparities within the *field*.

This logic of relational *orthodoxy* equally applies to new inductees in the Academic *field*. Similar to the institutionalised disincentive that compels established actors from publishing material that may have implications for their symbolic status, PhD candidates are also dissuaded from *heterodoxy* and encouraged to pursue research that strives for legitimate *capital* and *field* advancement. For Bourdieu (1988a: 95),

[45] Bourdieu (1988a: 62; 1993a: 10) suggested that the 'high faculties' included theology, law and medicine with social sciences suffering a doubly insubordinate position in that it is in the shadow of the natural sciences and therefore additionally inferior in the 'cultural stock exchange' since scientific values derived from the natural sciences are subsequently considered more valuable.

'there is no master who does not recognize the value of the institution and its institutional values which are all rooted in the institutionalized refusal of any non-institutional thought'. Consequently, the dominant *orthodoxy* imposes prerequisites that homogenise the *habiti* of prospective agents, thereby initiating them into a *field* of 'similar expectations and probably trajectories' where the promotion of 'legitimate' knowledge and the reproduction of *orthodoxy* are rewarded (Bourdieu, 1988a: 156)[46].

The application of self-reflexivity should not boast pretentions of neutrality or independence since it neither surmounts these conditions nor emancipates the *field*. On the contrary, self-reflexivity recognises that being a participant in a *field* involves an acceptance of its *illusio* and therefore any truthful knowledge produced is achieved 'not *despite* the interest he has in producing that truth but *because* he has an interest in doing so' (Bourdieu, 1993a: 11). Subsequently, this practice reveals 'the limits of the social world and so to make difficult all forms of prophetic discourse, starting…with the propheticism that claims to be scientific' (Bourdieu, 1993a: 17)[47]. For the 'scholastic fallacy' to be overcome and self-reflexivity to be achieved, the objectifying subject should apply the same objectifying logic that they extend to their object onto themselves, a process that entails 'not only everything he is, his own social conditions of production and thereby the "limits of his mind", but also his very work of objectivation, the hidden interests that are invested in it and the profits that it promises' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 67-68). By doing so, the utility of self-reflexivity is evident in 'freeing us from the illusion of freedom, or…from the misplaced belief in illusory freedoms' (Bourdieu, 1987: 15).

Invoking Gramsci's (1971: 244) treatise that politics is ubiquitous in the Weberian definition of referring to the distribution, allocation and appropriation of power, science is synonymous with politics (Swartz, 1997: 249). Each agent is directed by practical interests, and while self-reflexivity aims to concentrate on the institutionalised epistemological foundations of the discipline rather than individual introspection, it is important to trace the development of the researcher's *habitus* as an agent within his structured *fields* of practice (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 41; 2000: 10). Although committed to the practice of academic integrity, this research, which began in the School of Government and International Affairs at Durham

[46] Throughout Bourdieu's work there is a latent frustration with the nepotistic and elitist nature of the French Academic *field*. While his modest upbringing did not hinder his success, his concept of self-reflexivity may have become a tool of struggle in the very *field* it sought to transcend (Swartz, 1997: 283).

[47] Bourdieu (2000: 7) admitted that 'I do not like the intellectual in myself, and what may sound…like anti-intellectualism is chiefly directed against the intellectualism or intellectuality that remains in me, despite all my efforts, such as the difficulty, so typical of intellectuals, I have in accepting that my freedom has limits'.

University in October 2010, was not motivated by the prospect of accruing cultural and social *capital* with which to enhance his symbolic position in the Academic *field*, but by the practical interests of acquiring transferable cultural and social *capital* for advancement within the *Field of International Politics* (*FIP*)[48].

The son of an English father, who is a self-employed energy consultant, and a Scottish mother, who is an academic trained in psychotherapy, the researcher attended an independent school in a suburb of west London[49]. As Maton (2008: 58) observes, aspirations are conditioned by the *habitus*, 'we learn of our rightful place in the world where we will do our best given disposition and resources and also where we struggle'. Similarly, social agents gravitate to the corresponding fields that match the construction of their 'subjective expectations of objective probabilities' (Bourdieu, 1990: 59). The researcher's parents, who on account of their working class backgrounds had acquired values of cultural and economic *capital* as opposed to inheriting them, conformed to the predominant *orthodoxy* of their position that promoted private schools within the Educational *field* as the optimal opportunity for their children to achieve legitimately symbolic forms of *capital*. Consequently, these educational and social factors, whether consciously or subconsciously, had a considerable impact on the development of his *habitus*. Firstly, as a 'middle class' product of London's private education system, university enrolment was an expected outcome. Secondly, the morality embedded within a Benedictine Catholic School combined with the values instilled at home also contributed to the structuring of initial dispositions and perceptions. Thirdly, studying in the Classics Department at the University of Edinburgh, both classifications of distinction based on traditionally symbolic connotations, further entrenched the researcher's position and practice in the Educational *field*[50].

After graduating with an MA (Hons.) in 2006, rather than follow his peers in transferring cultural *capital* from the Educational *field* into the *fields* of professional practice, such as Law, Banking, Accountancy and Consultancy, the researcher, having cultivated an interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict throughout his adolescence, worked for a year as a political analyst at an NGO chaired by a Palestinian politician in Ramallah[51]. This experience, occurring at the embryonic

[48] Durham University is one of the oldest universities in the United Kingdom with an academic tradition dating back to the Venerable Bede in the 7th Century. The School of Government and International Affairs, formed in 2004, merged the Department of Politics with the Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies.
[49] The researcher's sister is two years older. She obtained a First Class degree in History from the University of Edinburgh in 2005 before attending Law School in London. She now works for a notable American law firm in London.
[50] The researcher received A Levels in History, Greek and Latin.
[51] The researcher's mother had spent the majority of the 1970s working in Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories.

stages of his professional development and coinciding with the widening chasm between Fatah and Hamas, may have substantially affected his perception of broader Middle East politics towards Palestinian-related issues[52]. The decision to return to the UK in 2008 was predicated on the understanding that entry into the *FIP* required further academic credentials and professional experience. After working for Middle East Consultants International in London, the researcher completed an MSc in International Relations (IR) Theory at the London School of Economics in 2009 while interning as a Middle East analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies until early 2010 (IISS).

This environment, which shifted focus from working *on* the Middle East as opposed to *in* the region, exposed new dimensions in formulating expectations and devising strategies for progression. In particular, the logics that govern access to both the Academic *field* and the *FIP* are inexorably homologous with the horizontal transferability of *capital* mutually compatible. Whereas the IR course structure at the reputable LSE provides its students with access to social and cultural *capital* that enables them to manoeuvre vertically within the Academic *field* or horizontally towards the *FIP*, the social and cultural *capital* accrued in international affairs think-tanks located in the *FIP* can equally be utilised to enhance the credentials of someone applying for an IR-related programme in the Academic *field*. Nevertheless, while symbolic distinctions exist within the Academic *field* (staff/students), an agent can still advance by mobilising *capital* vertically. Conversely, symbolic distinctions in the *FIP* (fellow/intern) are more restrictive with interns unable to supplement their cultural *capital* with economic and social *capital* thereby limiting opportunities for vertical progression. Testament to these constraints and in reaction to the financial crisis, the *FIP* issued more regulating barriers for entry by demanding that prospective researchers with a PhD were 'preferable'. Therefore, after six months working as a consultant for private companies in the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the researcher returned to the UK to embark upon a PhD at Durham University[53].

Similar to the decision to undertake a PhD, the choice of topic was not only of personal interest, but also instrumentally motivated. At the time of applying, Islamist movements were rising in prominence with governments, policy-makers and private

[52] Employing a Saidian critique, the researcher is aware that he would be designated as either a conscious or subconscious Orientalist due to his intellectual background within Western pedagogic practice. While acknowledging ontological, epistemological or methodological prejudices in Western academia towards the 'Orient', the researcher opposes the assumption that his applies to all Western-trained academics.

[53] The reasons for accepting the offer at Durham University were personal (the prospect of working with Dr Jeroen Gunning), academic (Durham University has a strong reputation for Middle East studies) and financial (Durham was less expensive than remaining at the LSE in London).

businesses eager to understand the ramifications of their respective mobilisation and politicisation[54]. In particular, despite its 2006 War with Israel, its brief military seizure of Beirut in 2008 and its overwhelming influence in Lebanon, Hizbullah remained relatively under-explored within existing literature that provided thick empirical information on the movement's evolution as opposed to applying conceptual models for collective action. Therefore, considering that Hizbullah's organisational structure concurrently manages the balance between its military, social and political 'Resistance' while propagating an encompassing narrative of Lebanese Nationalism, pan-Arab unity, Shi'i particularism and Islamic universalism, the researcher thought that Hizbullah's inherent complexity was an interesting subject for theoretical examination.

Consequently, this dual-*field* strategy was aimed at enhancing the researcher's cultural and social *capital* in the Academic *field* while simultaneously bypassing the lower stages of recruitment in the *FIP* by investigating opportunities for gradually transferring this *capital*. To satisfy the first part, the intention was to instigate an innovative contribution by using Hizbullah as the vehicle to offer a complementary conceptual framework to SMT for explaining Islamist movement inception and evolution. Furthermore, by selecting an internationally pertinent and practically relevant topic, the research would appeal to *fields* beyond academia. In the interim, the researcher would pursue efforts to augment his professional acumen in applying for part-time work, conducting field research in Lebanon, improving his Arabic proficiency as well as amalgamating networks from a range of areas and industries.

3.2 'L'Etranger' ('The Outsider'): Theoretical and Practical Logics

For Bourdieu (1993b: 271), 'one cannot grasp the most profound logic of the social world unless one becomes immersed in the specificity of an empirical reality, historically situated and dated'. After spending the first year critically engaged with pre-existing literature to identify a conceptual interlocutor that bridged the dichotomous chasm between Islamic studies and SMT, the researcher arrived in Lebanon at the beginning of his second year for a ten-month ethnographic research trip to examine this 'logic of the social world'. However, especially important for practising self-reflexivity, the second half of Bourdieu's citation contains a caveat: 'but only in order to construct it as an instance…in a finite universe of possible

[54] In 2010, whether in Palestine (Hamas), Iraq (Moqtada Al-Sadr), Yemen (Houthis), Egypt (Muslim Brotherhood) or Lebanon (Hizbullah), Islamist movements had propelled onto the *FIP*.

configurations'. Ultimately, this approach recognises the presence of theoretical and practical logics. While challenging, reconstituting the relationship between the two is a precondition for avoiding a 'scholastic fallacy' in which practical knowledge is transformed into theoretical knowledge (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 40). Instead, practical knowledge should be reconstructed theoretically 'by including in the theory the distance between practical logic and theoretical logic' (Bourdieu, 2000: 52).

In a university setting, the agent in the Academic *field*, or the 'scientist in the machine', is a product of its dominant rules and practices that reproduces the theoretical logic of knowledge institutionalised within the epistemological structures of their disciplines (Bourdieu, 2000: 60). In the case of this research, the format reflects academic demands in contributing knowledge within the prevailing trends of the discipline. As outlined in Chapter One, any cross-disciplinary approach that addresses Islamist mobilisation in the Middle East should firstly consider the literature published within Islamic studies and sociology in order to place the research within its pre-existing academic context. This includes documenting traditional debates within Islamic studies, such as Orientalist, modernist and pluralist perspectives, while concurrently referencing discussions within different schools of sociology, most specifically SMT.

Although this ethnological process occurs within a studious, 'intellectualocentric' environment that is separated from the social world, it is neither neutral nor devoid of political influences since the discourses that define its parameters are the direct result of struggles within the Academic *field* (Bourdieu, 2000: 41). As dominant narratives represent 'scientific' authority, the power to successfully produce, impose and inculcate legitimate representations of the social world, these constructions of knowledge equate to symbolic *power*, a condition of misrecognised and misattributed truth (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 51). Indicative of the Academic *field*, it is incumbent on the researcher to yield to rules that promote *orthodoxy* in order to attain the cultural *capital* required to legitimately progress. Consequently, it is within the confines of these politically-infused *fields* that concepts such as 'interest', 'ideology', 'culture', 'theory', 'politics' and 'religion' acquire their meaning as the barometers for future academic practice. By virtue of their prevalence and symbolic status, the application of mainstream theoretical logics becomes a normative function of practice.

However, as Gaston Bachelard posited, 'the world in which one thinks is not the world in which one lives' (Bourdieu, 2000: 51). Practical logic, which contains its own situational contexts, dynamics and functionalities, does not operate in the same fixed space and time as theoretical examination. Therefore, social scientists in the Academic *field* who equip themselves with a formulated scientific lens to transpose onto the real world 'misrepresent the practical and dispositional character of practices by projecting onto ordinary activities the epistemological assumptions of theoretical practices' (Swartz, 1997: 274). By exposing this epistemocentrism to the social world, a process in which theoretical logic deductively examines practice as opposed to practical logic inductively directing theory, the researcher endows the agent(s) with the same scientific reasoning that contributed to the composition of theoretical logic, thereby observing practice through a pre-configured prism that has no pretext in the experiences or perceptions of the corresponding object it presumes to explain. In this way, practices are selectively illustrated in isolation rather than viewed as dialectical logics that are relationally constituted. As argued by Bourdieu (2000: 54), 'it is no doubt the powerful, fascinating experience of being a stranger that makes him forget…that he is no less a stranger to his own practice than to the strange practices he observes'.

Testament to the challenge of reconciling theoretical and practical logics, Bourdieu (and Wacquant, 1992: 33) also struggled with the propensity of scholars to succumb to practical logics while serving as an intelligence clerk for the French occupational army by admitting that his intellectual activities in Algeria may have been driven 'to overcome my guilty conscience about being merely a participant observer in this appalling war'. In this respect, Bourdieu's position in Algeria as a 'political scholar' has been juxtaposed with the 'scholarly politician' embodied by Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), another contemporary, French-speaking 'outsider' in Algeria (Celarent, 2011). Despite comprehending the 'interest to objectivize' in the theoretical logic of the Academic *field*, Bourdieu, who wrote three books and a litany of articles on Algeria, also recognised the practical logic of producing politically relevant research that would attract more *capital* in the struggle for legitimate knowledge (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 260; 1988a: 152; 2000: 119; Schlthesis & Frisinghelli, 2012: 215-218)[55]. Conversely, as an active combatant in Algerian independence, Frantz Fanon (1963, 1965, 1967) identified the theoretical logic of the Academic *field* behind

[55] While serving as a clerk, Calhoun (2012) writes that Bourdieu sought to understand the Kabyle community in the context of capital markets and social transformation. In 1958, he released *Sociologie de l'Algerie*, a study of Berber societies in which he developed the concept of 'real psychological dispositions'. As a lecturer at the University of Algiers, he published *Travail et Travailleurs*, which examined labour migrants in the new metropolitan economy of colonial Algeria, and *Les Deracines*, which assessed how the colonial policy of forcibly removing peasants to quell resistance had resulted in a crisis of traditional agriculture.

colonial practice but rejected its practical logic by maintaining that the intellectual was not a passive object but a revolutionary catalyst for change[56]. Albert Camus (1913-1960), the Algerian-born philosopher, could also be included in this equation as 'scholarly apolitical' by appearing ambivalent to the practical logic of an 'insider' while distinctively applying Western theoretical logic to study the human subject[57].

Akin to Algeria, the balance between theoretical and practical logics is also salient when critiquing pre-existing literature on Hizbullah. Despite the proliferation of publications over the last decade, a trend that is directly correlated to Hizbullah's expanding role in Lebanon, there has been limited theoretical engagement or methodological reflection in assessing Hizbullah's emergence and evolution aside from disjointed attempts by Karagiannis (2009), Alagha (2011) and Azani (2011). This deficiency of conceptual immersion has resulted in further inter/intra-disciplinary polarisation. Surveying the contours of core texts on Hizbullah, commentators can be stratified into three main categorisations: those who reside in the Academic *field*; those who operate in the *FIP*; and those who practice in the Media *field*. While not explicitly acknowledging the theoretical logics that underpin their *field* placement, each commentator implicitly reflects the dispositions and practices of their respective *field* positions.

The first group comprises either of Lebanese academics (Alagha, 2006, 2011; Sharara, 2006; Hamzeh, 2004; Deeb, 2006a; Harb, 2011) or U.S. scholars who have spent significant time researching in Lebanon (Harik, 2005; Norton, 2007a)[58]. Adhering to the *illusio* of the Academic *field*, in which the generative principle of *orthodoxy* guides practice towards transforming cultural *capital* into symbolic *capital*, Hizbullah exemplifies an observable phenomenon with which to test hypotheses and assumptions derived from theoretical logic[59]. Since dispositions and perceptions in the Academic *field* are predicated on extant definitions of legitimate knowledge, the *orthodox* practice of *capital* accumulation and deployment for enhancing one's position is directed vertically. However, by virtue of their nationality or extensive experience, these commentators are stakeholders within the practical logic of Lebanon. Consequently, they exploited their linguistic and social understanding to produce informative analysis into the ideological inception and political evolution of

[56] Fanon thought that sociologists were 'fools at best, colonial tools at worst'. He saw no contradiction between the intellectual and the masses but believed the role of the former was 'not to educate in the same fashion as they have been educated; the educator becomes newly educated by challenging preconceived ideas about the backwardness of the masses' (Gibson, 2003: 198).
[57] Camus was a *pied-noir*, which denotes his ancestry to the initial French settlers in Algeria. Although criticised for his ambivalent stance on the War, his books, especially The Outsider (2000) and The Plague (2002), belie a complete antipathy on the subject.
[58] Dominique Avon and Anas Khatchadourian (2012) could also be included in this group.
[59] It is worth noting that post-2000 revisionist histories on the Shi'i in Lebanon have invariably been motivated by the rising prominence of Hizbullah (Winter, 2010; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008; Chalabi, 2006; Shanahan, 2005).

Hizbullah. Nevertheless, this thick empirical description has come at the expense of conceptual exploration. While Western-educated Lebanese academics, including Mona Harb and Lara Deeb (2012, 2011, 2007), have refreshingly illustrated Hizbullah's manipulation of space in institutionalising a Resistance culture, their approach embraces alternative disciplinary logics and methods that are not grounded in addressing conventional Hizbullah literature.

The second cadre contains academic analysts that are embroiled in foreign policy think-tanks within the *FIP*. In the *illusio* for this arena, the theoretical logic of scientific enquiry entrenched in the Academic *field* is supplanted by the practical logic to transfer *capital* horizontally for the purpose of exerting influence in decision-making. Propagating generalised discourses on 'Islam' and 'international terrorism' to gain political traction, most of these commentators focus on Hizbullah as an Iranian proxy that not only presents a destabilising force in Lebanon, but also poses a ubiquitous threat to U.S. and Israeli security (Levitt, 2013, 2014; Gleis & Berti, 2012; Azani, 2011; Jorisch, 2004; Ranstorp, 1997; Kramer, 1993)[60]. To preserve their standing and promote their status, the dispositions of these agents and their vertical enhancement of *capital* are synchronised to reproducing an *orthodox* narrative that observes Hizbullah through the myopic lens of Iran and Israel. Conversely, while Saad-Ghorayeb (2002) and Crooke (2009) are also invested in the practical logic of the *FIP*, they problematise its predominant theoretical logic and adopt approaches and perspectives that promote revisionist *heterodoxy* in re-evaluating the discourse and practice of the Islamic Resistance[61].

The third assemblage consists of journalists in the Media *field* who specialise on Hizbullah. Traditionally, the theoretical logic determining values of *capital* and legitimate practice in this sphere has been a combination of information integrity, observer objectivity and audience appeal. Due to its open constitution based upon the *illusio* of investigating and disseminating information to the public, the *habitus* is conditioned by the practical logic of discovering sources and uncovering stories. Considering the exponential global interest in Hizbullah, the subject attracts a litany of Western correspondents who either approach Hizbullah as the core focus (Jaber, 1997; Shatz, 2004; Goldberg, 2002; Cambanis, 2010; Blanford, 2011, Totten, 2011;

[60] Levitt, Jorisch and Kramer are all affiliated to the neo-conservative, pro-Israeli Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Kramer is also a Senior Fellow at the Shalem Centre in Jerusalem while Azani is the Executive Director for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center in Israel. Ranstorp is an expert on terrorism at the University of St Andrews whereas Gleis and Berti are political risk consultants.

[61] After publishing a highly informative book on Hizbullah, Saad-Ghorayeb is now the author of the *Resistance-Episteme* blog, which is a polemical platform for deploring intellectual imperialism and decrying criticisms against the Resistance. Crooke, a former MI6 agent and EU advisor on Hamas and Hizbullah is the Director at Conflicts Forum (Interview with Alastair Crooke, Beirut, 16 May, 2012).

Filkins, 2013), a peripheral interest (Young, 2010; Hirst, 2010; Fisk, 2001) or an instrumental marketing ploy (Dekker & Medearis, 2010; MacFarquhar, 2009). Consequently, achieving symbolic *capital* is less about innovative analysis and more to do with substantiating anecdotal evidence while ensuring that the narrative resonates with their broad readership. However, not only is Hizbullah's secrecy a barrier for access but Western newspapers are also influenced by both political and public opinion that harbour pro-Israeli tendencies and negative sentiments towards the Islamic Resistance, a practical logic that risks distorting scientific knowledge. Similarly in Lebanon, since local columnists and distributors are embedded actors within the practical logic of political polarisation, they become perceived as diametrically divided between 14 March (*Al-Nahar*, *Daily Star*) and 8 March (*Al-Safir*, *Al-Akhbar*).

Participant objectivation is challenging because 'it requires the deepest and most unconscious adherences and adhesion break, those that quite often give the object its very interest for those who study it' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 253). This self-reflexivity or 'epistemic reflexivity' may be unattainable but it is a methodological necessity in unravelling the agent from their own interests and position while simultaneously accounting for the constituted categories of perception that determine epistemological assumptions (Bourdieu, 2000: 119)[62]. Most importantly, it is a fallacy to disconnect this theoretical logic from its practical counterpoint in research. Therefore, the remainder of this chapter will assess the methodological importance of relationality before explaining the process by which the researcher endeavoured to objectify objectification in reconciling theoretical and practical logics while studying Hizbullah in Lebanon.

3.3 Spotting *Field* Relationality in Lebanon

The concept of relationality is not only a methodological priority in understanding and practising self-reflexivity, but it is also an imperative contribution in explaining movement mobilisation. Although the SMT tripartite of Political Opportunity Structures, Mobilising Structures and Collective Action Frames already provide a useful model that infers the innate importance of relation in movement inception and mobilisation, Bourdieu is pivotal to the reconceptualising of SMT by offering analytically robust tools that place relationality as the underlying and ubiquitous

[62] To objectify objectification means to adopt a process where one dispossesses 'the knowing subject of the privilege it normally grants itself (and to bring) to light the presuppositions it owes to its inclusion in the order of knowledge (Bourdieu, 2000: 10; 1988a: 15).

dynamic at the epicentre of the entire framework. Firstly, by introducing the continuous constitution of relationality between an agent's dispositions (*habitus*), positions (*capital*) and the contextual environment (*field*), Bourdieu's conceptualisation replaces the tautological conundrum of irreconcilable dualisms in SMT with a formula in which interactions between agents and structures are predicated on mutually compatible dialectics. Secondly, by expanding relationality to encompass *field* homology and *capital* transference, Bourdieu not only enables SMT to perceive Political Opportunities, Mobilising Structures and Collective Action Frames as symptomatic characteristics manifesting in each *field* rather than simply across them, but it also emphasises the intrinsic interdependence and interconnection of identifiably concurrent *fields* of activity as opposed to spheres operating in epistemological independence or isolation.

Due to the practical logics of either ideology or interest in directing pre-existing literature on Hizbullah, there remain limited instances of conceptual frameworks that guide the parameters of their respective analyses. Rather than explore the complexity of Hizbullah's multi-directional and relational environment, each focuses disproportionately on selected drivers that inform and impact the Party from the perspective of its internally-determined purpose and practice. Therefore, while embracing relationality, this concept is restricted to a selected *field* of Hizbullah activity. For example, whereas some assess the introverted management of transition between Hizbullah's ideological and political positions (Alagha, 2006, 2011; Norton, 2007a, 2007b; Azani 2011; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002), others omit the overtly political or military dimensions to investigate how Hizbullah actively inculcates a Resistance culture into conventional daily practice (Deeb, 2006a; Harb, 2011; Harb & Deeb, 2011). Equally, while some stress the tension in reconciling Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance and its parliamentary presence (Harik, 2005; Hamzeh, 2004), others are principally concerned with Hizbullah's regional role in 'global terrorism' (Levitt, 2013, 2014).

Conversely, Hizbullah neither emerged nor does it exist in a containable vacuum. While initially conceived by the ideology of the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hizbullah is an actor that exists and is embedded within the extant political, social and military structures of Lebanon. By extension, the preservation of Hizbullah is contingent upon the organisation's simultaneous management of its military presence, its social position and its political placement. Since these competitive *fields* contain their own structured logics and dynamics, intra and inter-*field* relationality is the critical

foundation for comprehending the prospect of Hizbullah's emergence and the possibilities for its evolution in Lebanon. Under these circumstances, Hizbullah is not in control of its situational context but adapts accordingly as both a proactive and reactive agent.

In Chapter One, proponents of 'pluralist' Islamic studies and 'critical' SMT converged on the importance of contextual relationality. Meanwhile in Chapter Two, Bourdieu's analytical tools were presented as conceptual interlocutors in effectively explaining the phenomenon of Hizbullah's collective action in Lebanon. While engaging in a self-reflexive process of experimentation during field research, in which the pre-determined parameters of a theoretical Bourdieu-SMT logic were not simply transposed but constantly informed and corrected by the observable practical logic of Lebanon, the researcher identified a number of relational *fields* for the purpose of examining Hizbullah's creation and reproduction of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. Although these empirical *fields* of enquiry intentionally reference and correspond in alignment with SMT levels of analysis, they also represent *fields* that have a direct and unavoidable influence on Hizbullah's multiple positions in Lebanon. Therefore, while the selection of these five inter-related and concentric *fields* by no means denies the existence or importance of other *fields* or sub-*fields* for Hizbullah in Lebanon, they intend to conceptually assess Hizbullah's relational purpose, perceptions, positions and practice within these specific areas of activity[63].

Once designated, the aim is to discern the key composition, components and characteristics of each *field* via the analytical tools devised by Bourdieu. Firstly, the researcher should describe the constitution of the *field*, namely its formation, its structured laws, its generative/regulative mechanisms and its *orthodox* and *heterodox* positions. Secondly, the objective is to locate the purpose, position and practice of specific agents with each field who are mutually endowed with the interest or stakes of participation (*illusio*) and equipped with dispositions and perceptions (*habitus*) that strategically guide or limit action towards *orthodoxy* or *heterodoxy* in relation to *field* dynamics. Thirdly, since agents inherit, acquire and deploy legitimately recognised *capital* (cultural, economic, social and symbolic) in order to promote, advance or change their position in relation to predominant *field* structures, it is important to account for the relative values of *capital*, methods for its accumulation and tactics for its activation. Fourthly, in order to deduce opportunities

[63] These may include, but are not limited to, national *fields* or local sub-*fields* in Finance, Economy, Judiciary, Education, Religion, Family, Literature or Music.

and susceptibilities of *field* homology and *capital* transference, one should also ascertain the relative permeability between *fields*. By following these four stages, not only can one analyse how Hizbullah created, cultivated and consolidated a Resistance *habitus* from *heterodoxy* to *orthodoxy* within its *fields* of operation, but also how it concurrently managed and harmonised the balance of this Resistance *habitus* across *fields*.

1. Social Mobilisational Field (SMF)

This is the *sine qua non* competitive arena for any episodes of *heterodox* practice of mobilised collective action, such as protest, resistance or revolutionary movements. Similar to the notion of Mobilising Structures in SMT, this field contains the pre-existing bodies and modalities that comprise the core nucleus of Hizbullah's popular support, including, amongst others, individual constituents, familial networks, informal tribal groups, grassroots organisations, religious institutions and commercial business connections. Through the dissemination of diverse yet specifically-catered Collective Action Frames that relate and resonate with its agents to form harmonised dispositions and perceptions (*habitus*), this *field* not only provides Hizbullah recruits for the Islamic Resistance, but it also mobilises voters to ensure the Party's representation in parliament.

Since Hizbullah intends to instigate sustained resistance rather than temporary mobilisation, and due to its almost exclusively Shi'i base, the Party must construct a series of frames that not only reference and appeal to traditionally prevalent mobilising repertoires within the *SMF*, but also devise and implement institutionalised narratives that produce and reproduce new methods for customised collective action. Considering the entrenched social structures of established confessional mobilisation within Lebanon's diverse mosaic, Hizbullah could not simply rely on independently injecting its values of cultural and economic *capital* into the *SMF*. Conversely, through the assimilation of discourses and practices in localised contexts, Hizbullah had to translate its economic and cultural *capital* into social *capital* within the Shi'i community by conforming to the inter-subjective understandings of mobilising rules and requirements in the *SMF*, such as addressing the structured dynamics of the patronage system, Shi'i religious networks and the familial nature of tribal affiliations. Once inducted and deemed legitimate, Hizbullah could invest in enhancing the accumulation and deployment of

recognised *capital* to vie for symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community by entrenching discourses and practices to achieve routinised collective action.

Unlike mainstream SMT, in which the pre-existing dispositions and perceptions of agents are subordinated to the rational and material strategies of a structurally centralised organisation in identifying opportunities, devising mobilisational modalities and translating frames into action, a revised Bourdieu-SMT approach places further emphasis on the agent. Consequently, agents already possess eclectic varieties of practices (*habitus*) and positions (*capital*) in relation to the extant structures of the *SMF*. Therefore, while Hizbullah aims to construct the lens through which agents perceive the interest of mobilisation (*illusio*) and facilitate exchanges of *capital* that coalesce an amalgamation of agents (*collusio*) conjoined in identity and solidarity into a collective Resistance *habitus* of purpose and practice, the Party does not exclusively direct or dictate agential action, but since the structures of the *SMF* exist independently of any one particular movement, Hizbullah must continue to adapt and modernise mobilising tactics that complement the dialectic process through which an agent negotiates its position in relation to the *SMF*.

2. Military-Security Field (MSF)

Since the conceptual development of mainstream SMT emanated from a post-1945, Western-centric epoch of socio-economic inequalities and civil rights within democratic contexts, there was initially minimal attention extended to the role of symmetric warfare or asymmetrical violence in the mobilisation of social movements. However, as demonstrated by the work of Della Porta (1995) on political violence and social movements, a number of scholars, especially on the Middle East, have broadened the scope of SMT to integrate incidences of inter-state military confrontation, intra-state insurgencies and trans-state terrorism (Hafez, 2003; Sutton & Vertigans, 2006; Jackson, 2006; Gunning, 2007a; Hegghammer, 2010; Parsons, 2012). However, these episodes of collective mobilisation motivated towards violence are either sporadic manifestations restricted to one particular *field* of activity or sustained activities within more than one *field* in which the asymmetric capacities of the organisation are eclipsed by the symmetrical capabilities of the targeted stakeholder. Furthermore, there is no SMT literature that conceptualises the phenomenon of Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance, an organised militia that has evolved into a legitimate military actor with a multi-*field* remit in Lebanon, resources

that rival the state, an arsenal that deters Israeli intervention and regional affiliations that evoke 'global terrorism'.

Lebanon's *MSF* operates in a particular historical and situational context in which chronic political polarisation and social suspicion amongst confessional factions have debilitated the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) since the conception of the modern state. Although widely perceived as a source of national pride, the LAF has become institutionally marginalised by the endemic elitism and confessional fragmentation within Lebanon's political and social structures. Consequently, Lebanon's *MSF* has never fully subscribed to the Weberian assertion that the state wields legitimate monopoly over violence but has been embedded with a military logic, reinforced by the civil war, in which militia power has directly translated into political influence. In 1982, as Hizbullah emerged on the peripheries of the civil war and with the LAF ineffectual, a collection of leftist militias confronted Israeli occupation while inter-confessional infighting struggled for the predominant *orthodoxy* in the *MSF*, a sphere primarily governed and managed by Syria.

Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance is a product of this prevailing logic. Predicated on its contradistinction to Israel and with the considerable transference of *capital* from Iran and Syria, the Islamic Resistance preserved its *modus vivendi* in the *MSF*. Since the 1990s, through a series of military engagements with Israel, Hizbullah has invested in adapting and enhancing its collectively organised practice within the structures of the *MSF* to develop a Resistance *habitus* endowed with the symbolic *capital* of an *orthodox* actor. However, the relevance of the Islamic Resistance is not contained to the *MSF* but Hizbullah endeavours to employ its symbolic *capital* for the purpose of elevating or leveraging its position in corresponding *fields* of activity. Not only does Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF* possess significant homology with the *SMF* by justifying, galvanising and sustaining the discourses and practices of the Resistance *habitus* within the Shi'i community, but it also provides Hizbullah with an invaluable amount of legitimately recognised symbolic *capital* with which to impose and leverage the logic of the Islamic Resistance onto the established structures of Lebanon's political system, a sphere in which it propagates *heterodoxy* while maintaining deficient *capital*.

3. Political Field (PF)

For Bourdieu (1991: 26), the *PF* is 'the site par excellence in which words and action and the symbolic character of power that is at stake'. Similar to the concept of Political Opportunity Structures (POS) in SMT, the construction, constitution and composition of the *PF* is characterised by a range of political indices, such as the openness or closeness of the system, the position or access of elites, the existence of prominent cleavages and the state's employment of repression or co-option in balancing against threats. Therefore, by focusing on the process through which an organisation/agent perceives political opportunities within their relational context and subsequently accumulates the relevant material/symbolic resources to enhance their practice and position, the POS in SMT and the *PF* in Bourdieu are linked in complementary conceptual synergy. Nevertheless, in practice, and unlike assumptions in SMT regarding the origin, form and purpose of collective action towards POS, the adoption of the *PF* can explain the complexity of political opportunities within the institutionalised system in Lebanon, the rationale behind Hizbullah's *heterodoxy* in intentionally declining conventional political opportunities and the emergence of political opportunities emanating from fields beyond the *PF*.

Conceived in the 19th Century and consolidated in the 20th Century, Lebanon's political system resembles a consociational democracy that contains an inherent paradox. While citizens have equal voting rights, political influence is distributed via a hierarchy of sectarian quotas thereby prioritising confessional balancing over democratic representation. Conforming to this logic, executive power is extended to a 'Troika', a tripartite arrangement enshrined in the Constitution in which the President is a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister is a Sunni and the House Speaker is a Shi'i. Consequently, this system produces and reproduces intra/inter-sectarian cleavages that debilitate the state's functionality and impact, thereby deferring the practice of repression and co-option to the parties themselves. Moreover, despite being an inclusive framework in principle, the entrenched prevalence of confessional allocations and established elites also inhibits opportunities for access.

Since its inception, Hizbullah has consistently deployed Collective Action Frames castigating Lebanon's political system as illegitimate and corrupt. Therefore, rather than capitalise upon objective opportunities, Hizbullah's presence and practice in the *PF* has been predicated on inculcating dispositions and perceptions that promote

heterodoxy in relation to the pre-existing logic and structures of the political system. Not only can a combined Bourdieu-SMT approach explain Hizbullah's position on the permutation of political opportunities in Lebanon, but it can also examine why Hizbullah's interpretation of interests and opportunities renders induction into the *PF* as more beneficial than immersion. Furthermore, this conceptual framework can highlight how Hizbullah strategically pursues bottom-up political opportunities without engaging in top-down political processes. By focusing on the enhancement of its symbolic *capital* in the *SMF* and *MSF* for the purpose of consolidating its status in local politics and advancing its social *capital* in the *PF*, Hizbullah seeks to create and pressure prospects for political opportunities within the prevailing system.

4. Organisational Field (OF)

In mainstream SMT, the social movement organisation is credited with managing the translation of objective political opportunities into the subjective perceptions of its mobilising base. Derived from insights in Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), the social movement organisation devises and disseminates centralised Collective Action Frames that facilitate the accumulation and deployment of material and symbolic resources to mobilise and sustain collective action. By representing a cohesive body that disseminates diversified yet coherent Collective Action Frames and galvanises harmonised practice through its mobilising repertoires, a Bourdieu-SMT *OF* is conceptually linked to the notion of a social movement organisation. However, deviating from the assumptions of instrumental rationality in RMT, in which a centralised organisation has the strategic foresight to identify, seize upon and transform opportunities into collective action, a Bourdieu-SMT approach focuses on the dialectical challenges of Hizbullah's intra-*field* dynamics, the placement of the organisation's CAF for mobilising opportunities between predisposed agents and pre-existing structures within respective *fields* as well as the *OF*'s multi-*field* management of homologous positions between *fields*.

From 1982, Hizbullah initiated a process of developing extant discourses and practices within the Shi'i community for the purpose of creating a cohesive organisation of collective dispositions and perceptions around the *orthodox* principles of an Islamic State in Lebanon, an Islamic Resistance against Israel and obedience to the *wilayat al-faqih* in Iran. Presided over by the *majlis al-shura* ('advisory council'), which divides day-to-day responsibilities between its Political, Executive, Military and Religious departments, Hizbullah's *OF* consists of Party

members engaged in national (parliament) or local (municipal) politics, military units within the Islamic Resistance, extensive social service institutions, media organs, networks of Shi'i clerics and private businesses[64]. Through these multi-faceted channels, Hizbullah's *OF* is tasked with acquiring and allocating internal resources with which to (re)produce holistic CAF and mobilising repertoires that promote cogent collective action in its *fields* of operation.

Nevertheless, a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation emphasises the recurrently dynamic negotiation in translating opportunities into action between Hizbullah's *OF* and its targeted agents in concurrent *fields* of practice. Firstly, although Hizbullah's *OF* expends significant *capital* in maintaining its Resistance *habitus* in each *field*, and since Hizbullah's *OF* inducted itself onto the *SMF* and *MSF*, two spheres in which Shi'i agents were already engaged in a mutually constituted relationship with the pre-existing structures of each *field*, the Party is unable to command exclusive rights over collective action but acts as an interlocutor for facilitating purpose and practice while the diversity of its agents also shape dispositions and perceptions that simultaneously inform Hizbullah's *OF*. Secondly, due to the differentiated logics and constitutions of Lebanon's *fields*, Hizbullah's *OF* must ensure that CAF and mobilising repertoires are not only specific enough to solidify its Resistance *habitus* within each *field*, but also general enough to manage the synchronisation of discourses and practices between *fields*. Thirdly, as all *fields* are competitive arenas by design, Hizbullah's *OF* is not immune from competition but is equally immersed in internal struggles over the legitimate interpretation of the *OF*'s prevailing rules (*doxa*) between predominant (*orthodox*) and revisionist (*heterodox*) narratives.

5. Field of International Politics (FIP)

In mainstream SMT, the role of exogenous factors and external actors is broadly covered by the remit of POS. Nevertheless, in order to effectively identify and assess the implications of particular global dynamics on intra-state affairs, the inter-state system should be conceptualised into a *Field of International Politics* (*FIP*). Conforming to the logic and constitution of *field* composition, states, equipped with structured dispositions and perceptions, compete with each other by strategically acquiring and deploying legitimately recognised values of *capital* to enhance or stabilise their position in propagating predominant *orthodoxy* or promoting revisionist

[64] The conceptualisation of organisational fields as consisting of multi-layered internal networks is similar to the revised SMT approach offered by Diani and Pilati (2011).

heterodoxy. The permeation of this international dimension is particularly pertinent in Lebanon. Whether historically manifesting in the administrative reforms of the Ottomans, the political reforms of the British and French or the persistent influence of regional states such as Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia, these foreign actors have had a considerable impact not only in constructing, entrenching and reproducing Lebanon's political and social structures, but also in ensuring the perpetual vulnerability and susceptibility of Lebanon to international intervention.

Rather than incorporate the *FIP* as a vehicle with which to investigate and speculate over Hizbullah's suspected 'terrorist' activities of illegal fundraising in North America, drug smuggling in Latin America or targeted assassinations in Asia, the objective of the *FIP* is to relationally place and trace Hizbullah within its international context. From its inception, Hizbullah has benefited militarily and politically from the transference of *capital* from Iran and Syria. Consequently, a significant proportion of its mobilisational discourse and practice has been predicated on the contradistinction between the Islamic Resistance and Israel. Additionally, Hizbullah frequently derides Israel's strategic ally, the U.S. or the 'Great Satan', as the hegemonic, neo-colonial power that presides over the predominant *orthodoxy* of the international system through its institutionalisation of liberal democracy and free market capitalism, a status that bestows excessive amounts of symbolic *power* to the U.S. regarding international norms and values. Therefore, Hizbullah is unable to ignore or extract itself from the relationality of its position in Lebanon to developments within the *FIP*. As a prominent member of the 'Resistance Axis', a regional alliance of aligning interests between Iran, Syria, Hamas in Gaza and Iraqi militias, Hizbullah is placed within the revisionist, counter-hegemonic *heterodoxy* of the *FIP*. As a non-state actor in Lebanon, Hizbullah can rely on the transference of *capital* to vindicate and reinforce its agenda in Lebanon from its affiliation within this *collusio* of *heterodox* practice. Conversely, as an inducted agent within the *FIP*, Hizbullah is also exposed to the effects of *capital* transfers from *orthodox* actors in the *FIP* aiming to balance against the influence of the Islamic Resistance.

3.4 Relational *Fields* of Practice in Lebanon

The adoption of a combined Bourdieu-SMT conceptual framework has four distinct advantages for explaining the inception, mobilisation and evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Firstly, self-reflexivity enables the researcher to recognise the intrinsic deficiencies and prejudices not only of their own practice, but also the inherently

institutionalised practice of the Academic *field*. Secondly, in order to mitigate against these risks, relationality assists in reconciling and reconceptualising the theoretical logics of Islamic Studies and SMT. By providing SMT with a set of analytical tools as opposed to a monolithically structured paradigm, relationality injects dynamism in transforming traditional dichotomies into dialectics. Thirdly, by identifying five relational *fields* of practice that are largely derived from SMT insights, relationality also introduces a multi-dimensional, inter-related and interdependent perspective that is largely omitted from existing literature on Hizbullah. Fourthly, by applying relationality, conventional notions of opportunity, interest and change are problematised. Rather than interpret the space and time occupied by a social movement in finite or linear terms, relationality permits a view in which collective action is a concurrent continuum in which opportunity is presence, interest is survival and change is incremental.



3.5 Practising in the Shadow of 'Al-Muamara'

From a practical perspective, there were two recurring themes that informed the researcher's approach. Firstly, writing in the context of protracted civil war and Israeli

occupation, Norton (1987: 4-5) remarked that 'Lebanon has hardly offered a hospitable research environment' leaving the 'scholarly cupboard…surprisingly dry'. Compounding this broader contextual environment of conflict is the palpably historical fomentation of 'Al-Muamara' amongst the Lebanese, an inscribed disposition in which researchers, especially Western ones, are treated with suspicion as they are assumed to be complicit in an eternal 'plot' concocted by Western powers to manipulate politics in Lebanon.

Similar to other conspiracy theories, although prone to hyperbole, the case for Lebanon is based on elements of fact. Whether witnessed by the role of British agent Richard Wood in the political arrangement of 1842, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, the British-French border committee of 1921, British influence in the 1943 National Pact or coordinated CIA/MI6 operations in 1958 to curtail socialist-inspired movements, 'Western' fingerprints are sprawled on the pages of modern Lebanon[65]. Most notably, Kim Philby, the mercurial MI6 double-agent within the pro-Soviet spy network referred to as the 'Cambridge Five', was stationed in Beirut from 1956 where the Hotel Saint-Georges became the chosen location for discussions with Kermit Roosevelt, the CIA officer who orchestrated Operation Ajax in 1953[66]. In this Cold War climate, Samir Kassir (2010: 15), a Lebanese writer who was assassinated amidst ominous circumstances in 2005, observed that Beirut was 'a place where nothing was destined to happen apart from secret machinations and dark plotting…a place where newspaper correspondents could eavesdrop on the conversations of diplomats and gather information'.

Prior to conducting fieldwork, the researcher acknowledged that the intentions of a quintessentially British looking/sounding male, studying a PhD on Hizbullah, extensively travelled in the region and with an affable proficiency in Arabic may elicit nefarious connotations in Lebanon[67]. Consequently, not only did certain Lebanese commentators refuse to be interviewed, but also some of the researcher's closest

[65] Richard Wood not only incited the Druze notables to revolt against the Christians, but he was also instrumental in structuring the *qaim-maqams* sectarian power sharing agreement in 1842 (Makdisi, 2000: 59-61). In 1916, the Sykes-Picot agreement divided the Middle East between British and French influence (Barr, 2012). In 1921, British intelligence agent Lieutenant Colonel Stuart Newcombe was influential in demarcating the boundaries between South Lebanon and northern Palestine (Blanford, 2006). In 1942 Charles De Gaulle ordered the arrest future President Bishara al-Khoury and Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh before British Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued an ultimatum demanding their release (Traboulsi, 2007: 105-108). Following their role in deposing Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh in 1953 and after the 1958 coup in Iraq, the US and UK approved clandestine operations in Lebanon and Jordan (Traboulsi, 2007: 136).

[66] Philby was allegedly an inspiration for the James Bond series, especially *The Man with the Golden Gun* (1965), written by Ian Fleming, an MI6 agent turned author. In 1956, journalist Richard Beeston wrote that Beirut was 'a bazaar for the trading of information between diplomats, politicians, journalists and spies' (Macintyre, 2014: 207).

[67] The researcher is a blond, blue eyed, 6'2 white male with a southern English accent who prior to Lebanon had worked in the occupied Palestinian territories, Jordan, the UAE, Saudi Arabia while also having visited Iran, Egypt and Oman. The researcher studied classical Arabic at Umm Al-Qura in Saudi Arabia and Al-Qasid Institute in Jordan as well as studying colloquial Arabic in the occupied Palestinian territories and Lebanon.

friends in Lebanon remained unconvinced of his genuine motivations[68]. Furthermore, the endemic polarisation of Lebanese politics, fuelled by a Hobbesian culture of mistrust that is exacerbated by continued foreign meddling in Lebanon, leads to methodological challenges in that approaching an interview with one individual may deter the engagement of other prospective interviewees[69]. Testament to this entrenched dynamic of suspicion, the researcher also discovered that tensions between Lebanese of the same confession but different political persuasions, as well as within confessions on the same side of the political spectrum were just as common as strictly inter-confessional or cross-political divisions[70].

The second factor guiding the practical logic of the researcher's methodology was the assumption that Hizbullah represents one of the most inaccessible and unapproachable political parties in the world (Harb & Leenders, 2005). From its eight-member *al-majlis al-shura* ('advisory council') to its constituents, Hizbullah's institutionalised discipline renders the movement practically impenetrable for researchers. Reminiscent of the religiously-sanctioned Shi'i practice of survival through dissimulation (*taqiyya*), a historical precedent that may encourage adherence in local communities, this secrecy is emblematic of the conditions in which Hizbullah was conceived, the strategy it seeks to implement, the security it strives to guarantee and the ambiguity it intends to stimulate. Operating alongside confessional groups tainted by memories of internecine fratricide and duplicity, Hizbullah's most pressing fear, verging on a state of paranoia, is the risk of infiltration from outsiders. This meticulously coveted guardianship over its internal dynamics renders researchers of both Lebanese and foreign origin exposed to the obstructive impediments of what has been crassly referred to as the 'bureaucracy of God' (Cambanis, 2010: 139).

Devoid of transparency, opinions on Hizbullah inevitably and dramatically vary. Consequently, the Party of God becomes rational and irrational; strategic and idiosyncratic; pragmatic and erratic; independent and dependent. In a couple of illuminating interviews that epitomised the confusion intentionally propagated by Hizbullah, the researcher met separately with Ali al-Amin and Qassem al-Qassir, two

[68] There were five prominent and 'independent' Hizbullah analysts from Lebanon who refused to be interviewed. The researcher was informed by a friend with connections to all five that his background was the reason for their hesitation. Although not extended the same courtesy, out of respect for their work, they will not be named. Throughout the course of the fieldwork, the researcher's friends, both Shi'i and Christian, consistently asked questions about his affiliation to the British intelligence agencies.

[69] While both 14 March and 8 March figures refused interviews or ignored questions due to the specific focus on Hizbullah, the researcher was also warned that Hizbullah would not process interview applications if he spoke with anti-Hizbullah Shi'i activists.

[70] One example occurred when the researcher introduced two Christian friends, one from Achrafieh in east Beirut and one from Ayn al-Rummaneh close-by on the edge of the southern suburbs. Although each of them supported the Free Patriotic Movement in 8 March, a fact that neither disclosed publicly, both refused to speak or meet with the other again.

seasoned Lebanese journalists from opposite sides of the political spectrum but who both write for *Shu'oun Janoubia* ('Affairs of the South'), a magazine based in the Hizbullah-controlled southern suburbs of Beirut[71]. However, when asked about Hizbullah's objectives in Lebanon, its popularity amongst the Shi'i, its regional strategy, its relationship with Iran or even the authority of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, the answers provided were emphatically contradictory. Rephrasing Winston Churchill's remarks on Russia, Hizbullah became the 'riddle' wrapped in the 'mystery' of Lebanon inside the 'enigma' of the Middle East. Prior to arriving in Lebanon in October 2011, and in a decision that further complicated fieldwork expectations, both Ibrahim Moussawi, Hizbullah's media advisor, and Nicholas Blanford, an experienced expert on Hizbullah, informed the researcher that the Arab Spring and the subsequent threat posed to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, one of the Party's main allies, had caused Hizbullah to enforce a self-imposed hiatus on permitting interviews for the purpose of security[72].

Considering these two factors, the researcher both deductively and inductively accepted that he neither possessed the *capital* required to conduct empirical research on the Shi'i community in the anthropological style of Lara Deeb (2006a), nor would he rely on the temptation to accumulate more accessible *wasta* ('connections') that exclusively targeted non-Shi'i or non-8 March sources for perspectives on Hizbullah. While the theoretical logic of the first viewpoint differed from the focus on this thesis, the practical logic of the second approach also threatened to engage in a methodological fallacy. Although interviews are an invaluable source of information, it was always unlikely that a Hizbullah official would be willing to speak openly and frankly to an outsider of any nationality[73]. Moreover, access to Hizbullah is inevitably contingent on social *capital* accrued within the Shi'i community, a potentially compromising relationship that positions them as invested stakeholders in the very *field* of inquiry under examination. By contrast, and while recognising the value of his *capital* as a Western PhD candidate, the researcher referred to himself as 'Mr Zero *capital* in Lebanon' during a conversation with Mona

[71] *Shu'oun Janoubia* (www.janoubiaonline.com) focuses on the socio-economic development for South Lebanon. Ali al-Amin, the son of Shi'i cleric Shaykh Mohammad Hassan al-Amin, is vocally critical of Hizbullah (Interview with Ali al-Amin, Beirut, 26 August, 2012). Qassem al-Qassir is ideologically close to Sayyid Fadlallah but is sympathetic to Hizbullah (Interview with Qassem al-Qassir, Beirut, 31 August). The third notable member of the magazine is Faysal Abdel Satar, a former Hizbullah strategist for Hizbullah who is still loyal to the concept of Resistance.

[72] Interviews with Ibrahim Moussawi (Beirut, 19 February, 2012) and Nicholas Blanford (Beirut, 10 September, 2012).

[73] Even if an interview is approved, Hizbullah officials rarely deviate from the Party line that regurgitates the core values and principles of the Resistance in context. Additionally, in the event that a Hizbullah official relays previously unreleased information, the researcher faces the added risk of falsely assuming that this individual is not only a genuine and credible source, but also divulging a testimony that is representational within Hizbullah.

Harb[74]. Although the comment was conveyed (and received) in a comical manner, the point is methodologically valid with the researcher permanently located as an outsider to the struggles within Lebanon's *fields* of practice (Callinicos, 1999: 100). However, whether this position is advantageous or detrimental is dependent on the researcher's practice of self-reflexivity.

Consequently, rather than plan a practical methodology around producing original primary data based on access to Hizbullah's officials or constituencies, the researcher prioritised the accumulation and reorganisation of information that would assist in testing an innovative conceptual framework devised to relationally examine the creation of reproduction of Hizbullah's Resistance in Lebanon. Therefore, by using Bourdieu's analytical formula, this approach would primarily concentrate on initiating a mutually constitutive dialectic in which the practical logic of Hizbullah's structuring of dispositions and positions within the structured contexts of Lebanon was both informed by and informing of a theoretical logic that explained this evolutionary phenomenon. In order to supply and supplement this equation with the requisite material, the researcher also collated both primary and secondary sources.

The pre-existing and proliferating literature on Lebanon was a useful base with which to integrate practical parameters into the devised theoretical framework. By incorporating and appraising a wide-ranging canon, the researcher was able to obtain detailed insights into pertinent topics, such as the history of the Shi'i in Lebanon, the formation of the Lebanon's political, economic and social structures, the dynamics of the 15-year civil war as well as dealing specifically with the inception and development of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Aside from containing constructive chronological narratives and analyses, this scholarship also entailed a litany of primary sources, including archived documentation, political statements, socio-economic indices, survey statistics and interviews, that could be extracted to guide and inform another proposed perspective. However, in order to personally and conceptually triangulate these previous lines of inquiry, as well as supplement them within a prevailing context, the researcher simultaneously pursued three alternative empirical avenues to emphasise the relational angle, namely semi-structured interviews, primary data collection and participant observation.

[74] Harb is an Associate Professor in the Department of Agriculture and Design at the American University Beirut (AUB). She has published extensively on Hizbullah and is familiar with the work of Pierre Bourdieu.

Firstly, despite the aforementioned methodological limitations, the researcher conducted interviews with key stakeholders not only to engage and gauge subjective opinions on Hizbullah, but also to deduce relational positions between agents by casting a broad sample. Complying with official Hizbullah protocol, the researcher regularly visited Hizbullah's Media Relations Department in the southern suburbs of Beirut to submit applications for interviews[75]. Over a period of ten months, this department arranged two interviews on the researcher's behalf: one with Dr Mahmoud Mohsen Saleh, a committee member of the Hizbullah-affiliated Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD); and another with Dr Ali Fayyad, the former Director of the CCSD and Hizbullah MP in parliament[76]. Additionally, in an effort to build a rapport of mutual respect, the researcher had a series of discussions with Ibrahim Moussawi, the head of Hizbullah's Media Relations Department[77]. In each instance, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with the objective of comparing the answers to a series of questions probing the dispositions, perceptions, practices and phases of Hizbullah's Resistance. As expected, almost all of the researcher's requests, including interviews with Hizbullah officials, access to municipal leaders, visits to Hizbullah's social services and meetings with Hizbullah-associated students at Beirut's universities, were denied[78].

Consequently, Hizbullah's introverted nature compelled the researcher to schedule other interviews with informed observers from outside the Party who could offer their own specific experiences and expertise on Hizbullah. Aside from five notable analysts with close links to the Party, who either ignored or refused interview requests, over 20 interviews were conducted with a selection of experienced journalists, think-tank fellows and eminent academics each with their own

[75] Hizbullah's Media Relations Department is located on the first floor of an unassuming building off Main Street in Bir al-Abd. On arrival to this modest office decorated with portraits of Sayyid Nasrallah and Ayatollah Khamenei as well as Hizbullah and Lebanese flags, visitors are welcomed by either Wafa or Rana, two female liaisons operating between applicants and Ibrahim Moussawi. The application form for interviews asks for a synopsis and purpose of the research, the information required, prospective interviewees and sample questions as well as asking for one's contact details in Lebanon, a copy of one's student card and a copy of one's passport. There are also unofficial channels with which to contact Hizbullah officials. However, on the advice of experienced experts, and concerned that these informal avenues would be discovered and thereby hinder any progress through formal means, the researcher decided to persevere with conventional methods.

[76] Fayyad, who wrote a significant portion of Hizbullah's 2009 Political Manifesto, is one of the Party's main spokespersons for Western journalists and researchers (Interview with Ali Fayyad, Beirut, 29 March, 2012).

[77] Ibrahim Moussawi has a PhD from the University of Birmingham in the UK on democratisation and the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* in Iran. He is an interesting and interested conversationalist who was eager to hear the researcher's opinion on both his book and on philosophical concepts. He regularly apologised for the 'bad timing' and insisted his 'hands are tied' when it comes to Party policy, especially following breaches of security by foreign researchers prior and following the 2006 War with Israel, such as the work of Avi Jorisch (2004). In this climate, Dr Moussawi even admitted that a Party employee working for *Al-Manar* was advised to change his PhD thesis to a topic unrelated to Hizbullah (Interview with Ibrahim Moussawi, Beirut, 13 May, 2012).

[78] The rejections became increasingly formulaic and farcical. Therefore, the researcher attempted to directly approach Hizbullah's student representatives at Beirut's universities, especially AUB and LAU, for the purpose of gaining a youth perspective on the Party. While this approach initially recorded success, with the first meetings always lucid and informative, the second meeting, testifying the entrenched discipline within Hizbullah, began with an apology with the potential interviewee relaying that they had been advised not to speak with me by Yousef al-Bassam, the coordinator for Hizbullah students in Beirut. After reaching out to al-Bassam, he declined an interview on account of the researcher being British.

perspectives on Hizbullah[79]. Furthermore, since one integral component of this holistic methodological process was to examine Hizbullah in relation to its extant environment, the researcher also sought the perspectives of other prevalent stakeholders operating as invested agents within the same *fields* as Hizbullah. For this reason, the researcher identified and approached non-Hizbullah members within the Hizbullah-led 8 March alliance in parliament as well as a cadre of figures within the Shi'i community who publicly opposed Hizbullah. These interviews were semi-structured in containing coherent and formatted lines of questioning while affording the interviewee the flexibility to elaborate on their personal interactions with Hizbullah.

Secondly, the researcher also explored opportunities for primary data collection. In particular, through Philippa Mishlawi, the researcher was offered privileged access to her personal archive of *Middle East Reporter* (*MER*). Instigated by the late Palestinian journalist Toufiq Mishlawi during the civil war, *MER* served as an invaluable media resource for foreign journalists, diplomats and businessmen by providing them with daily synopses and weekly analyses of all the Arabic press in English. Analysing thousands of entries from 1982 until 2011, the researcher was not only privy to original newspaper interviews, statements, polls and surveys from a broad selection of Lebanese and regional press outlets, but he was also able to extract first-hand information on Hizbullah by contextualising the ascension of the Party in relation to its attention in the media. Additionally, in parallel to this process, the researcher also monitored the archives of Hizbullah-associated websites, such as *Al-Manar* ('the Lighthouse'), *Al-Moqawama* ('the Resistance') and *Al-'Ahd* ('the Covenant'), to form an impression of how Hizbullah perceives itself, how it moulds its dispositions for Resistance and how it disseminates its narrative[80]. These sources contain databases of Hizbullah's daily news, political charters, party manifestos, policy papers, speech transcripts, television programmes and documentaries as well as infographics of military victories, the testimonies of fallen martyrs and interpretations of symbolic historical events.

Furthermore, through Naji Shaito, the Office Manager at the CCSD, the researcher was granted access to a comprehensive database that compiles and categorises all news pertaining to Hizbullah's social services in the local and national press[81]. With

[79] A full list of interviewees is provided in the Bibliography.
[80] www.almanar.com.lb; www.moqawama.org; www.alahednews.com.lb
[81] The office of the Hizbullah-aligned CCSD, which is decorated with Hizbullah posters and portraits, is located in a non-descript area in the southern suburbs. The well-equipped library is frequented by a number of young students intending to study a range of

the assistance of a friend, the researcher used this resource to track, download and translate a selection of approximately 400 articles documenting the activities of Hizbullah's social services from 1992 until 2011. Whereas the *MER* archive treated Hizbullah as a peripheral consideration, this database focused entirely on primary information pertaining to Hizbullah's public welfare programmes in the Shi'i community as well as including the implicit perception of the Lebanese press to the motivations and purposes behind the Party's network of grassroots institutions. Lastly, on the occasions when thematic reports by the CCSD contained information gaps on socio-economic data or demographic statistics of the Shi'i community in relation to national figures, the researcher consulted similar studies by the relevant Lebanese branches of the United Nations and World Bank.

Although possessing a proficient articulacy in Arabic, the researcher neither had the linguistic expertise nor the time required to effectively read and translate comprehensive secondary texts in Arabic. Additionally, considering the proliferating availability and accessibility of material on Lebanon, and especially on Hizbullah, either in English or translated into English, the researcher was able to identify and cover the vast majority of relevant existing literature for the purpose of fulfilling the stated objectives of this thesis in conceptually and empirically analysing the evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. In this context, these two primary sources of information on Hizbullah, namely the *MER* and CCSD archives, enabled the researcher to compensate for these deficiencies by including original and invaluable Arabic material. Whereas *MER*, which provided translations of Lebanese and regional press outlets spanning three decades, aided this research by placing Hizbullah's development within its situational environment, the CCSD articles, which were translated with the assistance of a Lebanese friend, offered insights from the perspective of both Lebanese and Hizbullah-affiliated outlets regarding the movement's social activities (see **Bibliography** for a full list of specific sources).

Thirdly, as part of the self-reflexive practice of immersing oneself into the practical logic of *fields* as an outsider, the researcher aimed to learn about Hizbullah and its constituencies through participant observation to obtain more interactive and experiential data on public practices in the Shi'i community, especially during regular visits to the southern suburbs of Beirut (*al-dahiyeh*) as well as trips to constituencies

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subjects. The library contains books in English, French and Arabic with its impressive collection ranging from Islamic Philosophy, Political Theory and literature specifically dealing with Hizbullah (both positive and negative) to books such as George Bush's memoirs and 'The English Constitution' (1873), a piece written by Walter Bagehot, one of the inspirational vanguards behind the liberal democratic and capitalist values of *The Economist*.

in Ba'albeck, Nabatiyeh, Tyre and Bint Jubayl. Since the spotlight is usually shone on Hizbullah in reaction to political events and military campaigns, the researcher was interested in witnessing how Hizbullah uses and demarcates public space in order to instil, inculcate and institutionalise a Resistance *habitus* of diverse yet harmonised practices. In particular, this included Hizbullah's strategy in adapting and modifying *orthodoxy* within the Shi'i community to project Resistance-related semiotics of imagery and iconography, thereby transforming material space into symbolic space to promote community identity and mobilisation that transcends boundaries of social class or geographical location. During this process, and with varying levels of success, the researcher would initiate informal conversations with local shopkeepers and young Shi'i in cafes with the intention of engaging them about their backgrounds and interests as opposed to directly asking for their opinions on Hizbullah.

Furthermore, and by extension, the researcher was also intrigued to observe the manifestation of Shi'i celebrated rituals as inaugurated and managed by Hizbullah. Whether visiting Hizbullah's commemorative museums, such as Mleeta, visiting cafes in *al-dahiyeh* to watch Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah's speeches, or attending religious events, like Ashoura, the intention was to gauge the *jaw* ('atmosphere') emitted by Hizbullah's mutually constituted relationship with its Shi'i constituents. While selective and brief, these contemporaneous encounters enabled the researcher to observe Hizbullah's habitat first-hand and explore the dynamic interaction between the conception, cultivation and consolidation of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in ascertaining the impact of its practices on the dispositions and perceptions of agents in the Shi'i community.

Conclusion

Illustrating the purpose behind methodological practice, the specific object of research is not as important 'than the method which was applied to it and which could be applied to an infinity of different objects' (Bourdieu et al, 1982: 50). Furthermore, any scientific approach that simultaneously 'fails to question itself does not, properly speaking, know what it does' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 236). In a logical continuation of Chapter Two, in which Bourdieu's 'Theory of Practice' was presented as a vehicle to reconcile the inherent dichotomies within Islamic Studies and SMT, this chapter has discussed the advantages of applying a Bourdieusian conceptual framework for enhancing the methodological precepts of SMT in order to

more effectively explain the creation and reproduction of Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. In particular, this review has focused on the researcher's adoption and implementation of self-reflexivity and relationality.

Principally, 'self-reflexivity' is a methodological technique in which researchers reflect the analytical tools for accessing and examining the object onto their own practice. This process not only entails an acknowledgement that the researcher may intentionally or inadvertently construct or reproduce the object based on their structured dispositions and perceptions, but also recognises that the researcher is embedded within the institutionalised limitations of the Academic *field*, a politicised arena of predominant discourses and practices that have the potential to produce 'unthought categories of thought which delimt the thinkable and predetermine the thought' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 40). Consequently, in theory, 'it is only by freeing the practice of science from all political contamination that one can hope to achieve a politically effective practice of science' (Swartz, 1997: 249). However, in practice, since exorcising the agent from the 'interested fiction' of 'neutral science' in the Academic *field* is an elusive goal, the researcher should endeavour to self-critically and perhaps counter-intuitively objectify the act of objectivation through self-reflexivity for the purpose of minimalising the detrimental impact of enabling a 'scientific myopia' that risks pre-constructing 'objects in the garb of science' (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 28; Bourdieu, 1975: 101).

Secondly, immutably intertwined with self-reflexivity is the Bourdieu's complementary concept of relationality. In its scientific form, methodological relationality refers to the mutually reinforcing and constituting connection between the theoretical logic of academic disciplines and the practical logic of social worlds. For Bourdieu (2000: 52), social science should not 'adopt practical logic for itself, but to reconstruct that knowledge theoretically by including in the theory the distance between practical logic and theoretical logic'. Regardless of its realisation, prevalent methodologies within academic practice remain inhibited by the 'scholastic fallacy' or 'scholastic disposition', a theoretical logic in which the researcher credits 'agents with the reasoning reason of the scientists reasoning about their practices' as opposed to initiating a dialectic with the practical logic of the agent (Bourdieu, 2000: 49, 60). By utilising this lens to inspect commentators implanted in either the Academic, *FIP* and Media *fields* that have contributed to pre-existing literature on Hizbullah in Lebanon, this chapter not only discovered distinctions between their theoretical and practical logics, but also identified the tendency of the practical logic of interest imbued within

the social world to supersede the role of theoretical logic in intellectual practice. Similar to self-reflexivity, while overcoming the innate distinction between theoretical and practical logics is perpetually unattainable, analytical tools are required to mitigate against their influence over methodological practice. Therefore, in response to this duality, by invoking the notion of *field* constitutions and dynamics, Bourdieu introduces the inclusive dialectic between theoretical and practical logics so that the researcher, regardless of personal interests, is cognisant of the implications of their epistemocentrism.

Ultimately, social science requires methodological approaches that 'accentuate the relational dynamic' (Bigo, 2011: 245). The innovative relational constitution of *habitus* and *capital*, both within and across *fields*, is an invaluable methodological contribution to social science theory. However, Bourdieu's conceptual framework has been criticised for his lack of detail in practically explaining *field* identity, the determinants of *field* homology, the overly structuralised concept of *habitus* and the Western-centric interpretation of *capital* (Swartz, 1997: 110-113; Calhoun, 1993: 70; Lipuma, 1993: 26). While Bourdieu would have accepted the basis of these criticisms, his analytical tools provide a robust method for relationality, the degree and extent of which are revealed and problematised once applied and tested to empirical phenomena. In particular, Swartz (1997: 136) commented that a considerable deficiency of Bourdieu's work has been to adequately account for the politics of collective mobilisation. By combining Bourdieu's conceptual instruments with SMT, these pillars can inform both a theoretical and practical methodology for examining Hizbullah's collective mobilisation in Lebanon.

More specifically, by reconceptualising rather than replacing SMT's epistemological tripartite of Political Opportunity Structures, Mobilising Structures and Collective Action Frames into five concentric and inter-related *fields* of analysis – *Social Mobilisational Field*, *Military-Security Field*, *Political Field*, *Organisational Field* and the *Field of International Politics* – this chapter has embraced a holistic concept of self-reflexivity and relationality to outline a methodological approach that has not only provided the practically-infused theoretical reasoning for conducting interviews, analysing selected primary data and exercising participant observation, but it has also offered a theoretically-instilled practical rationale for examining how Hizbullah has introduced, inculcated and institutionalised a harmonised Resistance *habitus* both within and between the homologous *fields* of activity in Lebanon. In the next chapter, the analytical tools of this Bourdieu-SMT framework will be implemented to

locate the Shi'i *habitus* before the emergence of Hizbullah within the construction and constitution of *fields* in modern Lebanon.

Chapter Four

Locating the Shi'i *habitus* in the Construction of Lebanon's *fields*

'From Jabal 'Amil…that quarry of Shiism and fountainhead of heresy, a damned *Rafizi* by the name of 'Abd al-Al…joined Ismail and supported and helped to propagate this false teaching. Calling himself *seyhu'l-Islam*, he became the *seyh* of apostasy'[82].

- *Treatise on the Refutation of the Rafizis, 1620s (Winter, 2010: 22)*.

'South Lebanon is not well known or sufficiently liked...Maybe it is tired because of its resounding past so it withdrew from the world little by little for over a thousand years that we forgot about it'.

- *Michel Chiha, one of the authors of La Revue Phenicienne, 1919*.

'The Muslims of the dissident Shi'i sect are peasants who obey their leaders. These have rarely expressed anti-Lebanese sentiments…The fact of being a Shi'i is by no means incompatible with being Lebanese…as the *Mitwalis* of the Hermil attached to the Lebanon since 1860 have demonstrated'[83].

- *Robert de Caix, Secretary General in Beirut in 1926 (Chalabi, 2006: 97-98)*.

'Our name is not *Matawlah*. Our name is men of refusal (*rafidun*), men of vengeance, men who revolt against all tyranny…even though this may cost our blood and our lives.'

- *Musa al-Sadr, the founder of Amal (Al-Nahar, 18 February 1974)*.

The modern state of Lebanon was 'one of the laboratories of modernity' (Kassir, 2006: 20) that emerged out of the *Field of International Politics* (*FIP*). On 26 April 1920, after months of political manoeuvring between Great Britain and France, the San Remo Conference concluded that the territories of Greater Lebanon and Syria would be administered under a French Mandate following the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire[84]. Consequently, after defeating Emir Faysal's Arab army in Maysalun on 24 July, thereby crushing Arab nationalist dreams of establishing *Bilad al-Sham* ('Greater Syria')[85], General Henri Gouraud, the French High Commissioner in the Levant, officially pronounced *Le Grand Liban* on 1 September 1920.

This newly constructed nation not only consisted of the predominantly Christian canton of Mount Lebanon (*Jabal Lubnan*), but it was also augmented by the annexation of the traditional coastal cities of Beirut, Saida, Tyre and Tripoli as well as

[82] An Ottoman term for the Shi'i that implied 'refusal' of Sunni orthodoxy (Winter, 2010: 1).
[83] Metouli, Mitwali or Metwallite (pl. Matawila) literally means followers of Imam Ali. Weiss (2010: 40-51) claims the term can be traced to an old battle cry of Jabal 'Amil ('mut waliyyan li-Ali'). For Firro (2003: 44), it refers to the Matwal, a tribe from the southern Hijaz. The name became 'bound up with notions of sloth, laziness, and all-round passivity', characteristics foreign travellers attributed to the Shi'i of Jabal 'Amil (Weiss, 2010: 40-51).
[84] The Syrian Mandate was divided into Aleppo, Damascus, an Alawi state and Jabal Druze.
[85] Acting on alleged promises from allies in Europe, Faysal was declared 'King of Syria' during the Arab Congress on 7 March 1920. The King-Crane Commission, established by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, discovered that 80% of respondents supported a United Syria (Traboulsi, 2007: 78).

four ex-Ottoman *cazas* (districts) – Hasbaya, Rashaya, Ba'albeck and Akkar (Traboulsi, 2007: 80). Jabal 'Amil, the 3,200 square kilometre area in the south stretching 80km from the mouth of the Awwali river north of Saida to 'the seven villages' in the south and extending 40km from the Mediterranean to the Biqa' Valley, was one of the regions annexed to *Le Grand Liban* (Mallat, 1988: 1)[86]. According to figures released in a 1921 edition of *al-Irfan*, Shi'i Muslims made up 48.2% of the south, or 62,796 people, and 14.8% of Greater Lebanon, with a total of 104,947 (Weiss, 2010: 58).

The arrival of Shi'i thought to Lebanon is generally attributed to Abu Dharr al-Ghifari, who was expelled from Syria by the Third Caliph, Uthman bin 'Affan (d.656), for his sympathies towards Ali ibn Abi Talib (d.661), a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. Al-Ghifari, banished to Jabal 'Amil, settled amongst the Christian population that was descended from the 'Amili tribe in Yemen (Firro, 2003: 44; Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 278; Shanahan, 2005: 14). However, the Shi'ism espoused by al-Ghifari, which predates the Battle of Karbala[87], should not be perceived as defining the dogmatic precedent for the modern politicised manifestation of the contemporary Shi'i/Sunni feud in Middle East. Contrarily, 'Shi'ism' at this time should be characterised by its differentiated challenge to Sunni orthodoxy rather than a distinct practice (Hodgson, 1955: 3; Halawi, 1992: 29; Weiss, 2010: 63). Prior to Ja'far al-Sadiq (d.765), the Sixth Shi'i Imam of the Abbasid period, it would appear that al-Ghifari's form of Shi'ism would have focused more on issues of jurisprudence.

Before the First Crusade, the Cairo-based Ismaili Shi'i Caliphate of the Fatimids (908-1171), who followed Ismail ibn Ja'far, the son of Ja'far al-Sadiq, extended its rule to cover most of modern Lebanon. During this time, the Shi'i enjoyed intermittent phases of autonomy while the Buyids of Baghdad and Hamdanids of Aleppo demonstrate the spread of Shi'i influence beyond the Mediterranean coast (Halawi, 1992: 30)[88]. After the Crusades, Shi'ism was eclipsed by the Ayyubids under Salah al-Din and, more saliently for the Shi'i of modern Lebanon, the establishment of the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt[89]. The latter, originating from Turkic tribes, launched a series of military expeditions during 1292, 1300 and 1305 in the northern regions of

[86] Bassa, Khalisa, Hunin, Quds, Yusha', Sulha and Tarbin, which were later allocated to Palestine (Mallat, 1988: 1).
[87] The Battle of Karbala (680) in which Mu'awiya, the son of Caliph Uthman, killed Husayn, the Third Shi'i Imam and the second son of Imam Ali, is frequently credited as instigating the separation between Sunnis and Shi'is.
[88] Including Abu Talib bin Ammar in Tripoli (1058-1109), Bani Mirdas in Sidon (1021-1028) and Ayn al-Dawla bi Abu Aqil in Tyre (1058-1124). William Harris (2012: 62) comments that many Shi'i fled Jabal 'Amil during the Crusades. The Buyids (932-1055) followed the practices of Ismail ibn Ja'far's brother, Musa al-Kazim. The Hamdanids were a dynasty combining Imami (Twelver), Rafidi, Zaydi, Ismaili and Nusayri Shi'i (Hourani, 2006: 51).
[89] Salah al-Din offered the Shi'i of Jabal 'Amil autonomy in 1187 (Harris, 2012: 63).

Jabal Akkar, Jabal al-Dinniya and Kisrawan that precipitated a mass Shi'i exodus (Shanahan, 2005: 15)[90]. Consequently, Ismailis and Nusayris left for southern Lebanon and Syria while the Twelver Shi'i resettled in Jabal 'Amil and the Biqa' Valley (Hourani, 2006: 52)[91]. By the time of the Ottoman Empire, whereas Jabal 'Amil was a relatively organised, geographically contiguous and hierarchical feudal system, the Biqa' was a more nomadic area 'with a less rigidly defined society' (Shanahan, 2005: 15).

Under the Ottoman Empire, in the aftermath of its dismemberment and following the inception of an independent Lebanese state, the role and influence of the Shi'i clergy (*ulama*) posed a recurring question both in the context of extant authoritative structures within the Shi'i community as well as within the emerging authoritative structures of Lebanon. Unlike Sunni Islam, clerical authority in Twelver Shi'ism is organised via a transnational and hierarchical leadership structure. Since the 18th Century, when proponents the Usuli school of thought eclipsed the traditional custodians of the Akhbari branch of Twelver Shi'ism, the predominant orthodoxy of practice has been characterised and predicated around the concept of *'ijtihad*. Contrary to the Akhbaris, who construed any challenge to the indisputable judgement enshrined in the *Qur'an* and *hadith* as illegitimate, the notion of *'ijtihad*, or 'independent reasoning', propagated by the Usulis proposed a revision in which senior clerics were sanctioned to modernise Shi'i belief within specific situational contexts. Consequently, the Usuli interpretation of *'ijtihad* became institutionalised within the *hawzat*, the educational establishment exclusive to Shi'i Islam.

After completing four initial phases of induction, including *muqaddimat* ('beginners', 3-5 years), *sutuh* ('surfaces', 3-6 years), *bahth al-kharij* ('outside research') and *ijtihad*, a *mujtahid* was then categorised in ascending order from *thiqat al-islam* ('Trust of Islam') to *hujjat al-islam wa al-muslimin* ('Proof of Islam and of Muslims') then *ayatollah fi al-'alamin* ('the Sign of God in the World'). In order to become a *marja*, 'a source of emulation' entrusted with producing edicts on legitimate practice based upon the reconciliation of religious texts and conditional context, an *ayatollah fi al-'alamin* had to demonstrate *al-adala* ('justice'), *al-a'lamiyya* ('knowledge') and *al-hayat* ('life') in relation to the number of their followers, the proximity of other *maraji* and the impact of their publications (Abisaab, 2006b: 244; Batatu, 1978: 193;

[90] Ibn Taymiyya, renowned for his violent diatribes against the Shi'i, allegedly participated in the third expedition. Maronites were also subjected to Mamluk reprisals in 1266, 1268 and 1283 (Hitti, 1965: 127-128). Harris (2012: 68) maintains that the expedition was caused by Kisrawan's strategic location and Mamluk suspicion of the area's loyalty to the Franks, not by its Shi'i population. In this way, Ibn Taymiyya provided the justification not the cause for the campaign.
[91] Historically, Druze is a branch of Ismaili Shi'ism.

Moussawi, 2011: 33-38). Therefore, in a theoretical sense, this *marja'iyya* network functioned at the apex of a hierarchical Shi'i religious authority that superseded geo-political boundaries.

Following the arrival of the Prophet Muhammad's companion Abu Dharr al-Ghifari in the mid-7th Century, the Shi'i *ulama*, particularly from Jabal 'Amil, were instrumental in adhering and contributing to the evolution of religious authority in Twelver Shi'ism. Initially, not only were the first two martyrs of Twelver Shi'ism, Shamseddine Muhammad ibn Makki (1333-1384) and Zayneddine ibn Nureddine Ali (1506-1558), from Jabal 'Amil, but the Shah also imported approximately 100 Jabal 'Amil scholars to teach at religious centres from the 16th Century as part of his effort to entrench Twelver Shi'ism into the mainstream Persian narrative (Hourani, 2006: 54-55; Winter, 2010: 10). On account of their revered status as the guardians of Shi'i religious thought, Shi'i clerics possessed considerable levels of localised authority within Shi'i communities, especially through the foundation and organisation of educational centres. However, indicative of developments within the Shi'i religious establishment under the Usulis regarding *'ijtihad* in the 18th Century, and as the contours of Lebanon's political system became delineated around confessional elites in the 19th Century, Shi'i clerics, inscribed with divergent interpretations and overlapping identities, remained divided and detached from the predominant channels of authority within their communities.

Firstly, by observing the dispositions of traditional convention, Shi'i clerics preferred to practise political quietism over participation, thereby limiting their prospective influence within a widening politicised space in Lebanon. Secondly, since authority in the Shi'i community was historically defined through an entrenched patron-client system presided over by rival Shi'i notables (*zu'ama*), the Shi'i *ulama* not only relied on these confessional elites for sponsorship and support, but they also became enmeshed in and fragmented by competitive intra-*zu'ama* struggles for authority. Lastly, as demonstrated by the inception of the Ja'fari Court and the Ashoura debates in the 1920s, Shi'i clerics were fractured between the transnational religious authority of Twelver Shi'ism in Najaf and the sub-national political authority of the Shi'i *zu'ama* in Lebanon. The conflation of these interests, which contributed to a deficiency in convergence, coherence or consistency amongst clerics, ensured that the Shi'i *ulama* operated as subordinate actors on the periphery of authority in Lebanon.

By the 1970s, two prominent Shi'i clerics who had studied under *marja al-taqlid* ('the highest source of emulation') Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim in Najaf and were inspired by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr's writings on revolutionary Shi'i activism, emerged to promote alternative approaches for combining religious and political authority amongst the Shi'i in Lebanon. Prior and during the initial phases of the Lebanese civil war, while Musa al-Sadr formed the Movement of the Deprived (*harakat al-mahrumin*) and the Lebanese Resistance Detachments (*afwaj al-moqawama al-lubnaniyya*) to mobilise the Shi'i community through pre-existing Lebanese repertoires of collective action towards reforming the prevailing system, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah sought to capitalise on Shi'i disenchantment by instilling and inculcating grassroots revolutionary change in Lebanon. Amidst these developments, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was concurrently espousing the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* ('Guardian Jurist'), a centralised model of Twelver Shi'i governance, opposed by Musa al-Sadr and Sayyid Fadlallah, in which religious and political authority was fused under the guidance of a Supreme Leader.

The implementation of *wilayat al-faqih* by Ayatollah Khomeini following the Islamic Revolution in 1979 reverberated resoundingly across Shi'i communities, especially amongst a young class of radical clerics intending to reconstitute the boundaries of conventional Shi'i practice in Lebanon. Raised on the lectures of Musa al-Sadr and Sayyid Fadlallah, ingrained with discourses of revolutionary Shi'i activism from attending seminaries in Najaf and galvanised by the revised structure of Shi'i authority institutionalised in Iran, these figures seized upon the opportunities presented by a protracted civil war, internal differences within Amal and Israeli military forays to replicate the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon. It was under these conditions that Hizbullah, an amalgamation of radical Shi'i activists equipped with the conceptual legitimacy of *wilayat al-faqih* and the practical justification of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, was conceived as a progeny of the Islamic Revolution to not only challenge the traditional quietism of religious authority displayed by the Shi'i *ulama*, but also to revolutionise the perceived authority of Lebanon's political system.

In the historiography of Lebanon, the history of the Shi'i is virtually unknown (Winter, 2010: 7). Invoking Kamal Salibi's *A House of Many Mansions* (1988), the Shi'i 'mansion' resembles a derelict shack ravaged by the victors of history. There are two possible explanations for this oversight. Firstly, since the Ottoman era, the Shi'i community has occupied rural and disconnected territory. As Mount Lebanon became the epitome and epicentre of the modern state, the Shi'i remained

marginalised on the peripheries of this internationalised zone of interaction. Consequently, scholars documenting the history of Lebanon focus on Mount Lebanon, a practice of historiography implying that the two comparatively underdeveloped cantons incorporated into the geographical boundaries of the state were perceived as making a negligible contribution to the state process.

Secondly, since a multitude of contending visions of the 'nation' exist in public discourse in Lebanon, a recurring debate that is often reflected by Lebanese historians inscribed with dispositions to propagate one particular narrative, establishing a viable historical canon is a challenging methodological objective. Due to geographical isolation and marginalised inclusion, valuable archives documenting the history of the Shi'i are traditionally localised and largely inaccessible to outsiders. For these reasons, reaching a consensus on a unified history of Lebanon that synthesises its constituent parts remains a controversial and elusive exercise. Under these circumstances, researchers are responsible for adopting a self-reflexive approach that acknowledges and negotiates internalised debates regarding sectarian narratives, collectively constructed memory and cultural sensitivities.

The emergence of Hizbullah warrants a reassessment of these two factors. Primarily, the Party of God is currently an established and influential political actor in Lebanon. Throughout its evolution, Hizbullah has promoted a cohesive platform in which the Shi'i represent a ubiquitous and integral component of Lebanon's political and social landscape. In this context, there has been a surge of revisionist literature in English that attempts to address the deficiency of scholarly work on the Shi'i of Lebanon. Although some of these authors do not deal with Hizbullah explicitly, it would be inaccurate to assume that the sudden influx of interest is independent of developments within the Shi'i community in Lebanon. Rather, it would appear that the implicit objective is to de-essentialise Hizbullah's exclusive representation of the Shi'i. Conversely, whether through convenience or conviction, commentators focusing on Hizbullah analyse the movement without sufficiently accounting for the historical context of the Shi'i community or the Lebanese system. In this way, 'Hizbullah represents a stage, not the cause, of the gradual integration of the Shi'i community into Lebanon'[92].

[92] Interview with Lokman Slim, Beirut, 9 August 2012.

The previous chapter identified five *fields* of practice with which to examine Hizbullah's mobilisation in Lebanon. While not contributing primary material to enhance the historical canon of the Shi'i, the objective of this chapter is to supplement existing sources by utilising a Bourdieu-SMT framework that plots the location of a Shi'i *habitus* and its possession of *capital* in relation to the construction and constitution of *fields* in Lebanon before the inception of Hizbullah. The first section positions the Shi'i within the administrative system designed by the Ottoman Empire (1516-1919); the second assesses the placement of the Shi'i within the *Political Field* (*PF*) under the French Mandate and the nascent phases of Independence (1920-1958); and the third addresses the role of Musa al-Sadr in inscribing a collective Shi'i *habitus* in the *Social Mobilisational Field* (*SMF*) and its transference into an *Organisational Field* (*OF*) during the initial stages of the civil war (1959-1978).

Salibi (1988: 222) wrote that 'one need not invent a special history for Lebanon before that date [1920] unless the country happens to have one'[93]. This may be a valid statement within the remit of a post-Westphalian interpretation of state formation and nationalism. Nevertheless, Lebanon's path to independence was one of imposition, not progression. A 'Lebanese History' may take 1920 as its reference point but the presence of competing narratives suggests that a 'History of Lebanon' is required to understand the complex trajectory of communities that would comprise the 'nation'. Cicero quipped that an ignorance of the past assures intellectual childhood. Similarly, this chapter argues that the Shi'i past illuminates the Shi'i present especially in explaining the resonance of Hizbullah's Resistance in Lebanon.

4.1 Shi'i mobilisation under the Ottoman Empire (1516 - 1919)

In the early 16th Century, two developments had a significant impact on the Shi'i of Lebanon. Traditionally a Sufi order from Ardabil in Azerbaijan, Shah Ismail established the Safavid dynasty in Persia in 1501. Influenced by the Qizilbash, a rebellious Turkoman tribe from Anatolia, the Shah adopted its 'esoteric and messianic form of Shi'ism' (Chehabi & Mneimneh, 2006: 1). As part of the conversion and institutionalisation process, the Shah imported approximately 100 Twelver Shi'i scholars from Jabal 'Amil to teach at religious centres in Persia (Winter, 2010: 10)[94].

[93] Firro (2003: 22) states that despite discursive frames propagated by various groups prior to 1920, the idea of a Lebanese nation did not exist before 1920.
[94] Not all Shi'i religious figures in Jabal 'Amil concurred with the Shah's project. The rise to prominence of Jabal 'Amil scholars in Iran is described by Abisaab (2006a: 88-89) and Hourani (2006: 56-59).

Moreover, in 1516, Ottoman Emperor Selim I defeated the Mamluks at Marj Dabik, expanding his rule throughout the Levant and aggravating the regional rivalry between the Sunni *orthodoxy* of the Ottomans and the Shi'i *orthodoxy* of the Safavids within the *FIP*[95].

Initially, testament to the solidarity of transferable *capital* between the Shah and the Shi'i under the Sublime Porte, Selim I not only proclaimed Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n as the 'sultan of the Mountain', but also deployed the Druze notable to repel the advances of a pro-Safavid rebellion by the Harfushs in the Biqa' (Hitti, 1965: 143-144). Moreover, the *millet* system was devised to ensure the co-existence of confessions and protect minorities in religious worship while subordinating them within the Ottoman hierarchy. Nevertheless, unlike Christians and Jews, the Shi'i, considered heretical apostates, were denied these rights[96]. Furthermore, historians have identified a tendency in Ottoman edicts to refer to Shi'i in derogatory terms like *Matawila*, *Revafiz* or *Qizilbash*, prejudiced designations intended to convey their duplicitous and rebellious nature (Abisaab, 2006a: 64; Winter, 2010: 110).

However, whereas the *millet* system classified subjects within confessional segments, the *iqta'*, or *iltizam*, model served as a method of effectively transferring tax revenues from farming (*miri*) to Istanbul. Subsequently, the *wilaya* (provinces) of the Mamluks were divided into *sanjaks* (districts) that were managed by a *wali* or *pasha* (an Ottoman governor). The *multazim*, a representative of the *wali*, was responsible for collecting taxes from a *muqata'ji*, a local notable who rented land to peasant tenants (Johnson, 2001: 86). As part of the patron-client relationship, the *muqata'jis* could demand labour and administer justice (Harris, 2012: 117). Consequently, the degree of autonomy extended to a *muqata'ji* was dependent on his ability to maintain order, deliver taxes and mobilise forces to assist the Ottomans. Fakhr al-Din al-Ma'n epitomises the extent of independence afforded to a compliant and efficient feudal lord. Despite hailing from Ismaili Shi'ism, this Druze *multazim* of *Jabal Chouf* was elevated to the position of *emir* within the *sanjaks* of Sidon-Beirut and Safad (Traboulsi, 2007: 5). By 1590, the Ma'n domain stretched from the *wilaya* of Damascus in the south to Tripoli in the north (Salibi, 1988: 66). The success of the Ma'n/Shihab dynasties in establishing the blueprint of the Lebanese polity may have

[95] This is perhaps the first time when one can identify a clear distinction between doctrines (Winter, 2010: 12).
[96] Under these circumstances, many Shi'i observed *taqiyya*, a practice of dissimulation and disassociation in which Shi'i were permitted to retire from public displays of faith to escape persecution and discrimination.

acted to distort the historical record by overshadowing the contemporary developments of their feudal peers[97].

However, the Ma'ns/Shihabs were not the only feudal elites that benefited from an Ottoman-endorsed system that prioritised administrative efficiency over ideological dogmatism. Recognising the local influence of the Shi'i Harfushs, not only did the Sultan reinstate their control in the Biqa' after the rebellion, but he also enlisted Musa ibn Harfush against the Shi'i Zaydis in Yemen in 1568 (Winter, 2010: 42). Additionally, the Shi'i Hamadas represented one of 'the most important, perhaps also the most feared and reviled feudal faction of what was to become northern Lebanon' with taxation powers even over the Sunnis (Winter, 2010: 58, 85; Shanahan, 2005: 22). In Jabal 'Amil, while a hereditary class of landed elite (*zu'ama*) presided over their Shi'i tenants, Shi'i clerics also ensured 'the survival of a tradition of high learning in small villages and market towns' (Hourani, 1985: 6)[98].

Although the discourse of the Ottomans may have privileged Sunni orthodoxy, in practice, the Sultanate aimed to establish order and efficacy by instrumentally co-opting a range of feudal elites with mutually beneficial incentives. In this arrangement, non-Sunni leaders 'constituted viable, even ideal, candidates' for concessions and integration into the imperial hierarchy (Winter, 2010: 43). Therefore, it would be inaccurate to interpret mobilisation in terms of a collective *habitus*, or *collusio*, motivated by confessional loyalty. Whereas Fakhr al-Din allegedly presented himself as a Christian, Druze or Muslim depending on his audience, the presence of Imamis, Nusayris and Ismailis confused the emergence of a definitive Shi'i practice (Hitti, 1965: 163; Abisaab, 2006a: 65). If allegiance to a historical identity can be detected, it perhaps lies in the division of tribal lineage between Qaysis and Yamanis (Hitti, 1965: 191)[99].

[97] After Ahmad Ma'n (1658-97) died without an heir, the Shihab clan, a Sunni family related to the through marriage, took over. They converted to Christianity around the time the Maronite Church strengthened its position with the Papacy in 1736 (Hourani, 1985: 6-9). Whereas Traboulsi (2007: 3) argues that the emirate of Fakhr al-Din constituted the beginning of the Lebanese polity, Harris (2012: 96) prioritises his role in brining communal elites of Mount Lebanon together. Salibi (1988: 128) and Hourani (1985: 6-8) credit the Shihabs of instituting a sort of 'Lebanese' system of tax collection in 1711 while Winter (2010: 170) believes that is was not until 1763 when a Shihabi emir breached the confines of its traditional enclave.

[98] The Ottomans had divided Jabal 'Amil into *bilad al-shuqayf* (north) and *bilad bishara* (south) (Weiss, 2010: 56). According to a 13th Century Arabic dictionary, *Lisan al-'Arab*, the word *za'im* derives from the verb *za'ma* which stands for *damina wa-kafila* ('to guarantee'), so a *za'im* is a *damin wa-kafil* ('guarantor') (Firro, 2003: 92). The predominant *zu'ama* in Jabal 'Amil were the Munkars, the Sa'bs and the Saghirs (Winter, 2010: 124, 126). Hourani (2006: 52), Harris (2012: 84) and Chalabi (2006: 28) discuss the historical lineage of the Saghirs, the successors of the Wa'ils and predecessors of the As'ads. The first two martyrs of Twelver Shi'ism, Shamseddin Muhammad ibn Makki (1333-1384) and Zayneddin ibn Nureddin Ali (1506-1558) were from Jabal 'Amil (Hourani, 2006: 54-55).

[99] The Shi'i were from a southern Arabian tribe (Yamani) whereas the Ma'ns/Shihabs were from the northern Arabia (Qaysi). This split is most evident during internal conflicts between the Druze in the 18th Century. The Jumblatts are Qaysi, the Yazbakis (Arslans) are Yamani. In 1980, a survey of the Druze community discovered that all but 16 families could be divided into one of these branches (Hitti, 1965: 157; Harris, 2012: 114-115; Johnson, 2001: 104).

Alternatively, it is more illustrative to construct an internalisation of intra-elite practice in which each agent, subsumed in a sub-*field* constituted by the Sultan, developed dispositions to enhance their *capital* and improve their position within the administrative hierarchy. Therefore, 'vertical divisions and internal conflicts within each religious group, the ruling and the ruled, should be given greater expression in a historical investigation' (Abisaab, 2006a: 73). This perspective of elite balancing, managed by the Ottomans, could explain the continuity in punitive measures applied to elites who violated the rules. In 1635, Fakhr al-Din was killed for supporting rebellions against the Ottomans as well as participating in an alliance with Tuscany and Pope Gregory XIII before the Sultan permitted Fakhr al-Din's nephew to resume the expected duties of the position (Traboulsi, 2007: 6-7; Harris, 2012: 107)[100].

Equally, Shi'i families were also punished for undermining the legitimacy of the Sultan. After attempting to independently expand their influence over Tripoli, the Ottomans dispatched the Shihabs to expel the Hamadas from the region in 1766 (Winter, 2010: 88-96; Halawi, 1992: 35)[101]. In Jabal 'Amil, the decision by the Ottomans in 1660 to separate the *wilaya* of Sidon led to a century of intermittent battles between the Shi'i and the Ma'ns/Shihabs (Salibi, 1988: 66; Winter, 2010: 125-129). After the Shi'i formed an alliance in 1768 with the Governor of Galilee, Zahir al-Umar, who was competing with the Shihabs in exporting cotton to Europe, and following the seizure of Sidon in 1771 while the Ottomans were fighting the Russians, the 'Amilis were eventually defeated in 1781 by Ahmed Pasha, the Governor of Saida (Winter, 2010: 136-141; Gharbieh, 1996; 31; Shanahan, 2005: 23)[102]. Lastly, the Harfushs, having previously escaped the attention of the Ma'ns/Shihabs, also became the victims of Ahmad Pasha's collective punishment in 1784[103].

The demise of the Shi'i was precipitated by the convergence of two symbiotic currents. Firstly, in the *FIP*, the Ottomans had become compelled to enact reforms that embraced decentralisation to counter-balance the threat posed by encroaching European powers, epitomised by Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1798. Secondly, not only had the Shihabs proved highly efficient administrators, but they had also initiated the construction of a national narrative. Converting to Christianity

[100] Fakhr al-Din supported the Governor of Aleppo against the Ottomans between 1605-07. After a period in self-imposed exile in 1611, Fakhr al-Din returned to launch military expeditions against the Christian enclave of Bsharri, the Shi'i Biqa' and the *wali* of Damascus in 1623.
[101] The decline of the Hamadas ushered the emergence of the Maronites in the Kisrawan of Mount Lebanon (Winter, 2010: 88-96).
[102] The Governor of Galilee allegedly granted Jabal 'Amil autonomy in return for a monopolisation over cotton production (Shanahan, 2005: 23). Ahmad Pasha was known as 'Cezzar', or 'the butcher': 'the lord of Palestine, viceroy of Syria and arbiter of Lebanese affairs' (Hitti, 1965: 175). Similar to the Hamadas, some Jabal 'Amil Shi'i sought refuge with the Harfushs in the Biqa' while the others incited uprisings in the 1780s with the result of mass destruction and double taxation (Shanahan, 2005: 24-25; Winter, 2010: 168-70).
[103] Due to the growing liability of being a Shi'i and the dominance of the Christians, the Harfushs converted to Christianity to improve their political fortunes (Shanahan, 2005: 21).

following a formal agreement between the Maronite Church and the Papacy in 1736, the increasingly organised Shihabs, backed by the French, emerged as the natural beneficiaries of Ottoman reforms[104]. At the advent of the 19th Century, the sectarian identity of the Shi'i, which did not prevent their rise, contributed to their decline (Winter, 2010: 176). Consequently, the Shi'i became reduced to *heterodox* positions within a sub-*field* of practice, constituted by a regional logic that aligned with the predominant narratives of the elite Bashir-*ein* duopoly (Shihab II and Jumblatt)[105]. In this context, the Shi'i, devoid of legitimate *capital*, were 'anachronistic and redundant', characterised by geographical division and fractured solidarity rendering the history of Jabal 'Amil one of dispossession and marginalisation (Winter, 2010: 117, 174-178).

Since Bashir Shihab II was expanding his authority to encompass a 'principality of established feudal structure, where everyone knew his place in the hierarchy', scholars suggest that *Jabal Lubnan* (Mount Lebanon) started to enter common vernacular as a distinct political and geographical entity (Salibi, 1988; 111; Makdisi, 2000: 30)[106]. Nevertheless, the conflation of endogenous and exogenous forces ruptured the alliance between Bashir-*ein* leading to significant alterations in the dynamics of *Jabal Lubnan*. Firstly, the crippling taxes imposed by Abdullah Pasha, Governor of Sidon, and enforced by Shihab II, in addition to his campaign against Damascus in 1821, incited a cross-confessional *ammiya* ('popular') movement as well as causing friction between Shihab II and Bashir Jumblatt (Harris, 2012: 133-135)[107]. Subsequently, Jumblatt was killed in 1825 and the Druze *muqata'jis* who participated in the revolt were forced from their lands. Secondly, due to his interests in sericulture, Shihab II was economically beholden to Muhammad Ali, the *wali* of Egypt, during his occupation of the Levant (1832-1840)[108]. This alliance not only evoked resistance from the Shi'i, but with Shihab II compelled by his Egyptian patrons to quash a Druze insurrection in Hawran, it also represented the first time that elite actors had 'confronted each other on a sectarian basis' (Traboulsi, 2007:

[104] Pope Leo X officially recognised the Maronites as an Eastern Christian Community in 1510. By 1584, Pope Gregory XIII established the Maronite College in Rome. Fakhr al-Din strengthened ties with Pope Gregory XIII. In 1658, King Louis XIV appointed Abu Nawfal al-Khazin as vice-consul in Beirut and granted him full French citizenship before being offered tax farmer status by Sultan Mehmet IV in 1671. Under him, Jesuits and Franciscans started coming to Lebanon (Harris, 2012: 109; Hitti, 1965: 161-178; Salibi, 1988: 106; Traboulsi, 2007: 60).

[105] 'Bashir-*ein*' refers to Bashir Shihab II, who succeeded Yusuf al-Shihab in 1788, and Bashir Jumblatt, a Druze *muqata'ji*.

[106] Except for Jabal al-Dinniya and Jabal Akkar in the north, Shihab II controlled all of what would become known as 'Lebanon' (Salibi, 1988: 108).

[107] 2,000 'Amili Shi'i were enlisted in Abdullah Pasha's military campaign in exchange for the Saghirs reclaiming their land rights over the area (Harris, 2012: 133).

[108] Muhammad Ali sought to take Syrian provinces as compensation after not receiving acknowledgement from the Ottomans for suppressing the Wahhabis (Harris, 2012: 136).

12)[109]. By June 1840, Maronites, Druze, Shi'is and Sunnis congregated in Antiliyas demanding a reduction in tax, opposing conscription as well as advocating the disarming of villagers and the abolishing of the principality (Harris, 2012: 138; Traboulsi, 2007: 13).

As the Ottomans struggled to manage the crisis, European powers sensed an opportunity to intervene, leading to the expulsion of Muhammad Ali and the exile of Shihab II. Addressing the escalating Christian-Druze tensions, European powers pressured Ottoman Foreign Minister Sekib Effendi into accepting a *Reglement* agreement in which the Shihab realm of *Jabal Lubnan* would be split into two self-governing *qa'immaqamiyas* ('lieutenancies'). The initiative, devised in 1842 but institutionalised in 1845, stipulated that the northern part, extending from Kisrawan to Tripoli, would be governed by Maronites, while the southern enclave, encompassing Sidon and the surrounding areas, would be governed by the Druze. Each district was headed by a *qa'im maqam* who presided over an administrative council of 12 members, answered to the *wali* of Sidon but remained appointed by the Ottomans in consultation with the Europeans[110].

For the first time, communal identity was legalised into geographical location and political representation to the point where sect became the expression of everyday practice (Makdisi, 2000: 78; Traboulsi, 2007: 26; Ziadeh, 2006: 67). This loose arrangement, which resonated more with the emerging national consciousness of the Maronites than the Druze *muqata'jis*, widened the chasm between the two sects concerning the transition of *hysteresis* from 'notable' to 'restoration' politics (Makdisi, 2000: 63-66)[111]. While the Druze observed the traditional sub-*field* logic of non-sectarian, patron-client practice, the Maronites, who deplored Druze minority authority over the Maronite majority, subscribed to religious identity as the basis for a 'modern reformed and ambivalent Ottoman sovereignty in Mount Lebanon' (Makdisi, 2000: 64)[112]. The fractures within this duopoly erupted in 1858 when Tanyus Shahin, the self-proclaimed emancipator of the Christian underclass, led the Maronite *ahali*

[109] The occupation rewarded Shihab II with autonomy over Jabal 'Amil leading to separate rebellions by the Sa'bs and Saghirs. In return, the Ottomans granted them rights over Jabal 'Amil until 1865 (Gharbieh, 1996: 34). The Harfushs also revolted in the Biqa' (Harris, 2012: 138).

[110] After deliberating over a number of options, the 12 members were comprised of one judge (*qadi*) and one councillor (*wakil*) from each of the main confessions – Maronite, Druze, Sunni, Shi'i, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic. The Shi'i were permitted to be on the council but were not allowed to hold a judicial position due to the religious disparities in jurisprudence with the Sunnis. The 12th member of each council was filled by a vice-*qa'im maqam*, a Maronite for the north and a Druze for the south (Shanahan: 2005: 25-27; Makdisi, 2000: 61; Traboulsi, 2007: 26).

[111] The Reglement was 'neither a proper constitutional text, nor a blueprint for a state-like political system, not even a recipe for permanent communal representation' (Ziadeh, 2006: 55). Benefiting from Ottoman land reforms, an autonomous and cohesive Maronite clergy owned approximately 25% of land in Mount Lebanon and used it to stimulate 'a sharp-edged Maronite self-conscious' amongst the peasantry (Harris, 2012: 125,130; Johnson, 2001: 92-95).

[112] The Maronites outnumbered the Druze in the Mountain 200,000 to 40,000 (Makdisi, 2000: 79). In the north, Maronite elites collected taxes from their co-religionists where the Druze elites in the south presided over a Maronite majority (Traboulsi, 2007: 16).

('peasants') of the north in a rebellion for social justice and economic equality[113]. In retaliation, the Druze targeted Christian communities with the most deadly attack occurring in Damascus in July 1860. Before the French intervened, Maronite-Druze hostilities claimed the lives of 5,000 people, the destruction of 200 villages and the displacement of 100,000 people (Traboulsi, 2007: 39)[114].

On 9 June 1861, the *mutasarrifiya* was announced as a compromise between an independent Christian emirate and the submission of Mount Lebanon to the Ottomans (Traboulsi, 2007: 41). Consequently, *Jabal Lubnan* became the 'official and internationally recognized name of a territory of special administrative character within historical Syria' (Salibi, 1988: 69). This *Reglement Organique* encompassed six districts managed by an Administrative Council of 12 councillors and governed by a non-Lebanese Christian (*mutasarrif*) selected by the Sultan in consultation with European powers (Makdisi, 2000: 159-161; Shanahan, 2005: 27)[115]. Consequently, the texts of 1861 and 1864 established a geographical entity of 'multimember, multisectarian constituencies' that created 'a single public identity, where one's sect defined one's involvement in the public sphere' (Harris, 2012: 160; Makdisi, 2000: 162). Additionally, since the *Reglement Organique* represented the first international text that both extended the autonomy of Mount Lebanon as well as the right of European powers to intervene in its affairs, the system produced a reinforcing dialectic of sectarianism 'from below', in the institutionalised practices of a sectarian discourse, and 'from above', in the shape of colonial and elite interests (Weiss, 2010: 11; Ziadeh, 2006: 72-73; Makdisi, 2000: 174)[116]. This 'new culture' enshrined a *doxa* of sectarianism into the structured logic of *Jabal Lubnan* in which the predominant *orthodoxy* would be constituted by an *illusio* ('stake') that accepted and reproduced the legitimacy of its practice.

Languishing *In the Shadow of Sectarianism* (Weiss, 2010), the Shi'i, who had neither participated nor contributed to this process, would have to adapt its dispositions, positions and practice to the structured logic of sectarian *orthodoxy*. Following the

[113] The rebellion, which spread from Kisrawan in the north to Hasbaya in the south, proposed a ruling council consisting of clerics, commoners, merchants and rich middle-class farmers (Traboulsi, 2007: 30).
[114] Notables from both sides, who had been incapable of controlling the militarisation of their subjects, agreed to curb the influence of the *juhhal* ('ignorant') mobs and restore order, Napoleon III despatched 6,000 French soldiers to Lebanon (Makdisi, 2000: 144-145; Traboulsi, 2007: 37). Demonstrating the fragmentation of the community, the Shi'i of Ba'albeck joined the Druze while the Shi'i of Jabal 'Amil provided refuge to fleeing Christians (Gharbieh, 1996: 35; Makdisi, 2000: 115).
[115] Kura, Kisrawan, Zahla, Matn, Sahil and Jezzine comprised the *mutasarrifiya* while Beirut, Tripoli and Sidon remained under the *wilaya* of Damascus (Makdisi, 2000: 161; Traboulsi, 2007: 43). Christians accounted for 79.45% of Mount Lebanon with Shi'i representing 5.64% (Gharbieh, 1996: 82). The Administrative Council, initially under a Catholic Armenian called Daoud Pasha was based at Beiteddine in Jabal Chouf but moved to Baabda in the 1880s and included 4 Maronites, 3 Druze, 2 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 1 Sunni and 1 Shi'i (Ziadeh, 2006: 77; Shanahan, 2005: 28). It was endowed with veto power over the mutasarrif on issues relating to Ottoman intervention and tax increases (Traboulsi, 2007: 43). The *mutasarrifiya* also created a gendarmerie of 1200 soldiers under a Maronite officer (Harris, 2012: 16).
[116] France, Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia.

dismantling of the *wilaya* of Sidon in 1865 and the subsequent division of Jabal 'Amil into separate administrative enclaves (*qadas*) within the *wilaya* of Damascus, the *mutasarrifiya* model exacerbated the fragmentation of the Shi'i between the *zu'ama*, *ulama*, *wujaha* ('new elite') and the *amma* ('working class'). While the As'ads of Taiyba continued to wield significant influence in and around Jabal 'Amil, the concepts of privatised land and decentralised authority entailed within the *Tanzimat* reforms of the Ottomans (1839-76) provided opportunities for an emerging mercantile class from the coastal regions to target the monopoly of the *zu'ama*[117]. As the *zu'ama* possessed the cultural *capital* required to access the Shi'i community, and with the *wujaha* striving to convert their economic *capital* into influence, a mutually beneficial alignment occurred through marriage alliances[118]. Nevertheless, these instances of social *capital* did not contain the struggle between the *zu'ama* and *wujaha* for symbolic *capital* amongst the *amma* (Shanahan, 2005: 42).

On account of their revered status as the custodians of Shi'i religious thought, the *ulama* also possessed extensive forms of cultural and social *capital*. However, since these clerics preferred to practise political quietism over engagement, they remained detached from the struggle for symbolic *capital*. Continuing the traditions of their ancestors, religious figures concentrated on the domain of education by opening the Kawthariyya (1820) and Hamadiyya (1882) schools around Nabatiyeh (Chalabi, 2006: 39-40)[119]. Not only were these centres under pressure from the establishment of missionary schools in the mid-19th Century, but in the context of Ottoman reforms, the introduction of modern secular schools to Jabal 'Amil and Sidon towards the end of the 19th Century also compromised the relevance of religious education[120]. In particular, the 'Amili Trio of Nabatiyeh, as well as individuals such as Arif al-Zayn, Abd al-Karim al-Khalil and Rashid Usayran, attended these schools (Firro, 2006:

[117] Ali al-As'ad was appointed to reorganise the provinces of Syria in 1860; Khalil al-As'ad became *mutasarrif* of Nablus in Palestine while Najib al-As'ad became *qa'im maqam* of Latakia. Kamil As'ad was the Shi'i representative for Beirut and attended the Constitution of Sultan Abd al-Hami in 1876 (Gharbieh, 1996: 36, 54; Firro, 2006: 541-42). The *Hatti-I Sharif* ('Sultan's edict') of Gulhane in 1839 and 1856 proclaimed the equality of all members of the Ottoman Empire (Picard, 1996: 21). In 1858, land reforms were enforced not only to weaken the nobility, but also to improve the effectiveness of tax collection in agriculture (Picard, 1996: 21; Johnson, 2001: 90). These reforms enabled the influx of *wujaha*, including the Fadls, Usayrans, Khalils and the Zayns. In particular, under the Qajar dynasty in Iran (1785-1925), the Usayrans served as Persian consuls in Sidon (Shanahan, 2005: 41-42).

[118] The Usayrans had marriage ties with the Zayns, Khalils and Haydars while the As'ads were linked to the Sharaf al-Dins, Zayns and Hamadas (Chalabi, 2006: 24; Shanahan: 2005: 40, 43).

[119] The *ulama* established a number of educational centres in Jabal 'Amil between the 14th and 17th centuries. Shaykh al-Maysi founded schools in Jezzine and Mays, Shaykh Karaki started one in the Biqa' and Zayn al-Din bin Ali established the Nuriyya School in Ba'albeck and the Shaqra School. As the schools were dependent on the financial backing and religious reputation of their clerical patrons, many of the schools had to close after the cleric died (Chalabi, 2006: 38).

[120] In 1860, the British Syrian Mission had schools in Beirut, Zahla, Ba'albeck, Hasbaya, Ayn Zahaltah and Shimlan. There were also Jesuit schools in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Zahla, Bikfaya and Jezzine, not to mention the Jesuit College of 1843 that became the Universitie Saint-Joseph in 1875. The Syrian Protestant College of 1866 became the American University of Beirut in 1920 (Traboulsi, 2007: 60). Epitomised by the schools founded by Rida al-Sulh and Hassan Makki in Nabatiyeh, which followed curricula derived from the modern Sunni schools of the Sultan (Firro, 2006: 539).

539). This cadre of Shi'i, who represented the vanguard of an emerging intelligentsia, aimed to address the notions of Shi'ism within their prevailing environment[121].

As the traditional organising structures of the Shi'i community remained static, regional developments galvanised the *heterodoxy* of these intellectual discussions regarding identity and nationalism. In the Ottoman Empire, the aborted Constitution in 1876 and the subsequent suspension of parliament (1877-1906) by Sultan Abdul Hamid II sewed the seed for the 1908 revolution by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), or the 'Young Turks', a movement that demonstrated the possibility of implementing a national project (Picard, 1996: 25). Moreover, while reformist thinkers in Egypt, such as Jamal al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, contributed to debates on reconciling Islam with modernity, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran (1905-1907) also grappled with the prospect of merging Shi'ism and nationalism.

Rather than act as passive consumers on the peripheries of these debates, Shi'i figures were instrumental in proactively translating discourses into practice. Whereas Abd al-Karim al-Khalil created the Association for Arab Renaissance (1906), joined the Arab Brotherhood Society (1908) and established the Arab Club (1909), Arif al-Zayn started *al-Irfan*, a monthly journal to 'promote cultural and educational progress' within Jabal 'Amil by exploring the 'nation' problematic by linking aspects of Shi'i '*asabiyya* ('tribalism'), the Muslim *umma*, the Ottoman civic *umma* and the Arab National *umma* (Firro, 2006: 536-37; Traboulsi, 2007: 69; Shanahan, 2005: 47)[122]. In 1913, Rustum Haydar founded the Young Arab Society in Beirut and published *al-Mufid* ('The Useful'), at which point activists from Jabal 'Amil began flocking to Damascus, the thriving epicentre of these symposia (Chalabi, 2006: 34). By 1915, after participating with Christians and Sunnis at the First Arab Congress of Paris, Abd al-Karim al-Khalil joined the 'Amili Trio in the Arab Revolt Society (Firro, 2006: 543).

As these Arab Nationalist initiatives gathered momentum and risked transforming into rebellion, Fuad Pasha, supposedly on information provided by Kamil As'ad, ordered the hanging of 14 activists, including Abd al-Karim al-Khalil, in May 1916 at what has become famously known as 'Martyrs Square' in Beirut (Chalabi, 2006:

[121] The 'Amili Trio refers to Muhammad al-Safa, Sulayman Dahir and Ahmad Rida. Arif al-Zayn was the founder of the *Jabal 'Amil* newspaper in 1903 and the Sidon-based *al-Irfan* journal (1909-1973) (Chalabi, 2006: 33, 173; Firro, 2006: 541; Gharbieh, 1996: 36).
[122] This topic was specifically discussed in a three-part article by Ahmad Rida in 1910 entitled *Ma Hiya al-Umma* ('What is a Nation?'). Rida defined the nation as 'a collective *'usba* (group) regrouped by one common bond which held it together…it either comprises several religions regrouped by one language, such as the Arab *umma*, or several languages embraced by one religion, such as the Muslim *umma*, or several religions and different languages… such as the Ottoman *umma*' (Firro, 2006: 537).

51)[123]. The repressive response adopted by the Ottoman authorities nullified episodes of defiance within a Shi'i community whose members had been instrumental in conceiving and cultivating unifying frames and solidaristic practices. Consequently, during the First World War, the Shi'i remained geographically and ideologically divided. Compounding this situation, the Shi'i lost many men as a result of Ottoman-imposed military conscription. Furthermore, not only were agricultural fields left abandoned, but Shi'i areas were disproportionately affected by a famine in 1915 that killed a quarter of the population (Gharbieh, 1996: 50; Chalabi, 2006: 47; Hitti, 1965: 217). Economically destitute, many Shi'i chose to emigrate rather than face the continuous deterioration of their land.

4.2 Shi'i mobilisation under Mandate and Independence (1920-1958)

In September 1920, General Gouraud proclaimed the inauguration of *Le Grand Liban*. Within the *FIP*, as demonstrated with the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and articulated at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, France was competing with the British for political and trade influence in the Middle East following the power vacuum caused by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Concurrently, the French, who had cultivated relations with their Christian counterparts in Mount Lebanon since the early 17th Century, sought to secure and stabilise their partners in the Lebanist national project[124]. Consequently, the French integrated the predominantly non-Christian zones surrounding *Jabal Lubnan* into the embryonic state, altering the demographic dynamics to a point where the population of annexed areas outnumbered Mount Lebanon.

By incorporating the Mediterranean ports, the fertile planes of the Biqa' and the agricultural industry in the south, the French ensured that the ideologically compatible core was sustained by the geographically advantaged periphery. *Jabal Lubnan* was transformed from a detached enclave to the primary beneficiary of an economically prosperous Greater Lebanon[125]. In Bourdieusian terms, the French architectural design for Lebanon's *Political Field* (*PF*) was beginning to demarcate its boundaries. The symbolic *capital* accrued by France in the *FIP* following the *hysteresis* of the First World War enabled the Maronites to imprint their narrative of

[123] Muhammad al-Safa, Ahmad Rida, Arif al-Zayn and Rashid Usayran were arrested while Rida al-Sulh was exiled. Kamil As'ad allegedly divulged the identities of the dissenters (Shanahan, 2005: 48; Firro, 2006: 542; Chalabi, 2006: 50-51). Since Arab Nationalist movements threatened the traditional *zu'ama* system, As'ad sought to preserve his traditional position.
[124] The Christian canon of nationalism can be traced back to 17th Century Maronite Patriarch Istifan Douaihi and 19th Century Bishop Niqula Murad (Johnson, 2001: 145).
[125] Accordingly, 83% of fiscal revenues accumulated by the new state emanated from the appropriated areas whereas 80% of the proceeds were spent on the infrastructural development of Mount Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007: 81; Halawi, 1992: 42)

Lebanese nationalism as the prevailing *orthodoxy* in the *PF*. Subsequently, by transferring their social and cultural *capital* in the *Social Mobilisational Field* (*SMF*) to the *PF*, the Maronites aligned the homology of their collective *habitus* to propagate perceptions and dispositions privileging the practice of Lebanese nationalism. Conversely, the Ottoman crackdown on the Arabist intelligentsia and the defeat of Emir Faysal by the French had dented the challenge of pan-Arab *heterodoxy* that connected Sunnis and Shi'is in the *SMF* during the War. Ultimately, the *illusio* ('stakes') of the *PF*, the *doxa* of which enshrined the *mutasarrifiya* system, required adherence to an *orthodoxy* that embraced the durability of the traditional elite system.

The Shi'i 'lacked the political capability, organization, contacts, and resources to present a formal case to the Paris Peace Conference' (Chalabi, 2006: 97). Furthermore, exemplified by Kamil As'ad, traditional Shi'i leaders possessed dispositions to affiliate with revisionist Arab *heterodoxy* amidst the dominance of French *orthodoxy*. Initially threatened by the Arab nationalist movement, As'ad attempted to manage its impact by declaring loyalty to Sharif Husayn's 1918 Arab government in Damascus, opposing the prospect of a French mandate in 1919 and endorsing the 'King of Syria' in 1920 (Firro, 2006: 544). Despite French warnings, such as the suspension of political activities in Jabal 'Amil and the replacement of Shi'i employees in Saida with Christians, As'ad joined 600 members of the Shi'i *zu'ama* and *ulama* in publicly pronouncing Jabal 'Amil as an autonomous component within a Syrian federation (Gharbieh, 1996: 81-85; Traboulsi, 2007: 78; Chalabi, 2006: 78-79; Firro, 2006: 544-545). However, this display of Shi'i solidarity was overshadowed by an attack on Christians in Ayn Ibl by a Shi'i guerrilla group[126]. As General Gouraud announced *Le Grand Liban* in the presence of Maronite Patriarch Hawayik and Sunni Mufti Naja, prominent Shi'i figures, including As'ad, were accused of aiding the rebels and fled to Syria and Palestine (Firro, 2006: 546; Gharbieh, 1996: 94).

At the advent of the state, the Shi'i were 'paralysed and beaten' (Chalabi, 2006: 84). Geographically, they were detached from *Jabal Lubnan*, and by extension the locus of power. Whereas the Maronites had created contiguous confessional communities, and with the Sunnis connected by coastal links between Tripoli, Beirut and Saida, the Shi'i were concentrated around Jabal 'Amil and the Biqa', two areas that had never

[126] Approximately 7,000 Shi'i guerrillas launched attacks against French positions in the south between 1918-1920 before Colonel Nieger was despatched to crush the rebellion (Gharbieh, 1996: 89-91).

been joined during the Ottoman era[127]. This dislocation produced divergent practices between the 'Amili Shi'i, who were predisposed to accept their subservience to the *zu'ama* and political institutions, and the Biqa' Shi'i, who were 'more independent, less subject to the influence of external authority' (Shanahan, 2005: 34). Nevertheless, the Shi'i were conjoined by their socio-economic status where the common archetype was 'uneducated' with limited access to basic services and 'poorer than his compatriots' with an 'occupation likely to be unskilled and unremunerative' (Halawi, 1992: 67).

These conditions were compounded as the Shi'i operated on the margins of Lebanon's Beirut-centric, free-market capitalist oligopoly. Epitomised by Michel Chiha, a Greek Catholic and Francophile who advocated for the resurgence of a neo-Phoenician culture in Lebanon, the country's economic priorities were directed towards the tertiary sector of finance[128]. Since approximately 90% of the Shi'i labour force was employed in agriculture, this economic model precluded the injection of investment and development in the primary sector (Picard, 1996: 40; Halawi, 1992: 52; Chalabi, 2006: 27)[129]. Rather than unify to alleviate the plight of their communities, Shi'i leaders were locked in disjointed practice between Lebanese and Arab nationalism. As the Maronite Mountain and Christian Beirut elite coalesced around Lebanism, urbanised Sunnis promoted the cause of Arabism. The division and exclusion of the Shi'i from this discourse 'marks the beginning of their ideological alienation within the context of the modern state' (Chalabi, 2006: 73). Considered superfluous by the French and subordinate by the Arab government, the Shi'i were reduced to espousing incoherent *heterodoxy* in the form of either Shi'i exceptionalism or Lebanese Muslim Resistance.

The Shi'i may have been acutely marginalised but the restructuring of the *mutasarrifiya* system into national institutions presented opportunities for mobilising a collective *habitus* in the *SMF* with which to translate into active participation in the *PF*. Whether witnessed in the establishment of the Representative Council (1922), the inauguration of the Ja'fari Court (1926), the Lebanese Constitution (1926), the

[127] Jabal 'Amil fell under the administration of *wilaya* of Sidon whereas the Biqa' was in the jurisdiction of *wilaya* of Damascus.
[128] Chiha attempted to form a pluralist political model to synthesise Lebanism with all Lebanese citizens (Firro, 2003: 37). Through his close connections with the influential Pharaon and Khoury families, Chiha represented a crucial link between the Maronite elite and the Beirut bourgeoisie, a considerable component of an oligopoly that dominated the banking, utilities and communication sectors to amass a fortune superseding Lebanon's state budget (Traboulsi, 2007: 58, 84,115-117; Zamir, 2000: 36; Picard, 1996: 38). Christian entrepreneurs eclipsed their Muslim counterparts in Beirut by a ratio of roughly 5:1 (Sayigh, 1962: 69-71).
[129] Jabal 'Amil grew tobacco and cultivated cotton. Originally, the Ottomans seized control of production from local producers in 1883 and offered the rights to an Austrian-British-French consortium. This contract was renewed for a further 15 years in 1913 (Halawi, 1992: 57-58). Farmers in Jabal 'Amil were further impacted when Galilee, an important trade link to the south, became governed by the British mandate. Similarly, the Biqa', which specialised on cereals, raisins and rearing sheep, was also affected by the decision to separate *Le Grand Liban* from its main market in Syria (Halawi, 1992: 52).

national census (1932) or the events prior and during Lebanese Independence (1936-43), the Shi'i confronted five inter-related obstacles in initiating cohesive movement: overcoming competition between Shi'i elites in the *PF*; preventing the permeation of *zu'ama* rivalry within intra-clerical disputes in the *SMF*; failing to transfer Shi'i grievances in the *SMF* to the *PF*; mitigating against non-Shi'i co-option by constructing an *Organisational Field* (*OF*); and the inability to align *capital* with an external power to ensure privileged Shi'i access to the *PF*.

Firstly, in May 1922, following a series of Muslim boycotts opposing their allocation of five seats (one Shi'i) in the 15-member Administrative Council, General Gouraud replaced the body with a partly-elected, 30-member Representative Council comprised of 13 Muslims (two Shi'i), a distribution that almost directly correlated to the results of the 1922 national census (Traboulsi, 2007: 88; Picard, 1996: 33)[130]. This opening presented an opportunity for the *zu'ama* to enhance their interests and influence. Reinforcing the authoritative structures of the patron-client relationship in the Shi'i community, an adherence to the logic of sectarianism within the *doxa* and *illusio* of the *PF* not only enabled the *zu'ama* to legitimately transfer their pre-existing *capital* from the *SMF*, but their improved access to elites and resources also consolidated their positions in the *SMF* through pledges of patronage and development projects. Therefore, the *zu'ama* responded 'affirmatively' to the invitation of institutional participation extended by the French who interpreted the co-option of Shi'i notables as important for the stabilising Lebanon (Firro, 2006: 546).

Rather than encourage intra-Shi'i solidarity through a collective *habitus* in the *PF*, the institutionalisation of the *zu'ama* signified an era of *matlabiyya*, 'the politics of demand' or 'a model of patronage-seeking by a community' (Chalabi, 2006: 115). Previously, the *zu'ama* were locked in competition whereby each aimed to promote and legitimise their 'right to rule' by evoking 'powerfully resonant images in the Shi'a socioreligious discourse' (Halawi, 1992: 86)[131]. The *PF* simply created a new arena for rivalry where the interpretation of *matlabiyya* was pursued and contested. Consequently, *zu'ama* practice was characterised by the perception of intra-sectarian mistrust and the disposition to temporarily align either with another Shi'i *za'im* or the

[130] Initially, General Gouraud simply increased the number of seats in the Administrative Council to 17 (6 Maronites, 3 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 1 Druze, 4 Sunni and 2 Shi'i) (Chalabi, 2006: 123; Gharbieh, 1996: 97).
[131] The Hamadas traced their lineage to fighting with Imam Husayn at Karbala; the Fadls claimed descent from Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, the Islamic leader who expelled the Crusaders from Jerusalem; and the As'ads derived respect from their links to the Anaza tribe and to the Saghirs (Halawi, 1992: 86).

non-Shi'i elite to marginalise an adversary[132]. In the 1920s, the old schism resurfaced between the *zu'ama*, wishing to preserve traditional practice, and the *wujaha*, endeavouring to promote more active modes of integration.

Secondly, the establishment of the Ja'fari court on 30 January 1926 by High Commissioner Henri Jouvenel offered the Shi'i an opportunity to neutralise *zu'ama* rivalry, activate the *capital* of the *ulama* and produce a harmony of intra-Shi'i positions and practice in the *SMF*. By recognising Ja'fari jurisprudence over issues of personal status in the Twelver Shi'i community, Weiss (2010: 30) credits this event as a major development in contributing to the 'reconsiderations and redefinitions of collective Shi'i solidarity and identity'[133]. Nevertheless, this opportunity became nullified by intra-clerical disputes and intra-elite rivalry. Primarily, since the Iraqi-based Grand Ayatollah Taqi Shirazi issued a *fatwa* in 1920 against cooperating with French authorities, the most prominent 'Amili clerics refused to serve as president of the court (Chalabi, 2006: 142)[134]. The transnational and hierarchical structure of Shi'i religious authority (*marjaiyya*) not only resulted in divergent attitudes, but also indicated the increasing importance of a traditionally de-politicised clergy[135]. Consequently, intellectual disputes over the predominant *orthodoxy* of legitimate religious practice presented an opportunity for the *ulama* and the *zu'ama* to compete for symbolic *capital* in the *SMF*.

This was particularly evident during the Ashoura debates over the commemorative celebration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn at Karbala in 680[136]. In the early 1920s, Shaykh Abd al-Husayn Sadiq established the first Jabal 'Amil *husayniyas* in which Ashoura was practised through *latam* (self-flagellation), a self-harming ritual where adherents re-enact the suffering of Iman Husayn. Conversely, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin argued for a reformist approach that focused on the sanctity of body and projected an inclusive image of Shi'ism within the eclectic composition of Lebanon (Weiss, 2010: 70-91). Sensing an opportunity to politicise the symbolic relevance of

[132] The As'ads were at odds with the Zayns and Usayrans; the Zayns were close to the Usayrans but hostile to the Fadls while the Usayrans were allied with the Fadls. These competitions are documented in the pages of outlets such as *al-Irfan*, *al-Barq*, *al-Bashir* and *Lisan al-Hal* (Chalabi, 2006: 119, 124-126).

[133] The court was granted exclusive autonomy over marriage, divorce, dower, maintenance payments, pious endowments, inheritance and property. The court also integrated the Shi'i into the broader sectarian mosaic in which Shi'i identities were 'reconfigured within the multisectarian environment of Greater Lebanon' (Weiss, 2010: 31, 124).

[134] Munir Usayran was appointed after Shaykh Husayn Mugniyeh, Sayyid Muhsin al-Amin and Sayyid Sharaf al-Din refused (Weiss, 2010: 107).

[135] Religious authority in Shi'ism is predicated upon the concept of *ijtihad* ('independent reasoning'). *Ijtihad* acts to adapt and modernise Shi'i belief within the prevailing situational context. Therefore, each pious Shi'i, regardless of geographical location, follows a designated *marja* (pl. *marjaiyya*), a 'source of emulation'. Through his superior credentials as a senior *mujtahid*, a *marja* is entrusted with producing edicts on legitimate practice based upon a reconciliation of religious texts and conditional context.

[136] The first public observance of Ashoura occurred under Mu'izz al-Dawla al-Buwayhi in 10th Century Iraq. The threat of persecution by Sunni powers led Shi'is to observe *taqiyya*, the legitimate disassociation from public ritual for the purpose of preservation. The public return of Ashoura to Lebanon is attributed to the influx of Iranian immigrants in the 19th Century as a means of facilitating religious integration and solidarity (Weiss, 2010: 65-69; Khuri, 1975: 185).

intra-clerical discourse as a means of accumulating *capital*, the *zu'ama* exacerbated these divisions with the Zayns supporting Sayyid al-Amin while the As'ads and Fadls endorsed Shaykh al-Sadiq (Shanahan, 2005: 148; Halawi, 1992: 90). Similarly, the Shi'i notables also aggravated intra-clerical differences regarding education. Although Shaykh Mugniyeh and Sayyid al-Amin were equally responsible for establishing Shi'i schools through the 'Amili Ulama Society, the latter's patronage with the Zayns and the former's reliance on the Khalils resulted in an intractable collision over location that led to the eventual abandonment of the project (Shanahan, 2005: 149; Gharbieh, 1996: 110). Furthermore, Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, who developed an extensive network of educational centres in Jabal 'Amil, frequently encountered obstacles from the Khalils due to his alliance with the As'ads (Gharbieh, 1996: 113)[137].

Thirdly, on the 23 May 1926, the announcement of the Lebanese Constitution and the subsequent proclamation of the French-inspired 'Lebanese Republic' posed an additional opportunity for unified Shi'i mobilisation (Ziadeh, 2006: 91)[138]. The Chamber of Deputies and 16-member Senate replaced the Representative Council while a President, bestowed with considerable executive power and answerable only to the French High Commissioner, presided over the bicameral system (Traboulsi, 2007: 90)[139]. However, the Constitution failed to qualify the relationship between religious communities and the state (Ziadeh, 2006: 94)[140]. By legitimising the Mandate and institutionalising the principle of *muhasasa* ('allocation of shares') over *musharaka* ('equal representation'), the Constitution reproduced the 19th Century discourse and practice of sectarian quotas in the *PF*, a system that further entrenched elite positions in Lebanon (Ziadeh, 2006: 107). Assisted by the French prerequisite for stability, the Shi'i *zu'ama* were able to solidify their exclusive role as the representatives of their confessional community (Firro, 2003: 89).

Under the stipulations of the Constitution, the sectarian *orthodoxy* of the *PF* required the metamorphoses of 'traditional communities into political communities' (Meouchy

[137] Sayyid Sharaf al-Din (d. 1957) started the Jafariyya schools in 1938. By 1941, 400 students were receiving a free education. A decade later, the number had reached 640 (Gharbieh, 1996: 113-122). Another example of the *zu'ama* accentuating feuds between the ulama occurred later in 1933 when the Shi'i submitted two separate petitions to the French in attempting to appoint a religious representative on the same level as the Maronite Patriarch and the Sunni Mufti: one forwarded by the Zayns and the other recommended by the Usayrans and Fadls (Firro, 2003: 161-162).

[138] The Constitution Committee of 1925 consisted of 12 members, two of which were Shi'i (Firro, 2003: 32). With the British and French finalising the demarcation of the southern border in March 1923, the 'Lebanese Republic' represented a sovereign state of territorial integrity with Beirut as its capital (Traboulsi, 2007: 86-87).

[139] Before it was abolished in 1927, the Senate contained three Shi'i (Firro, 2003: 101). The first president was Charles Dabbas, a Greek Orthodox Christian.

[140] Article 9 stipulated that the state had a responsibility to uphold the freedom of religious communities to practise their rights and Article 95 stated that there should be a fair distribution of government and administrative posts but this did not apply to the Council of Deputies (Ziadeh, 2006: 94).

in Weiss, 2010: 123). In 1928, Yusuf al-Zayn illustrated the collective condition of *huquq al-Shi'a al-mahduma* ('Shi'i grievances'), a situation in which the Shi'i had become humiliated by the lack of state action to address the sect's most basic of demands (Weiss, 2010: 59-60). For example, approximately 83% of the Shi'i community was illiterate, and with 92.5% of Lebanon's aid budget spent on Christian education, the only options available for the Shi'i were either inaccessible government schools, expensive private schools or outdated religious schools (Halawi, 1992: 42; Gharbieh, 1996: 107)[141]. Consequently, Shi'i constituencies, second only to Maronites, started to channel their frustrations via the ballot box[142]. Although the Lebanese Republic permitted the transference of discontent within the *SMF* to the *PF* through an electoral process, Shi'i representatives were disposed to observe a logic of intra-elite competition in the *PF* that prioritised the struggle for symbolic *capital* amongst the Shi'i in the *SMF* at the expense of collectively and effectively advocating for the alleviation of Shi'i grievances.

Fourthly, while the national census of 1932 confirmed the potential power of Shi'i mobilisation within the political system, the Shi'i were unable to replicate its confessional counterparts in transforming this opportunity into a cohesive *Organisational Field* (*OF*)[143]. According to the results, the Shi'i accounted for 155,000, or 19.5% of a population of 793,000 (Shanahan, 2005: 31)[144]. As the landscape of the *PF* became dominated by the rivalry between Bishara al-Khoury's Constitutionalist Bloc and Emile Edde's Nationalist Bloc, a number of political parties emerged, such as the Lebanese Communist Party (1924), the Syrian National Socialist Party (1932), the Phalange Party (1936) and the Najjadeh Party (1936), to adapt to the prevailing norms of mobilisation in Lebanon. Despite this trend, the Shi'i failed to establish a representative *OF*[145].

Conversely, conforming to the traditional patron/client dialectic, the position of the Shi'i *zu'ama* between the *PF* and the *SMF* ensured that services were delivered in

[141] In 1931, 70% of Muslims and Druze attended state schools compared to 70% of Christians who enrolled in private schools (Harris, 2012: 181). Comparatively, Shi'i illiteracy figures far surpassed its confessional counterparts: Sunnis, 66%; Druze, 48%; Maronites 39% (Gharbieh, 1996: 108). As for Shi'i religious learning, between 1918-1957 the number of students attending seminaries in Najaf dropped from 6,000 to 2,000 (Shanahan, 2005: 141).
[142] Shi'i constituencies recorded the highest participation figures in the 1929 elections with a reported 48% in South Lebanon and 37% in the Biqa' (Shanahan, 2005: 55).
[143] At the time of writing (2015), there has yet to be an official census in Lebanon since 1932.
[144] The 1932 census recorded that Maronites represented 28.7%; Greek Orthodox 9.7%; Greek Catholic 5.9%; Sunnis 22.4%; Druze 6.7% (Picard, 1996: 61). Disputes concerning the results of the census revolve around the differing methodologies used by the Official Gazette, the Lebanese Government and French sources regarding the number and status of emigrants (Firro, 2003: 119-122).
[145] Whereas al-Khoury, a descendent of the Shihabs, believed in reconstituting Lebanon's relationship with France, aligning with the Beirut bourgeoisie and embracing Lebanon's 'Arab character' in partnering with Muslims, Edde advocated closer ties with France, an economic policy that invested in the mercantile aristocracy of Mount Lebanon and a political arrangement that protected a Christian monopoly (Shanahan, 2005: 60; Traboulsi, 2007: 93-94; Harris, 2012: 184). There were two unsuccessful attempts at forming Shi'i political parties: Rashid Baydoun's *Hizb al-Tala'i* ('Vanguards Party') in 1937 and Ahmad al-As'ad's *Hizb al-Nahda* (Renaissance Party) in 1947 (Shanahan, 2005: 61; Halawi, 1992: 85).

return for votes. This arrangement accentuated inter-elite factionalism and suspicion to the point where retaining access to the *PF* superseded sectarian loyalty in the *SMF*[146]. The formation of a cogently Shi'i *OF* would have compromised the privileged position and practice of individual interests in the *PF*. This instrumental, self-serving disposition of preservation, in which Shi'i notables balanced and manoeuvred against *zu'ama* adversaries for community support through temporary, cross-confessional alliances may have delayed the construction of a cohesive Shi'i *OF*, but it consolidated the *capital* of Shi'i elites both within the *SMF* and the *PF*[147]. Testament to the obedience of this inscribed *modus operandi*, while the Usayrans and Fadls allied with Edde during the 1935 elections, the As'ads supported Khoury (Chalabi, 2006: 132).

Fifthly, as exemplified by the structured constitution and composition of the *mutasarrifiya* system, Shi'i elites were not only marginalised from the predominant narrative of the *PF*, but they also lacked aligned or transferable *capital* with external powers, thereby diminishing their ability to benefit from developments within the *FIP* pertaining to Lebanon. In 1936, French recognition of Syrian independence and Great Britain's Anglo-Egyptian Treaty invited discussions about the prospect of Lebanese independence, a narrative that divided Lebanon along historically conventional lines. Whereas President Edde feared that Lebanese independence would lead to its annexation by Syria, Muslim unionists were concerned that independence would further legitimise Lebanon's imposed borders (Traboulsi, 2007: 98). As France recognised Lebanon's independence in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance on 13 November 1936, the protracted economic crisis greatly stymied the agricultural sector leading to protests in the majority Muslim cities of Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre and Nabatiyeh. Since Shi'i communities were disproportionately affected, demonstrations in Bint Jubayl created rifts between the Shi'i *zu'ama*, the emerging *wujaha* and Shi'i constituents signifying the usurping of the traditional 'politics of demand' by the 'politics of protest' (Chalabi, 2006: 135)[148].

Attempting to use Bint Jubayl as a way of emphasising the dire socio-economic conditions in the south, Adil Usayran joined Khoury's Constitutionalist Bloc to project an all-encompassing programme for reform, facilitated *ulama* efforts in matching

[146] As demonstrated by the relationship between the Hamadehs and Haydars in the Biqa' during the 1920s and 1930s or the joint cooperation between the As'ads, Usayrans and Khalils in 1943, the exception to rule of intra-Shi'i rivalry in the *PF* occurred when elites perceived external challengers as a collective threat (Firro, 2003: 168; Shanahan, 2005: 60-67).
[147] Aware of the fractured relationships within the Shi'i *zu'ama*, non-Shi'i elites attempted to further expose and exploit divisions amongst their Shi'i counterparts.
[148] Events in Bint Jubayl eroded the reputation of the Shi'i *zu'ama*, such as Muhammad Bazzi, while enabling opportunities for the aspiring Shi'i merchant class, like Adil Usayran (Weiss, 2010: 191-201; Chalabi, 2006: 133-135).

clerical salaries to their Sunni counterparts and followed the other six Shi'i deputies in withdrawing from the Council in response to the government's treatment of the poor (Traboulsi, 2007: 103; Chalabi, 2006: 135, 143; Firro, 2003: 171)[149]. Nevertheless, these displays of Shi'i solidarity were eclipsed by the homology between the *FIP* and Lebanon's *PF* as the *hysteresis* of the Second World War suspended the Constitution. Under these circumstances, Khoury and Riad al-Sulh aligned their social *capital* in the *PF* to circumvent the impasse of Lebanon's independence culminating in the National Pact, an oral agreement drafted by British General Edward Spears and ratified by Free French General Georges Catroux on 31 July 1943 (Harris, 2012: 196)[150]. After the September elections, Khoury became President while al-Sulh assumed the premiership with a 6:5 Christian/Muslim split in the 55-member Council of Deputies[151]. Despite receiving almost one-fifth of the available seats, the Shi'i remained on the periphery of central decision-making and reverted back to the conventional practice of intra-elite division.

This cross-sectarian accord, which initially encountered obstacles in revising the Constitution[152], was a compromise between the two seemingly irreconcilable positions of Lebanese and Arab nationalism. While the Maronites agreed not to seek Western intervention and accept Lebanon's 'Arab profile', the Muslims would abandon aspirations of uniting with Syria and agree to a Lebanon 'that assimilates all that is beneficial and useful in Western civilisation' (Traboulsi, 2007: 109). The tripartite balance of power, namely the appointment of a Maronite President, Sunni Prime Minister and Shi'i Speaker, ensured representation for the major sects within the *PF*[153]. Theoretically, the National Pact advocated citizen equality and religious freedoms where the community acted as an 'intermediary society' between the 'unified sovereign nation' and the 'individual citizen' (Ziadeh, 2006: 124).

However, the National Pact set the precedent for negotiated decision-making in Lebanon by further entrenching a culture of dependency subordinating an inherently weak and factional elite to the interests of dominant powers in the *FIP* with regards to definitive meanings and operational parameters of independence, confessional power-sharing and national identity (Ziadeh, 2006: 124; Firro, 2003: 209). Moreover,

[149] Usayran called for a free democratic state that addressed issues of taxation, economic development, trade, education, culture and tourism while providing agricultural training colleges to empower the peasants and diminish the control of the landowners (Chalabi, 2006: 136). By 1937, the Constitutionalist Bloc included other prominent Muslims from all over Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2007: 103)
[150] The only written version of the National Pact appears in a ministerial document of 7 October 1943 (Traboulsi, 2007: 109).
[151] The population percentages of the different sects correspond to the seats allocated: 30.3% Maronites; 20.2% Sunnis; 19.2% Shi'i; 11.1% Greek Orthodox; 6.1% Druze; 6.1% Greek Catholic; 5% Armenian and 2% for other minorities (Halawi, 1992: 97).
[152] After attempting to amend elements of the Constitution, the Free French arrested Khoury and al-Sulh before British Prime Minister Winston Churchill demanded that Free French leader Charles De Gaulle release them on 22 November 1943, a date that signified the end of the French Mandate (Traboulsi, 2007: 107-108).
[153] The position of Speaker was officially offered to the Shi'i in 1947 and remains held by a Shi'i to this day (Halawi, 1992: 97).

the National Pact contained a paradoxical notion of equality in that it established the equality of Lebanese as citizens inasmuch as it institutionalised their inequality as subjects belonging to 'hierarchised religious communities with unequal access to political power and public office' (Traboulsi, 2007: 109). Rather than distribute seats based on demographics, it became incumbent on elites to distort and manipulate demographics for confessional purposes (Firro, 2003: 204). Therefore, the National Pact was more a 'Communitarian Pact' that favoured the two most powerful (Picard, 1996: 71).

The initial deficiencies within the nascent National Pact appeared after the Second World War as the economic prosperity of Beirut, presided over by the Khoury-Chiha alliance, contrasted the deteriorating socio-economic conditions experienced by the broader Lebanese public (Picard, 1996: 46-48). Intending to mobilise agents in the *SMF* towards a reconstitution of the predominant *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, the Patriotic Socialist Front, led by Kamal Jumblatt, the founder of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), in conjunction with Raymond and Pierre Edde, the Lebanese Communist Party, the Phalange Party and the Syrian National Socialist Party, released a reform programme that aimed to address issues of unemployment, inflation, social services and economic inequalities (Traboulsi, 2007: 124). By September 1952, Khoury was forced to resign[154]. Failing to relate or resonate with either of these prevalent trends in the *PF*, the Shi'i elites returned to the familiar *heterodox* practice of exclusion and estrangement.

The presidency of Camile Chamoun contributed further to detaching the Shi'i from mainstream Lebanese narratives. Domestically, although Chamoun planned on curbing the influence of traditional elites through the adoption of a new election law, this initiative not only exacerbated socio-economic conditions by distancing government services from the people, but its application also reinforced sectarian identities and loyalties on the local level (Shanahan, 2005: 69)[155]. Regionally, the Anglophile president was accused of deviating from the National Pact in compromising Lebanon's neutrality and incurred the wrath of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser by failing to denounce the Baghdad Pact of 1955, rebuffing the

[154] Chiha acknowledged the failure of the government in September 1952 when he wrote that 'it may be well that authority and responsibility are disassociated whereas they should be joined. That may well be a mistake, but that is the way things are' (Traboulsi, 2007: 125).
[155] In order to dilute elite authority, Chamoun increased the number of electoral districts from 9 to 33 and decreased the number of deputies from 77 to 44 (Traboulsi, 2007: 129). The South was divided into 7 electoral districts to diminish the influence of the *zu'ama* while the Biqa' was divided into 4 electoral districts (Shanahan, 2005: 68).

Arab Defence Pact and not publicly condemning the 1956 Suez War[156]. Confronted by a mounting pro-Nasserite movement in Lebanon, Chamoun signed the Eisenhower Doctrine, a pledge by the U.S. President to defend nations threatened by international communism. When pan-Arab Free Officer General Abd al-Karim Qassem conducted a *coup d'etat* against King Faysal II in Iraq in July 1958, Chamoun requested U.S. assistance in securing Lebanon from pan-Arab sympathisers, a decision that resulted in an internal crisis that claimed the lives of 2,500 Lebanese[157].

4.3 Shi'i Mobilisation under Musa al-Sadr (1959-1978)

In 1959, Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian cleric from a prestigious family of Lebanese ancestry, was invited to replace Sayyid Sharaf al-Din in Tyre[158]. Two years prior to his death in 1957, Sayyid Sharaf al-Din had hosted Musa al-Sadr in Lebanon, recognising that the *ulama* were failing to relate to the aspirations of their followers. Rather than interpret *bida* ('innovation') as heresy, the *ulama* required an independent figure, outside the auspices of the *zu'ama*, who could bridge the chasm between modernisation and tradition (Ajami, 1986: 74-75; Gharbieh, 1996: 143). Al-Sadr, aside from the credibility and transferability of his social and cultural *capital*, was considered an ideal candidate. His journal in Qom, *Makatib Islami* ('Lessons from the School of Islam'), broke the mould of Shi'i quietism by emphasising the need for the Shi'i to transform from passive actors into active agents whereas his reformist educational programme of the *hawza*, which sought to address illiteracy in the Shi'i community, also caused reverberations through the Shi'i establishment (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 148-152)[159]. Initially, the young cleric deliberated over the decision before being persuaded by his mentors in Qom and Najaf: Ayatollah Mohammad Husayn Borujerdi, the Shi'i *marja al-taqlid*, and Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, the most revered *marja* for Lebanese Shi'i (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 151; Chehabi & Mneimneh, 2006: 38-39)[160].

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[156] Chamoun even flirted with the idea of joining the Baghdad Pact, an agreement orchestrated by Great Britain that joined Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan in a defensive alliance to counter the overtures of the Soviet Union.

[157] While British troops landed in Jordan to protect King Husayn, *Operation Blue Bat*, which consisted of 14,000 U.S. soldiers, was deployed for three months in Lebanon.

[158] Born in 1928, Musa al-Sadr was the son of Ayatollah Sadr al-Din al-Sadr (1882-1953), who could trace his lineage back to Musa ibn Ja'far, the Seventh Shi'i Imam (Halawi, 1992: 124). Sayyid Sharaf al-Din was Sadr al-Din al-Sadr's cousin (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 143; Ajami, 1986: 43). Musa al-Sadr studied at Qom, the Tehran Faculty of Law and Political Economy as well as Najaf (Norton, 1987: 39). Notable family members include Ismael al-Sadr, who led the revolt against the Iranian Shah (1891-1892), Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr, who became Prime Minister of Iraq in the 1940s, and Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, arguably the most influential Shi'i cleric of the 20th Century (Gharbieh, 1996: 141).

[159] In 1961, Musa al-Sadr warned that 'if the call to religion is not accompanied by action…the call will have little impact' (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 152).

[160] The reasons for his reluctance include the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 and the opposition to his appointment voiced by Shaykh Mugniyeh and Jafar Sharaf al-Din (Gharbieh, 1996: 143-152). However, the 1958 Free Officer Revolution in Iraq, the Shah's censorship of religious activity in Iran and his financial situation following the death of his father acted as incentives to move to Lebanon (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 144-151).

As al-Sadr arrived in Tyre, Lebanon was under the influence of 'Shihabism', a term coined by George Naqqash to describe the interventionist etatism of Fuad Shihab, who had assumed the presidency after the 1958 Crisis (Harris, 2012: 214)[161]. Based on the slogan of *la ghalib wa la maghlub* ('neither dominant nor dominated'), the former Commander of the Armed Forces established the Social Development Agency to address mobility and inequality, implemented a 'Green Plan' to cultivate land and a National Social Security Fund to fuel social projects and economic growth (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 31; Traboulsi, 2007: 140-141; Picard, 1993: 6)[162]. Furthermore, the Public Service Council was responsible for practising meritocracy in recruitment and ensuring a 50:50 split between Christians and Muslims. Under 'Shihabism', the number of state employees doubled and school attendance quadrupled with Muslims accounting for 53% of university students (Traboulsi, 2007: 140; Picard, 1993: 6; Hanf, 1993: 95-105). However, compared to their urbanised Sunni counterparts, the Shi'i were disadvantaged by their underdeveloped educational infrastructure and access (Shanahan, 2005: 73). Additionally, despite receiving 19.2% of parliamentary seats, the Shi'i remained underrepresented in the state system (Halawi, 1992: 98). Between 1946 and 1962, and juxtaposed alongside Maronites (40%) and Sunnis (28%), the Shi'i possessed fewer than 4% of administrative posts (Gharbieh, 1996: 105-106).

While 'Shihabism' recorded a modicum of success in increasing employment opportunities, enhancing living standards and bureaucratising Lebanon away from traditional patronage, the reforms failed to rectify the structural deficiencies of the Lebanese system[163]. Vindicating the predominant economic model of mercantile capitalism, the capital, prospering from the closures of Haifa and Suez, was booming as a result of re-routed trade from oil producing states, remittances from abroad and tertiary sector expansion that comprised 72% of GDP by 1970 (Gharbieh, 1996: 156)[164]. This exponential rise came at the expense of agricultural production, an industry that employed 90% of the labour force in the largely Shi'i areas of South Lebanon and the Biqa', which plummeted to represent only 9% of GDP by 1974

[161] 'Shihabism' represented the combination of 'social intervention, mild etatism, and security service influences within a civilian regime' (Harris, 2012: 214).
[162] A number of state tributaries were formed to ensure the effectiveness of these initiatives, including the *Institut de Recherche et de Formation en vue de Developpement* (IRFED) for planning and data gathering, a Central Bank for monetary policy and regulation, the Central Office of Statistics, the Office of Social Development, the Board for Large Scale Projects and the Litani River Authority (Harris, 2012: 215).
[163] According to a Quality of Life Index measuring basic living standards from 1960 to 1970, the situation of the Shi'i markedly improved with an increase of 36% in the Biqa' and 44% in South Lebanon (Hanf, 1993: 95-105).
[164] 30% of the world's private gold transactions went through Beirut (Picard, 1996: 46). In 1959, government statistics calculated that Lebanon's population was almost matched by the number of 1,143,040 Lebanese emigrants (1,143,040 in North America [35%], South America [45%] and Africa [11%]). Traboulsi (2007: 159) adds that émigré remittances increased from 5.38% in 1951 to 30% of GDP in 1974.

(Halawi, 1992: 49-52). The privatisation of *homo capitalisticus* had encroached upon the primary sector to the extent that Lebanon became a net importer of agricultural produce despite its abundance of tobacco and sugar beet (Halawi, 1992: 53)[165]. This 'agro-capitalism' ensured that the traditional tenant system was exploited and paralysed by a monopoly of commercial elites privileging imports over investment (Picard, 1993: 7; Traboulsi, 2007: 158-159)[166].

By 1970, the agricultural industry had lost 100,000 active members (Traboulsi, 2007: 159). Confronted with economic destitution and unable to rely on the patronage of the *zu'ama*, farmers relocated from the rural periphery to the urban core with almost 50% of the Shi'i community migrating to the *hizam al-bu'us* ('belt of misery') encircling downtown Beirut to comprise 29% of a population that had bloated from 80,000 in 1921 to 850,000 by 1977 (Picard, 1993: 7; Gharbieh, 1996: 162; Harris, 2012: 187)[167]. While Muslims remained outperformed in the tertiary sector, the unskilled Shi'i accounted for 80-90% of factory workers in the southern suburbs and 50-60% in the eastern suburbs (Halawi, 1992: 70)[168].

For the Shi'i, these socio-economic conditions elicited a more profound effect on the *SMF* than the *PF*. Conventionally, the organising principle of *orthodox* Shi'i practice, predicated on the patron-client relationship, was presided over by a *za'im* at the apex of a stratified hierarchy who exercised authority on account of his intersubjectively recognised symbolic *capital*, which was channelled through his cultural (genealogical lineage), social (kinship networks) and economic (land ownership) *capital*. This system of domination in feudal society represented a form of symbolic *power* in that the discourses and practices imposed by the *zu'ama* and their *qabaday* enforcers were acknowledged, accepted and applied as a legitimate ordering mechanism in the inscribed dispositions of their dominated subjects[169]. However, the economic *hysteresis* from capitalist practice precipitated the urbanisation of the Shi'i to the southern suburbs of Beirut (*al-dahiyeh*) and the subsequent rupture of the symbolic *capital* possessed by the *zu'ama* through the mutually constituted, patron-client

[165] Agricultural exports decreased from 44.5% in 1965 to 24.6% in 1971 (Halawi, 1992: 53).
[166] In this system, producers were completely beholden to elites and banks for equipment and distribution (Traboulsi, 2007: 158). For example, the *Regie Co-Interessee des Tabacs de L'Empire Ottoman* employed 72% of the peasantry by the mid-1970s (Halawi, 1992: 57-58). Following a decision by economic elites to import tobacco, production drastically decreased from 1967 until 1972 (Gharbieh, 1996: 158). The cultivation of sugar beet in the Biqa' represents another example of this shift in prioritising imported goods (Traboulsi, 2007: 158).
[167] By 1970, 29% of the South and 16.9% of the Biqa' had migrated to Beirut, numbers that increased to a combined 65% following Israeli raids into Lebanon in 1975 (Gharbieh, 1996: 159-161; Norton, 1987: 23). The 'belt of misery' stretched from Karantina to Rami al-Ali and Laylaki in the West to Judayeh, Sin al-Fil, Mudawar, Burj Hammoud, Naba and Dikwaneh in the east and bordering Nahr Beirut, Ghubayri, Ayn al-Rummaneh, Shiyah, Haret Hreik, Burj al-Barajineh and Murayjeh all the way to the airport.
[168] In the 1960s, only 1 in 6 prominent businessmen were Muslim (Johnson, 2001: 191). In 1973, the Christian/Muslim ratio in the tertiary sector was 75.5:24.5 (commercial); 71:29 (Banking); and 67.5:32.4 (Industry) (Traboulsi, 2007: 162).
[169] A *qabaday* was a 'man of the people, a helper of the weak and poor, a protector of the quarter or neighbourhood and a communal and confessional champion' (Johnson, 2001: 48, 54; Lloyd-Peters, 1972: 197).

dialectic. The Shi'i *habitus*, compelled to adjust perceptions of practice due to the prevailing context, sought to realign their dispositions and enhance their opportunities for *capital* acquisition. While the constitution and logic of the *SMF* remained structured with the interest of coalescing and cooperating within a confessional grouping, *al-dahiyeh* provided alternative manifestations and modalities than the village for mobilisational practice.

The southern Beirut district of Shiyyah offers a microcosm of these shifting trends. In 1925, Shiyyah grew from a suburb of 575 households into two suburbs – Shiyyah (predominantly Maronite) and Ghubayri (mostly Shi'i) – of 4,587 by 1969 (Khuri, 1975: 21)[170]. During this transition, the village logic of family allegiances, which were initially important in facilitating an introductory connection to the suburbs, was incrementally superseded by the urbanised logic of sectarian allegiances in the city (Khuri, 1972: 198). The amalgamation of structured familial networks from diverse geographical origins into a structuring suburban landscape of loosely defined spaces required a collective mechanism of social integration that exceeded the realms of *zu'ama* authority. Consequently, rather than the family, sectarian identity provided the material, moral, emotional and occupational assistance in acclimatising to urban life (Johnson, 2001: 156). As epitomised by El-Hajj Khansa, not only did the Shi'i leader deploy sectarian frames to lobby the municipal council for more Shi'i representation (1952) and autonomy (1956) in Ghubayri, but he also inaugurated public Ashoura celebrations that shaped and reinforced a collective Shi'i sense of solidarity (Khuri, 1975: 181-186)[171].

Comparatively, the *PF* remained largely immune from compositional changes in the *SMF*. At its core, the institutionalised culture of Lebanon's *PF* entrenches the characteristics of consociation, 'an alliance of moderate communal leaders who in the interests of stability, accepted within the association of the consocies the relative dominance of one of the communities' (Johnson, 2001: 37)[172]. Testifying to the reproductive preservation of this system, traditional patterns were periodically transferred within modern socio-economic structures (Firro, 2003: 98). Unlike European states, where the bourgeoisie proponents of capitalism were challenged by

[170] Around 75% of the Shiyyah population were migrants, 97% of which were from rural villages (Khuri, 1975: 21). During the *mutasarrifiya*, the Maronite to Shi'i ratio was 5:2. After the First World War, the Maronites left Shiyyah while the Shi'i preferred to settle in the village of Ghubayri (Khuri, 1975: 21-30).

[171] The Khansa family were originally from Ba'albeck. In 1952, following the influx of 22,000 migrants into the area, the two sects agreed to rearrange the municipality whereby the Maronites would receive 5 seats and the presidency while the Shi'i got 6 seats. In 1956, the two areas split into separate municipalities. The increasing identification with sectarian framing not only applied to the Shi'i, but also extended to the Maronites of Shiyyah who began to relate to the Phalange Party, which propagated a Maronite vision of Lebanese nationalism (Khuri, 1972: 202-206; 1975: 207-210, 231).

[172] For further explanations of consociation, refer to Hudson (1976), Dekmejian (1978), Lijphart (1977) and Khoury (1976).

a unified proletariat opposing industrial structures that determined the means of production, the prevalence of clientalism and confessionalism rendered Lebanese elites relatively unscathed (Halawi, 1992: 72). Since elite distribution of power within the confessional system (*al-iqta'at al-siyasiyya*) inhibited the mobilisation of the masses into a cohesive political force, Mahdi 'Amil argued that capitalism complements, rather than contradicts confessionalism (Firro, 2003: 64)[173]. This dynamic of dominance, expressed in confessional terms, is managed and manipulated as a collective dispositional practice of sectarian elites in order to sustain the logic of the *PF*. Therefore, considering the homology between the *PF* and *SMF*, discontentment with economic inequality and social dislocation was directed via the mutually constituted organising principles and frames of sectarianism as opposed to class (Khuri, 1975: 234). Consequently, suburban modes of collective action in the *SMF* cut across social classes and recruited primarily on the basis of sect (Khuri, 1975: 202, 231).

As a result of this homology, localised political practice in the suburbs reflected its national counterpart. The migration of the Shi'i to Beirut may have directly loosened the grip of the *zu'ama* but through the institutionalised logic of *hizbiyyah* (political support), either in the form of *taba'iyyah* (between leaders and followers) or *tahaluf* (alliances) amongst confessional actors in the *PF*, Shi'i elites were able to transfer, reinstate and reinforce their capital via local leaders to influence the methods by which social mobilisation was transformed into political action (Khuri, 1975: 195). In particular, the electoral law enabled Shi'i elites to further control political participation by stipulating that citizens register and vote in their original constituencies (Norton, 1987: 32). As the *doxa* of the *PF* and *SMF* was structured on the recognised *lingua franca* of confessionalism, legitimate *orthodox* practice reproduced traditional patron-client dynamics. Paradoxically, while the Shi'i elites represented the dominated branch of the dominant *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, they directed the dominant *orthodoxy* of practice amongst the dominated Shi'i in the *SMF*.

The prevalence of this system, which had witnessed 250 families occupy 965 seats in the Council of Deputies from 1920 until 1975 and produced only four Shi'i Speakers in the 40 years following the National Pact, severely stunted and accentuated socio-economic conditions with 20% of Lebanon's workforce

[173] Mahdi 'Amil, or Hasan Hamdan, was a prominent Lebanese Marxist extensively on the confessional nature of the political system (Frangie, 2012: 465-482).

unemployed in the early 1970s (Picard, 1996: 54; Halawi, 1992: 71)[174]. The Shi'i were disproportionately affected with the annual revenue per capita in Beirut standing at $803 compared to $151 in the South, the average family income for the Shi'i $2,000 below the national standard and 50% of Shi'i not receiving any education (Traboulsi, 2007: 161; Norton, 1987: 17)[175]. The combination of socio-economic marginalisation, exponential urbanisation and political exclusion not only amplified Shi'i dissatisfaction, but also unified Shi'i grievances against a closed system of inactivity that was 'deaf to their demands' (Norton, 1987: 32; Halawi, 1992: 73).

Bereft of political representation, many Shi'i vented and channelled their frustrations through other emerging parties. Karim Pakradouni observed that Shi'i only perceived themselves as the 'proletariat of Lebanon' once they were exposed to their wealthier compatriots in Beirut (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 286). Emphasising this identification, a survey conducted at the American University of Beirut, Université Saint Joseph and Lebanese University discovered that 61% of Shi'i affiliated with the 'Left', 68% preferred revolution over reform, 67% wanted to abolish private property and 90% supported the embryonic Palestinian resistance against Israel (Barakat, 1977). Due to the espousal of a supra-national pursuit of collective justice and identity for dominated elements of society, the political ideals of communism and socialism resonated saliently amongst the Shi'i with the term 'Shi'i shuyu'i' ('Shi'i communist') becoming a popular invocation (Halawi, 1992: 106; Shanahan, 2005: 103)[176]. Consequently, the Shi'i became the demographic nucleus of the Lebanese left, comprising almost 50% of the Lebanese Communist Party (Halawi, 1992: 106) as well as contributing considerable members to the Organisation of Communist Action in Lebanon (OCAL), the Progressive Socialist Party, the pro-Syrian Ba'ath Party and the Socialist Arab Action Party[177]. Therefore, by the end of the 1960s, the Shi'i were geographically divided, socio-economically deprived and politically dispersed, burdened with a 'negative communitarian identification' in the absence of an 'indigenous ideology they could embrace or formulate' (Chalabi, 2006: 114, 108).

Cognisant of these objective realities, Musa al-Sadr embarked upon a series of initiatives to address the core deficiencies and divisions within the Shi'i community

[174] Aside from Greek Orthodox Habib Abu Shahla (1946-1947), only Ahmad As'ad, Kamil As'ad, Sabri Hamadeh and Adil Usayran held the Shi'i-reserved post of Speaker (Halawi, 1992: 84; Shanahan, 2005: 65).
[175] In terms of medical doctors, only 5.5% were stationed in the south, 3% in the Biqa' and 65% in Beirut (Traboulsi, 2007: 161). The south and Biqa' only contained 28.6% of state schools and 14% of private schools (Barakat, 1977; Halawi, 1992: 108-109).
[176] Not all Shi'i joined leftist groups. Although few in number and rarely occupying high positions, Shi'i figures were present in the predominantly Christian Phalange Party, the National Liberal Party and the Syrian National Socialist Party (Shanahan, 2005: 92-95).
[177] For example, the LCP's deputy Secretary General Sa'dlallah Mazra'ani was a Shi'i, around 20% of the Progressive Socialist Party was Shi'i, the Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party in Lebanon in 1967 was a Shi'i named Assim Qansu and the Secretary General of the Socialist Arab Action Party in 1972, Hashim Ali Muhsin, as well as the majority of the group, which was a branch of George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was Shi'i (Shanahan, 2005: 100-105).

for the purpose of transforming social grievances into opportunities for organising cohesive mobilisation. In order to challenge Shi'i perceptions and dispositions in the *SMF*, Musa al-Sadr had to observe the structured rules of *orthodox* practice and acquire the recognised *capital* with which to instil a Shi'i *collusio*. Initially, by virtue of his religious learning, al-Sadr was able to horizontally transfer his cultural *capital* from Qom and Najaf to Jabal 'Amil. However, politically passive and symbolically eclipsed by Shi'i elites, the fragmented *ulama* focused on providing public services. By acknowledging 'the political potential of social services as a means of outflanking the traditional elite' and framing revised narratives, al-Sadr established the Social Institute for Orphans and the Destitute, the Bayt al-Fatat ('Girls' home'), the Institute of Islamic Studies and accepted a teaching post at Amiliyya in Beirut (Gharbieh, 1996: 166; Halawi, 1992: 136).

In order to secure the economic *capital* to cover these ventures, al-Sadr cultivated his social *capital* in two areas. Firstly, al-Sadr's arrival in Lebanon coincided with the formation of SAVAK, the Organisation of Intelligence and National Security, in Iran with the Shah tasking Major Mojtaba Pasha'i, the chief of SAVAK's Middle East branch, to ensure that Lebanon identified more with Iran rather than fall under the influence of Nasser's Arab Nationalist overtures (Samii, 2006: 168-169). Although al-Sadr did not directly ask his domicile country for funds, he benefited indirectly from their existing commitments to the Shi'i community, and through his meetings with Major Pasha'i and General Teimur Bakhtiar, the head of SAVAK, al-Sadr gained access to elites within the *PF*[178]. Subsequently, Iran's meddling in Lebanon perhaps pressured Shihab reforms to reach the Shi'i community while also persuading the president to grant al-Sadr Lebanese nationality in 1963 (Samii, 2006: 169). Secondly, al-Sadr also endeavoured to expand his network beyond the *ulama* to encompass both Shi'i and non-Shi'i circles. While nurturing ties with the Committee of Social Struggle, a Shi'i forum specialising on working professionals and youths, as well as appealing to the emerging middle class of Shi'i expatriates, mostly based in West Africa, al-Sadr also joined *haraka ijtima'iyya* ('Social Movement') with Greek Orthodox Archbishop Gregoire Haddad, an inter-confessional group that focused on improving socio-economic development on the peripheries of the country (Gharbieh, 1996: 174; Halawi, 1992: 137-139; Ajami, 1986: 97-99)[179].

[178] Before al-Sadr, the Shah funnelled money to Lebanon via Ayatollah Mohammad Husayn Borujerdi and the Pahlavi Foundation with 80% reserved for Shi'i schools and the rest forwarded to the *ulama* via SAVAK (Samii, 2006: 169). SAVAK meetings fuelled rumours that al-Sadr was an Iranian spy. Shaykh Mugniyeh wrote that al-Sadr was *al-Jasus al-Mu'ammam*, or 'the spy with the turban' (Gharbieh, 1996: 151).

[179] The Shi'i who emigrated to West Africa in the early 20th Century mainly settled in Nigeria, Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone. Nabi Berri, the leader of Amal, was raised in Sierra Leone (Ajami, 1986: 97-99).

Nevertheless, 'for wealth to play its part, it had to be converted into political and social power' (Ajami, 1986: 99). Compounding this equation, the Shi'i were not only divided in the *PF* and the *SMF*, but they also possessed dispositions that envisaged Shi'ism as a cultural identity rather than a conduit for political mobilisation. Conforming to conventional Lebanese practice, al-Sadr addressed this impasse by establishing an institution exclusively reserved for the Shi'i and legitimised by the state. Consequently, despite reservations from Shi'i elites, the Lebanese Parliament passed law 72/67 creating the Higher Islamic Shi'i Council (HISC) in May 1967 before the vote was ratified into statute by the government in December (Traboulsi, 2007: 178)[180]. Although the Shi'i were the last of Lebanon's confessions to institute a religious council, the HISC was responsible for issuing fatwas, organising community affairs, cooperating with its Lebanese counterparts, fighting underdevelopment and injustice and supporting the Palestinian Resistance (Traboulsi, 2007: 178; Halawi, 1992: 142)[181]. On 23 May 1969, Al-Sadr was elected President of the Beirut-based HISC, a body consisting of a 43-member executive board reflecting the diversity of the Shi'i community (Ajami, 1986: 114-119)[182].

Despite these developments, 1970 represented a crucial test for al-Sadr in organising the Shi'i community. Firstly, following the death of Shi'i *marja al-taqlid*, Sayyid Muhsin al-Hakim, al-Sadr angered the Iranian *ulama* by endorsing his Najaf mentor, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, over Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's model of *wilayat al-faqih* (Chehabi, 2006: 191). Secondly, after al-Sadr refused to submit intelligence on Lebanese opposition groups to the new Ambassador to Lebanon, Major-General Mansur Qader, Iran revoked his passport and restricted its funding to the Shi'i leaving the community to rely on the *al-Majlis al-Janub* ('the Council of the South'), a government programme dealing with development (Samii, 2006: 175-176; Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 157; Gharbieh, 1996: 199). Thirdly, having been expelled from Jordan after Black September, the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) resettled in Lebanon where an estimated 240,000 Palestinians lived amongst Shi'i communities in the South (Picard, 1996: 81).

[180] Although Shi'i elites felt threatened by the HISC, only one of 20 Shi'i deputies rejected its formation in parliament (Gharbieh, 1996: 184; Norton, 1987: 44).
[181] The Sunnis established The Supreme Official Islamic Council on 13 January 1955 with the Doctrinal Council of the Druze Community founded on 13 July 1962 (Halawi, 1992: 141).
[182] Less than half of the Religious Directorate attended and voted for al-Sadr, whose term was extended in March 1975 until his 65th birthday in 1993 (Halawi, 1992: 142). The Council comprised of 19MPs, 12 clerics and 12 laymen and was located in a Christian suburb of Beirut whereby 'Shia money was buying into the real estate of the city, even though that money was still without commensurate political power of self-esteem' (Ajami, 1986: 114-118).

Under the model of neo-Phoenician free market capitalism, the *Military-Security Field* (*MSF*) was widely perceived as irrelevant and superfluous to Lebanon's priorities[183]. After the Syrian National Socialist Party attempted to stage a coup on New Year's Eve in 1961, President Shihab sought to transform the *MSF* by boosting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to 15,000 and restructuring its security apparatus around the Deuxieme Bureau, an intrusive intelligence network charged with collecting information and co-opting Lebanese officials (Traboulsi, 2007: 139; Harris, 2012: 216)[184]. Following the defeat of Arab forces against Israel in 1967, Palestinian *fedayeen* fighters began launching raids into Israel from Lebanon. In retaliation, Israel bombarded South Lebanon from 1968, sporadic assaults that caused further destruction to a depleted community and brought the Palestinians into direct confrontation with the LAF (Traboulsi, 2007: 153). Consequently, LAF General Emile Bustani and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat signed the Cairo Accords in November 1969, an agreement that paradoxically permitted the Palestinians to wage Resistance from South Lebanon while respecting the territorial authority of the Lebanese authorities[185]. The insertion of Palestinian *fedayeen* and the militarisation of the South became a contentious issue not only for the Shi'i, but also the Maronites by contributing to the disruption of dynamics in the delicate *MSF*.

Although al-Sadr sympathised with the Palestinian cause, the Shi'i leader was concerned by the detrimental socio-economic implications of the PLO on his efforts to mobilise the Shi'i community into a cohesive *OF*. Exemplified by the Israeli strike on Arqoub in mid-May 1970 as well as Israeli retribution on South Lebanon after the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972, bellicose Israeli responses to PLO activities were resulting in severe civilian and infrastructure damages that disproportionately impacted the Shi'i community (Halawi, 1992: 151). Reluctant to criticise the PLO, and with the Council of the South comprising only 2.6% of the government's annual expenditure, al-Sadr initiated a public offensive in 1973 calling for mass rallies, sit-ins and civil disobedience (Gharbieh, 1996: 205). While al-Sadr promoted collective action in the *SMF*, Syria's endorsement of the PLO undermined Lebanon's *PF* and the disintegrating legitimacy of the LAF in the *MSF*, a crumbling of *capital* that threatened to induct Maronite militias, such as the *Kataeb* (Phalange) and the

[183] After the National Pact, approximately 60% of the 3,300-strong armed forces were Christians (Harris, 2012: 200). By 1970, the poorly equipped Lebanese Army was 62% Muslim and predominantly led by Maronites and Druze (Picard, 1996: 84). Believing that an Army would either provoke Israel or encourage a coup d'état, the Christians preferred not to unnecessarily invest in one (Traboulsi, 2007: 175).

[184] Under Shihab's reforms, the position of Public Security Director was held by a Sunni, the military room at the presidential palace handled Muslim leaders while the chief of staff managed Druze matters and military intelligence. Gabby Lahoud became head of the army's Deuxieme Bureau and the Commander of the Unified Security Agency (Harris, 2012: 216; Traboulsi, 2007: 144).

[185] The Lebanese were obligated to respect the right of Palestinians to resist Israel while continuing to exercise full civilian and military rights over Lebanon. Palestinian refugee camps were placed under PLO control with fedayeen granted freedom of movement throughout Lebanon (Picard, 1996: 81).

National Liberation Party, into the *MSF* to curtail the PLO[186]. In July 1973, the LAF, alongside Maronite militias, confronted the PLO at Tal al-Za'atar, an encounter that paralysed the *PF* by debilitating the ability of Lebanese elites to administer order through conventional channels (Traboulsi, 2007: 182).

As an impending *hysteresis* risked engulfing the *PF* and *MSF*, al-Sadr radicalised his rhetoric in the *SMF* and announced the formation of *al-Harakat al-Mahrumin* ('the Movement of the Deprived') in March 1974, a unified *OF* representing the mobilisation of a collective Shi'i consciousness through the construction and dissemination of a revolutionary frame of reform. Al-Sadr's rhetoric swiftly reverberated in a ruptured *PF* as his candidate, Rafiq Shahin, defeated the traditionally influential As'ads to win the elections in Nabatiyeh (Norton, 1987: 46; Gharbieh, 1996: 228). Despite speeches infused with Shi'i references, delivered at Shi'i locations and coinciding with Shi'i festivals, al-Sadr combined concepts of secularism and sectarianism[187]. Rather than confessionally determined and in contradistinction to the predominant *orthodox* practice of the *SMF*, al-Sadr propagated a Lebanese movement rejecting feudalism and embracing those 'who feel deprived…as well as those who feel responsibility toward the disinherited' (Halawi, 1992: 155). Testament to his cross-confessional appeal and the growth of his social *capital*, al-Sadr managed to attract endorsements from notable Christian and Sunni figures[188].

While al-Sadr gathered traction in the *SMF*, tensions escalated in the *MSF*. In February 1975, Nasserite leader Mar'uf Sa'ad was killed in an LAF attempt to suppress a demonstration in Sidon. Moreover, immediately after the shooting of a Christian congregation in the Beirut suburb of Ayn Rumayna on 13 April, Phalange militiamen killed 27 Palestinians on a bus heading to Tal al-Za'atar. Intending to resort to non-violent and inclusive mobilisational methods in the *SMF* as a way of address the intensification of violence towards civil war in the *MSF*, al-Sadr staged a fast stating 'I will not wield a sword. Our weapons are the words of God' (*Al-Anwar*,

[186] After Operation Spring of Youth on 9/10 April 1973, a clandestine Israeli mission that killed three prominent Palestinian figures in Beirut, the PLO called for LAF Chief Iskander Ghanim to be sacked. When President Franjiyeh refused, Syria imposed an economic boycott on Lebanon and funnelled supplementary Palestinian fighters into the country. As the LAF failed to sufficiently surround Palestinian camps in Beirut, President Franjiyeh admitted that the LAF had lost its legitimacy and urged Maronite militia leaders to boost their own resources (Picard, 1996: 87; Harris, 2012: 225).

[187] Al-Sadr employed Shi'i rhetoric by proclaiming that Karbala 'is a deposit placed in our hands so that…we draw out of it a new source of reform, a new position, a new movement, a new revolution, to repel the darkness, to stop tyranny and to pulverize evil' (*al-Hayat*, February 1, 1974). Conversely, Al-Sadr also downplayed sectarian overtones by declaring that 'I shall fight until there remains not one of you oppressed, whether Shi'ite or not, and until every inch of lands is fully exploited' (*al-Nahar*, 18 March, 1974).

[188] Not only did al-Sadr secure the support of 190 intellectuals from a variety of religious communities in November 1974, but he also received endorsements from Patriarch Khuraysh and other prominent Christian figures. Furthermore, Sunni clerics, the Islamic Association and six other Sunni organisations also sponsored al-Sadr (Ajami, 1986: 134; Gharbieh, 1996: 208-211; Halawi, 1992: 155).

28 June, 1975). Regardless, the Shi'i leader could not defuse chronic division in the *SMF* or an eruption of hostilities in the *MSF* by adopting tactics that had limited resonance to the predominant modes of institutionalised sectarianism entrenched within Lebanon's *fields* of practice. On the contrary, al-Sadr's movement was conceived and cultivated within the precise structures it claimed to change. By extension, *al-Harakat al-Mahrumin* was subjected to and regulated by the rules of organisation that enshrined Lebanese mobilisation. In this way, al-Sadr's actions reflected 'the revolt of a confession, not a confessional revolt' (Ghassan Tueni in *Al-Nahar*, 18 March, 1974). Therefore, devoid of extensive forms of legitimate *capital* with which to challenge the predominant *orthodoxy* of mobilisation in Lebanon, al-Sadr was compelled to adapt to the logic of prevailing practice. Subsequently, 'in a society at war, he had to play by new rules' (Ajami, 1986: 169).

After a bomb struck Ayn Bunaya in the Biqa' on 6 July 1975, al-Sadr succumbed to revised *orthodoxy* of practice in Lebanon. Transferring *capital* from the *SMF* to the *MSF*, al-Sadr announced the formation and induction of *Afwaj al-Moqawama al-Lubnaniyya* ('The Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance'), or Amal, the official armed wing of the *al-Harakat al-Mahrumin*. Initially, Amal aligned with the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), a pro-Palestinian alliance of mostly leftist militias that advocated for the abolition of sectarian quotas (Traboulsi, 2007: 189)[189]. However, sensing an opportunity in the shifting dynamics of dominance in Lebanon, al-Sadr defected from the LNM and repositioned his *capital* with the Syrian intervention under the legitimacy of the Arab Deterrence Force in May 1976, a deployment that prevented the PLO and its allies from defeating the Christian militias[190]. Equipped with an evolving disposition that interpreted the PLO as a *heterodox* inhibitor as opposed to an *orthodox* enabler in the inculcation of a collective Shi'i *habitus*, al-Sadr revealed that 'Palestinian resistance is not a revolution…it is a military machine that terrorizes the Arab world…The PLO is an element of disorder in the south. The Shia have finally gotten over their inferiority complex vis-à-vis the Palestinian Organisation' (Ajami, 1986: 178).

Conclusion

The inception of Hizbullah did not occur in a vacuum but was dependent upon extant discourses and practices within the Shi'i community in Lebanon. The tendency of

[189] The LNM consisted of 12,000 fighters from 15 groups; the PLO possessed 30,000 fighters; and the right-leaning Christian Lebanese Front contained 12,000 fighters (Picard, 1996: 101-103; Harris, 2012: 237).
[190] The Sunnis militias, the Ba'ath Party and the SSNP also deserted the LNM (Harris, 2012: 239).

academics to conceive Shi'ism through the prism of its radical permutation in the second half of the 20th Century omits 'multiple forms of political engagement, social interconnection, and diverse expressions of cultural identity within the Shi'i milieu' (Weiss, 2010: 223). The purpose of this chapter has been to examine the trajectory of Shi'i mobilisation in the history of Lebanon as a way of introducing its most modern manifestation. A combined Bourdieu-SMT lens identifies three underlying themes that assist in explaining the disposition and position of the Shi'i community before the advent of Hizbullah in Lebanon.

Firstly, rather than reductively invoke the innate or linear exceptionalism of Shi'i mobilisation, it is imperative to interpret the perception, position and practice of Shi'i collective action as inextricably linked to Lebanon's structured environment through a dynamically dialectical process of mutual constitution. Consequently, Shi'i practice is 'no more inscrutable or exotic than the politics of any other Lebanese community' (Norton, 1987: 13). Although indications of discrimination against the Shi'i are evident during the Ottoman era, the sub-*field* system was instrumentally structured to prioritise administrative stability over religious ideology. Therefore, the cause of the Shi'i decline towards the end of the 18th Century was less about confessionalism and more to do with elite deviation from the recognised *orthodoxy* of practice imposed by Istanbul. As the convergence of exogenous and endogenous forces institutionalised the logic and contours of Lebanon's *PF* around the *doxa* (law) of sectarianism, the Shi'i were not estranged from its composition, extraneous to its interpretation or immune to its influence. While lacking the extensive *capital* or unified frames of their confessional counterparts, the Shi'i remained exposed and subjected to the rules, interests and opportunities embedded within the structured system, albeit from a *heterodox* position.

The establishment of *Le Grand Liban* under the French mandate further entrenched the constitution of the *PF* to elevate a prevailing *orthodoxy* of Lebanese nationalism. While the Shi'i were geographically, socially and ideologically located on the peripheries of this arrangement, the core of the system inherently contained access opportunities for the Shi'i to pursue avenues of *capital* acquisition and political participation via the *SMF*. Additionally, the tactics and modalities employed by Musa al-Sadr demonstrated that episodes of collective action within the Shi'i community continued to be identified and determined by dispositions that acknowledged their implicit, yet marginalised, inclusion within the Lebanese system rather than their distinctively explicit exclusion. In this respect, Shi'i mobilisation before 1979 was

directed by its *heterodox* position within the relational structures of Lebanon, not by its *heterodox* practice.

Secondly, a defining characteristic not only in the Shi'i community, but also in Lebanon as a whole, was the role of confessional elites in managing structured practice within the areas under their authority. According to Salibi (1988: 145), the Shi'i 'never developed the social and political coherence of the Maronites or the Druzes'. Contrary to their perennial and intentional victimisation, Shi'i elites were systematic in exploiting and exercising their privileged position within a community-based system. Whereas rivalries amongst fellow elites operated under the parameters of propagating confessional interests, the competition between Shi'i notables over symbolic *capital* within their communities inhibited the evolution of a holistic mobilisational narrative.

In the Ottoman era, the Sultan enabled landowning elites to benefit from a localised patronage system provided they fulfilled their prerequisite duties within the governing *iltizam* model. This structuring *orthodoxy* for inter-elite practice, in which stakeholders had a vested interest in preserving the arrangement, was organised around shared inter-elite dispositions over distinct confessional solidarity. In the mid-19th Century, while Maronites and Druze reconstituted the link between popular mobilisation (*SMF*) and elite representation (*PF*) for the purpose of confessional action (*OF*), Shi'i elites, who were geo-politically detached from these developments, traversed the chasm between the *SMF* and *PF* by reverting to the traditional logic of patronage. Therefore, instances of Shi'i mobilisation that contemplated alternative discourses and practices were constrained, co-opted or channelled by Shi'i elites.

Under the French mandate, as Maronites, Sunnis and Druze endeavoured to capitalise on the opportunities presented by the Lebanese system in creating organisations that aligned *capital* and harmonised practice between the *PF* and *SMF*, intra-Shi'i competition not only led to division and marginalisation in the *PF*, but also contributed further to the fragmentation of the Shi'i in the *SMF* as rivalries permeated religious, educational and socio-economic affairs. While Musa al-Sadr attempted to erode the monopoly of Shi'i elites over representation by accumulating the legitimate *capital* required in the *SMF* to establish a cohesive *OF*, the institutionalised logic of elite self-preservation represented a considerable obstacle in ingraining dispositions of active participation amongst the Shi'i community.

Thirdly, throughout the history of Lebanon, it is challenging to identify substantive examples of a collective Shi'i *habitus* (*collusio*), a harmonisation of perceptions and dispositions conjoined in identity and practice. Conversely, the Shi'i community exhibited diverse, differentiated and disjointed discourses that inhibited organised mobilisation. In the Ottoman period, while Shi'i notables observed intersubjective understandings of structured elite practice, this was neither solidaristic nor exclusively Shi'i. Consequently, Shi'i tenants coalesced only by virtue of their subordination and inactivity within a prevailing patronage system. As their confessional counterparts strived to consolidate a collective *habitus* between the *mutasarrifiya* and Mandate, prospects for establishing a Shi'i collective *habitus* were precluded by differences amongst and between traditional notables (*zu'ama*), the mercantile elite (*wujaha*), religious leaders (*ulama*) and the working class (*amma*).

Under the French Mandate, while the Shi'i elite continued to utilise their superior values of *capital* to nullify and negate any challenge to their position, the Shi'i *ulama* remained restrained by their disposition to observe traditional quietism, their disagreements over legitimate religious practice and their reliance on patrons. Meanwhile, disproportionately affected by the capitalist policies of Beirut, the Shi'i community was unified in socio-economic position but geographically dispersed, devoid of organisation and bereft of recognised *capital*. Although the advent of urbanisation exposed the Shi'i to a newly structured space of alternative mobilisational discourses and practices, the formulation of a collective *habitus* was impeded by the transposition of patronage systems in urbanised contexts, the reproductive strictures of the electoral process and the existence of leftist and communist parties that resonated with Shi'i grievances but were not explicit demonstrations of Shi'i mobilisation thereby diluting their ability to transfer *capital* from the *SMF* into the logic of sectarianism within the *PF*.

By merging the positions of divergent Shi'i agents and revealing the opportunities of a cohesive *OF* through the customisation of pre-existing mobilisational repertoires and the construction of unifying collective action frames, Musa al-Sadr was instrumental in unlocking and inculcating the basis of a harmonised Shi'i *habitus* (*collusio*) in the *SMF*. While the eruption of *hysteresis* in the *MSF* accelerated Amal's formation, thereby disrupting the consistency of its intended composition, the disappearance of al-Sadr during a visit to Libya's Colonel Qaddafi in 1978 threatened

to reignite extant frictions within the Shi'i community[191]. Therefore, the objective of the next chapter is to explore the emergence of Hizbullah in the context of Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, the return of Shi'i clerics from Iraq, the disappearance of al-Sadr, Israeli intervention in Lebanon, and most saliently, the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic Republic, a development signifying the transformation of Iran from a passive observer to an active stakeholder in Lebanese affairs.

[191] Norton (1987: 53-56), Halawi (1992: 202-208) and Ajami (1986: 183-185) provide possible reasons behind his disappearance.

Chapter Five:

The Creation and Positioning of Hizbullah in Lebanon (1982-1991)

'Every politically significant revolution is anticipated by a transformation of the intellectual landscape'.
- *Tony Judt (2005: 535)*

'Had the enemy [Israel] not taken this step [the invasion of Lebanon in 1982], I do not know whether something called Hizbullah would have been born. I doubt it'.
- *Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, Hizbullah Secretary General (1992-), Al-'Ahd, 21 November, 1997*

'Hizbullah is the people's march; it is a popular state…every believer who fights Israel in the South and who defends the honour of the Muslims…has links with the Islamic Revolution belongs to Hizbullah…We [Islamic Amal] work for Islam and are bound to the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, we are part of Hizbullah'.
- *Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, spokesperson for Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islamiyya, or Islamic Amal (MER, 3 December, 1983).*

'There is no connection between the internal administration of the Iranian state and Hizbullah's administration. These are two separate issues, each having its particularities and bodies of administration despite the commitment of both to the commands and directions of the Jurist Theologian [*wilayat al-faqih*]'.
- *Naim Qassem (2005: 57), Deputy Secretary General of Hizbullah.*

The inception of Hizbullah has divided scholars around the relative importance of endogenous and exogenous factors in motivating the Party of God's initial mobilisation as well as the level of cohesion and coherence attributed to the embryonic movement. The first group, perceiving Hizbullah through the prism of Iran, interprets the Party of God as a hierarchically organised and strategically calculated proxy of the Islamic Republic with limited independence in decision-making. By extension, Hizbullah is synonymous with the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO) and therefore implicated in terrorist operations against Western targets throughout the 1980s[192]. Conversely, the second group argues that these assumptions deny the influence of intrinsically Lebanese factors in the emergence of Hizbullah and endow the nascent movement with a consistent logic belying the complexity of multi-faceted relations during the civil war. Therefore, the 'uniformity and solidarity of Hizbullah, like that of the Shi'i community itself, can be over-estimated and hence its importance magnified out of proportion' (Piscatori, 1989: 314)[193].

[192] Commentators include Deeb (1988), Kramer (1993), Ranstorp (1997), Hamzeh (2004) and Levitt (2013; 2014).
[193] Scholars include Piscatori (1989), Norton (2007a), Jaber (1997), Baer (2003) and Azani (2011).

The underlying cause of this polarisation emanates from the arrival of Hizbullah on the periphery of a protracted civil war. Not only is access to primary sources on Hizbullah sparse, but Hizbullah officials also avoid engaging in detailed discussions about the movement's early activities[194]. Devoid of the appropriate information with which to reliably substantiate their perspectives, each side of the spectrum interprets the deficiency of data in dichotomous ways. The first approach applies the methodological practice of 'Hizbullah hindsight', a correlation of causation in which the current reputation of the movement creates a continuous rationale of intentional design, organisation and mobilisation that supersedes historical irregularities. Rather than speculate by promoting a linear narrative, the second approach construes the methodological paucity of discernible facts as an impediment in identifying and designating Hizbullah as an organised or cogent actor in Lebanon.

By incorporating a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation, this chapter aims to contribute to this debate by detecting shifts in Hizbullah's perception of opportunities, its utilisation of mobilisational resources and its deployment of collective action frames for the purpose of illustrating the Party of God's evolution during the 1980s. The Lebanese civil war ushered in a period of intractable *hysteresis*, a condition in which previously constituted laws of position and practice became relationally detached and disconnected from the dispositions of agents. As a consequence of this chaotic conditional context, each invested stakeholder, operating beyond conventional parameters, sought to capitalise on perceived opportunities by strategically adjusting or aligning their *capital* to enhance their prospective position in the restructuring of *fields* in Lebanon. In order to locate and trace the trajectory of Hizbullah within this environment, three inter-related processes will be explored.

Firstly, Hizbullah was 'not an Iranian creation' and it would be a 'capital mistake' to directly correlate Iran's ideology or its financial power with the sudden manifestation of Shi'i revolutionary activism in Lebanon (Abu Khalil, 1991: 391; Chehabi, 2006: 201). On the contrary, the political and socio-economic roots of Shi'i mobilisation had a historical pretext. However, while elements of these radical *habiti* had been inducted into the *illusio* of the *SMF* via Amal, the *orthodox* propensities of the latter failed to resonate with the growing *heterodox* dispositions of the Shi'i community. Therefore, it is necessary to explain how and why the role of Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Israel's Operation Litani into Lebanon, the return of a network of

[194] When questioned about the Party of God's leadership structure, its connections to Iran, its ties with IJO and its tension with Amal as well as leftist groups in the 1980s, the researcher discovered that Hizbullah-affiliated individuals fail to divulge information and prefer to redirect attention to the dysfunctional Lebanese system and the threat posed by Israeli occupation.

Shi'i Lebanese clerics from Iraq, the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr and the Islamic Revolution provided the opportunities, mobilising modalities and collective action frames required to compel the radical *habiti* of the Shi'i community to coalesce into a *heterodox* position of *collusio* in the *SMF*, a state in which collective agents are conjoined in identity, solidarity and purpose.

Secondly, this chapter will analyse the dynamic dialectic of constitution between Shi'i *collusio* in the *SMF* and the construction of Hizbullah's *OF*. Rather than an instantaneous conversion, this association was consolidated over time. While it is indisputable that Ayatollah Khomeini's Revolution in 1979 supplied Hizbullah with its politico-religious framework and Israel's invasion in 1982 legitimised the justification of its implementation in Lebanon, Hizbullah not only had to induct its narrative within the entrenched structures of Lebanon's *SMF*, but it also had to abide by the *orthodoxy* of pre-existing networks and repertoires to expand its base while simultaneously investing in institutions that transformed disparate *heterodox* dispositions into a collective Resistance *habitus*. By sharing significant amounts of social, economic and cultural *capital* with the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hizbullah seized upon the opportunity to transfer corresponding values of *capital* into Lebanon, a development that fostered *field* homology between Iran's *PF* and Lebanon's *SMF*. The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon and the gradual fragmentation of Amal also enabled Hizbullah to assemble its *OF* and cultivate a Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* that promoted an alternative model for Shi'i mobilisation.

Thirdly, this chapter intends to explain the relationship between the IJO and Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. Harb and Leenders (2005: 185) posited that distinguishing between the social and the military activities of Hizbullah fails to acknowledge the interactions between them. By adopting a perspective that examines Hizbullah concurrently in relational *fields* of practice, one can assess the demarcation of boundaries between the IJO and the Islamic Resistance. While compatible in terms of religious identity and revolutionary ideology, they were incongruent with regards to position, practice and purpose. For Hizbullah's *OF*, the Iranian-endorsed priority was to establish an Islamic Resistance that recruited agents from the *SMF* to combat Israel and compete with other militias in the *MSF*. Conversely, for the IJO, which comprised of a loose network of seasoned Shi'i fighters, the objective was to perform the immediate interests of Iran in the *MSF* while the Islamic Resistance was under construction. Therefore, each movement

should be evaluated for the different ways in which they transferred, deployed and augmented *capital* from Iran within their respected *fields* of practice.

Invoking Quentin Skinner's (1969) methodology of history, there are two inherent risks in revisiting the origins of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Primarily, by fixating on the contemporary impact of Iran and Hizbullah, one may inadvertently or intentionally propagate the 'myth of parochialism', a reflective but not reflexive practice that privileges a myopic insight into the exogenous influence of the Islamic Republic at the expense of endogenous dynamics in Lebanon. While the Islamic Revolution, which enshrined the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* and the principle of Resistance against Israel, was pivotal in Hizbullah's inception, it has 'been given too much credit' (Piscatori, 1989: 309). Ayatollah Khomeini was the catalyst for change, not the fundamental cause or expression of Shi'i mobilisation in Lebanon. The Najaf legacy, in which revolutionary activism replaced apolitical quietism as the intellectual norm of clerical practice, should not be reduced to Ayatollah Khomeini's theory of Islamic government (Shanahan, 2005: 169). Furthermore, Hizbullah advocates for the 'Islamic Revolution in Lebanon' were not restricted to emulating Iran, but as agents inscribed with the perceptions and practices of Lebanon's structured parameters, they were responsible for devising methods for an exclusively Lebanese context.

Accompanying this methodological fallacy is the 'myth of prolepsis', a decontextualising act that credits Hizbullah with a level of coherent logic, strategic foresight and cohesive organisation before the manifestation of these characteristics. Walid Jumblatt, the long-serving Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, admitted that Hizbullah barely figured on his radar during the 1980s and inferred that the Islamic Resistance represented a peripheral consideration rather than a primary concern[195]. Reinforcing this claim, surveys of Lebanese press outlets during the civil war from both ends of the political spectrum, such as *Al-Nahar* and *Al-Safir*, demonstrate incremental but not incessant attention to Hizbullah as a formalised actor in Lebanon. By omitting a relational perspective that contextualises Hizbullah both in conjunction with its *field* counterparts, as well as in accordance to the structures of those *fields*, the movement's practices are prone to embellishment.

[195] Interview with Walid Jumblatt, Beirut, 3 July 2012.

5.1 From Radical *habiti* into *collusio*

Sayyid Fadlallah, a prominent Shi'i *mujtahid* in Beirut, referred to the Iranian Revolution as 'the earthquake' that shook the foundations of Lebanon (Sankari, 2005: 173)[196]. However, since the Revolution required receptive actors for enacting corresponding perceptions of opportunities, mobilising modalities and action frames in Lebanon, over-stating the earthquake devalues the tremours within the Shi'i community that preceded and contributed to the scale of the resulting rupture. Consequently, Sayyid Fadlallah was instrumental in cultivating radical *habiti* of *heterodox* agents in the *SMF* with Husayn Moussawi, the founder of Islamic Amal, crediting the Shi'i cleric for 'the socialization and education of this generation' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 302). Exemplifying this important role, 'Then Came the Earthquake' appeared in the June-July 1980 issue of *al-Muntalaq* ('The Source'), a journal associated with *al-Ittihad al-Lubnani lil Talabah al-Muslimeen* ('the Lebanese Federation of Muslim Students'), an organisation Sayyid Fadlallah helped establish at the Arab University of Beirut in 1966 (Sankari, 2005: 134, 173).

On the surface, Sayyid Fadlallah replicated the course of Musa al-Sadr. Both clerics acquired cultural *capital* by tracing their educational lineage to Najaf in Iraq, the epicentre of Shi'i religious learning, where they studied under Muhsin al-Hakim and Abu Qasim al-Khui. Moreover, while exposed to the lectures of Ayatollah Khomeini in Najaf, both expressed reservations concerning the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* and preferred to endorse the Shi'i activism espoused by Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr[197]. Both also derived social *capital* in Lebanon from respected familial heritage[198]. Whereas al-Sadr was invited to Tyre by Sayyid Sharaf al-Din, Sayyid Fadlallah owed his position at Masjid al-Imam Ali in east Beirut to the *Usrat al-Ta'akhi* ('Family of Fraternity'). Initially, both sought to address the dispossession and demoralisation of the Shi'i community by transforming their cultural *capital* into enhanced social and economic *capital* for the purpose of instilling a collective *habitus* through interactive networks of formal and informal institutions[199].

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[196] *Ijtihad* is the process of 'independent reasoning' between Islamic principles and the prevailing context. A *mujtahid* is a qualified individual who is authorised to engage in this reconciliation of theory and praxis.

[197] In particular his work *Iqtisaduna* ('Our Economics') and *Falsafatuna* ('Our Philosophy').

[198] Sayyid Sharaf al-Din was related to Musa al-Sadr through the former's maternal grandfather as well as the latter's father (Chehabi & Tafreshi, 2006: 143). Sayyid Fadlallah's father, Ayatollah Sayyid Abdul Ra'uf, was a revered figure in the Shi'i community (Sankari, 2005: 121: 160).

[199] Supplementing public lectures, al-Sadr assumed the leadership of *Jam'iyyat al-Bir wal-Ihsan* ('the Local Benevolent Society') in 1961, founded the *al-Mu'assasah al-Ijtima'iyyah* ('the Social Institute') in 1962, the *Bayt al-Fatat* in 1963 and the *Ma'had al-Dirasat al-Islamiyyah* ('Institute for Islamic Studies'). Sayyid Fadlallah founded a *musallah* ('prayer hall'); a *husayniyya*; a cultural club for women; a medical clinic; and *al-Ma'had al-Shari' al-Islami* ('the Islamic Legal Institute') in 1966 (Sankari, 2005: 127; 131-133).

However, the two clerics diverged on the precise route to symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community. By inaugurating *al-Harakat al-Mahrumin* and Amal, al-Sadr had indicated his disposition to recognise the legitimate *orthodoxy* of the prevailing system in both Lebanon's *SMF* and *PF* as a means of pursuing a reformist agenda. Conversely, Sayyid Fadlallah refused to affiliate with *orthodox* actors believing that such an association would not only undermine his focus on grassroots revolutionary change, but would also compromise the universal value of his message by limiting his influence to Lebanon[200]. Expediently conforming to *orthodox* methods of *capital* accumulation in the *SMF*, Sayyid Fadlallah intended to achieve symbolic *capital* as a precursor to encouraging the inculcation of radical *habiti* producing *heterodox* practice. Since Sayyid Fadlallah disassociated from conventional practice, the civil war presented opportunities for Sayyid Fadlallah to enhance his *capital* at the expense of al-Sadr.

In a military campaign initiated in 1975 to link their cantons into one contiguous enclave, Christian militias seized Nab'a in August 1976 and attacked Tal al-Za'atar, a predominantly Palestinian camp, in September 1976 culminating in the displacement of approximately 100,000 Shi'i, including Sayyid Fadlallah, to the southern suburbs of Beirut[201]. As al-Sadr attempted to mediate a solution via eroding political channels, Sayyid Fadlallah disseminated his collective action frames of *heterodoxy* from the Imam Rida mosque at Bir Al-Abd in *al-dahiyeh* where his publications reached and resonated with an audience in search of guidance[202]. Transcending traditional Islamic theory, Sayyid Fadlallah declared that the Shi'i must replace entrenched dispositions of oppression and inferiority with a radical spirit of activism led by an organised and flexible movement (Sankari, 2005: 158). Augmenting the credibility of Sayyid Fadlallah's *capital* in the *SMF*, Ayatollah al-Khui, the Shi'i *marja al-taqlid*, appointed his former pupil as a *wakil* ('representative') in Lebanon[203]. By adopting a Bourdieu-SMT analysis, the four contributing factors inspiring Hizbullah's creation after 1977 can be reconceptualised to explain the process by which Sayyid Fadlallah's discourse not only expanded beyond Beirut to induct more radical *habiti* into the *illusio* of the *SMF*, but also harmonised a Shi'i *collusio* of *heterodox* practice.

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[200] Interview with Hani Abdallah, Beirut, 11 September 2012.

[201] Other Shi'i areas cleared by Christian militias in east Beirut included Harat al-Ghawarina, Maslakh and Karantina. Although Tal al-Za'atar was mostly comprised of Palestinians, around 43% of the camp was Shi'i (Sankari, 2005: 135). Sayyid Nasrallah, the current Secretary General of Hizbullah and a regular attendee of Sayyid Fadlallah's lectures in Nab'a, was forced to move from Karantina to Bazouriyah in South Lebanon where he joined Amal before leaving for Najaf later in 1976 (Blanford, 2011: 29; Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 209).

[202] These included *Al-Islam wa Muntiq al-Quwwah* ('Islam and the Logic of Force') as well as *al-Hiwar fil Qur'an* ('Dialogue in the Qur'an') in 1976 and *Khutuwat 'ala Tariq al-Islam* ('Steps Along the Path of Islam') in 1977.

[203] Although Ayatollah al-Khui was a proponent of clerical quietism, he likely believed that, unlike Iraq, conditions in Lebanon were conducive to Sayyid Fadlallah's approach. Sayyid Fadlallah used this heightened position to establish *Jam'iyyat al-Mabarrat al-Khayriyyah* ('the Society for Benevolent Charity') in 1978 (Interview with Hani Abdallah, Beirut, 11 September 2012).

Firstly, following a PLO attack near Tel Aviv in March 1978, Israel retaliated with Operation Litani, a two-week long strike on South Lebanon that had three important consequences for the Shi'i. Primarily, the assault resulted in an estimated 2,000 deaths and the displacement of 250,000 people, most of whom were Shi'i (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 10). The majority that resettled in *al-dahiyeh* were exposed to Sayyid Fadlallah, whose religious rhetoric and social services aimed to channel passive frustration into active mobilisation. Moreover, since al-Sadr had distanced Amal from the PLO, the Shi'i in South Lebanon who remained in solidarity with the Palestinians embodied radical *habiti* in search of representation within the *SMF*. By propagating a pro-Palestinian and pro-Resistance counter-frame to Amal, Sayyid Fadlallah appealed to the dispositions of these dislocated Shi'i. Lastly, the endorsement and stationing by non-Lebanese actors of two military forces in South Lebanon attracted resentment from the Shi'i population. Whereas UNSC Resolutions 425 and 426 charged the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a six-month peacekeeping mandate to ensure Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, restore peace and security to South Lebanon and facilitate the return of the Lebanese state to the area, the deployment of the South Lebanon Army (SLA), an Israeli proxy comprised of Lebanese, was perceived as formalising the Israeli occupation at the expense of UNIFIL[204].

Secondly, in 1977, approximately 100 Shi'i clerics returned to Lebanon from Najaf strengthening the *heterodox* movement of radical *habiti* that was coalescing around Sayyid Fadlallah (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 302). Under the Ba'ath Party in Iraq, Shi'i clerics were routinely subjected to persecution by an Arab Socialist regime threatened by religious activism. By 1978, as Ayatollah Khomeini fled to France, Shaykh Abbas Moussawi, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and Shaykh Ragheb Harb returned to Lebanon (Alagha, 2006: 28; Shapira, 1988: 129). This vanguard of Hizbullah was raised on the lectures of Sayyid Fadlallah and al-Sadr before having their dispositions embedded through an education in Najaf influenced by *Hizb al-Dawa*, a subversive Shi'i group in Iraq infused with the activism of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini[205]. Returning to Lebanon, these Shi'i clerics

[204] Under Saad Haddad, the SLA was to create *Haras al-Watani li-Qura' al-Janub* ('National Guard for Villages in the South') to administer order but after his death Antoine Lahd paid recruits from all sects $300 a month to create village militias comprised of the sect within the village. The SLA enabled Israel to justify, implement and reproduce its occupation of South Lebanon (Norton, 1987: 111-112; *MER*, 7 April, 1984: 14-15).

[205] Almost all of Hizbullah's initial leaders were educated at Najaf, including Shaykh Subhi Tufayli, Shaykh Naim Qassem, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, Shaykh Mohammad Yazbek, Shaykh Muhammad Ismail al-Khaliq and Shaykh Ali al-Kurani (Shapira, 1988: 129). Shaykh Moussawi and Sayyid Nasrallah, both of whom would become Secretary General of Hizbullah, formed a close relationship in Najaf. Shaykh Harb studied under Sayyid Fadlallah at the Islamic Legal Institute in Beirut (Shapira, 1988: 129; Alagha,

dispersed to stimulate different permutations of Shi'i activism. Although Sayyid Fadlallah was not involved in the leadership of *Hizb al-Dawa*, a number of returnees from Najaf who joined the Lebanese Federation of Muslim Students in Lebanon continued to sympathise with its cause[206]. While Shaykh Harb became a prominent figure in the Association of Ulama of Jabal 'Amil, Shaykh Abbas and Sayyid Nasrallah led the *Hawzat al-Imam al-Mutazar* in Ba'albeck as members of Amal. Although the transnational transfusion of cultural and social *capital* through radical *habiti* complemented Sayyid Fadlallah's objective in mobilising a Shi'i *collusio* by inculcating dispositions and perceptions of *heterodox* practice, rather than concentrate on grassroots modalities of collective action, returnees from Iraq calculated that integrating into pre-existing organisations provided the optimum opportunity for igniting a radical Shi'i *habitus* in the *SMF*.

Thirdly, the disappearance of al-Sadr on 31 August 1978 in Libya produced a leadership vacuum in Amal that amplified the structural deficiencies of the organisation and increased the allure of *heterodox* mobilisation. Since the Shi'i leader devised a flexible and encompassing frame to enable Amal to progress according to the *orthodox* rules of practice in Lebanon, the movement was 'as much an ideal, socio-political state of mind, as it was a palpable well-organized entity' (Norton, 1987: 87). Following the outbreak of the civil war, al-Sadr's shifting allegiances, the Nab'a exodus, the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon and Amal's detachment from the PLO highlighted the inability of the movement to effectively reconcile its diverse Shi'i base with prevailing contextual trends resulting in an eclectic reformist movement geographically, socio-economically and ideologically divided that lacked the organisational cohesion to unify these cleavages. Consequently, after al-Sadr's disappearance, Husayn al-Husayni, Nabih Berri and Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine competed for the symbolic *capital* to redirect the predominant *orthodoxy* of Amal's *OF*[207]. This internal friction, which caused dissonance in *field* homology between Amal's *OF* and the *SMF*, compelled its supporters to re-evaluate their positions thereby exposing them to the overtures of competing frames within the Shi'i community and expanding the space for the prospect of *heterodox* practice.

2006: 28). Shaykh Harb (d. 1984) and Shaykh Moussawi (d. 1992), along with Imad Mugniyeh (d. 2008), are currently revered as Hizbullah's 'Three Leading Martyrs'.

[206] Future Hizbullah leaders, such as Shaykh Tufayli, Shaykh Qassem, Shaykh Yazbek and Shaykh Kurani, may have harboured *Hizb al-Dawa* views and joined the organisation established by Sayyid Fadlallah but the latter was not a member of *Hizb al-Dawa* (Interview with Hani Abdullah, Beirut, 11 September 2012).

[207] Muhammad Shamseddine was also educated in Najaf. On returning to Lebanon in 1969, he led prayers at the Dikwaneh mosque in east Beirut, opening the *jam'iyyat al-khayriyyah al-thaqafiyya* ('the Cultural and Charity Association') before moving to Shiyyah and becoming the vice president of the Higher Islamic Shi'i Council (Qassem, 2005: 15-16; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 34-35).

Fourthly, despite the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, its effect on galvanising the radical *habiti* of agents in Lebanon's *SMF* was less about the innovation of Ayatollah Khomeini's political thought and more about the implications its implementation would have on transferring *capital* to Lebanese Shi'i. Not only was the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* highly contested in Shi'ism, especially amongst Ayatollah Khomeini's Najaf peers such as Sayyid Fadlallah, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Musa al-Sadr and Muhammad Shamseddine, but the prevalent structures in Iraq and Lebanon also appeared practically incompatible with its application. Conversely, regardless of the loose *field* homology between radical Shi'i *habiti* in Iran and Lebanon, the Islamic Revolution exemplified the metamorphosis from *heterodoxy* in the *SMF* to *orthodoxy* in the *PF*. The Lebanese system may have precluded corresponding opportunities but the legitimacy of Ayatollah's symbolic *capital* accentuated the *field* homology between the *orthodoxy* of Iran's *PF*, *SMF* and *MSF* and the *heterodoxy* of radical Shi'i *habiti* in Lebanon's *SMF*. Considering the discourse of the Islamic Revolution resonated with radical Shi'i *habiti* in Lebanon's *SMF*, particularly in establishing an Islamic state and resisting Israel, these agents could expect a significant transfer of cultural, economic and social *capital* to enhance their collective position, especially since most of Ayatollah's inner circle had received military training at PLO camps in Lebanon[208].

After the Islamic Revolution, the radical *habiti* of Lebanon's *SMF* strategically aligned the framing of their *heterodox* practice in coordination with the predominant *orthodoxy* in Iran. Despite harbouring reservations with the notion of *wilayat al-faqih*, both Sayyid Fadlallah and Sayyid Shamseddine embraced a position of being 'constitutionally non-committal' by traversing the boundary between supporting the revolution while reassuring the non-clerical Shi'i leadership and non-Shi'i population in Lebanon (Mallat, 1988: 41)[209]. As early as 1978, a number of Shi'i in Lebanon had started establishing committees in solidarity with the Islamic Revolution (Chehabi, 2006: 203). In 1979, an amalgamation of loosely affiliated groups converged to form the Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002:

[208] A pact signed on 24 June 1975 by Sayyid Fadlallah and Musa al-Sadr agreed that Amal and pro-Khomeini revolutionaries would be trained by the PLO (Sankari, 2005: 153). A reported 700 members of *Hizb al-Dawa* were trained in PLO camps (Sharara, 2006: 109). While Ahmad Khomeini, the Ayatollah's son, received training in Lebanon, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, a student and secretary for Ayatollah Khomeini who became Ambassador to Damascus, also graduated from a PLO camp in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997: 79; Alagha, 2006: 28; Hirst, 2010: 176-177). Mustapha Chamran, a close associate of al-Sadr who became Defence Minister under Ayatollah Khomeini, fought against Christian militias at Tal al-Za'atar in 1976 and trained *Hizb al-Dawa* and Amal fighters at PLO camps (Hirst, 2010: 176; Alagha, 2006: 33). Ahmad Montazeri, the son of Ayatollah Husayn Ali Montazeri, one of Ayatollah Khomeini's key advisors, not only received training at a PLO camp in Lebanon, but also became the supervisor of the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements in the Islamic Republic, which was operated by Mehdi Hashemi, who also received training in Lebanon (Hirst, 2010: 176-177; Ranstorp, 1997: 80). Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Karrubi also allegedly received training in Lebanon (*MER*, 17 November, 1990: 7-8).

[209] Sayyid Shamseddine believed in *al-'adadiyya*, a system of governance based on pluralist democracy and consultation (Mallat, 1988: 40). Sayyid Fadlallah believed that his concurrent support for the quietism of Ayatollah Khui and the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini were mutually complementary by following the former on religious issues and the latter on political matters (Sankari, 2005: 177-179).

13). Concurrently, while the Islamic Students' Organisation of Nabatiyeh, which included Shaykh Harb and Shaykh Sa'id Ibrahim, championed radical change in Lebanon, the *Tajammu' al-Ulama al-Muslimeen* (the 'Association of Muslim Ulama') was an inter-Muslim collection of clerics inspired by the Iranian Revolution in which Sayyid Fadlallah was joined by prominent Sunnis including Shaykh Maher Hammoud in Sidon and Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban in Tripoli (Norton, 1987: 173)[210]. Furthermore, remnant *Hizb al-Dawa* members in Lebanon also openly promoted an Islamic Revolution[211]. By creating a dense network of pre-existing organisations akin to the premise of resource mobilisation theory, these groups provided the foundation of organised radical *habiti* with which to transfer into a cohesive social movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Morris, 1986).

Nevertheless, while radical Shi'i *habiti* endeavoured to translate the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Revolution for the purpose of attracting agents into the *illusio* of Lebanon's *SMF*, rival factions emerged in Iran's *PF* over the way in which its *orthodoxy* should be exported and mobilised in Lebanon. Initially the Freedom Movement of Iran, such as Mustapha Chamran and Ibrahim Yazdi, spearheaded a moderate approach to foreign policy[212]. Epitomised by their social and cultural *capital* with Musa al-Sadr, these individuals endorsed Amal's charter, a document that favoured the institutional framework of Lebanon and rejected external influence (Deeb, 1988: 690-691)[213]. Conversely, the Islamic Republican Party, embodied by Ali Khamenei and Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, not only argued that affiliation to both al-Sadr and Ayatollah Khomeini was mutually exclusive, but they also sought to cultivate an affinity with radical *habiti* in Lebanon's *SMF* that propagated revolutionary change (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 96; Chehabi, 2006: 206-207)[214].

[210] Shaykh Sha'ban combined Jundullah with the Movement of Arab Lebanon to form the Islamic Unification Movement (*Tawhid*) in Tripoli. The Movement of Arab Lebanon was a pro-Iranian group of Palestinian students in Fatah and the Popular Resistance of Khalil 'Akkawi (Piscatori, 1989: 299). Citing Munir Shafiq, Tripoli demonstrates the transition of Lebanese Maoists to Islamism. Initially, the Maoist-leaning Student Squad, which became *Katiba al-Jarmaq* in 1977, fought alongside *al-'Asifa* ('the Storm'), Fatah's military wing, against the South Lebanon Army before some of its members turned to Islamism. Anis Naqqash converted to Islam in Tehran while Ismat Murad and Khalil 'Akkawi joined the Islamic Unification Movement. Three other leftist fighters, including Trad Hamadeh, Saud al-Mawla and Imad Mugniyeh, went on to join Hizbullah. The latter attended Sayyid Fadlallah's lectures in the mid-1970s before joining Fatah's elite Force 17. As a close associate of Anis Naqqash, it could be argued that he was affiliated with the Maoist *Katiba al-Jarmaq* and shifted to fighting under Islam around this time (Sing, 2011: 1-44; Blanford, 2011: 29).

[211] These included, Shaykh Tufayli, Shaykh Qassem, Shaykh Yazbek, Shaykh Ismail al-Khaliq and Shaykh al-Kurani.

[212] In the provisional government in Iran, Mustapha Chamran was Defence Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi was deputy premier, Sadeq Tabatab'i (Musa al-Sadr's nephew) was a government spokesperson and Sadeq Qotbzadeh was foreign minister (Chehabi, 2006: 204).

[213] Chamran initially returned to Iran along with Amal members Husayn al-Husayni, Nabih Berri and Sayyid Shamseddine. Following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, 600 Amal members left Lebanon to fight for Iran. While a member of the provisional government, Chamran was elected to the 24-member council of Amal in April 1980 (Chehabi, 2006: 204-206; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 102).

[214] The Islamic Republican Party chastised Amal for following Ayatollah Khui instead of Ayatollah Khomeini after the death of Ayatollah Hakim in 1971. Its initial attempts to enlist Fatah to train the Revolutionary Guards and send them to south Lebanon were thwarted by the provisional government (Chehabi, 2006: 191; 206-207).

The escalating tensions between Iran and Iraq at the beginning of 1980, as well as the killing of prominent Shi'i clerics such as Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr under Saddam Husayn, presented the radical faction with the political opportunity to eclipse the moderates. By 1981, the Islamic Republican Party had discredited and marginalised the provisional government in the *PF* as liberals who were incapable of managing the impending crisis with Iraq (Chehabi, 2006: 209; Sankari, 2005: 185). Referring to themselves as *dowlat-e-hezbollahi* (the 'State of the Party of God'), which invoked memories of Sayyid Hadi Ghaffari's 'hizbullahis', the vigilante group of Islamist activists who intimidated secular liberals during the anti-Shah protests of 1978, the hardliners gradually disposed of the moderates and monopolised control over Iran's *PF* (Chehabi & Mneimneh, 2006: 31-35)[215].

Following the killing of Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the disbanding of *Hizb al-Dawa* and encouraged its affiliates in Lebanon to infiltrate Amal, which as of April 1980 was led by Nabih Berri, for the purpose of informally converting the dominant Shi'i secularist party into one amenable to the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997: 30)[216]. By June 1981, in its attempt to enter Lebanon's *MSF* and legitimise the credibility of its Resistance against Israel, the Iranian parliament authorised the *Pasdaran* forces of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to be despatched to Lebanon (Ranstorp, 1997: 33). After being refused access by Syria, the allegedly defunct *Hizb al-Dawa*, in solidarity with Iran's war with Iraq and in retaliation for Iraq's targeting of Shi'i clerics, claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut in December 1981. The vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) set a tactical precedent for future repertoires of practice in Lebanon's *MSF*. This sequence of events signalled a shift by Iran's *PF* to an interventionist approach that entailed the active transference of *capital* in order to provide the strategic resources, frames and opportunities for the mobilisation of radical Shi'i *habiti* and the promotion of *heterodox* practice in Lebanon.

Inspecting pre-1982 trends within the Shi'i community through a traditional SMT lens, one can identify and illustrate three inter-related themes: firstly, the objective emergence of political opportunities contained within the civil war, the Israeli assaults on South Lebanon, the internal friction within Amal and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran; secondly, the importance of pre-existing networks and

[215] Chamran died under suspicious circumstances on 21 June 1980; Sadeq Tabatab'i retired from politics; and Sadeq Qotbzadeh was killed for allegedly conspiring against Ayatollah Khomeini in 1982 (Chehabi, 2006: 208).
[216] Sayyid Nasrallah and Shaykh Moussawi were already involved with Amal, as was Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid and Husayn al-Moussawi. Shaykh Muhammad al-Khaliq (Ayatollah Montazeri's representative in Lebanon at the *Hawzat al-Rasul al-Akram* in Beirut), Shaykh al-Tufayli, Shaykh al-Kurani and Shaykh Qassem began to join Amal at this time (Sankari, 2005: 172; Shapira, 1988: 127).

organisations, whether doctrinal, societal or familial, for mobilising an alternative Shi'i movement; and thirdly, the presence of prognostic and diagnostic Collection Action Frames within the Shi'i community promoted by either Sayyid Fadlallah, Musa Al-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr or Ayatollah Khomeini. Nevertheless, by neglecting the relational dynamics reconciling the range of Shi'i dispositions, perceptions and positions within as well as between respective *fields* of practice, each infused with their own constitutive logics, generative rules and opportunity structures, this conceptual framework requires a combined Bourdieu-SMT perspective to effectively explain the intricate nuances of Shi'i mobilisation before 1982.

Devoid of cohesive organisation or coherent direction, Shi'i collective action was not predicated on political opportunities. While the exacerbated deprivation of the Shi'i during the civil war enabled Amal to enhance its symbolic *capital* in the *SMF*, the prevailing logic of a resurgent *MSF* over a relinquished *PF* ensured that the perception of political opportunities in the latter would rely on the pursuit of *capital* in the former, a *field* in which the Shi'i were a relatively disadvantaged and defective actor. Furthermore, the lack of Iran's pre-existing *capital* in Lebanon precluded the Islamic Republic from instantaneously transferring the legitimacy of its revolutionary *orthodoxy* to corresponding radical *habiti* embedded within the *heterodoxy* of Lebanon's entrenched *fields* of practice. Consequently, opportunities for Shi'i mobilisation were initially confined to the *SMF*, a *field* of dispersed *habiti*, diverse frames and diversified action. As the *SMF* experienced reverberations from Lebanon, as well as Israel, Iraq and Iran, competing Shi'i agents endeavoured to alter their *capital* accordingly to attract *habiti* into the *illusio* of the *SMF* and entrench a *collusio* of dispositions. Rather than instil a Shi'i *collusio* towards *orthodoxy*, the Islamic Revolution served to actively create *field* homology between Iran's *PF* and Lebanon's *SMF* to galvanise the *heterodox* practice of radical *habiti*, a process which was facilitated by the discourse of Sayyid Fadlallah, Israeli military operations in South Lebanon, the return of Najaf-trained clerics from Iraq, internal crises within Amal and the prominence of the Islamic Republican Party in Iran.

5.2 The Construction of Hizbullah's *Organisational Field* (*OF*)

Referring to 1982, Sayyid Nasrallah, the current Hizbullah Secretary General, stressed that originally 'there was no plan…other than to resist the occupation'[217].

[217] Cited in the May/August edition of *Middle East Insight* (1996: 38).

Implementing this aim required the execution of two objectives: to gather, train and organise recruits before despatching them to the occupied areas; and to disseminate this narrative among the people 'first, in a bid to raise their morale, and second to instil in them a sense of animosity towards the enemy, coupled with a spirit of resistance' (Jaber, 1997: 49-50). Contrary to the assumptions of scholars who attribute Hizbullah with a logic of coherence and consistency, this phased process of transforming radical *habiti* into a *collusio* of *heterodox* practice, or 'communities of resistance' (Crooke, 2009: 178), before forming a cohesive *OF* of harmonised mobilisation neither transpires in a vacuum nor represents an immediate act of metamorphosis but involves a mutually constituted relationship between the inscription of dispositions and the structures of Lebanon's *SMF*[218].

While the symbolic *capital* accrued by the Islamic Republic had already facilitated the convergence of radical *habiti* of *heterodox* practice in Lebanon's *SMF*, the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London on 3 June 1982 by the Abu Nidal Organisation and Israel's subsequent invasion of Lebanon compelled the disparate Shi'i groups in Lebanon to coalesce[219]. Furthermore, when Nabih Berri, the leader of Amal, joined the *Hay'at al-Inqath al-Watani* ('National Salvation Committee') with President Elias Sarkis, which intended to negotiate with Israel, Husayn Moussawi, a military commander in Amal, and Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, Amal's representative in Tehran, simultaneously announced their defection and the inauguration of *Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islamiyya* ('Islamic Amal')[220]. Concurrently, after a series of negotiations led by Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, the Iranian Emissary in Damascus, which intensified after the kidnapping in Lebanon of Ahmad Motevasselian, the leader of the Revolutionary Guards, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad finally consented to the deployment of 1,500 Pasdaran fighters under Mohsen Rafiqdost in the Biqa' Valley (Chehabi, 2006: 216; Ranstorp, 1997: 34-36)[221].

Under these circumstances, Shaykh Subhi Tufayli, one of the founders of Hizbullah, recounted that 'the instructions of the leader – Imam Khomeini – were to create a

[218] These scholars include Deeb (1988), Kramer (1993), Ranstorp (1997), Hamzeh (2004) and Levitt (2013, 2014).
[219] In April 1982, during the Iranian Conference for Islamic and Third World Liberation, the Association of Muslim Ulama in Lebanon, including eminent Shi'i and Sunni clerics, was officially established (Sankari, 2005: 194-195). Sabri Khalil al-Banna, a.k.a. Abu Nidal, formed his organisation after splitting from Yasser Arafat's PLO in 1974. Husayn Said, Nawwaf al-Rosan and Marwan al-Banna shot Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London on 3 June 1982 (Deeb, 2003: 70-71). For Sayyid Nasrallah, the subsequent Israeli invasion of South Lebanon was the catalyst for amalgamation of Shi'i groups (*Al-'Ahd*, 21 November, 1997). Corroborating this statement, Ehud Barak, a former Israeli premier, admitted that 'when we entered Lebanon…there was no Hezbollah…it was our presence that created Hezbollah' (*Newsweek*, 18 July, 2006).
[220] Other figures who joined Islamic Amal were Sayyid Nasrallah, Husayn al-Khalil, Shaykh Qassem, Muhammad Ra'ad, Shaykh Moussawi (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 15).
[221] Immediately after Israel invaded Lebanon, and to protect his monopoly over the situation in Lebanon, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad rejected the entry of Iranian Revolutionary Guards into Lebanon. President al-Assad perhaps altered his position after negotiating a lucrative oil agreement with Iran and/or realising that Syria required assistance in balancing against the threat posed by Israel in Lebanon (Hirst, 2010: 185; Chehabi, 2006: 214; Ranstorp, 1997: 34-36).

movement that springs from pure Islamic fundamentals; a movement that shakes the current situation' (Hamzeh, 2004: 24)[222]. Aside from instilling the values of Islam, the organisation would wage Resistance against Israel and follow the *wilayat al-faqih* (Qassem, 2005: 19). The primary obstacle confronting this aspiring movement was the geographical, social and economic cleavages of Lebanon's *SMF*, which produced an overwhelming disparity in *habiti* and *capital* between the embryonic experiment and its more established counterparts. However, the *hysteresis* caused by the civil war, and the militarised dispositions it induced, precipitated a hiatus in the conventional structures of the *SMF*, thereby permitting an influx of *capital* from *heterodox* challengers intending to capitalise on debilitating conditions to enhance their position and negotiate a reconstituted *orthodoxy*. In this context, the Biqa' Valley exemplified the conducive environment required for a *collusio* of radical *habiti* to initiate a cohesive *OF* that would foment a symbiotic synthesis between the Islamic Republic and its corresponding counterparts in Lebanon.

Principally, the Biqa' was a strategically advantageous and relatively concealed position inside the Syrian sphere of influence, detached from the battlegrounds of the civil war but geographically adjacent to Israel's occupying forces. Furthermore, the area was historically Shi'i but not subject to the delineated leadership structures of South Lebanon (Winter, 2010: 175).The Shi'i of the Biqa' were perceived as 'wild and assertive clansmen', governed by a fragmented network of tribal relationships that were open to alternative modes of mobilisation (Ajami, 1986: 127; Wege, 2012: 772). As summarised by Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, 'their men are courageous and mostly armed…they do not submit to government authority…They have fought several times…and have won. They like the clergy' (Chehabi, 2006: 216). This social composition not only provided Shi'i agents endowed with revolutionary dispositions and perceptions, but also supplied the aspiring movement with recruits experienced in local conflict[223]. Moreover, having received military training at PLO camps in the 1970s, senior Iranian figures, such as Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Ahmad Montazeri and Mohsen Rafiqdost, utilised their pre-existing social *capital* with Shi'i figures in the area, including Shaykh Abbas Moussawi (Nabi Shayth), Husayn Moussawi (Ba'albeck), Shaykh Tufayli (Brittal), Shaykh Yazbek (Buday) and Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid (Zahla), to enhance the cross-fertilisation of mobilisational principles

[222] Sayyid Fadlallah, Shaykh Yazbek, Shaykh Afif Nabulsi, Husayn Moussawi, Shaykh Kurani, Shaykh Harb and Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid were also in attendance (Hamzeh, 2004: 24).
[223] People were also recruited from camps near Ba'albeck, such as Wavel, Janta and Bani Sbat (*MER*, 7 November, 1987: 9).

and practices through the recognised legitimacy of personal and familial networks (Malthaner, 2011: 177)[224].

Whether displaying religious credentials from Najaf or practical experience from Lebanon, the Shi'i that congregated at the *Ochak al-Shahada* ('Lovers of Martyrdom') camp in Ba'albeck under the operational tutelage and organisational alignment of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards shared a common affinity in terms of cultural, social and economic *capital*. Galvanised by the Islamic Revolution, emanating from impoverished Shi'i districts and incensed at the effects of the Israeli invasion, these Shi'i agents were motivated by a perception of Resistance that sought to reconstitute the *orthodoxy* of Shi'i mobilisation in Lebanon's *SMF*[225]. Initially, since each agent was beholden to dispositions that had determined their position and practice prior to the Israeli invasion, this exhibition of *collusio* amongst radical *habiti* resembled a coalition of community-based social movements rather than a cogent organisation. Consequently, the groups coalescing in Ba'albeck included the Lebanese Federation of Muslim Students, *Hizb al-Dawa*, Islamic Amal and the Committee Supportive of the Islamic Revolution, which consisted of clerics from the Ulama of Muslim Scholars, the Ulama of the Biqa' and the Ulama of Jabal 'Amil. Additionally, a cadre of Shi'i operatives, having become seasoned agents in the *MSF* through their association with Leftist and PLO militias, may have also participated at Ba'albeck after Yasser Arafat's forces were expelled from Lebanon[226].

Once assembled, the objective was to crystallise a collective *habitus* of 'Islamic Resistance' into a durable *OF* through a relational process of insemination and dissemination. This organisation, 'Hizbullah', or 'the Party of God', derived from two verses in the Qur'an, was an 'umbrella movement' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 15) or a 'rudimentary constellation' (Sankari, 2005: 198) expounding a unified frame but characterised by an amorphous constitution[227]. Sayyid Fadlallah (1985: 246-247) had previously cited the 'Party of God' as an 'organic, generic body, whose fluid terms of action include all committed adherents of Islam in perpetual and multifaceted

[224] Ali Akbar Mohtashemi had personal relationships with Shaykh Tufayli, Shaykh Abbas Moussawi and Husayn Moussawi (Alagha, 2006: 33). Shaykh Yazbek was Iranian President Khamenei's representative in Lebanon, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid had been Amal's spokesperson in Tehran and Ayatollah Montazeri's representative in Lebanon was Shaykh Muhammad al-Khaliq (Ranstorp, 1997: 44-45).

[225] Following the Israeli invasion, government aid to the South was halted and local commerce stunted as the agricultural market became flooded by Israeli produce (*MER*, 24 July, 1982: 15-17). Furthermore, while the invasion caused a mass exodus of Shi'i from their homes, between 1982 and 1985, Israel incarcerated approximately half of the remaining male population at Ansar, Khiyam and Atlit (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 301). Additionally, around 25% of those killed during the Sabra and Chatila massacre in 1982 were Shi'i (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 11).

[226] As discussed below, this group may have included IJO members such as Imad Mugniyeh, Abd al-Hadi Hamadi and Talal Hamiyeh.

[227] 'And whoever takes God and His Messenger and those who believe for friends – surely, the Party of God, they shall triumph' (Qur'an, 5:56). 'These are they into whose hearts He has impressed faith, and strengthened them with a Spirit from Himself, and He will cause them to enter Gardens wherein flow rivers… These are the Party of God. Now surely it is the Party of God who are the successful' (Qur'an, 58:22).

confrontation with the forces of irreligion, corruption and oppression'. Unlike the subversive *Hizb al-Dawa* that embodied a 'party of the *ummah*', 'Hizbullah' signified 'the *ummah* of the Party', a revision that shifted focus to the mobilisation of a public body of religiously pious adherents (Abu Khalil, 1991: 392; Sankari, 2005: 201). Considering that Ali Akbar Mohtashemi 'wrote, produced and directed Hizbullah', it is unsurprising that the movement mirrored the designation of the Islamic Republican Party in Iran (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 207). Reinforcing Shaykh Qassem's assertion that 'up until 1985, Hizbullah was not yet a single entity that could stand up and speak for itself', Hizbullah was conceived as a boundless movement that exceeded the limits of a conventional party and whose component parts belied any semblance of organisational cohesion (Jaber, 1997: 62; Alagha, 2006: 34; Azani, 2011: 59; Shanahan, 2005: 113)[228].

The priority of Hizbullah's *ta'bi'a* ('mobilisation') strategy was to transform cultural and economic *capital* into social *capital* for the purpose of constructing a Resistance *habitus* instilled with *heterodox* dispositions and perceptions. Akin to the notions of *al-moqawama al-mujtama* ('Resistance society') or *al-hala al-islamiyya* ('Islamic milieu'), the formation of this *collusio* of *habiti* in the *SMF* would be reproduced through institutions in which a *wajib shari'* ('religious obligation') was perceived as *al-malafal thabit* ('a fixed and invariable dossier') and where *iltizam* ('commitment') became 'the norm for a majority of the community' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 112; Harb & Leenders, 2005: 192). Invoking the analogy of the 'body social', Hizbullah sought to replace labels of *Mahrumin* ('disinherited') or *Mustad'afeen* ('disempowered') with a holistic Resistance in which there exists a division of responsibilities between functions but no overall distinction in direction (Danawi, 2002: 52-55). According to Husayn Moussawi, 'we [Hizbullah] are seeking to formulate an Islamic society which in the final analysis will produce an Islamic state. But this must not be interpreted to mean that our objective is to set up an Islamic state in Lebanon' (*MER*, 3 December, 1985: 10).

By the end of 1982, as a nascent stakeholder in Lebanon's *SMF*, Hizbullah remained deficient of recognisable *capital* and devoid of a centralised *OF* capable of managing resources as well as mediating between its Resistance *habitus* and the prevailing environment. As a precursor to establishing its own independent institutions, Hizbullah initially relied on incorporating its Resistance frames and practice within

[228] Shaykh al-Kurani, a Hizbullah leader formerly of *Hizb al-Dawa* explained that 'the path of Hizballah is not that of an organization or party in the usual and conventional sense...Hizballah is an organization and an apparatus adapted to what is required for Islamic deed and for the masses of its members' (Shapira, 1988: 124).

pre-existing mobilising structures in the *SMF*. Firstly, Hizbullah attempted to legitimise its cultural *capital* and acquire social *capital* through mosque networks. As the cohort in Ba'albeck attests, Hizbullah's vanguard possessed significant cultural *capital* within religious networks in the *SMF* from South Lebanon (Shaykh Harb and Shaykh Afif Nabulsi), the Biqa' (Shaykh Tufayli and Shaykh Yazbek) and Beirut (Shaykh Qassem and Shaykh al-Khaliq). Complementing this effort were Hizbullah-aligned clerics with radical *habiti*, including Sayyid Fadlallah, Shaykh Sha'ban and Shaykh Hammoud. Through the customary Muslim practice of delivering sermons and interacting with attendees at mosques, Hizbullah not only created a formal space with which to replace the traditional disposition of Shi'i quietism with the revised perception of revolutionary activism via the Islamic Resistance, but this direct engagement with Shi'i agents also enabled Hizbullah to develop informal relationships of trust leading to the legitimate recognition and augmentation of the movement's status within an increasingly beleaguered Shi'i community via familial networks, religious consultations and conflict resolution (Malthaner, 2011: 184; Hamzeh, 1997: 93-118). This grassroots access assisted Hizbullah in inducting and inculcating the mobilisation of radical *habiti* into the *illusio* of the *SMF*[229].

Secondly, Hizbullah entrenched its Resistance exegesis into the *tabligh* ('curriculum') of the *hawzat* system in Lebanon. Exclusive to Shi'ism and in existence for centuries particularly in Najaf and Qom, a *hawza* is a religious seminary in which students aspire to certified clerical authority[230]. By 1982, Hizbullah independently administered *al-Imam al-Mutazar* in Ba'albeck and *al-Rasul al-Akram* in Beirut[231]. In the reconfiguration of this pedagogic institution, Hizbullah clerics represented the new 'organic intellectual', a young breed of Shi'i thinkers that related and appealed to an increasingly urbanised Shi'i base by emanating from outside the traditional *ulama* of Jabal 'Amil as well as comprehending the importance of appropriating scientific knowledge for infusing radical dispositions and activating revolutionary change (Abisaab, 2006b: 232-233). Unlike Najaf and Qom, the religious intellectualism nurtured at the Hizbullah *hawzat* did not offer an eclectic *tabligh* of Shi'i thought but

[229] Reinforcing the importance of mosques in accumulating cultural and social *capital*, Shaykh Tarrad shifted allegiances to Ayatollah Khomeini in 1981 and changed the name of his mosque in Beirut from the Ghubayri Mosque to the Imam al-Mahdi Mosque (Sharara, 1996: 200-210). Also, on arriving in Ba'albeck, the 'cultural unit' of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards established the Ras al-Ayn Mosque as Hizbullah's headquarters while the al-Zaher Mosque was transformed into a military barracks (*MER*, 19 March, 1983: 12).

[230] There a four phases to becoming a Shi'i religious authority: *muqaddimat* ('beginner', 3-5 years); *sutuh* ('surfaces', 3-6 years); *bahth al-kharij* ('outside research'); and *ijtihad* ('interpretative reasoning'). The Shi'i hierarchy is then divided in ascending order from *Thiqat al-Islam* ('Trust of Islam') to *Hujjat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin* ('Proof of Islam and of Muslims') then *Ayatollah fi al-'Alamin* ('Proof of Islam and of Muslim, the Sign of God in the World'). To become a *marja*, an Ayatollah must demonstrate *al-adala* ('justice'), *al-a'lamiyya* ('knowledge') and *al-hayat* ('life') based on the number of their followers, the proximity of other *maraji* and the impact of their publications (Abisaab, 2006b: 244; Batatu, 1978: 193; Moussawi, 2011: 33-38).

[231] *Al-Imam Al-Mutazar* was founded by Shaykh Abbas Moussawi before he was replaced by Shaykh Yazbek in 1984. *Al-Rasul Al-Akram* was directed by Shaykh Sulayman Akhtari, an Iranian cleric, with the assistance of Shaykh al-Khaliq, a Hizbullah official. Hizbullah had established five more hawzat in Beirut, South Lebanon and the Biqa' by the end of the 1980s (Abisaab, 2006b: 245-252; Hamzeh, 1993: 327).

prospectively politicised its programme to advance the pre-scripted Hizbullah interpretation of Islamic Resistance (Abisaab, 2006b: 245, 252).

Thirdly, Hizbullah usurped and reshaped the historical narrative of ritual Shi'i practice by demarcating space, promoting public displays of piety and expounding the virtues of 'martyrological will' or *irada istishhadiyya* that physically and socially differentiated observant Shi'i agents from their confessional counterparts in the *SMF* (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 128). Conforming to the conventional compartmentalisation of territoriality and spatiality in Lebanon, Hizbullah adorned its operational microcosm with symbolic imagery and iconography that verified its identity. In the first Hizbullah camps in Ba'albeck, the area was inundated with slogans, such as 'Death to America' and 'Death to Amine Gemayel', strategically juxtaposed with pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini (*MER*, 19 March, 1983: 11). These insignia acted to affirm, confirm and reaffirm each individual Shi'i *habitus* in relation to the collective *collusio* of radical *habiti*. Additionally, in a further expressive declaration of piety, Hizbullah males became identifiable by their beards whereas women began donning the *chador*, a traditionally full-bodied Shi'i garment worn in Iran (*MER*, 19 March, 1983: 11).

This intentional co-option and customisation of Shi'i mores is most evident when evaluating Hizbullah's practice of Ashoura, the event commemorating the death of Imam Husayn at Karbala in 680AD. Rather than lamenting Ashoura as exemplifying the perpetual victimisation of the Shi'i, the Islamic Revolution sought to revise the framing and perception of Imam Husayn's death into one of empowerment. Consequently, despite physical challenges and the prospect of death, the revolutionary Shi'i 'is ready to fight for an Islamic cause. He is so powerful as to even change the course of the battle of Karbala with a positive outcome' (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 11)[232]. Therefore, Karbala was to be transformed from a 'pertinent rite to a revolutionary one, from a chorus of lamentations to one of imprecations, from an act of submission to one of rebellion' (Picard, 1993: 31). Similar to the urbanisation of the Shi'i in the 1960s and 1970s, ritual practice would not only connect the traditional past with the modern present, but it would also transcend individual isolation by cultivating 'cultural consensus and communitarian cohesion' towards motivating activism (Picard, 1993: 31; Deeb, 2006a: 163). The powerful impact of (re)appropriating Karbala manifested on 16 October 1983 when an Israeli

[232] This extract was allegedly recited by the Pasdaran in 1982 when they visited the Umayyad Mosque and the Zaynabiyya, the shrine outside Damascus honouring Imam Husayn's sister, before travelling to Lebanon (Chehabi, 2006: 214).

convoy interrupted an Ashoura procession in Nabatiyeh[233]. By reframing Imam Husayn's apotheosis as triumphant, while simultaneously constructing a direct correlation between his defiant rebellion against Caliph Yazid and Hizbullah's Resistance against Israel, this incident, combined with the martyrdom of its fighters, especially Shaykh Harb on 16 February 1984, contributed to vindicating the legitimate authenticity of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*[234].

Nevertheless, the consistent transmission and management of this programme required the establishment of a cohesive *OF* to enshrine the principles of Hizbullah (*doxa*) while institutionalising and transferring the *orthodoxy* of its Resistance *habitus* to the structures of the *SMF*. The appellation 'Hizbullah' may have been in circulation since 1982, but the formalisation of Hizbullah's *OF* cannot be detected until 1984. Referring to the congregation of Shi'i in Ba'albeck in mid-1982, Shaykh Tufayli compared Hizbullah's creation to a 'scuffle of camels…full of dust and noise' (Hirst, 2010: 183)[235]. Initially, Hizbullah was led by the 'Committee of the Nine', a coalition of three groups with positions divided equally amongst Shi'i clerics within Islamic Amal, the Ulama of the Biqa' and the Islamic Committees (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 304; Qassem, 2005: 19-20)[236]. Subsequently, this assembly composed the 'Manifesto of the Nine', a document approved by Ayatollah Khomeini that stipulated the movement's Islamic programme, its Resistance against Israel as the 'ultimate confrontational priority' and its recognition of *wilayat al-faqih* (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 22; Blanford, 2011: 47). By October 1982 and exemplifying Iran's influence in delineating the boundaries of this emerging *OF*, not only did Ayatollah Khomeini send his personal representative, Ayatollah Fazlollah Mahallati, to oversee a five-member 'Council of Lebanon' in implementing *sharia* law, but the military, cultural, economic and social departments of the Iranian Pasdaran were also duplicated in the organisational structures of the 'Council for Lebanon' (Chehabi, 2006: 218; Ranstorp, 1997: 44-45; Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 25).

The 'Council of Lebanon', which was convened for the first time in early 1982, was responsible for disseminating a coherent frame for mobilisation. As part of this process, Hizbullah began distributing its weekly journal, *al-'Ahd* ('the Covenant'), in

[233] Sayyid Shamseddine, an Amal-affiliated cleric, was outraged by the intrusion, calling for 'civil resistance' against Israel (*MER*, 23 October, 1983: 7).
[234] Ashoura interpretations were also a source of intra-Shi'i competition with Amal and Hizbullah hosting separate rallies from 1985 following a sequence of physical and ideological clashes (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 134).
[235] At this stage, Ahmad Kan'ani, an IRGC Commander, provided assistance to Shaykh Abbas Moussawi and Shaykh Tufayli (Ranstorp, 1997: 34-36).
[236] Based on geographical location, social links and religious credentials, the researcher has speculated the members within this 'Council' at the end of 1982. Shaykh Abbas Moussawi, Shaykh Tufayli and Shaykh Yazbek (Ulama of the Biqa'); Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid, Shaykh Qassem and Shaykh Nasrallah (Islamic Amal); Shaykh Harb, Shaykh al-Khaliq and Shaykh Nabulsi (Islamic Committees).

1984 and gradually replaced the Iranian radio station (*Voice of Revolution*) with the *Voice of Islam* (1986) and the *Voice of the Oppressed* (1987) in Ba'albeck (*MER*, 19 March, 1983: 12; *MER*, 31 October, 1987: 20)[237]. However, the PLO's official withdrawal from West Beirut in 1982 and Amal's seizure of the area in February 1984 enabled Hizbullah with opportunities to expand the scale and scope of its programme. Capitalising on its social networks with Amal to shuttle a contingent of its leadership to Beirut, including Sayyid Nasrallah, the nascent Hizbullah *OF* became directly exposed to a demographic of Shi'is it had previously been unable to access, namely the urbanised Shi'i underclass of Beirut as well as radicalised Shi'i from the South who had been forced to migrate to the capital because of Israel's occupation.

On 16 February 1985, Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid presented Hizbullah's 'Open Letter' to 'the oppressed in Lebanon and the world' in the southern district of Shiyyah (Alagha, 2011: 39)[238]. Despite contributing nominally to the Resistance in the South due to Hizbullah's difficulty in geographically or socially accessing the hierarchised structures of Jabal 'Amil, the announcement purposefully coincided with the anniversary of Shaykh Harb's martyrdom and the retreat of Israel to the 'security zone' in order to firmly associate the inception of Hizbullah and the Israeli occupation within the perceptions of the Shi'i community[239]. Consequently, the 'Open Letter', which acted as Hizbullah's 'diagnostic frame' in identifying Lebanon's endemic problems and offering an alternative solution, labelled the U.S., the 'Zionists' and the Phalange Party as 'enemies', 'oppressors' and co-conspirators accused of concocting plots to subvert the true authority of the *umma* (Karagiannis, 2009). In contradistinction, Hizbullah's Resistance was portrayed as a pan-Arab, pan-Islamic movement committed to freeing Lebanon by directly confronting these forces for the purpose of reconstituting the Lebanese system towards the Islamic governance espoused by Ayatollah Khomeini's *wilayat al-faqih* (Alagha, 2011: 39-55)[240].

The 'Open Letter' symbolised the arrival of Hizbullah's *OF* into Lebanon. However, the prospect of a centralised *field* that declared to exude a synergised homology between the Biqa', southern Beirut and the South but remained constructed and framed around the transference of cultural, economic and social *capital* from the

[237] *Al-'Ahd* was soon followed by the publication of *al-Bilad* ('the Country'), a monthly Hizbullah journal. Harik (1994: 44) and Hamzeh (1993: 327) provide alternative English translations for Hizbullah's radio stations.
[238] The full title of the 'Open Letter' was *Al-Nass Al-Harfi Al-Kamil li-Risalat Hizbullah ila Al-Mustad'afeen* (Alagha, 2011: 39).
[239] Beginning in January 1985, the first phase of Israel's withdrawal involved relinquishing control over 500 square kilometres but retaining 2,300 square kilometres or 225 of Lebanese territory before evacuating from east of southern Lebanon to Hasbaya and then retreating to the international border by the end of the year (*MER*, 19 January, 1985: 7-8).
[240] Following the 'Open Letter', Hizbullah supporters marched into Sidon tearing Lebanese flags, destroying pictures of Lebanese President and Phalange Party leader Amin Gemayel, smashing stores and supermarkets selling liquor and raising Iranian flags and portraits (*MER*, 23 February, 1985: 18).

Islamic Republic, questioned the operational independence of this emerging *OF*. While Hizbullah's 12-member Consultative Council, which was inaugurated in 1986, represented the core nucleus of the movement's leadership, Iran's Higher Defence Council allegedly monitored its activities with Ayatollah Khomeini intervening in instances of internal contestation (*MER*, 22 March, 1986: 7-12)[241]. Additionally, Hizbullah's *OF* established seven administrative committees that duplicated the Intellectual, Financial, Political, Information, Military, Social and Legal departments of Iran's Pasdaran[242]. The Islamic Republic also provided its progeny in Lebanon with an annual package of approximately $140 million, a vital source of economic *capital* for generating further cultural and social *capital* (Harik, 1994: 41)[243].

In particular, the establishment of Hizbullah's own integrated network of social welfare institutions within the mobilising structures of the *SMF* exemplify the influence of economic and cultural *capital* from Iran in enabling Hizbullah's *OF* to not only perform its Islamic responsibility in empowering the Shi'i community, but also to inculcate and institutionalise an intrinsic and holistic Resistance *habitus* by producing 'a set of meanings embedded in an interrelated religious and political framework' (Harb & Leenders, 2005: 174). Prior to the inception of Hizbullah, the Imam Khomeini Support Committee provided the Shi'i community with basic sustenance requirements (Malthaner, 2011: 177; Blanford, 2011: 81)[244]. Subsequently, *Mu'asasat al-Shahid* ('Martyrs Foundation') and *Jihad al-Bina* ('The Struggle for Reconstruction') embodied two vanguard *SMF* organisations that while based on precedents in Iran became exclusively operated by Hizbullah's *OF*. Conceived to complement and relieve the Islamic Resistance 'by assisting the populace in their endurance of Israeli aggressions', these services inscribed Hizbullah-infused discourses and dispositions into the routinised practice of the Shi'i community (Qassem, 2005: 86). Although centrally structured under Hizbullah's *OF*, the concurrently organic development of a *collusio* of radical *habiti* in the *SMF* would incrementally and independently reproduce Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus*.

[241] Iranian President Khamenei, Speaker Rafsanjani and IRGC Chief Mohsen Rafai apparently took personal care of Hizbullah (*MER*, 22 March, 1986: 10). Further demonstrating this Iranian influence, it was agreed in January 1986 that any prospective Constitution for the Islamic Republic of Lebanon should be based on the Iranian Constitution (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 34). Moreover, in August 1986, Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Hassan Akhtari, met with Hizbullah leaders in Lebanon to relay messages from Ayatollah Khomeini (Wege, 1994: 158).

[242] Hizbullah's flag even resembles the Pasdaran flag.

[243] While exact figures are difficult to ascertain, estimates place Iranian contributions to Hizbullah at between $5 million and $10 million a month (*MER*, 17 October, 1987: 10; Piscatori, 1989: 305; Hamzeh, 1993: 328). The confusion not only lies in the clandestine nature of Hizbullah's finances, but also in the complexity of avenues by which funds were transferred to Lebanon. Whereas Iran may have provided military equipment directly, financial payments may have been deposited from the coffers of the Iranian state. However, this 'official' channel does not include indirect proceeds from Islamic charitable foundations in Iran, private donations, expatriate remittances or money accrued by Shi'i clerics via religious taxes, such as *zakat* or *khums* (Harik, 1994: 41).

[244] The Imam Khomeini Support Committee had branches in Beirut, Tyre, Sidon and Ba'albeck (Blanford, 2011: 81).

The Martyrs Foundation was established the day after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon to offer care for the families of Resistance martyrs and wounded fighters, opening the Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ba'albeck and *al-Rasul al-Azzam* Hospital in south Beirut (Danawi, 2002: 29; *MER*, 19 March, 1983: 12; Harik, 1994: 32)[245]. By 1987, the Islamic Health Committee of the Foundation's Health Institute was managing 17 medical centres, allotting $225,000 a month to the families of martyrs, covering 100% of expenses for the families of injured fighters and offering 70% of free care for affected civilians (Azani, 2011: 72-73; *MER*, 22 March, 1986: 7-12). From its formation in 1982 until the official announcement of its Financial Committee in 1986, Hizbullah had assigned $90 million to support these health services (Harik, 1994: 32, 41; 2006: 280; Hamzeh, 1993: 327)[246].

The Social Institute of the Foundation supplied educational support for the families of its fighters. Prior to Hizbullah, this service was performed though institutions such as the Islamic Religious Education Association, or *jam'iyyat al-ta'lim al-dini al-islami* (JTDI)[247]. Since a number of prominent Shi'i clerics within the JTDI became Hizbullah leaders in 1982, including Shaykh Qassem, the association was gradually incorporated into the structures of Hizbullah's *OF* to manage the Party of God's *Mustapha* schools that focused on 'training Shi'ite religion teachers and publishing religion textbooks specifically designed for Shi'ites' (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 211; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 63). By 1987, the Social Institute offered scholarships and grants for thousands of children to attend *Mustapha* schools across Beirut, the Biqa' and South Lebanon (Harik, 1994: 26; 2006: 272)[248]. Furthermore, while the *Takaful* Institute aimed to promote empowered self-sufficiency by providing financial assistance to families through interest free loans, philanthropic donors and vocational training, the Culture Institute sought to convey Hizbullah's Resistance discourse and its institutional practice as synonymous with the Check and Balance Institute formed to cultivate durable relationships between Hizbullah volunteers and the Shi'i community through the monitoring of each beneficiary (Danawi, 2002: 32)[249].

Jihad al-Bina, which began operating in 1985 under the slogan 'Together We Resist, Together We Rebuild', was comprised of professional engineers and agricultural

[245] *Dar al-Hawra*, a Beirut-based Hizbullah hospital opened in 1986, treated around 59,244 women and 10,490 children in its first year (Hamzeh: 1993: 327).
[246] *'Al Ahd* (1 August, 1989) and Hamzeh (1993: 329) provide a list of infirmaries (16), dental clinics (2) and civil defence centres (6) founded by Hizbullah in the Biqa', southern Beirut and the South between 1983 and 1987.
[247] The JTDI, which received an official licence from the Ministry of Interior in 1981, was established by a group of Shi'i clerics (Le Thomas, 2010)
[248] The Mehdi Scouts, which was also established in the 1980s exposed students to a range of organised assemblies, rallies, marches and summer camps (Azani, 2011: 73)
[249] In the Bir al-Abd district of Beirut's southern suburbs, the Martyrs Foundation reportedly aided a total of 1,440 families, 2,204 wounded or crippled soldiers and 1,727 orphans during the 1980s (*MER*, 24 November, 1990: 10-12; Harik, 1994: 26).

experts who were charged with reconstruction and development (Danawi, 2002: 71; Blanford, 2011: 81)[250]. Established on the five core principles of promoting Islam, cultivating popular Resistance in areas subject to Israeli occupation, facilitating partnerships with local communities, instilling self-reliance and sustainability as well as delivering quality projects, Jihad al-Bina performed a range of services from building and renovating homes, roads, administrative buildings and mosques in addition to installing irrigation systems, communication lines, digging wells, collecting garbage and delivering power generators (Bisaat, 2002: 9; *MER*, 24 November, 1990: 10-12). Moreover, the organisation also provided agricultural training, technical advice and microfinance loans to rejuvenate the traditionally integral agricultural sector in Shi'i areas[251].

Hizbullah's *OF* did not invent *heterodox* repertoires to promulgate *heterodox* practice but acknowledged the importance of developing a Resistance *habitus* by adopting and customising *orthodox* mobilising structures within the *SMF*. Consequently, the struggle of Hizbullah's *OF* in transforming recognised *capital* into symbolic proportions through the provision of social services to the Shi'i community mirrored the *orthodox* practice of its confessional counterparts in the absence of etatism. Both confronted with and contributing to the debilitation of the state, sectarian elites established public programmes for moral and instrumental purposes. Not only did elites offer basic services to alleviate the troubles encountered by their communities, but in the process, this dependency also institutionalised confessional solidarity that conferred legitimacy on elite leadership. In 1976, the Christian Lebanese Front created semi-autonomous Popular Committees that managed social programmes. Invoking a phrase reminiscent of Hizbullah's rhetoric in 1982, Bashir Gemayel referred to these services as representing 'internal resistance' in symbiosis with 'military resistance' (*MER*, 25 May, 1984: 16-18)[252]. While Walid Jumblatt formed the Civil Administration of the Mountain to provide relief assistance to the Druze community, Nabi Berri appropriated funds from the Ministry of the South for the Shi'i in South Lebanon while all groups capitalised on technological advancements in

[250] Jihad al-Bina became registered as a charitable organisation in 1988 with headquarters located in the Haret Hurayk district of Beirut's southern suburbs but possessing area offices nationwide (Harik, 1994: 27; Danawi, 2002: 71).
[251] In 1988, Jihad al-Bina received 30 tractors from Iran, issued pamphlets on new agricultural materials and techniques while also providing qualified engineers for consultancies free of charge (Harik, 2006: 278).
[252] By 1977, the 142 Popular Committees consisting of 1400 civil servants and serving around 25,000 people organised community assistance in the form of infrastructure maintenance, water delivery, garbage collection and financial assistance to the families of dead fighters (Harik, 1994: 16, 33).

communication to transmit their narratives and enhance mobilisation practice (Harik, 1994: 3)[253].

Whereas the Maronites and Druze levied taxes on their communities and secured funds from foreign patrons, the most lucrative source of economic *capital* was the civil war as formerly legitimate actors within the *PF* benefited from their access to embattled state institutions to augment their private coffers (Harik, 1994: 39-40). Omitting the proceeds from a burgeoning informal economy, approximately 25% of state revenue was embezzled by militias with the latter's seizure of Lebanon's ports depriving the state treasury of 60% in annual customs (Traboulsi, 2007: 233, 237; *MER*, 17 October, 1987)[254]. While its dominant confessional counterparts revised *orthodox* practice to legitimise the transference of their *capital* by reconstituting a *field* homology that conflated the logics of the *PF*, *MSF* and *SMF*, Hizbullah's *OF*, devoid of relationally recognisable *capital* on account of its *heterodox* position and practice within these *fields*, was unable to replicate 'a mini-state with its own ports, airports, taxation and civil administration' (Alagha, 2011: 22-23).

Although rejecting the theoretical logic of *orthodoxy* in the *SMF*, Hizbullah's *OF* tacitly accepted participating in the *illusio* of its practical logic. Restrained by its deficiency and inferiority of *capital*, Hizbullah's *OF* would capitalise on the opportunity of horizontally transferred *capital* from Iran to sustain the inculcation of a *heterodox* Resistance *habitus* while subscribing to the *orthodox* structures of mobilisation in the *SMF*. By the time of its First Conclave on 11 November 1989, in which Shaykh Tufayli was declared Secretary General, Hizbullah's *OF* was producing, managing and harmonising a *collusio* of radical *habiti* in the *SMF* through a range of social services across Shi'i communities in Beirut, the Biqa' and South Lebanon[255]. While this incremental rather than exponential process may have been activated by the permeation of political opportunities, mobilising repertoires and collective action frames emanating from Iran, a Bourdieu-SMT perspective renders Hizbullah's *OF* as more than a proxy of the Islamic republic in a Shi'i microcosm of Lebanon.

[253] The number of radio stations proliferated from one in 1975 to 47 in 1986, including the Voice of Lebanon (Phalange), the Voice of Free Lebanon (Lebanese Forces), the Voice of the Mountain (PSP) and the Voice of the Lebanese Resistance (Amal) (*MER*, 31 October, 1987: 20).

[254] Between 1986 and 1989, 140 cargo ships disappeared off the Lebanese coast. During the civil war, 40% of cultivated land was used for hashish that was worth $6 billion for those who controlled its trade. The LF, PSP and Amal co-opted all aspects of the state's income-generation including import-export facilities, tourism, real estate, media and banks (Traboulsi, 2007: 234-237). Militias also administered Lebanon's ports: Dbayhe (Chamoun); Selaata and Minyeh (Franjiyeh); Jiyeh, Sidon, Tyre and Khalde (Jumblatt); Ouzai (Amal); Beirut and Jounieh (LF) (*MER*, 11 October, 1986: 21).

[255] Hizbullah founded the Islamic Charitable Al-Imdad Committee in 1987 and the al-Jarha Association for the wounded and disabled in 1989. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the findings of the investigation conducted by Hizbullah's Security Mobilisation Department' following the assassination attempt on Sayyid Fadlallah on 8 March 1985, Hizbullah had also created an independent body dedicated to research (*MER*, 8 March, 1986: 7-8; Qassem, 2005: 99-100; Sankari, 2005: 209).

Firstly, while the Islamic Republic represented the head of the global Islamic movement, Hizbullah's *OF* 'are the ones who shall have the final word…we alone take decisions in matters concerning the Lebanese scene and political matters bearing on us' (Hizbullah official in *MER*, 20 April, 1991: 9). Subsequently, Iran provided the conceptual *doxa* and values of transferable *capital* required to constitute the logic and structures of Hizbullah's *OF*. However, the practical application of *orthodoxy* in the *OF* as well as the strategic translation and distribution of *capital* allocated to articulate opportunities, organise mobilisational methods and devise action frames in localised contexts for the purpose of inculcating collective perceptions and dispositions towards *heterodox* practice was contingent upon extant radical agents that were inducted, inscribed and invested in the relationally entrenched dynamics of Lebanon. Consequently, whereas the hierarchical administration of Hizbullah's *OF* appeared Iranian in design, the substance of its direction was Lebanese.

Secondly, and by extension, the use of mosque networks, the reconfiguration of the *hawzat* curriculum, the appropriation of public Shi'i rituals and the cultivation of social service organisations demonstrate the intricacies of the Iran-Hizbullah relationship in praxis. Although the cultural and economic *capital* of the Islamic Republic could be transmitted to Hizbullah for establishing welfare institutions, Lebanon's compositional complexity and conditional particularities precluded the horizontal transposition of Iran's organically acquired symbolic *capital*. Therefore, the struggle for symbolic *capital* in Lebanon's *SMF* depended upon the ability of Hizbullah individuals and institutions to independently adopt a transitional process of *capital* confirmation for mobilising prospective radical *habiti* into the *illusio* of the *SMF* by directly relating to their positions, dispositions and perceptions before consolidating a self-reproducing Resistance *habitus*. While the Islamic Republic provided the initial *capital* for Hizbullah to maintain its *heterodox* position by temporarily complying with the theoretical logic of *orthodox* practice in the *SMF*, it was Hizbullah's *OF* that pragmatically manoeuvred, managed and developed its *capital* to sustain the practical logic of its *heterodoxy* in the *SMF*.

5.3 Identifying Hizbullah in the *MSF*: Islamic Jihad and Islamic Resistance

The Military law of 1979 had attempted to modernise the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) by diluting confessional loyalties and boosting its strength to 50,000[256]. By 1982, despite institutional reforms and injections of assistance from abroad, U.S. Colonel Arthur Fintel revealed that the LAF remained plagued by sectarianism with the under-resourced brigades existing 'mostly on paper' (*MER*, 23 April, 1983: 18)[257]. The chronic ineffectiveness of the LAF led to the influx of actors vying for the dominant *orthodoxy* in the *MSF*. As radical Shi'i activists congregated in Ba'albeck, the *MSF* was not only overshadowed by clashes between the PLO-aligned Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and the Syrian-affiliated Amal, but Israel's occupation of Beirut in September 1982 and the PLO's withdrawal also complicated an increasingly convoluted *MSF*. Consequently, opportunities for the emerging Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* were inhibited by the presence of symmetrical actors, including Israel (80,000), Syria (30,000), UNIFIL (7,000) and the Multinational Forces (3,600), as well as asymmetrical forces, such as the South Lebanon Army (1,500) and the Lebanese National Resistance (*Jabhat al-Muqawama al-Wataniya al-Lubnaniya*)[258].

On 11 November 1982, Ahmad Kassir, in an action reminiscent of the attack on the Iraqi Embassy, killed 75 people after detonating his car at the Israeli headquarters in Tyre. This attack, which was purportedly orchestrated by Imad Mugniyeh, was followed by the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut on 18 April 1983, which killed 52 people, and the joint attacks on 23 October 1983 targeting the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 people, and a French military base, which killed 80 people (Hamzeh, 2004: 83) [259]. Moreover, on 12 December 1983, the 'Kuwait 17', which was linked to *Hizb al-Dawa* and included Mustapha Badr al-Din, a cousin and brother-in-law of Imad Mugniyeh, as well as Yousef Moussawi, a cousin of Islamic

[256] The Lebanese Constitution placed the LAF under the President but bestowed 'highest military' authority with the Minister of Defence. At the advent of civil war, President Franjiyeh and Minister of Defence Karami 'pulled in opposite directions and the blanket tore' leading to the disintegration of the LAF (Fuad Lahoud in *MER*, 26 June, 1982: 12-14). In 1976, whereas Lieutenant Ahmed al-Khatib deserted the LAF to form the PLO-affiliated Arab Army, Colonel Antoine Barakat left the LAF to pledge allegiance to President Franjiyeh. Major Sa'ad Haddad also severed ties with the LAF to head the Israeli-endorsed SLA (El-Khazen, 2000: 332-333; *MER*, 26 June, 1982: 13). The Military Law created the Higher Defence Council (HDC) was attached to the Ministry of Defence and above the Military Council, which consisted of the President and Prime Minister (*MER*, 29 January, 1983: 10).

[257] The LAF was allocated 25% of Lebanon's national budget and received financial assistance from France, Italy and the U.S. Nevertheless, 60% of its 2,200 officers were Christian while most of its soldiers were Shi'i from rural areas. By the early 1980s, the LAF consisted of 12 mostly sectarian composed brigades of approximately 25,000 men (*MER*, 29 January, 1983: 10; 19 March, 1983: 18; 23 April, 1983: 18; 15 December, 1984: 12-13).

[258] In its 21 September 1982 manifesto, the LNR is characterised as 'a movement borne out of parties and political groups of disparate doctrines and orientations and different outlooks…but that are united on one particular point, which is the defence of occupied Lebanese land, to repel the dangers of occupation and end it' (*MER*, 15 September, 1984: 8).

[259] Imad Mugniyeh, the nephew of prominent Shi'i cleric Shaykh Jawad Mugniyeh, fought with the PLO in the early stages of the civil war and allegedly planned the operation in Tyre with the assistance of Abu Jihad, his former Palestinian commander (Seale, 1990: 468; Blanford, 2011: 53). The 1983 attacks in Beirut were either in response to the involvement of France and the U.S. in the civil war or because of their support of Iraq against Iran (Hamzeh, 2004: 83).

Amal leader Husayn Moussawi, killed six people in six simultaneous attacks on U.S., French and Kuwaiti assets in the Gulf state (Jaber, 1997: 127-129).

The Islamic Jihad Organisation (*Munazzamat al-Jihad al-Islami*) claimed responsibility for all of these attacks[260]. Citing their collective religious identity, ideological compatibility and overlapping social networks, some commentators argue that the IJO was a convenient pseudonym for the military wing of Hizbullah in which a cohesive collection of Shi'i cells, acting at the behest of Iran, committed terrorist atrocities against Western targets[261]. Substantiating this argument, these authors refer to the elevated positions of IJO operatives within the institutionalised hierarchy of Hizbullah's military structures in the mid-1980s. Whereas the Islamic Resistance was deployed to the South in 1984 to combat Israel, the Special Security Apparatus (SSA), which was ostensibly an extension of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and National Security (SAVAMA), was responsible for covert surveillance and intelligence (Hamzeh, 2004: 70)[262]. According to Ranstorp (1997: 68-70), Hizbullah's SSA was comprised of prominent IJO members, such as Imad Mugniyeh, Abd al-Hadi Hamadi and Husayn al-Khalil[263].

Conversely, another cadre of scholars suggests that the IJO was an amorphous and semi-autonomous collection of individuals motivated by both instrumental as well as ideological factors[264]. While acknowledging the congruent affinity of Shi'i revolutionary activism between Iran, Hizbullah and the IJO, this cohort cites the IJO's idiosyncratic behaviour as indicative of its unorganised and relatively independent composition. Moreover, the IJO's alleged role in Hizbullah's SSA must be relationally examined in the context of Hizbullah's lack of organisational cohesion in the *SMF* and its limited operational presence in the *MSF*. As seasoned stakeholders in the *MSF*, structured with dispositions towards Shi'i revolutionary activism, the IJO represented a separate entity that could continue to pursue its own practice while concurrently facilitating and assimilating into Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. By applying a Bourdieu-SMT approach, this section intends to provide a conceptual and practical explanation for a perspective that reinforces an

[260] While the IJO initially claimed responsibility for the Tyre operation, Hizbullah took credit for the attack in a communique in August 1985 and commemorates his death annually on *Yom al-Shuhada* as one of its 12 'self-sacrificing' martyrs. Due to its organisational infancy, it is unlikely that Hizbullah perpetrated this assault but proclaimed its responsibility because the operation targeted Israel (Blanford, 2011: 64; Sankari, 2005: 207).
[261] These commentators include Deeb (1988), Kramer (1993), Ranstorp (1997), Hamzeh (2004) and Levitt (2013, 2014).
[262] Initially, the SSA was under the command of Shaykh Abbas Moussawi before Wafiq Safa took over in 1985. This unit was divided into three branches: the central security apparatus; the *Amn al-Hizb* ('Party Security'); and the *Amn al-Khariji* ('Overseas Security') (Ranstorp, 1997: 68-69).
[263] Security policy was supposedly filtered down from Iran's National Security Council to the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements and then to the Pasdaran before being relayed to Hizbullah via Husayn al-Khalil, an IJO operative who managed security in the South for Islamic Amal's Husayn Moussawi before joining Hizbullah's SSA (Ranstorp, 1997: 85; Wege, 2012: 772).
[264] This group of scholars includes Piscatori (1989), Norton (1997), Baer (2003), Jaber (1997) and Azani (2011).

interpretation whereby the Islamic Resistance and Islamic Jihad were convergent in identity and ideology but divergent in purpose and practice.

In Part Six of its 1985 'Open Letter' entitled 'Our Main Enemies', Hizbullah claims that 'our populace has chastised them [the U.S., Israel and France] on 18 April and 23 October 1983. The Islamic Resistance launched a war of attrition against the invading Israeli forces and was to destroy two leading military headquarters'. This extract poses an integral question regarding Hizbullah's induction into Lebanon's *MSF*, namely the deliberate distinction made between 'our populace' and the 'Islamic Resistance'. Whereas IJO attacks on foreign targets in 1983 were attributed to 'our populace', Hizbullah appeared to claim credit for the suicide attacks against Israel by Ali Husayn Safieddine on 13 April 1984, which occurred after the assassination of Shaykh Ragheb Harb on 14 February 1984, and by Hassan Kassir on 7 February 1985, which followed the assassination of Shaykh Abdullatif al-Amin on 15 November 1984.

Supporting this division, Hizbullah, which consistently expressed pride in its martyrdom operations, condoned but never admitted involvement with IJO activities (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 95-96)[265]. While Shaykh Tufayli and Shaykh Qassem revealed that the IJO emanated from the same 'Islamic Current' (*al-tayyar al-islami*), they denied any formal association (Blanford, 2011: 77; Jaber, 1997: 142; Hamzeh, 2004: 77). Similarly, although confirming the existence of the IJO and its operations, Sayyid Nasrallah asserted that 'it was independent from the party. It is absolutely incorrect that the Islamic Jihad was a cover name for Hizballah' (*Al-Wasat*, 3 March, 1996). However, since Hizbullah was predicated on an Iranian-infused logic of Islamic Resistance, the core assumption is that the IJO, which was also comprised of radical Lebanese Shi'i aligned to the Islamic Republic, represented the operational arm of the Party of God in the *MSF* during the early years of its emergence. Therefore, the complex composition and association of these Shi'i agents, such as Hizbullah, the IJO and Islamic Amal, strategically aligned in identity yet diametrically separated in practice, can be illustrated by examining their underlying purpose and uneven development in the *MSF* in juxtaposition with Iranian interests.

[265] Hizbullah displays biographies, videos and commemorations of its 12 'self-sacrificing martyrs' on its *Al-Manar* and *Al-Moqawama websites*. In 1985, Husayn Moussawi stated that 'we know nothing of Islamic Jihad…it does not exist' (*MER*, 15 June, 1985: 16). Additionally, neither Hizbullah nor Sayyid Fadlallah condoned the policy of kidnapping foreigners on political, moral and religious grounds (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 97; *MER*, 21 September, 1985: 7-8).

Contrary to the assertion that his movement and Hizbullah were synonymous, Husayn Moussawi explained in 1983 that 'the Islamic revolution is the source of all power and theologian rulings, which are extended through the clergymen of Hizbullah, the tributary, and carried out by members in Islamic Amal, the instruments'[266]. While Hizbullah represented a nucleus of clerics charged with transferring *capital* from Iran to cultivate a Resistance *habitus* within Lebanon's *SMF*, these figures neither possessed the experience nor familiarity with the logic of the *MSF*. Therefore, the non-clerical elements of 'Islamic Amal', mostly derived from the security branches of Amal in the *MSF*, not only provided Hizbullah with an interim body of fighters to conduct operations on its behalf, but also assisted in training prospective recruits for the Islamic Resistance. Whereas Hizbullah's development of an inscribed Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF* was a meticulous process, and with Islamic Amal equally ill-equipped to fulfil Iran's immediate interests in the *MSF*, the Islamic Republic required a temporary and flexible alternative.

Following the eruption of Iran-Iraq hostilities, Lebanon signified a way for Iran to retaliate against and leverage the U.S. and France for their tacit support of Saddam Husayn. In 1982, two Pasdaran officers, Mehdi Nezhad and Hossein Mosleh, were despatched to the Biqa' to form the equivalent of Fatah's Black September from remnant Lebanese Shi'i fighters who were disbanded after the withdrawal of the PLO (Baer, 2003: 883, 889). This IJO unit of professional Shi'i combatants, endowed with extensive social and cultural *capital* from both the PLO as well as *Hizb al-Dawa*, would act as a rapid response conduit for executing Iran's agenda in the *MSF* in the absence of a more permanent and organised presence[267]. Subsequently, rephrasing Deeb's (1986: 19) analogy, Hizbullah and the IJO were gravitationally part of Iran's solar system but traced distinct, yet intersecting, orbits. Although orchestrated by Iran, these two components were neither beholden to the Islamic Republic nor were they organisationally mature enough to be conjoined in coordination. This is perhaps why the IJO, 'the hunting dogs of Iran', were supplied with diplomatic passports not offered to Hizbullah (Jaber, 1997: 117; Hirst, 2010: 226)[268]. The operational distinction in the *MSF* is evident when comparing the *heterodox* practice of the IJO

[266] Similarly, Hizbullah was described as 'the overall title of groups of Shiite clerics and theologians who provide religious guidance for activists and operatives engaged in any kind of action, violent or political, for the promotion of the Islamic Revolution' (*MER*, 24 December, 1983: 14). Islamic Amal provided the 'logistics and operational center for the terrorist acts perpetrated by the first units of Hizbullah' (Shapira, 1988: 125; Piscatori, 1989: 302; Wege, 1994: 154).
[267] Islamic Jihad was the name of a journal and radio station in Tehran associated with *Hizb al-Dawa* (*MER*, December 24, 1983: 12).
[268] Jaber (1997: 117) refers to Imad Mugniyeh, the Hamiyehs, Moussawis, Aqeels, Shehadehs and Ezzedeens.

during the hostage crisis alongside the Islamic Resistance's struggle for *orthodoxy* against the LNR and Amal[269].

As evidenced by the retaliatory seizure of AUB President David Dodge on 19 July 1982 following the capture of four Iranians by the Lebanese Forces, as well as the series of abductions from February 1984 until January 1985 aimed at liberating the 'Kuwait 17', the IJO initially employed kidnapping as a reactive strategy[270]. Since this approach was a relatively low-risk, practically convenient and financially rewarding method for leveraging more dominant actors, this *heterodox* practice became recognised as an effective and proactive tactic in the *MSF* with a plethora of groups resorting to kidnapping as a means of achieving personal and ideological objectives[271]. Consequently, the IJO was one of a variety of loose 'organisations' in the *MSF* involved in the business of hostage taking. While elements within this emerging trend, such as Ahmad Shouker, appeared varied in their motivations and allegiances, IJO demands remained mostly consistent in mirroring the interests of the Islamic Republic by compelling France to cease its support of Iraq and enticing the U.S. to exchange arms for hostages[272].

Nevertheless, the bombings of 1983, the killing of Malcolm Kerr (January, 1984), the murder of William Buckley (June, 1985) and the hijacking of three airplanes (1985-1988) not only demonstrated the levels of violence inflicted by the IJO, but also revealed the detached dispositions of a semi-autonomous unit directed by an Iranian-aligned strategy as well as guided by emotively-infused personal vendettas[273]. Incidentally, IJO members were either related by familial ties, their former affiliations with the PLO or their links to 'Ayn al-Dilbah in Beirut's southern suburbs (Baer, 2003)[274]. This *collusio* of radical *habiti*, conceived in the *SMF* but consolidated in the

[269] The hostage crisis, which resulted in the abduction of 87 Western citizens, started with the kidnapping of David Dodge, the President of AUB, on 19 July 1982, and concluded on 17 June 1992 with the release of Thomas Kemptner and Heinrich Strubig, two German relief workers (Hirst, 2010: 227).

[270] These included Frank Regier (February 1984), Christian Joubert (February 1984), Jeremy Levin (March 1984), William Buckley (March 1984), Benjamin Weir (May 1984) and Laurence Martin Jenco (January 1985) (Baer, 2003: 333).

[271] Examples include the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, the Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims, the Organisation of the Oppressed on the Earth, the Believers Resistance Front, the Holy Warriors for Freedom, the Organisation for the Defence of Free People (Jaber, 1997: 120-125; Baer, 2003: 300-340; Hirst, 2010: 225-230).

[272] Despite being a Shi'i and a member of the Organisation of the Oppressed, Ahmad Shouker acted as a freelancer, kidnapping Peter Kilburn, Leigh Douglas, Philip Padfield and Alec Collett before selling them to pro-Libyan groups who killed the hostages in retribution for the U.S. raid from Britain on Libya in April 1986 (Jaber, 1997: 121. The IJO captured French nationals, including Jean-Paul Kaufmann and Michel Seurat (May, 1985) as well as Marcel Coudry and a four-man French television crew (March, 1986), to prevent France pursuing arms deals with Iraq while pressuring the country to agree to a $1billion loan to Iran (Hirst, 2010: 227-229). Benjamin Weir (September, 1985), Laurence Jenco (July, 1986) and David Jacobson (November, 1986) were allegedly released as part of the Iran-Contra affair (Picco, 1999: 101-102).

[273] The IJO were responsible for hijacking TWA 847 (June, 1985), Iraqi Airways 163 (December, 1986) and Kuwait Airways 422 (April, 1988). The group has also been accused of murdering Michel Seurat (5 March 1986) and Colonel William Higgins (6 July 1990). Whereas the latter is thought to have died of hepatitis while in captivity, Colonel Higgins was reportedly taken by the Believers Resistance Front with the IJO unusually not claimed credit for the kidnapping (Hirst, 2010: 225-230).

[274] The IJO 'Ayn al-Dilbah familial connection is evident throughout the hostage crisis era. Ri'bal Jallul, one of the hijackers of Iraqi Airways 163 was the younger brother of Jihad Jallul, a resident of 'Ayn al-Dilbah with connections to Abd al-Hadi Hamadi. Furthermore, the Islamic Liberation Organisation, a group formed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Shaykh Sha'ban in July 1985, kidnapped four Soviets later that year to stop Syria's offensive on Tripoli. Subsequently, a Shi'i named Khudur Salameh, later

MSF was a bond of inscribed identity and solidarity that transcended the transference of *capital* from Iran. This camaraderie may illustrate the cause for the IJO's erratic behaviour and the discernible discrepancies during the hostage crisis in reconciling Iranian interests with personal agendas.

Firstly, whereas the 'Kuwait 17' were not a strategic priority for Iran, the IJO's exhaustive efforts to secure their release may be explained by the fact that Mustapha Badr al-Din was both the brother-in-law and accomplice of Imad Mugniyeh. Secondly, Anis Naqqash, who was arrested for attempting to assassinate Chapur Bakhtiar, the former Iranian prime minister, was Mugniyeh's mentor in *Katiba al-Jarmaq*, the Maoist militia that fought alongside the PLO[275]. Thirdly, the decision to detain Terry Anderson for over six years (18 March, 1985 – 4 December, 1991) may be connected to the assassination attempt on Sayyid Fadlallah on 8 March 1985, an attack that killed Jihad Mugniyeh, the cleric's bodyguard and Imad's brother. Fourthly, the incessant obstinacy of Abd al-Hadi Hamadi in releasing hostages may be related to his insistence on freeing his brothers, Muhammad Ali and Abbas Ali, both of whom had been arrested in Germany[276]. Lastly, the demand to release Lebanese Shi'i prisoners from Israeli prisons was more likely an appeal driven by personal networks than a calculated directive from Iran.

Speaking one year since the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War and two months after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Hashemi Rafsanjani, the newly elected Iranian President, admitted that 'we have had no relations for some time with those holding the hostages. They are not traditional Hizbollah' (Picco, 1999: 113). While the kidnappers were Shi'i, endowed with the shared spiritual and political beliefs of the Islamic Republic, they were also rogue Lebanese actors adamant not to 'give up something in exchange for nothing' (Chehabi, 2006: 291; Picco, 1999: 165). Therefore, when reviewing the relationship between Iran's *PF* and the IJO in Lebanon's *MSF*, the advantages of access and flexibility that attracted the Islamic Republic to the IJO's composition was counterbalanced by the disadvantages of a semi-autonomous body subjected neither to the control nor the co-option exerted over a structured organisation. As Iran shifted from revolutionary confrontation with the West to pragmatic accommodation, especially by attempting to amend Paragraph

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revealed as Ali Dib, was arrested. Ali Dib had not only served Fatah in 'Ayn al-Dilbah in 1975, but he was also linked to the hijacking of Kuwait Airways 422. Moreover, Imad Mugniyeh negotiated the release of the Soviets with Yasser Arafat (Baer, 2003: 366-370, 405-406; *MER*, 2 November, 1985: 11-12).

[275] Naqqash, who was eventually pardoned by French President Francois Mitterrand, also maintained personal ties with Ahmad Khomeini, Ayatollah Khomeini's son, and Mohsen Rafiqdost, the head of the Pasdaran.

[276] Muhammad Ali was arrested on 13 January 1987 for his role in hijacking TWA flight 847 whereas Abbas Ali was detained shortly afterwards for his role in kidnapping Rudolf Cordes and Alfred Schmidt (Baer, 2003: 405-406).

6 of UNSC Resolution 598 in attributing blame for the Iran-Iraq War to its adversaries, Iran's *PF* initiated a relational realignment of its *field* homology with Lebanon's *MSF* to reflect its perception of *capital* within a revised *FIP*. In this recalculation, the IJO's inscribed disposition of *heterodoxy* was rendered irrelevant in a post-civil war epoch of reconstituted *orthodoxy*.

Conversely, the principal priority for Hizbullah in 1982 was to institutionalise a *collusio* of Resistance *habiti* through a cohesive *OF* before despatching military units in the *MSF*. In the interim, as demonstrated with the seizure of the Shaykh Abdullah barracks in 1983, Islamic Amal acted as the conduit for Hizbullah's interests in the *MSF*[277]. Therefore, the official entrance of Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance (*al-moqawama al-islamiyya*) into Lebanon's *MSF* as a 'unified organisation' occurred in mid-1984 (Chehabi, 2006: 225). On 13 April 1984, the Islamic Resistance had announced its first suicide operation. Furthermore, in an effort to boost its limited social *capital* in the *MSF*, the Islamic Resistance began coordinating with the predominantly leftist LNR in its attacks against Israel (*MER*, 15 September, 1984: 10)[278]. By the end of 1984, the Iranian Pasdaran had established six Islamic Resistance military centres in the Biqa'. Although Hizbullah's 1985 Open Letter embellished its operational impact, the Islamic Resistance remained eclipsed by the LNR in the *MSF* with the coalition claiming responsibility for 1,219 attacks on Israeli and SLA positions between 20 September 1982 and 16 February 1985 (*MER*, 23 February, 1985: 9). Moreover, of the 24 suicide attacks in 1985, the Islamic Resistance had only orchestrated two of them[279]. During its first year of combat, the Islamic Resistance, despite erroneously claiming credit for 90% of operations against Israel, had lost 156 fighters with its tactics characterised as militarily reckless, ill-disciplined and displaying limited strategic nous (Malthaner, 2011: 224)[280].

In order to address its operational deficiencies while concurrently competing with the effectiveness of the LNR in the *MSF*, Hizbullah's *OF* decentralised military command

[277] Islamic Amal's Husayn Moussawi allegedly masterminded the attack on the Shaykh Abdullah barracks (*MER*, 19 March, 1983: 11-12). The Shi'i leader claimed that by December 1983, 8/10 attacks on Israel in the South were conducted by Islamic Amal (*MER*, 3 December, 1983: 10). Additionally, the Fajr Brigades, an Iranian unit affiliated to the Revolutionary Guards, had begun fighting with the LNR against Israel by this time (*MER*, 17 December, 1983: 18). The IJO purportedly held hostages at the Shaykh Abdullah barracks. While sharing a common identity and regional patron, it is likely that the IJO were based in the same area as Hizbullah without being organisationally linked.

[278] The formation of the LNR was declared on 16 September 1982 by the Lebanese Communist Party and the Organisation for Communist Action in Lebanon (Barda, 2004). By January 1983, the LNR claimed responsibility for 41 operations and the death of 282 Israeli soldiers (*MER*, 15 January, 1983: 6). Amal, a member of the LNR and which had seized considerable territory in West Beirut in February 1984 after the defection of Colonel Lofti Jaber from the LAF with his mostly Shi'i brigade, probably acted as a key intermediary in linking the Islamic Resistance with other militia groups (*MER*, 3 March, 1984: 8).

[279] Hassan Kassir on 5 February 1985 and Amer Kalakesh on 12 March 1985. The SSNP was responsible for 5, the Ba'ath Party for 5 and the Nasserites for 3 (Malthaner, 2011: 205).

[280] Comments relayed during an interview with Timur Goksel in Beirut, 9 May 2012. Hamzeh (1993: 322) states that the Islamic Resistance was responsible for the majority of attacks against Israel between 1984 and 1985. Considering its geographical scope and organisational immaturity compared with the LNR, this is likely an attempt to augment the stature of the Islamic Resistance.

to its geographical enclaves in the Biqa', Beirut and the South. By mid-1985, the intricate two-phase, two-year process for entrenching dispositions of *takalif al-shari* ('loyalty') amongst new recruits through *ta'bi'a* ('mobilisation') and *intizam* ('discipline'), as well as the *heterodox* practices of the Islamic Resistance, were managed by the centralised structures of Hizbullah's *OF* (Deeb, 1988: 696-697)[281]. However, recognising the need for operational flexibility and efficiency, area commanders in the Islamic Resistance were extended responsibility in planning and executing military tactics (Jaber, 1997: 38). In the South, the area was divided into four administrative spheres (Iqlim al-Touffah, Nabatiyeh, Tibnine and Tyre) then subdivided into sectors (*qita'at*) of around 12 villages with groups (*majmuat*) operating on the local level (Blanford, 2011: 80; Hamzeh, 2004: 71).

Regardless of the operational restructuring, the challenges for the Islamic Resistance in the South oscillated around its inability to replicate the compatibility of its *MSF* Resistance *habitus* in the Biqa' and Beirut with its manifestation in the South, an integral component in legitimising Hizbullah's confrontation with Israel. Whereas Hizbullah's preferred mobilisational practice of 'utilitarian exchange' between traditional loyalty and contemporaneous Resistance through semi-autonomous networks generated traction in Beirut and the Biqa', the embedded social structures of the South prioritised the collective solidarity of Shi'i individuals against Israel over the imposed integrity of the Islamic Resistance (Malthaner, 2011: 198). Considering Amal's consolidated influence and privileged position, Shi'i from the South contributed disproportionately fewer martyrs to the Islamic Resistance between 1983 and 1985 (Malthaner, 2011: 197). However, the War of the Camps (1985-1988), which polarised the *orthodoxy* of the *MSF* between pro-Syrian and pro-Palestinian actors, combined with the internecine battle between Hizbullah and Amal (1988-1990), presented the Islamic Resistance with opportunities to capitalise on LNR disintegration and subvert Amal's dominance amongst the Shi'i community in the South.

Firstly, with Syria intending to monopolise the *MSF* by curbing resurgent PLO activity in the camps of south Beirut, President Hafez al-Assad mobilised Amal to neutralise the perceived Palestinian threat. Conversely, Amal's LNR allies, such as the PSP and LCP, who had assisted the Shi'i movement in dismantling the pro-Palestinian

[281] The first phase focused on religious aspects of Hizbullah's Resistance while the second involved practical military training. If a recruit received a recommendation from a Hizbullah cleric, they would be exempt from the first phase (Hamzeh, 2004: 76).

Mouribitoun in west Beirut in 1984, opposed the crackdown on the PLO[282]. Consequently, Nabih Berri's adherence to Syria's agenda in the *PF*, his abandonment of the Palestinian cause in the *SMF* and his preference for security over resistance in the *MSF* not only contributed to the deterioration of the LNR, but also exposed recurring contradictions within Amal's *OF*. Comparatively, by rejecting the logic of the *PF*, remaining supportive of the Palestinians in the *SMF* and prioritising Resistance over internal disputes in the *MSF*, Hizbullah's *OF* projected the ideological coherence and operational consistency that led many of Amal's members into becoming 'influenced by the Iranian model of political activism' (Shanahan, 2005: 112). Most notably, Mustapha Dirani, the head of Amal's Security in the South, defected to Hizbullah in 1985 and formed the Believers Resistance Front (Azani, 2011: 64)[283]. Furthermore, Hassan Hashim, Amal's Executive Chairman, instigated an uprising against the movement in 1987 while Mahmoud al-Faqih and Daoud Daoud, two prominent figures in Amal's southern command, were also relieved of duty (*MER*, 4 April, 1987: 7-10)[284].

Moreover, Hizbullah profited from a campaign targeting prominent leaders of the LCP, a core component of the LNR. In the weeks following the assassination of Husayn Mroue on 17 February 1987, nine LCP leaders were killed and 17 kidnapped (*MER*, 14 March, 1987: 13-14)[285]. Since the LCP posed a significant threat to Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* within the Shi'i community both in its collective action frame, as the non-sectarian champions of liberating the oppressed from Western capitalism, and in practice, as the vanguard of the anti-Zionist Resistance in Lebanon, leftist figures blamed the Hizbullah for orchestrating these attacks[286]. Despite these accusations, intra-LNR fragmentation increased Hizbullah's popularity as the Islamic Resistance recorded 283 attacks against Israeli positions in 1987 alone (Malthaner, 2011: 92). Furthermore, contrary to earlier figures, 75% of the 357 Hizbullah fighters who died between 1986 and 1988 were from the South (Malthaner, 2011: 207-214). Nevertheless, the rising stature of the Islamic Resistance caused Syria to reset the balance of actors in Lebanon's *MSF*. As 7,000 Syrian soldiers

[282] Syria's Lebanese allies in this campaign consisted of the anti-PLO Palestinian National Salvation Front, which included the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command, Saiqa, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, the Palestine Liberation Army and Fatah al-Intifada. This coalition also comprised of LAF General Michel Aoun and the SSNP (Deeb, 2003: 129-130).
[283] The Believers Resistance Front was responsible for the kidnapping of Israeli pilot Ron Arad on 16 October 1986 (Jaber, 1997: 29).
[284] Hassan Hashim was subsequently expelled from Amal along with his co-conspirators on 6 March 1987. Aql Hamiyya, Amal's chief military officer was also discharged for staging a revolt against the leadership (Shanahan, 2005: 111).
[285] Other assassinated LCP leaders included Ahmed al-Ayoubi, Mahdi 'Amil, Suheil Taweli, Khalil Naaous, Michel Wakeed, Nour Tawqan (Barda, 2004).
[286] In March 1987, a Hizbullah official was quoted saying 'there will not remain a singly communist alive in south Lebanon' (*MER*, 14 March, 1987: 13-14). During interviews conducted by the author, two Lebanese academics associated with the LCP claimed that Hizbullah was behind the attacks (Interviews with Walid Fakr al-Din, Beirut, 25 August 2012 and Mona Fayyad, Beirut, 17 August 2012). Contrarily, a former LCP member who is currently a fellow for the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation, a Hizbullah-affiliated research institute, denied Hizbullah's involvement (Interview with Hassan Jouni, 25 August 2012). There remains no concrete evidence implicating Hizbullah to the assassinations.

deploying to Beirut to prevent Amal's capitulation, on 24 February 1987, 23 members of the Islamic Resistance were killed by Syrian forces in Basta[287].

Secondly, the eruption of Hizbullah-Amal hostilities in 1988 also acted to enhance the *capital* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. Traditionally, while Hizbullah and Amal tacitly observed cordial relations to prevent the destructive ramifications of intra-Shi'i sedition (*fitna*), Iran and Syria mediated this arrangement to preserve their political interests. However, the abduction on 17 February 1988 of Colonel William Higgins, a U.S. Military Observer for UNIFIL, acted as the catalyst igniting Hizbullah-Amal tensions[288]. Since Colonel Higgins was under his protection in the South, Nabih Berri accused Hizbullah of attempting to undermine Amal and ordered his commanders to expel 1,000 Hizbullahis from the South or face dismissal (*MER*, 23 April, 1988: 14)[289]. As Abd al-Majid Saleh, Amal's Chief Political Officer, warned of an impending 'head-on collision', Shaykh Qassem (2005: 101) referred to this imminent confrontation as a 'fight for existence' (*MER*, 5 March, 1988: 9)[290]. The first five days of clashes in Beirut killed 100 people (*MER*, 14 May, 1988: 9).

As Syria and Iran strived to contain the situation by initiating negotiations, Hizbullah and Amal were engaged in a national struggle for symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community[291]. Whereas Amal fought to reassert its authority, Hizbullah sought to legitimise the insertion of the Islamic Resistance. Acknowledging the importance of accumulating social *capital*, Hizbullah not only deployed its cultural *capital* to discredit the Amal-aligned, 'un-Shiite' Higher Islamic Shi'i Council, but also deployed its economic *capital* by doubling the salary of prospective Amal defectors to $150-200 a month (*MER*, 23 July, 1988: 7; Picard, 1993: 37)[292]. In an effort to demonstrate its symbolic *capital* amongst the Shi'i, Hizbullah concurrently executed two suicide operations against Israel in 1988[293]. With Amal also adopting this tactic, the various

[287] During this 'Fathu'llah massacre', Hizbullah fighters were killed for refusing to dismantle a checkpoint in Beirut. Naim Qassem (2005) claimed that Hizbullah sacrificed retribution for its Resistance alliance whereas Blanford (2011: 90) reported that Hizbullah did plan to respond by assassinating Ghazi Kanaan, Syria's chief of intelligence in Lebanon.
[288] The Organisation of the Oppressed of the Earth and the Believers Resistance Front, neither of which was officially linked to Hizbullah or the IJO, have also been accused of kidnapping and killing Colonel Higgins after the kidnapping of Shaykh Obeid by Israel on 28 July 1989 (*MER*, 21 January, 1989: 18; *MER*, 12 August, 1989: 9).
[289] Shaykh Adib Haidar, the head of Amal's cultural section, was dismissed after refusing to condone the arrest of Hizbullah members (*MER*, 5 March, 1988: 11).
[290] Nabih Berri accused Hizbullah of deviating from the Iranian Revolution in its 'radicalism, kidnapping and terrorism' while Hizbullah's Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid accused Amal of attempting 'to uproot Islam and the Revolution' (*MER*, 23 April, 1988: 14). Whereas Amal chastised Hizbullah as a foreign product incompatible with Lebanon, Hizbullah slogans referred to Nabih Berri as the 'Nero of the southern suburbs' (*MER*, 7 May, 1988: 10; 21 May, 1988: 13).
[291] The first committee was convened in May 1988 and attended by Ayatollah Ahmed Janati (Ayatollah Khomeini's representative), Ahmed Destamalchian (Iran's Ambassador to Lebanon), Nabih Berri, Mohammed Shamseddine, Sayyid Fadlallah and Abbas Moussawi (*MER*, 21 May, 1988: 10).
[292] Approximately 300 fighters left Amal for Hizbullah (Picard, 1993: 37).
[293] Haytham Dbouk on 9 April and Abdullah Atwi on 19 October.

elements of the Lebanese Resistance conducted approximately 700 attacks on Israeli positions in 1988 (*MER*, 4 February, 1989: 8)[294].

Especially after the assassination of prominent Amal leaders, such as Daoud Daoud, Mahmoud al-Faqih and Hassan Sbaiti, in Ouzai on 22 September 1988, Hizbullah began to tighten its grip over Beirut's southern suburbs as well as consolidating its positions in the South by the time the first official ceasefire occurred in February 1989 (*MER*, 10 December, 1988: 8; 18 March, 1989: 11; Picard, 1993: 37)[295]. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the suicide operation of Assad Berro on 9 August 1989 in retaliation for the abduction of Hizbullah recruiter Shaykh Obeid ten days earlier, the Islamic Resistance continued to respond to Israeli activities in Lebanon. Nevertheless, despite this independently amplified *capital*, the Islamic Resistance remained susceptible to manoeuvres within the *FIP* due to the *field* homology between Iran's *PF* and Hizbullah's *OF*, as well as Syria's command over the predominant *orthodoxy* of Lebanon's *MSF*.

Primarily, following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1989, President Rafsanjani seized the opportunity to pursue a pragmatic policy of realigning his position in the *FIP* regarding the United States. Subsequently, the Pasdaran withdrew from Lebanon, Mohsen Rafiqdost was sacked and Ali Akbar Mohtashemi was reassigned (Chehabi, 2006: 228, 288). As its first official conclave was inaugurated on 11 November 1989, Hizbullah's *OF* had nurtured its own endogenous *capital* in Lebanon but remained reliant on the complementary transference of exogenous *capital* from Iran. Although deriding this strategic shift, Hizbullah reluctantly accepted that it was futile 'to wage jihad against the West when Iran itself was calling for a truce' (Hamzeh, 1993: 323). Moreover, Hizbullah's *OF* was beholden to the symbolic *power* of Syria in Lebanon. In the space of a year, President al-Assad reconstituted Lebanon's *PF* by finalising the Ta'if Accord on 22 October 1989, augmented his position in the *FIP* by supporting U.S. intervention in Kuwait in August 1990 and rebalanced Lebanon's *MSF* by defeating LAF General Michel Aoun in October 1990. A month later, Amal and Hizbullah were pressured to cease a two-year conflict claiming 500 lives (*MER*, 3 November, 1990: 8)[296]. Amal retained its hegemony over the South while Hizbullah was restricted to conducting

[294] The feud with Amal contributed to a decrease in the number of Hizbullah recruits in the South (Malthaner, 2011: 210).
[295] Hizbullah boasted a prominent presence in Iqlim al-Touffah, Iqlim al-Karroub, Jbaa, Jarju', Jibsheet, Deir Qanoun al-Nahr, Siddikin, Aiteet and Batouleh (*MER*, 18 March, 1989: 11; Picard, 1993: 37).
[296] The final ceasefire negotiation was attended by Farouk Shara'a (Syria's Foreign Minister), Ali Akbar Velayti (Iran's Foreign Minister), Shaykh Tufayli, Mohammad Shamseddine and Sayyid Fadlallah. Hizbullah lost an estimated 261 fighters between 1989 and 1991 (Malthaner, 2011: 224).

Resistance operations against Israel with the stationing of Syrian troops in Beirut ensuring that Hizbullah's activities in the southern suburbs would be monitored[297].

The shared confessional identity and revolutionary ideology exhibited by Shi'i actors in Lebanon during the civil war has caused scholars to presumptuously conflate the practices and purposes of Hizbullah and the IJO. In revisiting the evolution of these movements, the objective has been to conceptually explain and reinforce the argument that their respective inceptions and trajectories were mutually divergent. A Bourdieu-SMT approach illustrates the existence and expression of concurrent opportunities, mobilisational modalities and collective actions frames within relational *fields* of practice. While both represented corresponding consumers of horizontally transferred *capital* from Iran, Hizbullah was the embodiment of a durable movement, conceived in the *SMF* to cultivate and consolidate a Resistance *habitus* via the constitution of an *OF* before the institutionalisation of a cohesive Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF*. Conversely, the IJO symbolised an amorphous cell of experienced Shi'i operatives connected by familial networks, guided by semi-autonomous dispositions and activated solely in the *MSF* to execute Iran's immediate interests.

Conclusion

Following the Lebanese civil war, Sayyid Fadlallah stated that 'revolutionary dynamism has little to do with the present state of Iran and Syria…Although they may have the necessary forces and possibilities, their scope of action has become more limited' (Chehabi, 2006: 297). The pre-existing canon on Hizbullah's inception tends to be divided as to the causal factors behind its framing and practice. Subsequently, Hizbullah is either a 'palpable organization that receives orders and directions from Iran' or a 'fluid collection of groups over which Iran's real influence may be only nominal' (Norton, 1987: 101). Therefore, this chapter applied a Bourdieu-SMT approach to problematise the assumptions of previous examinations and to explain the relative balance of influence between endogenous and exogenous forces in the embryonic stages of Hizbullah's evolution in Lebanon.

Firstly, while the Iranian Revolution was instrumental in galvanising the disparate strands of radical *habiti* in the *SMF*, the transference of *capital* from the Islamic Republic should not be solely credited with igniting revolutionary dispositions or

[297] Sayyid Nasrallah allegedly dismissed this settlement and left for Iran (Chehabi, 2006: 229).

creating *collusio* amongst radical Shi'i *habiti* in Lebanon's *SMF*. Following the Najaf debates in the 1960s, in which the *heterodoxy* of revolutionary activism replaced the *orthodoxy* of apolitical quietism as the normative collective action frame for a new generation of Shi'i clerics, Musa al-Sadr and Sayyid Fadlallah were in the process of inducting the Shi'i into the *illusio* of the *SMF*. As the civil war aggravated the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of the Shi'i underclass, Sayyid Fadlallah's *heterodox* mobilisational frames of revolutionary activism, which contrasted al-Sadr's preference for *orthodox* practice, resonated more with a proliferating mass of radical *habiti* in the *SMF*.

Consequently, Israel's Operation Litani into South Lebanon, the influx of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Shi'i into Beirut, the expulsion of hundreds of young Shi'i clerics from Iraq and the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr all contributed to the harmonisation of radical Shi'i *habiti* in the *SMF*. In this context, the Iranian Revolution augmented the opportunities for radical Shi'i *habiti* to legitimise their *capital* rather than provide the impetus for these disjointed movements to coalesce into an organised *collusio*. Adopting conventional SMT terminology, it broadened the constituency of people susceptible to radical mobilisation, but it did not immediately result in social movement organisations capable of structuring or directing this constituency. In this way, 'Hizbullah was by no means the brainchild of any Iranian personality; in fact, its leadership nucleus had formed before the Islamic Revolution unfolded' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 306).

Secondly, Hizbullah's *OF* should neither be assessed as Iran's proxy nor perceived as organised and consistent. Those who view Hizbullah as purely a proxy of Iran refer to the movement's mobilisational tactics, such as the cultivation of mosque networks, the establishment of the *hawzat* system, the appropriation of Shi'i public rituals and the creation of social welfare organs as evidence that Hizbullah's *OF* represented duplications of pre-existing practices and institutions designed by the Islamic Republic. Moreover, not only is the construction of Hizbullah's *OF* interpreted as being imported from Iran, but its hierarchical structures are construed as centralised and cogent from its inception. Reinforcing this inseparable homology between Hizbullah and Iran, Shaykh Harb famously proclaimed that 'my house in Lebanon is the embassy of the Islamic Republic' (*The Times*, 23 February, 1984)[298].

[298] Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid said that 'we do not say that we are part of Iran; we are Iran in Lebanon and Lebanon in Iran (Alagha, 2011: 50).

Naturally, as adherents of Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary activism, Hizbullah intended to inculcate a Resistance *habitus* based on the Iranian prototype, one in which a Shi'i agent is 'a fighter, a religious person, a pious, an ascetic, an intellectual, and a political person, all incorporated into one person' (Sayyid Fadlallah in Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 111, 113). Subsequently, Hizbullah endeavoured to produce collective dispositions and perceptions within *al-moqawama al-mujtama* ('Resistance Society') that became 'the norm for a majority of the community' (Harb & Leenders, 2005: 192). However, rather than horizontally transfer and transpose *capital* from Iran, Hizbullah had to devise mobilising methods that adjusted and customised *heterodox* practice to the structural dynamics of Lebanon's *SMF*. Whether demonstrated by its efforts to reframe the concept of Resistance in localised contexts, its attempts to engage communities through grassroots mediation or its endeavours to relate to the specific needs and expectations of Lebanese Shi'i in the provision of social services, Hizbullah pursued *heterodox* practice by transforming imported *capital* into mobilisational modalities that were derived from and developed *orthodox* repertoires of confessional practice in Lebanon's *SMF*. While mainstream SMT may emphasise the objective presence of political opportunities, it is unable to explain that perceptions or permutations of opportunities are dependent on the homologous constitution within and between divergent *fields* of practice.

Furthermore, Hizbullah's *OF* should not be assumed as possessing a hierarchised structure or an institutionalised leadership from its inception. Conversely, entrenching harmonised dispositions and perceptions into consistently organised practice is an ongoing as opposed to a predetermined process. Although the Council of Lebanon was formed in 1983 and the *majlis al-shura* inaugurated in 1986, Hizbullah's *OF* only established a formalised Executive Consultative Council and Politburo that covered the Biqa', Beirut and the South during its First Conclave in 1989 (Harik, 2005: 54). Between 1982 and 1988 it was 'hard to define exactly who or what Hizbullah was' (Harik, 1994: 53). Additionally, until 1988, Hizbullah 'were paranoid…too suspicious and secretive, impossible to talk to and communicate with and extremely, unrealistically, fundamentalist'[299]. Therefore, attributing continuously cogent decision-making capabilities to a centralised *OF* undergoing its nascent stages of development threatens to bestow a strategic foresight that Hizbullah had yet to consolidate.

[299] These comments were cited by Timur Goksel in Jaber (1997:30) but repeated during an interview with the author in Beirut, 9 May 2012.

Thirdly, existing literature on Hizbullah confronts challenges in clarifying the relationship between the IJO and the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. While both converged with the Islamic Republic in confessional identity and revolutionary ideology, this chapter argued that they should be interpreted as distinct movements on account of their differentiated purposes and practices in the *MSF*. For Hizbullah, the priority was to establish a collective Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* managed by a cohesive *OF*. Since the cultivation of a sustainable military force was a meticulous process, Hizbullah did not deploy the Islamic Resistance into the *MSF* until 1984. Contrarily, devoid of hierarchical leadership structures or organisational cohesion, the IJO was an amorphous composition of seasoned Shi'i operatives trained by the PLO, linked to *Hizb al-Dawa*, conjoined by familial networks and tasked with serving Iran's immediate interests in Lebanon's *MSF* during its war with Iraq. Therefore, the IJO, originating from the *collusio* of radical *habiti* in the *MSF*, and Hizbullah, emanating from the *collusio* of radical *habiti* in the *SMF*, were plotted on parallel, not synonymous trajectories. A classical SMT perspective would not readily be able to capture the nuanced relationship between the divergent logics of these *fields*.

Similarly, the progressive incongruity between the Islamic Republic, the IJO and the Islamic Resistance can be explained by their respective evolutions. As evidenced by the IJO's semi-autonomous activities or the reticence of the Islamic Resistance to cease hostilities with Amal, Iran may have contributed *capital* to enhance the position of endorsed agents in the *MSF* but it was unable to dictate their practice. Ultimately, Lebanese actors were not passive receptacles but inscribed with pre-existing dispositions and perceptions that interpreted opportunities, strategically calculated the value of their *capital* and generated practice in dialectic relation to Lebanon's situational context. As Iran and Syria adjusted their *capital* to adapt to the revised reconstitution of the *FIP* following the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union, the IJO and the Islamic Resistance also realigned their positions in Lebanon. Whereas the *heterodoxy* of the IJO was rendered irrelevant in a post-civil war epoch and compelled its members to seek alternative avenues in the *MSF*, the Islamic Resistance, which had morphed into an organised force of approximately 4-5,000 fighters, was preparing to capitalise on the opportunities presented in the *FIP* to vie for the legitimate *orthodoxy* of its Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF* (Malthaner, 2011: 92; Ranstorp, 1997: 67; Wege, 1994: 155).

Although traditional SMT offers constructive explanatory concepts, such as political opportunities, mobilising structures and collective action frames, this chapter has

argued that a comprehensive examination of Hizbullah's evolution in the 1980s requires these principles to be supplemented by the analytical tools provided by a Bourdieusian perspective. Firstly, not all opportunities perceived by Hizbullah were limited to the political sphere. Rather, the introduction of concurrent *fields*, each determined by their specific logics, generative rules and structured opportunities, enables the identification of a diverse range of possible prospects and tactics for mobilisation. Secondly, each Shi'i agent propagates either *orthodox* or *heterodox* practice depending on their pre-existing dispositions, perceptions and positions. Therefore, Hizbullah cannot simply construct encompassing *heterodox* mobilisational repertoires but must firstly acquire and expend the recognised *capital* required to induct, integrate and inculcate agents into its modalities of collective action by acknowledging *orthodox* methods of practice in each *field*. Lastly, Hizbullah cannot project discursive frames unilaterally but must simultaneously maintain *field* homology by not only ensuring the convergence of transferred *capital* from Iran to its prospective agents, but also in reproducing the symbiotic synergy of its positions both within and between *fields* of practice in Lebanon.

Emerging on the peripheries of the Lebanese civil war, Hizbullah evolved from a *collusio* of radical *habiti* to a cohesive *OF* that presided over an embryonic yet synchronised homology of its Resistance *habitus* between Lebanon's *SMF* and *MSF*. Translating the transference of *capital* from the Islamic Republic, Hizbullah promoted *heterodox* practice by devising and adapting mobilisation strategies that resonated with Shi'i agents operating under the prevailing *orthodoxy* of Lebanon's structured *SMF* and *MSF*. Although cultivating and consolidating a Resistance *habitus* based on its endogenously accrued and legitimately recognised *capital*, the continued enhancement of Hizbullah's position remained mitigated against by the existence of more established actors in Lebanon. Furthermore, akin to the other warring factions in Lebanon, Hizbullah was also susceptible to a rearrangement of the *FIP* in which Syria augmented its symbolic *power* in Lebanon while Iran shifted from espousing revolution to embracing pragmatism. The next chapter will explore how Hizbullah's *OF* responded to these developments in order to maintain and sustain its positions in Lebanon.

Chapter Six

Infitah and the 'Lebanonisation' of Hizbullah (1992 – 2000)

'This charter wastes the blood of the martyrs. It implies the return to a regime worse than the one we have fought…It puts chains on the Lebanese people and transforms the country into a large Maronite prison'.

- *Hizbullah's Shaykh Tufayli in response to the Ta'if Accord (MER, 23 December, 1989: 10)*.

'If the Army is essential for the presence of the homeland, the State and sovereignty, the presence of more than one Army is the main cause for the loss of sovereignty, the disintegration of the State and the extinction of the homeland'.

- *Brigadier General Fuad Aoun (MER, 25 March, 1989: 10-11).*

'Whoever wants to take away our weapons must first liquidate us…we will not give them up and will continue to fight until all of our land is liberated'.

- *Hizbullah's Shaykh Qassem (Azani, 2011: 89).*

'They resist with their blood. Resist with your vote'.

- *Hizbullah campaign slogan in 1996.*

Addressing Lebanon's post-civil war settlement, Ghassan Tueni (1985, 2004) commented that the 'War of Others' inevitably led to the 'Peace of Others'. Although 62 Lebanese MPs were shuttled to Ta'if in Saudi Arabia to discuss terms, Syria directed the negotiations that resulted in the signing of the National Unity Charter for Lebanon on 22 October 1989, otherwise known as the Ta'if Accords (Harris, 2012: 255)[300]. Exploiting the opportunities emanating from the *hysteresis* of civil war, President al-Assad utilised Syria's geo-political and socio-economic links with its historically inseparable counterpart to augment the legitimacy of its symbolic *power*, a status in which Syria's *capital* was institutionalised as normatively indisputable in Lebanon. Whereas the Ta'if agreement cemented Syria as the custodian over the predominant *orthodoxy* of Lebanon's *PF*, by successfully mediating internecine Shi'i tensions between Amal and Hizbullah while also nullifying the threat of Christian actors, such as Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces and General Michel Aoun, Syria simultaneously consolidated its monopoly over Lebanon's *MSF*.

President al-Assad's calculated repositioning within a transitioning *FIP* further enabled Syria to reinforce its symbolic *power* over Lebanon. By facilitating the end of

[300] The Ta'if Accords followed at least eleven unsuccessful proposals from President Franjiyeh's National Committee for Dialogue in 1975 to the Husayni-Hoss Initiative in 1989 (Picard, 1996: 157-158; Salam, 2003: 42).

the civil war, leveraging its social *capital* with Iran and publicly endorsing the U.S. in condemning Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, thereby adjusting Syria's alignment away from the impending collapse of its former Soviet Union ally towards the looming prospect of U.S. unipolarity, President al-Assad ensured that its exclusive hegemony of Lebanon was not opposed by external actors. Consequently, Syria was elevated to an 'Ottoman arbitrator', a paradoxical embodiment of a 'destabilising stabiliser', 'an equilibrator of disequilibrium' and a *hamiha haramiha*, 'a guard who is a robber' (Ziadeh, 2006: 175). For Hizbullah, Syria's unbridled supremacy was perceived both as an enabling opportunity and a disabling threat.

The revision of *orthodoxy* within Lebanon's *PF* via 'novation', a concept that renegotiated the 1943 National Pact rather than reconstitute its inherent *doxa* (law), the Ta'if Accords directly undermined Hizbullah's Collective Action Frames by preserving the prevailing system (Salam, 2003: 43). Subsequently, the political settlement simply converted the impasse of the civil war into a new arrangement of fragmentation whereby mutual suspicion within and between communities reproduced competition and dependency (Leenders, 2012: 162-163). Regarding executive authority, the inauguration of the Troika, or the 'Three Presidencies', a governing triumvirate in which the President (Maronite), Premier (Sunni) and Speaker (Shi'i) divided the instruments of state power through a continuous process of interpersonal conciliation. With the influence of confessional actors neutralised, Syria maintained the balance and regulated conflicts from outside the institutional framework (Karam, 2009: 53). In the Council of Ministers, despite the Ta'if Accords allocating seats evenly between Muslims and Christians, stipulating equal representation and enshrining proportional representation amongst confessional groups within each religious community, the agreement repeated the implicit contradiction of the National Pact in that 'the three major communities were recognised as equal in principle, although in practice proportional priority was applied both among the three and vis-à-vis the other communities' (Ziadeh, 2006: 141; Halawi, 1992: 215). Within the *muhasasa* ('allotment') of an enlarged 128-member legislative, the Maronites were afforded 34 seats (26.5%) while 27 (21%) were distributed to both the Sunni and Shi'i (Nir, 2009: 178).

Therefore, although inter-communal dialogue was identified as the route to abolishing political sectarianism, its perception was informed by agents embedded within systemic practices of political sectarianism rendering its dissolution dependent on an indeterminate Lebanese timeframe (Hanf, 1993: 588). Consequently, the Ta'if

Accords created one nation, divided into two equal parts, sub-divided into three equal parts, 'supplemented by a row of equally un-subtractable parts of the One Lebanese People' who are 'divided equally on unrelinquishable regions of the One Lebanese Land' (Ziad Rahbani in Ziadeh, 2006: 143). Underneath the veneer of this compositional arrangement, Syria presided over the dominant *orthodoxy* of the *PF*, managed elite cleavages and defined legitimate forms of *capital*. However, since the doors were allegedly 'open to any actor accepting the rules of the game', this potential opportunity navigated Hizbullah between the Scylla of inclusion and the Charybdis of exclusion[301].

Derived from links to Iran and the Islamic Resistance against Israel, Hizbullah had acquired considerable supplies of cultural *capital* in the *MSF* to serve as a strategic asset in Syria's dealings with Tel Aviv and Tehran. Subsequently, while Lebanese Defence Minister Michel Murr declared on 23 March 1991 that 'all Lebanese and non-Lebanese armed groups must disarm', the Islamic Resistance was exempt from this order (*MER*, 30 March, 1991: 16; 13 April, 1991: 9)[302]. This approach would legitimately authorise Hizbullah's *OF* to pursue symbolic *capital* in the *SMF* and *MSF* without the risk of compromising the precepts of the Resistance discourse by engaging with the restrictive structures of the *PF*. Nevertheless, considering Syria's symbolic *power* in the *MSF*, a decision that spurned an inclusive process would not only threaten to reduce the independence of Hizbullah's *OF* by relying disproportionately on political protection from an historically unreliable Syrian partner intent on prioritising its interests in the *FIP*, but the Lebanese identity of the Islamic Resistance would also be tarnished with Hizbullah's *OF* perceived as a perennial outsider, detached from its counterparts in the *PF* and associated with the policies of external actors.

Contrarily, participation would launch Hizbullah's *OF* onto *terra incognita*, an unchartered course that implied a compromise in practice between military resistance and political representation whereby the relative benefits of engaging in a debilitating *PF* would be weighed against the possible implications of this shift on the integrity of its Collective Action Frames in the *MSF* and *SMF*. By implicitly bestowing legitimacy on the prevalent system, Hizbullah's *OF* would become exposed to the divisive cleavages Syria planned to exploit. Although premised on pluralism, the elite

[301] These rules included accepting the Ta'if Accords, demobilising militias (except the Resistance), rejecting violence in public life and swearing allegiance to Syria (Karam, 2005: 320).
[302] Militias were expected to handover their weapons and integrate into Lebanese military institutions. The document also banned illegitimate tax collecting, non-licenced media, parallel security and intelligence organs while offering amnesty to compliant militia leaders and approving the repatriation of displaced people (*MER*, 30 March, 1991: 16-17).

sectarianism of the *PF* remained predicated on a governing Troika to which Hizbullah had no access. Additionally, Amal, a seasoned Shi'i party that enjoyed extensive social *capital* with Syria, would endeavour to marginalise its Shi'i rival from the corridors of influence. Conversely, by realigning its Collective Action Frame to acknowledge the *illusio* of the *PF* in contesting the 1992 parliamentary elections, political presence would provide Hizbullah's *OF* with the opportunity to diversify its mobilising strategy to project a holistic platform with which to protect the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* and the Shi'i community in the *SMF* in accordance with the *orthodoxy* of Lebanon's structured context.

Hizbullah's subsequent 'Lebanonisation' has been widely cited in pre-existing literature[303]. However, this work struggles to problematise and reconcile the theoretical and practical logics of Hizbullah's 'Lebanonisation'. Overall, while this canon conceptually construes 'Lebanonisation' as an objectively observable and uniform process, it assumes that Hizbullah was compelled not only into engaging with the *orthodoxy* of political participation, but also in accepting the practical distinction of its ideological and political interests in Lebanon. From a traditional SMT perspective, the strategic calculations of a rational organisation would recognise the opportunities entailed in attaining political access and accordingly adjust its Collective Action Frames to translate the benefits of this shift to the subjective perceptions of its mobilising base. Alternatively, a Bourdieu-SMT approach, which interprets theoretical and practical logics as mutually constituted dialectics, offers a more comprehensive explanation for Hizbullah's 'Lebanonisation'. The objective of this chapter is to utilise this conceptual perspective to elucidate the evolution of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in Lebanon by examining two inter-related and durable processes.

Firstly, 'Lebanonisation' was a term coined by Sayyid Fadlallah to imply a temporary accommodation of the situational context as a means to facilitate change (Hamzeh, 1993: 18). While tacitly acknowledging the existence of Lebanon's *PF*, Hizbullah's *OF* neither submitted to its predominant *orthodoxy* nor succumbed to its institutional structures, its legitimate values of *capital* and its generative practices. Considering the inscribed dispositions of a structured and structuring Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* and *MSF* that contested the constitution of the system, Hizbullah's *OF* promoted *heterodoxy* in the *PF* to preserve the convergence of its ideological and

[303] Including Ranstorp (1998), Saad-Ghorayeb (2002), Harb and Leenders (2005), Harik (2005), Alagha (2006), Badran (2009a) and Azani (2011).

political interests. For Hizbullah's *OF*, perceived opportunities in the *PF* related to its *illusio* ('stakes') rather than the advantages of complying with *orthodox* practice. Therefore, Hizbullah's 'Lebanonisation' was one that prioritised presence over substance. By entering Lebanon's *PF*, Hizbullah's *OF* conceded that the objective opportunities presented by an entrenched *illusio* superseded subjective reservations concerning its legitimacy. Nevertheless, by inducting itself as a *heterodox* agent, retaining the homology of its Resistance *habitus* and refusing to subject itself to the expected *orthodoxy* of the *PF*, Hizbullah's *OF* advocated a position and practice antithetical to the notion of 'Lebanonisation'.

Secondly, Hizbullah's *OF* has consistently discarded the ambiguous connotations of 'Lebanonisation' while invoking *infitah* ('opening up') as a more sufficient term to describe the politicisation process (Jones & Catignani, 2010). By applying a Bourdieu-SMT framework, the multi-faceted complexities of this transitional policy can be illustrated through the dynamic multi-*field* management of Hizbullah's *OF* in maintaining the homology of its Resistance *habitus* within and between the *PF*, *SMF* and *MSF* as opposed to simplifying its activities to a linear equation of transforming objective opportunities into the subjective perceptions of mobilising agents via Collective Action Frames. By the end of the civil war, Hizbullah's *OF* had cultivated an analogous Resistance *habitus* between the *SMF* and *MSF* but remained unable to exercise exclusive command of individual practices since their agents were embedded within pre-existing *fields* of differentiated logics. Primarily, Hizbullah's *OF* aimed to transfer its *capital* in the *SMF* and *MSF* to the *PF*, a sphere in which Hizbullah possessed no recognisable *capital*, positional presence or practical experience. Moreover, Hizbullah's *OF* was responsible for reconciling the compatibility of its Resistance *habitus* between these three *fields*. This challenge required balancing its aggregated symbolic *capital* derived from *orthodoxy* in the *SMF*, its aspiring symbolic *capital* dependent on Syria's *orthodoxy* in the *MSF* and its annulment of symbolic *capital* on account of its *heterodoxy* in the *PF*.

6.1 Realigning the Resistance

From the latter stages of 1990 until the official proclamation of participation by Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah on 3 July 1992, Hizbullah was embroiled in internal discussions over the theoretical legitimacy and practical feasibility of engaging with the *PF* (Qassem, 2005: 191). Rather than confined to a discourse where agents within Hizbullah's *OF* juxtaposed the consequences of politicisation in

relation to the structured principles of the 1985 Open Letter, these deliberations considered the prospective impact of this decision on the perceptions and practices of its Resistance *habitus* across the *SMF* and *MSF*. The combination of realigning its Resistance *habitus* while sustaining organisational cohesion posed considerable opportunities and threats for Hizbullah's development. Initially, the majority of the *majlis al-shura*, presided over by Shaykh Tufayli since 1989, rejected any adherence to the intrinsic *doxa* and *illusio* of the *PF*. Consequently, Hizbullah's *OF* dismissed Prime Minister Omar Karami's post-war administration and released a declaration urging the government to safeguard independent 'political, intellectual, ideological and media freedoms' (Alagha, 2006). Reflecting this position, a senior Hizbullah official revealed that 'the political scene is not of any importance to us, and we don't want to interfere in it. The real issue lies in the South and the role of the Resistance in confronting the Israeli enemy' (*MER*, 20 April, 1991: 10).

Despite this rhetoric, the Ta'if Accords had caused a *hysteresis* within Hizbullah's *OF* over its future. Whereas Shaykh Tufayli represented the *orthodox* approach of emphatically opposing the Lebanese system, Shaykh Abbas Moussawi adapted his dispositions to propose a revised *orthodoxy* based upon his assessment of the Shi'i community as well as Iran's shifting practices in the *FIP*. Perceiving political pragmatism as an opportunity to ensure the durability of Hizbullah, Shaykh Abbas Moussawi replaced Shaykh Tufayli as Secretary General during the second conclave in May 1991 with the radical components of Hizbullah's *OF*, emanating from either *Hizb al-Dawa* or Islamic Amal, relegated to *heterodox* positions[304]. Subsequently, Hizbullah's *OF* reconstituted the *orthodoxy* of its strategic priorities towards the continuation of Resistance, the cessation of all intra-Lebanese disagreements through dialogue, the endorsement of *infitah* that propagates pluralism and national unity as well as supporting the alleviation of socio-economic and communal issues (Alagha, 2006: 150-151)[305]. This calculated policy signified Hizbullah's acknowledgement of survival within the status quo but did not indicate a substantive intention of allegiance. Akin to Ayatollah Khomeini's acceptance of the 'poisoned chalice' that concluded the Iran-Iraq War, the rules of the *PF* compelled Hizbullah's *OF* to submit to the 'Rhythm of Reality' (*MER*, 25 May, 1991: 8). In order to ensure that this symbolised an opportunity to be capitalised upon as opposed to posing a threat of co-option, Hizbullah's *OF* strived to internally reconcile the concept of

[304] This group included Shaykh Tufayli, Mohammad Fneish and Mohammad Ra'ad (*Hizb al-Dawa*) as well as Husayn Moussawi and Husayn al-Khalil (Islamic Amal) (Wege, 1994: 157; *MER*, 25 May, 1991: 10). The 1991 conclave established a 15-member Political Council and a 9-member Executive Council. The latter's three branches included Security, Jihad al-Bina as well as Enforcement, Recruitment and Propaganda (Hamzeh, 1993: 326).
[305] Hizbullah started negotiating with Christian parties across Lebanon at the beginning of 1992 (*MER*, 7 March, 1992: 16-17).

wilayat al-faqih while adjusting the diversification of its Collective Action Frames to maintain homology within and between its Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* and *MSF*.

Sayyid Fadlallah, assuming the role of *al-Murshid al-Ruhi* ('Spiritual Guide') rather than a Hizbullah leader, had addressed this conundrum in 1985. The Lebanese cleric, whose emphasis on implementing a democratically non-confessionalist *dawlat al-insan* ('a state for mankind') deviated markedly from Hizbullah's approach, believed the endemic corruption of the system and the improbable prospect of an Islamic state in Lebanon warranted revolutionary activists 'to strive to create an Islamic societal milieu...that would ultimately pave the way to revolutionary change' (Fadlallah, 1985: 31)[306]. For Hizbullah, the challenge lay in pursuing a course of action that demanded involvement in a reprehensible system for the purpose of initiating change. While the Party of God risked being exposed to laws and practices that subordinated Islamic values, the cost of stringently upholding conceptual principles at the expense of political access was potentially more detrimental to Hizbullah's sustainability in Lebanon. As articulated by Shaykh Qassem, 'we want to change the situation and one way to do that, no matter how many limitations it involves, is entering the parliament' (Azani, 2011: 97).

Even from a *heterodox* position, interacting with the *PF* presented four distinct opportunities for Hizbullah. Firstly, Hizbullah could garner cross-confessional support against the Israeli occupation by expounding the ethos, justification and legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance within the parameters of the *PF*. Secondly, by using parliament to lobby against kleptocracy, clientalism and the inequity of socio-economic initiatives, Hizbullah could grant the *PF* '*de facto* recognition' to amplify the needs of the Shi'i community on a '*de jure* basis' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 28). Thirdly, by entering the *illusio* of the *PF*, the parliamentary subsidiary of Hizbullah's *OF*, and by extension the Party's core leadership, would be recognised as a legitimate Lebanese actor. Fourthly, by rivalling Amal's *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, Hizbullah could augment its symbolic *capital* in the *SMF* as a credible representative of the Shi'i community. Ultimately, since 'political life dictates practical interaction with other groups without delving into the ideological background of every party', Hizbullah would enhance its agenda of achieving symbolic *capital* and affecting change by accessing new channels for boosting its cultural and social *capital* through legislative votes, parliamentary committees and political fora (Alagha, 2006: 151).

[306] A detailed account on the aspects of democracy, accountability and justice within Fadlallah's approach is included in the rest of the article that appeared in *al-Muntalaq* on 27 February 1985 (Sankari, 2005: 238-239).

Therefore, Sayyid Nasrallah ridiculed any 'contradiction between participating in the elections and serving in parliament and between continuing the battle for your true rights' (Azani, 2011: 98). While the inherent *doxa* of the *PF* in Lebanon precluded the acquisition of symbolic *power*, Hizbullah could use the *PF* to increase its symbolic *capital* in the *SMF* and assist in striving for symbolic *capital* in the *MSF*. Since there was no discernible incompatibility between pluralist democracy, albeit consociational, and Hizbullah's philosophy, political accommodation was not perceived as an alternative to its Resistance *habitus*. Rather than an equation contingent upon reconciling polarised narratives, Hizbullah could adapt Shi'i political thought within the relative flexibility and openness of Lebanon's *PF*. Consequently, although Hizbullah's *OF* managed to acclimatise its dispositions to the preconditions of the *PF*, the Party could not unilaterally embark upon this transitional process without realigning the perceptions of its constituents in the *SMF*. Despite accruing symbolic *capital* in the *SMF*, Hizbullah did not possess unwavering loyalty within a dynamic Shi'i community. After 15 years of civil war, the Shi'i were directed as much by socio-economic concerns as they were by questions of identity and ideology.

The conflict resulted in 144,240 deaths and an estimated 1.2 million internally displaced people from a post-war population of 2.7 million (*MER*, 14 March, 1992: 12; Nasr, 2003: 144-148)[307]. By 1990, Lebanon's budget deficit was 387 billion Lebanese Pounds (LP), or 65% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with a mounting debt of 1,200 billion LP, or almost 200% of GDP (*MER*, 5 May, 1990: 17). According to Premier Omar Karami, the overall cost of reconstruction would be $4.5 billion over five years (*MER*, 14 December, 1991: 7)[308]. Aggravating these conditions, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait denied Lebanon of Saudi Arabia, its major trading partner, as well as a significant proportion of its remittances since Lebanese expatriates were forced to return from the Gulf (*MER*, 15 September, 1990: 12-14). While the Lebanese Central Bank managed to avoid liquidation, the plummeting depreciation of the currency, the decline in exports, the fall in foreign reserves and stagnating GDP rendered the economy in need of $8-10 billion (*MER*, 5 May, 1990: 18; 16 June, 1990: 17)[309]. After failing to deliver a viable economic strategy, riots over the price of food led to the resignation of Premier Karami on 8 May 1992 (*MER*, 9 May, 1992: 7). The influx of 200,000 Syrian workers as well as goods flooding the Lebanese market,

[307] Approximately 670,000 Christians and 157,500 Muslims emigrated from Lebanon (Khalaf, 2003: 134).
[308] Around 57.6% was needed for infrastructure, 26.9% for social needs, 13.1% to boost productive sectors and 2.4% for project expenses. Lebanon subsequently received pledges of $2.7 billion from Arab and international donors (*MER*, 14 December, 1991: 7).
[309] One short-term positive was that since the government borrowed from the Central Bank rather than raising revenue from the public, the decline in public spending decreased the deficit and foreign debt (*MER*, 6 July, 1991: 13).

combined with the liberal economic doctrine of Rafiq Hariri, Karami's successor, that preferred to rely on foreign investment to boost domestic growth, caused increased income inequality, alienated the lower classes and prioritised Beirut as a source of stimulus (Gambill, 2009: 134-135; Harris, 2012: 260).

Under these circumstances, Sayyid Nasrallah admitted that Hizbullah conducted surveys prior to the elections to gauge Shi'i public opinion (Azani, 2011: 97). Presumably compiled by the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), a Hizbullah-affiliated institute responsible for producing scientific research on socio-economic issues, the findings would have mirrored two surveys by AUB that aimed to measure Hizbullah's popularity within an increasingly heterogeneous Shi'i community[310]. While a poll of 1,427 respondents in 1992 reported that 62% of Shi'i would vote for the Resistance, a 1993 survey of 405 respondents revealed that Hizbullah (41%) was the most popular Shi'i party in Lebanon (Harik, 1996: 41-67; 2005: 50)[311]. Most saliently, dispelling the assumption that Hizbullah represented the pious Shi'i underclass, 44% identifying with 'high socio-economic status' indicated an affiliation with Hizbullah compared to 35% for Amal (Harik, 1996: 55). Moreover, of the 76% that recorded 'moderate' or 'low' religiosity, only 12% described their primary identity as Shi'i with 43% considering themselves Lebanese first and 41% supporting the current political system over an Islamic state (Harik, 1996: 53-56; Azani, 2011: 96).

Although the methodology of these samples encountered geographical limitations, the general trend demonstrated that the provision of social services, for which Hizbullah scored a 64% approval rating compared to Amal's 20%, in addition to Hizbullah's campaigning on good governance, implied that socio-economic and administrative considerations resonated more pertinently than the creation of a Resistance society within the Shi'i community (Harik, 1996: 56; Gunning, 2007b: 172). Therefore, when Sayyid Nasrallah announced Hizbullah's participation in parliamentary elections on 3 July 1992, the moderate direction of Hizbullah's rhetoric appeared to be conducive with the demands of Shi'i *habiti* in the *SMF*, symbolising a mutually constituted convergence reinforcing a '*prognostic frame of representative*

[310] Interview with Dr Mohsen Saleh in Beirut, 27 March 2012. Refer to Shaery-Eisenlohr (2008: 186-187) for more information on the work conducted by the CCSD.
[311] By contrast, Amal received 31%.

governance that favours the establishment of a pluralistic political system where justice and fairness prevail' (Karagiannis, 2009: 375)[312].

Consequently, with the impact of a chronic economic paralysis factoring as the core driver of concern amongst the Shi'i community, and having restructured its *OF* to prepare for its impending engagement with the *PF*, Hizbullah sought to capitalise upon the mobilising opportunities of politicisation. Firstly, by accentuating the dysfunctional capabilities of the state in responding to the needs of the Shi'i, Hizbullah would concurrently invest in its own institutions to demonstrate its capacity in effectively providing sustainable assistance for its constituencies. Secondly, in a post-war epoch in which the Ta'if Accords represented the prevailing *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, Hizbullah reconstituted the holistic narrative of homology amongst its Resistance *habitus* within and between the *SMF* and *MSF*.

During the civil war, the provision of social services by all warring parties produced a situation in which 'warlords have actually held the fragile state together' (Harik, 1994: 54). However, the lack of scale and scope within the state's post-war reconstruction initiatives enabled Hizbullah to apply the same logic in 'perpetuating the Shi'a community's dependence on its social welfare institutions and discrediting rival political forces' while commanding support in justifying the incorruptibility of its social justice (Gambill, 2009: 134-135). For the purpose of expansion and professionalism, Hizbullah's *OF* centralised the management of its pre-existing welfare services under the remit of an Executive Assembly that was divided into three institutes (*mu'asasat*): Educational (*al-tarbawiyya*), Social (*al-ijtima'iyya*) and Health (*al-suhiyya*). In turn, these were compartmentalised into three geographical regions – southern Beirut, the Biqa' and the South – to effectively meet the specific demands of each Shi'i constituency.

The objective of Hizbullah's *ta'bi'a tarbawiyya* ('educational mobilisation'), in which heterogeneous Shi'i *habiti* were transformed into a Resistance society via the inculcation of a homogenised Resistance *habitus*, consisted of four complementary components. Firstly, Hizbullah established *Mahdi* schools through the formation of the Islamic Institution for Education and Teaching (Le Thomas, 2010)[313]. Directly

[312] Out of the 12 members of the *majlis al-shura*, 10 approved of entering into politics while 2 rejected the motion. Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei authorised the results of the vote.

[313] Between 1992 and 1993, Hizbullah opened three of these schools (Jaber, 1997: 164). While following the Lebanese school curriculum, each school also promoted Hizbullah's Islamic values. Girls and women had to wear the hijab, the school calendar commemorated Shi'i imams and victories of the Islamic Resistance while school slogans, symbols and trips focused on Hizbullah's discourse thereby reinforcing the next 'Resistance generation' (Le Thomas, 2010).

funded and managed by Hizbullah, *Mahdi* schools institutionalised a Resistance *habitus* through pedagogic practices. Secondly, the JTDI, which was ideologically synchronised to Hizbullah but practically independent as a subsidiary of the Higher Islamic Shi'i Council, continued to oversee the development of *Mustapha* schools (Le Thomas, 2010). Unlike the *Mahdi* schools, which focused on deprived children within the Shi'i community, the *Mustapha* schools catered for an emerging Shi'i middle class (Le Thomas, 2010). Thirdly, *al-Imdad*, which was established in 1987 before registering with the Ministry of Interior in 1988, supplied vocational training schemes and micro-finance support through *al-Qard al-Hassan* ('The Good Loan')[314]. Ideologically aligned to Hizbullah but functioning with a degree of managerial autonomy, *al-Imdad* opened its first school in 1993 as part of its mandate in delivering educational services to Shi'i outside the community's traditional strongholds (Le Thomas, 2010)[315]. Lastly, Hizbullah maintained solid relationships with universities that criticised the elitist power structures of traditional academia, such as the Lebanese University, the Beirut Arab University and the Islamic University of Lebanon (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 61).

Furthermore, unlike the Amal-affiliated Council of the South or the PSP-associated Ministry of Displaced, Hizbullah continued to rely on the mobilisation of Jihad al-Bina for reconstructing and rehabilitating neglected Shi'i areas[316]. Between 1990 and 1994, Jihad al-Bina delivered more than 20 million litres of water to Beirut's southern suburbs at a cost of $960,000 (Harik, 2006: 273). Additionally, the organisation built power stations, supplied generators, dug wells and provided storage tanks (Jaber, 1997: 156). Not only did Jihad al-Bina repair mosques and schools, but the organisation also revived pride and expertise in the Shi'i community's dilapidated agricultural sector by installing irrigation canals, laying roads and establishing a series of Agricultural Centres and Cooperatives to stimulate interest and offer technical training on modern techniques (Jaber, 1997: 163-166; Danawi, 2002: 81)[317]. To supplement these services, Jihad al-Bina approved loans of up to $3,000

[314] *Al-Imdad* arranged professional training programmes, such as bread-making initiatives, sewing courses, hairdressing workshops and generally injected funds for local commerce, including mini-markets and grocery stores. *Al-Qard al-Hassan* offered imbursements of $2 million to 6,885 families in 1992 (Harb & Leenders, 2005: 187; Fawwaz, 2000; Jaber, 1997: 149).

[315] *Al-Imdad* reached Shi'i minorities in West Beirut, Batroun and the Western Biqa' Valley. While a progeny of a parent organisation in Iran, *al-Imdad* administered schools funded by the Lebanese Ministry of Education (Le Thomas, 2010).

[316] Between 1992 and 1999, the Council of the South was allocated LL730 billion for reconstruction projects while the Ministry of the Displaced received LL900 billion (Bissat, 2002: 3).

[317] Jihad al-Bina operated with an annual budget of $5 million comprising of contributions from Iran, donations from associations and private individuals, the proceeds from Islamic taxes as well as fees from contracted work and consultations. Before implementation, prospective projects were subject to feasibility assessments and identified potential partners. Between 1988 and 1995, Jihad al-Bina established Veterinary Centres, Agricultural nurseries and 16 Agricultural Cooperatives as well as setting up a company that sold agricultural equipment to farmers at a reduced cost. Jihad al-Bina also formed relationships with a range of government ministries as well as with the UN and other international bodies (Bissat, 2002: 8-11; Danawi, 2002: 81-82; Harik, 2006: 279).

and founded two Farmers' Solidarity Funds to compensate for the neglect of many Shi'i families in the National Security Fund (Bissat, 2002: 7; Harik, 2006: 279)[318].

Rather than function purely as a reactive service provider, Hizbullah's relief organisations served as a proactive resource for assessing the needs of the Shi'i community as well as instilling its constituents with the impetus to discover their collective agency in precipitating change. In 1991, Hizbullah commissioned the CCSD to analyse the condition of infrastructure in Beirut's southern suburbs to ascertain what services were available and to examine the government's development policy for the area (Harik, 2006: 274)[319]. Similarly, in 1992, when the government prohibited the plantation of hemp and poppies, not only did the CCSD compile a report on alternative solutions, but Jihad al-Bina also instigated Agricultural Extension Services (Danawi, 2002: 82)[320]. Overall, when combined with the Health Institute, which reviewed hundreds of thousands of cases a year through its management of 46 medical centres, clinics and infirmaries across Lebanon, Hizbullah spent approximately $8.7 million on welfare institutions in 1993 (Jaber, 1997: 168). Having previously received the majority of its funding from Iran, the decline in revenues from the Islamic Republic on account of its policy of pragmatism led Hizbullah to become more self-sufficient. By 1992, its consolidated social *capital* with the Shi'i expatriate community, its collection of obligatory religious taxes derived from its cultural *capital*, such as *Khums*, *Zakat*, and *Sadaka*, as well as income raised via its system of professional institutions, contributed the majority of Hizbullah's economic *capital* in Lebanon (Harik, 1996: 63; Fawwaz, 2000)[321].

At the advent of elections, Hizbullah was undergoing a process of converting its cultural, economic and social *capital* into symbolic *capital* within the *SMF*. Alongside its mosque networks and media outlets, such as *Al-'Ahd*, *Al-Nour* and *Al-Manar*, Hizbullah was performing its *al-amal al-salih* ('good works') through social welfare organisations that strived to instil *taqwa* ('a state of absolute piety'), promote *iltizam* ('commitment') and encourage the reproductive self-discipline and self-sufficiency of *takaful ijtima'i* ('mutual responsibility') (Deeb, 2006a: 169-207). Consequently, Hizbullah's *OF* was institutionalising a homogenous Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*, possessing dispositions of solidaristic practice that would enliven its corresponding

[318] In South Lebanon, 3,344 family members joined the Farmers' Solidarity Fund whereas 700 families signed up to the one in the Biqa'. Charging a LL10,000 membership fee, the Fund had raised LL162 million by 1999 (Bissat, 2002: 7).
[319] In 1991, Hizbullah called on the Dahiyeh Activists and Residents Committee to lobby the government to improve the situation in the area. Following the findings of the CCSD report, Hizbullah issued a press release entitled 'the Southern Suburbs: An Area of Misery Awaiting Solution' on 14 January 1992 (Harik, 2006: 275).
[320] Interview with Dr Mahmoud Mohsen Saleh in Beirut, 27 March 2012.
[321] Gambill (2009: 134-135) states that expatriate money was collected through illegal dealings, such as the blood diamond industry in Sierra Leone, drugs and cigarette smuggling from Syria and audiovisual bootlegging from South America.

components in the *PF* and *MSF*. However, in order to sustain the mobilisation of this Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*, commensurate developments were required in the *MSF* to fulfil the objective of synchronising relationally constituted practice. In conjunction with social services, the second component of Hizbullah's strategy before the elections was to juxtapose the endemic ineffectiveness of the LAF with the proliferating sophistication of the Islamic Resistance. Endeavouring to strike a balance between perceptions that either associated the Islamic Resistance with intentionally fomenting violence or accused it of substituting military action with *jihad bil lisan* ('struggle by tongue'), Hizbullah aimed to 'create social solidarity around the resistance' (Azani, 2011: 110; Karagiannis, 2009: 375).

The disarming of the militias and the disarray of the LAF resulted in a security vacuum. During the civil war, LAF Commander Michel Aoun had declared that 'you are either soldiers of sects and mercenaries…or soldiers of the homeland' (*MER*, 17 May, 1986: 14). The Maronite General, who regularly invoked Christian rhetoric throughout his 'War for Liberation' against Syria in 1990, was exiled after the civil war while the symbolic *capital* of the LAF became further diluted by sectarianism and emasculated by Syria's symbolic *power* in Lebanon. Although the *al-alaqat al-mumayyaza* ('privileged relations') in the Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination (15 May, 1991) and the Common Defence and Security Pact (1 September, 1991) engendered a semblance of equality between Syria and Lebanon, they were more a courteous 'code for control and domination' (Kassir, 2003: 87). Nevertheless, as expressed by Brigadier General Fuad Aoun, the 'Army remains the best representative of the Lebanese people' in the face of governmental stasis (*MER*, 25 March, 1989: 10).

After the civil war, the fortunes of the Islamic Resistance became inextricably linked with Emile Lahoud, who was appointed Commander in Chief of the 37,000-strong LAF on 28 November 1990, issuing a warning to President Elias Hrawi not to 'interfere in Army affairs and I and the Army will not interfere in politics' (*MER*, 2 June, 1990: 7-10)[322]. A staunch ally of the Assad family, Lahoud believed that Israel's occupation of the 'security zone' in the South represented Lebanon's most pressing threat. In the short-term, as a proponent of Resistance and recognising the limitations of an ill-equipped LAF, Lahoud aimed to support Hizbullah while restructuring his forces away from sectarianism. In the long-term, Lahoud planned on

[322] Emile Lahoud was the son of Major General Jamil Lahoud, who was chosen by Syria to set up a military academy in Homs after independence in 1943 (*MER*, 28 September, 1998: 14; 12 December, 1998: 10).

implementing a series of reforms to enhance the LAF's capabilities in facilitating national reconciliation and administering internal security. Ultimately, Lahoud insisted on endowing the LAF with 'a real national resistance nature and…legalizing the Resistance by setting up complementarities between the latter and the army for the defence and security of Lebanese territory' (Pakradouni, 2012: 10).

This unequivocal endorsement of Hizbullah in the *MSF* was partly due to the inability of the government to allocate sufficient resources to the LAF. Initially, Defence Minsiter Michel Murr declared that the LAF required $240 million to complete the integration of former militia fighters and boost its total size to 54,000 (*MER*, 2 May, 1992: 9-10)[323]. This plan, which sought to prepare Lebanon for the eventual withdrawal of 35,000 Syrian soldiers, was deemed ambitious considering the state of the economy and the existing budget for defence, which stood at $5 million (*MER*, 2 May, 1992: 9-10). Subsequently, under significant pressure from Syria, the Lebanese government pledged to support the Islamic Resistance as long as Israel occupied South Lebanon and on the condition that the Islamic Resistance did not operate where the LAF was stationed (*MER*, 18 January, 1992: 18). Therefore, having returned the Abdullah barracks to the LAF in August 1991 and backed by Damascus, the Islamic Resistance received approval as an *orthodox* actor in the *MSF*. Exemplifying its elevated status of recognition, the military law banning militias neither mentioned Hizbullah as an exception for national resistance nor did its 18 articles stipulate that the LAF was the exclusive proprietor of weapons in Lebanon (*MER*, 1 February, 1992: 11-12).

Consequently, having amplified its cultural *capital* of Resistance by consolidating its social *capital* with Syria and maintaining the transference of economic *capital* from Iran, the acceptance of the Islamic Resistance by the *PF* enabled Hizbullah's *habitus* in the *MSF* to transition from illegitimate *heterodoxy* to participant *orthodoxy*. The Syrian Arab Army, and to a lesser extent the LAF, remained the symbolic embodiment of the *MSF* but the Islamic Resistance had become internally legitimised by aligning its *capital* with the predominant *orthodoxy*. In this context, Hizbullah officials began publicly reiterating their ability to uphold the responsibility of Resistance. Following the assassination of Hizbullah Secretary General Shaykh Abbas Moussawi by Israel on 16 February 1992, the Islamic Resistance responded by displaying the variety of repertoires at its disposal, ranging from symmetrical

[323] A draft law proposed at the beginning of 1992 had wanted to incorporate 20,000 Christian and Muslim militia fighters into the LAF. By May, only 6,000 had been included (*MER*, 1 February, 1992: 11-12; 2 May, 1992: 9-10).

warfare, such as launching of Katyusha rockets, to asymmetrical tactics, including guerrilla attacks targeting Israeli and SLA positions in the 'security zone' as well as the deployment of suicide bombers, epitomised by Ibrahim Daher's operation on 12 August 1992 (*MER*, 29 February, 1992: 13)[324]. Commenting on the exponential sophistication of the Islamic Resistance, Hizbullah commander Shaykh Nabil Qaouk revealed:

> 'the Resistance today can boast of having specialised regiments each with its own particular weaponry…we have all the ingredients of a regular army. The Resistance is on a different psychological level than it ever was before…we are strengthened by the people's support for us and their adoption of our cause' (Jaber, 1997: 39).

As parliamentary elections began on 23 August 1992, Hizbullah had reorganised its *OF* to accomplish a cohesive homology of practice between the *SMF* and *MSF* while creating opportunities to transfer *capital* to the *PF*. A month earlier, Hizbullah released its official political programme that not only echoed its intention to employ political access to protect the Resistance and eliminate confessionalism, but also to demand reforms in securing people's rights and defending their dignity (Alagha, 2011: 63-69; Hamzeh, 2004: 11). Politically, Hizbullah campaigned for an end to kleptocracy and clientalism while calling on the government to uphold media freedoms. Militarily, Hizbullah endorsed a partnership with the LAF, emphasising the existential threat posed by Israel and the duty of the government to assist martyrs' families. Socially, Hizbullah advocated for initiatives that improved social security, health, education and training as well as infrastructural development and agricultural investment.

Despite this encompassing programme, Hizbullah's *OF* had to adapt its practice to an institutionalised electoral system in the *PF* that was intentionally structured to marginalise radical challengers and dilute monopolies by encouraging moderately-inclined multi-confessional lists (Harik, 2005: 77)[325]. After Ta'if, Syria had reorganised the country into five *muhafazat* (districts), namely Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the Biqa', South and North Lebanon (Alagha, 2006: 43). Under these stipulations, the Shi'i were allocated 14 seats in the South, eight in the Biqa' and two in Beirut (Nir, 2009: 182)[326].

[324] A particular example was Hizbullah's killing of SLA Intelligence Officer Husayn al-Nabi in Bint Jbeil on 5 October 1992 (*MER*, 10 October, 1992: 10).
[325] Between 1943 and 1992, five electoral systems had been applied: 1947 (55 deputies from five districts); 1951 (77 from nine); 1953 (44 from 33); 1957 (66 from 25); and from 1960 until 1972 (99 from 26) (*MER*, 9 December, 1995: 9).
[326] Unfortunately for Hizbullah, not only was its main sphere of influence in *al-dahiyeh* not considered part of Beirut, but the majority of its residents were registered in Amal's strongholds in the South (Nir, 2009: 182).

In preparation, Hizbullah mobilised 600 members trained in managing campaigns in order to enhance constituency turnout and to devise strategies for facilitating cooperative alliances[327]. In the Biqa', Hizbullah formed the *La'iha Mutaharikah* ('Moving List') to balance against Amal's Husayn al-Husayni, the incumbent House Speaker, and won eight seats in Ba'albeck-Hermel with half consisting of non-Shi'i partners (Hamzeh, 1993: 330)[328]. While Hizbullah allied with the Druze and Basim al-Saba to secure the nomination of Ali Ammar in Baabda, the Party negotiated a coalition agreement with the Islamic Group and the Islamic Society of Philanthropic Projects to guarantee a place for Mohammad Berjawi in Beirut (Hamzeh, 1993: 332). In the South, Hizbullah begrudgingly complied with *al-saqf al-suri* ('the Syrian ceiling'), a mitigation measure designed to negate intra-Shi'i competition under the overarching interests of Syria in the South. Subsequently, Hizbullah and Amal combined lists with the former recording success with the election of Mohammad Ra'ad in Nabatiyeh and Mohammad Fneish in Tyre (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002: 54)[329].

By the close of voting on 6 September 1992, Hizbullah's 12-member bloc, *wafa' lil moqawama* ('Loyalty to the Resistance'), which included four non-Shi'i MPs, became the largest representative grouping in parliament[330]. As the majority of Christian parties boycotted the elections in protest against Syria's hegemony over Lebanese affairs and the discriminatory effect of the amended election law, the average voter turnout across the five districts was only 30.34% (Salam, 2003: 47)[331]. Alongside President Elias Hrawi, the other parts of the 'Troika' were filled by Amal leader Nabih Berri (Speaker) and Rafiq Hariri (Premier), a Sunni billionaire businessman. The Cabinet Statement, released on 9 November 1992, epitomised the structural idiosyncrasies of the Syrian-imposed Ta'if system. Whereas Syria's military presence and prospects for abolishing political sectarianism were expunged from the agenda, the status of Hizbullah in relation to Israel's occupation remained ambiguous. Since the wording of the document insisted on the 'right of Lebanon and the Lebanese to confront Israeli occupation', Hizbullah immediately castigated Prime Minister Hariri for his omission of the 'Resistance' (*MER*, 14 November, 1992: 8-16).

[327] Hizbullah's *al-majlis al-shura* issued a fatwa (religious decree) calling on Shi'i to vote for Hizbullah. Lebanese newspapers reported that Hizbullah's security apparatus were present at polling stations to intimidate voters while some claimed that Hizbullah bribed government departments for the identification cards of deceased citizens (Hamzeh, 1993: 332-333; *MER*, 29 August, 1992: 9).

[328] These eight candidates were: Shaykh Ibrahim al-Sayyid (Hizbullah); Muhammad Yaghi (Hizbullah); Khodr Tlays (Hizbullah); Ali Taha (Hizbullah); Ibrahim Bayan (Sunni); Munir al-Hujayri (Sunni); Rabiha Kayrouz (Maronite); Saoud Rufayli (Greek Orthodox) (*MER*, 17 October, 1992: 15-20).

[329] Testament to the complexities of social structures in the South, Amal submitted a mixed list of 26 candidates in the South with only three standing as representatives of the party (Harik, 1996: 42).

[330] Hizbullah failed to elect only two candidates (Harik, 1996: 42).

[331] According to Hamzeh (1993: 331-332), voter turnout was below average in the predominantly Christian areas of Baabda (12%) and Beirut (13%) and above average in the predominantly Shi'i areas of Ba'albeck-Hermel (35%) and South Lebanon (37%). While the four major Christian leaders, namely Amin Gemayel, Michel Aoun, Raymond Edde and Dory Chamoun, had relocated to Paris after the civil war, Samir Geagea was arrested on 21 April 1994 for committing a series of atrocities from the massacre of the Franjiyeh family on 13 June 1978 to the assassination of Danny Chamoun on 21 October 1990. Additionally, in terms of the election law, Syria diluted, diversified and divided Christian enclaves to diminish their influence in Lebanon (El-Khazen, 2003: 67).

The ‘Troika’ system, manipulated by Syria, was both enabling and disabling. While Hizbullah was empowered by its parliamentary presence, it lacked access to the ‘Troika’ and relied on Syria for preserving the Resistance. Concurrently, Syria ensured Amal’s acquiescence by using Hizbullah as a neutralising influence on Nabih Berri in his relations with the President and Premier. Similarly, Syria’s power over the Presidency and parliament could check Rafiq Hariri’s attempts to pursue economic initiatives or address issues of Lebanon’s security that contravened Syria’s interests. Demarcating the boundaries for sanctioned manoeuvrability, Ghazi Kan’an, Syria’s power broker in Lebanon, judged that that the role of the Lebanese in Lebanon was to ‘engage in trade and commerce’ whereas the domain of Syria in Lebanon was to command ‘politics and security’ (Traboulsi, 2007: 245-246).

Citing Hizbullah’s electoral success, Alagha (2011: 23) concluded that in terms of *maslaha* (‘interest’), the ‘logic of operating within the bounds of the Lebanese state has prevailed over the logic of revolution’. Conversely, Shaykh Qassem (2005: 188-189) interpreted Hizbullah’s decision to pursue the inherent political opportunities with the Lebanese state as complementing rather than contradicting the principles of revolution. The difference between these dichotomous perspectives emanates from their respective perceptions of interest. Whereas Alagha construed the constitution of interest in the *PF* as precluding Hizbullah from propagating its revolutionary principles, Qassem viewed access to the *PF* as enabling Hizbullah to solidify its interest in simultaneously inculcating a principled Resistance *habitus* across Lebanon’s *fields* of practice. By 1992, Hizbullah’s *OF* had demonstrated its ability to balance its interests and principles. By disseminating Collective Action Frames that incorporated the needs expressed by the Shi’i community, Hizbullah diversified its mobilising modalities in the *SMF*. Furthermore, not only had the Syrian-endorsed Islamic Resistance become acknowledged by the *PF* as an *orthodox* actor in the *MSF*, but the Loyalty to Resistance, despite engaging in *heterodox* practice, also represented the largest bloc in parliament. Consequently, Hizbullah’s *OF* successfully realigned the homology of its Resistance *habitus* between the *SMF* and *MSF* while horizontally transferring its accumulated *capital* to the *PF*.

Nevertheless, the 1992 experiment had also demonstrated that Lebanon’s *PF* was institutionalised to elicit and reinforce a perpetual practice of supporting the system through compliance while progressively adjusting to ‘the anomalies of the political process’ (El-Khazen, 2003: 72). Once initiated, Hizbullah’s opportunities for

navigating around the *PF* and balancing its *heterodox* position would be determined by a continual, mutually constitutive dialectic of persuasion and validation. Primarily, Hizbullah's *OF*, lodged between the *MSF* and *PF*, would be charged with reproducing the legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance as a defensive force against Israeli occupation. Concurrently, Hizbullah's *OF*, reliant on maintaining its symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community, would also be responsible for adhering to the structured rules of the Lebanese system in facilitating confessional mobilisation in the *SMF* for preserving its position in the *PF*.

6.2 Striving for symbolic *capital* in the *MSF*

For the Islamic Resistance, the route to symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* depended on the conversion of its cultural and economic *capital* into social *capital* with Syria and the LAF. In particular, and having ascended the hierarchy to represent an *orthodox* actor, the enduring legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* was contingent upon recognising the parameters and regulations of practice imposed by Syria, such as targeting UNIFIL or provoking Israel beyond the designated 1,200 square kilometres of occupied land in South Lebanon. By the end of the 1990s, in diligently observing and optimising opportunities within the prescribed 'rules of the game', the Islamic Resistance had acquired enough symbolic *capital* through what Major General Robert Scales referred to as a 'revolution in warfare' to initiative an alteration of the prevailing *orthodoxy* in the *MSF* (Gleis & Berti, 2012: 84).

Following calls in 1991 for the deployment of the LAF to the South, Hizbullah's *OF* further devolved 'resistance-related endeavours' in the *MSF* to the Jihad Assembly, one of five bodies in the *majlis al-shura* reporting directly to the Secretary General, a position that primarily focused on supervising and coordinating the members of the Council rather than personally directing military affairs (Qassem, 2005: 63-64; Blanford, 2011: 124)[332]. The remodelling of Hizbullah's leadership structure not only acknowledged the importance of prioritising field experience for executing military activities over structuring rigidly bureaucratic procedures, but also intended to promote professional expertise and operational efficiency[333]. Consequently, senior commanders in the Islamic Resistance were extended 'the status of an autonomous

[332] These endeavours included oversight, recruitment, training and security while the other four assemblies were the Political, Executive, Parliamentary and Judiciary (Qassem, 2005: 63). Although the representative of the Jihad Assembly is anonymous, it is believed that the position could have been held by either Sayyid Nasrallah himself or by Hajj Muhsin al-Shakar (Hajj Fouad Shikr) (Alagha, 2011: 161; *MER*, 3 July, 1993: 7-8).

[333] According to Hizbullah's Deputy Secretary General Shaykh Qassem (2005: 72), 'liberation operations' were planned and executed independently without the interference of political interests.

body, able to deal with the day-to-day attacks on Israeli targets without having to refer to the leadership in Beirut' (Jaber, 1997: 38)[334].

As demonstrated by the launching of its first Katyusha rockets after the assassination of Shaykh Abbas Moussawi in February 1992 as well as the firing of its first AT-3 Sagger anti-tank and SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles by the end of that year, the Islamic Resistance was advancing its military capabilities beyond small arms and light weapons (Blanford, 2011: 132). Moreover, Lebanese newspapers cited enhanced instances of cooperation between the LAF and Islamic Resistance in southern Beirut, the Biqa' and around the 'security zone' in the South (*MER*, 2 January, 1993: 7-8)[335]. This coordination was largely due to Hizbullah's social *capital* with LAF Commander Emile Lahoud, who refused Rafiq Hariri's requests to curtail the Islamic Resistance by asserting that 'my conscience does not allow me to strike the Resistance that confronts Israel when all I want is to put together a national army capable of taking up this role' (Alagha, 2011: 118; Pakradouni, 2012: 13).

The first official test of the Islamic Resistance occurred on 25 July 1993 when Israel, in the midst of negotiating the Oslo Accords with the PLO, launched Operation Accountability, a seven-day strike in retaliation for the killing of five Israeli soldiers in the occupied zone. As the name implied, Operation Accountability aimed to inflict damage on Hizbullah's positions in the South in order to expose tensions between the Islamic Resistance and the Lebanese authorities (Harik, 2005: 115-116). During the campaign, Israel conducted 1,244 raids and fired 28,000 shells, killing 130 civilians and displacing 300,000 people from 120 villages (Qassem, 2005: 110-111). In response, Hizbullah, which claimed the loss of only 13 fighters, countered with 300 rockets and 30 military operations, killing two Israeli civilians (Blanford, 2011: 147). Although Israel publicly declared victory, Operation Accountability failed to elicit its desired outcomes since the Lebanese government remained relatively mute on Hizbullah's activities while Syria boosted its stature by mediating the ceasefire.

Conversely, the oral 'understanding', brokered by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in which both sides were expected to restrict operations away from civilian centres, acted to indirectly enhance the credibility of the Islamic Resistance and confer legitimacy as an *orthodox* actor within Lebanon's *MSF*. Not only had

[334] Timur Goksel revealed that it was Sayyid Nasrallah who first appointed a Hizbullah liaison officer for UNIFIL in the South (Interview in Beirut, 9 May 2012).
[335] This relationship was not always cordial. On 13 September 1993, the LAF killed 9 Hizbullahis in the southern suburb of Ghubayri during a protest against the signing of the Oslo Accords (*MER*, 15 September, 1993: 7).

Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* been consecrated to symbolic proportions, exacting national respect for surviving an onslaught from the most powerful military in the region, but Hizbullah's hybrid of conventional and guerrilla tactics, especially the use of Katyusha rockets as a defensive response to Israeli occupation, were also justified as a recognised amendment to the structured laws of military practice. After the death of nine Israelis on 19 August 1993 in Shihin, the launching of Katyusha rockets was described as 'an equilibrium of terror' (*MER*, 25 September, 1993: 7). Explaining the logic behind Hizbullah's interpretation of a proportionate response, a Hizbullah official warned that 'let aggression on Lebanon and shelling against civilians stop and we shall launch rockets no more…As long as there is occupation, there will be Resistance' (*MER*, 25 September, 1993: 9)

While the decentralised decision-making structures of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* were ideologically prompted and financially endorsed by Iran within redlines delineated by Syria, Hizbullah did not surrender its agency or submit to the instructions of its regional partners[336]. Rather, by strategically navigating within the inter-subjectively understood remit of structured opportunities, Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* incrementally developed its practice as it became increasingly exposed and experienced in the *MSF*, thereby enabling the Islamic Resistance to cognitively identify and effectively capitalise upon contextual opportunities. In 1993, the Islamic Resistance conducted 450 attacks, killing 12 Israeli soldiers and losing 69 fighters (Blanford, 2011: 145; Malthaner, 2011: 219). However, by 1995, the Islamic Resistance had executed 908 operations, killing 23 soldiers and losing 72 fighters (*MER*, 6 January, 1996: 9; Blanford, 2011: 148-149)[337].

Allegedly enshrined in Khalil Harb's 'Principles of Warfare' of 1995, the tactics employed by the Islamic Resistance were evolving beyond vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) and suicide vest improvised explosive devices (SVIEDs), exemplified by Salah Ghandour's attack on 25 April 1995, to encompass embedded cells in coordinated 'hit and run' attacks or simultaneous diversionary decoys on 3-4 Israeli/SLA positions using Saggar-3 anti-tank missiles, mortar teams and Katyusha rockets as cover (Blanford, 2011: 123; *MER*, 19 February, 1994:

[336] Sayyid Nasrallah reported that 'Syria does not tell us to heat it up at this time or scale down at another time…the fighters are in an open-ended state of war, and they act depending on when, where and how many targets are accessible' (*MER*, 27 August, 1994: 13). Similarly, in the context of Iran, Sayyid Nasrallah stated that 'we have a lot of respect for the Islamic Republic of Iran, but our decisions are self-made. We confer with our Iranians friends and listen to their views, but they cannot impose anything on us (*MER*, 6 April, 1996: 8).

[337] The Islamic Resistance also killed an estimated 33 SLA members in 1995 (*MER*, 6 January, 1996: 9).

15)[338]. Exploiting its superior knowledge of the terrain, the Islamic Resistance also replaced wire-controlled IEDs with radio-controlled ones that were disguised and detonated from a distance. Meanwhile, Hizbullah's communication systems, which intentionally transported messages via couriers as well as through privately integrated networks, rendered it difficult for Israel to intercept transmissions. Moreover, the Janus-faced strategy of the Islamic Resistance, which concurrently defended land like a conventional military force while adopting unconventional modalities for military offensives, caused considerable confusion for Israel in formulating a corresponding response (Biddle & Friedman, 2008: xii)[339].

Testament to Hizbullah's observation and obedience to the 'rules of the game' in the *MSF*, the Islamic Resistance reportedly violated the oral agreement 13 times between 1993 and 1996 whereas Israel contravened the arrangement 231 times (Blanford, 2011: 154-155). Israel was beginning to lose its symbolic status and competitive edge since the fragile rapprochement with the Palestinians compelled the government to refrain from any military campaigns that could be perceived as unjustified or disproportionate. As Israeli Deputy Defence Minister Mordachai Gur admitted that 'we are suffering…and we are hurting greatly', Timur Goksel highlighted the deteriorating relations between UNIFIL and Israel in the South (*MER*, 7 January, 1995: 8; 8 April, 1995: 12). Additionally, following the abduction of Mustafa Dirani in Kasernaba on 21 May 1994 and the raid on Ain Kawkab in the eastern Biqa' two weeks later, the Lebanese government was furious at Israel's encroachment on its sovereignty[340]. As opposed to risk proactively engaging in these debates, Hizbullah's *OF* recognised the potentially negative ramifications of its public intervention and allowed Lebanese discontentment with Israel to gain momentum independently. By apprehending and handing over the suspected collaborators behind the two operations to the Lebanese authorities, Hizbullah augmented its symbolic *capital* in eclipsing the diminishing status of the LAF and presenting itself as the only actor capable of protecting Lebanon from Israel[341].

On 11 April 1996, the Islamic Resistance confronted its second significant military test when Israel initiated 'Operation Grapes of Wrath' by striking the southern

[338] Motorcycles ostensibly transported carriers of Saggar-3 anti-tank missiles to and from their positions whereas mortar teams travelled via Toyotas or Volvos. The Islamic Resistance had also acquired Dutch-made night-vision equipment, advanced body armour and new American-styled military helmets (*MER*, 19 February, 1994: 15).
[339] In July 1995, Israel's Egoz Reconnaissance Unit was tasked with waging an anti-guerrilla, micro-warfare campaign against Hizbullah (Blanford, 2011: 148-149).
[340] Mustapha Dirani, who was accused of the kidnapping of Israeli pilot Ron Arad in 1986, was seized from his home northeast of Zahla by Israeli commandos. The Israeli attack on Ain Kawkab, which was a Hizbullah training base located only six kilometres from the Syrian border, killed 26 people (*MER*, 28 May, 1994: 13; 4 June, 1994: 6).
[341] Hizbullah handed over 7 'spies' to the Lebanese authorities. By the beginning of 1996, Hizbullah had captured and handed over 70 men and women to the Lebanese authorities for conspiring with Israel in Lebanon (*MER*, 1 April, 1995: 13-15; 6 January, 1996: 10).

suburbs of Beirut, the first attack on the capital since 1982. Although the *casus belli* was predicated on halting Hizbullah from firing rockets, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres intended to satisfy the security concerns of the Israeli public following the assassination of former premier Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 and prior to the 1996 elections by demonstrating his ability to protect Israel while concurrently capitalising on the prevailing political paralysis in Lebanon between President Hrawi and Prime Minister Hariri to cripple Hizbullah[342].

The 16-day assault attempted to disable Hizbullah's central nervous system by striking its headquarters, institutional infrastructure and military apparatus to 'sow dissension between the Resistance and the people' as well as 'seeking to push the state to pressure the Resistance'[343]. Israel conducted 2,350 air sorties and 600 raids killing 160 people (including 14 from the Islamic Resistance) and displacing 400,000 while Hizbullah launched 746 Katyusha rockets into Israel (Blanford, 2011: 159-160). On 18 April 1996, 100 people were killed after Israeli shells struck a U.N. compound in Qana[344]. Aside from the civilian casualties, Operation Grapes of Wrath also caused almost $700 million of damage, including the destruction of two power stations that provided electricity to Beirut (*MER*, 20 April, 1996: 9; Blanford, 2011: 159). Nevertheless, although Israel fulfilled its objective in stirring resentment amongst the Lebanese, it was the government and the LAF that were incapacitated as Hizbullah attracted national support[345]. As articulated by Prime Minister Hariri:

> 'we cannot rein in the Resistance while Israel occupies part of Lebanese territory…That would spark a civil war worse than what the Israelis are doing in our country right now…There is nothing we can do today because the people would see us as traitors' (*MER*, 20 April, 1996: 7).

In a repeat of Operation Accountability, Syria diplomatically intervened to mediate an end to hostilities. Whereas the oral agreement of 1993 signified the induction of the Islamic Resistance as a legitimate actor in Lebanon's *MSF*, the 'April Understanding' of 26 April 1996 legally institutionalised the Islamic Resistance as a regionally

[342] Only 14 Israeli civilians had been killed by Katyusha rockets since February 1992 while nearly 500 Lebanese and Palestinians had been killed by Israeli attacks (Norton, 1999: 27).
[343] This is an extract from a report produced on Operation Grapes of Wrath by Hizbullah's *Al-'Ahd* journal: http://english.alahednews.com.lb/uploaded1/essaysimages/big/2013/04/april1996-en.JPG; http://english.alahednews.com.lb/uploaded1/flashes/infograph/nissan1996-en/index.html
[344] Contradicting Israel's claims that 'regrettably, a few rounds had overshot and hit the U.N. compound' while targeting Hizbullah's launching sites, a U.N. inquiry into the attack on Qana, led by Major General Frank van Kappen, concluded that 'while the possibility cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely that the shelling of the U.N. compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors' on the part of Israel (*MER*, 11 May, 1996: 16-18).
[345] The LAF refrained from militarily engaging with Israel while Hizbullah's reputation grew. Hizbullah advertised funding opportunities for the Islamic Resistance in local papers with Christian woman donating $15,000 provided it was used to fire Katyusha rockets into Israel (*MER*, 12 August, 1995: 9; Jaber, 1997: 196-198).

recognised stakeholder propagating the *orthodoxy* of Lebanon's *MSF*. The document, which was overseen by a five-member Monitoring Committee including the U.S., Israel, France, Lebanon and Syria, insisted that all parties must commit to avoiding civilian areas while stipulating that all parties exercise the right to self-defence. Therefore, although the Islamic Resistance was prohibited from firing Katyusha rockets into Israel, it received international authorisation to resume its pre-existing practice of militarily combating Israel in the occupied zone for defence and deterrence purposes.

The developments of 1993 and 1996 demonstrated that the Islamic Resistance was maturing in the *MSF* to achieve results '*within* the rules' that required Israel to contemplate strategic revisions (Hirst, 2010: 249). By May 1996, Israel voted in Likud's Benjamin Netanyahu, a hardliner whose interpretation of Israeli security and the peace process acted to vindicate Hizbullah's position. Subsequently, Hizbullah Commander Shaykh Qaouk argued that 'the Resistance managed to transfer that distress from the military field to the field of security and to the public and political fields' (Azani, 2011: 199). The restructured 'rules of the game', in which Hizbullah and Israel were expected to observe an inter-subjectively understood logic of interaction, 'allowed for both sides to conduct periodic, indirect negotiations for the return of prisoners and bodies' (Norton, 2007a: 87-88). On 21 July 1996, Hizbullah exchanged the remains of Rachamim Alsheikh, Yossi Fink and 17 SLA bodies in return for 45 prisoners from Khiyam and 123 Lebanese bodies (*MER*, 27 July, 1996: 7; Qassem, 2005: 140).

Nevertheless, despite this elevated standing, the Islamic Resistance persisted in its targeting of Israel and the SLA in the occupation zone. Replenishing stockpiles with more advanced weaponry, enhancing the efficiency of its activities and escalating its attacks, Sayyid Nasrallah announced that the Islamic Resistance had conducted 825 operations by the end of 1996 resulting in the deaths of 27 Israeli soldiers (Azani, 2011: 196; Blanford, 2011: 180)[346]. From 1996 until 2000, the Islamic Resistance launched 4,963 attacks on Israeli and SLA targets (Zisser, 2009: 161). Most saliently, not only was Hizbullah's fatalities per mission ratio decreasing, but the Islamic Resistance had also comparatively narrowed the gap in overall

[346] These included Hizbullah's 10th and 11th suicide operations: Ali Ashmar (20 March, 1996) and Bilal Akhras (10 June, 1996). Not only was the Islamic Resistance becoming more adept at designing and detonating explosives, but Hizbullah was also receiving more advanced rockets than the Katyusha, including the long-range, Iranian-made Fajr-3 missile (*MER*, 9 November, 1996: 15-16).

casualties, accomplishing almost parity with Israel by 1997 (Hirst, 2010: 263)[347]. In particular, the Islamic Resistance exhibited its sophistication on 4 September 1997 in Ansariyeh when it ambushed and killed 12 members of Shayetet 13, Israel's elite naval commando unit[348].

The victory of qualitative methods over quantitative capabilities in the *MSF* had profound implications for the *orthodoxy* of Israel's practice. Primarily, Israeli strategists and soldiers were becoming demoralised by their collective inability to curtail or defeat the refined efficiency of multi-faceted tactics employed by the Islamic Resistance. As summarised by a Hizbullah commander, Israel was 'hysterical over the impotence of their advanced weaponry as far as the guerrilla war is concerned' (*MER*, 26 December, 1998: 10). Ultimately, hit and run attacks on fixed positions as well as ambushes on patrols using a combination of IEDs, machine-gun fire and AT-3/4 missiles negated Israel's conventional technology and overstretched its resources (*MER*, 26 December, 1998: 11). Additionally, as epitomised by Ansariyeh, the Islamic Resistance was developing its own human and signals intelligence systems through a combination of SLA informants and customised information techniques not only to uncover Israeli spy networks, but also to circumvent Israel's advanced detection technology in monitoring and executing missions across the occupation zone (*MER*, 12 June, 1999: 11-12)[349].

Compounding Israel's frustration, the Islamic Resistance was not contravening the prescribed principles of military confrontation but abiding by established 'rules of the game' within the predominant *orthodoxy* of the *MSF* that Israel had assisted in constructing, structuring and legitimising (*MER*, 26 December, 1998: 11). Therefore, by violating international agreements, tacitly recognising its occupation of Lebanon and implicitly engaging with Hizbullah's Resistance, Israel was veering towards *heterodox* practice within a standardised *orthodoxy* it had contributed to institutionalising. After all, Israel 'never challenged the right of Hizbullah to attacks its soldiers in Lebanon' (Norton, 1999: 27). The Islamic Resistance fighters were 'Lebanese on their own land', embedded as 'the shepherds, the farmers, the shopkeepers in all the villages under occupation…No one can ever stop them from

[347] In 1997, Hizbullah lost 60 fighters from 855 missions killing 39 Israelis and 25 SLA soldiers. In 1998, Hizbullah lost 38 men but killed 24 Israelis and 33 SLA soldiers. In 1999, Hizbullah launched 1500 operations at a loss of 36 fighters (Hirst, 2010: 263; Malthaner, 2011: 219).
[348] Sayyid Nasrallah revealed in 2010 that the mission's success was due to Hizbullah's intelligence apparatus discovering how to intercept Israeli transmissions sent via unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) (Blanford, 2011: 192-194).
[349] Hizbullah was able to persuade SLA members to defect by exploiting the conditions of their original recruitment, such as poor living environments, bribery, involuntary conscription, threats of imprisonment or the confiscation of property (*MER*, 12 June, 1999: 11-12).

fighting on their land against Israeli occupation' (Timur Goksel in *MER*, 19 December, 1998: 12).

Politically, rather than diminishing its reputation in the *SMF*, Israel inadvertently reinforced and expanded Hizbullah's appeal by providing further ammunition to mobilise the Party of God's extensive network of institutions and galvanising the broader Lebanese public. One of the most effective conduits for Hizbullah to convert its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* into social *capital* within and beyond the Shi'i community in the *SMF* was through media. Reflecting on the Qana massacre of 1996, *Tele Liban*'s Zahera Harb (2008: 150) recalled that 'the nation was in shock and we, the journalists, were part of the nation'. *Al-Manar*, Hizbullah's official TV station, was instrumental in devising and disseminating Hizbullah's Collective Action Frames through 'liberation propaganda'[350]. Hizbullah's *qanat al-moqawama* ('Station of Resistance') projected and translated Hizbullah's discourse not only to the Shi'i community and the Lebanese public, but also to the Israeli public with its Hebrew subtitles and the international community with its English translations (Harb, 2009: 53). Following the killing of Hadi Nasrallah, Sayyid Nasrallah's 18 year-old son, by the Israeli Egoz Unit on 12 September 1997, media outlets may not have independently generated evocative reverberations inciting Lebanese mobilisation but the repetitive accentuation of unifying frames presented an opportunity to display the unrelenting commitment of Hizbullah's Secretary General, heighten the public's awareness of the Islamic Resistance's cultural *capital* and attract social *capital* by aligning the sympathetic sentiments of those who could relate to the death of a son in conflict. Therefore, the cause and content of the Islamic Resistance became more accessible to the Lebanese public.

In this context, and with Hizbullah eager to 'shed the Iranian label' and adopt a more 'flexible formula' that aimed at giving all Lebanese the opportunity to participate in the war to liberate the homeland, Sayyid Nasrallah announced the formation of *al-saraya al-lubnaniyya li-moqawamat al-ihtilal* ('The Lebanese Brigades for Resisting Occupation') on 3 November 1997 (*MER*, 18 October, 1997: 13). Although operationally distinct from the Islamic Resistance, this 'Lebanonisation of Resistance', which represented an amalgamation of volunteer fighters from a variety of confessionalist, nationalist and secularist backgrounds, conducted 175 attacks

[350] In 1994, the Public Information Centre coordinated all of Hizbullah's communication activities. In 1996, following Operation Grapes of Wrath, the Lebanese cabinet granted *Al-Manar* an official state licence. By July 1997, Hizbullah held a 55% stake in the Lebanese Communication Group, which merged *Al-Manar* and *Al-Nour* (Jorisch, 2004: xiii, 24-25; Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 62).

between 14 March 1998 and 15 November 1999 (Alagha, 2006: 47)[351]. While the purpose of inaugurating the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (LRB) was not motivated with the intention of 'Lebanonising' Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF*, the inclusive gesture supplied Hizbullah's *OF* with the opportunity to 'Lebanonise' the framing of the Islamic Resistance in order to enhance its social *capital* with the *SMF*, a development that would enable Hizbullah's *OF* to solidify its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* while accumulating recognised forms of social *capital* in the *PF*.

During this process, *Al-Manar* also functioned to expose, emphasise and embed these symbolic victories at the expense of the 'Small Satan' or 'Zionist entity'. On 28 May 1998, Israel agreed to release the bodies of 40 Hizbullah fighters, including Hadi Nasrallah, and 65 Lebanese prisoners in exchange for Itamar Ilyah, one of the Israeli soldiers killed at Ansariyeh (Alagha, 2006: 49; Qassem, 2005: 141). *Al-Manar* broadcast live images of the military reception as the Troika attended the return of the martyrs at Beirut Airport and covered Sayyid Nasrallah's speech addressing the sacrifice of the martyrs at the Imam Al-Mahdi School in Ouzai (Harb, 2009: 58-60). Supplementing the reporting of commemorative events, comprehensive news accounts as well as reels of *amaliyat istishahidiya* ('martyrdom operations') and feeds of Israeli ambushes through its coordination with the military media service of the Islamic Resistance, *Al-Manar* sought to undermine the Israeli 'military machine' and psychologically implanted doubt amongst the Israeli public while simultaneously informing, empowering and harmonising the natural compatibility of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* between the *MSF* and *SMF* (Jorisch, 2004: 22)[352].

The killing of Brigadier General Erez Gerstein on 28 February 1999, the highest ranked military figure targeted by the Islamic Resistance, epitomised the influential congruence between Hizbullah's 'military ability and media credibility' (Harb, 2009: 58). While Hizbullah's security apparatus was tasked with monitoring his movements, Hadi Nasrallah's former unit in the Islamic Resistance was responsible for planting three bombs in the occupation zone (*MER*, 12 June, 1999: 11-12). Testament to the

[351] Prerequisites for membership included having no ties with Israel, possessing no political or ideological commitment besides resisting Israel and demonstrating physical and mental ability. After extensive military and ideological training that redesigned affiliation on a 'nationalist basis', the Lebanese Brigades conducted its first attack on 14 March 1998 to mark the 20th anniversary of Operation Litani. Almost half were between 25 and 30 with 35.7% possessing university degrees. They contained Sunnis (38%), Shi'i (25%), Druze (20%) and Christians (17%) with recruits coming from Beirut (40%), North Lebanon (20.6%), South Lebanon (17.4%), the Biqa' (12.4%) and the Chouf (8.6%) (*MER*, 21 March, 1998: 12-13; 16 January, 1999: 9-10; 18 December, 1999: 19).

[352] In particular, on 27 February 1998, while Israel denied the existence and success of Operation Beir Kalab, al-Manar not only released footage that substantiated the event, but also conducted an interview with the Hizbullah commander in charge of the operation. Additionally, on 15 May 1999, when Hizbullah regained control over Beit Yahoun, al-Manar ensured that a connection was made between Hizbullah's activities and its pro-Palestinian credentials by invoking the anniversary of *al-Nakba* in 1948 when Israel compelled approximately 800,000 Palestinians to leave their homes (Harb, 2009: 56-58, 63-65).

clandestine nature of Hizbullah's intelligence gathering and precise execution, Brigadier General Erez Gerstein's motorcade of four armoured cars was struck three kilometres north of the Israeli border in Markaba (*MER*, 6 March, 1999: 7). Almost immediately, *Al-Manar* broadcast a full brief of the operation and a complete profile of Brigadier General Gerstein. Commenting on Israeli TV, which relayed the report, military personnel revealed that such detailed analyses of the operation could only have been possible through extensive research and preparation beforehand (Harb, 2009: 61-63). Mirroring the fatigue of the Israeli public and militarily confounded, Israel's retaliation consisted of a few air raids over the southern suburbs of Beirut and the Biqa'. Despite threats from Israeli Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz and Defence Minister Moshe Arens, 'it wasn't a lion that roared. It was a mouse crying before it wriggled back into its hole' (Alex Fishman in *MER*, 6 March, 1999: 8).

Six months after Ehud Barak, the impending Israeli premier, declared a unilateral withdrawal from the 'security zone', the Islamic Resistance demonstrated the audacity of a military actor on the ascendency with the suicide operation of Ammar Hammoud on 30 December 1999, the twelfth and last of its kind. From a mediocre position as one of a plethora of *heterodox* militias sharing in the *illusio* of Resistance against Israel in the *MSF*, the Islamic Resistance, presided over by the predominantly consistent leadership structures within Hizbullah's *OF*, strategically accumulated and deployed *capital* to adapt, develop and evolve its Resistance *habitus* in accordance with the parameters permitted by the intrinsic dynamics of the *MSF*. By the time of Israel's withdrawal, the Islamic Resistance had cultivated and consolidated its symbolic *capital* as a legitimately *orthodox* actor[353].

The innovative ingenuity and reproductive quality of the Islamic Resistance in relation to the structured rules of practice enabled the amassing of symbolic *capital*, a resource that bestows authentic acceptance upon the means and meaning of the *capital* utilised. Due to conserved *field* homology between its Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* and *MSF*, not only was Hizbullah's *OF* able to transfer symbolic *capital* from the *MSF* to influence the practice of its Shi'i agents in the *SMF*, but the unprecedented *hysteresis* the Islamic Resistance triggered in Israel presented Hizbullah's *OF* with an opportunity to mobilise its media organs in projecting a 'Lebanonised' Resistance narrative that also appealed to non-Shi'i agents within the

[353] During Hizbullah's Fifth Conclave (1998), the *majlis al-shura* remained largely similar to its previous composition. One notable change was the alleged appointment of Jawad Nour al-Din, a.k.a. Hajj Radwan or Imad Mugniyeh, as the head of the Jihad Council (*MER*, 1 August, 1998: 5; Alagha, 2011: 162; Blanford, 2011: 124). The increased efficiency of Hizbullah's military tactics may be attributed to enhanced experience with the average age of martyred fighters rising from 21-22 (1983-1991) to 26 (1998-2000) (Malthaner, 2011: 223).

SMF. By extension, this inclusive dialogue between the Islamic Resistance and Lebanese civil society acted to augment Hizbullah's social *capital* within the institutionalised corridors of the *PF*. However, despite these unparalleled accomplishments in the *MSF* and *SMF*, Syria remained the custodian of symbolic *power* in exerting authority over practice in Lebanon. Therefore, retaining and transmitting viable forms of *capital* into Lebanon's *PF* ultimately relied on opportunities produced or provided by Syria.

6.3 The Politics of Resistance

Following the 'April Understanding' of 1996, Hizbullah's *OF* had created a harmonious Resistance *habitus* between the *MSF* and *SMF* in which cultural and economic *capital* was simultaneously being reinforced into symbolic *capital*. Exemplified by its relationship with LAF General Lahoud as well as its military engagements with Israel, Hizbullah had also expanded its social *capital* beyond the Shi'i community. Nevertheless, the priority for Hizbullah's *OF* was to translate this symbolic *capital* to the *PF* without compromising the management and meaning of its existing status. As the 1996 parliamentary elections approached, Hizbullah's *OF* was confident that the exploits of the Islamic Resistance combined with the provision of welfare programmes could be adjusted to the logic of the *PF* in embodying the antithesis to the free market capitalism advocated by Premier Hariri. Since 1992, the Sunni businessman had sought to address Lebanon's post-war malaise by securing loans and grants from foreign creditors. Benefitting from his established networks with international governments, Hariri initially received $1.5 billion to instigate a series of projects centred on the reconstruction of Lebanon's infrastructure[354].

For the opportunities of this 'Harirism' to succeed, the premier recognised the importance of navigating around the structured restrictions of the *PF* by constructing 'his own sphere, mixing public and private to conquer his own place alongside the "presidents' club"' (Leenders, 2012: 213, 216). Through SOLIDERE, a private company established by Hariri to oversee Beirut's transformation, the state's Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), a public 'technopolitical organization' vulnerable to Hariri's clientalism, announced $1.7 billion of initiatives in Electricity, Telecoms, Transport, Water, Education and Health (Leenders, 2012: 211; *MER*, 4

[354] Contributors included Italy ($439m), the European Council and Central Bank ($285m), the Saudi Development Bank ($130m), the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development ($92m), the World Bank ($175m), France ($31m), UNDP ($20m), OPEC ($10m), the Islamic Development Bank ($33m) and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development ($25m) (*MER*, 6 November, 1993: 10).

March, 1995: 13-15)[355]. Despite injecting foreign investment into Lebanon, Hariri's policies were criticised by opposition MPs, including Hizbullah, for excessive borrowing and irresponsible spending. Furthermore, the premier was denounced for prioritising the core of Beirut at the expense of the Lebanese periphery as well as for adopting a unilateral stance that promoted a culture of nepotism and corruption within SOLIDERE and the CDR (*MER*, 2 December, 1995: 10-11)[356].

In its 1996 electoral statement, Hizbullah's *OF* focused on deploring the morality of this 'Harirism' on socio-economic grounds as opposed to deploying exclusively Shi'i frames in the *PF*. The text, which endorsed 'a state of development with no discrimination and participation with no exclusion or elimination', emphasised the need to protect equality and justice by investing in human development and public services (Alagha, 2011: 69, 71-74)[357]. In response to Hariri's counter-claim that Hizbullah simply intended to weaken the state while incubating the Islamic Resistance from Lebanon's society and institutions, Hizbullah insisted on the continuation and nationalisation of the Islamic Resistance (*MER*, 1 June, 1996: 12). Testament to this commitment, the document referred to the 'faithful Lebanese' and 'our vast cultural affiliation with all its diversity, richness and sublime human value, within a framework of integration and unity' (Alagha, 2011: 69). While the Resistance was primarily incumbent on Hizbullah, its purpose was an inclusive 'endeavour with all the Lebanese people' as well as with the state (Alagha, 2011: 71).

Although composed by an actor becoming more familiar with the rules of practice in the *PF*, the authenticity of Hizbullah's *orthodox* framing failed to convince its *field* counterparts. During Operation Grapes of Wrath, Hariri had admitted that if the Israelis were unable to defeat the Islamic Resistance, the Lebanese state should not be expected to defeat Hizbullah (Harik, 2005: 118). While Lebanon's elite neither had the political nor the military muscle to disobey Syria's symbolic *power* with regards to the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*, they were able to manoeuvre around the structured parameters of the *PF* to limit Hizbullah's influence. Converging on the aim of 'clipping the wings of the bird that has outgrown all others so fast', Rafiq Hariri, Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, in a move authorised by President Hrawi, coalesced their respective values of *capital* to publically portray Hizbullah as propagating

[355] SOLIDERE is the French acronym for the Lebanese Company for the Development and Reconstruction of Beirut Central District (*MER*, 6 November, 1993: 9).
[356] By the end of 1996, Hariri had secured pledges of approximately $3.2 million for development and reconstruction projects in Lebanon (*MER*, 21 December, 1996: 8).
[357] Hizbullah also lobbied for increased media freedoms, an attempt to ensure the state's legitimacy of the Party's media organs, specifically *Al-Manar*.

extremism over moderation while concurrently espousing the notion that the Resistance should be the preserve of the nation (*MER*, 24 August, 1996: 7)[358].

These seasoned campaigners mobilised their superior experience in the *PF* to balance against a commonly perceived threat. While Ali Ammar, Hizbullah's MP for Baabda, was defeated as the Druze and Christians united to support Shi'i independent Bassem al-Saba, Muhammad Berjawi, Hizbullah's MP for Beirut, lost to Muhammad Baydoun, a traditional figure of the Shi'i elite endorsed by the Christians and Sunnis. Amal also caused Hizbullah problems within the *saqf al-suri* in the South and the Biqa'. After intense deliberations with Nabi Berri, mediated by President Hafez al-Assad, Sayyid Nasrallah reticently agreed at the 11th hour to honour the Syrian-imposed Shi'i partnership with Amal by consenting to the composition of electoral coalitions that prevented Hizbullah from maximising its political representation (Hamzeh, 2004: 114)[359]. Consequently, Hizbullah's *wafa' lil moqawama* bloc in parliament dropped from 12 to 9 with four MPs representing the South and five in the Biqa', which included two non-Shi'i allies. Meanwhile, Hariri and Berri, with the assistance of Christian voters, managed to negate the gains made by 'fundamentalist' groups in 1992 (Khashan, 1997)[360]. Commentators judged that Hizbullah had learned 'in Lebanon only Syria decides and you have only one sponsor – Damascus not Tehran' with some predicting that 'when the right time comes, the Party will be evicted from the country's political life' (*MER*, 21 September, 1996: 8; Khashan, 1997). Overall, the election results had inflicted a 'double humiliation' on Hizbullah, not only in compelling the Party into coalitions against its will, but also in revealing that coalitions neutralised any competitive edge the Party may exhibit over its opponents (*MER*, 14 September, 1996).

However, the elections served as a reminder of Hizbullah's *heterodox* position in the *PF*, not a symptom of its inevitable demise. While Hizbullah continued to maintain *field* homology between its Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF* and *SMF*, it had failed to effectively employ this *capital* to challenge the extant *orthodoxy* of the *PF*. Rather than rely on passively berating the government as a unilateral actor, Hizbullah had to actively implement a strategy that sought to combine its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF*

[358] Whereas Berri commented that 'resistance is a national trait' and not the exclusive property of one group, Jumblatt demanded that Lebanon be 'spared the colossal losses it has been paying for Katyusha rockets fired across the border' (*MER*, 24 August, 1996: 7).
[359] An example of Hizbullah's marginalisation in the *PF* can be seen with the announcement in 1996 of a new $225 million motorway in the South from Saida (a Hariri stronghold) to Naqoura (an Amal enclave). Circumnavigating Hizbullah's wishes, the contract was offered to Shafiq Hariri (Rafiq's brother) and Randa Berri (Nabih's wife) with the construction outsourced to Kassyoun, a Syrian contractor (*MER*, 7 September, 1996: 10).
[360] Both Hariri and Berri received 20 seats in parliament. By contrast, Islamic groups lost five sears in total with the only successful 'fundamentalist' candidate in northern Lebanon receiving the lowest number of votes compared to the ten other elected Sunni deputies (Khashan, 1997).

and *SMF* with the accumulation of social *capital* in the *PF*. Prior to the elections, there were indications of this shift in policy towards the nationalisation of the Resistance for political purposes. Principally, Hizbullah's *OF* had mobilised its welfare institutions and media organs to nationalise the scope and appeal of the Resistance by conducting extensive polls on public opinion, demonstrating its ability to address socio-economic needs in the context of Israeli aggression as well as discarding the exclusive and subversive nature of its operations in the *MSF* in relation to the state (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 187; *MER*, 19 June, 1999: 11-12; Azani, 2011: 129). Nevertheless, the acceleration of this approach appeared after Hizbullah's mediocre performance in the 1996 elections.

After the death of Hadi Nasrallah in 1997, not only were Lebanese flags used to commemorate his martyrdom, but Hizbullah also formed the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (Azani, 2011: 129). While these gestures of 'Lebanonisation' were important, they were not imperative for the intrinsic legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* since Hizbullah possessed significant forms of symbolic *capital* on account of its operational practice as well as its relations with Iran, Syria and General Lahoud. Instead, the aim of Hizbullah's *OF* was to use its recognised symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* as a conduit to consolidate and expand its influence in the *SMF*, the integral mobilising source in transferring *capital* into the *PF*. However, unlike the *MSF*, the rules governing the *SMF* were considerably more dynamic and competitive in aspiring for symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community, let alone the wider *field* itself. In order to enhance its political position, Hizbullah's *OF* pursued a two-pronged strategy in the *SMF*: to expand its appeal and accessibility amongst the Shi'i community while seeking and solidifying cross-confessional coalitions.

The first challenge confronting Hizbullah's *infitah* was the reconciliation of allegiances in praxis between *wilayat al-faqih* and Lebanon's structures of authority. After the Islamic Revolution, Hizbullah cadres supported Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran whereas most Amal members followed Ayatollah Khui. From 1992, Hizbullah's *OF* had framed this nexus as mutually inclusive since the structured constitution of Hizbullah's *OF*, which institutionalised the concept of *wilayat al-faqih*, was legitimately sanctioned within the Shi'i enclaves of Lebanon's *SMF* as long as revered figures within the hierarchical establishment of religious Shi'i leadership were also respected. However, the deaths of Ayatollah Khomeini (1989), Ayatollah Khui (1992), Ayatollah Golpayegani (1993) and Ayatollah Araki (1994) created a temporary vacuum in Shi'i religious authority, namely between Sayyid Fadlallah, who called for Ayatollah Sistani

of Najaf to be the next *marja al-taqlid*, and the incumbent holder of the *wilayat al-faqih*, Ali Khamenei, who claimed religious jurisdiction not only inside Iran, but also outside the country (Chehabi, 2006: 300)[361].

Although positioned in Lebanon, Hizbullah's *OF* was conceptually predicated on and predisposed to the strictures of *wilayat al-faqih*. For Sayyid Nasrallah, 'the secret of our strength, growth, unity, struggle, and martyrdom is *wilayat al-faqih*, the spinal cord of Hizbullah' (Hamzeh, 2004: 34). Conversely, the pre-revolutionary framing that had galvanised and inscribed the collective Shi'i *habitus* (*collusio*) in Lebanon's *SMF* prior to the formation of Hizbullah was primarily supplied by Sayyid Fadlallah. While obedience to *wilayat al-faqih* permitted flexibility in the private domain, especially regarding *ibadat* ('ritual practices') and *mu'amalat* ('daily dealings'), Hizbullahis were publicly obligated to follow one source of emulation (Shaykh Qassem in Alagha, 2006: 99). Therefore, Sayyid Fadlallah's belief in *al-marja'iyya al-ta'adudiyya* (a collective of revered clerics) and his elevated status as a *marja al-taqlid* in 1995 brought him into direct confrontation with his former students within Hizbullah[362].

This struggle for symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community led to a smear campaign orchestrated by Hizbullah to discredit Sayyid Fadlallah, which included distributing pamphlets accusing the cleric of *fitna* ('sedition'), chastising his religious exegeses on Islamic history and Ashoura, castigating his sermons through the counter-mobilisation of Shi'i imams as well as raiding his property (Sankari, 2005: 256-257)[363]. However, the relational balance in symbolic *capital* between Hizbullah and Sayyid Fadlallah amongst the Shi'i community in the *SMF* prevented either party from exercising symbolic *power*, a state in which symbolic *capital*, in the absence of a counterpoint or adversary, is promoted to unrivalled proportions to the extent that force is perceived as legitimate. Therefore, this use of coercive practice, particularly in support of a foreign actor against a locally revered figure, was largely deemed as unjustified by the broader Shi'i community in Lebanon. This behaviour was also invoked as evidence for Hizbullah's disingenuous and distanced stance from revitalised efforts at promoting national unity.

[361] The standoff between Sayyid Fadlallah and Ali Khamenei was ultimately a political struggle over the religious nucleus of the Shi'i *ulama*. Whereas Sayyid Fadlallah believed that Najaf should remain separated from the *wilayat al-faqih* in Iran as the epicentre of Shi'i thought, Ali Khamenei intended to merge Shi'i religious authority under the auspices of Qom and the *wilayat al-faqih* in Iran (*MER*, 29 January 1994: 8-9; Chehabi, 2006: 299).
[362] Interview with Hani Abdallah in Beirut, 11 September 2012.
[363] Audio recordings of Sayyid Fadlallah's *ijtihad* ('reasoning') were tampered with while the Shi'i cleric's house was looted in Bir al-Abd (Sankari, 2005: 256-257).

By 1996, Hizbullah's *OF* started to alter its tactics to construct a *modus vivendi* that was more synchronised to the eclectic structures of Lebanon's *SMF* rather than enforce imported interests. In recognition of this shift, Ali Khamenei appointed Sayyid Nasrallah and Shaykh Yazbek as his official representatives in Lebanon from 1995, a move that enabled them to directly collect funds from religious taxes thereby enhancing Hizbullah's independence in Lebanon and projecting a more Lebanese image of the Party (Alagha, 2011: 53). Furthermore, rather than simply instigate its own organisations, Hizbullah's *OF* began engaging and challenging pre-existing institutions in the *SMF* via conventional channels. Aside from rhetorically berating Amal over the partisan procedures of the Higher Islamic Shi'i Council (HISC), Hizbullah concluded its assault on Sayyid Fadlallah before the parliamentary elections and instrumentally exploited his rivalry with the HISC's Amal-affiliated President Sayyid Shamseddine by supporting the cleric's right to deliver Friday prayers in the southern suburbs on 17 May 1996 (*MER*, 1 June, 1996: 11)[364]. By endorsing Sayyid Fadlallah, Hizbullah expected to incur the wrath of Amal in the short-term but intended to embolden its position within the Shi'i community in the long-term by goading Sayyid Shamseddine into reforming the pro-Amal leadership structures and electoral processes of the HISC[365].

Moreover, since the 1996 elections proved that achieving efficacy in the *PF* required adequate investment in an assortment of inter-confessional social *capital*, Hizbullah's *OF* inaugurated robust and interdependent relationships beyond the Shi'i community. Reiterating its 1996 epistolary statement, Hizbullah released a document of principles in April 1997 that demanded acceptance for Lebanon's cultural diversity and promoted national identity over political sectarianism (Azani, 2011: 129). As a means of activating this discourse, Hizbullah firstly appeased Syria by authoring the 'Charter of Collective Action to Enrich Political Life in Lebanon', an initiative that unified Hizbullah not only with two pro-Iranian Sunni groups, namely *Tawhid* and *Jama'at Islamiyya*, but also with the Ba'ath and the SSNP, two pro-Syrian secular parties (*MER*, 12 April, 1997: 13)[366].

[364] Musa al-Sadr was replaced by Sayyid Shamseddine as the HISC's President at the expiration of his term in 1994. On 17 May 1996, Sayyid Fadlallah undermined the authority of Sayyid Shamseddine by delivering a sermon to 20,000 residents from his mosque in Haret Hurayk. Sayyid Fadlallah, whose actions were supported by Ali Khamenei, was accused by the HISC and Amal of politicising his religious authority (*MER*, 1 June, 1996: 11).

[365] While Amal wanted to amend the HISC's by-laws to extend Sayyid Shamseddine's mandate, Hizbullah pushed for the leadership of the HISC to run for election. Rather than an electoral college comprised of figures associated with the generally pro-Amal *zu'ama* in the South, Hizbullah lobbied for an electoral body of 10,000 members consisting of professors, lawyers, doctors and engineers as well as clerics and businessmen (*MER*, 3 April, 1999: 9-10).

[366] Al-Ahbash, a pro-Syrian group, was excluded. Its leader, Shaykh Halabi, was assassinated in 1995 by three supporters of Abu Mohjen (Abd al-Karim Saadi), the head of the Islamic Partisans Brigade, a movement founded in Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camp by Shaykh Shreidi in 1985 (*MER*, 12 April, 1997: 13).

Secondly, considering that the re-emergence of the Christian electorate in 1996 was a key impediment to its success, Hizbullah sought grassroots rapprochement with Christian representatives in Lebanon (*MER*, 31 May, 1997: 7). Although Hizbullah had conducted preliminary discussions over religious pluralism with Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir from 1992, the political substance of these overtures only gathered momentum after the pro-Syrian Karim Pakradouni became Secretary General of the Phalange Party in 1993 (*MER*, 12 December, 1992: 9; Pakradouni, 2012: 100)[367]. Coinciding with a visit from Pope John Paul II in May 1997, Hizbullah released 'A Reading in Papal Guidance', a publication that called for ecumenical dialogue under the united values supplied by religion (Alagha, 2006: 154). Thirdly, on 18 August 1997, Hizbullah arranged a symposium that assembled 27 political parties, including those who had marginalised them in 1996, including Amal, the PSP and the Phalange, to construct a plan for Lebanese unity in supporting the Resistance and strengthening ties with Syria and Iran (*MER*, 23 August, 1997: 16-17; Qassem, 2005: 82). The Charter of this coalition, which was announced just weeks before the establishment of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (LRB), portrayed Hizbullah as the vanguard movement responsible for rehabilitating and harmonising national unity[368].

This centralist pivot by Hizbullah's *OF* in the *SMF*, both in diluting the notion of *wilayat al-faqih* and in eroding the insular character of its practice, precipitated a corresponding shift in the growth of *heterodox* positions within the organisation. Deploring the abandonment of the Shi'i in the Biqa', Hizbullah's former Secretary General Shaykh Tufayli declared that Sayyid Nasrallah had deviated from the principles of the movement. Citing government legislation that banned the cultivation of hemp and poppies, an industry worth $1 billion, without investing in alternatives, Shaykh Tufayli reported that half of Hermel's 100,000 residents were hungry with the other half forced to sell their land (*MER*, 28 June, 1997: 9-10). Attempting to refocus Hizbullah's attention away from the monopoly of the Resistance in the South towards the socio-economically oppressed in the Biqa', Shaykh Tufayli, confirming that 'I am not looking for a post in government or in Hizbullah', managed to direct $97 million

[367] At the end of 1992, Hizbullah delegates Nawwaf Moussawi and Shaykh Tlays visited the Maronite Patriarch before the latter's assistant met with Sayyid Nasrallah on 22 January 1993 (Qassem, 2005: 206-207). From 1993, Karim Pakradouni conducted political discussions with Hizbullah through Ghalib Abu Zaynab before Mahmoud Qomati, a member of Hizbullah's politburo, and Husayn al-Khalil, the head of Hizbullah's Political Assembly and the personal advisor for Sayyid Nasrallah, were specifically tasked with the Christian portfolio (Interview with Ibrahim Moussawi in Beirut, 7 September 2012). In 1996, Pakradouni organised a conference in Achrafieh, the Christian enclave of eastern Beirut, in solidarity with the Resistance (Pakradouni, 2012: 100).

[368] The coalition, which consisted of two committees, also included the Ba'ath Party, the SSNP, the LCP, pro-Syrian Sunni parties, the Nasserites and three Armenian parties (*MER*, 23 August, 1997: 16-17).

for development in eastern and northern Lebanon (*MER*, 12 July, 1997: 10; 19 July, 1997: 17)[369].

This popular movement headed by one of the founders of Hizbullah not only irritated Sayyid Nasrallah, but also threatened the geographical and ideological core of Hizbullah's nucleus by highlighting internal discrepancies within a movement that prided itself on cohesion as well as attracting the sympathy of prominent Shi'i figures, such as Sayyid Fadlallah and Shaykh Mechaymesh (*MER*, 28 June, 1997: 9-10; 15 November, 1997: 11)[370]. In a response that acted to vindicate Shaykh Tufayli's objections, Hizbullah consented and cooperated with the state in permitting 3,000 LAF soldiers to deploy in the Biqa'. During the assault that ensued, Shaykh Tufayli's supporters raided a Hizbullah *hawza* while Shaykh Tlays, Tufayli's son-in-law and a Hizbullah MP, was killed (Chehabi, 2006: 304; Alagha, 2006: 48). On 30 March 1998, Sayyid Nasrallah announced the end of the episode affirming that Shaykh Tufayli's 'expulsion has been decided and it doesn't require a General Congress to make it effective. The problem is behind us' (*MER*, 18 April, 1998: 10). Subsequently, as part of Hizbullah's Fifth Conclave in 1998, Shaykh Tufayli became the first prominent figure to be officially exiled from the Party[371].

By embarking on a post-1996 policy of aligning its cultural *capital* with the prevailing structures of the *SMF* while simultaneously expanding its social *capital* across sectarian lines to ostensibly embrace 'Lebanonisation', Hizbullah's *OF* had diversified the framing of its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to fit the configurations of the *SMF*. Moreover, by maintaining its position between these *fields*, Hizbullah's *OF* had mobilised this revised stance to evade the internal fragmentation caused by its strategic pivot in adapting to institutionalised rules of practice, thereby enabling Hizbullah to enhance its position in the *SMF* for the purpose of targeting *capital* deployment in the *PF*. The inception of municipal elections in May 1998, the first since 1963, presented an opportunity for Hizbullah to circumvent traditional avenues for political access within the Lebanese system by providing alternative channels for the transference of *capital* between the logics of social and political mobilisation. As acknowledged by Sulayman Takieddine, municipal elections represented 'a mobbish

[369] This bias was reflected in the composition of Hizbullah's *al-majlis al-shura* where only one member, Shaykh Yazbek, was from the Biqa'. At this time, 80% of Hizbullah's Resistance martyrs hailed from the South (Malthaner, 2011: 222).
[370] Sayyid Nasrallah was allegedly so frustrated that he threatened to resign (MER, 28 June, 1997: 9-10). Shaykh Mechaymesh, previously a media advisor for Hizbullah under Shaykh Tufayli in 1989, defected from the Party in 1998 after siding with Sayyid Fadlallah in his interpretation of applying *wilayat al-faqih* in Lebanon (Interview with Reda Mechaymesh in Beirut, 3 September 2012).
[371] During the Fifth Conclave, Sayyid Nasrallah's term was extended indefinitely. Other members of the majlis al-shura were: Husayn al-Khalil (Political Advisor); Shaykh Qassem (deputy Secretary General); Shaykh Safieddine (Executive Council); Muhammad Ra'ad (Political Council); Shaykh Yazbek (Judicial Council); and Sayyid Nasrallah (Jihad Council although believed to be Imad Mugniyeh).

democracy or democracy of the mob...a massive assault against the established elites of pre-war traditional clans and political parties' (*MER*, 23 May, 1998: 15).

According to a legislative decree of 1977, which outlined the official mandate of Lebanon's 708 registered municipalities, decision-making powers were devolved to local councils while the mayor was bestowed with the authority to implement decisions under the consultative supervision of the council (*MER*, 23 May, 1998: 17)[372]. The implications of this seismic shift, in which the onus of representation was redirected from regional districts reliant on electoral coalitions to the localised autonomy of municipal councils, allowed Hizbullah to play to its organisational strengths in achieving four objectives: firstly, to implant and expand its grassroots inculcation of Resistance in small communities; secondly, to legitimise and institutionalise its social service programmes in the *SMF*; thirdly, to fulfil its aim of loosening the grip of, and gradually replacing, mainstream parties and traditional families in majority Shi'i areas; and fourthly, to cement its appeal as a coalition partner for non-Shi'i actors or parties attempting to operate in majority Shi'i constituencies.

Consequently, the promulgation of Hizbullah's proliferating public programmes, orchestrated by the Education, Social and Health Institutes, would not only receive credit through municipal elections, but also increased access, functionality and legitimacy by aligning their work and employees with local councils[373]. Additionally, Hizbullah-run municipalities would be charged with collecting taxes as well as dictating expenditure, granting the Party with the ability to invest and reinvest in development and reconstruction efforts compatible with their interests while approving, instructing and inscribing the imagery and projection of local identity through the control of physical and social space, such as the adornment of posters and slogans, the erection of mosques, the location of meeting centres, the issuance of business licenses for local commerce and the organisation of public events.

Hizbullah's ubiquitous involvement in local affairs guaranteed that it 'dominated local councils' in the 1998 elections (Alagha, 2006: 49). In Beirut, Hizbullah temporarily suspended its animosity towards Premier Hariri to compete for one of three allotted

[372] Local council responsibilities included: drafting laws and regulations; setting and collecting fees and taxes; processing bills; designing town planning and development projects; accepting grants and issuing licenses; implementing public works and services; (re)naming streets, towns and villages; repairing infrastructure; organising transportation; providing for social needs. The mayor was tasked with budgets; drafting bills on revenues and expenditure; representing councils; protecting the environment and antiquities; issuing housing and construction permits; and setting regulations. Decrees presented by the mayor did not require the approval of ministers, governors or administrative divisions (*MER*, 23 May, 1998: 15-17; Hamzeh, 2004: 122-123; Alagha, 2006: 48).
[373] By the end of the 1990s, Hizbullah had 15 coordinated NGOs all based in the southern suburbs (Fawwaz, 2000).

Shi'i seats in Beirut's 24-seat council by running on his Beirut Accord List (Harik, 2005: 101)[374]. In *al-dahiyeh*, Hizbullah utilised its social *capital* with local families to win all 22 seats in Ghubayri and recorded a landslide in Burj al-Barajneh while Amal failed to gain any seats (Hamzeh, 2004: 128)[375]. Despite Amal's historical affiliation with the *zu'ama* of the South, Hizbullah also managed to dent its monopoly. Nabih Berri's associates scored 12 municipalities (94 seats) to Hizbullah's 11 (97 seats) in Nabatiyeh while in Tyre and Bint Jubayl, Hizbullah secured 11 municipalities (122 seats) compared with Amal's 27 (231 seats) (Harik, 2004: 130). In the Biqa', Hizbullah won 18 municipalities (224 seats) to Amal's 9 (158 seats) but could only muster four out of 21 council seats in Ba'albeck and were prevented from a landslide victory in Hermel due to the popularity of Shaykh Tufayli in Brittal (Hamzeh, 2004: 130; Alagha, 2006: 49)[376].

Primarily, Hizbullah owed its success to the effective transmission of its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to the *SMF* through its network of grassroots services and media outlets[377]. However, while a significant proportion of Hizbullah constituents were willing to display their gratitude and loyalty to the Islamic Resistance via the ballot box, social services were not offered unconditionally (Danawi, 2002: 43-50; 60-62). Through self-regulating networks such as *Al-Akhawat al-Moutatawe'at*, or the 'Volunteer Sisters', Hizbullah could indirectly monitor recipients of aid and judge whether they were morally deserving of assistance or whether they were betraying the sanctity of the Resistance by failing to observe the pious precepts expected by Hizbullah's welfare programmes (Fawwaz, 2000)[378]. Subsequently, those who failed to comply with socio-religious practices or register their vote correctly during elections were not only publicly ostracised, but also denied access to Hizbullah's services (Danawi, 2002: 62)[379].

[374] Hizbullah not only joined Hariri's list, but also cooperated with the Christians by urging its supporters to vote for the whole list (Harik, 2005: 96-101).

. [375] In Ghubayri, Hizbullah allied with Muhammad al-Khansa, a prominent leader in local politics with an extensive familial network as well as a popular figure in the area for spearheading social services (Harik, 2005: 103). In Burj al-Barajneh, the popularity of Hizbullah's Rasul al-Azzam Hospital ensured its success (Harik, 2005: 104).

[376] Out of 97 municipalities in the South, Hizbullah won 22, Amal won 39, the Christians won 23, 11 were disputed, one was split and one was called for the leftists (Harik, 2005: 107; Hamzeh, 2004: 130).

[377] In mid-1999, *al-Hayat* reported that Hizbullah's social serves had expanded their operational reach. The Martyrs Foundation was providing 1400 orphans with a free education while the *Takaful* programme was assisting 1,419 children and supplying 244 university grants. The Educational Institute managed 9 schools and 5,300 students. Between 1996 and 2000, Hizbullah spent LL16 billion on education aid. Meanwhile, the Health Institute was providing assistance to hundreds of thousands of people at subsidised rates with 21 dispensaries, 9 medical centres, 13 clinics, running 95 ambulances and 5 roving infirmaries as well as training 360 volunteers and 119 rescuers. The Institute for the Wounded addressed 3083 cases that offered salaries, housing, medical care, allowances, rehabilitation and support for incapacitated fighters and their families (*MER*, 19 June, 1999:11-12; Danawi, 2002: 42; Harb & Leenders, 2005: 187, Hamzeh, 2004: 55).

[378] In particular, the Volunteer Sisters, which operated throughout Hizbullah's NGO network, offered support and subsequently monitored 161 widowed wives of fallen martyrs between 1995 and 1999. If a recipient of assistance remarried or drifted from piety, she would not qualify for aid (Danawi, 2002: 43-46).

[379] Since each eligible voter was listed, local delegates, ordinarily affiliated to Hizbullah, were able to tell which registered individuals did or did not vote (Danawi, 2002: 62).

Secondly, since the composition of the *SMF* represented an eclectic mosaic that restricted 'the ability of one religious current to reign supreme', Hizbullah developed its mobilising frames beyond the reliance of exclusively partisan rhetoric to embrace a conceptual and practical pivot towards an encompassing national narrative (Harik, 2005: 109). Conforming to its post-1996 policy of developing social *capital* within and across its constituencies, Hizbullah diversified its profile to the non-Shi'i community and facilitated cross-confessional coalitions prior to the elections that contributed to its broadening appeal. As witnessed throughout the elections, whether coalescing with local Shi'i families, Sunnis or Christians, Hizbullah evolved into an *orthodox* actor capable of attracting the attention and respect of its counterparts by accumulating forms of recognised social *capital* within the structured rules of the *SMF*[380]. Not only did Hizbullah remove all religious and ideological symbols surrounding Christian polling stations in *al-dahiyeh*, but the Party also demonstrated its intention to enact 'Lebanonisation' by announcing that the 1985 Open Letter no longer acted as Hizbullah's 'primary frame of reference' (Alagha, 2006: 48-49).

Despite Hizbullah's tangible success in the 1998 elections, this enhanced position in local politics symbolised a Pyrrhic victory since municipalities remained largely disconnected from the *PF*. Compounding the assertion that the *PF* incessantly 'attempts to alienate Hizbullah from internal political and public-service gains', Hizbullah was endowed with 'sources of authority, the ability to act, and means and budgets that directly influence the daily life of the Shiite community' but 'these do not have the political-public responsibility existing the public-executive-national system' (Qassem, 2005: 202; Azani, 2011: 125). Ultimately, Hizbullah was still at the whim of Syria and the governing Troika, especially Amal, which remained 'the political cover for the Resistance in Lebanon and no other group can compete with it in that regard, even if that group spearheaded military activities' (*MER*, 5 September, 1998: 7).

Although Hizbullah exhibited adeptness in reacting to the inherent game within Lebanon's *PF* by cognitively developing its dispositions and resourcefully amalgamating *capital* to alter its position, the municipal elections evinced that as the Party advanced towards the *orthodox* end of the *PF* spectrum, 'the game will become more competitive' (Farid El-Kazen in *MER*, 13 June, 1998: 8). Consequently, regardless of Hizbullah's maturing prowess in the *MSF* and *SMF*, the institutionalised intransigence of positions and interests within the *PF* signified the main obstacle to

[380] While recognising that the *zu'ama* were open to co-option in seizing municipalities from Amal in the South, Hizbullah underestimated their influence in the Biqa' (Hamzeh, 2004: 130-131).

access. Therefore, opportunities for Hizbullah's enhanced political induction and legitimation would emanate from the alignment of pre-existing elites in the *PF* with favourable perceptions regarding the Islamic Resistance.

Following the conclusion of President Hrawi's term in November 1998, LAF General Lahoud was appointed as his replacement. The staunchly pro-Syrian and pro-Islamic Resistance incumbent had consistently opposed Prime Minister Hariri since 1992 when he admitted that 'we will not get along' (Pakradouni, 2012: 4-5). Similarly, Premier Hariri accused General Lahoud of being too lenient on Hizbullah and deliberately abusing his position by personally mobilising the security forces to influence and intimidate[381]. Subsequently, this rivalry had permeated into the political, business and security arenas of Lebanese affairs. In particular, Premier Hariri proposed a reform package for the police to balance against pro-Lahoud Colonels, including Jamil al-Sayyid, a pro-Syrian Shi'i, and Mustapha Hamdan, a pro-Syrian Sunni, who held security positions traditionally filled by Christians (*MER*, 20 September, 1997: 10). Justifying General Lahoud's political interventions, his aide stated that 'the military establishment is not willing to see the whole of Lebanon become part of Hariri's personal holdings' (*MER*, 21 June, 1997: 13)[382]. Nevertheless, once Syrian President Hafez al-Assad assigned the Lebanese portfolio to his son, the equilibrium of this feud was tipped towards General Lahoud who benefited from his close relationship with Bashar al-Assad whereas Premier Hariri, who had extensive personal ties with Ghazi Kan'an and Abdul Halim Khaddam, was suddenly associated with the increasingly marginalised Syrian faction in Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 27).

Before becoming President, General Lahoud, who had been instrumental in restructuring the sectarian complexion of the LAF, insisted that a military man 'will have no role in politics, and if elected, will simply don a civilian suit and walk into parliament as a plain citizen' (*MER*, 28 September 1998: 16-17)[383]. Rather than allaying fears by recognising the entrenched dynamics of Lebanon's *PF*, President Lahoud continued his assault on Hariri from a different podium. During his first speech, President Lahoud reiterated the right of citizens to know how taxes are spent, how contracts are implemented and how investments are managed (*MER*, 28

[381] Hariri argued that Lebanon could not take responsibility for the Resistance until Hizbullah started coordinating with the Lebanese authorities, especially the LAF (Pakradouni, 2012: 11). In 1994, the LAF raided the office of Fuad Siniora with planned military cuts under review and with Hariri stalling on the promotion of Lahoud's candidates for Colonel. Moreover, while Hariri endorsed Ghaneim al-Zoghbi as Chairman of the General Workers' Congress, Lahoud deployed troops to the GWC headquarters to ensure that Elias Abu Rizk assumed the position (*MER*, 21 June, 1997: 12-13).

[382] Not only was most of Lebanon's Finance Ministry occupied by Hariri aides, but his confidants were also positioned in the Central Bank, the Banking Control Committee and the Ministry of Justice. Hariri also had personal relationships with the heads of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (*MER*, 23 January, 1999: 7-8).

[383] General Lahoud had introduced mixed ranks with geographical assignments while ensuring the return of the 12th Brigade, affiliated with Walid Jumblatt, and the 6th Brigade, associated with Nabih Berri, to the authority of the LAF (*MER*, 28 September 1998: 16-17).

November, 1998: 7). Less than a week later, and despite enjoying a parliamentary majority of 85/128, Hariri resigned by invoking a 'constitutional technicality' in Article 53 after swiftly realising that his activities would be considerably inhibited by the new figurehead of the triumvirate (*MER*, 5 December, 1998: 5)[384]. Hariri was subsequently replaced by Selim al-Hoss, a two-time premier who had long decried Hariri's frivolous expenditure and crony capitalist policies[385].

The combination of President Lahoud, Premier al-Hoss and Speaker Berri at the helm of the *PF* confirmed the absolute dominion of the *saqf al-suri*. The Troika, often described as 'a snake with three heads each biting the other' (Elias Hrawi in *MER*, 4 April, 1998: 9), now represented the convergence of three figures, each with dispositions equally beholden to Syria and committed to the practice of reproducing the predominant *orthodoxy* of the *PF* in conjunction with their patron. Prior to 1998, Hizbullah was politically vulnerable having experienced fractious relations with Hariri, tenuous links to Hrawi and temperamental fraternity with Amal. With limited direct access to the corridors of power, Hizbullah ultimately relied on the fickle and unpredictable whims of Syria in sustaining the Islamic Resistance. For the first time, whether through compulsion or volition, the new Troika arrangement on the eve of the millennium offered a congruent front with which to provide political leverage for the Islamic Resistance within the internal dynamics of the *PF*.

Conclusion

Rather than dispute the conceptual identification and practical implementation of Hizbullah's 'Lebanonisation' or *infitah*, this chapter has sought to explore the authenticity and extent to which Hizbullah assimilated into the post-war Ta'if system. Alagha (2006: 201) argued that the 1990s proved that Hizbullah had 'put its political ideology in the drawer and practiced a down-to-earth pragmatic political program'. Subsequently, within the parameters of its conditional context, Hizbullah's *masaleh* ('interests') were to suspend Islamisation and adapt accordingly to the *al-qawanin al-wadiyya* ('man-made laws') entailed in 'Lebanonisation' (Alagha, 2006: 205). From the perspective of SMT, the objective opportunities of Lebanon's post-civil war system encouraged Hizbullah's *OF* to 'Lebanonise' its Collective Action Frames and mobilisational modalities for the purpose of realigning the subjective perceptions of its

[384] Hariri argued that Nabih Berri's gesture allowing President Lahoud to use the Speaker's bloc in parliament to vote as he wished contravened Article 53, which stipulated that one must either pick or abstain (*MER*, 5 December 1998: 5).
[385] At the end of 1997, al-Hoss had helped defeat a bill proposed by Hariri for the allocation of $800 million to finance specific development projects denouncing the lack of transparency and accountability in the process (*MER*, 4 October 1997: 7-8).

supporters to the prevailing tide of its situational environment. This transformation is evident when inspecting the internal rearrangements of Hizbullah's *OF*, the Party's parliamentary presence in the *PF*, the diversification of messages and techniques from exclusively Islamic rhetoric in the *SMF* and the nationalisation of the Islamic Resistance with the inauguration of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades in the *MSF*. Reinforcing the notion that the 1990s signified an epoch of substantive change for Hizbullah, the Party's slogan of 'the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon' was replaced with the 'Islamic Resistance in Lebanon'.

Nevertheless, interpreting Hizbullah's 'Lebanonisation' as an objectively uniform and observable phenomenon threatens to distort the Party's transition from revolutionary ideology to political pragmatism. Firstly, this approach not only fails to problematise the various permutations of perception and meaning within the term 'Lebanonisation' depending on the placement and position of agents within differentiated *fields* of practice, but it also implies Hizbullah's strategic metamorphosis in tacitly acknowledging and accepting Lebanon's predominant *orthodoxy*. Secondly, even by substituting the designation of 'Lebanonisation' with *infitah* ('opening-up') to characterise Hizbullah's post-1992 practice, this assumption neglects to consider the relational complexity confronted by Hizbullah's *OF* in devising tactics to advocate an alternative direction while maintaining a positional balance and cohesion between its *fields* of operation. Overall, throughout the 1990s, Hizbullah's 'Lebanonisation' or *infitah* was far from coherent, consistent or complete since its policy primarily intended to persuade the Lebanese towards the *orthodoxy* of the Resistance in the *MSF* rather than infer Hizbullah's assimilation into the *orthodoxy* of Lebanon's *PF* (Badran, 2009a: 61). A Bourdieu-SMT approach assists not only in examining how Hizbullah was able to navigate and enhance the position of its Resistance *habitus* within and between Lebanon's *fields* of practice, but also why this method was employed as its preferred policy.

Hizbullah's *OF* was constructed and subsequently structured on the tenets of resisting Israel, propagating Islam and obedience to *wilayat al-faqih*. These values acted as the prerequisite criteria for inducting agents, designing its predominant *orthodoxy* of practice and defining the currency of *capital* within the dynamics of Hizbullah's *OF*. While the theoretical logic underpinning the rules of reproductive conformity in the *field* (*doxa*) are immutable, the practical logic of its implementation is reliant on an agent's strategic perception and interpretation of these inherent laws. Consequently, the conveyors of Hizbullah's *orthodoxy* in the *OF* may not have been

able to reconstitute the *field* by changing its *doxa* towards 'Lebanonisation', but they could deploy their symbolic *capital* within the structures of the organisation towards *infitah*, a negotiation of a revised rendering of 'Lebanonisation' that altered Hizbullah's discourse and dispositions.

In the *MSF*, considering the symbolic *capital* accrued by the Islamic Resistance under the auspices of Syria's symbolic *power*, the 'Lebanonisation' of the Islamic Resistance in the 1990s was cosmetic as opposed to concrete. Consequently, the inauguration of the LRB in 1997 was more a public concession than a demonstration of integration. At the end of the civil war, Weberian notions affirming the legitimate monopolisation of force as the preserve of the state were largely defunct. Faced with a decrepit and dysfunctional military apparatus, Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF*, on account of the transferability of cultural and economic *capital* from Iran, aligned its practice to the institutionalised laws (*doxa*) composed by Syria and modified its dispositions towards *orthodoxy*. By diligently observing its operational remit, the Islamic Resistance strategically adapted its dispositions and perceptions to accumulate recognised *capital*, evolve in experience and enhance its position in the *MSF*. Despite being labelled as a 'Foreign Terrorist Organisation' by the U.S. State Department in 1997, the qualitative success of the Islamic Resistance against Israel, exemplified by the 'April Understanding' of 1996, resulted in Hizbullah emerging as a legitimate participant and possessor of symbolic *capital* both in the eyes of Lebanese as well as in Israel[386].

The inherent *doxa* engendering the structures of *illusio* in the *SMF* required a considerably more customised adjustment to warrant 'Lebanonisation'. Traditionally, *SMF orthodoxy* was determined by efforts of actors to instigate, develop and inculcate confessional repertoires of mobilisation while framing these modes of collective action within a 'Lebanese' context. Initially, through the improved efficacy of its social welfare programmes and the professionalism of its media organs, Hizbullah's *OF* appeared content with entrenching its position and vying for symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community. By synchronising field homology between its agents in the *MSF* and *SMF*, Hizbullah's *OF* aimed to continually achieve symbiotic synthesis through

[386] In March 1992, Islamic Jihad was blamed for the killing of 30 people in a suicide attack targeting the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in Argentina. On 18 July 1994, Islamic Jihad was accused of orchestrating the bombing of the Jewish Cultural Centre in Buenos Aires that killed 95 people. Islamic Jihad was also allegedly responsible for an attack on the Israeli Embassy in London on 26 July 1996 as well as the bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. Jorisch (2004: 11-12) argues that these events are 'indicative of the expansion in Hizbullah's worldwide operational capabilities during the 1990s', epitomised by the extensive expatriate Shi'i population in the Tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. As noted in Chapter 5, while not denying congruencies in identity and ideology, a distinction should be made in purpose and practice between Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance, an organised military unit focused on combating Israel in Lebanon, and Islamic Jihad, an amorphous composition of transnational Shi'i combatants who were not subject to the rules of Lebanon's *fields*.

the institutionalisation of a holistic Resistance *habitus*. However, recording commensurate success in the *PF* required actively fostering cross-confessional coordination and devising inclusive frames that invoked the *orthodoxy* of Lebanon's eclectic organising structures in the *SMF*. Since Hizbullah's *OF* was unable to effectively translate the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Resistance into the *PF* during the 1996 elections, the Party reverted to the innate laws of the *SMF* and sought to supplement its discourse with practice by reconciling the Resistance within the pre-existing parameters of Lebanon's *SMF*.

As evinced by the shifting expression of intra-Shi'i competition, the augmenting autonomy of Hizbullah's *OF*, the management of Shaykh Tufayli's 'Revolution of the Hungry', the facilitation of inter-party coalitions and the results of the 1998 municipal elections, Hizbullah's *OF* was publicly carving an edifice resembling a Lebanese design. Moreover, the frequent deployment of Lebanese imagery and iconography in the context of military operations enabled Lebanese citizens to engage with the Resistance, bestow acknowledgment on its legitimacy and contemplate opportunities for the aggregation of cross-confessional *collusio*, in which *habiti* converge in solidarity but not in practice. For example, in 1999, Hizbullah ritualised Qana as a site for national mourning by combining historical invocations in Islam and Christianity to unite Lebanon against a common enemy with the slogan 'Qana is the Karbala of the Twentieth Century; it is a land made holy by the Lord Jesus and contaminated by the Zionist Satan' (Norton, 1999: 25). Principally, *Al-Manar*, which by 2000 was broadcasting for 18 hours a day, had become the third most watched TV station in Lebanon and the sixth most popular news source in the Arab world (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 62; Jorisch, 2004: 24). Through the content of its programmes, *Al-Manar* was instrumental in periodically projecting, consecrating and reproducing the intrinsic association between the Islamic Resistance and Lebanon.

In the *PF*, Hizbullah's 'Lebanonisation' was tangential. The 1992 elections, in which Hizbullah comprised the single largest bloc in parliament, demonstrated that the Party was not only willing to engage with Lebanon's political system but could also compete effectively. Nevertheless, the 1996 elections proved that the institutionalised dynamics of the *PF* could obstruct Hizbullah's *OF* from transferring and converting *capital* accumulated in other *fields* into further political gains. Paradoxically, while the post-war Lebanese state was undeniably debilitated, 'the state's omnipresence constituted a major ingredient of the elites' strategies aimed at self-enrichment and political outmanoeuvring of their rivals' (Leenders, 2012: 231). As Hizbullah

possessed minimal influence with the ruling Troika, its role was reduced to *heterodoxy*, a position not only antithetical to 'Lebanonisation' by definition in harbouring dispositions of incessant opposition, but also overly dependent on the whims of Syria in providing political cover for the preservation of the Resistance. Vindicating the extent of access restraints, Hizbullah's elevated political protection was only possible at the end of the decade with the election of Emile Lahoud and the appointment of Selim al-Hoss, two traditional elites whose perceptions inclined them to recognise the necessity of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon (Azani, 2011: 156).

Consequently, 'Lebanonisation' should be assessed through the prism of the Islamic Resistance since the primary objective of Hizbullah's *OF* in the 1990s was to concurrently create symmetry between its Resistance *habitus* within differentiated spheres of practice through the legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. As an invested stakeholder in a variety of *fields*, each governed and operating under their own institutionalised norms of practice, Hizbullah's integration within these spheres produced uneven degrees of 'Lebanonisation'. Ultimately, as an inducted participant, Hizbullah's *OF* had to tacitly abide by the logic of each respective *field* by devising tactics to accumulate legitimate *capital* for the purpose of facilitating incremental change.

Nevertheless, the motivation behind Hizbullah's understanding of *infitah* in the context of 'Lebanonisation' was determined by, and inextricably correlated to, capitalising on opportunities within the specific requirements of each *field* in legitimising and transferring the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. Framed in the equation of means-end rationality, 'Lebanonisation' was an unavoidable yet subservient epiphenomenon to access and affect acceptance rather than a significant display of approval or compliance with the prevailing system. At the advent of the millennium, as Israel prepared for its impending withdrawal, Hizbullah's *OF* had achieved its goal in maintaining a balanced equilibrium of practice within and between the *MSF* and *SMF* while the 1998 reshuffle in the *PF* cemented a pro-Syrian Troika that ensured a favourable stance towards the political legitimacy of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.

Chapter Seven

Reproducing a State of Permanent Resistance (2000 – 2010)

'Hizbullah has lowered its profile, but not its presence. Its guerrillas will simply melt into conveniently situated Shi'i villages along the border...If they maintain their much-publicised discipline, coexistence will be manageable. But, if they get intoxicated with the power of the gun, then we are in trouble'.
- *UNIFIL official (MER, 12 August, 2000: 8).*

'The Christians have conquered their fear of the Syrians. Even the Muslims are demanding a correction of the relationship with Syria nowadays…all are loudly demanding an end to malpractices and for a sounder relationship with Syria, but not at the expense of Lebanon's sovereignty and independence'.
- *Sarkis Naoum (Al-Nahar, 27 September, 2000).*

'I found out that politics is more difficult than the Resistance'.
- *Hizbullah's Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah (Pakradouni, 2012: 99).*

'Have you seen that film with Al Pacino? It's an offer you can't refuse...We are engaged in dialogue but we are wasting our time…We can still argue for 10 or 15 years more but they [Hizbullah] aren't going to give you their weapons'.
- *Walid Jumblatt, Druze head of the Progressive Socialist Party (Interview, 3 July 2012).*

On 25 May 2000, Israel officially completed its unilateral withdrawal from Lebanese territory in accordance with UNSC Resolution 425 after 22 years of occupation[387]. A day later, Sayyid Nasrallah delivered his inaugural 'Liberation Day' speech in Bint Jubayl proclaiming that 'Israel, which has nuclear weapons and the strongest air force in the region, is weaker than a spider's web'. Speaking in the shadow of the Lebanese flag, Hizbullah's Secretary General praised the sacrifice of 1,276 Islamic Resistance martyrs but declared that 'this victory belongs to all of the Lebanese people' and reassured the Lebanese government and public by claiming that 'we are not a security authority and we are not going to be' as well as confirming that 'you're going to find Hizbullah and the Islamic Resistance, in particular, more modest than ever before'[388].

The exodus of Israel represented an opportunity for Hizbullah in vindicating its *modus operandi* while concurrently acting as an existential threat that compromised

[387] Overall, Israel withdrew from 933 square kilometres (45% of the South or 10% of Lebanon). Antoine Lahd, the leader of the Israeli-sponsored SLA, stated that 'I was angry with Israel for giving the order without notifying me, and uprooting the inhabitants of the security zone in such a humiliating way'. Although Hizbullah discouraged retribution, members of the Party objected to the limited sentences and fines imposed on SLA fighters who remained in Lebanon leading to a series of reprisals in the South. Approximately 6,000 SLA militiamen poured into Israel to seek asylum (*MER*, 9 October, 1999: 7-8; 24 June, 2000: 9-11; 5 July, 2003: 10).
[388] Between 1983 and 2000, 69.6% of Hizbullah's 1,276 martyrs came from the South, 21% from the Biqa' and 8.9% from Beirut (Malthaner, 2011). Extracts from Sayyid Nasrallah's speech were taken from Hizbullah's *Al-'Ahd* website. http://english.alahednews.com.lb/essaydetails.php?eid=14178&cid=446#.UgoBloVko7A

its *modus vivendi*. Domestically, the homology of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* and the *MSF*, cultivated by the Party's *OF*, had reached its zenith in producing harmonised practice in mutually reinforced compatibility. Regionally, the Islamic Resistance had elevated its strategic profile in enabling Syria and Iran to enhance their *capital* to promote revisionist *heterodoxy* within the *Field of International Politics* (*FIP*). However, the extraction of the causal component of the Manichean equation would inevitably impact the effective justification of its diametric counterpart. While the symbolic *capital* accrued by Hizbullah in the *SMF* and *MSF* was framed in contradistinction to Israeli occupation, the legitimacy and leverage of the Islamic Resistance in the *FIP* was predicated on the enduring presence of a belligerent Israeli occupier. Consequently, Israel's withdrawal risked undermining Hizbullah's domestic credibility, questioning its regional *raison d'être* and placing it in danger of becoming a 'rebel without a cause' (ICG, 2003).

According to *Ad-Diyar*, 'it is no secret that it will be quite hard for Hizbullah to survive in Lebanon's turbulent politics bereft of the Resistance flame' (*MER*, 14 October, 2000: 8-9). Therefore, in order to reproduce the *orthodox* legitimacy of its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF*, Hizbullah's *OF* had to implement three inter-related objectives: firstly, to locate and devise probable cause for continuing the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* thereby maintaining the source of its domestic and regional relevance; secondly, for the purpose of reinstituting its symbolic *capital* amongst the Shi'i community in the *SMF*, Hizbullah's *OF* would have to embark upon a process of reframing its discourse, relating this position with extant practices as well as initiating new mobilisational modalities that could complement this revised course; and thirdly, since the Party remained 'an authority without authority', and with Lebanon's elite system contingent upon inter-confessional alliances, Hizbullah would have to seek social *capital* in the *PF* to protect its alternative direction (Fayyad, 2006: 2).

Firstly, for Hizbullah's *OF*, Israel's withdrawal could not be perceived as a symbolic victory that negated the Islamic Resistance and diminished the impetus of its mobilisational strategies in the *SMF*. Conversely, the aim was to realign the framing of the Islamic Resistance to emphasise its relentless appeal and application. Whereas the Palestinian cause embodied a flexible 'master frame' that reinforced regional Resistance against Israel, Hizbullah's *OF* also employed a rationale that directly resonated with the Shi'i community and the broader Lebanese public[389].

[389] Shaykh Qassem asserted that Israel will never receive security guarantees because 'it is still involved in the Palestinian question, still occupies the Golan Heights and still has problems in Jerusalem' (*MER*, 3 April, 2000: 7).

Conforming to conventional practice, Hizbullah's *OF* insisted on the liberation of Lebanese prisoners incarcerated by Israel, especially Shaykh Obeid, Mustapha Dirani and Samir Kuntar[390]. Nevertheless, the primary foundation for validating the existence of the Islamic Resistance would be Israel's continued occupation of Lebanese land, namely the Sheba Farms.

Following the demarcation of the 'Blue-Line' by the UN on 7 June 2000, which classified the Sheba Farms as Syrian territory annexed by Israel in 1967, and after the issuing of UNSC Resolution 1310 on 27 July 2000, Israel had been judged as fulfilling its obligation in vacating Lebanese land (Spyer, 2009: 206)[391]. Consequently, from a UN perspective, the fate of the Sheba Farms was inexorably linked to the status of the Golan Heights and therefore subject to UNSC Resolution 242, which called on Israel to withdraw from territory occupied in 1967 (Harik, 2005: 139). However, Lebanese authorities disputed this interpretation by citing agreements with Syria in 1943 and 1951 proving that the territory had been transferred to Lebanon (Hajjar, 2002: 25)[392]. This diplomatic debate over the ownership of the 14 Sheba Farms, a remote area of 25 square kilometres between the northern ridges of Mount Hermon and comprising 2% of Lebanon, was extended to include Al-Ghajar, the Kfar Shouba Hills and the 'Seven Villages' (ICG, 2006b: 17; Harik, 2005: 139)[393]. Regardless of cartographic semantics, the unequivocal support of Syria on this issue provided the Islamic Resistance with the legitimate authorisation to resume its rebranded remit.

Secondly, the Israeli withdrawal posed two challenges for Hizbullah's *OF* in sustaining its *capital* within the *SMF*. While the Party would have to adapt, diversify and modernise its social service institutions and disseminating outlets for the purpose of developing frames and practices within the Shi'i community that inculcated its revised approach, Hizbullah's *OF* also had to assuage reservations by expanding upon the opportunity of transferring its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to connect with a broader demographic of non-Shi'i agents in the *SMF*. Either motivated

[390] Shaykh Obeid, a Hizbullah recruiter, was seized on 28 July 1989 while Mustapha Dirani, the leader of the Believers Front, was kidnapped on 31 May 1994. Samir Kuntar, a Druze Lebanese member of the Palestinian Liberation Front, was sentenced by Israel in 1980 for his role in the kidnapping of an Israeli family in Nahariya.

[391] The 'Blue-Line', which runs for 110 km from Ras Naqoura on the Mediterranean coast in the west to the foothills of Mount Hermon in the east, was based on the 1949 armistice line (Blanford, 2006: 78; Hajjar, 2002: 22).

[392] Despite the UN displaying a series of Syrian and Lebanese maps showing the Sheba Farms in Syria, Lebanon submitted maps from 1961 and 1966 that demonstrated the opposite. Not only was the Sheba Farms identified as Syrian on the Lebanese LL1,000 note, but Nabih Berri was also unable to point to the area on a map (*MER*, 21 June, 2000: 11-12; Blanford, 2011: 253-254).

[393] In 1923, the Alawite village of Al-Ghajar was divided with the northern two-thirds sectioned to Lebanon while the southern third was given to Syria. The Israelis occupied the village along with the Golan in 1967 and imposed citizenship on its residents in 1981. By 2000, the southern section of the village, which is also important due to its access to the Hasbani River, remained under Israeli control. According to newspaper reports, residents of the village have never expressed an interest in being liberated (Blanford, 2011: 283; *MER*, 1 September, 2001: 7-9; 21 September, 2002: 7). The 'Seven Villages' refers to Terbikha, Saliha, Malkiyeh, Kades, Hunin, Nabi Yusha and Ibl al-Qamh, predominantly Shi'i villages on the Israeli side of the blue-line. In 1920, they were part of Greater Lebanon before becoming part of Palestine in 1924 (ICG, 2006b: 19).

by conviction or compulsion, Shi'i agents within Hizbullah's demarcated constituencies were already engaged in the visceral reproduction of a Resistance *habitus* that was privately and publicly institutionalised into daily practice[394]. Therefore, adjusting discursive frames and practices to ensure homologous mobilisational modalities required a process that supplemented Hizbullah's pre-existing organisational structures.

Beyond the Shi'i community, Hizbullah's *OF* exploited the advent of the 2000 parliamentary elections to nationalise the accomplishments of the Islamic Resistance by using its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to project the inclusivity of its agenda in Lebanon. Consequently, Hizbullah's *OF* focused on upholding 'the security of all the citizens, without discrimination among their groups and sects', praised 'the cooperation of the public government and the Lebanese Army' in defeating Israel and reiterated initiatives to create a National Body for the Abolishment of Political Sectarianism in promoting national unity, advocating state reform and addressing socio-economic issues (Alagha, 2011: 76-81). Demonstrating this commitment, none of Hizbullah's parliamentary candidates were clerics, the Party changed its logo from the 'Islamic Revolution in Lebanon' to the 'Islamic Resistance in Lebanon' and renamed its journal *Al-Intiqad* ('The Critique'), a revamping that sought to display a more secular image (Alagha, 2011: 116; 2006: 159)[395].

Thirdly, while Syria had traditionally protected Hizbullah's position in Lebanon's *PF* to serve its interests in exerting strategic leverage over Israel and Iran as well as balancing the influence of parities in Lebanon, the Israeli withdrawal on 25 May 2000 and the death of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on 10 June 2000 solidified the Party's social *capital* in the *PF*. Whereas Hafez al-Assad perceived Hizbullah as an inferior proxy, his son and heir, Bashar al-Assad, surrounded himself with a young cadre of fellow Alawites that shared his political vision of enhancing the status of the Islamic Resistance[396]. Furthermore, through his previous role as head of Syria's Lebanese portfolio, the incumbent Syrian President also had a close relationship with his Lebanese counterpart and staunch Hizbullah advocate Emile Lahoud.

[394] Hizbullah constituents were not only religiously and legally required to vote for the Party, but they were also coerced into doing so by Hizbullah's intrusive welfare networks (Norton, 2007b: 481; Malthaner, 2011; Danawi, 2002). By 2000, 15,000 children were being educated in 15 Hizbullah-affiliated schools while the Martyrs Foundation was directly assisting over 1,000 families and providing medical care for 5,000 people per month (Le Thomas, 2010; Bortolazzi, 2011: 33-36).

[395] Nevertheless, over half of Hizbullah's *majlis al-shura* was comprised of clerics. Hizbullah removed the opening Qur'anic verse on the opening page of *Al-'Ahd* as well as the portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei (Alagha, 2006: 169).

[396] Bashar al-Assad promoted the 'Alawite component' of the new Syrian regime, including his brother (Maher), his sister (Bushra), his brother-in-law (Assef Shawkat) and his cousins in the Makhlouf family at the expense of Sunni Syrian officials, such as Abdul Halim Khaddam and Hikmat Shehabi (Blanford, 2006: 54). Despite being an Alawite, Ghazi Kanaan, Syria's head of intelligence in Lebanon, was replaced by Rustom Ghazaleh in December 2002 (Harris, 2012: 267).

A week after Bashar al-Assad was unanimously elected, the Camp David Accords between Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat concluded without any tangible results. The Israeli premier, who approved the unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, pivoted to the Peace Process after accepting that his decade long policy of 'Syria first' had failed but now confronted a revitalised Resistance in Lebanon and the ruptures of a renewed Palestinian *intifada*, resulting in a resurgent Syria augmenting its *capital* within the revisionist *heterodoxy* of the *FIP*. In this context, while Hizbullah retained its *heterodox* position in the *PF* on account of Syrian cover, and despite its role in expelling Israel from Lebanon, the Party would ultimately remain beholden and restrained by the applied regulations of *al-saqf al-suri*, one of the imposed mechanisms of Syria's symbolic *power* in Lebanon.

Although Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid revealed that Hizbullah could have received 25% of the popular vote in 2000, the complex Syrian diktats entailed within the 'Ghazi Kan'an' election law reduced the combined yet temperamental Hizbullah-Amal 'Resistance and Development Bloc' to 29 seats in parliament with Hizbullah attaining 12 compared to Amal's 17 (*MER*, 16 September, 2000: 12)[397]. As Nabih Berri resumed the position of Speaker, Hariri received 106/128 of the vote to become Prime Minister with Hizbullah comprising part of the group that withheld its support (Harik, 2005: 151)[398]. In the *MSF*, the Islamic Resistance symbolised a formidable guerrilla force with material capabilities to rival any competitor in Lebanon while Hizbullah's extensive social institutions directed an expansive and sophisticated network of mobilisational structures in the *SMF* that disseminated holistic Resistance frames and practices. Additionally, by 2000, Hizbullah's *OF* was financially self-sufficient with its independent revenues exceeding donations from Iran (Gambill, 2009: 135). Nevertheless, despite this successful accumulation of capital and the gradual evolution of its position, Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *PF* had not substantially progressed since 1992.

The aim of this chapter is to assess the management and development of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the context of two episodes of *hysteresis* in Lebanon. Firstly, the objective is to evaluate how Hizbullah's *OF* readjusted its Collective Action

[397] Primarily, the composition and delineation of the five governorates within the revised 2000 election law were intentionally designed to balance the scales of influence in Lebanon (Blanford, 2006: 78; *MER*, 11 December, 199: 12). Before the elections, clashes erupted between Hizbullah and Amal with Sarkis Naoum commenting that the relationship between the two parties 'will be unshakeably solid…on the summit level, but…precarious on a rank-and-file baseline' (*MER*, 22 July, 2000: 12; 19 August, 2000:7). Of Hizbullah's 12 MPs, nine were Party members, two were Sunni and one was Maronite.

[398] Hariri possessed a parliamentary alliance of 55 MPs. Meanwhile, 19 MPs were loyal to President Lahoud and 25 were listed as independents (Harik, 2005: 151).

Frames and mobilisation modalities to maintain and reproduce the homologous synergy of *capital* immediately following the Israeli withdrawal. Considering Syria's symbolic *power* over Lebanon's *PF*, the scale and scope of Hizbullah's perception of political opportunities were predominantly restricted to advancing its Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF* and *SMF*. Secondly, this section intends to ascertain how Hizbullah's *OF* mitigated against the implications of Syria's withdrawal in 2005 following the assassination of Premier Hariri. The unprecedented shattering of the *saqf al-suri* caused significant reverberations amongst agents in the *PF*. For Hizbullah's *OF*, Syria's physical retreat from Lebanon presented both an enabling opportunity and a debilitating risk. Either way, the opening of a previously closed sphere for *capital* accumulation and deployment demanded corresponding shifts in reconstituting the dispositions and practice of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* within and between its fields of operation.

By analysing the withdrawals of Israel and Syria through a conventional SMT lens, there is a tendency to credit or attribute Hizbullah's reactions with a uniform and unilateral process of strategic calculation. Accordingly, in bestowing the agents of Hizbullah's *OF* with decision-making capacities that privilege the notion of instrumental rationality, the Party is perceived as discursively and practically translating objective opportunities into subjective mobilisation while appropriating and allocating the *capital* required to independently facilitate this phased transformation. This conceptual assumption not only fails to consider the diversified limits of opportunities that exist within the structured logics of each the *PF*, *SMF* and *MSF*, but also lacks the ability to detect differentiated dynamics of mutual relation between Hizbullah's *OF* and the pre-existing perceptions and practices of its analogous agents across designated *fields*. Alternatively, by applying a combined Bourdieu-SMT approach that assists in explaining this inter-related complexity, Hizbullah's strategic (mis)perceptions, (mis)calculations and (mal)practices can be conceptualised to examine how Hizbullah's *OF* identified opportunities, constructed tactics to disseminate complementary Collective Action Frames, ensured that these discourses were inculcated in practice and institutionalised cohesive mobilisation across its operational *fields*.

7.1 Fissures within *Pax Syriana*

The rationale behind Ehud Barak's decision to unilaterally withdraw without establishing a Lebanese partner was informed by the assumption that Israel's departure would nullify Hizbullah's Resistance and negate Syria's military presence (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 22). Contrarily, on the strategic level, whereas Ayatollah Khamenei endowed Hizbullah with the conceptual legitimacy to continue its *jihad* against Israel, Syria supplied Hizbullah with the practical legitimacy for preserving the Islamic Resistance (Norton, 2007a: 90). However, Hizbullah required a tactical approach that reflected its revised situational context but remained commensurate with the recognised 'rules of the game' in the *MSF*. As conceded by Sayyid Nasrallah, 'Resistance liberates land, but Resistance to prevent an aggression against a country is something new' (Blanford, 2011: 305). Consequently, the post-2000 Islamic Resistance would surrender its offensive proclivities and embrace defensive principles, acting as a deterrent rather than a belligerent that adopted 'means of defying the enemy without necessarily firing a shot' (ICG, 2003: 8).

Hizbullah's military commanders, who ultimately defined the adjusted practices of the Islamic Resistance, were responsible for calculating and preparing for the inevitability of war with Israel[399]. In the long-term, considering that the Islamic Resistance could not compete with Israel's military arsenal by resorting to symmetrical warfare, and since Katyusha rockets were pivotal in determining the outcome of any potential conflict by pressuring the Israeli public to compel the government to desist, Hizbullah began constructing a network of underground bunkers in the South to conceal their launching sites from pre-emptive Israeli attacks[400]. In the short-term, with Hizbullah intent on avoiding 'terrorist' appellations, the Islamic Resistance would cease its martyrdom missions and focus on executing a sequence of guerrilla-styled 'reminder operations' in the Sheba Farms against 'enemy-held, hostile, or defined territory' (Harik, 2005: 169). Reserving its rockets for retaliatory purposes, Hizbullah also redirected its efforts to kidnapping Israeli combatants through the creation in 2000 of *Amn al-Muddad* ('Counter Intelligence'), a highly independent and clandestine department allegedly directed by Jawad Nur al-Din, later identified as Imad Mugniyeh, who was appointed head of the Jihad Council of Hizbullah's *majlis al-shura* during the Party's Sixth Conclave in July 2001 (ICG, 2003: 3; Wege, 2012:

[399] Interview with Nicholas Blanford in Beirut, 10 September 2012. Similarly, epitomised by 'Defence of the Land' (2002) and 'Elevated Waters' (2003), Israeli generals were also devising contingencies for military operations in Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 61-62).
[400] By 2000, the Islamic Resistance allegedly possessed approximately 7,000 Katyusha rockets (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 23).

774)[401]. Ramzi Nohra, who was instrumental in planning the capture of Ahmad Hallaq in 1996 and the death of Israeli Brigadier General Erez Gerstein in 1999, was one of the most prized assets within this secretive cell[402].

Furthermore, testament to the increasing legitimacy bestowed upon the Islamic Resistance by the *PF*, Hizbullah's alternative strategy in the *MSF* received approval from President Lahoud during a meeting with Sayyid Nasrallah on 26 June 2000, in which it was agreed that the former would 'pursue political action for the liberation of Lebanese territory and the Resistance would pursue whatever action was necessary to free what could not be freed politically' (Pakradouni, 2012: 123). In terms of coordination, General Jamil al-Sayyid, the head of the General Security Directorate (GSD), mediated between President Lahoud and Hizbullah while General Michel Sulayman, the head of the LAF, liaised with the Islamic Resistance in the South[403]. Demonstrating Hizbullah's discipline in adhering to the revised 'rules of the game' in the *MSF*, the Israeli-Lebanese border remained relatively dormant. In the first three years after 2000, *Al-Intiqad* reported that although Israel had violated Lebanon's airspace 7,171 times, between 2000 and 2006, only 17 Israelis (one civilian) were killed in the Sheba Farms and during skirmishes across the Blue-Line (ICG, 2003: 8; Norton, 2007a: 91)[404].

This effective method of military engagement was directed by shifting the tactical focus towards kidnapping as a means of compelling Israel into negotiating the release of Lebanese prisoners. On 7 October 2000, the Islamic Resistance seized three Israeli soldiers in the Sheba Farms during an operation calculably conceived to coincide with the *Palestinian Al-Aqsa* intifada and therefore elicit a minimal response due to the prevalence of Israel's policy of 'restraint and containment' that avoided inciting simultaneous conflicts on two fronts (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 39-41)[405]. A week later, Sayyid Nasrallah announced that Elhanan Tannenbaum, an alleged Israeli Colonel masquerading as a businessman, had been captured in Beirut[406]. By

[401] Imad Mugniyeh reportedly started working for the Iranian secret services after the civil war (*MER*, 20 October, 2001: 9). During the Sixth Conclave, Sayyid Nasrallah, Shaykh Qassem, Hajj al-Khalil, Shaykh Safieddine and Shaykh Yazbek all retained their positions while Shaykh Ibrahim al-Amin al-Sayyid became head of the Political Council and Jawad Nur al-Din (Imad Mugniyeh) became head of the Jihad Council (*MER*, 4 August, 2001: 6; Alagha, 2011: 163).

[402] Ahmad Hallaq was an Israeli agent accused in 1994 of organising a car bomb in southern Beirut that targeted Imad Mugniyeh but instead killed his brother Fuad, a local supermarket manager (*MER*, 14 December, 2002: 8).

[403] General al-Sayyid was described as 'not only the ruler of Lebanon, he was almost the ruler of Syria' (Blanford, 2006: 93). Another Lahoud ally, General Mustapha Hamdane, became Commander of the Republican Guard with the combination of these respective heads encompassing a 'political power centre' of their own (Pakradouni, 2012: 124; *MER*, 26 April, 2000: 7). General Sulayman commented that 'there is constant coordination with the Resistance movement in the South…our common vision leads to automatic coordination' (*MER*, 15 February, 2003: 7).

[404] During the same period, the *Amn al-Muddad* was responsible for identifying 20 Israeli spies in Lebanon (Wege, 2012: 774).

[405] Responding to the operation, President Lahoud claimed that not only was it impossible for the LAF to prevent Hizbullah's activities, but it was also impossible for it to prevent Israeli retaliation thereby placing the LAF in the crossfire (Pakradouni, 2012: 127).

[406] In an operation supposedly orchestrated by Imad Mugniyeh and executed by Qais Obeid, Tannenbaum was lured to Dubai via Brussels on the pretence of finalising a drug deal before being taken to Beirut (Blanford, 2011: 299; Qassem, 2005: 143).

29 January 2004, Hizbullah had returned all four Israelis in return for 435 prisoners, including Shaykh Obeid and Mustapha Dirani (*MER*, 31 January, 2004: 7)[407]. Hizbullah not only received significant values of symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community, but since only 11 of the freed prisoners were Hizbullahis with the total number comprised of 400 Palestinians, 12 Lebanese and 12 Arabs, the transference of *capital* from the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* also permeated into Lebanon's broader *SMF* and *PF* (Norton, 2007a: 87-88). A survey of 1200 people compiled by the Beirut Research and Information Centre revealed that 70% of Shi'i and non-Shi'i respondents supported the liberation of the Sheba Farms by the Islamic Resistance (Qassem, 2005: 148)[408].

Due to the tangible results of kidnapping, rockets served as a preventative and retaliatory function. By 2003, the Islamic Resistance reportedly possessed 8-10,000 missiles but refrained from launching them to prevent drawing attention to the construction of underground bunkers or the location of its artillery[409]. Ironically, it was Palestinian groups that compromised Hizbullah's strategic military balance in the South (Norton, 2007a: 92). As an *orthodox* actor in the *MSF*, the Islamic Resistance derived a considerable proportion of its symbolic *capital* by upholding the rights of Palestinians against Israel. However, it could not permit *heterodox* practice, namely the firing of rockets by radical groups in Palestinian camps in Lebanon, from disrupting the intricate dynamics of the *MSF*. Highlighting the dilemma, Muhammad Ra'ad asserted that 'we cannot reject Palestinian cross-border activity and we cannot accept it' (*MER*, 3 February, 2001: 9)[410]. Aside from this conundrum, the Islamic Resistance concentrated on developing its information-gathering capacities within the Amn al-Muddad, preparing its Mirsad-1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and expanding its covert HUMINT (human intelligence) and SIGINT (signals intelligence) programmes[411].

For the first five years following Israel's withdrawal, the Islamic Resistance managed the process of transition in redefining and adjusting its dispositions of *orthodox*

[407] In August, Shaykh Obeid became the head of Hizbullah's social services (Alagha, 2011: 165-166). Mediated by the Germans, Israel also promised to repatriate 59 Lebanese fighters, provide information on 24 missing people and supply landmine maps for information on Ron Arad, the Israeli pilot kidnapped in 1986 (Blanford, 2011: 365). For Israel, the case of Samir Kuntar remained linked to Ron Arad whereas Hizbullah insisted on the whereabouts of four Iranians kidnapped in 1982 (Qassem, 2005: 146).

[408] As for those who disagreed, Hajj al-Khalil stated that 'we don't care…they have always existed…such voices have no impact on the Resistance' (*MER*, 16 December, 2000: 10).

[409] Hizbullah's arsenal included Katyusha rockets with a range of 23 kilometres as well as the Iranian-made Fajr (72km) and Zelzal (200-300km) missiles that enabled the Islamic Resistance to reach beyond Israel's northern areas to water reserves in Tiberias and nuclear facilities in the south (*MER*, 9 November, 2002: 7-8).

[410] In September 2005, a 40km missile was fired into Israel. Since the Islamic Resistance did not claim responsibility, Timur Goksel remarked that 'we have to start wondering about the vaunted discipline of the Party of God or someone else who has those capabilities' (*MER*, 3 September, 2005: 13).

[411] The Mirsad-1, which was piloted in November 2004 and April 2005, was Hizbullah's name for the Iranian Ababil-T UAV (Blanford, 2011: 323-324).

practice to the demands presented by the revised regulative structure in the *MSF*, as defined by Israel and Syria, while maintaining the legitimacy of its symbolic *capital*. The practice of defensive deterrence through kidnapping operations and retaliatory rocket fire was not only proving effective in elongating the durability of the Islamic Resistance, but prisoner exchanges, approved by the Israel's *PF*, also contributed to the recognition and reproduction of these activities. Therefore, threats to Hizbullah's position in the *MSF* would not emanate from discrepancies within its own internalised logic of practice but would occur as a consequence of its relational homology with developments in Lebanon's *PF*, a compositionally convoluted sphere of porous constitution whose endogenous agents were disproportionately susceptible to *capital* deployment from exogenous actors.

After 9/11, the upgrading of Hizbullah by the U.S. from a 'terrorist organisation' (1997) to a 'Specially Designated Global Terrorist Organisation' (2001) caused the Islamic Resistance to cease any erratic operations in the *MSF* (Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 20)[412]. In particular, Imad Mugniyeh, Hassan Ezzedine and Ali Atwah, all ostensibly senior leaders in Hizbullah, were placed on America's 'Most Wanted List' for their activities from 1983-1992 (*MER*, 17 November, 2001: 8-9)[413]. Reacting to this alteration in the *orthodox* discourse of the *FIP*, Sayyid Nasrallah proclaimed that 'we have not carried out operations anywhere in the world', a statement backed by President Lahoud who pledged that 'Hizbullah will keep its operations and various other activities confined to Lebanese territory' (Hirst, 2010: 293: *MER*, 24 November, 2001: 7). Even Prime Minister Hariri, who had previously been humiliated when Hizbullah conducted a foray into the Sheba Farms one day after he reassured investors in Paris that the Islamic Resistance would cease these operations, asserted 'let no one think that we will stand hand-cuffed toward the demand of liquidating the Resistance' (*MER*, 10 November, 2001: 7)[414]. Following UNSC Resolution 1373, which institutionalised the admonishing of global terrorism as a legitimate *orthodox* discourse with the *FIP*, both Syria and Lebanon refuted the inclusion of the Islamic Resistance.

[412] The appellation extended to implicate suspected Hizbullah members (Sayyid Nasrallah, Sayyid Fadlallah, Imad Mugniyeh, Shaykh Tufayli and known financers including Qassem Aliq as well as Husayn and Ahmad al-Shami) and organisations (the Islamic Resistance Support Organisation, Bayt al-Mal, the Yousser Company for Finance and Investment, Al-Qard Al-Hassan, the Martyrs Foundation, Jihad al-Bina and the Lebanese Media Group). Israel (2002), Canada (2002), Australia (2003) and Holland (2004) followed the U.S. designation (Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 20; Azani, 2011: 201)

[413] Most notably, their role in the 1983 bombings, the kidnapping of William Buckley (1984), four Soviet diplomats (1985) and Colonel Higgins (1985) as well as the hijacking of planes (1985) and the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Argentina (1992) (*MER*, 17 November, 2001: 8-9).

[414] On 16 February 2001, Hizbullah raided the Sheba Farms and killed one Israeli soldier one day after Hariri claimed that there would be no more raids across the Israeli border (Blanford, 2006: 83). Hariri argued that the Islamic Resistance could not take full credit for Israel's withdrawal as it would not have been possible without the support of the government, the LAF, the internal security forces and the business community (Shatz, 2004; *MER*, 24 February, 2001: 7-8).

The urgency of the U.S. in confronting global terrorism placed Syria in a precarious predicament. As a state intent on projecting influence in the *FIP* without the advantage of geo-strategic resources, Syria traditionally swung between Hariri's economic liberalism and Hizbullah's asymmetric warfare with the pendulum predominantly fixed in the direction of Resistance over rehabilitation[415]. Emulating his father's bandwagoning policy during Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait, Bashar al-Assad initially endorsed President Bush's 'War on Terror' against Al-Qaida. However, as evidenced by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's remarks that 'there cannot be a situation where you support the war against Al-Qaida and at the same time support Hizbullah's terrorist activities', the U.S. categorised the two groups within the same stratification with the prevailing narrative depicting Hizbullah as 'the A-team of terrorists' and Al-Qaida as 'a sort of benched reserve' (*MER*, 15 December, 2001: 9; 5 October, 2002: 8)[416].

Under this international pressure, Syria was vulnerable and devoid of the legitimate *capital* required to sufficiently protect the Islamic Resistance from an emerging U.S.-inspired *collusio* that enveloped the *orthodoxy* of the *FIP*. Perceiving Syria's retreat from view as an opportunity to enhance his position within the Troika of the *PF*, Prime Minister Hariri exploited his independently-accrued social *capital* in the *FIP*, especially with French President Jacques Chirac, to accumulate leverage by persuading the European Union not to indict Hizbullah as a 'terrorist organisation'. Not only did this augment his relationship with Syria, but the premier also capitalised on the impasse to implement 'Harirism'. With Lebanon's debt at 140% of GDP and its budget deficit at 51% of GDP, Hariri signed onto the European-Mediterranean Partnership and in return for securing $5 billion in financial aid at the Paris II Conference, the premier promised to apply economic reforms aimed at privatising state industries while cutting public spending (Blanford, 2006: 88)[417].

The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 compelled Syria to undertake more drastic measures beyond exerting influence over Hizbullah in observing a moratorium on operations. After redeploying 6,000 soldiers from Beirut in June 2001, President Assad withdrew 4,000 in 2003, leaving a total of 16,000 in Lebanon (*MER*,

[415] Syria's grasp over Lebanon's economic fortunes were most pertinently evident regarding oil requirements. Receiving discounted oil as part of its 'oil-for-food' programme with Iraq, Syria exported oil to Lebanon at almost twice the price and regularly scuttled attempts by Hariri to strike a similar arrangement with Iraq (*MER*, 3 March, 2001: 8-9; Blanford, 2006: 86).
[416] For U.S. Senator Bob Graham, Hizbullah was more threatening to the U.S. than Saddam Husayn while David Wurmser, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheyney's policy advisor, expressed his preference for a pre-emptive war against Syria and Hizbullah, a position shared by other prominent neo-conservatives, John Bolton and Richard Perle (Shatz, 2004).
[417] By February 2002, Hariri had boosted opportunities for European trade, secured 500 million Euros form the World Bank, the European Commission and the Mediterranean Development Agency of the European Investment Bank and explored ways into privatising Electricite Du Liban, Middle East Airlines, Lebanese Telecom and Lebanon's water industry (*MER*, 17 March, 2002: 10-11).

1 March, 2003: 7-8). Commenting on the initial aftermath of Iraq and U.S. statements declaring that Syria may be next, Sarkis Naoum quipped that since Damascus and Tehran will inevitably be held responsible for Hizbullah's activities, 'this could be the beginning of the end of the Resistance' (*MER*, 19 July, 2003: 9). On 12 December 2003, the official U.S. ultimatum arrived through the 'Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act', a document that threatened to issue sanctions on Syria unless President Assad agreed to withdraw from Lebanon, dismantle Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance, close the offices of rogue Palestinian factions in Damascus and discontinue its nuclear programmes (Schenker, 2009: 222)[418].

The friction caused by the Syrian Accountability Act was directly channelled into Lebanon, resulting in the increasingly irreconcilable polarisation of the *PF*. Primarily, the Accountability Act galvanised the practice of an emerging *heterodoxy*, a movement centred on Qornet Shahwan, a broad Christian coalition amalgamated by Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, and PSP leader Walid Jumblatt, which had been propagating a redefinition of Syrian *orthodoxy* since 2000[419]. Conversely, the *orthodox* trend was represented by President Lahoud and Speaker Berri, two vehement proponents of Syria in the *PF*. Although embodying *heterodoxy* in the *PF*, Hizbullah was an integral ally for the President and Amal based on a combination of its pro-Syrian dispositions, the popularity it accrued from prisoner exchanges and its dominant display in the May 2004 municipality elections[420]. Although Prime Minister Hariri personally associated with the sentiments of the oppositional camp, and despite incessant slurs from President Assad accusing the premier of scheming against the Syrian regime, the third component of the Troika straddled the schism in the interest of maintaining order and averting anarchy in Lebanon's *PF*[421]. Exemplifying the strategic decision to prioritise long-term reconstitution over short-term rupture, Prime Minister Hariri accelerated efforts to dissuade French President

[418] Prior to the signing of the Act, Michel Aoun, the exiled Lebanese Christian leader, emphasised to U.S. Congress the damaging effects of Syria's military presence in Lebanon and called for the application of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which enables the use of force (Pakradouni, 2012: 202). Due to the specific content and lobbying of the Act, it has been accused of privileging Israeli security over Lebanese sovereignty (Hirst, 2010: 299). Sanctions began in May 2004 when President Bush authorised the prohibition of exporting U.S. goods to Syria, prevented Syria from obtaining humanitarian supplies from the U.S. and ceased all Syrian Airways flights to and from the U.S. (Blanford, 2006: 89).

[419] Qornet Shahwan consisted of Amine Gemayel, Butros Harb and Nassib Lahoud as well as the Lebanese Forces (Samir Geagea), the Free Patriotic Movement (General Aoun) and the National Liberation Party (Chamoun) (*MER*, 5 May, 2001: 8-9).

[420] Hizbullah recorded triumphs the southern suburbs of Beirut (98 seats to Amal's 10), the South (87 seats out of 142) and the Biqa' (36 to Amal's 21). Both Hizbullah and Amal joined Hariri's list in Beirut while the premier lost in his home constituency in Sidon as President Lahoud and the intelligence agencies rallied a combined list of Hizbullah, Sunni groups and prominent Sidon families (Hamzeh, 2004: 132-135; Alagha, 2006: 55-56; Blanford, 2006: 96).

[421] Ali Hajj, Hariri's aide and a prominent figure in the ISF, worked for the Syrian intelligence services (Blanford, 2006: 94).

Chirac from adopting the Accountability Act while engaging in secret meetings with Hizbullah's Sayyid Nasrallah (Blanford, 2006: 94, 97)[422].

As Emile Lahoud prepared to extend his presidency for another three years, the chasm within the *PF* widened with prominent religious leaders from across the confessional spectrum, such as Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir, President of the HISC Shaykh Qabalan and Sunni Mufti Qabbani, also publicly declaring their disapproval with the proposal. Marwan Hamadeh, a key figure in the PSP, argued that the opposition understood the reason for amending Article 49 in this specific case but it was reticent to set a precedent that undermined the principle of power transfers in the *PF* (Pakradouni, 2012: 218). Concurrently, news circulated in the *FIP* of an imminent UNSC Resolution that would augment the prerequisites of the Accountability Act with stipulations enshrining fair presidential elections free from foreign intervention. Consequently, Prime Minister Hariri, whose parliamentary bloc would prove decisive in acquiring the two-thirds majority required to amend the Constitution and extend President Lahoud's term, was wedged between the revised preservation of Syrian *orthodoxy* and the risky elevation of a UNSC-endorsed *heterodoxy* in Lebanon's *PF*[423].

On 26 August 2004, and with President Lahoud still short of a quorum of two-thirds, President al-Assad allegedly relayed to Premier Hariri that 'I am Lahoud and Lahoud is me. If your friend Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I would sooner break Lebanon on your head and the head of Chirac than break my word' (Blanford, 2006: 100). A week later, UNSC Resolution 1559, which omitted direct reference to Syria and Hizbullah, was passed with nine votes and six abstentions[424]. Despite this development, President Lahoud was re-elected with the assistance of all but one of Hariri's 18 parliamentary seats on 3 September 2004 (Schenker, 2009: 222)[425]. Alluding to the trepidation of deviating from the predominant *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, Prime Minister Hariri admitted 'it is true I was against extending the president's

[422] Both Sayyid Nasrallah and Hariri believed that riots during the May 2004 elections were organised by the intelligence services and executed by Amal to drive a wedge between Hizbullah and the premier. Private meetings between Sayyid Nasrallah and Hariri were arranged by Lebanese journalist Mustapha Nasr and attended by Husayn al-Khalil. Even Yehya Arab, the head of Hariri's security, was not present (Blanford, 2006: 97). Around this time, Hizbullah also convened its Seventh Conclave with the only notable change being the promotion of Shaykh Hassan Ezzedine as the Party's representative in the South. Sayyid Nasrallah's personal media advisor, Hajj Muhammad Afif, replaced Shaykh Ezzedine as the chief of Hizbullah's central press office (Alagha, 2011: 165-166).

[423] President Lahoud required 86 MPs to change the Constitution but could only count on the support of 77: 49 from Hizbullah, Amal, Sulayman Franjiyeh, the SSNP, the Northern Metn Bloc, the Ba'ath Party, the National Gathering and the Bsharri Bloc; 20 independents; and 8 from other political parties (*Al-Safir*, 4 September, 2004).

[424] UNSC Resolution 1559 called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon; the disarmament of all the militias; Lebanese control over all its territory; and fair presidential elections free from foreign intervention (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 53). After negotiations with Russia, China and Algeria as well as considerable lobbying from Hariri, Syria and Hizbullah were not mentioned by name (Blanford, 2006: 106). The Resolution was voted for by Angola, Benin, Chile, France, Germany, Romania, Spain, the UK and the US while Algeria, Brazil, China, Pakistan, the Philippines and Russia abstained.

[425] President Lahoud received 96/128 votes. Ghattas Khoury, a close friend of Hariri, was the only member of the premier's bloc to vote against an extension (Blanford, 2006: 106-107).

term…yet I cannot accept breaking Syria's decisions in Lebanon…My relations with Syria are good...I will not allow anyone to disturb them' (*MER*, 2 October, 2004: 13).

Regardless of his political concessions and demonstrations of obedience, President al-Assad remained sceptical of Prime Minister Hariri's intentions regarding UNSC Resolution 1559 and continued to marginalise the premier. After Syria undermined his authority in forming a cabinet and following the attempted assassination of Marwan Hamadeh, Rafiq Hariri resigned declaring 'enough. I'm not playing this game anymore' (Blanford, 2006: 108)[426]. Nevertheless, since Hariri was entrenched as an invested stakeholder in the *illusio* of the *PF*, he swiftly resumed efforts to accumulate and deploy *capital* in the interest of redefining rather than replacing Syrian-imposed *orthodoxy*. While publicly avoiding rallies against UNSC Resolution 1559, Hariri also reconvened discussions with Sayyid Nasrallah affirming that 'I am not with Resolution 1559. I am with Ta'if' (Blanford, 2006: 118)[427]. Promoting a partnership with Hizbullah that advocated a relationship of mutual equality with Syria, Hariri suggested that the issue of the Islamic Resistance be internalised as a Lebanese and not a regional or international concern. Simultaneously, Hariri indirectly indicated his support for the rapidly unifying, *heterodox*-promoting oppositional movement at the Bristol Gathering in December 2004[428].

This tactically balanced manoeuvring employed by Hariri in Lebanon's *PF* provoked both confusion and alarm in Syria. On hearing that the former premier had informed Rustom Ghazaleh of his intention not to consent to Syrian appointments on his electoral lists, Sulayman Franjiyeh, Lebanon's pro-Syrian Interior Minister, designed an electoral law aimed at neutralising Hariri's influence within the Sunni community while concurrently targeting the composition of his cross-confessional alliances[429]. While President Assad warned UN envoy Terje Roed Larsen that Hariri was 'playing dirty roles against Syria', the aspiring premier was consolidating his relationship with Hizbullah by convincing France not to designate the Islamic Resistance as a 'terrorist

[426] Not only did Syria present Hariri with a list of pro-Syrian candidates for posts in government, but Nabih Berri also informed Hariri that seven cabinet ministers would collapse the government if he chose to resign (Pakradouni, 2012: 221). On 1 October 2004, an attempt was made on the life of Marwan Hamadeh, a close friend of Walid Jumblatt and the uncle of influential journalist Gebran Tueni (Blanford, 2006: 108-114). It was the first high-profile assassination attempt since the killing of Elie Hobeika, a former head of the Lebanese Forces, in January 2002 (Pakradouni, 2012: 176-177). Hariri was replaced by Omar Karami.

[427] In November 2004, around 100,000 Lebanese congregated in Beirut to protest against UNSC Resolution 1559. Hizbullah retired to the rear of the demonstration, refrained from polarising language and wielded Lebanese flags as opposed to party banners (Blanford, 2006: 117; Alagha, 2006: 58).

[428] By October 2004, the Qornet Shahwan/Democratic Gathering coalition had enlarged to include the Lebanese Communist Party, Nassib Lahoud's Democratic Renewal Party and Elias Atallah's Democratic Left Party (*MER*, 16 October, 2004: 14-15). In December 2004, the largest multi-sectarian oppositional bloc in Lebanon's history congregated at the Bristol Hotel. This 'Bristol Gathering' denounced the amendment of the constitution that extended President Lahoud's term, called for a fair and just election law as well as an impartial government to supervise the upcoming elections (*MER*, 18 December, 2004). Ghattas Khoury and Bassil Fleihan, two of Hariri's most trusted colleagues, attended the meeting (Blanford, 2006: 116-117).

[429] The revised electoral law privileged the *qada* system over the larger *muhafazat* constituencies. Not only were Beirut's districts redrawn to dilute Sunni representation with Shi'i and Christian candidates, but in Saida, where Hariri's sister Bahiya was running, the predominantly Sunni city was combined with its Shi'i suburbs for the first time (Blanford, 2006: 121).

organisation' and even agreeing to run a Hizbullah candidate on his list (Harris, 2012: 268)[430]. In return, Sayyid Nasrallah promised to arbitrate a rapprochement between Hariri and President Assad scheduled for 14 February 2005 (Blanford, 2006: 126).

Rafiq Hariri was killed that afternoon as his convoy approached the St Georges Hotel on Beirut's corniche. The reverberations of the explosion, which left 23 people dead, shook the foundations of Lebanon's *PF* and ushered in a period of protracted *hysteresis*. Whereas President Lahoud accused Israel and Islamic radicals of corroborating to destabilise Lebanon, opposition activists blamed the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services for orchestrating the assassination[431]. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan despatched a team led by Irish Deputy Police Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald to conduct preliminary investigations, President Assad tentatively agreed to an arrangement with President Lahoud whereby Syrian troops would gradually withdraw from Lebanon (Harris, 2009b: 68; *MER*, 12 March, 2005: 7)[432]. Internally, the assassination of the former premier evoked a diametrical split that produced a competitive struggle for the new predominant *orthodoxy* in Lebanon's *PF*. On 8 March, in a rally that Gebran Tueni credited as signifying Hizbullah's shift to 'the internal political game' by 'engaging in political life like other parties', Sayyid Nasrallah addressed a crowd of approximately 500,000 people wielding Lebanese flags and espoused the unshakeable bond between Syria and Lebanon (*MER*, 19 March, 2005: 8). Conversely, on 14 March, Rafiq Hariri's son, Sa'ad, announced the commencement of the 'Cedar Revolution' and 'independence *intifada*' against Syrian intervention to an estimated one million supporters[433].

The sudden eruption of *hysteresis* that engulfed Lebanon's *PF*, in which 'domestic forces and trends expanded to fill the political space…and to reposition themselves in a new political constellation' threatened the political protection of the Islamic Resistance (Fayyad, 2006: 2). Before 14 February 2005, Hariri and Syria ensured that the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* was insured in the *PF*,

[430] UN diplomat Terje Larsen was in Damascus to suggest merging the Ta'if Accord with Resolution 1559 and encourage Syria to redeploy its soldiers to the Biqa'. On returning to Beirut, he warned Hariri of President Assad's comments (Blanford, 2006: 123).
[431] Initially, Ahmad Abu Adass, a 22 year-old Al-Qaida-inspired salafi-jihadist of Palestinian origin living in the Tarek al-Jadideh neighbourhood of West Beirut, was implicated as the perpetrator. Substantiating this claim, Interior Minister Elias Murr revealed in September 2004 that the government had uncovered an Al-Qaida cell intending to target Beirut (Blanford, 2006: 108, 141). However, opposition activists claimed that preliminary evidence pointed to the joint involvement of Syrian intelligence chiefs, such as Rustom Ghazaleh and Jamaa Jamma, in coordination with their Lebanese counterparts, including Jamil al-Sayyid (the head of the General Security Directorate), Mustapha Hamdan (the head of the Presidential Guards) and Ali Hajj (Hariri's former security liaison and head of the ISF) (*MER*, 30 April, 2005: 8; 9 July, 2005: 11-12).
[432] The deal consisted of three phases: a) withdrawing the remaining 15,000 Syrian troops to the Western Biqa'; b) establishing a joint military commission to determine the size and length of stay for the remaining forces and clarify the relationship between these forces and the authorities of the Lebanese states; c) agreeing on the completion date for the full withdrawal of Syrian forces (*MER*, 12 March, 2005: 7).
[433] It is noteworthy that the date 14 March is also supposedly of symbolic importance to 8 March aligned Free Patriotic Movement because it was the day that General Aoun launched his 'Liberation War' against Syria in 1989 (Interviews with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012 and Hagop Pakradounian in Beirut, 6 September 2012).

affording Hizbullah the freedom to avoid political disputes and exhibit a *heterodox* position. However, after Hariri's death, and although Hizbullah had not been publicly accused of executing the assassination, the European Parliament passed a non-binding resolution on 10 March designating Hizbullah a 'terrorist organisation' (Azani, 2011: 201). Moreover, on 7 April, UNSC Resolution 1595 was enacted to create an International Independent Commission to assist the inquiry into the killing of Hariri (Harris, 2009b: 68). Exposed by Syria's dwindling presence in the *MSF* and its diminished ability to enforce *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, Hizbullah's *OF* sought to shield itself by repositioning its Resistance *habitus* in Lebanon.

Firstly, as Syria completed its withdrawal at the end of April and despite the intent of the interim authority to support UNSC Resolution 1595 and secure the resignation of President Lahoud's pro-Syrian intelligence officers, Hizbullah not only voted in favour of Najib Miqati's government, but also pushed for a cabinet position for the first time through its associate, Labour and Agriculture Minister Trad Hamadeh (*MER*, 23 April, 2005: 7)[434]. Secondly, Hizbullah participated in the 2005 parliamentary elections as part of a quadripartite coalition with Sa'ad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and Nabih Berri (Fayyad, 2006: 4). Nevertheless, despite its recourse to this accommodating perspective, Sayyid Nasrallah's speech in Bint Jubayl to commemorate the fifth anniversary of Israel's withdrawal illustrated the transitional challenges in independently balancing discourse and practice between the *orthodoxy* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* and Hizbullah's *heterodoxy* in the *PF*. Referring to the status of Hizbullah's 12,000 rockets, the Secretary General proclaimed that 'any hand that reaches to take those weapons away is an Israeli hand that will be cut off' while paradoxically pledging that 'we don't want to fight anyone…the weapons we have are not meant for internal use' (*MER*, 4 June, 2005: 8).

In a frenetic contest, Sa'ad Hariri's 14 March alliance became the first anti-Syrian coalition in three decades to hold a majority in parliament after receiving 72 seats compared with the 35 seats attained by 8 March (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 55)[435]. Arguably, the biggest surprise was the performance of Michel Aoun's Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) whose 21 seats accounted for 70% of the Christian vote, deprived Sa'ad Hariri the two-thirds quorum required to rescind President Lahoud's extension

[434] Jamil al-Sayyid, Ali Hajj and Raymond Azar were replaced by Wafiq Gezzini, Ashraf Rifi and Georges Khoury respectively. Mustapha Hamdan remained President Lahoud's chief aide until he was arrested (Pakradouni, 2012: 256).
[435] The 72 seats won by 14 March were spread across a variety of parties: Hariri's Future Movement (36); Jumblatt's Democratic Gathering (15); Qornet Shahwan (14); Tripoli Bloc (3); Democratic Left (1); Democratic Renewal (1); and Independents (2). For 8 March: Hizbullah (14, eleven of which were Shi'i); Amal (17); the SSNP (2); the Ba'ath Party (1) and the Christian Phalange (1) (*MER*, 18 June, 2005).

and led *Al-Safir* to judge that 'the Christians at long last have a leader' (Pakradouni, 2012: 243). In an act that demonstrated its decreasing dependence on Iran and Syria, Hizbullah's *OF* responded to these results by seeking approval from Lebanese Shi'i cleric Shaykh Afif Nabulsi before joining the government (Alagha, 2011: 54). Although Sayyid Nasrallah had previously declared in 1999 that 'the entry of one or two ministers in government would not change a thing', Hizbullah's Secretary General announced that 'we have decided to get involved in Lebanese politics from A to Z' with Muhammad Fneish and Trad Hamadeh representing Hizbullah in Fuad Siniora's 24-member cabinet (Azani, 2011: 155; *MER*, 16 July, 2005: 7-8)[436]. After the initial findings of the Detlev Mehlis directed UN inquiry into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri led to the arrest of President Lahoud's four generals, Fuad Siniora released his government's cabinet statement. Rather than implant its revisionist *heterodoxy*, the document succumbed to the institutionalised *orthodoxy* of the *PF* by paradoxically calling for good relations with Syria, stressing the need to respect international law, omitting reference to UNSC Resolution 1559 and sanctifying Hizbullah as 'the Lebanese Resistance movement' that epitomises 'the Lebanese people's national right to liberate their territories and defend their dignity in the face of Israeli aggressions, threats and ambitions' (*MER*, 30 July, 2005: 17).

For Elias Hanna, 'Hizbullah benefited more from the Syrian withdrawal than it suffered'[437]. Accordingly, after being confined by the imposed conditions of the *saqf al-suri* for over two decades, the physical removal of Syria, strategically aligned in solidarity and identity but incompatibly distinct in position and practice, instilled Hizbullah with a degree of rejuvenated freedom by opening the previously vetted and coveted corridors of political practice. Although only marginally improving its political footprint, Shaykh Qassem revealed that the opportunity of participating in government 'made us directly responsible for providing domestic protection in a better way than before' (Khatib, 2011: 66). Furthermore, with Syria reduced to exerting its symbolic *power* indirectly, President Assad would increasingly rely on Hizbullah to sustain his influence over *orthodox* practice in Lebanon.

Nevertheless, the incorporation of two ministers into government posed more questions for Hizbullah's *OF* than it answered. In theory, Hizbullah intended to safeguard 'itself and its arms behind the same debilitating rules of governance to ensure that no decisions could be made to disarm the movement despite continuous

[436] 14 March received 15 positions, 8 March were allocated two portfolios, President Lahoud possessed three appointments while the remaining four representatives were considered independent (*MER*, 23 July, 2005: 7; Alagha, 2006: 65).
[437] Interview with Elias Hanna in Zouk Mosbeh, 7 August 2012.

UNSC Resolutions' (Leenders, 2012: 246). Therefore, the Islamic Resistance would deliberately exploit the discrepancy between Lebanon asking the international community 'to help discover the killers of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and at the same time ignore the UN-drawn Blue-Line' (Randa Haidar in *MER*, 6 July, 2005). Yet, since the concept of consensual democracy, which was enshrined in Lebanon's *PF*, reified the ruling of a two-thirds majority, Hizbullah's 14 MPs and two ministers would remain insufficient in emphatically shielding the Islamic Resistance from political pressures emanating via domestic schemes or UNSC Resolutions.

7.2 The (Mis)Management of the 'Silent Majority'

Before the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, Lebanon's *MSF* and *PF*, while related by virtue of Syrian-imposed *orthodoxy*, were distinctly compartmentalised in purpose. Following Syria's withdrawal, the struggle for the reconstitution of *orthodoxy* conflated the mutually inclusive homology between political stability and national security. As Syria set to reassert itself from Damascus, Hizbullah was solely responsible for maintaining the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* by transporting its symbolic *capital* to the *PF*. Consequently, Hizbullah had to emerge from its position of *heterodoxy* in the *PF* to challenge the prevailing *orthodoxy*, a process that would require the strategic acquisition of legitimate *capital* through the adjustment of its practices. This 'Lebanonisation', a transformation comparatively more tangible than the 1990s, was not a revolutionary project to precipitate substantive change but a reactionary method to reform the reproductive *orthodoxy* of a pre-existing system. Accordingly, 'while Hizbullah's participation in government is a mark of its reconciliation with the State, it does not necessarily signify a reconciliation with the current political authority' (Fayyad, 2006: 8). This durable programme, in which semantic interpretations of *orthodoxy* in the *MSF* encroached upon the *orthodoxy* of the *PF*, resulted in over two years of contentious politics.

In the midst of Hizbullah's induction into government, Lebanon was mired in a series of assassinations targeting high-profile anti-Syrian figures, including journalist Samir Kassir (2 June) and LCP leader George Hawi (28 June). Moreover, a week before the release of Detlev Mehlis's first report on 20 October, which implicated both Syrian and Lebanese intelligence officers in the killing of Rafiq Hariri, an attempt had been made on the life of President Lahoud's son-in-law Elias Murr while Ghazi Kan'an, Syria's former intelligence chief in Lebanon and a close confidant of Hariri, allegedly

committed suicide[438]. As the implementation of UNSC 1636 applied diplomatic pressure on Syria to cooperate with the investigation or risk further sanctions, the publication of Detlev Mehlis's second report on 12 December coincided with the assassination of *Al-Nahar* journalist Gebran Tueni[439]. With the majority of Siniora's government displaying support for the adoption of UNSC Resolutions 1559, 1636 and 1644, the last of which broadened the scope of investigations beyond Hariri, the five Shi'i ministers walked out in protest only to return once the government assured them that Hizbullah would be classified as the 'resistance', not a 'militia', thereby exempting the Islamic Resistance from the specifications of UNSC Resolutions (*MER*, 17 December, 2005: 7; Alagha, 2011: 121) [440].

However, despite commanding influence over Shi'i ministers in government, Hizbullah's *OF* acknowledged that this was an inadequate and unsustainable source for protecting the Islamic Resistance as long as the *PF* was institutionally governed by majority rulings. While the absence of Shi'i representatives in cabinet decisions was a powerful image, the credibility of Hizbullah's position and practice in the *PF* would be improved by the presence of a non-Shi'i ally. From the beginning of 2005, former Phalange leader and Syrian fixer Karim Pakradouni had been mediating between the FPM, President Lahoud and President Assad over the return of Michel Aoun to Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 252). By March 2005, after Syria advised that Sayyid Nasrallah be notified of these discussions, Hizbullah initiated a year-long process of negotiation with the FPM before announcing a ten-point Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which was signed at the Saint Michael Church in the southern suburb of Shiyyah on 6 February 2006 (*MER*, 11 February, 2006)[441].

Overall, rather than reduced to the expedient convergence of two discordant parties, the MOU enabled these relative novices in the *PF*, both of whom were locked in *heterodox* positions, to seize upon the opportunity of combining their symbolic *capital* within two disproportionately disenfranchised segments of the *SMF* to enhance their

[438] The assassination attempt on Elias Murr, a pro-Syrian member of 8 March, and the alleged suicide of Ghazi Kan'an, Syria's former intelligence chief in Lebanon, may be linked to the imminent release of the UN investigation's first report, which was rumoured to be implicating Syrian and Lebanese intelligence figures in the assassination of Hariri. Both Murr and Kan'an were not only privy to sensitive information pertaining to the intelligence movements in Lebanon, but they were also considered untrustworthy by Rustom Ghazaleh, who replaced Kan'an as Syria's spy chief in Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 266; Harris, 2009: 68; Blanford, 2006: 177-179).
[439] The second UN report tied the assassination to three brothers in Al-Ahbash who had direct links to President Lahoud (*MER*, 16 January, 2006: 16).
[440] UNSC Resolution 1644 not only extended the inquiry for another six months, but it also introduced the prospect of a tribunal with an international character. Under Belgian prosecutor Serge Frammertz, all political killings (attempted and executed) from Marwan Hamadeh to Gebran Tueni would be investigated as part of the same case (Harris, 2009b: 69).
[441] While Sayyid Nasrallah originally met with Tony Harb and Kamal Yazigi, Pakradouni conducted talks between Emile Lahoud and General Aoun (Pakradouni, 2012: 252-253). The final details were negotiated between two delegates from each of Hizbullah's (Abu Zaynab and Mahmoud Qomati) and the FPM's (Gebran Bassil and Ziyad Abs) political councils (Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012). The signing of the MOU at Saint Michael's was of symbolic importance with Sayyid Nasrallah acknowledging the historical presence of Christians in the predominantly Shi'i southern suburbs while Michel Aoun was born and raised in the southern district of Haret Hurayk, the location of Hizbullah's headquarters.

respective positions through the establishment of a collective *collusio* in the *PF*. While the FPM calculated that they should have been allocated 40 seats in the 2005 elections, the Shi'i also repeatedly argued that they were entitled to at least 40 seats in parliament (Harris, 2009a: 17)[442]. By this logic, both parties, with the addition of Amal, possessed a 'silent majority' representing almost two-thirds of Lebanon. Although Michel Aoun's vehement opposition to Syria's meddling in Lebanese affairs posed a potential issue for this prospective partnership, the withdrawal of Syrian forces cosmetically removed this obstacle, facilitated his return and enabled both parties to promote a compatible domestic programme that focused on eliminating the kleptocratic corruption of Lebanon's capitalist system[443]. Subsequently, the MOU, which omitted any reference to the Ta'if Accords or UNSC Resolution 1559, not only permitted Michel Aoun to use Hizbullah's status as an anti-establishment actor for the purpose of confronting his traditional Christian rivals in 14 March, but by reinstituting the dynamics of the *PF* away from 'traditionally vertical (inter-sectarian) lines towards horizontal (intra-sectarian) direction', the FPM also provided Hizbullah with a popular non-Shi'i associate that would politically support the Resistance, uphold relations with Syria and advocate government decision-making based on consensus over majority (Fayyad, 2006: 5)[444]

Despite expending significant attention to invest in augmenting its social *capital* in the *PF*, Hizbullah's *OF* became rapidly redirected to the eruption of hostilities in the *MSF* as the abduction of Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev on 12 July 2006, two soldiers within the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), sparked the 34-day 'July War' (*al-harb al-tormuz*)[445]. Following the kidnapping of three IDF soldiers on 7 October 2000 as well as botched attempts in June and November 2005, this operation, allegedly orchestrated by Imad Mugniyeh and resulting in the deaths of ten IDF soldiers, was not an innovatively conceived strategy but a consistently applied tactic[446]. Rather, the timing of the operation, which occurred soon after the capture of Gilad Shalit in the Gaza Strip, and Israel's bellicose response, which tested the capabilities of the

[442] Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012.
[443] Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012.
[444] The MOU's ten-point plan and initial analysis into the comparative advantages of the alliance are detailed in *MER* issues dated 11 February, 2006; 25 February, 2006; and 1 April, 2006.
[445] Following the infiltration of an Islamic Resistance cell into Israel, the IDF deployed two hummers of seven people to the penetrated area. The second was disabled by machine gun fire and artillery, killing all three soldiers, while the first was hit with RPGs. Goldwasser and Regev were subsequently seized during the attack. Two hours later, after the IDF sent a Merkava tank unit into Lebanese territory, the Islamic Resistance bombed the patrol killing all four soldiers. Another IDF soldiers died when the Nahal force was ordered to retrieve the wounded. With Goldwasser and Regev also dying from their injuries, this operation became one of the deadliest days for the IDF in Lebanon (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 1-5, 12-13).
[446] While the IDF foiled a kidnapping attempt in the Sheba Farms in June 2005, a foray into Israel by the Islamic Resistance on 21 November 2005 was also repelled by the IDF (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 5-6). In May 2006, Hizbullah and Israel exchanged fire across the border (Norton, 2007a: 134-135). After the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit on 25 June 2006, the IDF raised the abduction alert in South Lebanon from 2 to 4 before lowering it again two days before the kidnapping (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 10-11).

Islamic Resistance, called to question the ability of Hizbullah's *OF* to manage the synergy between practices in the *MSF* and *PF*.

Operation 'Truthful Promise' (*wa'd al-sadiq*), along with Israel's sustained retaliation, caused the deaths of 161 Israelis (119 soldiers; 42 civilians) and an estimated 1,191 Lebanese of which approximately 200 were Islamic Resistance fighters (ICG, 2006a: 1)[447]. By the time of the ceasefire on 14 August, the Islamic Resistance had fired around 4,000 rockets to Israel's 20,000 (Crooke & Perry, 2006; Cordesman, 2006: 22). The conflict left 1.5 million people displaced with Lebanon suffering $4 billion worth of damage compared to $500 million in Israel (Norton, 2007a: 142)[448]. An hour after Udi Goldwasser and Eldad Regev were captured, *Al-Manar* broadcast a recording of Sayyid Nasrallah revealing that 'we've kept our promise to free our prisoners' (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 75)[449]. However, on 27 August, Sayyid Nasrallah admitted that 'if any of us had a one percent concern that Israel was going to respond so fiercely, we would not have ordered the kidnapping of those soldiers'[450]. While these statements confirm the decision-making process of Hizbullah's kidnapping strategy, the friction between the *MSF* and *PF* is more indicative for ascertaining the rationale behind the tactical timing and implications of the operation. In Bourdieusian terms, this episode can be characterised as an instance of *allodoxia*, a (mis)adventure or (mal)practice predicated on the misjudgement or misperception of the value of one's *capital* in relation to the structural parameters of legitimate action.

Prior to Operation 'Truthful Promise', Hizbullah's *OF* was developing the social *capital* it had accrued with the FPM in the *PF* by engaging in the National Dialogue Roundtable from 2 March[451]. Affirming his loyalty to Lebanon, Sayyid Nasrallah not only informed the committee that he would even 'fight the Syrians if they occupied the Sheba Farms', but he also signed an 'honour pact' with Sa'ad Hariri days before the kidnapping 'not to do anything that would provoke Israel along the Lebanese

[447] Perhaps due to the difficulty in identifying an Islamic Resistance fighter, numbers vary from 64 (Hizbullah figures), 150 (*MER*, 7 October, 2006: 10), 184 (Crooke & Perry, 2006) to 500 (Israeli calculations).
[448] One million IDPs were from South Lebanon while the remaining 500,000 were from northern Israel. The War left 15,000 homes destroyed as well as 1500 factories, markets, shops, commercial buildings and vital infrastructure (airports, ports, water and sewage facilities and electrical plants). Additionally, Israeli attacks decimated 91 bridges, 600km of road and 545 cultivated fields. Regarding economic losses, and perhaps as a result of combining short-term damages with projected long-term effects, figures vary between $2-20 billion for Lebanon and $500 million to $4 billion for Israel (Alagha, 2011: 124-125; Blanford, 2011: 412; Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 249-250; Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 97; ICG, 2006a: 1; Norton, 2007: 142; Salem, 2006: 4; Zisser, 2009: 164-165).
[449] By 12 July 2006, Israel was only holding three Lebanese prisoners: Samir Kuntar, Nissim Nasser and perhaps Yihiye Sakaf (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 83).
[450] Slightly different translations of Sayyid Nasrallah's interview have been presented (Alagha, 2011: 127; Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 250; Leenders, 2006: 49-50; Norton, 2007b: 486).
[451] The three-month National Dialogue consisted of 14 Lebanese politicians including Sayyid Nasrallah, Michel Aoun, Nabih Berri, Samir Geagea, Fuad Siniora, Sa'ad Hariri and Amin Gemayel (Pakradouni, 2012: 282-283).

border' (Ibrahim Baydoun in *MER*, 9 July, 2006)[452]. Additionally, Hizbullah agreed in principle to the establishment of an international tribunal (Salem, 2006: 2). Although these discussions displayed a cooperative façade in the *PF*, the activation of operations in the *MSF* was determined by the erosion of Hizbullah's resolve following the application of political pressure exerted by 14 March on Lebanon's national defence strategy as well as on the Palestinian question.

Firstly, the premise of Hizbullah's programme entitled 'Is Israel our Enemy or not?' (2006) fundamentally contrasted the 14 March mantra of 'Lebanon's strength is its weakness', a phrase coined by Pierre Gemayel to explain that Lebanon's relative fragility and neutrality would balance against the domination of intervening parties. Subsequently, 14 March launched a multi-pronged campaign to undermine the legitimacy of Hizbullah's proposition. Buoyed by the release of Serge Brammertz's first report and in a move that President Lahoud warned would 'create a violent controversy in Lebanon', Premier Siniora omitted the term 'Resistance' in the preamble for the Arab Summit in Khartoum on 28 March (Pakradouni, 2012: 289-290). Moreover, emboldened by UNSC Resolution 1680 on 17 May, which reinforced UNSC Resolution 1559, the 14 March alliance increased the volume of its protestations against Hizbullah[453]. Not only did 14 March assert that Resistance should be contingent on the confirmation of the Sheba Farms as Lebanese by the UN and on the unanimous support of the Lebanese people, but Walid Jumblatt and Sa'ad Hariri also exploited perceived flaws in Hizbullah's logic, namely its incessant detachment from state institutions, specifically the LAF, and its immaturity in failing to comprehend that protracted military issues can only be resolved via political processes (*MER*, 5 August, 2006: 7-8,16).

Secondly, the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in the Iraqi city of Samarra on 22 February 2006 exacerbated internecine tensions between the Sunni and Shi'i. A couple of months earlier, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-Palestinian founder of the Al-Qaida-inspired *Tawhid wal Jihad* in Iraq, the group accused of the bombing, claimed responsibility for firing Katyusha rockets into Israel from South Lebanon (Blanford, 2006: 196)[454]. Moreover, following the arrest of nine Lebanese and Palestinian salafi-jihadi militants in April for plotting the assassination of Sayyid

[452] Interview with Hagop Pakradounian in Beirut, 6 September 2012.
[453] UNSC Resolution 1680 called on Syria to prevent the infiltration of weapons into Lebanon; to engage with its neighbour on the delineation of borders; and to participate in diplomatic relations in order to respect Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. In June, a UN report into the assassination of Hariri reminded Syria of Chapter VII ramifications in the event of culpability or obstruction (Harris, 2009b: 72-73).
[454] In July 2005, Jund al-Sham, a salafi-jihadi group in South Lebanon, announced that it would target leading Hizbullah figures. In January 2006, the Lebanese authorities arrested 13 Al-Qaida members and charged them with planning terrorist attacks in Lebanon (Blanford, 2006: 195-196).

Nasrallah, al-Zarqawi accused Hizbullah in June of 'raising false banners regarding the liberation of Palestine' (Gambill, 2009: 145). Therefore, after the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit by Hamas on 25 June, not only did the emergence of radical Palestinian factions and the resumption of operations by Hizbullah's Sunni counterpart risk eclipsing the Palestinian credentials of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*, but these episodes also vindicated the complaints of 14 March in the *PF*, which argued that Hizbullah's defence strategy was constrained by the inability of the Islamic Resistance to contain Palestinian groups within the self-professed parameters of its security jurisdiction in the South.

In this context, Operation 'Truthful Promise' could be interpreted as either an Iranian or Syrian order 'aimed at igniting a war with Israel' or 'a reckless miscalculation that unwittingly wreaked havoc on the country' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006a: 1). Refuting the role of external forces, U.S. military experts admitted that kidnapping operations were orchestrated from Hizbullah's headquarters in *al-dahiyeh* with no Israeli official believing that the Islamic Resistance was purely adhering to orders from Iran or Syria (Cordesman, 2006: 15; Exum, 2006: 7)[455]. Therefore, while the Islamic Resistance had been preparing for war with Israel since 2000, it would appear that the July kidnapping represented a bidirectional 'reminder operation' that conformed to conventional practice in applying a defensive tactic aimed at reiterating Israel's offensive occupation and its incarceration of Lebanese prisoners while simultaneously acting as a strategically calculated decision in proactively diverting attention away from sectarian sedition and restoring its credibility in Lebanon.

Technically, the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers was classified as a 'quality operation', one in which the commanders of the Islamic Resistance are required to seek the permission of Hizbullah's *al-majlis al-shura*[456]. Nevertheless, the discrepancy between Sayyid Nasrallah's pledges in the *PF* and the practice of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* can perhaps be explained by dispositional disparities within Hizbullah's *OF*. As kidnapping was recognised and sanctioned as a pre-existing strategy in the *MSF*, it is feasible to assume that Sayyid Nasrallah may have deferred tactical decision-making to Imad Mugniyeh, the head of the *Amn al-Muddad*. Due to its previous success, and since Mugniyeh was head of the Jihad Council within the *majlis al-shura*, the clandestine figure probably exercised significant autonomy in

[455] While Iran despatched around 100 military advisors to Lebanon and although Syria continued to supply weapons to Hizbullah, the Islamic Resistance remained relatively independent during the War. Henry Crumpton, the U.S. State Department's Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, admitted in reference to Syria and Iran, 'in terms of them controlling Hizbullah, no. They cannot put Hizbullah out of business…Iran does not completely own Hizbullah' (*MER*, 29 July, 2006: 14).
[456] Interview with Timur Goksel in Beirut, 9 May 2012).

identifying and timing prospective operations. Furthermore, informed by inscribed experience, and with abductions ordinarily subscribing to predictable procedural outcomes, there was little precedent of a state going to war over the capture of two soldiers, particularly considering that Israel was embroiled with Hamas in Gaza and traditionally avoided fighting on concurrent fronts (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 83).

However, by abducting IDF soldiers in Ayta ash-Sha'ab and shelling Za'rit, neither of which were in the vicinity of the Sheba Farms, the Islamic Resistance partially violated the 'rules of the game' thereby evoking a stern reaction from Israel for committing *allodoxia*, a process by which the Islamic Resistance misattributed and miscalculated the balanced equilibrium between its possessed *capital* and perceived opportunities in the *MSF* (Exum, 2006: 8; Leenders, 2006: 39-40)[457]. Invoking Hizbullah's contraventions and haunted by the embarrassment of its withdrawal in 2000, Israeli Defence Minister Amir Peretz stated that 'we expected Hizbullah to break the rules, so now we will break it' (Hirst, 2010: 308).

Despite neutralising 59 of Hizbullah's long-range rocket launchers in the first 34 minutes of Operation Specific Weight on 13 July, Israel's performance during the war, as accentuated by the subsequent Winograd Commission, was a dismal display of political indecision, military blunders and internal miscommunication demonstrating the divergent dissonance between Israel's *PF* and *MSF* (Exum, 2006: 12)[458]. As judged by Elias Hanna, 'Israel lost because it did not win and Hizbullah won because it did not lose'[459]. The expectations encompassing the latter part of the equation were substantially aided by the lack of coherent aims articulated by Israel's inexperienced and fragmented governing triumvirate[460]. Five days after authorising Operation Specific Weight, and three days into air strikes on *al-dahiyeh*, Premier Olmert finally listed Israel's ambitious conditions for a ceasefire, namely the return of hostages, the deployment of the LAF to the South and the disarming of Hizbullah (Blanford, 2011: 389). Although Hizbullah's *OF* was compelled into contemplating negotiations due to its rising vulnerability, its preservation was assisted by Premier Olmert's intransigent

[457] After the Islamic Resistance struck Israel in May 2006, the IDF warned that if such a provocation was repeated, Israel would use it as a pretext 'for a new arrangement along the border' (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 71).
[458] Before the war, Hizbullah possessed 13,000 rockets ranging from the Katyusha (20km), Fajr-3 (43km) and Fajr-5 (75km) to the Uragan (70km), Khaibar (100km) and Zelzal 2 (210km) (Blanford, 2006: 338-339; Exum, 2006: 6; Cordesman, 2006). Prior to Operation Specific Weight, Israeli leaders agreed that this arsenal be pre-emptively liquidated. The attack limited the Islamic Resistance's ability in launching long-range rockets and incapacitated its missile command centre (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 77-91).
[459] Interview with Elias Hanna in Zouk Mosbeh, 7 August 2012.
[460] In May 2006, the triumvirate consisted of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defence Minister Amir Peretz and Chief of Staff for the Israeli Armed Forces Dan Halutz. These three constantly disagreed over mission objectives. Initially, while Olmert and Halutz wanted to hold the Lebanese government accountable by striking civil infrastructure, Peretz strongly opposed this direction (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 77-78).

adherence to a holistic programme that led to a series of mismanaged ventures that disrupted the cohesive balance between Israel's *PF* and *MSF*.

Rather than complement military action with a corresponding political solution, the dysfunctional relationship involving Premier Olmert and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz created a chasm between the two resulting in a confused strategy of incommensurate goals that risked plunging Israel into protracted conflict[461]. This deficiency in homology was patently evident in Israel's concept of proportionality and its disorderly ground offensive into Lebanon. Firstly, in the case of air strikes targeting the densely-populated *al-dahiyeh*, Lebanon's infrastructure and the massacre at Qana on 30 August, Israel failed to justifiably associate these civilian centres with its proportionate attacks on Hizbullah. Secondly, as evinced in Maroun Al-Ras, Bint Jubayl, Taybeh and Ayta ash-Sha'ab, Israeli military commanders were confounded as to whether ground incursions represented the first stage of a surge into Lebanon or a precautionary measure to consolidate positions across the border[462]. In this tautological state of flux, Israel neglected the diplomatic track, especially Fuad Siniora's seven-point, Hizbullah-approved ceasefire plan on 24 July, which addressed all of Israel's prerequisite conditions[463]. Epitomising Israel's 2006 experience, despite the impending UNSC Resolution 1701 on 14 August, Premier Olmert presented the IDF with 60 hours to advance to the south of the Litani River[464]. Not only were 33 Israeli soldiers killed in the last few days of the conflict, but UNSC Resolution 1701 was also not dissimilar from Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni's original proposal a month earlier (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 94-95; 229).

While Israel's indeterminate aims rendered Hizbullah's victory dependent purely on survival, the effective performance of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* ensured that Israel was prevented from achieving its objectives by creating 'new definitions of power and victory that cannot be measured in quantitative or material terms' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006a: 3). Before 12 July 2006, the Islamic Resistance was compartmentally organised into four geographical areas in *al*-dahiyeh, South

[461] On 23 July, Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni that the hostages would not be released through military means (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 145).
[462] For Israel's Northern Command, forays into Maroun al-Ras and Bint Jubayl were the first phase of 'Elevated Waters', a campaign to advance into Lebanese territory. Meanwhile, Israel's General Headquarters wanted to avoid a ground offensive in Lebanon altogether (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 132-150).
[463] Siniora's plan called for the release of Israeli and Lebanese soldiers; the retreat of Israel behind the Blue-Line; the transfer of contested territory to the UN; the handover of minefield maps to the UN; the deployment and authority of the LAF to South Lebanon; the enhanced support of UNIFIL; the reinstating of the 1949 armistice line; and the commitment of the international community to the rehabilitation of Lebanon (Pakradouni, 2012: 307-309). This proposal was accepted by the five Shi'i ministers in government (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 157).
[464] Following the failure of Operation Change of Direction 8 on 1 August, the IDF devised Operation Change of Direction 11, a multi-directional push towards the Litani River. Despite reservations, Premier Olmert authorised the plan 60 hours before the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1701 (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 173-196, 209-215).

Lebanon, the southern coastline and the Biqa' Valley with around 500-600 concealed weapons caches and bunkers (Blanford, 2011: 346; Exum, 2006: 4; Crooke & Perry, 2006)[465]. Despite the initial damage inflicted by Operation Specific Weight, the C-802 anti-ship missile attack on the INS Sa'ar 5 Hanit on 14 July as well as the Katyusha assaults on Kfar Giladi and Haifa on 6 August proved that the Islamic Resistance retained its destructive potential[466]. In addition to rockets, the 'netcentric' warfare employed by the Islamic Resistance kept its ground forces mobile and versatile (Cordesman, 2006: 21). South of the Litani, Hizbullah mobilised the Nasr Brigade, an elite unit centring on 1,000 men operating around 12-15 villages in small groups of seven to ten (Exum, 2006: 5; Blanford, 2011: 346). Since Israel failed to pass the Litani River, the northern-based Badr Brigade focused on launching long-range rockets[467]. The adoption of hybrid guerrilla tactics, in which 'flat, networking of autonomous units, using deliberately low-tech systems, combined with its episodic and unexpected deployment of small specialised units using high-tech weapons', disabled and circumvented the competitive advantage of Israel's conventional military capabilities in South Lebanon (Crooke, 2009: 185-186)[468].

Unlike conclusions to previous encounters with Israel, in which Syria directly transmitted the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Resistance from the *MSF* to *PF*, Hizbullah's *OF* was now accountable for managing this transference. Seizing upon the opportunity of framing its exploits as an unprecedented 'divine victory' by a Muslim-Arab force over Israel, the Islamic Resistance renewed its self-professed status as the only actor capable of defending Lebanon. In theory, UNSC Resolution 1701 sought to curtail Hizbullah by permitting only UNIFIL and the LAF to bear arms between the Litani River and the Blue-Line, a precursory motion before implementing Resolutions 1559 and 1608 that demanded the complete disarmament of armed groups unless authorised by the government (ICG, 2006a: 2). Hizbullah accepted Resolution 1701, specifically the deployment of 15,000 Lebanese soldiers and 10,000 UNIFIL representatives, interpreting it as 'an arms management as opposed to an arms decommissioning scenario' that applied to visible weapons and not the concealed munitions of the Resistance (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006b: 3). Regardless of

[465] Not one Islamic Resistance commander knew the entire structure or location of the bunker network. Each unit comprised of three bunkers – one for munitions and two for reserves. Each bunker was 30-50 metres underground, constructed with reinforced steel and contained electricity systems, air supplies and drainage pipes. The Islamic Resistance also built decoy bunkers (Crooke & Perry, 2006; Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 45-46).

[466] Unbeknownst to Israel, Hizbullah had been developing an amphibious warfare unit consisting of the C-701 (15km) and C-802 (120km) anti-ship missiles since the 1990s (Exum, 2006: 6; Blanford, 2011: 350; Cordesman, 2006: 18). In a live speech, Sayyid Nasrallah's asked the people to look to the sea, at which point a camera broadcast instant images of the attack on INS Hanit with the Hizbullah leader stating that 'you wanted a change in the game rules – you will get it' (Harel & Issacharoff, 2008: 102).

[467] Realising that the average response time of Israel's Air Force was 90 seconds, the Islamic Resistance had trained to set-up, fire and cover its positions in 60 seconds (Crooke, 2009: 185-186).

[468] The Islamic Resistance had amassed a vast selection of anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment by 2006 (Exum, 2006: 6; Cordesman, 2006: 5, 18).

the semantics, neither UNIFIL nor the LAF were capable or willing to enforce the Resolution's stipulations[469]. Counterintuitively, the presence of these forces assisted the Islamic Resistance in creating a buffer with Israel in securing the Shi'i population while supplying an internationally legitimate cover for the movement to resume its social services and replenish its military stockpiles[470]. However, confronting dissenting reservations from 14 March, senior Hizbullah official Nabil Qaouk remarked that 'there is now a political assault to achieve the same aims as the military war (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007a: 6).

Consequently, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan posited that 'it has generally been accepted that Hizbullah cannot be disarmed by force' (*MER*, 2 September, 2006: 7). Therefore, rather than target Hizbullah's weapons by imposing ambiguous expectations, UNSC Resolution 1701 attempted to 'reclaim the rules of the game politically' by emphasising that 'as long as Hizbullah's demands are raised within the framework of Lebanon's lawful rights as a state, they will be dealt with on that basis and not on the basis of Hizbullah's particular conditions' (Rosana Boumoncef in *MER*, 26 August, 2006: 12). By shifting direction to the *PF*, the international community and its Lebanese partners intended to nullify the symbolic *capital* acquired by Hizbullah in the *MSF*. In the absence of Syria, Hizbullah would be compelled to justify the advantageous *orthodoxy* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* from a disadvantageous position of *heterodoxy* in the *PF*, a competitive arena where structured practice privileged majority rulings over inter-confessional consensus. Due to the allocation of seats in the 2005 elections and the subsequent polarisation of the *PF*, the Islamic Resistance would be exposed to institutionally majoritarian decisions unless Hizbullah pursed other extra-institutional opportunities to obstruct this process. If Hizbullah forfeited, 'it loses not only its political power and the type of Lebanon that it envisages, but also its arms' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007: 7).

Responding to this threat, Hizbullah issued an ultimatum on 6 November demanding that Premier Siniora either form a national unity government and grant 8 March a blocking third plus one over decision-making or the alliance would resort to protesting its under-representation on the streets (Alagha, 2011: 130-131)[471]. Ultimately,

[469] The Islamic Resistance maintained good relations with both UNIFIL and the LAF in the South. For the latter, not only did it refuse to deploy to the South without Hizbullah's consent, but it also concurred with Hizbullah's logic of differentiating between private and public weapons (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2006b: 3). Similarly Hizbullah's Ali Fayyad stated that 'we agreed with the Army that if they see us with weapons, they can take them. But they cannot search for caches; caches are not visible' (ICG, 2006a: 14).

[470] During his 'Divine Victory' speech, Sayyid Nasrallah claimed that the Islamic Resistance had already boosted its rocket arsenal to 20,000 (*MER*, 22 September, 2006: 7).

[471] Hizbullah claimed that the number of parliamentary seats (57/128) and cabinet posts (7/24) distributed to 8 March did not represent their popular support. This logic was reinforced by surveys conducted in 2006 by *Al-Nahar* and the Beirut Centre for Research and Information, both of which concluded that the Shi'i alone were entitled to between 37 and 40 seats in parliament based on their

achieving veto power would permit 8 March to 'prevent passage of sensitive laws, but also to bring down the government at a time of its choosing' (ICG, 2006a: 12). Catalysing the impending implosion, Premier Siniora retorted by approving a draft text submitted by the UN for the tribunal in Lebanon despite the resignation of six opposing ministers[472]. The opposition, which was backed by President Lahoud and Speaker Berri, not only asserted that Article 52 of the Constitution insists that the text be ratified by the presidency and parliament, but also decried a motion without Shi'i representation as contravening the Ta'if Accords stipulation that 'no authority is constitutional which violates the pact of national coexistence' (Salem, 2006: 2; ICG, 2006a: 8-10). This struggle for *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, in which both parties claimed symbolic *capital* after the 2006 War, resulted in a political impasse. Compounding this crisis, 14 March politician Pierre Gemayel was assassinated on 21 November. By default, the defection or death of two more cabinet members would collapse the government (*MER*, 25 November, 2006: 7)[473].

Amidst this descent into paralysis, each actor pursued specifically targeted spheres that they perceived would maximise mobilising opportunities for transferring *capital* into the *PF*. Consequently, while Hizbullah's *OF* set to reassert the status of its weapons via the accumulation of capital in the *SMF*, 14 March sought to challenge the *orthodoxy* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* by enlisting the services of external actors in legitimising the tribunal and enhancing the capabilities of the LAF. On 1 December, Hizbullah's supporters erected 1,000 tents adjacent to parliament in Riad al-Sulh and Martyrs Square, both symbolic spaces for 14 March, and called on the government to resign (Norton, 2007b: 488; Harris, 2009b: 77). However, in an episode in which Sayyid Nasrallah miscalculated the adjustment of partisan rhetoric of Resistance with the pragmatic practice of political resolution, the campaign slogan of 'no to civil war, no to lifting the sit-in, no to use of weapons in the country and no to foreign trusteeship' soon spiralled out of control as violence erupted between the Sunni and Shi'i leaving eight dead and hundreds injured (*MER*, 3 February, 2007: 7). This temporary detachment between Hizbullah's *OF* and the *SMF* in articulating the distinction of legitimate repertoires for mobilisation in the *PF* and *MSF* signified that

population figures (*MER*, 18 November, 2006: 9). Contrary to the Ta'if Accords, Hizbullah believed that 'the Lebanese cake should be divided three ways, not two ways' (*MER*, 27 January, 2007: 9).

[472] Since the UN submitted the draft text in English on 10 November, the opposition managed to get the vote postponed until 13 November. Despite the resignation of a quarter of the cabinet, the five Shi'i ministers plus President Lahoud's Greek Orthodox ally Yacoub Sarraf, Siniora adopted the bill (*MER*, 18 November, 2006: 7; ICG, 2006a: 8; Harris, 2009b: 76; Norton, 2007b: 487).

[473] By the end of 2006, 14 March suggested a 19-9 government split with each party picking the remaining two candidates who would be unable to vote when a clear division occurred thereby preventing both blocs from achieving a two-thirds majority. In another proposal, a 19/10+1 arrangement was forwarded in which the 30th minister would be approved by a majority and unable to vote on divisive matters (ICG, 2006a: 14-15).

the Party was no longer 'master of a confrontation it had planned but which was taking a confessional life of its own' (ICG, 2007: 3)[474].

Moreover, aside from mobilising its constituents in the *SMF*, Hizbullah's *OF* also propagated unity with Syria over the legitimate *orthodoxy* of the *PF* while balancing between its pursuit of symbolic *capital* and Syria's management of its declining symbolic *power*. For Hizbullah's *OF*, permitting the tribunal to succeed through a majority vote would not only weaken its patron, but it would also set a dangerous precedent for the inevitable discussion of its weapons. For Syria, the tribunal represented an existential threat to its authority in Lebanon. While the interests of both parties converged, as stakeholders occupying differing perceptions and positions, each were subject to their own inscribed dispositions for actualising the manifestation of these agendas into practice. Although the assassinations of 14 March politicians Walid Eido (13 June) and Antoine Ghanem (19 September) indirectly served Hizbullah's interests, as an invested domestic actor competing for credible *capital* in Lebanon's *PF*, the Party would endeavour to distance itself from these illegitimate methods.

Conversely, 14 March dispositions for acquiring legitimacy in the *SMF* directed practice towards securing grants from foreign donors to rehabilitate Lebanon's economy, pursuing the international tribunal and restoring the capabilities of the LAF. Since the assassination of Rafiq Hariri and the fragmentation of the Maronite leadership diminished the coalition's ability to maintain symbolic *capital* not only within the Sunni and Christian communities but also amongst international patrons, 14 March sought to revitalise its position. Firstly, in January 2007, following earlier fora in Rome and Stockholm, the Lebanese government received pledges of $7.6 billion from foreign donors during the Paris III Conference (*MER*, 27 January, 2007: 7)[475]. Intending to overshadow the reconstruction and assistance offered by Hizbullah, Premier Siniora claimed that the funds would revive confidence and investments in the Lebanese market as well as rebuilding Lebanon's infrastructure and compensating families whose properties were destroyed by the war[476].

Secondly, 14 March exerted pressure on 8 March by invoking the legitimacy of the international tribunal. On 30 May 2007, the controversial UN draft text was adopted

[474] To defuse tensions, Sayyid Nasrallah stressed the need for political dialogue, issued a *fatwa* encouraging the Shi'i to vacate the streets and declared that 'anyone using a firearm against a Lebanese brother is working for Israel' (ICG, 2007: 3; Norton, 2007b: 488).
[475] During the July War, Premier Siniora received pledges of around $1 billion in Rome before securing another $1 billion in financial assistance in Stockholm in September (*MER*, 29 July, 2007: 8-9; 9 September, 2007: 13-14).
[476] The premier announced that $40,000 would be paid to every family who had lost its home (*MER*, 9 September, 2007: 13-14).

by UNSC Resolution 1757 under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which 'permits the use of force to confront threats to international peace and security' (Harris, 2009a: 17; Norton, 2007b: 487). Lastly, the government appealed to the U.S. for military aid. Having provided Lebanon with only $126 million between 1948-2006, the U.S. committed to a package of over $1 billion by the end of 2007, a deal that was contingent on a 14 March administration (*MER*, 15 September, 2007: 10; Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 20)[477]. However, concerned that lethal weaponry may fall into the wrong hands, the U.S. ensured that the LAF was only supplied with non-lethal equipment (Schenker, 2009: 227-228; *MER*, 15 September, 2007: 10). As demonstrated with the 19 May until 2 September siege of Nahr Al-Bared in 2007, a Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon, the LAF suffered from a deficiency of combat experience and military hardware. The assault against Fatah Al-Islam, purportedly an affiliate of Al-Qaida with links to Syrian intelligence, killed 163 LAF soldiers and resulted in 34,000 residents losing their homes (*MER*, 15 September, 2007: 9; Norton, 2007b: 489)[478].

The expiration of President Lahoud's term on 24 November 2007 also presented both coalitions with an invaluable opportunity to vie for *capital* in the *PF*. Nevertheless, neither alliance had the two-thirds quorum required to push through a preferred candidate[479]. For the first time since Lebanon's independence, the doors of the president's palace in Baabda remained closed. Although Hizbullah was intent on appointing a pro-Syrian president, ensuring a blocking third in a national unity government and renouncing UNSC Resolution 1559, the Party delegated internal Maronite discussions to its ally with Shaykh Qassem remarking 'General Aoun has written specific points in his pocket…go and talk to him…if you agree, we could reach a settlement in 24 hours' (*MER*, 15 December, 2007: 2). While resigned to withdrawing his candidacy, the FPM leader provisionally accepted the nomination of General Michel Sulayman but argued for his accession to be connected with a broader government reform package addressed in his five-point plan[480]. In the midst

[477] Between 2006 and 2010, the U.S. has provided Lebanon with $1.35 billion in overall assistance. Of this figure, $690 has been reserved for improving the capacities of the LAF and ISF (Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 20). Additionally, the U.S. designated Jihad al-Bina as a 'terrorist organisation' in February 2007 and issued an Executive Order in August 2007 'blocking the property of persons undermining the sovereignty of Lebanon or its democratic processes' (Schenker, 2009: 229-230).

[478] Shaker al-Absi, a member of the anti-Arafat, Syria-endorsed Fatah Al-Intifada in Damascus in 1983 before becoming an associate of Al-Qaida operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, seized control of Fatah Al-Intifada compounds in Nahr al-Bared in November 2006 and changed the name of the group to Fatah Al-Islam. According to Qassem Qassir, Syria has 'something to do with them [Fatah Al-Islam] but not everything to do with them' (Gambill, 2009: 146-147; *MER*, 26 May, 2007: 11-12; 9 June, 2007: 13; 30 June, 2007: 8; 7 July, 2007: 11-12; 16 December, 2007: 9-10).

[479] From September until November 2007, a committee chaired by Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and consisting of the four main Christian leaders – Michel Aoun, Sulayman Franjiyeh, Samir Geagea and Amine Gemayel – discussed options before submitting a list of 12 names. Although Michel Aoun was adamant on becoming president, strict 14 March obstacles to this scenario led to Michel Sulayman, Commander in Chief of the LAF, and Riad Salameh, the Governor of Lebanon's Central Bank, emerging as the two favourites (Pakradouni, 2012: 340; *MER*, 25 August, 2007: 8; 17 November, 2007: 2).

[480] The five-point plan stated: 1) the FPM leader would suggest a presidential candidate from outside his party; 2) Sa'ad Hariri would appoint a premier from outside the Future Movement; 3) the National Government would be split 55/45 in favour of 14 march with

of amplified pressure on 14 March following the assassinations of General Francois al-Hajj on 12 December 2007, widely identified as a replacement for General Sulayman, and Captain Wissam Eid on 25 January 2008, an ISF communications officer responsible for investigating Hariri's killing, Sa'ad Hariri rejected Michel Aoun's proposal and refused to acquiesce to the opposition's demand for veto power (Norton, 2007a: 167; Harris, 2009b: 78)[481]. Aggravating the vacuum, Speaker Nabih Berri postponed any potential vote until 8 March received a favourable deal[482].

Despite detaching itself from the intricacies of these negotiations, Hizbullah proceeded on its rhetorical berating of 14 March with MP Husayn Hajj Hassan prophetically announcing that 'you want to monopolise authority and you think the Americans can protect you. You will soon know that you are mistaken' (*MER*, 5 January, 2008: 3). After the culmination of a series of security developments, including the intermittent assassinations of political officials, the killing of the reclusive head of Hizbullah's Jihad Council Imad Mugniyeh in Damascus on 12 February 2008 and the deployment later that month of the USS Cole to the Mediterranean to deter Syria against intervening in Lebanon, the internalised logic of practice in the *PF*, which had resulted in an eight month hiatus, was in danger of being directly infiltrated by the practical logic of the *MSF*[483].

By the beginning of May 2008, Hizbullah was embroiled in an acerbic exchange with Minister of Telecommunications Marwan Hamadeh over the existence of its independent communications network that connected Beirut, South Lebanon and the Biqa' Valley (Harris, 2009b: 78). In particular, Hizbullah was accused of installing this sophisticated system for monitoring the activity of government officials and businessmen using Runway 17 at Beirut Airport (*MER*, 3 May, 2008: 2). After an inquiry confirmed that Hizbullah was running a privatised network separate from state control in breach of Lebanon's sovereignty, the government removed Director of Airport Security Brigadier General Wafiq Shuqayr for permitting the installation of illegal surveillance equipment and sharing confidential information with Hizbullah (ICG, 2008: 3). In response, Sayyid Nasrallah, declaring that its clandestine

each camp appointed two major cabinet posts each; 4) the *caza* system would be adopted as part of a new election law; 5) General Sulayman would remain as Commander in Chief of the LAF (Pakradouni, 2012: 341).

[481] Concerning the composition of a national unity government, 14 March was willing to offer a 15-5-10 split. Other proposed combinations included a 10-10-10 equal split and a 13-7-10 division (*MER*, 3 January, 2008: 26).

[482] From September 2007 until May 2008, Berri postponed the parliamentary vote on the president 19 times (Norton, 2007a: 169).

[483] It is widely believed that Mugniyeh was assassinated during a coordinated CIA-Mossad operation. At his funeral, Sayyid Nasrallah revealed for the first time that Jawad Nur al-Din and Hajj Radwan were aliases for Mugniyeh (*MER*, 23 February, 2008: 2). Although Mugniyeh's replacement was kept anonymous during Hizbullah's 8th Conclave in 2009, Israeli sources note that Hossein Mahadavi, an Iranian Quds Force commander had assumed responsibility for Mugniyeh's duties (Gleis & Berti, 2012: 64-66). Other names include Fuad Shakar, who Mugniyeh replaced in 2001; Mustapha Badr al-Din, Mugniyeh's brother-in-law; and Talal Hamiyeh, who served with Mugniyeh in the PLO and IJO.

communication centre was invaluable in its fight against Israel, vowed to 'cut any hand that extends to touch the arms of the Resistance' (*MER*, 10 May, 2008: 8). Consequently, with the LAF supposedly striking a deal to desist from intervening, the Islamic Resistance launched Operation Smashing the Balance on 8 and 9 May, an offensive that blocked entry points into Beirut, seized media buildings owned by the Future Movement and secured the residences of 14 March leaders Sa'ad Hariri and Walid Jumblatt (Alagha, 2011: 143)[484]. On 14 May, as the Islamic Resistance returned positions back to the LAF, an estimated 70 people had been killed. While Marwan Hamadeh commented that Lebanon was witnessing 'the encroachment of Hizbullah's mini-state', Abdel Rahman Rashid wrote that 'the opposition has now become naked and Hizbullah's identity disclosed – it is a confessional, aggressive and foreign-backed militia' (*MER*, 10 May, 2008: 7; 17 May, 2008: 8).

Hizbullah's blitzkrieg of Beirut had three immediate consequences. Primarily, 'the message was delivered. Don't fuck around with us'[485]. Although thwarted in the Chouf, the Islamic Resistance, which deliberately targeted 14 March assets as opposed to symbolic government buildings, was clinical in its operational precision, mobilising only 50 experienced men to supervise strategically important locations while delegating the groundwork to Amal and the SSNP, two allies with a considerable presence in central Beirut (Zisser, 2009: 171-172)[486]. Secondly, and controversially, Defence Minister Elias Murr admitted that while Hizbullah's Operation Smashing the Balance was objectionable, there was consensus both in Lebanon's *PF* and outside that something needed to break the political deadlock[487]. Thirdly, and arguably most critically, Hizbullah's *OF* had demonstrated that bereft of the recognised *capital* required to effectively enhance its position in the *PF*, the Islamic Resistance would not hesitate to overcompensate by unilaterally transposing or imposing the legitimate status of its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to coercively facilitate endogenous change within the structured logic of practice in the *PF*.

This audacious move, which could be viewed as the second instance of Hizbullah's *allodoxia* in as many years, led to the signing of the Doha Accord under the auspices of Emir Shaykh Hamad al-Thani on 21 May, in which 14 March maintained its majority in a national unity government but the 8 March received its one third plus

[484] In a decision that caused the resignation of prominent Sunni officers, General Sulayman said that the 70,000-strong LAF (60% Shi'i) wanted to 'avoid deeper divisions on the domestic front and to preserve social peace' (*MER*, 24 May, 2008: 9). The Islamic Resistance also attempted to connect Shi'i villages in the South to Beirut by targeting the Chouf Mountains (Badran, 2009b: 54).
[485] Interview with Timur Goksel in Beirut, 9 May 2012.
[486] Jumblatt struck a deal with his Druze rival, Talal Arslan, in order to repel the Islamic Resistance from the Chouf (Badran, 2009: 55).
[487] Interview with Elias Hanna (Beirut, 7 August, 2012).

one veto power, enabling it to prevent the government from pursuing policies that threatened to enforce the international tribunal or regulate Hizbullah's weapons[488]. On 25 May, Michel Sulayman officially became the President of Lebanon. Ultimately, the Doha Accord institutionalised the repositioning that had transpired amongst actors in the *PF* since Ta'if. However, for Husayn al-Husayni, unlike the principle of cross-sectarian coalitions enshrined in the Syria-imposed *orthodoxy* of the Ta'if Accord, the Doha Accord 'did not give candidates not belonging to the prominent political force in their sect a chance to win', leading to 'the collapse of the known political system' (*MER*, 25 October, 2008: 7). While this process exacerbated political polarisation in Lebanon, and although the entrenched *doxa* of the *PF* prevented any party from possessing an outright majority, Hizbullah, with the assistance of its 8 March allies, was elevated to an enhanced position from which it could propagate its interpretation of *orthodox* practice to instrumentally contribute to the redesigning of the predominant governing parameters of *orthodoxy* in the *PF*. Typifying this influence, Hizbullah's weapons became normalised into Lebanon's national defence strategy with the cabinet statement proclaiming 'the right of Lebanon, its people, arms and Resistance to liberate or restore the Sheba Farms and Kfar Shouba hills as well as the occupied part of Ghajar, and the right to defend Lebanon against any aggression and protect its waters' (*MER*, 2 August, 2008: 2)[489].

7.3 Serving at the Pleasure of the Resistance

As explained above, between 2000 and 2010, Hizbullah's *OF* was primarily focused on instituting two complementary processes: firstly, adapting to Israel's withdrawal by adjusting its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to preserve the predominant status of its prevailing *orthodoxy*; and secondly, the active transference of symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* to compensate for Hizbullah's *heterodox* values of *capital* in the *PF* following the forced retreat of its guarantor in 2005. However, neither of these developments would have been possible without the commensurate cultivation of its Resistance *habitus* in the third sphere of activity, namely the *SMF*. By not only providing a pool of prospective recruits for the Islamic Resistance, but also ensuring Hizbullah's performance in the polls, the mobilisation of the *SMF* was the most significant *sine qua non* driver for both inter-*field* homology and the instigation of change. While

[488] In Doha, both alliances agreed to vote in Michel Sulayman as president. The composition of the national unity government would be a 16:11:3 split with parties also agreeing to implement the 1960 *caza* system into the Election Law. Furthermore, the Accord stipulated that 'the state will have the exclusive authority to ensure the security of the country and its citizens in a manner that maintains common living and social peace for all Lebanese and residents on Lebanese soil' (*MER*, 24 May, 2008: 8).

[489] President Sulayman announced that the army and the state must capitalise 'on the capacities of the Resistance' whereas Michel Aoun acknowledged that the Islamic Resistance was legitimate until Israel withdrew from the Sheba Farms (*MER*, 31 May, 2008: 17-18; 22 November, 2008: 8).

regulated by inscribed perceptions and dispositions, the practice of agents within the *SMF* is not structured to the point of remaining stagnant. Rather than act as passive receptacles, these actors are embedded in a mutually constitutive negotiation with their contextual environment.

By 2000, the landscape and composition of the Shi'i within the *SMF* was altering. Testament to two decades of social welfare and capacity building, Hizbullah's constituents were more educated, empowered and expressive. Subsequently, this Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*, which had been nurtured and nourished by Israeli occupation, would ultimately bestow Hizbullah with the legitimacy to sustain the Islamic Resistance after 2000 as well as endorse the encroachment of the *MSF* onto the *PF* in 2006 and 2008. While an increasingly self-conscious community may have posed a challenge to Hizbullah's symbolic *capital*, diversified and dependent constituencies presented Hizbullah's *OF* with the opportunity to revise its mobilisational framing and practices in ways that resonated, realigned and redirected its *SMF* counterparts into generating collectively compliant action. Invoking Bourdieu's axiom that all *fields* are competitive struggles over culture, Hizbullah's *OF* objective was to reconcile and reinforce its post-2000 Resistance narrative into the pre-existing structured practice of its corresponding *habitus* in the *SMF*.

Conventionally, the characteristics and motivations of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* have been viewed through a unitary lens. As evidenced by the initial phases of its evolution in Lebanon, Hizbullah's holistic framework of 'Islamic Resistance' appealed to a Shi'i community that was economically deprived, socially dislocated and politically marginalised. Consequently, the prevalent perception was that Hizbullah exclusively represented the highly pious Shi'i underclass. Problematising this assumption, scholars examining Shi'i constituencies after the civil war posited that Hizbullah derived a significant proportion of its support from the Shi'i middle class as well as Shi'i who identified with low levels of religiosity, a conclusion questioning the view that socio-economic issues and religious predispositions featured highly as the predominant trends illustrating Hizbullah's attraction to the Shi'i community (Harik, 1996, 2005; Hamzeh, 1997, 2004; Norton, 2000).

Since Israel's withdrawal, the debate over the relative categorisation of Hizbullah's constituencies resurfaced. In their review detailing the backgrounds of 129 Hizbullahis killed in action, Krueger and Maleckova (2002: 27-34) discovered that participants were more educated and less impoverished than the average Lebanese

citizen. Contrarily, in his 2003 study of 256 respondents exploring the origins of Hizbullah's support, Haddad (2006: 21-34) argued that 'destitution, illiteracy, intense dissatisfaction, and high religiosity correlate positively with favorable attitudes vis-à-vis political attachment to Hezbollah'. Contradicting these results, a cross-confessional poll of 983 respondents conducted by Hanf (2003: 197-228) found that only 22% of people considered religion important while 80% cited non-religious indicators as more relevant with two-thirds of the survey revealing that economic cleavages were more divisive than differences of identity[490]. Based on this empirical and quantified evidence, Hizbullah's post-2000 constituencies were either estranged from their Lebanese counterparts or the source of Hizbullah's support belies reductionist attempts that disregard its eclectic components.

Rather than a case of incompatible dichotomies, namely high versus low religiosity or economic destitution versus relative affluence, the phenomenon of Hizbullah's support is one of compatible distinctions. While it is an anathema to inspect Hizbullah's evolution through a linear lens, it is also a methodological fallacy to expect Hizbullah's adherents to have remained static. Although the Shi'i activism espoused by Hizbullah initially targeted a homogenous subsection of downtrodden Shi'i seeking a conduit to articulate their grievances, the opportunities provided by Hizbullah's considerable investments in the community enabled each agent to accumulate new forms of legitimate *capital* in the *SMF* thereby altering their perceptions and dispositions of the contextual environment within the structuring parameters of a Resistance *habitus*. Therefore, while solidaristic in practice and identity, Hizbullah agents possess different attitudes and abilities that render their developments within the *SMF* uneven. As Hizbullah enhances its stature and expands its influence in legitimating *capital*, the space for distinction between Resistance *habiti* in the *SMF* widens. Increasingly, Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* becomes heterogeneous in position and disposition with the degree of institutionalisation broadly distinguishable between ideologues, instrumentalists and pragmatists.

Firstly, ideologues have been fully inducted and inculcated into Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance. Independent of relational dynamics and context, ideologues are stringently loyal to Hizbullah's principles and practice. Secondly, instrumentalists, while not fully subscribing to Hizbullah's interpretation of Shi'i religious framing or

[490] According to a similar survey in October 2005, 34% of respondents claimed not to identify with their confession (Farha, 2009: 91).

military activity, recognise the importance of conforming to the predominant strictures of confessional mobilisation in the *SMF*. These Shi'i agents, who benefit socially and economically from Hizbullah's elevated political prestige, its patronage systems and its sophisticated network of social services, strategically perceive their individual prosperity to be inextricably linked to a collective propensity that privileges Hizbullah's Shi'i narrative. Thirdly, Shi'i pragmatists purely classify themselves in association with Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* as the most convenient way of managing the processes of daily practice. For this grouping, although Hizbullah represents a leading voice for the Shi'i in Lebanon, it remains secondary to familial or tribal ties. Unlike the stratifications alluded to in the surveys, these dynamic combinations are not delineated or compartmentalised by socio-economic or religious indices. Conversely, by 2000, a wealthy ideologue of low religiosity and a destitute instrumentalist or pragmatist of high religiosity may coalesce under Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*.

Since Hizbullah had portrayed the Resistance as antithetical to Israel, the first challenge for Hizbullah's *OF* in a post-2000 epoch was the emergence of a young Shi'i demographic within its Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*. Rather than display the insecure dispositions of previous generations, this educated segment of Shi'i society, raised on the revolutionary revised narrative of piety, pride and practice, imagined a reconstitution of Resistance towards a modern, post-occupation period. In particular, this entailed 'the expansion of a Shi'i market base that demands access to leisure activities that do not violate certain moral norms' (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 14; 2007: 4). For Hizbullah's *OF*, while conventional methods of community mobilisation through religious centres, social services, media outlets and organised public commemorations were effective, they were inadequate forms of cultural production in maintaining its Resistance *habitus* within a rapidly modernising context. As emphasised by Hizbullah MP Mohammad Fneish, 'the ability of Islamic groups to retain their party faithful is largely dependent on their willingness to adapt to the socio-political context within which they operate and their effectiveness in dealing with the challenges arising from it' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 307). Therefore, to prevent gaps forming 'between the daily practice of its sympathizers and its discourse' (Avon & Khatchadourian, 2012: 163), Hizbullah's *OF* developed new techniques that not only aimed to satisfy the expectations of a proliferating demographic, but also simultaneously reinforce its monopolisation of space where Hizbullah's cultural *capital* would be repeatedly consumed, legitimated and reproduced by its structuring Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*.

Firstly, while unable to dictate the appetite for leisure and entertainment markets in *al-dahiyeh*, Hizbullah's *OF* involved itself in commercial ventures to ensure that these projects observed and were integrated into the area's intrinsically Hizbullah-regulated aesthetic (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 15)[491]. Moreover, adjusting to a technologically aware and articulate audience, Hizbullah's *OF* not only revamped programmes on *Al-Manar*, but also digitalised the semiotic projection of its messaging through the Lebanese Association for the Arts (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 17)[492]. Secondly, Hizbullah's *OF* capitalised on the entrenched inter-subjective understandings of Resistance in the *SMF* to elevate and enshrine its legacy in the annals of Lebanese history. Discarding post-2000 pretentions of its obsolete obscurity, the Islamic Resistance would be immortalised as a perpetual struggle over oppression that required perennial mobilisation. This cultural (re)production of Hizbullah's symbolic historical narrative of Resistance and its appropriation of collective memory was particularly evident with the opening of museums, especially the private *shuhada* commemorations, the *Rijalat Al-Majd* exhibition for Hizbullah's 1,281 martyrs in *al-dahiyeh* and the public restoration of the Israeli prison at Khiyam, as well as the establishment of the Cultural Centre of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Beirut (Danawi, 2002: 25-39; Deeb, 2008: 372-386; Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2008: 158-198)[493].

Despite encountering a period of transition, Hizbullah's *OF* was able to address and adapt to trends that impacted its Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*. Due to the multi-faceted structure and composition of the *SMF*, Hizbullah could not exercise symbolic *power*, a state in which the perceptions and dispositions of its agents resulted in the replication of a legitimately holistic apparatus of programmatically compliant practice. Nevertheless, after two decades of *capital* identification, accumulation and transference, Hizbullah's *OF* had achieved symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community, a status in which the acquisition and currency of *capital*, whether social, cultural or economic, produced a recognised expression of *orthodox* practice. Whether institutionalised via conviction, compulsion or coercion, its exemplary performance in the 2004 municipality elections demonstrated that Hizbullah's

[491] Whether demonstrated by the Al-Imna' Group's proposal to build an amusement park or plans to open U.S.-based commercial chains, 'even when not directly party-driven or controlled, sites incorporated into the Islamic milieu often work to consolidate Hizbullah's constituencies' (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 15).
[492] This group hired professional designers, graphic artists and advertising experts to produce exhibits and media commemorating political and religious events (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 17).
[493] The *shuhada* museums, which were placed in the converted apartments of Hizbullah fighters, intended to promote sympathy and solidarity with the martyr and his family. Visitors were exposed to military and social pictures of the deceased, quotes from the Qur'an, personal messages to his family and videos showing the martyr profess the voluntary motives behind his sacrifice as well as broadcasting the mission in which he perished (Danawi, 2002: 25-39). In Khiyam, where Israel had incarcerated around 5,000 Lebanese, Hizbullah's museum aimed to appropriate the cultural rights to the site while creating an association of legitimacy between the Islamic Resistance and the Israeli occupation. The Islamic Cultural Centre was formed to propagate the historical consistency and convergence between Iran and Lebanon, focusing on shared religious identity and solidarity.

extensive social services and the cultural (re)production of its narrative amounted to hegemonic authority over its constituencies[494].

The second challenge confronting Hizbullah's *OF* post-2000 was the devastating humanitarian and economic toll incurred during the July 2006 War, which evoked a critical response from a Lebanese public that accused Hizbullah of deliberately rousing a bellicose response from Israel. According to an *Al-Arabiyah* survey in January 2007, Hizbullah's national popularity plummeted from 74% to 54% with 53% of respondents blaming Hizbullah for provoking the conflict (Alagha, 2011: 132). However, since the July War disproportionately affected the lives and livelihoods of Hizbullah's constituencies, the magnitude of Israel's aggression and its resulting repercussions threatened to rupture the cohesion between the framing disseminated by Hizbullah's *OF* and the digestion of this narrative within its corresponding Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*.

For Lob (2014: 2), the events of 2006 showed that 'a crack in Hizbullah's edifice had appeared as the organisations encountered the first serious blow to its popular support'. Conversely, a survey conducted by Abdo Saad in 2006 reported that 95% of the Shi'i population remained supportive of Hizbullah's Resistance (Malthaner, 2011: 219)[495]. While this 'crack' may have been detectable on the surface in the aftermath of 2006, a combination of Hizbullah's pre-existing modalities for mobilising and regulating agents in the *SMF*, as well as its adeptness to adapt, customise and modernise, effectively prevented this crack from morphing into a substantial crevice. In particular, Hizbullah's *OF* focused on deploying and augmenting its *capital* within the *SMF* to further incubate and inculcate its Resistance *habitus* by mobilising its network of social welfare institutions to reconstruct damaged constituencies, monopolising public space to form an indelible link between physical nature and symbolic Resistance as well as developing the cult of Sayyid Nasrallah, a Shi'i leader personifying the epicentre of the Resistance against Israel.

Firstly, through its social services, Hizbullah's *OF* had invested significant resources in instilling and institutionalising its Resistance *habitus*. Overall, these public programmes performed multiple and concurrent functions. Not only was Hizbullah abiding by an Islamic obligation to empower its community, but this daily practice

[494] Hizbullah, which won 120 of 900 municipalities in Lebanon, managed to further eclipse Amal. In Beirut, Hizbullah won 98 to Amal's 10; in South Lebanon, Hizbullah won 87 to Amal's 55; and in the Biqa', Hizbullah won 36 to Amal's 21 (Harb, 2011: 134; Hamzeh, 2004: 132-135; Alagha, 2006: 55-56).
[495] Considering that Abdo Saad is a pro-Hizbullah pollster, it is likely that the survey was methodologically and politically partial.

also repeatedly inscribed agents with a holistic Resistance framework that ensured political support at the ballot box, consolidated the reproduction of Resistance dispositions through the routinisation of sacred or mundane rituals and acted as a public monitoring mechanism to deter dissension or defection. Consequently, after 2006, Hizbullah could rely on the influence of extant, established and entrenched practices within the *SMF*. Testament to the scale and scope of its influence, Hizbullah was reportedly the second highest employer in Lebanon after the government, providing salaries for approximately 35,000 families (Nir, 2009: 184).

The Council for Development and Reconstruction calculated that the July War had cost Lebanon $7 billion in economic losses and $3.6 billion in direct damages to civilian infrastructure (Al-Harithy, 2010a: 3)[496]. Moreover, *Al-Hayat* reported that around 85% of the destruction caused by Israel had centred on the predominantly Shi'i southern suburbs and South Lebanon (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 98)[497]. Cognisant of the inevitable politicisation of reconstruction, Israeli General Yossi Kuperwasser implored the international community to act before Hizbullah and Iran could capitalise on the situation (*MER*, 26 August, 2006: 14). Heeding this warning on 31 August, around $1.8 billion was raised for humanitarian aid at the Stockholm Conference with Prime Minister Siniora pledging $33,000 to each family whose home was destroyed (Fattah & Kolb, 2006: 106). However, following a speech from Sayyid Nasrallah the day after the ceasefire outlining Hizbullah's policies for addressing reconstruction, Hizbullah's *OF* had already employed its extensive economic and social *capital* to swiftly deposit funds and access affected communities through Jihad Al-Bina (Harb & Fawwaz, 2010: 24). Within the first weeks, and with financial assistance from Iran, Hizbullah spent between $300-$400 million on compensation and rehabilitation projects, issuing $12,000 to those who had lost their homes and $10,000 to those whose homes were damaged (Flanagan & Abdel-Samad, 2011; Blanford, 2011: 413; ICG, 2007: 20)[498]. As summarised by one beneficiary, 'the Lebanese state takes three months to bring help. The UN takes three years. Hizbullah is there the next day'[499]. Accordingly, not only had Hizbullah reassured the cross-section of its *SMF* agents by honouring, activating and delivering upon its pledge, but it had also recorded a significant political victory in undermining the Lebanese state's ability to provide.

[496] The $7 billion amounted to approximately 30% of GDP, a staggering total considering that Lebanon already had a debt burden that stood at 180% of GDP. The $3.6 billion included the destruction of 125,000 housing units, 612 schools, 97 bridges and 850 commercial enterprises (Al-Harithy, 2010a: 3).
[497] *Al-dahiyeh* ($876m); Bint Jubayl ($552m); and Marjeyoun ($362m) (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 98).
[498] Aside from Hizbullah's disposable income, Iran apparently transferred $150 million to Hizbullah immediately after the ceasefire and was willing to supply Hizbullah with an 'unlimited budget' for reconstruction programmes (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 105).
[499] This quote originally appeared in a *Boston Globe* article by Thanassis Cambanis on 19 August (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 107).

Secondly, continuing with its engagement in cultural (re)production, Hizbullah's *OF* embarked upon a reconstruction effort that imbued the Resistance footprint not only in its adornment and manipulation of space, but also in the design of the physical landscape[500]. During the 2006 War, 4,000 Israeli airstrikes targeted *al-dahiyeh*, mostly around Hizbullah's 'security quadrant' in Haret Hurayk, an act of 'urbicide' that destroyed 1,232 residential buildings that housed approximately 30,000 people (Alamuddin, 2010: 46; Harb & Fawaz, 2010: 21). In response, Sayyid Nasrallah issued a promise (*wa'd*) to make *al-dahiyeh* 'more beautiful than it was' (Harb & Fawaz, 2010: 24). The Wa'd Project, planned by Hizbullah-affiliated institutions, such as Jihad Al-Bina and the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), was broadcast broadly via the Lebanese Association for Arts (Harb, 2011: 141-145). Although residents, aside from those in Haret Hurayk, had the option of delegating reconstruction responsibility to Hizbullah, 'the government was funding Wa'd through its compensation for dwellers and Wa'd's operations were mostly financed by the government's compensation payments to the dwellers' (Harb &Fawaz, 2010: 29)[501].

While both the government and Hizbullah's *OF* acknowledged the struggle for symbolic *capital* within the *SMF*, the latter's pre-existing presence and control in *al-dahiyeh* enabled it to benefit disproportionately from the process. Although funded through state channels, Hizbullah not only exercised exclusive rights over the selection of private enterprises to invest in and implement proposals, but also dictated the appearance of the reconstruction effort. Considering that the population of *al-dahiyeh* had bloated from 100,000 in 1975 to 750,000 after 2006, Hizbullah's urban landscaping, which was framed as the social solution for confronting Israel's attempts to eliminate the Resistance, exchanged its economic and social *capital* into cultural *capital*, a transformation that significantly augmented the legitimacy of its symbolic *capital* amongst the Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*[502]. This reconstruction method was also duplicated in other strategic sites of Resistance, such as Bint Jubayl in South Lebanon (Al-Harithy, 2010b: 70-99)[503].

[500] The acknowledgement and importance of this exercise in legitimation was demonstrated in 2007. In what Deeb (2008: 395) referred to as 'cultural erasure', Israel destroyed Hizbullah's museum in Khiyam along with 20 publishing houses and research institutes.

[501] Due to the importance of the area to Hizbullah, residents in *al-dahiyeh* received more generous compensation packages with $55,000 provided for those whose houses had been destroyed while $30,000 was offered for partially damaged homes. Nevertheless, since the area was disproportionately impacted by Israeli attacks, other state bodies, such as the Council of the South, the Ministry of the Displaced, the Central Fund of the Displaced and the Council of Development and Reconstruction, also vied for influence by contributing to compensation efforts in *al-dahiyeh* (Harb & Fawwaz, 2010: 27-28). As traditionally mixed area of Haret Hurayk was home to Hizbullah's 'security quadrant', Hizbullah circumnavigated local government to ensure that the main organs of the Islamic Resistance remained clandestine.

[502] The population figures for *al-dahiyeh* were cited in *MER*, 26 November, 2009. For Harb (2011: 148), the Hizbullah-*al-dahiyeh* link operates 'as a cognitive framework nourishing a collective Shi'i consciousness and generating a feeling of pride and self-worth'.

[503] Due to its geographical position, and since it was the location of a major battle with Israel in 2006, Bint Jubayl was of vital symbolic relevance for Hizbullah. Reconstruction efforts focused on Hizbullah's attempts to rebrand its identity and instil a collective memory that perceived the city as the frontline of the Resistance (Al-Harithy, 2010b: 70-99).

Furthermore, as demonstrated in Mleeta, a large outdoor museum managed by the Association for Reviving Resistance Heritage (ARRH), Hizbullah's *OF* also conceived cultural (re)production initiatives that intended to connect and engrain the Islamic Resistance into the fabric of Lebanon's natural landscape[504]. Opened in 2010 with the slogan, 'where the land speaks to the heavens', the site seeks to solidify a dialectic in which Mleeta, previously one of Hizbullah's main hubs of Resistance against Israeli occupation, is naturalised and legitimised by divine providence. Located at the summit of a hill with views over the fertile planes of South Lebanon, visitors are directed through a labyrinth of spaces that reveal the daily practice of a Hizbullah fighter in the field, from trails, tunnels, bunkers, and arms caches to displays of captured Israeli military equipment[505]. For the purpose of framing the site's relevance, visitors are welcomed by an introductory video narrated by Sayyid Nasrallah that supplants historical facts with Hizbullah's Resistance narrative[506]. By doing so, Mleeta, which received nearly half a million visitors in the first three months, 'can control people by narrating a specific heritage and memory…As these values merge [Islamic Resistance and culture], they become one with a singular conceptualisation of "culture" within which there appears to be very little room for negotiation' (Mleeta architect cited in Harb & Deeb, 2011: 29). For a Hizbullah supporter, by visualising the transcendental metamorphosis of Resistance practice through imagery and iconography, Mleeta reaffirms identity, reinforces purpose and reinvigorates pride in connecting them to the glorified sacrifice of the Islamic Resistance, which in turn, confirms and cements the *illusio* of their Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*.

Thirdly, in Sayyid Nasrallah, Hizbullah possesses a charismatic leader of Weberian proportions. Equipped with military acumen, religious credentials, political nous and oratory skills, Sayyid Nasrallah is the embodiment of the modern Shi'i activist. Consequently, the Hizbullah leader is not only revered by his supporters, but he is also respected by his adversaries. Although appointed Secretary General in 1992, Sayyid Nasrallah was propelled into the limelight in 1997 following the death of his son, Hadi, during a Hizbullah operation against Israel. Since then, 'Abu Hadi' has been admired throughout the region both within and outside the Shi'i community. While the Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll of 2008 listed Sayyid Nasrallah as the most popular leader in the region with an exponential rise from 14% in 2006 to 26% in

[504] The ARRH is also responsible for the Khiyam museum, the memorial garden in Maroun Al-Ra's in South Lebanon, the memorial museum in the Biqa' commemorating Shaykh Abbas Moussawi and the Resistance museum in *al-dahiyeh* (Harb & Deeb, 2011: 17).
[505] A detailed blueprint and discussion of Mleeta, including the 'Exhibition', 'Abyss', 'Path', 'Cave', 'Liberation Field' and 'Martyrs Hill', is provided by Mona Harb and Lara Deeb (2011: 22-24).
[506] One notable example is the lack of reference to other Lebanese groups that pioneered the Resistance against Israel while Hizbullah was in its infancy. As demonstrated with the commemorative plaque of 'Tribute to the Sons of the Resistance Martyrs', the site unsurprisingly promotes a Hizbullah-centric interpretation of historical Resistance against Israel.

2008, the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre ranked the Hizbullah leader as the 17th most influential Muslim leader in the world (Telhami, 2008; Esposito & Kalin, 2009). His renowned yet sporadic speeches, prepared with meticulous detail, are delivered both in public and from undisclosed locations to vast audiences. Conveyed in a linguistic style that fuses classical and colloquial Arabic to not only demonstrate his credibility as a statesman, but also his connection to the Shi'i street, Hizbullahis emphasise his honesty, integrity and commitment to the Resistance.

While the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 enhanced his profile, Sayyid Nasrallah, whose name literally means 'victory of God, became vindicated by his promise of 'divine victory' in 2006. In December that year, when Hizbullah supporters mobilised for sustained public protests against the government, their slogan was 'Allah, Narallah w-*al-dahiyeh* kullaha' ('God, Nasrallah and the entire suburbs') (Malthaner, 2011: 91). By extension, his prophetic statements have earned him a reputation whereby his words exude a linguistic form of symbolic *power*. Whereas his virtues as a leader remind the Shi'i of the Twelve Infallible Imams, his retreat from public view, which is a precautionary measure to mitigate against the risk of assassination, has acted to reinforce an association with a lineage of martyred Shi'i icons. This elusiveness has augmented his appeal to the point where, similar to his Shi'i forbearers and conforming to the ritual practice of the tradition, Sayyid Nasrallah is on a path to apotheosis. On the rare occasions when he publicly emerges, he is mobbed by crowds frequently interrupting his speeches by chanting in frenzied unison: 'labayka ya Nasrallah' ('At your wish, Nasrallah'). Consequently, Sayyid Nasrallah is the conduit through which the Shi'i visualise, express and channel their support for Hizbullah. As proclaimed by one supporter in 2006, 'Sayyid Hassan is our state. This war may not be over, but we are not afraid. The Sayyid will protect us'[507]. His words are compliantly obeyed, his image decorates Hizbullah households as well as communities and his name resounds in songs, 'you are our sensitivity, you help us touch and help us feel, you are our only medicine, you cure us and help us heal'[508]. As the personification of Hizbullah, Sayyid Nasrallah is an invaluable source of symbolic *capital* in the *SMF*.

Following the developments of 2006 in the *MSF*, and through its strategic deployment of *capital* and multi-faceted activities in the *SMF*, Hizbullah's *OF* successfully reconnected the two fields in synchronised synergy. By 2008, in mobilising tens of

[507] This quote is extracted from a *New York Times* article by John Kifner on 16 August 2006 (Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 109).
[508] These lines are taken from a 'Wa'd' ('promise') song about Sayyid Nasrallah (Cambanis, 2010: 197).

thousands of people for two years of sustained protest against the government before launching an armed assault on Beirut, Hizbullah's *OF*, with limited instances of internal discord, enlisted its symbolic capital in both fields to pressure for change in the *PF*. After the resulting Doha Agreement, Israeli General Gadi Eisenkot, warning that 'harming the population is the only means of restraining Nasrallah', disclosed the 'Dahiyeh Doctrine', a military strategy authorising the indiscriminate bombing of Lebanon in the event of an attack on Israel (*MER*, 4 October, 2008: 4-5; Hirst, 2010: 380).

Despite these threats, Hizbullah contributed 12 out of the 57 seats amalgamated by 8 March alliance in the 2009 elections. Although its proportion of seats in parliament was reminiscent of previous performances, the transformation of symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* into social *capital* in the *PF* resulted in a Hizbullah-led 8 March alliance that not only comprised around 45% of the Chamber of Deputies, but also allegedly carried 55% of the popular vote, 130,000 more than its 14 March rivals who received 71 seats (Cambanis, 2010: 286) [509]. While reiterating the disparity between the 'parliamentary majority' and the 'popular majority' in Lebanon, Sayyid Nasrallah accepted the results but insisted on a national unity government that enshrined the concept of 'consensus democracy'. After five months of political manoeuvring, 8 March gained one-third of cabinet posts in Prime Minister Sa'ad Hariri's government on 7 November 2009, an administration Emile Khoury referred to as the 'Third Republic' (*MER*, 14 November, 2009: 7-9)[510].

Conclusion

After a decade of recurring episodes of *hysteresis* in Lebanon, the end of 2009 signified a brief moment of catharsis as Hizbullah's *OF* had strategically managed its *capital* to reposition its Resistance *habitus* both within and between the *MSF*, *SMF* and *PF*. In this context, and 24 years after its original 'Open Letter', Hizbullah delivered its 32-page 'Political Manifesto' on 30 November, 2009[511]. Projected to an audience at Jinen Hall in *al-dahiyeh*, Sayyid Nasrallah appeared on screen proclaiming Hizbullah's rebranded framing from 'Islamism' and political revisionism to

[509] Out of the 128 seats in five major electoral districts nationwide, 8 March had won 2/19 in Beirut, 10/23 in the Biqa', 21/35 in Mount Lebanon, 3/28 in North Lebanon and 21/23 in South Lebanon (*MER*, 13 June, 2009: 14-18).
[510] After onerous negotiations, the agreed composition of the national unity government was a 15 (majority), 10 (opposition) and 5 (president appointees) split with the opposition requiring a 10+1 combination to veto legislation. Hizbullah were allocated the Agriculture and Administrative Development ministries (*MER*, 14 November, 2009).
[511] In 1994, following Hizbullah's induction into politics, and in 2002, after Israel's withdrawal, Hizbullah officials intimated that the Party would be updating the 1985 Open Letter but the process was delayed due to contextual complications and the need for internal discretion (Alagha, 2011: 163).

'Lebanonisation' and political pragmatism'[512]. Reflecting its maturity, the Hizbullah leader stated that 'people evolve. The whole world has changed over the past 24 years. Lebanon changed'[513]. However, by identifying with the Resistance, Syria, Iran and Palestinian rights while chastising U.S. hegemony and Israeli belligerence, Hizbullah's *OF* confirmed its unwavering loyalty to revisionist *heterodoxy* in the *FIP*. Moreover, by promoting a national defence strategy that staunchly justified the sanctity of its weapons, Hizbullah continued to refuse any flexibility in the *PF* regarding the 'red-line' status of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. Therefore, Sayyid Nasrallah's interpretation of change was not informed by Hizbullah's acceptance of *orthodoxy* in Lebanon's *PF* but by Hizbullah's ability to utilise the transference of symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* in altering the *orthodoxy* of the *PF*. Consequently, the 2009 cabinet statement, which was released days after Sayyid Nasrallah's speech, accentuated 'the right of Lebanon, its people, its army, and its Resistance to liberate the occupied Lebanese territory in Sheba and Kfar Shouba hills'.

From a mainstream SMT perspective, whether through necessity or conviction, Hizbullah's gradual politicisation and the subsequent decision to reframe its focus from Islamic governance to 'consensus democracy' represented an objective opportunity enabling the Party to safeguard its interests while ensuring its preservation by inducting and sustaining the mobilisation of the Resistance within the pre-existing structures of Lebanon's political institutions. Nevertheless, by prioritising the relational dialectic of perceived opportunities between Hizbullah's *OF* and Lebanon's *PF*, this framework neglects to acknowledge the dynamic and diversified mobilising modalities employed by Hizbullah's *OF* beyond the political process in harmonising its Resistance *habitus* within the *SMF* and *MSF* as well as in maintaining a balance of synergy between its operational spheres of practice. By applying a Bourdieu-SMT approach, the continuous and complex constitution juxtaposing the strategic decisions of Hizbullah's *OF* between 2000 and 2010 in relation to its endogenous and exogenous contexts can be more effectively explained.

Following Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizbullah's *OF* was preoccupied with retaining and realigning its symbolic *capital* within and between the *MSF* and *SMF* while relying exclusively on Syria to protect the Islamic Resistance in the *PF*, a sphere Hizbullah's *OF* actively sought to avoid as it was predisposed to perceive delicately

[512] The 'Political Manifesto' was published just after Hizbullah's 8th Conclave. The Party's 7-member *majlis al-shura* remained largely unchanged aside from Muhammad Ra'ad's position as head of the Parliamentary Council, an addition that potentially reflected Hizbullah's increasingly political activities on account of the 8 March alliance. Additionally, following the assassination of Imad Mugniyeh, the eighth member and head of the Jihad Council remained anonymous.
[513] Extract from Ladki (2009).

woven political processes in Lebanon as characterised by the toxic and corrupt practices of elite sectarianism, state bureaucracy, chronic kleptocracy, familial patronage and foreign meddling. However, after fissures within *Pax Syriana* culminating in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 and the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, Hizbullah's *OF* was devoid of Syrian protection and surrounded by impending domestic threats.

Cognisant of the freedom of movement opportunities entailed with the shattering of *al-saqf al-suri* yet aware of the precedent set by Amal's politicisation, Hizbullah's *OF* conformed to a notion of 'Lebanonisation' in the *PF* that was more tangible than the 1990s but contained an irrefutable caveat of plausible deniability, a situation whereby it possessed enough of a national presence to defend the Islamic Resistance without accepting national accountability for unintended consequences. Nevertheless, following mounting pressure between 2006 and 2008 as Hizbullah's *OF* persisted in forcefully applying the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* onto the logic of the *PF*, the Party realised that preserving its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* and *SMF* while concurrently advancing its position in the *PF* demanded more sustainable solutions than either withdrawing Shi'i ministers from government in protest or directly transferring and illegitimately transposing its *orthodoxy* in the *MSF* onto the *PF*.

Consequently, Hizbullah's *OF* revised its traditional *heterodoxy* in the *PF* by adjusting its dispositions and perceptions, acquiring the sufficient forms of *capital* required to enhance its position and succumbing to the generative/regulative practice of elite sectarianism. However, by tacitly acknowledging and participating within the rules of *orthodoxy* in the *PF*, even for the purpose of guaranteeing short-term protection in the *MSF* while in the long-term pursuing a reconstitution of the prevalent *orthodoxy* of the *PF* as an active stakeholder, the endemically polarised nature of the *PF* limited the modalities through which Hizbullah's *OF* conventionally navigated around the politicisation of the *MSF* and the privatisation of the *SMF*. In other words, vying for political coverage to alleviate the Islamic Resistance inevitably entailed the burden of accountability, an expectation that risked compromising the harmonious balance of its holistic narrative. Therefore, the prospect of this enhanced engagement in the *PF* led Hizbullah's *OF* to prepare for a corresponding shift in the diversification and modernisation of mobilising tactics in the *SMF* by expanding its social services, investing in leisure activities and imprinting its cultural (re)production on public space.

Since the inception of the Islamic Resistance occurred within the structures of Lebanon's relational context, managing the opportunities for seeking protection in the *PF* was inextricably counterbalanced by the threat this level of participatory interaction posed in undermining the autonomous position of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*. Consequently, Hizbullah's *OF* was confronted with an institutionalised process of contestation in Lebanon that inherently balanced the conflictual equation between the perception of opportunities as determined by the differentiating logics of the *PF* and *MSF* with the *SMF* wedged in the middle. For example, Hizbullah insisted on occupying only two ministries in government since 2005 but 'they don't need to address this; they have the whole country'[514]. By 2009, the precise terms of the 2006 Hizbullah-FPM MOU became clear with the former delegating the day-today administrative authority to the latter, a position it could use to eclipse its Christian rivals in exchange for the FPM offering its non-Shi'i support to the former in vetoing any legislation in the *PF* that compromised the Islamic Resistance. In this way, Hizbullah's *OF* could implicitly defend the Islamic Resistance in the *PF* while explicitly concealing and exonerating itself from accusations that the Party was monopolising the functions of the *PF* to achieve this objective. However, despite the FPM possessing more parliamentary seats and cabinet posts than its ally, this arrangement was neither as equitable nor as subtle as it appeared with the broader Lebanese public aware that Hizbullah was the figurehead of the 8 March alliance.

A Bourdieu-SMT lens provides an insightful perspective for identifying and examining the efforts of Hizbullah's *OF* between 2000 and 2010 in traversing the delicate equilibrium of passively non-committal engagement in the *PF* while sustaining its symbolic *capital* in the *SMF* and *MSF.* In conclusion, Hizbullah's consistent strategic practice elicited a series of corresponding trends, conceived before 2010 but activated in 2011, that indicated the challenges of maintaining and sustaining a harmonious inter-*field* Resistance *habitus* of concurrent *orthodoxy* within the pre-existing structures of Lebanon.

Firstly, although Sayyid Nasrallah opined that the Resistance 'should be shielded from being tarnished in local political and bickering', the two are inexorably inseparable via *field* homology (*MER*, 14 July, 2009: 10). Confirming the assumptions of the broader Lebanese public, the advancement of Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *PF* was predicated on safeguarding the *orthodoxy* of its symbolic *capital* in the

[514] Interview with Alain Aoun in Beirut, 7 September 2012.

MSF. This was particularly evident on 12 January 2011 when Gebran Bassil, the FPM's Minister of Energy, announced the resignation of all ten opposition cabinet members, which was followed by the withdrawal of the independent Shi'i Minister of State Adnan Husayn, thereby activating the veto clause and enabling 8 March to collapse Sa'ad Hariri's government.

While the die was cast by its ally, the game was orchestrated by Hizbullah to reprimand Hariri for threatening to legitimise the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), an investigation the politicisation of which Hizbullah interpreted as a precursor for targeting the weapons of the Islamic Resistance. Although Hizbullah circulated this argument after the inception of the STL in March 2009, the collapse of the government occurred days before the first issuance of indictments that on 28 June 2011 implicated four Hizbullah members - Salim Ayyash, Mustapha Badr al-Din, Husayn Oneissi and Asad Sabra - as the alleged perpetrators behind the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005[515]. Therefore, despite its rhetoric of 'Lebanonisation' and 'consensus democracy', by portraying itself as an actor willing to pursue inimical as opposed to inclusive policies that subordinated the stability of the *PF* to its interests in the *MSF*, Hizbullah's *OF* was viewed as a disingenuous pariah. This stringent *modus operandi* not only risked intensifying both non-Shi'i and Shi'i resentment within the *SMF*, but also the cost/benefit calculations of the FPM in its arrangement with Hizbullah in the *PF*.

Secondly, the Party's gradual involvement in the *orthodoxy* of the *PF* placed considerable strains on the social contract between Hizbullah's *OF* and its Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*. In 2008, Shaykh Qassem stated that 'we have never considered the Resistance to be in competition with the state' (*MER*, 27 September, 2008: 4). Nevertheless, despite the alternative administration in June 2011 being headed by former Sunni Premier Najib Miqati and with the Party only possessing two ministries, Hizbullah's *OF* was behind the formation and function of a government that was devoid of 14 March figures[516]. Rather than perceived as having nominal (2005) or veto (2009) influence, by 2011, Hizbullah indirectly supervised all ministries of state. Therefore, Hizbullah became elevated onto a pedestal of accountability for everyday administrative responsibilities it had so eagerly attempted to avoid, such as electricity

[515] A fifth Hizbullah member, Hassan Mehri, was indicted on 31 July 2013. The STL and the role of Hizbullah in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri have been covered extensively (MacDonald, 2010; Taher, 2011; Bergman, 2015)

[516] The majority of the 30-member cabinet was dominated by 8 March parties with the Free Patriotic Movement (7), Tashnag (3), Hizbullah (2), Marada (2), Amal (2) and SSNP (1) as well as ministers from outside March 8, including Premier Miqati's party (3), the Arab Liberation Movement (1), independents (6) and the PSP (3) (Interviews with Walid Jumblatt in Beirut, 3 July 2012 and Hagop Pakradounian in Beirut, 6 September 2012). Muhammad Fneish and Husayn Hajj al-Hassan retained their positions as Hizbullah's Minister of State and Minister of Agriculture respectively.

shortages, unemployment, crime, income inequality and public services. Restrained by the innately debilitating structures of Lebanon's state bureaucracy, Hizbullah, previously tasked with providing for the Shi'i community, was embroiled in a national system of limitations that conflated its roles between a state and non-state actor.

This situation highlighted vulnerabilities within the Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*. Despite its extensive social services and cultural (re)production initiatives, Hizbullah's *OF* does not command exclusive control over the perceptions and practices of its agents in the *SMF*. In particular, increasingly educated, integrated and modernised Shi'i youth, 70% of which are under 20, have demonstrated a tendency to question the boundaries of prevailing norms and values (Raphaeli, 2009: 110; Harb & Deeb, 2007: 5). Subsequently, they are optimally placed to juxtapose disparities between their expectations and the quality of services available, an equation that was problematised by instances where elements within the Hizbullah community contradicted the Party's narrative of piety in reportedly succumbing to the symptomatic temptations of greed extended to those participating in an institutionally corrupt political system[517]. Furthermore, in 2009, Hizbullah admitted to difficulty in curbing petty crime in Beirut's increasingly congested southern suburbs[518]. Consequently, Shi'i opportunists previously attached to a Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* sensed an opportunity to exploit the distraction of Hizbullah's deeper politicisation and capitalise on the Party's overstretched reach domestically. More specifically, this refers to the expanding autonomy and activity of powerful clans in the northern Biqa' or informal urbanised familial gangs in *al-dahiyeh*[519].

Thirdly, while previously engaged in mainstream struggles with Amal and Sayyid Fadlallah for symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community in the *SMF*, both direct and indirect opposition to the monopoly of Hizbullah's *OF* over the Shi'i narrative became increasingly more vocal after 2000. Despite its enhanced reputation after Israel's withdrawal, there were a series of sporadic tremours of discord from a variety of formal and informal grassroots Shi'i initiatives, including Dr Mahmoud Ramadan's

[517] In 2007, Walid Jumblatt accused Hizbullah-affiliated Shi'i investors of illegally purchasing Christian and Druze land in the South Lebanon, the Western Biqa' and Mount Lebanon in order to link the Party's three core constituencies (*MER*, 16 June, 2007: 16-17; Interview with Walid Jumblatt in Beirut, 3 July 2012). In 2009, Salah Ezzedine, a Shi'i businessman with connections to Hizbullah, embezzled $300 million in a pyramid scheme (Blanford, 2011: 473; Lob, 2014: 5). In 2011, not only was Jihad Mugniyeh, Imad's son, accused of living a decadent lifestyle, but his mother Wafa, Imad's wife, was prevented from attending a conference by Hizbullah to ensure her private wealth was not made public (Blanford, 2011, 475; *The Arab Digest*, 11 December, 2011). In 2013, the brother of Hizbullah MP Muhammad Fneish was arrested on charges of illegally importing medicine (Lob, 2014: 5).

[518] In late 2009, since *al-dahiyeh* was experiencing higher levels of criminal activities, including car thefts, drug dealing, counterfeiting and unlawful abuse of state utilities and services, Hizbullah called on the state to deploy 350-600 members of the ISF to administer order (*MER*, 26 November, 2009: 7).

[519] As noted in previous chapters, Hizbullah has relied on the social structures of prominent clans to comprise the nucleus of the organisation. Whether associated to the Chamas (Nasr al-Din, Allaw) or Zaaiter (Muqdad, Jaafar) branches of the Hamadiyya clan, these families are affiliated to Hizbullah through convenience over conviction while continuing to engage in their own practices. One tribal member stated that Hizbullah 'are powerful, but they can't afford to mess with the tribes here, so they leave us alone' (Samaha, 2012; Blanford, 2011: 477-478).

Shi'i Grouping (2004), Issam Abu Darwish's Al-Kiyan Gathering (2004), Sayyid Muhammad Al-Amin's public rallies (2004) and Shaykh Muhammad Hassan Al-Amin's Shi'i Gathering (2005)[520]. In particular, as epitomised by the provocative and polemical article published on 7 August 2006 by Lebanese University Professor Mona Fayyad entitled 'To Be a Shi'i Now…', the destruction caused by the July War and the perception of Hizbullah's self-professed absolution in accepting responsibility accentuated discontentment amongst sectors of the Shi'i community[521]. Substantiating claims by these pockets of protest that insisted Hizbullah primarily depended on incentivising practical co-option as opposed to motivating principled conviction in maintaining its hegemony over the Shi'i community, *Al-Nahar* reported during the July War that approximately 70% of the Shi'i supported Hizbullah while only 25-30% of those were ideologues (Zisser, 2009: 173).

However, Hizbullah's *OF* consistently prevented this dissatisfaction from translating into sustained counter-mobilisation within the Shi'i community in the *SMF*. Firstly, through its expansive network of social service institutions, Hizbullah's *OF* deployed extensive values of economic and social *capital* to address the diverse needs of its constituencies, ensure compliance and preserve its symbolic *capital*. Secondly, although Ibrahim Shamseddine, Ahmad al-As'ad and Shaykh Ahmad Talib are prominent Shi'i figures, their grassroots initiatives remained largely disparate and dysfunctional with neither possessing the individual or the collective capacities of recognised *capital* in the *SMF* to propose a networked, organised or viable 'third way' alternative, a trend that was effectively managed by Hizbullah's control of public space and accessible resources within the Shi'i community[522]. Thirdly, as demonstrated by the cases of journalist Ali al-Amin and activist Lokman Slim, Hizbullah's *OF* regularly employed its sophisticated media organs and organised community networks to discredit the legitimacy of aspiring challengers within the *SMF*[523]. Lastly, Hizbullah's *OF* also adopted tactics of direct intimidation, assault and detainment to nullify perceived threats to its authority from individuals who openly

[520] More information on these expressions of dissent can be found in (*MER*, 31 July, 2004: 15; 7 August, 2004: 7-8; 28 August, 2004: 9-10; 19 September, 2005: 13).

[521] Interview with Dr Mona Fayyad in Beirut, 17 August 2012). One extract from the article reads: 'To be a Shi'i is to accept that your country be destroyed before your very eyes…and that it comes tumbling down on your head, and that your family be displaced and dispersed and becomes a 'refugee' in the four corners of the nation and the world, and that you accept standing up to the enemy with no complaints as long as there is a fighter out there with a rocket that he can launch at northern Israel – and maybe even at its south – without asking about the 'why' or about the timing or about the usefulness of the end result…'

[522] Ibrahim Shamseddine is the son of Sayyid Muhammad Shamseddine, Ahmad al-As'ad is from one the most eminent *zu'ama* families in Lebanon and Shaykh Ahmad Talib is the son-in-law of Sayyid Fadlallah.

[523] While Ali al-Amin, Lokman Slim and Ibrahim Shamseddine were accused by Hizbullah's media organs of providing information and receiving money from U.S. agencies, Shaykh Ahmad Talib's Lebanese Ulama Gathering was portrayed as being a pro-14 March organisation (Interview with Ali al-Amin in Beirut, 26 August 2012). Hayya Bin'a, Lokman Slim's NGO, has frequently faced bureaucratic obstacles imposed by Hizbullah-affiliated municipalities to prevent him from working in Shi'i areas (Interview with Lokman Slim in Beirut, 9 August 2012).

criticised the Party (Smyth, 2011: 3-4)[524]. The 2010 arrest and trial of Shaykh Mechaymesh, formerly a member of Hizbullah before opposing the concept of *wilayat al-faqih*, as well as the efforts of the Independent Clerical Gathering and other Shi'i figures in lobbying for his release, represented an example of Hizbullah's attitude to dissension within the Shi'i community of the *SMF*[525].

The purpose of mentioning these three themes is not to conclude that Hizbullah's *OF* is on the brink of demise. On the contrary, not only does Hizbullah's *OF* possess hegemonic material and symbolic control over its constituencies, but the expulsion of Shaykh Tufayli (1997), the defection of Shaykh Mechaymesh (1998), the dismissal of Nayef Krayem (2003) and the resignation of Husayn Nabulsi (2006) remain the only notable cases of friction within Hizbullah's *OF*[526]. Rather, the objective is to emphasise that the strategic priority of Hizbullah's *OF* between 2000 and 2010, which ultimately aimed to increasingly engage with the *orthodox* structures of the *PF* in order to protect the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*, was neither a unilaterally monolithic nor a universally accepted phenomenon. As it pursued this logic, Hizbullah's *OF* risked episodes of *allodoxia* in either disrupting the management of its Resistance *habitus* within the Shi'i community or rupturing simmering tensions within the pre-existing structures of an entrenched system in Lebanon.

In particular, amidst Lebanon's complicated dynamics, maintaining equilibrium within and between four positions of *orthodoxy* simultaneously, without the prospect of achieving symbolic *power*, enhances the possibility of corresponding counter-mobilisations from either extant (*orthodox*) or emerging (*heterodox*) actors. In the *PF*, as Hizbullah's *OF* independently strives for symbolic *capital* via the logic of the Islamic Resistance over the *doxa* of institutionalised inclusivity, it confronts challenges from the convergence of its *field* counterparts. In the *SMF*, Hizbullah's *OF* risks creating fractures within the practice of its Resistance *habitus* as the management of its symbolic *capital* becomes perceived as exercising symbolic *power* where coercion overpowers consent. In the *MSF*, similar to the case of Hamas and the Qassam Brigades in Gaza, the continuous balance between political compromise and military

[524] These included: Ahmad Chehab, and independent Shi'i; Durayd Yaghi, the Shi'i Vice President of the PSP; Sayyid Ali al-Amin, who was removed from his post as Grand Mufti of Tyre; and Ahmad al-As'ad, the head of the Lebanon Option Party (Smyth, 2011: 3-4; *MER*, 11 April, 2009: 4).

[525] Shaykh Mechaymesh was detained by the Syrian authorities in 2010 before being transferred to Lebanon in October 2011 and charged with spying for Israel. Senior Hizbullah officials, especially Shaykh Qaouk and Shaykh Ali Daamoush, have allegedly played a role in his detainment. Lokman Slim, along with the Independent Clerical Gathering, which includes Shaykh Ahmad Talib, Sayyid Ali al-Amin, Shaykh Hassan al-Amin and Shaykh Hani Fahs, are running the campaign for his release (Interviews with Lokman Slim on 9 August, Ali al-Amin on 26 August and Reda Mechaymesh on 3 September 2012).

[526] Hizbullah dismissed Nayef Krayem, the Director of Al-Manar, in 2003 for harbouring pro-Fadlallah tendencies in his controversial statements about Ashoura and the concept of *wilayat al-faqih* (ICG, 2003: 14; Norton, 2007a: 118). Husayn Nabulsi, Hizbullah's Director of Media Relations, resigned after the 2006 War for unknown reasons.

reinforcement poses a threat in either widening or conflating the distinction of symbolic *capital* in the *PF* and *MSF*[527]. Lastly, since all *fields* are sites of struggle that contain *orthodoxy* and *heterodoxy*, Hizbullah's Resistance *habitus* in the *OF*, as demonstrated after the civil war, is also not immune from internal fissures over legitimate forms of *capital* and practice. As articulated by Hizbullah MP Muhammad Fneish, 'in striking a delicate balance between ideological integrity and political reality, it [Hizbullah] too must be careful not to allow this balance to tilt too heavily either way, lest it spell its eventual demise' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2003: 307).

[527] Members of the Islamic Resistance have independent and privileged access to counterparts in Iran and Syria that are not extended to the political branch leading to decentralised decision-making processes within Hizbullah (Addis & Blanchard, 2011: 18).

Conclusion

Whither the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon?

'When you play the game of thrones; you win or you die. There is no middle ground'.
- *Cersei Lannister, 'Game of Thrones', 2011* -

'I'll tell them how I survive it…It's like a game. Repetitive. Even a little tedious after more than twenty years. But there are much worse games to play'.
- *Katniss Evergreen, 'The Hunger Games: Mockingjay' (Collins, 2010: 390).*

'The game is the game. Always.'
- *Avon Barksdale, 'The Wire', 2002 - 2008*

Over the last decade, a proliferation of TV shows and films have entered the public sphere of mainstream popular culture in the West. Whether intending to transmit their respective narratives through the lens of reflected reality, fantasy or dystopia, a predominant theme is to convey political and social struggles by invoking the rationale of a 'game'. Due to the perceived linkages between the 'gaming world' and the 'material world', illuminating the latter via the language of the former becomes an appealing exercise. In this way, disparities and dichotomies within prevalent organising structures and power dynamics are produced through intersubjective understandings and zero-sum calculations of inherent rules and allocated resources, resulting in a range of strategies and tactics devised to maintain or enhance one's relative position with unpredictable and elusive outcomes.

Academics, in order to capitalise on trendy analogies as a means of translating complex concepts, have responded with a series of literature, in particular on 'Game of Thrones' (Carpenter, 2012; Saideman, 2013), 'The Wire' (Penfold-Mounce, Beer & Burrows, 2011; Bramall & Pitcher, 2013) and 'The Hunger Games' (Henshaw, 2013; Weber, 2013)[528]. While the creation and reproduction of Hizbullah's Islamic Resistance may not attract the same number of viewers, the intricate and incessant balancing of actors in Lebanon resembles the motif of a game. Norton (1987: 126) stated that 'a sect must dominate or be dominated, or withdraw from the game', and while Hizbullah MP Ali Fayyad admitted that the Party of God is enmeshed in the country's 'internal political game', Secretary General Sayyid Nasrallah has frequently

[528] Not only has Francis Fukuyama, the prominent author of the 'End of History', written an article entitled 'Down to the Wire' (2012), but his work has also been cited online to explain 'Game of Thrones' and 'The Hunger Games'.

referred to military confrontation with Israel as tantamount to observing the 'rules of the game'[529].

In the Introduction, three inter-related aims were listed in exploring Hizbullah's struggle for symbolic *power* in Lebanon. Firstly, the intention was to investigate Hizbullah's mobilisation through the lens of Social Movement Theory (SMT), a prevalent conceptual model for collective action that is under-utilised by scholars specialising on the Middle East. Secondly, since mainstream SMT contains a number of theoretical deficiencies, the purpose was to employ analytical tools developed by Pierre Bourdieu, such as *habitus*, *capital* and *field*, to complement and supplement the effectiveness of SMT. Thirdly, the goal was to empirically apply this reconceptualisation to illustrate how Hizbullah inculcates and institutionalises its Resistance within and between multiple *fields* of practice, each constituted by differing logics and differentiated structures.

The applied objectives to achieve these aims have concurrently sought to dialectically examine Hizbullah's induction and emergence within the pre-existing parameters of Lebanon's multi-faceted 'game'. Consequently, reconfiguring the George Polya (1945) approach of problem-solving analysis, this thesis has attempted to comprehend the subject (Hizbullah's mobilisation in Lebanon), devise a plan for addressing the phenomenon (the development of a Bourdieu-SMT conceptualisation) and implement the framework (reconciling theory and praxis through empirical assessment). Adhering to the fourth component of the model, namely reviewing the results of the process, this Bourdieu-SMT schematic invites and reveals eight salient conclusions pertaining to Hizbullah's struggle for symbolic *power* in Lebanon.

The Shi'i past is fundamental in illuminating the Shi'i present. By omitting an account that assesses the location of the Shi'i during the phases of Lebanon's evolution and the incremental institutionalisation of its composite structures, any evaluation into Hizbullah is rendered limited in its ability to sufficiently comprehend the root causes behind *why* and *how* the movement moves. As detailed in Chapter Four, a Bourdieu-SMT lens assists in this process by offering a conceptual framework not only equipped to construct the constitution and composition of Lebanon's state structures, but also to place and trace the *habitus* of the Shi'i within the parameters of these emerging *fields*.

[529] Interview with Ali Fayyad in Beirut, 29 March 2012.

Firstly, the Shi'i are characterised by their *heterodox* position, not their *heterodox* practice. In other words, claims of Shi'i exceptionalism should be replaced by a perspective that identifies and interprets the Shi'i as marginally included rather than perennially excluded. Therefore, while reduced to the peripheries and eclipsed by the more cohesive narratives of their counterparts, they remained inducted into a system that provided opportunities for accumulating and deploying legitimate *capital* in the *Political Field* (*PF*). Secondly, entrenched rivalries between traditional Shi'i elites have consistently controlled the space between the *Social Mobilisational Field* (*SMF*) and the *PF*. Consequently, with the elites predisposed to preserve their privileged position, the reproduction of the patron-client relationship has greatly restricted opportunities for pursuing organised Collective Action Frames or mobilisational practice. Thirdly, there exist only scant examples documenting the cultivation of a collective Shi'i *habitus* (*collusio*), a state in which agents in the *SMF* are conjoined in perception, position and practice. A combination of divergent Shi'i elite interests, a conventionally quietist and divided *ulama* as well as a lack of available and accessible legitimate *capital* hindered the development of sustained mobilisation through an *Organisational Field* (*OF*).

Prior to the Lebanese civil war, the Shi'i were geographically separated, socially dislocated, economically deprived, ideologically confounded and politically marginalised. Through Amal, Musa al-Sadr managed to initiate the harmonising of Shi'i *habiti* into collective mobilisation. Nevertheless, its immediate and broad remit compromised the coherence of its *collusio*. Therefore, any Shi'i actor aspiring to inculcate a collective Shi'i *habitus* would confront the challenge of navigating and negotiating an *SMF* structured by dispositionally dispersed and disjointed agents, pre-existing cleavages of *capital*, diversified mobilisational modalities and contrasting Collective Action Frames.

Hizbullah in Lebanon is a progeny, not a proxy of the Islamic Republic. Iran has been pivotal in the evolution of Hizbullah in Lebanon. Following 1979, the Islamic Republic utilised its symbolic *power* in Iran to export the revolution by transferring significant values of cultural, social and economic *capital* that facilitated the creation of Hizbullah. This alignment has resulted in the predominant assumption that Hizbullah is a passive and compliant extension of Iranian foreign policy as opposed to an active and invested stakeholder in Lebanese affairs. As outlined in Chapter

Five, a Bourdieu-SMT perspective highlights the complexity of this mutually constituted relationship.

Firstly, the Islamic Jihad Organisation (IJO), an Iranian-endorsed group responsible for perpetrating attacks and kidnappings against Western targets in the 1980s, exhibited solidarity with Hizbullah in terms of identity and ideology but was detached from the Party of God in purpose, position and practice. While the IJO was an amorphous cadre of Shi'i operatives with pre-existing *capital* in the *MSF* that acted as a tool for Iran to execute immediate objectives, Hizbullah, as demonstrated by its Iranian-funded activities in the *SMF*, represented the gradual consolidation of an enduring *OF* that would embody a sustained presence traversing all *fields* in Lebanon. Secondly, the prevailing *doxa* (law) constituting the logic of Hizbullah's *OF* may have centred on the seemingly Iranian imported concepts of *wilayat al-faqih* and Resistance against Israel, but this neglects the composition of the *habiti* within the *field* itself. Whereas the Islamic Republic provided the broader impetus behind Collective Action Frames and mobilisational techniques, the *habiti* comprising Hizbullah's *OF* were also influenced by internal developments intrinsic to Lebanon. Therefore, the *orthodoxy* charged with interpreting and negotiating the governing *doxa* in Hizbullah's *OF* was one of Lebanese design within its relational context, not one of Iranian imposition.

Consequently, Hizbullah's *OF*, which functions as the movement's central nucleus and nervous system, may have been structured by the transference of Iranian *capital* but the continual structuring is performed by agents embedded within the mutually constitutive structures of Lebanese dynamics. Therefore, while there is a considerable degree of *field* homology between Iran's *PF* and Hizbullah's *OF*, a connection that results in a synergy of perceptions and dispositions, this does not translate into harmonised or homogenised practice. As Hizbullah's *OF* evolved into an established movement within the operational *fields* of Lebanon, relying less on the transference of *capital* from Iran, the Party of God became more self-sufficient in devising and developing independently constructed Collective Action Frames and mobilisational methods, that while resonating with Iran, pursued an autonomous trajectory of perceived opportunities within Lebanon.

Hizbullah's OF guides rather than dictates the dynamism of the SMF. Since emanating from the amalgamation of Shi'i groups in the Ba'albeck in 1982, the aim of Hizbullah has been to instil a Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*, one in which agents are

infused with the discourse and practice of a brand of radical Shi'i activism that intends to entrench dispositions of empowerment, resilience and self-sufficiency. Cognisant of its deficiency in legitimate forms of *capital*, Hizbullah sought to initially utilise the transference of economic and cultural *capital* from Iran by conforming to *orthodox* confessional mobilising structures in the Shi'i community, such as familial ties, mosque networks, the establishment of media organs and the provision of social services. In gradually accruing symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community by incorporating and building-upon pre-existing methods, Hizbullah employed its own organisations to implant and institutionalise its Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*.

Originally, Hizbullah's institutions endeavoured to perform an Islamic duty in reviving a traditionally downtrodden community. Following Hizbullah's decision of *infitah*, or 'opening-up', to participate in the 1992 elections, the increasing Shi'i dependency on these services acted as an incentive for political mobilisation. Subsequently, not only has the Party of God developed these organisations in terms of structure, professionalism and sophistication, but it has also adapted and expanded its activities in the *SMF* to reflect the growing diversification of the Shi'i community. As Hizbullah's *OF* produces the parameters of a Resistance *habitus*, *SMF* agents reproduce its legitimacy through routinised practice. In the context of a seemingly dysfunctional state apparatus, some refer to the scale and scope of Hizbullah's work as a 'state within a non-state' (John Kifner cited in Fattouh & Kolb, 2006: 109). As Bilal Naim, the former director of the Hizbullah-sponsored Mahdi Scouts, claimed, 'Hizbullah is stronger than the state…this is not Hizbullah's problem, this is the government's problem' (quoted in Blanford, 2011: 413-414).

Although Hizbullah's *OF* has deftly consolidated a Resistance *habitus*, its agents retain agency by remaining constituted in relation to the broader logic of the *SMF*. Therefore, while the Party of God is responsible for exposing opportunities for *capital* accumulation within the Shi'i community, its increasingly empowered and educated constituencies are becoming more adept at independently adjusting their dispositions and perceptions towards modern forms of mobilisation. While Hizbullah's *OF* attempts to innovatively prepare for this eventuality through investments in leisure and entertainment activities, the cultural (re)production of private and public space and technologically-advanced modalities for engagement, it confronts significant challenges in sustaining the integrity of its Resistance *habitus*. In particular, as Hizbullah becomes perceived as a politically influential force in Lebanon, it is compelled to manage the enhanced expectations of a young constituency, growing

opposition voices within the Shi'i community, the prospect of petty crime and the socio-economic implications of its military activities.

The Islamic Resistance is enabled and disabled in the MSF. The invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 was arguably the prime catalyst for Hizbullah's conception. Therefore, as a core component of *orthodoxy* in Hizbullah's *OF*, the nurturing of a Resistance *habitus* in the *MSF* and the subsequent accruement of symbolic *capital* is dialectically constituted by Israeli occupation. Initially, the Islamic Resistance benefited from Iran's social *capital* with Syria, the custodian of symbolic *power* in Lebanon, to access the *MSF*. In the mid-1980s, despite the withdrawal of the PLO, the Islamic Resistance was reduced to a *heterodox* position and inhibited by the established presence of the Lebanese National Resistance and operational inexperience in the *MSF*. Most importantly, as demonstrated by its internecine feud with Amal, the legitimation of Hizbullah's position and practice was defined by Syria's imposed rules of *orthodoxy* in the *MSF*.

The calculated strategy of Syria at the end of the civil war to balance Shi'i actors in Lebanon by enhancing Amal's *capital* in the *PF* while augmenting Hizbullah's *capital* in the *MSF*, acted to preserve the Islamic Resistance under the mitigated management of *al-saqf al-suri* ('the Syrian ceiling'). Subsequently, recognised as the exclusive representative of Lebanese Resistance against Israel, Hizbullah adapted its military practice to elevate its status in the *MSF*. Following Operation Accountability (1993), Operation Grapes of Wrath (1996), the formation of the Lebanese Resistance Brigades (1997), Israel's withdrawal (2000) and the invocation of the Sheba Farms as justification for continuing the Resistance (2000-), the Islamic Resistance not only achieved symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community and amongst the broader Lebanese public, but by establishing 'rules of engagement' that observed the mutual logic of confrontation and deterrence, Hizbullah also legitimated its *capital* in the *MSF* with Israel. Although the Islamic Resistance was designated a 'terrorist organisation' by the U.S., Israel accepted the group as a 'military organisation' (*MER*, 28 October, 2006: 9).

Whereas Syria's symbolic *power* in Lebanon enabled the Islamic Resistance, its demise after the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005 threatened to disable the legitimacy of Hizbullah's symbolic *capital* in the *MSF*. The disparity lies in the irreconcilably divergent dispositions and perceptions concerning whether the Islamic Resistance is the cause or effect of the state's inability to defend Lebanon.

Whereas the 14 March coalition claims that Hizbullah's arsenal is the cause of the state's weakness, Hizbullah's Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah argues the opposite, namely that 'until the causes of the virtual absence of the state are addressed, Hizbullah's arms will remain' (Saad-Ghorayeb, 2007: 14). As a result, while 14 March exploited Hizbullah's relative deficiency of recognised *capital* in the *PF* by employing internationally-mandated resolutions, especially the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, that question the legitimacy and loyalty of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF*, Hizbullah, as witnessed in 2006 and 2008, capitalised on the deficiency of 14 March *capital* by transferring and applying its symbolic *capital*, derived from the logic of the *MSF*, to the logic of the *PF* for the purpose of exerting leverage over 14 March.

The Party of God is a reticent and recalcitrant actor in the PF. On 26 May 1975, following the collapse of his military government after just three days, Brigadier General Nur Al-Din Rifai opined, 'blessed is the one who does not govern in Lebanon…I can tell you that military life is better than politics' (*MER*, 16 September, 2000: 7). Exemplified by its 1985 'Open Letter' and its slogan advocating for 'the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon', Hizbullah realised the regulative historical structures of the *PF*. George Orwell wrote that 'to accept political responsibility now means yielding oneself over to orthodoxies and party lines, with all the timidity and dishonesty that that implies' (Davidson, 2001: 483). In a similar vein, Hizbullah, conceived from radical *habiti* exhibiting dispositions towards Islamic Resistance, was hesitant to risk compromising the integrity of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* by fully accommodating or engaging in what it interpreted as the debilitating and bias framework of the *PF*.

Although the decision to participate in the 1992 elections was labelled as *infitah* ('opening-up') or 'Lebanonisation', a process that tacitly acknowledged the political system, Hizbullah seized on the opportunity of democratically entering the *PF* in order to deliberately propagate a *heterodox* position and practice. This induction into the *PF* represented a ratio of win-win proportions. Militarily protected but politically restrained by Syria, Hizbullah's *OF* could access Lebanon's governing structures, publicly promote the exploits of the Islamic Resistance and garner symbolic *capital* in the *SMF* by chastising the predominant *orthodoxy* without the corresponding accountability attached to the complicity of that *orthodoxy*. The assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005 and Syria's sudden disintegration of symbolic *power* in Lebanon presented both an opportunity and threat for Hizbullah in the *PF*. While Syria's retreat

removed significant restraints on the independent acquisition of Hizbullah's *capital* in the *PF*, it exposed the symbolic *capital* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* to the scrutiny of established actors in the *PF*. Consequently, to compensate for its lack of recognised *capital* in the *PF*, Hizbullah resorted to and relied on preserving its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF* by translating and deploying it to the *PF*. Whereas its social *capital* with Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement, both forged due to the extent of Hizbullah's symbolic *capital* in the *MSF*, acted to block the pursuit of practice that targeted Hizbullah by conforming to the *orthodox* procedures of the *PF*, the concurrent transference of the logic of the *MSF* to the *PF*, as demonstrated by the practice of the Islamic Resistance in 2006 and 2008, acted to elicit and exact concessions that altered the prevailing *orthodoxy* in the *PF*.

Huda al-Husayni argued that Hizbullah 'has not joined the political process in order to integrate, but rather to use it to protect its irregular existence outside' (*MER*, 5 May, 2007: 8). Hizbullah remains a reticent and recalcitrant actor in the *PF* that avoids institutionalised state structures by engaging instrumentally and superficially to promote *heterodoxy*. Nevertheless, in order to defend the *orthodoxy* of its symbolic *capital* in the *MSF*, Hizbullah was required to gradually embed itself more substantively within the *orthodoxy* of the *PF*. Despite recurrently possessing only two cabinet ministries, a practice that prefers to conceal its influence by distributing responsibility to its allies rather than attract public attention for being associated with the structural idiosyncrasies of Lebanon's *PF*, the role of Hizbullah in creating and managing the governments of Najib Miqati (June, 2011) and Tammam Salam (February, 2014) revealed its interest in prioritising the *orthodoxy* of the Islamic Resistance in the *MSF* over the *orthodoxy* of active participation in the *PF*.

Hizbullah's relevance is contingent on maintaining field homology. A Bourdieu-SMT perspective places conceptual focus on the dynamic and concurrent relationships within as well as between *fields* of practice. Rather than disproportionately credit or reduce the importance of one particular *field*, an analysis of Hizbullah requires a holistic approach that not only identifies the designated *fields* in which Hizbullah has created, cultivated and consolidated a Resistance *habitus*, but also explains how Hizbullah's *OF* balances its position within each sphere to produce and reproduce the harmony of its Resistance *habitus* as well as the homology of its presence across *field*s in Lebanon. In order to maintain the durability of this process, it is incumbent on Hizbullah's *OF* to consistency ensure the effective implementation of three inter-related processes.

Firstly, whether referring to the *SMF*, *MSF* or *PF*, Hizbullah's *OF*, through the deployment of mobilising repertoires and Collective Action Frames, must strategically inform, induce and induct agents into the opportunities of participating in accordance to the pre-existing structured *illusio* ('stakes') of each *field*. Secondly, by providing, exposing or enhancing agents' access to legitimate forms of recognised *capital* within a designated *field*, Hizbullah's *OF* must tactically inculcate dispositions and perceptions that seek to institutionalise a cohesive Resistance *habitus* and facilitate vertical ascension of reproductive practice towards symbolic *capital* and the occupation of predominant *orthodoxy* within each *field*. Thirdly, while developing its positions depending on the specific generative and regulative structures within each *field*, Hizbullah's *OF*, by adapting, customising and modernising its mobilisational repertoires and Collective Action Frames, must simultaneously strive to horizontally align the cohesion and coherence of its Resistance *habitus* across *fields* that are constituted by differentiated logics.

Since the prospect of an archetypal Resistance *habitus* exists in the conflated space between the theoretical logic of its strategic ambitions and the practical logic of its tactical objectives, Hizbullah's *OF* produces a diversification of homologous Collective Action Frames to encompass the multiplicity of intra-*field*, inter-*field*, and extra-*field* contextual challenges in attaining a uniform *orthodoxy* of mobilising practice in Lebanon. While the constant negotiation and balancing of its positions may be accused of evoking organisational ambiguity, this informality enables Hizbullah's *OF* to be rhetorically agile and versatile (Badran, 2009a: 64; Piscatori, 1989: 314). Rather than admit incompatibility, Hizbullah's *OF* 'uses sophisticated arguments – or sophistry – to reconcile them all' (Saad-Ghorayeb & Ottaway, 2007: 4-5). Moreover, in Sayyid Nasrallah, a revered leader whose values and virtues recall the 'synthesis of the saint and the revolutionary' described by Arthur Koestler, Hizbullah's *OF* possesses a mouthpiece that is capable of discursively welding the overall *orthodoxy* of a Resistance *habitus* together in harmonious constellation (Davidson, 2001: 421).

Progression is a relative, not absolute objective. Hizbullah emerged on the peripheries of the civil war advocating an Iranian-inspired and Israeli-justified 'Islamic Revolution in Lebanon'. In Bourdieusian terms, Hizbullah was struggling to replicate the Islamic Republic's ascension to symbolic *power*, a state in which it legitimately dominated the prevailing *orthodoxy* of discourse and practice in Lebanon. However,

due to the intrinsic limitations embedded within the structured constitution and diverse composition of Lebanon, the aim of vertically or horizontally converting symbolic *capital* into symbolic *power* is elusive. According to Ezzat Safi, 'Hizbullah must understand that speaking of victory when it comes to internal Lebanese issues is baseless and illogical as the Shiite Group will never get the chance to impose its ideas and views on its rivals in Lebanon' (*MER*, 21 April, 2007: 7).

In the *SMF*, by conforming to the pre-existing *orthodoxy* of confessional mobilisation, Hizbullah's *OF* achieved symbolic *capital* within the Shi'i community, a situation in which its values of economic, social and cultural *capital* were deemed legitimate. While this institutionalised a Resistance *habitus*, there remain an eclectic variety of sectarian and non-sectarian agents in the *SMF*, endowed with their own forms of recognised *capital*, whose presence inherently precludes Hizbullah from dominating the prevailing *orthodoxy*. In the *MSF*, although the Islamic Resistance equally consolidated its Resistance *habitus* and accumulated symbolic *capital*, the conventional state model, in which legitimacy over violence is bestowed upon the symbolic *power* of the LAF, prevents Hizbullah from exercising exclusive rights over the predominant *orthodoxy* of the *MSF*. In the *PF*, despite attempting to avoid the entrenched structures of elite sectarian politics that govern practice by propagating a *heterodox* position, not only was Hizbullah drawn into the logic of *orthodox* participation, but avenues for acquiring symbolic *capital* are also inhibited by processes and positions that are designed to reproduce the prevailing system. Under these circumstances, Hizbullah's *OF* is wedged between the conceptual pretension of symbolic *power* and the practical preservation of symbolic *capital*.

Therefore, as relayed by a Hizbullah member, the Islamic Resistance is 'a revolution that comprehends that failure to recognise the existence of boundaries can lead to disaster' (Crooke, 2009: 177). Rather than struggle for symbolic *power*, Hizbullah's *OF*, through a dialectical process of mutual constitution, self-correction and realignment within the boundaries of its situational environment, has adjusted its dispositions and perceptions to reconceptualise its Resistance *habitus* towards a redefinition of revolution that considers the opportunities prevalent in the predominant structures of Lebanon. According to Huda al-Husayni (*MER*, 5 May, 2007: 8), Hizbullah wants to duplicate the role of the Pasdaran in the Islamic Republic whereby it operates 'along with the state, but independently' while benefiting from the support of the state's institutions. Consequently, the recourse of maintaining symbolic *capital* over struggling for symbolic *power* has forced the

trajectory of the Islamic Resistance to be framed and contested through 'negotiated revolution' (Lawson, 2004), a relational process of *capital* acquisition, possession, positioning, deployment and exchange that results in incremental gains and compromises within an extant Lebanese framework.

The permeation of Syria's protracted hysteresis into Lebanon. During the period of this research, the conflict in Syria erupted to embody one of the most politically intractable and militarily intransigent humanitarian crises since the Second World War. Following Hizbullah's involvement on the side of President Bashar al-Assad, a number of policy-affiliated commentators have assessed the cause, context and consequence of the deployment of the Islamic Resistance in Syria (Byman & Saab, 2014; ICG, 2014; Levitt, 2014; Lob, 2014; Sullivan, 2014). Recurring themes include the passive subordination of Hizbullah to Iranian interests, the aggravation of Shi'i/Sunni sectarian tensions in Lebanon as a result of the Islamic Resistance in Syria, the revelation of Hizbullah's moral hypocrisy in reconciling its strategic discourse with its tactical practice and its eroding popular legitimacy within the Shi'i community in Lebanon. While the Hizbullah dimension of the Syria conflict requires further academic attention and inquiry, a Bourdieu-SMT perspective can provide a few preliminary and brief observations.

Firstly, along with Iran, the Assad regime has been instrumental in activating the core *doxa* of Hizbullah's *OF*, namely facilitating the Islamic Resistance against Israel. While there have been differences in practice concerning the *orthodoxy* of Resistance, as evidenced by Syria's historical curtailing of Hizbullah's influence in Lebanon, Sayyid Nasrallah announced that 'Syria is the backbone of the Resistance…the Resistance will never stand by while its backbone is exposed' (*Al-Manar*, 25 May, 2013). Initially, with Hizbullah reluctant to enmesh itself in Syria's intrinsic dynamics and Syria reticent to request support from a Lebanese asset, Hizbullah justified its intervention under the pretext of defending Shi'i communities, protecting Shi'i shrines as well as offering logistical and material assistance to its ally in the same way it accused Sunni actors in Lebanon with regards to the opposition. Furthermore, the timing of the decision to publicly declare its commitment to the conflict in April 2013 was determined more by the calculated perceptions of Hizbullah's *OF* in relation to its Lebanese context rather than its 'absolute obedience to Iran' (Levitt, 2014: 110). Primarily, the encroachment of *takfiri* groups, a term employed by Hizbullah to describe Al-Qaida-inspired, salafi-jihadi movements, particularly Jabhat al-Nusra, in the vicinity of Lebanon's borders posed a

destabilising threat to the Party of God by potentially accessing and galvanising corresponding trends in Lebanon. Furthermore, the regionalisation and polarisation of the crisis in the *Field of International Politics* (*FIP*), which increasingly juxtaposed a Russian-endorsed, Iranian-led Resistance 'Axis' against a U.S.-sponsored, Saudi-led Sunni alliance, risked deposing President Assad, weakening Iran and placing the Islamic Resistance in a precarious position in Lebanon. As emphasised by a Hizbullah official, 'if we didn't fight in Syria, we would now be fighting in Lebanon' (ICG, 2014: 5).

Secondly, the Islamic Resistance immersed itself into the *hysteresis* of Syria's *MSF*. Devoid of the symbolic *capital* it possesses in Lebanon's *MSF*, the Islamic Resistance, along with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Iraqi Shi'i militias, Afghani Shi'i militias and Syrian paramilitary units, is contributing values of transferable *capital* in the struggle to preserve the symbolic *capital* and predominant *orthodoxy* of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Originally responsible for assisting President Assad in securing the Lebanon-Syria border around Qusayr and Qalamoun, as well as defending the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine in southeast Damascus, the presence of the Islamic Resistance expanded to support the SAA in consolidating and recapturing territory in Aleppo, Homs and Dara'a. From a Bourdieu-SMT perspective, and in the context of Lebanon's *MSF*, this sustained practice may result in three inter-related consequences. Primarily, as the Islamic Resistance independently ingrains its *habitus* and acquires *capital* in direct relation to the structures of Syria's *MSF*, it may solidify its position to become an established agent vying for symbolic *capital*, thereby causing fused *MSF* logics between Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, as demonstrated by sporadic attacks on Hizbullah targets by salafi-jihadi groups, the growing *field* homology between Syria's *MSF* and Lebanon's *SMF*, which produces *habiti* of overlapping positions, may lead to an intensification of *heterodoxy* by emerging salafi-jihadi actors, bolstered by the potential radicalisation of both Sunni Lebanese and predominantly Sunni Syrian refugees, that challenge the legitimate *orthodoxy* of the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. Moreover, the deployment of the Islamic Resistance in the proximity of the Syria-Israel border risks disrupting and dismantling the structured logic of Hizbullah-Israel relations in Lebanon's *MSF* by attempting to transfer this dynamic to a new sphere of differentiated constitution.

Thirdly, the Collective Action Frames and mobilisation methods employed by Hizbullah in institutionalising a Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF* have been predominantly shaped in contradistinction to Israel. Accordingly, Hizbullah's *OF* has

been able to avoid explicitly engaging in sectarian discourses or practices in Lebanon. By allegedly shifting attention from Israel to prioritise a conflict that was increasingly perceived as a Shi'i-Sunni war that aggravated tensions in Lebanon, Hizbullah risked a 'crisis of popular legitimacy' (Lob, 2014) in which the Resistance *habitus* of Hizbullah agents in the *SMF* became dislodged from their routinised practice. However, by utilising the legitimacy of its pre-existing mobilisational structures, Hizbullah's *OF* devised and disseminated revised and realigned Collective Action Frames that justified its continual support for President Assad by weaving traditional themes of Resistance against the U.S. and Israel alongside the emerging threat posed by *takfiri* groups, a designation of salafi-jihadi extremists in Syria that intentionally attempted to dissociate established Sunni actors in Lebanon from this trend as opposed to conflate their practices. Conversely, the Collection Action Frames employed by Jabhat Al-Nusra, the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) and their counterparts in Lebanon, which not only refer to the Shi'i as apostates, but also discard the structured logic of Lebanon as illegitimate, coupled with their practice, which targets Shi'i communities, acts to validate and vindicate Hizbullah's position amongst its Resistance *habitus* in the *SMF*. The ability of Hizbullah's *OF* to sustain this association will determine its success in maintaining the legitimacy of its symbolic *capital* in the *SMF*.

Fourthly, the Syrian conflict exacerbated fractures between the primarily pro-opposition 14 March coalition and the principally pro-regime 8 March alliance in the *PF*. Considering the current *orthodoxy* of the 8 March alliance, Hizbullah's *OF* activated its Resistance *habitus* and employed its social *capital* with Amal and the FPM to prohibit its traditional adversaries from enacting political motions that undermined its position in Lebanon. Consequently, as Hizbullah presides over a paralysed political process, oversees a plummeting economy, fosters sectarian tensions and prolongs a deteriorating humanitarian crisis, the perceptions and dispositions of 14 March become reinforced. Citing its obstinate stance on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which has implicated five Hizbullah members in the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and its military involvement in Syria, which contravenes the Baabda Declaration, a document that reiterates the neutrality of Lebanon in regional affairs, 14 March accuses the Party of God of privileging its strategic partnership with Iran and Syria over its responsibility to stabilise Lebanon. In response, and testament to the observance of *orthodoxy*, Hizbullah's *OF* has sought to resort to conventional practice in addressing these disputes by transferring and transposing its predominant narrative, infused by the symbolic *capital* of the

Islamic Resistance, to the logic of the *PF*. By appealing to the nationalisation and normalisation of the security threat posed by salafi-jihadi groups in Lebanon, especially to the pre-existing Sunni elite, Hizbullah intends to adhere to the balancing structures of sectarian politics by engaging in negotiation with its confessional counterparts in order to reconstitute the prevailing *orthodoxy* of the *PF.*

According to Hizbullah MP Ali Fayyad, the Party of God, having decided to induct and immerse itself into the 'internal political game' of Lebanon, is now invested in 'working to change the sectarian system'[530]. Nevertheless, testament to the complex intricacies of positional balancing within the constituted structures of Lebanon, by entering the 'the sectarian system', Hizbullah is not immune or indifferent to its influence in reproducing prevailing *orthodox* practice. Since opposition to Hizbullah is disposed to perceive the Party of God's discourse and practice as one that intends to alter or impose the *orthodoxy* of sectarianism in its favour as opposed to reconstitute the *doxa* of sectarianism in Lebanon, 'the Shi'i party is as much constrained by its success as its adversaries have been enlivened by its rise' (Norton, 2007a: 172). Subsequently, as stated by Roland Pryzbylewski ('Prez') in 'The Wire', 'no one wins. One side just loses more slowly'. Regardless, the conditioned and conditioning characteristic of the *habitus* is predicated on unforeseen outcomes as much as by relational processes. In this respect, the struggle, and by extension, 'the game is not over'[531].

A Bourdieu-SMT approach can offer a valuable theoretical insight into the contributing and determining factors driving Hizbullah's perpetual mobilisation and movement within the Lebanese 'game'. However, rather than claim to provide an all-encompassing conceptual model for explaining the emergence and evolution of Hizbullah, this Bourdieu-SMT perspective, subscribing to the Popperian model of falsification, ought to be applied and tested to other instances of movement mobilisation in order to initiate an inter-disciplinary conversation in which a variety of epistemological and methodological lenses are employed and cross-fertilised to explain the conceptually underexplored phenomenon of collective action in the Middle East.

[530] Interview with Ali Fayyad in Beirut, 29 March 2012.
[531] Interview with Ali Fayyad in Beirut, 29 March 2012.

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This thesis relied on primary material in Arabic supplied by two main sources. Firstly, for data and information pertaining specifically to Hizbullah's internal activities, statements and social services, the researcher received approximately 400 articles from the archives of the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation (CCSD), a semi-autonomous think-tank associated with Hizbullah that monitors and stores releases from a selection of the Party's various media outlets (listed below). This sample of reports, ranging from 1982 until 2010, was translated with the assistance of Noam Raydan. They are quoted in the text from their original Arabic source.

- *Al-'Ahd*
- *Al-Intiqad*
- *Al-Manar*
- *Al-Moqawama*

Secondly, this thesis benefitted from access to Philippa Mishlawi's archives of *Middle East Reporter* (*MER*), a daily and weekly publication run by Toufiq Mishlawi that translated and analysed press material from a variety of Arabic outlets across the region (listed below). The researcher only utilised *MER* reports covering the period between 1982 and 2010. In instances where information from this source is used, the relevant Arabic publication is cited specifically with reference to *MER* for translation purposes. Alternatively, when the text quotes direct analysis attributed to *MER*, only the publication is referenced.

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- *Al-Mustaqbal* (Lebanon)
- *Al-Nahar* (Lebanon)
- *Al-Nida Al-Watan* (Egypt)
- *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (London)
- *Al-Safir* (Lebanon)
- *Al-Wasat* (Bahrain)
- *Al-Watan* (Saudi Arabia)
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